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THE DEVELOPMENT OF (DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS
IN THE HASHEMITE KINGDOM OF THE JORDAN)

BY

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VAN DEUSEN -- DEMOCRACY IN JORDAN

The opinions expressed in this thesis are limited to individual views of the student.

PREFACE

The associations, customs, and relationships governed by democratic principles and consciously approved by the society are Democratic Institutions. The development of these principles is a history of both the people and the government, for in a democratic form of government there should exist a majority of the people capable of taking part intelligently in the government. At the same time there must exist a government which is formed and which functions on democratic principles.

This thesis will concern itself with those factors that bear directly or indirectly on the phases advancing the inhabitants of the country toward taking part in a democratic government and with those events that have contributed to the political development of the government. The main emphasis of the thesis will be placed on the political development of the area and not on descriptions of administrative instruments.

Jordan is unique in many respects. It rightly may be considered as an artificial state. Economically it is poor and incapable of financing its defense from its resources. Strategically its location is important, although it is not situated on any world route of communica-

tion. Politically it has developed, during a lifetime, from an absolute monarchy to a Middle Eastern democracy. Internationally it has been caught in the cross currents not only of the Western World but also of the Arab World. For these reasons many of the changes that took place in Jordan have their motivating force in pressure from another country. In this thesis it is not intended to analyze completely all of the external facts and occurrences that have affected Jordan but, rather, to mention briefly those external events while spending more time on the actual effect in the country. In the same respect, as this is primarily a political study, the Palestine War will not be covered from the tactical or strategic viewpoint. The causes of the war will be discussed only in regard to Jordan. The Zionist-Arab relations centering around Jordan will be discussed only from the Jordanian viewpoint.

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CHAPTER I

DESCRIPTION OF TRANSJORDAN

Geography

Transjordan is an inland country with only one small and unimportant outlet on the gulf of Aqaba. Most of the country is now excluded from the area of international travel. In the past the routes of historical movement lay along the coast,¹ while its historical contact with other countries was mainly through the ancient caravan routes and the trade routes of the pilgrims which generally ran north to south along the division of the desert and the cultivable land.

Transjordan is largely an elevated arid plateau.² The country is divided into three general areas; the Jordan Riff, the Highlands, and the Desert.

The Jordan Riff was not produced by the slow movement of water but by a sudden movement of the earth's

¹W. B. Fisher, The Middle East, London Methuen and Co. 1952, p. 79.

²M. Y. Nuttonson, Agroclimatology and Crop Ecology of Palestine and Transjordan and Climatic Analogues in the United States, Geographic Review, Vol. 37, July 1947, p. 436.

crust³ that created a narrow floor three to fourteen miles wide⁴ that lies some two thousand feet below the hills that form its sides. The length of the Riff is about 250 miles.⁵ The Jordan Riff is divided into two sections, the Ghor and the Wadi Arabah.⁶

The Ghor begins in northern Syria at the base of the Anti Taurus range and continues southwards to the Dead Sea.⁷ It descends from Lake Tiberias 686 feet below sea level to the Dead Sea 1280 feet below sea level.⁸ This area is the most important part of the Riff. It contains 260,000 dunums of irrigatable land and most of the population of the Riff.⁹ The sides of the Ghor are not as steep as the escapements of the Wadi Arabah and allow transportation to enter and leave the floor of the

³A Handbook for Syria Including Palestine, ID. 1215, Naval Intelligence Division, His Majesty's Stationary Office, London, p. 644.

⁴M. Y. Nuttenson, op. cit., p. 439.

⁵A Handbook for Syria Including Palestine, op. cit., p. 645.

⁶A Handbook for Syria Including Palestine, ID. 1215, op. cit., p. 644.

⁷Ibid., p. 645.

⁸Ibid.

⁹B. A. Toukan, A Short History of Transjordan, Luzac and Co., London, 1945, p. 5.

valley at many points. The valley drains into the Jordan River and the Dead Sea.¹⁰

The Wadi Arabah begins at the southern end of the Ghor, (the Dead Sea) and continues southwards to the Gulf of Akaba.¹¹ The highest part of the Wadi Arabah is 800 feet above sea level so that the gradient rises about 2,000 feet in sixty miles. The Wadi is enclosed by escarpments along both sides that are broken by occasional wadi gorges which enter from the east and west. The wadi constitutes a natural highway from the Gulf of Aqaba to the Dead Sea, however it has not been used since the days of the Romans.¹² The importance of the Wadi lies in the natural defensive line that it creates between the countries east and west of the Riff, also the end of the Wadi, the Gulf of Aqaba. There is little habitation in the Wadi as the area contains practically no cultivable land.

The Highlands of Transjordan are a series of high and wide discontinuous ravines, broken mountain blocks and rolling plateaus that drop abruptly on the west into the Jordan Riff from 4,000 feet above sea level in the north to 5,400 feet in the south. This plateau with the

¹⁰ A Handbook for Syria Including Palestine, ID. 1215, op. cit., p. 644.

¹¹ Ibid., p. 667.

¹² Ibid.

sharp western face descends gently in the east and gradually merges into the desert.¹³ The eastern boundary of the Highlands is the desert which may be defined as the Hedjaz Railroad.¹⁴ The highlands may be divided from the north to the south into four districts of Ajlun, Belqa, Kerak, and el Jibal or esh Shera.¹⁵

Ajlun the northern most area contains the woodlands and barren mountains. It produces wheat, cereals and grapes.¹⁵

The Belqa, the center district, around Amman, varies in its characteristics. The northern Belqa is similar to Ajlun while the southern section of Belqa is similar to Kerak.¹⁵

Kerak the area south of Belqa and north of el Jibal possesses the most fertile lands that produce corn and wheat.¹⁵

The northern part of the highlands the combined areas of Kerak, Belqa and Ajlun contain most of the 4,490,000 dunums of cultivable land (260,000 dunums of

¹³Nuttonson, op. cit., p. 439.

¹⁴Warriner Doreen, Land and Poverty in the Middle East, London, 1948, p. 75.

¹⁵A Handbook for Syria Including Palestine, op. cit., p. 667.

irrigated lands in the Ghor).¹⁶ The cultivable lands vary in width and fertility, however, are more uniform than the lands of Palestine.¹⁷ In the north, the cultivable lands extend to the lava flows that dominate much of the northern section. The extension to the east of the cultivable lands gradually decreases in width from north to south.¹⁸

The southernmost section of Transjordan el Jibal or esh Shera is defined on the north by an escarpment which is marked by a depression south of Shobek and runs west of south.¹⁹ This area is south of thirty degrees N. and extends to the gulf of Aqaba. It is distinctly different from the rest of the highlands as it is a sandy mountainous region, that supports no agriculture and is considered wasteland.²⁰

¹⁶B. A. Toukan

¹⁶A Short History of Transjordan, op. cit., p. 5. Alfred Bonne, Land and Population in the Middle East, Trends and Prospects, The Middle East Journal 1951 p. 39 gives the following table in hectares as to the land of Transjordan. One hectare is equal to approximately ten dunums. Table in 1,000 of hectares. Total area 9,600.

Report	Cultivated	Cultivable but not cultivated	Total Cultivable	Irrigated	Possible to Irrigate
Warriner p. 75-6	445	...	445	26	6
Clapp Rpt. II p. 10	600	...	600
Konikoff	460	360	820	26	..

¹⁷M. Y. Nuttenson, op. cit., p. 438.

¹⁸W. B. Fisher, op. cit., p. 377.

¹⁹A Handbook for Syria Including Palestine, op. cit., p. 439.

²⁰M. Y. Nuttenson, op. cit., p. 439.

The desert is the third important division of Transjordan. The cultivable lands of the areas that have been mentioned consist of only a narrow strip between the Jordan Valley and the Hedjaz Railroad.²¹ The Jordan desert is an arid region with few oases and water points. It covers more than four-fifths of the total area of the country.²² Generally it drains towards the east. The average altitude is 1,650 feet with some points as high as 3,000 feet. This area is suitable only for nomadic type existence, that will allow the flock to extend into the desert during the winter rains, and follow the grass back towards the riff during the summer.

Climate

Jordan is subjected to the Mediterranean climate. During the winter and spring, the south westerly winds bring rains from the Mediterranean, while during the summer the winds from the east having crossed the desert are dry and carry no rain. More than two-thirds of the total rainfall of the area occurs between December and May.²³ The well developed mountain massifs running parallel

²¹Warriner Dorseen, op. cit., p. 75.

²²M. Y. Nuttinson, op. cit., p. 439.

²³M. Y. Nuttinson, op. cit., p. 447.

to the coast line both the Palestine mountains and the eastern edge of the riff restrict the rainfall to a narrow littoral zone that cause conditions to rapidly alter as one progresses away from the coast.²⁴ The coastal mountains and the mountains of east Jordan drain the rain from the clouds so that the rainfall decreases from 600-800 mm at the crest of the Jordan hills to less than 100 mm to the east in the desert.²⁵ Besides the marked graduation from west to east, there is also an apparent climatic difference in a short distance from north to south. The rain bearing south west winds have a longer sea fetch in the north, while in the south as Aqaba the air is drier as the winds have passed over the land masses of north Africa and the Sinai.²⁶ By this it can be seen the cause of the increased cultivable lands in the north western part of Jordan and the gradual decrease of the land that can be utilized for cultivation as one progresses southward.

Effect of Climate and Geography on the People

The climate of Jordan indicates that four-fifths of the land, the desert, can only be used by a nomadic

²⁴W. B. Fisher, op. cit., p. 3.

²⁵Konikoff, Transjordan an Economic Survey, Jerusalem 1946, p. 14.

²⁶W. B. Fisher, op. cit., p. 3. Konikoff, op. cit., p. 14.

people, while other sections vary in the potential production. This natural climatic condition has divided the people of Jordan into three classes. The fellahiin, (farmer), or the settled inhabitants dependent on agriculture; they are found in the areas of cultivation of the Ghor, Ajlun, Belqa, and Kerak. The semi-nomadic people occupy the land that is not capable of supporting them completely on agriculture as parts of Belqa and Kerak. They have not given up their nomadic customs or way of life. The nomads are forced to live a nomadic life due to the land they occupy. They follow the rains into the desert and retreat before the heat and dryness of the summer. The nomads are found mainly in the desert, Kerak, Wadi Arabah, and the southern area of el Jibal or esh Shera.

CHAPTER II

GOVERNMENT OF THE OTTOMANS

Theoretical Administration of the Ottomans

In discussing the development of democratic institutions in Jordan it is necessary to begin with the theoretical government of the Turks. Although, there was considerable difference between the government that actually existed in Jordan and the government that was drawn on paper, many of the instruments that in recent times have been utilized are based or borrowed entirely from the Turkish system of administration. The development of the Turkish administration will not be discussed. The Turkish government discussed will refer to the theoretical Turkish government based on the fundamental laws of 1864 and 1871.

The Ottoman empire was divided into vilayets. Each vilayet governed by a vali. The boundaries of the vilayets changed from time to time but the area of Jordan remained within the vilayet of Syria in spite of the creation of the independent Sanjack of Jerusalem. Every vilayet had an administrative council consisting of ex-officio and elected members. The qadhi and the mufti of each district and the dignitaries of the Christian

churches were amongst the ex-officio members. The elected members (four) consisted of two moslems and two non-moslems. In addition to the council, the vali was aided by the defterdar (treasurer), the maktubji (secretary). There was a General Council in each vilayet meeting once a year for a session of not more than forty days. Such matters as roads, agriculture, commerce, and taxation were to be subjects of deliberations though no business might be discussed without the consent of the vali who presided. The council was to have the power of recommendation to the imperial government.

The vilayet of Damascus was divided into the Sanjacks of Hama, Sham Sherif (Damascus), Hauran, and Kerak. The sanjacks of Hauran (more exactly the Kaza of Ajlun) and the complete sanjacks of Kerak became part of Transjordan. Each sanjack was governed by a mutesarraf who was aided by the same type of administrative council found in the vilayet. In addition the mutesarraf was served by the muhasebeji (treasurer) and the tahrirat mudiri (secretary). Each sanjack was to elect four members to the general council, two moslems and two non-moslems. (This law regarding the councils was a dead letter in the empire.)

The sanjacks were further divided into Kazas of which Jordan consisted of Ajlun, Salt, Kerak, Tafleh,

Ma'an. Each kaza was governed by a kaimmakam and a council of three.

The smallest district of the Ottoman government was the nahiyehs governed by a mudir. The mudir and his council were elected by the district. The council was proportional to the religious beliefs of the community. The mudir might not be an imam, nor a priest, nor a government official. His appointment was for two years and required confirmation from the vali. Members of the council held office for two years, half retiring each year. The most important function of the council was the proportioning of taxes to the villages in the district.

The villages elected councils of elders presided over by a mukhtar or if the villages had more than one religious group one mukhtar represented each religion. The taxation of the village was divided amongst the families by these councils.

Municipal councils of the larger cities were responsible for the usual duties of water supply, lighting street sanitation, city hospitals, etc. The councils consisted from six to twelve members elected for four years half retiring every two years. The president of the council was appointed by the government and was a paid official, the city engineer, medical officer and veterinary surgeon were consulting members.

Actual Conditions Under the Ottomans

Jordan prior to 1900 was a neglected and ignored part of the vilayet of Syria.²⁷ The individual Arab chiefs and princes ruled the country and waged war on one another and accorded only the most nominal allegiance to the Sultan.²⁸ In Kerak in the 1870's the young medjelli (Turkish appointed governor) ranked as a colonel in the Turkish army and drew pay for that position. This appointment was mainly for the collection of taxes. However as an independent ruler he demanded and received ransom from all travellers that passed through his area and maintained an attitude "we are lords here and care less than nothing for pashas or the sultan."²⁹

The Turkish administration gradually spread from Damascus to Ajlun³⁰ in 1865, and continued to spread southwards so that es Salt was a settled government by 1870 and in 1873 a garrison of soldiers was stationed in Kerak.³¹

²⁷George Lenczowski, The Middle East in World Affairs, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, N. Y. 1953, p. 300.

²⁸Brigadiere John Bagot Glubb, OMC, DSO, OBE, MC. The Story of the Arab Legion, Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1948, p. 190.

²⁹H. B. Tristram, The Land of Moab, N. Y. Harper, 1873, p. 99.

³⁰Brigadiere John Bagot Glubb, op. cit., p. 190, Konikoff, op. cit., p. 16.

³¹Tristram, op. cit., p. 174.

This early expansion of Turkish rule, was restricted to the cultivable lands in the highlands. The tribes in the desert were free, even the local settled shieks, as Kerak paid the tribes a tribute annually to protect themselves from the bedouin raiding.³²

The warlike raids of the bedouins were so frequent that when the muslim elements of Daghestan immigrated to Turkey following the Russian conquest, the Shishans were settled by Abdul Hamid in the Jordan area as a buffer against the bedouins. This group was followed by a second, the Circassians who were settled after the Russo/Turkish war 1877 to 1878.³³ These two groups were effective in protecting their areas³⁴ against the bedouins and until the present constitute an important and strong minority in Jordan.

The establishment of Turkish rule over this backward area that had been neglected for centuries,³⁵ was aided by the construction of the Hedjaz Railroad. This pilgrim route or strategic railroad that followed the

³²H. B. Tristram, op. cit., p. 99.

³³Konikoff, op. cit., p. 19. The Shishans settled in Zerqa (200), Roseita (150) and Azraq, the Circassians in Wadi Sir (2000), Jerash (1,500), Naur (500).

³⁴Ellsworth Huntington, Palestine and Its Transformation, Houghton Mifflin Company, N. Y. Boston 1911, p. 294.

³⁵Article Transjordan Has Been Transformed, 25 years progress under the mandate, Great Britain and the East, November 1946, Vol. LXII No. 1766, p. 51.

ancient pilgrim road not only made it necessary for the government to secure the area but it also called government attention to the area. The construction of the railroad increased the population, Amman trippled in ten years. Crowds of emigrants following the construction gangs, settled in the area.³⁶ At the same time the use of the railroad for the movement of troops from Palestine to Yemen as was done in 1904³⁷ made the road from Jerusalem to Amman a strategic military route. Although the control of the government continued to expand prior to the beginning of World War One. It is safe to say that the easternmost limit of the Ottoman control was the Hedjaz railroad and the southernmost limit the vicinity of Kerak.³⁸

The relation between the people of Jordan and the Turks was not cordial. The population did everything within their power to frustrate the efforts of the Turkish administration. In 1909 the Ottoman government tried to carry out a population census and evaluate the immovable property for taxation in the sanjack of Kerak, the tribes and the villages although divided by tradition, feuds and

³⁶Palestine Exploration Fund, 1904, p. 188.

³⁷Palestine Exploration Fund, 1905, p. 91.

³⁸Article Transjordan Has Been Formed. Great Britain and the East, November 1946, vol. LXII, No. 1766, p. 20.

local jealousies were united in the defiance of the government so that the project had to be renounced.³⁹ In Amman during the same time the government officials did not dare apply the same methods to the Circassians as they did the fellahin. The Circassian temperament was known to have been easily aroused and resentful over governmental interference, despite the fact that they constituted the most law abiding and law enforcing group in Amman.⁴⁰

The villages of Jordan had less respect for the government than the cities. Generally the villages were visited mainly by the police and only for making arrests or the investigation of crimes. Although the majority of the police and the government officials were appointed from Arabs of the area, their methods of enforcing law, order and the firmans of the central government were harsh. The gendarmerie was noted for its cruelty that was enough to cause most of the villagers to flee to the hills or the vineyards when the troops entered the villages. The method of investigation of crimes usually included the bastinado of several innocent persons, and included much pomp and show at the expense and finances of the villagers.⁴¹

³⁹Konikoff, op. cit., p. 12.

⁴⁰Ellsworth Huntington, op. cit., p. 294.

⁴¹John B. Glubb, The Story of the Arab Legion, op. cit., p. 190.

The rural population did not always peacefully accept the administration and at times, they turned on the gendarmerie and officials. Often the governors of the areas maintained their position as much by bluff as by force.⁴²

The bedouin and the semi nomadic people of the area were no fonder of the Turkish government than the villagers. Generally the true nomads, the wanderers that were dependent only on their herds of sheep and goats were completely independent and were subject to only their own tribal laws. The Ottomans made no attempt to try and control these raiding groups that were continually at war with one another. However, the semi nomads or those that entered the settled areas and came in contact with the Turkish government were individually as independent and correspondingly resentful of the government. In 1909 Ellsworth Huntington travelling in the Jordan area records a talk with a shiek in which the shiek tried to explain that his people had fought with the government not many years ago,

His eyes were so fierce and his gestures so violent that I began to think that he was really getting angry. With all his soul he said he hated the uniform of my guide, a soldier, but that the man himself was good, apart from that which his clothes implied. Why does the government take taxes from poor Arabs who come from the desert in times

⁴²Ibid.

of drought, he asked? Have not the Arabs the right to feed their flocks wherever there is grass, some day, soon the soldiers will see what my people will do.⁴³

In addition to the attitude of the villagers and the nomads, the relations between the two groups were not conducive to good government. There existed a hostility between the desert and the town, contempt on one side and distrust on the other.⁴⁴ The bedouins whenever hunger or pressure of numbers or drought made their hard life harder, would overrun the fertile lands bordering the desert and invade the grainfields of Jordan.⁴⁵ The villagers on the borders of the desert and in the various oases were under so called tribal protection for which they paid heavily either in money or in cattle and produce. This subsidy money or khafar was in theory payment to the local nomad tribe for protection against other tribes, but actually it meant that so long as the tribute was paid, the local tribe would not raid.⁴⁶ The bedouins could always dominate the villagers as they were naturally more warlike and could strike swiftly and retreat with their loot without fear of pursuit, moreover

⁴³Ellsworth Huntington, op. cit., p. 214.

⁴⁴Major Jarvis, Arab Command, Hutchinson and Co. Ltd., London, 1946, p. 56.

⁴⁵Ellsworth Huntington, op. cit., p. 37.

⁴⁶Major Jarvis, op. cit., p. 56.

they possessed the only means of transportation in the desert, the fast trotting camel.⁴⁷ The villager being stationary could never win. The bedouin moving continually escaped pursuit.⁴⁸ In addition certain groups and tribes of the Druzes actively attacked the government troops as well as the fellahin.

It can be seen from the description of the conditions under the Ottomans that although there existed in Damascus a form of government on paper, actually there was no government over most of the area. What government was found was not efficient in controlling the three main groups of people: the villagers, the semi nomads, and the tribes. The importance of this period is not in what is found as far as government, but the total lack of any basic respect for law and order, or respect for authority that the future governments of Transjordan could build on. As will be seen in Transjordan, the theoretical government of the Ottomans does develop, but at the same time the formation of that government was the action of the establishment of a government in the area for the first time.

⁴⁷Ibid.

⁴⁸Ellsworth Huntington, op. cit., p. 37.

CHAPTER III

WORLD WAR I

During the war the Arab army of Lawrence and Faisal ended any rule that had existed in Jordan. Jordan was the route of march of the Arab armies. So long as the war continued and there was a large British force present to maintain order, the nomads fulfilled a useful role, in the defeat of the Turks. As soon as the hostilities were over and the Turkish government collapsed, the bedouin or the nomad began again to prey on the settled population.⁴⁹

On October 1, 1918, Damascus became the seat of the new Syrian de facto government headed by Emir Faisal.⁵⁰ The situation at this time was incoherent and puzzling to all. The British and the French were bound by the Sykes Picot agreement as were the British and the Arabs by the McMahon correspondence, both documents diametrically opposed. The civil administration and government of Jordan at this time reflected indecision as no one in authority was clear as to what the future of Jordan was to be and who was to rule.⁵¹ The British government was

⁴⁹Jarvis, op. cit., p. 61.

⁵⁰T. E. Lawrence, Seven Pillars of Wisdom, London, 1952, p. 793.

⁵¹Jarvis, op. cit., p. 63.

much too concerned with the end of the Western war to worry over the future of Jordan, while both the Hedjaz government and the Faisal government had quite opposite views on the situation. Even the British officers and officials on the spot had individually different ideas on the subject.

Both the Hedjaz government and the Faisal government claimed the areas of Akaba and Ma'an. In Akaba the kaimakam had been appointed by some person or person unknown and received his orders direct from the government of King Hussein in Mecca. At the same time, he would receive contradictory orders from Damascus. The kaimakam, to avoid confusion, governed as he saw fit.

The kaimakam of Ma'an had been informed by the Damascus government that he was independent of Aqaba while the kaimakam of Aqaba had been instructed by Mecca that Ma'an was directly under his authority. Luckily, neither of the two had any idea of exerting their authority and a bond of friendship grew over the mutual appreciation of Scotch whiskey and Ma'an continued to be independent.⁵²

The troops, either British, Australian, or Indian that garrisoned Jordan considered the dividing line between Hedjaz⁷ and Syria as running east and west from Shobek. The area south of this Aqaba and Ma'an was

⁵²Jarvis, op. cit., p. 63.

administered by the king of Hedjaz⁵³ while the area north fell into Enemy Occupied Territory. It was far from clear into whose area it would fall⁵⁴ for final administration. From the initial occupation of the area by the British until the withdrawal of British troops, the British army sent administrators to Jordan utilizing the age old military system of requesting commanders to select suitable officers for civil administrative posts. This system as it had in the past, resulted that the administrators were those of the least military ability and in many cases the imaginative types

queer but otherwise delightful characters, who are calculated never to see the woods for the trees and who at the first opportunity jump into the saddle of some hobby horse and gallop off into the blue.⁵⁵

In addition to the selection, the administration was short of funds and personnel. In the Ajlun area it was necessary for the administrator to divide the area into four independent and naturally hostile districts and maintain order by threatening any one of the four by an attack from the remaining three.⁵⁶ Amman and Salt retained an official

⁵³Ibid., p. 78.

⁵⁴Seton-Williams, Britain and the Arab States, Luzac, London, 1948, p. 169.

⁵⁵Jarvis, op. cit., p. 64 to 65.

⁵⁶Col. F. G. Peake, Transjordan, Royal Central Asian Society, Vol. 26, 1939, p. 381.

er two of the old regime that had no power and were ineffective,⁵⁷ while the desert remained as it had over the past centuries, the land of the tribes and tribal rule. The bedou with the break-down of what little government that existed continued his natural encroachment into the lands of the villages.

This completely unnatural and confusing situation was not to last for long and the solution to the problems rightly or wrongly began with the Anglo-French agreement of 1919 which provided for the withdrawal of troops from Syria excluding Palestine and from Cilicia. The replacement of these troops in the interior to be Arabs and on the coast of Cilicia French.⁵⁸ The withdrawal of the British troops from Syria included the area of Transjordan. It is felt that the withdrawal from Transjordan was due to the unsettled delineation of the mandate, as it was improbable that the British would have intentionally ended the vague semblance of law, order and government that remained due to British forces if they had been certain of being given mandate control of the area. Transjordan was left without army or police to maintain order. This allowed eight new independent shiekhdoms to become the only government of the area.⁵⁹

⁵⁷Ibid., p. 380.

⁵⁸A. H. Hourani, Syria and Lebanon, Oxford University Press, London, 1954, p. 55.

⁵⁹Jarvis, op. cit., p. 78.

The Anglo-French agreement had another effect. The agreement was protested by the Faisal government in Damascus and was the motivating force that caused the Syrian congress of notables in Damascus on March 20, 1920 to offer the crown of Syria to Faisal. The acceptance of the position of king of Syria by Faisal was disavowed by both the French and the British who continued with their plans for the San Remo conference.⁶⁰

At the San Remo conference of April 25, 1920, the British were awarded the mandate for Transjordan and Palestine, while the French secured agreement to the mandate territories of Syria and Lebanon.⁶¹ The consequent actions of the French and the Faisal government led to the defeat of the Arab forces at Maisalun and the French occupation of Damascus on July 25, 1920.⁶² The ending of the Faisal government left the area of Transjordan with no higher government than the independent shiekhdoms that had been formed after the withdrawal of the British troops.

The reasons for the British interest in the mandate of Transjordan at this time should be examined. The

⁶⁰A. H. Hourani, op. cit., p. 55.

⁶¹Williams Seton, op. cit., p. 169.

⁶²A. H. Hourani, op. cit., p. 55.

possible motivating forces that caused the British to accept the area of Transjordan will be considered after which return to the period of the eight independent shiekdoms and the period prior to the enforcement of the mandate.

Reasons for the Formation of Transjordan

As has been pointed out in the description of the climate and geography of Jordan the area cannot be considered important as a productive zone. The importance of the area to the Western powers mainly Britain lay divided between the following considerations:

1. route of communication;
2. strategic interests; and
3. prestige.

Although the ancient routes of communication followed mainly the coast, the pilgrim route reached new importance with the events of World War I. The area east of the Jordan became to be thought of in modern terms as a possible route from the Red sea to the Persian⁶³ gulf. The implementation of this route was possible with the advent of motor transportation. This land route led dangerously near the Suez.⁶⁴ The area also contained

⁶³George Lenczowski, The Middle East in World Affairs, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, N. Y. 1953, p. 301.

⁶⁴F. G. Peake, Transjordan, op. cit., p. 375.

the ancient caravan routes from the Mediterranean coast to Baghdad and the potential route for a pipe line which was considered at the San Remo conference.⁶⁵ Also the route of communications must be considered in relation as a link from the Red sea to the mandate of Iraq and the oil interests of the British in that area.⁶⁶

The strategic value of Transjordan is a reflection in the value of the area as a route. The British statesmen had been quick to realize that the security of the Red sea and its approaches from the Indian ocean were essential to the full use of the Suez.⁶⁷ Egypt had been proclaimed a protectorate, Iraq was to be a mandate; however, the campaign of 1915 and the Turkish advance to the canal had shown the necessity of protecting the canal from the north by the control of both the Palestine area and the area of the Hedjaz railroad.⁶⁸ The inclusion of Transjordan led to the creation of a buffer state against the

⁶⁵Stephen H. Longrigg, Oil in the Middle East, Oxford University Press, London 1954, p. 87.

⁶⁶Carl Brockleman, History of Islamic People, Routledge Press, London, 1952, p. 490.

⁶⁷Gordan East, Mediterranean Problems, Thomas Nelson and Sons, London 1940, p. 91.

⁶⁸Elizabeth Monroe, The Mediterranean in Politics, Oxford University Press, London 1938, p. 54.

east.⁶⁹ Also during the war the new weapon of air power had been demonstrated. The area east of the Jordan was a central location of either defense of or offence against the canal. The area, if controlled by an unfriendly power had the potentiality of neutralizing the canal. In addition to its military strategic value, this area was also administratively strategic for it has been shown over the centuries that there can be no peace and security in Syria, Palestine, or Sinai unless similar conditions prevail in Transjordan.⁷⁰

In addition to the primary reasons, Britain was interested in maintaining her position as the western leader of the Arabs and no matter how unimportant, the area east of the Jordan might have been, she had no desire to see another power take control.⁷¹ She wished to increase her voice in the council of Europe by the establishment of two friendly people, the Jews and the Arabs. The cardinal error in this, though developed to be the wording of the promises that were made to both the groups.⁷²

⁶⁹Kenneth Williams, Britain and the Mediterranean, George Newnes Limited, London 1943, p. 94.

⁷⁰F. G. Peake, op. cit., p. 375.

⁷¹George Lenczowski, op. cit., p. 301.

⁷²Elizabeth Monroe, op. cit., p. 54.

In addition to the prestige which Britain hoped to gain with her relations with the Arabs was the desire to advertise her greatness as a power along the world's greatest highways, the Mediterranean and the Suez.⁷³

From the Fall of Faisal's Government
to the Formation of Emirate

With the withdrawal of the British military forces from Transjordan, there existed only the ineffective government of the eight independent shiekdoms which were formed on the tribal basis.⁷⁴ The paramount shieks were not powerful enough to maintain law and order but were willing to destroy it.⁷⁵ Each of these small states established barriers around their areas and maintained hoardes of officials to maintain their individual custom and tarrif rights.⁷⁶ This is exemplified by the government of the kaza of Tafilah which had a kaimakam, with no authority, a qadi with no cases, a mufti and no congregation, a postmaster with no post office, a telegraph master with no telegraph, a minister of finance and treasury and no money. The minister of public health

⁷³Ibid., p. 66.

⁷⁴Jarvis, op. cit., p. 78.

⁷⁵John Bagot Glubb, The Story of the Arab Legion, Hodder Stoughton, London 1948, p. 59.

⁷⁶Jarvis, op. cit., p. 78.

had as his only guide Pears Annual and when requesting medicines submitted a long list of varying potencies for aphrodisiacs.⁷⁷ The Amman area had been taken over by the neighboring tribe of Beni Sakhr (shiek Mithgal and Said Khair Omedeh, the mayor of Amman),⁷⁸ and Salt by Mazhar Bey Raslan.⁷⁹ Conditions in Jordan at this time indicated the complete lack of any government. Peake Pasha at the end of this period reports that the few gendarmie that remained from the Faisal government were of the wrong type, lazy, loafed in the coffee shops and had received no pay for months. Villagers fired on Peake's inspection troop saying later they believed he was a hostile force sent by a rival government a mile or two away. One shiek fired and mamed for life a police officer only because he had been a police officer under Faisal and still wore his uniform. While another shiek stole a rifle from a policeman and proceeded to test its accuracy by firing at all who passed his tent. In Amman, Peake witnessed a man cut down with a sabre in cold blood, no effort was made to stop the criminal after the act.⁸⁰

⁷⁷Ibid., p. 66.

