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THE LEGACY OF AIR CONTROL: A REASSESSMENT OF THE ‘SPLENDID TRAINING GROUND’ OF MANDATE IRAQ

by
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ABSTRACT
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Title: The Legacy of Air Control: A Reassessment of the 'splendid training ground' of Mandate Iraq

This thesis reexamines the air control scheme developed by the Royal Air Force (RAF) within Iraq from 1922–1930. The case study of Mandate Iraq has an enduring interest for military planners lately because of a rise in autonomous systems. Air policing within the air control scheme allowed for the successful maintenance of order in the wake of the 1920 Iraq Revolt and remained a pillar of British control until the 1958 coup. While many works cite this case study to further their critique either of empire or to justify the use of drones today, many do not adequately address the underlying complexities of the air control scheme. The general design of Air Control consisted of three central pillars: aerial bombing campaigns, armored cars and local levies, and intelligence collection vis-à-vis British Intelligence Special Service Officers (SSOs). Each element contributed to a strategic outcome of successful internal control of Iraq while cutting costs during British rule. Previous research highlights the lethal effects, i.e., aerial bombing campaigns, as the hallmark of the air control scheme. Its supporting components deserve more credit than previously acknowledged. While air power was an essential factor in controlling unrest over the vast arid and mountainous terrain within Iraq, the other factors often overlooked are the armored car units and SSO's working in concert with RAF air squadrons. This study expands upon the recent work of Richard Newton, who argues for SSOs as a central pillar of Air Control, vital to the success of maintaining Britain's colonial control. Political and economic aspects unique to Mandate Iraq and Air Control's development are also stressed within this study. Air Control was not only a means of ensuring the RAF's independent service status. Its emergence fits into a broader argument of Britain's 'Middle Eastern Question.' Three unresolved matters of Air Control are addressed in this thesis, the relationship of the Sharifian Solution to Air Control's formation, the cost savings argument, and the use of intelligence within the air control scheme. This critical analysis concludes with a brief discussion on the modern implications of Air Control.

PREFACE

What does 100 years of aerial operations within Iraq mean? It's a distressing question to ask, to which there is no answer, but something I contemplated deeply during this research process.

Like anything, as you continue to study a topic, its intricacy can grow into a tangled web of events. Unraveling, explaining, and interpreting these events is the duty of the researcher and one I take seriously. So, in the hopes of any of this information being helpful to other researchers, I have tried to combine all the literature of Iraq's Air Control experience into one document. This approach is not without its drawbacks. Air Control is a divisive topic, and this research can be interpreted in various ways. I have tried to ground the topic in its historical context showing how events influenced this policy and its actual practice. I believe that understanding the historical uses of air power might prevent any overestimation of its capabilities today. In a sense, this text can be taken as a starting point for understanding our more modern context. Regrettably, these issues of violence will continue to persist as drones continue to proliferate throughout the world.

This research cannot ignore the ethical issues of Air Control. Aerial bombardment has a level of detachment from any actual effects caused on the ground. This detachment has continued into the present and is much greater now with drones. Words on paper cannot do justice to describe any of these events to the reader. The most accessible resource to witness this historical policy is a British Channel 4, Secret History episode entitled "Birds of Death" and can be found on YouTube. At times this violence might not come across plainly within the text. I tried to address these issues while being as fair as possible to the specific context. I apologize for any callousness conveyed to the reader, but too often, I have seen surface-level arguments either for or against Air Control. By delving into its intricacies, I hoped to provide a comprehensive understanding at a more appropriate depth for further analysis or criticism.

This thesis has been a learning process. COVID-19 forced me to get creative in my sourcing so that almost all the sources within the bibliography are available digitally. I attempted to be as thorough as possible, and this piece's overall content should be more than satisfactory to anyone interested in this topic. I tried to be precise in terminology, so everything is easily understood either through the Abbreviations and Glossary section of the manuscript. Whenever referencing Britain's air policy in the Middle East, two interchangeable terms were used: Air Control or air control scheme. At times within the literature on Air Control, this can be less specific and something I have tried to rectify. Well-known English spellings of Faisal and Hussein were utilized instead of either Faysal or Husayn. Also, Ikhwan and sheikh spellings are used instead of Akhwan (British primary source spelling) or shaykh. All other names and places were attempted to keep the proper pronunciation. For any other Arabic transliteration, I have italicized specific words in question.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ILLUSTRATIONS

Figure

ABBREVIATIONS

AC	Army Co-operation
ACF	Armed Civil Forces
ACM	Air Chief Marshal
Air Cdre	Air Commodore
AM	Air Marshal
AOC	Air Officer Commanding
AOC-in-C	Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief
AOC(India)	Air Officer Commanding, RAF India
AP	Air Publication
ASM	Air Staff Memorandum
AVM	Air Vice-Marshal
BEF	British Expeditionary Force
Capt	Captain
CAS	Chief of the Air Staff
CB	Contrôle Bédouin
CFS	Central Flying School
CGS(India)	Chief of the General Staff, India
CID	Committee of Imperial Defence
CIGS	Chief of the Imperial General Staff
C-in-C	Commander-in-Chief
Col	Colonel
DCAS	Deputy Chief of the Air Staff
DS	Directing Staff
Flt Lt	Flight Lieutenant
FTS	Flying Training School
WWI	First World War
GOC	General Officer Commanding
GoI	Government of India
Gp	Capt Group Captain
GS	General Staff GS(India) General Staff, India
HMG	His Majesty's Government
HQ	Headquarters
HQ RAF(Iraq)	Headquarters Royal Air Force, Iraq
IAF	Indian Air Force
IGS	Imperial General Staff
IO	India Office
IPS	Indian Political Service
ISR	Intelligence, Surrveillance, and Reconnaissance
JRUSI	Journal of the Royal United Service Institution
LAC	Leading Aircraftman
Lt Col	Lieutenant Colonel
Lt Gen	Lieutenant General
Maj	Major
MOD	Ministry of Defence
NWF	North-West Frontier
NWFI	North-West Frontier of India

NWFP	North-West Frontier Province
OC	Officer Commanding
PM	Prime Minister
PUS	Permanent Under Secretary of State
QFI	Qualified Flying Instructor
RAFQ	Royal Air Force Quarterly
RFC	Royal Flying Corps
RNAS	Royal Naval Air Service
RUSI	Royal United Service Institution
SASO	Senior Air Staff Officer
SoS	Secretary of State
Sqn Ldr	Squadron Leader
SR Officers	Service des Renseignements, French Urban Intelligence Officers
SSO	Special Service Officer
Wg Cdr	Wing Commander
WO	War Office

GLOSSARY

RAF Air Control Description

Air Control — The political administration of undeveloped countries inhabited by backward and semi-civilised populations has always been based in the last resort upon military force in one form or another; the term "air control" implies that the ultimate force takes the form of aircraft as the primary arm, usually supplemented by armoured cars and sometimes by small land forces.

The countries for which a system of air control is particularly suited, as opposed to military control by land forces, are those which combine inaccessibility—whether due to great distance or to the nature of the terrain—with a population organised on a loose tribal basis, living either as nomads or in scattered villages rather than concentrated in town.[1]

David Omissi

Air Control — The policy of assigning responsibility for the defense of a region to the Air Ministry (and, de facto, assigning command to the senior RAF officer).
Air Policing — The employment of aircraft to maintain the internal security of a state.
Air Substitution — The replacement of ground forces by aircraft.[2]

Richard Newton

Air Control — The sum total of air-oriented actions taken to influence the behavior of local populations and adversaries to conform to desired standards of conduct.[3]

Anna Feigenbaum and Anja Kanngieser

Atmospheric Policing — Technologies and techniques for controlling populations that are fundamentally predicated on their relationship with air and colonize space in ways that other weapons do not.

NATO Definitions

Air Policing — A peacetime mission involving the use of the air surveillance and control system, air command and control and appropriate air defence assets, including interceptors, for the purpose of preserving the integrity of the NATO airspace part of Alliance airspace. 2012.05.04

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[1] AIR 9/12 Draft - Air Staff Memorandum No.[?] Air Control of Undeveloped Countries

[2] David E. Omissi, *Air Power and Colonial Control: The Royal Air Force, 1919-1939* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1990). XV

[3] Richard Dana Newton, *The RAF and Tribal Control: Airpower and Irregular Warfare Between the World Wars* (University Press of Kansas, 2019), 14.

Doctrine — Fundamental principles by which the military forces guide their actions in support of objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgement in application. 1973.03.01

RAF Definition

Air power — The ability to use air capabilities in and from the air to influence the behaviour of actors and the course of events.

Note: When referring to bombing compared to the modern military description of kinetic effects or kinetic applications of air power.

Bombing (Kinetic) — In the colonial context air power had access to bombs, generally 20-lb, 112-lb, or 230-lb bombs, and small arms ammunition. British primary sources define this as “air action,” and references to the term bombing throughout this manuscript can be swapped with the more modern term, kinetic effects, in most cases. Modern military terminology differentiates between non-kinetic and kinetic uses of air power. Current kinetic capabilities now include precision engagement in the interdiction, dynamic targeting, and close or deep air support roles. Non-kinetic uses range from air transport/ambulance, ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance), air command and control, and electronic warfare.

CHAPTER 1

TIMELINES, TREATIES, COMMISSIONERS, AND MAPS

1.1. Timeline

1831 — Ottoman reconquest of Baghdad: capture of the last mamluk governor

1908 — Young Turk revolution in Istanbul

1909 — Sultan Abdulhamid II deposed

1914 — November: British occupation of Basra

1917 — March: British occupation of Baghdad

1918 — November: British occupation of Mosul

1920 — April: San Remo meeting assigns Mandate for Iraq to United Kingdom July–October: Iraqi revolt November: Sayyid Abd al-Rahman al-Kailani forms first Iraqi government.

1921 — March: Cairo Conference decides on Prince Faisal bin Husain alHashemi as king of Iraq August: enthronement of King Faisal in Baghdad

1924 — March: Constituent Assembly opens June: Anglo-Iraqi Treaty passed

1925 — March: Iraqi government signs Turkish Petroleum Company oil concession December: League of Nations decides that Mosul should remain part of Iraq

1927 — First major oil finds near Kirkuk

1930 — June: new Anglo-Iraqi Treaty signed promising Iraqi independence

1932 — October: League of Nations ends Mandate and grants independence to Iraq

1933 — September: King Faisal dies; King Ghazi succeeds

1935 — January: official opening of Kirkuk – Mediterranean pipeline

1936 — October: military coup d'état, backed by General Bakr Sidqi; Hikmat Sulaiman forms a government 1937 August: Bakr Sidqi assassinated; Hikmat Sulaiman overthrown by army[4]

[4] Charles Tripp, *A History of Iraq*, 3rd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), xii, https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511804304.

1.2. Treaties and Diplomatic Agreements

1918 — 31 October, Armistice of Mudros: Ended the fighting between the Ottomans, British and French.

1919 — 28 June, Treaty of Versailles

1920 — 18 to 26 April, San Remo Conference

10 August, Signing of Treaty of Sèvres

1921 — 12 to 21 March, Cairo Conference: Finalized the Class A Mandate enforcement system.

23 August, Crowning of King Faisal

1922 — 5 May, Muhammerah Treaty:
Conference laid down the principles of tribal allegiance and assigned the Muntafiq, Dhafir, and ‘Amarat tribes to Iraq, also formed a commission to determine ownership of resources.

10 October, Anglo-Iraqi Treaty:
Signed in principal but subsidiary agreements lasted for two more years.

December, ‘Uqayr Conference:
Formally established a neutral zone between Nejd and Iraq. Also sometimes spelled or referred to as the Uqair agreement or Ojair protocol. Water access was granted to all parties in neutral zones, but no buildings or dwellings were supposed to be constructed. Began a disagreement over desert posts between Iraq and Nejd. It also created a neutral Kuwait-Saudi zone. Ibn Sa’ud abandoned his claim over the Dhafir tribe.

1923 — 24 July, Signing of Treaty of Lausanne:
Redrafted the previous Sèvres Treaty.

1924 — Voted 4 March and finalized 31 April, Anglo-Iraq Defense Agreement

1925 — 1 November, Bahara Agreement:
The Iraq-Najd treaty reaffirmed the Muhammara Convention and the ‘Uqayr Protocols of 1922 (cross-border raiding). After this agreement, Iraq’s desert post warning system for 1924–25 was terminated until 1927.

2 November, Hadda Agreement: Between Trans-Jordan and Nejd.

1926 — 5 June, Anglo-Turkish-Iraqi Treaty (Treaty of Ankara):
Ended the Mosul Question. Iraq got Mosul and Turkey got 10% of Oil revenues for 25 years, but Iraq bought them out after 4 years for £500,000 sterling. (See Article 14)

1927 — 10 to 20 May, Negotiations for Treaty of Jeddah:

British-Saudi Arabia Treaty. Britain recognized ‘Abd al-Aziz Al Sa’ud’s (Ibn Sa’ud) complete independence and sovereignty in the Hijaz and Najd. Began the process of manumission, relinquished Britain’s capitulatory rights, but left the Hijaz–Trans-Jordan boundary undefined.

1930 — 21 February, *Lupin* Meeting

Established peace between Faisal and Ibn Sa’ud after the Ikhwan rebellion and ended large cross border raids.

1.3. British High Commissioners in Iraq

This list excludes most administrators who served during the Second World War or for less than a year. Those marked with an asterisk (*) appeared as ‘accredited representative’ before the Permanent Mandates Commission at the session noted.

Acting Civil Commissioner, Henry Talbot Wilson 1918–1920
Sir Percy Cox, 1920–23
*Sir Henry Dobbs, 1923–28 (10th session, November 1926)
Sir Gilbert Clayton, 1928–29
*Sir Francis Humphrys, 1929–32 (20th session, June 1931; 21st session, October–November 1931)

1.4. Maps



Map 2. 1930 SSO Areas of Responsibility



Map 1. 1924 War Office Map of Iraq (AIR 5/400)



Map A100.03. Map entitled: "Map of the Boundary between the Vilayet of Mosul or Northern Frontier of Iraq and the Vilayet of Van in Turkey, in two sheets. Complied from Survey Sheets (137), from sketch maps of Goyan Frontier, Khabur Valley, Nerva and Raikan, Rowanduz frontier and Maunsells sheets." With annotations illustrating the Turco-Iraqi Frontier question, 1925-1926. [CO730/105/3]. (Original size: 675x750 mm). [This map is of particular relevance to documents at volume 1, section 29.]

Map 3. 1925–1926 Mosul Boundary (CO730/105/3)

CHAPTER 2

INTRODUCTION

Throughout history, contemporary technologies of the times have dictated how the state maintains power and order through its policing mechanisms. In the aftermath of the First World War, a novel weapon system was repurposed as a means of policing empire. The airplane became a vital tool in policing vast geographical areas previously inaccessible to the central government. In the colonial periphery, territorial borders gained heightened relevance and previously inaccessible tribal zones were brought much closer into the fold. The porousness of frontiers and borders began to decrease resulting from the increased capability of policing these problematic areas. Budding aerial reconnaissance provided better administrative knowledge of these areas as well as much quicker means of communication between the peripheral and the metropole. The lethal aspect of air power (strategic bombing) proved to be an oft cited means of the maintenance of order for these problematic zones.

Air power has continually been employed in these peripheral zones since its initial inception in concert with continuous technological advancement. Nations now have the technological means of monitoring all physical features and geographically referenced activities on the earth through orbital geospatial imagery and remote sensing under a broader unifying theme of Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT). Air power's enforcement capabilities have also benefited from technological advancement. International interventions authorized by the UN Security Council, can now employ a denial of airspace by traditional military fighter aircraft creating no-fly zones (A2AD-Anti-Access Area Denial). Targeting technology has become much more accurate with

precision-guided missiles and ‘smart bombs’ furthering the applications of nascent air policing in peripheral and conflicts.

Today a new technological innovation is shaping our lives, i.e., the spread of Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS) and Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS), or drones, the more commonly used term. Sophisticated reconnaissance and targeting technology have now unified into one device, recreating the paralyzing effect of the mythical Gorgon Stare.[5] Real-time video surveillance and wide area search imagery with high-resolution spot mode tracking of individuals have merged, turning the drone into an ever-watching ‘eye in the sky’ capable of firing a Hellfire missile at a moment’s notice. Current cutting-edge technology can launch an inert warhead (R9X) or Long Blade from a drone with the capability of executing a passenger in a moving vehicle, leaving the driver unharmed.[6] These innovations in technology have allowed for an expanded role in both military and civil policing missions, creating a much more enticing tool for governments and militaries to deploy them. Drone use by states has increased exponentially since first becoming weaponized by the United States in February of 2001.[7] Due to the American-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, the utility of air policing has reemerged as a topic of academic discussion among both military air power theorists and critical imperial historians, primarily due to the technological

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[5] Since been delisted from their website found through Digital Archive. “DARPA Advances Video Analysis Tools,” News, DARPA Advances Video Analysis Tools, July 3, 2011, https://web.archive.org/web/20110703135309/https://www.darpa.mil/NewsEvents/Releases/2011/2011/06/23_DARPA_advances_video_analysis_tools.aspx.

[6] Eric Schmitt, “U.S. Used Missile With Long Blades to Kill Qaeda Leader in Syria,” *The New York Times*, June 24, 2020, sec. World, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/24/world/middleeast/syria-qaeda-r9x-hellfire-missile.html.

[7] Lt. Col. Thomas Mark McCurley, *Hunter Killer: Inside America’s Unmanned Air War* (New York, N.Y: Dutton, 2015), 19.

advancements of these unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). In the wake of the United States' protracted conflict in both Afghanistan and Iraq, the use of drones has become an oft-cited means of policing the 'Global War on Terror.' This rise in use can be directly attributed to the drawdown of troops as a result of soaring costs or competing claims on resources after 2011. For many strategic thinkers in the US today, this position is in many ways similar to the situation Great Britain found herself in during the interwar period in the aftermath of WWI. In both cases, imperial overstretch has encouraged occupying powers to utilize new technologies to impose order while trimming the occupational expense and minimizing the risk of casualties.

David Omissi's definition of air policing as the employment of aircraft to maintain the internal security of a state has become more prevalent with added operational flexibility of drones. The current counterterrorism *modus operandi* of execution or removal of individuals in these peripheral zones is handily provided with the use of UAS from afar. Nations now possess the capability of enforcing air policing missions onto other states without setting foot in the region (although they almost always have some ground forces). Civil wars in Syria, Yemen, Libya have all utilized Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAVs) in an asymmetric context pitting both neighboring and Western states against non-state actors and rebel groups.[8] Furthermore, military drones' association with low-intensity conflict allows competing states to engage in tit-for-tat exchanges without formal declarations of war. The issue with technology's use and application of force has always been vehemently debated. Along

[8] Francesco F. Milan and Aniseh Bassiri Tabrizi, "Armed, Unmanned, and in High Demand: The Drivers behind Combat Drones Proliferation in the Middle East," *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 31, no. 4 (May 18, 2020): 735, https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2020.1743488.

with the rise in technological growth of air power's capabilities, there have been both proponents and critics of the use of aerial policing. Air alone advocates continue to argue that advanced technology has reached a developed enough stage to police a region without physical troops. Most critics of aerial policing cite international law such as the precedent against bombing/killing noncombatants caught in the unintended crossfire. This heated contention encapsulates the bulk of the debate in use among policy makers and within much of the academic literature. This primary claim first emerged in Whitehall during Air Control's early use in the 1920s from a Labour controlled government.[9] The continued inability to only target combatants was first attributed to early airplanes and continues today. Significant civilian casualties can still occur even with the added precision.[10]

Since entering the drone age, a reexamination of the roots of Air Control and the reasons for its success within 'the splendid training ground' of Iraq can be helpful in adding nuance to the discussion of today's environment.[11] When extolling the benefits of technological innovations for security, the human element often becomes discounted. This framing is precisely the case in the context of the interwar era and the over-reporting of 'strategic bombing campaigns' as *the* means of controlling the empire throughout the period. In the same way today, the hype surrounding the use of drones has allowed for a continual under-reporting of supplemental factors that contribute to the force-multiplying effect of UAS, i.e., Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance

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[9] James S. Corum, "The Myth of Air Control: Reassessing the History," *Aerospace Power Journal* XIV, no. 4 (January 2000): 66.

[10] For example, see the reporting done by www.airwars.org.

[11] Jafna L. Cox, "A Splendid Training Ground: The Importance to the Royal Air Force of Its Role in Iraq, 1919–32," *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 13, no. 2 (January 1985): 157–84, https://doi.org/10.1080/03086538508582685.

(ISR) and close air-support in areas inaccessible to human pilots. Most academic analysis of drone strategy remains buoyed at the surface. An oversimplification perpetuates this into a binary argument for either (1) reducing military casualties (an inevitable result of 'boots on the ground') or (2) a moral argument against the indiscriminate killing of noncombatants or innocents. The fetish of only analyzing bombing aspects of air policing has caused a lacuna to emerge when evaluating the British air control scheme. This is particularly pertinent to the present with how globalized and interconnected the world is today, and this manuscript helps sheds light on the linkages of new aerial control mechanisms through an in-depth account of its first iteration. Times have changed from the monopoly of technology residing within the most powerful and wealthiest countries with the advent of globalisation's zenith. The previous monopoly of air power by a select number of states has diversified its holdings with hundreds of countries as well as non-state actors employing drones. The cheapness and readied availability of drones has leveled the playing field in this respect, currently seen through a globalized competition for drone supremacy. China's accessible Wing Loong with a base price of one million dollars per unit and now Turkey's Bayraktar TB2 can supply similar capabilities to any country blacklisted from purchasing US built drones.[12] As we continue to grapple with the trajectory of technological advancements in air supremacy, a grounded approach to their first applications can better provide a more measured avenue into the future.

[12] Adam Rawnsley, "Meet China's Killer Drones," *Foreign Policy*, accessed July 15, 2020, https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/01/14/meet-chinas-killer-drones/.

2.1. Historiographical Review and Background

The study of Air Control has gone through an array of interludes since it first began as a research topic with intermittent periods of military interest. Its first study started as a military study in 1954 for the United States Air War College. "*Project Control*: *The Concept of Control by Air and Other Means*" was a classified study examining various case studies (including Britain's air control scheme) to make use of air power's capabilities against Russia during the Cold War.[13] Due to its classified nature, it would take a few decades until academics would come to analyze this phenomenon beginning with Beaumont's first study of interwar British air policing in 1979.[14] This first academic analysis was rooted in the criticism that the asymmetry of colonial policing by the RAF overly preoccupied themselves and limited their later effectiveness against Germany and the Luftwaffe in WWII. Then came Maj. General James Lunt, who also wrote a biography of John Glubb, provided an account of his experience of Air Control during his service in Yemen in the 1950s.[15] David Killingray connected Britain's successful expedition in Somaliland as the precursor to the RAF's air policing duties in the Middle East.[16] Jafna Cox's significant contribution soon

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[13] The first unclassified mention is found in George R Gagnon, "Air Control: Strategy for a Smaller United States Air Force" (1993). Mullis also makes a note of this report. "As the PCR 1 study advocated, air control or CAOM appeared to be a viable option available to national-level decision makers to " ... control the behavior of hostile or potentially hostile nations." Tony R. Mullis, "The Limits of Air Control: The RAF Experience in Aden, 1926-1967" (Air University, March 1997), n. 2, https://apps.dtic.mil/docs/citations/ADA398059. It has since been declassified and resides with the Air Force Historical Research Agency at Maxwell AFB.

[14] Roger A. Beaumont, "A New Lease on Empire: Air Policing, 1919-1939," *Aerospace Historian* 26, no. 2 (1979): 84–90.

[15] James D. Lunt, "Air Control: Another Myth?," *The RUSI Journal* 126, no. 4 (December 1, 1981): 66–68, https://doi.org/10.1080/03071848108523396.; This stems from Lunt's fuller description of peripheral conflicts throughout the world. See James D. Lunt, *Imperial Sunset: Frontier Soldiering in the 20th Century* (London: Macdonald Futura, 1981).

[16] David Killingray, "'A Swift Agent of Government': Air Power in British Colonial Africa, 1916-1939," *The Journal of African History* 25, no. 4 (1984): 429–44.

followed this in its analysis of the political maneuvering within various British military departments. This reshuffling of responsibility solidified the RAF's continued existence as an independent service by undertaking imperial policing duties, beginning with Iraq.[17] These early academic works caught the wind of military strategists again. Bruce Hoffman's work on British Air Power for RAND continues today as the Project AIR FORCE (PAF) division.[18] The initial era finally culminated with the seminal work on Air Control by Omissi and is still seen as *the* source on the subject even with its vocal criticism of the heightened emphasis of the aerial bombing part of Air Control.[19] Omissi describes aerial bombing campaigns in the peripheries of Iraq, primarily in the Kurdish-controlled mountains whilst neglecting its significant application in the Bedouin-occupied steppe to the southwest of the Euphrates. Aerial bombing within the RAF's air control scheme was most prolific on the Tukey/Mosul border. Many air sorties were used to reinforce the policing of this border. Omissi's overemphasis of aerial bombing as the primary policing mechanism of Air Control without acknowledging its supplemental aspects has exacerbated a split in interpretation among scholars.

When trying to understand Britain's air control scheme's implications, there are two primary camps currently analyzing air policing tactics and the method of Air

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[17] Cox, "A Splendid Training Ground."

[18] Bruce Hoffman, "British Air Power in Peripheral Conflict, 1919-1976" (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1989). Air power for Irregular Warfare purposes continues to resonate with RAND. See Daniel Byman et al., "Air Power as a Coercive Instrument" (RAND Corporation, 1999), https://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1061.html; Alan J. Vick et al., "Air Power in the New Counterinsurgency Era: The Strategic Importance of USAF Advisory and Assistance Missions" (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2006), https://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG509.html; Karl P. Mueller et al., "Precision and Purpose: Airpower in the Libyan Civil War" (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, July 8, 2015), https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR676.html; Becca Wasser et al., "The Air War Against the Islamic State: The Role of Airpower in Operation Inherent Resolve" (RAND Corporation, February 5, 2021), https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA388-1.html.

[19] Omissi, *Air Power and Colonial Control: The Royal Air Force, 1919-1939*.

Control; one is military scholars, both former and active personnel, and the other is imperial historians and critics of empire. Since Hoffman and Omissi's work occurred directly prior to the first Gulf War, there has been somewhat of a military fascination with the subject in the air force. The aftermath of the Gulf War spawned many military studies conducted into Air Control's viability in a more modern setting, aided with more advanced technological capabilities.[20] Imperial historians have also continued to analyze this topic creating a disagreement in the focus of study—the primary difference in this camp rests over civilian casualties. While civilian casualties no doubt occurred, both groups have been less interested in this scheme's more indirect applications, i.e., the role of intelligence. The actual value of Special Service Officers (SSOs) within the air control scheme has been overlooked, which is just beginning to become addressed. due to the technological fascination of air power among military personnel and the concentration on civilian casualties from imperial historians.[21]

Military air power theorists have taken the Iraq example as the successful application of Air Control, which has continued to be cited in current military literature. This application has been both critiqued and argued as a basis for the need for air power's continued use in various wartime and peacetime scenarios, with many of these

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[20]See Michael A. Longoria, "A Historical View of Air Policing Doctrine of Air Policing Doctrine: Lessons from the British Experience between the Wars, 1919-39" (Air University Press, 1992), JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/resrep13761; Mullis, "The Limits of Air Control"; Gagnon, "Air Control: Strategy for a Smaller United States Air Force"; Richard F. Walker, "Facing the Future: A Doctrine for Air Control in Limited Conflicts" (Air University, 1998); Corum, "The Myth of Air Control"; James S. Corum and Wray R. Johnson, *Airpower in Small Wars: Fighting Insurgents and Terrorists* (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2003); Major John Boehm, "'Air Policing': A Modern Interpretation." (Air University, 2008); Joel Hayward, ed., *Air Power, Insurgency and the" War on Terror"* (Royal Air Force Centre for Air Power Studies, 2009); John E. Murphy, "Air Policing" (Army Command and General Staff Coll Fort Leavenworth KS School of Advanced Military Studies, 2009), https://apps.dtic.mil/docs/citations/ADA506166; Erik K. Rundquist, "Desert Talons: Historical Perspectives and Implications of Air Policing in the Middle East" (M.A., Air University, 2009).

[21] Newton, *The RAF and Tribal Control*.

scholars originating from the air force. As such, there has been a tendency to over-emphasize air power's technological applications as a superior method of policing today and invoke the Iraq case as proof of historical success. Some scholars among this group have been wary of Air Control. Peter Gray's critique accounts for the sociopolitical underpinnings that led to Air Control's creation, i.e., austerity measures and the need for an independent air force.[22] Still, the intelligence apparatus necessary for the system was never acknowledged allowing for the advent of drones to influence many of these reassessments of Air Control. Additionally, the argument for air power within Iraq has continued after its use in the First Gulf War. It has since gained a newer relevance due to the historical interpretations of counterinsurgency operations (COIN).[23] Modern COIN doctrine revitalized the desire to reinterpret the Iraq case study as a successful counterinsurgency campaign against the Iraqi rebellion of 1920-1922 and the overall policing of its mandate.[24]

The other camp of researchers is predominately composed of historians of the British empire. These have notably been revisionist of empire due to the critical nature

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[22] Peter W. Gray, "The Myths of Air Control and the Realities of Imperial Policing," *Aerospace Power Journal; Maxwell AFB* 15, no. 3 (Fall 2001): 21–31.

[23] Tim Benbow and Rod Thornton, *Dimensions of Counter-Insurgency: Applying Experience to Practice* (London: Routledge, 2008), 109–11, https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203825860.

[24] Angelina M Maguinness, "Counterinsurgency: Is 'Air Control' the Answer?," 2009, 9; Harry Kemsley, "Air Power in Counter-Insurgency: A Sophisticated Language or Blunt Expression?," *Contemporary Security Policy* 28, no. 1 (April 1, 2007): 112–26, https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260701240500; Andrew Mumford, "Unnecessary or Unsung? The Utilisation of Airpower in Britain's Colonial Counterinsurgencies," *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 20, no. 3–4 (September 1, 2009): 636–55, https://doi.org/10.1080/09592310903251906; Peter Lieb, "Suppressing Insurgencies in Comparison: The Germans in the Ukraine, 1918, and the British in Mesopotamia, 1920," *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 23, no. 4–5 (October 1, 2012): 627–47, https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2012.709765; John Daley, "Paraphrasing a Predicament: Operation Iraqi Freedom and the Mesopotamian Insurrection of 1920," *The Midwest Quarterly* 58, no. 4 (2017): 389–406.

British Empire is analyzed and looked at today.[25] One of Air Control's primary critiques has been the civilian casualties attributed to this new method of enforcement. While primary sources depict these policing actions as strategic and limiting of civilian casualties, imperial historians have continually challenged these claims, with military historians less skeptical of primary accounts.[26] Scholars like Satia and Tanka have taken the argument against empire the furthest with their critical interpretation of the definition of 'strategic bombing'. The question of degrees of brutality lay at the forefront of their analysis and have focused primarily on Air Control's aerial bombing operations.

There are conflicting interpretations on actual numbers of the death toll between parties. Most archival and secondary sources utilized for these figures lack local accounts from either the Kurds or Iraqi's at the time.[27] One helpful resource which adds additional context to this issue is the *Birds of Death* documentary (6 July 1992). Within the film, the BBC interviewed victims of these air policing raids, and they provide a clearer picture of the effect on the inhabitants. Often dropped leaflet warnings of bombings failed to reach the town in such a way that everyone knew about the scheduled bombing. One victim describes how timed action bombs were used without

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[25] See: Priya Satia, "The Defense of Inhumanity: Air Control and the British Idea of Arabia," *The American Historical Review* 111, no. 1 (February 1, 2006): 16–51, https://doi.org/10.1086/ahr.111.1.16; Toby Dodge, *Inventing Iraq: The Failure of Nation Building and a History Denied* (Columbia University Press, 2003), 131–56; Charles Townshend, *Desert Hell: The British Invasion of Mesopotamia* (Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2011), 453–78; Yuki Tanaka, "British 'Humane Bombing' in Iraq during the Interwar Era," in *Bombing Civilians: A Twentieth-Century History*, 2009, 8–29.

[26] This is noted in, Dodge, *Inventing Iraq: The Failure of Nation Building and a History Denied*., Chapter 7; Omissi, *Air Power and Colonial Control,* Chapter 8; For the alternative view see Sebastian Ritchie, *The RAF, Small Wars and Insurgencies in the Middle East, 1919-1939* (Royal Air Force, Centre for Air Power Studies, 2011), 7–10.

[27] See Appendix 4 of a primary account by Sir Hugh Trenchard of his views of bombing.

any warnings by the British. (this is a direct contradiction to primary imperial accounts, which adamantly maintained that the proper warnings were issued). In one scene after a bombing campaign had taken place, RAF pilot McNeil fired upon two Kurds struggling to get a donkey up a hill for sport. Churchill received a report of an RAF pilot specifically targeting women and children. While Churchill admonished Trenchard and demanded a court-martial, no action was taken.[28] While these war crime accounts are nothing out of the ordinary regarding outlying events during wartime, these often get glossed over if only the archival records are taken at face value.

Contrary to the claims of imperial historians, air power theorists continue to cite the 'humane' applications of these air policing missions within Mandate Iraq as the genesis of air power and control.[29] This is due to the simple calculus of comparing the recorded deaths of the 'burn and scuttle' approach from the 19th century to the air policing practices in the 20th century when citing primary sources.[30]. The most recent supporting argument is found within RAF historian Sebastian Ritchie's analysis *The RAF, Small Wars and Insurgencies in the Middle East, 1919-1939*.[31] This work details a rigid command structure for any aerial bombardment prohibiting its overuse and constraints when using force. Ritchie also notably defends Arthur "Bomber" Harris, a

[28] George Case, "Birds of Death," Documentary, *Secret History* (Channel 4, July 6, 1992), Youtube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Y4g5pFggpVQ.

[29] Longoria, "A Historical View of Air Policing Doctrine of Air Policing Doctrine: Lessons from the British Experience between the Wars, 1919-39"; Rundquist, "Desert Talons: Historical Perspectives and Implications of Air Policing in the Middle East."

[30] John Cotesworth Slessor, *The Central Blue: Recollections and Reflections* (Cassell, 1956), 66–67.

[31] Ritchie, *The RAF, Small Wars and Insurgencies in the Middle East, 1919-1939*, 36, 43–44, 64, 69.

prominent RAF officer for one who speaks in simile and metaphor and should not be taken at face value.[32]

This same application, developed during the Iraq Mandate, was repurposed again during the First Gulf War.[33] Nowadays, the argument of this historical case study is used as an argument for the use of drone strikes. The claims for its use have remained remarkably the same; the most argued points are their strategic targeting capabilities, the ability to limit troops on the ground, and intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) purposes. Priya Satia has linked these two strategies in her insightful analysis of Britain's Air Control. There is an increasing attraction to use drones in the same geographical region. Coalition forces (primarily the United States) are seeking to limit their large troop presence during long protracted conflicts of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars (much like the British after WWI).[34] Technology and innovation have increased the capabilities of imperialism and allowed for a new way of maintaining empire. Both Omissi and Satia have linked the fixation of technology as a means of control in both cases as historical firsts in aerial technology, which furthers the thesis on the use of technology within empires first proposed by Headrick's

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[32] See Appendix 6 for a service history of Harris.

[33] David Omissi, "Baghdad and British Bombers: Iraq Is No Stranger to British Aerial Bombardment. David Omissi Recalls The1920s When Gas Shells and Explosives Were Used to Keep Dissident Tribesmen under Control," *The Guardian (1959-2003)*, January 19, 1991, 187144893, ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The Guardian and The Observer.

[34] Priya Satia, "'A Rebellion of Technology': Development, Policing, and the British Arabian Imaginary," in *Environmental Imaginaries of the Middle East and North Africa*, Book, Section vols., 2011, 23–59; Priya Satia, "Drones: A History from the British Middle East," *Humanity: An International Journal of Human Rights, Humanitarianism, and Development* 5, no. 1 (2014): 1–31, https://doi.org/10.1353/hum.2014.0002.

"Tentacles of Empire," since updated as a global history of military technology in the service of imperialism in his 'Power over Peoples.'[35]

2.2 Methodology and Sourcing

This study will comprise a historical analysis of Air Control in the framework of Britain's rule of Iraq under the League of Nations Mandate (1920-1932) utilizing both primary and secondary sources. The focused timeframe of this period will be from 1922–1930 and will mirror John Glubb's tenure within Iraq. Captain John Glubb, the most widely known British officer, working in tribal frontiers, provides a focal point for this study due to his contemporary relevance evoked in the argument for drones. This case study's first contribution will consist of an assessment of the political factors that led to Britain's Air Control scheme. There will be an augmented emphasis on the economic factors contributing to the development of the air policing model and how it emerged as a larger than life success story for military practitioners. The repeated argument of the cheapness of air control is continually credited for its overwhelming success and continues to be a compelling reason for the use of modern air policing. The second is through an analysis of the intelligence apparatus working in step with the RAF's aerial patrols and sorties. While aerial policing was an essential factor in the success of controlling unrest and maintaining control over the vast arid and mountainous terrain of Iraq, the supporting factors of armored car units and the SSO's working in concert with RAF air raids have been overlooked. SSOs provided real-time intelligence for the RAF and lived and operated throughout Iraq, acting as the local

[35] Daniel R. Headrick, *Power over Peoples: Technology, Environments, and Western Imperialism, 1400 to the Present* (Princeton University Press, 2010).

liaison for resolving general unrest and, when necessary, personally directing air raids to quell recalcitrant tribes. The much-cited tactic dubbed the ‘inverted blockade’ glosses over the importance of the SSOs within this scheme.

