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THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN INGROUP BIAS AND THE ATTRIBUTIONS OF MORAL RESPONSIBILITY

by
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at the American University of Beirut

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ABSTRACT
OF THE THESIS OF

<u>Mohamad Hussein Cherry</u>   for   <u>Master of Arts</u>
                                                  <u>Major</u>: Philosophy

Title: <u>The Interplay Between Ingroup Bias and the Attributions of Moral Responsibility</u>

In this paper, I will begin Chapter 1 by introducing P. F. Strawson's descriptive account of Moral Responsibility and attribution from his essay, "Freedom and Resentment," where he presents a new compatibilist version to the argument of determinism and responsibility grounded by human psychology. In Chapter 2, I will introduce and define a descriptive account of ingroup identification and ingroup bias. Then, I will present studies that show an increase in ingroup bias when moral judgments are required during wartime compared to peacetime. In the case of sacrifice, increased ingroup bias during wartime will be shown through participants finding it more morally acceptable to kill an outgroup member to save an ingroup member. As for the case of prosecution, participants demanded less justice for an ingroup member perpetrator against an outgroup member. This tendency was increased when the participants were rated as high glorifiers. Then, I will define identity fusion and explain it as an essential pillar to our understanding of the process that plays within ingroup bias in both sacrifice and prosecution. Subsequently, I will explain increased ingroup bias and the role of identity fusion in the process through motivated reasoning. In Chapter 3, I will showcase Lebanon's sectarian divisions and present a commonly encountered problem in the Lebanese ecosystem whereby people who identify with sectarian political groups tend to be biased toward their own group members by being morally lenient toward them. Two case studies will be explicated, one that is a personal conversation held and the other is a set of testimonies from the 2019 October Uprising. The heightened ingroup bias and moral leniency are achieved by keeping a war-like status quo within the communities, which is constantly fed through war-reminding and ingroup-glorifying rhetoric by groups. This continuous rhetoric supplements the motivated reasoning driven by identity fusion and ingroup bias, which results in people continuously wanting to protect the group and the self against outside threats. Finally, I will discuss the paper's argument, the importance of Strawson's account, the reason to focus on a combined descriptive-normative approach to moral responsibility, the possible implications our understanding of moral responsibility from this scope has on the Lebanese landscape, and the possible questions raised for future studies.

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CHAPTER 1

PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVE:
P. F. STRAWSON AND MORAL ATTRIBUTION

1.1. P. F. Strawson

An important issue that plagues the argument of moral responsibility and attribution is whether the thesis of determinism is true or not. The thesis of determinism can be understood as grounded by causal laws and necessitation, whereby everything that happened or will happen in the universe, including human thought and action, could not have happened and could not happen otherwise (McKenna & Russell, 2008, p. 1). Everything that happens is subject to causal laws (p. 1). Of the different views on the issue, two main opposing camps have risen to fame: the compatibilist and the incompatibilist, later called optimist and pessimist by P. F. Strawson, respectively.

1.1.1. Compatibilists

The compatibilists argue that both the thesis of determinism and the idea of moral responsibility can co-exist. For compatibilists, the claim that freedom requires causal necessitation is confused (p. 2). In other words, freedom's existence is not contingent on a determined world where a necessary connection between cause and effect must exist. The compatibilists argue that, irrespective of the existence of such a connection, what necessitates freedom's existence is the absence of coercion and compulsion in the agent's act (p. 2). An act that is coerced or the result of compulsion is made against the agent's will and desire (p. 2). On the other hand, an act based on the agent's will and desire results in the agent being

morally responsible for the act since the agent retains a choice in their actions. However, such an argument might raise the susception of contradiction in logic. An agent cannot be in a deterministic world and be morally responsible based on their actions stemming from will and desire.

The compatibilists support their argument by claiming that an agent's action can be influenced through categories of incentives: praise and blame and rewards and punishments (p. 2). An agent's future actions can be influenced through these incentives, making the determination of our own will as agents the only requirement for freedom to retain moral responsibility (p. 2). Hence, the existence of a deterministic world does not adjudicate the individual's free will and the presence of moral responsibility. In this case, relying on such incentives to influence an agent's future actions would be considered a forward-looking approach to moral responsibility. An example of an author who defended the forward-looking approach is J. J. C. Smart. He proclaimed that an individual could ascribe responsibility to an agent for their actions if the agent could have omitted to do that action had the agent been given a motive, such as a reward or punishment (Smart, 1961, p. 302-303). By punishing an agent for the crime they committed today, the punishment will serve as an example and deterrent to any future possible criminal acts.

1.1.2. Incompatibilists

On the one hand, incompatibilists argue that the truth of determinism is mutually exclusive to the existence of moral responsibility. For incompatibilists, a forward-looking approach does not work because it removes the true essence of freedom in an agent's action. If today's external incentives influence an agent's future actions, then it is possible that the

agent did not choose an action based on the strict availability of alternative options (McKenna & Russell, 2008, p. 2). An example would be children or animals, where actions can be influenced through incentives but are still pragmatically not morally responsible agents (p. 2). Therefore, it is not enough to say that what necessitates freedom is the absence of coercion and compulsion—a deeper understanding of freedom is required. According to the incompatibilists, what necessitates the existence of free will is the agent being the ultimate originator of their actions while having the ability to choose from different alternatives (p. 2). However, having such an ability falsifies the possibility of a deterministic world—one cannot truly have the option to choose if one's actions are already determined. Therefore, an individual cannot be held responsible for their actions if determinism is true. For an individual to be morally responsible, free will must exist (Strawson, 1963, p. 341). Two schools of thought arise under the incompatibilist camp: the libertarians and the hard determinists. The first, being the libertarians, argue that agents can freely choose between alternative actions and accordingly be held responsible. For example, Roderick Chisholm (1964) is a libertarian who argues that humans are "prime movers unmoved," by which they each cause events to happen through their actions, and nothing nor anyone causes that cause (p. 12). The second, the hard determinists, argue that the world is necessarily determined, necessitating free will's nonexistence. Therefore, by extension, we cannot be held morally responsible (Vilhauer, 2004, p. 547).

1.1.3. Reactive Attitudes

The problem with the classical free will debate is that it leads us to a conclusion that presents moral responsibility as impossible to have since neither side can provide a plausible

explanation for the truth of free will and our undoubtable ability to choose our actions in a world that is either determined or undetermined (McKenna & Russell, 2008, p. 3). In his essay "Freedom and Resentment," P. F. Strawson (1963) offered an alternative outlook that showed moral responsibility is part of human nature, particularly in human emotion, irrespective of the truth or falsity of determinism. In his account, Strawson also uses the terms "pessimists" and "optimists" to emphasize the human being's undeniable emotional component and to be consistent with one of the objectives of his essay, which is to explain why the free will dispute has the emotional significance that it does (McKenna & Russell, 2008, p. 4).

Strawson grounded the existence of moral responsibility on human interactions, which are coupled with feedback in the form of attitudes and reactions (Strawson, 1963, p. 342). In other words, when a person undertakes a behavior with another person, the feeling that the recipient of that interaction, whether offended, resentful, grateful, hateful, loving, or hurt, is an undeniable response that presents itself as the foundation of moral responsibility (p. 342). To illustrate using an example, two scenarios will be provided: a negative and a positive scenario. For the negative scenario, assume that person X steps on person Y's hand. In this scenario, we face two possible outcomes based on why person X is stepping on the hand. If the action was accidental, person Y might be hurt physically but not as hurt psychologically since person X's action was accidental. However, suppose the action was intentional or with disregard for person Y. In that case, person Y might be hurt physically and would probably be hurt psychologically to a greater degree than if it were accidental. Thus, in the latter two cases, we can assume that person Y is more resentful toward person X than in the first case (p. 342). As a result, person Y's resentful feelings toward person X

are grounds for holding person X morally responsible for their actions. In other words, the reactive attitude of person Y determines whether person X should be held responsible. As for the positive scenario, assume that person X had bought a pack of cookies, and when meeting person Y, person X gives person Y half the number of cookies they bought. In this scenario, we are also faced with two possible outcomes based on why person X gives the cookies. Suppose the action was an incidental consequence, unintended, or even regretted by person X, i.e., person X has intended to buy themselves two pieces of cookies, and the only available option was a pack of four, then person Y would feel benefited toward a desire they might have had. However, if person X had intended to buy the pack of cookies to split in half with person Y, then person Y would have a sense of gratitude toward person X and their goodwill (p. 342). These feedback feelings, or as Strawson calls "reactive attitudes," provide a foundation and a roadmap to moral responsibility.

Reactive attitudes are not restricted to the first connection in an interpersonal encounter, such as the earlier example. According to Strawson, one can have resentment on behalf of others in the form of a second connection, even if the individual's dignity and own interest are not involved (p. 346-347). For example, a third person watching an armed robbery incident will resent the criminal and condemn the actions. These feelings, even from a third-person perspective, are enough to qualify as "moral" (p. 347). In addition to a second connection in the form of a third-person perspective, reactive attitudes occur in the first-person perspective toward the self and in the form of self-reactive attitudes in connection with demands on oneself for others (p. 347). For example, the sense of obligation in the form of responsibility, guilt, remorse, and shame are the reactive attitudes we can count on for personal moral responsibility. If an individual feels guilty for being mean to a friend, then

the individual is assuming moral responsibility for the act. According to Strawson, all three types of attitudes (first person, second person, and third person) are humanly connected (p. 347). In addition to that, Strawson claims that, in general and within limits, all three types of attitudes demand the same expectations from one another. In other words, what we demand others on others and what we demand ourselves for others is, to an extent, to the limit of what we demand from others to ourselves (p. 347).

Therefore, relying on reactive attitudes, we can attribute moral responsibility to actions independent of determinism. For example, if a person feels resentment toward a behavior made against them, the person who committed this behavior is held responsible for their wrongdoing. On the other hand, if a person intended goodwill with someone else, then based on the reactive attitude, we can infer that the good-willed person is held responsible for the good deed. In other words, reactive attitudes are based on the expectations of and demand for the manifestation of a certain degree of goodwill or regard on the part of the other individual toward ourselves, or to the minimum of the manifestation of and demand for the absence of the expression of active ill will or indifferent disregard (p. 347). These manifestations, which can be regarded as a form of human-interaction expression, will count differently between different types of human relationships and thus depend on the particular relationship (p. 347). That being said, Strawson explains that what is attributed is not necessarily justified. The commitment to practice ordinary relationships, which constitutes the existence of expectations resulting in reactive attitudes, is part of the general framework of human nature and is not a particular case that can be isolated for revision within the general framework (p. 346). In other words, the attribution will happen based on human nature and not based on justified attribution since that will require the individual to assess the gains and

losses at every turn of reactive attitudes felt after a behavior has been made. However, that will require us to have a choice in how we feel, something that Strawson says we cannot have (p. 346). By distancing the argument away from the thesis of determinism, the need to provide a concrete explanation for free will becomes irrelevant to the argument. Even if determinism is true, which would assume that all behavior is determined in a sense, one cannot assume that it is a consequence of any thesis of determinism that the individual does not know what they are doing, that their behavior is unintelligible in terms of conscious purpose, or that we live in a world of delusion with no moral sense (p. 347). In addition, even if we could imagine that we had the choice in how we feel as a reaction, the truth or falsity of determinism will not affect our natural-based feelings (p. 346). One cannot deny that we have these feelings when our expectations are not met during human interactions. These feelings are undeniably a reaction to these interactions, even in the thesis of true determinism.

The argument also considers the complex human interactions that can include people who are not as mentally capable as the average person (exempting conditions) and interactions whereby the recipient chooses to forgive the other party (excusing conditions). Strawson categorizes excusing conditions of those who are not responsible as individuals who behave negatively but are unaware of their wrongdoing or the negative consequences of it. One might find out that the person did not know what they were doing, did not mean to do what they did, or did not realize what they did as a result of a behavior. In this case, Strawson claims that we are able to not hold the individual partially or even fully responsible for the act (p. 343). In excusing conditions, the agency is not removed from the actor; rather, the actor is excused in that particular case. In other words, the actor is expected to act differently in other cases. As for the exempting conditions, it is categorized as acts by people who are

not mentally capable or developed, such as a child or someone with a heightened mental disorder. In this case, one might find out that the individual was not being themselves, was under a lot of anxiety and mental strain, was acting under post-hypnotic suggestion, or was merely a child. The reaction by the recipient will not contain the same level of resentment, if any, since the recipient knows that there lacks the mental capacity to tell the difference between good and bad. In this case, Strawson claims that we are also able to not hold the individual responsible for the act (p. 343-344). In exempting conditions, the actor's agency is removed from that case and other cases. The child is exempted as long as the child remains a child. In other words, the child will not be expected to act differently in other cases. Strawson suggests that in cases such as the above two categories, one can employ what he calls "objective attitudes" (p. 344). As the name implies, having an objective attitude during human interactions entails viewing the other party as an object that does not possess agency over its actions for obvious reasons that we can all agree on, such as being a child or having schizophrenia. In cases like this, one can feel a certain disappointment from behavior made by another individual but will not feel resentful toward them (p. 344). For example, if a child misbehaves, the parent might feel disappointed at the lack of discipline but will not feel resentful toward the child for saying an inappropriate word—the child does not understand the meaning of that word and has only picked it up from somewhere.

Another example is that of a relationship between a psychologist and their client. Even though the client could be considered what we agree to be "normal" (i.e., is experiencing a low degree of instability, such as job-related frustration), the psychologist's vocation dictates that they employ an objective attitude toward their client. Therefore, if the client expresses an urge to go up to their boss and punch them in the face after making them

work overtime for months, the psychologist will, in turn, psychoanalyze the situation and guide the client into reaching the root reason for these urges without having a resentful reactive attitude that would judge the person as immoral for having these thoughts. Objective attitudes must be used in different scenarios in life, but Strawson stresses that the idea of objective attitudes is not natural to the human being (p. 344). In addition, Strawson emphasizes that objective attitudes do not contain reactive attitudes, which are employed in meaningful interpersonal relationships (p. 344). Reactive attitudes, which contain resentment, forgiveness, love, and hurt, are important feelings we attach to attitudes and intentions in relationships that Strawson calls "participant reactive attitudes" (p. 344). These attitudes arise only from meaningful or genuine connections and relationships with people, such as friendship, familial, and romantic partnerships that entail engaging with the human being as a human being rather than an object.

