

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY OF BEIRUT

THE ROLE OF PALESTINIAN RESISTANCE IN
MAINTAINING THE CONFLICT STATUS QUO

by

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Approved by




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ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS OF

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The Palestinian resistance transformations in methods and the development of the performance was made by trial and error by many internal and external factors through the history of Israel Arab conflict. Started as a regional nationalism conflict, where all borders were a battlefield then it turned into territory conflict by fragmented factions in Gaza and West Bank. The uprisings from 1987 to 2005 led to two political gains, Oslo accord and international recognition of PLO and the withdrawal from Gaza. The deterrence plans and the Israeli power imbalance during the two uprisings couldn't succeed to dominating the resistance and positioning them in the optimal point of control. Attrition values and unstable conflict cycles on both sides led to peace discussion. Confrontation after the withdrawal from Gaza 2005 gave the Israeli better positioning and the attritions were mostly in one side, which allowed them to be in discussions positioning of the power game. The Palestine resistance was not in any day a resistance of political factions; it was individual and community collective consciences, as history indicates that the conflicts never end as well the dream of the Palestinian state. Lion's Den and Lone Wolves' activities are the expressions of objection on the grievance, political process, and the historical Palestinian factions' modus operandi. The Palestinian Authority and factions' management of the political gains led to losing both resistance and the strong political position where internal conflicts, corruption and multinational programs were the reasons thereof. The push and pull factors to resist for the Palestinians are different based on the interests of the factions, the Palestine authority ended up generating new conflict cycles with no solutions and open confrontation and de-escalation with no political gains or terror balancing in front of effective deterrence strategies by Israel. The resistance optimal equilibrium (ROE), which is a terminology I coined from the Social Optimal equilibrium, showed the best use of resistance when the Israelis changed their deterrence methods many times and the attrition levels increased to reach political solution and better positioning for the Palestinians and that is by separation of non-violent resistance from violent resistance in West Bank in the second intifada, the mass peaceful protesting under at least some national objectives and in avoiding the escalation in Gaza strip.

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ABBREVIATIONS

CR: Civil resistance

FF: Fateh Faction

IDS: Israeli Deterrence strategy

Israeli: Colonizers

P: Power Factors

PA: Palestinian Authority

PF: Palestinian Factions

PLO: Palestinian Liberation Organization

PNVR: Palestinian non-violent resistance

PR: Palestinian resistance

Min PR: Minor Palestinian resistance (mainly stabbing, throwing stones, clashes)

MPR: Major Palestinian resistance (mainly use of explosives, rockets, hard military attacks)

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Overview

This thesis is divided into seven chapters. The first chapter will provide an overview of the historical background of the foundation of Palestinian resistance, main transformations, Israeli national security, security doctrines, and the theoretical framework around the definition of the conflict as asymmetric conflict. The second chapter will present the methodology used in this thesis, which is a case study approach. It describes the selection criteria for the participants and the data collection methods used. The chapter also provides a detailed explanation of the data analysis techniques used in the study.

Chapter 2: The methodology I used to extract the models, sources, comparison between types of resistance by number of losses, political gains and equation of power that was created by the factors of pull and push to attack.

Then chapters 3,4,5, and 6 will explore the dynamics of the Palestinian resistance movement and strategies within big and major events that happened in the new history of Palestinian- Israeli conflict. The thesis will begin by discussing looking at the first intifada: Types of resistance adopted by Palestinians mainly popular protesting and throwing stones, how this type of resistance affects the deterrence policies, and the power equation that led to political Gain. Then the thesis will present in chapter four: The resistance during Oslo agreement with new factors emerged as Palestinian Authority security coordination and new Islamic organizations, and mainly it was military attacks in all of Palestine that led to new intifada - Resistance was unmanageable. Also, chapter

five will explore the resistance during the second intifada using both popular protesting and more aggressive military operations. The new power equation created led to the political agreement (withdrawal from Gaza) and unmanageable Resistance forms. Another major event will be discussed in chapter six which highlights the transformation of the Palestinian Resistance after the Israeli military withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and focuses on how more factors emerged as humanitarian needs and political interests of the authority of Hamas (Pull Factors) where it was Manageable Resistance. Chapter Seven will keep tracking the Palestinian resistance in the west bank and how the new military groups emerged and the power equation changed but was still manageable due to different pull factors., in addition this thesis also recognized the turns that resistance took and focuses on Nonviolent resistance in Palestinian-occupied areas in 1948 lands and its impact on the power equation. The last chapter will include the finding of the thesis and the conclusions that focus on analyzing how current types or forms of resistance are enhancing the status quo of the conflict cycles between Palestinian and Israeli occupation.

The international pressure factors (Arabs, U.S, EU, Iran, Turkey, UN) were not calculated in the power equation because the study focused more on three pillars (attrition by resistance, deterrence tools, and the conflict's status quo). However, I addressed the role of Iran in militarizing of Gaza and supporting the new armed groups in west bank and the role of Egyptian government in blockade of Gaza borders. I believe that the role of U.S , Iran is constant but the role of the other members of the international committee is variable according to the level of aggressiveness in the conflict and the reasons behind it such as settlements in west bank.

1.2. Historical Background

The Palestine – Israeli conflict passed through different contexts and variables since the Ottoman empire from 1904 till 1914 in the second wave of Jewish immigration

that took over the land of the peasants (TelliÖĖIU, 2019) where the resistance started, then the British colonization era and the Israeli colonization, and in each phase the means of resistance and counter resistance took new shapes and limitations. The Palestinian Liberation Organization PLO and Palestinian factions used many routes to position themselves strongly, get some rights, and achieve liberation as a strategic objective. The means are the popular uprising since 1936, the military operations locally and regionally as groups, individuals, and factions (Sayigh, 1986), the peace negotiations process (1979 -1993) (Rawan, 2013), that crafted at the end Oslo accord Sep. 1993 (Kelman, 2007), and the non-violent resistance as the last sheik jarrah struggle 2023 (John, 2022). In my thesis, I am addressing the impact of the resistance on the Israeli counter resistance policies. To narrow down the research Economic, political and social approaches will not be weighted as answering the question of the effect of resistance on the Israeli military budget where the aim of the study is which kind of resistance had the great impact on the Israeli national security that led to a peace agreement or any sort of political gain.

The Palestinians resistance began as popular local revolts between Palestinians and Jewish settlers 1920 to 1948, then infiltration and retaliation from 1948 to 1967, then low intensity conflicts from 1967 to 2000 and the last phase was mowing the grass of nonstate armed group from 2000 till present (Adam, 2021).

Adopting a process of keeping a fragmented weak resistance that adopt conflicted approaches at minimum risks was the belief of Israelis that this will lead to a solid control over the resistance activities, and consequently, Israelis will prevail. The best positioning will be preserved by Israel for a long term using disengagement strategy, and matrix of suppression, dominance, and outstanding international diplomacy (Jeff, 2006), where the conflict is characterized by an asymmetric conflict, which produces certain power

dynamics of control and attrition, and its emerged after the cold war (Amanda et al., 2022). Understanding the asymmetric conflict term with many contexts and commonalties drives us to frame other types of asymmetries as power asymmetry happens when there is an imbalance of all kind of power as the Palestinian organizations versus the Israeli , then strategic asymmetric when both sides are asymmetric in their power and strategic and tactical approach in the conflict as using the classical institution of army and intelligence (State strategies) where on the other side Palestinian used military guerrilla warfare, and Then the structural asymmetric when conflict parties have different positions and try to change the structurally rooted cause of the conflict as securitizing the land by (Israeli) mitigates any changes of superiority in the relations toward the opposite side (Gallo & Marzano, 2009), which is trying to liberate a region or acquire some rights (Palestinians). Palestine and Israel, Taliban and the Americans, or IRA and Sinn Fein in Northern Ireland are examples of asymmetric power in a conflict.

The above definitions are useful to describe the Palestinian case. Looking through the framework of the above discussed concept, the asymmetric Palestinian conflict is characterized by power asymmetry, structural (ethnic cleansing occupation) violence, and incompatible strategic interests. Power asymmetry is measured by international acquiescence and funding of the state of Israel, international sympathy to holocaust, war on terror and military prowess. Structural is violence of the partnership between military and social legal institutions in uprooting and ethnically cleansing Palestinians. Strategic is how both sides view peace differently due to strategic interest of political actors that cannot agree on lasting peace. peace resolution challenging as both parties relentlessly engage into battles of proving their existence from both sides.

Ze'ev Jabotinsky is Ze'ev (Vladimir) Jabotinsky (1880 – 1940) was a Zionist leader – the founder of the Revisionist Movements and founder of the Iron wall concept in his article in 1932 (knesset, n. d.), that was built according to him on one main goal is to (fortified military front – and to stubbornly defend the Zionist position). Avi Shlaim, an Oxford historian and Israel expert said that (Israel has adopted a plan¹ based on an essay written before the formation of Israel by the Zionist intellectual Ze'ev Jabotinsky. More detailed examination of Jabotinsky's Iron Wall concept is important since it gives a realistic view of Israeli defense policy as well as a pattern for integrating control measures (pre-emption and defense) and coercion (deterrence-denial and punishment) in a bid to accomplish a long-term and continuous denial effect) (Avi, 2001).

The two approaches mentioned by Jabotinsky and explained by Shlaim according to current Israeli deterrence policies are deterrence by denial which is to make any form of resistance is useless and wants work like the apartheid wall that reduce the number of military operations in the Israel part in west bank but the deterrence by punishments is to the threat of punishment if the attack happened (Michael, 2018). Both concepts will be measured and defined by real examples from the conflict cycles and the deterrence strategies.

The Palestinian-Israeli conflict, since the recognition of the Israeli state (Jewish Virtual Library, n. d.) and the rise of the resistance by the insurgents in 1936 (Middle East Eye, 2021) against the British colonization and later against the Israeli Ethnic cleansing in 1948 (UN, n. d.), the conflict is characterized by concentration of power and the superiority of the Israeli against the Palestinians with all means of political, economic,

¹ Deterrence plans based on the iron wall concept

and military power which renders the conflict asymmetric (Palma Feres, 2018). Both parties grow under different political, socioeconomic, security, ideological, and international factors, which establish certain power dynamics that craft the decision-making process of escalation and stability. The Israelis (counter-resistance²) for instance against any resistance act from individuals or organized groups is based on the main objectives to protect national security, survival of the state, and military superiority over the whole region (Jansen, 2008) without any consideration of the Palestinian needs, while the Palestinian resistance is seeking political and human rights gain, revenge, and the liberation of the land. Several changes have occurred in the Palestinian resistance's strategy, structure, style of violent conversation, competence, decision-making process, and the restoration of nonviolent resistance. Since 1918, as a result of several circumstances, the Israeli army doctoring and counter-resistance programs have played a significant role.

This study will unpack the means of resistance and the transformations that happened negatively or positively from the history of the conflicts, escalation and de-escalation of incidents and the means of resistance used such as (Popular uprising , violent resistance ,Nonviolent resistance) in its impact on the Israeli counter resistance polices and plans such as (Punishments, securitization of the community and target killing) The thesis will try to answer four main questions whether these means of resistance caused attrition to the Israeli or not? which type of resistance were powerful that led to political solution ? , if there is a relation between the status quo of the conflict cycles and pattern of using same type of resistance? and what equations of power can we

² Counter resistance because counter terrorism term will classify and judge the Palestinian side.

extract from the four periods that may be considered as factors hinders the resistance means to be evolved? . The study will analyze the means adopted by Palestine groups, individuals and political factions in four historical periods, During the 2 intifadas and after Oslo Agreement Then after withdrawal from Gaza till 2022 and I will study Hamas as a model of the Palestinian factions.

Some of the terms used in study need to be clarified as Colonizers: who are taking control of the country by using force and using ethnic cleansing approach (BDS, n. d.). Means: (such as using rockets, kidnapping, stones, Stabbing and guerrilla fight tools) where transformations could be in terms of resistance methods, from guerilla fight to non-violent resistance or change in location or the whole approach can be changed, such as sending rockets from Gaza only. The status quo of the conflict is the regenerating of escalation and de-escalation cycles and the same repositioning of the conflict parties such as the superiority of the Israeli or revenges of the Palestinians without any political changes. The counter resistance policies are the anti-terrorism polices adopted by the Israeli government that include the army, intelligence tactics, plans and rules of engagement during the period of the study. I will be focusing on four main Periods, first intifada (1987 – 1993), then after Oslo Accord, from (1993 -2000), then second intifada from (2000 to 2005) and then after withdrawal from Gaza (2005-2021) These years witnessed a deflection in the Palestinian cause and a lot of transformations in both Palestinian resistance and the Israeli counter-resistance policies.

CHAPTER II

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

In this literature review I will discuss historical background of the Palestinian resistances, then types of resistance used by the Palestinians moreover the literature will cover the arguments around the main terms that related to the study as asymmetric conflict, Israeli national doctrines and counter resistance policies and conflict cycles patterns.

