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THE DOCTRINE OF INTERNAL RELATIONS BY BLANSHARD

(Is the Universe an Internally
Related System?)

By

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A Thesis Presented to the Faculty of the
Graduate School of the American University
of Beirut in Candidacy for the degree of
Master of Arts.

February 1954

Dedicated to
Prof. Herschel Elliott
In Remembrance of His
Valuable Criticisms and
Suggestions in Writing
This Thesis

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Abstract

The thesis consists of two parts; the presentation of the Doctrine of Internal Relations as conceived by Blanshard, and the Critique of this doctrine. The presentation of the doctrine has been worked out in three chapters. In the first chapter, I tried to show how Blanshard reduces the plurality of the universe to a unity as a result of his rejection of the Doctrine of Abstract Universals and his belief that a thing is individuated by its unique relations to everything else in the universe. In the second chapter, Blanshard's Doctrine of Internal Relations is explained by special reference to the method of difference by which everything is related to everything else internally. In the third chapter I have tried to explain the principles of causality as an intrinsic connection which involves necessity, as well as its relevance for the doctrine of internal relations.

In the critique I tried to show that Blanshard has failed in his attempt to prove that the universe is one internally related system as he has conceived it. My objections are twofold: First, he has failed to show that the individual thing depends for its being on all of its relations to everything else in the universe. This was due to the inadequacy of his arguments to reduce the particular to the universal and to overcome the apparent particularization due to space and time. And second, he has failed to provide a relation that would relate all things to one another internally without lapse of time. My objection to his argument that the re-

lation of difference relates all things internally, is that "difference" is not a positive relation. Rather it is a derivative relation which can only restate the meaning of a positive relation and hence cannot give more information than the positive relation from which it is derived. And again my criticism of the argument that things are related internally by causal relations will be that unless we are certain of a relation that would relate things causally without lapse of time, we can not prove that the universe is one internally related system at a moment of time and consequently that everything depends for its being on everything else in the universe.

Finally, I tried to show that in such an internally related system as conceived by him knowledge becomes impossible.

Part One

The Doctrine of Internal Relations by Blanshard

Introduction

Our aim in philosophy is to know things as they are. Some thinkers, the skeptics and perhaps the positivists, doubt the possibility of transcending what is immediately given in sense perception. As a consequence, they have claimed that all metaphysical problems are pseudo-problems; that such knowledge is meaningless. I believe, however, that metaphysics is not meaningless and that we can and must go beyond what is perceived in order to make knowledge of what is perceived possible.

With this purpose in view I propose to examine in this thesis one view of the nature of knowledge, namely the idealists', as represented by Brand Blanshard in The Nature of Thought. Thereafter I will try to evaluate it with respect to the rigor of its proofs and its claim to making the world more intelligible.

To the question as to how the universe should be conceived so as to make the world intelligible, Blanshard's answer is that the universe must be conceived as one system in which everything is related to everything else internally. Briefly stated the doctrine means that everything that exists owes its being to its relations to everything else in the universe; that its nature, when other things change, is affected not by some of its relations, but in differing degrees by all of its relations to everything else.

The doctrine of internal relations is to be distinguished from the doctrine of external relations in that according to the latter

a thing does not owe its being to its relations to everything else, that a change in a thing may take place without affecting other things, and that the presence or the absence of something does not necessarily make difference to other things.

The significance of the doctrine of internal relations for epistemology is great. According to this doctrine, a thing is the meeting-point of all the effects that ensue from everything else in the universe. Therefore to know a thing as it is, requires a long pilgrimage to discover the nature of everything. Blessed be he, who knows something as it is, for he shall see everything in one thing and one thing in everything. This is the doctrine all in all.

Now we may proceed to the plan of the thesis. There are two main parts: the first is the presentation of the doctrine of internal relations, and the second is a critique of it. The presentation of the doctrine is divided into three chapters. The first chapter has three divisions, the first of which is concerned with the presentation and the refutation of the doctrine of abstract universals. According to this doctrine the universal is a generic quality which is not only conceivable, but also identical with its species. Against this doctrine in the second section Blanshard offers the doctrine of the concrete universal—that the universal is the partial realization of its species, and that it exists in

thought as the idea of its species, not in the species itself. In the third division the individual or the particular is reduced to the universal, leading to the view that the universe is one system, not many, and that the uniqueness of the individual can be achieved only when its relations to everything else in the universe are exhausted.

In the second chapter further evidence is cited in support of the doctrine of internal relations. Blanshard finds this evidence in a precise understanding of what is given when we know a term or a thing. He insists that what-a-thing-is-not is just as important to its being and to our understanding of it as what-it-is. But the what-it-is-not is everything else in the universe. Consequently a term cannot be or be understood independently of the whole universe.

In the third chapter I will try to give Blanshard's criticisms of two important views on the nature of causation. He first tries to show that it is a misinterpretation of the Heizenberg principle of indeterminacy to take it as evidence for causal indeterminacy. Then he points out the inadequacies of the regular-sequence view of causation. Blanshard had to direct his attention against these rival theories of causation in order to clear the ground for his assertion of the logical necessity view. In such a conception of the causation he sees final and complete confirmation of this theory of internal relations—that everything in the universe is related to every other thing in one vast network of causal relations.

Thus Blanshard in order to support the doctrine of internal relations gives two proofs completely different in essence from each other. The first is an argument based on the relation of difference which relates all things to the universe independently of time. The second is derived from his conception of causation as logical necessity which relates events internally through dynamic change--action and reaction.

In the critique I have tried to evaluate the arguments by means of which Blanshard tried to reduce the universe to a self sufficient, completely internally related system. These criticisms are the following:

First, Blanshard's method of reducing the particular to universal is not valid.

Second, his argument for rejecting space and time as principles of particularization is not justifiable, and that space and time are principles sufficient to particularize things.

Third, difference as a relation does not relate things internally.

Fourth, causality cannot be shown to relate compresent events internally.

Fifth, this doctrine of internal relations fails to account for the possibility of knowledge.

Chapter 1The Abstract Universal vs. the Concrete Universal and
the Individual vs. the Universal

Cognition involves the subsumption of a thing perceived or conceived under a universal or a general idea. Mind, when it identifies something, grasps it as an instance of a type. Thus thought in acquiring knowledge proceeds by classifying things according to the identity or similarity of their common characteristics.

Knowledge is held by some to advance by observing particular instances and abstracting universals from them. By others it is thought to progress by the analysis of universals. For the former, knowledge proceeds from the concrete to the abstract, while for the latter, it proceeds from the abstract to the concrete.

Thinkers like Bosanquet and Blanshard take a midway position. They believe that when a person is conscious of something, he knows it is like something and at the same time different from other things. Thus the abstraction and the analysis of universals go together. That is to say, in a knowing agent identification and differentiation operate together. When one calls something red, he at the same time differentiates it from other colors. To say something is red, is to say that it is not blue, or yellow, or green.

At this point the question arises as to how we come to know

universals, that is, what makes them meaningful to us. One answer is that we grasp the universal by abstracting common characteristics from particulars. This answer is objectionable, Blanshard argues, because no one ever perceives something as a particular object. As soon as he is aware of a thing, he considers it something, and that something is the universal which later is abstracted when other instances of that object are perceived. In other words, the failure of this answer lies in that it assumes what it later tries to abstract. For example, when a man who has not seen a turtle sees one, he does not grasp it as an individual, but rather seizes its general features. He identifies it with the class of animals having hard shells and thorny legs. Later when he sees more of this type of animal, he notices that these general characteristics are shared in common. He abstracts and considers these common features as the characteristics of the turtles. Thus the object is grasped as a universal before the universal is abstracted by observing many instances of it.

But according to Blanshard there is another important function of perception. For example, when a person identifies an object as a book, he is at the same time differentiating it from a chair or a table. Thus according to Blanshard universals become explicit in the process of differentiating and identifying objects. And both of these processes occur simultaneously.

Now Blanshard does not doubt the possibility of knowledge. Knowledge for him proceeds by identification and differentiation.

These processes use universals and thus universals become indispensable for knowledge. Universals make identity possible and identity in turn renders perception, judgement, and inference possible. It has been mentioned how in perception one identifies the object with a universal. Judgement involves the use of universals and identification too. In inference without assuming the sameness of the subject in the premise and in the conclusion deduction would be impossible. Thus the importance of universals for knowledge is great. The problem for us is to find out what the nature of the universal is and how we could conceive it. To this question there are two chief answers, one is provided by the formal logicians, and the other by the idealists, of whom we are taking Blanshard to be the representative.

A. The Doctrine of Abstract Universals

1. The abstract universal is a generic quality which is identical in its species.

The doctrine is often advocated by formal logicians.¹ The gist of this theory is that a universal represents a class which consists of a group of particulars having one or more properties in common. The argument is as old as Plato and Aristotle, for whom the general idea, form or essence, represented the set of attri-

¹ William James, Cook Wilson, Bertrand Russell, Norman Kemp Smith, and others.

butes shared in common by particulars, while those attributes not shared in common were distinguished as accidental properties.

Furthermore the set of the common properties is considered to be essential to the individual as a species of the genus which is characterised by those properties. This set is known as the intension of the genus, while the particulars which share these common properties are called the extension of the genus. According to the formal logicians, when a person has a general idea, he thinks of the intension of the term, and in thinking of the particulars in general he refers to them as the embodiment of the intension of the general idea, which is abstracted from them.

a. Identity is conceivable.

The abstraction of the universal is made on the assumption that the universal is the same in all the particulars and that it can be conceived in thought without affecting either the universal or the species.

Thus by observing many figures having three angles we grasp the similarity of their character and we can see that three angledness is identical in all of them. Triangularity, though it does not exist in nature apart from particular triangles, still can be distinguished in the particulars. The moment we distinguish the common features in a group of particulars, we begin to abstract the universal, to conceive and to use it. The argument given to support this view is that, had it not been for our ability to conceive the generic qualities by themselves, we would not be able to

use them and to draw inferences from them. Let us take an example. We have an idea of triangularity and the knowledge that the sum of the angles of a triangle is equal to two right angles. In thinking about this one does not think about a specific right, isosceles, or other triangle, because this characteristic is independent of the degree of the angle. It is identical in all triangles and can be thought of by itself apart from particular triangle. Though it does not exist by itself in nature, it does exist in thought.

