

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY OF BEIRUT

LEBANON POST PM RAFIQ HARIRI ASSASSINATION:
THE RULE OF THE QUADRIPARTITE ACCORD 2005-2008
“DAWLAT AL-HILF AL-RUBA’I”: A QUALITATIVE STUDY

by
TARIQ FAREED ZEDAN

A thesis
submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Master of Arts
to the Department of Political Studies and Public Administration
of the Faculty of Arts and Sciences
at the American University of Beirut

Beirut, Lebanon
August 2023

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY OF BEIRUT

LEBANON POST PM RAFIQ HARIRI ASSASSINATION:
THE RULE OF THE QUADRIPARTITE ACCORD 2005-2008
“DAWLAT AL-HILF AL-RUBA’I”: A QUALITATIVE STUDY

by
TARIQ FAREED ZEDAN


Approved by:

Signature



Dr. Jamil Mouawad, Assistant Professor
Department of Political Studies and Public Administration

Advisor



Signature

Dr. Karim Makdisi, Associate Professor
Department of Political Studies and Public Administration

Member of Committee

Signature



Dr. Joseph Bahout, Associate Professor of Practice
Department of Political Studies and Public Administration

Member of Committee

Date of thesis defense: August 1, 2023

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY OF BEIRUT

THESIS RELEASE FORM


Student name: Zedan Tariq Fareed
 Last First Middle

I authorize the American University of Beirut, to: (a) reproduce hard or electronic copies of my thesis; (b) include such copies in the archives and digital repositories of the University; and (c) make freely available such copies to third parties for research or educational purposes:

- As of the date of submission
- One year from the date of submission of my thesis.
- Two years from the date of submission of my thesis.
- Three years from the date of submission of my thesis.

Signature _____

September 7th, 2023
Date



ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This would not have happened if it weren't for the unconditional support of my dear wife Razane M. Nasser. Her endless support and encouragement led me to this milestone in my life. To her, I am forever in debt when she showed the act of heroism, I could not have at times of health crisis. This is ours. A case study of your triumph and not only one of Public Policy and International Affairs.

To the Nasser family, thank you. To each one of Mr. Mustapha Nasser's Daughters: Aya, Rim, and Nour a big thanks. To Mrs. Maha Nasser special thanks for your undoubted trust. To share your beloved husband's Mustapha Nasser carrier secrets is a decision to write history. And you have done so.

I would like to thank Dr. Jamil Mouawad for his continuous support as a supervisor and a scholar. His comments and several discussions transformed the ambiguity into a question. This is a question that turned out to be much more than a case study thanks also to the support of Dr. Karim Makdassi and Dr. Joseph Bahout who both have contributed to this work. A special heartfelt thanks to the nation of Lebanon. If nations were people, Lebanon would be that one person sitting on a wooden bench on top of a hill over looking the marvelous cultural banquet of modern history called the Mediterranean Sea and telling riveting stories of Public affairs and policy making. Thanks to the American University of Beirut for being that person.

ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS OF

Tariq Fareed Zedan

for

Master of Arts

Major: Public Policy and International Affairs

Title: Lebanon Post PM Rafiq Hariri Assassination: The Rule of The Quadripartite Accord 2005-2008 “Dawlat Al Hilf Al Ruba’i”: A Qualitative Study

When the 2005 parliamentary elections ended with the March 14 movement winning the majority of parliament the next constitutional step was the selection of the prime minister. As stipulated in the constitution the Candidate would have to gain the majority of parliament votes to be assigned as Prime minister-elect. However, the newly elected parliament was not the venue where the political leaders of Lebanon conducted their consensus and discussions.

The 14th of March leader Saad Hariri had two candidates to head the government: Bahij Tabbara and Fouad Siniora. His choice was settled when he asked Siniora to visit Hezbollah leader Nasrallah, accompanied by his political advisor the late Mr. Mustafa Nasser. Siniora, the former finance minister presented his “national convictions,” alongside his affirmed belief in the Palestine cause and in the resistance as an option. Most importantly he expressed his commitment to the “Quadripartite agreement” and not the constitution.

The “Quadripartite accord” between the future movement (Saad Hariri), the progressive socialist movement (Walid Jumblat), the Amal movement (Nabeh Berri), and the Hezbollah party. The accord came as a replacement for the withdrawal of Syria’s influence in managing Lebanese state affairs in the aftermath of UN resolution 1559 and the vacuum of power in the shadow state due to the assassination of PM Rafik Hariri (2005). It is necessary to recall the rule that dictated the accord of the four-party alliance in April 2005 between Hariri Jr. and Nasrallah: The majority is yours (the March 14 team in return for protecting the resistance’s weapons and national partnership in internal files, i.e. consensus in the Council of Ministers.

Four accords, four political parties, and four unity governments occurred in Lebanon between 2005 and 2008. Let alone multi policies about economic and financial matters and not to forget two wars, the semi-international war during the Israeli 2006 attacks and a semi-civil altercation in the May 2008 Hezbollah invasion of Beirut. Like many post-colonial states, this in specific could endure major conflicts/crises, which in turn presents the following obvious question: Does a Lebanese state exist? However, the gap I intend to study is that the existence of the shadow state in Lebanon provides the answer. I intend to study how the “Quadripartite Accord explains this. To the best of my knowledge, all events, and related accords pertinent to that period are not officially documented, nor are the governmental documents waiting to be released. Hence, the rationale of this study is to uncover the mask that was put on the Lebanese state between the years 2005 and 2008

using a qualitative approach that involves the triangulation method which is based on a discourse analysis of Mr. Mustafa Nasser and published books and studies from the Lebanese media between 2005 and 2008. The civil unrest during that period was created by the ruling class itself by utilizing the state's constitution and tools the shadow state managed to sustain its place as part of the ruling class. A case in point is the "Quadripartite Accord" in 2005 which came to protect the sect or their respective position in the ruling class.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	1
ABSTRACT	2
ABBREVIATIONS.....	7
INTRODUCTION.....	8
METHODOLOGY, OBJECTIVES AND ARGUMENTS.....	11
2.1. Triangulation Qualitative Research Methodology.....	11
2.2. Ethical Considerations	11
2.3 Objectives and Argument	11
HISTORY AND BACKGROUND OF THE STATE OF LEBANON, MR. MUSTAPHA NASSER (POLITICAL ADVISOR TO PM RAFIK HARIRI & SAAD HARIRI) AND THE DOCUMENTS	13
3.1. The Question of a State.....	13
3.1.1. Formal and Informal Structures	14
3.1.2. The geopolitical role of Lebanon on the Map.....	20
3.1.3. Game Change: US invasion of Iraq 2003, Changing of the Guards (SyrianCustodianship to a Hybrid International Custodianship).....	22
3.2. Mustapha Nasser.....	26
3.2.1. Mustapha Nasser, the Personal Documents.....	26
3.2.2. Mustapha Nasser, the Role	28
3.2.3. Mustapha Nasser, the Person.....	30

LITERATURE REVIEW	34
4.1. Policy Formulation in the Shadow State.....	34
4.1.1. The Two Republics of the Modern State of Lebanon.....	34
4.1.2. The Taif Era; The Institutionalization of the Shadow State	35
4.1.3. Taif Accords (اتفاق الطائف): From Street Sharing to State Sharing.....	38
4.1.4. The Shadow State; as a Result of a Weak State	42
4.1.5. UN Resolution 1559, The Foreign Influence on Lebanese Policymaking ...	43
4.1.6. The True Rulers of Lebanon.....	48
4.1.7. The Theoretical Framework of the Kinds of Policies Developed	50
4.1.8. The Regional Political Landscape	50
4.1.9. Best Practices during the Syrian Presence in Lebanon.....	52
4.1.10. The Assassination of the Taif Agreement UN Resolution 1559, 2004	57
4.2. The Rise of the Quadripartite Accord and Concurrently the Lebanese Shadow System.....	59
4.2.1. An Overview of the Quadripartite Accord	59
4.2.2. Motives and Interests: Protecting the Taif Agreement not the State	62
4.2.3. Three Pillars of Agreement between Hezbollah and Hariri Jr.....	66
4.2.4. The 2005 Parliamentary Elections, Who Owns Majority in the Parliament?	67
4.2.5. Cracks in the Accord: Riyadh Accord, Hiring First-grade Officials	69
4.2.6. Hezbollah from the Shadow to the Light: a Journey Led by the Quadripartite Accord.....	71
4.3. The Collapse of the “Quadripartite Accord”	73
4.3.1. The Three Major Events that Fractured the Accord	73
4.3.2. The Tribunal of the Assassination of PM Hariri, a Deal Breaker.....	75
4.3.3. The Reaction to Two Government Policies (May 7, 2008), the Empire Strikes Back	78
4.3.4. Doha Accord, a New President Refurbished the Electoral System, a New Narrative of Rule	79
DISCUSSION	82

CONCLUSION	85
APPENDIX 1	88
APPENDIX 2	93
REFERENCES.....	94

ABBREVIATIONS

Jr. Junior

PM Prime Minister

Sr. Senior

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The consensus practice has long been a landmark feature of the Lebanese power dynamics by the ruling elites. A cornerstone of the state of Lebanon for policy and agreement. Thus, how to become a member of the ruling class is answered by following the consensus among the ruling class (Intra-elite consensus) and not through national consensus. Similarly, the narrative of who and how policies are produced has also utilized the constitution in two ways: solidifying the narrative of how and who rules Lebanon and creating sectarian veto rights. This narrative has been a major debate that dominated the political discourse during the period between 2005 and 2008 (Mokalled, 2022). Many interpretations of constitutional practices such as elections, government formations, and policy production have put fuel on the fire of the debate. For example, as per the constitution holding the majority in the Lebanese Parliament and/or the cabinet means acquiring the ability to develop, ratify and implement policies. This was not the debate that dominated the scene between 2005 and 2008 and most certainly not the case on how and who ruled Lebanon in that period.

How did the “Quadripartite Accord” between the four political parties address this issue? From a consensual framework or by democratic practice? For example, why could not the 14th of March coalition rule? Did this coalition hold the majority of 128 (64+1) seats in the parliament required for policy production? Did the same coalition hold a majority in the cabinet of ministers required to produce policies as stipulated in the constitution? Specifically, regarding 14 major national matters also stipulated in the constitution (for instance War and peace, international treaties, etc.). And was there a

pre-agreed approach to policymaking among the members of the “Quadripartite Accord”?

This case study will identify the existence of the Lebanese shadow state. I intend to build on the Oxford definition of Africa’s post-colonial states and its shadow states. As stated in the Oxford Edition “A system of governance in which a form of parallel government is established by a coalition of domestic leaders, local intermediaries, and foreign companies, such that the formal apparatus of the state is not where the real power lies” (Nic Cheeseman, Online version 2019).

I will also build on the definition of the Lebanese formal and informal state structures as set forth by Dr. Jamil Mouawad "Consolidating and securing the resilience of this system creates what can be described as a “parallel state”, which acts as an intermediary between state and society and is endorsed by the ruling elite and the international community." Dr. Mouawad continues the definition of the parallel or shadow state, in the case of Lebanon, as follows "have long undermined state institutions while empowering a system of patronage and clientelism often endorsed directly or indirectly by the international community." (Mouawad, 2017).

This conclusion will be researched through the study of the documents of Mr. Mustapha Nasser (1950 – 2018). As a political advisor to the late PM Rafiq Hariri and PM Saad Hariri, he was instrumental in the shadow state and the process of the coalition creation and practice of the “Quadripartite Accord”. He was particularly the one trusted channel between the Hariri (Sr. & Jr.) and Hezbollah. This channel was assigned to him using involvement in the shadow state and not by occupying an official government position.

The Lebanese state's existence has been under question. I would like to emphasize that the Oxford definition above of shadow state is not one related to the existence of a state. The role of the ruling elite in Lebanon by the four parties of the "Quadripartite" accord and the documents of Mr. Mustapha Nasser have provided evidence of the following: A systematic approach outside government structures by the four parties of this case study as dubbed in the media "The Quadripartite Accord". All are to be managed by local intermediaries which in the end obtain the power to influence the state or at times challenge it. Moreover, the elements of this definition as per the documents of Mr. Nasser are valid.

This thesis takes the "Quadripartite Agreement" as a case study to illustrate how does the shadow state operate and by whom. Taking into account the rhetoric of how and who rules Lebanon that is the foundation of the said agreement. The thesis is divided into three parts.

I will begin with an introduction of the story of the state of modern Lebanon from the ruling elite point of view as described in the documents of Mr. Nasser. I will then move to introduce Mr. Nasser the person, his role, and then the state and type of his personal documents. I will then conduct a study of the past and genealogy of policy production in Lebanon post-civil war by describing the nature of the Lebanese state and the types of structures existing along with regional and international factors affecting the state, which will be followed by a description of the Quadripartite Accord. All will be conducted by reviewing the personnel unpublished documents of Mr. Nasser and triangulating them with publications and identified resources.

CHAPTER 2

METHODOLOGY, OBJECTIVES AND ARGUMENTS

2.1. Triangulation Qualitative Research Methodology

The methodology adopted in this study is qualitative research methodology using triangulation of information: namely analysis of 1) Mr. Mustapha Nasser's personnel records and minutes of meetings, 2) selected references from published books and studies from the Lebanese media, and 3) Assafir and Annahar newspapers archives for agreement/policy announcement.

2.2. Ethical Considerations

No official state documentation has been recorded or published about this shadow system. It was limited to the interpretation of individuals participating in the system. Moreover, most press releases came to announce the outcome of this system when information was purposely leaked to the press. The personnel documents of Mr. Mustapha Nasser (Advisor to both Hariri's Sr. & Jr.) who played a pivotal role in the shadow system. These documents have not been released yet by his family. Hence, I sought the consent of Mustapha Nasser's family in reading and quoting for this research (Appendix 2).

2.3 Objectives and Argument

In this case study, I have outlined two primary objectives. Firstly, to examine the presence of the Lebanese shadow state, and secondly, to understand that while the Lebanese state may not be entirely absent, it exhibits weaknesses. These objectives will

be explored using the documents of Mr. Nasser concerning the inception of the "Quadripartite Accord," which serves as compelling evidence. Furthermore, this data will be cross-referenced and contextualized with historical practices.

It's important to clarify that our aim is not to delve into the nature of the Lebanese state itself, but rather to investigate the existence of the shadow state. Consequently, our research path leads us into a complex web of interrelated local, historical, economic, and sectarian interests, which have often caused confusion regarding the presence of a state, let alone a shadow state.

In this pursuit, I contend that examining the mechanisms behind political policy production in Lebanon offers a promising approach to untangling this conundrum. Therefore, it becomes crucial to analyze power dynamics within the ruling elite and identify the locus of power. An illustrative case in this regard is the "Quadripartite Accord" established in 2005, involving four political parties: the Future Movement, the Progressive Nationalist Party, the Amal Party, and Hezbollah.

CHAPTER 3

HISTORY AND BACKGROUND OF THE STATE OF LEBANON, MR. MUSTAPHA NASSER (POLITICAL ADVISOR TO PM RAFIK HARIRI & SAAD HARIRI) AND THE DOCUMENTS

3.1. The Question of a State

The 2000 parliamentary elections and the win of the majority of seats were considered a victory by PM Rafiq Hariri for several reasons. Following the election of President Emile Lahoud, Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri failed to secure the parliamentary majority necessary for his reappointment. This outcome was largely attributed to a growing sentiment and mounting accusations of corruption surrounding his political leadership, particularly undermining his credibility as a national leader. Ranging from personal reasons all the way to political goals, the man's ambitions dominated his efforts and tools to the objective of a landslide electoral win. This objective was viewed as a challenging force of dominance to the shadow state which was not accustomed to. The coalition leading to the election of PM Rafiq Hariri and in his discussions with Hezbollah wanted what he described as a "clean list of his party's candidate in the city of Beirut" (Nasser, 1998). That meant he did not want any candidates recommended by Syria as in previous elections, Syria being the domineering force in the shadow state at that time maintained a practice of dictating half of the candidates of a list of over 15 parliamentary seats in the Beirut District. The Hezbollah party acted to break the deadlock between PM Hariri and Syria. In frustration PM Rafiq Hariri accepted the Syrian candidate for the Armenian sect seat of Beirut (1998). Hezbollah inquired about the suggestion of going down from seven candidates to only one. In the documents of Mr. Nasser, we can clearly

identify how the consensus among the ruling elite outside state structures is the cornerstone of policy production.

Mr. Nasser, as per his archives, was quick to answer that the number is not important but the consensus part that PM Rafiq Hariri confirmed. This dialogue indicates how consensus is a principal unwritten covenant within the shadow state (Nasser, 2000).

The question of a State in Lebanon and its powers has been under constant challenge. A story of nation and geography that can be traced back to as old as the Phoenician era, when a group of people managed a society based on consensus and conflict. Both are at the heart of the narrative which created the modern state of Lebanon. In this case study, the narrative of a Lebanese state is imperative to understand the structures and their relation to the people of Lebanon. The absence of a state is not to be proved with the presence of sectarian leaders and the ruling elite (Mouawad & Baumann, 2017). A much more complex methodology that creates the existence of a state. To understand this path of multiple layers one must follow the history of modern Lebanon. In this chapter, I will build on the theoretical understanding of the modern state of Lebanon and through the eyes of the ruling elite that ruled Lebanon during the years 2005-2008 under the case study of the “Quadripartite Accord” by reading the documents of Mr. Nasser.ag

3.1.1. Formal and Informal Structures

Freedom generates creativity. In Lebanon where political freedom is boundless, its limit is constantly being tested, and subject to politics itself and not law. One might deduce as well that creativity is borderline fiction and is the job of the press core to investigate and separate the myth from the truth. This describes Mr. Nasser’s documents.

He was one of the leading political players as a member of the shadow state. Rooted in intellectual and ethical discourse as well as his practice, he is a soft-spoken man with sharp words, committed to the national course as a citizen and open to the sectarian discourse as a politician. He has been trusted by all shades of the political landscape. Simply because he understands the mindset of the ruling class. Mr. Nasser was active as a renowned journalist with exceptional contacts with the political elite. Most notably his relationship with individuals operating in the shadow system (Al-Ahed, 2008).