A question follows in Strawson's logic in response to reactive attitudes. Since he has shown us when reactive attitudes can be considered and when acts can be excused (e.g., children and those forgiven), and assuming that we do, in fact, live in a deterministic world, should determinism not mean that everyone's actions are excused, since they had no choice in them (p. 345)? When faced with the issue of determinism, Strawson quickly refuted the objection of a determined world affecting his argument. He sought to answer the question of determinism without having to define what determinism is. By doing so, he implies that he does not fully understand what determinism means by saying, "Perhaps we shall see that the question can be answered without knowing exactly what the thesis of determinism is" (p. 345). In a way, Strawson is also aiming at another objective of his essay, which is to show that the thesis of determinism is not only unclear but that the necessity of its clarity is not

required for his argument (p. 345-346). Strawson's reply to the thesis of determinism is that its truth or falsity does not affect what reactive attitudes are built on: interpersonal relationships and attitudes. Strawson invites us to think of the different kinds of relationships we exhibit in our lives "as sharers of common interest" (p. 342), such as family, colleagues, friends, and lovers (p. 342). He then asks us to think of the importance we attach to the reactive attitudes and intentions we have toward each other and in response to actions by one another (p. 343). It is only natural that we demand a certain level of goodwill from the people in those relationships, even at different degrees depending on the different types of relationships (p. 343). As such, Strawson questions whether accepting the thesis of a deterministic world will even impact these expectations, and by extension, the reactive attitudes. As far as Strawson is concerned, such interpersonal relationships are deeply rooted in our makeup as humans to the extent that acknowledging one theoretical conviction over the other (determinism means we have no control over our attitudes) would not mean that we will abruptly change the way we treat one another and our attitudes toward each other (p. 345). In other words, our commitment to participate in ordinary interpersonal relationships, such as friendship and family, is too engrained in our nature for us to take seriously the thought that adopting a thesis such as determinism and lack of free will will change our world in a way where interpersonal relationships and the range of reactive attitudes that come with them no longer happen (p. 345).

Responsibility, then, should no longer be understood as the agent's power in taking action but as the response to human action toward other humans.[1] Therefore, the focus is no longer on the action but on the reaction. By adopting this understanding of moral responsibility, we are no longer bound by the metaphysical question and the problems attached to it. The fact is that we are alive, even if it were, to an extreme sense, an illusion—the illusion of being alive is a fact, to the very least. The fact is, we feel we have the choice, agency, and presence in a given moment, even if it were, to an extreme sense, an illusion—the illusion of having free will is a fact to the very least. The fact is, we have reactive attitudes in the world we live in, even if it were, to an extreme sense, a deterministic world—the reactive attitudes are undeniably part of our nature. Therefore, Strawson provides us with a practical foundation to work on when it comes to moral responsibility. By relying on the science of human nature—psychology—to understand moral responsibility, we can deduce real-life applications and be able to interpret different events in such a way that allows us to understand a variety of human-related phenomena, including ones that could have been overlooked before. Using reactive attitudes, P. F. Strawson shows us that responsibility is entrenched in both our intellectual and emotional lives.

1.2. Galen Strawson

One of Strawson's main counterarguments is Galen Strawson's account. In his paper titled "On 'Freedom and Resentment,'" Galen Strawson argued that P.F. Strawson's

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[1] The understanding of this was made with the help of Simon Cushing, a professor of Philosophy in the University of Michigan – Flint. An explanatory video on the subject was used and can be accessed through the following link: https://youtu.be/mYOtIamkenw.

compatibilist approach to moral responsibility and basing it on the individual's feelings toward others is incorrect. According to Galen Strawson (2008), one cannot deny the feeling of free will, irrespective of whether determinism is true. In either case, people feel free will as part of their natural human composition. This feeling that it is part of the natural human composition is because of the following: at any age or given moment, we cannot deny the feeling that in a given moment where there seems to be a choice that needs to be taken, one will have the sense of their ability to do what they want to do to achieve what they want to achieve by doing different actions (p. 105). For example, a person had 10 dollars in their pocket and was headed to the market to buy a bottle of wine for the gathering the person was holding. On their way to the market, they are stopped by a charity worker collecting 10-dollar donations to people affected by a devastating disaster. According to Galen Strawson, one cannot deny that one has a sense of choice in this situation. Even if one looks back in the future and admits determinism took its path, the sense of choice was present at that given moment. Therefore, philosophers cannot escape the condition of the free will illusion in any argument they try to present to explain moral responsibility. However, not being able to prove that free will truly exists while admitting the truth of its presence as an illusion means that one is forced into the incompatibilist camp since the compatibilist camp hinges on the idea that determinism and free will can co-exist. According to Galen Strawson, the undeniable sense of free will makes it compatibilistically unexceptional (p. 106). Yet, being compatibilistically unexceptional makes this sense of freedom the fundamental base of the impermissible sense of true responsibility (p. 106). Furthermore, our feeling that we have free will and self-control is the foundation of our naturally incompatibilist sense of our true-responsibility-entailing self-determination (p. 106). Therefore, Galen Strawson implies that

just as free will is illusionary, so is thinking that a compatibilist reality could exist based on our illusion-producing genetic makeup (p. 106).

Galen Strawson is at odds with P. F. Strawson over his compatibilism and disagrees with using reactive attitudes as the grounds for responsibility. According to Galen Strawson, we should not base our commitment to responsibility on the grounds of our experiences toward other people, as this provides a weak explanation of what responsibility is (Strawson, 2008, p. 106). Instead, the individual should prioritize the experience of their own agency and then use the experience with other people as the objects of the reactive attitudes. Building on the argument against compatibilism, it becomes evident that the focus of the human when going through the illusion of free will is on the self. When, in the example, the individual was faced with the dilemma of whether to donate the 10 dollars or use it to buy wine for the gathering, the individual should focus on their experience of their own agency to make the decision. This splitting moment of the sense of agency is what defines possible actions, which to Galen Strawson, is the starting point for any argument to responsibility. The focus on the self is supported even further by Galen Strawson's reasoning: when P. F. Strawson is basing responsibility on reactive attitudes, he assumes the necessity of other people's agency (or illusion of it). However, the belief that other people have agency over themselves rests on the fact that the individual can experience agency over their own self (p. 110). In other words, being able to comprehend agency in others is merely a reflection of the ability to comprehend agency in oneself. As such, while reactive attitudes can be useful, they should come second to the experience of our own agency, the priority on the grounds of responsibility. Galen Strawson argued that one's own responsibility for action appears to be more founded than one's commitment to belief in the responsibility of others (p. 94, 112). In addition, Galen

Strawson criticized P. F. Strawson's "general framework" of attitudes and ideas. According to him, the framework has major tensions, whereby alterations, even partial ones, shake the foundations of this framework with supposedly inflexible constraints. According to Galen Strawson, there exists no difficulty in adopting decisions that would alter practices and undermine P. F. Strawson's framework (p. 112-113).

1.3. Reactive Attitudes and Self-Determination

With both P. F. and Galen Strawson's arguments presented, it is evident that reactive attitudes still hold clear importance in our interpersonal lives and certainly play a significant factor in responsibility attribution, even with Galen Strawson's criticism. P. F. Strawson's account has a normative undertone, by which he attempts to argue how we ought to perceive moral responsibility's basis to be. He nevertheless uses a descriptive account, supported by human psychology, to present his argument. His argument depends less on conceptual analysis and more on the descriptive account of human moral psychology, emphasizing the importance of human emotion in morality (McKenna & Russell, 2008, p. 5). By looking at the descriptive, human-based, undeniable existence of emotions, we avoid "over-intellectualizing" the free will debate, a mistake that P. F Strawson observes both the optimists and pessimists make (p. 5; Strawson, 1963, p. 350). His descriptive account is vital to understanding how integral yet fragile morality can be in particular contexts, namely in war or war-like scenarios.

People assume that what comes into play when people react are ethical concerns— what, in fact, happened in front of them. However, as we have seen, people's reactions do not necessarily constitute what is moral. Instead, they are based on the reactive feelings that

stem from expectations toward the actor. For example, suppose the company decides to let go of an employee due to the employee's lack of commitment to the job (e.g., showing up late, not fulfilling duties, and such). In that case, the employee might feel resentful either way. The employee might also file a lawsuit against the company. The factors that cause these reactive attitudes are what the paper is interested in and works on identifying using literature and studies conducted. These factors are important because, though morally irrelevant, they play an integral role in reactive attitudes. The factor's key role in influencing reactive attitudes is why we cannot justify moral responsibility purely from the practice itself. However, this paper is not concerned with the justification of moral responsibility. Instead, the paper is interested in shedding light on the ability of human nature, emotions, and environmental factors to contaminate reactive attitudes, rendering them incapable of providing us with a solid, justified foundation of responsibility. By studying the emotional spillover of morally irrelevant features on moral responsibility, we can create a tool to help us explore the application of such spillovers in real-world circumstances. To be able to develop this tool, the paper will explicate several studies made that show us how environmental factors can, as well, affect the "moral compass," so to speak.

Although in a Galen Strawsonian world we perceive ourselves as moral agents who are capable, or at least are in the illusion of being capable, of agreeing on what right and wrong is in every circumstance, studies have shown that when certain interpersonal factors are attributed to an event, the person's moral compass does not always point North. Instead, studies have shown that people tend to undertake actions and judgments biased toward their own groups when in a dire situation, particularly in war or a war-like context. This bias, when unchecked, can result in negative consequences when the issues at hand involve the lives of

others, the community, or governance. Moral psychology, and in particular ingroup bias, will be discussed in the upcoming chapter. Different studies will also be presented to support Strawson's argument that we cannot escape human emotion in our judgment and decision-making.

CHAPTER 2

MORAL PSYCHOLOGY:
INGROUP BIAS

2.1. Introduction

While P. F. Strawson's argument of moral responsibility and its key element—reactive attitudes—provide us with a launching ground, using reactive attitudes is a double-edged sword. This chapter expands on the topic by showing that external factors can affect Strawsonian reactive attitudes by discussing two points: the descriptive human emotion attributed to ingroup bias and the effect context has on it. Studies will be presented showing that irrespective of what is agreed to be the ethical decision, bias toward one's own group occurs when different groups are present in a scenario. Additionally, the bias toward one's own group increases further in the context of wartime compared to peacetime. Two outcomes of bias toward one's own group will be explored: the decision to sacrifice and the decision to demand prosecution. In the case of sacrifice, moral judgment was involved, whereby wartime increased the tendency of participants who found it more morally acceptable to kill someone from a group not part of theirs to save someone from their group. In the case of prosecution, moral responsibility was involved, whereby the demand for justice by participants decreased for a perpetrator belonging to their group, and a severer punishment was demanded for a perpetrator belonging to a different group.

The chapter will begin by defining ingroup identification and ingroup bias under the umbrella of the social identity theory. Then, studies will be presented that show how ingroup bias in peacetime can influence the decision of participants to sacrifice a group member.

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Additionally, the studies will show how the decisions will be further influenced when the same experiments are adjusted to be within a wartime context, resulting in a greater tendency by the participants to avoid sacrificing group members. Next, studies will show how ingroup bias can influence participants' decisions in exonerating a group member from prosecution. Using a real-life wartime context, the studies highlight the greater tendency of the participants to demand less justice for group members. After, a theoretical understanding of how groups can form interpersonally, called Identity Fusion, is presented to explain how sharing genetics (i.e., blood relations) is not required to form kinship; traumatic events and common goals can also provide a foundation for the sense of kinship between people to form a group. Then, the chapter will present and define "motivated reasoning" to show why P. F. Strawson's reliance on reasoning to justify the reactive attitude's moral attribution is shortsighted. Lastly, a summary will show how P. F. Strawson's well-established moral responsibility framework based on human emotion is susceptible to change through the influence of environmental factors and a sense of group identity.

2.2. Group Belonging

In the past, humans have managed to survive by living, dining, working, and procreating in groups (Everett et al., 2015, p. 1). The small kin-based groups expanded into larger ones that could be based on geography, nationality, language, religion, and sect (p. 1). It has been proposed that in addition to humans' propensity for group identification, ingroup cooperation, and outgroup competitiveness may have co-evolved (p. 1). The social identity theory, which aims to explain these phenomena, contends that when people identify with a group, they start to see the traits of that group as belonging to themselves. As a result, the

group eventually becomes an integral part of the self (Everett et al., 2015, p. 2; Raffield et al., 2015, p. 37). Additionally, it has been demonstrated that those who identify more strongly with their group are more likely to remain true to it in the face of danger and to care more about how their group is treated in comparison to other groups (Everett et al., 2015, p. 2; Raffield et al., 2015, p. 37). According to the social identity theory, people are driven to forge a strong group identity by 1) differentiating their ingroup from outgroups and 2) upholding a high level of collective ingroup self-esteem (p. 2). Everett et al. (2015) claim that social competition coupled with ingroup bias is one of the most popular strategies people employ to uphold a favorable social identity of their ingroup (p. 2).[2] The systematic propensity to assess one's group and its members more favorably than the outside group and its members is known as ingroup bias (p. 2). People consequently decide to act in ways that favor members of their group as opposed to members of other groups, also known as outgroup members (p. 1).[3]

2.3. In-depth Understanding of Ingroup Bias

2.3.1. Sacrifice

While ingroup bias exists during ordinary, peaceful, everyday life, studies show that such a bias heightens during war or war-like contexts. Hanne Watkins and Simon Laham (2018) examined ingroup bias by observing the participants' reactions to the trolley dilemma

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[2] Social competition is defined by Everett et al. (2015) as a group engaging in action with the purpose of changing the group's standing (p. 2).

[3] Outgroup members: members of a group that is different from that of the group the individual identifies with.

(switch and footbridge) in peacetime and wartime. The switch trolley dilemma is first presented to participants in the experiment. In this scenario, a trolley is moving on the main track toward five people tied to the railway. If the trolley continues in its path, it will kill the five people. However, the participant can pull a lever to switch the trolley's path onto the sidetrack. One person is tied to the railway on the sidetrack, and if the trolley continues with its path on the sidetrack, it will kill this person. The participant is then faced with the dilemma of leaving the trolley on its original track, killing five people, or pulling the lever to save the five people but killing one person instead. The footbridge dilemma is then presented to the participants. In this scenario, the trolley is on a track headed toward five people tied on the railway. If the trolley continues in its path, it will kill the five people. However, the participant can save the five tied people from death by pushing one large person onto the track to derail the trolley, which results in the death of the pushed person.

Participants were recruited for the study and divided to participate in three different scenarios: the control, the ingroup, and the outgroup. The participants are presented with the switch and footbridge dilemmas in all three scenarios. However, slight differences were placed between each scenario. In the control scenario, the five people on the main track, the one person to be sacrificed (whether being on the sidetrack or pushed), and the participant belong to the same country X. For the outgroup scenario, the five people on the main track and the participant belonged to country X, while the one person to be sacrificed belongs to country Y. Lastly, for the ingroup scenario, the person to be sacrificed and the participant belong to the same country X, while the five people on the track belong to country Y. In summary, the study was delineated as follows: the participants were divided into three groups (scenarios), and each had to make a moral judgment on both the trolley and footbridge

dilemmas in two different contexts (peacetime vs. wartime) (p. 451). For the two contexts, the variable between the two scenarios was related to the reference of people involved in the study. In the peacetime context, the participants, the five people on the main track, and the one person to be sacrificed were all civilians and referred to as "men" (p. 451). In wartime context, all were referred to using the masculine third-person pronoun and described as soldiers (p. 451). Therefore, the study had the following design: (Intergroup condition: control vs. outgroup sacrifice vs. ingroup sacrifice) x 2 (Context: peace vs. war) x 2 (Scenario: switch vs. footbridge) (p. 450).