As a result of this example, the distinction of the essential and accidental properties becomes explicit. If one reasons that the sum of the angles of a triangle is equal to the sum of two right angles, independently of the size of the triangle or of the degrees of the angles and that the triangle can be conceived apart from these specifications, then he admits that the size of the triangle or the degree of the angles are accidental properties, in so far as they are related to the property that the sum of the angles of the triangle is equal to two right angles.

But the conflict between the doctrine of the abstract universal and a doctrine of internal relations now can be noted. If one believes that everything is related internally, then he will also hold that there is nothing accidental, that everything is essential to the being of everything else, that the presence or absence of a characteristic or relation must make a difference to every other thing in the universe. Consequently there can be no accidental

properties and in fact there can be no abstract universals. We must next pass to Blanshard's refutation of this view, which is given in two main objections.

1. No generic quality is ever found to be identical in two things.

According to Blanshard the theory of abstract universal leads one to the belief that the abstract universal, or the intension of a class, is found in a group of properties that are unrelated to it. The unrelated properties are those which are not shared by the species and so are considered accidental. For example the skin color of man is not a part of the abstract universal man, and so is accidental to it. This conception of the universal will lead to paradoxical consequences. For example, if this were the case, then by adding some other quality to the intension of the class one could get the species of that universal. This would be possible because the abstractionists' contention is that the universal is found identically in the species and the other properties of the species, apart from those that form the intension of the class, are accidental to it. Therefore, if we consider the class intension as the nucleus and add any quality (provided it be appropriate) from the outside, then we should obtain a species of that genus. For example, if one wishes to get a species of triangularity, he can conceive it as right, obtuse, or acute, etc. But the view of the abstractionists permits us to conceive red or blue triangles as species as well.

Blanshard argues further that we would have the freedom to do this, because the theory does not foresee the essential relations of the characters that make a species and the characters that are confined to the class intension. If we deny the essential relation of all the properties of a species to the genus, then we would have, as the example above shows, a red triangle, as a species of the genus triangle. But strictly speaking being a red triangle is not the same as being a right triangle. To be a right triangle is a mode of being a triangle, while to be red is not. Triangularity denotes a structure, and if we are to conceive species of it, then it is required that the differentiating quality also be structural. To be right angled satisfies the structural condition, while to be red does not. Therefore redness does not make a triangle a species of triangle. The abstractionists may argue that the red triangle is a species of the genus of red objects, or a member of the class of red things, because it possesses this color in common with other red objects. But Blanshard says:

"We may call a figure a species of coloured object, just as we may call colour the distinguishing mark between kinds of figure; but, try as we will, we cannot think in this fashion. For a species is a genus's way of being; triangularity and redness are not ways of being each other"¹

The statement, "a species is a genus's way of being" implies that a thing cannot be regarded as a species of a universal which does not entail the whole character of the object. Thus, "redness" does not cover the nature of the triangle, while "rightangledness"

¹ Blanshard, The Nature of Thought, Vol. I, p. 586. London, Allen and Unwin, 1948. The underlining is mine.

satisfies the condition fully. But this in effect anticipates the view, which will be discussed later, that the individual is the same as the universal, because the statement "a species is a genus's way of being" entails the belief that the genus covers the whole nature of the species. In other words a specific object cannot be a species of any one of its qualities possessed in common with other things. Thus man can be a species only of manliness and not of rational beings or of biped animals or of mammals or of any particular quality which is thought he shares in common with other animals or things, because none of them covers the whole character of man. We may end this criticism by saying that a thing can be the species of that universal which covers its whole character.

This criticism brings us to the more fundamental criticism which when discussed fully will bring to light their close relationship.

The intension of a class which is abstracted as though it were common to the species, is not found identically in each member of the species. A broad abstraction such as animality, or figurehood is not identically the same in all animals, or figures respectively. That is, no two animals exemplify their animality identically. How is it possible, then that they should have the class intension of animality in common? If no two animals have the same mode of animal behavior, then we must realise that what the abstractionists

take as the intension of the class of animality does not reside in the animals in an unmodified form. Rather we must think that the other characteristics of each animal modify the animality of the organism. For example, (everybody agrees I am sure) man's animal behavior is related to the qualitative and quantitative aspects of his sense organs, digestive system, circulatory system, reproductive system, brain, arms, legs, etc.; Even the shape of his hand and fingers. Nails and hairs, which are considered accidental properties of the animals, play an important role in the life of some animals. Now, since the relation of animality with the constitution of the organism is so evident, and since no two animals even of the same genus have the same constitution, it follows that no two animals have identical animality. And the principle of abstraction, which is based on the assumption of identity of the intension of the class in the species, is thereby refuted.

2. The identity of the universal in its species is inconceivable in abstracted form.

This fallacy of the identity of the intension of the class in its species, may be attributed to the belief that we somehow can conceive of the abstracted universal in its naked form. That is, we can conceive of animality apart from a particular animal. Some people like Joseph and Bosanquet think that we can conceive the universal isolated from the particular, and others not. Blanchard is one of those who maintain we cannot. That is, no universal can be thought as abstracted from its species, because there is no

identity of the universal in its various species.

We have seen that Blanshard's first objection was to refute the notion that the universal is exemplified identically in its species, and that it is unmodified by the so-called accidental properties. In other words, Blanshard's criticism amounted to saying that all properties are essential to the species and that they modify the class intension.

Now we come to the second objection which says that the universal cannot be conceived apart from the species. If we cannot conceive the universal apart from the particular, it does not follow that the universal cannot be exemplified identically in its species. Nor if we can conceive the universal apart from the particular, does it follow that it is exemplified identically in the species. One may believe that we can conceive the universal apart from the particular and still may not believe that the universal is identical in its species. Thus Joseph and Bosanquet believe that, we somehow can have a definite idea of the properties that seem common to things apart from the things which exemplify them. But these thinkers still believe that what is conceived abstractly is not found in the species in its abstracted form, because the abstracted concepts are essentially related to the other properties of the objects. But Blanshard rejects even this. According to him we can never conceive such identity, since it does not exist in various species of a genus. And he finds it

strange that Joseph and Bosanquet, though they do not believe in the identity of the abstract universal in each member of it, still agree with the abstractionists that we can have a definite idea of the abstract universal.

Many people may agree with Berkeley that we cannot imagine a universal apart from a particular. But some think that though the ability of our imagination does not transcend the particular, yet somehow our conception can. But the case is not so. We have seen that there is a relation between the genus and the species, and that the genus so conceived cannot be imagined or conceived without reference to its species. It is a fallacy to think that the genus is an essence and found identically in all of its species. No two things exemplify a character identically. If no two things are identical in any respect whatsoever, then abstracting, which is thought to be concerned with extracting common elements, is a misinterpreted process. We would be abstracting something which is not found there, because there is nothing which is shared identically. This amounts to saying that we cannot differentiate the genus from the species; that is for example we cannot differentiate manhood from a particular man, or coloredness from a particular color, because there is no such a thing as manhood residing identically in the particular men as their essence, or coloredness residing identically in particular colors as their essence.

Thus, we can neither conceive the genus as shared in common by its species, nor the genus as abstracted from the species without referring to a particular.

B. The Concrete Universal

1. The universal is the partial realization of its species, and it exists in thought and as the idea of its species and not in the species.

We have seen that, the attempt of the abstractionists to find identity of the generic quality in the species, and their contention that such a universal is conceivable in its abstracted form, was severely attacked by Blanshard. Nobody denies the usefulness of abstract universals in thought. In fact almost all our thinking involves the use of abstract universals. Though sciences, particularly biology, are greatly indebted to this method of abstraction, nonetheless it is not an authentic method and the pervading principle, namely that of identity, implied in it, is a fiction rather than a truth. However, to consider it a fiction is still foreign to the intellect. This is a legacy left from primitive man and embodied in our modern languages. We still think in terms of identity and communicate our thoughts in terms of abstract universals. We can neither deny the reality of the abstract universals, nor can we resolve it completely into its species, for it is felt somehow to be distinct from them. It remains for us to find a solution reconciling these two contradictory views.

Blanshard thinks that, the key to the solution of the riddle is to be found in the theory of the concrete universal. Briefly stated it is the view that the generic universal is the partial

realization of its species, and that it exists only as the thought of its species. Blanshard thinks that the solution is to be found in the fact that thought is teleological in its mode of functioning. However, before we can understand this explanation of the doctrine of concrete universal, we must digress briefly to show how Blanshard conceives the nature of thought.

For Blanshard thought progresses purposefully. The process of thought is characterised by two ends; the immanent and the transcendent. The immanent end is an inherent desire to acquire knowledge. While the transcendent end is an inherent desire to know things as they are in themselves. The immanent end of thought is a potentiality seeking actualization through knowing. Since an idea can be called a piece of true knowledge only when it reveals the object as it is, it follows that the immanent end can be actualized only when the transcendent end is realized. In other words, the desire to know will get satisfaction only when things are known as they are.

If thought is conceived thus, then the meaning of the "idea" for the idealist should bear the character of thought, because ideas are the constituents of thought. This will be clearer in the following quotation from Blanshard.

"Thought in its essence is an attempt to attain, in the sense of achieving identity with, a special end of its own. The relation between idea and object must be conceived teleologically, as the relation of that which is partially realized to the same thing more fully realized.

