THE PROBLEM OF

ESSENCE AND EXISTENCE

IN GEORGE SANTAYANA'S PHILOSOPHY

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A STUDY OF GEORGE SANTAYANA'S SCEPTICISM

AND THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL POSITION RESULTING FROM IT

By

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ABSTRACT

The attempt in this paper is to find out whether or not Santayana's scepticism and the outcome of it, which is the idea of essence, has enabled him to find existence.

The first chapter is primarily an examination of Santayana's scepticism. It tries first of all to state that Santayana's technique and type of scepticism, as a method of procedure, may be compared with the method of scepticism adopted in philosophy since the time of Descartes. Thus, Santayana's scepticism is compared with Descartes', and in so doing it is pointed out that Descartes ended with the "Cogito" as the fullest possible limit of his scepticism. Santayana's own technique is evidence that scepticism and doubt could be be pushed further than that. In other words, it could be pushed beyond the personal 'I', i.e. into essence.

In chapter two, the attempt is to analyse the outcome of Santayana's scepticism, by pointing out the fact that Santayana's scepticism was not meant to banish all ideas in a sort of intellectual suicide, but rather withheld the belief that ideas or essences reveal anything. In the ultimate act of doubt Santayana discredited the existence of anything. Thus, in that state he was forced to withdraw into an immaterial universe, a realm of essences. The essential point in the first section of chapter two is to point out how it was justifiable for Santayana to withdraw into the realm of essence and thus not posit anything alien to it, i.e. the external world.
In section two of the same chapter, Santayana's essences are compared with Platonic Forms.

In the third section, in anticipation of the way in which the problem in this paper is to develop eventually, it is pointed out that even after introducing the notion of animal faith, existence for Santayana will seem to borrow its individuality from essence because any description of existence would be an essence and not existence. "The flux of existence flows by flowing through essence".¹

We are now confronted with a problem, a problem due not only to Santayana's own way of thinking, but a basic problem of philosophy, namely, the problem of essence and existence. In order to understand how Santayana meets this problem we must understand how, accepting the idea of essence as the outcome of his scepticism, this same essence can lead him towards or give him existence.

Highly pertinent to the discussion and also for purposes of providing a background the rest of the chapter is a brief survey of the history of philosophy to point out concrete cases of outstanding philosophers who had to face the mire of losing, in some way or other, existence in essence.

Chapter three tries to show how Santayana, by means of his technique of bringing in the notion of animal faith tries to provide a refuge from ontological despair. He does this in order to be able to posit the external world. This technique in turn is contrasted with Descartes' resort to the idea of God in order to prove the existence of the external world.

¹ Santayana, George, Realms Of Being, p. 39
Section two is a discussion of the possibility and the extent of knowledge of the external world or the flux of existence after animal faith is posited.

Section three is a statement to the effect that when the problem in this paper is considered in the light of modern realistic tendencies, it becomes clear that the problem of metaphysical speculation is to understand rather than to construct the structure of existence, i.e. "The task of such realistic metaphysics is to illumine the basic structure of existence which underlies all".¹

Therefore, the critical approach to the problem in this paper is in the light and the perspective of the modern realistic attitude. The justification for adopting this approach lies mainly in the fact that Santayana’s leap from essence to the act of positing animal faith on no rational grounds is a form of procedure which marks a high similarity to the realistic form of procedure. For this reason the last chapter is to define and criticize Santayana’s epistemological position with respect to the problem of essence and existence.

Santayana’s epistemological procedure is compared with the realists. In his earlier writings Santayana’s concept of nature prescribes the direction of his epistemology. The world of events as such is posited and it is the process of common sense exploration and scientific thought that establishes and justifies the world of events. In Santayana’s later writings the starting point is not in any sense the world of events but rather inert essences. Thus, at great length, it is pointed out that his later method is alien to

¹ The Philosophy of George Santayana, edited by P.A. Schilpp, p. 95 From S.P. Lamprecht’s article entitled, "Animal Faith And The Art Of Intuition."
to a realist's. One of the basic points made for that contention is that Santayana's very procedure of starting from essence, as a result of his scepticism, and forcing himself into existence, is an indication of reversing the realist's procedure of starting from actual existence and proceeding therefrom.

It is asserted that agnosticism characterizes Santayana's general epistemological position. This sort of agnosticism is compared with Kant's agnosticism. However, it is contended that within this general agnostic frame it is possible to find absorbed in Santayana's thought a sort of constructive realistic attitude.

Santayana's agnosticism consists mainly in that he does not share the belief that it is possible to understand the intrinsic nature of Reality. To the question, need anything be posited and believed in at all?, Santayana replies that to abstain from faith and be reduced to the intuition of essence is possible, and with regard to the creed of animal faith that there is a world—no guarantee can possibly be offered. Thus, he agrees with the contention of the bankruptcy of realism in its attempt to find a rational ground for our belief in the external world.

Another aspect of Santayana's epistemological position is subjectivism. By subjectivism here it is not meant that all reality consists of exclusively conscious being and its states. It is rather taken to denote the belief that if the mind is left only with essences to intuit, it may or may not posit any belief in the external world.

In his scepticism existence could not be a problem for Santayana because it is not to be found in the unique realm
that it(scepticism) lead him to, i.e. essence. So, obviously, existence was not given to Santayana in his initial step—scepticism, because of the impossibility of finding any ground for existence. He thereupon introduced the notion of animal faith and tried once more to find existence. Even then existence was not clearly and in itself given to him due to the impossibility of having real access to it.

So, Santayana's system is another system that is doomed to lose existence, not in an impressive manner in a metaphysical idea such as the system of Hegel did in the Absolute, but rather in something much less imposing and pompous than that, i.e. inert essences.
AN ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS

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INTRODUCTION

This study of Santayana's scepticism and the epistemological position resulting from it is intended not to be a criticism of the method of procedure of philosophical scepticism of the sort adopted since Descartes. It is rather an attempt to find out whether or not with the outcome of his scepticism, i.e. the idea of essence, Santayana has succeeded in bridging the gap between essence and existence.

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CHAPTER ONE

Santayana's Scepticism and Criticism of Knowledge
Section One: Santayana's Scepticism

In the history of philosophic speculation there have been philosophers who have constructed their systems on what they called self-evident axioms and postulates. There have also been others, particularly since Descartes, who have regarded such seeming self-evidence of axioms and assumptions as dubious. These latter men are those who construct their so-called systems after having doubted the ideas and assumptions which others have accepted as axiomatic and thus valid and true. Santayana belongs to the latter type of philosophers. Thus the original motivation of his scepticism is his doubt of the dogmas and opinions of mankind. (1) His scepticism is an analysis of belief to discover the risks and the logical uncertainties inherent in it. (2)

This scepticism is not concerned with abolishing ideas as the Pyrrhonists are supposed to have attempted to do, but rather simply not to credit them. (3)

Santayana contends that human intelligence, paradoxically enough, has piled up surprising fictions on fictions, and this dogmatic structure stands and passes for a proof of its rightness. (4) It is in this perverted and wayward growth that Santayana tries to detect the weak spot. He

1. Scepticism And Animal Faith, p. 7
2. The Philosophy of George Santayana, edited by P.A. Schilpp, p. 576
3. Scepticism And Animal Faith, p. 16. /from Santayana's Replies
4. Ibid., p. 7
likens the structural growth of mankind's dogmas and opinions unto a kind of luxuriant vegetation which gives rise to a sort of strangling and murderous activity among the plants of the vegetation itself. Similarly, the voices of contrary fancies and assertions of the mind have come to challenge one another. In other words, out of conflict between dogmas - a conflict which comes about from a suspicion of errors about facts - criticism has arisen.¹

The method of doubt of Santayana is in some ways similar to that of Descartes', i.e. in the sense that he tries to question the assumptions that are made in discourse. It is intended to be an investigation of the latent presuppositions in all immediate experience that claims to be a knowing of something other than and beyond itself.² The method of doubt in both Descartes and Santayana is a methodological device whereby their readers are startled into a premature acquiescence with the subsequently favored metaphysical doctrines. In both cases the scepticism is a dramatic approach to a determined exposition of the author's convictions, convictions which the author has entertained from the start but hopes to make more plausible by exhibiting them as the only refuge from the calamity of a far reaching ontological despair.³

It is essential to note here further points of similarity between Descartes and Santayana, in their procedure and argument for their doubt. Descartes, having extended his method of doubt to what is for him, its fullest possible

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1. Scepticism And Animal Faith, p. 7
2. The Philosophy of George Santayana, From the article, "Santayana's Doctrines of Essence", by C. Hartshorne.
3. Ibid. p. 123
limits ends with his principle "Cogito Ergo sum". Whereas Santayana's similar utterance, namely "I find that I think and am" is not the conclusive statement of his doubt. To elucidate the statement just made it should be added that Santayana's assertion, "I find that I think and am", is said in the following context: Suppose, in my doubt, I renounce all beliefs yet the pressure of existence seems to confront me...... these pulsations and phantoms which to deny is to produce and to strive to banish is to redouble...... forces me to say, I find that I think and am. However, Santayana does not stop there. He is well aware of the consequences of such a halt, namely, to urge that a self or ego is presupposed in experience or even must have created experience by its absolute fiat is, according to him, to fail in critical thinking.

Santayana admits that experience is not a condition for a critic of knowledge who proceeds transcendently, and also acknowledges the fact that not much harm might be done if transcendentalism were recognised to be simply a romantic episode in reflection, a sort of poetic madness, and no necessary step in the life of reason. He adds that the delusion becomes troublesome to the serious critic of knowledge when it inclines him to imagine that in asserting that experience is a product and has two terms, subject and object, he is describing the inner nature of experience not its external condition as natural history reports them; and may then be tempted to assign a metaphysical status and logical necessity to a merely material

1. Scepticism And Animal Faith, p. 22
2. Ibid., pp. 21-22
3. Ibid., p. 23
4. Realms of Being, p. 331

Santayana distinguishes two levels of life, the human body, one which he calls the spirit and the other, the
fact. Instead of the body which is the true subject in experience he may think he finds an absolute ego, and instead of the natural environment of the body, which is the true object, he may think he finds an illimitable reality; and to make things simple he may proceed to declare that these two are one. "But all this is myth," says Santayana.

Further, in considering Descartes' 'Cogito' Santayana asserts that 'I think therefore I am' if taken as an inference is sound because it is analytical, only repeating in the conclusion something assumed in the premise. If taken as an attestation of fact it is honest and richly indicative, as its terms being heavy with empirical connotation; but what is 'I', what is 'therefore', and what is 'existence'? The highly significant and typically suggestive remark that Santayana makes in this respect is that if there were no existence there would certainly be no persons and no thinking and it may be doubted if anything existed at all. That any being exists that my be called 'I', so that I am not a mere essence, is more doubtful. For, according to him, the conviction involved in saying 'I am' does not entail an indubitable fact because the sense in which this 'I' exists is vague for the simple reason that after all that which is given in the 'I' is a mere datum and existence does not belong to a mere datum nor is 'I' a datum to oneself.

psyche. By spirit he understands the actual light of consciousness falling upon anything - the ultimate invisible emotional function of life in feeling and thought; on the other hand, the psyche is the specific form of physical life asserting itself in any plant or animal. The animal or plant will die, and the matter hitherto controlled by that psyche will be scattered.

1. *Scepticism And Animal Faith*, pp. 23-24
In conclusion Santayana’s contention at this point is that thinking is another name for discourse, and Descartes’ in noting his own existence was really less interested in the substance of himself or in the fact that he was alive than in the play of terms in discourse which seemed to him obvious. Therefore, Santayana states that the Cartesian axiom simply betrays a fantastic theory of the Universe called Psychologism. This theory according to him fuses the two disparate substances posited by Descartes and maintains that while the inner essence of substance everywhere is to think or at least to feel, its distribution, movement and aspect seen from without are those of matter.

It is rightly remarked that Santayana’s scepticism is not an end in itself but a sort of clearing ground. Descartes’ certainly lies in his existence whereas Santayana’s lies in his ‘Essences’. The fact is that the point of Santayana’s scepticism is to distinguish essence from existence, and it is here that we can understand how his scepticism is a clearing ground for a sound philosophy.