The Literature review I used is based on three pillars. The first one researches on deterrence policies and Palestinian resistance history, forms and transformation, while in the second pillar is the Israeli expert thoughts, theories about power dynamics and the nature of the conflict, and in the third pillar is Palestinian approaches and hypothesis about the conflict and forms of resistance. In The literature review I tried to find academic researches that study the impact of the Palestinian resistance on the Israeli deterrence polices and its role in the s status quo of the conflict.

2.1 Historical Background

The term "resistance" goes back to World War II, when it was originally used to describe the clandestine movements taking place across occupied Europe, particularly in France. Year later, the word was eventually adopted by national liberation organizations, opposing colonial powers in the Third World. This historical legacy is strongly connected with the term and individuals affiliated with it, offering a credible, almost glorious depiction of resistance fighters combating over invading troops. This tendency eventually

extended all across the Middle East, beginning with the National Liberation Front in Algeria, while the greatest linkages were obtained from its adoption by Palestinian organizations and people since the late 1950s (Valensi, 2016).

The Palestinian resistance started with the peasants from 1882 -1917 when the migrant Jewish east Europe built the first settlement called Petah Tikva, 1886 which witnessed the first clashes (Halperin, 2017), then with the resistance from 1917-1936 of the British colonization and the increase of the Jewish immigrants. The resistance back then used the popular strikes, unorganized armed cells and political struggle (Halperin, 2017). In 1936, the first organized armed groups emerged by Iz Eldin al Qassam and when Arabs and Palestinians requests for end of occupation and oppression was not met, the Arabs revolution occurred between 1936 and 1939 using Guerilla war against the Zionism and the British colonization in different locations .The British colonization support the Zionism by destroying 5000 villages and open 14 prisons (Kabha, 2014). The resistance at that time was at the national level and the impact was 2 rounds of negotiations and the international community pushed to ask Arabs to be mediators to reach de-escalation. The absence of strategic planning, lack of resources and the Second World War improved the superiority of the Zionist movement and the British colonization. In 1965, the first Palestinian success was achieved by establishing the first resistance organization (Fateh) that used Arab countries (Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, Syrian) as bases to its operation (Sayigh, 1984).

Palestinian-Israeli conflict, which started 73 years ago, transferred from regional military conflict during the Arab nationalism era to internal asymmetric conflict after the occupation of the Palestinian lands in 1967. After 1967, the Israeli government tried to reduce the conflict by decreasing interactions with the Palestinian society and supporting

the Palestinian local authorities such as leading municipalities and villages committees, and later after Oslo by the Palestinian authority. That was the general framework approach with a non-considerable impact planned by Moshe Dayan after the occupation in 1967 (William, 1981). The conflict is more complicated to be solved by local authorities or humanitarian assistance. The Palestinian resistance was active throughout Palestine, especially in the first and second intifada seeking political gains and at least the withdrawal of the Israeli from the land occupied in 1967.

Throughout the history of the Israeli state, national security was the main concern and interest of the government, where the society lived under threats every day, shaping the doctrine of the Israeli army (great power patron) and a (red lines punishment) principles (Cohen et al., 1998). After the Oslo accord on September 13, 1993, the Palestinian resistance power factors changed by new variable as fear of civil war with the PA (Palestinian Authority) (Hassan, 2011). While on the Israeli side, Oslo had changed the counter terrorist policies radically (Byman, 2011). The Palestinian resistance before the Israeli disengagement from Gaza in 2005 (Baker, 2015) took many forms (protesting, military operations using car explosives, human martyred in all of Palestine in addition to political and legal resistance). After 2007, the resistance used rockets, tunnels, protesting, and antitank rockets) from Gaza strip only and very few individual initiatives in West Bank. In 2007, Hamas took over Gaza, as the ability to build, innovate and develop the faction's military bases became easier. After 50 years of occupying the 1967 lands, Israelis brought 600,000 settlers to the West Bank, took 100,000 hectares from Palestinians (Amnesty International, n. d.), and imposed many rules and procedures of counter-resistance that humiliated the Palestinians, which increased the level of war escalation (Goodman, 2017). Since 2007, the Palestinian resistance and counter resistance

Israeli approaches have not been the same in Gaza and the West Bank. The control over the society by the Israeli government became not only by military power but also by securitizing the community, which may be the reason behind the current peace deadlock and status quo of the conflict. Israeli national security policies were founded on deterrence measures, with the goal of preventing Israel's adversaries against invading or harming its inhabitants, or at the very minimum prolonging the intervals of peace amid clashes. Israeli Mossad was in charge of alerting the country of an impending collapse of Israel's deterrence, enabling security forces to prevent any assault and restore deterrence (Golov, 2016). See (Appendix).

2.2 Resistance Forms and Impact

The Palestinians Guerilla fighters (hit-and-run) since 1965, caused calculated threat by the Israeli with no considerable impact (Hudson, 1972) when the Palestinian organizations were fighting regionally during the rising of nationalism in Arab countries, which led at the end to military withdrawal from surrounding countries due to conflicts with the incubators and bad planning. Regardless of the political reasons, the resistance strategy was not planned, organized nor protected well by the Palestinians (Hilal, 1980). Even when they moved to international military operations in 1972, such as Munich operation and hijacking of airplanes that brought world attention in media and negative impact where no country will accept to support international terror according to Daniel bayman (Byman, 2017). In The first and second intifada and after the withdrawal of the colonization from Gaza, Palestinians still adhered to their right to defend themselves and express their objection by all means of resistance according to the scholar Abdul Wahab Almusairy (Almusairy, 2008). The literature review shows multiple of explanation of the

impact of the means of resistance in front of the counter resistance policies of the Israeli colonization in an asymmetric conflict. According to middle east task force who is advocating for non-violent resistance in Palestine that non-violence resistance was more powerful than any means of resistance and it was born since the British colonization back to 1930s and led to induce peace negotiations (Middle East Task Force, 2005). According to Dr. James Zogbi, President of the Arab American Institute, Palestinians threw stones, shot them with guns, when they use guns they brought tanks and when they sent rockets they bombarded the whole area (James, 2022).

Mubarak Awad, one of the leaders and founders of the non-violent resistance strategies, also stated that (Resisting evil with the gun is one method, but we can also resist evil with non-violent means, and that means discipline, strategy, training, and knowing your opponent) (Mubarak, 2015). On the opposite side, the military resistance that falls under the Palestinian factions, individuals and unknown cells, which used different means such as shooting, stabbing, sending rockets, kidnaping soldiers, burning farms, hunger strikes and martyrdom operation in West Bank, 1948 lands and in Gaza was still the adoptable solution. To the best of my knowledge studies focused more on the impact of the resistance on the legal, political, economic and human rights negative consequences and less on the relation between deterrence policies and the resistance as the patterns of the conflict cycles to generate itself or lead to negotiation .

For the violence dialogue, researchers discussed the counter resistance consequences as per the analysis of Pia Therese Jansen in his book (the consequence of Israeli counter-terrorism policy) . Jansen studied the long term consequences of the Israeli counter resistance policies and he stated that it can prevent some attacks but its the root cause of continuous resistance and revenges, moreover his approach was based on

enhancing and enforcements of the socio- economic, and political conditions that build a sphere of useless need to attack by the Palestinians and how the Israeli should decrease the damages of counter resistance that leads to less attacks (Jansen, 2008). On another level, some researches shed light on security means against the Palestinian faction without the reflection on the means of the opposite sides and its impact on the national security according to what Mitchell Bard discussed regarding the barriers in West Bank, Gaza and Lebanon (Mitchell, n. d.), or the development of the resistance as expansion, means, political dimensions and tactics away from its value on colonization power according to what Majed Al Kayali, a Palestinian writer, mentioned in his book (the discussion of weapons) that shed light on the development of resistances, while comparing old and new strategies adopted. As a result, he concluded that resistance developed, improved and gained more points to Palestinians. However, the strategic planning failed due to corruption and fragmented Palestinian factions and what we means by fragmented is not under hegemonic leadership (Majed, 2020).

Regarding security and deterrence policies, researches and sources were various in terms of the impact of the securitization on the Palestinian society that led to dehumanization of the community and caused more violence, where the Israeli historian Mikha Goldman considered security polices and the increase of Palestinian population is a real threat as the Israeli government had to reevaluate the situation based on long-term strategy, by providing economical and humanitarian needs that reduce tension. (Goodman, 2017) The Palestinians consider violent dialogue is their right, while the colonization considered the use of power as a special mean or physical pressure neglected all human rights and led to bloody consequences (Byman, 2011). The violent dialogue uses means that are changeable according to the different spheres and socio-economic

variables on both sides. Ami Ayalon, head of the General Security Services Shin Bet, said “Hundreds of people died in our streets and I was angry. More than any other feeling. I was angry because, for us in the Shin Bet . . . it was clear that we were going to face a wave of violence, a popular uprising, what we call intifada, and it was written in all our papers, in all our analysis, and nobody was listening. I remember that I met cabinet ministers and prime ministers, I even approached the press, in order to try to send a message to the public debate, and I couldn’t” (Molly, 2020).

The structural asymmetric conflict between Palestinians and Israelis to take over the land or to control the society went through accumulated years of conflict (Gallo & Marzano, 2009) so it’s hard to test the impact of any potential change in the equation easily, where sometimes no change in rules of engagement gives a better positioning for one party over another. The structurally asymmetric conflict life cycle is depicted in Figure 1 as follows:




Figure 1 The Structurally Asymmetric Conflict Life Cycle

The model in Fig 2 is the Curle-Lederach model shows how conflict cycle takes place along two dimensions: power balance and awareness. When conflict starts, the power balance is not too high and awareness of both parties to their objectives is high and motivated by ideological and political legitimacy. The model assumes that when both parties are aware of their rights, sustainable peace becomes reachable despite many conflict cycles. In our studied conflict, there is high level of awareness of rights and legitimacy for both sides where one side's objectives are liberation, and other side's objectives are permanent resettlement through occupation and ethnically cleansing. The assumption of high level of awareness of both parties would lead to lasting peace does not hold true in the studied conflict because the dominant power (Israel) does not appease its nullification policy.

The conscientization and confrontation phases are where conflict reaches a deadlock (new conflict cycles that could be after deescalating period or peace agreement, comes with it different set of security and engagement rules evolves. From seven decades same pattern of conflict cycles uses political violence and violent dialogue (Vinson, 2015).

Yakoov Amidror, the former General and the Security Advisor of the Israeli government he doesn't agree on the term of unwinnable wars against insurgent even if other specialists as General Wesley Clare said it's an unwinnable war and what Rand recommends that the U.S will not win in Iraq because it an unwinnable war and they have to find other solutions. On the other side, Yakoov's believes that sufficient victory is not to destroy terrorism but to keep the minimal risk and prevent terrorists from outburst. The 6 principles that secure the defeat of the terrorist groups are (The decision of the political

echelon to defeat terrorism and to bear the political cost of an offensive, Control of the territory from which the terrorists operate, Relevant intelligence, Isolating the territory within which counterterrorist operations are taking place, Multi-dimensional cooperation between intelligence and operations, and Separating the civilian population that has no connection with terrorism from the terrorist entities)³. This paper will show that the Israeli government uses all these principles to keep its superiority and a good positioning and it indicates that political solution will not be the first option to choose. Sergio Catignani⁴ "Bitsum" is the hebrew word that means "to do" that shed light on the army doctrines, knowledge made them fighters, classical army with no abstract thinking to different theories of counter insurgents ⁵, that continuously generates conflicts.

The conflict dynamics stand on a few pillars. One of the major pillars is security that is involved in regenerating and reducing the conflict cycles at the same time (Goodman, 2017). The counter resistance methods used by Israelis are permit system and closure policy, selective killing, demolition of houses, deportation, administrative detention, interrogation methods, and the fence (Jansen, 2008) that guarantee the control over the land and the society. All these methods are working under social, political, laws, and international factors and are being used on Palestinian authority, society, and the factions (Alon, 1982). On the other hand, the Palestinian resistance and society are using different means and methods, which are improving, and which witnessed many transformations and were peaceful protesting, legal battles, military operation as

³ <https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/93849/Winning%20Counterinsurgency.pdf>

⁴ Israeli Counter-Insurgency and the Intifadas: Dilemmas of a Conventional Army, by Sergio Catignani.

⁵ https://www-jstor-org.ezproxy.aub.edu.lb/stable/pdf/25482580.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A3cac749a9b922f21f7f90fd776101cbe&ab_segments=&origin=&initiator=&acceptTC=1

martyrdom, car explosives, rockets, individual military operations, kidnapping of Israeli soldiers, and hunger strikes (Valensi, 2016) by factions, individuals and secret groups that guarantee the existence and the continuous insurgent act.

