AMERICAN UNIVERSITY OF BEIRUT

POST-DISASTER RECOVERY GOVERNANCE, AID ARCHITECTURE, AND CIVIL SOCIETY'S PARTICIPATION THE CASE OF LEBANON'S REFORM, RECOVERY AND RECONSTRUCTION FRAMEWORK (3RF)

by
SOPHIE LINN KATHARINA BLOEMEKE

A thesis
submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Master of Arts
to the Center for Arab and Middle Eastern Studies
of the Faculty of Arts and Science
at the American University of Beirut

Beirut, Lebanon
May 2022

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY OF BEIRUT

POST-DISASTER RECOVERY GOVERNANCE, AID ARCHITECTURE, AND CIVIL SOCIETY'S PARTICIPATION.
THE CASE OF LEBANON'S REFORM, RECOVERY AND RECONSTRUCTION FRAMEWORK (3RF)

by
SOPHIE LINN KATHARINA BLOEMEKE

Approved by:

Mona Harb
Signature
_____
Dr. Mona Harb, Professor   Advisor
Department of Architecture and Design

Mona Harb
Signature
_____
Dr. Mona Fawaz, Professor   Co-Advisor
Department of Architecture and Design

Mona Harb
Signature
_____
Dr. Carmen Geha, Assistant Professor   Member of Committee
Department of Political Studies and Public Administration

Signature
_____
Jonathan Papoulidis   Member of Committee

Date of thesis defense: April 28, 2022
Mona Harb

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY OF BEIRUT

THESIS RELEASE FORM

Student Name: Bloemeke   Sophie   Linn Katharina
                  Last   First   Middle

I authorize the American University of Beirut, to: (a) reproduce hard or electronic copies of my thesis; (b) include such copies in the archives and digital repositories of the University; and (c) make freely available such copies to third parties for research or educational purposes:

☒ As of the date of submission

☐ One year from the date of submission of my thesis.

☐ Two years from the date of submission of my thesis.

☐ Three years from the date of submission of my thesis.

Sophie Bloemeke _____   _May 12, 2022_ _____
Signature   Date

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

ABSTRACT

OF THE THESIS OF

<u>Sophie Linn Katharina Bloemeke</u>   for   <u>Master of Arts</u>
<u>Major</u>: Middle East Studies

Title: <u>Post-Disaster Recovery Governance, Aid Architecture, and Civil Society's Participation. The Case of Lebanon's Reform, Recovery, and Reconstruction Framework (3RF)</u>

Country platforms have increasingly gained significance in aid delivery—as reflected in the commitment of many international organizations to this model. In academia, the role of country platforms in aid delivery is, however, understudied. Knowledge about this model is often held by practitioners and remains largely undocumented, generating a research gap.

The thesis aims to analyze the institutional arrangement of Lebanon's Reform, Recovery and Reconstruction Framework (3RF), focusing on the role of civil society organizations (CSOs). Therefore, I analyze how the international community allocates space to CSOs in the 3RF – both discursively and institutionally. Additionally, I examine the ways CSOs claim and appropriate their ascribed space in the 3RF and use the opportunity to (re)organize in order to hold both the Lebanese government and international donors accountable. Hence, this thesis aims to investigate how the 3RF creates windows of opportunity for change and collective action for government reforms.

I supplement desk review of academic literature, reports and podcasts related to aid architecture with an ethnographic approach: I conducted 24 semi-structured in-depth key informant interviews with members of civil society organizations and international organizations. Additional primary data is provided through participant observation of the 3RF's Consultative Group meetings. Given that Lebanon's 3RF process is ongoing, I follow both a descriptive approach to document the initial process and a normative approach to derive lessons learned and possible policy interventions.

I argue that the 3RF includes adaptive and effective institutional arrangements that may disrupt path dependency and enable reforms, mainly its Consultative Group. Yet, the 3RF is consolidating CSOs' fragmentation in Lebanon, through the composition of its CG; and providing insufficient modalities for CSOs to work collectively in coherent and effective ways towards reforms. Besides interpretation bias, the limitations include the scope and representation of my study: I focus on the role of CSOs in the Consultative Group and in sector coordination, and prioritized interlocutors from international organizations and civil society for my sample.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ILLUSTRATIONS

Figure

ABBREVIATIONS

3RF	Reform, Recovery and Reconstruction Framework
ALDIC	The Lebanese Association for Taxpayers' Rights and Interests
ALI	Association of Lebanese Industrialists
ALS	Areas of Limited Statehood
ANGO	Alternative Non-Governmental Organizations
B5	Fund Building Beirut Businesses Back & Better Fund
BAPPENAS	Ministry of National Development Planning of the Republic of Indonesia
BHI	Beirut Heritage Initiative
BRR	Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Agency of Aceh and Nias
BUL	Beirut Urban Lab
CG	Consultative Group
CLDH	Centre Libanais Des Droits Humains
CMU	Central Management Unit
CSO	Civil Society Organization
EDL	Electricité du Liban
ERP	Emergency Response Plan
ERRA	Earthquake Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Authority (Pakistan)
EU	European Union
FBO	Faith-based Organization
I3RF	Iraq Reform, Recovery and Reconstruction Fund
IHRC	International Human Rights Commission
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organization
IOB	Independent Oversight Board
LCRP	Lebanon Crisis Response Plan
LFF	Lebanon Financing Facility
LHDF	Lebanon Humanitarian & Development NGOs Forum
LHF	Lebanon Humanitarian Fund
LHIF	Lebanon Humanitarian INGO Forum
LLWB	Lebanese League for Women in Business
LUPD	Lebanese Union for People with Physical Disabilities
MENA	Middle East and North Africa

NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OEA	Order of Engineers and Architects
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OHCHR	UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
OMSAR	Office of Minister of State for Administrative Reform
PCU	Planning and Coordination Unit
PM	Prime Minister
RDNA	Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment
RPBA	Recovery and Peace Building Assessment
SSVP	Société de Saint Vincent de Paul
SWG	Sector Working Group
TAC	Technical Advisory Committee
ToR	Terms of Reference
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
WB	World Bank
WDR	World Development Report

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION AND METHODS

A. Research Questions, Hypotheses, and Limitations

Country platforms and recovery frameworks increasingly gain significance in aid delivery because they are supposed to increase aid effectiveness and ownership. Thus, various international organizations committed to this approach, particularly in fragile contexts and post-disaster situations. However, the country platform approach is understudied in academia. Knowledge about this model held by practitioners remains largely undocumented in academia and creates a research gap. This research gap is contrasted by the increasing calls for the country platform approach in aid practice which makes the study of aid architecture even more relevant.

Thus, this thesis aims to analyze the aid architecture of Lebanon's Reform, Recovery and Reconstruction Framework (3RF) as a case study. The 3RF was established by the European Union, United Nations and World Bank in 2020 as a response to the Beirut Port Explosion on August 4, 2020. I chose this case study because the 3RF stands out with its innovative approach to incorporate and institutionalize civil society organizations (CSOs) in high-level policy consultations. The 3RF established a Consultative Group (CG) including 16 CSOs (selected after a call for interest that drew more than 50 applications).

This thesis addresses a set of research questions: What considerations informed this context-specific institutional set-up of the 3RF? Moreover, because the 3RF stands out by explicitly including "reform" as one of the three components besides recovery and reconstruction, I ask in what ways the 3RF contributes to more adaptive policies that can

initiate political change. On the role of CSOs, the thesis will explore two questions: How does the international community organize the participation of CSOs in the 3RF across scales (high-level, sector-level)? And how does the 3RF impact the CSOs' landscape in Lebanon and the internal coordination among CSOs?

Two sets of hypotheses guide this exploration:

1. The 3RF's structure includes adaptive and effective institutional arrangements that may disrupt path dependency —namely its CG.

2. Yet, the 3RF is: (i) consolidating CSOs' fragmentation in Lebanon, through the composition of its CG; and (ii) providing insufficient modalities for CSOs to work collectively in coherent and effective ways towards reform and to hold donors and government accountable.

My thesis contributes to understanding how aid effectiveness is impeded in fragile contexts because of three interconnected factors: Firstly, elite capture through the state, secondly, complex relations among donors, and thirdly, ineffective engagement of non-traditional aid actors like CSOs. The 3RF is an example for international organizations' incoherence and competition and reflects how CSOs' contributions are not fully leveraged. Consequently, I argue that donors consolidate the status quo in Lebanon despite advocating for reform, conditional aid, and emphasizing the role of CSOs as governance actors ensuring ownership.

The analysis of the 3RF's potential to instigate reforms based on its institutional arrangements and decision-making mechanisms is informed by two interconnected lenses: (i) the adaptability of the 3RF's institutional architecture, using literature on path-dependency and windows of opportunity, (ii) political settlements and policy effectiveness, using the framework of the World Development Report on Governance and

the Law that considers power asymmetries and the bargaining between stakeholders as conditions for policy reforms.

I position my research in an on-going paradigm shift of new aid architecture that originated from critical discourses on aid effectiveness and ownership in grey literature which are particularly relevant for aid architecture in fragile contexts due to their limited state capacity. For that matter, I briefly review country platforms in other contexts and draw on literature about aid effectiveness and CSOs as non-state governance actors at the humanitarian-development-nexus in fragile contexts.

I used a mixed-methods approach, relying on primary data from 24 key informant interviews conducted between November 2021 and February 2022, and on participant observation of three Consultative Group Meetings. Additionally, it relies on desk research as I reviewed grey literature related to aid architecture and country platforms in other contexts and included official documents of the 3RF such as Terms of Reference for the Consultative Group and co-chairs' statements issued after Consultative Group Meetings. I will present my methods and data collection in more detail at the end of this chapter.

Given that Lebanon's 3RF process is ongoing, I mainly follow a descriptive approach to document the processes in the initial phase.

Some limitations arise from the fact that the 3RF is a process still unfolding at this stage which limited the scope and representation of my study. I prioritized interlocutors from the EU, UN and World Bank (hereafter also principal organizations) and local civil society organizations (mainly from the Consultative Group) for my expert interviews. This focused the thesis' scope on the institutional arrangements and processes of the 3RF, and privileged the consultative role of CSOs in the CG at the expense of the

Institutional Oversight Board (IOB). However, additional interviews with CSOs from the IOB would complement the analysis of the role of CSOs, in particular in terms of accountability and progress tracking of reforms. Moreover, interviews with representatives from the principal organizations who are leads and co-leads of working groups would enrich the analysis of coordination with CSOs at the sector scale and sector-specific reforms.

Nonetheless, the evidence I collected allow me to describe the processes in 3RF's initial phase of transition, experimentation and reconfiguration. To supplement this documentation, I follow a normative approach by deriving lessons learned that can inform policy recommendations for the 3RF in particular (as it is still unfolding) and decision-makers in development co-operation and practitioners in recovery governance in general.

B.   Structure

I will start presenting my methods and data collection in this chapter which provides information on my sample, interview guide and includes my positionality statement.

Then, I will review the literature on country platforms and recovery frameworks, aid effectiveness in fragile contexts, and CSOs as non-state governance actors in the field of humanitarian and development aid in Chapter 2.

The literature review is followed by a case profile in Chapter 3 which presents Lebanon's moment of multiple crises, the 3RF's institutional design and the CSO landscape in Lebanon.

In Chapter 4 and 5, I will present and discuss my findings in relation to the literature in two sub-chapters which include: i) adaptive and effective arrangements in

the 3RF's institutional architecture, including four case studies of reform initiated through the 3RF, ii) the impact of the 3RF's institutional design on the CSO landscape in Lebanon, and structural constraints for CSOs within the 3RF to effectively initiate transformative change and reforms.

I conclude this thesis in Chapter 6, discuss limitations and future research questions and provide some policy recommendations of relevance to decision-makers in development co-operation and practitioners in recovery governance.

C.   Methodology and Data Collection

Following the case study approach (Simons, 2009; Yin, 2014), I explore Lebanon's Reform, Reconstruction and Recovery Framework (3RF) as a case study of post-disaster governance. According to Simons, the design of case studies is informed by the "complexity and uniqueness of a particular project, policy, institution, programme or system" (Simons, 2009, p. 21). Therefore, there are two unique characteristics of the 3RF that informed my case study design:

First, the institutionalized engagement of civil society organizations in the 3RF through the Consultative Group is unprecedented. This feature offered a suitable lens through which I could examine the aims and struggles of the 3RF actors. The second distinct feature of the 3RF is its "experimental approach," as emphasized by the international community, which allows space for the 3RF actors to reconfigure the institutional architecture of the 3RF based on assessed shortcomings and needs.

I draw on two sets of data to explore the institutional aid architecture of Lebanon's 3RF and the role of CSOs.

First, I gathered secondary data from gray literature related to aid architecture and governance in post-disaster and post-conflict contexts. My desk review included academic literature, reports, and podcasts and allowed me to extract my research questions on the 3RF. To analyze Lebanon's 3RF as a case study, I conducted a review of grey literature, including the Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment report, the 3RF report, the Call for Expression of Interests for CSOs to apply for the Consultative Group, the CG's Terms of Reference, and the official statements of the CG's co-chairs after the three high-level CG meetings.

To triangulate my evidence and compare policies with practices, I include an ethnographic approach to aid architecture (Ferguson, 1994; Escobar, 1995; Mosse, 2004, 2015) to gather primary data. Therefore, I conducted 24 semi-structured expert interviews about the 3RF platform.[1] I got access to key informants through purposive sampling and expanded my network through snowball sampling. I interviewed experts from two groups, the international community and local civil society, between November 2021 and February 2022. From the first group, I conducted 9 interviews with professionals of international organizations like the World Bank, UN agencies, and the European Union in Lebanon engaged in the 3RF.[2] From the second group, I conducted 15 interviews with

---

[1] 11 interviews were conducted via zoom, and 13 interviews were conducted in person. The majority of interviews were conducted in English; only one interview was conducted in French mixed with some Arabic. Three interviews I conducted had two participants from the same organization which changed the interviews to include elements of "focus group experience" by prompting the participants to discuss amongst themselves. Out of 27 interlocutors of the 24 interviews, 13 were female, and 14 were male. Within the group of the CSOs, it was balanced between 8 male interlocutors and 9 female interlocutors, whereas 6 interlocutors were male and 4 were female form the international community.

[2] Four interlocutors from the World Bank, three interlocutors from the UN, and two interlocutors from the EU.

members of Lebanese civil society organizations.[3] The duration of the interview ranged from 40 to 60 minutes. Interview questions were organized along two main themes: 1) the aid architecture of the 3RF and to what extent it is adaptive and effective, and 2) the space and role allocated to CSOs. The interview guide included questions related to the aid architecture of the 3RF, the reform aspect of the 3RF, the mandate of the Consultative Group, Consultative Group meetings between the main stakeholders, the selection of CSOs for the Consultative Group, the creation of sector working groups, and the self-organization and coordination amongst CSOs (see Appendix for the complete Interview Guide). I analyzed the data from the interviews using the theoretical proposition strategy, which suggests analyzing interview data under key themes (Yin, 2014) by using the computer software MAXQDA for coding the interview transcriptions.

Besides conducting interviews, I obtained primary data from direct personal observation of the 3RF's Consultative Group meetings held in July 2021, November 2021 and April 2022. In addition, I accessed unpublished documents of the 3RF through the Beirut Urban Lab, which holds a seat in the Consultative Group of the 3RF for Lebanon[4], and through documents that interviewees and other groups or organizations involved in the recovery process shared with me.

---

[3] 13 of which have a seat in the Consultative Group, whereas is member of the 3RF's Independent Oversight Board, and one CSO member served on the independent advisory group that was involved in the selection of CSOs for the Consultative Group.

[4] The Beirut Urban Lab (BUL) is positioned in the Consultative Group as a reformist CSO. At the same time, BUL is a critical/reflexive observer studying the 3RF process through applied research, namely a research project on post-disaster recovery governance which is funded by the International Development Research Centre (IDRC). This positionality of BUL will be reflected on at a later stage in the larger part of the study. My affiliation with BUL facilitated the data collection process in two ways: It granted me access to grey literature and other unpublished documents and it facilitated the interviews, as interlocutors (both from civil society and international community) reacted positively to my affiliation with BUL and were very responsive.

This mixed-methods approach allowed me to explore various questions regarding how the 3RF impacts governance structures with CSOs and donors through the institutional and discursive framework it provides.

The scope of this study is limited: The dynamic process of the 3RF is still unfolding, which prevents a comprehensive assessment of its success or failure. Initial difficulties like the inaction of the caretaker government, the COVID-19 pandemic, and institutional bottlenecks caused by the economic crisis intensified this issue and delayed the process, and only four consultative group meetings took place in the first year since the launch of the 3RF in December 2020. However, the 3RF gained momentum in fall 2021, especially with the establishment of working groups in October 2021 and the third CG meeting in November 2021. Despite the time constraints of my thesis and the prematurity of the study, I argue that data collection and documentation of this process is important from the initial stage to showcase challenges and provide policy recommendations to adapt the institutional architecture for the remaining duration of the process. In other words, given that Lebanon's 3RF process is ongoing, I follow both a descriptive approach to document the initial process and a normative approach to derive lessons learned and possible policy interventions.

Moreover, I faced additional challenges, including the scarce availability of data on recovery platforms and the lack of a guiding strategic doctrine for recovery platforms which led to a lack of conceptual clarity in the grey literature.

Finally, limitations of my study arise from the fact that I follow an interpretative approach. Therefore, it is essential to highlight the social context in which I will carry out this study – in other words, my positionality. Theories on interpretative research (Bourdieu, 1996) acknowledge that the researcher's objectivity is impossible, which

affects several aspects: problematization, choice of method, the ways of conducting the field research, the analysis of the contents, and the interactions with the subjects of the study are all determined by the positionality of the researcher.

Because I am following an interpretivist paradigm, my findings offer only one reality out of many realities which is based on my position. According to the concept self-reflexivity, I acknowledge my position as a white woman from Germany with limited language skills in Arabic, who is conducting research at a private American university, in a post-colonial context and a donor-dependent country. I have some professional experience in international development cooperation, which led me to critically reflect on legitimacy, effectiveness, and direct and indirect effects of aid. However, these qualifiers facilitated my access to the international donor community. On the other hand, these qualifiers may have distanced me from my interlocutors from the local CSO landscape because they associated it with their perception of a foreign student. My positionality, therefore, may have prompted my interlocutors to construct their narratives accordingly.

In addition, my academic background in area studies has encouraged me to question Western-constituted, essentializing, and pathologizing narratives on development in the Global South. Therefore, I am interested in going beyond narratives of underdevelopment, state fragility or ungovernability, etc.

Moreover, I want to challenge the hierarchies in knowledge production that informs and justifies international policies and critically reflect on the international assistance in the ongoing recovery process in Lebanon. In addition, I witnessed the October 2019 uprisings ("Thawra") in Lebanon and experienced the vibrant landscape of CSOs and activist groups. Therefore, reflections on my positionality and how it

influenced my work have been taken into account while analyzing my data, to the best of my capacities.

CHAPTER II

ASSESSING AID ARCHITECTURE, COUNTRY PLATFORMS, CSOS AND REFORMS

I will analyze the 3RF's potential to instigate reforms based on its institutional arrangements and decision-making mechanisms through two interconnected lenses: I frame the question if the 3RF's institutional architecture is adaptive based on literature about path-dependency and windows of opportunity, as scholarship on path-dependency emphasizes the dichotomy between stability and adaptability of political systems. Therefore, I take into account how path-dependency and windows of opportunity translate into practice in Lebanon. I will also draw on literature about aid effectiveness and the likelihood of aid to initiate reform and break path-dependency in Lebanon. In addition, I analyze the issue of policy effectiveness based on the framework introduced by the World Development Report on Governance and the Law that takes into account power asymmetries and the bargaining between stakeholders in its assessment of reform. In order to assess the role of CSOs in the 3RF, I draw on scholarship about CSOs as governance actors and literature about the CSO landscape in Lebanon. However, first, I review recovery frameworks and case studies to trace the underlying models of recovery frameworks, how these models traveled from one context to another, and how past experiences informed Lebanon's 3RF.

A.   Aid Architecture and Country Platforms

1.   *Country Coordination Platforms as an Umbrella Term*

The country platform approach represents the broader paradigm shift in development cooperation from a focus on growth and poverty reduction to a focus on risk

management and resilience (Papoulidis, 2020). This paradigm shift started in the past 20 years and is rooted in two discourses: Firstly, the discourse on aid effectiveness for development, in particular responding to a growing number of heterogenous development actors (including the private sector), e.g. through sector-level multi-stakeholder partnerships (The Partnering Initiative and World Vision, 2016). Secondly, the discourse on the increase in the number and intensity of disasters and protracted crises (Mawdsley, Savage and Kim, 2014; Papoulidis, 2020; One CA Podcast and Papoulidis, 2021).

Therefore, various international organizations have increasingly committed to the country platforms approach to manage aid flows, particularly in fragile contexts[5] (Rose, 2019; Arab Reform Initiative, 2021). International organizations promoting country platforms include the World Bank Group, the OECD, the G20 group, and UNDP; they share the same reasoning on country platforms to increase aid effectiveness and aid legitimacy in fragile contexts[6] (*UNDP Strategic Plan, 2018-2021*, 2017; *Making the Global Financial System Work For All | Report of the G20 Eminent Persons Group on Global Financial Governance*, 2018; *World Bank Group Strategy for Fragility, Conflict,*

---

[5] The concept of state fragility originated in the discourse of aid agencies and donors and gained traction in the mid-2000s through the humanitarian-development-peace nexus that guides international aid policies (Nay, 2013; Grimm, Lemay-Hébert and Nay, 2014). The OECD defines fragility "as the combination of exposure to risk and insufficient coping capacity of the state, systems and/or communities to manage, absorb or mitigate those risks" (OECD, 2020: Executive Summary). According to the World Bank, fragility is based on "deep grievances and/or high levels of exclusion, lack of capacity, and limited provision of basic services to the population" as well as "the inability or unwillingness of the state to manage or mitigate risks" (*World Bank Group Strategy for Fragility, Conflict, and Violence 2020–2025*, 2020: 6-7). A vast body of literature focuses on the normative origins of the concept and shows that international organizations like the World Bank and OECD diffuse and instrumentalize state fragility to create legitimacy for donor-led reforms in the financing of development aid (Grimm, Lemay-Hébert and Nay, 2014; Nay, 2014; Saeed, 2020).

[6] The commitment of the international community to country platforms in fragile stats results from the challenges of aid delivery in these contexts. In fragile contexts, country platforms better adapt to changing country needs enables scaling and reconfiguration from humanitarian response to development plans (*UNDP Strategic Plan, 2018-2021*, 2017:16 – 17). Therefore, country platforms aim to improve the coherence in the humanitarian-development-peace nexus in fragile contexts (OECD, 2020).

and Violence 2020–2025, 2020; Malpass and World Bank, 2019; OECD, 2020): Aid effectiveness[7] is addressed by emphasizing joint funding mechanisms, improving multi-stakeholder coordination, and involving the private sector to unlock investments. Simultaneously, country ownership and matching international assistance with the country's needs are supposed to increase aid legitimacy.

Despite the promising effects of country platforms, they have potential pitfalls: Some scholars lamented the lack of a guiding principles in practice which leads to variations of country platforms, reinvention of older models and mixed outcomes (Papoulidis, 2020). Other critics pointed to the lack of clear assessment tools of country platforms, the need for regulation of private sector involvement, and the challenge of country ownership in fragile states where country platforms are more likely to be donor-driven (Plant, 2020). Another weak point is the stagnant implementation following the needs assessment process (United Nations Development Group and World Bank Group, 2007).

Jonathan Papoulidis characterizes country platforms by three components 1) a high-level steering group, 2) sector-level groups and 3) a secretariat level group (Papoulidis, 2020, see fig. 1).

---

[7] There is a vast body of literature on aid effectiveness that generally follows a macro-economic approach (for overview (Kenny, 2008; Doucouliagos and Paldam, 2009; Dreher and Langlotz, 2020). There is still no consensus if aid is effective and many scholars even pointed to unintended and harmful effects of aid, including aid dependency (Bräutigam, 2000; Moyo, 2009), aid fragmentation, (Knack and Rahman, 2007; Djankov, Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2009; Fengler and Kharas, 2011; Kharas, 2011; Schulpen, Loman and Kinsbergen, 2011; Anderson, 2012; Faust, Grävingholt and Ziaja, 2015; Gehring *et al.*, 2017; Ziaja, 2020), de-politicization of aid (Ferguson, 1994; Easterly, 2002), and political favoritism or political alignment of recipients with donors (Escobar, 1995; Alesina and Dollar, 2000; Faye and Niehaus, 2012; Hickel, 2017; Dreher, Eichenauer and Gehring, 2018; Facon, 2021).

Figure 1. Schematic of country platforms. Author's own graphic based on Papoulidis.

The lack of a guiding doctrine and conceptual clarity turns "country platform" into an umbrella term for a variety of post-disaster and post-crisis as well as

developmental recovery frameworks.[8] The majority of case studies assess the institutional frameworks for governance[9] in post-disaster contexts.

The 2020 Global Guide to Developing Disaster Recovery Frameworks suggests three models for the institutional set-up of post-disaster recovery frameworks that typically follows a Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment[10]: 1) Create a new institution for reconstruction and recovery management, 2) strengthen and coordinate existing line agencies or ministries for sector-based recovery, and 3) create a hybrid arrangement by establishing a temporary reconstruction and recovery agency (see figure 2).

In the past years, the international community increasingly adopted the hybrid system because it supplements the strategy to strengthen existing governance structures by supporting the recovery effort through a temporary agency. However, the disadvantages of the hybrid model include that it potentially lacks the human and financial capacity and political weight to guide and coordinate the recovery effort (GFDRR, 2020).

---

[8] The lack of conceptual clarity is one of the main challenges in researching country platforms because it intensified the scarce availability of data. The International Recovery Platform collects and provides information, data and case studies of post-disaster recovery platforms, see https://www.recoveryplatform.org.

[9] I draw on definitions of governance based on its institutions (structural definition) and its modes of coordination (process definition) (Börzel, Risse and Draude, 2018). In Western scholarship, the governance debate has increasingly focused on stakeholders involved in governance other than the national government (Kooiman, 2003; Levi-Faur, 2012). Some scholars emphasized the emergence of other non-state actors and civil society groups as governance actors (Rhodes, 1996). Theories addressing the varying involvement of stakeholders include governance by networks (Rhodes, 1996; Provan and Kenis, 2007) and governance without government (Rosenau, 1992; Rhodes, 1996; Grande and Pauly, 2005; Provan and Kenis, 2007). Critics of the governing without government thesis, however, claim that the nation-state still plays an important role in governance (Davies, 2000; Pierre *et al.*, 2005).

[10] The 2008 Joint Declaration on Post-Crisis Assessments and Recovery Planning is the foundation for the cooperation between the European Union, the United Nations and World Bank in assessing and planning recovery, reconstruction and development in crises-affected countries. This tripartite agreement is put in practice based on Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment in countries recovering from disasters – or Recovery and Peacebuilding Assessments for countries recovering from crises related to conflict or fragility (European Union, United Nations, and World Bank Group, 2008).

Recovery Agency	Line Ministries	Hybrid Approach
+ Can accelerate coordination and implementation of recovery. + Models of good practice exist with features that can be replicated. + Can draw on resources beyond the civil service resource pool. + Can focus on tasks that are specific to reconstruction (e.g., land acquisition, development of reconstruction policy).	+ Respects and strengthens existing government structure and capacities. + Does not create additional competition for resources and power. + Facilitates transition from reconstruction to longer-term development.	+ Respects and strengthens existing government structure and capacities. + Has a light structure therefore can be easily dissolved at the end of reconstruction. + Provides additional capacity to line ministries whose capacities and resources are under immense pressure. + Provides a single point of responsibility for managing reconstruction. + Can focus on tasks that are specific to reconstruction (e.g., land acquisition, development of reconstruction policy, aid tracking).
- Potential for rivalry among existing agencies. - Takes more time and resources to establish than expected. - Requires existence of strong central government for support and authority. - Can create issues of sustainability of reconstruction 'investment.' - Does not strengthen existing government bodies.	- Capacity was low before earthquake and with the earthquake, has been further curtailed. - Line ministries drawn away from their routine work. - Requires third-party implementation. - Does not address specific reconstruction activities (e.g., coordination of off-budget funds and continuous communication with stakeholders on reconstruction progress, and upholding transparency and accountability).	- Light structure may not be sufficient to deal with the enormity of the task. - May lack the political weight necessary to coordinate other line ministries or other reconstruction actors.

Figure 2. Three Options for Disaster Recovery Frameworks:
Pro and cons (Disaster Recovery Guide 2020)

Anticipating the context-specific, potential shortcomings of the hybrid model provides a set of questions to assess Lebanon's 3RF: How does the recovery framework address these pitfalls? And are the institutional arrangements of the 3RF adaptive enough to address challenges that may arise in the process, like the lack of capacities and political weight? If so, how?[11]

---

[11] The models provided by the Guide of Disaster Recovery Frameworks are a useful entry-point to analyze the institutional set-up of Lebanon's hybrid recovery framework and its stakeholders. However, it is crucial to consider the potential gap between institutional arrangements and practice in the analysis of the 3RF's institutional adaptability. Hilhorst, Boersma and Raju (2020, p. 215) recognize that the roles in everyday post-disaster governance practices are constantly negotiated and "permeated by politics of power and legitimacy." They provide a useful framework for analyzing this gap and introducing three definitions of governance in the post-disaster context: A "formal governance" (how governance arrangements are intended), "real governance" (how formal governance arrangements manifest and evolve in actual practice), and "invisible governance" (the household, neighborhood and network-level disaster response outside of formalized governance arrangements).

2.   *Lessons Learned from Other Recovery Platforms*

Case studies provide insights into the implementation and mapping of good practices or raising red flags. In this section, I'll briefly review the recovery frameworks of Haiti, Somalia, Pakistan and Indonesia, Central African Republic, Northeast-Nigeria, and Iraq.

Haiti's recovery framework is an interesting case study to examine because it elucidates contradictory effects of institutional adaptability. Some authors argue that Haiti's platform illustrates how aid that is not channeled through the recipient country's government can undermine ownership and reform efforts, and create ineffective parallel systems (Batley and Mcloughlin, 2010).[12] Matters are more complex. On the one hand, Haiti's platform is an example of the design of platforms in ways that are not adaptable or institutionally reconfigured – e.g., the integration of the sector-level groups into the institutional set-up, and often takes time (GFDRR *et al.*, 2014; Fondation de France and Agence Française de Développement, 2015; Chan and Bécoulet, 2019). On the other hand, Haiti's recovery framework shows how the intended design of the institutional arrangement changed over time: The Interim Haiti Recovery Commission (IHRC) was launched as an interim body for high-level coordination between donors due to the lack of a national recovery agency within the Haitian Government, but was initially not intended as a funding or operational body. Instead, the IHRC was supposed to be complemented by a Haiti Reconstruction Fund. Still, after the mandate of the IHRC expired, government agencies within took over the reconstruction process after they raised concerns about ineffective, political illegitimate parallel structures of the donor community.

---

[12] Therefore, scholars have analyzed how donors can bypass governments in poorly governed countries with high risks of corruption without creating parallel systems (Dietrich, 2013; Acht, Mahmoud and Thiele, 2015).

In contrast, Somalia's recovery platform outlasted several National Development Plans and adapted well to changing needs of the country. One indicator for its high adaptability is its transformation from a donor-led platform to a platform with high country ownership which ultimately provided extensive institution-building (GFDRR and UNDP, 2014).

Other examples for hybrid systems are Indonesia's recovery framework after the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami and Pakistan's Earthquake Reconstruction and Recovery Agency (ERRA) following the 2005 earthquake (GFDRR and UNDP, 2014). The ERRA ensured that the reconstruction activities were well-aligned with planning objectives because the ERRA council included ministries of key line agencies and the prime ministers of affected areas. The hybrid model in Pakistan is often cited as an example of good practice because it provided a sunset clause to ensure that ERRA's mandate is time-limited. Similarly, the four-year mandate of the Agency for the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Aceh and Nias (BRR), in Indonesia, enforced a handover strategy to existing national agencies. In addition, the national planning agency (BAPPENAS) led the Indonesia's damage and need assessment and was involved in reconstruction from the initial stage (GFDRR, 2010).

In 2016, the EU, UN and World Bank collaboratively assisted the Federal Government of Nigeria in the Recovery and Peace Building Assessment (RPBA) (World Bank Group, 2015) as a response to Boko Haram violence and internal displacement in Nigeria's North Eastern regions. The process of the RPBA is an example for solid preparatory work, extensive data collection, dialogue and stakeholder consultation (World Bank Group, 2017). It impacted the Buhari Plan, the Nigerian Government's master plan for the North East, and transitioned into the North East Nigeria Recovery and

Stabilization Program facilitated the institutional framework for implementation, coordination and monitoring and a plan for financing. However, the North East Nigeria Recovery and Stabilization Program does not provide appropriate governance structures for effective local-level implementation but became a "balancing act between different levels of governance" (Brechenmacher, 2019). These include the misalignment between policy making on the federal and state level, corruption, disregarding local community's involvement in the reconstruction effort, and the government's lack of political commitment, transparency and coordination at the federal level (Brechenmacher, 2019). These factors limited the program's effectiveness according to critics and "institutional rivalries and overlapping mandates impede collaboration, obscure lines of accountability, and result in ad-hoc interventions" (Brechenmacher, 2019).

Similar to the Nigerian case, the 2016 post-conflict Recovery Platform for the Central African Republic (*CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: National Recovery and Peacebuilding Plan 2017-21*, 2016) was a tripartite effort and built on earlier experiences like pooled funding mechanisms in Somalia to ensure greater aid harmonization (Papoulidis, 2020). Moreover, the National Recovery and Peacebuilding plan contained some good practice elements, e.g. early establishment of mutual accountability and monitoring frameworks and a Secretariat charged with technical support of the implementation (World Bank Group, 2017).

Another example for a multi-donor trust fund to streamline aid inflows in post-conflict contexts is the Iraq Reform, Recovery and Reconstruction Fund (I3RF). It was established in 2018, funded by multiple donors,[13] and provides "a platform for financing and strategic dialogue for reconstruction and development, with a focus on targeted

---

[13] The donors are Germany, the United Kingdom, Canada, and Sweden.

national reforms and public and private investments in sectors involving socio-economic recovery and reconstruction" (World Bank Group, 2021c). While the World Bank claims that the Fund had a central role in policy dialogue for reforms and provided evidence that informed the White Paper, the reform program of the Government of Iraq, critics lament that the focus on structural reforms in state institution disregards the political reality, like the political elite's lack of will, and the fiscal crises (Ruba Husari, 2020). This is in line with criticism that Pooled Trust Funds often prioritize implementation of projects at the expense of reforms.[14]

The different experiences from recovery frameworks in Haiti, Somalia, Pakistan, and Indonesia, Central African Republic, North East Nigeria, and Iraq show that recovery platforms and their adaptability should be assessed based on their context-specificity. Therefore, Lebanon's 3RF should be assessed against the backdrop of its own declared objectives, one of which is governance reforms[15], and its institutional adaptability.

---

[14] Correspondence with J. Papoulidis, 15.10.2021

[15] These reforms can be categorized into light and heavy reforms according to the 3RF's unprecedented, non-sequential two-track approach: The first, people-centered track aims to address urgent needs, particularly of the most vulnerable groups. This track is funded by grant financing and requires the adoption of action plans and reforms which are light in nature. The second track, the reform and reconstruction track, focuses on "critical reforms to address governance and recovery challenges in Lebanon," which are prerequisites for international support and financing, or in other words, financing is conditional on heavier, more comprehensive reforms (World Bank Group, European Union, and United Nations, 2020b).

B.   Path-dependency and Adaptability

Since the mid-1990s, a vast body of literature has focused on opportunities for institutional change or adaptability that can disrupt path-dependency. Kingdon (1995) provides a conceptual insight into how "policy windows" emerge and establish a specific governance trajectory. Similarly, the neo-institutional approach of (Collier and Collier, 2015) introduced "critical juncture" as a term for identifying the conditions under which governance processes may be reconfigured.

Literature on path-dependency demonstrates how adaptability or institutional change is impeded because political systems tend to be locked in their specific, consolidated institutional patterns and major stakeholders contribute to keeping the status quo (Béland and Powell, 2016).[16] However, to avoid deterministic theoretical frameworks, a vast body of scholarship emphasized that besides structural context, agency is a crucial factor for institutional adaptability (Kay, 2005). As such, there is a logical contradiction between governance actors adapting to institutions that self-reproduce and the governance actors' agency to shape and reconfigure the institutions (Kay, 2005).[17]

Another thread in the literature on path-dependency argues that institutional change is difficult to achieve, and disrupting path-dependency is most likely due to external shocks (Pierson and Skocpol, 2002). Exogenous shocks are random events that

---

[16] Path-dependent processes are theoretically often explained with "policy feedback mechanisms" or "developmental pathways" (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010; Béland and Powell, 2016; Sabatier and Weible, 2018). These are recurrent patterns of institutional processes (Pierson and Skocpol, 2002).

