

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY OF BEIRUT

THE SISYPHUS COMPLEX OF SUB-SAHARAN
MIGRANTS IN ALGERIA

by
MOHAMED SOFIANE ABDALLAH TIMTAOUCINE

A thesis
submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Master of Arts
to the Department of Political Studies and Public Administration
of the Faculty of Arts and Sciences
at the American University of Beirut

Beirut, Lebanon
September 2022

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY OF BEIRUT

THE SISYPHUS COMPLEX OF SUB-SAHARAN
MIGRANTS IN ALGERIA

by
MOHAMED SOFIANE ABDALLAH TIMTAOUCINE

Approved by:



Signature

Dr. Karim Makdisi, Associate Professor
Political Studies and Public Administration

Advisor



Signature

Dr. Jamil Mouawad, Visiting Assistant Professor
Political Studies and Public Administration

Member of Committee



Signature

Dr. Nikolas Kosmatopoulos, Assistant Professor
Political Studies and Public Administration

Member of Committee

Date of thesis defense: September 5, 2022

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY OF BEIRUT

THESIS RELEASE FORM

Student Name: Timtaoucine Mohamed Sofiane Abdallah
Last First Middle

I authorize the American University of Beirut, to: (a) reproduce hard or electronic copies of my thesis; (b) include such copies in the archives and digital repositories of the University; and (c) make freely available such copies to third parties for research or educational purposes:

- As of the date of submission
- One year from the date of submission of my thesis.
- Two years from the date of submission of my thesis.
- Three years from the date of submission of my thesis.



September 12, 2022

Signature

Date

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First and foremost, I wish to extend my gratitude to my thesis advisor, Pr. Karim Makdisi, and my committee members Pr. Jamil Mouawad and Pr. Nikolas Kosmatopoulos, whose wisdom, support, and guidance made this work possible. I would also like to thank Mr. Mahmoud Haidar, whose expertise, and discussions helped give spirit and momentum to this thesis.

Furthermore, I would like to thank my family [Dalila Touaimi, Mustapha Chafi, and Hiba Timtaoucine (Assil, Amir, and Melissa)] and my partner, Maïwenn Le Chaton, for their constant support and encouragement during and beyond this thesis.

A special appreciation goes to the friends who helped focus my topic further through numerous debates and discussions including Sarah Joron, Rafik Amrani, Tarek Hadjoudj, Wassila Ould Hamouda, and others.

ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS OF

Mohamed Sofiane Timtaoucine

for

Master of Arts

Major: Public Policy
and International Affairs

Title: The Sisyphus Complex of Sub-Saharan Migrants in Algeria

People's movement across borders has become increasingly regulated over the past few decades. Migration went from being a normal phenomenon that is often discussed in the political field to more and more being debated in the security field. Securitization of migration has been the unfortunate response to people's irregular movement across borders, be it to seek asylum or search for a better life.

Algeria has significantly securitized migration starting 2008 after passing law 08-11 that turned the act of migrating irregularly, whether in or out of the country, illegal and punishable by law. One of the punishments set for migrants who enter the country in irregular fashions has been escort to the border. The country's southern borders, especially with Niger, became full of migrants coming in, and migrants being deported to the borders through official and non-official convoys. The latter have a horrible record for the manner in which migrants are treated and the conditions they undergo crossing after being dropped off at point zero.

This thesis analyzes this policy and its convoys under the Multiple Streams Framework, to understand its inception and the actors involved in it, and the securitization theory to understand its development and uncover the impact it has had on migrants, migrant women, and the Algerian state.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	1
ABSTRACT	2
INTRODUCTION	5
A. Global Overview on Migration	5
B. Overview of Migration in Algeria.....	9
C. Research Problem.....	11
D. Research Aims, Objectives, and Questions	14
E. Significance.....	17
F. Limitations	17
G. Outline.....	18
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY	21
A. Conceptual Framework	21
B. Research Design.....	24
LITERATURE REVIEW	26
A. Migration in Algeria.....	26
B. Multiple Streams Framework.....	38
C. Securitization Theory and Securitization of Migration.....	43
D. Hypothesis.....	46
MIGRATION TRENDS IN ALGERIAN AND THE ESCORTS TO THE BORDER POLICY	50
ESCORT TO THE BORDER: A MULTIPLE STREAMS ANALYSIS	61

A.	The Problem Stream.....	61
1.	Framing.....	62
2.	Indicators	63
3.	Focusing Events.....	64
B.	Policy Stream	66
1.	Policy Communities	66
2.	Policy Ideas – Primeval Soup.....	67
C.	The Political Stream.....	69
1.	National Mood.....	69
2.	Governmental Turnover	70
D.	Window of Opportunity and Policy Entrepreneur	70
E.	Conclusion	72
	SECURITIZATION OF MIGRATION	74
	THE IMPACT OF SECURITIZATION OF MIGRATION IN ALGERIA.....	80
A.	The Impact on Migrants	80
B.	The Impact on Migrant Women.....	81
C.	The Impact on The State	83
D.	Conclusion	84
	RECOMMENDATIONS	85
	CONCLUSION	89
	BIBLIOGRAPHY	95

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

A. Global Overview on Migration

Human mobility is a growing global phenomenon with millions of individuals traveling across the world. One aspect of mobility that is the subject of controversy in political discourse and electoral campaigns, especially in Western countries due to the rise of right-wing figures, is migration. Despite the lack of a definition under international law, the term migrant is often attributed to individuals who move away from their place of usual residence, be it within the same country or across international borders (IOM, 2019, p. 132). Definitions, other than the one provided by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) exist and they vary depending on the agency¹ or the country that is employing the term.

Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, mobility in general and migration specifically were restricted globally – reducing the predicted numbers by 2 million international migrants – to stop the spread of the disease (IOM, 2021). Despite so, the number of migrants continued to grow globally where in 2020 it reached 281 million international migrants, higher than 2019's 272 million and three times that of 1970 of around 84 million migrants (IOM, 2021, p. 23).

¹ For example, the “United Nations Recommendations on Statistics of International Migration defines an “international migrant” as any person who has changed his or her country of usual residence, distinguishing between “short-term migrants” ... and “long-term migrants”” See (World Migration Report 2022, 2021, p. 23)

The vulnerability of migrants during the pandemic significantly increased, especially that of irregular migrants. Irregular migration is defined by IOM as the “[movement] of persons that takes place outside the laws, regulations, or international agreements governing the entry into or exit from the State of origin, transit, or destination” (IOM, 2019, p. 116). This thesis will continue to use the agency’s term of irregular instead of the State’s illegal migrants or aliens.

Irregular migration has also been on the rise. The Migration Outlook report has shown a 57% rise in irregular migrant crossings in 2021 compared to the year before, and a 38% increase compared to pre-pandemic 2019. Europe witnessed nearly 200,000 irregular crossings last year with these numbers expected to continue to grow, especially for arrivals from North Africa (ICMPD, 2022). This could be attributed to economic reasons but also to a multitude of factors in countries of origin including conflicts, wars, repressive regimes, climate change, or simply aspirations of migrants (IOM GMDAC, 2021). Estimates are that by 2050, the world would reach around 200 million climate migrants (Brown, 2008).

The international community has drafted guiding frameworks that provide protections to people on the move by categorizing them [migrants, asylum seekers, refugees, and IDPs] and entitling them to certain rights under international law and norms, both, in binding and non-binding fashions. The 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol that ensued it, identify what constitutes a refugee and what rights they are entitled to. The International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families, as the name entails, provides protections to migrant workers and promotes their rights. More Recently and following the New York Declaration for Refugees

and Migrants in 2016, states, in cooperation with IOM, drafted the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM) which sets up a framework for countries to cooperate and the improve migration governance and management.

Despite these frameworks, and to counter the rising numbers of migrants, policy makers began linking migration policy to national security. This became more evident with the rise of non-state actors and transnational terrorist activity. Migration began gaining a high priority status in Europe in the 1990s following several terrorist attacks such as the Paris Metro Bombings in 1995, the Madrid bombings in 2004, and London in 2005 (Adamson, 2006, p. 166). Whereas in the U.S. the September 11, 2001, attacks placed migration on the country's top national security priority.

States began taking a securitization approach to migration, especially with the avid influx of irregular migrants in 2015-2016. Both sea and land borders got more intensified and securitized. This can be seen in the Americas, for example, the United States increased its deployment of border patrol agents to over 4,000 and started to 'build a wall' during the Trump presidency (MMC, 2019), and Mexico deployed 6,000 soldiers to the Guatemalan borders to stop migrants from passing through to get to the U.S.

In Europe, for example, Hungary built border fences and increased the number of armed police by the thousands, the EU strengthened the mandate of FRONTEX (European Border and Coast Guard Agency), increased the number of its officers to 10,000, and increased their budget from 6.3 to 238.7 million euros (3,688 percent increase) (MMC, 2019), and Turkey deployed soldiers and built fences on its borders.

Migration management was also further securitized, especially, outside the borders of receiving countries through collaborations with and funding for countries of origin and transit for migrants. In addition to the example provided above for the US-Mexico, the EU and European countries have been attempting to shift ‘the burden’ of migration management onto the regions of origin. This can be highlighted through the EU’s Khartoum Process, which seeks to strengthen the border security of Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan, South Sudan, and Tunisia in order to reduce the flow of migrants from these countries to Europe (Clingendael, 2016). In Libya, the EU’s support for the Libyan Coast Guard led to it intercepting migrants and refugees departing from the country’s coastline and detaining them in centers where they have faced several human rights violations and abuses (MMC, 2019).

However, if irregular migrants managed to succeed and reach their destination or transit country, they could also face further securitization through detainment and escort to the border. These two policies often work together as migrants who are set to be removed from a country are detained prior to that. Escort to the border takes place in different countries and regions around the world be it the Americas, Europe, or Africa². This thesis explores escort to the border within Algeria.

² See: Franceinfo: <https://bit.ly/3vF7LBj> ; Bloomberg: <https://bloom.bg/3Qhz3FB> ; and ReliefWeb: <https://bit.ly/3zDLMvM>

B. Overview of Migration in Algeria

Algeria has long been known to be a departure and transit country for migrants on their journey to Europe through Spain, Italy, and France. However, during the last two decades, the country's migration profile expanded as it had become a very attractive destination country for migrants seeking economic opportunities (Arrouche, *Migration Governance in Algeria: Challenges, Interests and Future Prospects*, 2022). The portfolio of migrants includes those that came to Algeria legally – for example, the Chinese companies that brought thousands of their own laborers to work on infrastructure projects (Reuters, 2008) – and irregular migrants who either overstay their visas or enter through the country's porous borders. It also includes migrants that cross the country's sea borders through the Mediterranean to Europe.

To deal with the influx and outflux of irregular migrants, the Algerian authorities put forward a repressive law on June 25th, 2008, named Law 11-08 through which it set up conditions of entry, stay, and movement of foreigners in the country. The law criminalizes irregular migration be it by foreigners or Algerian nationals. The punishments include fines (nationals and foreigners), imprisonment for up to five years (nationals and foreigners), or expulsion and escort to the border (foreigners) (Journal Officiel, 2008). Although the law provided certain provisions for appeal in case an individual is set to be expelled or escorted to the border (Article 32), these provisions exclude irregular migrants (illegal entry or overstay), and it grants the jurisdiction of the escorts to El Wali (the governor) (Article 36).

By 2014, Algeria and Niger reached a controversial cooperation agreement part of which was to repatriate Irregular Nigerien nationals. Algiers created the narrative that these

repatriations were at the request of the Nigerien government and is part of their attempt to combat the rising trend of begging practiced by migrant women and children (Farrah, 2020). Following that, and by October 2015, Algeria had repatriated 3,600 Nigeriens, most of whom were victims of trafficking, and three-quarters were women and children. These were termed official convoys.

However, by 2015, Algeria began increasing the number of deportations mixing between Nigeriens and other African nationals. In cases of mixing, these are referred to as non-official convoys. These migrants are often ‘loaded’ onto trucks and dropped-off at an area that is referred to as Point Zéro at the Algeria-Niger border (InfoMigrants, 2021). Then, the authorities point to the direction of Assamaka and leave the migrants there to make the forced journey of 15 kilometers on foot in the desert with no guiding system. Between August 2017 and December 2018, Algeria had escorted around 19,500 Nigeriens and 750 Africans of different nationalities to the borders (Amnesty International, 2017).

Between 2014 and 2019, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) had reported the expulsion of 40,000 irregular migrant from Algeria (Farrah, 2020). These trends were coupled with several violations on the part of the Algerian authorities as there were numerous reports of use of extreme force, absence of a due process, and expulsion of asylum seekers, children, and unaccompanied minors. Once abandoned at the borders, migrants either cross to enter Niger or return back to In Guezzam (Tamanrasset) [Algeria] to continue their migratory journey, be it to regain their lives in the city they were taken from or continue to plan their journey upwards to Europe (Arrouche, Fallone, & Vosyliūtė, 2021). This journey back, however, is across a dangerous path that is filled with robbers, smugglers,

human traffickers, and security officials who can detain and deport the migrants again (IOM, 2021).

Although escorts to the border used to take place both to the Algeria-Mali and Algeria-Niger borders, only the latter has remained increasingly operational. Security issues and protests against Algeria's actions led to the closure of the migrant center in Bordj Badji Mokhtar near the Mali borders and the suspension of expulsion through there in 2020 (Farrah, 2020). Therefore, the thesis focuses only on deportations that happen through Tamanrasset's Point Zero with Niger.

C. Research Problem

There is an abhorrent lack of official data and statistics on regular and irregular migration, especially on the part of the Algerian government (GoA). Instead, there are estimates published by the GoA and international or local organizations (Arrouche, 2022). The previous Minister of Interior in Algeria, Noureddine Bedoui, stated that the process of counting irregular migrants is extremely complicated, following up with an estimate average of 500 irregular crossings to Algeria every day from its southern borders (APS, 2018). The minister's emphasis on these borders stems from the fact that the high numbers of entries happen through there, especially from Niger (Farrah, 2020). Algeria falls on the Central Mediterranean Route (CMR), which is the main migratory route to Europe as it connects Sahel countries to North Africa and Europe (IOM, 2021). From Niger, Migrants head to Tamanrasset, either to transit to Libya then Italy, or remain within the country's fifty-seven other provinces.

Prior to Law 08-11, Algeria had in place Ordinance 66-211 published on January 29th, 1966, that codified the conditions of entry, movement, stay, and exit of foreigners in Algeria (Journal Officiel, 1966). The country's Minister of Interior at the time, Yazid Zerhouni, said in 2008 that considering the change in circumstances, the old law had become outdated and presented to the parliament Law 08-11 (Belhadj, 2008). This law codified Algeria's views on migration, especially irregular migration be it of Algerians seeking to leave in makeshift boats through the Mediterranean or foreigners that had overstayed their visas or entered the country illegally.

Several other ministers and public officials following Zerhouni have made direct correlations between the presence of migrants and organized crime, diseases, drugs, and other vice [see (Hawam, 2022) (APS, 2021)]. Zerhouni claimed that the policy was put in place to protect foreigners and reduce organized crime; however, its impact has shown to be counterproductive as it made migrants who were returned to the border continuously vulnerable during their crossing journey or return to Algeria [(Amnesty International, 2017); (Arrouche, Fallone, & Vosyliūtė, 2021)]. Although the policy made no reference to collective expulsions, the practice of it has been as such.

The policy of escort to the border codified in Law 08-11 and the manner in which it is being practiced are part of a much bigger global phenomenon referred to as securitization of migration, through which migration is transferred from the political to the security field. In Algeria, the discourse around migration is highly securitized as it is often linked, by policy makers and politicians, to drugs, crimes and criminal networks, diseases, and even terrorism. Even the manner in which the policy of escort to the border was drafted portrays irregular

migration as a punishable crime. It is no surprise, that both the official and unofficial convoys are portrayed as solutions to eradicating these problems that are coming from outside.

The implementation of the policy has been increasingly repressive over time, inhumane, and often does not make an exception for vulnerable cases that need protection, including asylum seekers and potential refugees (Arrouche, 2022). Furthermore, as shown above, the numbers of escorts to the border are becoming more frequent with more individuals expelled outside of Algeria under unsafe circumstances.

Unfortunately, this is very likely to continue if not significantly expand in numbers. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), “Sub-Saharan Africa is the region in the world most vulnerable to climate change” (IMF, 2020, p. 15). The impact of climate change in the region coupled with high population growth is further contributing to conflict and mass migration in the Sahel (IMF, 2020). Considering the predictions of 200 million climate migrants by 2050, Algeria could be witnessing unprecedented numbers of migrants attempting to enter its borders. If so, then Algeria’s current securitization of migration strategy of rounding up irregular migrants and escorting them to the border could potentially place both the migrants and the state at a higher risk of vulnerability.

