AMERICAN UNIVERSITY OF BEIRUT

THE LIMITS OF SECULAR POLITICAL MOBILIZATION IN LEBANON

by
ZEINOUN ANIS HALLAL

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at the American University of Beirut

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THE LIMITS OF SECULAR POLITICAL MOBILIZATION IN
LEBANON

by
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AN ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS OF

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In this thesis, I address the question of political mobilization in Lebanon, and try to understand: how can the theories of social mobilization contribute to explain the inability of secular parties to mobilize people in Lebanon in the post-Taef era? Why are secular political parties not able to mobilize for social change in Lebanon? And what are the underlying factors for the rigidity and resilience of the Lebanese political system?

In the aftermath of the Civil War in Lebanon, peace was restored in 1990 when political elites agreed to the Taef Accord. The Post-Civil War era was intended as a transitory period into a more representative political system.

Since the 1990s, secular political parties and groups, such as Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP) and the Lebanese Communist Party (LCP), tried to introduce reforms to the political system (e.g. electoral law), or to the civil fabric (e.g. civil marriage). Those initiatives failed on a background of national debates and fierce opposition from the political and religious strata.

Using literature review on power sharing systems, electoral design, political parties, clientelism and sectarian identity, I draw a proposition that secular political parties in Lebanon are not able to mobilize the public due to lack of access to institutions and public services mutually reinforced by the resilience of sectarian identities. I test my proposition using Social Mobilization Theory (SMT) as a theoretical framework. Furthermore, I map the existing political parties in Lebanon and analyze elections results for the years 2000, 2005 and 2009 to confirm conclusions.

Findings demonstrate that the resilience of sectarian politics in Lebanon resides in a vicious circle involving: power/access to resources, political elites/clients, sectarian electoral laws and activated religious identities. As a result, secular political parties lack partisan engagement, and are unable to reach a critical mass in government institutions. Consequently, they are either marginalized or annexed to a sectarian power.

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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATONS

ADL   Armenian Democratic Liberal Party

ARF   Armenian Revolutionary Federation

AV   Alternative Vote

CSO   Civil Society Organizations

DLM   Democratic Left Movement

FM   Future Movement

FPM   Free Patriotic Movement

GCL   General Confederation of Labor

HA   Hezbollah

JI   Islamic Group

LCP   Lebanese Communist Party

LDP   Lebanese Democratic Party

LF   Lebanese Forces

MM   Marada Movement

NLP   National Liberal Party

NPO   People's Movement

POS   Political Opportunity Structures

PR   Proportional Representation

PSP   Progressive Socialist Party

SDT   Social Domination Theory

S-F   Structural-Functional

SI   Social Innovations

SIT   Social Identity Theory

SJT   Social Justification Theory

SMT   Social Mobilization Theory

S-P   Social-Psychological

SSNP   Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party

UN   United Nation

To My Father

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

My observations, which lead to the current research, are both within the personal and public remits. After witnessing, as a child, the horrors of the Lebanese Civil War, I started later to build a growing understanding of the "us" and "them" horizontal and vertical divisions within the space I live in.

In the aftermath of the Civil War in Lebanon, peace was restored in 1990 when political elites agreed to the Taef Accord. The Taef agreement guarantees the institutionalization of what Lijphart coins as a "government by elite cartel" (Lijphart, 1969, p.216) and adopts an accommodative model of power-sharing with the intent of rectifying the inequality of representation between Muslims and Christians in Lebanon (Maila, 1992).

The Post-Civil War era was intended as a transitory period between a partially inclusive system before the war and an all-inclusive system, which segregates executive and legislative institutions from sectarian cleavages. Aside from the even distribution between Muslims and Christians in the parliament and first degree civil servant positions, the system was otherwise designed to evolve into a Meritocracy. As I write this thesis today, twenty-nine years later, the Lebanese political system remains, by and large, sectarian par excellence.

Since the 1990s, several initiatives in Lebanon tried to introduce reforms to the political system (e.g. electoral law)[1], or to the civil fabric (e.g. civil marriage)[2] (Assaf, 2002; Merhi, 2012; Ofeish, 1999; Zuhur, 2002). Those initiatives failed on a background of national debates and fierce opposition from the political and religious strata (Zuhur, 2002). There were several attempts by secular[3] political parties to introduce reform to the electoral and civil laws (Zuhur, 2002). In the aftermath of the Arab uprisings, there is a lack of new efforts to drive mobilization within the Lebanese political system towards modernity and additional representation. Public movements of contestation such as "You Stink" in 2015 were able to mobilize cross-sectarian support (Owens, 2015; Zogby, 2014). However, mobilization was obstructed, and came to an end later in 2016, due to a combination of state oppression and counter narratives (Geha, 2019a, 2019b; Kraidy, 2016).

In this thesis, I address the question of political mobilization in Lebanon, and try to understand: how can the theories of social mobilization contribute to explain the inability of secular parties to mobilize people in Lebanon in the post-Taef era? Why are secular political parties not able to mobilize for social change in Lebanon? And what are the underlying factors for the rigidity and resilience of the Lebanese political system?

Secular political parties in Lebanon have a tradition, which extends back to the first half of the 20th century. The Lebanese Communist Party (LCP), established in the

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[1] See news articles: (*Proportionality Law the Best*, 2013) & (*SSNP Favors One-Constituency Electoral Law*, 2013)

[2] Also see news article: (*Civil Marriage Bill Still Stirring up Controversy*, 1998)

[3] defined as non-sectarian parties with cross-sectarian public support, voter constituencies and campaigns. This is discussed in more details in subsequent chapters.

1920s, and the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP), established in 1935, are currently the largest secular parties in Lebanon. The Progressive Socialist Party (PSP), envisioned as a secular party, has become more confessional over years, especially after the Civil War (El Khazen, 2003; Richani, 1998). Despite their long standing presence and activity in the political life in Lebanon, the sectarian nature of the Lebanese political system has prevented secular political parties from growing horizontally, to drive social and political change.

In trying to examine the mechanisms, which hinder secular reform in Lebanon, I study the political theory of consociationalism and accommodative democracy. Power-sharing literature thrived in the second half of the 20th century by political writers such as Arend Lijphart, Donald Horowitz and Brendan O'Leary, among others. The major argumentation is that in divided societies pursuing modernization and democratization, power sharing among constituencies provides enough stability and enough democracy. Lebanon adopted a model of power sharing since its independence in 1943 through the National Pact. This model has been revisited with the Taef Accord by the end of the Civil War in 1990. Many claim that the Taef agreement, instead of advocating modernity, in reality increased divisions and sectarian polarization by institutionalizing confessionalism within the state (Fakhoury, 2009; Karam, 2012; Maila, 1992; Ofeish, 1999).

In addition to the confessional nature of the political system, the Lebanese society is vested with clientelist networks, which govern many aspects of the social, economic and political lives. The origins of clientelism dated back to the 19th century feudal rule in Mount Lebanon (Eisenstadt & Roniger, 1984). However, clientelism in

Lebanon is also connected to the sect. This creates a distinct model where the patron is not only the landlord or political elite, but also the religious protector and the dignity signifier (Hermez, 2011; Ofeish, 1999).

In the post-Taef political system, clientelism has become more prominent with the control of political elites over access to resources and welfare (Cammett, 2011). State institutions are marginalized within contradictory weak state and strong system structures. Thus, mobilization is gated by sectarian affiliations, which has become, over time, networks of self-representation intertwined with material benefits. Elite domination blocks the alteration of power by ensuring an electoral design, which guarantees the regeneration of the same system. Khazen coins the post-Taef political system as authoritarian, and argues that under the Taef formula the space for reform is narrower than before (El Khazen, 2003).

Under these conditions, secular political parties in Lebanon are faced with challenges from the society divided over sectarian cleavages, the political system which is governed by oligarchic sectarian elites, and from the overlap of clientelism and sectarian identity. Consequently, secular political parties face serious obstacles to form cross-sectarian and cross-territorial horizontal networks (Richani, 1998).

I argue that secular political parties in Lebanon are unable to mobilize the public due to the nature of the sectarian political system, the institutional design, and the limited ability to provide material support due to the lack of access to public services. This proposition is independent from potential structural limitations, developmental issues and governance deficiencies within secular political parties. In a country, such as

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Lebanon, secular reform is very unlikely without a mass secularization of the political system.

Theories of social mobilization address the different mechanisms of change in societies. I build on Social Mobilization Theory (SMT), as a theoretical framework, which allows the incorporation of the complexities of the Lebanese picture. SMT utilizes an instrumental approach in understanding networks of mobilization within the political opportunity structures (POS). Practices, in the form of partisan mobilization, are analyzed in the form of electoral behavior, as well as other informal types of mobilization.

This thesis consists of six chapters. In chapter one, I introduce my research question of why it seems impossible to mobilize secular reform in Lebanon. I also touch on the different elements of the sectarian political structure in Lebanon. The focus of this thesis is the post-Taef era, yet it tracks the foundations of the current entanglement of sectarian affiliations, clientelist networks and elite domination. The major argument is that there is a need to create a melting pot for these different foundations in order to come up with a coherent explanation of secular immobilization in Lebanon. This melting pot is Social Mobilization Theory.

Chapter two is a literature review of the available resources which cover the main themes of this thesis as follows. First, I examine theories of social change, and demonstrate the opportunity provided by SMT to understand the Lebanese political system. Second, I dig within the theories of accommodative democracy with the intention of illustrating the different views around power sharing in divided societies. This is imperative to understand the foundations of constitutional design under the Taef

Accord and the prospects of reform within the existing POS. Third, I examine the literature around political elites and elite domination. Lebanon is founded on elite coalescence and political parties emerge from elite mobilization to balance against each other using sectarian masses. Fourth, I discuss electoral design in power-sharing systems. This is crucial to understand the electoral performance of secular political parties, and how this is determined via the engineering of electoral laws. Finally, I discuss the literature around clientelism and sectarian identities. Clientelism is a phenomenon, which hinders modernization and democratization in many parts of the world. In the Lebanese context, clientelist relations play a hindering role to the horizontal mobilization by secular political parties.

In chapter three, I explain the methodology of this research. By synthesizing the literature review, I draw my proposition about secular mobilization in Lebanon: **Secular political parties in Lebanon are unable to mobilize the public due to a vicious circle of lack of access to institutions and public services mutually reinforced by the resilience of sectarian identities**. In order to operationalize my proposition, I map major political parties in Lebanon to systematically single out contemporary secular political parties, and then combine the literature review synthesis with an overview of electoral laws and results from the years 2000, 2005 and 2009. This is performed within the framework of the Social Mobilization Theory (SMT), which combines the political context with social networks, in order to understand political practices and behaviors.

Chapter four examines the first parameter of SMT by drawing a detailed picture of the sectarian political structure and institutional design in the post-Taef

period. This is performed by examining the major amendments in the Taef constitution and the institutionalization of confessionalism in Lebanon after 1990. The electoral design, which is subject to elite gerrymandering, is also visited to understand the type of electoral laws and practices governing the process of representation in Lebanon

Chapter five covers the second parameter of SMT by looking into the structure of clientelist networks in Lebanon. The origin of clientelism, as well as the contemporary forms of clientelism, are inextricable from sectarian mobilization tactics employed and exploited by sectarian political parties and groups. Sectarianism as a network diffuses within the material and non-material forms of exchange between public and sectarian elites. The mechanisms of politicizing sectarian identities, as well as the typology of political parties, are also examined in this chapter.

Chapter six focuses on the understanding of political practices and addresses the final element of SMT. Practices in the form of electoral behaviors and voting preferences are quantitatively presented and analyzed through the elections results of the years 2000, 2005 and 2009. The case of secular political parties is then portrayed on the background of context and networks to test the proposition on secular mobilization mentioned above.

Finally, I conclude with a synthesis of the findings, which substantiate my proposition about the inability of secular political parties to mobilize public in Lebanon. The different elements of political mobilization produce a vicious circle, which hinders secular political parties from attracting partisans and mobilizing voters The outcome of this research gains more importance especially on the background of the current populist upheaval in Lebanon.

CHAPTER II

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE REVIEIW

In this chapter I review the available resources on the theories of social change and political activism. This underpins the theoretical framework, which I will use to analyze and examine my proposition. I also examine the literature on power-sharing systems in the form of "consociational" or "accommodative" democracy in order to build the context of the Lebanese political system. Further research into political parties, electoral laws, clientelism and identity is inextricable from the research question, of secular political mobilization, I am trying to address. I use this literature review to draw the multi-layer understanding of the social networks, power relations and political practices in Lebanon.

A. Theories of Social Change

The question of political mobilization in the modern globalized world is one of the central questions in social and political studies. In a world of nations and nationalism, power relations, and a vast spectrum of political systems, ethnic and religious polarizations, the quest for an ideal political system, an abundant life and social norms based on equality and equity dominate the field of social study and constitute the foundations of political engagement. To understand political mobilization, what it is and how it connects to both the private and public spheres, its aspects, motives and consequences, but above all what drives humans to mobilize, I will review the

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major theories of social change to understand the explicit and implicit drivers of partisanship and opinion formation.

1. *Historical theories of social change*

Theories on change in society are dominated by a Western view of the world. In this context, Jean Murray maps four main theories: Evolutionary, Conflict, Structural-Functional and Social-Psychological (Murray, 1998). Under the effect of Darwinism, sociologists depicted society as continuously changing and inevitably progressing. From this view, evolutionists regard social change as a natural selection process where societies move forward necessarily from a lower to a higher state. Conflict theorists, on the other hand, regard social change as a by-product of contestation over scarce resources. The dynamics of tension among human groups are the real motives and drivers of change. According to Murray, this was notably advocated by Karl Marx, who theorized that conflict and the management of conflict are at the heart of historical inevitability (Murray, 1998). The advancement of industrialization laid the foundation for a Structural-Functional (S-F) school. In this view, society is a system structured of social units striving for dynamic equilibrium. Social units function within a system and interact towards creating shared values. This model of social change demands a holistic view of society moving forward, albeit at a very slow pace. Finally, and recently, Social-Psychological (S-P) theorists, accept the notion that change is rather a product of individual evolution. Society is an atomized structure of individuals undergoing personality and psychological changes, ultimately representing the real forces of social change (Murray, 1998). Among the important

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contributors to the S-P theory is Max Weber, who did not regard capitalism as a mere evil exploitation of the masses, but rather an individualistic trait rooted deeply in the psychological preferences of capitalists (Weber, 2012).

Further advancements in the theories of social change are either theories that synthesize two or more of the above views or advanced tailor-made approaches designed to address specific societies or trends. The cultural theory of social change draws on conflict theory, and presents social change as a conflict among different self-representations or definitions. Change, in the form of social or political movements, emerges from the contested views of ideal society among competing social factions and the official system, or the state (Montero, 2013).

2. *Modern frameworks of social change*

In light of the global wave of social movements in recent decades, sociologists and political scientists sought to expand disciplines into incorporating new methods of societal and political studies. In addition to the cultural theory of social change, explained above, theories such as Social Identity Theory (SIT), Social Domination Theory (SDT), System Justification Theory (SJT) and Social Movements theory (SMT) emerge as flexible frameworks in this context. The first three theories; SIT, SDT and SJT are thoroughly discussed by Andrew Reynolds (K. J. Reynolds et al., 2013). SMT, on the other hand, is dynamically used to study social change by both Russell Lucas and Daniel Meier (Lucas, 2014; Meier, 2015).

In developing a theoretical framework, I examine the four theories identifying potential parallels with the goal of studying the mechanisms of political and social

change in a country like Lebanon. Social Identity Theory (SIT) focuses on the collective action of the constituents of society. Change is driven by a sense of a shared grievance towards the alleviation of social inequalities. SIT treats society as classes and capitalizes on the dynamics of class struggle within groups having a shared identity (K. J. Reynolds et al., 2013). On the other side of the spectrum, Social Dominance Theory (SDT) approaches social change from the lens of the dominant elite. Despite its resemblance to SIT in terms of dividing society into two groups of exploiters and exploited, it departs from it by considering these divisions as rather natural. SDT seeks to explain why a system remains stable under seemingly unbalanced conditions, and takes into account both individual values and elite manipulation. Hegemony is one of the apparatuses utilized by dominant elites to preserve the status quo and prevent social change by different means of rentierism and legitimization (K. J. Reynolds et al., 2013). Social Justification Theory (SJT) draws on SIT, but notes that being in an exploited social class and sharing its grievances is not enough for mobilization. SJT emphasizes the conditions under which an exploited community might seek the preservation of the status quo, acting against their own interest. In divided societies, this theory can explain why a contest between identity and class can cripple social mobilization (K. J. Reynolds et al., 2013). Finally, Social Movements theory (SMT), utilizes societal networks in the context of an institution or a system of institutions in order to study the mechanisms of public contention. SMT observes social movements in the light of the context, the networks and the practices of mobilization. The context represents the structure within which a political opportunity might emerge. Networks are formal and informal channels

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of societal exchange, while practices describe how people mobilize trying to either preserve or change an existing set of norms (Lucas, 2014; Meier, 2015).

Recent research on social mobilization in what is called the "new mobilization theory" has been focusing on unifying the approach to social mobilization on the Macro, Meso and Micro levels (Törnberg, 2018). These levels of analysis differ in terms of scope and impact. The Macro level is concerned with the trans-national impact of social movements, while the Meso level addresses the relation between the state and movements, in addition to networks among movements within the state. The Micro level of analysis is concerned with the dynamics within social movements and groups (Törnberg, 2018). Both the Meso and Micro levels are of interest in this research. I use these levels as the context, and then deconstruct the networks of power between society and institutions, as well as the impact of identity on political activism in Lebanon.

In the light of contemporary movements of political contention, sociologists examined possible patterns and correlations which can establish an overarching connection between, for example, the "Occupy movement" and the "Arab uprisings" (Nulman & Schlembach, 2018). In a globalized world, a common denominator of economic grievances, and democratic inefficiency, lack of transparency and scarcity of capital can be regarded as a "meta-force" normalizing ethnic and geographic differences. Eugene Nulman and Raphael Schlembach emphasize that:

"The study of protest and social movements can no longer be encapsulated in the typical juxtaposition of the social scientific approaches used in North America and in Western Europe…While such analytical pluralism has long characterized the study of protest and contentious politics…the global economic uncertainties brought…have triggered new waves of political mobilization" (Nulman & Schlembach, 2018, P. 376-377).

These "new waves" of global movements described above, with the existing frameworks falling short of interpretation, triggered a new surge in the literature about social change. The complexity and multitude of elements interacting within the different under-layers of societies, below the grid, mandated a nouvelle approach more focused on the drivers of collective actions within social networks. According to Donatella Della Porta, to understand the "movement of the streets and the squares" as a universal phenomenon, the study of social mobilization and political activism has to incorporate new tools and levels of analysis (Della Porta, 2015). This aims at finding correlations among events such as the Spanish indignadas, the "Umbrella Movement" in Hong Kong and the civil unrest in Syria (Della Porta, 2015). The seemingly sudden nature of these protests, as well as the success of some of them to radically replace the existing political paradigms, are commonalities which are unorthodox to the classical study of social movements (Törnberg, 2018).

Finally, the interaction between institutions and activism is also connected to the political opportunity structures (POS). These structures exercise direct influence on the breadth and depth of political engagement. The more responsive the institutions, the more the public engagement (Nulman & Schlembach, 2018).

3. *From Micro to Meso: the multi-level interdependence*

Anton Törnberg argues that at the core of every social movement there is always a strive for social change. The aim of people engaging in activist expression is often the replacement of a certain manifestation of the current social and/or political orders with new orders. This implies that social movements would ideally be organized

and ready to harvest any suitable opportunity within the political structure (Törnberg,
2018).

