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RURAL DISPLACEMENT AND ITS IMPLICATIONS ON LIVELIHOODS: THE CASE STUDY OF INTER-RIVERINE COMMUNITIES IN SOUTHERN SOMALIA

by
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ABSTRACT
OF THE PROJECT OF

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Title: Rural displacement and its implications on livelihoods: the case study of inter-riverine communities in southern Somalia

Displacement has been frequent and prevalent in Somalia since the 1970s; few years after Siad Barre came to power. The number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Somalia is quite staggering. About 2.6 million Somalis live in protracted displacement, facing severe problems, including indiscriminate killings, forced evictions, sexual violence, and limited access to essential services.

More than 20 years of conflict, combined with recurrent droughts and challenging livelihoods in the rural areas of Somalia, has caused a mixed situation of displacement and migration ranging from voluntary to forced migration patterns. Recurrent drought, competition for natural resources, and poor living conditions contribute to fighting in rural areas, causing people to flee to Mogadishu and other urban areas. Most of the IDPs in Mogadishu originate from the inter-riverine regions of southern Somalia and belong to weak clans such as Digile-Mirifle and the Bantu Minority groups. Therefore, this research sought to investigate drivers of rural displacement in Somalia, giving particular focus to the people from the inter-riverine areas and how displacement and land expropriation affected their livelihoods.

The research used a qualitative approach to collect a detailed and in-depth understanding of displacement, its causes, and patterns in Somalia. The qualitative data was collected through observations, unstructured interviews, and focus group interviews. The interview targeted a sample population of 44 participants to help inform the study objectives and aims. Somalia is often seen as the scene of unceasing violence and insecurity after the fall of the state.

However, the study shows that the interplay between conflict and displacement has seen various stages, modifications, and evolutions. The study has also shown that most of the internally displaced people in Mogadishu came from the inter-riverine areas of southern Somalia, who left their origin places for various reasons. Some said that they were forced to leave their due to clan conflicts, while some said they left because they lost their livestock and other resources to droughts and other natural disasters. IDPs encounter a number of challenges when they arrive at IDP camps in Mogadishu. The study found that IDPs face insecurity, discrimination and other exploitations in the camps. There is no access to education, clean water, healthcare and other services in the camps. The study has shown that there is widespread unemployment among the IDP communities.

In summary, displacement is a common phenomenon that affects thousands of Somali citizens. It is often caused by various factors including conflicts, environmental effects and loss of livelihoods. For displacement to be addressed, Somali government

needs to implement effective policies that tackle root causes, while responding to the needs of those already affected by it.

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ABBREVIATIONS

IDPs - Internally displaced persons

IDMC – Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre

UNHCR – United Nations Higher Commissioner for refugees

HRW- Human Rights Watch

NGO – Non-governmental Organization

HIPS – The Heritage Institute for Policy

Studies SNM – Somali National Movement

USC – United Somali

Congress SNA – Somali

National Alliance SSA –

Somali Salvation Alliance

SDF – Somali Democratic Movement

UNOSOM – United Nations Operation in

Somalia TNG – Somali National

Government

UIC – Union of Islamic Courts

TFG – Transitional Federal Government

ENDF – Ethiopian National defense

Force AMISOM – African Union

Mission in Somalia

UNPOS – United Nations Political Office in Somalia ARS - Alliance for the Re-
liberation of Somali

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1. Background and problem statement

Displacement has been frequent and prevalent in Somalia since the 1970s, few years after Siad Barre came to power (World Bank, 2014). The number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Somalia is quite staggering. According to Human Rights Watch (2013), about 2.6 million Somalis live in protracted displacement, facing severe problems, including indiscriminate killings, forced evictions, sexual violence, and limited access to essential services. More than 20 years of conflict, combined with recurrent droughts and challenging livelihoods in the rural areas of Somalia, has caused a mixed situation of displacement and migration ranging from voluntary to forced migration patterns (World Bank, 2014). The country has a long history of volatility and displacement. Since the 1970s, Somalis have been displaced at different scales in reaction to varieties of dynamics, including conflict, disasters, and economic hardship (Hammond, 2014).

Displacement and civilians fleeing across in the neighboring countries was high in the 1990s at the onset of civil war and state collapse, and between 2007 and 2012, when escalated violence and droughts conspired to contribute to widespread famine.

Somalia plunged into a civil war in 1991, and although currently the country is recovering, the situation remains volatile. Violence is still raging on, causing many to leave their homes in search of protection and livelihood. According to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, the year 2017 was Somalia's second most violent

year in nearly a decade. Recurrent drought, competition fornatural resources, and poor

living conditions contribute to fighting in rural areas, causing people to flee to

Mogadishu and other urban areas (IDMC, 2018). Mogadishu has been both a

battlefield that has itself triggered urban displacement and a sanctuary for many IDPs

fleeing from insecurity and lack of opportunities in rural areas (IDMC, 2018).

      Most of the IDPs in Mogadishu originate from the inter-riverine regions of

southern Somalia and belong to weak clans such as Digile-Mirifle and the Bantu

Minority groups (Menkhaus, 2016). The inter-riverine area is a fertile stretch of land

that lies between the Shabelle river in the north, the Juba river in the south, the

Ethiopian border in the west, and the Indian Ocean in the east. The area has over

fourteen ecological regions, with mainly four types of livelihood: agriculture,

pastoralism, agro-pastoralism, and trade (Mukhtar, 1996). This area is commonly

known as Somalia's breadbasket due to its fertile agricultural land.

      According to Besteman (1996), the Italian colonial administration, dreaming of

an agriculturally fertile colony, established Italian owned plantations in the inter-

riverine areas, dispossessing local farmers. Natives in these areas were forced to work

as laborers on the Italian plantations. The colonial era was the beginning of suffering

for these indigenous communities as they had previously encountered other waves of

invasion in their areas, resulting in land- grabbing and abuse by different actors. The

most significant cases of land-grabbing against the inter-riverine communities

happened in the 1980s, when elites closely associated with the regime started systemic

grabbing of vast areas of irrigable land (De Waal, 1996). During this time, many

farmers were forced off their land by violently and ended up as an agricultural

proletariat.

In January 1991, Mogadishu was seized by rebels fighting against the regime, causing the country to descend into anarchy. After fleeing the capital, Barre's forces-maintained strongholds in the inter-riverine areas for a year, during which they committed heinous crimes against the local population by destroying infrastructure and bringing agricultural production, which was the mainstay of the community, to a standstill (Mukhtar, 1996). The Bantus and Rahanwayn had the misfortune of being the weakest from a military perspective (Natsios, 1996).They became trapped between General Aideed's rebel forces in the north, Barre's in the southwest, Morgan's, who's the son-in-law of Barre, in the south, in what commonly became known as the triangle of death (Mukhtar, 1996). According to Natsios (1996), cries committed against the Bantus and Rahawayn by the Hawiye and Darood clans were as brutal as those against the Bosnian Muslims.

When Siad Barre's military government was defeated, rival clan militias drove the country into serial civil conflict, in which they tried not just to seize and control state institutions, but also to confiscate land and natural resources (Cassanelli, 2015). Hawiye clans who managed to oust the Siad barre regime, claimed that they liberated the inter-riverine from illegal occupation by the previous regime and they had no intention of returning them to the pre-Barre owners (Cassanelli, 1995). In the absence of a functioning state, the clan continues to provide essential services such as social protection, justice, and physical protection. The clan structure posed extraordinary obstacles for the inter-riverine communities because they do not belong to major clan system and therefore they could not ask for the protection of the warlords or other clan militias (World Bank, 2014).

Despite inhabiting Somalia's most fertile agricultural land, the Rahawayn and Bantu communities were hardest hit in both 1991 and 2012 by famine. According to Majid & Macdowell (2012), 750,000 people were classified as being in a state of starvation, which translated into 17% of the total population in south/central Somalia. Out of this population, approximately 66% were from rural areas, and 35% were IDPs residing in camps in Mogadishu. 81% of those from rural areas were from the inter-riverine agro-pastoralists of Bay and Bakol, 15% were from the farming areas of Middle Shabelle and Lower Shabelle, while just 5% were pastoralists (Majid & McDowell, 2012).

1.2. Topic and purpose

Somalia has faced a sharp increase in new displacements triggered by both the ongoing conflict and other disasters in 2017 and the first half of 2018 (IMCD, 2018). Many the IDPs have moved from rural areas to the country's urban areas in search of protection, shelter, and humanitarian aid. Displacement is shaping Somalia's urban and rural landscape and contributing to its rapid urbanization, and according to UNHCR, Somalia's rate of urbanization averaged 4.5% from 2005 to 2010 (UNHCR, 2016). Comprehensive and up-to-date information on the total population in Mogadishu is not available but is estimated to be as high as 2.12 million people (UNHCR, 2016). Mogadishu has the second-highest urban population in the world after Dhaka, the capital city of Bangladesh (Somali Public Agenda, 2019).

The situation deteriorated in 2011 and a serious drought that had been building for the past two years, as well as the economic and other effects of conflict and restrictions on movement and trade in South Central Somalia resulted in the emergence of the worst famine the country had seen in more than 20 years

(Hammond, 2015). As of 2018, the number of IDPs in Mogadishu was 2,648,000 (IMDC, 2018), and the majority of these people were displaced from the inter-riverine areas in southern Somalia (UNHCR, 2016). Humanitarian assistance in the inter-riverine areas were hampered by five bottlenecks: 1) AL-Shabab's refusal to permit aid agencies to operate in the region; 2) US suspension of food aid into areas controlled by Al- Shabab; 3) chronic insecurity pre-dating Al-Shabab; 4) diversion of food aid by armed groups and corrupt officials in the government; and 5) a ' privilege gap' in Somali society, in which low- status groups lacked the social capital to access relief aid and remittances (Menkhaus, 2012).

Moreover, Al-Shabab imposed heavy taxes on the people, and forcefully recruited their children, eroding their livelihood coping mechanisms. In Somalia, war has been fought along ethnic and clan lines, and clan affiliation has played a critical part in shaping people's vulnerability (Jaspars & Maxwell, 2008). Minority clans in Somalia have a strong but limited social support mechanism in comparison with major clans due to limited international reach (Majid & McDowell, 2012).

Arriving in Mogadishu is not the end of problems for the IDPs. According to Human Rights Watch (2013), members of the displaced communities often faced serious human rights abuses, including rape, battering, ethnic discrimination, restricted access to food and shelter, restrictions on movement, and reprisal when they dared to protest these abuses (HRW, 2013). The fate of the IDPs is often in the hands of gatekeepers, who are generally from the dominant clans in Mogadishu. It is these gatekeepers who determine the location of settlements, and access to humanitarian assistance. Women IDPs are often vulnerable to sexual violence. The extent of sexual and gender-based violence against women and girls is believed to be widespread and is

largely unreported throughout south-central Somalia (HRW, 2013).

Recently, the security of Mogadishu has been improving and many Somalis are returning from overseas. As such, there has been an increase in development projects being launched in the city. This often leads to the forcible evictions of IDPs. According to Amnesty International, tens of thousands of people have been driven from their shelters, often with no notice, with the threat or use of power and with no alternative relocation provided (HRW, 2013). IDPs were pushed into the periphery of Mogadishu, with many of them moving to Afgooye corridor, where living conditions are dire. Afgooye corridor has little presence of the government and has a reputation for insecurity.

A lot of has been written about the general situation of IDPs in Mogadishu, the serious problems they face and their living conditions. However, little attention has been given to the weak and vulnerable people whose properties and resources have either been looted or destroyed and their current predicament in the IDP camps in Mogadishu. This study investigated the rural displacement of weak clans from inter-riverine land in southern Somalia, their historical dispossession and marginalization first at the hands of the Italian colonial administration, the subsequent land-grabbing by elites close to the former regime in 1980s, and how after the collapse of the regime in 1991 clan militias loyal to Hawiye warlords forcefully confiscated their lands and looted their resources. The study also explains the current predicaments of IDPs from the inter-riverine areas in Mogadishu.

1.3. Potential significance

Somalis are often portrayed as a homogenous society. But according to Mukhtar (1996), Somalia has always been divided into southern farming and agro-pastoral clans and northern nomadic clans that have different cultural, linguistic, and social structures. The myth of homogeneity has helped the nomadic clans to dominate the sedentary agro-pastoral, and farming communities in the inter-riverine regions. The pastoral society became more powerful after the formation of the state in the 1960s, and nomadic culture was glorified over the agriculturalist tradition, which was common in the inter-riverine area. In African and global contexts, pastoralism is marginalized. However, it is the dominant culture in Somalia (Majid & McDowell, 2012).

After the collapse of the state, the inter-riverine communities were first attacked and looted by the fleeing Barre military and later by the Hawiye warlords, displacing these non-armed and weak communities from their farms. A study of the local political economy, looking into rural displacement, the abuse, and the land appropriation against the inter-riverine communities, as envisioned in this research, could help better understand the political and economic drivers behind the protracted cases of displacement in Somalia. The findings of this study will help inform NGOs and human rights activists who advocate for the rights of the displaced, particularly minority groups. The study will also be useful for the inter-riverine communities if they want to take their case to the national and international courts for redress.

1.4. Research questions

The following are the research questions guiding this study:

1) What are the main drivers of displacement experienced by the inter-riverine communities in southern Somalia?

2) To what extent were the inter-riverine communities affected by forceful land expropriation and evictions from their ancestral land before and after the breakout of the civil war?

3) What are the significant implications of displacement on the livelihoods of the inter- riverine IDPs displaced from the inter-riverine areas of Southern Somalia?

1.5. Limitations

This study was limited by several factors, which revolve around: 1) the overall security of Mogadishu, which is the selected site for the study; 2) the sensitivity of the topic; 3) the literature gap on IDPs from the inter-riverine regions; and 4) short timeframe for building confidence with the research subjects.

Despite significant improvements, Mogadishu's security situation remains volatile and unpredictable. Concerns remain over general insecurity in the city, which is characterized by the insurgent techniques currently used by Al-Shabab and many other spoilers taking advantage of the continuing lack of law and order (HIPS, 2014). There are widespread suicide attacks, hand grenade attacks, and targeted assassinations that regularly occur in the city and its environs. This remained a cause of concern for the researcher and the IDP individuals who were interviewed during the fieldwork, as most of IDP settlements are located on the outskirts of the city, which

has a high reputation for insecurity.

Another limitation is that the topic touched upon a highly sensitive issue, entrenched in the current debate on diversion of aid, corruption, and forceful evictions, which are being carried by government officials and other powerful actors associated with the government or the dominant clans in Mogadishu. This needed a careful approach, considering the risks involved.

Moreover, IDP settlements are controlled by powerful gatekeepers. These gatekeepers and their local militias always abuse the displaced communities in their camps by stealing the food allocated to them by humanitarian agencies and also restricting their movement. There is no doubt that they are not be tolerant to anyone trying to investigate the issues of the displaced people. Also, IDPs are most likely not to speak out against the abuses of the gatekeepers in fear of possible reprisals.

The research was conducted in three months as the researcher needs to come back to AUB in time for the completion of the thesis. With this short timeframe, it was key challenge to build confidence of interlocutors, and more importantly, of IDPs.

1.6. Overall approach and rationale

Somalis are a traditional and patriarchal society where the culture and traditional elders are respected. After the collapse of the central state in 1991, traditional leaders have taken over the roles of the state in security and law, and have consolidated their role as dispute mediators and the enforcers of Xeer (the customary laws that regulate most aspects of social life within and between the clans) (Gundel, 2006). With the consideration of the role of the community elders, this study utilized a bottom-up approach, by contacting the community elders first. The lead researcher

explained the aim of the study and assured them that the findings will be shared with them. Also, women play a critical role in today's society as they are the breadwinners of their families by undertaking menial jobs and small businesses. Women's role in the research is seen as quite important because they are the ones who encounter most of the abuses committed against the IDPs.

The study adopted qualitative approach, and the researcher spent a substantial amount of time possible with the community by conducting participant observation first before conducting interviews and the focus group discussions. Similarly, the researcher was mindful of the asymmetrical relationship, which is based on unequal power and resources. The aim is for the researcher not to become an exploitative and a temporary observer, which can have long-term consequences for the community (Ellen, 1984). The researcher assured the community that he would share the findings of the study with them so that they will have the opportunity to voice their opinions about the final result. This helped gain the trust and collaboration of the community. The researcher also considered how time is valuable for the IDPs as they may use it for their daily social processes including earning livelihoods. This is very important since members of the displaced communities have to do different casual jobs to fend for their needs. Therefore, place and time was set in accordance with the preference of the community. Refreshments such as drinks and snacks were provided by the researcher as well. Also, the different views were triangulated and checked from key informant interviews and literature review.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1. Causes and Patterns of Displacement in Somalia

Displacement is a global phenomenon, which affects millions of people every year. The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (2019) recorded twenty-eight million new displacements due to disasters and conflicts across the world. Nine out of the ten worst affected countries accounted for more than a million new displacements each. Many people who fled disasters in countries such as Syria, Somalia, Iraq and Yemen, had already been displaced by conflict (IDMC, 2019). Since the collapse of the Somali state, a large number of the Somali population have been fleeing internally and internationally from violence and conflict, famine, severe food insecurity and loss of livelihoods. The dramatic transformation of conflict in south- central Somalia in the 1990s initiated protracted displacements, and environmental factors and the political crisis exacerbated the situation (Lindley and Haslie, 2011).