Taking into account the increasing flows of migrants through the CMR into Algeria, the continuous growing number of escorts to the border, the inhumane nature through which they are being conducted, the racism espoused to them, the real possibility of a significant rise in both the numbers of entries to Algeria and escorts to the border due to the impact of climate change which could further perpetuate the cycle of migrants entering-migrants deported, I have selected the topic of migration in Algeria as an overall theme to study in this

thesis. More specifically, however, the angle that this thesis examines is the one pertaining to migrants that re-enter Algeria after their escort to the border.

A cycle is being created through the escort of migrants to the border that is Sisyphean in nature. After the authorities ‘unload’ the migrants at Point Zero, they place them in the direction for the nearest Nigerien city. Migrants then re-enter Algeria be it after the authorities leave or after reaching Assamaka, Niger. There are several reports and testimonials of this taking place (Arrouche, Fallone, & Vosyliūtė, 2021). The journey back north to In Guezzam, Tamanrasset, then the remainder of Algerian cities is a dangerous one filled with bandits, smugglers with ‘trafficking attitudes’, and human traffickers (Farrah, 2020). Considering the increasing number of women and children who are ever more vulnerable³ to these actors (IOM, 2021), this thesis has also placed attention on the impact of this securitization strategy on women migrants who return to Algeria after their refoulement.

D. Research Aims, Objectives, and Questions

Despite the international pressure on Algeria to cease these expulsions, the government had put forward several justifications claiming that their actions constitute voluntary returns, are humanitarian in nature, and are based on the request of neighboring southern states. Reports by international organizations and UN spokespersons, addressed in the chapters below, have shown the opposite. Representatives of the GoA recognize that

³ In 2013, in the Niger desert a few kilometers away from the Algerian borders, 92 bodies of migrants were found after dying of thirst. Among them were 48 children and 37 women. See DW: حداد بالنيجر: لمقتل مهاجرين عطشا بالصحراء: <https://bit.ly/3oYKWEQ>

migrants that come to Algeria do so through smugglers and admit that on their journey into the country and within Algeria are being exploited by human traffickers and criminal networks. Despite so, they continue to escort significant numbers of migrants to the borders, some of whom have been deported several times, yet they continue to return.

Therefore, the primary aim of this thesis is to uncover and highlight the impact of securitization of migration in Algeria, practiced through its escort to the border policy, on Sub-Saharan migrants and women migrants who return to Algeria after their refoulement, and the state. The inclusion of women comes from their unique vulnerability. The harsh reality in Algeria is that there is an increasing number of women that are migrating upwards to Algeria, and they are targeted by human traffickers and dangerous smugglers for an exploitation that is uniquely different in practice than that of males.

The secondary aim of this thesis is to examine the link between these flows of ‘re-entry into Algeria’ after the escorts and state security, in other words, the impact of this policy, and the resulting re-entries, on Algeria itself. Representatives of the GoA in charge of the migration issue have made several claims that migrants are being exploited by criminal networks; and the policy of escort to the border was justified as a means to combat those; therefore, is the policy really combating these criminal networks or empowering them, taking re-entries into account? These two aims will be reached through a thorough examination of the literature present and the discourse of policy makers in Algeria under the framework of ‘securitization theory’.

The objectives of this thesis are to further understand the securitization approach taken by Algeria towards migrants, focusing on the escort to the border policy and its

consequences on migrants and the state. The research will explain how this policy came into action, why it was deployed by the government, and whether there are other policy alternatives to it. Furthermore, the thesis will identify the actors and agencies involved in the implementation process, along with their roles and positions. These will be done using Kingdon's public policy analysis framework named the Multiple Streams Theory.

Another objective of this thesis is to examine Algeria's conception of security and how it gets reflected within the relevant policy at study. I will also look into the focusing events that brought this policy into action, and how they were utilized by security professionals to develop their speech acts to securitize public policy beyond the normal policy implementation and moving into the extra-legal practice of escort to the borders. Through the securitization theory, I will examine the above and the linkages established between migration and security.

The main research question of my thesis is: what is the impact of securitizing migration in Algeria, through the escort to the border policy, on Sub-Saharan migrants in general and women in specific? Other questions that this thesis will answer are: what are the security implications of this policy on Algeria? How did this policy come into action? Who are the actors involved in putting it on the agenda and in the implementation process? What are their roles and interests? Are there policy alternatives? And does the EU have any influence on this policy and its implementation?

E. Significance

The aspired impacts of this thesis fall on three levels: the theoretical, the social, and the policy. Starting with the theoretical, this thesis seeks to contribute to the literature on migration, securitization and securitization theory, and the Multiple Streams Framework. What is unique is that it uses both frameworks to study migration within Algeria, a country that is not too often covered by academic research in English. Furthermore, the paper also highlights the interplay of gender and security within a migration context in Algeria.

At a social level, the research showcases the racism espoused with this policy in its implementation. It also brings to the surface the realities that migrants face due to the relevant policy. It places emphasis on the rising phenomena of migration, especially through the CMR, and highlights the dangerous implications this could have if the main responses from Algeria are repression and refoulement. For the policy aspect of this thesis, recommendations are provided prior to the conclusion that are based on the compilation of data acquired and the analysis made to ensure a safer journey for migrants, and a decreased risk for the state as well.

F. Limitations

As mentioned above, one of the major obstacles faced while conducting research on this topic is the abhorrent lack of data. Nearly all the numbers available on migration, especially those provided by GoA representatives, are estimates and approximates. I have found that the data provided by international organizations are more precise in instances where it is them who intervene, for example receiving migrants near Assamaka after they

cross the borders back to Niger. However, even these numbers may be misleading as smugglers can get to migrants prior to them coming in contact with these organizations.

Another limitation has been interviews. Some of the public officials I had reached out to with the intention of conducting an interview for this thesis were either unavailable or unable to respond. However, those that agreed to talk to me, and although they provided good information, it was often city-specific and could reveal the identity of the person interviewed; others, however, shared information with me but unofficially. Other interviews could have been conducted beyond public officials, including with migrants who are impacted by this policy. However, conducting these interviews requires special permissions on the part of the university and the government, which might delay the production of this thesis beyond the agreed upon deadline. Even after obtaining the needed authorizations, traveling to Tamanrasset to interview migrants and smugglers, may be both expensive and risky.

G. Outline

The following chapter of this thesis details the thesis' research design including the methodology, conceptual frameworks selected, and the positionality of the author. The third chapter is a literature review that is divided into four parts. The first section is on 'migration in Algeria' followed by 'Multiple Streams Framework', then 'Securitization Theory and Securitization of Migration'. The chapters will review the existing literature and academic works in each theme highlighting their contributions to the thesis. The chapter is concluded with a hypothesis that highlights the key findings and the existing gaps and how this thesis would contribute to filling them.

The fourth chapter further elaborates on the background of the case selected providing more details on Algeria's migration profile, the relevant policy and how it developed, the agreement with Niger, the worrying numbers of escorts, and the dangerous trip upwards after re-entry, highlighting how Sisyphean the journey is. Testimonials by individuals who were subject to refoulement and those that re-entered are added to show the severity of the situation. The chapter will also contextualize the policy within a broader view from a global practice, to regional, and to local. Furthermore, it will highlight the agreements that bind Algeria to treating migrants better, and the pressure exerted on the country from international bodies. Considering the role the EU has played in the Mediterranean to export migration management outside, the chapter will examine whether that has taken place with Algeria, and the GoA's response to those requests.

The fifth chapter applies the Multiple Streams Framework (MSF) to Algeria's policy of escort to the border of Sub-Saharan migrants. This chapter will answer how this policy came into being, and who the actors involved in that process are. Using Kingdon's MSF, the chapter will uncover the events that took place under the problem stream, the policy stream, and the political stream. Among others, it will put forward the indicators used by the GoA and the focusing events, along with the problem brokers and the policy entrepreneurs. The chapter will showcase, how those three streams came together to create this policy.

Chapter six is on the framework of securitization of migration and how it applies to the implementation of escort to the border beyond the legal texts. Within this section, the thesis will identify the referent objects, the securitizing agents, their mechanisms, and how they shifted the policy from the political to the security field. It will also highlight the

focusing events that potentially led them to do so or they used as an excuse for their policy orientation. Algerian institutions will be addressed here as they are key to the securitization process of migration. Security, as defined by the Algerian regime, will be analyzed along with how it is used as a justification for escort to the border and how it further securitizes migration. This chapter will answer the questions relevant to how the policy developed beyond the legal text, how it became repressive, and who made it as such and why.

The seventh chapter will highlight the impact of securitization of migration in Algeria on migrants who re-enter the country, how women are especially vulnerable, and the potential repercussions of this policy on the state itself.

The remaining two chapters will offer a set of policy recommendations for the GoA and other international actors that are based on the research offered in this thesis and a conclusion to summarize them, highlight the main arguments, and providing avenues for further research.

CHAPTER II

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

A. Conceptual Framework

Considering the fact that this thesis deals with a public policy issue, it needed an analytical framework from the same field. The MSF was chosen as the analytical framework to study Algeria's 'escort to the border' policy because of the main assumptions it provides. Kingdon's work 'Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies', later enriched by the likes of Herweg, Zahariadis, and Knaggård, offers the assumption that public policy processes happen in the midst of ambiguity (Kingdon, 1995). This concept negates the existence of a rational solution to a given problem and assumes that political life is chaotic, complex, and dynamic in nature; hence, there is a variety of solutions to a given problem. Furthermore, other assumptions the framework provides are that policy processes are also subject to time constraints, problematic preferences, fluid participation, and stream independence (Herweg, Zahariadis, & Zohlnhöfer, *The Multiple Streams Framework: Foundations, Refinements, and Empirical Applications*, 2018).

MSF's is built on the idea that there are three independent streams that operate at the same time that are coupled by an agent or more during a specific opportunity. These elements are the problem, policy, and political streams, along with the policy entrepreneurs and the window of opportunity. The first stream relates to problems, which are seen under this framework as conditions that move away from the ideal state, as perceived by policy makers or citizens, that are public in nature as they need the government to resolve them (Herweg, Zahariadis, & Zohlnhöfer, 2018). These problems gain the attention of policy makers through

indicators and focusing events. However, not all conditions are problems. Often times there needs to be the effort of framing these conditions as problems using the indicators and focusing events to convince policy makers to pay special attention to the problem. Although Kingdon calls the individuals or agencies that do this policy entrepreneurs, as they operate across all three streams, Knaggård argues that within the problem stream there exists another agent, the problem broker (Kngaggard, 2015). The problem broker frames conditions in certain ways in order for them to be considered as problems by the policy makers. Policy entrepreneurs can play the role of problem brokers.

In the policy stream, there are two significant elements that take shape. The first being the policy communities. These ones are loose groups of civil servants, interest groups, academics, researchers, think tanks, or consultants who work on policy problems. They devise different policy ideas and advocate for them (Herweg, Zahariadis, & Zohlnhöfer, 2018). This process where ideas are discussed and advocated for is called the primeval soup. Many policy ideas are brought up during this stage and they undergo what is known as a softening up process. Here, policy ideas are debated and voted in or off by the policy community until the strong ones remain and garner their approval. The ones that survive the softening up are often the ideas that do not contradict the values of the policy community.

The third stream is the political stream. Here, attention should be paid to national mood, interest groups, and government turnover. The national mood is often tested through surveys. The assumption is that large numbers of people tend to think along common lines, and they set up the mood. Interest groups often put pressure on policy makers and advocate for certain policies or policy changes (Herweg, Zahariadis, & Zohlnhöfer, 2018). The

government turnover often drives change in policy orientation and agenda setting. As new individuals come into power, they bring along new ideas and can shift policy direction from the ones before.

In order for policy change to happen, Kingdom argues that all three streams are coupled together through a window of opportunity (Herweg, Zahariadis, & Zohlnhöfer, 2018). This window enables advocates to push their pet proposal or bring attention to a problem. These advocates can be policy entrepreneurs. These individuals or agencies help frame issues in the problem stream, they try to couple all three streams, and they push for their own pet projects.

Migration is a global phenomenon with actors involved being of different nationalities, hence, it needed to be analyzed through a broader conceptual framework instead of just a policy analysis one. Securitization of migration enables this thesis to explain escort to the border beyond its inception and follow its development and impact through time. The theory of securitization paints a different picture of migration. One where national security priorities and the ensuing policies are not a natural phenomenon, but rather carefully designed ones at the hands of policy makers (Eroukhmanoff, 2017). Furthermore, these securitizing actors, with the power to move issues beyond politics, transform normal political issues to extreme security issues that require urgent intervention to prevent the danger and menace that awaits from this problem.

This is done initially through ‘speech act’, which is when policy makers frame an issue as a security problem, and they try to convince their constituents of why it is being lifted above politics. This shows that policy makers have the ability to paint a certain reality their

way in order to trigger certain responses. The cycle through which securitization of migration happens starts with focusing events that bring the issue to the wider public and the policy makers attention. The securitizing agents take advantage of those events and launch their securitizing speech acts in order to frame an issue along those events and as a national security priority (Messina, 2014). Once the public has received that discourse, public policy making on the issue would be outside the normal decision-making procedures. Policy makers create the link between migration and security at an institutional level then vigorously defend it. Their justification for the policies would be to defend a referent object. This could be either the citizen, the state, the identity, or a few others depending on the framing used and the sectors it is used in.

The case study at hand will apply both these frameworks in their respective chapters and attempt to analyze the relevant policy to understand how it came about, what brought it, who brought, how it is implemented, and what is its impact.

B. Research Design

The thesis employs a qualitative research design to understand the issues faced by migrants in Algeria and the impact of the policy of escort to the border on them. Unfortunately, data is extremely scarce on the topic in Algeria; hence, quantitative data is hard to come by, especially on the numbers of re-entries to Algeria. Furthermore, I believe that irrespective of whether the numbers are large or not, the issue maintains its significance since there are individuals that are going through horrifying situations of exploitation as a result of a state policy that was set out to protect them at first. This is worth highlighting also

because the estimates are that migrants will continue to increase in numbers; hence, the use of qualitative research design.

Although some of the data used provides some numbers, they are mostly approximates, rather than precise. Hence, the data mostly used in this thesis is qualitative in nature as well. The analysis technic used here is one of discourse and text analysis to understand the meanings behind the speeches of several politicians and the writings of experts and journalists on the topic of migration in Algeria.

The time frame the thesis deals with is between 2007 and 2022. In 2007, a copy of the policy was first leaked to the press as a sign that the law was being drafted. The evolution of the policy is studied between that 2007, the verbal agreement with Niger in 2014, all the way to the time of the writing of this thesis. The limitations of this research are the abhorrent lack of data, and the difficulty in conducting interviews to acquire more precise data.

CHAPTER III

LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter brings together a collection of academic literature that tackles various aspects of my thesis. These aspects include how migration and escort to the border have been studied within the Algerian context, the Multiple Streams Framework development and use within the field of migration, and the securitization theory and its application to migration. The aim of the chapter is to bring forward some of the most relevant ideas put forward on the topics at hand and assess them. The hypothesis at the end of this section will identify the research gaps and highlight the pertinence of my thesis.

A. Migration in Algeria

I have been able to find three trends when it comes to writings on migration in Algeria. The first category is on emigration whereby they provide historical overviews, detailed accounts, and list policies relevant to Algerians leaving the country or returning [see Collyer's *Moving targets: Algerian state responses to the challenge of international migration*; 2012]; this, however, falls outside the scope of this thesis and, hence, will not be address below. The Second category is a mix of reports and articles on the status of migrants in Algeria and their journey into the country with occasional references to the practice of escort to the border whereby they showcase testimonials and various forms of information [See *(Forced to Leave Stories of Injustice Against Migrants in Algeria, 2017)*]. The third

category of writings available is only available in Arabic and directly tackle escort to the border, albeit from a legal perspective.

Starting with the second category, this publication offers very valuable insights into the world of migration management in Algeria. Kheira Arrouche's article 'Migration Governance in Algeria: Challenges, Interests and Future Prospects' provides a critical assessment of the country's migratory framework and highlights the GoA security priorities and interests⁴. Policy priorities and realities of migration in this article are contrasted and matched to the results of a survey named 'Towards sustainable and mutually beneficial migration partnerships in the Southern Mediterranean' funded by different European institutions.

She argues that Algeria opted to manage migration autonomously, adopting both a repressive and indifferent approach to it. She further notes that this has resulted in a securitized perspective that regards irregular migration as a threat to its nation and its management is done outside the legal and institutional frameworks. She claims that this has led to serious concerns around migrants' fundamental rights.

In the first half of her section pertaining to irregular migration, the author attributes the increase in flows to Europe from Algeria to socioeconomic and political reasons, in addition to the systematic visa denials for Algerian youth, supporting her argument with survey results by Algerian respondents. The second part explains in a few paragraphs the policy that the GoA has put in place to deal with migration, law 08-11. She notes that the law

⁴ (Arrouche, Migration Governance in Algeria: Challenges, Interests and Future Prospects, 2022)

criminalizes irregular migration and considers overstaying a crime that could lead to expulsion from the territory, which has made several migrants live under fear of refoulement.