When we say that an idea is of an object, we are saying that the idea is a purpose which the object alone would fulfil, that it is a potentiality which this object alone would actualize, a content informed by an impulse to become this object. Its nature is hence not fully intelligible except in the light of what it seeks to become. Mind, in taking thought, attempts to pass beyond its present experience to what it would be but is not yet, and so far as it has thought of this end, it already is the end in posse. The idea is thus both identical with its object and different from it. It is identical in the sense in which anything that truly develops is identical with what it becomes. It is different in the sense in which any purpose is partially realized is different from the same purpose realized wholly."¹

In the light of this "theory of idea", we may begin to understand the theory of concrete universals, which, as stated formally, is summed up in the following two points: first, that the universal is the partial realization of its species, and second, that it exists only as the idea of its species. The generic universal is a general idea and therefore, following the idealistic theory of idea, it is the partial realization of its species, just as any idea, which is the partial realization of its object. The universal is potentially its differentia and is embodied in them not as a detached entity but as the purpose is in the work of art. It is identical with its species potentially, and will be fully identical when it achieves in them its complete realization. This is the same as in the case of any idea. The idea is potentially its object and it will be identical with it when it reveals its object as it is. The general idea or the universal, according to

¹ Ibid. p. 473

Blanshard,

"is a process that moves to its end through a differentiation directed from within; and the process is a living one which belongs to the nature of mind."¹

The relation of the universal to its species is of this sort: the universal exists only potentially and it is mental. It will come into fuller being when the goal of thought is achieved. But what has the actualization of the universal got to do with that of thought. For the idealist the answer is that the idea is potentially its object. The idea and its object cannot be separated, as in the case of art, the purpose cannot be separated from the work. The case is similar in the relation of the universal to its species. The universal is ideal and it is the thought of its species. Blanshard sums up his position in three points:

" (a) When we think of man, there is not before us, explicitly or implicitly, any set of invariable qualities shared by all men in common; such a set of qualities neither exists nor can be clearly conceived... (b) The universal we do grasp is one which, developed to the full, would be the various individual men. (c) This indeterminate universal, which is potentiality only, does not exist in the real world independently of mind; its being is in thought."²

C. The Individual vs. the Universal

1. The individual reduces to the universal.

It was stated that, for the idealist thought is teleological in its mode of functioning. First there is the demand to know

¹ Ibid. p. 611

² Ibid. p. 620

things, and second the demand to know things as they are. These two demands are inseparable from one another. The realization of the second is the satisfaction of the first, and the satisfaction of the first implies the realization of the second. When mind knows the things as they are, it reaches its full actuality, and these demands which are elements of potentiality in its nature are fulfilled. As long as these demands are not satisfied, all the contents of thought, that is the ideas, are partial realizations of their objects. The generic universals, which are general idea in the mind, are in an indeterminate form, and since thought is seeking to actualize itself, these potentialities must come in to a determinate form. One can see that while using a general idea, we refer to individuals. When the general idea, which is a partial realization of its species, attains its full realization, the problem is whether or not we must still consider things as separate individuals, independent of one another, or as a system of interdependent entities.

Blanshard reduces the particular or the individual to the universal by the following arguments: the individual is considered to be a wholly determined unique entity. The uniqueness is, that which makes a thing different from everything else in the universe. This uniqueness can be achieved only when the possibility of repetition is transcended. What makes a thing different from others is an odd question. We never doubt that we see things as different

from each other. But when we begin to enquire into the properties that make one thing different from another, we come to realize that, the supposedly differentiating properties are still not sufficient to make one thing wholly different from the others, because any property we think of is theoretically repeatable in other things. If this is the case, then we are always in the realm of the universals. For example, if we ask someone why he thinks that a table is different from a chair, he will point to differences in use: the chair, he will say, is to sit on, the table is to write or to work on. But if we point out that, we can sit on the table and we can write and work on the chair, he will say, their structure is different. We can show him still that such specific universals: four-leggedness, or three-leggedness, or other properties may be shared by both. All of the mentioned qualities are still universals, and we have not reached the individual yet, because any quality which is repeatable cannot differentiate things. Finally, if we press him hard, he will say that, even if they share the same universals, still we see them as two, not as one, precisely because they occupy different places in space and time. But space and time are themselves repeatable and so universals. This is shown by the well known paradox: that if we were so made that we were living half of the day in dream and the other half awake, and that everything in one duplicated everything in the other, we would not know which world was the real. Thus we see that any limited set of qualities or

relations are theoretically repeatable. If they are repeatable, then they do not particularize or individuate objects, because repeatable qualities or relations are still universals and do not indicate uniqueness.

For Blanshard any limited set of qualities and relations, including spatial and temporal, are in principle repeatable. However, he makes one exception to the rule, that is the unrepeatableness of the universe. The definition of the universe is that it is the totality of existing things. So repeatableness of the universe contradicts its definition. This being the case, uniqueness of a thing can be achieved if and only if all of its qualities and relational properties with everything in the universe is thought of.

However, the denial of the individuals is not as easy as it seems. There are objections to be met, and these will lead to strange results.

It was stated before that the generic universal covers the whole nature of its species, or that a species is genus's way of being. This amounts to saying that the species is the same as the generic universal, because the universal is not a set of qualities common in its species but rather includes all the properties of its species. Therefore the species is the same as the universal. We also said that those who conceive the universal thus reject the notion of its repeatability in its species, while those who object to this view argue that besides the generic universals there are specific universals, and these may have instances. The differen-

tiations of specific universals are particular instances. The particulars may vary while the universal may remain the same.¹

Thus Russel thinks of two white patches which, in respect to color, are indistinguishable, but occupy different places in space.

He says:

'It is this spatial plurality which makes the difficulty of the theory that denies particulars.' In virtue of the properties of space, 'the numerical diversity of the two patches of white is self-evident. They have the relation of being outside each other, and this requires that they should be two, not one.' '... for example, if x is above y, x and y must be different entities.' 'Thus the fact that it is logically possible for precisely similar things to coexist in two different places, but that things in different places at the same time cannot be numerically identical, forces us to admit that it is particulars, i.e. instances of universals that exist in places, and not universals themselves.'²

This objection is unavoidable, and if one accepts it, he is forced to believe in the plurality of the universe. Furthermore it leads to the doctrine of external relations, for repeatable instances are self-identical and immutable.

Blanshard brings some objections against the idea that instances of universals exist in different places. According to him, to say that instances of universals exist in different places and not universals themselves, amounts to saying that universals them-

¹ Here it is important to make some clarifications. The differentiations of generic universals are individuals such as: this horse, John, that man, this pin, etc. The differentiations of specific universals are particulars such as: specific taste, color, odor, length, etc. These specific universals may have instances in two different places, and as existing in different places they are considered to be particulars.

² *Ibid.* pp. 642-643. Quoted by Blanshard from *Arist. Soc. Proc.*, N.S., Vol. 12, 1911-12; Blanshard has pieced together passages from pp. 10, 17, 19, in this order.

selves exist in different places, because what makes a thing an instance of a universal is the presence of the universal in it. So two things can be said to be instances of the same universal if they possess the same universal in common. But this leads us to the doctrine of abstract universal which was refuted before.

Another objection, which assumes the view that the particular is the universal's way of being, is this. In saying 'this patch is white', the subject "patch" does not become the particular of the universal "whiteness". Therefore, the true particular of the universal whiteness is "this white". But "this white" suggests nothing besides the specific quality whiteness. Therefore the subject and the predicate are no longer different. They are both universal and the same universal. If one is not satisfied with this argument and believes that there is something besides the universal which is its predicate, Blanshard offers the following dilemma.

"If this 'something more' goes beyond the nature of the universal asserted, offering as subject, for example, some temporal segment or spatial area, then the subject is not a particular of that universal, and to insist that it is, would mean logical chaos. On the other hand, if the particular contains nothing beyond its universal, then it is idle to say that they are different."¹

But these arguments are besides the point and do not affect Russell's objection. Whether the things seen are universals or

¹ Ibid. p. 647

instances of universals, the fact still remains that they are seen in two different places in space, and to deny that they are two amounts to saying that a thing can exist in two different places at the same time.

Blanshard realizes the force of Russell's objection, which forces him to nothing less than the denial of space and time as principles of individuation. Blanshard says:

"Our reply must be... radical, for the objection goes very deep; indeed it points to nothing less than a conflict between categories, between identity on the one hand and spatial and temporal relation on the other; nor does there seem to be any way of meeting it except to decide for one of the parties. And this is a very grave responsibility, for both are accepted with absolute confidence by science and common sense. That identity is so accepted scarcely needs showing. No one doubts, in the ordinary course of things, that the same tree or person may persist, or that the sums of two columns of figures may be the same. To be sure... abstract identities are not always discoverable where they are supposed to be. But to abandon identity generally would be to abjure all reasoning, since inference moves through identity; and indeed this alternative is not intelligible... Identity is indispensable. But then, on the other hand, spatio-temporal difference seems indispensable too. Few axioms are more compelling, as we have seen, than that a thing cannot at once be in two places. And since if a thing is spatial, some at least of its qualities must be spatial too, it would seem that the axiom holds also of these qualities; they too, are cut off from being in two places at once. If you say they can be, you end in the quicksand Mr. Russell warns of, the conclusion that precisely the same entity is to the right and left of itself. And that again is nonsense. We are thus in an extraordinary position. Identity and spatio-temporal difference are both indispensable. Yet if we take identity seriously, we land in spatio-temporal absurdity; and if the exclusiveness of space and time is taken seriously, we end by denying identity."¹

¹ Ibid. pp. 648-649

The denial of the category of identity is equivalent to the denial of the concrete universal. The acceptance of space and time as real is equivalent to the assertion that all existing entities that are located in space are particulars. Thus both the denial of the category of identity and the acceptance of space and time as real will do away with the universals. But for the idealist to dispense with the universal is equivalent to the downfall of science. Blanshard writes.

"...In attacking the abstract universal, we were not seeking to destroy identity; we were seeking to find its true residence; and unless it is granted a residence somewhere, we do not believe that either scientific generalization, or indeed thought of any kind, can be made intelligible. Compelled then to choose between identity on the one hand and spatio-temporal arrangement on the other, we can only choose identity. Choice, indeed is hardly the word; we 'can no other'."¹

If one tries to save both identity and space and time, he can do so by saying that what are identical are universals and what are in different places are particulars. But in this case he will not escape the old criticism namely that he is assuming the particulars to exemplify instances of universals. But this we saw was absurd, because no set of qualities is shared in common by the species of the universal. That is, if one believes in the reality of universals and particulars, whether he is a realist in the medieval sense or a conceptualist, he accepts also that the universal is exemplified identically by its species. Identity in this sense is rejected, because no two things manifest the universal identically. On the

¹ Ibid. p. 650.

other hand to deny universals, Blanshard points out, is impossible.