To introduce the two hypothetical countries and manipulate the group identity of the participants, Watkins and Laham (2018) presented the participants with an excerpt of background information as follows:

> "Imagine that there are two countries, Country X and Country Y. You are a citizen of Country X, but otherwise the exact same person you are now (i.e., you have the same family, same job, living situation, attitudes, etc.). Country X and Country Y are currently at [war/peace]. Please keep this in mind while reading and responding to the following scenario." (Watkins and Laham, 2018, p. 451)

The results of the experiments provide insight into the effects of war or war-like contexts on people's moral judgments. In the control group, participants judged it morally acceptable to sacrifice one to save five almost equally when comparing peacetime to wartime, with M = 2.99 and 3.09, respectively, on a scale of 1-6 (1 being least morally acceptable to sacrifice).[4] However, the results differed when ingroup and outgroup variables were factored

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[4] M denotes the mean, or average, of the results. For more information on M, see https://tinyurl.com/yckzyb8c.

in. In the outgroup scenario, where the sacrificed person was of a country that is different from that of the participant, the participants viewed it more morally acceptable during wartime to sacrifice the outgroup member to save the five ingroup members (M = 2.89 in peacetime; M = 3.34 in wartime) (p. 452). However, the results of the ingroup scenario showed that participants viewed it less morally acceptable during wartime to sacrifice one ingroup member to save five outgroup members (M = 3.00 in peacetime; M = 2.65 in wartime). Therefore, that implied that the participants viewed it as more morally acceptable during wartime to allow the trolley to continue its path unhindered and result in the killing of five outgroup members, with a tendency to favor ingroup lives (p. 452).

The study shows the effect of context on human moral psychology and, therefore, the influence context has on a person's moral judgment. While P.F. Strawson's reactive attitudes provide us with a roadmap on moral responsibility, one can see how different environmental factors can affect people's reactive attitudes and influence them to make decisions that favor their group over others. These different moving parts of the scenario come together when a person wants to make a moral judgment. When the ingroup/outgroup differences were controlled for, the wartime context did not result in a significant variation; almost all participants believed that sacrificing one person to save five is the morally acceptable thing to do. However, when the ingroup/outgroup factor was introduced to the scenario, greater bias in favor of ingroup members appeared when the setting was adjusted for war. As shown in the study, a bias toward the participant's own group was observed, where it was either deemed less morally acceptable to sacrifice ingroup members to save outgroup members from death or more morally acceptable to sacrifice outgroup members to save ingroup members from death.

Watkins and Laham (2018) conducted a second study to replicate the first study. In addition to the parameters from the previous study, they introduced a new factor to explore: they added the outside perspective, which entailed the participant from that group being from a third country. Just as with the first study, the participants went through a mixed design that integrated the participants' group membership: 3 (Intergroup condition: control vs. outgroup sacrifice vs. ingroup sacrifice) x 2 (Perspective: insider vs. outsider) x 2 (Context: peace vs. war) x 2 (Scenario: switch vs. footbridge) (p. 453). The results were replicated successfully. As with the first study, the participants in the second study found it more morally acceptable during wartime than peacetime to sacrifice an outgroup member to save five ingroup members. The participants found it less morally acceptable to kill the ingroup member to save the outgroup members in wartime (M = 3.28 in peacetime; M = 2.91 in wartime) (p. 454). Regarding the newly added factor in the replicated study, the participant is from a third country (Country Z). Results from the insider and outsider groups replicated those of the first study, which saw only an insider group in the design (p. 454). By adding the insider/outsider factor, Watkins and Laham ensured that ingroup bias was controlled. The results by the outsider group, where the participant is from a third country, replicated those of the first study. Similar to the first study, the outsider group from a third country found it morally acceptable to sacrifice outgroup members to save ingroup members (p. 455). The results suggest that morality based on ingroup psychology does not necessarily only stem from ingroup bias only, but that perspective is also involved, whereby the general acceptance of intergroup discrimination during wartime is factored in (p. 454). In other words, when a participant belonging to Country Z finds it morally acceptable for a participant from Country X to sacrifice individuals from Country Y to save individuals from Country X, it shows us

that perspective of what is moral during wartime is present. This phenomenon could be understood the same way P. F. Strawson explains his reactive attitudes, whereby one does not have to be the first or second person in the interaction to feel a reaction to an action; instead, one could be a third person watching and have a reaction to an action even if their livelihoods are not involved. One interpretation of the results of the outsider group could be understood through the following example: an Arab who is a third-party spectator views it as more morally acceptable for a person of Zulu ethnicity to choose to sacrifice one person of Hutu ethnicity to save five Zulu people when the Zulu and Hutu people are at war.

Watkins and Laham's (2018) studies offer insight into how a difference in context, particularly between peacetime and wartime, can influence decision-making by participants. However, a significant limitation of both studies is how the context change was based on the participants imagining the different settings of peacetime and wartime. Therefore, the participants' responses are based on what they think they would do in those contexts rather than what they would actually do. While the studies cannot verify whether the participants would, in fact, make the decisions they expressed they would in the experiments, a possibility remains that they would not. However, one would expect that in an imaginary experiment, the participants would be able to identify specific factors that might influence their decisions away from what is normatively accepted to be the ethical thing to do. Yet, as shown earlier, an experiment based on the imagination of the context nonetheless influenced the participants' decisions. As such, the results of the studies by Watkins and Laham remain an important pillar in the argument. It is important to note that Watkins and Laham's experiments were set up in a manner that did not require the participants to explore who was responsible for wrongdoing in the scenarios when asked whether they would pull the

lever/push the person. Instead, the participants were required to decide to pull the lever/push the person by judging the situation based on the information given, thus providing us with implications on general moral judgments. In the next subsection, studies by Leidner et al. (2010) will ask the participants to decide whether they would exonerate or demand prosecution of the person in question using a real-life scenario in their experiment. By doing so, Leidner et al. can explore the effects of ingroup bias on decision-making and its implications on moral responsibility.

2.3.2. Prosecution

It has been shown that humans tend to find it more morally acceptable to sacrifice an outgroup member for the sake of ingroup members and to favor moral judgments that lean toward ingroup morality (p. 7). Referring to P. F. Strawson's reactive attitudes, we can see how context can affect a person's moral judgment. However, while the past study provides an understanding of ingroup bias and morality in the context of war, it only sheds light on the participants' responses within the scope of saving/sacrificing an ingroup member. A second angle will be discussed next, which investigates the people's moral judgments and behavior when faced with a scenario that requires prosecuting/exonerating an ingroup member rather than sacrificing one. This investigation will provide a more rounded approach to the effects of context on moral judgments by people in a closer-to-day-to-day-life setting.

In a study by Leidner et al. (2010), participants were evaluated in situations where members of the outgroup mistreated members of the ingroup. Leidner et al. provided two terms in the study. The first, emotional minimization, was defined as minimizing the victim's psychological reality of suffering and pain (p. 1116). The second term, explicit

dehumanization, was defined as considering people less than human (p. 1116). The study measured emotional minimization and explicit dehumanization, which were hypothesized to function as moral disengagement strategies by the participants when confronted with ingroup transgression, affecting behavioral intentions, such as the demand for justice. Two terms were defined by the study that will be used to explain ingroup bias: ingroup glorification and ingroup attachment. Ingroup glorification is when an individual views their group as superior to other groups (outgroups) on multiple levels, such as the belief that their group has superior morality (p. 1116). Ingroup attachment, on the other hand, is defined as when the individual's self-identification is intertwined with the essence and common fate of the group (p. 1116). According to Leidner et al., the main difference between glorification and attachment is that people considered as high glorifiers tend to compare their group to others, where the focus is the superiority of the ingroup compared to outgroups and loyalty and obedience toward the ingroup (p. 1116). On the other hand, people considered as being highly attached do not have a comparative edge, but instead focus entirely on the ingroup (p. 1116). Leidner et al. explain that people who harbor beliefs in the impeccability and superiority of their group can easily see less injustice made by their group's wrongdoings (p. 1116). In addition, glorification is concerned with the preservation of the group's image, and therefore, any threat to that image will likely be met with the execution of defensive mechanisms by the ingroup glorifiers. As such, Leidner et al. confer that individuals considered high glorifiers are less likely to see the need to reestablish justice and respond to their group's wrongdoings through the subject diminishing of the impact of the group's actions and by undermining the victims (p. 1116). The study aimed at distinguishing ingroup glorification from ingroup attachment first. The study's second objective was to show that people who exhibit ingroup glorification traits

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show tendencies of ingroup bias in a war context, which reflects moral leniency toward ingroup members.

The study recruited participants from the U.S. and measured them for national (ingroup) glorification and attachment. Then, the participants were given two written scenarios in the form of newspaper articles, where the justice, emotional minimization, and explicit dehumanization by the participants were manipulated in each scenario and measured the individual difference variables of attachment and glorification (p. 1117-1118). Both scenarios were based on true events from the U.S. military personnel accused of abusing and torturing civilians in Abu Ghraib Prison in Iraq. The two scenarios were recreated; the first presented a U.S. soldier as the perpetrator and an Iraqi civilian as the victim. The second presented an Iraqi soldier as the perpetrator and an ingroup as the victim (U.S. civilian). The study's results displayed that people with glorification tendencies, by which they believed their group was superior to others, expressed greater emotional minimization and explicit dehumanization of the victim group (p. 1118-1119). Leidner et al. hypothesized that people reached moral disengagement when ingroup members were the perpetrators due to emotional minimization and explicit dehumanization. Moral disengagement is a psychological process that enables individuals to construct a reality in which their own actions are not morally repugnant and, as a result, do not warrant self-condemnation (p. 1116). Such moral disengagement means that individuals with high glorification tendencies will demand less justice for perpetrators of their group when compared to individuals with low glorification tendencies. This tendency is confirmed by the study's results when measuring the justice demanded by the participants (p. 1118-1119). In other words, there was no significant difference in the demand for justice between those with ingroup attachment and those with

ingroup glorification when the offender is an outgroup member. However, when the offender is an ingroup member, participants with ingroup glorification significantly demanded less justice for the perpetrator than participants with ingroup attachment (p. 1118).

To replicate the findings and assess the role of glorification, Leidner et al. conducted a second study. To prevent unintentional bias by the participants toward the outgroup, the second study redefined the outgroup perpetrators to be English-speaking "allies," particularly Australians. By doing so, the study avoided the perpetrators being viewed as victims, which was likely the case for Iraqis, Middle Easterners, and Arabs in general (p. 1120). U.S.-born participants were recruited and given a newspaper article nearly identical to the newspaper in the first study to read (p. 1121). Similar to the first study, the participants were given an assessment to answer scales on emotional minimization and explicit dehumanization. The results successfully replicated those of the first study, and the participants once again significantly demanded less justice for the perpetrators of their groups than participants did for perpetrators of outgroups (p. 1121). Furthermore, high glorifiers significantly demanded less justice for ingroup perpetrators than outgroup perpetrators (p. 1121). Additionally, the higher the ingroup glorification was for the participants, the more explicit dehumanization occurred (p. 1121). The results of emotional minimization were replicated to reflect the results of the first study. However, while glorification was in the same direction as the study, the results did not reach significance (p. 1121). The findings from the first and second studies allow us to conclude that an individual's moral psychology and moral leniency toward ingroup members are influenced by their understanding of their ingroup and what the group stands for.

2.3.3. Identity Fusion

Non-genetically-related individuals forming a group that tends to make decisions that prefer saving group members from sacrifice and exonerating them from punishment during wartime can be explained further by Raffield et al. (2015) using the concept of identity fusion. Raffield et al. define identity fusion as when members of the same group are influenced by certain circumstances to identify with one another as if they were kin. Such kinship can then develop further in challenging and traumatic times, such as wartime and conflict, to result in the identities being fused (p. 37). Ingroup members are seen as kin, the identities of the group members fuse into one identity, and if an ingroup member feels harmed, then the rest of the group members feel harmed, as well. This shared reaction is further supported by the possible consequence of identity fusion resulting in the person developing a strong sense of commitment toward their group, which leads them to act altruistically to the point of self-sacrifice (p. 36-37). An additional consequence of identity fusion is possible, resulting in the person perceiving their group as superior and invulnerable to other groups, motivating radical pro-group behavior, which could lead to hostility toward outgroup members (p. 37).

One study that can provide an understanding of the effects of identity fusion is that of Swann et al. (2009). Swann et al. conducted a study that aimed at showing how people whose identities are fused with their group reflect social and personal identities fused together, making them functionally equivalent. An effect of this functional equivalency is that activating either social or personal identities results in an increase in tendency to endorse extreme pro-group behavior. The study experimented using two conditions. The first condition saw the participants' personal identities activated by requesting that they indicate their willingness to fight for themselves. The second condition saw the participants' social

identities activated by requesting that they indicate their willingness to fight for their group. As for the control participants, they did not receive additional activation manipulation. As such, the following design was adopted: 2 (fusion: fused vs. nonfused) x 3 (identity activation: personal, social, no-activation-control) factorial (p. 1004). The authors hypothesized that if the social and personal identities of fused participants are functionally equivalent, activating either social or personal identities should increase the fused participants' tendency to endorse extreme behavior relative to the control group (p. 1004). Furthermore, an additional hypothesis by the authors was made concerning the attending being placed on identities. According to Swann et al., when comparing the results of fused participants to nonfused participants, the authors hypothesize that activating the nonfused participants' social identities should increase their endorsement of extreme behavior relative to the control group; however, activating their personal identities should not result in a similar effect (p. 1005).

Swann et al. recruited volunteer Spanish high school students enrolled in a psychology class with the consent of the students and their parents. The experiment was conducted within two waves, with 10 days between the first and second waves. In total, 421 students (369 girls, 52 boys; mean age = 15.81 years, SD = 0.92) completed both the first and second waves (p. 1005). In the first wave, the participants were required to list five negative traits about themselves in addition to writing a brief paragraph describing behaviors that showed each of the five traits they listed without naming the traits (p. 1005). Next, the authors conducted a manipulation check, which indicated that the traits shared by the participants were perceived as significantly more negative than the middle point of the scale (0; M = -1.63, SD = 0.47, t(420) = -70.91, p = .001) (p. 1005). In addition, the perceptions

shared were not associated with the study's independent variables (p. 1005). Finally, the participants completed measures of the certainty they had for the five traits: identification, fusion for their group, and prototypicality (p. 1005).