Many policies appearing on the front pages of Assafir newspaper were negotiated and thoroughly discussed over days and months at times among the shadow system. After reaching a consensus, it was then pushed to the papers. This serves as a written testament to the work of the shadow system as most of the work of the system was done in private quarters and not public and most certainly not in state buildings. I have read the documents of Mr. Nasser and it indicates how major policies made by the government came after its endorsement by the shadow system. Also, it is evident from the documents how the conflict among the ruling elite or inside the shadow system created street fights and paralysis of the state. All this came during the period between 2005-2008. As I have triangulated the information with local press releases from Annahar.

As discussed earlier my research is a case study on the work of the shadow state in Lebanon between the years 2005 and 2008. Many events have happened. While the shadow system is not new to this period, this system remains a basic way of the rule to Lebanon. It has been a fundamental character of the Lebanese political history. It can be traced to the creation of Mustarifiyyat Jabal Libnan in 1860. The sectarian division was only institutionalized with the creation of Grand Lebanon in 1920 (Salamey, 2013). All reached its peak with the contradiction of regional conflicts with the occupation of

Palestine in 1948 and then the civil war. With the end of the civil war, the parallel system became much more organized under the Syrian military presence. Which was called the Syrian custodianship era (Zahar, 2008).

Then the question of a state manifests itself as follows: a parallel state or a shadow state? I have understood from the documents of Mr. Nasser that the view of the ruling elite is that the state is a tool and that they seek sectarian rhetoric and constitutional tools to manage it rather than undermine the state. This can be understood from the acts of the politicians during the said period specifically, where it was not one of a parallel state but a shadow state. This as a result only came from the historical practice and political framework of the sectarian laws which in turn resulted in solidifying the concept of a shadow state (Zalghout, 2022).

One can check the press releases in Assafir newspaper and Annahar. A simple chronology of all political and strategic decisions made by the state came after announced meetings between the political elite and not the cabinet. The choice of Sinoura was first confirmed in an undisclosed meeting. The situation was so delicate the political elite had to get the green light from regional countries and international stakeholders. As indicated in the documents of Mr. Nasser the decision of the ruling elite for the Prime minister candidate after the 2005 parliamentary election was made between Saad Hariri and Nassrullah (Nasser, 2005).

The question of a state precludes to the following question as well, why was this agreement of the choice of the prime minister not written? As per the documents of Mr. Nasser the term “strategic ambiguity” is regularly used. And as if it is the methodology along the side of the ideology of policy production in Lebanon. Politicians can say something, do something else, and write something that completely did not happen. They

can maneuver. The problem is that the political elite understands that positions in the state are granted from the shadow system. And this club is entered through the sectarian channel. And Elections are subject to the electoral law which in turn is drafted by the shadow system (Salloukh, 2006).

One needs to differentiate between Lebanon the country and Lebanon the state to comprehend the detailed discussions and agreements in the documents of Mr. Nasser. The first, Lebanon the country, is strategically powerful, while the second is structurally weak. This small country is a regional and perhaps global line of contact (Fawaz, 2009). As the famous saying goes, “You can stay away from strategy, but the strategy cannot stay away from you.” Lebanon’s geography remains strategic (Amery, 2002).

It is the genius of Lebanese geography-the country on the one hand, and the disastrous administration of Lebanon, the state, on the other. Lebanon has always undertaken the positive and negative outcomes of the region, in politics, culture, art, money, and banking (Atiyyah, 2021). The period between 2005 -2008 has elevated this role. Both Lebanon’s state and the shadow state, which used to express the region have done so very execrably. However, the side agreement by the shadow state was not at all times in compatibility with regional politics. The shadow state was expressing itself only at times of conflict and dispute. For example, the trouble of agreeing on a ministerial statement and the interpretations of words by a unity government sounds absurd. The reality was that the shadow state was reviewing the statements about the regional conflict and local politics to the point at a certain time the shadow state have become a burden on its Arab community as well as the international community (Zeidan, 2023).

This precludes the next question when reading the documents of Mr. Nasser: is Lebanon difficult to understand? Is Beirut no longer producing anything but the worst that it has

when for decades it has been absorbing the worst of the region and transforming it into an element of motivation and life? And who rules Lebanon?

In Lebanon, some political parties have demanded distancing themselves from what is happening in the region. On the other hand, the Arab scene looks different. Arab states are distancing themselves from the local details of Lebanese politics. The attitudes and behaviors of the political class in Lebanon contributed to the loss of Arab interest to the point of distancing themselves from Lebanon (Gause III, 2014).

Small and perhaps trivial Lebanese battles are being fought amid the mother of all battles in the region during the period between 2005-2008 (Fanack, 2010), to the extent that the Lebanese politicians see themselves through the prism of their religious, sectarian, and personal narrowness, to the extent that the outside becomes increasingly convinced that this Lebanese political class is difficult to replace, and it is impossible to work with it or even change its behavior or produce an alternative for it (Khatib, 2021).

The concerned regional and international capitals see Lebanon the country as a failed state that lacks the maturity needed to make a sustainable policy toward Beirut. Except for France, which was prepared to help after the bombing of the port of Beirut on August 4, 2020 (Sandford et al., 2020), the concerned capitals are waiting for the Lebanese issue to mature or for the outside to take over the management of Lebanon's file, as has been the custom since the founding of Lebanon a hundred years ago until the recent Syrian yesterday. This will not be possible if the Shadow state was not part of any discussion of the future of the country (Hamouche, 2022).

Whoever reads Lebanon's political history finds that all kinds of external interference (Ottoman, French, Syrian, Egyptian, Israeli, Iranian, and others) are the reason for Lebanon's shadow state existence, rather it is a foundational element (Harris,

2012). This interference can even be traced back to the Phoenician era three thousand years ago. This interference is in the genes of Lebanon's constitutional, geographic, sectarian, and historical composition. External interference is an authentic element in all aspects of Lebanese life, it has nothing to do with a sect, region, party, or leadership (Dionigi, 2012).

From this perspective, there is an approach by the shadow state members based on the domineering of managing external interference rather than combating it. The idea may be shocking to the Lebanese people, but we have to accept when reading the documents of Mr. Nasser as we accept the fact that there are issues such as corruption, unemployment, growth indicators, and deficits, which are theoretically acceptable in certain percentages, as well as the case with external interference in Lebanon. It does not matter if Lebanon has a strong country, what matters is his role as the shadow state (Shebaya, 2023).

As the questions of a state pile up here we get to the heart of the matter: How are policies created? By the government? Or through the sectarian parties? And if a conflict occurs can the government create policies? I have found an answer in the documents of Mr. Nasser when he recalls the era of political Harirism and goes back to 1998, particularly when PM Rafiq Hariri and the Council of Bishops met in Bkerke. It is said that when one of the sovereigns asked about Samir Geagea's release case, Hariri answered immediately: "But he is a criminal... That's what the judiciary says". A little silence had prevailed until one of the bishops asked: "Why did no one else be brought to trial?" Hariri replied: "Let's agree... you want to release him or imprison the rest?" Everyone laughed and the dialogue ended (Nasser, 2004).

The above-mentioned dialogue had several implications regarding the Lebanese political mind and the role of the state. Apart from the descriptions of this mind as esoteric, sectarian, and service-oriented, and from the academic analysis of the geographical location as being engaged in the political system called geopolitics, there is an implication that presents itself: How can we understand the decision-making mechanism in Lebanon?

The mechanisms of decision-making in Lebanon often raised several questions, starting from the democracy of the system to the state's independence. Political and security clashes are a constant feature in Lebanon. Most decisions aimed at strengthening stability and democracy - despite their importance – are still suspended in the corridors of the state. Likewise, all political forces act from the premise that the state does not have a leading role in every matter of governance. This disregard and complexity mainly lie in the system's dual structure, which derives its legitimacy from the end-of-war agreement (Taif Agreement), and its practice of regional stability (Rizq, 2022). This duality origin can be traced back to the establishment of the Emirate of Lebanon, starting from the Al-Qaem Maqamatian regime in Al-Mutasarrifiyyah until Greater Lebanon (Khoury, 2021).

3.1.2. The geopolitical role of Lebanon on the Map

Lebanon and its people are no strangers to the term crises. This country was born with conflicts. It makes, reflects, and witnesses it. Also, it benefits and benefits from it. However, this time, the crisis seems unusual. Let's say it's different from previous crises. If we go back to history, there is a recurring cycle or pattern of the Lebanese crises and the Lebanese wars. Lebanon gained its independence in 1943 (Faour, 2007), and its stability was shaken in 1958 (Salibi, 1961), that is, after 15 years. Later, the big shake

was in 1975, that is, 17 years later (Haugbolle, 2010). The war ended in 1990, and civil peace only lasted for 15 years, so the assassination of Rafiq Hariri put Lebanon on the path of war - the open national crisis (Iskandar, 2006). We are now in the year 2023 when the approximate rate of national crises applies. This is Lebanon's biography: a war that leads to peace, then a war that leads to peace, and so forth.

This country is on the global line of contact/ living between two positions. Between the no war and no peace. It is living in an abnormal moment on an Arab Mashreq path loaded with a deadly power vacuum since the US occupation of Iraq in 2003. In this Mashreq, there is no peace without war or war without Lebanon. However, Lebanon has always been a doorway to crises. Lebanon exploded, while the Arab world was witnessing political monotony on its stage in the wake of the 1973 war (Baxter, 1994).

There is an authentic Lebanese role in the region that cannot be bypassed. The issue is not related to a leader, sect, party, or region. It is deeper and touches the entire strategic map of the region. The crisis that Lebanon is going through today touches on the realities of the Lebanese role on the big strategic regional map. Perhaps it is the first time that we find the parties in power (both supporters and opposition that change from time to time) sticking to the state, even if it has become the weakest tie (Taleb, 2022).

What Lebanon suffers from is the functional deficit on the map, not the abolition of its geographical role and all its legacy and history including its state. Lebanon suffers because of the large number of roles required of it, east and west, north and south. Lebanon the country is reeling under the weight of the OVERLOAD roles that are required of it internationally and regionally. Perhaps the curse of geography. For sure the lack of state decision proves is absent despite the shape of the government is vivid.

However, it is certain that political Lebanon, that is, the Lebanon of the people, has so far been unable to create a ruling class worthy of it and its role (Mahdi, 2021).

When we browse Lebanese digital media, we do not find anyone calling for dialogue, and if any does, the invitation comes too late. There is a settling of scores between politicians who excel in the game of the edge of collapse. However, the total collapse, if it occurs, i.e. the great and resounding collision (the international community does not seem to accept it in light of the equation of balance of terror) will inevitably lead to the downfall of the political and economic model produced by the Taif Agreement (Norton, 1991).

What Lebanon is witnessing from the mixing of roles is a result of the state of no war and no peace. An era that disrupted politics. Thus, no policies are produced. The tragic truth is that Lebanon, which used to produce politics, ideas, and revolutions, has become a graveyard for parties, ideas, and revolutions. The political dynamics that witnessed the interaction between this camp and that camp have ended. The Lebanese minds are capable of innovation and luring the inside into a balance that opens the door to new external approaches to the Lebanese inside (Mac Ginty, 2010).

3.1.3. Game Change: US invasion of Iraq 2003, Changing of the Guards (Syrian Custodianship to a Hybrid International Custodianship)

The year 2003 was the year of the American invasion of Iraq. The year in which Uncle Sam launched a massive military invasion despite the lack of a global consensus on the operations. Every discussion about the reality of the Middle East starts from this event. Because of its strategic impact on the regional political structure in a central region on the planet. A centrality that imposes itself on the agenda of all stakeholders of the Middle East. The centrality of the Middle East on the world map can be derived from the

U.S. Department of Defense. The Pentagon has restructured the deployment of its military forces globally according to an emerging new international political map (Barnett, 2003).

With the collapse of the Soviet Union (1991), U.S. President George Bush Sr. announced the birth of a New “New World Order” in which Washington assumed global leadership. As a result, four U.S. military command centers were formed, distributed according to geographical location. The Arab world was part of the Central Command (CentCom), which has every share of its infamous name. This CentCom was entrusted with managing the political and security balances in the Middle East, according to a regional political structure that integrated regional interests built by the strategic contexts of the new international order (Gause III, 1994).

The political structure, like engineering structures, consists of a roof and columns. The political ceiling in the Middle East was based on five pillars: The Camp David peace agreement between Israel and Egypt (1978); The Oslo Agreement between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (1993); the Wadi Araba Treaty between Jordan and Israel (1994); The National Accord Agreement known as the Taif Agreement to end the Lebanese civil war, or the establishment of the Syrian custodianship (1989). And the most central pillar in terms of substance, was represented by the policy of dual containment by Washington of both Iraq and Iran. A policy that is a mixture of military inducements and economic sanctions for both countries. This building, or structure, was shaped by the strategic context of the global transformation and not the other way around. For example, the Israeli occupation state had the right to “injure” one of these “five pillars”, even if this constituted a violation of international laws, on the pretext of fighting terrorism or preemptively defending “the security of the State of Israel”, as happened with Lebanon in

the wars of 1993 and 1996 or the siege of Ramallah until the departure of Yasser Arafat (2002 -2004) (ARAFAT).

However, the ceiling of these military operations did not reach the extent of exposing the building to collapse. Also, the political phenomena of “Hariri’ism”, led by Prime Minister Rafic Hariri, outside the borders of Anatolia and the rest of the East (أنطاكيا (وسائر المشرق) came from within the political structure and not from outside of it. In other words, Lebanon's political, security, and monetary stability was directly linked to the stability of the security and monetary structure of the region (the Middle East).

Mr. Mustapha Nasser as a political advisor to PM Rafik Hariri has described this role. According to Mr. Nasser Hariri sent Basil Fleihan, an economic advisor to the prime minister, in the second half of the 1990s to the United States and asked him to seek the assistance of an "American friend". This so-called friend will put a small clip on the daily strategic briefing to the office of the American president in the White House containing a proposal for the United States. The clip suggested that Washington requested the Arab Gulf countries to place a deposit in the Central Bank of Lebanon worth one billion dollars. The reason is the fear that the collapse of the Lebanese monetary and financial crisis will lead to successive collapses that affect several American allies in the region, and the first of them is Egypt, so, the deposit took place on the next day (Nasser, 2004).

Simply put what the clip meant is that the political structure of the region represented an intertwined international and regional partnership. Each party owns shares in the real estate, according to its location, and in a manner that does not threaten the ceiling to collapse. As for the building committee, it used to meet in an agreement under a political roof drawn and determined by Washington, which owns the keys to the building's main gate .The radical change took place after the United States of America

became a neighboring country to all the countries of the Middle East (real estate) by occupying Iraq. When Uncle Sam's forces decided to go to the Iraqi mainland (2003), prompted by the events of September 11 (2001), the first pillar collapsed: the dual containment of Iraq and Iran, which opened the door wide to foreign interference in the affairs of the region (Chesterman & von Einsiedel, 2004).

The demolition of the pillars continued with Israel's repeated military operations in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, bringing down the Palestinian-Israeli peace project . The culmination of the demolition of pillars was in Normandy. The day the French celebrated the 75th anniversary of the landing of Allied forces on the North Coast of the United Kingdom. At that time, George Bush Jr. and French President Jacques Chirac agreed on the issuance of UN Resolution 1559 relating to Lebanon (Baumann, 2012). The strategic content of the Resolution is the obituary of the Taif Agreement, without specifying the date of its burial (so far) and the termination of Syria's international mandate to manage Lebanese affairs (the custodian ship Era). It is worthwhile to note that the Camp David Accord has remained steadfast despite all that, as announced by former Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi (the candidate of the Muslim Brotherhood) in his candid letter to Israeli President Shimon Peres, beginning with his famous greeting, "Dear Shimon Peres"!What applies to Camp David applies to Wadi Araba between Jordan and Israel, although the common denominator between these two "waves of peace" is a coldness that has not expired to this day (Miller, 2012).

In the following, I will expand on the background of both the documents and the role of Mr. Nasser and the shadow state. This will be discussed through my reading of the documents of Mr. Nasser.

3.2. Mustapha Nasser

3.2.1. Mustapha Nasser, the Personal Documents

As mentioned before, Mr. Nasser was dubbed in local circles as the “silencer of secrets”. He has been working closely with local leaders as part of the shadow state and maintained a detailed archive of documents. He was a man of conciseness who repulsed from rhetoric. As such he was keen on jotting every thought and analysis on matters of public policy. Also, in his work with Rafiq Hariri and the demanding and rigorous load of negotiations, he maintained detailed minutes of meetings for all the meetings between both leaders, including phone calls and requests. This was part of the trust and process he had developed for the relationship and both parties relied on that.

His documents can be categorized into first, the minutes of meetings, and second, his input and analysis of the meetings and other issues. Also, he has organized the documents by time frame and not incidents or events or the level of classified information. I obtained the consensus of his wife Mrs. Nasser and his four daughters to use the documents pertaining to the years of this case study between the years 2005-2008.

It is worth noting that some comments and information on the documents referred to years out of the time frame of the study. Mrs. Nasser was so graceful that she allowed me to go back when needed into past documents. In total, I have gone through 4 boxes each with an average of five files labeled and handwritten by Mr. Nasser. His family had scanned the documents and made electronic copies available for my research under their custody.

In this case study, the aim is to focus on the work of the Quadripartite Accord in policy production. The discussion of both leaders was not processed as official state

policies, but rather passed in a chain of policy systems and then sent to official government structures.

Reading the documents of Mr. Nasser uncovered much information. On the one hand, the minutes of meetings between the two political leaders of Lebanon Rafiq Hariri and Hezbollah provided the answer as well as proof of how policies are produced in the shadow of official state structures. Yet the comments of Mr. Nasser and the documents of his opinion on policy-making and Lebanese politics, in general, provide a deeper understanding of the mindset of the shadow state and its interlocutors. In this section I have read what I consider is the most revealing description of this mindset. The document expresses Mr. Nasser's view of consent, coalition, and above all the absence of the state in policy making. A narrative of who and how Lebanon is ruled provides logical and historical legitimacy to the "quadripartite accord" as per his understanding (Appendix 1). The document is not dated. However, from the sequence of historical events and the specific mention of the accord, Mr. Nasser obviously drafted it between the years 2005-2010. It is also evident from the document that the shadow state in his view existed long before the second republic of Lebanon. He identifies the role of regional stakeholders and draws parallels to the work of local sectarian leaders. From Othmans' rule that was replaced by the French mandate to the Egyptian influence of President Nasser. Then Turing to the rule of the Israeli forces that ended with the Syrian era (Nawfal, 2023).

