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THE REFORMATION AND THE CRISIS OF WESTERN CIVILIZATION: THREE HISTORICO-PHILOSOPHICAL INTERPRETATIONS: HEGEL, MARX, TOYNBEE

M.A. Thesis written under the supervision of Professor C. Miller, and submitted to the History Department of the American University of Beirut, October, 1951, by

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Summary of M.A. Thesis submitted to the history department of A.U.B. 1951

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by David C. Gordon

superviser: Dr. Charles Miller

The purpose of this paper is to study the contributions that these three historical philosophers have made to an understanding of the dynamic relationship between the Reformation and the contemporary world. The author does not claim that the sins or triumphs of the modern world are all to be attributed to the Reformation, but he does believe that without an understanding of the Reformation, the crisis of modern civilization can neither be understood nor adequately faced. The author, similarly, does not claim that Hegel, Marx, and Toynbee have said the last words of interpretation on the Reformation; he does, however, believe that their interpretations implicitly and explicitly together combine the essential aspects of the Reformation, and that the interpretations of other historians can be correlated with one or another of these three interpretations.

The crisis of the West may be divided into three aspects, the political, which involves the crisis of the nation-state; the economic, which involves the disintegration of capitalism; and the spiritual, which involves the collapse of a system of values and the sense of alienation and atomization of contemporary man. This triple division is one basis for the selection of Hegel, Marx, and Toynbee as the historical philosophers to be treated. Each of these three thinkers emphasizes one of the three aspects as being of fundamental importance. Hegel considered the nation-state as the culmination of the historical process and struggles between nations to be the principle of historical change; Marx regarded the classless society as the culmination of history, and class-war as the principle of historical change; and, Toynbee regards the responses of the individual, in the last analysis,

as the most important key to social breakdown or salvation.

Hegel interpreted the Reformation as the dawn of the modern conception of the State with its claims to absolute sovereignty, a conception which was to find its embodiment in the Prussian state. This conception is, from a logical point of view, a pernicious anachronism today, but it is still a powerful force in world affairs. The Reformation, as any other movement, from the Hegelian point of view, could only be conceived as progressive in the tight deterministic scheme that regarded history as the march of God. The nineteenth century belief in progress, from the perspective of the middle of the twentieth century, is considered to be untenable if not naive, by the new school of historical philosophers like Spengler, Sorokin, and Toynbee. What Hegel heralded as the dawn of the realization of the Kingdom of Heaven on earth, a number of contemporaries see as the beginning of the disintegration of the West because of the divorce of the kingdoms of the earth from the Kingdom of Heaven, as a result of the Reformation.

Marx interpreted the Reformation as a superstructural product of a new mode of production that, acting upon its sturcture, gave an "enormous impulse" to this mode of production. The most important result of the Reformation, from this point of view, was the transformation of Christian values to make them more compatible with capitalism and, also, to make them serve as psychological stimulants to capitalistic enterprise. The dawn of the nation-state, as well as the Reformation, was, from the Marxist point of view, an effect in the last analysis of the economic revolution that produced capitalism. According to Marx, capitalism was both more creative than anything that preceded it, and at the same time, because of its contradictions and inadequacies, bound to collapse. Much of Marx's apocalyptic prognosis has been fulfilled in contemporary society, but too much has occurred that contradicts Marxist predictions to make his scheme,

in its pure form, any longer tenable.

Toynbee would agree with Hegel that a major effect of the Reformation was to contribute to the splitting up of Europe into a number of sovereign states, but Toynbee would not agree that this was beneficial. Toynbee, again, would agree with Marx that the new mode of production that the reformation did so much to release and encourage, created a restive urban proletariat. In short, Toynbee regards Western civilization as split horizontally into states and vertically into social classes; the insights of Marx and Hegel are, therefore, subsumed in Toynbee's interpretation of the Reformation. In Toynbee's scheme, however, the economic and poltical fruits are seen as consequences, not of dialictical necessity, but of the spiritual and cultural failure of the creative minority of Western civilization to meet the challenges of parochialism, and, later, of industrialism and democracy. As keys to salvation, from the Toynbeean point of view (the point of view the author of this paper supports), the monistic insights of Hegel and Marx are inadequate. Toynbee rejects any deterministic shheme of history, and so, according to him, neither the Reformation, nor the emergence of unbridled capitalism or unbridled nationalism were inevitable, and the crisis of Western civilization, deep-rooted though it be, can be overcome if Western man has the wisdom and humility to submit to God and to rediscover the only source of the values upon which his civilization has been built. This source is Christianity.

Addendum: This paper includes three chapters that deal critically with Hegel, Marx, and Toynbee as historical philosophers, one chapter on the crisis of Western civilization, three chapters dealing with the respective interpretations of the Reformation of these three writers, and a concluding chapter which treats the dynamic relationship between the Reformation and the crisis. A selective and critical bibliohtaphy is included.

INTRODUCTION

A rough parallel may be drawn between psychoanalysis and the study of history. As the former study seeks to liberate the individual psyche, so history seeks to liberate peoples and their civilizations from the difficulties and torments of the present. Both see man as organically related to a past which largely conditions his present, and salvation for either lies in the organic understanding and transcendance of this past. History is, as E. Cassirer has said, "a form of self-knowledge";[1] it is the knowledge of the self inextricably involved in the time-process, and the enrichment of the self through the understanding of past experience. "It does not guarantee the correctness of our response," J. Strayer has written, but it should improve the quality of our judgement."[2]

This conception of history implies human freedom, the possibility of transcendance over the past. From the alternative, deterministic point of view, the study of history has no real point since man's understanding can promise no salvation. This study of the Reformation and its relation to the crisis of Western Civilization, is written in the spirit of the former conception of history, though two of the historical philosophers with whom it will deal were determinists. The reason for this paradox is that both Hegel and Marx offered classic interpretations which must be assimilated into any creative solution of the crisis of the contemporary Western world as well as into any understanding of the Reformation.

There is another reason why Hegel and Marx have been included. E. Cassirer has written that a "new understanding of the past gives us... a new prospect of the future, which in turn becomes an impulse to intellectual and social life."[3] In other words, the character of the understanding of the past is important in determining the responses of the present. Needless to say, the historical insights of both Hegel and Marx play vital roles in contemporary society.

Conversely, it is also true that the challenges of the present limit the understanding of the past. Thus Hegel's interpretation of the Reformation was to a

considerable extent influenced by the challenge of Napoleonic imperialism, Marx's, by the evils of mid-nineteenth century capitalism, and, one might add, Toynbee's, by the contemporary crisis of Western Civilization.

If this is true, the historical philosopher can only proceed in his investigations with the greatest caution and humility; he must always bear in mind that the challenge he faces may be an historical and not an eternal challenge. He must, also, guard against a response that may be immediately effective but disastrous in the long run. The present writer should state at this point that of the three historical philosophers he will deal with, he is tempermentally and intellectually most sympathetic to Toynbee; he believes, furthermore, that the interpretations of history of Hegel and Marx, though rich in insights, have, in the long run, proved disastrous because of the temporal provinciality and lack of humility in their authors.

The crisis of the West may be divided into three main aspects, the political which involves the crisis of the nation-state; the economic, which involves the disintegration of capitalism; and the spiritual, which involves the collapse of a system of values and the sense of alienation and atomization of contemporary man. This triple division, which will be elaborated in Chapter IV, is another basis for the selection of Hegel, Marx, and Toynbee as the historical philosophers to be treated. Each of these three thinkers emphasizes one of the three aspects as being of fundamental importance. Hegel considered the nation-state as the culmination of the historical process and struggles between nations to be the principle of historical change; Marx regarded the classless society as the culmination of history, and class-war as the principle of historical change; and, Toynbee regards the responses of the individuals, in the last analysis, as the most important key to social breakdown or salvation.

It follows, that each thinker would interpret the crisis of the West from a definite point of view; for Hegel the crisis would be political, for Marx, economic , and for Toynbee, spiritual. Correspondingly, for Hegel salvation lies through the

emergence of the ideal nation-state; for Marx through the emergence of a classless, international society; and for Toynbee, through a religious revival.

Each of these thinkers belongs to one of the three great schools of the philosophical interpretation of universal history. Hegel and Marx, at least, were the greatest exponents of their particular schools. The three schools are the idealist, the materialist, and the recent school that may be called religio-cultural.[4] These three schools can perhaps best be distinguished by the use of P. Sorokin's terminology. Hegel's was an "idealistic" point of view that saw God and nature as equally real, and history as the unfolding of Reason in the flux of nature; Marx, was a "sensate" point of view that saw history as determined by material forces and man as essentially the product of his material environment; and Toynbee is an "ideational" point of view which regards history as related to an eternal supra-sensory God and man as essentially a spiritual being. The characterestic that distinguishes these three schools from earlier and different schools of history (those of the Enlightenment, for example) is their conception of history as a dynamic process in which man, partially or completely, is conditioned by his particular nation, class, or society.[5]

In the schemes of these philosophers, the sixteenth century is the period that created the modern era of Western Civilization. For Hegel this century saw the dawn of the nation-state; for Marx, the origin of capitalism; and for Toynbee, the breakdown of Western Civilization. Each of these occurences,as will be shown, was intimately involved with the Protestant Reformation.

Preserved Smith, a distinguished historian of the period, has written of the Reformation that "... the most important fact in modern history is undoubtedly the great schism of which Martin Luther was the author, the consequences of which are still unfolding and will continue to unfold for many a century to come."[6] Whether this is true or not, the Reformation plays a most important part in the schemes of history of Hegel, Marx, and Toynbee. The purpose of this paper is to study the

contributions that these three historical philosophers have made to an understanding of the dynamic relationship between the Reformation and the contemporary world. The author, of course, does not claim that the sins or triumphs of the modern world are all to be attributed to the Reformation, but he does believe that without an understanding of the Reformation, the crisis of modern civilization can neither be understood nor adequately faced. The author, similarly, does not claim that Hegel, Marx, and Toynbee have said the last words of interpretation on the Reformation; he does, however, believe that their interpretations implicitly and explicitly together combine the essential aspects of the Reformation, and that the interpretations of other historians can be correlated with one or another of these three interpretations.

It is with this conviction that the author will subsume a number of related interpretations of the Reformation under the three interpretations at hand. Under Hegel's interpretation, for example, will be examined the democratic liberal point of view, from which the Reformation is regarded, as Hegel regarded it, as a revolt for political freedom. Under Marx's interpretation will be mentioned a number of non-communists who have accepted the economic interpretation of the Reformation, or who, like Max Weber have studied the psychological relationship between Protestantism and capitalism. And, finally, under Toynbee, he will subsume other interpretations from the Christian point of view, the Catholic and the neo-Orthodox for example, which differ from Toynbee's interpretation only in details. Similarly, the author will draw on a variety of sources for the study of the crisis of Western Civilization.

It should be made clear that this paper is about the Protestant Reformation of the sixteenth century and about the crisis of Western Civilization, a cultural area which includes the United States and contemporaneously, at least in a superficial sense, the whole globe. The paper will deal with the theological disputes of Catholics and Reformers only in so far as they have relevance for the West in its present predicament. The section heads are all taken from "Choruses from 'The Rock'".

The present author shares T.S. Eliot's despair if not his faith.

Notes to the Introduction

1. E. Cassirer, An Essay on Man: An Introduction to a Philosophy of Human Culture (New Haven, first published in 1944), p. 191.
2. J.R. Strayer, ed., The Interpretation of History (Princeton, 1943), p. 15.
3. E. Cassirer, op. cit., p. 178.
4. P. A. Sorokin deals with this school of historians in Social Philosophies of an Age of Crisis (Boston, 1950).
5. There are, of course, exceptions to this generalization. Montesquieu, Condorcet, and Vico are three writers who came to similar general conclusions about the nature of historical man. However, no one of these three men established a school; they may all be considered brilliant precursors to the modern schools of the philosophy of history.
6. P. Smith, The Life and Letters of Martin Luther (London, 1911),. p. vii.

PART I

TIME PRESENT:

THE CRISIS

"The world turns and the world changes,
But one thing does not change.
However you disguise it, this thing does not change:
The perpetual struggle of Good and Evil.
Forgetful, you neglect your shrines and churches;
The men you are in these times deride
What has been done of good, you find explanations
To satisfy the rational and enlightened men.
Second, you neglect and belittle the desert.
The desert is not remote in southern tropics,
The desert is not only around the corner,
The desert is squeezed in the tube-train next to you,
The desert is in the heart of your brother."

CHAPTER I

The March of God:

Hegel's Philosophy of History

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel was born of an upper middle class Lutheran family in Stuttgart, in 1770. His life, almost wholly an academic one, though not unaffected by the Napoleonic political maelstrom, consisted of a career of scholarship that saw him through the University of Tubingen, where he studied theology, a private tutorship in Switzerland and Frankfort, a period as Privat-Docent at Jena, editorship of the Journal fur Philosophie with Schelling, where he made his reputation, and professorships at a number of universities. In 1818 he was offered the chair of philosophy at the University of Berlin, and one year before his death in 1831, when he was the recognized intellectual dictator of Germany, he was made rector of the university.[2] His historical importance derives not from any act of his life, but from his lectures and books which had a profound effect in shaping German philosophical and political thought. The legacy of his absolutist philosophy and his identification of this absolute with the modern state, as will be shown, still lives today to a considerable extent in the Germany of Hitler, and less directly, forms part of the idealogical background of Mussolini's Italy and Stalin's Russia. The suggestion that the recent Russo-German war was one between the left and right wings of the Hegelian school is not wholly fanciful.[3]

No part of Hegel's philosophy can be considered in isolation for to him no aspect of life is wholly intelligible except as known to the Absolute Mind, the Mind that is everything and all-knowing at one and the same time. In other words, anything absolutely known reveals all truth, the whole universe, and, conversely the whole truth tells everything about any particular thing. His Weltanschauung, though it is usually described as idealist, can be equally well seen as materialistic or realistic, for to Hegel the material is necessary to Spirit and, at the same time, is Spirit; and conversely, the Spirit must, to be anything more than abstract

nothingness, become Matter.[4] "Spirit", Hegel wrote, "is alone Reality. It is the inner being of the world, that which essentially is, and is per se; it assumes objective, determinate form, and enters into relations with itself- it is externality (otherness), and exists for self; yet, in the determination, and in its otherness, it is still one with itself- it is self-contained and self-complete, in itself and for itself at once."[5] The material is Spirit implicitly and Spirit is the material explicitly;[6] they both are identical and different in the Absolute Mind.[7] Hegel is, therefore, no mystic although he would admit that the mystic realizes a very important, though alone insufficient, truth about the Absolute.

Since Spirit and Matter imply one another, and because Spirit projects itself into its otherness and then strives to realize itself in its otherness, the universe is a process logically and ontologically. Hegel's whole philosophy seeks to explain this process by which Spirit (Mind), including the whole of reality, ontologically in the world, historically in time, and logically in pure thought, through a series of interrelated stages, seeks to comprehend this truth in its completeness. "The Hegelian world is a process," J.B. Baillie, has written, "that is self contained, and so as a whole is at rest with itself: it is a process sub specie temporis, but a unified whole sub specie aeternitatis. Its unity is all-pervading, and is maintained in and through the process of its finite parts."[8]

Hegel claimed to offer not just another philosophy but the philosophy which criticized the defectiveness of all previous systems of thought and at the same time corrected these defects by subsuming these systems in his own philosophy.[9] This synthetic philosophy he claimed to be the expression of Absolute Knowledge, the absolute comprehension of the Absolute Spirit by itself and of itself. In this Logic, Hegel showed how this occurs in the realm of pure thought. Mind(Spirit) seeks to describe the Absolute by a series of categories, each one of which, though partly true, is found wanting and is transcended by a more complete category, until the Absolute is finally discovered to be pure Mind. The process is circular, for

for to understand what pure mind is, one has to retrace the stages of the Logic, for pure mind is all the other categories in various stages of implication, and they all are made explicit in Absolute Mind.[10] In other works, Hegel did exactly the same thing. He showed how Spirit seeks to know itself wholly through natural, psychological, religious, and philosophical self-development.

Since reality is Mind seeking self-knowledge in all realms of experience, Reason (the act of gaining this awareness) is firstly the principle by which truth is grasped, and, since reality is rational mind and the universe is Mind, Reason is, second, the principle of the universe.[11] It should be added that Hegel dinstinguished between empirical Understanding which studies Matter and does not see the unity between the material and the mental, and Reason which seeks to comprehend the unity of Mind and Matter (the Notion). Since, however, the universe is the process of self-comprehension each stage of development is limited in its rationality and needs to be transcended by a higher stage. At each stage, nevertheless, the process is as rational as it can possibly be until once again transcended. "What is rational is actual and what is actual is rational;"[12] Hegel's famous dictum, expresses this truth. T.M. Knox explains that Hegel meant not that everything that exists is rational, but that existence that realizes its essence (its true nature) is rational.[13] It is here, as will be shown, that Hegel's absolute system reveals a serious weakness of itself, for it does not assimilate the contingent which is the factor preventing the invariable identification of every existent with its essence.

The process is the dialectic, the triadic movement by which a thesis (a category of the Logic, for example, like Being) gives birth to its negation (Nothing) the category into which pure being dissolves, the antithesis, which, in turn, produces a synthesis (Becoming) the higher category which includes the first two that sublates the first two "moments" in a higher truth. No category (a concept describing the Absolute) and no universal (a concept applying to some things in nature), disappears; each is an inadequate yet partial expression of the truth which

is the Absolute Mind. Hegel wrote; "The concept's moving principle, which alike engenders and dissolves the particularizations of the universal, I call "dialectic.'" [14] The dialectic, thus, reveals the unity of all particularizations in the Absolute and at the same time maintains their otherness. An example of the dialectic in the actual universe is Spirit-Nature Absolute Mind; in history, Greek spontaneous freedom-Roman abstract legality-German disciplined liberty; in ethics, Abstract Right-Morality-Ethical Life; in religion, Oriental Mysticism-Greek Anthropomorphism-Christianity; in Art, Symbolism-Classicism-Romanticism; And in the realm of Absolute Mind, Art-Religion-philosophy. Each "moment" of each triad is truth, but the only complete truth, to reiterate, comes in the synthesis of the last triad, and all the triads are finally seen to be interdependent. The Absolute philosopher is the only man to know all of truth explicitly.

While Reason is the principle of the process that is the universe, and the dialectic the operation of this process, the energizing force is Will. The Will's activity is to destroy the false distinction between subjectivity and objectivity and finally to comprehend their difference by creating identity. [15] In the realm of law and ethics (the two for Hegel are ultimately one) this can be illustrated by the triad Formal Right (where abstract principles are imposed on the Will from outside and so are not felt by Will to belong to itself)- Morality (where Will becomes conscientiousness but has no standard for correct action)- Ethical Life (where the two synthesized are recognized by Will to be one, when caprice and impulse give way to rational and free obedience on the part of Will to what it knows to be its own). [16]

As the universe is Mind(Spirit) in the process of return into itself, and as Mind is freedom, this end of this process is freedom. Mind develops through three stages, Mind Subjective, Mind Objective, and Mind Absolute when full freedom is realized. "In the full truth of that liberation," Hegel wrote, "is given the identification of the three stages- finding a world presupposed before us, gen-

erating a world as our own creation, and gaining freedom in it and from it."[17]

In the first stage nature "... in its own self realises its untruth and sets itself aside... it is not yet mind, but soul... the sleep of the mind."[18] Mind rises through consciousness (where it views the world as substantial externality), self-consciousness (where ego sees itself as an object and so in this externality), and the union of the two in the notion (the ego sundered into categories identical with it) of the Mind (which now sees externality and subjectivity to be identical and different at the same time). [19] Mind, then, realizes itself fully as the union of theoretical will (abstract knowledge) and practical will (which alone is caprice and unfree).[20]

Mind now in the stage of abstract liberty, seeks actual self-embodiment in external institutions which are its own. The stage of Objective Mind (the world of institutions) [21] has now been reached. The union of the rational will and the single will "... constitutes the simple actuality of liberty." [22] Will now free, embodies itself in Law. The moral impulse of Will and the abstract universalism of Law are realized to be identical and, in the modern State, as Wallace observes, [23] occurs the complete union of nature and mind. Mind is still only implicitly absolute and not yet free. "Liberty, shaped into the actuality of a world, receives the form of Necessity, the deeper substantial nexus of which is the system of organization of the principles of liberty, whilst its phenomenal nexus is power or authority, and the sentiment of obedience awakened in consciousness."[24]

It is only in "self-conscious thought" [25] that complete freedom is realized, for only here is there infinite self-reflection, absolute non-dependence on anything else but itself; Mind thinks the Absolute and the Absolute is Mind; Mind thinks its own self.

The freedom which is the self-fulfilment of the process is the concept of Will [26] and the completion of the dialectic. In the realization of freedom, duty is seen to be identical with freedom, and this identification, in social

life, the realm of the Ethical Life, is the Good.[27] The individual ego, the particular agent of the Idea (the Absolute in movement), now realizes that the Ought is the is and the actual is its own otherness and so its own self. In other words, Will comes to realize that it cannot impose subjective desires on the external world and so returns to cognition, to the realization that the Good, its Good, is that which is the external world.[28] It is no longer a slave to caprice, and it no longer regards Right (Morality, Ethical Life, and World-History)[29] as externally imposing itself; the ego knows that Right is its own universal self and so obeys it freely. Thus, the ego can say: "In doing my duty, I am by myself and free";[30] man therefore acquires "... liberation from dependence on mere natural impulse... and liberation from indeterminate subjectivity."[31]

A number of important implications follow from this conception of the universe and man. First, freedom is conceived as a willed negation of individual autonomy: therefore, the Lockean conception of individualism is incompatible with Hegelianism. Second, morality is ultimately universal, though only realized as universal in the State which is the institutional embodiment of the Ethical Life. Evil exists when the notion and the will are unreconciled, goodness when they are.[32] Hegel is, therefore, an essentialist rather than an existentialist philosopher.[33] Third, God is pure Mind and so he is the process of World History, of the Logic, and of every other particular process; and man, evolved to the level of Absolute Knowledge, is God: -- ultimately man, God, and the universe, therefore, are interchangeable terms. And, fourth, the process is determined and teleological. The Idea must develop in the logical way it does in all realms of reality; the telos must be freedom and Absolute Mind, and it must, in time, embody itself in the State. Hegel in short was a logical determinist.[34] An important corollary is that the role of the philosopher is not a creative but a contemplative one; he comprehends the stage at which the Idea has arrived in his own time; he can exert no real influence but only make explicit the principle (the form of Spirit)the actors of history (ultimately the Idea working through Will) have realized unconsciously.

Man makes history but only as the agent of the unfolding Idea.

History, for Hegel, is the progressive self-development of the Idea in time, in the realm of contingency.[35] As Spirit, to seek determination negates itself in space (nature), so does it empty or externalize itself in time.[36]

History is the story of constant dialectical change which finally culminates in the State and in Absolute Spirit, and in this process, Spirit assumes a number of progressively higher self-expressions of its freedom; Spirit seeks its own liberation from dependency. In the Phenomenology of Mind Hegel studied the logical development of human consciousness, and in his Philosophy of History he attempted to show how these forms of consciousness manifested themselves in human history. The forms of Spirit appear in history in the form of contingency, and in the Phenomenology as science. Both studied together are history "intellectually comprehended... they form at once the recollection and the Golgotha of Absolute Spirit, the reality, the truth, the certainty of its throne without which it were lifeless, solitary, and alone."[37] This is the philosophy of history.

Hegel's position as to the finality of his system is notoriously ambiguous. While he seems to say that history culminates in the Prussian State, at least in its concept, and that historical development is and must be logically necessary, yet he admits both that the correspondence between logic and history is rough[38] and uncertain, and that a people like the Slavs, for example, "... remains excluded from our consideration, because hitherto it has not appeared as an independent element in the series of phases that Reason has assumed in the World. Whether it will do so hereafter, is a question that does not concern us here; for in History we have to do with the Past."[39] As will be shown, it is unclear how Spirit in history can advance beyond the Prussian State where absolute freedom is apparently realized.

The religious term for the Idea or the Absolute Spirit is God, and, for Hegel, each people (nation) defines its conception of the Absolute in its conception

of God. [40] Religion is the base of the political, social and moral life of a people; it is the highest expression of a Zeitgeist, and to it all institutions to find actuality must conform. [41] Put in another way, it is through religion that the individual transcends his particularity and seeks to merge himself with his own universal. [42] This history of religion is, therefore, identical with the history of peoples. While religion is prior to political institutions, philosophy is subsequent, but on a freer and so higher plane. The definition of the Absolute a people feels religiously, its philosophers know rationally. The history of philosophy, it might be added, is identical both with the History of religion and with the philosophy of history, except that philosophy deals with the pure stages of Spirit intellectually conceived, while the latter two deal with the embodiment of these stages in the texture of culture. Philosophy, itself, it follows is also identical with the history of philosophy, since philosophy is self-critical Spirit progressing to its complete self-realization. The idea (the Absolute seen is process) is one, though self-differentiated.

The philosophy of history does not deal with particularities (the contingent factors, the accidents) but with the underlying spiritual forms of peoples; where the spiritual form manifests itself in a culture actually, this is rational reality. Hegel admits the value of history as an empirical science but only as a necessary supplement to the philosophy of history. [43] He insists that as Reason is the guiding principle of the universe, history is fundamentally rational and so subject to philosophical study. "It must be observed at the outset," he wrote, "that the phenomenon we investigate- Universal History- belongs to the realm of Spirit. The term "World" includes both physical and psychical nature. Physical nature (the realm of the contingent and irrational) also plays its part in the World's History, and attention will have to be paid to the fundamental natural relations thus involved. But Spirit, and the course of its development, is our substantial object." [44] Hegel, then, by no means underestimates (as Marx would have him do) the role of environment in history. Man's evolution is partly determined by

nature,[45] but nature itself, of course, being the self-negation of Spirit, has no history since it is dependent upon Spirit and so knows no freedom.

The philosophy of history does not deal with individuals except in so far as heroes ("Great Historical Individuals") they symbolize the principle of their time and are followed by the masses who recognize their own truth in these men.[46] The proper study of the philosophy of history is peoples, the forms of religion in which they express their stage of the Idea-in-feeling, and the states in which they institutionalize their forms of Spirit.[47]

In the Hegelian conception of History, Wallace has written "The mind of the world moves, as it were, in cycles, but with each new cycle a difference supervenes, a new tone is perceptible."[48] Nothing is lost, but all that has been negated is dialectically sublated into a higher synthesis.[49] The protagonists in this Hegelian scheme are nations[50] each one of which embodies one and only one stage of the process of Spirit. This stage is objectified in the state through which the nation's freedom is realized; where there is no state there is no nation and also no history.[51] Individuals, even the greatest, are agents of the Idea which works through their passions[52] (that form of Will which seeks private interests), and only when passions are reconciled with the Idea in the State is liberty won and a new stage of history reached.[53] In other words, the "cunning of reason" works through human passions.[54] Another important point concerning the process of Spirit is that each nation embodies both the form of Spirit dominant in itself and the negation of this form, this negation being the fundamental factor accounting for the decline of a nation.[55] Logically the German nation has to form an exception since as the fulfilment of freedom it can generate no negation. Warfare between nations, it follows, is the practical manner by which superior forms of Spirit gain historical ascendancy over inferior ones.

As W.T.Mc Govern has pointed out, Hegel, by distinguishing creative reason (Will unaware of itself) as the active force in history from reflective (conscious)

reason as that which comprehends what is, conceived of history as undeterminable by any consciously applied human program. Man can only comprehend history ex post facto and he is therefore the mere tool of necessity.[56] Progress, therefore, to Hegel, is inevitable, but its direction is unpredictable. The goal of progress -- freedom-- was only known to Hegel because he lived at a time when freedom had been attained in the form of the Prussian state.

"Since the State is mind objectified," Hegel wrote,[57] "it is only as one of its members that the individual himself has objectivity, genuine individuality, and an ethical life." In the State necessity and freedom and duties and rights become identical.[58] The State is divided into its moments (family, community) which it sublates but never obliterates; the sovereignty of the State is the unity of the differentiated agencies.[59] The State has absolute freedom and so absolute sovereignty; it is "The march of God in the world..." [60] Although it is an hereditary monarchy, the monarch has no real power; he simply is the personal expression of the sovereignty of the State who gives a subjective confirmation to what is decided by law.[61] T.M. Knox makes the point that Hegel's State does not have absolute power [62] but that it is subject to the criticism of philosophy which alone has Absolute Knowledge. "It cannot be too often emphasized," he writes, "that Hegel's philosophy culminates not with the state but with art, religion, and philosophy, which lie beyond the state and above it..." [63] This point is at most of little consequence, since, as has been pointed out above, philosophy comprehends what is and can only quixotically proffer what it thinks should be. At most, philosophy, in the Hegelian scheme, can propose minor alterations. [64] McGovern's fivefold description of the Hegelian state is, it seems to the writer of the present paper, therefore, correct. The five points McGovern makes are: 1) the State is divine, 2) the individual is only free to willingly subordinate himself to it, 3) its dictates are higher than those of natural law or subjective morality, 4) the State is supreme over society as society is supreme over the family, and 5) the State is superior to humanity as a whole.[65]

Above even the State, however, is the World Spirit, the moving universal Spirit which is behind all history and states. To quote Hegel, "... whatever in the world possesses claims as noble and glorious, has nevertheless a higher existence above it. The claim of the World-Spirit rises above all special claims." [66] The State still has absolute sovereignty, but the worthiness (rationality) of its underlying principle must meet the test of the World Spirit which is "... a court of judgement", [67] "the mind which gives itself actuality in the world-history and is the absolute judge of states." [68] This conception establishes no basis for any form of world government transcending the sovereignty of individual states, for a state requires other states to fulfil itself. The World Spirit is simply a type of relentlessly rational nemesis.