Both conflict parties adopted strategies that guided their pull and push factors. For Palestinians, the main principles are mobilization of the community, accumulation of military power, Arab and Islamic communities being part of the struggle, keeping the enemy in alert mode, the surrounding region as a long-term supporter especially Lebanon, and the Islamic ideology as one of the main provocative reasons to struggle. On the other hand, for Israelis, there are eight main doctrines, namely nation-in-arms, strategic defense, operational offense, short wars for limited ends, quality versus quantity, red lines, self-reliance and great-power patron¹⁴.




Figure 2 The use of force by the Israeli power during the conflict based on the target of the attack and intensity of the attacks

Fig 2 shows the use of force by the Israeli power during the conflict based on the target of the attack and intensity of the attacks. Y Axis shows targets such VEO (Violent Extremist Organizations) and are classified as “Direct actor as the launcher of the rockets. Indirect Actors is (proxy Actor) such using PA to arrest assailants or by closing borders. The scale of violence should maintain the deterrence objective and minimizing the risk. The objective of the dominant power is not to eliminate the resistance, and instead is to control of the means of resistance.(Vinson, 2015)

Security studies discussed the impact of the intifada as a mean of resistance , the colonization counter-resistance policies , human rights, the use of technology, and how to reduce the tension and the conflict cycles by supporting the humanitarian part according to what Micah Goodman, an Israeli historian and thinker, mentioned in his book *The Masada 67* (Goodman, 2017). Others discussed how the Israeli Government engineered the social and political structure of the Palestinian society to have full control over the resistance and the whole community using the Foucault theory of soul and body, as they assumed that all the securitization in West Bank and Gaza was to control Palestine minds and body and to change their consciousness toward the occupation where pull factors improved in a way that does not encourage any terrorist ideas (Moughrabi, 1992). On the other hand, other studies discussed the power dynamics between resistance and colonization regardless of the internal factors that hinder the Palestinians to be a weighted variable in the security equation as corruption, political division, limited resources, weak economic and social structure, many security breaches, being disconnected geographically, the Apartheid wall, international accreditation and peace agreements¹⁷. Some studies argued that counter resistance policies in terms of numerical values tried to measure the impact of such policies on casualties or how they minimize the negative

consequences in the medium and long term such as controlling the level of killing and substitutes (Alon, 1982). First, through "deterrence by denial" refers to the deployment of available force to prevent the adversary from attaining his aims by defeating him militarily or stopping him from carrying out his threat. Second, "deterrence through punishment" is used to penalize the adversary by threatening to destroy his key infrastructure.

The counter-resistance methods couldn't eliminate or reduce the frequency of conflict cycles and the daily tension on the ground. The counter resistance studies in the case of structural asymmetry were beyond merely using power but were controlling and continuously monitoring of the life cycle of the insurgents, community, their literature, funding, mindset, and the modus operandi of their activities. The study will try to define the most powerful means based on the level of control from the colonizer side and the disruption of the security system that could lead to a change in the power dynamics and the status quo of the ongoing conflict.

CHAPTER III

METHODOLOGY

I used the descriptive and historical analytic approach as follows

3.1 Data collection

The data for this thesis included a corpus of different documents about the modern history of Palestinian resistance and the deterrence policy of Israeli occupation in Palestine. The corpus of documents was retrieved from Israeli official documents published by Jewish library, ministry of foreign affairs, Israeli writers and officials, human rights centers as btselem and research centers as RAND. This thesis views the forms adopted that shaped Palestinian resistance and how Israel elaborated their deterrence policies according to the power dynamics with Palestinians. Those two parameters were used to identify power equations resulting from the interactions between Palestinian resistance and Israeli deterrence policies, and through both of the parameters, data sets were identified and interpreted. The data resources were primary and consisted of electronic documents. It also included policy documents and speeches for Israeli politicians and prime ministers such as Isaac Rabin and Yuval Diskin the Israeli general security director. In collecting data about Palestinian resistance, I depend on a large spectrum of sources such as press releases, fact sheets, op-eds Research centers, and press briefings. While collecting data about Israeli policies I took a different approach and set different criteria for sources, taking way to depend on only Israeli formal sources while collecting data about Israeli deterrence policies. I used More than 120 academic resources that address the power dynamic and conflict resolution between Palestinians and the Israeli.

in-depth review of many documents that cover main major events in the Israeli-Palestinian modern history, exclusionary criteria were applied and data were filtered based on:

1. Publication date: only relevant documents for four main events will be identified as a sample. The events are:(the first intifada in 1987, the second intifada (2000), post- Oslo agreement (1993), and post Israeli military withdrawal from the Gaza Strip (2007)
2. Filtered based on depth and discussion: about relation between change in resistance forms and change in deterrence plans and the attrition values
3. Filtered only which are deprived of reliable sources: such as Israeli. Palestinian and independent statistical and research centers

Although there was a limitation of language to dig more in Hebrew sources but the many translated sources from Hebrew were relevant to the research question and reliable.

3.2 Data Analysis

Data samples were categorized and sorted into groups based on each event. In each I tried to explore and analyze the following:

1. Form of Palestinian resistance in the period of time
2. Deterrence policy Israeli occupation used to defeat or minimize the risks of the Palestinian resistance
3. Look at whether both parties plans and activities had led to any political gains or not
4. What power equations resulted from these events

I analyzed the data samples to extract the following:

- Equation of power that was made (power dynamics)
- Indicators of attrition on both sides (the number of casualties)
- Fast and continuous changes in the Israeli policies and plans to end the violent cycles, take control of the situation, and if the resistance means lead to a solution or regenerate another conflict cycle using the same pattern.
- Factors that affect the decision-making process (pull and push factors).

Through analyzing the content of data sample, I examined the relationship between the increase of attrition values, securitization, and the Palestinian resistance forms that led to political gains.

3.2.1 Resistance Optimal Equilibrium Model

The analysis of each period encouraged me to craft a model of (Resistance optimal equilibrium) when the resistance is unmanageable or Israeli optimal equilibrium where they keep the statusquo of the current conflict cycles

I will use this model to analysis the finding and reach a conclusion about the relation between the statuesque of the conflict and the resistance means. in the four periods. The model crafted from the result of the equation of power as type of resistance + (pull or push factors) Versus Israeli deterrence policy (denial or punishments) = Attrition high or low that lead to new conflict cycle or Peace negotiations

CHAPTER IV

THE FIRST INTIFADA (GENERATION OF THE STONES 1987 -1993) AND ITS IMPACT ON THE ISRAELI DETERRENCE POLICIES

In this chapter I will discuss the means used by the Palestinian resistance organizations, PLO and the Palestinian community in the first intifada and analysis its impact on the deterrence plan by the Israeli government. The chapter will discuss what do you mean by Uprising and mass protesting (is intifada as one of a powerful types of resistance), the losses from both sides, power equation and the how deterrence plans failed to avoid high level of attrition from the Palestinian side that led to peace agreement. Also in this period new Islamic movements established as Hamas and Islamic Jihad they were involved in the resistance.

The intense Mass protesting by the Palestinian community during intifada fallen under rebellions sociology that is different than tracking a revolutionary party that seek to take over the authority. The uprising community has a common feel of frustration, and the refusal to follow the laws and legitimacy of the whole system is not considered at all (Study.com, n. d.). Governments used deterrence theories that reduced the number of people involving in the rebellion by how much the threat of the government will be active and the price of disturbance, and at the same time they will not be punished if they are outside the targeted groups. Increasing the punishment will also lead to revenge so the best practice according to security experts is to isolate the insurgents and a promise of reward that does not lead to revenges of the society, where we have to strike a balance between actions that could bring on terrible economic distress and a situation in which

they have nothing to lose, and measures which bind them to the Israeli administration and prevent civil disobedience. (Machain et al., 2011).

“We must always remember one main rule—even though it is simple and self-evident—if we are forced to fight, we will not fight in the past but in the future. And what was successful in the past will not necessarily be successful and appropriate in the future . . . Alertness requires us to check our means of defense from time to time considering the changing reality and to keep up with the times” (David Ben-Gurion, 1952)

The intifada in 1987 was the first uprising and revolt after 1967 war that seized the rest of the historical Palestinian borders (Jonathan, 2006), the civil resistance that spread all over Gaza, East Jerusalem and West Bank (Stein, n. d.), and on December 8th, 1987, for many reasons mainly colonization, arresting and expansion of settlers. Uprising and limited military operations took place all over the colonized areas using stones, stabbing, street trapes, strikes led by 'Unified National Leadership of the Uprising' (Zack et al., n. d.), and a few military operations. All ages were engaged in the strike; kids, students, women and political leaders (Shif & Ya'ari, 1990). Even if the intifada was a collective action and not one party was behind it, it was still considered as a resistance mean with special characteristics that brought power to Palestinians as the target is unknown for Israeli. The deterrence should be calculated sensitively in order not to increase the number of insurgents and revenges, as the colonizers' army is facing either classical army or armed groups which confused his rule of engagement. In the international law, colonizers have to protect Palestinians, therefore, using violence against them is a crime (Miskel, 2004).

According to the Israeli army, in the first four years of the intifada (more than **3,600** Molotov cocktail attacks, 100 hand grenade attacks and 600 assaults with guns or explosives were reported by the Israel Defense Forces. The violence was directed at

soldiers and civilians alike. During this period, 16 Israeli civilians and 11 soldiers were killed by Palestinians in the territories; more than 1,400 Israeli civilians and 1,700 Israeli soldiers were injured. Approximately 1,100 Palestinians were killed in clashes with

Palestinians killed in the Occupied Territories (including East Jerusalem)

Year	Palestinians killed by Israeli security forces	Of them: Minors under age 17	Palestinians killed by Israeli civilians	Of them: Minors under age 17
Dec 9-31 1987	22	5	0	0
1988	289	48	15	2
1989	285	78	17	5
1990	125	23	9	2
1991	91	24	6	3
1992	134	23	2	0
1993-13.9.93	124	36	5	1
14.9.93-31.12.93	30	4	8	0
1994	106	16	38	8
1995	42	4	2	1
1996	69	10	3	1
1997	18	5	4	0
1998	21	3	6	0
1999	8	0	0	0
2000 until 28.9	12	2	0	0
Total	1,376	281	115	23

Israeli troops) (Mitchell, n. d.). According to the human rights center B'Tselem, the statistics below show the number of casualties from both parties:

Figure 3 Palestinians killed in the Occupied Territories (including East Jerusalem)

Palestinians within the Green Line

Year	Palestinians killed by Israeli security forces	Palestinians killed by Israeli civilians
Dec 9-31 1987	0	0
1988	1	5
1989	1	2
1990	1	10
1991	5	2
1992	2	0
1993-13.9.93	7	2
14.9.93-31.12.93	4	0
1994.	7	1
1995	0	1
1996	0	2
1997	0	1
1998	0	1
1999	1	0
2000 until 28.9	4	0
Total	33	27

Figure 4 Palestinians within the Green Line

Power factors = (Palestinian uprising) + (Palestinian violent resistance) versus (Israeli counter insurgent policies and its development)

The Role: PF=PVR+PU Versus changeable ID Plans

Israelis killed within the Green Line

Year	Israeli civilians killed by Palestinians	Of them: Minors under age 17	Israeli security forces personnel killed by Palestinians
Dec 9-31 1987	0	0	0
1988	2	0	0
1989	17	1	5
1990	13	0	2
1991	7	0	4
1992	8	1	1
1993-13.9.93	6	0	5
14.9.93-31.12.93	3	0	2
1994.	47	2	4
1995	9	0	21
1996	38	7	15
1997	25	3	0
1998	1	0	0
1999	1	0	0
2000 until 28.9	0	0	0
Total	177	14	59

Figure 5 Israelis killed within the Green Line

The table shows Israelis killed within the green line

The unified leadership of the intifada had a clear instruction not to use guns or any military weapons but they dismantle how to make (Molotov), nails trapes, strikes and economic boycott. 5% of the activities kept military ones (Wafa, n. d.), its neither Guerrilla war nor terror campaign or a low intensity conflict (Inbar, 1991).

The mass uprising led to unifying Palestinian streets and forces, it brought back the Palestinian cause on the Arab table where at that time it was not at priority list in addition to the bad image of the colonizers at international level as per the international law perspective (Alin, 1994) and it was a great opportunity for the new Islamic movement as HAMAS and Islamic jihad to mobiles and proved its ability as a major player in the

conflict. The intifada was a shock for the Israeli, as no plans were prepared for that scenario, where it took them months to set a response and a strategy, for a colonizer that follows a strict counter resistance policy and mapping all risks. Instead, they were following a trial-and-error model (Inbar, 1991). Wise firmness policy pushed the army to be at the forefront instead of being at the borders police. Prime minister Rabin started to recognize that it's not the same that time (Inbar, 1991). The insistence of the Palestine resistance and community to keep the uprising fire flamed with snowball effect that broke the colonization's **first rule** of counter resistance is to reduce casualties and absorb the incident fast and strong by using thousands of troops and sticks and to separate the insurgents from the daily life by allowing those who want to work in the occupied territories, as Israelis tried to comprehend the streets (Inbar, 1991). This theory based on the assumption of giving humanitarian needs and economic benefit will reduce the resistance escalation but it failed to deescalate the uprising.