⁷⁸Ibid., p. 68.

⁷⁹Abdullah, op. cit., p. 143.

⁸⁰F. G. Peake, op. cit., p. 381.

The lack of government did not aid in the limited restoration that was necessary after the war. The telegraph lines had been destroyed and the poles cut and used for firewood, the main road to Palestine was out of repair and the trip from the Jordan had to be made on horseback, and lastly the Hedjaz railroad was still out of action.⁸¹

The task that faced the British on the acceptance of the mandate was not to take over or restore a government but to begin again and recreate a government for the area.⁸² There is little doubt that if some action had not been taken at this time that both Syria and Transjordan would have reverted completely to tribal rule and poverty (Glubb).

With the British acceptance of the mandate Sir Herbert Samuel in August of 1920 traveled to el Salt where he met with the shieks of the East Bank. At his meeting he declared that the British government favored the establishment of local self-governments which would be assisted by the British.⁸³ This program was implemented by the formation of small independent states of Karak,

⁸¹Ibid., p. 380.

⁸²John Glubb, op. cit., p. 59.

⁸³B. A. Toukan, A Short History of Transjordan, Luzac, London, 1945, p. 44.

Amman, Salt, and Ajloun. Local councils were constituted from the leaders in the towns and the shieks of the tribes who generally enforced the authority of the government.⁸⁴ The independent government had no inter-communications between one another and administrative barriers developed.⁸⁵ This system was a complete failure, however; during this time the British High Commissioner became aware of the conditions in Transjordan. The first problem that was to be faced was the complete lack of law and order. In this respect Colonel Peake was sent by Sir Herbert Samuel to head the work of organizing public security. In addition it was decided that the revenues of the area should be kept completely independent of those of Palestine.⁸⁶ The British were aware of the anti-Zionist stand of the shieks and populace of Jordan. When Major F. R. Summerset was appointed to the Ajlun area he was met by a deputation of shieks at the Jordan river who insisted that he should sign a statement that he would not attempt to introduce the Zionist policy of Palestine to Transjordan.⁸⁷

The British were not slow to realize that the

⁸⁴Norman Bentwich, England in Palestine, Kegan, Paul, Trench, Truber and Co. Ltd., London 1932, p. 52.

⁸⁵Abdullah, Memoirs of King Abdullah of Trans-jordan, Jonathan Cape, London 1951, p. 200.

⁸⁶Norman Bentwich, op. cit., p. 52.

⁸⁷F. G. Peake, op. cit., p. 79.

independent government that they had formed was not satisfactory, the existing government did not function properly. The arrival of Emir Abdullah offered the opportunity for the fulfillment of the promises of the McMahon correspondence, the formation of a government that would be more efficient (under the leadership of one recognized respected emir) and the chance to undo the harm that had been brought about by the independent Arab states and the equally ineffective independent British states.

The Arrival of Abdullah

The first train that completed the trip from Damascus to Amman was financed by a group of Syrian merchants that encouraged the plan of repairing the road as the train progressed in order that their goods could be taken to Jordan. As Colonel Peake watched this first arrival in Amman, an Arab officer with a revolver in hand ordered the driver of the train to proceed south. He learned afterwards that it was to be used to bring Emir Abdullah from Medina as he had been selected to lead the Arabs in revolt against the French.⁸⁸ Abdullah in Medina was determined to attack the French who had destroyed the Damascus government and restore the Hashemite rule in Syria.⁸⁹ On the return trip from Medina the crews

⁸⁸Peake, (Art Transjordan) op. cit., p. 382.

⁸⁹Séton Williams, Britain and the Arab States, op. cit., p. 170.

that were with Abdullah repaired the track as they proceeded. They burned the telegraph poles for fuel.⁹⁰

Abdullah first went to Ma'an where the kaimakam still paid homage to the Mecca government.⁹¹ At Ma'an a telegram was received from Raslan Bey, governor of Salt

The National government has heard of your intention to stay in Transjordan. If your visit is a private one, the country will welcome you; if it is for political purposes, the government will do all to stop your coming.

Abdullah replied to this message

I am visiting Transjordan to occupy it as directed by the Royal Arab government of Syria. I am now acting for His Majesty King Faisal and it is your duty to receive your orders from Ma'an.⁹²

Abdullah then proceeded by train to Amman where one of the first people that he met was Mr. Kirkbride, the British representative in Amman.⁹³ In Amman Abdullah was welcomed by the local councils that had been established by the British and took over effective administration on March 21, 1921.⁹⁴

⁹⁰St. John Philby, Arabian Days, Robert Hale Ltd., London 1948, p. 232. Jarvis, op. cit., p. 80. Peake, op. cit., p. 382. There is some difference as Philby states that the RR was opened by Ali who repaired it coming from Medina, however, Peake's witnessing account is believed to be more correct.

⁹¹George Kirk, A Short History of the Middle East, Methuen, London 1952, p. 160.

⁹²Abdullah, op. cit., p. 193.

⁹³Ibid., p. 200.

⁹⁴Peake, op. cit., p. 384. Kirk, A Short History, op. cit., p. 160. Abdullah, op. cit., p. 200.

The arrival of Abdullah could not have been more timely planned. At the time he arrived the British secretary for colonial affairs, Mr. Churchill, was attending the Cairo conference. Upon the arrival of Abdullah in Amman a wire was received by Colonel Peake, the Transjordan representative at the conference, that "Emir Abdullah entered Amman today." This wire led to the agreement at Cairo that a conference would be held in Jerusalem, between Mr. Churchill and Emir Abdullah.⁹⁵ The invitation was forwarded to the King of Hedjaz⁹⁶ (Hussain), and also an invitation was forwarded from the High commissioner of Palestine, Mr. Samuel, directly to Emir Abdullah.⁹⁷ The meeting took place in Jerusalem March 26, 1921 in which the following points were put forward:

1. The British should use their good offices with the French to secure the eventual restoration of an Arab administration in Syria under Emir Abdullah's leadership. Abdullah would remain in Transjordan to check the anti-French movement and thus prepare for an eventual reconciliation with the French.

2. The formation of a single state of Palestine and Transjordan was rejected by the British as it could not be reconciled with the British government's promise to the Jews.

⁹⁵Jarvis, op. cit., p. 80.

⁹⁶Abdullah, op. cit., p. 200.

⁹⁷Abdullah, op. cit., p. 200. B. A. Toukan, op. cit.,

3. Mr. Churchill could not agree with the union of Transjordan and Iraq although the possibility of placing King Faisal on the throne of Iraq was discussed.

4. The agreement was to be provisional as Emir Abdullah stated he could not conclude an agreement without the consent of his father, King Hussain of Hedjaz. The provisional section of the agreement was to be for six months. However, it remained in force until the independence of Transjordan was formally declared in 1923 including the sections regarding the British subsidy to enable the Emir to raise an Arab force to be recruited locally for the maintenance of law and order in the area.⁹⁸

During the meeting Emir Abdullah expressed his opinion to Mr. Churchill regarding the British stand in Palestine and maintained that the Arabs would not allow the rights of the Palestinian Arabs to be subjugated for the sake of the Jews. The position and recognition of Ibn Saud was also discussed in which Mr. Churchill said that he could give no answer as to the position of the British government as that would have to come from the cabinet.⁹⁹

Abdullah accepted the provisional agreement offered by Churchill and his staff of Mr. Deeds (the

⁹⁸Abdullah, op. cit., p. 204.

⁹⁹Ibid., p. 200.

chief secretary), Colonel Lawrence and Lord Edward Hays.

In Amman Abdullah abolished the local governments and established a centralized control from Amman. He linked together the separate administrative districts and attempted to do away with the existing administrative barriers and the various local governments that existed in the different parts of the country.¹⁰⁰ In effect Emir Abdullah was reinstating a continuation of the Turkish form of administration in the form of a native Arab government with a mandatory structure over the whole. The mandate was represented by an agent of the High Commissioner, a British Resident stationed in Amman. The British resident supervised the Arab administration and advised it through a body of British advisors and executives who were attached to various governmental departments.¹⁰¹

From the first, things began to go wrong for the new government in Amman. The French discharging of the Syrian officials of the Faisal government caused a great number of these discharged officials to go to Transjordan with the hope of finding posts in the Amman government. Unfortunately, although these men were intellectually suited for the jobs, they had but one desire which was to

¹⁰⁰B. A. Toukan, op. cit., p. 45. Abdullah, op. cit., p. 200. Peake, op. cit., p. 384.

¹⁰¹Bentwich, England in Palestine, Broadway House, London 1932, p. 301. George Lenczowski, op. cit., p. 301-302.

raise a force and money for the retaking of Syria. They wished only to use the resources of Transjordan to embarrass the French.¹⁰²

¹⁰²Jarvis, op. cit., p. 108. Peake, op. cit., p. 384.

CHAPTER IV

TRANSJORDAN 1921-1928

Formation of the Emirate

The acceptance by both the British and Abdullah of the provisional agreement for the government of Transjordan laid the cornerstone for the foundation of the Hashemite Kingdom. Although this was merely a provisional agreement, it lasted until 1923. The Palestine Order in Council of 1922 separated Transjordan from Palestine making Transjordan a separate state. The British government in 1923 announced that they were prepared to recognize the independence of Transjordan under Emir Abdullah providing that: the government formed, would be constitutional and, the government so formed would place the British government in such a position that her international obligation would be fulfilled under the mandate.¹⁰³

Abdullah lost no time in proclaiming his independence which was done in 1923¹⁰⁴ however, it was five years, 1928 before the organic law or constitution was to be passed. During the intervening five years, the British

¹⁰³E. A. Speiser, op. cit., 76. B. A. Toukan, op. cit., p. 47. C. R. W. Seton, op. cit., p. 703.

¹⁰⁴E. A. Speiser, op. cit., p. 76.

did little to limit the absolute power of the Emir other than the British ultimatum that followed the disturbance of August 1924 which withdrew the financial administration from his control. Abdullah was forced to accept this withdrawal of control as the three most important ministries were held by British officials.¹⁰⁵ Other than this the British government was content to allow the government to continue until the final constitution was passed in 1928.

During this period Abdullah was in effect the state, not only by his desire but because of the tribal customs and habits of the people; It is necessary to discuss briefly the Emir in order to aid in the understanding of the events that follow.

Abdullah as the second son of King Hussain was brought up in Constantinople. This early training not only gave him close contact with government but also contact with the Turkish system of administration.¹⁰⁶ At the same time, as the son of an Arab King he was reared according to the tribal customs that political issues are settled by the leaders and not by politics. Abdullah personified his country not only to his people but to

¹⁰⁵Carl Brockleman, op. cit., p. 491.

¹⁰⁶T. E. Lawrence, op. cit., p. 50.

its sister states. In this respect it can be seen that the personal dislikes of the Hashemite family towards the house of Saud not only influences the relationship between Ibn Saud and Abdullah but also the relations between the two countries.¹⁰⁷ The politics of Arab leaders are controlled by self-interests that opposed any force of unity in the area.¹⁰⁸ Lawrence made two observations of Abdullah. Lawrence describes Abdullah initially as being

too balanced, too cool, too humorous to be a prophet, especially the armed prophet who, if history be true, succeeded in revolutions.

Lawrence continued and said

that perhaps his value would come at a later date in the time of peace, he is too complex for a single purpose.¹⁰⁹

The second impression of Lawrence was less favorable. Abdullah is described as being constantly ailing which Lawrence felt was laziness and self-indulgence. He seemed to be more interested in riding, shooting, chess and reading, than he was in the situation in the Hedjaz or the war. His brain often betrayed twisted ideas making a strong cord of design but not separated into straight desires.¹¹⁰ Lawrence's first impression was

¹⁰⁷E. A. Speiser, The United States and the Near East, Harvard University Press, Cambridge Mass, 1947. E. Monroe, op. cit., p. 234.

¹⁰⁸E. Monroe, op. cit., p. 234.

¹⁰⁹T. E. Lawrence, op. cit., p. 78.

¹¹⁰T. E. Lawrence, op. cit., p. 219-223.

to prove more correct for Abdullah became a hard working and serious ruler rising at five or five thirty to meet the demands of state.¹¹¹

Abdullah was noted for his knowledge of Arabic both as a poet and speaker of the purest classical, this was seconded by his ability at and ardent study of chess. His good humor is not disputed, he enjoyed many types of jest which was not dampened by his abstinence from drink and tobacco or his devotion to Islam.¹¹² On Fridays he could be seen by anyone going to or coming from the mosque.¹¹³ This practice was to later cause his death.

During the years between 1921 and 1928 Abdullah was in fact the absolute ruler of Transjordan.¹¹⁴ His rule was tempered only by the British advisers that exercised control over the finances and aided in the establishment of his government. In fact Transjordan was not in need of a democratic form of government during this time but a centralized government that could face the problems inherent with its foundation. The Emir was aided in his absolute position by an advisory council that changed names many times during this period. It

¹¹¹The Middle East's new King, Great Britain and the East, July 1946, Vol. LXII No. 1762, p. 46.

¹¹²T. E. Lawrence, op. cit., Ibid., p. 219-223.

¹¹³The Middle East's New King, Great Britain and the East, July 1946, Vol. LXII No. 1762, p. 46.

¹¹⁴Elizabeth Monroe, op. cit., p. 234.

began as the council of advisors presided over by the administrative secretary,¹¹⁵ in August of 1921 it changed to the consultative council with a president at its head,¹¹⁶ in June 11, 1923 it became the council of deputies headed by the president of the council of deputies,¹¹⁷ September 5, 1923 the council of controllers¹¹⁸ (majlis al nuzzar) and on June 1926 the name became the executive council.¹¹⁹ The name of the council meant as little as its importance for the body was appointed by the Emir so that any one representative that would not do his bidding would be replaced in the government. The councilmen were like Abdullah's chess men to be moved and played with but not taken too seriously.

The most serious threat to the position of Emir Abdullah was the visit of his father, King Hussain of Hedjaz to Jordan in 1924 when it is believed he had the intention of placing his son Ali on the throne of Trans-jordan.¹²⁰ King Hussain had in the past attempted to make his son Abdullah a mere viceroy to the kingdom of Hedjaz¹²¹

¹¹⁵Abdullah, op. cit., p. 205.

¹¹⁶Ibid., p. 206.

¹¹⁷Ibid., p. 212.

¹¹⁸Ibid.

¹¹⁹Ibid., p. 217.

¹²⁰Jarvis, op. cit., p. 104.

¹²¹H. Philby, B. St. John, op. cit., p. 232 to 235.

came to his son and supposed viceroy, to raise money and support for his plan of declaring himself Caliph of Islam. During this visit Abdullah not only pledged his support to his father but donated finances for this project.

Early Government of Transjordan

Although the agreements of the San Remo conference gave the British the power to establish a de facto independent state in Transjordan. These agreements were not effective until the signing of the treaty with Turkey in 1924, and were not confirmed by the League of Nations until July 24, 1924.¹²³ Despite the fact that the mandate had not been accepted by the League, Britain established a mandate government for Transjordan under the High Commissioner in Palestine.¹²⁴ The High Commissioner was represented in Amman by a permanent resident that supervised the Arab administration and advised it through a body of British advisers and executives that were attached to the various governmental departments.¹²⁵

¹²³Seton-Williams, op. cit., p. 169.

¹²⁴Abdullah, op. cit., The High Commissioners to Palestine were Sir Herbert Samuel, 1920 to 1925; Lord Plumer, 1925 to 1928; Sir John Chancellor, 1928 to 1931; Sir Arthur Wauchope, 1931 to 1938; Sir Harold McMichael, 1938 to 1944; Lord Gort, 1944 to 1945.

¹²⁵George Lenczowski, op. cit., p. 301 to 302.

Under this structure, the mandate government was the government of Emir Abdullah. The government of Abdullah facilitated in form finally returning to an extension of the Turkish system of administration. The area of Transjordan was divided into four districts of Ajlun, Belqa, Kerak, and Ma'an each divided into fifteen sub-districts. The administrative officer in charge of a district was the mutesserif while the kaimakam or the mudirs were in charge of the sub-districts.¹²⁶

Within the districts there were district administrative councils (majlis idara) composed of the mutesserif, the accountant, the qadi sharia and an elected Moslem and an elected Christian. The decisions of the district administrative councils were forwarded to the committee of the central government, consisting of the chief minister or his representative, the treasurer and the director of health. This committee heard all the appeals from the district administrative councils. Questions of financial matters were referred to a second committee consisting of the chief accountant, the director of lands, and the advocate general.¹²⁷

During this same period the municipal councils

¹²⁶ Report by His Britannic Majesty's Government to the Council of the League of Nations on the Administration of Palestine and Transjordan for the year 1927, p. 75.

¹²⁷ Report by His Britannic Majesty's Government to the Council of the League of Nations on the Administration of Palestine and Transjordan for the year 1927, p. 75.

were reformed; and existed in Amman, Salt, Irbid, Kerak, Ma'an, Madeba, Zerka, Hosn, Ajlun, Jerash, Tafileh, and Akaba. Excepting Amman, where the president was appointed by the governor (mutesserif) the president was nominated from the members of the council exclusively. The chief duty of the municipal council was the preparation of the municipal estimates. These estimates were prepared in consultation with the municipal advisory committee made up of government officials but also had to be approved by the chief minister of the government who had to accord approval on any changes.¹²⁸

Central Government of Transjordan

(Early Period)

During the early period the central government of Transjordan changed hands many times in rapid succession. April 1921 saw the formation of the first government in Transjordan with Rashid Bey Tali¹²⁹ the Administrative Secretary presiding over the council of Advisors, however, his government was short lived and in August of 1921 Mazhar Bey Raslan¹³⁰ took his place until March of 1922 when Ali Ridha Pasha Rikabi,¹³¹ was a Damascene with a

¹²⁸Report by His Britannic Majesty's Government to the Council of the League of Nations on the Administration of Palestine and Transjordan for the year 1927, p. 75.

¹²⁹Abdullah, op. cit., p. 205.

¹³⁰Ibid.

¹³¹H. St. John B. Philby, op. cit., p. 117.

distinguished record in Faisal's ill fated government. He was the ablest of all the men serving under Abdullah, ambitious and of dictatorial temperament, he frequently disagreed with the British resident over financial matters but at the same time held his respect for his ability to get things done.¹³² It was during his tour that the tribes began to murmur against the government especially the Adwan. The final break came between the regent and Rikabi over the extension of credit to the Jordan government Abdullah's support of Philby, the regent caused the resignation of Rikabi and his replacement by Mazhar Pasha Raslan who formed his second government that lasted until after the Adwan rebellion on September 5, 1923 and the new government of Hassan Khalid Pasha¹³³ took the reigns of government with a platform that amongst other things was to right the wrongs that had caused the rebellion.

1. Reforming the assessment and collection of taxes so as to safeguard the interest both of the public and the treasury;
2. To give preference to Transjordanian candidates for all appointments;
3. To rid the government of the members of the Istaqal party; and

¹³²Ibid., p. 231.

¹³³Abdullah, op. cit., p. 205.

4. To reduce expenditures by scaling down salaries and the staffing of the government.¹³⁴ It is during this period that the Syrian refugees of the Damascus government were causing trouble in the Amman government and on May 3, 1924 Ali Ridha Pasha Rikabi returned to the government with the hopes of ridding the government of the Damascus influence.¹³⁵ He remained in power for two years and it was not until June of 1926 that Hassain Khalid Pasha¹³⁶ returned to head the government, with a platform of preparing the country for the formation of a legislative council and the representative body required by the agreement of 1923. He asked the public not to meddle in the political theory but to support the government in its plans for development of social services and the maintenance of peaceful relations with the neighboring states. This government remained in power for five years and saw the realization of the organic law and beginning of an elective system in Jordan.

During this period it is not correct to say that the government was representative. The concern of the government was the return of law and order, the settling

¹³⁴Abdullah, op. cit., p. 212 to 215.

¹³⁵Jarvis, op. cit., p. 108.

¹³⁶Abdullah, op. cit., p. 218 to 220.

of the various outside disputes, and as important, the building of a civil service for Jordan. This last point was one that caused much difficulty in Jordan and it was not until the end of the twenties that the problem was solved.

Government Servants

Despite the fact that the early government of Transjordan was organized along the lines of the Turkish provincial system and was of a simply nature in comparison with the administration of Palestine;¹³⁷ it was difficult, nearly impossible, to find trained Transjordanians to fill the posts of government. In 1921 many of the civil and military servants of the Faisal government came to Jordan when the Damascus government had collapsed.¹³⁸ Thus the new government was hindered by the affairs of Syria for the dismissed Syrian public servants were intent only on raising a force in Jordan to march against the French.¹³⁹ This group of Syrians were known as the ^{Istaqual}Istaqual party and through their zealous collection of taxes for their own purposes at least one revolution (Adwan's 1923) was caused.¹⁴⁰ The Istaqual party was not concerned with the advancement of Jordan. One of the early chief

¹³⁷Norman Bentwich, op. cit., p. 301.

¹³⁸George Lenczowski, op. cit., p. 301 to 302.

¹³⁹Jarvis, op. cit., p. 79.

¹⁴⁰Jarvis, op. cit., p. 107.

ministers, a Druz, spent nearly all his time receiving the mal-contents from Syria.¹⁴¹

The first to attack the problem of the members of the Istaqual party was Colonel Peake who was able in one stroke to end the power of the Istaqual in the Arab Legion. However, he was not able to completely destroy the party's hold in the government. The party regained control in 1924 after the departure of King Hussain. Peake suggested that Rikabi Pasha be returned to the government in 1924 but even he, was unable to rid the government of the undesirable elements. Despite the position of Abdullah, the Istaqual party was able to maintain a great deal of control.¹⁴² Selected officers from the Palestine service both British and Palestinians were appointed to the Transjordanian service for this reason and given position in the executive offices of the government.¹⁴³ This system proved beneficial from its beginning in 1925. In 1926 members of the government were replaced by Transjordanians.¹⁴⁴ Article III of the agreement of 1928 stated no official other than those with

¹⁴¹P. G. Peake, op. cit., p. 384.

¹⁴²Jarvis, op. cit., p. 108.

¹⁴³ Report by His Britannic Majesty's Government to the Council of the League of Nations on the Administration of Palestine and Transjordan for the year of 1926, His Majesty's Stationery Office, London 1927, p.76

¹⁴⁴Abdullah, op. cit., p. 218.

Transjordanian nationality would be appointed to the Transjordan government without the concurrence of His Britannic Majesty.¹⁴⁵ From this, it may follow that only British official would be acceptable to HMG and certainly not members of the Istaqual party. Through these measures the infiltration of the Syrian hot heads was checked and Transjordan was able to settle down to training of Jordan officials so that by 1929 there remained only a handful of non-nationals in the more specialized positions, such as director of health, and public works, chief accountant, postmaster of Amman, the sanitary sub-inspector of Amman, stores officer.¹⁴⁶

British Residents

The British residents that were appointed to Transjordan were representatives of the High Commissioner¹⁴⁷ of Palestine. After the declaration of 1922 of His

¹⁴⁵Report by His Britannic Majesty's Government to the Council of the League of Nations on the Administration of Palestine and Transjordan for the year of 1929, p. 142.

¹⁴⁶Ibid.

¹⁴⁷Abdullah, op. cit., p. 225. The list of the British Residents were:

Mr. Abramson	1921
Colonel Lawrence	1921
Mr. Philby	1921 to 1924
Mr. Kirkbride	1938 to 1946
Sir Henry Cox	1924 to 1938

Majesty's government that Transjordan would be considered separately from Palestine, the duties of the resident took on a new prospective. The resident although under the High Commissioner was in effect the head of the mandate government of a separate state. The importance of the resident lies also in the attitude that was adopted by the first two important residents, Lawrence, and Philby.

Sir Herbert Samuel had had a great deal of trouble during the early days of the emirate and requested Colonel Lawrence to straighten things out.¹⁴⁸ Colonel Lawrence arrived in the autumn of 1921 and pursued a policy of emphasising the independence and autonomy of the Emir in relation to the British government.¹⁴⁹ Although during the time of Lawrence the administration began to shape up in some respects¹⁵⁰ the importance lay in this attitude of the independence of Transjordan, which was carried on by Mr. H. St. John B. Philby.

¹⁴⁸H. St. John B. Philby, op. cit., p. 208.

¹⁴⁹Norman Bentwich, p. 132.

¹⁵⁰H. St. John B. Philby, op. cit. Although during this time Lawrence accomplished some things, his strong point was not administrative paper work, when he turned over the records to Philby he did so by burning all the files that he had, which included several passports that were in for renewal. The records that he turned over consisted of the secret copy of the MacMahon Husain correspondence and a sheet of note paper showing how he had spent about 100,000 pounds Sterling included on the list was "10,000 lost, I forgot how or where." Later during the residence of Philby a box burried in the sands near Akaba was found. That contained 10,000 pounds Sterling. Philby believes that it consisted of the amount that Lawrence had lost as he had probably burried it in the sands and forgotten when or where.

Mr. Philby in an interview with Mr. Churchill was assured that the mandate would be administered quite separately and that the Zionist clause would not apply to the area (later incorporated in the declaration of 1922) that as long as the area of Transjordan refrained from being a nuisance it would be permitted by His Majesty's government to develop under its own self-government with only general control by the High Commissioner of Palestine, Mr. Samuel.¹⁵¹ With the assurance of Mr. Churchill, Philby added to the program of Colonel Lawrence in giving local autonomy to the government of Transjordan. One of his first acts was to recall all the British officials from the outlying districts and turn the local government over to the inhabitants.¹⁵² He insisted that all the British staff to remain in Amman in order to avoid any appearance of interference in the government and only made suggestions through the Emir or the ministers of the council.¹⁵³ Under Philby, Transjordan was given a free reign to develop itself.

¹⁵¹H. St. John B. Philby, op. cit., p. 208.

¹⁵²Ibid., p. 211.

¹⁵³Ibid.

He, Philby, continually fought against the encroachments¹⁵⁴ of the Palestine government and finally resigned as he felt that Samuel was attempting to extend the Palestine rule into Transjordan. The attitude of Philby was that independence could be developed in Transjordan had not such lines been inconsistent with the aims of Samuel and the Palestine government.¹⁵⁵

Philby and Lawrence set the stage that was to continue towards the self-government of Transjordan. These two men, if anything turned more of the government over to the inhabitants that the British government believed advisable. However, it was through their actions that the necessity of self-government was impressed on the officials and the people of Transjordan.

Extension of Law and Order

The most pressing problem that faced the newly formed emirate in Jordan was the conditions of law and order. As has been mentioned even under the Turks, there was no real security in the country and with the end of the Turkish rule any form of government or ruling

¹⁵⁴Ibid., p. 230 and 235. When the Palestine Police occupied a post on the Transjordan side of the Jordan, Philby immediately demanded their withdrawal. The second incident the occupation of a post of Hamma in the Yarmuk he sent Peake with the Arab Legion to haul down the Union Jack as Philby thought that the only flag that was to be flown in Transjordan was over his house or on the bonnet of his car.

¹⁵⁵H. St. John B. Philby, op. cit., p. 235.

institutions declined so that the tribes were in the processes of taking over the cultivated lands and the area was reverting to tribal rule. The tribes presented the most difficult problem for the establishment of law and order. Firstly, they were not accustomed to the submission to higher authority; and secondly, the natural life of the desert of the time did not allow a stabilized authority to dictate the movements, the laws, the wars, or the customs of the tribes.¹⁵⁶ To add to the difficulty of the general conditions, there were only 280 kilometers of roads in the entire country making it difficult for law enforcing agencies that existed in 1920 to travel about the country between the warring tribes.¹⁵⁷

The first movement for the establishment of some type of law and order was begun by Colonel Peake and the early formation of the Arab Legion. The initial formation was met with suspicion but when the tribes found that the force was to be formed, if not from volunteers from Transjordan, from people of Palestine¹⁵⁸ a high type bedouin or enlistee began to appear in the force and take pride in their jobs.

¹⁵⁶John Glubb, op. cit., p. 59.

¹⁵⁷Emily Bisharat, Transjordan the Land of Antiquities, The Arab World, Vol. II, 1946, p. 115.
Konikoff, op. cit., p. 76.

¹⁵⁸John Glubb, op. cit., p. 61.

The activity of early days of the Arab Legion was caused by the conditions of the government at the time. As early as January 1922 it became engaged in the settling of the revolts of the towns of Tafileh and Kerak.¹⁵⁹ This was followed by the revolt of the Adwan tribes in September of 1923 in which the armoured cars of the Royal air force and the Arab Legion took part in a short but decisive battle while being observed from the air by the Royal Air Force.¹⁶⁰

Not always did the government cooperate with the law enforcement elements. The Adwan uprising was due to the excessive tax burden that was applied to the Adwans to relieve the powerful Beni Sakhrs from their just taxes. Following the suppression of the revolt, the government allowed the Beni Sakhrs to raid the Adwans. This condition had to be corrected by Colonel Peake.¹⁶¹

At this time Transjordan had no defined boundaries so that the areas of the desert presented not only the problem of inter-tribal warring, but also the wars of the tribes from neighboring countries as Syria and Saudi Arabia. The Wahabbies of Ibn Saud were perhaps the

¹⁵⁹Toukan, op. bit., p. 46. John Glubb, op. cit., p. 60, who says the first use was in the Ajlun area.

¹⁶⁰Toukan, op. cit., p. 46, Philby, op. cit., p. 226 to 227.

¹⁶¹Jarvis, op. cit., p. 107.

most threatening force. Their attack in 1922¹⁶² was driven back by the Beni Sakhr tribe but the threat of a more serious invasion that would have led to the conquest of Transjordan by the Wahabbies of Saudi Arabia had it not been for the help of the Royal Air Force was the invasion of August 23, 1924. The Wahabbies advanced to Ziza a few miles from Amman. The Arab Legion and the tribes finished the route that was begun by the Royal Air Force.¹⁶³

The Syrian situation was no less critical with the Druzes and the tribes of the northern lava belt. The French control had forced many of the Druz leaders to flee to the oasis of Azrak where they were given asylum, however, the French and the tribes of the northern area clashed due to a misunderstanding over the boundary which later was rectified by agreements and demarkation of the boundary.¹⁶⁴

Much of the early establishment of law and order in the desert had to be done by the adoption of the laws of the desert to the situation in hand. This was ably done by the assignment of John Bagot Glubb, presently

¹⁶²Toukan, op. cit., p. 46.

¹⁶³Toukan, op. cit., p. 46. John B. Glubb, op. cit., p. 62. H. St. John B. Philby, op. cit., p. 241 and 242.

¹⁶⁴Report by His Britannic Majesty's Government to the Council of the League of Nations on the Administration of Palestine and Transjordan for the Year 1927, p. 74, Ibid., 1926, p. 66.