Arrouche dedicates a part of her article on return and reintegration, mainly for Algerian nationals in Europe. She discusses Algeria's unwillingness to cooperate with the EU on readmission agreements and attributes it to lack of policy standards and weak mechanism and infrastructure on the country's part. She also adds that due to this stance, some European countries have tried to exert further pressure on Algeria in order for it to recover its migrants and other African nationals, but this has only further complicated the issue. This, she claims, is mostly due to Algeria's avoidance of cooperation initiatives that could be threatening or undermining of its sovereignty. Arrouche further strengthens this by sharing Algeria's Minister of Foreign Affairs opinion on the matter who linked this to the EU's attempts to externalize their border and the GoA refusal to act as a policeman for Europe.

Another section of her article discusses the lack of protection for forcibly displaced people and the absence of an asylum system in the country thus far. Due to this, she notes, UNHCR conducts the provisions of protection, despite its very limited operational area away from key entry points. The remaining parts of the article are policy recommendations on how Algeria could further enhance its migration governance policy through cooperating and building an updated strategic partnership with the EU in economic and industrial avenues, education infrastructure, and empirical research upon which policy can be built.

Arrouche's article provides both valuable insights and recommendations on how migration could be better governed in Algeria. It seems, though, that the cooperation

frameworks her piece revolves around are the EU's 'Renewed Partnership with the Southern Neighbourhood' and the 'New Pact on Migration and Asylum.' I would argue that her paper discusses migration in Algeria as it pertains to Europe. In other words, migration is addressed mostly from the perspective of Algeria being an origin and a transit country more so than being a destination country for migrants.

In her article, Arrouche shares several survey results, interesting of which is the one that places countering smuggling and trafficking of migrants, building economic opportunities, and addressing root causes of irregular migration as key areas of migration policy for the country. She fails to mention, however, how these areas have been used repeatedly by representatives of the GoA as justifications for escort to the border and refusing cooperation with EU counterparts on migrations.

Furthermore, the author's emphasis on migration from Algeria being mostly for socio-economic and political reasons, which she does not further detail beyond the statement, is reductionist in nature. Despite being supported by the results of the survey, I would argue that it dismisses the migrants' personal aspirations first, and that the survey guided participants towards that answer. The survey provided the following answers to the question 'What is the main driver of outwards irregular migration from your country?': 'Lack of socio-economic perspectives, Conflict or instability, Joining family/relatives living abroad, Impact of climate change, I have no particular views on this matter' (Arrouche, 2022, p. 123).

Considering the absence of conflict and instability in Algeria, the fact that not all migrants have relatives abroad, and the low responsiveness in the survey to climate change, migrants were mostly directed to the socio-economic answer. An additional tab where

respondents could type in their answers could have changed the results of this question. Based on these results, the author made recommendations for further socio-economic partnerships to generate job opportunities. However, migrating to Europe through the Mediterranean requires significant sums of money which youth often work to acquire (Farrah, 2020).

The ensuing article by Chloe Teevan⁵ titled “Algeria: Reforming Migration and Asylum Systems in a Time of Crisis” promotes several policy recommendations that cover various levels of cooperation on migration management based on the information she shares in her research. She sets the tone in her introduction by highlighting the presence of different estimates on migrants in Algeria, the GoA’s reluctance to work with the EU on migration governance, and advises EU policy makers to be careful of their approach on the topic with their Algerian counterparts

The second section of her article begins by tracing Algeria’s large southern borders with Morocco, Mali, Niger, and Libya and the rising securitization there. She traces the status of borders and their control measures, exemplifying by the freedom of movement that Tuaregs enjoyed moving across these countries, which became rather difficult with the rise of conflict and destabilizing events in Libya and the Sahel 2011 onwards. She notes that these events not only constituted push factors for migration, but also security concerns for Algeria as terrorists started moving across those borders into the country. GoA representatives have labeled those borders as a hub for transnational crimes such as smuggling and trafficking in persons, prostitution, and arms trafficking, which terrorists have taken advantage of. She

⁵ Teevan (Algeria: Reforming Migration and Asylum systems in a time of Crisis, 2020)

further notes the lack of data, especially the disaggregated kind, on the number of migrants, but uses UNDESA estimates of 250,000, with the main nationalities being Mali and Niger.

Teevan dedicates a good portion of her article describing the current realities and existing systems of reception. She argues that Algeria has been struggling to meet its international and regional commitments on migration, including what was written in the 1951 convention, the 1967 ensuing Protocol, and other agreements drafted by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the Arab League that the country is signatory to. She adds that despite the constitution recognizing the superiority of international law and the principle of non-refoulement, this does not guarantee asylum, since there are no national procedures for it. This job is handled by UNHCR, who registers the asylum seekers, but their job is limited to Algiers, instead of the south where the high concentration of vulnerable cases are.

Breaking shortly from the international with an observation on Algeria's abstention on the GCM vote on claims of lack of distinction between regular and irregular migrants, Teevan addresses law 08-11 and how it blocks migrants from regularizing their status; thus, subjecting them to refoulement. Then, she observes the ambiguity within Algerian law in terms of access to healthcare and education for migrants – whether they are a right for everyone or just citizens.

The author spends the remainder of this section addressing countering narratives between international organizations, mainly the UN, who called Algeria's forced returns of migrants a violation of international law, and GoA representatives who argued that these actions were put forward to combat the security risk of terrorists and criminal organizations

who have taken advantage of migrant flows. She concludes this part with a discussion on racism at the social, media, and political levels that Black Algerians and migrants suffer from.

In the subsection that follows, Teevan provides more details on the political and economic context that is impacting both local youth and Sub-Saharan migrants, highlighting the new reform agenda brought by the new president at the onset of 2020, the drop in hydrocarbons prices upon which Algeria's economy is built, and the discontinuation of the Hirak due to COVID-19. She notes that rather than a drop in the number of expulsions under president Tebboune, the Minister of Interior promised an increase in the pace of expulsion. The author does report some optimism as the GoA has increased cooperation with IOM allowing for more assisted voluntary return flights for migrants. This collaboration has also included putting at IOM's disposal a wing at the airport and a lodging center for migrants registered for these operations all while facilitating their judicial investigations.

The political interest subsection stresses the significance of sovereignty to Algerians and argues that the refusal of the EU's disembarkation platform proposal can be attributed to that. She adds that this does not necessarily translate to unwillingness to cooperate, but rather seeking one that is not at the expense of their sovereignty, and she exemplifies by the agreement with Germany to return Algerians who had their claims to asylum rejected. Under this section, she establishes a link between the black decade and the ensuing terrorist activities that haunted Algeria to their emphasis on security when it comes to migration.

The author predicts that Algeria's return to diplomacy under president Tebboune could lead to a shift in its migration governance as maintaining good relations with African partners could pressure Algeria into developing a National Strategy on Immigration and

Asylum. In her concluding sections, the author further remarks the lack of data, local research, and journalist interest in Sub-Saharan migration to Algeria, and provides three sets of recommendations (at the state, civil society, and research levels).

Teevan goes beyond other authors like Arrouche when tackling migration management by situating it in a local political context, a regional one, and an international one in terms of obligations. The information she shares are valuable to understanding Algeria's mechanism of governing migration and the justifications used by public officials for them. What is also interesting is that it tackles migration in Algeria not simply as a country of origin and transit but also as a destination. Hence, the policy recommendations she makes advocate further transparency, more cooperation, and further research. However, she advocates for further EU cooperation and involvement both at the governmental and civil society level. As far as the latter is concerned, some of the recommendations she made seem to insinuate working around the state, which would certainly upset Algeria and could cause trouble in as far as the first level is concerned. Although the article is well rounded, it has not selected a specific angle to tackle, for instance, the policy of escort to the border, its impact on migrants, and the dangerous dynamics it has created despite her initial focus on asylum seekers, a category intensely vulnerable to the dangers of the migratory journey in Algeria.

The final paper within this category is by Brittany Van Soest⁶ titled 'Migration Governance in Countries of Transit: Assessing Policy Implications in Algeria'. The article concerns itself mostly with how the concept of sovereignty, and the different subcategories

⁶ Brittany Van Soest (Migration Governance in Countries of Transit: Assessing Policy Implications in Algeria, 2019)

it has including domestic, international legal, Westphalian, and interdependence impact a state's approach to irregular migration and migration governance. The author focuses on migration across the Mediterranean and selected Algeria as a transit country, while recognizing its status as one origin and destination. Granting Algeria that status, she later addresses externalization policies by the EU and European countries towards 'safe third countries' where migrants can be disembarked. Within the context of Algeria, she argues that this was met with refusal due to the state's attachment to sovereignty. One, she adds, that was badly fought for since Ottoman and French occupation.

The author follows by building an argument starting with how post 1962 sovereignty had become a valued concept not to be let go off despite violent domestic events. She highlights the political context leading up to the 1992 parliamentary elections and the ensuing black decade that she referred to as a civil war. Despite attaining internal peace and security, she notes, the actions of Al Qaida in the Maghreb made Algeria respond to terrorism through 'crackdowns on weapons' and 'increased border security.' She argues that Algeria, through border control, prioritizes territorial sovereignty; hence, establishing a link between sovereignty and refoulement.

In the ensuing chapter, Van Soest remarks the EU's attempt to list Algeria as a 'safe third country' and argues that the EU's push back on migrants' arrival to Europe through the Mediterranean, especially through Libya, has shifted entry points and made Algeria more desirable to migrants. This contributed to Algeria being more than just a country of origin and transit into one of destination as well. With that being the case, she claims that Algeria does not have a 'whole of government' approach to collecting data on migration, lacks

political will and coherence between ministries, and does not have the needed capacity to control its borders. She attributes the numerous entries to Algeria to these factors over the official turning a blind eye.

Van Soest concludes that Algeria is more concerned with territorial control and maintaining social stability (Interdependence and domestic sovereignty) than the Westphalian style sovereignty. She recommends further cooperation through international legal mechanisms that ensure the agency of 'less cooperative' states as a process towards adopting a global norm.

The author's choice to pursue qualitative research in the absence of data is admirable; however, it did not justify her choice of pursuing the analysis of Algeria as a transit country. Although Algeria continues to be a transit country for migrants that cross to Libya and Morocco on their journey to Europe, it has become significantly more of a destination country than anything else. Due to this, it would have been useful for the author to justify how would studying sovereignty for a destination country like Algeria differ from studying sovereignty for a transit country like Algeria. Furthermore, this article joins a whole set of literature that only views migration trends in Algeria in as far as Europe is concerned rather than flows to the country independent of the journey across the Mediterranean.

Moving shortly to the last category of writings under migration in Algeria, I have found that a significant number of writings on this topic from within the country, especially those tackling law 08-11 or escort to the border specifically, are great replicas of each other.

While several of them share similar titles⁷, others share the same division of chapters, or even the same methodology: description. The articles are often divided into two sections, the first one provides a variety of definitions including migration and its various types, expulsions, and deportations. Within this chapter, they also specify sections to note what expulsions and deportations are not. The second section of these articles are often reserved for the legal procedures. Here, the authors begin to detail the specificities of law 08-11 as it pertains to removing foreigners from the country and the mechanism this is done through, with some titles reserved to some critique in where the law falls short.

I have managed to find two exceptions to this type of publications. The first is by author Bouhada Sarah in her article ‘The Repercussions of Illegal Immigration on Algerian Security’⁸. Sarah begins by defining irregular migration and introduces several factors behind it, including political, economic, and social themes. Within the section that follows she addresses the elements mentioned in the title of her article. She provides migratory routes to Algeria and push factors for migrants to get to the country or transit through it. She then delves into the repercussions.

Starting with political-security ones, she highlights how migrants are lured in with money by terrorists so that they join their ranks and infiltrate other migrants whereby they spread radical ideas and exchange information on the movements of the Algerian security

⁷ [see (Abderrazak, The legal rules for the deportation of illegal immigrants, 2019); (Illegal immigration and mechanisms to combat it in the Algerian legislation, 2021); (Expulsion and/or Escort to the Border Under Law 08-122 Different Approaches and Similar Goal, 2014); (The Legal System for Deportation and Expulsion of Foreigners in Algerian Law, 2018) (The Legal System for Deportation and Expulsion of Foreigners in Algeria, 2015); (The Legal System for Entry and Exit of Foreigners from the Algerian Territory, 2018)],

⁸ (The Repercussions of Irregular Migration on Algerian Security, 2020)

forces. She further adds that irregular migrants join transnational crime networks in order to traffic and deal in drugs. The economic implications of irregular migration are that it threatens the Algerian labor force by providing cheaper prices causing higher unemployment among Algerians. She notes that money laundering and forgery of currency and papers has increased since migrants had arrived.

Ending with the social impact, she remarks a social imbalance in the demographics in the southern cities of Algeria, which could threaten the identity of local inhabitants and the appearance of racial and religious minorities that are foreign to the Algerian community with their Christian and pagan practices. Along with the explicit notes of racism present beyond the social implication, which disregard the constitutional protections to freedom of religion, the paper not only perpetuates stereotypes and overgeneralizes on some of the incidents that have taken place, it also further intensifies governmental rhetoric and propaganda accusing migrants of all that she mentioned without valid generalizable proof.

The second exception is an article by Laalama Zohir⁹ who drafted a comparative study between Algeria and France named ‘The Administrative Judge’s Oversight of the Legitimacy of the Decisions to Deport Foreigners.’ The author lists the various articles in French and Algerian law in as far as they pertain to deportation, expulsions, and escort to the border. The article praises French law in being overarching, properly defines all aspects of deporting foreigners, and is distinct through the regular amendments that keep it updated, unlike the Algerian law that is broad in nature. The common point between all the articles

⁹ Laalama (The Administrative Judge’s Oversight of the Legitimacy of the Decisions to Deport Foreigners-A Comparative Study between Algeria and France , 2021)

mentioned under this category, other than being written in Arabic, is that they are entirely descriptive in nature, and mostly do not advance solid arguments.

B. Multiple Streams Framework

MSF was developed by Kingdon through his work in ‘Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies.’ In summary, the five essential elements that the framework is built upon are the problem, policy, and political streams along with policy entrepreneurs, and policy windows. The framework was later enriched by several authors including Knaggård, who, in ‘Theoretically Refining the Multiple Streams Framework: The Multiple Streams Framework and the problem broker’ introduced the concept of ‘problem brokers’ and how they define problems in order for policy entrepreneurs to couple them with their pet projects (policy proposals). He argues that more attention should be given to the problem stream, since these actors, there, frame certain conditions as public problems and attempt to convince policy makers of those frames.

MSF provides a tool to identify these actors, for example policy entrepreneur and what they do manipulate the process and attempt to create or seek policy windows. Another writing that helps expand the use of MSF is by Herweg et.al named ‘Travelling Far and Wide? Applying the Multiple Streams Framework to Policymaking in Autocracies,’ through which they provide a variety of assumptions on how the framework could be applied and expanded in non-democratic contexts with a focus on absence of media freedom, the role often played by the leader, and how that impacts the streams and windows. Further details on the framework are provided in the research design chapter.

The two articles provided below, provide a great use of MSF on migration related policy.

Starting with Elin Jakobsson's article named 'How Climate-Induced Migration Entered the UN Policy Agenda in 2007-2010: A Multiple Streams Assessment'¹⁰ whereby she studies why the issue that had been known by academics and policymakers for decades suddenly gained agenda prominence at the international policy level at that point in time. She notes that discussions on climate-induced migration date prior to 2007 and traces it to 1985 when the UN Environment Program (UNEP) created the concept of environmental refugees. These discussions, she adds, between sceptics and alarmists, were peripheral up until 2007 when fluidity in actors, framings, and structures culminated in the adoption of paragraph 14f in the Cancun Adaptation Framework (CAF) in 2010. She attributes the significance of the adoption of this paragraph to it serving as a steppingstone for efforts on climate-induced migration to be elevated and recognizing a new category of forced migration outside the refugee convention.

After explaining the MSF and the interviews conducted, she delves into categorizing events under the framework. Starting with the problem stream, she argues that the problematization of climate-induced migration happened because of fears of refugees invading the global north, the vulnerability of affected societies, and the presence of a legal void to protect these societies outside the convention. These, along with the 2004 Indian earthquake and Tsunami, and the several reports in 2007 that foresaw migration driven by

¹⁰ Jakobsson, (How Climate-Induced Migration Entered the UN Policy Agenda in 2007–2010: A Multiple Streams Assessment, 2021)

climate change leading to a crisis that could spiral out of control and pose a threat to stability and security internationally, she argues, led to the heightened securitization of climate-induced migration in 2007.

Within the policy stream, she remarks the formation of a policy community on climate-induced migration made up of humanitarian, economic, and academic actors that did not necessarily represent security actors. These humanitarian actors, the policy entrepreneurs, helped shift the face of climate change from glaciers and coral reefs to human beings. This change in framing was further empowered through advocacy focusing on softening up policy makers and changing the narrative from security implications for states to one on humans.