Rabin said no sticks killed and every insurgent will have a scar (Tedla, 2010). The Palestinian resistance set two strategic goals; the withdrawal from West Bank, insisting on civil protesting to a proof the absence of the rule of colonizer law and gaining international acceptance (Mishal & Aharoni, 1989). The colonizers used a higher risk assessment, which considers that the intifada touches the national security that changes the counter resistance plans to different power equation, which is using more violence and massive arrests around 170,000 Palestinians, as more than 23000 were interrogated by GCC (Neff, 1997), where according to Rabin it's sui generis situation especially that the IDF was on a battels against Arabs in Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt and Syria in classical armies war zones and not in front of insurgents (Cohen, 1994).

The Palestinian strategy of using stones, strikes and street nails was successful in mobilizing everyone who can join. The most powerful use of that means is that no rules of engagement can cover public uprising, where IDF is used to engage in normal warfare and that was huge shock to the counter resistance policies. The superiority of fire, airplanes and military means were undefined because it can't be used in such context, and that will be linked on the research of using rockets in Gaza that kept the imbalanced power. The Palestinian hard standing in the intifada could not be beaten by community punishments, detention and use of physical power. The Israeli is going to use different sets of counter resistance measures such as (limitation of freedom, economic constraints, and surveillance to hunt) by containment and pursuit plans (Cohen, 1993). Lengthy curfews were enforced on Palestinian towns and neighborhoods that reaches 24 hours, incarcerating individuals inside of their homes and putting an end to the enormous public engagement in the streets that had marked the First Intifada. Counting night curfews, Palestinian communities experienced 2,237 days of curfew throughout the initial 2 years of the Intifada. 118 of the 1600 curfew orders issued in 1988 and 1989 lasting more than 5 days. Curfews have also been enforced on holidays and feasts, putting the whole Palestinian community beneath lockdown. According to military orders, everyone who ignored the curfew for whichever excuse was shot to death. As a result, the economic status of the towns under long curfews became fragile and it was meant to push Palestinian back (Ikram, 1990), using special squad teams to kill and shoot in active area, in all means of counter resistance by short and sharp army doctoring or Rabin long physical, economical and general punishment. Streets were blocked to control the society's health and education, as well as demolish homes with a mix of military civilian means of grievance.

Approximately 130,472 Palestinians had been injured, 481 expelled, 22,088 held without trial, 2,533 houses demolished or sealed, and evenly important for the eventual division of the land, 184,257 Palestinian trees uprooted. The counter resistance strategies were not the best strategic methods for the colonization leaders such as Moshe Dayan, the Minister of Defense who believed that improving life conditions for the Palestinians is the only way to avoid social outburst (Nur, 2022). Improve Socio economic situation is a counter insurgents' method that didn't work in most of the conflict life cycles. The Palestinian resistance adopted the hand biting strategy in front of the long-term attrition policy. The increase of attrition and national security shocks led to peace discussions that wouldn't happen without a continuous pressure on the Israeli side. 80% of all act were stone -throwing incidents (Inbar, 1991)

The uprising ended because of the peace process that PLO believed it will bring back their rights. The Palestinian aimed to keep the status of their position until they achieved their target that was translated later into peace negotiation and political solution. Since the victory of 1967, Palestinians achieved the startup of the peace process, by Madrid discussions to Oslo, then international recognition of the PLO (Historian, n. d.). At that time, new Islamic resistance movements such as Hamas (Laub & Robinson, 2021), and the Islamic jihad emerged (Aljazeera, 2022), which were funded and supported by Iran. Both were involved in the intifada and it was fertile soil for them to recruit and to spread their doctrine.

The Israeli main questions were: Is the intifada a war to win? And what are the political objectives and security superiority in winning the war that may come again so their wining is to restructure their aggression, existence and throw the responsibility over the PA that led to less physical interaction with Palestinians?

The ideological shift was the result of new political circumstances. The dream of Greater Israel suffered a major blow after the outbreak of the first intifada in Palestinian areas, when thousands of young Palestinians went to the streets to throw stones and Molotov at Israeli army soldiers and Jewish settlers (Goodman, 2017).

CHAPTER V

1994 -2005 OSLO, AND THE SECOND INTIFADA (AL-AQSA INTIFADA)

In this chapter I will discuss Oslo accord implications in the power equation, the losses from both sides after Oslo Accord, the new Israeli deterrence plans and the indirect deterrence by the PA, and how the Palestinian power (attacks and protesting) was at the same power of the deterrence plans that cause high attrition values, in addition to the period after the second intifada that led to a political gain (Withdrawal from Gaza).

5.1 Oslo Accord and the indirect deterrence

Oslo Accord set new rules of engagement, the Israeli withdrawal from the villages and cities are geographically separated by (A, B, C Areas), which was considered as primary path to full withdrawal from the land of 1967 that never happened and in contrast holding the resistance activities that never happened also (Office of the Historian, n. d.). Regardless of the direct and indirect reasons of the second intifada that could be summarized in continuity of the colonization, settlers and oppression of the Palestinian human rights according to Btselem human rights organization (Carmi, 1999).

The new setup and the role of the PA tried to proof its control and power on the ground by imposition of capital punishment, mass, arbitrary detentions, imprisonment without trial and Torture. The PA joined the IDF efforts as indirect deterrence tool. During the that period from 1994 to 2005, the statistics shows as in table casualties from both sides continued after the peace agreement, which was not easy to implement in reality and it didn't reflect the willing of both parties as s community and the state.

The Palestinian resistance could use the legal battle and the peace process as a mean of resistance if it gave the minimum stabilizations and rights. Oslo was shorter than any umbrella that may cover all the conflict variables or a weighted value in the power equations. The Palestinian factions believed in military operations as a tool not to liberate only, but to gain stronger positioning in their theory of change (Byman, 2011). In that duration before the second intifada, the environment of the Palestinian resistance changed with additional variables as below:

Power factors = (Fateh + PA Legal resistance + Oslo) + (Palestinian violent resistance + Intifada 2 civil resistance) versus (Israeli new counter insurgent policies and its development) + (PA).

PF: F+PA Legal Resistance + Oslo +PVR +CR V ID (new rules + PA = attrition

Persons killed before and after the Declaration of Principles, 13 September 1993

	Before the Declaration of Principles (9 December 1987 to 13 September 1993)		After the Declaration of Principles (14 September 1993 to 30 April 1999)	
	In the Occupied Territories	In Israel	In the Occupied Territories	In Israel
Palestinians by Israeli security forces	1,070	17	270	11
Palestinians by Israeli civilians	54	21	59	6
Palestinian security forces by Israeli security forces	-	-	18	-
Total number of Palestinians killed by Israelis	1,124	38	347	17
Israeli civilians by Palestinian residents	47	53	43	124
Israeli civilians by Palestinian security forces	-	-	1	-
Israeli security forces by Palestinian residents	43	17	32	42
Israeli security forces by Palestinian security forces	-	-	16	-
Total number of Israelis killed by Palestinians	90	70	92	166
Total	1,322		622	

Palestinians killed in the Occupied Territories include those killed in Israeli detention facilities

Figure 6 Persons killed before and after the declaration of principles

increased with no control over the resistance that led to Peace discussions.

The Islamic resistance Hamas Role: Although the Islamic jihad (Erik, 2021) was established before Hamas and later believed in non-violent resistance in addition to other Palestinian factions but for research purposes, I will focus on Hamas as they were the elected authority in Gaza and the second biggest faction after Fateh.

During the late 1987, at the onset of the first Palestinian intifada, HAMAS was founded, with origins in the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, and is backed up by a robust sociopolitical system inside the Palestinian territories. The power of HAMAS is centered in the Gaza Strip and parts of the West Bank. The group's charter advocates for the establishment of an Islamic Palestinian state in place of Israel and opposes any agreements reached between the PLO and Israel.

During the 1990s, HAMAS has had a military wing identified as the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, which has carried out several operations against Israel in both Israel and the Palestinian territories. Massive attacks targeting Israelis, limited attacks, homemade roadside explosives, and missile strikes are examples of such attacks (Laub & Robinson, 2021).

“Between April 1993 and September 2000, 27 suicide attacks were carried out by Hamas that resulted in 120 of the 290 casualties, which Israel attributed to Palestinian terrorist organizations; between September 2000 and November 2004, 112 suicide attacks were carried out by Hamas, resulting in 474 of the 918 fatalities, which Israel attributed to Palestinian terrorist organizations.[13] It is noteworthy that during this second shorter time period, Hamas caused casualties four times more than Israel; moreover, the percentage of Israeli casualties of terrorism resulting from Hamas' attacks increased by approximately 11 percent.” (Singh, 2013).




Figure 7 Total casualties and deaths in Hamas Terror attacks from 1989 to 2000 (GoDaddy, 2015)

The Israeli strategies before the intifada were to separate the head from the body of the factions where they expelled 400 Palestinian leaders to Lebanon from Gaza and West Bank in 1992. However, this led to more attacks (Haberman, 1990), which means that the most powerful card of the resistance is the people who believe in the cause not in the leaders who took the first intuitive and nobody can arrest the whole population. These incidents show the strong PF tactics and the wrong ID perceptions.




Figure 8 Hamas Attacks 1992-1993

Palestine mass population protesting was under the sphere of peace process and a control of PA that felt like they lose the street if they will not take any action after the 1996 massacre (Jonathan, 2006) within the huge mobilization of Hamas and jihad movements. Unfortunately, the Israeli used the PA as third party counter insurgent to arrest resistance members or what so called ‘Indirect deterrence by de facto security forces’ (Kirchofer, 2016), where the PA tried to monopolize the power (Farish & Barney, 2020). From 1994 to 2005, the PA arrested hundreds of leaders, shut down organizations and tried to disarm them and even built forces for that purpose. Arafat claimed in 1993 that the formation of Hamas was Israel's mistake: ‘‘Rabin believed that by assisting Hamas, he could promote competition for the PLO. Rather, he instilled extremism’’ (Brinn, 1993).

The colonizers and the PA used deterrence by punishment, but Hamas and the faction overcame this challenging period, and the violent dialogue had its impact on the statuesque of the power dynamics between both parties (Al-Jazeera, 2005). From the colonizer perspective, the deterrence system failed to reduce the resistance strategies in

the first stage or in the second stage from 1987 to 2000 and the statuesque point of control was not achieved yet. The PA role was not completely a winning card for the colonizers, because the dynamics was not stable 6. However, this new resistance strategy will succeed in gaining new strong positioning or there are other pull factors that may take place. The IDF had to create new rules and terms to keep the peace process that protect its national security and to reposition new rules of engagement with less interaction with the Palestinians.




Figure 9 Fatalities since 2000 from the Israeli - Palestinian conflict (UN, 2007)

5.2 Repositioning and Enhancing Local Authority During the Second Intifada from 2000 to 2005

Israeli commanders, including Brigadier General Yaakov Amidror, were cautious of the evacuation from specific West Bank locations, claiming that "Israel's intelligence

capacity in Gaza had collapsed to nothing." Due to a paucity of intelligence, Israel's Chief of Staff, Amnon Lipkin-Shahak, stated that Israel has "no reaction for dealing with suicide bombers". Yuval Diskin, Shin Bet's Director General from 2005 to 2011 and a former member of the agency, recalls: "We pondered how we could prevent terrorism if we no longer controlled the territories" (Byman, 2011).

The resistance faced new set of rules of engagement that aimed to low willing to attack (less push factors) and less physical existence, and this was the first time that Israel set new terms as terrorism and local authority Rabin said (thus sought to de-link terrorism and the peace process: He vowed to 'fight terrorism as if there were no peace process, and work for an agreement as if there were no terrorism'). It's obvious that the Palestinian resistance bill was high in terms of deportation, target killing and detentions in additional of the role of the PA.

The figures demonstrates that military operations, mobilization, and rocket launches rose although the conflict's present system remained unchanged and the Israelis had almost no control over the conflict in the region cycles (Milton-Edwards & Farrell, 2010). In 1990s and until the second intifada, the counter measures didn't achieve the satisfactory level of conflict management for the Israeli at all. However, the colonizers didn't surrender as they kept searching for different counter insurgent policies that can put limitations and red lines for the resistance and achieve domination and control (Gallo & Marzano, 2009). One of the thesis policies by the PA is trying to engage Hamas in the peace process by 6% of the chairs but they refused the offer (Usher et al., 1994), the international anti resistance war on Hamas birth in Sharm Sheik summit in 1996 (Mubarak & Clinton, 1996). The Palestinian resistance was punished by Arabs, Israeli and the PA in a way Hamas couldn't work actively as before, such as Jordan that accepted

the peace discussion with PA (Pearlman, 2008) and that is an important factor in how to avoid international punishments where resistance kept its effectiveness and flexibility.