Figure 1 "This graph illustrates the multi-level relationships among free social spaces, political regimes, and landscapes. SI is an abbreviation for social innovation. The graph is a remake inspired by Geels's (2005a) model of innovation in socio-technical systems" see (Törnberg, 2018, p.390)

Törnberg's model (figure 1) describes the dynamics of social change within a stable, or seemingly stable, political regime. Social "Grassroots" movements act within the free social spaces (or within a political opportunity space), and consolidate pressure to create what he calls "radical social innovations" (SI) (Törnberg, 2018, p.383). The

political regime is described as "stable" in the sense that incremental changes, but not radical ones, are possible. Two significant elements are prerequisites to catalyze SI:

- External factors influencing the free social space for or against SI.

- Game-changing events which are either interpreted or co-created by social movements.

The culmination of a favorable window within the political structure, a dramatic event, and possibly external support make social innovation possible, and thus, the frames connecting political institutions and the society, within which they exercise authority, are compromised. This leads to the formation of a new political structure with new norms and values (Törnberg, 2018).

However, Social movements often fail in achieving social change. The successful mobilization of individuals is obstructed by horizontal and vertical delineations in many political systems (Vráblíková, 2014). On the contrary, the presence of "competitive veto points" within a political structure facilitates networking and activism. In essence, "institutional opportunities" are as important as resources and motivations for mobilization (Vráblíková, 2014).

One of the reasons for the failure of social movements is the rigidity of the political or social structure (J. Clark, 2004). Built on vertical lines of unbalanced power relations, like in patron-client relationships, this, and similar social structures, generally dilute the ability of individuals, coming from same backgrounds and sharing similar grievances, from mobilizing towards social change. Social Movement Theory builds on horizontal networks of homogeneous (or perceived as homogeneous) individuals.

Consequently, such movements often have parallels with ethnicity, race or religion (J. Clark, 2004).

Examining the micro social universe structure, several sociologists and researches, such as Herbert Blumer, Armand Mauss & Charles Tilly, describe the life-cycle of social movements and categorize it into four stages (Pullum, 2014):

• *<u>Emergence</u>*

This phase is characterized by the presence of a general collective grievance or discontent. Some individuals would try to voice these concerns in the public sphere albeit no large scale active organization or mobilization occurs.

• *<u>Coalescence</u>*

This is the phase when new movements emerge. Activists will start to work with other similar, or like-minded, activists to address common issues. At this point in time, many do not identify with the discontent as collective, and thus, activists start to create arguments and messages to address and mobilize additional public support in what is called the process of "framing". In this phase also, activists will try to approach political structures to identify opportunities and/or decision makers who might support them with their cause. As these tactics yield results, the social movement starts to gain importance within the public sphere.

• *<u>Institutionalization</u>*

The young social movement, now consisting of increasing number of members or activists, starts to create a structure characterized by a specific task within this movement. Hierarchical structures emerge, and subsequently, resources, in the form of staff and items, are deemed necessary. In this phase, a successful social movement will

exercise a certain degree of influence on policy making and in certain places, and under

certain conditions, might be able to inflict radical changes to the political structure.

• *Decline*

Social movements can either achieve their goals, and thus, dissolve within the

existing or the new political or social systems, or fail to reach a critical mass or level of

influence. One of the common reasons of decline is government or state oppression.

Existing political institutions may resist change by responding within a spectrum of soft

power to coercive retaliation. Sometimes the public drives a social movement into a

breaking point by either refusing to mobilize or rejecting it, and even fighting against it.

These very dynamics are central to my argument about the nature of mobilization and

political activism in Lebanon.

B. Accommodative or Consociational Democracy

In order to build an understanding of the nature of political mobilization in

Lebanon, I research the literature which explains political systems, constitutions and

processes of representation in multi-ethnic and sectarian societies. These societies are

often deeply divided over both horizontal and vertical lines. Constitutions, in such

states, are often designed to mirror the constitutions of colonial powers or to mitigate

and resolve an eruption of violence on ethnic and religious parallels (Horowitz, 2008)

(Lijphart, 2004). Donald Horowitz explains that the question is two-fold: What is the

better system which allows fair representation of all constituents of deeply divided

societies? and how do we produce and maintain such systems? The "what" describes the

nature of the system (parliamentary, presidential or semi presidential) per se, and the

"how" explains the process of fostering representation (electoral laws and political parties) (Horowitz, 2008).

1. *The nature of power sharing democracy*

Brendan O'Leary defines power sharing as "any set of arrangements that prevent any agent or organized agency from being the winner who holds all critical power, whether temporarily or permanently" (McEvoy & O'Leary, 2013, p.3). Operationalizing this model in the real world entails the organization and employment of key institutions in the state such as the executive, the legislative and the judicial bureaucracies of government. This organization is instrumental to ensure power is shared among the different layers of the state i.e. within the state bureaucracy, military and civil administrative agencies (McEvoy & O'Leary, 2013)

In divided societies, especially where electoral behavior and political parties and elites are divided across ethnic, sectarian and religious lines, electoral outcome and the nature of the political system can either promote cooperation and compromise or the rupture of violence and conflict (Horowitz, 2008). Brendan O'Leary defines accommodation as an overarching concept which contains four major types: "Centripetalism", "Multiculturalism", "Consociationalism" and "Territorial Pluralism". (McEvoy & O'Leary, 2013, p.19).

In this context, I focus on the two main diverging views on what could be the best political recipe to create and maintain a stable democratic or representative system. Arend Lijphart theorizes consociationalism as the best alternative for divided societies, and presents extensive literature on the types of political institutions, constitutions and

electoral laws that can guarantee stability in highly confessional societies (Lijphart, 1969, 2004, 2004). According to Dixon, Lijphart's theory is based on the Dutch management of "plural conflict" between 1917 and 1967, which he then sought to adopt as a model which can sustain stable political structures in divided societies (Dixon, 2011). Arend Lijphart advocates a model of representative democracy, where all ethnic constituents of a society are granted a share in the apparatus of the state, while at the same time continue enjoying a certain level of inter-group autonomy protected by the constitution. Electoral laws, therefore, should be designed to fit the size of each group as the constitution simultaneously protects the privatization of internal ethnic cleavages (Lijphart, 2002). Consociational systems can thus be defined as: "institutions and procedures that encourage consensus rather than allowing the will of those who represent a simple majority of the population to prevail" (Pinder & Burgess, 2007, p.9).

On the other hand, Donald Horowtiz advocates for what he calls the "centripetal approach", which "does not abandon majoritarian democracy, but it aims at majorities that are cross-ethnic and at governments formed by moderate interethnic coalitions" (Horowitz, 2008, p.3). Ethnic or sectarian political parties are expected to demonstrate moderation and form coalitions with external partners in order to appeal to voters from other groups. It is imperative to note that both consociational and centripetal approaches do not seek the abolition of ethnic and sectarian cleavages, but rather to create melting pots for cooperation, pacification and democratization. One major difference is that consociational systems promote post electoral coalitions, while centripetal systems promote pre electoral ones (Horowitz, 2008)

Lijphart believes that consociational political systems are the only sustainable solution for deeply divided societies (Lijphart, 2002, 2004). The major argument, over which Lijphart believes there is a consensus, emerges from several potential structural problems in societies or states characterized by discrimination along language, religion and ethnic origins or any combination of those. The central argument here is that democracy in its classical form (classical majoritarian) is not sustainable in such societies, and therefore, there is a need for a more representative form of democracy. This argument can be traced back to John Stuart mills' writings on democracy and democratization (Lijphart, 2002). It is thus conceivable that these issues of ethnicity and ethnic loyalty are more pronounced in societies which do not have democratic political systems both partially or completely.

Arend Lijphart explains that the two "primary characteristics" of consociational systems are power sharing and group independence (Lijphart, 1969, 2002, 2004). Power sharing means that all constituents of society should have a share of representation in the government institutions, especially, but not restricted to, the executive institutions. On the other hand, each group should be allowed to manage its own affairs whether cultural, religious or educational. Lijphart emphasizes that this is not enough to manage a stable representative political system. Since the major goal would be to mend minority grievance and marginalization, and more importantly avoid eruption of violence, two "secondary characteristics" are recommended: proportionality and mutual vetoes (Lijphart, 2002, 2004). Proportional representation relative to the size of the ethnic or sectarian group is key for the fulfillment of the promise of a share of power for all, while mutual vetoes guarantee that there would not be a domination from

one, or more, ethnic or sectarian group in the legislative or executive chambers due to numeric superiority (Lijphart, 2002, 2004). It is often the definition which topics fall under the veto right which makes a consociational system prone to reach a deadlock and political stagnation. This remains a topic for debate especially in practice as I discuss later.

2. *The debate over power sharing democracy*

Both Consociational and Centripetal approaches are criticized by advocates from both sides. On the one hand, for some critics, it is questionable whether consociational power-sharing fosters enough democracy and democratic behaviors, and whether it can actually work in practice (Dixon, 2011; Horowitz, 2008; Lijphart, 2002, 2004; Selway & Templeman, 2012). On the other hand, granting communal groups a guaranteed share of power, while at the same time letting each group mind its own affairs, might not promote tolerance and moderation. For a power sharing system to be stable, there should be a certain level of cooperation among groups and group elites in particular. The absence of an incentive to cooperate can be one of the reasons for the failure of some of the consociational models (Horowitz, 2008).

Donald Horowitz explains that in a consociational system, elites will only need to form coalitions after elections. The reason is that there is no incentive to cater other groups' needs or opinions due to group autonomy expressed also in electoral laws. This might lead to elites "coalescing" rather than "compromising" and forming "coalitions of convenience", which are not stable and might fail in moments of severe political disagreements (Horowitz, 2008). In addition, elites might find themselves in a vicious

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alternating circle of extremism and moderation. On the one hand, they have to appeal to sectarian sentiments to harvest intragroup support, and on the other hand they have to show enough moderation and willingness to compromise in order to coalesce with elites from other groups. For Horowtiz "what begins as a grand coalition may end as a coalition of the middle, opposed by extremists on the flanks" (Horowitz, 2008, p.1220). Branden O'Leary explains that group autonomy might be a guarantor of the stability of the system. This does not necessarily have to lead to deepening cleavages, but rather empowers elites to represent and foster peaceful cooperation based on intra-group popular support (McEvoy & O'Leary, 2013; McGarry & O'Leary, 2004)

Yet, there are some scholars who criticize both consociational and centripetal power sharing proposals, particularly consociationalism (Dixon, 2011; Selway & Templeman, 2012). This counteracts Lijphart's claim that there is a consensus over power sharing. Empirical evidence, testing the impact of the key characteristics of consociational democracy (Parliamentary and Proportional Representation (PR)) on violence and conflict in divided communities, provides a statistical evidence that consociationalism exacerbates conflict and violence, and deepens ethnic rifts (Selway & Templeman, 2012). In particular, the combination of parliamentarism and PR seem to increase the potential for conflict as a function of how deep a society is divided. This sheds doubts on whether consociational systems perform better than majoritarian or presidential systems in divided societies (Selway & Templeman, 2012).

Paul Dixon explains that the consociational theory is built on a "primordial" view of ethnicity and identity, and this is why consociationalists prefer segregation of power among groups and group autonomy governed by elites (Dixon, 2011). In

consociationalism, ethnic and sectarian identities are treated as natural and unchangeable. Dixon cites that this pre-20th century view of identity has ignited ethnic fanatics and justified violence over ethnic and religious lines (Dixon, 2011). For O'Leary this might be a better option when dynamic representation is not possible. He emphasizes that in some places a "quota" system has to be adopted, and thus sects have to be treated as fixed over time (McEvoy & O'Leary, 2013)

In addition to the above critiques, Arend Lijphart cites additional scrutiny to his theory (Lijphart, 2002). In a power-sharing system with autonomous groups, when do ethnic or sectarian groups, autonomous enough, decide they do not wish to remain within the fabric of the multi-identity state? The possibility of developing group independence sentiments might prove problematic to the unity of the consociational state (Lijphart, 2002). Related to this discussion, Donald Horowitz argues that under such conditions, competitiveness might replace cooperation and the silo-like consociationalism structure might deepen the rupture among the different groups, sometimes leading to yet another cycle of violence or conflict (Horowitz, 2008).

Finally, there is the issue of applicability and transferability of consociationalism as one successful model of representation from western countries to other parts of the world. Some might regard consociational power-sharing model as not authentic to other parts of the world where different cultural, religious and social dynamics apply (Lijphart, 2002).

For Lijphart, all the above critiques are refutable or, at best, not profound enough. Democracy can have different forms other than the "government-opposition" classical model. When there is a grand coalition, or when the nature of the state is multi-

ethnic and requires power sharing, a political system, which pre determines the participation of each group in the government institutions, does not necessarily need to pass the "turnover" or "two-turnover" test. According to Lijphart, it does not mean that this is not a good form of democracy (Lijphart, 2002). In addition, having none written agreements (or pacts) among political leaders does not differ much, in Lijphart's opinion, from what we see in established western democracies such as in the United Kingdom. When PR is used, it is natural that political elites would exercise influence within their groups and seek to form some "behind closed doors" agreements. Such forms of social interactions within political networks provide flexibility, and are sometimes more stable than what can be considered as rigid frameworks within constitutions. The only consideration, which Lijphart emphasizes, is that elites in power sharing systems should demonstrate a higher level of cooperative behavior (Lijphart, 2002, 2004).

The dispersion of power among a wider base of representation is another potential drawback which critics highlight within consociational theory. The failure of power sharing systems in Cyprus in 1963 and in Lebanon in 1975 was associated with reaching a dead end or a "democratic breakdown" (Lijphart, 2002). Addressing this critique, Lijphart emphasizes that the very same countries also experienced periods of stability under the same power sharing systems, albeit suffering from drawbacks (e.g. the unbalanced representations of Christians and Muslims in the Lebanese system prior to 1975). This does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the system should be replaced, but rather rectified (e.g. as in the Taef agreement of 1989 in Lebanon) (Lijphart, 2002).

Donald Horowtiz explains that the partial adoption of power-sharing features within consociationalism is the most common practice, and consequently leads to the failure of the power sharing experiment. It is not enough to institutionalize power sharing in elections, for example, if minority veto is not guaranteed and if not all institutions are repurposed to preserve moderation (Horowitz, 2008). Nevertheless, Lijphart argues that the proof of the superiority of consociationalism is the mere absence of viable alternatives (Lijphart, 2002, 2004). Some had attempts at recommending a majoritarian system where both majorities and minorities behave moderately, such as the suggestion of Brian Barry in the case of Northern Ireland (Barry, 1975). Lijphart questions the practicality of such proposals and doubts the incentive for majority ethnic groups to cooperate with minorities under such conditions. At the same time, however, in what seems to be self-contradictory, Lijphart recommends elites to exercise moderation and statesmanship (Lijphart, 2002, 2004). This final point, in turn, is criticized by Horowitz, who doubts that elites would want to compromise and share power. Elites are extensions for their groups, and thus it is easier to promote exclusivity and exercise extreme right winged politics (Horowitz, 2008).

Donald Horowitz advocates an alternative to consociationalism. The central argument is that accommodation can only be a result of the genuine will to compromise among political parties and elites, without which a stable power-sharing system cannot be achieved (Horowitz, 2008). Horowtiz tackles the same idea more than once by explaining that "the mere need to form a coalition will not produce compromise. The incentive to compromise, and not merely the incentive to coalesce, is the key to accommodation" (Horowitz, 1992, p.171), and that "without incentives to compromise,

the only coalitions that will be formed are coalitions of convenience that will dissolve" (Horowitz, 1992, p.175). As a solution, Horowitz proposes developing and adopting electoral methods, such as "alternative vote" and "instant runoff" to promote moderation and insure the election of moderate representatives, sympathetic with other minorities (Horowitz, 2008). Lijphart responds that being in the seat of political power is an incentive enough for political parties, albeit that political elites in power sharing systems are expected to show long-term thinking and prudency. He adds that it is not sure whether Horowitz's designs can work, given that there are only few examples in the real world (e.g. Fijian constitutional system 1999-2000) (Lijphart, 2002, 2004).

Regarding the secessionist thresholds, the possibility of a group (or groups) developing independence sentiments within power sharing systems has not been proven empirically, according to Lijphart (Lijphart, 2002, 2004). On the contrary, having a centralized democratic state might not necessarily defuse secessionist sentiments should they evolve. The cost of separation can increase, and prove costly, in the case of balanced power sharing systems. In fact, Lijphart notes that having strong autonomous ethnic groups might prove more stable, as these groups have enough ground to build equal or balanced coalitions among them (Lijphart, 2002, 2004).

Finally, the applicability and transferability of the western power sharing model to other parts of the world might pose a localization problem. A solution might be a bottom-up design which takes into account the specificities and particularities of a given society. Lijphart argues that consociational democracy is not new but a natural evolution, since it has been exercised even before it was theorized for by political writers in the Sixties (Lijphart, 2002, 2004).

3. *Considerations for consociational design*

Lijphart provides guidance on the practical implementation of consociationalism, while undermining the debate over majoritarian plurality vote (advocated by Lijphart) versus alternative voting (advocated by Horowitz) (Lijphart, 2002, 2004). Since it is not expected that any of the minority groups would be willing to conceive their representative elected by another group, the incentive to compromise and cooperate is the same whether before, during or after the polling process. Additionally, a parliamentary system is far more superior to a presidential one, due to the "winner takes it all" nature, or perceived nature, of presidential systems. A cabinet elected, or voted for, by the parliament, might prove far more stable (and democratic) as opposed to one elected or appointed by the president. The former acting by virtue of a wide ground of support compared to the latter, which cater to, and is more dependent on, the president.

Furthermore, a parliamentary system guarantees a wide base of representation and does not require a direct election of the president. The deadlock that might occur, due to the president being on opposite ends with a parliament, and where presidency does not hold the majority, can be avoided[4]. Cabinet stability can be guaranteed through legislation and by adding limiting factors to the freedom of voting against granting trust to the cabinet by the parliament. Such limitations include, but are not restricted to, increasing the threshold of consensus, or mandating the simultaneous selection of a new prime minister (Lijphart, 2002, 2004). In a contrasting view, Joel Selway and Kharis Templeman argue that with a larger base of representation, and more parties represented

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[4] Lijphart ultimately recommends limiting the prerogatives of the president and ideally transforming this role into a more ceremonial form (Lijphart, 2004)

in the government institutions, consensus becomes more difficult, and that there might

be "a built-in bias in favor of the status quo in such systems" (Selway & Templeman,

2012, p.1547).

Lijphart warns that pre-determined group participation is a drawback in some

semi-presidential consociational systems, such as in Lebanon after 1990 (Lijphart,

2004). The pre-determination of which groups namely participate in power sharing

might exclude and marginalize some minority groups on the one hand, but also groups

which would like to define themselves on the other hand. This might limit the freedom

of selection of group representatives, as well as hinder group alignment and formation

outside existing lines of discrimination within the society, be it ethnic, sectarian or

religious, per se. An additional feature of pre-determination is the fixed ratio under

which group participation is regulated, such as the Christian-Muslim 6:5 ratios before

the Taef Agreement in Lebanon. In essence, Lijphart recommends that minorities can

benefit from a loose definition of pre-determination. Some systems, such as in Belgium,

guarantee some sort of over representation for smaller groups (Lijphart, 2002, 2004).

On another level, for Power sharing advocates, federalism & decentralization

may provide stability to power sharing systems. There is a clear controversy between

Lijphart and Horowitz over which lines federalism should be drawn (Horowitz, 2008;

Lijphart, 2002). The former advocates that the more homogeneous the distribution of

communal groups within concentrated geographies is, the more suitable federalism

becomes. The more homogenous the groups, the more effective the geographic federal

lines. This implies federal units would be small and many (Lijphart, 2002). Horowitz

criticizes this view by emphasizing that such divisions will only deepen the rift among

society constituents and hinder cooperation in the interest of coalescence. Horowitz recommends federal lines which allow some sort of diversity within the federal canton. There is a higher chance to promote moderation among political elites in the case that those elites would have to appeal to constituents other than their own group. This also applies to the electoral district, where Horowitz advocates promoting moderation by diversification. Federalism can also support nationwide cooperation, since arriving to the central federal government means political parties have to appeal and cooperate with other constituents to win the polls (Horowitz, 2008).