At the political stream, she notes the change that was taking place at the institutional level. She describes how the COP (Conference of the Parties) grew in size and became more professional and goal-oriented, the arrival of new leadership at the UNHCR, Antonio Guterres, and the impact of Al Gore's film about climate change on relevant actors and the wider public. With these streams taking place, she moves to the section on the window of opportunity. Here, she argues that a policy window opened for an agenda on climate-induced migration to advance. She asserts that once the issue gained a wide public and political audience due to threat and security concerns, a new policy community was formed that pushed for the recognition of climate-induced migration in global governance, and policy entrepreneurs shifted the framing to one on human security. She then concludes that had it not been for the fact that these events took place simultaneously and the efforts of policy entrepreneurs to soften up policy makers, it would have been less likely to see climate-induced migration on the international policy agenda and the CAF.

The second article is ‘Multiple Streams Theory: Insight into The Global Compact on Migration’ by Wa’ed Alshoubaki. This article, similar to the one by Jakobsson looks at policy making on migration from an international aspect. She attempts to uncover how the GCM got on the global public policy agenda, and how the three streams culminated in a window of opportunity. She does so by modifying certain concepts within MSF to reconcile between public policy making at the national and international levels.

The author introduces GCM, and her relevant research questions then proceeds to detail her theoretical perspective. In that section, she emphasizes that the coupling of all three streams within MSF is deliberate and requires architecting issues. In the following section she specifies and justifies her modification to the theory remarking that global issues require global coordination for intervention. She adds that global public policy covers a worldwide polity and is done by states, NGOs, corporation, social movements, and individuals. Wa’ed re-categorizes them into internationalized public sector officials (state officials), international civil servants (employees of IOs), and transnational policy professionals (non-governmental participants). She argues that their interaction for the formation of global public policy requires ‘partnerships’, hence, this concept replaces Kingdon’s ‘entrepreneurship’ effects as it is adopted in public policy formation at the national level. Based on this, she replaces the ‘politics stream’ with ‘regime stream’, which she defines as ‘the institutional environment within which international policies are made’ (Alshoubaki, 2021, p. 78).

Alshoubaki then tackles the streams starting with the problem. There she highlights the indicators and focusing events, noting the total number of international migrants of 257,700,000 and the mass influx of refugees and immigrants to Europe and the Middle East

that peaked in 2015. She references the Syrian Civil War and the resulting refugee crisis of 5,600,000 Syrian who fled to neighboring countries and Europe. She also takes note of the reaction of certain states to this influx who opted out of asylum treaties and closed their borders. To get to their destinations, she adds, migrants and refugees can fall victim to smuggling and trafficking, supporting this by presenting estimates of Interpol that 90% of refugees who entered the EU did so through smugglers who made 6,000,000,000 USD just in 2015.

At the regime stream, Alshoubaki portrays it as a collective of UN norms, human rights conventions, and international migration organizations, such as IOM, which used that combination to enhance migration governance through GCM. She highlights the EUs prominent role in the GCM preparation and its experience in the field of management of migration. Then proceeds to explain how this regime expanded during the GCM consultation phase to incorporate more actors. Within the policy stream, Wa'ed tackles the primordial policy soup composed of members states and other stakeholder who brought forth cross cutting issues that are of common interest to states and migrants including human rights, sovereignty, and children's issues. This led to the adoption of a framework of managing migration that is both a 'whole-of-government' and a 'whole-of-society' approach. The chapter after explains the policy process that GCM underwent and the role of partnerships in achieving them. Her conclusion calls for further research on the implementations process and its barriers.

These two articles are great examples of how migration can be studied using MSF. Despite the fact the articles focus more on a global public policy setting, one can notice a

difference between how they managed the streams. Alshoubaki felt compelled to change the political stream into the regime one, whereas Jakobsson did not. This goes to show that MSF is a tool, although some adjustments may need to be made, it remains a great tool used to explore how public policies come into the agenda and who are the actors involved in that process.

C. Securitization Theory and Securitization of Migration

Security has proven to be an elusive and contested concept to define. This can be attributed to the absence of a definition that is neutral in nature (Smith, 2005). However, several definitions are offered for the concept by different schools of thought. For example, the Aberystwyth School perceives the state as one of the main causes for insecurity, and they argue that security can be achieved if people are not deprived of it by others. Hence, to them security is emancipation, and they argue that the two are two sides of the same coin. However, the Copenhagen School perceives security as survival, and that a problem becomes a security issue in international relations only when actors present it as posing an existential threat to a referent object. Building on this definition, securitization is thus understood as the process through which non-security issues are transformed into urgent security threats. Below are two writings on how a non-security issue, migration, is made into a crisis.

Starting with Valeria Bello's journal article¹¹ named 'the spiraling of the securitization of migration in the EU: from the management of a 'crisis' to a governance of human mobility?' through which she argues that migration securitization is not linear but

¹¹ Bello (The spiralling of the securitisation of migration in the EU: from the management of a 'crisis' to a governance of human mobility?, 2022)

rather a spiraling progressing phenomenon that involves different actors and their narratives, policies, and practices. Bello's main argument is that the main contributors to securitizing migration and the reinforcing of the perception of it being tied to crime; thus, managing it as a crisis, are prejudicial cognitions of actors manifested in their narratives and practices. She claims that state and non-state actors with a specific cognition of ethnicity and nation that is rooted in prejudicial narratives of migration construct human mobility as a threat. She further adds that the opposite is also true, whereby actors who do not hold discriminatory cognition and resist securitization, seek to de-securitize the issue through discourse, practices, and policies.

She highlights a central idea in her argument noting that it is not the language of security but that of prejudice that makes migration a national security concern. She builds on that by shifting attention to how nations are built and the construction of threat. She posits that nation-building projects succeed when there is a common cause and interest. If not, it can be created through fighting an external threat together. Therefore, states can be defined along ethnic and national lines and outsiders, migrants, can be seen constructed as a threat. This, she calls up-warding forces, those who construct migration as a security threat through narratives, then policies, and practices. The opposite is down-warding forces and they de-securitize migration.

Unique to her paper is the claim that '... [prejudice is] a cognition that informs the social construction of migration as a threat...[and that] the securitisation of migration first happens cognitively in actors' perspectives and then epistemically spirals through practices and narratives.' (Bello, 2022, p. 1333). She also claims that those with no intercultural values

will more likely view migration negatively and exemplifies by several countries in Europe and their harsh reaction to migration. In the following sections she divides non-state actors onto four parts those that are public or private and have collective interests or individualist interests. Although some have a de-securitizing role, others are hard to predict. Bello's paper presents a great framework to work with when addressing speech acts as a securitizing tool and the interplay between the public and the state on issues such as migration.

The second article is on the 'Implications of Securitisation of Migration' by Elisabeth Farny¹² who establishes a link between securitization, fear, and racism. The cases she selects to draw attention to the rise of securitization are the U.S. and the EU. She highlights the developments that took place in Europe starting in 1980 and the formation of the Union and the Schengen area as leading causes to why migration was constructed as destabilizing and dangerous to public order. In the U.S., she argues, this started much later in the aftermath of the September 11th, 2001, terrorist attack.

Farny claims that 9/11 furthered the link between migration and security at the EU level but is not the main securitizing factor. That, she argues, was the attempt to protect European identity and culture within a fortress. One that guaranteed freedom of mobility within but has restrictive external borders. In this section, she posits that countering organized crime and terrorism led to stricter public policies and tighter external border in the U.S. and the EU, ones that embodied extreme security (for states) and extreme insecurity (for migrants).

¹² Farny (Implications of the Securitisation of Migration, 2017)

In the section after, Farny remarks the fears and anxieties in Western societies around their identity, security, and wellbeing; hence, the resulting politics of fear stemming from places like the EU and the U.S are built on differences of appearance and ethnicity – the undocumented immigrant being the non-European. She adds that public fears of the large-scale movement of migrants are larger than the number themselves. However, the politicians' portrayal of them as such impacts how migration is dealt with in the political domain. This she refers to as the construction of migration as a security threat, in other words securitization through a speech act.

The section that follows, Farny calls for the study of the role of racism in the discourse of securitization of migration. She claims that negative attitudes towards migrants can be based in beliefs that the host country is superior in terms of culture, race, or identity. Furthermore, countering organized crime and terrorism, along with protecting 'socio-political cohesion' are factors leading to constructing migration as a security threat. This leads to immigrants from a different background being portrayed as an imbalance to the nation. In her conclusion, Farny offers a recommendation that if migration is to be viewed as a security issue, it should be to highlight the vulnerability of migrants and the impact of exploitation and discrimination on them.

D. Hypothesis

Building on the gaps in the literature and the results of the research, this thesis argues that securitization of migration is creating a cycle of entrapment within the country that is

badly impacting both migrants, by increasing their vulnerability, and Algeria, as it is increasing its expenditures and potential security risks.

The research gaps within the section of ‘migration in Algeria’ that are common within ‘the second category’ are that migration is studied in Algeria in as far as those flows relate to Europe. Even though they recognize Algeria as a destination country, they choose to label it as a transit state through which migrants eventually cross to Europe. This could potentially be due to funding, as several of the papers written on migration in Algeria, like the ones presented, are funded by European and EU institutions. This paper argues that Algeria should be further studied as a destination country. This is largely because the number of migrants that arrive to Algeria has significantly increased over the years, with most of them staying in the country looking for economic opportunities (Menacer, 2020). Paolo Giuseppe Caputo, the IOM Algeria chief of mission has noted that ‘Algeria receives more migrants every day than all of Europe’ (Magnan, 2019, p. 1). He also stated that there are around 300,000 irregular migrants living in Algeria in 2020.

Other gaps in the literature include the focus on flows of migrants headed upwards to Algeria, or those headed downward after refoulement; however, not much attention is given to the cycle that is created because of escort to the border. Furthermore, they highlight the journey of migrants into the country and its dangers, but do not place it in a more global context of securitization of migration. Often the word securitization is used to refer to increased security only rather than the transfer of the issue into the security field and outside the policy making arena. As for those that address the legal system, the third category, they

are merely descriptive in nature providing more details on how the policy is ‘supposed to be’ implemented.

For the literature on MSF, the framework continues to expand in its use beyond the western world and the traditional topics of policy making. The articles assessed in the literature review are unique in the sense that they show MSF can be used not only to evaluate migration as a public policy issue, but also within an international context. They are also important in the sense that they highlight the role that actors play in developing a policy and placing it on the agenda. The two also show how windows of opportunity lead to a policy being placed on the agenda, either by events coming together simultaneously or due to the actions of policy entrepreneurs. The gap here is that there are not many articles that use MSF as a tool to understand how migration policies come into being at the national level, especially outside western countries.

As for the articles on securitization, I have noted that when the theory is used to understand how migration has become a threat to national security, it is often done within a Western/European context. In addition to the two articles assessed above on this theory, others have been drafted to study the securitization of migration in the European Union, the United States, France, and Canada¹³.

This research aims to contribute to filling the gaps in the literature on migration in Algeria by contextualizing it within a broader discussion on securitization of migration and

¹³ See: Jaskulowski (The securitisation of migration: Its limits and consequences, 2019); Messina (Securitizing Immigration in the Age of Terror, 2014); Hyusmans (The European Union and the Securitization of Migration*, 2000); Bourbeau (The Securitization of Migration A study of movement and order, 2011)

seeking to identify how migration got securitized in Algeria? How the policy came about? Who are the actors involved in policy drafting and implementation? How can securitization of migration be a spiraling cycle? And how does securitization contribute to the creation of a cycle of entrapment? And what is its impact on migrant women?

CHAPTER IV

MIGRATION TRENDS IN ALGERIAN AND THE ESCORTS TO THE BORDER POLICY

At the end of the black decade in Algeria, the GoA invested heavily in rebuilding its infrastructure; thus, launching several development and housing projects. This served as a perfect opportunity for both project contractors – who needed cheap labor – and sub-Saharan migrants who sought work opportunities. The country began shifting from simply being one of departure and transit, to also one of destination for sub-Saharan migrants. With the flows of migrants who sought job opportunities, came other migrants who practice mendicity in numbers significant enough to get the GoA's attention.

The Algerian military had and continues to operate along the borders to monitor entry and exit from the country. It set up several military bases close to entry and border areas to ensure a quick response in instances when an intervention is needed (Djoughri, 2021). On the ground, collaboration takes place between Algerian border patrol agents, armed customs agents, and border police. In the sky, the army uses mostly helicopters and drones to monitor the movement along the borders. There are mixed reports on how the military handles migrants. Farah's research shows that the military mostly looks for human traffickers, arms dealers, terrorists, and contraband. There are instances where migrants were stopped and allowed in by military personnel (Farrah, 2020).

Fear of these actors is genuine considering the country's experience with terrorism in the 1990's and after. Algeria's *Al Wiaam AlMadani* (Civil Concord Law) and *Al Muslaha Al Wataniya* in 2005 (Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation), granted amnesty to

those who committed acts of terror in an attempt to end the bloodshed. However, terrorist groups continued to run their operations in the country, this time in a transnational fashion, striking different cities and institutions resulting in hundreds of deaths.

In the midst of this, the GoA passed law 08-11 on June 25th, 2008, that sought to codify the rules pertaining to the movement of foreigners into, out of, and within the country. This law was labeled repressive¹⁴ as it criminalized irregular migration of both Algerians and foreigners. For foreigners, defined under the law (in article 3) as ‘any individual who carries a nationality other than the Algerian nationality or has no nationality.’ (Journal Officiel, 2008), the legal actions that are taken against them in case they enter the country illegally or overstay their visa period are deportation or escort to the border (article 36). Those who re-enter Algeria in unauthorized fashions, can be imprisoned and receive a sentence of two to five years (article 42). The rhetoric around the law itself linked migration directly to national security, labeling it a threat to public order¹⁵, and public officials continued to define it in such terms for years to come (France24, 2019).

The policy of escort to the border entered Algeria’s legal arsenal and went into practice after. Reports show it was suspended twice, the first being in 2012 when the conflict with Mali started and the presidency requested that Malians be accepted as refugees (BenAhmed, 2012), and the second was during the COVID 19 pandemic (Teevan, 2020). In between however, Algeria deported and escorted thousands of sub-Saharan irregular

¹⁴ See (Arrouche, Migration Governance in Algeria: Challenges, Interests and Future Prospects, 2022)

¹⁵ (Arrouche, Migration Governance in Algeria: Challenges, Interests and Future Prospects, 2022, p. 122)

migrants to its southern borders, especially with Niger. This was done either through official or non-official convoys.

This phenomenon is not exclusively practiced by Algeria. Examples of it can be seen in the Americas, Europe, and Africa. In the U.S., the national guard returned migrants to the borders in Texas by orders from the governor of that state (Hagan, 2022), in France, the government escorted Bulgarian and Romanian irregular migrants to the borders with Belgium (Benjebria, 2021), and in Morocco, the authorities escorted tens of irregular sub-Saharan migrants to the Algerian borders (Ghabchi, 2017).

In Algeria, the official convoys started in 2014 as part of Algeria's controversial verbal agreement with Niger to repatriate irregular Nigerien nationals to their country and by that year 1,345 migrants were expelled. These migrants are handed off by Algerian authorities to Nigerien authorities. Non-official convoys, however, mix between Nigeriens and other African nationals and escort them to a border area near Niger named Point Zero. Migrants are then forced to walk 15 km to the nearest city across, Assamaka. The latter convoys are a violation of article 33 of the 1951 UN Convention on Refugees¹⁶ as they constitute a refoulement (Farrah, 2020).

The numbers of arrests and expulsions significantly increased in the years after where in 2016, over 1,500 sub-Saharan migrants were arrested, with hundreds of them deported including several registered with UNHCR as asylum seeker (Amnesty International, 2017).

¹⁶ Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, Article 33 - Prohibition of expulsion or return ("refoulement")

'1. No Contracting State shall expel or return ("refouler") a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.'

At the same time, around 9,290 Nigeriens were expelled from the country. By 2018, over 12,000 Nigerian and 649 sub-Saharan were expelled through convoys, whereas nearly 12,000 other migrants were escorted to the border with Niger.

In addition to these numbers, another worrying aspect of these expulsions are the manner in which these migrants are treated. Migrants have reported several actions that would constitute human rights violations on the part of the Algerian authorities. Human Rights Watch (HRW) called out the Algerian security forces for separating children from their families during mass arrests, stripping them from their belongings, banning them from challenging their removal, and failing to screen their status (as asylum seekers or refugees) (Human Rights Watch , 2020). HRW further noted how unaccompanied children and the ones separated from their families are also detained and deported – despite being under the age of 10 years old sometimes.

Provinces in Algeria, through their security delegates, collect and send data on daily basis to the ministry of interior, one of the information shared is the number of irregular migrants in detention. Once the number grows enough to fill a detention center, the minister of interior sends an order to all Walis [governors] to send the migrants to the detention center in Tamanrasset. This journey can take up to 4 days by bus to cover a distance of 2,400 kilometers. Once there, the migrants get all their fingerprints taken, then either deported through official convoys or non-official convoys.