Past history, to repeat, the only history philosophy can treat, is the story of the rise and fall of nations embodying different forms of human consciousness and of Spirit. A number of peoples have no history (at least in the [illegible] early nineteenth century) because they are either, like the Slavs and the Americans, undeveloped, [69] or like the Negroes, who have not yet transcended nature and so have not attained any level of self-conscious Spirit. [70] In Asia (India and China) the germ of freedom was planted, but, since the Asiatic knew no subjective freedom, except for the despot whose freedom was little more than caprice, [71] they have had no genuine history, although they did realize the basic principle (the Absolute as all-embracing Being) of human dialectical development. Religiously, the Oriental sought self-annihilation in substance, the only reality underlying all ephemeral phenomena; and politically, the Oriental passively accepted arbitrarily imposed laws and customs he had no hand in creating. [72]

Persia represents a higher stage, for here, in the worship of light, the implicit equality of all men before God was recognized and the ruler himself became in principle subject to the law. [73] Man was freed from nature, and tolerance was practised. The defect in the Persian system, however, was that no

principle of organic unity was discovered; Persia was defeated by the Greeks who discovered the higher principle of the unity of subject and nature in the form of individuality.[74] The Jews recognized the higher principle that God is person instead of substance, but by conceiving God and nature as irrevocably different, their God, transcendant and wrathful, was not approachable by man and no principle of immortality was recognized. The Egyptians comprehended , though confusedly, the unity of man and nature. They saw soul as other than nature (in their view of immortality), yet they saw the soul as capable of being housed (in furnished pyramids). [75]

History begins in Asia but is fulfilled in Europe. In Asia, where all states were despotisms, the subjective spirit never freed itself from the Absolute Sprit (embodied in the ruler who alone was free). "The History of the World", Hegel wrote, "travels from East to West, for Europe is absolutely the end of History, Asia the beginning." [76] Persia, Egypt, and the Jews were the bridges between East and West.

Subjective freedom, in the form of immediate (un-self-conscious) individuals first appeared in Greece. Man was recognized as free from the dictates of any abstract law and was seen as moving freely in Nature.[77] Nature, instead of escaped from, was transformed by man, into an expression of himself; Nature was spiritualized in soulpture and in Hellenic polytheism, for example. The Greek recognized spontaneously that whatever was natural and beautiful was moral; he did not, however, realize that morality must depend, to be lasting, upon rational knowledge. When individualism became self- conscious and selfish, with the Sophists, and when the Delphic oracle, the voice of spiritualized Nature, was no longer believed, Greece collapsed, and a symptom of this collapse was the Peloponnesian wars. [78] In the Greek democratic, individualist state there was a fatal lack of any understanding of the universal nature of the State; the Greek realized, in short, subjective freedom but not the universal principle of universal law without which freedom becomes anarchy. Greek harmonious and natural

unity was atomized into unrelated individuals over whom, Philip of Macedon, finally imposed order in the form of dictatorship.

With Rome, Spirit reached manhood; it came to realize that only through discipline, through State enforced law, can the individual find freedom from anarchy. "Free individuals," wrote Hegel, "are sacrificed to the severe demands of National objects, to which they must surrender themselves in the service of abstract generalization."[79] The Romans had discipline which guaranteed abstract human equality; their failure was sacrificing subjective freedom in the process. Spirit, unable to bear this legalistic straight-jacketing, rebelled and turned to Epicureanism, Stoicism and Scepticism[80] all of which rendered the soul indifferent to the actual world. But the Spirit yearned for the reconciliation of itself with the real world it could only find in Christianity.

Christianity taught the identity of man and God both united in Spirit, the new and higher truth symbolized by Christ; man as potentially identical with God was now totally free qua man; his rational decisions and their objectification in the State were now divine. Man was now potentially prepared to submit freely to the dictates of God, for God's rationality was not recognized as man's own rationality.[81] But the Christian State could only be realized in a people subjectively prepared for it. The Byzantines illustrate the corruption of Christianity when it is superimposed on a people unprepared to assimilate it.[82] Christianity became superstition; its spirit became fanatical and barbaric[83] and the "corrupt and imbecile" Byzantine empire fell to the Moslems because of this disparity.[84]

The first Western political objectification of Christianity came with Charlemagne's empire, but the time was not ripe, and the empire collapsed to give way to the "chaos" of the Middle Ages.[85] The elements were now, however, present in Europe for the final synthesis-- the free, rational modern State. These elements whose merging will be treated in a later part of this paper, are

the Germanic tribes, as yet barbaric; Christianity, the religion of freedom; and the Roman principle of abstract universal equality under law.

The importance of Hegel's Philosophy of Histoy lies not in its originality but in its synthesis of a number of important ideas into a coherent whole. For example, R.G. Collingwood has observed, basic elements of his Philosophy of History were advocated by Herder (the view that philosophical history must be universal history), Kant (the view of history as the development of freedom), Schiller (the view that history culminates in the present), Fichte (the view that man's freedom is the same as his consciousness of his freedom), and Schelling (the view that universal history is a cosmic process culminating in the self-consciousness of Spirit).[86]

Hegel has had an enormous influence on many fields of study;[87] his great contribution was to have conceived of all realms of life and experience historically, as products of evolution and as involved in the process of evolution. His second contribution, less lasting in academic circles, at least outside Germany, was to have revived the conception of history as teleological. This influence was especially strong in stimulating Higher Criticism,[88] in laying the foundations of the Prussian school of history (Sybel, Droysen, Dahlmann, Dunker, and Treitschke),[89] and, as will be indicated, in forming the historical basis of Marxism. According to Benedetto Croce, Hegel was one of the leading founders of modern philosophy and so, from the Crocean revisionist Hegelian point of view, history. Hegel, with Vico as a possible exception, was the first philosopher of history to conceive universal history and philosophy according to a pattern of development.[90] Whatever one might think of his political influence, a subject which will be treated below, both modern philosophy and history are deeply indebted to him.

The criticisms that will be made of Hegelianism in the following pages must touch upon Hegel's general philosophy in spite of the fact that the major

interest at hand is his interpretation of history. As should be evident by now, philosophy and history are inseparable in the Hegelian scheme.

The most serious flaw in the Hegelian system is its inability to assimilate the contingent. According to A. Seth, Hegel's categories are abstraction from nature one of whose chief characteristics is the contingent, the irrational, and unpredictable factor of particularity, of chance. Becoming, for example, Seth points out, does not follow logically from Being and Nothing, but is a category Hegel derived from experience in order to synthesize the first two moments of the first triad.[91] When Hegel sought to derive all of reality from his categories, he attempted the impossible; Hegel's individual thing became a bag of universals without any particularity- and a universe made of such things is neither possible nor, by Hegel's own admission (he calls nature the realm of the contingent), a fact. G.R.G. Mure, a more sympathetic expositor of Hegelianism, shares this criticism; his main point is that Hegel never fully sublated the empirical world into the rational, and, owing to this factor of particularity (for example, in any ideal state the individual will continue to have particular wishes and desires), Hegel's world is dualistic and so incomplete.[92] This same dualism, that comes when Hegel passes from his Logic to Nature, is pointed out by Stace. He observes that Hegel's inability to derive any particular from his Logic posits a second absolute reality that is irrational (the Kantian thing-in-itself again).[93] It is, for the same reason, that Bertrand Russell believes that the Hegelian system cannot stand scrutinity.[94]

The consequences for the philosophy of history of this failure are enormous;[95] One may agree with Mure that history although it reveals an unfolding of Spirit,[96] nevertheless because of the factor of chance, of brute matter, or irrationality, the process of this unfolding is neither regular, predictable, nor necessary. History, once again, cannot be deduced rationally, but must be studied empirically. (Hegel, of course, argued that his own objective study of history supported his logically derived pattern.)

Another flaw that undermines the completeness of the Hegelian system, is that Hegel's dialectical method proves to be an inadequate key to history since it is unable to sublate particularity, as has been shown, in its syntheses.[97] A second weakness of the dialectic is that there is no reason why the antagonists of the dialectical system should be political nations and not economic classes as Marx would have had it;[98] that Hegel chose nations as the objective embodiment of dialectical stages was to a certain extent due to the subjective factor of Hegel's sensitivity to the need for the Germans to create a strong state in the nineteenth century. A third criticism of the dialectic, made by Croce is that Hegel failed to distinguish between "dialectical opposition" and "distinction."[99] As a character in Arthur Koestler's The Age of Yearning somewhere remarks, there was Protestantism in the sixteenth century, and Catholicism, both bitterly opposed to one another. Where was the synthesis? And,a fourth criticism of the dialectic, is that Hegel's claim to the finality of the dialectical process culminating, in political life, in the Prussian state is a denial of his method unless history is to have a stop.[100] The alternative as J. Loewenberg has written, is that "Hegel's own method decrees that his own system be ultimately jettisoned."[101]

Hegel's determinism, which Croce has called a modern form of transcendentalist theology,[102] leads to unfortunate moral consequences. The identification of the ought with the is both eliminates the possibility of consciously applied reforms and sanctifies the power relationships and class divisions that exist.[103] In this connection, Santayana has bitterly observed that Hegelianism "... is simply contempt for ideals, and a hearty adoration of things as they are."[104] This states the criticism in an exaggereated way; it is more applicable to the consequences of Hegelianism than to the spirit of Hegel.

Collingwood, defending Hegel on this score, claimed that Hegel's conservatism was a personal trait and not a rationally necessary consequence of his

philosophy.[105] Enough has been said already to indicate that the author of this paper finds such a defense of Hegelianism virtually meaningless. The converse of Collingwood's criticism appears to him to be more accurate.

R. Niebuhr, for example, writes that, "Hegelianism is... a rationalized version and corruption of the Christian view of the unity of human life and the dynamic quality of historical existence."[106] Seth points out that Hegelianism renounces God as a separate being and identifies him with the absolute philosopher;[107] Foster observes that Hegel twisted the Christian doctrine of divine creation and made of God a Demiurge instead of a Creator, and man a tool instead of a free moral being.[108] According to Seth, the Young Hegelians were quite justified in interpreting Hegel materialistically and in identifying the Absolute with the purely human.[109] Man according to these critics, is free to choose good or evil; he is free to be sinful, while according to Hegel man is only free, and ought only to be permitted, to choose good, and the good is the actual.

Other pernicious moral consequences follow from the Hegelian conception of the State. J. Dewey points out that the Hegelian sacred dogma of state sovereignty is one of the greatest barriers to the evolution of the "international mind,"[110] and Hobhouse, who shares all of Dewey's objections to Hegelianism, points out that the Hegelian State must consist of automatons instead of free citizens, and that there is nothing to keep Hegel's monarch, who appoints the ruling bureaucracy, from being a dictator.[111] Both of these men, of course, share the liberal democratic view that the State is an agent of the community rather than its supreme ruler.[112]

Even assuming that Hegel interpreted Christianity, the State, and history correctly, there is still the problem of the future. Royce[113] and Seth[114] have both observed that Hegel's history has no future since the Absolute was attained in Hegel's time. Furthermore, the history of the Prussian State posterior to its realization of the Absolute has not been a happy one. G.M. Trevelyan has written

that what freedom Prussia had in 1830 she certainly did not have under Hitler.[115] According to Hegel, Christianity fulfilled itself in Germany. How can this claim be reconciled with Ludendorff's statement on his seventieth birthday that: "At the moment we Germans are the people which freed itself furthest from the teachings of Christianity"?[116] How can Hegel's claim for the Prussian state, again, be reconciled with Germany's defeat in 1918? As Northrop has pointed out, the Hegelian philosophy was smashed at Versailles.[117]

Mure attempts to salvage Hegel from the wreck with the argument that Hegel did state that history could not be predicted and that his philosphy of history was necessarily provisional.[118] He admits the ambiguity in Hegel between the nationalist who mistakenly saw his own nation as the embodiment of the Absolute and the scholar who provided a historical basis for understanding human experience.[119] This would be difficult to deny. As Foster has written, "Hegel's failure consists, not in his recognition of the superiority of historical understanding, but in his restriction of its sphere."[120] From history, Hegel exempted his Absolute, his State, and himself.

A number of students have denied any connection between Nazism and Hegelianism. J. Barzun[121] believes that Hegel was opposed to both reaction and revolution, dictatorship and unbridled individualism. He observes that Hegel was considered a dangerous radical in his time (for advocating religious intolerance and careers open to talent on the basis of rationality,) and that a year after Hegel's death an article he had written in favor of the English Reform Bill was suppressed.[122] As for his "worship" of the State, Barzun argues, Hegel was merely advocating the only possible German answer to Napoleonic imperialism.[123] He observes furthermore, that the Frenchman Bossuet and the Englishman Hobbes were both "state-worshipers" for similar reasons.[124] Barzun might have also pointed out that Karl Marx, before becoming a communist, criticized the Prussian state in the Rheinische Zeitung for not meeting Hegel's ideal.[125]

Franz Neumann's opinion is similar to Barzun's. He believes that Hegel's rational, free State is incompatible with the dynamic, racialist German state of Nazism.[126] Royce also would agree, for he saw twentieth century German militarism as a betrayal of the spirit of nineteenth century German idealism.[127] One might quote Hegel himself, in this connection, to show the disparity between the Nazi and the idealist spirit: "Many Protestants have recently gone over to the Roman Catholic Church, and they have done so because they found their inner life worthless and grasped at some thing fixed, at a support, an authority..."[128] This suggests that Hegel would have disapproved of the totalitarian regimentation of ideologies like facsism and communism.

Before presenting the opposite side, it might be well to touch on certain weaknesses in the treatment of Hegel as a liberal. First, Barzun's argument that Hegel did no more for the state than Hobbes or Bossuet is not particularly relevant since Hobbes had no lasting influence on British politics, and Bossuet's France was undermined by the Enlightenment and overthrown by the French Revolution. Second, though Marx may have interpreted Hegel liberally, at this point, many other Germans used Hegel as an argument for the maintenance of the status quo.[129] Third, Neumann notwithstanding, there are germs of racism, as will be shown, in Hegel's philosphy. And fourth, though the Hegelian spirit may not have been illiberal, this need not affect the argument that the consequences of Hegelianism were.

Hegel's philosophy had much more than merely an academic impact on German society. As the intellectual leader of Prussia, the state that unified Germany by conquering her, Hegel's philosophy for a period was the state philosophy, and this is a state where higher schools and universities were governmentally controlled, and where the universities were both the chief organs of "public opinion" and the training centers of the ruling German bureaucracy.[130] A number of students share, either fully of substantially, McGovern's thesis that Hegel, both because

of his intellectual influence and because of his absolutist philosophy, was the "morning star" of the fascist theory of State.[131] However, many would not go as far as Popper who sweepingly states: "Nearly all the more important ideas of modern totalitarianism are directly inherited from Hegel..." [132]

John Dewey's more sober point of view is that the eventual influence of German nineteenth century idealism was totalitarian notwithstanding the cosmopolitanism of a man like Kant, or, presumably, the "liberalism" of a man like Hegel. "Weapons forged in the smithy of the Absolute become brutal and cruel when confronted by merely human resistance," he has written.[133] His point which is shared by Bertrand Russell[134] is that the democratic tradition is allied with philosophical empiricism, as any absolutist philosophy naturally allies itself with totalitarianism.[135] Another valuable observation Dewey makes is that there is racism in Hegel's philosophy, a logical consequence of which is anti-semitism.[136] Hegel, he observes, identified the free, rational State, whose bearers the Germans were, with German Culture and Race. Also, Hegel attributed the instability of Romance peoples to the fact that they were mixtures of the Latin and Germanic races while the modern Germans were pure. B. Croce places Hegel among those who contributed to the"invention of Germanism",[137] an attitude of "national pride and boasting... which came to take in Germany the form of a scientific doctrine." According to Croce, this idea is essentially a secular adaptation of the Biblical idea of a chosen people given a "philosophical garment" in Hegel's Philosophy of History and a racialist formulation in Nazism.[138]

For all these faults that have made the influence of his philosophy often pernicious, Hegel's conception of history continues to be very suggestive. There are many today who would agree with M.B. Foster that: "To philosophize is to study the history of philosophy philosophically,"[139] or with Croce that philosophy and history are one subject, or with Collingwood that history must deal with underlying motives rather than mere particular acts,[140] or with Dewey's pragmatic view-

point that philosophical systems change as new problems arise in man's development,[141] or with Toynbee's view of the relativity of historiography, or, finally with the tenets of the Dialectical Materialists. To all of these men, in varying degrees, Hegel has made a profound contribution both as a historical philosopher and as a philosophic historian.

Notes to Chapter I

1. R. Schlesinger, Marx: His Time and Ours (London, 1950), p. 12.
2. J. Loewenberg, "Introduction" to G.W.F. Hegel, J. Loewenberg, ed., Hegel: Selections (N.Y./Chicago/Boston, n.d.), pp. ix-xliii.
3. H. Holborn, "The Science of History" in J. Strayer, ed., The Interpretation of History (Princeton, 1943), p. 62.
4. W. Wallace, Prolegomena to the Study of Hegel's Philosophy and Especially of His Logic (Second Edition, Oxford, n.d.), p. 148.
5. G.W.F. Hegel, trans. with introduction and notes, J.B. Baillie, The Phenomenology of Mind (Second Edition, revised and corrected, London, n.d.), p. 86. No quotations in this paper have been changed in the interests of grammatical consistency or correctness. The present writer assumes no responsibility for directly quoted errors.
6. W.T. Stace, The Philosophy of Hegel: A Systematic Exposition (London, 1924), p. 2
7. G.W.F. Hegel, "Philosophy of Mind" from W. Wallace ed. and commentator, Hegel's "Philosophy of Mind", pp. 161-316, which is part of Hegel's The Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences, p. 163. Hegel wrote: "Mind has for its presupposition Nature, of which it is the truth, and for that reason its absolute prius. In this its truth Nature is vanished, and mind has resulted as the 'Idea' entered on possession of itself. Here the subject and object of the Idea are one--either is the intelligent unity, the notion. This identity is absolute negativity- for whereas in Nature the intelligent unity has its objectivity perfect but externalised, this self-externalisation has been nullified and the unity is that way been made one and the same with itself."
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9. W.T. Stace, op. cit., p. 2.
10. G.R.G. Mure, A Study of Hegel's Logic (Oxford, 1950), as well as the works of Stace and Wallace have been used as background for Hegel's Logic.
11. J.B. Baillie, op. cit., p. 34.
12. G.W.F. Hegel, trans. and commentator, T.M. Knox, Hegel's Philosophy of Right (Oxford, n.d.), p. 10. Any material included in pp. 1-13 (Preface) and 296-376 (Translator's Notes) will be cited: T.M. Knox, Hegel's Philosophy of Right. All other material (The Philosophy of Right and Hegel's "Additions" will be cited: G.W.F. Hegel, The Philosophy of Right.
13. Ibid., p. 302.
14. Ibid., p. 34.
15. Ibid., p. 32.
16. Ibid., p. 35-36.
17. G.W.F. Hegel, "Philosophy of Mind", p. 115.
18. Ibid., p. 169.
19. Ibid., p. 197-198.
20. Ibid., pp. 206-09.
21. W.T. Stace, op. cit., p. 374.
22. G.W.F. Hegel, "Philosophy of Mind., p. 241.
23. Ibid., p. 24.
24. Ibid., pp. 240-41.
25. Ibid., p. 303.
26. G.W. F. Hegel, Hegel's Philosophy of Mind, p. 313.
27. Ibid., p. 103.
28. W.T. Stace, op. cit., pp. 291-92.
29. T. M. Knox, Philosophy of Right, p. 233.
30. Ibid., p. 253.
31. Ibid., p. 107.
32. W.T. Stace, op. cit., p. 401.
33. For a critique of Hegel from the existentialist point of view see Soren Kierkegaard, ed. R. Bretall, A Kierkegaard Anthology (Princeton, 1947), pp. 190ff.
34. Morris R. Cohen discribes Hegel's determinism with succinct clarity in his The Meaning of History (LaSalle, 1947): "Though Hegel refers to history as a progress in the consciousness of freedom, only the Absolute is really free-free in the sense that there is nothing to determine it- but even the Absolute is not free to develop in any other

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13. Ibid., p. 302.
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16. Ibid., p. 35-36.
17. G.W.F. Hegel, "Philosophy of Mind", p. 115.
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manner than that determined by the rigid laws of the Hegelian dialectic. (pp. 87-88).

35. G.W.F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind, p. 808.
36. G.W.F. Hegel, trans. J. Sibree (from the Third German Edition), Lectures on the Philosophy of History, (London, 1861), p. 75.
37. G.W.F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind, p. 808.
38. W.T. Stace, op. cit., p. 132.
39. G.W.F. Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of History, p. 363.
40. Ibid., p. 52. M. Cohen is again lucid on this point. He writes: "The Hegelian philosophy of history is substantially a metaphysical adaptation of the Christian view. God is one and history is the unfolding of God. He unfolds Himself on the human scene. God is primarily a logician unfolding himself in Hegel's logic. But the world-drama requires antagonists. Therefore the Absolute must create His own antithesis in the process of unfolding, and in that struggle the synthesis is created, and so history moves on in an unending spiral."
41. G.W.F. Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of History, p. 52.
42. Ibid., p. 51.
43. Ibid., p. 11.
44. Ibid., p. 17.
45. Ibid., p. 83.
46. Ibid., p. 31.
47. Ibid., pp. 14-17.
48. W. Wallace, Prolegomena to the Study of Hegel's Philosophy and Especially His Logic, p. 222.
49. In his Lectures on the Philosophy of History, Hegel wrote: "The grades which Spirit seems to have left behind it, it still possesses in the depths of its present."(p. 82).
50. G.W.F. Hegel, "Philosophy of Mind", p. 275.
51. Ibid., pp. 275-77.
52. G.W.F. Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of History, p. 24.
53. Ibid., pp. 24-25.
54. Ibid., p. 34.
55. Ibid., p. 78.
56. W.M. McGovern, From Luther to Hitler: The History of Fascist-Nazi Political Philosophy (Boston/N.Y., etc., n.d.), pp. 282-83.
57. G.W.F. Hegel, The Philosophy of Right, p. 156.
58. Ibid., p. 163.
59. Ibid., p. 179.
60. Ibid., p. 276.
61. Ibid., pp. 288-89.
62. T.M. Knox, Hegel's Philosophy of Right, p. 299.
63. Ibid., p. 305.
64. L.T. Hobhouse, The Metaphysical Theory of the State: A Criticism (London, n.d.) fn., p.23.
65. W.M. McGovern, op. cit., pp. 297-319.
66. G.W.F. Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of History, p. 39.
67. G.W.F. Hegel, The Philosophy of Right, p. 216.
68. Ibid., p. 279.
69. G.W.F. Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of History, pp. 88-91.
70. Ibid., p. 103.
71. Ibid., p. 63.
72. See G.S. Morris, Hegel's Philosophy of the State and of History: An Exposition (Second Edition, Chicago, 1892), pp. 140-49.
73. G.W.F. Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of History, p. 120.
74. Ibid., pp. 231-32.
75. Ibid., p. 299. (See also G.S. Morris, op. cit., pp. 171-75.)
76. Ibid., p. 109.
77. Ibid., p. 234.
78. Ibid., p. 278.
79. Ibid., p. 113.
80. Ibid., p. 389.
81. Ibid., pp. 333-347.

manner than that determined by the rigid laws of the Hegelian dialectic. (pp. 87-88).

35. G.W.F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind, p. 808.
36. G.W.F. Hegel, trans. J. Sibree (from the Third German Edition), Lectures on the Philosophy of History, (London, 1861), p. 75.
37. G.W.F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind, p. 808.
38. W.T. Stace, op. cit., p. 132.
39. G.W.F. Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of History, p. 363.
40. Ibid., p. 52. M. Cohen is again lucid on this point. He writes: "The Hegelian philosophy of history is substantially a metaphysical adaptation of the Christian view. God is one and history is the unfolding of God. He unfolds Himself on the human scene. God is primarily a logician unfolding himself in Hegel's logic. But the world-drama requires antagonists. Therefore the Absolute must create His own antithesis in the process of unfolding, and in that struggle the synthesis is created, and so history moves on in an unending spiral."
41. G.W.F. Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of History, p. 52.
42. Ibid., p. 51.
43. Ibid., p. 11.
44. Ibid., p. 17.
45. Ibid., p. 83.
46. Ibid., p. 31.
47. Ibid., pp. 14-17.
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50. G.W.F. Hegel, "Philosophy of Mind", p. 275.
51. Ibid., pp. 275-77.
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62. T.M. Knox, Hegel's Philosophy of Right, p. 299.
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70. Ibid., p. 103.
71. Ibid., p. 63.
72. See G.S. Morris, Hegel's Philosophy of the State and of History: An Exposition (Second Edition, Chicago, 1892), pp. 140-49.
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Chapter II

The Specter of Communism: The Marxian Philosophy of History

The fabulous life of Karl Marx began in 1818 in Trier (Treves), a city of the German Rhineland. Marx's father, who had renounced his Jewish faith one year before Karl's birth, was an "enlightened" man in the tradition of Condorcet. His Jewish background, according to several students, in part explains the sense of prophetic mission of the son, and his rationalism the fact that, as I. Berlin has written, Karl Marx "...remained both a rationalist and a perfectibilian to the end of his days."[1]

Marx's personality and career were turbulently multi-dimensional. As a student at the universities of Bonn and then Berlin, he mixed with the Young Hegelians, the radical élite of the time; as a crusading propagandist he edited the Rheinische Zeitung, the Neue Rheinische Zeitung, and the Deutsh-Französische Jahrbücher; as an ideological whip he ruthlessly demolished, as far as communist circles were concerned, intellectual opponents in books like The Poverty of Philosophy (Proudhon), and The Holy Family (the Young Hegelians); as a cosmopolite and polyglot he wrote tracts in French, English, and German; as an activist he helped organize the Communist League in Brussels for which he, with Engels, wrote The Communist Manifesto, and he played a major role in the founding of the First International which he dominated from its birth in 1864 to its demise in 1872; as an indefatigable scholar, Marx spent long hours in the British Museum composing Capital, his most serious contribution to political economy; as a dangerous radical he suffered political expulsion from Prussia, France, and Belgium; and, finally, as a devoted though impoverished pater familias, he, and his ever faithful Jenny von Westphalen, raised a large family that was rich in the knowledge of both human sorrow and happiness. Terms such as "fanatic" and "prophet of hatred" have been applied to Marx, but, as I. Berlin has pointed out, Marx's case was never pathological in the sense that he ever suffered alternating moods of exaltation and persecution mania; he remained prolifically creative until his death in 1883.[2]

Marx, as the father of communism, cannot be discussed without reference to his intimate friend, collaborator, and left-hand man, Frederick Engels. The two formed a team, and the term "Marxism," will be used in the following pages, to designate their joint product.[3]

Marxism, like Hegelianism, was a consciously synthetic product of a variety of ideas and ideologies, the most important of which was Hegelianism itself. According to Lenin, the most important sources were German philosophy (Hegel especially), English political economy(Ricardo especially), and French socialism(men like Proudhon and Blanc whom Marx called "Utopian Socialists").[4] These Marx combined dialectically into a "complete and symmetrical whole", the only form in which, according to Marx, the partial truth of each source could contribute to the complete truth. Hegel's spiritualism was corrected by the empirical realism of British political economy; the harmful individualism of British economy was corrected by the insights of the Utopian Socialists; and the utopianism of the French by Hegelian historicism. Ludwig Feuerbach should also be mentioned as a source because his Essence of Christianity was instrumental in helping Marx to break with the idealism of his student days.[5]

Before any attempt to describe Marxism more fully can be made, it should be pointed out that the writings of Engels and Marx are full of ambiguities and apparent contradictions. As a result, Marxism has been interpreted in a variety of irreconcilable ways. The writer of this paper will outline the most important interpretations of moot points and suggest which ones appear to him to be the most convincing. Marx was both a scholar and a propagandist, an absolutistic and a relativistic moralist and systematizer; his theory can be read both to mean that man is determined and that man is only conditioned, both that communism is inevitable and that it can only succeed by being worked for. It is in considerable measure Marx's fault that today there is such disparity between "orthodox" Marxists who, in Sidney Hook's words have created a "monistic world-view" only to be compared

to "the great traditional religions" [6] and modern democratic Marxists like G.D.H. Cole, S. Hook, and A.D. Lindsay, who regard Marxism as a method, to be applied to changing circumstances rather than as an absolutist system.[7]

The attempt to explain the human historical process and the claim to have done so, on the part of Marx and Engels, were grandiose to say the least. The following excerpt from Engel's speech at Marx's grave shows this. It will also serve, perhaps, as a thumb-nail introduction to the Marxist philosophy which will be treated below; "As Darwin discovered the law of evolution in organic nature, so Marx discovered the law of evolution in human history: the simple fact, previously hidden under ideological growths, that human beings must first of all eat, drink, shelter and clothe themselves before they can turn their attention to politics, science, art and religion; that therefore the production of the immediate material means of life and consequently the given stage of economic development of a people or of a period forms the basis on which the State institutions, the legal principles, the art and even the religious ideas of the people in question have developed and out of which they must be explained instead of exactly the contrary, as was previously attempted." [8]

The Marxist conception of truth is a combination of a Jamesian type of instrumentalism, Lockean empiricism, and inverted Hegelianism. Facts, for the Marxist, are sense-data whose validity are tested in practice. [9] They are not simply passively impressed upon man, as the pre-Marxis materialist argued, but they are the products of the interaction between man and nature. "The question whether objective truth is an attribute of human thought-is not a theoretical but a practical question," Marx wrote: "Thought is "sensuous human activity" rather than mere contemplation as the earlier materialists claimed; "...in opposition to materialism the active side of thought was developed abstractly by idealism-which of course does not know real sensuous activity as such." [10] According to Marx who considered himself a scientist rather than a metaphysician "...philosophers have

only interpreted the world differently, the point is, to change it."[11]

While Marx's epistemology was instrumentalist, his ontology was, in his own terminology, materialistic, but not in the eighteenth century mechanistic sense of Holbach and Helvetius. Mind, though posterior to matter, is not matter alone; reality is a result of their dialectical interpenetration. According to Marx, men "...began to distinguish themselves from animals as soon as they begin to produce their means of subsistence, a step which is conditioned by their physical organization."[12] Marx in this statement implicitly makes a qualitative distinction between human beings and their environment. This dualism in Marxism has been pointed out by both Popper,[13] and G.D.H. Cole[14] who both prefer to designate Marx's philosophy as "realistic" rather than "materialistic".[15] The higher the stage of human evolution, the less is man motivated by material considerations because the greater is his control over his material environment. In the final Marxist stage of evolution, therefore, mind will be completely free to exploit nature at its will.