In general, the impact of federalism on pacification is inconclusive in the empirical literature. For example, there is no robust evidence to support that group autonomy will improve distribution of public goods (Selway & Templeman, 2012). Some critics argue that drawing lines around homogeneous groups might further heighten the "distinctiveness vs others" sentiments within those groups and drive them to seek further autonomy (Selway & Templeman, 2012). Federalism has also been criticized as being some sort of apartheid as Lijphart advocates that "good social fences may make good political neighbors, a kind of voluntary apartheid policy may be the most appropriate solution for a divided society" (Lijphart, 1969, p.219). Paul Dixon warns that hoping for ethnic or sectarian lines, institutionalized within a federal system, to wither away over time, is not guaranteed without specifying mechanisms and institutions which can foster such a change (Dixon, 2011).

Arend Lijphart also recommends power sharing to extend outside the remits of the major political institutions such as the parliament and the cabinet. It is desirable to institute quotas in civil servants' appointments and in the armed forces (Lijphart, 2004).

While he explains that these quotas do not necessarily have to be fixed, but rather designed as a range, he does not explain how the different groups would agree on who gets what in time for appointments. There is a plethora of examples of stalemate situations over the appointment of government executives and civil servants such as in Lebanon (Public university, Public administrations, Ministry employees, Foreign affairs staff and Army officers) as predicted by some political authors (Horowitz, 2008; Selway & Templeman, 2012).

As a final note, consociational and centripetal power sharing systems are still subjects to debate in politics. Some argue that stretching the boundaries of power sharing to a universal theory has made it "vague, ambiguous and even contradictory" (Dixon, 2011, p.309). As a theoretical framework, Dixon considers consociationalism to be "primordialist, segregationist, elitist" at its best (Dixon, 2011, p.312). Based on empirical evidence, it is not conclusive that the power sharing recipe can reduce violence in divided societies. Some even argue that divided societies are not fertile for democracy and go beyond to recommend that autocratic regimes might be the only way to create a stable system and preserve peace (Selway & Templeman, 2012).

4. *The role of political parties & elites*

Political parties have been discussed extensively in the literature as lying at the foundation of modern democracy. It is important to notice that while western scholars address the role of political parties in western democracies, this approach falls short from addressing political parties in deeply divided societies under a sectarian consociational democracy (Boduszyñski et al., 2015). Western scholars focus on

analyzing what they consider to be the current plight of political parties in modern democracies. Recent theories try to explore the political legitimacy of parties and conclude that anti-party sentiments can be explained by a paradox in Democracy (Deschouwer 1996). Others also examine this crisis and its relationship to the structure of democracy (Ignazi, 2014; Stokes, 1999; Webb, 2005), or to the type of partisan affinity to political parties (Karp & Banducci, 2007). Voter preferences, game theory and coalition politics are also dominant in western literature (Fagerholm, 2016; Glazer, 2010; Spoon & Klüver, 2015). On the other hand, the literature on political engagement in divided multi-ethnic societies is, by and large, narrowly concerned with the democratization process through elections, such as in Melanie Cammett's research on partisan activism in Lebanon (Cammett, 2011), or with the best electoral options for better representation of minorities in Africa as addressed by Matthijs Bogaards (Bogaards, 2003).

Political Parties are the central political mobilization apparatus. They are usually the incubators for political elites. However, within the power sharing consociational model, political parties are facades for ethnic and sectarian affiliations, and sometimes extremists' representation (Horowitz, 2008). The presence of extremists in a country may lead to a destabilization of the political system over time (Selway & Templeman, 2012). In divided societies, political parties become controversially caught within a reversed role of top down (elite driven) rather than bottom up (people driven) aggregation. Political elites lead and represent parties of their corresponding groups. On the other hand, parties play the role of dissemination of elites' *agendi genus*, which reflects the consensus (or sometimes the absence of consensus) among elites

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(Deschouwer & Luther, 1999). Additionally, in such societies, political parties play the role of expressing communal sentiments and become vehicles for demonstrating ethnic exclusivity (Lijphart, 2004). This mechanism or phenomenon can prove indispensable to frame politics in Lebanon, as I will illustrate. In this context, consociational arrangements might develop parallels with systems with "Partitocracy" (Deschouwer & Luther, 1999; Sinardet, 2010).

One of the defining roles within consociational systems, is the role of elites. This is of particular interest for this research. Arend Lijphart defines consociational democracy as "government by elite cartel designed to turn democracy with a fragmented political culture into a stable democracy" (Lijphart, 1969, p.216). Due to the severe divisions within fragmented societies, elites are expected to play the role of guarantors or arbiters. The stability of the democratization process, and later the representative democracy itself, requires that power sharing is first and foremost a pact among elites. An informal pact, and a share in the state control, are expected to provide elites with sufficient incentives to keep the masses at bay. This means that elites represent their own groups by default. They manage the interests of these groups and are expected to not interfere in the affairs of other groups.

Elites in power sharing systems are trusted to demonstrate a sense of statesmanship. Yet, how this is produced is not clear. According to Lijphart: "elite domination does not vary a great deal among democracies. The difference between majority rule and power sharing is not whether leaders do or do not predominate, but whether they tend to be adversarial or cooperative" (Lijphart, 2002, p.41). This view poses a dilemma for political mobilization and, particularly, democratic political

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mobilization. Since the masses are treated as less politically mature, and prone to drop quickly into ethnic or sectarian conflict, interaction among distinct groups is considered undesirable. Within the elite consociational model, subjects, as people, are treated by political authors advocating consociationalism, as passive and indifferent (Scott, 1990; Sinardet, 2010).

5. *Electoral design in power sharing systems*

Electoral laws provide the frame within which political parties mobilize partisans and advance social and political change. Through both the "law" and "hypothesis", Maurice Duverger explores the relationship between party systems and electoral laws, and substantiates the relationships between majoritarian representation and two party Systems (known as the Law) from one side, and proportional representation and multiple party systems (known as the Hypothesis) from the other (Duverger, 1951, 1959).

In addition, Duverger describes the characteristics of polarization & depolarization as political behaviors. Polarization happens when, in a majoritarian electoral system, a major political party receives higher representation disproportionate to its size at the expense of smaller political parties, while depolarization occurs in PR electoral systems resulting in a wider representation of most political parties (Duverger, 1959). The process by which electoral laws influence and shape political parties, voters, and consequently the outcomes, is described by Duverger through two factors or elements: a mechanical factor (How votes convert into seats) and a psychological one (How candidates and voters respond to the mechanical effect) (Duverger, 1951, 1959).

This description of the process, in other words, contributes to the understanding of political mobilization in general.

It is particularly meaningful for this research to understand how the psychological effect works in divided societies, and when sectarian and social cleavages come into play. Under an electoral system, where third place parties (smaller or minority parties) have lower chances of attaining seats, voters might decline from supporting those parties, and subscribe into supporting parties or elites with higher chances of winning. One other direct manifestation of the psychological effect is that political elites, sometimes at opposite ends, seek momentary electoral coalitions to preserve their share of power. Donald Horowitz cites this phenomenon, and warns that elites might indirectly give rise to extremists by engaging in such electoral coalitions (Horowitz, 2008).

However, in the case of countries where electoral laws are not permanent or can be changed from one elections to another, the impact of the psychological effect is less consistent with Duverger's description (Benoit, 2004). Other researches, such as Douglas Rae, reveal, through a systematic review, that in communities with strong minority parties, polarization might not function in a consistent manner and other dynamics such as ethnicity and identity politics might prove to be stronger drivers for voter behavior and political mobilization (Rae, 1971).

When it comes to the choice of the electoral systems, there are different theories which promote one electoral system versus others, and describe the best electoral choice for a certain country or community, as I have elaborated in the previous sections. The issue by which an electoral system is chosen by a government is subject to

different factors and lacks a substantial body of evidence. There is more focus on how political actors adapt to the existing electoral institutions. Yet, sometimes instead of adapting to the existing electoral design, political actors resort to changing the electoral design frequently, in order to insure continuous representation (Benoit, 2006). I particularly find this final point relevant to the design of electoral laws in Lebanon, and it contributes to finding answers to the research question of this thesis, as I will elaborate in the subsequent chapters.

In divided societies, the issue of political representation is continuously contested. These societies are more prone to conflict among constituents. Thus, the makers of constitutions and electoral law find it challenging to generate the right model for every society. One of the major challenges facing the designers of electoral laws is the tendency of divided and polarized societies to vote over ethnic or sectarian preferences. Political preference made on the basis of identity might transform elections into "elections by census" (Bogaards, 2003; O'Leary et al., 2009; Reilly, 2006; Selway & Templeman, 2012). This is particularly dangerous in heterogeneous societies with one or more majorities and several minorities, as one of the outcomes could be lack of or no representation of one or more of the minorities.

In addition, party leaders and political elites have lower incentive to appeal to cross-ethnic voters. Instead, it would be more appealing for them to run for elections by clustering support around ethnic or sectarian exclusiveness, and intra-sectarian claims, rather than moderate cross-sectarian slogans (O'Leary et al., 2009; Selway & Templeman, 2012). As a consequence, the distribution of public goods and government support might be diverted by virtue of ethnicity or demography; Hence contributing to

the creation or reinforcement of already existing ascriptive patron-client relationships between elites and voters.

Among the three types of electoral laws[5] i.e. majoritarian, proportional and intermediate (or mixed), advocates of consociational systems prefer PR as the best option for divided societies. PR "allows for the faithful translation of social cleavages into political cleavages through political parties" (Bogaards, 2003, p.60). The aim is to create an all-inclusive political system where all constituents are necessarily represented.

Arend Lijphart argues that PR is far more superior to plurality, double-ballots majority runoff, and alternative voting (Lijphart, 1969, 2002, 2004). In PR systems, Lijphart makes a distinction between list PR and single transferable vote (Lijphart, 2004). The best characteristics to be chosen are what Lijphart calls "closed list PR" models within multimember districts, which are relatively small, to guarantee better representation of the voters by corresponding representatives (Lijphart, 2002, 2004). Closed-list PR means that parties provide a fixed list of candidates where voters will have to choose a political party rather than a preferred candidate (Lijphart, 2004)[6].

One example, cited by Lijphart, is the Danish model, which recruits PR in small districts with low votes thresholds, as well as compensatory seats, which are

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[5] The New International IDEA Book for 2005 identifies "three broad families of electoral systems in use: plurality/majority systems, proportional systems, and mixed systems. Within these there are nine 'sub-families': First Past the Post (FPTP), Block vote (BV), Party Block vote (PBV), Alternative vote (AV), and the Two-Round System (TRS) are all plurality/majority systems. List Proportional Representation (List PR) and the Single Transferable Vote (STV) are both proportional systems. In addition, Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) and Parallel systems are both examples of the mixed model. In addition, there are other systems such as the Single Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV), the Limited Vote (LV), and the Borda Count (BC) which do not fit neatly into any particular category and can be regarded as three further sub-families"(A. Reynolds et al., 2005)

[6] See (Lijphart, 2004) "Constitutional design for Divided Societies", p. 101, and (Lijphart, 2002) "Wave of Power Sharing Democracies", p.53

granted nationwide for even lower votes' threshold. This can be advantageous for minorities or small political parties, which do not have enough representation at district level, but can muster a nationwide support of dispersed votes among districts (Lijphart, 2004). The model, suggested by Lijphart, obviously works better in an "all minority situation that is the absence of a majority group" (Lijphart, 2002, p.17). In addition, Lijphart criticizes the adoption of semi-PR systems, such as in Lebanon, where the sectarian affiliation of candidates is pre-determined within every electoral district (Lijphart, 2002).

Contenders of consociationalism criticize the over-importance associated to PR. For Horowitz, PR might induce conflict by deepening existing ethnic and sectarian cleavages within and among districts (Horowitz, 2008). To address this issue, Horowitz suggests the use of one of the following; alternative vote (AV), territorial distribution with plurality, or multimember constituencies with communal pre-determined seats, depending on the context and the type of demographic distribution (Horowitz, 2008).

Alternative vote can be considered as "another chance for majoritarian democracy" prescribed by Horowitz for divided societies (Bogaards, 2003, p.61). It requires a limited number of parties on the national level, which can appeal to cross-sectarian cross-territorial votes through moderate programs and slogans. This is particularly criticized by Branden O'Leary who considers AV as just another majoritarian system, which threatens the representation of small minority groups (McEvoy & O'Leary, 2013; McGarry & O'Leary, 2004).

The mechanism by which Horowitz suggests to implement AV is vote pooling, which in essence is a preferential majority voting. Candidates receiving a simple

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majority via preferential votes in one district will be selected, but in case no candidate has a simple majority then the votes for the candidate receiving the least number of votes will be redistributed based on the second voters' preference. This is repeated until one of the candidates has the majority of votes (Bogaards, 2003; Horowitz, 1992, 2008). In heterogeneous districts, this process may encourage candidates to adopt moderate politics in order to appeal to voters from other groups. For this system to work, special care should be granted to the design of the electoral districts.

Further criticism to PR highlights that it does not filter representation in terms of moderation and extremism. It is conceivable that extremist parties would be able to attain representation through PR. This can be due to the lower incentive for moderation during elections, where elites have a higher probability of securing seats for themselves and their parties by appealing to voters on the right of the median voter in a district (Horowitz, 2008). This is more evident in the case of political parties, which represent only one group confound to a homogeneous electoral district. In this case, those parties have no incentive to appeal to cross sectarian voters and would obviously reside to heightening group exclusivity in order to mobilize voters (Selway & Templeman, 2012).

Branden O'Leary mentions that the best implementation of PR is guaranteed ideally when the different groups have equal sizes, while in societies with groups of mixed sizes, additional prerogatives, such as pre-determined quotas which protects the rights of representation of minorities, should be introduced (McEvoy & O'Leary, 2013). Furthermore, empirical research from the study of several transitional elections in

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divided societies provided little evidence that cross-sectarian mobilization and moderation have emerged within such conditions (Bogaards, 2003).

C. Sectarian Identities & Clientelism

In the previous sections, I have discussed the dynamics of power sharing systems and the debates associated with consociationalism. There is no final consensus on which system fits which society. Yet, there is a consensus that a suitable system should enact a wider representation for different constituencies in a divided society. I have also discussed different considerations for electoral laws and the role of elites and political parties. In Lebanon, the role of elites and parties is inextricable from social networks and dynamics within the sectarian and religious strata. In the next section, I examine the literature about clientelism in underdeveloped or emerging countries. I also discuss the elements of identity reinforcement in minority and post-conflict mediums. This supports the overall direction of this research in understanding social and political mobilization enablers and disablers in Lebanon

1. *Sectarian identities and minorities*

The phrase minority group suggests a numerical value for a group, which is less in number as opposed to another group residing in the same space. Hence, "ethnic minorities are numeric minorities in a country" (Bochsler in Kasapovi, 2016, p.174). However, this is not a straightforward definition, especially when a country has several groups of various sizes. When a group is defined as ethnic or sectarian, there is a presumption that this group has a distinct set of characteristics, which sets it apart from other groups. These characteristics can be physical, religious, linguistic or cultural and

the presence of these distinct characteristics, which set a group apart, succumbs to what we call ethnicity. Hence, in essence, an ethnic group can be a majority or minority. Some researches, argue that with globalization and the advancement in communications and networking, ethnic or sectarian identities would be replaced with national identities. Yet, ethnicity appears to be entrenched as our times endure continuous consolidation of ethnic identities (Scott, 1990).

Within the context of state building, according to Dixon and Scott, there remains, among researchers, a primordialist interpretation of ethnicity (Dixon, 2011; Scott, 1990). The major argument is that ethnic identities are natural, constant over time, unchangeable and that people within a group would continue to subscribe to this self-representation indefinitely (Dixon, 2011; Scott, 1990). This rather rigid and static view of ethnic affiliation and identity, among designers of political systems, might be one of the reasons for the failure of power sharing systems, which are presumably seeking for modernization, democratization and an all-inclusive representation in divided societies. The primordialist approach emphasizes that ethnic bonds are built along ties, which justify themselves, not only through the present, but also through the past. History, and historical discourse, contribute to the collective sentiment of subscribing into an ethnicity (Barany, 1998; Scott, 1990).

However, George Scott and Susan Olzak cite another approach to the understanding of ethnic affiliation using the lens of social circumstances. This "circumstantial" view explores how internal or external stimuli affect group solidarity and crystalizes identity as a channel to gain access to resources. In this sense, the

primordialist view is "psychological" and the circumstantial view is "behavioral" (Olzak, 1983; Scott, 1990).

For George Scott, these two views are neither separate nor sufficient to explain ethnic dynamics. Ethnic sentiment can explain the origin of the ethnic identity but cannot explain its maintenance, which in turn can be explained by the circumstances[7] (Scott, 1990). Susan Olzak goes one step further to suggest that the political and economic institutions, in a given context (state or market), are situationally responsible for maintaining ethnic boundaries: "A variety of state functions-including education, civil rights, housing, welfare, taxation and redistribution plans, and quota recruitment systems in official representative bodies-may excite ethnic competition" (Olzak, 1983, p.368).

Finally, Kanchan Chandra, differentiates between "nominal" ethnic identities, which draw parallels with the primordial view, and "activated" ethnic identities drawing parallels with the circumstantial or situational views (Chandra, 2011).

2. *Sectarian mobilization*

In the context of social mobilization theories, subscribing to ethnic or sectarian identities can be regarded as means to gain access to social and economic resources (Al-Haj, 2015; Barany, 1998; Olzak, 1983; Scott, 1990). Ethnic and sectarian mobilization is discussed by several authors, to try and describe its governing mechanisms (see Al-Haj, 2015; Barany, 1998; Fuist, 2013; Olzak, 1983).

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[7] Scott argues that existing ethnic identities are collated and reinforced (and thus maintained) when the group finds itself opposed by another group(s) based on (or because of) its ethnic distinctiveness such as in Lebanon or Ireland. See (Scott, 1990). Olzak maintains the same view through what she coins as the "competitive view" of ethnic mobilization. See (Olzak, 1983).

Susan Olzak defines ethnic mobilization as the "collective action that takes some set of ethnic markers (e.g. skin color, language, territorial identification) as criteria for membership" (Olzak, 1983, p.357). This is inextricable from the political practices in modern states, which promote minority and ethnic politics as an intuitive right (Reilly, 2006). For ethnic or sectarian groups to mobilize, group solidarity is considered a pre requisite. Olzak again defines group solidarity as "the conscious identification with a given ethnic population and includes the maintenance of strong ethnic interaction networks and institutions that socialize new members and reinforce social ties" (Olzak, 1983, p.356). This can be measured vis-à-vis by the strength of networks within a group in so far as this supports the maintenance of cultural distinctiveness such as, but not limited to, language, religion and intragroup marriages (Barany, 1998; Olzak, 1983). Ethnic or sectarian mobilization can take several shapes, such as protest, voting, social movements, political parties and trade unions (Al-Haj, 2015; Barany, 1998; Tarrow, 1998).

There are several perspectives to examine ethnic and sectarian mobilization. These include the reactive approach, the competitive approach and the political opportunity structures (POS) approach (Al-Haj, 2015; Barany, 1998; Olzak, 1983).

The reactive approach describes how shared social contexts such as group discrimination, political marginalization and resource deprivation can represent common grounds for social solidarity and mobilization, per se.