"You cannot give up identity even if you want to. And, to put as a second point what is partly the same, the issue is not a bare alternative between the following: on the one hand, identity plus the belief that there is nothing but universals: and on the other, space and time plus the belief that there is nothing but particulars. You do not get rid of universals merely by believing in space and time, for they crop out again everywhere within these orders themselves. Every relation in space—to the left of, above, east, west—is a universal; and a body's extension seems just as plainly universal as its colour or its weight. Thirdly, though taking all attributes as universals does force us to call in question the space-time order as we know it, the mere acceptance of that order does not prove that particulars exist. For particularity, properly conceived, is the uniqueness achieved by exhausting a thing's relations; and thus mere loyalty to space and time will not reserve their contents from universality. It is an illusion to suppose you can save a plurality of particulars by standing up boldly for space, time, and common sense. For none of these, either singly or in their unity, will really serve to particularize."¹

But the problem remains unsolved. The denial of the particulars entails the logical impossibility of the existence of the same thing in two different places at the same time. The only excuse which is given by Blanshard, is that the belief in the reality of space and time involves the denial of identity, and this is detrimental to knowledge.

The abstract universal as such exemplified identically in its species is not real. There is no triangularity or manliness identically shared by triangles, or by men. Nor can we conceive triangularity or manliness apart from particular triangles or particular men, because such universals as the essence of subsumed particulars

¹ Ibid. p. 650.

do not exist. The generic universal is not found in its species; it is ideal and is our thought or idea about its species. This thought is a purpose which is striving to realize itself in its object by knowing it as it is. We have seen that a thing located in space and time is not a particular; it reduces to abstract universals. At this point it is important to understand what Blanshard means when he says that the generic universal realizes itself in its object. Its object is the sum total of qualities and relations to everything else in the universe. Therefore when Blanshard says that the generic universal or an idea realizes itself in its species or object, the species or the object should not be taken as individual or particular in the traditional sense. For example to know a man as he is necessitates besides the knowing of all of his qualities, the knowledge of his infinite relations to everything in the universe. Or again just as knowing a triangle, as it is with all its properties, involves knowing everything in geometry; so for thought to know its species or its object as it is, is to realize itself in the whole universe. Thus for thought the task of knowing its object involves the huge, the practically impossible task of knowing the whole universe, because its object is the aggregate of infinite qualities, the meeting place of all its relations to everything else in the universe. For thought to realize itself in its object means, then, to realize itself in every object because to know its object as it is, requires that its relation to everything else be known. This in turn requires that the characters of everything in the universe be known.

Thus, we see the bearing of the doctrine of concrete universals to that of internal relations. If a concrete universal is to be actualized in its species, then it involves the knowledge of everything in the universe. Its species is a center where infinite qualities and relations meet. This conception of the universal entails the belief that everything in the universe is internally related to everything else, and that the universe is one system. Furthermore it does not deny individuality, though it may seem to deny it. It says the individuality or uniqueness of a thing depends on its relations to everything in the universe. This means that what differentiates one thing from another is everything that makes the universe.

Now we reached a point which links this chapter to the following chapter. How an individual entity should be conceived is the theme of the next chapter.

Chapter 2Relations and Properties

The exposition of the controversy between the externality and the internality of relations and qualities is the main purpose of the thesis. The problem stated briefly is; whether or not a term retains its identity in spite of the changes in its relations to other terms. A relation is internal to a term when its modification or change entails a modification or change in the nature of its term. A relation is external when its change does not affect its term. Some realist philosophers take a mid-way position. They think that some relations are internal and some external. For example, the regular beating of the heart is internally related to the proper functioning of the lung, because any change in one will affect the other. While the loss of a hair is externally related to the regular beating of the heart, for its loss does not modify the function of the heart or that of the lung. The idea behind it is that while the heart or the lung cannot function without one another. Still either can do so, for example, without a hair, for bald men do manage to live at least for a while. Thus baldness has been held to be a quality which is related to the heart or to the lung externally.

The idealist, however, with whose theory we are interested at present, does not make any compromise. For him all relations are internal; that is, all qualities whatever they are or in whatever

way they are related are essential to the term and modify it whenever they undergo a modification or a change. The change in them may be very slight or very insignificant, but still it is a change and its effect modifies the term. As soon as one accepts the fact that there is some modification in the term, because of the change of qualities and relations, he is compelled to accept the relation as internal. This is what the definition of internality requires.

The doctrine of external relations is closely associated with the theory of abstract universals. The intensions of a genus is considered to be the essential characteristic of a species, and the other attributes are considered accidental to it. Thus, when man is defined as a rational and two-footed animal, the color of the skin is considered accidental and therefore related to rationality and two-footedness externally. For example, when a white skin becomes tan, it does not modify the rationality of the individual. But we have seen that the abstract universal was not found in its species identically, and that to conceive it apart from the species was beyond our ability. Furthermore, one cannot show that the color of the skin is not essential to the behavior of the individual as a whole. While, on the other hand, we think there are many examples which illustrate the close relationship of the behavior of an animal with that of its color, type of hair, type of nail, etc. It is not pure accident that the color of the animals living in the jungle and of those living in the arctic zone

be appropriate to the environment. Color is one of the essentials of their protective mimicry. By adapting the color of the environment the animal remains unnoticed by its enemies and by its prey. Thus color is essential for the survival of the animal. Other features, such as nail, hair, etc. have their proper function in the welfare and the type of behavior which animals have. Thus when one examines carefully all the properties of a thing he will find that there are no accidental properties. All are essential for the animal's being what it is. However, one can see that not all the properties of the animals are essential in the same degree. For example the heart of a man is more essential for his life than his hair. But to disregard the effect of the hair on the type of life a man would live is a mistake.

The theory of internal relations is summed up, by Blanshard, in these three points.

" (1) That every term, i.e. every possible object of thought, is what it is in virtue of relations to what is other than itself; (2) that its nature is affected thus not by some of its relations only, but in differing degrees by all of them, no matter how external they may seem; (3) that in consequence of (2) and of the further obvious fact that everything is related in some way to everything else, no knowledge will reveal completely the nature of any term until it has exhausted that term's relations to everything else." ¹

1. The meaning of a term.

In the previous chapter, we have seen that Blanshard reduces

¹ Op.cit. Vol. 2, p. 452.

the individual or the particular to universals. Uniqueness, which is supposed to make a thing particular was confined only to the total universe; that is a thing, in order to be considered a unique individual or a particular, should be taken with all of its qualities and of its relations to everything else in the universe. This also means that, in order to know something as it is, one has to exhaust all of its qualities and all of its relations to everything else in the universe. This gives us the clue to Blanshard's peculiar way of defining a term. A term is any possible object of thought. Its nature entails in addition to all of its qualities and its relations with everything else in the universe all the qualities and relations which it lacks. What a term possesses and what it lacks are equally true to and definitive of its nature. Thus, if x is a table, it is also not a chair and not a book. X's not being a chair or a book is as real as its being a table. For it is in the nature of it to be a table and not to be a chair or a book.

1. Difference is an internal relation.

The meaning of a term as given above, entails the belief that the nature of a term has two aspects — positive and negative: to be something and not to be another thing -- and both aspects inhere in the nature of a thing. These two aspects are related to each other by the relation of difference. When one says that x is a table and x is not a chair, it means that being a table is different from being a chair, for otherwise they would have the

same meaning. We have seen that to account for the difference of one thing from another a set of qualities are not sufficient, because they may in principle be repeatable. So in order to account for their difference one has to state all their qualities and relations to everything in the universe, because only then is individual thing achieved. So the difference between a table and a chair is to be found in a difference in the qualitative and relational properties, which the table possesses and lacks, and in similar properties, which the chair possesses and lacks. Strictly speaking, a table lacks the sum of all the qualities and relations that make a chair, and a chair lacks the sum of all that make a table. Consequently no property of the table can be identically found in the chair, because any quality in the table is related to all the qualities and relations in a manner different from that of the chair. For example, both the table and the chair may have four legs. According to the theory of abstract universal four-leggedness is not a property that differentiates a table from a chair, because it is commonly shared by each of them. But Blanshard would deny the identity of this property in each of them, because they are found in different contexts. The four-leggedness of the table is not identical in all its aspects with the four-leggedness of the chair. In the first case it is related to the functions and other properties of the table and in the other to those of the chair. One should not isolate a property from its context. If this is true, then the four-leggedness in the table and

in the chair is a property, that differentiates the table from the chair, and the chair from the table. The same argument can be applied to any specific quality of the two objects. Thus what makes the table different from the chair is the sum total of all qualities and relations that make a table a table, and a chair a chair, if this is the case, then a change in their difference necessitates a change in them, and a change in them implies a change in their difference. But since everything is related to every other thing with the relation of difference, it follows that a change in their difference will be a change in the nature of both, though the change will be in the negative aspect of their natures.

To illustrate the principle, let us take the case of the table. It is said that the nature of the table included what is as well as what is not. Let us assume that there is a table x and a chair y . One of the properties of x is that it is not y . x is not y means, x is different from y . Similarly one of the characters of y is that it is not x . Let us suppose that x changes to x_1 , then y , which was not- x , becomes not- x_1 thereby making a change in their difference. Also, if there were a change in their difference there must have been a change in the terms. This argument is true for everything in the universe. When x becomes x_1 , everything, which had the property of not being x , acquires the property of not being x_1 . Thus, as was said, the change is in the negative aspect of their nature. If this argument is valid, then difference is a relation which relates everything to everything else internally.

2. Relations give rise to relational properties, and these become part of the nature of the terms.

In defining a term, it was found that for Blanshard its nature comprised besides its qualities all of its relations with everything else in the universe. These relations are not qualities. But they give rise to 'relational properties'¹, and these properties belong to the nature of the terms. Thus if x is to the left of y, then x has the relational property of being 'to the left of y'. Or if x is heavier than y, then it has the relational property of being 'heavier than y'. If this is the case, then when a term comes into a new relation with another term, its nature thereby will be modified by acquiring a new relational property.