In the early 1990s, the number of internally displaced persons (IDPS) spiked to nearly two million in Somalia, averaging over one million per year since 2007. Refugee numbers have been averaging nearly 600, 000 per year. As of 2012, one million Somali refugees lived in a total of 124 countries worldwide, with the largest numbers found in Ethiopia (223,000) and Kenya (512,000) respectively. Dadaab, the world's largest refugee camp in Northeastern Kenya, is a home to the largest concentration of Somalis outside of Mogadishu (Robinson and Zimmerman, 2014). Regarding both the numbers of people affected and their humanitarian and protection needs, this is widely acknowledged to be among the worst displacement situations in

the world (Lindley and Haslie, 2011).

There are number of interconnected drivers and triggers of displacement in Somalia. Conflict and violence are the major causes of displacement in the country. According to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC, 2019), conflict and violence displaced more than 578,000 people in 2018, the highest figure in a decade. Evictions from urban centers, mainly of IDPs, accounted for about 44 per cent of the figure (IDMC, 2019). In Somalia, there is a close link between the proximate drivers of displacement and forced migration – conflict and insecurity – and the deeper predisposing impact of structural economic underdevelopment. Both are precipitated by an intersection of drought and insecurity. Local drivers have, in turn, been exacerbated by regional environmental stress and a large wave of out-migration in 2011 and 2012 (Van Hear, et al 2018).

Famine is a constant feature in Somalia, and it contributes to the widespread displacement of people from the rural areas to urban centers. In 2011, the UN declared that famine in Southern Somalia affected 3.1 million people, of whom an estimated half million were malnourished (Maxwell & Fitzpatrick, 2012). Even though the media ascribed drought as the major cause of the famine, there were other factors that contributed to this humanitarian crisis.

According to Maxwell and Fitzpatrick (2012), conflict, rapidly rising global food prices, and other long-standing, structural factors have played a major role in causing the worst famine that hit the country in two decades. These proximate causes of famine, compounded on a long- existing crisis of livelihoods, governance and the environment in Southern Somalia, an area that had lacked any effective government since the collapse of the Siad Barre military regime in 1991 and has come under the

control of Al-Shabaab in 2007. Even though famine severely affected most of the country, south-central Somalia bore much of the brunt. Indeed, 65% of those affected and displaced came from the rural areas, particularly from the inter-riverine areas (Majid & Mcdowell, 2012).

Most of those displaced from their places of origin belong to fragile clans such as Digile- Mirifle and the Bantu minority groups, the majority of the displaced arrived in Mogadishu from the inter-riverine areas (Menkhaus, 2016). Ironically, this area is known as Somalia's breadbasket due to its rich and fertile agricultural land. It lies between the Shebelle River in the north, the Juba River in the south, the Ethiopian border in the west, and the Indian Ocean in the east. It has over fourteen ecological regions, with mainly four types of livelihoods: agriculture, pastoralism, agro-pastoralism, and trade (Mukhtar, 1996).

Environmentally, this part of the country is arid and semi-arid and frequently experiences episodes of drought, when rainfall is low for a prolonged period. As Lindley (2014) argues, in Somalia, prevailing ecological conditions are critical to rural activities such as livestock rearing and crop production, which are a key component of the livelihoods of a majority of Somalis. However, these livelihoods are constantly affected by droughts, forcing people to migrate to urban areas in search of survival. On the other hand, Jayawardhan (2017) aptly argues that environmental displacement is not solely as the result of ecological change. It is a multicausal problem where ecological and socioeconomic vulnerability act together to displace marginalized people.

This is evident in Somalia, because the 2011 famine disproportionately affected the livelihood of certain ethnic minorities and wealth groups. These were

predominantly drawn from historically marginalized segments of the Somali populations, particularly, the Reewin and Bantu communities who were also by far, and the biggest 'victims' in the 1991/92 famine (Majid & McDowell 2012; Cassanelli, 1995). This is an indication that socio-economic inequality and marginalization of vulnerable communities account for the disparity in who is displaced by the effects of climate change (Jayawardhan, 2017).

2.2. Rural Displacement in Somalia

Displacement is shaping Somalia's urban landscape and contributing to the country's rapid urbanisation. Many internally displaced people (IDPs) have moved from rural areas to the main cities in search of shelter, protection, and humanitarian assistance (Taruri et al, 2020). Miller-House (2020) explains that droughts, floods, inadequate or absent health services, and a highly volatile security situation has created an alarmingly low level of food availability. These challenges limit rural people's opportunities to eke out existence and force them to leave and come to urban areas to live as IDPs.

Previously, most of Somalia's population live in the rural areas. Close to 80% of the people are pastoralists, agriculturalists, or agro-pastoralists. Except for a small number of Somalis who depend on fishing, the rest of the population are urban dwellers (Briton et al., 1993). Menkhaus (2020) states that Somalia's urban population is growing rapidly. Increasing pressures on rural livelihoods is leading to destitution and urban drift, contributing to very high rates of urbanization in Somalia. It is so evident in Mogadishu and other urban areas of Somalia. Rapid urbanization in Somalia, as in many other war-torn countries, is driven by in- migration of displaced

people who are often amassed in camp (Bakonyi et al., 2019).

Rural displacement has spiked recently due to natural disasters such as droughts and floods which deplete or destroy rural people's crops and livestock, depriving them of their livelihood sources. But as Menkhaus (2020) explains communal competition over valuable land – pasture, wells, irrigable farmland, and especially cities and towns – has been at the heart of the Somali crisis since 1990. Many of the grievances fuelling the initial civil war can be traced to land grabbing in the 1980s. Land disputes continue to enflame tensions and stoke armed clashes and displacements across parts of Somalia. Political elites are often direct beneficiaries of land grabs, especially when their clan gains control of a lucrative seaport, airstrip, or commercial artery. Control of land is a matter of existential importance in Somalia, and places considerable pressure on the political elite to defend and advance their clan's claims on territory.

According to Lwanga-Ntale and Owino (2020), Somali powerbrokers, local communities, subnational governments and the national government rely, to a great extent, on militias to achieve their interests, including, accessing power, controlling local economies and responding to conditions of insecurity, vulnerability and contestation. This acquisition of power by a few elites and their increased access to scarce resources such as agricultural land can lead to more conflict and forced displacement from the rural areas. Most of those affected by displacement from the inter-riverine areas in southern Somalia. These people have a long history of forced removal from the most productive land by successive political authorities and exploitative relations with politically or militarily dominant groups (Majid & McDowell, 2012).

Often times, most of those who analyze Somalia's current situation and what led to the breakout of the civil war in 1991 neglect the fact that conflict is fueled by competition for natural resources. As Elmi and Barise (2006) state that Somali clans had often clashed over resources such as water, livestock (camels) and grazing long before Somalia became a sovereign country. For one to fully grasp the situation they need to look at dynamics of land ownership and competition for resources. This is important because historical claims to land and resources by different Somali clans play an important and sometimes powerful role in current political debates in Somalia (Farah et al., 2002). Also, Webersik (2008) writes that the struggle for land involves not only access to valuable resources but also territorial control to achieve political influence; violence in Somalia has become a means to access markets, pursue trade, or participate in political decision-making processes. Due to its resource-rich agricultural land, the inter-riverine area became the center of competition among different powerful actors (Mukhtar, 1996). People from this area are often those most affected by forceful land expropriation, leading to their exodus from the rural areas into urban areas where they live as IDPs.

2.3. Clan Dynamics and Social Relations in Somalia

Clans and kinships are cornerstones for the Somali society. As Gundel (2009) states, studying clan dynamics is the key to understanding the political constitution of the Somali society, kinship and its specific kind of social contract. For as long as Somalis are dependent on their kinship lineage for security and protection, responsibilities, duties, rights and liabilities will continue to be perceived along collective rather than individual terms. In Gundel's (2009) viewpoint, the clan remains

collectively responsible for actions of its individual members, and rights of women and children will continuously be seen in the context of the interests of maintaining the strength of the male-based clans

In agreement with Gundel (2009), Luling (2006) argues that most Somalis, however, possess a 'segmentary' descent system, in which all the genealogical lines meet at the top. This exists in its simplest and starkest form among the nomadic pastoralists who inhabit the northern two thirds of Somali territory and its extreme southern range, and their urbanized cousins. Among the agricultural people of the south of Somalia, in the area between the two rivers Shebelle and Jubba, genealogy carries a different weight. Here most populations are sedentary, not nomadic, and so political alliances are based on living in the same area (Luling, 2006).

Somalia is often misrepresented as a country with an ethnically homogeneous population, culture and language (Gundel, 2009; Mukhtar, 1996). Indeed, the perceived majority of the population are composed of the ethnic nomadic-pastoralist Somalis who speak Af-Maxaa-tiri(i.e. the "noble clans" of the Darood, Hawiye, Dir, and – depending on one's perspective– the Isaaq), which became the official language of Somalia after independence. The other large group is composed of the mainly sedentary agro-pastoralist people, residing in the inter-riverine area between the Juba and Shebelle rivers in Southern Somalia, known as Digil-Mirifle or Rahanweyn. They speak Af-Maay-tiri, which is quite distinct from Af-Maxaa-tiri (Gundel, 2009). The myth of Somali homogeneity played a major role in the rise of nomadic clans to political predominance, and the appropriation of resources from the less warlike and intensely religious agro-pastoral groups in and around the inter-riverine region. A major factor in the Somali conflict is the struggle among clans for control of limited

and increasingly scarce resources, especially land and water (Mukhtar, 1996). This has created a violent competition between the Darood and Hawiye clan families for economic and political dominance of the inter-riverine region. The distinction between the nomadic clans and the agro-pastoral and riverine communities is not confined to the kinship. Historically, the inter-riverine communities have long been marginalized and kept in the periphery of state power and resources.

In support of the above argument, Besteman (1996) contends, the combined factors of language, racial constructions, and occupation have left a substantial population of southern farmers and agro-pastoralists marginalized from national governments since the 1970s. Indeed, even before the era of Somali independence, the Somali Youth League, whose members came from Darood and Hawiye clans dominated the political life of Somalia, the inter-riverine communities found themselves increasingly marginalized and discriminated against in education and state employment (Mukhtar, 1996). The Af-Maay dialect spoken by the majority of the inter-riverine communities was denigrated in the 1970s when 'standard Somali was given an official script that then became the language of the state (Besteman, 1996). It is not only the Rahawayn clans which live in the inter-riverine areas. There are other minority clans including the Bantus who have also been subjected to marginalization. According to Gundel (2009), the Bantus mainly live in the southern areas with a concentration of agriculture. Depending on their location, these people have different names, such as Makane, Shiidle, Reer Shabelle, Gosha or Mushunguli. Somali nomadic clans seek to assimilate minority groups to control them. However, particularly in the case of the Bantus (whom the 'noble' nomadic clans aim to exploit for the cultivation of the fertile lands), there is a wide perception amongst many of the

nomadic clans that they are too different to be assimilated and therefore must be marginalized, which led to a situation of impunity of attacks against Bantu groups (Gundel, 2009).

2.4. Displacement, political economy and power in Somalia

In their study of political economy of food in Somalia, Jaspars et al (2019) note that there are three broad periods, when considering trends in vulnerability and power in production, trade and aid. The first period is during Siad Barre's era, when wealth and power was concentrated in the hands of a small number of elites associated with the government. According to Jaspars et al (2019), this concentration of power and wealth depended in part on the marginalization of the inter-riverine communities. During this time, De Waal (2015) described Somalia's economy as 'rentier kleptocracy' in which the state buys political loyalties or grants favored rent-seekers with opportunities at the expense of the society at large (De Waal, 2015 cited by Jaspars et al, 2019). These elites had clan affiliation with Siad Barre. Samatar (2008) argues that, they benefited from state farms and price control during the early socialist years of 1970s and did so again during the capitalization of agriculture in 1980. This is when the liberation of land tenure facilitated land grabs by the well-connected elites. According to Jaspars et al (2019), from the early 1980s labor and land were highly commodified and dependent on cheap and exploitable labor from the clans that inhabited the inter-riverine regions that were not well represented in the political system.

The second period was from 1989 to 1992 when the country descended into civil war. Jaspars et al. (2019) note that clan-based militias fought for control over

resources, causing large scale looting and theft, displacement, and famine among those who had earlier been marginalized. Cassanelli (1995) argues that Hawiye clans who managed to oust Siad Barre, claimed that they liberated the inter-riverine regions from illegal occupation by the previous regime with no intention of returning them to the pre-Barre owners. In the absence of a functioning state, the clan continues to provide essential services such as social, physical, and legal protection. However, the clan structure posed extraordinary obstacles for the inter-riverine communities because they do not belong to major clan system and therefore, they could not request protection from the warlords or other clan militias (World Bank, 2014). This lack of support rendered them vulnerable to attacks and seizure of their assets. According to Natsios (1996), crimes committed against the Bantus and Rahawayn by Hawiye and Darood clans were as brutal as those against the Bosnian Muslims. Following the breakout of the civil war in the country, the inter-riverine communities were extremely vulnerable and lacked strong protectors as the invading powerful clans siezed their assets.

The third period, according to Jaspars et al. (2019), is from 2000 and is marked by the introduction of Western- and Ethiopian-backed various forms governments with a coincidental rise of Islamist movements, leading to a resumption of conflict, large-scale displacements, and famine or humanitarian crisis in 2008, 2011, and 2017.

2.5. Livelihoods strategies and displacement in Somalia

According to Chambers and Conway (1991), livelihoods refer to assets, strategies, and capabilities essential for sustenance. In a state of conflict, Jaspars (2010) points out that the impact of conflict is determined by analyzing various groups by examining different livelihoods and assets. He further states that it is also essential

to examine the influence from the overall environment of the political governance, including policies, institutions, and processes influencing access and control of resources to determine vulnerable groups and reasons why. As such, Lindley (2009) observed that the interplay of these structures and agency, including economic and political dimension, offers an approach to understanding useful points of departure, particularly when understanding the concerns of conflict and related mobility from the "bottom up." In Somalia, the long-standing political, economic, and social system that sustains lives and livelihood have been disrupted and transformed with protracted conflict that has lasted for more than a decade (Sage & Majid, 2002).

Sage and Majid (2002) further separate livelihood and vulnerability into four economic groups to comprehend how different populations survive, prosper, and suffer in different ways. These groups consist of 1) agro-pastoralists; 2) Pastoralists; 3) Riverine farmers; 4) Urban residents and IDPs. The economy of Somalia is dependent on pastoralism, which is also its dominant sector. Bishop et al. (2008) noted that a more significant proportion of Somalia's population is involved in pastoralism with vast lands used for keeping livestock than any other country in the horn of Africa. The latter indicates that livestock production plays a crucial role in the livelihood of the Somali population. Hassan et al. (2014) define pastoralists as individuals who obtain more than 50 percent of their livelihood from keeping livestock and their products. It is an integral part of land use in the history of dry land dwellers and the economy. According to Sage and Majid (2002), pastoralists are found in most rural areas across Somalia, particularly in arid regions located in Northern and Central Somalia and Ethiopian and Kenyan borders.

Agro-pastoralism is the second major economic group in Somalia. According to Longley et al. (2001), agro-pastoralism is the predominant livelihood strategy between Shebelle and the Juba River. Agro-pastoralists are also found in western Somaliland and enclosed regions in the northeastern part (Sage & Majid, 2002). There are different forms of combining livestock rearing and crop production among these agro-pastoralist groups. However, most groups predominantly rear cattle and grow sorghum as the primary crop. According to Sage and Majid (2002), the agro- pastoralist communities during famine have proper food security.

The agro-pastoralist groups in Southern Somalia are marginalized both politically and militarily; hence they are the greatest victims of violence since the collapse of the Siad Barre regime in 1991 (Besteman and Cassanelli, 1996). All these combined with poor rains and harvest have resulted in a loss of assets (both food and livestock), and displacement has resulted in large- scale food deficits and loss of livelihood. Sage and Majid (2002) further point out that the following factor undermines agro-pastoral livelihoods:

- Poor rains and consecutive seasons of crop failure
- Depletion of fixed asset, such as land due to conflict
- Disruption of trade and closure of border due to conflict
- Physical isolation from ports and services in Somalia's main urban centers
- Lack of security from violence and economic exploitation of weaker social groups
- Increasing commercial and communal debt
- Crop pests, disease, and bird attacks
- Decreasing levels of assistance from international aid agencies

Livestock ownership is hugely lower in Riverine communities, and strategies for minimizing risks depend on access to available land and different soil types, which is not enough (Longley et al., 2001). The riverine community is found towards the end of the coast of River Juba and Shabelle. They generate a majority of their food and income from the cultivation and sale of cereal and non-cereal crops (Sage & Majid, 2002). Similarly, the agro-pastoralists in the inter- riverine, mostly farmers who belong to the Bantu communities, have been marginalized, discriminated against, and exploited (Jaspars et al., 2019). These groups have shown persistently high acute malnutrition levels and suffered the most severe famines in 1992 and 2011 (Jaspars et al., 2019). These groups have shown persistently high acute malnutrition levels and suffered the most severe famines in 1992 and 2011.