The testimonial of how migrants are treated during their arrest and deportation are horrifying, especially when it comes to vulnerable cases. Migrants have reported having legal paperwork destroyed during the arrests, others were beaten and clubbed, while most had their

belongings stripped from them. The testimonials also highlight how women's vulnerabilities are unique. Rokia Tamara, who lived in Bechar with her two kids spoke about her experience saying, "The police forced their way into our house, grabbed us, didn't explain why, didn't ask for documents...I explained that I was recovering from a Caesarian operation, but they took me anyway. The children were sleeping, and they took them too." (Human Rights Watch , 2020).

Janet Kamara, a Nigerien who was escorted to the Point Zero while pregnant said that "Women were lying dead, men.... Other people got missing in the desert because they didn't know the way," (Hinnant, 2018). When interviewed by Associated Press, the journalist noted that Janet's 'body still aches from the dead baby she gave birth to during the trek and left behind in the Sahara, buried in a shallow grave in the molten sand' and that 'Blood streaked her legs for days afterward, and weeks later, her ankles are still swollen.' (Hinnant, 2018)

Aid workers assisting the migrants in Niger upon their arrival from these expulsions have also cited atrocious signs on migrants. For example, in addition to the wounds and bruises on many migrants, one worker mentioned the arrival of two women in October of 2020 that were pregnant, one had a broken leg and the other went into labor after arrival. Another added that some women have reported that they had been raped by Algerian men in uniform (Human Rights Watch , 2020). One migrant reported that along with the seizure of personal items, security officers even remove clothes from babies, quoting them saying '[you] came to Algeria with nothing, and you will leave with nothing,'.

It is difficult to ascertain how many of these vulnerable cases exists due to the lack of data and reporting, – both by the GoA, which collects data but does not share it, and relevant

international organizations – however, the risk is very high especially with increased deportations. In 2018, estimates are that Algeria expelled around 25,000 migrants to Niger, followed by 25,000 more in 2019 (Human Rights Watch , 2020). These spikes in deportations are the drawback of a few conflicts that arose between the Algerian community and the migrant communities in different cities, the most notorious of which is the one that took place in Bechar in 2016 (Lahyani, 2016).

When called out on their inhumane treatment and deportation of migrants and asylum seekers, Algerian officials use the sovereignty card, arguing that migration is a national security issue (France24, 2019). They also emphasis on the ‘high’ budget that the state has dedicated to these operations to guarantee a humane procedure, with estimates of 20-25 million euros. In other instances, the officials even attack relevant international bodies and accuse them of launching smear campaigns, espionage, and having hidden agendas against Algeria (Tlemçani, 2020).

The national security argument used by the Algerian authorities is rooted in their assertion that irregular migrants that arrive to Algeria do so through human smugglers and traffickers (J, 2018). This, they posit, entraps migrants in debt and places them at the mercy of these criminal networks. Therefore, this escort to the border policy is portrayed as a mechanism through which the GoA rescues vulnerable migrants from the hands of their traffickers. For example, the head of the department of Migration in the Algerian Ministry of Interior, Hassan Kacimi, stated that Algeria ‘saved 14,000 woman and child from the hands of Nigerien criminal networks who were about to exploit them in mendicity all over the country. (Annasr, 2018).

This trafficking and smuggling often starts at the country or even city of origin. Between Niger and Algeria, networks of human smuggling and trafficking are operated mostly by Nigerien Tuaregs who are socially well connected with their Algerian Tuareg counterparts (Farrah, 2020). Entrance to Algeria with them starts from Assamaka [Niger], crossing through to In Guezzam [Algeria] then Tamanrasset. That path is made more difficult by the Algerian sand berm that goes up to between two to four meters. Migrants are dropped off close to the border and they are told to cross the Berm where another smuggler would be waiting for them. However, reality has it that, often times, the smugglers are not waiting on the other side, so migrants instead walk to In Guezzam. It is worth highlighting that the crossing is a terrifying process since security forces highly surveil the area.

The line between human trafficking and human smuggling is becoming very blurred in the Niger-Algeria path. Human trafficking is defined as ‘... the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of people through force, fraud or deception, with the aim of exploiting them for profit’ (UNODC, n.d.), whereas human smuggling is ‘the facilitation, for financial or other material gain, of irregular entry into a country where the migrant is not a national or resident’ (UNODC, n.d.). Migrants are falling more in the hands of smugglers with trafficking attitudes or traffickers themselves. The risk is one of violence and potential abuses. Tamanrasset, for example, became a major destination for women and children trafficked from Zinder [Niger] in order to practice begging for money (Farrah, 2020).

The Global Initiative research on human smuggling in Algeria has shown that a large number of women identified as victims of trafficking from Niger were trapped in debt bondage and as a result were forced into domestic work, prostitution, and mendicancy in order

to pay back their debt to the smugglers (Farrah, 2020, p. 25). These cases are extremely difficult to track and to support especially since these victims avoid going to the authorities to report this out of fear of deportation. They also avoid seeking medical support for the same reasons.

This fear is a valid one as there are instances of this happening. One of which is the case of Marie-Simone, who after being gang raped in Oran, was rejected from several health institutions after seeking medical attention. When she went to report the case to the authorities, the gendarme inquired about her paperwork then said ‘You have no paper. You leave, or else it's the cell’ threatening he would take her to jail (Kolli, 2016).

The migratory routes in Algeria are dangerous ones. On the way up from the Sahel [entry to Algeria] migrants face the avid risk of falling in the wrong exploitative hands of human smugglers and traffickers along with getting apprehended by the authorities. On the way down, migrants face abuse, human rights violations, and potentially death if they find themselves on non-official convoys. Movements upwards and downwards are managed under law 11-08 and other international frameworks.

Algeria is signatory to several international and regional conventions that protect migrants, asylum seekers, and refugees. Internationally, it ratified the 1951 Refugee Convention, the 1967 Protocol, the 1990 International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, and the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children (Palermo Protocol). Regionally, on the African side, the GoA signed the 1967 Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, whereas on the Arab side it is signatory

to the 1994 Arab Convention on Regulating Status of Refugees in the Arab Countries (Teevan, 2020). Although the constitution insists on the supremacy of the conventions signed by the president, Algeria is yet to establish an asylum system as per its international commitments in the treaties above (Arrouche, 2022).

Furthermore, within the existing international framework on migration governance, Algeria abstained on voting for the GCM. However, it has been cooperating and drafting reports on GCM goals to the United Nations Network on Migration. The country has expressed several reservations on the GCM but claims that its policy orientation goes along with some of the compact's goals (Government of Algeria, 2021). Within these reports it also highlighted the challenges it had been facing, among others are organized crime, terrorism, human trafficking, and 'contagious diseases brought by the significant influx of migrants' (translation mine) (Government of Algeria, 2021, p. 5). The GoA also stresses on cooperating with countries of origin of migration from the Sahel to assist them in achieving sustainable development whilst respecting their sovereignty.

Sovereignty is extremely important for Algeria and is often employed as a tool to defend itself against foreign pressure, whether when the EU attempts to push it to move in a certain orientation on migration, or when UN agencies critique its policy of official/non-official convoys to the border (Soest, 2019). Migration is regarded as a national security issue and is addressed within the parameters of the state's sovereignty without interference or support from abroad (France24, 2019).

The GoA does not have any direct programs or funding from the EU on migration or migration governance. It is not even involved in the Mobility Dialogue with the European

Union, unlike some of its neighbors (Teevan, 2020). Some EU states placed pressure on Algeria to build disembarkation centers along the Mediterranean to become a safe third country where migrants are sent in case they are caught at sea. Algerian Minister of foreign affairs at the time called out the EU on this and categorically rejected being ‘the policeman for Europe’ (Arrouche, 2022, p. 17). This

Some funding does, however, go to the UN Migration agency (IOM), the UN Refugee agency and some other local organizations that work with refugees and migrants (Teevan, 2020). The most notable work done by IOM Algeria is their Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration program, which hosts than transports sub-Saharan migrants safely back to their home countries. This program is mostly funded by the EU, EU member-states, and the US to a lesser extent.

This shows alignment between the four parties whereby the EU and European states wish to keep migrants outside their borders, Algeria wishes to return irregular migrants, and IOM, as a humanitarian agency that is able to operate within international law and norms, carries those that wish to return to their country of origin safely, – fulfilling one aspect of target 10.7 of the Sustainable Development Goals seeking to ‘[facilitate] orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration and mobility of people...’ – hence, a win for all four parties. Further independent studies need to be conducted to determine whether this could constitute a win for the migrants themselves or not.

Outside of this framework, irregular migrants face the constant threat of expulsion to Niger, be it through official convoys, which Algeria calls ‘voluntary returns’ that are based on the request of the countries of origin, or the extra-legal practice of non-official convoys

which leaves migrants stranded in the desert. Several migrants have not only expressed their intention but have in fact re-entered Algeria after their escort to the border, leading to another journey upstream through In Guezzam, Tamanrasset, and the rest of Algeria (Farrah, 2020) (Arrouche, Fallone, & Vosyliūtė, 2021). Once there, the threat of deportation, once – or several times – more continues to loom.

CHAPTER V

ESCORT TO THE BORDER: A MULTIPLE STREAMS ANALYSIS

The policy of escort to the border reached the discussion table of the Algerian legislator at a critical time. It was presented to the parliament under a proposal for law 08-11 that would regulate the entry, movement, and exit of foreigners in Algeria and replace the prior Ordinance 66-211 passed in 1966. The minister of interior at the time, Yazid Zerhoni, being the person in charge of presenting the plan and advocating for it, gave a speech explaining how the policy would work and the reasoning behind it.

A. The Problem Stream

Several of what falls under the problem stream can be derived from the minister's speech at the parliament in April of 2008 and the MPs response to it. During his speech, Zerhoni emphasized that the proposed law takes a security approach towards the entry, stay, and movement of foreigners in Algeria, but 'that does not mean at all that Algeria had given up on its principles of solidarity and respecting human rights' (Younsi, 2008). This can be linked to an essential part of the problem stream which is 'framing'.

The minister added that the previous law from 1966 was over 40 years old and was no longer applicable considering the changes the country had encountered. These changes represent two significant aspects of the problem stream, the indicators – used policy

entrepreneurs and makers to emphasizes the size of the problem – and the focusing events – which make the relevant problem more visible.

1. Framing

Through his speech, and those of others during this session, Zerhouni, who also plays the role of a problem broker, continuously links the issue of irregular migration, especially that of foreigners, mostly sub-Saharan coming into Algeria, to vice, terrorism, and other types of organized crime. Along with calling migration a security issue in his speech, he emphasized that the law was drafted this way in order to enable the security authorities of the country to properly monitor the foreigners who enter Algeria ‘illegally’ and could constitute a threat to national security. He creates a distinction between ‘those that come to Algeria with good purposes, like businessmen, tourists, and teachers’ and those that come ‘for other purposes’ – who would be controlled by the authorities – hinting at irregular migrants and demonizing them.

Other policy makers, including one from the FLN (Front National de la Liberation), spoke on what he called ‘the African Presence’ in Algeria, who ‘often sell products that are used in witchcraft’ or promote Christianity. In other instances, migrants are portrayed as ones that ‘often resort to crime including fraud, forgery, and prohibited trade. This political rhetoric serves to paint a picture of migrants as beggars, criminals, crime facilitators, and even victims. Hence, escort to the border serves as a solution to rid the Algerian community from these criminals and as a step to pull victims away from the perpetrators.

2. Indicators

Although law 08-11 passed in 2008, the earliest available copy of it was leaked by the press in 2007 (Lotfi, 2007). As mentioned earlier, irregular migration from sub-Saharan Africa was continuously on the rise following the black decade where several development projects were being erected. Unfortunately, there are mostly approximate of how many there were, especially since these migrants entered through irregular means.

During his speech, Zerhouni provided some justifications for why the law was being updated, some of which serve as the indicators used by the government to draft-out law 08-11. Zerhouni initially argues that the change happened due to a significant demographic and economic change in Algeria and how the country overall had changed in that respect. Zerhouni adds that when Ordinance 66 was passed, Algerians were around 9 million people (Youssef, 2008). Furthermore, Algeria had come out of a war of independence and needed labor to help it build an economy and some institutions. Hence, Algeria used foreign labor in several fields including education, health, and hydrocarbons. However, by 2008, Algerians had become nearly 35 million and the country's GDP per capita went from 235.6 USD in 1966 to 4923.6 USD (World Bank, n.d.). His framing, thus, is that Algeria no longer needs the same amount of foreign labor as it did before.

Zerhouni also spoke about the rising numbers of sub-Saharan migrants who used Algeria for transit on their way to Europe. Although the minister did not provide any numbers to substantiate his claim, the data available about migration trends to Europe at the time shows that around 65,000 and 120,000 sub-Saharan irregular migrants enter the Maghreb region, which Algeria is part of, on their migratory journey (Haas, 2006). In Algeria

specifically, the Gendarmerie authorities released published reports highlighting the increase in the number of migrants they detain per year. The numbers between 2007 and 2008 increased by 12% where in 2007 the gendarmerie detained 6988 irregular migrant and 7838 in 2008 (Boutalbi, 2009).

3. Focusing Events

Algeria's porous borders enabled several elements to go in and out of it, whether good or bad. Push factors from the Sahel were continuously increasing, especially those relevant to climate change. By 2007, climate-driven migration shifted at the policy level (and UN level) from simply being an academic topic that is discussed among experts only to one gaining the interest of policy experts and makers and the public both at the local and international level (Jakobsson, 2021). Several policy reports highlighted how climate-driven migration could spiral out of control leading to a crisis that might become a threat to international stability. These reports, such as Christian Aid's 'Human tide: The real migration crisis', led to a wave of securitization policy of migration across the world.

The second focusing event for the policy of escort to the border relates to terrorism. Zerhouni and other policy makers, 2008 and onwards, have made a link between migrant irregular crossing and the presence of terrorism in Algeria. Despite Algeria's peace projects that ended the black decade, some terrorist activity remained after. However, in 2007, the year the draft version of law 08-11 was leaked, one of the main groups responsible for atrocities during that era and out-survived the peace projects, the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat on January 2nd 2007 changed their name to Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb

(Bouaaza, 2007). This change also marked a shift in their operations whereby this group went from national to transnational with international ties. With this also came fighters that were regional and international that came in through the borders¹⁷.

Another focusing event that is the result of the second one is the combination of terrorist attacks that took place in Algeria after the Salafist Group became part of Al Qaida, the biggest of which is the attack on several local and international institutions on the same day. On December 11th, 2007, a bomb exploded in Algiers leading to the damage of the Constitutional Council, the Supreme Islamic Council of the Presidency, a hotel that was hosting a meeting of judges (Khaled, 2007), and a bus carrying university students (Amnesty International, 2007). Moments later, a second explosion happened near the building of the UN Refugee agency. Around 117 people were injured and 36 others, both Algerians and foreigners, lost their lives in the attacks. Although it is difficult to determine whether those that committed this were Algerian or not, one needs to look no further than the fact that this act was then committed by a transnational group with members from the region.

These focusing events can be read through the lens of Minister Zerhouni's rhetoric of wanting to keep those who may not have the best intentions when they come into Algeria under the eyes of the authorities.

¹⁷ See Zahraa <https://bit.ly/3Aimm72> & Echourouk on catching 70 foreign Al Qaida fighters with foreign agendas <https://bit.ly/3CxjndF>

B. Policy Stream

1. Policy Communities

Data around these actors is scarce. However, from the speeches of some members of the parliament I was able to determine that the policy community is composed of different agents but all within the state apparatus. During the speech of representative Belkacem Kouadri from the Islamic party, he noted that the minister had mentioned that the draft of law 08-11 was drafted by a technical inter-ministerial committee. Unfortunately, in all of the research collected, there is no mention of any name of the members that were involved in it. However, it is certain that the Ministry of Religious Affairs was not part of the committee as MP Kouadri's had complained during his speech.

Another member of the policy community is the parliament's Committee of Legal and Administrative Affairs. After the draft was presented to the parliament by Minister Zerhouni, the committee convened for 15 hours and reviewed several proposals by its members and other members of the parliament. This leads to the third member of the policy community who are the different political parties and the representatives in their parliament. Parties brought forward different policy propositions and amendments that were reviewed by the committee at the parliament. Throughout the discussion, political disagreements showed on certain aspects of the law, especially on the detainment centers. The FLN [majority party] insisted on building detention centers as they represented the strength of the Algerian state, the Labor party saw the detention centers as inhumane and an infringement on the state sovereignty (Younsi, 2008). Unfortunately, the Algerian political system is one that is run by state agents with little to no space for individuals from outside the system. During the

research process, there was no evidence that educational institutions, think tanks, or actors outside the state apparatus took part in the development of this draft law.

2. Policy Ideas – Primeval Soup

Taking into account that there was no information on the individuals involved in the initial draft of the law, it has been equally challenging to find the different policy ideas and proposal that did not make it the primary discussion. However, once the proposal was in the hands of the parliament, there was another primeval soup that took place both at the plenary and the legal committee.