Lt. General Commander of the Arab Legion, who was able through his understanding of the bedouin and the tribal type existence to utilize means such as holding sheep and camel in ransome and payment of blood money in such a way that he not only ended in time most of the raiding in the area, but gained the respect of the desert bedou.¹⁶⁵

The villagers and the semi-nomadic groups of Transjordan in addition to their minor revolts had a hatred toward law enforcing officers resulting from the Ottoman rule. This obstacle was overcome by the selection of well qualified and trained police officers, which with time resulted in the gendarmie being regarded with respect and confidence.¹⁶⁶

By the end of the 1928 period, although all of the problems of the establishment of a law abiding country had not been solved, Transjordan, at least, was well on the way towards having an effective law enforcing agency in the hands of the Arab Legion. This action was mainly due to the British advisors and not the local government. The armed forces remained in the hands of the British and during the early years 1922 to 1924 when the Arab Legion was too new and too small to cope

¹⁶⁵ John B. Glubb, op. cit., p. 83.

¹⁶⁶ John B. Glubb, op. cit., p. 193 and 194.

with the forces that were sent against it; the added support of the armored car and the aircraft from the Royal Air Force base that the British had established was sufficient to turn the tide so that law and order continued to advance in the area.

The settlement of the boundaries was necessary for the continuation of the advancement of law and order.

Establishment of the Boundaries
of Transjordan

The division of the Ottoman empire although done at conferences on maps, had never been agreed to on the ground by the parties concerned. During this time the need for boundaries became more and more apparent. In respect of law and order a wanted man could simply join one of the wandering tribes¹⁶⁷ that travelled from one area to another leaving not only the hunted but the hunter wondering which country he was in. New methods of travel, the motor car and the airplane had made travel to Iraq directly possible¹⁶⁸ so that what had previously been waste land suddenly had a reason to be delineated. The differences between the French on the north and

¹⁶⁷Transjordan Has Been Transformed, Great Britain and the East, November 1946, Vol. LXII, No. 1766.

¹⁶⁸Ibid.

the expanding force of Ibn Saud on the south and east brought to a head the necessity of the agreement on the boundaries.

The first boundary of Transjordan was defined by the Order in Council of 1922, excluding Transjordan from the article of the mandate relative to the establishment of a national home for the Jews in Palestine.¹⁶⁹ This was defined by the order of the High Commissioner for Palestine September first as a line drawn from a point two miles west of the town of Akaba on the Gulf of that name up to the center of Wadi Arabi, Dead Sea and the river Jordan to its junction with the river Yarmuk, thence up the center of that river to the Syrian frontier. The area was exempt from the clauses regarding special regime in the holy places and the development of a Jewish national home.¹⁷⁰ This memorandum was a shock to Jewish ambitions.¹⁷¹

The western boundary of Transjordan was easily established as it required only the action of the British

¹⁶⁹Toukan, op. cit., p. 46. O. R. W. Seton, Legislation of Transjordan 1918 to 1930, William Clowes and Sons, London 1934, p. 702.

¹⁷⁰Williams Seton, op. cit., p. 170 and 171.

¹⁷¹James Parkes, A History of Palestine from 135 AD to Modern Times, London, Victory Gollancz, 1949, p.

This decision of the British ultimately led to the formation of the Revisionist Party which demanded the inclusion of Transjordan in the mandate under the clause of the National home. It also had the added disadvantage of giving the Arabs of Palestine the feeling that they were to be swamped by the superior power, wealth and numbers of the Jews.

with the eventual approval of the mandate commission of the League of Nations. However, the northern boundary was the dividing line between two mandate territories as such was an arbitrary line drawn with no good reasons either ethnical or economically. The boundary was defined by the Anglo-French agreements of 1920.¹⁷² This boundary between Syria and Transjordan having in many cases no land marks except for the Yarmuk river valley in the north-western section caused many disagreements over where the actual boundary existed, this was especially true in the case of the tribes that migrated across the eastern areas in the lava belt. The French were not prone to co-operate with the Arab Legion and as neither the French nor the Transjordanian had complete control over the tribes in the area, the boundary remained a constant problem.¹⁷³

The area that bordered on the lands of Ibn Saud was the most difficult boundary to define. The establishment of the rule of King Hussain over the areas of Ma'an and Akaba, including a small strip of Palestine that separated Transjordan from Siani, was accepted by Great Britain. However, when the Hedjaz government fell

¹⁷²A. H. Hourani, op. cit., p. 56.

¹⁷³John B. Glubb, op. cit., p. 108.

and the Hashemite rule was ended in the Hedjaz, Britain took a new interest in the southern area.¹⁷⁴ In addition to the Aqaba area the forces of Ibn Saud had occupied the corridor between Transjordan and Iraq. Both of these areas were important for the British line from Suez to Basra; however, of the two, the corridor linking Jordan and Iraq was the most critical.¹⁷⁵ This strip was important as a future pipe line route and secondly as a block against Ibn Saud's possible expansion towards the north. The problem of the corridor was settled by the Hadda Agreement signed by Abdul Aziz Saud and Gilbert Clayton. This agreement was reported to have been reached by threats of joint British-French action against the Sauds. The agreement¹⁷⁶ settled the boundary of the north-east and east in a very artificial map style adhering to no natural lines in the following words.

Article 1. The frontier between Nejd and Trans-jordan starts in the north-east from the point of intersection of meridian 39° E and parallel 32° N which marks the termination of the frontier between Nejd and Iraq and proceeds in a straight line to the point of intersection of meridian 37° E and parallel 31° 30' N and thence along meridian 37° to the point

¹⁷⁴Jarvis, op. cit., p. 119.

¹⁷⁵H. C. Armstrong, The Lord of Arabia, Khayats, Beirut, 1954, p. 190.

¹⁷⁶Ibid.

of its intersection with parallel $31^{\circ} 25'$ N from this point it proceeds in a straight line to the point of intersection of meridian 38° E and parallel 30° N leaving all projection edges of the Wadi Sirhan in Nejd territory and thence proceeds along meridian 38° E to the point of its intersection with parallel $29^{\circ} 35'$ N.

The Hadda agreement was to remain in force as long as Britain was entrusted with the mandate for Transjordan.¹⁷⁷

Although the Hadda agreement settled the eastern boundary, the acquisitions of the areas of Ma'an and the town of Aqaba was the result of a fait accompli in June 1925.¹⁷⁸ Abdullah had the flag of Transjordan raised and issued a proclamation incorporating the area into the Emirate of Transjordan. The acceptance by Ibn Saud of the inclusion of those parts of the Hedjaz into Transjordan was not settled until 1927. A change of notes between the King of Hedjaz and of Nejd and its dependencies and Gilbert Clayton, Commissioner and Plenipotentiary of His Britannic Majesty's defined the boundary as:

The frontier between the Hedjaz and Transjordan starts from the intersection of Meridian 38° E and parallel $29^{\circ} 35'$ N which marks the termination of the frontier between Nejd and Transjordan, (Hadda agreement) and proceeds in a straight line to a point on the Hedjaz railway two miles south of Mudawwara. From this point it proceeds in a straight line to a point on the Gulf of Aqaba two miles south of the town of Aqaba.¹⁷⁹

¹⁷⁷Report of His Britannic Majesty's Government to the Council of the League of Nations on the Administration of Palestine and Transjordan for 1926, appendix 1

¹⁷⁸Abdullah, op. cit., p. 217. Toukan, op. cit., p. 46 and 47.

¹⁷⁹Report by His Britannic Majesty's Government to the Council of the League of Nations on the Administration of Palestine and Transjordan for the year 1934. p. 299.

The King of Saudi Arabia, Ibn Saud did not accept this view of the boundary, but for the maintenance of cordial relations agreed to maintain a status quo in the Ma'an Aqaba area and not to interfere in the administration until favorable circumstances would permit a final settlement.¹⁸⁰ The final correspondence of May 21, 1927 established the southern boundary that exists until today. The Iraqi-Transjordan boundary was also established by the exchange of letters August 16, 1932 from Nuri Said to the Jordanian government with the approval of C. H. F. Cox, the British resident which defined the boundary as

The frontier between Iraq and Transjordan starts in the south at the point of junction of the Iraq Nejd frontier and the Transjordan Nejd frontier and ends in the north at that point on the Iraq-Syria frontier and the Transjordan-Syrian frontier, as ultimately delimited, which is nearest to the summit of the Jebel Tenif. Between these two terminal points the frontier follows where possible prominent physical features, provided that it shall not diverge more than five kilometers from a straight line between these two terminal points.¹⁸¹

Importance of the 1900 to 1928 Period

Towards the Development of

Democratic Institutions

in Jordan

During the period from 1900 to 1920 Jordan lost

¹⁸⁰Ibid.

¹⁸¹Report by His Britannic Majesty's Government to the Council of the League of Nations on the Administration of Palestine and Transjordan for the Year 1932, p. 265.

all form of government that existed in the country. Through the British action the emirate was formed and the present country founded. This period is important for:

1. the formation of the emirate and the establishment of a definite type of government, the constitutional monarchy;

2. the establishment of the boundaries that gave the emirate a delineated area within which to function;

3. the most far reaching events that occurred during this period were in regard to the establishment of law and order.

Although it would be a mistake to say that by 1928 the complete area was under the control of the law enforcing agencies of the emirate, it would be more mistaking to say that no advancement had been made. The Arab Legion and the police were formed and were functioning and through these agencies the most important catalyst towards the formation of a democratic state. The resentment towards the central government that prevailed in Palestine was not finding roots in Jordan and the area began its growth under the conditions of stability not only in government but in security, both qualities which are necessary for a democratic development both due mainly to the British aid in administration.

CHAPTER V

TRANSJORDAN 1928 to 1939

Organic Law

Although the independence of Transjordan was proclaimed in 1923 it was not until April 19, 1928 that the organic law or the constitution appeared in the Official Gazette. This constitution was one of the stipulations of the British agreement of 1923 in which Great Britain agreed to recognize the independence of Transjordan providing that: the government would enable Great Britain to fulfill her obligations under the Mandate of the League of Nations, and that the government of Transjordan was constitutional.

The organic law of Transjordan is based on the Iraqi organic law.¹⁸² It contained sections that provided for the rights of the people, the emirate and the rights of the Emir, the legislative, the judiciary, the administration, validation of laws and judgments, and a general section.¹⁸³

The section regarding the rights of the people included the definition of nationality, equality before

¹⁸²Norman Bentwich, op. cit., p. 222.

¹⁸³C. R. W. Seton, Legislation of Transjordan 1918 to 1930, William Clowes and Sons, London 1934, p. 397 "The Organic Law."

the law, right of property ownership, equality of taxation, right to establish schools, and the definition of Arabic as the official language of the country. In addition rights of personal freedom were defined such as freedom from aggression, freedom of speech, freedom of religion, and freedom of censorship except where prescribed by law.

The rights of the emirate established the line Emir Abdullah Ibn Hussain and his heirs as the rulers of Transjordan. The most important paragraphs of this section of the organic law was that His Britannic Majesty shall have the power to accede when necessary on behalf of Transjordan to any commercial or extradition treaty or international convention.

The legislative council and the definition of persons eligible to be elected to it were defined in part III of the organic law. The legislative council had no right to initiate measures, nor could it force the executive council to resign. The Emir at the same time had the right to dissolve the legislative council. In addition, all acts had to be signed by the Emir before they could become law.

The courts of Transjordan were defined as three types, the civil, the religious, and the special courts. The religious courts were subdivided into the moslem

courts and religious community councils.

The organic law recognized Ottoman laws that had not been appealed or amended. These laws would remain in force as would all legislative acts completed by the constituted authority since September 23, 1918.

The organic law was effective as of the date that the Emir approved, April 16, 1928.

The Treaty of 1928

With the passing of the organic law, it became possible for a new treaty or agreement to be signed between Britain and Transjordan. This was done at Jerusalem on February 20, 1928 by Lord F. M. Plumer and Hassan Khalid Abul Huda. The agreement was published in the official gazette on December 30, 1928 and official notification of the ratification was published February 1, 1931.

The agreement between Transjordan and Britain in effect recognized the conditions as they existed in the country. A British resident was to reside in Transjordan on behalf of the High Commissioner of Palestine. The British resident was responsible for the handling of all correspondence with the foreign government, and the responsibility of the British government towards the maintenance of the mandate position was recognized. Britain maintained the right of control over foreign

*What was
visited?*

affairs and finances and the right to maintain armed forces in the country. Although, in the agreement it was specific that the duty for payment of the armed force lay with Transjordan, Britain agreed to supply the country with funds for local forces. Included within the agreement was article III which specified that no official other than of Transjordanian nationality would be appointed to the government without the concurrence of the British government.¹⁸⁴

The Electoral Law and 1929 Elections

The announcement of the organic law necessitated the establishment of electoral laws. This was accomplished by the Legislative Council Electoral Law of 1928. This law defined the qualifications for the members of the legislative council; the number of the council (sixteen, of which fourteen were to be elected and two elected by a special council to represent the bedouins). The law prescribed that every Transjordanian not a bedouin who had reached eighteen years of age, was eligible to vote unless:

1. he had lost his civil rights;
2. claimed foreign protection,

¹⁸⁴G. R. W. Seton, op. cit., p. 703 to 708.

3. had been declared bankrupt;
4. had been placed under interdiction by a competent court and not been released;
5. had been sentenced to prison for more than one year for moral turpitude and not received a pardon for the crime;
6. was mad or an idiot.

The law also divided Transjordan into three electoral districts Belqa, Ajloun, and Kerak (Ma'an was included in Kerak and Amman in Belqa), established the means of registration, defined regulations for the primary and secondary elections and regulations for the election of two members to represent the bedouins to the legislative council.¹⁸⁵

In order to become law the organic law had to be ratified by an elected legislative council.¹⁸⁶ The form of the government as defined in the organic law was not popular, and encountered resistance on all sides especially in regard to the point that the Transjordanians had no rights against the British.¹⁸⁷ This opposition took the

¹⁸⁵C. R. W. Seton, Legislation of Transjordan 1918 to 1930, William Clowes and Sons, London 1934, p. 248 to 266 (Legislative Council Electoral Laws).

¹⁸⁶Report of His Britannic Majesty's Government to the Council of the League of Nations for the year 1928, p. 99.

¹⁸⁷Carl Brockleman, op. cit., p. 491.

form of a national congress that demanded a national parliament and a responsible ministry.¹⁸⁸ The opposition attempted to dissuade electors from registering in the government sponsored election, by insinuation that the motive of the registration was for the formation of a roll of conscripts.¹⁸⁹ It was not until January 1929 that the election was complete with only three per cent of the entitled electorate voting.¹⁹⁰ The second election showed an increase to eighty per cent of the entitled electorate voting.

It would be incorrect to say that these were free elections. Transjordan was still essentially autocratic. The people of the area did not understand western free elections. No self-respecting Arab ruler would allow a person professing an opposing view to become a member of the government. One candidate at this election complained that having distributed more than 400 pounds Sterling and having a large family in the area in the final count he failed to receive more than four votes.¹⁹¹

¹⁸⁸ Esmond Wright, Abdullah's Jordan 1947 to 1951, Middle East Journal, 1951, p. 44.

¹⁸⁹ Report of His Britannic Majesty's Government to the Council of the League of Nations for the Year 1928, p. 99.

¹⁹⁰ Carl Brockleman, op. cit., p. 491.

¹⁹¹ Col. F. G. Peake, CMG, CBE, Transjordan, Royal Central Asian Society, Vol. 26, 1939, p. 390.

The Actual Position of the Emir

Under the Organic Law

1928 to 1939

Despite the elected legislative council the government of Transjordan was neither responsible nor constitutional in a western sense.¹⁹² The Emir retained what responsibility there existed in the government. While the British retained effective control by their advisors and the control of the financial, military, and foreign affairs,¹⁹³ thereby further limiting the powers of the legislative council.

The organic law delegated the power to the Emir to issue written administrative orders with the concurrence of the council of ministers during the period that the legislative council was not in session.¹⁹⁴ This gave practically absolute control to Abdullah as firstly; the legislative council was in session for only three months of the year¹⁹⁵ and then at the call of the Emir; secondly; the council that advised the Emir was appointed by the

¹⁹² Esmond Wright, op. cit., p. 441.

¹⁹³ Seton Williams, op. cit., p. 173. Lenczowski, op. cit.

¹⁹⁴ Norman Bentwich, op. cit., p. 300.

¹⁹⁵ Esmond Wright, op. cit., p. 440.

Emir from either the elected representatives or the officials of the government. The fact that appointments and dismissals from government service were on the recommendation of the responsible minister and approved by the Emir¹⁹⁶ gave Abdullah the power to assure that during the time that he and the council were in power, the council would agree to his program and the government servants carry it out. In effect the Emir had the legal position of being an almost absolute monarch. Emir Abdullah ruled with a heavy hand.¹⁹⁷ Critics of the government were subject to press censorship, house arrest or exile by the Emir. Neither the British advisors nor the government were able during his lifetime to wean him from these methods.¹⁹⁸ At times as in 1933 the Emir would not call the meeting of the legislative council and continue to rule through his legal stand;¹⁹⁹ however, in cases that the council seriously disagreed with the Emir as in 1931 when the council refused to pass the budget law, the Emir dissolved the council and a new election²⁰⁰ was called usually resulting in the council that the Emir desired.

¹⁹⁶Norman Bentwich, *op. cit.*, p. 300.

¹⁹⁷Seton Williams, *op. cit.*, p. 170.

¹⁹⁸Esmond Wright, *op. cit.*, p. 441.

¹⁹⁹Report of His Britannic Majesty's Government to the Council of the League of Nations for the year 1933, p. 242.

²⁰⁰Report of His Britannic Majesty's Government to the Council of the League of Nations for the year 1931, p. 170.

During the early days of 1928 there was much to say in favor of the strong position of both the Emir and the British advisors, however, as time went on and the development of not only trained personnel but a stabilized system of government, the British gradually turned over some of the controls that they had maintained which in most cases were absorbed by the legislative council such as the agreement of 1936 in which some of the restrictions on the raising of military forces and the appointment of representatives to foreign countries were removed.²⁰¹

The Actual Position of the
Executive Council

As has been seen the Emir retained most of the power in the early government. In maintaining his absolute position he was aided by his appointed body the executive council. The members of the council were heads of the various administrative departments. The council normally consisted of the chief minister, minister of justice, chief secretary, treasurer, director of health, and director of education.²⁰² It was to these various ministers that the British advisors presented their recommendations

²⁰¹Saton Williams, op. cit., p. 173.

²⁰²Report of His Britannic Majesty's Government to the Council of the League of Nations, op. cit., 1939, p. 139.

and from these ministers that the legislative council received the acts which were made law. Members of the council might hold more than one portfolio.²⁰³ The power of appointment of the Emir assured that the council was a harmonious working body. During this period the council was an executive body that was concerned mostly with the carrying out wishes of the Emir and the recommendations of the British advisors and not the democratic functions that are normally thought of existing in such a council.

The Legislative Council

The organic law prescribed that the legislative power of Transjordan be vested in the legislative council²⁰⁴ an elected body consisting of sixteen members (fourteen elected members and two bedouins: the elected were divided according to religion as nine moslem Arabs, three Christian Arabs, and two Circassians).²⁰⁵ The composition of this

²⁰³Abdullah, op. cit., p. 219.

The prime ministers of Jordan from 1929 to 1945 were Hassan Khalid Pasha, first prime minister 1929 to 1931; Shiekh Abdullah Effendi Sarraj (in addition chief justice, head of internal affairs, and finance minister. Ibrahim Pasha Hashim, November 1933 to September 1938; Tewfiq Pasha Abu'l Huda, September 1938 to October 1944; Samir Pasha, October 1944 to May 1945; Tewfiq Pasha Abu'l Huda, May 1945.

²⁰⁴Seton Williams, op. cit., p. 170. E. A. Speiser, The United States and the Near East, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass, 1947, p. 156.

²⁰⁵Report of His Britannic Majesty's Government to the Council of the League of Nations for the year 1929, p. 139. Konikoff, op. cit., p. 12.

body remained constant during this period despite the fact that an appointment of one of the members of the legislative council to the executive council required a new election²⁰⁶ to fill the vacancy in the legislative council.

The first meeting of the legislative council was composed of a suspicious group that regarded the government as attempting to deprive them of their elected rights. To remove some of the feeling, the Emir amended the organic law during the first meeting to grant complete freedom of speech during the time that the council was in session.²⁰⁷

During the early years, the legislative council at times did not meet due to the fact that the deputies did not appear²⁰⁸ or that it was not called by the Emir. With the passage of time the legislative body began to become more insistent in the handling of the affairs of

²⁰⁶Abdullah, op. cit., p. 219.

²⁰⁷E. Wright, op. cit., p. 440. Report of His Britannic Majesty's Government to the Council of the League of Nations for the year 1929, op. cit., p. 139.

²⁰⁸Carl Brockleman, op. cit., p. 492.

government. The power of the Emir was utilized from time to time to check any extreme movement. In 1931, despite the fact that the country was being supported by British subsidy, the legislative council held that the British government had no right to control the budget and refused to pass the budget presented by the executive council.²⁰⁹ This led to the Emir utilizing his authority under the organic law and dissolving the legislative council and the resulting second elections. During the second elections eighty per cent of the eligible electorate are reported to have voted in comparison with the three per cent reported during the first elections.²¹⁰

The period of 1928 to 1939 may be considered a period of training for the elected body, not only for the representatives, but also for the electorate. The people were not accustomed to the functions of even a controlled democratic form of government. During this time, with the over-riding hand of the Emir and the British advisors; the people, the politicians, and the government, were given time to ease into the shoe that had been made by

²⁰⁹Report of His Britannic Majesty's Government to the League of Nations for 1931, op. cit., p. 170, and 1933, op. cit., p. 242.

²¹⁰Ibid., year 1931, p. 170.

the organic law and the agreements of 1923 and 1928.

Government Bureaus

During the period of 1928 to 1938, the governmental administrative body continued to develop so that by the end of the period in the central government there were the following departments: finance; customs excise; and trade; legal and judicial; education; health; posts; telegraphs; and telephones; agriculture; lands; public works; antiquities; and public security (The Arab Legion).²¹¹ It is not necessary to follow the developments of all the accomplishments of these departments other than the way in which they influenced the people of the area during this time. (Discussed under the division of population.) The formation of a government that had the necessary department for the effective administrative control, and the fact that these departments were established, not on a democratic basis, leads one to conclude that it is during this period that the machinery for a democratic form of government was established.

Administration of Transjordan

The early administration division established after the initial agreement with Great Britain, four

²¹¹Report of His Britannic Majesty's Government to the Council of the League of Nations for the year 1934, op. cit., p. 238 to 267.

administrative districts. In 1931, the area of Transjordan, at that time with defined boundaries was redivided in that the desert was placed under the command of the Arab Legion.²¹² This left the following five districts²¹³ and sub-districts:

Ajlun: (ancient Gilead). The northernmost district (Zerka R.) between the Yarmuk and the Yabbok rivers. It comprises five sub-districts and contains six of the twelve municipalities of Jordan, and over 200 villages.

Belqa: (ancient Amman or Philadelphia) bounded (Zerka R.) on the north by the Yabbok and on the south by the river Aron (Wadi Mojib). This area is not as densely settled contains over 160 villages and divided into three districts. Amman in 1945 became a separate administrative unit as the capital.

Kerak: (ancient Moab). South of the river Arnon and extends to a line which roughly marks the end of the area under regular cultivation. It contains approximately 70 villages and is divided into two sub-districts.

²¹²Konikoff, op. cit., p. 12.

²¹³Konikoff, op. cit., p. 12. B. A. Toukan, op. cit., p. 6. Report of His Britannic Majesty's Government to the League of Nations for the year 1936, op. cit., p. 315. The sub-divisions of the districts are:

Ajlun	(Ajlun (Irbid (Jerash (Deir Abu Said (Malka	Belqa	(Amman (Salt (Madeba	Kerak	(Kerak (Tafilah Ma'an	(Shobeck (Aqaba (Petra
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Ma'an: (part of ancient Edom). Southernmost district. It contains not more than thirteen villages, the most important which is the port of Aqaba and contains one municipality and three sub-divisions.

The Desert Area: bounded mainly by the railroad and extending to the eastern boundary. The desert contained only one administrative area and no municipalities.²¹⁴

The administration within the districts follows almost completely the administration under the Ottoman reign (see early Ottoman section). The districts are administered by a mutesarraf who is appointed by the Emir. The mutesarraf administers with the help of an administrative council under the leadership of a president and two official and four non-official members. The four non-official members are selected by a committee presided over by the district administrative officer. The committee is composed of two government officials, the president and members of the municipal councils within the district, the heads of the various religious communities, the mukhtars of the villages²¹⁵ In districts where there are

²¹⁴Konikoff, op. cit., p. 12. B. A. Toukan, op. cit., p. 6.

²¹⁵Report of His Britannic Majesty's Government to the Council of the League of Nations, 1936, op. cit., p. 315 and 303. Konikoff, op. cit., p. 12.

500 Christians there must be one representative on the administrative council if there are 1,000 Christians or more there must be two.

The duties of the mutesarraf and the administrative council of the district are limited to the collection of taxes, the assessment of taxes, and the enforcement of the various regulations regarding crops. They have no magisterial power excepting that deligated under the tribal court law of 1936.²¹⁶

The municipal councils (see Ottoman section) found at the most important cities and although governed mainly by the Ottoman code were reformed under the law of 1937 effective 1938. Under this law the majority of the council would be elected; however, there were insufficient trained personnel to fill all positions such as the medical officer, engineer, and veterinary which led to the appointment of administrators. This situation is quite normal in Transjordan as the majority of the people running for election have no technical training. The president of the council is nominated by the central government. This nominated position made the president

²¹⁶Report of His Britannic Majesty's Government to the Council of the League of Nations for the year 1936, op. cit., p. 315.

independent of any political motives and it was thought he would be more energetic towards fulfilling his duties.²¹⁷ Within the municipalities, according to the law of 1937, all the various minorities were represented. The municipalities make their own estimates of expenditures for the municipality which is approved by the prime minister and financed by local control taxes on imported goods and from government subsidy.

During the time 1928 to 1939, there continued to exist a shortage of trained personnel to fill the administrative positions. In 1938 there were 927 employees in the government, 539 of which were native born Trans-jordanians while 313 were seconded from other governments.²¹⁸

Classification and Advancement of the
People of Transjordan 1928 to 1939

The population of Transjordan may be divided into groups by three methods, racial or ethnical, religious or by the type of life that the people live. Although the majority of the people are Arabs, there exist minorities

²¹⁷ Report of His Britannic Majesty's Government to the Council of the League of Nations for the year 1936, p. 311.

²¹⁸ Ibid., p. 303. Included in the 313 were the following: 11 Tripolitarians; 12 Hedjazes; 17 Turks; 60 Syrians; 130 Palestinians; 75 Lebanese; 8 Egyptians.

of Circassians, Shishans, Turkamans and Persian Bahais.²¹⁹ The most prevalent religion is Islam, however, there are groups of Christian Arabs in Salt and other areas. Although the minority division is important, it does not have the same importance or is not the same source of trouble as in Lebanon. The rights of the minority groups either racial or religious are protected and the groups exist side by side with little friction. The most important division is according to the life of the groups, the fellahin, the semi-nomadic, and the nomads.

The classification of the population into the groups of fellahin (farmer), nomadic, or semi-nomadic has a direct bearing with the climate (see effects of the climate) and the government of the time (early foundation of the rule in Transjordan). Of the three groups, the smallest is most important, the nomad and semi-nomad. Both groups maintain a tribal character.²²⁰ In fact both groups may be classified as bedouin, and constitute 150,000 of the 400,000 population estimated in 1945.²²¹

²¹⁹B. A. Toukan, op. cit., p. 4. Williams Seton, op. cit., p. 168. Report of His Britannic Majesty's Administration to the Council of the League of Nations for the year 1929, op. cit., p. 138.

²²⁰Konikoff, op. cit., p. 4.

²²¹Williams Seton, op. cit., p. 168.

The principal tribes of Transjordan are the Beni Sakhr, Sirhan, Beni Khalik, Issa, and the Seit with the tribes and clans under their protection (generally classified as the bedouins of the north) and the Howeitat, Mana'een and the Hajaya (the bedouins of the south).²²²

At all times there have existed in Transjordan all phases of the change from complete nomadism to complete sedimentary population and in most cases all these phases will exist in one tribe, it is, therefore, difficult to divide these tribes into the two groups of nomadic and semi-nomadic although, in general, it may be said that the Beni Sakhr, Hawetat and the Brihan are nomadic although they all own and cultivate lands, and the Beni Hassan, Hejaya are semi-nomadic although they have tents and flocks.²²³ The tribal division is important politically in that the representatives of the bedouins are appointed from the groups of the north and of the south. The tribal groups cannot be considered either a minority, cultural group, or a primitive society that is extraneous to the culture of

²²²Ibid., 169.

²²³J. B. Glubb, The Economic Situation of the Transjordan Tribes, Royal Central Asian Society, 1938, Vol. 25, p. 448.

the area. In fact the tribes contain a virile part of the population that contributes an important part to the economic activity of the country.²²⁴ The groups are an integral part of the culture of the area.

As has been discussed on the formation of Transjordan the tribes presented a formidable problem to the new state of Transjordan (see extension of law and order). Before there could be any government, the tribal conditions had to be stabilised and before any type of representative form of government could be established the tribes had to be integrated into the state. Some type of education given to the tribes to make them capable of taking part in a representative state. If it were not possible to develop these traits, the tribes stood the chance of becoming a minority group from which political pressure could be exercised from other countries or internal groups.²²⁵

The first step for the inclusion of the bedouin in the state of Transjordan was the continuation of the extension of law and order that was begun in the earlier period. The tribal court law of 1924 was found ineffective and replaced by the bedouin control board with jurisdiction

²²⁴Afif I. Tannous, The Arab Tribal Community in a Nationalist State, The Middle East Journal, Vol. I, 1947 January, p. 11.

²²⁵Afif I. Tannous, op. cit., p. 6.

over the tribal courts. When in 1931 the desert area was placed under the Arab legion, the tribal offences (settlement) law of 1933 was passed and worked well with the bedouin control board. The success of the bedouin control board lay mainly on the ability and prestige of Emir Shaker and until his death in 1935, law and government was extended into the lands of the bedou. With the death of Emir Shaker not one person could be found that would fill his position. This necessitated the passing of a series of laws, the tribal court law 1936, the tribal court of appeal law of 1936, and the bedouin control law of 1936 were passed that established an effective legal system.²²⁶ As important, was the signing of the treaty of friendship and bon voisinage between Transjordan and Saudi Arabia, July 27, 1933 signed in Jerusalem and ratified at Cairo which dealt with the handling of raids, the return of loot, and the control of the bedou of the desert that often disappeared over the boundaries of the neighboring states.²²⁷ In addition to the tribal laws and the agreement with Saudi Arabia the continued activity of the Arab legion especially

²²⁶ Report of His Britannic Majesty's Government to the Council of the League of Nations for the year 1936, op. cit., p. 319.