While Marx may have rejected materialistic monism, it is not at all certain that he rejected determinism. In this connection the confusion in Marxist writings between scholarship and propaganda results in considerable ambiguity. Passages can be cited which indicate that Marx believed in an ineluctable determinism and others that suggest he believed man, understanding the conditioning factor of his historical and material environment, is free to choose the most logical social solution to his predicament. For example, Marx wrote in Capital:[16] "It is a question of these laws themselves, of free tendencies working with iron necessity towards inevitable results," and yet Marx, in the Communist Manifesto exhorts the working classes to take revolutionary action, and in a letter to Lassalle[17] he expressed gratitude to Darwin for having dealt "the death-blow...to "teleology" in the natural sciences." See treats Marx as having been a determinist although he admits that there is a certain amount of evidence to the contrary.[18] Sabine considers the question a puzzle; he considers Marx to have said, in effect: "Human cal-

culation and human interests are a factor in producing the necessity, yet the necessity predetermines the calculation and the direction that the interests must take."[19] The liberal Marxists interpret Marx as not having been a determinist. Lindsay observes that man is controlled by necessity only so long as he is ignorant and poor;[20] determinism is thus something man finally overcomes. Cole interprets Marx to have meant that although man cannot act wholly independently of his conditions of life, yet he can fail to take advantage of those possibilitites for improvment that are open to him.[21]

On one point, the students are in almost universal agreement, and that is that the Marxian key to the human condition is the dialectic, the historical process that conditions man if it does not determine him.[22] The dialectic has already been discussed in this paper; it remains simply to point out that Marx believed, in contrast to Hegel, that the dialectical process was human and natural rather than spiritual and logical; that is, it evolves through the struggle between man and his human and material environment rather than between logical categories. As will be shown in a later discussion of the dialectic, the essential difference between the Hegelian and the Marxian conception of the dialectic has nothing, Marx notwithstanding, to do with the opposition between idealism and materialism; the essential difference is that the principle of the dialectic was economic for Marx and ideological and political for Hegel, and that, as a result, for Marx creative progress would have to be fundamentally economic while for Hegel it would be ideological.

The dialectic for Marx, as well as being the pattern of human progress, was a method of ascertaining the correct course to be followed in order to realize socialism.[23] As the latter, as a method, of social analysis, man should be able to predict the main lines of human development and act accordingly; he will know what is possible and what impossible, and he will know how to correlate his political activity with economic actuality. To give an example; in a speech on the

question of free-trade, Marx argued that free trade should be supported because its empirically observed effect was to dissolve nationalism and to heighten the class struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. Knowing that the proletariat could never win its international victory until this occured, Marx advocated that the contemporary type of economy (thesis) be pushed to its logical conclusion so that it might generate its own destruction (antithesis) which alone could pave the way for a superior economic society (synthesis).[24]

The determining laws of dialectical change, according to Marx, are not to be found in politics, psychology, or philosophy, but in "...the material conditions of life," the realm where man grapples with nature and with his fellow man, consciously or unconsciously, for a higher standard of living; this realm is what the eighteenth century philosophers and economists, as well as Hegel, called "civil society". The anatomy of this society, according to Marx "is to be sought in political economy,"[25] and the laws this study involves are the laws that ultimately determine the social, intellectual, and political life of the community.

The final determinant, in Marxism, of the political economy of any society is its "mode of production", an omnibus term which includes the way labor is organized, (the most important factor), the geographical environment (of greatest importance at the beginning of human development), and the level of technological and scientific development, (which is often, as in the case of the rise of the first stage of capitalism, of no major importance).[26]

The economic laws of any one society, the Marxist claims, are determined by the mode of production of that society, and as every mode of production is in dialectical movement, economic laws change. Thus, by conceiving of political economy in Hegelian relativistic terms, Marx rejected the view of the classical economics that there are certain eternal economic laws which it is the job of the economist to discover. As Engels put it, economics, with Marx, became a historical study.[27]

The most important principle of economic analysis for Marx was the Labor Theory of Value. This theory, which in Marx's time had a reputable standing among the most orthodox economists, states that the value of any commodity is determined by the amount of human "socially necessary labor time" put into the production of that commodity. Today, as an explanation of value, this theory is in disrepute,[28] but according to a number of contemporary students, it has validity as a moral claim on the part of the working-classes exploited in a society which treats each worker as a commodity instead of as a human being deserving of a just charge for his work.[29] The reason the worker is exploited, according to Marx, is that the capitalist pays him only enough money to subsist on, while the worker is forced to work more hours than is necessary to create this much value. The value, called surplus value by Marx, created above the worker's wages is taken by the owner of the factory. By the relative standards of capitalism, this may be a legitimate situation, but from the point of view of the worker conscious of the possibility of a collectivist society which will insure economic equality, it is not.[30] Individualistic, capitalist society must, according to Marx, be based on inequality, but since production under capitalism is becoming progressively more social (the role of any individual in the total productive process is becoming impossible to determine), there is no reason why this inequality should persist. The writer of this paper is incompetent to judge the validity of Marx's economic theories; he can, however, cite an expert who confirms his view that the Labor Theory of Value, as an economic explanation, is not a particularly important element in Marxism. Joan Robinson writes: "Voltaire remarked that it is possible to kill a flock of sheep by witchcraft if you give them plenty of arsenic at the same time. The sheep, in this figure, may well stand for the complacent apologists of capitalism; Marx's penetrating insight and bitter hatred of oppression supply the arsenic, while the labour theory of value provide the incantations."[31]

The most important aspect of the "mode of production" is the manner in which labor is organized, i.e., the class structure of a society.[32] The basic criteria of

the character of a particular society are ownership of the means of production and the degree of freedom the working classes enjoy.[33] The structure of the society is not necessarily a consciously recognized fact; the class status of an individual, according to Marx, is an objective rather than a subjective fact which determines his consciousness, in most cases, unconsciously.[34] The average man may explain his political actions ideologically, and he may be quite sincere in this. Nevertheless, the ideology he believes in the final analysis is determined by his economic status in society. Classes, in short, the Marxist claims, are objectively hostile to one another whether this fact is subjectively recognized or not, or whether a society is tranquil or in revolutionary upheaval. No social revolution can be anything more than superficial unless it results in a change in the class structure of society, and no real revolution, conversely, can be anything less than a class-struggle.[35] Any real historical change is therefore the result of class struggle.

Marx distinguished between the economic structure of a society and the superstructure which includes all non-economic realms of human endavor. "What else does the history of ideas prove," the authors of The Communist Manifesto asked, "than that intellectual production changes in character as material production is changed? The ruling ideas of each age have been the ideas of the ruling class."[36] And to quote Engels: "If...technique depends on the stage of science, science depends far more still on the state and the requirements of technique. If society has a technical need, that helps science forward more than ten universities."[37] It was, to give one more example, the fact that the philosophes were unable to transcend the limits of their time, that their "eternal justice" was simply the justice of the middle classes struggling for power.[38]

It is of essential importance to note, however, that the superstructure of a society is more than just a passive reflection of the economic structure -- the superstructure, once produced, acts upon the structure and in many ways can modify it.

Nevertheless, in the mutual interaction between structure and superstructure, the Marxist argues, the former is the strongest and ultimately is bound to prevail. The economic factor, Engels wrote "...is far and away the strongest, most primary or decisive."[39] Plekhanov has outlined in five points the relationship between structure and superstructure: (1) the productive system is created, (2) it conditions the economic relations of a society, (3) a socio-political régime is erected upon the foundations of these relations, (4) human psychology is determined by the second and third factors, and (5) ideologies are formulated reflecting this psychology.[40]

A number of important corollaries follow. Morality is class morality and is relativistically conceived; art is the product of a particular society in time and as there are no eternal moral values so there are no eternal aesthetic standards;[41] the prevailing legal system of any society is bound to be one that protects the property and other vested interests of the ruling classes,[42] and it follows that political power is "...merely the organized power of one class for oppressing another."[43] Of course, when the oppressed class rises to demand its rights, it gains in political power until it conquers the state. Political power is, according to Engels, fundamentally economic power,[44] that is, only that class which rules the economic structure of a society has real power. The qualifying remark is made by Lindsay,[45] that although politics have been determined by economics in the main until today, in the communist society, politics will control economics.

The institutional custodian of economic power, according to Marx, is the state, and until the state is overthrown socialism is impossible. Marx made this clear in his attack on the Lassallean Goth Program which provided for co-operation between state and workers.[46] When the proletariat finally gains power and a "classless" society is realized, the state will wither because it will no longer have any function.[47]

But, so long as there is a state, there will be exploitation, and since co-operation with the state is precluded by Marx, the alternative, revolution, is

sanctioned. As S. Hook has expressed it, "...revolution is the political mode by which a social revolution takes place."[48] Thus the effect of the Glorious Revolution was to bring "... the landlord and capitalist expropriators of surplus-value" into power,[49] and the French Revolution brought the French bourgeoisie into power. A peaceful and legal social revolution is conceived of as possible in England,[50] but this concession on Engel's part, as S. Hook has pointed out, contradicts the Marxian thesis.[51] The march of history depends upon violence, and violence is only successful when it results in fundamental economic changes; this is a fundamentally important lesson of history. When reactionary violence is practised against an economic system, as in the case of foreign conquest by a backward people, the mode of production will reassert itself and conquer its conquerors.[52] And where violence is not practised, political power, in one form or another, must remain in the hands of the exploiters.

Strachey has aptly described Marxism as "...a highly unified and integrated outlook upon the world. It is a seamless coat..."[53] The philosophical, economic, and sociological ideas that have already been discussed in this paper do not, therefore, stand independently; they are links in the Marxian chain, and the chain is history. Marx has written, "What I did that was new was to prove: (1) that the existence of classes is only bound up with <u>particular, historic phases in the development of production</u>; (2) that the class struggle necessarily leads to the <u>dictatorship of the proletariat</u>; (3) that the dictatorship itself only constitutes the transition to the <u>abolition of all classes</u> and to a <u>classless society</u>."[54]

The developmental pattern of history is the dialectical struggle between classes; struggles and changes that do not affect the class structure of society occur, of course, but they are relatively superficial.[55] That the superstructure affects the structure has already been stated, but, to reiterate, "...the production and reproduction of real life constitutes in the <u>last instance</u> the determining factors of history.[56] The mode of production cannot, therefore, be changed by political action unless it, the mode of production, develops its negation to

a sufficient degree.[57]

Engel's confession that "Marx and I are partly responsible for the fact that at times our disciples have laid more weight upon the economic factor than belongs to it,"[58] is"in the final instance" a spurious remark unless one agrees, which the present writer does not, with the liberal Marxists that Engels and Marx were not deterministe.[59]

The role of man, in the Marxian historical scheme, is again similarly insignificant unless one interprets Marxism non-deterministically; "...what individuals are," Marx has written,"depends upon the material conditions of production."[60] Engels admits that men "...make their history themselves," but "... only in given surroundings which condition it and on the basis of actual relations already existing..."[61] On the other hand, Marx suggested that men influence the tempo and character of an economic transition but not the basic pattern. Germany, for example could have copied the English experience with capitalism to "shorten and lessen the birth-pangs" of the industrial revolution in Germany.[62] And elsewhere he wrote that the "individual" he was writing about in Capital was an abstract man embodying the economic categories of his time.[63] Nevertheless, this abstract man remains "in the last instance" the "real"man as far as historical development is concerned.

In the Marxian historical scheme, two premises are accepted, by implication, without question. One is that universal history is the history of one civilization culminating in a classless society, and the second is that there is progress in history.[64] The stages of the unfolding of "civilization" have been four: (1) "Asiatic" primitive communism, (2) ancient slavery, (3) medieval feudalism and (4) bourgeois capitalism.[65] Each stage lasted until its mode of production produced all it could and, concomitant with its unfolding, the mode of production of each stage generated its negation, an exploited class, which inevitably realized the succeeding and higher mode of production. Marx wrote:

"No social order ever disappears before all the productive forces, for which there is room in it, have been developed; and new higher relations of production never appear before the material conditions of their existence have matured in the womb of the old society."[66]

In Marx's time, as it is of course today in the greater part of the non-Russian dominated world, the prevailing mode of production was capitalism. Marx defined capitalism as a system of production which begins when each individual capital employs a comparatively large number of wage-earning workers simultaneously working in the same place to produce the same commodity.[67]

Marx distinguished two important stages in the unfolding of the capitalist mode of production, the "manufacturing" and the "industrial". The first stage, which lasted from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century, emerged from enterprises that consisted either of a concentration of workers each doing a specialized job, or of the co-operation of artificers of one handicraft. Both types of production, as they grew, merged, after a dialectical leap from the quantitative to the qualitative in "...a productive mechanism whose parts are human beings."[68] The "quantitative" leap occurred when the accumulation of co-operating workers produced the new "collective power of the masses."[69] In the process individual differences between workmen tended to disappear. The debasement of the workers was completed in the industrial stage of capitalism when, in the automatic factory, the "hierarchy of specialized workers" was levelled into one undifferentiated mass. The workman was transformed into "a part of a detail-machine";[70] he became a "crippled monstrosity".[71] This proletariat class was the source of profit for the bourgeoisie; it was also the class which would eventually destroy capitalism and establish the fifth great historical stage, communism.

"What the borugeoisie...produces, above all, are its own grave-diggers. Its fall and the victory of the proletariat are equally inevitable."[72] Capitalism,

Marx believed, was nearing the stage when it would be unable to produce any more, and it would, therefore, be forced to give way to socialism, a mode of production which can produce both more commodities and provide for a more equitable distribution of the commodities produced.

There are three main reasons why capitalism must disappear according to Marxists.[73] First, under capitalism production is for profit rather than for the benefit of society as a whole; as a result the forces of production are curtailed. Second, production is social while wealth is appropriated privately. The proletariat, conscious of this contradiction, must eventually realize that it need not tolerate it. And third, competition among capitalists is unplanned and anarchic;[74] crises result and capitalism eventually undermines itself. In the process, large business swallow small ones,[75] the proletarian "industrial reserve army" is enlarged,[76] and the ground is paved for revolution. The proletariat, as its suffering is intensified, expresses its lot in the superstructural ideological form of moral protests; they come to regard capitalism with Marx, as "... a pestiferous source of corruption and slavery,"[77] and they demand its abolition.

The last stage of capitalism is imperialism; this view was suggested by Marx[78] and elaborated by Lenin.[79] The reasoning behind this prediction is that as the contradictions within a national capitalist economy begin to eliminate an internal market (as rates of profit and as the capacity of the working classes to consume decline), external markets are sought, nations clash, and the ensuing wars undermine capitalism to such an extent that the proletariat is given the opportunity to seize power.

The last stage of historical development will be the communistic, and the goal that will be realized is freedom. "In proportion as anarchy in social production vanishes," Engels wrote, "the political authority of the State dies out. Man, at last master of his own form of social organization, becomes at the

same time the lord over Nature, his own master-free."[80] Since the Marxist regards Economic Man as the fundamental man, man freed from economic necessity will become free. Another characteristic of the final stage will be the emancipation of the human personality; capitalism makes highly trained freaks of the mass of human beings, trained in particular manual operations at the expense of all other human potentialities, while under communism, in S. Hook's words, "... man ceases to suffer as an animal and suffers as a human. He therewith moves from the plane of the pitiful to the plane of the tragic."[81] The Marxian vision of the future has been expressed by Marxists in terms that are too vague for any clear and coherent picture to emerge.

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The apologetics and the denunciations of Marxism have been to prolific and furious over too long a period of time for more than the main points of issue to be dealt with in this paper.

The fundamental question of determinism has already been discussed. The writer of this paper need only state that he agrees with Bober[82] Federn,[83] and Sabine[84] that the writings of Marx in the main do suggest determinism rather than not. If Marx and Engels can be judged by the historical fruits of their work, the religious zeal of their contemporary disciples would confirm the view that a belief in inevitability was more than implicit in Marx and Engels.

The ambivalence between a scientific and a crusading approach to history permeates all their works. In his most scholarly book, Capital, for example, Marx describes with righteous indignation a society his own theory shows to have been inevitable and, in its own period of creativity, more productive than any system prior to it in history.[85] This would be an unimportant though amusing contradiction if it were not a symptom of a deeper failing in Marx, namely the profoundly subjective nature of his "scientific" work.[86] The result is that Marxism, though fundamentally a secular religion in a scientifically minded age, has gained a spurious authority because of its scientific superstructure. It is

difficult to disagree with Federn's judgement that Marxism is little more, from a scientific point of view, than a priori, deductive philosophy of history.[87]

This criticism is amply illustrated by the superficiality of Marx's treatment of the "superstructure." He assumes the economic mode of production is the determining factor, and then, without any inductive study, simply states that any given non-economic realm of society is determined by it. There is too much that cannot possibly be explained this way. For example, as Sée argues, how can Marxism explain why a poor and disunited Germany in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries produced the art of the great Romantics while Germany since 1871, united and prosperous, has been relatively barren artistically? Or, how can Marxism explain the lack of any American art commensurate with America's industrial might?[88] Federn,[89] in the same vein, asks why the change of Europe to a money economy produced such different effects in the different countries of Europe. And, why, Bober asks, did Greeks produce speculative geometry instead of arithmetic if science reflects economic needs?[90] And, how can Marxism account for the genius of a man like Leonardo da Vinci?[91] In short, the distinction Marx makes between structure and superstructure is untenable at least in its classical form.

Another pitfall resulting from the conception of the economic factor as exclusively primary is the untenable division of society into economic classes. Contemporary experience with the passions of racism and nationalism is evidence enough to the contrary. Class-consciousness, in the Marxist sense,[92] as Sée observes, was probably a sentiment created by modern socialist literature more than anything else.[93] It is significant that this consciousness arose first in France where socialist literature was most widely spread rather than in England which first experienced the Industrial Revolution. In ealier times, in Rome or in the period of the French Revolution for example, struggles were never exclusively

between economic classes; Roman plebians were led by ambitious and idealistic aristocrats,[94] and in the French revolution there were never any clear-cut class divisions.[95] As Sorel has pointed out, society has been divided into economic classes only when economic groupings have accepted the "myth" that this was the correct division to make.[96] Furthermore, none of the class struggles enumerated by Marx brought about any change in the mode of production.[97] In the case of the French Revolution the mode of production had changed before the revolution[98] to give one classic example. One might also point out, (as Bober does somewhere), that the great struggles between the popes and the emperors in the Middle Ages were between members of the same class. Once again Marx's a priori historicism fails to explain the facts.

Marx's account of the state is vulnerable for the same reasons. As A.M. Schlesinger Jr. observes American experience shows that the state, rather than being the agent of the wealthiest economic classes can be "an object of genuine competition" among classes.[99] Recent British experience, furthermore, shows that Marx exaggerated the intractibility of the capitalists in the face of a social revolution.[100] It has already been shown that Marx's prediction that this might happen in England contradicts his theory of the state.[101]

Perhaps the most harmful fruit of Marxism has been its view that political power is determined by economic power. In the first place, as Federn observes, and as Marx himself points out, economic power was historically determined by physical power rather than the reverse.[102] Popper, similarly, observes that an individual can only enjoy economic power after the state has arisen to protect his property.[103]

Marx's theory leads to the conclusion that economic solutions will cure the problems of power politics and so he failed to consider any provisions for checking the abuses of political power.[104] The most searching analysis of power

is probably Bertrand Russell's study Power: A New Social Analysis. "To suppose that irresponsible power," Russell wrote, "just because it is called Socialist or Communist, will be freed miraculously from the bad qualities of all arbitrary power in the past, is mere childish nursery psychology." [105]

Marxism as history is no less vulnerable to criticism than it is as sociology. Periods of history, as Federn argues, are symbolically helpful but never clear-cut. Marx, divided the stream of history into economic divisions to prove his theory of economic dialectical contradiction; this is no more legitimate than Hegel's division of history into national cultural divisions.[106] Another case of arbitrariness is that Marx and Engels failed to treat themselves as historically conditioned by their own middle-class backgrounds.[107]

Other weaknesses of the dialectic are its failure to explain the centuries of Asiatic economic "backwardness",[108] the fact that scientists like Copernicus and Newton were able to discover universal physical laws without employing the dialectical method,[109] and the fact that modern scientists do not believe that the process of the universe is dialectical.[110] F.C.S. Northrop argues that any thesis can be negated in a variety of ways; that communism in Russia negated a peasant economy by leaping over an industrial stage is a case in point.[111] Chance and Lenin determined the negation as much as did any economic necessity.

Marxism, because of these inadequacies, has failed as historical methodology in three main respects: (1) to account adequately for non-economic factors in history, (2) as a result, to explain satisfactorily past historical occurences, and (3) to predict the future correctly.

Among the factors that may at times be primary, there are eight important ones Marx underestimated. First, there is the factor of "imitation" (what Toynbee calls "mimesis"), the disposition of the mass of men to follow a course of action initiated by a creative individual. There is no reason why this individual cannot,

in this way, create a unique and unpredictable movement.[112] Second, there is the factor of a general scheme of moral values (what A. Huxley calls the Perennial Philosophy) that saints and mystics have discovered in vastly dissimilar epochs and societies. See states that Engels admitted that some men have transcended class morals, but he cannot account for this by Marxist principles.[113] Third, there is the factor of psychological forces as primary in determining behaviour; Freud, for example, has shown the importance of sex as such a factor. Fourth, there is the factor of gradual change; many fundamental changes have occurred without a violent revolution.[114] Fifth, there is the factor of decadence and degeneration in the lives of civilizations.[115] The Dark Ages and not feudalism followed the decay of the Roman Empire. There is no reason, as Laski points out, why a new Dark Ages rather than communism might not follow the decline of Western civilization.[116] Seventh, there is the factor of war which Marx never explained adequately.[117] (If war is a result of capitalism, how can it be explained earlier wars?). And eighth, Marx underestimated the factor of accident, Cleopatra's beauty or Napoleon's genius, for example.

Marx and Engels, as a result of underestimating the occasional primacy of these factors, misinterpreted past historical occurences. A number of examples will illustrate this. First, the Marxist explanation of the fact that women and not men in primitive societies do the heavy work is that women are more dexterous at agricultural work. Modern anthropology findings show this to be nonsense, Federn points out;[118] women do the heavy work because they are physically weaker and are dominated by men. Matriarchal exceptions can only be explained as a combination of religious with sexual factors. Second, feudalism is best explained not as a natural result of the negation of a slave economy, as the Marxists would have it, but as a product of military necessity and the need for security in the anarchy of the Dark Ages.[119] Third, if there was only one "Asiatic" mode of production, as Marx claimed, why was it that Asia experienced so many

different societies and cultures? And fourth, capitalism, as Marx himself admitted, was in part the product of the discoveries of the explorers, and this was an "accident" rather than a necessity."[120]

Marxism as a technique for the prediction of the future is equally inadequate and again because of its unwarranted emphasis of the economic factor. This is revealed by the course of events since Marx's day. To give only three outstanding examples, socialism, which Marx predicted would come first in Germany, came first in Russia; the proletariat, instead of becoming progressively more impoverished is enjoying a progressively higher standard of living in capitalist countries; and, nationalism, instead of having disappeared among the proletariat as Marx said it would, has, since the beginning of the First World War become intensified.

The Marx who has been criticized in the preceding pages is, for the most part, Marx the crusader and propagandist. Though his analyses and prophecies were not always happy ones, the success of communism today is proof enough that behind the utopian prophet of the classless society, there was always Marx the scholar, keen and realistic in his observations. L. Schwarzchild's[121] view that but for Marx the contemporary world would have been radically different is exaggerated in its simplicity; one might suggest, however, that Marx was a prophet in the sense that his vision corresponded closely enough with reality and hopes to attract the allegiance of men who may yet substantiate the vision.

As a scholar Marx contributed to several fields of scholarship. Schumpeter has credited Marx with having made a real and lasting contribution to sociology, a contribution which compared to pre-Marxian theories, was a revolutionary advance.[122] Schlesinger goes even further and states that a sociologist today can no more reject Marxian insights and methods than a physicist can ignore Newtonian laws.[123] Marx has made an equally lasting contribution to the field of economics. Ac-

cording to Joan Robinson, modern economists are closer today to Marxian views than to classical views. "Marx," she has written, "however imperfectly he worked out the details, set himself the task of discovering the law of motion of capitalism, and if there is any hope of progress in economics at all, it must be in using academic methods to solve the problems posed by Marx."[124] Schumpeter's estimation of Marx as an economist is practically the same as Joan Robinson's. Marx's great contribution according to him was to have blended economic theory and history chemically and to have brought within the purview of economics factors (strikes, for example) which classical economists had dismissed as mere accidents.[125]

Thompson is extremely critical of Marx the historian, but he is forced to admit the great influence Marx has had in turning historians from political and diplomatic histories to the study of the underlying sociological forces.[126] See also admits this contribution, and Seligman,[127] who rejects "scientific socialism", treats Marx as the father of the economic interpretation of history which he (Seligman) accepts. The economic interpretation of history, in one form or another, is, needless to say, widely accepted among historians today.

That Marxism is both a living political and intellectual force needs no discussion; L. Schwarzchild, who bitterly laments the fact, goes so far as to describe the modern era as "the Marxian".[128] Laski was indubitably right when he wrote that Marx "...found communism a chaos and left it a movement."[129] As an intellectual force Marxism has taken many forms ranging from Charles Beard's individualistic economic interpretation of history, through Bernsteinian revisionism, to Stalinist Byzantinism, and even those who deplore communism as a religious movement and as an intellectual Weltanschauung agree that the fundamental Marxian insights must be assimilated into any philosophy of reconstruction. Bertrand Russell, for example, has written: "Both old-fashioned democracy and new-fashioned Marxism aimed at the taming of power. The former failed because it was only political, the latter because it was only economic. Without a dombination of both,

nothing approaching to the solution of the problem is possible."[130] And F.C.S. Northrop has written: "Marx has made it forever impossible hereafter for anyone to pretend to have an adequate economic or political theory or moral philosophy which does not pay attention to man's bodily as well as his ideational nature, and to the physical universe as well as to purely cultural institutions."[131]

Both as social analysis and as apocalyptic prophecy, the specter of Marxism will haunt the world for a long time to come.