2.1.1. Definitions and Terminology

When looking through the literature, there are many different areas of interest where aerial policing has been discussed and analyzed. As such, establishing a consistent understanding of various terms and where in the literature they have originated from is the first step needed for progressing into the remainder of this text. This manuscript continues to use the definitions set by Omissi of Air Control, air policing, and air substitution, as three separate parts within the colonial context set in the Glossary. An updated definition of Omissi’s understanding of *Air Control* has been supplied by Richard Newton. It remains to be seen if this updated definition will replace Omissi’s in the coming years. Nonetheless, this is included to provide an additional context for how Air Control continues to be defined and redefined in the prevailing years.

Omissi’s definitions will continue to be used and referred to within the manuscript when dealing with the colonial context. With the conclusion focusing on possible implications for the present, another understanding more suited to the conditions of the modern-day will be used. The modern definition of air policing has evolved from its earlier context due to aircraft’s technological advancements. Air policing is now associated with imposing no-fly zones over a specific country. This first such zone was made famous in the aftermath of Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm. After the First Gulf War, no-fly zones were created to enforce crippling

sanctions against Saddam and protect Iraqi civilians.[36] This approach found favor with the international community as a way to intervene in peacekeeping missions without large troop deployments. In the wake of the First Gulf War, a similar mission by NATO in the Balkans/Bosnia enacted a similar air policing policy of a no-fly zone along with signature airstrikes. These air policing missions contributed to the final agreement reached with the Dayton Peace Accords. This policy also factored in the Kosovo intervention just a few years later. NATO currently defines air policing as, "A peacetime mission involving the use of the air surveillance and control system, air command and control and appropriate air defence assets, including interceptors, for the purpose of preserving the integrity of the NATO airspace."[37]

Finally, there is the current conjuncture, which now incorporates drones into the ability to police the air both remotely and autonomously. There has been budding literature in human geography arguing that states have increasingly encroached into all aspects of everyday life, including aerial hemispheres, through continual technological advancement.[38] This new type of policing has been dubbed 'atmospheric policing' by human geographers, influenced in part by political theorist Mark Neocleous.[39]

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[36] Operation Southern Watch enforced areas below the 32rd parallel (later extended to the 33rd in 1996). Operation Provide Comfort (later as Northern Watch) enforced areas above the 36th. For more on no-fly zones, see Alexander Benard, "Lessons from Iraq and Bosnia on the Theory and Practice of No-Fly Zones," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 27, no. 3 (September 1, 2004): 454–78, https://doi.org/10.1080/1362369042000282985.

[37] "Air Policing," in *AAP-06 NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions* (Brussels, Belgium: NSA, 2019). NATO's description of its air policing history can be found on its website at https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_132685.htm. Most recently air patrols have increased along NATO's eastern border since the Russia-Ukraine crisis.

[38] See for example, Majed Akhter, "The Proliferation of Peripheries: Militarized Drones and the Reconfiguration of Global Space," *Progress in Human Geography* 43, no. 1 (February 1, 2019): 64–80, https://doi.org/10.1177/0309132517735697.

[39] Mark Neocleous, "Air Power as Police Power," *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 31, no. 4 (August 1, 2013): 578–93, https://doi.org/10.1068/d19212; Caren Kaplan and Andrea Miller,

Feigenbaum and Kanngieser's definition of atmospheric policing refers to those technologies and techniques for controlling populations that are fundamentally predicated on their relationship with air; through requiring air for their transmission and dispersion, they colonize space in ways that other weapons do not.[40] In contrast, Air Force personnel see outer space and cyberspace as an extension of their aerial domain.[41] While not as intrinsically focused on this facet due to a historical focus, this definition is needed to reimagine the drone age's future trajectory. In summation, to make the terminology used in this study clearer, Omissi's definitions will continue to be utilized within the colonial setting. NATO's definition of air policing will be used in reference to the present with an additional twist of the atmospheric element.

2.1.2. Primary Sources

Regarding primary sources, the British Library produced a multi-volume collection of archival intelligence records formed the *Iraq Defence Intelligence, 1920 – 1973* records and provides much of the primary source material, made available after consolidating a significant number of sources from the Air Ministry (AIR), Cabinet (CAB), Colonial Office (CO), Foreign Office (FO), and War Office (WO) records related to intelligence functions. These are replicated copies of the original held in the

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"Drones as 'Atmospheric Policing': From US Border Enforcement to the LAPD," *Public Culture* 31, no. 3 (September 1, 2019): 419–45, https://doi.org/10.1215/08992363-7532679.

[40] Anna Feigenbaum and Anja Kanngieser, "For a Politics of Atmospheric Governance," *Dialogues in Human Geography* 5, no. 1 (March 1, 2015): 80–84, https://doi.org/10.1177/2043820614565873. Kaplan and Miller have since added drones to this discussion.

[41] Air Chief Marshal Sir Stephen Dalton, "The Future of British Air and Space Power: A Personal Perspective," *Air Power Review* 12, no. 3 (Autumn 2009): 13; Jon R. Lindsay, "Cyber Conflict vs. Cyber Command: Hidden Dangers in the American Military Solution to a Large-Scale Intelligence Problem," *Intelligence and National Security* 0, no. 0 (October 30, 2020): 8, https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2020.1840746.

British National Archives.[42] Most importantly, they contain the Air Ministry (AIR23) records of the Secret Service Officers (SSO) reports. These and additional British primary sources are found in the Cambridge Archives Online database, including *Iraq Administration Report 1914-1932*, *The Expansion of Wahhabi Power in Arabia, 1798-1932,* and *Records of Iraq, 1914-1966.* The Iraq Administration Reports hold all League of Nations reports for Iraq during the mandate and prior wartime administration with budgetary data for the defense expenditure of the mandate. Additionally, Burrows and Cobbin's work has highlighted the Young–Vernon financial mission of 1925 for reshaping the civil and military expenditure of Iraq.[43] The Expansion of Wahhabi Power in Arabia details the expansion of the House of Saud and the development of the future of Saudi Arabia. The Records of Iraq are the consolidated archive of Britain's activities within the region, comprising fifteen volumes. These were all utilized when looking for additional reports by John Glubb and for a thorough understanding of the organizational structure of the mandate.[44] All cited volumes were scanned with the open-source program Tesseract enhancing these volumes for optical character recognition (OCR) for volumes searching for key-phrases surrounding "John Glubb," "Air Action," and

[42] Most of the sources of this thesis rely upon British primary sources for an understanding air control. While this is problematic in the sense that this perpetuates the continual lack of Iraqi voice within these events, the goal of this study is to understand how British policy is being read and understood within today's context by military scholars.

[43] Colonial Office, "Iraq. Report of the Financial Mission Appointed by the Secretary of State for the Colonies to Enquire into the Financial Position and Prospects of the Government of Iraq, 1925." (CAB 24/173/75, May 1925), CAB 24/173/75, The National Archives, Kew.

[44] The best 'official' British summary of the Iraq Mandate is found in the "Special Report by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Council of the League of Nations on the Progress of Iraq during the period 1920-1931" found in Jarman, *Iraq Administration Reports 1914-1932: 1931-32*, 10:1–333.

"SSO."[45] Some extracts are appended and provided in full to be referenced throughout this case study as annexes. Furthermore, Tancred Bradshaw has published some of Glubb's personal reports, providing new widely accessible primary source material.[46]

In addition to the official ministry records and Glubb's papers, are two journals of interest, published during this period of study the *Royal United Services Institution Journal* and *Journal of The Royal Central Asian Society*. Primarily only military officers contributed to RUSI, and this journal's timeframe documents the War and Air Offices' heated debates over the utility of Air Control. Interestingly the most contentious issues were inveighed vis-à-vis pseudonyms hiding the author's identity. This allowed both the War Office and Air Ministry to voice their argument in either opposition or in support of Air Control. Also within this journal are the helpful Air Notes reports detailing air operations of the interwar period throughout the empire.[47] The other journal *JCAS*, had a wider authorship base of British military and civil administrators and held published lectures, papers, notes, and debates over Iraq's development.[48]

Autobiographical accounts and memoirs were also utilized. Prior to the mandate, Arnold T. Wilson's later recounting of his tenure in Iraq was consulted in

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[45] While Tesseract is far from perfect, utilizing this resource hopefully enhances the thoroughness of study by not missing any reports due to negligence. Simply searching "Glub" was a unique enough identifier to capture most reports from each volume. See https://guides.library.illinois.edu/c.php?g=347520&p=4121425 for general use and installation.

[46] Tancred Bradshaw, *The Glubb Reports: Glubb Pasha and Britain's Empire Project in the Middle East 1920-1956* (Springer, 2016).

[47] E.g. "Royal Air Force Notes," *Journal of the Royal United Services Institute* 68, no. 469 (February 1, 1923): 175–85, https://doi.org/10.1080/03071842309420252.

[48] For a detailed overview of the RCAS see: Robert S. G. Fletcher, *British Imperialism and "the Tribal Question": Desert Administration and Nomadic Societies in the Middle East, 1919-1936*, Oxford Historical Monographs (Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2015), 19–66.

addition to General Haldane's of the Iraqi revolt.[49] For the mandate itself is Wallace Lyon's memoir of his time in Kurdistan from 1918-1944.[50] Although John Glubb is more generally associated with his later work in Jordan, the works of John Bagot Glubb, first employed as an SSO officer in Iraq from 1922–1926, and then as an Administrative Inspector for the Iraqi Mandate from 1926–1930, have provided the primary understanding of the duties and roles of an SSO officer within the RAF for researchers.[51] Glubb's writings need substantial background knowledge when reanalyzing for additional insights and have been paired with Norton's work as a reinterpretation of the role of SSOs. A recently discovered short RAF account by R.J. Stone of the 1927-28 border raids was also used.[52] This adds another British account of these much under-reported skirmishes along Iraq's southern border. Lastly, Former Air Marshall John Slessor's autobiography, who commanded the RAF within Iraq during the mandate, as well as a series of his published lectures from 1936 titled "Airpower and Armies," which propounds the RAF's fully fleshed out position on air power after Air Control had been in use for over a decade.[53]

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[49] Arnold T. Wilson, *Mesopotamia 1917-1920: A Clash of Loyalties, A Personal and Historical Record* (London: Humphrey Milford, 1931); James Aylmer Lowthorpe Haldane, *The Insurrection in Mesopotamia, 1920* (Edinburgh and London, 1922), http://hdl.handle.net/2027/inu.30000083739544.

[50] D. K. (David Kenneth) Fieldhouse, *Kurds, Arabs and Britons: The Memoir of Wallace Lyon in Iraq 1918-44* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2002). The general primary account of British Mandate is Stephen H. Longrigg, *Iraq, 1900 to 1950* (London: Oxford University Press, 1953).

[51] John Bagot Glubb, *War in the Desert: An RAF Frontier Campaign* (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1960); John Bagot Glubb, *Arabian Adventures: Ten Years of Joyful Service* (London: Cassell, 1978).

[52] R.J. Stone, "Trouble with the Akhwan Tribes in 1927" (Short manuscript written, March 22, 1928).

[53] John Slessor was also a later contributor to the United States' Control by Air and Other Means project. Slessor, *The Central Blue: Recollections and Reflections*; Sir John Cotesworth Slessor, *Air Power and Armies* (Tuscaloosa: The University of Alabama Press, 2009).

2.1.3. Secondary Sources

There are quite a few major works on the air policing practice of the RAF during the interwar period. The starting point for the most recent generation of scholars has been David Omissi's text, *Air Power and Colonial Control: The Royal Air Force 1919-1939.*[54] This seminal work goes into the inner workings of Britain's air control scheme along with a thorough evaluation of its effectiveness throughout the regions of the empire. This has been a pivotal text for scholars since its publication and, as such, will provide the backdrop for this work. The RAF Air Historical Branch has published its own analysis of these events.[55] Richard Newton has conducted the most recent study on this topic, both his thesis *Control without Occupation: The missed lesson of effective air operations in irregular conflict from the RAF's air control scheme* and his recent published version of the doctorate, *The RAF and Tribal Control: Airpower and Irregular Warfare Between the World Wars* provide an additional vector within the air policing literature concentrating on its supporting structure.[56] Newton's thesis argues for the overlooked importance of the SSOs, and he believes they are the unexplored reason for the RAF's success within the air control scheme. Newton provides an introductory insight into how the RAF influenced the first Gulf War and later with America's wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Also, Newton's former service background

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[54] Omissi, *Air Power and Colonial Control: The Royal Air Force, 1919-1939*.

[55] Ritchie, *The RAF, Small Wars and Insurgencies in the Middle East, 1919-1939.*

[56] Richard Dana Newton, "Control without Occupation: The Missed Lesson of Effective Air Operations in Irregular Conflict from the RAF's Air Control Scheme" (Ph.D., King's College London, 2016), https://kclpure.kcl.ac.uk/portal/en/theses/control-without-occupation(36ef651b-dce7-432b-8b91-b3f7d3de9194).html; Newton, *The RAF and Tribal Control*. Unavailable to the researcher are the newly discovered papers of H. H. James, another SSO operating in Iraq during the mandate first used in Richard Newton's published work. H. Hindle James, known as "Huck" to his family, served as an SSO in Iraq in 1924–1926. Newton argues that Flt. Lt. James's letters, diary entries, and poems offer additional insight to the SSOs not in his doctoral research.

within the USAF means that his work is of particular interest to the military air power theorists and is an indication of how the British experience continues to influence US policy within the present day.

Unpublished theses were also used, and there are several worth mentioning in this particular case study. The most comprehensive academic overview of the career of John Bagot Glubb was conducted by Maureen Norton titled *The Last Pasha: Sir John Glubb and the British Empire in the Middle East, 1920-1949.* Norton provides a detailed account of Glubb's experience as an SSO and subsequent work in Transjordan. This research stems from a 1986 deposit of Glubb's private papers in St. Antony's College, Oxford. Glubb's later memoirs do not explicitly portray a transitionary view of force. Encapsulated within Norton's work is a clear demarcation from an early supporter of Air Control into a later critic of this policy during his tenure for the British. This gap in the literature has had modern day implications, with military officials utilizing Glubb's early writing in *JCAS* to justify the use of drones.[57] Neville Parton's work on re-analyzing RAF doctrine during the interwar period is unique because it provides initial drafts of Air Control doctrine. These early drafts illustrate a more grounded view of the British policy of policing recalcitrant tribes.[58] James Spaight, a lawyer focusing on international law for the RAF, finalized this early doctrine. The final versions and early drafts are provided in Appendix 2. The most thorough account of the

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[57] Charles J. Dunlap, "Air-Minded Considerations for Joint Counterinsurgency Doctrine," *Air and Space Power Journal* 21, no. 4 (Winter 2007): 63–74.

[58] Neville Parton, "The Evolution and Impact of Royal Air Force Doctrine, 1919-1939" (Ph.D., University of Cambridge, 2010), https://doi.org/10.17863/CAM.31227.; The published account was only a journal article and some of these early drafts are not provided in full. For the widely available version see Neville Parton, "The Development of Early RAF Doctrine," *The Journal of Military History* 72, no. 4 (2008): 1155–78, https://doi.org/10.1353/jmh.0.0104.

later export of air control on India's Northwest Frontier by Andrew Walters's *Inter-War, Inter-Service Friction on the North-West Frontier of India and its Impact on the Development and Application of Royal Air Force Doctrine.* Walters's study is an all-encompassing analysis of India's experience of Air Control and builds upon British Army infantry officer Andrew Roe's work.[59] The approach of this study is influential to this manuscript in the approach of analyzing the supplemental factors contributing to the use of Air Control. Also, Walter's overarching context of imperialism identified by Phillip Headrick and his methodology in providing helpful appendices has been adopted. There is yet a still existing gap of Air Control's later use in Yemen both during the interwar period and then much later with James Lunt's experience in the British counterinsurgency in Yemen and Oman during the 1960s.[60]

When covering the mandate period, Peter Sluglett's *Britain in Iraq: Contriving King and Country* is a focal point for understanding Mandate Iraq and is seen as a foundational source along with the historical work of scholars such as Charles Tripp and Toby Dodge. A local voice is consulted by means of Ali Alawi's recent biography

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[59] Andrew M. Roe, *Waging War in Waziristan: The British Struggle in the Land of Bin Laden, 1847-1947* (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2010). Additional works by Roe are found mostly in Royal Air Force Air Power Review. E.g. Lieutenant Colonel Andrew M Roe, "Aviation and Guerrilla War: Proposals for 'Air Control' of the North-West Frontier of India", *RAF Air Power Review* 14, no. 1 (2011);"'Good God, Sir, Are You Hurt?": The Realities and Perils of Operating over India's Troublesome North-West Frontier", *RAF Air Power Review* 14, no. 3 (2011); "Evacuation by Air: The All-But-Forgotten Kabul Airlift of 1928-29", *RAF Air Power Review* 15, no. 1 (2012); Colonel Andrew M Roe, "The Troublesome 1930s: General Unrest, Intense Activity and Close Cooperation", *RAF Air Power Review* 16, no. 2 (2013)

[60] Yemen, historically the British protectorate of Aden, has had a long-storied history of air power in the region. Air Control's analysis of these events is currently dominated by air power theorists. See particularly Chap 5. The British Colonial Wars, 1945-1962 and 9. Intervention in the Mideast, 1962-2000 in Corum and Johnson, *Airpower in Small Wars: Fighting Insurgents and Terrorists*, 179–224, 379–422; Peter Dye, "Royal Air Force Operations in South-West Arabia 1917-1967," in *Air Power, Insurgency and the" War on Terror"*, ed. Joel Hayward (Royal Air Force Centre for Air Power Studies, 2009), 43–63.

of King Faisal, which serves to round out this Western material with an Iraqi view.[61] Toth's focus on the pastoral economy contextualizes an often-overlooked facet contributing to the significant border issues between Iraq and Saudi Arabia during Glubb's tenure in Iraq.[62] More recent works by Orit Bashkin, Sara Pursley, Phebe Marr and Ibrahim Al-Marashi, and Robert Fletcher have all been noteworthy for redefining various aspects of the interwar and mandate period.[63] Although some are not directly cited, these are important recent works worth mentioning, relevant to this period. Also relevant is a recent IMF publication that reanalyzed the interwar period, highlighting Britain's waning economic hegemony.[64] In addition to primary source records of Britain's accounting of the mandate's costs, recent analysis within economic history have illuminated the underlying factors which contributed to this cost-saving scheme.[65]

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[61] Peter Sluglett, *Britain in Iraq: Contriving King and Country* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2007); Tripp, *A History of Iraq*; Fletcher, *British Imperialism and "the Tribal Question"*; Ali A. Allawi, *Faisal I of Iraq* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014).

[62] This is notably absent from Newton's recent contribution. Anthony B. Toth, "Conflict and a Pastoral Economy: The Costs of Akhwan Attacks on Tribes in Iraq, 1922-29," *Critique: Critical Middle Eastern Studies* 11, no. 2 (September 1, 2002): 201–27, https://doi.org/10.1080/1066992022000007826; Anthony B. Toth, "Tribes and Tribulations: Bedouin Losses in the Saudi and Iraqi Struggles Over Kuwait's Frontiers, 1921–1943," *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 32, no. 2 (November 1, 2005): 145–67, https://doi.org/10.1080/13530190500281424.

[63] Orit Bashkin, *The Other Iraq: Pluralism and Culture in Hashemite Iraq* (Stanford University Press, 2008); Orit Bashkin, "Deconstructing Destruction: The Second Gulf War And The New Historiography Of Twentieth-Century Iraq," *The Arab Studies Journal* 23, no. 1 (2015): 210–34; Sara Pursley, *Familiar Futures : Time, Selfhood, and Sovereignty in Iraq*, Stanford Studies in Middle Eastern and Islamic Societies and Cultures (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2018); Phebe Marr and Ibrahim Al-Marashi, *The Modern History of Iraq*, 4th ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2017), https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429494437; Ibrahim Al-Marashi and Sammy Salama, *Iraq's Armed Forces : An Analytical History* (Routledge, 2008), https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203928769; Fletcher, *British Imperialism and "the Tribal Question."*

[64] Thomas Sargent et al., *Debt and Entanglements Between the Wars* (USA: International Monetary Fund, 2019), https://www.elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF071/28327-9781513511795/28327-9781513511795/28327-9781513511795.xml.

[65] Geoff Burrows and Phillip E. Cobbin, "Budgetary and Financial Discontinuities: Iraq 1920–32," *Accounting History Review* 21, no. 3 (November 2011): 247–62, https://doi.org/10.1080/21552851.2011.616716; Tal Boger, "British Imperialism and Portfolio Choice in the Currency Boards of Palestine, East Africa, and West Africa," *Journal of Social and Administrative Sciences* 5, no. 4 (December 30, 2018): 296–308, https://doi.org/10.1453/jsas.v5i4.1801.

Regarding the intelligence aspect of the air control scheme, the work of Martin Thomas and Priya Satia will provide the initial foundation for analyzing the use of intelligence as an aspect of control. As mentioned previously, this argument will expand Richard Newton's recent work through further analysis on John Glubb. Daniel Neep provides a comparison of a control scheme within the Syrian Mandate in his chapter on air power and the 'compression of space' in *Policing the Desert: Coercion, Consent and the Colonial Order,* as well as his more fleshed-out analysis of French colonial control entitled *Occupying Syria under the French Mandate: Insurgency, Space and State Formation.*[66] The French model of air policing was less effective at reducing costs, and there was less political will from their leaders at home. As a result, aircraft remained confined as an army support role, chiefly as close-air support. Aerial reconnaissance was provided by intelligence officers, but it wasn't unified like Britain's Air Control model later exported to Palestine and Yemen. France's frontline commanders also did not work with civil authorities during military operations.[67] These sources provide an additional resource to the air policing knowledge because while aerial bombardment was utilized primarily as an auxiliary form in the French model, the more relevant comparison is between their intelligence officers. The *Service des Renseignements* (SR Officers) and *Contrôle Bédouin* (CB Officers) were the French equivalents to the British SSOs and Political Officers in providing political intelligence. The *Service des*

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[66] Daniel Neep, "Policing the Desert: Coercion, Consent and the Colonial Order in Syria," in *Policing and Prisons in the Middle East: Formations of Coercion*, ed. Laleh Khalili and Jillian Schwedler (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), 41–56; Daniel Neep, *Occupying Syria under the French Mandate: Insurgency, Space and State Formation*, Cambridge Middle East Studies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).

[67] Thomas has the most succinct comparison between the two schemes. See Martin Thomas, "Markers of Modernity or Agents of Terror? Air Policing and Colonial Revolt after World War I," in *Britain in Global Politics Volume 1* (Springer, 2013), 68–98.

Renseignements primarily focused their intelligence gathering in urban areas, whereas *Contrôle Bédouin* officers were the ones tasked with maintaining tribal control in Syria by drawing from France's prior experiences in North Africa. The similarities between the two systems are much greater than their differences, and their comparable use within the desert geography bears some weight. Neep's historical analysis of Syria's model underscores Satia's contention for the continued tendency of employing air policing in the desert terrain today.

Specifically, for the armored cars, an essential later source was found at the tail end of the research for this thesis. Nigel Warwick's contribution entitled *In Every Place: The RAF Armoured Cars in the Middle East 1921-1953* is very relevant to this study.[68] Warwick, the Corps Historian to the RAF Regiment, had access to the extensive AIR records at Kew and conducted interviews with former RAF personnel. A previous RUSI lecture by Godsave first detailed the cars within the Air Control scheme.[69] Warwick has expanded the understanding by Godsave creating a new authoritative source on the subject. In addition to his extensive use of AIR records are the personal papers of L.A. Simmons, an Armoured Car serviceman during his time in Iraq.

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[68] Nigel W.M. Warwick, *In Every Place: The RAF Armoured Cars in the Middle East 1921-1953* (Great Britain: Forces & Corporate Publishing Ltd, 2014).

[69] Squadron Leader G. E. Godsave R.A.F, "Armoured Cars in Desert Warfare," *Journal of the Royal United Services Institute* 76, no. 502 (May 1, 1931): 396–406, https://doi.org/10.1080/03071843109427277.

2.3. Outline

This thesis has been broken into four substantive chapters. Chapter 3 introduces the scheme of what became known as Air Control, focusing on its historical origins before its first use in Iraq and the solidification of its doctrine. Other colonial powers' air power use are also examined, comparing their adaptation to Britain's merging of civil-military functions. An additional doctrinal aspect of the RAF highlights how it was practiced and utilized. By exploring the historical instances where air power was used, an initial argument will be proposed as to why there has been an over-reliance on its destructive aspects shaping scholar's ideas of aerial policing.

Chapter 4 adds a political context often overlooked with Air Control's emergence, namely the interservice rivalry between the India Office and the Foreign Office leading to Britain's Sharifian Solution. Timothy Paris's research highlighting this split has remained disassociated with Air Control's development, and this chapter aims to rectify this lacuna. Generally, Air Control's establishment treats Mandate Iraq as a vehicle ensuring the Royal Air Force's continued independence from the Admiralty and Navy after WWI. Air Control had two essential political undercurrents critical to its beginnings: the RAF's interservice rivalry and the more prolonged political debate of the "Middle Eastern Question."

Chapter 5 will describe the Mandate of Iraq in detail, enumerating why the cost savings of Air Control was politically vital to its success and implementation. An initial groundwork frames the mandate by presenting a strategic viewpoint from officials in Whitehall. Cost reduction of imperial control became the avenue to ensure the RAF's continued existence during inter-agency infighting over budgets. The economic logic behind certain aspects of the air control scheme is also explored. The use of air power in

the Mandate administration for tax collection purposes and its imagined use in the desert geography are notable examples. This survey recontextualizes the cost savings argument making a case that the RAF inflated its savings. Control of Iraq was maintained, and costs were reduced, but not by air power alone.

Chapter 6 will analyze the understudied aspect of British Intelligence's contribution to the Air Control scheme, i.e., Special Service Officers (SSOs). John Glubb will provide the focal point, and this chapter will argue for the importance of understanding the air control scheme's intelligence apparatus. The lack of development within the literature has allowed for the misinterpretation of the uses and benefits of Air Control, overemphasizing the role of coercion through bombing. As a result, this has neglected the vital intelligence provided to allow for effective bombing campaigns and prevent local unrest before reaching the bombing stage. The very nature of Air Control required a comprehensive understanding of the population and their grievances.

CHAPTER 3

EARLY ITERATIONS OF AIR POWER

This chapter addresses how airplanes' advent revolutionized the conception of space by adding a theoretical depth to this new use of technology by the state. By exploring the historical instances where air power was first utilized, an initial argument will be proposed as to why there has been an over-reliance on the bombing aspects shaping air policing's original ideas. An overview of various empires' use of air power is provided by assessing different integration levels of military and civilian administrations at the onset of the experimentation phase. The comparative analysis concludes by describing Britain's early experiences contributing to Air Control's development, the most prominent early air power model. The RAF's early doctrine is also evaluated, paying particular attention to revisions in its early doctrinal writings. Air Staff Memoranda highlights the role of intelligence in the air control scheme after its first few years of use in Iraq.

3.1. Air Power and Peripheral Spaces

> "Control of frontiers is political: aircraft are merely a powerful new weapon to assist in that control."[70] - Air Commodore J. A. Chamier

Control without occupation, the penultimate air power concept, has been consistently sought after since the inception of the airplane at Kitty Hawk in 1903. The advent of aircraft for military use fundamentally changed how war was conducted at the

[70] Air Commodore J. A. Chamier C.B, "Air Control of Frontiers," *Journal of The Royal Central Asian Society* 21, no. 3 (July 1, 1934): 417, https://doi.org/10.1080/03068373408725319.

tactical level and has continually spawned new technologically superior iterations. More importantly for administrators and politicians, the added possibility of crossing enemy lines and striking the enemy's metropole is constantly believed to have a strategic effect capable of achieving political solutions. Even the threat of this capability is cited as an effective coercive tactic on the specific population in question, preventing any further unrest. Imperialistically, air power provided new opportunities that were tested and refined during the interwar period to maintain Empire. Virtually all imperial powers in the aftermath of World War I would utilize airplanes to suppress colonial rebellions and police their colonies during the interwar period. The technological solution of air power is still argued for today and at times more vehemently since there has been a giant leap forward in scientific advancement.[71] Politicians continue to see air power as an easy solution to a many-faceted geo-political issue, and this historical overview is a much needed reminder.[72]

History has shown that air power has been most often employed within peripheral spaces, remaining much less potent in urban areas. Early air policing suffered from precision and targeting issues, avoiding the use of "air action" or strategic bombing during times of large urban unrest or labor strikes. Peripheral spaces where air power generally operated became synonymous with colonial frontiers, where law enforcement was already relatively lax. Mark Neocleous has likened this historical use

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[71] See Keen's Gold Medal Essay in JUSII on the historical technological aspects of air power to contrast with today's capabilities. Colonel F. S. Keen, "To What Extent Would the Use of the Latest Scientific and Mechanical Methods of Warfare Affect Operations on the North-West Frontier of India?," *Journal of the United Service Institution of India* 53, no. 238 (October 1923): 393–415.

[72] Frank Ledwidge, *Aerial Warfare: A Very Short Introduction*, *Aerial Warfare: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford University Press), 2, accessed September 3, 2020, https://www-veryshortintroductions-com.libproxy.udayton.edu/view/10.1093/actrade/9780198804314.001.0001/actrade-9780198804314.

of air power as tantamount to a form of police power. The policing of these ill-controlled frontiers was significantly strengthened through the use of aircraft.[73]

> 'In air power we possess a rapid and economical instrument by which to ensure peace and good government in our outer Empire, and more particularly upon its Asian and African frontiers ...' where there was offered 'considerable scope for Air Force police work.'[74]

The notion of encroachment into the boundaries of the state allowed for more direct control by the central authority and solidified its hold on the entire nation-state. Neep's theoretical model of state space is applicable in this instance due to the nature of this new technology known as air power.[75] The new speed of air travel now allowed the "man on the spot" to communicate and better inform Whitehall and Baghdad's policymakers with more timely intelligence. Previously, this centralized bureaucracy only allowed for only a top-down approach to control when controlling the frontier. The only applicable method for reasserting colonial control during a "small war" was predominantly with a significant number of ground troops slowly regaining control of a problem area. The British would then pummel the rebelling town/centre, with artillery until they surrendered, causing extensive casualties. This artillery heavy method is defined as the Ground Method (colloquially referred to as Butcher and Bolt) by John Slessor.[76] The most considerable weakness in the shift away from the Ground Method

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[73] Neocleous, "Air Power as Police Power," 581–82.

[74]'Memorandum by the Chief of the Air Staff on Air Power Requirements of the Empire', 9 Dec. 1918, in Sir Frederick Sykes, From Many Angles: An Autobiography (London, 1942), Appendix VII, pp. 561, 565 cited in Cox, "A Splendid Training Ground," 157.; See also Sykes's earlier ideas of peacetime aviation in Sir Frederick Hugh Sykes, *Aviation in Peace and War* (London, 1922), http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc1.$b32899.

[75] Daniel Neep, "State-Space beyond Territory: Wormholes, Gravitational Fields, and Entanglement," *Journal of Historical Sociology* 30, no. 3 (2017): 466–95, https://doi.org/10.1111/johs.12126.

[76] Slessor, *The Central Blue: Recollections and Reflections*, 59–61.

after the addition of air power was the loss of local intelligence. The advantage of traversing distances quickly to target rebels inhibited the capacity to gather more localized intelligence, which aided an understanding of rebellion's underlying reasons. This was supplemented with the RAF's SSOs, but as Martin Thomas notes, these early years were very experimental and SSOs were required to run before they could crawl.[77] Frontiers lacked the traditional infrastructure of maintained paved roads and telegraph lines, making communication between the metropole and these frontiers varied. Early aircraft were extremely helpful in this regard and augmented any lagging construction. Thus, the entanglement of empire had reached a much more advanced stage due to the advancement of air travel.

Although air policing in the periphery has continually seen extensive use, it was also debated for possible applications in the metropole. Traditional colonial and urban policing methods focused on quelling riots and unrest in urban centers.[78] Demonstrations of aerial flybys and the dropping of leaflets urging an end to the strikes hoped to add another layer to riot control creating somewhat of a deterrence effect. Peter Gray has pointed to British imperial air policing first occurring on the home front due to worry over coal and rail strikes during WWI and immediately after the war. This first appeared in December of 1917, when aircraft were used to drop leaflets to workers

[77] It would take some years until intelligence was more formally acknowledged as a central pillar in the Air Control scheme. Martin Thomas, "Bedouin Tribes and the Imperial Intelligence Services in Syria, Iraq and Transjordan in the 1920s," *Journal of Contemporary History* 38, no. 4 (October 1, 2003): 449–50, https://doi.org/10.1177/00220094030384002.

[78] See Chapter 3 'Paying the butcher's bill?': Policing British colonial protest after 1918 in Martin Thomas, *Violence and Colonial Order: Police, Workers and Protest in the European Colonial Empires, 1918–1940* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 64–86, https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139045643.

urging them to end their strikes.[79] Soon after, these leaflet dropping missions expanded into calls for aerial bombardment in Ireland by the Army to assist as air support. Notably, Winston Churchill called for some "air action" to help quell the surge in violence between 1919–1921. The British Cabinet eventually approved very limited rules of engagement for armed airplanes in March 1921 against Irish insurgents. However, Air Marshall Hugh Trenchard was wary of their use so close to Britain, and it is doubtful that these air patrol missions caused casualties.[80] Trenchard feared any lethal use of air policing so close to the home front would result in political reprisals for killing civilians and unseat its already tenuous position as a newly independent military arm.

Nevertheless, aerial bombardment would still be perceived as a tool for policing, albeit primarily relegated to frontier areas where it was viewed as a legitimate practice. This overlaps with a racial view of the colonies' semicivilized peoples detached from the more civilized Irish.[81] Notions of a racial other also emerge after further analysis of the doctrinal publications on air policing of semicivilized tribes. This racial sentiment was also formally noted at the Hague in 1923 when drafting the 'Rules for Aerial Warfare' of international law and only applied to civilized nations. After the transition to a Labour government in 1924, British public criticism of Air Control did increase.

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[79] Gray, "The Myths of Air Control and the Realities of Imperial Policing," 24.

[80] Omissi cites only 10 out of 338 hours in April 1921 were armed patrols. Omissi, *Air Power and Colonial Control: The Royal Air Force, 1919-1939*, 40–43.

[81] See Mark Neocleous, *War Power, Police Power* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2014), 150–51, https://doi.org/10.3366/j.ctt9qdr8p.

Unfortunately, this only heightened the secrecy of the RAF's reporting of civilian casualties.[82]

Trenchard's wariness of bombing held a difference in opinion due to the time's racial view, but the density of population in urban centers also coincided with when "air action" was appropriate. Later, when employed in Palestine during the unrest in August of 1929 (Wailing Wall riots or the Buraq intifada) there was no administrative acknowledgment of "air action" (bombing).[83] Rules of engagement during military operations prohibited bombing any urban centers. The most significant benefit of early air power within an urban setting is much the same as today by providing quick troop transport, aerial reconnoitering, medical ambulance services, and more efficient communication between the police and supporting infantry reinforcements.[84]

There can be no better example of the airplane's increased utilization unfolding within the frontier policing realm than its training ground of Iraq. These peripheries were naturally suitable to the encroachment from the air, specifically within Mesopotamia, due to the inhospitable nature of the area's desert and mountainous terrain. T.E. Lawrence would become an early proponent advocating its cause after his firsthand experience as a part of the British-led Arab Revolt.[85] Lawrence would go on to

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[82] Satia, "The Defense of Inhumanity," 35–40.

[83] David Omissi, "Technology and Repression: Air Control in Palestine 1922–36," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 13, no. 4 (December 1, 1990): 49–50, https://doi.org/10.1080/01402399008437430.

[84] See Appendix E of US Army, "Field Manual 3-24: Counterinsurgency," *Headquarters, Department of the Army, Washington, DC: December* 15 (2006). There was a large debate over these recommendations for air power in new population-centric COIN doctrine. See Conrad Crane, "United States," in Thomas Rid and Thomas Keaney, eds., *Understanding Counterinsurgency: Doctrine, Operations, and Challenges* (London, United Kingdom: Taylor & Francis Group, 2010), 59–72, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/aub-ebooks/detail.action?docID=515345.