[17] In addition, literature on opportunities for change often disregards power asymmetries between the governance stakeholders (Capoccia and Kelemen, 2007). The issue of power asymmetries is particularly relevant for fragile contexts. Taleb (2010) provides insights into adaptive governance in fragile contexts by introducing the concept of "maximum tinkering" which expresses the openness of political leaders to experimental approaches.

can disrupt the system's stability and disrupt the path or create new paths (Steinmo, Thelen and Longstreth, 1992).

Another school of thought within path-dependency theory emphasizes the potential of gradual processes incrementally undermining institutional structures and identified endogenous processes as drivers for this change (Weyland, 2008; Mahoney and Thelen, 2009).

Lebanon's 3RF is an interesting case study in this respect as it was formed at a moment of exogenous shocks like the port explosion in combination with a process of gradual endogenous change, epitomized during the 2019 uprising to which many 3RF's CSOs participated.[18]

As such, combining the concepts of effective and adaptive institutional architecture to analyze the 3RF appears a productive entry point. Therefore I choose an approach to analyzing path-dependency that bridges those threads in the literature and accounts for multilayered realities along the lines of Gerschewski who introduces an approach that aims to "disentangle the sources of a cause (exogenous vs. endogenous) from its time horizon (sudden vs. gradual)" (Gerschewski, 2021, p. 231).

1. *Path-Dependency in the Lebanese Context*

Analyzing Lebanon's sectarian political system through the lens of path-dependency explains how the sectarian system reproduces itself and resists reforms

---

[18] Saying that the port blast and the international community's joint response in form of the 3RF is an external shock does not imply that CSOs – which were prompted to expand their mandate after the explosion and which are backed in the policy arena by the international community did not attempt to collectively organize and push for reforms before. Neither is it meant to dismiss the continuation and trajectory of humanitarian interventions of international organizations and the longstanding presence of international organizations in Lebanon, ever since the end of the Civil War and even more so since the Syrian crises.

through various tactics. The co-optation of civil society organizations and unions is one tactic (Clark and Salloukh, 2013; Geha, 2019). Others include intimidation, hollowing out political institutions, and gerrymandering (Salloukh, 2006; Salloukh *et al.*, 2015; El Kak, 2019). Most importantly, the elite established a sectarianized welfare system that reproduces sectarian loyalties based on clientelistic service provision (Salloukh *et al.*, 2015; Baumann, 2016).

Can donors use conditional aid to disrupt the resilience and reproduction of the sectarian political system in Lebanon? Does the 3RF structure provide "loopholes" for the sectarian political elite to capture?

The entrenchment of the sectarian political elite and its reluctance to undertake reforms turns the issue of 3RF-induced reforms – through donors' conditionality and CSOs' collective action – ad absurdum. Or, as Nagle puts it: "Zombie power-sharing means that it is almost impossible to change, reform, and accommodate new policies, especially for non-sectarian issues and identities" (Nagle, 2020, p. 138). But, despite the strong path-dependency of the sectarian political system, there is a longstanding scholarly tradition to frame particular political moments in Lebanon's history as "windows of opportunity" for an alternative to the sectarian political system.[19]

---

[19] These political moments include the 1990s which – according to (Baumann, 2016) – provided better conditions than the civil war era and the post-2005 era due to its violent sectarian clashes. However, Clark and Zahar (2015) argue that Lebanon's 2005 Cedar Revolution was a critical juncture, whereas Geha (2016) describes post-2005 only as a "partially critical juncture".

C.   Aid and Reform

1.   *Assessing the Impact of Aid*

According to the literature of aid dependency, aid can undermine internal efforts for policy reforms and economic development because recipient states calculate aid as a regular source of income (Rahnama, Fawaz and Gittings, 2017). Other scholars have argued that the disincentivizing effect of aid further undermines the accountability of the recipient government and weakens the citizen–state relation in the recipient country and reinforces low state capacities (Bräutigam, 2002; Moss, Pettersson and van de Walle, 2006; Pritchett, Woolcock and Andrews, 2013). Likewise, scholars analyzed how aid sustains the status quo including neopatrimonialism and the political survival of autocratic leaders (Kono and Montinola, 2009; De Mesquita and Smith, 2010; Nieto-Matiz and Schenoni, 2020). Still other scholars pointed to the amplifying effect of aid, which enhances democracy in democratic states but makes autocratic states more autocratic (Ahmed, 2012; Dutta, Leeson and Williamson, 2013). Other critics have emphasized that foreign aid facilitates corruption without control mechanism in place (Isaksson *et al.*, 2018; Dávid-Barrett *et al.*, 2020) because it encourages rent-seeking (Moyo, 2009).

The literature points to the dilemma of donors: On the one hand, donors undermine ownership of the recipient government in areas of limited statehood to avoid sustaining the political system that hinders development progress (Gisselquist, 2015). For example, donors channel less than 20 % of aid through the government of the recipient country in fragile contexts (Dreher, Lang and Ziaja, 2018) but allocate aid to (I)NGOs (Beisheim, Ellersiek and Lorch, 2018). On the other hand, aid that is not channeled through the recipient country's government can equally undermine reform efforts and

creative ineffective parallel systems. Particularly in conflict-affected contexts and countries with weak capacities, state-building efforts can be subverted if aid is channeled through non-state actors (Batley and Mcloughlin, 2010).[20] Therefore, scholars have analyzed how donors can bypass governments in poorly governed countries with high risks of corruptions without creating parallel systems (Dietrich, 2013; Acht, Mahmoud and Thiele, 2015).

2. *Aid and Reforms in Lebanon*

Despite Lebanon's poor track record of donor conferences and aid programs conditional on implementing reforms like Paris I (2001), Paris II (2002), Paris III (2007), and CEDRE (or Paris IV, 2018) (Atallah, Mahmalat and Zoughaib, 2018, 2018; LCPS, 2020), the 3RF as a joint response plan to the Beirut blast 3RF may provide a more effective window of opportunity to push for reforms, through its Consultative Group incorporating CSOs.

Saleh and Harvie (2017) argue that donor funding could serve as a window of opportunity to generate positive macro-economic outcomes for Lebanon, particularly if donor funding is channeled to public expenditure targeting infrastructure.

However, several factors constrain the effectiveness of aid in Lebanon, including 1) the unpredictability and volatility of aid flows impeding a long-term vision, 2) aid allocation based on loans instead of grants further undermining Lebanon's financial stability, 3) the lack of transparency of aid allocation (also limiting aid accountability, 4) the lack of alignment of donors' and national priorities and 5) the lack of engagement

---

[20] Some scholars prioritize service provision as a minimal condition for governance, which became known as the "good enough governance" (Grindle, 2007).

mechanisms of civil society and aid recipient population or groups (Abi Khalil, Gorevan and Saieh, 2017).

Elite capture is considered one of the most significant constraints for development (Le Borgne and Jacobs, 2016) and international donors lost trust in the Lebanese political elite because they have mismanaged past aid packages (International Crisis Group, 2021).[21]

On the other hand, some progress has been made towards a greater inclusion of national and local organizations in the aid sector, even if the degree of aid localization can be improved (Bruschini-Chaumet et al., 2019; Shabake, 2021). Given that local and national organizations were at the forefront of responses to multiple crises in Lebanon, the localization of aid (the direct allocation of funds to local NGOs) is becoming a more pressing issue than ever. Consequently, aid allocation for the post-blast recovery sparked growing public debate about strengthening the role of CSOs and local NGOs (Atrache, 2021; Facon, 2021).

Likewise, the international community considered CSOs as important stakeholder in the post-blast response. As a result, they capitalized on the consultative role of CSOs during the Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment and institutionalized it through the 3RF's Consultative Group – as I will discuss in detail later.

---

[21] Humanitarian aid in the context of the Syrian crisis also revealed spillover effects of corruption from the public to the third sector, which underlines once more the importance of coordination bodies with clear mandates (BouChabke and Haddad, 2021). Another impact of the Syrian crisis is the reconfiguration of Government-donor-relations: The Syrian crisis as an exogenous shock gradually changed the Lebanese Government's strategy – moving from a policy of inaction to taking a more active role in shaping response policies to the crisis and gaining more leverage in relation to UN agencies at large, but it also legitimized the government's prior inaction (Geha and Talhouk, 2019).

D.   CSOs' Engagement in Development Cooperation and Recovery Governance

Despite advocating for the participation of civil society actors (CSOs) or faith-based organizations (FBOs) in country platforms as a good practice to guarantee ownership and accountability (*UNDP Strategic Plan, 2018-2021*, 2017; *World Bank Group Strategy for Fragility, Conflict, and Violence 2020–2025*, 2020; OECD, 2020), the international aid community has not developed tools and mechanisms that effectively involve CSOs in recovery frameworks. This structurally constrained environment limits the effectiveness of CSOs. Thus, The Siem Reap CSO Consensus on the International Framework for CSO Development Effectiveness (2011) highlighted the need for an enabling environment for CSO's effectiveness in development cooperation.[22]

Donors themselves often contribute to the capacity gap of CSOs as a result of insufficient funding or short-term support (Srinivas, 2009; Bhargava, 2015; Munene and Thakhathi, 2017).

As a result, a vast body of literature shows that CSOs barely affect the quality of governance (Thompson, Conradie and Tsolekile de Wet, 2014) or even have a negative

---

[22] The Siem Reap CSO Consensus on an International Framework of CSO Development Effectiveness (2011) was integrated in the preparatory framework for the fourth high-level forum on aid effectiveness in Busan in 2011 and formulated ownership and transparency as goals and demanded accountability from donors and recipient governments. Moreover, it highlighted the need for an enabling environment for CSO's effectiveness in development cooperation ('The Siem Reap CSO Consensus on the International Framework for CSO Development Effectiveness', 2011).The role of CSOs in the Busan process was unprecedented for two reasons. Firstly, CSOs officially took part in the forum for the first time and therefore claimed ownership (Hayman, 2012). Secondly, the outcome agreement, the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation dedicates an article (article 22) to CSOs involvement in development (OECD, 2011). Besides emphasizing country ownership, the Busan Partnership Agreement reinforced all the principles of the Paris Declaration (namely: 1) ownership by the recipient country, 2) alignment of donor aid and the recipient's national development goals, 3) harmonization of donor programs and better coordination among donors, 4) managing for results through assessment frameworks, and 5) mutual accountability (OECD, 2005). and committed to implement them more effectively by stressing the need for greater program quality and accountability. The Busan Partnership Agreement mandated the Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation (GPFDC) to monitor the development principles for aid effectiveness and to include South-South co-operation and non-governmental actors like CSOs and the private sector as development partners (OECD, no date b).

impact like increasing aid fragmentation and, therefore, transaction costs (Schulpen, Loman and Kinsbergen, 2011).

Similarly, the study on NGOs' role in Haiti's reconstruction process shows that the (I)NGO-led development model in Haiti increased the country's dependency on donors and international aid through opaque and undemocratic projects (Edmonds, 2013).

Thus, capitalizing on the presence of a robust civil society can lead to further erosion of state institutions (Dietrich, 2013) and can create "discourses of sidelining the state" (Fawaz and Harb, 2020) that wrongly release public institutions from their responsibility towards citizens.

The role of CSOs as a driving force for policy reform can take on different forms. Some studies reduced the role of CSOs to awareness-raising about the respective political issue that furthermore results in political change (Iati, 2008). Beyond awareness-raising, scholars have emphasized the need for CSOs and the state to be aligned on policy frames to achieve reforms in conflict-affected states (Chaney, 2016).

Critics of engaging CSOs point to the contradiction of empowering local stakeholders in disaster response governance because the process of empowerment is top-down "targeting the 'local' actors who can fit – or be made to fit – within a global system, regardless of how different local governance structures already function" (International Institute of Social Studies, 2020). Therefore, consensus-oriented disaster governance

tends to engage actors who are already more consolidated and empowered[23] – which, I argue, can also be observed in the selection of CSOs for the Consultative Group of Lebanon's 3RF.

1.   *Role of CSOs to promote Good Governance*

Scholars expect both aid effectiveness and legitimacy to increase if donors channel it through NGOs (Dreher, Lang and Ziaja, 2018; Hassan, Lee and Mokhtar, 2019) as NGOs are expected to improve the quality of governance, promote democratic values (Baur and Palazzo, 2011) and therefore, increase legitimacy (Lister, 2003).

However, one crucial question in the literature on legitimate governance actors is whether legitimacy can be transferred to non-state actors (Egholm, Heyse and Mourey, 2020). Some scholars have argued that a transfer of legitimacy to non-state actors is possible if their goals correspond with the goals of the local population (Krasner and Risse, 2014). In addition, according to the theory of input legitimacy (Scharpf, 1999), governance and actors of governance are considered legitimate based on the quality of the decision-making process. The latter is also known as "participatory quality" (Krasner and Risse, 2014: 556, Risse and Stollenwerk, 2018). In other words: Input legitimacy refers to the voice of the people who are governed. Whereas some scholars have advocated for the legitimacy of CSOs as governance actors due to their "civil behavior,

---

[23] Because scholars emphasized the relevance of CSOs and social capital for recovery (Aldrich, 2012), it is essential to acknowledge that the governance logic of local or community participation can vary within the same post-disaster recovery: Curato's comparative case study of three modes of community participation in the aftermath of Typhoon Hayan in the Philippines suggests the following: The way community participation unfolds depends on 1) how the community is imagined, 2) who is in charge of decision-making processes that affect the community, and 3) what mechanisms are available for feedback and accountability. This varying degree in community participation is also affected by "shared assumptions on who can take part (…) in the recovery process defined by various stakeholders with differential access to power" (Curato, 2018, p. 19).

their discursive orientation and their […] consensual behavior" (Baur and Palazzo, 2011: 590), critics of this theory argued that this deliberative approach of decision-making disregards power structures. They argued that the involvement of CSOs do not necessarily improve the participative quality of governance or contribute to a democratic public sphere because of differential power hierarchies (Cooke and Kothari, 2001; Lister, 2003).

Given that multiple stakeholders co-constitute governance and power is contested by state actors and societal actors (in the Lebanese context), it is important to take into account local power dynamics. Melis and Apthorpe (2020) emphasize that locally led disaster governance is often reduced to national state actors in contrast to international actors. Therefore, it often disregards local actors that are usually not perceived as "traditional" governance actors. Moreover, they argue that all stakeholders involved in disaster governance use "the discourse of 'the state in charge' and 'the community knows best' to legitimise their own role as response actors while disputing others' capacities" (Melis and Apthorpe, 2020, p. 366). Therefore, they advocate for "multi-locality" that provides an approach to open disaster response governance to new actors that are usually excluded, and to reduce tensions between local state and non-state actors (Melis and Apthorpe, 2020). Likewise, Lie (2019) debunked the "ownership discourse" by illustrating how it conceals asymmetrical aid relations. According to Lie, there is gap between policy and practice with regards to the ownership principle. This gap is not based on bad policies, weak implementation or lack of will at the recipient's end but is deliberately caused by donors: Despite officially advocating for country ownership, donors employ new, tacit and indirect forms of governance (*"developmentality"*) that undermine local ownership in practice (Lie, 2019). In other words, Lie's concept of developmentality shows how donors govern from the distance and make their policies

those of the recipient through conditionality while officially stressing the recipient's freedom and responsibility.

2. *The Role of CSOs to ensure Accountability*

In a post-disaster context, accountability is often an essential ingredient of good governance (Haigh, Amaratunga and Hettige, 2019). Haigh, Amaratunga and Hettig (2019, p.11) conceptualize accountability based on three elements: 1) answerability (the need for justification of actions), 2) enforcement (the sanctions that could be imposed if the actions or justifications for the actions are found to be unsatisfactory), and 3) responsiveness (the ability of those held accountable to respond to the demands made).

Moreover, scholarship distinguishes different forms of accountability – based on a functional and a directional approach. The functional approach includes a legal and a social definition of accountability. Civil society organizations play a pivotal role within the social dimension of accountability. However, the ability of civil society groups to "perform a watchdog function "(Haigh, Amaratunga and Hettige, 2019, p. 10) depends on enabling legislation for CSOs, on participatory governance practices, as well as on general power structures. Social accountability is often conceptualized as a form of civil-society-driven activism: "Making powerholders responsive to the everyday grievances of the citizens regarding the quality and delivery of public services, inefficiency and corruption, absenteeism and delays, constitutes the core focus of social accountability." (Dhungana, 2020, p. 396). However, some scholars point to the limited impact of social accountability activism driven by CSOs: While it promotes transparency and flow of information, it rarely results in the improvement of the institutional set-up, nor does it create institutional accountability.

Fox (2015) criticizes that transparency-based approaches only provide accountability in the sense of institutional answerability, but have a limited impact on institutional change or reform. One of the reasons for this limitation is the lack of sanctions in the case of power abuse or underperformance (Dhungana 2020, p. 396) or the general absence of an independent judiciary. In other words: Accountability depends on the enabling legislative environment for CSOs and "recognized legitimate standards as the measurement against which actors are held to account" (Polack, Luna and Dator-Bercilla, 2010, p. 16) as well as an institutional design that provides "clear lines of authority, accountability and rational delegation of roles" (Haigh, Amaratunga and Hettige, 2019, p. 11).

Besides the functional definition of accountability, the directional approach distinguishes upwards accountability (e.g., from beneficiaries to donors) and downwards accountability (e.g., from donors to beneficiaries). In post-disaster recovery governance, upwards accountability is often privileged at the expense of downwards accountability. The reasons are that upwards accountability can be legally or contractually ensured and is easily measured in the form of outputs. In addition, CSOs often have a strong, financially driven motivation to ensure accountability to donors, whereas accountability to beneficiaries has less institutional weight (Daly and Brassard, 2011: 512). Therefore, international aid structures often prevent social accountability by privileging upward accountability to donors at the expense of downward accountability to communities (Dhungana, 2020, p. 396). Especially CSOs are expected to play a crucial role in improving accountability and providing mechanisms for downward accountability (Haigh, Amaratunga and Hettige, 2019). Daly and Brassard (2011, p. 517) propose a framework for multi-directional accountability based on four factors: "1) Multi-

directional flows of information, 2) Coherence and coordination, 3) Accessible and inclusive decision-making process, and 4) Grounded-level oversight, monitoring, and direct involvement."

E.   Assessment Frameworks

1.   *Policy Effectiveness Cycle and Political Settlements*

The World Development Report on Governance and the Law (2017) suggests that policy failure, ineffective policies, or the absence of policies cannot be addressed by the prevalent development paradigm of the international community, which advocates three major approaches for assessing available conditions for governance reforms: good governance, capacity building for implementation, and rule of law. The WDR argues instead for a new framework focused on an adaptive "policy effectiveness cycle". The policy effectiveness cycle provides a model to assess the bargaining process between stakeholders within a specific institutional setting, and recognizes the essential role of power asymmetries (and hence of political economy) as a challenge to governance reform. The model draws on the concept of political settlements.

Political settlement is an inter-elite common understanding that organizes political power according to the best interests of elite groups and includes horizontal negotiations between elites and vertical negotiations between elites and citizens (Kelsall, 2018; Khan, 2018). According to Di John, O'Meally and Hogg (2017) development actors need to consider and acknowledge political settlements between governance actors to make aid and service delivery in fragile contexts more effective. Parks and Cole (2010) argue that donors can influence political settlements by shifting benefits of aid to excluded groups, supporting the emergency of development elite coalitions that are excluded from the political settlement, maximize transition moments by supporting to

shape new political settlements and to help mobilize excluded groups. However, Bell and Pospisil (2017) argue that the international donor community accepts "formalized political unsettlement" in fragile contexts to allocate aid, or in other words, inter-elite deals that exclude other groups and translate political conflict into a set of political and legal institutions instead of resolving it.

The Policy Effectiveness Cycle includes a set of questions to assess political settlement or the "process through which actors bargain about the design and implementation of policies within a specific institutional setting" (World Bank, 2017). These questions are organized along six steps (Figure 3): (i) diagnosis of functional problems, (ii) assessment of power asymmetries, (iii) identification of target reforms, (iv) designed mechanisms of intervention, (v) identification of a coalition of key stakeholders for implementation and (vi) conditions to undertake evaluation and adapt (World Bank, 2017).

Figure 3. Policy Effectiveness Cycle (World Development Report 2017)

Adopting the WDR framework, there are six questions for the analysis of the 3RF:

1. Has the 3RF identified functional problems[24] (commitment, coordination, cooperation) and how?

2. Has the 3RF identified the nature of power asymmetries (exclusion, capture, clientelism) in the Lebanese context and designed its platform accordingly? If yes, how?

3. Has the 3RF identified the most relevant entry points for reform (contestability, incentives, preferences, and beliefs)[25]? Which and how? For instance, in particular sectors, does the 3RF affect the policy arena and shape preferences/beliefs, create incentives, and widen contestability of those excluded?

4. What mechanisms for intervention have the 3RF prioritized (first-level rules, mid-level rules, high-level rules)[26]?

5. Is the 3RF supporting the building of a coalition of key stakeholders to support reform? Did the 3RF identify key stakeholders (elites, citizens,

---

[24] The WDR considers those three "Cs" as key institutional functions that determine whether policies are effective or not. The WDR suggests a diagnostic approach for identifying the functional problem based on these three Cs. The WDR defines commitment as "the consistency and continuity of policies over time", coordination as "the alignment of beliefs and preferences", and cooperation as "the voluntary compliance and absence of free-riding."

[25] The WDR argues that new governance actors can enter the policy-making environment to reshape the policy arena and to act as levers for political change. Existing constraints can be lifted by widening the contestability of the policy arena (e.g. by inviting new actors), by creating incentives for policy reform, and by shaping preferences and beliefs of actors.

[26] The WDR suggests three levels of rules to determine the potential of reform policies: The first-level rules (R1) relate to specific, sector-level policies, for example budget allocated to a certain sector. The midlevel rules (R2) are organizational forms, and the WDR provides the independency of the judiciary and central bank as an example for midlevel rules. High-level rules (R3) refer to "rules about changing rules", e.g. constitutional and electoral law. According to the WDR, some policies require reforms at all three levels in order to be effective.

international actors) and how?[27] How is the 3RF institutional structure

leveraging the CG to push for reforms?

6. Does the 3RF incorporate mechanisms of regular evaluation to help it

   adapt its institutional architecture in view of making reforms more

   effective?[28]

I will discuss my findings on the 3RF's institutional design and its potential to

disrupt path-dependency and initiate reforms by applying the concept of political

settlements as an analytical lens and using the Policy Effectiveness Cycle as an

assessment framework.

2.   *A Model for Assessment of CSO Engagement in the 3RF*

The 2010 UNDP User's Guide for CSO assessment reviewed existing civil

society assessment tools and identified five dimensions covered by most assessment

tools: capacity, engagement, environment, governance, and impact (UNDP, 2010). Given

that most existing assessment tools focus on capacity training and engagement – due to

the financial-led interests of donors – I could not identify useful frameworks to assess the

role of CSOs in ensuring accountability in a multi-stakeholder platform. Moreover, many

assessment tools have one of two flaws: They are either self-assessment tools and,

therefore, focus on individual CSOs, or they are external assessments following the logic

of donors' interest.

---

[27] The WDR emphasizes that the anticipation of opposition and unintended consequences is crucial. The WDR identifies three key stakeholders whose interests impact the implementation of reforms: Elites, citizens, and international actors. The WDR suggests two tactics to decrease the risk of reversal: "anticipation of changing balance of power around the reform process" and "adopting an adaptive approach, such as building coalitions in anticipation of reform."

[28] The WDR emphasizes that trajectories are not necessarily linear and assessment or evaluation is complex.

Therefore, based on the literature reviewed above, in particular Daly and Brassard's framework of multi-directional accountability, I identified three questions to assess the capacity of CSOs in the CG to hold donors and the government accountable and to determine the form of accountability that can be achieved by CSOs:

1) Are stakeholders of the 3RF provided with easy and free access to critical information (including plans, agendas, budgets, sources of funding, time frames, and expectations)?

2) Have the mutual responsibilities of stakeholders of the 3RF been clearly defined in written documents that have been shared and approved, through which roles, tasks, duties, and rights have been assigned, in ways to ensure the effectiveness, transparency, and accountability of the work?

3) Does the 3RF provide mechanisms of enforcement or sanctions?

Another interesting framework is the NEAR Localization Performance Measurement Framework which is a model to assess the degree of localization of aid and locally-led humanitarian action. The performance of localization focuses on 1) Partnerships; 2) Capacity; 3) Funding; 4) Coordination and 5) Policy, influence and visibility, 6) Participation (see. Figure 4). To assess the role of CSOs in the 3RF, and more specifically in the CG, I extracted three relevant questions from this framework:

1) Does the 3RF provide support for the institutional capacities of local CSOs?

2) Does the 3RF contribute to improve leadership and influence of local CSOs in this coordination mechanisms at the national or sectoral scale?

3) Does the 3RF increase the visibility of CSOs in policy discussions?

TABLE 1 NEAR LOCALISATION PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT FRAMEWORK	
LOCALISATION PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT FRAMEWORK	
Partnerships	More genuine and equitable partnerships, and less sub-contracting
Funding	Improvements in the quantity and quality of funding for local and national actors L/NA
Capacity	More effective support for strong and sustainable institutional capacities for L/NA, and less undermining of those capacities by INGOs/UN
Coordination and complementarity	Greater leadership, presence and influence of L/NA in humanitarian leadership and coordination mechanisms
Policy, influence and visibility	Increased presence of L/NA in international policy discussions and greater public recognition and visibility for their contribution to humanitarian response
Participation	Fuller and more influential involvement of crisis-affected people in what relief is provided to them, and how

Figure 4. NEAR Localization Performance Measurement Framework (Shabake, 2021)

CHAPTER III

LEBANON AND THE 3RF

A. **Multiple Crises**

1. *Beirut: Between the Port Explosion and Uprisings*

On August 4, 2020, an explosion in the Port of Beirut destroyed big parts of the port and damaged residential and commercial areas within a radius of five kilometers. More than 200 people were killed, 6,500 were injured, and 300,000 residents displaced in surrounding areas (World Bank Group, European Union, and United Nations, 2020b). 2,750 tons of improperly stored ammonium nitrate detonated in the port, causing the explosion, which is considered one of the strongest non-nuclear explosions ever recorded (Hernandez and Scarr, 2020). The explosion also exacerbated the trust crisis resulting from public institutions' inaction in delivering basic services and implementing reforms (World Bank Group, European Union, and United Nations, 2020b).

As the Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment conducted by the World Bank Group in cooperation with the European Union and the United Nations states, Lebanon faced multiple crises prior to the devastating blast in August 2020, including spillovers from the Syrian crisis resulting in Lebanon hosting the largest refugee per capita population in the world, the financial and economic crisis that became apparent in 2019, and the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic (World Bank Group, European Union, and United Nations, 2020a).

A year earlier, during the October 2019 uprising, people mobilized in mass protests addressing the unfolding financial crisis, the lack of governance reforms, and overall state negligence (International Crisis Group, 2020). According to a report by the International Crisis Report, odds for reforms are minimal for several reasons: Firstly, in

the past, the political elite thwarted reforms that could threaten their power and the self-reproducing sectarian system. Secondly, Lebanon witnessed several episodes of political deadlock since the end of the Civil War. Thirdly, government formation is often stalled – the most recent government formation in September 2021 followed thirteen months of political stalemate – meaning that Lebanon had a caretaker government for a substantial amount of time during the crisis. Fourthly, with upcoming parliamentary and presidential elections in May 2022, the time for the government formed in September 2021 to decide on reforms is minimal. Lastly, even if the current administration initiates overdue reforms, Prime Minister Mikati announced that he would leave the implementation of reforms to the next government. The formation of a new government will most likely, once again, take a substantial amount of time, which further decreases the probability of policy implementation, which is regularly delayed (International Crisis Group, 2021).

2. *Economic and Social Crisis*

The economic crisis in Lebanon that became apparent in October 2019 by a halt of capital inflows is categorized as one of the top 10, and most likely even one of the top three most severe crises globally since the nineteenth century (World Bank Group, 2021b). The World Bank labeled the economic crisis a "deliberate depression" due to the political elite's inaction to perform political reforms and economic stabilization (World Bank Group, 2020). Real GDP growth is estimated to have decreased by 20.3 % in 2020 (World Bank Group, 2021b). The Lebanese lira lost 90 % of its market value to date, and the inflation rates remain in the triple digits– causing a dramatic decline in the households' purchasing power (ESCWA, 2021).

The social impact of the economic crisis is severe: Due to the devaluation of the Lebanese lira and high inflation rates, more than half of the population now lives below

the poverty line (ESCWA, 2020). According to the World Food Program, 22 percent of the Lebanese face food insecurity (Khoury, 2021). When extending the indicators for poverty from the individual or household income levels to additional indicators in the areas of health care, medicines, services, education, employment, housing, and assets, a report by ESCWA found that the poverty rate of the Lebanese population reached 82 percent – meaning that 82 percent of the population are subjected to deprivation in one or more of these areas, regardless of their material resources or financial capacities to access substitutes to public services (ESCWA, 2021). The Deliberate Depression further undermines weak public services because, with increasing poverty rates, more people depend on public services as they can no longer afford private substitutes (World Bank Group, 2021b). With extreme poverty on the rise and the persistent erosion of state capacity, the International Crisis Group emphasized the importance of humanitarian aid not conditional on reforms to mitigate the economic crisis's impact and prevent further destabilization. This humanitarian aid includes direct assistance to the population and segments of the private sector, the operational maintenance of critical infrastructure, and assistance to security forces (International Crisis Group, 2021).

3. *Historizing Aid Allocation to Lebanon:*
   Donor Conferences and Humanitarian Response Plans

Over the past twenty years, the four major donor conferences for Lebanon: Paris I (2001), Paris II (2002), Paris III (2007), and CEDRE, also referred to as Paris IV (2018), were all conditional on implementing reforms. However, Lebanon has a poor track record for implementing these required reforms (Atallah, Mahmalat and Zoughaib, 2018, 2018; LCPS, 2020).

Lebanon witnessed a high influx of aid flows ever since the end of the Civil War (see figure 5). In the immediate post-civil war phase, foreign aid provided resources for reconstruction projects, whereas aid was channeled to Lebanon mainly for financial stabilization after 1997 (Dibeh, 2010). International donors' efforts also focused on institutional development within the public sector by providing technical assistance for several ministries, among which the Office of Minister of State for Administrative Reform (OMSAR) established in 1993 to rebuild administrative capacity (El-Zein and Sims, 2004).

Local NGOs as well as international organizations and international donors became prominent actors following the 2006 war and "citizens routinely turn to better organised and funded NGOs and overseas donors for social provision" (Mac Ginty and Hamieh, 2010) – resulting in a peak of aid allocation in 2008 (see figure 5).

Yet another increase of aid allocation to Lebanon following the Syrian crises (United Nations, 2021; OECD, no date a) exacerbated challenges like the lack of coordination among the actors involved (Ayoub and Mahdi, 2018). However, the Syrian crises also led to new dynamics in aid allocation: Instead of direct engagement with the Lebanese government like before, donors started to fund their own humanitarian agencies and organizations. Moreover, the increasing numbers of actors did not only emphasize the need for coordination, particularly among actors relying on similar sources of funding, but even "sparked competition between the government and civil society organization" (Ayoub and Mahdi, 2018).

Therefore, the increasing the volume of aid flows and the new composition of actors in humanitarian assistance emphasized the need for a better coordination of aid in Lebanon. As a response to the competition and fragmentation of actors, efforts for

coordination of humanitarian aid increased: the Lebanese Crisis Response Plan (LCRP) was issued in 2012 and the Lebanon Humanitarian Fund (LHF), a Country-Based Pooled Fund in 2014 by OCHA (OCHA, 2018). The Lebanese Crisis Response Plan was launched to coordinate the humanitarian response to the Syrian crisis bringing together more than 112 partner organizations in order to mitigate the impacts of the Syrian crisis. Implementation partners include humanitarian and development organizations and the Lebanese Government (United Nations and Government of Lebanon, 2021).[29]

The Emergency Response Plan (ERP) was launched in 2021, complementing the LCRP by supporting 1.1 million of the most vulnerable Lebanese and migrants affected by the crisis. The ERP is a time-bound, 12-month emergency plan developed under the leadership of the Humanitarian Coordinator and the Humanitarian Country Team in Lebanon in cooperation with the UN's Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the UN, and NGOs (OCHA, 2021).

---

[29] The LCRP aims to provide relief assistance to 1.9 million Syrian refugees, vulnerable Lebanese and Palestine refugees, and to deliver basic services to 2.5 million people (United Nations and Government of Lebanon, 2021).

Figure 5. Net official development assistance in US $ received by Lebanon 1960 – 2019 (World Bank Group, no date) based on data by the OECD

In sum, since the end of the Civil War, aid allocation increased and established donors as important political actors which is exacerbated by regular political stalemates and the inaction of the state. Attempts to enhance coordination among donors and (I)NGOs have resulted in two humanitarian coordination frameworks. In the aftermath of the Beirut Port Explosion, the international community emphasized the need for coordination in the disaster response, which includes relief and development aid. For this purpose, the European Union, the United Nations and the World Bank established the Reform, Recovery and Reconstruction Framework (3RF). However, before turning to the 3RF, I will present the landscape of civil society in Lebanon to trace how CSOs became an important stakeholder in humanitarian aid and development co-operation in Lebanon.

B.   Landscape of CSOs in Lebanon

Civil society, which is often called the third sector, is a popular, but contested concept which lacks a clear definition. Or, to borrow from (Edwards, 2013, p. 3), "civil society is one of the most enduring and confusing concepts in social science." Moreover, CSOs and NGOs are terms that are often used interchangeably, however, I understand civil society organizations as an umbrella term, which makes NGOs a subset of CSOs. In addition to NGOs, CSOs include community-based organizations, faith-based organizations, constituency-based organizations like trade unions and professional organizations, academic organizations, grassroots organizations and activist organizations (UNDP and Australia AID, 2013, p. 124).

Lebanon has one of the most active CSO landscapes in the MENA region – based on the number of registered civil society organizations and their activities (Kingston, 2013; Beyond Reform and Development, 2015). Since 2005, the CSO landscape in Lebanon has flourished. Several events resulted in the recurring revitalization of the NGO sector, such as the Cedar Revolution in 2005, the Israel-Hezbollah War in 2006, the Syrian refugee crisis in 2011, and most recently, the humanitarian response to the Beirut port explosion (Beyond Reform and Development, 2015; Clark and Zahar, 2015; Fawaz and Harb, 2020).

In Lebanon, NGOs "operate in a complex, pluralistic political environment marked by multiple sources of political legitimacy, authority, and sovereignty" (Nagel and Staeheli, 2015, p. 225). Many factors explain the fragmented landscape of NGOs in Lebanon. I discuss below three factors: 1) Absence of the state in service provision and lenient legislation, 2) sectarian political groups' and religious groups' reliance on NGOs to provide services to their constituents, 3) the aid regime and the ensuing

professionalization of NGOs, and their depoliticization. I then move to discussing the positioning of the CSOs within the 3RF platform.

1. *Absence of the State in Service Provision and Lenient Legislation*

In Lebanon, CSOs "fill the gap left by the absence of the state" (Haddad, 2017, p. 1757) ever since the civil war. According to the 2015 Beyond Reform and Development Report on CSOs, most CSOs fulfill functions of awareness-raising, capacity building, and service provision, whereas fewer CSOs work on policy development issues, and almost no CSOs work in advocacy or lobbying campaigns. The report found that 62 % of CSOs work at the national level, and 38 % are community-based CSOs. In terms of sectoral priorities, CSOs were active across a variety of sectors, with social development, health, education, human rights, and environment being the most prominent sectors for CSO engagement. In contrast, municipal services, urban planning, judicial development, technology, and entrepreneurship being the least prominent sectors (Beyond Reform and Development, 2015).

Lebanon provides an enabling legal environment for establishing CSOs due to a liberal Law of Associations (Beyond Reform and Development, 2015; Clark and Zahar, 2015). However, once established, the lack of a legal framework for CSOs to operate reduces their efficiency (Haddad, 2017). Despite the legislation facilitating the establishment of CSOs, in practice, public institutions often control, repress and co-opt NGOs (Clark and Zahar, 2015, p. 15). Therefore, Lebanese legislation further fragments the NGO landscape.

2. CSOs' Alignment with Political and Religious Groups

Moreover, CSOs are affected by the deep socio-political divisions in Lebanon and even sustain and reproduce these divisions (Kingston, 2013). This claim aligns with findings that sectarian elites penetrate, besiege, or co-opt Lebanese CSOs due to their recursive relation (Clark and Salloukh, 2013) or met with counter-narratives and repression by the government and sectarian elites aiming to demobilize them (Geha, 2019). Since 2005, the NGO landscape transformed from the dominance of community-based associations to interest-based associations (Clark and Zahar, 2015).