Let us suppose x had a son y, then x acquires the relational property of being "the parent of y". The acquisition of this property makes a modification in the nature of x and y at the same time, such that if x had not been the parent of y, he would not be what he is at present. Besides that, if x had been the parent of z instead of y, again he would be different from what he is now, for to be the parent of y is not the same as to be the parent of z. If y is different from z, then the relation of y to x is different from the relation of z to x. If the relation is different, then the relational property will be different too. If this is the case,

¹ This is a term used by G.E. Moore, in his book Philosophical Studies, p. 28.

then neither the relations could remain unchanged when the relational properties are changed, nor the relational properties remain the same when the relations are changed. It follows that if the relations change they change their terms too. This shows that all relations are internal to their terms.

But one may think of certain relations and relational properties whose presence and absence make no difference to their term. For example, whether one wears a neck-tie or not, does not make an essential difference to the nature of the person. If he wears one, then he would acquire the property of being a 'wearer of a neck-tie'. But this property does not change a person's nature in the same way that the property of being intelligent would. The loss of the neck-tie does not alter one's nature, while the loss of his intelligence does. And therefore the second is essential to his nature while the first is not. Here, again we have the old problem of essence and accident. We have seen that the idealist considers the demarcation artificial; that is, there is no accident. Everything is essential, but essential in degree. It is true that the loss of one's intelligence will put one into an insane asylum while the loss of a neck-tie will, in most cases, probably not put one there. Nevertheless, it is false that the loss of the neck-tie will have no effect on the individual whatsoever. One cannot be indifferent to the loss of his neck-tie: he may be sorry for it; one may think of buying another; one may

not use a neck-tie anymore, etc. These little things have little effects on the nature of man, and to disregard and reduce them to nothing which is unessential or irrelevant to the character of something. But in saying this, he does not mean to say that everything is essential or relevant in the same degree. Infinite different characters exhibit infinite degree of essentiality or relevancy to something. If things are essential in degree, then they are internal in degree. By this one means that a thing affects another thing in proportion to its relevance to it. The loss of the neck-tie is not as essential or as relevant to the well being of the organism as the loss of the intelligence. Another example: a famine in China affects China more than it affects Egypt. But to say that it does not affect Egypt at all directly or indirectly is wrong. An earthquake in Japan radiates its shaking effects to every spot on the earth, though its effects decrease in proportion to the increase of distance.

If the introduction of the notion of "essentiality in degree" is a valid compromise between the contradictory notions of the essential and the accidental, then, if one accepts that relations give rise to relational properties, he should not limit his acceptance to few relations which only are thought to be essential but to all relations, for all are essential though in degree.

3. Concrete terms cannot lose their relations without changing their nature.

The doctrine of internal relations considers relations as

objective and as real as the terms, for they are part of the nature of the term. As has been stated, when the relations of a term change, the nature of the term changes too. Now, we are going to show that the converse also is true: that is when the nature of the terms changes, it entails the change of its relations.

In the previous chapter, we have seen that for Blanshard everything is theoretically repeatable, except the universe. As a consequence uniqueness can be achieved only when we specify all the qualities of a thing as well as all its relations to everything else in the universe. By such a definition it may seem that Blanshard is denying the individuality of things, because it resolves them, whether a horse, or a man, or a tree, into the whole universe. However, this is not the case; no two things are identical. Every entity has a unique position in the universe which depends not on a few properties or on spatio-temporal order, but on the totality of its qualities and relations to everything else in the universe. In order to find out the uniqueness of a leaf, one has to specify all of its properties and all of its relations to everything else in the universe. We have seen that Blanshard does not consider his view arbitrary, but the only alternative which will account for the individuality or particularity of a thing, because any limited set of qualities or relations is repeatable and hence these qualities become universals.

If this is the case, then it appears that Blanshard is begging the question of concerning internal relations. To consider every

relation that a term has as part of its nature necessarily entails the belief that these relations are internally connected with it, and that whenever the term changes, its relations change with it necessarily. But with similar reasoning one may criticise the holder of the external relations as well, for to exclude color from the intension of a particular class and to consider it an accidental property, entails the belief that color is related to its object externally.

This should be kept in mind, because here lies the crucial point of the problem. And now, we may take an example and try to show why all relations should be considered essential to a term, and why, when the term changes, its relations also change. Let us say; A and B are friends. The question is: can A and B become enemies without either of them being changed? If they can, then friendship or amity are related to their terms externally. If not, then they are related internally. But it is evident that they cannot become enemies without themselves being changed, one can reason it out thus: if A and B are friends, and if A remains A, and if B remains B; then why should they be enemies? Certainly there must be a reason for their becoming hostile. A may behave such that B might not approve it, or A may hear some bad things about B's early life, etc. All such reasons tend to change their attitude toward each other. But a change in their attitude is a change in their nature. Therefore A and B cannot lose their relations to each other, without changing their nature.

One may think of spatial relations as accidental to their terms. One may say that a building, whether it is built here or a few meters distant is still the same building. This amounts to saying that Paris would be what it is now, if instead of being in Northern France it were built in the Southern France; that is, though its spatial relations are changed, Paris is still Paris. This of course is nonsense. If Paris had been in the Southern France, perhaps it would not have been the capital. Granted that it would be the capital, the people in it would not be those who are living at present. All traffic, all business, all correspondences would be different. Its location would affect all of its functionings, and so all of its character. This shows that a change in the spatial relations affect the whole nature of Paris, and Paris cannot lose its spatial relations without losing its character.

Thus Blanshard is led to conclude that a concrete term owes its character ~~to~~ its relations. And when it loses its relations, it changes its nature and vice versa, when it changes its nature, it has changed its relations, because a concrete term is nothing but the sum total of its qualities and its relations.

Chapter 3Causality

If one could show that certain things are uncaused, or, still less, if one could only show that certain things, though caused, happen independently of other things, it would be sufficient to disprove the doctrine of internal relations. Blanshard thus has found it necessary to establish and affirm a belief in universal and necessary causation.

Recently a certain theory in physics known as Heisenberg's principle of indeterminacy was welcomed by some people who yearn to be undetermined. They thought it shattered the causal chains and freed man's will from its eternal slavery. But unfortunately these people were the victims of the fallacy of equivocation of meaning. According to the principle of indeterminacy, one cannot determine, in the sense of measure, the velocity and the position of an electron particle accurately at the same time. One can determine only the position or the velocity, but not both. Due to the double meaning of the word "indeterminacy" this has been interpreted to mean that the electron particle is undetermined, in the sense of uncaused, and so self-caused or free to move whenever it pleases to do so. It was further argued that, if this is true for the microscopic particles, then it must be true to macroscopic objects, above all to man, since they are composed

of free particles. But as was said, the principle of indeterminacy deals with measurement, and is consistent with two explanations: that this indeterminacy in measureability results from real freedom in nature or that it results from the conditions of measurement. Certainly Heisenberg's principle, then, cannot be taken to prove that physical events are uncaused and one's belief in causation must be founded on its ability best to order and explain the events of nature. Consequently Blanshard must show that the regular-sequence view is inadequate to explain recurrent events as well as that necessity in causation alone can explain the possibility of scientific prediction.

Some people accept causality as a regular sequence and not as a necessary connection: that is, when we say that A is the cause of B, we mean to say that B follows A regularly, without being necessarily connected with it. Hume was the first modern philosopher who rejected the relation of cause and effect as a logical necessity. His arguments can be summed up in two statements: first, that no idea or sensation implies another, and second, that constant recurrence of an event does not imply that the cause and the effect are related by logical necessity. In other words, we can never know that one event implies another event necessarily. If we cannot know it, then we have no right to posit it.

The question which Hume raised cannot be answered, because,

as a matter of fact, logically we cannot prove that one thing implies another.

But Blanshard does try to refute Hume indirectly, by showing the short comings of the regular-sequence theory of causality. His attempt is to show that no other theory of causality satisfies the requirement of knowledge except causality as logical necessity.

The first argument against the regular-sequence view is, that it is in conflict with the theory of probability. The argument briefly is this: to say that B follows A regularly and not necessarily is in effect to say that they are not related to one another necessarily, and so B's succession is an accident. If one believes that B's succession is an accident, then he has to permit a person to say that B may follow events other than A, and that events other than B may follow A. Furthermore, the probability of the constant recurrence of B decreases geometrically. For example if the probability that B will succeed A once out of x possibilities is $\frac{1}{x}$, the probability that it will succeed A consecutively twice will be $\frac{1}{x^2}$, for three times $\frac{1}{x^3}$, etc. But when B constantly follows A, the probability of the succession of events other than B will get less; that is, the more B follows A instead of other events, the more it decreases the probability of its not following A. According to Montague and Blanshard, the more B follows A, the more it affirms the truth of the view of causality as necessary connection. The holders of regular-sequence view can defend themselves consistently if they, like Santayana, agree that no matter how many

times B follows A, still it follows it accidentally and not necessarily. But to adhere to chance is somewhat foreign to the questioning intellect, though it is logically possible.

The regular-sequence theory of causality may be adequate to explain physical phenomena, but it keeps one always in doubt. While the necessary connection view explains it better. To quote Blanshard;

"For on the chance hypothesis every successive repetition of a conjunction given in the past is the occurrence of the progressively more improbable, while on the hypothesis of intrinsic connection it is only a confirmation, more impressive at each recurrence of what the hypothesis predicted."¹

The regular-sequence view involves another difficulty, which is that of induction. The adherents of the regular-sequence view believe in the recurrence in the future of events similar in kind to those which have occurred in the past. But are they justified in their belief? Certainly not, for if A and B, as cause and effect, are not necessarily connected, no reason would justify a person's believing in the joint recurrence. If B is not connected to A necessarily, it may cease to succeed it at any time. So the holder of regular-sequence view has no right to expect its regular reappearance in the future. On this view, therefore, the prediction of the future is groundless.

The regular-sequence view leads one to skepticism, for it finds no necessary connection between percepts and their causes.

¹ Blanshard, The Nature of Thought, Vol. II, p. 506.