[85] "The war showed me that a combination of armoured cars and aircraft could rule the desert: but that they must be under non-army control, and without infantry support…" Cited in Newton, *The RAF and Tribal Control*, 86.

write editorials both in favor of Faisal ibn al-Hussein as Iraq's monarch and for the use of air policing for controlling the desert.[86] The British, which had conquered the sea with her Navy, now sought to conquer something historically just as inaccessible, the desert. Early British accounts drew many parallels from Naval doctrinal thinking. The "desert with all its mysterious fascination" had "an unreal atmospheric quality comparable with the sky. Perhaps," pondered a wing commander, "this is why people call it 'The Blue.'"[87] John Glubb also viewed the desert as an ocean. Glubb continuously alludes to the Syrian Desert as a vast-sea lane.[88] The recent work of Robert Fletcher has identified a desert corridor of British influence facilitated by airplanes first emerging during the early interwar period. This conquest of the desert corridor required petrol dumps and refueling stations for these early aircraft, creating aerial and physical spheres of influence. Neep's novel idea of equating quantum entanglement as a new theoretical way to reconstruct our notion of empire in this context is quite helpful when conceptualizing the running of this desert corridor.[89] Using Daniel Neep's proposal for historical sociology to utilize new insights gleaned within quantum physics and paired with Fletcher's new work, we can recontextualize these peripheral encounters within the desert to better understand new interactions between the state and the governed in respect to Empire. While in charge of Iraq from 1918-20, acting Civil Commissioner for Mesopotamia Arnold T. Wilson, utilized

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[86] Timothy J. Paris, *Britain, the Hashemites and Arab Rule, 1920–1925: The Sherifian Solution* (London: Frank Cass, 2003), 84–86.

[87] Cited in Priya Satia, *Spies in Arabia: The Great War and the Cultural Foundations of Britain's Covert Empire in the Middle East* (Oxford University Press, 2008), 242.

[88] R. S. G. Fletcher, "Running the Corridor: Nomadic Societies and Imperial Rule in the Inter-War Syrian Desert," *Past & Present* 220, no. 1 (August 1, 2013): 213, https://doi.org/10.1093/pastj/gtt014.

[89] Neep, "State-Space beyond Territory," 486–88.

airplanes almost exclusively as a means of travel throughout the region.[90] This belief was articulated by Air Vice-Marshall Sir John Salmond, the first Air Commodore of the RAF in Iraq.[91] The Air Ministry formally noted this in 1924.

> Without air transport, the niceties of administration and military touch are impossible with other existing means of travel in Iraq, and perhaps the greatest achievement of Air Control in Iraq during the six months under review has been the introduction of this inestimable asset. By its means it has been possible to achieve a highly centralised yet widely understanding intelligence which is the essence of wise and economical control.[92]

A modern interpretation of these peripheral spaces now incorporates the utilization of unmanned drones, in addition to manned aircraft. The argument of filling the peripheral spaces' with drones echoes many of these same notions held in the early 20th century still occurring in the same geographical area. Human geographers have taken this argument of the global periphery and couched the discussion in the more extensive history of imperialism. Their premise argues that states' militarized drones have created peripheries within their own states and emphasize its importance upon the greater global periphery.[93]

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[90] Wilson, *Mesopotamia 1917-1920: A Clash of Loyalties, A Personal and Historical Record*, 238–39.

[91] "Air Power and that alone made it possible in this country of vast distances and primitive communications to hold all the strings at one moment, to tighten one here and loosen one there, and to act swiftly and surely at the right spot at the right moment." D.S.O. Air Marshal Sir John Salmond K.C.B. C.M.G., C.V.O., "The Air Force in Iraq," *Journal of the Royal United Services Institute* 70, no. 479 (October 1, 1925): 495, https://doi.org/10.1080/03071842509433787.

[92] Note by the Air Ministry, 1 August 1924, on "The method of employment of the air arm in Iraq" [AIR9/14] found in Anita L. P. Burdett, *Iraq: Defence Intelligence, 1920-1973*, vol. 1: 1920-1925 (Slough: Archive Editions, 2005), 610.

[93] Akhter, "The Proliferation of Peripheries," 65.

3.2. The Colonial Laboratory

Air power would gain its wings in what practitioners referred to peripheral conflict as "small wars" and redefined as imperial policing by Charles Gwynn during the interwar period.[94] Scholars now refer to these events as counterinsurgency or colonial policing when revisiting these occurrences, but these occurrences' genealogy has its roots in the term "small wars."[95] Before World War I, the airplane's bird 's-eye view was utilized in both military and civilian scenarios, primarily for geographical surveying and scouting. Early iterations were generally used as a reconnaissance tool to support ground troops through scouting in a wartime scenario, remaining mostly as observational units. This new capability provided vital intelligence for commanders when formulating their tactical battle strategy. Likewise, artillery observation aircraft bolstered targeting capabilities and was its principle use during battle besides any offensive action.[96]

The first use of the airplane in a small war setting has been attributed to the Italians during their Libyan campaign (1911–13).[97] Its initial aerial reconnaissance missions for their air force soon added bombing capabilities to their retinue by dropping

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[94] Charles William Gwynn, *Imperial Policing* (London, Macmillan, 1934).

[95] Robert Johnson, "Command of the Army, Charles Gwynn and Imperial Policing: The British Doctrinal Approach to Internal Security in Palestine 1919–29," *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 43, no. 4 (August 8, 2015): 570–89, https://doi.org/10.1080/03086534.2015.1083221.; This was first made famous by Charles Callwell in his book Small Wars published in 1898. The term now is quite diluted with historical accounts either referring to these instances of unrest either as small wars or imperial policing. Military practitioners today either relabel these historical instances as either counterinsurgency, low-intenstity conflict, or the broader umbrella term of irregular warfare. Historians refer to this as primarily as colonial policing. See Laleh Khalili, *Time in the Shadows: Confinement in Counterinsurgencies* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2013), chap. 1.

[96] Slessor, *Air Power and Armies*, 41–45.

[97] Omissi, *Air Power and Colonial Control: The Royal Air Force, 1919-1939*, 5.

small two-kilogram grenades.[98] These early-era air units conducted the first-ever tactical reconnaissance and artillery observation, day and night bombardment, and propaganda leaflet drops.[99] The Spanish were also early adopters of air power for policing in their Moroccan Protectorate. In December of 1913, near the village of Beni Hozmar just south of Tétouan, an air detachment used a small number of German-made shrapnel bombs in several skirmishes against Moroccan insurgents.[100] Another early instance of air power for policing purposes was traced to the United States in 1916 during the Mexican civil wars, as part of the Mexican Punitive Expedition. While proof of concept was achieved in favor of the airplane's utility, the machines were in such ill condition that they could not be truly effective and exposed the inadequacy of U.S. aviation.[101]

The Great War would change how air power grew from simply providing aerial reconnaissance into its own independent military arm, capable of providing accurate intelligence, close air support, and strategic bombing capabilities targeting both cities and industries behind enemy lines.[102] While the Italians and Spanish utilized their air power in a much more limited manner, both empires would be the first to use aircraft to deploy chemical weapons in colonial warfare.[103] Later in the 1930s, during the

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[98] The first reported aerial reconnaissance mission is cited as 21 October 1911. November 1 is dated as the first use of grenades, although these were largely ineffective. Headrick, *Power over Peoples*, 306–7.

[99] John Howard Morrow, *The Great War in the Air: Military Aviation from 1909 to 1921* (University of Alabama Press, 2009), 25.

[100] Corum and Johnson, *Airpower in Small Wars: Fighting Insurgents and Terrorists*, 68.

[101] General duties of these small air units was aerial observation and air mail services. Corum and Johnson, *Airpower in Small Wars: Fighting Insurgents and Terrorists*, 12–21.

[102] For a brief overview of early air power advancements, see A.F.C., D.S.O. Group-Captain A. E. Borton C.M.G., "The Use of Aircraft in Small Wars," *Journal of the Royal United Services Institute* 65, no. 458 (May 1, 1920): 310–19, https://doi.org/10.1080/03071842009421889.

[103] There are reports of Italy dropping gas bombs in Libya between 1923–30, and by Spain in Morocco between 1921–26. John D. Sislin, "Chemical Warfare in the Interwar Period: Insights for the Present?," *The Nonproliferation Review* 25, no. 3–4 (May 4, 2018): 199, https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2018.1519343.

Spanish Civil war and Italy's conquest of Ethiopia (Abyssinia), air power would also play an integral factor. Still, from the outset of WWI, the Spanish, American, and Italians did not develop a cohesive civil-military scheme.[104]

French and British air power uses were the most comprehensive in scope, having greater integration with land forces to suppress many anti-colonial movements in the wake of the postwar negotiation of WWI. The international order was in flux with reparations against Germany, the parceling out of the Ottoman empire, and many other subsequent decolonization efforts boiling over for France and Britain.[105] Both also had to account for a large external war debt during a period referred to by Gertrude Bell as the Devil's Cauldron.[106]. For imperial policymakers of either empire, this new technology would register as assisting colonial population surveillance, intelligence, and enforcement efforts at minimum financial cost. These two empires constructed a new method of coercion utilizing air power to police their empire's borders.[107]

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[104] The 26 April 1937 Guernica civilian bombing during the Spanish Civil war by the Luftwaffe is cited as having the most notable test for strategic bombing policy prior to WWII. See Brian Armstrong, "Through a Glass Darkly: The Royal Air Force and the Lessons of the Spanish Civil War 1936-1939," *Air Power Review* 12, no. 1 (2009): 32–55. James Corum, an authoritative figures on the *Luftwaffe*, argues the Guernica bombing was inflated by the international media at the time. James S. Corum, *Legion Condor 1936–39: The Luftwaffe Develops Blitzkrieg in the Spanish Civil War* (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2020), 52–53.

[105] Germany would take on significant reparations in the form of the war debt, along with the Ottoman Empire's remnants, parceled out to both the French and British. There remains a significant gap between understanding the impacts German reparations and the Ottoman Public Debt. The Ottoman Public Debt Administration was a holdover institution from Ottoman borrowing but her debts would be redistributed after the war with the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923. See both Sluglett, *Britain in Iraq*, 90; Burrows and Cobbin, "Budgetary and Financial Discontinuities," 251.

[106] "The truth is that Asia, from the Mediterranean to the Indian frontier, is now such a devil's cauldron that it's impossible to feel convinced that we shall save Mesopotamia from the general confusion." Gertrude Bell to her father, Sir Hugh Bell, 14 November 1920. http://www.gerty.ncl.ac.uk/letter_details.php?letter_id=434

[107] Thomas, "Markers of Modernity or Agents of Terror? Air Policing and Colonial Revolt after World War I," 68.

The French use of air power would be used in a much more conventional setting, i.e., bombing, and was more indiscriminate and brutal in its air campaigns, notably its Rif Wars.[108] Similarly, in France's Syrian Mandate, French air power was also viewed as an auxiliary form of control. Air power in Syria was used most notably during the Great Syrian Revolt of 1925–1927 when France ordered aerial bombardment against the city of Damascus, causing over 330 casualties in October 1925. More generally, French use kept air power's primary duties to aerial reconnaissance, photography, communications, artillery observation and tactical bombing.

Unlike the British, the political climate did not facilitate air power's expansion into a cornerstone of colonial policing. Colonial administrator Louis-Hubert Lyautey, one of the strongest advocates of air power for French colonial purposes, had pushed for a more integrated air policing model in Morocco since 1912 but was replaced in September of 1925 during the Rif Wars against Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Karīm al-Khaṭṭabi (Abd el-Krim).[109] Overall, Lyautey's push for more integration with the *Service des Renseignements* (SR) did occur to some degree with some shared chain of command between military and civilian intelligence services. From the military side,

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[108] A 1925 RUSI Journal criticizes the brutality of the French offensive in 1925 against Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Karīm al-Khaṭṭabi (Abd-el-Krim). "The conduct of these operations was drastic in the extreme, and was further supported by the activity of a few small columns which devastated the country of the tribesmen." "French Morocco," *Journal of the Royal United Services Institute* 70, no. 480 (December 1, 1925): 762, https://doi.org/10.1080/03071842509426087; Corum and Johnson, *Airpower in Small Wars: Fighting Insurgents and Terrorists*, 77.

[109] "This logic of carefully targeted aerial bombardment as part of a minimum force strategy appealed to Lyautey. As he put it, 'A single bomb that misses its target, even if it causes no damage, is more damaging to our [pacification] policy and the good name of our air force than ten successful bombardments of the most rebellious tribe.'" Cited in Thomas, "Markers of Modernity or Agents of Terror? Air Policing and Colonial Revolt after World War I," 83. The French reinforcements in 1925 brought the total number of French troops to 158,000 men adopting a strategy of overwhelming firepower effectively ending the Lyautey's push for air policing to achieve political ends. Martin Thomas, "Crisis Management in Colonial States: Intelligence and Counter-Insurgency in Morocco and Syria after the First World War," *Intelligence and National Security* 21, no. 5 (October 1, 2006): 704, https://doi.org/10.1080/02684520600957662.

army chief of staff General Buat had similarly made efforts to centralize the air forces and expand their responsibilities. His premature death in December 1923 stalled these efforts.[110] While France did have a sizeable air force by 1923, fielding over 3,000 aircraft, it never achieved a fully fleshed-out system some officials like Lyautey and Buat had envisioned. It would take another ten years until the French Air Force would become nominally independent.[111]

It would be the British who would seek to test a new way of control via coercion through the fear and threat of bombing; demonstrations of force would first need to be made, of course.[112] Air bombing raids had an ulterior initial motive in the hopes of swaying recalcitrant tribes from rebelling. After displaying the airplane's capabilities, a simple fear of bombing was hoped to prevent civil unrest with minimum force.[113] The concept of Britain's air control model began its incubation period during the Third Afghan War in the spring of 1919.[114] Three years prior, the Indian reserves were fighting on India's North-West frontier, gradually replacing their losses with armored cars and aircraft.[115] Britain's utilization of air bombing as aerial support for

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[110] Robert J. Young, "The Strategic Dream: French Air Doctrine in the Inter-War Period, 1919-39," *Journal of Contemporary History* 9, no. 4 (1974): 60, https://doi.org/10.1177/002200947400900403.

[111] Young, "The Strategic Dream," 63.

[112] For a primary source example, see Appendix 4.

[113] A modern interpretation of this would be *Shock and Awe*.

[114] The Third-Afghan war lasted from May-August of 1919 after Amir Habibullah was assassinated in February. His son and successor Amir Amanullah declared jihad against British India seeking to free himself of British influence. For a British primary account, see Anita L. P. Burdett, *Afghanistan: Defence Intelligence, 1919-1973*, vol. 1: 1919-1928 (Slough: Archive Editions, 2002), sec. 1.1-1.2.; for further study see Brian Robson, *Crisis on the Frontier: The Third Afghan War and the Campaign in Waziristan 1919-20* (Stroud: Spellmount, 2007).

[115] Murphy, "Air Policing." 12.

these Indian reserves naturally increased during this period. [116] Omissi cites Kabul's bombing on 24 May 1919 Empire Day, where four 112-pound and sixteen 20-pound bombs were dropped by a Handley Page V-1500 aircraft as the first occurrence of a city bombing. [117] While this event caused minimal damage to the city, its importance was greatly exaggerated and quoted at the time as creating a tremendous psychological effect. It was also interpreted as influencing the *Amir'*s decision to sue for peace. In this sortie, the largest bomber, operated by Captain 'Jock' Haley, went further, claiming his aircraft had "ended the war on its own."[118] The Air Ministry began using this operation as clear evidence for its use in imperial defense.

The other precursor to the emergence of a cohesive air control plan occurred within British-controlled Somaliland. Since the 1890s, Mohammed Abdullah Hassan, a tribal leader the British dubbed as "the Mad Mullah," had caused trouble in the British protectorate by raiding tribes friendly to the British.[119] After the Great War had ended, the British government decided to reinforce the protectorate with an RAF squadron of DH-9 reconnaissance/light-bomber aircraft.[120] Four previous expeditions before the Great War had proved unsuccessful and costly. In lieu of Sir Geoffrey Archer's

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[116] Interestingly the Khyber Rifles influenced the formation of the Assyrian Levies in Iraq due to Britain's notion of martial races. The Khyber Rifles were disbanded because of the large desertions during this "small war" Roe, *Waging War in Waziristan: The British Struggle in the Land of Bin Laden, 1847-1947*, 94, 130.

[117] Omissi, *Air Power and Colonial Control: The Royal Air Force, 1919-1939*, 11.

[118] Halley, "The Kabul Raid", 441 cited in Andrew John Charles Walters, "Inter-War, Inter-Service Friction on the North-West Frontier of India and Its Impact on the Development and Application of Royal Air Force Doctrine" (PhD Thesis, University of Birmingham, 2018), 218.

[119] Air power was first thought in this instance prior to the war in 1914. "Naval Lieutenants Boothby and Richard B. Davies are at Berbera, investigating the feasibility of utilising airships for the purpose of an expedition to subdue the Mad Mullah in the desert." Found in "GENERAL CABLES. (Reuter's Messages.) AIRSHIPS AGAINST THE MAD MULLAH.," *Barrier Miner (Broken Hill, NSW: 1888 - 1954)*, June 15, 1914.

[120] James S. Corum, "The Myth of Air Control: Reassessing the History" (Air and Space Power Journal Maxwell AFB AL, January 2000), https://apps.dtic.mil/docs/citations/ADA522125, 63.

recommendation of cutting costs by using bombers to reinforce the army troops, the newly dubbed 'Z-Force' began its mission on 21 January 1920. By mid-February, Mohammed Abdullah Hassan and his troops had been defeated and routed.[121] Air power provided a significant contribution to this successful effort. In addition to aerial bombardment, the airplane provided aerial reconnaissance of enemy locations, and its use of air transport allowed for a quicker, more effective means of communicating victory. Within less than 48 hours after the victory by the British, aircraft allowed the British governor to visit all the principal tribal chiefs and inform them of Hassan's defeat. In an ex-post review, the RAF convincingly claimed air power generated a swift end to the rebellion after its tactical success. Additionally, the cost of quelling this rebellion was a paltry sum of £77,000, causing the Colonial Under-Secretary, Leopold Amery, to claim that this was the 'cheapest war in history.'[122]

These decided effects provided a formative influence on the Air Authority, using these two primary cases to formulate their unique strategy of imperial policing. The effectiveness of the airplane in fighting against these incursions produced the underpinnings of Air Control: a focus on the psychological impact dubbed as the "moral effect," the ability to reach geographical areas previously inaccessible to large ground forces, aerial reconnaissance, intelligence of enemy movement, air transport as quick means of communication, and the reduced need for troops resulting in savings of both blood and treasure for the British Empire.

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[121] David Hall, "Ruling the Empire out of Central Blue: The Royal Air Force and Counter-Insurgency (COIN) Operations in the Inter-War Period," *Air Power Review* 10, no. 2 (2007): 68–76, 70.

[122] Glenn Torpy, "Counter-Insurgency: Echoes from the Past," *The RUSI Journal* 152, no. 5 (2007): 19.

3.3. Doctrinal Aspect of Air Control

Why the RAF would produce doctrine if it was then going to ignore it – and as second order issues, if it did produce bad doctrine, why did it do so, and if the doctrine was in fact reasonable, why was it not followed?[123]

Regarding the brutality of strategic bombing and the conflicting reports on the death toll upon non-combatants, an analysis of doctrinal thinking lays the groundwork for the later discussion of Iraq as this new testing ground for early air policing applications.[124] The practice of strategic bombing has been the most fiercely contested aspect of early air power. Most scholars have focused on how early air power theory influenced civilians' later strategic targeting in WWII.[125] The philosophy for strategic bombing was seen as a way of demoralizing the enemy by targeting civilians outside of the war front. It was largely ineffective after the first instance.[126] Further analysis of early RAF doctrine allows for a greater understanding of the approach strategic bombing was believed to be used in the wake of WWI on the frontier.[127] The Royal Air Force's doctrine was greatly influenced by their policing efforts in the peripheries of the empire, stemming largely from their experience in Mandate Iraq.[128] While air power allowed for new possibilities for a medical ambulance, locust culling, and air transport,

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[123] Parton, "The Development of Early RAF Doctrine," 1161.

[124] For a helpful overview of early theory and doctrine see, Phillip S Meilinger, "The Historiography of Airpower: Theory and Doctrine," *The Journal of Military History* 64, no. 2 (April 2000): 467–501.

[125] For more on this, see Scot Robertson, *The Development of RAF Strategic Bombing Doctrine, 1919-1939* (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1995).

[126] Omissi, *Air Power and Colonial Control: The Royal Air Force, 1919-1939*, 116.

[127] Satia, "The Defense of Inhumanity." With brutality at the forefront of the analysis of Air Control Satia neglects a shift in later doctrinal editions acknowledging a greater need for intelligence in Air Control.

[128] Doctrine has many different interpretations. A working definition for this work relies on NATO's definition which has remained unchanged since 1973. "Fundamental principles by which the military forces guide their actions in support of objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgement in application." "Doctrine," in *AAP-06 NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions* (Brussels, Belgium: NSA, 2019), 2-D-9.

analysis of early RAF practice still generally focuses on how aerial bombardment was used to influence and prevent further unrest from occurring in Britain's Iraq Mandate.[129]

With air power in its infancy, theorists had differing visions for its use and applications. Giulio Douhet, an Italian theorist, was the most prominent of these early thinkers.[130] Douhet's own experience in Italy's 1911 Libya campaign soon developed into one of the first theories of strategic bombing warfare made famous in *The Command of the Air*, published in 1921.[131] Douhet's main principles were gaining air superiority, suppressing enemy air defenses, and targeting the enemy's "vital centers" (centers of population, government, and industry). Incidentally, Douhet's writings were not widely translated outside Italy or widely available in English until much later in the early 1930s.[132] While Douhet's theories did not factor into the early RAF doctrinal publications, they reflect existing views of early air power and later influenced ideas of civilian bombing in WWII. In contrast, Hugh Trenchard's approach to air power, later formally dubbed "Trenchard doctrine," concentrated on the sociopolitical implications of strategic bombing.[133] Trenchard argued that air power's critical purpose was to destroy the enemy's morale and willingness to fight.

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[129] For the RAF's non-lethal aspects of air power in Iraq see, Newton, *The RAF and Tribal Control*, 79–81.

[130] Phillip S. Meilinger, *Airwar: Essays on Its Theory and Practice* (London: Routledge, 2003), 7–35, https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203827680.

[131] Douhet's wartime experiences drew upon his service from the Italian incursion into Libya and commanded one of the first military aviation units. Original publication title was *Il dominiodell'aria,* see Headrick, *Power over Peoples*, 307. Douhet's theories are still relevant today with modern air theorists still influenced by his ideas. Douhet was seemingly vindicated during the Cold War and the nuclear arms race and then later in Operation Desert Storm/Shield. See John Warden's Five Rings theory briefly discussed in, David R. Abruzzino, "Old Wine in New Bottles: Douhet, Warden, and Counterinsurgency," *Small Wars Journal*, 2013.

[132] Douhet did meet with American theorist Billy Mitchell in 1922. Meilinger, *Airwar*, 29–30.

[133] Viktoriya Fedorchak, *British Air Power: The Doctrinal Path to Jointery* (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2018), 43; Ross Mahoney, "Trenchard's Doctrine: Organisational Culture, the 'Air Force Spirit' and the

RAF historian Neville Parton's analysis of the RAF's interwar doctrine has been the most authoritative since Omissi's discussion of the interdepartmental infighting for the RAF's continued independence. Parton illustrates how early RAF doctrine was more than monolithic in its approach to air policing. Scholars should be aware of the political context surrounding its early editions and the changes in its later editions. Recently, Viktoriya Fedorchak's analysis has also contributed to an improved understanding of early RAF doctrinal writings by highlighting two substantial early RAF milestones. The first was the simple fact that the RAF published its own doctrine even though it acknowledged cooperation with both the Navy and Army. The second was the RAF's concept of strategic bombing served as justification for its existence during the interwar period.[134] From a doctrinal standpoint, the only thing that set the Royal Air Force apart was their stance on air power's psychological effects, arguing for the pacifying of tribes with minimal force. Understanding why these early writings focused on this heightened aspect adds an overlooked nuance to RAF practice. Much of these early writings were published before Air Control was first tested in Iraq. The first comprehensive doctrinal document was written primarily in 1921 during the interdepartmental infighting between military branches over plans for the Royal Air Force's continued independence. This document came to be called Royal Air Force *Operations Manual* (CD22) and would become the first identifiable policy for the RAF to govern imperial policing operations and for the next four years. While most of the manual's chapters focus on the more tactical aspects of air power, such as inter-land/air

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Foundation of the Royal Air Force in the Interwar Years," *British Journal for Military History* 4, no. 2 (February 4, 2018): 164, http://bjmh.gold.ac.uk/article/view/798.

[134] Fedorchak, *British Air Power*, 42–46.

cooperation and air warfare, there was one chapter devoted to aerial coercion tactics and another dedicated to aerial policing of semicivilized tribes. The aerial coercion tactics were (1) the destruction of fighting personnel, (2) destruction of material on land and sea, (3) morale effect upon the enemy populace, and (4) the incendiary effect.[135] From these four tenets, the ones dealing with the air control scheme's lethal applications have received the most study. The last chapter (Chapter XI) was utilized to frame how the entire RAF would go on to police their empire in the interwar period. Army punitive actions were simply substituted for aerial bombardment, and James Spaight corrected early drafts to account for international law, drawing mainly from the minor CD21 pamphlet.[136]

Between the update to CD22 was a two-year lull between official doctrines from 1926–1928, and the RAF updated their operations manual from CD22 to the RAF War Manual (AP1300).[137] While not much had changed in its general bombing policy, intelligence's acknowledged role in the air control scheme had.[138] Intelligence was now seen as a central pillar and played a more vital role than scholars have previously recognized. Due to the large discrepancy in an actual perceived "morale effect,"

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[135] Air Ministry, Operations Manual, Royal Air Force, p. 51, cited in Parton, "The Evolution and Impact of Royal Air Force Doctrine, 1919-1939," 80.; See also Appendix 1 illustrating the changes in the bombing of towns and uncivilized tribes after accounting for international law.

[136] Parton, "The Evolution and Impact of Royal Air Force Doctrine, 1919-1939," 92–93. See also excerpts for this change in Appendix 1.

[137] There were more than these two seminal documents. There were also Gold Prize essays about Air Power in RUSI as well as lesser doctrinal manuals. ASM16 has the first official accounts of "demonstration flights," AM19, *Memorandum by the Air Staff on the Psychological Effects of Air* defends the Army's continued criticism of brutality, and ASM20 details the RAF operations commanded by John Salmond in Kurdistan during the years 1922–24. Walters, "Inter-War, Inter-Service Friction," 105–17.

[138] "By the late 1920s this had evolved into an appreciation of the requirement for accurate intelligence regarding one's opponents, as well as an understanding of the overall aim, and the way in which air could influence the achievement of that aim (for better or worse)" Neville Parton, "Air Power and Insurgency: Early RAF Doctrine," in Hayward, *Air Power, Insurgency and the" War on Terror"*, 41. See also Appendix 1 for extract from AP1300 on intelligence's role.

intelligence filled the gap by understanding who, what, and when targeting should occur. A simple lack of communication between the offender and the policemen often transpired in the early years of Air Control.[139] Failure to account for this change in doctrine and practice has had modern-day implications for how military thinkers have reanalyzed Air Control. Chapter 6's focus on John Glubb elaborates on this issue.

This chapter has shown the early theories, experiences, and possibilities of early air power. Early air power theory has remained remarkably the same as today with the ideas of commanding the air (aerial superiority), intelligence gathering (ISR), attack (aerial interdiction), and mobility (troop transport).[140] The tactical feasibility for air power in the advancement of Empire and early ideas of aerial bombardment to police peripheral regions began to percolate during these "small wars" before and after the Great War. The final ingredient making the British experience so unique is the political component discussed in the subsequent chapter. The inter-service rivalry and infighting between civil and military branches would push the RAF into conducting a new security experiment known as Air Control. Later iterations eventually shifted from simple bombardment to a burgeoning intelligence apparatus led by Special Service Officers.

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[139] Glubb's account of his own early experience as an SSO in Nasiryah shows there were continual misunderstandings between the British orchestrated Iraqi government and the outlying tribal areas. Glubb's mapping over the Barkat and Sufran tribes led to their eventual bombardment when a simple dialogue between parties could have resolved the issue. Glubb, *Arabian Adventures: Ten Years of Joyful Service*, 110–20; James D. Lunt, *Glubb Pasha, a Biography: Lieutenant-General Sir John Bagot Glubb, Commander of the Arab Legion, 1939-1956* (London: Harvill Press, 1984), 29–30.

[140] Ledwidge, *Aerial Warfare*, 7–12.

CHAPTER 4

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS LEADING TO AIR CONTROL

This chapter focuses on two political undercurrents; the RAF's battle for continued independence as a military branch and Britain's much more complicated "Middle Eastern Question" debated during and after WWI. These two currents merged to create a new imperial policing method in Britain's new Mandates in Iraq, Palestine, and Trans-Jordan, referred to as Air Control. Various political maneuverings within British parliament culminated with implementing the first version of Air Control on 1 October 1922 in Iraq with the transfer of military defense to the new Air Ministry from the War Office. Previous research highlighting Air Control's establishment treats Mandate Iraq as a vehicle ensuring the Royal Air Force's continued independence. Air Control also enabled the successful implementation of the Sharifian Solution already in discussion before adopting the air control scheme in Iraq. Adding additional background of Britain's Middle East policy from Timothy Paris's work on the Sharifian Solution sheds further light on how Air Control emerged in conjunction with the establishment of Mandate Iraq and the RAF's interservice rivalry. These two histories have been paired together, giving a fuller depiction of how Iraq's early defense organization developed. First, an introduction of the pre-Mandate period prior to the ratification of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1922 is presented due to complex intra-British policies at this time. Second is an RAF-focused account on Air Control's adoption, hard-pressed by Winston Churchill and Hugh Trenchard. This chapter concludes by

fusing these two histories and distinguishes a shift from overt colonial control to a more covertly backed Sharifian solution.

4.1. Background—A Whitehall Perspective of Mesopotamia

A thorough understanding of the establishment of Britain's Iraq Mandate can be onerous due to its ever-changing and adapting nature prior to its official inception. Although the formation of Iraq is artificial only in the sense that all nation-states are artificial creations that solidify and mature over time, from the crux of things when discussing these events, sufficient background must be presented to provide a full picture view. An analysis of Whitehall's policy during this period within the Middle East espouses an inchoate affair with many differing vested interests. Throughout its history and preceding its official inception in 1921 with King Faisal's crowning, various political maneuverings occurred in a dizzying fashion. This section sheds light on Britain's inter-department level disputes by summarizing the differing viewpoints affecting Iraq's future trajectory. Iraq underwent eight years of interregnum in rule from 1914-1922. The first six years began with the British landing at Fao, lasting until the Iraq Provisional Government was created in late 1920 by British Commissioner Percy Cox. On the ground in Iraq, martial law was in effect but transitioned from 1917-19 as an Occupied Enemy Territory staffed by the War Office into a civilian administration organized by a joint War-Civilian administration.[141] The signing of the Anglo-Iraqi treaty on 10 October 1922 formally ended the transitionary period of British rule, signifying Iraq as 'developed' enough for local management with Britain in charge of

[141] This is not to be confused with the Occupied Enemy Territory Administration (OETA) focused in the Levant region. Allawi, *Faisal I of Iraq*, 152–55.

external defense. Still, it would take another two years until the subsidiary agreements were finalized within the Iraqi parliament. The ratification vote finally occurred on 10 June 1924 after British High Commissioner Henry Dobbs's threat of dissolving the Constituent Assembly.[142]

During the early postwar aftermath of WWI, a reshuffling of Britain's colonial administrative branches occurred. This bureaucratic battle altered Iraq's defense and internal policing goals.[143] The players creating British Middle East policy have all been acknowledged in the historiography. A more straightforward summary of their views and opinions is necessary before any subsequent analysis can be made.[144] British India's importance in these affairs has recently been overshadowed, requiring some of this to retread old ground.[145] The competing departments for British Middle East policy were: the India Office, Foreign Office, Colonial Office, Whitehall, War Office, Admiralty,

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[142] When consulting British primary sources see, Jane Priestland, *Records of Iraq, 1914-1966. Volume 3. 1921-1924: Establishing the Kingdom* (Archive Editions, 2001), sec. 3.18-Iraqi-British relations: criticism and acceptance of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty by Constituent Assembly; its ratification; British dissatisfaction with King Faisal; Iraq's position vis-a-vis League of Nations, May 1923-December 1924, https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/book/62090; B. H. Bourdillon, "The Political Situation in Iraq," *Journal of the British Institute of International Affairs* 3, no. 6 (1924): 283, https://doi.org/10.2307/3014554. For a recent account see Ann Wilks, "The 1922 Anglo-Iraq Treaty: A Moment of Crisis and the Role of Britain's Man on the Ground," *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 43, no. 3 (July 2, 2016): 342–59, https://doi.org/10.1080/13530194.2015.1102709.

[143] There are more in-depth accounts of this fracturing and bickering within the British bureaucracy of His Majesty's Middle East policy. For starters, see, Helmut Mejcher, "British Middle East Policy 1917-21: The Inter-Departmental Level," *Journal of Contemporary History* 8, no. 4 (October 1, 1973): 81–101, https://doi.org/10.1177/002200947300800405; Timothy J. Paris, "British Middle East Policy-Making After the First World War: The Lawrentian and Wilsonian Schools.," *The Historical Journal* 41, no. 3 (September 1998): 773–93, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0018246X98007997; Paris, *The Sherifian Solution*; John Fisher, "Lord Robert Cecil and the Formation of a Middle East Department of the Foreign Office," *Middle Eastern Studies* 42, no. 3 (May 1, 2006): 365–80, https://doi.org/10.1080/00263200500521172.

[144] The first seminal work to discuss this complexity was Briton Cooper Busch, *Britain, India, and the Arabs, 1914-1921* (Univ of California Press, 1971).

[145] Newton omits the India/Foreign Office political battle over control of the Middle East prior to the 1921 Cairo Conference. Newton, *The RAF and Tribal Control*, 47. For a helpful overview, see Priya Satia, "Turning Space into Place: British India and the Invention of Iraq," in *Asia Inside Out*, ed. Eric Tagliacozzo, Helen F. Siu, and Peter C. Perdue (Cambridge, MA and London, England: Harvard University Press, 2015), https://doi.org/10.4159/9780674286320-009.

and Air Ministry.[146] During the war, the interdepartmental battle was primarily between the India Office and the Foreign Office's Cairo branch. Iraq's possible futures were debated in Whitehall and chaired in Lord Curzon's committees.[147] There were three possible outcomes for a successful conquest of the Ottoman Empire's territories. (1) The India Office would expand its borders to include Iraq, strengthening its influence. (2) The Arab Bureau in Cairo's Foreign Office would oversee the region, bolstering British Egypt. (3) It would create a new Middle East Bureau to administer these new territories. A mixture of all three occurred, causing a great deal of complexity in unraveling this period. The war ministries supplied the defense and enforcement, arguing over the budget necessary for carrying out their duties.

Sykes-Picot's importance has always weighed heavily with a post-war analysis of events. The reality is that after the war, the Sykes-Picot agreement had to be altered.[148] While the more apparent reason was the Bolshevik leak of the secret deal, France and Britain were faced with a massive war debt that transformed earlier ambitions for colonial conquest. Also, talk of self-determination echoed by Woodrow Wilson and his 14-Point Plan factored heavily into the formation of the mandate system proposed by Jan Smuts. The bitter rivalry between the two competing British blocs would continue to vie for policy dominance before establishing the Mandate System.

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[146] Wilson's own account of this India/Foreign Office split mentions the War Office as a player in these negotiations. "[…] I was painfully aware, from current departmental correspondence and from other sources, of the extent of the divergence of opinion between the Foreign and India Offices, and of the inability of both offices to control the vagaries of the War Office which appeared at the time to be an almost autonomous department of His Majesty's Government." Wilson, *Mesopotamia 1917-1920: A Clash of Loyalties, A Personal and Historical Record*, 164.

[147] Inter-departmental Persia and Mesopotamian committees (1917), followed by a Middle East committee (1917–18), an Eastern committee (1919), and an interdepartmental conference on Middle Eastern affairs (1919–20 (IDCE)). Paris, "The Lawrentian and Wilsonian Schools," 774.

[148] Toby Dodge, "The Danger of Analogical Myths: Explaining the Power and Consequences of the Sykes-Picot Delusion," *AJIL Unbound* 110 (2016): 132–36, https://doi.org/10.1017/S2398772300002944.

After WWI, Timothy Paris has identified two competing philosophies: epitomized in Arnold Talbot Wilson and Thomas Edward Lawrence. These Wilsonian and Lawrentian camps debated the mechanism of how to maintain British influence in the Middle East after the war. Arnold T. Wilson coming from the India Office, believed in direct British Control and was acting Civil Commissioner of Iraq from 1918-20. T.E. Lawrence, whose fame had risen into larger-than-life figure was backed by the Foreign Office, believing the most practical solution was to honor some wartime commitments and grant Hussein's sons a type of monarchy in Iraq and Trans-Jordan.[149] This philosophy would maintain British interests tethered to one family, the Muslim holy places' guardians. After adopting the Mandate System at San Remo and the later Cairo Conference of March 1921, some consolidation occurred. The main disputes were relegated within the Foreign Office and the Colonial Office's new Middle East Department. The Sherifian Solution eventually became the agreed-upon British policy for Iraq at the Cairo Conference, although its implementation was staggered and not fully implemented. Hussein himself would later fall out of favor, and in late 1925 'Abdul-'Aziz ibn 'Abdul-Rahman ibn Faysal Al Sa'ud (hereafter referred to as Ibn Sa'ud) would end up conquering the Hijaz.