Thus, many researchers distinguish al-mujtama al-ahli from al-mujtama al madani – pointing to the differences between CSOs based on kinship and sectarian ties and those based on social movements and other forms of activism (Clark and Salloukh, 2013; Beyond Reform and Development, 2015). Clark and Zahar (2015) suggest the category of alternative NGOs (ANGOs) to express the emergence of non-sectarian, non-political NGOs which challenge the sectarian system and seek structural change. However, the power asymmetry between ANGOs and sectarian political stakeholders impeded structural change (Clark and Zahar, 2015).

Another indication for the fragmentation of Lebanon's civil society is the tensions among (non-sectarian) social movements and activists: They are divided between "structural approaches to crisis that advocate placing them within their macro-political context, and reformist tendencies that focus on achieving incremental wins" (Khneisser, 2020, p. 364).

3. Professionalization and Depoliticization

Besides sectarian politics, international donors and their political-strategic interests impact NGOs. Jeffrey (2012) describes the influence of donors on local CSO landscapes

as "gentrification of civil society," which leads to the institutionalization and professionalization of local NGOs according to the Western framework of donors. In Lebanon, NGOs are "frequently too professionalized, […] if not depoliticized by donors' agendas" (Harb, 2018, p. 90). Sukarieh and Tannock (2015) showcase the professionalization of NGOs and development programs targeting youth and argue that both rhetoric and funding thwart structural change by reinforcing neoliberal policy responses. Scholars criticize the neoliberal approach to NGOs at the expense of their democratic value (Duffield, 2001; Eikenberry and Kluver, 2004) which disconnects them from the community's needs (Kamat, 2004; Arda and Banerjee, 2019), referring to the global ongoing process of NGO-ization as "privatization from below" (Petras, 1999: 432). Similarly, studies on Palestine and Haiti reveal that donors imposed decision-making processes of aid architecture and professionalized and therefore depoliticized NGOs (Jad, 2007; Taghdisi-Rad, 2011; Arda and Banerjee, 2019). Still others criticize NGO-ization as a new form of colonialism (Choudry and Kapoor, 2013) and dependency on donors (Beisheim, Ellersiek and Lorch, 2018).[30]

In the case of Lebanon, Nagel and Staeheli (2015) suggest that Western geopolitical interests lead to the funding of Lebanese CSOs that aims at democracy and citizenship promotion based on a Western understanding. Increasing amounts of aid allocated to local NGOs to foster Lebanon's civil society led to the mushrooming of CSOs in Lebanon (Nagel and Staeheli, 2015). Those NGOs which receive funding from donors are often more institutionally consolidated organizations at the expense of smaller NGOs,

---

[30] Another criticism underscores how NGOs have the same pitfalls like other governance actors and aid recipients as they only promote short-term projects (Srinivas, 2009) and lack accountability and representation (Unerman and O'Dwyer, 2006). Finally, NGO-ization can further weaken state structures and undermine state-building (Dietrich, 2013).

which are better connected to the communities and their needs (Facon, 2021). Still, even NGOs with higher capacity are subjected to donors' interests (Facon, 2021).

In the past, Western donors even reinforced the sectarian status quo by funding sectarian-affiliated NGOs instead of supporting ANGOs/NGOs that challenge the sectarian system (Clark and Zahar, 2015).

In Lebanon, the low direct allocation of funds to NGOs or INGOs further reinforces the capacity gap of NGOs (Facon, 2021), and other modes of funding – e.g., by the diaspora – cannot meet the needs either (Fawaz and Harb, 2020).

In sum, due to lenient legislation, there are many CSOs in Lebanon, and their profile is diverse across sectors. Many are aligned on political and religious groups that delegate service provision to them. Additionally, many CSOs have become depoliticized and dependent on donors' agendas and compete over funding. As a result of these multiple forces, the CSO landscape in Lebanon is fragmented. The aftermath of the Beirut port explosion and its humanitarian response accelerated the establishment of new NGOs and prompted existing NGOs to expand their mandate in response to the post-blast needs. The profile of the NGOs involved in the post-blast recovery is diverse, including NGOs affiliated with political figures, FBOs, and humanitarian-developmental NGOs distancing themselves from religious or political affiliations (Fawaz and Harb, 2020). I will discuss the CSOs engaged in post-blast response in more details later. Now I will present the Reform, Recovery and Reconstruction Framework.

C.   The Reform, Recovery and Reconstruction Framework (3RF)

1.   *Making of*

The Lebanon Reform, Recovery and Reconstruction Framework (3RF) was established by the United Nations, the European Union, and the World Bank in December

2020 in response to the explosion on the Port of Beirut on August 4, 2020. Unlike previous aid coordination frameworks like the ERP, the 3RF is not humanitarian in nature, but aid allocation is conditional on reforms. For financing, the UN, EU, and WB also established the multi-trust fund, the Lebanese Financing Facility (LFF), which serves as one primary source of financing for the 3RF. As a mechanism for pooled grant funding, the LFF aims at strengthening the coherence and coordination of financing to address short-and medium-term recovery, reform, and reconstruction priorities.

In terms of financing, the 3RF follows a two-track approach: The first, people-centered track aims to address immediate recovery and urgent needs, particularly of the most vulnerable groups, and is funded by international grant financing conditional on light reforms. The funding for the second reform and reconstruction track, through concessional loans and private finance, depends on implementing essential reforms and macroeconomic stabilization (World Bank Group, European Union, and United Nations, 2020b).

The set-up of the 3RF is based on the Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment conducted by the World Bank Group in cooperation with the European Union and the United Nations between August 5 and August 31, 2020. The objective of the RDNA was to estimate the impact of the blast on the population, infrastructure, service delivery, and physical damages through rigorous ground data collection. Additionally, the RDNA team invited more than 300 stakeholders from public institutions, civil society, NGOs, INGOs, professional organizations, private sector organizations, think tanks, youth groups, donors, and UN Agencies in more than 40 Stakeholder Feedback and Engagement Meetings between August 17 and 21, 2020, to ensure representation and community outreach (World Bank Group, European Union, and United Nations, 2020a). The RDNA

identified needs and priorities for recovery and reconstruction in 16 sectors affected by the blast (World Bank Group, European Union, and United Nations, 2020a).[31]

Based on the RDNA, 3RF priorities for each sector were structured around four strategic pillars: (i) governance and accountability; (ii) economics opportunities and job creation; (iii) services and infrastructure (namely: housing and urban services, and the rebuilding of the port); and (iv) social protection, inclusion, and culture (World Bank Group, European Union, and United Nations, 2020b). The 3RF primarily addresses reconstruction and recovery at the scale of Beirut, but some reforms scale up to the national level (World Bank Group, European Union, and United Nations, 2020b).

---

[31] Macroeconomic Impact; 5 Social Sectors: Housing; Health; Education; Culture; and Social Protection and Jobs; 4 Infrastructure Sectors: Transport and Port; Energy; Water Supply and Sanitation; and Municipal Services; 3 Productive and Financial Sectors: Commerce and Industry; Financial; and Tourism; 3 Cross-cutting Sectors: Governance; Social Sustainability and Inclusion; and Environment.

4 August 2020	Beirut Port Explosion
5 August–31 August 2020	Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment (RDNA)
10 August 2020	Resignation of Lebanese Prime Minister Diab
4 December 2020	Launch of the 3RF / LFF
10 February 2021	Launch: Call for Expression of Interest (CSOs CG)
23 February 2021	Deadline: Expression of Interest
	Appointment of CSOs for the CG
31 March 2021	1st Consultative Group Meeting
28 April 2021	Launch: Call for Expression of Interest of Civil Society in the Independent Oversight Board of the 3RF
29 April 2021	B5 Fund endorsed by Partnership Council of the LFF
12 May 2021	Deadline: Expression of Interest of Civil Society in the Independent Oversight Board of the 3RF
3 June 2021	Appointment of CSOs in the Independent Oversight Board of the 3RF
27 July 2021	2nd Consultative Group Meeting
5 August 2021	B5 Fund signed
10 September 2021	Formation of new Lebanese Government (Mikati Administration)
11 November 2021	Launch of B5
16 November 2021	3rd Consultative Group Meeting
4 April 2022	4th Consultative Group Meeting and start of second rotation

Figure 6. Timeline of the 3RF. Own representation based on (World Bank Group, European Union, and United Nations, 2020b, 2020a).

2.   *Institutional Architecture*

The institutional structure of the 3RF comprises four units (see figure 7): (i) a Technical Team and Secretariat, (ii) a Consultative Group (including representatives of the government, international donors, NGOs/CSOs, and the private sector), (iii) an

Independent Oversight Body led by civil society, and iv) a Steering Committee, also known as Partnership Council, which simultaneously serves as the governing body of the LFF to ensure that financing aligns with the 3RF's prioritization. In addition to those four institutional bodies, the 3RF document mentions working groups at the sector level.


Figure 7. Institutional Architecture of the 3RF (World Bank Group, European Union, and United Nations, 2020b)

In the following, I briefly discuss the mandate of the four units in the 3RF and of the sector working groups.

a. Technical Team/Secretariat

The Technical Team comprised of EU, UN and World Bank officials guides and coordinates the work of the Secretariat. The Secretariat supports the institutional arrangements and facilitates the 3RF implementation. Therefore, the Secretariat and the Technical Team promote technical coordination at all levels of the 3RF, e.g. by

scheduling and following up on meetings. Members of the Technical Team also facilitate the selection of CSOs for the Consultative Group and the Independent Oversight Board, as well as the membership of donors in the Consultative Group. In the initial phase, thee Technical Team performed mainly as the coordination unit for the 3RF until a distinct Secretariat was established in June 2021 that facilitates the coordination between the stakeholders.[32]

b. Independent Oversight Board

The civil-society-led Independent Oversight Board monitors the 3RF and is supposed to ensure transparency and accountability, e.g. by providing broad oversight on 3RF implementation and holding 3RF stakeholders accountable for the progress of the 3RF. The IOB's main functions include: assessing the implementation of guiding principles of the 3RF (inclusion, leave no one behind etc.), monitoring the implementation of the 3RF (in particular following up on policy recommendations by the CG), reporting on the 3RF, and promoting citizen engagement in the 3RF. The CSOs Kulluna Irada, Lebanese Transparency Association (LTA), and Maharat were selected for the first rotation of the IOB. In February 2022, the call for expression of interest for the second rotation was closed (European Union, World Bank Group, and United Nations, 2022) and three additional CSOs were selected: ALDIC, CLDH, Nusaned.

c. Partnership Council

The composition of the Steering Committee includes the EU, UN and World Bank which also take the role as co-chairs, high level representatives of donors with

---

[32] Key Informant Interview

pledges over $5 million to the LFF, Lebanese authorities and civil society/private sector with 2-3 representatives respectively.[33] NGOs/CSOs will implement selected activities funded by the LFF through intermediary agencies like INGOs which meet the World Bank's fiduciary standards and which then provide grants to local NGOs and CSOs (World Bank, 2021).

d. Consultative Group

The Consultative Group is a tripartite forum for coordination and dialogue between the Lebanese Government[34], civil society and the private sector[35], and development partners[36]. It is co-chaired by the Prime Minister, the UN Resident Coordinator, a donor representative (from the European Union), and a CSO representative.

The Consultative Group's mandate is 1) to provide strategic guidance for the implementation of the 3RF; 2) ensure strategic coordination, harmonization, and alignment of resources to 3RF priorities; 3) review and monitor progress in implementation; 4) communicate results and advocate for strategic initiatives in support of the 3RF.

---

[33] The LHDF, Green Mind and KAFA have a seat in the Partnership Council. On May 12, 2022, LHDF, LLWB and ALI were selected as representatives for the Partnership Council for the second rotation. Email Exchange, 12.05.2022

[34] 9 seats for Government representatives, including President Office representative, Prime Minister or his or her designate (Co-Chair), Deputy Prime Minister, 3 representatives from line Ministries, Beirut Governorate representative, 2 parliament representatives.

[35] 9 seats for CSO and private sector representatives, including 3 representatives of INGO and NGO (preferably umbrella organizations), 4 local civil society representatives, 2 representatives of business associations/professional associations – due to rotational system additional seats (see 1.2.3. below).

[36] United Nations Resident Coordinator (co-chair), European Union (co-chair), World Bank Group, representatives of the donor community and International Financing Institutions.

Even though the Terms of Reference state that Consultative Group Meetings should be held bi-monthly in the initial phase, after which they should be scheduled on a quarterly basis, only four Consultative Group meetings took place since the launch of the 3RF in December 2020: the first on 31st March 2021, the second on 27th July 2021, and third on 16th November 2021, and the fourth on 4th April 2022.

According to the Terms of Reference, the decision-making in the Consultative Group is by consensus – and the co-chairs take a facilitating role to build consensus ('3RF Consultative Group Terms of Reference', 2021)

e. Sector Working Groups

In addition to the four units of the 3RF, the platform aims to leverage existing coordination efforts in the form of Sector Working Groups (SWGs). Sector Working Groups aim to share knowledge and strengthen the coordination and coherence across programs and sectors on 3RF priorities, which build upon the sectors identified in the RDNA (World Bank Group, European Union, and United Nations, 2020b). Following a stock-taking of existing sector coordination structures that was conducted by the three principal organizations and supported by CSOs, the 3RF worked towards formalizing fourteen sector working groups for the implementation of projects within the 3RF framework in October 2021 (see Figure 8).[37] There are differences between the sector working groups in two regards: formalization and involvement of different stakeholders.

In terms of formalization, some of those sector working groups build on existing sector coordination; some were already launched; yet others are not launched yet. In terms of involvement, some sector working groups additionally include CSOs without a seat in

---

[37] Expert interview IC 02, 09.12.2021and Email Exchange, 08.10.2021

the CG, some are more driven by the three principal organizations. Moreover, the sector working groups aim to enhance the coordination between public agencies and CSOs at the sector-level. Therefore, representatives from public institutions and ministries are supposed to join the sector working groups.[38]

	Working Group
Pillar: Improving Governance and Accountability	
1	Anti-Corruption Coordination Group (for 1.1 and 1.2 of 3RF)
2	Rule of Law working group (for 1.3 3RF)
Jobs and Economic Opportunities	
3	Private Sector (for 2.1, 2.2. and 2.3)
Social Protection, Inclusion and Culture	
4	Social Protection (3.1)
5	Social Inclusion and Gender (3.2)
6	Culture (3.3)
Improving Services and Infrastructure	
7	Housing (4.1)
8	Municipal services (4.3)
9	Port (4.2)
10	Electricity (4.3)
11	Environment (4.3)
12	Education (4.4)
13	Health (4.4)
14	Water (4.4)

Figure 8. 3RF Sector Working Groups under the four pillars, Source: Email by 3RF Technical Team/Secretariat

According to the Terms of Reference for the Sector Coordination[39], the sector working groups will be collaboratively led by a sector lead and a co-lead from among the three partner organizations (UN, EU, WB) who report to the 3RF Secretariat/Technical Team and regularly call for meetings (on a monthly basis) to review and advance the sector agenda. These meetings will be open to 3RF stakeholders (Lebanese Government, CSOs/private sector, donors), but the leads are responsible for inviting at least one

---

[38] Expert interview IC 02, 09.12.2021 and Email Exchange, 08.10.2021

[39] There are ToRs for all sector working groups, but each sector working group can additionally define sector-specific ToRs.

representative of CSOs and the Lebanese government in the working group ('3RF Sector Coordination Terms of Reference', 2021).

The sector working group's primary functions are 1) promoting and leading sector work in line with 3RF guiding principles and sector priorities, 2) establishing and maintaining sectoral coordination and communication tools, 3) facilitating regular dialogue on 3RF priorities in the sector, as well as monitoring and reporting on progress against the backdrop of 3RF priorities, in particular prior to Consultative Group Meetings ('3RF Sector Coordination Terms of Reference', 2021).

To conclude, the 3RF is an innovative new design for a country platform because it allocates space to CSOs on several scales: The Consultative Group institutionalizes the advisory role of CSOs for strategic guidance and policy dialogues at the high-level. Moreover, CSOs consult about sector-specific commitments of the 3RF and their implementation through the expansion, combination or establishment of sector working groups. While CSOs contribute to tracking the progress on commitments in the sector working groups, the Independent Oversight Board is another mechanism for broad oversight on 3RF implementation and to hold 3RF stakeholders accountable for 3RF progress. Lastly, the multi-trust fund LFF will provide grants to CSOs for the implementation of selected activities.

As my thesis focuses on the consultative role of CSOs in the 3RF, I will now present the composition of the Consultative Group.

D. CSOs in the Consultative Group of the 3RF

The 3RF Technical Team/Secretariat created three categories to group CSOs that expressed interest and were selected for the CG: 1) national and international NGOs

(umbrella organizations and networks), 2) civil society or community-based organizations or initiatives (citizen-based initiatives, academic initiatives, think tanks, advocacy organizations like gender/women's rights, inclusion, human rights, etc.), and 3) professional and business organizations or private sector associations (see figure 9).

The CG includes nine seats for a total of 16 CSOs – two of them are fixed seats held by the Lebanese League for Women in Business (LLWB) and Kafa. The remaining seven seats are held by fourteen CSOs which rotate after the first year. The fourteen CSOs sharing the seven rotational seats are the Lebanon Humanitarian & Development NGOs Forum (LHDF)/Lebanon Humanitarian INGO Forum (LHIF)[40]; Association of Lebanese Industrialists (ALI)/the Beirut Order of Engineers and Architects (OEA); the Society Saint Vincent de Paul (SSVP)/Live Love Lebanon; Green Mind/arcenciel; the Beirut Urban Lab (BUL)/Beirut Heritage Initiative (BHI); Lebanese Union for People with Physical Disabilities (LUPD)/Khaddit Beirut; and ALDIC/Lebanese Center for Human Rights (CLDH).

---

[40] LHIF announced to remain an observer in the CG and to hand over the representation role during the second rotation to LHDF "to ensure continuity of broad-based representation for local NGOs on the 3RF" because it is "essential to preserve the voice of local civil society with government interlocutors and the international donor community" in times of crises. (Email Exchange, 07.02.2022)

Category I: *National and international NGOs*		
First rotation	**Second rotation**	**Specificity**
Lebanon Humanitarian & Development NGOs Forum (LHDF)	Lebanon Humanitarian INGO Forum (LHIF)	Umbrella association/representativity, local and international NGOs – Umbrella association/representativity, international NGOs
Society Saint Vincent de Paul (SSVP)	Live Love Lebanon	Community-based NGO/social focus on most vulnerable and social justice – Community-based volunteering/youth
Green Mind	arcenciel	Environment/climate action/women leadership/advocacy – Services/sustainable development/inclusion/advocacy
Category II: *Civil society or community-based organizations or initiatives*		
First rotation	**Second rotation**	**Specificity**
Beirut Urban Lab (BUL)	Beirut Heritage Initiative (BHI)	Academic initiative/Beirut focus/ policy/inclusion/advocacy – Beirut focus/citizen/sector, technical
Lebanese Union for People with Physical Disabilities (LUPD)	Khaddit Beirut	Disability/inclusion/policy/advocacy - Academic initiative/Beirut focus/CE (community-based volunteering)/youth
KAFA	KAFA	Women's rights/gender equality/violence against women/advocacy and support/inclusion
ALDIC	Lebanese Center for Human Rights (LCHR)	Reforms and business recovery/strategic advice and advocacy – Human Rights/ Advocacy/policy
Category III: *Professional and business organizations*		
First rotation	**Second rotation**	**Specificity**
Lebanese League for Women in Business (LLWB)	Lebanese League for Women in Business (LLWB)	Gender/Business representativity/business recovery/advocacy/community development
Association of Lebanese Industrialists (ALI)	Order of Engineers and Architects	Economic/Expertise/representativity – Professional/technical/representativity

Figure 9. CSOs in the 3RF's Consultative Group based on internal 3RF document

These sixteen CSOs were selected from more than 50 CSOs that applied to a call of interest. This call of interest specified five criteria for applications: representation, expertise, track record, capacity, inclusion, and non-partisanship. Below, I present briefly the sixteen CSOs represented in the CG (Figure 10). I will discuss the selection and composition of the CG in more detail later.

To conclude, the design of the 3RF is innovative and accommodates the political reality in Lebanon in two ways: First, the two-track approach combines the immediate response to urgent needs and recovery with financing for reconstruction which is

conditional on extensive reforms. Second, the institutionalization of CSOs at the high-level policy dialogues is a response to the high human capital of CSOs in Lebanon and to the mistrust in the Government. In the following, I will discuss the 3RF's design and institutional structures in more detail by analyzing its potential to initiate reform and by examining the contribution of CSOs to the 3RF.

	Sector	Establish-ment	Mission Statement	Rotation in 3RF	Category in 3RF
ALDIC	business recovery, governance https://www.aldic.net	2012	The Lebanese Association for Taxpayers' Rights and Interests (ALDIC) aims to promote tax ethics and inform citizens and taxpayers about their rights and obligations in taxation. ALDIC aims to facilitate communication between citizens and tax administrations and promote good governance through "the modernization of Lebanese institutions and existing legal frameworks. ALDIC aims to establish structures that permit better control of the management of funds and protection against all forms of misappropriation or misuse of power."	1st	*Civil society*
Arcenciel	multiple sectors, including the environment, economy, and socio-culture https://www.arcenciel.org	1985	In general, arcenciel promotes the social and economic integration of marginalized people and communities into society and aims to change discriminatory national policies. According to its mission statement, arcenciel aims to "promote diversity, integration, and development through 5 core programs: Agriculture & Environment, Mobility & Health, Responsible Tourism, Youth Empowerment, and Social Support". These five programs are implemented at 12 centers across Lebanon.	2nd	*National NGO*
Association of Lebanese Industrialists (ALI)	Private sector, local businesses http://www.ali.org.lb/	1942	According to the mission state, ALI aims "to protect and promote the interests of Lebanese Industry, vis-à-vis the national, local, regional, and international governments, authorities, and institutions." As the leading industrial lobby group in Lebanon, ALI promotes "an environment favorable to business in the context of a competitive market economy." ALI represents Lebanese industry in public institutions like the Parliament and Trade Unions and participates in policy-making consultations. ALI's objective includes accelerating structural reform of Lebanon's labor market, including the internationalization of Lebanese SMEs.	1st	*Professional and business organizations*
Beirut Heritage Initiative (BHI)	Urban planning, culture, and heritage https://beirutheritageinitiative.com	2020	According to its mission statement, the Beirut Heritage Initiative is an "independent and inclusive collective working on restoring the built and cultural heritage of Beirut affected by the August 4, 2020 Blast" (BHI website). BHI follows a 3-phase strategy in response to the Beirut Port Explosion, which includes emergency propping and sheltering of	2nd	*Civil society/ community-based initiative*

			houses, partial repairs and full restorations, and a vision for urban regeneration. BHI aims to create synergies between local and international stakeholders involved in the reconstruction process and publishes restoration manuals to set standards for restoration.		
Beirut Urban Lab (BUL)	Urban planning, housing, culture, and heritage https://www.beiruturbanlab.com/en/	2018	The Beirut Urban Lab is a collaborative, interdisciplinary academic initiative established in the Maroun Semaan Faculty of Engineering and Architecture (MSFEA) at AUB. The Beirut Urban Lab was founded in 2018 as a research-activist initiative, and it builds on a long history of urban research initiatives since 2006. The mission statement reads that the Beirut Urban Lab aims to contribute to "an ecosystem of change empowered by critical inquiry and engaged research, and driven by committed urban citizens and collectives aspiring to just, inclusive, and viable cities"	1st	*Civil society /academic initiative*
Greenmind	Environment https://qoe.nqd.mybluehost.me/greenmind/	2012	Greenmind was established in 2012 and aims to promote sustainable social and economic practices in the MENA region. Greenmind follows an approach of awareness-raising and advocacy to mainstream good green practices. Greemind created the Green Mind Award, which is awarded to companies from the public and private sector or other organizations and individuals committed to sustainability and good environmental practices.	1st	*National NGO*
Kafa	Women's rights and gender equality https://kafa.org.lb/en/	2005	KAFA (enough) Violence & Exploitation is a "Lebanese civil, non-governmental, non-profit, feminist, and secular organization" that seeks to end gender-based violence and exploitation. It follows multiple approaches: advocacy for law reforms, awareness-raising and influencing public opinion, conducting research and training, and providing social, legal, and psychological support for women and children victims of violence. Kafa works in four fields of action: 1) domestic violence unit follows a double approach of awareness-raising and legal campaigns. 2) KAFA's Anti-Trafficking and Exploitation Unit is dedicated to protecting sexual exploitation and trafficking and forced domestic work, 3) KAFA Child Protection Program, and 4) a support center for social, legal, and psychological support.	1st and 2nd	*Civil society / community-based organization*
Khaddit Beirut	multiple sectors, including education, community health, environment, local businesses https://khadditbeirut.com	2020	The grassroots and academic initiative seeks to apply an "agile, evidence-based, inclusive, and holistic approach driven by local needs, accountable to people, and focused on sustainable solutions in the areas of community health, education, environmental health, and local business."	2nd	*Civil society /community-based volunteering /academic initiative*
Lebanese Center for	Human rights	2006	The Lebanese Center for Human Rights (LHCR/CLDH) is a human rights organization	2nd	*Civil society*

Human Rights (LCHR)	http://www.rightsobserver.org		created by the Franco-Lebanese Movement SOLIDA (Support for Lebanese Detained Arbitrarily). CLDH focuses on monitoring the human rights situation in Lebanon and fights enforced disappearance, impunity, arbitrary detention, and racism, and rehabilitates victims of torture. CLDH organizes press conferences, workshops, campaigns, and advocacy meetings on human rights issues and researches and documents human rights abuses in Lebanon in reports. Besides awareness-raising and advocacy, CLDH offers legal and psychological support in their Rehabilitation Center for torture victims in Beirut, Centre Nassim. CLDH is part of a network with various international and regional organizations, including FEMED (Euro-Mediterranean Federation against Enforced Disappearance), RREMDH Euro-Mediterranean Network of Human Rights, OMCT SOS Torture Network of the World Organization against Torture, IRCT (International Rehabilitation Council for Torture victims) and FIDH (International Federation of Human Rights). Moreover, CLDH regularly coordinates with the United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Detention WGAD and the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture.		*/ research initiative*
Lebanese League for Women in Business (LLWB)	Women's representation, private sector, business recovery https://llwb.org	2006	The Lebanese League for Women in Business (LLWB) was founded in 2006 as a professional association that provides a platform to professional women for "sharing experiences, developing competencies and skills, establishing networks and exchanging expertise, accessing funds and mentorship." LLWB implements its activities in the four pillars good governance, business and members' development, advocacy, and community development. By facilitating women in business to "take the lead and succeed" and by increasing the number of women impacting Lebanon's economic development, LLWB aims to promote gender equality in Lebanon.	1st and 2nd	*Professional and business organizations*
Lebanese Union for People with Physical Disabilities (LUPD)	Social inclusion, people with disabilities http://lphu.com	1981	LUPD is a grassroots organization that aims to defend the rights of people with disabilities and to ensure that they have access to equal opportunities and basic needs. LUPD follows approaches of awareness-raising and advocacy to end marginalization and discrimination of people with disabilities and to ensure their inclusion and participation in society.	1st	*Civil society /community-based organization*
Lebanon Humanitarian & Development NGOs Forum (LHDF)	Umbrella organization for local NGOs https://www.lhdf-lb.org/en/	2014	Lebanon Humanitarian & Development NGOs Forum (LHDF) was established by Lebanese NGOs in the humanitarian sector in the context of the Syrian crisis. LHDF aims to improve the coordination between local NGOs and between local NGOs and external stakeholders to respond to humanitarian and development needs. LHDF's mandate particularly includes consensus-building among local NGOs. The	1st	*National and international NGOs / umbrella organization*

			strategies of LHDF include awareness-raising advocacy, coordination and information management, capacity-building, among others. The LHDF facilitates the representation of local NGOs with public entities, donors, the international community, and other external stakeholders.		
Lebanon Humanitarian INGO Forum (LHIF)	Umbrella organization for INGOs http://www.lhif.org	2012	The Humanitarian INGO Forum (LHIF) was created in 2012 as a coordinating body for 60 INGOs working in the humanitarian sector. It was established as a response to the Syrian Refugee Crisis in Lebanon, but it expanded its initially humanitarian mandate to facilitate overall coordination between INGOs. The LHIF aims to promote coordination among its member organizations to increase effectiveness. Moreover, LHIF advocates for shared positions and a consistent voice. The LHIF facilitates the representation of INGOs with external stakeholders and in leadership bodies, e.g., at the Lebanon Crisis Response Plan (LCRP).	2nd	*National and international NGOs / umbrella organization*
Live Love Lebanon	multiple sectors like governance, environment, culture, and in particular, youth https://livelove.org	2012	Live Love Lebanon was established in 2012 and promotes positive narratives to engage citizens in solution-finding for environmental and social problems. Live Love focuses on awareness-raising through social media. Live Love works in three realms: nature, society, and culture. Live Love has a network with partners from both the public and private sectors. Live Love targets the youth in particular.	2nd	*Community-based NGO /volunteering*
Order of Engineers and Architects	Professional syndicate https://www.oea.org.lb/ (in Arabic only)	1951	According to the mission statement, the syndicate seeks to raise the status of the engineering profession, and it plays a key role in the legislative and regulatory affairs related to the profession. The mission statement of the Order of Engineers and Architects also states that its mission is not limited to professional issues only but also includes administrative, social, and educational issues, e.g., through its pension fund and educational training.	2nd	*Professional and business organizations*
Society Saint Vincent de Paul (SSVP)	Social inclusion and social justice https://stvincentlb.org	1860	Society Saint Vincent de Paul (SSVP) in Lebanon was established in 1860 with the stated objective "to provide assistance to the poorer and supply them with their most urgent needs." SSVP works in the "spiritual, social, medical, educational, recreational and development" field. As a Christian charity organization, its original branch was founded in 1833 by Catholic laymen.	1st	*community-based NGO*

Figure 10. Profile of civil society represented in the 3RF's Consultative Group. Author's own representation based on organizations' websites, Daleel Madani, and internal 3RF documents.

73

CHAPTER IV

3RF'S INSTITUTIONAL ARCHITECTURE –
ADAPTIVE AND EFFECTIVE ARRANGEMENTS?

The institutional architecture of the 3RF includes some of the adaptive and effective arrangements discussed previously that can serve to disrupt path dependency. In this section, I will discuss first the context-specific considerations that informed the aid architecture of the 3RF and I will present adaptive and effective arrangements, or the lack thereof. Secondly, I will discuss four case studies where the 3RF serves as a window of opportunity for reforms.

I argue that the principal organizations considered context-specific challenges arising from the political system in Lebanon when designing the 3RF, but did not sufficiently address power asymmetries and institutional bottlenecks that impede reform.

A.   Designing the 3RF: Context-specific Considerations

The Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment (RDNA) study describes Lebanon as a "dysfunctional and hollowed out state" and mentions elite capture as "hidden behind the veil of confessionalism and confessional governance" (World Bank Group, European Union, and United Nations, 2020a, p. 15). Moreover, the RDNA concludes that the government has failed to implement structural and sectoral reforms that has been conditional for aid in the past. The study also emphasizes citizens' distrust in the political and economic system, resulting in a crisis of legitimacy (World Bank Group, European Union, and United Nations, 2020a, p. 15). To address this crisis of legitimacy, the RDNA proposes two approaches to widen contestability and incorporate new stakeholders into the policy arena. One is the "whole of Lebanon approach," which seeks to include

representatives from government, civil society, private sector, activist groups, think tanks, academia, and international community. The other is the "building back better approach," which aims to indicate the political will for transformative change because "ignoring the underlying drivers that have contributed to the tragedy would lead to continued crises and lost momentum towards meaningful change" (World Bank Group, European Union, and United Nations, 2020a, p. 16).

Interestingly, the RDNA describes the explosion as a "wake-up call for rapid and systematic change" and refers to the current political moment as a "critical junction" – echoing a language commonly used in literature on path-dependency as we saw earlier (World Bank Group, European Union, and United Nations, 2020a, p. 16). In other words, the RDNA makes a diagnosis of the political issues and, thus, considers the political settlement in place. Consequently, the RDNA's context-specific recommendations[41] for the set-up of a recovery platform operates as a "non-traditional model that relies more heavily on NGOs and civil society (…) bearing in mind the need in the long-term to strengthen Lebanese State capacities and roll back elite State capture." (World Bank Group, European Union, and United Nations, 2020a, p. 19).

One interviewee from the international community indicated that the nature of the disaster also determined the new approach, because neither a post-conflict nor a post-disaster framework could be applied: "You try to focus on those issues that also respond to some of the causes of the conflict and not only address the consequences. And this

---

[41] One interlocutor described that post-disaster and post-conflict needs assessment "used to be considered as an end by themselves" but that the tripartite effort between the World Bank, the EU and the UN that started in 2012 established a new way of thinking "how these assessments can be not just end by themselves, but they can be a means towards helping the key stakeholders, the owners, especially the local owners to work on the same page when it comes to humanitarian efforts, early recovery, medium to long term recovery and reconstruction." (Expert interview IC 01, 29.11.2021)

basic principle, we applied to Lebanon, it's, of course, not a post conflict transition, but it's not just a simple natural disaster, because a lot of the causes for the explosion are rooted in Lebanon's fragility and nature of its political settlement."[42] Similarly, when asked about the consultations during the RDNA, interlocutors from the international community stated: "We cannot come up with a framework which is doing business as usual. We have to come up with a framework which is different and which gives enough ownership to the people, to the local level. And let me say the local level, it comprises citizens, civil society, NGOs, academia, think tanks, but also the local level of the state in which in this case it can be the municipality or the subnational level, which is the governorate."[43]

Indeed, the 3RF Report states clearly that regaining the trust of Lebanese citizens in government institutions is a critical requirement for the recovery and stresses the need for the government to take responsibility. One interlocutor emphasized the citizens' lack of trust in the government in the aftermath of the port explosion, but also in general, as it became evident during the Uprisings in October 2019.[44] The 3RF also underscores that "Lebanon needs to adopt a new governance model that breaks the capture of political elites over state institutions and ensures that these institutions serve people's needs and can respond to the crises the country faces." Therefore, the platform stresses the need for "a different way of working" and a "collaborative process that is based on the participation of the government, civil society, the private sector as well as development partners" (World Bank Group, European Union, and United Nations, 2020b, p. 14).

---

[42] Expert interview IC 08, 28.01.2022

[43] Expert interview IC 01, 29.11.2021

[44] Expert interview IC 06, 24.01.2022

Likewise, several interlocutors from the international community emphasized how the design of the 3RF took elite capture and the lack of reforms into account by introducing the two-track system that includes conditionality for reconstruction but also enables support in the early recovery.[45] Moreover, they emphasized the discrepancy between high human capital in terms of CSOs and their exclusion from the political arena: "The collective neglect of this country of very powerful and active civil society organizations and actors [is problematic, thus] we felt immediately they should also have a role and we can take this opportunity to bring them into this partnership."[46] As such, ownership is not only mirrored in the process of the RDNA which engaged several stakeholders[47], but also in the aid architecture of the 3RF: "[We wanted] institutional arrangements [to be a] reflection of that kind of an ownership… This local ownership is, for the time being, at least, firmly grounded in the local stakeholders and in the overall institutional arrangements, which has never been done before anywhere in the world."[48][49]

Several other interlocutors from the international community echoed this assessment of the role of CSOs in the 3RF architecture, using words like "unique", "distinguished", "groundbreaking", "unprecedented," and expressed o the experimental nature of the 3RF.[50] Likewise, CSOs described the 3RF as unprecedented and

---

[45] Expert interview IC 06, 24.01.2022, Expert interview IC 05, 13.01.2022, Expert interview IC 08, 28.01.2022

[46] Expert interview IC 05, 13.01.2022

[47] Expert interview IC 08, 28.01.2022, Expert interview IC 07, 27.01.2022, Expert interview IC 03, 03.12.2021

[48] Expert interview IC 01, 29.11.2021

[49] Nonetheless, there is some continuity or policy mobility in terms of recovery frameworks and individuals who are experts in post-disaster recovery governance despite the innovative elements of the 3RF.

[50] Expert interview IC 01, 29.11.2021, Expert interview IC 07, 27.01.2022, Expert interview IC 08, 28.01.2022, Expert interview IC 04, 07.12.2021, Expert interview IC 05, 13.01.2022

revolutionary and welcomed a new platform[51] that disrupts the lack of interaction between government and civil society.[52]

The 3RF's aid architecture includes CSOs using two mechanisms: on the one hand, establishing a Consultative Group (CG) that operates "at the heart of this initiative, as the platform for dialogue"[53], leveraging CSOs in sector coordination on the operational level[54], and, on the other, establishing an Independent Oversight Board (IOB), which addresses "one of the root causes and problems of Lebanon which is a lack of accountability at all levels."[55]

Yet, several interlocutors from the international community emphasized the importance of securing the ownership of state institutions of the 3RF, despite risking state capture: "It became clear that that there was a very fine line in order to preserve a balance between not turning Lebanon into an NGO state, and at the same time telling the state and state institutions, it's not business as usual. So, the 3RF, its importance is that it provides you with this balance."[56]

According to the Policy Effectiveness Cycle, identifying power asymmetries is crucial to ensure effective policies. Power asymmetries can be based on exclusion, capture and clientelism (World Bank, 2017). In the RDNA and the 3RF Report, the principal organizations identified power asymmetries based on exclusion, capture and clientelism, and addressed exclusion and capture by inviting CSOs to the table,

[51] Expert interview CSO 02, 08.12.2021, Expert interview CSO 08, 25.01.2022

[52] Expert interview IC 03, 03.12.2021

[53] Expert interview IC 03, 03.12.2021

[54] Expert interview IC 07, 27.01.2022

[55] Expert interview IC 08, 28.01.2022

[56] Expert interview IC 06, 24.01.2022

establishing a two-track system, and increasing accountability through the IOB and reporting in sector working groups by CSOs, which I will discuss later.