Now, if we are aware only of our percepts, on this theory we cannot know the nature of the external objects from the character of the percepts, since they are not intrinsically connected. Skepticism is inevitable as we find it in Hume.

If one believes in the possibility of knowledge, he automatically should reject the regular-sequence view of causality. But we have seen that for Blanshard, mind is teleological in character. The sole purpose of thought is to understand the world as it is and thereby quench his thirst for knowledge. But the regular-sequence view of causality does not satisfy the nature of thought, for it leads to skepticism, a position which thought is struggling to overcome.

We have seen that the regular-sequence view makes the possibility of knowledge difficult, because the succeeding events are not intrinsically connected, and so there is no sense in relating one thing to another. But the surprising thing is that though two types of event are not intrinsically connected yet they do succeed one another regularly whenever the first type is given. This leads us to believe in their being intrinsically connected, for it is unlikely that their regular succession is always accidental. There must be an intrinsic connection between cause and effect, such that the character of the effect depends on the character of the cause, otherwise we shall not have any reason to suppose that they succeed one another regularly. Now to assume that there is

an intrinsic connection between cause and effect is not enough. The connection must be also necessary for two reasons: first, necessity is implied by the meaning of intrinsic connection, second, to assume that the character of the effect follows from the character of the cause, and yet to hold that given the same cause, the same effect may not necessarily follow, is in conflict with the laws of identity and contradiction. If B's nature follows from the nature of A, then whenever A is given and assuming the constancy of everything else, B should follow necessarily. If not-B follows instead of B, then we have to assume either that A while remaining identical with itself can produce B and not-B, or that it is not identical with itself. The first is impossible, because A has one nature and its behavior follows from its nature, so if its nature remains constant its behavior also remains constant and so one kind of effect can follow from it and not many. The second also is impossible in the sense that we are assuming the identity of A. But it is a possible alternative of the first, because two different effects cannot be produced from the same cause.

Thus, this view of causality is in harmony with the nature of thought. We have seen that thought is potentially the intelligible world, and it is in a process of actualization. The same unfolding processes exhibit themselves in the non-mental events. We said that the relation of the cause and the effect is intrinsic and necessary. The effects depend on and owe their nature to the nature of the cause. In other words the character of the

effect is potentially in the cause, and what is happening is that the cause is being developed by the actualization of the potential elements in it.

But the case for internal relations in order to be complete requires a conception of causality which will relate everything to everything else. In other words, when we speak of the cause of an effect, we have to consider not one thing as the cause of it, but everything in the universe. This consideration implies the conception of the universe as one system, in which everything is related causally to everything else.

Now it is possible to grant the universality of causation conceived as necessary connection but refuse to limit the universe to one system. The universe would then consist of many systems such that events in one system are causally related to one another but events in different systems not. Therefore events in the same system would be internally related, while events in different systems would be externally related to one another. For example, if one takes the human body as a system, the functioning of the organs are mutually caused by one another. Similarly the organs of another animal or a plant are internally related to one another within that animal or that plant. But the function of the organs of one animal to the organs of another animal or of a plant is externally related. So that when an animal dies other animals' or plants' organs still function regularly as if nothing has happened.

This view is in conflict with the view that the universe as a whole is an internally related system. For Blanshard such thinking is short-sighted, for it permits no relation to exist at all between the events in one system and those in another. But, argues Blanshard, if they are not causally related directly, they may be so indirectly. The problem is now to find a common cause connecting the two systems. If one can find that, then he can conclude that they are ultimately connected causally with one another. For example one might take the air and show that how respiration of the plants has effect on the quantity of the different constituents of the air, which in turn has affected the respiration of the animals, and vice versa. The point is well illustrated in a balance aquarium. Now if we consider the earth as a big balance aquarium, we may realize the dependence of the plant kingdom on the animal kingdom and vice versa. If this is true, then a single plant or animal will have some effect on the whole kingdom of plants and animals. The effect of their death may be very insignificant for the proper functioning of the rest, but still it is not nothing. Again if one considers the heat and the rays of the sun, he can connect the events which are taking place in the sun to those taking place on the earth. Consider the relation of life to the sunlight and you connect the earth as one system to the sun as another system. Indeed, light rays interpenetrate the whole system of the heaven. Still, most important of all, a thing which connects all bodies to one another

better than anything else is gravitation. It is directly proportional to the product of the masses of the bodies and is inversely proportional to the square of their distance. The law of gravitation relates one object to all internally, no matter how far they are apart, and encourages one to boast that if he shakes his beard all the stars will play their music.

To sum up: the regular-sequence view of causality is inadequate to explain the recurrence of events: the logical necessity view explains it better, and it gives a better ground to predict future events. In accepting the logical necessity view we should not limit it only to systems within which events are necessarily related. Events of separate systems may be related to each other either directly or indirectly. Thus all systems are related to each other causally, and form one system.

Part Two

A Critique of the Doctrine of Internal Relations

The Critique of the Doctrine of Internal Relations

As Conceived by Blanshard

In this critique I shall try to evaluate Blanshard's arguments to reduce the universe into one internally-related system. The questions which I shall discuss will be the following: first, the universal vs. the particular; second, space and time as principles of particularization; third, the relation of difference; fourth, causality; and fifth, the intelligibility of the universe.

In the first, I shall try to show that Blanshard's method of reducing the particular to the universal is not justifiable. His argument was: that anything which is repeatable is a universal, that any limited set of qualities, or relations, is repeatable in principle and so is a universal, that individuality depends on uniqueness, and that the universe alone is non-repeatable, which beliefs forced him to conclude that individuality can be properly conceived only by enumerating a thing's relations to everything else in the universe. My criticism of this argument will be that it involves certain inconsistencies. If any limited set of qualities, or relations, is repeatable, then the generic universal will be exemplified in two things and the abstract universal, which Blanshard rejected, will really exist in things. Furthermore, Blanshard cannot reduce thing to abstract universals, because in an internally related system, as he has conceived it, a thing's

nature is affected by all of its relations to everything else, and since no two things have the same relations to everything else, it follows that no two things can exemplify the same quality identically. Thus mere theoretical repeatability without actual repeatability cannot be acceptable as a sufficient reason for reducing any specific set of properties to universals.

Secondly, I shall try to show that Blanshard's method of rejecting space and time as principles of particularization is not valid. His main argument for rejecting them was that space and time thus conceived were in conflict with the category of identity as based on the doctrine of concrete universals, the denial of which would make knowledge, as he conceived it, impossible. My criticism will be that the truth of a basic metaphysical principle, such as that which makes things particular, should not be made to depend on whether or not it makes knowledge possible. And then I shall try to defend the view that space and time are principles sufficient to particularize things, because it is inconceivable that two things occupy the same place at the same time and in the same respect.

Thirdly, I shall try to point out that the relation of difference, by means of which Blanshard finds all things to be related to one another internally, is not a meaningful relation. To do this I shall try to show that a thing can be understood in terms of its positive properties, and that the negative properties are known by logical derivation from the positive properties; hence, they

do not add anything to the definition or meaning of a term. The relation of difference, thus, will be reduced to a logical relation, and, as such, cannot be used as evidence in favor of the doctrine of internal relations.

Fourthly, although I will accept causality as Blanshard understands it, I shall try to show that causality, so conceived, does not give sufficient ground for holding the doctrine that the universe is one internally related system. As we have already seen, in such a system a thing depends for what it is on its relations to every other thing in that system. Hence since everything in the universe exists at an instant all compresent events must be internally related. And to satisfy such a requirement there should be a relation which relates every thing to every other causally without involving lapse of time, because, if all compresent events are not thus related, then there will be some things which are not directly dependent upon some other things as they exist at any given instant of time. So far as science tells us, there is only one relation, namely that of gravitation, which possibly may connect spatially distant objects causally. But so far no one is sure whether or not gravitation relates distant objects in temporal sequence or instantaneously. If gravitation is not instantaneous, then the internally relatedness of compresent events becomes problematical. Thus being uncertain of the true nature of gravitation, it does not serve to show that the universe is a single internally related system as Blanshard has conceived it.

Finally, I shall try to show that in spite of Blanshard's contention the universe cannot be said to be intelligible if we accept his doctrine of internal relations, because such a system itself is closed, and everything in it is too complex to be known.

- Chapter 1

The Universal vs. the Particular

1. Blanshard's method of reducing the particular to universal is not valid.

We have seen that Blanshard, while reducing the individual or the particular to the universal, considered everything except the universe to be repeatable in principle. Though he did not believe that this is in principle possible. Therefore, he argued, if a thing is in principle repeatable, then it cannot be an individual, for individuality rests on being unique. Blanshard considered any limited set of specific qualities or relations to be repeatable in principle, and, therefore, incapable of individuating things. For him the only thing which is not repeatable is the universe. Hence, individuality properly conceived can be achieved only when a thing's relations to everything else in the universe are exhausted. It is the cogency of this method of reducing the particular to the universal that I want to question.

In my opinion there is a contradiction between the doctrine of internal relations as conceived by Blanshard and his method of reducing the particular to the universal. However, before pointing out the contradiction, it would be better to quote his own argument. In answer to those who argue that a thing's particularity is due to a unique association of properties, Blanshard says:

"... the qualities—hardness, heaviness, colour, shape, any others we might mention—are all of them universal, that they might be repeated together as well as singly, and hence that they cannot serve to make this lump of matter the unique thing that it is."¹

And a bit further on, he continues:

"The narrow complex of relations in which it (the particular) presents itself and which confers particularity upon it is always theoretically repeatable, and is therefore itself universal, there is no essential difference between particulars and universals"²

In these quotations Blanshard says that the qualities as well as the relations might be repeated, and if they are repeatable, then they are universal and not particular, because even theoretical repeatability is sufficient to annul the uniqueness of a quality or a thing. Here it is important to know what kind of universals we shall get, when things are repeatable in principle. If we have a duplication of a quality or a thing, then the same quality will be in two things. And, consequently, this quality will be an abstract universal. But Blanshard already has shown, to his own satisfaction at least, that there are no abstract universals and that no grouping of qualities, and no particular quality is actually repeated identically in two things. The failure of his argument lies in the reintroduction of a meaningful use of abstract universals when he has already shown that there is no such thing.