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[149] Originally Lawrence and the Foreign Office petitioned for Faisal to rule in Syria and Abdullah in Iraq. With Britain's Eastern campaign conquering most of the former Ottoman territory there was a faction believing Britain had won Syria for herself and France should step aside. In 1918 most occupying troops were British in Syria, numbering 100,000 compared to 15,000 French. Instead, Britain withdrew from Damascus in September 1919, and Clemenceau gifted Britain with Mosul. Clemenceau then lost reelection to Alexandre Millerand, who was the one to expel Faisal from Syria on 24 July 1920. Paris, *The Sherifian Solution*, 51, 66; Neep, *Occupying Syria under the French Mandate*, 25–28; Allawi, *Faisal I of Iraq*, 257. For a more recent account of Syrian ambitions for independence see Elizabeth F Thompson, *How the West Stole Democracy from the Arabs: The Syrian Arab Congress of 1920 and the Destruction of Its Historic Liberal-Islamic Alliance* (New York, NY: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2020).

4.1.1. Wartime Developments (1914–1918)

The British seizure and occupation of Mesopotamia began soon after the outbreak of war between Great Britain and the Ottoman Empire. In October 1914, Percy Cox formally declared the *vilayet* of Basra under British influence, contesting previously held Ottoman territory. On 21 November, Indian Expeditionary Force D landed in Fao and fully captured Basra by April of 1915.[150] This landing spanned the beginnings of an Eastern campaign northwards from Basra, ending with British control of three Ottoman *vilayets*, *wilayets*, or provinces. (The others being Baghdad in October 1917, and Mosul from the Armistice of Mudros on 30 October 1918). Historically the British Raj had controlled all relations within the Arabian Peninsula for many generations prior to WWI. Mesopotamia's first conception of rule was to be an Indian focused affair mirroring Lord Cromer's Egypt. The India Office had grown into its own distinct entity and organizational culture separate from greater Whitehall. Due to the significance of exports to the Persian Gulf and the discovery of oil, India sought to secure additional economic security during the war and expand its own influence with a satellite entity in Mesopotamia.[151] It was imagined to emulate the Egyptian protectorate and fall under British India's sole purview.[152] Basra's occupation soon grew in size and scope, requiring additional colonial investment. Almost all Turkish officials had fled, necessitating extra civilian administrators from India, thus beginning the first significant

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[150] Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, "The British Occupation of Mesopotamia, 1914–1922," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 30, no. 2 (April 1, 2007): 7, https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390701248780.

[151] Busch, *Britain, India, and the Arabs, 1914-1921*, 22; Rosie Llewellyn-Jones, "The British Raj and the British Mandate in Iraq," *Asian Affairs* 46, no. 2 (May 4, 2015): 273–74, https://doi.org/10.1080/03068374.2015.1037165.

[152] Philip Willard Ireland, *Iraq: A Study in Political Development* (London: Jonathan Cape Ltd., 1937), 136.

civilian personnel addition.[153] After Basra's quick capture, the Indian-led staff pushed further north than initially intended seeking to capture Baghdad. The primary result from this overextension and an ill-fated retreat to Kut al-Amara was a loss in faith of Indian Forces. The Mesopotamia campaign led by Major-General Charles Townshend transferred from sole Indian control after the retreat and five-month siege at Kut. It soon thereafter became a British War Office affair now coordinated from England and led by Major-General Maude.[154]

An informal rift in an agreed-upon Middle East policy slowly emerged during wartime with two Middle Eastern campaigns staffed by these two separate administrations seen as Arabists.[155] The other front of the Eastern Campaign stemming from Egypt, looked to harass Turkish troops along the Hejaz railway. While India was losing control of the war planning for Mesopotamia, its dominance for the Arabian peninsula was formally contested when the High Commissioner of Egypt and the Foreign Office, backed the Sharif of Mecca and his sons in the now notorious Hussein-McMahon correspondence culminating with the Arab Revolt.[156] The India Office had disregarded the Sharif and were already partial to continuing their ongoing support of Ibn Sa'ud.[157] India tried to reclaim its legitimacy for Mesopotamia by issuing an

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[153] For some helpful background, see both Camille Cole, "Controversial Investments: Trade and Infrastructure in Ottoman–British Relations in Iraq, 1861–1918," *Middle Eastern Studies* 54, no. 5 (September 3, 2018): 744–68, https://doi.org/10.1080/00263206.2018.1462164; Gabriel Young, "Infrastructures of Empire and Sovereignty: The Port of Basra in Interwar Iraq," *Journal of Arabian Studies* 9, no. 2 (July 3, 2019): 123–44, https://doi.org/10.1080/21534764.2019.1750545.

[154] Satia, *Spies in Arabia*, 39.

[155] Arabists here were regional area experts fully grasping the 'Arab mind'; Gertrude Bell, T.E. Lawrence and later John Glubb are viewed as some of the most prolific.

[156] Ireland, *Iraq: A Study in Political Development*, 101; Townshend, *Desert Hell*, 265–70.

[157] Joseph Kostiner, *The Making of Saudi Arabia, 1916-1936: From Chieftaincy to Monarchical State* (Oxford University Press on Demand, 1993), 31–35.

additional monetary contribution to its already substantial number of troops and supplies.[158] Instead, on 29 March 1917 India was told it would not have a direct hand in overseeing Mesopotamia, London was to manage Basra directly, and Baghdad was to be under indirect British tutelage for the remainder of the war.[159] This period's key facts felt later from the divergence in war fronts, and opinions began to grow and fester into separate ideologies of control. This rift in policy, stemming from wartime, lead into peacetime negotiations. The gridlocked negotiations within Whitehall created just the sort of scenario favoring unique and novel solutions.

4.1.2. Debate over the Mechanism of Control, i.e., the Sharifian Solution (Late 1918–1921)

After the war, this informal rift widened into two competing factions over the Middle East's philosophy of control. The Egyptian Foreign Office branch had risen to a competing prominence during the war with its Arab Intelligence Bureau led by Sir Gilbert Clayton and D.G Hogarth.[160] The Foreign Office felt honored to compel some wartime commitments promising local rule. The Hussein-McMahon correspondence, and later Anglo-French Declaration of November 1918 signified a now public acknowledgment for greater autonomy to these regions' local inhabitants.[161] The Foreign Office's underlying premise was maintaining British influence by working

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[158] Of India's substantial contributions to the war £479 million was unrequited. Amiya Kumar Bagchi, "Indian Economy and Society during World War One," *Social Scientist* 42, no. 7/8 (2014): 15. See also Manu Sehgal and Samiksha Sehrawat, "Scandal in Mesopotamia: Press, Empire, and India during the First World War," *Modern Asian Studies* 54, no. 5 (September 2020): 45–47, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0026749X18000215.

[159] Allawi, *Faisal I of Iraq*, 345.

[160] See the buildup to this eventual rift from the British Cairo perspective in Bruce Westrate, *The Arab Bureau: British Policy in the Middle East, 1916–1920* (Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992), 79–86.

[161] Sluglett, *Britain in Iraq*, 20–26.

directly with the Hashemite clan. The Arab Bureau's champion with full Foreign Office backing was T. E. Lawrence, their most gifted orator, and was sent to the Paris Conference as their spokesmen.[162]

The India Office still believed in their much longer history of dealing with this region venerated themselves as the experts, believing in a more hierarchical administration run by British officials. Henry A.T. Wilson and Percy Cox, the India bloc leaders on the ground, thought that Iraq would require direct rule due in part to the current tribal policy enforced in Delhi and a dismal view of Iraqi elites to rule themselves.[163] A more in-depth view of these thoughts must also account for the British perception of their Muslim population. India had the largest Muslim constituency within Britain's Empire, and adding Mesopotamia under the India Office would formally put much of their Muslim bloc under one umbrella. Both views make compelling arguments when accounting for Britain's geostrategic position at the time. It must be restated that these promises of autonomy were made during wartime and later contingent on appeasing the United States. Its new hold on these conquered areas was still tenuous, and it was uncertain how many forces and personnel would be needed to maintain stability. The preceding discussions were all overseen in Lord Curzon's iterant committees in Whitehall to agree upon the Middle East's final authority.[164]

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[162] Westrate, *The Arab Bureau*, 170.

[163] This view was contrasted with Syria which had more 'western' colleges, e.g., Syrian Protestant College and Université Saint-Joseph. Iraq had the Latin Fathers, the Alliance Israelite and the Church Missionary Society. See Iraq. Civil Commissioner, Arnold Talbot Wilson, and Gertrude Lowthian Bell, *Review of the Civil Administration of Mesopotamia* (London, H.M. Stationery Off., 1920), 10–11, http://archive.org/details/reviewofciviladm00iraqrich.

[164] The current committee for this period was the interdepartmental conference on Middle Eastern affairs IDCE from (1919–20). This was the last committee before Churchill's push to create the Middle East Department in early 1921. See Paris, *The Sherifian Solution*, 106.

The fighting effectively ended on 30 October 1918 with the Armistice of Mudros. Still, the Mandate System's decision did not conclude until after the 1919 Treaty of Versailles, and was tabled for the later San Remo Conference of April 1920. The Treaty of Sèvres in August of the same year finally secured Turkey's reparations, but this was then abandoned, leading to the Chanak Crisis of 1922.[165] In the uncertain period of 1918–20, Iraq was overseen by Acting Commissioner Henry A.T. Wilson. Starting in April 1918, Colonel Wilson, who rose through the ranks in the Indian Army, was put in charge. Wilson still believed direct rule was the most efficient method for British interests. Direct rule as a policy began to fall out of favor, especially after the United States had entered the war, and talks of self-determination were in the air. Even within the India Office in 1919, Sir Arthur Hirtzel, the India Office Secretary in Whitehall, was critical of Wilson's administrative approach and advised him to limit himself.[166] Wilson himself was far removed from this discussion and preoccupied with things on the ground. Lawrence did not help matters and increased the public furor with anonymous 1920 articles in *The Times, The Sunday Times,* and *The Observer* bolstering Faisal and criticizing Wilson in Iraq.[167] These anonymous articles caused two things to happen. The India Office finally consolidated itself around Wilson, defending him, and Churchill became enchanted with Lawrence's ideas. Lawrence would soon join him in

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[165] There are a great many treaties and agreements throughout this tumultuous post-war period. For the Chanak Crisis specifically see Martin Thomas and Richard Toye, "The Chanak Crisis, 1922," in *Arguing about Empire: Imperial Rhetoric in Britain and France, 1882-1956* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198749196.001.0001/acprof-9780198749196-chapter-5.

[166] [Hirtzel to Wilson] "I ought to warn you that there is a growing feeling here that you are administering too much. Lord Curzon especially is always on the theme of not governing Mesopotamia as if it were an Indian province, which is what he suspects you of doing." 17 September 1919, Wilson Papers, Add Mss 52455C. cited in Paris, *The Sherifian Solution*, 89.

[167] Paris, "The Lawrentian and Wilsonian Schools," 788–89.

his new Middle Eastern department of the Colonial Office. Arnold Wilson was removed from his post as acting High Commissioner and stuck with much of the blame for his inability to quell the Iraqi revolt of 1920. A reformulation in defense policy was direly needed to counter this additional expense.

Britain would require a more indirect means of rule, and the idea of Mesopotamia as a colony or even a veiled protectorate had to be adapted. The effect of these various arrangements discussed at San Remo was that Britain acquired Palestine, Mesopotamia (shortly renamed Iraq), Palestine, and Trans-Jordan; France acquired Syria and Lebanon, albeit there was some measure of accountability to the League of Nations for the running of the territories under the newly devised mandates system in the Permanent Mandates Commission (PMC).[168] Before installing Faisal as monarch over the mandate, the final stage was a provisional local government from 1920–21 overseen by Percy Cox. Faisal was proclaimed king in 1921 after his expulsion from Syria by the French and repackaged as part of Lawrence and Churchill's Hashemite Solution. The Iraq Levies took up the bulk of the constabulary duties during this pre-mandate period and were a multi-ethnic force until after the mandate creation.[169] A large drawdown of British and Indian troops planned to transition internal security to a new Iraqi military as a multi-ethnic force. The Levies soon developed into a primarily Assyrian based establishment focused mostly as an auxiliary force to the British RAF. In the Mosul *wilayet* the Assyrian Levies were vital to the RAF defense against the

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[168] A more detailed overview of these events is presented in Fieldhouse, *Kurds, Arabs and Britons: The Memoir of Wallace Lyon in Iraq 1918-44*, 1–22.

[169] The Iraq Levies were founded by Major J.I. E`adie (a Special Service Officer in the Indian Army) with an initial recruitment of 40 local soldiers in 1915. This unit would eventually grow on to its peak with 6,199 soldiers in May of 1922 before its gradual drawdown. John Gilbert Browne, *The Iraq Levies, 1915-1932* (London: The Royal United Service Institution, 1932), 1; Warwick, *In Every Place*, 50.

large border skirmishes against Turkey, later becoming the relied upon auxiliary force.[170]

At the Cairo Conference of March 1921, the Iraq Mandate was deemed to fall under the Colonial Office's jurisdiction with the creation of the new Middle East Department (Churchill was Colonial Secretary from 1921–22). The hope was to better coordinate Middle East policy; in reality, British policy was officially split in the region.[171] Palestine, Mesopotamia (Iraq), and Aden were put under the new Middle East Department's jurisdiction.[172] This new departmental bureau drew its personnel from established blocs within the empire, most coming from either India or Egypt. Most notably, the places where Air Control was utilized all had Colonial Office jurisdiction. The Foreign Office maintained the authority of Egypt, Persia, and French relations in Syria. The India Office continued to have some say due to its large Muslim population.[173] The bitter rivalry now between the Colonial Office's Middle East Department and the Foreign Office would continue to vie for dominance of policy throughout the mandate. Even with something as minor as spelling, the Colonial Office and Foreign Office could not agree on how to spell Iraq as Iraq or Irak.[174] Most crucially, while British policy was debated, these competing divisions provided

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[170] See both David Omissi, "Britain, the Assyrians and the Iraq Levies, 1919–1932," *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 17, no. 3 (May 1, 1989): 301–22, https://doi.org/10.1080/03086538908582795.; and more recently Laura Robson, "Peripheries of Belonging: Military Recruitment and the Making of a 'Minority' in Wartime Iraq," *First World War Studies* 7, no. 1 (January 2, 2016): 23–42, https://doi.org/10.1080/19475020.2016.1159595.

[171] Fisher, "Lord Robert Cecil and the Formation of a Middle East Department of the Foreign Office," 376.

[172] David E. Omissi, "The Royal Air Force in Iraq and India in the 1920s.," *The Journal of the T E Lawrence Society* XIII, no. 2 (2004): 67.

[173] Paris, *The Sherifian Solution*, 359.

[174] When reading primary sources of this time you will notice that the Colonial Office favored Iraq while the Foreign Office were partial to spelling it with a k as Irak.

subsidies to the Hashemite and ‘Abd Al-Aziz families warring over supremacy of the Arabian Peninsula. British India believed their man was Ibn Sa’ud, while British Egypt continued to advocate for Hussein and his sons.[175] The significance of this effect is felt, especially for Iraq’s case. There were significant skirmishes over the Nejd/Iraqi border during the mandate period. A split British policy allowed these two factions to vie for dominance, causing many lives to be lost.[176] John Glubb’s principal efforts in Iraq focused on policing this contested border during these significant border skirmishes.

4.2. Establishment of Air Control

Air policing was taken the furthest within the British context due in large part to political expediency in the post-war discussions during a time of financial austerity. Though Britain’s early small war successes demonstrated the tactical feasibility of substituting some land forces for air forces, the political context bears additional weight to explaining how and why the RAF became involved with imperial policing. The history of the Royal Air Force’s development has been well documented by historians, although there remains a single comprehensive source on the subject.[177] For a brief

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[175] This rift would continue well into the mandate period, even after Ibn Sa’ud finally conquered the Hijaz at the tail end of 1925.The Sharif fled to Cyprus and abdicated on October 6, and King Ali finally acquiesced to Ibn Sa’ud at Jeddah on December 19th retreating to live in Iraq with his brother Faisal. Interestingly there was even an attempt from 1937-40 with the Italians to install Ali back in Hijaz. See Alan de Lacy Rush, *Records of the Hashimite Dynasties : A Twentieth Century Documentary History. Volume 4. the Hijaz : The Reign of King ‘Ali and the Aftermath* (Archive Editions, 1995), https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/book/65650.

[176] See Toth, “Conflict and a Pastoral Economy.”

[177] See Omissi, “Air Power and Colonial Control: The Royal Air Force, 1919-1939; Parton, “The Development of Early RAF Doctrine.”; The importance of the RFC’s theatre campaigns during WWI is still being studied, see Peter J. Lambert, “The Forgotten Airwar: Airpower in the Mesopotamian Campaign” (2003), https://apps.dtic.mil/docs/citations/ADA416938; James Pugh, *The Royal Flying Corps, the Western Front and the Control of the Air, 1914–1918* (Routledge, 2017), https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315553191. Also the civilian aspect has been discounted until recently, see Michael Collins, “A Technocratic Vision of Empire: Lord Montagu and the Origins of British Air

overview, the RFC and RNAS were formally integrated as the newly independent RAF on 1 April 1918. After the end of WWI, the Royal Air Force was fighting for its continued independent service status as the Air Ministry.[178] Competition among the Admiralty, War, and Air departments was fierce due to the shrinking war budget after WWI. This was due to a period of harsh austerity measures in the wake of the British war debt, with a weighty tax increase to pay off the American owned debt.

While the civilian administrations were debating the Middle East question, the Air Ministry fought for its continued independence. For the military departments, a new 10-year rule signified a shift into a peacetime military and planned for a considerable overall reduction in forces, creating a contentious interservice rivalry. The August 1919 principles, more popularly known as the 10-year rule, were instituted by the British War Cabinet on 15 August 1919. The underlying philosophy was that the British empire would not be engaged in any great war for the next ten years and that no Expeditionary Force would be needed for the foreseeable future. This policy was a heavy factor in establishing the security apparatus in Iraq. Most historians have dubbed this period as one of strict oversight by the Treasury Department, but John Ferris points to the first five years of this policy as a rolling renewal and not a fixed ten-year term.[179] George Peden has also added a distinction to the Treasury's full power, equating it more to a

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Power," *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 45, no. 4 (July 4, 2017): 652–71, https://doi.org/10.1080/03086534.2017.1353259.

[178] In 1918 the postwar landscape, the newly created RAF shrunk from a wartime peak of 220,000 to 28,000 in 1920 Parton, "The Development of Early RAF Doctrine," 1158.

[179] The 10-year rule is a misnomer and was coined by historians after the fact. "Between 1919 and 1924 this principle was usually called something like 'the decision of 1919 that the British Empire will not be engaged in any great war during the next ten years'". John Robert Ferris, *The Evolution of British Strategic Policy, 1919–26* (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1989), 17, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-09739-5.

sliding bracket based upon the specific project to be discussed.[180] This was the particular context of these early discussions on what to do with an independent air service in peacetime.

The RAF was fighting to maintain its independence and justify its continued existence in the interwar period. Winston Churchill saw another chance of political ascendency after being linked with the failure of Gallipoli. Churchill saw the possibilities air policing provided as a means of political gain after becoming Secretary of State for War and Air.[181] As early as 1914, Churchill had penned a report on air power's possibilities on African frontiers.[182] When Churchill became the Colonial Secretary in 1921, Britain's early experimentation period of air power in the Northwest-Frontier and Somaliland vindicated his earlier ideas. Both instances codified his notion of an air substitution strategy for the mandates, resulting from a much greater pressure to save money on defense. Churchill asked Hugh Trenchard, Chief Air Marshall, to see if the RAF could undertake imperial policing duties, allowing Britain to cut costs. Hugh Trenchard viewed this opportunity as a stable budgetary future for the newly independent RAF. He fulfilled Churchill's request in his March 1920 memorandum entitled *A Preliminary Scheme for the Military Control of Mesopotamia.*[183] This document would lead to a new means of imperial control for newly acquired regions at

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[180] G. C. Peden, *The Treasury and British Public Policy, 1906–1959* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 171, https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198207078.001.0001.

[181] Omissi, *Air Power and Colonial Control: The Royal Air Force, 1919-1939*, 8–9.

[182] See "Proposed Aircraft Expedition to Somaliland. Printed or Circulated in 1914 Mar 19" (March 19, 1914), CAB 37/119/47, The National Archives, Kew, http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/C6176433. Also cited in Killingray, "'A Swift Agent of Government,'" 429.

[183]Secret minute by Sir H. Trenchard, Chief of Air Staff, to the Secretary of State, 12 March 1920, "A preliminary scheme for the military control of Mesopotamia by the Royal Air Force" [AIR9/14] found in Burdett, *Iraq: Defence Intelligence, 1920-1973*, 2005, 1: 1920-1925:9–16.

the end of WW1. Churchill could not afford another political embarrassment after his failure at Gallipoli, and the RAF needed Air Control to "work" to justify its continued independence. If control of these new territories solidified on a shoestring budget, Churchill's political future and the RAF's independence would be significantly strengthened.[184] Trenchard saw the opportunities Air Control could offer the RAF by maintaining its independent status and ensuring its continual utility if they would take over colonial policing duties. The outbreak of revolt in 1920 within Iraq would end up solidifying the case to attempt the means of Air Control in Iraq. The summer 1920 insurgency would further cripple the budgetary costs of maintaining an occupied military presence within the region.

4.3. Conclusion

The political environment Air Control emerged from during the early post-war consolidation was essential to its conception. Air Control as a defensive scheme could not have occurred if the interservice civil rivalry was absent, and only discussing interservice friction of the military tells an incomplete story. While the broader argument for the maintenance of control for mandate Iraq at the time initially was debated between the Lawrentian and Wilsonian camps over the mechanism, either

[184] Arnold Wilson has been labeled with the criticism of Trenchard's scheme as 'hot air and aeroplanes', but by Feb. 1921 even he had come around to the idea. "My general conclusion is that the Royal Air Force in Mesopotamia have proved that they alone of the Armed Forces of the Crown are in a position without assistance from other arms to lend adequate support to local levies in the maintenance of order, and it is my belief that an adequate force of the R.A.F. supported by a small number of first class Military Units primarily for garrison duty, and only in special emergencies for offensive tactics, would give us better value for our money than anything else." Paper by Mr AT. Wilson, 26 February 1921, "Note of use of air force in Mesopotamia in its political aspects and as to its utility, actual and potential, in support of the civil government of that country" [AIR.9 /14] in Burdett, *Iraq: Defence Intelligence, 1920-1973*, 2005, 1: 1920-1925:113. The quote is mentioned in Newton, "Control without Occupation," 64, n.94.

direct control, e.g., India model or indirect control, e.g., the Sharifian solution.[185] Winston Churchill and Air Marshall Hugh Trenchard furthered the Lawrentian policy in cabinet meetings for the case of an independent air force. Churchill had previously envisioned such an idea in 1914 for Somaliland, and now as Secretary for the Air was in a position act.

Furthermore, what made Air Control "work" for the British in Iraq was more than a novel way to limit military expenditure. Securing Faisal's support as opposed to a traditional military occupation was vital to achieving Britain's continued influence in the region. Faisal's ousting from the ill-fated Syrian experiment allowed for a British full-fledged Hashemite Solution. The much more charismatic and influential son of Sharif Hussein came to rule Iraq instead of his brother Abdullah. A robust local administration was needed to be put in place and Faisal fit the bill to a tee. Even though Faisal was a complete outsider for Iraq's inhabitants and thrust upon them as their king, his later efforts for early independence butted heads with British officials. Faisal's desire for autonomy is bemoaned throughout British primary sources, but his actions did help solidify a more collective identity for the region. The political acumen to maneuver both local and British interests is often neglected whenever Air Control is discussed, although difficult to quantify, is a critical element.

Britain's philosophy of control within the Middle East shifted from the overt imperial control espoused by the India bloc into the covertly backed Sherifian Solution. While these interdepartmental disputes muddy the waters when trying to grasp a clear picture of Iraq's outlook and viewpoint by Britain, this very muddiness factors into the

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[185] Paris, *The Sherifian Solution*, 87–107.

haphazard way policies were eventually enacted and enforced within the region. Throughout the whole process, what can be agreed upon was the philosophy of cutting British taxpayer expense after the Great War's conclusion. Britain had depleted its Exchequer and had acquired new territory after the San Remo Agreement and was responsible for the newly created Mandate System by the League of Nations. There were frequent demands for independence from the 1920 Revolt until the 1930 agreement to grant Iraq independent status within the League of Nations in 1932. In contrast, Britain tried to maintain more covert control over the mandate by keeping Faisal checked and subservient to imperial interests. Intelligence collection factored in as well with the rise in covert rule discussed later in Chapter 4. Much of the disagreements later within Iraq would be over its military defense, with Faisal trying to recruit and develop a sizeable Iraqi army vital to its independence. This argument soon took hold, with Iraq becoming the showpiece of the new philosophy of Air Control. The more widespread discussion of the Sharifian solution eventually won out, and the air control scheme was agreed upon by Whitehall at the Cairo Conference. The RAF would take over all military and policing duties for the entire mandate in October 1922, eventually becoming the empire's primary policeman in the Middle East.

Iraq's air scheme would allow for a cheaper alternative to outright military occupation, ensuring a continued means of control. This defense policy became the first display of what Omissi defines as air substitution in Britain's air control scheme. The drawdown of 100,000 troops in the wake of the rebellion of 1920 replaced many of these soldiers with aerial squadrons. When Vice-Air Marshall John Salmond took over control of Iraq in October 1922, he was the first RAF commander to command Army troops. The full tally under his first year of command was 8 Battalions, 8 RAF

squadrons with twelve aircraft each, 4 amoured car companies, and 1 pack battery. Besides British troops, 15,000 Indian and local troops formed the Army, Levies and Police, overseen by British Gazetted officers.[186] The Levies currently fluctuated between 4,600 and 4,800 infantry force comprised mostly of Assyrian Christians; one unit each of Kurdish and Turkoman cavalry and some Marsh Arab components.[187] Air substitution allowed a much more palatable cost to the British taxpayer. In the fiscal year of 1921–22, British expenditure totaled £23.36 million and fell dramatically to £7.81 million, and eventually, costs diminished to no more than £3.90 million in the fiscal year of 1926–27.[188] While these figures provide all the arguments needed from an accountant's perspective, there are shifted and hidden costs that have been largely ignored. The subsequent chapter will address, which has heightened the perceived success of Iraq's defense reduction. With the conclusion of Iraq's training ground, Air Control would be a catch-all term with the Iraq proof of concept applied in other areas of the empire. The most famous of these schemes have been from Britain's first training ground within their creation of the Mandate of Iraq in 1922. Since that point in time, Air Control as an internal security mechanism was instituted within Palestine and Trans-Jordan in 1925, and later the Aden Protectorate in 1928.[189] These financial constraints, along with the political limitations of the mandate, severely altered the dense landscape

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[186] Or *gendarmerie* depending on how you define the police at this time if using the French interpretation of a military led peacetime force. Air Marshal Sir John Salmond K.C.B., "The Air Force in Iraq."

[187] Omissi, "Britain, the Assyrians and the Iraq Levies, 1919–1932," 304. Exact figures and numbers for troop units is currently unknown. Most historians cite the RAF proposal for Cairo but neglect to mention the additional Army troops listed in the League of Nation records. See Appendix 8, Table 2 for additional consultation.

[188] Omissi, *Air Power and Colonial Control: The Royal Air Force, 1919-1939*, 37.

[189] From 1925–1929 the only military forces in Trans-Jordan and Palestine was the RAF, placed within Middle East Command. Ritchie, *The RAF, Small Wars and Insurgencies in the Middle East, 1919-1939*, 53.

in which Air Control could reside as a means of imperial policing. Air Control fits into the more prolonged political debate of the “Middle Eastern Question” and cannot be understood without this often neglected context. The political gridlock over any clear British policy for the region was paired with a limited financial situation seeking novel solutions.

CHAPTER 5

THE STRATEGIC AND ECONOMIC ELEMENTS OF IRAQ'S DEFENSE

Many scholars acknowledge the role of financial constraint within Whitehall when formulating Iraq's security. Scholarly consensus, when analyzing Air Control, has ascertained the primary reason for its initial inception was facilitated by a problem of economy (along with the interdepartmental infighting of both civil and defense departments). This phenomenon has sparked a more recent literature highlighting the cost savings aspect of Air Control and draws a historical precedent for drones' modern application.[190] This chapter aims to expand upon this growing literature of these interwar austerity measures in contrast to the present and contextualizes the issue regarding the history of Air Control's emergence.[191]

Today, understanding the cost savings argument is problematic. The RAF's cost cutting measures have generally been left unchallenged. Popular understanding of the Mandate and Iraq's defense accepts the cheaper air control scheme ensured the RAF's independent service status. In addition to simplifying British interests only with oil, is the controversy at the end of the Mandate between the RAF (Air Ministry) and Army (War Office). The inter-service rivalry did not end with the adoption of Air Control but continued throughout the interwar period. The USII Journal (JUSII)

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[190] Murphy, "Air Policing"; Rundquist, "Desert Talons: Historical Perspectives and Implications of Air Policing in the Middle East"; Boehm, "'Air Policing': A Modern Interpretation."; Satia, "Drones."

[191] Mary Manjikian, "Do Fewer Resources Mean Less Influence? A Comparative Historical Case Study of Military Influence in a Time of Austerity" (U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute Strategic Studies Institute, January 2015), 24–31, https://apps.dtic.mil/docs/citations/ADA615535; Sargent et al., *Debt and Entanglements Between the Wars*.

publications from this period are split with a declaration by the RAF of Air Control as a resounding success and the Army bemoaning the project as a false attribution of air power's role.[192] Before any linkages between the cheapness of Air Control to RPAs (drones) can be drawn, the cost savings argument must be unpacked. Multiple angles are explored to provide a backdrop for this inter-service friction to weigh these competing arguments accurately. First, an economic overview elaborates on Whitehall's strategic aims and policy in Iraq during a tenuous period of austerity. Second is a discussion of the airplane's role in the civilian administration, paying particular attention to the desert geography and how it was believed to administer this new region cheaply and efficiently. And third is an analysis of the economic implications of Iraq's defense budget and funding. This concludes with a general acknowledgment of some cost savings for Air Control but rectifies the saving's degree. Cost reduction was not achieved exclusively through air substitution. Outsourcing costs onto the local administration was an integral factor in the air control scheme's perceived success.

5.1. Cost and Austerity Outlook

As colonialism developed over time, Britain felt that its acquired colonies should be self-sufficient and require little funds from Whitehall. While historians have noted a shift towards the view that imperial territories needed to be financially self-sufficient, the post-war landscape consolidated this thinking due to a depleted Exchequer. The broader context of considerable financial constraints drastically altered

[192] Controversial issues were authored under pseudonyms. The most contentious topic was continually air power and army co-operation throughout this period. See Walters for an overview of the controversy among practitioners and specific examples. Walters, "Inter-War, Inter-Service Friction," 22–24.

Britain's view on its colonies and recommended a new defense policy that could save on policing these mandates through the deployment of innovative technological means. The underlying reason for this was two-fold. (1) Britain's territories grew in the wake of WWI after a substantial investment in blood and treasure. Political and economic pressure at home as well as India's refusal to supply the necessary troops, are cited as the leading causes.[193] (2) British aims had to reformulate their colonial control structure in unfamiliar territory after acquiring an enormous war debt from American creditors.[194] Demand for financial stringency in Iraq intensified after overspending in quelling the 1920 Iraqi Revolt. As seen above, the early post-war decision of Churchill and Trenchard's idea of Air Control revolved around this war debt.

The primary consideration which bears additional weight regarding Air Control's creation is the austerity and fiscal measures affecting *Pax Britannia* directly following the interbellum of Iraq's rule. By 1921, Britain's GDP still had not recovered to prewar levels. The period of postwar reconstruction for Britain was a time of financial hardship due to the slow revival of its economy.[195] This was further

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[193] See point II of Decline, Revival, and Fall in John Gallagher, *The Decline, Revival and Fall of the British Empire: The Ford Lectures and Other Essays*, ed. Anil Seal (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 86–99, https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511523847. For an explanation on the failure of the Esher Committee in supplying the necessary Indian personnel, see Elisabeth Mariko Leake, "British India versus the British Empire: The Indian Army and an Impasse in Imperial Defence, circa 1919-39," *Modern Asian Studies* 48, no. 1 (January 2014): 301–29, http://dx.doi.org.ezproxy.aub.edu.lb/10.1017/S0026749X12000753.

[194] The unemployment rate of 11.3% is the third highest for the period of 1920-2010. The British National Debt/GDP ratio rose from prewar 1913 levels (25%) to maintain a rate of at or above 160% from 1921-1938. Martin Slater, *The National Debt: A Short History* (Oxford University Press, 2018), fig. 6. For the full dataset see the Bank of England's "A Millennium of Macroeconomic Data for the UK" database page A29, https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/statistics/research-datasets.

[195] An introduction with primary accounts on the gold standard, unemployment, Geddes Axe can be found at https://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/education/resources/twenties-britain-part-one/

compounded by an acute recession in 1920–21 as soldiers returned to Blighty.[196] Major troubles were an unseen deflation of the pound's value and unemployment skyrocketing from 2% to 11.3% (over 2 million people).[197] Churchill was a deciding voice in all these budgetary decisions. He moved from Secretary of State for War and Air (1919–21) to Colonial Secretary (1921–22), orchestrating the colonies' defense budgets. His influence continued with the ill-fated return to the gold standard, as Chancellor of Exchequer (1924-1929).

The general maintenance of order and rule for colonial territories aside from a military garrison was the levy system. For general policing purposes, local levies were drawn from the surrounding population and commanded by British officers. The rationale of drafting local levies to underwrite the cost of policing had been in practice for some time by the British, and their outlook on Iraq was no different. Local levies were paid in the local currency, further subsidizing the security of their colonies. This philosophy was quite prominent in the Iraq Mandate, creating a division between British-funded levies (primarily used as auxiliary forces to the RAF) and the Iraq Army's development. To operate local expenditure and costs, currency boards were often created to facilitate this exchange in British colonies.[198] Currency boards had the added benefit of easing Britain's balance of payments and controlling colonial

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[196] In 1922, over 300,000 ex-servicemen under the age of 30 had no formal skills. Gerard J. De Groot, *Back in Blighty : The British at Home in World War One* (London : Vintage Books, 2014), 332–36, http://archive.org/details/backinblightybri0000degr.

[197] Christopher Hood and Rozana Himaz, *The UK Geddes Axe of the 1920s in Perspective*, *When the Party's Over* (British Academy), accessed April 4, 2020, https://www.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.5871/bacad/9780197265734.001.0001/upso-9780197265734-chapter-4.

[198] For an introduction to currency boards see Atish Ghosh, Anne-Marie Gulde, and Holger Wolf, "Currency Boards," in *Handbook of the History of Money and Currency*, ed. Stefano Battilossi, Youssef Cassis, and Kazuhiko Yago (Singapore: Springer, 2020), 687–715, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-0596-2_38.

finances.[199] In Iraq's case, the Indian rupee was the modicum of exchange throughout the mandate until its nominal independence. It wasn't until the mandate's end when the Iraqi dinar became the national currency fixed to sterling.[200]

An often neglected aspect is the Government of India's economic influence throughout this process. The historical ties of trade between India and the Arabian peninsula continued into the interwar period. Even after the failure of the India Office's bid for direct control of Iraq, these economies still held vital ties.[201] With the beginning of the Indian Expeditionary Force's occupation of Basra, the Indian rupee superseded the Turkish lira. By 1918, the Indian Rupee had become the official means of exchange in the Iraq Mandate, lasting until 1932. Currency manipulation had an incalculable effect on the cost savings for British military expenditure by further deflating the rupee's value compared to pound sterling.[202] During WWI, financial pressure forced British pound sterling from the gold standard to a silver-based currency. Britain's push to return to the gold standard, first announced in March 1919 and achieved in April 1925, was at the expense of India, and transitively Iraq.[203] Treasury officials were

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[199] Wadan Narsey, *British Imperialism and the Making of Colonial Currency Systems*, Palgrave Studies in the History of Finance (Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2016), https://www.palgrave.com/us/book/9781137553171; Boger, "British Imperialism and Portfolio Choice in the Currency Boards of Palestine, East Africa, and West Africa."

[200] The Iraqi dinar was fixed to British sterling as a currency board in London from April 1932 until 1 July 1949. Laws Nos. 42 and 43 enacted in 1947 began the process of creating a national bank. Joseph Sassoon, *Economic Policy in Iraq, 1932-1950* (Routledge, 1987), 103–7, https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203043523.

[201] Priya Satia, "Developing Iraq: Britain, India and the Redemption of Empire and Technology in the First World War*," *Past & Present* 197, no. 1 (November 1, 2007): 245–52, https://doi.org/10.1093/pastj/gtm008.

[202] This sterling backed currency was argued in the hopes of combatting inflation but was ultimately used to by the British to control Indian monetary policy. India did return to some form of gold standard, a Bullion standard. Balachandran still equates this Bullion standard as no different than the previous silver peg. G. Balachandran, *John Bullion's Empire : Britain's Gold Problem and India Between the Wars* (Routledge, 1996), 155, https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315026596.