B. (In)Effective Elements of the 3RF's Aid Architecture

In the following section, I will assess the governance structures and practices of the 3RF, particularly looking at the political settlement, the mandate and scope of the 3RF, overlaps with other coordination mechanisms, coordination among donors, and accountability and reporting. I argue that the international community's incoherence is a constraining factor for the 3RF's effectiveness.

1. The Hurdle of Political Unsettlement

Several interlocutors from the international community stated that the slow progress and lack of reforms in the 3RF implementation were linked to the political settlement (or formalized political unsettlement) and to endogenous issues rather than to the platform's institutional architecture.[57] Civil society representatives shared this reading and still believed the institutional architecture of the 3RF did provide them with opportunities to advocate for reform and impact policy-making.[58]

Even though CSOs and international community collectively push for reforms, this "leverage stops at the willingness of the government,"[59] as one interlocutor from the principal organizations stated. Thus, the political situation, stalemates and paralysis lower

---

[57] Expert interview IC 08, 28.01.2022, Expert interview IC 09, 10.02.2022, Expert interview IC 04, 07.12.2021

[58] Expert interview CSO 08, 25.01.2022

[59] Expert interview IC 07, 27.01.2022

the expectations of the Consultative Group's success to instigate reforms.[60] Many interlocutors described that the care-taker government did not show commitment to the 3RF and caused a stalemate. Even though the Mikati Administration showed more commitment to the 3RF, government inaction still stalls the reform and implementation process of the 3RF.[61]

Besides commitment issues, the stalemate also impedes ownership, as one interlocutor from the international community argued: "Even if there's a consultative process, there are a limited number of people holding the pen. But sometimes you sacrifice a bit of the ownership in the process. And I think the political situation in Lebanon is so volatile that it's really hard to have strong government ownership."[62][63]

The lack of commitment and ownership was intensified because the 3RF initially "didn't have a life on its own"[64] and government considered it as an "appendage" without seeing the benefits of institutional set up.[65] Consequently, the international community focused their efforts on increasing the government's ownership and commitment.[66]

The Policy Effectiveness Cycle suggests a diagnostic approach for identifying the functional problem impeding effective polices which can be based on commitment,

---

[60] Expert interview IC 05, 13.01.2022

[61] Expert interview IC 04, 07.12.2021, Expert interview IC 02, 09.12.2021, Expert interview IC 03, 03.12.2021, Expert interview CSO 04, 13.12.2021, Expert interview CSO 12, 03.02.2022, Expert interview CSO 11, 02.02.2022

[62] Expert interview IC 09, 10.02.2022

[63] However, another interlocutor pointed to varying degrees of ownership by state actors in the 3RF and argued that the municipality and governorate claimed more ownership (Expert interview IC 01, 29.11.2021).

[64] Expert interview IC 02, 09.12.2021

[65] Expert interview IC 01, 29.11.2021

[66] Expert interview IC 02, 09.12.2021

coordination and cooperation issues (World Bank, 2017). The 3RF addresses commitment as a constraint for effectiveness by actively trying to increase the commitment of the Lebanese Government as previously discussed. The principal organizations accommodated cooperation as a constraint – which the Policy Effectiveness Cycle defined as "the voluntary compliance and absence of free-riding" (World Bank, 2017) – by increasing ownership of the government. However, the 3RF seems to lack mechanisms to counter coordination as a functional problem which is defined as "the alignment of beliefs and preferences" (World Bank, 2017). It failed to evoke a common understanding of policy priorities of the stakeholders involved in the bargaining process as I will elaborate when presenting the four case studies for reform in the next chapter.

Even though there is consensus among interlocutors that the ineffectiveness of the 3RF results from the general political stalemate and not from the institutional structure, there are divergent views whether the 3RF's institutional design sufficiently addresses these functional problems or not. For example, two interlocutors from the international community described the institutional structures as flexible "to anticipate an evolving situation in Lebanon"[67] and modifiable "through ongoing practice."[68] In contrast, two interlocutors described the 3RF as "too heavy"[69] for the volatile political situation in Lebanon and argued that the 3RF's "elaborate institutional arrangement" made them "very difficult to operationalize."[70] Likewise, another interlocutor argued that the institutional architecture does not sufficiently consider the political unsettlement:

---

[67] Expert interview IC 05, 13.01.2022, Expert interview IC 08, 28.01.2022

[68] Expert interview IC 08, 28.01.2022

[69] Expert interview IC 09, 10.02.2022

[70] Expert interview IC 01, 29.11.2021

"Given the volatility and the complexity of the political situation, having a lighter and more focused [structure] might have been a little bit better for the context. I think the style of the 3RF is kind of presuming a more stable context."[71]

Yet, presuming a stable institutional structure for a country platform designed to address (multiple and deliberate) crises seems quite absurd. Aid architecture is supposed to be context-specific and consider political crises, and therefore should aim to design agile institutional systems that increase the likelihood of reforms.

However, (Bell and Pospisil, 2017) argue that the international donor community often accepts "formalized political unsettlement" in fragile contexts to allocate aid, which translate political conflict into a set of political and legal institutions instead of resolving it. Therefore, the 3RF risks to legitimize Lebanon's "Zombie power-sharing" (Nagle, 2020, p. 138) between the political-sectarian elite which is based on the Taif-Agreement: For example, if the 3RF strengthens or establishes institutions without putting mechanisms in place that prevent their hollowing-out or co-optation by the political-sectarian elite, the 3RF is likely to help reproduce the system.

Examples for such institutions that risk co-optation or reversal are the Central Management Unit or the Planning Coordination Unit that I will showcase later as reform attempts.

According to the Policy Effectiveness Cycle it is crucial to decrease the "risk of reversal" by anticipating changing balance of power around the reform process and building coalitions (World Bank, 2017). The 3RF does not sufficiently address this risk of reversal because there is no anticipation of changing balance of power around the reform process. (e.g. through co-optation of CSOs, hollowing out public institutions, up-

---

[71] Expert interview IC 09, 10.02.2022

coming elections that are likely to stall the reform process). Yet, the 3RF leverages ownership of public institutions at the local scale e.g. the municipality and the governorate, and tries to build coalitions.

2. *3RF's Mandate and Scope*

Two aspects led to confusion about the 3RF mandate and scope, namely the two-track approach and the geographical scope.

There is no consensus among representatives from the international community on the 3RF's two-track approach which includes the people-centered recovery track (Track 1 which focuses on essential actions and funded through international grant financing), and the reform and reconstruction track (Track 2 that focuses on critical reforms which are conditional for financing). While some interlocutors argued that the two-track approach facilitated the implementation of the commitments by enabling "no regret measures" (cost-effective immediate policy actions) in the first track,[72] others stated that it adds another level of complexity.[73] One interlocutor phrased the confusion about the two-track approach like this: "When we were then trying to look at what projects are relevant to the 3RF, what falls under this umbrella, it was really tricky, because everyone had a different view, and even the donor and the implementer on the same project wouldn't necessarily agree it this was 3RF relevant or not… Over time, there's been clarity that track one is more a direct response to the blast and track two takes a broader view. But that's not necessarily how it was framed originally. And that's not how it was understood originally. So it has been a bit messy, and that's where I've always

---

[72] Expert interview IC 08, 28.01.2022, Expert interview IC 01, 29.11.2021, Expert interview IC 05, 13.01.2022

[73] Expert interview IC 09, 10.02.2022

found that the tracks and the three different categories [institutional strengthening, investments and programs, and reforms] confusing and a bit muddled."[74]

Some interlocutors stated that the 3RF interventions are programmatically and spatially limited to the Beirut Port Explosion response, and others stressed the importance of limiting the mandate to the blast response and to having an exit strategy: "As soon as a project or an issue is implemented related to 3RF as a response to the explosion, then the working groups should be deactivated. Because there is no point, it's been implemented."[75] In contrast, other interlocutors argued that the 3RF could serve to institutionalize the role of CSOs in governance,[76] indicated a long-term vision and the upscaling potential for the 3RF: "The thinking was always to say, look, if this works, there's no reason this should be limited to Beirut's reconstruction. Already with reform as a key pillar, we're touching on national issues."[77] Thus, the mandate and scope of the 3RF can be said to lack clarity which is likely to impede the effectiveness of the 3RF.

3.   The 3RF and other Coordination Mechanisms: Overlaps or leverage?

Several interlocutors raised the issue of defining the mandate of the 3RF in relation to other coordination mechanisms in place to avoid parallel structures and to leverage on existing ones. On the sector level, "there were tons of negotiations around how to make use of existing mechanisms."[78] Many interlocutors from the international community emphasized that the international community tried not "to duplicate or overlap with what

---

[74] Expert interview IC 09, 10.02.2022

[75] Expert interview IC 07, 27.01.2022

[76] Expert interview IC 07, 27.01.2022

[77] Expert interview IC 08, 28.01.2022

[78] Expert interview IC 09, 10.02.2022

exists, but rather integrate it and, and have 3RF located in the existing mechanisms."[79]

which they described as a "pragmatic approach"[80] of the 3RF.

However, one interlocutor from the international community also acknowledged that the mandate of the 3RF was overlapping with humanitarian coordination mechanisms: "The challenge is how do you ensure for those areas that overlap maybe across planning frameworks that there is some way of ensuring consistency and information sharing."[81] Other interlocutors from the international community reacted with sensitivities when asked about overlapping frameworks. Representatives from the UN repeatedly emphasized the non-humanitarian nature of the 3RF and its limited mandate to the post-blast response,[82] while WB representatives stressed the leverage of existing coordination mechanism at the sector level or through the Lebanon Crisis Response Plan (LCRP) and advocated to turn the 3RF into a donor forum for development aid.[83]

These divergent narratives on the 3RF's mandate led to confusion as expressed by interlocutors from both civil society and international community. One interviewee stated: "There wasn't much clarity on the direction how reporting is done, if donors are implementing a project […], is it under the 3RF, is it under LCRP? There's a bit of confusion on all sides about what constitutes 3RF work."[84] One CSO representative indicated that the 3RF had cross-cutting priorities with the Emergency Response Plan

---

[79] Expert interview IC 03, 03.12.2021

[80] Expert interview IC 08, 28.01.2022

[81] Expert interview IC 08, 28.01.2022

[82] Expert interview IC 07, 27.01.2022

[83] Expert interview IC 07, 27.01.2022 and Expert interview IC 06, 24.01.2022

[84] Expert interview IC 04, 07.12.2021

(ERP) and the Lebanon Crisis Response Plan (LCRP): "I'm just a bit concerned that there is not much of coordination with other coordination mechanisms such as the ERP, so the Emergency Response Plan coordination structure, and the LCRP, the Lebanon Crisis Response Plan. So we're starting to have a lot of coordination mechanisms that work in parallel, supposedly on very specific identified mandate. But for example, there is a number of cross cutting between the ERP and the 3RF, there is a number also of cross cutting between the LCRP and the 3RF."[85]

Ironically, country platforms are supposed to increase aid effectiveness and reduce aid fragmentation as discussed previously, but the lack of clarity what constitutes the 3RF in distinction to other coordination frameworks is detrimental to effectiveness.

4.   *Coordination matters among the Principal Organizations*

The divergent views on the mandate of the 3RF and differentiation of the 3RF and other existing coordination frameworks can also be analyzed through the relations among the principal organizations. In general, many interlocutors from the international community stressed the Memorandum of Understanding between UN, World Bank and EU on which basis post-disaster recovery frameworks were designed in other contexts.[86] Moreover, one interlocutor indicated that the good personal relation between the UN Resident Coordinator, the World Bank Director and the EU Ambassador facilitated the

---

[85] Expert interview CSO 01, 13.12.2021

[86] Expert interview IC 07, 27.01.2022, Expert interview IC 08, 28.01.2022, Expert interview IC 04, 07.12.2021, Expert interview IC 06, 24.01.2022

discussions and set-up of the 3RF.[87] Another interlocutor stated that the collaboration between these organizations helped "consistent messaging from the international side."[88]

However, at the sector scale, the coordination between the principal organizations was complicated due to a lack of common terminology in each organization, or as one interviewee put it: "You have to learn how to talk their own language."[89]

Moreover, one member from the international community indicated that the ownership of particular international organizations in Lebanon complicated the integration of working groups and merging sector coordination under the framework of the 3RF: "We downscaled our ambitions and we made these working groups for the 3RF. But thankfully some of these sectors still merged."[90]

Hence, incoherence and internal institutional matters of international organizations is detrimental to the effective implementation of the 3RF in terms of both projects and reforms.

Another factor that impeded the coordination among the principal organizations was the absence of the Secretariat in the initial phase that now facilitates coordination between the stakeholders, particularly on sector coordination.[91]

When I analyze the relation between the principal organizations through the lens of the of the Policy Effectiveness Cycle, it becomes evident that the bargain process

---

[87] Expert interview IC 05, 13.01.2022

[88] Expert interview IC 08, 28.01.2022

[89] Expert interview IC 04, 07.12.2021

[90] Expert interview IC 02, 09.12.2021

[91] Expert interview IC 05, 13.01.2022, Expert interview IC 09, 10.02.2022, Expert interview IC 02, 09.12.2021, Expert interview IC 03, 03.12.2021

between the principle organizations should be taken into account when assessing functional problems of the 3RF (World Bank, 2017). As discussed in this section, competition between international organizations constraints their coordination and cooperation which also impedes the 3RF's effectiveness.

5. *Accountability and Reporting*

There are several parallel monitoring and progress tracking mechanisms in the 3RF: The Government tracker of commitments is separate from the monitoring mechanisms of the principal organizations which were harmonized for the sector working groups. One interlocutor indicated that the 3RF faced reluctance to compare the progress tracking which leads to lack of common understanding for the commitments.[92] In addition to the Government Tracker and the monitoring by the sector working groups, the IOB uses its own mechanism for progress tracking.[93] The lack of a joint system for tracking the status of the commitments could also dilute the conditionality, as one interlocutor phrased it: "I think the conditionality is a little bit too loose in the 3RF and even how we're tracking it. There's pressure for the international community to demonstrate that they're doing stuff, even though the government's not necessarily living up to their part of the bargain. So I think the mutual accountability aspect of it needs to be clear."[94] This is in line with the literature that found that accountability depends on recognized standards, an institutional design that provides clear roles and tasks, and sanctions in the case of power abuse or underperformance (Polack, Luna and Dator-Bercilla, 2010; Haigh,

---

[92] Expert interview IC 09, 10.02.2022

[93] Expert interview CSO 10, 01.02.2022

[94] Expert interview IC 09, 10.02.2022

Amaratunga and Hettige, 2019; Dhungana, 2020). Hence, accountability risks to be undermined because the 3RF does not clearly define priorities and deliverables or standardize the reporting.[95]

Moreover, according to Policy Cycle of Effectiveness regular evaluation is vital for effective policies in fragile contexts (World Bank, 2017). However, the 3RF lacks appropriate and standards to monitor and track the commitments because there are parallel structures (government tracker, monitoring through IOB, monitoring through sector-working groups). Moreover, feedback mechanisms like citizen engagement platform and grievance mechanisms are insufficiently addressed or delayed in the 3RF. However, the 3RF addressed feedback and request from 3RF stakeholders, e.g. by including the second rotation of CSOs and by strongly engaging CSOs in the sector coordination.

C.   (In)Adaptive Elements of the 3RF's Aid Architecture

In the following, I will discuss two potentially adaptive elements of the 3RF's aid architecture: The Consultative Group and sector working groups. I argue that the establishment and configuration of the Consultative Group and the set-up of working groups are conceived as an attempt to adapt to the political unsettlement in place. However, the organization of CG meetings and sector coordination is not well designed to actually reshape the policy arena and make reforms likely.

---

[95] Expert interview IC 09, 10.02.2022

1.   *Consultative Group reshapes the Policy Arena*

One interlocutor from the international community emphasized the bargaining process with the government to accept CSOs as a stakeholder. "It took us a hell of time and energy in negotiating with the government for them to consider the CSOs as a peer."[96]

As previously discussed, the international community institutionalized the role of CSOs in the 3RF across scales: The advisory role in the CG, the oversight role in the IOB and the implementation role in sector coordination. I will discuss these impacts of the 3RF institutional structure on CSO participation in the CG in the next chapter. I will also show how the CSOs are trying to get closer to decision-making by pushing for the Central Management Unit (CMU) and Planning and Coordination Unit (PCU) which will be discussed in the next sub-chapter.

These processes and the 3RF principles such as "whole of Lebanon approach" and "people-centered recovery" can be interpreted as efforts to invite CSOs as new stakeholders and widen contestability in the policy arena. These concepts are based on the Policy Effectiveness Cycle which suggests that identifying entry points to reshape the policy arena (e.g. by shaping preferences, creating incentives, and widening contestability) and key stakeholders (elites, citizens, international actors) can form a coalitions to make policies adaptive and disrupt path-dependency (World Bank, 2017).

However, this section focuses on the interaction between the 3RF stakeholders in the CG because the Policy Effectiveness Cycle emphasizes the "process through which actors bargain about the design and implementation of policies within a specific institutional setting" (World Bank, 2017). Thus, I focus on the interaction between actors in the CG meetings. Many CSOs lamented the lack of dialogue at the high-level and the

---

[96] Expert interview IC 07, 27.01.2022

statement-based meetings which limit the effectiveness of the 3RF.[97] One CSO representative described the first CG like this: "I think the first one, we just sat, sat back and just listen to the ambassadors and the donors speak. I think we had very little contribution to the first one. We were just there as observers."[98] Another CSO stated: "I think we're not talking enough to each other. So it was like statement-based, rather than a discussion."[99][100]

It should be noted that the first and second CG meeting were held in a hybrid format as it was organized as an online conference but invited the co-chairs to the Serail. For the second CG meeting, the 3RF invited a victim of the Beirut Port Explosion for a testimony and commemorated the victims of the Beirut Port Explosion ('Press Release. Second Consultative Group Meeting', 2021). The agenda for the second CG did not foresee interaction with CSOs besides the statement of the CSOs' co-chair. Yet, several CSO members used the chat function to engage with the other stakeholders and deliver their messages to the CG. Two CSO members asked about the progress of the Independence of the Judiciary Law and three CSOs thanked the victim of the explosion for her courage to bear testimony – however without any response or interaction with other stakeholders.[101]

---

[97] Expert interview CSO 10, 01.02.2022, Expert interview CSO 02, 08.12.2021, Expert interview CSO 07, 19.01.2022, Expert interview CSO 11, 02.02.2022

[98] Expert interview CSO 08, 25.01.2022

[99] Expert interview CSO 14, 10.02.2022

[100] However, at every CG meeting the CSO co-chair held a speech. In addition, members from the international community stressed that the co-chair of the CSOs participates in drafting the co-chairs' statement, which is an official document that is negotiated and endorsed by all the stakeholders (Expert interview IC 02, 09.12.2021).

[101] Participant Observation, 27.07.2021

One interviewee from the principal organizations argued that "CSOs have not only made their voice heard. And as we have gone from meeting CG1, to CG2, to CG3, I think they've become increasingly better to make their voice heard and get some of their priorities across."[102]

The 3RF gradually increased the interaction during CG meetings, for instance by allocating more space to CSOs to speak during CG meetings, which was described as an "empowering experience"[103] by CSOs: "So I think that that shows adaptability, even if maybe the 3RF did not conceive of a time where CSOs are going to speak in addition to the co-chair speaking, but where they felt that maybe giving time to the CSO to present their demands, is going to help the 3RF advance. So they've introduced this. Now, this is something I'm totally speculating on. But you know, there was no room in the agenda of the second CG for us to speak. So one can perhaps see that the fact that they gave us five minutes to speak in the third CG is as a development that recognizes also the fact that they need to accommodate for the voices of CSOs in these meetings."[104] Similarly, the fourth CG meeting was framed as a "round table" and "open debate" in the agenda. However, the open debate was limited to prepared two-minutes statements and new donors who joined the CG took the floor to read statements.

Hence, the CG is an innovative platform where voices of CSOs can be heard at the levels of donors and especially government (which is particularly relevant in the absence of any coordination mechanism between government and civil society).

---

[102] Expert interview IC 03, 03.12.2021

[103] Expert interview CSO 08, 25.01.2022

[104] Expert interview CSO 08, 25.01.2022

However, this platform has become a performative stage with no time for debates because pre-selected CSOs have two minutes to speak about issues. Moreover, the Government representatives do not engage with CSOs in these meetings, and the Prime Minister often leaves before the meeting ends.[105]

2. *Sector Working Groups as Tools for Potentially Effective and Adaptive Processes?*

This section analyzes the potential of sector working groups as an effective and adaptive planning tool in the 3RF aid architecture. I will focus on the role of CSOs in the sector coordination in the next chapter.

As discussed previously, sector working groups aim to share knowledge and strengthen the coordination and coherence across programs and sectors on 3RF priorities identified in the RDNA (World Bank Group, European Union, and United Nations, 2020b). The sector working group's primary functions are 1) promoting and leading sector work in line with 3RF guiding principles and sector priorities, 2) establishing and maintaining sectoral coordination and communication tools, 3) facilitating regular dialogue on 3RF priorities in the sector, as well as monitoring and reporting on progress.

The sector working were not strictly specified from the outset[106] which left space for anticipating new needs and upscaling to issues not directly related the blast.[107] The sector coordination is also flexible in terms membership because the inclusion of CSOs in existing sector coordination was described as an adaptive process by some

---

[105] Participant Observation, 16.11.2021, Participant Observation, 04.04.2022

[106] Expert interview IC 04, 07.12.2021, Expert interview IC 06, 24.01.2022, Expert interview CSO 06, 14.01.2022, Expert interview CSO 07, 19.01.2022, Expert interview IC 08, 28.01.2022, Expert interview IC 09, 10.02.2022, Expert interview IC 02, 09.12.2021
[107] Expert interview IC 05, 13.01.2022

interlocutors.[108] Several interlocutors addressed the reasons for not defining and institutionalizing the working groups from the outset: "We have never formalized this because we didn't want to deviate our focus of getting it right in the area of the blast […] without losing the opportunity of going for a broader scope."[109] – as one interlocutor from the principal organizations stated.

However, another interviewee called specifying the sector working groups in relation to the 3RF a "dilemma" because their formalization would "create a super heavy architecture that has lots of bodies." However, he also pointed to the fact that transaction costs increase through repeated discussions on sector coordination "without necessarily adding much value."[110] Another interviewee from the international community also emphasized that a loose sector coordination from the get-go in combination with an extensive set of actions could fragment sector working groups: "I think it's really easy for aid architecture to sort of balloon because everybody wants a group for their pet issue, but I don't think they're necessarily needs to be a formal group for everything."[111] This would also lead to constant reprioritization because the "the architecture is adaptive, but the framework as a planning tool is not."[112]

Thus, the aim of not formalizing sector coordination was to be flexible, to use leverage, and to avoid parallel structures. However, this step was counterproductive, as

---

[108] Expert interview IC 02, 09.12.2021

[109] Expert interview IC 05, 13.01.2022

[110] Expert interview IC 08, 28.01.2022

[111] Expert interview IC 09, 10.02.2022

[112] Expert interview IC 09, 10.02.2022

sector coordination did not yet gain momentum and constantly renegotiated by all stakeholders which limits its adaptive and effective impact.

D. Reform Efforts within the 3RF

Assessing the immediate policy actions and critical reforms set by the 3RF in December 2020 (see Figure 11) is beyond the scope of this thesis.[113]

To assess the ability of the 3RF to disrupt path dependency, I chose four cases of policy actions towards reforms, using two criteria: i) I cross-referenced the commitments mentioned in the 3RF Foreword, the Tracker of CG action points, and the 3RF Monitoring Framework with the data from my interviews, and ii) I prioritized commitments that included active engagement or advocacy by CSOs to work towards their achievement. The four cases are two draft laws and two initiatives for institutional strengthening: The Public Procurement Law, the Independence of the Judiciary Law, the making of a Central Management Unit (CMU, at the scale of the central government), and of a Planning and Coordination Unit (PCU, at the scale of the governorate/municipality of Beirut).

I argue that despite considerable efforts, structural constraints including the international community's incoherence, the political stalemate and lack of political will on the site of the government, as well as insufficient involvement of CSOs limit the likelihood of reforms.

---

[113] For more on this matter, check, the 3RF Secretariat's stock-taking of the 3RF commitments during the fourth CG meeting, which included a monitoring framework that assessed the progress on the commitments and their milestones ('3RF Monitoring Framework', 2022). In addition, the Tracker of Action Points made during CG meetings takes stock of the commitments and lists obstacles to achieving reforms ('Tracker of CG Action Points', 2022).

Immediate policy actions to enable recovery:

› Within a reasonable timeframe, conduct a transparent investigation on the causes of the explosion, with support, cooperation, and expertise from Lebanon's international partners.

› Help operationalize the 3RF governance structure, bringing together government, civil society, and international partners to enable inclusive dialogue and decision making.

› Ensure that insurance claims settlement and solvency monitoring are addressed, while initiating the development of a policyholder protection scheme.

› Prepare the 2021 budget and incorporate a strong program for social protection and inclusion; establish a unified registry of social assistance programs and put in place grievance redress, verification, and monitoring and evaluation systems.

› Develop a strategy and guidelines on conservation and rehabilitation of historic buildings; develop an action plan for repair, rehabilitation, and reconstruction of housing and buildings linked to the wider urban recovery, sensitive to heritage and the environment and support housing, land, and property rights.

› Adopt a vision statement that lays out the principles for port sector reform and a reconstruction strategy, including for customs.

› Establish clear institutional arrangements to manage hazardous materials and waste from construction and demolition.

Critical reforms to enable scaling up of reconstruction:

› Strengthen the independence and effectiveness of the judiciary; implement the anti-corruption strategy and fully staff and fund the National Human Rights Commission as well as the National Anti-Corruption Institution, while strengthening oversight roles and capacity of the Central Inspection and Court of Accounts.

› Adopt the new Public Procurement Law and implement regulations and secondary legislation, including the mandatory usage of revised standard bidding documents; formalize the legal and regulatory framework for public investment management.

› Enact and implement the insolvency and insolvency practitioners' Law and Insurance Law. Enact the draft competition law, including reforms to exclusive agencies, and adopt an insurance sector restructuring and development strategy.

› Develop a plan to ensure financial sustainability of the National Social Security Fund (NSSF) and extend contributory benefits, following an external audit; reform NSSF governance.

› Finalize, approve, and implement the Social Protection Strategy, adopting a comprehensive, right-based approach; develop a COVID-19 vaccine deployment strategy and operational plan.

› Finalize and approve the new heritage law to protect the historic urban fabric, facilitate private sector involvement in heritage rehabilitation and adaptive reuse, and support the productive use of these assets for cultural and creative industries.

› Enact a new Port Sector Law, addressing the port authority's operations as well as customs and defining the respective roles of the central government, the port authorities, and commercial operators, as well as their relationships in terms of duties, rights, and responsibilities.

› Implement Law 462 without amendments to establish and staff the Electricity Regulatory Authority (ERA); ensure transparency in public procurement in the electricity sector.

Figure 11. Reforms in the 3RF Foreword.

Monitoring the 3RF Commitments

Figure 12. Monitoring the 3RF Commitments ('3RF Monitoring Framework', 2022)

1. Case 1: The Public Procurement Law

The adoption of the Public Procurement Law was mentioned in the Foreword under critical reforms to enable scaling up of reconstruction (World Bank Group, European Union, and United Nations, 2020b). The first milestone, as defined in the 3RF Monitoring Framework, was achieved in June 2021and entailed the parliamentary approval of the Public Procurement Law ('3RF Monitoring Framework', 2022). In addition, the adoption of a wider anti-corruption strategy by the Government was described as a success, but one interlocutor from the international community pointed to the lack of roadmaps for its implementation.[114]

The co-chairs' statement of the second CG described the Procurement Law as an essential reform that requires action "on the part of the Government with input from

---

[114] Expert interview IC 05, 13.01.2022

CSOs and funding and technical assistance from the international community" and stated that the "Public Procurement law's secondary legislation should be passed and Electricité du Liban's (EDL) procurement be conducted within the frame of the Public Procurement law" ('Co-Chairs' Statement: Second Consultative Group Meeting', 2021). This was also explicitly mentioned in the speech of the CSOs' co-chair which described the fact that the EDL has its own procurement process as "unacceptable" and requested that the Procurement of EDL should be brought under the new Public Procurement Law.[115]

Until the third CG in November 2021, progress in anti-corruption (cf. 3RF's pillar Improving Governance and Accountability) was noted positively given an inter-ministerial committee to implement the Public Procurement law was formed ('Co-Chairs' Statement of the Third Consultative Group Meeting', 2021). According to one interlocutor from the principal organizations, the international community pressured to implement the law: "We've been banging on about public procurement. The law was passed. Now it needs to be implemented. So we kept saying: implement the law." As a consequence, in the third CG meeting, the Parliament requested technical and financial support to draft those ten decrees for the law to be enforced in August 2022 ('Co-Chairs' Statement of the Third Consultative Group Meeting', 2021; 'Tracker of CG Action Points', 2022).

The draft law which was developed by the Institut des Finances Basil Fuleihan and mandated by the Minister of Finance was supported by several international organizations – a process that "takes a lot of energy" according to one interlocutor from a principal organization who added: "The best we can do is to influence the decision of the parliament and to go and do some lobbying with a number of people and to support

---

[115] Speech of the CSOs' co-chair, Second Consultative Group Meeting, 27.07.2021

those who are holding the reforms, either as a minister or as a political party, or as a parliamentarian commission, or even as members of the CSOs, and use our own leverage as institutions or as donors to use this influence."[116]

In the case of the Public Procurement Law (which "did not fly very high in the parliament"[117]), international pressure contributed to the adoption of the law. However, CSOs were more at the receiving end in this process. According to one CSO from the CG, they merely attended meetings at Basil Fuleihan Institute for information purposes.[118] There were no public consultations with CSOs which had a "negative impact on the ability of CSOs to efficiently support formal efforts" – according to (The Lebanese Transparency Association, 2021) which is a member of the IOB.

2. *Case 2: Independence of the Judiciary Law*

Strengthening the independence and effectiveness of the judiciary was mentioned in the 3RF Foreword under critical reforms to enable scaling up of reconstruction (World Bank Group, European Union, and United Nations, 2020b, p. 4). The ('3RF Monitoring Framework', 2022) defines the adoption of "the draft legislation that would strengthen the judiciary's independence, through a transparent process inclusive of civil society" as a commitment. During the second CG, CSOs and the international community put pressure on the adoption of the Independence of the Judiciary Law "with principles safeguarding independence reinstated, without further

---

[116] Expert interview IC 07, 27.01.2022

[117] Expert interview IC 07, 27.01.2022

[118] Expert interview CSO 04, 13.12.2021

clauses to the contrary" – as stated in the ('Co-Chairs' Statement: Second Consultative Group Meeting', 2021).

The first milestone, the preparation of a draft law on Judiciary Independence was finalized by a parliamentary sub-committee, transferred to Parliament's plenary and circulated to stakeholders ('3RF Monitoring Framework', 2022). In the third CG, the co-chairs acknowledged the commitment by the Government and Parliament to work with the 3RF Rule of Law working group to review drafts of the Independence of the Judiciary law to ensure international standards ('Co-Chairs' Statement of the Third Consultative Group Meeting', 2021). One interlocutor from a principal organization emphasized that the international community needed to call on shortcomings of laws not to check off reforms which are deficient.[119]

However, the inclusive revision process defined as the second milestone has been on hold. International pressure from UNDP, EU and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) to "create a space for an inclusive and participatory discussion around the draft legislation" was not successful ('3RF Monitoring Framework', 2022). Furthermore, the Framework states that "the opacity of the [revision] process remains cause for concern, and the draft continues to be questioned" ('3RF Monitoring Framework', 2022).

The Ministry of Justice formally sent the draft law to the Venice Commission in March 2022, after the international community and CSOs from the IOB insisted that the Government consults the Commission to align on international standards (Maharat Foundation, Kulluna Irada, and The Lebanese Transparency Association, 2021).

---

[119] Expert interview IC 02, 09.12.2021

One interlocutor from the principal organizations argued that the Independence of the Judiciary Law was an example where civil society and principal organizations could follow up on revisions closely at the sector working group level. He also saw the Independence of the Judiciary as a good example of the alignment between CSOs and the international community, arguing that the principal organizations were more likely to take CSOs' recommendations into account if they had a similar position.[120] However, on the part of the CSOs, the co-chair criticized in her speech during the second CG that CSOs, constitutional experts and professionals were not consulted, even though they could have strengthened the law.[121]

3. Case 3: The Central Management Unit (CMU)

In the 3RF Foreword and during the second CG meeting, the international community emphasized the need for more responsiveness and ownership on the parts of the government and parliament (World Bank Group, European Union, and United Nations, 2020b; 'Co-Chairs' Statement: Second Consultative Group Meeting', 2021). In the third CG meeting, stakeholders discussed the establishment of a Central Management Unit that is supposed to enhance this responsiveness and ownership. Prime Minister Najib Mikati had announced the revival of a "Central Management Unit", at the level of the central government which would help coordinating the 3RF between ministries, public agencies, local governments and CSOs.[122] The co-chairs' statement praised that decision

---

[120] Expert interview IC 05, 13.01.2022

[121] Speech of the CSOs' co-chair, Second Consultative Group Meeting, 27.07.2021

[122] Interestingly, there were two divergent narratives if the CMU builds on a CSO initiative because it was included in the CSOs' recommendations or if it draws on an initiative by the Mikati administration in 2012 Even if the origin of the idea can be contested, most interlocutors agreed that the decree by the Prime Minister can also be considered a result of lobbying by CSOs.

which also entailed expanding the scope of the CMU ('Co-Chairs' Statement of the Third Consultative Group Meeting', 2021). The CMU would include three donors and development partners, as well as three CSOs, and be housed in the Office of the Prime Minister. The CMU's Terms of Reference were to be jointly developed by all representatives before the fourth CG.

The Prime Minister's Office issued decree No. 157/2021, signed on November 15, 2021 amending Decree No. 19/2021 dated March 17, 2021 on the coordination of state institutions on the 3RF.

It states the establishment of a joint advisory committee (لجنة استشارية مشتركة) that is tasked with: 1) providing strategic advice for the 3RF implementation, 2) ensuring strategic coordination and alignment of resources with the priorities of the 3RF, 3) reviewing and monitoring implementation progress, and 4) sharing information and advocacy for strategic initiatives that support the 3RF.[123]

Several interlocutors from the international community interpreted the CMU as a commitment to more participatory governance and a recognition by the government that CSOs are indeed a constructive force.[124] They stated that the decree indicates a commitment to stepping up state ownership and government responsiveness in the 3RF.[125]

---

[123] Decree No. 157/2021

[124] Expert interview IC 02, 09.12.2021, Expert interview IC 03, 03.12.2021

[125] Expert interview IC 04, 07.12.2021, Expert interview IC 05, 13.01.2022

Interlocutors from the international community and civil society alike considered the CMU a "sustainable"[126] attempt to open "a communication channel"[127] and "institutionalize inclusion, transparency and accountability,"[128] beyond the scope of the post blast response. With regards to CSOs, several interviewees from the principal organizations emphasized that the CMU would ensure a "permanent representation of CSOs"[129] and "institutionalize the role of CSOs."[130] Another interlocutor stressed that the CMU could play a pioneer role in promoting better governance in general.[131]

Yet, some CSOs were skeptical of the decision and said that the Prime Minister's Office was using the CMU to pay lip service to the process.[132] Indeed, these fears were not unfounded. The PM office issue a draft ToR for the CMU that was shared with donors and the CG's co-chair, who were all quite critical of it. They met with the Prime Minister to discuss their feedback and volunteered to help contribute revising the ToRs.[133] Thus, with the 3RF secretariat, some of the CG's CSOs drafted a new set of ToRs for the CMU and submitted it to the PM's office who never responded to it, which led to frustration among the CSOs and the CG more generally.[134] During the fourth CG meeting on April

---

[126] Expert interview CSO 07, 19.01.2022

[127] Expert interview CSO 02, 08.12.2021

[128] Expert interview IC 07, 27.01.2022

[129] Expert interview IC 02, 09.12.2021

[130] Expert interview IC 07, 27.01.2022

[131] Expert interview IC 03, 03.12.2021

[132] Expert interview CSO 10, 01.02.2022

[133] Expert interview CSO 14, 10.02.2022, Expert interview CSO 04, 13.12.2021, Expert interview CSO 05, 14.01.2022, Expert interview CSO 11, 02.02.2022, Expert interview IC 06, 24.01.2022, Expert interview CSO 01, 13.12.2021, Expert interview CSO 04, 13.12.2021, Expert interview CSO 07, 19.01.2022, Expert interview IC 02, 09.12.2021

[134] Expert interview CSO 05, 14.01.2022

4, 2022, civil society representatives and the co-chair noted how the CMU was not being established despite the commitment made at the third CG meeting, and underscored the need to include CSOs in the governance process ('Co-Chairs' Statement of the Fourth Consultative Group Meeting', 2022). Prime Minister Mikati responded that CSOs will be invited in due time, once the CMU is "well established" ('Co-Chairs' Statement of the Fourth Consultative Group Meeting', 2022). The co-chairs' statement declared that "this engagement should be stepped up, even after the elections, as much progress could be made even under a caretaker government" ('Co-Chairs' Statement of the Fourth Consultative Group Meeting', 2022).