Nevertheless, Santayana, in his thoroughgoing scepticism is aware of the fact that it is hard to criticise without a dogmatic criterion. He says, “Dogma can’t be abandoned; it can only be revised in view of some more elementary dogma which it has not occurred to the sceptic to doubt.” Therefore, this vital compulsion

1. Scepticism And Animal Faith, p. 291
2. The Philosophy of George Santayana, From article: ‘Santayana’s Philosophical Inheritance’ by C.J. Sullivan Jr. p. 86
3. Scepticism And Animal Faith, p. 9
to posit and to believe something, even in the act of doubting, would nevertheless be ignominious if the beliefs which life and intelligence forced upon us were always false. Yet the brute necessity of believing something so long as life lasts does not justify any belief in particular. "If all opinions are necessarily false, it would at least be not to sin against intellectual honour";¹

To put the above argument and its implication in other terms, it should also be noted that Santayana, in his analysis and doubt of belief and human opinions ends in a sort of solipsim of the 'passing moment'. There we see an attempt to demonstrate that the terms of experience are unsubstantial, that demonstration in matters of belief would be impossible if faith (alleged knowledge) did not interprete them.

He also contends that dogmatism is out of place in the ideal sphere where essence is studied and which conveys no knowledge of fact, and to suppose that they do is an abuse of dogmatism. His purport is that it is only as signs for facts and not as dialectical terms that essences convey knowledge.²

It seems as though the development of the line of argument of this section at this stage has brought us face to face with the need to see and understand the convictions and foundations upon which Santayana's criticism of knowledge in general is based.

¹. Scepticism And Animal Faith, p; 294
². Ibid., p. 10
Section Two: Santayana's Criticism of Knowledge

The opening remark in this chapter, as to the original motivation of Santayana's scepticism, is highly pertinent and meaningful in understanding his attempts to criticise knowledge. His contention that human intelligence has piled up fictions is meant not only to strike at the root of the beliefs, ideas and customs of the 'unimportant masses' of men, but rather and particularly so, at the accumulated body of philosophical and rational knowledge which is passed to us as valid and true.

However, it should be pointed out that Santayana, who is by temperament a thinker who feels at home in the ideal discourse – of essences, might in point of fact have admired the beauty in the structure of systems like that of Kant's or Hegel's and others with idealistic tendencies, and what is more, he might have been pleased with the validity of their logical and rational arguments but only so if the systems or the system in particular, were a piece of discourse in the ideal world of essences. He might have sympathised more with the views of such system-makers had they substituted the indefinite article a or an instead of the definite article the before the name of their system, i.e. A Critique of Pure Reason instead of The Critique of Pure Reason; A Phenomenology of Mind instead of The Phenomenology of Mind. This substitution might have been welcomed by Santayana for at least two reasons: a. The placing of the indefinite article would imply that the system maker meant to leave some room for an attitude which admits that the
human mind is liable to error because most idealists feel that they have achieved a complete understanding of the universe. b. Santayana is by way of method a sceptic, and thus possible systems in the universe of discourse may be interesting to hear of because of their consistency and validity in that world of discourse only; yet, the forms and systems we create in the world of discourse ought to be checked with the real world of experience to find out whether that corresponds with it and is true.¹

A careful reader may find between the lines of Santayana's more philosophic writings, especially when they are meant to be a criticism of the idealistic sort of thinking, the application of an old but very useful principle. It is the Plotinian principle (as found in the AENNEADS),² that in the immaterial world the knowledge of the thing is the thing. But Santayana has added an Aristotelian premise to that principle, so that when he is not in the realm of essence i.e. (in a realistic Universe) the epistemological principle would still be applicable—and our newly coined principle runs thus— In the immaterial world the knowledge of the thing is the thing, and in the material world the knowledge of the thing is not the thing for while the origin of knowledge lies "in the impact of matter upon sense its goal is the comprehension of essences".³

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1. The distinction presupposed between valid and true is that a proposition or an argument may be valid without being true with respect to the world of experience.
2. A similar principle may be found in Parmenides also.
3. Reason in Common Sense, p. 165
Santayana's criticism of knowledge in general seems at first sight aphoristic and witty and not a logical refutation of the philosophies and/or philosophers. In order to discover to what extent he does or does not logically refute these philosophies it will be wise to examine Santayana's reactions to these.

The criticism is carried out primarily (in the following part) by dealing with the individual philosophers in questions:

In this section, we shall be concerned mainly with Santayana's criticism of Modern Philosophers with idealistic tendencies.

We should recall that in Descartes, the consciousness 'I' became the fulcrum of his philosophy. This assumption was carried to its logical extreme by his followers and successors. So let us see what Santayana has to say in this respect.

Berkeley: Berkeley asserted that our ideas are in our minds. A realist would have understood the statement to mean that the material world is patched together out of ideas. Santayana was well aware that the suggestion that our minds have constructed the external world by treating sensations as effects of a permanent substance distributed in a permanent space, would have sounded meaningless to Berkeley just for the reason that permanence, substance and space are non-existent ideas. They are not images (to Berkeley) in any sense, they might be 'notions' like that of spirit which has 'ideas', or they might be algebraic signs used to facilitate the operations of thought. However, Santayana's countercharge to such a remark is in place and meaningful. He says that
indeed they are algebraic signs in respect of their object or signification, not concrete images, but rather terms in a mental process, elements in a method of inference. They could be used with all confidence to lead us back to the concrete values for which they stood and to the relations which they enabled us to state and discover. Experience would thus be furnished with an intelligible structure and articulation and, a psychological analysis would be made of knowledge into its sensuous material and its ideal objects. But Berkeley's objection was that there would then be no difference between such an idealist and the most persistent materialist. Yet, Santayana handles the problem as follows: "Esse est percipi" is not a bad point of departure for a theory of knowledge but the sophistical interest of it is that it denies our right to make the distinction that if a thing were never perceived, or inferred from perception, we should never know that it existed; but once perceived it may be more conducive to comprehension and to regard it as existing independently of our own perceptions; and our ability to make this supposition is registered in the difference between the two words, to be, and to be perceived - words which are by no means synonymous but designate very different relations of things in thought. Here, Santayana's contention is that it is a truism to say that I am the seat or locus of my ideas and whatever I know is known by me; it is an absurdity that I am the only object of my thought and perception. (1)

1. Reason in Common Sense, pp. 108-113
Santayana's final word in this respect is that the laws of experience to which the empirical idealists refer are all laws of physics. Possibilities of sensations that stand and change according to law; the sensations themselves, if not referred to those permanent possibilities would be "a chaos worse than a dream." (1) So the ambiguity Berkeley overlooked lay in the relation of ideas to physical things, which he wished to reduce to groups or series of pellucid ideas--a chimerical physics. Had Berkeley abstained altogether from identifying ideas with objects of natural knowledge (which are events and facts) and from trying to construct things out of optical and tactile images, he might have much enriched the philosophy of specious reality and discerned the innocent realm of ideas.

Humean Empiricism: Santayana means to say that if empiricism trusted the intellect and consented to "immerse Humean impressions in experience understood" (2) then it would become ordinary common sense and science. Hume seems to have assumed that these perceptions lay in time and formed certain sequences and that these perceptions were repeated. But Hume could never have explained why they should be so as long as he ignored or denied the existence of bodies and unless the transitive force of memory was admitted. It is also added that Hume's mistake was in the belief that perceptions constituted the very stuff of existence. All of these incoherencies arose in the attempt to divorce experience from its physical ground and its natural objects. What Hume had done was to invoke an alleged habit of perceptions always.

1. Reason In Science, p. 150
2. ibid. p. 151
following one another in the same order....but the notion was made plausible by confusing it with the habits of the physical world where similar events recur when the conditions are similar: intuitions follow the same routine, but the conditions for an intuition are not the previous intuitions but the whole present state of the psyche and of the environment. (1)

Kant: I think it is not a misinterpretation of Kant to say that Kant’s conclusion was that experience is the substance of nature, which is a construction in thought. Experience was viewed as being itself the source and condition of all thinkable objects. In other words, Kant tried to show that only by the application of categories to immediate data could knowledge of an ordered universe arise - the categories being the principles of interpretation by which the datum acquires this perspective in thought and becomes representative of a whole system of successive or collateral existence.

What Santayana has at the back of his mind with regard to this Kantian type of interpretation of things is that synthesis by means of categories is not a natural but a dialectical condition of pregnant experience and it does not introduce such experience but constitutes it. In other words, experience came to figure in Kant as a system of non-natural efficient forces i.e. having supernatural antecedents; Santayana’s protest is that experience has no supernatural condition. Nature is the sum total of its conditions i.e. the whole object, the parts observed, plus

the parts interpolated is the self existent fact. The mind in its empirical flux is a part of this complex, and to say that it is its own condition or that of the other objects is 'a grotesque falsehood.'(1) Nature is the condition of mind and not vice versa; Experience alone being given, it is the ground from which its conditions are inferred and these conditions are empirical. To make the conditions of experience metaphysical and prior in the order of knowledge to experience itself is simply a piece of surviving Platonism. Therefore, according to Santayana, Kant's fundamental oversight and contradiction lay in not seeing that the concept of a set of conditions was the precise and exact concept of nature, which he consequently reduplicated having one nature before experience and another after. The first, said to condition experience, was a set of 'verbal ghosts', the second, which alone could be observed or discovered scientifically was declared fictitious; However, the truth is that the simple nature or set of conditions for experience which the intellect constructs is the object of our thoughts and perceptions ideally completed.(2)

To this kind of Transcendentalism, which posits instead of the empirical 'I', a transcendental ego, and the categories of thought instead of the principles of intelligence, Santayana replies that the logic of transcendentalism is nothing but "sympathetic poetry and insight into the hang and rhythms of various thoughts." It is a method of creative flat by which not this or that idea of the universe but Universe itself comes into being.(3)

1. Reason in Common Sense, p. 101
3. ibid p. 302.
Let us set forth the foregoing arguments in general terms: Santayana’s high sense of toleration and ability to see his opponent’s point of view allows him to say that Berkelian type of philosophies are frank and lucid about the ideal or visionary nature of the possible data of experience. Yet these systems invited mankind to substitute a metaphysical faith in a metaphysical power for the animal faith in matter by which we are accustomed to live; in their systems the potency of matter was packed away into the mysterious mechanism of each soul; Santayana’s fearless assertion is that the ‘Spirits’ posited by Berkeley, Malebranche, Leibnitz are mythological names for certain operations of Matter; God is such a mythological name for the Universal operations of matter. In other words, (for Santayana) the cosmic flux is nothing phenomenal nor composed of visual images; Uprooted from the organ and occasion that support them, phenomena vanishes like ghosts. It is in memory that any vestige of phenomena remains. So, the medium in which the mind stuff moves is avowedly physical space and time. (1)

And lastly, his definition of Idealism is interesting: thought and love fixed upon essence. In point of fact, Santayana can’t but think of an idealist as one whose moral and poetic sense is arrested on pure essence. Of course this flight into fancy would even be possible to a materialist, if he preferred the study of essence to that of matter or events: but his natural philosophy would keep his poetic ecstacies in their proper place; Santayana’s contention is that idealists have inclined to substitute essence for matter

1. Realms of Being, p. 372
in their theory of the universe: and it is this superstition of those ideas passing for facts and not the pure study of essence that is commonly known as Idealism.
CHAPTER TWO

An Analysis of the Outcome of Santayana's Skepticism
I. The Outcome of Santayana's Scepticism.

Santayana's scepticism was not meant to banish all ideas in a sort of intellectual suicide, but, like Hume, he withheld the belief that ideas reveal anything. Santayana's scepticism was a form of belief and assertion, since in the act of doubt he is led to maintain his position. This implies that there is no sound doubt without reflection. Therefore, Santayana's scepticism may be said to be an affirmative or assertive form of scepticism because his intention was to discover something i.e. errors about human beliefs, by pushing scepticism as far as he logically could.

The application of this technique of pushing doubt or scepticism to its logical end was the original aim of Santayana, but fortunately this did not lead him to the intellectual confusion of Pyrrho. In his ultimate sceptic state Santayana could go no further than he actually did for he believed it impossible to go any further.

