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THE ROLE OF GRIEVANCES, ADVERSARIAL ATTRIBUTIONS, AND NEGATIVE EMOTIONS IN MOTIVATING THE OCTOBER 17TH LEBANESE UPRISING: A SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL CONTENT ANALYSIS OF PROTESTERS' SPEECH IN LIVE TV COVERAGE

by
RAJAA MAHER ABDULAHAD BARBARY

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

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ABSTRACT
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Title: The Role of Grievances, Adversarial Attributions, and Negative Emotions in Motivating the October 17th Lebanese Uprising: A Social Psychological Content Analysis of Protesters' Speech in Live TV Coverage

Lebanon is a religiously diverse country that has witnessed multiple political upheavals revolving around disputes within and regarding the power-sharing sectarian system of its governance. Several social movements have tried to call for the abolishment of the sectarian political system without success. Most recently, economic grievances led to mass mobilization that swept the streets of the country on the evening of October 17, 2019, in what developed to be the largest anti-regime movement in the country's recent history, calling for a complete overhaul of the system.

Building on several traditions within the field of social-psychological collective action research, the current work examines the different types of perceived injustices (*grievances*) which motivated the October 17th Lebanese uprising, in addition to the different outgroups identified by protesters as being responsible for said injustices (*adversarial attributions*), and the self-reported negative emotional states of the protesters (*emotions*) as they actively engaged in collective action. The roles of these factors are discussed in aggregate terms as well as in terms of temporal development (*temporality*) over the course of the analysis time frame. The utilized methodology is a combined approach of qualitative and quantitative content analysis of protesters' discourse in live local television footage during the first three days of the uprising.

The results of our analyses showed that protesters predominantly cited being aggrieved by economic grievances, attributed blame to the totality of the system for these injustices and expressed exasperated anger in their spontaneous speech. The temporal analysis demonstrated that, while fluctuations were present in all of the emergent factors, the abovementioned ones remained the most frequently cited within each respective category of collective action motivators. The thesis concludes with a contextual discussion of the results as well as limitations to the current work and future directions for further research.

Keywords: collective action, social movements, grievances, perceived injustice, adversarial attributions, blame, negative emotions, intergroup conflict, Lebanon, October 17th, revolution, uprising, LBCI

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

On the evening of October 17, 2019, a small group of Lebanese citizens marched the streets of their neighborhoods, chanting anti-government slogans and calling on their fellow Lebanese to join in protest against a system that has continuously failed them (Faqih, 2019). This small group quickly turned into massive crowds that popped up in different locations across the country after mere hours (Atallah, 2019a). The protests followed a year of economic decline, which resulted in the closure of businesses, higher unemployment numbers, stringent austerity measures, and grim expectations for the Lebanese pound (Sabah, 2019; Abed Al-Hussein, 2019).

In addition to the poor economic situation, more than a hundred reported wildfires spread across several regions in the country a few days before the uprising, leading the Lebanese Civil Defense to announce a state of emergency as scores of people were injured (An-nahar, 2019a). Murmurs about the government's poor response to the fires, or lack thereof, had already started circulating on Lebanese communication platforms (Al-Manar, 2019; An-nahar, 2019b; Al-Joundi & Fakhry, 2019). Moreover, in an attempt to close budget deficits, the government announced the imposition of new taxes in a proposed 2020 budget, hiking up the prices of basic commodities such as gasoline, tobacco, and introducing a usage tax on a number of social media platforms such as WhatsApp (Haboush, 2019; Saarti, 2019; LBCI, 2019b).

Although the people's response in the form of anti-government protests may have been expected, the speed and spontaneity at which the protests spread across different parts of the country could not have been predicted (Faqih, 2019). The present

research is interested in examining some of the social-psychological factors that motivated the Lebanese people to participate in what was seen as the largest anti-system mobilization in the country's recent history (Freiha, 2019). While past research shows that grievances play a central role in motivating collective action (e.g., the Social Identity Model of Collective Action, van Zomeren et al., 2008), it typically does not aim to identify the different types of grievances that motivate collective action. Similarly, social psychological research on collective action typically does not delve into the different types of adversaries/outgroups that protesters perceive, nor does it usually explore the types of emotions that arise in naturalistic settings of collective action, or rarely does it do so in the context of uprisings. The present work aims to expand past research by examining the different types of perceived injustices (*grievances*) which motivated the October 17th Lebanese uprising, in addition to the different outgroups identified by protesters (*adversarial attributions*), and the self-reported negative emotional states of the protesters (*emotions*) as they actively engaged in collective action. We define collective action as any action taken by members of a group "aimed at challenging group-based discrimination or group disadvantage or at ending or preventing an injustice" (Tausch et al., 2011, p. 129).

This thesis offers a qualitative content analysis of the discourse of protesters in live television footage on the first three days of the uprising, examining the types of grievances, adversarial attributions, and negative emotions that emerged. Additionally, we present a quantitative content analysis identifying the most frequently mentioned types of grievances, the most frequently mentioned outgroups identified as culprits, as well as the most frequently cited negative emotions. These frequencies will be discussed in aggregate terms as well as in terms of temporal fluctuations over the first

three days of the uprising. Temporal progress is of particular interest here as this work aims to capture the factors that motivated protesters to take to the streets at the instigation point of the movement and the short period thereafter.

The data that will be analyzed in this work is LBCI's live coverage of the uprising, which consists of almost on-going interviews with protesters on the street once the very first protest on the 17th of October 2019 started gathering a small crowd. The coverage of LBCI quickly turned into an open mic for the protesters to deliver their message to the leadership of the country as well as other Lebanese citizens watching the events of the day unfold in real time. The broadcast was also peppered with interviews with political leaders and other figures of authority about the recent outcry, as well as the regularly scheduled news hours, which again were covering the protests. The selection of the time frame of analysis and our reasoning for zooming in on the first three days of the uprising is detailed in the methodology section of this thesis. We begin with an overview of the Lebanese context, followed by literature on each of the aforementioned factors.

CHAPTER 2

THE LEBANESE CONTEXT

Lebanon is a diverse country of 18 religious sects divided among Muslim, Christian, Druze, and Jewish groups (Traboulsi, 2012). After its independence from the French mandate in 1943, Lebanon was governed by consociationalism, which is a calculated power-sharing system that guaranteed the representation of its diversified sectarian components (Makdisi & Khalil, 2013). According to Traboulsi (2012), this system aimed to achieve harmonious living by ensuring that governance is equitably distributed amongst sects according to sectarian quotas. Of these quotas, the president was to be Christian Maronite, the prime minister Muslim Sunni, and the speaker of parliament Muslim Shi'ite, while parliamentary seats were to be divided on a 6:5 ratio in favor of Christians. This system, however, was eventually contested in the wake of social and demographic changes. The eruption of the Civil War in 1975 eventually led to violent confrontations between armed sectarian groups and involved a challenge to the Christian-dominated power-sharing system.

The end of the 15-year Civil War brought with it the Ta'if Accord, which reaffirmed the power-sharing governance while adjusting the parliamentary representation ratio to 5:5 amongst Muslims and Christians, as well as shifting some of the privileges of the Maronite president to the Sunni prime minister and the Shi'ite speaker of parliament (Makdisi & Khalil, 2013; Traboulsi, 2012). While a handful of the key figures changed, power-sharing was eventually divided among many of the same warlords whose parties fought each other during the Civil War (Traboulsi, 2012). These past warlords (or their children) continue to rule Lebanon to this day. One of the

first legislated laws by the post-war government was the issuance of an amnesty agreement in 1991, approved as law 84 of the Lebanese penal code, which pardoned and prevented the prosecution of war crimes committed during the Civil War era (Legal Informatics Center, 1991; Presidency of the Council of Ministers, 2017).

The Ta'if Accord sought to bring peace to Lebanon following the violence resulting from discord over the consociational system; however, the agreement merely introduced a new distribution of representative quotas, arguably worsening the bitterness brought forth by consociationalism (Traboulsi, 2012). Moreover, due to the representative quotas, the consociational system did not allow for the separation of one's sect from politics, and Lebanese politicians campaigned for posts based on their sectarian affiliations (Di Ricco, 2011). This led to the formation of clientelist networks of political elites that worked hard to maintain and strengthen confession-based political connections, which has further perpetuated the difficulty of separating one's sectarian identity from political participation (Bray-Collins, 2013).

The main political players of Lebanese governance remain virtually unchanged to this day, although they are now repositioned alongside the two politically opposing camps of March 8th and March 14th. These two camps are primarily divided over regional politics and struggle over influence within the country. The March 8th camp is a coalition of political parties allied with Syria and Iran around an axis of resistance to Israeli and U.S. American influence in the region, while the March 14th camp is a coalition of political parties allied with Saudi Arabia and the United States. The two camps were formed in 2005 when the Cedar Revolution erupted in Lebanon with the aim of ending Syrian control over the country, with the March 14th camp leading the revolution against Syrian control and the March 8th camp leading the counter-

revolution. The main players of the March 8th camp currently include two prominent parties with mostly Shi'ite supporters, namely Hezbollah led by Hassan Nasrallah and the Amal movement led by Nabih Berri (Speaker of Parliament), as well as the Free Patriotic Movement with mostly Christian supporters, with Michel Aoun as president of the Lebanese republic and Gebran Bassil as party leader, alongside other smaller political parties. Hezbollah is the only political party that was officially allowed to hold arms after the Civil War ended, as it was leading the resistance against the Israeli occupation of Lebanon. Israel withdrew almost completely from Lebanese territories in 2000. Hezbollah continues to be armed to this day. The March 14th camp includes the Future Movement with mostly Sunni supporters, led by Saad Hariri, prime minister at the time of the October 17th uprising, as well as two parties with mostly Christian supporters, namely the Lebanese Forces led by Samir Geagea, and the Kataeb party led by Sami Gemayel, in addition to the Progressive Socialist Party with mostly Druze supporters, led by Walid Jumblatt. Notably, political parties from both camps have been accused of high-level corruption throughout their years of influence (Salloukh, 2019; Al Jazeera, 2012; Transparency International, 2019).

Social movements to bring an end to the consociational system and demands for secular reforms to overhaul the regime were plentiful throughout the post-Civil War era, but not fruitful (Bray-Collins, 2013). More recently, the civil society led a number of popular campaigns, such as the Laique Pride and the Isqat el Nizam movement, calling for an end to the consociational system (Bahlawan, 2014). As the country grew further divided after the Syrian withdrawal in 2005, leading to the formation of the March 14 and March 8 opposing political camps, which were frequently portrayed as a Sunni-Shi'ite divide (Bray-Collins, 2013), some secular activist groups believed that political

stability in Lebanon is not achievable without secular governance that guaranteed equal status to citizens regardless of their sect (Hamdan, 2011; Muhanna, 2010).

In 2015, a garbage crisis overtook the streets of Lebanon as politicians disputed over contracts with local and international sanitization companies due to conflicts of interest, resulting in mass protests in a number of Lebanese regions (Mohammad, 2018). The resultant 'You Stink' campaign, however, quickly changed from an environmental cause to an anti-government movement (Skaini, 2015) and witnessed the emergence of anti-system slogans, such as 'all of them means all of them'. However, it was unsuccessful at effectively challenging the system (see Kerbage, 2017). Seeing this was fertile ground for change, many new independent candidates ran for the parliamentary elections of 2018, yet following a reformulation of the Lebanese election law in the year prior, only a small number were able to succeed, and the same political forces were reproduced, albeit in altered proportions (El-Helou, 2018).

Following the 2018 parliamentary elections (Maila, 2018), Lebanon witnessed a year of consistent human rights violations such as suppression of the freedom of speech, unlawful arrests, police brutality, and gender- and sexuality-based discrimination, among others (Human Rights Watch, 2019). In addition, the newly formed unity government consisted of a cabinet with opposing perspectives on policymaking. This exacerbated the already faltering structural stability of the country and raised to the forefront an inevitable economic and ecological crisis, fostered by governmental corruption and ever-increasing debt (Atallah, 2019b). In an effort to repay the debt and close the budget deficit, the cabinet proposed a number of new taxes in mid-October 2019 to be implemented as part of the 2020 budget, including ones on tobacco, gasoline, and WhatsApp (Haboush, 2019; Saarti, 2019; LBCI, 2019b). As the news of

the proposed budget broke out, people took to the streets on the evening of October 17, 2019 to protest the new austerity measures and the government's consistent failure to intercept the many crises it has imposed on the country (An-nahar, 2019c; Darkoub, 2019; Fayyad, 2019b).

We now move to an overview of literature on the relevant factors that have been studied as motivators for collective action, starting with an examination of theory and past research on perceived injustice. Subsequently, we briefly discuss the contribution of research within the social identity perspective, followed by literature on adversarial attributions and the allocation of blame. The final section of this literature review tackles theory and past research on the role of negative emotions in motivating collective action. We end the section on each of the above motivating factors with a brief discussion that relates the reviewed literature back to the Lebanese context in conjunction with relevant local news reports on the uprising.

CHAPTER 3

REVIEWED LITERATURE

3.1. Grievances

This study aimed to expand past research by examining the different types of perceived injustices that motivated the October 17th uprising. We first detail some of the prominent theoretical approaches to the link between grievances and collective action, followed by an overview of empirical work on this link, and conclude with the specific aims of the current work.

"At the heart of every protest are grievances", writes Klandermans (2014, p. 5). When a negative discrepancy arises between what an individual believes they are rightfully entitled to receive and what they actually receive, they are likely to perceive their situation as unjust (Crosby, 1982). Perceptions of injustice, in turn, may result in negative emotions, such as anger, which have been repeatedly shown to translate into collective action if experienced on a group level, that is, experienced as *shared* grievances (Stürmer & Simon, 2004). The link from shared grievances (or perceived injustice) to collective action has been theorized through a number of approaches, the relevant ones of which are explored in the sections to follow.

3.1.1. Relative Deprivation Theory (RDT)

The Theory of Relative Deprivation, as (re-)conceptualized by Runciman (1966), aimed to explain how grievances may be experienced on a personal and group level. RDT stipulates that individuals may feel personally deprived when they compare their situation to that of other individuals, while they may feel deprived as a group when

they compare their group's situation to that of another group, or to the situation of their own group at a different point in the past (Smith & Ortiz, 2002). According to the theory, experiencing group-based deprivation is more predictive of collective action than experiencing personal deprivation. This is corroborated by meta-analytic evidence from Smith and Ortiz (2002) and Stürmer and Simon (2004).

Tyler and Smith (1998) write that the relative aspect of RDT is core to the theory as it lends reason to why deprivation may not be experienced by objectively disadvantaged groups or experienced by objectively advantaged groups. Experiencing deprivation is relative because it depends on the status of the comparison target that group members decide to use as a reference point. That is, an advantaged group may choose to compare its status to that of a more advantaged group and feel relatively deprived; likewise, a disadvantaged group may choose a more disadvantaged group as its target of comparison and not experience relative deprivation.

As such, past work has demonstrated that it is comparison-based (relative) deprivation that is more meaningful for collective action, as opposed to objective or absolute deprivation (see Smith et al., 2012 for a review). Moreover, another line of research suggests that the combined experience of both personal and group-based relative deprivation, coined as Double Relative Deprivation (DRD), predicts collective action participation over and above the unique pathways of personal and group relative deprivation (Foster & Matheson, 1995).

3.1.2. Distributive and Procedural Justice

Tyler and Smith (1998) have subsequently argued that Relative Deprivation Theory does not address how disadvantaged group members become aware of their

disadvantage. One model that does so, they note, is Adams's (1966) Equity Theory, which posits that evaluations of fairness are made based on judgements of equal reward for comparable contribution, that is, *distributive justice*. Individuals who perceive a negative discrepancy between expectations and reality will judge the outcome as unfair, which results in distress. This distress is perceived distributive injustice. *Procedural justice*, on the other hand, is concerned with fairness evaluations of the decision-making procedures that resulted in the outcome in question (Thibaut & Walker, 1975). Concerns with distributive justice often overlap with those of procedural justice, in that individuals may evaluate an objectively unfair outcome as fair if the decision-making procedure that resulted in the outcome was perceived as fair (Ambrose & Arnaud, 2005).

The real-world applicability of the principles behind Equity Theory have been scrutinized by researchers who have reasoned that equity concerns cannot be generalized to all social relationships (e.g., Deutsch, 1975; Sampson, 1975). Deutsch (1975) explains that the focus on equity is perhaps a byproduct of the nature of Western societies' concern with economic matters, which has been reflected in the field of social psychological research as equity becoming the central principle to distributive justice concerns. The author notes that this perspective limits the understanding of other social interactions not governed by input/output ratios.

In his 1975 paper, Deutsch outlines four types of injustices that may occur with regard to the distribution of benefits and harms, which may be driven by:

> "The *values* [emphasis added] underlying the distribution of benefits and harms, the *rules* [emphasis added] by which the values are operationalized, the *implementation* [emphasis added] of the rules, or the *procedures* [emphasis added] for determining which values, rulers, or practices shall be employed. The scope of applicability of one's concepts of justice is determined by the scope of one's perceived community." (p. 143).

Depending on the situation, individuals will employ one or more of the above conceptualizations of distributive justice when assessing the fairness of the allocation of benefits and harms to their group. The author also notes that the boundaries of the ingroup changes depending on the context. For example, when considering the benefits and harms of climate change, all of human life may be thought of as the ingroup, while only the core family unit may be perceived as the ingroup when thinking of relocation for work, for instance.

Empirical research has traditionally tested the impact of experimentally manipulating perceptions of distributive and procedural justice on intentions to engage in collective action (e.g., Greenberg, 1987; van Zomeren et al., 2004; van Zomeren et al., 2012; see Ambrose & Arnaud, 2005 for a review of conceptualizations of procedural and distributive justice). However, from an applied perspective, we argue that it is more meaningful to understand the content and the type of the grievances that are generated from the context, especially so when examining the motivating factors behind a specific event, such as the October 17th uprising. Understanding what mobilizes people in a given context can help inform both those who wish to mobilize others in the future, such as civil societies and activist groups, as well as policy makers seeking to address and resolve the people's grievances.

3.1.3. The Social Identity Model of Collective Action (SIMCA)

One of the propositions of the Social Identity Model of Collective Action (SIMCA; van Zomeren et al., 2008), which will be expanded upon in the following section of this review, is that the experience of injustice provides a unique explanation for the occurrence of collective action, bridged by the role of social identification.

Specifically, and in line with previous meta-analytic work on relative deprivation, perceptions of affective injustice were a stronger predictor of collective action than non-affective injustice. Smith and Ortiz (2002) demonstrated that feelings of relative deprivation (affective injustice) were more strongly related to collective action than mere cognitions and perceptions of relative deprivation (non-affective injustice). As will be further discussed in the upcoming part on *Emotions*, shared affective injustice gives rise to group-based negative emotions, underlined by heightened group identification, which then predicts specific action tendencies against the object of the negative emotion (Mackie et al., 2000). Taken together, and as synthesized by SIMCA, collective action has been consistently shown to stem from collective experiences of injustice, or shared grievances, through the politicization of highly identified group members.

3.1.4. The Lebanese Context and Grievances

One of the main limitations of the above approaches is the lack of a typology that lays out the specific grievances associated with particular social movements. That is, the approaches are not interested in identifying the type and content of grievances seen to be contextually important. Instead, perceived injustice is frequently conceptualized as a single construct (e.g., Odağ et al., 2016; Simon & Klandermans, 2001; van Zomeren et al., 2008). This work aimed to identify the grievances that were central to the October 17th uprising based on protesters' spontaneous expressions of their reasons for protesting. This will shed light on what truly mattered for people and what motivated them to take to the streets. Understanding the specific grievances that motivated people to mobilize is pivotal in capturing a more holistic image of why and

how such a spontaneous uproar took place. Moreover, from an applied perspective, this understanding can help inform both those who wish to address the grievances and those who wish to use them to their advantage in future mobilization.

Based on local news reports, grievances expressed by protesters included concerns over corruption and clientelism, unemployment and nepotism, access to education, health care, electricity, clean water, and the suppression of the freedom of speech (Atallah, 2019a; Battah, 2019). This present research examines the grievances that were most important contextually. As such, the above grievances were used as predetermined codes in the coding process of the data, while also allowing for novel codes to emerge through qualitative content analysis. We now move to an overview of theory and past research on the role of social identification in motivating collective action.

3.2. Social Identification

Social identity was theorized by Simon (1999) as a space a person occupies in society. The most prominent definition of social identification in the social psychological literature is that it is "that part of an individual's self-concept which derives from his (sic) knowledge of his (sic) membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership" (Tajfel, 1978, p. 63). Identity processes have been theorized in terms of the Social Identity Theory (SIT; Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and Self-Categorization Theory (SCT; Turner et al., 1987), known together as the social identity perspective.

3.2.1. The Social Identity Perspective: SIT, SCT, and SIMCA

One of the most widely cited frameworks of identity is the Social Identity Theory (SIT; Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel & Turner, 1979), which has informed the field of collective action research for many years (e.g., Ellemers et al., 1993; Mummendey et al., 1999; Stathi et al., 2019; van Zomeren et al., 2004; van Zomeren et al., 2008; see Hornsey, 2008; Breinlinger & Kelly, 2014 for reviews). Proponents of the theory posit that social interactions fall on a spectrum of extremes, ranging from interpersonal on one end, to intergroup on the other. Consequently, social interactions occurring on the interpersonal end of the spectrum are strictly individualistic in nature as they do not evoke any social representations. Here, one's self-concept depends on the attitudes, behaviors, and cognitions that define an individual's personal identity. Conversely, intergroup interactions occur when individuals view themselves as prototypes of their social groups; here, one's self concept depends on the individual's appraisals of their social group, as well as the perceived benefits and consequences of group membership.

According to classical SIT, in order for individuals to engage in collective action, they need to perceive a common negative fate with other group members, that is, see themselves as being 'stuck' with their group in a status of disadvantage (impermeability in intergroup status boundaries), but stuck unfairly (illegitimate intergroup status differentials), and envision an alternative social system where their ingroup can gain higher status (unstable ingroup status). In other words, when members of a disadvantaged group perceive the status differential between their own group and other groups in the social system as illegitimate and unstable, they are more likely to identify with their disadvantaged ingroup and participate in collective action to advance

their social status (e.g., Ellemers, 1993). In sum, SIT posits that higher identification with the disadvantaged ingroup predicts engagement in collective action.

Stürmer and Simon (2004) aimed to advance the predictions of SIT by arguing that politicized identification, particularly identification with social movement organizations (SMOs) concerned with the plight of a given disadvantaged group, is an even stronger predictor of collective action than stand-alone identification with the larger disadvantaged group. Cumulative evidence for the link between social identification and collective action through politicized identification comes from the Social Identity Model of Collective Action (SIMCA; van Zomeren et al., 2008). SIMCA was the result of a meta-analysis of socio-psychological research aimed at examining the effects of identity, perceived injustice, and perceived group efficacy (defined by Bandura (1995) as "people's beliefs in their joint capabilities" in resolving their grievances; p. 33) on collective action. The meta-analysis showed that all of these factors uniquely and positively predicted collective action intentions, and less strongly, collective action behavior. SIMCA integrated these effects into a predictive model that holds at its core identity as directly predicting collective action, and indirectly through the pathways of perceived injustice and perceived group efficacy. In other words, individuals high on group identification are more likely to perceive injustice as affecting the group as a whole (i.e., experience group-based relative deprivation), and are thus more likely to engage, or show intentions to engage, in collective action on behalf of their group. Moreover, consistent with previous findings (e.g., Stürmer & Simon, 2004), SIMCA demonstrates that identification with a politicized identity is a more proximal predictor of collective action than identification with an un-politicized identity.