²²⁷ Report of His Britannic Majesty's Government to the Council of the League of Nations for the year 1934, op. cit., p. 300 (full text).

after 1931 settled the tribes to the extent that the ancient arts of cattle stealing and raiding were becoming a thing of the past and the government was able to concentrate on other forms of improving the conditions of the bedouin. In fact the bedouins at the end of the period were no longer free nomads but naturalized citizens in a new state. They were subjected to laws and boundaries, and were no longer free to wander as their ancient life dictated.²²⁸

With the increase of public security in Jordan, the number of semi-nomads increased and the villagers were able to send their flocks to the desert without fear of life or property during the grazing season. This led to an increased homogeneity within the population as a whole and allowed the farmers to increase their income from a more diversified source of income.²²⁹

Following the major problem of subjecting the tribes to a peaceful productive existence, the government began to encourage the settlement of the tribes with the purpose of broadening the basis of their economy and to give them a fixed stake in immovable property which would add to the economic security and bring about a social

²²⁸ Eliahu Epstein, The Bedouin of Transjordan, The Royal Central Asian Society, Vol. 25, 1938, p. 228.

²²⁹ J. B. Glubb, The Economic Situation of the Transjordan Tribes, op. cit.

change. By 1938 every section of the major tribes was in possession of a certain amount of land.²³⁰ The basis of this settlement was voluntary co-operation with the government and an attempt was made to provide for all aspects of the community rather than the agricultural side only.²³¹

The move for the settlement of the tribes began after World War I and continues to the present. The first movement was the selling of the Sultan's lands to the tribes in which even the Beni Sakhr purchased lands. The tribe owned 426,000 dunums in 1935. Using the Beni Sakhr as an example, the early acquisition of land had its bad effects. Although the tribe had over twenty four villages, the land was tended by tenant fellaheen and in fact the shieks became land lords while the rank and file retained the nomadic characteristic. Other tribes as the Hawaitat, psychologically and socially different, were easier to convert to a stationary or semi-nomadic life.²³² One of the basic problems in the development of agriculture amongst the bedouins was the initial costs. This problem was met by the tribes and the Beni

²³⁰ Report of His Britannic Majesty's Government to the Council of the League of Nations for the year 1938.

²³¹ Afif I. Tannous, op. cit., p. 14.

²³² J. B. Glubb, The Economic Situation of the Transjordan Tribes, op. cit., p. 233.

Sakhr were the first to use tractors and mechanical plough in Transjordan. Between 1920 and 1938 the tribes made great progress in the extension of the cultivated area and in the use of agricultural machinery.²³³

During this period the tribes of the north and west were constantly limiting the scope of their movements and constantly adding new occupations to their economy. Many in this area gave up the life of the nomad's customs and the communal organization.²³⁴ In the eastern and southern sections, the tribes maintained their tribal rule, and although they farmed, the tribal community remained.²³⁵

The government action of the division, selling, and establishing definite ownership, was the greatest incentive towards the settling and the diversification of the economy of the bedouin.²³⁶

The establishment of law and order and the settling or giving the tribes a permanent base did much for the advancement of the tribes. It gave those that had never had a permanent root a place to return and

²³³J. B. Glubb, The Economic Situation of the Transjordanian Tribes, op. cit., p. 451.

²³⁴Ibid.

²³⁵Eliahu Epstein, op. cit., p. 232.

²³⁶Report of His Britannic Majesty's Government to the Council of the League of Nations for the year 1929, p. 138.

at the same time made it possible for the government to begin schools at the wells and bases to which the tribes returned during the summer. Two bedouin schools were established, one at Azaraq and Mudawara, in addition two other schools at Rum and Bair, were maintained by the officer commanding the desert patrol.²³⁷ The bedouins of the Arab legion also were taught the rudiments of reading and writing which added to the practically non-existent percentage of literacy amongst the tribes. It cannot be said that the bedouin developed during this time into a citizen of the state that was capable of taking an active and thinking part in a democratic form of government, but it can be said that the tribes changed to the point that they no longer hindered the development of democracy in the country. A beginning was made by including the bedouin and his tribal life into the state. Education was begun and a permanent settling ground in tribal owned land established. The extension of agriculture replaced the income that in the past had been derived from raiding. The government, mainly through the Arab Legion, was no longer an instrument to be fought, and the tribe submitted to the taxes and controls that were levied upon them.

²³⁷Report of His Britannic Majesty's Government to the Council of the League of Nations for the year 1934, op. cit., p. 253.

The fellahiin (including the settled villages and towns) and semi-nomadic population will have to be discussed under one heading as the semi-nomads lie between the two extreme groups, thus the problem of both, apply to the semi-nomads. The settled population of Transjordan largely consisted of self-contained communities that were mainly concerned with the growing of sufficient food for their own consumption.²³⁸ As late as 1924 vegetables had to be imported from Syria or Palestine.²³⁹ The conditions that existed between the tribes and villages during the time of the Turkish reign hindered the progress of the farmers. The greatest retarding force of the advance of the villages was the land ownership system of the Turks.

The Ottoman Land Code of 1858 AD (1274 AH) distinguished between five main categories:

Mulk: land that was owned absolutely by an owner;

Miri: state land that was assigned to a person who maintained the right of using it, and heritage. The ownership of the sub-soil remained in the possession of the state;

²³⁸B. A. Toukan, op. cit., p. 5.

²³⁹Emil Bisharat, Transjordan the Land of Antiquities, The Arab World, Vol. II, 1946, p. 115.

Waqf: Religious or family trusts;

Metruke: Communal lands as roads, threshing floors, etc.

Mewat: Waste lands.

In addition to the above classifications, there were the state lands that were classified as:

Mahlul: Miri lands which had been left uncultivated for three years and then reverted to the ownership of the state;

Madawara: These lands were formerly the lands of the Sultan but with the revolution of 1909, the lands were classified as state lands. Within this category were many dunums that the farmers had voluntarily registered in the name of the Sultan in hopes it would keep the tribes from attacking or destroying their crops.²⁴⁰

The Turkish system of land ownership led to unproductive use of lands.²⁴¹ In addition, the unstable conditions in Transjordan caused much of the cultivable land to lay fallow. The first problem that faced the government was the redistribution of land and the establishment of ownership. In 1927 the director of

²⁴⁰Konikoff, op. cit., p. 33 to 34.

²⁴¹Col. F. G. Peake, Transjordan, Royal Central Asian Society, Vol. 26, 1939, p. 391.

land registration had to secure photographic reproductions of the land registration, state domains, agricultural lands and waft property from Constantinople as the Arabs had destroyed all the records of the Turkish government during the war believing that it was the safest way to avoid the payment of taxes.²⁴²

The redistribution of state lands was begun in 1928 with the land survey. As the lands were surveyed and ownership determined, the government would sell the state lands to the occupant on the payment of a bedl mithl (ten times the land tax) which was payable annually over a ten year period. If there was no occupant, an applicant might occupy the land and if he did not interfere with any ancient rights might acquire the land after three years.²⁴³

In addition to the settlement of ownership and selling the state lands, the government undertook in 1933 to abolish the Mushaa (communal ownership) system by the Land Settlement Law of 1933. This work continued until at the end of 1943 title had been settled on

²⁴²Konikoff, op. cit., p. 37.

²⁴³Konikoff, op. cit., p. 34.

individual owners for more than three fourths of all the cultivated land.²⁴⁴

The settlement of land ownership had the following results:

1. It gave security of tenure to the farmers and allowed them to make improvements on a permanent basis.

2. It prepared the way for the establishment of greater equality between the villages in taxes and land evaluation.

3. It established a new land registration and land ownership that led to a decrease in crime caused by disputes over land ownership.

4. It allowed large land owners (shieks) and absentee land owners to buy large parcels of land.

5. It weakened the power of the village shiekh or the head man who in the past had divided the communal lands. The tax reform continued to weaken his power.²⁴⁵

The money lenders at this time did not constitute an important group and they were not able to control the selling and buying of the lands that were handled through the government. Thus, the selling of land did not lead

²⁴⁴Richard N. Frye, The Near East and the Great Powers, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1951, p. 77. Konikoff, op. cit., p. 35. Report of His Britannic Majesty's Government to the Council of the League of Nations for the year 1935, op. cit., p. 287.

²⁴⁵Richard N. Frye, op. cit., p. 80. Ibid., p. 77.

to the control of the land by a rich minority that has existed for so long in most of the middle east countries.²⁴⁶

Besides the redistribution of lands and the establishment of ownership, the revision of the tax system that was applied to the settled and semi-nomadic groups was another important reform. After World War I, the old Turkish system of taxation was re-established. This system was unfair as different systems based on various percentages were collected from different areas depending on the ability of the government at the time of tax collection. In 1933 following a recommendation of Sir Ernest Dawson, a tax reform began applying to agricultural produce. It taxed six per cent of the gross annual yield. This tax was to replace the ^{warko}work, tithe, and road tax. Strong opposition resulted from the large land owners so that a slight revision was made. The new tax could not be more than 10,000 J.P. greater than the combined three original taxes. This change in tax law did away with the privileged positions of some of the strong tribes, as the Beni Sakhr, and equalized the tax burden between the various villages, and individual groups such as the Circassians.²⁴⁷

²⁴⁶Ibid., p. 80.

²⁴⁷Konikoff, op. cit., p. 87.

The new government of Transjordan began the extension of education that benefited mainly the settled and the semi-nomads. The number of government schools continued to increase during this time so that by 1939 almost every village of any size had one or more schools of elementary type. The department of education founded in 1923 had difficulty in securing teachers that had the necessary qualifications. Army officers from Palestine were appointed to teach academic subjects, university graduates that were hired from other countries usually returned to their homes.²⁴⁸ By 1939 there were more than sixty five government schools and 116 private schools in Transjordan,²⁴⁹ graduates from the government schools were sent on scholarships to Beirut to the American University, Talabaya Agricultural School, Syria, Kadoorie Agricultural School, Tulkarm, Woman's Training College, Jerusalem, and English School, Jerusalem. On the completion of their course, these students were to return to Transjordan and increase the teaching staff.²⁵⁰

²⁴⁸Jordan Ministry of Education, Education in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, 1953, p. 11.

²⁴⁹Report of His Britannic Majesty's Government to the Council of the League of Nations for the year 1934, op. cit., p. 252.

²⁵⁰Ibid., p. 253.

The mandate government and the government of Transjordan during this time continued the expansion of the road net. When the government was formed in Transjordan, there was 280 kilometers of roads in the area only 30 of which were mecadamized.²⁵¹ The number of kilometers of road and the amount suitable for motor traffic continued to increase during this period. One cause was the extension of law and order by the Arab Legion²⁵² while the other was the increasing control of the central government over the outlying provinces. By 1939 a communication net was such that exports and imports could be made into Jordan. For the first time the people began to become aware of western luxuries. The villages were able to export the excesses from bumper crops, while the importing of foods during the lean years stabilized food prices that usually fluxuated with the crops of the year.²⁵³ By 1939 there were over 1,438 kilometers of roads ninety four per cent were still dirt. Work was proceeding on the desert road to Baghdad,²⁵⁴ and Transjordan was in the

²⁵¹Konikoff, op. cit., p. 76.

²⁵²John B. Glubb, The Story of the Arab Legion, op. cit., p. 108.

²⁵³John B. Glub, The Economic Situation of the Transjordan Tribes, op. cit., p. 452.

²⁵⁴Report of His Britannic Majesty's Government to the Council of the League of Nations for the year 1934, op. cit., p. 266. Konikoff, op. cit., p. 76.

first stages of building a suitable communication and travel net.

The changes that were made between 1928 to 1939 in villages and the semi-nomadic groups had greatest affect towards the development of a democratic type of government in Jordan. The settling and expansion of the cultivable lands and the granting to the inhabitants of the village ownership of their lands, combined with the continuation of increase of law and order, the beginning of education, and the increase in communication began the education of the villagers towards the point that in the future they would be able to actively take part in a representative form of government. Without the changes that had taken place in the lives of the settled and the semi-nomads of Transjordan it would have been impossible to have formed a government from the illiterate, isolated, and insecure population that existed in 1928.

Zionists and Transjordan

Palestine during this period was kept in a continual state of unrest by the Arab, Jewish, British disagreements and the resulting open war over the Zionist policy. There were some early indications in Transjordan of the dislike of and the desire to restrict Zionism to the west side of the Jordan. This was exemplified in the opposition to the first British entry

until a statement was signed that Zionist policy was not to be implemented and the agreement of the British to exclude the Transjordan area from those paragraphs that applied to the Zionist home. However, in general, Transjordan was too well controlled by the Emir and the British advisors to have extreme emotional concern over the situation that existed in Palestine. The government was determined to stop any infiltration of Zionists into the area despite some early action as: Abdullah's leasing 65,000 dunums in the Ghor to the Jewish agency and Shiek Mithqal al Faiz actively favoring Jewish colonization.²⁵⁵

In April of 1933, a law was passed that prohibited the sale or lease of land to the Zionists by stating that it was forbidden to lease or sell lands to any alien.

In 1936, when the Arab-Jewish riots were taking place, Transjordan remained calm. Emir Abdullah was called on by the Arab Higher Committee to mediate with Ibn Saud, and Ghazi of Iraq to settle the disagreement. This offer was made when it became evident that the strike might cause the loss of the complete orange crop of the year.²⁵⁶ This offer had no results and the disturbances

²⁵⁵Carl Brockleman, op. cit., p. 492.

²⁵⁶James Parks, A History of Palestine From 135 AD to Modern Times, Victor Gollancz Ltd., London, 1949.

continued.²⁵⁷ After the settlement of the 1936 riots, the Arab leaders that had fled to Damascus attempted to send gangs of armed men into Jordan to disturb the peaceful situation that was maintained in the area. These groups of irregular forces were met by the Arab League that continually defeated them and made their raids so costly that they were discontinued.²⁵⁸ The Arab Legion continued to maintain peace.

The only seriously considered recommendation the Palestine disturbances of 1928 to 1939 produced, was the Peel Report of 1937. The recommended partition of the Peel Report was favored by Abdullah as: (1) it was in accord with the Greater Syria Plan (2) it presented a check on the expansion of Zionism (3) it would have increased the territory and prestige of Abdullah.²⁵⁹

The Zionist movement had little effect in Trans-jordan during this time. The people were building a national spirit that continued to develop and although they were ardent supporters of the Palestine Arabs, at the same time they were proud of their own country and

²⁵⁷George E. Kirk, A Short History of the Middle East, Methuen and Co. Ltd., London, p. 185.

²⁵⁸John B. Glubb, The Story of the Arab Legion, op. cit., p. 235.

²⁵⁹Gordan East, Mediterranean Problems Thomas Nelson and Sons, London, 1940, p. 174.

the order and loyalty that was found in it.²⁶⁰ Due to this feeling, Transjordanians during this time were unwilling to rebel against the government of their area and were more content working towards the advancement of their own area.

²⁶⁰John B. Glubb, The Story of the Arab Legion, op. cit., p. 235.

CHAPTER VI

TRANSJORDAN DURING THE WAR

The Participation of Transjordan and Move for Independence

In the autumn of 1939, the English star was at a new low in the Middle East. The conclusion of the Palestine riots of 1939; the anti-British operations of the various groups of exiles that were found in Damascus and Baghdad; and the moves of the Germans in Syria; all added to the dislike of the British by the Arabs. Rumors were circulating that Ibn Saud was ready to make an alliance with Hitler, while many thought that the suffering of a major defeat by Britain would cause the Arabs to rise against them.²⁶¹

Jordan was not filled with the same undercurrents of anti-British feeling. The country had remained separated from the emotions and actions of the other Arab countries.²⁶² Abdullah, the controlling figure in Transjordan; was intensely loyal to the British. This loyalty was more on a personal basis than it was loyalty to the British

²⁶¹John B. Glubb, The Story of the Arab Legion, op. cit., p. 251.

²⁶²B. A. Toukan, The Future Settlement of the Arab Countries, Royal Central Asian Society, May 1943, p. 199.

government.²⁶³ Nevertheless, when Britain entered the war Abdullah declared that Transjordan would stand by her allies which she did during the complete war, a great complement to the British.

The Arab Legion played only a limited part in the war. In the Tigris and the Euphrates campaign, the Legion suffered only a handful of casualties; their part was so critical that subsequently the commander in chief of the operation stated that without the help of the Arab Legion Baghdad would not have been taken.²⁶⁴ In the Syrian campaign, the Legion was a guide and reconnaissance unit. A small part of the Arab Legion took part in the North African war. The major portion of the time, the Arab Legion was utilized guarding vital supply centers and expanding.²⁶⁵

The expansion of the Arab Legion continued during most of the war so that by the end of hostilities, the Jordan Arab Legion was a well trained force with fifty armored cars and four infantry battalions.²⁶⁶ These

²⁶³B. A. Toukan, op. cit.

²⁶⁴John B. Glubb, Ibid., The Story of the Arab Legion, op. cit., p. 303.

²⁶⁵B. A. Toukan, A Short History of Transjordan, op. cit. Esmond Wright, op. cit., p. 441.

²⁶⁶George E. Kirk, The Middle East 1945 to 1950, Oxford University Press, London, p. 270.

forces were to serve the country well during the Palestine war.

In 1939 Mr. Malcolm McDonald announced that the British government had agreed to the replacement of the Executive Council as prescribed by the organic law with a council of ministers responsible to the Emir.²⁶⁷ Other than this, the government of Transjordan during the war did not change. The power of government remained in the hands of Abdullah who appointed and dismissed his cabinet when forced to, but always maintaining ministers that would second his program. The government did not depend on popular approval, but the desires of the Emir. The greater share of the administration was done by the directors of the departments and not the ministers.²⁶⁸ Many of the opponents of Abdullah found it safer in Damascus than in Amman due to his strong banded methods. As in 1946 when a group of lawyers in Irbid that had applied for a post in the Department of Justice complained that the post had been filled under the pressure brought by outside influences (the prime minister's son had

²⁶⁷Esmont Wright, Abdullah's Jordan, 1947 to 1951, The Middle East Journal, 1951, p. 440.

²⁶⁸Transjordan Has Been Transformed, op. cit., p. 51. John B. Glubb, Transjordan and the War, Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society, Vol. XXII, 1949, op. cit., p. 24.

received the appointment). Abdullah had nine of those that complained arrested under the Defense Regulations and sent to Ma'an which offered little opportunity for the practice of law.²⁶⁹

During the war this form of government allowed a stable government to continue. Tawfiq Abul Huda remained as prime minister during the complete period with the exception in October 1944 to May 1945 when Samir Pasha formed his government.²⁷⁰ This form of government was necessary not only due to the world situation at the time, but the people of Transjordan were not prepared for a representative government. The majority of the people were still illiterate.²⁷¹ The constitution of the country helped in establishing the stabilized conditions that existed as it allowed a certain scope for debate but did not go so far as the constitutions of the west.²⁷²

²⁶⁹George E. Kirk, (GEK) Cross Currents Within the Arab League, The World Today, Vol. IV No. 1, January 1948, p. 24.

²⁷⁰Seton Williams, op. cit., p. 173. Tawfiq Pasha Abu'l Huda had been the Chief Minister since September 1928. He was the first Prime Minister and the first Minister for foreign affairs. He reformed his government July 1941, November and December 1942, May 1943, October 1943. resigned October 15, 1944, reformed his government in May 1945.

²⁷¹Brig. J. B. Glubb, Transjordan and the War, op. cit., p. 24. Konikoff, op. cit., p. 27. The Emirate possessed only one newspaper, a small sheet that appears intermittently on p. 18. The population demonstrates the final stages of evolution of a nomadic to a sedimentary population.

²⁷²Brig. J. B. Glubb, Transjordan and the War, op. cit., p. 24.

The Greater Syria and Fertile
Crescent Plans

In addition to the expansion of the Arab Legion during the war, the second most important occurrence was the development of the Greater Syria and Fertile Crescent Plans. The Greater Syrian Plan was the unification of Transjordan and Syria, Lebanon and Palestine were included within the plan varying with the conditions of the time. This plan was the first move towards Arab unity. It was begun in July of 1940 when Abdullah sent two notes to the British government regarding the Transjordan aspirations of a junction of Syria and Transjordan.²⁷³ During the summer of 1941, the Transjordan Legislative Council and some of the tribal chiefs sent telegrams to the British and the free French in which they stated that it was the Transjordan national aim to achieve Arab unity,²⁷⁴ and requested Syrian unity in order that the area might conform to its natural geographical boundaries.²⁷⁵ To these notes Mr. Oliver Lyttelton replied to the Emir in Amman that the discussion would have to wait until after the war.

²⁷³Richard N. Frye, op. cit., p. 141.

²⁷⁴George E. Kirk, (GEK) Cross Currents Within the Arab League, op. cit., p. 19.

²⁷⁵Richard N. Frye, op. cit., p. 141.

Hardly a week before the Syrian invasion on May 29, 1941 Mr. Eden made the statement that as the Arab countries had made great strides and that if there is a desire for unity, the British government would give their support to any scheme that met with general Arab approval.²⁷⁶

The initial plan for Fertile Crescent unity was submitted by Nuri Said of Iraq that visualized the unity of Syria, Transjordan, Lebanon, and Palestine which would be linked with Iraq by a federation agreement. The two plans were supplementary and not contradictory, both disregarded Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Although this blue book of 1942 was circulated, it met with much disagreement. Egypt desired to retain a leading position in the Arab world and objected to the possible leadership of Iraq. Saudi Arabia was against any extension of the rule of the Hashemites while the forty leading families of Syria and Lebanon did not wish to merge into a larger state.²⁷⁷

In the spring of 1943, Abdullah began an active campaign for his election as King of Syria and the Greater Syria plan. This caused a visit to Transjordan by Nuri Said in which he expressed the view that Abdullah's

²⁷⁶George E. Kirk, The Middle East in the War, Oxford University Press, London, p. 335. George Lenczowski, op. cit., p. 400.

²⁷⁷George Lenczowski, op. cit., p. 402.

action would irritate the nationalists of Syria and also King Ibn Saud. Nuri Said again placed his plan of the Fertile Crescent forward favoring a federation type of union.²⁷⁸

During the discussions prior to the signing of the Arab League Pact, Abu'l Huda, the Transjordan representative, suggested to the League that Syria and Transjordan be given an opportunity to discuss the unity of the two countries before joining the League. Although Jamil Mardam, the Syrian representative agreed to unity in principle, he disagreed with Transjordan's approach to the problem.²⁷⁹

Despite the formation of the Arab League and Syrian objections, Abdullah during 1945 continued to work for Greater Syria.²⁸⁰ The Syrian objections to the plan were mainly:

1. The Anglo Transjordanian Treaty of March 22, 1946;
2. The constitution of Transjordan which left little freedom to the people;
3. The possibility of an increasing Zionist move

²⁷⁸George E. Kirk, (GEK) Cross Currents Within the Arab League, op. cit., p. 19.

²⁷⁹Richard Frye, op. cit., p. 143.

²⁸⁰George E. Kirk (GEK) Cross Currents Within the Arab League, op. cit., p. 19.

through the union;

4. Syria desired a larger grouping than Greater Syria.²⁸¹

Abdullah's change from the Greater Syria plan to the Fertile Crescent movement began in 1946. It was actually a continuation of the initial federation plan of Nuri Said of 1942. In 1946 Abdullah in a speech from the throne pointed out that his primary interest was in the security of the western portions of the Arab Lands rather than personal or dynastic interests.²⁸² He also was reported to have said the same year that when union between Transjordan and Iraq is realized, other Arab countries will follow.²⁸³ Syria in 1947 under President Quwatli adopted the attitude that if any union was to take place, it should be through union with Syria as a free republic, which added to Transjordan's trend towards union with Iraq.²⁸⁴ Nuri Said visited Amman in April of 1947 and discussed a proposed merger of the finance and defense of the two countries. Abdullah returned this visit the same year.²⁸⁵

²⁸¹Richard Frye, op. cit., p. 188.

²⁸²Ibid., p. 189.

²⁸³George E. Kirk, (GEK) Cross Currents Within the Arab League, op. cit., p. 19.

²⁸⁴Richard Frye, op. cit., p. 150.

²⁸⁵Esmond Wright, op. cit., p. 443.

Opposition to the proposed junction continued to grow during this time. There were groups in Syria that desired the union of the two countries, but the government employees and the controlling minorities were opposed.²⁸⁶ While in Amman were groups that were afraid that the union of the two countries would force Amman back to the provincial town that it had been before the establishment of the mandate.²⁸⁷ The Egyptian and Saudian blocks during this time continued to apply pressure towards the ending of the proposed union of Jordan and²⁸⁸ Iraq, while Lebanon and Syria feared that any union would make it possible for the realization of the Greater Syria or the Fertile Crescent Plans.²⁸⁹ Due to the internal and external pressures that were exerted on both Trans-jordan and Iraq, the planned union was reduced to a treaty of Alliance and Brotherhood which was signed April 15, 1947.²⁹⁰

The treaty of alliance with Iraq did not end the work of Abdullah towards a greater state. In 1948 he

²⁸⁶Robin Mougham, Syria and Transjordan, The Spectator, May 9, 1947, Vol. 178, op. cit., p. 519.

²⁸⁷George E. Kirk (GEK) Cross Currents Within the Arab League, op. cit., p. 24.

²⁸⁸Richard Frye, op. cit., p. 172.

²⁸⁹Ibid., p. 151.

²⁹⁰Ibid.

made a trip to Turkey to win support for his plan. The same year he planned to hold manoeuvres near the Syrian border. However, this move roused Arab opinion against Transjordan and Britain, to such a point, that on July 14, 1948, the British Minister of State announced that the position of the British government was that the unity of the Syrian area was essentially and exclusively a concern of the inhabitants of Syria and the other states in the area. The attitude of the British government was strict neutrality, while desiring to maintain tranquil conditions in the Middle East.²⁹¹

In 1948, Abdullah relying on a swing towards the Ulema and the conservatives that constituted his greatest power in Syria, he again made a bid for annexation in a proclamation to the government of Syria for a conference to:

1. to draw up a plan for unity or federation within the limits of international treaties and national aspirations and joint interests;

2. to consider the issue of unity or federation as concerning the Syrian State and the will of the Syrian people alone, excluding Egypt and Saudi Arabian pressure groups;

²⁹¹George E. Kirk (GEK) Cross Currents Within the Arab League, op. cit., p. 20.

3. to define Palestine and ensure the end of the Zionist danger.²⁹² This plan also was rejected by Syria.

In effect the annexation of Palestine by Trans-jordan in 1948 ended the active part of the campaign towards the inclusion of Transjordan into a larger state. However, Abdullah continued in his desire to unite with either the Fertile Crescent or the Greater Syrian plan as shown by his statement to the press in Iraq when he said that the goal of the Iraqi should be the unity of Iraq, Jordan, and Syria. That is my policy and the policy of my father, my brother, and my ancestors.

The assassination of Abdullah ended any hopes of unity, however, during the time that the movement was afoot, it had wide repercussions not only in the areas of Jordan, Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon, but in the meeting and movements of the Arab League.²⁹³

²⁹²Ibid., 21 to 18.

²⁹³Esmond Wright, op. cit., p. 490.

CHAPTER VII

INDEPENDENCE OF TRANSJORDAN

From November 1943 until mid 1944, the government of Transjordan exchanged notes with Great Britain in regard to the ending of the mandate and the establishment of an independent state. These notes were released to the press in June of 1944 by the government of Transjordan. The British government replied that; although, the government was aware of the fact that Transjordan wished to join on an equal basis, the other Arab countries, during the war such negotiations could not take place. Relations would have to continue on the existing basis until the end of the war at which time the British government would be willing to conclude a treaty more compatible with the situation.²⁹⁴ The problem of the independence of Transjordan was left at this point until the meeting of the United Nations in regard to mandate territories. Mr. Bevin announced at that meeting, that as the British government was going to grant Transjordan complete independence in the near future, the problem of a trusteeship over the

²⁹⁴Seton Williams, op. cit., p. 173.

area did not exist.²⁹⁵

The granting of independence was determined by strategic and political reasons. Britain at that time could see that her forces would be forced to withdraw from Egypt and Iraq which left only Cyprus, which was unsatisfactory, or Palestine, or Transjordan. Palestine was eliminated due to the Zionist conditions which left only Transjordan as the area from which she could maintain control over her interests in the Middle East. Britain had every right to feel that United Nations' action might lead to the formation of a joint trusteeship with Russia or the United States.²⁹⁶ Article eighty one of the United Nations Trusteeship made provisions for direct international (unspecified) administration, article eighty seven called for direct petitions and inspections by the United Nations, while strategic areas would be considered by the Security Council. The limitations of the trusteeship as established by the United Nations combined with the disagreements that had arisen over the United States plan, the British plan, the French plan, and the views of Egypt and Iraq²⁹⁷ indicated that it was

²⁹⁵Ibid., 174.

²⁹⁶E. A. Speiser, The United States and the Near East, Harvard University Press, Cambridge Mass, 1947, p. 180.

²⁹⁷The Trusteeship Proposals at San Francisco, The World Today, Chatham House Review, August 1945, p. 82 to 85.

most advisable for Britain to release Transjordan from mandatory supervision but maintain a position by military forces, treaties and economic aid.²⁹⁸

The position adopted by Britain in the United Nations and the promises that had been made to the government of Transjordan were climaxed in the signing of the Treaty of Alliance of 1946 between Mr. Bevin and Ibrahim Pasha Hashim in London, March 22, 1946.²⁹⁹ This treaty had two sections. The first recognizing Transjordan as fully independent under the sovereignty of Emir Abdullah. The second an annex of ten articles which dealt with the handling of military, commercial and foreign relations between the two governments under the alliance.

On May 25, 1946, Emir Abdullah assumed the title of King. This made it necessary to sign a new treaty with Great Britain which was not concluded until 1948.³⁰⁰ The treaty of 1948 was in essence a twenty-year mutual assistance alliance. Article II of the annex established an Anglo-Transjordan Joint Defense Board composed of equal numbers of representatives from both governments. Article I

²⁹⁸E. A. Speiser, op. cit., p. 180.

²⁹⁹Abdullah, Ibid., p. 106, op. cit., p. 223. James Parkes, A History of Palestine from 135 A. D. to Modern Times, London Victor Gollancz, 1949, p. 349.

³⁰⁰E. A. Speiser, op. cit., p. 106. Abdullah, op. cit., p. 223.

of the annex allowed the British to station R. A. F. at Amman and Mafrak and allowed freedom of transit facilities.³⁰¹

As an independent kingdom, Jordan concluded a treaty with Iraq (Treaty of Alliance and Brotherhood) June 10, 1947, and a Treaty of Friendship with Turkey, January 11, 1947.³⁰² On December 16, 1948, Transjordan announced that the international agreements made by the government of Transjordan under the mandate would remain in force while those made by the Transjordan government with the British government or economic agreements or extradition laws by which Transjordan was bound through the British government, would be declared null and void.³⁰³

Transjordan failed to secure admission to the United Nations in 1947. The application of Transjordan was supported by nine of the eleven members of the United Nations Security Council, however, it was vetoed by the Soviet Union on the grounds that the USSR did not have diplomatic relations with Transjordan and was doubtful as to the independence of the country.³⁰⁴

³⁰¹Esmond Wright, op. cit., p. 441.

³⁰²Richard Frye, op. cit., p. 152. The Middle East Journal Vol. I, 1947, p. 212 and 449.

³⁰³The Middle East Journal, Vol. III, 1949, p. 198.

³⁰⁴E. A. Speiser, op. cit., p. 181. Williams Seton, op. cit.