¹ Ibid. p. 627

² Ibid. p. 635

And if there is no such thing in actuality, then the unique grouping of qualities or properties in any particular thing should be sufficient to establish its uniqueness—its particularity—without recourse to the thing's relations to a unique Absolute.

Secondly, even if the above objection is disregarded, still Blanshard has confused the realms of the possible and the actual. Again confining our argument to an internally related universe, as conceived by Blanshard, let us see whether or not any quality can actually be repeated, even if it should be theoretically repeatable. I believe that in a universe, such as Blanshard has conceived, no quality can be repeated actually, and hence that any quality will remain unique—that is, particular. To support my belief, it will be sufficient to quote Blanshard's own words on internal relations. He says:

" (1) That every term, i.e. every possible object of thought, is what it is in virtue of relations to what is other than itself; (2) that its nature is affected thus not by some of its relations only, but in differing degrees by all of them, no matter how external they may seem;....."¹

If this is what Blanshard means by internal relations, and if this is the truth about the nature of things in the universe, then there cannot be two things exactly alike in any respect, in part because no two things can have the same spatial location at the same time,

1 op.cit. Vol. 2, p. 452.

and, therefore, no two things can be related in the same way to every other thing. Hence in such a system no two things can exemplify the same quality identically.

However, Blanshard does not say that two things can actually exemplify the same quality identically, and I believe that he simply confines himself to theoretical repeatability and does not go further. In one place he says:

"So long as one remains within a limited field of relations one is always confronted with the theoretic possibility (and nothing more is required) that this complex should be repeated, and just so long one is tarrying within the land of universals... But surely this conclusion is disastrous for those who believe in particulars in the ordinary sense. For all that we commonly call particulars, pots and pans, mountains and rivers, are now seen to be universals. The only true particular is the absolute."¹

In the above quotation he definitely states in the parenthesis, that nothing more than theoretical repeatability is required to reduce any limited set of particulars to universals. And in the above argument I tried to show that in Blanshard's own system actual repeatability is not possible, and that he cannot go beyond theoretical possibility. But one may question whether or not the mere theoretical possibility of repetition of a group of qualities offers sufficient ground for considering that group of qualities a universal. The answer in my opinion is in the negative, because I believe that if any limited set of particulars is not actually

¹ Ibid. p. 639. The italics are mine.

repeatable, (as is the case in Blanshard's system) then it is not actually universal; that is, it is a particular. Consequently Blanshard can ascribe no significant meaning to theoretical repeatability and groups of qualities have become particulars in actuality. Thus it seems that Blanshard has devised such a far-fetched argument for the reduction of the particular to the universal that it is no longer acceptable. He has failed to give reasonable grounds for reducing the particular to the universal.

Chapter 2Space and Time as Principles of Particularization1. Blanshard's argument for rejecting space and time as principles of particularization is not justifiable.

As we have seen Blanshard's conception of the principle of identity based on his doctrine of concrete universals was in conflict with the notion of space and time as principles of particularization. On page 28-29 of this thesis I have given Blanshard's arguments for accepting the doctrine of concrete universals and rejecting particularization by space and time. It is the cogency of his argument which I now would like to question.

A summary of the main points of the argument is as follows: knowledge is possible only if we assume the doctrine of concrete universals. Space and time as principles of particularization separate things from each other as independent and unique entities and thereby contradict the principle of particularization based on the doctrine of concrete universals, that is, that the particular owes its uniqueness to its relations to everything else in the universe. Both of these contradictory views cannot be true. If space and time were principles of particularization, then Blanshard's doctrine of this concrete universal would be false and the category of identity based on this doctrine would suffer a similar fate. But if we reject the category of identity thus conceived, then for Blanshard

knowledge would be impossible. Therefore space and time cannot be accepted as principles of particularization.

The objection which I want to raise against such reasoning is this: the truth or metaphysical reality of a principle should not be made to depend on the ground that it makes some knowledge possible or impossible. First, the discovery of such a principle is itself a kind of knowledge, and it is a non sequitur to argue that this principle is false because it makes the acquisition of some other kind of knowledge impossible. And secondly, the question, "what particularizes thing?" is different from the question, "what makes knowledge possible?" Therefore they should be answered independently.

In my opinion Blanshard's method of rejection of space and time as principles of particularization is similar to that of the theologians of the late Middle Ages who rejected such scientific discoveries as the earth's rotation around the sun, because they were not in conformity with the truth as they conceived it, namely, church doctrine and the teachings of the Bible. The fact that a principle fails to fit into one's own system of knowledge does not necessarily make that principle false. Blanshard thinks that if he accepts space and time as principles of particularization, then knowledge of things becomes impossible. But the order of things in themselves does not depend on the mode of explanation give by any philosopher. So, if space and time as principles of particularization do not fit in Blanshard's system of knowledge, all he

should say is that they do not fit in his own system of knowledge.

Therefore we need only conclude that if space and time are principles of particularization Blanshard's conception of knowledge will be impossible. Blanshard's argument loses force for he has not shown that all other epistemologies are untenable.

The argument can be restated by insisting that the question of what makes things particular is different from the question of what makes knowledge possible. This first question is so fundamental and elementary that its answer may be given before more complex and comprehensive questions in metaphysics and epistemology are considered. Its answer may not necessarily depend on a particular preconceived system of knowledge, and consequently I criticize Blanshard for his manner of rejecting space and time as principles of particularization. He did not criticize space and time for not adequately differentiating particulars, but for not being consistent with his highly complex and speculative system. His failure seems to be one of requiring an explanation of the simple in terms of what is unnecessarily complex and speculative.

2. Space and time are principles sufficient to particularize things.

Numerical diversity is due basically to uniqueness of spatial position of a thing at a moment of time. Any particular thing is sensed and conceived as an individual thing through its spatial boundaries. And this conception or imagination rests on our

awareness of objects through sense perception. When we look at things, we differentiate them numerically simply by tracing the spatial boundaries which contain a thing exclusively. Most people know how a blind person differentiates numerically one thing from another by passing on his fingers over its spatial boundaries. Two balls may be identical in all respects such that a blind man will not be able to differentiate qualitatively one from the other by feeling them with his fingers, but still he will consider them two and not one, when he has both of them in his hands at the same time, precisely because they occupy different places. Or again, identical twins are often mistaken one for the other, and are considered to be one and not two. But we shall know that we are mistaken when we see them both at the same time. Such cases force us to say that, even if in every respect two things were identical, they still would not occupy the same place at the same time, and if no other quality might help us to differentiate one thing from the other, we at the end should resort to space and time as the basic principles of particularization. Mere repetition of qualities does not reduce a particular to a universal, because, even if every quality of a thing is repeated in another thing, still there will remain one property which is not repeatable at the same time—that is, its spatial position. No two things or entities occupy the same space with respect to other entities at the same time. This is a physical impossibility. It is this

spatial uniqueness which is sufficient to make a thing numerically different from each other at any moment of time. And to know the numerical diversity of things it suffices to know their spatial location.

Chapter 3The Relation of Difference1. Difference as a relation does not relate things internally.

I now take issue with Blanshard's contention about difference. I will not at this point raise the question whether or not the universe is an internally related system. I shall only question the belief that difference as a relation can supply any additional evidence for the doctrine of internal relations.

According to Blanshard, as we have seen the definition of a term comprises the sum of its positive and negative characteristics which consist of the properties a thing possesses and those which it lacks and all other things possess. The relation of difference gives any specific thing the additional important property of not possessing the characteristics which characterize every other term. As a consequence, Blanshard argues, a change in any object in the universe will necessitate a change in the characteristics of the particular thing under consideration. For example, when a tile on the roof of West Hall cracks, the table on which I am writing has undergone a change in its negative properties. The table formerly was in part a not whole-tile on the roof of West Hall; now it becomes a not cracked-tile on the roof of West Hall. Or generalized: any change in the properties of a thing will alter the negative

character of everything else in the universe by changing the existing difference between their positive and negative characteristics. Thus Blanshard believes that he has given new and forceful evidence for his contention that the universe is an interrelated system. It is the strength or meaningfulness of this argument which I now wish to call into question.

In my opinion Blanshard's argument, if valid, rests on the validity of his assumption that the definition of a term comprises both its positive and negative characteristics. And unless we limit the definition of a term to its positive character, the definition will continually suffer a change, because whenever some other thing changes, the negative character of everything else will change with it simultaneously. But if we understand a term as the sum of its positive properties only, then a change in other things will not change its character unless there is a change in its positive characteristics, which will be affected not through a change in the relation of difference between the first which possesses them and other objects, but only through causal relations. It is this view that I shall try to defend: that things are known by the positive properties they possess.

Any system of knowledge is based on characteristics and relations stated positively and not negatively, because only positive statements based on empirical facts can explain the nature of things definitely and precisely. For example, if one wants to know

about the elephant, he has to observe the animal and record the characteristics it possesses. Knowledge by observation is positive. What one sees are the properties which the elephant possesses. And all one needs to know are the properties which make up the elephant, because as soon as one knows what an elephant is, by mere logical operation one can tell what it is not. This negative description does not supply additional knowledge about the elephant, because what it is not can be known only by reference to what it is. Thus when one says that the elephant is dark grey, he at the same time means to say that it is not white, or blue, or red, etc. And by stating what the color of the elephant is not, he is not supplying new information about it, because the color dark grey implies the exclusion of all other colors.

Furthermore, that knowledge can be achieved exclusively by way of knowing the positive properties will be apparent when we consider that no negative statement helps us to know the properties which an unknown thing possesses. This is so, because the class in which a particular thing is not a member constitutes a realm of infinite possibilities. To illustrate we can say that the elephant is not blue because it is dark grey, but we cannot say that the elephant is dark grey only because it is not blue. If it is not blue, then it does not imply that it is dark grey: it may have any one of the infinite colors besides the dark grey.

To sum up: no negative property supplies additional knowledge.

