

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY OF BEIRUT

THE MYTH OF THE ECONOMIC HYPOTHESIS: AN
EXAMINATION OF WITTGENSTEIN'S CRITIQUE OF
PSYCHOANALYSIS

by
RAED T. KHELIFI

A thesis
submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Master of Arts
to the Department of Philosophy
of the Faculty of Arts and Sciences
at the American University of Beirut

Beirut, Lebanon
December, 2019

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY OF BEIRUT

THE MYTH OF THE ECONOMIC HYPOTHESIS: AN
EXAMINATION OF WITTGENSTEIN'S CRITIQUE OF
PSYCHOANALYSIS


by
RAED T. KHELIFI

Approved by:



Dr. Raymond Brassier, Professor
Department of Philosophy

Advisor




Dr. Hans Muller, Associate Professor
Philo

Member of Committee



Dr. Quinn Gibson, Assistant Professor
Philo

Member of Committee



Dr. Saleh Agha, Lecturer
Philo

Member of Committee

Date of thesis/dissertation defense: December 17, 2019

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY OF BEIRUT

THESIS, DISSERTATION, PROJECT RELEASE FORM

Student Name: Khelifi Raed _____
Last First Middle

Master's Thesis Master's Project Doctoral Dissertation

I authorize the American University of Beirut to: (a) reproduce hard or electronic copies of my thesis, dissertation, or project; (b) include such copies in the archives and digital repositories of the University; and (c) make freely available such copies to third parties for research or educational purposes.

I authorize the American University of Beirut, to: (a) reproduce hard or electronic copies of it; (b) include such copies in the archives and digital repositories of the University; and (c) make freely available such copies to third parties for research or educational purposes after:

- One ~~year~~ year from the date of submission of my thesis, dissertation, or project.
- Two years from the date of submission of my thesis, dissertation, or project.
- Three ~~years~~ years from the date of submission of my thesis, dissertation, or project.

Raed Khelifi 30/12/2019
Signature Date

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I dedicate this work to my committee, and especially to my advisors, Drs. Ray Brassier and Hans Muller, whose generous guidance was essential for the obtainment of my Master's and Bachelor's degrees, and whose limitless support was indispensable for the completion of this work.

To Rana, Andrea, Jack, and other friends who provided well needed intellectual and psychological support in various steps throughout the writing of this thesis.

And to my parents, to whom I dedicate everything I have accomplished and will accomplish in the future.

AN ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS OF

Raed T. Khelifi for

Master of Arts

Major: Philosophy

Title: The Myth of the Economic Hypothesis: An Examination of Wittgenstein's Critique of Psychoanalysis

This work examines the complex relation between psychoanalysis and science in light of Freud's insistence that he is engaging in natural science. This thesis argues that psychoanalysis is not a natural science, and attempts, through Wittgenstein's examination of concepts like the unconscious and the symptom, to understand what kind of science psychoanalysis is. Instead of examining Freudian psychoanalytic assumptions and measuring them against the standard of the scientific method, we will attempt to bring forth and examine the kind of assumptions that are in play when people pose the question of what kind of science is psychoanalysis, and understand the contribution psychoanalysis had on scientific progress in general.

CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	v
ABSTRACT.....	vi
Chapter	
I. INTRODUCTION.....	1
II. THE SCIENCE OF THE UNCONSCIOUS	3
A. The Unconscious as envisioned by Freud.....	4
B. What makes the study of the Unconscious a science?	10
III. REASONS AND CAUSES.....	17
A. Is the Unconscious a realm of reasons or causes?	17
B. Why does Freud insist on calling them causes?.....	22
C. Can hermeneutics provide salvation to psychoanalysis?	26
IV. THE ECONOMIC HYPOTHESIS	31
A. What makes causal links in psychoanalysis difficult to establish?.....	32
B. The role of the Economic Hypothesis.....	37
C. The Economic Hypothesis: A mythology	38

V. CONCLUSION..... 41

REFERENCES..... 45

To Shahrazed

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Much ink has been spilled over the scientific status of psychoanalysis, and strong arguments were made for its scientificity as well as against it. Attitudes regarding psychoanalysis have also widely varied throughout its brief history. Freud was initially resisted by the scientific community, while at the same time succeeding in securing faithful disciples. After his death, and with the migration of psychoanalysis to the United States, Freud was celebrated as a revolutionary, not only as a psychoanalyst, but as someone who has redefined psychology. In fact, the first two versions of the *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders* (known as the DSM) were written by avowed Freudians.¹ A decade later, the medical community decided to shun it again for both cultural and medical reasons. Although it is common now to easily dismiss psychoanalysis as pseudo-science, the fact that numerous thinkers and philosophers took on the question of its scientificity, and the oscillation between acceptance and rejection of psychoanalysis by the scientific community, are a testament to the difficulty and complexity of the issue. In addition, the question of the scientific status of psychoanalysis also forces with it a re-examination of what we mean by science and knowledge and the relationship between the two.

This paper will not attempt to answer any of these large questions. It will, by way of Ludwig Wittgenstein and Jacques Bouveresse's reading of him, attempt to highlight the hidden assumption that are in play when philosophers question the scientific status of psychoanalysis. It

¹ "Why Freud Survives." Louis Menand. 2017.

will try to show that most of the ‘grammatical confusions’ hinge on an interpretation of the economic model of the unconscious, which we will explain later, and the concept of causality that comes to be embedded in it. We will eventually try to show that although psychoanalysis is not and cannot be treated as a natural science, it succeeds in opening room for an expansion of the concept of science.

What makes Wittgenstein a good entry point for the treatment of this question is the fact that he does not have a cohesive argument against psychoanalysis, but rather numerous schematic comments about its different aspects exposing a number of seeming weaknesses. We will begin by trying to understand his remarks regarding the unconscious.

CHAPTER II

THE SCIENCE OF THE UNCONSCIOUS

One of the features that mark the Wittgensteinian critiques of Psychoanalysis is that they differ from the general trend of similar criticisms at the time, which, although robust at times, simply mask rejection of taboo ideas such as the Oedipus complex and infant sexuality. Furthermore, the critiques that were advanced by Wittgenstein, as will be shown throughout this thesis, came only as a redirection of the trajectory of psychoanalysis; e.g. trying to steer away from Freudian attempts to find a place within the natural sciences that result only in theoretical confusions. Freud believed that it is essential for psychoanalysis to be a science, and considered himself to be a man of science, while Wittgenstein considered that arguing for the ‘scientificity’ of psychoanalysis is futile and unnecessary. In a way, Wittgenstein’s analysis of the new science could be understood as reproaching Freud for misunderstanding his own discovery by insisting to be a part of the thriving scientific community and by being narrowly focused on having psychoanalysis be perceived as a science to a point that limits its potential. Wittgenstein believed that Freud would have fared better if he attempted a less ‘scientific’ project that fit better the subject matter at hand. It will also appear throughout this paper that one of Wittgenstein’s motives behind his interest in critiquing psychoanalysis is the fact that it represents a certain confusion that results from having ungrounded scientific assumptions in domains where they might be inapplicable, like philosophy, or psychoanalysis. Wittgenstein’s dissatisfaction with the trend of transposing scientific principles onto philosophy, and his attempts to demarcate what can be talked about philosophically and what can be talked about scientifically, will be shown to be reflected through his dealing with psychoanalysis.

However, before delving further, we have to clarify what kind of science Freud believes psychoanalysis is. In order to do that, the reader must be familiarized with a distinction that is established in the German academic field at the time. Science, or *Wissenschaft*, in the period during which Freud was active, was mainly divided into *Naturwissenschaft* and *Geisteswissenschaft*. The first was concerned with the natural sciences, or with how the natural world functions and what it produces, while the second, which remains more difficult to translate (it literally means the sciences of the mind/spirit), includes social sciences, mathematics, logic and some of the humanities (e.g. history). *Geisteswissenschaft* is the domain in which cultural dynamics and the creations of the human mind are the objects of scientific investigation. The subject and all that the subject subjectively produces falls under this kind of science, contrasted with natural science's object-oriented-ness. Freud always maintained that psychoanalysis is a *Naturwissenschaft*, instead of a *Geisteswissenschaft*², which means that it is concerned with objective phenomena just like physics, chemistry and other hard sciences.

Wittgenstein believed that natural science and its language specify what can be spoken of scientifically. And he believed that presenting studies of the unconscious as an endeavor in the science of nature is unwarranted. The question then becomes: is the object of psychoanalysis, as a science of the unconscious, fit to be talked about scientifically?

A. The Unconscious as envisioned by Freud

The idea that a part of our mental life is unconscious, that it directly influences our conscious lives and is influenced by it, was not originally a psychoanalytic proposition. Unconscious elements, e.g. hidden motives or intentions, have always been posited to provide a

² Assoun, P. L. (1981). *Introduction à l'épistémologie freudienne*.

complete picture of mental life. Psychoanalysis however introduces the notion of the unconscious as a system that is capable of some sort of systematic causal influence. In philosophy, the idea that thoughts are separate from thinkers and that concepts somehow exist independently is commonplace: it could be traced back to the origins of philosophical thought in Platonic dialogues. It was Plato himself that presented the notion that, in addition to the independence of thought, there is a part in the psyche (the soul) that contains ideas that are not directly accessible to consciousness. In his theory of recollection (*anamnesis*), Plato explicitly says, through Socrates, that the realization of some of the ideas that we “possess” cannot happen directly, and that these ideas cannot simply be thought or immediately triggered. Plato hints at the necessity of mediation by an external other to help one access these kinds of thoughts. Thus in the *Meno* dialogue, it is only with the specific set of questions asked by Socrates that the slave becomes able to solve the geometric problem posed to him. The premise of the argument Socrates is trying to advance is the fact that the only way to explain the knowledge the slave acquires about geometry is by admitting that he “had” it all along, since he was not provided with any external “new” knowledge, but only presented with questions. These Socratic guiding questions helped the slave access a part of himself that he himself did not know about. Plato goes on to argue that this unconscious (or, non-conscious) knowledge, which we all have, is stored in the soul.³ Although the rise of the notion of the unconscious as we know it came much later than Plato, the idea that the mind, (the psyche, the soul...) is not the same as consciousness had its

³ “If, then, there must exist in him – both while he is and while he is not a human being – true opinions which can be stirred up into knowledge by questioning, won’t it have to be the case that his soul had in it all this knowledge, all along? For it’s clear that throughout all time he either was or was not a human being.” *Meno* Which translation?

germ his dialogues,⁴ and the use of non-conscious or unconscious elements in describing mental events was prior to the rise psychoanalysis.