[203] Peden, *The Treasury and British Public Policy, 1906–1959*, 191–93.

primarily fixated on preventing India from monopolizing global gold imports.[204] British policy kept India from acting as a "sink" for importing precious metals and supported this policy throughout the interwar period. Due to the exchange rate from British GBP to the Indian Rupee (Rs), in Iraq, the entire British Mandate allowed for a reduced local cost in British expenditure at an average exchange rate of 1 GBP to 15 Indian Rupees.[205] The other aspect of India's influence is made clear through the accounting of defense expenditure. Indian troops had formed the bulk of military forces in the Middle East during WWI, whether in Mesopotamia or Egypt, Gallipoli, and Palestine.[206] Some of these forces did not fall under Britain or the Treasury's purview. India's defense came solely from her budget in Delhi and contributed to some 10–20% of British estimates in Iraq.[207] Primary and secondary sources on Air Control have never set apart India's contribution to the RAF's force reduction in Iraq. Although unknown, this oversight has perpetuated a flawed understanding of the air control scheme's low cost.

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[204] There is a great deal of complexity with adding British-Indian monetary policy to the mix. Suffice it to say India and Iraq was a sterling silver backed currency throughout the mandate. British policy sought to return to gold at the expense of a depreciated rupee. This indirectly reduced British expenditure at the local level in the Iraq mandate. G. Balachandran, "Towards a 'Hindoo Marriage': Anglo-Indian Monetary Relations in Interwar India, 1917-35," *Modern Asian Studies* 28, no. 3 (1994): 615–47; Balachandran, *John Bullion's Empire*.

[205] "So expenditure was calculated in lakhs of rupees (1 lakh = 100,000 rupees) and inevitably comparisons were made between what could be bought or spent in Iraq and how much cheaper it would have been in India. Fuel oil, for example, was cheaper in Bombay than in Basra." Llewellyn-Jones, "The British Raj and the British Mandate in Iraq," 272.

[206] India contributed over 700,000 Indian personnel to the war effort. Leake, "British India versus the British Empire," 303–4.

[207] "India always paid the maintenance costs of about 20 per cent of the British army and 10-20 per cent of the RAF, indirectly subsidising their net estimates to the same degree." Ferris, *The Evolution of British Strategic Policy, 1919–26*, 35.

5.2. The Strategic Importance of Iraq

Understanding Iraq's continued importance to British interests helps frame its philosophy of control during a time of fiscal stringency. British interests in the region were more nuanced than just controlling Iraq's oil reserves. There were several reasons for maintaining an interest before and after the Great War, with oil being one of many. These aims were not static and gradually shifted throughout this period. A historical view of the region stemmed from a fear of British India's susceptibility to Russian and German encroachment.[208] This view of Mesopotamia as a Russian-German buffer state held some staying power in the postwar aftermath, especially within the Indian administration.[209] British fears of Russian interference continued even during the midst of its Bolshevik revolution. There are continued British intelligence reports of Russian-backed Turkish agents and propaganda trying to upset the Mosul province's borders.[210]

The question of oil was an initial factor at the beginning of WWI and expanded within this timeframe as the world increasingly relied on this newer fuel source. However, this reasoning is more in line with the war effort during WWII and onwards than this early interwar period. As Britain's Navy fully transitioned from coal to oil-powered ships, Iraq's oil reserves became a more strategic need. Petroleum reserves

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[208] Keith Neilson, "For Diplomatic, Economic, Strategic and Telegraphic Reasons: British Imperial Defence, the Middle East and India, 1914-1918," in *Far-Flung Lines*, ed. Greg Kennedy and Keith Neilson (Routledge, 1997), 103–23, https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203044162-10.

[209] A. C. Yate, "Britain's Buffer States in the East," *Journal of The Royal Central Asian Society* 5, no. 1 (January 1918): 3–23, https://doi.org/10.1080/03068371808724751.;R.A. Lieut.-Colonel F. W. Barron O.B.E., "The New Responsibilities of the British Empire Created by the Assumption of Mandates in the Middle East, and Their Strategic Significance, with Special Reference to the Defence of India," *Journal of the Royal United Services Institute* 67, no. 466 (June 1, 1922): 257–60, https://doi.org/10.1080/03071842209420204.

[210] There were fears of Russian troops invading Persia and Russian influence over Turkey and its efforts to reclaim Mosul. See section 1.5: Intelligence reports and appraisals concerning the external threat to Iraq from Turkey via Anatolia; Persia; and the Soviet Union, via Bolshevik activities, March-December 1921 found in Burdett, *Iraq: Defence Intelligence, 1920-1973*, 2005, 1: 1920-1925:127–74.

were known to reside in the region surrounding Basra before WWI, influencing their initial occupation. Later in the Mandate era, they were also discovered in Kirkuk and Mosul.[211] During the many post-war negotiations, the British Navy had a more immediate concern about the possible weakening of Britain's position in Iran. Persia's oil reserves alone, supplied by the D'Arcy concession of 1901, accounted for more than half of the Admiralty requirements. The Admiralty had acquired a joint stake in the concession in 1914, provided by the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. The British presence in Iraq had the added benefit of protecting its navy's oil supply in Abadan. If Iraq had to be abandoned either due to Turkish invasion or the Leave-Iraq parliamentary bloc, the Admiralty's long-term budgetary situation would be jeopardized.[212] Contextually, the United States had a global monopoly on oil stemming from the Gulf of Mexico, and the British sought to turn away from it due to national security reasons. As Sluglett has identified, the question of oil rights even jeopardized the final acceptance of Great Britain's control of the Iraq Mandate.[213] After the Cairo Conference's conclusion, oil negotiations delayed its eventual ratification due to other nations demanding a stake in

[211] To be fair a British review of the Eastern campaign lists the occupation of Basra with protecting the Persian oil fields as the second of only two reasons for its initial campaign. Note prepared by Middle East Department, Colonial Office, by the Instructions of the Committee, to Implement the Skeleton Statement Circulated as IRQ2. 11 December 1922, Britain's role in Iraq: Memorandum by Foreign Office, London 15 December 1922, 'Political Consequences of a British Withdrawal from Iraq' [FO 371/7772] found in Priestland, *Records of Iraq, 1914-1966. Volume 3. 1921-1924: Establishing the Kingdom*, 105–11. Also an AIR8/57 record in Burdett, *Iraq: Defence Intelligence, 1920-1973*, 2005, 1: 1920-1925:367–84.

[212] Secret memorandum No. I.R.Q11 by the First Lord of the Admiralty, 16 December 1922, for circulation to the Cabinet Committee on Iraq, setting out the Admiralty's reasons for retaining Iraq within the general sphere of control [AIR8/57] Found in Burdett, *Iraq: Defence Intelligence, 1920-1973*, 2005, 1: 1920-1925:395–96.; Also Lieut.-Colonel F. W. Barron O.B.E., "The New Responsibilities of the British Empire," 259, 272.

[213] Sluglett, *Britain in Iraq*, 68–71.

the Turkish Petroleum Company's remnants.[214] While oil cannot be deemed the primary factor, its relevance to Britain's geostrategic aims undoubtedly existed.

The most significant reason for continual investment in Iraq was a persistent desire for a direct link between British Egypt and India. Shifts in global trade during the nineteenth century had deepened a British presence in Egypt. The opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 expanded British trade, rerouting the original route around the Cape to India. The first real threat to Britain's trade route was Germany's development of its Berlin-Baghdad railway, beginning at Ankara in 1888.[215] A rising Germany led to an escalation of events culminating in WWI.[216] Timely communications between Whitehall and Delhi were critical for its war effort. The issue of logistics was made apparent during the Middle Eastern Campaign.[217] A communication lapse contributed to significant logistical problems for the Indian Army's campaign leading up to the siege of Kut.[218] Delayed communication also exacerbated the previously discussed Indian and

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[214] See also Tripp's description of The Mosul Question. The Turkish Petroleum Company consolidated as the Iraqi Petroleum Company in 1929. "… by the late 1920s, once American interests had been accommodated, it was owned jointly by the Anglo-Persian Oil Company 23.75%, Royal Dutch Shell 23.75%, Compagnie Française des Pétroles 23.75%, a US-based consortium, later shared equally between Standard Oil of New Jersey and Mobil 23.75%, and Gulbenkian 5%." Tripp, *A History of Iraq*, 58.

[215] It was eventually completed in 1940. For a broad account, see Murat Özyüksel, *The Berlin-Baghdad Railway and the Ottoman Empire: Industrialization, Imperial Germany and the Middle East* (London•New York: I.B. Tauris, 2016). For a specific focus on German and Ottoman efforts for oil, see Volkan Ş Ediger and John V. Bowlus, "Greasing the Wheels: The Berlin-Baghdad Railway and Ottoman Oil, 1888–1907," *Middle Eastern Studies* 56, no. 2 (March 3, 2020): 193–206, https://doi.org/10.1080/00263206.2019.1667775.

[216] For a general summary of Britain's fears of Germany prior to the war, see Kristian Ulrichsen, *The First World War in the Middle East*, 2014, 23–25.

[217] Telegraph lines had been laid in the years 1865–69 with one overland and one underwater cable along the Persian coast connecting London to India. Still telegraphs had their limitations of being shorter messages and a delayed transcription time. James Onley, *The Arabian Frontier of the British Raj: Merchants, Rulers, and the British in the Nineteenth-Century Gulf* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 35–38.

[218] Kaushik Roy, "The Army in India in Mesopotamia from 1916 To 1918: Tactics, Technology And Logistics Reconsidered," *1917: Beyond the Western Front*, January 1, 2008, 156–57.

Egyptian split policy. The airplane solved this issue after the war via an air mail route. Before the airmail route, a large portion of communications required naval transport, severely delaying official correspondents. The Cairo-Baghdad air route reduced the 3-week sea route to a mere 24–48 hours.[219] Communication from London to Baghdad was also improved from over a month to now 7-9 days by air.[220] Moreover, as Robert Fletcher has pointed out, this faster means of communication allowed HMG to establish and run a new desert corridor of British influence.[221] This running of the corridor

[219] Secret memorandum No. I.R.Q.4 by the Secretary of State for Air to the Air Ministry, 12 December 1922, "Value of the air route between Cairo and Baghdad for strategic and other purposes" [AIR8/57] found in Burdett, *Iraq: Defence Intelligence, 1920-1973*, 2005, 1: 1920-1925:386–87. Hill's account cites the first flight from Baghdad to Cairo taking eleven hours at an average speed of 79 miles per hour. Wing Commander Roderic Hill, *The Bagdad Air Mail*, 1929, 32, http://archive.org/details/TheBagdadAirMail.

[220] "By sea mail a letter from London to Baghdad travels via the Suez Canal, Red Sea, Karachi, the Persian Gulf and Basrah, and takes approximately a month, thus making Iraq, from the point of view of communications, considerably further away than India. The Air Mail altered all this and telescoped the twenty-eight days into nine or even less." Hill, *The Bagdad Air Mail*, 32.

[221] Fletcher, "Running the Corridor." See also a detailed map (Map 2.1) of this corridor in Fletcher, *British Imperialism and "the Tribal Question,"* 73.

eventually added a land route between Damascus and Baghdad operated by the Nairn Transport Company.[222]

Figure 1: Imperial Air Route Scheme, 1936

Aside from the mail and overland route, quick reinforcements from other areas along this corridor were seen as a strategic benefit. Quick resupply of garrisons in times of trouble greatly reduced the number of battalions garrisoned at bases. Trenchard envisioned Iraq as the RAF's focal point in linking other parts of the empire.[223] The entire imperial air route eventually linked London to Cairo, Baghdad, Karachi, Delhi,

[222] Major D. McCallum, "The Discovery and Development of the New Land Route to the East," *Journal of The Royal Central Asian Society* 12, no. 1 (January 1, 1925): 43–67, https://doi.org/10.1080/03068372508724887.

[223] This imperial link had the added benefit of training pilots in long distance flight. Satia, *Spies in Arabia*, 258–61.

Singapore, the Cape.[224] The imperial air route made a strong case for maintaining RAF air bases in Shaiba and Habbaniyah until 1958.[225]

There were substantial investments also sunk into agriculture to erect the Biblical Eden identified by Priya Satia.[226] With its large cotton conglomerations (British Cotton Growing Association), Britain attempted to increase its global monopoly by utilizing untapped agricultural reserves in Mesopotamia.[227] This dream never materialized. The initial fervor for large-scale development in Iraq had begun to wane by 1920.[228] The World Depression, dependence on oil rents for revenue, and WWII ended these dreams.[229] Tripp identifies the start of this shift in the 1931–32 Iraqi budget when oil suddenly accounted for 20% of government revenues.

Lastly was the highly precarious Mosul *vilayet* (province) within British Whitehall and the Permanent Mandates Commission (PMC). Iraq's general boundaries of Basra, Baghdad, and Mosul were set after the San Remo conference's conclusion in April 1920, but there were still frequent debates over Mosul's future. Various junctures

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[224] By 1926 eight air squadrons were in Iraq, six in India, three in Egypt which could also assist Aden and Sudan, and one for Palestine and Trans-Jordan. Though at this stage the route still relied on landing grounds along the way to refuel. Omissi, *Air Power and Colonial Control: The Royal Air Force, 1919-1939*, 136–37.

[225] After the mandate in 1932, the RAF base at Habbaniyah replaced the Hinaidi and Mosul bases. The transfer was completed in 1937. Fieldhouse, *Kurds, Arabs and Britons: The Memoir of Wallace Lyon in Iraq 1918-44*, 31; Warwick, *In Every Place*, 24.

[226] Satia, "9. Turning Space into Place," 279–80. See also John Fisher, *Outskirts of Empire : Studies in British Power Projection* (Routledge, 2018), chap. 2. Mesopotamia in the official mind, before, during and after the First World War, https://doi.org/10.4324/9781351042703.

[227] Special Report to League of Nations on Progress of Iraq during 1920-31 found in Jarman, *Iraq Administration Reports 1914-1932: 1931-32*, vol. 10, sec. X-Irrigation, Agriculture, Connected Services. B.8-Work on Cotton, pp.194–196; Ja'Far Pasha El Askeri C.M.G, "Five Years' Progress in Iraq," *Journal of The Royal Central Asian Society* 14, no. 1 (January 1, 1927): 65, https://doi.org/10.1080/03068372708724958.

[228] Satia, "Developing Iraq," 233.

[229] Regarding agriculture, dates were the primary agricultural export of Iraq during the mandate. Local cultivation of cotton was inhibited by the frequent locust swarms affecting farmer's willingness to grow the crop. Tripp, *A History of Iraq*, 69.

throughout the mandate period sparked different ideas.[230] The key reason Whitehall viewed Mosul as a part of Iraq (other than Clemenceau gifting it to Lloyd George at Versailles after increased British pressure) was a geopolitical view of maintaining the stability of Iraq's Mandate. [231] The PMC feared a potential upset between other mandates' regional balance if they consented to an autonomous Kurdish region. Longrigg also cites the economic aspect with markets closely conjoined to Baghdad and Mosul.[232] (In reality, markets had much closer ties to Aleppo and Syria (*Bilad al-Sham*).[233] Longrigg argues that separating the province with additional customs and trade negotiations would have been too costly in the long run. This view gradually changed after the Exchequer overspent on halting the 1920 insurgency. The continued Turkish-Iraq border disputes also raised a genuine fear of losing Mosul altogether and impacting the surrounding territories.[234] These significant investments raised the question of what H.M.'s Government could gain after their sunk cost of Iraq, should it need to be abandoned if Turkey invaded in great numbers.

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[230] The continued Turkish/Iraqi border disputes and the quest for Kurdish independence sought by Shaikh Mahmud of left the question of Mosul unresolved. There was a possibility of British withdrawal to either Baghdad or all the way to Basra if the mandate failed. See fuller accounts in Robert Olson, *The Emergence of Kurdish Nationalism and the Sheikh Said Rebellion, 1880–1925* (University of Texas Press, 1989); Hawkar Muheddin Jalil, "The British Administration of South Kurdistan and Local Responses, 1918-1932" (Ph.D., University of Leicester, 2017), https://hdl.handle.net/2381/39976.

[231] See for example, James Barr, *A Line in the Sand : Britain, France and the Struggle for the Mastery of the Middle East* (London: Simon & Schuster, 2011), chap. 5. I Want Mosul.

[232] Longrigg, *Iraq, 1900 to 1950*, 154.

[233] For the impact on these new borders and restructuring of regional trade, see Cyrus Schayegh, *The Middle East and the Making of the Modern World* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2017). For Mosul specifically , see Sarah Shields, "3. Mosul Questions: Economy, Identity, and Annexation," ed. Reeva Spector Simon and Eleanor H. Tejirian (Columbia University Press, 2004), 50–60, https://doi.org/10.7312/simo13292-005.

[234] Countries listed as being impacted from a withdrawal from Iraq: Syria, Palestine and Transjordania (Trans-Jordan), Arabia, Egypt, Soudan (Sudan) and Persia. Confidential memorandum [No. I.RQ.8] by the Foreign Office, 15 December 1922, "Memorandum on the political consequences of British withdrawal from lrak", 15 December 1922 [AIR8/57] found in Burdett, *Iraq: Defence Intelligence, 1920-1973*, 2005, 1: 1920-1925:391–95.

> The question of oil remains to be touched upon. The Iraq oil-fields have not only not been developed, but have not even been properly prospected. There is no doubt that there are considerable deposits of oil, particularly in the Mosul vilayet, though the exact quantities still remain a matter for surmise. This is not the place to go into the question of the claims of the Turkish Petroleum Company or the various international difficulties that centre round the question of oil concessions. It is possible that, even if Mosul reverted to Turkey, the rights of the British oil interests could be maintained. What is-relevant to the present purpose is the desirability. of keeping within the British sphere of influence what may prove to be one of the most important oil-fields of the future.
>
> We have spent vast sums of money in Iraq both during and since the war. The war expenditure was part of the price of victory and must be written off as such. As a result of our victorious campaign we found ourselves faced with new, embarrassing and costly obligations. After many difficulties, and doubtless many mistakes, we have reached a point at which expenditure has been reduced to something like manageable proportions, and at which a satisfactory political settlement is within sight. If the political situation can be maintained, there is a clear prospect of further progressive reduction of cost, and a hope of some definite return for our heavy outlay. If we cut our losses now, we shall have nothing whatever to show for all our heavy sacrifices of blood and treasure. If, on the other hand we exercise patience for a little longer we may reap some tangible reward.[235]

This uncertainty over Mosul would continue well after the internationally recognized agreement in 1926 between Turkey, with additional incursions in 1928 and later in 1931.[236] Large oil quantities were officially discovered later at around 1927, although oil deposits were already known to exist. All these geostrategic aims contributed to maintaining an interest in Iraq well after Iraq was fully admitted to the League of Nations in 1932. From the Mandate's outset, the air route was the paramount

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[235] Note prepared by Middle East Department, Colonial Office, by the Instructions of the Committee, to Implement

The Skeleton Statement Circulated as IRQ2, 11 December 1922, Britain's role in Iraq [FO 371/7772] found in Priestland, *Records of Iraq, 1914-1966. Volume 3. 1921-1924: Establishing the Kingdom*, 108.

[236] The border dispute was mostly resolved with the Anglo–Turkish–Iraqi Treaty (Treaty of Ankara) of 5 June 1926. The Brussels line was established as well as Article 14's granting 10% of oil rights to Turkey. Iraq bought out Turkey's rights for £500,000 sterling four years later. Text of Treaty between Iraq, Great Britain and Turkey, in Settlement of the Traqi-Turkish Frontier together with notes exchanged at Ankara, 5 June 1926 [FO 371/12256] found in Priestland, *Records of Iraq, 1914-1966. Volume 4. 1925-1927: The Constitution and the Mosul Settlement*, 722–23.

importance seen in Whitehall's eyes; oil interests continued to grow and eventually superseded the air route after the Mandate's conclusion.

5.2.1. The Logistical Component of Air Control

> Culturally, mastery of the air – and of the air-waves – conferred still greater advantages, making once impenetrable and seemingly incomprehensible desert spaces less forbidding […] By threatening coercion cheaply, it transformed previously outlandish imperial ambition into affordable schemes to regulate vast swathes of desert steppe.[237]

The primary assumption in the cost savings argument of Air Control comprised a logistical advantage. Criticisms aside from its practice, there were very real benefits to this technology. In particular, the desert steppes of the Near East and north Arabia and the Fertile Crescent profited the most from air power. A large percentage of territory recently acquired in the British and French Mandates had historically been under the nomadic Bedouin's control. Air power for civilian use was imagined first and foremost through aerial reconnaissance of these rural areas. The argument laid at the Cairo Conference argued for an expansion of air power to impose regular civil-military administrations in these new frontiers.[238] Aerial photography and surveys of cultivated fields and large grazing herds could establish more accurate tax estimates for agricultural and livestock production.[239] RAF personnel could now assist

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[237] Thomas, "Markers of Modernity or Agents of Terror? Air Policing and Colonial Revolt after World War I," 68.

[238] "The countries for which a system of air control is particularly suited, as opposed to military control by land forces, are those which combine inaccessibility – whether due to great distance or to the nature of the terrain – with a population organised on a loose tribal basis, living either as nomads or in scatter villages rather than concentrated in towns." AIR 9/12 Draft – Air Staff Memorandum No. [?] Air Control of Undeveloped Countries

[239] Thomas, "Markers of Modernity or Agents of Terror? Air Policing and Colonial Revolt after World War I," 77.

Administrative Inspectors and Political Agents, informing them where to focus tax collection efforts. Aerial surveillance would serve as a tool to identify the various tribal geographical locations and monitor their grazing patterns. Air power also aided farmers, combatting locust swarms, and by 1923 was providing an air ambulance service during a cholera outbreak.[240] All of these non-lethal aspects provided an additional benefit to the British administration in reducing costs and improving efficiency.

Air Control's application to the arid lands under British rule promised a new method of control through air policing. The demography of the Iraq mandate was split between rural and urban. British perception of Iraq was predisposed towards a primordial view of this division into nomadic and sedentary tribes and a disdain for the urban-based *effendi*.[241] The previous century's doctrine of punitive expeditions evolved into a deterrent display of force dubbed the "moral effect." A continued threat of bombing with the airplane was believed sufficient for governing a semi-civilized people.[242] Previously there was a delayed reaction between the state and this fringe space.[243] There was an operational challenge in sending a large number of troops to

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[240] Newton, *The RAF and Tribal Control*, 80–81.

[241] Dodge, *Inventing Iraq: The Failure of Nation Building and a History Denied*, 69–72.

[242] This complexity of orientalism and air policing is best understood through Priya Satia's work. See in particular Satia, "'A Rebellion of Technology': Development, Policing, and the British Arabian Imaginary," 37–43. See also Dodge's account of Oriental Despotism. Toby Dodge, "'Stephen Hemsley Longrigg and his contemporaries: Oriental Despotism and the British in Iraq: 1914-1932', the English translation of Stephen Hemsley Longrigg et ses contemporains; le despotisme oriental et les Britanniques en Irak: 1914-1932," *Maghreb - Machrek* No. 240, no. 2 (2010): 33–58.

[243] Responses which did occur were brutal in their response. 19th century colonial warfare generally describes these operations as "Butcher and Bolt" or "Burn and Scuttle." Colonial policing was predicated on large displays of force to prevent any further uprisings (punitive expeditions). British "minimum force" doctrine soon supplanted these punitive measures but often in times of crisis, martial law always went into effect. For a recent context specific comparison, see Jangkhomang Guite, "Colonial Violence and Its 'Small Wars': Fighting the Kuki 'Guerillas' during the Great War in Northeast India, 1917–1919," *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 30, no. 2 (February 23, 2019): 447–78, https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2018.1546369.

dispel any notion of insurrection. The more recent advancements of air power's novel technology now presented an almost instantaneous response to recalcitrant tribesmen.

Much of British tribal policy in Trans-Jordan and Iraq drew from India's historical experience on the Northwest Frontier. The India Office believed in "the time-honored method of enforcing on a tribal community responsibility for the acts of its individual members."[244] This factored more notably in the early years of the Iraq Mandate when tribes were grouped and dealt with as a single polity in an adaptation of India's Tribal Policy.[245] Enforcing communal responsibility made dealings with tribal groups much more straightforward and cheaper for the British.[246] Adding air power to the mix allowed direct contact to Britain's islands of support in rural areas. If the tribal sheikh failed to collect his tribe's taxes or various members rebelled, serious repercussions occurred. Toby Dodge links the RAF with a new tier of tax enforcement; there were instances of air sorties (bombs dropped to reinforce this message). These aerial raids enforced collection efforts over tribal groups, a force multiplier when collecting rifles from large tribal confederations.[247] After bombs were dropped, armoured car units were dispatched to collect either rifles or the more general taxes of tribes.

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[244] Slessor, *The Central Blue: Recollections and Reflections*, 55.

[245] The Tribal Criminal and Civil Disputes Regulations (TCCDR) created in Iraq formally divided urban and rural law. It first originated in 1916 and by 1925 was written into the Iraqi constitution. Marion Farouk-Sluglett and Peter Sluglett, *Iraq Since 1958: From Revolution to Dictatorship*, 3rd ed. (London: I.B.Tauris, 2001), 12, https://doi.org/10.5040/9780755612383. Dodge, *Inventing Iraq: The Failure of Nation Building and a History Denied*, 92–99.

[246] See Sluglett's analysis of British Tribal Policy. Sluglett, *Britain in Iraq*, 169–72.

[247] Police efforts were focused removing as many modern rifles as possible after the events in 1920. There was limited success with rifle collection. Numbers were always much lower than the police's goal. Dodge, *Inventing Iraq: The Failure of Nation Building and a History Denied*, 154–55.

However, the logistical advantages of Air Control were not a panacea for all problems of colonial control. This aerial enforcement of tax collection was one such case. John Bagot Glubb maintained that the enforcement of taxes by airplane destroyed the pastoralists' main source of livelihood, i.e., livestock. This errant form of air power was also still strategically limited. Aerial patrols required frequent refueling and were constrained to only a few hours of flight at a time.[248] Glubb asserts that while the technology of the time allowed for this greater enforcement of law at this stage, it was not all-encompassing. Large parts of the desert remained untamed by the government. With no real reason to populate these regions in significant numbers, the nomadic Bedouin's migratory patterns had generally been unregulated by the government. The newly minted borders of the various mandates required an enforcement policy preventing cross-border migration. Ibn Sa'ud's efforts to extend Nejd's territory with the Ikhwan made this border very porous. The Ikhwan would raid into Iraq's borders and demand Iraq's southern tribes pay *zakat* for protection.[249] If not paid, tribes would be attacked, inflicting many casualties. Air patrols policed this border for protection, but telling friend from foe from the air was challenging. In its early application, Air Control sometimes alienated Iraqi tribes into going over to Ibn Sa'ud for protection. According to Glubb, it was not until the Bedouin were brought into the fold by recruitment into a

[248] For an understanding of the technical limitations of early air power see Omissi's technical discussion in chp. 7. Omissi, *Air Power and Colonial Control: The Royal Air Force, 1919-1939*, 134–49.

[249] These occurrences have been well studied. For starters, see perhaps Clive Leatherdale, "British Policy towards Saudi Arabia 1925-1939" (Ph.D., University of Aberdeen, 1981), 159–66, https://abdn.alma.exlibrisgroup.com/view/delivery/44ABE_INST/12152963370005941; Daniel Silverfarb, "Great Britain, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia: The Revolt of the Ikhwan, 1927-1930," *The International History Review* 4, no. 2 (1982): 222–48.

loyal police force that the desert could be fully conquered.[250] […] "Bedouin forces in armed cars accomplished what no Government had succeeded in for centuries, the complete subjugation of the Bedouin tribes of Northern Arabia."[251] The Desert Camel Corps created by John Glubb supplemented routine aerial patrols with a presence on the ground to grasp and enforce these new borders between the various mandates, aided by armoured cars.[252]

The geographical component of the desert suited the developed scheme of Air Control and the premise of air substitution. This method did not solely rely on air power, and land forces were present. It did allow for a cheaper and as effective deterrent along the Iraq/Nejd border than a larger military garrison. Aerial patrols were in close communication with these small land forces. Desert outposts along the borders relayed and shared intelligence between units (more on this in the subsequent chapter).

5.3. Financial Discontinuities of the Mandate

Modern comparisons to drones must consider the imperfect cost reduction and use of local forces needed for the RAF's air control scheme. Structural elements of Iraq's Mandate contributed to the RAF's cost savings. An inflated Iraqi military budget and an increase in British administrators' tax collection are the most visible. In addition to the shifted costs are increases in local forces, supplanting RAF forces throughout the mandate's timeline. This portion addresses Iraq's defense expenditure, dissecting the

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[250] Major J. C. Glubb, "The Bedouins of Northern 'Iraq," *Journal of The Royal Central Asian Society* 22, no. 1 (January 1, 1935): 29, https://doi.org/10.1080/03068373508725347.

[251] Glubb, "The Bedouins of Northern 'Iraq," 30.

[252] See Appendix 2 for the League of Nations description of the force.

resounding success the RAF labeled Air Control after the Mandate. While achieving its aims, some of its assertions need clarifying upon further study.

5.3.1. Iraqi Military

Ja'far al-Askari, the first Iraqi Defence Minister and then later foreign ambassador, proposed an Iraqi military plan in 1920.[253] al-Askari advocated for a transitionary period between fully staffed British forces, to a British officer led Iraqi force, and finally, with full autonomy given to the Iraqi military.[254] This proposal's timeline was delayed due to the northern border skirmishes with Turkey over the Mosul province, requiring many more troops than initially planned. RAF command prolonged the Levy system and later used this element against the argument for conscription.

Faisal had personal ambitions to leave the British umbrella as soon as possible. After his ousting from Syria, his next best option was to merge his aspirations with the British.[255] Along with defense minister al-Askari and other ex-Ottoman officers, they strongly advocated for an independent Iraqi Army. Faisal believed that a conscripted military throughout all of Iraq would strengthen his position and create a sense of national unity, proving that Iraq could manage its defense capabilities independent of

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[253]For a more detailed account by Askari, see Ja'far al-'Askari, William Facey, and Najdat Fathi Safwat, *A Soldier's Story: From Ottoman Rule to Independent Iraq : The Memoirs of Jafar Pasha Al-Askari (1885-1936)*, English (London: Arabian Publishing, 2003). Unfortunately his memoirs end in 1919. See the Epilogue and Appendices for a discussion on his role in Mandate Iraq. Askari had an eventful career and is known as the "Father of the Iraq Army".

[254] Views of Jaafar Pasha al Askari regarding the formation of an Army for the Iraq State: Note by Maj. -- Gen. I Djafer el Askeri, Minister for Defence, Baghdad, 12 November 1920 [AIR23/439] found in Burdett, *Iraq: Defence Intelligence, 1920-1973*, 2005, 1: 1920-1925:58–65.

[255] 'H.M. government and I are in the same boat and we must sink or swim. Having chosen me you must treat me as one of yourselves and if you wish me and your policy to succeed it is folly to damn me permanently in the public eye by making me an obvious puppet.' he told Cox. CO 730/4/41449, Cox, Baghdad, to Churchill, London, 6 August 1921, Telegram 396. cited in Allawi, *Faisal I of Iraq*, 379.

Britain. The British undermined much of Faisal and Askari's early efforts by recruiting Assyrian Christians as local levies and paying them a higher daily salary than their fellow Iraqi military counterparts.[256] This salary discrepancy contributed to the debate over the idea of conscription for the Iraqi military.[257] British accounts claim that this was due only to combating the Turkish influence in Mosul. Ali Allawi portrays this as an all-encompassing battle over the autonomy of the Iraq mandate.[258] Gertrude Bell's letters also describes this bureaucratic battle and the juxtaposition she found herself in. Bell had a soft spot for Faisal and was his closest British confidant after Lawrence had left Iraq and resigned from his post in the Middle East Bureau.[259] She viewed Faisal as her personal creation and had developed sympathy for Arab independence, but her ultimate loyalty was toward British interests.[260] Bell continued to argue against Faisal's early attempts for autonomy. Faisal was under no disillusions as to being a British pawn

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[256] According to Angsusingha, in 1922 the Iraqi military salary grew from Rs 2,000 to 4,500 by April. The Levies would similarly be increased from Rs 4,500 to 5,500. Sopanit Angsusingha, "Aliens in Uniforms and Contested Nationalisms: The Role of The Iraq Levies in Shaping Aspects of Iraqi Nationalism under The British Mandate of Iraq (1921-1933)," *Georgetown University-Graduate School of Arts & Sciences* (thesis, Georgetown University, 2018), 101, https://repository.library.georgetown.edu/handle/10822/1050730.

[257] Myriam Yakoubi, "The Cooperation between the British and Faisal I of Iraq (1921–1932):," in *Cooperation and Empire*, ed. Tanja Bührer et al., 1st ed., Local Realities of Global Processes (Berghahn Books, 2017), 279–80, https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvw04b5r.14.

[258] Allawi, *Faisal I of Iraq*, 476–82. Much of this comes from Al-Marashi's work. Al-Marashi assisted in Allawi's research and has since focused on the history of the Iraqi military. See Al-Marashi and Salama, *Iraq's Armed Forces*; Ibrahim Al-Marashi, "Military–Society Relations in Iraq, 1921–58: Competing Roles of the Army," in *State and Society in Iraq : Citizenship under Occupation, Dictatorship and Democratisation*, ed. Benjamin Isakhan, Shamiran Mako, and Fadi Dawood, 1st ed., Library of Modern Middle East Studies (London•New York: I.B. Tauris, 2017), 109–32, http://www.bloomsburycollections.com/book/state-and-society-in-iraq-citizenship-under-occupation-dictatorship-and-democratisation/ch5-military-society-relations-in-iraq-1921-58-competing-roles-of-the-army/.

[259] Myriam Yakoubi, "Gertrude Bell's Perception of Faisal I of Iraq and the Anglo-Arab Romance," in *Gertrude Bell and Iraq: A Life and Legacy*, ed. Charles Tripp and Paul Collins, Book, Section vols. (British Academy, 2017), https://doi.org/10.5871/bacad/9780197266076.003.0008.

[260] By 1919, Bell had switched from believing in direct rule, to agreeing with Lawrence's philosophy. Fieldhouse, *Kurds, Arabs and Britons: The Memoir of Wallace Lyon in Iraq 1918-44*, 10–11.

in their game of control of Iraq and sought to extricate himself from his British chaperones. Faisal, Pasha Nuri Said, and Jafar Pasha continued to argue for conscription as the quickest means of independence, but this led to a large enough Shia resentment and pushback by the British.[261] The conscription project was shelved until after the mandate's end.

Replacing land forces for air squadrons, i.e., air substitution, discounts the local police forces needed throughout this process. Along with the plans for an expanded Iraqi military is a buildup of the Iraqi Police. The Black and Tans, previously used in Ireland and later exported to Palestine are better known as Britain's global policing units.[262] British policy for Iraq's police was slightly different. Most police officers in Iraq drew from India and its Criminal Investigative Division. CID personnel were tasked with maintaining peace and security throughout the larger cities, adding its notable fingerprint system and training local recruits. This number is no small figure, growing from its initial number of 400 in 1918, to 2825 after the 1920 unrest, and ending with 7,991 at the end of the Mandate. [263] The police are often unrecognized

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[261] Nuri Al-Said and Jafar were brothers-in-law. Yasin al-Hashimi and Rashid Ali Al-Gaylani were also in the pro-conscription group. Al-Marashi and Salama, *Iraq's Armed Forces*, 24. See Sluglett's broader analysis of this issue for further clarification. Sluglett, *Britain in Iraq*, 94–110.

[262] See perhaps, Dr Georgina Sinclair and Dr Chris A. Williams, "'Home and Away': The Cross-Fertilisation between 'Colonial' and 'British' Policing, 1921–85," *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 35, no. 2 (June 1, 2007): 221–38, https://doi.org/10.1080/03086530701337567; Alex Winder, "Policing and Crime in Mandate Palestine: Indigenous Policemen, British Colonial Control, and Palestinian Society, 1920–1948" (Ph.D., United States -- New York, New York University, 2017), https://search.proquest.com/docview/1938310998/abstract/14393B448CAC4E47PQ/1.

[263] Wilson's numbers line up close with Iraq's PMC report. League accounts have the number at 2,825 including 22 British Officers of 1 Jan. 1921. Ten years later this number is listed at 7,991 including 12 British Officers. Wilson's numbers are 2,638 at the end of 1920, and in 1928 this number was at 6,800 personnel with about 6,500 actual police. Report to the League of Nations. 1931. *Special report by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Council of the League of Nations on the progress of Iraq during the period 1920—1931*. Colonial No. 58, London: HMSO. Found in Jarman, *Iraq Administration Reports 1914-1932: 1931-32*, 10:55–56. Arnold T. Wilson, "The Iraq Police: A Notable Example of British Administrative Adaptability," *The Police Journal* 1, no. 1 (January 1, 1928): 34, https://doi.org/10.1177/0032258X2800100104.

within the RAF's air control scheme and generally do not factor into the calculus of air substitution.