Hence, no negative property will add anything to the definition or meaning of a term. If this is the case, then it will be superfluous to enumerate the negative properties in defining a term. Therefore, the definition or the meaning of a term can be expressed sufficiently by its positive properties, while the negative properties are known by logical derivation.

If the above argument is valid, then the relation of difference is simply a logical relation, which gives no new or additional information about metaphysical reality. Hence it cannot be used to give independent evidence to support the belief that the universe is an internally-related system, because logical relations do not involve lapse of time; they are formal relations and are valid for any term independently of space, time, and causation.

Thus difference, as a logical relation, relates things immediately without reference to temporal order, because it merely expresses in different form what is given in the positive relation. If we should take difference to be a synthetic relation as Blanshard has taken it, then difference should give a relation between terms independently of the causal, temporal order. In other words Blanshard uses the relation of difference to relate all terms independently of actual, causal relations. And thus, he would be able to prove that the whole universe is internally related, whether or not it in fact is so related. Consequently, I can only conclude that the argument is based on an improper understanding and use of the

of the relation of difference. It cannot be taken as evidence in favor of internal relations. If the universe is so related, the evidence must be drawn from the positive characteristics of reality, not from a priori, non-temporal, non-causal arguments, which if valid, can only express in different outward form that which was already known or assumed.

Chapter 4Causality1. Causality cannot be shown to relate compresent events internally.

My conception of causality will not be different from that of Blanshard. That is, if A is invariably succeeded by B, then A is the cause of B, in the sense that between A and B there is a necessary relation. The nature of B is partly grounded in the nature of A, and partly in things which play a part in bringing B into effect.

I agree with Blanshard's view concerning causality, because it explains the multiple recurrence of two succeeding events more adequately than the regular-sequence view. I believe that regular succession and necessity are more in harmony than regular succession and chance. When B succeeds A regularly, it is not probable that it succeeds it in all cases accidentally. And causality thus conceived explains experience better than conceived otherwise, because it gives a justification for prediction and expectation, whereas the regular-sequence view does not.

Accepting Blanshard's view on causality, I shall now discuss the extent to which it serves to relate things internally. As we have seen, according to Blanshard's conception of internal relations the universe is internally related through and through. In a system such as this, a thing is what it is in virtue of its relations to everything else

in the universe. This means that a thing is related internally to everything else at any moment of time, because its being at that moment depends on its relations to everything else in the universe at that moment. Consequently, all compresent events are internally and reciprocally related to each other.

At this point two problems arise; first, the relation of the events in the past to the events in the present; and second, the relation of the co-existing events taken at one moment of time. With respect to the first, I agree with Blanshard that present events are causally related to the past events, and, therefore, are internally related. But I only agree with him in so far as he limits himself to particular chains of events, which may or may not intersect each other. Thus when one listens to a singer, the sound coming from the singer to the listener constitutes a chain of events within which the succeeding events are causally, and, therefore, internally related to the preceding ones. Such a chain of events may intersect at any moment with some (but not necessarily all) other similar chains of events taking place at the same time. This is due to the fact that sound waves travel in spatial and temporal sequence. Hence, when two persons sing in two different places at the same time, we shall hear the one nearer to us before we hear the other. Thus two chains of events may start at the same time and intersect at different times. This is important to the consideration of the doctrine of internal relations, because when two chains of events do not intersect, they are isolated from each other at that time, and therefore do not affect each other. This means that they

are not internally related to each other at that moment.

The above discussion anticipates the sort of answer I shall give in considering the second problem, namely that of the relation of the co-existing events taken at one moment of time. I cannot agree with Blanshard that at any moment a thing depends for what it is on its relations to compresent things, because this entails the belief on that all compresent events are causally connected. But according to present scientific knowledge there is no causal connection between things which is instantaneous with the possible exception of gravitation, the only evidence offered by Blanshard to relate all bodies causally at any moment of time. With regard to gravitation there is no certainty among scientists as to whether it relates things instantaneously or with the speed of light. And in so far as its true character is in doubt, it should not serve as the sole evidence for a metaphysical doctrine. This makes the reciprocal affection or reciprocal internality of relations problematical, and, hence, weakens the fundamental premises of the doctrine of internal relations--namely:

" (1) That every term, i.e. every possible object of thought, is what it is in virtue of relations to what is other than itself; (2) that its nature is affected thus not by some of its relations only, but in differing degrees by all of them, no matter how external they may seem;...."¹

¹ Op. cit. Vol. 2, p. 452, as previously quoted on p.36 of the thesis.

Chapter 5The Intelligibility of the Universe

1. This doctrine of internal relations fails to account for the possibility of knowledge.

According to Blanshard only the doctrine of internal relations can render the world intelligible. In other words the world is intelligible, if it is a world in which everything is related to everything else in such a way that one thing imprints its character on everything else, and it in turn bears upon itself the character of everything else. Such a system seems to him to have more claim to knowability, than a world in which things are unrelated and exist independently of each other. One of the forceful arguments for the intelligibility of the internally related system is that things are necessarily connected to each other and that this makes prediction possible.

If we associate knowledge with true prediction or inference, then we can truly say that wherever prediction or inference is possible, there knowledge is possible. Since an internally related system provides the possibility for prediction or inference, then, if knowledge is possible at all, it can be achieved only in such a system. This seems to be the logic of Blanshard's idealism.

The meaning of a term, as we have seen, was that it is the sum total of its qualities and its relations to everything else.

And still, each quality or each relation a thing has depends on the nature of everything-else. A man who is bald, owes his baldness to everything else in the universe. Hence if one wants to know the causes of his baldness, he must know everything else in the universe. While if one knows a thing in its entirety, he can predict all other things. This idealistic view of knowledge is well expressed in Tennyson's well-known poem entitled "Flower in the Crannied Wall"

.....
 Little flower—but if I could understand
 What you are, root and all, and all in all,
 I should know what God and Man is.

If everything is so related to everything else, the problem now is what we can know and how much we can know. Anything that we perceive bears the permeating effects of everything else. Each quality is the meeting-place of infinite effects, and each of these effects radiates from a near or a distant entity, itself the meeting place of other infinite effects. Thus everything is complex; all affect each other reciprocally or mutually. The system is closed.

It is my criticism that in such a system it would be in practice impossible to know a thing as it is, because that would require nothing less than to know the infinity of things and their relations to any particular thing which we want to know. So far even Blanshard will agree that it is impossible in practice to know a thing as it is, because it is impossible to know everything in the universe. But I shall try to show further, that, in such a system it is even

impossible in principle to know a thing as it is. For the sake of illustration, let us consider three things A, B, and C as forming an internally related, closed system. According to the doctrine of internal relations as conceived by Blanshard, in order to know A as it is we have to know B and C. And in order to know B and C as they are we have to know A, because their nature in part depends on A. But A cannot be known unless we know B and C, which in turn cannot be known unless we know A. Thus each thing needs the knowledge of the other to be known as it is. The system is closed and there is no open window through which to enter into it. However it is conceivable that a very small system may be known in its entirety. But when the system is considered to be very large, then it will be in practice increasingly difficult to know it as a whole. And when it is considered infinite, then that will make the knowledge of the properties and relations of the infinite objects in principle impossible, because it is impossible to know an infinite system of concrete objects and relations as a whole. The infinity by definition cannot be limited, and any knowledge we acquire is limited, because to know something means to define or to limit a thing's nature. And if we cannot know the system as a whole, then we cannot know the part, because, as Blanshard says, in order to know a thing as it is we have to know everything else in the universe, that is, the universe as a whole. But if the universe is an infinite closed system, then it is in principle impossible to know it as a whole. And if we cannot in principle know it in its entirety, then we cannot in principle know any particular thing as

it is, because a full knowledge of a thing requires the knowledge of everything else in the universe. Hence Blanshard's conception of the universe as one internally related system does not make knowledge possible.

Conclusion

In the foregoing critique, I have tried to show that Blanshard has failed in his attempt to reduce the universe into one internally related system as it is expressed in his doctrine of internal relations.¹ There are two things to be shown in order to prove his doctrine. First, he had to show that a thing depends for its unique being on everything else in the universe, and second, he had to show that there is a relation which binds all things in the universe together at any moment of time^{so} that if there is a change in one place it must affect everything else in the universe instantaneously. Otherwise Blanshard cannot say that a thing at any moment of time depends for what it is on everything else in the universe.

As to the first, he could not show satisfactorily that the uniqueness of a thing is derived from its relations to everything else. In this attempt he found two great obstacles. The first was the apparent irreducibility of the particular to the universal. I have tried to show that his argument which says the particular is a group of universals, because any finite set of qualities is repeatable in principle, does not hold. The reason was that in his system, no two things can exemplify the same quality identically,

1 cf. p. 36 of the thesis

and, hence, no universal can be actualized. The second obstacle was the apparent particularization due to space and time. Blanshard did not offer a positive direct argument to show that space and time do not particularize things. Rather he rejected them as principles of particularization by the indirect argument that space and time thus conceived are in opposition to the category of identity based on the doctrine of concrete universal and hence to the possibility of knowledge as he had conceived it. I have tried first to show that such an indirect way of rejecting the validity of the view that space and time are principles of particularization is not justifiable, and second, I tried to show that space and time do particularize things because it is the experiential expression of the law of contradiction that two things cannot be in the same place at the same time with respect to other things.

As to the second of the main things to be shown, Blanshard could not provide a relation that would relate everything at any moment of time and thus bring the universe into one united system. He thought he had found such a relation in "difference" but, as I have tried to show, it is not a positive relation and hence does not serve for this purpose. He also found further evidence in causation as all pervasive relation. But the difficulty was to show that all things are causally related instantaneously. The only suggested principle was gravitation, which may or may not be instantaneous in its effects. If it relates things with finite velocity, then compresent events are affected by each other not at a moment of time, but after a lapse of time. Hence, one cannot say with certainty that a thing

depends for what it is on all present events in the universe.

Finally, I tried to show that this system, contrary to the claim of Blanshard, does not make knowledge possible. The system is intricate and closed, which make knowledge in practice impossible. And if the universe is taken as an infinite closed system, then knowledge becomes impossible even in principle.

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