However, it is only with the advent of psychoanalysis that being unconscious no longer remained a predicate of mental content and *the* unconscious started being used as a grammatical subject, as a substantive. The word unconscious is no longer only an adjective that describes a quality of mental entities; i.e. that of being unavailable and inaccessible to us consciously, or being a mental object that can be pinpointed by a conscious subject when the appropriate stimulus is presented; it also became a noun that denotes a system with a special mental location that fits within a new topographical model that presents the human mind as multi-layered. This new system possesses unique characteristics that differentiate it from the other mental system, i.e., Consciousness. In *New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis*, Freud writes: “the word ‘unconscious’ has been made to mean a mental province (*provinz*) rather than a quality which mental things have” (p. 102). Although the psychoanalytic unconscious (the Unconscious or the Ucs) could be defined in a multitude of ways, especially given the different modes in which Freud presents it, it suffices, for now, to stress that Freud differentiates the unconscious from the preconscious, another system where ideas are only simply non-conscious, but are not prevented through some sort of mechanism from being summoned to consciousness. The mark of the Unconscious is the mechanism of repression.

The concept of the Unconscious started to force itself in the Freudian understanding of the psyche when Freud encountered the apparent incompleteness of mental life. Through his

⁴ The knowledge of the slave was not unconscious *per se*; he was helped through Socrates’s questions to make the inferences of claims that he already held consciously. However, the conclusion of the dialogue hints at the possibility of non-conscious knowledge.

⁵ Freud's different expositions of his conception of the psychical apparatus generally use the terms 'system' (System) and 'agency' to designate the parts or substructures of this apparatus. More rarely, we find the words 'organisation' (Organisation), 'formation' (Bildung) and 'province' (Provinz). (*The Language of Psychoanalysis*. Laplanche and Pontalis, P. 15)

personal and clinical experience, Freud acquired the belief that the data of consciousness are filled with gaps. The most striking of these are common para-praxes like slips of the tongue, dreams, and memories, but also “ideas of the sources of which we are ignorant ... and results of mentation arrived at we know not how” (p.167)⁶. The derivation of the concept of the unconscious comes as an application of some version of the principle of sufficient reason.⁷ The obvious gaps that permeate our conscious mental lives must have the capacity to be etiologically studied. Put differently, we cannot scientifically accept that some of our thoughts are self-causing, or lack a cause; they do not come *ex nihilo*. The initial hypothesis is that all of these ‘anomalies’ must fit into at least one chain of causation in order to make sense. Furthermore, this must be done in a way that preserves their status as ‘anomalies’ or interruptions of consciousness, and that avoids treating mental phenomena horizontally, turning them into physical occurrences. Examining this chain of causation will be one of the themes of this paper, because it is, in my opinion, a reflection of a fundamental disagreement between Freud and Wittgenstein. In fact, one of the main textual sub-questions of this paper could be formulated as the following: Provided that we cannot deny the effects of the unconscious on conscious life, and that we cannot reduce them to physical occurrences that do away with consciousness altogether, what is the best instrument and approach to examining this specific type of causality? And could this relation be appropriately called a relation of cause and effect?

At any rate, and whatever the answer to that question may be, an adjectival use of the word unconscious would have been sufficient to describe the unconscious processes that are required to render the gaps of our mental lives intelligible. However, the main motive behind the

⁶ ‘The Unconscious’

⁷ “[The existence of the Unconscious] is necessary because the data of consciousness are exceedingly defective; both in healthy and in sick persons mental acts are often in process which can be explained only in presupposing other acts, of which consciousness reveals no data.” (p. 117)

introduction of the dynamic use of the word lies in the fact that this mental province includes the repressed within it. In fact, in the opening lines of his essay 'The Unconscious', Freud describes how repressed instincts (more accurately, the ideational content representative of those instincts⁸) and other thoughts remain, through a certain mechanism, within an individual's unconscious regardless of their conscious 'will', and it is precisely these repressed thoughts that compelled psychoanalysis to expand the definition of the word.⁹ In 'Delusion and Dream in Jensen's Gradiva', Freud introduces repression by saying that it "is a kind of forgetting which distinguishes itself by the difficulty with which the memory is awakened, even by strong objective appeals, as if a subjective resistance struggled against the revival" (p. 143). Repressed content is paradoxical in nature, because the ego has to be dissociated from it, but this dissociation changes how the ego manifests itself, since the repressed returns disguised in some form or another. That is also why repressed content cannot be simply 'forgotten'. Repression "at the same time makes inaccessible and conserves something psychic" (p.149)

Every repressed content somehow returns through the formation of a symptom, and this is what distinguishes the repressed from the simply forgotten. The retrieval of the former is not a matter of simple remembrance as it is in the case of the latter. Furthermore, in the case of simple forgetting, the forgetting itself is, in a way, also forgotten. But every act of repression comes with a reaction whereby traces of that repressed memory/thought always resurface. At the same time, the ego cannot be thought to have access to the repressed content, because the displeasure of facing it outweighs the pleasure of succumbing to its retrieval and 'releasing' it. The dynamics

⁸ Only the repression of ideas leads to the formation of the unconscious. Repression of instincts, say repressing the sexual instinct through a vasectomy for example, does not result in the formation of the unconscious.

⁹ This is how Freud introduces the first 'non-descriptive' use of the word unconscious: "The unconscious comprises, on the one hand, processes which are merely latent, temporarily unconscious, but which differ in no other respect from conscious ones, on the other hand, processes such as those which have undergone repression, which if they came into consciousness must stand out in the crudest contrast to the rest of the conscious mind." ('The Unconscious' p. 122)

of repressed content forced Freud to believe that a further division of the mental is necessary (there is a division within the non-conscious: the preconscious was not enough because any content in the preconscious could potentially resurface immediately and it shows no resistance when summoned)¹⁰. According to psychoanalytic theory the repressed content, unlike the rest of unconscious (i.e. non-conscious) material, resists being brought to consciousness. Repressed ideas require psychoanalytic treatment to be brought forth, because without treatment they will remain unconscious, only interrupting consciousness sporadically through symptoms, thus creating some sort of a pathological balance. It is a balance because preserving traumatic experiences and reminiscences of intensely shameful or disgusting experiences in the unconscious is the result of appeasing all demands presented by the different psychical agencies. However, the dissolution of repressed content qua repressed content and its incorporation into the register of consciousness promises a cure of the symptom. Furthermore, the continuous traces of the repressed content allow the ego to defend itself from the resurging repressed content: it is the only way the ego can allow the inclusion of what it fails to incorporate in its entirety (the memory of the traumatic event). The resurging content seeks satisfaction through cathexis (binding an energy to an idea or an object to facilitate the release of tension) that would overthrow the ego's balance in a way that could hinder the social and practical life of the patient and their relation to the external world. The result is a compromise between the repressed material and the ego, e.g., substituting the repressed by similar or related content that is tolerable by society¹¹, condensing it in one idea, or sublimating it by attaching it to a less harmful or a more acceptable idea, etc...

¹⁰ In 'The Unconscious', Freud utilizes Breuer's succinct definition of the preconscious as "capability of being conscious" (p. 123)

¹¹ Social norms as internalized by the super-ego.

This is why repression could be the first revolutionary concept that psychoanalysis offers. It is repression that is responsible for creating a split within the individual that forces the mind – to put it in an unrefined manner – to defend itself from itself. Thus repression is the logical precursor to the concept of the unconscious.¹² The image of the human mind as a unified mental space where forgetting and remembering only happen due to contingent factors is no longer sufficient. Instead, Freud identifies various parallel mechanisms that could run counter to each other and that operate non-consciously.

This dynamic between the repressed content and consciousness, along with the clinical efficiency of the concept in helping to retrieve repressed memory, is what forces us, according to Freud, to accept the dynamic nature of the unconscious as a system.

B. What makes the study of the Unconscious a science?

By this point it should be clear that the main reason for the dynamic characterization of the unconscious is the existence of gaps in mental life. There must be a cause behind our seemingly random conscious choices, or the puzzling sequence of events and characters that we see in our dreams. Working within a naturalistic framework, it is admitted that those events that are mental in nature must belong to one or more causal chain. In the beginning of his career, Freud was led to these questions through neurophysiology, his initial focus. This is the reason behind his attempts to establish physical causal chains underlying mental phenomena.