These underlying complexities of the Iraq Army, Levies, and Police allow for a greater understanding of why the Mandate's defense budget was so large. If defense were entirely under Iraqi control, Faisal hoped the British would finally grant independence. The air substitution and reduction in forces on the British side successfully shrunk British troops. Simultaneously, the Iraqi Army grew to its final height of 12,000 soldiers, and its police grew to around 8000 police officers.[264]

5.3.2. Taxes

The British enforced an outlook for a balanced budget for Mandate Iraq. There were many complaints about the striving for a balanced Iraqi budget by its inhabitants. The Treaty of Lausanne intensified these objections, adding a yearly payment towards Iraq's portion of the Ottoman Public Debt.[265] Increasing local taxes was a means for reducing British expenditure in Iraq. Under British tutelage, there was a much more vested interest in improving and standardizing tax collection efforts. The tax system for Mandate Iraq was inherited and drew from the Ottoman system. Previously, Ottoman tax policy modernized under the Tanzimat reforms.[266] During this period, Baghdad

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[264] The goal from the Cairo Conference was estimated for around 15,000 local troops. The most ever recruited for the Iraq Army never went above 12,000 forces. From 1925–1931 the number was about 7,500 troops. 4.) from a General Report "Strength of lraq and Army and Levies" [AIR9/14] found in Anita L. P. Burdett, *Iraq: Defence Intelligence, 1920-1973*, vol. 2: 1926-1932 (Slough: Archive Editions, 2005), 707; Sluglett, *Britain in Iraq*, 183.

[265] Allawi, *Faisal I of Iraq*, 454–55.

[266] These began later in 1844 for Iraq. The original start date began in 1839 for other parts of the empire. See Keiko Kiyotaki, *Ottoman Land Reform in the Province of Baghdad*, vol. 66 (Brill, 2019), 4–5, https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004384347_009.

grew in power as a centralized tax collector for the region under a tax farming and crop sharing system. The Land Code of 1858 granted a *tapu* (title deed) in a system mimicking private ownership in practice but was legally defined as a leasehold.[267] The *tapu* system came to Iraq under the governorship of Midhat Pasha in 1871.[268] There was a disjointed implementation in the Mesopotamian region due to an urban-rural divide for these land rights.

The British continued to rely on this land tenure system built on tax farming and crop sharing concepts. British policy reversed the Ottoman system's modernization reforms by taxing the tribal sheikhs directly and holding them accountable for their whole tribe. Instead of lands held in common by both leaders and followers, now leaders had sole ownership.[269] In Britain's drive to standardize and expand the previous Ottoman system, these very standardization efforts were an overwhelming factor for local unrest during the British occupation. One such early instance of taxation disproportionally taxed Shi'a residents over burying their dead in Najaf. Amal Vinogradov has pointed out this was a lucrative tax for the British since many practicing Shi'a, not just from Iraq, sought to lay their loved ones to rest.[270] These increases in revenue collection largely fell within the rural areas where previous efforts

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[267] Kiyotaki, *Ottoman Land Reform in the Province of Baghdad*, 66:185–91; Nora Barakat, "Underwriting the Empire: Nizamiye Courts, Tax Farming and the Public Debt Administration in Ottoman Syria," *Islamic Law and Society* 26, no. 4 (September 13, 2019): 397–99, https://doi.org/10.1163/15685195-00264P02.

[268] Midhat Pasha's solution to tribal unrest was to begin transferring public lands to tribes, making them productive members of society. Unfortunately, Baghdad's central government could not fully implement this policy change, and new *tapu* deeds were suspended in 1881. Nida Alahmad, "State, Oil, and War in the Formation of Iraq," in *A Critical Political Economy of the Middle East and North Africa*, ed. Joel Beinin, Sherene Seikaly, and Bassam Haddad (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2021), 152–56.

[269] Sluglett, *Britain in Iraq*, 165–66.

[270] Amal Vinogradov, "The 1920 Revolt in Iraq Reconsidered: The Role of Tribes in National Politics," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 3, no. 2 (1972): 133.

were less thorough. By the mandate's end, virtually every citizen was now held liable for taxes.[271]

5.3.3. Outsourcing Defense

Acknowledging local defense expenditure and its broader implications are essential in understanding Air Control's perceived success. Iraq's budget was tasked never to run a deficit maintaining yearly solvency.[272] In the first few years of the Mandate, the government operated on a surplus. After the 1922 passing of the Geddes Act, costs were shifted onto the local Mandate whenever possible.[273] The Geddes Axe cut British expenditure in Iraq, forcing the Iraqi budget to make room for Britain and Iraq's newly ratified military agreement in 1924. Defense soon became Iraq's highest individual expense throughout the Mandate. In 1924 defense and police forces accounted for 34% of its entire budget. Al-Askari also noted these hidden export costs of the Iraqi government in a JCAS publication.[274] E. Hilton Young and Roland V. Vernon's financial mission intended to rein in Iraq's budget spending, but many of their recommendations went unheeded.[275] After the Vernon-Young report, military expenditure remained the principal expense throughout the Mandate's conclusion when accounting for the Iraq Police and Ministry of Defence. The year 1925–26 had the

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[271] Marr and Al-Marashi, *The Modern History of Iraq*, 33.

[272] Kiyotaki, *Ottoman Land Reform in the Province of Baghdad,* 66:231.

[273] Hood and Himaz, *The UK Geddes Axe of the 1920s in Perspective*, 81.

[274] […] the "invisible exports" of Iraq being considerable, including as they do the whole of the cash expenditure of the British forces in Iraq and the expenditure on local labour and purchases in Iraq of foreign capital, are not inclined to think that the country is living beyond its means. El Askeri C.M.G, "Five Years' Progress in Iraq," 71.

[275] Colonial Office, "Young–Vernon Report"; Longrigg, *Iraq, 1900 to 1950*, 163–64; Burrows and Cobbin, "Budgetary and Financial Discontinuities."

highest rate at 41% and never went lower than 35%.[276] Some of this bloated budget accounts for Faisal's conscription efforts and expanding the military's recruitment, but the other part was for the RAF outsourcing some of its expenditure.

5.4. Piecing it Together

On the surface, the RAF's yearly budget illustrates excellent cost savings. The air control scheme reduced the 1921–22 budget of £23 million per annum to around £4 million by 1926–27.[277] At the end of the mandate, this figure was a paltry sum of £0.48 million in the budgetary year of 1930–1931.[278] This cost reduction is misleading if its supplemental elements are discounted. Understanding the costs of Air Control within Iraq is encapsulated between two competing claims. Within the military establishment at the Mandate's end, there was a correspondence between two pseudonyms *Jundi* (soldier) and *Taiyari* (pilot), in subsequent RUSI publications. These were written during an ex-post evaluation of the Mandate. The Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930 had just been signed, granting greater autonomy to Iraq as 'independent' with the airbases in Iraq still manned by British R.A.F. troops. Jundi, undoubtedly from the War Office, is quite critical of the cost savings claims for the air control scheme in Iraq. Jundi claims Air Control comprised 20,000 local troops (Iraq Army and by this time, the Assyrian

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[276] "Report by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Council of the League of Nations on the Administration of 'Iraq for the year 1931"; "Report by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Council of the League of Nations on the Administration of 'Iraq for the period January to October, 1932" found in Jarman, *Iraq Administration Reports 1914-1932: 1931-32*, 10:387, 489.

[277] Omissi, *Air Power and Colonial Control: The Royal Air Force, 1919-1939*, 37; Sluglett, *Britain in Iraq*, 182. See also the full League of Nations tables in Appendix 8 for the full garrison reduction.

[278] The RAF's yearly budget reduction from years 1920-26 can also be found in Sluglett, *Britain in Iraq*, 88.

Levies) and a police force resembling a *gendarmerie.*[279] Jundi also makes a note of the RAF outsourcing some of its budgets onto Iraq's military. Taiyari, the defender of the RAF's scheme, points out a discrepancy in RAF revenue sharing with Iraq. "The total increase in cost to the Iraq Government has been £515,000 in this period, while a decrease of £2,500,000 has been made in the R.A.F."[280] The League of Nations tables and figures provided in Appendices 3 and 8 falls closer with Jundi's argument, but Taiyari is correct that this was not a total offset of costs. Dissecting these arguments, although interesting, is less important than a general understanding of why this debate has remained unresolved. There were both strengths and limitations of Air Control throughout the period that the last chapter addresses. The central reasoning of an RAF presence rested with cost savings for the Exchequer. Cost reduction was achieved, albeit in a more roundabout manner than previously presented. Financial posturing went on well after Iraqi independence in 1932, with the stipulation of British control of airbases, long-term oil concessions (commercial activities are noticeably absent from the 1930 Treaty of Alliance), and Iraq's Currency Board.

The cost savings argument was central to the RAF's continued independence. This analysis of costs emphasizes an inflated percentage in reducing ground forces, leading to the RAF's policy of Air Control. Whereas a simple overview of Air Control portrays excellent financial savings, further inspection yields a mixed result. Many of these budgetary cuts and expenses foisted onto Iraq would still have been enacted and enforced if the War Office were left in charge of defense. The most important thing to

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[279] Jundi, "Eight Years of British Control in Iraq," *Journal of the Royal United Services Institute* 76, no. 501 (February 1, 1931): 12, https://doi.org/10.1080/03071843109426128.

[280] Taiyari, "Eight Years of British Control in Iraq: A Reply," *Journal of the Royal United Services Institute* 76, no. 502 (May 1, 1931): 421, https://doi.org/10.1080/03071843109427280.

note of the cost savings argument is its complexity and nuance. There were many moving parts to reducing military expenditure. India subsidized British military spending to a certain degree. Tax collection efforts and revenue within Iraq increased under British supervision. Iraq's main budgetary expense was its military and police budget throughout the Mandate's entirety, with most of these expenses aiding the RAF's Air Control efforts. Establishing a proper dollar figure amount in savings is impossible because of the objectivity of the official LoN records, RAF, and War Department's nonconcurrent interpretation of facts. The RAF achieved a reduction in overall defense expenditure, but the degree is much less than previously illustrated.

CHAPTER 6

INTELLIGENCE: THE UNEXPLORED FACET OF AIR CONTROL

This chapter examines the air control scheme's intelligence aspects and argues that it was vital to its overall success. SSO officers and their intelligence within the scheme were crucial for maintaining stability within Mandate Iraq and along its steppe frontiers. Moreover, after some years of operation, they were finally formalized into an established branch of the RAF within the new air control scheme.[281] By 1930, 11 SSO officers were operating throughout Iraq, two officers were in training, and one was stationed at Air Headquarters writing intelligence reports and corresponding with Whitehall (see Map 2). SSOs' overall expenditure was relatively minimal due to their limited number. These agents effectively controlled large geographical regions at a fraction of a typical military garrison's forces.[282] Air Control's early uses are explored first, stressing a bluntness during this period of experimentation. Much of the scholarship on air policing uses this early period as the window through which to understand Air Control and does not acknowledge the increasing importance of its covert element. Second is a comparison between the French and British rural

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[281] Officially this coincided with the adoption of RAF control in October 1922. Ritchie, *The RAF, Small Wars and Insurgencies in the Middle East, 1919-1939*, 33. After examining the AIR23 files, SSO intelligence reporting becomes much more standardized by 1924. See also Map 2 for an illustration of their region of responsibility.

[282] Expenditure incurred on the service of intelligence in Iraq from 1926–1928 was as follows: 1926–£6,550, 1927–£6,420, 1928–£7,620. [AIR2/1196] found in Burdett, *Iraq: Defence Intelligence, 1920-1973*, 2005, 2: 1926-1932:435–37. The other cost were small subsidies to favorable tribal sheikhs. For example, Fahad Beg ibn Hadhdhal received a subsidy of Rs. 12,000 Rs. (1923 value =£680) a month. Dodge, *Inventing Iraq: The Failure of Nation Building and a History Denied*, 84. The subsidy policy slowly changed into land grants after a continued push to cut costs.

intelligence services within their desert administrations. Historians credit Britain's desert administration as much cheaper than the French, utilizing fewer resources for a similar result. Also, intelligence officers' influence within these administrations has often been understated in the literature. These agents had a long-lasting impact; the most prominent stayed much longer than the standard service term. The final portion examines John Glubb's tenure within Iraq. Using Glubb as the focal point illustrates a transition in the application of force; to a greater reliance upon persuasion and indirect means as opposed to the heavy-handedness of the early period. Many historians have not explicitly identified a change in the philosophy of control. By demarcating a shift in policy from fear of reprisal to one of persuasion, the final section argues against a bombing-centric understanding of Air Control.

6.1. Early Practice of Air Control

> The role of the aircraft is to locate the raiders, break down their resistance, and disorganize them by air attack, while that of the armoured cars is to round up the fugitives, arrest the leaders, and drive the rank and file back across the frontier or into their own area. The cars can also deal with any isolated parties who have escaped notice from the air.[283]

The initial assertion that Iraq could be policed with airplanes, armoured cars, and local levies was yet to be fully developed after the Army's initial transition to RAF command in October 1922. The fledgling Iraqi Mandate had two primary threats, one external and the other internal: to the north, the Mosul boundary dispute with Turkey simmered on into the late 1920s (see Map 3); further south the central Euphrates remained unstable, its tribes still embittered after the crushing of the failed rebellion of

[283] R.A.F, "Armoured Cars in Desert Warfare," 400.

1920.[284] These threats are fundamentally different and cannot be conflated. For the first year of RAF authority, the external Turkish threat engrossed British efforts. All operations were overseen by Air Officer Commanding (AOC) Air Vice Marshall Sir John Salmond jointly commanding air and land units (8 battalions and not the four most often cited at the start of this transitionary period).[285] The aggressive nature of Salmond's Forward Offensive Policy against Turkey envisaged using air power as an auxiliary force in conventional warfare.[286] Air power held a decisive advantage in mountainous terrain, aiding policing efforts in Kurdistan against Shaikh Mahmud, also acting as a force multiplier against the Turks. These operations were distinct from the internal policing activities defined as Air Control. They were much more extensive, requiring the bulk of RAF forces to defend the Iraq-Turkish border.

Internally, the problem in the central Euphrates is much more emblematic of early Air Control. Before any significant intelligence apparatus emerged, this initial period set a deterrence policy through force to maintain authority.[287] Deterrence here

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[284] The Kurdish question, raised to prominence at Sevres, had yet to be fully addressed at this initial period of the Mandate. There were conflicting viewpoints within Whitehall on their position over Mosul. While some like E. W. Noel (from the Colonial Office) was one of the more vocal voices to further Kurdish autonomy, it was eventually decided by Percy Cox to keep Mosul as part of Iraq in order to maintain a defensive posture against Turkey. Fieldhouse, *Kurds, Arabs and Britons: The Memoir of Wallace Lyon in Iraq 1918-44*, 37–42.

[285] The idea of air substitution was unproven and citing an unaltered Cairo plan is not an accurate portrayal of events. In January 1923 Turkey had massed some 8,000 infantry, 2,000 cavalry, and 33 guns less than 20 days march to Mosul. The reduction of forces down to 4 battalions occurred after the July 1923 Treaty of Lausanne. Warwick, *In Every Place*, 50–52.

[286] An official account by Salmond is reported in ASM 20. Salmond cites 52 tons of bombs and 72,000 rounds of small arms ammunition used by aircraft for these operations. Lecture by Air Marshal Sir J.M. Salmond to the students of Staff College, Quetta ASM 20. [AIR8/71] Undated but most likely early 1924. See Appendix I in Parton, "The Evolution and Impact of Royal Air Force Doctrine, 1919-1939," 241–44. found in (and dated incorrectly as Dec. 1922) Burdett, *Iraq: Defence Intelligence, 1920-1973*, 2005, 1: 1920-1925:399–415.

[287]The official deterrence policy is found in ASM 46, Notes on Air Control of Undeveloped Countries. See a brief discussion in Newton, *The RAF and Tribal Control*, 104.

was unquestionably blunt and employed to instill a fear of the airplane and a reverence for its power.[288] Establishing the rule of law through air power needed some example to be made, and this was done in the Samawah *qadha* against a subsection of the Bani Huchaim confederation. The primary dispute was over unregulated dams impacting downriver irrigation efforts and a general refusal by the Beni Huchaim confederation to pay taxes. A gathering of sheikhs for the Barkat and Sufran tribes was "requested" in November of 1923. Out of 42 tribal leaders, only four appeared. Only one of the four attempted to collect a 10,000 Rs fine.[289] The others claimed they did not have the authority to order such a demand.[290]

It was decided to use air sorties (bombing) as a substitute for a punitive expedition, quickly solving the perception of British authority throughout the mandate.[291] The Al-Barkat and Al-Sufran tribes (part of Bani Huchaim) were chosen

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[288] In this early period, the sole case of internal dissent questioning the brutality of bombing emerged. Commodore Lionel E. O. Charlton after witnessing the effects of air action requested to leave his post due to conscience. See Omissi, *Air Power and Colonial Control: The Royal Air Force, 1919-1939*, 175.;David Omissi, "RAF Officer Who Resigned Rather than Bomb Iraq: David Omissi Looks Back to the Twenties, When the RAF Fought Dissident Tribesmen.," *The Observer (1901- 2003)*, February 10, 1991, 477408315, ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The Guardian and The Observer. Charlton discusses this account in Charlton (1931) and More Charlton (1940). For a list of his publications, see https://airminded.org/biographies/l-e-o-charlton/.

[289] "Report on Operations against the Barkat and Sufran," 30/11/23 & 1/12/23, AIR 23/443 *Beni Huchaim Operations 1923*.

[290] "It was accordingly decided that before Government officers proceed to the area, and as a gauge of the present attitude of the tribesmen, the sheikhs and headmen of two recalcitrant tribes should be summoned to the local headquarters of Government as SAMAWAH and a security be demanded from them. The result left no doubt of the attitude which they and their tribesmen intended to adopt. Of some 42 sheikhs and headmen summoned only four came in and of these four only one was ready to produce a satisfactory guarantee. The remaining three, after some days of delay and equivocation, stated that they could produce no securities, and were not prepared to answer for so much as their own headquarter villages. Nevertheless, in order that at this stage no chance of obviating offensive action might be lost, a final conference was called as SAMAWAH on the 28th November, and confirmed the conclusion previously reached." Also noted in "Iraq Command—Report October, 1922–April 1924," Air Publication 1105, 32-36. AIR5/1253 *Operations Iraq Chapters 1 to 13 (1918–1924)*.

[291] "Aircraft, armoured car and levies were concentrated (the role of the latter arms being aerodrome etc. defence) and after 3 days of air operations the majority of the offending leaders had made their submission." See III of Secret notes by Air Staff, Plans, 28 March 1933, on the more important operations

because they were farthest away from the Basra-Baghdad railway and least likely to sabotage it.[292] Planning was quite involved because accurate targets needed identifying. AOC John Salmond ordered a thorough reconnaissance by two SSOs a month prior to any air raids. Operations commenced on 29 November 1923, lasting three days. The hopes of solidifying British control by providing an example to other regions that did not acquiesce to governmental authority succeeded.[293] Glubb was actually the SSO who mapped the area for the RAF before the operations against Al-Barkat and Al-Sufran tribes. This example is not a typical example of Air Control, but an unrefined version.[294] Eventually, after solidifying unrest in the central Euphrates region, Glubb would focus on the frequent attacks in the southern desert by the Ikhwan orchestrated by Sa'ud.

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in Iraq since the assumption of responsibility for defence by the Air Ministry [AIR9/14] Burdett, *Iraq: Defence Intelligence, 1920-1973*, 2005, 2: 1926-1932:733.

[292] Glubb, *Arabian Adventures: Ten Years of Joyful Service*, 107.

[293] "The moral effect of the action taken against these two tribes was so great that it was possible to summon to SAMAWAH all the sheikhs and the principal headmen throughout the whole area. The Minister of the Interior addressed them and laid down certain conditions, all of which were accepted." "Iraq Command—Report October, 1922–April 1924," Air Publication 1105, 35. AIR5/1253 *Operations Iraq Chapters 1 to 13 (1918–1924)*.

[294] Most military historical accounts continue to overlook the number of casualties in this operation. Ritchie, *The RAF, Small Wars and Insurgencies in the Middle East, 1919-1939*, 28–30. Newton, *The RAF and Tribal Control*, 73. Sluglett has the casualties at 144 and an unspecified wounded. Sluglett, *Britain in Iraq*, 188–90. Dodge cites approximately 100 men and women killed, 6 destroyed villages, and 6 horse, 71 cows, and 530 sheep killed. Dodge, *Inventing Iraq: The Failure of Nation Building and a History Denied*, 150–55.



Figure 2: Depiction of Aerodrome Defense in the Samawa Operation (Found in Warwick, In Every Place, 114)

6.1.1. General Bombing Policy of Air Control

There is early enthusiasm for "air action" within Britain's administrative records, the lethal approach to solving problems of unrest. After initial testing and the belief that the 'moral effect' would enable the pacification of tribal unrest, air action is cited as the primary means of control. Aerial bombing within the air control scheme has caused the most significant divergence within academic sources, perhaps overemphasizing its fundamental role. The severity of its uses has become grounds of contention, obscuring its actual practice. There were two options the British traditionally used, a Ground Method or the newly minted Air Method.[295] The Ground Method was akin more to a punitive expedition using scorched earth tactics than the Air Method.[296] The RAF's primary air tactic in Iraq, Trans-Jordan, Yemen, and the Northwest Frontier was coined as an *inverted blockade*. According to Glubb's description of the bombing strategy, this occurred when quelling any insurrections or uprisings against the state (tribal rebellion).[297] The sequence of events for this tactic began with a failure to follow the demands of the state. What caused these violent responses by the British started first with a demand for either taxes, the return of looted property, or the evacuation of grazing grounds. A deadline would be set for when this demand needed to be met. If these demands went unheeded, either the local SSO or Political Officer would warn the village of an impending bombing no later than 24 hours before it was to take place. In the absence of human contact, leaflets would be

[295] This is not to say that one method of control is 'better' than another (this comparison is mainly to highlight that both methods cause great harm, the strategic benefits of air power notwithstanding).

[296] The Air Method described within the primary sources is what Omissi has redefined as air substitution.

[297] Glubb, *Arabian Adventures: Ten Years of Joyful Service*, 31.

dropped 24–48 hours prior to the scheduled bombing, informing residents to leave their homes because of the impending destruction.[298] The primary purpose of the bombing was not in causing large casualties, but in interrupting everyday life.[299] The objective of the *inverted blockade* was in its explicit statement to the offending party—the possibility of what could happen without prior warning. Once operations had ceased and residents returned to their destroyed homes and livestock, the village leader would invariably submit to the British authorities, and any further disturbance nipped in the bud. Slessor's description argues this practice was more humane, contrasting Air Control to his own Ground Method experience in the Northwest Frontier. However, Slessor also stresses the importance of intelligence for the Air Method to work appropriately or else the bombing is useless in targeting the offending tribe, "One must know pretty intimately the habits and methods of livelihood of the different tribes and sections, exactly what villages or valleys they inhabit and the houses of all the headman and principle inhabitants."[300]

RAF-centric accounts detail a rigid chain of command for any air operations (see Newton's diagram below).[301] When air attacks were authorized, the SSO's role was to brief the aircrews on which targets to strike, noting those that should not be damaged and avoided. On occasion, the SSO would either ride with the pilots or follow via an

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[298] John Bagot Glubb, "Air and Ground Forces in Punitive Expeditions," *Journal of the Royal United Services Institute* 71, no. 484 (November 1926): 777–84, https://doi.org/10.1080/03071842609422019.

[299] See a codified version of Air Control by Iraq's government. Iraqi Ministry of Defence, *Official secret book: Notes on Air Control over the Tribes*. (Government Printing, Baghdad: Publication of the Defence Ministry, 1935). Translated by Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi. https://www.aymennjawad.org/25127/air-control-over-the-tribes-secret-iraqi-ministry.

[300] Slessor, *The Central Blue: Recollections and Reflections*. 62-65.

[301] For the counterargument, see Satia, "The Defense of Inhumanity"; Satia, "Drones."

RAF armored car to help direct airstrikes.[302] The SSO continued to act as a local liaison with the tribe to warn of a follow-up attack if there was no change of behavior.

Figure 3: Official Process of requesting air actions to support civil authorities. (Diagram by Richard Newton)

[302] Newton, "Control without Occupation," 151.

The primary duties of the armoured cars were: routine patrols and convoy protection throughout Iraq, defense of major RAF aerodromes, forward landing strips. Any significant air operation had a refueling station nearby, requiring a defensive perimeter to protect these landing strips (See Figure II). No 4 Armoured Car Company is the most well documented because of the private papers of L. A. Simmons, stationed at Hinaidi (RAF base near Baghdad). LAC L. A. Simmons joined the RAF as a skilled driver and was part of the Southern Desert operations of 1928.[303] A general patrol consisted of four Ford or Rolls-Royce Cars mounted with machine guns.[304] A car had a crew of five, all of whom had to be able to drive it and handle any of its weapons. "Our 'armoureds' were greatly respected everywhere."[305] When men on the ground spotted too large of an enemy, they radioed for aerial support.[306] Eventually, after dedicated patrol routes were established throughout the desert (by 1928), armoured cars became much more reliable and effective in policing the desert.[307]

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[303] L. A. Simmons's private papers are held at the Imperial War Museum Sound and Document Archives as *Private Papers 7284* (IWM Document Archive). These papers were used by both Kiernan and Warwick. Although he is cited in IWM as being in No 4 ACC, by April 1927 the individual Companies had been dissolved and the Armoured Car sections that formed them operated under the control of "Armoured Car Wing". In Simmons case it was No 2 Section of Armoured Car Wing. Simmons received a service medal in 1928 and rose to the rank of Flight Lieutenant (Flt Lt). https://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/30007423

[304] The Fords were armed with the Lewis 0.303 in. light machine gun, and the Rolls Royces armoured cars were armed with the Vickers 0.303 in. heavy machine gun.

[305] Cited as Simmons, notebook of 'RAF Memories' (no paging) in V. G. (Victor Gordon) Kiernan, *Colonial Empires and Armies, 1815-1960* (Gloucestershire: Sutton Publishing, 1998), 197.

[306] A fuller account of the use of armoured car use by the RAF can be found in Warwick's recent work. It details the other discounted pillar of Air Control, mechanized transport. Warwick, *In Every Place*. For the French use of mechanized transport in desert operations, see Mehdi Sakatni, "From Camel to Truck?: Automobiles and the Pastoralist Nomadism of Syrian Tribes during the French Mandate (1920–46)," *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East* 39, no. 1 (May 1, 2019): 159–69, https://doi.org/10.1215/1089201X-7493865.

[307] See Warwick's discussion of Glubb's dissatisfaction on the cars' performance in Iraq and a "truer" assessment of their role during the 1927–30 raids. Warwick, *In Every Place*, 133–34.

The RAF's institutional independence was rooted in its dogmatic strategic bombing doctrine, but shortcomings in this policy soon became apparent. Targeted groups mitigated the effect of bombing raids by hiding in caves or moving at night as early as 1923.[308] By 1925, various tribes in southern Iraq, when attacked by aircraft, dismounted and hid in bushes. Air Intelligence reported that tribesmen who followed this policy had lost camels but no men.[309] Radio technology was not advanced enough to be relied upon for great distances in these early air raids. Large banners and signals were erected to communicate between air and land forces to communicate in the air. At times this limitation was used against the British.[310] What would soon be acknowledged was that in addition to bombing and armoured cars, was an intelligence element vital to the air control scheme's success.

Intelligence maximized the impact of air power's deterrence, as was noted later in its Operations Manual (1928). Air Staff Intelligence, headquartered in Baghdad, expanded in Iraq, creating a robust system staffed by RAF SSOs, supported by Political Officers (POs) and Administrative Inspectors (AIs). The transition in doctrine and practice is apparent in Glubb's writings as he progresses from first recommending air raids to later becoming critical of the practice of bombing tribesmen. After his forays

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[308] In response the RAF developed timed-action bombs and implemented night raids. See Case, "Birds of Death," sec. 11:02-11:54.

[309] Extract from Air Staff Intelligence Report, 25 January 1925, on the effect of British aerial action against the Akhwan [AIR 23/331] found in Anita L. P. Burdett, *The Expansion of Wahhabi Power in Arabia, 1798-1932 : British Documentary Records : Volume 7. 1925-1928*, 7 (Cambridge Archive Editions, 2013), 44, https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/book/64358.

[310] A separate case occurred in Yemen, where enemy troops stole British cloth signs to confuse the pilots and prevent an aerial bombing. Omissi cites one successful Zeidi counterattack in October of 1925 where these cloth signals had been captured and used to deploy a command to stop the bombing. This miscommunication created a temporary state of disarray, enabling a counter offensive against British forces. Although this tactic only appeared successful this one time, it portrays an adaptation to air power not thought possible at this time by air proponents. Omissi, *Air Power and Colonial Control: The Royal Air Force, 1919-1939*, 121.

along the desert frontier and his experience as an intelligence officer, Glubb began to criticize air raids because they did not solve the problem's root cause. Governmental policy tended to discount the importance of migration patterns in the pastoral economy, inadvertently hindering and upsetting the general livelihood of the Bedouin. General livelihood for these peoples was in the health and well-being of livestock. Grazing patterns spanned vast distances and had already been severely limited by the new borders of the Mandates. Most tribesmen had little love for any form of government and wanted some form of protection from the state after being forced to pay taxes and relinquish their arms. Even the local government in Baghdad tended to ignore their plight.[311] The SSO officer, in this sense, became the primary liaison between British and Tribal authority and sometimes was their "best" advocate for their plight.

6.2. The Burgeoning Intelligence Empire

Both Martin Thomas and Priya Satia have written extensively on imperial powers' growing intelligence apparatus during the 20th century.[312] As these empires grew in scope and complexity, they sought to use intelligence services as a means of controlling and maintaining their expanding empire. Expansion led to increasing concerns about colonial unrest and possible rebellion.[313] Fear of revolution was at an

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[311] "Baghdad had comfortably instructed me to notify the tribes that if they moved further forward, we could not be responsible for their safety, but it was not possible to escape the issue by such means. The shepherds replied that Umm Rahal was two days' march north of the Nejed frontier. Why, they enquired, did they pay taxes to the government, if not in order to be safe within their own frontier? The safety of people who paid taxes to Ibn Saud was guaranteed by him, they pointed out." Glubb, *War in the Desert: An RAF Frontier Campaign*, 148.

[312] See both Martin Thomas, *Empires of Intelligence: Security Services and Colonial Disorder after 1914* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, California: University of California Press, 2008); Satia, *Spies in Arabia*.

[313] Various schemes of direct and indirect rule were used. See Migdal's 'strategies of survival' for some of these long-term consequences. Joel S. Migdal, "Strong States, Weak States: Power and

all-time high after the Great War due to Woodrow Wilson's 14-Point Plan, expressly point twelve, advocating self-determination for colonial subjects under Ottoman rule. The great fear, in some ways an early example of the 'Domino Theory' that obsessed post-WWII US strategists, was that if even a single colony achieved independence, then the whole colonial system would start crumbling like dominoes to subsequent independence movements. Monitoring possible revolt led to a burgeoning intelligence apparatus within both empires as a means of detecting any potential civil unrest in these colonial "intelligence states."[314]

A divergence occurred in administering rural and urban regions. Urban intelligence operations focused on monitoring political groups advocating nationalism, communism, or pan-Arab ideals. For the British, this role was filled via Political Officers (POs), whereas for the French, this role generally fell to *Service des Renseignements* (SR) officers. [315] Intelligence was sometimes shared between the two. Thomas cites an example of SR officers studying the British PO's methods.[316] With the acquisition of desert territories, a separate administrative structure was created to control tribal populations, a mixture of nomadic, semi-nomadic, and sedentary

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Accommodation," in *Understanding Political Development : An Analytic Study*, ed. Myron Weiner and Samuel P. Huntington (Little, Brown and Company, 1987), 391–434, http://archive.org/details/understandingpol00wein.

[314] Martin Thomas, "Intelligence Providers and the Fabric of the Late Colonial State," in *Elites and Decolonization in the Twentieth Century*, ed. Jost Dülffer and Marc Frey, Cambridge Imperial and Post-Colonial Studies Series (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2011), 27, https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230306486_2.

[315] Unmentioned civil agencies were *Section de Centralisation du Renseignements* (SCR)–counterespionage and the *Sûreté Générale*–counternarcotic and communist repression. For an overall guide of French intelligence in the Levant, see Martin C. Thomas, "French Intelligence-Gathering in the Syrian Mandate, 1920-40," *Middle Eastern Studies* 38, no. 1 (January 2002): 1–32, https://doi.org/10.1080/714004430.

[316] Thomas, "Bedouin Tribes and the Imperial Intelligence Services in Syria, Iraq and Transjordan in the 1920s," 554.

pastoralists.[317] The Contrôle Bédouin (CB) and the RAF Special Service Officers (SSOs) are notable military intelligence divisions created to fill this role. French CB commanders and British SSOs provided detailed reports on tribal leaders, general movement, and competing feuds between various tribes.[318]

For the British and RAF in Iraq, Army intelligence officers were subsumed into its command. Commonly, the Army used SSOs for local internal intelligence and advised British Army commanders and units on the frontiers.[319] In Iraq during the 1920 revolt, specially appointed officers were sent out to outlying districts to conduct military intelligence work.[320] In 1922 the RAF repurposed these Army officers, increasing their numbers to operate throughout Iraq's administrative districts.[321] SSOs eventually formed their own organizational culture separate from Political Officers and Administrative Inspectors and freely expressed their personal views and interpretation of events to Air Headquarters.[322]

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[317] For the history of this expansion, see Benjamin C. Brower, *A Desert Named Peace: The Violence of France's Empire in the Algerian Sahara, 1844-1902* (Columbia University Press, 2009).

[318]This is mentioned for the French in Neep, *Occupying Syria under the French Mandate*, 180. The British SSOs also provided weekly reports, for an example see "Secret weekly report" No. AL/10/37, para. 1: Shammar intelligence, and para. 2: Raids, undated [c. April 1925][AIR23/292] found in Burdett, *Iraq: Defence Intelligence, 1920-1973*, 2005, 1: 1920-1925:721–22.

[319] Newton, *The RAF and Tribal Control*, 126.

[320] "It has often been pointed out that the present system of Special Service Officers was initiated after the 1920 insurrection, because of the reluctance shown by the Political Officers to appear to be alarmist, with the result that their reports were too meagre and too late, although there is abundant evidence that clear warnings had been given to them of the seriousness of the position." Memorandum by Wing-Cmdr K.C. Buss, Air Headquarters, Iraq, undated, "Intelligence in Iraq after 1932", with Appendix: Chart showing proposed headquarters establishment and allocation of duties (in tabular form) [AIR2/11] found in Burdett, *Iraq: Defence Intelligence, 1920-1973*, 2005, 2: 1926-1932:477–88.

[321] Ritchie, *The RAF, Small Wars and Insurgencies in the Middle East, 1919-1939*, 33.

[322] Thomas makes note of their wide readership. Their analysis accompanied various administrative correspondents in FO and CO reports. Thomas, "Bedouin Tribes and the Imperial Intelligence Services in Syria, Iraq and Transjordan in the 1920s," 549. For a description of the duties of AIs, see Fieldhouse, *Kurds, Arabs and Britons: The Memoir of Wallace Lyon in Iraq 1918-44*, 27–31. In 1923 there were twenty four AIs. In 1933 the number fell to ten, before the position was terminated. Some like Lyon became Land Settlement Officers after the Mandate.

The main object of the Special Service Officer system of intelligence is the provision of information to Air Headquarters from a source entirely independent of the intelligence organisation at the disposal of the civil authorities. Whereas information supplied by the civil authorities may be biased by an Iraq Government point of view, the information obtained and forwarded by the Special Service Officer is free from any such influences. The civil authorities obtain their information from police and junior government officials while the Special Service Officer obtains what is required by personal investigation or through agents in close touch with local conditions.[323]

RAF SSOs were granted a great deal of personal autonomy and freedom of movement. These persons were the lone representative of the government, overseeing a vast region. Their superiors were worried about them "going native" or caring more for local inhabitants than necessary.[324] Many of these officials extended their military tours. Some retired from official military service and transitioned into administrative roles for the mandates, maintaining their same level of authority. Newton categorizes British intelligence agents as a precursor to modern special forces personnel, typifying them into two tiers. Tier one was career-oriented, conducting shorter tours and focusing on career advancement. Tier two fully embraced the freedom of SSO life, remaining much longer than the standard two-year term. Along with Glubb, several SSO officers stayed in the region, such as his close colleague, Flight Lieutenant Guy M. Moore, residing in Iraq for over six years. Flight Lieutenant Robert Jope-Slade served as an SSO in Iraq from 1924–1935, Flight Lieutenant George Reed served 12 years between 1922–1934. Flying Officer Ernest Howes was an SSO for more than 12 years, finishing as a Flight

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[323] Among the differing levels of intelligence within the archive, there were only seven items given the identification of *Most secret* included within both Iraq: DI volumes pertaining to the Mandate, this being one of them. Most secret memorandum by Air Intelligence, 1 December 1929, describing the air intelligence in Iraq [AIR2/1196] found in Burdett, *Iraq: Defence Intelligence, 1920-1973*, 2005, 2: 1926-1932:435.