And that at all times Lebanon was managed by consensus and conflict among the ruling elite outside state structures. All to allude to his conclusion that the "Quadripartite Accord" is a signature of Lebanese public policy. I have attached the document and would strongly advise to refer while reading the case study (Nasser, n.d.) (Appendix 1).

Moreover, his thoughts on consensus as a prerequisite to policy production have been triangulated with other documents of his thoughts and opinions. Such as the role of the accord in preserving the position of members of the shadow state in state structures. In his view, the 2005 parliamentary elections would redraw the political map of Lebanon as anticipated by the political ruling elite. It was conducted after the UN resolution 1559 and subsequent to the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. All have had a major effect on the general national Lebanese public opinion. This impact would manifest itself through a series of discussions and understandings among the ruling elite to preserve their position in the state. One of these manifestations was the re-election of the incumbent Parliament President Nabih Berri. A path that faced the opposition of Syria. However, the “quadripartite accord” would secure the position (Nasser, 2005).

President Berri was in the same place when he first became the head of parliament. He managed to secure the position with the special help of Rafiq Hariri and the working of the shadow state (Zedan, 2023).

3.2.2. Mustapha Nasser, the Role

All the meetings held by PM Saad Hariri with the Secretary General of Hezbollah, Sayyed Hasan Nasrallah, were held with more than one witness. In recent meetings, they were joined by Hariri's advisor and his cousin, Nader Hariri, after he was attending them, similar to Nasrallah's meetings with PM Rafiq Hariri, the political assistant to the Secretary-General, Hussein El-Khalil, and colleague Mustafa Nasser (Nassif, 2011b).

I was not fond of PM Rafiq Hariri's politics and made my feelings clear to Mustapha Nasser. Knowing his relationship with the late PM, I purposely instigated the discussion about the relocation of Lebanese citizens living in the Downtown area of

Beirut to avoid the wrath of the civil war. “The community you mean?” he answered. He later explained the process of negotiating among the shadow state that took place for the relocation process of people he was in charge of. He did not refer to any governmental agency nor did he involve any state apparatus. It was the discussion and work of people that know people in government positions which was later amplified during the 2006 Israeli aggression. Mustafa was sitting in his house with his phone on his ears talking to Saad Hariri and then to Hussein El-Khalil the political advisor of Nasrallah, explaining the point of view of both parties, for 33 days, the duration of the war, his phone did not stop ringing. It was clear to me what Nasser’s role was, however, the role of the state has not been yet.

Nasser’s role as a member of the ruling elite began as a journalist. He would say that journalism is the ultimate door opener of all careers. True to his career as a journalist, Nasser first worked for the local Saudi Riyadh-based newspaper Al Jazeera. He met the young and ambitious entrepreneur Rafiq Hariri in the 1970s. This relationship grew closer with time. Rafiq Hariri liaised with Sayed Mohammad Hussein Fadlallah through Mustapha Nasser. Also, Rafiq Hariri entrusted Nasser with matters related to his self-image as the future of Lebanon. All this was before Rafiq Hariri assumed the position of Prime Minister.

The relationship after this premiership of Hariri made Nasser’s role even more incognito. This role can be split into three phases. The first was from 1992 to 1996, the time of the so-called Syrian custodianship where Rafiq Hariri’s political role was shaped in a smaller local Lebanese one. The second was between the years 1996-2004, the time when Hariri’s role was transformed from a local to a regional one that came after the end of the Israeli aggression of 1996 and its subsequent “Understanding of April”. It is the

point where the role of Hezbollah has become much bigger. The third part was between 2004 and 2010, the tumultuous time of many strategic shifting events, namely the UN resolution 1559 and the assassination of Rafiq Hariri, which led to the Quadripartite Accord. In this period, the role of Hezbollah shifted into the government as they were members of the parliament only prior to the accord. Afterward, they have become members of the cabinet of government as agreed in the accord.

3.2.3. Mustapha Nasser, the Person

I have become a family member of Mr. Mustapha Nasser when I met his daughter Razane who is my beloved wife. From the start, we have developed a friendship along with family relations. Mr. Nasser confided in me and shared his thoughts and ideas on public matters and political opinion. In this chapter, I have relied on my interaction with Mr. Nasser for over a decade. This is my reading of the person from my dialogue with him.

The relationship between a citizen and the state is typically defined by the rule of law. And its firsthand experience is related to an incident with law enforcement. This is not the case in Lebanon. And most certainly not the case for the young Mustapha Nasser. He recalls the day he went back home to see his father and his Christian neighbor's father sitting in the living room overly exaggerating their fondness for one another. This a lesson to the young Nasser and his friend that sectarian slayers and prejudice are not allowed. Nasser recalls the kids' dispute in his neighborhood of Ras El Nabi '. He specifically remembers Muslim kids saying, "Abdul Nasser will come and teach you Christians a lesson". Much to the parent's dismay, the innate feelings of the kids were not related to the state as Nasser recalls laughing. He mentions how neither

President Nasser of Egypt nor the pope of the Vatican was capable to stop the prerequisites of the Visions civil war of the seventies nor build a state in Lebanon post-war.

This feeling of Mustapha Nasser was different from his father's, Ahmad Nasser. The latter was a stoic man with a career in law enforcement and a solid conviction in the state's power and role. He represented the Lebanese middle class of the fifties and sixties of the past century specifically identified with the "Chihabism" of President Fouad Chiahab. Moustafa was third in a family of seven. He attended the "Al Makased" schools then moved to "Al Amlieyah" school to graduate from high school in Cairo, Egypt. His education was later continued at the Lebanese University to graduate with a Bachelor of Arts in Philosophy. Later he attended Sorbonne University to pursue his master's degree. After finishing all the courses, he was not able to continue and submit his thesis for the final graduation due to the war in Lebanon for he had to fly back home and take care of the family. An unfinished business as he calls it that lingered dearly.

He was remembered by the rhetoric of the state daily and that it is the one central power of the Lebanese land and people. Only to leave the house and the state-centric narrative would fade away. This feeling was amplified in his youth as the civil war commenced. A dichotomy he carried as a shield that prevented him from being corrupted by the war rhetoric and joining any political militia which he firmly tributes to his father. Mustapha was always quick to mention how Lebanon was created by citing his family history.

As for many typical Lebanese anecdotes of ancestral migration, his grandfather Mohammad went to New York made money then came back home to start a business in Ras El Nabi ', Beirut in early 1900. By 1920 along with the creation of modern Lebanon

the charismatic intellectual Muslim leader and friend Riyadh El Soleh asked the Nasser family to register their civil address in the Ashrafiei district. The reason is to increase the number of Muslims for future votes in the newly formed state of Lebanon. The voting right of citizens was seen by Mr. Nasser as a tool used by the ruling elite. His family's ancestral lineage leads to the prophet Mohammad allowing him to add the "Said" title in front of his first name. His response was "What for? Am not participating in elections and am not a local leader of a suburban town. I am a Lebanese citizen from Beirut". This citizen of Beirut identified himself as a journalist first and foremost. He promoted this as an occupation and insisted on it even during his long service as a political advisor to PM Rafiq Hariri and later PM Saad Hariri.

His parents practiced Muslim prayers and traditions. Yet his father was a liberal who believed in personal freedom. Moustafa would often recall his father's Christian best friend who unfortunately due to the civil war shifted to a new address. From an early age, Moustafa showed independence in ideas and beliefs. His siblings would notice how he participated in the heated debates of the grownups and was seen hanging around as an intellectual member of the family. Also, his interest in the public sphere drew him further to follow the daily published newspapers and through reading and discussion he was able to remember details. Most notable was his ability to reconcile since he showed massive ability at an early age to resolve disputes. He also excelled in negotiating many of the school disputes between the students and the teachers. A character that would grow with him in life to become masterful of the game of negotiation.

In his social life, one would notice the diverse circle of friends Nasser had. He was capable to maintain a relationship with people from all walks of life. Despite his sensitive work with PM Rafiq Hariri and then PM Saad Hariri, Nasser was known to

maintain the separation between work and friends. He was dubbed by the media as the “Silencer of Secrets”. A skill and a personal ability that made him close to decision-makers and part of the Lebanese ruling class. Moreover, his ability to recall events and connect the dots provided him with the ability to sustain relevance and contemporariness related to all social shifts. He would emphasize his view of the other by putting himself in their shoes. “For one to understand the collective memory of the Arab Christians one must be able to look at them as humans longing to live in a state”. Later during the conflict that ensued in Lebanon under a “Sunni” vs. “Shia” banner, he was quick to remind of the same.

CHAPTER 4

LITERATURE REVIEW

4.1. Policy Formulation in the Shadow State

4.1.1. The Two Republics of the Modern State of Lebanon

This question of a state started with the inception of the modern state of Lebanon and has grown to be one lingering and unsettled issue. The modern state of Lebanon has experienced two republics since its creation in 1920 under the French mandate. The first republic refers to the proclamation of the Lebanese independent revolution (1943-1989), and the second republic refers to the end of the civil war and the proclamation of amendments to the constitution as a result of the agreement reached between the Lebanese Parliament members in the Saudi City of Taif (1989) (Hirst, 2010).

Lebanon gained its autonomy in 1920 declaring its constitution in 1926. This constitution created a parliamentary democratic state under the French mandate. Yet after its independence from France in 1943, the power practice of the state mandated a consensus among local sectarian leaders. The agreement between President Bechara El-Khoury and PM Riyad El-Soloh and the subsequent ministerial statement created the benchmark of constitutional practice and state power sharing. Lebanon is currently a parliamentary democratic republic under a confessionalism framework of religious proportionality where the three top state positions are distributed among the three major religious sects, namely the Christian Maronite for the Presidency, Muslim Shia for the parliament, and Muslim Sunni for the cabinet of ministers. Along with a set proportion to the ratio between Christians and Muslims in government and state structures (Mansour,

1993) leading the path for the rise of a shadow state. The term “Shadow State” is defined as “a system of governance in which a form of parallel government is established by a coalition of domestic leaders, local intermediaries, and forging companies, such that the formal apparatus of the state is not where the real power lies”(Nick Cheeseman, 2019).

Despite many regional and global conflicts, mainly World War II in 1945; the occupation of Palestine; and the influx of refugees because of the 1948 war and the military coup in Syria in 1949, both the constitution and the power practice mentioned above survived. The state of Lebanon witnessed several regional challenges leading to the 1975-1989 civil war. This war came at a heavy cost to the Lebanese state structure and the power practice rhetoric, giving birth to the second republic of Lebanon called the “Taif Republic”(Randal, 1990).

It is imperative to note that the constitution of 1926 and the power practice rhetoric of 1943 and its related process of decision-making by both the state and the shadow state did not change. The fingerprints of the shadow state remained and what has changed in the second republic is the relationship between the state and the shadow state. During the first republic, the state was occasionally challenged by local sectarian leaders. While in the second republic, the state is managed by the local strain leaders under the influence of the neighboring country Syria. In this specific republic, all policies generated by the Lebanese state went through a process that included stakeholders, not official government personnel. An era dubbed “The Syrian custodianship” era (Mansour, 1993).

4.1.2. The Taif Era; The Institutionalization of the Shadow State

In its latest form, the Lebanese Regime adopted the principle of balance among the three powers (the Presidency of the Republic, the Presidency of the House of

Representatives, and the Presidency of the Council of Ministers), assuming that the framers of the structure ensure that this relationship will guarantee non-monopolization of power, as a maximum, and the suspension of the war option internally, as a minimum. However, civil wars were costly, and the political price came for operationalizing this equation through the legitimization of a legal and constitutionally inclusive “Council of Ministers”. Here lie the mechanisms of political action in the Regime.

When the last constitutional settlement was concluded because of the Taif Agreement, the request to preserve the spirit of the said agreement was exclusively demanded, but other matters cannot be dismissed or even skipped, as the legality and charter of any political decision are primarily subject to the parties of the agreement, not to the agreement itself. Through this multilateral practice, the case for the Taif Agreement is directly related to the framers of the legal mechanism of decision-making and the charter task of preserving the balance. The National Reconciliation Charter, which is called the “Taif Agreement” was executed on October 22, 1989, and approved by the Lebanese Parliament in its session held at Kleiat Airport on November 5 of the same year, and it included four basic clauses: general principles & reforms, an extension of State’s sovereignty over all Lebanese territories, the liberation of Lebanon from Israeli occupation, and Lebanese-Syrian relations. Based on this Charter, amendments were made to the 1926 Constitution and voted on in Parliament on September 21, 1990.

Karim Pakradouni, the former head of the Phalangist Party, describes the current conflict as a struggle "within Taif" not "on Taif" in terms of site improvement. The rush to the "obstructive" third of the loyalists and the "guarantor" of the opposition reflects this conflict. Twenty years later and with different regional and local scenes, the permanent need to return to the textual foundations of Taif arises. There is no need to

delve deep into the text of the agreement, as the political value of the legality of any decision lies in setting a two-thirds quorum in the Council of Ministers for 14 decisions described as “essential” as stipulated: “As for the basic topics, they demand the approval of two-thirds of the members of the Council of Ministers as being essential topics, which are as follows: amendment to the Constitution, declaring and lifting the state of emergency, war, and peace, general mobilization, international agreements and treaties, the state’s general budget, comprehensive and long-term development plans, the appointment of first-class employees and their equivalent, reconsideration of the administrative division, dissolution of the House of Representatives, Electoral Code, Nationality Code, Personal Status Codes, and the dismissal of Ministers.

After resolving the identity and finality of the Lebanese Nation, and based on the Taif Agreement being the state’s constitution, the new political functions of the three presidencies were exercised as stated in the general principles and reforms clause included in the National Reconciliation Charter. Upon practice, the political forces differed on the requirements of these and other reforms, from the abstraction of the presidential authority of the Republic to the authority limits of the Prime Minister. However, this crisis is not of interpretation, but rather a crisis of re-implementation of the “Taif Agreement.” The limits of the validity of these and other reforms will be the strategic threshold that has reshaped political security based on the balance. In the world of settlement policies, Lebanon, with its current system, appears to be a unique state that uses democratic mechanisms aimed at ensuring participation in governance, and other consensual mechanisms aimed at preserving the principles of coexistence, which deserves the description of “consensual democracy” par excellence.

The Taif era power relations, representation discourse, and appointment were conducted through the consensus of the shadow state and using democratic practice. The influence of the shadow state in Lebanon was not official yet vivid in all aspects related to the Lebanese State. It also included a construct of “how” and “who”. Thus, the policy-making process by the state was defined by practice and not the constitution, by rhetoric, and not concise. This created a narrative of “how” the democratic state of Lebanon can be managed and by “who” in a religiously diverse country. A “consensual democracy” was the narrative for best governance. A narrative built on the 1926 constitution, the 1943 confessionalism framework of religious proportionately, and now the Taif agreement.

Agreements are subject to dispute and conflict when put into practice. Political agreements based on rhetoric are especially sensitive to influence. Such agreements are subject to elements non-related to the text. The Taif agreement specifically was based on the common denominator between the parties in conflict thus lacking a timeframe for all state policies implementation. It is important to emphasize the difference between text and practice. The shadow system has exasperated the narrative and left the text to be defined by rhetoric. Rendering the power relations to its discretion and not the state (Blandford, 2011).

4.1.3. Taif Accords (اتفاق الطائف): *From Street Sharing to State Sharing*

The ruling class has lost the ability to stop the collapse while the power of the Taif Agreement and its regional patrons is either standing in a deep crisis (Syria) watching (Saudi Arabia), or waiting (the United States) until Allah (God) writes something that was supposed to be done by the “Ayat Allah” (Iran).

One of the social customs and traditions in Lebanon is that the supporters dress their leader in the traditional Arab cloak; which is embellished with shiny gold (belt)

buttons, as a tribute to his leadership. A symbolic sign that carries many meanings and purposes and is not devoid of striking paradoxes. It does not matter the education, culture, or project of the one wearing the cloak; what is more important is preserving the value of the cloak at all costs. The priority of the value of the cloak is for the leadership over other economic programs, social conditions, and political strategies. A scene that embodies the fate of Lebanon, whose people are suffocating between the value of the cloak (sectarian rights) and the value of the state (citizen's rights).

Between the rights of the sect and the rights of the Lebanese state are stories as old as Baalbek Castle, and perhaps more. The rights of the sects needed a special Lebanese container or social contract called (الصيغة); this contract has always narrated the history of the community, its legacy, its geography, its demographics, its fears, the excess of its strength, and its relations. In modern history, at least since the middle of the nineteenth century, the contract was a vivid expression of the balance between local power and the external support that can be stimulated for the interest of this or that group in this small country and its area from the time of the Subprefecture to the present day.

There are many “Tests” or examples. Maronite Patriarch Elias Hoayek took the cloak test under the title “Greater Lebanon”, while Camille Chamoun’s test was held under the title “Baghdad Pact”, not to forget Charles Helou under the title “Cairo Agreement”. Fouad Chehab is the only one who passed the test successfully when he laid down the cloak of positive balance with Jamal Abdel Nasser on the Lebanese-Syrian border (the borders of the United Arab Republic at the time). A common factor in all these attempts is the strategic environment of the region.

The conflict between the contract (community rights) and the state is apparent in the literature of the civil war era of the last century. From the saying "the wars of others

on the land of Lebanon" through "there is no winner and no loser" to "the road to Jerusalem passes through Jounieh." The Lebanese went on to support the world revolutions and the Arab wars. The reasons for the outbreak of the Lebanese war itself are still unknown; was it a Lebanese-Lebanese war, or was it the wars of others in the land of Lebanon?