In the second wave, the study gave the participants feedback concerning their identities. This was done through the participants learning that the evaluator correctly identified one of the five negative traits and that the evaluator rated the remaining four traits more positively than the participant perceived themselves (p. 1001). The participants then completed a manipulation check after receiving the feedback from the evaluators by completing a question (scale of 1 to 10; 1 = not at all, 10 = extremely) that indicated how far they believed the evaluator to have seen them as they saw themselves (p. 1001). Lastly, the participants were measured for their willingness to die or fight for their group (p. 1001). The participants were then randomly assigned to three groups: social identity activation, personal identity activation, and control. First, participants from the social identity activation group were asked what they would do for the group on the willingness to fight for the group scale (p. 1005). As for the personal identity activation group, the participants were asked to indicate what they would do for themselves on a five-item scale from the willingness to fight for the group scale. For example, one of the items is, "I would fight someone physically threatening me" (p. 1005). Lastly, the control group proceeded directly to complete the dependent measures (p. 1005).

The results of the study revealed three main effects. The main effect was attributed to identity fusion, whereby fused participants expressed more willingness to die compared to nonfused participants (β = .44, t(409) = 10.26, p = .001) (p. 1006). The second main effect observed indicated that within the fused participants, there was a higher willingness to die in

the social and personal identity groups compared to the control group (β = -.18, t(409) = -3.16, p = .002) (p. 1005). Lastly, within the nonfused participants and when comparing the social and personal identity groups, the results indicated that the willingness to die was higher in the social identity group compared to the personal identity group; however, their willingness remained less than in fused participants (p. 1005). The findings show how fused people's social and personal identities are functionally equivalent (p. 1006). In other words, when a person's identity is fused with their group, the reactions that they would have on themselves and the group are functionally the same. People will be willing to fight for their group as much as they are willing to fight for themselves. Thus, it can be understood that the activation of either the personal or social identity of fused persons will increase their willingness to die for their group, or in other words, their willingness to partake in action with the aim of saving a group member or exonerating them from prosecution in the form of fighting for them. This tendency or increased willingness to fight for the group, whereby the participant is willing to act for the group as they would act for themselves, is a bias toward the group that aims at protecting the group members.

The individual's bias toward the group and its members, whereby they want to save or exonerate them, is potentially a sense of moral obligation that stems from the possible kinship that forms and the identity fusion that occurs. It is clear, then, that an individual's reactive attitude of responsibility attribution and moral judgment stems from an emotion felt by the self that has been intertwined with the greater self—the group—which can fuse together and be further exacerbated through a sense of kinship. These kinships can be emphasized further in war, or war-like contexts, which enable deeper identity fusion and result in a greater bias toward the ingroup that ultimately reflects in a reactive attitude that

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mirrors the group's attitude as a whole. An example of identity fusion being observed in war or war-like context was one in the Libyan Civil War of 2011, where it was recorded that 97% of the revolutionary battalions felt their identities fusing with their battalion members (Raffield et al., 2015, p. 37). Additionally, 45% of the frontline fighters felt their identities fused more with their battalion members than their family members—underscoring the effects of war or war-like contexts on the individuals' sense of kinship (p. 37). However, even though identity fusion provides us with clarity when it comes to reactive attitudes stemming from ingroup bias, there remains a missing piece in our understanding of this process: the reasoning the person adopts, which allows them to arrive at these reactive attitudes.

2.4. Motivated Reasoning

It is important to understand what reasoning structure the person goes through when their moral judgements and attribution lean towards a preference for the group. While people's bias of moral judgments tending to prefer saving/exonerating ingroup members can be understood as an effort that would best preserve the group, it does not explain why there has been a substantial increase of ingroup bias during times of war as compared to peacetime (Haidt & Joseph, 2008, p. 20). Motivated reasoning provides us with an explanation of this discrepancy and fills the gap. Motivated reasoning is the characterization of people using knowledge structures influenced by motivation and supporting a desired conclusion. It is argued that motivation influences the cognitive processing of a person's beliefs, concepts, and inferential rules used in judgment, affecting knowledge structures (Kundra & Sinclair, 1999, p. 13). For instance, a person in a toxic relationship who is driven to believe their

partner is the one for them suppresses information shared with others about their flaws to justify their commitment to them (p. 13). A second example is when an individual is in a healthy friendship with someone but is motivated to believe that this person is a burden on them will trigger knowledge of their friend's flaws to justify their resentment toward them. Motivated reasoning is not only limited to judgments on interpersonal relationships but also applies to moral judgments. Motivated reasoning occurs when individuals construct and evaluate biased moral arguments and decisions to arrive at a preferred conclusion (Kunda, 1990, p. 483).

A study by Ditto et al. (2009) recruited college students as participants and presented them with the trolley problem. The study's goal was to observe whether motivated reasoning would occur by participants belonging to the two major U.S. political parties (conservatives and liberals) when faced with the dilemma. The trolley problem was contextualized to be relevant in time and location to the U.S. by adjusting it to include a racial implication. The participants were divided into two groups. The first group was asked to decide either to push or not push a man named "Tyron Payton" on the tracks to save "100 members of the New York Philharmonic" (p. 327). On the other hand, the second group was asked to decide either to push or not push a man named 'Chip Ellsworth III" on the tracks to save "100 members of the Harlem Jazz Orchestra" (p. 327). Ditto et al. intended to lead the subjects to infer a racial implication to the dilemma by having them choose 1) whether to kill an African American man to save 100 majority-white people; 2) whether to kill a White man to save 100 majority-African American people (p. 327).

In the study, the participants were given scenarios to read. Then, a series of assessments were given to the participants to determine whether sacrificing Tyron and Chip

was a moral decision. The assessments were a series of scales that assessed the participants' beliefs on whether sacrificing Chip/Tyron was the morally appropriate course of action. It also measured the endorsement of consequentialism as a general moral principle (e.g., that it is okay to occasionally allow the death of one innocent person for the goal of saving a large number of innocent people) (p. 327). The results revealed that the participants who identified as liberal were more likely to deem it morally unacceptable to sacrifice Tyron while deeming it more morally acceptable to sacrifice Chip. On the other hand, the participants who identified as conservative did not show any significant differences between the Tyron and Chip sacrifice dilemma (p. 327).

Ditto et al. conducted a replication study and recruited participants from a shopping mall to ensure the study's population was representative. This location contained a better mix of conservatives and liberals and a higher age average of participants (p. 328). The experiment was adjusted from the original. The participants were given two scenarios similar to the original study: 1) there is a boat with people on it, and one of them is a severely injured individual named Tyron Payton. Tyron must be sacrificed by throwing him off the boat to save the boat from drowning. By mentioning that Tyron is severely injured, the participants can infer that throwing Tyron off the boat would result in his death. 2) the same scenario applies, but the name of the severely injured individual was renamed to Chip Ellsworth III. To manipulate the study, the participants were asked to guess Tyron and Chip's races after the assessment. The results successfully replicated the first study, with liberals finding sacrificing Chip more morally acceptable than sacrificing Tyron. On the other hand, the conservatives did not show any significant statistical difference in who they preferred to sacrifice (p. 328). In addition, 64% of the participants believed Tyron to be black, while 79%

believed Chip to be white. However, the authors attribute the lower percentage in Tyron's case to possible political correctness by the participants identifying as liberals who put an effort in not assuming a person's race based on their name (p. 328).

Both studies by Ditto et al. show that individuals display motivated moral reasoning and principles during moral dilemmas. It is essential to explain, at least briefly, why motivated reasoning is believed to have occurred in the above experiments. In the U.S., with the political landscape being majority liberal or conservative, the liberals are less tolerant of social inequality than are conservatives (p. 328). Research also shows that, unlike the conservatives, liberals are particularly concerned with fairness (p. 328). This particular concern implies that the scenarios provided were more triggering to the liberals with their political ideology, one that is sensitive to racial inequalities. Such a high level of sensitivity meant that the study had a high level of influence to invoke motivated reasoning and principles when the participants identified with liberal political ideology compared to participants who identified with conservatives. With Tyron being a common African American name, motivated reasoning was triggered with respect to the symbolism of race and equality within the liberals' race ideology. It led the participants to deem it less morally acceptable to sacrifice an African American to save 100 majority-white people—a potentially racist decision.

Studies on motivated reasoning show that humans, depending on their emotional reactions, might make different decisions when faced with the same scenario. By desiring a particular conclusion, such as eliminating racism from society, individuals are motivated to make decisions that best serve the desired conclusion. Hence, in P. F. Strawson's example of person X stepping on person Y's hand, if person Y already had a predisposed desire to reach

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the conclusion of fighting with person X, then even if person Y genuinely did not mean to step on person X's hand (and was able to show that), person X's reactive attitude may still be aggressive and place the blame on person Y. A more relatable example is the following: imagine you are an employee sharing an office with a colleague. Imagine that you and your colleague have the same position on the hierarchy. One day, a higher position is vacant, and the manager is considering promoting either you or your colleague to this higher position. The manager decides to watch both of your performances for the next couple of months to determine who deserves to be promoted more. In the coming days, you are both tasked to deliver a document by working on it together. Both you and your colleague decide to split the work in half and compile it before sending it to the manager. For efficiency, you volunteer to compile the work once your colleague is done. After your colleague submits their work to you, you realize their work is subpar. In addition, it contained a grave error that would have changed the result of the deliverable. Your colleague apologizes and admits it was an honest mistake. However, with the promotion being in the back of your head and contingent on who is working better, you could not help but think that your colleague does not deserve the promotion. Ultimately, you had the same half of the work, and you did it flawlessly. Subsequently, you submit the deliverable and inform your manager of the mistakes and how your colleague is at fault. This is a case of motivated reasoning taking over your responsibility attribution. Not only was your colleague not intending harm toward you, as it was an honest mistake, but you also took the extra step to make sure your manager found out about the mistake because you genuinely believed that a person who deserves to be promoted to the higher position could not be making such mistakes—securing your promotion against

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theirs. It is evident that one cannot blindly trust their emotional responses, the reactive attitudes, without questioning their reliability and efficacy.

Watkin and Laham's (2018) study showed that people's moral judgments rely not only on reactive attitudes. It was shown that when group belonging was factored in, people tended to make biased decisions toward their group members. When a war or war-like context was added to the scenario, the bias toward their group members increased further. When the participants were divided into two groups and presented with their respective scenarios that emphasized groups and ideologies, the scenarios encompassed enough level of influence to invoke motivated reasoning. The result was participants with reactions differing between choosing to sacrifice an ingroup member over an outgroup member. Similarly, the study conducted by Leidner et al. (2010) showed that the participants demonstrated motivated reasoning, and those of them with high moral glorification tendencies, which caused emotional minimization and explicit dehumanization of the outgroup, exhibited moral disengagement when ingroup members were perpetrators or subject to prosecution. As such, the participants were motivated to deem a decision moral when it served best the group, which can be regarded as kin, and themselves by demanding less justice for the ingroup members and protecting the self-image that had become integrated with the group's characteristics (p. 36; Everett et al., 2015, p. 2). Thus, a top-down motivated reasoning approach assesses the moral dilemma. The participant will, therefore, construct a reasoning that fits the preferred choice.

2.5. Recap

To summarize, people in war or war-like contexts will experience more profound identity fusion with other individuals who share a challenging experience and a worldview, resulting in a greater sense of kinship. When the individual's group, which they feel a fused identity with and a sense of kinship to, is mistreated, then the reactive attitude by the one person toward the aggressor is influenced by the group's ideology and attitude. In turn, the individual will exhibit motivated reasoning that will allow them to reach what appears to be a justified moral path to the desired outcome. The desired outcome, justified by motivated reasoning, can potentially turn into moral judgments and decisions where the person chooses to save and exonerate ingroup members to protect the group from outgroup members. An attack on one becomes an attack on all. For example, an attack that targets a religious institution building, such as a church or a mosque, will hurt not only the individuals in the building but also the religious group as a whole. In turn, reactive attitudes are not merely limited to the people within the building but will expand to affect the group member's responses. Therefore, the studies presented show that a well-established moral responsibility framework based on human emotion can still be influenced and is thus not a reliable contamination-free framework. Irrespective of what is thought to be moral, the human nature of interaction guided by the complicated functioning of emotion coupled with a variable environment shows that one cannot simply rely on the human population to 1) act ethically and 2) deny the weight of human emotion. Even with P. F. Strawson's well-established moral responsibility framework, human emotion is susceptible to bias through environmental factors and a sense of group identity that has an increased effect when adjusted to wartime context.

The fragility of human emotion, being easily contaminated with environmental factors and a sense of group identity, makes the resulting bias in both moral judgment and moral responsibility a dangerous phenomenon. Ingroup bias is not restricted to studies conducted in controlled environments – it can be seen around us. If utilized, ingroup bias has the potential to become a tool for mass oppression and corruption. Lebanon, a case that will be explored next, is a good and visible example of ingroup bias existing with implications on the political scene and on benefiting politicians by keeping them strong and in power. The next chapter will provide a brief history of Lebanon's sectarian political system and discuss how ingroup bias in moral judgment and moral responsibility is occurring. The chapter will also present how ingroup bias can potentially be used as a tool to ensure the political groups' continued exoneration from crimes and continued pro-group support by their followers, thus shedding light on its power and providing a framework of understanding of the Lebanese context.

CHAPTER 3

LEBANON:
HOW INGROUP BIAS PLAYS A ROLE

3.1. Introduction

As shown in the earlier chapter, external factors can affect Strawsonian reactive attitudes, with a focus on two main factors: the human emotion attributed to ingroup bias, and the effect context has on it. With the understanding of how the demand for prosecution and willingness to sacrifice are affected, we are able to appreciate the emphasis P. F. Strawson places on emotion as an inescapable factor of human life while also understanding how easily contaminated by environmental aspects and unreliable these emotions can be. This chapter will provide a real-life example of how reactive attitudes can be contaminated— one that the general audience can relate to. Specifically, Lebanon will be presented as the near-perfect example of how human psychology not only alters the reactive attitudes of the masses but also happens at a dangerous level that could hinder any serious progress away from the never-ending sense of turmoil.

The chapter will start by providing a background summary of Lebanon's current political and group identity makeup. Then, a section will be dedicated to providing examples on the application of ingroup bias, group identity, and contaminated reactive attitudes within the Lebanese context. Particularly, the section will focus on a non-conflict scenario and the 2019 October Uprising. After, the Prisoner's Dilemma will be provided as a possible influence of motivated reasoning that enhances reactive attitudes that reflect saving and exonerating group members through ingroup bias. Lastly, the chapter will elaborate on the

takeaway resulting from the understanding of this phenomenon in the Lebanese context and the implications it can possibly have.