In *Project for a Scientific Psychology*, written in 1895 (but never actually published during his lifetime), Freud took on the task of grounding psychological phenomena on a material

¹² “We have reason to assume that there is a primal repression, a first phase of repression, which consists in the psychical (ideational) representative of the instinct being denied entrance into the conscious... The second stage of repression, repression proper, affects mental derivatives of the repressed representative.” ‘Repression’. Freud. (p. 2979). Taken from the *Complete Works* compiled by Ivan Smith.

basis and attempted to reduce the human psychology to “a sort of economics of nerve forces” (p. 129).¹³ In the first page of this work Freud clearly expressed his agenda by writing that “The intention of this project is to furnish us with a psychology which shall be a natural science: its aim, that is, is to represent psychical processes as quantitatively determined states of specifiable material particles and so to make them plain and void of contradictions.” (p. 355)¹⁴ And in this project, we see the beginnings of the failure of Freud’s monist (physiological) enterprise, which would later morph into the economic model of the mind. In fact, later on, Freud completely drops the project because in the course of his career, as James Strachey puts it, “Freud the neurologist was being overtaken and displaced by Freud the psychologist: it became more and more obvious that even the elaborate machinery of the neurotic systems was far too cumbersome and coarse to deal with the subtleties which were being brought to light by ‘psychological analysis’ and which could only be accounted for in the language of the mental process” (p. 163)¹⁵.

The clinical efficacy of psychoanalytic technics compared to the infinite intricacy of the human neurophysiological composition compelled Freud to turn to psychology and delegate the task of biologizing the mind to ‘a science of the future’. Some four decades and a half after the ‘project’, Freud expresses the futility of the project when he writes in an *Outline of Psychoanalysis* (1940) that “If it [knowledge of how conscious mental events correspond to physiology] existed, it would at the most afford an exact localization of the processes of consciousness and would give us no help towards understanding them” (p. 28). This means that even pinpointing the area where the physical process responsible for a psychical phenomenon takes place, does not and

¹³ Freud’s letter to Flies on May 25, 1895.

¹⁴ Taken from: <http://users.clas.ufl.edu/burt/freud%20fleiss%20letters/200711781-013.pdf>

¹⁵ *The Unconscious*, James Strachey’s ‘Introduction’.

cannot tell us much about the mental phenomenon qua mental. This indicates that Freud realized that the relation between the mental and the physical is more complex than that of supervenience, and that an explanation of mental events is not only possible without invoking the physical/biological, but needs to avoid biology in order to be accurate.

Freud began working on *The Outline of Psychoanalysis* in 1938 which indicates that his belief that examining the etiology of an unexplained mental event would be more fruitful when it is restricted to the mental is a part of his mature view.¹⁶ Furthermore, this causal chain legitimizes the derivation of the unconscious. And it is in this point that we need to bring in Wittgenstein to the conversation. Wittgenstein's belief that the metaphysical reification of the unconscious is unnecessary reflects his general position regarding any metaphysical reification of linguistic entities. There is no justifiable need, according to Wittgenstein, to posit the unconscious as an object or subject of scientific study. The role played by the term 'unconscious', before Freud's redefinition of it, is sufficient to reach the conclusions that Freud had in mind. For Wittgenstein, the idea of mental locality for example creates more difficulties than it resolves issues. For example, having a topographical model of the human mind where mental states and ideas in general would have a 'location' that is different from the location of the physical event that correspondent or associated with them is unwarranted and confusing. What's more, it is one thing to claim that in doing so, one is just describing a helpful representation, but to allow oneself to use this representation to generate scientific claims without providing any argument as to why this representation of the mind is necessary seems to

¹⁶ Freud, however, never lost hope in the idea that in the future physiological and psychological explanations would form a cohesive scientific framework. Even in the Outline he mentions 'a science of the future' that will answer questions regarding the relation between biological development and mental development in relation to sex. However, in the Outline he believes that biology contains as many gaps if not more than psychology. Either way, Freud never outlined in detail what this science of the future would look like.

be the graver problem. It has been already mentioned that Wittgenstein is not an adversary of psychoanalysis rather, his main purpose is to save it from traditional metaphysics and ontological pseudo-questions that are in reality masking grammatical confusions, similar to what he set out to do for philosophy in the *Philosophical Investigations*. The other problem Wittgenstein saw in the reification of the unconscious is not that the unconscious will be treated as a thing but that it will be thought of as a subject, similar to the unnecessary difficulties created in a language in which “instead of saying ‘I found nobody in the room,’ one [says] ‘I found Mr. Nobody in the room.’” Wittgenstein continues, “Imagine the philosophical problems which would arise out of such a convention. Some philosophers brought up in this language would probably feel that they didn’t like the similarity of the expressions ‘Mr. Nobody’ and ‘Mr. Smith.’” (p. 69).¹⁷ In Freud’s portrayal of the unconscious, there is a temptation to think of it not only as a thing but also as an agent, just as in Wittgenstein’s thought experiment nobody became Nobody and thus somebody through a confused linguistic equation.¹⁸ This is not helped by the fact that in *The Interpretation of Dreams* Freud gives a prime example of grammatical confusions by writing: ‘Accordingly, we will picture the mental apparatus as a compound instrument, to the components of which we will give the name of ‘agencies’, or (for the sake of greater clarity) ‘systems’ which may perhaps stand in a regular spatial relations to one another.’ (p. 536) It will be clear by the end of this chapter how the question of whether these entities are agencies or systems makes all the difference.

However, Freud was careful to emphasize that the unconscious is not another consciousness within the same subject, as he writes after what he believed to be a conclusive

¹⁷ *The Blue Notebooks*.

¹⁸ In the English translations of Freud’s work there is a tendency to capitalize the U in Unconscious when using it as a substantive.

proof for the existence of the unconscious that “what is proved is not the existence of a second consciousness in us, but the existence of psychical acts which lack consciousness... The well – known cases of ‘double conscience’ (splitting of consciousness) prove nothing against us” (p.170).¹⁹ But Wittgenstein was still not convinced of the difference in nature between the unconscious and consciousness, and for him it seemed that these psychical systems were still being treated as agents. In the following lines, Jacques Bouveresse effectively captures Wittgenstein’s objection: “Freud’s procedure is questionable, from Wittgenstein’s point of view, not, as is sometimes believed, because he reifies but because he personifies the unconscious and, in a more general way, the sub-personal components of the personality.” (p. 37)

Freud, however, believed that a “personality” is primarily unconscious. It is clear throughout Freud’s corpus that the individual subject arises as the result of a compromise between instinctual demands and the external world (in simple terms, between nature and culture) resulting in the veneer of the ego, so in this light this argument might seem weak. A look at the genesis of the human mind as Freud understands and presents it shows that the result is a bifurcation between a primitive unconsciousness that does not have a place in society and a consciousness that is a mediating layer between it and between the demands of civilization. A subject is precisely this struggle between these ‘sub-personal’ components, all of which need to be personified *only insofar as they make demands and require satisfaction*. The course of action taken by an ‘agent’ is also the result of this conflict.

Wittgenstein’s point is also echoed by David Archard in *Consciousness and the Unconscious*, when he writes: “On the one hand, the unconscious is an intentional psychic agent which nonetheless behaves in a purely mechanical fashion; on the other hand, the unconscious is

¹⁹ ‘The Unconscious’.

cognitively primary, alogical, comprised of shifting and heedless desires, but it makes a very sophisticated use of language” (p. 128). These two attributes lead philosophers like Archad and Bouveresse’s Wittgenstein to believe that the concept of the unconscious is inherently contradictory. However, they both underestimate the revolutionary implications of the concept as envisaged by Freud. The unconscious is a mechanism of ideational manipulation that is effected in order to relieve psychological tensions whose origins and manifestations are somatic ,and at the same time the unconscious can be prompted to effect somatic change in case of patients undergoing analysis. Furthermore, all temptations to reify the unconscious are misleading because it should not be treated as an object (say an organ); yet nor is it simply a mental reservoir of bestial desires either (i.e. it is not synonymous with the id). The unconscious system has as input the ideation of non-linguistic a-logical bodily instinct-turned-to-drives²⁰ as well as contents derived from conscious experiences and whose output has to be incorporated in an ideal (linguistic) register that is acceptable by society (represented by the ego and super-ego) for it to obtain ‘its objectives’ and acquire the release of psychological tension. Although instincts supply the unconscious with ‘energy’, this instinctual energy can only be intentionally manipulated in analysis linguistically and the drives mediate between these energies and their ideational representations. The drives are the result of the ideation of instincts and needs; they are the barrier between the somatic and the semantic. In fact the insistence on the separation between the two systems (the Ucs on one side and the Cs/Pcs) that led to realist interpretations of the Ucs was

²⁰ For readers unfamiliar with Freud’s jargon, this expression might seem odd. Its explanation mandates the examination of the difference between instinct and drive, which is a different topic from the one at hand. It does not help that although there is a clear demarcation between *Trieb* and *Instinkt* in Freud’s German work, Freud’s standard edition, compiled by James Strachey, seems, at times, to confuse the two terms. The main difference between the drives and the instinct as explained in *Instinct and its Vicissitudes* and in *The Language of Psychoanalysis* is that biological instincts, whose source is somatic, “delegate” a psychological representative in order to achieve their aim, their aim is achieved through an object the determination of which is ideal. In a way, the drive is the form of the biological instinct that allows the system to seek satisfaction through various contents.

initially proposed to highlight the independence of these two systems in terms of the rules that govern them. The unconscious is not governed by logical operations or at least by the same operations that govern conscious thought; e.g. we can unconsciously hold contradictory beliefs that would have equal inferential forces. At the same time, censorship determines what kind of thoughts remain repressed, and censorship is a logical operation insofar as it is intertwined with consciousness. In this light, what seems like a contradiction in the nature of the unconscious could be explained by its double nature: Unconscious mechanisms are propelled by forces supplied by the drives (the source of which is biological instinct) and shaped by the demands of the external social and physical world which are processed by the ego. It is precisely the eccentric nature of this entity coupled with its explanatory force that compelled Freud to found a science of studying it. Keeping in mind Freud's revolutionary aspirations regarding psychology, one can conclude that he could not see the possibility of a psychology that no longer acknowledges this natural anomaly that redefines what nature means and that ties together all psychical components. The question remains whether the clinical findings of Freud warrant this understanding of the unconscious.