CHAPTER VIII

THE GOVERNMENT OF TRANSJORDAN 1947 TO THE PALESTINE WAR

A Constitution of 1947

The treaty of Alliance between Transjordan and Britain and the transformation of the Emirate to a kingdom on May 25, 1946 was the motivating factor in the promulgation of the new constitution of 1947.³⁰⁵

Under the new constitution, the government of Transjordan was composed of two houses, a chamber of deputies and a council of notables. The chamber of deputies was elected for five years by manhood suffrage. The chamber consisted of twenty members (ten Moslem Arabs, four Christians, two Circassians, two Bedouins elected by a special commission set up by the king). The council of notables consisted of ten members to be appointed by

³⁰⁵Abdullah, op. cit., p. 223, The Middle East Journal, 1947, Current Events, p. 206.

The government of Ibrahim Pasha al Hashim which was formed after the fall of the Abdul Huda government in 1946 was responsible for the signing of the treaty with Great Britain. The ratification of the constitution of November 11, 1947 was under the government of Samir Pasha al Rifai which was composed of the following: Samir Pasha al Rifai, Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of Defense; Shakin Amin Shamqifi, Minister of Education, Cadi; Abbas Pasha Mirza, Minister of Interior; Umar Bey Matar, Minister of Communications, Agriculture and Commerce; Solayman Bey Nabulsi, Minister of Finance; Bisharah Bey Ghasib, Minister of Justice.

the king. The legislative branch of the government had no control over the finances or appointments.³⁰⁶ The new constitution was passed by the Legislative Assembly of November 11, 1947 and the first elections scheduled for October of the same year.³⁰⁷

Elections of 1947

The elections of October 20, 1947 began to show an interest of the people in the democratic form of election. Approximately 100,000 voters were registered by the government and in the elections an estimated sixty per cent of the electorate voted. During the elections the candidates were active in campaigning. In one case a candidate dropped leaflets from planes over bedouin villages and for the first time political parties began to appear on the scene. The government-sponsored Al Nahda party (Revival) was the only active party in Jordan³⁰⁸ however, an opposition from Syria was formed mainly by Subhi Abu Ghanima and was represented by three Syrian parties consisting of about 1,000 exiles Transjordan

³⁰⁶Esmond Wright, op. cit., p. 441.

³⁰⁷The Middle East Journal, 1949, Current Events, p. 84. Esmond Wright, op. cit., p. 442.

³⁰⁸Esmond Wright, op. cit., p. 442.

Independent Youth Party, Free Transjordan League, Transjordan Arab Party.³⁰⁹ The opposition of these parties was centered on the platform of the formation of a more liberal constitution with a freely elected general assembly, the withdrawal of British troops, and the repudiation of the British treaty. The opposition parties objected to police surveillance, the emphasis of Abdullah on foreign relations and Greater Syria and the failure of the government to concentrate on the problems of Transjordan.³¹⁰

The elections progressed without incident and the government party won handsomely with little opposition. The main importance in the elections was the demonstration of a united Transjordan. There was no indicated changes in policy.³¹¹ The government still remained a monarchical directed democracy and support was more important from the throne than from parliament.³¹² Although Abdullah was aware of the more modern conceptions of the constitutional monarchy, he was by temperament and upbringing from the passed school of patriarchal rulers, that was

³⁰⁹George E. Kirk (GEK) Cross Currents Within the Arab League, op. cit., p. 24.

³¹⁰Esmond Wright, Ibid., op. cit., p. 442.

³¹¹Esmond Wright, op. cit., p. 442.

³¹²Esmond Wright, op. cit., p. 442.

accustomed to exercising personal authority with justice and forbearance.³¹³ At the same time the social backwardness of Transjordan was such that there was not a vigorous opposition.³¹⁴ Even under the new constitution, the strong character of Abdullah was still a controlling factor in the dismissal of ministers. Those that were not personally liked by the King did not remain in government.³¹⁵

Preparations for War

The newly elected government of Transjordan began its service at the most difficult time in the history of the country. From 1943 the Zionist groups in Palestine had been engaged in terrorist wars, and extensive political and propaganda campaigns in Britain and the United States, which lead to the formation of an independent Jewish state. The moves of the Zionist were directed towards securing their ends at any cost. The Jewish agency, the Irgun Zvai Leumi and the Haganah in Palestine³¹⁶ fought and attempted to block all moves of the Arab Higher Committee and the Arab irregular forces. Between these

³¹³Royal Central Asian Society In Memorial of His Majesty Abdullah Ibn al Hussein, King of Jordan, 1952, p. 212.

³¹⁴Esmond Wright, op. cit., p. 448.

³¹⁵Great Britain and the East, The Middle East's New King, July 1946, Vol. LXII, No. 1762, p. 46.

³¹⁶George E. Kirk, The Middle East 1945 to 1950, Oxford University Press, 1954, London, p. 259 to 27.

The Jewish Agency remained the governmental group of the Zionists while the Irgun Zvai Leumi and the Haganah

two opposing forces were the British that attempted to maintain some sort of law and order during the last days of their mandate rule.³¹⁷ On April 2, 1947 the United Kingdom requested that the Palestine situation be placed on the agenda of the special session of the General Assembly as soon as possible. This request resulted in the appointment of the United Nations Special Committee for Palestine that went to Palestine and Beirut to interview the Jewish agency and the Arab Higher committee.³¹⁸ The United Nations on November 29, 1947 passed a resolution

were responsible for the majority of the terrorist actions including kidnapping of British officers, the King David Hotel bombing, attacks on the Arabs and other actions that would intimidate the Arabs and place the British in an embarrassing position. At the same time the world Zionist organizations were presenting an entirely different picture to the world especially the United States that represented the Zionists and the Jews as being the oppressed and wronged group.

³¹⁷ Stewart Perowne, The One Remains, Hodder and Stoughton, London, p. 70.

³¹⁸ George E. Kirk, The Middle East 1945 to 1950 op. cit., The Jews during the visit of the UNSCOP utilized all their cunning to influence the committee. The arrival of the Exodus carrying 4,554 illegal immigrants was detained by the British during this time and utilized for propaganda purposes. The Arab Higher Committee refused to give information to or to take part in the hearing in Palestine resulting in the Committee trip to Beirut where the Arab side was presented. The Zionists all in all were able to utilize the UNSCOP to their complete ends with very little if any effective moves by the Arab representatives.

that embodied the plan of partition into an Arab and Jewish state. The plans for partition were rejected by both the Arabs and the Jews and it became evident that a serious conflict was to arise in Palestine with the end of the mandate. The United Nations appointed a mediator Count Folke Bernadotte to Palestine.

Transjordan had not remained calm during these disturbances as it had in the past over the boiling pot of Palestine. Tension continued to mount until the passing of the partition plan by the United Nations. This resulted in the overt acts of the government on December 2, when both houses of parliament voted unanimously to support Arab interests in Palestine. In Amman anti-partitions demonstrations took place. The demonstrators wrecked the office of American Trans-Arabian Pipe Line Company.³¹⁹

From December 1947 until May of 1948 active guerrilla war was carried on in Palestine. The better organized and military trained Zionist units together with the skilful use of terrorism and propaganda was successful in forcing many of the Arabs to flee from the area of the proposed Jewish state, 150,000 Arabs were

³¹⁹The Middle East Journal, Current Events, Vol. II, 1948, p. 222.

estimated to have been refugees by April of 1948.³²⁰ A majority of these fled to Transjordan and the safety of the Muslim state.

In April of 1947, the Arab League held a meeting in which the strategy for the joint action of the Arab states in regard to Palestine was discussed. At this meeting, the League declared that the intervention of the Arab states was not for territorial self-aggrandizement but to save Palestine from Zionism and restore the country to the people. The League sent a special delegation headed by Azzam Pasha to satisfy itself of Abdullah's loyalty to the League. Abdullah pledged Transjordan towards the maintenance of order and a peaceful solution of the Palestine problem.³²¹ British pressure was being brought towards the peaceful settlement of the Palestine affair. A British government spokesman on January 28, 1948 stated that if the Transjordan's Arab Legion should attack the proposed Jewish state after the withdrawal of the British forces the Legions subsidy of approximately two million pounds would be withdrawn.³²²

³²⁰George E. Kirk, The Middle East, 1945 to 1950, op. cit., p. 263.

³²¹Esmond Wright, op. cit., p. 444. Richard Frye, op. cit., p. 155 to 158.

³²²The Middle East Journal, Current Events, Vol. II, 1948, p. 222.

By May of 1948 it was evident that there would be fighting between the Arabs and the Jews. Due to the strained relations between Transjordan and Syria a meeting was held between president Shukri Quwwatli and Abdullah at Deraa on May of 1948 by which time co-ordinated action between the Arab states was a necessity. At this meeting Abdullah insisted that he be placed in command of the armies of Transjordan, Syria, and Lebanon when they moved into Palestine and brought influence on the Arab League to guarantee the payment of the British subsidy that had been threatened to be withheld.³²³

Not only was Abdullah the commander of the Arab forces, but the small army of Transjordan was the only effective military force in the Arab countries.³²⁴ Even the Arab Legion was not large (four infantry battalions) nor complete (a field artillery battery had just been added a few months before the war and the crews were not completely trained),³²⁵ nor did the Arab Legion have freedom of action (it had been agreed with the British government that the Arab Legion would occupy only the

³²³Esmond Wright, op. cit., p. 444.

³²⁴George E. Kirk, Ibid., The Middle East 1945 to 1950, op. cit., p. 270.

³²⁵George E. Kirk, The Middle East 1945 to 1950, op. cit., p. 270.

areas of Palestine that had been assigned as the Arab state in the U.N. partition plan). On the other hand the Transjordan forces were not fighting over long lines of communications as were the Iraqi and Egyptian forces nor was the Arab Legion filled with corruption and discord as was found in the Egyptian forces. However, during the fighting the Arab Legion was by far the most capable force and occupied and took more territory than any other of the armies.

CHAPTER IX

THE PALESTINE WAR

The actual Palestine war was divided into three phases. The initial phase from the beginning of hostilities of May 15, 1948 to the first truce June 11, 1948; the second from the resumption of hostilities July 7 until the second truce July 18; the third from July 18 to October including the final Israeli offensives of December and January 1949.

The progress of the war will not be discussed other than the factors that influenced future relations and developments in Transjordan.

During the first phase of fighting, the Arab forces were relatively successful. The Iraqi forces advanced and stretched their supply lines past the breaking point while the Arab Legion maintained control over the central front. The Syrian forces advanced slightly but were stopped in the north. The Egyptian forces advanced mainly through the Arab lands of the south and were successful in occupying or advancing through a large track of land but did little actual fighting.³²⁶ The situation at this time was extremely favorable to the Arabs

³²⁶George E. Kirk, The Middle East 1945 to 1950, op. cit., p. 270 to 298.

and the Jewish state was willing to accept the UN armistice of June 11, 1948.

King Abdullah during the first months of fighting was able to recognize the fact that the Arab forces were not strong enough to push the Israelis in the sea. From his realistic stand he accepted the fact that Israel existed as a state. He expressed his views to the British government and the United Nations Mediator regarding the annexation of Palestine.³²⁷ In June went to Cairo where he conferred with Farouk followed by visits to Baghdad³²⁸ and Saudi Arabia where he expressed his views on the annexation. The plan of annexation was refused by both Egypt and Saudi Arabia.³²⁹

During the armistice period, the Jewish state was able to strengthen itself by buying and smuggling into Israel against the terms of the armistice aircraft, arms, and munitions while the Arab states without the finances nor the co-operative market were denied any military supplies by the powers of the west. Most of these Jewish supplies were procured in the United States,

³²⁷George E. Kirk, The Middle East 1945 to 1950, op. cit., p. 280.

³²⁸The Middle East Journal, Current Events, Vol. II, 1948, p. 467.

³²⁹George E. Kirk, A Short History of the Middle East, op. cit., p. 223 to 224.

England or Czechoslovakia. Funds for the Jewish state came from the Jewery of the United States.

It was soon evident that the first truce would not result in any permanent settlement and hostilities began on July 8. In ten days the strengthened Jewish forces were able to advance on all fronts and force the Arabs back. A second truce ordered by the United Nations became effective on the fifteenth of July. British pressure was brought on Abdullah and the government of Transjordan for the acceptance of this truce by the withholding of the 500,000 quarterly subsidy that was not paid until July 28 after the Jordan government had agreed to the truce.³³⁰

The advance of the Jews during the ten-day campaign and the action of the United Nations and the British added flames to the fever of the people of Transjordan. On July 14, a riot broke out in Amman over the British and American stand. On July 18, the King personally had to dispense a civilian mob that was shouting "Down with the British, Down with Truman."³³¹

From July 18 until October 15, there existed an uneasy truce. During this period the mediator

³³⁰The Middle East Journal, Current Events, Vol. II, 1948, p. 467.

³³¹Ibid.

Count Bernadotte was murdered by a Jewish squad that was spirited out of the country. The Israeli army continued to receive reinforcements of arms and planes.

By the time that the October offensive of 1948 the Israeli was strong enough to defeat the Egyptian forces in the south. This campaign took only eight days between October 14 and 22. Israel also drove the Lebanese forces of al Qawuqji^{331b} from Palestine and advanced between two and six miles inside the territorial limits of Lebanon.

During December of 1948 and January of 1949, the Israeli forces again attacked the Egyptian forces and invaded Egyptian territory which caused the Egyptians to threaten the evoking of the Anglo-Egyptian treaty. This caused the Israeli to stop, but not before claiming to have cut the link between Egypt and Transjordan at al Awja.

Israel made its most spectacular gains during the peace negotiations. During this time the Arab states made peace agreements individually while the Jewish state was able to grasp as much as possible from each one of the states. The two most important incidents that occurred in the signing of the treaty were the actual occupation of el Awaja and the Shuna agreement, both to have effect in the future of Transjordan. In the peace negotiations March 2, 1949, Israel claimed

^{331b} Interview, The forces of Qawuqji were supplied by the Arab Legion. During the later part of the war they withdrew into the Lebanese and Syrian Sector and at times are confused as being Lebanese supported when in effect they were Jordanian troops.

that she was in possession of the area on the gulf of Aqaba. However, the Arab Legion countered that the Jordan forces were in actual control sixty miles north of the town. Armistice talks came to a stand still and on the seventh of March two columns of Israeli troops thrust southwards and occupied the area.

The Iraqi government had refused to take part in the Rhodes conference and agreed to be bound by an armistice signed by the Jordan forces. Iraq had then decided to withdraw her forces before being attacked. The Iraqi area was turned over to the Arab Legion. The Arab Legion's position then became so unsound militarily that it was necessary for Abdullah to conclude the Shuna agreement when Israel threatened not to recognize the withdrawal of Iraqi forces. The Jews threatened to attack the Jordanian forces if they did not agree to withdraw for an average depth of two miles along the face of the fifty five mile long salient.³³² This agreement

³³²(Interview). It is reported that at the actual demarcation of the cease fire line on maps, the Jordanian representative was prohibited from being advised by the British officials serving the Jordan government. While the Jewish government had a staff of trained personnel that were well aware of the land value, the water, the productivity and desirability of all the lands that were being decided on. This resulted in the fact that the line that was finally agreed upon was one that took the best farmlands and land that had water resources while the rocks and the hills were left to the Jordanian side. In addition the Shuna agreement was drawn on a large scale map so that when the transfer was made to a smaller scale, the transfer included the changing of the Transjordan boundaries over

was signed and led to the formation of many frontier villages that were separated from their cultivable lands. The Rhodes agreement was signed by the Jordanian representative on March 11, 1949.

which the Transjordanian representative had no authority to act. This change on boundaries was not mentioned in the text of the Shuna agreement or the Rhodes agreement. However, a year and a half later, the Israeli troops occupied this area and caused the Yarmouk river dispute. In the southern area, the Jews claimed that this area was to be a part of Israel under the 1947 partition scheme and thus the Arabs had no right to be there. Under this criteria Galilee, Lydda, Ramle, Beit Jibrin and many other places were Arab under the 1947 partition and are held by the Jewish military force. If military occupation is the criteria the Arab forces held this southern area during the fighting in June of 1948. In this way the Jews utilized the 1947 partition plan when it was in their favor or the de facto military situation when it was in their favor by using the most favorable claim the Jewish representatives were able to justify their acquisition over the best lands.

Interview: Another source states that at the Rhodes conference there were British representatives, however, the Jordan delegation was composed of only East Bank representatives that were not aware of the land values, the water sources or the conditions of the villages. Originally Abdullah had agreed to the appointment of three Palestinians. These members were dropped from the delegation due to the insistence of Abul Huda who believed that the presence of the Palestinian representatives would have made the negotiations difficult.

CHAPTER X

ANNEXATION OF PALESTINE

Prior to the withdrawal of the British forces from Palestine, during the period of guerilla warfare the mayors of Hebron and Gaza, Shiek Muhamad Jabari and Rashid Shawwa, were visited by Glubb Pasha, the commander of the Arab Legion. On May 15 the Legion moved into the area of Jericho and a large part of north Judea. The only opposition to this move were the voices of the Mufti and Egypt.³³³ After the initial phase of the war, when it was evident that the Arab forces were not going to be able to push the Jews into the sea, Abdullah undertook his ill-fated mission to secure the agreement of the other Arab countries, mainly Egypt and Saudi Arabia, to the annexation of the Palestine area by Transjordan. The plan of Abdullah caused an immediate reaction in the formation of the so called Gaza government under the rule of the Mufti of Jerusalem who had led the Arabs against the Jews and the British since the early days of the

³³³Esmond Wright, *op. cit.*, p. 445.

mandate.³³⁴ The Gaza government formed in 1948, caused a reaction in Palestine in the form of the National Palestine Congress headed by Ahmad Bey Khalil,³³⁵ a former magistrate of Haifa during the mandate. The National Palestine Congress held a conference December 1, 1948 at Jericho (This meeting is not to be confused with the Nablus meeting held two months later and headed by Sulayman Tuqan) Shiek Jabari headed the Jericho conference. Over 2,000 representatives of Palestine attended; including mayors, mukhtars, military governors, the delegates from the various refugee camps as well as the tribal leaders of the area.

The Jericho conference recognized King Abdullah As King of all Palestine and asked him to take steps for the unification of the two countries.³³⁶ The platform adopted at the congress included:

1. continuation of the fight for liberation of Palestine;

³³⁴George E. Kirk, A Short History of the Middle East, op. cit., p. 223 to 224. Richard N. Frye, op. cit., p. 168. The Arab League recognized the resolution of April 1948 as the binding agreement so that when the Arab Government of all Palestine was formed on September 20 and its first cabinet formed by Ahmad Hilmi Pasha of September 22 the other members of the League excepting Jordan recognized it as the legal government of Palestine. The Egyptian and Iraqi government recognized it October 1, 1948, Syria and Lebanon October 14, 1948.

³³⁵Esmond Wright, op. cit., p. 445.

³³⁶The Middle East Journal, Current Events, Vol. III, 1949, p. 198.

2. the union with Transjordan under the name of South Syria;

3. that in the government there would be an advisory committee of Palestine Arabs to assist Abdullah and represent the Palestinian percentage of the population.³³⁷ The request from the National Palestine Congress was forwarded to the cabinet in Amman. The action of the congress was favorably received by the cabinet on December 7. The proposed merger of the two countries was passed by both houses of the Jordanian parliament on the 13 December 1948.³³⁸ King Abdullah was aided in his declaration by the Ulema of Palestine that disregarded the ruling of al Azhar and on December 20 Abdullah appointed Shiek Husam al Din Jarallah to the post of mufti of Jerusalem leaving the title of ex-mufti for Haj Amin el Hussaini.³³⁹ Although the ex-mufti appealed to Ibn Saud for assistance and his agents continued to visit the refugees in the various camps. The influence of the ex-mufti was on the wane from this point.³⁴⁰

³³⁷ Esmond Wright, op. cit., p. 445.

³³⁸ The Middle East Journal, Current Events, Vol. III, 1949, p. 198.

³³⁹ Ibid., p. 195.

³⁴⁰ Esmond Wright, op. cit., p. 446 to 447.

The step of annexation of Arab Palestine was one that followed not only the character of Abdullah but of the character of all Arab monarchs. The annexation would give the Jordanian King a larger country and enhance his prestige. The fact that such an action was contrary to the agreements and detrimental to the cause of Arab unity was not considered.³⁴¹

Despite the individual motives, the annexation of the area into Transjordan was the only logical step. The area controlled by the Jordanian and the Iraqi forces had historically been united with Transjordan.³⁴² The advisability of this unity was shown by the recommendation of the Peel report of 1937. It also was the only way that an effective administration could be established in the area. The carrying out of this plan caused three distinct reactions:

1. The Arab;
2. The Israeli; and
3. The British.³⁴³

The action of Abdullah caused an almost unified denunciation by the Arab governments. The Syrian President

³⁴¹Elizabeth Monroe, op. cit., p. 56

³⁴²Esmond Wright, op. cit., p. 223.

³⁴³Greater Jordan, The Spectator, April 28, 1950, Vol. 184, p. 558.

Shukri Quwwatli declared that the move was inconsistent with the aims of the Arab armies. Iraq was against the move.³⁴⁴ King Farouk delivered a message to all the representatives of the Arab countries excepting Jordan declaring that the Jericho conference did not represent the decision of the Palestine people.³⁴⁵ Only Yemen quietly approved.³⁴⁶

A violent press campaign began against the move of Abdullah. Akhbar al Youm of March 18 to 25 declared that King Abdullah was a traitor and had been in touch with the Israeli government during the war.³⁴⁷ This was added to by reports from Colonel Abdullah al Tall, a former officer of the Arab Legion who was exiled to Egypt. Colonel Abdullah al Tall requested permission to testify before the Arab League Council stating that he had proof of Abdullah's intrigues with Israel during the war and proposed that the League should seek to have Abdullah abdicate if he refused to become a constitutional monarch.³⁴⁸

³⁴⁴Esmond Wright, op. cit., p. 445 to 446.

³⁴⁵The Middle East Journal, Current Events, Vol. III, 1949, p. 195.

³⁴⁶Esmond Wright, op. cit., p. 446.

³⁴⁷Middle Eastern Affairs, Current Events, Vol. I, 1950, p. 156.

³⁴⁸The Middle East Journal, Vol. IV, 1950, p. 339.

The position of the Arab countries was not strong at this point. Riots were occurring in Cairo and Alexandria. The Syrian³⁴⁹ government was weak due to the internal trouble caused by the Palestine war. (The coup of Colonel Zaim was brewing, although it did not occur until March 30 1949.)³⁵⁰ On the 27 of March, King Abdullah notified the Arab League that Jordan was boycotting the meeting; however, the Jordanian minister to Cairo Baha al Din Bey Tuqan stated that he had been instructed to attend the meeting but not to debate those questions over which authority had been denied by Amman.³⁵¹ It seemed that Jordan might have been expelled from the Arab League.³⁵² The political committee of the Arab League invited Ahmad Hilmi Pasha, Prime Minister of the all Palestine Gaza government, to attend the meeting and King Abdullah announced that Jordan would welcome expulsion from the Arab League if the League attempted to prevent the unification of the East and West banks. This pressure

³⁴⁹Esmond Wright, op. cit., p. 445.

³⁵⁰George Lenczowski, op. cit., p. 252.

³⁵¹The Middle East Journal, Vol. IV, 1950, p. 339.

³⁵²Middle Eastern Affairs (monthly), Council For Middle Eastern Affairs, N. Y. N. Y. Vol. IV, 1950, Current Events, p. 253.

brought by Jordan was added to by the decision of the Legal department of the League that the Jordan annexation of Arab Palestine provided no grounds for the League to rule against Jordan. Following this, Jordan officially notified the other Arab countries that it considered the annexation of Arab Palestine irrevocable and not open to further discussion.³⁵³ The only accomplishments of the League were a series of negative agreements most of which were directed against Jordan such as any state that signed a separate peace with Israel would be expelled from the League.³⁵⁴

The Jewish state was opposed to the annexation of Palestine. The inclusion of Palestine in the state of Transjordan meant that the new Zionist state would have a stronger neighbor on the east bank; however, on April 3, 1949, with the signing of the Rhodes agreement, the Zionist state recognized the inclusion of the area into the state of Jordan.³⁵⁵

It is difficult to determine exactly what the official British view was at the time, however, subsequent

³⁵³The Middle East Journal, Current Events, Vol. IV, 1950, p. 339.

³⁵⁴Middle Eastern Affairs (monthly), Current Events, Vol. I, 1950, p. 156.

³⁵⁵Esmond Wright, op. cit., p. 449.

events indicate that the British government favored the annexation of the Arab section of Palestine and aided and advised Abdullah to continue towards its annexation. There is no evidence of any block or hinderance being placed in the way by the British government.

CHAPTER XI

THE GOVERNMENT OF TRANSJORDAN

1945 TO JULY 1951

Intergradation of Palestine

Into The Government

During the initial invasion and occupation of Palestine, the west bank had been governed by a centralized military government. This government was headed by a governor general of all Transjordan occupied territory (Umar Matar Pasha). Before being able to present to the Arab League meeting in March of 1949 a fait accompli regarding the annexation of Palestine, it was necessary to establish a civil government in the area. The form of the government remained much the same, however, civilians were appointed to fill the post previously occupied by military officers. Na'im Tuqan became governor of Hebron and was responsible for the organization of local administration. Ahmad Khalil was appointed governor of Ramallah and Samaria and Abdullah Tall the governor of the Old City of Jerusalem.³⁵⁶

³⁵⁶ Esmond Wright, op. cit., p. 448. Abdullah Tall resigned his military commission to accept the appointment as governor of Jerusalem as a civilian. He later was convicted in absentia as being the person responsible for planning the assassination of Abdullah.

The problem of intergradating the west bank into the government came at a difficult time. During the Palestine war there had been a growth of corruption and bureaucracy within the government as well as a tendency to label all radical thoughts as being communistic.³⁵⁷ The government of Transjordan was not given time to straighten its own house. The Jericho conference had indicated that the Palestinian elements were anxious and determined to take their rightful place in government in accordance with their new citizenship extended by King Abdullah prior to the March meeting of the Arab League.

To begin the merger with the west bank, the government of Transjordan took several steps. The cabinet was reformed on May 3 to include three Palestinian representatives thus fulfilling the conditions of the Jericho conference.³⁵⁸ Palestinians were appointed to high positions in the government such as Ragheb Pasha Nashashibi to the post of custodian of the holy places in Jerusalem (January 15, 1950).³⁵⁹ These appointees were

³⁵⁷ Ineffective Arabs, The Spectator, April 14, 1950, p. 487.

³⁵⁸ The Middle East Journal, Current Events, Vol. III, 1949, p. 323. The cabinet that was formed on May 3 included Taufiq Abul Huda, Prime Minister; Ruhi Bey Abdul Hadi (Palestinian), Foreign Affairs; Musa al Nasir (Palestinian), Minister of Communication; Fawzi al Mulqi, Minister of National Defense; Sulayman al Sukkar, Minister of Finance and Economy; Said al Mufti, Minister of Interior; Falah Madahah, Minister of Justice; Khuluisi al Khayri (Palestinian), Minister of Agriculture and Commerce; Shiekh Muhammad al Shanqiti, Minister of Education and Qadi.

³⁵⁹ Esmond Wright, op. cit., p. 456.

mainly influential political leaders who had supported Abdullah in the annexation of Palestine. On June 1, 1949 the name of the country was officially changed to The Hashemite Kingdom of the Jordan.³⁶⁰ The most important was the passing of the laws that guaranteed the political rights of the Palestinians.

The laws and regulations that extended political rights to the Palestinians appeared in the Official Gazette on December 20, 1949. It officially extended Jordanian citizenship to all Palestine citizens. Included were laws regulating the house of deputies and the chamber of notables amended to equally represent the west bank. The chamber of deputies was dissolved as of the 1st of January 1950 and new elections provided for.³⁶¹ In March 1950 it was announced that the cabinet after the elections would be responsible to the chamber of deputies and not the King.³⁶² This announcement was made primarily to satisfy the demands of the Palestinians.

Registration for the new Parliament began in January. More than 300,000 voters registered, half were registered in the west bank section.³⁶³

³⁶⁰Seton Willdams, op. cit., p. 254.

³⁶¹Official Gazette, December 20, 1949.

³⁶²Esmond Wright, op. cit., p. 456.

³⁶³The Middle East Journal, Current Events, Vol. III, 1949, op. cit., p. 449.

CHAPTER XII

THE ELECTIONS OF 1950

Before the elections took place, the action of Abdullah in attempting negotiations without the help of the United Nations Conciliatory Commission, an Israel/Jordan five year non-aggression pact precipitated a crisis in the government. The disclosure by Israel of the negotiations caused the resignation of the Abul Huda government on March 2, 1950 in disagreement with the pact. Following the fall of the government, Samir Pasha al Rifa'i was unable to form a cabinet and Abul Huda again took control of the government presumably under the understanding that the continuation of negotiations would be dropped.³⁶⁴ The Abul Huda government remained in power until April 2 when the cabinet resigned prior to the election of April 11. Abul Huda was appointed to the council of notables by King Abdullah on the day of the elections.³⁶⁵

This cabinet action of the Abul Huda government

³⁶⁴Miriam Freund, Intra Arab Tensions Hamper Palestine Settlement, Foreign Policy Bulletin, May 5, 1950, Vol. XXIX, No. 30.

³⁶⁵The Middle East Journal, Current Events, Vol. IV, 1950, p. 339.

was the first time that the legislative body had successfully defeated the desires of King Abdullah. It was an introduction to what was to take place in the coming elections.

The elections of April 11, 1950 were not typical of those that had been carried out in the past. An active political minded opposition was now present with the educated Palestinians taking part in the government. The ex-mufti agitated against the elections, announcing that the participation in the election was recognizing the partition of Palestine between Great Britain and the Jews. Within Jordan there were disturbances in Hebron, Nablus and the Old City of Jerusalem. Some of the Palestine editors as Dawud al Isa openly opposed the policy of Abdullah towards peace with Israel. An opposition party al Ba'th (not officially recognized by the government) was active in opposing the Abdullah candidates and succeeded in having Abdullah Rimawi (Ramallah), Abdullah Nawas (Christian Arab representative from Jerusalem) and Kamal Barakat and Mustafa Bushnaq, (former supporters of the mufti) elected to the Legislative council.³⁶⁶

Following the elections the opposition vigorously disputed the results. It was claimed that there were

³⁶⁶Esmond Wright, op. cit., p. 457.

forged ballots and one district was reported to have voted more than 100 per cent of the electorate.³⁶⁷ It was evident after this election that the dictatorial methods of King Abdullah would have to be revised as the new Palestinian element would no longer accept without dispute, riots, and argument the methods that had been so successfully used in the past. In spite of the claims of the opposition, the new legislative council was formed³⁶⁸ and twenty representatives from the west bank took their place in the legislative body. Of the 20 east bank representatives seven were returned unopposed.³⁶⁹

On April 17, 1950 King Abdullah appointed twenty senators to the chamber of notables, seven of which were Palestinians, most of which were royal supporters.³⁷⁰

One of the first actions of the new Jordan Parliament was to pass a resolution recognizing the union

³⁶⁷Ibid.