The competitive approach describes the consolidation of group identity and consequently the emergence of certain forms of mobilization, when a group is either competing for access to economic or political resources, or faced by an internal or

external threat, which might jeopardize its material or physical security (Al-Haj, 2015; Barany, 1998). This perspective maintains that sectarian mobilization is not restricted, and can be a feature of both marginalized as well as dominant groups (Al-Haj, 2015; Olzak, 1983). It also does not recognize the primordial view of identity picturing it as a passive state of nature. Instead, the competitive perspective regards group mobilization and group identity as mutually reinforcing (Olzak, 1983; Scott, 1990). Within this context, sectarian groups' militarization can be comprehended as a reaction to external existential threats.

Finally, the POS approach is a recent development in the research around sectarian mobilization in so far analyzing the likelihood of the success of mobilization within an existing set of political institutions or structures. As Sidney Tarrow explains POS refers to "consistent—but not necessarily formal, permanent or national— dimensions of political environment which either encourage or discourage people from using collective action" (Tarrow, 1998, p.19-20). Changes in POS can be favorable for group mobilization, which can also benefit from strong sectarian leadership organizing social movements.

Social Movement Theory (SMT) provides a viable framework for the study of ethnic and sectarian mobilization as it combines the cultural distinctive aspects of groups with the dynamics of POS, identity and group solidarity (Fuist, 2013; Lucas, 2014; Meier, 2015). The three aspects of SMT (context, networks, practices), which I discussed earlier, can be employed to deconstruct the mechanisms of sectarian mobilization. Todd Fuist describes these aspects in relation to culture as sites, resources and social movement (Fuist, 2013). He further explains how some sites or contexts

create the right circumstances for social networks, which result in social mobilization, and consequently, in line with Olzak and Scott, how mobilization then mutually reinforces these networks[8] and allows for the exploitation of the existing POS (Fuist, 2013).

Identity networks allow sectarian mobilization through the creation of a shared meaning towards alleviating shared grievances, compete with other groups for resources or react to an external threat. The presence of strong sectarian leadership allows the organization of groups within structures such as sectarian organizations or political parties. This is the focus of the next section, and is important to understand social mobilization in multi-confessional countries such as Lebanon.

3. *Sectarian leadership and parties*

Leadership, in the form of populist or elitist leadership, is imperative for group mobilization. In the case of sectarian mobilization, which I am concerned with here, a leader from within the group is usually the driver into organizing an apparatus of followers, who in turn organize group mobilization around a shared identity (Barany, 1998). In some conditions, there can be several leaders for one group (Chandra, 2011). Those leaders may climb the ladder of power by virtue of descent or self-attained social status. Most of the times, leaders enjoy both a nominal and an activated sectarian identity (Chandra, 2011). Leaders are also selected from within a group by virtue of social status and ability to represent and strike bargains with other constituencies.

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[8] Fuist refers to the example of religious movements and in particular how churches serve as "intermediate sites", between public and private spheres, fertile for forging social networks and consolidating identity culminating in ethnic mobilization. See (Fuist, 2013)

However, the presence of a monopolistic leader is usually an outcome of a rivalry or consensus among sectarian elites. In all cases, a high level of intra-group rivalry might undermine the ability of a group to effectively mobilize internal support (Barany, 1998)

The organization of sectarian mobilization leads to the formation of sectarian parties. A sectarian party, in essence, is a party, which represents the interests of a sectarian group. In her work, Kanchan Chandra follows an empirical method to define scientifically the parameters and lines over which we can classify a party as ethnic as opposed to multi-ethnic and non-ethnic parties[9]. Political parties can be mapped for example based on name, supporters, constituency of ethnic votes and campaign messages. She argues that any of those indicators, taken individually, falls short from accounting for a holistic ethnic definition of a party, and thus, they have to be used combined.

Chandra explains that an ethnic party, in practice, is characterized by "particularity", "centrality" and "temporality". Particularity means that an ethnic party always seeks the representation of a defined group, which is by default excluding other group or groups. These interests are demonstrated centrally within the claims and campaigns of such a party. Finally, temporality means that a party might change its orientation over time to include or exclude other constituencies (Chandra, 2011). This means that a party might shift gears depending on the context and POS. In the

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[9] Chandra draws on the Constructivist Dataset on Ethnicity and Institutions (CDEI) to define eight indicators, which can be used to map and categorize political parties. These indicators analyze orientation, platform and leaders based on name, campaigns, voter support and proportion of ethnic votes. Hence, a party, which positions itself as representing one exclusive ethnic group, is an ethnic party. A multi ethnic party is a party, which addresses the interests of all ethnic constituencies in a given society, while a non-ethnic party addresses all the constituencies without eluding to any ethnic interest. This will be discussed in further details when analyzing political mobilization in Lebanon. (see Chandra, 2011)

subsequent chapters, I build on Chandra's model to apply on sectarian politics and political parties in Lebanon.

In divided societies, organization around ethnic or sectarian parallels is encouraged as a mechanism which allows different constituencies to be represented in power sharing institutions[10] (Reilly, 2006). This is also a natural tendency, since it is easier for leaders from one group to aggregate support from within their sectarian base. As I have discussed earlier, this provides political leaders and elites with lower incentives to appeal to cross sectarian votes and constituencies (Horowitz, 1992, 2008; Reilly, 2006).

In addition, identity appeal exerts what Chandra calls an "ethnic pull", which is deeper and, seems to be, more significant for individuals than economic or ideological pulls. Governments and law makers, in divided societies, tend to design power sharing systems on the assumption that a sectarian party is by default a uniform block. The nature of the electoral system and the mechanisms chosen to transform votes into representation, define the context within which political contestation takes place. This is further reinforced with political systems which pre-determines seats by sect, or where elections are designed based on small districts with homogenous constituencies and localized political parties (Chandra, 2011; Reilly, 2006). This leads to the political and economic marginalization of individuals and groups which do not choose to subscribe to such a definition, depriving them from access to resources and public goods. In

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[10] The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) encourages the formation of ethnic minority political parties, which compete for representation based on ethnic votes. This is also encouraged by the UN conflict resolution approaches of conflict in divided societies such as Lebanon, Iraq, Kosovo and Bosnia etc... (see Reilly, 2006)

addition, these political representation mechanisms lead to heightened communal polarization and are mutually reinforcing (Horowitz, 2008; Reilly, 2006).

In the aftermath of cycles of violence due to ethnic or sectarian contention, the issues of identity, minorities, political systems and the need for a reconciliatory political approach are extensively reviewed in literature. Reconciliation is deemed necessary in order to create trust within the fragments of war torn societies (J. Clark, 2004; Kachuyevski & Olesker, 2014). In the aftermath of the Arab Uprisings, the topics of religiosity, identity and political representation are gaining more momentum. However, secular parties, considered to be the historical carriers for a sustainable process of democratization, seemingly continue to fail in providing an alternative to religious politics or authoritarian regimes in the Middle East (Boduszyñski et al., 2015).

4. *Clientelism: dynamics & social networks*

Research on social movements is widely concerned with the study of horizontal networks in societies as being essential for mobilization. These horizontal networks usually extend among different constituencies (individuals, groups or institutions), and can be formal or informal (J. Clark, 2004). As much as general social mobilization theories are concerned, they try to explain the mechanisms by which individuals are voluntarily mobilizing by subscribing into a certain collective group. Horizontal networks such as class, ideology, economy or simply ones created due to shared geography, can provide individuals with enough incentives to mobilize (J. Clark, 2004).

Clientelism (or patron-client relationship), on the other hand, is a form of vertical networks. A Clientelist relationship is characterized by being hierarchical, unequal two-way exchange between a patron (independent individuals of higher social or economic status) and a client (dependent individuals or groups of lower social or economic status) (J. Clark, 2004; Eisenstadt & Roniger, 1984; Hodder, 2015; Shami, 2012).

A clientelist relationship is a voluntary one. There is an argument among researches whether clientelism fosters political and social stability or promotes vertical isolation of groups, resulting in the potential exacerbation of political polarization at large, and communal polarization in particular (J. Clark, 2004; Hodder, 2015; Shami, 2012).

In discussing political elites[11], I have eluded to the relationship between elites and individuals within the same sectarian group and the role played by elites in mobilizing individuals. This also applies to the discussion of sectarian leadership[12] and the intra-group networks over nominal or activated identities. Those networks are, by and large, but not exclusively, clientelist in nature. Political, ethnic or sectarian elites exercise power directly via control of resources or indirectly via a "sub-elite", which is usually a large group of second level elites diffusing into different formal and informal institutions of society and the state (Bottomore, 1993). Elites exploit the dependency of the clients and monopolize access to resources, leaving clients with no viable alternatives other than to compete among each other for the support of the patron (Eisenstadt & Roniger, 1984; Shami, 2012).

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[11] See political parties and elites section
[12] See sectarian leadership and parties section

A patron-client system is empirically characterized by being particularistic and diffuse, built over the "simultaneous exchange of different types of resources - above all, instrumental and economic as well as political ones (support, loyalty, votes, protection) on the one hand, and promises of reciprocity, solidarity and loyalty on the other" (Eisenstadt & Roniger, 1984, p.48). In addition, all patron-client systems demonstrate a sense of loyalty and reciprocity. Clients, consolidating around a patron, exhibit solidarity, which in many ways draws parallels with ethnic or sectarian solidarity. Those networks are mostly informal, and in departure with what is generally considered to be formal or legal (Eisenstadt & Roniger, 1984). This implies that consolidated ethnic or sectarian groups, especially in underdeveloped countries, are more prone to develop clientelism as a compensation for the absence of a strong central political authority, and as a collective effort to access resources, which in turn are consolidated around patrons i.e. the strata political elites. Shmuel Eisenstadt cites what he coins as "paradoxical contradictions" within the patron-client relations. Among these contradictions are the persistence of inequality between patrons and clients combined with solidarity and a sense of belonging, as well as a combination of coercion and exploitation by patrons coupled with voluntary subscription by clients[13] (Eisenstadt & Roniger, 1984)

The impact of clientelist social networks on collective action is inextricable from the context, i.e. the society, where they exist. In essence, the political and social structures around these networks might enable or hinder collective action. Mahvish

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[13] Eisenstadt cites Lebanon among the countries with strong clientelism networks, despite attempts at modernization in public institutions and economic reforms. He argues that the persistence of these networks is not undermined by development but rather resides in "other social features" (Eisenstadt & Roniger, 1984, p.204)

Shami argues that clientelism, taken alone, cannot account for the inability of individuals to mobilize over horizontal lines. Her argument is that the patron control of a group of clients does not hinder mobilization, but rather the combination of clientelism and the "isolation" of this particular group is what renders horizontal networks impotent (Shami, 2012). This implies that clientelism does not facilitate large-scale cooperation among various groups of societies and this might have a detrimental impact on state building efforts in highly divided societies.

Several researches have analyzed the impact of clientelism on attempts of political and economic reform, especially in politically underdeveloped and divided societies (Cammett, 2011; Cruz & Keefer, 2015; Hodder, 2015). In those societies, clientelism is identified as a major obstacle hindering development and social equality. Cesi Cruz and Philip Keefer lead an empirical study to demonstrate that in clientelist based societies, patrons or political elites generally resist efforts of institutional reform. They argue that these patrons have no incentive to pursue programs, which foster development since they climb to political power by virtue of the clients' loyalty. Thus, they have no check on their political performance. Case studies examining countries with backwards bureaucratic efficiency, substantiate these conclusions. Politicians in a patron-client system will only seek reforms when they benefit their status and consolidation of power (Cruz & Keefer, 2015). This is especially problematic in countries with divided societies and consolidated sectarian groups within political parties. Political elites will appeal to voters via confessional sentiments rather than promise developmental incentives. In addition, in the absence of electoral programs, elites escape scrutiny by keeping the system flexible and by exercising power within

informal networks. In conclusion, Cruz and Keefer find a significant correlation suggesting that the absence of "programmatic" political parties results in the resistance and persistence of Clientelism (Cruz & Keefer, 2015).

Finally, other researchers such as Rupert Hodder, argue that patronage might as well be an agent of political stability in newly established democracies (Hodder, 2015). Hodder underpins patronage as just another form of existing informal institutions, which along with formal institutions, constitute the functioning apparatus of democracy in many parts of the world: "…patronage is entirely congruent with democratic principles. Clients will work to cultivate in their patrons a sense of trust and a desire to extend support, while patrons who do not meet clients' expectations may lose respect and face opposition" (Hodder, 2015, p.168). According to Hodder, this can lead to the emergence of programmatic political parties. In addition, clientelist networks are so diffuse in many societies, to the extent that their abolishment is practically impossible. Instead, it may be possible to make use of them intertwined within the fabric of state institutions: "…the negative features of patronage (such as corruption, favoritism, and particularism) noted so widely in the literature may reveal something of the energy that propels democracy… As such, these features both stimulate and risk the emergence of formal organizations and democratic patterns" (Hodder, 2015, p.170).

CHAPTER III

RESEARCH METHODOLGY

The central concern of this thesis is the factors that allow political parties in Lebanon to mobilize and recruit citizens. The literature review suggests that social and political mobilization in divided societies are not governed by uniform "one size fits all" type of dynamics.

Consequently, I run an exploratory deductive method in order to produce a typology of the intertwining forces, which reinforce the resilience of the current Lebanese political model and maintain its rigidity against social or political movements seeking reform. I draw on the descriptive analysis of political parties, presented by Kanchan Chandra, by which they are classified into sectarian, multi-sectarian and non-sectarian (or secular) as an entrance to frame political parties as the issues of concern in my research question (Chandra, 2011).

A. Observation: A system of resilience

In the aftermath of the Civil War in Lebanon, peace was restored in 1990 when political elites agreed to the Taef Accord, which draws on conflict resolution literature for divided societies. The Taef Agreement guarantees the institutionalization of what Lijphart coins as a "government by elite cartel" (Lijphart, 1969, p.216) and adopts an accommodative model of power sharing with the intent of rectifying the inequality of representation among Muslims and Christians in Lebanon.

The post-Civil War era was intended as a transitory period between a non-inclusive system before the war and an all-inclusive system, which segregates executive and legislative institutions from ethnic cleavages. Aside from the even distribution among Muslims and Christians in the parliament and first degree civil servant positions, the system was otherwise designed to evolve into a Meritocracy.

The Taef Agreement introduced Article 22 (enacting changing parliamentary system to bicameral by introducing a confessional senate council), and Article 24 (stipulating parity of representation among Muslims and Christians) to guide the transition to abolishing inherited sectarian characteristics in the pre-war system (Maila, 1992). The transition was entrusted to the first parliament to be elected after the Civil War. This is constitutionalized in Article 95, which states that "the first Chamber of Deputies which is elected on the basis of equality between Muslims and Christians takes the appropriate measures to realize the abolition of political confessionalism according to a transitional plan." (ICL - Lebanon—Constitution, 1990). At the time of writing this thesis today, twenty-nine years later, these articles remain unimplemented and the Lebanese political system remains by and large sectarian par excellence.

Since the 1990s, several initiatives in Lebanon tried to introduce reforms to the political system (e.g. electoral law), or to the civil fabric (e.g. civil marriage) (Assaf, 2002; Merhi, 2012; Zuhur, 2002). Those initiatives failed on a background of national debates and fierce opposition from the political and religious strata (Zuhur, 2002). There were several attempts by secular political parties to introduce reform to the electoral and civil laws (Zuhur, 2002). In the aftermath of the Arab uprisings, there has been a lack of new efforts to drive mobilization within the Lebanese political system

towards modernity and better representation. Public movements of contestation such as "You Stink" in 2015 were able to mobilize cross-sectarian support (Owens, 2015; Zogby, 2014). However, mobilization was obstructed and came to an end in 2016 due to a combination of state oppression and counter narratives (Geha, 2019a, 2019b; Kraidy, 2016).

From these observations, I derive my research questions. How can the theories of social mobilization contribute to explaining the inability of secular parties to mobilize people in Lebanon in the post-Taef era? Why are secular political parties not able to mobilize for social change in Lebanon? And what are the underlying factors for the rigidity and resilience of the Lebanese political system?

B. Literature Synthesis

Literature review on consociationalism suggests contested views over the stability of power sharing systems. The consociational theory appears to be insensitive to nuances, which, as Donald Horowtiz and others have explained, might reinforce vertical silos, promote extremism and heighten sectarian identity activation. In addition, elites are expected to exercise statesmanship and prudence, which many times proves to be farfetched, as elites subscribe into "sectarian outbidding" and promote "elections by census" (Dixon, 2011; Horowitz, 1992, 2008; Lijphart, 1969, 2002, 2002; Selway & Templeman, 2012).

Political parties in divided societies are vehicles for group exclusivity and mobilizing sectarian voting. Joel Selway and Kharis Templeman discuss the impact of sectarian polarization exercised by elites to mobilize voters. There is little evidence that

divided societies are able to transition into cross-confessional moderate politics after adopting consociational models (Bogaards, 2003; Deschouwer, 2006; Deschouwer & Luther, 1999; Selway & Templeman, 2012; Sinardet, 2010). I have also discussed the concepts of group solidarity as a prerequisite for sectarian mobilization (Al-Haj, 2015; Barany, 1998; Olzak, 1983; Scott, 1990). Both, the circumstantial and POS approaches, shed the light on how confessional groups mobilize to access resources within the Lebanese system.

In addition, the literature around electoral systems suggests that, in divided societies, Duverger's mechanical and psychological effects might be impacted by identity politics, which can be more potent drivers of partisanship and voting behaviors. Furthermore, elites seek the adaptation of the electoral process to their agendas, and thus, guarantee a high level of certainty in favorable poll results (Benoit, 2004, 2006; Duverger, 1951, 1959; Rae, 1971). In Lebanon, between the elections of 1992 and 2009, the majoritarian electoral law has been repeatedly subject to continued contestations among elites, resulting in continuous adaptation, which many times rendered the election process inefficient.

There exists a plethora of literature around patron-client relationships (J. Clark, 2004; Eisenstadt & Roniger, 1984; Hodder, 2015; Shami, 2012). This literature review demonstrates correlations between clientelism and sectarian mobilization in divided societies. Patrons contribute to the polarization and isolation of confessional components and promote narratives, which strengthen nominal and activated communal identities. In essence, social and political informal and formal networks in many divided societies, such as Lebanon, are clientelist in nature. The persistence of these clientelist

networks cannot be accounted for without factoring in sectarian forms of political

engagement (Eisenstadt & Roniger, 1984). This research, also, identifies the literature,

which establishes a strong correlation between clientelism and the lack of reform in

underdeveloped countries and divided societies (Cammett, 2011; Cruz & Keefer, 2015;

Hodder, 2015). Cruz and Keefer explain how political elites resist reform and control

access to resources and public goods in order to impact political mobilization.

Consequently, political campaigns tend to run merely on the ground of communal

social, economic and cultural programs and result in the reinforcement of already

existing ascriptive patron-client relationships between elites and voters. This leads to

the political and economic marginalization of individuals and groups which do not

choose to subscribe to such a definition, depriving them from access to resources and

public goods, which otherwise is possible should they adopt an activated confessional

identity (Horowitz, 2008; Reilly, 2006).

Since 1992, electoral laws in Lebanon were designed to serve the hegemony of

the existing ruling elites, and block any serious attempt to replace the existing political

structure and bureaucracy (Haddad, 2010; Salloukh, 2006). Under these conditions,

secular political parties are not able to reach a critical mass needed in the parliament to

drive a change in the political system and consequently, the social and economic

manifestations of sectarian politics. Furthermore, in a clientelist political system,

sectarian political parties and their elites control access to resources and public goods

deeming them (i.e. sectarian elites) more efficient in mobilizing partisanship and

political engagement (J. A. Clark & Salloukh, 2013).

