AN ESSAY ON

THE PROBLEM OF FREEDOM AND DETERMINISM.

"Strive to enter in at the strait gate: for many, I say unto you, will seek to enter in and shall not be able."  St. Luke, XIII:24.

M.A. Thesis in Philosophy
presented by

Juliette E. Ouéchek.

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PART I.

The Immediate Reality of the Problem.
CHAPTER I

The immediate reality of the problem.

It seems quite out of place to speak of liberty in an age similar to the XXth century, and in a period which — apparently at least — gives the first place to forms of government such as Nazism and Sovietism. In fact, for a person born in our age, brought up according to the most recent scientific educational systems, a person namely who has a scientific spirit lined with the deepest beliefs that science will some day — sooner or later — reveal to us the ultimate reality of our being, for such a person, I say, it is of course not the proper time to speak of freedom or of liberty. Surely it is not the proper time to speak of certain facts which, by the novelty and spontaneity of their apparition escape the unshakable and universal laws of science.

Science has done a tremendous and wonderful work in every domain. It has taken into its sphere everything, material or intellectual; and like a merciless judge, has forced everything to reveal the secrets of its being. Moreover, not satisfied with pure knowledge it has got from them, science has subdued their existence to some definite laws, so that every thing in the future happens, and will always happen, in the way science has assigned to it. And science succeeds most of the time.

As a result of this success of science and of scientific laws, the human mind has taken the attitude of submissiveness to
everything that can be formulated in the form of an algebraic equa-
tion - i.e., everything the nature of which can be studied, simpli-
fied, and explained by the law of cause and effect, or by any other
law. Other things such as miracles, or even certain domains of the
soul which have not yet been explained by any of the scientific a-
xioms, are considered as untrue and rejected momentarily with the
hope that one day science will surely overcome the difficulty or t
the obscurity contained in them. In short, liberty is not a XXth
century dogma, for with it is brought the doubt in the value of scien-
ce, the aim of which is to gather as many facts as possible under
one and unique law. To believe in liberty is also to believe that
scientific laws have not the character of universality - that they
hold true for some facts only, and leave in darkness many others.
And with the doubt in the value of science is also brought the state
of unrest to the mind to which the nature of things escapes now, so
much so that I believe one is not very mistaken if he thinks that
our anxious search for laws, our search for faith in science, and in
general in the principle of Determinism, comes first of all from our
human character which seeks peace, unity and continuity in things -
these being surely guaranteed by the existence of laws.

I have also said that the reason why liberty is out of pla-
ce in our age is the fact that we are in an epoch in which such forms
of Government as Nazism and Sovietism are developed. In fact, what
these two systems proclaim first of all, is the primacy of the State
current
over the individual. Of course, there is a reciprocal i.e. the re-
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tribution by the state of the benefit it receives from the individual, yet, the chief aim of this latter is by no means his own good, but the good and welfare of the State. Man in these forms of government is but a useful machine, a means for the great work: the good of the state. Now with such state of things is there any room to speak of the individuality, of the freedom and will of man? Is he not rather reduced to a thing with nothing of what is called properly human?

I shall not build further neither upon the rigid scientism nor upon the "mechanised humanity" of Nazism and Sovietism, my purpose being simply to state a fact which seems to be obvious: the fact, namely, that our age is not the age of liberty: that our general belief is that we have solved the problem of liberty by science and machine and laboratory, and also by Statism. Yet, in spite of all these apparent proofs against the existence of liberty, in spite of the fact that on almost half of the surface of our earthly globe men have lost most of their individual human rights: in spite of all this, I say, the problem of liberty remains intact, and man is essentially a free being.