Given the importance of social identity to collective action, we originally aimed to examine the different identities which were at play during the early beginnings of the October 17th Lebanese uprising, namely the different identities that were evoked through the spontaneous speech of protesters. However, we ended up foregoing this analysis for reasons explained in Appendix A. We nevertheless still briefly reviewed the role of identification in collective action in this literature review as a recognition of its importance and to clarify that its omission from our analysis is not an oversight but rather a decision born out of the analytic process itself. In the section to follow, we move to discuss the second side of contentious social interactions by examining how the outgroup is identified and perceived to be responsible for the misfortune of the ingroup through the 'us' versus 'them' dichotomy.

3.3. Adversarial Attributions

A second main aim of this work was to identify the different actors that were the target of blame for the Lebanese people's predicament during the October 17th uprising. In this section, we offer a brief review of how previous works have dealt with the concept of adversarial attribution and blame allocation, followed by empirical evidence for the role of these attributions in motivating collective action. We conclude the section with a discussion of the current context.

When tackling the identity aspect of collective action, research typically focuses on the identity processes of the members of the disadvantaged ingroup (e.g., van Zomeren et al., 2008), and less so on how the outgroup is conceptually formed. Simon and Klandermans (2001) use the term 'adversarial attribution' to describe a part of the politicization process concerned with allocating blame to "an external opponent or

enemy, such as a specific outgroup, an authority, or 'the system'" (p. 325). These blame attributions, which are accompanied by demands for retribution, are allocated to a party that is perceived to be responsible for the disadvantaged group's misfortune. While blame may be a natural reflex in any unfortunate situation, as it is human nature to look for meaning, the literature on blame attribution distinguishes between the possible antecedents and outcomes of internal and external attributions of blame (Gurr, 2015).

Internal attributions of blame are directed toward oneself or the ingroup. Frijda et al. (1989) found that internal attributions elicit negative feelings such as shame, guilt, and regret, which implicate self-agency features. In particular, shame was found to correspond to the action readiness of the desire to disappear, further illustrating its self-focused nature. Other research (e.g., Allpress et al., 2014; Lickel et al., 2005) illustrates that vicarious and group-based experiences of guilt and shame are associated with self- or ingroup-focused attributions for the source of these negative emotions (i.e., blame). Internal attributions of blame, therefore, are argued to inhibit politicization (Simon & Klandermans, 2001). External attributions of blame, or adversarial attributions, on the other hand, further the process of politicization, as they hold an external party, or an outgroup, responsible for the ingroup's predicament, thus enhancing the distinction between 'us' and 'them' (Simon & Klandermans, 2001). This distinction will in turn enhance the salience of the group's social identity, now politicized, which in turn leads to a perpetual cycle of othering the outgroup and identifying more strongly with the ingroup.

Literature on blame attribution distinguishes between the outcomes of attributing blame to a specified culprit (specific blame), and the outcomes of perceiving blame as diffused amongst many culprits (unspecific blame; Iyengar, 1989). Javeline

(2003) explains that attributing blame to a specific culprit from the political elite is more challenging for potential protesters from the general public because structural organizations, such as governments, often consist of responsibility-diffusing decision-making hierarchies that facilitate the blurring of accountability. More so, the author explains that specific blame allocation is more difficult in times of political protest where information on culpability is not readily available and where politicians may take advantage of the chaotic situation to further perpetuate the confusion. The combination of these factors makes it more difficult for people to attribute blame to a specified entity (Javeline, 2003).

In her study on the 1998 Russian wage crisis, which revolved around chronic wage delays and nonpayment, Javeline (2003) surveyed a large national sample and found that the majority of those who did not protest the delay of wages did so because it was unclear to them against whom they were protesting. On the other hand, those who allocated blame to a specific culprit, even if this allocation was inaccurate or misinformed, were more likely to protest. The author's argument, here, is that the more specific the blame is, the more it is likely for collective action to occur, within the context of shy mobilization in response to economic downfall. The current work, however, aims to explain mass mobilization, as opposed to its absence. Moreover, since the context at hand is that of an uprising, it is expected that blame would be attributed to a number of different systemic targets, since the social change goal here is revolutionary (Sweetman et al., 2013). Nevertheless, Javeline's (2003) argument of the multiplicity of the targets of blame being associated with decreased mobilization might hold true in situations where the social change goal is not a revolutionary one.

3.3.1. The Lebanese Context and Adversarial Attributions

To our knowledge, there is little social-psychological research on adversarial attributions and collective action. This study aims to explore the ways in which protesters allocated blame when airing their grievances in order to formulate a typology of the different adversaries that were implicated during the uprising. In line with the politicization process proposed by Simon and Klandermans (2001), we anticipate that attributions of blame to an external adversary will be one of the defining features of our data as the context in question is a highly politicized one. Moreover, we expect to see the emergence of a number of different external targets of blame due to the revolutionary social change goal of the movement (Sweetman et al., 2013), which would logically be accompanied by dissatisfaction with multiple aspects of governance. Specifically, and based on local reports (e.g., Information International, 2019), we expect the system as a whole to be one of the main targets of blame. As such, we propose to predetermine the code of 'the system' in the coding process of the data as an example of an external adversary. By contrast, codes of the many other anticipated adversaries identified by the protesters should emerge through the exploratory fashion of our content analysis. Next, we turn to theoretical and empirical considerations of the role of emotions in motivating collective action followed by a consideration of the Lebanese context.

3.4. Emotions

For the purpose of complete transparency, we begin this section by noting that the proposal for this thesis did not initially consider the role of emotions as a motivator for collective action. As such, emotions were integrated into this work subsequently, but

were a part of the coding of the data from the beginning, as will be detailed in the methodology section. Here, the aim is to report on the prototypical emotions that have been studied in the literature on collective action; however, in actual effect our coding process for *Emotions* was exploratory.

While this work did not initially plan to examine the role of emotions in motivating the October 17th uprising, the data we analyzed contained a considerable percentage of emotion-related codes that we could not ignore. Moreover, examining the role of emotions in motivating mass movements is not a novel approach as emotions have been studied in conjunction to many facets related to collective action such as grievances (e.g., Stürmer & Simon, 2004) and efficacy (e.g., van Zomeren et al., 2004). In this section, we first offer a theoretical overview of appraisal theories of emotions and intergroup emotion theory, followed by empirical evidence for the link between emotions and collective action, and conclude with a discussion of the Lebanese context.

3.4.1. Emotional Appraisal and Intergroup Emotion Theory

Emotions play an important role in social movements in that they constitute one of the core motivators to participate in collective action (van Zomeren, 2013). This begins with emotions experienced at the level of the individual, which are conceptualized by appraisal theories of emotion as complex responses to specific situations that elicit highly differentiated cognitions, feelings, and action tendencies (Mackie et al., 2000). Specific emotions experienced at the individual level are triggered by particular appraisals (or assessments) of whether or not an event seems to bode in the individual's favor, and whether or not the individual has the capacity to cope with the said event. Depending on the situation, cognitive appraisals elicit specific emotional

experiences (e.g., Roseman et al., 1990), which, in turn, trigger specific action tendencies (e.g., Frijda et al., 1989). For example, anger directed at another person is often interpreted as resulting from appraisals that the other has harmed the self and that the self is capable of defending against this harm. In turn, anger at another individual leads to the action tendency of directing aggression toward the other (Mackie et al., 2000).

However, in order for action to take place at the collective level, emotions promoting the action tendency to move against the other ought to take place at the collective level as well. Self-Categorization Theory (SCT; Turner et al., 1987) offers a solution for this by positing that group members will no longer think of themselves as unique individuals when their social identity is made salient, but rather as exemplars of the group. The mechanisms of identity saliency were theorized by SCT as operating on different levels of inclusiveness and exclusiveness, activated contextually. The theory offers three levels of self-categorization: the human identity, the superordinate inclusive level; the social identity, the intermediate level, defined through memberships in certain social groups but not others; and the personal identity, the subordinate exclusive level, defined by one's own self-categorization. Importantly, Turner and colleagues (1987) argue that levels of identity become salient antagonistically, such that when one level becomes more salient, other levels decrease in saliency. With relevance to the current discussion, when the social (or group) identity switch is turned on, the other levels of identity are dimmed down, lending reason to no longer viewing oneself as a unique individual, but as an exemplar of the group. By doing so, group members perceive the similarities between themselves and other members as more salient, in turn essentially

confusing their own characteristics with those typical of their ingroup (Mackie, 1986; Smith & Henry, 1996).

Based on this understanding, E. R. Smith (1993) developed a model of intergroup emotions that was based on notions of social identification with the ingroup. The model proposed that when the social identity is made salient, ingroup members experience emotions on behalf of the ingroup even if the matter does not personally concern the group members as individuals. The ingroup members will then cognitively appraise the situation to assess whether or not it benefits the ingroup. As such, appraisals of events concerning the social identity activate specific emotions toward the outgroup, or intergroup emotions. These intergroup emotions in turn result in action tendencies directed at the outgroup, an example of which is moving against the outgroup through collective action as a response to group-based anger (van Zomeren, 2013).

With this knowledge in mind, we move to examine the literature on the role of emotions in motivating collective action tendencies. This work will review the emotions most commonly studied in relation to collective action by disadvantaged groups, namely anger, but also a close cousin which might be relevant in the context we are examining, that is, contempt. That said, our content analysis has allowed for the bottom-up emergence of novel emotions from the data, which will be discussed in the results and discussion sections.

3.4.2. Emotions and Collective Action

3.4.2.1. Anger

Anger is typically associated with the intentions to take action against the target of anger, as it is often characterized by a high level of arousal (Averill, 1983). At the intergroup level, Montada and Schneider (1989) found that anger is associated with the action tendency of confronting those perceived as responsible for inflicting injustice.

Mackie et al. (2000) theorized that the emotion of anger is linked to offensive action tendencies, such as moving against the outgroup, while other negative emotions such as fear should not promote such offensive action. Their work provided empirical support for the above hypothesis in the context of opinion-based groups among undergraduate students: when the ingroup was perceived as having the social support it needed (perceived as capable), ingroup members were more willing to report aggressive action tendencies toward the outgroup such as confronting, opposing, or attacking the outgroup.

In a similar vein, Pennekamp et al. (2007) investigated the role of anger among two disadvantaged groups in encouraging action against those responsible for the inflicted injustices. Focusing on two different groups, the first being individuals of Surinamese descent, a formerly enslaved colony of the Netherlands, the second being women, the authors examined the antecedents and consequences of group-based anger directed at the Dutch people, for the former group, and at men, for the latter group. Studying these two groups simultaneously allowed for the provision of evidence from both people who have experienced injustice in the past (the Surinamese people) and people who continue to experience ongoing injustice (women). This is interesting because it demonstrates that the disadvantage need not to be currently taking place in

order for people to feel angry, as the mere memory of injustice, even of events that transpired over a century prior as in the case of the Surinamese people, is sufficient to retrigger group-based anger toward the oppressors.

Importantly, Pennekamp et al.'s (2007) work took into account the role of domain relevance, a concept that distinguishes how important or relevant the disadvantage is to the members of the group in question. Domain relevance played a stronger role for the Surinamese group, whereby participants who viewed the slavery past of their ancestors as more personally relevant experienced more anger toward the outgroup (the Dutch people). For both the Surinamese and the women's group, however, the results showed that both domain relevance and group-based anger predicted tendencies to engage in collective action in demand of reparations for the ingroup. These findings are consistent with the conceptualization of anger as an action-oriented emotion (e.g., Carver & Harmon-Jones, 2009; Walker & Smith, 2002). Notably, the above research tackles action tendencies, or intentions to engage in collective action, and not actual engagement. The present work aims to examine how anger was expressed by those actively engaging in protest, thus extending the evidence on the important role of anger in motivating collective action.

3.4.2.2. Contempt

Tausch et al. (2011) were interested in studying how two forms of negative emotions can motivate two different forms of collective action. Within the context of intergroup conflict, Tausch et al. (2011) hypothesized that anger will more strongly predict normative forms of collective action, such as petition signing, sit-ins, and demonstrations, that seek to enhance the situation for the ingroup from within the

system, while contempt will more strongly predict non-normative forms of collective action, such as riots and different forms of political violence, that seek to attack the system and those deemed responsible for the ingroup's predicament. The reasoning for this distinction was based on the work of Fischer and Roseman (2007) who provided evidence for anger and contempt being closely related yet distinct emotional experiences. Fischer and Roseman (2007) demonstrated that anger usually occurs in contexts of close relationships where some degree of control over the other person, the target of anger, still remains, and where reconciliation and the resolution of the conflict, rather than the destruction of the relationship, are the sought-after goals. Contempt, on the other hand, occurs in relationships of a lesser or no intimate nature, where anger has occurred in the past and has not been resolved, and where conflict resolution and reconciliation are no longer the desired goals (Fisher & Roseman, 2007). Contempt, then, can best be understood as an experience of unresolved and accumulated anger toward the same target that often results in permanent damage to the contemptuous relationship.

Because such emotions often lead to the desire of distancing oneself from the target of contempt, Tausch et al. (2011) theorized that non-normative forms of action would be associated with this emotional experience in an intergroup setting. The authors tested this hypothesis in three different contexts of intergroup conflict: first, in relation to students protests against hikes of tuition fees in Germany; second, in relation to action support of Indian Muslims who have suffered economic and social disadvantage as a group for decades; and third, in relation to British Muslims' attitudes toward UK foreign policy. Results from all of the above contexts provided evidence for the authors' hypotheses: contempt was more positively related to willingness to engage

in, or support for (or less opposition to) more extreme, non-normative forms of collective action. Likewise, the results showed that, across the three settings, anger was a better predictor of intentions to engage in more normative forms of collective action.[1]

Furthering this line of research, Becker and Tausch (2015) presented a dynamic model of engagement in collective action which holds at its core the distinction between anger and contempt and the consequences to which they lead. The model proposed that engagement in normative versus non-normative forms of collective action is predicted by both different emotions and differently perceived group efficacy, in line with Tausch et al. (2011). The combination of anger in response to injustice coupled with high levels of perceived group efficacy was found to predict engagement in normative forms of collective action, while feelings of contempt coupled with low levels of perceived group efficacy was found to predict engagement in non-normative forms of collective action. This was again in line with Fischer and Roseman's (2007) conceptualization of anger as a short-term emotion that allows room for reconciliation between the contending groups and contempt as a long-term emotion associated with morality-laden judgements of the opponent's characteristics, thus triggering radical action intentions such as non-normative forms of collective action.

In summary, literature on the role of contempt in motivating collective action has repeatedly shown that contempt is an emotion separate from anger that better predicts non-normative or radical forms of collective action.

1 Except for the latter context of British Muslims' attitudes toward UK foreign policy, where anger was related to support for violent action only toward military, and not civilian, targets.

3.4.3. The Lebanese Context and Emotions

Since the overarching aim of this work was to closely examine the motivating factors that were at play during the instigation of the October 17th uprising, we aimed to explore the roles of emotions traditionally found to motivate collective action such as anger and contempt but also to offer a profile of any other emotions that were verbalized by the protesters as they actively protested. We reasoned that this bottom-up approach would allow us to uncover emotions not traditionally studied in the field, due to contextual novelty of the research.

Both local (Abi Samra, 2019; Gergis, 2019; Raseef22, 2019) and international (El Houri, 2019; Patience, 2019) news sources reported an overwhelming state of collective anger, some even dubbing it a "burst" (Abou Khalil, 2019) during the early days of the Lebanese uprising. Some reports spoke of a chaotic emotional state (Hachem, 2019); others wrote about unified elation (Ayoub, 2019). While other emotional states such as unrest (Khoury, 2019) and hope (Al-Amil, 2019) were also present in the rhetoric, they do not characterize the overall atmosphere of the beginning of the uprising. Nevertheless, as the category of emotions was not considered for this work a priori, we did not approach the coding process with any predetermined codes for emotions. Therefore, all of the findings on emotions reported hereinafter come as a result of the exploratory analysis of the protesters' spontaneous speech. In the following section, we turn to a brief discussion of the temporal aspect of this thesis.

3.5. Temporality

Temporal changes in the features of a movement are usually examined over long periods of months and often years of political unrest. An example of such a case is the

mapping of the emotional climate as perceived by the general public in Tunisia, an analysis that extended over a period of 4 years following the start of the Tunisian revolution (Rimé et al., 2017). The Lebanese uprising, undisputedly, consisted of several consecutive months of ongoing collective action, with some believing that the revolution is still ongoing after more than two years since its instigation, but has taken a different mode of action. To that end, while the longitudinal exploration of the stages through which the uprising has passed will indeed offer major points of interest, the purpose of this work is to propose a profile or a typology of motivating factors at the instigation point of the uprising and the short period that followed the onset of the first protest. As we embark on this task, we zoom in on the events of the first three days to outline the main features of the movement as it amassed public support and arguably set the tone of the months to follow.

CHAPTER 4

STUDY AIMS AND DATA

4.1. Aims

The current study aims to examine some of the social-psychological factors that motivated people to spontaneously take to the streets on October 17, 2019. The analysis relies on the discourse of protesters during the live broadcast of LBCI of the first 72 hours of the uprising, focusing on identifying the types of grievances that were at play, the different adversaries blamed for these grievances, and the emotional experiences as verbalized by protesters. We also aim to analyze the occurrence frequencies of the above factors, both in aggregate terms and over the first three days of the movement. As mentioned earlier, this fine-grained temporal analysis of the uprising's events will allow for a deeper understanding of the instigating factors that motivated people to take action.

From a theoretical standpoint, this analysis aims to fill the gap in the literature of conceptualizing grievances as a single construct in collective action research (e.g., Odağ et al., 2016; Simon & Klandermans, 2001; van Zomeren et al., 2008) by examining the content of the grievances that were cited by the protesters. Moreover, this work offers a mapping of the different targets that were identified as being perceived as responsible for the country's deteriorating socioeconomic situation, in addition to an exploration of the emotions that were present in a revolutionary context, beyond the traditionally studied ones. In other words, this work aims to offer a typology of collective action motivating factors through a novel approach of bottom-up exploratory analyses of the free speech of protesters. From an applied perspective, on the other hand, the current

work will help inform both activist groups as well as policymakers on the specific factors that motivated people to take to the streets during the uprising.

4.2. The Data

The proposed study will involve a content analysis of live coverage of the first few days of the uprising in which protesters spoke to reporters on television. We focus in particular on footage from the local television channel LBCI. The live coverage illustrates two key points: first, it provides a glimpse of what people were citing as their reasons for protesting, and second, it shows what those who were not protesting were exposed to on television. Despite the limitations of this approach, it also has various benefits which we explain in the sections below.

According to their website, LBCI was established during the Civil War era as the first national Lebanese broadcasting agency (The Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation International, n.d.). In recent court disputes over ownership of the channel, the Lebanese Forces (a Christian Nationalist party led by Samir Geagea) accused Pierre El Daher, the CEO of LBCI, of using the channel as a platform for misinformation, claiming that El Daher never purchased the rights to the company from the Lebanese Forces (An-nahar, 2018). After a judge ruled in the favor of LBCI (An-nahar, 2019d), a charged back-and-forth erupted between the channel and Geagea, who opposed the ruling but did not challenge the verdict through legal appeal (LBCI, 2019a). Despite these disputes, a study on media trust showed that the majority of a national sample trusted LBCI as a source for updates on the October 17th uprising (Melki & Kozman, 2020).

Reflecting on the source of the data, one may wonder if the field reporter's affiliation to a television channel such as LBCI may have had an effect on what protesters chose to say. While social desirability would still be at play in survey and interview data, it should be at its maximum during a live broadcast since there is no anonymity/confidentiality and protesters are aware, or at least may have an idea, of the size of their audience when they speak on television.

Notwithstanding the possible personal, sectarian, and political biases that may arise from data generated by LBCI, as well as possible negative reactions to the channel's field reporters, the live coverage offers a myriad of unique insights. As mentioned above, the data provides a glimpse of people's stated reasons for protesting. Those who agreed to, and at times spontaneously chose to, speak to the field reporters, were well aware that what they say will be seen and heard by hundreds of thousands around the country. They are likely to have cited the true factors that motivated them to protest and, given the very brief airtime each individual was allowed, focused on what is most important and meaningful to them. Moreover, those who encouraged others to mobilize not only cited the reasons that mobilized them, but also the reasons they believed to be important enough for others to join in mass mobilization.

Although this method may not be ideal to study people's motivations to mobilize, it is expanding knowledge from an angle that is unconventional and novel in the field of social movement research (Della Porta, 2014). More commonly used methods in studying social movements are surveys and protester interviews, using either evidence-based scales or open-ended questions, according to Della Porta (2014). However, important differences appear when comparing survey or interview data with data generated from a live broadcast. The live coverage offers naturalistic data, as

protesters' speech is a deliberate act of self-expression and constitutes an act of protest in and of itself. As such, the live coverage captures the spontaneity of the uprising, a key element in this context, and the rawness of people's emotions. The present data is therefore accessing people's real-time thoughts and emotions, in ways in which survey and interview data cannot.

The larger issue with traditional research practices in the context of a national uprising, however, is the element of time. Surveys and interviews alike take time to be prepared, and approvals of ethics boards usually extend that period. Without prior knowledge that mass protests are to occur, surveys and interviews fail to capture the early beginnings of such events. Data generated from live broadcasts holds the advantage of time in this sense, as individuals are spoken to during the act of protesting. Since this analysis is interested in the motivating factors that ignited the uprising, such data is fertile ground for our work.

The second benefit of the LBCI live coverage is gaining insight on what people were exposed to on television. As the protests grew in numbers from one day to the next (Obeid et al., 2019), it can be argued that individuals who joined the movement in subsequent days were exposed to protesters citing their motivations to protest on television. Consequently, people's exposure to the coverage of the early hours of the uprising arguably helped shape their perception of, and perhaps future engagement in, the protests.

To summarize, the data and methodology used in this analysis are not without their limitations, and they do not neatly fall under any of the conventional practices of social movement research (Della Porta, 2014). Nevertheless, given the characteristics of the event of interest, the content of the data, and the novel approach of the analysis, we

reason that the possible benefits of this analysis's outcomes outweigh the drawbacks of the data's nature and present a unique and innovative methodological approach to the study of collective action.