In the post-Taef era, repeated elections in Lebanon seem to have deepened sectarian tensions leaving "no desire for communal coexistence in a unitarian polity" (Haddad, 2010, p.78). As a byproduct, secular political parties in Lebanon find themselves facing one of three options. First option is to align with the sect of which it is the major component (Progressive Social Party – PSP aligned with Druz ethnicity) (Richani, 1998). Second option is to align with another sectarian hegemonic party (Syrian Social Nationalist Party - SSNP aligned with pro-Syrian sectarian parties) (El Khazen, 2003), or finally, become politically marginalized (Communist Party – CP) (El Khazen, 2003; Richani, 1998).

Anton Törnberg develops a model to explain how Meso and Micro levels of society networks function within an institutional frame and an existing political opportunity structure (Törnberg, 2018). The POS impact on social and political mobilization is thoroughly discussed by Sidney Tarrow, who argues that social mobilization is inextricable from the nature of the existing POS (Tarrow, 1998). The literature examining the often failure of social mobilization in divided societies suggests that horizontal and vertical delineations, competitive veto points, clientelism and activated communal identities are among the most important factors which undermine efforts for reform (Bogaards, 2003; J. Clark, 2004; Cruz & Keefer, 2015; Vráblíková, 2014).

C. Proposition

In order to answer my research questions: Why secular political parties in Lebanon seem to be not able to mobilize for social and political change? And what are

the factors which allow political parties in Lebanon to mobilize, include and recruit citizens? I formulate a proposition based on my observations and subsequent literature review, using the traditional model of scientific research.

The literature suggests a correlation between party mobilization, clientelism and elite domination in divided societies. Electoral laws in Lebanon, designed and influenced by sectarian elites on favorable district distribution, potentially fragment the power of representation of secular parties and treat them as a group of minorities. Drawing on Duverger's psychological characteristics of political polarization, voters in Lebanon favor sectarian parities but probably as a consequence of clientelist networks which control access to resources.

To answer my research questions, **I propose that secular political parties in Lebanon are not able to mobilize the public due to lack of access to institutions and public services mutually reinforced by the resilience of sectarian identities**.

Secular political parties in Lebanon address all constituencies irrespective of communal and religious identities. However, they seem to have little effect in mobilizing the masses behind overarching cross-sectarian goals, such as civil marriage or non-territorial proportional electoral laws.

The resilience of this model of politics resides in a vicious circle (figure 2, p.58) involving: power/access to resources, political elites/clients, sectarian electoral laws and activated religious identities. As a result, secular political parties in Lebanon lack partisan engagement and are unable to reach a critical mass in government institutions. Consequently, they are either marginalized or annexed to a sectarian power.

D. Theoretical Framework

In developing a theoretical framework, I have examined the social mobilization theories identifying potential parallels with the goal of studying the mechanisms of political and social change in a country like Lebanon.

Social Identity Theory (SIT) focuses on the collective action of the constituents of society by drawing on class struggle (K. J. Reynolds et al., 2013). On the other hand, Social Dominance Theory (SDT) approaches social change from the lens of the dominant elite. SDT seeks to explain why a system remains stable under seemingly unbalanced conditions, and takes into account both individual values and elite manipulation. (K. J. Reynolds et al., 2013). Social Justification Theory (SJT) emphasizes the conditions under which an exploited community might seek the preservation of the status quo, acting against their own interest. In divided societies, this theory can explain why a contest between identity and class can cripple social mobilization (K. J. Reynolds et al., 2013). Finally, Social Movements theory (SMT), utilizes societal networks in the context of an institution, or a system of institutions, in order to study the mechanisms of public contention. SMT observes social movements in the light of the context, the networks and the practices of mobilization. The context represents the structure within which a political opportunity might emerge. Networks are formal and informal channels of societal exchange, while practices describe how people mobilize trying to either preserve or change an existing set of norms (Lucas, 2014; Meier, 2015).

SIT is not suitable as a theoretical framework as its approach to the dynamics of social change does not take into account vertical divisions in society. SDT and SJT

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can be employed to analyze elite domination and public justification for the status quo

respectively. Yet, both frameworks are not able alone to encompass all the elements of

the vicious circle of political mobilization in Lebanon. In contrast, Social Movements

Theory (SMT) provides a viable framework for the study of political mobilization in

Lebanon as it combines the cultural and sectarian distinctive aspects of groups with the

dynamics of POS, identity and group solidarity (Fuist, 2013; Lucas, 2014; Meier, 2015).

The three aspects of SMT (context, networks, practices) can be employed to deconstruct

the mechanisms of political practice in Lebanon and address the research questions by

testing the proposition. Further analysis can be drawn from the concepts of SDT and

SJT.

The vicious circle of Political Mobilization

Figure 2 Illustration of the elements of the vicious circle of political mobilization in Lebanon

E. Data sources and Operationalization

Data sources comprise an extensive literature review, which encompasses more than 100 sources including academic articles and books, reference volumes, newspaper articles and data archives. The bibliography covers a wide range of academic views and theories, which addresses the key elements relevant to this research.

Major topics include: social mobilization theories, power sharing systems, electoral design, electoral laws and results, political parties, sectarian framing and mobilization, patron-client relationships and political elites. In this research, I strive to examine opposite views and debates in an effort to synthesize a meaningful conclusion and reduce bias. Data sources encompass both local and global resources, where I attempt to test my proposition on the background of the study of similar political systems.

To operationalize my proposition, the lenses of clientelism, access to , sectarian identity, electoral laws and election results are used to examine mobilization, in the form of voting behavior, as a dependent variable. My proposition is examined by applying the SMT model:

• Context: accommodative structures and institutions, electoral laws

• Networks: clientelism, access to resources, political parties

• Practices: political mobilization, voting behavior

In her work, Chandra follows an empirical method to define scientifically the parameters and lines over which we can classify a party as sectarian as opposed to multi-sectarian and non-sectarian parties. Political parties can be mapped, for example, based on name, supporters, constituency of votes and campaign messages (Chandra,

2011). Drawing on Chandra's work, I argue that most of the political parties in Lebanon are either sectarian or multi-sectarian. In the subsequent chapters, I map the political parties in Lebanon to demonstrate that the only few parties qualify today as non-sectarian, such as the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP) and the Lebanese Communist Party (LCP).

I use the literature review to construct the Lebanese political model over the three elements of SMT. Then I analyze election results, votes and distribution of seats among sectarian and secular political parties and groups in the elections of 2000, 2005 & 2009. I finally conduct a synthesis which allows combining SMT elements and quantitative election results to demonstrate that secular political parties are neither able to reach a critical mass in the legislative nor to mobilize political activism in Lebanon.

F.   Limitations and Bias

This research does not factor in the study of potential structural weaknesses and fragmentations within secular political parties. In addition, I count on limited research towards mapping political parties in Lebanon. Driving a solid categorization of sectarian and non-sectarian political parties poses strains on the definition, and might not account for additional views on the usage of terms such as "secular", "sect" and "sectarian".

Challenges from using the literature review include an inherited limitation of inclusiveness. Relevant literature might be overlooked and therefore potential "other" views and research may not be included within this thesis. In addition, limiting the quantitative analysis to the election results between 2000 and 2009 can impact the

thoroughness and generalization of the conclusion. Finally, I account for my personal biases and political views as potentially impacting the direction of the research and the synthesis of resources.

CHAPTER IV

CONTEXT: POLITICAL STRUCTURE IN LEBANON

In this chapter, I examine the context of the Lebanese political system. Within SMT, understanding the context is imperative to define the type of political opportunity structure within which political mobilization can take place. I first discuss accommodative power sharing in Lebanon tracking its development in the post-Taef era. Then I analyze the electoral design for the consecutive elections after Taef.

A. Accommodative Power Sharing in Lebanon 1920-1990

The approach to the history of Lebanon has always been subject to argumentation. It is not possible, until the moment, to find a unified version that might bring satisfaction to all the parties involved. This lies at the heart of the eternal Lebanese question of identity and belonging. Lebanon, as a state, in its current borders did not exist before 1920. It was created along the lines of these borders against the will of many of its people, especially the Muslims, and placed under the French mandate (Traboulsi, 2007). The Muslim component in the newly born state expressed dissatisfaction with the proclaimed borders and demanded reunification with greater Syria, while the Christians, mainly Maronites, demanded an independent state (Traboulsi, 2007).

Halim Barakat explains that Lebanon is a mosaic[14] and not a pluralistic society based on criteria, which characterizes heterogeneous societies (Barakat, 1973). In both mosaic and pluralistic societies, there are several provisions, which make sure no one group monopolizes the political scene. In pluralistic societies, there is generally an agreement on fundamental issues facing society while mosaic societies often lack this agreement[15] (Barakat, 1973). The first constitution of Lebanon under the French Mandate was stipulated in 1926. The System was presidential and it gave a clear advantage to the Christian component in the newly born state (Salem, 1998). Under the 1926 constitution, the president, informally agreed on to be Christian, was vested wide and irreversible powers, and the parliamentary deputies' ratio was Christian 6: Muslims 5. This distribution of power was linked to the census of 1932[16], which has shown that Christians exceeded Muslims in numbers of population[17]. However, many of the researchers in later decades, and especially towards the end of the twentieth century,

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[14] There are 18 official sects recognized in Lebanon among Christians, Muslims and Jews. Christians include: Maronites, Greek orthodox, Greek Catholics, Armenian Orthodox, Armenian Catholics, Syriac orthodox, Syriac Catholics, eastern Nestorians, Chaldeans, Evangelicals, Copts and Latins. Among Muslims: Sunnis, Shiites, Druze, Alawits, Ismailis. (Barakat, 1973; Fakhoury, 2009; Salamey, 2014)

[15] Based on Barakat Lebanon is a mosaic society due to the following characteristics (Barakat, 1973):
1. Lack of consensus on fundamentals.
2. Lack of extensive and open dialogue.
3. Private loyalties and interests dominate public loyalties and interests.
4. Geographical concentration of different religious communities.
5. Non-separation of religion from the state and legitimization of confessionalism.
6. Absence of a unified educational system.
7. The existence of conflicting reference

[16] The last population census in Lebanon was conducted in 1932 under the French Mandate. The census showed that Christians exceeded Muslims in the ratio of six to five (population was 793,426). In 1973, the Lebanese Parliament was composed of 99: 30 seats for Maronites, 20 for Sunnis, 19 for Shi'i, 11 for Greek Orthodox, six for each of Greek Catholics and Druze, four for Armenian Orthodox, and one for each of Armenian Catholics, Protestants and other minorities. (See Barakat 1973)

[17] The 1932 Census showed that Maronites are 29%, Sunnis 22%, and Shi'ites 20% (Haddad, 2009; Salamey, 2014)

estimate that the number of Muslims have exceeded that of Christians in Lebanon (Barakat, 1973; Fakhoury, 2009; Ghossain, 1988).

The birth of the Lebanese state, in its current form, in 1920 was part of a critical period in the political and economic history of the region and the world. These circumstances laid the foundation for a state ruled and controlled, by and large, by Christians, and more specifically the Maronites. A status that was contested, since the beginning, by a considerable number of the citizens in the new state or "*Keyan*". Many in Lebanon believed they are part of an Arab Nation, but later accepted this coexistence institutionalized in the National Pact in 1943: an informal agreement between the Maronite President and the Sunni Prime Minister (Barakat, 1973; Bogaards, 2019; Fakhoury, 2009, 2015; Haddad, 2009). In fact, the National Pact in 1943 did not necessarily enjoy grassroots advocacy, let alone the support of marginalized factions especially, but not solely, the Shiite constituency. In essence, Halim Barakat explains that the "…institutionalization of confessionalism was introduced through the National Pact of 1943 which has made religious membership as the most important criterion for recruitment." (Barakat, 1973 p. 315). Some researchers consider the National Pact in 1943 to be the beginning of power sharing in Lebanon (Bogaards, 2019; Salamey, 2009). Others, like Marie Zahar, tracks it back to *Mutassarifiyya* times in the 19th century (Zahar, 2005).

The formula of power sharing in Lebanon is constantly subject to system level strains. Events, such as the 1958 civil upheaval, served as a demonstration of the sensitivity of the intricate sectarian balance on a background of regional and global political balance among states (Hudson, 1976; Rabil, 2011). The 1975 brutal Civil War

marked the breakdown of the system and laid a heavy shadow on this formula and its ability to survive (Lijphart, 2004; Salem, 1998).

By 1990, the Civil War has been stirring in Lebanon for around 15 years with unsurmountable horizontal and vertical devastation of social, political and physical infrastructures. However, the same period witnessed major international and regional events such as the end of the Cold War and the start of the Arab-Israeli peace process. Under these circumstances, the Taef Agreement (officially known as The Document of National Accord) came into light after the surviving 62 Lebanese deputies of the 1972 chamber (elected before the Civil War)[18] met in the city of Taef in Saudi Arabia between 30 September and 22 October 1989.

The Taef Accord brought institutionalization to the National Pact, that was a gentleman's agreement between Muslim Prime Minister and Christian President in1943 (Fakhoury, 2009). In many ways, the Taef agreement and the National Pact can be described paradoxically as representing the formal versus informal manifestations of accommodation (Bogaards, 2019). Arend Lijphart explains, as mentioned earlier, that informal agreements can be indeed the stronger aspect of stability in power sharing (Lijphart, 2002, 2004). While Lijphart explains that sectarian pre-determination is one of the weaknesses of accommodative power sharing in Lebanon (Lijphart, 2002), Matthijs Bogaards considers that pre-determination is mostly effective and prevalent in Lebanon due to its informal nature. Bogaards goes even further to consider that this informal nature of accommodation is what makes the Lebanese system very hard to change (Bogaards, 2019).

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[18] The legitimacy and moral authority of the deputies of the chamber of 1972 representing the Lebanese people in Taef is scrutinized. For more on that see Fakhoury 2009; p.168 and Karam 2012; p.37.

B. Accommodative Power Sharing in Lebanon under the Taef Accord

The Taef constitutional adjustments were meant as an enhanced version of the 1926 constitution, and aim at institutionalizing the informal agreements within the 1943 National Pact (Karam, 2012; Maila, 1992; Ofeish, 1999). As we have seen in the literature review, scholars in the second half of the 20th century increasingly focused on the study of ethnic and sectarian conflicts, and the basis on which a democracy might be founded in divided societies. This has been marked with the development of the "Consociationalists school" which recognized power-sharing systems as a type of democracy (Fakhoury, 2009). The post-Civil War update to the accommodative system relies on a theoretical background of the many power sharing political and social scientists such as Arend Lijphart, Donald Horowtiz, Paul Dixon and Branden O'Leary.

For Lijphart, Lebanon was a highly acceptable form of democracy until the break of the Civil War in 1975. Lijphart notes that there was a reasonable level of conciliation between the sectarian factions. He adopts the notion that the outbreak of Civil War can be largely attributed to external factors rather than drawing on mere internal factors of division, misrepresentation of the masses, and a high sense of social and economic inequality (Lijphart, 2004). Furthermore, Lijphart explains that the power sharing system is not to be blamed, but rather failures are a mischief inflicted by choosing and implementing unsuitable policies by law makers (Lijphart, 2002).

While the debate over the reasons of the 1975 Civil War remains an open topic (Fakhoury, 2009), Ohannes Geukjian notes that Lijphart fails to account for the role of external forces in supporting the stability of a consociational or accommodative system (Geukjian, 2016). Simon Haddad equally maintains that accommodative political

institutions may not be able to prohibit violence and that foreign interference is required (Haddad, 2009). Additionally, Donald Horowitz views a different fundamental problem with the consociational or accommodative system in the adoption of what he calls the "warlords peace", where power sharing is negotiated among elites who are only ready for coalescence as much as it guarantees a tactical advantage and not really concerned with promoting moderation in exercising power (Horowitz, 2008).

I analyze some of the aspects of the Taef Agreement, from a text perspective, to portray the institutional context of social and political mobilization in post-war Lebanon. The agreement is divided into 3 parts (ICL - Lebanon—Constitution, 1990): the first is a preamble, while the second presented modifications to the body of the existing constitution. The third part is a general section, while not embodied within the constitution, serves as a guideline to various important policies including the relationship between Syria and Lebanon.

The preamble was added to the constitution for the first time, as the Lebanese constitution never had one. It was meant to set the basis for the foundation of the new republic of Lebanon (Salem, 1998). Questions like Sovereignty, identity and the general spirit of the political and economic system were addressed in this constitutional preface. The preamble also underpinned the foundations of the new accommodative power sharing in Lebanon. Clause 'b' introduced a major change to the National Pact of 1943 by stipulating the identity of Lebanon as an Arab state as opposed to having an Arab face. Clauses 'c' and 'e' transformed the presidential nature of the republic into parliamentary based on "respect for public liberties, especially the freedom of opinion and belief, and respect for social justice and equality of rights" and established upon

"the principle of separation, balance, and cooperation". It is noteworthy that Arend Lijphart recognizes the difficulties law makers might face when addressing the topics of civil rights and social justice in a power sharing system (Lijphart, 2004).

The authors of the Taef Agreement set an ambitious goal of abolishing the confessional political system in clause 'h'. Nevertheless, they fail to link it to a timeline (Maila, 1992; Norton, 1991). Finally, clause 'j' declared that the highest norm is the "pact of communal coexistence" without which "no constitutional legitimacy for any authority" can exist. In Salem's words "…although the presidential character of the system was completely overhauled, the coalitional and confessional aspects of the system remained intact" (Salem, 1998 p.15).

Examining the main body of the new constitution, reveals that 31 articles in the 1926 constitution were amended, either partially or completely. In essence, the new constitution marked the transition from a presidential system to a rather collegial one, as most of the prerogatives of the president were transmitted to the council of ministers or, in best cases, shared. These amendments mount to enhance the confessional and accommodative characteristics of the system as far as they create what was accepted as a better form of power sharing (Articles 17, 18, 44, 49, 53, 54, 56, 64 and 69).

After 1990, most of the executive powers of the President were to be shared with the Prime Minister, who also countersigns all the president's decrees. On the other hand, the position of Speaker of the Parliament was reinforced by prolonging his term from one to four years. In the post-Taef years, the distribution of power over the three major positions in the state resulted in what was called the "Troika" (Ofeish, 1999; Salem, 1998). Over time, the concentration of power in the Troika marginalized the

intended inclusive and collegial features of the Council of Ministers and the Chamber of

Deputies, and resulted in recurrent political deadlock which crippled the government

whenever a dispute erupted among the ruling Troika (Ofeish, 1999; Salem, 1998; Zahar,

2005). This only deepened sectarian polarizations and reinforced vertical lines among

different factions in post-war Lebanon.

Among the articles of special interest are articles 19, 22, 24, 69 and 95. The

establishment of the Constitutional Council in Article 19 to "supervise the

constitutionality of laws and to arbitrate conflicts that arise from parliamentary and

presidential elections" is an implementation of Lijphart's recommendation to create

balance and check over the potential exploitation of power (Lijphart, 2004). This is in

alignment with the spirit discussed earlier in the preamble as "…it introduces reforms to

support the consolidation of the Lebanese state and national institutions" (Karam, 2012,

p.36). In reality, political polarization and deep sectarian divisions often rendered the

constitutional council inactive[19].

Article 24 introduced parity between Christians and Muslims in the number of

parliament deputies. Under the new constitution, the President can no longer force the

council of ministers to resign, and Article 69 postulated the conditions under which

such a resignation is deemed in force. What is of special concern here is clause 'b',

which considered the council of ministers resigned "if it loses more than a third of the

members specified in the decree forming it". The issue of the "one third guarantee" *(Al-*

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[19] Among the many articles in local news about the failure of the constitutional council you can see "Constitutional Council fails to convene once more." Daily Star Lebanon NA (2013).
http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Politics/2013/Jun-18/220762-constitutional-council-fails-to-convene-once-more.ashx (accessed Oct 9, 2019).

Thuluth Al-Dhamin) became a matter of continuous political polarization and added to the complexity of reaching an agreement among the sectarian groups[20].