[324] This was critique on the objectivity of these British and French intelligence officers. See Neep, *Occupying Syria under the French Mandate*, 182; Slessor, *The Central Blue: Recollections and Reflections*, 57; Fletcher, *British Imperialism and "the Tribal Question,"* 188.

Lieutenant in Aden at the start of the Second World War.[325] This long-term commitment to HMG's local service allowed for an in-depth understanding of various social complexities. This critical detail has often been forgotten when analyzing Britain's ability to maintain a light troop presence and its lasting influence in its mandates and protectorates' domestic affairs.

France's intelligence system was more sophisticated but lacked air power as an integral piece. Its colonial intelligence apparatus had civil and military intelligence agencies monitoring unrest in Syria, Algeria, and Morocco. In Morocco, Resident-General Louis-Hubert Lyautey's *Service des Affaires Indigènes* (Native Affairs Division) trained and exported officers to Algeria and Syria.[326] In Syria, the Levant *Service des Renseignements* (SR), formed in 1921, had around seventy officers monitoring urban sedition. The Contrôle Bédouin (Bedouin Inspectorate), were established by General Henri Gouraud in the Levant in 1920 and focused on policing the *badiya* (desert). CB officers commanded Méharistes, locally recruited camel units of about 250–300 men. Méharistes supported CB officers acting as a roaming desert police force and are comparable to Glubb's later Desert Camel Corps.[327] SR and CB commanders were trained in *La méthode Lyautey*, an anthropological/cultural philosophy of colonial policing.[328] As an aggregate, France spent a great deal more

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[325] Richard Dana Newton, "The RAF's Special Force before the Special Duties Squadrons," *Air Power Review* 21, no. 1 (Spring 2018): 100.

[326] Thomas, "Bedouin Tribes and the Imperial Intelligence Services in Syria, Iraq and Transjordan in the 1920s," 547.

[327] Méharistes stemmed from Algeria's Armée d 'Afrique. Its first chief, Captain Charles Terrier, is commensurable to Glubb's role for the British. See Neep's discussion on the Contrôle Bédouin and the Méharistes in Neep, "Policing the Desert: Coercion, Consent and the Colonial Order in Syria," 45–49.

[328] Thomas, *Empires of Intelligence: Security Services and Colonial Disorder after 1914*, 62–64.

resources and effort in controlling the *badiya*. French agents had more training and were better equipped in comparison to the British.

6.3. John Glubb

> Then when in any area there were disturbances, the officer was recalled to Baghdad, put into the aircraft and told to lead the aircraft to the people who were giving the trouble. These were called Special Service Officers. Of course the RAF didn't have anybody who could speak Arabic… So although I was a soldier and would have gone with the Army, the RAF nipped in and asked me if I'd like to stay with them because I spoke a few words of Arabic… I was attached to the RAF and sent to a number of successive areas. Whenever there was threatened a disturbance, one was sent to that area and told as quickly as possible to become familiar with all the tribes, the camps, the villages, and everything else so that if the thing blew up you would be able to fly the aircraft and hit the correct target. On this job I spent several years all up and down the Euphrates.[329]

The most well-known British SSO is Captain John Bagot Glubb (when in Iraq), Glubb Pasha, or *Abu Hunaik* (Father of the little jaw) after he found fame as commander of Jordan's Arab Legion. Common anglophone perception still associates T.E. Lawrence as the mastermind behind irregular warfare for controlling the desert.[330] In contrast, historians have noted Glubb as an important figure, primarily for commanding the Arab Legion, and more generally, deciding the trajectory of rule within the Middle East (i.e., Jordan). Glubb, also a prolific writer, penned some 22 works of military history, histories of the Arab world, and autobiographical accounts

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[329] Glubb Interview, Reel 01, p. 8 cited in Maureen Heaney Norton, "The Last Pasha: Sir John Glubb and the British Empire in the Middle East, 1920-1949" (PhD Thesis, John Hopkins University, 1997), 66–67.

[330] The US military still has 7 Pillars of Wisdom as a recommended reading today and COIN guru David Kilcullen revisited Lawrence's 27 articles of tribal desert warfare, providing US military leaders with 28 of his own prescriptions. Mumford, Andrew. "Warrior-scholarship in the age of globalised insurgency: The work of David Kilcullen." In Andrew Mumford and Bruno C. Reis, eds., *The Theory and Practice of Irregular Warfare: Warrior-Scholarship in Counter-Insurgency* (Routledge, 2013), 137, https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203766019.; Also recently noted in Ian Oxnevad, "Beyond a Desert Revolt: TE Lawrence's Theory of Proxy War and State Creation," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 0, no. 0 (February 6, 2020): 2–3, https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2020.1723283.

that illustrate a broader impact upon further study.[331] Glubb spent most of his life within the Middle East, shaping matters to benefit Britain's imperial interests.[332] Iraq was Glubb's training ground during his postings here. What Glubb learned during his time in Iraq formulated into a refined desert and tribal control policy, later implemented in Trans-Jordan[333]

John Bagot Glubb, the son of Major General Fredrick Manley Glubb, was born on 16 April 1897. He began his military career with the Army Corps of Engineers, and in WWI, injured his jaw, later gaining the name *Abu Hunaik.* After WWI, Glubb volunteered for duty in Iraq, arriving in October 1920 at the age of twenty-three. He worked his first two years on Euphrates riverboats, ferrying passengers, and overseeing other construction projects as an engineer. The RAF, needing language officers, asked if he was interested in serving as an intelligence officer, becoming an SSO. Glubb agreed and moved in April 1922 to Nasiriyah, the headquarters of the Muntifiq Division.[334] His early SSO years centered around the Euphrates with a responsibility of 40 miles on either side, from the Syrian border to just north of Basra.[335] From 1925–26 Glubb became SSO Akhwan Defence, headquartered at Abu Ghar. After his commitment as an

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[331] Glubb's approach to desert control is quite opposite of Lawrence's much hailed approach to proxy warfare. Glubb modeled his approach on Sir Robert Sandeman's policy of light taxation and small subsidies to preferential tribes in Baluchistan. Glubb advocated for penetrating the desert and creating a regular Arab army from its tribal population. Bradshaw, *The Glubb Reports: Glubb Pasha and Britain's Empire Project in the Middle East 1920-1956*, 17–20. For more depth on Sandeman and his system, see Christian Tripodi, *Edge of Empire : The British Political Officer and Tribal Administration on the North-West Frontier 1877–1947* (Routledge, 2016), 49–67, https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315578774.

[332] Most of Glubb's opinions went unheeded in Whitehall at the time. Glubb makes note of his lack of political acumen in his memoirs. Glubb, *Arabian Adventures: Ten Years of Joyful Service*, 135.

[333] Lunt, *Glubb Pasha, a Biography: Lieutenant-General Sir John Bagot Glubb, Commander of the Arab Legion, 1939-1956*, 91.

[334] Glubb, *War in the Desert: An RAF Frontier Campaign*, 70.

[335] Eight months of Glubb's post as SSO Nasiriyah was actually in Ramadi during the Turkish offensive. Lunt, *Glubb Pasha, a Biography: Lieutenant-General Sir John Bagot Glubb, Commander of the Arab Legion, 1939-1956*, 22.

SSO ended, Glubb stayed in the region as an Administrative Inspector (1926–1930). However, much of his previous SSO duties and responsibilities overlapped as an AI. After his tenure in Iraq, Glubb was recruited to Trans-Jordan, becoming second-in-command of the Arab Legion and commanding the Desert Patrol. Glubb eventually took over the Arab Legion from Colonel Peake in March 1939, maintaining his role until 1 March 1956.

There were two major border threats to the Mandate of Iraq. Turkish forces regularly tested the Mosul region's northern mountains during the early years, and Shiekh Mahumd's drive for independence aggravated the region's insecurity.[336] The southern desert border with Nejd was also tested due to Ibn Sa'ud's machinations for expanding Saudi Arabia's boundaries through his use of the Ikhwan.[337] While a complete description of the border raids between Iraq and Saudi Arabia is beyond the scope of this thesis, some preparatory background clarifies Glubb's predicament in policing this problematic border.[338] During WWI, the British had subsidized two competing powers in Western and Central Arabia, Ibn Sa'ud and the Hashemites, the Hijaz and Nejd's competing monarchies. This balance was disrupted after the war with

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[336] There are numerous intelligence reports by British intelligence officers stating that the Turks had Russian backing. See Intelligence reports and appraisals concerning the external threat to Iraq from Turkey via Anatolia; Persia; and the Soviet Union in Burdett, *Iraq: Defence Intelligence, 1920-1973*, 2005, vol. 1: 1920-1925, sec. 1.5.

[337] The Third Saudi State developed throughout 1902-1932. Su'ad's expansion began from Riyadh, conquering Hasa in 1913. During WWI, Sa'ud fought over control of Nejd with Ibn Rashid. Sa'ud's victory over Ha'il occurred in 1921. Sa'ud turned towards the Hijaz, conquering it in 1926. The final acquisition was the formal annexation of 'Asir in 1930. Throughout the late 1920s, the area was referred to as the Kingdom of the Hijaz and Nejd and its Dependencies. Ultimately, on 22 September 1932, we get the current designation of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (Hijaz, Nejd, 'Asir and Hasa). Madawi al-Rasheed, *A History of Saudi Arabia*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), chap. 2. The emerging state, 1902–1932, https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511993510.

[338] See perhaps, Silverfarb, "Great Britain, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia"; Kostiner, *The Making of Saudi Arabia, 1916-1936: From Chieftaincy to Monarchical State*.

the Hashemite defeat at Turaba (1919) and Ibn Sa'ud's 'crawl' into the Hijaz, and his victory over the last remaining Hashemite forces in 1925. By then, the Sharif of Mecca, Hussein ibn 'Ali, decamped to Cyprus and Sa'ud expelled his eldest son, Ali, to Iraq in January 1926.

Throughout Ibn Sa'ud's war upon the Hijaz, there were Ikhwan raids on Iraq's southern border and Trans-Jordan. These border incursions by the Ikhwan were different in scale and ferocity from the historical forms of desert raiding, which had an ecological basis.[339] Traditionally, desert raids acted as a mechanism for recovering livestock losses, redistributing wealth from wealthy tribes to poor. Causalities rarely occurred, with raids principally focused on stealing livestock. British understanding of this phenomenon likened it to a form of sport and permitted internal raiding, dropping a "Rules for Raiders" in leaflets by aircraft.[340] By contrast, in an Ikhwan raid, all males above 12 years of age were killed. Any moveable property was looted along with the livestock.[341]

Policing this border only through aerial patrols was insufficient. The much-touted technological advantage of airpower was, in actuality, limited by a constricted flight time during reconnoitering patrols over the desert.[342] Air visibility in the desert was difficult due to limited physical landmarks, helping determine an enemy's position.

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[339] Iraq was not the only one experiencing these border raids. Kuwait was also raided by the Ikhawn. See Toth, "Tribes and Tribulations."

[340] Robert S. G. Fletcher, "The ʿAmārāt, Their Sheikh, and the Colonial State: Patronage and Politics in a Partitioned Middle East," *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 58, no. 1–2 (April 10, 2015): 178–79, https://doi.org/10.1163/15685209-12341369.

[341] "6 September 1928 Glubb to Cornwallis," TNA: CO 730/137/9, found in Bradshaw, *The Glubb Reports: Glubb Pasha and Britain's Empire Project in the Middle East 1920-1956*, 22–24.

[342] On average it took 90 minutes by air to reach the Najd-Iraq borders and this would only allow for another hour or two of aerial overwatch before needing to refuel.

The Ikhwan had the advantage of exploiting the terrain due to years of experience in desert warfare. Air power was more reactive in this environment, depending on human intelligence to inform airmen when and where to be.

The most formative experience Glubb encountered in his post in Nasriyeh is one of the largest documented raids. On 23 December 1924, Glubb departed from his position in Nasiriyah to warn the Dhafir of an impending Ikhwan raid. Glubb was too late and witnessed a stream of refugees fleeing the aftermath.

"A whole shepherd nation seemed to be moving northward, the entire face of the desert being covered as if by swarms of ants… scenes of chaos… Along the whole length of the Nejd frontier, from Basra to near Nejef, the shattered and terrified remains of the Iraq shepherd tribes arrived in panic and confusion on the banks of the Euphrates In these three heavy inroads [raids carried out in December 1924] several hundred Iraqis had been massacred … It was a devastating blow.[343]

[343] Glubb, *War in the Desert: An RAF Frontier Campaign*, 136.



Figure 4: Southern Desert 1924–25. Reproduced from Warwick, In Every Place, 102

Glubb argued Ibn Sa'ud instigated these Ikhwan raids, saddling him with the principal blame for major incursions in 1924–25. Whitehall remained split on this issue, with the Foreign and Indian Offices reluctant to undercut a relationship with Ibn Sa'ud seen as vital to the safety of Indian pilgrims and the stability of Britain's positions in Eastern Arabia, while the Colonial Office showed more sympathy for Glubb's position.[344] These bureaucratic divisions prolonged the attacks on Iraq's southern border as well the promulgation of a formal policy that could control cross-raiding between the Iraqi-Nejd border and secure it.[345] Realizing the leadership vacuum, Glubb advocated for himself to fill this void in his March 1925 Desert Strategic Assessment report.[346] In recounting these events, his published writings highlight humanitarian motives brought to the fore through his encounter with the shepherds' terror during the 1924 Christmas day Ikhwan raid. Glubb states that this experience was pivotal to his lifelong work for

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[344] There is a debate over how much sway Ibn Sa'ud held over the Ikhwan and their leaders. There were times throughout when Ikhwan leaders who doubled as tribal sheiks acted on their own, even if with the general aim of expanding the borders of Wahhabi Saudi Arabia as well as being instigated by Saud to try and expand Saudi Arabia's borders. Glubb discusses this issue and makes a clear distinction between the 1924–25 border raids and the 1928–29 raids. The former Glubb asserts were under Saud's command while the second occurred after the fracturing of Saud's power as a result of the revolt of the Ikhwan under such leaders as the Mutayri sheikh, Faysal al-Duwaysh. The resulting power struggle threatened Ibn Sa'ud's authority and for a time undermined the border agreements reached by Iraq and Trans-Jordan with him under British tutelage in 1925–26. Joseph Kostiner, "On Instruments and Their Designers: The Ikhwan of Najd and the Emergence of the Saudi State," *Middle Eastern Studies* 21, no. 3 (July 1, 1985): 298–323, https://doi.org/10.1080/00263208508700631. For greater detail from a Saudi perspective see perhaps an unpublished thesis by Al-Azma. Talal Sha'yfan Muslat Al-Azma, "The Role of the Ikhwan under 'Abdul-'Aziz Al Sa'ud 1916-1934." (Durham University, 1999), http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/1472/1/1472.pdf.

[345] The 'Uqayr Protocol was believed to have settled this issue in 1922. A neutral zone was established as a buffer zone to allow for grazing and water access between tribesmen, but the Ikhwan raided into Iraqi territory on many occasions.

[346] See Appendix 5. After this large December raid, Glubb's suggestion for an SSO post along the Iraq/Najd border was granted. Abu Ghar was first occupied by British and Iraqi troops on 8th January 1925. Glubb's first report as SSO Akhwan Defence is dated 30 March 1925. Three extracts from a report by Special Service Officer, Akhwan Defence, 30 March 1925: "Raid by Ad wan lbn Rimmal", "Movements. Faisal Al Dowish" and "Caravans for the Akhwan in the Hajaz [sic]" [AIR23/71] found in Burdett, *The Expansion of Wahhabi Power in Arabia, 1798-1932 : British Documentary Records : Volume 7. 1925-1928*, 83–85.

the nomadic Arabs. While this no doubt was a reason in shaping his early motivations, as Norton has clarified, this was just one of the many elements of Glubb's internal compass that allowed him to further the informal parts of the British empire.[347]

6.3.1. Shift Away from Overt Force

Glubb still believed in the view of pacifying tribes through displays of force in 1925, but this gradually began to change. In Glubb's report on the Ikhwan raids in December 1924, he surmises that if the government had bombed further, it would have cemented the view that the Iraq government was in control and the Ikhwan raiding would not have been nearly as severe.

"There is little doubt that had 8 or 9 machines been able to go out on the 27th, such an example could have been mad[e] of this raiding party, that peace on the frontier would probably have ensued for a couple of years. It is difficult to conceive of a more golden opportunity allowed to slip." (Specifically pg 675, 11. Lost Opportunities on 27/12/24)[348]

Glubb's views of force adapted after moving from his post in Nasireyyh into the desert and becoming the Desert SSO of Abu Ghar. Martin Thomas has asserted that

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[347] Norton, "The Last Pasha," 64.; Glubb had a near total grasp of the desert economy, utilizing this knowledge to pursue a policy of humane imperialism modeled on Sandeman's work in Baluchistan that aimed to protect Bedouin livelihoods on a very limited budget. For a discussion on Humane Imperialism see Riccardo Bocco and Tariq M. Tell, "Pax Britannica in the Steppe: British Policy and the Transjordan Bedouin," in *Steppe and State: The Social Origins of Modem Jordan*, ed. Eugene Rogan and Tariq M. Tell (London: British Academic Press, 1994).

[348]"A Report on the Akhwan Raid of 26/12/24, and the Ensuing Operations", by Capt. J. B. Glubb, Royal Engineers, Special Service Officer, Akhwan Defence, Nasiriyah, to Air Staff (Intelligence), Air Headquarters, Iraq, 31 December 1924. [AIR 23/331] Found in Anita L. P. Burdett, *The Expansion of Wahhabi Power in Arabia, 1798-1932 : British Documentary Records : Volume 6. July 1920-December 1924*, vol. 6 (Cambridge Archive Editions, 2013), 669–84, https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/book/64357.; A brief summary of these actions is provided from an RAF review of its operations in Iraq. "Heavy air action taken against Akhwan raiders south west of Samawah. These raiders had been active periodically since the summer. 53 Akhwans and 75 animals killed by air action in 4 days—great deal of loot abandoned." (VIII) December 1924–January 1925, Secret notes by Air Staff, Plans, 28 March 1933, on the more important operations in Iraq since the assumption of responsibility for defence by the Air Ministry [AIR9/14] found in Burdett, *Iraq: Defence Intelligence, 1920-1973*, 2005, 2: 1926-1932:735.

the RAF SSOs were told to run before they could crawl, and Glubb exemplifies this to a T.[349] One lone representative was ordered to establish a border presence, some 550 miles, and prevent these raids. Glubb transitioned from a philosophy of direct force to an indirect approach based on co-opting and seducing tribes against Abd Aziz. As Glubb learned the ins and outs of desert politics, he became more successful. Looking back on these events in his later life, Glubb concluded that the principal lesson learned was a need for better intelligence on Bedouin affairs and events in the desert.[350] Glubb realized this during his year at Abu Ghar as the Desert SSO post. Improved intelligence-gathering efforts enabled a more sophisticated means of tribal control as opposed to bombing raiders after they were discovered. After studying Ibn Sa'ud's methods, Glubb began to adapt and incorporate these to suit British needs in Iraq.

Generally, in the seduction of tribes, a tribal ruler sent his men to "extract oaths of allegiance" to Ibn Sa'ud, winning their loyalty. Glubb and British officials describe this process as "go over."[351] Ibn Sa'ud did this through clandestine and nonviolent means described as treachery.[352] Glubb created his own local intelligence service focusing upon desert affairs. He took advantage of the hospitality of being able to walk into any tent and talking to various tribal leaders to gather intelligence. A white guest

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[349] Thomas, "Bedouin Tribes and the Imperial Intelligence Services in Syria, Iraq and Transjordan in the 1920s," 549–50.

[350] Glubb, *War in the Desert: An RAF Frontier Campaign*, 110.

[351] Norton, "The Last Pasha," 71. For greater detail, see John Craven Wilkinson, "Nomadic Territory as a Factor in Defining Arabia's Boundries," in *The Transformation of Nomadic Society in the Arab East*, ed. Martha Mundy and Basim Musallam (Cambridge University Press, 2000), 44–62.

[352] C. Treachery. By entering into correspondence with the principal men on the enemies' side, and making them promises, or giving them money. The final conquest … is merely a *coup de grace.* A study of the present situation will show that exactly the same process is going on at the present moment under our noses. As a result of occasional violent raids, continuous alarms and Ibn Saud's gifts of money, the Iraq tribes are one by one going over to Nejd. Glubb, Memorandum, No. 54. Cited in Norton, "The Last Pasha," 73.

tent was erected outside the formal garrison next to Glubb's tent at Abu Ghar. Glubb established paid informants (spies) to visit neighboring tribes and extract recent tribal politics and raiding events under the decorum of hospitality. Also, providing his own tent for travelers permitted Glubb to interview visitors for information.[353]

Overall, British reports and intelligence improved significantly throughout this period, spearheaded by Glubb's efforts. Toth notes a much greater understanding of these tribal raids delineating an increased quality in reporting starting in 1927.[354] Information was vital in combatting the later period of the 1927-30 raids. This latest phase began after the attack on the Busayya desert post on 5 November 1927 led by Faysal al-Duwaysh (Mutayr tribe) and Ikhwan leader.[355] On 24 February 1928, raiders were successfully located and bombed, ending that season's raids.[356] The subsequent raiding season of fall 1928-29 was the last major offensive by Duwaysh before his retreat to Kuwait. Glubb's Desert Force could now combat these raids offensively.[357] Glubb had the RAF armoured car units' backing and could still count on RAF air

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[353] Glubb still had to write his intelligence reports for Air HQ. Much of this intelligence gathering was delegated to his slave Hamad. Glubb, *War in the Desert: An RAF Frontier Campaign*, 177.

[354] Toth, "Conflict and a Pastoral Economy," 210–11. For a primary account see, Despatch 'C' from [Sir] Gilbert Clayton, High Commissioner for Iraq, Baghdad to Rt. Hon. Sidney Webb, Colonial Secretary, London, 17 June 1929, regarding the losses inflicted on Iraqi tribes by Najdi raiders since May 1928, and enclosing a document prepared by the Iraq government: List of Akhwan Attacks on Iraq Tribes from 1 July 1928 to 31 May 1929, in English and Arabic versions [FO 967/21] found in Anita L. P. Burdett, *The Expansion of Wahhabi Power in Arabia, 1798-1932 : British Documentary Records : Volume 8. 1929-1932*, vol. 8 (Cambridge Archive Editions, 2013), 72, https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/book/64359.

[355] Stone, "Trouble with the Akhwan Tribes in 1927," 2.

[356] "Two squadrons of 9as with 112 lb. bomb and eight 20 lb bombs on each machine and three Victorias with 520 lb. and 20 lb bombs aboard pass over us at 0900 hours en route for Es Safa. At 1300 hours we saw the formation return. Stone, "Trouble with the Akhwan Tribes in 1927," 10; Warwick, *In Every Place*, 124–25.

[357] This was also a time of stricter adherence to the 'Uqayr protocol. Armored cars and air patrols could not go farther than 20 miles past the neutral zone Toth, "Conflict and a Pastoral Economy," 212–13; Norton, "The Last Pasha," 132.

support if needed.[358] Glubb asserts that all his efforts finally culminated in his successful stand against the Ikhwan at al-Abtiyya on 19 February 1929. Glubb organized the Iraqi sheepherding tribes in a defensive formation against Duwaysh and some 800 men. Duwaysh seeing a readied defense, retreated and called off his offensive.

After abandoning any further raids into Iraq, the Ikhwan turned to conflict within Nejd, where Ibn Sa'ud won a decisive battle against the Ikhwan rebels at Sibilla on 29 March 1929. They retreated, seeking refuge in Kuwait, sending a letter to the British, offering to halt all raids into Iraq and Kuwait, but this was denied.[359] ACC units pursued them, evicting them from Kuwait, and by December 1929, the Ikhwan were retreating to Lusafa (As Safa) and Jariya. Farhan Ibn Mashur surrendered on 24 December 1929; eventually, he was escorted back to Syria. The RAF led by Glubb and Air Commodore Charles Burnett chased Duwaysh and others fleeing to Jahrah on 5 January 1930 after Saud's Army appeared. The key Ikhwan leaders, Naif Ibn Hithlain, Faisal Duwaysh, and Jasir Ibn Lami, surrendered on the 9th to Burnett and Glubb after RAF operations.[360] The Ikhwan appealed to Glubb, asking for sanctuary in Iraq, but

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[358] "Captain Glubb's success in maintaining order and establishing a personal ascendency over the lawless Bedouin in the Southern desert has been remarkable. […] At the Lupin conference even King Ibn Sa'ud expressed to me his admiration of the services which Captain Glubb had rendered to 'Iraq during the recent operations (Humprys)." Glubb's full account of these events can be found in a Foreign Office memorandum. His description in *War in the Desert*. is better complemented now that this is easily accessible, "A Report on the Operations on the Iraq-Najd Frontier. From 1st December 1929 to the 15th of January, 1930. Unnumbered despatch from [Lt. Col. Sir] F. H. Humphrys, High Commissioner for Iraq, Baghdad to Rt. Hon. Lord Passfield, Colonial Secretary, London, 16 April 1930, with enclosure: […] [FO 371/14451] found in Burdett, *The Expansion of Wahhabi Power in Arabia, 1798-1932 : British Documentary Records : Volume 8. 1929-1932*, 8:280–318. Norton stops short with Glubb's efforts at al-Abitiya, but there is a final confrontation in the fall/winter of 1929–30 when Sa'ud's army rounds up the Ikhwan rebels.

[359] Silverfarb, "Great Britain, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia," 246.

[360] Glubb, A Report on the Operations", found in Burdett, *The Expansion of Wahhabi Power in Arabia, 1798-1932 : British Documentary Records : Volume 8. 1929-1932*, 8:306.

ultimately, the key leaders were handed over to Sa'ud after January of 1930. All told, any "air action" (bombing) in achieving the unconditional surrender of Duwaysh, and other Ikhwan leaders was minimal.[361]



Figure 5: Southern Desert December 1928–February 1930.
Reproduced from Warwick, In Every Place, 135

[361] Only 25 bombs were dropped during this operation. "Historical Summary of Situation in Southern Desert 19 December 1929 to 10 February 1930," 6. AIR 23/624 *Southern Desert operations*.

In co-opting the tribes and playing Bedouin politics, Norton personifies Glubb as becoming a sheikh, leading and commanding the Desert Camel Corps. Glubb recruited the sons of tribal leaders into the Desert Force, effectively consolidating local authority under himself (this same method was later used in Trans-Jordan). Iraqi newspapers were filled with accounts of Glubb's seduction of the tribes, and this process was not as clandestine as the British would have liked.[362] After the Iraq-Nejd border disputes were resolved aboard the *Lupin* on 21 February 1930, Glubb would do much of his same work in Trans-Jordan. After British control of Iraq ceded in 1932, intelligence continued to play a vital role for the British, with the scheme operating much the same as during the Mandate. The principal difference was nominal. The SSO title became Liaison Officer (this was more politically acceptable) and was reduced to five posts throughout Iraq with more intelligence officers staying at Air Staff

[362] [RAF report on *Al Ahali* article Monday, 8th May, 1933 entitled Intelligence Officers] "The editor takes up the whole question of intelligence officers alleged frequent visits to outlying frontier and other localities occasionally […] The editor places them in the same category as those of Captain Glubb before his departure from 'Iraq observing that, 'The connections established by Mr. Glubb remain, being continued by the 'Resident' who has suspended him on the frontier. Frontier district Shaikhs continue to frequent Mr. Glubb's room and to hold discourses with the clerk or Resident Officer maintaining with the latter the same connection that which they maintained with Mr. Glubb when the latter was amongst them. No change has followed the transfer of Mr. Glubb, all that has happened being that the latter has transferred his seat from the 'Iraqi-Najd' frontier to the 'Iraqi-Najd-Transjordan' frontier.'" Local press extracts from *Al Ahali*, 8 May 1933, "Intelligence Officers" [AIR2/1196] Found in Anita L. P. Burdett, *Iraq: Defence Intelligence, 1920-1973*, vol. 3: 1933-1941 (Slough: Archive Editions, 2005), 25. and 20 May 1933, "The Rulers of the Desert Does the public know who is Mulla Hamdan?" [AIR2/1196] Found in Burdett, *Iraq: Defence Intelligence, 1920-1973*, 2005, 3: 1933-1941:25–26.

Headquarters.[363] The Iraq Royal Air Force took over some of the duties after years of training by the RAF.[364]

Due to both the limits of the "moral effect," the need for some "boots on the ground," and technological limitations at the time, Air Control was incapable of policing Iraq as an "air alone" method. Once allied to the intelligence gathered by SSOs like Glubb, Air Control was an effective policing practice and capable of operating on a shoestring budget. It was even cost-effective within the desert, utilizing forward operating bases and petrol dumps to make up for early aircraft's technical deficiencies and limited flight times. Overall, the supporting pillars of armored vehicles and human intelligence ensured a more palatable cost to British taxpayers, while still maintaining stability.

Glubb's career in Iraq exemplifies the limits of the bombing aspect of Air Control, later arguing against it, claiming it incited hatred for British rule. A sophisticated intelligence service was required to inform and co-opt various tribes to maintain a semblance of security during the Mandate period. A doctrinal shift in RAF publications acknowledges intelligence's role and reduces the explicit force needed to maintain rule.[365] Much of this shift was due to the influence of Glubb, who successfully

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[363] Appendix A: "Distribution of Air Staff Intelligence Officers for Post Mandate Period"[AIR2/1196]; Most secret telegram No. Z.426J from Wing-Cmdr Graham, Iraq, to Wing-Cmdr Harries, Air Ministry, 24 September 1932, reporting that present arrangements will continue until Iraq authorities raise objection [AIR2/1196] found in Burdett, *Iraq: Defence Intelligence, 1920-1973*, 2005, 2: 1926-1932:697,704.

[364] Iraqi Ministry of Defence, *Official secret book: Notes on Air Control over the Tribes*, 12-14. Translated by Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi. https://www.aymennjawad.org/25127/air-control-over-the-tribes-secret-iraqi-ministry.

[365] "…aircraft would only be used in fact to bludgeon wrongdoers into a grudging submission. But in actual practice nothing is farther from the truth, for the essence of air control is an accurate and detailed knowledge of the people, and this necessitates constant intercourse between political and intelligence officers, and the inhabitants." p.s.a. Squadron Leader The Hon R. A. Cochrane A.F.C. R.A.F., "The Work

revised the use of force from overt to covert. Utilizing his intimate knowledge of tribal customs to suit his own purposes, Glubb broadened British imperial control. Glubb's intelligence network penetrated the Ikhwan camps, gathering reliable intel for possible impending raids. Timely intelligence gave Glubb the necessary warning to defend against Faysal al-Duwaysh's advance at al-Abitiya and later events in 1929–30. After Iraq's southern border was settled, Glubb was recruited for corresponding work in Trans-Jordan. Glubb created a similar police force, training a Bedouin force for his Desert Patrol (and later when in command of the Arab Legion). Glubb secured the Nejd/Trans-Jordan border, ensuring continued security for the Iraq Petroleum Company's oil pipelines, and in the process, launched Trans-Jordan's militarized welfare system.

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of the Royal Air Force at Aden," *Journal of the Royal United Services Institute* 76, no. 501 (February 1, 1931): 97, https://doi.org/10.1080/03071843109426135.

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

This thesis has focused on three specific issues within the current literature on Air Control: the political uncertainty and power struggle within the various Cabinet Offices, the cost savings argument, and the importance of intelligence within the general scheme. Addressing these specific issues within the Air Control literature is pertinent for existing matters today as drones and autonomous weapon systems continue to grow in sophistication. Many arguments made by the RAF for its air control scheme are still taken at face value. Tackling its various elements' nuances hopes to provide grounded expectations for anyone seeking past precedent in their use of drones today.

Few scholars studying Air Control have linked the Eastern Theatre's tumultuous political events to its development as a defense policy. The India Office's vision for a satellite entity in Iraq, although a failed dream, carried into the post-war landscape. Most accounts only discuss an interservice rivalry inside the military establishment, fighting for a stable budget during peacetime. David Omissi convincingly argues that RAF undertook imperial policing duties to maintain relevance during the interwar period. Air Control should also be understood as the enforcement arm of the Sharifian Solution. The addition of a civilian interservice rivalry creates a fuller account of how the novel use of technology was used for policing purposes. These two events are, in fact, conjoined and cannot be understood separately. A contentious political period in both the civil and military services made it possible for the experiment to happen.

A cursory inspection of the RAF's defense reduction yields a misleading narrative. The cost savings argument of Air Control is much more opaque than

previously conveyed. Cost reduction was achieved but not by air substitution alone. This detail is stressed because incomplete Air Control accounts are still cited, echoing a similar argument for saving blood and treasure. Elements outside Britain's Exchequer hold a sizeable portion of the RAF's savings. The British Raj and Iraq's government offset some of the RAF's expenditure, making its cost reduction figures exaggerated. Iraq's Army, Police, and Levies also aided air substitution efforts. These units are often unidentified or dismissed in the RAF's account during the transition from British Mandate to Iraq's nominal independence.

The emphasis on intelligence is not to discount any violence from Air Control's practice. What is disputed is the overstated impact of the strategic bombing and its cited "moral effect." Bombing could not change or shape human behavior on its own. The role of intelligence within the air control scheme increased its strategic capabilities. The SSOs who stayed on past the standard two-year commitment provided an indeterminate aspect of its success. These agents made the system "work" from an operational perspective. Once allied to the intelligence gathered by SSOs like Glubb, Air Control was an effective policing practice and capable of performing on a shoestring budget.

Highlighting the underpinnings of Air Control has been the focus of this study. Aside from redefining its emergence and essential elements, it is meaningful to reflect on how these policies might be associated with current issues. There is a clear genealogy since Air Control's first use in Mandate Iraq. Aside from its export to Yemen, Palestine, Trans-Jordan, and to a certain degree the Northwest Frontier, is a study of its applications by the United States after WWII. The United States has been the most inspired by Air Control. *Project Control by Air and Other Means* enlisted RAF personnel, notably John Slessor, to provide a basis for air power in peripheral conflict

during the Cold War.[366] Its total influence is uncertain, but the report clearly formed the basis for air power's use during the Cold War, citing British Air Control as one of its primary case studies. CAOM was subsequently noted in US Air Journals during an analysis of the First Gulf War. Air power's role appeared indisputable for air advocates, who argued air power was now the key component for winning future conflicts. Consequently, *Shock and Awe* formed a basis for the initial campaign of the Second Gulf War. Ultimately, the international community's approach to peacekeeping by means of air policing throughout the 1990s continued into the 21st century, i.e., the Libyan intervention.

Modern air power approaches are increasingly drawn to drones and their professed efficacy in resolving multi-faceted political issues. The ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance) capabilities alone have greatly enhanced intelligence collection efforts compared to nascent reconnaissance efforts. Pattern-of-life analysis can map an individual target's movements, build unique databases for possible targets, and possibly eliminate any need for human intelligence.[367] These capabilities add a new component to Feigenbaum and Kanngieser's understanding of atmospheric policing.

Since the weaponization of drones, their usage in warfare has been on the rise. Drones have extended middle-income countries' air power capacities. Wealthy nation-

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[366] "Among the men who pioneered the idea of using air power to control unfriendly peoples were members of the British Royal Air Force during the early twenties. Several of these men showed generous interest in Project Control and assisted at Maxwell Airforce Base, offering valuable advice, encouragement, and constructive criticism. Among these were Marshal of the Royal Air Force, Sir John Slessor; Air Marshal Sir Robert Saundby, and Air Marshal W. L. Dawson." "Project Control: The Concept of Control by Air and Other Means—Final Report" (Maxwell AFB, AL: USAF Historical Collection, Air Force Historical Research Agency, June 1954), 3, REEL K2568 K239.042-9.

[367] Drones provide full motion video on targets. Computers can map their movements and profile their behavior, turning metadata into actionable intelligence. Nina Franz, "Targeted Killing and Pattern-of-Life Analysis: Weaponised Media," *Media, Culture & Society* 39, no. 1 (January 1, 2017): 111–21, https://doi.org/10.1177/0163443716673896.

states previously maintained unchallenged aerial superiority. With the proliferation of drones, there are multiple options for smaller states and non-state actors to contest the previous paradigm (drones have gone consumer). UAVs and RPAs can be bought and maintained much more cheaply than traditional fighter jets and bombers (low millions). Drones have been an integral factor within Syria, Libya, and Yemen's civil wars. Foreign actors have employed drones to aid competing factions in their foreign policy objectives, further compounding the crises.[368] Not long ago, drones played an essential role in Azerbaijan and Armenia's conflict (27 Sept–10 Nov 2020) for the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region.[369] Drone use by non-state actors will also intensify, notably, since the highly effective Houthi claimed drone attack on two Aramco oil facilities in Saudi Arabia on 14 Sept 2019.[370] This attack reduced the global oil market by over 5% for a few days while it recovered and brought OPEC to its lowest monthly output since 2002.[371] Since then, there has been another attack in Jizan on 12 Jul 2020, which seems to imply the start of a new trend.[372]

It is evident some vestige of Air Control will continue to be tested and refined throughout the Middle East. Regional rivalries and non-state groups will continue to

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[368] For a succinct example, see Jason Pack and Wolfgang Pusztai, "Turning the Tide: How Turkey Won the War for Tripoli" (Middle East Institute, November 2020), https://www.mei.edu/publications/turning-tide-how-turkey-won-war-tripoli.