Notes to Chapter II

1. I. Berlin, Karl Marx: His Life and Environment (Second Edition, London/N.Y./Toronto, 1948),p. 26
2. The following sources were used for biographical material on Marx: I. Berlin, op. cit., F. Mehring, F. Fitzgerald, trans., Karl Marx: The Story of His Life (London, n.d.), and L. Schwarzschild, The Red Prussian: The Life and Legend of Karl Marx (London, n.d.).
3. H. See, Materialisme historique et interpretation economique de l'histoire (Paris, 1927), pp. 14-15 suggests that Engels's modesty was the cause of the legend that he played second-fiddle. Karl Pedern, The Materialist Conception of History: A Critical Analysis (London, 1939), treats Engels as Marx's intellectual inferior and blames him for perverting a number of Marxian ideas. M.M. Bober, Karl Marx's Interpretation of History (Second Edition Revised, Cambridge, 1948), with whose view the present writer agrees, treats the two as a single team.
4. V.I. Lenin, "The Three Sources and Three Constituent Parts of Marxism" in K. Marx, Max Eastman ed., Capital: The Communist Manifesto: and Other Writings, pp. xxi-xxvi (N.Y., ed.), p. xxi.
5. F. Mehring, op.cit., p. 52.
6. S. Hook, "The Scope of Marxian Theory", pp. 851-60, V.F. Calverton, ed., The Making of Society (N.Y., n.d.), p. 851.
7. See A.D. Lindsay, Karl Marx's Capital: An Introductory Essay (London, first published in 1925), G.D.H. Cole, What Marx Really Meant (N.Y., 1937), and S. Hook, Towards the Understanding of Karl Marx: A Revolutionary Interpretation (London, 1933). Any reference to S. Hook below is to this particular volume.
8. F. Mehring, op. cit., pp. 531-32.
9. M.M. Bober, op. cit., p. 120. pp. 197-99.
10. K. Marx, "Theses on Feuerbach" in K. Marx and F. Engels, The German Ideology;R.Pascal,ed. Parts I & II (. N.Y., n.d.), p. 197.
11. Ibid., p. 199.
12. K. Marx, and F. Engels, R. Pascal ed., The German Ideology: Parts I & II (N.Y., n.d.), p. 7.
13. K.R. Popper, The Open Society and its Enemies, vols., II (London, n.d.), II: 95.
14. G.D.H. Cole, op. cit., pp. 12 and 16.
15. The same point of view is expressed in G. Plekhanov, trans., Eden and Cedar Paul, Fundamental Problems of Marxism (Second Edition, N.Y. n.d.), and in S. Hook, op. cit., pp. 37-38.
16. K. Marx, S. Moore and E. Aveling, trans., Capital: A Critique of Political Economy: The Process of Capitalist Production (Revised and Amplified according to Fourth German Edition, N.Y., n.d.), p. 13. This volume is only the first volume of Capital. Henceforward referred to as Capital.
17. K. Marx, and F. Engels, trans. and ed., Dona Torr, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels Correspondence: 1864-1895: A Selection with Commentary and Notes (New Edition, N.Y. 1936),p. 125. Henceforward this volume will be referred to as Selected Correspondence, the title that appears on the cover of the book. The letter to Lassalle was written on Jan. 16, 1861 from London.
18. H. See, op. cit., pp. 26-29.
19. G.H. Sabine, A History of Political Theory, (N.Y., n.d.),p. 684.
20. A.D. Lindsay, op.cit., pp. 36-36.
21. G.D.H. Cole, op. cit., p. 97.
22. G.H. Sabine, op.cit., 685-86. Lenin, The Teachings of Karl Marx (London, n.d.) shares this point of view.
23. G.H. Sabine, op.cit., p. 686.
24. K. Marx, "Discours sur la question du libre-echange" pp. 148-61, in K. Marx, Misere de la philosophie: reponse a la philosophie de misere de M. Proudhon (Paris, 1947) pp. 148-61. The first major part of this book (pp. 8-314) includes an abridged
25. synthesis of the three volumes of Capital made by J. Borchhard & translated by S.L. Trask. Henceforward this section of the book will be cited as Capital etc.

25. K. Marx, trans., N.I. Stone, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy (Chicago, n.d.), p. 11.
26. K. Federn, op. cit., pp. 13-18 passim. Federn argues that Marx was confused as to the role of intellect in the development of a mode of production; Marx seemed to say that intellect both creates a mode of production and is the result of a mode of production. This is a vicious circle. Bober and Federn both point out cases where Marx and Engel, create confusion by using different terms like mode of production, technology, and forces of production interchangeably.
27. F. Engels, trad., Bracke (A.-M. Desrousseaux), M.E. Dühring bouleverse la science (Anti-Dühring), vols. II:5-6-. (Paris, 1933-49)
28. A.D. Lindsay, op. cit., pp. 57-58.
29. G.H. Sabine, op. cit., pp. 708-09.
30. See both G.D.H. Cole, op. cit., pp. 276-77, and A.D. Lindsay, op. cit., pp. 96-109.
31. J. Robinson, An Essay on Marxian Economics (revised, London, 1947). p. 22.
32. See A.D. Lindsay, op. cit., pp. 43-45 on the question of what Marx meant by the term "class." Lindsay's conclusion is that he meant a group of people sharing common aspirations and complaints who are bound together by loyalty.
33. M.M. Bober, op. cit., p. 96.
34. K. Marx and F. Engels, Selected Correspondence, pp. 511-12. The letter referred to is one from Engels to Mehring written on July 14, 1893, from London. See also K.R. Popper, op. cit., pp. 103-14 passim.
35. S. Hook, op. cit., p. 205.
36. "The Communist Manifesto" pp. 315-55 in K. Marx, Max Eastman, ed., Capital: The Communist Manifesto: and Other Writings, p. 341. Henceforward this will be referred to as "The Communist Manifesto".
37. Selected Correspondence, p. 517, Engels was writing to H. Starkenburg on Jan. 26, 1894, from London.
38. Anti-Dühring, I:2-3.
39. Engels to C. Schmidt (Oct. 27, '90, from London), pp. 282-275 in the appendix to S. Hook, op. cit.,
40. G. Plekhanov, op. cit., p. 72.
41. See K. Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, p. 312, for Marx's explanation as to why modern man enjoys Greek art.
42. In the letter to C. Schmidt that has been cited, Engels admitted other factors affecting the legal system of a society. One of these factors is the need for camouflage on the part of the ruling classes; this results in consistency in the law. S. Hook, op. cit., p. 135 suggests tradition (cultural lag) as another factor.
43. "The Communist Manifesto", p. 343.
44. Letter to C. Schmidt, p. 276.
45. A.D. Lindsay, op. cit., p. 31.
46. K. Marx, "Marginal Notes to the Program of the German Worker's Party", in II: 17-34 in K. Marx, and F. Engels, Selected Works, vols. II,(Moscow, 1946).
47. Anti-Dühring, III: 46-47.
48. S. Hook, op. cit., p. 84.
49. Capital, p. 795.
50. Engel, in the Preface to Capital, p. 32.
51. S. Hook, op. cit., p. 248.
52. Anti-Dühring, II:71.
53. J. Strachey, The Theory and Practice of Socialism (London, 1937), p. 356.
54. Selected Correspondence. Letter to Weydemeyer, March 5, 1852, p. 57.
55. H. Laski, Communism, (London, 1926), p. 77, and S. Hook, op. cit., p. 123.
56. Engels' letter to J. Bloch, London, Sept. 21, 1890, pp. 275-278 in S. Hook, op. cit., appendix, p. 276.
57. Anti-Dühring, III:23-4.
58. Letter to J. Bloch, p. 278.
59. E. Seligman,(The Economic Interpretation of History (Second Edition, N.Y., 1907), pp. 64-7), would, together with S. Hook, disagree with this argument, while Bober and Federn would agree.

60. From a selection from The German Ideology published in K. Marx, Max Eastman, ed., Capital:The Communist Manifesto: and Other Writings, p. 118.
61. Selected Correspondence, p. 517. This is from a letter to H. Starkenburg written on Jan. 25, 1894 from London.
62. Capital, pp. 14-15.
63. Ibid., p. 15.
64. G.H. Sabine, op. cit., p. 696.
65. M.M. Bober, op. cit., p. 46.
66. K. Marx, from the Introduction to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, p. 12.
67. K. Marx, Max Eastman, ed., Capital etc., pp. 63-
68. Capital, pp. 369-371.
69. K. Marx, Max Eastman, ed., Capital etc., p. 65.
70. Ibid., p. 124.
71. Ibid., p. 85.
72. "The Communist Manifesto", p. 334.
73. M.M. Bober, op. cit., pp. 206-08.
74. Anti-Dühring, III. Engels treats capitalist society as on a moral plane that is parallel to Darwin's world of struggle and survival.
75. Capital, p. 582.
76. Ibid., p. 693.
77. Ibid., p. 536.
78. G.D.H. Cole, op. cit., p. 55.
79. V.I. Lenin, Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism: A Popular Outline (New, Revised Translation, N.Y., n.d.).
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81. S. Hook, op. cit., p. 95.
82. M.M. Bober, op. cit., p. 308.
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98. R.N. Carew Hunt, The Theory and Practice of Communism: An Introduction (London, 1950),p. 91.
99. A.M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Vital Center: The Politics of Freedom (Boston, n.d.) pp. 152-56.
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101. See p.41.
102. K. Federn, op. cit., pp. 246-51.
103. K.R. Popper, op. cit., p. 120.
104. Ibid., p. 118.
105. B. Russel, Power: A New Social Analysis (London, n.d.), p. 307.
106. K. Federn, op. cit., pp. 203-09.
107. M.M.Bober, op. cit., p. 381.
108. Ibid., pp. 384-85.
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112. K. Federn, op. cit., p. 239.
113. H. See, op. cit., p. 90.
114. Ibid., p. 111.
115. K. Federn, op. cit., pp. 186-87.
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119. J.A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (N.Y./London, n.d.),p. 13 and K. Federn, op. cit., p. 178.
120. M.M. Bober, op. cit., p. 326.
121. L. Schwarzschild, The Red Prussian: The Life and Legend of Karl Marx, (London, n.d.) p. 7.
122. J.A. Schumpeter, op. cit., pp. 13-14.
123. R. Schlesinger, Marx: His Time and Ours (London, 1950), pp. 432-33.
124. J. Robinson, op. cit., p. 95.
125. Ibid., pp. 44-46.
126. J.W. Thompson, with the collaboration of B.J. Holm, A History of Historical Writings, vols. XI, (N.Y., 1942) II:629-30.
127. E. Seligman, op. cit., p. 24.
128. L. Schwarzschild, op. cit., p. 7.
129. H. Laski, op. cit., p. 22.
130. B. Russell, Power... , pp. 297-98.
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Chapter III

Of Churches and Civilization: Toynbee's Philosophy of History

Arnold J. Toynbee, one of the several scholars to make the cover of Time[1] magazine in recent years, has already become something of a popular institution. It is almost a legend, for example, that Toynbee was first seriously challenged by history while studying at the British Archeological School in Athens in 1912. There, in the coffee houses of Greece, he first heard of Lord Grey's foreign policy, and came to understand the independence of nation states and the oneness of European history. A year or so later, while teaching Thucydides at Balliol, he suddenly saw the parallel, and so the structural similarity, between his own times and those of the Peloponnesian Wars. The interpreter of universal history was in the making.[2]

The most important reason for his contemporary fame, is, of course, that he is the author of A Study of History. The reception of the first six volumes of this work is too well known to need any discussion. Among the legion of scholars who have recognized his brilliant achievement and who have been at least momentarily overwhelmed by its magnitude, is Professor R.H. Tawney. "It is of the nature of a book so massive and so dynamic", he writes, "to sweep the reader off his feet. But it would be poor a compliment to the author if — to use his own language — the initial "rout" were not followed by a "rally". Confronted by a highly intelligent elephant, moving at the rate of a hundred yards in ten seconds, the judicious traveller takes to the nearest tree, where he presumably meditates at leisure, after recovering his breath on such vulnerable points as elephants may possess."[3] And even by those inimical to his religiousness, Toynbee enjoys the reputation of being one of the best-equipped historians of his time.

Toynbee's education as an historian began at his mother's knee. When he was a boy, his mother, a historian herself and one of the first English women to hold a university degree, read English history to him at night. His education, mostly in the classics, continued at Winchester, at Balliol College and, at the British

Archeological School in Athens. Besides this rich academic background, Toynbee has had experience, fruitful for an historian, in several areas of practical life. He served as a fellow and tutor of ancient history at Balliol and as a Professor of Modern Greek and Byzantine Studies at King's College in the University of London. From 1921-22 he worked in Greece as a foreign correspondent for the Manchester Guardian and during both World Wars, he served in the English government. Today he is co-editor of the continuous series, A Survey of International Affairs, and since 1925 he has been Director of Studies of the Royal Institute of International Affairs. [4] The first six volumes of A Study of History, his major work, were published between 1934 and 1939.

Neither the magnitude nor brilliance of A Study of History can alone account for Toynbee's contemporary fame. Perhaps the best explanation is that the profoundest dimension in this work is the spiritual. Emery Neff in The Poetry of History has suggested that modern thought, conscious of the crisis Western Society is facing, is "in search of a historian" who can show the way to salvation.[5] This crisis is, of course, essentially spiritual. A Study of History, whether regarded as a symptom of a failure of nerve, as the atheistic rationalist would have it, or as a sign of spiritual revival, is a book of and for the times.[6]

Though his Protestant faith permeates A Study of History, Toynbee gives the impression of being ironically calm, objective, and sometimes even whimsical. At one point in his work, while analyzing the origins of modern race feeling in Protestantism, he makes such a favorable case for Catholicism, that he feels obliged to state in a foot-note, that "...it may be pertinent for him (the author) to mention that he was brought up as a Protestant and that he has not become a Catholic." [7] Toynbee's Christian theism is always explicit, but it is never forced upon his material. On the contrary, his frequent use of the conditional should be anathema to those Christians who are certain of a divine working in history. Toynbee, to use Professor Harbinson's phrase, "is "first of all a Christian and a historian." [8]

Toynbee's method of historical study is empirical. Put simply, this means that tentative observations which he makes are tried by a number of test-cases. The original hypotheses are then either modified or discarded, or else they become laws. Toynbee never presumes to claim scientific validity for his laws; they are simply historical patterns he has observed in operation in the various civilizations he has studied. Their value for the understanding of the present and future is suggestive and not final. Professor Trevelyan rightly points out that the variety or absence of responses to various challenges in Toynbee's scheme of history is either explicable by chance or by a faith in divine intervention. "How are you," he asks, "to make a 'Philosophy of History' out of such a casual affair?"[10] Toynbee, then, is not a determinist. The future of a civilization cannot be predicted; "...our future", he writes, "largely depends upon ourselves. We are not just at the mercy of an inexorable fate."[11] Toynbee suggests how God might work in history; he never insists that He does so work and certainly he never claims that God's plans for the future can be fully known to man.[11a]

Toynbee does insist, however, that now is the time when the voluminous data of the fact-finders and writers of monographs must be integrated in an interpretative and meaningful whole.[12] The collecting of facts and their synthesis he describes as "...two antithetical yet complementary activities."[13] A Study of History is such an attempt to fulfill the second beat of what he terms this "rythm" of historical scholarship.

Since history has interpretative functions, he rejects the Aristotelian view that history is a mere technique for gathering "particulars" in contrast to poetry which deals with "universals." History and fiction, which both originated in mythology, were later differentiated not on the basis of "truth" involved in each, but according to the quantity of data each seeks to interpret. Where fiction deals with the innumerable data of personal relationships, and so must use the intuitive method, history deals with institutional relations (the highest insti-

tutions being civilizations), an area where the data are "...too numerous to tabulate but not too numerous to survey," and so use the scientific method. [14]

Thus both fiction and history seek to discover "universals"; the difference is that their fields of investigation are quantitatively different.

However, though he uses the technique of science in his study of institutional relation, Toynbee does not conceive of history as a science. Toynbee admits that "...it remains true that the facts of the highest order, the 'intelligible fields of study', the comparable units of history (i.e. civilizations) remain inconveniently few for the application of the scientific technique, the elucidation and formulation of laws. None the less, at our own peril, we intend to hazard the attempt..." [15] Toynbee makes no claims to being able to predict the future; he provides no patent solution to the crisis of the twentieth century. He is a man who has devoted a great part of his life to the study of human historical experience. He says, in effect: "This is what I have observed in my study of civilizations. Here are the paths that have led to destruction in past experience, and here are the paths that have led to growth and creativity. We are in a state of peril today; we can save ourselves by benefitting from the experiences of others; we can save ourselves from destruction by avoiding the errors others have made."

Although Toynbee approaches history from an oecumenical point of view, he does not conceive of history as one in the sense of revealing the development of a single civilization. [16] History to be coped with must be, and can be, divided into a number of "intelligible fields of study." These units he calls civilizations. [17] He means by this that no nation can be studied alone, while each civilization can be studied, at least during its period of growth, without reference to any other civilization. In other words, each civilization is "self-determined", that is, it finds the sources of its growth within itself and it, itself, creates its own destruction. [18]

Civilizations, Toynbee writes, "...are not static conditions of societies

but dynamic movements of an evolutionary kind."[19] While each possesses a unique character, the patterns of their birth, growth, breakdown, and disintegration are the same. For this reason Toynbee considers civilizations to be philosophically contemporary and equal in value.[20] He identifies twenty-six civilizations in history, of which ten are extant today.[21] Of these ten all, except perhaps Western Society, are either "arrested" (that is they have stopped growing at a certain point) or they show signs of disintegration. Although Western Society may be in a state of disintegration, it is still vital enough to threaten all the other civilizations with absorption.[22]

A civilization, though a unique phenomenon, may be related to another civilization in time, when the death of one gives birth to another. This relationship Toynbee calls "Apparentation-and Affiliation"; it is a relationship analogous to that between parents and children.[23] An example of Apparentation-and Affiliation is the relationship between the Hellenic Society, which by its disintegration, gave birth to the Christian Church, and Western Society which emerged from this Christian Church.

A Civilization is born, according to Toynbee, not for environmental or racial reasons,[24] but because a group of people meet a given "challenge" with a successful "response",[25] and the civilization continues to grow because fresh challenges are met with equally successful responses. The mass of people in any society, however, does not answer the challenges forced upon society. This is always the work of either a creative individual or a creative minority. As long as the minority is creative it will inspire the masses to meet the challenge, by setting an example. The masses are persuaded and follow the minority in its response. Civilizations are born in this manner, and so do they grow.

Growth is essentially a progress toward "self-determination" (or self-articulation), which means that the field of challenge is shifted from the external world to the inward;..." a growing personality or civilisation," in Toynbee's words[26],

"tends to become its own field of action."[26] This process of self-determination, the most important sign of growth, is called "etherialization."[27] It is a simplification of social and human techniques which releases forces in man and society previously repressed by too close an attachment to the material and the external. This process of etherialization works in all fields of life. Fpr example, in art it has resulted in the purer form of music, in communication it has produced telephones and less rigidly inflected languages. But etherialization does not only involve simplification; it also means, writes Toynbee, "... a transfer of energy, a shift of emphasis, from some lower sphere of being or sphere of action to a higher sphere."[28] In other words, in a growing civilization not only do the processes and techniques of life become progressively more simplified, but the spiritual element in man is released and finds progressively greater freedom.

Another sign of the growth of a society is a "differentiation" of its individual members who are at the same time bound by an underlying unity.[29] Civilizations grow, Toynbee writes, "...through an élan that carries them through response to further challenge and from differentiation through integration to differentiation again."[30] A civilization is growing when it is in a state of spiritual development, when its differentiated members, and so the society, are becoming constantly more free and less dependent on external stimuli.

While in growth the differentiated parts of a civilization are integrated and the directing minority holds the allegiance of the masses through persuasion, when a breakdown occurs this process is reversed. The integration of the society is disrupted and the ruling minority, unable to meet the challenge, and so no longer creative, is obliged to employ force to control the now recalcitrant majority.[32] The creative minority thus becomes the dominant minority. The penalization for this loss of harmony between the parts of a society is a "loss of self-determination."[33] The society is now split (social schism),and at war with itself.

The various civilizations that have appeared in history have revealed a

common rythm of disintegration. First there is a "rout" which is followed by a "rally". Then occurs a more severe rout which this time is coped with by the imposition of a "universal state" upon the discordant elements of the social body. The civilization is now ready for dissolution into an "interregnum" (state of anarchy) or for destruction at the hands of an external enemy. [34]

As the society disintegrates it creates within itself a class of men who are in the society but not of it. This is the internal proletariat.[35] At the same time it loses the loyalty of a class of men outside the civilization proper who instead of being absorbed as before now are incited to rebellion because of oppression. This is the external proletariat.[36] This sign of social schism (which can be either horizontal, that is geographical; or vertical, a matter of ~~caii~~ class division) is the outward sign of an internal, spiritual disintegration (schism in the soul).[37] Civilizations, as stated above, do not collapse because of an external pressure; they destroy themselves.

From among the oppressed and miserable proletariat of the disintegrating civilization, a new creative minority appears because of the "need to be reborn" (palingenesia); this minority creates a "universal church" which may form, in turn, the chrysalis out of which a new civilization will grow.[38] It is only this new creative minority that can now offer salvation, and this only on a "supra-mundane" spiritual plane.[39]

As far as civilizations go, Toynbee's conception is cyclical; civilizations are born, they grow, they suffer a breakdown, and they disintegrate. However, Toynbee suggests, this might possibly be only part of the story. Toynbee is a theist; his ultimate conception of history is a Christian one. "While civilizations rise and fall," he writes, "and, in falling give rise to others, some purposeful enterprise, higher than theirs, may all the time be making headway, and, in a divine plan, the learning that comes through suffering caused by the failure of civilizations may be the sovereign means of progress."[40] This "purposeful enter-

prise" is God's, and the end He seeks to realise through it, according to Toynbee, is "...a cumulative increase in the means of Grace at the disposal of each soul in the world."[41] In other words, there may be an unilinear progress, not on a material plane (though the indirect fruits may be social progress), but on a religious plane. Toynbee conceives of the possibility that Western Society, as it disintegrates, may provide a "world-wide repetition of the Roman Empire" for Christianity to spread over.[42] Christianity, as the heir to all the religions that have preceded it, will then reign supreme on earth.

Churches in Toynbee's scheme, therefore, play a very important role. Not only do they serve as the haven for the members of a civilization in decline and the possible chrysalises of civilizations to come, but they are also "ends" representing a higher stage than civilizations.[43] "It seems almost as if civilizations have to fall in order that higher religions may arise..."[44] Toynbee concludes. This is, of course, the theme of De Civitate Dei; it is not strange that Toynbee should identify his work with St. Augustine's.[45]

In evaluating Toynbee's work, a question that immediately arises is whether his theism does not disqualify him as a historian. Professor E.H. Harbison deals with this question in a small pamphlet entitled Religious Perspectives of College Teaching in History. He argues that not only need one's Christian faith not prejudice one's historical scholarship, but that the Christian faith can give the historian an invaluable depth of vision into the historical process. Professor Harbison bases his argument on two main points. First, every historian is bound to give coherence to the multiplicity of historical data in terms of some outlook whether consciously or unconsciously; "...the knower," he writes, "is intimately involved in the process of knowing."[46] Second, Christianity, by its very nature, should give the historian both an oecumenical point of view, thus freeing him from the halters of national or racialist prejudice, and a sense of the multiplicity and unpredictability of human responses.[47] Professor Harbison, of course, neither

claims that Christian qua Christian is better qualified than a non-Christian to be a historian, nor that all Christians are qualified to be historians. He simply makes the point that a Christian can be a good historian, and conversely a historian can be a good Christian.

This point of view, which is also Toynbee's, naturally denies the possibility that history can be reduced to a science. For the Christian theist, the "...church stands first; and at the outset we must assume, Henry Adams has written, "that the church will not and cannot accept any science of history, because science, by its definitions, must exculde the idea of a personal and active providence."[48] If history can be reduced to a science, then, Toynbee's theistic conception, which must allow for free will and for divine intervention, is incorrect, and must go the way of other unscientific systems. In the final analysis, Toynbee, as a Christian historian, is conditioned and perhaps, in rejecting the possibility of scientific necessity, limited by his religiousness.

Toynbee's approach to history, for this reason, must be rejected by Marxists and all others who believe that history can be reduced to a science.[49] Yet, strangely enough, Toynbee has been attacked for preaching a type of historical determinism. Professor K.R. Popper, for example, in his The Open Society and Its Enemies criticizes Toynbee on this count.[50]

Professor Popper is hostile to any attempt to reduce history to a system (an aberration which he calls "historicism"), because it is dangerous to human freedom and responsibility as well as being intellectually invalid. "Historicism," he writes, "is not only rationally untenable, it is also in conflict with any religion that teaches the importance of conscience."[51] There is something hysterical in his attitude. His viewpoint, as far as the writer of this paper can see, is quite compatible with Toynbee's, yet Professor Popper goes on to accuse Toynbee of "contemporary irrationalism".[52] He means by this, that Toynbee's work is another symptom of a pessimistic loss of faith in the possibility of a rational solution of contemporary problems.

He gives as an example Toynbee's treatment of Karl Marx. Toynbee, according to Professor Popper, by explaining Marx solely as a prophet motivated by a twisted religious drive, does not take his proposals for social reform seriously.[52a] This is not a just criticism. Toynbee's point is that Marxism, whatever its program might be, is essentially a form of religion, and that it will fail because it is an incomplete religion.[53] Although it derives its spiritual drive from Christianity, it has left out the essential conception of the City of God as the reason for the brotherhood of man. Without this spiritual dimension, socialism cannot succeed, Toynbee argues. But far from denying the valid points in Marxist philosophy, Toynbee conceives Marxism as both a product of a failure in Christianity and as a challenge that might stimulate Christianity to recognize its proper duties in the twentieth century.[54] In an article which appeared in The New York Herald Tribune in 1949, "How to turn the tables on Russia " Toynbee dealt with the Russian challenge to Western civilization.[55] "What is the main objective of our western society in our times?" he wrote,"I should say that it is to go on extending to the whole of society the material and spiritual benefits already enjoyed by the middle class." Toynbee, far from advocating a theistic determinism, thus recognized the need and the possibility of consciously applied reforms. It is difficult to see any validity in Professor Popper's criticism.

Professor R.H. Tawney's evaluation[56] is both more urbane and less sweeping. Although he expresses deep admiration for A Study of History, he makes several pointed criticisms of Toynbee's method. This method, he writes, "...is to formulate explanations, and then to illustrate, test, and confirm them by passages in the history of different civilizations."[57] The last step, the confirmation of the explanation, Tawney considers to be precarious. "It involves", he writes, "detaching particular developments or episodes from their context in the life of the society to which they belong, and then using them as evidence of the general conclusion which it is desired to illustrate."[58] One of the examples Tawney uses is, again, Toynbee's treatment of Marxism. He accuses Toynbee of lifting Marx out of his

historical context in order to prove that he is a prophet in the Christian tradition. In doing this, Toynbee ignores the fact that Marx's ethical premises came from the French Revolution and his economic ideas from the industrial capitalism of England.[59] Tawney's criticism is well-taken; where Toynbee extracts examples from their context, he is, of course, subject to the criticism of the specialist.

Another criticism Tawney makes, a less valid one, is that Toynbee minimizes the importance of national cultures in emphasizing the importance of civilizations.[60] Toynbee's point is that where particular national members of a civilization are too highly articulated, that civilization is possibly in a state of disintegration. This happened in the Hellenic society and resulted in the Peloponnesian wars; this might be what began to happen to Western society before the sixteenth century with the Religious Wars of that century as the tragic consequence.

R.G. Collingwood, in his Idea of History,[61] also expressed a sceptical view of Toynbee's method. His criticism, although it is based on a reading of only the first three volumes of A Study of History, is fundamental enough to be mentioned. Collingwood, a philosopher of history himself, regards history as a continuous process rather than a series of discrete phenomena. The only adequate approach to the understanding of this process is the imaginative and intuitive, and not the positivistic.[62] Toynbee, by using the scientific technique, falsifies the historical process by artificially dividing it into discrete and unrelated units (civilizations). For example, Collingwood points out, Toynbee seems to regard the Hellenic Society and the Western as two separate phenomena instead of as two manifestations of one continuous stream.[62a]

Toynbee anticipates this criticism.[63] He admits that there is a "continuity of history" in an abstract sense, but he insists that the individual units called civilizations possess unique and individual personalities, as, for example, do people. Western society is related to Hellenic society, as has been pointed out, by Apprentation-and Affiliation. This does not mean, however, that Western society does not possess a unique personality which is different from the Hellenic, any-

more than that a child does not grow up to be a different person from his parents.

To the mind of the writer of this paper at least, Collingwood's point is answered in the actual writing of A Study of History. Toynbee, as Collingwood himself admits, is too good an historian either to ignore the element of continuity in history or to sacrifice the living reality of history to any procrustean system. As the reader soon finds out, A Study of History is essentially an imaginative conception of universal history from the point of view of a mature and scholarly Christian historian. However vulnerable its philosophical structure may be, this attempt of an historian to interpret man's experience in light of the crisis of the modern world is both courageous and worthwhile.

Notes to Chapter III

1. Time (March, 17, 1947), p. 71-72.
2. A.J. Toynbee, Civilization on Trial (N.Y., 1948), p. 7.
3. R.H. Tawney, "Dr. Toynbee's Study of History" in International Affairs (Nov., 1939), XVIII:801.
4. The biographical facts have been taken from "A.J. Toynbee" in ed. A. Rothe, Current Biography: Who's News and Why 1947(N.Y.), pp. 644-46, and from the first chapter ("My View of History) of Civilization on Trial, pp. 3-15.
5. Emery Neff, The Poetry of History (N.Y., 1947), Chapter I is entitled "Twentieth-Century Thought in Search of an Historian".
6. F.M. Sweezy, "Signs of the Times" in The Nation(N.Y., Oct. 19, 1946). This article is mentioned by F.L. Shuman in International Politics: The Destiny of the Western State System (N.Y., Toronto, London, 1948), fn., p. 14. The writer of this present paper read it when it first appeared. It deals with the question suggested in this paper.
7. A.J. Toynbee, A Study of History, vols. VI (London, 1934-39), I:227. Henceforward in these notes, A Study of History will be referred to as A Study...
8. S.Harris Harbison, Religious Perspectives of College Teaching in History (The Edward W. Hazen Foundation, New Haven, n.d.), p. 28.
9. Civilization on Trial, pp. 9-10.
10. G.M. Trevelyan, An Autobiography and Other Essays (London, N.Y., Toronto, 1949), p. 83.
11. Civilization on Trial, p. 41, In A Study..., I:300-301, Toynbee points out that it is impossible to predict how any one group of people will react to a given challenge. At the basis of his scheme, therefore, there is an unknown quantity. "This unknown quantity," he writes, "is the reaction of the actors to the ordeal when it actually comes."