In that ultimate act of doubt Santayana discredited the existence of anything. He removed the instinctive belief in an environment beyond the given scene, in a past or future beyond the specious present. Thus, the sensible events within it lost all the urgency of actual motion: they became pictures of motions and ideas of events so much so that the events and the reality of change they involved were all illusions to him. In other

1. Scepticism And Animal Faith, p. 30
words, the mind in this state cannot treat its data as facts or signs of facts because not one of the posited objects is a datum in which a sceptic can rest because existence or fact can't be a datum at all, for existence involves external relations and actual flux, whereas a datum must be embraced in a single shake of apperception and nothing outside it can belong to it at all. (1) So, the datum was a pure image, and for that reason it was essentially illusory and unsubstantial. Consequently, in the act of doubt Santayana was confronted with the datum.

It should be noted that if the datum is not treated as a signal for an event in time then the datum ceases to be an appearance since it no longer implies any substance that appears. Moreover, in such a situation experience cannot be said to be actual and valid since by definition and implication the presence of a datum excludes and denies the existence of the external world, the actual world of experience, because there is no surrounding world out of which a datum can arise.

Therefore, Santayana, at this stage of his scepticism, has withdrawn into an immaterial universe because his universe now has not the "contingency nor the fortunes proper to an existence"; (2) Yet for all that, Santayana ended with the dictum that nothing exists, which, although he called it false dogma, he further says—"is tenable intuitively and while it prevails is irrefutable". It is implied here that in each datum taken separately there would be no occasion to speak of existence because the existence of the intuition that gives the datum would not

1. ibid. p. 39
2. ibid. p. 40
3. ibid. p. 44
be asserted until appearance ceased to be actual and was viewed from the outside as something that presumably has occurred. In such an external view there might be truth or error, not so in each appearance taken in itself, and as a whole each is a pure appearance and bears no witness to anything further. (1)

In this respect, Santayana's conclusion is that the assertion that the datum exists is not meaningful because that which exists is the fact that the datum is given at that particular moment. Santayana's contention is that it is the intuition and not the datum which occurs, and that which is certain and given is something of which existence can't be predicated and which, until it is used as a description of something else, can't be either true or false;

It may be safely concluded here that Santayana could find no evidence of existence in pure intuition since in that nothing given exists, as it is given, and moreover, by definition a datum is a "term in passing through a visioned universal" and the realm in which it lies, which intuition discloses, is the very realm of non-existence, of inert and ideal being. (2)

It should be added that in the act of intuiting a datum, Santayana suspends all knowledge of fact and instead intuits ideas. This act could not be challenged because it professes to have no ulterior object or truth and runs no risk of error for the reason that it claims no jurisdiction over anything alien or eventual. (3) In this way, Santayana is forced to entertain the illusion without succumbing to it. But what remains of this non-

1. *ibid.* p. 44
2. *ibid.* p. 54
3. *ibid.* p. 70
deceptive illusion is a truth i.e. this truth, the being of which requires no explanation since it is what it is, and since there is no error about this illusion, it is therefore no illusion but an idea. This manifest being is merely the quality which it inherently and logically is: This Santayana calls an Essence. (1)

In conclusion, the outcome of Santayana's doubt is Essence.

II. Santayanic Essences And Platonic Forms

One may stop here to ask whether Santayana's thought with his emphasis on Essence, may not drive him to a sort of Platonic conception and understanding of the Universe, i.e. the Platonic Dialectic. In other words, since Santayana is left with Essence only, as a result of his scepticism, and an essence is by definition an intelligible pattern and harmony, it seems as though it is of importance to note and understand some of the main and basic differences and likenesses between a Santayanic Essence and a Platonic Form.

It might be said safely that the basic difference between an Essence and a Form is that the former unlike the latter is inert and does not have the ontological or metaphysical status of the Platonic Form to lay claim to or to exercise control over nature, nor to be the cause of things. "The realm of essence is not peopled by magic powers." (2)

For both Santayana and Plato Essences and Forms respectively stand apart in a distinct division from the

1. ibid. p. 73
2. ibid. p. 77
world of phenomena as such, i.e. an intelligible or mental realm is attributed to them although they may not agree with each other on the nature of the realm. The Platonic world of Forms is the world of thought and above all intelligible in nature, and similarly, Santayana's realm of Essence is a product and at the same time the ground and abode of the spirit or mind. (1)

Both, Santayana and Plato use the present simple tense of the substantive verb, to be, to denote Form in Plato's case, and Essence in Santayana's case. A Platonic Form is, it is in the sense that it is initially and exclusively that which is. Likewise Santayana speaks of Essences, though they enjoy no ontological privilege, as not being the ground of the sensible world. They just are. An Essence is that which inalienably is; it is self identical and thus different from every other Essence. Plato's definition of an Idea or Form is almost exactly the same. (2) According to Plato the ultimate mark of true being lies in selfhood, i.e. self identity is the mark of a Form.

It would not be irrelevant to the discussion if it is also noted that Plato's definition of a Form is that which is really real. It seems as though existence as such is not attributed to it. Similarly, Santayana's Essences do not in any sense imply existence. However, Santayana and Plato undoubtedly do not imply the same thing in this respect because an Idea for Plato stands above the sensible thing of which it is the Idea in being more real than the sensible thing. There are degrees of being for Plato, and the reality proper to

1. ibid. p. 77
2. For the present account of the Platonic Forms I depended on Etienne Gilson's interpretation of Plato's philosophy as it is expounded and criticized in his work, Being And Some Philosophers.
Forms in the true sense, transcends existence, existence as
ascribed to the sensible world. Therefore there is a real
difference in Plato's use of the substantive verb, is.\(^1\)

Another dissimilarity between the Platonic realm of
Forms and the Santayanic realm of Essences is that the
former seems to be limited because self-contradictory Forms
or Ideas do not have a legitimate place in the Platonic world
of Ideas---since by definition that realm is intelligible and
wholly self-consistent, whereas Santayana's realm of Essences
may contain any image or idea even if it be self-contradictory
and absurd. Thus, Santayana is justified in calling his realm
of Essences infinite, "It (the realm of Essences) is the
sum of mentionable terms about which or in which something
is said".\(^2\) "In other words it is the unwritten catalogue,
prosaic and infinite of all the different characters possessed
by all things if they existed."\(^3\)

Another point that should be remarked is that the idea
of Plenitude or Fullness in the hierarchical realm of the
Platonic World is the fundamental tenet in Plato's philosophy.
The Form of Good is the highest and most real and fullest in
Being amongst all the other Forms or Ideas, and is their source
and cause of their being. This idea of Plenitude could be no
problem for Santayana because his Essences are inert and have
no power over other Essences and the sensible world. Yet,
to state a point of fact it should be added that Santayana's
discernment of Essence confirms the Platonic logic by assigning
to these an ideal status, and also as being the terms of dis-
course, and not moral models or ideals as Plato's Socratic
ideas were to begin with, and neither principles of intel-

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1. Here, I am indebted to C.F. Cornford's Plato's Theory of
Knowledge.
2. Scepticism And Animal Faith, p. 77
3. ibid. p. 98
eligibility as Plato's ideas were later known to function as. In other words, Santayana, "saw with rare exactitude that the logic and ontology of essence are independent of the moral laid upon them, and can be kept all the better when the latter is removed. Instead of denying the choice of Platonic natures, he drowns them in an ocean of logical realism."(1)

"Even the so called primary qualities are simply those Essences which Science uses in its description of things, but in the meantime the things have evaporated; all knowledge of nature and history have become a game of thought. Nothing is ever present to us except some Essence. The evidence of data is only obviousness and give no evidence of anything else. If I hypostatize Essence into a fact, I am putting my trust in animal faith, not in any evidence and implication of my actual experience. I turn to an assumed world."(2)

It may be remarked here that the above quoted words contain some of the boldest assertions that Santayana has ever made. No doubt Santayana has not meant to deny the fact that we can have direct experience of things. However a philosopher in constructing his system has to state intelligibly the 'whatness' of the 'that' which experience encounters, i.e. existence and the external world. He has to explain it dialectically and on intelligible and rational grounds, and there is no reason why this remark should not equally apply to the position of a mystic and/or pure existentialist philosopher in the Kierkegaardian sense of the term. If the philosopher or the so called system maker leaves it up to us to take existence for granted, in point of

2. Scepticism And Animal Faith, p.99
fact we all do in ordinary mental states. In the realm of experience we may be content with the instinctive feeling called animal faith, but in seeking a ground for experience as such, we may refer back to experience for verification but not as a proof and explanation of experience itself.

III. The Problem of Essence and Existence in the History of Philosophic Thought.

It is interesting to note that at the time when the temper of official philosophy of the day was idealistic, Royce in America and Bradley in England, Santayana's approach was highly realistic, as we find it in *The Life Of Reason*. It should be noted that Santayana, in *The Life Of Reason*, ended with the notion that, though we have sense experience, our knowledge of the world is by means of thought and ideas or essences. In other words, he meant to say that our knowledge of physical space and matter is not intrinsic although it is given to us in sense experience. The reason is that in our own understanding of the physical world or the objects in it, the particular object is transferred to a pictorial or mental picture of it, and the parts perceived are transposed into terms of essences. So, existence seems to borrow its individuality from essence because any description would be an essence and not existence. Thereupon Santayana asserts that without this "wedding garment of essence, no guest is admitted to the feast of existence". He further adds that it is only when the Flux of events, by its concentration and sustained rhythm manifests some

1. *Realms of Being*, p. 24
recognizable identity of form, can we speak of a concretion in existence, i.e. of a thing; if we abandon that concretion or essence then the thing is dissolved. The Flux itself would be most empty of unrealities if it still pretended to flow after having obliterated within itself all distinction of quality, direction of or phase i.e. all self identical essence. "The flux flows by flowing through essences." (1)

As far as this paper is concerned the last statement is a momentous declaration made by Santayana, and it is of prime importance to us. We are here faced with a fundamental problem. It is not only a problem due to Santayana's way of thinking, but it is and has been a basic problem of Philosophy.

Santayana's conclusions and metaphysical structure, or any other philosopher's metaphysics should rest on the foundation on which it is erected. We have noted already that the outcome of Santayana's scepticism is an Essence. An Essence can at its best introduce him into the ideal realm of Essence. After undergoing the state and technique of doubt and resulting with Essence, it seems Santayana has not been able to reverse the process, of getting out of the consequences of the outcome of his scepticism. In other words, Santayana's starting point was an Essence, this would not lead him to a sort of realism, as this was his original motive.

History teaches us that Santayana is not the only thinker who had to face this mishap. The same mishap

that had befallen Descartes' followers befall Santayana. A rather careful study of Descartes' Meditations makes it plain to us that Descartes could not successfully prove the existence of the external world. So long as Descartes could not get out of his 'ego, in other words, out of his axioms and ideas, to prove the existence of the external world, he was, therefore, left to abide with them in his 'ego'. Students of philosophy know well how fruitful and at the same time detrimental this failure proved to be to subsequent philosophical thinking.

Descartes' followers took up the Cartesian ego with its ideas and axioms (the ego is by definition a thinking thing; a thinking thing thinks and has ideas) and declared that the external world is composed of these ideas—so the external world and existence was made up of these ideas. In other words, existence which is not an idea or group of ideas was subsumed under and lost in ideas or essences.

In the study of the history of philosophy one may find many dead systems victims of the error of losing Existence in Essence. These victims have consciously or unconsciously overlooked the imminent danger that befalls any system which neglects to find a legitimate position for both Essence and Existence, without losing one in the other. Neither one should be able to encroach upon the territory of the other.

To illustrate briefly the application of what has just been said let us first consider Aristotle's case. To start with, Aristotle's deliberate emphasis was on the existent—as a realist would approach it, but in spite of this we all know that he ended with essences rather than existence: Any given thing or object is by
definition what truly is its essence, according to Aristotle. Further he meant to say that a corporeal thing is not what it is because of its matter, but rather being in an individual is the form or essence by which it is a substance. Apparently, Aristotle was not sufficiently aware that such a definition of an object would lead him to a difficulty that he surely would have liked to avoid. In his *Metaphysica*\(^1\) Aristotle assumes existence as a mere prerequisite to being. The material object is not what it is because of its matter, but because Form or Essence is inherently the ground of it.

The difficulty is that Aristotle took Existence for granted and proceeded to explain individual things in terms of Essence, thus Existence was explained in terms of Essence.