³⁶⁸The Middle East Journal, Current Events, Vol. IV, 1950, p. 339. The government that was formed following the elections was as follows: Said al Mufti, Prime Minister; Falah al Madadiah, Minister of Interior; Fawzi al Mulqi, Minister of Defense; Sulayman al Sukkar, Minister of Finance; Shiekh Muhammad al Shanqiti, Minister of Education and Chief Cadi; Raghib Nashashibi, Minister of Agriculture; Ruhi Pasha Abdul Hadi, Minister of Justice; Ahmad Touqan, Minister of Public Works and Construction; Sa'id Ala al Din, Minister of Commerce; Anastas Hananya, Minister of Posts and Telegraphs. This cabinet included five Palestinian representatives.

³⁶⁹Esmond Wright, op. cit., p. 456.

³⁷⁰Ibid., p. 457. The Middle East Journal, Current Events, Vol. IV, 1950, p. 339.

of the east and west banks into the country of Jordan. The two houses approved the annexation without prejudice to final settlement of the Israel Jordan boundary. On the 25 of April Muhammad Pasha Shurayqi, Minister of Exterior, formally notified the United Nations of the annexation.³⁷¹ On April 27 Great Britain approved the annexation with reservation regarding the boundaries between the two countries.³⁷²

Prime Minister, Said Pasha Mufti, on the 28 of April, announced to the Associated Press, the Jordan position on the annexation of Palestine. This included:

1. There had been no change in the Jordan attitude towards the Arab League since the signing.

2. It was hoped that the Arab states would not hinder the settlement of the Palestine government if this settlement was in the interest of the Palestinian Arabs.

3. The annexation had been recognized by the British government.

4. Jordan is willing to justify her actions to the Arab League in order to maintain good relations with the other Arab states.

³⁷¹The Middle East Journal, Ibid., 1950, p. 340.

³⁷²The Times, London, April 28, 1950. Esmond Wright, op. cit., p. 457.

5. Jordan does not desire to withdraw from the Arab League but if the Arab League rejects the annexation the government is unable to foretell the results.

6. The government of Jordan is opposed to the internationalization of Jerusalem.

The change that had taken place in the government due to the inclusion of the Palestinian elements was more evident in the summer months. The Parliament was active in criticising the government. In order to quell the rising disagreements Sa'id Pasha al Mufti reformed his government on October 12.³⁷³ Abdullah on November 1, 1950 announced in his speech from the throne that the Committee of Constitutional amendments had made progress

³⁷³The Middle East Journal, Current Events, Vol. V, 1951, p. 82.

The aims of the second government of Sa'id Pasha al Mufti were to co-operate and remain in the Arab League and to establish diplomatic relations with Syria. In the speech from the throne, Abdullah stated that the desires of the government were to strengthen all the aspects of life in the country. He approved the establishments of estimates in regard to major projects such as the port of Aqaba.

The cabinet of the second government was composed of: Sa'id Pasha al Mufti, Prime Minister; Ruhi Pasha Abdul Hadi, Minister of Foreign Affairs; Ahmad Bey Tarawni, Minister of Trade and Agriculture; Hashim Bey Jayyusi, Minister of Transport; Muhammad al Shurayqi, Minister of Justice; Ahmad Bey Tuqan, Minister of Education; Anastas Bey Hananya, Minister of Reconstruction; Fawzi Pasha al Mulqi, Minister of Defense. On the 11 of November, Muhammad al Shurayqi, Minister of Justice and Acting Minister of Education resigned; Abdul Rahman Pasha Khalifah assumed the post of Acting Minister of Justice and Shiek Abd Ghoshah (Cadi) assumed the post of Acting Minister of Education.

as had the Committee of Legal unification; the Department of Agriculture had been expanded as had the Departments of Public Works, Post and Telegraph and Health.³⁷⁴ Neither the new government of al Mufti nor the speech of Abdullah decreased the feeling against the government.

Parliament attacked the dominant position of the British in Jordan. The military arrangements on the treaty of 1948 were condemned as they made the Arab Legion for all intensive purposes a British force. The existence of British air bases in Jordan was considered an infringement on sovereignty of Jordan.³⁷⁵ On the 28 of November anti-British demonstrations took place in Amman.³⁷⁶ Glubb Pasha, the commander of the Arab Legion was attacked by the press in December as the Arab Legion had not been active in resisting the occupation of the Rutenberg area by the Israeli forces.³⁷⁷ Criticism reached such a point that King Abdullah imposed a press censorship on parliamentary procedures. The Sa'id Mufti government was dissolved and Samin Pasha Rifa'i asked to form a new government.

³⁷⁴Middle Eastern Affairs, Council of Middle Eastern Affairs, N. Y., N. Y., Vol. I, 1950, p. 331, Current Events.

³⁷⁵The Middle East Journal, Current Events, Vol. V, 1951, p. 82.

³⁷⁶Ibid.

³⁷⁷Esmond Wright, op. cit., p. 458.

The government of Sa'id Mufti had very little opportunity to pass constructive legislation. As has been mentioned the constitutional amendments committee was working towards making the constitution more compatible with the Palestinian section of the population. The government did succeed in passing a law that would move all major government departments from Jerusalem to Amman for easier ministerial control.³⁷⁸ This governmental move was to be completed by April 1, 1951 and caused adverse comments from Palestine.

Samir Pasha al Rifa'i after forming his government,³⁷⁹ allegedly made his statement of policy deliberately ambiguous. The opposition especially from the Palestinian side was so strong that it was necessary to reimpose strict censorship of the press.³⁸⁰ The Rifa'i government in spite of its beginning was able to complete some work. On January 13 a proposal was made for the creation of a Higher Economic Council that was formed on January 27 consisting of the minister of economy and finance, minister of industry and trade, financial undersecretary, the directory of the statistics department and the

³⁷⁸The Middle East Journal, Current Events, Vol. V, 1951, p. 82.

³⁷⁹Middle Eastern Affairs (Monthly), Council for Middle Eastern Affairs Inc. N. Y., Vol. II, 1951, Current Events, November.

³⁸⁰Ibid.

director of the Ottoman Banks.³⁸¹ This council was to study the overall financial problems of Jordan and recommend the expenditure of funds. Also a council of the Ulema was formed as the highest religious authority in Jordan. This council represented the first of its kind in Jordan. Shiek Muhammad al Amin al Shanqiti was appointed as the first president of the council.³⁸² A social welfare five year plan was approved for the establishment of new hospitals and the necessary funds were allotted.³⁸³ The Rifa'i government was soon in difficulty as the opposition had found a weak spot, the budget. On April 25 Sulayman Pasha al Nabulsi, minister of finance stated that the expenditures of Jordan were estimated at JD.13,500,000 and revenue estimated at JD.11,700,000.³⁸⁴ January of the same year, Abdullah had attempted to secure an increase in the British grant necessitated by the new financial responsibilities of Palestine such as the liabilities of the Palestine government, pensions of mandatory government officials and other problems.³⁸⁵ The opposition ignored these factors and criticised the budget

³⁸¹The Middle East Journal, Current Events, Vol. V, 1951, p. 207.

³⁸²The Middle East Journal, Current Events, Vol. V, 1951, p. 206.

³⁸³Ibid., p. 346.

³⁸⁴Ibid.,

³⁸⁵Esmond Wright, op. cit., p. 458 to 459.

claiming that sixty five per cent of the budget was for the army and twenty per cent of the remainder for the expense of the Royal Household Regiment.³⁸⁶ The development projects of Aqaba were considered to be inadequate and the expenditures for public services considered excessive. In addition the Ulema Council and the Zaka tax were extremely unpopular with the opposition. This difficulty arose mainly as King Abdullah had allowed the budget to be debated when the finances of the country were not only stretched by the inclusion of Palestine but dependent upon the British grant in aid.³⁸⁷ Prime minister Rifa'i attempted to stop the rising dessionion by reshuffling his cabinet in March prior to the debate on the budget.³⁸⁸ King Abdullah after seeing the stand of the opposition was unchanged, dissolved parliament on the 3 of May 1951 and called for new elections within

³⁸⁶The Middle East Journal, Current Events, Vol. V, 1951, p. 346.

³⁸⁷Esmond Wright, op. cit., p. 458 to 459.

³⁸⁸The Middle East Journal, Vol. V, 1951, p. 345, Current Events.

The cabinet as of April 1951 was as follows: Samir Pasha Rifa'i, Prime Minister; Shiekh Abdullah Ghosha, Cadi; Suleiman Pasha Nabulsi, Minister of Finance; Anistas Bey Hananya, Minister of Foreign Affairs; Ahmad Bey Tuqan, Minister of Education; Hashim Bey Jayyousi, Minister of Agriculture, Development; Jamil Pasha Tutunji, Minister of Social Welfare; Anwar Bey Khâtib, Minister of Justice; Bishara Bey Husayn, Minister of Communication.

four months.³⁸⁹

Before the new election could be held King Abdullah was shot July 20, 1951 in the Omar Mosque. *This is wrong. It actually takes in al-Aqsa Mosque.*

The period 1945 to 1951 marked a complete change in the government of Jordan. The position of the King was no longer considered in the light of a tribal form of government. The Palestinian elements that were aware of the use and powers of the legislative council were anxious to utilize the years of training they had under the British. They were not content to allow the King to rule in the name of a constitutional monarchy. It can safely be said that democracy in Jordan took root during this time. The methods of Abdullah were outmoded; it was time for a change. Perhaps one of the most fortunate events for the continued advancement of democracy in Jordan was the death of King Abdullah. It relieved the heavy hand of his position and allowed the country to continue to advance on a democratic line.

³⁸⁹ Ibid.

On March 2, Khalid Bey al Husaynit, the UNRWA assistant controller for the Nablus area was shot while leaving his car to enter his home. This incident was reported to have been completely unrelated to UNRWA activities, however, it is interesting that it occurred during the heat of the discussion over finances much of which dealt with the relief and reconstruction programs of the government.

CHAPTER XIII

THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL 1951 to 1952

The death of King Abdullah (July 20, 1951) occurred at an unfortunate time. The legislative council had been dissolved by Abdullah and new elections had not taken place. At this time Tawfiq Abul Huda came forward to grasp the reins of government. Abul Huda had been the prime minister during most of the war years. He is a frail long nosed man with a fading voice and deceptively wild manner. His enemies consider him one of the shrewdest of men and his friends assert that he is the most realistic leader. He had long been considered by the west to be the most qualified man to continue running Jordan.³⁹⁰

On July 24, the old legislative council met and prime minister Samir al Rifa'i resigned. Tawfiq Abul Huda formed his cabinet the following day.³⁹¹ It was the government of Abul Huda that was faced with the difficult problem of succession. Crown Prince Talal at

³⁹⁰ Samir Souki, Red Wedge in the Middle East, News Week, November 1954, p. 26.

³⁹¹ The Middle East Journal, Current Events, Vol. V, p. 490, 1951. Tawfiq Abul Huda, Prime Minister; Minister of Foreign Affairs; Sa'id Mufti Pasha, Vice Prime Minister and Minister of Interior; Sulayman Bey Tuqan, Minister of Defense; Shiek, Muhammad Amin al Shanqiti, Cadi; Muhammad Khalifeh Pasha, Minister of Finance; Sulayman Sukkar Pasha, Minister of Commerce Industry and National Economy; Dr. Jamil al Tutunji Pasha, Minister of Health and Social Affairs; Ruhi Abdul Hadi Pasha, Minister of Education; Hashim Bey al Jayyusi, Minister of Communications; Anistas Bey Hananiya, Minister of Development, Reconstruction and Agriculture; Falah al Madadiah Pasha, Minister of Justice.

that time was in Switzerland undergoing medical treatment for a nervous breakdown.³⁹² It was mainly through the efforts of Abul Huda that the situation was promptly settled. (see position of king 1945 to 1954). The obvious condition of the Crown Prince placed an additional load on the shoulders of the legislative branch.

The government in the hands of Abul Huda represented not a legislative or a representative government but an interim vehicle by which to transfer the power that had been held by the King to the legislative branch or to the prime minister. The greatest problem that had to be faced was to fulfill at least in appearance the desires of the west bank in maintaining a representative government. Elections for the new legislative assembly were scheduled for August 29. Although the first municipal elections since the end of the mandate were postponed by the crisis of the assassination, the government rapidly re-scheduled them for December 30.³⁹³

The August elections brought a great deal of political activity in the country. Candidates actively campaigned, the opposition and the government formed into groups that might be called parties. These groups were

³⁹²George Lenczowski, op. cit., p. 308.

³⁹³The Middle East Journal, Current Events, Vol. V, 1951, p. 206. Mariam Zarour, Ramallah, My Home Town, The Middle East Journal, Autumn 1953, p. 430.

under the leadership of the candidate and represented individual views more than principles of a party. Election pamphlets appeared from the Popular Bloc (a group of young men with an anti-British platform that advocated the realization of the freedoms that were outlined in the constitution) and the communist party. The elections were carried out in an orderly fashion. Abul Huda and his supporters returned to parliament. The first government formed on September 8 was essentially the same government that had existed prior to the elections. This gave time for the government to continue its transfer of powers and the continuation of not a smooth government, a consistent policy during this difficult period.

Arab relations under King Talal were not the same as his father's. Following his proclamation as King on September 5 he requested Abul Huda to announce the discontinuation of plans for the Fertile Crescent. The King then proceeded into the camp that had continually fought his father by a state visit to Riyadh and by his support of Egypt.

³⁹⁴The Middle East Journal, Current Events, Vol. VI, 1952, p. 77. The cabinet consisted of the following: *indicates new appointees: Tawfiq Abul Huda, Prime Minister; Minister of Foreign Affairs; Said Mufti Pasha, Vice Prime Minister; Muhammad al Amin al Shanqiti, Cadi; Ruhi Bey Abd al Hadi, Minister of Education; Sulayman al Sukkar, Minister of Trade and Industry; Anastas Hananya, Minister of Justice and Reconstruction; Jamil Pasha Tutunji (April 30, 1952 al Sayyid Khulusi al Khayri*) Social Affairs and Health; Hashim Bey Jayyusi*, Minister of Commerce and Public Works; Sulayman Touqan, Minister of Agriculture and Defense, replaced April 30, 1952 Al Sayyid Ahmad al Tarwana* as Minister of Agriculture); Abd al Halim Hanuud*, Minister of Finance.

Relations with Britain were not as amicable as they had been. This was caused by the Anglo-Egyptian crisis. It is reported that the Egyptian government offered to supply officers for the Arab Legion and to subsidise the country if Jordan would follow Egypt's lead. Talal did not avail himself of this offer;³⁹⁵ however, the feeling in Jordan was openly in favor of Egypt. In September a trade agreement was signed between Egypt and Jordan.³⁹⁶ Demonstrations occurred in Amman in October and November in sympathy with the Egyptians.

Although the anti-British sentiment was strong the fact remained that the finances of Jordan were dependent upon the British grants in aid. The economic problems of the country were discussed in Parliament in December. There developed the belief that the solution for the complete independence for Jordan lay in the unity with one of the other Arab countries. Ex-Prime Minister Samir Pasha Rifa'i was especially active during this time in advocating financial independence through union with Iraq.³⁹⁷

³⁹⁵George Lenczowski, op. cit., p. 308. Other sources state that this at the most was a newspaper offer.

³⁹⁶Al Urdon, Thursday, September 27, 1951.

³⁹⁷The Middle East Journal, Current Events, Vol. VI, 1952, p. 216. Other well informed sources state that for Samir Pasha Rifa'i to make such a statement is illogical as he was at odds with Nuri Sa'id and opposed to any union.

The most important move taken by the September 1951 government of Abul Huda was the announcement of the amendment to the constitution. This had been discussed and debated under the earlier Sa'id Mufti government of 1950, however, as long as Abdullah was King, there was little probability that it would have been carried out. The amendments were: to make the cabinet responsible to the parliament; the consent of parliament would be required for the signing of any treaty of alliance; parliament would on a 2/3 vote have the right of censor of its members; and that a vote of no confidence from the parliament would require the resignation of the government.³⁹⁸ In effect all the measures of the amendment were directed towards limiting the powers of the King. The right of the King to dissolve parliament, and the royal veto were to be abolished leaving the power of the King much as visualized in a constitutional monarchy.

The government freed all those sentenced and held in custody under Abdullah on charges of taking part in subversive activities. Many of those accused had been merely in opposition to the programs of King Abdullah and their action did not reflect any move towards the

³⁹⁸The Middle East Journal, Current Events, Vol. VI, 1952, p. 77.

communist party or movement for the overthrow of the government.³⁹⁹

The Abul Huda government was faced with the problems of the Palestine border incidents, the refugees, the status of the state of Israel combined with the external relations of the Anglo-Egyptian controversy and relations between the Arab states.⁴⁰⁰ The government under Abul Huda either faced or settled these problems in such a way that the least resentment possible resulted in the country. The west bank Palestinians were appointed to a greater number of government posts⁴⁰¹ and the coming into effect of the new constitution in January 1, 1952 continued to reduce the criticism from the Palestinian elements of the government.

³⁹⁹The Middle East Journal, Current Events, Vol. VI, 1952, p. 77.

Although it was announced that persons would no longer be arrested under the Defense regulation that permitted the imprisonment of persons without trial and denied the right of *Habitus Corpus*, the government was active in arresting and sentencing members of the proven Communist party. On February 20, 1952 Fu'ad Nassir and three of his associates, the leaders of the Communist party in Jordan were sentenced to ten years imprisonment, Salim Elias Mitri, Gabir Husayn Gabir, and Elias Hanna Shamma members of the party were each sentenced to six years imprisonment.

⁴⁰⁰Ibid., Abul Huda in October 1951 visited Ibn Saud in Saudi Arabia and in November made a state visit to Syria and Lebanon in regard to the exchange of envoys between the countries. March 19, 1952, Colonel Fawzi Silu the Syrian Chief of State and Colonel Adib Shishakli Chief of Staff began official talks with Jordan in regard to economic agreements and the Yarmuk river dam at Wadi al Dalil.

⁴⁰¹Ibid. The cabinet of Abul Huda contained four Palestinians of the seven appointed. Other appointments to important government positions had continued since the annexation.

CHAPTER XIV

THE CONSTITUTION OF JANUARY 1, 1952

The Constitution of January 1, 1952 consisted of nine parts; Government and Form of Regime; Rights and Duties of the Jordanian People; Powers of the State; the Executive power (the King and his rights, the ministers). The Legislative Power, The Judiciary, Finance, Miscellaneous, and Repeals.

Many of the sections of the Constitution were directed towards the correction of the situations that had existed under the leadership of King Abdullah, while others were the inclusion of those principles that were demanded by the Palestinian element of the country. In the discussion of the Constitution those points that are considered important will be discussed, however, a detailed analysis of the Constitution will not be given.

The rights and duties of the Jordanian people included the rectification of many of the evils that had been complained of in the past. Personal liberties were more rigidly defined such as: no person shall be detained or imprisoned except in accordance with the law, no Jordanian shall be exiled, or prevented from residing anywhere, freedom of speech and press (publication of

newspapers could not be suspended nor may their license be withdrawn, a limited censorship may be imposed in case of martial law or emergency, however, the law shall specify the manner of censoring the materials), freedom of holding meetings and forming societies and political parties within the limits of the law, elementary education shall be compulsory and free in government schools, and the position of labor shall be protected.

The Constitution recognized that the source of power of the government lay in the hands of the people. The execution of the government to be by the King through his ministers.

The King's rights were limited by the Constitution. The King was recognized as the head of the state but his power lay in the hands of the House of Representatives. All Royal jurisdiction was required to be by Iradas and signed by the Prime Minister and the Minister or Ministers concerned. As important in this section of the Constitution is the detailed line of secession that included every possibility that might arise.

The Constitution entrusted the council of ministers with the conduct of all affairs of state whether
internal

or external. Although the decisions of the council were to be submitted to the King for approval they were to be implemented by the council of ministers and oral or written orders of the King could not release the minister from this responsibility. The prime minister and the minister are to be collectively responsible before the House of Representatives for matters of general policy of the state. Each minister is responsible to the House for his individual ministry. The Council of Ministers is bound to resign on the 2/3 vote of no confidence from the House of Representatives, and every new government must receive a vote of confidence on its program. Also within the Constitution were detailed specifications on the censor and trying of ministers in the government.

The legislative power of the government of Jordan was vested into two houses, the Senate and House of Representatives. The Senate could not exceed half the number of the members of the House of Representatives. Although the King had the right to appoint members to the Senate the Constitution specified the qualifications for eligibility. The Senate met at the same time that the House of Representatives and if the House was dissolved the Senate by law would be suspended. The term of office for the Senate was eight years.

The House of Representatives is elected for four years unless dissolved. The King may dissolve the House

by Irada three times only, however, he may convene the National assembly for certain matters specified in the Irada. Each secession called by Irada must be dissolved by Irada. The National Assembly may also be convened by the King to meet in extraordinary session with a signed petition signed by the majority of the members. The petition must specify the matter which is to be discussed.

After a law had been passed by both houses, it must have the approval of the King and be published in the official gazette to be officially in force. If the King withholds his approval, he may return the law to the National Assembly within a space of six months from the time submitted to him. Upon being returned to the National Assembly for the second time it may become law with the approval of 2/3 of the National Assembly. If the measure fails to secure the necessary 2/3rd vote it may not be resubmitted until the following meeting of the National Assembly.

Within the Constitution provisions were made for the formation of the Diwan Khas or Special Councils to interpret any law which has not been ruled on by the courts. The decisions of the council shall be published in the Official Gazette and have the force of law.⁴⁰²

⁴⁰² The Middle East Journal, Vol. VI, 1952, Translation of the Constitution of Jordan.

The importance of the new Constitution lay in the fact that the power of the King was limited and the powers of the legislative body and the rights of the people defined. It was no longer possible for a king of the power of Abdullah to assume control and rule the country as it had been done in the past, in fact, the power lay now in the hands of Abul Huda and the legislative body. At the present, although the position of the King does enter into the government of Jordan, the powers that were held by Abdullah are now vested in the cabinet. The legislative body has assumed importance that was previously denied it. The power of the King lies within two articles; the power to appoint to the Council of Notables, and the right to allow a law to lay for six months before acting or the option of returning it to the National Assembly for an overriding vote.

From the promulgation of the Constitution of January 1, 1952 to the present time there may be said to exist a democratic form of government in Jordan. The form of government in fact had advanced faster than the ability of the people to accept and take part in a true representative government, however, with the inclusion of the more educated and political ^{As} conscious Palestinians the newly authorized constitutional democracy continued to develop.

CHAPTER XV

THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL

JANUARY 1952 TO 1954

The problem of Israeli-Jordan relations continued to consume much of the time of the government and the politicians. In addition from the time of passing of the Constitution until the crowning of King Hussain, the problem of the cession of the King was of major concern to Abul Huda and the government. Rather than to include the discussion of these problems under the legislative branch they have been discussed under the separated heading of the Israeli problem and the position of the King.

During May and June 1952, the condition of the King became critical. A regency council was appointed to carry out the duties of Talal.⁴⁰³ On September 30 Abul Huda resigned his government to the regency council and reformed his government.⁴⁰⁴ The position of Abul Huda

⁴⁰³Middle Eastern Affairs, Current Events, Vol. III, 1952, p. 211. The Regency council consisted of: Prime Minister Abul Huda; Speaker of the Senate, Ibrahim Pasha Hashim; Speaker of the House of Deputies, Abdullah Pasha el Kuleib;

⁴⁰⁴The Middle East Journal, Current Events, Vol. VII, 1953, p. 64. The new cabinet consisted of: Tawfiq Abul Huda, Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of Defense; Sa'id al Mufti, Vice Prime Minister

as the head of both the regency council and the government was the subject of attack mainly from the Palestinian elements.

In addition to the criticism of the position of Abul Huda in the government, most Palestinians believed that the west bank was not receiving its share of consideration in government and that preference was being shown to the east bank. The defense regulations which in the past had been utilized by Abdullah were criticised as arrests under these laws were made without the benefit of the right of Habeas corpus. The government in October of 1952 began a program of appeasement towards the west bank. The defense regulations were amended so that excepting the cases that involved border incidents and infiltrations, the right of Habeas corpus could not be violated, and persons arrested were guaranteed a hearing. In addition a deputy minister of interior was appointed in Jerusalem.

The deputy minister of interior of the west bank is responsible for the municipalities and districts of Palestine, however, the minister of interior and the

of Interior; Abd al Halim al Nemr, Minister of Education; Khulusi al Khayri, Minister of Economy and Commerce; Ahmad al Tarawinah, Minister of Agriculture; Jamil al Tutunji, Minister of Health and Social Affairs; Musa Nasir, Minister of Finance; Anwar Nusaybah, Minister of Construction and Development; Ali Hasna, Minister of Justice; Saba Akasha, Minister of Communication.

Amman government remained the controlling force.⁴⁰⁵ The titles of Pasha and Bey were abolished in August 1952 as these titles had been conferred mainly on Transjordanians.⁴⁰⁶ These moves did not ease the strife between the two banks.

On November 12 the Abul Huda government received a vote of confidence.⁴⁰⁷ Following this a crisis occurred in the relations between the two banks caused by a Bedouin representative (a firm supporter of Abul Huda) openly attacking in Parliament the East Bank. This speech solidified East Bank opposition that was to continue into 1953. Demonstrations took place in Jerusalem, Nablus, and Ramallah on November 14, and on the following day, students in Amman went on strike calling for the dismissal of the government.⁴⁰⁸

The reason for the fall of the Abul Huda government and the opposition to the government was the disagreement between the views of the two banks. Other sources give reasons that are considered secondary in comparison with the East West Bank struggle. Among these reasons are:

1. Failure to release all political prisoners.
2. Failure to pass legislation for, or to encourage the formation of political parties.

⁴⁰⁵Interview.

⁴⁰⁶Middle Eastern Affairs, Current Events, Vol. III, 1952, p. 211.

⁴⁰⁷The Middle East Journal, Current Events, Vol. VII, 1953, p. 64. The vote of confidence was given by twenty two of the members of the house of deputies that remained after the opposition had walked out of the meeting.

⁴⁰⁸The Middle East Journal, Current Events, Vol. VII, 1953, p. 64.

3. Attacks on Abul Huda as being a tool of the British and his action in applying the defense regulations in suppression of the newspapers.

4. Attacks on the government over the existing situation on the border, especially after the announcing of the Israel policy in selling Arab lands that had been left by the refugees.

The leadership of Abul Huda was essential during⁴⁰⁹ this time. His strong hand had led Jordan through its most difficult period. He had assumed control on the death of Abdullah, passed the new Constitution, led the government during the difficult time of the succession of the throne, and maintained the constitutional monarchy until the new king was able to take his place. It is not being over speculative by saying that without Abul Huda Jordan had every chance of becoming either a republic or completely anti-British, or subjected to the desires of the Arab League due to the discord that had developed between the two banks. The anti-British feeling that had been introduced by the Palestinians initially was strong enough to have resulted in breaking relations with England at the expense of the grant in aid that assured the independence of Jordan. Although this feeling was not overcome, it was placated to the point that the constitutional monarchy was well established. By the end of the Abul Huda government, the traditional position of Jordan allied with the west more than the

⁴⁰⁹Various interviews.

Arab League had been maintained. As it will be seen Abul Huda comes to the front when there is need for a strong man to maintain this position, however, in his sincere interest towards the country of Jordan he relinquishes his position to others when it seems that the government or the international situation is stable enough to permit it.

With the proclamation of the new King, Abul Huda following the constitution tendered his resignation and the new King Hussain requested Fawzi al Mulky to form his government which he did on May 5, 1953.⁴¹⁰

The government of Fawzi al Mulky has been called an experiment in true democracy.⁴¹¹ The problem of the unification of the east and the west banks demanded that the regulations be loosened. There was freedom of expression and action that had never before been found in Jordan.⁴¹²

⁴¹⁰The Middle East Journal, Current Events, Vol. VII, 1953, p. 354. The new cabinet was composed of five members of Abul Huda government and five new members with no previous experience. The cabinet consisted of: Fawzi al Mulky, Prime Minister and Minister of Defense; Sa'id al Mufti, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of State; Sulayman Sukkar, Minister of Finance; Ahmad Tuqan, Minister of Education; Anistas Hananya, Commerce; Husayne al Khalidi, Foreign Affairs and Chief Justice; Bahgat al Talhameni, Interior; Mustafa Khalifeh, Health, Social Affairs; Anwar al Khatib, Economy, Development and Reconstruction; Hikmat al Masri, Agriculture; Shafiq Rashidat, Communications and Justice. On November 6, 1953 the cabinet was changed as follows: Husayne al Khalidi Social Welfare; Bahjat al Talhuni, Interior and Justice; Hazzah Majali, Interior (new member); Shafiq Rashidat, relinquished position of Justice.

⁴¹¹Souki Sam, Red Wedge in the Middle East, News-Week, November 1954, p. 26, Special Report on Jordan.

⁴¹²Ibid.

This freedom was used by political groups for the normal and orderly development of democracy. However, the communist elements exploited to an increasing degree these rights to infiltrate the political thought of the country.⁴¹³

The new cabinet moved to Jerusalem for the first time since partition and it was planned to set up offices in the holy City responsible to the minister of state in Amman.⁴¹⁴ This move was primarily to appease the west bank and had no permanent results other than the holding of one parliamentary meeting in the City and the return of the government to Amman.⁴¹⁵

The Mulky government established a Supreme Council of Defense to counteract the criticism, the Arab Legion was an instrument of the British.⁴¹⁶ This council had control of both the National Guard and the Arab Legion.

Constitutional amendments were debated. The

⁴¹³Ibid.

⁴¹⁴The Middle East Journal, Current Events, Vol. VII, 1953, p. 512.

⁴¹⁵Interviews.

⁴¹⁶The Middle East Journal, Current Events, Vol. VIII, 1954, p. 80.

The Council consists of the Ministers of Defense Finance, Interior, Foreign Affairs, The Chief of Staff and two senior officers of the Arab Legion.

amendment regarding the power of the King to dissolve either or both of the Houses and for the Chamber of Deputies to dissolve itself was defeated. A bill that required that no member of Parliament would hold posts in the Cabinet was withdrawn. The Constitution was amended in that confidence could be withdrawn by a majority of one vote instead of 2/3 vote and the Chamber of Deputies could withdraw confidence from any one member of the government which would cause the resignation of that member and not the complete government.⁴¹⁷ The government also passed a new law regarding Jordanian citizenship.⁴¹⁸

The experiment of complete democracy under the Mulky government was not a success. Ministers were accused of corruption, freedom of speech, and press had gotten out of hand and communism and other external influences were applying pressure to the government.⁴¹⁹

⁴¹⁷The Middle East Journal, Current Events, Vol. VIII, 1954, p. 195. The Arab World, a Daily Digest of Arab Opinion and Press, March 1, 1954 and January 28, 1954.

⁴¹⁸The Arab World, op. cit., February 19, 1954.

⁴¹⁹Souki Sam, Newsweek, November 1954, op. cit., p. 26. The Arab World, op. cit., December 19, 1953: Al Difaa and Falastin Syrian papers printed in part a statement by Haj Amin el Husseini which urged West Bankers to wrest the command of the National Guard from the Arab Legion and Left Bankers and place it under the direct supervision of Palestinians faithful to the Higher Arab Executive Committee, both papers commented that this was impossible with the elected parliament.