CSOs stressed the importance of establishing a CMU: "We need the CMU because we need to reach cabinet. It's easier to reach ministries, but a lot of decisions are done at the cabinet level."[135] Despite advocating for the CMU, some CSOs had mixed feelings and were skeptical about the CMU in practice "because of the actual clashes between the Parliament, the Ministry and the Presidency."[136] One CSO member suggested that the CMU should be "institutionalized outside government, maybe through Parliament, because we don't want wasted efforts, eventually if there is a change of government"[137], a concern which is also reflected in the ('Co-Chairs' Statement of the Fourth Consultative Group Meeting', 2022). Other issues regarding the implementation include the capacity gap between CSOs providing pro bono work and other stakeholders in the CMU.[138] Another CSO expressed the fear of co-optation of the CMU by the

---

[135] Expert interview CSO 14, 10.02.2022

[136] Expert interview CSO 04, 13.12.2021

[137] Expert interview CSO 05, 14.01.2022

[138] Expert interview CSO 03, 03.12.2021

government: "this might be just another committee that might also play against us over time and it might be also be just a facade."[139]

4. *Case 4: The Planning and Coordination Unit (PCU)*

In the 3RF Document, one commitment for a people-centered recovery is "a housing recovery strategy and action plan linked to wider urban recovery while sensitive to heritage, cultural life and environment" (World Bank Group, European Union, and United Nations, 2020b, p. 53).   The 3RF Monitoring Framework classified the commitment as on hold/delayed. One component of the strategy is the establishment of a Planning and Coordination Unit, advocated by CSOs. The PCU is to be housed at the governorate level, and to coordinate an urban strategy in the neighborhoods affected by the blast, starting off from a pilot project named "The Green Path" endorsed by several CSOs in the CG, and outside of it. It should also have a more technical-arm overseeing building permitting, as well as data gathering and dissemination, in addition to operating as a go-to place for dwellers of the neighborhoods affected by the blast in need of information and support.

The PCU illustrates a reform initiative conceived, led and lobbied for by CSOs. It has its roots in a longer history: it "has been advocated for years by many of the civil society organizations, and they were not having the room for to be listened"[140] – as one interlocutor from the international community described. A representative from civil society confirmed that the PCU builds on older activism at the municipal scale, recalling the program of the municipal campaign Beirut Madinati in 2016 (Fawaz, 2019): "We

---

[139] Expert interview CSO 05, 14.01.2022

[140] Expert interview IC 04, 07.12.2021

were unable to take the municipality of Beirut through elections, and establish a Planning Unit, maybe now, through the 3RF, there's a possibility to create the planning unit in the municipality, this would be a win for urban and environmental activists who have lobbying this for a long time. It's worth trying to do that!"[141] Lobbying for the PCU through the 3RF provides an important opportunity to influence policy making, as one CSO representative phrased it: "We are leveraging that fully."[142]

Recommending the PCU at the CG level was the result of several meetings among CSOs that the CSOs' co-chair organized to discuss the 3RF's four pillars and derive recommendations. The CSOs discussed and drafted a long list of recommendations which was then prioritized in a shortlist presented during the third CG meeting.[143] According to a CSO representative this prioritization was essential, even if the deliberative process was "messy": "We're focusing our efforts, and we're really lobbying for two very specific asks: the Planning Unit and the urban strategy, and all our efforts are invested there."[144] The CSOs' co-chair included the PCU in her speech during the second CG in July 2021 by emphasizing that the reconstruction effort needs to be part of an urban strategy: "We believe that a City Planning Unit should be created within the municipality of Beirut to coordinate this work. CSOs and professionals working on the urban domain are ready to staff this unit and provide the needed expertise. Inclusion of CSOs will secure oversight and accountability. For example, the Beirut Urban Lab, the Order of Engineers and Architects, Live Love Lebanon, etc. This falls within the 3RF

---

[141] Expert interview CSO 08, 25.01.2022

[142] Expert interview CSO 08, 25.01.2022

[143] Expert interview CSO 08, 25.01.2022

[144] Expert interview CSO 08, 25.01.2022

under the principle of subsidiarity and to build the capacity of the municipality. We will reach out to the Municipality and the Mohafaza [Governorate] of Beirut, as well as to the sector leads from UN Habitat and the World Bank, to start this discussion."[145]

The planning unit idea received solid support from the international community which considered it an important step "bringing governance and decision making closer to the grassroots level and to members of civil society"[146]—which also helps the lobbying. Both the World Bank and UN Habitat (who are leads/co-leads of the housing working group) endorsed the idea, ahead of the third CG meeting.[147]

Accordingly, the PCU was endorsed and adopted as a milestone to formulate the housing recovery strategy and action plan ('Tracker of CG Action Points', 2022; '3RF Monitoring Framework', 2022). The co-chairs' statement after the third CG declares: "The CG calls for a coordination planning unit for urban recovery in the office of the Governor of Beirut together with the Mayor of Beirut. This unit will coordinate with the Army Forward Emergency Room, civil society and the international community ('Co-Chairs' Statement of the Third Consultative Group Meeting', 2021).

At the time of writing, the PCU has not been formed, due to hesitations among principal organizations about its timing and feasibility, given the political climate. The current consensus seems to be, according to one of the CSOs on the CG, for it to be attached to the scope of works of the Technical Advisory Committee (TAC), which assists the implementation of the 3RF's Housing/Culture project, launched in March 2022. CSOs who had lobbied for the PCU do not appear content about this compromise which they

---

[145] Speech of the CSOs' co-chair, Second Consultative Group Meeting, 27.07.2021

[146] Expert interview IC 04, 07.12.2021

[147] Expert interview CSO 08, 25.01.2022

see as a way "to dilute and postpone the making of the PCU," but have pushed for the ToRs of the TAC to include a provision related to the PCU.

The bottlenecks associated to the PCU's formation also reveal how the 3RF is hesitant about institutionalizing processes of reform and more comfortable in initiating projects (Papoulidis, 2022)– which is not a foremost characteristic of effective and adaptive country platforms as discussed earlier.

With regards to bottlenecks, the Policy Effectiveness Cycle can help determining the likelihood of reform policies, by distinguishing whether reform interventions need first-level rules, mid-level rules, and high-level rules (World Bank, 2017). The 3RF has prioritized first-level (like sector-level reforms, e.g., in housing and urban recovery) and mid-level rules (like the independence of the judiciary), but did not include high-level rules ("the rules about changing rules") in the designed mechanisms of reform intervention. Focusing efforts on first-level and mid-level corresponds with the scope of the Track 1 'people-centered recovery' which aims at lighter reforms. Moreover, past experiences in Lebanon have demonstrated that reform programs that rely on high institutional requirements (or in other words requirement of high involvement of political actors from different parties and institutions) are less likely to succeed: An assessment study of the institutional requirements of the Paris III reform agenda concluded that "international donor community must avoid reform measures that create institutional bottlenecks [...] which can be used to justify inaction" (Atallah, Mahmalat and Zoughaib, 2018). Moreover, across the three levels of rules, power asymmetries were not sufficiently considered which limited the meaningful contribution of CSOs and impeded the likelihood of reforms.

To conclude, the 3RF is an innovative new design for a country platform because it institutionalizes CSOs as governance actors on several scales, most importantly through the high-level Consultative Group, and the sector-level implementation.

The design of the 3RF's institutional architecture took context-specific challenges and constraints and formalized political unsettlement into account and consequently provided the CSOs with high-level representation in the CG, Oversight, and implementation of commitments and projects. Despite this innovative approach and unprecedented engagement of CSOs, the overall political stalemate and structural constraints impede both effectiveness and adaptability of policy actions and reforms. However, the 3RF provides a narrow margin for maneuvering through the tensions as showcased in the four cases studies of reforms. These reform efforts show considerable efforts trying to experiment and initiate institutional strengthening and reforms – against many odds, and with a lot of back-and-forth. In the next chapter, I will zoom in on the impact of the 3RF's institutional structures on CSOs' collective action to initiate these reform processes. Thereby, as demonstrated by the four reform efforts, I will keep in mind the formalized political unsettlement as a structural constraint for CSOs (Bell and Pospisil, 2017) and the CSOs' agency to shape and reconfigure institutions and disrupt path-dependency (Kay, 2005; Nagle, 2020).

CHAPTER V

THE ROLE OF CSOS IN THE 3RF

To what extent is the 3RF's institutional design supporting CSOs' operations and enabling them to work effectively towards reforms and to hold donors and the government accountable? In this section, I answer this question by examining two dimensions. First, I assess the impact of the 3RF's institutional design on CSOs' operations by studying matters of coordination, selection, rotation, positionality vis-à-vis projects and reforms, and levels of cohesion. Second, I evaluate CSOs' (in)effectiveness by investigating both internal and external determinants that affect processes of work. For the former, I examine processes of deliberations as well as capacities and resources of CSOs. For the latter, I investigate flows of communication as well as modalities that may enable reforms and accountabilities such as role definition, bylaws and ToRs, and sectoral coordination tools.

A.   3RF's Institutional Design and Impact on CSOs' Operations

According to the literature I discussed previously, transferring governance to CSOs does not necessarily improve the decision-making process. Moreover, the involvement of CSOs as governance actors should consider power asymmetries in deliberative frameworks, including relations to other governance stakeholders like the state and donors, as well as intra-CSO relations. In the following, I will discuss the 3RF's institutional design and impact on CSO's operations. I argue that the mode of CSOs' engagement in the 3RF lacks sufficient coordination, leads to discontinuity and consolidates the fragmentation of civil society.

1. *Coordination and Selection Matters*

In order to determine the impact of the 3RF on the coordination of CSOs, it is important to take into account the degree of coordination among CSOs prior to the 3RF. Some CSOs referred to collaboration predating the 3RF, namely through activism[148], sectorial coordination based on Memorandum of Understanding [149], NGO forums[150], and the Beirut Relief Coalition, a consortium of NGOs and volunteers responding to the explosion.[151]

However, the majority of CSO representatives stated that CSO coordination was insufficient before due to three reasons:[152] Firstly, competition between local CSOs working in the same sector.[153] Secondly, the lack of comprehensive NGO forums or secretariat where all NGOs are registered.[154] Even if coordination mechanisms for NGOs' advocacy existed, international NGOs were predominantly represented in sectorial coordination or platforms[155] "because they have the capacity because they have the

---

[148] Expert interview CSO 12, 03.02.2022, Expert interview CSO 03, 03.12.2021, Expert interview CSO 08, 25.01.2022

[149] Expert interview CSO 03, 03.12.2021, Expert interview CSO 08, 25.01.2022, Expert interview CSO 02, 08.12.2021, Expert interview CSO 06, 14.01.2022

[150] Expert interview CSO 01, 13.12.2021, Expert interview CSO 14, 10.02.2022, Expert interview CSO 11, 02.02.2022

[151] Expert interview CSO 02, 08.12.2021

[152] Expert interview CSO 01, 13.12.2021, Expert interview CSO 06, 14.01.2022, Expert interview CSO 03, 03.12.2021

[153] Expert interview CSO 01, 13.12.2021

[154] Expert interview CSO 14, 10.02.2022. adding that forums or coalitions sometimes exist on the sectoral level, giving the example of the environmental sector. Another CSO stated to be part of a group of CSOs that is coordinating on different sectorial issues (freedom of expression, migrant workers, deportation, human rights stuff in general).

[155] Expert interview IC 04, 07.12.2021, Expert interview CSO 01, 13.12.2021

resources and the expertise in doing advocacy".[156] Thirdly, CSOs considered advocacy as having no impact. As one interlocutor from civil society stated: "There was nothing before that made us think that our voices or what we do would really be taken into consideration at the end."[157] Another interviewee argued that enhancing coordination among CSOs and establishing CSOs as an important stakeholder through the Consultative Group is "the only positive outcome from the 3RF up until today."[158]

Thus, I will zoom in on the CSOs' impact on the 3RF by analyzing the selection, rotation, profile and coherence of CSOs in the Consultative Group.

The three principal organizations drafted and published a Call for Expression of Interest for the Consultative Group on their websites in February 2021[159] and according to the 3RF Secretariat/Technical Team, 60 CSOs applied.[160] With regards to inclusion, the call of interest specified that it aims at gender balance and that CSOs should be gender-inclusive and not discriminate against particular sex or gender identities. Moreover, CSOs representing vulnerable groups, including the disabled and youth, were favorably considered according to the call of interest.

Even though the World Bank, UN, and the EU required non-partisanship defined as "service provision or […] other activities without regard to any religious community or political affiliation" (World Bank Group, 2021a) in the call of interest, this requirement does not necessarily eliminate normative biases or favoritism towards particular groups.

---

[156] Expert interview CSO 01, 13.12.2021

[157] Expert interview CSO 07, 19.01.2022

[158] Expert interview CSO 03, 03.12.2021

[159] Expert interview IC 05, 13.01.2022, Expert interview IC 08, 28.01.2022

[160] Expert interview IC 05, 13.01.2022, Expert interview IC 03, 03.12.2021

Indeed, this excludes important community-based organizations and faith-based organizations[161] that were mobilized in the post-blast recovery works. Numbers of the Beirut Urban Lab from January 2022 show that 26% of the actors recorded to be operating in urban recovery in the neighborhoods affected by the blast are FBOs or religious institutions. Therefore, the process follows a narrow and biased understanding of civil society that favors secular-perceived NGOs. However, the call of interest emphasizes other forms of engagement like agenda-based ad hoc participation of CSOs in the CG[162], participation in the Independent Oversight Body (IOB), participation in multi-stakeholder coordination mechanisms, participation in sector-/issue-/area-based working groups, and task groups, and town hall and neighborhood discussions, but does not specify institutional modalities for such participation and keeps the matter open to CSOs to figure out. The principal organizations were equally vague about the mode of selection of CSOs for the CG by using terms like self-selection, self-nomination, and self-steering selection, which implies that CSOs need to organize among themselves decide on members for the CG by consensus – even after publishing the call for expression of interest.

Moreover, the call for expression of interest by the 3RF Technical Team/Secretariat addressed more consolidated, institutionally capable, experienced CSOs and therefore decreased the likelihood for newer CSOs and not-yet-institutionalized initiatives to be represented in the 3RF due to the five criteria provided (representation, expertise, track record, capacity, inclusion, and non-partisanship). Therefore, the call for expression of interest targeted consolidated groups or groups that

---

[161] Except for Catholic organization Société de Saint Vincent de Paul which is a member of the 3RF's Consultative Group.

[162] Expert interview CSO 04, 13.12.2021

were already known and had a network. Even though this may lead to an elite bias, it decreases the likelihood that CSOs cannot participate and contribute to the CG in a meaningful/impactful way. Several interlocutors from the principal organizations described the process of selection organized by the 3RF Technical Team as clear and transparent and emphasized that the call for expression of interest was disseminated widely.[163] Even though the majority of CSOs that were selected agreed that the process was transparent, the process was less clear in reality: There is an inconsistency between the international community's narrative on the selection of CSOs as a bottom-up, participatory approach and the low degree of organization of CSOs in Lebanon. One interlocutor from the principal institutions described the selection as a "…process of self-organization: So, we were not selecting, because, of course, we want to empower civil society here. It has nothing to do with us selecting and deciding, and this has always been our attitude."[164] However, the Technical Team faced challenges to rely on a participatory process and self-selection by the CSOs and therefore decided to call for expression interest.[165] Based on a prioritized shortlist, the CSOs' nominations were supposed to be done by consensus (self-selection) or—in case no consensus could be reached—by majority vote by the CSOs that applied. However, one interlocutor from the principal organizations indicated that the self-nomination process was complicated because "it took us a lot of work with them, you know, just to bring them together because they were not used actually to work together. They are very good individual CSOs. But actually, when

---

[163] Expert interview IC 07, 27.01.2022, Expert interview IC 08, 28.01.2022, Expert interview IC 09, 10.02.2022

[164] Expert interview IC 05, 13.01.2022

[165] Expert interview IC 03, 03.12.2021

you tell them to come together to agree on something, it's not that easy."[166] Given that the lack of coordination amongst CSOs discussed above impeded the self-selection, several interlocutors from the international community mentioned that setting clear criteria for the selection[167] was crucial and emphasized two aspects: First, they described the endorsement by other CSOs as a critical criterion in the application for the CG to ensure representativeness of a wide spectrum of CSOs. And second, they emphasized that CSOs had to learn that CG membership excluded them from LFF financing due to the conflict of interest.[168]

To facilitate the selection of CSOs, the 3RF established an independent advisory group consisting of "independent experts which were Lebanese, who had a good knowledge of the local conditions and prior experiences with CSOs in Lebanon, but that were working for the international organizations, international CSOs or organizations or prior staff members of international organizations."[169] According to a member of this independent advisory group, they were tasked to ensure inclusiveness, gender balance, representation of marginalized groups and independence/non-affiliation to mainstream political groups.[170] However, the 3RF Technical Team, shortlisted 20 organizations from the pool of 60 CSOs which applied[171] to make sure that they "fulfill some minimum requirements also in the documents that an organization submitted to be considered."[172]

[166] Expert interview IC 07, 27.01.2022

[167] The international community specified five criteria: representation, expertise, track record, capacity, inclusion, and non-partisanship
[168] Expert interview IC 07, 27.01.2022, Expert interview IC 01, 29.11.2021

[169] Expert interview IC 03, 03.12.2021

[170] Expert interview CSO 15, 17.02.2022

[171] Expert interview IC 08, 28.01.2022, Expert interview IC 03, 03.12.2021

[172] Expert interview IC 08, 28.01.2022

This shortlist was handed to the independent advisory group which then reviewed the applications and shared their own assessment.[173]

However, a member of the independent advisory group indicated that the group's mandate was limited because the Technical Team had already shortlisted and separated CSOs along three categories (umbrella organization/NGO, civil society/community-based etc., and private sector and professional organizations) and provided clear criteria for selection mentioned above. One interlocutor who was a member of the advisory group described their mandate like this: "I don't think we had the decision [to impact selection criteria] simply because this was all done. And then the applications came in, and we got to choose from among the applications. There was an initial selection, and we had to see if we're okay with that or not, and then do the final selection. So it was more or less, the work had, in a way, already been done."[174] The independent advisory group unanimously voted on the selection of CSOs and assessed the selection process as smooth.[175] Interlocutors from the principal organization also described the selection process as transparent and unchallenged by the CSOs.[176] "The whole process went surprisingly smooth and the outcome was broadly accepted with very few dissenting voices. I personally, I heard maybe one or two that questioned aspects of the process, but that was really a very minimal reaction to what could have been a questioning of the process and the selection by disappointed members or outside experts. So that went very smooth."[177]

---

[173] Expert interview IC 08, 28.01.2022, Expert interview CSO 15, 17.02.2022

[174] Expert interview CSO 15, 17.02.2022

[175] Expert interview CSO 15, 17.02.2022

[176] Expert interview IC 07, 27.01.2022, Expert interview IC 03, 03.12.2021, Expert interview IC 08, 28.01.2022

[177] Expert interview IC 03, 03.12.2021

When asked about the feedback on their expressions of interest, the majority of CSOs could not recall that the Technical Team provided reasons for their selection.[178] However, many CSOs speculated that the selection was based on the work in their sector, their outreach or their coordination with other CSOs in the case of umbrella organizations or forums.[179]

There was a disaccord between CSOs regarding the selection process: Most CSOs described the selection process as transparent[180] and two CSOs assessed the process as positive, given that Lebanon lacks a database for registered NGOs.[181] Other CSOs simply criticized the "lack of professionalism"[182] during the selection and the announcement and recalled that CSOs that were not selected were frustrated with the selection process.[183] One interviewee raised the question about self-selection and argued that selection by the principal organization is the best option "because there's a lot of NGO politics" and referring to it as "burden of selection"[184] – indicating that the selection by a supposedly independent committee also raises questions of legitimacy.

Even CSOs which described the selection process as transparent criticized the lack of legitimacy of CSOs. "For the CSOs to have better legitimacy, let's say, and be

[178] Expert interview CSO 07, 19.01.2022, Expert interview CSO 02, 08.12.2021, Expert interview CSO 01, 13.12.2021, Expert interview CSO 06, 14.01.2022, Expert interview CSO 05, 14.01.2022, Expert interview CSO 09, 26.01.2022, Expert interview CSO 13, 09.02.2022

[179] Expert interview CSO 07, 19.01.2022, Expert interview CSO 02, 08.12.2021, Expert interview CSO 01, 13.12.202, Expert interview CSO 09, 26.01.2022, Expert interview CSO 14, 10.02.2022, Expert interview CSO 13, 09.02.2022

[180] Expert interview CSO 04, 13.12.2021, Expert interview CSO 12, 03.02.2022, Expert interview CSO 14, 10.02.2022, Expert interview CSO 07, 19.01.2022, Expert interview CSO 08, 25.01.2022

[181] Expert interview CSO 12, 03.02.2022, Expert interview CSO 14, 10.02.2022

[182] Expert interview CSO 08, 25.01.2022

[183] Expert interview CSO 06, 14.01.2022, Expert interview CSO 08, 25.01.2022

[184] Expert interview CSO 14, 10.02.2022

better chosen and accepted by the other CSOs, by the government, the government it's another story, but by the people, I think that we should find another way of choosing CSOs to be leading such discussions. A way that is more democratic, that is more open to maybe civil society, too, I'm not sure. But I think they should be another way."[185]

The 3RF addressed this issue of representativeness and legitimacy and aimed to ensure greater inclusion and diversity by establishing a rotational system that was backed by the independent advisory group.[186]

2. *Rotation and (Dis)Continuity*

However, the rotational system impedes the continuity and coordination of CSOs – as indicated by interlocutors from CSOs. This issue was raised and addressed to the variable extent at three different scales: the 3RF scale, the intra-rotational scale, and the scale of all the CSOs in the CG.

The Technical Team held a presentation on the selection and introduced the idea of rotation[187] which was challenged by the CSOs, as one interlocutor from the first rotation recalls: "I remember there were also some tensions in that first meeting about the rotation. A lot of people resisted that and they were telling them: Why are you doing this, we need continuity. And it's not very effective to have two people sharing the seat. And then by the time that, you know, the first CSO would have learned the ropes of how things are working and build trust with others and you're going to make them exit and bring other

---

[185] Expert interview CSO 07, 19.01.2022

[186] Expert interview IC 08, 28.01.2022, Expert interview IC 03, 03.12.2021, Expert interview CSO 15, 17.02.2022

[187] Expert interview IC 08, 28.01.2022

people."[188] However, it should be noted that while some CSOs from the second rotation welcomed the idea of the rotational system because it ensured inclusion[189], other CSOs from the second rotation criticized the rotational system because it dilutes the engagement of CSOs.[190] For example, CSOs from both the first and second rotation described initial confusion about the role of the CSOs from the second rotation which resulted in a lack of coordination between the two rotations in the beginning.[191] One CSO member of the second rotation indicated that after the selection of CSOs for the CG and the announcement of the rotational system, the second rotation was not consulted: "So at some point like after three, four months, we knew that there were two meetings, no one was coordinating with us. No one was telling us what we should be doing or how to communicate."[192]

However, the CSOs requested the 3RF to engage the CSOs from the 2nd rotation more actively for reasons of consistency: One member of a CSO from the second rotation stated: "If you want to create continuity, the minimum is that you have to know what's going on."[193] This was echoed by several CSO members from the first rotation[194], as one interlocutor put it: "So this is something that actually we requested as the civil society group. When we started to have the meeting, we challenged the 3RF with the terms of

---

[188] Expert interview CSO 08, 25.01.2022

[189] Expert interview CSO 12, 03.02.2022

[190] Expert interview CSO 11, 02.02.2022

[191] Expert interview CSO 14, 10.02.2022, Expert interview CSO 11, 02.02.2022, Expert interview CSO 02, 08.12.2021

[192] Expert interview CSO 02, 08.12.2021

[193] Expert interview CSO 02, 08.12.2021

[194] Expert interview CSO 01, 13.12.2021, Expert interview CSO 08, 25.01.2022

reference of the rotation system by telling them that it's important to have continuity and to ensure that the rotation number two, that is coming after us, […] that there is a proper continuity in the discussion. So that's why we requested that the people, the organizations from the second rotation would be allowed to attend the Consultative Group as observers."[195] The Technical Team answered this requested and started to invite CSOs from the second rotation as observers "to ensure institutional memory."[196]

The CSOs from the second rotation had divergent perceptions about their role, ranging from observers as described by the principal organizations to active members: "Our role is not having first round, or second round, it's really [to] actively engage with the donors, with the government and being out and loud and clear on how we can tackle the biggest problems that Lebanon is facing in this crazy time."[197] In contrast, another interlocutor representing a CSO in the second rotation said: "So our role as observers is practically nothing. We're just attending the meetings, so we attended the General Council meeting at the Serail two weeks ago. But we had nothing to do, we didn't have to speak, the goal was to be aware of what was going on and prepare ourselves for the day when we will be in charge."[198] The status of an observer was echoed by another CSO from the second rotation who emphasized that participating as an observer facilitated the "handover process so that we understand what the first group was working on, […] to know what are the things that we need to continue."[199]

---

[195] Expert interview CSO 01, 13.12.2021

[196] Expert interview IC 03, 03.12.2021

[197] Expert interview CSO 02, 08.12.2021

[198] Expert interview CSO 03, 03.12.2021

[199] Expert interview CSO 11, 02.02.2022

Despite succeeding in including the rotation in 3RF processes both at the 3RF scale and the scale of the CSO group, some CSOs from the second rotation expressed frustration about their delayed inclusion because they missed CG meetings.[200] One CSO member from the second rotation mentioned: "it was a bit late for us to get in"[201] after the 3RF Secretariat invited the second group as observers and that his CSO only started to attend meetings in November 2021. Yet another interlocutor from the second rotation explained that the lack of coordination in the initial phase complicates the rotation: "It's the handover process we are struggling with. And when you come to an already established work, you would feel like you're an intruder, you're not understanding things. So, I don't think there's good facilitation of the shift of work between the two rotation."[202]

However, it should be noted that there are varying degrees of coordination between CSOs from the first and second rotation at the level of intra-CSO coordination[203], and that the feeling of intrusion expressed by one interlocuter is at one end of the spectrum. In contrast, another CSO from the second rotation indicated that they were partnering with the CSO they were sharing a seat with from the first rotation.[204] The CSO from the first rotation echoed this statement and mentioned meetings and sharing information with the CSO from the second rotation for a joint positioning starting in

---

[200] Expert interview CSO 06, 14.01.2022

[201] Expert interview CSO 06, 14.01.2022

[202] Expert interview CSO 11, 02.02.2022

[203] Two explanations for varying degrees of coordination between first and second rotation is personal relations and how the CSOs sharing a seat were grouped. If the CSOs sharing a seat work in the same sector, they were more likely to coordinate and even knew each other or collaborated before (Expert interview CSO 08, 25.01.2022 and Expert interview CSO 03, 03.12.2021). One CSO member from the first rotation stated that there was no CSO in the second rotation working on the same issue (environment) which also raises questions about the representativeness and continuity. (Expert interview CSO 14, 10.02.2022).

[204] Expert interview CSO 03, 03.12.2021

March 2021.[205] However, other CSOs from the first rotation indicated not being proactively coordinating with the CSO they were sharing a seat with.[206] At the scale of meetings with all the CSOs, several CSOs stated that the co-chair of the CSOs was inviting the second rotation – to ensure continuity and to facilitate the hand-over process.[207]

3. *Positionality: Projects or Reforms?*

Examining the motivation of CSOs to join the CG is an entry point to draw conclusions on the composition and representativeness of the CG as well as the reform issues and sectors CSOs might advocate for. When asked about the expression of interest, the CSOs mainly provided two different reasons for their motivation: Policy-making and implementation of projects. Several interlocutors emphasized that their organization's motivation to join the CG stems equally from both the reform aspect and the implementation or service provision on the ground.[208]

Even though several CSOs stated to aim for both reform and implementation, the division between influencing policies and work "on the ground" is a dividing line that fragments the CSOs of the CG. This claim was implicitly and explicitly supported by several CSOs. One interviewee described the fragmentation of the CG in that regard: "Because the agenda is reform and reconstruction. And some people are focused on the

---

[205] Expert interview CSO 08, 25.01.2022

[206] Expert interview CSO 07, 19.01.2022, Expert interview CSO 05, 14.01.2022

[207] Expert interview CSO 01, 13.12.2021, Expert interview CSO 08, 25.01.2022, Expert interview CSO 06, 14.01.2022, Expert interview CSO 04, 13.12.2021, Expert interview CSO 14, 10.02.2022

[208] Expert interview CSO 02, 08.12.2021, Expert interview CSO 14, 10.02.2022, Expert interview CSO 13, 09.02.2022, Expert interview CSO 11, 02.02.2022

reconstruction and some people on reform. And I think this is, so it's not only sectoral division in relation to themes but also type of work that they want to focus on."[209]

CSOs that focus on the implementation aspect presented themselves as close to the community and knowing its needs. Two CSOs assessed the selection of CSOs for the CG against the backdrop of their work on the ground[210] and found that some CSOs were included "for reason of diversity" but did not know "what was going on on the ground to give real and concrete and realistic feedback."[211] Another CSO with the self-image of being 'on the ground' and a main interest in implementation mentioned access to information about funding for recovery and the aspiration to be known as an active and experienced CSO by the donors as a motivation.[212]

One interlocutor reflected on the influence on policymakers but also emphasized service provision and the access to information as a motivation: "We don't only provide the services, the services are the basis for all the policies that we call for or we lobby for, laws and all these issues. […] That's why we were interested in following up on the policies and that the World Bank, the UN, and the EU are forecasting for Lebanon. So we thought that we should be there in order to know what's going on, influence if we can have any influence."[213]

Some CSOs emphasized that commitments of the 3RF were inherent to their mandate, like monitoring aid, the compliance of the recovery with human rights

[209] Expert interview CSO 14, 10.02.2022

[210] Expert interview CSO 03, 03.12.2021, Expert interview CSO 02, 08.12.2021

[211] Expert interview CSO 02, 08.12.2021

[212] Expert interview CSO 09, 26.01.2022

[213] Expert interview CSO 13, 09.02.2022

conventions, general reform and governance issues, action research, and urban recovery.[214]

Several CSOs perceived the 3RF and their membership in the CG as an opportunity to push for reforms and influence policymaking because "we need to be present in these gatherings to influence more and be in several discussions. So it was interesting for us to have our views as one shared on the table and be part of the discussion."[215] Or as one interlocutor phrased it: "So that's why the reform aspect of the work is very important for us. We want also a lot of things related to decentralization of decision-making, decentralization of structure, institutional structure. We want several reforms issued, and then, inclusiveness is very important in developing national strategies and plans. And so the 3RF actually provided also a model of this inclusiveness to a certain extent, there's question marks about success, inclusiveness, but it is a good start. We are happy that they are trying to invest with CSOs in certain decision-making aspects."[216]

Another interlocutor described the motivation for a seat in the CG vis-à-vis international organizations influencing the reform agenda: "I thought that this was also a very good platform for the recommendations that we would be generating from our study, to reach the policymakers and that we would be in a position where we would really be able to influence policymaking, given the landscape where international organizations and CSOs are dominating the process of urban recovery."[217]

---

[214] Expert interview CSO 11, 02.02.2022, Expert interview CSO 07, 19.01.2022, Expert interview CSO 08, 25.01.2022

[215] Expert interview CSO 06, 14.01.2022

[216] Expert interview CSO 14, 10.02.2022

[217] Expert interview CSO 08, 25.01.2022

The motivation of CSOs to join the CG also reflects their position towards the public institutions and the state: Many CSOs described a sense of duty or responsibility to provide expertise[218] as a key reason for the expression of interest to join the CG, and described the efforts of CSOs as "state-building from scratch"[219], which raises questions about the intention of CSOs to substitute the state. However, many CSOs also rejected the "state of the NGOs" and emphasized the importance to strengthen cooperation with public institutions,[220] as one CSO representative phrased it: "We all know that the donor organizations have less trust in public authorities and today are pushing more for civil society funding. But in a sense, we need to bridge this and have the endorsement of the government ministries or officials and have them on board to eventually ease up and facilitate our work. You don't want government officials to be, you know, fighting you on this. It's not a competition, but it's rather a collaboration that we're aiming to reach and put on the table the input of everybody."[221]

Moreover, one CSO also mentioned the risk of co-optation by international organizations: "We were also quite conscious that we could get instrumentalized by the international organizations, and used as a token to legitimize policies that we might not always agree with. So we were not 100% sure that we wanted to go inside there to do this. Because of that risk of being co-opted." However, before applying to the CG the

---

[218] Expert interview CSO 05, 14.01.2022, Expert interview CSO 02, 08.12.2021, Expert interview CSO 04, 13.12.2021, Expert interview CSO 11, 02.02.2022

[219] Expert interview CSO 02, 08.12.2021

[220] Expert interview CSO 12, 03.02.2022, Expert interview CSO 10, 01.02.2022, Expert interview CSO 05, 14.01.2022, Expert interview CSO 11, 02.02.2022, Expert interview CSO 14, 10.02.2022, Expert interview CSO 06, 14.01.2022,

[221] Expert interview CSO 06, 14.01.2022

CSO internally debated this issue and concluded that the opportunity to advocate for reforms overweighed the threats.[222]

In sum, the CSOs' motivation to join the CG is circumstantial evidence for their fragmentation along several lines: their focus on policymaking and reform or orientation on service provision, their alignment on or opposition to collaboration with state institutions, their alignment or non-alignment with donors.