CHAPTER 5

METHODOLOGY

5.1 Materials

5.1.1 Source of Materials

This work used the footage of LBCI's live coverage of the first three days of the October 17th uprising. In a working paper on media uses and trust during protests, Melki and Kozman (2020) reported that the majority (88.2%) of a Lebanese nationally representative sample (N = 1000) relied on television sources for information on the ongoing protests, with WhatsApp and Facebook following in second and third place, respectively. Out of the six local television stations[2] that were reviewed, LBCI was found to attract 58.4% of surveyed viewers, and registered the second highest level of viewer trust, at 54.8%.[3]

Accordingly, we approached LBCI with a request to share their live coverage of the protests, as they were consistently reporting on the events of the uprising (Battah, 2019). The station was contacted through the general address on its website (support@lbcgroup.tv), was promptly responsive, and a representative connected with the Primary Investigator to arrange for data transfer.[4]

2 The reviewed TV stations were Al-Jadeed, LBCI, MTV, OTV, al-Manar, and NBN.

3 The survey by Melki and Kozman (2020) reported that Al-Jadeed attracted 62.9% of surveyed viewers, and registered the highest level of trust at 55.5%, while MTV came in third place after LBCI in terms of trust, at 43.7%.

4 Al-Jadeed was also contacted through the mailing address provided on its website (info@aljadeed.tv); however, they were unresponsive to a number of emails from the PI and no attempts of contacting them over the phone were made. Several months after we received the footage utilized in this thesis from LBCI, we were able to obtain some footage from Al-Jadeed as well. Regrettably, the footage was not timestamped (with both date and time) and had a number of gaps in the coverage. For this reason, in addition to the fact that we received the Al-Jadeed footage after the majority of the one from LBCI was transcribed and the coding process had begun, we could not utilize the data we received from Al-Jadeed.

5.1.2. Selection of Analysis Time Frame

A preliminary timeline of the first few days of the uprising (Appendix B) was manually constructed by triangulating data from different sources to map out the main events of October 17 through October 20, 2019. Both Arabic and English, and some French, news sources were taken into account. The timeline informed us on the possible cut-off points at which the analysis is to end. It was a given that the time frame of the analysis would begin on the evening of Thursday the 17th of October, although the exact starting time is not clear as each news agency reported a different time for when the protests began. As such, and since we were limited by the available data, the beginning of the time frame of this analysis was the beginning of LBCI's live broadcast covering the protests.

Initially, the time frame of the analysis was supposed to cover approximately 55 hours of footage, from the beginning of the protests on October 17 to the end of the broadcast on October 20. The reasoning for this was to analyze the speech of protesters from the very beginning of the mass movement to its peak on the Sunday that followed, in line with reports that Sunday's protests were the largest recorded protests in modern Lebanese history (Annahar, 2019). However, the process of data coding proved to be particularly challenging and lengthy for a single coder. Thus, due to this limitation, the analysis time frame had to be reduced to include approximately 42 hours of LBCI footage, ending on the night of Saturday, October 19, just before the start of Sunday's mass mobilization. We argue that this approach puts adequate closure to the analysis, as the final event that takes place on the night of October 19 is the resignation of the ministers of the Lebanese Forces from the then-government. Informed by the data, we

considered this move to be the first concrete response from the leadership to the protests and to the most frequently cited demand of governmental resignation.

5.2. Procedure

The data was secured from the LBCI headquarters by the author on a password-protected external hard drive disc. The footage that entered the analysis was approximately 42 hours in length, while the total received footage was approximately 65 hours long.[5]

5.2.1. Transcription

The footage was transcribed in Lebanese Colloquial Arabic to best represent the protesters' spontaneous speech. Undergraduate students in psychology were recruited as research assistants (RAs) to transcribe approximately 95% of the footage that entered the analysis, while the author transcribed the remainder.[6] When the transcription was completed, the author cross-checked all the transcripts against the video footage to detect and fix any possible errors.

5.2.2. Coding

The quantification and generation of codes were done manually on excel spreadsheets. Coding was done in 1's and 0's, whereby 1's indicated the presence of a specific code in a protester's utterance and 0's indicated its absence. Whenever a new

5 The remaining footage hours that were not used consisted of coverage of events after our analysis cut-off point.

6 The RAs were selected from a pool of applicants based on the accuracy of their work on a sample task, as well as self-reports of language skills and speed of transcription. The footage files were shared through view-only Google Drive links, and the RAs were asked to sign a Code of Honor pledging not to reshare the data.

code was detected, an extra column was inserted under the relevant category and all utterances that took place before this instance received a 0 for the new code. Each row represented one protester.

Other information that was coded included the order in which the protester appeared in each video, the order of the video file on the protest day in question, and the number of the protest day.[7] This combination was used as an identifier to easily locate and re-access utterances for further investigation or for the extraction of qualitative excerpts. Moreover, the transcripts included timestamps inserted at every 5-minute interval, which were also included in the coding excel spreadsheets; this further aided in the retrieval of the protesters' utterances.

Other coded demographics included the protesters' gender,[8] broad age group based on appearance,[9] and the geographic location in which the broadcast took place. Moreover, a *promptedness* variable was used to indicate whenever a protester was prompted by the LBCI reporter to speak. A prompt could have been either a general question or a statement directed at the protester(s) about a recent event that took place, or a more direct question about the protester(s) reasons for protesting.[10]

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7 October 17 is Day 1, October 18 is Day 2, and October 19 is Day 3.

8 As visually perceived by the transcribers; male, female, or unknown.

9 Transcribers were given the instruction to allocate an age group to each protester (youth, middle-age, senior, or unknown). This was done completely based on appearances. Youths were defined as falling within the range of teenagers to college students/young professionals. Middle-aged protesters were those who showed slight to moderate signs of aging such as balding, graying hair, and/or some facial wrinkles. Seniors were characterized by advanced signs of aging such as a full head of white hair and excessive wrinkles. As for those who spoke off camera, their visual ages could not be assessed and were coded as unknowns. Some protesters also stated their exact ages, for example when trying to make a point of how young or how old they are; those were placed into the appropriate age groups accordingly.

10 Despite coding for this, we cannot fully isolate prompted from unprompted responses because it was possible for a protester to feel prompted by a question directed not to himself/herself per se, but to another protester in their vicinity. Importantly, we also did not code for the specific type of prompting (this was an oversight), for example if it were an open-ended question such as "what would you like to say?" or a more direct question such as "why are you protesting against leaders you voted for?". This

Each protester was equated to one utterance, or one row of data on the excel coding spreadsheet.[11,12] Appendices C and D provide a sample transcript (C) and coded data (D) of approximately 2 minutes of footage, included here to illustrate concretely how the coding process was carried out.

5.2.3. Translation

Qualitative content analysis dictates that examples of speech excerpts be provided for each theme in order to capture the nuances of the subthemes and codes it contains. Since the transcripts are in Arabic, only the (randomly) selected excerpts were translated to English.[13]

5.2.4. Exclusion Criteria

Since we are interested in adults' political thought, young children were excluded from the analyses. The RAs were given the instruction to allocate the age group 'child' in the ID code of those who clearly appeared to be children. These instances were not coded; therefore, the age group 'child' was simply used to pinpoint the utterances that were to be excluded.

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renders the resulting responses from 'prompted' vs. 'unprompted' utterances not very indicative of the role of prompting in this context.

11 Rows in the excel spreadsheet represented the utterances of protesters, and columns represented the codes.

12 Although it would have been desirable, we cannot be confident that there were as many protesters as there were utterances. Some protesters may have spoken off camera or given several statements to the media over the course of our data, so it is not possible to guarantee that data points were not duplicated.

13 Qualitative examples of all codes were selected by sorting the responses of the protesters by present/not present for each code (on the excel sheet) and randomly highlighting three 'present' utterances for each code on each day. This was done manually and resulted in a total of 9 excerpts per code, divided over the days. Following this step, two out of the nine examples were chosen by the author for inclusion in this thesis.

Moreover, since we were interested in the political thought of those who partook in the mass mobilization against the ruling system, interviews that took place on the street with people who identified themselves as politicians or part of the leadership of any political party were excluded from the analyses.

An additional exclusion measure was to disregard utterances which came from protesters who were not presently on the streets in Lebanon. This included not accounting for any interviews that were done with protesters at the television studios and any interviews done outside of Lebanon, as well as statements made by protesters through recorded videos sent to LBCI outside of the channel's live coverage.

5.3. Content Analysis

This work used content analysis to examine the factors that motivated Lebanese people to mass mobilize by analyzing the free speech of protesters on the live broadcast. Content analysis is a method of analyzing qualitative data (Franzosi, 2007), used in various fields, including psychology (e.g., Moon et al., 2017), sociology (e.g., Weber & Carini, 2012), and linguistics (e.g., Brustad, 2017), among others. We approached the data both qualitatively, by generating codes based on the protesters' free speech, and quantitatively, by quantifying the frequencies of said codes.[14] Combining qualitative and quantitative methods is a frequently used approach in content analysis (Riffe et al., 2014). Figure 1 below provides a visualization of the levels of analysis using the category of *Grievances* as an example.

14 Codes are our smallest unit of analysis.



Figure 1: Illustrative Visualization Showing the Levels of Analysis of Grievances

Note. The contents of the figure are based on the results of our analyses; however, not all results are included as this exercise is merely an illustrative one.

5.3.1. Qualitative Content Analysis

Based on the literature reviewed above and information on the Lebanese context, the data was approached with general predetermined codes relevant to the known antecedents of collective action (i.e., *Grievances*, *Adversarial Attributions*, and *Emotions*, e.g., Iyer et al., 2007; Javeline, 2003; Stürmer & Simon, 2004). However, since it was not feasible to predict all of the codes which may emerge, and since the interest here is in the subjective motivating factors to engage in collective action, the analysis also allowed for the emergence of novel codes from the data in a top-down-and-bottom-up combination approach. Finally, once the coding process was completed, all emergent codes were combined into subthemes or themes under the greater category

for the analyses to follow. Depending on the size of the category,[15] the codes were: a) arranged into subthemes which were then fit under more inclusive themes (larger categories), or b) directly grouped under themes without passing through mediatory level of subthemes (smaller categories). Based on local news reports, the predetermined codes for *Grievances* were, in no particular order of importance: corruption, clientelism, unemployment, nepotism, education, health care, electricity, clean water, and the suppression of the freedom of speech (Battah, 2019; Atallah, 2019a). In addition, a survey by Information International (2019) conducted two weeks after the beginning of the uprising showed that 51.2% of those who joined the protests cited "downing the current system" as their main goal, therefore 'the system' was considered another predetermined *Grievances* code.

In line with Information International (2019), the predetermination for *Adversarial Attributions* included only one code, the system, while the category of *Emotions* had no predetermined codes as it was an emergent category; that is, it was not part of the initial plan for this work. When reporting on the results, qualitative examples are given for each of the codes, subthemes, and themes.[16]

5.3.2. Quantitative Content Analysis

After qualitatively establishing the emergent codes and grouping them into their respective subthemes and/or themes, quantitative content analysis was used to quantify the frequency of occurrence of each said subtheme/theme. Frequencies were given both

15 Determined by the number of codes it contains.

16 It is important to note here that we approached the data with the expectation to code for all and any novel ideas mentioned by the protesters. For example, we expected protesters to engage in mobilization attempts of television audiences and to voice their demands. Accordingly, we coded for all emerging factors, but we will not be analyzing them in the present work as they are beyond the scope of our research. It is through this approach that we were able to include the category of *Emotions* in the analyses instead of that of social identification

in aggregate terms and over the levels of the independent variable (days). The total sample consisted of the total number of protesters who spoke over the three-day period (*N* = 1,213 protesters), unequally divided over the levels of the independent variable in the following manner: Day 1 = 212, Day 2 =336, and Day 3 = 665 protesters. Frequencies of occurrence of codes reported by day were calculated as the number of protesters who mentioned a particular code during the day divided by the number of protesters who were interviewed on that same day.[17] The same applies for frequencies of occurrence of subthemes and themes.

All statistical analyses in the quantitative section of this work were conducted using SPSS (IBM SPSS Statistics for Windows, Version 24.0. Armonk, NY: IBM Corp.).

5.3.3. Descriptive Statistics

. Descriptive statistics are reported overall (aggregating over three days) as well as by day, to trace the fluctuations of said subthemes/themes over the three days. Where appropriate, graphs are inserted to visualize these temporal fluctuations.

For temporal analyses, the Chi-Square test of independence was conducted on all the variable interactions. Chi-square tests are widely used, within the field of psychology and other fields, to test if two categorical variables are related (Sharpe, 2015). However, a statistically significant omnibus Chi-Square test of independence associated with more than one degree of freedom does not pinpoint the source of significance. As Beasley and Schumacker (1995) stated, "no Chi-Square test should

17 If 20 people mentioned grievance x on Day 1, then the frequency of occurrence of grievance x on Day 1 is (20÷212)×100 = 9.43%.

stop with the computation of an omnibus Chi-Square statistic" (p. 80). Therefore, follow up testing was needed.

As recommended by Sharpe (2015), post-hoc testing using the SPSS feature of adjusted *z*-tests with an automatic Bonferroni correction was conducted for cell comparisons whenever the omnibus Chi-Square test showed statistical significance. Cell comparisons, as opposed to examining the standardized adjusted residuals—which is a method used to trace down the variable level(s) responsible for the significance in the omnibus test—, is used to identify which levels of a variable differed significantly from each other (for examples on this application, see Kilgo et al., 2018; Tierney et al., 2018).

Importantly, one of the assumptions of the Chi-Square test is having cell sizes of at least five data points or higher. Where this assumption was not met, Chi-Square could not be used. Instead, Fisher's Exact Test of Independence for *r* x *c* contingency tables was used to conduct the analyses whenever one of the cells resulting from the interaction of the two variables held less than five data points. In addition, whenever a cell held no data points at all (observed count = 0), Fisher's Exact Test of Independence for a 2 x 2 design was utilized whereby the cell holding no data points was excluded from the analysis and the variable was reduced to a dichotomous one (Laerd Statistics, 2016).

Finally, Cramer's V calculation is reported for effect sizes. We followed the recommendation of Cohen (1988) in treating Cramer's V values of less than or equal to 0.1 as indicative of a trivial effect size, values between 0.1 and 0.3 as a small effect size, values between 0.3 and 0.5 as a medium effect size, and values greater than 0.5 as a large effect size.

CHAPTER 6

RESULTS

Before delving into the results of our main analyses, we first turn to a brief section of general descriptive data. The below sections will first report said descriptives in aggregate terms (across the three days), followed by a temporal breakdown (by day) since temporality is the main independent variable of this work.

6.1. Aggregate Descriptives

The final count of our sample is N = 1,213 protesters, divided unequally over the analysis period.[18] Of the total sample, the majority were male [76% (n = 942); female = 20% (n = 243); unknown[19] = 2.3% (n = 28)]. Protesters were also coded into loosely defined subjective age groups[20] in the following manner: youths (teenager—30's) = 50.5%; middle-age (ages 40's—50's) = 30.1%; seniors (ages 60+) = 5%; unknown (not shown on camera) = 14.3%.

Figure 2 below illustrates how many people spoke in each of the areas covered by the LBCI broadcast over the first three days of the uprising. It is important to note here that this does not mean that protests were not happening in other areas in parallel,

18 It is important to note here that it is indeed possible that some protesters may have been counted more than once if they spoke on different days or at different points during the same day, as the video footage was transcribed by a team of undergraduate assistants over the course of several months. In addition, it was also difficult to check for this double counting error when the transcripts were being reviewed since recognizing a protester who has spoken at an earlier point completely depended on the author's memory. For an accurate count to be guaranteed, video footage should be cross-checked using facial recognition software.

19 Those labeled as 'unknown' for gender were not shown on camera in the LBCI video footage (most of the time by their own choice) and did not display a gender-specific tone of voice.

20 We were interested in gaining a general understanding of the age groups in which protesters fell. Since it was not possible to know their ages exactly, we devised this method of grouping the protesters into loose age groups based on their appearance. This was first done by the undergraduate assistants during the transcription process, then it was checked by the author.

or that actual crowd sizes are accurately reflected in the below numbers. We could not code for each protester's origin due to the absence of this information for most protesters. Instead, we focused on coding for each protester the area in which they were recorded protesting.

We also tallied the percentage of protesters who mentioned each particular category (i.e., *Grievances*, *Adversarial Attributions*, *Emotions*) at least once, in order to identify the most frequently mentioned categories. Over the three days, around three quarters of protesters mentioned the category of *Grievances* (77.2%) and the category of *Adversarial Attributions* (75.3%). Conversely, *Emotions* were expressed verbatim by a mere 19.5% of protesters, resulting in only small percentages and fluctuations in its themes.



Figure 2: Map of Lebanon Displaying the Number of Protesters by Area

6.2. Temporal Descriptives

Figure 3 below depicts the fluctuations in the percentages of gender and age group on each day. As shown, the majority of protesters on each day were young men, while women and seniors were the minority. When looking at the temporal progression, men seem to be lower in number on Days 2 and 3 compared to Day 1, suggesting more

women joined as the uprising progressed. The youth age group, on the other hand, is demonstrating an increasing frequency of occurrence, while the middle-aged and senior age groups remain relatively consistent over the same period. It is important to note, however, that the unknown age group variable decreases over the period of the three days, suggesting the increase in youth percentages is due to a higher percentage of protesters appearing off camera in the first day and thus have no known age-group assigned to them.[21] The unknown gender group also decreases over time but shows an overall smaller percentage compared to the unknown age group category, likely because transcribers were able to detect the gender of the protester from their voice even if they spoke off camera. This would mean that the true number of protesters speaking off camera is closer to that of the unknown age group.



Figure 3: Gender and Age Group Temporal Variation

21 It is also a possibility that the high percentage of protesters coded as have an unknown age group is due to transcription error, as the transcribers were new to the process and might have chosen to code protesters as unknowns if their ages were ambiguous.

As for the areas covered by the broadcast, the only two regions which received coverage on all three days were Beirut (49.4%, n = 599) and Matn/Keserwan (8.8%, n = 107), while the other were covered for only one or two of the days (see Table 1). Beirut stands out as being the most covered area across the days.

	Beirut	Dahieh	Matn/ Keserwan	Aley/ Chouf	Tripoli	South	Anfeh	Presidential Palace
Day 1	✓ n=103	✓ n=103	✓ n=6	×	×	×	×	×
Day 2	✓ n=111	✓ n=20	✓ n=79	✓ n=42	✓ n=21	✓ n=5	✓ n=5	✓ n=53
Day 3	✓ n=385	×	✓ n=22	✓ n=63	✓ n=106	✓ n=89	×	×

Table 1: Areas Covered by the LBCI Broadcast over Time

Finally, as mentioned above, the categories of *Grievances* and *Adversarial Attributions* occur in overwhelmingly larger frequencies than the category of *Emotions* (see Figure 4). This holds true for each day as well, whereby *Grievances* dominate, followed closely by *Adversarial Attribution*, while *Emotions*, unsurprisingly, remain in a distant third place. Disregarding statistical significance, the expressions of grievances decrease slightly on Day 3, suggesting that protesters may have started expressing other issues of concern which we did not examine in this work, such as demands. Moreover, blame allocation (adversarial attributions) intensified on the second and third days as compared to Day 1, while expressions of emotions registered a slightly higher percentage on Day 2 and Day 3 as compared to the first day.



Figure 4: Categories: Temporal Variation

6.3. Conventions of Results Presentation

We detail some aspects in which the below qualitative results are presented. With relevance to the excerpts presented as examples to illustrate the themes/subthemes in each relevant section, note that the translation used has been done by the author from the transcribed data. Moreover, the excerpts included hereinafter may include words or phrases that fit under other subthemes of the category in question. That is, an excerpt presented for a given subtheme within the category of *Grievances* may contain parts coded under other subthemes from the same category, as well as the two other categories (*Adversarial Attributions* or *Emotions*). However, for the purposes of demonstration, only the part corresponding to the relevant theme/subtheme is highlighted. The words or phrases in **bold** are the part of the utterance which, in context, were coded as the corresponding theme/subtheme.

6.4. Grievances

6.4.1. Specific Coding Method

The coding process for the category of *Grievances* was guided by a number of predetermined codes, based on local news reports, and allowed for the emergence of novel codes as the data was explored. The predetermined codes for *Grievances* were *corruption*, *clientelism*, *unemployment*, *nepotism*, *education*, *health care*, *electricity*, *clean water*, *the suppression of the freedom of speech*, and *the system*. Coding was done by carefully reading the transcripts and indicating whenever a protester expressed a grievance during their speech. As a general rule of thumb, grievances were identified as expressions of discontent with the situation.

The initial codes were created in a verbatim manner, with the aim to combine them into broader themes once the coding was done. For example, the very first time a protester spoke about salaries being too low, a new code for a 'low salary' grievance was generated (a column was added on the excel coding sheet) and the coding process carried on. Protesters who spoke before this point would receive a '0' code, or 'not present', for this newly added grievance, and protesters who spoke after this point either received a '0' or a '1', 'not present' or 'present', respectively, based on whether or not they mentioned this particular grievance in their speech.

After the coding process was completed, the predetermined codes and the newly created ones were combined into subthemes, which were then combined into *Grievances* themes, or clusters of subthemes. Hence, the category of *Grievances* was comprised of four levels: the codes, the subthemes, the themes, and the category (see Figure 5 for a visual illustration).



Figure 5: Illustration of the Coding Process of Grievances

Note. The data presented in the figure is not comprehensive and is used for illustrative purposes only. That is, we presented data from only one theme of *Grievances* as an example, while our findings consisted of six *Grievances* themes.

6.4.2. Qualitative Analysis

The data was initially coded into 67 unique codes of *Grievances*. These codes consisted of the 10 predetermined ones, all of which were detected in the data, in addition to 57 newly created codes resulting from the exploratory analysis. Once the data coding was complete, all codes (both predetermined and newly created) were combined under 22 unique subthemes, which were then clustered under 6 unique themes of *Grievances*. We use the term unique here to mean that no code was included

in more than one subtheme, and no subtheme was included in more than one theme. That is, the subthemes and themes are mutually exclusive in their categorization. Nevertheless, note that the same protester could utter speech that could of course be coded under different subthemes that belong to different themes.

The most frequently endorsed theme of *Grievances*, out of the six, was that of *Economic Grievances*. The next three most endorsed themes were *General Systemic Injustice*, *Bad Leaders*, followed by *Absence of Democracy and Accountability*, respectively. These were followed by the theme of *Psychosocial Grievances* in fifth place. Lastly, the theme of *Discriminatory System* was the least endorsed out the six *Grievances* themes. Next, we briefly define each of these themes and present related excerpts from the protesters' speech. The presentation of the themes of *Grievances* hereinafter will be from the most to the least endorsed in total (across the analysis period). Similarly, the subthemes housed under each theme will also be presented and discussed from the most prominent to least prominent subtheme. Table 2 below displays the six themes of *Grievances* alongside the subthemes housed under each one.