3.2. Background

Lebanon is marred with political turmoil and corruption, which has crippled the nation's progress into a safe, prosperous economy (Abouzeid, 2021). It is not uncommon for the Lebanese citizen to occasionally witness small-scale local skirmishes, which is a quick reminder of stress-evoking memories of Lebanon's Civil War, a war that lasted from 1975 to 1990 as a result of a confessionalism political system that disproportionally provided one sect with more executive powers over the rest of the sects (Westfall, 2021; Hiro, 1993, p. 1-27; Bahout, 2018, p. 140). It is also not uncommon for the average Lebanese citizen to hear certain people belonging to sectarian groups defend their own group's political-related wrongdoings but condemn others'.

Such a bias toward the ingroup, which wields political power, benefits those in leadership positions. By using ingroup bias, political leaders can count on their ingroup members' support of their immoral acts, such as corruption, military-style aggression, incompetence, or even failure. A study conducted by Shi et al. (2022) suggests that in cases of sexual misconduct scandals by political figures, individuals were more likely to perceive their ingroup member political figure's character traits as positive as compared to outgroup political figures (p. 16). In addition, the findings suggest that the political figures associated with sexual misconduct scandals were still likely to receive support from their political parties (p. 16). Unlike the bipartisanship division of the US between liberals and conservatives, Lebanese political groups are primarily divided in terms of sectarian

affiliations (el Khazen, 2003, p. 3). Deep sectarian divisions in Lebanon can be traced to the makeup of the state and the government itself. Influential positions in the government are distributed according to sect; for example, a Maronite Christian as the president, a Sunni Muslim as the Prime Minister, and a Shia Muslim as the Parliament Speaker (Abouzeid, 2021). The holders of these positions are elected by the parliament, which is divided in a sectarian manner, where each sect is given a quota. Furthermore, the geo-demographic setup of Lebanon after the Lebanese Civil War has polarized the regions to become predominantly populated by a single sect (Verdeil, 2019). This means multiple, smaller-sized circle groups are created where the members identify with a political party representing a specific sect. In other words, sectarian divisions have formed groups that people can identify with, just as any other type, such as nationality.

Not only was Lebanon built on sectarian divisions, but it was also destroyed through sectarian strife – a civil war that only ended with the entrenchment of sectarianism within the society and political spoils being distributed among opposing factions (Aboultaif, 2019, p. 110-116; Badaan, Richa and Jost, 2020, p. 139-140; Westfall, 2021). While studies have shown that frequent cooperation between different groups decreases ingroup bias, conflict has been suggested to heighten the differences between groups (e.g., sectarian groups), thus drawing an emphasis on ingroup/outgroup sentiments (Haddad, 2001, p. 137). Consequently, as conflict increases, ingroup bias increases and heightens (p. 137). We often see examples of sectarian-fueled war-like conflicts that refresh ingroup loyalty and ingroup bias within the masses. An example of such an incident is that of the 2021 Tayyoune Clashes in Beirut, which saw Christian supporters of the Lebanese Forces, a right-wing Maronite Christian political party, marching in the streets carrying large crosses the night before the clashes in

anticipation of an expected protest by Shiite Hezbollah and Amal Movement supporters against judge Bitar (Karam, 2021). Subsequently, a day after the protest, which saw weaponized clashes and the death of several people, a large number of men carrying weapons and flags of Hezbollah and Amal Movement was seen parading in a show of strength in Beqaa Valley (Chulov, 2021). Such a conflict refreshes ingroup loyalty and bias, which might result in a base of supporters that is morally lenient toward their ingroup members, especially those on the frontlines (leaders, soldiers, politicians). As a result of the moral leniency and heightened ingroup bias, individuals identifying with a group will adopt a reactive attitude, driven by motivated reasoning, toward situations they encounter with the purpose of exonerating group members from punishment and saving them from sacrifice or harm.

3.3. Application

3.3.1. Non-Conflict Scenarios

Reactive attitudes and moral leniency biased toward the group do not exclusively occur during or right after a war or conflict; studies have shown that a war-like scenario or a scenario that appeals to conflict is enough to trigger a heightened response. A conversation occurred a few years ago between two people, who will be called Fadi and Rami. When the conversation occurred, there had not been an immediate sectarian-based conflict occurring during or right before the conversation. Fadi strongly supported the Amal Movement, a political group that exclusively identifies with the Shia sect. On the other hand, Rami was a secular person who identified with the secular movement. As the conversation moved, Fadi expressed his discontent and anger with the latest news reports surfacing, which accused members of the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM), a Christian Maronite-majority sect political

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group, of corruption. Fadi explained how FPM's corruption is hurting the country. Rami fully agreed with Fadi that FPM's corruption is immoral and immediately followed his agreement with an emphasis that not only should the FPM be held accountable, but all other political groups from all other sects must be accountable for their immoral actions. No person or sect should be immune to accountability, Rami said. Suddenly, Fadi became defensive and said that the Amal Movement was not accountable for the wrongdoings but that the group was framed or forced into these acts. When asked to elaborate on being forced to be corrupt, Fadi responded that if the Amal Movement did not take a piece of the cake, they (the political opponents of other sects) would take the whole cake and leave us (Shia) with nothing but hunger.

When Fadi felt that Rami's statement was threatening his group, his reaction mirrored that of someone wronged. In Strawsonian terms, Fadi felt that Rami had intentionally stepped on his hand and hurt him. When Rami spoke about holding all political groups and leaders accountable for their wrongdoings, Fadi was well-aware that his group had indulged in what could be considered corruption, but that does not change his belief that they should not be held responsible. For Fadi, the reasons behind his group's actions exonerate them from being held responsible for corruption. Fadi felt that Rami had unjustifiably accused his group of corruption. Accordingly, Fadi's reactive attitude was negative, reflecting a defensive and hurt attitude.

In terms of the Strawsonian perspective of reactive attitudes, Fadi's reaction can be considered both second person and third person. Rami's statement was clearly not aimed at Fadi in particular. However, as Strawson (1963) explained in terms of the third person perspective, the individual's dignity and own interest do not have to be involved in the matter

as in the form of a first connection for the individual to have a reactive attitude (p. 346-347). In this case, Fadi responded to Rami as an observer of an unjust claim against the group in accordance with his own feelings on the matter. On the other hand, when it comes to the second person perspective, further explanation is required to show how Rami's statement on a group is translated to a statement directed toward Fadi. As seen in chapter two, identity fusion dictates that Fadi's identity has intertwined and fused with that of his group. Fadi does not identify only as an individual but also as part of the collective that is his group and those who support and lead it. Therefore, even though Rami did not intend to hurt Fadi by having Fadi's group integrity questioned, identity fusion will make Fadi feel—consciously or unconsciously—that his own integrity is being questioned. Thus, to eliminate the idea that his or his group's integrities are questioned, Fadi employs a reactive attitude guided by motivated reasoning and influenced by ingroup bias. In other words, the reactive attitude employed by Fadi was a reflection of the motivated reasoning and ingroup bias that he experiences, which tilts Fadi's moral judgment and responsibility attribution toward exonerating his group—the Amal movement—for having indulged in corrupt acts. Instead, he places the blame on the situation itself, as he mentioned, "[…] they […] would take the whole cake and leave us […] with nothing but hunger." The statement was not empty; it was guided by the motivated reasoning that, as someone who views himself as not corrupt, the group that Fadi identifies with cannot be corrupt either. Therefore, the response's end goal is to show that whatever actions the group indulges in, even if from the outside seem corrupt, are in fact not corrupt. By saying that if his group does not play ball, so to speak, with the situation, then the group's survival will be threatened. In this case, the group choosing to act in certain ways to ensure the safety of its members and in response to a threat toward its

survival exonerates it from indulging in what could be considered corrupt in normal circumstances. The existential threat also triggers a war-like context, which, as seen in previous studies, heightens the ingroup bias by the individual. Fadi had a reactive attitude influenced by a moral stand, which was reached through motivated reasoning with the end goal of protecting the ingroup and its image, which is integrated with Fadi's identity. This moral stand is increasingly heightened when there is a continuous general sense of a war-like status quo. Additionally, such a response is not restricted to one group or another but is more likely shared among all sectarian-inspired groups. As an exercise, one can attempt to use the same example above but change the names of the individuals and the political group they are affiliated with to another Lebanese sectarian political group. It is more likely than not that the same trend of the conversation will follow whether the individual is a supporter of the Amal Movement, the FPM, the Lebanese Forces, the Future Movement, or the Progressive Socialist Party.

In terms of moral attribution, there is an asymmetry in how Fadi is operating to attribute responsibility. During the conversation when the FPM was the subject matter (the outgroup), Fadi was able to attribute responsibility to the FPM for their corrupt acts without issue. In the end, corruption is an unethical behavior. However, when the subject matter became the group Fadi identifies with, Fadi was quick to dismiss any attempts at holding his group responsible for the unethical behavior (corruption). Therefore, in this case, one could question whether responsibility attribution is guided by what is and is not ethical. Instead, it appears to be following feelings rather than reason, which aligns with Strawson's explanation of reactive attitudes. The asymmetry exists where as long as the subject of the matter is not the self (or the group the self identifies with), then the mechanism of what is and what is not

moral applies. In other words, individuals exhibiting this sort of asymmetry quickly attribute responsibility toward what they believe is moral or immoral. However, when the subject of the matter is the self (or the group the self identifies with), the individual's moral compass becomes more lenient toward the self and the group.

Had the conversation occurred between two Amal movement members who were discussing the different quality of roads being built by the group in two Amal-majority neighborhoods, the intensity of ingroup bias would have probably been less severe. Instead of having a reactive attitude that held the group responsible for the corruption due to inequitable road quality in different neighborhoods for the same group, the conversation would have probably shifted toward a reaction that would have served to exonerate the group's actions by providing a less-aggressive explanation that could be, for example, business related. In this scenario, while the individual exonerates the group, the reactive attitude is forgiving rather than attributing responsibility.

3.3.2. 2019 October Uprising

In 2019, people in Lebanon were growing increasingly frustrated with the country's economic situation. It was not until October of that year, when a newly proposed tax on WhatsApp calls was introduced, that the people's patience ran out (Makdisi, 2021, p. 437). Protests erupted in central Beirut comprising people of all backgrounds waving the Lebanese flags in a deliberate sign of unity of all sects under one banner (p. 437). One of the most remarkable aspects of the uprising was the presence of people from all backgrounds. Not only were the streets filled with people of different sects and regions of Lebanon, but they also included those who denounced the political parties in their entirety and those who

remained loyal to their political leaders (Al-Amine, 2022, p. 166). In the first few days of the uprising, a sense of unanimous agreement in demanding better living standards existed among the people under a patriotic sentiment and unified by the national flag (p. 167). However, while people who identify with political parties (from here on referred to as "loyalists") were participating in the uprising, they remained fearful of any attempts by rivals to co-opt the movement (p. 167).

Soon after, differences began to emerge. Particularly, divisions appeared between classes and religious piety (p. 167). Al-Amine explains how religious people participating in the movement pointed out how some people were drinking and smoking Hasheesh, while others pointed out the elitism of some protesters who decided to block the road by doing yoga. However, the event that struck the most division among the protesters was the chant demanding all the political class be toppled by saying, "All of them means all of them." This made many loyalists defensive as they feared that they were being singled out by the uprising (p. 167). The reason behind that might be understood in the following manner: by saying all of them means all of them, the chant meant to target the traditional political establishment in Lebanon alongside the political elites that have ruled under this establishment for many years. In doing so, a division was created whereby at least two groups were made as a result of the changes. The first group can be called the "new wave." They demanded the abolition of the traditional system to form a new one. The second group can be called the "traditional establishment." They believed the traditional political establishment was not directly at fault and that reform was the method to follow as an answer to the issues. While the chant took turns at all the mainstream politicians, one incident captured the spotlight. When the

protesters chanted, "All of them means all of them—Nasrallah is one of them," some protesters replied by shouting, "Nasrallah is a red line!"

One should not be surprised by the defensive response of some of the protesters. As remarked earlier, group identity in Lebanon is an intertwining between the political group and the religious sect it represents, both in the political sphere and in the communal sphere. Al-Amine shared how one of the interviewees expressed themselves by saying, "As a religious [Muslim] Shia, my political views derive from my religious beliefs, and Hezbollah best represents this relationship." (Al-Amine, 2022, p. 169). As such, by singling out one political leader at a time, and in accordance with our understanding of group identity, ingroup bias, and reactive attitudes, the citizens who identify with the political group that also belongs to their sect will immediately have a reactive attitude that 1) fears for the group (and thus for the self) from prosecution that mirrors the politicians' constant warmongering rhetoric, and 2) is inclined to exonerate/save the group member with the influence of motivated reasoning. In this case, by saying, "Nasrallah is a red line!", it is applicable to assume that the protestor is exonerating their political leader from whatever blame is being attributed to them in relation to the corrupt regime and, in turn, is acting on it by shouting a defensive sentence back in an effort to save the group member, albeit proportionally in nature. Another example of ingroup bias taking form is shared by Al-Amine, with a protester aligned with the Future Movement, a Lebanese Muslim Sunni political group, expressing, "The best thing that can happen to Lebanon is for each party to fully govern its own sect." (Al-Amine, 2022, p. 168). Although the corruption has affected Lebanon on all fronts, including the Sunni population in Lebanon, and although the Future Movement and other Sunni-majority political parties have actively participated in Lebanon's political sphere, which is ripe with corruption on all

fronts and conducted by all parties, the protester still believed that a form of religious-based federalism would provide Lebanon and its different sects with better living standards. The protestor, therefore, excused and exonerated his own group from the corruption taking place in the establishment they participate in and instead placed the blame on the system of shared governance. Speaking after the August 4 Beirut Explosion, a supporter of the Lebanese Forces expressed by saying:

> "The uprising has lost most of its backing. Few still believe in its ability to bring about necessary change. Change could still happen through elections. But even then, I think that everything would stay the same: the Shia will vote for Amal and Hezbollah, the Druze for Joumblatt, and so on. Each sect will still vote for the same parties; even us, we will again vote for the Lebanese Forces. This is because sectarian identities are tied to these parties" (Al-Amine, 2022, p. 170).