The causes of the fall of the Mulky government in May of 1954 were: (1) The dispute over the Johnson Plan, (2) the border situation especially the Kibiya raid⁴²⁰ (3) the refusal of the Mulky government to take part in round table discussions with Israel in spite of British pressure (4) reported corruption within the government that the Prime Minister was either unwilling or unable to cope with.⁴²¹ The request of the resignation of the Mulky government by King Hussain caused an outburst of claims of British pressure throughout the

⁴²⁰ Interview: There are two beliefs regarding the responsibility of the Kibiya raid: (1) The dismissal of the Brig. Commanding the sector and the Regt. Commander were political moves to remove the blame from the government and place the Arab Legion at fault. This view is somewhat upheld by the fact that the Regt. Commander although charged as a traitor was later reinstated as the commander of the National guard. (2) The governmental view that the Arab Legion was completely at blame and negligent in handling the situation as the relief force did not arrive until much after the Israeli raiding party had withdrawn.

The truth of the responsibility lies partially with the Arab Legion however the terrain, communication net, the climate at the time and tactical considerations relieve most of the responsibility from the Legion and place a great deal of responsibility on the government for refusal to consider these factors.

Following the Kibiya incident the UN recommended Jordan and Israel to take part in a round table discussion to reach a settlement of the border problem. This is called for in the Rhodes agreement. The Jordan government refused to take part in these discussions as it would have recognized the government of Israel, and demanded that the matter be settled in the Mixed Armistice commission. This caused British and UN pressure to be brought on the government with little result.

⁴²¹ Interview: It has been reported that sufficient evidence existed to prosecute several members of the Mulky government for accepting bribes. The King demanded this in a secret session of Parliament. The subsequent release of these proceedings to the press caused the King to announce that he did not want spies in his government and request the resignation of the government. The members of parliament placed the blame on British pressure over the Johnson plan and the round table discussion. Other sources denied the fact that corruption existed in the government.

Arab World.⁴²² The conditions that had grown up under the Mulky government were such that a change in government was necessary. The fact that the press of the area inferred British intervention seems to indicate nothing more than the politicians of Jordan were placing the blame where it would be accepted by the people especially the Palestinians. However, the criticism of British interference became so strong that it was necessary for King Hussain to issue a statement through the royal cabinet that the cause of resignation of the Mulky government was for internal reasons in addition to the fact that the government had been in power for over a year.⁴²³

On may 5, 1954, the Abul Huda government came to

⁴²²The Arab World. The cabinet of Fawzy Mulky tendered its resignation on a holiday. The cause is believed to be that the government would not accept the British view and continued to insist that the Nahaleen incident should be examined separately by the United Nations Security Council. It is reported that the British government informed the Jordan government that it would be difficult for Britain to intervene in the defense of Jordan if occasion arose.

Al Bina (Damascus) reported that the cause of the fall of the Mulky government was the telegram that had been sent to Mr. Vychinsky applauding his pre-Arab stand on the Nahaleen incident.

Al Ahram (Egypt) stated that the reason was British pressure.

Al Akhbar (Cairo) stated that Queen Mother Zein had been to Beirut to dispell rumors that she might have had a hand in the matter.

⁴²³The Arab World, May 11, 1954.

power.⁴²⁴ The announced policy of the government was "no peace with Israel" and the government would not fall back on the attitude adopted by Jordan in the Security Council.⁴²⁵ The statement of policy was expanded in June when a debate of confidence took place. The policy of the government embodied the following points:

1. no peace with Israel;
2. the continuation of the Arab League policy in regard to Palestine;
3. the government to respect the constitutional freedoms of the citizens;
4. bills to correct the existing situation in regard to elections, defense and tribal affairs would be introduced into the National Assembly,⁴²⁶

The government founded by Abul Huda was not to remain in power for long. The initial program of the cabinet was presented on the 10 of June and on the 23 of June Abul Huda advised the King to dissolve parliament.

⁴²⁴The Middle East Journal, Current Events, Vol. VIII, 1954, p. 329. The Arab World, May 5, 1954. The government of Abul Huda consisted of: Abul Huda, Prime Minister; Jamal Tuqan, Minister of Foreign Affairs; Ahmad al Tarawinah, Minister of Communications; Wasfi Mirza, Minister of Agriculture; Saba al Akashi, Minister of Justice; Hashim al Jayyusi, Minister of Interior; Abdul Rahman Khalifah, Minister of Finance, Acting Minister of Justice; Anwar Nusaybah, Minister of Defense and Education; Khulusi al Khayri, Minister of Economy, Development and Reconstruction; Anastas Hananya, Minister of Commerce; Dr. Jamil Tutunji, Minister of Health and Social Affairs.

⁴²⁵The Arab World, May 5, 1954.

⁴²⁶The Arab World, June 10, 1954.

This was done on June 23 and new elections were ordered within the limit of time prescribed by the constitution.⁴²⁷ It is believed that this move was made due to a split in parliament between the backers of Abul Huda and the opposition,⁴²⁸ which also may be divided as those pro-Iraqi and those pro-Syria.⁴²⁹ The reasons presented by Abul Huda for having the parliament dissolved before it had finished its normal elected tour (fourteen months early) was that the dissolved chamber contained elements working against the best interests of the state.⁴³⁰ However, other sources state that the dissolving of parliament occurred shortly before the debate over the vote of confidence⁴³¹ of the Abul Huda government as it was expected to include personal attacks against the Prime Minister, at first the government was to resign but then it felt that the resignation would not serve the best interest of the country so that the King was advised to dissolve parliament under the emergency power of the

⁴²⁷The Arab World, June 23, 1954.

⁴²⁸Ibid.

⁴²⁹The Arab World Translated from al Bina, June 23, 1954.

⁴³⁰Ibid., Translated from al Hayat, June 23, 1954.

⁴³¹The Middle East Journal, Current Events, Vol. VIII, 1954, p. 452.

constitution.⁴³²

After the dissolving of parliament, the cabinet issued a communique that it would continue to follow the policy of its ministerial statement. The action of the government was critically attacked as being unconstitutional as a true crisis did not exist in the government.⁴³³

The elections of October 16, 1954 brought forth the new political groups and parties of Jordan. The National Front and the Baath on the left; the Moslem Brotherhood and the Liberal Front on the right.⁴³⁴ Electioneering was carried out throughout the country. Members visited the smallest villages talking with the mukhtars and the people. Political activity prior to the elections indicated that an active part was being taken by both the government and the opposition. Abul Huda during these elections recognized that it was necessary to return a unified and strong government. He is supposed to have chosen candidates that he backed for their political maturity and anti-communist beliefs.

⁴³²The Arab World, al Hayat, June 23, 1954.

⁴³³The Arab World translated from al Baath and al Manar, June 23, 1954.

⁴³⁴Sam Souki, Newsweek, op. cit., November 29, 1954.

Abul Huda is reported to have then, assured the election of his followers by extremely unorthodox methods.⁴³⁵ The usage of the election by Abul Huda caused not only the extremists but the middle of the road politicians who were not solidly with him to be defeated.

During the week of November 29, 1954, forty Jordanian politicians, including twenty six that had been defeated in the elections, petitioned the King to dissolve the parliament on the basis of the conduct during the previous election. This group secured a new election under a caretaker government.⁴³⁶

The elections of November 1954 were the most unorderly that had been held in Jordan since its founding. The night before the elections the Arab Legion was notified that there would be an anti-Abul Huda riot the following day. Before the ballots had been counted on election day a number of the opposition entered Amman. Some withdrew from the election others claimed that the elections had been faked. This was the match that touched off the riots that followed. The followers of the opposition beat up the police. When reinforcement arrived they

⁴³⁵Sam Souki, News Week, November 29, 1954, op. cit., p. 27.

⁴³⁶Ibid.

found that the roads were blocked and were met by showers of rock from the overlocking buildings. A battalion of soldiers was called to quell the disturbances and was met by showers of rocks and the mob made it necessary for the military to use their weapons in spite of orders to the contrary.⁴³⁷ The United States Information Service was burned and for two and a half hours the mobs controlled the center of the capital.

The November election riots had three direct results:

1. The hatred of Abul Huda and Glubb Pasha increased. Both of these leaders believe that the source of trouble is from outside sources;

2. Abul Huda who now has remained in power has promised to conduct a ruthless campaign against the subversives especially the communists. The November riots gave him justification for all the measures he has taken or will take;

3. The actions of Abul Huda during the elections in October and his plan of a clean up has embittered many of the opposition that are anti-communist and may

⁴³⁷Sam Souki, News Week, *op. cit.*, November 29, 1954. The Arab Legion reported that the firing was a matter of shooting or having the weapons taken from the hands of the soldiers. During the riots neutral sources state that between nine to fourteen were killed and 160 wounded.

force these groups to form a coalition with the communist party.

It seemed at first that Abul Huda, the new power in Jordan was content to allow the normal development of democratic institutions to occur in Jordan, however, he did not consider the influences that were to enter the government when the free form of self-expression was allowed under the Mulky government. During this time and until now Jordan is in need of a strong leader that will gradually turn over the responsibility of the government. The experiment of the Mulky government showed that the freedom that is inherent in democracy allowed the expression of anti-British, anti-government in power and resulting anti-progress feeling that has not been found in Jordan in the past. If Jordan is to continue to advance, the negative approach must be kept out of government and the country and for the present it has been indicated that although the parliamentary representative body has advanced miles from the absolute position of Abdullah in the 1920's it still needs the strong hand of a sincere leader.

CHAPTER XVI

POSITION OF THE KING AND SUCCESSION

AFTER THE DEATH OF ABDULLAH

Abdullah's accomplishment of the annexation of Palestine was no small feat. The annexation of the west bank had trippled the population of his country. The Arab Legion had proved itself to be the only effective fighting force in the Arab countries; and his statesmanship had left Jordan at the end of the war a force almost as powerful as the combined Arab League. Abdullah had accomplished this through his diplomacy, patience and subtle balancing of powers and interests.⁴³⁸ As important during this time was that he had succeeded in balancing the view of the east (Jordan) with those of the west (Britain) and at the same time secured his and his people's interests. His ability, in spite of differences between Jordan and Britain, managed to maintain freedom of action and development within country.⁴³⁹

Following the annexation of Palestine, Abdullah

⁴³⁸Edmond Wright, *The Middle East Journal*, op. cit., p. 439.

⁴³⁹Royal Central Asian Society Journal, *In Memorial of His Majesty Abdullah Ibn al Hussain, King of Jordan*, 1952, p. 212.

was faced with the difficult problem of integrating the two banks. The Palestinians were not content to accept the tribal position of the King that had so long existed in Transjordan, in fact, many of the Palestinians held the tribal lands in contempt. The past concern of Abdullah in international affairs over local interests was not to be accepted by the Palestinians. King Abdullah by necessity began a campaign to appease the Palestinians. He toured the west bank visiting the villages and towns of Palestine and weekly prayed at the Mosque of al Aqsa.⁴⁴¹ His speeches maintained a constant pro-Palestinian tone.⁴⁴² However, resentment towards the strong-willed King continued to grow. On March 26, 1948 an attempt was made to assassinate him.⁴⁴³ On July 17,

⁴⁴⁰ Esmond Wright, op. cit., p. 459.

⁴⁴¹ Esmond Wright, op. cit., p. 456.

⁴⁴² The Middle East Journal, Current Events, Vol. III, 1949, p. 82, November 1, 1948 at the opening of Parliament King Abdullah stated that he was determined to bring peace to the Arabs of Palestine; Interview; The views of King Abdullah on the City of Jerusalem were to maintain the holy city of Islam under government of a Muslim country.

See section on the development of government during this time for other actions of Abdullah in attempting to unify the east and west banks.

⁴⁴³ The Middle East Journal, Current Events, Vol. III, 1949, p. 323. Three Palestinians were sentenced to death on the charge of attempting to assassinate Abdullah on March 26, 1949.

Riad Bey es Solh was killed. The assassination of Riad Bey es Solh was reported to have been in opposition to his rumored mission of appeasement between Iraq and Jordan directed towards unity of the two countries.⁴⁴⁴ This assassination brought forth an immediate reaction from King Abdullah in the form of an announcement that all newspapers would print and publish an editorial that such actions would not be tolerated in his country.⁴⁴⁵

External pressures were brought to bear against King Abdullah through the Palestine elements. The support of the Mufti and the releases by the exiled Abdullah al Tell added to the resentment towards the King. Abdullah continually fought the spread of this feeling by active censorship of the Palestine press and after the censorship was lifted imposing fines or closing those papers that did not agree with his government.⁴⁴⁶

In effect the annexation of Palestine made little

⁴⁴⁴The Illustrated London News, July 28, 1951, p. 127. On July 16, 1951 Riad Bey el Solh Prime Minister of Lebanon was murdered in Amman on his way to the airport whence he was to fly to Beirut after spending three days in Amman on the invitation of the King. King Abdullah had roused the hostility by his plans for a Greater Syria and also his edict of April 1950 and the incorporation of Palestine.

⁴⁴⁵Interview.

⁴⁴⁶Interview.

difference in the governing principles that Abdullah followed and as in spite of the new population, Abdullah was the government.

On July 20, 1951 Mustafa Shukri Ashu, a 21 year old Jerusalem tailor reported to be a member of the Sacred Struggle Organization, shot and killed King Abdullah as he entered al Aqsa Mosque to perform his Friday prayers.⁴⁴⁷ The subsequent investigation determined that the assassination was planned by Abdullah at Tall a Jordanian Arab Legion Officer who had driven the Israel forces out of Jerusalem but had later been dismissed from the Arab Legion.⁴⁴⁸ From Egypt Abdullah at Tall had conducted a campaign against Abdullah in hopes that the death of Abdullah would end the contract of Major General Glubb Pasha and he would be able to return to power in Jordan.⁴⁴⁹ More important was the implication of the

⁴⁴⁷The Middle East Journal, Current Events, Vol. V, 1951, p. 490. S.G.T. King Abdullah's Assassins, The World Today, October 1951, p. 411. On the body of Mustafa Shukri Ashu was found a talisman in Arabic written by Musa Ahmad al Ayyubi which said "Kill, thou shalt be safe" It seems that the plan had been for the accomplices to throw grenades in the mosque after the murder and allow him to escape in the confusion. The talisman and the revolver led to the arrests.

⁴⁴⁸The Middle East Journal, Current Events, Vol. V, 1951, p. 490. Major General Glubb testified that Col. at Tall had favored an understanding with Israel and that he had been a friend of Moshe Dayan, Israeli commander in New Jerusalem.

⁴⁴⁹Esmond Wright, op. cit., p. 448. Abdullah at Tall the military commander of Jerusalem resigned his commission and became the first civilian governor of the city. Due to the ambitions of Abdullah at Tall, Abdullah removed him from government after which he went to Egypt and released the text of the Shuna agreement to the Arab League that was to cause joint Arab attacks on the actions of Abdullah.

family of Hussaini which led many to believe that the assassination was caused by the weakening power of the ex-mufti. The few Hussainies in the country following the annexation were credited as not having accepted the Hashemite rule.⁴⁵⁰ The assassination of King Abdullah was the result of the fanaticism, social distress, anti-Hashemite, anti-British and anti-Israel feeling that was found in Palestine.⁴⁵¹

Abdullah's death occurred at a critical time.

⁴⁵⁰S.G.T. King Abdullah's Assassins, The World Today, 1951, p. 412 to 417.

The Middle East Journal, Current Events, Vol. V, 1951, p. 490. In the trial that followed ten persons were charged with having conspired against the King. Three were cousins of the former Mufti Haj Amin al Hussaini and two others were linked with his organization in Palestine. The accused were: * were executed. *Musa al Hussaini (former head of the foreign bureau in Jerusalem), he had gone to Germany with the mufti during the war, was advisor to the U.N. Conciliation Commission at Lausanne and defeated in the 1950 elections. *Abd al Mahmud Ukkah, a Jerusalem shopkeeper. *Zakariya Mahmud Ukkah, brother of Abd al Mahmud Ukkah and associate. *Abd al Qadir Farahat, a Jerusalem sheep dealer. Abdullah at Tall sentenced in absencia (to death). Musa al Ayyubi, sentenced in absencia (to death). The following were released: Father Ibrahim Ayyad, a Catholic priest, Kamil Kaluti, a Jerusalem shopkeeper, Tawfig al Husaini, chief curator of al Aqsa Mosque, Dr. Da'ud Hussaini.

⁴⁵¹Esmond Wright, op. cit., p. 460.

The situation could have easily degenerated into anarchy and violence.⁴⁵² The country had been deprived of its firm ruler and the line of succession was not clear.⁴⁵³ In addition the death of Abdullah changed the international position in regard to Jordan as there was no indication of a continuation of policy.⁴⁵⁴ These effects that could have taken place were shouldered by the right hand of Abdullah, Abul Huda (see government section) who was able to carry on in a more enlightened way the work of King Abdullah.

Abdullah left three wives and two sons, Talal and Na'if.⁴⁵⁵ Neither of his sons were capable of the loyalty and devotion that Abdullah had given and received especially towards and from the British.⁴⁵⁶ The mental condition of Talal at this time was under question while the business life of Na'if left much to be desired.

Talal the oldest son of King Abdullah had been

⁴⁵²By the Waters of Jordan, The Spectator, July 27, 1951, Vol. 187, p. 116.

⁴⁵³Ibid.

⁴⁵⁴Esmond Wright, op. cit., p. 460.

⁴⁵⁵The Middle East's New King, Great Britain and the East, July 1946, Vol. LXII, No. 1762, p. 47.

⁴⁵⁶Royal Central Asian Society, In Memorial of His Majesty, Abdullah Ibn al Hussain, King of Jordan, 1952, p. 212.

known to be suffering from a mental illness for some time prior to his father's death. On May 15, 1951 on the departure of King Abdullah for a state visit to Turkey, Crown Prince Talal took the oath as Regent, however, due to his illness it was necessary for him to leave the country and Prince Na'if assumed the position.⁴⁵⁷ In June, King Abdullah and the Regent and Premier of Iraq Abdul Ilah and Nuri es Said conferred on the question of the illness of Talal. A statement was issued that there existed no disagreement between the King and Talal. Talal remained Crown prince.⁴⁵⁸ The following month, July 10, 1950, Emir Talal departed from Amman to Geneva for treatment. Talal was in Switzerland undergoing treatment when the assassination of his father occurred.

The problem that faced the government of Jordan was one of succession. Na'if for some time had been known to have engaged in illicit trade activities with the third wife of King Abdullah. These activities which were known made him unacceptable for the throne. However, if it were possible to have Talal crowned as King even

⁴⁵⁷The Middle East Journal, Vol. V, 1951, p. 346.

⁴⁵⁸Middle Eastern Affairs, Current Events, Vol. II, 1951, p. 307.

in his mental condition he could be deposed by the National Assembly and his son Hussain would assume the title when coming of age.

The plan was implemented mainly by Abul Huda who in August sent deputy prime minister Said Pasha el Mufti to Switzerland who returned and announced that the throne could remain open for Talal. On August 30, Dr. Jamil Pasha Tutunji, minister of health and social affairs announced that the treatment of Talal had been successfully and the Emir would return to Amman.⁴⁵⁹ Abul Huda then called on Egyptian doctors that testified that Talal was sane and capable of assuming the title of King.⁴⁶⁰

In addition to the condition of the Crown Prince there were other factors that may have had a bearing on the decision of Abul Huda. The Emirs Talal and Na'if were identified with two policies:

1. Talal was considered to favor closer attachment to Egyptian leadership in the Arab League; while
2. Na'if considered the late King's personal interpretation of Jordanian independence including maintaining close relations with Britain.⁴⁶¹

⁴⁶⁰Interview.

⁴⁶¹The Spectator, By the Waters of Jordan, p. 116, Vol. 187, July 27, 1951 (see footnote p. 186, the Times Weekly Review, June 19, 1952).

Talal was proclaimed King September 6, 1951.⁴⁶² In the opening speech of the new parliament he stated that he hoped the new constitution would be passed. On October 29 dissolved the Senate that had been appointed during Na'if regence and appointed a new body consisting of fifteen of the outgoing members and five new members.⁴⁶³

It was not long before it became evident that Talal's condition was worse than had been thought. On May 18, 1952 Talal, his queen and two of their sons left Amman for Europe for medical treatment.⁴⁶⁴ June 3, the Regent of Iraq arrived in Amman to discuss the condition of Talal and a secret session of the Jordanian parliament was held to determine the successor.⁴⁶⁵ On the 4 of June the cabinet announced that a regency council would be appointed, and on the 5th it was announced that the action of the government had the approval of the Queen and the Crown Prince.⁴⁶⁶ Following the appointment of the Regency Council (the leader of which was Abul Huda), a charge was made that Emir Na'if was plotting to seize the throne of Jordan.⁴⁶⁷ The wire of King Talal of the 13 of June in

⁴⁶²The Middle East Journal, Current Events, Vol. VI, 1952, p. 77.

⁴⁶³Ibid.

⁴⁶⁴Middle Eastern Affairs, Current Events, Vol. III, 1952, p. 211.

⁴⁶⁵Ibid., p. 261.

⁴⁶⁶Ibid.

⁴⁶⁷Ibid.

which he approved the action of the government touched off a spark in the Arab world.⁴⁶⁸ On August 14, after a private meeting of the two houses of Parliament lasting ten hours on Monday, the government declared the termination of the reign of King Talal and a regency council was appointed.⁴⁶⁹ The son of Talal, Crown Prince Hussain, was proclaimed his successor and Emir Muhammad brother of King Hussain the crown prince.⁴⁷⁰

⁴⁶⁸Middle Eastern Affairs, Current Events, Vol. III, 1952, p. 261.

Following the wire of Talal, Na'if departed from Lausanne to visit the King at his request. Three days later June 18, Nuri es Sa'id followed to Switzerland and on the 22, Abul Huda proceeded to the conference. On July 3, Talal on sick leave returned to Amman.

The Times weekly review, June 19, 1952. The appointment of a regency council in Amman has been severely criticised in government newspapers in Iraq as an action likely to lead to disastrous results. Gawad el Khatib a member of the constitutional Union Party executive has accused the Jordanian political leaders of using King Talal's illness as an excuse to deviate from the policy of King Abdullah. Even the opposition newspapers of Iraq have chosen to support the government on this question. Syria on the other hand seems rather to welcome the appointment of the regency council as a statesmanlike step which precludes the possibility of union of Iraq and Jordan. The accusation is widespread in the Arabic Press from Egypt to Iraq that behind King Talal's illness is a British plot to oust Talal as being too independent of British aims. Abul Huda is represented in Syria as a wise man who has foiled the British and saved the throne of Jordan while in Iraq he is seen as a tool used by the British to enslave the Jordanian people. Even in Jordan there are some opposition politicians who maintain that King Talal's condition is not serious but that Britain wants to get rid of him because he opposes any agreement with Israel.

⁴⁶⁹See Times above. The Times Weekly Review, August 14, 1952.

⁴⁷⁰The Middle East Journal, Current Events, Vol. VII, 1953, p. 4. Ibid., Vol. VI, 1952, p. 461.

On May 2, 1953, King Hussain on his 18th birthday was sworn in as the new King of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.⁴⁷¹

It is easy to see that during the period from 1945 until July 20, 1951 the position of the King remained much as it always had under the leadership of King Abdullah. However, by the changes that occurred in the government and the obvious inability of either Talal or his son Hussain to take a strong position, the natural result of this period was the change of the power of the King to the Legislative Branch or to the hands of Abul Huda. After the death of Abdullah, it can be seen from the new constitution that difficulties were expected in the line of succession. The constitution that was passed under Talal included the most minute details of regency councils and line of succession that ordinarily would not be considered necessary. The Kingship after the death of Abdullah became one of a figurehead and the power of the monarchy was in the elected body guided by Abul Huda. Jordan was no longer to be lead by a strong monarch.

⁴⁷¹Ibid., Vol. VII, 1953, p. 354.

CHAPTER XVII

POLITICAL PARTIES

Prior to the annexation of Palestine there was no recognized legal opposition party. The Al Nahda (Revival) party, government sponsored party was first active in the 1947 elections.⁴⁷² The only opposition during this time was from parties formed outside Transjordan under the leadership of Subhi Abu Ghunaima. The opposition, a small group of about 1,000 exiles in Damascus consisted of three groups Transjordan Independent Youth Party, The Free Transjordan League, and Transjordan Arab Party. The platform of the opposition was based on: the abdication of Abdullah and the formation of a freely elected general assembly, governed by a more liberal constitution; the withdrawal of the British troops and the repudiation of the British treaty of Alliance, the attention of the government directed towards internal improvements and not international affairs.⁴⁷³ These early parties had no effect on the development or actions of the government they are mentioned only as the earliest

⁴⁷²Esmond Wright, op. cit., p. 442.

⁴⁷³George E. Kirk (GEK), Cross Currents Within the Arab League, p. 24.

parties formed.

The parties formed later are not political institutions that are considered as political parties in the west. The parties of Transjordan and later of Jordan represent the following of one man. The individual characteristics and desires of the leader are the platform and not a political idea that is usually considered to be connected with western parties. For that reason in the parties that were formed the importance lies in the men at the top and not the platform or idea of the party.⁴⁷⁴

In 1950 King Abdullah allowed the formation of the Jebal el Watani (National Front Party) as a legal opposition party. This party was formed by a former minister Sulayman al Nabulsi in 1950. The instrument of the National Front was the newspaper "al Mithaq" which began a daily complaint column that became very popular so much so that the newspaper was closed in March of 1951.⁴⁷⁵ The National Front Party was successful to a degree and in 1954 had three members in Parliament. Although the party represented socialists, it contained all the well known communist elements.⁴⁷⁶

⁴⁷⁴Interview.

⁴⁷⁵Esmond Wright, op. cit., p. 458.

⁴⁷⁶Interview.

The Ba'ath (resurrection) party was established in 1948 but was not allowed by the government to take an active part in politics under the party name.⁴⁷⁷ Permission until the present time has been refused by the government to allow its formation as a legal party (last request submitted in March 1954). The party has as its maxims, liberty, union, and socialism. The party advocated the union of all the Arab countries from Gibraltar to include Saudi Arabia. Although the party has not been allowed to function as an open instrument it has continued to operate without the government's permission and had two members in the parliament that was dissolved in 1954.⁴⁷⁸

The Difaa (defense party) of the Nashashibi family was active in the 1950 elections.

The Sacred Struggle Organization has existed in Jordan since the annexation. It was the party of the el-mufti Haj al Hussaini. The party has lost ground since the assassination of King Abdullah with which it had been connected. In general the Sacred Struggle Organization has a completely negative platform that is against everything except the return of the ex-mufti to power.⁴⁷⁹

⁴⁷⁷The Arab World, op. cit., March 25, 1954 translated from "Barada" a Damascus daily paper.

⁴⁷⁸Interview.

⁴⁷⁹The Middle East Journal, Current Events, Vol. V, p. 490.

The Sha'b party formed in 1947 without government approval was dissolved by the government six months after its formation. It remained as an official organization of former ministers, deputies, and other well known political figures.⁴⁸⁰ The Sha'b party in general is in agreement with the government with a vague platform that appealed to the refugees and the Transjordan elements.

The constitution of 1952 (Part II section 16 ii) explicitly gave the right for the formation of political parties providing that their objects were lawful, their means peaceful, and the regulation of the party did not infringe on the provisions of the constitution. At the same time the political parties were limited by the Defense Regulations of the country and it is within these regulations that the government was able to control and forbid any undesirable opposition from forming.

The first application for governmental permission under the new constitution was the (Resurrection Party) Ba'ath Party on January 11, 1952 which was denied by the government. This application was followed by the Sha'b Party (People's) on January 24, 1952,⁴⁸¹ which was approved the same year. The Sha'b and the al Nahda parties are the only two parties that were recognized

⁴⁸⁰Ibid., Vol. VI, p. 216.

⁴⁸¹The Middle East Journal, Current Events, Vol. VI, p. 216.

by the government.

Opposition grew due to the failure of the government to recognize more than two parties and on January 20, 1954, a new law was drafted which came into force on February 16, 1954. This law outlined the conditions under which a political party would be allowed to form (those listed in the constitution). It further stated that the party must apply to the government for permission but if the government did not answer the application within forty five days the party would be allowed to function. In cases of a negative reply, the party had the right of appeal to the Court of Cassation. The cabinet reserved the power to order the dissolution of any party against the interests of the country.⁴⁸²

Under this new regulation the Umma Party of Samir al Rifa'i requested permission in June 1954.⁴⁸³ The Umma Party is composed of politicians that has as its main aim the desire to secure control of the government.⁴⁸⁴

The Socialist Arab Renaissance Party applied

⁴⁸²The Arab World, op. cit., January 20, 1954.

⁴⁸³The Middle East Journal, Current Events, Vol. VIII, 1954, p. 454.

⁴⁸⁴Interview.

under the new law, but its application was rejected in June 28, 1954.⁴⁸⁵ The aims of this party are the same as the Umma.

There is no communist party as such in Jordan. Of the top ten leaders of the communist movement, eight have been arrested and two have fled to Syria. In spite of the lack of a party, the communists have been able to infiltrate the country and have a great following especially amongst the refugees.⁴⁸⁶

Campaigning in Jordan depends on the personality of the candidate. Candidates utilize the press, distribute hand bills, rent cafes or coffee shops. At political meetings they make speeches in which they give their campaign promises. Most of the promises are not based on logic but designed to appeal to the emotions of the people. Normally after a candidate finishes his speeches the floor is opened to questions from the public. At present many of the parties not recognized by the government send representatives to these meetings and question the candidate intelligently on his platform. This at times leads to considerable embarrassment. The candidates

⁴⁸⁵The Middle East Journal, Current Events, Vol. VIII, 1954, p. 454.

⁴⁸⁶Souki, Red Wedge in the Middle East, Newsweek, November 29, 1954, op. cit., p. 26 to 27.

hold mansiffs for the most important leaders of the communities; a visit to the refugee camps is a necessity as every attempt must be made to secure the refugee vote.

In general the campaign is merely a means in which the people may judge the personality of the candidate. The political promises are not considered as binding upon the candidate other than having a remark recorded in the official gazette.

It is a mistake to criticise the type or actions of the political parties found in Jordan. A western type party could not function in Jordan. In the west the people look towards the platform of the party they follow while in Jordan the backwardness of most of the people requires that they follow a leader much as a leader of a tribe or clan. In this respect the personal representation of the candidate fills the same need that the more advance platform parties of the west.

CHAPTER XVIII

THE PRESS AND RADIO

The press and radio are as instruments of democratic states and as such are good indicators of the development of a country toward complete democracy. In as much as the radio is government controlled, it will not be discussed. In Jordan, however, the press and the advancement of freedom of expression presents an interesting study.

In 1946 the Emirate possessed only one newspaper which was a small sheet that appeared intermittently.⁴⁸⁷ During the early years of the Kingdom, the international situation had great bearing on the freedom of views as in 1948 when Syrian newspapers were banned and a fine of 100 Pounds Sterling could be imposed on anyone listening to the Damascus radio.⁴⁸⁸

The annexation of Palestine brought a great number of newspapers into Jordan. Freedom of the press had been exercised under the British Mandate. The

⁴⁸⁷Konikoff, op. cit., p. 27.