Theme	**Subtheme**	**Theme**	**Subtheme**
1. Economic Grievances	Corruption	4. Absence of Democracy and Accountability	Repression
	Economic Deprivation and Impoverishment		Illegitimate Rule
	Labor Conditions		Lack of Accountability
	Failure to Meet Basic Needs		Suppression of the Freedom of Speech
	Taxes and Inflation	5. Psychosocial Grievances	Physical and Mental Harm
2. General Systemic Injustice	Discontent with the System		Immigration
	Accumulation of Injustice	6. Discriminatory System	Nepotism and Clientelism

	General Injustice		Sectarianism
3. Bad Leaders	Incompetence		Sexism
	Uncaring Politicians		
	Deceitful and Manipulative Leaders		
	Disloyalty		

Table 2: Themes and Corresponding Subthemes of Grievances

6.4.2.1. Economic Grievances

The most commonly endorsed theme in the category of *Grievances* is *Economic Grievances*, which housed the largest number of subthemes, and by extension, the largest number of codes, amongst the themes. This theme consisted of the multifaceted economic grievances that have been gradually baring down on the Lebanese citizen for the months leading to the outbreak of the protests, affecting nearly every aspects of their lives from the inability to find employment to the recurrent difficulties associated with providing for their everyday needs. Below is a list of the subthemes of *Economic Grievances*, alongside a brief description of each subtheme.

a. Corruption: this subtheme included accusatory statements and anecdotes about the politicians being corrupt, illegitimately enriching themselves and adding to the country's national debt crisis.
b. Economic Deprivation and Impoverishment: this subtheme included testimonies of growing economic hardship characterized by, among other factors, the constant need to borrow money to make ends meet and the inability to afford food or basic needs.

c. Labor Conditions: this subtheme included mentions of unemployment, delays in receiving salaries, undocumented foreign workers taking over the job market, and being overworked and underpaid.

d. Failure to Meet Basic Needs: this subtheme included references to the lack of access to, or the inability to afford, proper education, healthcare, water, and electricity. It also includes criticism of the unavailability of garbage collection services, qualified emergency response units, adequate infrastructure, and safety and security.

e. Taxes and Inflation: this subtheme included condemnations of the newly imposed taxes (as part of the then-2020 national budget) as well as concerns that the worst is yet to come in terms of inflation and the devaluation of the national currency.

This theme showed that the protesters' primary grievances were of economic nature, but also that these were multidimensional, in that they consisted of grievances that touch upon a multitude of aspects of everyday life. An illustrative quote for each subtheme is provided in Table 3 below.

Subtheme	Excerpt
a. Corruption	*"They are the ones who got us to this point; to this **debt**, this hunger, **this corruption**, and to this level of **theft**."* V2.15, M26 (code: stolen money and debt)[22]
b. Economic Deprivation and Impoverishment	*"These people that you see, these are the starving people, the destitute and **impoverished people** who **can't even afford to buy bread**…**We are here because of our poverty and our hunger**, to tell them all that they all must fall."* V3.18, M11 (code: impoverishment and poverty)
c. Labor Conditions	*"**Syrians have taken over my job, Iraqis have taken over***

22 The notation at the end of the excerpt indicates the protest day, the number of the video file on that day, the notation given to the protester from whom this excerpt was taken, and the specific code under which this excerpt was initially coded before being clustered under the subthemes. The above notation of V2.15, M26 (code: stolen money and debt) means that this excerpt came from the 26th protester (M26) who spoke in the 15th video of the 2nd day of the protests (V2.15), and it was initially coded under the newly created code 'stolen money and debt'.

	***my job**."* V2.13, M23 (code: foreign workers)
d. Failure to Meet Basic Needs	*"We the Lebanese people* ***are not receiving our most basic rights**. **We don't have a proper health care system; we don't have proper roads to drive on**."* V2.21, M3 (code: infrastructure and basic services)
e. Taxes and Inflation	*"...**the dollar exchange rate is about to reach 2,000 Lebanese pounds, it has already reached 1,600 and 1,700, it keeps on fluctuating**."* V2.11, M7 (code: present/future inflation and exchange rate)

Table 3: Subthemes of Economic Grievances – Excerpts

Note. See Appendix E for more excerpts from all codes under the category of grievances.

6.4.2.2. General Systemic Injustice

The *General Systemic Injustice* theme consisted of protesters' sense of generalized *injustice*, expression of general discontent with the *system* as a whole and the sense that grievances have a chronic element to them (*accumulation* of injustice). It housed the three following subthemes:

a. Discontent with the System: this subtheme included expressions of discontent toward the system/state as a whole, through blanket statements about everything going wrong, the statelessness of the country, and having no trust in a system that has repeatedly failed the people.
b. Accumulation of Injustice: this subtheme included reference to the accumulation of injustices over the decades-long rule of the current political class.
c. General Injustice: this subtheme included reference to general feelings of inequity, oppression, and being stripped of basic rights.

This theme illustrated how participation in the uprising was driven for some by the experience of chronic grievances relating to the system as a whole rather than particular

policies or politicians, and by a general sense of oppression and injustice. Table 4 below displays excerpts to illustrate each subtheme.

Subtheme	**Excerpt**
a. Discontent with the System	"*Down with this **corrupt system** that let us down in both 14 and 8 [of March]."* V2.14, M10 (code: the system)
b. Accumulation of Injustice	*"The economic crisis that has been worsening **since 1993**, coupled with failed economic policies, **has been building up tension within people** and they finally burst today."* V1.8, M10 (code: accumulation)
c. General Injustice	*"**They made us live in oppression**, they have ruined and broken us."* V3.29, M11 (code: oppression)

Table 4: Subthemes of General Systemic Injustice – Excerpts

6.4.2.3. Bad Leaders

The next theme in order of occurrence is that of *Bad Leaders,* which comprised negative views of politicians, targeted either at individual politicians or at the political class in general, criticizing either their competence, care, honesty and/or loyalty. The following four subthemes are housed under the theme of *Bad Leaders*:

a. Incompetence: this subtheme included accusatory statements of the politicians as often dodging responsibility, being inept and incapable of doing their jobs, and lacking the basic skills of good leadership.
b. Uncaring Politicians: this subtheme included testimonies of feeling worthless to the politicians who have isolated themselves from the public, by living comfortable and secluded lives, and are oblivious to the people's daily struggles.
c. Deceitful and Manipulative Leaders: this subtheme included criticism of unkept promises and manipulation tactics implemented by the politicians to garner support. It also captured instances where protesters accused some

politicians of conspiring against the Lebanese people by striking secret deals amongst themselves during the uprising.

d. Disloyalty: this subtheme included accusations of the politicians as being unpatriotic and having hidden agendas that serve the purposes of foreign powers.

Table 5 below displays an excerpt to illustrate each subtheme.

Subtheme	Excerpt
a. Incompetence	*"This political class* ***failed over 30 years ago to take charge of the country*** *and it got us to where we are today. If we give them the 72 hours grace period,* ***they will not do anything*** *with it, just like* ***they did not do anything in the past 30 years****."* V3.21, M7 (code: incompetent rulers)
b. Uncaring Politicians	*"We have no other option but to do this* ***so those in charge would pay attention to us****, because if we stayed standing here in the street for 10 years just being peaceful* ***no one will look at us****."* V1.10, M16 (code: people are worthless to the politicians)
c. Deceitful and Manipulative Leaders	*"****They kept on promising us tomorrow, but tomorrow never came.****"* V2.16, M4 (code: liars)
d. Disloyalty	*"****These people are not loyal to Lebanon; they all belong to foreign countries.****"* V3.6, M15 (code: foreign loyalty)

Table 5: Subthemes of Bad Leaders – Excerpts

6.4.2.4. Absence of Democracy and Accountability

The theme of *Absence of Democracy and Accountability* consists of grievances that revolve conceptually around the absence of democracy and accountability in the system, even if protesters do not explicitly mention the word democracy (or lack thereof). The theme of *Absence of Democracy and Accountability* houses the following subthemes:

a. Repression: This subtheme includes condemnation of police brutality and protest suppression, as well as testimonies documenting the violence carried out by supporters of the regime's political parties, particularly in southern Lebanon.
b. Lack of Accountability: This subtheme includes condemnations of the tactics used by politicians to avoid being held accountable for their actions.
c. Illegitimate Rule: This subtheme includes criticism of the politicians as being power hungry, staying in power for too long, and manipulating election results in their favor.
d. Suppression of the Freedom of Speech: This subtheme includes criticism and anecdotal evidence of the regime's suppression of the freedom of speech.

Table 6 below displays an excerpt to illustrate each subtheme.

Subtheme	Excerpt
a. Repression	*"I would just like to say all of the regime, and Nabih Berri in specific, to* ***pack up their thugs from the streets.****"* V3.23, M22 (code: militia/parties violence)
b. Lack of Accountability	*"You all steal from the people then go* ***hide behind the security forces and your bodyguards****."* V2.25, M11 (code: immunity and protection)
c. Illegitimate Rule	*"We came here to tell them that since we were kids, we got to know them and their names.* ***Our parents used to work for their parents, we work for them, and our kids will probably work for their kids.*** *This is not at all acceptable. The country is rampaged by theft and corruption. People are dying and going hungry.* ***Let them get off our backs already****."* V2.16, M39 (code: power-hungry rulers)
d. Suppression of the Freedom of Speech	*"****We just want the freedom to express our opinion****."* V3.5, M19 (code: freedom of speech)

Table 6: Subthemes of Absence of Democracy and Accountability – Excerpts

6.4.2.5. Psychosocial Grievances

The theme of *Psychosocial Grievances* speaks to the psychosocial outcomes of the economic grievances endured by the Lebanese people. This theme could be of particular interest to psychologists as it demonstrates how the effects of an economic crisis can translate into *harm* beyond the financial aspect and can redefine social relationships through *immigration*. The theme of *Psychosocial Grievances* houses the following subthemes:

a. Physical and Mental Harm: this subtheme included condemnations of a system that has harmed its people both physically and mentally by reducing their agency, depriving them of dignified living, and permanently damaging their lives.
b. Immigration: this subtheme included testimonies of being affected by immigration (either needing to immigrate or having had a family member need to immigrate) due to the unavailability of opportunities in Lebanon.

An illustrative quote for each subtheme is provided in Table 7 below.

Subtheme	Excerpt
a. Physical and Mental Harm	*"**We grew up in shelters and were raised in wars, our parents were raised in wars**, and Lebanon still hasn't changed."* V2.15, M1 (code: ruined childhoods and lives)
b. Immigration	*"**Our children are becoming immigrants.** They don't want to stay here; **they want to immigrate**. This is my son; he has an American passport; **he wants to go live in America**."* V1.4, M12 (code: immigration)

Table 7: Subthemes of Psychosocial Grievances – Excerpts

6.4.2.6. Discriminatory System

The least endorsed theme of *Grievances* is that of *Discriminatory System*, consisting of grievances which conceptually relate to the different types of discrimination the political system enacts against the people, be it based on connections, political affiliations, sect, or gender. The theme of *Discriminatory System* houses the following subthemes:

a. Nepotism and Clientelism: This subtheme included criticism of the clientelist and nepotistic nature of the system of governance. It also included anecdotal reports of unmet clientelism whereby protesters cited being turned away after being coerced to vote or show support for some politicians in exchange for basic rights/services.
b. Sectarianism: This subtheme included criticism of how the system has managed to discriminate amongst and cause clefts between the people based on sect.
c. Sexism: This subtheme included criticism of sexist policies such as the inability of Lebanese women to grant the nationality to their children if the father was not a Lebanese citizen.

Table 8 below displays an excerpt to illustrate each subtheme.

Subtheme	Excerpt
a. Nepotism and Clientelism	*"I have 3 young boys;* ***I went around and spoke to all of the parliamentarians and ministers asking them to employ my sons and none of them approved.*** *... It is our fault for chasing after them to beg for favors, but* ***this is just how things work****."* V3.19, M6 (code: unmet clientelism)
b. Sectarianism	*"****They have purposefully divided us. They divided us through sectarianism****."* V1.3, M12 (code: sectarianism)
c. Sexism	*"... **the least that needs to be done is providing Lebanese mothers with the ability to grant her kids the nationality**. "*

	V3.36, M5 (code: women unable to grant the nationality)

Table 8: Subthemes of Discriminatory System – Excerpts

Before turning to the descriptives of the data, it is important to note here that these themes of *Grievances* are conceptually nested within one another and are not mutually exclusive. For example, concerns over *corruption* cannot be conceptually separated from those over *nepotism* or *sectarianism* since one begets the other. Similarly, economic concerns such as *deprivation* and labor-related grievances (*labor conditions*) result in a system with which people are discontented (*discontent with the system*), where injustices accumulated over many years (*accumulation of injustice*), and where uncaring and incompetent individuals hold the highest positions of power (*uncaring politicians*; *incompetence*).

6.4.3. Descriptive Data

Of the total sample size (*N* = 1,213), 77.2% of protesters expressed at least one grievance whenever they spoke (n = 936), distributed relatively evenly in the following way over the three days (Day 1: n = 166, 78.3%; Day 2, n = 267, 79.5%; Day 3, n = 503, 75.6%).

Figure 6 below displays the themes of *Grievances* by frequency of occurrence across the three days. As shown, the majority of protesters gravitated towards the theme of *Economic Grievances*. This was followed by the themes of *General Systemic Injustices*, *Bad Leaders*, and the *Absence of Democracy and Accountability*, each endorsed by approximately more than a third of the protesters. Next, the theme of *Psychosocial Grievances* was endorsed by almost a fifth of protesters. Finally, the

Discriminatory System was the least cited theme of *Grievances* during the first three days of the uprising.



Figure 6: Grievances Themes: Order of Occurrence (across all days)

The analyses of *Grievances* were done at the theme level. However, we also present data showing the frequency of occurrence of all subthemes under the category of *Grievances* for documentation purposes. Figure 7 below displays the subthemes of *Grievances* by frequency of occurrence overall (aggregated across the three days). It is interesting to note that the four most predominant subthemes, in order of occurrence are *Corruption* (Theme: *Economic Grievances*), followed by *Discontent with the System* (Theme: *General Systemic Injustice*), *Accumulation of Injustice* (Theme: *General Systemic Injustice*), and *Economic Deprivation and Impoverishment* (Theme: *Economic Grievances*), all endorsed by approximately 20% of protesters or more. Logically, these most endorsed subthemes of *Grievances* come from the themes that had the highest percentages of occurrence (see Figure 6 above), which were concerned with economic issues and broad systemic condemnations.



Figure 7: Grievances Subthemes: Order of Occurrences (across all days)

Adjacent to each subtheme title, in the above figure, we have indicated the theme under which each subtheme has been placed: (1) signifies the theme of *Economic Grievances*, (2) the theme of *General Systemic Injustice*, (3) the theme of *Bad Leaders*, (4) the theme of *Absence of Democracy and Accountability*, (5) the theme of *Psychosocial Grievances*, and (6) signifies the theme of *Discriminatory System*. The distribution of the subthemes shows a general dominance of the top three themes over

the bottom half of the graph (higher percentage), with the subthemes coming from the three least endorsed themes (4, 5, and 6) clustering around the upper half (lower percentage) of the graph.

In terms of the temporal variation, the analyses were performed at the theme level, as mentioned earlier. Figure 8 below depicts the fluctuations of the themes of *Grievances* by frequency of occurrence over the analysis period. Disregarding statistical significance, five out of the six themes display an inverted U-shape trend, whereby their frequency of occurrence increased from Day 1 to Day 2, showing an amplification among protesters joining on Day 2. However, these grievances then decreased from Day 2 to Day 3, albeit to varying degrees. The themes in question are: *Economic Grievances*, *General Systemic Injustice*, *Bad Leaders*, *Psychosocial Grievances,* and *Discriminatory System*. This trend is noteworthy because one may have expected protesters to increasingly gravitate toward the popularized expressions of the movement, but this trend was not observed for all grievances. What this indicates is that by the third day, protesters were choosing to talk less about certain types of grievances. Meanwhile, the only theme that does not follow this trend, and in fact behaves in an opposite manner, is that of *Absence of Democracy and Accountability* which decreased from Day 1 to Day 2 and increased again from Day 2 to Day 3.



Figure 8: Grievances Themes: Temporal Variation

6.4.4. Quantitative Analyses

Next, we turn to a quantitative temporal analysis of the themes of *Grievances* to examine how the frequency of these expressions varied over the course of our data. For each theme, a Chi-Square test of independence was conducted between the theme and *Protest Day*. In all cases, all cell frequencies were greater than or equal to five, making a Chi-square test an appropriate statistical test to conduct. Statistically significant Chi-square tests were followed by post-hoc tests to determine which days differed significantly from each other.

6.4.4.1. Economic Grievances

There was a statistically significant association between *Economic Grievances* and *Protest Day*, $\chi^2(2) = 18.68$, $p < .001$. The association was small (Cohen, 1988), Cramer's V = .12.

As shown in Table 9, post-hoc cell comparisons revealed that Day 1 and Day 3 do not differ from each other, while Day 2 significantly differs from both days,

displaying an inverted U-shape trend as shown in Figure 8 above. That is, there was a significant increase in protesters' expression of being aggrieved by economic grievances from Day 1 to Day 2, followed by a significant decrease from Day 2 to Day 3.

Economic Grievances	Protest Day			
	Day 1	Day 2	Day 3	Total
Present (observed count)	104_a	212_b	328_a	644
% within Economic Grievances	16.1%	32.9%	50.9%	100.0%
% within Protest Day	49.1%	63.1%	49.3%	53.1%
% of Total	8.6%	17.5%	27.0%	53.1%

Table 9: Crosstabulation of Economic and Psychosocial Grievances and Protest Day

Note. Cells with identical subscript letters do not differ significantly from each other at $p = .05$.

6.4.4.2. General Systemic Injustice

There was a statistically significant association between *General Systemic Injustice* and *Protest Day*, $\chi^2(2) = 33.23$, $p < .001$. The association was small, Cramer's V = .17.

As shown in Table 10, post-hoc cell comparisons revealed that Day 1 and Day 3 did not differ from each other, while Day 2 significantly differed from both days, once more displaying an inverted U-shape trend similar to the one observed with the theme of *Economic Grievances* above.

General Systemic Injustice	Protest Day			
	Day 1	Day 2	Day 3	Total
Present (observed count)	61_a	164_b	213_a	438
% within General Systemic Injustice	13.9%	37.4%	48.6%	100.0%
% within Protest Day	28.8%	48.8%	30.0%	36.1%
% of Total	5.0%	13.5%	17.6%	36.1%

Table 10: Crosstabulation of General Systemic Injustice and Protest Day

Note. Cells with identical subscript letters do not differ significantly from each other at $p = .05$.

6.4.4.3. Bad Leaders

There was a statistically significant association between *Bad Leaders* and *Protest Day*, $\chi^2(2) = 28.55$, $p < .001$. The association was small, Cramer's V = .15.

As shown in Table 11, post-hoc cell comparisons revealed that there was a significant increase in protesters' expression of being aggrieved by bad leaders from Day 1 to Day 2 and from Day 1 to Day 3, occurring alongside a non-significant decrease of these expressions from Day 2 to Day 3.

Bad Leaders	Protest Day			
	Day 1	Day 2	Day 3	Total
Present (observed count)	42_a	140_b	241_b	423
% within Bad Leaders	9.9%	33.1%	57.0%	100.0%
% within Protest Day	19.8%	41.7%	36.2%	34.9%
% of Total	3.5%	11.5%	19.9%	34.9%

Table 11: Crosstabulation of Bad Leaders and Protest Day

Note. Cells with identical subscript letters do not differ significantly from each other at $p = .05$.

6.4.4.4. Absence of Democracy and Accountability

There was a statistically significant association between *Absence of Democracy and Accountability* and *Protest Day*, $\chi^2(2) = 38.59$, $p < .001$. The association was small, Cramer's V = .18.

As shown in Table 12, post-hoc cell comparisons revealed that there was a significant decrease in protesters' expression of being aggrieved by the absence of democracy and accountability from Day 1 to Day 2, followed by a significant increase from Day 2 to Day 3. Day 1 and Day 3 did not differ from each other.

Absence of Democracy and Accountability	Protest Day			
	Day 1	Day 2	Day 3	Total
Present (observed count)	91_a	66_b	236_a	393
% within Absence of Democracy and Accountability	23.2%	16.8%	60.1%	100.0%
% within Protest Day	42.9%	19.6%	35.5%	32.4%
% of Total	7.5%	5.4%	19.5%	32.4%

Table 12: Crosstabulation of Absence of Democracy and Accountability and Protest Day

Note. Cells with identical subscript letters do not differ significantly from each other at $p = .05$.

6.4.4.5. Psychosocial Grievances

There was a statistically significant association between *Psychosocial Grievances* and *Protest Day*, $\chi^2(2) = 20.10$, $p < .001$. The association was small, Cramer's V = .13.

As shown in Table 13, post-hoc cell comparisons revealed that Day 1 and Day 3 did not differ from each other, while Day 2 significantly differed from both days, once more displaying an inverted U-shape trend similar to the one observed with the other themes of *Grievances*.

Psychosocial Grievances	Protest Day			
	Day 1	Day 2	Day 3	Total
Present (observed count)	27_a	86_b	103_a	216
% within Psychosocial Grievances	12.5%	39.8%	47.7%	100.0%
% within Protest Day	12.7%	25.6%	15.5%	17.8%
% of Total	2.2%	7.1%	8.5%	17.8%

Table 13: Crosstabulation of Psychosocial Grievances and Protest Day

Note. Cells with identical subscript letters do not differ significantly from each other at $p = .05$.

6.4.4.6. Discriminatory System

There was no statistically significant association between *Discriminatory System* and *Protest Day*, $\chi^2(2) = 2.37$, $p = .31$, ns. The association was trivial, Cramer's V = .04. As previously mentioned, however, it is worth noting again the non-significant inverted U-shape trend of the results.

6.5. Adversarial Attributions

6.5.1. Specific Coding Method

Under *Adversarial Attributions*, we approached the data with one predetermined code of 'the system' and allowed for other codes to be detected as the data was further explored. Coding was done by carefully reading the transcripts and indicating whenever a protester attributed blame, or pinned the responsibility of the country's deteriorating situation, to a certain target.

The initial codes were created in a verbatim manner, with the aim to combine them into broader themes once the coding was done. For example, a new code for an adversarial attribution was generated (a column was added on the excel coding sheet) when a protester allocated blame to Saad Al-Hariri for the first time. Protesters who spoke before this point would receive a '0' code, or 'not present', for this newly added adversary, and protesters who spoke beyond this point either received a '0' or a '1', 'not present' or 'present', respectively, based on whether or not they named Al-Hariri as a target of blame in their speech.

After the coding process was completed, the codes that emerged, or the many targets of blame that the protesters named, were combined into themes of *Adversarial Attributions* for the following analyses. Hence, the category of *Adversarial Attributions* was comprised of three levels: the codes, the themes, and the category (see Figure 9 for a visual illustration).



Figure 9: Illustration of the Coding Division of Adversarial Attributions

Note. The data presented in the figure is not comprehensive and is used for illustrative purposes.

6.5.2. Qualitative Analysis

The data was initially coded into 25 unique codes, each signifying a target of blame (adversarial attribution), e.g., the whole system, the Parliament, or Saad Al-Hariri. The predetermined code of 'the system' was indeed detected in our data. Following this, the unique codes were clustered under seven themes of targets of blame, namely: *Totality*, *Specific Entity*, *Specific Person*, the Unidentified 'They' with no co-occurrence of another target of blame (*Only 'They'*),[23] the (Lebanese) *People*, *Ingroup*, and *Exemptions*. We detail these below and end with a discussion of the mutual exclusivity/inclusivity of the themes.