Another way of examining the issue of whether the unconscious should be regarded more as an agent or as a system is to examine the notion of causality with regard to the unconscious. This chapter has shown that the science of unconscious processes is considered by its founder to be an objective science. Wittgenstein perceptively noticed that this formula of the objective science of the subject will create a host of problems, most notable of which is the confusion of reasons with causes. Natural science pursues the study of natural 'agent-less' causes while the subject is the realm of reasoning. The question that arises is: How can a science that putatively makes causal claims have reasons as its target?

CHAPTER III

REASONS AND CAUSES

A. Is the Unconscious a realm of reasons or causes?²¹

As already mentioned, the problem of confusing reasons with causes could be understood as a reflection of the problem of attempting to study the unconscious objectively. The unconscious, as portrayed in the previous chapter, is an entity that behaves like an agent but which is neither an entity nor an agent. Its activity, which can only be inferred from the lacunae of consciousness and thus cannot form a totality, cannot, because of various repressive mechanisms, be claimed by any actual agent. This is why this chapter's discussion is a continuation of the analysis of the previous problem. Although the problem of the what-ness of the unconscious, its quiddity, or even what it means to say that "the unconscious is" remains unsettled, delving into the functions played by the unconscious and the structures that govern them could get us closer to understanding it. If the unconscious is capable of blindly forcing perceptible change on consciousness in a regular fashion then it can be considered to be causally efficacious. However, if the unconscious is a purely causal system, where can we fit the talk of hidden desires and ulterior motives that, although it presupposes an agent, is integral to analysis? This is how the confusion that Wittgenstein sees in Freud's notion of the unconscious is transposed onto the discussion of reasons and causes, rendering the problem more palpable. In his 1930-1933 lectures, Wittgenstein goes as far as describing psychoanalytic treatment of

²¹ Throughout this section, the difference between reasons and causes will be touched on from more than one angle. However, at the outset we can say that Wittgenstein believed that reasons and causes are and need to be clearly kept apart because of, inter alia, 1) epistemological access: reasons are validated by first person authority while causes are established experientially 2) reasons are grounded in practice and in life-forms while causes have a more objective ground.

reasons and causes as an “abominable mess”. In a comment on Freud’s treatment of jokes Wittgenstein says: “The confusion between getting to know the cause & the reason for laughing, has caused the extremely pernicious effect which psychoanalysis has had – why the pupils of Freud have made such an abominable mess. It’s because what Freud says sounds as if it were science but is in fact a wonderful representation.” (p. 365)

This discussion also echoes Freud’s insistence regarding the scientific status of psychoanalysis. Wittgenstein held the belief that if the notions of cause and effect were to make sense it would have to be within a scientific context. This means that a causal hypothesis can only be established through repetition of experiment the results of which would lead to its confirmation or refutation. Although, as Bouveresse points out, Wittgenstein had equivocal views on our epistemological access to identifying causes and effects, where he does not seem to deny that in some cases knowledge of causes can occur without repetition of experiment²², he was clear on the fact that causes happen blindly, and certain about the fact that they differ categorically from reasons. For Wittgenstein, causes and reasons belong to two different language games. Causes are generally established experimentally after a hypothesis is put forth, while reasons cannot be established that way. In connection to this he says: “If one answers the question “Why did you move your arm?” by giving a behavioristic explanation, one has specified a cause. Causes may be discovered by experiments, but experiments do not produce reasons. The word “reason” is not used in connection with experimentation. It is senseless to say a reason is found by experiment. The alternative, “mathematical argument or experiential evidence?”

²² “Wittgenstein wonders if one can say, as Russell was saying, that cause is known by intuition before being known by the repetition of experiments. And he admits that an experience exists that might be called an “experience of the cause” (we know immediately that pain follows a blow), “but not because it infallibly shows us the cause, but because in seeking the cause we have one root of the language game of cause and effect.”” *Wittgenstein Reads Freud*, p.70.

corresponds to "reason or cause?"²³ This quote is also important because it shows that Wittgenstein is not putting causal studies above investigation of reasons in terms of its cognitive value or rigor. In other words, while experimental science is the field of causes, reasons could also be the grounds for reliable knowledge like mathematics, and knowledge is not only valuable if the conditions of its establishment are replicable. Mathematics, logic and language (commonly grouped together by Wittgenstein) are reason-governed fields because one cannot experimentally, but only logically, establish a truth in those realms. For Wittgenstein, a proper etiological investigation would likely require repeatable experiments that test hypotheses and would potentially provide us with the ability to predict future events. In one of his lectures he says: "When I say "reason can't be found by experiment", I'm saying: It has no sense to say: Reason is found by experiment. How does a man know the reason why he did a thing?" (P. 201)²⁴

Although most of Wittgenstein's philosophical insights in psychology are negative, in the sense that they do not add anything new to the domain *per se*, but examine its premises and break down its concepts, making it difficult to outline his holistic view of the subject, he does, however, believe that it is a domain that is capable of identifying verifiable causes, and it differs from psychoanalysis in this. Contrasting it with his understanding of aesthetics, he writes: "In Aesthetic investigations the one thing we're not interested in is causal connections; whereas the one thing we are interested in Psychology is causal connections." (p. 342).²⁵ And he seems to see that Freud's work, especially his treatment of jokes, is akin to an aesthetic explanation that

²³ The ideas in this passage are taken from G.E. Moore's notes Lecture 6a, starting from page 200. But the formulation of the passage as quoted above is taken from (<https://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/at/wittgens.htm>) because they are summarized and more cohesive.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Ibid.

purports to identify connections within a synoptic network of ideas and events in an individual's life, and will be more valuable if understood as such. It is not a theoretical edifice but more like an endeavor of elucidating concepts by drawing similes and making conceptual connections. If the distinction between a scientific study and an aesthetic explanation in the sense that was just employed is still unclear, the following passage from *Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief* outlines how causal explanations differ from aesthetic ones:

“11. The sort of explanation one is looking for when one is puzzled by an aesthetic impression is not a causal explanation, not one corroborated by experience or by statistics as to how people react. One of the curious things about psychological experiments is that they have to be made on a number of subjects. It is the agreements of Smith, Jones and Robinson which allows you to give an explanation-in this sense of explanation, e.g. you can try out a piece of music in a psychological laboratory and get the result that the music acts in such and such a way under such and such a drug. This is not what one means or what one is driving at by an investigation into aesthetics
12. This is connected with the difference between cause and motive. In a law-court you are asked the motive of your action and you are supposed to know it. Unless you lie you are supposed to be able to tell the motive of your action. You are not supposed to know the laws by which your body and mind are governed.”

(Passage 11, p. 21)

Moreover, Wittgenstein's dissatisfaction with the notion of causality in Psychoanalysis goes beyond the epistemological method of identifying causes. Bouveresse makes it explicit that for Wittgenstein it is not that reasons are as efficacious as causes, and that the only difference lies in how they present themselves to us. The main problem is the fact that talking about reasons and identifying and analyzing causes are entirely different language games; ones which are almost completely separate. This comes in response to a conception in psychoanalysis, which also exists in various branches of philosophy of mind, that views reasons as causes seen from within. For Wittgenstein, a reason is not a cause to which only the subject has access. He says:

Second confusion consists in saying that the reason is a cause seen from inside. What people are thinking of is something like a clock of which you see the wheels, & one of which you don't... Relation between analysis of a joke & experimental method of Psychology. Criterion of correctness of an aesthetic analysis must be agreement of person to whom I make it. Freud's remark that we don't know why we laugh /when hear a joke/ points to the puzzle which gives rise to aesthetics. But aesthetics does not lie in finding a mechanism. (P. 361-363)²⁶

In other words, it is not that reasons are causes that do not require reliable experimentation just because the subject has the privilege of an internal view. Causes are of a mechanical nature, whereas reasons belong to a language practice. However, before moving to the 'first confusion', one small remark regarding the passage quoted above. In that passage, Wittgenstein claims that agreement of the patient is integral to making psychoanalytic claims, which consolidates his view that psychoanalysis is only occupied with reasons. He also repeats this more clearly in the Cambridge Lectures 1932-1935, where he says, "What the patient agrees to can't be a hypothesis as to the cause of his laughter, but only that so-and-so was the reason why he laughed" (P. 39). The two assumptions contained in this quote can be rephrased as follows. Firstly, Wittgenstein believes that psychoanalysis' method of identifying causes lies in achieving the agreement of the patient undergoing analysis to a specific causal hypothesis proposed by the analyst, and secondly, that this is misguided because agreement is not enough to establish causality: agreement indicates that we have identified a reason, not a cause. The importance of the agreement of the subject that is being scrutinized is common in both psychoanalysis and Aesthetics, but has no place in natural science, and that is why psychoanalysis and aesthetics are similar. However, without running the risk of doing away with agency, we can say that the agreement that is achieved during analysis is a special kind of

²⁶ 1930 – 1933 Lectures, From the Notes of G.E. Moore.

agreement. Sometimes the analysand is oblivious to the fact of why s/he is compelled to agree. Furthermore, agreement can come in various ways. Sometimes it can be masked as behavioral change, and it can even manifest itself as disagreement when reaction formation occurs.²⁷ All of these trends make it difficult to differentiate between reasons and causes in psychoanalysis on the simple basis of agreement, or simply to differentiate between the two, because sometimes unconscious subjective reasons can play the role of objective causes. This is captured by Cioffi in *Wittgenstein's Freud* where he writes: "The objection to speaking in this connection of the "abominable mess" made by Freud's disciples in confusing cause and reason is that it represents the state of affairs too much as one of helpless confusion and overlooks the way in which the confusion is ingeniously exploited in the interests of the theory. In the notion of reasons which are causes there is more grammatical flair than grammatical muddle."