⁴⁸⁸George E. Kirk (GEK), Cross Currents Within the Arab League, op. cit., p. 24.

Palestinian editors were soon to find the same freedom did not exist in Transjordan. Printed opposition was not to the liking of King Abdullah. During the time of King Abdullah, there was always press censorship. Government representatives entered the printing offices and censored those sections that were contrary to government policy.⁴⁸⁹ Newspaper editors who criticised Amman would find their newspapers closed or could be imprisoned from five to sixty days, usually at Al Bayr a desert outpost, or fined 100 Pounds Sterling.⁴⁹⁰ By 1949 six Egyptian newspapers had been banned.⁴⁹¹

In 1950 Abdullah attempted to abandon censorship. After the elections of 1950 (September) it was found necessary to reimpose some form of press censorship as the resentment that had formerly been directed towards the British and the Jews changed direction and was critical of Amman.⁴⁹² This did not effect the censorship on outgoing cables that was imposed on May 15, 1948 and remained in effect until 1951.⁴⁹³ The control of the

⁴⁸⁹Interviews.

⁴⁹⁰Interviews. Esmond Wright, op. cit., p. 453.

⁴⁹¹Ibid.

⁴⁹²Ibid., p. 458. The Middle East Journal Vol.IV 1950, p. ⁴⁷³Current Events.

⁴⁹³Ibid., Vol. VI, 1952, p. 76.

newspapers varied from direct censorship to governmental control through threats of action against the editors. These methods were used from 1950 until the passing of the new law regulating the press in 1953.⁴⁹⁴

The Press law of 1953 defined that any person having a high school education could become the owner of a newspaper, anyone with a college education could be editor of a paper. The law forbids any publication of news: of members of the royal family, other than that which is released; reporting on secret sessions of parliament; secret sessions of courts; court sessions regarding divorce; adoption, or separation, or other cases involving public morals. In addition troop movements could not be published. New licenses for newspapers were to be issued prior to the end of October 1953. Once a paper is licensed, it can not be closed unless it fails to adhere to the approved schedule of publication or violates the laws governing the press.⁴⁹⁵ This new law did much to increase the freedom of the press; however, the defense regulations that are still in effect gives the government some control in the actions of the press.

⁴⁹⁴Interviews. The Middle East Journal, Vol.VIII 1954, p. 79. The Cabinet Suspends the Newspaper "al Hawadith" for three months, September 14, 1953. *Ibid.*, Vol. VII, 1953, p. 64. After the disturbances of November 12 to 15, 1952, three newspapers were closed and one editor arrested .

⁴⁹⁵Interview.

Freedom of the press in effect still does not exist as demonstrated by the closing of five weekly newspapers of August 17, 1954 by Abul Huda for attacking his government.⁴⁹⁶

From the annexation to the present day, freedom of the press has advanced. The press is being allowed more and more to express its views. A degree of governmental control is desirable. Editorials at times grasp on single events and expand them to fringe on the truth or to misrepresent the facts. The closing of five newspapers in August of 1954 was predicated as the attacks of these weeklies were not criticism based on fact but were written to deceive the public by publication of false information in an attempt to degrade the government. At the present time the legal government control through the law of 1953 combined with a lenient usage of the defence regulations does not hinder the action of the respectable and progressive type paper; however, it allows the government to control those papers that are not responsible in reporting views or news to the people.

⁴⁹⁶The Middle East Journal, Current Events, Vol. VIII, 1954, p. 453.

CHAPTER XIX

THE ARMISTICE PERIOD FOLLOWING THE PALESTINE WAR

It is thought in many western countries that the Palestine war in reference to a shooting war ended with the Rhodes agreement. It may be true to say that the agreement ended the legally recognized hostilities between the Jewish and Arab forces but until the present there continued to exist a state political war in which raids and actual military engagements are used as an instrument of politics.

These engagements reported by the United Nations as incidents have had a great effect in the life of the people in Jordan. The situation on the frontier prohibited a stabilized natural condition that would have allowed development without outside pressure. In addition, the brutal incidents excite not only the people of Jordan, but all the Arab world. The incidents that have occurred and had the greatest effect were, forcing the bedouins from Israel into the Gaza Strip and Egypt⁴⁹⁷ in 1950, the

⁴⁹⁷The Middle East Journal, Current Events, Vol. V, 1951, p. 85. Major General William E. Riley, United Nations Truce Supervisor, stated that on September 2, 1950, 4,000 Arab bedouins had been driven from Israel into Egypt and an additional thousand into the Gaza Strip.

Wadi Araba Expulsion in 1950,⁴⁹⁸ Yale Child Murders in 1950,⁴⁹⁹ the Falama village shelling 1951,⁵⁰⁰ the Christmas Murders near Bethlehem.⁵⁰¹ The most brutal of all the incidents that occurred was the Quiba raid in which a large armed Israeli patrol crossed the border and destroyed the village of Quiba killing 57 of the inhabitants of the village. These incidents began with the signing of the armistice and continue up to the present

⁴⁹⁸The Rising Tide of Terror, Press and Publicity Bureau, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Amman, 1952, p. 7. The Wadi Araba expulsions aroused the public sentiment to a new pitch in the Arab world. A group of 120 Arabs including children suspected of being infiltrators by the Israelis were gathered in Qatra Concentration in south Israel. They were loaded into three-ton trucks and driven one day and into the night. They received neither food nor water. They were released at night in groups of three or four, told to cross to Jordan and then fired on. Their crossing necessitated the barren lands of the south where neither food nor water are found. Without direction or knowing where they were going less than 75 per cent of those that began reached Jordan alive.

⁴⁹⁹The Yale Child Murders, Ibid., p. 8. Three children were sent from their village to gather wood. As they were working close to the border an Israeli patrol crossed the border and after killing one of the girls that attempted to run away the Jewish patrol took the remaining two children to a nearby wadi and shot one fatally the other died later.

⁵⁰⁰The village of Falama was shelled by mortars and machine gun fire. A man his son and daughter were killed.

⁵⁰¹The Rising Tide of Terror, Press and Publicity Bureau, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Amman, 1952. Included are the Qatanna Rape, the rape of a 26-year old Arab Woman Sharafat attack, destruction of two village houses, Hebron mutilations in which two Arabs were killed and their bodies mutilated in the most sadistic way. Israel Respects an Armistice "Three Years of the Jordan-Israel Armistice" Official Jordan Government publication gives the following figures 1949, 129 incidents 55 deaths; 1950 130 incidents 23 deaths; 1951 238 incidents 38 deaths.

day.⁵⁰²

In addition to the border incidents, the property seizure of the departed Arabs, the undervaluation of the lands and the arbitrary dispossession of the lands by the Jews added to the hatred of the state of Israel.⁵⁰³

As a result of this situation, Jordan is more dependent than ever on the British subsidy without which she could not support the Arab Legion. The continual pressure of Israel continues to have its effect on the various groups of the population in Jordan especially the west bank and hence has effected the political and democratic development of the country.

⁵⁰²El Beirut, March 1, 1955.

⁵⁰⁴The Rising Tide of Terror, op. cit.

CHAPTER XX

THE WEST BANK

Transjordan was able to annex the highlands of Palestine consisting of the hills of Samaria and the hills of Judea.⁵⁰⁵

The northern section, the hills of Samaria are bounded on the east by the Jordan riff, on the north by the truce line (physically by the plains of Sharen). The truce line mainly due to the Shuna agreement deprived Jordan of all the rich farm lands of the plains of Esdraelon and the plains of Sharen so that the area consists of a mountainous region fifty miles long and thirty miles wide⁵⁰⁶ that is broken by small plains and open valleys. Olive groves and wheat are grown in the area. In this northern area are found several large cities and many large towns that truely represent urban population such as Nablus, Tulkarm, and Calqilya, and Jenin.

The southern area or the hills of Judea is

⁵⁰⁵M. Y. Nuttenson, op. cit., p. 437.

⁵⁰⁶Ibid.

bounded on the east by the Jordan riff, the south by the Beersheba valley⁵⁰⁷ and the east by the plains of Acre and Judea. The eastern boundary at the present may be considered as the cease fire line as it is in the northern sector. The Judean plateau is harsher and more rugged than the northern section of Samaria. In addition the rain fall gradually decreases from the northern section of the Judean⁵⁰⁸ area to the southern that overlooks the plains of Beersheba a semi arid desert. (See climate under Transjordan.) Judea is the less fertile and productive of the two sections. Judea also has a number of large cities Ramallah, Jerusalem, Bethlehem and Hebron.

* The population of the west bank evolved under different circumstances than the population of the area of Transjordan. While Transjordan prior to World War I was a neglected province of the Ottoman Empire, Palestine was the subject to the continual controversies of Europe. Most of the European interest was based on religious motives, either political-religious actions or in some case true religious motives. There was also a great deal of European archaeological interest in the area mainly concerning biblical research. Due to this interest

⁵⁰⁷Ibid.

⁵⁰⁸M. Y. Nuttenson, op. cit., p. 446.

including the Christian pilgrim trade, the Ottoman government of Palestine was stable. Many of the various sects of Christianity built hospitals and schools in the area especially in Jerusalem.⁵⁰⁹ In addition to the difference of the Ottoman rule of Palestine and the Ottoman rule in Transjordan, the mandate government of the British was able to build on an existing government rather than beginning anew. By the outbreak of the second World War, Palestine was one of the best administered countries in the Middle East. A generation of Palestinians had grown up in the mandate administration, they were energetic, able and enterprising and were found in every department of the government.⁵¹⁰

After this taste of mandate rule in theory and practice of modern administration, it is only natural

⁵⁰⁹The Palestine Exploration Fund, 1894, p. 262
 "In an article by Herr Baurath Von Schick states" It is remarkable that nearly all the new hospitals here are situated on the same ridge which comes from the city (Jerusalem) and extends in a north-west direction. Inside the town the new Greek hospital, outside the gate the French, Russian, Dr. Sandrisky's hospital for children, Rothchild hospital, the new German hospital, then English hospital which is about to be built, beyond this the Municipality hospital, further out the German Jews are planning to build a hospital.

A handbook of Syria Including Palestine, p. 199, the French allotted 40,000 pounds Sterling, the Italian 80,000 pounds Sterling and the German and the Austrian government support other church schools.

⁵¹⁰Stewart Perowne, The One Remains, London Hodder and Stoughton 1954, p. 70.

that especially the educated classes and mandate administrators would have a profound effect on the character of the government of Jordan.⁵¹¹ The Palestinians as a group were better educated, politically more mature and contained a representable percentage of teachers, merchants and craftsmen. In fact due to the internal pressures that existed between the Jews the Arabs and the British the people of Palestine were too well educated in politics.⁵¹²

In addition to the political awareness of the people of Palestine there was a definite anti-British sentiment amongst the population in contrast to the pro-British feeling that had been maintained by Abdullah and passed to his tribal followers.⁵¹³ This anti-British feeling combined with a minority unleyal to the government, especially the followers of Haj Amin el Hussaini and Abdullah et Tall,⁵¹⁴ made it impossible for the government

⁵¹¹The Spectator, Ineffective Arabs, April 14, 1950, Vol. 184, p. 487.

⁵¹²Interview with a village mukhtar who said when asked if the people took a part in the politics of the country answered that the life of the Palestinian is politics and has been politics since the mandate. If anything they talk too much of politics and do not do their work.

⁵¹³Esmond Wright, op. cit., p. 454. Various interviews. This view is found especially true amongst the Christian elements and also the better educated.

⁵¹⁴Esmond Wright, op. cit., p. 454. Ibid., p. 456, "al Baath declared that Britain had betrayed Palestine in an editorial" such criticism had never appeared in Trans-jordan prior to the annexation. In August of 1949 an underground was discovered that was supposedly linked with Israel. In Amman the newspaper al Mithaq appeared as an opposition paper to the actions of Abdullah.

made it impossible for the government of Jordan to continue under the past methods of Abdullah. The people of Palestine were too aware of the usage of the Parliamentary system, of debate and control through the legislative branch to accept a lesser form of democracy.⁵¹⁵

The annexation of Palestine increased the population of Transjordan from 420,000 in 1945 to 1,367,180.⁵¹⁶ The population may be divided into the Transjordan elements (discussed under Transjordan) and the Palestinian elements of the urban population, the villages, the frontier villages, and the refugees.

The urban population of Palestine represents a true form of urbanization while in Jordan with the exception of Amman there is little to distinguish many of the town people from the country people either in way of life or dress. In fact Transjordan possessed only one city, Amman that could be called urban while in Palestine the smallest villages exemplified a developed type of society. The Palestine villages from the days of

⁵¹⁵Ibid., p. 455.

⁵¹⁶There is considerable difference in the exact figures of the population of the area: The Middle East Journal, Vol. V, 1951, p. 82. Total population 1,367,180 of which 464,680 are Jordanians, 102,500 refugees in Jordan, 800,000 Palestinians and refugees in Palestine area. Esmond Wright, op. cit., p. 449, gives the following on refugees in October 1948, 200,000 refugees. Spring of 1949, 300,000 refugees, end of 1949, 500,000 refugees. Other sources vary in the total population from 1,200,000 to 1,400,000, however most agree that the refugee population is around a half million. UNRWA Report of June 3, 1953, 476,201 in Jordan.

the Turks had schools and local governments the larger towns as Nablus, Hebron, Ramallah, Bethlehem, and Jerusalem were municipalities in the true sense.⁵¹⁷ These villages and towns were accustomed to trade with the surrounding area and were not content with the totally self-contained existence that was found in many of the smaller villages in Transjordan. The west had not come to Transjordan with a rush, and business was still conducted with the leisure and dignity of ancient times⁵¹⁸ while Palestine had been a part of western culture for many years.

The cities of the west bank were faced with the problem of the refugees and the cutting off of their customary routes of communication. With the end of the Palestine war refugees from the Jewish side flocked to the larger cities. 172,635 refugees settled in the various towns.⁵¹⁹ This presented not only a social problem for the municipalities, but resulted in the lowering of wages for the labor force that lived in the cities. Due to the United Nations Relief, the refugee could afford

⁵¹⁷Konikoff, op. cit., p. 18.

⁵¹⁸Kenneth Williams, op. cit., p. 90.

⁵¹⁹Stewart Perowne, op. cit., p. 180, Appendix I, UNRWA Report June 1953.

with his relief food to work at a wage that would not support an non-refugee worker.⁵²⁰

In many cases the customary route of trade for the cities was towards the coast. The cease fire line, and the Israeli blocade, cities were forced to turn towards Amman or Jerusalem. In addition the cities were concerned for the first time in years over their own protection. The Arab Legion and the Haris el Watani (National Guard) is continually on guard against the possible attack from the Jewish side.⁵²¹

The villages of Palestine (excluding the frontier villages) are faced with the same problem of the refugee. 144,030 had settled in the villages as of June 1953.⁵²² Many of these find work during the harvest season, however, the lands of Palestine are not fertile enough to support the sudden increase in population. In most cases the influx of the refugees in the village has led to a decrease in the standard of living within the village.

⁵²⁰Interviews.

⁵²¹Most of the incidents have centered on the smaller villages, however, the Bethlehem murders and the Hebron mutilation have occurred on the outskirts of the cities. Jerusalem is in a different position and is frequently fired on by rifle, machine gun or mortars.

⁵²²Stewart Perowne, op. cit., p. 180. Appendix I.

The villages that are within striking distance from the border are faced with the problem of being continually on guard against a possible attack from the Jewish side. Most of the villages are guarded by the National Guard (haris ^a el Watani).

The frontier villages present a special problem to Jordan. These villages are the result of the Shuna agreement and the map that was prepared in Rhodes.⁵²³ Some 130,000 Arabs live in these villages that are either divided by the line, leaving the churches, mosques, or schools on the Jewish side, or cut completely from their farm lands. The inhabitants of the villages are not refugees in the eyes of the United Nations as they have not lost their homes. Today the villagers can sit and look across the border to their fields that are either laying fallow or being tilled by their enemies the Jews.⁵²⁴ These are the villages that are subjected to most of the incidents and the inhabitants live surrounded by defensive wires and trenches waiting for the next attack. The

⁵²³Kirk, The Middle East, 1945 to 1950, op. cit., p. 297.

⁵²⁴Ibid., p. 20. Georginia Stevens, Arab Refugees, 1948 to 1952. The Middle East Journal, 1952, p. 289.

villages separated from their means of livelihood are forced to send their young men to the cities to work. In most cases this migration is unsuccessful in bringing in sufficient income for more than the lowest standard of living.

The refugees present the greatest problem. A complete coverage of the refugees in Jordan will not be attempted, but the effect that the refugees have had in the political development of the country will be shown.

Most of the refugees were farmers who depended on agriculture as their means of livelihood.⁵²⁵ The Palestinian fellahin is more educated and politically aware than his Transjordanian counterpart, however, most have only one skill, that of agriculture labor. It became evident that the new country of Jordan did not have the capability of absorbing this number (472 thousand) into the agricultural life of the country.⁵²⁶ The result of this situation combined with the natural reluctance of the refugees to settle, lest it releases any claim that he might have for his lands, has led to the camps that contain more than 130,000 refugees.

⁵²⁵ M. G. Ionides, The Jordan Valley, The Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society, 1952, p. 217.

⁵²⁶ Ibid. Steward Perowne, op. cit. Appendix I, 144,000 were absorbed in the villages of Jordan.

⁵²⁷ Ibid.

The refugees have been used continually as a political force. Abdullah was the first, in welcoming the refugees to Jordan and granting them citizenship and the right to share the meager resources of his country.⁵²⁸ However, especially the refugees in the camps half of which are under sixteen years are utilized by many of the political forces.⁵²⁹ The communists through Beirut and Damascus have infiltrated the camps.⁵³⁰ The Jordan

⁵²⁸ Georgina Stevens, op. cit., p. 286.

⁵²⁹ Ibid.

⁵³⁰ Sam Souki, Red Wedge in the Middle East, News Week, November 29, 1954.

Interview. Various sources stated that the percentage of communists in the camps of Jordan could be estimated as high as ninety per cent. It is felt that this is an overly high percentage, however, the fact remains that the communists have used the camps as breeding grounds. The feeling is generally that the refugees held in the camps with little or no work during most of the year find that communism offers something that they have not tried while the government in power allows their condition to remain as it has been. In addition it has been found that the spread of communism is proportional to the type of camp and the way the camp is run. Some of the camps that are well run have no appreciable percentage while others under the leadership of a less enterprising individual are controlled by an anti-government group. Despite the fact that UNRWA has given most of the camps medical facilities superior to those of their villages, the mortality rate of infants seems high. The birth rate is astoundingly high. One person stated in the camps with no work there is only the coffee shop, talk of politics and having children to keep the men busy.

The Jordanian government has taken strong measures against the communist increase. In general the prisons that are established are filled with active communists. The camp itself is left as a breeding place for political thoughts other than democracy.

politicians visit the camps and make promises,⁵³¹ not only to the refugees in the camps but the others that constitute more than one third of the population.⁵³²

Although the majority of the refugees are those capable of earning their living only through agriculture there exists a large minority that were able to leave Palestine with considerable liquid cash. These minorities also had the ability in trade and commerce or in education or government. In effect this educated minority was able to change the life of the urban centers of Jordan mainly Zerka and Amman. New buildings both commercial and residential sprung up all over the area. New industries and businesses were founded.

⁵³¹Interviews. During the campaigns for elections it is necessary for all candidates to visit the refugees and place their platform of no peace with Israel and the return of the refugees to their homes in Israel. This platform is continually adopted by all those that wish to be elected. Although there were many reasons for the fall of the Mulki government, it is considered by many that one of the causes was the failure of the government to keep the promises that had been made in the campaign to the various refugee groups.

⁵³²The Rising Tide of Terror, op. cit., p. 96. The refugees are divided into three groups the 144 thousand in the villages, the 172 thousand in the towns, and the 130 thousand in the camps, all of which constitute an important minority for elections in all three places the villages, towns, and camp areas.

Although this minority that brought in money changed the appearance of the towns, it did not increase the potentiality of the area sufficient to absorb the refugee population.

The effect of the annexation on the population of Jordan was to change the complete outlook of the people towards the government. The new groups of the city, villages, frontier villages, and the refugees were to bring into play, forces that the government of Abdullah had never had the necessity of contending with. Not only were these people capable of democratic thought, but they had a definite anti-western feeling. The government of Transjordan had been successful mainly because the tribal characteristics of the people had assured Abdullah of a loyal following. After the annexation it became necessary to balance a foreign power against a more educated and nationalistic electorate. The anti Israeli feeling of the Palestinian was more intense due to the personal losses that were incurred especially amongst the refugees and those wealthy people that were forced to leave their property. This caused a definite stand by Abdullah and the government towards the refusal

of a settlement of the Palestine problem.⁵³³ At the same time the government was faced with the problem of appeasing the refugees.⁵³⁴ In addition to these factors was the dislike of the Palestinians towards any federation or union with the other states such as Syria or Iraq so that with the annexation of Palestine the Greater Syria and the Fertile Crescent plans were dropped.

The people of Palestine not only brought, but forced for the first time a representative government in Jordan.

⁵³³The moves of Abdullah towards the settlement of a peace agreement indicate that he as the King was personally in favor of a permanent settlement with Israel. However, in 1949, the mayors of Samaria visited Amman and asked for the renewal of the war, Abdullah announced that it was impossible due to British and American pressure. From subsequent events, it is safe to say that Abdullah was willing to accept Israeli and recognize it as a fait accompli; however, he maintained the hope until late in the war of acquiring a sea outlet on the Mediterranean.

⁵³⁴The Middle East Journal, Vol. II, 1948, Current Events, p. 467.

The King in a speech reported that Jordan was spending about 250,000 pounds Sterling a month on relief for the refugees. The reference to the improvement of the conditions of the refugees was one of the flanks in all the governments that came to power, after the annexation.

CHAPTER XXI

ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEMS OF ANNEKATION

In effect the annexation of Palestine did not present a great administrative problem. Palestine during the time of the mandate had continued the Ottoman system of administration so that the municipalities, the villages, and the kazas could be included under the same set of laws that existed in Transjordan. In many cases there were minor changes that were necessary but the similarity between the systems of government facilitated the integration of administration.⁵³⁵

Jordan began in 1950 the unification of the laws of the country. A committee was formed to study and recommend the necessary changes.⁵³⁶ Palestine under the mandate had utilized the British criminal code while Transjordan had followed the old Ottoman code. This led to a new Jordanian code that follows in many cases the

⁵³⁵Interviews. While in Jordan there had been no increase in the number of Municipalities. The Palestinian view was to encourage the smallest villages to form a municipal government and do away with the government appointed Mukhtars. This view has been accepted by the Jordan government and at the present those villages that are capable are encouraged and aided in forwarding requests for the formation of municipalities.

⁵³⁶Theodore Mogahnam, Development in the Legal System of Jordan, Middle East Journal, 1952, p. 194 to 196.

Syrian Criminal Code (based on the Lebanese Criminal Code that is strongly influenced by the French Code).⁵³⁷ The new Jordanian code caused criticism from both the Jordanians and the Palestinians, however, it meets the problem of the unified country.

One of the problems that faced the integration of the administration was the location of the center of government in Amman. The Palestinians were accustomed to the government of Jerusalem. The fact that the seat of government had moved to the other side of the Jordan caused adverse comment. It was felt that the government was unduly concerned with the east bank and was ignoring the west bank.⁵³⁸ To some extent this was counteracted by the formation of an assistant minister of interior located in Jerusalem. In effect this office was merely another step before administrative papers would reach the capital and the policy-making groups.⁵³⁹

⁵³⁷Ibid.

⁵³⁸Interview. All the Point Four work that has been carried out in Jordan has been to the benefit of the east bank. The west bank has only the smaller development board that undertakes personal loans and not large scale projects. It should be added that the most backward part of Jordan in the east bank that does not have the road net, communication net, or the advanced way of life that is found in the west bank.

⁵³⁸Interview.

The intergradation of the two banks had a profound effect on the educational system of Jordan. Since 1950 the educational system has undergone a radical change.⁵⁴⁰ The schooling system of the two banks was intergraded and an extensive study of curricula, textbooks, and standard of education.⁵⁴¹ Finances are the greatest problem hindering the advancement of education in Jordan. The Palestinian element of the population added a considerable number of teachers, however until now it is still necessary for some of the villages and municipalities to share in the expense either by the construction of schools or the paying of teachers.⁵⁴² In addition UNESCO has founded and maintains sixty elementary schools that handle 17,000 students,

⁵⁴⁰Education in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Jordan Ministry of Education 1953, p. 1.

The Ministry of Education was increased in 1952 by the addition of an Under Secretary of State for Education. The Ministry of Education made the final authority on all matters pertaining to education, a group of seven specialized inspectors were appointed to inspect particular subjects in all schools. In addition there are six district inspectors under a chief inspector to see that the teachers both of the private and public school abide by the rules of the state.

⁵⁴¹Ibid., p. 1 to 5.

⁵⁴²Ibid.

Interview, in 1955 UNESCO schools expanded to handle 42,000 students.

however, this is an insufficient number for the refugee population as there are over 11,000 awaiting entrance. By 1954, the Jordan government had founded a system of education,⁵⁴³ it had improved the facilities for the bedouin.⁵⁴⁴ The retarding factor in education remains not the will of the government or the people, but finances.

The annexation of Palestine caused new interest in other social services such as Health and Social Welfare. A ministry to handle these services was created in 1950. The medical staff of Jordan is woefully lacking. Although Palestine brought many doctors to the area, Transjordan had always been lacking in trained medical personnel.⁵⁴⁵

⁵⁴³Education in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, op. cit., At the present time there exist village schools (four years), primary schools (first five years), elementary schools (first seven years). On the completion of the elementary school, the intermediate secondary schools continue for two more years or the secondary schools for four years after the elementary school. There also are three types of technical education, those after the completion of the primary and secondary schools and the Kadouri agricultural school that is attended upon the completion of the intermediate secondary school. Teachers are trained in a teachers school that is entered on the completion of secondary school.

⁵⁴⁴Interview. At the present time there are seven schools for the bedouin.

⁵⁴⁵Konikoff, op. cit., p. 24.

In addition to the doctors of Palestine the United Nations relief organization formed hospitals and clinics in the refugee camps that treat those within the camps.⁵⁴⁶ It will be many years before Jordan can possibly have a medical or welfare service that will meet the needs of the people.

Although the intergradation of the administration of the east and west banks present no great problem the financing of the administrative units and services that the Palestinians were accustomed to, has caused a drain on the government. This in addition to the fact that the army of Jordan must remain in an alert status and continue to be on a war time footing not only in numbers but in the percentage of the budget that is allocated to the armed forces. The Palestinian element aided the government in its insistence of social services and the advancement of education and medical facilities that will in the long run help develop the electorate towards a healthy and educated view rather than a biased and emotional approach. The financial problem still remains and there seems at the present to be no solution other than, union with another wealthy country as Iraq, or the increase in aid from Britain.

⁵⁴⁶visit to camps and interviews.

CHAPTER XXII

CONCLUSIONS

The development of democracy in Jordan has been a gradual process passing through many phases. Prior to the formation of the organic law in 1928, it is mistaken to say that any form of democracy existed in Jordan. The power of the government lay absolutely in the hands of Emir Abdullah. It was through Abdullah and the British advisors that democracy was allowed to take root. The close friendships and personal loyalty that were shown,⁵⁴⁷ allowed the Emir to accept in good faith the recommendations of the British. This resulted in a gradual release of some of the powers of the throne while a stable government based on democratic principles was formed.

By the end of World War II, Transjordan had

⁵⁴⁷In Memoriam of His Majesty Abdullah al Hussain, King of Jordan, The Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society, p. 214. The loyalty between the British and Abdullah was more of an individual type and can be judged by the statement of Brigadier Broadhurst "If the world has been robbed of a hero I have lost the kindest master I could ever hope to serve. I am deeply proud, an Englishman, to have spent much of my manhood in his service and when I am asked, often enough, and by men of many nations what manner of man he was, I reply with pride that he was the very paragon of an Arab Prince and all that a warrior, a scholar and a gentlemen could wish to be. He was a lover of his faith and his people without fanaticism."

advanced by leaps and bounds along the road of self-government. It is doubtful if the government in 1946 was capable of independence; however, the diplomacy and abilities of Abdullah were successful in securing the independence of Transjordan without arousing bitterness towards or from the British. The British remained in control of the army and maintained advisors in the country. In fact the presence of the British has added stability to the country. The army, the instrument usually responsible for the overthrow of a government in the Middle East, is excluded from politics. The British advisors maintain mainly a check on the spending and budget of the country. This curtails possible development of financial chaos as happened in Egypt.

Democracy did not appear until after the death of Abdullah, the annexation of Palestine, and the promulgation of the new constitution. It is not only unfair to Jordan, but a mistaken idea of its possibility if one attempts to compare present democratic conditions in Jordan with the west. True democracy is against the cultural background, the educational standards and the emotional instability of the people of the Middle East. There exists a small minority in all of the Middle Eastern countries that is capable of what is considered western democracy. In most cases this minority consists of the

extremely educated class that has either been educated in western type homes, attended foreign universities, or adopted western culture. In some cases as the Lebanon this minority is comparatively large, so that the power although theoretically with the people is controlled by this educated group. Jordan including Palestine has a small percentage of education leaders consisting mainly of Palestinians. Thus in Jordan to protect the rights of the Transjordan inhabitants from complete control by the Palestinian elements and the extreme Palestine emotions against Zionism and their-British feeling, it is necessary that a damper be kept even on the rule of the minority.

The position of the British in Jordan has been attacked by the other Arab countries and the Palestinian element. The Jordan government is continually referred to as British governed. It is as mistaken to consider Jordan an instrument of the British as it is to consider the country independent. Jordan is incapable of being self-sufficient economically. A country cannot be completely independent politically if it is not independent economically; although, it may approach independence as have the member states of the British Commonwealth. The British control over the military forces limits the political field of Jordan in as far as force as an instrument is concerned. However, internal political conditions are controlled by the people of Jordan. At

the present and undoubtedly in the future the Arab countries and the Jordanian politicians out of power will continue to criticize the British position without recognizing the fact that the British government at the most is concerned with a stable condition in the country, and that without British aid Jordan would be part of Israel, part of a neighbor state, or subservient to some other country for economic reasons.

The extreme emotional approach inherent to the people of the area is a great hindrance to democracy. The emotional instability permits the mass to become extremely active either for or against (usually against) any idea or governmental move. This action is seldom thought out and is a reaction to emotional temperament more than an expression of logic. This feeling that can be stirred in the people of the area is capable of causing the overthrow of the government through the demagoguery of a few leaders. For this reason instruments of government such as the censor, arrest, and seemingly undemocratic dismissals of governments are a necessity.

The people in Jordan today take as large a part in a democratic government as conditions permit. The government may be said to have advanced to controlled democracy. The government remains in the hands of a few that realize the importance of the growth of democracy

in the controlled state. There is little indication that this condition will change for some time. In fact the existing government is the most democratic that can exist in Jordan.

CHAPTER XXIII

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