For the next illustration of the same difficulty let us consider Hegel's case. Hegel seems similar in approach and consequence. That is to say, Hegel's criticism of the state of philosophy and philosophies was that\(^2\) they were ontological, empty concepts. Hegel's intention was to deduce existence a priori. His criticism was primarily directed against the Conceptualism of Wolff and Kantianism. Kant had assumed the 'Given' and the 'thing in itself' but every thing took place as if that 'Given itself were not. Hegel's triumph -- Concrete Idealism -- over Kantian critical Idealism was in knowing the Given. Instead of positing the thing-in-itself as the unknowable root

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2. *Gilson, Etienne*, op. cit. p. 132
of all appearance, Hegel posited it as the previous condition which is that of the thing. "Actual reality is the thing as the actualised unity of its essence and of its existence." Hegel's logic therefore is concrete dialectic of being qua being. But Hegel's logic has eaten up the whole reality. The brand new essence of Hegel has not only explained existence a priori, it has explained it away. (1)

The attack on Hegel's absolute Idealism came from religion in general and in particular from Sren Kierkegaard whose battle cry was that philosophy had eliminated existence -- that is the very core of the modern existentialist revolt.

It should be noted that in Wolff's and Hegel's cases we were left with ontologies only, without existence, and in Kierkegaard's case we seem to be left with an existence without an ontology. This meant divorce between philosophy and Existence: What a queer outcome! Hegel was criticised by Kierkegaard on the same basis and for the same reason that he himself had criticised his illustrious predecessors.

This brief exploration of the history of philosophy has led us to the core of the problem of the thesis. Similarly to Aristotle, Hegel and others that may also be mentioned, Santayana has fallen into the same difficulty: He never meant to lose sight of Existence, except in his moment of doubt, yet it seems that the irony of Fate works on the principle of justice rather than mercy; that is why no one seems to have found

1. Eidsen, E. Kerner op. cit. P. 122
salvation in philosophical speculation. The steps that Santayana had taken led him through an entrance that was shut for good behind him, like death's door that allows no exit.

Santayana was to a certain extent aware of the cruciality of the problem of Essence and Existence— even in his earlier writings. In *Reason In Common Sense*, conjointly with Aristotle he declares that things\(^1\) have reality, independence and are the cause of perception, while ideas\(^2\) exist in the mind. Yet, he adds that while in life man comes upon the accidental, in the quiet of reflection he could not but recast everything in ideal moulds and retain nothing but intelligible relations and eternal natures. So, there shall always be a battle between logicians or dialectical metaphysicians on the one hand and common sense or realistic philosophies on the other. The former charging the world with unintelligibility and the latter charging the logical world of the former with abstractness and unreality.

Next, the attempt will be to find out whether Santayana with the outcome of his scepticism, i.e. Essence, has not fallen into the serious difficulty of explaining away existence in terms of Essence.

So, this opens the way to a more careful consideration of how Santayana arrives at his conclusions with respect to the problem of Essence and of Existence. Therefore this consideration will be the object of our attention in the two chapters which will follow.

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1. p. 171
2. Here the term Essence is not used because the term was not yet fully ingrained in Santayana's philosophy.
CHAPTER THREE

Animal Faith & Knowledge of the Flux of Existence
I. Santayana's Technique of Brings the Notion Of Animal Faith To Provide A Refuge From Ontological Despair.

Santayana's technique of forcing into the proceedings of his dialectic at the terminal or vanishing point of his scepticism the idea or notion of animal faith in order to be able to posit the existence of the external world may in some respects be compared to Descartes' resort to the idea of God in order to prove the existence of the external world. (1)

1. It is felt that Santayana's scepticism is a mean between Descartes' scepticism and the Humean type. Descartes in his doubt, in discrediting and doubting everything did not lose his own personal history and identity with it, i.e. his ego. By making an exception in his favour where there is no ground for such an exception, Descartes merely revealed that his motives were impure and that he was not really anxious to give up his believing attitude in order to push scepticism to its final end. On the other hand Hume pushed his scepticism to such an extent that he could not recover again from it. In other words the scepticism which we are concerned with is a type of scepticism which is not Pyrrhonistic, of the type that suspends all judgement, but rather scepticism of a positive or constructive sort: i.e. to doubt everything in order to give no credit to ideas of any kind so that if we start again to try to found any philosophy it may not be based on any moral or intellectual prejudice or bias at all. But what Hume seems to have done was to doubt even the possibility of doubt because for him there was no doubting agent or mind to doubt, hence no ideas, but simply fleeting impressions or groups of mental images, and that was all. But Santayana went about doubt in a more constructive way, i.e. in his doubting state he was left with a mind genuinely free and detached, an imputation of essences with no logical compulsion to go beyond it.

In this footnote some terms have been used from F.A. Olafson's article entitled, "Scepticism And Animal Faith," published in Journal of Philosophy Vol. LI No. 2.
After having undergone doubt with Essence as its outcome, Santayana had to make appeal to animal faith because Essence in itself is not nor gives knowledge and can't be recognised as a feature in an experience if animal faith is not posited. Santayana could not do otherwise because Essence with which he was left could in no sense be the ground of Existence as some Cartesians, especially of Berkeleyan type, claimed to have proved; nor could he come across the idea of God and resort to him as Descartes had done before him. Descartes, in his scepticism, conceived of the idea of God. For him, this idea is the most real and most perfect and thus necessarily exists—according to Descartes' definition, or more exactly, according to a piece of abstract reasoning called the ontological argument for the proof of the Existence of God.

Once the existence of God is posited, Descartes could easily make recourse to Him and assert that the Perfect Being could in no way deceive him i.e. God being the cause of everything, Descartes assumed the fact that the ideas or images that his own mind could conceive, one among which being the idea of the external world, could in no way be illusory and fictitious because God in no way wishes to deceive us. Therefore, the idea of/or ideas about the external world are not illusory or aroused by a deceiving being, but are true. (1)

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1. The intention here is only to state Descartes' argument with respect to his proof of the existence of the external world. So it is felt that it is unnecessary to explain in detail the way in which Descartes distinguished between, hallucination, illusory and dreaming states, and waking and normal states.
Therefore the striking difference between Descartes and Santayana's scepticism is that before waking up from the sceptic's trance-like state, Descartes already had in embryonic form at least, the quintessence of his later-to-be metaphysics and philosophy. It was adequate for Descartes to come across the idea of God in his sceptical meandering among an indefinite number of ideas because logically, and as a matter of fact, all the rest could be added to his system, by means of the idea of God. By means of the idea of God Descartes could give an account of the external world, as is done in his Meditations. His system would be complete with Ego-Idea of God—External World. Whereas, Santayana was deprived of the right to make such a claim. It is true that both Descartes and Santayana had been left with the ideas or essences of their ego, yet the difference was that Descartes by coming across the idea of God or the Perfect Being declared without hesitation that a perfect being necessarily exists, while Santayana saw no reason why such an idea necessarily should entail the fact that it exists. The idea of Perfect Being was just another idea or essence among a multitude of ideas that occur or could occur to his mind. "I can't admit that some particular essence—water, fire, atom, or Brahman—is the intrinsic essence of all things, so that if I narrow by imagination to that one intuition I shall have intuited the heart of the whole of
Existence.\(^{(1)}\)

So this may be another basic difference between Descartes' and Santayana's technique of doubt. From the above one sees that the consequence of Cartesian doubt ended with a philosophy that was Descartes' with all its various elements and tendencies. In like manner the consequence of Santayana's doubt was his philosophy. However, we all know, that at the start the initial step of both was apparently to discredit all their ideas. The statement made on the second page of this paper about the method of doubt in general is quite correct and easily applicable both to Descartes and Santayana. In both of them the method of doubt is a dramatic approach to a determined exposition of the author's convictions, convictions which the author entertained from the start but hopes to make more plausible by exhibiting them as the only refuge from the calamity of a far reaching ontological despair.

Consequently, it may be said of Santayana that the conviction which he entertained from the start was that the realm of essence being infinite in its range, contained both essences that happen to express the natures of existing things and also the essence

1. *Skepticism And Animal Faith*, p. 100; The following is a later addition, and is deemed pertinent to our argumentation: "If we can assign any positive trait to existence itself, this is only the purely logical one that it is contingent... As there is no necessity that you or I exist, there is no necessity that anything exist at all. The notion of a necessary being is then a chimera. That an essence should be or entail its existence on the finite plane of trees and tables is finite nonsense. That it should do so on the infinite plane of God is infinite nonsense". D.C. Williams, *Journal of Philosophy*. Vol. LI No. 2, p. 39.
of non-existing things as well. Santayana could not resort to something else in order to justify to himself that certain particular essences expressed the natures of existing things and others did not. Santayana was fully aware of the fact that "no ontological argument is possible, no demonstration can be given which proceeds validly from essence to existence; discourse is not by its own unaided powers able to establish matters of fact but only to explore implications and meanings."(1) In other words Pure spirit intuits and imagines possibilities and in pure intuition there is no knowledge.

Let us note here briefly the meaning and implication of bringing into the picture or positing "animal faith".

It should be stated at first, as a way of defining one's terms or notions, that the objects of animal faith alone are the existing things or events to which the animal is reacting and to which he is attributing the essences which arise before his fancy.(2)

It is remarked that essences may be recognised as pure essences and one is free to do so but if an essence is hypostatised into a fact then it means we are putting our trust in animal faith. (2) This in turn means that we have turned to an assumed world about us. We know that no manifest essences

1. Realms Of Being p. 93
2. ibid. p. 83
can bear any testimony to the ulterior world of things, yet, if the ulterior fact just happens to exist then it will justify the belief. Intuition of essence, to which positive experience and certitude are confined is always illusion if we allow our hypostatising impulse to take it for evidence of anything else. In other words, essences are the terms used in perception but they are not given until attention is sketched upon the thing which is posited blindly in action by animal faith. But need anything be posited and believed in at all? In seizing upon any particular essence first discourse is guided by an irrational fatality. We run up against this or that essence for no logical reason. This arbitrary assault of intuition upon essence is an evidence that something not essence, intuition has come into play. In the perusal of essence irrational animal life is involved. To abstain from faith and be reduced to the intuition of essences is feasible, but then there would be nothing but the realm of essence. So, Santayana asserts that with regard to the original articles of the animal creed that there is a world, a future, things sought can be found, etc...no guarantee can possibly be offered. But while life lasts in one form or another this faith must endure.

1. *Realms of Being*, p. 34
2. ibid. p. 132
3. ibid. p. 167
4. ibid. p. 180
The effort of knowledge is to discover what sort of world this disturbing world happens to be, and that the external things exist is a faith not founded on reason but precipitated in action and in that intent involved in perception. (1)


In this section our discussion on the extent of knowledge of the Flux of Existence logically follows from the analysis and implication of animal faith. Without positing animal faith there could be no knowledge. However, Santayana, by means of animal faith goes no further than to make an inference about the external world. We know that according to Santayana the expression of natural fact is through the medium of essence. So knowledge of fact is pictorial because knowledge of a thing is intuition of the essence of the thing. Knowledge is always symbolic, never literal. (2) And the notion that Knowledge must penetrate to the inner quality of its object, that light space, music, reason, as the intuition renders them, must penetrate the universe is a childish illusion for Santayana. (3)

1. *Reading of Being*, p. 105
2. *ibid.* p. 102

On deliberate grounds, interpretation of Santayana’s words has been avoided as much as possible in this section, due to the fact that this same section may be referred to later on, to test the authenticity of the conclusions that shall be drawn.

3. *ibid.* p. 85
With respect to the extent of knowledge of the flux of Existence, or the external world, it should be stated that Santayana assumes that the flux is itself absolute and the seat of existence.\(^{1}\) In its own nature, spirit or mind arrests the flux of things, as best as it may in its intuition and turns it unto a store of synthetic pictures and symbols both sensuous and intellectual, i.e. existence at each mode or center is what it happens to be, showing such form, energy, intensity or consciousness as it happens to show. We consider and inspect each part separately by transporting ourselves into it at least ideally, before we can say what that part is intrinsically.\(^{2}\) So, in dialectical analysis we are immediately concerned only with images which are symbols or words. For instance, mathematical space and time can't appear in sense as they are defined to be infinite, equable and pure.\(^{3}\) They remain specious or ideal in their nature, purified extensions or generalisation of the imagery of sense. Thus the clearness and necessity native to essence when kept in its own realm are thus attributed to the realm of matter. Santayana contends that the terms of Science, like those of sense, are essences describing in discourse the objects encountered in action. The reason why essences spontaneously evoked in in-
tuition can nevertheless apply to nature or to their occasion, is because they arise out of them. In other words, Santayana assumes that mind is bred in the material movements to which it refers and is controlled by them. (1)

In dialectical analyses concerned with physical space, physical space is given to us only pictorially; Pictorial space and physical space belong to different realms of being; they are connected by mutual implication i.e. the bond lies in the organ of intuition which is a part of the agent in action. (2) Pictorial space and then geometrical space are cast like a search light or a net over the field of action and serve to measure it. (3) Some true indication is contained, however, knowledge, synthesis, and range in apprehension are all adventitious to the existing object; they transfer it from the physical to the pictorial; transpose the parts of it perceived at all into terms of essence. Moreover, Santayana adds that the measure of descriptive truth now possessed by pictorial space need not always belong to it. (4) Physical continuity which is not dialectical includes instability. Physical change includes continuity and falls into recurring rhythms, yet it is in terms of essence that these rhythms are described. The description becomes true in so far as these or equivalent essences are actually embodied in the field of action.