2.6. Somalia's Historical Analysis

Most of the academics and the media often describe Somalia as a failed state due to the chronic instability and lawlessness that erupted in the country in 1991. Rebel groups organized as along clan militias toppled Siad Barre's dictatorial regime which lasted for more than twenty years. A lot has been written about the state collapse in 1991 and the destruction and human suffering that followed, but what is often not investigated is the history that shaped and contributed to conflict in Somalia. Therefore, to understand the collapse of the state in Somalia and what went wrong it is important to link the present to the past (Doornbos & Markakis, 1994). Hence, the aim of this section is look into the different trajectories of history in Somalia, beginning from the Colonial rule and Postcolonial period to explain the current predicament, and to place displacement in the center of this history.

2.6.1. Somalia's Colonial and Post-Colonial History

Similar to the rest of the continent, the interest of the European colonial powers in Somalia began mid-1880s (Abbink, 2003). As elsewhere on the African Continent, Western colonialism changed local dynamics and reshaped both Somali society and politics. Somali territories were portioned into different parts by the invading European powers. The British established a protectorate in the Northern of Somalia, in what is now called Somaliland, the Italians established their presence in the south, while the French secured Djibouti, gaining access to vital port on the Red Sea route. Before the arrival of the European powers in the Somali peninsula, Somalis led a decentralized way of life and pastoralism was a common practice and source of livelihood due to the compelling ecological and economic conditions in the region.

Communities were dispersed and lacked the necessary organization to form a single political unit. Technically, there was no any unifying state in charge. This is, according to Issa-Salwe (1996), one of the main factors that led to the partition of the Somali territories into five parts by the European colonial powers. Unlike most of the African countries which were ethnically divided, majority of Somalis belonged to the same ethnic group. This forceful partition of Somali territories left behind painful legacy for the Somali people, with the near-permanent fragmentation of their historical grazing lands, resulting in not only hardships for those who found themselves separated from their loved ones, but also in the insoluble and never-ending border disputes existing among their neighboring countries which embroiled Somalia into a war on several occasions (Sheik-Abdi, 1981).

Spread throughout the Horn of Africa, the Somali people are comprised of numerous clans and sub-clans. Traditionally, Somali society has been marked by

nomadic pastoralism in the north and agricultural pastoralism in the south. There were

stark differences in the colonial economic policies of Italy and Britain, which tended to

amplify regional traditions. While Italy developed a comprehensive economic plan for

the more agrarian southern Somalia, the largely nomadic British Somaliland remained

neglected. This situation produced lasting disparities in wealth and infrastructure.

Under this colonial economic order, the clans evolved into political identities tied to

economic benefits or disadvantages. The domination and colonization of European

powers, namely Britain and Italy resulted in linguistic, political, juridical, and

economic disparities in colonial governance thus contributed additional divisions and

hierarchies to the dynamism of Somali society (Besteman, 1996).

As stated above, the o European countries that Balkanized Somali territories

into five major parts used two distinctive methods of ruling over the Somalis. The

British rule in the North in what is now called Somaliland can be characterized as

indirect, allowing the traditional tribal authorities to govern through its leaders.

Although the British did permit the formation of cultural societies, or political parties,

there was social segregation and Africans were denied direct participation in the

government. The stability of diya-paying groups was weakened by the appointment of

chiefs for each clan by the British colonial authorities to ease the running of their

administrations (Issa- Salwe, 1996).

Compared to the British, the Italian administration imposed direct Western

system of governance on Somalis. The Italian colonial administration was highly

centralized with all posts of any importance held by Italians. During the era of Italian

fascism, land was appropriated from Somali owners, who were then forced to work the

land essentially as sharecroppers, reducing Somalis to a source of cheap labor. Trade

and commerce within Italian Somaliland were controlled by governmental monopolies; participation was denied to Somalis in any sector of the economy and that deemed essential to Italian interests (Issa-Salwe, 1996).

From 1893 to 1905, when the Italian government assumed direct administration of the southern portion of the inter-riverine region, two companies - the Filonardi Company 1893-1896, and the Benadir Company 1896-1905 - introduced customs and tariff regulations which were anathema to the people of the region. Most early protests were provoked by these measures (Mukhtar, 1996). This resulted in a great deal of discontent. With the introduction of forced labour in the interior, and the toleration of slavery in the newly established plantations, popular resistance acquired a new dimension. The Nassib Buunto movement is a good example of resistance against slavery and forced labour (Mukhtar, 1996). Whatever the differences in exercising powers of Britain and Italy, it is obvious that both colonial systems were disruptive and disconcerted indigenous societies. Colonialism influenced the Somali society in terms of reinforcing and creating clan division.

Most importantly, Somali traditional ways of governance were destroyed because of imposed arbitrary boundaries that were drawn along the economic interest of colonial powers with a total disregard of the existing traditional clan ties and the local society's way of life.

2.6.2. Post-Colonial History

After the 10-year interim period, on June 26, 1960**,** the northern protectorate of Somaliland gained independence from Britain. Five days later July 1, 1960, the two former colonies united to form the United Republic of Somalia under President Aden

Abdullah Osman and appointed Dr. Abdirashid Ali Shermarke as the first prime minister, and 123-members the National Assembly representing both territories. Independence was followed by a brief period of democratic governance. A national constitution was adopted by a referendum in 1961 and a National Assembly was created to represent the various clans/ subclans (S. Kimenyi, et al, 2010). The newly formed state faced quite of number of challenges. Isse-Salwe (1996) explains that one of the major challenges faced by the independent state of Somalia was to break the colonial legacy and influence under which the European colonies had developed.

The union of the north and south was not smooth as there were administrative challenges aggravated by the linguistic barriers. This was so because there was no official scrip of Somali language to facilitate communication within the new independent government. In the south, the Italian language was the main means of administrative and legal communication, and in the north English was mainly used. The legal system in the southern region was based on customary and Islamic laws.

However, in the northern region there was a different system based on the English common and statutory law, upon the Indian Penal code and Somali custom. To solve the legal problem, a unified legal system was introduced. The Supreme Court was instructed to establish two separate sections to deal with cases from the two regions. Some difficulties were surmountable, but others were more sensitive, such as that of tariff levels. To standardize the system, the tax rates of the northern region had to be raised to the levels of the southern region. The increases raised the price of essential commodities in the north. The exodus of the British expatriates 67 also affected the northern economy causing economic decline in the region. Soon widespread discontent surfaced in the northern region, and people expressed their

grievance in a referendum on the constitution of 1961, with 54,284 voting against and 49,527 for, whereas in the southern regions only 128,627 voted against and 1,711,013 voted in favor (Isse-Salwe, 1996).

Civilian government survived for nine years in the Somali Republic. It has been noted by many observers that here was one of the few African states which had peaceful elections: indeed, there were non- violent transfers of power based on the results, with presidents serving in the span of those nine years. While a single party, the Somali Youth League, dominated the political scene throughout this period, very few obstacles were put in the way of opposition parties - in fact, they proliferated to nearly uncountable proportions. Opposition leaders were often able to make inflammatory speeches against the Government. The civilian regime allowed a small modicum of free press; and an outrageous and irreverent anti-government publication, Dalka, could be published regularly (Laitin, 1976).

Event though, political violence was not the norm during the nine years of civilian rule, the country faced a host of other challenges, mostly in the making of the ruling civilian elites. There were widespread corruption, nepotism and management of public funds that drew the ire and frustration of the people. Unfortunately, after almost a decade of parliamentary democracy, the ever-increasing tension between antagonistic political elites, which undermined national solidarity, seemingly weakened state institutions and allowed corruption to fester. For that reason, the demand for change increased and that gave the military an opportunity to seize power after the last civilian president of the country Abdirashid Ali Sharma'ke was assassinated by one his guards in 1969 (Laitin, 1976; M. Khayre, 2017).

Siad Barre who was the commander of the Somali military became president, dissolving parliament, and the civilian administration. Under the military, 'Scientific Socialism' was adopted as the guiding ideology for the country's development. Under the banner of Scientific Socialism, Barre embarked on a radical programme to fundamentally restructure Somali society (Bradbury, 1994). This program initially received support from a class of urban intelligentsia and technocrats, grappling with the move from a pastoral society to a modern nation state, and disillusioned with the debilitating effects of 'clannism'. With a centrally planned program, national development was promoted through an end to 'tribalism' and a commitment to 'popular participation', under the guidance of the single Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party.

According to Samatar (1997), the military regime that took over power seemed representative of all Somali society and they articulated nationalist and communitarian ideas in their first communiques, emphasized self-reliance as a national development strategy and developed a script for the Somali language. This was followed by the establishment of more schools in all parts of the country and of the Somali National University. The Military regime's effective way of dealing with the infamous drought that hit the country in 1974-75 also boosted their legitimacy and earned support from the public. But it is worth to note that despite pledges of self-reliance, Somalia's dependence on foreign increased (Sheik-Abdi, 1981).

Certainly, its reliance on the Soviet Union for military equipment and technical assistance increased in the period I969-75. There have been, of course, intermittent cash donations by a number of Arab countries. Since I975, there has also occurred a gradual lessening of dependence on the Soviet Union, with Saudi Arabia, China, and Kuwait assuming an increasingly significant role in providing funds for development

project and overall technical assistance (Sheik-Abdi, 1981). When Barre came to power in 1969, he vowed to put an end to "tribalism," as he called the clan system. He wanted to substitute national governmental laws for customary ones and to hold all individuals responsible for their individual acts. Allegiance to the government would theoretically strengthen allegiance to the state and would weaken the strength of competing pockets of communities who were dispersed throughout the countryside which the state could not penetrate (Hashim, 1997).

However, according to Bakonyi (2009), the popular enthusiasm for the military regime and its version of socialist development soon faded as it became obvious that most of its promises, including the termination of clan-based corruption failed to materialize. Instead, the regime increasingly based its power on Siyaad Barre's own clan, the Darood/Mareexaan. As result of the nationalization program, clan-based nepotism and corruption pervaded every aspect of the country's institutions and was even expanded to the economic sector. After more than twenty years of brutal repression and dictatorship, rebels started to organize themselves and resist the government. By late 1980s, Siad Barre's grip on power was becoming increasingly tenuous. The Somali National Movement (SNM) began operating in the northern region in 1988. Government reacted with brutal force but was not able to destroy the SNM. In early 1989, the central government was also faced with insurrection in the south, and many rebel groups organized as clans took up arms against the government. In 1991, these clan militias overthrew the military regime and the country descending into anarchy and chaos.

2.6.3. Post-Siad Barre history (Civil war period)

After years of fierce fighting, mainly happening in the rural areas of the country, the rebels overpowered government forces. Siad Barres fled Mogadishu in an armored tank, escorted by soldiers, loyal to him as things fall apart. But, as soon as they forced Siad Barre out, rebel groups disintegrated, turning on themselves. Different factions fought each other and immediately plunged the country into civil war and failed to install a new national government. The U.S. and the UN humanitarian and military intervention from 1993 through 1995 also failed to restore peace (Powell et al, 2008). The country fell into a total ruin and disintegration.

In May 1991, the SNM (Somali National Movement), secured control of the former British Somaliland and declared that the 1960 union was null and void and that henceforth the northern region would be independent and known as the Republic of Somaliland. In Mogadishu, USC (United Somali Congress) mostly composed of Hawiye clans tried to appoint an interim government, but this triggered a bitter feud between Hawiye clan factions within the USC. The forces of the two rival warlords, Gen. Maxamed Faarax Caydiid of the Somali National Alliance (SNA) and Cali Mahdi Maxamed (Ali Mahdi Muhammad) of the Somali Salvation Alliance (SSA), tore the capital apart and battled with Siad's regrouped clan militia, the Somali National Front, for a control of the southern coast and hinterland. This brought war and devastation to the grain- producing region between the two rivers (Jubba and Shabelle), spreading famine throughout southern Somalia. Due to its vast resources, the inter-riverine areas became a hotspot where both forces allied with the fleeing Barre and the Hawiye militias faced off, with civilians bearing the brunt of the war. According to Mukhtar (1996), while other factions were armed to teeth, the Somali Democratic Movement

(SDM) that represented the inter-riverine areas lacked arms and sufficient means to defend their territories. This was because the Reewin/Rahawayan and other clans from this area were excluded from the government. The faceoff between Barre allied forces and rebels loyal to General Aideed led to the mass starvation of civilians in the area, with both of them pillaging and brutalizing the defenseless population. During this time, it is estimated that nearly 500,000 people died in the man-made famine that followed (Mukhtar, 1996).

There were several attempts to revive a functioning state in Somalia and the international community and neighboring countries spearheaded these initiatives. As Menkhaus (1996) explains, Formally, the mandate for fostering national reconciliation in Somalia was given to UNOSOM in the UN Security Council Resolution 814 (1993), which authorized UNOSOM, under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, 'to assist the people of Somalia to promote and advance political reconciliation, through broad participation by all sectors of Somali society. The aim was to reestablish national and regional institutions and civil administration in the entire country [and] to create conditions under which Somali civil society may have a role, at every level, in the process of political reconciliation. Fourteen peace conferences have been held in different cities at different times.

Five of these (Djibouti 1991, Addis Ababa 1993, Cairo 1997, Arta 2000 and Eldoret/Mpegati 2002-2004) were major conferences to which the international community lent its support (Elmi & Barise, 2010). Notably, each of these conferences produced some sort of peace agreement and a new government. However, all the agreements failed except the Mpegati conference which ended in 2004.

In 2000, Djibouti hosted and facilitated what came to be called the Arta Peace Process. Arta produced a power-sharing agreement and the declaration of the Transitional National Government in August 2000. The Arta process was innovative in that delegates were clan elders and civil society leaders, not faction and militia leaders. The Arta process also established the "4.5 formula" into Somali politics – a system of fixed proportional representation by clan in both negotiations and transitional governments. The formula allocates an equal number of seats to each of the four main clan-families (Darood, Dir, Hawiye, and Digil-Mirifle) and apportions half of that number for Somalia's many 'minority groups', which include the Bantu, Benadiri and low caste groups.

However, the formula did not solve conflicts over representation (Menkhaus, 2007). The 4.5 (four-point-five) clan-based power-sharing formula resulted from a meeting among factions under the umbrella of the National Salvation Council, also known as the Sodere Group (Elmi, 2014). The formula provides equal political representation to the four clan families in Somalia - the Darood, Digil and Mirifle, Dir and Hawiye - with a number of smaller clans receiving, cumulatively, half representation. The 4.5 system is demonstrated in the House of the People of the Federal Parliament of Somalia in which, of 275 seats, the four major clans are each guaranteed 61 seats, with the remaining 32 seats allocated to 'minority' clans. Eno and Eno (2009) called the 4.5 system as an 'apartheid- like system which represents absolute discrimination and severe ethnic marginalization. Upon its introduction as an instrument for power sharing, the affected communities protested it forthwith as well as in many other forums, and indeed continue to do so to this day.

The Transitional National Government (TNG) led by President Abdi Qasim was formed in Arte Conference in 2000, but Abdi Qasim was vehemently opposed by powerful warlords who were in charge of Mogadishu and much of Southern Somalia. Abdi Qasim's government failed to operate in the country as it was rendered ineffective by the warlords. Nevertheless, most of the warlords in South/Central Somalia agreed on the Transitional Federal Charter that established the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in Kenya in 2004. Since its relocation to Somalia in 2005, the TFG has faced heavy opposition, initially from the warlords that controlled the country, later from the United Islam Courts (UIC) that emerged as a new political actor in June 2006, and currently from the al Shabab and Hisbul Islam militias (Gomsrud & Gaas, 2010). The Transitional Federal Government (TFG) led by Abdullahi Yusuf seemed to be ineffective in its face off against the mighty warlords in charge of Mogadishu and much of the south-central Somalia in 2006.

However, things took another turn when a variety of Islamist organizations, centred on a long-standing network of local Islamic or *sharia* courts in Mogadishu, had come together under an umbrella organization, popularly known in the Western media as the Islamic Courts Union. As the movement coalesced and seized control of Mogadishu, the Islamic Courts Union became an alternative to the internationally recognized, but internally disputed, Transitional Federal Government, then restricted to Baidoa. To the outside world, where the shift in the politics of Somalia had gone largely unnoticed, the Courts' sudden ascendance looked like a carefully planned Islamic revolution (Barnes & Hassan, 2007). After evicting the warlords from much of south-central Somalia, the Islamic Courts tried to attack the base of the Transitional federal Government in Baidoa. In response to what seemed like an imminent fall of the

southern city of Baidoa to the forces of the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC), Ethiopian

troops launched an offensive into Somalia in support of the country's beleaguered

interim federal government (Baker, 2007).

Apparently catching the UIC off-guard, Ethiopian soldiers – backed by tanks,

artillery, attack helicopters and fixed-wing ground attack aircraft – quickly drove the

UIC forces out of Mogadishu and most of the territory it had previously occupied. The

remnants of the UIC fled to a rugged, forested corner of southern Somalia on Kenya's

border. The TFG relocated to Mogadishu, getting full support from the invading

Ethiopian troops. The arrival of the Ethiopian soldiers in the capital city of Somalia

infuriated many Somalis who saw the Ethiopians as the enemy of their nation.