B. Why does Freud insist on calling them causes?

In the course of the development of his corpus, Freud touched superficially and indirectly on the problem of reasons and causes. As discussed in the previous chapter, Freud, while not denying that the subject could be studied in the form of a law-governed biological system, drifted away from a physiological explanation of human behavior, leaving this task to a science of the future (perhaps what he had in mind is some form of neuro-psychoanalysis). He shifted from his aspiration of developing a physiological framework to relying on a notion of the mind that presents it as an economy of forces that is governed by strictly deterministic laws. In other words, he transitioned from the body to the mind without changing the formal scientific

²⁷ Freud's essay 'Negation' (1925) is full of examples where the apparent disagreement of the patient is an indication of 'agreement'. Freud writes: "You ask who the person in the dream can be. It's not my mother.' We emend this to: 'so it *is* his mother.'"

framework of explanation that seeks scientific regularity and rigor and tries to minimize speculation. In a way, instead of accepting that the discovery of the unconscious would subvert the neo-Kantian scientific model, the economic model came as a Freudian extrapolation of the tripartite representation of the human mind that would perfectly fit, or that would not disturb, the prevalent scientific world-view. The seeming regularities that he has observed in his patients' neuroses strengthened the intuition that psychoanalytical investigations must fit within the framework of natural science. This was behind the creation of the "abominable mess", and it is most evident in *The Interpretation of Dreams*. At the start of the book, Freud deals first with the sources of our dreams. After mentioning that modern science cannot content itself with mystical notions of spirits and other beings interfering with our dreams, he writes "Most authorities appear to agree in assuming the causes that disturb sleep -that is, the sources of dreaming- may be of many kinds, and that somatic stimuli and mental excitations alike may come to act as instigators of dreams." (p. 535)²⁸ Freud explores how (internal and external) sensory and organic stimulation plays a major part in causing us to dream about certain things and not others. However, the fact that the same organic stimulation might lead to different dream contents led him to the conclusion that there must be other 'causes' that are responsible for the content of dreams. For example, a limb that is in pain will most likely cause a dream that is centered around that limb, but the exact content of the dream is, according to Freud, still 'over-determined' by a host of other psychic causes.²⁹ The interpretation effected by the dreaming mind on different somatic disturbances of the sleeping body is such a complicated process that the epistemological value played by those disturbances in explaining the 'cause' of a specific dream becomes

²⁸ Taken from the *Complete Works*.

²⁹ Freud relies on Mourly Vold's experiments where he would manipulate the position of a sleeper and record the dreams they would have. For this, refer to (C) The Stimuli and Sources of Dreams in *The Interpretation of Dreams*.

negligible. Dream symbolization is heavily intertwined with the mental, to the point that “for example, if we are using our fingers we dream of numerals.” (p. 550)³⁰ Freud goes on to highlight the absence of efforts in investigating the psychological factor in dream formation, which, for him, warrant the importance of this book.

This is where the origins of Wittgenstein’s critique could be situated. When Freud encountered the inadequacy of the then-contemporary scientific conception of the process of dream formation, he misguidedly posited other psychological causes, but what he was in fact studying were reasons and motives. According to Wittgenstein, Freud commits a common philosophical mistake that usually arises when dealing with a priori laws, but that can be transposed to psychoanalysis. The following passage from Moore’s notes during Wittgenstein’s lectures explains this point:

People have queer idea that this must happen. I should say: What if it didn’t happen? You say: If it didn’t, there must be some explanation. I say: What “must” is this? Do you mean that it’s the same thing? We often think that we are dealing with an a priori law, when we’re dealing with a norm (of expression) which we ourselves have fixed. People say “Cause is always proportional to effect”. Then suppose I make huge explosion by pulling a trigger. People say: Real cause must be something else. But we’re forced to say this: If we find another, we say: There you are: if you don’t, we say, I haven’t found it yet. (p. 262)

We tend to posit causal relations before we actually find them, and we misdiagnose the problem by saying that the causality eludes us. This is because we would like to fit in newly encountered anomalies in our complex systems of representation. When dealing with the physical world, assumptions like the universe being a closed system or nature being uniform, while arguably problematic, allow the pursuit of causal hypotheses, although the Wittgensteinian critique could

³⁰ Ibid.

potentially be extended to physics as well. Either way, psychoanalysis does not even attempt to argue for showing that what it purports to examine is of a causal nature, and just assumes it.

What Wittgenstein proposes instead, is a revision of the norm of expression, or simply, the mere realization that we are indeed dealing with a norm of expression when engaging in psychoanalytic analysis. So, in a sense, the absence of studies regarding the psychological causes of dreams is not a gap in literature that needs to be filled, as Freud might have thought, but the question itself as envisioned by Freud is not one that should occupy scientific psychology. Or at least, psychoanalytic theory needs to establish the links that its practice purports to examine.

The problem could also be tackled differently by reexamining Wittgenstein's notion of aesthetics. Wittgenstein believed that there are two ways to understand the effects of a work of art on its perceivers. We could take the natural psychology path and start establishing laws that are based on experiments. Or, we could choose the other aesthetic way which relies on building connections that are less like a causal chain and more like a synoptic network of similes. Psychology can investigate *how*, for example, some colors have a certain effect on us when used in a certain way and could predict with accuracy the effects of an artistic technique on the reception of a given piece of art. For example, there is regularity when it comes to studying the emotions instigated by employing different camera angles and techniques. But this is not the same as investigating why, for example, this film makes me think of a certain thing, while another film arouses another memory in me. In relation to this, he claims, "Aesthetics is "descriptive"... We were in a state in which we thought that whenever we were puzzled, what we wanted was a cause: we thought "why" always meant: What is the cause of this? Now we do ask: Why is this poem beautiful? What is beautiful about it? And people thought this was asking for causal explanation." (p. 342)

This is connected to the discussion on psychoanalysis in two interrelated ways. The first, is that Wittgenstein believes that Freud's treatment of jokes in *Jokes and their Relation to the Unconscious* is an ingenious aesthetic exercise in making connections and similes, but one that is in no way scientific and whose causal hypotheses are unverifiable. The second is the fact that Freud is an example of those who rush to seeking a causal explanation whenever presented with a puzzlement (the seeming arbitrariness of the symptom or of dreams, etc.) that could be phrased as a "why" question. Aesthetic investigations, while far from being useless or arbitrary, are not the same as the pursuit of an objective single answer, because they cannot admit one. Seeing a work of art as something else, or the affective relation a work of art has with its perceiver, are very subjective and 'reason-governed' phenomena and hence their study can be conducted in various different ways such that the 'final results' could be different without contradicting each other. Similarly, Freudian psychoanalysis can be thought of a matter of a "seeing as" of the symptom and a fitting of it into a wider network of life-events and ideas such that it becomes impossible to say that this is the real cause of one's symptom and not another. This is how Freud is looking for causes in a domain that is governed by reasons. According to Wittgenstein, Freud believes that, through the talking cure, he is (re)inscribing symptoms within solid chains of causation, whereas in fact he is only reinterpreting them within a synoptic network of reasons.

C. Can Hermeneutics provide salvation to psychoanalysis?

It could be that what Wittgenstein had in mind is some version of Habermas's hermeneutic psychoanalysis, whereby psychoanalysis would be, to a certain extent, reduced to an 'aesthetic' task of interpretation and the biological package would be jettisoned. Both of these thinkers see, in their respective manners, how the pursuit of a place within natural science's

framework presents the young science with a host of theoretical problems. However, I argue that a hermeneutical shift into pure semantics deprives Freud not only of the status of a ‘natural scientist’, but also of something that is integral to his view of psychoanalysis and of the human subject. In *Knowledge and Human Interest*, Habermas writes: “In contrast to conscious motivations, the unconscious ones hereby acquire the driving, instinctual character of something that uncontrollably compels consciousness from outside it. Impulse potential, whether incorporated in social systems of collective self-preservation or suppressed instead of absorbed, clearly reveals libidinal and aggressive tendencies. This is why an instinct theory is necessary.” (pp. 255-256) Habermas goes on to ground instinct in language by arguing that “Even the concept of instinct that is applied to animal behavior is derived privately from the pre-understanding of a linguistically interpreted, albeit reduced human world: in short, from situations of hunger, love, and hate” (p. 256). Although this provides a temporary outline of how reasons can turn into causes when becoming unconscious, this is also where hermeneutic psychoanalysis departs from Freudian psychoanalysis. In making the unconscious the primary object of study for psychoanalysis, Freud indirectly shifts focus to the forces within the unconscious: the energies and the drives. Although Freud admits that neither psychoanalysis nor any other science can say almost anything about these entities, they nevertheless present the building blocks of the new science. In *An Outline of Psychoanalysis*, Freud writes: “The hypothesis we have adopted of a psychical apparatus extended in space, expediently put together, developed by the exigencies of life, which gives rise to the phenomena of consciousness only at one particular point – and under certain conditions – this hypothesis has put us in a position to establish psychology on foundations similar to those of any other science, such, for instance, as physics” (p. 105). Here we find an admittance of the incapacity of psychoanalysis to explore the

bridge between the psychological apparatus and its biological basis, but in admitting this, Freud is also admitting that this connection presents the axiomatic essence of psychoanalysis. The physicist's objective is not understanding the nature of his/her objects of study, e.g. electricity or electrons, because even though these physical phenomena can be quantified, their 'essence' is impenetrable. However, the physicist is also required to posit them as theoretical concepts in order to achieve the possibility of manipulating them for the satisfaction of human ends.