1. *Realms of Being*, pp. 240-1
2. *Ibid.* p. 245
It is only by such embodiment in matter that essences can be loosened, as it were, from their essential setting and turned into characteristics of facts.\(^1\)

Santayana's understanding of phenomena is that each moment of existence is a center and self-assertive; it is so by being a focus of rays gathered into it from external sources and discharged again into eventual parts. By virtue of these connections and transmissions its place is fixed in the flux; all that it possesses besides its intrinsic essence, its originality, its feeling if it has feeling, is hidden and escapes physics altogether. In human language how can this mixture of self-assertion and instability proper to any moment of existence be expressed?\(^2\) To the defining intellect the flux of existence is indeed a flight of eternal essences. Though at each moment matter must be something specific yet if we consider its unknown plastic stress and the incalculable accidents to which it may be subject, we shall hardly be able to hold it to any other enduring character than those involved in its distinctive function which is to lend existence to certain essences in a certain order and enable them to succeed and to confront one another.\(^3\) To penetrate into the inner flow of this existence, for instance, mathematical views seem to be impartial but they are wretchedly abstract e.g. number is a just category to apply to the field of action, since its elements move as units, but is a

\[^1\text{Realms of Being, p. 273}\]
\[^2\text{Ibid. p. 279}\]
\[^3\text{Ibid. p. 280}\]
miserable essence to substitute for them. Accurate
science has this defect that it seems to describe
the distinction of units and to record averages in
movements that elude sense and yet are conceived
and posited only in reference to pictorial objects.
Existence however is not simply a series of essences
solidified, nor a juxtaposition of phenomena, it is
the life of matter. Thus, it is nothing if it is not
complex, elastic and fundamentally chaotic. However
perfectly the flux of existence be transcribed, it
would not be that flux in person and science can't
more truly describe the flux of existence although
its attempt is more serious than the vulgar essences
which visibly give it character. In a contingent
world necessity is a conspiracy of accidents. The
precipitation of accidents is the mark of matter
shifting its equilibrium and modifying its action.\(^1\)

The flux of matter assumes forms; the essence
of these forms or events, as distinguished from that
event itself is called a trope. A trope is the es-
sence of that sequence seen under the form of eternity;
since existence in this event has realised that essence,
that essence has descriptive value in respect to this
world. Tropes are not necessarily exhaustive even of
that part of the flux in which they may be discovered.\(^2\)
No trope is exclusive as if it could prevent the develop-
ment of other trope but some tropes are repeated. They
are measures constantly maintained. They are maintained.

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1. *Realms of Being*, p. 230
2. *ibid.* p. 298
The more exactly and the more pervasively a trope repeats itself the more it introduces us, if we discover it, into the heart of the flux. Repetition itself marks the beginning and end of a trope and rescues it from the arbitrary stage of human apprehension. The flux can be truly measured only by tropes which repeat themselves uninterruptedly on their own plane. To turn this trust in repetition or this imaginative insight into science is merely a matter of attentive observation measurement and transcription of current metaphors into technical terms. (1) Although scientific philosophy warns us that law (a simple trope) is merely a formula or an average or an equation approximately realised in a certain plane of events, yet this probability lets loose our action and expectation; the force of expectation projects law into a metaphysical power compelling events to obey it. This is according to Santayana the great idol of the passions which science subserves. (2) A law is an essence eternally identical and nature is in flux and probably never the same. On the human scale the fundamental instability in nature would remain negligible. (3) Belief in law when hasty is called superstition, or when more cautious, empiricism: but the principle in both cases is the same; both take expectation for probability; what probability

2. *ibid.* p. 300
3. *ibid.* p. 302
can there be that an expectation arising at one point should define a law for the whole universe? Expectation is merely an animal attitude that confidently though vaguely posits a world in which the validity of a prevalent law lies simply in its function as a measure of events. The flux which exhibits this trope or obeys this law is a mathematical or pictorial skeleton traced by the economy of thought; it is no substance within the soft substance of events. Tropes diversify but can't control existence.\(^1\) The facts which have aroused the intuition necessarily transcend the terms or essences used to describe or embody them; they transcend every ideal synthesis of them. So, though Existence can't be wholly elucidated in terms of essence, yet it is only in terms of essence that facts can be described, partiality and instability beset all description.\(^2\) Irrelevant as the inner cogency of logic or dialectical thinking may be to truth, (a complete report of all events occurring in time) logic possesses in its chief lines of deduction and in many of its development a natural truth. Yet there is a metaphysical illusion or idolatry in peopling the world with hypostatic identities and materialised truths; Yet not to recognise conventional truths, truths relevant to action, would be idiocy and to contradict them would be madness.\(^3\)

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2. *ibid.* p. 429
3. *ibid.* p. 443
III. A Statement To The Effect That The Character Of The Problem In This Paper Is Epistemological And Is To Be Viewed And Analysed In The Light Of Recent Realistic Tendencies.

Earlier in this paper it was noted that with Kierkegaard's revolt against the state of Philosophy in general, i.e. against abstract speculative thinking and objective knowledge as he understood it to be, there seemed to have come about a sort of divorce between philosophy and existence. Kierkegaard contended that it is in subjective form of knowledge that man can grasp existence which philosophers had explained away in empty concepts. Existence is the only actual reality which man can grasp, Kierkegaard meant to say. This implied that man's only business is to exist and not to philosophise. In other words, this meant that "If philosophy has no use for existence, why should existence have any use for philosophy?" [1]

Today, with varied emphases in different philosophical circles and schools of thought, it is not an easy task to state precisely the preponderant and distinctive characteristics of philosophical thinking. It is extremely unwise even to attempt to make such a statement if the end in view is to have it universally accepted in philosophical circles. However, it is an undeniable

1. E. Gilson op. cit. p. 132
fact that especially with the dawn of the twentieth century, there seems to have come about a transfer
of power and authority; in more precise terms, a
different emphasis and attitude in philosophical
thinking. During the first quarter of the present
century Bosanquet could declare and have it accepted
without much official opposition that Bradley's
APPEARANCE AND REALITY is the gospel of philosophy.
To-day, there are few thinkers who still want to
hear such a statement made. In other words, the
prerogative enjoyed by Bradleyan or Idealistic
tendencies seems deprived of that coveted position.
The turn of the century marked the beginning of the
new emphasis. This new emphasis may be marked out
by the publication of James' DOES CONSCIOUSNESS
EXIST? G.E. Moore's REFUTATION OF IDEALISM, and
the publications of the New Realists. (1) This new-
attitude may be termed the Realistic attitude.
Later on, it will be made clear that these new
comers would not try to deduce or construct Exist-
ence and Reality speculatively, i.e. by means of
concepts and categories. Existence, the external
world, was assumed or taken for granted. The real
world of experience and existence being no construc-
tion of the human mind was posited as common sense
does it. Further-more, they contended that this real

1. As early as in 1910 or even before, the following
words were written by a group of thinkers:
"Inasmuch as subjectivism renewed and fortified
under the name of 'Idealism' is the dominant
philosophy of the day, it affords the chief
resistance which an innovating philosophy as
Realism has to overcome." The New Realism,
Introduction p. 11, Cooperative studies by
E.B. Holt, T. Marvin, W.P. Montague, R.B. Perry,
W.B. Pitkin, and E.G. Spaulding.
world can be known by the human mind. "The task of such a realistic metaphysics is to illumine the basic structure of Existence which underlies all." (1)

It is obvious that this new approach was alien and definitely opposed to the former one, which constructed reality out of concepts, and which was of course due to a perversion and misplacement of the ego centric predicament—Which had entangled philosophy in its claws since Descartes. So, the problem of metaphysics now, with the realistic approach, was to understand rather than construct the structure of Existence. To put this in strict epistemological terms, we might say that "Epistemology which enjoyed the privilege of furnishing us with a theory of Reality was found out that metaphysics owed logically neither its problems nor their solution to the theory of knowledge." (2)

So it could be asserted that, with the advent of the Realistic approach, there seems to have come about a divorce between metaphysics and epistemology. In other words, metaphysics seems to have been emancipated from the bonds of epistemology.

It is contended that Realism (3) posits the world of events as such and its play is open or

1. Wild, J. Introduction to Realistic Philosophy, p. 17
2. The Philosophy of George Santayana, p. 95, by S.P. Lamp-Recht.
3. Ibid. p. 483 "The Thought of George Santayana in the Crisis of Contemporary Philosophy" by A. Banfi.
free problematics, i.e. nature or the world of events is not schematised by theoretical reason as critical idealism would conceive. The position of Realism may be characterised by being hypothetical and it is the process of scientific thought and exploration that establishes and justifies it. This is distinguished from the traditional speculative problematics of knowledge which logically identified epistemology with metaphysics. In simpler words, we could say that it was inconceivable logically speaking for a thinker to hold Hegel's or Kant's views on epistemology without at the same time adhering in some way or other to Hegel's or Kant's metaphysical construction of Reality, because both are inseparably interwoven. Whereas thinkers to-day with realistic bent may hold differing hypothetical interpretations of Reality, at least in the quiet of contemplation.

So far as the problem in this paper is concerned, henceforth, the perspective and the critical approach to it will be in the light of the developments of recent realistic approach. This is not an arbitrary decision but is in itself justifiable, due to the fact that Santayana's leap from Essence to the act of positing animal
faith, on no rational grounds, is a form of, or procedure which marks a close resemblance to the realist's method.
CHAPTER FOUR

The Epistemological Position of Santayana's Thought

(Criticism & Conclusion)
In this chapter, our problem will be mainly and almost solely an epistemological analysis of Santayana's thought, rather than a methodological analysis, (1) although in some respects, Santayana's claim to knowledge, if he has any, is based on the methodological. In other words, Santayana is all for the knowledge that science can give us, because for him Science as an imaginative and practical art contains trustworthy knowledge. (2) He deplors the fact that modern philosophy has not drawn its inspiration from science, and the misfortune of science is that it has not yet saturated the mind of philosophers and recast the world. (3) However, the above statement represents the contention in Life of Reason. That is his earlier phase.

In the Realms of Being, the sequel to Scepticism and Animal Faith, i.e. his latter phase, Santayana's contention is not contradictory to that presented in Reason in Common Sense and Reason in Science of the Life of Reason. It is not our purpose and aim to inquire in details whether it is possible to point out

1. Terms borrowed from M.K. Munitz's article, Ideals and Essence in Santayana's Philosophy, in The Philosophy of George Santayana, p. 187. By epistemological is meant the moulding into which the problem of knowledge has been cast since Descartes. It is concerned with the question, how the mind in being confined to its own 'ideas' can possibly know the external world. The methodological is concerned with understanding the conditions, material, procedures and ideals of science.