5.3 Security Plans Failed to Protect Israeli National Security

When Oslo Acord or the bargaining process failed, the second intifada uprising started from 2000-2005 under new equations of power and proved that deterrence policies failed at three levels: 1 to have local authorities who manage the security in the territory, 2 the mitigation of Hamas attacks and the factions, 3 the new uprising and expansion of the military groups. To summarize the resistance activities happened in the 2nd intifada they could be categorize as follows:

1. Peaceful protest adopted by the whole community.
2. Violent resistance in the occupied territory by Fateh faction and other PF
3. Violent resistance in all locations by Hamas, Islamic jihad and popular front

5.4 PA +PR+NVR Versus IDM + Destroying of PA Institution

PA+ Palestinian resistance violent and non-violent versus Israeli community punishment that include damages of all Oslo achievements as official buildings and free of movement privilege for the political leaders

The second intifada started as a tool for the resistance, as a way to gain more political pressure on the Israeli and it changed from protesting of thousands to an armed conflict and violence. When the PA tried to stop it, the Fatah leader Marwan Barghouti

announced that (are you not ashamed of asking this of us, we are still burying our dead. We must let the Israelis understand that we will not tolerate it anymore) (Harel & Issacharoff, 2004) and that's an indicator of confusion of how to use your tools and for how long due to different perspectives in one faction as well between faction inside and outside the PA (fragmented national programs). The factions' strategies were different in using the violence inside the occupied territory or inside the 1948 land, where Alqas abridge showed opposition to the operation outside 1967 lands but Hamas agreed to attack in all the Palestinian map.

5.5 The Open War

Open conflict broke out across 1200 km of open roadways, in which attacking colonizers who promote counter-resistance aims and diminish their efficiency to the bare minimum, became simple. There were hundreds of people loaded with Molotov cocktails, pistols, assault rifles, machine guns, hand grenades, and explosives. Additionally, Palestinians, frequently police officers, also joined in among the rock throwers and equipped with weapons. The Palestinian resistance upped its violent attacks against Israelis by unlawfully employing mortars and anti-tank missiles imported into the Gaza Strip, to confront violent mob. According to IDF reports, Palestinians launched mortar bombs into Jewish settlements in Gaza and Israel, while anti-tank missiles were fired at Israeli soldiers in Gaza (Jewish Virtual Library, n. d. -a). At first, Israelis used restricted operation techniques like erecting barriers to minimize the probability of martyrdom operations and striking, along with assassinating resistance leaders as one of many ways to destroy resistance administration and organization. They assassinated Slah Shhadi with a one-ton bomb. Former Shin Bet director wrote in his book that Hamas strikes canceled

their f16 dominance, and he added that they killed 100 Palestinians for every Israeli killed and declared victory, which is contrary to counterinsurgency policies that separate attackers from society and reduce their actions through their understanding of the punishment.

In Israel, Hamas conducts a series of suicide bombs, 21 Israelis outside a Tel Aviv disco were killed in June 2001 and 30 Jewish at a Passover seder supper in Netanya in March 2022. After four months, Israeli air strikes murder Hamas military commander Salah Shehadeh, and Israel imposes a blockade on Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat's residence in Ramallah city.

In March-April 2004, Hamas co-founder Sheikh Ahmed Yassin was assassinated by an air strike in Gaza Strip, followed by another assassination for Abdel Aziz al-Rantissi one month later. As a result, Hamas commanders chose to hide, and their successor remained unknown.

On August 15, 2005, the Israeli conducted a one-sided disengagement from Gaza Strip, after long time of occupation since it was controlled by Egypt in 1967. They left their settlements, and Gaza's authority had transferred to the Palestinian authority (Reuters, 2021).




Figure 10. The Israeli civilians and military killed by the Palestinians during the 2nd intifada. *Source: (Btselem, 2023b)*

In 2002, the Israeli launched the (shield operation) and it was the second biggest military operation since 1967 as it was characterized by (like war operation) (Lavie, 2010). The Palestinian faction “attrition” and the challenge to Israel’s endurance was with no clear political objectives as the equation was an uncontrolled uprising by the PA and continuous peace discussion under road map (Sharon, 2005). Palestinian factions Guerilla warfare entered discussion after realizing that the international factor and the PA are strong elements that will not lose nor start a fight with them and they are still in the expansion stage.

Throughout the duration from 2002 to 2005, Israel murdered the Hamas political leader Ismael Abu Shahab in Gaza, and the leader Abdel Aziz al-Rantissi, co-founder and political leader in 2004. Shift in viewpoint occurred once Israel began targeting political figures rather than military commanders. Which implied that Hamas would be under scrutiny to check if its political officials could be granted amnesty, and then would not be listed for attacking, and whether martyrdom bombings could be halted. Some might claim that the handful of martyrdom bombings that occurred during the second stage were intended to convey political support and legitimacy as a result of the Second Intifada. "Abu Shanab certainly wasn't the clearest assassination target. He had advocated for the cease-fire, which he described as a check of Israeli and American commitments to follow through on the road map to peace. He wasn't ever armed, despite being one of Hamas' top 4 politicians. Like he stated prior the June 29 cease-fire, could be applied consistently unless "Israel agreed to let us create our own state" along the old 1967 borders. Hence, his generation would "leave it to future generations" to decide if the conflict would persist until Israel vanished. He explained further that “In theory, that shouldn't be sufficient,". "But, as a result of this situation, let us establish a Palestinian state on

whatever area can be liberated and see what happens." Such pragmatism is a considerable departure from Hamas' initial stance in the first stage. The political goal was changed from freeing all of Palestine to pre-1967 borders, as was the strategy of armed organizations' targets. Here we can notice a new factor emerging in the Palestinian resistance that considered the international attempts to two state solutions which reflected later to be a de facto authority in Gaza strip. So, they are not aligned with the Arafat body, but they accepted their ideas if it works.

Israelis were calculating a new counter resistance strategy that includes political, military, economic, humanitarian, and public diplomacy where avoiding military confrontation can't be applied anymore (Manekin, 2020). The dilemma of changing concessions and using of power is the main priority because finding a tool to balance all national security needs ,a political path and certain deterrence measures, where the Palestinian understands the consequences and keeps the Israeli national security preserved in a long controllable statuesque (Lavie, 2010).

IDF highlighted on the political echelon in one side and on the Israeli population that conducting a limited compelled conflict campaign on the other side, requiring maximum coordination among various elements involved – political, military, economic, humanitarian, diplomatic, and public diplomacy. Considering social resilience, which that enhance unity and harmonization. The IDF used huge forces to eliminate the roots of the resistance. Thousands of staff work on the level of planning division, operations division, commands, coordination of government activities in territories, many “pressure methods” Aggressive means were applied against the Palestinian leadership and the security forces. Military operations conducted by Israel included “ticking bombs” in targeted killing of the political officials, arrests in Palestinian areas, disclosures, networking, severe

movement restrictions through curfews, and seizure of territories during Operation Defensive Shield (Lavie, 2010).




Figure 11 The closure per quarter from 2000-2005

As Maj. General Giora Eiland, head of the IDF’s Planning Directorate, explained, “It was understood that the intention was to reach a casualty ratio that would demonstrate which side was stronger” (Eiland, 2010).




Figure 12 Palestinians killed by Israeli security forces

Source: (Btselem, 2023b)

In addition to the Collective punishment, which pressured the population not to support insurgents (the levers policy), the abuse of hope, economic security, innocent people. that are applied on elements that are not involved in terror to put pressure on terror, so that it won't happen (Dicter & Byman, 2006). Various actions were taken by the IDF such as creating buffer zones, fences and borders and demolishing thousands of houses as showed in figure 3.




Figure 13 The demolition of houses from 2000 to 2005

Source: (Btselem, 2023b)

The barrier is comprised of a zone ranging between 35 and 100 meters in width (Equipped with a fence, patrol roads, ditches, side service roads and a buffer area). The policy of Israel to use West Bank to serve its own needs and purposes, while ignoring the needs and rights of the local Palestinians. (B'tselem 2012)

Simultaneously, the resistance activities were largely manageable in the Gaza Strip, because barriers in Gaza were surrounded by heavily guarded and buffered by a military no-go zone. It's hard for the resistance to enter Israeli occupied lands, moreover Gaza also contained far fewer Jewish settlers than the West Bank, with approximately 9000 (Amnesty., n. d.) residing in the former and more than 200,000 in the latter during this period.

General "Danny Rothschild," Former Head of Research Division of Military Intelligence Division, says: "It is desperate and frustrating that the intifada forces succeeded in carrying out a series of commando operations, and the least that can be said is that the security services' talk about reducing their capabilities is not only exaggerated, but purely imaginative! He adds, "Regardless of the efforts made by our security services to strike the uprising, it must be recognized once and for all that it cannot be eliminated, and whoever rushes from among our army leaders to declare every day an imaginary victory against it, what they do represents the real and painful response to such empty declarations of any content.

Eitan Haber, director of Yitzhak Rabin's office, said: "The truth that the decision-making circles in "Israel" must realize is that there is absolutely no military solution to the intifada, and until Israeli leaders imbibe this conviction, more disappointments will be ours!" (Abu-Amer, 2018).

The second intifada changed the counter resistance policies and positioning from close physical interaction inside the occupied territory to transferring the crisis into PA and remote control of the conflict. Technology surveillance, barriers and more barriers, discovering the infrastructure of the Palestinian resistance, and use of target killing as a main strategy for the intelligence. The resistance continued after the end of the intifada and that's an indicator that the IDF reduced the tension and even contained the intifada, but they couldn't mitigate the threats and contained the possibility of new military operations. Killing political leaders didn't affect the efficiency of the organization because it continued its military attack, but at the same time new rules of engagement emerged by 2004, Shin Bet claimed that it 'was able to stop 95 percent of the attempted attacks on Israel, capturing almost every suicide bomber who dared attempt crossing into

Israel' (Byman, 2011). But threats in Gaza increased where the capacity of the resistance in their current setup pushed them to cease fire and searched for alternatives (JPOST, 2013) as the withdrawal in 2005.

CHAPTER VI

AFTER THE WITHDRAWAL FROM GAZA IN 2005 TILL 2022 (MOWING THE GRASS/GAZA)

In this chapter I will discuss the Means of resistances, the new equation of power after withdrawal from Gaza and its impact on reducing the attacks on the Israeli. What was the positioning of both sides in the power equations. The new factors that hinder the resistance to achieve high attrition values, the losses from both sides and the statuesque that established to generate same conflict cycles without any major changes that pushes to discuss new peace agreements.

6.1 Gaza Resistance

Two main historical incidents had a great impact on a huge transformation in both Israel counter resistance and the Palestinian resistance (Hamas); the first one was withdrawal from Gaza in 2005 by Areal Sharon (MoFA, 2021), and the second one was the elections and civil war with Fatah (PA) that brought Hamas to be the de facto authority in Gaza (CIE, 2006).

Regardless of the disengagement from Gaza whether it's a victory for the Palestinians or a strategic military need and national security goal for the Israelis, the confrontation changed where Hamas succeeded to achieve what the PA failed to do as rule of power over the community that made a disciplined strip. The Israeli withdrawal from Gaza was for different reasons. The first direct reason was that a lot of attacks on the settlers on roads, launching rockets, mortals and infiltrated attacks (Oren & Regev, 2008), where the IDF couldn't protect 8000 settlers living beside 1.5 million Palestinian

(Booth & Eglash, 2015). The second was strategic and stronger in the equation of power, which was the repositioning of Israeli where Gaza became a big prison surrounded by domes, drone overnight, easy screening, and the air force that can attack specific locations, infrastructure of the resistance. The gathering of intelligence information will be easier by agents, and surveillance technology in addition to the blockade that was justified internationally when the authority inside for Hamas.

The Palestinian resistance Hamas benefitted from the Israeli withdrawal and the de facto authority in accumulation of power by building a huge military infrastructure supported by Iran, smuggling and production of rockets, military training and all technical and financial support became easier (Shine & Catran, 2017).

In addition to the tunnel that was used for trade, military and attacking (Avishay, 2016; BBC, 2004), the new resistance strategy was built based on the experience and operational tactics from 1987 to 2005. Two main pulling factors added to the equation of power, first the authority they have where community needs became priority and second there was an opportunity to become political actors between international players.




Figure 14 Sharon's proposed staged withdrawal from Gaza

The PA surveillance, detention and most important (Dayton program) that work on the national consciences and the replacement of Palestinian national security and resistance notions into illusion of Palestinian state existence. They failed to implement it in Gaza to undermine Hamas operations and the faction's resistance (Perry, 2011).