4.   *On Coherence*

When asked how they would assess the coherence of the CG, all the interlocutors described the group of CSOs in the CG as coherent or partially coherent. They provided different reasons for this assessment. One interlocutor emphasized the "holistic approach with the Beirut blast response" as an example of the coherence but expressed disappointment with the slow implementation.[223] Several CSOs stated that the group of CSOs in the CG is gradually becoming more coherent and referred to the coordination in the CG as a learning curve.[224] However, they also emphasized the need to further improve coherence: "We have to be much more coherent, in order really to constitute a political force. CSOs are not a political force."[225]

Four interlocutors mentioned the work and expertise in different sectors in relation to the coherence of the group of CSOs in the CG: One member stated that

---

[222] Expert interview CSO 08, 25.01.2022

[223] Expert interview CSO 01, 13.12.2021

[224] Expert interview CSO 02, 08.12.2021, Expert interview CSO 06, 14.01.2022, Expert interview CSO 09, 26.01.2022, Expert interview CSO 03, 03.12.2021

[225] Expert interview CSO 03, 03.12.2021

different expertise was not constraining coherence[226], whereas the other three interlocutors argued that it limits the coherence because "these sectors are not interconnected."[227]

Another interlocutor assessed the coherence of the group of CSOs in terms of thematic and regional focus: "I think the problem is that most of them are Beirut based. […] I think, you know, the experiment is set up in a way that all of these people that sit there, including us, are very privileged. Right. So they are universities, think tanks, NGOs. So in that sense, it's a coherent group."[228] Similarly, another CSO member pointed to the detrimental effect of coherence and described the group to be "too coherent" – adding: "You need to have some controversy because this is how things change. […] If everyone's agreeing in principle on everything, that's too much coherence."[229]

This statement is in line with the "sense of cooperative atmosphere"[230] amongst CSOs that most interlocutors described. In case of disputes, they were resolved[231] because "we have to put our differences aside and try to have a common understanding and a common ask, have a minimum amount of things that we want to see happening."[232]

---

[226] Expert interview CSO 11, 02.02.2022

[227] Expert interview CSO 13, 09.02.2022, Expert interview CSO 03, 03.12.2021, Expert interview CSO 14, 10.02.2022

[228] Expert interview CSO 12, 03.02.2022

[229] Expert interview CSO 14, 10.02.2022

[230] Expert interview CSO 14, 10.02.2022

[231] Expert interview CSO 05, 14.01.2022, Expert interview CSO 01, 13.12.2021, Expert interview CSO 11, 02.02.2022, Expert interview CSO 14, 10.02.2022

[232] Expert interview CSO 01, 13.12.2021

However, some CSOs indicated that there were some tensions between CSOs based on generational differences.[233] Another interlocutor read these tensions as "ego issues" rather than conflict between generations.[234] Some CSOs members pointed to competitiveness amongst CSOs, that is also reflected in 3RF processes which pressured CSOs to distinguish themselves[235] and "need to feel that they're pushing more than others."[236]

Even though many interviewees described a high level of coordination and a collaborative dynamic amongst CSOs in the CG, they referred to structural reasons that lead to tensions amongst CSOs – both at the national scale and the 3RF scale:[237] One interlocutor stated that there was tension because the selection process of the co-chair representing the CSOs in the CG was not clear.[238] Regarding tensions caused by structures at the national scale, one CSO member stated: "All in all I think there's been a high level of coordination. It's not perfect, because the way that the political system is set up, it fragments you. So every time you want to do something, you need data, you need resources, there is always this episodical mobilization. So I think that there is also a lot of competition, there is a lot of tension. Not because people don't want to coordinate but because it's fragmented as such that you end up looking out for yourself, and a system that's trying to kill you, either shut you down or steal your money, steal your data."[239]

---

[233] Expert interview CSO 02, 08.12.2021, Expert interview CSO 08, 25.01.2022

[234] Expert interview CSO 03, 03.12.2021

[235] Expert interview CSO 04, 13.12.2021, Expert interview CSO 03, 03.12.2021

[236] Expert interview CSO 03, 03.12.2021

[237] Expert interview CSO 12, 03.02.2022, Expert interview CSO 11, 02.02.2022

[238] Expert interview CSO 11, 02.02.2022

[239] Expert interview CSO 12, 03.02.2022

Tensions amongst CSOs were also witnessed by representatives of the international community, one interlocutor remarked: "It feels more hostile. I think there's like more built up bitterness between some of the groups." The interlocutor went on describing how CSOs "turned on each other" on several occasions.[240]

Three CSOs expressed their views critically on the issue of coherence by raising questions about the representativeness of the group of CSOs in the CG and the power relations amongst them: One interlocutor argued that the group of CSOs managed to present coherent messages or recommendations the 3RF stakeholders, which was, however the result of strong collaboration between a few CSO which had more capacity: "The lack of coherence is not necessarily because of tensions or of lack of willingness to be coherent, but it might be also related to conditions of work that are very difficult, and to the volunteering aspect of CSOs serving on this 3RF."[241]

The lack of capacity was a recurring theme in interviews with CSOs as a constraint to attend and follow up all the meetings[242], whereas others indicated that they have the human capacity to involve multiple individuals in 3RF work or the financial capacity to hire new individuals.[243] One CSO member reflected that their financial and human capacity "puts us in a peculiar position"[244] and argued that in terms of active contribution to the CG, CSOs have different resources: "Then you see that the CG is very much dominated by one CSO which has the tools to work and write, and who has the time

[240] Expert interview IC 09, 10.02.2022

[241] Expert interview CSO 08, 25.01.2022

[242] Expert interview CSO 14, 10.02.2022, Expert interview CSO 09, 26.01.2022, Expert interview CSO 13, 09.02.2022

[243] Expert interview CSO 02, 08.12.2021, Expert interview CSO 06, 14.01.2022, Expert interview CSO 08, 25.01.2022

[244] Expert interview CSO 08, 25.01.2022

to do it [preparing a presentation, A/N] versus others who don't have time to even read an email and reflect on it."[245] The distinction of CSOs in terms of financial and human capacity could also be validated based on participatory observation in terms of the equipment and location of offices and the number of staff. Moreover, when asked about their professional trajectory, some interviewees indicated working for their CSO part-time or volunteering, whereas other CSO members were more experienced in working with donors and advocacy in multi-stakeholder platforms or at the international level due to prior consultancy or other professional experiences.

5. *Discussion*

As demonstrated, the mode of CSOs' engagement in the CG shows lack of coordination, top-down selection process, rotational system leading to discontinuity, a CG including distinct positionalities among CSOs and a CG with main incoherence among CSOs. Hence, the 3RF institutional design contributes to fragmenting CSOs in the CG – knowing that CSOs are already fragmented in Lebanon as discussed before.

While the CSOs perceived the 3RF in a positive way and as an opportunity to influence policymaking at a high level, several factors consolidated their fragmentation like the selection and rotational system. Despite internal efforts for exchange with the second rotation, the rotational system consolidates the fragmentation because it separates the CSOs and disrupts the continuity of their actions within the 3RF. An analysis of the selection process reveals that 3RF representatives maintain the narrative of self-selection and bottom-up empowerment of CSOs, except for one interlocutor from the principal organizations who stated that "there was a really genuine effort to try and make sure it

---

[245] Expert interview CSO 08, 25.01.2022

was a competitive process"[246] and therefore, acknowledging the competitive aspect of the selection process that complicates participatory approaches for self-nomination. The lack of coordination between CSOs that impeded the self-selection is rooted in structural constraints, competition for funding, and dependency on donors (Beisheim, Ellersiek and Lorch, 2018), but the 3RF enhanced coordination among CSOs to some extent.

The 3RF's narrative of "self-selection" is challenged by the CSOs who perceived it more as a top-down effort. Despite delegating the selection to an independent advisory group consisting of local experts who are familiar with the CSO landscape, the selection process was significantly facilitated by the 3RF representatives by drafting the call for expression of interest, setting criteria, and creating a shortlist of applicants. This raises questions about the quality of ownership (Lie, 2019).

Therefore, the 3RF can be considered as a continuity of donor policies in Lebanon that aims at funding Lebanese CSOs that are institutionally consolidated and promote democracy and citizenship promotion based on a Western understanding (Nagel and Staeheli, 2015; Facon, 2021). This reflects the contradiction of empowering local stakeholders through a top-down process and "targeting the 'local' actors who can fit – or be made to fit – within a global system, regardless of how different local governance structures already function" (International Institute of Social Studies, 2020).

This closely relates to another issue of the selection process: the elite bias. CSOs with more capacities were more likely to be chosen. This observation is in line with literature professionalization of CSOs, "NGO-ization", and the alignment of NGOs with donors (Jeffrey, 2012; Sukarieh and Tannock, 2015; Harb, 2018; Fawaz and Harb, 2020; Facon, 2021).

---

[246] Expert interview IC 09, 10.02.2022

The fact that CSOs "fill the gap left by the absence of the state" (Haddad, 2017, p. 1757) is also reflected in the composition of the CG because CSOs felt pressure to provide services that put an additional burden on already stretched resources which are intensified by the crisis. The CSOs represented in the CG could be categorized as service providers and reformists. On the one hand, the service providers claimed to be more connected to the community's needs (Kamat, 2004; Arda and Banerjee, 2019), whereas reformists focused on "achieving incremental wins" (Khneisser, 2020, p. 364). Despite criticizing the political-sectarian elite, many CSOs did not seem to fear co-optation or repression from public institutions (Clark and Zahar, 2015, p. 15) but rather from the international community which demonstrates the awareness of donor-led approaches.

B.   Effectiveness of CSOS to Initiate Reforms

I turn now to assessing the effectiveness of CSOs in the 3RF's Consultative Group, by looking at internal and external determinants of effectiveness. The former includes processes of deliberations as well as capacities and resources of CSOs. For the latter, I discuss communication as well as modalities that may enable reforms and accountabilities such as role definition, bylaws and ToRs, and sectoral coordination tools. I argue that both internal and external factors constrain the effectiveness of CSOs to initiate reform. I define internal determinants as factors within the margin of maneuver of CSOs or, in other words, their agency to reconfigure governance structures. In contrast, I refer to external determinants of effectiveness as factors outside the scope of CSOs' agency.

1.   *Internal Determinants of (In)Effectiveness*

As discussed previously, the agency of political actors to reshape governance structures should not be disregarded and CSOs and activist groups have a long-standing history to push for transformative change in Lebanon. In this section, I discuss CSOs as governance actors in the 3RF by examining the internal determinants of (in)effectiveness.

a. Processes of Deliberations

Several CSOs praised the work of the co-chair in coordinating the CSOs[247] which was echoed by the international community who also commended the efforts of the CSOs' co-chair.[248]

---

[247] Expert interview CSO 05, 14.01.2022, Expert interview CSO 09, 26.01.2022, Expert interview CSO 12, 03.02.2022

[248] Expert interview IC 02, 09.12.2021

CSOs described three main tasks of the co-chair who 1) serves as an important focal point who was in close contact with the 3RF Secretariat, 2) organizes meetings for outreach and prioritizing of action items, 3) collects feedback from the CSOs in meetings and via email to draft her speech in CG meetings, to report to the 3RF, and to present recommendations.[249] However, some CSOs from the second rotation criticized the lack of transparency during the election of the co-chair on behalf of the CSOs because they were not involved in the election.[250][251]

Interlocutors from civil society stated that the co-chair organized meetings among CSOs from the CG frequently.[252] Multiple CSOs described their deliberations positively and stressed that the CSOs of the CG were aligned on the central issues. CSOs used phrases like "deliberative effort", "minimum consensus", and "collaborative work" when describing the coordination amongst CSOs, e.g. when talking about gender issues or drafting the ToRs for the CMU.[253] Moreover, words used by CSOs to describe their deliberations included "open discussion"[254], "platform for exchange" and "solid consultation."[255] Other CSOs stated that the CSOs' co-chair engages in outreach and invites multiple stakeholders to meetings, which the co-chair either knows personally or

---

[249] Expert interview CSO 03, 03.12.2021, Expert interview CSO 04, 13.12.2021, Expert interview CSO 08, 25.01.2022, Expert interview CSO 05, 14.01.2022, Expert interview CSO 07, 19.01.2022, Expert interview CSO 12, 03.02.2022, Expert interview CSO 13, 09.02.2022, Expert interview CSO 14, 10.02.2022

[250] Expert interview CSO 01, 13.12.2021, Expert interview CSO 02, 08.12.2021

[251] There is a lack of clarity about the eligibility to be serve as a co-chair and about the co-chair's rotation.
[252] Expert interview CSO 03, 03.12.2021, Expert interview CSO 07, 19.01.2022, Expert interview CSO 01, 13.12.2021

[253] Expert interview CSO 12, 03.02.2022, Expert interview CSO 11, 02.02.2022

[254] Expert interview CSO 01, 13.12.2021, Expert interview CSO 09, 26.01.2022

[255] Expert interview CSO 05, 14.01.2022

which were recommended by other CSOs to expand the network.[256] Many CSOs referred to meetings in Beirut Digital District in October 2021 organized by the co-chair.[257] Those meetings were organized along the four pillars of the 3RF and their aim was to come up with priorities and recommendations to the 3RF[258] and several CSOs described the discussions as productive because the CSOs agreed on the input they wanted to provide to the 3RF.[259]

However, other CSOs indicated that the discussions were too abstract and did not provide concrete recommendations or strategies for reforms.[260] Another interlocutor described the turnout as "impressive" and the debate as "very rich, in the sense of human capital", but indicated that the meetings lacked clear organization.[261] Even though those meetings were described as "ad hoc"[262], CSOs stated that one positive outcome of those meetings was to introduce CSOs to each other and group them based on their expertise/sector which led to new coalitions of CSOs advocating for specific projects or reforms or priorities.[263]

---

[256] Expert interview CSO 08, 25.01.2022, Expert interview CSO 09, 26.01.2022, Expert interview CSO 04, 13.12.2021, Expert interview CSO 03, 03.12.2021, Expert interview IC 02, 09.12.2021

[257] Expert interview CSO 07, 19.01.2022, Expert interview CSO 09, 26.01.2022, Expert interview CSO 02, 08.12.2021, Expert interview CSO 14, 10.02.2022, Expert interview CSO 08, 25.01.2022, Expert interview CSO 13, 09.02.2022, Expert interview CSO 06, 14.01.2022

[258] Expert interview CSO 07, 19.01.2022

[259] Expert interview CSO 14, 10.02.2022, Expert interview CSO 06, 14.01.2022, Expert interview CSO 03, 03.12.2021

[260] Expert interview CSO 02, 08.12.2021

[261] Expert interview CSO 08, 25.01.2022

[262] Expert interview IC 02, 09.12.2021

[263] Expert interview CSO 04, 13.12.2021, Expert interview CSO 08, 25.01.2022

However, despite the participatory approach, some CSOs were frustrated that the meetings among CSOs were not well moderated and lacked prioritization, tangible action points, and follow-up.[264] CSOs described the meetings as "chaotic"[265] and "poorly organized" and not "conceived well and effectively", and CSOs questioned "how productive and impactful they were" but welcomed the intention.[266] Moreover, interlocutors were lamenting that CSOs advocacy was organized in a "loose manner" and that at those meetings no one is "systematically keeping time, or clarifying what are the rules of order, how do people speak, when, how much time each person has, preventing people from interrupting, so the rules of the meetings have never been clarified by anybody, nor by the 3RF, nor by the co-chair." In addition, the leadership of those meetings were unclear because it was not clear if the CSOs' co-chair or the 3RF Secretariat was moderating.[267] One interlocutor stated that some CSOs were "pushing every day to make it much more professional, to have that sort of timing, droit de parole, timing for people to share their ideas, to create, agenda set before and having feedback from everyone. And since it's done on a voluntary basis, and like some people lack the professional side of how they can discuss things together […]. So, we're pushing hard to make them much more professional and efficient."[268]

---

[264] Expert interview CSO 02, 08.12.2021, Expert interview CSO 07, 19.01.2022, Expert interview CSO 08, 25.01.2022

[265] Expert interview CSO 02, 08.12.2021

[266] Expert interview CSO 08, 25.01.2022

[267] Expert interview CSO 08, 25.01.2022

[268] Expert interview CSO 02, 08.12.2021

<u>b. Capacity and Resources</u>

Several CSOs indicated that the voluntary aspect of CSO inclusion in the 3RF constrains the effectiveness because CSOs sometimes lack the capacity to follow up or be actively involved, mostly due to a lack of human resources.[269] Two CSO members described their project implementation and service provision on the ground in combination with their lack of human resources as a limiting factor for the CSO's active involvement in the 3RF and participation in meetings.[270] However, some CSOs who mentioned lack of capacity stated that they had more resources to work on 3RF related issues compared to other CSOs in the 3RF and that they were able to delegate work or hire new staff if they personally did not have the capacity.[271]

In terms of sector working groups, one interlocutor stated that she had thought that the CSO involvement was limited to a consultative, advisory role: "So, I wasn't up for that kind of level of commitment, to be honest."[272]

When it comes to effective coordination amongst CSOs in general, one CSO member indicated that CSOs' scarce resources limit their ability to coordinate and argued that incentivizing CSOs to coordinate more could solve this issue.[273] Similarly, another interlocutor stated that the budget for coordination could have compensated and absorbed the capacity constraints and facilitated the coordination.[274]

---

[269] Expert interview CSO 01, 13.12.2021, Expert interview CSO 02, 08.12.2021, Expert interview CSO 03, 03.12.2021, Expert interview CSO 13, 09.02.2022, Expert interview CSO 14, 10.02.2022

[270] Expert interview CSO 09, 26.01.2022, Expert interview CSO 09, 26.01.2022, Expert interview CSO 13, 09.02.2022

[271] Expert interview CSO 05, 14.01.2022, Expert interview CSO 08, 25.01.2022

[272] Expert interview CSO 12, 03.02.2022

[273] Expert interview CSO 11, 02.02.2022

[274] Expert interview CSO 14, 10.02.2022

One interlocutor stated that capacity deficits of the CSOs delayed the understanding of the 3RF processes and structures and argued that more regular updates would be useful:[275] "Because what happens is that suddenly they send all these documents with like detailed [information]," adding: "a lot of amount of information that we need to review in like five days."[276] Moreover, the CSO member described a capacity gap between donor representatives and CSOs – according to him, the donor representatives were more familiar with the 3RF structures, while it took the CSOs a significant amount of time to understand the structures and processes.[277]

However, when asked about the access to information for CSOs, representatives from the international community expressed a mismatch between CSOs' demand to receive more information and the CSOs' reaction to receiving information: "I think they did say 'this is too detailed, like, how do you expect me to have time to go through this?' So, it was just interesting, because I think, you know, that it was just kind of a gut reaction of 'we need more information'. And then we share, and they'd be like 'oh god, this is too much work'" – adding that coordination and partnership was transaction heavy.[278]Another interlocutor from a principal organization stated that the CSOs suddenly got an opportunity to take part in policy discussion, but were not focused enough and lacked the capacity to be involved in everything.[279]

[275] Expert interview CSO 14, 10.02.2022

[276] Expert interview CSO 14, 10.02.2022

[277] Expert interview CSO 14, 10.02.2022

[278] Expert interview IC 09, 10.02.2022

[279] Expert interview IC 07, 27.01.2022

When asked about the frequency of their participation in 3RF meetings, most CSOs stated to participate regularly. However, some interlocutors revealed to be more on the "receiving end" without active participation. Interestingly, this was the case for both first- and second-rotation CSOs. There were different reasons for the lack of participation. One CSOs stated that the high-level CG meetings were held in English which was a barrier to actively participate.[280] Another reason provided was the lack of time and resources to prioritize 3RF meetings.[281] Besides the lack of capacity to participate, CSOs from the second rotation indicated that they did not know if active participation was expected from them or provided their membership in the second rotation as a reason for not attending yet.[282] Some also stated that the lack of information about the second rotation CSOs' role delayed or limited their participation.[283] In one case, a technical reason prevented a CSO from the second rotation to get regular updates via emails.[284]

2. *External Determinants of (In)Effectiveness*

<u>a. Communication</u>

I will discuss insufficient communication which includes the flow of information, follow-up on action points, and online meetings.

---

[280] Expert interview CSO 09, 26.01.2022

[281] Expert interview CSO 13, 09.02.2022, Expert interview CSO 09, 26.01.2022

[282] Expert interview CSO 12, 03.02.2022

[283] Expert interview CSO 11, 02.02.2022, Expert interview CSO 03, 03.12.2021, Expert interview CSO 06, 14.01.2022

[284] Expert interview CSO 11, 02.02.2022

<u>i. Flow of Information</u>

Several CSOs indicated that the flow of information should be improved to enhance the CG's effectiveness. Several CSOs criticized that the principal organizations/Technical Team did not provide sufficient information on the rotational system and the overall institutional architecture.[285] Some CSOs indicated that they did not know whom to reach out for to clarify issues or indicated that a website or other information-sharing platform would facilitate the work and increase effectiveness.[286] Other CSOs indicated that they were not receiving regular updates on institutional reforms like the CMU[287] or 3RF projects, like the B5 fund.[288] "We expect, at the end to be receiving such information without requesting them, because we are part of the structure. This is still not happening. […] But we're not supposed to request because also our role is to consult, so we're a consultative group. So, basically to be able to give our input, we should be aware of what's going on."[289] Many CSOs criticized the lack of information on working groups.[290] While there were some CSOs which described the information flow as positive,[291] one CSO did not receive updates for technical reasons[292] and others argued that flow of information should be improved: "Communication could

---

[285] Expert interview CSO 02, 08.12.2021, Expert interview CSO 07, 19.01.2022, Expert interview CSO 11, 02.02.2022, Expert interview CSO 14, 10.02.2022

[286] Expert interview CSO 14, 10.02.2022, Expert interview CSO 07, 19.01.2022, Expert interview CSO 08, 25.01.2022

[287] Expert interview CSO 14, 10.02.2022

[288] Expert interview CSO 07, 19.01.2022

[289] Expert interview CSO 07, 19.01.2022

[290] Expert interview CSO 14, 10.02.2022, Expert interview CSO 11, 02.02.2022, Expert interview CSO 07, 19.01.2022

[291] Expert interview CSO 12, 03.02.2022

[292] Expert interview CSO 11, 02.02.2022

be coordinated better, flow of information could be coordinated better. The resources, I think 3RF should put resources to this coordination."[293] The 3RF addressed the lack of information and confusion about 3RF structures by establishing or staffing the Secretariat which supports the 3RF stakeholders technically, schedules meetings on a regular basis and to facilitates the exchange.[294] Several interlocutors from civil society stated that the 3RF Secretariat improved the flow of information and emphasized the Secretariat's responsiveness[295], as one CSO member phrased it: "Now there's the Secretariat. But this is also recent, because before that, we didn't know. I mean, it's not that we didn't know. We have the co-chair that we send emails to, and she manages to you know, try to contact the principals etc. But it was much more difficult before. Now it's easier with the Secretariat."[296]

Even though one interlocutor stated that the Technical Team/Secretariat was tasked to ensure that information was available and expectations were clear,[297] other representatives from the international community indicated that information sharing in the 3RF had limitations. One interlocutor stated that she could not disclose all information, but only information relevant to 3RF projects due to the policies of her organization.[298] Another interlocutor emphasized the importance of information sharing

---

[293] Expert interview CSO 14, 10.02.2022.

[294] Expert interview IC 05, 13.01.2022, Expert interview IC 09, 10.02.2022, Expert interview IC 02, 09.12.2021, Expert interview IC 03, 03.12.2021

[295] Expert interview CSO 04, 13.12.2021, Expert interview CSO 01, 13.12.2021, Expert interview CSO 11, 02.02.2022, Expert interview CSO 07, 19.01.2022, Expert interview CSO 05, 14.01.2022, Expert interview CSO 08, 25.01.2022

[296] Expert interview CSO 07, 19.01.2022

[297] Expert interview IC 08, 28.01.2022

[298] Expert interview IC 07, 27.01.2022

and criticized that the 3RF initially did not intend to create an information management support to collect information from the ground.[299]

ii. Follow-up

Several CSOs described the follow-up on CSOs' recommendations or new governance structures by 3RF stakeholders as insufficient.[300] One interviewee criticized the lack of visibility on how the work of CSOs contributed to or impacted 3RF related projects: "When we give our comments and input, we don't know where it goes, we're not sure it's taken into consideration."[301] Another example is the sector coordination: Two CSO representatives and one interlocutor from the international community described that the hiatus of existing sector working groups and the lack of follow-up until the next Consultative Group meeting:[302] "The 3RF Secretariat shared with us a few, maybe a week before the general meeting, a laundry list of reforms asking us to comment on it. And there were back and forth over email about how this, I mean, we cannot comment on a document like this that we received that late and without any follow-up in between. So, it wasn't very effective, I would say, that approach from the international community to engage CSOs and their sectoral discussions. It got cut short."[303]

Therefore, CSOs stated that more regular updates were crucial to improving the effectiveness.[304] One representative from civil society criticized the statement-based

---

[299] Expert interview IC 04, 07.12.2021

[300] Expert interview CSO 07, 19.01.2022, Expert interview CSO 13, 09.02.2022

[301] Expert interview CSO 07, 19.01.2022

[302] Expert interview CSO 08, 25.01.2022, Expert interview IC 04, 07.12.2021, Expert interview CSO 13, 09.02.2022

[303] Expert interview CSO 08, 25.01.2022

[304] Expert interview CSO 14, 10.02.2022

approach during 3RF meetings that impeded proper follow-up and feedback: "I can make a statement. But again, it's not clear how it's captured. So, you need to follow up on the side. And this is about civil society's experience and knowledge on how to influence processes and how to make change."[305] He added: "And so there wasn't a discussion. Statement done. Move on. Minutes come later on. You see it in the minutes. Okay, good, it's in the minutes, how it was translated into like, really, how did it impact, I am not sure."[306]

iii. Virtuality

Several interlocutors both from CSO and the international community described that holding meetings online was a limiting factor for their effectiveness.[307] One interviewee summarized it like this: "You don't even have the body language and, you know, the cues that would help you understand these dynamics better, or, you know, a side conversation where it would convert to clarify this."[308] Another interlocutor stated that "there should be days of workshops, and now maybe now, it's easier now with situation of COVID-19 to organize these things, where we can also interact with the various stakeholders existing, especially the donors, as well as the principles. Because we need deep discussions on so many issues."[309]

---

[305] Expert interview CSO 14, 10.02.2022

[306] Expert interview CSO 14, 10.02.2022

[307] Expert interview CSO 14, 10.02.2022, Expert interview CSO 11, 02.02.2022, Expert interview IC 04, 07.12.2021, Expert interview CSO 08, 25.01.2022

[308] Expert interview CSO 08, 25.01.2022

[309] Expert interview CSO 14, 10.02.2022

b. Modalities for Reforms and Accountability

As discussed previously, clear governance structures matter for effectiveness of country platforms in order to initiate reforms and hold donors and the government accountable. In what follows, I discuss governance aspects of the aid architecture by assessing role definition for CSOs, terms of reference and bylaws for the CG and modalities for sectoral coordination.

i. Role Definition

One limiting factor for the CSOs' effectiveness to push for reforms is the lack of clear structures and roles. Many CSOs criticized the lack of clear institutional structures, as one interlocutor phrased it: "Why not having clear governance on how the members of the CSOs in the CG that got selected could like have this dynamic between rotation one and two, and clear understanding of how we can all have an active role."[310] Two interlocutors from the CSOs stated that the relation with other institutional bodies of the 3RF was not clear at the beginning and still needed to be clarified – in particular the relation with and role of the Independent Oversight Board.[311] One interlocutor also stated that it was not clear "how the work of the CG is indeed impacting the projects on the ground."[312] Several interlocutors indicated that the role of the CSOs in the CG was not clear.[313] One CSO member raised questions about the impact of CSOs on reforms and projects and indicated that CSO engagement should not be an end in itself: "Are we in

---

[310] Expert interview CSO 02, 08.12.2021.

[311] Expert interview CSO 07, 19.01.2022, Expert interview CSO 11, 02.02.2022

[312] Expert interview CSO 07, 19.01.2022

[313] Expert interview CSO 03, 03.12.2021, Expert interview CSO 11, 02.02.2022, Expert interview CSO 07, 19.01.2022, Expert interview CSO 14, 10.02.2022

the process of organizing the civil society, just for the sake of organizing the civil society or boosting the NGOs to become experts in NGO management?"[314] He emphasized that the role of CSOs should be defined. Another CSO representative claimed: "Now, you're asking me, what's our role? Up until today, we don't really know what the role is. Actually, the 3RF was practically in a limbo for a year."[315] This was echoed by interlocutors from the principal organizations: "The role for CSOs was so broad, but also they were different perceptions that they were going to be getting involved in, like the monitoring of specific projects."[316] This interlocutor later added that besides the role of the CSOs, the structures and aims of the 3RF in general were too broad and unclear: "People haven't come to a common understanding of what the 3RF is, what the scope of it is, and how they're going to work together to try to achieve its aims."[317]

One interlocutor from a principal organization claimed that the Technical Team ensured that the roles and structures were clear and indicated that the CSOs needed to grow into their new role because they did not play such a role on the advocacy level before.[318] From the perspective of the principal organizations, there are three themes of the coordination of CSOs: 1) The CSOs are responsible for their coordination, 2) the structures provided were perceived as sufficient, and 3) the CSOs waste too much time discussing structures instead of implementing projects.

---

[314] Expert interview CSO 06, 14.01.2022

[315] Expert interview CSO 03, 03.12.2021

[316] Expert interview IC 09, 10.02.2022

[317] Expert interview IC 09, 10.02.2022

[318] Expert interview IC 08, 28.01.2022

In general, interlocutors from the international community framed the CSOs' coordination as a learning curve which resulted in a more coherent and unified messaging in the 3rd CG meeting.[319] However, this narrative does not consider external reasons for the CSOs' initial lack of coordination like an insufficient flow of information, lack of understanding or capacity, etc. For example, one interlocutor stated that CSOs' co-chair did not know that she was expected to speak during the first CG meeting in March 2021 and therefore, improvised. Therefore, preparing the speech for the second CG collaboratively and organizing meetings alongside the four pillars to provide recommendations was a positive development.[320]

When asked about bylaws or clear governance structures provided to the CSOs, several interlocutors from the international community emphasized that the Technical Team could only support civil society but that the CSOs should organize themselves through a self-steering process and developing leadership:[321] "I think the least we can do is to respect the CSOs and to give them the space for them to organize it their way. We did not provide them with anything, because that really, for me, it will be really very disrespectful for their capacity. They are very capable NGOs. They are very professional NGOs, they absolutely don't need us. And I certainly at the personal level, I certainly don't want to bring additional bureaucracy in their way of working."[322]

Another interviewee from the Technical Team indicated that CSOs could only contribute to ownership through a bottom-up organization which is why the 3RF officials

---

[319] Expert interview IC 05, 13.01.2022, Expert interview IC 04, 07.12.2021

[320] Expert interview IC 02, 09.12.2021

[321] Expert interview IC 05, 13.01.2022, Expert interview IC 07, 27.01.2022

[322] Expert interview IC 07, 27.01.2022

did not interfere with their organization: "The idea being that we should not, we the internationals, the Secretariat, should not spoon-feed what we want them to do. We give them a platform at quite a high level with the Prime Minister etc. And we say it's really up to you what you want to do with this. So, and I strongly believe in that, because I don't believe that CSO representation would be meaningful if I start saying maybe you should be saying this, maybe we should be doing that, maybe you write a bylaw."[323]

The representatives from CSOs and the principal organizations are aligned on the idea to create a Secretariat of CSOs in the CG. However, the CSO member suggested that the principal organizations would facilitate the set-up,[324] whereas an interviewee from a principal organization indicated that the CSOs should establish a secretariat of the CSOs to enhance the effectiveness, also with regards to long-term coordination. "I had suggested, that it would be good for the CSO group to structure a little and to institutionalize its work so that they have some kind of a secretariat and the capacity to support the work. This has not occurred under the present mandate. And I find it a bit unfortunate because I think for them to become really effective. […] What are their terms of reference, what are their bylaws, what are their organizing principles and methods. Now, they worked rather on an informal basis. […] They've not really seen it in a broader and longer perspective whereby, you know, they will try to come together as a group and have this organized, in some kind of a sustainable manner."[325]

---

[323] Expert interview IC 02, 09.12.2021

[324] Expert interview CSO 02, 08.12.2021

[325] Expert interview IC 03, 03.12.2021

When asked about how the mandate of the CG was determined, members of the civil society represented in the CG criticized the lack of clear governance structures as described above.

One interlocutor stated: "No, there are no bylaws, because you know that everything went so quickly."[326] Interlocutors from the three principal organizations stated that the technical team was tasked to support the civil society in their self-organization. One interlocutor described the self-organization of CSOs as effective, based on the co-chair's statement in the CG meeting, but added that CSOs could draft and adopt bylaws, "this is not up to us to decide"[327] – once again reflecting the principal organizations' stance not to interfere with CSO affairs or facilitate their organization in the 3RF from top-down.

However, there are ToRs for the CG which one CSO member assessed as "quite generic."[328] According to the ToR, the Consultative Group's mandate is 1) to provide strategic guidance and direction for the implementation of the 3RF; 2) ensure strategic coordination, harmonization, and alignment of resources to 3RF priorities; 3) review and monitor progress in implementation; 4) communicate results and advocate for strategic initiatives in support of the 3RF ('3RF Consultative Group Terms of Reference', 2021).

According to CSOs, the ToR "were really focused on our role as advisory or consultative rather than having any impact on decision making and execution."[329] As a

---

[326] Expert interview CSO 04, 13.12.2021

[327] Expert interview IC 05, 13.01.2022

[328] Expert interview CSO 08, 25.01.2022

[329] Expert interview CSO 08, 25.01.2022

response, one interlocutor from a principal organization stated that the CG was negotiated in practice and provided the example that CSOs "insisted on decision-making. The word decision-making was very important to them. And we tried to explain to the that the phrase in the ToR is strategic guidance. It is not the same. But use that. That is your mandate."[330] He explained that the modus operandi of donors and the World Bank does not foresee including CSOs in the decision-making and that CSOs focused too much on structures and insufficiently on implementing projects.[331]

The facilitation and technical support of the CG members are determined in the TOR under organizational aspects: The 3RF Secretariat is responsible for developing the agenda for the meeting "with inputs from the members" ('3RF Consultative Group Terms of Reference', 2021). Moreover, the role of the Secretariat is to provide and distribute relevant documents and background documents for the meetings and discussions at least five days prior to a CG meeting. In terms of briefing/follow-up of the CG meetings, the Secretariat prepares minutes and circulates them with CG members for adoption within five days after the meeting. Adoption is reached if "no objection is received within ten calendar days from their distribution" ('3RF Consultative Group Terms of Reference', 2021).

Despite providing a framework for the CG, the ToR do not specify important organizational aspects, e.g. how the co-chairs are elected, how the Technical Team/Secretariat collects feedback to set the agenda for upcoming CGs, and how CG members can object to the adoption of minutes. The TOR also vaguely determine consensus as the decision-making model of the CG and task the co-chairs to take a

---

[330] Expert interview IC 02, 09.12.2021

[331] Expert interview IC 02, 09.12.2021

facilitating role to build consensus ('3RF Consultative Group Terms of Reference', 2021). As a response to the vague provisions, interlocutors from civil society demanded the principal organizations create clear governance structures: "We're getting to a point where they all understood that you cannot create an institution without creating governance, bylaws, a way of how we can interact and work together."[332] However, a representative from the principal organizations described "a tendency in Lebanese civil society to focus a lot on process and focus a lot on concepts that are very important, but not directly contributed to getting anything done in the context of Lebanon. […] And if we focus too much on the abstract concepts around organizing oneself, I think we lose the momentum."[333] Another interlocutor from the international community defined the institutional architecture not as a formal legal structure because the principal organizations did not know from the outset how the institutional structure would look like. Therefore, ToR were drafted to clarify the expected tasks, but "there were no such things as bylaws, or, you know, more formalistic documents, because experience shows, you can't really ex ante develop this, this has to grow. And maybe at some stage, it's useful to develop these. But it's not possible to do that from the start. I think another important principle is to say it's not up to us to organize civil society, right. I mean, that's really up to civil society to do."[334]

These statements again reflect the attitude of the international community to "not spoon-feed anything to the CSOs."[335]

---

[332] Expert interview CSO 02, 08.12.2021

[333] Expert interview IC 02, 09.12.2021

[334] Expert interview IC 08, 28.01.2022

[335] Expert interview IC 02, 09.12.2021

iii. Sectoral Coordination Structures

Many CSOs indicated that they were not aware that the institutional architecture foresaw the establishment of sector working groups.[336] Therefore when asked about sector coordination, the majority of CSOs referred to a meeting amongst CSOs organized by the co-chair of the CSOs in October 2021 at Beirut Digital District and not to the sector working groups.[337] At the time of the interviews between December 2021 and early February 2022, many CSOs lacked information on the sector working groups. Some were not even aware of the existence of working groups.[338] Others lacked information about the status and progress of the working groups.[339] Some CSOs were more proactive by requesting updates on the establishment of working groups or attending meetings of other working groups, whereas others mentioned that they did not know whom to reach out to for information on sector coordination.[340] In addition, some CSOs raised the issue that it was not clear and transparent how membership of working groups was organized.[341] Others were not attending working groups due to capacity reasons despite knowing of their existence and working in the respective sector.[342]

---

[336] Expert interview CSO 12, 03.02.2022, Expert interview CSO 14, 10.02.2022, Expert interview CSO 05, 14.01.2022

[337] Expert interview CSO 07, 19.01.2022, Expert interview CSO 09, 26.01.2022, Expert interview CSO 02, 08.12.2021, Expert interview CSO 14, 10.02.2022, Expert interview CSO 08, 25.01.2022, Expert interview CSO 13, 09.02.2022, Expert interview CSO 06, 14.01.2022

[338] Expert interview CSO 11, 02.02.2022, Expert interview CSO 09, 26.01.2022

[339] Expert interview CSO 07, 19.01.2022, Expert interview CSO 14, 10.02.2022,

[340] Expert interview CSO 07, 19.01.2022; Expert interview CSO 14, 10.02.2022

[341] Expert interview CSO 07, 19.01.2022, Expert interview CSO 14, 10.02.2022,

[342] Expert interview CSO 13, 09.02.2022

However, the working groups have varying degrees of operationalization: Some were already active (like Social Protection, Housing) and some were newly established following mapping of existing sector coordination by the principal organizations.[343]

Two interlocutors from principal organizations involved in setting up the sector working groups argued that slow and open-ended processes shaped the perception of CSOs to lack information about working groups: "Because in a lot of cases they have thought that there is a lot of information that actually does not exist on paper. So, even in the early days, there was this perception that the three institutions are sitting here with like a list of all the projects related to 3RF and they just aren't sharing it with anyone. But actually everybody was trying to figure out what's going on, or even the list of working groups. […] There was so much confusion around how can I engage, what are the groups? And we were trying to figure out what groups actually exist. So, I think that's been a bit of a struggle, because there's just this sense that like, information is being held back when actually it's that things haven't been defined. And that's the thing about the process as well, like this CSOs were involved at a stage where they could also influence the design of things, which is really good. […] But the downside of that is not everything's ready to show."[344] Another interviewee from the principal organizations confirmed: "The other thing is that people assume lots of things are happening when in reality, things are incredibly slow. So, these working groups, it took two months to set them up. So, people were saying what's going on? Negotiating with the UN about this. You know, it's not that nothing is happening. But it's not enough. It's often very slow."[345]

---

[343] Expert interview IC 02, 09.12.2021

[344] Expert interview IC 09, 10.02.2022

[345] Expert interview IC 02, 09.12.2021

One reason for this slow process was the competition between the three principal organizations which contributed to the lack of clear structures in the initial phase because the leadership of the organizations in different sectors was challenged and reshuffled to streamline coordination and prevent parallel structures as much as possible: The 3RF allocated roles of leads and co-leads of working groups from different organizations. As a consequence, some international organizations are not leading sectors anymore, but are still contributing to sector coordination.[346]

The Technical Team/Secretariat identified organizations and individuals who should be part of each sector working group. This happened in consultation with the CSOs of the CG and the UN and by taking into account other stakeholders that were already active in existing sector coordination mechanisms.[347] An interlocutor from a principal organization addressed the issue of membership and explained that CSOs could be directly nominated by the CSOs and the 3RF (based on meetings amongst CSOs where they nominated participants) or by the leads and co-leads of the working groups who also consulted and could suggest CSOs for the working group.[348] With regards to CSO membership, a representative from the international community who is a focal point for sector working groups in his organization described that some CSOs were only active at the level of strategic guidance in the CG. Others, however, were also active at the sector level[349] which frames the non-participation by CSOs as a deliberative choice, which they, on the other hand, explained with lack of information. Besides consisting of CSOs and

---

[346] Expert interview IC 04, 07.12.2021

[347] Expert interview IC 02, 09.12.2021

[348] Expert interview IC 06, 24.01.2022

[349] Expert interview IC 06, 24.01.2022

donors, several interlocutors from the international community stressed the importance of government participation and the intention to incorporate government representatives.[350] The need to incorporate government representatives and ministries in sector working groups was echoed by one civil society representative to enhance coordination with public institutions and to "push also for policymaking and influence at that level."[351]

The lack of information on membership was not the only unclear organizational component of sector coordination. Even in existing sector coordination mechanisms that were operationalized under the 3RF, there were no clear structures for coordination. One interlocutor from a principal organization mentioned that they asked the Technical Team/Secretariat to develop ToRs for the working group to clarify the "role of the co-lead vis-a-vis the lead, what is the role of a secretariat, […] what is the nature and purpose of this working group."[352]

The Technical Team/Secretariat drafted the ToR for the sector working groups which reflect the pillar structure of the 3RF.[353] The ToR define the facilitation of "timely, coherent, and efficient implementation of 3RF sector commitments" as the main objective ('3RF Sector Coordination Terms of Reference', 2021).