According to Menkhaus (2009), Enmity between Ethiopian highlanders and

Somalis is deep, rooted in centuries of conflict. To avoid armed resistance against the

Ethiopian troops, there was a proposed solution to rapidly deploy an African Union

peacekeeping force to replace the Ethiopians. But African leaders, not unlike their

European and North American counterparts, were reluctant to commit troops into such

a dangerous environment, and only after long delays were they ~~only~~ able to muster a

force of 2,000, so the Ethiopian forces stayed and joined in the efforts by the TFG

security forces which Ethiopia trained. Within weeks of the relocation of the TFG in

Mogadishu, along with its allied Ethiopian troops, a complex insurgency – composed

of a regrouped *shabaab*, ex-ICU sharia court militias, clan militias and other armed

groups – began a campaign of armed resistance. Attacks on the TFG and the Ethiopian

military occurred each day, involving mortars, roadside bombs, ambushes and even

suicide bombings. The Ethiopian and TFG response was extremely heavy-handed,

involving attacks on whole neighbourhoods, indiscriminate violence targeting civilians

and widespread arrest and detention. TFG security forces were especially predatory toward civilians, engaging in looting, assault and rape. The insurgency and counterinsurgency produced a massive wave of displacement in 2007. 700,000 of Mogadishu's population of 1.3 million were forced to flee from their homes (Menkhaus, 2009).

Having forcibly installed the TFG into Mogadishu in December 2006, Ethiopia heavily influenced the process of getting African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) authorised by the AU to facilitate the withdrawal of its own soldiers from Mogadishu (Elfversson et al., 2019). AMISOM was deployed without the consent of all the main actors, involved in the conflict and in the absent of a ceasefire or peace agreement. In addition, when the AU deployed AMISOM deployed into Mogadishu in March 2007, there were approximately 5,000–7,000 Ethiopian soldiers (ENDF) still protecting the TFG from the remnants of the ousted Islamic Courts Union (ICU) and al-Shabaab. With violence still raging on in much of the country,

President Abdullahi Yusuf decided to step down after a political disagreement with his prime minister. His resignation opened the door for a new administration in the anarchic Horn of Africa nation. From May 2008, under the auspices of the United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS), members of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia and the moderate wing of the resistance movement, Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS) started meeting in the town of Djibouti to find a way forward in rebuilding the collapsed state of Somalia (Kasaija, 2010). The negotiations between the two sides led to the conclusion of several agreements and declarations culminating in the election of Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed as the new president of Somalia.

In 2012, for the first time since the collapse of the state in 1991, Somalia held its first presidential election in the country. Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, an academic as well as a civic activist who worked for several national and international peace and development organizations surprisingly defeated Sheikh Sharif. The election of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud over incumbent President Sharif Sheikh Ahmed marked the end of an eight- year transition period. In 2017, elections in Mogadishu, current president Mohamed Abdullahi Farmajo defeated Hassan Sheikh. Ex-Prime Minister Mohamed Abdullahi "Farmajo" Mohamed surprisingly beat President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud in an election marred by corruption and vote-buying.

2.7. Conceptual framework

Independent Variables
Rural Displacement
- Dispossession (land grabbing & ...)

Dependent Variable
- Livelihood strategies

Intervening Variables
- Conflict and violence
- Marginalization

Figure 1 Source: (Own Work, 2021)

2.8 Theoretical Framework

In this study, the sustainable livelihood approach has been applied as the theoretical framework. The theory emerged as an important concept for understanding development policies in Africa in the wake of the twentieth century. As an approach, it offers a suitable strategy for modelling a system composed of unique competencies, such as activities that are essential for means of sustenance of individuals. Assets defined by livelihood include broad areas, such as money, livestock, or land, which also comprise social capital, education, and health. All these mentioned aspects that define livelihood are essential to IDPs. The theory, therefore offers a suitable way to elucidate how displacement can interrupt livelihood strategies of a community, particularly the Inter- Riverine community of southern Somalia, through dispossession caused by civil conflict and violence that denies household access to assets that can sustain their livelihood and human capital as well.

CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGY

3.1. Introduction

The research used a qualitative approach to collect a detailed and in-depth understanding of displacement, its causes, and patterns in Somalia. The qualitative data depends on how respondents interpret the situation. Hence this study is interpretive. The qualitative data was collected through observations, unstructured interviews, focus group interviews, and key informant interviews. The interview targeted a sample population of 44 participants to help inform the study objectives and aims. As Burgess (1984) states, utilization of participant observation, in-depth or unstructured interviews in the course of the research will allow the researcher to elucidate the meaning of social situations (p.3).

Moreover, one of the rational reasons why I opted for a qualitative approach is that it favors my research questions. Some of the research questions, which I have formulated, revolve around the reason why communities from Somalia's most fertile land are mostly affected by famines and the structural forces behind class, power, and displacement in Somalia. The study also aimed to study the implications of displacement and dispossession on the livelihoods of the communities from inter-riverine regions of Somalia. Another reason for choosing qualitative approach /arguably some also called it ethnography and descriptive approach/ is that it favors the theoretical frame used in this research.

3.2. Observation

First, the researcher undertook participant observation in the IDP settlements, observing the natural setting of the area, the sayings, and doings of the people. This was done by taking time to be with the community. It was important for the researcher, because as Hammersley and Atkinson (1994) note: 'we cannot study social world without being part of it' (p.249). observation at the IDP settlements in Mogadishu took about three weeks. The researcher informed the community that he was researching to avoid any misunderstanding from the beginning. After the participant observation, the researcher decided on how to select participants of the study, and different spectrums of the community were considered, including the community elders, women, youth, and the gatekeepers as well.

3.3. Focus Group Discussions

The second phase was the focus group discussions. Questions were framed as open-ended questions to generate the most possible information from the participants. The focus groups were conducted after the participant observation and before the interviews so that they could give the researcher the opportunity to develop an interview schedule that is based on participant understanding of the topic (Morgan & Spannish, 1984).

Research techniques that maximize the possibility of coming up with unexpected data include unstructured interviews and participant observation (Burgess, 2003). During the discussion, the researcher was the moderator and paid attention to the reactions and words of the participants. The researcher conducted seven focus group discussions with the IDP communities in Daynile and Dharkenley districts, with each

focus discussion taking between an hour or an hour and a half; participants were not interrupted during discussions, even though the moderator guided them to the topic if needed. Participants of the focus group discussions were people who were displaced from the inter-riverine areas and came to Mogadishu in different periods. Some arrived in recent months, while some participants told during the discussions that they came to Mogadishu 1990s during the height of the civil war in Somalia. Groups consisted of five participants to ensure all data required for the study gets extracted from the people. During the discussions, the researcher asked about reasons why they left their ancestral lands, their previous and current livelihoods and the overall predicaments at the IDP settlements in Mogadishu. Discussions were recorded with permission from the participants.

Since IDPs often face regular forceful evictions, focus group sessions allowed the researcher the opportunity to get data in one-shot collection (Berg, 2004). Interviews were the final step of the data-gathering process and the government officials, aid agencies operating in the area, and the gatekeepers were interviewed. This helped generate in- depth data, and it was also a good triangulation process.

3.4. Unstructured Interviews

To obtain valuable first-hand data, interviews were conducted with two Mogadishu local government officials and three aid workers. These interviews were unstructured and conducted at different times and were centered on questions that seek to generate date about factors that contribute to displacement, their livelihoods before being displaced compared to the current livelihoods and problems and opportunities in their everyday urban livings. The interview process was guided conversation in which

the researcher will seek insights into how participants understand their social worlds. According to Burgess (1984), unstructured questions are widely used by social scientists and these conservations are greater value than straight question and answer sessions as they provided rich detailed data that could be used alongside other materials.

3.5. Data Analysis Procedure

Data analysis occurred hand in hand with the data collection. By doing so, the researcher was able to analyze data while it is still fresh in his mind. Also, the research process involved constant analysis as field notes were read and reread to discover relevant problems of the study, hypotheses were also developed with regards to the problems, and the researcher also looked for valid indications of the variables contained in the hypotheses (Burgess, 2003).

Likewise, the coding system was established based on themes that came to light in the interviews. Audio and video notes were transcribed and translated into English. For convenience, the transcription, translation, and the coding were done simultaneously. Repeatedly reading the textual data, understanding it, and analyzing it for its authenticity and quality is important before proceeding with the interpretation. Primary data was scanned for words and phrases most commonly used by respondents, as well as words and phrases used with unusual emotions. Findings of the interviews/focus group/observation were compared with the findings of the literature review.

Finally, the patterns that arise from the collected data was linked to an existing theory and literature. To keep track of the data, the researcher created a serial numbers for each note, then date, place, and name of the respondent.

3.6. Site of the study

Mogadishu is the site chosen for this study due to its high number of IDPs, particularly IDPs, from the inter-riverine regions. Mogadishu is one of the oldest cities in East Africa, which was founded by Arab and Indian merchants in the century (Grünewald, 2012). The city started from two districts, namely Hamarweyne and Shingaani, which were first inhabited by the Benadiri 'minority' groups. As the physical characteristics of the coast allowed the establishment of a deep seaport, Mogadishu became a central element for the Italian colonization process in the Horn of Africa (Grünewald, 2012). Currently, Mogadishu has 17 districts, namely Hamarweyne, Shingaani, Abdiaziz, yaqshid, Hamarjadiid, Heliwaa, Kaaran, Shibis, Boondhere, Hamarjajab, Waberi, Wardhigley, Howlwadag, Hodan, Daynile, wadajir, Dharkenley, and Kaxda, which is the latest addition.

Following the toppling of the Siad Barre regime in 1991, Mogadishu became the center of the crisis, and many of its residents fled away as clan militias looted both public and private buildings and institutions. Even though it is improving, there is still widespread insecurity in the city, with the Islamist group Al-Shabaab carrying out suicide bombs and daily targeted killings.

3.7. Population

With a population of over 2 million, Mogadishu is the most populous and the largest city in Somalia (Somali Public Agenda, 2019). The city has long been the seat of the government, attracting many Somalis from the rural areas and other urban areas as well. The city started experiencing high growth of population in 1980s, which was resulted by a combination of factors including, the country's

increasing population growth, an influx of Somali refugees from Ethiopia and displaced people from the Ogaden War with Ethiopia in 1977-1978 and the country's substantial urban drift from the rural areas to the capital where vast majority of wealth, employment, educational opportunities, and other services were concentrated (RVI & HIPS, 2017). Out of 2 million inhabitants in Mogadishu, 2,648,000 of them are internally displaced (IMDC, 2018), who, the majority of them, originate from the inter-riverine regions. It is also important to mention that more than 50 percent of the IDP population lives in three districts, namely Hodan, Wadajir, and Dharkenley (RVI & HIPS, 2017).

3.8. Research Context

Mogadishu is divided into 17 districts, each governed by district commissioner (DC). The districts are Dharkenley, Wadajir, Waberi, Daynile, Hodan, Hawlwadag, Xamar Jabjab, Xamarweyne, Wardhigley, Bondhere, Shangani, Shibis, Yaqshid, Cabdicasis, Karan, Heliwa, and Kaxda. Mogadishu's mayor is appointed by the president of the federal government, and currently, the mayor is Omar Filish, who is a former warlord in the city. The mayor before him was Eng. Abdirahman Omar Osman (Eng-Yarisow) who was assassinated in his office by Al- Shabab in 2019. The mayor has the authority to appoint district commissioner for the 17 districts of the city, but not all the commissioners are new to leadership in the districts they control. Some of them have entered power alliance with former warlords who are wielding influence and power. The mayor is usually selected from Abgaal, which is one of the major clans of Hawiye who claim indigenous rights to Mogadishu, but the district commissioners come from other clans inhabiting the city, majority of them from Hawiye.

IDP settlements are controlled by gatekeepers who determine the fate of the displaced communities. Gatekeepers belong to the major clans, and they are individuals who organize themselves to exploit humanitarian assistance for their own personal and political gains. There is widespread insecurity in the city, with Al-Shabab still plotting regular attacks that inflict heavy casualty on the civilians and government personnel as well. AMISOM, African peacekeeping troops, help the government to maintain control.

Due to the complexities mentioned above, it was extremely difficult to conduct research in Mogadishu. Therefore, the researcher undertook all the necessary precautions the situation demands.

3.9. Trustworthiness

Getting the trust of the community was of high priority for the study, and the researcher ensured several steps necessary for trustworthiness. First, informed consent form was distributed to the participants of the study. According to Berg (2004), ensuring the confidentiality was important for obtaining truth and free-flowing data from the participants. Also, the members of the community were approached, starting with the traditional elders followed by women, youth, and other members. The community were promised that findings will be shared with them prior to publication.

Similarly, the researcher was familiar with the peculiar culture and accent of the inter-riverine community and gave special consideration to that. In addition to that, as a community with a lot of grievances such as displacement from their places of origin, the looting of their resources, and the squalid conditions in the IDP settlements, the researcher was always sympathetic to them and he showed his gratitude for their collaboration. The place and time were decided in accordance with their preferences.

CHAPTER 4

DISCUSSION OF MAIN FINDINGS

This study is motivated by the fact that Somalia and the Southern region has been experiencing relentless political instability, the continuing crisis in the nation has led to a political and political void and has hindered long-term supporters of community restoration. Although, displacement is common occurrence in the country, the study aimed to get to the bottom of why people from the inter-riverine areas in southern Somalia, which is the most fertile agricultural land in the country are often prone to displacement more than those from barren or less fertile land. Displacement is a global phenomenon that affects many countries in the world. Though, displacement is caused by factors, conflict and violence are responsible for the highest rate. Globally, almost 10 million people internally displaced by armed conflict and other forms of violence in 22 of its countries and an unknown number of those displaced by disasters, Africa is the continent with the largest number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) (Kälin & Schrepfe, 2013).

According to UNHCR (2020), During 2019, an estimated 11.0 million people were newly displaced. While 2.4 million sought protection outside their country, 8.6 million were newly displaced within the borders of their countries. Many displaced populations failed to find long-lasting solutions for rebuilding their lives. In Somalia, the political instability has lasted for duration of approximately 30years (Internal Displacement Monitoring Center, 2021).

Particularly, Somalia is often seen as the scene of unceasing violence and insecurity after the fall of the state. However, the study shows that the interplay

between political conflict and displacement has seen various stages, modifications, and evolutions. Leading up to the origin of the displacement that has continued to the current day, Somalia itself was a major refugee host nation, home to approximately 650,000 Ethiopians (Internal Displacement Monitoring Center, 2021). The people impacted were people living near the disputed frontier (southern region), where the violence was centered. The huge proportion of internally displaced people in the country has led to the manipulation of Somalia's national economy, as the government's use of aid services as a major source of income has played an integral part in bringing aid into Somalia's political economy, a pattern that has persisted to this day.

According to United Nation (UN), the first major displacement of refugees from Somalia began with series of events that led to the fall of President Siad Barre's regime in 1991. The war that broke out following the fall of the president led to a series of wars that have ever since paralyzed the efforts of the nation to regain peace. Ever since Asylum seekers and displaced persons have been the most persistently displaced group in the Horn of Africa (CCCM Somalia Overview, 2020). Even so, movement and migration have long been central elements in the economic and political history of the area. Ever since the 1970s, Somalis have been displaced to varying degrees in response to various dynamics, including war, natural disasters, and economic instability. The political distress in Somalia is believed to be the cause of instability in the country.

All the information was gathered by unstructured questionnaire conducted through group discussion with the IDPs and interviews with local government officials and aid agency workers. Most of the respondents were women and men equally

significantly provided substantial information. Also, the respondents were mainly victims of the civil war coupled with the effects of drought, flooding, famine, loss of economic activities, and poverty. Most of them, as revealed from the collected information, are at the camps due to limited and lack of work opportunities as well as income generating activities. Poverty arising from the loss of assets and land grabbing during the civil war, terrorism, insecurity, and inter-clan conflicts over resources such as pasture and water were as well reported to be major contributors of the internal displacement of the people in the region. Key informants such as gate keepers, government officials, and aid organization workers were also part of the interviewees and were part of the FGD.

Through observation conducted at the IDP settlement, this study established that the majority of the IDPs are women, especially from women headed households, and they generally appeared to be more vulnerable to displacement because they are caregivers. During the civil war and the extended periods of natural disasters such as drought, famine, and flooding, the IDPs were forced to move from their traditional settlement areas to the camps. But their overall conditions at the IDP have been poor with challenges of access to clean water and proper sanitation, quality shelter, proper healthcare, and education. Many of the respondents said that they feel destitute and despite getting international and local government aid, it is not enough.

Some have to borrow money and seek for assistance from relatives abroad or friends. According to the responses, some IDPs sort to make extra income by offering services and partaking in unskilled labor and small businesses. Due to the high rates of poverty in the camps, these people must resort to other means of making money since they have to survive. A 40-year old woman, for example, said that:

"My husband goes to look for work as a porter in construction sites to provide for us. He wakes up early in the morning and treks long roads to get to this his place of work. But this is not permanent, because he sometimes comes back home empty-handed and sometimes het gets robbed on the way back home" (FGD, 2021).