[369] Shaan Shaikh and Wes Rumbaugh, "The Air and Missile War in Nagorno-Karabakh: Lessons for the Future of Strike and Defense," December 8, 2020, https://www.csis.org/analysis/air-and-missile-war-nagorno-karabakh-lessons-future-strike-and-defense.

[370] Milan and Tabrizi, "Armed, Unmanned, and in High Demand," 741.

[371] Grant Smith, "OPEC Output Suffers Biggest Drop in 16 Years on Saudi Attacks," *Bloomberg.Com*, October 1, 2019, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-10-01/opec-output-suffers-biggest-drop-in-16-years-on-saudi-attacks; Tuqa Khalid, "Drones Used in Saudi Arabia's Aramco Attack Have Iranian Components: Report," *Al Arabiya English*, February 19, 2020, sec. Gulf, https://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/gulf/2020/02/19/Drones-used-in-Saudi-Arabia-s-Abqaiq-attack-have-Iranian-components-Report.html.

[372] "Yemeni Houthis Say They Hit Saudi Oil Facility in Drone, Missile Attack," *Reuters*, July 13, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-saudi-security-yemen-idUSKCN24D0U6.

interact during a retrenchment to great power competition, necessitating air power as an integral component.[373] Furthermore, as Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning models are incorporated into advanced drone systems, the belief of control without occupation will continue to resonate with military thinkers and politicians.[374] It is imperative to note that historically Air Control was incapable of policing Iraq as an "air alone" method; Air Control was not designed or implemented in this manner. Some "boots on the ground," a robust intelligence system, and an accommodating local administration were all indispensable in policing Iraq. Weaknesses were apparent in its "moral effect" and technological constraints. This case study illustrates that technological solutions do not occur in a vacuum. For the emergence of Air Control to happen, greater austerity concerns and interdepartmental in-fighting prompted an innovative solution in policing Britain's empire. Politics spurred the already existing technology of flight to be reimagined as a means of control throughout peripheral regions of the empire. Air Control's complexities and limitations must be understood for today's context of drones. If unrecognized, any air campaign seeking political solutions on the ground can achieve only mixed results.

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[373] For current trends the RUSI project on drones in the Middle East, https://drones.rusi.org/about-the-project. The Oxford Research Group's study on Remote Warfare has since lost funding but is still archived at https://web.archive.org/web/20200923093919if_/https://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/Pages/Category/remote-warfare.

[374] At the very least, these technologies can reduce the necessary troops needed 'on the ground', and echo earlier ideas of air substitution. "Defence Review: British Army to Be Cut to 72,500 Troops by 2025," *BBC News*, March 22, 2021, sec. UK, https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-56477900.

APPENDIX 1

RAF OPERATIONS MANUAL (CD22) PUB. 1922, EXTRACTS

Four main operational uses of bombing: "the destruction of fighting personnel, or of material on land and sea, the morale effect on the enemy population, and the incendiary effect.

Chapter VII – Aerial Operations and Aerial Fighting

Bombing of Towns

Draft

The attack on enemy towns with a view to influencing the morale of the enemy is primarily a matter for consideration of His Majesty's Government. Should such a course be decided on, national characteristics must be taken into consideration and, unless the attack can be conducted in great strength, it should not be attempted. Commanders must bear in mind that such attacks should be timed to co-incide with other factors likely to have a deteriorating effect on the morale of the enemy. A series of strong air attacks, relentlessly continued, on some of the larger enemy towns immediately following his defeat in the field or at sea may influence the duration of a campaign to a large extent. The type of bomb to be used may be left to the discretion of the commander of the air force, who should remember that the high explosive bomb carries the greater moral effect on a civilian population, but that at night, large fires caused by incendiary bombs have a very useful effect.[375]

Final Draft

The attack on enemy towns is subject to the rules which may be laid down as the result of international agreement in regard to the bombardment of towns from the air. Subject to such rules, which will be notified in due course, it must be borne in mind that, while the effect on the morale of the civilian population is no justification for air attack upon a town otherwise exempt under the rules, the effect of the bombardment of *legitimate objectives* included in the perimeter of a town is bound to be considerable, particularly after a defeat of the enemy's forces in the field or at sea. Attacks of this kind, when decided upon, should therefore be conducted in great strength and relentlessly pursued, such types of bomb being used as the commander of the Air Force may think best. All reasonable precautions must be taken to confine the attack to legitimate objectives and, in particular, to spare hospitals and other privileged buildings protected under the Geneva and Hague Conventions.[376]

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[375] Draft version of the *Operations Manual* in Air Ministry, "CD 22 Printing and Publication." Cited in Parton, "The Evolution and Impact of Royal Air Force Doctrine, 1919-1939," 81–82.

[376] Air Ministry, *Operations Manual, Royal Air Force,* p. 57 Parton, "The Evolution and Impact of Royal Air Force Doctrine, 1919-1939," 83.

Chapter XI – Aircraft in Warfare against an Uncivilised Enemy

Draft

"In operations against fanatical tribes the commander should bear in mind that a single attack on a sacred town or shrine will probably have the desired effect without further action"[377]

Final Version

"In these attacks, endeavor should be made to spare the women and children as far as possible, and for this purpose a warning should be given, whenever practicable." [378]

Royal Air Force War Manual (AP1300), published and distributed in May 1928

Chapter XIV – Air Operations in Undeveloped and Semi-Civilised Countries

Role of Intelligence

… The selection of the correct air objectives demands a comprehensive and accurate knowledge of the psychology of the enemy and of his customs and characteristics which can only be expected from those who have made a special study of the people. The choice is therefore governed primarily by political considerations and should be made only after due consultation with the political authorities.[379]

[377] Minute 44 from Spaight to CAS in Air Ministry, "CD 22 Printing and Publications." Cited in Parton, "The Evolution and Impact of Royal Air Force Doctrine, 1919-1939," 93.

[378] Air Ministry, *Operations Manual, Royal Air Force*, p. 128. Cited in Parton, "The Evolution and Impact of Royal Air Force Doctrine, 1919-1939," 93.

[379] *Air Ministry, Royal Air Force War Manual* Ch. XIV, para 20. Cited in Parton, "The Evolution and Impact of Royal Air Force Doctrine, 1919-1939," 137.

APPENDIX 2

EXTRACTS FROM LEAGUE OF NATIONS REPORT

9.—Raids from the Southern Desert.

Reference has been made in the section of this report dealing with the relations of the ‘Iraqi Government with the Hejaz-Nejd Government* to the difficulties which were created by the predatory activities of the nomadic tribes inhabiting the frontier area between the two countries. In the solution of these difficulties a most important role has been played by the Royal Air Force. Before diplomatic action could be successful it was essential that tribes which raided into Nejd from ‘Iraq should be punished, and that Nejdi raiders who crossed over into ‘Iraq from Nejd should find the ‘Iraqi tribes defended against their incursions. In the spring of 1924. and the winter of 1924-25 and again in the spring of 1927 and winter of 1927-28, the Royal Air Force, supported by detachments of the ‘Iraqi army and a force of ‘Iraqi desert police which had been organized especially for work in the southern desert, carried out constant air and ground patrols over the frontier area. and on several occasions engaged Raiders with salutary effect.

In the spring and autumn of 1929, the Royal Air Force was engaged in arduous operations holding the frontier against the threatened attacks of Nejdi tribes which had revolted against their government, and by denying them access to ‘Iraqi territory materially assisted the Nejdi troops which were operating against them.

The final surrender of the rebels in the winter of 1930, brought about mainly by the work of aircraft and armoured cars, restored peace to the border. Since then the southern desert area has been placed under the control of the ‘Iraqi desert police and order has been well maintained.[380]

5. —The Southern Desert Force.

Of the desert areas, in which control has been established by means of armed cars, by far the most important is the southern desert area stretching from the Trans-Jordan boundaries in the west to Kuwait in the east. In this area 15 cars are employed. With two mobile wireless sets. The several desert posts are garrisoned by some 90 men, while a further 90 camelmen are employed on roving commissions. This force, known as the Southern Desert Force, was organized in 1927-28 to combat the incursions of Nejdi raiders and to prevent the raids of ‘Iraqi tribes into Nejdi territory. The Southern Desert Force successfully fulfilled the role assigned to it, and government prestige in the area has been enhanced by the freedom from raiding which the Bedouin now enjoy.[381]

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[380] Jarman, *Iraq Administration Reports 1914-1932: 1931-32,* 10:43.

[381] Jarman, *Iraq Administration Reports 1914-1932: 1931-32,* 10:58.

APPENDIX 3

CONTEXT OF AIR CONTROL'S COST

B. Cost

[…] Political conditions, notably the delay in peace negotiations with Turkey, made it necessary that there should be two local forces, one the Iraq Army, under the control of and paid by the Iraq Government, the other the Levies under British officers, and paid for from British funds. The main duty of the latter was to be the preservation of order on the northern frontier. Owing to financial stringency the total strength of these two forces has never risen above about 10,000 men, but it is less this fact than the possibility of attack by Turkey which has made it impossible to carry out the proposed reductions in the Imperial garrison in Iraq. For over a year there have been small forces of Turks in the mandated territory trying to stir up the Kurdish tribes against His Majesty's Government, and on several occasions this resulted in heavy fighting, though only once were Imperial troops other than the Royal Air Forces and the British officered levies actually engaged in hostilities.

It was decided later that while the final reduction should be to 4 battalions, reduction to 6 battalions, was the most that could be effected by 1st October 1922.

The Cabinet decided on February 9th 1922 that the provision should be made in estimates for 1922-23 for 2 white and 4 Indian battalions, and that in addition Mosul garrison should remain until further orders. In accordance with this decision provision was made in estimates for 2 white and 7 Indian battalions up to June 1st and 2 white and 4 Indian battalions thereafter. The Near East situation has made it impossible for the latter reduction to be affected up to date, and it has been agreed that the existing garrison must remain until the termination of the Lausanne Conference.

(N.B. It is desirable that a decision should be reached before January 1st 1923 in view of the impossibility of evacuation troops after end of trooping season.)

It is estimated that the additional expenditure resulting from this delay in completing the programme of reduction will amount to between £300,000 and £350,000 in the current financial year, and in any case the programme itself had contemplated some time spent in getting down to the ultimately approved garrison.

Some analysis of the figure of £9,841,000 for the cost of Iraq during the current financial year may be of interest. The cost of the Native Levies is £600,000 and Local Civil expenditure amounts to nearly the same figure, of which £440,000 is in respect of the railways, almost all of it being costs actually incurred during earlier periods. The total distinctively "local" expenditure payable by His Majesty's Government is £l,193,800. The total cost of the Imperial garrison is put at £8,648,000. Of this, slightly more than £1,000,000 represents payments to the Government of India in respect of

Indian troops. £4,530,000 is the total of payments to the War Office, excluding payment for Indian troops, and £3,375.000 is the total payable to the Air Ministry. The "local" expenditure of £1,193,800 explained above and the £1,015,500 payable to the Indian Government are clearly charges solely and directly due to our retention of responsibility for Iraq. But unless it can be assumed that, if that responsibility were discarded, the two British Battalions now in Iraq, the artillery, transport engineering, commissariat and medical services, and the Royal Air Force Squadrons and ancillary services would all be disbanded, it is a matter of conjecture how much of the remaining £7,632,500 would be saved. This figure is not the cost of retaining these services in Iraq. It is their total cost, including in the cost case of the War Office at any rate, sundry overhead charges.

The figure of total "cost of Iraq" anticipated for 1923-4 is £4,830,00. How soon we can get below that is dependent on how far the expectations of the ~~C.A.S Colonial Audit Service~~ Chief of the Air Staff as to a reduction in garrison can be realized. Apart from the native levies, future civil charges should not reach £50,000.[382]

[382] From B. Cost, in 11 December 1922, enclosing a memorandum by the Middle East Department for circulation to the Cabinet Committee on Iraq, 11 December 1922, on the general question of policy in Iraq [AIR8/57] found in Burdett, *Iraq: Defence Intelligence, 1920-1973*, 2005, 1: 1920-1925:371–74.

Statement showing the approximate cost of Iraq to Imperial funds.

Year.	Amount.
Period prior to end of March 1919 (rough estimate).	£246,500,000
1919-20 (including expenditure on North West Persia).	£ 48,500,000
1920-21	£ 32,000,000
1921-22	£ 23,000,000
1922-23 (estimates including probable supplementary)	£ 9,841,000
1923-24 (forecast of probable estimate)	£ 4,850,000

APPENDIX (II B).

TABLE showing Increase in Local Forces by Combatants.

(Attached to Memorandum by the Chief of the Air Staff.)

Garrison.	Present, 1924–25.			First Year, 1925–26.			Second Year, 1926–27.			April 1, 1924.	Third Year, 1927–28.			Fourth Year, 1928–29.			Fifth Year, 1929–30.			Sixth Year, 1930–31.		
	Units.	Combatants.	British Officers.	Units.	Combatants.	British Officers.	Units.	Combatants.	British Officers.		Units.	Combatants.	British Officers.	Units.	Combatants.	British Officers.	Units.	Combatants.	British Officers.	Units.	Combatants.	British Officers.
IRAQ ARMY (Combatants).										Levies to be transferred to Iraq Government. Cavalry Assyrian Battalion and Pack Battery as Frontier Force. Arab Levy Battalion as Iraq Army Battalion.	IRAQ ARMY.			IRAQ ARMY.			IRAQ ARMY.			IRAQ ARMY.		
Cavalry Regiment	3	1,352	..	3	1,452	5	3	1,452	15		3	1,452	15	4	1,936	20	4	1,936	20	4	1,936	20
Pack Batteries	4	736	..	4	744	2	4	744	8		4	744	8	5	930	10	6	1,116	12	7	1,302	14
Infantry Battalions	5	3,750	..	6	4,140	18	6	4,140	36		7	4,830	42	7	4,830	42	10	6,900	50	11	7,590	66
Headquarters	..	..	..	..	..	5	..	..	5		..	..	5	..	..	5	..	..	5	..	..	5
	..	*5,838*	..	..	*6,336*	30	..	*6,336*	64													
IRAQ LEVIES (Combatants).											FRONTIER FORCE.			FRONTIER FORCE.			FRONTIER FORCE.			FRONTIER FORCE.		
Headquarters and Depot	..	..	21	..	..	21	..	..	21		..	..	21	..	..	21	..	..	21	..	..	21
Cavalry Regiment	2	914	14	2	914	14	2	914	14		2	914	14	2	914	14	2	914	14	2	914	14
Pack Battery	1	208	5	1	208	5	1	208	5		1	208	5	1	208	5	1	208	5	1	208	5
Assyrian Battalions	3	2,577	24	3	2,577	24	3	2,577	24		3	2,577	24	3	2,577	24	3	2,577	24	3	2,577	24
Arab Battalion	1	859	8	1	859	8	1	859	8													
	..	*4,558*	72	..	*4,558*	72	..	*4,558*	72		..	*10,725*	134	..	*11,395*	141	..	*13,651*	161	..	*14,527*	169
IMPERIAL FORCES.																						
Pack Battery	1	..	..	0	..	..	..															
British Infantry Battalion ..	1	..	..	1	..	..	1				..	..	..	0	..	..	..			..		
Indian Infantry Battalion ..	3	..	..	3	..	..	3				3	..	..	3	..	..	3	For part of year only.		0		
Squadrons, R.A.F.	8	..	..	8	..	..	7				7	..	..	6	..	..	6			0		
Armoured Car Companies ..	4	..	..	3	..	..	3				2	..	..	2	..	..	2			0		

NOTE.—The above figures are based on the following establishment:—

		Combatants.
IRAQ ARMY	Cavalry Regiment	484
	Pack Battery	186
	Infantry Battalion	690
IRAQ LEVIES	Cavalry Regiment	457
	Pack Battery	208
	Infantry Battalion	859

APPENDIX 4

CONTEMPORARY VIEW OF AIR CONTROL BY TRENCHARD

Minute Sir Hugh Trenchard

Mr Osborne,

You asked me to send you a few notes on what I said at the conference this afternoon on the subject of the recent trade but the good there tribe into Iraq as reported in Sir Henry Dobbs is telegram No. 622 dated 29th December.

The whole basis of our power in a vast country like Iraq is to keep the tribes in order and to prevent risings, it is to adopt instantaneous retaliatory measures by air action; this means that we must immediately hit back at the tribes raiding our territory. If we are prevented from taking this action then there is no doubt in my mind that we have reduced our air and ground forces unduly, but if we are still permitted to hit back at once, then we have ample forces at our disposal to keep order in Iraq and to prevent tribal risings.

I fully recognize the difficulties of dealing with tribes that are raiding a rock when these tribes are nominally under the control of Ibn Saud, though apparently he can't control them or, what is worse, his possibly merely a pretense and he may, in fact, be conniving at these raids whilst at the same time he expressed his disapproval of them.

During 1924 and 1925 the Akhwan tribes carried out numerous raids into the southeast Iraq, then, owing to greater power exercise by Ibn Saud over his tribes and to other causes, these raids seized. Since these rates can be carried out by the Akhwan over a frontier extending some 600 miles and since information concerning a raid take several days and perhaps weeks, to reach our headquarters in Baghdad, it is impossible for forces to make certain that they can catch the Raiders in an act of raiding. Therefore, when a raid takes place, if we are unable to catch them in the act, we must immediately hit hard with our air forces, at one or more of their headquarters, bases or villages.

From the information I have from all over the world, I'm certain that if this action were taken the raiding would seize.

Up to the present, owing to a variety of circumstances we have not taken such action, with the result that the Anezeh tribe, which, roughly speaking, inhabits the whole of the country extending from Transjordan to Baghdad (a distance of 800 miles) and over which the empire air route from Cairo to Baghdad passes, the gh[?] formerly peaceful and well disposed towards us, have within the past 6 or 9 months shown signs of coquetting with the Mutair tribe and of transferring their allegiance to Ibn Saud.

Should this actually happen, owing to their belief that we have not the power or, at any rate, the intention to punish the Mutair tribe for their misdeeds, then it will be impossible to maintain the trans desert route and the line of communications for reinforcement from Egypt, which is the whole basis of our power in Iraq, will be cut and in addition there would arise the political consequences, on which I am not qualified to speak, of Iraq seeing a large are of her territory coming under the authority of Ibn Saud who is at present hostile to her.

I, therefore, feel that the best course to adopt at the present time is immediately to authorise Iraq to use such air forces as are necessary to attack selected Mutair headquarters, etc. such as Al Hafar

Jariya al Ilya
Jariya es Sifla
And Artawyia.

This would, at any rate, deter the Mutair from further raiding and would also cause the Anezeh tribe to relise that it is to their advantage to remain friendly to the British powers in Iraq.

As no definite warning has been given to the Mutair that, in the event of a further raid, their headquarters, etc. Will be bombed. I think the best way to carry out the above course would be to drop warnings from the air at once on the Mutair tribe stating that, owing to this recent trade, they will be attacked from the air as then when we consider it necessary and the Air Officer Commanding should be authorised to attack them the following day. This, I am certain, will give the desired result.

At the same time, appreciating the political difficulties of the situation from you said to me at the colonial office, there is the alternative of dropping warnings from the air to the effect that, should have further raid take place, they will be bombed immediately and without further warning and that the intensity and duration of the bombing will be as we consider necessary. Simultaneously we should inform Ibn Saud as to what we intend to do in order to stop the raiding of the tribes which he states he is unable to control.

This alternative may be sufficient and may produce the desired result so far is raiding by the Mutair is concerned, but at the same time, as we have issued similar threats in the past I very much fear that it may be still insufficient to persuade the Anezeh (a tribe which it is vital to keep peaceful and on our side) to remain friendly towards us. I am afraid they will think that our warning is only one more "bluff" of British air power in Iraq; and it is possible that Ibn Saud may encourage the Akhwan to continue these raids so as to induce the Anezeh and other Iraq frontier tribes to throw in their lot with him.

The Colonial Office pointed out the political objections to the second alternative with regard to the attitude of the Iraq Government if we do not take immediate active measures, and it is not for me to enlarge on them, but I feel bound to point out that any adverse effect on the political situation in Iraq will be seriously detrimental to the security of our position, in view of the greatly reduced forces maintained there at the present time. I do not want to exaggerate this wretched raid by a few Arabs, but at the same time I'm not I'm most seriously concerned at the possibility that the Anezeh tribe may rise and go over to the Akhwans, which would bring about a situation which would be of the greatest character both for Iraq in the relation to the security of our forces located there.

I would like once more to repeat that I fully understand the importance of endeavoring to keep friendly with Ibn Saud, with whom we are in treaty relations in whose influence reacts in Aden, Transjordan and elsewhere, but I would point out that we experienced similar trouble on the Transjordan frontier in the early days of Ibn Saud's rise to power and by hitting the raiding tribe hard, the raiding has never been renewed.

Since I was you, I have called up my Secretary of State on the telephone at Cromer and I have informed him of what has occurred. He told me that I may add to

this note his thorough concurrence in what I have written and that he fully appreciates the importance of keeping friendly with Ibn Saud, but at the same time he recognises the utmost gravity of our position in Iraq if we do not protect our own tribes by the sole means in our power to hit back at those that raid them, viz. by bombing their headquarters, etc. as opposed to being restricted to attacking only the actual raiders who, owing to the magnitude of the area concerned, can seldom be located in time.

Further, he stated that this is the method he has found most suited to the use of air power, not only in Iraq but elsewhere, and the correct use of air power has always achieved the desired results.[383] C.A.S

[383] Minute by Sir H. Trenchard, Air Ministry London, undated; telegram from High Commissioner, Baghdad, to Colonial Secretary, London, 29 December 1927 [FO 371/12241] Priestland, *Records of Iraq, 1914-1966. Volume 4. 1925-1927: The Constitution and the Mosul Settlement*, 807–9.

APPENDIX 5

DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS AGAINST THE IKHWAN

1. The Bedouin tribes are hospitable and will allow a stranger to enter their tents, without even asking his name.
    a. Just fantastic from a European point of view
2. The existing imperial administrative system inhibits access to the bedouin, to the world of the desert.
    a. Great distances which divide these tribes from the Government times.
    b. [Government must be] established in the midst of the tribes themselves.
3. The existing imperial administrative system undermines gaining knowledge of the tribes, the land and the culture.
    a. It is impossible for them [officials] to find time to familiarize themselves with the habits of these tribesmen, much less with their feuds, alliance, raids and personalities.
    b. [These officials] suddenly called upon to give a decision between two leaders they have scarcely seen, and with whose customs and tribes they have never had the opportunity of becoming acquainted.
4. Bedouin tribes are simple, gullible and easy to control.
    a. An idea has been widely prevalent since the days of the Turks, that nomads are wild and ungovernable savages. This is pure delusion. Nomads, on the whole, are the easiest to govern of all Arabs. To familiarize himself with them, however, the official must resign himself to a great deal of physical discomfort in the desert.
    b. Intrigue, which alone makes any Arab troublesome, is rare amongst nomads, except in the case of a few chiefs. With the advent of aerial control, however, the nomad, instead of being before inaccessible to government forces, presents the easiest of all targets for aerial action. The nomad, moreover, is a simple savage quite lacking in that 'I'm-as-good-a-man-as-you-are' insolence which is characteristic of the slightly more civilized. Thus the savageness and ungovernability of the nomad may be written down as myth.
5. The indigenous system tribal system was patriarchal, based on the rule and control of one man.
    a. The most suitable form of Government for such primitive tribes would therefore appear to be that of a single man, whether political officer or paramount sheik, who would control them merely by their own customs.[384]

[384] J. B. Glubb, "Report on the Defensive Operations Against the Akhwan," Secret, For Official Use Only, 16 April 1925, Box 9, Iraq, Uncatalogued, Glubb Papers. Cited in Norton, "The Last Pasha," 75–89.; Also found in R/15/5/38, Reports of SSO Akhwan Defence, 8 March 1925. Toth references this report as well but in less detail. Toth, "Conflict and a Pastoral Economy," 207. Kostiner cites this as Air 23/332, report on Akhwan defense, by SSO Nasiriyya, March 8, 1925.

APPENDIX 6

RAF PERSONNEL INVOLVED IN AIR CONTROL

(This is a reproduction of Richard Newton's Appendix I and Nigel Warwick's Appendix I. Both sources provide a great resource for understanding the RAF hierarchy)

Amyas E. Borton commanded the RFC/RAF in the Palestine Brigade October 1917 to August 1918, and was Gen. Allenby's air commander during the 1918 Palestine Campaign. He returned to the Mid-East as the officer commanding the Mesopotamian Group, renamed Iraq Group, in 1921. When the RAF assumed responsibility for imperial policing in Iraq in October 1922, Borton continued as the operational commander of the RAF forces until returning to England in 1923 and becoming the commandant of the RAF College at Cranwell.

Sir (Henry) Robert Brooke-Popham served as the air officer commander (AOC) in Iraq from November 1928 until October 1930. In 1935 he became the AOC in C of RAF Middle East.

Kenneth C. Buss commanded No. 47 Sqn. in Egypt in 1920 and then served in Air Staff intelligence postings in Iraq until 1931, when he returned to the UK for flying training. He spent the 1930s serving in various postings in HQ RAF Middle East in Cairo, including a two-year posting in Jerusalem as the deputy director of intelligence for Palestine sad Transjordan, 1936-1938. During the Second World War he was the director of intelligence for HQ RAF in Palestine and Transjordan.

Sir (John) Adrian Chamier served as a staff officer and deputy director in the Directorate of Operations and Intelligence from 1919 – 1923. He was one of Trenchard's early 'English Merchants', helping to defend and advocate for an independent air force. From 1923 – 27, he was a staff officer at HQ RAF in India. After retirement from the RAF in 1929, he served as Secretary of the Air League and helped to promote air-mindedness through his writing and public speaking. In 1939, he was recalled to service and in 1941 accepted the position as Commandant of the newly formed Air Training Corps, earning the title, 'Father of the ATC'.

The Honourable Sir Ralph Cochrane served as a flight commander in 45 Sqn in Iraq under Arthur Harris. He commanded 8 Sqn in Aden in 1929. During the Second World War he commanded Nos. 3, 5, and 7 Gps of Bomber Command. In 1945 he was appointed head of Transport Command.

Sir Arthur Coningham commanded No. 55 Sqn. in Iraq, was on & staff of HQ RAF Middle East, and served as the senior airman for & Sudan Defence Force. During the Second World War he commanded 2nd Tactical Air Force.

Sir Robert M. Foster served as an SSO in Iraq during the 1920s after attending the RAF Staff College and the School of Oriental Studies During the Second World War he

commanded No. 214 Group in Iraq and No. 213 Group in Lebanon. In December 1944, he was AOC Desert Air Force.

Sir (Ernest) Leslie Gossage was a senior air staff officer at RAF Iraq Command in 1934 and was the air officer commanding for British forces in Aden from 1935 – 36. From 1940 to 1944 he served as commander-in-chief of Balloon Command.

Sir Arthur "Bomber" Harris commanded No. 31 Sqn. on the NW Frontier (1921-1922) and No. 45 Sqn. in Iraq (1922-1924) under Sir John Salmond. From 1938 to 1939 he was the AOC for Palestine and Transjordan. Harris commanded Bomber Command from 1942 to 1945.

Edgar J. Kingston-McCloughry was assigned to the staff in RAF India in 1929 and made a flight commander in No. 20 Sqn. (Army Co-operation) on the NW Frontier in 1932. He was a prolific writer on airpower during the interwar years. In 1942, he commanded No. 44 Gp. (Fess Service), and from December 1943 was the chief operational planner for the allied expeditionary air force for Operation Overlord (D-Day, Allies' invasion at Normandy).

Sir Edgar Ludlow-Hewitt was the air officer commanding in Iraq from 1930 to 1932. From Feb 1933 to Jan 1935 he served as the Deputy Chief of the Air Staff. Between 1935 and 1937, Ludlow-Hewitt was the AOC in India, where he directed training for RAF squadrons based in India toward improving capabilities for tribal warfare.He commanded Bomber Command from 1937 to 1940 when he was replaced by Sir C.F.A. Portal. From 1940 to 1945 he was the inspector-general of the RAF.

Sir Richard H. Peck served on the staff of Iraq Command from 1922 to 1924, until taking command of No. 84 Sqn in Iraq in 1924. During the Second World War served as the Director-General of Operations and Assistant Chief of the Air Staff. While serving the Directorate of Operations and Intelligence, along with Chamier and Slessor, he was one of Trenchard's 'English Merchants', writing and speaking to advance the cause of independent air power.

Viscount Portal commanded British forces in Aden from 1934 to 1936. From April to October 1940 he commanded Bomber Command. In October 1940 he succeeded Sir Cyril Newall as Chief of the Air Staff, a post he held until December 1945.

Sir (William) Geoffrey Salmond commanded the Middle East brigade of the RFC from July 1916 to August 1917. In December 1917 he assumed command of Middle East Command and remained there until 1922. In December 1926 he was given command of RAF India and was responsible for the RAF's successful evacuation of Kabul in 1928–1929. On 1 Apr 1933, he was appointed Chief of the Air Staff but died of cancer shortly thereafter.

Sir John Salmond became the first RAF officer to command all British forces in Iraq on Oct 1922. He was the first airman to serve as a joint force commander (modern term) in a theatre of operations. In 1929, he succeeded Trenchard as the Chief of the Air Staff.

Sir Robert Saundby was a flight commander in 45 Sqn under Arthur Harris and in 1925 he commanded the RAF Flight in Aden. At the beginning of the Second World War he was the Assistant Chief of the Air Staff (Operational Requirements and Tactics). In 1943 he became Harris' deputy at Bomber Command.

Sir John C. Slessor was a pilot in No. 17 Sqn. In Egypt during the First World War. He commanded 20 Sqn. On the NWF from 1921 to 1922, and No. 3 Wing in Waziristan from 1935 to 1937. He served in the Directorate of Operations and Intelligence with R.H. Peck from 1928 – 30. In 1943, he became commander of Coastal Command. In 1943, he commanded Coastal Command and in 1944 he replaced Sir Arthur Tedder as the commander of the RAF in the Mediterranean and Middle East. In 1950, he succeeded Tedder as Chief of the Air Staff.

James M. Spaight was a lawyer with the civil service who specialised in the law of air war. His writings served to establish parallels between lawful uses of force on land and sea with the new realm of aerial warfare. He concluded it was permissible to attack certain targets to cause civilian hardship and war weariness in order to create a desire to surrender. Spaight served in the Air Ministry from 1918 to 1937.

Sir Geoffrey William Tuttle was an engineering (aircraft maintenance) officer in Karachi, now Pakistan, from 1932 to 1935, and then served as a flight commander in 5 (Army Cooperation) Sqn in Waziristan from 1935 to 1937. In 1944 he was appointed the air officer commanding of Air Headquarters Greece.

RAF Armoured Car Companies (Reproduced from Warwick 604–607, Appendix 1)

Year	Commanding Officers
Armoured Car Wing HQ	
03 November 1922	Wing HQ Formed
	Wing Commander W.H. Primrose DFC
10 November 1924	Disbanded
01 April 1927	Reconstituted
	Squadron Leader A.H. Peck DSO MC
April 1928	Squadron Leader J.J. Breen
October 1928	Wing Commander J. McCrae MBE
March 1929	Squadron Leader D.E. Stodart DSO DFC
February 1929	Wing Commander C.H. Elliott-Smith AFC
01 April 1930	Disbanded
No 1 Armoured Car Company & No 1 Armoured Car Squadron RAF Regiment	
19 December 1921	Company formed. Attached to No 216 Squadron.
01 February 1922	Company becomes self-accounting
	Flight Lieutenant F. Fernihough MC
01 April 1922	Squadron Leader A.J. Currie
01 December 1923	Disbanded in Palestine
01 April 1930	Reformed in Iraq
	Wing Commander C.H. Elliot-Smith AFC
November 1931	Wing Commander V. Gaskell-Blackburn DSC AFC
June 1932	Squadron Leader A.W. Fletcher OBE DFC AFC
December 1932	Wing Commander W.V. Strugnell MC (*continues past 1932*)
No 2 Armoured Car Company & No 2 Armoured Car Squadron RAF Regiment	
07 April 1922	Company formed
	Squadron Leader M.G.D. Copeman
December 1922	Squadron Leader G. Blatherwick
March 1926	Squadron Leader A.N. Gallehawk AFC
December 1926	Squadron Leader J. Everidge MC
December 1927	Squadron Leader L.F. Forbes MC
April 1930	Squadron Leader H.G.R. Malet
December 1930	Squadron Leader E.B. Rice (*continues past 1932*)
No 3 Armoured Car Company	
03 November 1922	Company formed
	Squadron Leader F.H.W. Guard CMG CBE DSO

01 April 1925	Disbanded
No 4 Armoured Car Company	
03 November 1922	Company formed
	Squadron Leader R.P. Willock
November 1924	Squadron Leader G.G.H. Cooke DSC AFC
November 1925	Squadron Leader G.E. Godsave
01 April 1927	Disbanded
No 5 Armoured Car Company	
03 November 1922	Company formed
	Squadron Leader D.Harries AFC
April 1924	Squadron Leader D.O. Mulholland AFC
January 1925	Squadron Leader G.S. Trewin AFC
March 1926	Squadron Leader A.F.A. Hooper OBE
January 1927	Squadron Leader A.S. Morris OBE
01 April 1927	Disbanded
No 6 Armoured Car Company	
03 November 1922	Company formed
	Squadron Leader J.W. Cruikshank OBE
	(died of typhoid 20 February 1925)
March 1925	Squadron Leader – Wing commander E.W. Norton DSC
Frebruary 1926	Squadron Leader E.M. Pollard
	(died in air crash 26 July 1926)
August 1926	Squadron Leader F.R. Alford MC
January 1927	Squadron Leader A.H. Peck DSO MC
01 April 1927	Disbanded

APPENDIX 7



Appendix J: "Organisation of Air Headquarters, Iraq Command [Baghdad]" [AIR 9/14] found in Burdett, Burdett, Iraq: Defence Intelligence, 1920-1973, 2005, 2: 1926-1932:573.

APPENDIX 8

TABLES

Table 1[385]

On 1st January, 1921, the strength of the Iraqi Police Force was as follows

Budget for 1920–21| Rs. 39,87,318	
British Officers	22
British Non-Gazetted Personel	71
Iraqi Gazetted Officers	2
Inspectors	92
Mounted Police	400
Foot Police	2,238

On 1st January, 1931, the strength of the Iraqi Police Force was as follows

Budget for 1930–31| Rs. 82,37,500 (approx. £617,807 in 1931 numbers)	
British Officers	12
British Non-Gazetted Personel	5
Iraqi Gazetted Officers	59
Inspectors	229
Mounted Police	3,762
Foot Police	3,924

[385] Robert L Jarman, *Iraq Administration Reports 1914-1932: 1931-32*, vol. 10 (Cambridge Archive Editions, 1992), 55–56.

Table 2: Reduction of British Garrison in 'Iraq. (Combatant Units only.) [386]

Year	British & Indian Army	Royal Air Force	Iraq Levies
March, 1921	33 Battalions	4 Squadrons	
	6 Cavalry Regiments		
	16 Batteries		
	6 Sapper and Miner Companies.		
	4 Armoured Car Companies		
October, 1921	17 Battalions	6 Squadrons	4 Calvary Regiments
	13 Batteries	7 in February 1922	1 Pack Battery
	4 Sapper and Miner Companies	8 in May 1922	2 Battalions
	3 Armoured Car Companies		3 Machine Gun Companies
October, 1922	9 Battalions	8 Squadrons	3 Cavalry Regiments
	2 Batteries	2 Armoured Car Companies	4 Battalions
	1 Sapper and Miner Company		1 Battery
	2 Armoured Car Companies		
October, 1923	6 Battalions	8 Squadrons	3 Cavalry Regiments
	1 Battery R.F.A.	4 Armoured Car Companies	4 Battalions
	1 Pack Battery		1 Battery
	1 Sapper and Miner Company		
October, 1924	4 Battalions	8 Squadrons	2 Cavalry Regiments
	1 Pack Battery	4 Armoured Car Companies	4 Battalions
	1 Sapper and Miner Company		1 Battery

[386] Jarman, *Iraq Administration Reports 1914-1932: 1931-32*, 10:47–48.

October, 1925	4 Battalions	8 Squadrons	2 Cavalry Regiments
	1 Sapper and Miner Company	3 Armoured Car Companies	4 Battalions
			1 Battery
October, 1926	3 Battalions	8 Squadrons	1 Cavalry Regiment
	1 Sapper and Miner Company	3 Armoured Car Companies	4 Battalions
			1 Battery
			1 Machine Gun Company
October, 1927	2 Battalions	5 Squadrons	3 Battalions
	1 Sapper and Miner Company	2 Armoured Car Company	1 Cavalry Regiment
October, 1928	1 Battalion	4 Squadrons	2 Battalions
	1 Sapper and Miner Company	1.5 Armoured Car Companies	
October, 1929	Nil	4 Squadrons	2 Battalions
		1.5 Armoured Car Companies	
October, 1930	Nil	4 Squadrons	2 Battalions
		1 Armoured Car Company	

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AIR 5/839 *Monthly War Diary for No 5 Armoured Car Company, January 1923–December 1924.*
AIR5/1253 *Operations Iraq Chapters 1 to 13 (1918–1924).*
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