A rapid glance cast upon the social life of man, as well as the religious field of his experiences, will be enough to reveal to us how true and real and ever-living is the problem of his freedom. In fact, what is the meaning of this eternal strife of the nations for their independence? What is the meaning of these dreadful wars of liberation? What is the meaning of this general indi-
gnation of us all towards an event such as the oppression of small nations by the great, if not the revolt of humanity for her robbed liberty? And are we wrong if we say that the liberty of nations, or their being free, is something true and even truer than their being dominated or even supervised by others? In other words, as I have understood the formation of a nation, it appears to me that a nation is but the embodiment of the human character which is man's love of property: be it his house, his food, his family, his ideas, or his sentiments. Of course, man is a social being; that is, he is born to live with others; yet his sociability means not a complete dependence upon others; on the contrary, the sociability of a person, or of a group, or of a people, diminishes gradually when the person or group or people has the sufficient means which enable him to get rid of others. Man is not born a slave he is not even born with real profound love of equality of riches; he is egoistic as well. Now his being egoistic, his being lover of property and independence, means nothing else than his being free; and it is because he is so that he fights, and will ever fight for his independence, for his liberation. It is because he is free that the frontiers will never be suppressed, and I dare even say that because man is free, that communism finds difficulty to extend itself over the world. National Independence, wars of liberation, show that there had been always a continual progress, a continual advance towards the conquest of freedom. A mere example of the kind of evolution of the condition of woman: from a simple object in the house
of her master (husband), woman is now asking, and in certain democracies enjoying, the right of voting i.e. of contributing in a direct way to her own destiny, and the destiny of all.

Leaving the social field of national independence, let us consider another phenomenon: the eternal strife for the liberty of conscience and the liberty of worship. In fact, history as well as the spirit of our present time show that liberty of conscience as well as liberty of worship is an ideal for which any sacrifices are due. There had been martyrs of religions i.e. persons who had the love of God so deeply rooted in their heart that in order to worship freely that God they accepted all kinds of sacrifices and even death(1). In our times, there is no room for martyrdom: for neither the State nor the Church imposes their own religious beliefs, for with the emancipation of the mind, with the age of criticism and positivism, any thing imposed by force would have no chance of good result. In order to meet this state of mind "laicity or secularity" has been adopted. With the laical school the education of the youth is made without the primacy of our religion over others: no peculiar religious teaching is given; all religions are respectable because all of them though through different ways, lead us to the one aim, which is God. This generous idea of the laical school is lined with another idea of no less importance: to leave the youth to choose freely the ways which will lead him to God. It is J.J. Rousseau who first gave in the "Emile" the plan for such an education. At the age of fifteen the young boy will have to make a choice, a free and

(1) The pilgrim Fathers who left the old world to worship freely God, are a living example of this treal thurst of liberty.
voluntary choice, of one religion among the many revealed dogma; and his choice will be so free that it does not bear the impress of the religion of his family, nor that of his State. The laical school aims then at bringing the young persons to individual experiences, to readings in the history of religions, to personal deep reflexions about faith; it aims, in other words, in making of him a person capable of choice, and consequently, a free person.

And now, leaving the social field of the life of the individual, how many questions remain to be asked as to his own private life: how often does man desperately ask himself: Am I free or determined to love that person or to hate her? Am I free to choose my associate in life and in work? Am I free to choose even my work? Am I free to agree openly or in my heart with this or that cause in the present war? These are tragic personal phenomena of freedom or of determinism.

Why, man asks himself, in spite of the many obvious social reason of class, of wealth, of beauty, do I find myself loving this person rather than that? Neither science nor laboratories nor the most recent theories of heredity or any scientific theory explain selection, can force me to love an other, nor explain my present love. Love presents to me one of the most original manifestation of our freedom: when I love, i.e. when among the many possible subjects of love I decide to join my destiny to the other one who apparently and according to the many determinant factors had less chance to be chosen by me, I ask myself: am I really free to choose him
or her? I often speak of predestination or of fatality reigning over me and directing blindly my life; but is it so true, this chance or this angel of fatality? And have I not really contributed to my destiny? Have I not judged him or her the ideal being?

And when I hate a person, does not my hatred and its corollaries, revenge andæscold, depend on me? I hate sometimes and I plan revenge, or sometimes I plan to be merciful; but very often I hear myself revolting against the blind passion which has led me to awful acts of wickedness. Which is true, my freedom in this sentiment, or my being determined by passions or even by external events? Morality, any how seems to say—and I do agree with her—that hatred and revenge depend on us, and it proposes to us certain modes of giving way, or of deviating our rancour. The Jewish law proposed "the eye for the eye"; Christ proposed for us complete negation of hatred; Tolstoy, after the teaching of Christ, proposed not to resist evil. All these aim to say one thing: that we can and we do direct our sentiments, even those which we judge, by the force of their apparition, to be fatal. In fact, science, so far as I know, had not given any law which could give the reactions or even the manifestations of hatred, of jealousy: every being reacts differently and his reaction depends on how much he had acquired light or enlightened his heart and will with clear reasons and pure spiritual ideas.