In the context of the collapse of Somali government, the administration's exploitation of clan loyalties and linkages has made clan identity the key cause of security, dispute, and access to political power and facilities. The setting up of national borders in the post-colonial period also implied that several clans and sub-clans inhabited territories that stretched two countries and were, therefore, able to exploit economic, social, and civic ties and claims in numerous nations.

As the nation of Somalia started to fragment and, in the aftermath of the collapse, people retreated to their safety clans as tribal leaders and clan militia leaders fostered feuds to serve their interests for wealth and influence (CCCM Somalia Overview, 2020). Fierce battles between clans, coupled with the impacts of severe drought, resulted in the deaths of an estimated 250,000 Somalis in the 1992-93 emergency and sent everyone else to flee to safer places either in urban centers in the country or neighboring countries.

An elderly man said in the focus group discussions:

"My family and I came left our home 20 years when a major clan war erupted in our areas. We didn't have enough weapons or number of men to defend ourselves and resources and the only I could ensure safety of my family was to leave behind everything and head to the camps" (FGD, 2021).

Displacement in Southern Somalia has continued to occur even after the end of the wars. The study shows that other factors such as internal feuds and land grabbing from relatives and people in power have continually caused internal displacement in

Somalia. Research shows that by 2013, the number of the Somalis who have been displaced due to some of the reasons above approximately 1.1 million people. Research shows that due to the internal displacement of the people in Somali, there has been chaos in the nation and political unrest has gone to great lengths to create instability in the nation (CCCM Somalia Overview, 2020).

4.1. Historical Perspective on Patterns of Displacement in Somalia

Somalia has a long history of displacement dynamics. According to Lindley & Haslie (2011), there are three broad periods within the longer trajectories of governance failure in Somali territories. The first phase of major crisis that caused displacement was early to mid- 1990s, when Siyad Barre's authoritarian regime fought with rebel movements on a growing number of fronts, with the regime resorting to counter-insurgency tactics (Lindley & Haslie, 2011). The military regime was overthrown in 1991 and the state collapsed, descending into a protracted period of civil war and lawlessness. The largest conflict-induced internal displacement in southern Somalia happened between 1991 and 1993 as the country was going through a fresh circle of civil war.

Gundel (2002) states that prior to May 1992, the main cause of displacement was fighting and drought, while after 1992 displacement was mainly caused by food scarcity.
Estimates of internal displacement during that period were as high as 2 million, with refugee numbers peaking at above 800,000 in 1992 (Robinson and Zimmerman, 2014).

During the ensuing chaos, several strongmen belonging to bigger clans took advantage of the situation and established themselves as warlords, mobilizing clan-

people to contest control of key resources: markets, ports, water points, road blocks, state property, private property in urban centers, and the fertile agricultural lands between the Juba and Shebelle rivers (Lindley & Haslie, 2011). Most of those who fell victims to this invasion were communities in the inter-riverine regions, whose lands were forcibly confiscated by mainly Hawiye armed groups. While of some of these communities remained on their lands as sharecroppers or forced laborers, many were displaced (Lindley & Haslie, 2011).

Some of the IDP communities who took part in the focus group discussions conducted by the researcher of this study stated that they fled from their original areas as early as 1991 when the civil war broke out in the entire country. It is during this time when, according to some of the focus group discussion participants, they were attacked by clan militias.

> "I can't remember the exact day but it was 1992 when we caught in the middle of two fighting clan militias who were allied with both Siad Barre and the rebels respectively. Both militias were aggressive, killing our people and pillaging our crops, livestock and other properties. We had packed the little materials that we could afford to carry on our shoulders and fled the area. At first, we went to Baidoa but we couldn't get any assistance as our kids and the elderly were starving, therefore we trekked from Baidoa to Mogadishu in search of food aid" (FGD, 2021)

Some of elders of the IDP communities informed the researcher during the focus group discussions that we had lost their land to the government in 1980s when their land was nationalized in the socialist policy. But the elders believed the land was just taken over by powerful elites who were associated with the military regime.

"My brother and I lost the land we inherited from our father when one day the Somali government decided to expropriate all lands in Lower Shabelle region. We had no power to resist, therefore we had give in everything we had and started working on the same land we owned as laborer, but in 1991 when the government collapsed we had to leave the area. We fled to Dadaab refugee camp in Kenya and returned in 2000 when we resided in this settlement" (FGD, 2021)

This was followed by a quieter period from 1996 to 2005 (Lindley & Haslie, 2011) and was characterized by a relatively benign security environment (Majid & McDowell 2012). In South-central Somalia, pockets of relative stability emerged, particularly where major clans formed functioning coalitions. In the north, Somaliland and Puntland stabilized under autonomous administrations (Lindley & Haslie, 2011). There was a decline in IDP and refugee number during this period. Somali refugees figures showed a decline from 638,000 in 1996 to 395,000 in 2005, with IDP numbers declining to around 400,000 in 2005 (Robinson and Zimmerman, 2014).

The third period, from 2006 to 2012, was marked by a return to renewed large-scale internal and external displacement (Robinson and Zimmerman, 2014). This was caused by the transformation of the Somali protracted civil war in the context of the global war on terror, coupled to the problems of droughts (Lindley & Haslie, 2011). From the beginning of 2004, Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG) began to exert some control over southern Somalia.

In 2005-2006, building on neighbourhood networks of sharia courts and backed by Mogadishu's business community, the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) emerged as a major political force, winning a decisive victory against US-financed warlords in mid-2006 (Lindley & Haslie, 2011). This put the Courts and the TFG on a collision course

as both were vying for power. In 2006, Ethiopian troops, with the blessing of the United

States invaded Somalia in order to support the TFG and managed to disperse the Courts

from Mogadishu and other urban areas. This had inspired the most radical member of

the Courts, Al-Shabab to emerge as the strongest resistance to the TFG forces, the

Ethiopian army and other African Union troops (Maxwell & Fitzpatrick 2013). This

created a fertile ground for new displacement as many people were affected by the

conflict. According to Robinson and Zimmerman (2014), by 2009, the number of IDPs

had jumped to 1.5 million, the highest ever, and 680, 000 Somali refugees had fled to

the neighboring countries and beyond, including 161,000 in Yemen, 59,000 in Ethiopia

and 310,000 in Kenya.

In the late 2010 and early 2011, a combination of factors including rising global

food prices, and the severe droughts would have caused extreme hardship even in a

country that was not in a pre- existing state of protracted crisis, but would not have

resulted in the catastrophe that happened (Maxwell & Fitzpatrick 2013). The extra

vulnerability caused by these combined underlying factors, as well as the spiraling

effect of factors such as long-term displacement and reduced asset base increase the

impact of the drought and price rises, setting the stage for the famine in 2011.

4.2. Causes of Displacement and Land expropriation

4.2.1. Political Issues

Respondents pointed out that armed conflict led to their internal displacement,

which is has been a common occurrence in Somalia. In most cases, displacement,

according to the respondents, has been sparked with the revolt against the ruling

regime that governed their political government (Ibrahim, Malick and Wielenga,

2020). Aside from that, the struggle to control fertile land, as well as the economic resources of the country, has also been a major contributor to the internal displacement of the individuals as observed from most of the respondents. The intensification of such political issues, which is in accordance with Hassan et al. (2014) explanations, has turned the minority groups into targeted "enemies" subjecting them to torture, marginalization, discrimination, wanton killing, and destruction of properties, hence their internal displacement. Also, the rift in the political parties and groups in Somalia has been a major obstruction to humanitarian aid, which has forced most people from the Inter-riverine communities of the south to be displaced to refugees and IDP camps.

Most of the respondents also believe that lack of stable government in Somalia contributed to the numerous wars between their clans, which have led to displacement of the minority groups in the rural south to seek asylum and protection. Furthermore, the majority of the respondents attest that the current structure of the Somalia government is fragmented, and various ministries tasked with the management of policies protecting those who are internally displaced have not been well-implemented, further preventing humanitarian assistance to the refugee camps, exacerbating their present situation and livelihood. Most of the respondents blamed their nation and its government to be the reason behind their suffering in the camps.

One of the government officials, for example, said that "IDPs have occupied some buildings belonging to government offices, leaving the government officials to look for other areas to operate in further inhibiting their concerted efforts." Also, other structures of the government are not fully functional, delaying intervention of humanitarian assistance to the IDP camps (Hassan et al., 2014). The structure of the government according to the majority of the respondents is still contending with

pressing issues affecting the nation, and most of the interviewees believe that the present structure is not adequate enough to address the present humanitarian issues.

In addition, forced displacement is a key feature of Somalia's current political economy. The displaced persons include a significant vulnerable group of displaced persons from Awdhiigle, Buurhakaba, Walawayn, Waajid, Jowhar, Bardaale, Baidoa, Hudur, Barawe, and Beletweine need sustained support. The number of the internally displaced people in Somalia is weighing heavily on the nation's economy. As at now, the economy of Somalia cannot entirely take care of the millions in the camps and they must rely on the aid from humanitarian organizations and well- wishers. They may have to be a specific target of policies to overcome social, economic, and political marginalization. More than that, however, the trends of displacement have drastically changed Somalia's social, gender, and demographic structure. Knowing how displacement has shaped and continues to shape Somali society will be key to efforts to build peace and stability in the years ahead. Reestablishing the nation will require more than just funding from humanitarian organizations. This is because most of the displaced people are from minority clans and most of them require the support of the government.

4.2.2. Drought, Famine, and Floods

Some of the groups living in the IDP camps responded that the drought and floods made their livelihood in their ancestral lands worse, forcing them to flee or look for something more sustainable. The respondents also perceived and felt that continued neglect by the government during periods of drought, famine, and floods have forced them to seek shelter in the IDP camps. The situations that follow a natural calamity

tend to weigh heavily on the victims as explained by Bryld, Kamau and Sinigallia's publication (2014). According to the respondents, IDP and refugee camps takes care of them and provides them with the needed protection because at the camps, it is an agency tasked to protect and offer assistance to them. As much as most of the individuals interviewed in the IDP camps reported that they were displaced during the Civil war and the on and off inter-clan conflicts, extreme drought, famine, and flooding during rainy seasons took a toll on them and this made them seek for solace at the camps. One of the respondents particularly said:

> "because of the unpredicted environmental degradation and famine, they ended up advancing towards scarce river-fed regions as most of them depended on agro-pastoral and pastoral livelihoods, sparking conflict and violence between clashing communities, such as the inter-riverine communities" (FGD,2021).

In this situation, it is clear that they were left with no choice but to go to camps, where they have a chance of living a better life.

But then again, they say that before moving to the camps, they had their coping mechanisms. They attest that majority of Somali populations are accustomed to the harsh environment, which have made many of them develop coping mechanisms like migrating to other regions to look for pasture and water. Research shows that most of the Somalis are nomadic pastoralist. As such, they are used to constant migration to different regions where they can be safe from any forms of harm. What pushed them so much to the camp is simply the support provided by the NGOs, which is far much better than what the government offers. Others also get tired when drought become so intense and opt for settling at the camps instead of struggling to survive. One of the respondents said that,

"At first, we didn't have water scarcity. Our animals had enough and we also had enough, but due to the recurrent droughts, our wells dried up and sometimes we have to walk five to ten kilometer in search of water for cattle and explore new lands for settlement" (Interview, 2021).

In the recent years, most of the regions that were considered water catchment areas have dried up forcing many agro-pastoralists to walk long distance in some instance even for days to find pasture and land where they can settle. Other coping mechanism they used in the past include digging up hand dug wells, can no longer be sustained because they dry up fast and the water levels are low and salty.

In addition, Somali herders have used periodic migration as a coping strategy for decades, but climate change is a challenge for resilience. The tumultuous political circumstances, combined with unfavorable climatic conditions, have caused a significant number of people to migrate away from their places of origin. Competition over declining pastures and water supplies has created conflict between communities, especially the nomadic/pastoralist groups. Common cycles of droughts and floods have culminated in yield reductions in farming, hunger, and malnutrition, and prompted people to flee to areas where they can seek food aid.

The nation is made up mostly of pastoralist, cultivation and livestock farming are the central part of the majority of rural lands. Even so, unpredictable weather conditions affect food production and cattle, and disease outbreaks, such as rift valley fever, also affect livestock and cause significant losses in livestock, threatening the livelihoods of pastoralists. This causes others to migrate to urban areas where they remain in IDP settlements. With the degradation of household coping strategies (through regular droughts, floods, loss of properties and lives and families), options for rural communities are minimal.

According to the participants, the effects of violence, negative external conditions, and land loss are the loss of livelihoods and an increase in food inequality. An elderly man who was part of the FGD had to say the following:

> "When we were in our ancestral land, we used to cultivate our farms and had enough food for our families, but due to droughts we lost both our crops and livestock. Our children starting starving. That's why we had to leave, but unfortunately here at the camps, we don't have enough food to eat" (FGD, 2021)

As per the FAO, famine, and war are the major causes of food scarcity in Somalia (Ratnayake, 2009). The cyclical droughts that are becoming widespread in Somalia are particularly devastating for the refugees, given that the loss of assets drastically reduces their resistance. The respondents also pointed out that land degradation has played a major role in growing food insecurity, resulting in severe livestock losses, decreased rainfall and water supplies, and thus increased displacement of both pastoralists and farmers.

Some of the respondents explained that another cause of the environmental degradation is the rampant cutting down of trees for firewood. Arguably, people in Somalia have resorted to charcoal business and as such destroying the environment. To a certain degree, the changes in the climatic conditions in the past years can be attributed to the increased cutting down of trees. Ideally, the trees are cut down and non are planted to replace. When trees are cut down, the water catchment area is lost. As such, soil erosion cannot be avoided since most of the trees that would have caught the water are won out. This explains the increase in cases of the floods in most sections of the nation. Similarly, the cutting down of trees limits the surface area for executing the carbon cycle. Plants use carbon dioxide for the process of

photosynthesis. However, when there is carbon dioxide in the atmosphere and there are no plants that can make use of the carbon present, there is a likelihood of the carbon to be retained in the atmosphere. The carbon can react with components of the atmosphere to cause acidic rain, and in some cases draught due to high heat content. In as much as the charcoal business is effective in the economy of Somalia, it is the major cause of the natural calamities that end up hurting the citizens of the nation.

4.2.3. Forcible appropriation of land

The forced appropriation of land, according to the respondents, was a driving force for displacement and remained an obstacle to return. They argued that populations, notably agricultural minorities such as the Bantu, which had originally fled tensions and insecurity, had further suffered because of the forced appropriation of their farmland along the banks of the Shabelle River and Juba River by military clans. In the formative days of the civil war, bigger clans (especially the HabarGedir, of the Hawiye clan) seized rich farmlands and estates owned by agricultural clans and native communities, often contributing to their displacement. One of the participants who came from Lower Shabelle said:

> "We lost our land to clan militia who confiscated our properties by force
> and forced us to leave in 1996. We came to Mogadishu and lived here ever
> since. We would like to go back but there is no guarantee that we will be
> protected from those who chased us in the first place" (FGD, 2021).

Minority groups have been significantly affected by this pattern. Throughout the Shabelle Valleys and Juba in the south, for example, several clans have forcefully displaced indigenous peoples to seek new landowner-tenant connections and to profit

from the cultivation of several important crops, particularly bananas and citrus. Other minorities, such as the Bajuni, Asharaf Bravenese, who have traditionally been fishermen, have been deprived of access to their conventional means of subsistence as land and resources have been taken over by these stronger clans. Most of these communities subsequently moved to northern (Somaliland, Mogadishu, and Puntland) in pursuit of economic livelihoods.

4.2.4. Food Crisis

Arguably, the major cause of land grabs in Somalia. is the issue of food shortages.

Following the fall of agriculture, the market for agricultural products became lucrative since the shortage caused an increase in the prices of the food crops. According to the statistics collected, the prices of foods such as rice, wheat, corn and cereals had gone up. The 2007-2008 food shortage in Somalia was the beginning of land grabbing that had huge impacts on the citizens. Powerful groups grabbed land and they planted these food crops with the intention of selling them at higher prices when they are ready. Since these are food crops and they are necessities, people will have to buy even if the prices are double the original price. As such, the need for creating a source of food pushed people into grabbing lands that were productive and huge enough to support large populations.

4.2.5. Civil War, Terrorism, and Insecurity

A large proportion of the populations in rural south Somalia equally pointed out that they were displaced from their traditional lands due to the perennial conflict and

insecurity forcing them to seek refuge in the southern region of the country, especially the rural areas because it is relatively peaceful. One of the respondents who seemed quite educated and vividly remembers his experience during the war and the insecurity issues that erupted thereafter said;

> "the fight between the Ethiopian troops and the Islamists have spread into our areas causing many innocent people to be caught in the cross fire. We waited for about three months and we had to flee during the worsening of the war" (FGD,2021).

But then again according to majority of the respondents, Southern Somalia has still been subject to constant violent war and conflict, particularly due to wars over boundaries, terrorism, and insecurity, thus forcing more and more people to seek asylum at the camps (Elliot, & Holzer, 2009). The majority also attested that most of the conflicts that have contributed to IDPs took place because of the struggle among the clans to control the rich agricultural lands, pastures, and water points in the south, which are also highly considered valuable and suitable assets for pastoral farming. This is in accordance with the findings by Cassanelli (2015) because, a bigger percentage of those who experienced the impacts of the major wars say that the warlords viewed south Somalia as a haven that offers a strategic location to the port of Kismayo, which has also led to high levels of insecurity and terrorism due to retaliatory attacks and the seeking for dominance and control over potential economic activities.