6.2 The New Power Equation

Hamas's full authority in Gaza increased the military development versus Israeli air force superiority and development of counter resistance deterrence tools that included target killing policy. Many conflict cycles from 2006 to 2022 happened between the occupation and Palestinian resistance regardless of the reasons such as the assassination of leaders or because of al-Aqsa Israeli insulting and regardless the short-term political process that comes with each conflict temporary solutions. The link to the study is the efficiency of the strategy and the political gain or changing the statuesque that was crafted after the withdrawal from Gaza.

The bank of targets became bigger ,clear, defined where Hamas buildings ,Entities is known so the respond is easier and more effective as if anyone is walking around with a weapon.'(Kirchofer, 2016). Moreover, Yuval diskin, head of Israel's internal security service ('Shin Bet'), confirmed: '(We must give Fatah the conditions to succeed. At the same time, it would also attempt to ensure Hamas did not have the conditions to succeed. Seal Gaza off completely ignore it. At the same time, began to focus on improving conditions in the West Bank to create a starker contrast to the conditions in Hamas-controlled Gaza.) (Diskin & Jones, 2007).

All efforts made to Hamas to be lost , people suffered and were sanctioned, and followers to be reduced until they accepted political solutions or at least more weak positions .Instead in every confrontation withdrawal Hamas was gaining more followers and less positioning power (Abu-Amer, 2021). Hamas loaded more burdens in its calculation in the equation of power such as uplifting the sanction, opening borders, public services and that were clearly reflected during all ceasefire negotiations, which made the Israeli

strategy for punishment have new dimensions. The main objective of the resistance was to do a balance of terror through rockets. But instead, rockets were considered as an acceptable power to remain statuesque for certain limits with no unpredictable harm and casualties. Although the range of rockets increased in the last 16 years and reached 280 km, millions of Israeli were under a threats in addition to the capacity of production and firing density (Margaret, 2008) despite the Iron Dome and the “Magic Wand” efficiency of destroying rockets around 88% (Geist Pinfeld, 2023), as the controlled rules of engagements were set mainly by Israeli at the first place which losses are calculated and threats are measured (Even, 2009).




Figure 15 Number of rockets fired at Israel from Gaza strip by year





Figure 16 The Hamas Rocket Arsenal

Source: (Hinz, 2021)

IDF DISPOSITION AROUND GAZA



Map shows the rough position of the IDF's brigades. Ovals inside blue boxes depict armor units. X's inside blue boxes depict infantry units. Two half-circles in a blue box depict an airborne unit. An X on top of a box denotes that these units are brigades.

Figure 17 IDF disposition from Gaza

almost Israeli experts—inside the IDF and outside government—believe that the system of iron dome works. If so, Iron Dome probably saved lives and limited property damage (Raphael et al., 2017). Number of casualties decreased and the Israeli is better off than would be before the withdrawing from Gaza that confirmed that The disengagement benefited major Israeli interests.

Source: (Avishay, 2016)




Figure 18 Casualty Figures by type of attack

Hamas new rules of engagement and the adopted resistance were mixed with humanitarian needs, a political approach (especially after they won the elections), lessons from the first stages to avoid shaking Hamas organization’s structure by target killing, threat of international sanctions, and the preservation of the achievements that allowed them to accumulate power. The push factors changed from liberation to survival and

existence. The results of the new resistance strategies will be measured by the losses and gains and to what extent it will change the resistance optimal equilibrium and attrition of Israeli after each conflict cycles.

6.3 From 2005 till 2022 the Palestinian Resistance and the Israel had Six Main Escalations as Elaborated in the Below Diagram




Figure 19 Main escalations between Palestinian resistance and Israel

July-August 2014 – Teenagers’ kidnap and murder by Hamas led to a war that lasted for seven weeks, where more than 2,100 Palestinians were killed in Gaza, as well as 73 Israelis and 67 soldiers.

December 2008 – Israel launched a military offensive that lasted for 22 days, after rockets were fired at the southern Israeli town of Sderot, where 400 Palestinians and 13 Israelis were killed before a ceasefire was agreed upon.

November 2012 – Israel killed Ahmad Jabari, Hamas’s military chief of staff, followed by eight days of Israeli air raids on Palestine.

March 2018 – Protests of Palestinians began at Gaza’s fenced border with Israel, as Israeli troops began shooting to keep them back. More than 170 Palestinians were killed in several months of protests, inducing fighting between Hamas and Israeli forces.

May 2021 – The tension and injuries in Al -Aqsa Mosque during Ramdan pushed the factions and Hamas to threat Israel and asked her to withdraw its troops from Al-Aqsa. Hamas sent rockets and Israeli started a war that lasted for 11 days, at least 260 people were killed in Gaza and 13 died in Israel.

August 2022 – More than 30 Palestinians, including women and children, were killed in new air attacks conducted by Israeli planes. Palestinian Islamic Jihad, whose two commanders were killed in the air strikes fired dozens of rockets into Israel in response to those attacks.




Figure 20 fatalities of the Israeli after the withdrawal in 2005 to 2021

The Graph shows decreasing of the fatalities of the Israeli after the withdrawal in 2005 to 2021

IDF built a wall of six meters around the entire Israel–Gaza border, which includes underground walls in order to prevent tunnels excavations and its equipped of remote weapons, and radar monitoring systems (Meir Amit Terrorism and Intelligence Information Center 2022). This insinuates that Israel is increasingly settling into a new status quo. Thus, from a pro-withdrawal perspective, the main weakness of disengagement were not its strategic failures, but that the policy was too successful in maintaining a conflict management paradigm (Geist Pinfold, 2023).Some of the Israeli

researchers and politicians were looking to more sustainable , zero threat solutions other than managing the conflict but eliminate threats completely.

Palestinians killed by Israeli security forces




Figure 21 Palestinians killed by Israeli security forces from 2005 to 2021

The graph shows the fatalities from 2005 to 2021 where 6015 Palestinian were killed in Gaza and around 331 Israeli in Westbank, Gaza and east Jerusalem

The number of Israelis killed from 2005 to 2023 in all Palestine since the disengagement is 331 and the number of Palestine killed is 6015 in Gaza only, but one could say that even in the first and second intifada the ratio was not equal. The punishment of Israelis was for more effective models by the resistance as a terrified terror inside all Israeli occupied areas that caused a kind of balancing in terror. after the disengagement, the punishment is around launching defensive rockets. The first resistance model had the capabilities to increase the level of attrition and pressure to reach a point of solutions.

The figure below shows the losses after withdrawal from Gaza TILL 2021



Figure 22 The losses after withdrawal from Gaza

Source: (Helen, 2021)

In conclusion, the withdrawal from Gaza improved IDF capacities and mitigate many threats, despite the increase in potential threats coming from Gaza during extensive confrontations. The (Avishay, 2016), as Israel tried to maintain a balance of keeping Hamas and punish it in order not to be replaced by more violent organizations (Raphael et al., 2017).

Before disengagements 2.7 people were killed every month on the Israeli side, on average, by terror attacks originating in Gaza. After the disengagement to Operation Protective Edge in 2014, the number dropped to 0.7 (MoFA, 2023). In every conflict cycle, the resistance lost the military infrastructure and capacity that was built from years and was rebuilt again by the support of Iran as the only adopted strategy by the factions

6.4 The Game of Power, Balance and Denial Counter Resistance in the Great Prison Gaza

The rockets couldn't deter the assassination of the Islamic leaders at the level of Gaza, Israel from 2005 to 2022 starting from sheikh Mohamed Khalil in 2006 Islamic jihad, Ismail Almasry in 2006 form Hamas, Imad Shapani in 2007, Nafez Mansour in 2008, Issa Batarn in 2010 and lately Hassan Kaogi in 2021, head of Hamas military intelligence security department; Wail Issa, head of Hamas military intelligence counter espionage department; Majhad Hadidi, Control engineer, research, development, and manufacturing project; Mahmoud Fares, Head of the mechanics desk, research, development, and manufacturing project; Thafer Shu, Desk head, research, development, and manufacturing project (Jewish VirtualLibrary, n. d.). Each year they killed from different factions based on the threats that may shake the Israeli iron wall strategy.




Figure 23 Targeted killings of Hamas militants by month

The pull factors became an opportunity for the Israeli to focus after they managed to set new rules of engagement and the deterrence policies such as using rockets, which will lead to punishments of huge community loss, where the positioning point for the Israeli is less on casualties and threats are inside Gaza strip only. The pull factors enhanced by separation between Hamas political leaders and military ones, improved the role of Egyptians in de-escalation, the humanitarian assistance and the political diplomatic games. Hamas was involved through the discussions and negotiations with PA and Arab countries to improve its recognition and legitimacy internationally (Michelle & Jake, 2017), to the point where Hamas will reach to less violent response that takes into consideration indirect deterrence factors.

In conclusion, the Palestine resistance and Hamas had no choice but to adopt a limited resistance strategy because the internal competition with the PA , the political process of peace and the attacks that hit the heads of Hamas by the target killing in addition to loss of Arabs official support in the surrounding areas at the security or military level .

The resistance lost the unity of the cause between West Bank and Gaza, the extended body of Hamas was sieged by the PA and because of the weak structure of the military wing inside West Bank. Only six operations were adopted by Hamas since the disengagement (Mubasher, 2022), that made the conflict manageable by the Israeli (Geist Pinfeld, 2023). The rehabilitation process of Gaza after each war made Hamas the elected authority under a huge load, at the same time under tracing of Israeli Mossad, Shin Bet, IDF and all intelligence alerted any development in the military power of Hamas that led to a change in the status. Many political solutions were proposed to keep the military

power they had limited and the Israeli will accept peaceful resolution that includes other factions which means the modus operandi of the faction causing minimum violence.

CHAPTER VII

THE RESISTANCE IN WEST BANK AFTER THE WITHDRAWAL FROM GAZA IN 2005 TO 2022

In this chapter I will discuss the resistance in west bank by the historical Palestinian factions, new military groups and attacks by individuals and what are the power equations that were created and its impact on the Israeli deterrence plans, its challenges, losses from both sides and its expansion if exist.

The Palestinian resistance in West Bank (historical Palestinian faction, new groups after 2007 and the lone wolves) in West Bank faced many challenges. First, at the operational level with the new surveillance methods, securitization of society such as barriers and the deterrence policies. Second, at the resources level where materials and tools that made a change in the power equation are not affordable. Third, internal factors such as corruption, weak security structure and internal power dynamic impact on decision-making process. Fourth, the PA role in security as indirect deterrence. Fifth, the international role of U.S., Jordan and Egypt as key players in Gaza and the West Bank.

7.1 The Operational Aspect




Figure 24 The operational aspect of the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza


Source: (Dicter & Byman, 2006)

Before the construction of the fence, and in many incomplete places, the resistance only needed to cross an invisible line in order to reach Israel areas. There were no barriers. Approximately 75% of the martyrdom bombers who attacked targets in Israel came across the border in the area where the first phase of the fence was built.

From September 2000 till the end of 2006, more than 3,000 attacks derived from the West Bank, leading to the deaths of 1,622 people inside the Green Line. Relatively, since 2007, when most of the fence was built, until mid-2022, 141 attacks killed 100 people.

On November 11, 2006, Abdallah Ramadan Shalah, Islamic Jihad leader, stated on Al-Manar TV that conducting attacks from the West Bank is possible depending on

many factors. “For example,” he said, “there is the separation fence, which is an obstacle to the resistance, and if it were not there, the situation would be entirely different.” (Mitchell, n. d.).



This map shows the route and planned efforts of Israel's security fence on the West Bank.

Figure 25 Security fence route approved by Israeli government

Moreover On the operational level, the Israeli technology to intercept all kinds of communications even the physical ones (Kane, 2016), that enable them to discover hundreds of resistance cells and operations around 500 military operation were intercepted

in the war in 2022 only (ie4News, 2022). Israeli surveillance and intercept technology is a leading product in the security market.

The Palestinian resistance took into consideration the sensitivity of the relation with the PA where it has to keep the security coordination according to Oslo accord. Any Palestinian threat against Israeli proved how much PA control over the society (Associated Press, 2022), and because confrontation may cause civil war as what happened in Gaza. The resistance is giving the chance for a peaceful solution that most of the factions are not against it and part of the PLO that supports these factions, where the PA president is the president of the PLO at the same time (ECFR, n. d.). The PA offered money to those who have the intention to stop fighting like Lions' Den (Aljazeera, 2023b). Due to the continuous corruption, Israeli attacks and internal conflicts, the historical factions structure and development became harder and easy to breach and their capacities are much lower than handling any confrontation (Majed, 2020).

In terms of economic pressures, more than 28% in West Bank are working in the public sector (176,400) and 18% in Israeli and Israeli settlements around (113400) including both wage and non-wage labors (PCBS, 2021). The humanitarian and economical improvements are part of the deterrence policies to contain the resistance and to enhance the control of the the Palestsian authority, which they don't trust but keep it strong to serve their national security where Israeli thinkers as Micah Goodman said in his book MASYADA 67 that dehumanisation of the Palestians increase violence and the more we give the less violence we will face (Goodman, 2017). The Israeli counter resistance methods continue as it is from 2005 to 2023.