23 The data was initially coded to include all instances of blaming an unspecified 'they'. However, the analyses were restricted to those who only blamed an unspecified 'they' and named no other adversary in their speech.

Conceptually, these adversarial attributions fit under two broad classifications of external (outgroup) and internal (ingroup) targets of blame. External targets included allocating blame to the *Totality*, *Specific Entity*, *Specific Person*, and *Only 'They'*.

6.5.2.1. Totality

Allocating blame to the *Totality* revolved around blaming the entire system or the entire ruling political class. Popularized slogans (voiced by individual protesters, not as chants) such as "killon ya3ne killon" (all of them means all of them) were coded under this theme. A sample excerpt that received a code for *Totality* is as follows:[24]

> "When they do step down, they need to give us our money back, **them and all the ones that came before them. All the ministers, the parliamentarians, and the leaders that have been in power in the past** must no longer receive salaries." V2.15, M16

Here, the protester was not only allocating blame to all the rulers who are currently in power, but to all those who were in power in the past.

6.5.2.2. Specific Person

To capture the instances of calling out figures of authority by their name, the theme of *Specific Person* was coded to include instances of allocating blame to a specific individual, by name, e.g., Nabih Berri, or to a specific position, e.g., Head of Parliament. As will be detailed below, these themes were not mutually exclusive; meaning, a protester could receive a 'present' code for attributing blame to an

24 The translation of the qualitative excerpts used hereinafter has been done by the student and is not a literal translation of what the protesters have said, but a rephrasing of their speech aiming to best represent the essence of the utterance while adhering to proper linguistic usages.

individual person, as well as to the totality. The theme of *Specific Person* captured the instances in which protesters made a point out of mentioning a particular figure's name, an action seen as a breaking of taboos.[25]

> "I want to say something, Bashar Al Asad killed half his people so he could remain in power, we the Lebanese people are all ready to die just to remove **Michel Aoun**, to remove **Saad Al-Hariri**, and to remove **Nabih Berri**… It is for this reason that all the Lebanese people took to the streets today, so we can remove all of them. And I want to say something to **Sayyed Hasan**. Sayyed, you left the country without a president for two years and today you decided to say you are afraid of the void? Why is there so much contradiction in your rhetoric? How shameful." V3.17, M22

Here, the protester explicitly named the acts of the President of Lebanon (Michel Aoun), the then-Prime Minister (Saad Al-Hariri), and the Head of Parliament (Nabih Berri) as being the reason behind the protests. In addition, the protester called out the head of the Hezbollah party (Sayyed Hasan) for making inflammatory and contradicting statements.

6.5.2.3. Only 'They'

The theme of *Only 'They'* captured the instances of allocating blame to the vague target of an unknown 'they' (hinneh), with no co-mention of another adversarial target.

25 From contextual knowledge, implicating a specific political figure by name is considered out of the norm in Lebanon. Movement mobilizers and participants aim to steer clear from stirring sectarian conflict by pointing the finger at individuals with clear political and/or sectarian and/or religious affiliations, even if the accused is of the same political following/sect/religion of the accuser. Instead, protesters more often employ the vague unidentified 'they' (hinneh) when allocating blame, which is an adversarial identity broad enough to be adopted by all audiences and interpreted to mean whomever the listener believes is at fault.

> "If **they** do not step down themselves, we will go to **their houses** and bring **them** down. Wherever **they** may be, we will go and bring **them** down, and that is the end of it." V3.28, M26

Here, the protester chose to speak in the passive voice by keeping anonymous the party they believe to be responsible for the people's predicament.

6.5.2.4. Specific Entity

Blaming a *Specific Entity* refers to allocating blame to a specific governing branch (e.g., the government, the parliament), a political party, or the security forces.

> "We are not leaving the streets unless this corrupt **government** falls." V2.15, M7

Here, the protester named the government in specific as being the main reason for their participation in the protest and the entity they were explicitly calling on to resign, therefore rendering it an adversary.

Internal targets of blame, on the other hand, included blaming the Lebanese people (*The People*) and blaming the ingroup (*Ingroup*).

6.5.2.5. The People

The theme of allocating blame to *The People* represented instances of blaming the Lebanese people for subjecting the residents of Lebanon to the current status quo by voting for the wrong rulers, turning a blind eye to repeated offenses, or remaining passive.[26]

26 The implication here is that blame is being allocated only to a certain part of the Lebanese people—rather than the whole ingroup. Namely, blaming supporters of the regime and its political parties as well

> "I would like to invite every Lebanese youth who didn't elect this political class, all youth under the age of 21 should come down to the streets because **we did not elect these people**. We are not the ones who got them to where they are, and **those who voted for them** are crying in regret and we thank them a lot." V3.30, M15

Here, this young protester allocated blame to the older generations whom she perceived as being responsible for bringing and keeping the current rulers in power. The protester excluded herself from blame by stating that her generation did not vote for this political class.

6.5.2.6. Ingroup

Allocating blame to the *Ingroup*, on the other hand, can best be characterized by feelings of regret as it captured instances of allocating blame to oneself for making mistakes, for not being politically 'woke' enough, or for not seeing the situation the way it really is.

> "This time is slightly different because this time **we are protesting against ourselves**, or at least I am speaking personally. **I am protesting against myself**… It is okay**, we made our choice, we kept quiet, we got ourselves in this mess, and we should pay the price.** But enough, it is time now that we revolt. This time is different." V3.12, M2

Here, the protester stated that the Lebanese people, including herself, made the mistake of giving the current rulers legitimacy and a platform and perpetuating their statehoods. The way in which the themes of *The People* and *Ingroup* differ from each other is that

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as those benefitting from maintaining the status quo that has marginalized a considerable portion of the Lebanese people.

the former represented protesters who chose to exclude themselves from the blame, while the latter represented protesters who chose to include themselves in the blame.[27]

6.5.2.7. Exemptions

Lastly, the data contained instances of exemptions from blame (*Exemptions*) in which protesters exempted certain figures, political parties, or entities from blame. Protesters exempted figures from blame in one of three ways: saying that some leaders were positively viewed by a certain sector of the public (e.g., saying that they as Sunnis back Saad Al-Hariri), appealing to an authority figure for help (given the country's current situation), and ridding certain figures from responsibility by saying that they were not given the opportunity to implement positive changes. These three initial codes (positively viewed leaders, appealing to an authority figure, and "their hands are tied") were combined to form the reversed adversarial theme of *Exemptions*.

> "I would just like to direct a message to the **head of the army**, whom **we love and revere greatl**y, chief **you are an honorable person**, help us." V3.19, M2

Here, the protester is appealing to the head of the army by complimenting him as an honorable person and asking for his help. See Appendix F for more excerpts from the *Adversarial Attributions* themes discussed above.

Turning to a discussion of the mutual exclusivity/inclusivity of these themes, we note that these adversarial targets are not mutually exclusive due to the nature of the data. That is, protesters often allocated blame to more than one target in their speech and thus received a code of '1', or 'present', for all of the adversarial targets they

27 The majority of the responses coded under these two themes come from protesters who were prompted by the LBCI reporters to answer questions about why the people, or the protesters themselves, voted for the politicians they were protesting against. Some of these prompted protester responses came in the form of blame, at times allocated to the Lebanese people, and at others allocated to the ingroup as a whole.

named. However, there are two exceptions. The first is the theme of *Only 'They',* where blame was allocated only to the unspecified target of 'they' without the mention of any other targets. The second exception is the theme of *Specific Entity*, which included statements of protesters who blamed one or more specific entities but not the entire political system, making the theme mutually exclusive from that of *Totality*. Conversely, the theme of *Specific Person* is not mutually exclusive with other themes like *Totality* or *Specific Entity*. That is, protesters who named several figures of authority by name could receive a 'present' code for *Totality* as well as *Specific Person*. This case is demonstrated by the above excerpt provided as an example for the theme of *Specific Person*. The rationale behind this decision was our belief in the importance of capturing all instances where specific names were mentioned as it signified the breaking of cultural taboos in Lebanon. For a clarification of the overlap between the themes of *Adversarial Attribution*, see Table 14 below:

	Totality	Specific Entity	Specific Person	Only 'They'	The People	Ingroup
Specific Entity	×	✓				
Specific Person	✓	✓	✓			
Only 'They'	×	×	×	✓		
The People	✓	✓	✓	×	✓	
Ingroup	✓	✓	✓	×	✓	✓
Exemp-tions	✓	✓	✓	×	✓	✓

Table 14: Visual Representation of the Overlap Between the Themes of Adversarial Attributions

6.5.3. Descriptive Data

Of the total sample size (*N* = 1,213), 75.3% of protesters allocated blame to at least one adversarial target whenever they spoke (N = 913), distributed in the following way over the three days—Day 1: N = 151, 71.2%; Day 2, N = 261, 77.7%; Day 3, N = 501, 75.3%.

The analyses hereinafter are of the percentage of total protesters allocating blame to each adversary over the three days. Descriptive analyses showed that the external targets of blame that involved systemic adversaries (i.e., *Totality*, *Only 'They'*) and personalized attacks (i.e., *Specific Person*) were mentioned more frequently compared to more restrictive external targets of blame (i.e., *Specific Entity*) and compared to internal targets of blame (i.e., *Ingroup* and *The People*) and *Exemptions* (see Figure 10). The predominant adversarial attribution involved allocating blame to the *Totality*, endorsed by almost half the protesters. Conversely, around 6% or less of protesters displayed *Exemptions* from blame for particular figures, or attributed blame to a *Specific Entity*, *The People*, or the *Ingroup*. As for other external targets of blame, interestingly, both allocating blame to the *Totality* as well a *Specific Person* (a breaking of taboos; 20%) were endorsed more highly than those who only blamed an unidentified 'they' (*Only 'They'*; around 15%).



Figure 10: Adversarial Attributions Themes: Order of Occurrence (across all days)

In terms of temporal trends (see Figure 11), notwithstanding significance of changes, the external targets of blame of *Totality* and *Specific Person* showed a visible steady rise from Day 1 to Day 2, and to Day 3. The more ambiguous theme of *Only 'They'*, on the other hand, demonstrated the opposite trend of decreasing over the course of the three days.



Figure 11: Adversarial Attributions Themes: Temporal Variation

Moreover, the themes of Specific Entity, *Exemptions* from blame and the internal targets of blaming *The People* and the *Ingroup* were overall endorsed by a small percentage of protesters across the three days of the analysis and, as shown in the figure above, showed negligible and likely non-significant fluctuations over the three days.

6.5.4. Quantitative Analyses

Next, we turn to a statistical temporal analysis of the *Adversarial Attributions* themes, in order to see how the allocation of blame to different target progressed over the course of our data. Chi-square tests of independence between each theme and *Protest Day* were conducted. Unless stated otherwise, all cell frequencies were greater than or equal to five, indicating a Chi-square test of independence is an appropriate one. Significant tests were followed by post-hoc cell comparisons to determine which days differed significantly from each other.

6.5.4.1. Totality

There was a statistically significant association between *Totality* and *Protest Day*, $\chi^2(2) = 20.60$, $p < .001$. The association was small, Cramer's V = .13. As shown in Table 15, post-hoc cell comparisons revealed that allocating blame to the *Totality* increased from Day 1 to Day 2, but the increase was non-significant. However, Day 3 was significantly higher than both Day 1 and Day 2 in the allocation of blame to the *Totality*. These results showed that the allocation of blame to the *Totality* not only increased from one day to the next, but that it was also endorsed by a significantly higher proportion of protesters on the third day.

Totality	Protest Day			
	Day 1	Day 2	Day 3	Total
Present (observed count)	76_a	145_a	349_b	570
% within Totality	13.3%	25.4%	61.2%	100.0%
% within Protest Day	35.8%	43.2%	52.5%	47.0%
% of Total	6.3%	12.0%	28.8%	47.0%

Table 15: Crosstabulation of Totality and Protest Day

Note. Cells with identical subscript letters do not differ significantly from each other at $p = .05$.

6.5.4.2. Specific Person

The association between *Specific Person* and *Protest Day* only approached significance levels, $\chi^2(2) = 4.92$, $p = .09$. The association was trivial, Cramer's V = .06. No post-hoc tests were thus conducted to compare cells. What is worth noting here is simply that the percentage of those allocating blame to a *Specific Person* increased from one day to another, although these increases were not statistically significant (see Table 16).

Specific Person	Protest Day			
	Day 1	Day 2	Day 3	Total
Present (observed count)	31_a	59_a	140_a	230
% within Specific Person	13.5%	25.7%	60.9%	100.0%
% within Protest Day	14.6%	17.6%	21.1%	19.0%
% of Total	2.6%	4.9%	11.5%	19.0%

Table 16: Crosstabulation of Specific Person and Protest Day

Note. Cells with identical subscript letters do not differ significantly from each other at $p = .05$.

6.5.4.3. Only 'They'

There was a statistically significant association between *Only 'They'* and *Protest Day*, $\chi^2(2) = 28.93$, $p < .001$. The association was small, Cramer's V = .15. As shown in Table 17, post-hoc cell comparisons revealed that allocating blame only to the unidentified 'they' decreased slightly from Day 1 to Day 2, but the decrease was non-significant. However, Day 3 was significantly lower in the allocation of blame to *Only 'They'* than both Day 1 and Day 2.

Only 'They'	Protest Day			
	Day 1	Day 2	Day 3	Total
Present (observed count)	46_a	70_a	67_b	183
% within Only 'They'	25.1%	38.3%	36.6%	100.0%
% within Protest Day	21.7%	20.8%	10.1%	15.1%
% of Total	3.8%	5.8%	5.5%	15.1%

Table 17: Crosstabulation of Only 'They' and Protest Day

Note. Cells with identical subscript letters do not differ significantly from each other at $p = .05$.

6.5.4.4. Exemptions

There was no statistically significant association between *Exemptions* and *Protest Day*, $\chi^2(2) = 2.12$, $p = .35$, ns. The association was trivial, Cramer's V = .04.

6.5.4.5. Specific Entity

There was no statistically significant association between *Specific Entity* and *Protest Day*, $\chi^2(2) = 2.29$, $p = .32$, ns. The association was trivial, Cramer's V = .04.

6.5.4.6. The People

There was no statistically significant association between *The People* and *Protest Day*, $\chi^2(2) = .63$, $p = .73$, ns. The association was trivial, Cramer's V = .02.

6.5.4.7. Ingroup

No instances of allocating blame to the *Ingroup* were recorded on Day 1 (the 17th of October). Therefore, a Chi-Square test of independence could not be conducted as the assumption of expected cell frequencies being greater than or equal to five could not be met (Day 1 observed count = 0). Instead, Fisher's exact test was conducted between *Ingroup* and *Protest Day* (now a dichotomous variable consisting of only Day 2 and Day 3). There was no statistically significant association between *Ingroup* and *Protest Day* as assessed by Fisher's exact test, $p = .15$, ns.

In sum, these results demonstrated that the allocation of blame to the totality of rule and to specific individuals increased over the period of the analysis, albeit in a manner that only approached significance for *Specific Person*. On the other hand, attributions of blame to the generalized *'They'* behaved in the opposite direction of significantly decreasing on the third day compared to the former two, while attributions to *Specific Entity* adversaries, internal targets (*The People* and *Ingroup*), as well as *Exemptions*, displayed no significant temporal fluctuations.

6.6. Emotions

6.6.1. Specific Coding Method

The coding for the category of *Emotions* was approached in an exploratory fashion, with codes developed in a bottom-up manner. No predetermined codes were established. We did not distinguish between emotions expressed using first-person singular, first-person plural, or third-person plural pronouns (I, we, they, respectively). This was due to the observation that dividing the coding into three different ways of expression resulted in trivial numbers of data points without adding much meaning to the interpretation of the data.

Expressions were only coded as emotions if the protesters used the verbatim term to describe their own state. For example, the word "qaraf" (disgust), or its linguistic derivatives had to be mentioned in order for the utterance to be coded as containing an instance of disgust.

Thus, whenever an utterance contained a keyword that corresponded to an emotion, the utterance received a '1' code to indicate the presence of said emotion. All other instances of 'not present' emotions were coded as '0'. This verbatim approach to coding resulted in having no use for the hierarchical division of codes, subthemes, and themes used in the previous categories. Hence, the category of *Emotions* is comprised of only two levels: the themes and the category (see Figure 12 for a visual illustration).



Figure 12: Illustration of the coding division of emotions

Note. The data presented in the figure is not comprehensive and is used for illustrative purposes.

6.6.2. Qualitative Analysis

The data was coded into six emotions: *Anger*, *Pain*, *Humiliation*, *Disgust*, *Fatigue*, and *Despair*. In fact, however, the data was initially coded into seven themes, with exasperation as an additional emotion. However, since exasperation has been considered to be a subset of anger (Alvarado & Jameson, 2000; Russell & Fehr, 1994; Shaver et al., 1987), the two themes of exasperation and anger were merged under a single theme.

6.6.2.1. Anger

The phrases that were coded for *Anger* contained expressions such as “ghadhab al nas” (the people’s anger), “tafah al kail” (enough is enough), as well as “ma fina net’hammal ba’a” (we cannot take it anymore).[28] Interestingly, rather than merely expressing anger, the majority of the utterances under *Anger* had to do with the concept

28 For additional examples of phrases that were coded as corresponding expressions of *Emotions*, see Appendix G.

of being fed up and the intolerability of the overall situation in Lebanon, generated as a result of accumulating grievances. This theme captured people's anger, exasperation, frustration, and the feeling of running out of patience. The below excerpt is a sample of an utterance that was coded as containing an expression of *Anger*:

> "If they were thinking that they will reap anything other than **this anger** then they are very mistaken. **This anger** is only just starting, and it will not be resolved with just reversing the WhatsApp thing." V1.8, M8

Here, the protester comments on how the burst of anger that was present during the uprising is in response to the actions of the leaders (identified as 'they') and it will not be quieted down by the retraction of the WhatsApp tax.

6.6.2.2. Pain

Expressions that were coded under *Pain* contained keywords such as "waja'a" (ache) and "alam" (pain), alongside their linguistic derivatives. This theme of *Emotions* aimed to capture the instance in which protesters chose to focus on the suffering they have endured, be it rhetorical or literal, as a result of the worsening situation in the country. The below excerpt is a sample of an utterance that was coded as containing an expression of *Pain*:

> "People are going down and talking out of their **pain**, their **agony**, hunger, poverty, and unemployment. Suicide cases are on the rise. What are they waiting for?" V3.14, M11

Here, this protester gave a reason for why people chose to take to the streets in the way they did. She listed the many grievances that have accumulated over the years and asked the question of what more needs to happen for corrective action to be taken.

6.6.2.3. Humiliation

Utterances were coded as containing instances of *Humiliation* if they included expressions such as “zallouna” (they humiliated us), “shahhadouna” (they made us beg), and “massahou el ared fina” (they used us to mop the floor). Unlike the other themes, *Humiliation* included more phrases than keywords in its lexicon as more cultural idioms were used to describe humiliation than direct terms. This theme of emotions aimed to capture the instances in which protesters expressed feeling humiliated or made to feel devalued by the actions of the ruling class. The below excerpt is a sample of an utterance that was coded as containing an expression of *Humiliation*:

> **“We were humiliated and made destitute**. Look at how the people are living. I swear [the politicians] are all thieves.” V3.28, M37

Contextually, this protester described how she was made to feel humiliated by the country’s economic situation. She proceeded by saying that she was forced into working petty jobs to provide for the needs of her sick mother and her infant.

6.6.2.4. Disgust

Expressions that were coded as those of *Disgust* included keywords such as “tfou” (an interjection meaning spit), “qaraf” (disgust), and “wasakh” (filth). This theme

aimed to capture the different ways protesters expressed their disgust with the declining situation of the country as well as their perceptions of the ruling class as being rhetorically unclean people who have, and continue to, commit 'dirty deeds'. The below excerpt is a sample of an utterance that was coded as containing an expression of *Disgust*:

> "**Tfou (I spit)** on such a country, parliamentarians, and ministers." V1.4, M2

Here, the protester was expressing that the country and its political class disgusted him so much that he wished to spit on everyone.

6.6.2.5. Fatigue

Phrases coded under *Fatigue* include expressions such as "ta'ab" (tired) and "halak" (exhaustion), alongside their linguistic derivatives. This theme of *Emotions* aimed to capture the instances in which protesters expressed that they had grown weary from the continuous and worsening challenges of living in Lebanon. While the emotion of anger has been repeatedly linked to the action tendency of readiness to participate in collective action (van Zomeren et al., 2012; Tausch et al., 2011; van Zomeren et al., 2004), fatigue has been shown to be associated with considerably lower action tendencies (Frida et al., 1989). For this reason, we believed it was worth looking at *Fatigue* as its own theme to examine how and how much an emotion characterized by withdrawal, or lack of associated action, materialized within the context of a national revolution. The below excerpt is a sample of an utterance that was coded as containing an expression of *Fatigue*:

> **“People are very tired**, if they were not tired, they wouldn't go down and make these demands in such a way.” V2.20, M14

Here, the protester was essentially giving a reason for why people chose to take to the streets in the way that they did, that is, spontaneously and chaotically. Contextually, this protester responded with the above excerpt to the reporter asking him if he thought there was another way for people to express their grievances and demands other than closing streets and torching tires.

6.6.2.6. Despair

Lastly, the *Emotions* theme of *Despair* included the following expressions in its lexicon: “yaaes” (desperation), “ma fi amal” (there is no hope), and “yaret nmout” (if only we could die). This theme aimed to capture the instances in which protesters expressed that they had essentially given up on the prospect of an improved way of life. Similar to *Humiliation*, the expressions coded for *Despair* also included more phrases than keywords. The below excerpt is a sample of an utterance that was coded as containing an expression of *Despair*:

> “**I wish they would just open fire on us and kill us all.** I wish they would just shoot us all and kill us because **we are dying with each passing second in Lebanon.”** V1.1, M12

The protester here stated that the situation had gotten so bad in Lebanon that it feels as if people were dying over and over again, and that physical death might be more merciful. Contextually, this protester expressed his wish to die amid riot police attacks

and arrests on the first night of the uprising. See Appendix H for more excerpts from the *Emotions* themes discussed above.

6.6.3. Descriptive Data

Of the total sample size (N = 1213), 19.5% of protesters expressed at least one emotion whenever they spoke (N = 237). Of those who spoke on Day 1, 15.6% expressed at least one emotion (N = 33). Of those who spoke on Day 2, 20.5% expressed at least one emotion (N = 69). Of those who spoke on Day 3, 20.3% expressed at least one emotion (N = 135).

Descriptive analyses showed that the predominant emotion across the three days combined is *Anger*, followed by *Pain*, *Humiliation*, *Disgust*, *Fatigue*, and finally, *Despair* (see Figure 13). Next, we describe how these vary temporally over the three days leading up to the largest protest.