Terrorist groups in Somalia rose as a result of the agreement between the president of Somalia and that of the United states of America to work together following making the nation better. Since after the fall of the dictator General Mohamed

Siad Barre in 1991, Somalia has been on the struggle to maintain a central power and create a government (Elliot, & Holzer, 2009).

Even so, this has been next to impossible due to the rise of terrorist groups that rise through grabbing the most powerful elements of the economy such as oil and transportation system in the nation. Gradually, Somalia became a brooding place in which terrorist groups can not only grow but also plan their activities. Money has become a powerful tool for these groups and these people will buy their ways to any point. With the rise of technology, the terrorist groups have come to advance in their techniques and even in the technicality of the weapon they use during these attacks (Elliot, & Holzer, 2009).

The growth of terrorism continued to grow following the US's agreement to help Somalis in terms of healthcare, food and even protection from any form of harm. Since the civil war has existed since General Mohamed Siad Barre, the nation has not known peace and that is why the presidents that proceeded signed peace treaties with the US. Research shows that terrorist groups have held Somalia hostage for a long time, Alshabab being one of the most notorious ones. Elliot and Holzer (2009) explains that "In the same month, President Ahmed promised international donors his government would combat 'terrorism' and support human rights, gender equality and civil society" (216).

The fact that Somalia let in American troops to help protect the citizens and maintain peace and order, the terrorist groups were bothered, and they retaliated in the 9/11 attacks on US soil. Research shows that these groups grew because of the poverty rates that the nation had been subjected to due to the civil war that had lasted for approximately two decades. Citizens found themselves in need of money and means of

survival that could only be offered by the terrorist groups in exchange for their loyalty and protection against invaders. The growing of the terrorist community was however becoming a huge problem in the nation since the death rates were high and people lived in fear of being shot dead (Elliot, & Holzer, 2009).

Gradually, the lives of human beings were taken for no apparent reason and the terrorist groups were growing stronger each time. The intervention of the US was required so that it can paralyze the efforts of these groups and protect the rights of the citizens of Somalia. Insecurity proved to be a major challenge in Somalia for even the citizens of the nation.

Respondents also indicated that their status is one of the dominant factors contributing to displacement in Somalia as a consequence of security concerns caused by this fight. Many of these IDPs have escaped for a variety of reasons, such as high exposure to violence or threats of violence. Other than fear, most of the Somalis would escape from a war zone for the sake of their families and their own safety. For others, the forced consolidation of their land by powerful or well-armed clans and the loss of their investments and means of subsistence and led to their departure. This was related to the effects of clan politics in the conflict, which culminated in a diverse clan profile of displacement encounters. Like many other cultures, the Somali is not an exception when it comes to the secrecy and the importance of the ancestral land. The displacements were not only a cause of migration, but it was also a cause of distortion of culture.

Furthermore, most of the Somalia clans are still fractious with each other according to the majority of the respondents despite efforts towards peace building and intervention strategies. Lack of peaceful coexistence between majorities of clans in

Somalia does not only pose a threat to the humanitarian assistance, but also continue to displace minority groups who seek asylum and protection in IDP and refugee camps. Menkhaus (2016) also reported this in his publication. Besides, most of the humanitarian assistance accorded to the IDPs cannot be fulfilled if some clans disagree because of the existing clan dynamics, which continues to be a serious issue across Somalia. Alshabab, at the same time, continue to pose threat to the humanitarian assistance and workers efforts based on the information provided by majority of the respondents. The IDP camps are not entirely secure from Alshabab attacks, who target most of the humanitarian aid workers. During the focused group discussions, one of the aid workers, for instance, said that "the other week two of our support staff in medical and volunteer trainee were attacked and abducted by armed men. A few days later we were deeply saddened by the news that one of the volunteer's trainee's had been killed." People in the community have been condemned to their deaths, if not by hunger and the tough conditions, then by the gun. Since the war commenced in 2006, the rates of death in Somali have gone up as compared to the previous years.

4.3 Impacts of Displacement and Land dispossession on Livelihoods in Somalia

4.3.1 Poor Education

From the data collected from the respondents, education does not really have a place in the life of a Somali IDP child. As shown in figure 3 above, most of the displaced people had education only to the primary level. Most of them could not attend high school because of poverty issues or in most cases, migration from either war or calamities. Education is key to civilization of a nation and this explains why there were wars for the longest time in the country. Ideally, the IDPs have the opportunity to attend

schools. However, they are hindered by numerous factors such as poverty. As such, they must find work so that they can fend for themselves and their families. Research shows that some of the humanitarian aid that these people receive is all about the shelter, and basic needs. These people, however, have all the responsibilities and the food provided might not be enough for the whole family. In some cases, the children must find employment and help their parents to put food on the table. There are also children who are orphans while some have been separated from their parents. Such children do not have anyone except themselves. As such, they have to work and get money to buy food. Balancing time for school and that of work might be hard so most of them opt out of school.

4.3.2. Insecurity

Research shows that there are numerous insecurity issues that the people in the IDP camps face every single day. Respondents say that there are high rates of mortality in the camps, following the poor living conditions in the camps and illnesses. Others die during birth and the rates of pregnancies are also high. The mortality rate is also increased by the insecurities that these people are subjected to. Other than physical assault, there are cases where people are robbed violently, and they have no option but to comply. Rates of violent that result from the pressure to survive is a major concern when it comes to the Somalis in the camps. Abduction cases are also many in Somali camps and people face challenges that can cause them harm.

Some people are abducted and sold as slaves while others are abducted and sold to human trafficking. Occasionally, lives are lost carelessly in the camps mainly by putting their lives in bad situation. Illegal activities such as selling drugs are also

common in these camps and they are composed of violent activities. The rates of deaths in the camps can also be attributed to the fact that the camps have limited access to health facilities and proper water and sanitation.

4.3.3. Social Ramifications

Displacement and land expropriation often exposes the people, rather the settlers of the land to social ramifications that they could have avoided in the event that they had retained their land. A good example is that it exposes the poor to poverty. This is because the people might have lost the only land that they cultivated as the only source of their livelihood. Ideally, this has been the case in most Somali homes. The war disrupted the agricultural business and so when these people lost their lands to the grabbers, they lost their only way of survival. This is reflected in the poverty levels, loss of employment and the populations in the camps. Grabbing land from a certain group of people tend to risk putting the generation of a family to poverty for the rest of their lives.

4.3.4. Displacement of the People

Research shows that the huge numbers of the displaced people in Somalia mainly result from land grabbing. Ideally, as a person losses his land to the corporate firms and rich people, they are forced into moving out of the homes they have grown to know. As such, they not only lose the ties that they have created in this land and they have to find another place to settle. In Somalia for instance, most of the displaced people have to stay in camps, where the living conditions are not as good as their homes. Data collected from the interviewers revealed that the life these people live in

these camps suffer dearly. One of the interviewee claimed that the suffering in the camps is hard on women and children mostly. Other than theft, rape and physical abuse through beating, people in the camps find it hard to eat well and even protect them from contacting diseases.

4.3.5. Exposure to Violence

Land dispossession also come with the weight of violence and deaths that result from disagreements. Violent will rise from the fact that the land is being taken against the will of the owners. Some people believe that their ancestral land cannot be taken without their retaliation. As such, they will find ways of fighting back to stop the actions of the most powerful institutions. In Somalia for instance, research shows that people who dwelled in the rural areas lost their land to the terrorist groups who grabbed the lands. Ideally, in the interior, these groups can effectively come together and make plans without having to worry about being caught or any interference. Also, these locations are best to disguise their locations and sense danger from far. Research show that most of the people who owned land lost their lives in the violence that rose from grabbing land. The injustices of land grabbing were a common issue among the people of Somalia during the period of the civil war.

4.3.6. Loss of Familial Ties

The majority of the IDPs in Northern Somalia have lost relatives, siblings, or parents during the conflicts or the civil war that forced them to flee their ancestral land to seek refuge. Majority of the IDPs lost their kin and relatives when fleeing. Only a few families are still intact within the IDP camps, but most of the individuals have lost

a relative or kin. For those who cannot find their families or relatives, they are forced to join hosting IDPs (Bryld, Kamau, and Sinigallia, 2014).

When such situations arise, as stated by quite a number of the respondents, familial ties are lost and it calls for the need to try fitting into a new family. Cultural and traditional erosion are also some of the issues reported by the respondents, with some saying that at the camp, it is hard to keep or maintain cultures and customs that cement family units and clans. Some, for instance, reported that this is increasingly difficult for children as they often come to the camps traumatized and separated from their families. They particularly have a hard time coping since they have lost family ties and at times, they have to adopt new ways of living or even experience unfriendly spaces when under the authority of new families or clans.

According to the respondents, those who fled from their homes instead of getting refuge and humanitarian aid they desperately needed they come across unfriendly and hostile living conditions in Mogadishu. IDP houses in Somalia are divided into many 'umbrellas'. Every umbrella has a group of IDP houses. Leaders are elected to provide oversight and manage the IDP houses.

4.3.7. Suffering at the IDP camps

Being at the camps has subjected most of the IDPs to a lack of adequate supplies and enough essential amenities such as food, water, and proper health care. The perennial conflicts across the region, for instance, have rendered some of the camps into a state of lack of enough food supplies since the local authorities constantly divert relief supplies meant for the IDPs (Action Against hunger, 2021). Other regions controlled by ward lords and militia groups are also neglected from relief supplies,

which have subjected the majority of the IDPs to extreme suffering and limited access to quality healthcare, further affecting their quality of living. A big percentage of the respondents said that in as much as they are allowed to use the NGOs healthcare services, they from time to time experience challenges accessing the needed care and the quality of care provided is mostly insufficient. One of the aid healthcare providers during the FGD pointed out that this is primarily because;

> "the healthcare service at the camp is overburdened. The people here outnumber the available resources and healthcare personnel" (FGD, 2021).

She further said that mental healthcare is even one of the areas that is considerably lacking for IDPs struggling with depression, anxiety disorders, somatic symptoms, and post-traumatic stress disorder.

Also, many of the respondents in these IDP camps reported being subjected to human rights abuses, such as beating, rape, and ethnic discrimination. What is more, a larger proportion of women respondents attested to having been in at least one incident subjected to gender-based violence, which is most of the time not reported to the authorities (Bader, 2013).

One of the gatekeepers in Somalia IDP camps said that, "most of the IDPs in live in private lands, and sometimes face eviction amidst their suffering further worsening their situation." As further confirmed by Bader (2013), most of the IDPs are not even safe in refugee camps because the land is privately owned and at times the landlord comes to reclaim them back forcing them to evicted into other regions. When such incidents happen, they are not given notice or warning, and worse off, their shelter are destroyed and they are left alone to seek new areas for settlement. Also, one

of the aid workers said that,

> "People get evicted on regular basis. The city is recovering from protracted conflicts and a lot of development is happening leading to booming construction business. Therefore, the IDP communities are the weakest to target (Interview,2021).

According to the information collected, about 21% of the IDPs women were interviewed reported to have suffered beatings, harassment, and bullying from the gatekeepers and gangs. Young girls and women reported to having often faced gender discrimination and violence most of them were rape cases (Bader, 2013). Some women are also attacked when they go to cut firewood or when doing jobs to sustain their families. Women were the most targeted than men who were also not completely spared. Majority of these problems faced by IDPs are accredited to the social and economic problems IDPs face.

When asked about their experience, one respondent said,

> "life is not easy here. I sometimes wish if I could go back to my region, but I also keep in mind all the reasons why I fled from there. But here, we are people without dignity. We don't have a dignified life. We often discriminated based on our clan, our dialect and our children often get bullied on the streets and we try to react to that we fear armed militias will attack us. There is widespread insecurity at the camps as armed gangs maraud into the camps who rob and rape at will. We also fear to be evicted by the owners of the land. A camp that near to ours was evicted this week" (FGD,2021).

The level of insecurity IDPs face in their camps is also a huge concern especially to non - Drood clans like the madhiban and other clans displaced from south central Somalia. The reports of people displaced from south-central Somali areas belonging to the Rahanweyn clan and bantus group have shown these communities to

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be suffer a lot of abuse. Gatekeepers and the camp security team see them as inferior citizens and put them under harsh forms of repression, exploitation and physical abuse (Bader, 2013).

Originally Somali clans are divided into clan alliances that are created to protect the mutual interests of members of the alliance. The Somali bonds have a social contract which unites these alliances together. The contract calls to action the collective response of any attack to one of its members. The marginalized groups who are the minorities are outside the system and are vulnerable to being attacked. Their human rights are also violated by the superior clans; it has led to many IDP seeking protection from gatekeepers. The gatekeepers enjoy giving them protection but they also abuse the IDPs placed under their cover.

The fate of those displaced at the camp is often determined by the gatekeepers; who see themselves as leaders. The gatekeepers decide the location of IDP camps, the access of IDPs to these camps and their ability to access the camps. These gatekeepers are usually from the more dominant local clan; and are directly connected to local authorities and clan security team that guard and control the camps. Sexual violence is the most common crime in IDP settlements.

Displaced women and girls reported to human rights watch that rape usually occurred at night in their huts. Government-run IDP camps in the city also faced similar cases of sexual violence. Some women from those camps reported being raped by armed men in soldier uniform who later they revealed as government soldiers. Camp security have severally been implicated in threatening and abusing displaced people including children. It becomes more dangerous during distribution of food and inspecting of tents provided by humanitarian organizations as the

gatekeepers use this as their opportunity to commit crime Since the displaced communities encounter serious difficulties to obtain sufficient food and shelter, the gatekeepers use a variety of methods to steal food donations during and after distributions by the humanitarian agencies.

These results to some of them begging due to absence of food. Gatekeepers also profit from IDPs by threatening to confiscate the tents provided to displaced communities by humanitarian agencies. They do this so that they can restrict the IDPs movement by making sure they do not leave their camps. Several IDP women reported that they felt they were captives of the gatekeepers.

The displaced, especially the men have frequently raised alarms to the local government authorities about the abuses they face from gatekeepers. Most of the time the authorities failed to hear their pleas or promised them what they could not fulfil as they had earlier agreed. Some of the IDPs got beatings or were arrested by local police for daring to report them. The only option left for the IDPs to protect themselves from such police brutality was to further displace themselves. Most of the IDPs are untrained or semi-trained people who give casual manual labor to the market which helps in generating them some income. These IDPs are often exploited by the host community and they earn minimum wages after working.

4.3.8. Health and Welfare Problems

Additionally, one major challenge that Somalis have faced following land grabbing is the inability to access proper health care. Following the increased violent and many years of constant war, most of the health care facilities were destroyed and the parts that remained cannot be used due to insecurity. As such, the citizens are left to

struggle dealing with illness as the international bodies of health and relief organization struggle with offering health care services. Research shows that many Somalis suffer from malnutrition and other illnesses, most of which are as a result of the living conditions they currently face. Below are a number of diseases that the nation has suffered as a result of poor self-care and the inadequate health infrastructure.

4.3.8.1. Malaria

Malaria is an infection that is caused by Protozoan parasite that invades the body of the human red blood cells and it is transmitted through mosquito bites. In normal circumstances, people can prevent Malaria by sleeping under treated mosquito nets. In the case of Somalia however, this is impossible since most people have been displaced from their homes and don't have a place to stay, let alone a mosquito net (Hammond, 2014). Research from the World Health Organization informs that 54% of the total population in Somalia is at high risk of contracting and succumbing from the Malaria parasites. Nearly every person is at the risk of contracting Malaria and that is mainly because of the poor medical care.

4.3.8.2 Measles

It is also known as Rubeola. Measles is a contagious viral disease whose characteristics include, fever, coughing, and in most cases rashes. It is a common disease in children and in some cases, though rare, they appear in adults. The infants are immune to the disease up to an age of five years. Due to the poor health care available in Somalia, the number of deaths resulting from this illness increased (Hammond, 2014). Research shows that 3,616 suspected of measles have been reported in Somalia. The rate of infection of measles is high and that is mainly because

it is highly contagious. In Somali camps for instance, because of the nature of the camps in terms of many people being in the camp. In such a situation, the rate of measles spreading among the population was high and frequent, leading to high rate of death toll among children. Following the fact that most of the Somalis had lost their homes, they were forced to stay into the camps and refugee centers in which they were congested and did not have access to necessities such as water and food (Ali, 2021). As a result of poor hygiene, diseases such as Cholera outbreak would clear most of the population in the camps. Research shows that the number of deaths resulting from cholera outbreak were way higher than those caused by the war. Ideally, the war also disrupted the health care system and getting immediate attention and containing illnesses such as Cholera would be hard following the congestion of the people as well as the poor living conditions.