The deterrence activities were Community punishments as demolition of houses and street blocking , accumulation of deterrence methods and technology for tracking and keeping low violence response, detentions, check points, interception and disassembling the factions armed groups , Attack new groups activities, monitoring movements inside and outside, target killing, more fence and protection of settlement, indirect deterrence by PA, international support covered by U.S, exchange of information with other countries about the factions, monitoring Iran activities toward Palestinians, securing the borders by intelligence and surveillance with Jordan and Egypt, high security procedures and detection systems along the Jordanian borders to mitigate smuggling of weapons and explosives, recruiting agents in West Bank) (Golov, 2016).

Indicators of the number of casualties till the end of 2021 where around 900 Palestinians were killed in West Bank and East Jerusalem and around 230 Israelis were killed . the numbers show decrease in killing and confrontation from 2006 to 2021 as a result of all the mentioned factors.






Figure 26 Palestinians killed in West Bank and East Jerusalem

Source: (Btselem, 2023a)




Figure 27 Palestinians killed by Israeli security forces

No target killing in West Bank from 2006 till 2021, only two operations while in Gaza 110 target killing occurred, which indicates that there were no threats on the national security by the factions in west bank till 2021

Source: (Btselem, 2023a)




Figure 28 Fallback of the operation in Gaza and West Bank

Source: (Jewish Virtual Library, n. d. -b)

The graph shows a fallback of the operation in Gaza and West Bank due to all factors mentioned and the operations, most which happened by groups that did not belong to factions including 6 attacks for Hamas in 15 years (Bryan et al., 2021).

7.2 The Equation of Power from 2006 to 2021

- Hamis:** Pull (Authority Load in Gaza + responsibility of the humanitarian needs + PA detentions in West Bank + political process + allocation from west bank to Gaza that disrupt the organization power in West Bank + target killing) = Push Launching rockets for certain incidents Only (creation of redlines in the power equation)
- Other factions:** weak internal structure + reallocate to Gaza + Economic situations +part from the PLO or outside PLO +PA detentions + weak security

control + target killing + barriers = Launching rockets from Gaza and few clashes and attacks in West Bank

- **Israel:** Disengagement from Gaza, fence and apartheid wall, deterrence policies by punishment and securitization of the society + PA cooperation + EU and US economic and political umbrella = status quo and reduce number of attacks in West bank

7.3 From 2022 till present (Lions' Den, Lone Wolves and hidden armed groups)

The Palestinian resistance wealth are the Palestinians themselves by their participation through the history of the conflict inside and outside Palestine from the beginning of the settlements during the Othman empire until present from different social groups, ages and ideologies. What is common in the resistance dynamics is the push factors such as ideology of Islamic jihad, defense and revenge, grievance (Ganor, 2021) and it's a normal social movement against a colonizer like what happen in South Africa, Algeria and Tunisia.

The resistance as for the individuals is a basic need for liberation from occupation then it was framed by the thinkers and formulated in the public sphere (Lee, 2017). The individuals may execute alone as Lone wolves without any kind of links to factions (Ganor, 2021), or they will usually gather themselves in small military cells with military experience. These groups reached out for support from historical factions or Iran as Lion's Den.

The Lone wolves are hard for the Israeli to intercept because they don't have any means of communication with suspected factions and half of them used their own cars,

weapons and knives (cold weapons), as they don't have criminal records (Perry et al., 2019). The IDF stated that the lone wolf could be anyone and their deterrence plan is the surveillance of the social media, monitor who is active in certain locations they usually come from and close profile analysis, for example suspicious around anyone from certain areas rent a car and he-she doesn't drive a car for six months (IDF, 2016). The IDF has admitted that lone wolf is much harder than groups to intercept because there are no footprints to follow (Anna, 2022), although the new counter resistance plans failed to restructure youth mindset and it's impossible to read the mind of every young Arab. The Demolition of attackers houses and revoke identities was also used against their families. In 2015 after a multiple of attacks on bus stations Jerusalem municipality's government installed shielding of steel and concrete at 300 bus stops to discourage terrorists from launching car-ramming attacks against Israelis waiting for their bus.

According to the data collected by the Israeli Shin Bet Security Agency, 2015 was considered the deadliest year for terrorism since 2008. Twenty-eight people were killed in terror attacks on Israel during 2015: two foreigners, one Palestinian, three members of Israeli security services and twenty-two civilians.

In an effort to reduce the frequency of attacks, the Israeli government announced on March 23, 2016, that they had arrested over 1,200 Palestinian workers in Israel without proper permits during the previous month. Israeli police arrested 150 Israeli and Palestinian employers for not possessing proper permits to employ the Palestinians as well. The table below shows the attacks made by the lone wolves

Year	Military Operation
In 2016,	12 vehicular ramming attacks and 100 stabbing attacks were prevented by security forces. In all, 344 major attacks were prevented, and 108 attacks were carried out
In 2017,	54 terrorist attacks were successfully carried out. 400 terrorist attacks, including 13 suicide attacks and 8 kidnappings, as well as 1,100 potential lone-wolf attacks, were prevented.
2018	there had been 192 stabbing attacks and 139 attempted stabbings; 173 shooting attacks; 61 vehicular (ramming) attacks, and one bus bombing targeted at Israelis during the uptick in violence beginning in September 2015. Sixty-two individuals have been killed in these attacks.

Although these attacks can't be aborted because there is no traceable lines to start with. The Lone Wolves face limitation in expansion and the stabbing has no huge impact on casualties, moreover the places were also geographically limited to residents of East Jerusalem (Yoaz, 2009).

The expansion was key factor of the success and fail of this type of resistance that couldn't achieved with the result of the equation: Barriers + Cold weapons + Untraceable + ideological motivation + low violence impact Versus Israeli deterrence plans inactive + intelligence couldn't intercept + punishment after attacks demolitions and ID canceled for their families + surveillance required many assumptions and possibilities + it caused terror and required new security procedures. The expansion in locations and tools may lead to considerable change in the status quo but also will be reflected on the policies toward Palestinians who lived inside Israel. Unpredictable consequences of racism and

discrimination were against Palestine from the settlers and Israeli civilians that may increase.

7.4 Uprising of the Lion's Den and other militant groups:


The historical Palestinian factions in the West Bank lost its ability to defense or attack and its role was to keep the historical achievements and existence by cultural, political, military bodies and their representatives as part of the PLO, trying to improve their capabilities and structure in a way that the modus operandi of their path will not change (Majed, 2020). That's what made the young ages and leaders move from one faction to another until they fulfill their needs as a result the bond between the followers and the leaders and between the leaders and the decision makers is not strong and stable. From that point, any military group offered to fight to protect the camps and attacking in the occupied area was funded from two sources, Iran and some faction that is connected to Iran. It's worth to say al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) military groups were active and slightly developed by new military groups such as Jenin bridges that implement few new resistance activities but these groups it still working under the radar of the deterrence polices and the tools used are intercepted because of the a lot of footprints . MnayCells were killed by the target killing policy (Aljazeera, 2023a).

Year	Murdering IDF soldier Ido Baruch
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2022	Shooting at the Har Bracha and Shavei Shomron settlements.
2022	Firing on vehicles in the Nablus area.
2022	Shooting at army positions around Nablus.
2022	Placing a large IED at the Kedumim gas station, which miraculously did not explode.
2022	One terrorist linked to the group managed to reach Jaffa, part of the Tel Aviv area, armed with an improvised weapon and explosive devices. Fortunately, he was captured by Israeli security forces before he could execute a planned attack

Lions' Den is one of these groups Established in 2022 in Nablus, which used telegram for the mobilization, Lion's Den the militant group that attacks the Israeli several times (Joe, n. d.). Lions' Den operation were as follows (AIJAC, 2022).

In 2022, Israelis suffered from more than 5,000 terror attacks by Palestinians, including car-ramming attacks, shootings, stabbings and bombings that were targeting innocent men, women and children on the streets of Israel.



Number of People Injured in Terrorist Attacks from the Start of 2022

Month	Severe Injuries	Moderate Injuries	Minor Injuries	Killed	Number of Injured
January	0	1	9	0	10
February	0	1	13	0	14
March	4	7	17	12	28
April	4	4	35	4	43
May	3	3	35	4	41
June	0	0	22	0	22
July	1	1	13	0	15
August	3	5	87	0	95
September	1	3	33	2	37
October	2	4	47	4	53
November	6	3	38	5	47
December	0	1	9	0	10
Total	24	33	358	31	415

*From the section on the number of injured that appears in the report, Terrorism Against Israel as of December 21, 2022

Figure 29 Terrorism against Israel

Source: (NPDU, 2022)

Israelis dealt with the new armed groups as they were separated from the Palestinian social and economic life, in order not to give them a chance for mobilization and to decrease the

uprising. The counter resistance policies and deterrence plans such as community punishments, detentions of thousands, restriction of free movement escalated the situation, as these groups were under the radar and their footprints, logistics structure were discoverable like the other historical factions, and that goes back to the traditional way of factions in building armed groups or the hard environment they are working in. The PA offered them protection and money many times in coordination with the Israeli (Jack, 2022). The new group of the Islamic jihad was composed of around 100 fighters only in Jenin according to a Jazeera interview with the leader of Saraya Al-Quds Akram Alajoury (Al-Jazeera, 2023), while the Lions' Den were less than 50 members. As per Israeli sources, Lion's Den was established by Adham al-Shishani, Mohammad al-Dakhil, Ashraf Mubaslat and Ibrahim al-Nabulsi and all of them were under 25 years old and were killed by Israeli forces. Musab Shtayyeh who was arrested by the Palestinian Authority in September 2022, one of the senior leaders (ECRF, n. d.). Moreover, some leaders surrendered to the PA to be protected after they received many calls that they will be assassinated (Mohammed, 2022).

The counter resistance strategy is to keep the target killing policy, surveillance and interception of the armed groups inside and outside Palestine that was enough to deter the historical factions. The break waves operation to fight the new groups was working on three levels: first, security of the barriers line. Second, security of the villages and cities and the third target killing and dismantling the armed groups cells where to do so the Israeli involved 25 battalions, 5000 stand by forces and 8000 from police and the air force (Hodhod, 2022). The new groups got acceptance from the community as more than 72% of Palestine was with the new armed groups according to the study made by Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PCPSR, 2023). The new armed

groups were an indicator that resistance is the decision and action of Palestinian people in every conflict cycle. After the waves break operation, number of the attacks increased (Mohammad, 2022), but not as armed groups plans, resistance program became more for defensive purposes .They succeeded to alert the two communities toward the Palestinian cause and it helped in rising the settlers attacks protected by the Israeli government (Hodhod, 2023).

7.5 The Non-Violent Resistance (Sheikh Jarrah) - Impact of Peaceful Resistance on Israeli Counter Policy:

Non-violent resistance, first we define what we mean by non-violent protest, and if there is such thing as non-violent protest as it is a spectrum and a social movement that cannot be analyzed outside of violence of its colonial settler and colonial based dispossession from land, culture, family and home.

Israeli public opinion conception of legitimate methods of non-violent protest showed three types of legitimate nonviolent protests. (1) “*within the law (e.g., petitions legal demonstrations), nonviolent disobedience (e.g., unlicensed demonstrations, refusal to complete army service, refusal to pay taxes), and violent civil disobedience (e.g., the use of force against evacuating settlements)*” (Arens & Kaufman, 2012). Similarly, the polls to past trends show that 86% support lawful means of protest within the law, whereas 13.5% support unlawful means such as non-violent and violent disobedience, and only 6.5% support violent illegal methods (Arens & Kaufman, 2012). To this end, non-violent resistance is either within the Israeli law or non-violent disobedience. Have these methods had positive and sustained impact and why positive sustained impact cannot be sustained?

Legitimate methods for Palestinians holding Israeli citizenship since enabling them access to voting rights, official channels, Israeli public space and parliamentary elections where they were aiming at challenging the system from within. They had the right to vote and the right to be elected for parliamentary participation in order to demand equal citizenship rights based on democratic values of Jewish state where they approached the Supreme Court, Hebrew media, petitions, demonstrations, and establishing networks with Israeli left who are critical of occupation. However, the Zionist nature of the state and mistrust has ensured that Arab parties even as parliamentarians are not part of deliberations or policy making in the area defense and national security. Many Israeli Arabs held prestigious positions such as judges, doctors, professors but they remained minority middle class. Israeli Palestinians have ensured their visibility in the Israeli public discourse as well as in the international discourse, as they have utilized and created pathways of solidarity with Israelis inside and outside Israel.