Certainly, one of the main reasons for stopping the cannons of the destructive war is the Taif Agreement with all that it contains, not texts but rather the balance of local, international, and regional forces. The National Accord Agreement (Taif Agreement) was conducted in 1989. It was executed in the last quarter of 1990 in parallel with three strategic failures; the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Arab collapse (history of the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait), and the Christian collapse. The Second Republic was born from the ashes of these great collapses.

The agreement came with a strong push for regional/international events and the settlement of unresolved and complex issues related to the presence of groups in the form, identity, affiliation, and the end of the entity. However, the biggest test came when the Taif Agreement was practiced as a constitution for the country. Agreement as a word is one thing, yet as a practice is another thing.

This practice did not come out of nowhere. The political class allowed it to accumulate and take its full extent with the experience of sponsoring the execution of Taif. The Syrian officer, whatever his name, was able to make the leaders big or small as he pleased. They placed the cloak on this shoulder and lowered it off that shoulder. They closed political circles and opened houses with new names. If we reviewed only the banquets that were held in honor of the Syrian officers throughout Lebanon, it would need

volumes, from Qoubaiyat in the outskirts of Akkar to the southernmost city such as Bint Jbeil.

Lebanon indeed wore the Taif cloak thirty-two years ago, what is even more correct is that this cloak was left to Ghazi Kanaan for two decades to sew cloaks from them according to the sizes of those living in the heart of the new Lebanon contract. The matter was not without Lebanese political conflagration, yet the maestro was Syrian par excellence. The Canaanite cloak season ended (although his heir was from the Ghazala family) with the issuance of UN Resolution 1559, the decision that put Lebanon-Taif in the shooting range.

No stone is thrown in the Levant without its sound being heard in the mountain, no palm tree is cut down in Baghdad unless social bonds are cut along with it in Beirut. Suddenly all the demons came out into the open and fears grew. As the Arab Bedouins proverb says, “When cloaks get less valuable, Sheikhs become numerous.” When the value of the Taif Agreement was less valuable and the Syrian sponsor disappeared, the conflict over the cloak and contract intensified, until we reached what we have reached today: a crisis of governance for the share of the Maronites, a crisis of government for the share of the Sunnis, a crisis of contract for the share of the Shiites, three sects in crisis.

The Taif Agreement will remain just a pierced cloak for a contract that has expired and a state that has not and will not come. Is it time for a new Lebanese establishment, and is it necessary to start from scratch? The mechanism of the National Reconciliation Charter has excluded the decision-making process from official and statutory institutions into a system still in effect through certain figures, and in private salons that sometimes seek to maneuver and rather negotiate at other times until an agreement is reached. Thereupon, the agreed decisions are included in the agenda and put for a vote within the

Council of Ministers. The charter's mission is clear, which is not to expose state institutions to conflict.

4.1.4. The Shadow State; as a Result of a Weak State

In review of Mr. Nasser's documents, it is evident that the shadow state did not view the state as an obsolete structure but rather a structure that is and requires the constant management of the ruling elite (Nasser, n.d.).

While the state of Lebanon is widely perceived as either weak or fail; however, the practices of the ruling elite clearly demonstrate the weakness of the state in relation to its local power dynamics and foreign intervention. This also highlights that power is not located in state structures, but in parallel structures as called the "shadow state" (Mouawad, 2020). Going through the documents of Mr. Nasser, I have found that understanding the Lebanese question of state and its description can be derived from the mechanism of policy making. This in result entails the search of power and the tools of projecting power as influence in Lebanon.

In the search for power in Lebanon, it becomes more evident that it lies outside state structures. An investigation of the nature of power is not the purpose of this study but rather the place of power and how it is used to produce policies as well as who uses it. First, I have relied on the Oxford definition of the system where power is located outside state structures. And I have relayed the terminology used as it is described as the shadow state. The definition is the following and the term was popularized in the African context by William Reno:

“A system of governance in which a form of parallel government is established by a coalition of domestic leaders, local intermediaries, and foreign companies, such that the formal apparatus of the state is not where the real power lies. The shadow state is characterized by the presence of private armies, the corrupt distribution of state contracts, and the centrality of private personal networks.”

While the question of the state and its powers is the one under study, I will emphasize the second republic and the description of policy production about the position of power. Thus, highlighting the past practices of the shadow state.

In the second republic, there was a clear path to power relations. It started from the shadow state through channels chosen by the ruling elite and not by ways of representation of the public. For example, the involvement of Mr. Mustapha Nasser as an advisor to PM Rafik Hariri Sr. & Jr. notes of the meetings held in private quarters and not in government buildings indicate the process of policy production. A process that was protected by both parties at conflict at times based on the narrative of the rule above.

This narrative was practiced for fifteen years (1990-2005). It allowed the shadow state to dictate constitutional practices, such as the parliamentary election of the president and the proliferation of arms by local political parties. This practice was consented to by regional players as well as the US. so long as it was contained and did not spill over the region. All too came to a head-on collision with UN resolution 1559 (2004)(Nasser, 2005).

4.1.5. UN Resolution 1559, The Foreign Influence on Lebanese Policymaking

The Interpretation of the UN resolution by the shadow state demanded three objectives. The first was a demand for a free and transparent upcoming election of a new president to President Emile Lahoud. Second, the withdrawal of all foreign military forces. After the Israeli army withdrew from the occupied Lebanese South (2000), the

Syrian army was the only one existing in Lebanon. And third, the state is the sole barrier of arms and weapons. Hezbollah was and still bares arms along with several Palestinian factions holding light arms (Nasser, 2004)

The resolution was a declaration by the international community that the consented past practice of the shadow state is void rendering the narrative of “consensual democracy” expired. However, the ruling elite was quick to act and address the challenges to their position as political leaders. While the State was waiting for a directive by the local ruling elite to react, which in turn describes the role of each in the policy-making process, the shadow system managed by the ruling elite continued with the same narrative of governance despite the implications of noncompliance with the UN resolution. Incumbent president Emile Lahoud was elected unanimously by the parliament. A move that was viewed as influenced by the Syrian government. Damascus, in its view, stood in opposition to the American-Israeli-driven resolution (Nasser, 2004).

The implications of UN resolution 1559 (2004) and the assassination of PM Rafik Hariri in February 2005 exposed the common narrative of who and how Lebanon is to be ruled let alone how it was ruled between 2005 and 2008. This period remains one of the most challenging imperatives to understand the relationship between the Lebanese State structures and the ruling political elite. An elusive relationship that was exploited by the ruling elite. Both democratic tools and consensual mechanisms were subject to constant challenges and political meandering. One that supported the common narrative that Lebanon is a state ruled by sectarian leaders and is a state sect being gates to the ruling class club and not a means to rule only (Zedan, 2019).

The significance of this period stems from two fronts: the end of the Syrian custodianship and the vacuum of power in the shadow state resulting from the

assassination of PM Rafik Hariri. The ruling class was agile; quickly reorganizable; and able to change political banners (the 8th & the 14th of March), execute parliamentary elections in 2005, organize the proliferation of the Palestinian refugee camps weapons, appoint a new PM (Fouad Siniora) along with a cabinet, and above all maintain a divisive political discourse compatible with the ongoing regional conflict. Simply put, they were able to shift their political positions but not their political practice in the contentious ambiguousness of consensual democracy (Zedan, 2019).

It also indicates the mindset of how the shadow state managed and ruled Lebanon. In the month of October of 2004 PM Rafiq Hariri met with Hezbollah's secretary general Nasrallah. The meeting came right after the issuance of UN Resolution 1559. Rafiq Hariri an acting government official was conducting a meeting with a leader of a political party that stands in violation of international law. As well as various contributing factors to the rule of Hezbollah in local Lebanese politics. Yet the discussion as indicated in the minutes of meetings of Mr. Nasser discussed the future of the country and its power relations both locally and regionally. Hezbollah stood in opposition to the UN resolution and its political implications for its role and the conflict with Israel. To that PM Hariri had his interpretation of the resolution. PM Hariri told the secretary-general that his intention of the said resolution with regards to the withdrawal of foreign military forces, the Syrian military, is subject to the Taif agreement. Which meant that the Syrian military was to withdraw to Beqaa and not out of Lebanon. He continued to explain that the sealing of the UN resolution is the Taif agreement (Nasser, 2004). It is apparent from the dialogue between the two leaders that the convection of their ability to split the international and local resolutions upon their priorities. And that the Lebanese state would follow and not lead despite the political liability of the international community.

While the diverse and liberal nature of the country is culturally and historically rich and vivid in terms of media and knowledge production, the ruling class is the opposite. The inclusion of Hariri Jr. into the ruling class was one created by the embrace of the class itself, which is evident in the minutes of Mr. Nasser of the initial meetings held between the Hezbollah leader and Saad Hariri. Moreover, the agreements between four major political leaders/parties, despite their conflicting positions in the regional conflict, underscores the ruling class's ability to utilize sectarian discourse towards policymaking within the state. The "Quadripartite Accord" is a vivid example of the ruling class and its tools to manage Lebanese State affairs. The Four major political parties included: The Amal movement led by the president of the parliament Nabih Berri, The Future party led by the son of PM Rafik Hariri Mr. Saad Hariri, the Progressive Communist party led by Walid Jumblatt, and the Hezbollah party led by Sayeed Hassan Nasrallah. All parties have been active in the shadow system and represented in state positions, except for Hezbollah which was present in the parliament but in no other state positions at that period. The "Quadripartite Accord would change this as indicated in the documents of Mr. Nasser. A strategic turning point in the political journey of Hezbollah into the state. Also, the "Quadripartite Accord" based on the consensus above became a new layer to the narrative of how and who rules Lebanon. The shadow state represented by the Accord agreed to produce policies and share state resources despite their opposition to the regional conflict. Making the Accord a benchmark for understanding Lebanon's state affairs and internal unrest from 2005-2008 (Nasser, 2005)

The Accord was a detailed coalition/agreement based on the above narrative of rule. From the 2005 parliamentary elections to the PM candidate selections, the cabinet, the appointment of top security positions, all the way to economic policies and strategic

geopolitics were managed by the aforementioned accord. All aspects of state affairs were subject to the agreement despite the load and divisive rhetoric of the same ruling class. Rhetoric ensured the flow of finance by foreign players to the ruling class, confusing and by some a level of despair of change or reform. The practice above uses the sectarian/consensual system to maintain the ruling class and not to define it. Thus, the “Quadripartite Accord” is a child of the ruling class. The accord clearly states how policies are to be produced and by whom. Which in turn maintained the narrative of “who” and “how”. The Shadow system as a result became much more active and productive. Active in negotiations and in solidifying the narrative of rule.

The negotiation process among the ruling class was managed by people mostly not holding official state/government positions. They had meetings in private quarters and produced public policies. At times of dispute among the members of this “Quadripartite Accord”, the street was used to influence policymaking. The intention was not to undermine the state but influence the ruling elite members. When civil unrest occurs or a security incident happens, a customary question is put forth by the ruling elite: to whom of us is this incident (message) addressed? A mindset shared by all members of the ruling elite can be traced from the local press and related resales of the ruling elite.

The rule of the “Quadripartite Accord” came to a halt with the endorsement of the Siniora government of the newly formed tribunal for the assassination of Rafik Hariri. The collapse of the accord itself in 2007 indicated the collapse of policymaking and not the state and certainly did not mean the collapse of the ruling class. This in turn indicates that the stability and security of Lebanon commence with the ruling class and ends with the state and not vice versa.

One might get confused with the complicated layers of intersecting interests and ever-changing discourse of relevant regional and international powers. As well as the ongoing historical interference of foreign players in local politics claiming the protection of sects. These remain the symptoms and not the disease of the political system called consensual democracy. Political discourse and practice have supported the narrative of Lebanon being a country.

4.1.6. The True Rulers of Lebanon

The state of Lebanon is not the leader in the decision-making process and local political parties view the state as secondary to their approval or veto of policies. A practice that has been only exasperated after the civil war and the activation of the Taif agreement (MacQueen, 2009). The agreement is one thing, but the practice of a political agreement is something else. As such, this unique Lebanese political system was not a substitute for the state, and the state was observed as a tool and not an obstacle (Leenders, 2017). Also, the state's structure and its related power were not neglected by the political ruling class. Political parties used this shadow system to insure their respective position in the government (Barnett, 2005). It is imperative to mention that during these years the state was not a failed state, but rather weak as viewed by the international community due to the influence of Hezbollah on this shadow system (Hazbun, 2016).

We must differentiate between Lebanon the country and Lebanon the state. The first is strategically powerful, while the second is structurally weak. Lebanon's geography remains strategic. It is the genius of Lebanese geography, the country, on the one hand, and the disastrous administration of Lebanon, the state, on the other (Atzili, 2010). In its latest form, the Lebanese ruling elite adopted the principle of balance among the three

powers (the Presidency of the Republic, the Presidency of the House of Representatives, and the Presidency of the Council of Ministers) if the framers of the structure ensure that this relationship will guarantee non-monopolization of power, as a maximum, and the suspension of the war option internally, as a minimum. However, civil wars were costly, and the political price came for operationalizing this equation through the legitimization of a legal and constitutionally inclusive “Council of Ministers”, where the mechanisms of political action lay in the Regime as it was observed regularly in the documents of Mustapha Nasser (Nasser, Retrieved in May 2020).

When the last constitutional settlement was concluded because of the Taif Agreement, the request to preserve the spirit of this agreement was exclusively demanded, but other matters cannot be dismissed or even skipped, as the legality and charter of any political decision are primarily subject to the parties of the agreement, not to the agreement itself. Through this multilateral practice, the case for the Taif Agreement is directly related to the framers of the legal mechanism of decision-making and the charter task of preserving the balance. The National Understanding, which is called the “Taif Agreement” was executed on October 22, 1989, and approved by the Lebanese Parliament in its session held at Kleiat Airport on November 5 of the same year (UN, n. d.). The agreement included four basic clauses: general principles and reforms, the extension of the State’s sovereignty over all Lebanese territories, the liberation of Lebanon from Israeli occupation, and Lebanese Syrian relations (MacQueen, 2009). Based on this Charter, amendments were made to the 1926 Constitution, and voted on in Parliament on September 21, 1990 (Karam, 2012).

4.1.7. The Theoretical Framework of the Kinds of Policies Developed

Policies are generated by governments. However, the process of policymaking in Lebanon is not necessarily created within government buildings. It is a process that starts outside the government pushed to state buildings and then produced. A system working as a shadow to the state (MacQueen, 2009). In my research, I will be focusing on the policies of political aspects as stipulated in the Taif agreement for 14 issues. Major policies by the Lebanese state include the declaration of War, the assignment of first-grade positions, international treaties, and electoral laws, among others. Such policies require two-thirds approval of the cabinet of ministers which all possess political and strategic value (Badran, 2020). The mechanisms of decision-making in Lebanon often raised several questions, starting from the democracy of the system to the state's independence. Political and security clashes are a constant feature in Lebanon (Makdisi & El-Khalil, 2013). Most decisions aimed at strengthening stability and democracy and despite their importance are still suspended in the corridors of the state. Likewise, all political forces act from the premise that the state does not have a leading role in every matter of governance. This disregard and complexity mainly lie in the system's dual structure, which derives its legitimacy from the end-of-war agreement (Taif Agreement), and its practice of regional stability (MacQueen, 2009). This duality origin can be traced back to the establishment of the Emirate of Lebanon, starting from the Qaem Maqamia regime in Al-Mutasarrifiyyah until the declaration of Greater Lebanon.

4.1.8. The Regional Political Landscape

In Lebanon, the dichotomy of foreign and local intervention in policymaking is one with a valid example. I intend to research the role of the quadripartite accord in

policymaking from the local perspective only. This accord came between the four parties: Hezbollah, the Amal movement, the Socialist Progressive Party, and the Future Party in the year 2005 and after the assassination of PM Rafiq Hariri on February 14th of the same year. Since the 2005 parliamentary elections started on May 29, 2005, then the accord was conducted in the period during the months of March, April, and May (Safa, 2006).

However, the regional landscape has a tremendous impact on the behavior of the local part. The attitudes and behavior of the political class in Lebanon contributed to the loss of Arab interest to the degree of distancing themselves from Lebanon. Small and perhaps trivial Lebanese battles are being fought amid the mother of all battles in the region, to the extent that the Lebanese politicians see themselves through the prism of their religious, sectarian, and personal narrowness, and the outside becomes increasingly convinced that this Lebanese political class is difficult to replace, it is impossible to work with it or even change its behavior. Whoever reads Lebanon's political history finds that all kinds of external interference (Ottoman, French, Syrian, Egyptian, Israeli, Iranian, and others) are the reason for Lebanon's existence, and are rather its foundational element, implying that the external interference in Lebanon cannot be legitimized as much as it cannot be ignored or bypassed. This interference is at the basis of Lebanon's constitutional, geographic, sectarian, and historical composition and is an authentic element in all aspects of Lebanese life, having nothing to do with a sect, region, party, or leadership. From this perspective, there is an approach based on the domineering of managing external interference rather than combating it by local leaders as the quadripartite accord came to an exit (Nasser, 2005).

The idea may be shocking to policymakers, but we must accept it as we accept the fact that there are issues such as corruption, unemployment, growth indicators, and

deficits, which are theoretically acceptable in certain percentages, as is the case with external interference in Lebanon(Nasser, 2005). It does not matter if Lebanon has a strong country, what matters is its role on the map. From that angle, the quadripartite accord was born by the local leaders(Nasser, 2005). Moreover, the UN resolution 1559 and the assassination of PM Rafiq Hariri exerted massive pressure on the local leaders to conform to the regional conflict between the years 2005- 2008. This pressure was viewed by the four parties of the accord to organize their rule of the state. The disputes over certain top-level government positions were re-negotiated under the regional influence and the first one came with the appointment of the head of the General Security Authority. Many indirect requests were coming from Ambassadors serving in Beirut inquiring about the list of candidates. And many of the four parties were transparent in revealing the diplomatic requests made by the ambassadors.

“This was the political climate that surrounded Hariri’s assassination in February 2005. His death was without doubt a quasi-fatal blow to the balance that appeared in Lebanon after 1990. This upheaval almost completely transformed the mechanisms of sectarian competition in Lebanon by eliminating one of its main local pillars, Hariri.”(Bahout, 2016).