4.3.8.3 Teenage Pregnancies

Following the displacements and the rate of insecurity, which is on the rise in Somalia camps, teenagers are exposed to early pregnancies. Research shows that majority of the teenagers in the refugee and IDP camps are likely to get pregnant twice as much as teenagers living at home. Urindwanayo (2020) explains that "Within this displaced group, teenage pregnancy is one of the most significant health issues" (255). The rates of insecurity that these people are subjected to often cause situations in which they are susceptible to danger. Cases of assault in the camps are a common thing since most of the people do not have the caretakers who protect them from such harm. Moreover, the teenagers must help their parents to provide for the rest of the family members (Urindwanayo, 2020).

In the process, they have to move around, and no one is always safe. The rate of sexual harassment and assault that women face at the teen age is high in these camps. Other than that, most of the teenagers have dropped out of school due to the poor education system and the challenge of poverty that causes the inability to pay school fees. With nothing to do, these teenagers are idle and most of them get involved sexually.

Research shows that teenage pregnancies are among the largest causes of death in the world. Most of these women are often still young to give birth and they might encounter complications, most of which they cannot survive.

4.4. Environmental Effects

Displacement and land dispossession are also associated with environmental effects that are likely to result from the activities that the pieces of land are subjected to by the grabbers. Research shows that land use has impacts on the environment depending on the plans of the grabbers. Ideally, most of the time, land grabbers have the big plan of using land for commercial purposes. Additionally, such land can be subjected to a development activity that might cause environmental problems. The first step after grabbing land in most cases is to clear the land and convert it into something that these people can convert into a commercial space easily.

Deforestation has a huge impact on the environment. This can be seen in the case of Somalia, which is faced with challenges of deforestation such as famine, and hunger. Ideally, some grabbers can dispose off wastes carelessly and thereby end up polluting the soil, making it impossible for plants to grow in the identified land. Runoff from these lands can also be the source of pollution of water bodies, which in turn may

cause outbreak of diseases and the death of aquatic life. One respondent said:

> "one of the reasons why we became weak for the droughts is because back in the days we used to have bigger blots of land to cultivate, but due to inheritance our land shrank and it became impossible for us to sustain our lives with agricultural products. Also families used to support each with loans and everything. For example, you didn't have enough cows to milk for your children one of the neighbors used to step in and would let you borrow one of their cows but all that supporting system eroded and the situation became 'survival of the fittest'. On the other hand, soil of the farms changed with times and we suspect it was affected by soil erosion, but we couldn't produce enough yields" (FGD, 2021).

4.5. Loss of Faith in the Justice system

Arguably, most of the cases of land grabbing often involve government officials if not institutions. As such, powerful individuals and groups can get their way and take advantage of others because they have the support of the government. Also, these people provide so many fake title deeds and this makes it impossible for the common person to file case or even seek the help of the justice system to resolve the issue. Research shows that the people who are mostly involved in these activities include the Darood sub-clans. After the break of the civil war, the Darood sub-clans took over and begun harassing citizens for their own gain. The Somalian justice system is corrupt and so many people lose their lands without having to get to a courtroom to contest the conflicts. From the data collected from the interviews it is evident that most of the citizens of the nation have lost faith in their justice system. Mogadishu has faced the challenges of land grabbing mainly because it is an urban center. Regardless of it being one of the most developed cities of Somalia, its justice system is as low as its security.

4.6. Economic

4. 6.1 Loss of Land and Assets

Majority of the targeted individuals during conflict and war in Somalia are clans from minority groups who on numerous occasions have fled their ancestral land to seek protection and peace. As a result, more than half of the respondents said that the minority groups are forced to assimilate into the dominant clans to survive and protect themselves. Because of the current predicaments, most of the IDPs according to Bryld, Kamau and Sinigallia (2014) fear returning to their ancestral lands because their land is occupied with oppressive communities and local authorities that displaced them (Montani & Majid, 2002). Most of the respondents were also restricted to water, shelter, health, food, and sanitation amenities. In addition to that, most of the respondents are unable to adjust to new strategies of income generation characterized by the modern livelihoods or "life at the camp" since most of IDPs are either agro-pastoralists or farmers with limited skills outside these spheres. One of the men who took part in the focus group discussion said:

> I have been a farmer in my entire life. All I know is how to tilt land and produce crops, but now I must know some other skills to survive in the city. At first, I was so lost and hopeless but later I managed to adopt and join some of my friends who usually work on construction" (FGD, 2021)

4.6.2. Women forced to seek alternative means of livelihood for survival

Most women in the IDP camps after fleeing their homelands are forced to seek alternative means of livelihood, such as casual laborers, domestic works, and porters. Most of the individuals in the IDP camps including women engage continuously in short-term and low- paying work that is labor-intensive. Most of the women

interviewed apparently are the head of the households, meaning they are also the sole provider of the homes. As a result, IDPs have to work in deplorable conditions to survive amid the crisis of protracted famine and flooding (Bader, 2013). Most of the women including other IDPs are from minority groups, whose local authorities frequently deny basic rights and subject them to constant discrimination.

Accordingly, most of the women are denied access to resources that could assist improve their livelihoods. To make matters worse, some report being subjected to rape or forced to care for their families within the camp. This forces them to seek alternative sources of income to supplement the support they get from aid. Moreover, a larger percentage of women respondents stated that they receive assistance from humanitarian aids. However, the assistance they receive is limited since they are restricted. This is the reason they seek alternatives to sustain their livelihoods while in the IDP camps. One woman said during the focus group discussion:

> "I am a divorcee with 7 children. I don't have a man supporting us. I must wake up early in the morning to look for a daily labor. I do laundry for well-to-do families and the money I earn helps me to raise my kids, because the aid we sometimes get is not enough to survive on" (FGD, 2021)

4.6.3. Inability to sustain Basic Needs

The respondent from the IDP camps pointed out that the present condition limits their access to employment opportunities, and other vital basic needs that could support their well- being. Most people are vulnerable to harsh conditions both in urban centers are the minorities and the IDPs who live below the poverty line. Most respondents in IDP camps said they lack adequate healthcare services, food security,

proper shelter, clean water and sanitation, suitable education, and sustainable means of generating income. One of the respondents who seem educated and who joined the camp just recently said that "because of increased insecurity throughout the country in recent years, much of the NGO response to assist IDPs at the camp is hampered further subjecting the majority of us to difficult living conditions." The IDP camps are however catered for by the government as well as other international humanitarian institutions

4.6.4. Loss of Livelihoods

Most Somalis, according to the information obtained from the study, are either pastoralist or agro-pastoralist. When they are displaced because of war, famine, or political issues, the livelihood of the majority population is disrupted. The bulk of the respondents, for instance, reported losing their form of livelihood assets such as cattle, goats, and sheep, as well as agricultural land supporting pasture and crop farming (Action Against hunger, 2021).

Most of the IDPs, those reportedly previously engaged in the formal sector, also reported that they lost their formal employment and some had to cease formal education to support themselves and their families. IDP camps also offer limited land space that cannot support agricultural activities and livestock rearing, forcing the majority of the IDPs to seek assistance from humanitarian aids and relief supplies to support their livelihood. Bishop, Catley and Sheik (2008) in their study also had similar findings, establishing that displaced persons livelihoods are affected the most because Somalis are heavily dependent on pastoralism and agro-pastoralism (livestock rearing dependent on limited pastures) for survival.

Moreover, most individuals that had livestock are forced into barter trade for

essential supplies they can use for the sustenance of their livelihood. According to one

of the respondents,

> "the protracted conflict, famine, and unstable political environment in
> Somalia caused most IDPs to loss assets and brought about a huge food
> deficit that contributed to the loss of livelihoods. Like for me, I had to sell
> my cows and goats when they got very weak due to drought, constant
> stealing of livestock, and battle for pastures" (FGD, 2021).

4.6.5. Food Shortage

Moreover, a challenge that is caused by displacement and land dispossession is

food shortage. Ideally, before the outbreak of the civil wars in Somalia, the people

majored in Agriculture. It was not only their means of survival, but also the driver of the

economy of Somalia. However, when the wars broke out and people begun grabbing

land from settlers, most of the agricultural products were destroyed and the food chain

also cut. Consequently, food shortage became a huge problem in Somalia. Food

shortage is an issue that creates many more challenges related to poverty. For instance,

petty crimes are caused often by hunger. Additionally, people might begin developing

diseases related to malnutrition and other diseases causing low immunity and therefore

contracting many other illnesses.

4.7. Challenges Faced by Vulnerable Groups

The research discovered that there are minority groups who face challenges

when taking a course to reclaim land that has been expropriated or confiscated with

illegal force. For the majority of the population in Somalia, solving a case about land

grabbing requires power. Power in this nation depends on the money that the person holds, the connections that he or she has and above all, the clan from which he or she comes from. As such, the minority groups do not stand a chance at fighting the people who grab their pieces. Having power of influence and money can aid in reinforcing the court ruling passed on a conflict over land.

Research shows that the minority and the vulnerable communities may not have the power that they need to experience justice. Some researchers such as Mohamed Eno, characterize the relationship of the Somalis and the minority communities such as the Bantus to be based on prejudice. Arguably, some of the hate directed to these communities develops from the fact that the Bantus have an unholy origin (Eno, 2014). As mentioned above, they came to Somalia as slaves during the slave trade and had to remain there years later after it was abolished. Based on such mentalities and many other justifications, the minority groups have been subjected to discrimination and land grabbing without probable course. For these communities, acquiring true justice is next to impossible.

Below are some of the identified minority groups:

4.7.1. Women

The most available way of women to venture into a journey of justice in cases of land grabbing is through approaching the clam elders through the families of their husbands. In cases that these pathways do not lead to satisfaction of the ruling, then the women are implored to find courts and appeal their case. However, women in such quest often come across several obstacles that might hinder their ability to get justice. Women are often harassed in such situations.

First of all, women are expected to get married and the lands are often left for the men. As such a woman fighting over the right to own a piece of land tend to cause issues of resistance from the males who surround her. Additionally, women are not recognizable without husbands. This explains the reason why a woman will have to use the family of her husband to claim a piece of land that has been grabbed. Moreover, women tend to face laxity of the officers in charge of reinforcements of the ruling of the judge since they are associated with weakness. The culture of Somalia is more of patriarchal, giving men more dominant roles than women.

Also, Islamic courts do not allow women to attend courts without a man accompanying them. Women face imaginable obstacle to achieving justice. Ideally, most of the Somali women are also not as educated as the men. As such, they might lack the knowledge of solving the case effectively. Moreover, women are expected to pay large amounts of bribes for their cases to meet the satisfaction they are looking for. The women are not expected to oversee their own financial capabilities. As such, when a woman comes forward with a claim of a piece of land that has been grabbed from her. She will face challenges that will force her into paying more bribes than that which a man could have paid.

Arguably, the women are expected to be poor as opposed to the men. The Sharia laws and the Xeer are the most recognizable laws of the land of Somalia. As such, these are the major reference points when it comes to solving the issues of land disputes. The main challenge that women face in Somalia is that there is no particular law that has been dedicated to the protection of the rights of women to own land. The human rights activists to encourage equality in land ownership and other sectors of life have not gone as far in this nation. According to the Xeer laws, a woman is allowed to

own land, but only a half of the brother's share. Equality in inheritance of land cannot be achieved in Somali culture due to the belief that a woman will get married and leave the land unattended or bring her husband to occupy the land.

The customary laws on the other hand, women are denied inheritance rights at all. It is because of such issues that a woman may face challenges to get justice served. The justice institutions in this case will be on each other's heads and conflicts might arise, making the situation even worse. The customary law holds that if a woman's husband dies and she has no children, she cannot be given land. Relatives such as brothers of the husband and uncles grab the land. In cases when the woman has children, she is left portions of land, which are often under the care of the uncles until the first son becomes of age.

The status of the woman also determines the far a case about land grabbing can go in the Somali courts. If the woman comes from a well-known family with a high status, then she can face fewer obstacles in the journey of justice. However, if the name of the woman does not ring a bell in a person's mind, then the obstacles will be next to impossible. Educated and wealthy women are also in a better position since they can bribe their ways ahead and find a solution to their issue. They can also find better approaches that promote the process of acquiring justice.

There are bodies that have risen to fight the inequality that heavily weighs on the women. For instance, the *Somalia Women's Lawyers Association*. This body has proven to be effective in helping women, especially the minority ones with no status or money in solving cases of land disputes. There is also the *Somali Women's Development Center*, which is also dedicated to achieving equality for women in Somalia (Center for Economic and Social rights, 2016). This body supports women

dragged with cases of land disputes through hiring experienced lawyers and supporting them financially to ensure that justice is served. Other than the negative social norms that the women are subjected to, there is the issue of threats that these women receive from the men who grabbed their lands. Research shows that approximately 80% of women withdraw their cases in the process of gaining justice due to the fear of getting harmed or putting their children in harm's way. Corruption is also at a high rate in these justice institutions and this makes it impossible for justice to be served.

Occasionally, women lose their lands and cases due to bribes that their opponents have issued to the judges. The process of solving cases of land disputes also takes long in the courts and the women can give up along the way. Clearly, the injustice against women is deeply rooted in the culture and traditions of the nation. Also, corruption and other factors such as threats will not allow justice for women in Somalia. Agreeably, Somali women are one of the most vulnerable groups in this society when it comes to land disputes.

4.7.2. Internally Displaced Persons

As discussed earlier, Internally Displaced people are numerous in Somalia, mainly because of the wars that the country was subjected to for over 30 years. Research has it that approximately 1.1 million Somalis have been displaced internally. As such, most of them live in camps while others have found communities and towns where they have settled. The community has learnt to accommodate and accept the IDPs since they are a good source of cheap unskilled labor and as such, they are treated as guests.

Even so, the customary law does not grant the IDPS the rights to own land. These people have lived on people's lands and sometime on public land. They have built on these lands and most of the people presently IDPs have been born on these lands. It is however, believed that they have distant homes that they can claim. Following their background of displacement, the IDPs are not patent to customary land conflicts. This is because they do not own land and they also lack any rights that support their acquisition of land.

Often, land disputes arise when either legitimate owners of the land or even land grabbers force the IDPs out of the land they dwell in. Ideally, most of the IDPs fight back and refuse to vacate since they clearly do not have anywhere to go. Most of these people might have been born on the land in question and that is the home they have ever known. Research has identified three major barriers that these IDPs face in their attempts to seek justice. The first obstacle is corruption. Most of the IDPs are poverty stricken and they cannot stand a chance against a wealthy man who has money and status. Occasionally, these grabbers will pay their way out and eventually grab the land in question. Many of the Somali IDPs have lost their lands in this way. They are forced to go back to the slums, most of which are filled to capacity. Secondly, there is the challenge of inadequate knowledge of the legal procedures required to claim their homes.

Most of the IDPs do not even know that they can present their cases in courts to be tried and so, they just leave, feeling helpless. This has made most of the IDPs live in fear of losing their homes at some point. Thirdly, these people are likely to be pried upon for land grabbing due to their situation. There is always the feeling that these people are helpless, and they cannot argue since they have been displaced from

somewhere else in the country. As such, wealthy people have often taken advantage of them.

According to research from both interviews and USAID, most courts in Somalia have the tendency of dismissing the court cases of IDPs that involve land grabbing. Agreeably, the laws of the land do not have a provision on how to go about solving the cases of land involving the internally displaced. Customarily, they are not supposed to claim any land rights. Following their situation, the IDPs have to rely on strong clans to protect them from land grabbers. Having protection or connection to powerful clans tends to send away greedy grabbers, who are not willing to go to war with these clans. For this group, there are no hopes that they can attain justice when they have the issue of land grabbers.

There are however, few proposed pathways of accessing justice for these people. For instance, using social media to implore the government's intervention can help. Most of the time, when the issue is raised to the public, sympathizers and political persons are likely to intervene (Cassanelli, 2015). Issues of land grabbing from the IDPs are often a huge scandal that is likely to attract international audiences and intervention. Also, private institutions such as NGOs can step in to intervene. As such, it is required that the IDPs establish groups and bodies that can help them raise issues such as these to the public or even fight for their rights. These people need justice, either through compensation to find a place to settle or retain the land. Eviction is the worst that happens to most of them and this may destroy their lives.

4.7.3. The Somali Bantus

The Bantu communities in Somalia are divided into two groups. First group is an indigenous to the land, while some Bantu community was brought to Somalia to work on the lands during the slave trade. However, the slave trade came to an end after the abolition of slavery. After the end of slavery, most of these Bantus moved to settle in the Lower Shabelle River, where they could farm for survival. Bantus could not afford to keep animals due to the banditry that was rampant at the time (Cassanelli, 2015). During the colonial period, these Bantu settled in the Bondhere District of Mogadishu, which was a rural place back then. Some of the Bantus had the documentation of these lands while majority did not have. These people have stayed in these lands for centuries and yet they are still among the vulnerable groups. The present day Mogadishu is a town and the value of land has gone up. This has not only attracted the government, but also institutions and land grabbers. As such, these people have been subjected to instances of land grabs and most of them have faced obstacles in the attempts to appeal their situations. Presently, research shows that the Bantu communities have been displaced to some of the poorest communities such as Hamar JabJab and Yaqshid.