Article 95 stated that "The first Chamber of Deputies which is elected on the basis of equality between Muslims and Christians takes the appropriate measures to realize the abolition of political confessionalism according to a transitional plan". This goal is central to the reform intended in the new constitution by transferring confessional representation to the Senate articulated in Article 22. At the time of writing this research, neither of the two articles have been implemented.

In the special section of the Taef Agreement, the electoral law explicitly declares the "*Muhafaza*" as the administrative district as opposed to the smaller district of "*Caza*" in the 1960 electoral law. This formula was generally disregarded since the very first electoral law of 1992, as I elaborate in later sections. In essence, the "implementation of the accord turned out to be selective and controversial, leading to an increase in discord in a highly segmented Lebanese society." (Haddad, 2009 p.404)

The post-Taef era, albeit seemingly a democracy, demonstrated many of the characteristics of an oligarchy and a protectorate, and many of the politicians sought to subscribe into this oligarchy (Salem, 1998). Fakhoury and Haddad consider that offering legitimization for warlords by the Taef Agreement, and integrating them as new political players, made it harder to create a new start for the political system, as well as create a dysfunctional political reconciliation (Fakhoury, 2009; Haddad, 2009).

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[20] Bogaards considers that the violence of May 2008, which lead to the Doha agreement, was yet another episode of sectarian polarization in the absence of the mutual veto invoked within the Taef constitution. The reestablishing of the one third share of the 8 March Alliance (back then the opposition) was the exit to reach a settlement (see Bogaards 2019)

Furthermore, Fakhoury mentions four major dilemmas for accommodative democracy in post-Taef Lebanon (Fakhoury, 2017). First, Internal and external threats are not divided equally among communities, which made it easier to polarize along sectarian lines. Second, changing demographics and introverted communal relations with low incentives for moderation from within the system. Third, Political elites lack of coalescence behavior, which makes them vulnerable to external intervention, and fourth the lack of "arbitration mechanisms" which can play critical roles in the separation of powers and broker deals among communal elites (Fakhoury, 2017). In Salem's words Lebanon "standing as a constitutional system is questioned by the general disregard of the highest officials of government for the constitution and for the rule of law in general" (Salem, 1998, p.25)

C. Weak State-Strong System Paradox

Salamey argues that the implementation of corporate sectarian power sharing in Lebanon with a coalition among many sects, each with veto power over government decisions, necessarily led into a weak and deeply divided state (Salamey, 2009). At the same time, this allowed political elites to consolidate power and create a deeply complex system of political clientelism based on harvesting increasing sectarian isolation at the base, and elite negotiation at the top (Salamey, 2009).

The Lebanese political system has always been rigid and resistant to change due to each of the constituencies trying to preserve the status quo, and for fear of "upsetting the political system" (Barakat, 1973 p. 306). Political modernization stumbles upon the traditional building blocks of the Lebanese society. The primordial

self-representation and understanding of identity is dominant in Lebanon (Barakat, 1973; Hudson, 1976). This view of social ties through the lens of kinship, family and religious bonds implies that politics and political parties behave as a function of personal rivalries. Politics in Lebanon is the politics of the sect and not the politics of the nation.

Political parties in Lebanon do not spread across the nation, but rather rely on communal and sectarian support focused within geographies. These sectarian rivalries are transferred within the walls of the parliament hindering cooperation and marking alliances as temporary and opportunistic (Barakat, 1973). These dynamics undermine the power of the central government and delegates its prerogatives to sectarian elites. Another reason for the weakness of the central government might be the inflexibility of the institutionalization of accommodative power sharing in Lebanon (Lijphart, 2002). The paradox lies in that, while assuming that informal rules are easier to change than formal rules, informal rules in Lebanon seem to be hosting the arena of communal accommodative balance and, consequently, are harder to change (Bogaards, 2019; Salamey, 2009).

The Taef Agreement, intended to create a more stable power sharing system, ended up providing a "static power-sharing equation" which added to the rigidity of the system (Fakhoury, 2009 p.175). In addition, the post-Taef accommodative system became a sort of "exclusionary consociational authoritarianism" by excluding certain political groups from the balance of power (Fakhoury, 2009 p. 170), and by applying a sectarian quota in official public offices which do not respond to neither demographic nor political changes (Salamey & Payne, 2008)

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In terms of promoting personal rights, especially political rights of

mobilization, the post-Taef system in Lebanon denies individuals and civil institutions

the right to revise the Constitutional Council. At the same time, it grants that right to

religious heads of sectarian communities (Fakhoury, 2009; Ofeish, 1999). In many

ways, while the formal constitution promotes the individual political flexibility, it

reinforces in practice the informal grip of sectarian institutions allowing them to

confiscate the individual will to mobilize upon a free political choice.

According to Fakhoury, the limitations of the current sectarian political system

in Lebanon can be attributed to three major dilemmas: the inclination of the

accommodative formula to deadlock, the prominence of global and regional

intervention in the political life and its non-responsiveness to grassroots demands

(Fakhoury, 2019).

D. Electoral Design in Post-Taef Lebanon

In divided societies, consociationalists, such as Arend Lijphart, recommend

proportional representation (PR), in particular closed-list PR models with multimember

small districts, as the best electoral design (Lijphart, 1969, 2002, 2004). As I have

elaborated in the literature review, there is a debate whether PR provides for a more

stable power sharing as opposed to deepening sectarian cleavages. Donald Horowitz

suggest Alternative Vote (AV) through vote pooling as a better system. In divided

societies with heterogeneous districts, this might encourage political elites to adopt

moderate politics, in order to appeal to voters from other communal groups (Horowitz,

1992, 2008). On the other hand, the best implementation of PR is guaranteed

presumably when the different groups in a fragmented society, have equal sizes. In societies with sects of mixed sizes, additional prerogatives, such as pre-determined quotas, should be introduced (McEvoy & O'Leary, 2013).

The last electoral law before Taef was the law of 1960, which takes the *Caza* as the main electoral district. In the Taef constitution a law based on the *Muhafaza*, a bigger electoral district, is recommended. Joseph Maila notes that this is intended for the creation of larger lists, which can address a diversified public from different sects (Maila, 1992). The Taef constitution preserves the ballot list with predetermined sectarian distribution of seats, and seems unequipped for the abolition of sectarianism. In Maila's words, "electoral law is one of the most important instruments of social integration. In the project of Taef, however, it is considered as a simple mechanism which allows for communal representation." (Maila, 1992, p.68).

Elections in Lebanon after Taef took place five times between 1992 and 2010. Electoral laws were changed and manipulated, each time, to ensure political elites have a favorable result, based on sectarian distribution (Fakhoury, 2009; Salamey, 2009, 2014). The laws of 1992, 1996, 2000 and 2005 were hybrid laws, which combined both small and medium sized districts, while the 2009 elections were run based on the 1960 law of the *Caza*. In 1992, the electoral law was engineered fostering sectarian inequality (Fakhoury, 2009). The number of seats were increased from 108, as stipulated by Taef, to 128 in order to ensure the share of favored elite groups. In addition, the law adopted the *Muhafaza* in Beirut, the North and the South and the *Caza* in Bekaa and Mount Lebanon (Fakhoury, 2009). This process was repeated in each election in different combinations and after lengthy pre negotiations among political elites. The aim was to

ensure the best outcome for the ruling sectarian oligarchy through gerrymandering[21] (Salamey, 2014). When there is no agreement, elections turn into a matter of National dispute which many times threatens the integrity of the democratic process.

Block vote is the general rule used in the Lebanese elections until 2009. The voters could vote for an entire list (Straight Block Vote), take out some candidates from the list (Partial Block Vote) or vote for candidates from competing lists (Mixed Block Vote). There were no official printed ballots, which meant that voters were subject to pre-printed lists by political groups and parties, mainly sectarian (Salamey, 2014). Block vote and hybrid electoral districts as mechanical effects, triggered psychological effects of how political parties campaigned in elections, and consequently how voters behaved. This is a central element in this research, as I demonstrate in chapter VI.

Electoral laws impact the political positioning and behavior of political groups and elites. It can also impact alliances and coalitions by providing incentives for a certain political behavior (Horowitz, 2008; A. Reynolds et al., 2005). As Andrew Reynolds puts it, the representation process should be descriptive in the sense that the elected body should reflect a faithful mirroring of the voters. When a considerable percentage of voters is not able to achieve any single seat in an elected legislative for example, then, there is a doubt in the representative nature of the political system. This can only be attained through a properly designed electoral system (A. Reynolds et al., 2005). In the case of elections in Lebanon after Taef, there has been an increasing

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[21] One example of gerrymandering is the Baabda-Aley district in the elections of 2000. Aley (predominantly Druze) is combined with Baabda (predominantly Christian) allowing the slight majority of the Druze voters to decide on all the elected MPs including the Christian MPs. This example is also applicable in the South with the majority of the Shiite Votes and Beirut with majority Sunni Votes where all seats are determined with no consideration to communal constituencies (see Salamey, 2014)

disillusion in the effectiveness of exercising the right to vote due to the continuous

manipulation and engineering of the electoral law reflected in lower participation rates

and polarized voter behaviors.

In post-conflict divided societies, such as in post-Taef Lebanon, there is a need

to adopt a transparent electoral policy, which allows maximum representation and

inclusion (A. Reynolds et al., 2005). However, in reality, the political process of the

electoral system was characterized by lack of transparency and elite alliances, which

disregard communal nuances and aim at discouraging the rotation of political power

(Fakhoury, 2009). The electoral engineering was employed by sectarian elites as

mechanisms to preserve their control over the system, preserve its clientelist nature and

block any attempt to move away from sectarianism by disempowering secular groups

(Fakhoury, 2009; Salamey, 2014).

Kenneth Benoit explains that the direct consequences of the mechanical effect

of an electoral law, which provides less chances for certain political groups (or parties)

to reach the legislature, is a function of the voters' behavior (Benoit, 2006). By

employing Duverger's concept of polarization and psychological effect of electoral

laws, we realize that electoral laws in Lebanon, built on sectarian favorable district

formation, fragmented the power of representation of secular parties and independents,

and undermined their representation (Salamey, 2009). Over time, and recurrent

elections under the same conditions, voters who support secular parties have realized

that their votes are wasted. Factoring in the polarization of the system by sectarian

elites, consolidating power within their confessional groups and engaging in sectarian

slogans and monopolizing the representation of their sects, this made voters organically

bonded with their corresponding sectarian elites and increasingly identifying with them as points of access to the system (Salamey, 2009).

Electoral laws are considered as "one of the most important institutional decisions for any democracy" (A. Reynolds et al., 2005. p.1) and have a critical impact on the political life and its future. Therefore, electoral laws should be carefully chosen, and not made subject to frequent change. Short-term gains and power consolidation tactics by political elites often have detrimental effects on the long-term integrity of the system and the development of a healthy political culture (A. Reynolds et al., 2005).

CHAPTER V

NETWORKS: CLIENTELIST EXCHANGE, POLITICAL PARTIES AND SECTARIANISM

In the previous chapter, we have seen how the context of the Lebanese political system is forged based on sectarian distribution of power among confessional elites. This is achieved through various technics of electoral engineering, opportunistic alliances and sectarian entrenchment. Social Mobilization Theory examines social networks within a political context to describe and anticipate political and social behavior. In this chapter, I discuss the networks of social and political exchange in Lebanon focusing on clientelism, access to resources and political parties.

A. Origins of Clientelism in Lebanon

During the 19th century, Mount Lebanon was ruled by feudal families (*Muqata'ji*) who secured control over land and peasants in return for taxes paid to the Ottoman authorities. The legitimacy of the hereditary feudal families was preserved through various technics of patron-client relationships rather than coercion (Eisenstadt & Roniger, 1984; Hamzeh, 2001).

By the end of the 19th century and the early 20th century, clientelist networks became formalized with the introduction of elections to the councils of the *Mutassarifiyya* administration as many of the descendent linage of the historical feudal families transformed into the official administration (Eisenstadt & Roniger, 1984; Traboulsi, 2007). Political elites, now controlling access to public administration and

funds, reinforced their positions as patrons by gating access to public goods, education, medical care, civil servants' employment, and the institutions of law. This gave way to the crystallization of sectarian political leaders known as *Zuama* (from the word *Za'im*). *Zuama*, who are inextricably linked to sects, employed a spectrum of practices, which included providing services and protection to loyal followers, and resorting to coercion against contenders by banning access to resources or even physical threat (Eisenstadt & Roniger, 1984; Hamzeh, 2001). These increasingly defusing networks within the bureaucracy and the administrative layer aggrandized the powers of the *Za'im*. This status of *Zuama* encouraged subjects to increasingly subscribe into the role of the clients, cultural followers and political supporters of the *Zuama* (Eisenstadt & Roniger, 1984). Often, *Zuama* had middlemen or brokers to manage their patron-client relationships. Brokers became the gatekeepers and exercised their power through a large network of intertwined interests. For clients, the need for this intermediary step to access resources in the form of services and jobs became known as *Wasta* (Eisenstadt & Roniger, 1984).

By the 1960's, and until the beginning of the Civil War in 1975, the political system consisted of a huge network of clientelist interests defusing through the whole apparatus of the state and centralizing power in the hands of political elites[22] who, once landowners, now consolidated power in a completely neopatrimonial state (Eisenstadt & Roniger, 1984; Hudson, 1976). Michael Hudson notes that "Corruption and favoritism pervaded the whole system- including the bureaucracy and parliament as well as the

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[22] Almost one fourth of the 1960 parliament members are descendants of MPs appointed under the French Mandate. Other studies claim that 80% of the deputies inherited the parliamentary seat directly or indirectly (See Hamzeh 2001)

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presidency" (Hudson, 1976, p.115). The proliferation of corruption, favoritism and clientelism, on the background of a weak central state and strong sectarian groups contributed to the fueling of civil strife in 1975 (Eisenstadt & Roniger, 1984).

B.   Clientelism in Post-Taef Lebanon

The further institutionalization of confessional and communal dynamics with the Taef Accord transferred the clientelist features of the system to the second republic. The sectarian distribution of positions within the government, while keeping the jurisdiction of personal matters within the sect, meant that clergy continues to exercise power of interference in the state policies and decisions. Clergy, thus, becomes inextricably a major player within the patron-client system (Salamey, 2009; Salem, 1998). Lebanon, after Taef, became known as the "allotment State" (*Dawlat al-Muhasasa*), which means that, in addition to public and civil servants' appointments, every government decision whether it is political, economic or judicial has to be run through a bargaining process to ensure all elites are content (Karam, 2012).

Despite several reforms foreseen in the Taef constitution, Political elites, many times engaged in contradictory argumentations over the interpretation of constitution texts, but had no incentives to apply any of these reforms. Instead, the mentality of compromise governed the leading Troika, as well as the high level political actors, rendering the role of the government as a central arbiter nonexistent (Karam, 2012).

Despite the presence of clientelism in many developed societies, the nature of the sectarian power sharing of the Lebanese system created a fertile ground for all sorts of clientelist paradigms (Cammett, 2011; Hamzeh, 2001; Leenders, 2004). These

Clientelist networks form the basis of political activism and mobilization in Lebanon (Cammett, 2011; Leenders, 2004) and they "…have had a constraining effect on the enactment of universalistic policies and discouraged the development of citizen participation..." (Hamzeh, 2001, p.167).

Clientelist networks in economic and political activity replaced bureaucratic and administrative networks and contributed to further weakening of the state. These networks are directed by elites towards harvesting political loyalty in exchange for services (Cammett, 2011; Hamzeh, 2001; Leenders, 2004). For Reinoud Leenders, by institutionalizing sectarianism, the Taef Agreement itself, offered an extension to the culture of clientelism and a transfer of clientelist networks, which have been persistent in Lebanon since the 19th century (Leenders, 2004). The political stalemate among the Troika, the executive branches of the government, as well as the manipulation of the electoral process "…obstructed forms of bureaucratic organization while providing incentives for political actors to look for alternative institutional arrangements." (Leenders, 2004, p.180).

The failure of the post-Taef political system to replace clientelist networks strengthened the position of elites within the system. Furthermore, elites competed against each other over additional access to resources outside the official channels of public goods distribution (J. A. Clark & Salloukh, 2013). Consequently, public funds

were distributed on the basis of sectarian balance rather than developmental needs[23]

(Salti & Chaaban, 2010).

The proliferation of political and economic clientelist networks in post war

Lebanon meant that both elites and their clients subscribed into a mutually reinforcing

behavior of undermining the state institutions:

"In fact, it is in this context of weak bureaucratic institutions that social networks degenerated into a tool of rampant corruption, to the extent that in Lebanon networks and corruption came to be perceived as being virtually identical. Given the failure of bureaucratic institutionalization and the absence of even a minimal degree of state autonomy, competing social networks consistently fell short of generating the qualities of trust and durability they might have produced in different political contexts." (Leenders, 2004, p.188).

C. Sectarianism: A Social Network?

In examining networks of mobilization, I employ concepts discussed by Todd

Fuist in terms of "Framing", "Free spaces" and "Collective identity" (Fuist, 2013).

Fuist's major argument is that culture has a critical impact on the types of networks and

consequently, the nature of mobilization in a given space. Fuist draws his typology

where mobilization is an outcome of collective cultures, which serve as a prerequisite

for any type of social or political mobilization[24].

While a communal segmentation is, by and large, a prerequisite for

accommodation, it exerted a detrimental effect on the formation of an overarching

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[23] In a study by Salti & Chaaban, the authors demonstrated that the allocation of public spending was parallel to distribution and relative size of sectarian groups. In essence, the study shows that regardless of the socioeconomic situation, no *Muhafaza* was able to draw more public funds than the proportion which is allowed by its sectarian mass (see Salti & Chaaban 2010)

[24] In this sense religious institutions in Lebanon serve as sites of framing and mobilization and are effective in bolstering clergy agendas against secular movements and proposals (Civil marriage or the separation of the religion and the state)

national identity in Lebanon (Fakhoury, 2009). According to Halim Barakat, the non-separation of religion and the state had two major consequences on the shaping of sectarian networks. The first is the lack of inter-communal marriages, which reinforces communal alienation among sects and prohibits the development of channels of dialogue and tolerance. The second is the absence of a unified educational system, which is supposed to foster a national identity[25]. These two outcomes are inextricable from the underlying reasons leading to the absence of cultural integrity in Lebanon (Barakat, 1973). The continuous implementation of such techniques, after the Taef Accord, can be associated to elite interest in maintaining control of the Lebanese sectarian system.

Nevertheless, what is sectarianism? Is it a system of networks, a cultural manifestation or both? In this context, Sami Ofeish has run a sequence of surveys, which reveal, for example, that university students in Lebanon increasingly subscribe into religious practices in the post-Civil War era (Ofeish, 1999). However, he argues that sectarianism and religiosity are not congruent, albeit overlapping in some instances. Sectarianism implies a sense of competition with the "others" from other sects. In other cases, many of the sectarian people might not be particularly religious, but even non-practicing in daily life (Ofeish, 1999).

Other concepts, such as dignity and clientelism, are important building blocks of sectarianism (Hermez, 2011). Thus, the presence and persistence of sectarianism cannot be explained by merely the presence of sects, but rather sectarianism is a structure, a set of norms and a network of interest aggregation. Contrary to what usually

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[25] For more about the fragmented educational system in Lebanon see an extensive article by Stephan Deets (Deets, 2015)

is depicted, sectarianism is not a direct outcome of religiosity, but rather religion is frequently used as a sectarian mobilization instrument (Ofeish, 1999).

Social Mobilization Theory allows the implementation of an instrumentalist approach in studying networks of mobilization. This also allows other socioeconomic and political factors, such as clientelism, access to resources and elite domination, to be encompassed. Political elites, in Lebanon, institutionalize access to resources over sectarian lines, as well as oppose calls for political reform, by successful mobilization of sectarian networks (Cammett, 2011; Ofeish, 1999).