2. Reason in Science p. 304
3. Ibid. p. 304
two strains that are opposing in Santayana; i.e., in his earlier and in his latter writings, or whether they are sequential. For instance, a certain J. Buchler (1) tries to show that an examination of *Reason in Common Sense* shows the presence in it much that later disturbed his readers in *Scepticism and Animal Faith*. How successful Buchler is in pointing out and proving his point is not to be judged here, but it seems as though the basic difference between Santayana's earlier and later position is that (2) in the former, the metaphysical allegiance is announced beforehand and colors the procedure, whereas in the latter it is deferred with the expectation that it will be warranted as a conclusion. This difference is basic because speaking in analogy of the history of Philosophy, the difference that marks out the idealists from realists lies mainly in the fact that the latter announce the metaphysical allegiance as posited to begin with and once for all. On the other hand, for the idealists, specially of the Kantian type, metaphysics is deferred and that it is warranted as a conclusion to their epistemology. Therefore, it seems that the difference between the earlier phase and the latter phase of Santayana's thought is at least a difference of method, method

1. *Journal of Philosophy, Vol. LI, No. 2"One Santayana or Many,"* by J. Buchler
2. Buchler seems to point this out but does not draw the same conclusion.
of procedure. And this difference if pushed to an extreme will force us either to Idealism or Realism, (in the sense in which it is taken here); Therefore, we might avoid arguing whether Santayana is a humanistic-materialistic realist in his earlier work and taking knowledge as a fact, or whether he is an Olympian mystic, in his later writings, accepting knowledge as a miracle. We can't accept the proposition that his later thought is sequential to his earlier thought. The difference between Life of Reason and the Realms of Being is that in the former Santayana tries to construct the Universe or Reality out of the data of sensuous immediacy, i.e. his concept of nature prescribed the direction of his epistemology. In the latter, almost the opposite procedure is the case, through scepticism and critique of knowledge he arrives at his conclusion. In other words, in the Life of Reason, the world of events as such is posited, and it is the process of common sense exploration and scientific thought that establishes and justifies the world of events. (1) In this sense, Santayana's claim to knowledge is based on the Methodological. But, in his latter phase, the starting point is not in any sense the world of events but the world of essence. Therefore, so far as the method of approach of the problematics is

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1. The Philosophy of George Santayana. p. 482 by A. Banfi
concerned, the writer of Reason in Common Sense and Reason in Science seems to have adopted the method of a natural realist, and of Scepticism and Animal Faith and Realms of Being that of a more or less traditional speculator i.e. one who constructs or has access to Reality and the world of events, by settling beforehand the problem of knowledge. This very fact of settling the problem of knowledge and the knowing process beforehand and considering it as basic and fundamental to all dialectic is typical of a Kantian idealist. 

It was stated that the analysis of our problem will be mainly on epistemological grounds. To put it more precisely, we are confronted in our analysis of Santayana's thought with a complete dualism, the complete separation of essence from and existence, and the leap made from essence, on no rational ground whatsoever, to existence raises a whole lot of problems when viewed in the light of modern philosophy, i.e. philosophy since Descartes. The objective before us is to define, after having read into Santayana's thought in the previous chapters, and point out the different phases of his epistemological position.

Earlier in this chapter, it was noted that Santayana's method and approach in some respects seem on the surface a resemblance to the Realist's way. Moreover, surprisingly enough, San-
tayana is known generally, to be a thoroughgoing realist. Our next task is to point out that that is not exactly the case, and in the last analysis Santayana's method is alien to a realist's.

In his philosophical method, Santayana, by the very fact of starting by means of scepticism as the initial point of his dialectic at once places himself in the group of traditional speculators.

In other words, the very fact that Santayana makes recourse to scepticism so that he might later be able to believe he is on firm ground in his discourse or metaphysics connotes that Santayana, at least in method of procedure, does not have much in common with the method of modern realism. As it was noted earlier, modern realism contends that there has come about a divorce or emancipation of metaphysics from epistemology. To illustrate, the issue between the realistic and the traditional speculators is that the latter assert that epistemology is fundamental to all other sciences and the former assert that science is fundamental to metaphysics. Then, so far as that goes, in method, Santayana is not realistic. Although that is said, it is not implied that Santayana claims that one can by a direct study of the knowing process infer the limits of possible knowledge.

1. The New Realism, Chapter I,
and that epistemology can give us a theory of reality independently of all other sciences, as critics (Kantian), seem to have done.\(^1\)

Secondly, that which marks his method as alien to the realist's method is that the latter believes that the value of the external object is identical to the object known i.e., it is generally agreed among realists that there is formal identity between the object known and the object as such. This assumption is almost unquestionable for the realists, simply because if they do not make such an assumption, then they shall be left with solipsism.\(^2\) It is of extreme importance, because it enables us to pursue our quest, to know the world of objects better by trial and error. Santayana, by no means, refuses to admit that there is a sort of correspondence between the object known (its essence) and the external object. Had he not admitted this, he would also have been left with solipsism. As a matter of fact, the whole technique and purpose of making the leap from essence to existence was to save himself from the unique territory of essence into which he was forced as a result of his skepticism, in brief, solipsism. Santayana admits only the possibility of correspondence of essence and the corresponding object, and not the identity

\(^1\) *The New Realism*, p. 43

\(^2\) J. Wild, an Aristotelian Realist, actually says the above in his work, *Introduction to Realistic Philosophy*. 
of the two. Actually it was pointed out that Santayana considers it a metaphysical illusion to people the world with hypostating identities and materialised truths; that the flux of Existence in person can't be known even though science can more truly describe the flux of existence, and its attempt is more serious than the vulgar essences which usually give it character. In simple words, the object as such is never given to Santayana, essence is; on the other hand, to a realist the object is given in sense experience, and this enables us to know the exact nature of the object. However, if we should try to give Santayana's account of the phenomenological genesis of consciousness and of knowledge, it is not much different from a realist's. (1) But in the Realms of Being, as we alluded to above, this is not the case.

1. The following is a roughly paraphrased account of the phenomenological genesis of consciousness as outlined by Santayana in Reason in Science: A mind is gathered together in proportion as physical sensibility extends its range and is integrated. Knowledge is an advance on sensation precisely because it represents the rest of sentience with all the manner of ideal harmonies read into the whole act of representing it. After a datum of sense is devoured what ordinarily remains in memory is not representative of particular moments but rather a logical possession. So, thought is not only a bridge from sensation to sensation. Were it so, then the whole universe of mental discourse would then be unreal, and conventional structure impinging ultimately on sense, from which it would derive its sole identity. In identifying an object that happens is this, in the first place, various sensations and felt relations which cannot be kept distinct in the mind fall together into one term of discourse, represented by a sign, a word or an image. In the second place, the new perception is referred to that ideal entity of which it is now called, a manifestation and effect.
So far as that goes, an Aristotelian realist, like Wild, will not object to most of what was said in the footnote. In other words, in principle he will not object to the fact that ideas are the product of abstraction from the sensuous material. Thus, to the question how does the mind get to know objects and have ideas, Wild would say that through sense perception, we may have an objective apprehension of certain external qualities, qualities of the object, in the sense organ. (1) Thence comes about the abstraction of the species by the psychic faculty and rational cognition.

Thus, the notion of an independent and permanent world is an ideal term used to justify and mark the cohesion in space and the recurrence in time of recognizable groups of sensations. This recurrence and cohesion in existential phenomena force the intellect to frame the idea of such a reality. Individual objects must be discovered before abstraction can be made from their conceived nature. To discover a physical object, is to pack in the same part of space and fuse in one complex body, primary data, and colored form. These sensible qualities remain forever distinct in their sensible character, although intelligence observing these qualities to evoke together identifies them in their operation. Yet, we come to attribute to an object the terms of an intellectual synthesis. So, the ideal object is endowed with as many qualities as we had associateable sensations of which to make it up. This object is a concretion of our perception in space. Ideas, although their material is sensuous, are not themselves sensations.

Santayana and a realist might not disagree on this point. So far as the above lines from Santayana are concerned, there is no indication at all on the part of Santayana that we are condemned not to be able to know the exact nature of the object. So far as that goes, he is with the realists, but the point we made above to indicate the difference between Santayana and a Realist was that the latter claimed to be able to know the exact nature of the object known while Santayana does not seem to claim that in his latter writings. We should be reminded of the words, quoted earlier in this paper, "even the so-called primary qualities are simply those essences which science uses in its description of things but in the meantime the things have evaporated; all knowledge of nature has become a game of thought. Nothing is ever present to us except some essence. The evidence of data is only obviousness and gives no evidence of anything else."

Santayana's very procedure of starting from essence and forcing himself to existence is an indication of reversing the realist's procedure of starting from actual existence and proceeding there from. However, there is a sort of realism forced upon Santayana with the
positing of Animal Faith. It is in this context that we can say, and with reservations, that Santayana is a realist. It is true that for his knowledge of Reality, he professes to acquire from the bodies of science, i.e. by making an appeal to the theories contained implicitly in them. Knowledge is possible when our ideas are found to correspond with the objects in nature. In this sense, Santayana makes no claim, as an idealist would do, that by the sheer means of thought we have knowledge. These critics say "a fact is a concept." That actual criticism of knowledge proves that actual thinking is the only reality". (1) This statement might seem absurd, since a concept means at most the idea or supposition of a fact. It is in this sense that Santayana disagrees with Kantian idealists, and seems to agree with realists. Truly, metaphysics is emancipated from epistemology, by making no claim whatever that by the sheer means of thinking we could have knowledge. However, taking Santayana's thought in toto, we might consider Santayana as one who stands in the realistic group, as a thinker for whom metaphysics has been emancipated from epistemology, and that this is of fundamental importance, and fruitful for a better understanding of the external world. To so consider him may be due to either a misinterpretation of his thought or a failure on his part

1. The New Realism, p. 58
to have achieved a consistent realistic position. It seems that there is more truth in the latter. The argument made for this point remains to be seen.

It should be noted further that Santayana's basic tenet, that for which his whole scepticism stands as a bulwark, is that he is sceptical about a point for which realism stands or falls, i.e. Santayana after his doubt, has not been able to persuade himself on rational grounds that the external world is a fact. To start with and to end with, all that is given is a mental world of essence, and that is what Santayana has been able to assert on dialectical grounds. In that sense we could say that Santayana has never been able to wake up from his sceptic-trance (by definition that is a relapse into a non-material world) and thus, truly, he is an Olympian mystic.

This is undoubtedly opposed to the realist's essential tenet. For the realist there should exist no such problem as relapsing into a mental world to start with. The realist can't conceive that the actual world is not a brute fact and that it could not actually be known by the mind. Whereas, the independence of the external world is not the corner stone of Santayana's dialectic but an assumption to be admitted blindly and without any justification.

Moreover, we know that a realist starts with the world of things and posits therefrom our knowledge of it. On the other hand, Santayana starts
with essences and on his own grounds can't justifiably posit the world of things. So in realism there is the dualism of the external world, and our ideas of it. On the other hand, in Santayana such a dualism is not justifiable, or self evident.

The above differences between Santayana and a realist betray Santayana's epistemological position. This should be pointed out and by so doing point out the tener of his position and system.

Suppose we accept Animal Faith as an indispensable notion in Santayana's philosophy as it undoubtedly is. It is still not true to say that we can identify Santayana with conventional realism. This is evidently so, for he asserts that we shall never be able to learn the nature of the world of things in person, though we ceaselessly construct laws to learn about the tropes. What characterises Santayana's epistemological position above all is a sort of agnosticism. Now what sort of agnosticism does it consist of? In type and not in essence this agnosticism is similar to that of Kant's. Both Santayana and Kant start with ideas and reason. Kant on dialectical or rational grounds capsules down and schematises the structure of things and then this schematised structure is filled in by
sensibility. In Santayana there seems no formal sort of schematism but the process and direction is similar, i.e. Santayana starts with essences or ideas, takes for granted 'belief in demonstration' (rational or dialectical thinking), then, after Animal Faith is posited, learns about the world of phenomena. However, both posit and admit that the things in themselves 'Ding an sich', are unknowable. The reason, for both, is almost the same i.e. the intrinsic nature of Reality is not revealed or given to us. It is of course not to be overlooked that the details and the turns of argument by which the two thinkers come to their conclusion are different. However, the conclusion seems to be identical in form. Kant(1) succeeded in rescuing philosophy from Humean scepticism only at the cost of limiting man's field of knowledge to the world of natural occurrences, world of phenomena; This notion of a limitation arise in Kant's thought because he supposed that the mind is endowed with the faculties not only of sensuous intuition and understanding but also of speculative reason. This faculty of reason is the source of an unique and highly important idea of the infinite, which in various contexts may also be called the idea of the unlimited completeness or wholeness. When the nature and scope of our experience of sensuous objects is examined according to this criterion of absolute completeness, its limi-