According to the TOR, the sector working groups should be collaboratively led by a sector lead and co-lead(s) from among the three principal organizations who are responsible to report to the 3RF Secretariat/Technical Team and regularly (defined as

[350] Expert interview IC 06, 24.01.2022

[351] Expert interview CSO 06, 14.01.2022

[352] Expert interview IC 04, 07.12.2021

[353] Expert interview IC 02, 09.12.2021

monthly) call for meetings to review and advance the sector agenda. The 3RF Secretariat supports the leads technically (facilitating meetings, Microsoft SharePoint for information sharing, and providing aid tracking data) ('3RF Sector Coordination Terms of Reference', 2021).

The TOR state that membership is open to all 3RF stakeholders (CSOs, government, donors), and that leads should invite at least one representative from CSOs and government but describe the "core group, small in number, of entities active in the sector" ('3RF Sector Coordination Terms of Reference', 2021).

Despite this provision, the ToR state that humanitarian actors can participate as observers for "information-sharing purposes." The ToR also determine that "in due course, (co-)leads should also be selected from civil society" and that the sector working groups will be "administratively light, operate (mainly) in virtual format and extensively use digital applications" ('3RF Sector Coordination Terms of Reference', 2021).

Several interlocutors from the principal organizations described the working groups as a fundamental component in the aid architecture for decentralization and a bottom-up approach[354] and expected sector working groups to reach reforms: "We could show not only as a concept that the inclusivity works in abstract but it actually delivers."[355] The co-lead of a sector working group stated that the sector coordination structure "definitely was not their thinking in the beginning", but that the principal organizations realized that they need a formal space to discuss "how we track progress, for example, how we report to the consultative group meetings."[356] In order to assess if

---

[354] Expert interview IC 06, 24.01.2022

[355] Expert interview IC 02, 09.12.2021

[356] Expert interview IC 04, 07.12.2021

the 3RF delivers, the principal organizations designed a monitoring framework that assesses the commitments from the 3RF document in each sector by defining milestones and reporting on progress.[357] The leads and co-leads of each working group are tasked to assess the progress in collaboration with the working group's members. One interviewee indicated that CSOs were not fully engaged in reporting on progress: "In bringing on board the input from CSOs, and that's where it should be happening in theory through the working groups, because it's the working groups that fill those things out. But I think in practice, it's been like very few institutions that go and often it's the like, chairs of the working groups that fill in what they can based on their institution and then submit it. But it's, that's, the reporting so far as I think it's getting better, but from a pretty low base."[358]

Besides reporting on progress, another central role of sector coordination is the formulation of recommendations which are presented in the Consultative Group Meetings.[359] However, one interlocutor who is a co-lead of a sector coordination criticized that the working groups were pressured to propose projects for fast implementation, as she stated: "I cannot just cherry-pick". She was frustrated that debates were informed by quick wins instead of long-term vision and that organization and a systemic approach were needed for the sector working groups.[360]

Another issue in the sector working groups is the lack of ownership, as described by one interlocutor from the international community: "It's actually very detailed, the sets of priorities that the different sectors are meant to deliver. I just think maybe focusing on

---

[357] Expert interview IC 02, 09.12.2021

[358] Expert interview IC 09, 10.02.2022

[359] Expert interview IC 04, 07.12.2021

[360] Expert interview IC 04, 07.12.2021

a more limited set of specific actions and simplifying the framework so that people can really understand it, and then own it as a plan going forward, and then leaving some of the more detailed planning to the working groups might have enabled more ownership, because then the working groups would've been more involved in that design, would be more incentivized to kind of follow through on it."[361] She later added that tracking the progress on the 3RF commitments has been a challenge from the beginning which was even intensified by weak ownership because the working groups may have identified more urgent issues in their sector.[362] Moreover, tracking progress is diluted because the priorities defined for each sector are either too specific or too broad which complicates reporting on the progress of commitments.[363]

C.   Discussion

The lack of coordination among CSOs in the CG is in line with findings about how the lack of an organizational platform and leadership limit CSOs' impact on reforms in Lebanon (The Pulse, 2021, p. 29). However, the lack of clear governance structures and organizational provisions by the 3RF raises questions about its input legitimacy (Scharpf, 1999) and participatory quality (Krasner and Risse, 2014: 556, Risse and Stollenwerk, 2018) because it negatively affects the decision-making process. In other words: The mode of selection of CSOs and the lack of transparency and provisions on organization can undermine the legitimacy of CSOs as governance actors in the 3RF.

---

[361] Expert interview IC 09, 10.02.2022

[362] Expert interview IC 09, 10.02.2022

[363] Expert interview IC 09, 10.02.2022

By framing the coordination of CSOs as insufficient and making them responsible for their own coordination by stressing their agency in the 3RF as a partnership of equals, the international community disregards power structures that impede participative quality (Cooke and Kothari, 2001; Lister, 2003).

The international community's reasoning for not providing the CSOs with clear structures is bottom-up empowerment. However, the international community's perception of the CSOs' capacity to self-organize is contrasted by the lack of capacity described by CSOs and does not take into account the capacity gap between CSOs and other 3RF stakeholders.

The 3RF does not seem to address the capacity gap of CSOs (Srinivas, 2009; Bhargava, 2015; Munene and Thakhathi, 2017) and the increase in transaction costs due to CSO engagement (Schulpen, Loman and Kinsbergen, 2011). Hence, the lack of capacity does not only exacerbate the fragmentation but also constrains the effectiveness of CSOs in the CG to initiate reform and hold other 3RF stakeholders accountable.

Once again, undermining the CSOs' capacity to become effective stakeholders in the 3RF raises questions about local ownership in practice (Lie, 2019). However, when taking into account the limited capacity of CSOs as described above, clarifying governance structures could increase the effectiveness of their engagement. Stronger facilitation of the internal organization of CSOs by the 3RF principal organizations could absorb the capacity gap and should not be confused with limiting ownership.

The lack of information and clear governance structures not only limits the CSOs' effectiveness to initiate reform but also to hold other 3RF stakeholders accountable. The fulfillment of their role as watchdogs depends on an institutional design

that provides "clear lines of authority, accountability and rational delegation of roles" (Haigh, Amaratunga and Hettige, 2019, p. 11) – which the 3RF currently lacks.

Moreover, the 3RF risks privileging upwards accountability at the expense of downwards accountability (Daly and Brassard, 2011; Dhungana, 2020). The 3RF delegates progress monitoring the sector working groups and expects an active role from CSOs in reporting. At the same time, the 3RF is insufficiently addressing CSOs' requests for information sharing, possibly because CSOs lack of institutional weight in the 3RF compared to other stakeholders (Daly and Brassard, 2011; Dhungana, 2020).

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

A.   Summary

As discussed previously, the discourse (language used in 3RF documents and in the expert interviews) and practice (institutional set-up) of the 3RF indicates that the international community considered the political settlement (or formalized political unsettlement) and allocated space to CSOs as a response. However, how does the 3RF try to adapt the political settlement that hinders reforms and limits aid effectiveness? According to (Parks and Cole, 2010) international development organizations can influence political settlements by shifting benefits of aid to excluded groups, supporting new development elites which were formerly excluded from the political settlement and by helping organize and mobilize excluded groups in general which challenge the political settlement and advocate for particular reforms. Indeed, the 3RF shifts benefits of aid to excluded groups, mainly through the first track which includes a people-centered approach and addresses urgent needs for the most vulnerable populations. Moreover, the 3RF clearly supports CSOs as new development elites by institutionalizing their advisory role in high-level consultations through the Consultative Group. Lastly, the 3RF has attributed the role to CSO as watchdogs over reforms by establishing the IOB and involving them in progress tracking at the sectoral level which can interpreted as an effort to mobilize groups that challenge the political settlement and advocate for reforms.

Similar to Parks and Cole, the policy cycle of effectiveness argues that entry points for reforms need to be identified and provides three modalities for this: widening contestability, shaping preferences or creating incentives (World Bank, 2017). In order to

reshape the policy arena, the 3RF tries to lift existing constraints by inviting new actors (CSOs), incentivizing reform through the two-track approach (of which the second track provides conditional aid), and by shaping the preference and beliefs through collective advocacy (with CSOs) towards the Government. In other words, the 3RF identified relevant entry points for reforms, mostly by widening the contestability and inviting CSOs as new actors. However, the modes of engagement with CSOs are insufficient, and the 3RF lacks feedback mechanisms or grievance mechanisms, and does not involve the public.

B. Conclusion

This thesis has discussed Lebanon's Reform, Recovery and Reconstruction Framework (3RF) as a case study for post-disaster governance, aid architecture and civil society's participation. The thesis aimed to contribute to the documentation of country platforms in fragile contexts, using the Lebanon's 3RF as a case study. The increasing prevalence of the country platform approach in post-disaster or post-conflict contexts, is contrasted by the lack of documentation in academia, which creates a research gap. Moreover, the lack of policy research on country platforms makes the research of country platforms cases relevant as it can help extract lessons learned. The thesis also contributes to locating grey literature on recovery governance and platforms.

My analysis applied two interconnecting lenses: I used literature on path-dependency and windows of opportunity as an entry point to analyze the 3RF's potential to instigate reforms based on its institutional arrangements and decision-making mechanisms. Moreover, I used the concept of political settlement and policy effectiveness, using the framework of the 2017 World Development Report on

Governance and the Law that considers power asymmetries and the bargaining between stakeholders as conditions for policy reforms. I focused on the role of CSOs as governance actors involved in decision-making processes.

One of my arguments is that the 3RF includes adaptive and effective institutional arrangements that may disrupt path dependency and enable reforms, mainly its Consultative Group and sector coordination modalities. Yet, I show that the 3RF is also consolidating CSOs' fragmentation, through the composition of its CG, and providing insufficient modalities for CSOs to work collectively in coherent and effective ways towards reforms.

My thesis contributes to understanding how international donors' incoherence and competition consolidate the political unsettlement in fragile contexts as they contribute to inertia rather than working towards transformative change.[364] However, in the case of the 3RF, the international community does not intentionally prolong the status quo and consolidate the political unsettlement.[365] Instead, the international community consolidates the political unsettlement because of the multiplicity of international organizations with different internal institutional logics which are accountable to different agendas. This ultimately leads to the incoherence of international organizations and donors which dilutes the mandate and role definition of actors in the 3RF and limits the prospects of reforms.

---

[364] This finding is particularly relevant because the Policy Effectiveness Cycle was developed by the World Bank to assess the political settlement and power asymmetries to ensure an enabling environment for reforms in fragile contexts. However, this is contrasted by the negligence of power asymmetries and the lack of a change management process by the 3RF principal organizations in the 3RF.

[365] In contrast to other contexts, where the international community intentionally consolidates the political unsettlement as a peace mediation strategy to enable project implementation (Bell and Pospisil, 2017).

Hence, the 3RF is a good contemporary example of aid ineffectiveness resulting from complex relations between donors and from the political unsettlement in Lebanon. The ineffectiveness becomes evident because implementation of both projects and reforms is insufficient and delayed.

The institutionalization of CSOs in the CG forms an innovative approach and is particularly important due to the lack of coordination between government and civil society in Lebanon. Moreover, the inclusion of CSOs is a recognition of Lebanon's vibrant CSO landscape and the fact that CSOs substitute several state's functions, mainly through service provision. However, to prevent sidelining the state and further releasing public institutions from their responsibility or justifying the absence of the state, the 3RF emphasizes the collaboration between government representatives and CSOs, e.g. at the sector level, and by advocating for the Central Management Unit.

One of my findings shows how, even though the principal organizations did consider Lebanon's political unsettlement, the institutional architecture of the 3RF is not sufficiently addressing institutional bottlenecks and recurrent political statements that impede reform. Despite the two-track approach – which includes the people-centered recovery track (Track 1 which focuses on essential actions and funded through international grant financing), and the reform and reconstruction track (Track 2 that focuses on critical reforms which are conditional for financing – the 3RF risks reproducing the sectarian political system because initiatives for institutional strengthening could create bodies that are likely to be co-opted by the government, and because aid is facilitating the survival of the political sectarian elite. Moreover, synergies between the 3RF and other aid coordination mechanisms are not fully leveraged because the mandates are contested by international organizations.

In terms of CSOs, my findings also reveal that the 3RF has contributed to the fragmentation of CSOs through the unclear selection process, the rotational system of the CG, and the composition of CSOs with distinct positionalities in relation to reforms and project implementation. Moreover, the 3RF does not provide adequate mechanisms for decision-making processes and for the effective organization of the CSOs, which exacerbates the already existing lack of coordination among CSOs and the capacity gap. Hence, the potential of the 3RF in stepping up CSOs' collective action for reforms is impeded and even incremental change to disrupt path-dependency seems difficult to achieve.

Based on the assessment of the initial 3RF processes and experiences, this thesis aims to provide recommendations for the remaining time:

Firstly, the challenges of CSOs including the lack of clear roles and flow of information should be addressed, e.g. by providing modalities that ensure exchange between the rotations, and by increasing access to information in general. Secondly, the fact that sector working groups are increasingly gaining relevance – which is contrasted by the lack of information by CSOs on sector coordination – makes it more important to enhance coordination along the four pillars and to use them as entry point for sectoral reform. However, the 3RF risks the "projectization" of the platform at the expense of reforms, as it can already be observed at the sector level, where the implementation of projects is prioritized in sectorial discussions. Therefore, engagement and membership in sector working groups need to be clarified and consolidated.

Thirdly, the fact that the Secretariat already increased its members to perform its function of facilitation and technical support between all the 3RF stakeholders is an important step. Further funding for technical support, and to increase CSOs' capacities

and leverage their representation more efficiently is needed. In other words: Instead of paying lip service to CSO empowerment, the 3RF should consider the challenges CSOs are facing to organize effectively, e.g. by providing technical and financial assistance for a CSOs' Secretariat that could contribute to absorb the capacity gap between CSOs and other stakeholders. This CSOs' Secretariat should be 3RF specific, but could also be transformed in a forum or platform with a long-term vision to leverage the exchange between CSOs in the 3RF for future consultations and ensure sustainable coordination of CSOs.[366]

Lastly, government ownership in the 3RF is weak and will possibly be further undermined after the upcoming elections in May. Political stalemate caused by delayed government formation is likely and could once again stall the 3RF process. Hence, the 3RF should keep pushing for reforms with low institutional requirements (in other words: reforms that require low involvement of political actors from different parties and institutions) and should advocate to design new institutions like the CMU accordingly.[367]

The scope of this study is limited: The dynamic process of the 3RF is still evolving, which prevents a comprehensive assessment of its success or failure. The access to stakeholders from the international community and civil society was facilitated

---

[366] On May 12, 2022 the CSOs of the CG elected a new co-chair from the second rotation who announced to establish a Coordination and Communication Committee composed of CSO representatives from the second rotation to enhance the flow of information and coordination and ensure institutional memory among CSOs. Moreover, he suggested to create a CSO Council composed of six CSO representatives from the first rotation and six CSO representatives from the second rotation to enhance governance and decision-making modalities among CSOs. CSOs apparently provide resources to both the Coordination and Communication Committee and the CSO Council, and possible (technical) assistance by the 3RF Secretariat seems unclear at this stage. E-Mail Exchange 12.05.2022

[367] Moreover, discussions about the design of the CMU as a new institution should take practices and lessons learned from other context into consideration where similar institutions were established as part of the recovery framework. This shows once again the lack of a policy doctrine which can easily lead to reinventing the wheel and framing institutions as adaptive in the specific political setting even though the adaptive nature can be questions from a global-comparative perspective.

by the Beirut Urban Lab and interlocutors were very responsive. However, access to other stakeholders such as government officials and donors were challenging and resulted in another limitation of the thesis related to representation: My sample is limited to interlocutors from the EU, UN and World Bank and CSOs from the CG. In other words: Input from government representatives and donors (other than the EU) was not captured but could enrich future research. Moreover, an assessment of civil society's work in the IOB which is now complete with six CSO members could substantiate the CSOs' contribution in strengthening accountability and performing a watchdog function.[368]

Future research questions derived from this thesis could focus on comparative case study analysis of country platforms, which can help trace policy mobilities across contexts, and also help extract good practices and lessons learned from past country platforms. This could include the question of (limited) statehood and nature of the respective political system. In the context of Lebanon, more research is needed beyond issues of co-optation, the self-reproducing sectarian system and path-dependency (Nagle, 2020) by investigating questions of statehood in Lebanon and the role of the state causing and contributing to the crises (Parreira, 2020, 2022; Geha, 2021).

In the case of Lebanon's 3RF, future research is needed on profiling CSOs and their coalitions involved in the aid architecture and implementation of the 3RF. For that matter, supplementing this thesis' findings with quantitative methods could strengthen claims about fragmentation, coordination and collective action of Lebanese civil society

---

[368] Interestingly, two of the three additional members of the IOB are CSOs who have a seat in the Consultative Group. Besides Nusaned, ALDIC and CLDH got accepted as additional members for the IOB. As a result, they no longer have a seat in the CG due to the conflict of interest. ALDIC and CLDH were sharing a seat in the CG which means that CLDH will not be on the second rotation. Hence, the CG is thinning out and could lose momentum because CSOs switched the IOB and because of the over-all hand-over process to the second rotation.

in the context of post-blast recovery governance. This should include surveying CSOs that did not apply or were not accepted to the 3RF's CG or IOB. Lastly, zooming in on sector coordination, which is supposedly gaining momentum now, is a productive entry point to analyze CSOs' collective action for sector-specific reforms and to examine the relations between principal organizations at the sector level – possibly through quantitative and qualitative methods.

Finally, future research on the decision-making process should also focus on the question in which space decisions are taken and implemented – within or outside the 3RF – which includes issues of power relations, informality and social networks (Flyvbjerg, 1998; Booher and Innes, 2002; Innes, Connick and Booher, 2007).

APPENDIX I

INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

1) Could you tell me about your role in the 3RF?

The institutional setup of the 3RF

Institutional arrangements and decision-making modalities

1) What was the process for establishing the 3RF platform in Lebanon and what were the principles or considerations informing it?
   Probes: Was there a template applied to Lebanon?
2) Lebanon is undergoing a very difficult moment where it is delegitimized internationally and aid is now conditional on reforms. Lebanon is also known for its political sectarian system and clientelistic and corrupt operations. Were such challenging political realities taken into account in the institutional architecture of the 3RF and the establishment of the CG?
3) The 3RF stands out with the establishment of a Consultative Group incorporating CSOs to translate local ownership into practice.
   Can you reflect on the selection process of CSOs for the Consultative Group?
   (Half a year later, would you do things differently?)
4) What are the mechanisms/modalities of decision-making the 3RF provided to CSOs so they can organize themselves effectively? For instance, do they have bylaws through which they organize their decision-making, for instance? If not, do you know how do they operate?
   In your opinion, is this a limiting factor in their work process?
5) How do you deal with CSOs' recommendations made during the Consultative Group Meetings and/or other meetings? How are they addressed, if at all, and have they influenced decisions/ projects within the 3RF? Can you provide an example?

6) In sum, how would you qualify the role of the Consultative Group within the 3RF process? What impact is it having on the donors and the government? And on CSOs?

Adaptability

1) Institutional adaptability is an important attribute of recovery platforms – according to the literature, and it can help accountability. How does the institutional architecture of the 3RF ensure adaptability?
   Probes: In your opinion, what are the chances and challenges of the 3RF's institutional arrangement to enable its reconfiguration and adaption over time according to assessed needs?
   I heard that they are now forming working groups to associate public sector groups to donors and CSOs: Can you tell me more about this? Was this part of the plan? Or how did it start?
   In your opinion, is this an example of adaptability?

I heard that they are establishing a Central Management Unit. Can you tell me more about this? How this idea came to be?

Accountability is an essential factor for reconstruction and recovery efforts according to the literature.

1) Are CSOs in the 3RF provided with easy and free access to critical information (including plans, agendas, budgets, sources of funding, time frames, and expectations)?

2) And: Have the mutual responsibilities of stakeholders of the 3RF been clearly defined in written documents that have been shared and approved, through which roles, tasks, duties and rights have been assigned, in ways to ensure the effectiveness, transparency and accountability of the work?

3) There are other coordination mechanisms in Lebanon, like the LCRP or the ERP. Can you tell me how those existing mechanisms informed the set-up of the 3RF?

Reform is a critical component of the framework for Lebanon.
1) What are the chances and challenges of the 3RF in providing windows of opportunity for reform? For institution building, to improve accountability or rebuild trust in public institutions, for instance?
How do you assess its contributions on those fronts so far?
Can you provide me with examples to illustrate the 3RF's potential to push for reforms?

To conclude
1) Do you have any recommendations for literature or reports or case studies of recovery platforms that informed the set-up of Lebanon's 3RF? And to extract lessons learned or raise red flags?
2) Can you think of any colleagues you could connect me to who are involved in Lebanon's 3RF?

APPENDIX II

INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR CSOS

Coherence

1. Tell me about your role as CSO in the CG: how active are you in it? How regularly do you contribute to its meetings?

2. Do you know the other CSOs in the CG?
    Do you meet as a group outside of CG invitations?

3. Do you coordinate your position as CSOs on a 3RF-related issue?
    Do you get to agree on the messages you want to convey to the 3RF representatives? What is the mode of communication with other CSOs in the CG?

4. There is a rotational system in the CG (every three meetings):
    do you communicate with the CSO that you are sharing your seat with? (Assuming they are among the rotating CSOs)

5. I heard that the co-chair organized a series of sector-group meetings:
    Did you attend them?
    If yes, which did you attend? And can you share your experiences?
    If not, can you tell me the reasons why you did not attend?

6. Can you tell me more about the expression of interest for the CG? Why did you apply? In your opinion, how transparent was the selection process? Do you know why you were selected?

7. Can you tell me about your experiences with gender, generational, or any other type of dynamics in meetings?

8. Three CG meetings with the government and donors took place:
    Can you give me any insights, particularly on the most recent one, held in November 2021?

9. How coherent as a body would you evaluate the CG to be?
    And why?
    How has this been in favor/detrimental to the process of work?
    [Very coherent | coherent | partially coherent | not coherent]

10. How adaptive as a body would you evaluate the 3RF to be?

And why?

How has this been in favor/detrimental to the process of work?
    [Very adaptive | adaptive | partially adaptive | not adaptive]

Probes: Can you tell me about the CMU? Is this an example for adaptation in your opinion?

Did you know from the beginning, e.g. when you expressed interest to be on the CG, that the 3RF would establish sector working groups that also include CSOs?

Decision-making

11. How involved are you in the 3RF decision-making process regarding the B5 project or the Housing/Culture project?
    Have you reviewed documents about them, for instance?
    Were you involved in meetings related to them?

Access to information

12. Do you know whom to reach out to for questions about specific issues related to your sector in the 3RF?
    Have you done that? If yes, how did you communicate and what was the response?

To conclude

13. How would you assess the CG's role overall at this stage?
    How effective has it been?
    In your opinion, what is the prospect of the CG/3RF in your sector/pillar and in the cross-cutting sector "governance reforms"?

REFERENCES

'3RF Consultative Group Terms of Reference' (2021).

'3RF Monitoring Framework' (2022). Available at: https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/3RF%20Monitoring%20Framework.pdf (Accessed: 18 April 2022).

'3RF Sector Coordination Terms of Reference' (2021).

Abi Khalil, S., Gorevan, D. and Saieh, A. (2017) *Making Aid To Jordan And Lebanon Work: Aid effectiveness in middle income countries affected by mass displacement*. Oxford: Lebanese Center for Policy Studies, Oxfam International, Phenix Center for Economic & Informatics Studies, p. 16. Available at: https://policy-practice.oxfam.org/resources/making-aid-to-jordan-and-lebanon-work-aid-effectiveness-in-middle-income-countr-620258/.

Acht, M., Mahmoud, T.O. and Thiele, R. (2015) 'Corrupt governments do not receive more state-to-state aid: Governance and the delivery of foreign aid through non-state actors', *Journal of development economics*, 114(Journal Article), pp. 20–33. doi:10.1016/j.jdeveco.2014.11.005.

Ahmed, F. (2012) 'The Perils of Unearned Foreign Income: Aid, Remittances, and Government Survival', *The American political science review*, 106(1), pp. 146–165. doi:10.1017/S0003055411000475.

Aldrich, D.P. (2012) *Building resilience: social capital in post-disaster recovery*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Alesina, A. and Dollar, D. (2000) 'Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?', *Journal of economic growth (Boston, Mass.)*, 5(1), pp. 33–63. doi:10.1023/A:1009874203400.

Anderson, E. (2012) 'Aid fragmentation and donor transaction costs', *Economics letters*, 117(3), pp. 799–802. doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2012.08.034.

Arab Reform Initiative (2021) *Promises and Pitfalls: Lebanon Reform, Recovery and Reconstruction Framework (3RF)*. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5CtjBCMzmQs&t=4s (Accessed: 28 June 2021).

Arda, L. and Banerjee, S.B. (2019) 'Governance in Areas of Limited Statehood: The NGOization of Palestine', *Business & society*, (Journal Article), p. 33. doi:10.1177/0007650319870825.

Atallah, S., Mahmalat, M. and Zoughaib, S. (2018) *CEDRE Reform Program: Learning from Paris III*. The Lebanese Center for Policy Studies, p. 12.

Atrache, S. (2021) *Lebanon needs an aid paradigm shift*. Available at: https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2021/3/16/lebanon-needs-an-aid-paradigm-shift (Accessed: 6 January 2022).

Ayoub, B. and Mahdi, D. (2018) *Making Aid Work in Lebanon: Promoting aid effectiveness and respect for rights in middle-income countries affected by mass displacement*. Lebanese Center for Policy Studies, Oxfam International,

p. 14. Available at: https://www-cdn.oxfam.org/s3fs-public/file_attachments/bp-making-aid-work-lebanon-050418-en.pdf.

Batley, R. and Mcloughlin, C. (2010) 'Engagement with Non-State Service Providers in Fragile States: Reconciling State-Building and Service Delivery', *Development policy review*, 28(2), pp. 131–154. doi:10.1111/j.1467-7679.2010.00478.x.

Baumann, H. (2016) 'Social protest and the political economy of sectarianism in Lebanon', *Global discourse*, 6(4), pp. 634–649. doi:10.1080/23269995.2016.1253275.

Baur, D. and Palazzo, G. (2011) 'The Moral Legitimacy of NGOs as Partners of Corporations', *Business ethics quarterly*, 21(4), pp. 579–604. doi:10.5840/beq201121437.

Beisheim, M., Ellersiek, A. and Lorch, J. (2018) 'INGOs and Multi-Stakeholder Partnerships', in Beisheim, M., Ellersiek, A., and Lorch, J., *The Oxford Handbook of Governance and Limited Statehood*. Edited by A. Draude, T. A. Börzel, and T. Risse. Oxford University Press, pp. 210–230. doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198797203.013.10.

Béland, D. and Powell, M. (2016) 'Continuity and Change in Social Policy', *Social policy & administration*, 50(2), pp. 129–147. doi:10.1111/spol.12207.

Bell, C. and Pospisil, J. (2017) 'Navigating Inclusion in Transitions from Conflict: The Formalised Political Unsettlement', *Journal of international development*, 29(5), pp. 576–593. doi:10.1002/jid.3283.

Beyond Reform and Development (2015) *Mapping Civil Society Organizations in Lebanon*. Available at: https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/delegations/lebanon/documents/news/20150416_2_en.pdf (Accessed: 13 November 2021).

Bhargava, V. (2015) *Engaging Citizens and Civil Society to Promote Good Governance and Development Effectiveness*. Asian Development Bank.

Booher, D.E. and Innes, J.E. (2002) 'Network Power in Collaborative Planning', *Journal of planning education and research*, 21(3), pp. 221–236. doi:10.1177/0739456X0202100301.

Börzel, T.A., Risse, T. and Draude, A. (2018) 'Governance in Areas of Limited Statehood: Conceptual Clarifications and Major Contributions of the Handbook', in Börzel, T. A., Risse, T., and Draude, A., *The Oxford Handbook of Governance and Limited Statehood*. Edited by A. Draude, T. A. Börzel, and T. Risse. Oxford University Press, pp. 2–26. doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198797203.013.1.

BouChabke, S. and Haddad, G. (2021) 'Ineffectiveness, Poor Coordination, and Corruption in Humanitarian Aid: The Syrian Refugee Crisis in Lebanon', *VOLUNTAS: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations*, 32(4), pp. 894–909. doi:10.1007/s11266-021-00366-2.

Bourdieu, P. (1996) 'Understanding', *Theory, culture & society*, 13(2), pp. 17–37. doi:10.1177/026327696013002002.

Bräutigam, D. (2000) 'Aid Dependence and Governance', Expert Group on Development Issues (EGDI).

Bräutigam, D. (2002) 'Building Leviathan: Revenue, state capacity and governance', *IDS bulletin (Brighton. 1984)*, 33(3), pp. 10–20. Available at: https://deborahbrautigam.files.wordpress.com/2013/04/2002-building-leviathan.pdf.

Brechenmacher, S. (2019) *Stabilizing Northeast Nigeria After Boko Haram*, *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*. Available at: https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/05/03/stabilizing-northeast-nigeria-after-boko-haram-pub-79042 (Accessed: 11 March 2022).

Bruschini-Chaumet, C. *et al.* (2019) *The Localization of Aid in Jordan and Lebanon: Barriers and Opportunities for Women-led Organizations*. LSE, ActionAid Arab Region. Available at: https://arab-region.actionaid.org/sites/arab-region/files/publications/The%20Localization%20of%20Aid%20to%20Jordan%20and%20Lebanon.pdf (Accessed: 6 January 2022).

Capoccia, G. and Kelemen, R.D. (2007) 'The Study of Critical Junctures: Theory, Narrative, and Counterfactuals in Historical Institutionalism', *World politics*, 59(3), pp. 341–369. doi:10.1017/S0043887100020852.

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: National Recovery and Peacebuilding Plan 2017-21 (2016). Central African Republic, with support from the European Union, the United Nations, and World Bank Group. Available at: http://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/817461516999933538/pdf/122994-WP-PUBLIC-CAR-RPBA.pdf (Accessed: 24 March 2021).

Chan, J. and Bécoulet, M. (2019) *Delivering After the 2010 Earthquake: the Haiti Infrastructure and Institutions Emergency Recovery Project*. Available at: https://globaldeliveryinitiative.org/sites/default/files/case-studies/csc_haiti_ptt_oct_18-1_1.pdf (Accessed: 24 March 2021).

Chaney, P. (2016) 'Civil Society and Gender Mainstreaming: Empirical Evidence and Theory-Building from Twelve Post-Conflict Countries 2005–15', *World Development*, 83, pp. 280–294. doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2016.01.010.

Choudry, A. and Kapoor, D. (2013) *NGOization: complicity, contradictions and prospects*. London: NBN International.

Clark, J.A. and Salloukh, B.F. (2013) 'ELITE STRATEGIES, CIVIL SOCIETY, AND SECTARIAN IDENTITIES IN POSTWAR LEBANON', *International journal of Middle East studies*, 45(4), pp. 731–749. doi:10.1017/S0020743813000883.

Clark, J.A. and Zahar, M.-J. (2015) 'Critical Junctures and Missed Opportunities: The Case of Lebanon's Cedar Revolution', *Ethnopolitics*, 14(1), pp. 1–18. doi:10.1080/17449057.2014.924659.

'Co-Chairs' Statement of the Fourth Consultative Group Meeting' (2022), 4 April. Available at: https://lebanon.un.org/en/176775-fourth-consultative-group-meeting-reform-recovery-and-reconstruction-framework, https://lebanon.un.org/en/176775-fourth-consultative-group-meeting-reform-recovery-and-reconstruction-framework (Accessed: 18 April 2022).

'Co-Chairs' Statement of the Third Consultative Group Meeting' (2021), 16 November. Available at: https://lebanon.un.org/en/158802-third-consultative-group-meeting-reform-recovery-and-reconstruction-framework-press-release, https://lebanon.un.org/en/158802-third-consultative-group-meeting-reform-recovery-and-reconstruction-framework-press-release (Accessed: 18 April 2022).

'Co-Chairs' Statement: Second Consultative Group Meeting' (2021), 28 July. Available at: https://lebanon.un.org/en/137667-second-consultative-group-meeting-reform-recovery-and-reconstruction-framework, https://lebanon.un.org/en/137667-second-consultative-group-meeting-reform-recovery-and-reconstruction-framework (Accessed: 18 April 2022).

Collier, R. and Collier, D. (2015) *Shaping the political arena: Critical junctures, the labor movement, and regime dynamics in Latin America*. eScholarship, University of California (Book, Whole). Available at: https://go.exlibris.link/6LxWWlp4.

Cooke, B. and Kothari, U. (2001) *Participation: the new tyranny?* London: Zed Books.

Curato, N. (2018) 'From authoritarian enclave to deliberative space: governance logics in post-disaster reconstruction', *Disasters*, 42(4), pp. 635–654. doi:10.1111/disa.12280.

Daly, P. and Brassard, C. (2011) 'Aid Accountability and Participatory Approaches in Post-Disaster Housing Reconstruction', *Asian Journal of Social Science*, 39(4), p. 19;508;-533;20; doi:10.1163/156853111X597305.

Dávid-Barrett, E. *et al.* (2020) 'Controlling Corruption in Development Aid: New Evidence from Contract-Level Data', *Studies in comparative international development*, 55(4), pp. 481–515. doi:10.1007/s12116-020-09315-4.

Davies, J.S. (2000) 'The hollowing-out of local democracy and the fatal conceit of governing without government', *British journal of politics & international relations*, 2(3), pp. 414–428. doi:10.1111/1467-856X.00044.

De Mesquita, B.B. and Smith, A. (2010) 'Leader Survival, Revolutions, and the Nature of Government Finance', *American journal of political science*, 54(4), pp. 936–950. doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2010.00463.x.

Dhungana, N. (2020) 'Doing civil society-driven social accountability in a disaster context: Evidence from post-earthquake Nepal', *Politics and governance*, 8(4), pp. 395–406. doi:10.17645/pag.v8i4.3154.

Di John, J., O'Meally, S.C. and Hogg, R.S. (2017) *Social service delivery in violent contexts : achieving results against the odds – a report from Afghanistan, Pakistan and Nepal*. Washington DC: World Bank Group. Available at: https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/343141497021595501/pdf/116038-WP-PUBLIC-184p-SocialServiceDeliveryinViolentContextsFinal.pdf (Accessed: 20 March 2022).

Dibeh, G. (2010) 'Foreign Aid and Economic Development in Post-war Lebanon', in Mavrotas, G. (ed.) *Foreign Aid for Development: Issues, Challenges, and the New Agenda*. Oxford University Press, pp. 179–191. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199580934.001.0001.