Habermas writes: "The physicist, for example, does not provide information about the essence of electricity, but instead uses 'electricity' as a theoretical concept, just as the psychologist uses 'instinct'" (p. 246). It could be that Freud's notion of psychoanalysis as a natural science is grounded in the belief that the fundamental objects of study that are endowed with causal potentials are the energies that provide ideas with 'force', allowing them to effect somatic change (in the form of a symptom, a dream, a parapraxis, etc...). Reasons in this sense could be grounded in causes that allow them to produce palpable effects. Wittgenstein warns us from giving 'a reason why so & so is a reason. You mustn't mix up reason with cause.'³¹ Because reasoning, unlike a causal chain of explanation, is a finite operation. The bedrock of a 'chain of reasons' is the accepted linguistic-practical norm. Wittgenstein writes: "Giving grounds, however, justifying the evidence, comes to an end; – but the end is not certain "propositions" striking us immediately as true, i.e. it is not a kind of seeing on our part; it is our acting, which lies at the bottom of the language-game."³² This language game is "not based on grounds. It is not reasonable (or unreasonable). / It is there – like our life."³³

³¹ 1930-1933 Lectures G.E. Moore p.196

³² On Certainty Passage 204

³³ On Certainty Passage 559

Wittgenstein however, treats this grounding practical framework almost axiomatically, as a given. Psychoanalytic theory seeks to go further and attempts to discover and highlight the causes that shape our practices. It makes hypothetical claims about the causes of reasons in a way that changes our understanding of these two notions, especially when reasons in the unconscious attach themselves to libidinal energy in a systematic law-like manner. Reasons for psychoanalysis are constricted by a wide array of factors, (psychical, social, libidinal, etc...) and these factors can all be investigated, while Wittgenstein groups these notions under the concept of life-forms which he treats as given. This refutation also shows how Freud's own initial derivation of the unconscious has changed. The proof for the unconscious started as an application of the principle of sufficient reason, but is actually seeking not the reasons that legitimize the unconscious, but, especially with the emphasis on drive theory, morphs into a quasi-causal study that seeks the subterranean causes for our behaviors, and not reasons that justify certain mental phenomena.

Be that as it may, the conclusion of this chapter aims to emphasize the importance of the drive theory for Freud, even though it remains a black box. It is necessary because there would not be any movement in a 'non-somatic' Cartesian ego that is devoid of libidinal or instinctual energy. It is hard to see what would drive a Cartesian ego to act. Put simply, psychoanalysis is not the study of how ideas relate to each other, but rather is an attempt to understand the operations of the thinking body; not as a biological animal or a Cartesian ego, but as the complex interrelation of the two in a way that shifts our understanding of both poles. Furthermore, the drives are a 'black-box' because the question of their essence, just like the essence of electricity, is either a pseudo-question or a question for another domain like Philosophy. This limits Psychoanalysis to a very strict definition and a determined object. Even though this does not

solve the problems proposed in this chapter, but mainly narrows it to the question of the relation between the mind and the body, we believe that we have showed that the hermeneutic attempt either fails or has in view something entirely different from what Freud wished to investigate and explain.

Reducing symptoms to linguistic anomalies redefines Psychoanalysis to the point that it would only partake nominally in Freud's concepts. The only way for a hermeneutic psychoanalysis to be a valid candidate for continuing Freud's work is for it to prove that the role played by biology is distinguishable and is either negligible or capable of being canceled out, perhaps because it is qualitatively uniform. Habermas can say that all subjects share to some extent the same biological basis, so the only differentiating factor has to be cultural-linguistic, i.e., the cultural horizon of interpretation. However, even this would have been unconvincing for Freud because Freud's insistence on the role played by the somatic lies in his understanding of language. In *Intentionality*, Searle makes the argument that speech cannot in itself be intentional³⁴: the speakers impose intentionality upon language. Freud, being a student of Brentano and influenced by him³⁵, is thus familiar with the problems of intentionality and is aware that language has to get its affective and effective power from its users. So the symptom, as understood by Freud, can only acquire its force its non-linguistically.

Psychoanalysis then cannot be reduced to a task of (re)-interpretation. This claim by itself however, does not warrant the employment of causal hypotheses in psychoanalysis. There is something over and above hermeneutics in psychoanalysis that allows it to make causal claims and to give it the appearance of a natural science.

³⁴ "The mind imposes intentionality on the production of sounds, marks, etc..." (P. 164)

³⁵ My knowledge of Brentano's great influence on Freud comes from *Apprehending the Inaccessible: Freudian Psychoanalysis and Existential Phenomenology*, written by Richard Askay, and Jensen Farquhar (2006).

CHAPTER IV

THE ECONOMIC HYPOTHESIS

The idea that psychoanalysis cannot be reduced to a hermeneutic practice solidifies the fact that some form of causality is integral to the Freudian science, because it shows that the psychoanalytic endeavor targets something that is beyond re-interpretation and translation, and is interested in actual concealed behavioral links. The relationship between a symptom and a pathogenic idea cannot be reduced to that of a different modes of expression of the same thought, because, in addition to the role played by the energy of the drives, the unconscious is governed by different language patterns than conscious speech. At the same time, the idea with which the previous chapter concludes is reflected in the practice of psychoanalysis. Although the analyst can only affect change through symbolic manipulation, i.e. the talking cure, the ultimate goal, the reduction of the dangers or the elimination of the symptom – or ‘curing one’s stammer’ as Wittgenstein would have it – is a non-‘aesthetic’ goal that analysis seeks.

Although so far it has been argued throughout this thesis that some form of causality must be maintained in order for psychoanalysis to be possible, there are reasons to think that such a causal study is either impossible, or outside of the scope of psychoanalysis; or if such causal hypotheses were possible in psychoanalysis, they have to be wholly different from a traditional study of causality. One of the reasons for this is that the replicability requirement Wittgenstein believes is integral to making causal connections is impossible in psychoanalysis. I will now outline one of the main reasons for this.

A. What makes causal links in psychoanalysis difficult to establish?

There are a few psychoanalytic mechanisms that make the process of identifying causes in psychoanalysis almost impossible. In the transition from an attempt of a physiological explanation of neuro-psychical phenomena to a psychological understanding of the symptom, there was an integral step that Freud took that is directly related to the topic of the etiology of neurosis. Freud has written extensively on the topic of the etiology of neuroses: He targeted the question directly in *The Aetiology of Hysteria* and it was a running theme throughout his major works (*Studies On Hysteria*, *Three Essays on Sexuality*, and *The Interpretation of Dreams*, et al.). He always emphasized that a symptom is the result of the combination of constitutional factors and incidents in the patient's psychical history³⁶. Freud treatment of this topic came as a refutation of the temptation to understand the relation between these two factors as the following: A genetic disposition for a given pathology gets triggered by an environmental traumatic event that plays the role of an agent provocateur. This was the view Freud himself began with following the steps of his former teacher Jean-Martin Charcot. However, in *the Aetiology of Hysteria* (written in 1896), Freud proposes what was at the time a new psychological method of understanding the causes of hysteria; one that does not rely as much on the physiological history of the patient. Throughout the essay, Freud defends the conclusion that hysteria develops when a premature traumatic sexual experience leads to the development of an unconscious memory that

³⁶ In a footnote in *Three Essays on Sexuality*, Freud writes “neurosis will always produce its greatest effect when constitution and experience work together in the same direction” (P. 1494) and in *The Dynamics of Transference* he writes, also in a footnote “I take it this opportunity of defending myself against the mistaken charge of having denied the importance of the innate (constitutional) factors because I have stressed that of infantile impressions. A charge such as this arises from the restricted nature of what men look for in the field of causation: in contrast to what ordinarily holds good in the real world, people prefer to be satisfied with a single causative factor. Psycho-analysis has talked a lot about the accidental factors in aetiology and little about the constitutional ones; but that is only because it was able to contribute something fresh to the former, while, to begin with, it knew no more than what was commonly known about the latter. We refuse to posit any contact in principle between the two sets of aetiological factors; on the contrary we assume the two sets regularly act jointly in bringing about the observed result.” (p. 2457) Both quotes are taken from the *Complete Works*.

will, when conjoined with the right environmental conditions, cause³⁷ the rise of a symptom (This is known as the seduction theory). In 1924, Freud added a footnote admitting that in the original edition of the essay he did not yet free himself of his overvaluation of reality and his low valuation of phantasy. Although Freud reduced the emphasis laid upon sexual experiences and the role they play in the formation of neurosis and shifted it gradually to the manifestation of the Oedipus complex, the views presented in *The Aetiology of Hysteria* still remain interesting, making the essay, in a way, a condensed presentation of the confusions that arose with the gradual migration of a biological psychoanalysis to a psychological psychoanalysis. It is important for the present work because it does so in relation to one of our central themes, i.e., what causality meant for Freud. At the outset, one can notice an illustrative instance of how Freud's scientific language game itself creates confusion. To show that the repetition of a traumatic sexual experience (e.g. a reoccurring case of sexual abuse) is more probable to cause the development of hysteria than a single incident, Freud writes: "in the development of neuroses quantitative preconditions are as important as qualitative ones: there are threshold-values which have to be crossed before the illness can become manifest."³⁸ This is a classic case of confusing language games: If Freud is attempting to provide a new psychological approach to understanding hysteria that is in some way different from the physiological/hereditary method of understanding the pathology, then talk of threshold-values and quantitative preconditions misrepresents the matter.³⁹

³⁷ The picture is slightly more complicated, because the environmental trigger will reshape the reminiscence of the trauma which will, in turn, 'cause' the symptom. The memory of the trauma is not simply dormant and then reawakened. This is why the concept of 'apres-coups' causality or *nachträglichkeit* (also translated as 'afterwardsness') is important for psychoanalysis.