11a. Concerning the possible working of God in history, Toynbee in A Study... VI:324, writes metaphorically: "If, then, as it turns out, even Penelope has never woven nor drawn her threads in vain, what of the mightier weaver whose work is our study and whose song our ears have caught already in an earlier part of this book?"

12. A Study... I:1-6 passim.
13. Ibid, I:50.
14. Ibid, I:452. Toynbee deals with the relationship between science, fiction, and history in "Annex to I.C(iii) (e)", I:441-64. The section is entitled "Methods of Apprehension, Subjects of Study, and Quantities of Data".
15. A.J. Toynbee, abridger, D.C. Somervell, A Study of History (An Abridgement of Volumes I-VI), (N.Y., London, 1947). This quotation is taken from this abridgement rather than A Study... because it is more succinctly put there. The abridgement was gone over by Toynbee and has his full approval. Somervell has reduced the quantity of material in the original, but in no way the style or the spirit.
16. A Study..., I:149-71.
17. Ibid., I:22. Although Toynbee uses the terms civilization and culture interchangeably, he differentiates between "primitive cultures" which have no real history, and those cultures (civilizations) which do. See A Study..., I:147-49.
18. Ibid., V: 338.
19. Ibid., 176.
20. Ibid., I:172-77.
21. See A Study..., I:129-146, and IV:1-3.
22. Ibid., IV:2.
23. Ibid., I:44.
24. For Toynbee's reasons for rejecting environmental and racial explanations of the birth of civilizations, see Ibid., I:227-71, passim.
25. Ibid., I:271-315, passim.
26. Ibid., III:216.
27. Ibid., III:174-92, passim.
28. Ibid., III:183.
29. Ibid., III:337-90, passim.
30. Ibid., III:128.
32. Ibid., VI:279ff. Toynbee summarizes the nature of breakdowns in the following words,

(Ibid., IV:6) a breakdown is "...a failure of creative power in the minority, an answering withdrawal of mimesis on the part of the majority, and a consequent loss of social unity in the society as a whole."

33. Ibid., IV:133.
34. Ibid., IV: 283.
35. Ibid., I;fn., 41.
36. Ibid., V:19 ff.
37. Ibid., V:27.
38. Ibid., IV:171-74. The problem of whether the real catastrophes are the breakdowns or the births of civilizations will be treated in Part VII of the Study, entitled "Universal Churches". This part has not yet been published.
39. Ibid., VI:174.
40. Civilization on Trial, p. 15.
41. Ibid., 262-63.
42. Ibid., 239.
43. A.J. Toynbee, "Churches and Civilizations" in The Yale Review (Sept. '47, pp. 1-8) XXXVII:4-5.
44. Ibid., p.6.
45. A Study...IV:viii-ix.
46. E.H. Harbison, op. cit., p. 8.
47. Ibid., pp. 23-24.
48. This passage is taken from Henry Adams's presidential address to the American Historical Association in 1894. It appears in eds., C.P. Curtis and F. Greenslet, The Practical Cogitator or the Thinkers Anthology (Boston, n.d., pp. 125-130), p. 128.
49. For such an inimical attitude towards the theistic historian see Sidney Hook, Towards the Understanding of Karl Marx: A Revolutionary Interpretation (London, 1933), pp. 109-116, passim
50. K.R. Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies (London, first published in 1945, vls. II), Criticisms of Toynbee are to be found scattered through volume II which is entitled "The High Tide of Prophecy: Hegel, Marx, and the Aftermath")
51. Ibid., II:256.
52. Ibid., II:237.
52a. Ibid., II:239.
53. A Study...V: 581-87.
54. Ibid., V:586-87.
55. July 25, 1949, p. 7.
56. R.H. Tawney, op. cit. (See note 3).
57. Ibid., 801.
58. Ibid.
59. Ibid., 802.
60. Ibid., 805-806.
61. R.G. Collingwood, The Idea of History (Oxford, the first edition(1946)reprinted photographically(1948) with sheets of the first edition), pp. 159-65.
62. Ibid., 163.
62.a. A more extensive criticism of Toynbee along these lines appears in Pitrim Sorokin's Social Philosophies of an Age of Crisis (Boston 1950); Sorokin shares with Toynbee and other modern social philosophers like F.C.S. Northrop, Oswald Spengler and Albert Schweitzer, the views that the number of cultural units that have appeared in history are few(p. 277), that the linear view of history as a progressive march towards an ideal is untenable (p. 279), that Western civilization is today in a state of crisis, (pp297-98) and that this crisis is likely to breed a new set of supra-materialistic values of some sort (Ibid). He criticises Toynbee's conception of a "civilization" as being a single unity instead of "a cultural field where a multitude of vast and small cultural systems and congeries partly mutually harmonious, partly neutral, partly contradictory- co-exist." (p. 213). Toynbee is also vulnerable, according to Sorokin, for treating a "civilization" as the smallest unit of historical study. (pp. 214-15). No "civilization" can be understood alone, since in its body, ideals and techniques of other "civilizations"continue to exist. Since, Sorokin argues,

a"civilization" has no unity, it can neither be "born" nor "disintegrate", (pp. 217-31 passim). Sorokin observes, as does Collingwood, that Toynbee contradicts the artificial rigidity of his scheme in the actual writing of his history. Thus, Sorokin points out, Toynbee describes changes in the techniques and economic life of a civilization without any corresponding changes in other areas of that civilization's life. (p. 213). This contradicts Toynbee's view of a civilization as "a causal or causal-meaningful system."

63. A Study..., I:43-44.

Chapter IV

Bellum Omnium Contra Omnes

Hegel-Marx-Toynbee: The Crisis of Western Civilization

The plethora of scholarly studies and works of literature, today, that deal with social disintegration and moral despair is evidence enough that the West is in a state of crisis. One need only cite several titles of recent works to indicate this: Auden's The Age of Anxiety, Koestler's The Age of Longing, Sorokin's The Crisis of Our Age, Cousin's Modern Man in Obsolete, Spengler's The Decline of the West, and Eliot Paul's The Annihilation of Man. This state of crisis is a refutation of the optimistic rationalism of Hegelianism, a predicted, fertile field for communism, and perhaps the Armageddon of the Christian philosopher. An attempt will be made in this chapter to draw the main lines of this crisis from the points of view of each of the three historical philosophers at hand, and then to formulate a synthesis of their respective analyses.

Before discussing the crisis, however, it will be fruitful first to compare and contrast their respective schemes of historical interpretation.

There are obvious similarities between the schemes of Hegel and Marx. Both believed in dialectical necessity, both were optimistic as to the possibility of realizing salvation on earth, and both saw freedom as the goal of history. Marx never denied his great intellectual debt to his predecessor in dialectical historicism, but many scholars agree that Marx's claim to have surpassed Hegel by turning him right side up was based on a misconception of Hegelian, as distinct from earlier, idealism.[1] Where their philosophies differ is first, in the analysis of the state of things contemporary to themselves; second, in the possibility of revolutionary action, and third, in the key to past historical occurrences which could be similarly used to unlock the future. Concerning the first, Marx reacted against Hegel's optimism about the virtue of the Prussian state; where Hegel saw organic unity, Marx saw class exploitation, and where Hegel saw the rule of the rational

state over civil society, Marx saw the state as the agent of the dominating class in civil society.[2] In the second case, it has already been shown that Hegel did not believe that history could be predicted, while Marx believed both that it could be and that it should be predicted. If one were to leave the issue here, the third case, the question of unlocking the future, would have no meaning. However, Hegel's disciples, the Young Hegelians, realized that history could not stop with Hegel's death. Instead of remaining satisfied with a rational reality, they sought to make reality rational,[3] and the key to successful change, they believed, was ideological. Marx, in his acrid treatise on the Young Hegelians, The Holy Family, attacked them on this point, and if the Young Hegelians were right in believing that Hegel can be interpreted to have advocated a technique for change, Marx's criticisms are real if not correct. Marx's major point of criticism was that the Young Hegelians were guilty of naive and chauvinistic pipe-dreaming in imagining that any Absolute could be realized by the mental exercises of a German élite and that it could then conquer the world.[4] Enough has been said about the Young Hegelians to indicate that if Hegel's idealogical principles of historical change are employed in dealing with the future, Marx and Hegel are obviously at opposite poles. According to Marx, Hegel would be seeking change abortively on the superstructural level, while according to Hegel, Marx's class-warfare would only occur as a result of defects in the rationality of an ideology.[5] In other words, the difference, between the Marxian and the Hegelian monistic conceptions of past history are verbal, and it is only in the application of their concepts to the future, unchartered as far as the non-determinist is concerned, that the differences between them become of prime importance.

Toynbee's scheme of history differs fundamentally from the Marxian and the Hegelian schemes. Where they rest on the principle of inevitability, his rests on the principle of probabilities; where they assume the progressive unfolding of one civilization, he conceives of a number of civilization rising and falling, and in their declines interacting; where they treat man as an agent of Necessity, he

state over civil society, Marx saw the state as the agent of the dominating class in civil society.[2] In the second case, it has already been shown that Hegel did not believe that history could be predicted, while Marx believed both that it could be and that it should be predicted. If one were to leave the issue here, the third case, the question of unlocking the future, would have no meaning. However, Hegel's disciples, the Young Hegelians, realized that history could not stop with Hegel's death. Instead of remaining satisfied with a rational reality, they sought to make reality rational,[3] and the key to successful change, they believed, was ideological. Marx, in his acrid treatise on the Young Hegelians, The Holy Family, attacked them on this point, and if the Young Hegelians were right in believing that Hegel can be interpreted to have advocated a technique for change, Marx's criticisms are real if not correct. Marx's major point of criticism was that the Young Hegelians were guilty of naive and chauvinistic pipe-dreaming in imagining that any Absolute could be realized by the mental exercises of a German élite and that it could then conquer the world.[4] Enough has been said about the Young Hegelians to indicate that if Hegel's ideological principles of historical change are employed in dealing with the future, Marx and Hegel are obviously at opposite poles. According to Marx, Hegel would be seeking change abortively on the superstructural level, while according to Hegel, Marx's class-warfare would only occur as a result of defects in the rationality of an ideology.[5] In other words, the difference, between the Marxian and the Hegelian monistic conceptions of past history are verbal, and it is only in the application of their concepts to the future, unchartered as far as the non-determinist is concerned, that the differences between them become of prime importance.

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treats man as responsible for his actions; and where they identify an absolute with history, he conceives of God as eternal and transcendant. "Salvation", according to Toynbee, "cannot, of course, be sought anywhere except in the working of the consciences of individual human beings..."[6]

Toynbee, therefore, offers man the hope and anxieties of freedom while Hegel and Marx offer man the certainty or despair of Necessity.

Toynbee's scheme is different from Hegel's scheme, in particular, on three major points. First, Hegel believed war to be creative, while Toynbee believes that war is probably the "key to the breakdown of civilizations".[7] Second, Hegel believed that a nation state has a self-contained life. Toynbee would agree with Croce's criticism of Hegelian history that Germany cannot be treated as a closed system because into its making have gone contributions belonging to European history as a whole.[8] And third, while Hegel believed that the rise of fully sovereign states was socially progressive, Toynbee believes that it was socially disruptive.

Toynbee's scheme, similarly, differs from Marx's scheme on a number of crucial points. First, it differs as to the relative importance of the economic factor in history. While Marx considered this the fundamental factor, Toynbee writes that "...what we have called the cultural element in a civilization is its soul and life-blood and marrow and pith and essence and epitome, while the political and, a fortiori, the economic elements are, by comparison, superficial and non-essential and trivial manifestations of a civilization's nature and vehicles of its activity."[9] Toynbee never denies the reality or importance of political changes like the rise of nationalism or of economic changes like the Industrial Revolution; he does insist that the character each took was the result of a moral failure to assimilate them into Western Christendom. Second, while Marx saw a need "...to liberate the conscience from the witchery of religion"[10] and while he saw the social principle of Christianity as principles of class exploitation,[11] Toynbee believes that social principles divorced from Christianity are bound to lead to bankruptcy

and subsequently to moral enormities. Toynbee would agree with R. Postgate that Marxist morality was originally the liberal morality it repudiated (Lenin) and that the communists by denying this morality, ended up with no morality at all (Stalin).[12] But while Postgate believes the socialist should assimilate the political morality of the French Revolution into his scheme, Toynbee would add that the morality of the French Revolution was Christian in origin and that unless fructified continuously by the Christian faith it too will run dry. Toynbee could also use the testimonies of the ex-fellow-traveller or ex-communist writers in The God That Failed to make his point.

It is from these different points of view that Hegel, Marx, and Toynbee shed light on the crisis of today.

A fundamental aspect of the crisis of the West is what W. Friedman has called "The Crisis of the Nation-State."[13] In a world inter-related through commerce and industry as never before, and with the rise of multi-national states (Soviet Union, Commonwealth), and in an age rife with international ideologies that regard nationalism as reactionary and regressive, Hegel's absolute is now seen to be a relative institution. Friedman cautions, however, that it still is possible for the nation-state to survive by a policy of strict autarky because of modern techniques of production.[14] However, he argues that it was the doctrine of absolute sovereignty, promulgated by Hegel, that is largely responsible for the chaos of the world today.[15]

That Europe's failure to transcend this concept is responsible for her present weakness and bankruptcy in face of the giant-states of Russia and the United States, is the opinion of many students. "Europe", Paul Valery wrote as early as 1926, "obviously aspires to be governed by an American committee."[16] Ortega y Gasset has written: "The real difficulty...has its roots, not in this or that economic problem which may present itself, but in the fact that the form of public life in which the economic capabilities should develop themselves is altogether

inadequate to the magnitude of the latter. To my mind, the feeling of shrinkage, of impotency, which undoubtedly lies heavy on the vitality of Europe in these times is nourished on that disproportion between the great potentialities of Europe and the form of political organization within which they have to act."[17] Europe according to the same author, can emerge from her state of demoralization only through "...the determination to construct a great nation from the group of peoples of the Continent..." [18]Denis de Rougemont, writing along almost the same lines, argues that Europe can only be saved if she transcends her "anachronistic rivalries" and becomes a federation. [19]

One aspect of the crisis of the West today, then, is the political anarchy of Europe which is a source of her political and economic helplessness. The concept of sovereignty that Hegel regarded as the highest attainment in European civilization, and the institution of war, which Hegel advocated as a method of inspiring patriotism and unity within a state, are today prime sources of the anarchy and chaos of Europe and, in like manner, of the world. Hegel, in short, was a false prophet.

A second aspect, one that is intimately related to the first, is the economic one that involves the disintegration of the capitalistic system of production because of its failure to automatically cure unemployment, control crises, or produce economic freedom.[20] This disintegration is a two-fold one; it involves the disappearance of areas of competition due to monopoly, and it involves a loss of faith in a competitive system because of its inequalities and because of its tendencies to sink periodically into slumps. This is the crisis that was unevenly predicted by Karl Marx. According to Marx's latter-day disciple, Lenin, the disasterous wars of contemporary society are a result of the attempts of the ruling capitalist class of each nation to seek escape from over-production and class-war in imperialism.[21] The national governments, which are the agents of the capitalists, compete for colonies until they inevitably clash in war.[22] From the Marxist point

of view, then, national rivalries are a necessary consequence of a system of production whose contradictions have deepened and which, in theory at least, has intensified class-struggle. The wars of imperialism produce so much dislocation and suffering that they set the scene for the proletarian revolutions.

Toynbee agrees with a great deal of what the Marxist has to say and with what those who regard the political crisis as fundamental have to say. He recognizes the pernicious effects of the Industrial Revolution, the existence of a restive city proletariat, the "specter of unemployment" that persistently haunts the modern world, and the destructiveness of modern nationalism.[23] The reason for this crisis, he believes, was the failure of Europe as a whole to respond successfully to the new challenges of industrialism and democracy;[24] a failure that accounts for the channellization of some of the West's great technological techniques into the production of atom bombs, and of the spirit of equalitarianism into forms of tribalist militarism. It also accounts for the existence of a proletariat hostile to Western values and ripe for conversion to faiths like Nazism and Communism which seek the destruction of the West. Furthermore, Toynbee, as has already been indicated, believes that Western Civilization has become global, first because of the moribund state of all other civilizations, a state which provides a vacuum for expansion, and second, because in her state of disintegration, the West has turned to Imperialism. The fruits of this expansion form a vital part of the crisis, for Western Civilization is now threatened not only by her internal proletariat, but also by the external proletariat of her imperial domains. In a recent radio talk[25] on "The Impact of the West on Asia" he outlined the serious danger of an Asiatic population with its newly acquired Western ideas, techniques, and problems, turning to Russia for leadership rather than to a morally bankrupt Europe.

At the heart of the contemporary crisis, according to Toynbee, is neither national rivalry, nor economic competitiveness, but the spiritual demoralization of man and the bankruptcy of the modern secular faiths he lives by.

Recently a growing body of literature has appeared which accepts as fundamental such an interpretation of the crisis of the West. Six such works worthy of mention are Reinhold Niebuhr's The Nature and Destiny of Man, Leslie Paul's The Annihilation of Man, P. Drucker's The End of Economic Man, Pitrim Sorokin's The Crisis of Our Age, Joseph Krutch's The Modern Temper, and Christopher Dawson's The Judgement of the Nations. Niebuhr, writing from a neo-Orthodox point of view, brilliantly analyzes the inadequacies of secular faiths which have all proved failures because they have underestimated the power of evil and because their effect has been to reduce human individuality to an unimportant element in either a mechanistic, an idealistic, or a tribalist scheme.[26] Leslie Paul argues that Western Civilization is Christian in essence and that when Christianity ceases to "nourish and sustain" liberal ideas, these will finally run dry; religion alone, he argues, demands holiness as well as intellectual rightness, and it alone "implicates man's will."[27] The sickness of society today, Paul believes with Niebuhr, is a result of the "annihilation of man" as a result of the extraordinary prestige the secular faith of science has gained.[28] The cumulative effect of Darwinism, Marxism, Freudianism, Behaviourism, and the like, has been to destroy man's confidence in his free will and to make him feel a "robot" ruled by blind forces. It has also led to the desiccation of man's poetic and intuitive faculties because his non-scientific insights are considered to be little more than day-dreams.[29] This demoralization, Paul believes, is the deepest cause of fascism which he interprets as an internal revolt against the West.[30]

Drucker's analysis, upon which Paul drew heavily, is that socialism as well as capitalism have proven to be false gods.[31] He wrote: "The proof that the economic freedom of the individual does not automatically or dialectically lead to equality, has destroyed the very concept of the nature of man on which both capitalism and socialism were based; Economic Man."[32] With the collapse of faith in a world working according to rational laws and evolving towards an ideal a considerable segment of the masses has sought salvation in the mystique of fascism.

which Drucker describes as "...a sorcerer able to work powerful miracles that the masses in Europe demand and need to allay their intolerable terror of a world which demons have reconquered."[33]

Sorokin's sociological analysis, which, one might say, is no more scientific than Toynbee's, is that the "sensate" values of Western Civilization have enabled a great materialistic civilization to arise, but that the stimulus has, today, run out, to leave man with "a temporalistic, relativistic, and nihilistic mentality,"[34] in a world of anarchy, eclecticism, and sterility.[35] The reason for this bankruptcy is that no eternal values exist to bind men together, and this is because modern culture is based on materialistic values, which are self-refuting since values can have no empirical basis. Toynbee would accept most of Sorokin's conclusions except for Sorokin's fundamental conclusion that a sensate culture can ever be as genuinely creative as an "ideational" one. If the creative minority of Western Christendom has not "committed suicide", science and technology would have been assimilated into Western culture as servants rather than as masters.

Joseph Krutch's Aurelian confession is a perfect testimonial to Sorokin's description of the modern temper. Krutch wrote of the "spiritual iconoclasm of science"[36] that has undermined man's faith in love, in poetry, in religion, and in himself. Professor Stace, in an article entitled "Man against Darkness"[37] analyzes the moral crisis of man in a similar way. "Mankind", he wrote, "has managed to live only by means of lies, and the truth may very well destroy us." Stace, of course, means by "truth", scientific truth which alone he believes in. Toynbee does not share the pessimism of these two men because he believes in the "lies" of faith and God.

Toynbee is closest perhaps to Christopher Dawson in his analysis of the crisis of the West. The only important difference between them is that Dawson, who is a Catholic, is less critical of the mistakes of the Holy See than is Toynbee. Toynbee might easily have written: "This is the greatness and misery

of modern civilization- that it has conquered the world by losing its own soul, and that when its soul is lost it must lose the world as well."[38] Toynbee might also have written: "Marx was perfectly right when he claimed that the capitalist bourgeois was cutting ground from under its feet and producing its own grave-diggers. Where he went wrong was in his prophecy of the inevitable victory of the proletariat. The same grave was destined to receive them both, and the victorious power was not the brotherhood of free workers, but the impersonal tyranny of the machine order, which is an order of destruction no less than of production- an order of production for destruction which finds its supreme expression in mechanized warfare and in total world war."[39]

A synthesis of these various insights and analyses might picture Western Civilization as culturally atomized and as a result spiritually barren or desperate, as split vertically into hostile groupings (mostly economic), and as split horizontally into competitive if not antagonistic nations. These three divisions are aspects of one crisis; they are intimately and organically inter-related and interactive. The critical and determining point of the crisis for the Hegelian would presumably be the horizontal schism; for Marx it would be the vertical schism; and for Toynbee it would be the spiritual and cultural crisis.

This is the crisis of the West today. Its intensity, of course, is unequally evident in the different areas of the West; in Germany it is probably at its worst, while in the United States it is in its early stages. The World Wars, the economic depressions, the unemployment, the fanatic ideologies, the vast body of literature of despair, the collapse of European democracies and the fantastic phenomenon of the most powerful industrial nation in the world on the defensive ideologically, the decline and fall of the British Empire, and the extermination of millions of Jews, all these are symptoms of this underlying threefold crisis. The answer as to why and how it occurred can perhaps best be sought in a study of the Reformation, and through such an understanding of the historical subconscious some solution may suggest itself.

Notes to Chapter IV

1. See F.C.S. Northrop, The Meeting of East and West: An Inquiry Concerning World Understanding (N.Y., 1946), p. 225; R.N. Carew Hunt, The Theory and Practice of Communism (London, 1950), p. 30; K. Pedern The Materialist Conception of History: A Critical Analysis (London, 1939), p. 201; and A.D. Lindsay, Karl Marx's Capitalism An Introductory Essay (London, n.d.), pp. 17-18. Lindsay writes: "It does not matter whether you think...that the reasoning process in the mind is the primary reality and the historical process its reflection, or hold, as Marx certainly held, that the movement in thought is only the reflection of the movement of things." Marx's view was: "My dialectical method is not only different from the Hegelian, but its direct opposite. To Hegel, the life-process of the human brain, i.e., the process of thinking, which, under the name of "the Idea," he even transforms into an independent subject, is the demiurgos of the real world, and the real world is only the external, phenomenal form of "the Idea". With me, on the contrary, the ideal is nothing else, than the material world reflected by the human mind, and translated into forms of thought...With him the dialectic is standing on its head. It must be turned right side up again, if you would discover the rational kernel within the mystical shell." (K.Marx, trans. S. Moore and E. Aveling, F. Engels, ed., Capital: A Critique of Political Economy: The Process of Capitalist Production N.Y., n.d.), p. 25. This is the first volume of Marx's great study; henceforward it will be cited as Capital.).
2. S. Hook, Towards the Understanding of Karl Marx: A Revolutionary Interpretation (London, 1933), pp. 216-17. See K. Marx, J. Molitor, trad., "Critique de la philosophie de l'état de Hegel." Vol. IV of Oeuvres philosophiques which is part of Oeuvres complètes de Karl Marx (Paris). This particular volume was published in 1948.
3. I. Berlin, Karl Marx: His Life and Environment (Second Edition, London/N.Y. etc., 1948), p. 63.
4. K. Marx, J. Molitor, trad., "La sainte famille: ou critique de la critique critique (contre Bruno Bauer et consorts)", vols. II and III in Oeuvres philosophiques, which, in turn, is part of Oeuvres complètes de Karl Marx (Paris).(The two volumes of The Holy Family were published in 1947), II:145-46, 151-52.
5. I.Berlin, op. cit., p. 143; R. Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man: A Christian Interpretation, vols. II,(London, n.d.), p. 99; and R. Schlesinger, Marx: His Time and Ours (London, 1950), pp. 46& 49. All these students accept this interpretation of the relationship between Hegel and Marx.
6. A.J. Toynbee, A. V. Fowler, ed., War and Civilization: From A Study of History (N.Y., 1950), p. ix. See also A Study of History, vols., VI, (London, 1934-39), I:442. A Study of History will henceforward be cited as A Study...
7. A.J. Toynbee, War and Civilization..., p. viii.
8. B. Croce, V. Sheean, trans., Germany and Europe: A Spiritual Dissension (N.Y., n.d,), pp. 57-59.
9. A Study...V:200.
10. K. Marx, "Marginal Notes to the Program of the German Worker's Party," pp. 17-34 in K. Marx and F. Engels, Selected Works, vols. II, (Moscow, 1948), II:33.
11. F. Mehring, E. Fitzgerald, trans., Karl Marx: The Story of His Life (London, n.d.), pp. 131-32.
12. R. Postage, "Reflections of May Day 1949" in Horizon, May, 1948.
13. W.Friedmann, The Crisis of the National State (London, 1943).
14. Ibid., p. 113.
15. Ibid., p. 1.
16. P. Valery is quoted in a review of his Reflections of the World Today by S.Spencer in The Spectator, July 6, 1951, p. 26.
17. Ortega y Gasset, anonymous but authorised trans., The Revolt of the Masses (N.Y., n.d.), p. 107.
18. Ibid., p. 136.
19. Denis de Rougement, "The Conquest of Anarchy, pp. 16-18 and 88-91 in The Saturday Review of Literature, Jan. 13, 1951 (This issue of the Saturday Review of Literature

is entitled "America and the Mind of Europe: Mid-Century"), pp. 16-18.

20. See P.F. Drucker, The End of Economic Man: A Study of the New Totalitarianism (N.Y., 1939), and J. Strachey, The Theory and Practice of Socialism (London, 1937).
21. V.I. Lenin, Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism: A Popular Outline (N.Y.,n.d.)
22. G.H. Sabine, A History of Political Theory (N.Y., n.d.), pp. 715-946 deals lucidly with the question of the relationship of Lenin's thought to Marx's.
23. A Study..., V:161-65.
24. A.J. Toynbee, War and Civilization..., p. 9.
25. A.J. Toynbee, "The Impact of the West on Asia: Arnold Toynbee opens a series of talks entitled 'The Reawakening of Asia'" in The Listener, May 24, 1951, pp. 827-828,and 840.
26. R. Niebuhr, op. cit., I:56. Niebuhr wrote: "The fact is that it is not possible to solve the problem of vitality and form, or fully to understand the paradox of human creativity and destructiveness, within the limits of the dimension in which modern culture, whether rationalistic or romantic, views this problem. Within those limits modern culture is forced to choose between four equally untenable viewpoints: (a)It exalts destructive fury because it is vital, as in fascism; or (b)it imagines a harmony of vital forces in history which the facts belie, as in liberalism; or (c) it admits the dishonest pretensions of rational discipline and the reality of human destructiveness provisionally, but hopes for a complete change in the human situation through a revolutionary reorganization of society, as in Marxism; or(d)it despairs of any basic solution for the problem of vitality and discipline and contents itself with palliatives, as in Freudianism."
27. L. Paul, The Annihilation of Man: A Study of the Crisis of the West (London, n.d.), pp. 37, 169-70, 185-87.
28. Ibid., p. 133.
29. Ibid., pp. 129-41 passim.
30. Ibid., p. 141.
31. P.F. Drucker, op. cit., p. 37
32. Ibid., p. 47.
33. Ibid., p. 84.
34. P.A. Sorokin, The Crisis of Our Age: The Social and Cultural Outlook (N.Y., 1946) p. 96.
35. Ibid., p. 82.
36. J.W. Krutch, The Modern Temper: A Study and a Confession (N.Y., n.d.), p. 15.
37. The Atlantic, Sept. '48, pp. 53-58.
38. C. Dawson, The Judgement of the Nations (London, 1943), p. 66.
39. Ibid., 132.

PART II

TIME PAST: THE REFORMATION

"You, have you built well, have you forgotten the
cornerstone?
Talking of right relations of men, but not of
relations of men to God.
'Our citizenship is in Heaven'; yes, but that is
the model and type for your citizenship upon earth.

" When your fathers fixed the place of God,
And settled all the inconvenient saints,
Apostles, martyrs, in a kind of Whipsnade,
Then they could set about imperial expansion
Accompanied by industrial development.
Exporting iron, coal and cotton goods
And intellectual enlightenment
And everything, including capital
And several versions of the Word of God:
The British race assured of a mission
Performed it, but left much at home unsure."