4.1.9. Best Practices during the Syrian Presence in Lebanon

Like human nations have their distinct genealogy, the nation of Lebanon can trace back its genealogy through history over 3000 years ago. One that is filled with religion and heritage; however, the birth of a modern Lebanese state came in the year 1921 (Maktabi, 1999). At this historical point, a nation/state model has been created and the modern Lebanese state incorporated much of the history and heritage. The state was to

function according to a constitution and common practice and an act of balance between the power of law and the power of sects. This hybrid system was limited to the state and many events have put this system to the test: 1954, 1958, and 1969, but it was at the regional juncture of 1975 when the civil war broke out (Krayem, 1997a).

The 15-year war came at an end with a major cost to the power-sharing process, and it allowed for an era dubbed in media as the “Syrian Custodianship” which has only exasperated the shadow system through maintaining the influence of the local political leaders in the state (Szekely, 2015). A process that had the Syrian custody at the top of policymaking, while the state was reduced to a tool in the hands of state/sect leaders. Many examples exist as to the working of the system, for instance, the removal of almost 3000 refugees families from the Wadi Abou Jamil in today’s “Downtown Beirut” (Bou Akar, 2005), was first negotiated between Rafiq Hariri and Hezbollah privately (D & Al-Harithy, 2021).

The latter was not represented in the cabinet at that time and once the agreement was reached Prime Minister (PM) Hariri obtained the cabinet’s approval. In this practice the Syrian seal of approval was paramount, and this system was not capable to transform its decisions to the state without the Syrian influence, which further gave validity to this system and its practice (Nasser, 2006).

As Dr. Joseph Bahout had described “Lebanon’s system held together in the past in large part thanks to an external regulator, Syria. The chaotic state of Lebanon’s system today is to a considerable degree due to the absence of that external force. Beyond the text, Taif was largely shaped by the way it was implemented after 1990 and how Lebanon was governed, both by its new leaders and Syria, which exercised control—or tutelage—over the country. Syria’s tutelage over Lebanon was accepted by the international

community in exchange for Damascus's constructive participation in the peace process with Israel, an outgrowth of the Madrid Conference of 1991."(Bahout, 2016).

Calling things by their constitutional name suggests that the policy-making process in Lebanon is generated by the government. The cabinet was structured by the shadow state to function outside the state. During the Syrian custodianship, the Lebanese cabinet sessions were marked by Syrian influence. It was imprinted with another character, which is that there was no state in 1990 when President Hrawi assumed the presidency. There was no state, army, security forces, judiciary, courts, police stations hospitals, electricity, water, nothing, not even a village-to-village telephone. It was very clear that the world was tired of Lebanon and entrusted Syria with dealing with its issue according to a specific program, which is the Taef Accord. So the reality was that the entire world is returning to Syria for Lebanese state affairs (Boueiz, 2023).

Syria was practically authorized to do so within the framework of the Taif Agreement. As a result Syria had a major role regionally due to its influence in Lebanon. Moreover, Syria had allies in the Lebanese Council of Ministers, some of whom fully adopted the Syrian point of view, which was sometimes different from the interest of the Lebanese state. In return, the state of Lebanon needed Syria to help rebuild the state and dissolve the militias, re-form the army, collect weapons, and spread the army in all the Lebanese regions that were occupied by the militias. Hence, it was not easy to reconcile these two needs: to reconcile the need for Syria, given that no one was ready to help, neither America nor the Vatican nor France. At the same time worries that Syria's calculations and interest may not always coincide with the calculations or interests of the Lebanese state, and that Syria's interpretations of the Taif Accord or otherwise may differ in one way or another (Boueiz, 2023).

Some political personalities in the shadow state considered that showing their keenness to protect the interests of Syria would somehow qualify them and strengthen their position. For example, one day the European countries formed what was called " the European-Mediterranean Partnership Agreement", that is, a partnership between Europe" ,and non-European countries that are located on the shores of the Mediterranean Sea and close to Europe, and their economies and interests necessitate an agreement. This agreement stipulates that the concerned country submits a request showing to the European countries that they share with them the foundations or principles of public freedoms, human rights, free economy, cultural openness, etc. Indeed, it was necessary for the country that wanted to join the agreement to request from Brussels, then the foreign minister would go and present a pleading and request this capacity. The norms were that the Europeans should keep the response for several months before they answered, and then they might not respond positively.

The foreign minister Faris Boueiz went to Brussels and made the necessary argument in which he showed that Lebanon, since the time of Phoenicia, that is, six thousand years ago, has been practicing a free economy and the fundamentals of banking laws, from mortgage to supplying ships and other things, and that Lebanon during the .era of Rome had the largest and greatest school of law in which experts in law studied Al-Romani and Lebanon have the freedom to the point of chaos. T his intervention had an excellent impact according to the minister. The minister re turned to Beirut with a sense of tremendous triumph. Upon his arrival at the airport, the airport security chief informed himthat there was an extraordinary cabinet waiting for him. As soon as he entered the Council of Ministers, it seemed that the Council of Ministers session was adamant in criticizing the minister under the title How does Lebanon enter into an

agreement with Europe while Syria has not entered yet? How does the minister accept that? The session was adjourned. The minister continues that it came to his mind to contact President Hafez Al-Assad of Syria. The minister told the Syrian president “ .Mr President, this is what I did in Brussels, and this I consider a great achievement for Lebanon, especially since Israel is a member of this agreement and we have an interest in being in it to show the Arab point of view and to refute Israel's point of view when necessary. Also, Lebanon's economic interest requires that, because anything it will export will be according to European standards. it seems that some in Lebanon believe that it satisfies you by opposing this matter, and therefore instead of approving the Council of Ministers cheering on this issue, it has postponed this decision, and this is a shame for us because all countries will think that Syria is preventing us from entering into this agreement. So I came to inform you of this matter”. President Hafez Al-Assad immediately called Ghazi Kanaan, the Syrian intelligence official in Lebanon, and told him: It seems that some in Lebanon did not understand well what the Foreign Minister Fares Boueiz did in Brussels, and perhaps Lebanon needs Europe to answer quickly on this issue. The next day and upon the return of the minister to Beirut, President Hrawi called him asking: Where have you been? He continued to ask if he has any information on why the Cabinet is meeting today in the afternoon .Indeed, the cabinet met. While it was opposing the agreement a day before, in this session it became absolute support and praise for the foreign minister who succeeded in this matter and said that they studied the matter during the night, while they did not have any document, and that they agree. Jokingly the minister said: “ I propose, in addition to the minutes of the session, to express special thanks to President Al-Assad, who seems to have realized the interests of Lebanon more than the Council of Ministers” (Boueiz, 2023).

4.1.10. The Assassination of the Taif Agreement UN Resolution 1559, 2004

The Interpretation of the UN resolution by the shadow state demanded three objectives. The first was a demand for a free and transparent upcoming election of a new president: Emile Lahoud. Second, the withdrawal of all foreign military forces. After the Israeli army withdrew from the occupied Lebanese South (2000), the Syrian army was the only one existing in Lebanon. And third, the state is the sole bearer of arms and weapons. Hezbollah was and still bares arms along with several Palestinian factions holding light arms (Nasser, 2004).

The tone of voices in favor of Resolution 1559 and the campaign against Hezbollah rose to cause a storm around the international investigation whose strongest indication began with the arrest of the four officers with charges of involvement in the assassination of Hariri Sr. on August 30, 2005 (Harel & Issacharoff, 2008). The dispute over the International Court then exploded with the assassination of Gebran Tueini on December 12, 2005 (Al-Amin, 2006).

The resolution was a declaration by the international community that the consented past practice of the shadow state is void rendering the narrative of “consensual democracy” expired. However, the ruling elite was quick to act and address the challenges to their position as political leaders. While the State was waiting for a directive by the local ruling elite to react, which in turn describes the role of each in the policy-making process, the shadow system managed by the ruling elite continued with the same narrative of governance despite the implications of noncompliance with the UN resolution. Incumbent president Emile Lahoud was elected unanimously by the parliament. A move that was viewed as influenced by the Syrian government. Damascus, in its view, stood in opposition to the American-Israeli-driven resolution (Nasser, 2004).

The implications of UN resolution 1559 (2004) and the assassination of PM Rafiq Hariri in February 2005 exposed the common narrative of who and how Lebanon is to be ruled let alone how it was ruled between 2005 and 2008. This period remains one of the most challenging imperatives to understand the relationship between the Lebanese State structures and the ruling political elite. An elusive relationship that was exploited by the ruling elite. Both democratic tools and consensual mechanisms were subject to constant challenges and political meandering. One that supported the common narrative that Lebanon is a state ruled by sectarian leaders and is a state sect being gates to the ruling class club and not a means to rule only (Zedan, 2019).

The significance of this period stems from two fronts: the end of the Syrian custodianship and the vacuum of power in the shadow state resulting from the assassination of PM Rafiq Hariri. The ruling class was agile; quickly reorganizable; and able to change political banners (the 8th & the 14th of March), execute parliamentary elections in 2005, organize the proliferation of the Palestinian refugee camps weapons, appoint a new PM (Fouad Siniora) along with a cabinet, and above all maintain a divisive political discourse compatible with the ongoing regional conflict. Simply put, they were able to shift their political positions but not their political practice in the contentious ambiguousness of consensual democracy (Zedan, 2019). The importance and relevance of the Quadripartite Accord will explain the above as described in the documents of Mustapha Nasser.

4.2. The Rise of the Quadripartite Accord and Concurrently the Lebanese Shadow System

4.2.1. An Overview of the Quadripartite Accord

This accord came between the four parties: Hezbollah, The Amal movement, the Socialist Progressive Party, and the Future Party in the year 2005 and after the assassination of PM Rafiq Hariri on February 14th of the same year. Since the 2005 parliamentary elections started on May 29, 2005, then the accord was conducted in the period during the months of March, April, and May (Ayoub, 2020).

Amid PM Rafiq Hariri's recent electoral campaign and his endeavors to complete his alliance with "Hezbollah", Hariri presented an explicit request to Mr. Hassan Nasrallah: "Upon the formation of the government, I would like to get one-third of the Cabinet seats." With obvious astonishment, the Party's Secretary General asked about the significance of this demand, to which Hariri replied: "So that I could avoid the opposition of Lahoud and Berri's ministers within the Cabinet." (Nasser, 2005).

Another phase, especially when PM Saad Hariri formed his first government as PM in 2009. With the "March 8" having a strong determination to get one-third of the cabinet, Mr. Nasrallah mentioned in his explanation of this demand: "Thanks to your late father, who showed us the one-third quorum in the government" (Nasser, 2005).

Since assuming the political leadership of the family on April 20, 2005, after the coup caused by the assassination of his father, PM Rafiq Hariri on February 14, and the internal balance of power turned upside down, on the verge of a comprehensive withdrawal of the Syrian army from Lebanon, in a meeting that included him and the Secretary General of Hezbollah, Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, Saad Hariri told him that PM Najib Mikati's succession to head the government would swing between Siniora and

Tabbara. Nasrallah replied that he was not interested in the option of naming the new PM, but the latter must respect the four-party alliance that led Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri and Hezbollah to an electoral coalition with the March 14 forces led by Hariri and the head of the Progressive Socialist Party, Walid Jumblatt (Nicolais Nassif, 2010).

The process of bridging the gaps imposed itself as problematic in terms of the balance when the Syrian Army withdrew, as well as it was circulated in the media when Patriarch Sfeir, who was considered one of the main framers of the Taif Agreement, questioned it, so the obsession with the balance is considered a common issue inherent in the emergence of "Taif" and its people (Krayem, 1997b).

Everyone recalls how Christian representatives, at every step of negotiations in Taif City, were asking Muslim representatives not to judge the constitution in comparison to Amin Al-Gamil's reign and its practice (Krayem, 1997b).

There were a thousand scenarios for chaos and paralysis, during the growing scandalous gaps, and the same problems developed to bring the conflict to its functional form, starting with the legitimacy of the government and the quorum of the presidential elections, all the way to, after the parliamentary elections over naming the PM, a crisis of assignment rather than formation. It is clear that these gaps were not left to the constitution or the political norms to be invoked, but rather to an external power to supervise their regularity. In this environment, the four political parties came and created a coalition to bridge and close these said gaps in policy production (Nasser, Retrieved in May 2020).

The mechanism of the National Reconciliation Charter has excluded the decision-making process from official and statutory institutions into a system still in effect through certain figures, and in private salons that sometimes seek to maneuver and rather negotiate

at other times until an agreement is reached. For instance, as stated in the documents of Mustapha Nasser, PM Fouad Siniora is described as a person whose bureaucratic background manifests itself in a negative form in practicing policy development, which is what Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri often resorted to within the cabinet to maneuver and camouflage. A reference from Hariri to Siniora suffices, at which point the minister hits one of the items decided in the cabinet session with a barrage of systemic complexity that makes it crippled to cabinet voting. Two or even three sessions of cabinet pass until Hariri is informed of the agreement of all political forces from outside the cabinet and through advisors working in the shadow state. Mustapha Nasser would inform Rafiq Hariri of the agreement with Hezbollah for example. And Ali Hassan Khalil, the political advisor of parliament speaker Nabih Berri, would convey the approval of the Amal movement. Now the fourth session will be held while Siniora's reservations continue, amidst the surprise of the remaining members. With obvious restlessness, Rafiq Hariri questions this behavior, and Siniora replies that he is working according to his convictions. In the tone of a boss to a subordinate, Rafiq Hariri replies: "Put your convictions aside and do your duties." Away from the myth and the same context, it is clear that PM Rafiq Hariri did not exercise his role as PM through the official system only, but rather the majority of his political movement revolved around a political shadow system working with a Syrian administration and regional blessing to bridge the gaps (Tariq F Zedan, 2023).

Thereupon, the agreed decisions are included in the agenda and put for a vote within the Council of Ministers. The charter's mission is clear, which is not to expose state institutions to conflict. More than a station embodied the work of this parallel political system. For example, when the Quadripartite Alliance between Hezbollah, the Future Movement, Amal Movement, and the Progressive Socialist Party was dissolved,

no legal provision or even a government institution supporting the Alliance was found, but rather, another station called the "Riyadh Agreement" was found to re-establish this Alliance with Saudi blessing. When this agreement was dissolved, the street was resorted to and used to influence an agreement (Nasser, 2007).

Nasrallah talked about the deep trust that arose between them in their meetings in the recent months leading up to the assassination and dealt with the protection of the resistance and its weapons and the organization of its relationship with the Lebanese authority within the scope of twinning the legitimacy of the resistance with the legitimacy of the state without conflict. Hariri, the father, and Nasrallah were the de facto guarantors and not the state structures (Nasser, 2005).

The experience of coalition governance among the ruling elite was not entirely successful. Syria remained the reference for resorting between Berri and Hariri and between Hariri, Hrawi, and Lahoud, so the steadfastness of the governments of that era and half of them headed by Hariri Sr. It was accompanied by the will of Damascus in its survival (Nassif, 2011a).

4.2.2. Motives and Interests: Protecting the Taif Agreement not the State

Two days after Hariri's assassination, on February 16, 2005, Nasrallah went to Quraytem for condolences in person, despite the caution in his movements. The whole family was present. Mrs. Nazek and the most eminent sons at the forefront, Bahaa and Saad. He told the family "What can I do to help uncover the truth about the late President's killers? He added: he was my friend, my partner. I consider him a martyr because he died oppressed" (Nassif, 2011b).

At that point Hariri Jr. did not hold any official position in the state of Lebanon, this demonstrates that the initiation of a new member to the shadow state is derived from the shadow system itself and the state. The first item on the schedule of the shadow system was the upcoming parliamentary elections in 2005 after the resignation of PM Omar Karami. An election that was to map out the influence of the shadow system inside the state. Although political parties were split into two camps, the 14th of March and the 8th of March movements, the shadow system did not see this as a hindrance to the electoral coalition called “the quadripartite agreement” (Ayoub, 2006b; Nasser, 2005).

This agreement was constituted between four parties: Hezbollah, the Amal movement, the Socialist Progressive movement, and the Future movement. Their main goal was to create an alliance that would generate the majority in parliament. A majority held by the shadow system to create a government and generate policies outside the state (Nasser, 2005).

This did not come without challenges. Primarily by the newly returned exile general Aoun the leader of the free patriotic movement. General Aoun revived the Christian role in the state. The discourse was one of regaining the state back and not dismantling the shadow state. This comeback was described by Walid Jumblat as an electoral tsunami by winning 25 seats of the 128 in the parliament (Ayoub, 2006a).

However, during the election, the quadruple alliance was vigilant to ensure the winning of all 11 remaining seats in the Baabda-Aley district. Again, the work of the shadow system when a meeting between Nasrallah and Hariri Jr. to discuss the matter. A religious fatwa by Nasrallah to all constituents in the district of Baabda-Aley, who are the majority in the district, to vote for the Future movement candidates. This was endorsed

by the quadruple alliance and created the majority which the 14th of March movement claimed afterward (Ayoub, 2006b).

At that moment it didn't matter as the quadruple alliance was still operative with its primary objective of generating policies outside the state. While the diverse and liberal nature of the country is culturally and historically rich and vivid in terms of media and knowledge production, the ruling class is the opposite. The inclusion of Hariri Jr. into the ruling class was one created by the embrace of the class itself, which is evident in the minutes of Mr. Nasser of the initial meetings held between the Hezbollah leader and Saad Hariri (Nasser, 2008).

Moreover, the agreements between four major political leaders/parties, despite their conflicting positions in the regional conflict, underscores the ruling class's ability to utilize sectarian discourse towards policymaking within the state (M Diss, 2017).

The "Quadripartite Accord" is a vivid example of the ruling class and its tools to manage Lebanese State affairs. All parties have been active in the shadow system and represented in state positions, except for Hezbollah which was present in the parliament but in no other state positions at that period. The "Quadripartite Accord would change this as indicated in the documents of Mr. Nasser. A strategic turning point in the political journey of Hezbollah into the state (Nasser, 2008).