The committee's main policy addition to the draft has been an amendment that toughens the punishments for human smugglers in order to subvert them from bringing more migrants into Algeria. The fines imposed on smugglers were tripled under this amendment. The justification for it has been that subverting these actors also means reducing the possibility of the presence of 'transmissible diseases in the country, and the number of [irregular] migrants who are used as a tool for organized crime, terrorism, and drug trafficking' (Younsi, 2008).

Mr. Massoud Chahyoub, president of the committee of legal affairs, noted that his committee dealt with 48 amendments and that most were accepted while others were either withdrawn by their sponsors after an explanation from the committee or rejected from the draft as they did not embody the spirit of the law. He added that

‘The committee, in turn, introduced 6 amendments to the amendments submitted by the deputies, in addition to its initiative with nine other amendments that received the approval of the government. It also proposed a new article in the draft, which was also approved by the Ministry of Interior’ (Younsi, 2008, p. 1)

The president claimed that the adjustments that were added and approved during the committee’s primeval soup sought to provide additional protections to ‘legal’ migrants in case there was an order to deport them from the country (Younsi, 2008). The final amendment added by the committee that it’s president had saved the label of ‘humane’ for was one that changed the name of the detention centers from ‘shelter centers’ to ‘waiting centers’, as he graciously clarified that this was done to safeguard the dignity of these migrants – prior to unloading them off trucks and dropping them near the borders to walk for 15 kilometers in the desert heat.

Other policy proposals that showed up during the research that are worth mentioning include those by MP Belkacem Kouadri, who called for tougher punishments on the foreigners who insult or offend Algeria’s values (including religion and language). He called for a redefinition of the term ‘foreigner’ so that it distinguishes between foreigners who have special ties to Algeria [our brothers] so that they enjoy special privileges and foreigners whom Algeria only shares economic ideas with (Kouadri, 2008). The MP also asked for legal mechanism to protect the country against those who preach Christianity then for more defined rights and obligations of those who seek asylum in Algeria.

C. The Political Stream

1. National Mood

This section is very elusive as it is often identified through national surveys, and sometimes even those do not reflect the actual mood. The research has not found surveys that measure the national mood of Algerians at the time; however, considering the extraordinary circumstances the country had endured, the mood may not be that difficult to identify.

During the 1990s and up until 2002, Algeria was undergoing a period of rampant terrorism. After the army annulled the results of the 1991 parliamentary elections which the Islamist FIS (Front Islamique du Salut) won by a landslide, terrorist groups took up arms and used the mountains as their haven taking the country into an era of bloodshed (Omar, 2021). By 2005, Bouteflika brought forth a project for national reconciliation, which the public voted for by a majority to end the conflict (Otaibi, 2016). This plan unfortunately did not bring any accountability nor did all the fighters come down from the mountains. Those that stayed, later pledged allegiance to Al Qaida in 2007 and began launching several deadly attacks including the 2007 attack on the UNHCR and Constitutional Council. Algeria also had in place at the time a national emergency law that allowed for some extra-legal practices and arrests (Aljazeera, 2011).

Taking into account the public's traumatic experience during the black decade and the ensuing few years of terrorism, the state of emergency in place which did not leave for much of public freedom of expression and protests, the mood could be one of fear of terrorist action, especially one that had become transnational. This would justify the government's

use of the term terrorism when referring to migrants and the threat the GoA claims they represent to social order and national security.

2. Governmental Turnover

During the period up to when the law was passed, there were no political turnovers or major changes in government positions relevant to the policy at hand. The parliament had been elected in 2007¹⁸ and presidential elections were scheduled for 2009 that Bouteflika was most definitely going to win (Ould Ahmed & Lowe, 2009). Zerhouni had been minister of interior for years prior (APS, 2020), the president remained the minister of defense, and the head of the police remained unchanged for years as well (Al Arabiya News, 2017).

D. Window of Opportunity and Policy Entrepreneur

According to the available data, the policy entrepreneur of law 08-11 and by extension the escort to the border policy is the Minister of Interior at the time Yazid Zerhouni. Zerhouni approached the parliament with his pet project, detailed it in his speech, then entered into a debate with the parliamentarians. Within the policy stream, at the primeval soup, several policy ideas were exchanged and were either approved or disregarded by Zerhouni and his delegates. There does not seem to have been another policy proposal that replaces the proposed escort to the border, rather it seems that all the MPs were comfortable

¹⁸ See <https://www.iemed.org/publication/algeria-in-2007-a-year-of-elections-foreign-currency-and-investment-but-also-of-terrorism-and-social-tensions/>

with it and the discussions were on punishments, asylum seeker rights, and other cultural aspects relevant to the topic as mentioned above.

I would argue that the nature of the Algerian regime at the time: one that had recently shifted to a multiparty system in 1989 – with parties potentially not having the experience of being active on the opposition wings –, had come off a bloody war on terror – that started because an Islamist political party got their win annulled –, was under an emergency law for years, and one where the power is centralized in the hands of military-civilian elites, among whom was the president and his entourage (Ottaway, 2021), did not allow for a real political opposition to take place.

Herweg et.al, in their application of MSF, propose a hypothesis whereby they posit that ‘[in] issue areas in which the autocratic leader has delegated authority, policy proposals that the responsible executive supports have a better chance of gaining agenda status’ (Herweg, Zahariadis, & Zohlhöfer, 2022, p. 215). Considering that Zerhouni had been Bouteflika’s minister of interior for both electoral mandates, one can consider him to be his delegate. Hence, Zerhouni’s policy proposal was not likely going to receive severe opposition at the parliament. This thesis further argues, using Åsa Knaggård model in MSF, that Zerhouni was both a policy entrepreneur and a problem broker. His speech at the parliament has framed the issue of irregular migration along the lines of organized crime, terrorism, and national security, which other parliamentarians and policy makers to the time of the writing of this thesis continue to use.

Migration was successfully framed beyond being a condition and into a problem by Zerhouni. Herweg et.all provide another hypothesis that ‘It is more likely that problem

brokers succeed in framing a condition as a problem if it does not run counter to the regime's ideology or if it involves questions of autonomy.' (Herweg, Zahariadis, & Zohlnhöfer, 2022, p. 211). As alluded to throughout the thesis, the regime's ideology is one of security and sovereignty, concepts that were employed by Zerhouni at his proposal's presentation, other MPs during the primeval soup, and continue to be used until today.

As for the window of opportunity, it is not as explicitly obvious as with other instances. However, I argue that Zerhouni took advantage of the nature of the political regime in Algeria, the rising numbers of migrants, the transnational nature of terrorism, the repeated acts of terror by these transnational actors, then began drafting his pet project which he submitted to the parliament for debate along a security framing. Coupling the streams happened in the midst of political stability after a parliamentary election in 2007 and prior to a presidential election in 2009 that was guaranteed for Bouteflika. However, the national mood at the time both at the policy maker and public levels was one of alertness and fear of further terrorist activity. Zerhouni combined these elements in his proposal and defense at the parliament.

E. Conclusion

In conclusion, it appears that the policy of escort to the border came as a solution to the rising number of migrants and on the backdrop of the several terrorist attacks and movement that took place in Algeria following the black decade. The minister of interior, serving as the main policy entrepreneur, engineered and framed the policy along the lines of terror, national security, and fighting organized crime. During the primeval soup, several

policy amendments to the policy proposed were debated, but were not significant enough to change the course of the policy. The only viable alternative came years later under Prime Minister Tebboune who sought to regularize migrants' status through work permits instead (Al Arabiya, 2017). Understanding the origin of this policy, and the interest of the policy entrepreneurs – who sought to preserve the country's sovereignty – help explain how the policy was framed along those lines.

CHAPTER VI

SECURITIZATION OF MIGRATION

Security is defined by the Copenhagen School as survival, and that a concern becomes a security issue in international relations only when actors – securitizing professionals or elites – present it as posing an existential threat to a referent object (Smith, 2005). Building on this definition, securitization is thus understood as the process through which non-security issues are framed as urgent security threats and are transferred from the political to the security field. In other words, security issues are not necessarily threatening, however, referring to them as security issues makes them security problems (Eroukhmanoff, 2017).

As argued by Valeria Bello in the chapters above, securitization of migration is a spiraling phenomenon with different actors, practices, policies, and narratives among which the migration-security nexus is strengthened. This thesis adds another central element from securitization theory to this mix, which is focusing events. In Algeria, securitization of migration and the nexus of migration-security are continuously strengthened over time with the rhetoric becoming more securitized. The main interplay in this spiral happens between focusing events, elite securitizing speech (securitizing speech act), and referent objects.

Securitization of migration in Algeria often starts with focusing events. As explained in the problem stream of the MSF analysis, the policy of escort to the border finds its roots in different focusing events. The first being the period of bloodshed in Algeria known as the black decade. Security became a major priority for the GoA, and it was reflected in its policies. By 2007, prior to the first draft of the law containing this policy being leaked, the

Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat changed their name to Al Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb. Not only had they become transnational by titles, but also by operations and actors. Taking into account the large borders Algeria needs to cover, and the new nature of terrorist actors at the time, it set up a new law to deal with and monitor the entry, stay, and exist of foreigners in Algeria. A mechanism to deal with those that are no longer welcome – or never were in the first place – is escort to the border.

What is important to note here is that during Zerhouni's presentation of law 08-11 the phrases of combatting terrorism and organized crime were used by him and other parliamentarians as one of the main logics behind this law. This is important as it shows the significance of framing. The law was framed along the lines of terrorism and organized crime despite the absence of trends significant enough to link the two together – Zerhouni was asked about the number of foreign terrorists in Al Qaida operating in Algeria, he did not give a number and settled for 'they are few' (B, 2008) . The minister was quoted saying that the law takes a security approach to monitor individuals that enter Algeria irregularly and could constitute a threat to its security (Belhadj, 2008). Zerhouni's securitizing speech act created the link between migration, terrorism, organized crime, and by extension, security, launching the spiral of the migration-security nexus. The press also reported on his presentation emphasizing on the link he made further perpetuating his discourse.

Using Eroukhmanoff analysis, the sectors this policy seems to want to protect, inferred through the rhetoric of Zerhouni and other parliamentarians, are the economic, since they talked about how Algerian's labor has regressed in the market due to the presence of irregular market [referent object is Algerian Labor], the military since the minister continued

to use the phrasing of ‘state security’ when talking about the kind of people that enter the country [referent object is the state], the societal as migrants were demonized as individuals that practice witchcraft (Belhadj, 2008) and ‘spread Christianity’ which were portrayed as foreign to Algerian culture (Kouadri, 2008) [referent object is identity], and the political as they claimed that the law sought to protect citizens from transmissible diseases and pandemics [referent object is the citizen].

It is difficult to measure public opinion in Algeria during this period as there are no published surveys on how individuals perceived migration and the policy of escort to the border at the time. Herweg argues that national mood and the public perception can be irrelevant in some autocracies due to suppressing opposition and the lack of media freedom, which could provide a different framing from that of the government. In 2008, Algeria ranked 134th worldwide and its media was labeled not free by Freedom House’s ‘Freedom of the Press 2008’ report (Freedom House, 2008). Within the same year, the Economist democracy index ranked the country 133rd globally and categorized it as an authoritarian regime (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2008). These two indices help show how policy makers can shift issues from the political sphere to the security sphere without relying much on public receptivity.

Soon after the law was passed, the GoA began deporting migrants to the borders with Mali and Niger, albeit in smaller numbers compared to the years after. In 2012, migration was de-securitized for some time along the Algeria-Mali border due to the conflict that arose near the countries’ borders. Algeria issued a decree to stop deporting and escorting migrants to the Algeria-Mali borders as there was no legitimate authority in the area across that the

GoA could collaborate with (BenAhmed, 2012). The presidency also issued a decree to accept Malians as refugees.

As mentioned above, securitization of migration is a spiraling phenomenon. Migration was further securitized in 2014 after the GoA gentlemen's agreement with Niger to start deporting irregular Nigerien migrants across the borders and handing them to the Nigerien authorities. However, Algeria went beyond this agreement and started almost exclusively escorting migrants to point zero (Farrah, 2020). The flows became more mixed including different nationalities, and it put migrants in severe conditions in the desert.

This second spiral also started with focusing events. The war in northern Mali in the Azawad region in 2012 meant not only could Algeria no longer use those borders to deport migrants, but also that migrants could start to come into the country in higher numbers (Arrouche, 2022). Security was further strengthened there, and large sand berms were put in place. In 2013, following the terrorist attack on the Tingentourine gas facility – by terrorists that crossed the borders from Libya – Algeria significantly militarized its borders and upscaled the fight against organized crime and terrorism (Farrah, 2020). By 2014, with the borders with Mali closed, the instability in northern Mali, and the 2013 terrorist attack, Algeria sought an agreement with Niger to deport migrants there. This launched a spiral of government official and policy makers continuously defending the policy of escort to the border.

Even the media's reporting on migrants mostly reflected the stance of the government as the terms they used are securitized including 'the Africans are Invading the Streets' (Houam, 2022); 'Algeria announces a truce with Africans migrants' (BenAhmed, 2012); 'the

flow of African migrants hides a bigger conspiracy' (Mahsoul, 2021); and 'Algeria responds strongly to countries rejecting its deportation of African migrants and affirms: Do not interfere in our affairs' (J, 2018) (translation mine).

What can be seen through governmental rhetoric, is the link public officials establish between security and sovereignty. Hence, migration being labeled a national security issue should be seen through the lens of security and sovereignty being inseparable for the Algerian regime.

Waves of escort the border continue to take place in Algeria in significant numbers. The covid-19 pandemic might have reduced the number of individuals as the escorts have dropped in size. By mid-2021, Algeria had deported 1200 migrants to Niger, 515 of whom are Nigerien nationals who were on official convoys, and 752 West Africans who arrived on foot to Assamaka after being dropped off at point zero on non-official convoys (DW, 2021). Irrespective of the numbers, these non-official convoys still put migrants through hard and dangerous circumstances on their journey south.

The spiraling phenomenon of securitization of migration can be seen in Algeria's escort to the border and its development. The policy initially started under law 08-11 and was the result of several terrorist attacks, mainly the December 2007 ones, and the rise of Al Qaida. These events were used by policy makers, the securitizing agents, to further help shift the discourse on migration from a political issue, to one of national order and security. This was done with the intention of protecting the referent objects, which are Algerian citizens, their labor, identity, and the state. The same securitizing speech acts continued for years ahead.

By 2013, the Tiguentourine events, along with the unrest in Mali, further pushed the Algerian regime to secure its borders and securitize migration further. The deal with Niger highly securitized migration not only through speech, but it shifted migration from legal management to one outside the democratic scope as it left migrants stranded in the Sahara between Niger and Algeria. The spiral continues further beyond 2014 as the GoA continued to drop migrants by the border and in bigger numbers each year. The speech acts continued even at the highest level for years after even by prime ministers. Below the thesis elaborates more on the impact of this securitizing approach to migration in Algeria.

CHAPTER VII

THE IMPACT OF SECURITIZATION OF MIGRATION IN ALGERIA

A. The Impact on Migrants

Securitization of migration manifested in the escort to the border policy has had several severe negative consequences on migrants. As mentioned in the chapter on migration trends in Algeria there are several reports of assault, being denied healthcare, having their paperwork removed, and having their belongings taken away. These events are a violation of human rights and deny the migrants their dignity. When debating the draft law 08-11, representatives of political parties in Algeria sought to make it ‘a more humane law’ in as far as it pertained to treating irregular migrants; hence, they amended the name of the centers from shelters to waiting centers.

This utopic amendment completely disregards the fact that migrants, being placed in Point Zero have to walk 15 kilometers in the desert heat with barely any directions other than a finger pointing ‘that way’. Several have died, others were lost, but many made it across to Niger to be met with humanitarian organizations who would listen to stories about the horrific journey they made. However, reports and testimonials show that several migrants who are returned to the border actually re-enter Algeria since their belongings, money, friends, or even family would be there (Farrah, 2020) (Arrouche, 2022). Some have even said that they would return to the country even if the GoA ensured that they get ‘deported a thousand times’ (Arrouche, (forthcoming)).

B. The Impact on Migrant Women

Women are especially vulnerable to this policy. Not only do they struggle with the insecurity of potentially being deported from Algeria if they get caught, but they also face several unique challenges due to this policy. While working on migration in Algeria, I was informed by security delegates that one of the problems they face is that some migrant men often marry several women including underage ones and that escort to the borders is considered a blessing by these men sometimes as once their 'wife' is taken to the borders, pregnant or otherwise, the man can remarry again. Unsurprisingly, there are no official data that could support these claims, but security delegate in cities-of-entry are aware of this issue.

The interplay of feminism and securitization theory portrays the state as the cause of insecurities for women. This thesis shows how that is true. Some vulnerable women can find themselves at the mercy of the state or the human smuggler/trafficker. There have been several incidents where women with special vulnerabilities were either returned to the border or captured during mass arrests and deported later. Cases have been provided of women who gave birth upon arrival to Niger, who were deported weeks after giving birth, and who had to bury their baby in the sand while walking on foot after being thrown off at point zero. Women also reported being raped by men in uniform.