Israeli Arabs' non-violent resistance was either legal or disobedience of laws, which were limited within minority politics where the highest positive outcome is to achieve when it comes to changing the system within more equal distribution of economic benefits, and the negative outcomes would be withdrawal of citizenship, deportation, imprisonment, house arrest, fines, etc. In other words, indirectly, outcomes of non-violent legal resistance ensured its own containment within the systems of oppression of Israeli state despite gains on exposing practices on the international scene with backup from international and national human rights actors. After discussing legal methods such as petitions and non-violent disobedience of laws, we bring the discussion of Sheikh Jarrah which is an important case that has gained positive media international visibility of Palestinian narrative and raised suspicions regarding Israeli policies. One indicator is that

recent Gallup poll finds compared to past trends, less democrats sympathize (38%) with Israel, while no change regarding most republicans (78%) who continue to sympathize with Israel (Ismaeel & Willy, 2023).

Sheikh Jarrah events in East Jerusalem show the limits of non-violent resistance, as well as bias toward Israel by using the language of “eviction notice” which legitimized Israel illegal ownership and occupation of 3 homes of Palestinians, and shielded Israel from accountability when referring to violence affected on Palestinians as “settler violence”, and not as state violence.

Four families in Sheik Jarrah in occupied neighborhood in East Jerusalem were issued an eviction notice after the Supreme Court has ruled that they are not legal tenants of their home, and that they were served eviction notices. Many actors have taken part in non-violent resistance through the legal route through the Supreme Court, and non-violent disobedience. The Palestinian lawyer who represented the families in the court and the families who appealed for rejection of the ruling constituted forms and actors of non-violent legitimate legal means to resist. The families rejected compromises proposed by the Supreme Court which is a demonstration of legal non-violent resistance. Moreover, activists utilized formidably their access to western international media outlets and social media to expose use of excessive force and violence by Israel police against peaceful solidarity protestors (Amnesty, 2021b), in Sheikh Jarrah, and settler behavior. The final outcomes from the Supreme Court showed backtracking from eviction notice, freezing and later suspension of the eviction notice. However, the court did not challenge its Zionist logic and dispossession of Palestinians. The court “*ruled that the four families could stay in their homes until Israel carried out a land arrangement, a process that could take years or may not be carried out at all.*” (Al-Jazeera, 2022). Moreover, under the eyes

of the world, whether through traditional western outlets or through social media and sharing of live videos taken by population, this did not hold back Israel from negative reactions to non-violent forms of protest and leaders of the protest. During Sheikh Jarrah event, Muna el Kurd was arrested, so was her brother who was requested to turn himself to the police for investigation and was released afterwards (Tom, 2021). It is worth mentioning that the activists could have faced harsher punishments if they did not appear on western media and were not “internationalized” figures.

Despite the substantial peaceful protests, Israeli state has consistently reacted with excessive force that did not spare bystanders and worshippers making Ramadan prayers in East Jerusalem as per evidence gathered by Amnesty International (Amnesty, 2021a). On the other hand, the threat from demonstrations is not so much international exposure although it is dilemma for Israel to deal with, but the threat arose from repeating another scenario of Intifada where Palestinians in different geographical locations protested and united. The Sheikh Jarrah event was securitized because it crossed the green line. Arab Israelis represented around 20% of Israeli population. For the first time, Israeli Arabs have gone in large numbers in thousands to protest and was further galvanized by Israeli police indiscriminating violence against Arab Israelis. In Llyod, following a funeral of an Arab Israeli protester who was killed by Israel (BBC, 2021), protests and demonstrations erupted in a general strike for the first time which led to Israel declaring a state of emergency, in Llyod (BBC, 2021). The Times of Israel said this was the first time the government had used emergency powers over an Arab community since 1966 (BBC, 2021). Many Arab Israeli workers were fired by their Israeli employers through WhatsApp texts (Mustafa, 2021), and some were fearful to take public transportation (Mustafa, 2021). The protests showed failure of pacification of Palestinian identity in

Arab Israelis for exchange for access to economic benefits or public goods. Doctors, teachers, nurses have gone on strike to protest (Lubna et al., 2021), "*Enough attacks on people in Gaza, the West Bank and Jerusalem, Lod, everywhere. Enough attacks on our homes, our daily life and displacement. The displacement and erasure of our existence on our land needs to stop, we've experienced enough repression, arrests and threats to our homeland and our futures.*" (Lubna et al., 2021)

The riots and attacks spread in many cities in Tel Aviv prompted joint security coordination between Shin Bet (internal security arm of the Israeli government that works with Mossad). The police arrested 1500 Arab Israeli suspects where 70% were Arab citizens for campaign to restore order and crack down on mob violence and unprecedented communal violence (Isabel, 2021), Shin Bet detained suspects with no access to lawyers (Isabel, 2021). Two Arab Israelis were arrested by the Shin Bet and Israel Police in recent weeks on suspicion of carrying out nationalist lynchings in Kafr Kara against Jewish Israelis. Shin Bet and police arrested Arab Israelis for charges of "*stone-throwing at security forces, vandalizing public property, burning tires and firing fireworks* (Tzvi, 2021)" motivated by nationalist lynching (Tzvi, 2021). However, Shin Bet involved itself prior to escalation from peaceful protests to violent protests in May 2022, Shin Bet has admitted using spyware to send texts to warn them that they have been identified and will be punished if they take part in protests in Al Aqsa mosque (Middle East Eye, 2022). The recipients of the texts targeted Palestinians who did not take part in the protest, residents in East Jerusalem, and Palestinian citizens of Israel (Federman, 2022). The preemptive attempt by Shin Bet to use spyware to thwart protestors showed early warning of mass mobilization that would connect Palestinians across fragmented and separated geographies in the green line and in occupied territories that would be difficult to contain

or control. The Palestinian resistance launched al Quds sword in 10th of May 2023 because of the Sheikh jarrah and Aqsa violations (Awad, 2022). The resistance was in front of two main challenges: the Aqsa Mosque that considered the third Islamic Mosque for all Muslims all over the world, their ideology and ethics as well as for followers they have to act and the second challenge was to create the equation of the unified battle field (Gaza, West Bank and all Palestinian land). After they sent the first rocket, the resistance became violent and moved directly to a different level of power equations of violence conflict (Awad, 2022).

7The two non-violent resistances inside West Bank and inside Israel having different context where the Palestinians inside were linked to day-to-day life and they interest in the Israeli community, as they had no intention to lose it or escalate the protesting to threat the national security where the Islamic movement inside Israel is clear evidence that protesting by Palestinians is completely separate and categorize under civil disobedience.




Figure 30 Continuous path of demolishing housing units by the Israeli government as part of community punishments on east Jerusalem

Source: (Btselem, 2023b)

The graph shows the continuous path of demolishing housing units by the Israeli government as part of community punishments on east Jerusalem to mitigate any type of resistance even if it was categorized under civil protesting.



CHAPTER VIII

FINDINGS, CONCLUSION AND (THE RESISTANCE OPTIMAL EQUILIBRIUM ROE MODEL)

The resistance optimal equilibrium is balancing point and positioning of their actions that keep increasing or stable value of attrition on the Israeli occupation, where deterrence impact is not fully in control of the insurgents' consequences, their actions lead to high frequency of new deterrence policies and plans until pressure from both sides ends up of several political solutions. The resistance weight is balanced by the wight of the deterrence power, in a way keeping the status quo unstable or negative stability on national security and on the Israeli doctrine

8.1 The calculation of the (Resistance Optimal equilibrium ROE) during the First intifada:

The Equation: $PF = PNV + MPVR$

Power factors (Push and Pull) : (Palestinian Non-violent resistance) + (Minor Palestinian violent resistance) **Versus** Israeli counter insurgent policies and its development  Increase of attrition Values +Negative status quo for the occupations  Oslo Accord .




Figure 31 The model of ROE that I coined where modelling includes conflict cycle variables

8.1.1 The Second Intifada (Power Equation of ROE)

PF = PA +PR+NVR Versus IDM + destroying of PA institutions

Power factors (Push and Pull): Palestinian authority + (Major Palestinian Violent resistance) + (non-violent Resistance) **Versus** (Increase target killing political leaders + community punishment that include damages of all Oslo achievements as official buildings and free of movement → Increase of Attrition values +Negative status quo for the occupation → Withdrawal from Gaza

Graph:




Figure 32 Resistance Optimal Equilibrium - 2nd Intifada

8.1.2 After Withdrawal from Gaza: ROE Model

Hamas (Rockets + and Tunnel Operations) Versus (Airforce superiority + Target killing) → Positive Status quo for occupation + Low attrition values = No equilibrium / Israel Optimal positioning and control

Power factors (Push and Pull): Hamas's full authority in Gaza increases the military development + social economic needs as they are De facto authority and they are threatening by destroying the territory in the conflict cycles versus Israeli air force

superiority and development of counter-resistance deterrence tools that include target killing and 24 hours high tech surveillance tools.




Figure 33 AWG (After withdrawals from Gaza)

8.1.3 The West Bank and East Al-Quds Resistance Equation Include Lion's Den, Lone Wolves

Power factors (Push and Pull): Violent Resistance (Untraceable lone wolf + increase of armed groups attacks) Versus (low lone wolf impact in terms of casualties + Many footprints for new groups same as Palestinian factions cycle +deterrence operations as (waves break) \longrightarrow Low attrition values = No equilibrium / Israel Optimal positioning of control stable

The Palestinian resistance optimal equilibrium ROE according to the past resistance outcome is the hybrid approach that split the armed and non-armed resistance

under a unified political program where the equilibrium point pushed the Israeli to change the status quo and move to different deterrence plans then ask for peace dialogue instead the violent one:

- First intifada, which led to Oslo Accord by Non-violence and Peaceful resistance inside and outside the occupied territory was effective, and by keeping the violent resistance strategy is a positive pushing factor to peace (under one political program)
- Community-based violent resistance in the West Bank was also effective during the period of the study
- Escalation from Gaza had negative pull factors and consequences unless the resistance can break the imbalance of power by new type of rockets or tactics as the unified battle approach.
- Violence resistance outside the historical factions was effective in West Bank if they avoid targeted killing, by new structure outside the historical factions modus operandi and their internal development plans as to avoid traceable methods
- Change the Role of the PA to take same role in the first intifada or at least to get rid of the indirect deterrence. PA adaptation of non-violent resistance strategies under one political program with clear objectives was effective. Aggressive relations with the PA would affect the ROE positioning.

The Palestinian resistance became a source of troubles for the neighboring countries and a cause of internal civil war and clashes with the governments. The Palestinian resistance is learned by mistakes and it was supported by Arabs not adopted

by them, so the resistance transformations and development were affected by internal factors as knowledge, corruption and the weak modus operandi of the structure and the historical leaders' interests. The resistance improved but was still under certain limits that couldn't change the equation of imbalanced power to be in the best ROE resistance optimal equilibrium place that led to political solutions.

The resistance from 2006 until 2023 is moving in the same conflict cycles of Fig (AWG after withdrawal from Gaza) where using ideology, money and grievance are the main push factors. The faction assumption of disability to achieve different outputs on their current structure and context is not a logical argument, it keep no peace no war equation and a river of blood in additional to the economic crises in each conflict round. The loss of thousands of Palestinians and the damages in all aspects of life in each conflict cycle is a result of keeping the same equations of power and same Status quo point even if the answer was that any colonization will cost blood to liberate, but what are the political gains from all these violent dialogues. It was clear that in the two uprisings, Lone wolves, Lions' Den and Gaza war the push factors were the Palestine people and the community. factions were tools even if most of the Palestinians don't believe on their performance, but they have no choice only to serve through them and that was the reason of many defectors inside factions.

8.2 The Violent Dialogue Never Ends

Through Palestine history, the dream of the state and violent dialogue never ends because the colonizers are not an occupation but also an Ethnic cleansing that want takeover history, culture, land, language and the memories, So the pushing factors will remain even within a strong pull factor. The resistance used a defense strategy that

avoided the escalation of the Israeli in a way their comfort status and zone will not change, as Israeli also played same cards where they kept deterrence policies active in a way the insurgent calculations and perceptions of the Israeli capabilities are enough to pull them only not to eliminate them (cost-benefit and the sufficient victory). It's a delicate combination between employing operational discretion and preventive security measures that comprised a variety of techniques designed to obstruct terrorist movement and interaction.

If we consider Oslo Accord and Withdrawal from Gaza is a great achievement for the Palestinian resistance, then managing this victory was a failure. Factors around the resistance as attrition of the community and the neighboring countries should be calculated at a strategic level and need more studies on how to improve the resistance and the resilience of the community and if Arabs around Palestine will be another indirect deterrence or a supporter to build the Palestinian future state in the upcoming conflict cycles that may reach a solution.

APPENDIX

The history of establishing of the Palestinians factions and the PLO

1964 Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)

1965 Palestinian National Liberation Movement (Fatah)

1967 Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)

1969 The Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine

1970 Islamic Jihad Movement

1987 HAMAS (Islamic Resistance Movement)

1920 Popular Resistance Committees (PRC)

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