Also, the "Quadripartite Accord" based on the consensus above became a new layer to the narrative of how and who rules Lebanon. The shadow state represented by the Accord agreed to produce policies and share state resources despite their opposition to the regional conflict. As described in the documents of Mustapha Nasser "Making the Accord a benchmark for understanding Lebanon's state affairs and internal unrest from 2005-2008" (Nasser, 2005).

The accord was a detailed coalition/agreement based on the above narrative of rule. From the 2005 parliamentary elections to the PM candidate selections, the cabinet, the appointment of top security positions, all the way to economic policies and strategic geopolitics were managed by the aforementioned accord. All aspects of state affairs were subject to the agreement despite the load and divisive rhetoric of the same ruling class. Rhetoric ensured the flow of finance by foreign players to the ruling class, confusing and by some a level of despair of change or reform (Nasser, 2008).

The PM-designated name will be an integral part of the deal, similar to the one he had concluded, in the spring of 2005, by the quadripartite alliance when Fouad Siniora was selected as PM of the first post-Syrian governments, the price of a mutual political trade-off to govern the new post-Taif era. Thus, the name of the PM-designate emanates from this transaction, not from the binding parliamentary consultations conducted by the President of the Republic under Article 53 of the Constitution (Nassif, 2007).

The practice above uses the sectarian/consensual system to maintain the ruling class and not to define it. Thus, the “Quadripartite Accord” is a child of the ruling class. It clearly states how policies are to be produced and by whom, which in turn maintained the narrative of “who” and “how”. The Shadow system as a result became much more active and productive in negotiations and in solidifying the narrative of rule. The negotiation process among the ruling class was managed by people mostly not holding official state/government positions. They had meetings in private quarters and produced public policies. At times of dispute among the members of this “Quadripartite Accord”, the street was used to influence policymaking. The intention was not to undermine the state but influence the ruling elite members (Zedan, 2019).

Since 2005, almost everything in Lebanon has changed except the leaders of the government coalition. Berri, Jumblatt, and Hezbollah continued, and Hariri, the son, succeeded his father, while only President Michel Aoun entered from outside the Lebanon Rule Club after the Taif Agreement (Nassif, 2011a).

4.2.3. Three Pillars of Agreement between Hezbollah and Hariri Jr.

The Quadripartite Accord came in place with three pillars of agreement among the four parties. First, all decisions must be discussed among the four parties before sending to state structures for policy creation and production. As presented in the documents this was the practice by Rafiq Hariri during his time as PM and all parties agreed to continue in that mechanism. Second, to enter a coalition for the election to produce the majority to rule Lebanon together among the four parties. Third, the weapons of Hezbollah are a resistance force and will not be discussed until the conflict with Israel is over either by peace or the end of the state of Israel (Nasser, 2005).

Nasrallah also had to prove the quadripartite alliance on his part in the next stage as a safety valve that would avoid Lebanon from exploding between the forces of March 8 and March 14, and end any interference in Resolution 1559 and the weapons of the resistance (Gambill, 2010). At that time, he had a similar trade-off to determine the electoral alliance in the Baabda-Aley constituency between President Michel Aoun and the March 14 forces. The general, who had returned from Paris a few weeks ago, raised his sharp tone against Hezbollah's weapons and declared its illegality and the need to abandon it. Nasrallah sided with Hariri and Jumblatt. And if in the elections of the Baabda-Aley district, under the four-party alliance, the March 14 forces will grant 10 deputies who were sufficient to move the parliamentary majority from one place to

another. Thus, the March 14 forces acquired the parliamentary majority, which enabled them to control a similar government majority, within a condition that they later vetoed, which is a prior agreement in the Council of Ministers on important decisions to avoid resorting to voting and imposing a *fait accompli* on minority ministers (Nocolais Nassif, 2010).

4.2.4. The 2005 Parliamentary Elections, Who Owns Majority in the Parliament?

Lebanon is a parliamentary republic. As such the coalitions of political parties are driven by generating the majority in the parliament for policy making (El-Kak, 2012). Moreover, all the top three positions in the state: the presidency, parliament speaker, and premiership are elected from the parliament, and it is widely viewed by the political parties that control over this parliament is obtained by holding the majority (M Diss, 2017). However, the events between 2005 and 2008 did not reflect that as the conflict between the political parties at that time was attributed to the conflict between the members of the Quadripartite Accord (Nasser, 2008)

The accord was based on the understanding that the four parties would enter a coalition for the elections to produce a majority (Botrous, 2014). But they have also agreed that all decisions must reach an agreement among themselves before pushing to the parliament or government for voting. Also, a detailed agreement among the four parties was set forth before the 2005 elections through consensus among them. Directing voters to vote for a single candidate specifically in the areas of mixed religious affiliations. For example, the Baabda-Aley region with a majority of voters in are Shia part of Hezbollah was directed by Sayed Hassan Nasrallah in a religious order to vote for the total eleven candidates by the members of the accord. A victory of the eleven seats

granted the majority for the four-party coalition. As a result, the four parties won a majority of 104 seats out of 128 of the parliament (Nasser, 2005).

This in turn granted the members of the accord to select a prime minister candidate. Two have been nominated by Saad Hariri: Fouad Siniora and Bahij Tabbara (Nicolais Nassif, 2010). The meeting between Fouad Siniora and Nasrallah as Mr. Nasser recalls reaffirmed the four-party coalition and the Quadripartite Accord. The selection after a few days was announced in the local newspapers as the most successful candidate to gain the most votes in the parliament. As such, the parliament was open for a session to vote for the new prime minister. Siniora won with a total of 104 votes, the highest vote in Lebanese history (Zedan, 2019).

This practice continued during the government work and appointments of first-grade officials. The change occurred when the conflict happened among the four parties behind closed doors. It is evident from Mr. Nasser's documents that the majority in parliament was valid when the consensus among the four parties was accorded and was missing when disputed. And each party would count the number of seats in parliament to confirm their constitutional rights, but all along the negotiations among the four parties continued in closed doors out of the government structures and buildings until a consensus is reached. A majority is a tool and not a constitutional right in the view of the quadripartite accord members (Nasser, 2008).

Hezbollah's view did not hesitate to give Hariri power, ignoring President Michel Aoun and his popularity in the southern Metn. This is how the two men shared the inner balance of power: power at Hariri and weapons at Hezbollah. However, the latter noticed that force was used against him and his weapon, so everything that was built between them collapsed. Efforts had been made in the final months of 2005 to heal the rift through

a Saudi mediation known as the Riyadh Agreement, which quickly collapsed. Efforts were made three times in a row to rebuild trust between Nasrallah and Hariri who attributed distancing as justified to the party to how Siniora exercises power (Al-Amin, 2006).

4.2.5. Cracks in the Accord: Riyadh Accord, Hiring First-grade Officials

Riyadh sought a consensus between the pillars of the quadripartite alliance, and two officials of the Amal movement and Hezbollah went to Saudi Arabia accompanying PM Saad Hariri. A mechanism was agreed upon to manage the government situation following the principle of prior political understanding in connection with the understanding on which the government was based as the parliamentary elections took place (Al-Amin, 2006).

The accord did not collapse with foreign intervention due to the 2006 war. The disputes over the methodology of the four parties have been struggling with the continuous pressure of regional events (Barakat, 2021). The documents of Mr. Nasser and the timeline of such disputes made it clear that the first dispute occurred with the appointment of the General Directorate of General Security president. Many candidates were selected for the positions. And as a customary power practice and since the position is one held by a Muslim Shia, the final decision was one to be discussed between Saad Hariri and Hezbollah. At that specific meeting, the candidate was an ex-general from the Bekaa Governorate. Also, he was recommended by Hezbollah. During the meeting, Mr. Hariri made reservations about the candidate which were not related to his experience nor his affiliation with the greater regional conflict. Instead, Hariri suggested a new candidate. This was a move viewed by Hezbollah as an intervention in the accord. The meeting went

on to agree to disagree. And thus, the appointment of the new president of general security authority came at the cost of the mechanism of the Quadripartite Accord (Nasser, 2005).

The disputes within the four parties were growing as the regional conflict grew. The pressure and demand were vivid (Nasser, 2006). Many of the required government policies mandated by the Sinoira government were put on hold. The local media kept an eye on the regional conflict as the prime culprit to the lack of policy making. However, the documents of Mr. Nasser indicate that the negotiations between the four parties continued despite the growing gaps between them. In his view, it was an indication by the four parties of the value and importance to keep the accord alive. As such the four parties have agreed to meet in Riyadh City the capital of Saudi Arabia (Nasser, 2006).

This meeting was dubbed by the local media as the “Riyadh Accord”. This is a misleading name as it is the attempt by the four parties to reconcile the accord. In the Riyadh meeting, all four parties were represented. Mr. Hussein El-Khalil from Hezbollah, Mr. Ali Hassan Khalil from the Amal movement, Mr. Ghazi Al Aridi represented the Lebanese Nationalist Movement, and Mr. Nasser represented Mr. Hariri. The agreement took place in Rafiq Hariri’s Riyadh house and was documented, unlike the Quadripartite Accord. This meeting in Riyadh was endorsed by Saudi King Abdullah as was declared by Saad Hariri (Nasser, 2006).

However, this agreement was later killed when it was put to the test by implementation in Beirut. The rule of the “Quadripartite Accord” came to a halt with the endorsement of the Sinoira government of the newly formed tribunal for the assassination of Rafiq Hariri. The collapse of the accord itself in 2007 indicated the collapse of policymaking and not the state and certainly did not mean the collapse of the ruling class.

This in turn indicates that the stability and security of Lebanon commence with the ruling class and ends with the state and not vice versa (Nasser, 2007).

4.2.6. Hezbollah from the Shadow to the Light: a Journey Led by the Quadripartite Accord

The path towards policy making and projecting power and influence in Lebanon is a journey that follows the route of past practices, national rhetoric, and the constitution. This is not a linear path or journey in terms of trajectory. Power structures in Lebanon are ones built on layers. I have understood from the quadripartite accord that this journey has a starting point. And equally important to the understanding of policy-making in Lebanon is in identifying the starting point of this trajectory and journey. Similarly, power relations and their manifestations in Lebanon are ones born outside the state. Specifically, in the shadow of the state and not inside government structures and most certainly not by democratic tools. It is initiated by a group of people, parties, interests, etc. as per the Oxford definition of the shadow state. In this case study the quadripartite accord explains this trajectory. It provides an example of Hezbollah as a party whose major influence in the shadow state through the accord facilitated its accession to the state. One would not be able to overlook such a trajectory of the rise of Hezbollah from the shadow and to the state. One can deduce from the readings of Mr. Nasser's documents that the role of Hezbollah in Lebanon and its influence on policy production went through two phases. The first was during the premiership of Rafiq Hariri under the Syrian custodianship era 1992-2005. The second was the Quadripartite Accord era (Nasser, n.d.).

This journey from shadow to light, light being the official state, is one shared in the past by many political parties. It indicated that the path to power thus the management of the state starts in the shadow. During the first phase, Hezbollah was mainly represented

in the shadow state with a symbolic presence in the Lebanese Parliament. All matters of foreign affairs were discussed between both parties outside state structures. Including the negotiations at times of conflict with Israel. In the wars of 1993 and 1996, PM Rafiq Hariri was instrumental in brokering a cease-fire under UN auspices. Not to mention PM Rafiq Hariri's overarching relationships with regional stakeholders including but not limited to Syria and Saudi Arabia (Blanford, 2006).

Within Lebanon, this special relationship between Hariri and Hezbollah had many manifestations. For example, the parliament is constituted of 128 seats. As per the electoral law, it was agreed that one seat for Mrs. Bahia Hariri, the only sister of PM Rafiq Hariri was guaranteed in return for the other seat to be granted to Hezbollah in the southern city of Saida. An agreement by PM Rafiq Hariri with Hezbollah leader Nasrallah guarantees the relationship outside state structures. Also, PM Rafiq Hariri was adamant to include a member of the Lebanese Islamic resistance, as per his description, to be represented in the Lebanese capital, Beirut, in the parliament (Nasser, 1998).

The period between 1992-2005 was one that the shadow state managed all state affairs under the supervision of the Syrian authorities. As such all policies created by the shadow state indicated the approval of the Syrian regime and vice versa. The level of trust and confidence between both parties was deep as indicated in the documents. Mutually the remaining members of the shadow state constantly seek consensus at times of conflict. This would change in 2005. The assassination of PM Rafiq Hariri and the withdrawal of the Syrian army from Lebanon exposed the shadow state. It also creates a vacuum of power in the state structures that are required to be filled. Positions and parliamentary elections motivated Hezbollah to participate in the government. The

quadripartite accord enabled Hezbollah to enter the government with two representatives of their own names Mohamed Fneich and Trad Hmede (Blanford, 2006).

This move did not negate past practices by the shadow state. What is new was the accord that created the path and the first step of Hezbollah in the state government structures. In other words, if it was not for the accord one might wonder if Hezbollah would be present in official state matters. And the loss of a position in the state is a result of a diminishing influence in the shadow state. In the case of Hezbollah, while its presence in the state is small, its influence over the state is tremendous which is secondary to the Quadripartite Accord. The war of 2006 did not diminish this influence but rather fueled the dominance of Hezbollah in both the shadow state and state structures (Cordesman & Sullivan, 2007).

4.3. The Collapse of the “Quadripartite Accord”

4.3.1. The Three Major Events that Fractured the Accord

Lebanon’s government affairs and policy production continued through the consensus of the four parties and the process was challenged by many political and regional events. However, the accord was viewed as the only base for the agreement and a track record of recent turbulent events between 2006 and 2008, which posed challenges to the accord and its parties (Zedan, 2019).

The accord didn’t collapse suddenly. It rather went through serial challenges that led to its demise. While the first incident that created a dispute between the four parties was the disagreement on the candidate to be appointed as the security general, all four parties intended to continue the discussion outside government quarters to reach a consensus (Zeidan, 2023). However, these intentions while parted the colliding regional

conflict and the lack of transparency among the shadow state transformed the accord into a burden. A burden that was hit by three major events to conclude it is irrelevant in policy production (Zedan, 2019).

The problem came with the Veto submitted by the US Ambassador, Jeffrey Feltman, and his French counterpart Bernard Émié, as well as Terry Rodd Larsen, the International Commissioner, upon electing Nabeeh Berri for the position of the Head of Parliament, considering him active personnel of the Syrian authority (Terry, 2005). However, the political negotiations abroad and the limits of the constitutional institutes could effectively paralyze such disputes, parallel to termination of the potential ones, against irreversible attempts made by the Shia's shares and fraud. The breakdown of all partnership concepts was doomed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, along with the Public Security. Things escalated when Prime Minister Fouad Siniora, spurred by the majority forces, to settle the International Court issue through voting in the Council of Ministers on the day of the assassination of Gebran Tueini and refused to delay until Thursday for the scheduled meeting between Nasrallah and Bahij Tabbara to finalize the agreement (Nasser, 2006).

Three major events each created a turning point in Lebanese politics and the Siniora Government. The first event, the approval of the tribunal of the assassination of PM Hariri hit the accord at heart. Second, the government policies of the Siniora government on May 5th, 2008, declared the accord politically dead but not buried, while the third was the Doha Accord. The intervention of local and foreign stakeholders meant that the accord and its parties have failed to manage the country (Nasser, 2008).

The dialogue and direct meetings between Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah and the head of the future bloc, PM Saad Hariri, became inevitably critical. By

a few political, security, and strategical considerations, the appointment between Nasrallah and Hariri is being urgently impulse by internal efforts to submit it as early as applicable, whereas other parties wish to terminate any opportunity of gathering between the two entities, or to doom its failure, at the very least. In the same vein, any internal political conclusions, drawn early or delayed in time, are believed to be primarily subjected to those two entities' genuine political determinations (Nasser, 2008).

In addition to negotiations concerning certain requirements opposed by different conditions. However, the meeting was destined to take place on the ground that a new political phase has concurred the war in July and is mutually being admitted. The two entities were expected to have proceeded with a comprehensive review of the achievements submitted in light of the political partnership that accompanied the Quadripartite Alliance during the Spring of 2005, and the termination of a political rivalry post-July 12, 2006, which coincided with a third war in Lebanon, reflecting a complicated political case in the country (Ayoub, 2006a).

4.3.2. The Tribunal of the Assassination of PM Hariri, a Deal Breaker

The Assassination of PM Rafiq Hariri was a turning point in Lebanese politics. It created a vacuum of power in the ruling political elite. The shadow state that ruled Lebanon during the Taif era republic. Thus, the four political parties have agreed to fill the void and maintain their positions within the state. They were driven by the consequence of the assassination. This was from the point of view of the local political landscape of Lebanon. The regional conflict had a profound influence on the four-party accord (Nasser, 2008).

Each party had positioned itself according to its alliance with regional stakeholders. Moreover, major events in the region would put pressure on the policy-making ability of the parties to the accord. The Four parties to the accord have agreed that all international agreements must reach a consensus before being endorsed by the government. The tribunal of the assassination of PM Hariri was led by the International Organization of Justice and all the previous investigation was conducted by international agencies. From a political point of view, two parties of the accord saw the tribunal as a target to themselves, the Hezbollah and Amal movements. The future movement led by Hariri Jr and the socialist party led by Jumblat saw the tribunal as an international requirement and obligation by the Lebanese state. However, the accord stipulates a unanimous agreement among all four (Nasser, 2008).

Many meetings were held between Hezbollah and Saad Hariri at Mr. Nasser's house. It was agreed between the two-party leaders to further discuss the legal structure of the tribunal. And for that, a meeting was held between Dr. Baheig Tabbara and Hussein El-Khalil at Mr. Nasser's house. It was agreed that they would require time to further discuss and agree before sending to the cabinet of ministers and endorsing it by the government. The day after the assassination of Gebran Tueini, the local political landscape changed. The Siniora government rushed a session to vote on the establishment of the tribunal and approved it without the consensus of the four parties (Nasser, 2008).