tion is at once apparent. For why should we assume that the whole of reality is of such a nature as to be capable of being sensuously experienced by beings like ourselves? Reason, accordingly, suggests to us the wisdom of recognizing the possibility that our world of nature may be no more than the partial and inadequate appearance to us through our senses, of a reality whose farther reaches can never be thus sensuously apprehended, by entitling our world of objects, the world of phenomenological appearance, and what remains, the realm of ultimate reality. That is, in brief, Kant's argument for his conclusion that the Totality or wholeness of the nature of reality or Being is Unknowable. Although the steps by which Santayana comes to an agnostic conclusion are not, of course, through the same course as Kant's. As it was noted indirectly earlier Santayana admits of no bifurcation of Reality into a world of noumena and a world of phenomena, as Kant does it. For Santayana, if there is any world at all, it is the world of phenomena. He asserts that this world of phenomena is unknowable i.e., our knowledge of the world is limited for two reasons: the first reason agrees in principle with Kant's contention that when the nature and scope of our experience of sensuous objects is examined according to the criterion of absolute completeness, its limitations is at once apparent. The second reason is somehow wholly
unkantian. If for a moment we might be allowed to identify Kant's world of noumena with Santayana's Flux, there is a good deal of indication that the nature of the Flux if our petty minds were capable of knowing it, the nature of it would still be undoubtedly non-rational. As is noted in Chapter III of this paper, for Santayana, the characteristic aspect of the Flux, if anything at all, is essentially chaotic. "It is not a series of essences solidified. It is nothing if it is not complex, elastic and fundamentally chaotic. Thus, by nature, unknowable." What makes Santayana say that in the end is, of course, the inescapability of the fact that the Flux can't be schematised or be presented in a graphic transcript of it. We may posit e.g. the unit of arrangement in nature, and it may be true, but this is not proved by the mere intuition of such a unity. The regularity in the genesis of modes or phases of substance is constantly verified in action on the human scale, to expect it in phenomena is superstition. (1) Our knowledge of phenomena is never literal but pictorial i.e. we are always given essences, pictures of the objects that we want to know. Knowledge of the phenomena is always pictorial. We always have a pictorial knowledge of the physical space as such. Our knowledge of the Flux or phenomena is composed of snapshots or images, and these yield only words or laws in another realm.

1. Realms of Being, p.234.
of being from the Flux which confronts it. But a law or a description is an essence. Thus truth becomes a description of some field of essence already selected. So, ours are merely a vocabulary and the logical relations of its content do not compose the Flux. Thus, Santayana's agnostic temper asserts itself: "Only in terms of essence that facts can be described though partiality and instability besetting all description".

However, within this agnostic attitude we find a constructive sort of realistic attitude. The realist asserts that philosophy should abandon the claim to the possession of truth. In other words, philosophy must now abandon its supposed privilege of radically transforming all results which have been reached without taking knowledge into account. The disregard of epistemological consideration which is characteristic of special investigation is now justified. The right to disregard the subjective condition of knowledge is an achievement of critical reflection and it at once establishes the full right of all special branches of knowledge.

This statement on behalf of the realists implies at least two points, the second of which follows from the first, 1) that the authority and source of information of our knowledge of reality is to be gotten from the special sciences, 2) the principles of meta-

physics could be truer if based solely on the implications of scientific knowledge, the most reliable court of appeal for verification of our ideas, principles and sophisms. If the above represents more or less the realistic conviction, then it could be said that Santayana is an enthusiast of that sort. On the other hand, we should also note that at the bottom of his heart he does not share the ideas of a realist or a scientist, i.e., the possibility of understanding the nature of the Universe. In other words, Santayana’s absorption of realistic attitude within the larger frame of agnosticism is such that to view realism and agnosticism as two contradictory attitudes in the larger whole and as irreconcilable with each other is a gross misinterpretation or misrepresentation of the context within and around which Santayana’s thought centers. It is true that Santayana, like Kant, each in his own way, is a metaphysical agnostic. For Santayana, as well as for Kant according to his age, the best means and source for our knowledge is in sciences. Now, the question of extreme importance is: Does such an attitude undermine the ideals of science itself? One of the ideals of science has been to give the true explanation of the nature of phenomena. If we should for a moment look back upon the history of science since the Egyptians or the Babylonians, and the various explanations of the motions of planets and the suns and moons given since then, with astrology
involved, and then, the Ptolemaic, and Copernican hypotheses, and then the Newtonian and now Einsteinian Universe including their conception of space and time, it is more or less true to say that every added or new scientific explanation given seems to be a sort of construction on a more solid and truer basis rather than a mere reshuffling of hypotheses, as has been the plight of the different systems of metaphysics. To use Santayana's own terminology, science has always endeavored to explain nature in person. Santayana does not share this ideal of science to apprehend the Universe. Thus it seems to be, an abandonment of the ideal implicit in scientific inquiry. It is rightly remarked (1) that the methodological emphasis in Reason in Common Sense and Reason in Science, is more predominant than in Scepticism and Animal Faith and the Realms of Being, sequel to it. It is also true to say that by definition, these two different types of analysis are somewhat incomparable since they operate with contrasting assumptions about the nature of experience, the one affirning its adequacy to disclose the traits of our environment; the other insisting upon its inevitably illusive and fictional character. However, though the two sorts of analysis may seem opposed, it is our contention here that they live together. For instance, his analysis of space drives him to


by M.R. Munitz,
the conclusion that even in scientific inquiry and terminology we can have only pictorial space. The chapter entitled "Conventional Truths, in the Realm of Truth, should above all convey a careful reader. the implication that, after all, our scanty and partial knowledge of reality is dependable, because on a conventional and thus pragmatic basis it reflects the truths about Reality that we have been able to grasp. This sort of statement frankly and bluntly put forth by Santayana does not at all interpret our conventional knowledge of Reality as fictitious on a human or conventional basis. Santayana's outlook stands above and goes beyond that. If we try to think of Santayana's methodological and epistemological analysis, as wholly distinct from each other, then we shall be deluded like Munitz (1) into declaring that Santayana proposes that a criticism of our assumptions with regard to the acquisition of knowledge, when through, results in a disillusionment with science and a serious challenge to the ultimate validity of its ideal. The following is intended to be a reply to that sort of argumentation on its own grounds. Santayana would not doubt that one of the so-called constructive ideals of science is the understanding and explanation of the nature of phenomena. Indubitably, the theory presented in Reason in Science is not opposed to the ideal of science and its outlook in general. But, it should

be made clear that after Santayana reached the conclusions of Scepticism and Animal Faith, it is not wholly true that these conclusions challenge the formal adequacy of Science. The point is that Santayana in his later writings has not meant not to sanction the pursuit of science and the abandonment of the ideals implicit in scientific inquiry. What he did mean is that on the human level, the inward character of nature is unknowable. A scientist might be able to work on the assumption that nature is knowable but he is not, as a scientist justified to raise that assumption to a metaphysical hypostatization. If there can be a philosophy of science and philosophers of science, and if they declare that the nature of Reality is knowable then it is true that Santayana's claim... proclaims the ultimately fictional character of Science. (1) This difference between the position held by those who assert the character of knowability of Reality and those who doubt it, is at least a difference of ideal and outlook, and this seems no less than the difference between a realistic outlook and an agnostic outlook. Therefore, when Santayana adopts an agnostic position, he does it not at the cost of undermining the aim of scientific inquiry, but rather he does it in the same sense as a traditional metaphysician such as Kant. (2) Similarly, but not identically to Kant,

1. The Philosophy of George Santayana, p. 187
2. I found out that Munetz makes mention of a similarity between Kant and Santayana. "Thus the shades of Kantian 'Ding an sich' and Lockean 'Unknownable' rose their heads once more." ibid. p. 197.
Santayana adopts that position by allowing the 'surd', the impossibility of knowing the 'Ding an sich', and in Santayana's terminology, the impossibility of knowing, the Flux. So, it is important to see that even within the agnostic system the only source out of which we should draw our material for a truer conception of nature is by means of scientific knowledge. In other words, within the agnostic frame as representing his general outlook falls the realistic method representing 'the self corrective, cumulative advance of science'. No matter how well the achievements of scientific inquiry may fit in an agnostic outlook, it is undeniable that Santayana's method "removes knowledge as an ideal" (1) because our knowledge of nature is always "couchèd in symbolic terms and can't lay bare the intrinsic nature of things with an ultimate insight." (2)

In order to view Santayana's method of interpreting knowledge, it should be noted that Santayana's answer to the basic epistemological question of whether or not the object an individual apprehends can retain its character and existence apart from its relation to the apprehending subject, is a combination of epistemological dualism and of subjectivism and scepticism. (3)

Certainly we should admit that there is a sort of realism in the dualism of Santayana even though it is only on the surface and only a phase of his system. His basic tenet stands for a refutation of Realism, as it shall be pointed out later, because he recognizes

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1. The Philosophy of George Santayana, p. 187
2. ibid. p. 187 Quoted by M.K. Munitz from Santayana's work, Some Turns of Thought In Modern Philosophy.
3. By epistemological dualism, we do not mean psycho-physical dualism or Cartesian dualism of mind and body, but rather the dualism of the knower and the known. Lovejoy in his Revolt Against Dualism tries to point out that both may be fused together. However that is not the concern in this paper.
two separate orders, essences, and the Flux of Existence which may be inferred. He tries to maintain in his odd moments that the thing we perceive is existentially other than the cause of our perceiving it, i.e. he believes that the immediately given essences are mental in their nature but their causes are material. As was said, this dualism should not be confused with psychophysical dualism, mind and body being two distinct and separate entities. Moreover, to try to find an answer to what is called the causal theory of perception in Santayana's later thought is futile. In other words, Santayana posits on no rational grounds the external world. He does not try to explain metaphysically how it happens that our ideas correspond to the object. In that respect he is a thorough going mystic; knowledge is a miracle. Moreover, even if it is possible to attain knowledge or an explanation of the theory of perception, this knowledge may only be a phenomenological or existential description of the stages through which a sense perception passes to become an idea and thus knowledge of the object from which the senses received the data. Is that not merely a description of events rather than a metaphysical explanation? The question, how does the mind know the world, may be considered in two ways. On methodological grounds and on epistemological grounds. On the methodological ground as was noted above, according to the quotation from Reason in Common Sense, Reason in Science, we could rely for an explanation on the most reliable givens, that which is given by science. This consultation of the sciences provides information and data of the highest degree of exactitude that man is able
to get. To demand more than that would be to be motivated by some sort of superstitious craving. It is of course clear that for all that, i.e. the world in which science works and lives, Santayana has no proof of its existence, and if by any chance it does exist, it is 'an irrational accident'.

He won't attempt this proof because he does not want to commit the error of the brilliant but mistaken metaphysicians of the past by forgetting the fact that an idea is in itself inert and can't by any means be the cause or the ground of anything. That brought about the curse on philosophical thinking for centuries after the Greeks.

In other words, the metaphysicians started with an idea or ideas and deduced on so-called rational grounds the external world-Existence. To this problem of confusing, and even losing, Existence in the idea or ideas, Santayana's solution is simply the humble admission or recognition of the fact that there can be no proof given to prove the existence of the external world. It has to be posited, if at all, on faith. In epistemological terms, Santayana is well aware of the fact that the assumption of extra experiential causes for intraexperiential sense data is untenable because an immediate datum exists as a state of myself and as such it

is incapable of existing independently of my process of perceiving it."(1)

Is it not true to say that in the piece of argumentation as found in the foot note Montague seems to have a strong argument for

1. W.P. Montague, The Ways of Knowing, p. 262. Also he adds that the manner in which the sense datum intrudes itself upon me makes me realize that it is the object of a cause external to me. This cause I am tempted to name the real world; to distinguish it from the internal or perceived object. This real object can of course be only inferred, never experienced, because the self can experience only its own states. The inferred object, then, exists in a space other than the space of the perceived object. But where can this real space be? The only space I can possibly conceive is the space which I perceive in the space in which the perceived object and the sense data are located. This perceptual space is too internal and too subjective for real physical objects to exist in and so I must look beyond it for a suitable place in which to conceive my inferred object as located. The trouble is however that we cannot look beyond perceptual space. We can't possibly conceive of any space external to, in the sense of discontinuous with, the space that I perceive. The space that I perceive is the only space that I can attach any possible meaning to and if the physical object does not exist there, there is no conceivable where for it to be. In short the dualistic notion of an inferred time outside of or beyond perceived time turns out to be without meaning and we are driven to admit that the time as well as the space in which the physical causes of our sense data are supposed to exist can be no other than the time and space of the sense data of memory, and would be by their location in a time other than that of perception. It follows that the attempt of epistemological dualism to maintain a numerical separateness of sense data and their causes fails completely.(2)

2. ibid. p. 204
the contention and the implication of Santayana's scepticism? As was pointed out earlier, Santayana actually asserts that intuition of essence, to which positive experience and certitude are confined, is always illusion if we allow our hypothesising impulse to take it for evidence of anything other than essences. To the question, need anything then be posited and believed in at all?, he replies, to abstain from faith and be reduced to the intuition of essence is possible. With regard to the creed of animal faith that there is a world, no guarantee can possibly be offered. As A.D. Lovejoy puts it, "this belief in a continuity which is not in fact exemplified in anybody's experience is a piece of audacious metaphysical theorizing for which our savage ancestors in some very remote prehistoric epoch were probably responsible". In other words, Santayana's faithfulness throughout to the sceptical method led him not to find an ego or personality, at the extreme of doubt, but rather he pushed scepticism to its final end and found a mind genuinely free and detached, a kind of timeless intuition of pure essence, utterly free of concomittants or even references to any world of permanent objects or change that may exist.