The protestor expressed a typical recurrence of ingroup bias in the aftermath of war or war-like scenarios among the Lebanese population, whereby the people continue to vote for their political groups that represent their sect in elections. One can assume that in the aftermath of the devastating August 4 Beirut Explosion, a war-like sentiment ensued within the nation. Attributing responsibility to any government official quickly turned into a threat to the existence of the entire sect. By tying sectarian identities with the political sphere, the political groups and their politicians hold in their hands a powerful tool that is able to influence the masses and recalibrate their alignment whenever a threat to their support is imminent. Whether or not ingroup bias is or can be utilized as a tool, the rhetoric that has enabled, at least partially, the current status quo of group identity coupled with reactive attitudes and fueled by ingroup loyalty and bias has worked as a guarantor of the political groups' and leaders' position in power.

3.4. The Prisoner's Dilemma

It is important to question whether the people, and in this case the protestors, are not only aware of the ingroup bias that they are exhibiting but also of the ingroup bias that the other groups are exhibiting toward themselves. Whether it is the example of Fadi and Rami or the 2019 October Uprising, a trend can be seen where there might exist an understanding that the individuals are adopting reactive attitudes that are biased toward their groups as a result of motivated reasoning where they believe that, no matter what, the other groups will exhibit ingroup bias. To better explain this, the prisoner's dilemma can be considered between the ingroup and the outgroup (groups A and B, respectively). In this case, each group has two choices: to be corrupt (defect) in governance or to not be corrupt (cooperate). The payoff for each group is shown in Figure 1, where the left side of each cell represents what group A would benefit, and the right side of each cell represents what group B would benefit.

Figure 1. Depiction of the Prisoner's Dilemma

Clark & Lee (2005) provide a similar case between two political groups in terms of the advantages of lobbying. Similar to their case, both groups A and B are better off not being corrupt when they treat the situation collectively. The preferred outcome would be a collectivist approach in a governmental body by participating political parties. In this case, both groups will gain 5 units of resources. Conversely, if one of the two groups decides to be corrupt, the corrupt group will gain 10 units of resources while the honest and collaborative group will gain 1 unit of resources. In this case, the group that chose to remain collaborative will stand to lose greatly, while the group that chose to be corrupt will immensely gain more resources. Therefore, when each group seeks its own benefit individually, its best course of action would be to follow the corrupt path as it will give them the best outcome possible. However, if both groups choose to be corrupt, then both groups will receive 3 units of resources, resulting in the worst collective outcome (p. 384). While the graph provides us with expected results from a one-stop situation, a sequence of events where the political groups need to decide whether they want to be corrupt or not might change the dynamic. In the case of a sequence, one group's decision is heavily dependent on the other group's decision (p. 384). Therefore, for one group to remain uncorrupt, the other group must consistently choose not to be corrupt in decisions. Subsequently, when a group continuously chooses to be corrupt, the other group is better off doing the same (p. 384). This means that as long as group A believes that group B has continuously been involved in corrupt decisions, group A's best chance at ensuring the maximum amount of resources gained is by being corrupt as well. As a result of this dilemma, the individual or group they belong to might employ motivated reasoning with the end goal of having the best outcome for their group, which would entail 1) choosing the option with the maximum resulting amount of resources

under the condition that 2) the group is not backstabbed by the other group to not be left with the minimum amount of resources.

When it comes to the prisoner's dilemma, the options do not always have to be "corrupt" or "not corrupt." The defecting or contributing options can be given different names, and the same idea will still follow. When corruption is the option, it would explain why in the Fadi and Rami example, Fadi's reactive attitude was negative when Rami attempted to attribute responsibility to the corruption made by Fadi's group. For Fadi, the motivated reasoning follows that his group ought to be corrupt, as it was the only way to ensure its survival. Suppose we change the options to whether an individual should be biased to their group against another group member who has to choose whether they should be biased to their own group as well. In that case, we can explain why the protesters had the reactive attitudes they did. When the 2019 October Uprising began, the protestors collectively chose the cooperative option by chanting for unified changes that would not single out any particular group. For the time that the unified chants remained, the protesters were exhibiting attitudes in favor of the uprising and reaping the best-case result out of the situation. As soon as the chants turned their focus to naming individuals of the traditional political establishment, the defection from the unison provided an opportunity for loyalists to feel that the dynamic had changed, thereby motivating their reasoning. Taking the prisoner's dilemma, the loyalists would be understood to have chosen to defect at that instant with the motivated reasoning of avoiding having their group's leader end up with the worst-case scenario. In numerical terms, had the loyalist remained cooperative, they would have lost at a 10:1 ratio. By defecting as a response, the loyalists decreased the perceived loss in the dilemma, achieving a 1:1 ratio. The result of the loyalist's defection is adopting a reactive

attitude that rejected their political leader being attributed responsibility for the deterioration of the country's situation while still accepting to attribute responsibility to other political leaders. As highlighted by Clark & Lee (2005), the continued cooperation by the collective hinges on all groups choosing the cooperative option. As soon as the cooperation broke, loyalists entrenched behind their groups and adopted reactive attitudes that were supported by ingroup bias, deepening the division between different groups among the protesters and breaking the unison. This possibly resulted in the worst-case scenario for the protesters as a collective, whereby they could not keep the momentum of pressure on the government in its entirety to enact serious reforms. When different groups began to opt for the defect option, the collective best-case scenario was rendered impossible to achieve.

3.5. Takeaway

By emphasizing group identity through the intertwining of the political sphere and sectarian sphere, political parties in Lebanon can divert the masses' ingroup identification from a unified national one to multiple sectarian-based group identities. This results in a base of supporters experiencing identity fusion with the political group, where they view their group's politicians, ingroup members belonging to the same sect, and the rest of their group's supporters as kin. Such a sectarian ingroup identification benefits the political parties when their seats in powerful positions in the government are selected based on the sect they belong to. The people identifying with those groups will then exhibit ingroup bias and, by extension, reactive attitudes that reflect the individual exonerating or saving the group member. On the one hand, Watkins and Laham (2018) showed us how war or war-like contexts increase ingroup bias and result in the tendency of individuals to sacrifice outgroup members over

ingroup members, or in other words, increase the tendency to find it more morally acceptable to save ingroup members over outgroup members. On the other hand, Leidner et al. (2010) showed us that when an individual perceives their group as superior to other groups on different levels, such as that their group has superior morality compared to outgroups, ingroup bias then results in an increase in demanding less justice for their ingroup member, or in other words, result in an increase in demanding their ingroup member being exonerated from wrongdoing. Such heightening of ingroup bias through war, war-like contexts, and ingroup glorification can be exacerbated by political groups' narratives.

Political parties can increase the effects of ingroup bias by strengthening their narrative using war-like rhetoric, which allows them to preserve their positions in power and receive less rebuke and higher moral acceptability on infringements they have committed toward the people and the nation. As a result, the people resort to motivated reasoning to justify their group's wrongdoings as a means to an end—to protect the group—and a reactive attitude that expresses such reasoning. Such rhetoric has been recently documented by the FPM's leader, Gebran Bassil, where he expressed his belief that a war of elimination is targeting his movement by both local and international parties (الدهيبي, 2022). General Michel Aoun founded the movement during his exile in France post-Lebanese Civil War (Helou, 2019). The use of "war of elimination" in Bassil's rhetoric is a reference to the 1990 battle waged by General Michel Aoun's Lebanese Army forces on the Lebanese Forces Militia in an attempt to unify military power in the Christian sector of Beirut during the Civil War under one authority (الياس, 2020).

Another example can be seen made by OTV, a Lebanese news outlet and TV channel affiliated with FPM. In the aftermath of the August 4 Beirut Explosion, several arrests were

made to investigate the reasons behind the explosion and who to hold responsible. Among those arrested is Badri Daher, the Director General of Customs at Beirut Port at the time and an affiliate of the FPM (عيّاد, 2022). Being one of the highest ranked people arrested, the news of Daher's arrest caused outrage by the FPM and was subsequently followed by a campaign with the goal of releasing him. The campaign began with the Minister of Justice, who is close to the FPM, presenting the idea to change the appointed judge on the port explosion under the pretext of "accelerating the release of the detainees in the [port explosion] case" (عيّاد, 2022). Alongside the minister floating the idea, OTV began a propaganda campaign in what can be understood as a lobbying attempt through media to gather public support for Daher's release. OTV focused on creating reports that were broadcasted during its evening news bulletin, which is speculated to have been a purposeful act with the intent of garnering the maximum amount of views by FPM supporters (عيّاد, 2022). During those reports, OTV used phrases such as "Two years were stolen from the life of the Customs Director and his family," a clear appeal to the public's emotions, where the TV station dragged Daher's family into the case and attempted to victimize Daher as the casualty of a conspiracy theory. That conspiracy theory was reinforced during the reports through phrases used such as "[Daher's arrest] is a plot that targeted him, perhaps with the intention of reaching General Michel Aoun." Effectively, OTV was attempting to sway the public's focus from the explosion's aftermath to a conspiracy targeting the founder and previous leader of the FPM. According to the journalist, OTV launched over 40 media reports as part of a political propaganda campaign by the FPM under the name of "We Don't Leave Our People," a phrase used by FPM's current leader Gebran Bassil (عيّاد, 2022).

Through the title alone, one can identify the ingroup bias taking place, where it is insinuated that "our people" are loyalists to the FPM and that the group will fight for them no matter what. When put together with the other reports, it can be understood as a form of increasing ingroup glorification by implying that the group is superior to other groups as their group's morality is superior to others. Therefore, any accusation of immorality is not only unfound but is the result of a larger conspiracy targeting the group as a whole. In one of the reports, OTV describes one of Daher's stages of interrogation using the following language: "He received the treatment of terrorists, was subjected to ill-treatment and torture, as he was forced to wait for the judicial investigator for 3 hours in the iron cage in the flames of the August sun, in a flagrant violation of human rights" (عيّاد, 2022). The channel employed dramatized language that appealed to the people's emotions, aggravating them, and heightening their ingroup bias with the goal of achieving reactive attitudes that reflect the demand to exonerate Daher from prosecution in the case. Another report, titled "Until when will the unfairness last for Badri Daher?" included phrases used, such as, "the rosary does not leave his hand, and Saint Theresa's words hung on his jail's wall do not leave his eyes, saying 'my soul do not frighten, my soul do not be disturbed, who has Jesus Christ has everything.'" Clearly, OTV was focusing on Daher's Maronite Christian background, which the political group represents a large portion of. While one could argue otherwise, our understanding of reactive attitudes, ingroup bias, and what entails them provides us with the understanding to confidently assume that OTV's method was a carefully-knit utilization of ingroup bias to gather enough public sentiment, or in other words, reactive attitudes that demanded the exoneration of Badri Daher—an ingroup member—from prosecution.

When the people are constantly fed war-reminding, ingroup victimization, or ingroup glorification rhetoric with great emphasis on the outgroup and their infringements, the people who identify with their ingroup on a sectarian basis will exhibit reactive attitudes supported by their loyalty to their group and fear of harm for their ingroup members, in addition to preserving the image of the self, which has the group's characteristics integrated with it. In the case of Badri Daher, the group identifies as anti-corrupt. Therefore, any attempt to prosecute the group under corruption charges is an attack on the group's image, which is intertwined with the self. In other words, if the individual believes they are not corrupt and supports a group that claims to be anti-corrupt, then an attack on the group's morality is an attack on their morality. The resulting reactive attitude is one that would reject such claims. Such reactive attitudes are the reflection of higher moral acceptance of crime made by ingroups (less demand for justice/more demand for exoneration), higher number of ingroup members saved (sacrifice the outgroup member for more ingroup members saved), and the preservation of a positive image of the ingroup and its members (to protect the image of the self).

Furthermore, our understanding of the prisoner's dilemma can explain how the political groups do not need to convince their group members to be biased toward them as much as they need to convince them that others are biased toward their groups. By reminding their group members of how the outgroups have committed crimes in the past, the individual identifying with the group is then placed in a position where the best-case scenario for them and their group is to defect. Therefore, by shifting the ingroup identification to a sectarian one and by creating a never-ending war-like environment in the nation while continuing the reinforcing rhetoric, such as ones that prompt ingroup glorification, the people adhering to

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the specific sect will feel a continuous kinship toward the members of the same sect with a general feeling of threat toward their group, creating a prisoner's dilemma-like Catch-22. This general feeling of threat prompts them to adopt moral decisions guided by motivated reasoning to protect one another from harm. The way this is expressed is through reactive attitudes that mirror the emotional sentiment the individuals feel and the reasoning they experience in such circumstances.

While this explanation can be used to understand what occurs during war-reminding or war-like rhetoric, it is nevertheless not the full explanation. Different factors might be involved in how people react to such rhetoric, which for example, can be influenced by familial pressure (parents forcing their offspring to side with a party by instilling fear). The use of motivated reasoning and the occurrence of ingroup bias do, nevertheless, provide a partial explanation that allows us to foresee two things: 1) reactive attitudes are important to identify in the political sphere, where they are as fragile as isolated interpersonal cases, and 2) if utilized, they can lead to potentially dangerous results where the parties can capitalize on reactive attitudes to influence the masses for political gain.

CHAPTER 4

CONCLUSION:
WHAT CAN WE DEDUCE?

4.1. Introduction

With determinism being the center of the moral responsibility argument, it was challenging to provide a working framework of responsibility and attribution that the philosophers could collectively agree and rely on. Mainly, the reason behind this difficulty is the inability to provide a bullet-proof normative argument that hinged on either accepting or rejecting determinism, with the consequent effects on the existence of moral responsibility and attribution. Strawson's main contribution to this problem was mitigating the issue by providing the community with a framework that operates on "what in fact happens" rather than "what ought to be." By drawing this distinction when it came to responsibility, the argument was able to focus on what in fact happens—the descriptive analysis—to determine where moral responsibility lies. Several questions arise at this stage of the paper. Can we still consider reactive attitudes as the method to use when it comes to responsibility and attribution? Are we able to fully rely on reactive attitudes in the way that was explained to us by Strawson?

The closing chapter will summarize Strawson's reactive attitudes, the moral psychology studies presented, and the real-life application explained in the Lebanese context. Next, a section will be dedicated to considering what the argument tells us about the Strawsonian theory of moral responsibility. After, possible questions will be addressed as a response to the argument. Then, a revisit will be made to the paper's argument and how it

works. Lastly, an open discussion will be made to reflect on what can be taken from the argument and the future implications it can have.

4.2. Recap

The issue of the truth of determinism has long plagued the argument of moral responsibility and attribution, breeding two main camps pitted against one another in the discussion. On the one hand, we have compatibilists who argue that both determinism and moral responsibility can co-exist. In this case, the thesis of determinism is true, and one should still be held responsible for their actions. In their view, both can co-exist because an individual's freedom is not necessitated in the absence of a determined world. Instead, a determined world can exist, and an individual can retain their freedom under the condition that their acts are absent of coercion and compulsion. In other words, the individual can act without an influence against their will or desire.