Figure 13: Emotions Themes: Order of Occurrence (across all days)

The profile of these emotions was not the same on each day (see Figure 14). In terms of trends, and disregarding statistical significance, the above graph shows that

Anger was the most prevalent emotion across all days. Following a similar pattern, *Anger*, *Disgust*, and *Fatigue* showed an inverted U-curve trend, whereby they increased in frequency of occurrence from Day 1 to Day 2, only to then decreased from Day 2 to Day 3. *Pain* and *Humiliation*, on the other hand, showed a gradual increase by Day 2 and Day 3 as compared to Day 1. Finally, not much could be said about the trend of *Despair* as the theme did not come up in the data on Day 2 at all and merely decreased on Day 3 as compared to Day 1. As the percentages of the majority of the themes were quite low, these fluctuations may not be significant.



Figure 14: Emotions Themes: Temporal Variation

6.6.4. Quantitative Analyses

Next, we turn to the statistical temporal analysis of the themes of *Emotions* discussed above, in order to see how the expressed emotional state of the protesters shifted during the first few days of the October 17th revolution. Chi-square tests of independence were conducted between each theme and *Protest Day*. Unless stated otherwise, all cell frequencies were greater than or equal to five. Significant association

tests were followed up with post-hoc cell comparisons to detect which days different significantly from each other.

6.6.4.1. Anger

There was no statistically significant association between *Anger* and *Protest Day*, $\chi^2(2) = 1.18$, $p = .55$, ns. The association was trivial, Cramer's V = .03. These results show that the expressions of anger did not vary by much over the first three days of the uprising but remained the prominent form of emotional expression relative to the other coded emotions.

6.6.4.2. Pain

There was a statistically significant association between *Pain* and *Protest Day*, $\chi^2(2) = 8.60$, $p = .01$. The association was trivial, Cramer's V = .08.

As shown in the Table 18, Day 1 did not differ from Day 2 or Day 3, while Day 2 and Day 3 differed significantly from each other. This showed that protesters chose to express their pain on the third day of the protests significantly more so than on the first two days.[29]

29 Notably, despite the very small difference in the percentage of occurrence of Pain within Protest Day between Day 1 and Day 2, the comparison to Day 3 was significant for Day 2 but not for Day 1. This led us to believe that the comparison between Day 1 and Day 3 did in fact approach- significance (i.e., the p-value is between .05 and .1), but SPSS did not flag it due to the automatically applied Bonferroni correction at the .05 level. Used as an optional built-in feature in SPSS for multiple comparisons, the Bonferroni correction controls the rate of familywise errors, the error of incorrectly rejecting a null hypothesis. A Bonferroni correction is done by dividing the original p-value (.05 for this case) by the number of comparisons made (3 for this case) and using the resultant value (.0167) as the new threshold for significance.
To test our suspicion, we split the three-level independent variable into two dichotomous variables, one consisting of Day 1 and Day 3 and the second consisting of Day 2 and Day 3 and ran a Fisher's exact on the new variables. This was done based on guidance from Dr. Donald Sharpe, whose 2015 paper on tracing the source of significance from an omnibus chi-square test informed the quantitative analyses of this work. Dr. Sharpe was contacted personally by the author with the issue at hand and he promptly responded by proposing to isolate the problematic cells and re-run the crosstabulation tests in order to obtain the between-cells p-values. Dr. Sharpe further noted that it is not recommended to repeat this procedure for all of our interactions, as splitting the variables may be affecting the results in ways we

Pain	Protest Day			
	Day 1	Day 2	Day 3	Total
Present (observed count)	$6_{a, b}$	9_{b}	42_{a}	57
% within Pain	10.5%	15.8%	73.7%	100.0%
% within Protest Day	2.8%	2.7%	6.3%	4.7%
% of Total	0.5%	0.7%	3.5%	4.7%

Table 18: Crosstabulation of Pain and Protest Day

Note. Cells with identical subscript letters do not differ significantly from each at p = .05.

6.6.4.3. Humiliation

Only three instances of *Humiliation* were recorded on the 17th of October (Day 1). Therefore, a Chi-Square test of independence could not be conducted as the assumption of expected cell frequencies being greater than or equal to five could not be met (Day 1 observed count = 3). Instead, Fisher's exact test was conducted between the emotion of *Humiliation* and *Protest Day*. There was a statistically significant association *Humiliation* and *Protest Day* as assessed by Fisher's exact test, p = .03. Post-hoc tests (see Table 19) revealed that the proportion of those who expressed *Humiliation* showed a gradual increase from one day to the next. However, as shown in the table below, Day 2 did not significantly differ from Day 1 or Day 3, while Day 1 and Day 3 were statistically significantly different from each other. These results demonstrated that protesters reported relatively few experiences of humiliation on the

could not detect; however, since this was a special case where the difference in the percentages was a mere 0.1%, such a procedure could be defended.
As suspected, the comparison of Day 1 and Day 3 approached significance (p = .05) with a trivial effect size (Cramer's V = .07), while the comparison of Day 2 and Day 3 corroborated the initial significance (p = .01), also with a trivial effect size (Cramer's V = 0.8).

first day of the movement, but experienced humiliation significantly more so as the days passed.

Humiliation	Protest Day			
	Day 1	Day 2	Day 3	Total
Present (observed count)	3_a	$16_{a, b}$	36_b	55
% within Humiliation	5.5%	29.1%	65.5%	100.0%
% within Protest Day	1.4%	4.8%	5.4%	4.5%
% of Total	0.2%	1.3%	3.0%	4.5%

Table 19: Crosstabulation of Humiliation and Protest Day

Note. Cells with identical subscript letters do not differ significantly from each other at $p = .05$.

6.6.4.4. Disgust

There was no statistically significant association between the emotion of *Disgust* and *Protest Day*, $\chi^2(2) = 3.80$, $p = .15$, ns. The association was trivial, Cramer's V = .06.

6.6.4.5. Fatigue

There was no statistically significant association between the emotion of *Fatigue* and *Protest Day*, $\chi^2(2) = 3.48$, $p = .18$, ns. The association was trivial, Cramer's V = .05.

6.6.4.6. Despair

No instances of *Despair* were recorded on the 18th of October (Day 2). Therefore, a Chi-Square test of independence could not be conducted as the assumption of expected cell frequencies being greater than or equal to five could not be met (October 18 observed count = 0). Instead, Fisher's exact test was conducted between the

emotion of *Despair* and *Protest Day* (as a dichotomous variable consisting of only October 17 and October 19). There was no statistically significant association between the emotion of *Despair* and *Protest Day* as assessed by Fisher's exact test, $p = .56$, ns.

To recap, expressions of *Anger*, *Disgust*, *Fatigue*, and *Despair* did not significantly fluctuate over the period of analysis, while expressions of *Pain* and *Humiliation* registered a significantly higher level on the third day of the protests as compared to the first day.

CHAPTER 7

GENERAL DISCUSSION

The present research aimed to understand the motivating factors for the October 17th Lebanese uprising through the analysis of the free speech of protesters on the street, as captured in live TV interviews by reporters on the ground during the first three days. While we expected some codes to appear based on a review of the local news at the time (predetermined codes), the study was largely an exploratory one. Informed by both the relevant literature and the local reports, we planned to construct a typology of the specific types of grievances (*Grievances*) that were cited by the protesters on the streets, in addition to the different outgroups identified as culprits (*Adversarial Attributions*) and the emotions that were at play (*Emotions*).

Next, we present a review of our findings, describe the current study's contributions to the literature, discuss some of the work's limitations and practical implications, and lay out some questions for future research.

7.1. Review of Results

Overall, our data showed that the vast majority of protesters mentioned at least one grievance (*Grievances*) and attributed blame to at least one adversarial target (*Adversarial Attributions*). *Emotions,* on the other hand, were verbally expressed by a minority of protesters. In the sections to follow, we turn to a discussion of our findings within each category of interest where we reflect on how the findings of this work differ from past research and how they contribute to the literature.

7.1.1. Grievances

Our analyses yielded six themes of *Grievances*, which were, in order of prevalence: *Economic Grievances*, *General Systemic Injustice*, *Bad Leaders*, *Absence of Democracy and Accountability*, *Psychosocial Grievances*, and *Discriminatory System.* Taken together, our findings show that grievances stemming from economic issues and broad systemic shortcomings were at the core of the movement and were the focal point of the protesters' speech.

The results are in line with the rhetoric that the uprising did not take place merely because of the introduction of the WhatsApp tax, as some have dubbed it the 'WhatsApp Revolution' (Janoubia.com, 2019). In fact, the WhatsApp tax and taxes in general were not the issues that drove the rhetoric of the uprising. The theme of *Economic Grievances* was the most prevalent one, and within it the most prevalent subtheme was that of *corruption*: a specific form of economic grievances, which was the most predominant concern on protesters' minds. This finding goes hand-in-hand with what has been observed in other contexts such as the first wave[30] of Arab uprisings, where corruption in its different forms was found to be one of the most important motivations for people's anger toward the system (Sapsford et al., 2017). Moreover, our findings show that the *accumulation of injustice* was an important experience in this context: people expressed being unhappy for many years with how the political system was structured in that it has provided fertile grounds for the ongoing economic decline to end in an inevitable collapse. Looking back at the protesters' concerns in October of 2019 gives a sense that they were aware of an impending doom. Fears over the

30 Sapsford et al. (2017) conducted their survey in six countries from the MENA region: Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia. This was done in 2014, three years after the start of the first uprising in Tunisia in 2011.

exchange rate of the national currency, for example, were voiced from the second day of the protests.

The introduction of the WhatsApp tax, and the newly added taxes in general, as part of the then-2020 national budget were the needle that broke the camel's back, not the focal point of the uprising. These taxes were obviously stemming from a looming economic collapse of which the participants in the uprising became aware, leading people to take to the streets and voice their grievances. The citing of corruption here, then, speaks to the protesters' denunciation of the wrongful policies that have resulted in the imposition of new taxes to bridge the financial gap in the national budget. As such, protesters took to the streets and voiced their rejection of enduring the shortcomings of their corrupt rulers and called for a complete overhaul of governance.

Uprisings, by definition, are a form of collective action aimed at changing the entire system, so one would expect the grievances stemming from such a mobilization to also be of systemic nature. This was indeed corroborated by our data as the findings show that there were plenty of complaints about systemic failure. For example, the theme of *General Systemic Injustice* was the second most common *Grievances* theme. However, it is also worth noting that while an awareness of a systemic aspect to the problems faced by protesters was evident, descriptions of the specific procedural aspects of the system that protesters found to be problematic were not as evident in the data. Such descriptions include the perceived discriminatory nature of the system, which were represented by subthemes of *sectarianism* and *nepotism and clientelism*, housed under the least endorsed theme (*Discriminatory System*). The economic system or specific economic policies also received no particular emphasis in the early days of the uprising. That is, economic grievances such as deprivation and impoverishment

were not attributed to a specific economic system but mostly to corruption (see Majed, 2021).

Importantly, given the sectarian and neoliberal dimensions of the political system in Lebanon (see Majed, 2021), one might have expected protesters to mention the sectarian system more prominently as being at the heart of their grievances. Instead, it is remarkable that the consociational/sectarian feature of the system received infrequent mention in the first days of the uprising, while corruption instead was the most mentioned subtheme. That said, admittedly, our analysis did not examine the expression of identities, and protesters are indeed reported to have emphasized anti-sectarian and national identities. This suggests that opposition to sectarian divisiveness was a prominent feature of the uprising, even if the opposition to a confessional system does not seem to have been prominent. Future research would do well to focus more closely on the extent to which anti-sectarianism manifested itself during the first few days of the uprising and in what ways it did so.

As for temporal analyses of *Grievances*, visual analyses show a clear occurrence of an inverted U-shaped trend in the frequency of occurrence of most *Grievances* themes. While this comment holds true for some of the themes of the two other categories of *Adversarial Attributions* and *Emotions*, it is particularly evident in the themes of *Grievances*. This trend shows that the mentions of grievances are decreasing on the third day of the protests compared to the second day as protesters shift their rhetoric to other matters not included in our analyses. Based on our knowledge of the data, having gone through the transcripts a number of times, we can hypothesize that one potential reason for this trend is that protesters are choosing to shift the rhetoric from being problem-oriented, through their expression of grievances in the first two

days, to one that is more solution-oriented, through voicing the demands of their movement.

Importantly, this shift in emphasis does not mean that the protesters are no longer aggrieved by the injustices they cited the day before. Instead, the temporal analysis is useful to the extent that it highlights the psychosocial processes on the minds of protesters as they are evolving during the uprising and speaks of what they find worth expressing. Hence, our results suggest a slight shift of what is on the protesters' minds. Initially, their speech seems focused on describing the different injustices by which they are aggrieved, and which justify the calls for a systemic overhaul. These expressions then decrease on the third day to be replaced by other factors that are up for future research to uncover through greater analyses of the data.

Turning back to the literature, past research has repeatedly demonstrated that when people become aggrieved by an injustice, they are more likely to take to the streets and protest the infliction of this injustice (e.g., Smith & Ortiz, 2001; Stürmer & Simon, 2004; van Zomeren et al., 2004; van Zomeren et al., 2012). However, one of the main limitations of this research tradition in the field of social psychology is that it has rarely sought to identify the most endorsed types of grievances that come up as people engage in collective action. Instead, perceived injustice, or experiences of grievances, are more frequently conceptualized as a single construct (e.g., Odağ et al., 2016; Simon & Klandermans, 2001; van Zomeren et al., 2008).

That being said, we note that there have been efforts to distinguish personal from fraternal deprivation (Runciman, 1966) and procedural from distributive justice (Thibaut & Walker, 1975; Tyler & Smith, 1988), although these conceptualizations do not necessarily encompass the different forms that grievances can take. This was

evident in our data as we noticed that it was not very easy to understand the different grievances by using the above classifications as the expressed grievances were often a mixture of the different conceptualized divisions. Certainly, some of the inequalities that were cited by protesters can be categorized under distributive injustice, such as the mentions of the lack of resources and services within the theme of *Economic Grievances*. Other inequalities, such as the ones included under the theme of *Discriminatory System*, which have to do with the way people are treated by the system, speak more to the aspect of procedural injustice.

Still, not all grievances fit neatly into these classifications as some appear to be a mixture of a number of aspects of injustice. For example, the *Grievances* subtheme of *immigration*, which is housed under the theme of *Psychosocial Grievances*, speaks of the difficulties involved in separating from loved ones in the search of better living conditions. It contains a distributive aspect (lack of work opportunities), a procedural aspect (selective employment of supporters of the system, i.e., clientelism/nepotism), and an aspect that has more to do with the need for dignified living that is equal to, or perhaps more pressing than, the need to find employment opportunities. Also housed under the theme of *Psychosocial Grievances*, the subtheme of *physical and mental harm*, which speaks of the harms imposed by the system through actions that have reduced the people's agency and inflicted permanent damage on their quality of life, follows similar reasoning in that it cannot be discretely placed into one class or the other. What seems to be concrete is that there appears to be multiple dimensions of injustice present in the context of the uprising that cannot be holistically captured by the present classifications.

Hence, in order to understand the social psychological factors that motivate engagement in an uprising, it is important to understand the types of grievances that can lead to this type of collective action. This work contributes to the literature a typology of the grievances that were central to the October 17th uprising. Next, we turn to a discussion of the findings within the category of *Adversarial Attributions*.

7.1.2. Adversarial Attributions

The present research aimed to describe the different ways in which protesters constructed the identity of the outgroup(s) during the first days of the uprising. Since the social change goal was a revolutionary one, one would expect that the prominent attributions of blame were to external adversaries that represent the system as a whole. Our findings demonstrate that this was indeed the case. Overall, the vast majority of protesters allocated blame to at least one adversarial target whenever they spoke. Our analyses yielded seven themes of *Adversarial Attributions*, which were, in order of prevalence: *Totality*, *Specific Person*, *Only 'They'*, *Exemptions*, *Specific Entity*, *The People*, and *Ingroup*. These themes are divided between internal adversarial targets (*The People* and *Ingroup*), exemptions from blame (*Exemptions*), and external adversarial targets (*Totality*, *Specific Person*, *Only 'They'*, and *Specific Entity*).

Consistent with the literature on external and internal allocation of blame (e.g., Frijda et al., 1989; Simon & Klandermans, 2001), protesters allocated blame to an external adversarial target much more frequently than to an internal adversarial target. However, our data clearly showed the attribution of blame to multiple targets at once (rather than a single figure or entity). This is demonstrated through the theme of *Totality* which included instances of protesters naming multiple targets (e.g., the government,

the parliament, and the president) at once. While this was expected from the context of an uprising, it is not in line with the proposition of Javeline (2003) that mobilization becomes more likely when blame is attributed to a single specified target. Our findings suggest that the existence of multiple targets of blame is not necessarily linked to inaction, but perhaps to collective action against the system as a whole, that is, a revolutionary social change goal.

Interestingly, despite it occurring in a very small percentage, internal allocation of blame was indeed present in our data (through the themes of *The People* and *Ingroup*), which in and of itself is interesting as it was expressed by those actively engaging in protest. It is important to note here the context of these occurrences: the LBCI reporters had begun asking the protesters why they voted for the rulers they are currently protesting against. In response to such prompts, some protesters blamed the Lebanese people (*The People*) for their irresponsible actions of voting for and supporting the warlords currently in power, while others directed blame toward themselves (*Ingroup*). However, firstly, it is important to mention that the coding of our data did not take into account the possible co-occurrence of adversarial attributions to external and internal targets of blame, as they were coded independently from each other. Therefore, it may very well be the case that protesters who made internal attributions of blame also made external attributions of blame. Secondly, and more importantly, one could argue that the internal targets of blame by definition incriminated the ones in power, in that they consisted of blaming either others (*The People*) or oneself/the ingroup (*Ingroup*) for voting leaders into power who ended up not being worthy of their power position. In that sense, internal attributions of blame contain within them a blame of the leaders for their many shortcomings, an aspect of

regret (in the case of ingroup blame) for bringing the leaders into power, as well as a realization of the people's agency in bringing about change by removing those they helped reach power.

In terms of temporality, we highlight an interesting trend whereby all external targets of blame demonstrate a steady increase from one day to the next except for the theme of *Only 'They'* which decreases over the three days. As *Totality* tends to increase over the three days, *Only 'They'* behaves in the opposite direction, suggesting that, by the third day of the uprising, protesters simultaneously blamed the system as a whole and lessened expressions of vague attributions of blame.

Moreover, the specific external targets of blame also show increasing percentages of occurrence from one day to the next, albeit only approaching significance (*Specific Person*) or non-significantly (*Specific Entity*). What these results are telling us, essentially, is that the expressions of adversarial attributions by the protesters are becoming more specific (*Specific Person*, *Specific Entity*), more in support of a complete overhaul of the system (*Totality*), and less vague (*Only 'They'*) over the days of the movement. This is in line with rhetoric that protesters had overstepped the threshold of fear during the uprising by no longer sugar-coating their accusatory statements and affirming their lack of trust in the entirety of the political class.

As for the internal targets of blame, while both *Exemptions* and blaming *The People* slightly increase over the days, this increase is not significant, and their frequency of occurrence remains relatively low over the first three days. However, it is interesting to note that the slight increase in *Exemptions* might be that, with the skyrocketing blame of the entire system (*Totality)* through both individual statements

and group chants such as “all of them means all of them”,[31] some protesters might have felt the need to rectify the situation by exempting the figure they support of blame. Next, we move to a discussion of the findings within the category of *Emotions*.

7.1.3. Emotions

Of the total sample, around a fifth of protesters expressed at least one negative emotion, with the lowest recorded percentage of expressions occurring on Day 1. The finding that only a minority of protesters engaged in verbal expressions of negative emotions indicates that most protesters used their airtime to express non-emotional verbal content. As they engaged in justifying their participation in collective action and/or in mobilizing others to join, the verbal expression of emotions seems to have taken a secondary role in favor of the expression of grievances and adversarial attributions, but also likely in favor of other themes that are not analyzed in the present research. Moreover, we cannot conclude from our findings that emotions played a minor role in motivating the uprising, since emotions could have also been expressed in non-verbal ways for which we did not code. Still, the verbal expression of emotions in this naturalistic setting provides an opportunity to uncover the types of negative emotions that may underlie participation in an uprising.

The analyses showed that the emotion of *Anger* was by far the predominant one across the three days. This is consistent with the reviewed literature on anger being an action-oriented emotion (e.g., Carver & Harmon-Jones, 2009) and being the prototypical emotion associated with collective action (e.g., Mackie et al., 2000). Our findings differ from the typical findings in the collective action literature, however, in

31 Chants were not analyzed in the present research. This statement is merely a reflection of contextual knowledge.

the type of anger expressed by the protesters. The majority of the expressions of anger had to do with the concept of being fed up and the intolerability of the situation, generated as a result of accumulated grievances. For this reason, the theme of *Anger* in the present study, which is predominantly an expression of exasperation, may not be capturing the same conceptualization of furious anger typically found in the literature (e.g., Iyer et al., 2007, who measured anger using items such as feeling "furious, outraged, angry, incensed.", p.576). As such, our findings call for further research on this nuanced form of anger which is being expressed as exasperation or feeling fed up with a situation.

Notwithstanding its type, anger has been associated with increased autonomic arousal and activation of the fight or flight response (e.g., Lench et al., 2016), which prepares people for action (fight response). The utility of anger in intergroup conflict lends reason to its predominance in our data as research has demonstrated that angry people are perceived by others as more determined (e.g., Pettersson & Turkheimer, 2013) and committed (e.g., Reed et al., 2014) than non-angry individuals. Likewise, angry facial expressions were more likely to be perceived as powerful (e.g., Keating, 1985) and representative of high social status (e.g., Tiedens, 2001). Taken together, and relevant to the current study, one could argue that protesters were adamant to express their anger more so than other emotional states in order to be taken seriously by their audience of authority figures and other citizens alike.

However, as we were expecting, other emotions emerged in the spontaneous speech of the protesters, which are typically not studied in the literature, showcasing the value of naturalistic analyses of emotional expression. Our analyses demonstrate that the emotions of *Pain*, *Humiliation*, *Disgust*, *Fatigue*, and *Despair* were also present in

the protesters' speech, in that order of occurrence. In the few paragraphs to follow, we explore how the relevant literature has approached these emotional experiences.

Psychological experiences of pain have been mainly studied within the context of social exclusion, dubbing it social pain (e.g., Bernstein & Claypool, 2012; Riva et al., 2011). However, what we are seeing in the present data is the emotion of pain being associated with the experience of injustice. This is interesting because the emotion that has been mostly investigated with the experience of injustice is anger (e.g., Iyer et al., 2007), which is still present in the data, but the results are also pointing to pain as an important experience to collective action. The presence of pain is also interesting because it is an emotional state associated with withdrawal (Frijda, 1989), yet we find it present in a setting that is very much action oriented. Future investigation into the role of pain in motivating collective action can be beneficial in informing the field of how such an emotional state is being utilized in mass mobilizations.