One example of sectarianism as "purposeful rather than coincidental" (Ofeish, 1999, p.99), is the crisis of appointing deans within the Lebanese University in 1997. The contest among the Troika, each to secure an equal share of deans, led to the establishment of a new faculty (The college of Tourism and Hotel Management), in order to satisfy the number of deans per political elite (Ofeish, 1999). Sectarian mobilization was also instrumentalized in fighting the introduction of civil marriage in 1998. Civil marriage reform was submitted by the Syrian Social Nationalist Party, and supported by the Lebanese Communist Party and other secular groups. Religious institutions, from all sects, united in refusing this proposal. Finally, Prime Minister Rafik Hariri refused to sign the bill, and the public justification was that it has been passed, by President Elias Hrawi, to the cabinet without his approval. In this event, religious institutions reinforced the political stance of Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. The discussion was not around the pros and cons of civil marriage, but rather a political contention among political elites (Ofeish, 1999).

Sectarianism, as a social and political network, is constantly exploited by political elites to harness mobilization. In a study conducted in 1997 on 917 students at several universities in Lebanon[26], findings suggest that while 40% to 50% of the students didn't believe confessionalism is necessary for stability, yet their views of political mobilization and activism were, to a large extent, mirroring the sectarian distribution. Additional findings demonstrate that political partisanship and voting in elections were treated as separate forms of mobilization, signaling the clientelist informal nature of political mobilization in Lebanon. This is even more evident when 65% and 41% of the respondents chose family connections and political connections respectively, as most likely to help in getting a future job (Asmar et al., 1999).

Political activism in Lebanon is directly linked to access to resources and social assistance. Melanie Cammett demonstrates that access to public goods is directly proportional to the level of political engagement. The form of social assistance can vary between financial, medical and educational (Cammett, 2011). This would not have been possible without the continuous weakening of the state by political elites, and the hijacking of the role of the state by channeling its resources to serve a sectarian political agenda.

Mobilization can be formal, such as voting in elections, and informal, such as protests and demonstrations[27]. Informal mobilization usually requires a strong clientelist bond between political elites and subjects. Taking access to healthcare as an example, the study performed by Cammett reveals that 27% of all healthcare institutions are run

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[26] The study was conducted on students at AUB, LAU, Hagazian and Balamand (Asmar et al., 1999)

[27] For example, 8 and 14 March demonstrations were able to mobilize hundreds of thousands as opposed to the garbage crises in 2015

by both Christian and Muslim charity organizations, which sit at the convergence of interests between elites and clergy to facilitate sectarian mobilization. Sectarian political parties, especially Sunni and Shiite ones, control up to 8% of healthcare institutions, while only 9% of healthcare institutions are public (Cammett, 2011).

Controlling access to healthcare is one of the very important proponents of political mobilization, both formal and informal. The ability of sectarian political parties and elites to monitor political activism and behavior, in the absence of a strong state and an equal distribution of public goods, means that people are subject to political blackmail by sectarian elites and parties. Consequently, political activism is exercised along increasingly blurry lines of sectarian affiliation.

Dependency on sects or sectarian communities in Lebanon reduces the landscape of political activism and limits the political and intellectual freedom of its people. The primordial representation of identities, both individually and collectively, through the lens of sectarianism associates additional abstract meanings, which extend beyond the material relationship of clientelism. As Sami Ofeish explains, sectarianism extends beyond religiosity (Ofeish, 1999). It is also important to note that sectarian politics are a result of politicized sectarian identities: "as clientelism and sectarianism overlay each other, they form a nexus of power that can restrict social mobilizations, but they also have the ability to ignite them." (Hermez, 2011, p.529). However, Sami Hermez notes that the materialistic patron-client relationship, in Lebanon, is not enough to explain political affiliation. Individual and collective representations of dignity in the forms of equal rights, self-protection and self-determination are additional non-materialistic elements, which are important to satisfy in order to mobilize people

(Hermez, 2011). As a consequence, partisans, rallying for a political party, also seek non-materialistic social recognition in the form of collective dignity, such as seeing Hezbollah as the guardian of Shiite dignity against Israel, or Lebanese Forces as the guardians of Christian dignity against other sects (Hermez, 2011). The inability of secular political parties and movements to provide alternatives, both on the materialistic and non-materialistic levels limits their ability to mobilize. This, when coupled with the institutionalization of sectarianism within the political system, leads to the complete marginalization of secular politics in Lebanon. Just as sectarianism cannot be understood based on religion alone, it cannot be either understood based on loyalty to sectarian leadership alone.

Based on the above, I argue for a more inclusive definition of sectarianism as being a manifestation of social and political networks within the society, and having several mutually reinforcing drivers. According to Social Mobilization Theory, networks are the different types of structures within which, and through which, mobilization is possible. In this sense, sectarianism is not an end in itself nor an abstract descriptive social attribute. It is rather a politicized self-representation, which can only be realized within a political and a social structure i.e. a network.

Sectarianism, as a network, extends to the civil society. It engages in mutually reinforcing dynamics between sectarian elites and civil society to form what Janine Clark and Bassel Salloukh describe as the "culture of sectarianism"[28]. They conclude that:

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[28] Clark and Salloukh examine examples of sectarian mobilization in Lebanon. One of which is the General Council of Labor elections in 1997 which witnessed unprecedented interference of sectarian elites and resulted in the hijacking of the council by pro-government representatives. (see Clark and Salloukh 2013)

"The stickiness of sectarian identities in postwar Lebanon is the product of a dynamic, recursive, and mutually reinforcing relationship involving sectarian elites and civil society actors" …… "this, in turn, serves to reproduce sectarian identities and a general postwar culture of sectarianism that enables sectarian elites to safeguard their political power and socioeconomic interests"……"any attempt to invent alternatives to sectarian identities and modes of political mobilization, and hence to sectarianism, requires breaking this reciprocal relation through fundamental socioeconomic, monetary, and political reforms" (J. A. Clark & Salloukh, 2013, p.744-745).

D. Political Parties in Lebanon: Sectarian or Secular?

The oldest political parties in Lebanon date back to the first half of the 20th century. Traditionally, many of the Lebanese political parties were formed around political elite, and consequently a sect, and retained a clientelist relationship with the *Za'im*. In addition, ideological parties, undermining the power of the sect and the *Za'im*, were also formed on multi-sectarian basis (El Khazen, 2003; Hamzeh, 2001). In this section, I draw on the principles explained by Kanchan Chandra to map the major Lebanese political parties into sectarian and secular. In the next chapter, I deconstruct the relationship between the context and the network, i.e. between the political structure in Lebanon and the political parties as being networks for mobilization.

Benjamin Reilly explains that the challenge for democratization in divided societies is the politicization of identity issues, and consequently, it is easier for political parties to campaign along sectarian lines, and for political leadership to crystalize around these parties (Reilly, 2006). In the previous section, I discussed the politicization of sectarian identities. This very same process governs the formation and functionality of political parties in Lebanon.

The formation of sectarian parties, protected as a right for minorities in divided

societies[29], and expected in consociational systems with territorially concentrated sects,

might facilitate power sharing. However, it might also trigger an extremist political

competition (Reilly, 2006). But how do we define a political party as sectarian or

secular? Kanchan Chandra defines a sectarian party as "championing the particular

interests of one category" (Chandra, 2011, p.154). Using the same reasoning, a non-

sectarian party is a party, which does not champion the interests of any category or sect.

According to Chandra, sectarian parties can be distinguished based on three

aspects. The first is particularity, and this means that for a party to be representative of a

particular group, it does that by directly or indirectly excluding other groups. The

second aspect is centrality, and this is defined by how much the interests of a certain

group are featured within the party claims and campaigns. The third aspect is

temporality, and this relates to how consistent, over time, a political party is in

championing the interests of a certain group. This last aspect means that political parties

can change in nature over time from secular to sectarian, for example[30].

The novelty of Chandra's definition is that it sets a relatively more universal

method to map political parties. In this sense, sectarian parties are defined as sectarian,

regardless of how many sects or groups they claim to speak for or represent, as long as

they are excluding at least one of the communal components. A secular party, then, has

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[29] The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) guidelines recommend granting ethnic minorities and sects the right to form their own exclusive parties and compete in elections on sectarian and ethnic basis. The further implementation of PR electoral systems made election administration easier but deepened vertical divisions (see Reilly 2006)

[30] Richani's book "Dilemmas of Democracy and Political Parties in Sectarian Societies" accounts for the establishment of the Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) as a universalist nonsectarian party and how it adapted to the sectarian dynamics in Lebanon, reducing into a Druze dominated party (see Richani 1998)

to be an above-sect party, and should not have in its literature or campaigns any sign of sectarian or multi-sectarian interest aggregation. Chandra uses eight broad criteria based on which political parties can be mapped. This includes the party's name, the category they claim they represent, their explicit and implicit campaign messages, the voting base, the overall composition of the party votes, the composition of its leadership and its arena of contestation[31].

Table 1 Stratification of major Lebanese political parties based on party classification criteria.

Party Name	Acronym	Leadership	Political Central Position	Platform/Sect or Group	Major Votes	Chandra Criteria (5)	Nature
Amal Movement	AMAL	Nabih Berri*	Moderate Islam*	Shiia*	Shiia*	4	Sectarian
Armenian Revolutionary Federation	ARF	Hrant Markarian*	Socialism,Nationalism	Armenian Christians*	Armenian Christians*	3	Sectarian
Baath Arab Party	**BAATH**	**Assem Qanso**	**Arab Nationalism**	**Mixed**	**Mixed**	**0**	**Secular**
Democratic Left Movement	**DLM**	**Elias Attallah**	**Centrist Left**	**Mixed**	**Mixed**	**0**	**Secular**
El Marada Movement	MM	Suleiman Franjieh*	Liberal	Maronite*	Maronite*	3	Sectarian
Free Patriotic Movement	FPM	Gebran Bassil*	Centrist	Mixed Christians*	Mixed Christians*	3	Sectarian
Future Movement	FM	Saad Hariri*	Capitalism/Nationalism	mainly Sunni*	Sunni*	3	Sectarian
Hezbollah *	HA	Hassan Nassrallah*	Islamism*	Shiia*	Shiia*	5	Sectarian
Islamic Group *	JI	Azzam Al Ayoubi*	Islamism*	Sunni*	Sunni*	5	Sectarian
Kataeb Party	Kataeb	Sami Jemayel*	Lebanese Nationalism	Maronite*	Maronite*	3	Sectarian
Lebanese Communist Party	**LCP**	**Hanna Gharib**	**Communism**	**Mixed**	**Mixed**	**0**	**Secular**
Lebanese Democratic Party	LDP	Talal Arslan*	Liberal	Druz*	Druz*	3	Sectarian
Lebanese Forces	LF	Samir Geagea*	Lebanese Nationalism	Maronite*	Maronite*	3	Sectarian
National Liberal Party	NLP	Dory Chamoun*	Liberalism	Maronite*	Maronite *	3	Sectarian
People's Movement	**SHAAB**	**Najah Wakim**	**Nasserism,Socialism**	**Mixed**	**Mixed**	**0**	**Secular**
Popular Nasserist Organization	NPO	Ossama Saad*	Nasserism,Socialism	Sunni*	Sunni*	3	Sectarian
Progressive Socialist Party	PSP	Walid Jumblatt*	Officially Socialism	mainly Druz*	Druz*	3	Sectarian
Syrian Social Nationalist Party	**SSNP**	**Fares Saad**	**Syrian Nationalism**	**Mixed**	**Mixed**	**0**	**Secular**

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[31] A party does not necessarily have to satisfy all the criteria to be classified as ethnic. In fact, most of the parties, which combine several of those especially, name, message, leadership and pool of votes from one exclusive sect (such as Druz) or a wider group (such as Christians) is classified as sectarian. The absence of sectarian nominal and activated identity, in all of the criteria, is necessary to consider a party secular or non-sectarian. (see Chandra 2011)

I choose to use the most indicative criteria in this mapping. This includes the name of political parties, the sectarian affiliation of the leadership, the political central thesis or ideology, and finally the platform and major votes in consecutive elections.

In the table above (Table 1), I map 18 Lebanese political parties. In the analysis, most of the political parties do not exhibit a sectarian name. It is evident that party names in Lebanon are mostly not sectarian. Yet, the leadership of the political parties represent a clear sectarian affiliation. Many of the leaders have inherited the party from their fathers, such as Saad Hariri, Walid Jumblatt, Sami Gemayel, Sleiman Franjieh and others. On the other hand, many key leadership roles are assumed by relatives of General Micheal Aoun in the Free Patriotic Movement. As for Hezbollah, the general secretary Hassan Nasrallah combines both political and religious positions for Hezbollah partisans. Most of the political parties in Lebanon continue to function on a confessional level vis-à-vis a clientelist relationship with the *Za'im* (Hamzeh, 2001).

I use two major sources for the central political claim and the party supporting platform: A report by Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, a political organization operating programs in more than one hundred countries, including Lebanon (Stiftung, 2018), and Imad Salamey's study about government and politics in Lebanon (Salamey, 2014). For additional triangulation and checks, I use several published articles and books (Barakat, 1973; El Khazen, 2003; Hamzeh, 2001; Richani, 1998; Salamey & Payne, 2008; Salem, 1998).

To apply the final criteria, related to the voting strongholds of every political party, I utilize several data platforms and archives which illustrates the voting constituency for candidates from every political party. This includes governmental

platforms, such as "elections.gov.lb"[32], and other independent platforms, such as

"Libanvote.com"[33] and Adam Carr's election archives[34].

The outcomes demonstrate that most of the political parties rely on a narrow

sectarian affiliation for political mobilization. This is not always the case for some

parties or movements such as Future Movement (FM) and Free Patriotic Movement

(FPM). FM and FPM both have broad cross-sectarian candidates and representatives in

the parliament. However, at the core, both parties are vehicles to muster sectarian

support for their corresponding political leadership when needed. This would include

other forms of mobilization in the form of demonstrations, public and media campaigns.

Another example is the clear concentrations of voting powers in relatively pure

sectarian geographies, such as Beirut second district, Akkar, Tripoli and Saida, all with

the majority of Sunni votes in the case of Future Movement (Stiftung, 2018). The same

analysis applies to other parties including, but not restricted to, Free Patriotic Movement

(FPM), *Afwaj Mokawama Loubnaniya* (AMAL), Hezbollah (HA), Lebanese Forces

(LF) and the Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) (Salamey & Payne, 2008; Stiftung,

2018).

Out of 40 political parties featured by Salamey, I map 18 based on their size

and electoral power[35]. Using five of Chandra's criteria reveals that only five political

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[32] http://elections.gov.lb/Home.aspx , *(Elections 2019—2018, 2018* تفاصيل احتساب نتائج الانتخابات لعام *(*

[33] www.Libanvote.com , (Elections Archive, 2005)

[34] http://psephos.adam-carr.net/ , (Carr, 1999)

[35] I exclude parties formed around political elites which are usually either very territorial and/or feudal and non-ideological (such as Al-Azem Movement in Tripoli, Lebanese Unification Movement in Chouf, and Lebanese Popular Congress in Beirut). I also exclude more recent movements which qualify as secular (such as Mwatinoon w Mowatinat fi Dawla (mmfidawla)) to restrict the research to latest elections of 2009.

parties satisfy the criteria of secular political parties[36] (Table 1, p.87): Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP), the Lebanese Communist Party (LCP), The Baath Party (Baath), the People's Movement (SHAAB) and the Democratic Left Movement (DLM). The LCP has no presence in the parliament since the year 2000 (Rizik, 2011). This has been, by and large, due to continuous marginalization of the Lebanese Communist Party by sectarian politics (El Khazen, 2003), as well as the monopolization of the Civil Society Organizations (CSO), such as the General Confederation of Labor (GCL), historically the stronghold of the Communist Party mobilization arena (J. A. Clark & Salloukh, 2013). The Baath Party has been supported by the Syrians until the year 2005, While both People's Movement (SHAAB) and Democratic Left Movement (DLM) remain territorially restricted in the case of the former, and marginal in mobilization power in the case of the latter. SNNP, established in 1935, is one of the oldest ideological secular parties in Lebanon, which is still represented within the political institutions. In the next chapter, I illustrate the major electoral positioning and outcomes for these parties, focusing on SSNP and the LCP.

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[36] Applying the analysis to the remaining 22 parties will yield additional small secular groups, but hardly with an impact on elections and political representation.

`CHAPTER VI

PRACTICES: POLITICAL MOBILIZATION, PARTISANSHIP AND VOTING BEHAVIOR

Political practices, as expressions of mobilization, are the manifestations of social and political networks within a given political space. In the previous chapters, I discussed the clientelist nature of political and social exchange within the sectarian accommodative context of Lebanon. Sectarianism, as a network built around communal segmentation, channels political mobilization through the funnels of access to resources, public goods, and identity fortification through sectarian dignity gratification.

According to Andrew Reynolds, electoral participation increases when voters believe their votes are likely to make a significant difference in the future of political arrangements and outcomes (A. Reynolds et al., 2005). In Lebanon, electoral participation is mainly directed towards the preservation of the status quo. Additionally, there has been an increasing disillusion in the effectiveness of exercising the right to vote, due to the continuous manipulation and engineering of electoral laws. This is reflected in lower participation rates and polarized voters' behaviors. In the following sections, I discuss the post-Taef electoral design and the results of the elections of 2000, 2005 & 2009. Afterwards, I analyze the case of secular political parties in light of the vicious circle of mobilization in Lebanon.

A. Electoral Design and Results: 2000, 2005 & 2009

Elections in Lebanon after Taef, and until 2010, took place five times in 1992, 1996, 2000, 2005 and 2009. Electoral laws were changed and manipulated, each time, to ensure that political elites have a favorable result based on sectarian distribution (Fakhoury, 2009; Salamey, 2009, 2014). The laws of 1992, 1996, 2000 and 2005 were hybrid laws, which combined both small and medium sized districts, while the 2009 elections were run, based on the 1960 law of the *Caza*. The aim was to ensure the best outcome for the ruling sectarian oligarchy through gerrymandering[37] (MacQueen, 2016; Salamey, 2014).

Block vote was the general rule used in the Lebanese elections until 2010. The voters could vote for an entire list (Straight Block Vote), to take out some candidates from the list (Partial Block Vote) or to vote for candidates from competing lists (Mixed Block Vote). There were no official printed ballots, which meant that voters were subject to pre-printed lists by political groups and parties, mainly sectarian (Salamey, 2014). Block vote and hybrid electoral districts as mechanical effects, triggered psychological effects of how political parties campaigned in elections, and consequently, how voters behaved.

Political parties' electoral campaigns included, in addition to mobilizing partisans along electoral slogans, the pre-elections negotiations and coalition formation among political elites. This also included excessive use of the media in sectarian campaigns, which engages partisans in sectarian outbidding before and during elections. Furthermore, political practices did not exclude unethical electoral spending which

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[37] See section D in Chapter IV: Electoral Design in Post Taef Lebanon

exploited the materialistic exchange within the patron-client political formula (Fakhoury, 2009).

The electoral process, from a logistic perspective, was conducted in polling stations (*Al Aklam*), which stratified voters based on sect and place of birth (Salamey, 2014). This, in addition to the absence of officially printed ballots, made it relatively feasible for political parties and elites' representatives to monitor the electoral behavior of the public [38] (Cammett, 2011; Salamey, 2014). Further practices of political engineering included publishing the electoral laws only a very short time before elections, manipulating media coverage, instances of vote manipulation, as well as intimidation and vote buying (Fakhoury, 2009).