The position of the Bantus in Somalia is more of the same as that of the IDPs, except that these Bantus have lived in the lands longer. Most of the Somali communities do not recognize the Bantus and they often isolate them. Regardless of the representation that the Bantus have in government, their numbers are way smaller than the number of the minority communities. This has rendered the Bantu leaders powerless and as such, cannot protect them from the issues of land grabbing. When a Bantu has an issue of land grabbing, he or she is likely to face huge obstacles (CCM

Somalia overview, 2020). For example, corruption is the major undoing to the justice system of Somalia. Most of their opponents will bribe the courts and get rulings in their favor. Due to their economic situations, most of them might not afford the money to bribe and get the judge to do their jobs diligently.

When the Bantus win cases involving land disputes, which are rare, they cannot get reinforcements from the police. As such, they might have won the case but still lose the land in question. The Bantus do not have power in the Somali community and most of them are not armed. As such, they cannot protect what rightfully belongs to them. Research also shows that most of the Bantus are not well educated and as such, understanding how the justice system works might be a challenge (Center for Economic and Social rights, 2016). The issue of poverty also affects them and this may hinder their ability to want to carry on or even continue chasing a conflict. Bantus have suffered displacements from their homes and most of them have ended up in slums where they can barely fend for themselves.

Similar to the IDPs, the Bantus can also approach the justice system through the media since it can appeal to the public, the government and even international action. The most known pathway to Bantu's getting justice on the issue of land is through the Bantu elders. These people will look into the matter and then rule according to their capacity. If the issue is not amicably solved, it is moved to the land dispute groups, and later to the humanitarian assistance organizations. The resolution or the result of the case normally depends on connection to the most powerful clans in the area. The powerful clan will however, support only if the parties Bantu's agree to subordination.

4.8. How livelihood strategies changed due to land dispossession

4.8.1. Destruction of Agriculture

During the outbreak of the civil war in Somalia, most of the agricultural products and the farms were destroyed. Considering the fact that Agriculture was the main livelihood strategy in Somalia, the destruction impacted hugely on the survival of the citizens. Ideally, Somalis had to resort to other means of survival. For instance, small businesses such as Hawking cropped up after the civil war. Most people, especially mothers had children to provide for and the children. Hawking became a huge part of Somalia's survival techniques. Most of the people hawked fast foods and products that are used often (Hassan, Glover, Luukkanen, Jamnadass and Chikamai, 2014).

The destruction of Agriculture was not only seen in the crops, but also animals. Unlike before when the Somalis were nomadic pastoralists, they did not know what to do with the time they had and they also didn't have any means of survival. Gradually, businesses begun rising during the era of reconstruction of some parts of the country. The most common business that takes place in Somalia presently is the sale of charcoal to neighboring countries. In as much as it is an illegal business, most of the people have done this business and survived for a long time.

4.8.2. Begging on the streets

Research shows that after the end of the civil war, the number of homeless and street beggars were on the rise. The fact that people were willing to go to the streets to beg is an indication that they were opting for all the means available to sustain themselves. With the destruction of agriculture, famine kicked in and Somalis had a

difficult time surviving. Consequently, some people resorted to begging while other became more creative and became criminals. An increase in petty crimes such as Robbery and theft gradually increased. Research shows that the rates of crime spiked shortly after the civil wars (Hassan, Glover, Luukkanen, Jamnadass and Chikamai, 2014). It was a matter of survival and gradually, the suffering on the citizens was not only as a result of the war but also of crimes such as theft that was on the rise. The government has struggled with solving the problem of petty theft and has made tremendous improvements.

Regardless, it has not yet countered and contained the problem fully. Begging on the streets has huge implications on the citizens. Most of the respondents complained of lack of employment to the point that they have to beg on the streets before they can put food on the table. Begging weighs heavily on the dignity of an individual and a person's self-esteem becomes low. Social interaction is also limited, and people give up having cultivated the mindset of poverty.

4.8.3. Cutting Woods and Selling to other IDPS and other nations

Following the collapse of agriculture, citizens of Somalia begun cutting down trees and selling both wood and charcoal to fellow IDPS. Ideally, the need for survival has contributed to bigger problems such as deforestation in Somalia. The rate at which trees are cut down in this country cannot be compared to the rate of planting and as such, the climatic conditions become favorable for draught and famine (Hassan, Glover, Luukkanen, Jamnadass and Chikamai, 2014). The impacts of the deforestation on the environment are massive to the point that reviving agriculture might be a challenge in the nation. Regardless of the ban of the burning of charcoal and the

cutting down of trees, these people have no choice as they have to survive. Research

shows that approximately 2 million trees are cut down for charcoal in Somalia every

year. Arguably, the charcoal market goes way beyond Somalia and the neighboring

nations. Newspapers have identified countries such as United Arab Emirates, Bahrain,

Kuwait and Oman, to be the main markets for the charcoal that is burned.

4.8.4. Employment opportunities such as porters

Some of the citizens of Somalia sought employment following the fall of

Agriculture which they did when they owned land. Most of them are employed and

doing manual jobs that pay them minimally. Generally, employment is hard since

most of the working conditions are unfavorable and the workers are subjected to hard

labor. Other than that, discrimination is high and getting employed requires

connections and in some cases bribes. One respondent said:

> "My friends and I go into the market early in the morning to work as
> porters. We offload vehicles and do anything that needs manpower. We
> sometimes get and sometimes we don't get. Some men even use clan
> power to deny us our earned wages" (FGD, 2021).

4.8.5. Help from NGOs.

Some communities in Somalia have since then depended on the support from

NGO's and other Aid offering institutions. The poverty rates in these regions rose

tremendously and these people have no other way of surviving except from these

institutions. One aid worker interviewed said:

> "We provide different kinds of aid to the IDP communities. They were
> fresh and new to the settlement we give them blankets and other non-food
> materials that help them make temporary shelters for them. We also
> provide free healthcare to them"(Interviews, 2021).

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

Using qualitative method, this study investigated drivers of our rural displacement and its implications on livelihoods, putting focus on the locally displaced people in Mogadishu who were displaced from the inter-riverine areas of Somalia. The study looked into historical marginalization of people who are from the most fertile lands of Somalia. This same land used to be called Somalia's breadbasket, but unfortunately due to several political and economic dynamics explored through the study, communities from these certain areas of Somalia came more susceptible to displacement. They make up majority of urban IDPs in Somalia.

According to research conducted, displacement in Somalia has persisted for over three decades now and continues to surge amid climatic shocks, such as drought, famine, and flooding which has affected vast regions of their country. Currently, nearly more than 2.6 million Somalis reside in refugee and IDP camps due to voluntary or involuntary displacement that has taken place amid protracted displacement due to insecurity, forced eviction, and civil war. Somalia has a long history of unstable government and civil war that has left vast regions of the country in deplorable state disrupting the livelihood strategies of minority groups, such as Inter-riverine communities from Southern Somalia.

The majority of the displaced persons originate from the inter-riverine regions with fertile lands that support both crop production and pastoralism. But due to protracted civil war, famine, and flooding across the regions, they are forced to be displaced towards urban areas to seek shelter and refuge in the IDP camps where they

continue suffering living in poor and deplorableconditions (Bishop, Catley, and Sheik, 2008). The majority of the Inter-riverine communities in Somalia are supported with four types of livelihood strategies: agriculture, pastoralism, agro- pastoralism, and trade. Because southern Somalia offers rich and fertile ecological habitat, during the protracted civil wars the warlord, clan militia, and some government officials grabbed and acquire land unlawfully forcing the minority community groups to be displaced towards the South.

But even in the recent years, between 2017 and 2018, the findings revealed that Somalia is being faced with new patterns of displacement triggered by ongoing conflicts and natural disasters like flooding and drought. This complicates the problems of the IDPs at the camp once they arrive, experiencing gender-based and sexual violence, and ethnic discrimination, limited access to food and shelter, and inadequate quality healthcare. The problem is worsened because their livelihoods, mainly pastoralism and agriculture are disrupted. In the IDP and refugee camps, the IDPs also face continued insecurity from clan militia and threats from Alshabab (Elliot & Holzer, 2009).

Additionally, a high rate of uneducated individuals is also a contributing factor to the feuds and war that currently exists in Somalia. The conflict is negatively impactful to their lives since it ignites wars that continue to make their lives hard. Historically, people from the inter-riverine areas of southern Somalia have been marginalized and oppressed by different actors starting from the colonial period up until the civil war period. They have been brutalized, robbed of their properties, and chased from their ancestral lands, forcing them to live in a perpetual displacement.

Some of the participants said that their indigenous skills are not suitable for current market demands and often they have to improvise to adapt with the situation. Some often find it hard to eke out a living in the urban areas and have to live in an undignified manner. Combination of factors contribute to the displacement of inter-riverine areas. Research participants stated that communal conflicts and political issues, loss of livelihoods due to recurrent droughts often cause people to leave the rural areas.

Nonetheless, suitable measures can be put into place to improve IDP livelihood strategies, such as mandating proper humanitarian assistance and working together with a joint committee established with the government to address refugee issues and human rights, including their legal status. On top of that, establish projects such as a food-for-work programs can be used to solve issues of employment opportunities and improve the nutritional status of the IDPs. Also, creating employment opportunities such as knitting companies and even environmental protection projects that can employ most of the people can help in alleviating the issue of poverty (Elliot & Holzer, 2009).

Moreover, the government of Somalia can work with humanitarian assistance to build good self-contained houses for the citizens in the IDP camps and offer them at cheaper rents. Providing source of employment and better living conditions will give these people the chance to work hard and sustain their lives. It will also give them a sense of belonging. Other suitable strategies that can be implemented include mitigating surface run-off by building gabions in regions affected by flooding to prevent voluntary displacement.

Lastly, there is need to supply and avail clean and safe water in remote regions to prevent fights over water while at the same time enhancing the sanitation levels of the community. Also, supplying food and safe water to the IDP camps can be effective in reducing and avoiding outbreak of diseases such as Cholera.

Since the major challenge that the country faces is corruption, ridding it should be key to achieving better lives for the citizens. It is clear that corruption is the main reason behind land grabbing and these people have obstacles finding justice. As such, wars continue to rise and the lives of these citizens get worse. Creating educational opportunities and institutions can come a long way to eradicate corruption (Bishop, Catley, and Sheik, 2008). Ideally, letting the public know the effects of corruption and how it impacts on the lives of the standard citizens can help in urging people to report such cases and stand against them. Also, initiating measures and systems that aid in promoting transparency in government systems is also an effective way of eradicating corruption. Effective and independent law enforcement is also important to eradicate corruption.

Similarly, establishing health care facilities can help in reducing the death rates among the displaced. Also, the government should see to it that the IDPs get a place to stay. This is not only about offering them land, but also offering title deeds that show they own the land. Similar to all citizens, these displaced individuals also contribute to making the country both economically as well as socially. As such, they have the same rights to be comfortable and have a sense of belonging to their country.

The issue of displacement and land grabbing in Somalia can be resolved by going back to the original political structure of the traditional Somalia. As discussed above, for the minority groups to be protected from the issue of land grabbing, they

have to be protected or have connections to strong and influential clans. From this research, clans are an important institution in Somali structure. As such, the first step that the government can take towards curbing land grabbing and restoring order is approaching the issue through the clans. According to the events that have occurred in Somalia in the last thirty years, it is clear that the clan is the most powerful political unit that currently exists. Gundel (2020) supports that "Clan-members derive their identity from their common agnatic descent rather than the sense of territorial belonging".

Asking for the incorporation of the vulnerable communities under specific clans can help to ensure their protection from preys of land. Moreover, it can give them a better chance at getting justice when they report an issue to the Islamic courts. Furthermore, encouraging clan involvements can go a long way to preventing further displacement of the Somalis. As mentioned above, displacement and land grabbing are the primary causes of migration and congestion at the camps.

Ensuring that no more people get displaced can solve the issue of displacements. This will also mean that the government and the emergency response team should be ready to take care for the citizens who have been displaced as a result of natural disaster. Disaster response management institutions should be prepared and ready to take charge in the event of a disaster. This not only helps in the minimization of casualty, but also aids in the prevention of more IDPs. With the rates of displacement in Somalia, if action is not taken, the camps will be filled. Also, the government can create a housing system in which the citizens are given rooms to stay and they have to pay the rents. The process of reconstruction will require hard work and determination from both the government and the citizens.

The government of Somalia, at both federal and municipal levels can work on policies that give the IDPs rights and reinstate them in the society. Ideally these reforms should be about local integration of the IDPs in the urban centers. Depending on the reasons that made them migrate, these people cannot go back to their homes. As such, having them locally integrated into the urban areas can contribute to the development of the Somalia's economy through offering cheap unskilled labor (Hassan, Glover, Luukkanen, Jamnadass and Chikamai, 2014).

The government of Somalia is working with the international bodies of humanitarian assistance to come up with the best solutions for the IDPs. Even so, the government has passed policies that ensure that evictions are done in a proper and legal manner. Research shows that the government of Somalia ratified a legally binding agreement to protect the rights of the IDPs in Africa. The government should also use some of the funds from well-wishers and humanitarian assistance groups to construct rental houses for the IDPs. The involvement of the government is required to ensure that the plans are executed.

Resolving the issue of environmental degradation will also require not only dedication but also the effort of all citizens. Even so, leaders of the nation, including clan heads should engage in tree planting activities and watering them to grow. Ideally, if each village plants over two hundred trees and monitor them to growth, Somalia might be green in the next five years. Planting trees is a sign of a collective understanding of the implication of the environmental degradation. Arguably, natural calamities such as floods can be avoided by employing the various techniques to reduce erosion through mulching and even planting cover crops (Action Against hunger, 2021). Engaging in tree planting activities will help create an aspect of

responsibility and hopes of a better future. The government can go ahead to declare a tree planting international day and supply tree seedlings to the people for this activity. In the case of deforestation, there is no solution other than planting trees to help secure the future of Somalia's environment.

When tree planting becomes a communal and national activity, it is the responsibility of the citizens to protect the trees from businesspeople who cut them down and burn them to charcoal. Local authorities must be given the authority of arresting and detaining people caught cutting down trees. The issue of burning charcoals a direct effect to the citizens (Elmi & Barise, 2006). Some of the effects such as famine, drought and floods have already begun surfacing on the land. As such, educating the public about the importance of tress on land is important since they can protect the trees (Elmi & Barise, 2006). Acting on the issue of deforestation is the only way to save the indigenous species.

The government can also intervene through the border patrols not to grant exit to any people transporting charcoal out of the country. Arguably, most of the market for charcoal that is burnt in Somalia is sold in Arabic countries and other neighboring countries. Restraining such people and putting them to face the full arm of the law is likely to scare away such businesspeople and thus end the deforestation that is currently affecting Somalia's environment.

Research has pointed out that most of the children in the IDP camps do not attend school. As such, it is the role of the government to ensure that all children in these camps are taken to school. Promoting free education can come a long way to encouraging parents to take their children to school. Also, following up on the issue of children education through engaging the child protection agencies can help in ensuring

that the children are taken to school. Education is a key player to ending the conflict of Somalia and guarantee of a better future for the country. If the future generation is educated, they will be enlightened about the ways of solving conflicts. Also, they will work towards making their country better by abolition of vices such as corruption. Education is also important to the eradication of poverty that is weighing down the economy of the country.

APPENDIX 1

FGD guide for IDPs

1. What is your major source of livelihood? (please describe in detail)

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2. How has displacement affected your livelihood activities so far?

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3. What are your current livelihood activities?

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4. What are some of the causes of your displacement?

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5. Are some of these causes, the reason why you've become IDP? (please elaborate)

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6. How did you use your land before displacement? (only for those who had
   land or access to land before displacement)

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7. What was your livelihood activity before losing land?
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8. How did you cope before displacement/what were your coping mechanisms?

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9. Why did you seek shelter in alternative areas or camps as IDPs?

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10. Do the camps offer you a safe heaven? And what are your general

experiences at the IDP camp?

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11. How do you cope at the camps or in your current place of settlement?

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12. How has displacement affected your household assets and living conditions?

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APPENDIX 2

Interview questions for gatekeepers

➢ All information discussed should be kept confidential and should not be disclosed to anyone.

➢ Refrain from stating any sensitive information or any information that may identify specific incidents/individuals.

1. How long have the IDPs have been living in this camp?

2. What kind of services do you provide to the IDPs?

3. How is your relationship with the IDPs?

4. Do they deal with aid agencies directly or aid comes to them through you?

5. Who gave the IDPs this plot of land to occupy?

6. What are some of the main challenges IDPs face in this camp?

7. Do you help them address conflict within the IDP communities?

8. How is the security of the camp maintained?

9. Are the IDPs independent for running the day-to-day issues of the camp?

APPENDIX 3

Ten questions for humanitarian organizations:

➢　　　All information discussed should be kept confidential and should not be disclosed to anyone.

➢　　　Refrain from stating any sensitive information or any information that may identify specific incidents/individuals

1. What are the major forces that displaced these people from their original residences?

2. What kind of assistance do you provide with them?

3. How often do you receive new arrivals?

4. Do they talk about going back to their places of origin?

5. What kind of support do you give to those who are willing to return to their places?

6. Do humanitarian organizations get overburdened to provide assistance?

7. How do you integrate new migrants and the host communities?

8. What kind of obstacles do you encounter in your line of duties?

9. Are humanitarian organizations prepared to respond to influx of new arrivals of IDPs?

10. Do you think about the perception of the people towards to the support you provide?

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