The literature on humiliation within the context of collective action is sparse, as humiliation is typically studied in the context of conflict and violence. Instead, the experience of humiliation can perhaps be best understood in relation to collective action in the way that humiliation shares some of its features with other emotions. One perspective on the conceptualization of humiliation comes from Elshout et al. (2017) who posited that the experience of humiliation may share some features with other emotional experiences such as shame and anger and yet retain central features that distinguish it from both. The authors argue that the role of a perpetrator is the central factor that determines whether the experience of humiliation will be more shame-like or anger-like. Based on this reasoning, it follows that the more individuals hold themselves responsible for the humiliating situation, the more they are likely to display withdrawal

tendencies associated with feelings of shame, such as the desire to disappear (Frijda, 1989). Likewise, the more a person perceives an external perpetrator as responsible for inflicting the humiliating situation, the more they are likely to display action-oriented tendencies, one example of which is collective action. This conceptualization of humiliation, taken together with the finding that the most mentioned adversarial targets were external ones, we can conclude that the humiliation expressed by the protesters in our study was more similar to the experience of anger than to that of shame.

Similar to humiliation, the role of disgust in motivating collective action can best be understood through its relationship with other emotions that have been directly linked to collective action, such as anger and contempt. Moral disgust[32] was found to be a distinct emotional experience than that of anger and contempt (Hutcherson & Gross, 2011; Kupfer & Giner-Sorolla, 2016), motivated by appraisals of moral unworthiness and associated with long-lasting judgments of an inherently immoral character as well as little likelihood of reconciliation, when compared to anger and contempt.

It is unclear, however, the extent to which disgust and contempt can be disentangled in our data, as well as linguistically in Arabic.[33] While Hutcherson and Gross (2011) conceptualized disgust as being associated with the unwillingness to make amends, Tausch et al. (2011) adopted a similar definition for contempt as signaling irreconcilability with the outgroup. Regardless, the two studies converge on the point of reconciliation, whereby the emotion that is linked to lesser willingness to reconcile is

32 Hutcherson and Gross (2011) distinguished between moral and social disgust in their studies, defining the former as a response to violations of individual rights and communal codes, such as selling drugs to minors. Social disgust, on the other hand, was conceptualized as responses to violations of purity or sanctity, such as eating rotten foods. The interest of their studies, and relevance to this work, is moral disgust.

33 The term for contempt in Arabic is ‘ezdiraa’, which is not a commonly used word outside of Classical Arabic (Fus’ha), so it is unlikely for a protester to use such terminology when expressing contempt-laden emotions. The term for disgust, on the other hand, ‘qaraf’, can be thought of as often used to mean a form of contempt.

more likely to result in violent forms of collective action. Conversely, here, what we observe is the occurrence of disgust in primarily nonviolent collective action aimed at overhauling the entire system. That is, disgust here is occurring in a context of a revolutionary social change goal. Our data indeed comes from a context in which *"thawra"* (revolution) was chanted by protesters from the very first day of the movement. Conversely, the literature on emotions in collective action has focused primarily on collective action in non-revolutionary contexts. Our findings therefore shed light on the different emotions that might be relevant in a revolutionary context. In the context of people demanding a complete overhaul of governance, we observe the occurrence of expressions of disgust, a manifestation of feelings of profound appalment and ostracism.

As for fatigue and despair, perhaps their role could be viewed through research on how people act when they feel that neither normative nor non-normative forms of collective action will work (e.g., Saab et al., 2016). This research suggests that individuals are more likely to endorse violent forms of collective action in situations where the available means of action have a low chance of working, being dubbed the nothing-to-lose strategy. However, research on accompanying emotions such as despair or fatigue has not been conducted. The present findings suggest that these emotions might occur within the context of revolutionary forms of collective action. Still, further investigation into their role is needed before drawing any conclusions due to their small frequencies of occurrence in the current data.

Importantly, as it was the case with the category of *Adversarial Attributions*, the data coding process for *Emotions* did not take into account the co-occurrence of emotions. In other words, the presence of withdrawal emotions does not necessitate the

absence of anger, for example, as multiple emotions can co-occur. This point might explain the presence of both withdrawal associated as well as action-oriented emotions in the data. Nevertheless, further research is necessary to examine the independent role of negative emotions of withdrawal in predicting collective action engagement.

In closing, we note that the current research sheds light on the types of emotions that are associated with grievances. To date, research has focused on anger, frustration, and resentment as a result of injustice, but not on other emotional aspects that may be associated with injustice such as pain, humiliation, fatigue, and despair.

One point worth noting before moving on to the next section is the role of the audience in shaping the rhetoric of the protesters during the early days of the uprising. While this work does not take into account how having an audience may have affected what the protesters chose to say on live television, it is evident from the data that the protesters were well aware that they were being filmed and were speaking to an audience that was closely listening to them. As such, one possibility is that what the protesters chose to say may have changed depending on who they thought was watching. Another possibility is that what was being said by the protesters depended on what they needed from the audience in terms of action (e.g., support on ground, social media exposure), or what they needed the audience to know (e.g., storytelling to correct public records). Next, we comment on the novel contributions of the present study to the field of social psychology.

7.2. Contributions to the Literature

The present study made use of a unique opportunity provided by extensive live TV coverage of protesters during the first few days of the Lebanese uprising, in what

has been dubbed by some at the time as the “open mic” revolution (Battah, 2019). Uprisings and collective action moments are usually not mediatized in this manner. Given that uprisings and revolutions typically occur unexpectedly, researchers are often not able to conduct surveys and interviews at the outset of such events. As a result, research on the outset of such events is typically based on retrospective data (Della Porta, 2014). Accordingly, the dataset we produced in this thesis presents a unique and valuable opportunity to analyze protesters’ real-time thoughts and feelings during their participation in the uprising over the first three days.

Additionally, the social psychological literature on collective action rarely focuses on the contexts of revolutions and uprisings. Studies in this field typically examine collective action in western democracies, which do not usually aim at changing an entire system and where activism can be considered relatively safe (see the work of Ayanian et al., 2021 on resistance in repressive contexts for an example of this critique). From this perspective, the dataset explored here, and the proposed methodology, are valuable advancements to the literature in terms of providing direct access to protesters’ thoughts and feelings as they are unfolding at the onset of an uprising in a non-western context.

Another aspect of novelty in the present research is the temporal exploration which examines people’s perception of the uprising’s evolution in real time. The way that temporality has been utilized in the current study is not typically how temporal changes are studied in the social psychological tradition, as longitudinal studies on collective action tend to be sprawled over a number of months or years (e.g., Rimé et al., 2017), not days as is the case with this work. As such, examining an evolving

uprising in (daily) temporal terms from the initial spark contributes a more detailed understanding of how collective action unfolds.

From a theoretical standpoint, the way the present research delves into the concepts in question provides novel understandings of their role in motivating collective action. For instance, the present research aimed to go beyond the focus on a single conceptualization of injustice, which is typically the case in the relevant literature, in order to uncover the different types of grievances that emerged in the uprising. When studying the role of perceived injustice in motivating collective action, researchers do not usually delve into the different dimensions of injustice that can lead to collective action, especially within the context of an uprising. As such, understanding the types of grievances linked to a collective action aimed at toppling the entire system is vital in answering the question of what are the felt injustices that need to happen in order for people to rise against their rulers in efforts of changing the system. While the present research cannot speak on uprisings in other contexts, it does provide a description and a documentation of the types of grievances that emerged during the uprising in Lebanon.

Another aspect that is under-investigated has to do with the concept of adversarial attributions. In our literature review of social psychology, we were not able to find much that was done beyond the conceptualization of external versus internal allocation of blame (Simon & Klandermans, 2001). In an effort to delve deeper into how the outgroup is conceptualized and how there may be more than a single adversarial target, we aimed to examine what organically came up in naturalistic data. This point is an additional novel contribution of the present study as it sheds light on the classification of the different outgroups emerging during the uprising as well as the different types of blame that may be of particular importance in such a context.

As for the category of *Emotions*, the contribution of the present work is the uncovering of the types of emotions expressed by protesters in naturalistic data. This is a novel addition to the social-psychological literature on collective action, since the typical approach to the study of emotions has primarily been a top-down approach where the emotions to be investigated are decided upon a-priori (e.g., Tausch et al., 2011). The present research aimed to approach the data in a bottom-up manner in order to uncover emotions that are not typically looked at and that might be important to further examine in the future. This was the case here as the analyses demonstrated the presence of withdrawal-oriented emotions (e.g., pain) in the data.

In sum, the present research contributes both a novel methodological investigation of collective action using naturalistic data, and a novel theoretical contribution concerning the collective action motivators of interest (i.e., *Grievances*, *Adversarial Attributions*, and *Emotions*).

7.3. Limitations, Future Directions, and Implications

This work has a number of limitations that must be taken into consideration. In this section, we detail some of the most important limitations brought forth by the nature of our data, as well as coding and transcription limitations.

First off, obviously only a sample of protesters were interviewed or spoke to the media. As such, our results rely only on those protesters who did speak on television. It is unclear how the featured protesters may have differed from those who were not featured, and although the current data is arguably as close as one can get to the real-time thoughts and feelings of protesters as the uprising began and unfolded, this limitation must be kept in mind when drawing conclusions as to the generalizability of

the findings. Furthermore, as detailed in the relevant sections above, the data for this study is that of LBCI's coverage of the first three days of the uprising. That is, the data originates from only one TV channel, which only covered certain areas and for a specific time/duration of coverage.[34] Since protesters were present in areas not covered by LBCI, and since the broadcast of the covered areas was not round-the-clock, it could be argued that the typologies resulting from this work are not exhaustive of all of the motivators for the October 17th uprising. For example, LBCI did not cover the beginning of the uprising which began earlier in the afternoon on October 17th. Moreover, the present research adopted a selective exploration approach of motivating factors whereby not all matters mentioned by the protesters were analyzed (e.g., demands were not included).

Expanding on the above point of the selectivity of the data, we note that Beirut received the lion's share when it came to coverage. This has resulted in our typologies being largely influenced by the grievances, the blame targets, and the emotions of those who protested in Beirut. This is a limitation because grievances may vary geographically and logically speaking, those who live in the capital likely have different experiences than those who live in other cities or the suburbs. Future research could therefore analyze themes that occur in the data by region.

A second limiting factor pertaining to the nature of the data is that of social desirability and the high likelihood that protesters' speech was affected by the mere fact of appearing on television and addressing a sizeable national audience. This may have resulted in protesters restricting their speech or avoiding certain points of criticism that

34 It is also important to highlight here the unequal duration of coverage on each day, which resulted in unequal sample sizes. However, since all the temporal analyses were done in terms of percentages with the denominator being the number of protesters on each day, there should be no negative implications of this point on the results.

they deemed unfit for television. As such, the present research is accessing what protesters strategically decided to present about themselves on the media, especially as they attempted to mobilize others as well.

Finally, it is important to take into account how the source of our data is perceived by the public, as this may have affected what the protesters chose to say and may have even deterred some from speaking to the reporters. Some protesters accused LBCI and its reporters of being biased with their coverage of the movement. Examples that were given by the protesters, which also became evident through the transcription and coding of the data, include: only filming in selective areas, interrupting and arguing with the protesters if they spoke in a way that opposed the channel's political agenda, and allocating a disproportionate amount of airtime for interviews with political figures. While these instances were relatively few, it could be argued that people would be more inclined to avoid speaking to a TV reporter against whose station they had negative feelings than to confront them during a live broadcast. This, in turn, may have resulted in a selection bias of protesters.

In addition, we noticed through reviewing footage of confrontations with the security forces that the positioning of the LBCI camera crew and reporters was consistently sheltered behind the lines of security forces and not present inside the confrontations, as some other TV reporters were (e.g., Al-Jadeed). This may have resulted in furthering the selection bias of protesters as rioters were not interviewed (at least not while actively rioting) and are thus not fully represented by the data. The data is thus based primarily on the speech of nonviolent protesters. Using a dataset with a sufficient number of interviews with rioters, future research can benefit from seeking to

disentangle the motivations expressed by protesters based on the manner in which they were seen to be protesting.

Moving on to limitations pertaining to the coding process, we begin with reliability. I as the author of this thesis was the solitary coder of the entirety of the data, and no second coder cross-checked the codes. It is important to note that I may have unknowingly missed highly culturally specific expressions as I am not native to Lebanon, although note that I spent close to seven years in Lebanon by the time this project was initiated, immersed in the community.

A specific limitation pertaining to the coding process has to do with the difficulty in distinguishing between demands and grievances. In the results section on *Grievances*, we defined grievances as expressions of discontent; however, in practicality the codes included under the category of *Grievances* include all mentions of matters that the protesters found to be problematic. This led to the coding of some expressions of demands to be included under *Grievances* as issues that are not directly identified as reasons for protesting, but that signal discontent with an aspect of the system. For example, demands of employment were also coded as a grievance of unemployment, the reasoning being that protesters would demand things that give rise to discontent when absent.

Another limitation specific to the coding process had to do with the disentanglement of emotional expressions and their categorization into discrete emotional ‘boxes’. This issue was present for the emotions of disgust and contempt, as briefly mentioned above, but also for the emotions of anger and fatigue due to the exasperation component of the type of anger explored in this work. Linguistically, and arguably conceptually, the task of separating the emotion of feeling fed up from the

emotion of feeling tired is complex; the accumulation of unaddressed grievances can lead one to feel both 'sick and tired' and exhausted. This overlap has resulted in blurring the conceptual lines between the themes of *Emotions* explored in the present research.

Lastly, the analyses were limited to verbal expressions of the concepts of interest as the coding process was based completely off of the transcripts. Including non-verbal expressions such as placards, symbols, clothing, body language, or even tone of voice would have expanded this work to a project that is beyond the limits and time constraints of a thesis. Future research could expand on the findings of this work by focusing on the non-verbal aspect of the same data.

As mentioned earlier, the current research did not examine the co-occurrence of different themes or subthemes (e.g., external and internal targets of blame for *Adversarial Attributions* and the co-occurrence of withdrawal associated and action-oriented emotions within the category of *Emotions*). This point is both a caveat in the current study as well as a potentially fruitful direction for future research. Lastly, the present work has only focused on the role of negative emotions in motivating collective action while not taking into account the possible presence of positive emotions. However, based on our knowledge of the data through the coding process, the expressions of positive emotions were relatively limited in the protesters' speech compared to negative emotions.

Turning to directions for future research, we highlight the need for replication of these findings in the context of other uprisings, in addition to expanding the current findings to include further days beyond the 19th of October as well as analyzing various additional factors not examined in the current study, such as demands.

For the category of *Grievances*, the current study poses a question on the relevance of the traditional classifications that have been theorized in past work on classifying grievances (i.e., procedural and distributive justice; Thibaut & Walker, 1975; Tyler & Smith, 1988, and personal and fraternal relative deprivation; Runciman, 1966). Reflecting on the themes of *Grievances*, we find it difficult to neatly classify, or to justify the classification of, all of the emergent ideas into the currently available systems of classification. As discussed earlier, we find that some fit well into one conceptualization or the other, some form combinations of multiple concepts, and others arguably do not fit anywhere. Therefore, the existing typologies of injustice may not necessarily be capturing what people are experiencing from a subjective perspective and the different ways they may express or classify their multi-dimensional grievances. These are questions generated by the current study for future research. As a concluding statement, we believe that despite its limitations, the work is rich in novel aspects that present a number of opportunities for advancing our understanding of the social psychology of uprisings.

The present research illustrates how the study of factors underlying collective action can be enriched by the study of uprisings. In a field dominated by research from the west on western democracies, this study helps contribute findings on collective action that move away from western democratic contexts and shed light on collective action dynamics in non-western democracies. Importantly, our work also developed a valuable and novel methodological approach to the study of uprisings using naturalistic data. Our work provides an initial guide for the steps such an approach involves and what opportunities and challenges it may pose. We hope this will encourage researchers in the field to venture into similar explorations in the future.

CHAPTER 8

CONCLUSION

This work added to the literature a typology of the most endorsed *Grievances, Adversarial Attributions,* and negative *Emotions* as motivators for the October 17th Lebanese uprising through the analysis of protester speech. Results showed that the most endorsed theme of *Grievances* was that of *Economic Grievances,* with the subtheme of *corruption* garnering the majority of the protesters' support. Moreover, protesters on the ground overwhelmingly allocated blame to the *totality* of the ruling class and the political system in place, while attributions to specific adversaries were endorsed on a smaller scale during the first three days of the uprising. Finally, and consistent with the literature on the role of emotions in motivating collective action, *anger* was by far the most widely cited emotions followed by traditionally 'inactive' emotions of *pain, humiliation,* and *fatigue*. The analyses considered in this study lay the ground for future research that seeks to examine contextually relevant and culturally informed motivators of collective action with a revolutionary social change goal.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A.
REASONS FOR FOREGOING THE ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL IDENTITIES

In this section, we present a brief discussion of the difficulties we faced during the coding process for social identification which led to our decision of dropping this category from the analysis. The points raised below deal with obstacles faced both due to the nature of the data and the nature of the coding process we adopted. We first and foremost acknowledge the important role that identities play in motivating collective action, but also highlight their complexity and deep intersectionality. This is especially true in a heavily diversified country such as Lebanon.

The main problem we encountered was that the coding process revealed that there are numerous identities that any one protester can express, all of which could be relevant to our question of interest. This is a by-product of the naturalistic data we aimed to make sense of. In addition, these identities could be expressed in relation to grievances, demands, crowd descriptions, or emotions. Since the analysis approach of this work was an exploratory one, we did not have theoretical guidance to which we could turn to inform us on which type of identities the coding was to be done, nor was it feasible to code for all possible scenarios. The following excerpt illustrates how identities were often expressed in relation to multiple other factors:

> "I want to say that **we are** on the streets today to protest across Lebanon because the living situation is no longer bearable. **We want** to tell them: remove your hands from the pockets of **the poor** and from the pockets of **the working class**."
> V3.8, M10

The parts in **bold** are the expressions that would have been coded under identities. As it is evident, this protester linked the unidentified 'we' identity to her reasons for protesting *("I want to say that **we are** on the streets today to protest across*

Lebanon because the living situation is no longer bearable"), to a demand (*"**We want** to tell them: remove your hands"*), as well as to a grievance (having hands inside the pockets of others signifies theft), all in one utterance. Such instances prevented the coding of identities to consist of identities relating to separate factors (i.e. grievances or demands) since the expressions of identity were interconnected across factors.

Due to the complexity of the concept of identity, in general but also in the context of our question, a systematic analysis of the occurrence of identities could have benefited from a coding scheme that guides the process. However, talk about identities cannot necessarily be inferred through a search for specific words (a lexicon), since there are many ways that people talk about identities. In other words, a coding scheme would have only captured the instances of identity that were verbalized in ways that matched the lexicon of the scheme.

Taking into account that the dataset is very large, the multiplicity of identities and their numerous ways of expressions, a rigorous analysis of social identities would have perhaps necessitated a standalone project that serves the richness of the topic justice.

APPENDIX B.
PRELIMINARY REVOLUTION TIMELINE[35] – *(MAIN EVENTS)*[36]

October 17

12:58pm WhatsApp tax announced [1]

Evening Protesters took to the streets (exact time unknown) [2]

10:59pm Telecom Minister reverses WhatsApp tax [3]

October 18

12:04am Akram Chehyab's convoy stirs chaos, bodyguard fires shots [4]

01:25am Protesters increase in different locations; Kelloun Ya3ne Kelloun adopted [5]

01:29am Protesters target homes and offices of Hezbollah and Amal in Nabatiyeh [6]

02:07am Calls for open civil disobedience [7]

02:24am Tayyar office in Tripoli ransacked [8]

03:14am Downtown protests turn into riots; property damaged; tear gas fired [9]

35 The timeline was constructed using a web archiver, or an Internet time machine (https://archive.org/web). Web archivers take snapshots of websites and save them in their servers. While some Arabic websites are archived, the more common ones are typically websites in English. Websites in Arabic often have fewer snapshots per month, and the snapshots are often only of the front page of the website. This means that the time machine can display what the home page of the website looked like on a particular day, but once any link is clicked, the time machine takes the viewer to what the website looks like currently, since it has not saved a snapshot of every page the website contains. For this reason, I needed to depend on English news sources to retroactively follow the development of events. The Daily Star is one of the only locally based news website in English. Therefore, I constructed the skeleton for the timeline based on the events that appeared on The Daily Star's website, and, when the skeleton was completed, I reversed the search mechanism and looked for Arabic sources referencing each independent incident. Consequently, events that were not reported by The Daily Star did not make it to this timeline, which is a limitation worth noting. However, the purpose of the preliminary timeline is to construct an overall understanding of how the events unfolded, not to generate a comprehensive chronology of events that takes into consideration all of the available sources and viewpoints—an ambitious aim beyond the scope of this work.

36 The events included here are ones which were verified with at least 3 news sources other than The Daily Star. Articles by The Daily Star that referenced other sources were removed and the original sources were used instead.

05:08am	Two workers die trapped in shop set on fire [10]
07:39am	Aoun to lead a cabinet session to discuss the protests instead of Hariri [11]
07:50am	Day-long security forces attacks; arrests of protesters begin [12]
10:55am	Lebanese Forces announce withdrawal from Aoun's cabinet session [13]
11:45am	Geagea calls on Hariri to resign [14]
01:54pm	Walid Jumblatt calls for a peaceful movement again Aoun's mandate [15]
06:55pm	Hariri establishes 72-hour deadline for parties to agree on a solution [16]
07:50pm	Clashes between security forces and protesters trying to reach Baabda [17]
09:52pm	Sour Rest House set on fire [18]
11:10pm	Geagea announces Lebanese Forces ministers to resign [19]
<u>October 19</u>	
NA	Diaspora protests begin [20]
11:19am	Finance Minister: no new taxes in 2020 budget after meeting PM [21]
11:20am	Hassan Nasrallah announces opposition to government resignation [22]
06:22pm	Hussain Al-Attar killed on airport road [23]
11:56pm	Lebanese Forces ministers resign from government [24]
<u>October 20</u>	
11:05am	Largest protests since 2005: numbers estimated at hundreds of thousands [25]
09:07pm	Cabinet announces meeting in Baabda palace next morning [26]

Preliminary Revolution Timeline – (Sources)

[1]

〉 *Al Akhbar Newspaper.* https://al-akhbar.com/Politics/277949

〉 *An-nahar Newspaper.* https://tinyurl.com/yc4lme8c

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APPENDIX C.
SAMPLE TRANSCRIPT

RA Code: 101-108.302

Video title: 1.1_LBCI_COMP_OCT17_RA101-108.302

Timestamp: from 00:00:00 to 00:06:23

Television show

ف ١.١ ص. ماريو (ذكر ستوديو): نحييكم مشاهدينا الكرام وننتقل مباشرةً مع الزميل مارون نصيف الذي يواكب حركة الاحتجاجات على الطرق في العاصمة بيروت مارون إنت وين تحديداً وشو الطرق إلي عليا تحركات إحتجاج

الموقع: تقاطع الصيفي – بيروت

ف ١.١ ص. مارون (ذكر شارع): ماريو نحن في هذه الأثناء عند تقاطع الصيفي في الوسط التجاري ولكن في البداية لابد من الإشارة إلى أن هناك تظاهرة شعبية انطلقت في منطقة المشرفية بإتجاه الغبيري وأيضاً هناك قطع للطرقات في منطقة المشرفية وحرق للاطارات في الشوارع بالنسبة لهذا التحرك حيث نحن عند تقاطع الصيفي بدأ منذ حوالي ساعة أو ساعة و نصف من الأن تجمع في ساحة رياض الصلح إنطلق بعد نصف ساعة إلى جسر الرينغ وبعد قطع جسر الرينغ في الإتجاهين لمدة حوالى أربعين دقيقة إنطلق المتظاهرون في تظاهرة يعني في مسيرةٍ إلى هنا وقطعوا الطريق عند مدخل العاصمة تحديداً عند تقاطع الصيفي إعتراضاً على الوضع المعيشي إعتراضاً على الضرائب التي تفرض من قبل الحكومة ومن قبل يعني مجلس الوزراء أكان بقرارات وزارية أم في مشروع موازنة العام ألفين وعشرين وكان أخر هذه الضرائب، الضرب عشرين اه يعني ضريبة

العشرين سنت على المكالمات الهاتفية عبر الواتساب أو غير الواتساب كل المكالمات الهاتفية عبر الانترنت يعني يعطيك العافية شو جاي تقول يوم؟

ف ١.١ م١ (ذكر عجوز): والله جايين نطالب بحقوقنا إلي سارقينا نحنا بلد محكوم من مجموعة لصوص مش مش حكام هول مش زعما عنا مجموعة حراميه حاكمين البلد يعني نازلين نطالب بحقوقنا بكرامتنا إللي سالبينا متل أيا شعب بالعالم يعني لأنو هون فقروا العالم جوعوا العالم يعني حرقوا الأخضر واليابس حتى اليابس ما رحموا ما سلم منن يعني قمنا نحن (هون) هلأ كنا لقدام شوي على جسر الرينغو بيجو علينا تبع الشعب مكافحة الشغب بيهجمو علينا وبلشو يخبطو فينا وأنا كنت عم هدي الشباب يعني هجمو علينا وبلشو فينا الخبيط يعني.