B. Electoral Law and Elections 2000

Elections in the year 2000, unlike the elections of 1992 and 1996, happened under atypical political circumstances, such as the liberation of South Lebanon from Israeli occupation and the presidential change in the Syrian administration (Rizik, 2011; Salloukh, 2006). However, similar to all elections after Taef, pre-elections engineering continued to produce a law, which guaranteed the continuity of the existing system[39]. The contest among sectarian powers and political elites led to the adoption of a hybrid

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[38] Cammett explains that in many polling stations, political parties' representatives distribute marked lists to heads of families or electoral keys (*Mafatih Intikbiya*). Since representatives are allowed to be present inside the ballot station during the election day they will be able to identify whom did not participate. Finally, during the counting process, representatives can use the marked ballots to identify which family voted for which candidate. This process allows for the identification of who continues to receive access to welfare from the sectarian party or elite following elections. (see Cammett 2011)

[39] Back then, Prime Minister Salim Al Huss tried to push for a more representative electoral law but with no success (Fakhoury, 2009)

law, which did not preserve the *Muhafaza* and did not choose the *Caza*[40]. Consequently, Lebanon was distributed over 14 tailored districts (Three in Beirut, Three in Bekaa, Two in the South, Two in the North and Four in Mount Lebanon).

The elections witnessed unorthodox alliances and coalitions, such as the coalition between Hezbollah and Kataeb in the Baalbeck-Hermel district, SSNP with Kataeb in the Baalbeck-Hermel and with FM in the North, and the alliance of the NPO with FM in Saida (Rizik, 2011). The secular parties, such as SNNP, had to work with sectarian parties to ensure seats in the parliament. Other secular parties, such as SHAAB, withdrew from the elections due to what they considered as predetermined results and electoral engineering. LCP, which chose to run for elections alone against sectarian powers in the South, could not achieve any seat in the year 2000 parliament.

Table 2: Major distribution of seats in Elections 2000[41]

Election Year	2000
Hariri Block/FM	26
AMAL	16
Jumblatt Block/PSP	12
Hezbollah	12
SSNP	4
Baath	3
Kataeb	2
ARF-Tachnag	2
LDP	1
Marada	1
NPO	1
LF	0
Aoun Block/FPM	0
DLM	0
Independent/Others	**48**
Total	**128**

[40] The dispute among political elites was strong: Christians wanted *Caza* to preserve the power of the Christian vote while Harriri wanted 9 districts to bolster the Sunni vote. Jumblatt on the other hand wanted Mount Lebanon as one district to insure a majority of Druz votes (Rizik, 2011)

[41] Source: elections.gov.lb, Libanvote.com, Rizik 2011, Salloukh 2006

Table 3: Major distribution of seats in Elections 2000 (Independents/ Others)[42]

Election Year	2000
Independent/Others	**48**
National Liberal Party	0
Jamaa Islamia	0
ADL-Ramgavar	2
Hanchag	1
Skaff Block	1
Safadi Block	1
Murr Block	3
Dem Renewal Movement	2
Islamic Action Front	0
Lebanese National Block	2
Others	36

The election results (Tables 2 & 3) show that sectarian parties were able to capture most of the parliamentary seats in these elections, further marginalizing the presence and influence of secular parties in the political life[43]. Results also reinforce the understanding that, for sectarian parties, ideology is not a determining pre-requisite for electoral alliances (Salloukh, 2006). Under the existing electoral arrangements in 2000, secular parties were only able to obtain seven seats, by coalescing with sectarian parties and elites in electoral districts. SSNP gained four seats mainly under the umbrella of AMAL and Hezbollah, while the LCP was unable to gain any seat in the parliament of 2000. Other secular groups, such as the Democratic Renewal Movement, entered the Parliament with two MPs.

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[42]Source: elections.gov.lb, Libanvote.com, Rizik 2011, Salloukh 2006
[43] FPM, LF boycotted the 2000 elections

C. Electoral Law and Elections 2005

The elections of the 2005 were the first to happen after the Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon following the assassination of Prime Minister Rafik Hariri in February 2005. This was preceded by disputes over the renewal of the term of President Emile Lahoud and the issuing of the 1559 resolution by the UN Security Council, demanding the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon (Fakhoury, 2009). Simon Haddad notes that while those elections were supposed to fix the system imbalance and deep sectarian strife imposed by consecutive post-Taef elections, political elites ended up adopting the very same electoral law of the elections of 2000 with minor modifications[44] (Haddad, 2010). However, those elections were different, as international and local monitoring of the elections was allowed for the first time (Fakhoury, 2009).

The emergence of 8 and 14 March as two major political cross-confessional camps, was not translated into the electoral mapping. Instead, General Micheal Aoun, who came back to Lebanon with a sweeping Christian support, was marginalized by both 8 and 14 March factions. On the other hand, pre-elections unorthodox alliances reflected again, same as the year 2000, elite interests above programmatic politics. The "Quarto" alliance between Hezbollah, AMAL, Jumblatt and Future Movement meant that many of the seats of the upcoming Parliament were pre-determined, and this also accounted for the low voter participation especially in Beirut districts (Fakhoury, 2009; Rizik, 2011).

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[44] In Fakhoury's opinion the reason for adopting the 2000 law were "the lack of consensus among different communal groups, the inability of the opposition to agree on a common course of action, the loyalists/opposition cleavage, the lack of time, or whether it was a deliberate attempt to maintain some residues of the old regime" (See Fakhoury 2009, p. 295)

Table 4 Major distribution of seats in Elections 2005[45]

Election Year	2005
Hariri Block/FM	37
AMAL	17
Jumblatt Block/PSP	16
Aoun Block/FPM	14
Hezbollah	14
LF	4
SSNP	2
Kataeb	2
DLM	1
Baath	1
Marada	1
NPO	1
ARF-Tachnag	1
LDP	0
Independent/Others	17
Total	**128**

Table 5 Major distribution of seats in Elections 2005[46]

Election Year	2005
Independent/Others	**17**
National Liberal Party	0
Jamaa Islamia	0
ADL-Ramgavar	1
Hanchag	1
Skaff Block	5
Safadi Block	3
Murr Block	2
Dem Renewal Movement	1
Others	4

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[45] Source: elections.gov.lb, Libanvote.com

[46] Source: elections.gov.lb, Libanvote.com

In contemplating the results[47] (Tables 4 & 5), the impact of sectarian

polarization in the elections of 2005 was omnipresent in the absence of electoral

programs for most of the sectarian parties (Rizik, 2011).

Secular parties' seats were curbed into only four as opposed to seven in the

elections of 2000. The entrance of the Democratic Left Movement (DLM), as a new

secular player, did not obscure the fact that this was under the umbrella of the 14 March

alliance, and within a heightened sectarian polarization. SNNP seats, reduced to two,

were again achieved through coalescing with, and even patronage by, sectarian parties

in the South and Bekaa.

In Mount Lebanon, the LCP candidate, and other secular independent

candidates, either withdrew or were forced to withdraw given the unlikelihood of

gaining enough votes under the current law and sectarian propaganda. On the other

hand, the SNNP candidate, in that district, ran for elections, and lost, facing the full

power of sectarian mobilization from FPM (Rizik, 2011).

The LCP participated also by composing lists in the two South districts. The

LCP ran for elections with three communist candidates (one of which was a liberated

prisoner from Israeli detention camps, and a veteran from the resistance), and supported

an independent candidate in Tyre. In the South, the LCP had to face the bloc of

Hezbollah and AMAL, which transformed elections into a sectarian voting over the

legitimacy of resistance against Israel, on the background of refusing UN resolution

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[47] There are discrepancies between the results reported by the different sources. Fakhoury mentions that the Hariri block gained 36 seats and Aoun block 21 seats, while Salamey & Payne report 37 and 14 seats respectively. This however does not change the bigger picture of the outcome.

1559. As a result of sectarian mobilization, as well as the Block vote majoritarian technique, the LCP was unable to gain any seat in the South (Rizik, 2011).

D. Electoral Law and Elections 2009

The 2009 elections were the second elections after the Syrian withdrawal, and were conducted after a period of sever sectarian polarization and mobilization. The period between 2005 and 2009 was marked by both political and economic deadlock, especially after the war of 2006 between Israel and Hezbollah, and the sectarian events of 7 May 2008 (Haddad, 2010). In addition, sectarian tensions between 8 and 14 March camps invited farther external intervention in the elections, as well as electoral spending (Haddad, 2010). Under these circumstances, the small district *Caza* law of 1960 was adopted. Haddad emphasizes that "the adopted law, which allocated seats based on the smaller district known as the *Caza*, emphasizes local and confessional discrepancies and allows traditional politicians to perpetuate their power" (Haddad, 2010, p.51)

The pre-elections political coalitions created a new political scene with the signing of a memorandum of understanding between Hezbollah and FPM earlier in 2006. This memorandum was signed on the background of the collapsing Quarto alliance, which determined the results of the 2005 elections. The 2009 elections witnessed the highest money spending and vote influence in the history of Lebanon, as well as, Sunni-Shiite unprecedented sectarian polarization, and clergy interference from both Muslim and Christian religious leaders in order to influence the polls (Haddad, 2010; Rizik, 2011).

Table 6 Major distribution of seats in Elections 2009[48]

Election Year	2009
Hariri Block/FM	26
Aoun Block/FPM	19
AMAL	13
Hezbollah	12
Jumblatt Block/PSP	12
LF	8
Kataeb	5
Marada	3
SSNP	2
Baath	2
LDP	2
ARF-Tachnag	2
DLM	1
NPO	0
Independent/Others	**21**
Total	**128**

Table 7 Major distribution of seats in Elections 2009[49]

Election Year	2009
Independent/Others	**26**
National Liberal Party	1
Jamaa Islamia	1
ADL-Ramgavar	1
Hanchag	2
Skaff Block	1
Safadi Block	1
Murr Block	1
Dem Renewal Movement	0
Islamic Action Front	1
Lebanese National Block	0
Others	17

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[48] Source: elections.gov.lb, Libanvote.com

[49] Source: elections.gov.lb, Libanvote.com

The results[50] (Tables 6 & 7) show, once more, the capturing of sectarian parties and groups of most parliamentary seats. Haddad reports that 74 out of 128 seats (nearly 60%) were assumed by unopposed sectarian candidates, and that this pre-determination of results led to a very high level of abstention among voters (Haddad, 2010). Secular political parties gained five seats, out of which SSNP had only two.

E. Political Parties in Sectarian Politics: The case of Secular Political Parties

In Lebanon, the role of political parties is not easily separated from sectarian political elites. In modern democracies, political parties are traditionally the central political mobilization apparatus. They are usually the incubators for political elites.

Although Lebanese political parties have their roots after the birth of Greater Lebanon in 1920, Salamey argues that the development of the current life of the political parties in Lebanon started in 1950's[51] (Salamey, 2014). Yet, Lebanese parties, except for few secular parties, generally mirrored the confessional constituencies of the Lebanese society. Furthermore, they failed to promote national integration and cooperation (El Khazen, 2003; Salamey, 2014). The contemporary sectarian nature and positioning of the Lebanese political parties is an outcome of both the mechanical effect of electoral laws and the institutionalization of confessionalism in the state, as well as elite strategies of gerrymandering and exploiting state resources. Consequently, secular

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[50] There exist discrepancies among the reported sizes of the political blocks resulting from the 2009 elections. For example, Haddad reports FM to achieve a block of 25 MPs while Salamey reports 26 and Rizik reports 29. This is probably due to the shifting of political allegiance of some of the candidates over time marking the sectarian nature of electoral alliances.

[51] Salamey explains that contemporary sectarian politics started with Chamounism, referring to President Camille Chamoun who presented as a strong Christian Maronite Leader. Chamounism was opposed by Kamal Jumblatt, the Druze leader heading the PSP. (see Salamey 2014)

political parties have limited options to generate cross-sectarian platforms (MacQueen, 2016; Richani, 1998).

In post-Taef Lebanon, political parties face several problems, mainly related to the nature of the sectarian political system and the dysfunctional relationship between political parties and the state from one side, and the political parties and the public from another (El Khazen, 2003; Richani, 1998). This dysfunctional relationship is evident in the absence of a significant public influence on the political process, either due to clientelist relationships between the public and state representatives or due to confessional fragmentation and polarization (Salem, 1998).

In Lebanon, political parties are in departure with their original cause as vehicles of political change and mobilization, and became effectively used to influence the electoral process and to organize sectarian polarization. These dysfunctional roles of political parties in Lebanon are situated at the heart of the vicious circle of political mobilization. Within this context, sectarian political parties and elites play a major role in preventing secular political parties and groups from changing the rules of the political game. Secular political parties are stuck between the inability to fully conform with sectarian politics, and the rigidity of the political opportunity structures within the institutionalized formal and informal sectarian political practices.

Since their establishment, SNNP and the LCP both faced challenges in growing horizontal networks, especially among Maronite political elites (Richani, 1998). This early inability to break the sectarian and clientelist bonds within the Lebanese society, proved to be of grave consequences on the evolution of those political parties up until the Civil War. The political alignments of fighting factions over sectarian lines, during

the Civil War, created a dilemma for secular political parties where both participation and passiveness were potentially costly.

In the post-Taef period, and upon further institutionalization of confessionalism and the integration of war players within the reengineered power sharing political system, the dilemmas of the Civil War were transferred into an unfavorable political positioning for both SNNP and the LCP. The performance of secular political parties in the Lebanese elections reflects this dysfunctional political positioning, and the inability to effectively mobilize the public sphere and influence voting behaviors. In three consecutive elections (2000, 2005, and 2009) SSNP and the LCP were markedly unable to effectively create a critical independent mass within the legislature. The demise of secular political parties and their inability to mobilize the public and push forward secularization projects can be attributed to the major structural and cultural dilemmas, such as the institutionalization of sectarian politics within the Taef constitution, the persistence of a resilient culture of clientelism, and electoral engineering to guarantee elite domination.

Neither of those dilemmas is independently responsible for the current erosion of the popularity of secular parties. For example, in the elections of 1996, LCP candidates were able to mobilize 140,000 voters out of 1,100,000 voters, and nevertheless, were not able to gain any seat in the parliament (Richani, 1998). Furthermore, in a recent study about the voter mobilization powers of political parties in Lebanon in 2018, the report claims that SSNP mobilization power is around 40,000 votes across Lebanon (Stiftung, 2018). In a fully-fledged PR system on a large district basis, SSNP will still gain the same number of MPs as in the examined elections. The

major argument here is that, in this case, SSNP deputies would be elected regardless of the sectarian balance of power. In essence, SSNP would be able to preserve an independent political position and claim to faithfully represent its secular agenda.

Indeed, both Farid el-Khazen and Paul Salem have addressed the positioning of secular political parties in post-Taef Lebanon. The rigidity of the sectarian regime renders secular political parties subject either to political marginalization (such as the LCP), or to annexation by sectarian and/or foreign powers (such as SSNP) (El Khazen, 2003; Salem, 1998). Without a significant reform within the political system, which allows the emergence of new socioeconomic currents, as well as freeing the public from the sectarian segmentation and clientelist practices, secular political parties continue to behave, and be treated, as minorities within the political system.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

The major theme of this thesis is political mobilization in Lebanon. Since the end of the Civil War, and the establishment of the second republic upon the constitution envisioned within the Taef Accord, several attempts of reform have failed to introduce secularization and modernization into the political and social institutions in Lebanon.

Facing a rigid political structure within a weak state, secular political parties are incapable of significant public mobilization. In this thesis, I demonstrate that this lack of ability to attract partisans, by secular political parties, is independent from the potential structural dilemmas, developmental issues and democratic caveats within those parties. It is rather impacted by a vicious circle of mutually reinforcing sectarian clientelist networks and monopolized political institutions and electoral laws.

Based on my observations and the literature review, I draw a proposition that **secular political parties in Lebanon are not able to mobilize the public due to lack of access to institutions and public services mutually reinforced by the resilience of sectarian identities.**

In order to prove my proposition, I use Social Mobilization Theory (SMT), as a theoretical framework, allowing the study of the Lebanese political structure and institutions as a context, and the analysis of sectarian channels of materialistic and non-materialistic exchange through clientelism as networks. The networks of social exchange within the political context in Lebanon result in political practices and voting behaviors which are traced in elections results. The following conclusions substantiate

the inability of secular political parties to mobilize within the existing context and networks:

- The institutionalization of sectarian politics within the state. By preserving the pre-determined nature of sectarian representation, the Taef constitution, and the political practice emerging from it, create a limited area of maneuver for secular political parties.

- The monopolization of political decision-making and access to resources by sectarian political elites. Political elites transform into focal points of political mobilization by gating access to public goods and enslaving the political will of the public.

- The persistent, mutually reinforcing, clientelist relationship between the public and elites from one side, and public and sectarian parties from another side. Sectarian parties serve as totalitarian assets, utilized by political elites to hinder or ignite political mobilization.

- The diffusion of sectarianism as a complex network in all aspects of social life and the undermining of civil society. Sectarianism as a choice of self-representation is constantly an activated identity, which spread to both materialistic and non-materialistic forms of social exchange. Secular political parties are unable to present a functional alternative to the public.

- The electoral design and engineering of electoral laws, as well as, the electoral monitoring and intimidation. This is facilitated by restricting voters to their sect and area of origin. Post-Taef electoral design presents secular political parties with very narrow political opportunity structures, which hinder

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achieving a critical mass within the legislature, and furthermore, subjugate the independent political will of the existing representatives.

In this research, I address secular political parties in Lebanon not through the agency lens, but rather through a context, environmental and institutional lens. The synthesis of literature reveals a plethora of research around accommodative power sharing in Lebanon, as well as sectarianism, electoral design and the clientelist nature of exchange. Research around sectarian identities and the networks of material and non-material exchange is less prevalent. Finally, there exist only few resources in the literature around political parties and partisan engagement in Lebanon, especially in the post-Taef period.

The combination of the different political manifestations of social and political exchange in Lebanon within the framework of Social Mobilization Theory, provides a nouvelle lens of understanding the challenges facing secular mobilization and reform in Lebanon. It also reveals the deep level of complexity and entrenchment of the formal and informal sectarian networks of exchange and mobilization. Hence, this thesis contributes to a better understanding of the intertwined and rigid nature of sectarian politics in Lebanon.

A. Is a new model of politics possible?

The stability and utility of the accommodative model in Lebanon is questionable given the continuous cycles of political deadlock. Some researchers, such as Benjamin MacQueen, argue that the political system in Lebanon is not exactly consociational. MacQueen explains that "Lebanon's power-sharing arrangements are

not consociational. Instead, power sharing in Lebanon sustains a closed political system, one that actively resists efforts at implementing reform to enhance popular political participation." (MacQueen, 2016, p.74). Others, such as Farid el-Khazen, coin the post-Taef power sharing system in Lebanon as authoritarian (El Khazen, 2003), while Tamirace Fakhoury describes the political system in Lebanon as resistant to change from below, a resistance which is "entrenched within Lebanon's sectarian-based system" (Fakhoury, 2014, p.507).

A potential entrance to address reform might be the implementation of already existing constitutional recommendations. The enforcement of Taef reforms of abolishing sectarian allocation of seats within the parliament, the establishment of a House of Senates, and the empowerment of the Constitutional Council might potentially provide an opportunity for depolarizing sectarian identities.

On the other hand, electoral reform and adopting more representative PR systems are crucial for allowing political actors from outside the sectarian club into the political life. The adoption of a self-determined, as opposed to pre-determined affiliations, might further enhance the ability of secular parties to capture and aggregate the interests of the public and promote cross-sectarian cooperation. Recent cross-sectarian acts of contention indicate that there might be a disenchantment with sectarian politics among a wide class of Lebanese public, which is both cross-sectarian and cross-territorial. Electoral reform might present an opportunity for secular parties and groups to tap into this layer of citizens, currently subject to clientelist sectarian networks.

This research falls within the intersection of democratization, secularization, social networks and political activism. It combines system level analysis with social

elements of contention within political opportunity structures. The thesis contributes to

the limited research around secular political parties in Lebanon in the context of

sectarian political institutions and practices.

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