On the other hand, we have incompatibilists who argue that determinism and moral responsibility cannot co-exist. In their view, the compatibilist's understanding of freedom is shortsighted. According to the incompatibilists, it is not enough to say that the absence of coercion and compulsion guarantees free will. The reason behind this claim is that incompatibilists view the compatibilist approach to freedom as focusing on being forward-looking and neglecting the past ultimate cause of the influence that can still change the individual's choice. Since the individual cannot control the previous cause of the events that led to a given point, then for an individual to be free, they would have to be the ultimate originators of their actions. However, if one was the ultimate originator of their actions, then determinism cannot be true, and therefore, an individual cannot be held responsible for their

actions. Therefore, in a deterministic world, one should be held responsible only if they were the originators of their actions.

4.2.1. P. F. Strawson's Moral Responsibility

The issues raised by the thesis of determinism pose a problem for the discussion on moral responsibility. It places us in a position where we cannot have a normative argument that agrees on moral responsibility in the presence of free will or lack thereof. Both compatibilists and incompatibilists focus on the agent, their free will's existence, and whether they should be held responsible in that regard, making the argument of moral responsibility heavily reliable on the normative aspect but does not provide conclusive descriptive support. P. F. Strawson's essay steps away from the determinism problem. Instead of focusing on the agent and their free will (and subsequently responsibility), he focuses on the recipient of the action made by the agent. By stepping away from the determinism problem, P. F. Strawson provided a moral responsibility framework that bases itself on the matter of fact of human emotions rather than the normative understanding of free will. Instead of focusing on the agent and the type of action they are doing, Strawson asks us to focus on the reaction by the recipient of the behavior. The recipient's emotional responses, called reactive attitudes, determine whether the actor is responsible for their behavior.

To Strawson, we can all agree on the undeniable existence of emotional responses, which exist and happen regularly, whether we live in a deterministic world or not. Therefore, even if Roy lived in a deterministic world and had no control over his actions, he could still be held responsible. At first, such a claim would sound highly unplausible, especially with the incompatibilists' argument against responsibility existing in a deterministic world.

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However, Strawson's clever maneuver in this argument was a feedback system that ultimately decided whether an agent was responsible for their actions. In a way, that feedback system operated as a survey that determined the decision. For example, a company decreases its employees' monthly transportation allowance due to decreased global fuel prices. At first glance, this decision might seem reasonable. However, to gauge their decision's success, the company creates a survey that the employees can fill out, which will decide whether the company will backtrack its decision or keep it. Unexpectedly to the company, the employees provided resentful and negative feedback, expressing their discontent with the decision because, while the global fuel prices have decreased, local produce prices have increased. Since the company was not raising the basic salary, it is absurd to cut costs on transportation allowances. This feedback shows that the company is responsible for the employees' resentful feelings. Whether the thesis of determinism is true or not, the employees would have had these resentful feelings toward the decision. These feelings, called reactive attitudes, are what his clever maneuver is about.

By focusing on the reactive attitudes of the recipient of an action, the moral responsibility argument is no longer bound by the problem of determinism. Instead, it can rely on a matter of fact—the emotional responses by humans—as a form of a survey that will determine whether the agent is responsible for their actions. While this framework of responsibility attribution works on almost everyone, Strawson provides clear examples of where it cannot apply. These examples, as explained before, are categorized under excusing and exempting conditions. Briefly, the excusing condition is when an individual acts in a way where they genuinely did not mean to. For example, Roy accidentally steps on Amira's shoes while walking. In that instant, Amira, the recipient, might initially feel bothered by

Roy's invasion of personal space in addition to the pain felt from being stepped on. However, Roy quickly apologizes and explains that he had not noticed the person as he was searching for friends in the other direction. In that case, Amira excuses Roy and no longer feels resentful toward him since the action was a genuine mistake. It is worth noting that in the excusing conditions, the individual's agency is not taken away from them—they remain agents but are excused in a specific condition. On the other hand, we have exempting conditions, and they encapsulate those who must be exempted for actions for reasons that are beyond their control. For example, children and people with severe mental disorders are exempted from their actions for the period where they remain in this state. In this case, the individual's agency is removed from them, and they are consistently exempted from responsibility for as long as the state they are in continues, even if indefinitely.

4.2.2. Moral Psychology

Strawson's use of reactive attitudes is evolutionary. Humans are social creatures, and emotions are part of their being. By shifting the focus from what ought to happen to what is happening, we can effectively attribute responsibility where it should be within our current status quo. The status quo, of course, is the inability to prove whether we live in a deterministic world. While reactive attitudes seem to fit well in our pursuit of a framework of moral responsibility, Strawson fails to provide a thorough explanation and defense of reactive attitudes in particular. Yes, Strawson is correct to assume that human emotions' existence, and therefore reactive attitudes' existence, is reliable—we are emotional beings. However, Strawson is wrong to assume that reactive attitudes are bullet-proof; he is wrong to assume that the recipient will always have the same agreed-upon reactive attitude. In other

words, Strawson is wrong to assume that in every case where Roy steps on Amira's shoes, Amira's reactive attitude will always be the same (given the same excuse by Roy). Even if we assume to repeat the same exact encounter between Roy and Amira, Strawson's mistake is failing to see how psychology—the very thing he builds his theory on for a reliable framework—can alter reactive attitudes in a way that would undermine the reliability of the person's moral compass.

In particular, the paper discussed group psychology and its effects on reactive attitudes. Specifically, the paper focused on ingroup identification and ingroup bias under the umbrella of the social identity theory. The effects of ingroup bias on the individual's moral judgments and moral responsibility attribution were explained using identity fusion and motivated reasoning. The effects were explicated using studies that showed how group psychology could influence the individual's decision when faced with a dilemma that decided whether to save/sacrifice or exonerate/punish an ingroup member. When presented with the trolley dilemma, the participants tended to find it more morally acceptable to sacrifice an outgroup member over an ingroup member. In other words, the participants tended to prefer saving their ingroup members over outgroup members. However, adding groups as a factor was not the only contributor to the influence on moral judgment. The studies showed that, in compliment to group psychology, adding a context of war or war-like scenarios to the experiments resulted in the participants' preference to save ingroup members over outgroup members to increase further. On the other hand, when presented with scenarios that required the participants to decide whether an individual should be punished for a crime, participants with high ingroup glorification tended to demand less justice for the ingroup member as opposed to an outgroup member.

4.2.3. Real-life Application: Lebanon

The studies showed us how fragile human emotion can be when environmental factors, such as war contexts and glorified ingroup identities, are involved. The studies show that this fragility can result in moral judgment and responsibility attribution that favors the ingroup over the outgroup. The focus on the preservation of the group highlights the tendency of people to see morality from the group's interests' point of view. While the studies demonstrated what would happen in experiments, it was necessary to see how this phenomenon exists in the real world. The main objective of Chapter 3 was to showcase Lebanon as a prototypical example of how ingroup bias, use of war-like contexts and ingroup glorification rhetoric, and biased reactive attitudes that place (and exonerate) responsibility take place in a political system that affects the entire nation and its progress. The example also shows how this phenomenon is a dangerous event that is taking place, regardless of whether the beneficiaries are aware of its utility and effects on their personal gains.

Two main examples were provided to explain the phenomenon's application in Lebanon: 1) a personal encounter between Rami and Fadi as the non-conflict scenario and 2) the 2019 October Uprising. Everything put together, the examples show us how group identities in Lebanon are intertwined between the religious and political spheres. Due to this deep intertwining, someone who identifies with a religious sect in Lebanon will identify with the political group that represents it and vice versa. In addition, the deeply rooted religious-political link in the establishment means that a non-religious, secular, or atheist political movement cannot penetrate the system and found itself as a serious actor within the government. This type of system provides the ripe environment for political hegemony to

exist under the guise of sectarian rights and protection. In other words, by having a system that only accepts political groups that are intertwined with sects, and since different political positions in Lebanon are to be filled by specific sects, meritocracy is heavily undermined in favor of clientelism. By definition, clientelism uses four categories: dyadic relationships, contingency, hierarchy, and iteration (Al-Amine, 2022, p. 165). Briefly, dyadic relationships are face-to-face transactions and interactions between the patron and the client (p. 3). Contingency is the reciprocal nature of the exchange between the two parties (p. 165). One party's offering of a good or service directly responds to another's promise or delivery of a benefit (p. 165). The benefits can either be short-term in nature (e.g., money and food baskets) or long-term in nature (e.g., jobs, access to social services, and protection) (p. 166). Clientelism is hierarchal in the way that the relationship has to be between one party that holds the resources, status, and power that the other party (client) does not have (p. 166). Lastly, clientelism's iteration is defined as not being a one-time transaction but rather a repeated one that requires the trust of both parties where the client must deliver on their promise, such as loyalty to the group, while trusting that the patron will provide a service in the future (p. 166). The lack of meritocracy in political representation and increased clientelism will only fuel the effects of ingroup bias and ingroup glorification since the people will likely receive more government benefits if they pledge unconditional loyalty and allegiance to their sect and the political group that represents it. When revisiting the Rami-Fadi problem or the 2019 October Uprising testimonies, we can understand further why the individuals had the reactive attitudes they did.

In the Rami-Fadi example, the link between clientelism, sectarian political system, group identification, ingroup bias, and the reactive attitude that reflects exonerating the group

is clear. When the political establishment is clientelist, the individual's livelihood depends on loyalty toward a political group controlling resources. In response, the individual might be persuaded to have this unwavering loyalty when provided with transactions under the party's name that directly benefit the individual's livelihood. As a result, motivation to stay in line is created and is reinforced by the clientelist dynamic between the political parties and their supporters (p. 8). When Rami hinted that Fadi's political group was engaging in corruption, Fadi's reactive attitude reflected the ingroup bias and ingroup glorification that demanded less justice for the ingroup member compared to the outgroup through motivated reasoning. From the moral responsibility standpoint, Fadi was unable to hold his group responsible for the corruption taking place. This position can be further deepened by the idea that if Fadi's group is not engaging in corrupt acts, then his group and those that belong to it will suffer the consequences of a system that requires exclusive cooperation between all groups to remain just. The idea that the other groups, or the outgroups, can choose to defect from the trust-dependent cooperation and end up reaping the benefits of this defection places an existential problem for the ingroup.

Consequently, the point of the prisoner's dilemma and the problem with this line of motivated reasoning is that it increases the possibility of all parties choosing to defect in favor of securing the best-case scenario when the prospect of the outgroup defecting exists. Through this prisoner's dilemma, as described earlier in the third chapter, the group then justifies engaging in actions deemed corrupt with the motivated reasoning of protecting the group from an existential threat that could be in the form of losing resources or power that could have otherwise been gained if they had defected themselves. Thus, when the group's actions, which from Fadi's point of view are meant to protect the group, are questioned for

being immoral, Fadi's defensive and resentful reactive attitude reflects his belief that the group had no other choice but to engage in those actions. In addition, the constant war-reminding and ingroup-glorifying rhetoric happening in the background of Fadi's life fuel the ingroup bias to extents that exceed those of peace and cooperative times.

By keeping the population divided over sectarian lines, which have gradually morphed into geographic lines in present-day Lebanon, by supporting the current status quo of governmental positions being held according to sects and ensuring that there is no room for non-sectarian movements, by creating a clientelist dynamic through taking control over resources and ensuring that only supporters can access these resources, and by constantly using war-reminding and ingroup glorifying rhetoric that is based on sectarian and political differences and ensuring that possible outgroup hegemony is emphasized, the population of Lebanon is then pushed into a box that is teeming with reactive attitudes that reflect heightened ingroup bias that aims to save and exonerate ingroup members from the outgroup. Effectively, the population is kept busy with ingroup moral judgment and moral responsibility attribution, leaving the nation void of an objective body that can hold responsible the people being corrupt, irrespective of their sectarian or political belonging. On the other hand, it also provides the current people in power with pseudo-immunity from prosecution of their long-standing corruption that has been openly recorded but greatly disputed since the end of the Civil War in 1990.

4.3. Further Questions

With our understanding of this paper, different questions might arise. In this subsection, I intend to raise a few of those questions as a guide for future research. The first

question that should be raised regarding moral responsibility is whether we should adhere to P. F. Strawson's account of moral responsibility. With what has been showcased in this paper, one cannot help but question whether Strawson's account of moral responsibility still stands well. The paper has shown how group psychology, in particular, can alter or influence the individual's moral judgments and moral responsibility attribution. Therefore, one might question the efficacy of continuing to rely on reactive attitudes as a means to attribute responsibility. While this question is not meant to be answered in this paper, it is important to note that the predictability showcased in the variations stemming from group psychology are, in their own way, creating a level of "reliable variability." The way to achieve this reliable variability would be to revise and expand on Strawson's account of moral responsibility to include these variations. In this revised version, the predictability in the studies must be added to the explanation, which would render the argument no longer containing uncertainty in terms of consistent reactive attitudes. In the end, this remains a question to be examined further. Another question was raised when presented with this solution: can we use predictability to provide a more comprehensive philosophical account of moral responsibility? We have seen from the studies that there is a predictable trend of individuals leaning toward ingroup-bias-favoring behavior in certain conditions. In chapter two, I focus on the predictability of the studies in showcasing ingroup bias and its effects on moral judgments and responsibility attribution. While at first, chapter two presented itself as the studies that show how Strawson's reactive attitudes are not as predictable as he claims them to be, the variation presented in terms of ingroup bias in sacrifice and prosecution had predictability in its own right. This predictability gives us an "organized chaos" sense of moral responsibility's variability due to human psychology. Can this predictable nature of

ingroup bias, though deviating from Strawson's main claim, be integrated with the Strawsonian approach to create a more refined and stronger philosophical account of moral responsibility?

A question that follows is whether it would be possible to reconcile the philosophical and psychological accounts. In other words, can the descriptive and the normative be combined into one theory? As explained earlier, focusing only on the normative will place us in a position where the discussion will continue to revolve around "what ought to be" under the umbrella of the thesis of determinism and the issues it raises. As things currently stand, there does not seem to be an answer to the undeniable existence of free will and determinism. The best the community can explain is the existence of the feeling of free will. With this reality in hand, continuing the discussion with only the normative in question is prodigal. However, the community's exploration of the possibility of reconciling the philosophical and psychological accounts will allow us to work with what is available to us to reach practical answers. As we have seen, the descriptive account provides hands-on information applicable to the real world and can be utilized immediately in everyday life.

If one is not looking at the possibility of reconciling the philosophical and psychological accounts, or the possibility does not stand, then a question arises on whether we should discard the normative account completely in favor of the descriptive account to provide a practical explanation to moral responsibility. This approach would be problematic, as providing a purely practical explanation of moral responsibility in the real world does not help us discover what humans should, to the very least, practice to be in terms of morality. This means that the focus on human psychology provides us with the matter of fact excluding the "what ought to be." Such an approach is shortsighted and will leave the discussion on

moral responsibility partially unfinished. On the other hand, a purely normative approach to moral responsibility is not enough either. While the normative would help us discover what should be done in certain scenarios, there still exists a possibility of the normative to miss on descriptive information that would have otherwise better helped in explaining a phenomenon.