Dietrich, S. (2013) 'Bypass or Engage? Explaining Donor Delivery Tactics in Foreign Aid Allocation', *International studies quarterly*, 57(4), pp. 698–712. doi:10.1111/isqu.12041.

Djankov, S., Montalvo, J.G. and Reynal-Querol, M. (2009) 'Aid with Multiple Personalities', *Journal of Comparative Economics*, 37(2), pp. 217–229. doi:10.1016/j.jce.2008.09.005.

Doucouliagos, H. and Paldam, M. (2009) 'The Aid Effectiveness Literature: The Sad Results of 40 Years of Research', *Journal of economic surveys*, 23(3), pp. 433–461. doi:10.1111/j.1467-6419.2008.00568.x.

Dreher, A., Eichenauer, V.Z. and Gehring, K. (2018) 'Geopolitics, Aid, and Growth: The Impact of UN Security Council Membership on the Effectiveness of Aid', *The World Bank economic review*, 32(2), pp. 268–286. doi:10.1093/wber/lhw037.

Dreher, A., Lang, V.F. and Ziaja, S. (2018) 'Foreign Aid', in Dreher, A., Lang, V. F., and Ziaja, S., *The Oxford Handbook of Governance and Limited Statehood*. Edited by A. Draude, T. A. Börzel, and T. Risse. Oxford University Press, pp. 393–415. doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198797203.013.19.

Dreher, A. and Langlotz, S. (2020) 'Aid and growth: New evidence using an excludable instrument', *The Canadian journal of economics*, 53(3), pp. 1162–1198. doi:10.1111/caje.12455.

Duffield, M. (2001) 'Governing the Borderlands: Decoding the Power of Aid', *Disasters*, 25(4), pp. 308–320. doi:10.1111/1467-7717.00180.

Dutta, N., Leeson, P.T. and Williamson, C.R. (2013) 'The Amplification Effect: Foreign Aid's Impact on Political Institutions', *Kyklos (Basel)*, 66(2), pp. 208–228. doi:10.1111/kykl.12018.

Easterly, W. (2002) 'The Cartel of Good Intentions', *Foreign policy*, (131), pp. 40–49. doi:10.2307/3183416.

ECDPM *et al.* (2019) *Think local. Governance, humanitarian aid, development and peacebuilding in Somalia*, *ECDPM*. Available at: https://ecdpm.org/publications/think-local-bridging-between-humanitarian-aid-development-peacebuilding-somalia/ (Accessed: 28 June 2021).

Edmonds, K. (2013) 'Beyond Good Intentions: The Structural Limitations of NGOs in Haiti', *Critical sociology*, 39(3), pp. 439–452. doi:10.1177/0896920512437053.

Edwards, M. (2013) *The Oxford handbook of civil society*. New York: Oxford University Press (Book, Whole). doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195398571.001.0001.

Egholm, L., Heyse, L. and Mourey, D. (2020) 'Civil Society Organizations: the Site of Legitimizing the Common Good—a Literature Review', *VOLUNTAS: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations*, 31(1), pp. 1–18. doi:10.1007/s11266-019-00171-y.

Eikenberry, A.M. and Kluver, J.D. (2004) 'The Marketization of the Nonprofit Sector: Civil Society at Risk?', *Public administration review*, 64(2), pp. 132–140. doi:10.1111/j.1540-6210.2004.00355.x.

El Kak, N. (2019) 'A Path for Political Change in Lebanon? Lessons and Narratives from the 2018 Elections', *Arab Reform Initiative* [Preprint]. Available at: https://www.arab-reform.net/publication/a-path-for-political-change-in-lebanon-lessons-and-narratives-from-the-2018-elections/ (Accessed: 7 December 2021).

El-Zein, F. and Sims, H. (2004) 'Reforming war's administrative rubble in Lebanon', *Public Administration and Development*, 24(4), pp. 279–288. doi:10.1002/pad.327.

Escobar, A. (1995) *Encountering development: the making and unmaking of the Third World*. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press.

ESCWA (2020) *Poverty in Lebanon: Solidarity is vital to address the impact of multiple overlapping shocks*, p. 3. Available at: https://www.unescwa.org/publications/poverty-lebanon-solidarity-vital-address-impact-multiple-overlapping-shocks.

ESCWA (2021) *Multidimensional poverty in Lebanon (2019-2021): Painful reality and uncertain prospects*. Available at: https://www.unescwa.org/sites/default/files/news/docs/21-00634-_multidimentional_poverty_in_lebanon_-policy_brief_-_en.pdf (Accessed: 28 December 2021).

European Union, United Nations, and World Bank Group (2008) 'Joint Declaration on Post-Crisis Assessments and Recovery Planning'. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/fpi/system/files/2021-05/joint_declaration.pdf (Accessed: 17 April 2022).

European Union, World Bank Group, and United Nations (2022) *Call for Expression of Interest: Representatives of Civil Society in the 3RF Independent Oversight Board*, *EEAS - European External Action Service - European Commission*. Available at: https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/lebanon/109854/call-expression-interest-representatives-civil-society-3rf-independent-oversight-board_en (Accessed: 20 March 2022).

Facon, C. (2021) 'Why we need to decolonise Lebanon's aid sector | Middle East Eye', *Middle East Eye*, 3 July. Available at: https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/why-we-need-decolonise-lebanons-aid-sector (Accessed: 29 June 2021).

Faust, J., Grävingholt, J. and Ziaja, S. (2015) 'Foreign aid and the fragile consensus on state fragility', *Journal of international relations and development*, 18(4), pp. 407–427. doi:10.1057/jird.2013.23.

Fawaz, M. (2019) *Beirut Madinati and the Prospects of Urban Citizenship*. The Century Foundation, p. 14. Available at: https://tcf.org/content/report/beirut-madinati-prospects-urban-citizenship/ (Accessed: 17 April 2022).

Fawaz, M. and Harb, M. (2020) *Is Lebanon Becoming Another "Republic of the NGOs"?*, *Arab Center Washington DC*. Available at:

http://arabcenterdc.org/research-paper/is-lebanon-becoming-another-republic-of-the-ngos/ (Accessed: 24 March 2021).

Faye, M. and Niehaus, P. (2012) 'Political Aid Cycles', *The American economic review*, 102(7), pp. 3516–3530. doi:10.1257/aer.102.7.3516.

Fengler, W. and Kharas, H. (2011) 'Overview: Delivering Aid Differently', in *Delivering Aid Differently: Lessons from the Field*. 1st edn. Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, pp. 1–42. doi:10.7864/j.ctt127wks.

Ferguson, J. (1994) *The anti-politics machine: 'Development', depoliticization, and bureaucratic power in Lesotho*. Minneapolis MN: University of Minnesota Press.

Flyvbjerg, B. (1998) *Rationality and power: democracy in practice*. Chicago, ILL: University of Chicago Press (Book, Whole). Available at: https://go.exlibris.link/BFGVJNCr.

Fondation de France and Agence Française de Développement (2015) *Répondre aux crises. L'AFD, la Fondation de France et le financement des ONG en Haïti à la suite du séisme*. Available at: https://www.fondationdefrance.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/etude_afd_fdf_haiti_.pdf (Accessed: 30 June 2021).

Fox, J.A. (2015) 'Social Accountability: What Does the Evidence Really Say?', *World development*, 72(Journal Article), pp. 346–361. doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2015.03.011.

Geha, C. (2016) *Civil society and political reform in Lebanon and Libya: transition and constraint*. London: Routledge (Book, Whole). doi:10.4324/9781315644844.

Geha, C. (2019) 'Co-optation, counter-narratives, and repression: Protesting lebanon's sectarian power-sharing regime', *The Middle East journal*, 73(1), pp. 9–28. doi:10.3751/73.1.11.

Geha, C. (2021) 'People before politicians: How Europeans can help rebuild Lebanon – European Council on Foreign Relations', *ECFR*, 27 July. Available at: https://ecfr.eu/publication/people-before-politicians-how-europeans-can-help-rebuild-lebanon/ (Accessed: 10 May 2022).

Geha, C. and Talhouk, J. (2019) 'From Recipients of Aid to Shapers of Policies: Conceptualizing Government–United Nations Relations during the Syrian Refugee Crisis in Lebanon', *Journal of Refugee Studies*, 32(4), pp. 645–663. doi:10.1093/jrs/fey052.

Gehring, K. *et al.* (2017) 'Aid Fragmentation and Effectiveness: What Do We Really Know?', *World development*, 99(Journal Article), pp. 320–334. doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2017.05.019.

Gerschewski, J. (2021) 'Explanations of Institutional Change: Reflecting on a Missing Diagonal', *The American political science review*, 115(1), pp. 218–233. doi:10.1017/S0003055420000751.

GFDRR (2010) *Haiti Earthquake Reconstruction: Knowledge Notes from DRM Global Expert Team for the Government of Haiti*. Available at: https://www.gfdrr.org/en/publication/haiti-earthquake-reconstruction-

knowledge-notes-drm-global-expert-team-government-haiti (Accessed: 13 November 2021).

GFDRR *et al.* (2014) *HAITI EARTHQUAKE 2010. Recovery from a Mega Disaster. Recovery Framework Case Study*. Available at: https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/ru/821561493718328523/pdf/11469 6-WP-PUBLIC-rfcs-2014-haiti.pdf (Accessed: 29 June 2021).

GFDRR (2020) *Disaster Recovery Framework Guide. Revised Version.* Available at: https://www.gfdrr.org/sites/default/files/publication/DRF%20Guide.pdf (Accessed: 13 November 2021).

GFDRR and UNDP (2014) *Pakistan Earthquake 2005 - The Case of Centralized Recovery Planning and Decentralized Implementation: Country Case Study Series Disaster Recovery Framework Guide*. Available at: https://reliefweb.int/report/pakistan/pakistan-earthquake-2005-case-centralized-recovery-planning-and-decentralized (Accessed: 13 November 2021).

Gisselquist, R.M. (2015) 'Varieties of fragility: implications for aid', *Third world quarterly*, 36(7), pp. 1269–1280. doi:10.1080/01436597.2015.1041104.

Grande, E. and Pauly, L.W. (2005) 'Complex Sovereignty and the Emergence of Transnational Authority', in *Complex Sovereignty: Reconstituting Political Authority in the Twenty-First Century*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, pp. 285–300. doi:10.3138/9781442684201.

Grimm, S., Lemay-Hébert, N. and Nay, O. (2014) '"Fragile States": introducing a political concept', *Third world quarterly*, 35(2), pp. 197–209. doi:10.1080/01436597.2013.878127.

Grindle, M.S. (2007) 'Good Enough Governance Revisited', *Development policy review*, 25(5), pp. 533–574. doi:10.1111/j.1467-7679.2007.00385.x.

Haddad, T. (2017) 'Analysing State–Civil Society Associations Relationship: The Case of Lebanon', *Voluntas (Manchester, England)*, 28(4), pp. 1742–1761. doi:10.1007/s11266-016-9788-y.

Haigh, R., Amaratunga, D. and Hettige, S. (2019) *Accountability in the Context of Disaster Risk Governance*. UNDRR, p. 51. Available at: https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Accountability%20in%2 0the%20context%20of%20disaster%20risk%20governance.pdf.

Harb, M. (2018) 'New Forms of Youth Activism in Contested Cities: The Case of Beirut', *The International Spectator*, 53(2), pp. 74–93. doi:10.1080/03932729.2018.1457268.

Hassan, M.M., Lee, K.E. and Mokhtar, M. (2019) 'Streamlining non-governmental organizations' programs towards achieving the sustainable development goals: A conceptual framework', *Sustainable development (Bradford, West Yorkshire, England)*, 27(3), pp. 401–408. doi:10.1002/sd.1912.

Hayman, R. (2012) 'The Busan Partnership: implications for civil society', p. 16.

Hearn, S. and Zimmerman, T. (2014) 'A New Deal for Somalia? : The Somali Compact and its Implications for Peacebuilding', p. 15.

Hernandez, M. and Scarr, S. (2020) 'How powerful was the Beirut blast?', *Reuters*, 14 August. Available at: https://graphics.reuters.com/LEBANON-SECURITY/BLAST/yzdpxnmqbpx/ (Accessed: 5 January 2022).

Hernandez-Legorreta, C. (2019) 'Governance, Democratic Innovation and Civil Society Organizations, at the End of the Modern State', *Europolity : continuity and change in European governance*, 13(2), pp. 149–177. doi:10.25019/europolity.2019.13.2.7.

Hickel, J. (2017) 'Aid in reverse: how poor countries develop rich countries', *The Guardian*, 14 January. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/2017/jan/14/aid-in-reverse-how-poor-countries-develop-rich-countries (Accessed: 28 June 2021).

Hilhorst, T., Boersma, K. and Raju, E. (2020) 'Research on Politics of Disaster Risk Governance: Where Are We Headed?', *Politics and governance*, 8(4), pp. 214–219. doi:10.17645/pag.v8i4.3843.

Iati, I. (2008) 'The Potential of Civil Society in Climate Change Adaptation Strategies', *Political science*, 60(1), pp. 19–30. doi:10.1177/003231870806000103.

Innes, J.E., Connick, S. and Booher, D. (2007) 'Informality as a Planning Strategy: Collaborative Water Management in the CALFED Bay-Delta Program', *Journal of the American Planning Association*, 73(2), pp. 195–210. doi:10.1080/01944360708976153.

International Crisis Group (2020) *Pulling Lebanon out of the Pit*, p. 42. Available at: https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/eastern-mediterranean/lebanon/214-pulling-lebanon-out-pit.

International Crisis Group (2021) *Managing Lebanon's Compounding Crises*. Middle East Report No. 228, p. 44. Available at: https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/east-mediterranean-mena/lebanon/228-managing-lebanons-compounding-crises (Accessed: 7 December 2021).

Isaksson, A.-S. *et al.* (2018) 'Chinese aid and local corruption', *Journal of public economics*, 159(Journal Article), pp. 146–159. doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2018.01.002.

Jad, I. (2007) 'NGOs: between buzzwords and social movements', *Development in practice*, 17(4–5), pp. 622–629. doi:10.1080/09614520701469781.

Jeffrey, A. (2012) *The Improvised State: Sovereignty, Performance and Agency in Dayton Bosnia*. (Book, Whole). doi:10.1002/9781118278789.

Kamat, S. (2004) 'The privatization of public interest: theorizing NGO discourse in a neoliberal era', *Review of international political economy : RIPE*, 11(1), pp. 155–176. doi:10.1080/0969229042000179794.

Kay, A. (2005) 'A Critique of the Use of Path Dependency in Policy Studies', *Public administration (London)*, 83(3), pp. 553–571. doi:10.1111/j.0033-3298.2005.00462.x.

Kelsall, T. (2018) 'Towards a universal political settlement concept: A response to Mushtaq Khan', *African affairs (London)*, 117(469), pp. 656–669. doi:10.1093/afraf/ady018.

Kenny, C. (2008) 'What is effective aid? How would donors allocate it?', *European journal of development research*, 20(2), pp. 330–346. doi:10.1080/09578810802078704.

Khan, M.H. (2018) 'Political settlements and the analysis of institutions', *African Affairs*, 117(469), pp. 636–655. doi:10.1093/afraf/adx044.

Kharas, H. (2011) 'Transparency Changing the Accountability, Engagement, and Effectiveness of Aid', in Jung, W., Makino, K., and Kharas, H. (eds) *Catalyzing development: a new vision for aid*. Washington, D.C: Brookings Institution Press, pp. 233–259.

Khneisser, M. (2020) 'The Specter of "Politics" and Ghosts of "Alternatives" Past: Lebanese "Civil Society" and the Antinomies of Contemporary Politics', *Critical Sociology*, 46(3), pp. 359–377. doi:10.1177/0896920519830756.

Khoury, E. (2021) *Lebanon: Unprecedented number of people forced to rely on humanitarian assistance | World Food Programme*. Available at: https://www.wfp.org/stories/lebanon-unprecedented-number-people-forced-rely-humanitarian-assistance (Accessed: 3 January 2022).

Kingdon, J.W. (1995) *Agendas, alternatives, and public policies*. 2nd ed. New York: Longman.

Kingston, P.W.T. (2013) *Reproducing sectarianism: advocacy networks and the politics of civil society in postwar Lebanon*. Albany, N.Y: SUNY Press.

Knack, S. and Rahman, A. (2007) 'Donor fragmentation and bureaucratic quality in aid recipients', *Journal of development economics*, 83(1), pp. 176–197. doi:10.1016/j.jdeveco.2006.02.002.

Kono, D.Y. and Montinola, G.R. (2009) 'Does Foreign Aid Support Autocrats, Democrats, or Both?', *The Journal of politics*, 71(2), pp. 704–718. doi:10.1017/S0022381609090550.

Kooiman, J. (2003) *Governing as governance*. London: SAGE. doi:10.4135/9781446215012.

Krasner, S.D. and Risse, T. (2014) 'External Actors, State-Building, and Service Provision in Areas of Limited Statehood: Introduction', *Governance (Oxford)*, 27(4), pp. 545–567. doi:10.1111/gove.12065.

LCPS (2020) *The Government Monitor No. 16 – The French-Endorsed Plan: Rebranding Old Reforms*. Available at: http://lcps-lebanon.org/agendaArticle.php?id=193 (Accessed: 7 December 2021).

Le Borgne, E. and Jacobs, T.J. (2016) *Lebanon: Promoting Poverty Reduction and Shared Prosperity*. Washington, DC: World Bank. doi:10.1596/K8478.

Levi-Faur, D. (2012) 'From "Big Government" to "Big Governance"?', in Levi-Faur, D. (ed.) *The Oxford Handbook of Governance*. Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199560530.013.0001.

Lie, J.H.S. (2019) 'Local Ownership as Global Governance', *European journal of development research*, 31(4), pp. 1107–1125. doi:10.1057/s41287-019-00203-9.

Lister, S. (2003) 'NGO Legitimacy: Technical Issue or Social Construct?', *Critique of Anthropology*, 23(2), pp. 175–192. doi:10.1177/0308275X03023002004.

Mac Ginty, R. and Hamieh, C.S. (2010) 'Lebanon case study', in Adele Harmer and Ellen Martin (eds) *Diversity in Donorship: Field Lessons*. (ODI, Humanitarian Policy Group), pp. 39–48. Available at: /files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/5876.pdf (Accessed: 21 March 2022).

Maharat Foundation, Kulluna Irada, and The Lebanese Transparency Association (2021) 'Joint Communique Issued by the members of the Independent Oversight Board (IOB) of the 3RF', 27 October. Available at: https://maharatfoundation.org/en/communique3rf3 (Accessed: 18 April 2022).

Mahoney, J. and Thelen, K. (2009) 'A Theory of Gradual Institutional Change', in *Explaining Institutional Change*. Cambridge University Press, pp. 1–37. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511806414.003.

Mahoney, J. and Thelen, K.A. (2010) *Explaining institutional change: ambiguity, agency, and power*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (Book, Whole). doi:10.1017/CBO9780511806414.

Making the Global Financial System Work For All | Report of the G20 Eminent Persons Group on Global Financial Governance (2018). Available at: https://www.globalfinancialgovernance.org/ (Accessed: 28 June 2021).

Malpass, D. and World Bank (2019) *Driving Growth From The Ground Up: Speech by World Bank Group President David Malpass*, *World Bank*. doi:10/07/driving-growth-from-the-ground-up.

Mawdsley, E., Savage, L. and Kim, S.-M. (2014) 'A 'post-aid world'? Paradigm shift in foreign aid and development cooperation at the 2011 Busan High Level Forum: A 'post-aid world'?', *The Geographical Journal*, 180(1), pp. 27–38. doi:10.1111/j.1475-4959.2012.00490.x.

Melis, S. and Apthorpe, R. (2020) 'The Politics of the Multi-Local in Disaster Governance', *Politics and Governance*, 8(4), pp. 366–374. doi:10.17645/pag.v8i4.3174.

Menkhaus, K. (2006) 'Governance without Government in Somalia Spoilers, State Building, and the Politics of Coping', *International security*, 31(3), pp. 74–106. doi:10.1162/isec.2007.31.3.74.

Moss, T., Pettersson, G. and van de Walle, N. (2006) 'An Aid-Institutions Paradox? A Review Essay on Aid Dependency and State Building in Sub-Saharan Africa', Working Paper 74 | Center For Global Development, pp. 1–28.

Mosse, D. (2004) 'Is Good Policy Unimplementable? Reflections on the Ethnography of Aid Policy and Practice', *Development and change*, 35(4), pp. 639–671. doi:10.1111/j.0012-155X.2004.00374.x.

Mosse, D. (2015) 'Global Governance and the Ethnography of International Aid', in David Mosse and David Lewis (eds) *The Aid Effect*. Pluto Press, pp. 1–36.

Moyo, D. (2009) *Dead aid: why aid is not working and how there is a better way for Africa*. 1. American paperback ed. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

Munene, J.W. and Thakhathi, D.R. (2017) 'An analysis of capacities of civil society organizations (CSOs) involved in promotion of community participation in governance in Kenya', *Journal of public affairs*, 17(4), pp. e1668-n/a. doi:10.1002/pa.1668.

Nagel, C. and Staeheli, L. (2015) 'International Donors, NGOs, and the Geopolitics of Youth Citizenship in Contemporary Lebanon', *Geopolitics*, 20(2), pp. 223–247. doi:10.1080/14650045.2014.922958.

Nagle, J. (2020) 'Consociationalism is Dead! Long Live Zombie Power-Sharing', *Studies in ethnicity and nationalism*, 20(2), pp. 137–144. doi:10.1111/sena.12329.

Nay, O. (2013) 'Fragile and failed states: Critical perspectives on conceptual hybrids', *International political science review*, 34(3), pp. 326–341. doi:10.1177/0192512113480054.

Nay, O. (2014) 'International Organisations and the Production of Hegemonic Knowledge: how the World Bank and the oecd helped invent the Fragile State Concept', *Third world quarterly*, 35(2), pp. 210–231. doi:10.1080/01436597.2014.878128.

Nieto-Matiz, C. and Schenoni, L.L. (2020) 'Backing Despots? Foreign Aid and the Survival of Autocratic Regimes', *Democracy and security*, 16(1), pp. 36–58. doi:10.1080/17419166.2018.1555691.

OCHA (2018) *About the LHF*, *OCHA*. Available at: https://www.unocha.org/lebanon/about-lhf (Accessed: 7 January 2022).

OCHA (2021) *Emergency Response Plan Lebanon 2021-2022*. Available at: https://lebanon.un.org/en/139099-emergency-response-plan-lebanon-2021-2022 (Accessed: 7 January 2022).

OECD (2005) 'The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness: Five Principles for Smart Aid'. OECD Publishing, Paris. Available at: https://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/45827300.pdf (Accessed: 28 June 2021).

OECD (2011) 'Busan Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation: Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness'. OECD Publishing, Paris. Available at: https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/54de7baa-en.pdf?expires=1624910236&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=15761BD40291CA61D8AE18931F1C90E3 (Accessed: 28 June 2021).

OECD (2020) *States of Fragility 2020*. Available at: https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/sites/ba7c22e7-en/1/3/2/index.html?itemId=/content/publication/ba7c22e7-en&_csp_=89578a182071559ff79c670c40753038&itemIGO=oecd&itemContentType=book#section-d1e9230 (Accessed: 27 March 2021).

OECD (no date a) *OECD DAC Aid at a glance*, *Tableau Software*. Available at: https://public.tableau.com/app/profile/thielemans.v/viz/shared/FZCTWZTWC (Accessed: 7 January 2022).

OECD (no date b) *The High Level Fora on Aid Effectiveness: A history - OECD*. Available at:

https://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/thehighlevelforaonaideffectivenessahistory.htm (Accessed: 28 June 2021).

One CA Podcast and Papoulidis, J. (2021) *Jonathan Papoulidis on Country Coordination Platforms*, *Civil Affairs Association*. Available at: https://www.civilaffairsassoc.org/podcast (Accessed: 28 June 2021).

Papoulidis, J. (2020) *Country Platforms in Fragile States: A New Path for Development Cooperation*, *Global Delivery Initiative*. Available at: http://www.globaldeliveryinitiative.org/blogs/country-platforms-fragile-states-new-path-development-cooperation (Accessed: 24 March 2021).

Papoulidis, J. (2022) 'Resilient state-building: A new approach for the hardest places', *Development Matters*, 18 March. Available at: https://oecd-development-matters.org/2022/03/18/resilient-state-building-a-new-approach-for-the-hardest-places/ (Accessed: 18 April 2022).

Parks, T. and Cole, W. (2010) *Political Settlements: Implications for International Development Policy and Practice*. San Francisco: The Asia Foundation. Available at: https://gsdrc.org/document-library/political-settlements-implications-for-international-development-policy-and-practice/ (Accessed: 20 March 2022).

Parreira, C. (2020) *The Art of Not Governing: Local Politics in Postwar Lebanon*. ProQuest Dissertations Publishing. Available at: https://go.exlibris.link/LcR1zNC9.

Parreira, C. (2022) *Do Elections in Lebanon Matter?*, *The Policy Initiative*. Available at: http://www.thepolicyinitiative.org/article/details/137/do-elections-in-lebanon-matter (Accessed: 12 May 2022).

Pierre, J. *et al.* (2005) *Governing Complex Societies: Trajectories and Scenarios*. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK. doi:10.1057/9780230512641.

Pierson, P. and Skocpol, T. (2002) 'Pierson, Paul and Theda Skocpol. 2002.', in Katznelson, I., Milner, H.V., and American Political Science Association (eds) *Political science: the state of the discipline 3*. New York: Norton [u.a.], pp. 1–32.

Plant, M. (2020) *Some Thoughts on Country Platforms*, *Center For Global Development*. Available at: https://www.cgdev.org/publication/some-thoughts-country-platforms (Accessed: 28 June 2021).

Polack, E., Luna, E.M. and Dator-Bercilla, J. (2010) *Accountability for Disaster Risk Reduction: Lessons from the Philippines*, p. 34. Available at: https://www.alnap.org/system/files/content/resource/files/main/accountability-for-drr.pdf.

'Press Release. Second Consultative Group Meeting' (2021), 28 July. Available at: https://lebanon.un.org/en/137667-second-consultative-group-meeting-reform-recovery-and-reconstruction-framework, https://lebanon.un.org/en/137667-second-consultative-group-meeting-reform-recovery-and-reconstruction-framework (Accessed: 18 April 2022).

Pritchett, L., Woolcock, M. and Andrews, M. (2013) 'Looking Like a State: Techniques of Persistent Failure in State Capability for Implementation', *The Journal of development studies*, 49(1), pp. 1–18. doi:10.1080/00220388.2012.709614.

Provan, K.G. and Kenis, P.N. (2007) 'Modes of Network Governance: Structure, Management, and Effectiveness', *Journal of public administration research and theory*, 18(2), pp. 229–252. doi:10.1093/jopart/mum015.

Rahnama, M., Fawaz, F. and Gittings, K. (2017) 'The effects of foreign aid on economic growth in developing countries', *The Journal of developing areas*, 51(3), pp. 153–171. doi:10.1353/jda.2017.0066.

Rhodes, R.A.W. (1996) 'The New Governance: Governing without Government', *Political studies*, 44(4), pp. 652–667. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9248.1996.tb01747.x.

Risse, T. and Stollenwerk, E. (2018) 'Legitimacy in Areas of Limited Statehood', *Annual review of political science*, 21(1), pp. 403–418. doi:10.1146/annurev-polisci-041916-023610.

Rose, S. (2019) *Focusing on Fragility. The Future of US Assistance to Fragile States*. Available at: https://www.cgdev.org/publication/focusing-fragility-future-us-assistance-fragile-states-brief.

Rosenau, J.N. (1992) 'Governance, Order and Change in World Politics', in *Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511521775.

Ruba Husari (2020) *Iraq's reform program: A white paper with no action plan*, *Middle East Institute*. Available at: https://www.mei.edu/publications/iraqs-reform-program-white-paper-no-action-plan (Accessed: 11 March 2022).

Sabatier, P.A. and Weible, C.M. (2018) *Theories of the Policy Process*. Taylor and Francis (Book, Whole). doi:10.4324/9780429494284.

Saeed, R. (2020) 'The Ubiquity of State Fragility: Fault Lines in the Categorisation and Conceptualisation of Failed and Fragile States', *Social & legal studies*, 29(6), pp. 767–789. doi:10.1177/0964663920906453.

Saleh, A.S. and Harvie, C. (2017) 'Investigating the impact of donor funding: a case study on Lebanon', *EuroMed journal of business*, 12(1), pp. 2–19. doi:10.1108/EMJB-06-2015-0029.

Salloukh, B.F. (2006) 'The Limits of Electoral Engineering in Divided Societies: Elections in Postwar Lebanon', *Canadian journal of political science*, 39(3), pp. 635–655. doi:10.1017/S0008423906060185.

Salloukh, B.F. *et al.* (2015) *The politics of sectarianism in postwar Lebanon*. London: Pluto Press (Book, Whole). doi:10.2307/j.ctt183p3d5.

Scharpf, F.W. (1999) *Governing in Europe: effective and democratic?* Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198295457.001.0001.

Schulpen, L., Loman, B. and Kinsbergen, S. (2011) 'Worse than expected? A comparative analysis of donor proliferation and aid fragmentation', *Public administration and development*, 31(5), pp. 321–339. doi:10.1002/pad.619.

Shabake (2021) *Localisaton of aid in Lebanon. Mapping of the aid ecosystem in Lebanon*, p. 147.

Simons, H. (2009) *Case Study Research in Practice*, *Case Study Research in Practice*. London: SAGE Publications (Book, Whole). doi:10.4135/9781446268322.

Srinivas, N. (2009) 'Against NGOs?: A Critical Perspective on Nongovernmental Action', *Nonprofit and voluntary sector quarterly*, 38(4), pp. 614–626. doi:10.1177/0899764009334308.

Steinmo, S., Thelen, K. and Longstreth, F. (1992) *Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (Book, Whole). doi:10.1017/CBO9780511528125.

Sukarieh, M. and Tannock, S. (2015) *Youth rising?: the politics of youth in the global economy*. 1st edn. New York: Routledge (Book, Whole). doi:10.4324/9781315884660.

Taghdisi-Rad, S. (2011) *The political economy of aid in Palestine: relief from conflict or development delayed?* 1st edn. New York, N.Y: Routledge. doi:10.4324/9780203844199.

Taleb, N. (2010) *The black swan: the impact of the highly improbable*. Second, Random House Trade paperback. New York: Random House Trade Paperbacks (Book, Whole). Available at: https://go.exlibris.link/fQk8wwVm.

The Lebanese Transparency Association (2021) 'Lebanon's New Procurement Law. A missed opportunity', 7 May. Available at: https://transparency-lebanon.org/blogs/Lebanon%27s%20new%20Public%20Procurement%20Law%20-A%20missed%20opportunity (Accessed: 18 April 2022).

The Partnering Initiative and World Vision (2016) *Delivering on the promise. In-country multi-stakeholder platforms for Agenda 2030*. Available at: https://www.thepartneringinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/Delivering-on-the-promise-in-country-multi-stakeholder-platforms-for-Agenda-2030.pdf (Accessed: 26 May 2021).

The Pulse (2021) *The State of Civil Society in Lebanon. A pilot mapping study*. Beirut. Available at: https://thepulselebanon.com/ (Accessed: 12 June 2021).

'The Siem Reap CSO Consensus on the International Framework for CSO Development Effectiveness' (2011). Available at: https://d2ouvy59p0dg6k.cloudfront.net/downloads/international_framework_open_forum.pdf (Accessed: 28 June 2021).

Thompson, L., Conradie, I. and Tsolekile de Wet, P. (2014) 'Participatory Politics: Understanding Civil Society Organisations in Governance Networks in Khayelitsha', *Politikon*, 41(3), pp. 387–402. doi:10.1080/02589346.2014.975937.

'Tracker of CG Action Points' (2022). Available at: https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/Tracker%20CG%20action%20points.pdf (Accessed: 18 April 2022).

UNDP (2010) *User's Guide for CSO assessment*. Available at: file:///Users/sophie/Downloads/2010_UNDP_A-Users-Guide-to-Civil-Society-Assessments_EN%20(4).pdf (Accessed: 13 November 2021).

UNDP and Australia AID (2013) *Working with Civil Society in Foreign Aid. Possibilites for South-South Cooperation?* UNDP. Available at: https://www.google.com/search?client=safari&rls=en&q=undp+terminology+cso+ngo&ie=UTF-8&oe=UTF-8 (Accessed: 12 December 2021).

UNDP Strategic Plan, 2018-2021 (2017). Available at: https://strategicplan.undp.org/#next (Accessed: 28 June 2021).

Unerman, J. and O'Dwyer, B. (2006) 'Theorising accountability for NGO advocacy', *Accounting, auditing, & accountability*. Edited by J. Unerman and B. O'Dwyer, 19(3), pp. 349–376. doi:10.1108/09513570610670334.

United Nations (2021) *Aid Tracking Lebanon 2021, Q3*. Available at: https://lebanon.un.org/sites/default/files/2021-12/2021%20Q3%20Aid%20Tracking%20Lebanon%20%28as%20of%2030%20Sep2021%29.pdf (Accessed: 7 January 2022).

United Nations Development Group and World Bank Group (2007) *Joint Guidance Note on Integrated Recovery Planning Joint Guidance Note using Post Conflict Needs Assessments and Transitional Results Frameworks*. Available at: https://www.unocha.org/sites/unocha/files/dms/Documents/Joint%20Guidance%20Note%20on%20Integrated%20Recovery%20Planning.pdf (Accessed: 5 August 2021).

United Nations and Government of Lebanon (2021) *Lebanon Crisis Response Plan 2017-2021. 2021 Update*. Available at: https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/85374 (Accessed: 7 January 2022).

Weyland, K. (2008) 'Toward a New Theory of Institutional Change', *World politics*, 60(2), pp. 281–314. doi:10.1353/wp.0.0013.

World Bank (ed.) (2017) *Governance and the law*. Washington, D.C: World Bank (World development report, 2017). doi:10.1596/978-1-4648-0951-4.

World Bank (2021) *Lebanon Financing Facility for Reform, Recovery and Reconstruction (LFF)- Questions and Answers*, *World Bank*. Available at: https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/lebanon/brief/lebanon-financing-facility-for-reform-recovery-and-reconstruction-questions-and-answers (Accessed: 18 April 2022).

World Bank Group (2015) *NORTH-EAST NIGERIA. Recovery and Peace Building Assessment. Volume 1. Synthesis Report*. Available at: https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/25791/110424-v1-WP-NorthEastNigeriaRecoveryandPeaceBuildingAssessmentVolumeIweb-PUBLIC-Volume-1.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y (Accessed: 11 March 2022).

World Bank Group (2017) *Recovery and Peace Building Assessments*, *World Bank*. Available at:

https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/fragilityconflictviolence/brief/recovery-and-peace-building-assessments (Accessed: 11 March 2022).

World Bank Group (2020) *Lebanon Economic Monitor. The Deliberate Depression*. Available at: https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/34842/Lebanon EconomicMonitor-Fall2020.pdf?sequence=4 (Accessed: 27 December 2021).

World Bank Group (2021a) *Call for Expression of Interest: Representatives of Civil Society and Private Sector in the 3RF Consultative Group*, *World Bank*. Available at: https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/lebanon/brief/call-for-expression-of-interest-representatives-of-civil-society-and-private-sector-in-the-3rf-consultative-group (Accessed: 5 January 2022).

World Bank Group (2021b) *Lebanon Economic Monitor. Lebanon Sinking to the Top 3.pdf*. Available at: https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/394741622469174252/pdf/Leban on-Economic-Monitor-Lebanon-Sinking-to-the-Top-3.pdf (Accessed: 27 December 2021).

World Bank Group (2021c) *The World Bank In Iraq*, *World Bank*. Available at: https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/iraq/overview (Accessed: 11 March 2022).

World Bank Group (no date) *Net official development assistance received (current US$) - Lebanon | Data*. Available at: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/DT.ODA.ODAT.CD?end=2019&location s=LB&start=1960 (Accessed: 7 January 2022).

World Bank Group, European Union, and United Nations (2020a) *Beirut Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment*. Available at: https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/650091598854062180/pdf/Beirut -Rapid-Damage-and-Needs-Assessment.pdf (Accessed: 5 January 2022).

World Bank Group, European Union, and United Nations (2020b) *Lebanon Reform, Recovery and Reconstruction Framework (3RF)*. Available at: https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/948021607068524180/pdf/Leban on-Reform-Recovery-and-Reconstruction-Framework-3RF.pdf (Accessed: 15 September 2021).

World Bank Group Strategy for Fragility, Conflict, and Violence 2020–2025 (2020). Available at: https://documents.worldbank.org/en/publication/documents-reports/documentdetail/844591582815510521/world-bank-group-strategy-for-fragility-conflict-and-violence-2020-2025 (Accessed: 25 May 2021).

Yin, R.K. (2014) *Case study research: design and methods*. 5th edn. Los Angeles: Sage Publications.

Ziaja, S. (2020) 'More Donors, More Democracy', *The Journal of politics*, 82(2), pp. 433–447. doi:10.1086/706111.