As a reaction, the ministers of Amal and Hezbollah protested the endorsement of the tribunal and declared to pause their participation in the cabinet meetings; however, not resign from their respective positions. This was a protest by the two parties against the parties in the Quadripartite Accord and not the government and state. And the position they took was made clear by their media outlets against their partners in the shadow state

and not the state as they remained active in the parliament and associated ministries (Ayoub, 2006b).

The Shia ministers decided to withdraw the vote when Hezbollah justified to refuters that the withdrawal decision was a sign of opposition against the political coup over a previously stated agreement that concluded means of dialogue and approval among the Quadripartite Alliance before meeting up around the governmental table. Only then, Nasrallah declared, in the presence of mediators, that Hezbollah stands against the Court for two reasons: namely religious and political. When he came across the oral detailed explanations made by vice minister Baheej Tabara, he seemed to be open to giving up many of his reservations and even supported their establishments, on the condition that some restrictions are to be adjusted to secure transparency of their functioning and refraining them from any potential politicization (Nocolais Nassif, 2010).

A novel political perspective appeared on the horizon opposing attempts to manipulate the mutual quadripartite political understanding into the minority and majority authority game, such a will emerge as a reflection of apparent external pressures, parallel to political majority forces, along with ruining a few interests that were intended by some authority personnel. A lot has been narrated about the situation of the two parties during the “War of July” where the main theme was a crisis mutual of mistrust, or even worse. One of the parties accused the other to be a mere tool at the hands of the Syrian Iranian forces, targeting to derail the International Tribunal by disturbing the operation of capturing the two Israeli soldiers. Yet the same party accused the previous partner of evading commitments made through the dialogue table or in bilateral marathon sessions (Ayoub, 2006a).

The situation went worse when the two parties described the connection between the two foundational parties of the Quadripartite: Hezbollah and the Future Movement, as being mutual deception. PM Saad Hariri stated that five days before the capture, he warned Nasrallah, quoting the French President, Jacques Chirac, not to execute such a procedure, and to consider Gaza's status as an example after the capture of some soldiers. Nasrallah then promised to terminate any procedures of such kind. The procedure was albeit executed, knowing that it was previously planned at the exact spot, specifically on the 12th of July, it was also proceeded by detective processes over a month and a half, before pledging to implement it. How could I rebuild trust with him? A statement that was repeatedly said in the grand palace (Zedan, 2019).

4.3.3. The Reaction to Two Government Policies (May 7, 2008), the Empire Strikes Back

On May 5, 2008, the Siniora government developed two policies: the dismissal of Colonel Wafiq Choucair (the Airport security attaché from the military) and the handing over of Hezbollah's private telecom network (Al-Akhbar, 2011). At the state level, the two policies seem to be produced by the government that gained its confidence from the parliament. However, the production of the two policies did not generate from the shadow state nor was a consensus by the four parties of the accord. These policies created divorce by all four parties of the accord and an end to the functioning of the shadow state. This moment was the epitome of the collapse of the local aspect of policy production and the government structures.

The two policies came in the aftermath of the 2006 Israeli aggression. The four parties to the accord had been split over the result of this war (DeVore, 2012). The Future movement and the Socialist Movement saw the war as a breach by Hezbollah to the

accord by conducting a military operation without the consent of the shadow state. On the other side, Hezbollah and the Amal Movement had an opposite view. They viewed the military operation by Hezbollah as part of the ongoing resistance force that was agreed upon and a pillar of the agreement (May, 2019; Nasser, 2008).

Furthermore, these two policies have indicated how power sharing is a process that starts outside government and structures. And, emphasized the ability of the shadow state to use the street as dubbed by Lebanese media under the pretext of sectarian rights. All four parties utilized the events that ensued into a mini-civil war in Beirut and the Chouf region by claiming the protection of their respective sectarian rights (Ayoub, 2006a).

4.3.4. Doha Accord, a New President Refurbished the Electoral System, a New Narrative of Rule

Hezbollah appeared to be loyal to allies who supported it during the previous battle. It is admitted that a few political forces enjoy higher popularity such as Michel Aoun and Suleiman Frangieh than any other governmental affiliates, especially among the Christian majority members. It rendered unacceptable anymore to neglect such forces, consequently, any future meeting between Hezbollah and the Future Movement, at any level, cannot skip their interests. They own the right to introduce their demands and express their skepticism at recreating a new form of Quadripartite Alliance. In return, and particularly upon realizing the new areas of sectarian, religious, and political divisions designed by the new political alliances, whereas not a single community is focused on one direction, accordingly, any political divisions would be managed via rooting means of awareness, with the condition that it may not reverse the national interests of the public (Rais, 2005).

The situation necessitated the existence of an Arab mediator, namely Qatar (Kusumawijaya & Machmudi, 2022); but still there emerged a sort of impairment in the process considering the outcomes and consequences of the war (Barakat, 2014). There still is a critical role that must be played by internal factors, namely President Nabih Berri in addition to permanent mediators such as Mustapha Nasser. What could be achieved through those aspects and the meeting of Nasrallah and PM Hariri's framework post the feasts, and what may be concerned with the time boundaries relevant to the rights of the International Tribunal and presidential elections by the surrounding regional developments? (Nasser, 2008).

After an arduous power-sharing game, a semi-civil war erupted under the pretext of policymaking. Two government policies: the removal of the airport commander and the confiscation of Hezbollah's private telecommunication was more than enough to declare the collapse of the parallel system and its ability to diffuse conflicts (Abdul-Hussain, 2009). Hezbollah followers went to the streets and took control of the city. While condiment by the international community, the event called the 7th of May gave birth to a constitutional power-sharing agreement called the Doha Accords. The political parties in conflict went to the Qatari capital and resolved the 3-year power-sharing struggle. It is important to note that this agreement is written and has created a culture of sectarian veto (Rais, 2005).

Moreover, this accord declared the demise of the quadripartite accord. It also addressed issues that the quadripartite accord was not capable to resolve. Most importantly the election of a new president (Knio, 2008). The Lebanese army commander Michelle Suleiman was elected by the consensus of the local political class reached in the city of Doha which further indicates the rule of the shadow state in Lebanon. As well as

the arsenal of Hezbollah was set to be discussed under a new banner called the Defense forced strategy. Which again did not resolve the issue but left it to the shadow state's ability and willingness to resolve such matters.

The Final effect of the Doha Accord on the quadripartite accord was the agreement to the new concept of a unity government. The new cabinet of ministries was to be a partnership with the shadow state (Dakhlallah, 2012). No one party will have two-thirds of the number of cabinet ministers. This in turn created the sectarian veto. The logic of the quadripartite accord was to agree on policy production outside state structures. With this new accord and the cabinet structure, the shadow state moved inside the government (Nasser, 2008).

CHAPTER 5

DISCUSSION

This small country is a regional and perhaps global line of contact. As the famous saying goes, “You can stay away from strategy, but the strategy cannot stay away from you”.

In the world of settlement policies, Lebanon, with its current system, appears to be a unique state that uses democratic mechanisms aimed at ensuring participation in governance, and other consensual mechanisms aimed at preserving the principles of coexistence, which deserves the description of “consensual democracy” par excellence.

Lebanon descends from one crisis to another (Owen, 2013). The ruling class has lost the ability to stop the collapse while the power of the Taif Agreement and its regional patrons is either standing in a deep crisis (Syria) or watching (Saudi Arabia) or waiting (the United States) until Allah (God) writes something that was supposed to be done by the “Ayat Allah” (Iran). One of the social customs and traditions in Lebanon is that the supporters dress their leader in the traditional Arab cloak; which is embellished with shiny gold (belt) buttons, as a tribute to his leadership (Zeidan, 2021).

A symbolic sign that carries many meanings and purposes and is not devoid of striking paradoxes. It does not matter the education, culture, or project of the one wearing the cloak; what is more important is preserving the value of the cloak at all costs. The priority of the value of the cloak is for the leadership over other economic programs, social conditions, and political strategies. A scene that embodies the fate of Lebanon, whose people are suffocating between the value of the cloak (sectarian rights) and the value of the state (citizen's rights). Between the rights of the sect and the rights of the

Lebanese state are stories as old as Baalbek Castle, and perhaps more. The rights of the sects needed a special Lebanese container or social contract called (الصيغة); this contract has always narrated the history of the community, its legacy, geography, demographics, fears, the excess of its strength, and relations. In modern history, at least since the middle of the nineteenth century, the contract was a vivid expression of the balance between local power and the external support that can be stimulated for the interest of this or that group in this small country and its area from the time of the Subprefecture to the present day.

The conflict between the contract (community rights) and the state is apparent in the literature of the civil war era of the last century (Fahrenthold, 2019). From the saying "the wars of others on the land of Lebanon" through "there is no winner and no loser" to "The road to Jerusalem passes through Jounieh." The Lebanese went on to support the world revolutions and the Arab wars (Ryan, 2014). The reasons for the outbreak of the Lebanese war itself are still unknown; was it a Lebanese-Lebanese war, or was it the wars of others in the land of Lebanon? The Taif Agreement will remain just a pierced cloak for a contract that has expired and a state that has not and will not come. Is it time for a new Lebanese establishment, and is it necessary to start from scratch? In the world of settlement policies, Lebanon, with its current system, appears to be a unique state that uses democratic mechanisms aimed at ensuring participation in governance, and other consensual mechanisms aimed at preserving the principles of coexistence, which deserves the description of "consensual democracy" par excellence (Haddad, 2009).

In the closed meetings between Saad Hariri and Sayed Hassan Nasrallah, the discussion was about the affiliation of individuals in the regional conflict. While the candidate as per the sectarian distribution of positions a Muslim Shia, Hezbollah had reservations on some. Citing some may have affiliation with the embassy. And vice versa

some reservations came from Saad Hariri's side. It is worth noting that in the documents of Mr. Nasser, the discussion between the four parties were conducted under the pressure of regional events. And that the decisions made have been influenced by such events and not dictated as is perceived in the media by the four parties at times (Nasser, 2006).

At times of conflict between the four parties due to regional pressure, the local media arm of each party would portray the other party as a member of a certain foreign party. Thus, the treasonous position is for the benefit of the country and state. However, after the regional pressure is dissipated, we find in the documents their discussions and agreement between the parties on policymaking (Nasser, 2008). This only indicates that the conflict and agreement among the local parties are influenced not managed by foreign stakeholders.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

In this study, I investigate the nature of power and the state of Lebanon, and the implications of past practice in understanding the role of the state in producing policies and managing the state. I have found that the traditional concept of the ‘state’, as often understood by Western policymakers is valid in Lebanon. However, this definition implies a binary division between official and unofficial structures and between state and non-state actors.

In Lebanon, the state power resides outside the official structures, and to a large extent, its relationship with the public sphere can be described as follows: a horizontal relationship among elements of the elite and a vertical relationship between the elite and citizens. The interaction between these two axes is the role of the shadow state. The political parties, armed groups, and societal leaders compete and cooperate while relying on ideology, economics, and violence to maintain and exercise power.

For policymakers to understand the existence of the shadow state need to consider these systems of social power, as well as acknowledge the resilience of the shadow state along with the state. The description of state ‘failure’ is by design not result. Lack of accountability and an incoherent political system along with an elite political class has created the emission of a stateless Lebanon. Policymakers also often share this interpretation of the governance picture, at times labeling Lebanon as failed or failing state.

Yet in strict accordance with the definition of a state, the state in some form is very much present in Lebanon, even though it may not appear so to those who define the state

as a concept emerging from European history. This study interrogates the nature and effects of these power relationships through the documents of Mr. Nasser. It takes as its starting point the proposition that power in Lebanon is not the state. Although formal structures do play a role, power is principally exercised through competition and cooperation between the elite and actors such as political parties, armed groups, and societal leaders. Such practices are also responses to the instability that has beset each country's political system. I have read and come to conclude that the Lebanese leaders rely on an array of tools to maintain power in this way. These tools fall into three broad categories of ideology, state structures, and the use of violence and interaction with the institutions of government and with society. The leader or group that maintains effective relationships both 'horizontally' and 'vertically' can be said to enjoy power in the state.

During the period between 2005 and 2008, the Lebanese state faced a seemingly imminent and existential threat. It has been characterized as on the brink of collapse. Protests and bottom-up challenges to the ruling elite have led to movements calling for revolution. Infighting between parties and leaders— epitomized by repeated delays in the choosing of prime ministers or cabinets – let alone a war in 2006.

However, state collapse has not materialized in the country because state power has not been confined to government institutions. Instead, the shadow system of power has proven durable. Fragility in power systems, rather than the absence of the so-called 'neo-Weberian' institutionalized state, is the key to understanding whether Lebanon indeed is stateless. This is on the verge of collapse or simply muddling through successive crises.

Understanding the nature of power in Lebanon is critical to addressing persistent questions about state existence and formulating realistic conclusions. Policy thinking

should focus not only on the fragility or so-called hybridity of institutions or actors *per se* but also on the systems of shadow state in place. Acknowledging the shadow state provides a more realistic framework in which to define a state in Lebanon as observed from the documents of Mr. Nasser.

I must note that the intentions of the political parties in the accord were one of a caretaker to the state. I would use this analogy to summarize my understanding of the dialogue and information in the documents of Mr. Mustapha Nasser. States typically assume the role of the parent in the complicated relationship between public and private affairs, which is the total opposite in Lebanon. On the other hand, the ruling elite views their role as the parent of an only child called the “Lebanese State”. They simply, among themselves, have different and vocal views of how this child must behave, think, and at all times react to regional and international affairs and conflicts.

While the work of Mr. Nasser remains uncompleted it is incumbent on me to continue the analysis and research of the role and nature of the shadow state. The research can expand further by analyzing the effect of this period on the practice which resulted in the collapse of the financial and economic sectors. That being said, the shadow state was instrumental in building rhetoric of rule for Lebanon a study I which continue by perusing my Ph.D. through the basis of this thesis.

APPENDIX 1

MUSTAPHA NASSER'S PERSONAL DOCUMENTS

التكوين التاريخي للبنان الحديث -

من القرن السابع عشر

أما هو يدل لبنان على كل من القرنين ضمن الرولة الضمنية
مكمله بالقطاعات

حتى عام ١٨٤٠ وانفجار الوضع بين عموري الموارنة والروز

ويعود نظام القائم مقامين بينها طرف بيروت
حيث امتد التساوي حتى تاريخ

(دائما تدفن اجلي .)
ثم كان للباب العالي الفعلي طرفه نصيب القائم مقام
ويعاونه حيث للطوائف وقت ربي

هذا أدى الى فتن ذروتها ١٨٦٠ حيث حوكم
القطر الطائفي واهل الشرف فتمل وتزمرت في قرية
وتزوج منه الف حواجن وانتقل في ايامه

ولانت معا هذه مع حركتها صيدا بركاها
كول العرب المسيحي (لنصره الطائفي) فزف
وارسل اسطول
وارسلت طرف ١٤ الف عسكري
لما تدفن عواريات طائفة الطائفيين

امان ١٨٦٠ ادى الى نظام مدير هو الطائفي
حتى احره العالمين الرومي، طائفي الاصل
ويشرح النظام الطائفي وهو اكليل
(٧) للمسيحيين - و (٥) للمسلمين

ويعودها جاء لبنان الكبير بعد اذ كان العالم الاول

①

ومنذ الستينيات إلى ١٩٤٢ دور أوزار الصف
١٩٥٨ - ١٩٦٩ - اتفاقية القاهرة - ١٩٧٥ ^{الاتفاقية}

والوزمة التي ^{لله} وما ضمنه من عفو وانحيازها ^{سنوات} و
وطقت اتفاقية الروم. هذه هي من كل لبنان موزعة انقباران كل عدة
سنوات، مما ارتقت المجتمع والدولة وكل المؤسسات
فما يلي المستندات

الاتفاقية الطائفية جلبت كل هذه الوثائق
المستتره.
وصاية مصر (نابلس) ١٩٥٦
في تاريخ الاستقلال، ^{مصر}
وصاية اسرائيل ١٩٤٤ - ١٩٨٤
وصاية سورية ١٩٥٠ - ١٩٥٥
وصاية اسرائيل كوكيل مصر في اليوم
أذوقية
المستند في صفة الدولة والنظام التي شئت كما ضماها
الوطائيات

كل وصاية لها جو اعلى الوطائيات المستتره مصر
الوطائيات الفلسطينية مع فلسطين بالروس
الوطائيات العراقية اسرائيل
الوطائيات السورية سورية
الوطائيات الجزية الله اسرائيل
ليس المستند انبه او بنت اليوم هي دائمة
مادام النظام الطائفي، والدولة كما نظامك هي

(A)

الاتفاق الرباعي .

بعد إنشاء (٨) ازار و (١٤) ازار باسمه

الاتفاق على الاتفاق الرباعي وخلقته فقط

يغطي (٨) ازار العليه السياسيه ١١ نائب بعدا كاله
وقابل شرطين : الاول ان يكون بالاتفاق بين حوزة الله
والجيش الحريري حوله صلاح المطاوعة (صلاح حق الدم)
والثاني ان يكون في الامور الاساسيه خارج حيز الازرار

- تقرير الدستور - اعلام الصواب والفاوض
- المرور الى - المعاهدات الدوليه
- الموازنة - الخطط العمائيه
- اعداد التعليم الدرسي - حل حيز النواب
- قانون الانتخابات - قانون الحبي
- الحوال الشريعه

٤٨
تمت
٢٠١٤

من ضمن كى ان له اى حيز الطيفه
بعد حسن نصر الله الذي اتف به بالاتفاق
ليس زما صهي الرضيل بل تجر حرامه مع
حركة اهل وعرفا .

فخر الله اللدم صوه اعلاميه كبرى اذا لم يكن علمه
حتى نصر الله قاي اضن منه وعليه
فانظى القوه سعرضا له قدر ازان كبرى
العلم واقه صفت الرواى والبشر ، والنظا انطاني
مانصيه الصفتا المرصن .