Chapter V

The Simple Monk:
The Reformation in the Hegelian Scheme of History

Hegel considered Christianity, the religion that recognises God as Spirit and so man as God, to be the religion of freedom. Greece taught man to know himself as free Spirit, Rome taught him, in an abstract form, his rational universality, and Christianity appeared as the synthesis, God as man-God as abstract universal truth-God as Holy Spirit through which man is both one with and also different from Him. [1]

But, as was suggested in the last chapter on Hegel, a Christian Empire could only be realized on earth when a people would appear psychologically brought up according to the Christian principle. The Romans had relapsed into the "unhappy consciousness" of alienation from the external world, the Eastern Greeks, brought up on the principle of despotism, could never know Christianity subjectively, and barbarians, as yet unfamiliar with Roman rational legalism knew Christian truth only subjectively and so their Europe, in the Middle Ages, was anarchical.

Among these barbarians, however, the Germans, uncorrupted by too close a contact with Latinism, were to realize eventually their rational universality as identical with their subjective freedom in the form of the modern State.

The Middle Ages was a period of "individual and group particularity", [2] a condition designated as Feudalism. Feudalism was a system based not on rational universality, but on the need for protection on the part of peoples living in the anarchy that followed the collapse of the Pax Romana. [3] All secular politics were based on caprice and power; there was no secular authority recognized as embodied universality, and this was because Christianity, in its Catholic form, was cut off from politics. Gregory VII confirmed this divorce of the secular and the spiritual when he insisted on celibacy for the priests, so differentiating priests and laymen, and on the appointment of bishops by the Holy See. [4] The Catholic

Church thus stood for a corrupted form of Christianity, a Christianity made external for the laity; the mass (originally the symbol of the unity of man and God) became a matter of form, and priests and saints came to mediate between man and God. Man became wholly dependent upon the Church. "Thus through the perversion of the principle of Freedom," Hegel wrote, "Absolute Slavery became the established law." [6]

Gradually the Church was changed from a spiritual into an ecclesiastical power that became a political force. As a result, Hegel wrote,"... what the popes acquired in point of land and wealth and difect sovereignty they lost in influence and consideration."[7] The lie was given to the Catholics when, in the Crusades, Europe, trained to regard God in sensible objects (icons etc.) sought to recover Christ in his grave.[8] They found an empty grave, and disillusioned, they realized that God could be found in "...<u>the Subjective Consciousness alone.</u>"[9] This was one stage further in the explication of the religion Europe knew only implicitly in the Middle Ages.

As the Catholic Church lost the allegiance of the masses, free individual activity began, particularly in the form of free inquiry. Science arose, the shackles of superstition were torn off Christianity one by one, and the liberated spirit of man turned outwards into explorations.[10] Man now was beginning to realize that he was free, and, hence, the Renaissance occurred as the rebirth of the Greek principle of subjective freedom.[11]

But the dialectic so works, that only a single and a fresh people could become the bearers of this new principle. This predestined people was the German. Still naive and stupid, while at the same time warm, independent, and loyal, the German temperament was capable, though as yet only crudely, of loyalty to the group and at the same time it was deeply sensitive to individual freedom.[12] The mission of the Germans, as Morris describes the Hegelian view, was "...not only to receive the notion of true freedom as a central religious principle, but also to make it the organizing force of secular institutions." [13]The Germans never

adapted themselves to the principle of Roman (Latin) legality which they felt to be external until they discovered it as their own in their own State. The triad expressing this transition is Identity of the Spiritual and Secular (Charlemagne)- Split between Theocracy and State (secularization of the Catholic church)- the rational modern State (seen to embody freedom and to be as divine as the Church).[14] Another expression of this triad is Kingdom of God-Christ on Earth-union of God and Christ in Spirit (Holy Ghost).[15]

Man could only find his freedom politically in the strong secular state free from the external authority of the Catholic "theocracy" which he now knew to be external and corrupt. Put in other terms, Spirit which had fled the unhappiness of scepticism engendered by the decay of Rome, drowned itself in the "ministring agency" of the Catholic Church, by surrendering its freedom into universality, and next came to regard universality as its own, and so, with the Renaissance and later the Enlightenment it returned to free reason and dispensed with the Church that had made universality an externally imposed thing.[16]

The Reformation, the birth of inward spiritual freedom, Hegel likens to the rising Sun.[17] Only in Germany did the rays of this sun shine clearly and fully. While the rest of Europe devoted its energies to explorations,[18] Luther, "a simple Monk," announced to the world that Christ was inward and subjective instead of external, an actual presence through faith (in contrast to the Calvinist doctrine of "commemoration")- that the Kingdom of God was within man and so man was free and the external world was his own. "Thus Christian Freedom is actualized,"[19] wrote Hegel. Luther by preaching the doctrine that every man was his own priest and that through faith man and God were one, replaced papal authority by the principle of Christian freedom and the Catholic conception of the corruption of secular life by the principle of the divinity of secular institutions. The Objective Will and the Subjective Will were implicitly reconciled and secular institutions based on rationality ceased to be regarded as evil since they embodied man's universality;

rational laws became sacred, work became sanctified (for through it man rises from dependence by his own activity),[20] and marriage became holy. The principles of the Catholic Church were thus challenged and in parts of Germany overthrown. The Church crystallized its principles at the Council of Trent and so renounced any willingness it had to adapt itself to this new and higher truth. Necessarily, it opposed scientific investigation and the rise of free national states.[21] The Catholic world sank "...behind the Spirit of the Age."[22]

Only among the pure Germans could Christianity, as freedom, be fully realized. The Slavs, agricultural and immersed in feudal slavery, were unprepared, and the Latins and those Germans who had been partly Latinized, remained Catholics. This was partly due to the fact that they never realized "pure inwardness" of Spirit. The Latins, in other words, never freed themselves from a willingness to permit questions of conscience to be decided by the external authority of the Church.[23] However, they recognize the externality of the Church's dictates and so are indifferent to them.[24] The Latin, according to Hegel, is an unstable creature who, unable to appreciate the identity of true morality and inward freedom, suffers from a sort of moral schizophrenia. Like Voltaire, he is capable of regarding religion as little more than a means for keeping the masses in their place.

The English, of course, experienced a Reformation, but according to Hegel, it was an incomplete one.[25] The Englishman places liberty above any principle no matter how rational; he is unable to reconcile liberty and authority completely. (Hegel nevertheless had respect for English gradualism.) Only in Germany was the reconciliation between rights and duties, authority and freedom, individuality and universality, reconciled completely, and this, of course, only in the Prussian state. This was possible because only the Germans were temperamentally prepared to comprehend Christianity in its truest form, Lutheranism.

Hegel considered Christianity to be the culmination of religious evolution, and Protestantism (in its Lutheran form) to be the fulfilment of Christianity as the religion of freedom. In Christianity God is seen as Spirit instead of sub-

stance, and the whole universe, as Spirit, is God in various forms of Spirit. Evil is, therefore, considered neo-platonically as a defect of spiritual undere standing.[25] Evil, however, in the Hegelian universe, it should be noted, plays the additional role of the antagonist and so the stimulus to any incomplete state of spiritual being. God, to acquire content seeks self-alienation, but being the infinite Absolute he is the alienated being which strives dialectically to know itself as pure Spirit again. Man, as the highest form of life, being capable of knowing himself as Spirit, is potentially God[26] and so, through divine revelation (the evolution of Spirit to complete self-knowledge) man can, by knowing himself as free, infinite Spirit, know God who is free, infinite Spirit.

In primitive religions, God is a feared and unknowable object; in Asiatic religions he is substance that demands the suppression of all individuality; in Christianity God is person, revealed and not to be feared.[27] Only in Christianity is man, qua individual, seen to have infinite value and so to be incapable of being used as a means.[28]

Catholicism never realized this truth explicitly; it treated secular life as corrupt, and by making God an external object to the lay man, it denied man's freedom and infinite spirituality.[29] Because of this, secular life was based on caprice and suspicion. Protestantism, on the other hand, recognized every man as his own priest, as of infinite value, and so taught men to repect and trust one another.[30]

Religion, as the allegorical expression[31] of the Absolute, is, relative to philosophy, still not completely free. It insists on the submission (albeit voluntary) of the individual to the authority of collective experience (devotion and ceremony).[32] Religion is the consciousness of the Absolute Being while philosophy, the realm of pure freedom, is the self-consciousness of the Absolute.[33] In religion God is still clothed in symbols, while in philosophy he is pure thought which alone is infinite.[34] The reason the Christian religion is superior to any other

is that the Christian symbolism corresponds with the truth philosophy knows rationally.[35] God symbolises infinite personality, Christ symbolizes the self-externalization of Spirit, and the Holy Ghost symbolizes the identity of infinite personality and externality, an identity that, contrary to any pantheistic doctrine, preserves difference in unity. "What Luther initiated as faith in feeling and in the witness of the spirit," Hegel wrote, "is precisely what spirit, since it has become more mature, has striven to apprehend in the concept in order to free and so to find itself in the world as it exists today."[36] In short, Hegelian philosophy knows explicitly what Lutheranism knows implicitly.[37]

Religion is of prime importance in any civilization, according to Hegel, because it determines the forms of social and political life of a people. "It is no use," Hegel wrote, "to organise laws and arrangements on principle of equity and reason, so long as in religion the principle of unfreedom is not abandoned. A free state and a slavish religion are incompatible..."[38] Only a Protestant state can be free because only Protestants are free; only through the knowledge that the Ethical Life is the objectification and guarantee of man's freedom will man abide by its principle. In Hegel's terms "...ultimately, in the Protestant conscience the principle of religion and of the ethical conscience come to one and the same..." The moral life of the State and the religious spirituality of the State are thus reciprocal guarantees of strength."[39] Religion, the base of any State, is inferior nevertheless to the freer (because more rational) State. Religion is Spirit in a subjective form which given free reign would lead to fanaticism; only as subordinate to the State can religion be prevented from manifesting its less fortunate characteristics.[40] Ideally, Church and State stand in different forms for the same principle. "It is philosophical insight which sees that while church and state differ in form, they do not stand opposed in content, for truth and rationality are the contents of both."[41]

The only way for the Protestant states to establish themselves was through

the Thirty Years War (which guaranteed the independence of the Protestant states from papal domination) and the Seven Years War (by which Frederick the Great consolidated the Protestant State of Prussia.)[42] Frederick the Great, "a philosophical king" who has always been the darling of German nationalists, "took up the Protestant principle in its secular aspect; and though he was by no means favourable to religious controversies, and did not side with one party or the other, he had the consciousness of Universality, which is the profoundest depth to which Spirit can attain and is Thought conscious of its own inherent power."[43] Frederick the Great, in other words ruled according to rational law instead of according to arbitrary wilfulness. To this universality, individualism was forced to submit.

The rational modern State needs more than "laws of rationality" and a trained government to administer these laws, however. It needs the right "disposition" on the part of the citizenship and this is that they be willing to submit their particular desires to the rational constitution of the State."[44] This disposition" those Germans educated in Lutheranism had, in contrast to the French whose revolution for the "laws of rationality" failed because France never had a Reformation. The French turned against their religion and in the process suffered spiritual and social schism that finally led to the Terror.[45] Hegel's point is that the promulgation of abstract rights is bound to lead to anarchy and then dictatorship unless the people are trained through religion to know the discipline necessary to make the enjoyment of these rights possible. In Hegel's words, "... it is a false principle that the fetters which bind Right and Freedom can be broken without emancipation of the conscience-- that there can be a Revolution without a Reformation." [46]

The Lutheran Germans never had to break with religion because their religion recognized the authority and rationality of secular institutions; furthermore the Germans never had to indulge in regicide because their rulers already ruled according to rational law and realized that they earned popular allegiance only in so far as they ruled rationally.[47]

The French Revolution swept over Germany and the last relics of the Middle Ages were cleared away. The abstract principles of the French were assimilated by the German people who already had the "disposition" necessary to realize the fruits of these principles. Prussia matured to become the rational modern State wherein Will realized freedom by willing itself.[48]

Hegel viewed the Reformation, then, as a great spiritual revolution for freedom, and the Lutheran Reformation, in particular, as the most complete triumph of freedom. Without the Reformation no merely political or intellectual change could have hoped to have produced any lasting social change. Man can only be free, according to Hegel, if he recognizes his own inward freedom and respects the inward freedom of all other men; this is only possible if the religious consciousness is based on the explicit Christian principle that God is free, rational Spirit indwelling in man and the universe. Man could only realize this freedom objectively, according to Hegel, by rebelling against the external authority of the Catholic Church and by ridding himself of the contingent particularities of the legacy of the Middle Ages.

For these reasons the Reformation was a necessary and a good thing from Hegel's point of view; it enabled the Germans to fulfil in its most complete form the principle of the age, namely, the trend towards the evolution of the absolutely sovereign State. This was the major product of the Reformation, according to Hegel. He admitted that it involved the disruption of any unity Europe might have had, but this unity, from his point of view, had been in its irrationality repressive to freedom.

It is not only from the Hegelian point of view, of course, that the Reformation is considered to have contributed to human political freedom. From the liberal-democratic point of view, in its Lockean and Jeffersonian formulation, one fruit of the Reformation was also freedom, but freedom in a non-Hegelian sense. Freedom for Hegel meant the identity in difference of the individual and the State;

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for the liberal-democrat, freedom means the recognition of the individual as the possessor of inalienable rights that the State serves only to protect or to help fulfil. The Hegelian free individual is wholly subsumed in the State, while the free individual from the liberal-democratic point of view is an autonomous subject as well as a citizen. The Hegelian State is an end, while the liberal-democratic State is a means.

In contrast to Hegel, therefore, the liberal-democrat regards Calvinism, whose implicit individualism became explicit in American and British democracy to a considerable extent, as having contributed more to "freedom" than did Lutheranism.[49] Calvinism, partly because it was usually represented by minority communities, contributed to democratic individualism, while Lutheranism, partly due to Luther's having thrown his whole weight behind the princes in their struggles against peasants and Anabaptists, contributed to the strengthening of the monarchical state.

Hegel would agree with C. Beard that "...the Reformation undeniably made for liberty. It broke the overwhelming force of a Church that would allow no difference with itself."[50] And Hegel would also agree that Spirit in its Protestant expression was freer than in its Catholic expression. But, he would deny that the Lockean individualism that had its roots in Puritanism knows real freedom since it does not provide for a complete subsumption of the individual in the State. The liberal-democrat would agree with Randall's statement that "...Luther's refusal to carry his religious democracy into politics ended in promoting political tyranny, while Calvin's supreme emphasis on the power of God and submission to his will resulted in enhancing the human power of the individual against all "earthly authority".[51] Hegel's answer would be that since "earthly authority" correctly understood is divine, the Lockean individualist is separated from God and so, in Hegelian terms, he does not will his own universality, his own rational self. In short, the Lockean individualist is not free.

It is no accident, then, that Hegel picked the author of the Addresses

to the Christian Nobility of the German Nation on the Improvement of the Christian Estate as not only the hero of the Reformation but as also its profoundest prophet.

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3. PH, p. 388.
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Chapter VI

The Enormous Impulse

The Marxist Interpretation of the Reformation

Marx believed that capitalism originated in the sixteenth century and that it was intimately connected with the Reformation. The relationship between the structural economic revolution and the superstructural religious revolution was dialectical, that is, the two movements interacted upon one another and each was both cause and effect of the other. Of course, in the final analysis, the economic was the primary factor.

That the Reformation was a product of the individualistic spirit of the age, a classic interpretation, Marx would agree, but with the important qualification that "the individualistic spirit of the age" was the product of economic factors antedating the rise of capitalism.

Since the time of Marx and Engels, other students, Marxist or otherwise, have made important contributions to the economic interpretation of the Reformation. Their findings, where they help to elaborate Marxist insights, will be incorporated into the following discussion of the Reformation from the Marxist point of view.

According to Marx, the two most important economic factors antedating the sixteenth century were first the rise of a burgher trading class of the medieval towns and second the discovery of silver and gold abroad which effected the transition of Europe from a barter to a monetary economy. The two factors were inter-related; a money economy enabled serfs to escape into the bourgeoisie, and the bourgeoisie became a revolutionary force which further undermined feudalism.[1] The conflict between the towns and the feudal countryside turned the bourgeoisie into a united class hostile to feudal values and restrictions. "The burghers had created the conditions of a new class in so far as they had torn themselves

free from feudal ties, and were created by them in so far as they were determined by their antagonism to the feudal system which they found in existence."[2] The individualistic spirit of the bourgeois was, in other words, sublimated into a sense of class solidarity because of the common foe. After the disintegration of feudalism the bourgeoisie was to lapse into anarchic competitiveness.

The trading activities of the bourgeoisie united the countryside and slowly put an end to the isolatedness of manors and towns. As they grew in power they demanded equality of opportunity (a principle the proletariat was later to demand for itself),[3] and the abolition of feudal and corporate hindrances (river tolls and the "just price, for example) to free enterprise. This involved both the abolition of medieval institutions[4] within the towns (the guilds) and in the countryside (serfdom). Concomitantly with the rise of the bourgeoisie, the proletariat, the prerequisite raw material of capitalism, developed. As Engels put it, the bourgeoisie was "...saddled with its antithesis" from the start;[5] any bourgeois uprising produced a corresponding proletariat outbreak (in the Reformation, the Anabaptists, and in the English Cromwellian Revolution, the Levellers, for example). Gradually conditions were prepared for the "dialectical leap" into capitalism. "Although we came across the first beginnings of capitalist production as early as the 14th or 15th centuries, sporadically in certain towns of the Mediterranean" Marx wrote, "the capitalist era dates from the 16th century. Wherever it appears, the abolition of serfdom has been long effected, and the highest development of the middle ages, the existence of sovereign towns, has long been on the wane."[6]

These economic developments, i.e., the rise of a money economy, the growth of a bourgeois merchant class, and the emergence of a proletariat, reflected themselves in new superstructural ideas and beliefs. Politically, the bourgeoisie aligned themselves with those princes and kings who were seeking to create independent states; it was the king or prince who could grant protection and create stability in areas ruled with arbitrary irregularity by a multiplicity of feudal

nobles; it was the king or prince also, who could free the bourgeois from papal exactions and ecclesiastical interference with trade.[6] The superstructural ideology expression of these economic interests on the part of the middle class was some form of nationalism and some form of the doctrine of the Divine Right of Kings. The superstructural emotion was national patriotism.

The second superstructural reflection were the rationalistic ideas of the Renaissance, the new science in particular. The superstructural psychological factor that emanated from science was secularism.[7] Hegel's description of the secularization and the consequent loss of prestige of the Catholic Church during the Renaissance, as well as the rise of the sovereign states, is compatible with Marxism, and so, also, is Cunningham's suggestion that the perversion of Catholic values served as a stimulus to capitalism.[8] Tawney has pointed out that the Catholic Church in several ways submitted to the new secular spirit and was not always averse to cooperating with it.[9] The Scholastics, for example, liberalized canon laws to give allowance to the new economic values, and the Church, while denouncing pawn-brokers, cultivated great financiers like the Fuggers.[10] Of course, the Church continued, officially, to denounce the values of the new secular, individualistic spirit of capitalism.[11] "It only remains for us to repeat", to quote A. Fanfani, "that the Catholic ethos is anti-capitalistic, even if in certain ways it has favoured its capitalism's progress in this or that direction."[12]

The third major superstructural reflection, was the humanism of the Renaissance which put great emphasis on individual expression and self-cultivation. The psychological attitude that this gave rise to was individualism.[13] In Latin countries this expressed itself in agnostic forms (Montaigne, Machiavelli), while in Northern countries individualism expressed itself in religious forms. (Erasmus, Reuchlin).

These three psychological factors, patriotism individualism, and secu-

larism, each reflecting the rise of the new bourgeois merchant class, combined to produce the Reformation, according to Marx. Patriotism militated against the ideal of a united (feudal, Catholic) Christendom; individualism militated against the corporate, authoritarianism of the Church; and secularism served both to demoralize the Church (Cesar Borgia), and to undermine the presumptions of the papacy to incorruptibility and infallibility (Valla). In the religiously-minded North, these factors operated in favor of new religious expressions which would be national, individualistic, and free from the demoralization and presumption of the Catholic Church. The stage was set for Martin Luther.

The neatest Marxist eco-analysis of Luther is perhaps A. Labriola. He writes: "Martin Luther, comme les autres grands réformateurs, ses contemporains, ne sut jamais, comme nous le savons aujourd'hui, que le movement de la Réforme était un moment du développment du Tiers État et une rebellion économique de la nationalité allemande contre l'exploitation de la cour papale. Il fut ce qu'il fut, comme agitateur, et comme politique, parce qu'il ne fut qu'un avec la croyance qui lui faisait voir dans le mouvement des classes, qui donnait l'impulsion à l'agitation, un veritable retour au vrai Christianisme et comme une necessité divine dans le cour vulgaire des choses."[14]

The Marxist, therefore, does not deny that Luther created a new religious movement.[15] However,and this is crucial, the Marxist insists he did so only because the times especially in their economic aspect were ripe. Roy Pascal has written a Marxist essay on the "Class-Basis of Luther's Reformation" which is helpful in this connection.[16] He argues that Luther's "freedom of the Christian man" meant, in effect, that men were free to accept his (Luther's) orthodoxy; when some didn't, Luther used the princes to suppress them. In the process he subordinated the church to princely rule. For Luther "...the absolutist system was the right and sacred one, for it made possible that religious and moral system which was Luther's."[17] This moral system, in turn, was simply part of the super-

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structure reflecting the unconscious class outlook of Luther's "petty-bourgeois" class. It was this group which had suffered most from papal exactions, and from the exploitation of great financiers whom Luther consistently denounced, and it was this class which was threatened by Anabaptists and peasants who had given a radical twist (from the bourgeois point of view) to Luther's ideas. The natural ally of the petty-bourgeois was the class of princes whose interests were the same as theirs. Pascal concludes that "...only from this point of view can his (Luther's) thoughts and actions be seen as a harmonious, consequent whole."[18]

Erich Fromm, the distinguished social pshychologist also offers an economic interpretation, but one which makes more of the pshychological factors involved.[19] Fromm believes a new idea only becomes a powerful force in history if it "... answers powerful pshychological needs of certain social groups..."[20] The psychic anxieties Luther suffered from and which led him, ambivalently to seek both freedom and absolute authority, was the same anxiety the average menber of the middle classes felt.[21] The bourgeoisie suffered from the dilemma of wanting freedom to pursue economic enterprise and at the same time needing a psychic escape from the insecurity and hardships of the competitive system. Luther, as well as Calvin provided such a psychic bulwark with their doctrines of total submission in faith and the sanctity of secular activity.

Protestantism according to the Marxist interpretation, therefore, was a religious movement which resulted indirectly from the rise of a new mode of production, the capitalistic. However, it in turn, reacted dialectically upon the mode of production whose superstructure it was. This it illustrated most clearly in England when the Reformation, according to Marx, gave "a new and frightful impulse" to capitalism by placing expropriated church property in the more energetic hands, and by swelling the body of the proletariat by the suppression of monasteries.[22] These two effects were inter-related, for, as Marx wrote: "The estates of the church were to a large extent given away to rapacious royal favorites,

or sold at a nominal price to speculating farmers and citizens, who drove out, en masse, the hereditary sub-tenants and threw their holdings into one."[23] Henry VIII contributed to the creation of such a large pauper class that Queen Elizabeth was forced to recognize vagabondage as a major social problem.[24] These paupers, it should be added, flowed into the ranks of the peasants who had already been expropriated of their land during the enclosure movement.[25] "The expropriation of the agricultural producer, of the peasant", Marx wrote, "is the basis of the whole process of the rise of capitalism."[26]

Another contribution made by the Reformation, was the release of capitalistic enterprise dammed up by the Catholic Church; this the Reformers did by abolishing the practical agencies (ecclesiastical courts) through which the Church had managed with varying degrees of success, to regulate business morality.[27]

According to Erich Fromm one of the most important impacts of the Reformation on capitalism, was the creation of a new attitude "...towards effort and work as an aim in itself...an attitude which may be assumed to be the most important psychological change which has happened since the end of the Middle Ages."[28]

Men according to Fromm, now worked from internal compulsion rather than from external pressure, and the new character traits engendered became new "productive forces".[29] Fromm's theory is based on Max Weber's thesis that the Calvinist doctrine of the "calling" gave the "...modern entrepreneur a fabulously clear conscience"[30] and, by leading him to regard an increase in capital as an end in itself increased productivity enormously.[31] Marx, of course, would make the major qualification that the "spirit of capitalism" was the effect rather than the cause of capitalism as Weber claimed. But that the Marxists would agree with Weber's main argument is implicit in Marx's statement that Protestantism was the capitalistic expression of Christianity.[32] Engels, in this connection, stated

that while Lutheranism committed suicide by submitting to princely despotism, Calvinism which "republicanized" the Kingdom of God, became the real ideology of the "revolutionary" middle classes.[33] He also made the interesting suggestion that the Calvinist doctrine of predestination was so widely accepted among the bourgeoisie because it so correctly reflected the economic reality of the capitalistic system of production, i.e., fact that success depends upon factors uncontrollable by the individual.[34] It is important to remark that scholars like E. Troeltsch[35] Tawney,[36] and H. Laski[37] agree that Weber, though essentially correct, committed an anachornism by regarding the Calvinistic doctrine of the "calling" as having meant in the sixteenth century what is only came to mean in the seventeenth, and this was due mainly to the influence of capitalism. In the seventeenth century, these students agree, the doctrine of the "calling" did come to mean that success in business was a sign of divine grace.

Perhaps the most important effect of the Reformation, especially in its Calvinistic form, upon its structural progenitor was to replace the values of Catholicism with others more compatible, at least implicitly, with the individualistic, mundane impulses of the bourgeois capitalist. The Reformation, according to Engels destroyed the "spiritual dictatorship" of the Catholic Church,[38] and capitalism, according to The Communist Manifesto "...has put an end to all feudal, patriarchal, idyllic relations. It has pitilessly torn asunder the motely feudal ties that bound man to his "natural superiors," and has left no other nexus between man and man than naked self-interest, than callous "cash payment."[39] As a result of the destruction of the Catholic ideal, and as a result of the new values of capitalism all institutions that in the Middle Ages had softened the antagonism between rich and poor were done away with.[40] In other words, the lower classes became a proletariat that was within a society but not of it.[41]

Tawney has described how the values of capitalistic society, at its most robust phase, militated against the proletariat.[42] The only full members of the

body politic, he points out, were free holders. These men, the "elect", had the right to use their property in any manner they wished; their private advantage was equated with public advantage. The poor, on the other hand, were punished for vagrancy and abandoned in their misery on the grounds that poverty made them more productive while relief would enervate their energy. The emphasis, in this individualistic, acquisitive society, in short, was placed upon individual reponsibility rather than on social obligation. In effect, the proletariat were the victims of a system of values that employed a double standard; capitalistic society by its very nature was socially schismatic. The superstructure of democratic equalitarian values which were realized according to the Marxists in the second half of the eighteenth century in France, England, and the United States, in effect if not in intent, maintained this moral double standard, though under the cover of universal human values. During the Reformation the bourgeoisie expressed its economic interests in the religious form of Protestantism, and during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries it did so in the form of secular liberalism. The superstructure changed as the structure evolved. Fundamentally, however, the individualistic, atomistic tenets of both Protestantism and liberalism were the same because they reflected capitalism, and, according to Marx, only a dialectical (revolutionary) leap from the capitalistic mode of production to a communistic mode of production can change the system of value of modern men. Marx would agree with the contemporary philosophers of crisis that the sensate, atomistic values of the West have become bankrupt and no longer creative, and that modern Western society has become a "Wasteland". He expressed himself in indignant terms on the perniciousness of these values in the middle on the nineteenth century. The new mode of production, the socialistic, whose inevitable triumph he prophesied, will according to the Marxist philosophy, generate a new and higher system of values which will embrace all men.

Annex to Chapter VI

Critique of Marx's Interpretation of the Reformation

There are a number of important criticisms of Marx's interpretation of the Reformation that should be discussed. First, the Marxist notion that Protestantism was the religion of Capitalism can hardly explain the fact that following the atheistic Enlightenment, France ultimately reverted to feudal Catholicism rather than to either atheism or Protestantism.[43] Also, it cannot explain why Protestantism first emerged in Germany, which was capitalistically backward, rather than in a key urban area like Venice, or that it took root in Scotland rather than in Venice. Second, as B. Russell observes, opposition to papal financial exactions had existed for centuries before the Reformation; the Reformation, Russell argues, only came when papal abuses made possible a moral revolt.[44] And third, the increase in capital, a prerequisite for the change of the mode of production from a feudalistic to a capitalistic one, was the result not of economic necessity but an accident, i. e. the geographical discoveries. See argues, in this connection, that the influx of precious metal into Europe was the fundamental factor in giving rise to capitalism.[45] He thus rejects Max Weber's thesis that the fundamental factor was the "Protestant Ethic." Marx it should be added, agreed with this point of view when he wrote that the "great transformations" of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in trade (the result of geographical discoveries) were "decisive" in effecting the transition from the feudal to the capitalist mode of production.[46] This explanation, it has already been pointed out, is incompatible with Marx's theory that each mode of production engenders its own negation and successor. Feudalism never implied America or Africa.