³⁸ Ibid

³⁹ Another example comes in *Some General Remarks on Hysterical Attacks* (1909), where Freud seems to present an unclear non-biological dualism. He writes describing the onset of hysterical attacks, "Since the repressed content consists of a libidinal cathexis and an ideational content (the phantasy), the attack can be evoked (1) *associatively*, when the content of the complex (if sufficiently cathected) is touched on by something connected with it in

The second and more important point is that Freud, in this essay, never clarifies the relationship between his new psychological understanding of hysteria and what we have labeled as Charcot's hereditary/genetic view. In the beginning of the essay, Freud claims that he is presenting a new mode of discovering the etiology behind a case of hysteria that can circumvent the dependence on the reports of the patient and his/her entourage, and that provides the analyst with a new way to uncover the cause of the neurology, which is, as stated earlier, crystallized in identifying the premature sexual experience. However, in other parts of the essay, Freud attempts to explain the biological sensitivity hysterics exhibit when presented with certain stimuli by saying that it is "as if in such patients certain organs of the brain which serve to transmit stimuli were in a peculiar chemical state (like the spinal centers of a frog, perhaps, which has been injected with strychnine) or as if these cerebral organs had withdrawn from the influence of higher inhibiting centers (as in animals being experimented on under vivisection)." He continues "Occasionally one or other of these concepts may be perfectly valid as an explanation of hysterical phenomenon; I do not dispute this." (p. 432) It is not clear what the exact relation between the constitution of hysterics and the traumatic event is.

There are two ways to explain this discrepancy. Firstly, in this essay, what Freud is occupied with is primarily a new *method* of identifying and eliminating the cause of hysteria, and this should not necessarily bear weight on the theory. In other words, Freud is open to the possibility that methodically treating hysteria psychologically and understanding its physical basis or the role heredity plays in its formation are two different modes of dealing with it.

Theoretically, however, Freud never seems to have given up on that fact that psychology and physiology must form a cohesive picture. This makes sense when considering the simple fact

conscious life (2) *organically*, when for internal somatic reasons and as a result of psychical influences from outside, the libidinal cathexis rises above a certain degree..." (p. 1983). Complete Works.

that the symptom is essentially a somatically exhibited repressed idea. However, even if that is the case, this text is still an example of using language in a confusing way because it is unclear whether Freud is targeting theoreticians or practitioners or both.

Be that as it may, Freud has another way to deal with this theoretical difficulty of the relation between constitutional and psychological factors behind the formation of a symptom, that is by introducing the concept of *overdetermination*. In *The Language of Psychoanalysis*, Jean Laplanche and Jean-Bertrand Pontalis define overdetermination as the following:

The fact that formations of the unconscious (symptoms, dreams, etc.) can be attributed to a plurality of determining factors. This can be understood in two different ways: a. The formation in question is the result of several causes, since one alone is not sufficient to account for it. b. The formation is related to a multiplicity of unconscious elements which may be organized in different meaningful sequences, each having its own specific coherence at a particular level of interpretation. This second reading is the most generally accepted one.

Sometimes the hysterical symptom is said to be over-determined in that it is the outcome both of a constitutional predisposition and of a number of traumatic events: one of these factors on its own is not enough to produce or to sustain the symptom, and this is why the cathartic method of treatment, although it does not attack the constitutional causes of the hysteria, is nonetheless able to get rid of the symptom through the recollection and abreaction of the trauma.(p. 292)

It is hard to tell whether over-determination is a necessary concept for understanding symptoms or an *ad hoc* one that masks a fundamental confusion in the notion of causality in psychoanalysis, especially when understood following the first definition. Perhaps the first notion of overdetermination simply recognizes the basic psychoanalytic fact that the symptom is a physical manifestation of an (unconscious) idea and thus the relation must be multi-causal. It is also possible to understand the concept of over-determination as a reflection of the

psychoanalytic notion of the intertwinement of the mind and the body that refuses to give one primacy over the other or to treat the mind neither as a Cartesian ego, nor as an epiphenomenon of the physical.

The second definition (b) of overdetermination modifies the traditional definition of causality. In the second sense, a given psychological phenomenon can be caused by a host of factors that could independently, by themselves, account for the occurrence of the phenomenon. One of the consequences of this is that it allowed Freud the liberty to give different interpretations of dreams the same validity. This notion is not only applicable on level of interpretation, because as pointed out previously, Freud believed that unconscious processes are modelled as the movement of energy quantities, and the dynamics of these quantities is responsible for cases of causal over-determination. For example, in the economic model, dreams are the release of built up psychological energy. Freud makes it clear in *The Interpretation of Dreams* when he writes: “Dreams are not just translations but also object cathexis.” (p.3496)

In order to understand the consequences of the introduction of the concept of over-determination we have to explore other unconscious processes. In *The Interpretation of Dreams*, Freud writes that over-determination is responsible for creating a situation in dreams that condenses multiple waking ideas in one manifestation. This is known as the phenomenon of condensation, and it is defined by Laplanche and Pontalis as “One of the essential modes of the functioning of the unconscious processes: a sole idea represents several associative chains at whose point of intersection it is located. From the economic point of view, what happens is that this idea is cathected by the sum of those energies which are concentrated upon it by virtue of the fact that they are attached to these different chains.” (p. 82) For example, when in a dream one sees a stranger who has a moustache (like one’s father) and also whose hairstyle resembles one’s

neighbor's for example, this is the work of condensation. Condensation goes hand in hand with the phenomenon of displacement whereby a symbol (in dream formation for example) would substitute another (think of the example of numerals and fingers in dreams). The economic model is essential for understanding both phenomena, Laplanche and Pontalis write:

Like displacement, condensation is a process which Freud accounts for by means of the economic hypothesis: the energies which have been displaced along different associative chains accumulate upon the idea which stands at their point of intersection. If certain images-especially in dreams-acquire a truly exceptional intensity, this is by virtue of the fact that, being products of condensation, they are highly cathected. (p. 83)

B. The Role of the Economic Hypothesis

It appears through the quoted passage that the bedrock of displacement and condensation, and by extension the concept of over-determination, is the economic hypothesis. The economic hypothesis of energy quantification seems to provide the only valid link between the science of unconscious processes and mechanisms on the one hand and what is traditionally known as natural science on the other. It introduces physicality to psychoanalysis which comes embedded in the notion of quantity. The economic hypothesis explains the relationship between unconscious processes and ideas, or, how ideas influence each other systematically in a way that allows them to be put in a 'causal' relationship with the physical. It also succeeds at doing so while circumventing the need to explain the relation between meaning and the formation of the symptom which posed a problem for hermeneutic psychoanalysis. At times, Freud would present the economic model as an axiomatic hypothesis that would grant psychoanalysis a place with other domains like physics and chemistry and shield it against attacks on its missing link with biology, allowing it to make claims that look like they are quantitative and even physical. However, the result was exactly the opposite. By being unverifiable and by introducing notions

like energy quanta and opening room for making pseudo-scientific claims, the economic theory provides traction for the charge that psychoanalysis is a pseudo-science. Most claims that question the scientific status of psychoanalysis would be much weaker if the economic hypothesis were to be understood and presented only as a mode of presentation. It is treated by some critics, and even by Freud himself at times (and also his followers), as the scientific skeleton for the edifice of psychoanalysis, but it should be thought of as the opposite; it is in fact the outermost layer. The economic hypothesis borrows laws established in other fields without showing how they would be applicable in psychoanalysis. Attempting to argue for the scientificity of psychoanalysis by introducing the economic hypothesis reflect a narrow conception of science and miss psychoanalysis's potential for expanding that conception.⁴⁰

This brief exposition of Freud's economic model does not delve, in a detailed manner, into its premises and suppositions, the examination of which might disprove this model immanently or with contemporary scientific proof. However, it is important to invoke the economic model in order to show that it is this talk energetics that gives substance to Freud's notion of causality.

C. The Economic Hypothesis: A Mythology

Now that we have diagnosed the problem at the level of the economic hypothesis, the question now shifts to the following: Without the economic hypothesis can Freudian psychoanalysis be presented as science? The question is important because dispensing with the economic hypothesis altogether leaves us with a model that will either undesirably lead to a

⁴⁰ In Freud's time the dominant model of energy was the steam engine, which he thought was in a sense similar to human psychology. Freud also wanted to transpose the successes of thermodynamics onto psychology through the invention of psychodynamics.

reduction to hermeneutical psychoanalysis or that would simply have too many gaps to make sense. It is evident that key psychoanalytic concepts like repression, for example, makes no sense without the economic theory.

Under this conception, Wittgenstein's criticism hits the nail on the head if it is addressing the Freudian tendency to speak with a scientific flourish, and through that, a temptation to treat psychoanalysis as a natural science capable of establishing causal claims modelled on those of physics; or the notion that psychoanalysis will replace or oust psychology, something that Freud hints at. Wittgenstein's critique is valuable and does succeed in clearing confusions when understood as an attack on a certain understanding of the economic model and not on the economic hypothesis in itself. It is possible that energetics as a language game might offer the best representation of the dynamics of the mind. The notion that a wish can be fulfilled through a dream does not make sense without the language of energetics. Wittgenstein is right that through these representations psychoanalysis can effect change successfully and "cure one's stammer". For Wittgenstein, the theory that comes with psychoanalysis is a representation that works; it is neither able to nor needs to provide the ground for making what is known traditionally as causal claims. It almost says nothing about the physical that would fit in the framework of other medical sciences. The causal relationship psychoanalysis claims to make comes embedded within the mode of representation of energetics. We should insist that Wittgenstein's critique should be understood not as a critique of the inadequacy of the mode of presentation but as an insistence upon understanding the fact that it is a mode of presentation. Through realizing this, one understands that the value of psychoanalysis does not lie in its treatment of the energies themselves but in the logic of the workings of the mind that is captured by those energies. Wittgenstein himself hints at the fact that our understanding of our own minds, in a sense, has to

be grounded in a material representation when he says: “the human body is the best picture of the human soul.”⁴¹ For this reason, I believe that Wittgenstein would have probably found the economic ‘mythology’ very convincing, and this is why, I argue, that the problem is not in the economic hypothesis *per se*, but in a certain understanding of it that unnecessarily reifies its components. This resonates with Bouveresse’s conclusion of his book on Wittgenstein and Freud, where he believes that although psychoanalysis proposes a persuasive representation, it is not aware that it does. He writes: “In philosophy, the need to use persuasion is not a regrettable fault since the philosopher isn’t really dealing with a science, while the mistake of psychoanalysis is essentially to believe that it is one. Its mistake is not necessarily to use persuasion the way it does, but rather to refuse to recognize that this is essentially what it is doing and to underestimate the considerable dangers this use involves.” (p. 125)