Re-entry to Algeria after escort to the border is not exclusive to men; however, some of the actions of human traffickers and smugglers with trafficking attitudes can be. Upon re-entry, migrants overall and especially women have no financial resources to afford being taken back to the city they were arrested from. Hence, they need to start working in order to pay for smugglers to take them up. There are reports where women were forced into domestic

work, mendicity, and in some cases prostitution (Farrah, 2020). It is difficult to estimate how long migrant women remain trapped with these traffickers; but it is not the period that matters but rather the fact of entrapment. Algeria's response to liberating entrapped women? Well, it is escort to the border again or return to Niger once more (Annasr, 2018), where women would likely also try to go back to Algeria and unfortunately become entrapped again.

What is happening that is not being addressed not by reports nor by academic literature yet is this cycle of entrapment. Irregular migrants are traveling to Algeria, getting caught by the authorities and escorted to the border or Niger. Once there, several of these migrants re-enter the country. However, the practice of escort to the border ensures that migrants are stripped off everything, including money. Therefore, upon entering the country once more, migrants have to work, often times for the smugglers to pay their debt either prior or after their departure up north. This unfortunately leads to the entrapment of migrants, especially migrant women who find themselves forcibly doing domestic work, prostitution, or begging for money. Since the raids happened frequently over the years and in bigger numbers every time, they are at risk of being escorted to the border once more. If the intention of entering Algeria again is there after the second escort, what can be seen is a migratory cycle of migrants 'entering, going up north, getting deported, re-entering, deported...etc.' that is Sisyphean in nature. This, unfortunately makes migrants, especially irregular migrant women, far more vulnerable upon every re-entry.

C. The Impact on The State

Escort to the border was developed as a mechanism to fight organized crime and reduce the number of migrants in Algeria. What could be seen is that over time the numbers of migrants increased and so did the deportations, as shown above. Furthermore, upon re-entry, migrants resort to smugglers and human traffickers to continue their migratory journey up north. These individuals are the embodiment of ‘organized crime’ – that law 08-11 sought to fight – as they have networks to get migrants from one area to another – be it across the borders or within the country – and the risk they pose is they can either abandon them exploit them (Farrah, 2020). The end result is that organized crime networks have enjoyed a constant flow of clients that have been coming to them after the GoA deported them to Niger or point zero.

The Algerian government is well aware of this as Hacem Kacimi, the director of the department of migration in the ministry of interior, has claimed that there are 7,000 human smugglers who use over 14,000 4x4 vehicles in Agadez, Niger, to transport migrants into Algeria (El Hayet, 2018). These smugglers have enjoyed a constant flow of ‘clients’ both those that come from West Africa and those that are returned to Niger and want to get to Algeria. This compromises the state’s security even further with these actors becoming more powerful and wealthy. Another aspect to consider is the amount of money the state has been spending on these operations. In 2015, the Algerian Human Rights League called into question the significant spending on this policy. The league called for an investigation into ‘the 100 million USD that was dedicated to dealing African migrants without any tangible results’ (translation mine) (Mezyani, 2015).

D. Conclusion

Algeria's own security and budget are being threatened by this practice, especially if the numbers continue to go higher. The predictions are that climate-driven migration, among other factors, from the Sahel would become significant in numbers (IMF, 2020). If this policy remains in place and officials would implement it to deal with the potential rising flows of migrants from the Sahel, then there is a potential for catastrophic human rights violations and severe security violations. Women would be even more vulnerable, especially if they fall victims of human trafficking and smuggling. Their exploitation, would become the new issue for the Algerian government to deal with. However, the law unfortunately does not provide the protection these victims would need since the law does not see them as such.

CHAPTER VIII

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. First and foremost, the GoA needs to cease summary expulsions of migrants through its southern borders. These expulsions come with a whole set of arbitrary arrests that target sub-Saharan migrants mostly on the basis of color and race, often on orders from the minister of interior. The journey these migrants face within Algeria to get to Tamanrasset prior to expulsion is long and exhausting, especially for people with physical disabilities or pregnant women, as it goes up to 2,400 kilometers by bus. Along with the distance comes the inhumane treatment that several migrants reported be at on the way or at the centers. The summary expulsions, especially through non-official convoys are inhumane and only place migrants in further vulnerability and the state at potential reduced security. Hence, to protect migrants and the state, these expulsions need to cease.
2. Algeria needs to respect the international obligations and agreements it had signed on to and ratified to protect refugees, asylum seekers, and migrants. These conventions come with a plethora of mechanism that need to be implemented so that people on the move are assured the security they need. For example, the 1951 Geneva convention calls on countries to establish programs through which individuals can apply for asylum. Unfortunately, this is mostly being handled by UNHCR in Algeria, and their cards are sometimes considered invalid as Algerian authorities have deported several individuals with UNHCR Refugee status.

3. Provide better screening for detained migrants. It is an issue when migrants are returned against their will; however, it is a bigger issue when refugees and asylum seekers, especially those escaping persecution, violent acts, and human rights violation in their country of origin are returned to it or in a third country that is almost equally unsafe.
4. Algeria needs to revisit its legal arsenal on migration. Significant focus should be given to human trafficking and human smuggling and the punishments should distinguish between victims, such as trafficked women forced into prostitution, and perpetrators, such as the human traffickers forcing them into this work. This should be done in a manner whereby the local legal and policy arsenals are in complementarity with the international frameworks Algeria is party to.
5. Enable mechanisms through which migrants are able to regularize their stay in Algeria prior and after entry. This idea is not foreign to the Algerian regime as during Prime Minister AbdelMadjid Tebboune time in office, he was set out to provide refugees with the legal documents to stay in Algeria and enjoy legal protect (Al Arabiya, 2017), and also provide irregular migrants with residencies and work permits to cover the shortage of labor in agriculture and construction (Reuters, 2017). Tebboune is currently the president of Algeria as of 2019. Ever since, there had been no changes to the policy of escort to the border or the irregular migration policy overall. It is high time president Tebboune revisited his old proposal that ensured the protection of people on the move and at the borders.
6. Algeria needs a whole-of-government and whole-of-society strategy to migration governance. This would ensure better coordination at the state level between all

public and security officials to ensure better treatment of migrants. Civil society also gets to play a bigger role in terms of providing support to migrants and help the government provide certain services and protections that migrants need.

7. The Algerian regime needs to be more transparent with information sharing. Most of the data present on migration in Algeria is presented by international organizations and UN agencies. The GoA needs to be more transparent with the data it collects to allow for better coordination between its agencies and ministries, civil society, and international organizations and partners.
8. The GoA needs to invest in quality research on migration and migration governance in Algeria. A lot of the data is being collected by the GoA (Amine, 2017), but is rarely shared with the wider public or research centers. Drafting good and sustainable policies that are based on human rights needs evidence-based research, which can be provided by both state institutions and research centers who can bring a fresh perspective. Research should address all aspects of Algeria's migration profile, especially it being a destination country.
9. Algeria should seek to strengthen its cooperation with neighboring countries on migration issues. This should include both origin countries, especially Mali and Niger, and other countries of transit or destination, including Tunisia, Morocco, Libya, and other Mediterranean partners. Cooperation should be horizontal and takes into consideration the states' understanding of sovereignty.
10. IOM and the GoA need to enhance their cooperation to ensure not only better rights to migrants on the repatriation trips of voluntary returns, but also to expand their efforts beyond it. IOM has the capacity to support through the GCM on migration

governance, help on issues of human trafficking, and working with journalists on how to better report on migration.

CHAPTER IX

CONCLUSION

Human mobility is a global phenomenon that is often regulated by states through different mechanisms. Despite these regulations, individuals find ways to escape the established norms and travel across borders looking for a better life. Distinctions are made on the basis of why individuals do travel to determine their vulnerabilities. Refugees, asylum seekers, or migrants have different vulnerabilities and needs. Within the international system, there exists several agreements written to ensure the rights of these individuals and provide protections for them. Despite so, states often draft their own policies or implement certain decisions that place migrants, especially irregular ones, at major risks and furthers their vulnerability.

In Algeria, law 08-11, passed in 2008 by the Bouteflika government, sought to regulate the entry, stay, and movement of foreigners in the country. The law was portrayed as an update to ordinance 266 that preceded it by over 40 years. Minister Zerhouni argued that the law was put in place to combat terrorism and organized crime as it enabled the authorities to welcome those that visit with good intentions and keep a close eye on the ones with bad aims. Within this law came the policy of escort to the border, whereby migrants get arrested from different parts of the country, are taken to detention centers south of Algeria in Tamanrasset and deported through the borders with Niger and Mali. Deportations with Mali significantly decreased and stopped often due to the conflict up north and the protests against them in the area.

This paper sought to uncover the impact of this policy of escort to the border on sub-Saharan migrants in general, sub-Saharan migrant women, and the Algerian state itself. The targeted migrants were the ones that return to Algeria after their deportation as the ones that do not, often settle in Niger, if they are nationals, or receive the support of IOM to repatriate them back home safely. This, the thesis named the cycle of entrapment of sub-Saharan migrants, as human traffickers and smugglers with trafficking attitudes often exploit these migrants and trap them through debt bondage. The thesis highlights, the unique vulnerability of women.

Unfortunately, the literature that is present often tackles migration in Algeria in as far as it pertains to the country being one of transit to Europe or provides legalistic analysis of the policy. This, dreadfully, either ignores or deemphasizes the fact that there is a cycle of migration that is taking place between Algeria and Niger due to the policy of escort to the border whereby migrants come into the country, get deported, enter again but at a costly price, their freedom, since traffickers and smugglers chain them with debt.

To achieve its aim of uncovering the impact, the thesis sought to understand the policy better including what brought it forward, who were the actors involved, and what were the framings and circumstances that allowed it to pass. For this, the thesis used the Multiple Streams Framework developed by Kingdon. Under the problem stream, the thesis argues that the numbers of migrants arrested and detained every year shared by the Algerian gendarme, along with the significant growth in population and economy in Algeria served as the indicators used by Zerhouni to advance his pet proposal. Furthermore, the focusing events that made this policy pass were the climate change reports from 2007, which highlighted the

potential growth of irregular migrants worldwide, the Algerian terrorist group pledging allegiance to Al Qaida, and the terrorist attacks they launched on UNHCR and governmental institutions. This was inferred from Zerhouni's framing whereby he linked migration to terrorism and the need to limit al Qaida's power.

At the policy stream, the thesis highlighted the members of the policy community in Algeria on this policy, including Zerhouni, who was the policy entrepreneur, the inter-ministerial committee on migration, the Committee of Legal and Administrative Affairs, and the political parties in the Algerian parliament. The policy ideas shared in the policy primeval soup varied in terms of goals. Some sought to provide more detailed articles to protect asylum seekers, whereas some others sought to change the name of the detention centers. However, none were significant enough to challenge the escort to the border policy.

The political stream is the tricky one since national mood is often measured through surveys, pressure groups can have an impact on the political process, and government turnover happens often in democratic governments. In Algeria, there was no relevant governmental turnover, pressure groups find difficulties to operate in an authoritarian regime like Algerian one, and the national mood was one of wanting to move away from the bloodshed of terrorism, which migration was set along the lines of.

For the window of opportunity, I argue, that Zerhouni took advantage of the nature of the political regime in Algeria, the rising numbers of migrants, the transnational nature of terrorism, the repeated acts of terror by these transnational actors, then began drafting his pet project which he submitted to the parliament for debate along a security framing. The national

mood was set, the policy proposal was ready with barely any strong opposition to the president's delegate, Zerhouni, and a policy window was opened.

This security framing of the policy of escort to the border has led the thesis to adopt an overall conceptual framework of securitization of migration. Through this framework, the thesis was able to identify the referent objects based on the framing used by the securitizing agents, Zerhouni and other policy makers after. The framework also paints a picture of securitization of migration being one of spiraling nature that continuously evolves depending on the focusing events that take place. Law 08-11 passed after terrorist attacks and Al Qaida, the agreement with Niger came after the war in northern Mali and the Tiguentourine attacks.

Through securitization of migration, the thesis has explored the different aspects of escort to the border in Algeria. It enabled for a much clearer understanding of the impact of the policy on migrants and the state. The feminist influence of securitization theory shows how women can be the victims of states rather than receiving their protection. This was highlighted in the section above as women migrants are often forced by human smugglers and traffickers to work in a labor that is more vulnerable and compromising than that of their male counterparts. The security of the state is also further compromised since these networks of organized criminals have enjoyed a constant flow of clients after Algeria deports migrants to the borders.

To conclude, migrants have been victims of the policy of escort to the border. This policy has created a migratory cycle of entrapment that is Sisyphean in nature. Instead of pushing a boulder up a hill, migrants enter Algeria through difficult paths heading up north looking for better opportunities. Instead of the rock rolling down the hill, migrants are being

escorted to the border with Niger. And instead of pushing the boulder up the hill again, several migrants enter Algeria again and resort to human smugglers and traffickers. However, this renders them more vulnerable in terms of the work they are forced to do, and risks placing them in the hands of the authorities who would deport them to the borders again.

Migration is understudied in Algeria. Unfortunately, it is often studied in as far as it pertains to trends of migration to Europe, hence, Algeria is seen as a transit country rather than a destination country. Furthermore, the recommendations this thesis makes are for further research on the link between securitization of migration and human smuggling.

This paper has shown that there is a link between the two where one fuels the other; however, this research could stand to gain more from being supported with numbers and statistics owned by the government of Algeria. It could also be further strengthened with field interviews with migrants in Tamanrasset, security delegates across different entry points, and organizations working on migration to paint a bigger picture of the scenario that migrants face upon re-entering the country following their deportation.

This thesis also calls for further research on the link between securitization of migration and state policies and practices, especially the actions of security authorities [including police, gendarme, or others]. Taking into account the definition of public policy by Thomas Dye as being what the state chooses to do or not to do¹⁹, would impunity and turning a blind eye to the inhumane treatment that migrants and migrant women receive after

¹⁹Howlett & Cashore (Conceptualizing Public Policy, 2014)

their apprehension at the hand of security officials be considered part of the overall scheme of the government's securitization of migration policy?

- APS. (2018, 03 29). *Bedoui: 500 tentatives d'entrée illégale sur le territoire national enregistrées aux frontières sud du pays*. Retrieved from APS: <https://www.aps.dz/algerie/71882-bedoui-500-tentatives-d-entree-illegale-sur-le-territoire-national-enregistrees-aux-frontieres-sud-du-pays>
- APS. (2020, 12 18). *Décès de l'ancien ministre de l'Intérieur Noureddine Yazid Zerhouni*. Retrieved from APS: <https://www.aps.dz/algerie/114483-deces-de-l-ancien-ministre-de-l-interieur-noureddine-yazid-zerhouni>
- APS. (2021, 12 16). *الجزائر: ارتفاع مستمر في عدد المهاجرين غير الشرعيين*. Retrieved from APS: <https://www.aps.dz/ar/societe/118275-2021-12-16-15-53-09>
- Arrouche, K. ((forthcoming)). Unpacking Sub-Saharan migration in Algeria.
- Arrouche, K. (2022). *Migration Governance in Algeria: Challenges, Interests and Future Prospects*. EuroMeSCo .
- Arrouche, K., Fallone, A., & Vosyliūtė, L. (2021). *Between politics and inconvenient evidence: Assessing the Renewed EU Action Plan against migrant smuggling* . CEPS.
- Atika, A. (2018). The Legal System for Entry and Exit of Foreigners from the Algerian Territory. *University of Bouira*.
- B, Z. (2008, 12 19). "القينا القبض على إرهابيين ليبيا تسألوا إلى الجزائر". Retrieved from Ennahar: <https://www.ennaharonline.com/%D8%A3%D9%84%D9%82%D9%8A%D9%86%D8%A7-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%A8%D8%B6-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%A5%D8%B1%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%A8%D9%8A%D9%8A%D9%86-%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A8%D9%8A%D9%8A%D9%86-%D8%AA%D8%B3%D9%84%D9%91/>
- Belhadj, L. (2008, 04 09). *زروهوني " يؤكد أن مشروع قانون إقامة الأجانب يحمل مقاربة أمنية "*. Retrieved from Al Fajr: <https://www.djazairess.com/alfadjr/68372>
- Bello, V. (2022). The spiralling of the securitisation of migration in the EU: from the management of a 'crisis' to a governance of human mobility? *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 1327-1344.
- BenAhmed, M. (2012, 06 11). *الجزائر تعلن "الهدنة" مع المهاجرين الأفارقة*. Retrieved from Al Khabar: <https://www.djazairess.com/elkhabar/292972>
- Benjebria, L. (2021, 01 21). *Reconduite à la frontière : une procédure inutile et purement "statistique", dénonce une association d'aide aux migrants roms*. Retrieved from franceinfo: <https://www.francetvinfo.fr/monde/europe/migrants/reconduite-a-la->

frontiere-une-procedure-inutile-et-purement-statistique-denonce-une-association-d-
aide-aux-migrants-roms_4265641.html