٢ (3)

تسمه A فاصلي (٣)

وخلنا في جتره السنوره الاولى
حيث ان الفتح في حال تنفيذ البشري
التشاور خارج الوزارة
وسلام المقارن

وقامت من قور
عظمت قور (م) ازار مفعول الغلبه المينابه
لرح (١٢) ازار في كل مراقبه استخباره

مجلس الوزراء
مجلس النواب
الشارح
باسم الجمهور

انجب الوزراء وفقدت هزغته
اقفل
مجلس الوزراء
والتي دور الرئيه طوره
المطل

بند من المفاوضه اجمع خارج الحكم للتحقق
وكان له استخبارات بيايه حيث ولا قور
وله ربيت جمهوره ٨ دور له

- وجرى مبارك الوزير ايمان بنهم حوبت تحت الزمان
نكده وصول وكل طائفه

وصل شد الحمال اكي له ايار
انجزت كوريات (القراريه)
وقت التمهيد عدوا عندها يعني قفل محل
الوزراء سامن

وتبين ان اللطه على قورياتها كلفه

جزء اتفاق دولي وايطالي ومحلي في الدوله
وعادت الامور الى ايام اتفاق الرماي

الدكت المفضل = امير راض عبد الوزاره
باله مور الرماي به ايامه (ما سمى بانه اتفاق البشري)
لذغلب

ك (٦)

وسلم مع المقاومة لهزال خارج الاتفاق العربي

الدوم نحن في مهمة الاستخبارات
تصل الى نفس الموضوع سلم مع المقاومة
والثلاث المصطلح
او سلم مع المقاومة والثالث ور خارج مع الوزراء
بين الفريقين الوطنيين

الاحتلال العربي والوفاء العربي / العربي
والعربي العربي

لتبريد السياسات والا فكل فكل
انضمار كما هي فكل لسان
الاستقلال فكل اليوم

اله اذا تغير النظام الحاكم او هو العلم مع اسرائيل

(5)


APPENDIX 2

CONSENT FORM TO USE MUSTAPHA NASSER'S PERSONAL DOCUMENTS

Information Sharing Consent Form

I, Maha Saadeh hereby give my permission for Mr. Tariq Fareed Zedan to share the personal documents of my late husband Mustapha Mohammad Nasser with the American University of Beirut for research purposes related to his thesis as part of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts to the Public Policy and International Affairs Program at the Department of Political Studies and Public Administration of the Faculty of Arts and Sciences at the American University of Beirut.

Signature: Mrs. Maha M. Saadeh



21/8/23

Date and Time: At 16:00pm Tuesday the 21st of August 2023
Beirut, Lebanon

REFERENCES

- Abdul-Hussain, H. (2009). Hezbollah: A state within a state. *Current Trends in Islamist Ideology*, 8, 68-83.
- Al-Ahed. (2008). Mustafa Nasser Tells Nasrallah-Hariri Meeting Secrets! *Al-Ahed News* <https://english.alahednews.com.lb/5504/385>
- Al-Akhbar. (2011). Marwan Hamadeh | The legal father of May 5 decisions. <https://al-akhbar.com/Politics/88152>
- Al-Amin, I. (2006, November 3). Does Washington agree with Riyadh's initiative, or does it urge Jumblatt and Geagea to reject it? الأخبار.
- Amery, H. A. (2002). Irrigation planning in Lebanon. *Modern traditional irrigation technologies in the Eastern Mediterranean* 111.
- ARAFAT, Y. Profile of the President.
- Atiyyah, A. (2021). *From the conditions of culture and politics in Lebanon during the war (1975-1990)*. Arab Center of Research and Policy Studies
- Atzili, B. (2010). State weakness and “vacuum of power” in Lebanon. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 757-782.
- Ayoub, H. (2006a, 10 20). حكاية الموعد المعلق بين نصر الله وسعد الحريري متى بدأ التعارض ... وأين. موقع الحرب الإسرائيلية في إسقاط التحالف *Assafir*, 1.
- Ayoub, H. (2006b, 10 21). لأن الصراع السياسي وليس مذهبياً ... ولأن الكبار يلحون على التسوية نصر الله. والحريري: الحوار يشمل الحلفاء والمحكمة والحكومة والرئاسة *Assafir*, 1.
- Ayoub, H. (2020). Al-Hariri and Bassil seek help from Al-Khawaja: The government is postponed! <https://180post.com/archives/14883>
- Badran, S. (2020). The dissolution of the Lebanese parliament: A perverted application of the parliamentary system. *Digest of Middle East Studies*, 29(2), 200-214.
- Bahout, J. (2016). *The Unraveling of Lebanon's Taif Agreement: Limits of Sect-Based Power Sharing*. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
- Barakat, M. (2021). Tire - Khaldeh - The port- Shwayya: Hizbullah is besieged? <https://www.asasmedia.com/news/389961>
- Barakat, S. (2014). *Qatari mediation: between ambition and achievement*. Brookings Institution Washington.
- Barnett, T. (2003). Why the Pentagon Changes Its Maps
And why we'll keep going to war. <https://www.esquire.com/news-politics/a1546/thomas-barnett-iraq-war-primer/>
- Barnett, T. P. (2005). *The Pentagon's new map: War and peace in the twenty-first century*. Penguin.
- Baumann, H. (2012). The ‘New Contractor Bourgeoisie’ in Lebanese Politics: Hariri, Mikati and Fares. *Lebanon: After the Cedar Revolution*, 125-144.
- Baxter, S. (1994). *Arab-Israeli War, October 1973: Lessons Learned, Lessons Forgotten*. Naval War College.
- Blandford, N. (2011). *Warriors of God: Inside Hezbollah's thirty-year struggle against Israel*. Random House.
- Blanford, N. (2006). *Killing Mr Lebanon: the assassination of Rafik Hariri and its impact on the Middle East*. IB Tauris London.
- Botrous, P. (2014). Government Authorship... revives the "Quadrupartite Alliance". *Al-Jumhuriyyah*. <https://www.aljournhouria.com/ar/news/114858>
- Bou Akar, H. (2005). *Displacement, politics and governance: access to low-income housing in a Beirut suburb* Massachusetts Institute of Technology].

- Boueiz, F. (2023). حاول بوش في مدريد إقناعي بمفاوضات ثنائية مع شامير فرفضت. [Interview].
<https://aawsat.com/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B4%D8%B1%D9%82-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A/4452646-%D8%A8%D9%88%D9%8A%D8%B2-%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9%88%D9%84-%D8%A8%D9%88%D8%B4-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D9%85%D8%AF%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%AF-%D8%A5%D9%82%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%B9%D9%8A-%D8%A8%D9%85%D9%81%D8%A7%D9%88%D8%B6%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%AB%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%85%D8%B9-%D8%B4%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D9%81%D8%B1%D9%81%D8%B6%D8%AA>
- Chesterman, S., & von Einsiedel, S. (2004). Dual Containment: The United States, Iraq and the UN Security Council. In *September 11, 2001: A Turning Point in International and Domestic Law?* (pp. 725-756). Brill Nijhoff.
- Cordesman, A. H., & Sullivan, W. D. (2007). *Lessons of the 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah war* (Vol. 29). CSIS.
- D, M., & Al-Harithy, H. (2021). The [framing] of heritage in the post-war reconstruction of Beirut central district (Lebanon). *Urban Recovery: Intersecting Displacement with Post War Reconstruction*, 239.
- Dakhlallah, F. (2012). The Arab League in Lebanon: 2005–2008. *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 25(1), 53-74.
- DeVore, M. R. (2012). Exploring the iran-hezbollah relationship: A case study of how state sponsorship affects terrorist group decision-making. *Perspectives on Terrorism*, 6(4/5), 85-107.
- Dionigi, F. (2012). Lebanon: the politics of a penetrated society. In: JSTOR.
- El-Kak, F. (2012). Lebanon: Can Introduction Be Too Quiet? In *Emergency Contraception: The Story of a Global Reproductive Health Technology* (pp. 169-177). Springer.
- Fahrenthold, S. D. (2019). *Between the Ottomans and the Entente: The First World War in the Syrian and Lebanese Diaspora, 1908-1925*. Oxford University Press.
- Fanack. (2010). Foreign and Regional Intervention in Lebanon (2005-2008).
<https://fanack.com/ar/lebanon/history-of-lebanon/second-republic-since-1990/foreign-and-regional-interference-in-lebanon-2005-2008/>
- Faour, M. A. (2007). Religion, demography, and politics in Lebanon. *Middle Eastern Studies*, 43(6), 909-921.
- Fawaz, E. (2009). What makes Lebanon a distinctive country? In *Lebanon: Liberation, Conflict, and Crisis* (pp. 25-33). Springer.
- Gambill, G. C. (2010). Syria's Triumph in Lebanon: Au Revoir, Les Ententes. *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, 14(4), 26.
- Gause III, F. G. (1994). The illogic of dual containment. *Foreign Affairs*, 56-66.
- Gause III, F. G. (2014). Beyond sectarianism: The new Middle East cold war. *Brookings Doha Center Analysis Paper*, 11, 1-27.
- Haddad, S. (2009). Lebanon: from consociationalism to conciliation. *Nationalism Ethnic Politics* 15(3-4), 398-416.

- Hamouche, N. (2022). Two Years After the Port Blast, Lebanon Struggles for Renewal. <https://www.resetdoc.org/story/two-years-after-the-port-blast-lebanon-struggles-for-renewal/>
- Harel, A., & Issacharoff, A. (2008). *34 days: Israel, Hezbollah, and the war in Lebanon*. St. Martin's Press.
- Harris, W. W. (2012). *Lebanon: A history, 600-2011*. Oxford University Press.
- Haugbolle, S. (2010). *War and memory in Lebanon* (Vol. 34). Cambridge University Press.
- Hazbun, W. (2016). Assembling security in a 'weak state:' the contentious politics of plural governance in Lebanon since 2005. *Third World Quarterly*, 1053-1070.
- Hirst, D. (2010). *Beware of Small States: Lebanon. Battleground of the Middle East*.
- Iskandar, M. (2006). *Rafiq Hariri and the fate of Lebanon*. Saqi London.
- Karam, K. (2012). The Taif Agreement. . *New order, old framework*, 36-41.
- Khatib, L. (2021). How Will Lebanon Come Out of Its Political and Economic Crisis? <https://www.ispionline.it/en/publication/how-will-lebanon-come-out-its-political-and-economic-crisis-32421>
- Khoury, R. (2021). Inheriting Lebanon is an impossible task. <https://www.independentarabia.com/node/250871>
- Knio, K. (2008). Is political stability sustainable in post-'cedar revolution'lebanon? profile. *Mediterranean Politics*, 13(3), 445-451.
- Krayem, H. (1997a). Conflict resolution in the Arab world: Selected essays. *Selected Essays*.
- Krayem, H. (1997b). The Lebanese civil war and the Taif Agreement. *Conflict resolution in the Arab world: Selected essays*, 411-436.
- Kusumawijaya, K., & Machmudi, Y. (2022). Qatar foreign policy in Middle East conflict mediation. *Jurnal Middle East Islamic Studies* 9(2), 2.
- Leenders, R. (2017). *Spoils of truce: Corruption and state-building in postwar Lebanon*. Cornell University Press.
- M Diss, F. S. (2017). The distribution of power in the Lebanese parliament revisited. *GATE WP*, 1723.
- Mac Ginty, R. (2010). No war, no peace: Why so many peace processes fail to deliver peace. *International Politics*, 47, 145-162.
- MacQueen, B. (2009). Lebanon and the Taif Agreement. Political Culture and Conflict Resolution in the Arab World: Lebanon and Algeria. *Victoria: Melbourne University Publishing*, 37-89.
- Mahdi, S. (2021). Lebanon crisis: between the ambition of the people and the fragility of the political system. <https://democraticac.de/?p=78382>
- Makdisi, S., & El-Khalil, Y. (2013). Lebanon: The legacy of sectarian consociationalism and the transition to a fully-fledged democracy. *Research Policy-Making in the Arab Worl*
- Maktabi, R. (1999). The Lebanese census of 1932 revisited. Who are the Lebanese? *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, 26(2), 219-241.
- Mansour, A. (1993). *Al-Inqilab Ala al-Taif [The Coup Against the Taif Agreement]*. . Dar al-jadid.
- May, S. (2019). The rise of the "resistance axis": Hezbollah and the legacy of the Taif Agreement. *Nationalism Ethnic Politics* 25(1), 115-132.
- Miller, E. (2012). Morsi's warm letter to Peres sparks anger and denial in Egypt. <https://www.timesofisrael.com/morsi-letter-to-peres-sparks-uproar-in-egypt/>

- Mokalled, M. (2022). النظام ليس طائفياً أهل النظام طائفون. <https://www.alarabiya.net/politics/2022/01/04>
- Mouawad, J. (2017). *Unpacking Lebanon's resilience: undermining state institutions and consolidating the system?* JSTOR.
- Mouawad, J. (2020). Unpacking Lebanon's Resilience: Undermining State Institutions and Consolidating the System? The EU, Resilience and the MENA Region (eds. Colombo S., Dessi A., Ntousas V.), Brussels: Foundation for European Progressive Studies (FEPS) and Rome: Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI). In.
- Mouawad, J., & Baumann, H. (2017). WAYN AL-DAWLA? *The Arab Studies Journal*, 25(1), 66-91.
- Nasser, M. (1998). In *Personal Documents*. Beirut.
- Nasser, M. (2000). Personal documents In. Beirut.
- Nasser, M. (2004). Personal Documents In. Beirut.
- Nasser, M. (2005). In *Personal Documents* Beirut.
- Nasser, M. (2006). In *Personal documents* Beirut.
- Nasser, M. (2007). In *Personal documents*. Beirut.
- Nasser, M. (2008). In *Personal documents*. Beirut.
- Nasser, M. (n.d.). In *Personal documents* Beirut.
- Nasser, M. (Retrieved in May 2020). Mustapha Nasser's Private Documents. *Consensually retrieved from Mustapha Nasser's family*.
- Nassif, N. (2007, December 7). Biting fingers between loyal and opposition: He loses who screams brother first. الأخبار.
- Nassif, N. (2010, May 13). The Experience of the Dry Years: Siniora, Hariri, and Tabbara. الاخبار.
- Nassif, N. (2010, 5 3). تجربة سنوات الجفاف: السنيورة والحريري وطبارة. *Al Akhbar*.
- Nassif, N. (2011a, July 9). Between Loyalty and Opposition: a different style of Governance. الاخبار.
- Nassif, N. (2011b, July 19). Nasrallah-Hariri: Impossible Trust. الأخبار.
- Nawfal, M. (2023). 180 إعادة هيكلة السلطة السياسية.. لبنان واللعبة الجيوسياسية. *post*.
- Nic Cheeseman, E. B. a. S. e. H. (Online version 2019). A dictionary of African Politics. *Oxford University Press*.
- Nick Cheeseman, E. B., Saeed Husaini. (2019). *A dictionary of African politics*. Oxford University Press.
- Norton, A. R. (1991). Lebanon After Ta'if: Is the Civil War Over? *Middle East Journal*, 45(3), 457-473.
- Owen, R. (2013). *State, power and politics in the making of the modern Middle East*. Routledge.
- Rais, F. R. (2005). POST-TAIF ACCORD DEVELOPMENTS IN LEBANON. *Strategic Studies*, 58-82.
- Randal, J. (1990). *The tragedy of Lebanon: Christian warlords, Israeli adventurers and American bunglers*. Chatto & Windus.
- Rizq, S. (2022). The Impact of Sectarian Quotas on the Stability of the Lebanese Political System: A Case Study of the Shiite Sect "2005-2014". <https://democraticac.de/?p=83463>
- Ryan, C. R. (2014). Inter-Arab relations and the regional system. In *The Arab uprisings explained: New contentious politics in the Middle East* (pp. 110-124). Columbia University Press.
- Safa, O. (2006). Lebanon spring forward. *J. Democracy*, 17, 22.

- Salamey, I. (2013). *The government and politics of Lebanon*. Routledge.
- Salibi, K. S. (1961). Lebanon since the Crisis of 1958. *The World Today*, 17(1), 32-42.
- Salloukh, B. F. (2006). The limits of electoral engineering in divided societies: Elections in postwar Lebanon. *Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue canadienne de science politique*, 39(3), 635-655.
- Sandford, A., Davies, P., & Tidey, A. (2020). Beirut blast: Macron pledges international aid as protests erupt in Lebanon. <https://www.euronews.com/2020/08/06/beirut-blast-port-officials-under-house-arrest-as-anger-grows-at-lebanon-s-elite>
- Shebaya, H. (2023). Lebanon's Politicians Are Incapable of Productive Dialogue. <https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/lebanons-politicians-are-incapable-of-productive-dialogue/>
- Szekely, O. (2015). The costs of avoiding transitional justice: Lessons from Lebanon. In *Transitional justice and the Arab spring* (pp. 94-111). Routledge.
- Taleb, W. (2022). The possibility of a single alliance: Lebanon's opposition groups ponder how viable a united front is in upcoming polls. <https://today.lorientlejour.com/article/1289767/the-possibility-of-a-single-alliance-lebanons-opposition-groups-ponder-how-viable-a-united-front-is-in-upcoming-polls.html>
- Tariq F Zedan, "" (2023, May 5). آلية صناعة القرار السياسي في لبنان: دولة التحالف الرباعي. *AlMajala Magazine*.
- Terry, J. J. (2005). *US foreign policy in the Middle East: the role of lobbies and special interest groups*. Pluto Press.
- UN. (n. d.). *The Taif Agreement*. United Nations
- Zahar, M.-J. (2008). Power Sharing, Credible Commitment, and State (Re-) Building: Comparative Lessons from Bosnia and Lebanon. *Comparative Southeast European Studies*, 56(1), 35-57.
- Zalghout, Y. (2022). The concept of the state in a mixed society (the case of Lebanon). <http://www.awraqthaqafya.com/1943/>
- Zedan, T. F. (2019). الجورنالجي و كاتم الأسرار. شركة المطبوعات للتوزيع و النشر.
- Zedan, T. F. (2023). أناقة السياسة. الشروق.
- Zeidan, T. F. (2021). عباءة غازي كنعان المثقوبة.. وطوائف لبنان المأزومة. <https://180post.com/archives/17594>
- Zeidan, T. F. (2023). The Mechanism of Political Decision Making in Lebanon: The State of the Quadripartite Accord. <https://www.majalla.com/node/290751>