Am I free to choose the work of my life? Apparently not. Very few can practically follow the career which fits their mind and
their heart. Yet we keep in the very depth of our being the hope that one day, sooner or later, we could realize the work we have always willed, we have always loved: "Du sollst der werden der du bist", you must become what you are, Nietzsche used to affirm, meaning thereby that our will to power is a factor no less important than any other in the work of our proper ascension.

What about the artistic creation? Are not the Fifth Symphony of Beethoven, the Virgin of Raphael, and Hamlet of Shakespeare, the spontaneous manifestations of a demi-God, creator and free? From the innumerable possibilities of the beautiful, the artist chooses one form, and he conceives it with his genius. Are such pieces of art but the result of determining factors of heredity, society, influence of climate, or education? Have the technical laws of painting, of writing, of harmonies directed their hands and mind blindly, and the result was what they gave? Of course, everything bears its mark on the work of the individual; yet none can give of it the least true explanation; every piece of art depends and is created by what is purely human and personal. It was the sentiments and imagination and ideal of Beethoven which gave birth to the Fifth Symphony; the latter is the free creation of this man who has suffered and loved and of nothing else; it is the pure creation of a genius, whom neither malady nor poverty could prevent from tending towards these eternal forms of the Tragical, of the Beautiful, of the Glorious, of the Joy and the Happiness which he saw, understood and felt, and which he wanted to give a concrete form.
In other words, the problem of the freedom of man is brought about whenever the nature of man is concerned; namely, whenever his humanity i.e. his reason and his will, his suffering and his happiness, are concerned. The problem of the liberty of man is an ontological problem (i): man is or is not free and freedom constitutes an essential i.e. existential character of his being: a being who reasons and loves and hates, a being who wills and suffers, a being who is responsible and who comes to decisions regarding his own destiny.

It then appears that the fact of a necessity ruling one's life is not a hindrance nor an objection to the freedom of man, for man is free - if ever - independently of this necessity. He might not succeed to have the object of his love, he might not adopt the career which fits his ability, yet it remains true that his love lasts for ever i.e. he remains free to love or not, and his hope and his search for the work he likes last likewise.

Yet, if such an external necessity as the one which rules our actions, such as society, external circumstances, or even our physical constitution, is not an objection against man's freedom; there is another kind of necessity which not only makes possible the fact of freedom, but also it is the condition of freedom or of free acts at all. Here I would like to clear somehow my understanding of liberty. I can by no means understand liberty by the mere fact that there are no rules whatsoever which bind man's spirit; to be free is not, according to me, to do whatever I like simply because I do not respect any of the present laws, or simply because I ha-

(i) Ontology: [ontos = which is; logos = discourse]: the science of being.
ve the power to do whatever I like and indifferently choose this way of life or that, or this current of thought or that. To me, *librium arbiter*, or the faculty of the will to decide as to her action, is not real freedom; and man does not show his freedom by determining himself to any one of two possible actions, but rather, when faced by these two possible actions, he deliberately, i.e. with reason and choice, determines himself to that which appears to him to be the best. In other words, I believe that freedom is shown whenever there is on the part of the person obedience to something outside or inside of her, for instance to the love of God or the idea of the good, or the beautiful, or any other idea.

Now, that we have expounded very briefly some of the manifestation of liberty, let us cast a glance at the many proofs of its existence. First of all, let us hear the psychologist speak in favour of our liberty. His message to us is of this form: we have the intuition (I) that— in certain cases— our actions are absolutely free: nobody can prevent me from walking or singing. And what he means is simply this: whenever we reflect upon this substance of human activity, i.e. whenever we inquire into the nature or the motives of this activity— in some cases, we find that human activity is free in its essence, in its being. Example, what is the meaning of a physical effort, if not the manifestation of our free power? It is then a strength which flashes from all our being; it then commands it and gives it its direction. Such a fact of our freedom needs no proof: we simply feel ourselves to be free. Descartes (1)

is among those who said that "freedom needs no proofs: it is true by the mere experience that we have of it." "Elle se connaît sans peuvess par le seule expérience que nous en avons."(1) Bossuet also believes that such freedom needs not to be proved, for any normal person can intuitively apprehend his free will. "Un homme, je dis, qui n'a pas l'esprit gâté n'a pas besoin qu'on lui prouve son propre arbitre, car il le sent." (2)