A difficulty the present writer had in composing this paper, resulted from Marx's view that capitalism had its "origin" in the sixteenth century. If this is so, how can the Marxist explain the Renaissance with its revolutionary scientific interest, its individualistic proclivities, and its secularist tendencies?

Either he must say that all this was a superstructural reflection of the economic interests of the merchant class, or else he must say that the Renaissance was a reflection of feudalism. The latter, of course, he would deny, and, in maintaining the former, he would have to admit that a new class had come into power in a number of cities (Flanders, for example) without any corresponding change in the mode of production. The present writer solved the problem by treating the bourgeoisie of the twelfth century and on as capitalists in unconscious search of a new mode of production. This may be perfectly illegitimate, but the alternative, as far as the present writer can see, is to leave the Marxist interpretation even less coherent than it already is.

Another difficulty was to try to determine why the kings and princes, who were members of the feudal structure, should have had identical interests (in promoting the sovereign state) with the bourgeoisie, and, also, why members of classes other than the bourgeoisie, the petty German nobility, for example, should have supported the kings. Cole attempts to solve this problem in a Marxist way with the answer that the monarchs could break away from the feudal structure and rule independently because of the wealth that accured to them as a result of the great discoveries.[47] What, one might then ask, inspired rulers like Henry the Navigator and Isabella to defy the conventions and prejudices of Christendom and to subsidize colonial ventures? If the Marxist answers that it was the Renaissance, the question that immediately suggests itself is, was the spirit of the Renaissance structure or superstructure? If it was the second, and the Marxist would have to maintain that it was, the circle has been completed, and one then will ask, superstructure of what new mode of production? One might also ask the corollary question, if there was a new mode of production, how were kings and princes related to it ?

While attempting to elaborate the Marxist interpretation of the Reformation coherently, it kept occurring to the present writer, that historical events are

so much more intelligibly explained as the outcome of a variety of interacting factors one of which is at various times more fundamental than the others (but never exclusively so), than by the Marxist structure-superstructure pattern. In any historical analysis along such lines the economic factor, needless to say, will almost always be considered to be of major importance.

Preserved Smith in The Age of the Reformation interprets the Reformation as the result of a number of factors the most important of which was the economic (new wealth and the establishment of a money economy).[48] His interpretation, to the mind of the present writer, is an excellent example of a sober and coherent application of Marxian insights to the understanding of history.

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1. K. Marx and F. Engels, R. Pascal, ed., The German Ideology: Parts I & III (N.Y., n.d.) pp. 43-57 passim.
2. Ibid., p. 48.
3. F. Engels, Bracke (M.-M. Desrousseaux), trans., M.E. Dühring bouleverse la Science (Anti-Dühring), vols. III (Paris, 1933-49), I:175-78. This book will be referred to as Anti-Dühring henceforward.
4. F. Engels, "Socialism: Utopian and Scientific" pp. 86-142 in K. Marx and F. Engels, Selected Works, vols., 2, (Moscow, 1948), p. 108.
5. K. Marx, S. Moore and Edward Aveling, trans., Capital: A Critique of Political Economy: The Process of Capitalist Production (Revised edition, N.Y., n.d.), p. 787. Henceforward this volume, which is the first volume of Marx's great work, will be referred to as Capital.
6. G.D.H. Cole, What Marx Really Meant (N.Y., 1937), pp. 85-88.
7. F. Engels, "Socialism: Utopian and Scientific", p. 95.
8. W. Cunningham, An Essay on Western Civilization in Its Economic Aspect vols., II, (Cambridge, 1904), II:159.
9. R.H. Tawney, Religion and the Rise of Capitalism: A Historical Study (Holland Memorial Lectures 1922) (N.Y., n.d.), p. 34.
10. Ibid., p. 45.
11. Ibid., p. 149.
12. A. Fanfani, Catholicism, Protestantism and Capitalism (London, 1939), p. 159.
13. G.D.H. Cole, op. cit., p. 85.
14. Quoted in H. See, Materialisme historique et interpretation economique de l'histoire (Paris, 1927), (from A. Labriola, A. Bonnet, trad., Essais sur la conception materialiste de l'histoire), pp. 24-25.
15. F. Engels, "Introduction to Dialectics of Nature", pp. 57-73 in Selected Works, p. 58.
16. R. Pascal, "The Class Basis of Luther's Reformation", pp. 641-54 in The Hibbert Journal, July, 1931.
17. Ibid., pp. 652-53.
18. Ibid., p. 654.
19. E. Fromm, Escape from Freedom (N.Y./Toronto, n.d.).
20. Ibid., p. 85.
21. Ibid., p. 101.
22. Capital, p. 292.
23. Ibid., p. 792-93.
24. Ibid., pp. 793-94.
25. Ibid., pp. 806-and 789.
26. Ibid., p. 878.
27. R.H. Tawney, op. cit., pp. 83-89, and A. Fanfani, Op. cit., p. 199.
28. E. Fromm, op. cit., p. 93.
29. Ibid., pp. 296-97.
30. M. Weber, F.H. Knight, trans., General Economic History (London, n.d.), p. 367.
31. M.Weber, "The Spirit of Capitalism" (from The Protestant Ethic), pp. 506-53k in V.H. Calverton, ed., The Making of Society (N.Y., n.d.).
32. Capital, p. 91
33. F. Engels, "Socialism: Utopian and Scientific", pp. 96-99.
34. Ibid., -p. 96.
35. E. Troeltsch, op. cit., pp. 138-39.
36. T.H. Tawney, op. cit., p. 39.
37. H. Laski, The Rise of European Liberalism (London, 1947), p. 34.
38. F. Engels, "Introduction to Dialectics of Nature", p. 58.
39. "The Communist Manifesto", pp. 315-355 in K. Marx, Max Eastman, ed., Capital: The The Communist Manifesto: And Other Writings (N.Y., n.d.), p. 323.
40. Anti-Dühring, III:5
41. See W. Morris and E. Belfort Bax, Socialism: Its Growth and Outcome (London, 1908), p. 103. They wrote: "The middle of the sixteenth century, therefore brings us to this, that the animating spirit of feudal society (the responsibility of kings to the whole feudal society) is dead, though its forms, still exist, and are used for its own

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39. "The Communist Manifesto", pp. 315-355 in K. Marx, Max Eastman, ed., Capital: The The Communist Manifesto: And Other Writings (N.Y., n.d.), p. 323.
40. Anti-Dühring, III:6
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purpose by the bureaucratic system, which has now supplanted feudalism throughout the length and breadth of Europe. This must be considered as the beginning of the first period of modern History."

42. R.H. Tawney, op. cit., pp. 210-261 passim
43. M.M. Bober, Karl Marx's Interpretation of History (Second Edition, Revised, Cambridge, 1948), p. 153.
44. B. Russell, Power: A New Social Analysis (London, n.d.), p. 70, and K. Federn, The Materialist Conception of History: A Critical Analysis (London, 1939), p. 85.
45. H. See, op. cit. pp. 89-90.
46. Capital, pp. 368-69.
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48. P. Smith, The Age of the Reformation (N.Y., n.d.), pp. 743-750.

H.M. Robertson - Rise of economic Individualism. "Here is a Catholic counterpart to all Puritan beliefs about commerce... It would not be difficult to hold that the encouragement of economic rationalism was even stronger among Catholics than among Protestants."

Chapter VII

The Promethean Revolt
The Reformation in Toynbee's Scheme of History

For Toynbee, no part of the experience of a civilization is intelligible by itself, and therefore the Reformation is perforce treated in the context of Western civilization as a whole. This new civilization arose from the ruins of the Hellenic civilization which had known its highest phase of growth in Athens, its first rout in the Peloponnesian wars, and its "universal empire" under Rome. When the Roman empire, the last phase of the Hellenic civilization, was in its process of disintegration, the "universal church" of Christianity was born among its internal proletariat, and this church grew concomitantly with the empire's decay, to serve as the chrysalis of Western civilization. Thus, Western civilization, is in essence and soul Christian, a fact of crucial importance in Toynbee's scheme of historical interpretation.[1] "If we were to regard the Christian element in our Western culture as being the essence of it," Toynbee writes, "then our reversion to Hellenism might be taken...to be, not a fulfilment of the potentialities of Western Christendom, but an aberration from the proper path of Western growth- in fact, a false step which it may or may not be possible now to retrieve."[2]

This aberration may be described as an adherence to the values of Christianity while at the same time the Christian faith is denied. Democracy is an example of this aberration. It assumes, according to Toynbee, Christian behaviour, yet it rejects the spiritual foundations that alone vitalize and renew such behaviour; "...practice", writes Toynbee, "unsupported by belief is a wasting asset, as we have suddenly discovered, to our dismay, in this generation."[3] The secularization of the basic values of the West has resulted, today, in moral bankruptcy and social disintegration, and the spiritual void left is being filled with the new destructive worldly faiths of ultra-nationalism[4] and Marxism.[5] This is the burden of Toynbee's view of the present state of Western Civilization.

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Although pessimistic, Toynbee is no determinist. In spite of her repudiation of the Christian sources of her values, Western civilization may still be saved by what she has sought to reject. Christianity is protean; its spirit appears even in so a-religious a movement as the Marxist,[6] and it has proven effective enough to be accepted by the most oppressed proletariat body in Western civilization, the negro, from the hands of their white masters. It is also significant that the internal proletariat of the West has as yet shown no signs of having given birth to a Universal Church of its own.[7] But, Toynbee insists, salvation for the West lies only through Christianity. He writes, "...an apostate Western Christendom may be given grace to be born again as the Respublica Christiana which is its own earlier and better ideal of what if should strive to be."[8]

The evidence that Western civilization may be too far gone to be saved is considerable. In most of the civilizations that have disintegrated, the chief signs of suicide have been inter-state wars.[9] The West has just emerged from its third series of such wars, the first two being the Wars of Religion of the sixteenth century and what Toynbee calls "our great Western civil war of A.D. 1914-18."[10] Furthermore, examples of a dominant minority and of a disaffected proletariat are only too easy to find in the West. There are three archetypes of the dominant minority, the hangman who gains allegiance by oppression, the wastrel who enjoys his power while it lasts, and the conqueror who seeks glory abroad when he can no longer find it at home. Of the may examples of each in the West, one need only mention Henry VIII as hangman, Louis XIV as wastrel, and Cortes as conqueror.[11] Many types of proletariat besides the urban have been produced by the West. Among them are the religious proletariat produced by the Wars of Religion[12] and the intellectual proletariat in Germany which turned to Nazism.[13]

Another sign of disintegration is imperialism, a phenomenon Toynbee describes as "a material performance on an excessive scale", on the part of the civilization, "to give the lie to its own unacknowledged but agonizing conscious-

ness of incompetence and failure and doom."[14] Western imperialism is a sign of the disintegration of Western Civilization analogous to the expansion of a declining Hellenic Society under the leadership of Alexander the Great.[15]

The Western individual, in turn, as his society disintegrates, finds it progressively more difficult to attain social harmony or to find an outlet for his full creative powers. He tends, as a result, to react to the growing crisis in one of a number alternative pairs of contradictory modes of behaviour and feeling.[16] It would be superflous to paraphrase Toynbee's tightly-woven discussion here.[17] An example of such a pair is that of "truancy and martyrdom." Thomas Wolsey is representative of the individual who behaves like a truant. By serving his king better than his God, he betrayed the values of his culture;[18] the victim of this truancy was Thomas More who chose the alternate mode of behaviour, martyrdom, rather than abandon these values. The most fruitful pair is that of "detachment and transfiguration."[19] Detachment is the attitude of the man who is fully conscious of the state of disintegration his society is in, but believes he can do nothing about it. He remains a truant, but a passive and non-destructive one. Transfiguration is the experience of spiritual salvation; it leads to a rebirth that once again releases the creative energies in the individual. This is another way of expressing the idea that when a civilization has proceeded too far in its decline, salvation is only possible on a supra-mundane, spiritual, plane.

Although no certain prognostication will be possible until all is over,[20] Toynbee does suggest that Western Civilization is at present in its Time of Troubles, the period that usually precedes the establishment of a Universal Empire.[21] The first rout, in the rhythm of disintegration, was the Wars of Religion of the sixteenth century, and the second, the more intense wars of Nationality of the late eighteenth to the twentieth century. If the West is to follow the usual pattern, then, either Russia or the Western democracies should now be on the point of providing a universal order through the imposition of an empire. If this happens,

Western civilization will suffer its "knock-out blow" and will become spiritually sterile.[22]

Since the first rout of Western Civilization took place in the sixteenth century, the Reformation assumes a role of fundamental importance in Toynbee's scheme.

This revolt against the Catholic Church at first glance would appear to have been the original mistake since it disrupted the unity of Christian Europe.[23] However, the Reformation, though a mistake, was the result of an earlier failure, that preceded the Reformation by at least four centuries.

The major reason for the breakdown of Western Civilization, Toynbee suggests was the suicide of the Catholic Church in Hildebrandine times, and the consequent reactions this set off. This suicide was the result of the pride (hybris) engendered by the successful victory of the Church over Hohenstaufen pretentions.[24] The Church, intoxicated with her victory,[25] fell into the pitfall of replacing the Hohenstaufen despotism with one of her own, and so abused her mission to represent the highest ideal of the West.[26] The bitter fruit of this failure was the curse of parochialism (provincial self-consciousness) of which the Church herself became victim. The seeds of this aberration, Toynbee believes were planted originally by Hildebrand when he organized an armed force to combat brigand-nobles who were robbing papal property.[27] This error of meeting force with force led in turn to such struggles as those between Henry IV and the papacy of which only the parochial German princes received any benefit,[28] and eventually to the humiliations of the Babylonish Captivity (fourteenth century), the Great Schism (fourteenth and fifteenth centuries), the Sack of Rome in 1527, and finally to the Reformation.

This tragic fate of the Catholic Church Toynbee compares to that of Periclean Athens. As Athens turned from being the protector of her sister-states to their oppressor, so did the Roman See become the oppressor "...of her sister churches

whom she had liberated from the oppression of the Secular Power in Western Christendom."[29] Elsewhere, Toynbee writes: "While the Hellenic Society broke down and went into disintegration through a failure to transcend a traditional parochialism, our Western Society has failed...to maintain a social solidarity which was perhaps the most precious part of its original endowment."[30] The trustee of this endowment was the Catholic Church[31] and for this reason, Toynbee suggests, the misplaced action of the Catholic Church may well be the cause of the disintegration of the West.[32]

The new parochialism unleashed by the unfortunate behaviour of the Church, expressed itself in the rise of sovereign states, of vernacular literatures, and of new religious expressions.[33] The Catholic Church might have saved herself from the destructive effects that ensued if it had not opposed the conciliar movement in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.[34] By throwing away this chance of effecting a <u>modus vivendi</u> with parochialism she finally lost her claim to to embody the integrating ideal of Western Civilization, and she condemned "Western Christendom to be rent by a violent internal discord between its ancient oecumenical heritage and its new parochial proclivities."[35] The first disasterous consequence for the West as a whole was the Reformation and the subsequent wars of Religion.

Toynbee nowhere deals at length with the Reformation, at least not in the first six volumes of his study.[36] However, in a number of passages the main aspects of the Reformation are discussed in the course of his argument, and these passages, fitted together, do form a coherent interpretative whole. The most general statement he makes is that it was "...a great movement in the Promethean North of Western Europe (where the Baltic, the North Sea, and the Atlantic all beckoned towards new worlds) for emancipation from the Epimethian South (where the Western Mediterranean held the eye fixed upon worlds that were dead and gone)."[37] This suggests that the Reformation was the revolt of a creative part of the West from the

domination of a culture that had forfeited its creative leadership by committing suicide. The epithets "Epimethean" and Promethean" suggest that the "forward-looking" North was vital, and that the South had by its suicide released the evil forces that have plagued the West ever since.[38] Extended to modern times, the parallel still holds good, for Prometheus was finally destroyed for placing man before God.

In another passage, Toynbee describes the Reformation, more specifically, as a "drastic"[39] solution of the conflict between Parochialism and the oecumenical Church.[40] Thus the Reformation, forming part of the process by which secular governments had increasingly assumed papal prerogatives, led to the final emancipation of the Northern parochial states from the Church. As spiritual authority passed from the papacy to the individual,[41] so ecclesiastical authority passed from the pope to the parochial sovereigns. This, in turn, "helped to create the modern Western institution of parochial sovereignty."

While Hegel celebrated this development in the body of Western Civilization, Toynbee considers it disasterous both because it was destructive to Western unity and because it contributed to a wide-spread repudiation of Christianity in the West. These two consequences were inter-related, for the marriage of religion and parochial sovereignty, led to a series of wars which produced, because of their futile destructiveness, the anti-religious reaction of the Entlightenment.

This curse of parochialism fell upon Catholicism and Protestantism alike. In the case of the former, the pope assumed the role of a parochial sovereign when, for the ecclesiastical principalities, (Mainz, Cologne and Salzburg, for example) and in more modern times for Vatican City (by the Lateran Treaty of 1929) he claimed the prerogative of the modern sovereign state. By thus ignoring the principal of "Render unto Caesar..." the Church lost its oecumenical status and became just another competing parochial unit.[42] The Protestant Churches, at least the Anglican and the Lutheran, suffered far more seriously from Parochialism

by submitting to the patronage of secular princes. This misalliance of religion and politics resulted in a number of unfortunate consequences. For one, it produced the doctrine of the Divine Right of Kings which in more modern days has taken the form of the "pagan worship of sovereign national states."[43] In foreign affairs this misplaced allegiance resulted in what Toynbee calls "the monstrously cynical formula of 'Cujus Regio Ejus Religio'" which gave primacy to the political ambition of princes over the religious faith of the people. The Protestant Churches as a result of this surrender to the princes became, like the Byzantine Church, mere departments of state.[44]

Nonconformist Protestant sects, who fought state-control, were equally unfortunate, for in their resistance they fell victim to what Toynbee calls "the fissiparious tendency", i.e. they broke up into a number of unintegrated provincial units and so served further to disrupt the unity of Western civilization.[45] They finally found peace within the state when the spiritually uncreative principle of live and let-live toleration was established.[46]

The most grievous consequence of the control of religion by the political Toynbee writes, was "...the readiness of all the competing factions of the Western Christian Church in the Age of the Western Wars of Religion to seek a short cut to victory by condoning and even demanding, the imposition of their own doctrine upon the adherents of rival faiths by the application of political force..." This aberration "...sapped the foundation of all belief in the souls for whose allegiance the warring churches were competing..."[47] The reaction was one of scepticism and cynicism. The Enlightenment, commonly accepted as the period when the Western spirit was emancipated from prejudice and obscurantism, is, to Toynbee, merely an understandable but unfortunate consequence of the corruption of Christianity. The attitude of the "enlightened" mind he describes as one "which sterilized Fanaticism at the cost of extinguishing Faith. And this state of mind has lasted from the seventeenth century into the twentieth."[48]

Toynbee touches several important aspects of the Reformation, in various parts of his study, by way of illustrating his general laws of historical development, especially, in this particular case, the laws of the disintegration of civilizations. Henry VIII, whose case has been cited before and the German Princes who persecuted the peasants and the Anabaptists, serve as examples of the hangman type of the dominant minority.[49] Their victims were, correspondingly, members of an internal proletariat. Following the usual pattern of an exploited proletariat, the Anabaptists reacted both violently and gently to their ordeal.[50] Those who seized Münster in open rebellion in 1534-35 were of course of the violent variety, and those in Moravia and Holland who adopted a pacifist policy were of the gentle.[51] Both responses proved abortive; the Münster Anabaptists were crushed by force, while the others lost their moral fibre as they became economically successful and were re-absorbed into the main body of the culture from which they had sought to extricate themselves.[52] Another Protestant group that adopted a gentle policy, following a violent one, were the Quakers. They, like the Dutch and Moravian Anabaptists also rose from the ranks of the proletariat, ironically, by falling victim to their own teaching that honesty is the best policy.[53]

Calvinism is discussed under two section heads, "The Sense of Drift" and "Fatalism as a Spiritual Tonic"; both of these sections are included in the larger section, "Schism in the Soul." When a civilization is declining, Toynbee argues, the members of that civilization lose faith in their power to direct affairs, and therefore they suffer from a sense of drift. As a consequence, the idols of Chance and Necessity, both different expressions of the same thing, come to be worshiped.[54] Two examples from modern history of this worship are the doctrines of the laissez-faire of the classical economists and Marxist economic-determinism.[55] These two doctrines commonly believed to be ideological platforms of creative classes seeking power, in Toynbee's scheme are thus given a radically new interpretation. The advocators of these ideas, to him, were motivated by a loss of faith in human

control and not by a genuinely creative urge. As will be shown below, Calvinism was a similar type of doctrine.

The active and more creative attitude of responding to an ordeal is the "sense of sin" which leads the individual to blame himself instead of fatality for his troubles. Recognizing that the trouble is within himself, he seeks a spiritual transformation as the only way out of his predicament.[56] True Christianity, according to Toynbee, provides the means for this transformation, and deterministic perversions of Christianity, as Calvinistic predestinarianism, by denying human freedom, merely provide temporary but finally abortive escapes.

Calvinism, with its extreme emphasis on God's transcendance and on the inadequacy of the human will, is deterministic. It is a form of determinism, Toynbee writes, "...which is perhaps the most bizarre and perverse of all, since in this Theistic Determinism an idol is worshipped in the likeness of the True God."[57] The idol is, of course, Necessity. The aggressiveness of the early Calvinists, like that of the early Moslems and the contemporary Communists, is explained by the fact that a deterministic faith often acts as a "spiritual tonic", a stimulus which inspires men to action that they are certain has the force of destiny behind it.[58] This tonic, however, is an artificial one, for it is based on a faith which adversity is bound to undermine. Toynbee writes that the "...dynamism of yesterday has to be paid for with the "defeatism" of today."[59] Presumably, the fate of those Calvinists still faithful to their determinism, may be finally to give way to the fatalism so apparent in the Moslem Orient today.

Toynbee further considers the claims of the early Calvinists to have returned to the true teachings of the early Christian Church and of St. Augustine to be untrue.[60] St. Augustine's"true spiritual legacy," writes Toynbee, "was not the doctrine of Predestination." Rather did the Calvinists, and the Lutherans as well, return,for inspiration, to the "mallow phase" of the Syriac religious genius, that is to the Old Testament Prophets instead of to the New Testament.[61]

Toynbee presumably means that the Protestant re-discovered a God of transcendant might instead of Christ's inward God of love and mercy,[62] and so sanctioned a fanatical and bellicose militarism.

In conclusion, Toynbee conceived of the Reformation as both an expression of the parochialism whose challenge the Catholic Church failed to meet, and as a further stimulant to this movement. The failure of the Catholic Church created a climate of spiritual instability in the sixteenth century which, together with the force of parochialism, to a considerable extent conditioned Protestantism along unhappy lines. Thus, leaders of the Protestant movement were led to use the parochial power to strengthen their causes, and in most cases to preach perverse forms of Christianity. The result of these two unfortunate choices, as has been mentioned above, was to finally discredit religion and produce the anti-religious reaction known as the Enlightenment.

Toynbee's account of the Reformation appeared so pessimistic to the writer of the present paper that he wondered at the fact that Toynbee could remain a Protestant and could still maintain the possibility of a Christian revival. He wrote Toynbee a letter expressing his perplexity and received the following answer: "I do, as you point out, pick out certain aspects of the Protestant Reformation as examples of something that seems to have gone wrong with our Western Society, but in doing this I was not meaning to suggest anything like a general condemnation of Protestantism, and I believe that, whatever may be the future of Christianity in the Western World, Protestantism will be one of the main strands in it. My own personal expectation is that, this time, we are more likely to see a re-birth of Christianity than the birth of a new Church produced by the proletariat."[63]

The writer of this paper frankly finds it difficult to reconcile the optimism of this letter with Toynbee's treatment of the Reformation and of Western Civilization in his A Study of History. The teacher in this case has reasons the student knows not. Perhaps these reasons will be made explicit in the last volume

of his work which has yet to appear. However, the principal thesis culled from the pages of Toynbee's study stands, and this is that during the sixteenth century the "something wrong" that occurred was clearly a disruption of the unity of Western Civilization. The unhappy consequences of this misfortune plague the world today and account for the crisis of this age.

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Notes to Chapter VII

A.J. Toynbee, A Study of History, vols., 6, (London, 1934-39) will be referred to below as A Study...

1. See Chapter III.
2. A Study...V: fn., 6-7.
3. A.J. Toynbee, Civilization on Trial (N.Y., 1948), pp. 236-37.
4. A Study..., V:161-62.
5. Ibid., V:177.
6. Ibid., V:190.
7. Ibid., VI:191-98.
8. Ibid., V:188-89.
9. Ibid., V:17.
10. Ibid., V:16.
11. Ibid., V:47.
12. Ibid., V:160.
13. Ibid., V:157.
14. Ibid., III:154.
15. Ibid., III:140.
16. Ibid., V:376-99.
17. Ibid., V:376 ff.
18. Ibid., V:411.
19. Ibid., V:398.
20. Ibid., VI:313.
21. Ibid., IV:5.
22. Ibid., VI:319-20.
23. P. Sorokin makes a very important criticism of Toynbee's treatment of Western Civilization in his Social Philosophies of an Age of Crisis, p. 236. Concerning Toynbee's view that the disintegration of the West began after 1500, Sorokin writes: "If this is so, then according to his scheme, no revolutions, serious wars or hard-and-fast class divisions existed in Europe before that century. Factually, however,...serfdom and class divisions were hard and fast, and there were many wars-small and great."

    The present writer is not certain as to how Toynbee would answer this criticism, but he believes a possible answer, along Toynbeean lines, is that during the Middle Ages the West shared a common belief in the same set of values, and each individual Westerner felt himself to be a member of the same greater whole. Because of this, the individual Westerner felt both an emotional security and a purposefulness to his life. The West, in other words, was an integrated unity and the wars that occurred and the inequalities that existed, were not of crucial importance. That is, the antagonistic groups continued to recognize a common morality, the Christian, and a common arbiter, the Catholic Church. When, during the period leading up to the Reformation antagonistic groups no longer recognized the same morality or the same supra-political arbiter, the difference became crucial and seriously disruptive to Western unity and so destructive to harmonious growth.
24. A Study..., IV:215.
25. Toynbee discusses the Catholic Church intoxicated with her victory in ibid., IV:512-84.
26. Ibid., IV:524-25.
27. Ibid., IV:534-37.
28. Ibid., IV:539-41.
29. Ibid., IV:580.
30. Ibid., IV:214.
31. Ibid., IV:538. Toynbee writes: "To the Apostles at Rome our forefathers committed the destiny of Western Christendom, which was the whole of their treasure..."
32. Ibid., IV:580-81.
33. Ibid., IV:215.
34. Ibid., IV:217.
35. Ibid, IV:218.
36. Part X, unpublished yet, will deal with this question more fully. It is entitled "Contacts Between Civilizations in Time."

37. A Study..., I:19.
38. Toynbee talks of the papacy releasing "other spirits who are all more wicked than the supplanted householder."
39. Ibid., IV:219.
40. Ibid., IV:218.
41. Ibid., IV:218-19
42. Ibid., IV:220-21. This policy was in contradiction to papal policy at its wisest which Toynbee describes in the following way: "It was based on a combination of ecclesiastical centralism and uniformity with political diversity and devolution; and, since the superiority of the spiritual over the temporal power was a cardinal point in its constitutional doctrine, this combination made the note of unity predominant without depriving the adolescent Western Society of those elements of liberty and elasticity which are the indispensable conditions of growth. Even in those Central Italian territories over which the Papacy claimed secular as well as ecclesiastical authority the twelfth-century Popes gave encouragement to the movement towards city-state autonomy." (A Study of History, D.C. Somervell, abridger (N.Y./London, 1947), p. 350.
43. Ibis., IV:221
44. Ibid., II:369.
45. Ibid., IV:fn., 222
46. Ibid., IV:222-23.
47. Ibid., V:669.
48. Ibid., V:670-71. As has been pointed out, Toynbee does not believe that salvation for the West can come from this secular spirit. "A toleration", he writes, "that has no roots in Faith has failed to retain any hold upon the heart of Homo Occidentalis because human nature abhors a spiritual vacuum." (Ibid., VI:317).
49. Ibid., V:41.
50. Ibid., V:167.
51. Ibid., V:171.
52. Ibid., V:172.
53. Ibid., V:173.
54. Ibid., V:414.
55. Ibid., V:414 and 426.
56. Ibid., V:436-37.
57. Ibid., V:429.
58. Ibid., V:616-17.
59. Ibid., V:618.
60. Ibid., V:430.
61. Ibid., I:fn., 211.
62. In a brief passage, Toynbee suggests a footnote to this analysis by remarking that Luther translated the Books of Samuel and Kings into German together with the rest of the Bible. This was unfortunate since these books, as Ulfilas, the first translator of the Bible into a Teutonic language realized, are heavy with bloodshed and war (I:212). By this eliptical remark, Toynbee seems to mean that Luther was guilty of the aggressive tribal spirit of the Old Testament Prophets. This return of Protestantism to the extinct Syriac civilization for inspiration Toynbee calls a "Contact in the Time-dimension". Civilizations in decline tend to make contacts, as has been mentioned in Chapter III, with contemporary civilizations as well as with civilizations in the past. Toynbee differentiates between "archaism" which is an uncreative return to a dead worship (Anglo-Catholicism is an example of this), and this contact with another civilization which, presumably, can be creative. (VI:fn., 86.).
63. February 7, 1951.