ف ١.١ م٢ (ذكر راشد): ما هوي هيدا الحج عمرو ستين سنة قد بيو يمكن لعنصر الشغب بيجي بيضربو بالعصاية بيلبطو هو وبالأرض بيضربو لأني جيت عم صورو لعنصر الشغب هو وعم يضرب بيهجمو عليي بدن يضربوني ويكسرولي تليفوني بس أنا هربت والفيديو معي وبعتو للفيديو على الامم المتحدة على رقم الأمم المتحدة وبعتو على السويد للفيديو وبكرا الصبح بكون على كل وسائل الاعلام على كل وسائل التواصل الاجتماعي وعلى كل وسائل الإعلام (الفيديو) وهو عنصر الشغب اللي ضربو لما انعرف مين هوي خمس دقايق سحبو بطل موجود على الأرض عنصر الشغب ومعروف بالوجه وحافظين بالوجه مين هو.

ف ١.١ م١ (ذكر عجوز): من ساعة اللي نزلنا بنقلن ما تقربو على القوى الأمنية يعني خليكن بعاد.

ف ١.١ ص. مارون (ذكر شارع): لوين رايحين هلق لوين رايحين ماشيين؟

ف ١.١ م٣ (ذكر راشد): نحنا عم نستعمل سياسة ما عم نوقف بمنطقة عم نتغير أنا بدي إتشكركن يا وسائل الإعلام.

ف ١.١ ص. مارون (ذكر شارع): انتو لوين رايحين هلق؟

ف ١.١ م٣ (ذكر راشد): ما في هيك عم نمشي.

ف ١.١ م٤ (ذكر راشد): بدي اتوجه للبنانية أنا جاي من الضاحية وبدعي الشباب شباب الضاحية حي السلم بئر العبد الشياح كل الشباب نزلو معنا نحنا رايحين حمرا عين المريسة لحقونا كرمال الامام الحسين لحقونا.

ف ١.١ م٥ (ذكر راشد): كلمتين بس بكفي بقى يحلو عنا كلن ويفلو.

ف ١.١ م٦ (ذكر عجوز): تركوا الارجيله ونزلوا تركوا الارجيله ونزلوا.

الوقت: 00:09:50

APPENDIX D.
CODING SAMPLE[37]

P. Code	Locators		Demographics		Variables	
	Timestamp	Gender	Age Group	Protester Origin	Protest Location	Prompted Response
M1	00:08:07	0	3	0	Saifi	1
M4	00:09:25	0	2	Dahieh	Saifi	0
M5	00:09:40	0	2	0	Saifi	0

P. Code	Grievances					
	Corruption	Clientelism	Unemployment	Nepotism	Education	Hunger
M1	1	0	0	0	0	1
M4	0	0	0	0	0	0
M5	0	0	0	0	0	0

P. Code	Grievances				
	Electricity	Healthcare	Clean Water	Thieves Ruling	Stolen Dignity
M1	0	0	0	1	1
M4	0	0	0	0	0
M5	0	0	0	0	0

P. Code	Grievances				
	Poverty	Freedom of Speech	The System	Stolen Rights	No Mercy
M1	1	0	0	1	1
M4	0	0	0	0	0
M5	0	0	0	0	0

P. Code	Adversarial Attributions			
	Unidentified 'They'	Unknown Rulers	Zou3ama	All Of Them
M1	1	1	1	0
M4	0	0	0	0
M5	1	0	0	1

37 The coding was done in an Excel sheet; hence, the columns of this table were only formatted as stacked in order to fit on a Word document.
P. Code stands for "Protester Code", signifying the protester's sequence in the selected footage file
M stands for "Moutadhahir" as indicated in the above transcript
Gender: 0 = male, 1 = female, 2 = unknown
Age Group: 1 = youth, 2 = middle-age, 3 = senior, 4 = unknown
All other data: 0 = no, 1 = yes

APPENDIX E.
ADDITIONAL QUALITATIVE EXAMPLES FROM THE CATEGORY OF GRIEVANCES

Theme	Subtheme	Code	Excerpt
1. Economic Grievances	Corruption	Thieves	*"This corrupt regime is a snake governing the country made up of 3 heads,* ***30 thieves, and 128 weasels****."* V2.12, M9
		Stolen Money and National Debt	*"****They are the ones who got us to this point; to this debt****, this hunger, this corruption, and to this level of theft."* V2.15, M26
		Corruption	*"****We keep on hearing about corruption cases on TV,*** *but we never saw anyone being held accountable."* V1.2, M16
	Economic Deprivation and Impoverish-ment	Hunger	*"****This regime made the people grow hungry****."* V2.12, M6
		Impoverishment/ Poverty	*"These people that you see here, these are the starving people;* ***the destitute and improvised people who can't even afford to buy bread****…****We are here because of our poverty*** *and our hunger, to tell them all that they all must fall."* V3.18, M11
		Being in Debt	*"We can no longer find affordable living.* ***I took out a loan for 50 thousand dollars and I am unable to pay it back****."* V2.21, M14
		Cost of Living	*"Look at my son,* ***he doesn't have diapers and I can't get him any milk****…I also want to say that my mother is sick, and* ***her medication costs***

			a 100 dollars and we can't afford it*. On top of all that, we can't find employment or anything and* ***we have to pay 200 or 300 dollars in rent every month****, where am I supposed to find that kind of money?"* V3.28, M37
		Businesses Bankrupt	*"****Retail stores are going bankrupt****, there are no clothes left in the stores."* V3.15, M7
	Labor Conditions	Low Income	*"****Our salaries are $500, and our monthly expenditures are $1000, how are we supposed to live like this?****"* V3.24, M7
		Unemployment	*"****I've been unemployed and searching for a job for over a year and a half and I can't find anything****."* V3.28, M17
		Foreign Workers	*"We are over 200 guys here and if you count the employed ones, they would be only 10 or 12, and the rest of us are just staying at home. Why?* ***And then you find the Syrians employed****."* V2.6, M4
		Being Overworked	*"****I am a Lebanese citizen who works 12 hours a day****.* ***When I say I work 12 hours****,* ***it means I must be getting paid well and living the good life****,* ***but that is not the case****...* ***I have spent more than half my life just paying****. Shame on them.* ***We have had enough of this enslavement****, enough deprivation, and enough humiliation."* V2.13, M1
		Late/No Salary	*"I am a contractor with*

			the Ministry of Social Affairs. ***We haven't received our salaries for more than 7 months****."* V3.4, M19
	Failure to Meet Basic	Education	*"We are 24 years old and until now we don't work, and* ***we do not go to school or anything of the sort****, because of whom? All of this and* ***their children are in the nicest universities in France and Britain****. Are we not good enough?"* V1.1, M14
		Health Care	*"We are not asking for impossible things,* ***we just want a health card that will get us into hospitals when we need it*** *instead of being thrown out to the curb in front of hospitals, we just want to go inside and be medicated."* V2.15, M23
		Electricity	*"****No electricity****, no water, and no health care."* V1.2, M25
		Water	*"There is* ***no water*** *and electricity."* V2.5, M17
		Infrastructure and Services	*"****Nothing was spent from the budget on infrastructure****, on proper governance, or on reforms."* V1.2, M28
		Garbage	*"We want our most basic rights of electricity and running water,* ***and for them to remove the garbage piling on top of us****."* V2.13, M12
		Telecommunications Prices	*"The telephone charging card used to be 39,000 or 40,000 Lira.* ***I checked today and it became 44,000****."* V2.11, M7
		Double Paying	*"****We are paying our***

			water bill twice and our electricity bill twice*."* V1.3, M22
		Safety and Security	*"There are no jobs,* ***there is no security****, there are no schools, and there is no education."* V2.18, M5
		Pollution	*"I am here so that they may leave us with just a single reason to continue living in this country which we love dearly, be it* ***cleanliness****, our food and drink, or even* ***the air we breathe****."* V2.9, M1
		Inappropriate Response to the Fires	*"They are aiming their water hoses at the peaceful protesters* ***instead of using them on the forest fires****."* V2.25, M12
	Taxes and Inflation	Present/Future Inflation + Exchange Rate	*"If someone has taken out a loan, they are no longer accepting loan payment with the Lebanese Lira,* ***they are taking the difference from the dollar price****."* V1.9, M9
		Taxes	*"The people's demands today are united:* ***to bring down the government of taxes****, that is all."* V2.5, M13
		WhatsApp Tax	*"Would the rich man care if he picked up the phone and* ***WhatsApp was no longer free****? No."* V1.1, M10
2. General Systemic Injustice	Discontent with the System	"Everything"	*"We are not here because of the WhatsApp thing,* ***it's because of everything, everything****. Life here is very hard,* ***just everything****."* V2.5, M20
		The System	*"May* ***this system*** *fall.*

			***The regime** has ruined our lives."* V1.7, M10
		No Trust in Politicians/System	*"We are from Dahyeh, we are the children of Amal and Hezbollah, **we no longer trust you**. **Our trust in you is gone**; you are all thieves."* V1.3, M7
		Statelessness	*"**We have no elements of a homeland here**; we barely have the elements of a zoo."* V1.8, M9
		Failed/Rotten Government	*"We just want **this failed class** to resign, that is all."* V2.4, M9
	Accumulation of Injustice	Accumulation	*"**They have been eating away at people's rights for over 30 years**, but no one moved a muscle. Once WhatsApp was threatened, everyone reacted."* V2.16, M6
		Hitting Rock Bottom	*"We've reached **a stage of desperation** in Lebanon. **There is nothing available** for the Lebanese citizen anymore."* V2.20, M15
	General Injustice	Oppression	*"Today, starting from now, all Lebanese people should take to the streets to demand their rights and **voice their opposition to** hunger and **oppression**."* V1.4, M14
		No Justice	*"[Saad Al-Hariri] displaced us and kicked my husband out of his job. With what right? Where is his conscience? **Where is the state?**"* V2.23, M11
		No Rights	*"All of this is happening because **you are not allowed to demand your rights in Lebanon**."* V1.10, M12

3. Bad Leaders	Incompetence	Incompetent Rulers	*"It is unacceptable that our Prime Minister is so **immature and weak**."* V3.11, M20
	Uncaring Politicians	People are Worthless to Politicians	*"They have four million lives under their mercy… **No one is even looking our way**."* V2.4, M2
		Evil Rulers/Have No Mercy	*"**Do we have to continue living under their mercy while begging them to allow us to live?**"* V2.1, M2
		Politicians are at a Disconnect with People	*"Last night Bassil came out and said that if chaos is to happen, are you ready to go hungry? **Does he not know** that we are already starving? **Does he not know** that there is nothing left in this country?"* V3.16, M15
		Unresponsive Leaders	*"First of all, we would like to apologize from 'the father of all' **in case we woke him up from his slumber**, but once he gets up **let him see what is happening** in this country and solve things."* V3.24, M12
	Deceitful and Manipulative Leaders	Lying and Untrustworthy Rulers	*"I just want to say that **they are all imposters**, and they have all made us go hungry."* V3.24, M8
			*"Bassil and Saad Al-Hariri **made an under-the-table agreement**, and **they are just lying to the people** with the 3 days or 72 hours thing. An hour prior, Bassil spoke and said just give me three days and an hour later Al-Hariri came out and said they want a 72-hour*

			grace period." V2.25, M9
	Disloyalty	Rulers do not Represent Lebanon	*"Who are you?* ***You keep on taking your orders from America****."* V1.9, M30
		Foreign Loyalty	*"****These people are not loyal to Lebanon; they all belong to foreign countries****. We want patriots who are loyal only to Lebanon."* V3.6, M15
4. Absence of Democracy and Accountability	Repression	Police Brutality and Protest Suppression	*"****Look at all the slap [marks] that this guy has gotten****."* V3.14, M7
	Illegitimate Rule	Militia/Parties Violence	*"I just want to say that* ***this militant scene is in no way acceptable; we absolutely reject it****."* V3.28, M1
		Power-Hungry Rulers	*"****They have swallowed the country as a whole and they are not yet satisfied****."* V3.19, M17
		Elections Manipulation	*"They install their own ballot boxes and break the rules every time,* ***they manipulate the boxes****."* V3.11, M9
	Lack of Accountability	Strongmen in Power	*"****They have divided the resources of the country amongst themselves****… **There is nothing left in this country that is not controlled by them** or which they have not taken over, and* ***they are controlling the people as a result****."* V2.11, M8
		Immunity and Protection	*"We want to thank the minister Akram Chouhayeb for stirring up the people. In order to protect him,* ***some of his thugs started shooting at the people and he hid behind them****."* V1.9,

			M20
		No Accountability	*"**Where are those who said they will hold the corrupt accountable?**"* V1.3, M14
	Suppression of Freedom of Speech	Freedom of Speech	*"**They don't want anyone to speak**. They just want to set up their cannons and shoot at people. **They want the people to shoot at each other, they don't want any one to say anything**."* V1.2, M29
5. Psychosocial Grievances	Physical and Mental Harm	Cancer Rates	*"Lebanon has the **highest rate of cancer** in the world."* V2.4, M11
		Killing the People	*"We just want to at least stay alive on earth, we are still too young to die, **but they will surely kill us**, and we will surely go to the skies soon."* V2.4, M3
		Ruined Childhoods/Lives	*"**They have been ruining childhoods since 1995 and now they are ruining our lives more and more**."* V1.1, M17
		Suffocating	*"Enough is enough, **people are suffocating**."* V1.10, M2
		Mental Illness	*"**There is not a single Lebanese who does not go to psychotherapy**. **There is not a single Lebanese who does not take pills for his nerves**."* V2.13, M9
		Reduced Agency	*"I am only 18 years old, and I have joined the people in the streets because **I have been feeling that I do not have a future in this country**; this is not okay."* V3.20, M5
	Immigration	Immigration	*"They made us live*

			through a civil war, the country offers no employment, and all ***Lebanese people are immigrating****. There is nothing left here."* V2.14, M14
		Brain Drain	*"Look at all these youth, the best of the best from Lebanon.* ***They are leaving the country and immigrating to foreign countries to work****.* ***All these brains are leaving the country****, what a pity."* V1.8, M1
6. Discriminatory System	Nepotism and Clientelism	Nepotism	*"Have we in our lifetime ever seen the* ***son of a parliamentarian*** *standing in line waiting for his turn at the hospital, or being told that the hospital does not have a vacant bed for him?"* V1.4, M1
		Unmet Clientelism	*"****I kissed hands and feet just to have my son be enrolled in the official Hariri school****. I cried at the office of Mouna Abou Moussa, and she did not agree to register my son, even though* ***I have been voting for the Al-Hariri family my whole life****."* V2.4, M16
		Clientelism	*"I applied to 4 different jobs….* ***I did not get accepted to any of them because I do not support any political parties***." V3.28, M4
	Sectarianism	Sectarianism	*"****We need to cancel sectarianism****. They have planted this rotten seed in us.* ***They are manipulating us for their foreign agendas in***

			the name of sectarianism and they made us hate each other*."* V2.11, M10
		Dividing People Against Each Other	*"**They have to stop dividing us. They have divided us enough already. They divided us into religions then sects and then political parties**, enough."* V2.21 M9
	Sexism	Women Unable to Grant the Lebanese Nationality	*"... **the least what needs to be done is providing Lebanese mothers with the ability to grant her kids the nationality**."* V3.36, M5

APPENDIX F.
ADDITIONAL EXCERPTS FROM THE THEMES OF ADVERSARIAL ATTRIBUTIONS

Theme	**Excerpt**
Totality	*"But with the current situation,* ***the politicians that are currently in power*** *will not leave. If the politicians do not step down, the situation in this country will not resolve."* V2.2, M7
	"I am here to say that I am with the Lebanese people in refusing ***all of this political class and all of these leaders.****"* V3.18, M1
Specific Person	*"****Riad Salameh*** *says it's none of his business, whose business is it, then? whose business is it? we just want to know."* V1.2, M29
	"We should start from the very top with ***Aoun****, who is sleepily occupying Baabda and not doing anything … The first thing that needs to happen is that* ***he*** *should fall, then the* ***Head of Parliament****, then the* ***Prime Minister****, followed by all the parliamentarians and ministers - all of them. But at first the fall needs to happen from the heart of Baabda, and that is all."* V3.31, M8
Only "They	*"Just like* ***they*** *made us go hungry, we want to make* ***them*** *go hungry."* V1.2, M15
	"We will remain in the streets until ***they*** *fall."* V3.4, M6
Exemptions	*"The Hezb* ***has nothing to do with it****."* V1.3, M4
	"Your eminence Sayyed Hasan*, we are being humiliated.* ***Help us****, where are you? come out and tell them to step down, what are you waiting for?"* V3.12, M5
Specific Entity	*"We are staying here until* ***the government*** *decides to resign. [We are here] in a civil way, not insolently, and they are still here shamelessly."* V2.1, M2
	"We were here two days ago, we were here yesterday, we are here today, and we will continue until the fall of this ***government****."* V3.14, M4
The People	*"****The people*** *are* ***asleep****; the people are asleep."* V1.8, M11
	"Whoever wants to take offense from hearing the truth can

	leave the streets. They are 128 donkeys, and ***the Lebanese*** *are sheep."* V2.2, M6
Ingroup	***"We were sheep in the past****, but now we have all awakened and we don't want to stay silent any longer."* V2.6, M4
	*"****The mistake we made*** *is that* ***we re-elected*** *the warlords who fought in the Civil War.* ***We allowed them*** *to govern us, and we forbid this from happening again."* V2.22, M12

APPENDIX G.
ADDITIONAL EXAMPLES OF EMOTIONS CODE PHRASES

Emotion	Lexicon	Translation
Disgust	– تفو	– I spit
	– قرف	– Disgusting
	– قرفتونا	– You disgusted us
	– قرفنا	– We are disgusted
	– وسخين	– (They are) filthy
Fatigue	– تعبنا	– We are tired
	– تعبونا	– They made us tired
	– هلكتونا	– You wore us out
	– هلكنا	– We are worn out
	– العالم تعبت	– People are tired
	– هلكوا ربنا	– [literal] they wore out our god
Anger	– الوضع ما بقى ينحمل	– The situation is no longer tolerable
	– معاش فينا	– We can't take it anymore
	– مابقى فينا نتحمل بعد	– We can't bare this anymore
	– نحنا الثورة والغضب	– [literal] we the revolution and the anger
	– نحنا جايين عن غضب	– We are here out of anger
	– غضب الناس	– The anger of the people
Humiliation	– ذلونا	– They humiliated us
	– عم نعيش بذل من وراهن	– We live in humiliation because of them
	– مسحوا في الارض	– [literal] they mopped the floor with us
	– شحدونا	– They made us beg
	– عم نتبهدل	– We are being belittled
	– شرشحونا	– They humiliated us
Pain	– موجوعين	– We are in pain
	– بيوجعني	– It pains me
	– نحنا متألمين	– We are aching
	– نحنا نوجعنا	– We have been pained
	– الكل عم يوجع	– Everyone is in pain
	– الشعب انوجع	– The people have been pained
Despair	– ياريت يفحتوا رصاص ويقتلونا	– If only they would shoot and kill us
	– مضطرين نسكر الطريق	– We are forced to close the road
	– ما النا خيار غير نولع دواليب	– We have no other option but to burn tires
	– انا يأست من الوضع	– I have given up on the situation
	– مافي امل	– There is no hope
	– ماعدنا بعد شي نخسروا	– We have nothing left to lose

APPENDIX H.
ADDITIONAL EXCERPTS FROM THE THEMES OF EMOTIONS

Theme	Excerpt
Anger	*"Enough. The country is* ***no longer bearable. It's not bearable."*** V1.4, M11
	*"**The people are angry**, and it is understandable, they are not thugs."* V3.7, M8
Pain	*"We should all come down, as Muslims, Christians, Sunna, Shiite, and Druze. All sects should come down for Lebanon.* ***Lebanon is in pain today and the Lebanese people are in pain**."* V1.2, M20
	*"**Everyone you see here today is in pain.**"* V2.15, M23
Humiliation	*"I was estranged for 5 years because of this political class. I came back to Lebanon and because of them I was kicked from place to place.* ***I was humiliated*** *for 3 years in Lebanon, and I still could not find work."* V1.10, M5
	"We the Lebanese people ***have accepted humiliation for far too long"*** V2.16, M14
Disgust	*"When we find* ***128 garbage bags*** *and a* ***garbage bin that can hold them****, we will leave the streets,* ***once we find 128 garbage bags."*** V2.21, M7
	"All Lebanese people are on the ground today, all carrying Lebanese flags. We represent hunger, poverty, ***disgust****, humiliation, and everything they have made us suffer from since the year '92."* V3.8, M10
Fatigue	*"You should have been our caretakers, but you made us hate our lives,* ***you wore us out, you consumed us****. Enough is enough, leave us alone already, leave us alone."* V1.7, M15
	"The people are in pain; ***the people have grown tired****."* V1.10, M22
Despair	***"I have given up****. I do not want to set myself on fire or kill myself, but* ***I have given up****. I am a person who no longer wants to live under the cover of the Lebanese identity."* V3.11, M1
	*"**We are dead people. If we speak up no one will hear us, and if we do not speak up, we will be stepped on**. We are only dead*

	bodies walking around, and no one is sympathizing with us. We are only moving skeletons." V3.13, M31

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