- Bouaaza, A. T. (2007, 08 19). *القاعدة في بلاد المغرب الإسلامي*. Retrieved from Al Jazeera:
<https://www.aljazeera.net/opinions/2007/8/19/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A8%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%BA%D8%B1%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%8A-2>
- Bourbeau, P. (2011). *The Securitization of Migration A study of movement and order*. New York: Routledge.
- Boutalbi, S. (2009, 03 23). *لجزائر محطة استقرار آلاف المهاجرين الأفارقة*. Retrieved from AlFadjr:
<https://www.djazairss.com/alfadjr/105114>
- Brown, O. (2008). *Migration and Climate Change*. Geneva: International Organization for Migration.
- Clingendael. (2016, 02 22). *THE KHARTOUM PROCESS: SHIFTING THE BURDEN*. Retrieved from Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations:
<https://www.clingendael.org/publication/khartoum-process-shifting-burden>
- Djoughri, S. (2021). Securing Algerian land borders: what role for the National People's Army? *Recherches Juridiques et Politiques*, 649-661.
- DW. (2021, 07 27). *المنظمة الدولية للهجرة: الجزائر ترحل أكثر من 1200 مهاجر نحو النيجر*. Retrieved from DW:
<https://www.dw.com/ar/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%86%D8%B8%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%84%D9%84%D9%87%D8%AC%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%A6%D8%B1-%D8%AA%D8%B1%D8%AD%D9%84-%D8%A3%D9%83%D8%AB%D8%B1-%D9%85%D9%86-1200>
- Echourouk. (2008, 03 30). *ملاحقة 70 انتحاريا أجنبيا جندتهم "القاعدة" في الجزائر*. Retrieved from Echourouk:
<https://www.echouroukonline.com/%D9%85%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AD%D9%82%D8%A9-70-%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D8%A3%D8%AC%D9%86%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D8%AC%D9%86%D8%AF%D8%AA%D9%87%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B9>
- El Hayet. (2018, 10 15). *الآلاف من مهربي البشر يغرقون الجزائر بالمهاجرين الأفارقة يوميا*. Retrieved from El Hayet: <https://www.djazairss.com/elhayat/101125>

- Eroukhmanoff, C. (2017). Securitisation Theory. In S. McGlinchey, R. Walters, & C. Scheinpflug, *International Relations Theory* (pp. 104-109). Bristol, England: E-International Relations .
- Farny, E. (2017, 01 28). *Implications of the Securitisation of Migration*. Retrieved from E-IR: <https://www.e-ir.info/2016/01/29/implications-of-the-securitisation-of-migration/>
- Farrah, R. (2020). *Algeria's Migration Dilemma Migration and human smuggling in southern Algeria*. Geneva: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime.
- France24. (2019, 04 01). "وزارة الداخلية الجزائرية تؤكد أن إعادة مهاجرين الى الحدود هي "قضية أمن قومي". Retrieved from France24: <https://www.france24.com/ar/20190104-%D9%88%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AE%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%A6%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%A4%D9%83%D8%AF-%D8%A3%D9%86-%D8%A5%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D9%85%D9%87%D>
- Freedom House. (2008). *FREEDOM OF THE PRESS 2008: A YEAR OF GLOBAL DECLINE* . New York: Freedom House.
- Ghabchi, B. (2017, 03 17). *المغرب يرحل عشرات المهاجرين نحو الحدود مع الجزائر*. Retrieved from France24: <https://www.france24.com/ar/20170117-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%BA%D8%B1%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%A6%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%AC%D8%B1%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%AF%D9%88%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%B1%D8%AD%D9%8A%D9%84-%D8>
- Government of Algeria. (2021). *Review of implementation of the GCM in Algeria*. United Nations Network on Migration.
- Haas, H. d. (2006, 10 01). *Trans-Saharan Migration to North Africa and the EU: Historical Roots and Current Trends*. Retrieved from Migration Policy Institute: <https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/trans-saharan-migration-north-africa-and-eu-historical-roots-and-current-trends>
- Hagan, S. (2022, 07 08). *AMLO Condemns Texas Plan to Use National Guard for Migrants*. Retrieved from Bloomberg: <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-07-07/texas-authorizes-national-guard-to-return-migrants-to-border#xj4y7vzkg>
- Hawam, B. (2022, 02 04). *الأفارقة يغزون الشوارع*. Retrieved from Echourouk: <https://www.echouroukonline.com/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%81%D8%A7>

%D8%B1%D9%82%D8%A9-%D9%8A%D8%BA%D8%B2%D9%88%D9%86-
%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%B9

- Herweg, N., Zahariadis, N., & Zohlnhöfer, R. (2018). The Multiple Streams Framework: Foundations, Refinements, and Empirical Applications. In C. Weible, & P. Sabatier, *Theories of policy process* (p. 37). New York: Routledge.
- Herweg, N., Zahariadis, N., & Zohlnhöfer, R. (2022). Travelling Far and Wide? Applying the Multiple Streams Framework to Policy-Making in Autocracies. *Polit Vierteljahresschr*, 203-223.
- Hinnant, L. (2018, 06 26). *Walk or die: Algeria strands 13,000 migrants in the Sahara*. Retrieved from Associated Press: <https://apnews.com/article/deserts-niger-africa-international-news-algeria-9ca5592217aa4acd836b9ee091ebfc20>
- Houam, B. (2022, 02 04). *الأفارقة يغزرون الشوارع*. Retrieved from Echourouk: <https://www.echouroukonline.com/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%82%D8%A9-%D9%8A%D8%BA%D8%B2%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%B9>
- Houda, B. Y. (2018). *The Legal System for Deportation and Expulsion of Foreigners in Algerian Law*. Retrieved from University of El Arbi Ben Mhedi.
- Howlett, M., & Cashore, B. (2014). Conceptualizing Public Policy. In I. Engeli, & C. R. Allison, *Comparative Policy Studies Conceptual and Methodological Challenges* (pp. 17-33). Palgrave Macmillan.
- Human Rights Watch . (2020, 10 09). *Algeria: Migrants, Asylum Seekers Forced Out*. Retrieved from Human Rights Watch : <https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/10/09/algeria-migrants-asylum-seekers-forced-out>
- Huymans, J. (2000). The European Union and the Securitization of Migration*. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 751-777.
- ICMPD. (2022, 01 24). *Migration Outlook report: 57% rise in 2021 irregular migration, growing crises at borders and key elections signal EU migration pivot in 2022*. Retrieved from ICMPD: <https://www.icmpd.org/news/migration-outlook-report-57-rise-in-2021-irregular-migration-growing-crises-at-borders-and-key-elections-signal-eu-migration-pivot-in-2022>
- IMF. (2020). Adapting to Climate Change in Sub-Saharan Africa . In IMF, *Regional Economic Outlook Sub-Saharan Africa COVID-19: An Unprecedented Threat to Development* (pp. 15-32). Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund.
- InfoMigrants. (2021, 04 23). *Algerian desert: The 'point zero' where migrants are abandoned*. Retrieved from InfoMigrants :

<https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/31728/algerian-desert-the-point-zero-where-migrants-are-abandoned#:~:text=Since%20the%20beginning%20of%20the,lost%20and%20are%20never%20found.>

- IOM. (2019). *International Migration Law Glossary on Migration*. Retrieved from International Organization for Migration: https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/iml_34_glossary.pdf
- IOM. (2021). *Smuggling Of Migrants on The Central Mediterranean Route Issues, Challenges And Perspectives*. Bamako, Mali: International Organization for Migration.
- IOM. (2021). *World Migration Report 2022*.
- IOM GMDAC. (2021, 08 25). *Migration drivers*. Retrieved from Migration Data Portal: <https://www.migrationdataportal.org/themes/migration-drivers>
- J, M. (2018, 11 21). *الجزائر تتردد بقوة على الدول الرافضة لترحيل المهاجرين الأفارقة وتؤكد : لا تتدخلوا في شؤوننا*. Retrieved from AL SEYASSI: <https://www.djazair.com/alseyassi/105147>
- Jakobsson, E. (2021). How Climate-Induced Migration Entered the UN Policy Agenda in 2007–2010: A Multiple Streams Assessment. *Politics and Governance*, 16-26.
- Jaskulowski, K. (2019). The securitisation of migration: Its limits and consequences. *International Political Science Review*, 710-720.
- Journal Officiel. (1966, July 29). *Journal Officiel de La Republique Algerienne Lois et Decrets*. Algiers.
- Journal Officiel. (2008, July 02). *JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE ALGERIENNE N° 36*. Algiers.
- Journal Officiel. (2008). *Loi n° 08-11 du 21 Jomada Ethania 1429 correspondant au 25 juin 2008 relative aux correspondant au 25 juin 2008 relative aux des étrangers en Algérie. JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE ALGERIENNE N° 36*.
- Khaled, H. (2007, 12 12). *الجزائر في مرمى الإرهاب ... مجدداً*. Retrieved from Al-Akhbar: <https://al-akhbar.com/International/175939>
- Kingdon, J. (1995). *Agendas, alternatives, and public policies*. New York: Harper Collins College Publishers.
- Kinggaggard, A. (2015). Forum Section: Theoretically Refining the Multiple Streams Framework The Multiple Streams Framework and the problem broker. *450 European Journal of Political Research* , 450-465.

- Kolli, F. (2016, 11 21). *Le viol d'une Camerounaise relance le débat sur le sort des migrants en Algérie*. Retrieved from L'OBS:
<https://www.nouvelobs.com/rue89/rue89-jetlag/20151105.RUE1190/le-viol-d-une-camerounaise-relance-le-debat-sur-le-sort-des-migrants-en-algerie.html>
- Kouadri, B. (2008). *مناقشة قانون إقامة وتنقل الأجانب في الجزائر*. Retrieved from Youtube:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FPTPkGM3rZA&t=242s&ab_channel=kouadriCom
- Laalama, Z. (2021, 06). *The Administrative Judge's Oversight of the Legitimacy of the Decisions to Deport Foreigners-A Comparative Study between Algeria and France*. Retrieved from Algerian Scientific Journal Platform:
<https://www.asjp.cerist.dz/en/downArticle/18/35/2/154388>
- Lagherib, E. E. (2015). *The Legal System for Deportation and Expulsion of Foreigners in Algeria*. *University of Biskra*.
- Lahyani, O. (2016, 03 28). *صدامات بين جزائريين ومهاجرين أفارقة.. قنبلة موقوتة*. Retrieved from Al Araby:
<https://www.alaraby.co.uk/%D8%B5%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A8%D9%8A%D9%86-%D8%AC%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%A6%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%8A%D9%86-%D9%88%D9%85%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%AC%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%86-%D8%A3%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%82%D8%A9-%D9%82%D9%86%D8%A8%D9%84%D8%A9-%D9%85>
- Lotfi, L. (2007, 11 06). *الشروق تنفرد بنشر نص مشروع القانون المتعلق بحركة الأجانب*. Retrieved from Echourouk: <https://www.djazairiss.com/echorouk/18463>
- Magnan, P. (2019, 11 21). *"L'Algérie reçoit quotidiennement plus de migrants que toute l'Europe", selon une agence de l'ONU*. Retrieved from Franceinfo:
https://www.francetvinfo.fr/monde/afrique/algerie/lalgerie-recoit-quotidiennement-plus-de-migrants-que-toute-leurope-selon-une-agence-de-l-onu_3711305.html
- Mahsoul, H. (2021, 09 29). *تدفق المهاجرين الأفارقة يخفي مؤامرة خطيرة*. Retrieved from Ech Chaab:
<http://www.ech-chaab.com/ar/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%84%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%B3%D8%A8%D9%88%D8%B9%D9%8A%D8%A9%D9%85%D9%84%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%B5%D8%A9/item/179091-%D8%AA%D9%80%D8%AF%D9%81%D9%82-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%87%D8%A7>

- Menacer, L. (2020, 12 14). “*Il y a environ 300 000 migrants irréguliers en Algérie*”. Retrieved from Algeria-Watch: <https://algeria-watch.org/?p=75556>
- Messina, A. (2014). *Securitizing Immigration in the Age of Terror*. Cambridge University Press, 530-599.
- Mezyani. (2015, 07 07). *رابطة حقوق الإنسان تحذر من الاتجار بالبشر وسط الأفارقة*. Retrieved from Al Djazair Al Jadida: <https://www.djazairiss.com/eldjadida/37848>
- MMC. (2019, 12 17). *The ever-rising securitisation of mixed migration* . Retrieved from Mixed Migration Centre: <https://mixedmigration.org/articles/the-ever-rising-securitisation-of-mixed-migration/>
- Mourad, Y. (2014). *Expulsion and/or Escort to the Border Under Law 08-122 Different Approaches and Similar Goal*. *Academia*, 279-289.
- Omar, A. (2021, 08 16). *العشرية السوداء.. قصة سقوط الجزائر في مستنقع الدم*. Retrieved from Aljazeera: <https://www.aljazeera.net/midan/intellect/history/2019/3/13/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B4%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D9%84%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B0%D8%A7-%D8%B3%D9%82%D8%B7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%A6%D8%B1-%D9%81%D9%>
- Otaibi, H. (2016, 10 17). *العشرية السوداء بالجزائر.. مجازر بشعة خلفت جروحًا لم تندمل*. Retrieved from CNN: <https://arabic.cnn.com/world/2016/10/17/algerian-civil-war>
- Ottaway, M. (2021, 10 13). *Algeria: The Enduring Failure of Politics*. Retrieved from Wilson Center: <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/algeria-enduring-failure-politics>
- Ould Ahmed, H., & Lowe, C. (2009, 04 09). *Algeria's Bouteflika on course for election win*. Retrieved from Reuters: <https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-algeria-vote-idUKTRE5385GH20090409>
- Reuters. (2008, 08 26). *العمالة الصينية المتفانية تذهل الأفارقة... وتخيفهم*. Retrieved from Alrai media: <https://www.alraimedia.com/article/59990/%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%AA%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%AF/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B5%D9%8A%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AA%D9%81%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%B0%D9%87%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%8>
- Reuters. (2017, 07 04). *الجزائر تصحح أوضاع مهاجرين أفارقة وسط نقص بالعمالة*. Retrieved from Al Arabiya: <https://www.alarabiya.net/north-africa/2017/07/04/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%A6%D>

8%B1-%D8%AA%D8%B5%D8%AD%D8%AD-
%D8%A3%D9%88%D8%B6%D8%A7%D8%B9-
%D9%85%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%AC%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%86-
%D8%A3%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%82%D8%A9-
%D9%88%D8%B3%D8%B7-%D9%86%

- Sara, B. (2020). The Repercussions of Irregular Migration on Algerian Security. *The Journal of Social and Human Sciences*, 139-153.
- Sellam, K., & Adjal, Y. (2021). Illegal immigration and mechanisms to combat it in the Algerian legislation. *The Journal of Law and Society*, 384-258.
- Smith, S. (2005). The Contested Concept of Security. In K. Booth, *Critical Security Studies and World Politics* (p. 27). London: Lunne Rienner.
- Soest, B. V. (2019). Migration Governance in Countries of Transit: Assessing Policy Implications in Algeria. *University of Denver*.
- Teevan, C. (2020). *Algeria: Reforming Migration and Asylum systems in a time of Crisis*. ecdpm.
- The Economist Intelligence Unit. (2008). *the Economist Intelligence Unit's Democracy Index 2008*. The Economist.
- Tlemçani, S. (2020, 09 07). *Hassen Kacimi. Expert des flux migratoires et des menaces dans le Sahel : «Des djihadistes syriens ont tenté de se déployer en Algérie avec le statut de réfugié»*. Retrieved from El Watan:
<https://www.elwatan.com/edition/actualite/hassen-kacimi-expert-des-flux-migratoires-et-des-menaces-dans-le-sahel-des-djihadistes-syriens-ont-tente-de-se-deployer-en-algerie-avec-le-statut-de-refugie-07-09-2020>
- UNODC. (n.d.). *Human Trafficking* . Retrieved from UNODC:
<https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/human-trafficking/human-trafficking.html>
- UNODC. (n.d.). *Migrant Smuggling*. Retrieved from UNODC:
<https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/human-trafficking/migrant-smuggling/migrant-smuggling.html>
- World Bank. (n.d.). *GDP per capita (current US\$) - Algeria*. Retrieved from The World Bank:
<https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?end=2008&locations=DZ&start=1966>
- Younsi. (2008, 04 09). *زرهوني يعرض مشروع قانون دخول الأجانب على البرلمان تعزيز المقاربة الأمنية للبلاد*. Retrieved from Al Massa: <https://www.djazairiss.com/elmassa/5310>

زرهوني: إنشاء مراكز لإيواء المهاجرين غير الشرعيين و منح بطاقة إقامة لمدة عشر سنوات. Retrieved from Ennahar: <https://www.djazairess.com/ennahar/7813>