CONCLUSION

Before the relationship between the crisis of the West and the Reformation is elaborated, the main conclusions of the preceding three chapters will be briefly re-stated.

Hegel interpreted the Reformation as the dawn of the modern conception of the State with its claims to absolute sovereignty, a conception which was to find its embodiment in the Prussian state. This conception is, from a logical point of view, a pernicious anachronism today, but it is still a powerful force in world affairs. The Reformation, as any other movement, from the Hegelian point of view, could only be conceived as progressive in the tight deterministic scheme that regarded history as the march of God. This nineteenth century belief in progress, from the perspective of the middle of the twentieth century, is considered to be untenable if not naive, by the new school of historical philosophers like Spengler, Sorokin, and Toynbee. What Hegel heralded as the dawn of the realization of the Kingdom of Heaven on earth, a number of contemporaries see as the beginning of the disintegration of the West because of the divorce of the kingdoms of the earth from the Kingdom of Heaven, as a result of the Reformation.

Marx interpreted the Reformation as a superstructural product of a new mode of production that, acting upon its structure, gave "an enormous impulse" to this mode of production. The most important result of the Reformation, from this point of view, was the transformation of Christian values to make them more compatible with capitalism and, also, to make them serve as psychological stimulants to capitalistic enterprise. The dawn of the nation-state, as well as the Reformation itself, were, from the Marxist point of view, effects in the last analysis, of the economic revolution that produced capitalism. According to Marx, capitalism was both more creative than anything that had preceded it, and at the same time, because of its contradictions and inadequacies, bound to collapse. Much of Marx's apocalyptic prognosis has been fulfilled in contemporary society, but too much has occurred

that contradicts Marxist predictions to make his scheme, in its pure form, any longer tenable.

Toynbee would agree with Hegel that a major effect of the Reformation was to contribute to the splitting up of Europe into a number of sovereign states, but Toynbee would not agree that this was beneficial. Toynbee, again, would agree with Marx that the new mode of production that the Reformation did so much to release and encourage, created a restive urban proletariat. In short, Toynbee regards Western civilization as split horizontally into states and vertically into social classes; the insights of Marx and Hegel are therefore subsumed in Toynbee's interpretation of the Reformation. In Toynbee's scheme, however, the economic and political fruits are seen as the consequences, not of dialectical necessity, but of the spiritual and cultural failure of the creative minority of Western civilization to meet the challenges of parochialism, and, later, of industrialism and democracy. As keys to salvation, from the Toynbeean point of view, the monistic insight of Hegel and Marx are inadequate. Toynbee rejects any deterministic scheme of history, and so, according to him, neither the Reformation, nor the emergence of unbridled capitalism or unbridled nationalism were inevitable, and the crisis of Western civilization, deep-rooted though it be, can be overcome if Western man has the wisdom and humility to submit to God and to rediscover the only source of the values upon which his civilization has been built.

In the early nineteenth century, a great humanist in the best tradition of European cosmopolitan liberalism wrote:

> We scarcely know what we owe to Luther, and the Reformation in general. We are freed from the fetters of spiritual narrow-mindedness; we have, in consequence of our increasing culture, become capable of turning to the fountain head, and of comprehending Christianity in its purity. We have, again, the courage to stand with firm feet upon God's earth, and to feel ourselves in our divinely-endowed human nature. Let mental culture go on advancing; let the natural sciences go on gaining in depth and breadth, and the human mind expand as it may- it will never go beyond the elevation and moral culture of Christianity as it glistens and shines forth in the Gospels!

> But the better we Protestants advance in our noble development, so much the more rapidly will the Catholics follow us. As soon as they feel themselves caught up by the ever-extending enlightenment of the time, they must go on, do what they will, till at last the point is reached where all is but one.
> The mischievous sectarianism of the Protestants will also cease, and with it the hatred and hostile feeling between father and son, sister and brother; for as soon as the pure doctrine and love of Christ are comprehended in their true nature, and have become a vital principle, we shall feel ourselves as human beings, great and free, and not attach special importance to a degree more or less in the outward forms of religion. Besides, we shall all gradually advance from a Christianity of words and faith, to a Christianity of feeling and action.[1]

The clouds of internecine warfare and of social turmoil were already on the horizon when Goethe, Hegel's contemporary, with his fervent optimism, spoke these words. Today these clouds have so overwhelmed Western man that it is only with a sardonic nostalgia that he can look back to the pretty court-life of Weimar. The vision of the Reformation both as a revolt for freedom and as a return to the unadulterated teachings of Christ was finally blown to smithereens, along with much else, at Hiroshima. The Reformation, from the perspective of today, released, along with the sovereign nation and the bourgeois class, the evil spirits that have poisoned the soul of Europe and, that today, threaten man with extinction.

Ironically, it is the Catholic Church rather than any Protestant church which as a disciplined body is making the most effective stand against the forces of moral destruction. "The history of Protestantism would seem to indicate," Toynbee has written, "that the Protestant act of casting off the armour four hundred years ago was premature..."[2] The Catholic Church is alone "tough" in its resistance, argues Toynbee, because it has preserved "...the spear of the Mass, the shield of Hierarchy, and the helmet of the Papacy..."[3]

A growing body of contemporary scholars share Toynbee's pessimistic conclusions concerning the Reformation. Leslie Paul considers the two most harmful results of the Reformation to have been the atomization of Christianity, and the passive alignment of leading Protestant churches with capitalism and with secular

government.[4] Christopher Dawson believes that the worst effect was the disruption of Christian hegemony, an occurrence which "prepared the way for the secularization of culture." This disruption created a neutral territory where secularism could grow.[5] R. Niebuhr believes that Protestantism: "Despite the religious profundity of its conception of human spirit, which transcends all circumstances and norms so much as to be responsible to no one but God,...has frequently contributed to the anarchy of modern life by its inability to suggest and to support relative standards and structure of social virtue and political justice. It has thus indirectly contributed to the romantic defiance of all rational and traditional norms in the sphere of politics and morals. In that sense the profoundest expression of Christian individuality is itself partly responsible for the anarchy of modern life."[6] And McGovern is of the opinion that the seeds of nazism were planted by Luther. He argues that the Reformation destroyed the concept of the pope as the supreme spiritual arbiter of Europe and so destroyed the idea of Europe as a single community; the states which had been handmaidens of the Church, at least theoretically, now virtually made churches handmaidens of the state. The net effect of the Reformation, McGovern argues, was the international anarchy which produced the concept of the balance of power and the pitifully ineffective theories of Grotius.[7] His unilinear analysis is too simple, though it is, broadly, much the same as Toynbee's. McGovern's weakness is in minimizing the blame that the Catholic Church must assume for the disruption of Europe.

Niebuhr and Paul, as well as Toynbee, hold the Catholics largely responsible; Paul argues that the Catholics abused their power and so asked for what they got, and Niebuhr, more profoundly, blames the Catholics for equating the Church with the Kingdom of God. Niebuhr's point is that a human institution is bound to fall into sin, and the sins of an institution claiming identification with Heaven, is correspondingly bound to descredit its heaven in the eyes of its devotees or else to give rise to a rebellion.

The Christian interpretation of the Reformation can be summarized as follows:

a Church divided against itself cannot stand; the Reformation disrupted the unity of the Church and released forces of individualism, statism, and capitalism, which, in t turn, made any unified European culture impossible, and no culture divided against itself can stand. "When a society dispenses with God, and with the Absolute," Sorokin has written "and rejects all the binding moral imperatives, the only binding power that remains is sheer physical force itself."[9] From the Christian point of view, this is the stage that the West is rapidly approaching.

Today Western society may be divided roughly into four ideological groupings, the capitalistsic democratic states living off the legacy of eighteenth and nineteenth century secular liberalism, the countries that have gone communist under the military and ideological inspiration of Stalinist Russia, the fascists who now control only Spain and who are elsewhere in the underground, and the democratic socialists who today govern England. Of these groupings, two, the communist and the fascist, would destroy Western Civilization if they could, and the other two groupings are perilously disunited internally as well as <u>vis-a-vis</u> one another. But the threat to the West does not lie here alone. Today a newly awakened Asiatic population (the term "Asia" is here used as Toynbee uses it to include all areas of the world that are predominantly "backward" and primitively agricultural)[10] is demanding both national and economic satisfactions; its attitude towards the West is antagonistic because of the memories and the actualities of imperialism, and the West, tragically appears to be unable to formulate a creative ideology that might replace her exploitative imperialism. Needless to say, if the West does not help Asia with her problems creatively, the West will forfeit this greater part of the globe to Russia.[11]

There are two major challenges, then, that the West must face, the challenge of her internal schisms, and the challenge of an awakened Asia. These two challenges are closely inter-related and neither can be met alone. These challenges may not be inseparable, but it is certainly safe to say that they preclude any possibility

of maintaining the status quo.

The internal problem, as has been suggested, is a threefold one, political, economic, and spiritual. Each of the three historical philosophers that have been dealt with are represented in the Western world today, in one form or another, with possible solutions that are more dynamic and morally more potent than the liberal-democratic universalism of the United Nations.

Hegel might have repudiated nazism if he had been alive during the regime of Hitler, but, as has been concluded, fundamental Hegelian principle found expression in the myths of fascism. Fascism as an answer needs little discussion; as Leslie Paul has argued it was both a "revolution of destruction"[12] and "a revolt against the West."[13] It was a symptom of the diseases that afflict the West rather than any solution, and because of its racism, it can only have a negative appeal, as an anti-Western movement, to the masses of Asia. The resistance of China to Japan in the last war, which stands in marked contrast to China's surrender to communism, shows that fascism in Asia can only have a limited success and one based solely on brute force.

But the main argument against fascism is that, as an anti-Western movement, it seeks the total subordination of the individual to the racial group and to the Führer. This is a repudiation of the concept recognized in all Western ideologies, whether secular or religious, of the dignity of the individual.

Communism, on the other hand, is a more vital movement, both because of its universalist appeal, and because, albeit in a perverted form, it accepts the Western conception of the innate dignity of man.

The insights of Marx, moreover, have to be met by any non-communist creative response. As Karl Mannheim has concluded, one clear lesson of the collapse of the Weimar Republic, is the economic and political vulnerability of the liberal democratic laissez-faire society.[14] The choice before the West "...is only between

good and bad planning," he argues.[15] The determining criterion here is the preservation of the freedom of the individual. Trotsky once argued in favor of communism as the only path to salvation because it "leads humanity from out the dark night of the circumscribed I."[16] But is it one thing, as Trotsky himself came to realize, to create a society in which the individual may fulfill himself through cooperation with other men, and quite another thing to organize the individual out of existence.

One of the most eloquent proponents of Marxism, of the liberal variety, in recent years, has been Harold Laski. In Faith, Reason, and Civilization,[17] he painted a picture of the West in crisis which is similar to Toynbee's except that Laski's bête noire, of course, was the capitalist mode of production with its perverse individualistic values of the acquisitive society. The solution, he argued, was the faith which animates Russia today, the identification of human productivity with the social good. He admitted the evils of Russian communism, but, and here his argument seems to fall apart, he argued that Stalinism was a mere scum on the great wave of the future. It seems, to the present writer, more intelligible to regard Stalinism, especially in 1951, as the wave itself rather than as an accidental scum.

As for the Christian argument, Laski attacked it as it is represented in Dawson's The Judgement of Nations. He had no trouble in showing that the Church deserved the Reformation, that it stood in the way of the progress of science, and that it has, in modern times, often aligned itself with reactionary social forces (witness the excommunication of Lamennais in 1834). The Christian solution, Laski argued, was to return to an anachronistic synthesis that could not possibly be revied in the hearts of the masses of men. It is important to note, first, that Laski is attacking the Catholic Church, and, second, that in his attack on Dawson, a Catholic, he assumes that Dawson believes that the only answer is a return to the medieval papacy, although Dawson nowhere states this explicitly. Laski may

have been right, but if he was, his attack cannot be applied to non-Catholic Christians like Toynbee or Niebuhr who certainly do not believe that any return to medieval Catholicism is either practicable or desirable.

Both Niebuhr and Toynbee are men who are socially conscious and well aware of the importance both of preserving political liberty and striving for economic equality. They would differ with Laski over the feasability of a purely secularist solution to social problems, and they would argue that Stalinism, far from being an accident, is a logical consequence of the Marxian religion.

In this connection, Niebuhr has written: "It is not altogether strange that Marxist politics should in Russia result in political realities not too distinguishable from the fruits of fascism. For in both cases the paradoxical relation of the creative and the destructive forces in human life is not fully understood; nor is the relation of form to vitality in human creativity fully comprehended." [18]

If fascism is an hopelessly abortive solution to the Western crisis, communism is destructive, the liberal-Marxist notwithstanding, of the liberal tradition of the West. As A.M. Schlesinger Jr. argues, a fundamental problem for the West is to steer clear of the Scylla and Charybdis of fascism and communism [19] in order to enhance the political and economic freedom of the individual without destroying his dignity as a human being. Toynbee, as the present writer interprets him, would preserve the crumbling liberal traditions of the West, but inject into them the life-giving fluid of faith and spirituality.

However successfully the West might cure her internal schisms, unless she relates her self-emancipation to the challenges the world as a whole faces she is doomed. The West cannot cure its crises today, for example, unless the Asiatic world is included, and the new-born nations of Asia, weak and self-conscious of their national liberations as they are, cannot be expected to take the lead in the creation of a new world society. The West is faced with two alternatives,

as Toynbee has pointed out;[20] it can lose Asia to Russia, in which case her eventual defeat will be practically certain, or it can take the lead in helping Asia to solve her enormous problems.

There is no easy solution to the impasse man has reached. He is bound up in a series of inter-linking vicious circles. One of these circles is that of war. As Jawaharlal Nehru implied in his recent talk with Norman Cousins,[21] war is a product of moral degradation; yet a system of values must, the time calling for it, be defended in war. Another vicious circle is the fear that prevents national governments from sacrificing any national sovereignty to create a genuine world government; and a third vicious circle is the fear, as well as the greed and short-sightedness, which prevents individuals or classes, or nations, from making sacrifices for a cause or an ideal they have no confidence in. Yet these vicious circles must be broken or the world is doomed to either destruction or to a brutal reign of terror and moral degradation in which the individual will be irrevocably "annihilated".

This latter order is what Toynbee calls a Pax Oecumenica by a world-conqueror or a Universal Empire. It has already been shown that Toynbee considers such an order to be the nemesis of creativity. Instead, "What the situation manifestly demands is a voluntary association of the peace-loving peoples of the World in sufficient force and cohesion to be unassailable by any who reject their pact of collective security or who break it; and this peace-keeping world-power...must also be sufficiently just and wise in the use of its power to avoid the provocation of any serious wish to challenge its authority."[22] Of man's capacity to fulfill such a logical and necessary vision, Toynbee is deeply sceptical. He has written "... inasmuch as it cannot be supposed that God's nature is less constant than Man's, we may and must pray that a reprieve which God has granted to our society once will not be refused if we ask for it again in a contrite spirit and with a broken heart."[23]

If these words mean anything, they mean that the vision of a harmonious

free world order will remain a pipe-dream unless some man or some group responds with sufficient greatness to cut the Gordian knots of the vicious circles. This calls for a spiritual transformation of the will, as Leslie Paul has put it,[24] and this can only begin with the wills of individuals. André Gide has written that "The world will be saved by a few",[25] and the few will be the "creative minority" of the future.

This minority will have to do far more than propose eclectic syntheses of world outlooks like Northorp, or elaborate fool-proof schemes for world government like Culbertson. Their's must be a faith that reaches more deeply into the hearts and souls of men than faiths like fascism and communism; as Dawson has pointed out, the secular idealism of liberal internationalism is inadequate for the job.[26] The new faith must be viscerally or divinely motivated and preached; any cerebral concoction, however well-meant, is as dry leaves before the cold winds of hatred, fear, and fanaticism.

No sincere and responsible western statesman, outside the Russian world, would probably dispute the wisdom of world federation, and at least one great Asiatic statesman, Nehru, has sanctioned it. However, Nehru's guarded answers to Cousins evidenced the hesitancy most statesmen, with the interests of their nations and the opinions of their publics uppermost in their minds, must feel. Nehru agreed with Cousins that the United Nations should become more of a world body than it is today, but, he said, "...we can't have it suddenly or by decree. One has to grow up to it...It will come when in a large measure the organization itself begins to represent what might be called the will of the world community."[27] Nehru is, of course, right; first there must be the will and the heart-felt vision.

Notes to the Conclusion

1. Eckermann, Conversations with Goethe (London/N.Y., Everyman's, n.d.), p. 423.
2. A.J. Toynbee, A Study of History, vols. VI (London, 1934-39), V:243.
3. Ibid., V:242.
4. L. Paul, The Annihilation of Man: A Study of the Crisis of the West (London, n.d.), p. 177.
5. C. Dawson, The Judgement of the Nations (London, 1943), pp. 69 and 72.
6. R. Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man: A Christian Interpretation, vols.II (London, 1941-34), I:641.
7. W.M. McGovern, From Luther to Hitler: The History of Fascist-Nazi Political Philosophy (Boston/N.Y., etc., n.d.), pp. 21-76 passim.
8. R. Niebuhr, op. cit., I:214.
9. P. Sorokin, The Crisis of Our Age: The Social and Cultural Outlook (N.Y., 1946), p. 163.
10. See A.J. Toynbee, "The Impact of the West on Asia: Arnold Toynbee opens a series of talks entitled 'The Reawakening of Asia'" pp. 827-28, and 840, in The Listener, May. 24, 1951.
11. It may be asked, at this point, whether Russia is not part of the West. From the point of view of the present writer, Russian civilization is a mixture of Oriental and Byzantine as distinct from Catholic traditions. Russia experienced no Reformation and no Renaissance in the European sense . Communism, though a Western product, has been in a sense conquered by Russian civilization and therefore is a religion even more incompatible with Western civilization than it was at its birth with Marx and Engels. This is, in the main, Toynbee's point of view, also.
12. L. Paul, op. cit., p. 34.
13. Ibid., p. 98.
14. K. Mannheim, E. Shils, trans., Man and Society: In an Age of Reconstruction (Enlarged and Revised Edition, N.Y., n.d.), p. 4.
15. Ibid., p. 6.
16. Quoted in E. Wilson, To the Finland Station (N.Y., 1940), p. 434.
17. H.J. Laski, Faith, Reason, and Civilization : An Essay in Historical analysis (N.Y.,1944)
18. R. Niebuhr, op. cit., I:54.
19. A.M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Vital Center:The Politics of Freedom (Boston, n.d.), p. 54.
20. A.J. Toynbee, "The Impact of the West on Asia...",
21. J. Nehru and Cousins, "Conversations with Nehru" in The Saturday Review of Literature (April 14, 1951, pp. 13-19, 60-61, and April 21, 1951, pp. 7-12and 46-49), April 21, p.11.
22. A.J. Toynbee, A. V. Fowler, sel., War and Civilization: From A Study of History (N.Y. 1950), pp. xi-xii.
23. Ibid., p. 11.
24. L. Paul, op. cit., p. 181.
25. A. Gide, "Two Declarations by André Gide", pp. 393-400 in Partisan Review, (July-August, 1951).
26. C. Dawson, op. cit., p. 151.
27. J. Nehru and N. Cousins, op. cit., Arpil 21, pp. 8 and 46.

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Among the articles dealing with contemporary problems that Toynbee has written are: "The Impact of the West on Asia: Arnold Toynbee opens a series of talks entitled 'The Reawakening of Asia'" in The Listener (May 24, 1951) pp. 827-28, and 840; and "How to turn the Tables on Russians" in The Herald Tribune (July 25, 1949).

Two important critical treatments of Toynbee are R.H. Tawney, "Dr. Toynbee's Study of History" in International Affairs (Nov., 1939), pp. 798-806, and the relevant parts of P.A. Sorokin, Social Philosophies of an Age of Crisis (Boston, 1950). Other critiques appear in works which will be cited below.

D. General Works

There are a number of valuable general studies which deal with Hegel, Marx, and Toynbee's interpretations of history either directly or by way of expounding an alternative interpretation. K.R. Popper, The Open Society and its Enemies, vols. II (London, 1945) is a boisterous and sweeping diatribe against the "enemies" of the liberal 'open society' ranging from Plato to Toynbee. It is very good on Marx, irresponsible on Hegel, and mediocre on Toynbee. Emery Neff, The Poetry of History (N.Y., 1947) is a stylistic, popular account of the contributions of various historians to man's knowledge of his historical being. It includes a very general, sympathetic account of Toynbee's study. Paul Foulquié, La dialectique (Paris, 1949) includes the main criticisms that have been made by various students of Marx's and Hegel's conceptions of dialectical development. J.R. Strayer, ed., The Interpre-

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The best introductions to the study of Toynbee are his Civilization on Trial (N.Y., 1948), a collection of essays; A.J. Toynbee, A.V. Fowler, ed., War and Civilization: From a Study of History (N.Y., 1950) which includes a short preface by Toynbee; and A.J. Toynbee, D.C. Somervell, abridger, A Study of History: Abridgment of Volumes I-VI (N.Y./London, 1947). This last work is perhaps too compact to be relied upon alone for any real understanding of Toynbee's work, but as a quick reference book it is invaluable. An helpful essay by Toynbee is "Churches and Civilizations" in The Yale Review (Sept. '47), pp. 1-8. The main source is of course his monumental A Study of History, vols. I-VI (London, 1934-39) which constitutes two-thirds of what is to be a nine volume work.
Among the articles dealing with contemporary problems that Toynbee has written are: "The Impact of the West on Asia: Arnold Toynbee opens a series of talks entitled 'The Reawakening of Asia'" in The Listener (May 24, 1951) pp. 827-28, and 840; and "How to turn the Tables on Russians" in The Herald Tribune (July 25, 1949).

Two important critical treatments of Toynbee are R.H. Tawney, "Dr. Toynbee's Study of History" in International Affairs (Nov., 1939), pp. 798-806, and the relevant parts of P.A. Sorokin, Social Philosophies of an Age of Crisis (Boston, 1950). Other critiques appear in works which will be cited below.

D. General Works

There are a number of valuable general studies which deal with Hegel, Marx, and Toynbee's interpretations of history either directly or by way of expounding an alternative interpretation. K.R. Popper, The Open Society and its Enemies, vols. II (London, 1945) is a boisterous and sweeping diatribe against the "enemies" of the liberal 'open society' ranging from Plato to Toynbee. It is very good on Marx, irresponsible on Hegel, and mediocre on Toynbee. Emery Neff, The Poetry of History (N.Y., 1947) is a stylistic, popular account of the contributions of various historians to man's knowledge of his historical being. It includes a very general, sympathetic account of Toynbee's study. Paul Foulquié, La dialectique (Paris, 1949) includes the main criticisms that have been made by various students of Marx's and Hegel's conceptions of dialectical development. J.R. Strayer, ed., The Interpre-

tation of History (Princeton, 1943) is a stimulating collection of essays by a number of contemporary students on the problems and values of modern historiography. R. Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man: A Christian Interpretation, Vols. II, (London, first published in 1941) contains brilliant critiques of almost all important modern ideologies and philosophies. It is critical of Hegel and Marx and sympathetic to Toynbee. This book is, to the mind of the present writer, one of the greatest and most suggestive works by any modern thinker.
B. Russell, Power: A New Social Analysis (London, n.d.) contains valuable criticism of Marx from what J. Burnham would call the "Machiavellian" point of view. F.S.C. Northrop, The Meeting of East and West (N.Y., 1946) contains important criticism of both Hegel and Marx. R.G. Collingwood, The Idea of History (Oxford, the first edition (1946) reprinted photographically (1948) with sheets of the first edition) also contains important criticism of Hegel and Marx as well as an enlightening critique of the first three volumes of Toynbee's work. Collingwood's point of view has been obviously deeply influenced by B. Croce whose History: Its Theory and Practice (N.Y., 1921), translated by D. Ainslie, is especially valuable for its criticism of Hegel from a revisionist Hegelian point of view. Other works that have been used by the present writer are: J.W. Thompson, with the collaboration of B.J. Holm, A History of Historical Writing, Vols., II, (N.Y., 1942); G.H. Sabine, A History of Political Theory (N.Y., n.d.) which contains excellent critical expositions of the thought of Hegel, Marx, and Lenin; F.J. Teggart, Theory and Process in History (Berkeley/Los Angeles, 1941); M.R. Cohen, The Meaning of Human History (La Salle, 1947); E.E. Harbison, Religious Perspectives of College Teaching in History (New Haven, The Edward W. Hazen Foundation, n.d.); B. Russel, The Problem of Philosophy (London/N.Y., etc., first published in 1912); B. Croce, V. Sheean, trans., Germany and Europe: A Spiritual Dissension (N.Y., n.d.); and V.F. Calverton, ed. The Making of Society (N.Y., n.d.) which is an anthology of selections from outstanding past and present men who have made important contributions to sociology.

II. The Crisis of Western Civilization

Hegel, of course, has nothing that bears on the contemporary crisis of the West. Marx, on the other hand, had a great deal to say about it apocalyptically. Toynbee's views on the crisis appear throughout his works; in fact, it is safe to say that Toynbee, conscious of belonging to a civilization in disintegration, is mainly concerned in his work with the nature and the meaning of disintegration.
The works that cast light upon the crisis of the West are legion. Among the most rewarding are: N. Angell, The Steep Places (London, 1948); J.W. Krutch, The Modern Temper: A Study and a Confession (N.Y., 1929); "America and the Mind of Europe: Mid-Century", the Jan. 13, 1951 issue of The Saturday Evening Post, which includes essays by prominent European intellectuals like Denis de Rougement and A. Koestler; W. Friedmann, The Crisis of the National State (London, 1943) which is valuable as a study of the collapse of the Hegelian concept of the sovereign State; W.T. Stace, "Man Against Darkness" in The Atlantic (Sept. '48), pp. 53-58, which is a brief but lucid account of the fruits of irreligion in Western civilization; P.A. Sorokin, The Crisis of Our Age: The Social and Cultural Outlook (N.Y., 1946); F. Neumann, Behemoth: The Structure and Practice of National Socialism: 1933-1944 (Toronto/N.Y., etc., 1944); R. Niebuhr, op. cit.; L. Paul, The Annihilation of Man: A Study of the Crisis of the West; P.F. Drucker, The End of Economic Man: A Study of the New Totalitarianism (N.Y., 1939); C Dawson, The Judgement of the Nations (London, 1943); V.I. Lenin, Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism; A Popular Outline (Revised Edition, N.Y., n.d.) which is, of course, a picture of the crisis from a communist point of view; H.J. Laski, Faith, Reason, and Civilization: An Essay in historical analysis (N.Y., 1944) presents a liberal Marxist view of the crisis of the West. Both these last works proffer solutions along Marxist lines. Among the works that seek to meet the crisis contructively without abandoning the liberal tradition are: K. Mannheim, E. Shils, trans., Man and Society: In an Age of Reconstruction (Enlarged and Revised Edition, N.Y., 1940); J. Dewey, Reconstruction of Philosophy (N.Y., n.d.); N. Cousins, Modern Man is Obsolete (N.Y., 1945);

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III. The Reformation

Primary sources on the interpretation of the Reformation must include almost all the works by Hegel, Marx, and Toynbee that have been cited because relevant material is interspersed through their respective works. The works that is most relevant for the Hegelian point of view is Hegel's Lectures on the Philosophy of History. Other works that have been made use of are: W. Cunningham, "Medieval and Modern Times" which is the second volume of An Essay on Western Civilization in Its Economic Aspect and was published in Cambridge, in 1904; W.E. McGovern, From Luther to Hitler: The History of Fascist-Nazi Political Philosophy (Boston/N.Y., etc., 1941); E. Troeltsch, W. Montgomery, trans., Protestantism and Progress: A Historical Study of the Relation of Protestantism to the Modern World. (N.Y., 1921); J.E.E. Dalberg-Acton, J.N. Figgis and R.V. Laurence, eds., Lectures on Modern History; G. de Ruggiero, R.G. Collingwood, trans., The History of European Liberalism (London, 1927); C. Beard, The Reformation of the Sixteenth Century: in its Relation to Modern Thought and Knowledge (Hibbert Lectures April, May, June 1883) (London/Edinborough, 1883); E.P. Cheyney, "The Dawn of a New-Era-1250-1454" in W. Langer, ed., The Rise of Modern Europe (N.Y./London); A. Fanfani, Catholicism, Protestantism, and Capitalism (London, 1939); R. Pascal, "The Class Basis of Luther's Reformation" in Hibbert Journal (July, 1931) which is a Marxist interpretation; R.H. Tawney, Religion and the Rise of Capitalism: A Historical Study (Holland Memorial Lectures 1922) (N.Y., first published in 1926 in America); M. Weber, F. H. Knight, trans., General Economic History (London, n.d.); and P. Smith, The Age of the Reformation (N.Y., n.d.) the last chapter of which ("The Reformation Interpreted") is an invaluable summary of the leading interpretations of the Reformation that have been made by past and present students; this chapter is also valuable for bibliography.

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