1. Revolt Against Dualism p. 27
2. Lovejoy here quotes from B. Russell.
Now we are in a better position to state a very important point, namely, Santayana's scepticism and the method implied together with the outcome of scepticism stands for the refutation of realism, simply by the fact that in Realism we do not know that any simple entity exists unexperienced, and we can not possibly know that unexperienced entities exist even if they do exist. There is no possible way in which we can know this. Therefore, we do not know it and have no reason to believe it.

Stace tries to prove that no proof of the existence of unexperienced objects is possible. As we know, anything that is immediately given in experience is essence; Stace concludes that by inductive reasoning we can't infer the existence of the world. Inductive reasoning is to be ruled out because it is generalization from observed fact. The required inference, if there is to be an inference, must be of a formal nature. And by reasoning, inductive or deductive, the existence of an entity can't be proved. His point is that: 1. The existence of an unexperienced entity can't be known by perception, 2. that it can't be known by reasoning, 3. that the arguments commonly relied upon by realists to prove it are all fallacies.

Likewise, Santayana agrees with the contention of the bankruptcy of realism in its attempt to find a rational ground for our belief. Moreover, it is stated by Stace\(^{(1)}\) that the suggestion of primitive belief, instinctive belief or animal faith is obviously based upon the realization that we can't have a knowledge of unexperienced existence either from perception or from reasoning. Since that is so realists are compelled to appeal to instinctive belief. Stace adds that such a weak position seems hardly to require discussion because a primitive belief is merely a belief which we have held for a long time and may well be false. An instinct is some kind of urge to action, not an urge to believe a proposition. And it is therefore questionable whether there are such things as instinctive beliefs in any strict sense, although, of course no one will deny that we have beliefs the grounds of which are only dimly if at all perceived. Is it not obvious that to base our belief in unexperienced existences on such grounds is a mere gesture of despair, an admission of the bankruptcy of realism in its attempt to find a rational ground for our belief? Stace's conclusion seems to be in conformity with

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Santayana's agnostic temper, namely, we have no reason whatsoever to believe that unexperienced entities exist. We can't prove that they do not exist, since our belief in unexperienced existences is not to be explained as either 1. perception 2. an inference, or 3. instinctive belief. It can be explained as a mental construction or fiction which has been adopted, not because there is the slightest evidence for it but solely that it simplifies our view of the universe.

We now pass to another aspect of Santayana's epistemological position. His faithfulness to scepticism throughout his later writings led him to a sort of subjectivism. Subjectivism for Santayana is of course not to be confused with the usual meaning of the word subjectivism which is the belief that objects can't exist independently of a consciousness of them, and that therefore all reality consists of exclusively conscious being and its states. For Santayana it is rather the belief that if the mind is left only with ideas or essences to intuit, it may, if consistency is sought within that plane, not posit belief in anything alien to essences, i.e. material objects. This is perfectly justifiable along that plane or realm. So we see that Santayana has logically been forced to withdraw into the position which makes him declare that essences are all that there is to anything, and nothing is more than that. In other words, this faithfulness to the sceptical method cost him the loss of existence. Of course, this loss is not to be thought of in the same manner as the loss of existence by the traditional metaphysicians such as Wolff, Hegel, and others, as pointed out earlier. This loss may be termed as the loss of existence at the cost of explaining away existence in and/or by an idea or ideas. On the other hand,
Santayana's technique left him with essences only, i.e. with the logical impossibility of his being able to do anything with existence. Existence this time was not explained away but rather could not be problematical. In other words, Existence could not be a problem because it is not to be found in the unique realm that Santayana finally was forced into. So far as that goes, that is all that there is to it.

However, the methodical application of the sceptical way has given Santayana the position as held in the Realms of Being i.e. the application of that method drove him to a sort of subjectivism. This sort of subjectivism transfers externally existent objects to the internal realm only. In other words, the application of the sceptical method has driven Santayana away from any conceivable sort of dualism of knower and the external world. The external objects are once for all, never given in the realm Santayana is left in. Thus we are reduced to dwell in a domain composed solely of essences and the mind intuiting these essences. This may seem very near to subjectivism proper but is not exactly the same thing. The latter recognizes no reality outside of experience. Santayana's sort of subjectivism recognizes that but only by allowing the word experience a special denotation i.e. experience meaning a play and intuition
of essences, with the possibility of having no hypostatic element in them.

It seems it is essential that we compare the sort of subjectivism proper to Santayana with the subjectivism of, at least, one classical subjectivist such as Berkeley. Berkeley tried to show that the external world depends upon perceptions or ideas. He distinguished two sorts of ideas or states of consciousness: finite conscious being and one infinite conscious being, who according to his own immutable laws creates those physical experiences which we describe as the material world and which we suppose to have existence independently of consciousness. (1)

As we remember, Santayana's objection to this kind of argumentation would be that Berkeley overlooked the relation of ideas to physical things. Berkeley wished to reduce physical things to groups or series of pellucid ideas. Ideas are algebraic signs in respect of their object or signification, terms in a mental process, not concrete images. In other words, Santayana substituted the external material world for all the functions that a Berkeleyan God would have to sustain. The sort of subjectivism that Santayana was reduced to was the consequence of his scepticism. It is in that sense that scepticism and subjectivism are fused in him i.e. subjectivism as the position in which you are left with

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ideas and essences only, with no intrinsic right to posit that those very inert ideas do or don't, can or can't, tell anything about the external world. In point of fact scepticism, the act of doubt, leads one to dwell in and contemplate such a universe; i.e. in the state of doubt a sceptic has, it is true, ideas, but his scepticism is characterised by not crediting those ideas while in the state and act of doubt. Therefore, Santayana in his sceptic state is not supposed to attribute any credit to ideas. But in his subjective state, i.e. after he makes appeal to animal faith, he may credit those ideas but has no sufficient reason for doing so. The only difference between giving credit and not giving it, is simply of practical value and this value if applied to the touchstone of dialectical cogency is superfluous and also meaningless. The reason for that is that the passage from the sceptic state to subjective state is actually a passage from the realm of pure essence into the realm of Existence, but on dialectical grounds we are still in the realm of essence because all our knowledge of the external world, if we have any, is by means of essences and these, if they reveal anything to us, reveal other essences, and nothing else. "All data are in themselves essences and this shows how little evidence there can be for faith because we presuppose that here is some real object or event to be known or reported,
prior or subsequent to the report that reaches us. In other words, we presuppose existent facts about which our affirmations may be false or true. "If I hypostatise an essence into a fact I am putting my trust in animal faith, not any evidence and implication of my actual experience." (1) Moreover, in connection with his criticism of idealists, Santayana says that neither a material thing nor an actual intuition has its being in being perceived: both, by definition, exist on their own account, by virtue of their internal energy and natural reactions. Therefore, either Existence apart from givenness is admitted inconsistently into idealism or existence is denied completely. (2) In other words the dilemma of dialectical thinking for Santayana is that either we admit Existence inconsistently or else we deny it completely; to put it less strongly, not to affirm it. This implies both scepticism - to deny, and subjectivism to admit inconsistently. So, there is, evidently, a reconciliation and a sort of fusion of both, and are at the same time two aspects of a whole, of his thought.

Finally, how does this sceptic-subjective aspect of Santayana's thought fall in within his general position, agnosticism? Supposing we admit within the framework of his thought the notion of animal faith as an essential element of his doctrine. By so doing we have introduced on top of sceptic-subjective machinery, an element that prevents the

1. *Scepticism and Animal Faith*, p. 98
activity at full swing of the sceptic pendulum. Thus, we may posit and hypostatise an essence into a fact or event. Consequently, we have started to glean and acquire knowledge because in fleeting essences only, there could be had no knowledge without alleged experience in an assumed world. So, with such a structure i.e. animal faith introduced on top of the sceptic-subjective pedestal, we are thus equipped with essence as a tool and a willingness amidst natural facts to hunt for knowledge. However harmonious that may be, it is inescapable that knowledge of fact is always pictorial, for the very reason that knowledge of a thing is intuition of the essence (of the thing). Nevertheless, the description and knowledge of the fact becomes true in so far as these or equivalent essences are actually embodied in the field of action. We know that to the defining intellect the Flux of Existence is a flight of essences, and that to penetrate into the inner flow of Existence, however perfectly the Flux be transcribed, it would still not be that Flux in person because the facts which have aroused the intuition necessarily transcend the terms or essence used to describe or embody them; they transcend every ideal synthesis of them. So, though Existence can't be wholly elucidated in terms of essence yet, it is only in terms of essence that facts can be described though partiality and instability besetting all de-
scription. So, Santayana's conclusion is that there is a metaphysical illusion or idolatry in peopling the world with hypostatic identities and materialised truths.

Obviously, the strain of Agnostic approach is evident in the above. Facts and Existence forever transcend and escape our knowledge and description of them. Existence as the thing in itself is unknowable. There is no Kantian dualism of the noumenal and phenomenal world. There is one world, if at all it is assumed, and that is intrinsically unknowable.

The conclusion that follows from the above may be drawn as follows: Santayana could not do what he had undone, i.e. his scepticism gave him not an 'ego' or a personal history, it gave him essence, and that is almost nothing. Whenever there is act of doubting, by definition everything is unhypostatised, i.e. everything is sublimated into essence and the universe that is composed with it. So, when Santayana wanted to wake up and unchain himself from scepticism i.e. from the world of essences, even by means of the notion of animal faith, he found out that he was still not without essences and the world that they presented, and these could give him, perhaps other essences, but not existence itself. His initial step which is scepticism is best exemplified in the statement, nothing exists.
His second step or phase, subjectivism, discovered after he has introduced the notion of animal faith to posit an assumed world, may be exemplified in the statement, it would be idiocy not to recognize a world relevant to action. His third and at the same time his general agnosticism may be exemplified by the statement, although a world may be assumed to exist, it shall forever escape our knowledge, in the intrinsic sense.

So, we see that existence was not given to Santayana in his initial step, i.e. scepticism. We also know that after having taken that step Santayana could not find existence due to the impossibility of finding any ground for existence in essence. He, thereupon, introduced the notion of animal faith, and tried once more to find existence. Even then, existence was not clearly and intrinsically given to him due to the impossibility of having real access to it.

Alas! here is another system that is doomed to lose existence, not in an impressive manner in a metaphysical idea such as the system of Hegel did in the Absolute, but rather in something much less imposing and pompous than that, i.e. inert essences.

What a mysterious irony of Fate! Existence—that in which we live and have our being shall eternally escape us! It seems that there is real insight in Kierkegaard’s statement to the effect that man’s only business is to exist and not to philosophise because philosophising, apparently, has had no use for existence. It seems as though it is true to say that
man's philosophic endeavor through centuries of intense speculation, even including the dialectic of logico-positivists, is evidence of Kierkegaard's contention. In other words, all the different ways and means of philosophic chattering, so called speculation, of the different schools and in different ages were meant, undoubtedly, to be sensical talk on the true nature of Being and Existence; yet, each in its turn has proved to be merely sophistic rather than true philosophic insight and speculation on the true nature of Existence.

This verdict on the outcome of philosophic endeavor represents also the philosophic spirit of Santayana.

-The End-
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