The psychological account of ingroup bias keeps the status quo as is in Lebanon and other similar examples, where it becomes difficult to have meaningful change. What possible solutions can be provided with our understanding of group psychology and moral responsibility? As mentioned earlier, as dialogue and communication between groups decrease, group differences become more emphasized, causing more division. Would a solution to this problem be creating more communication between the groups? While it might seem a good and possible solution from afar, would communication between groups create the needed change to avoid mass ingroup bias that ensures political groups remain in power? That being said, is ingroup bias a negative psychological phenomenon to begin with? Could it not have been the reason why groups have survived this long? Lastly, would it be possible to remove group psychology from creatures who, as far as we know, have become social and group-based creatures through evolution?

When it comes to moral responsibility in terms of group psychology, it might be that the person chooses to identify with that group for personal gain and not because they really identify with the group, and so do not hold the group responsible only because, at a personal level, it will backfire and not because the individual truly identifies with the group, and thus wants to protect their group members. In this case, should this individual be described in the same manner as those described in the chapter two experiments? It is important to explore further whether the same framework applies to this individual in terms of moral

responsibility. This subsection dedicated itself to asking further questions that might arise from our understanding of what has been presented hitherto. However, the paper does not intend to answer any of the questions. Rather, the paper intends to present itself as a starting point to identify and recognize moral responsibility as a philosophical problem and a psychological understanding. The paper also has an indirect aim to emphasize the importance of an interdisciplinary approach. Thus, this paper should be used as a starting ground for further research on moral responsibility or the political turmoil that plagues Lebanon.

4.4. Wrap-up

Strawson uses the descriptive account in his essay to provide us with, in my opinion, one of the best reflections of a descriptive view on the moral responsibility argument. As far as I see his descriptive account, I proclaim it to be significantly important to our understanding of responsibility, which is necessary for any serious advancements in the thesis of moral responsibility. However, Strawson uses the descriptive account as a supplement to the normative claim of responsibility to tell us, in the end, how we ought to view responsibility and how we ought to do it (using reactive attitudes). Throughout his essay, Strawson swings back and forth between providing a descriptive account to support a normative claim and then substantiating the descriptive account with another normative claim. In other words, Strawson attempts to create a normative account of moral responsibility using information exclusively derived from the descriptive view of human emotions validated using normative claims. To that end, Strawson's normative account of moral responsibility is weak and raises issues.

We have seen how emotions in our daily lives support Strawson's use of reactive attitudes as a stable source of moral responsibility attribution independent of determinism. This use is grounded by the emotions' descriptively undeniable occurrence in our daily lives, be it a deterministic world or not, which happen in different forms. Reactive attitudes being one of these forms of emotions, which happen in the form of a reaction to an action that reflects the acceptance or rejection of the action, provide us with a feedback-survey-type of understanding on whether the action is liked, is taken in a neutral sense, or is resented. When liked, we can gauge the action as something good, where the recipient might be grateful for the act. We can hold the agent responsible for the good deed in this case. When resented, the opposite happens, and we can gauge the action as being something bad, where the recipient might be annoyed by the act. We can hold the agent responsible for the bad deed in this case. As far as the descriptive account goes, Strawson provides us with a clear and significant understanding of how important it is to identify and resort to reactive attitudes to categorize a recipient's feelings toward an action made to attribute responsibility. Unfortunately, while we can rely on emotions being part of human nature and can rely on humans feeling positive, neutral, or negative toward an action, we cannot rely on the judgment being proper. In other words, it is not that every time an individual feels resentful toward an action that the agent is automatically taken for granted to be responsible. The reason behind this unreliability in judgment and attribution stems from variability in the very thing Strawson's argument grounds as reliable: emotions.

This unreliability in judgment and attribution stems from Strawson's normative aspect of his essay. Particularly, it was his explanation concerning the two conditions where the person would be either excused or exempted from moral responsibility. Strawson put these

conditions under the umbrella of that which does not seem natural or reasonable (p. 343). Basing the conditions of reason and what seems natural, Strawson defines excusing conditions as when a person is excused from a specific action from being morally responsible due to the act's unintentional harm toward the recipient. For example, excused conditions include someone who is a full agent and is normally fully responsible for their actions but has mistakenly made an action without the intention to harm but has harmed a person. In this case, the person is excused for that particular action, but their agency remains, and they remain fully responsible in other cases (p. 343). The need to repeat this definition is to note that Strawson substantiates his claim of providing an excuse in such conditions using a normative statement. The statement he uses claims that in such instances, it is obvious that the situation would result in the recipient not holding the individual responsible and viewing them or their attitudes as inappropriate (p. 343). Instead, their specific action invites us to view the specific injury resulting from this action as inappropriate. Consequently, it invites us to view the injury as one for which the agent was partially or fully not responsible (p. 344). When speaking of the exempting conditions, Strawson defines them as when a person is exempted from moral responsibility for having a condition that disallows them to make proper judgments and, therefore, actions. Such exempting conditions could include being a child and therefore not mature enough to identify what is moral and immoral or someone under great mental strain and therefore cannot think clearly due to the psychological barriers preventing them from doing so (p. 343). When defining the exempting conditions, just as with the excusing conditions, Strawson substantiates his claim to provide exemption in such conditions using a normative statement. The statement he uses claims that we will not feel resentment toward a person for committing an action when that person is not themselves (p.

344). The statement continues to say that we should not feel toward the person during abnormal stress as we would feel toward them during normal circumstances, where the person is experiencing normal levels of stress (p. 344).

In both cases, Strawson does not attempt to provide a descriptive and thorough explanation as to why we, in those two cases, do not hold the person fully responsible for their actions. Instead, he assumes that this is the case, basing it on the reasonable and the assumption of it being natural, and takes it for granted that we will feel that way in all cases and toward all people who fall under those conditions. In addition, Strawson provides us only with two conditions where responsibility would not be attributed and a third condition where the individual would assume objective attitudes, such as a psychologist, though follows up by defining it as something that we cannot, in the normal case, continue to use for too long (p. 344). Strawson falls short of calling objective attitudes unnatural to human beings, probably due to his claim that humans can adopt objective attitudes in some cases. However, his use of normal in this case has a normative undertone to it, which seems to be an attempt to explain when we ought to (normative) use objective attitudes using the matter-of-fact (descriptive) of observing people who can be objective and substantiating the claim of humans being unable to remain objective by saying we cannot continue to do this in normal conditions, since ultimately humans will go back to their emotional base (normative) (p. 344).

Chapter two showed us how Strawson is wrong to believe that there are only two conditions where people would not be held fully responsible for their actions. In addition, chapter two showed us that even if we consider exempting and excusing conditions that Strawson speaks of as being universal, we cannot take them for granted. In other words, we cannot assume that the conditions will result in the same reactive attitudes in every instance.

In particular, the paper presented how group psychology and what takes part in it (social identity theory, ingroup bias, ingroup glorification, identity fusion, motivated reasoning) can create predictable variability in the human's emotional responses under the umbrella of moral judgment and responsibility attribution, resulting in exemptions and excusing from responsibility in cases not discussed by Strawson. Namely, when individuals identify with a group, they tend to lean toward moral judgments and moral responsibility attributions that favor the ingroup. The two main items discussed in this paper in terms of variability in emotions are 1) the tendency of individuals to find it more morally acceptable to sacrifice outgroup members over ingroup members, thereby leaning toward saving ingroup members over outgroup members, and 2) the tendency by individuals to demand less justice to ingroup members for wrongdoings they have done and more justice to outgroup members for wrongdoings they have done. The first case showed that when a war context was present, the tendency to save ingroup members increased. The second case showed that the higher the ingroup glorification within the individual, the less justice they demanded for their ingroup members; therefore, the more likely to demand to exonerate the ingroup member. As a result, reactive attitudes can no longer be relied on as concrete grounds to attribute responsibility.

The studies have shown that in these particular group psychology cases, environmental factors (war/peace) and group hegemony (ingroup glorification and superiority) can affect the person's moral judgment and responsibility attribution. Therefore, Strawson was wrong to believe that if person X stepped on person Y on purpose (with the intent to harm), we could rely on person Y's reactive attitude being resentful and attributing responsibility as the unquestionable response. He fails to see a situation where person Y would immediately identify person X as part of the same group. Thus, due to the shared group

identity, person Y forgives (exonerates) person X for their intentional harm. Reactive attitudes exist. However, understanding responsibility through reactive attitudes is not black and white; it is a spectrum. Variability can and does exist; however, the positive angle with this paper showing that variability exists is that it also shows its predictability. The studies showed us that during wartime, there is a predictable increase of individuals preferring to save their ingroup members over outgroup members.

On the other hand, the studies showed that individuals with high ingroup glorification predictably demanded less justice for their ingroup members than outgroup members. This predictability allowed the paper to expound Lebanon as the prototypical example of how this particular scope of variability (group psychology) taking place nationally and in the political scene can have grave effects on the entire country. The predictability understood using group psychology also allowed the paper to identify the phenomena in Lebanon and propose the possibility of it being utilized to garner and retain political power. Using the Strawsonian understanding of moral responsibility places us at the risk of justifying ingroup bias that prefers to exonerate and save ingroup members when contrasted with outgroup presence. In other words, by relying fully on reactive attitudes as the tool for moral responsibility attribution and having only two Strawsonian conditions where responsibility is attributed, reactive attitudes stemming from ingroup bias are justified and left unchecked. As such, particularly in the Lebanon example, the current Strawsonian framework prohibits us from viewing the population's actions and reactions stemming from ingroup bias as anything other than natural and justified. By following this understanding, group supporters having reactive attitudes that demand to exonerate ingroup members and hold responsible outgroup members are justified and in accordance with Strawsonian moral responsibility. Therefore, while

Strawson's descriptive account is significant to our understanding of responsibility, we cannot rely on his framework of responsibility attribution. Lastly, while this paper cannot prove the reactive attitudes of the people, which reflect ingroup bias that aims to save and exonerate ingroup members, are a result or sign of group psychology being used as a political tool, the paper was nevertheless able to identify and define the phenomena and show its existence in the Lebanese landscape. This identification and defining of the phenomena will therefore help future researchers in their endeavors to understand and provide solutions for the problems that prevail throughout the Lebanese political scene.

The use of a descriptive account in this paper as grounds for moral responsibility is in tandem with P. F. Strawson's aim. The problem with focusing on the normative aspect of moral responsibility, or in other words, what we ought to do to be moral, is that it does not provide us with a mechanism to gauge responsibility in a given scenario. Even if the problem of determinism has been resolved and the community collectively agrees on a standpoint, we still face a problem where people might still feel responsibility should be attributed. What is meant by that is the following: if everyone agrees that determinism exists and that one cannot be held responsible since free will does not exist, the agreement does not expunge the resentful feelings (reactive attitudes) a person might have over an act made after collectively agreeing that people cannot be held responsible due to lack of free will. On the other hand, if everyone agrees that people should be held responsible irrespective of the truth of determinism, we face several issues with the contradiction the compatibilist logic raises. In addition, normative compatibilist reasoning of moral responsibility becomes a forward-looking approach, which paves the way for potential oppression in the name of "making an example for future acts." Therefore, this normative approach does not provide a true

framework to attribute responsibility since it is motivated by the concern of the future (forward-looking) rather than the present.

Hence, we can determine what works and what does not by focusing on the descriptive aspect of moral responsibility. We can see what is reliable and what is not. We can identify influencing and motivating factors that might affect responsibility. Strawson's first shortcoming is taking the reactive attitudes and the conditions they are excused and exempted for granted. In a way, Galen Strawson's idea that freedom could be an illusion applies to this shortcoming by P. F. Strawson, where he failed to see certain instances where reactive attitudes could be an illusion of justified ones (ingroup-bias-influenced reactive attitudes). The second shortcoming by Strawson is the unclear distinction between the normative and the descriptive in his essay, which undermines the true potential of its importance and contribution to the discussion of moral responsibility. Instead, I believe the argument should be tackled as follows: first, the normative and the descriptive must be clearly divided. We cannot substantiate the matter of fact using what we ought to do (or what is obvious we will do). Instead, we must continue to address the argument of moral responsibility from a normative standpoint. However, we can see what issues arise when we focus on the normative only, which probably drove Strawson to create his essay. Therefore, the best approach is to use the descriptive account of human emotions to guide us as we develop a normative account that includes our complete understanding of human emotions. We cannot expect people not to be biased toward their groups when their groups are, at least subjectively, in danger without creating a normative account of moral responsibility that would consider these emotions and be able to provide a safe pathway for people to follow,

one that does not undermine or invalidate their feeling of needing to act in favor of the group (and therefore in favor of the self).

A descriptive approach to responsibility does not tell us how to best build a playground to avoid children colliding with one another (and thus having to hold someone responsible). Instead, a descriptive approach to responsibility tells us the playground is already built, the playground is already messy and in some places unorganized, and it tells us if we look at the reactions the children are having on the slides and monkey bars, we can identify where in some of these instances some children are held responsible for the chaos. In addition, a descriptive account allows us to identify how other factors can be involved in the responsibility attribution, such as children playing dodgeball and forming groups, which reveals why some children are not being held responsible for the chaos in some instances. Thus, in the debate of responsibility, one can argue for decades over what ought to be done. Conversely, when focusing on the descriptive, one can start working immediately with the de facto case of responsibility using human emotions that will exist regardless of the normative argument of responsibility. In this way, we can construct a normative account of responsibility that is in tandem with the reality of human nature. As P. F. Strawson mentions in his essay, we should not regard ourselves as detached from the attitudes we question as philosophers; we must not forget that in philosophy, we must consider all the facts and all their bearings (Strawson, 1963, p. 351).

I believe this paper will help us take a step closer to an effective responsibility attribution framework that can be used as a normative account, one without the limitations the thesis of determinism raises but one that includes our descriptive understanding of human nature. While the main goal of this paper is to explicate the philosophical aspect of moral

responsibility from the Strawsonian perspective, the paper has a secondary goal of creating an understanding of moral responsibility in the local Lebanese landscape. While it provides a limited explanation of responsibility attribution and ingroup bias in Lebanon, I believe it moves us closer to fully understanding Lebanon's entrenched tripartite relationship between politics, sects, and people. By understanding why and how increased ingroup biases take place, their effects on responsibility attribution, and the implications that result from the possibility of utilizing ingroup bias as a tool by politicians for their personal gain, we can then focus our energy to aim at more effective ways to curb such actions and attribute responsibility using a framework that does not open the door for corruption.

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