⁴¹ *Philosophical Investigations*. Part IV passage 4.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

It is the combination of the language of energetics and the language of interpretation that makes psychoanalysis possible. Freud was aware that this combination of both frameworks together is the key to producing an instrument capable of grasping human unconscious processes. In *Freud and Philosophy*, Paul Ricoeur argues that for psychoanalysis to be able to study what it claims to be its object, it has to contain the language of interpretation and the terminology of energetics. For him, it is the nature of human desire that forces this convergence of the language of forces and of meaning. Among Ricoeur's incisive ideas regarding Freud's philosophical assumptions is his explanation of how some of the physical or physiological principles that Freud adopted at the beginning of his career morphed into psycho-physical principles. An example is the constancy principle that is the logical precursor of the notion of the drive, whereby the drive is defined as a drive by the psycho-physical system towards a state of constancy, i.e., stability that is free of change, in a way, towards a form of homeostasis. In the course of Freud's career, this principle will outlast its expression in terms of neurons and will be conceived as the self-regulation of a psychical system.⁴² The same could be said of the reality principle that will gradually be overthrown by the unfolding logic of the death drive.

Whether Ricoeur succeeds in showing that the nature of human desire *necessarily* gives psychoanalysis this shape is irrelevant to the aims of this thesis. So is the larger question that examines the relationship between the mode of representation of a science or its instruments on one side, and its object on the other. The conclusions of this thesis are less ambitious, albeit of import given the common misunderstandings that result from disregarding them. What we can

⁴² Chapter I, Part I, Book II. *Freud and Philosophy*. Paul Ricoeur. 1970

firmly assert in concluding is that psychoanalysis is neither a discourse or a theory of meaning, nor a natural science that purports to deal with psychic or psychological forces in a quantitative and causal manner. It is more of a systematic study of unconscious processes that requires the tools borrowed from hermeneutics and energetics. Furthermore, the value of this thesis lies in demonstrating the futility of attempts to reshape psychoanalysis into a natural sciences that makes verifiable claims similar to physics, and in showing, by way of Wittgenstein, that the Freudian promises of a natural science of the future that will close the gaps that currently exist in our scientific *Weltanschauung* are entirely unnecessary.

The fact that psychoanalysis is a mixed discourse that could at times seem contradictory, might be necessary to capture phenomena that even ordinary language has labeled with an oxymoronic word i.e. ‘the psychosomatic’. Psychoanalysis, when understood as a mixed field that is different from natural science, becomes the best tool capable of grasping the psychosomatic symptom in its richness; not as a physical occurrence in an infinite chain of physical events, and not as a meaningful expression that can be exchanged with an abundance of equivalent expressions in the task of translation, but precisely as an event that introduces gaps in, and at the same time informs, our picture of human behavior.

It is also wrong to say, even from the vantage point of contemporary science, that scientific language is unnecessarily problematic and that psychoanalysis could have simply done without it. The Wittgensteinian argument that the scientific claims psychoanalytic theory makes create more problems than it attempts to resolve stands if one understands psychoanalysis, as Freud might have hinted at, as a *Naturwissenschaft* analogous to physics and chemistry. However, the value of psychoanalysis becomes apparent when understood as something other

than natural science. For example, the internal logic of the economic theory was in part responsible for the clinical success of the analytic practice.

By analyzing Wittgenstein's remarks on psychoanalysis, this thesis has attempted to address certain views about psychoanalysis's scientificity in a way that make the question of whether it is a natural science irrelevant. For example, in identifying the antagonism between the pleasure and the reality principles, does Freud pinpoint something analogous to a scientific law or puts forth a hypothesis about human nature? Or does he instead highlight a logical tension at the heart of human existence? Even if the pleasure principle has an 'economic' aspect that could be cashed out in terms of libidinal energy and relocated to the realm of biology, the value of Freudianism lies elsewhere; it lies in bringing forth the logical tension that arises with the rise of language, society, and human civilization within the natural world and our biological makeup and past.

Wittgenstein deserves the self-given label of 'a disciple of Freud', because he understood psychoanalysis and its economic hypothesis not as a contribution to the science of nature but as a mode of representation with its own logic. What I believe distinguishes Wittgenstein's critique from the rest of critiques that target Freud's claim to be a scientist of nature is that even though he succeeds in highlighting with precision Freud's theoretical confusions, he also manages to highlight why psychoanalysis can be a great device if understood rightly. Although the economic theory cannot be admissible as a scientific framework allowing for the establishment of verifiable laws, it is nonetheless a 'language game' that is capable of adequately seizing its object and understanding it. We can concede the point that the economic model is a hypothesis that is scientifically unverifiable without having to deny its explanatory power. The language of energetics can be maintained if one can avoid speaking 'non-sense', the prime example of which

is attempting to assert scientific causal claims. It provides a picture of the mental whose internal logic allows us to understand the mechanics of the unconscious in a way that no other domain could. Psychoanalysis, even as a mythology, still has a logic.

Even though Freud is sometimes reproached for his excessive ambition, he still underestimated the value of his own discovery. Even without trying to pursue a place among the hard sciences, a pursuit that is at the root of all the confusion Wittgenstein was pointing out, psychoanalysis would have gradually forced the expansion of the notion of science that, for example, allowed the rise of the social sciences. Perhaps Freud would have been content in having Psychoanalysis labeled as a social science, especially when considering how important the social sciences are today. The point is not whether Psychoanalysis is a social science (or another science that is not natural science); it is that the progress of Psychoanalysis has inevitably led to a re-examination of the concept of science itself, and an expansion of it. For this reason Lacan's subversion of the question seems to be entirely justified, as he writes in *Autres Ecrits*: "The question that makes our project radical remains: That which goes from: Is psychoanalysis a science? to: What is a science that includes psychoanalysis?"⁴³

⁴³ "Permanente donc restait la question qui fait notre projet radical : celle qui va de : la psychanalyse est-elle une science? à : qu'est-ce qu'une science qui inclut la psychanalyse?" (P. 187). Translation is my own.

REFERENCES

- Archard, David. *Consciousness and the Unconscious*. (1984).
- Assoun, Paul-Laurent. *Introduction à l'épistémologie freudienne*. Payot, 1990.
- Barrett, Cyril. *Wittgenstein: Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief*. (1966). <http://psych.nyu.edu/pelli/papers/wittgenstein.pdf>
- Bouveresse, Jacques. *Wittgenstein reads Freud: the myth of the unconscious*. Princeton University Press, 1995.
- Cioffi, Frank. *Wittgenstein's Freud. Studies in the Philosophy of Wittgenstein* 186 (1969).
- Freud, Sigmund. *Collected Papers: Studies in parapsychology*. Vol. 10. Collier Books, 1963. https://www.sas.upenn.edu/~cavitch/pdf-library/Freud_Unconscious.pdf
- Freud, Sigmund. *Introductory lectures on psychoanalysis*. WW Norton & Company, 1977. <https://ia801601.us.archive.org/33/items/in.ernet.dli.2015.49982/2015.49982.New-Introductory-Lectures-On-Psycho-analysis.pdf>
- Freud, Sigmund. *Project for a scientific psychology* (1950 [1895]). <http://users.clas.ufl.edu/burt/freud%20fleiss%20letters/200711781-013.pdf>
- Habermas, Jurgen. Trans. Jeremy Shapiro, *Knowledge and human interests*. London: Heinemann Educational, 1972. Print.
- Jensen, Wilhelm, Sigmund Freud, and Helen M. Downey. "Delusion and Dream: An Interpretation in the Light of Psychoanalysis of Gradiva, a Novel, by Wilhelm Jensen." (1903). <https://www.gutenberg.org/files/44917/44917-h/44917-h.htm>
- Lacan, Jacques. *Autres écrits*. Paris: Seuil, 2001. https://www.psychanalyse.com/pdf/lacan_bibliographie_livre_Autres_Ecrits.pdf
- Laplanche, Jean, and Jean-Bertrand Pontalis. *The Language of Psycho-Analysis*. Translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith, Karnac Books. 1973.
- Menand, Louis. "Why Freud Survives." *The New Yorker*, *The New Yorker*, 9 July 2017. www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/08/28/why-freud-survives.

Masson, Jeffrey Moussaieff. "The Complete Letters of Sigmund Freud to Wilhelm Fliess, 1887-1904." (1985).

Plato, Meno. Trans. by J. Holbo & B. Waring (2002).

<https://www.staff.ncl.ac.uk/joel.wallenberg/ContextsJoelGeoff/meno.pdf>

Ricoeur, Paul. *Freud and philosophy: an essay on interpretation*. Translated by Denis Savage. Yale University Press, 1970.

Searle, John R., *Intentionality: An essay in the philosophy of mind*. Cambridge university press, 1983.

Smith, Ivan. *Freud- Complete Works*. (2010).

Wittgenstein, Ludwig. *The blue and brown books*. (1961).

Wittgenstein, Ludwig, and George Edward Moore. *Wittgenstein: Lectures, Cambridge, 1930-1933: from the Notes of GE Moore*. Cambridge University Press, 2016.

Wittgenstein, Ludwig, et al. *On certainty*. Vol. 174. Oxford: Blackwell, 1969.