What in few words the psychologists hold is this: we feel that we are free in what we do; i.e. our actions emanate from our being, and have no other motives than our will. Bergson, whom we shall meet again in this work, believes that we are free: our free acts are nothing else but acts resulting, by way of psychical causality, from all our psychical life. What they all say about liberty is of course neither serious nor deep; they advanced as true the intuition of liberty, and this very word brings with it some vagueness and shallowness; they also spoke of free actions as if liberty is found only in actions of man, while it is rather in man himself, in his nature that suffers and loves and hates and wills. Any how, let us take their argument for what it is worth, and before leaving the field of psychology let us hear what Reid has to say also in favour of our freedom. Reid (3) has found that the "fait privilégié" of Bacon is also found in the domain of Psychology; this "fait privilégié" or the crucial experiment which decides as to the existence of our liberty, is the case usually called "case of indifference," and by it is meant any action brought about

(1) Principes de Philosophie, I. art.39
(2) A. Cuvillier. Manuel de philosophie, tome I. Colin, Paris 1831 chap. XX, La liberté.
(3) Thomas Reid, the scottish philosopher born in 1710.
"indifferently" by this or that chain of causes. Example: some pieces of money I have in my purse, I have no definite reason why I take this rather than that: it is the same case of indifference which made the Ass of Buridan free to eat his bundle of grass either on the right or on the left. What he means by "case of indifference" is that two or more possible actions present to the mind, have all of them the same attractions to it, so that a person believes that she has no special reason to tend towards this alternatives rather than towards the other, and she believes that her act depends on the pure capricious play of her will. Now this faculty to bring oneself to actions without any determinate motive would be nothing other than liberty.

Not only Psychology is convinced of the reality of our freedom, but also every human institution has the same conviction. First, let us define what a human institution is. A human institution is this ensemble of rules or of laws which are established whenever there is a group of individuals living together and dealing one with the other. These rules are here in order to check upon the proper conduct of every one of them. So defined human institutions mean also Sociology, Education and Ethics, since these so called sciences deal with human sentiments and will and actions. Now, if we inquire into the basic ground of these sciences we find the fact that the liberty of man has been considered and one of the two alternatives (its existence, or non existence) has been adopted, taken for granted or even implied.
If men make contracts or contract promises, this can only mean that they are free to perform them, and that they recognised themselves mutually engaged by their own will. "Contracts" imply in relation to human character the existence of the freedom of man in two ways. The first one is that contracts are themselves the creation of a free will; contracts are not some natural facts, we do not find them made by nature; they are not like our physical nature for instance which imposes itself upon us; they are not like the forces of nature which we support, nor are contracts given to man by an activity which is not human; neither any divinity nor nature can ever impose contracts, or even the necessity of contracts upon man. Man alone has created this conventional arbiter - which is the contract - to check upon his will and consequently his actions in the future; in other words, man alone, freely adopted for himself and for others this ruler and judge. The second way by which freedom is implied in contracts, is that there is no meaning, no "raison d'Être" whatsoever of the contracts, if men were not free to perform them, or even to break them, and if their execution did not depend upon his good faith. In fact, I said that contracts are the pure creation of man by which he engages himself into some actions in the future. Now, if he engages himself, this means that he can escape from his promise; and that is why he promises (this implying his freedom); or even if he decided to perform them, this means also that he has the capacity to fulfil his engagement, i.e. in other words he is free (by capacity I simply mean the lack of constraint which could prevent him from doing any act.).
Let us pass to the existence of Law (I), and let us try to see what are the suppositions made by its existence. Law implies the supposition on the one hand, that all rational beings, in a given circumstance, have more than one way to act; and, on the other, the affirmation of the social necessity of one way only. In other words: Law supposes that man is free to act in any way he likes, in any way which appeals to him most; and yet it prescribes to him, in the name of a higher good, (the good of society, for instance) only some one way to follow, forbidding him from following the rest. Now, if such is the supposition made by law, this simply means that man is considered as a free being, a being namely who possesses reason, which enables him to face the many possible actions and understand their motives, and a will which allows him to take any decision whatsoever. Law moreover implies that man is responsible, i.e., possessing a certain knowledge of what is good or what is bad; his actions are such that he can be judged for them. Were he not free and responsible, man would never have appeared in a court of justice, since every crime he commits will be pardoned, if he has no knowledge and no will. In fact, punishment and sanctions would be monstrous and iniquitous if the forbidden act had not been deliberately accomplished i.e., accomplished with reason and choice. In fact, why should there be any punishment at all? if not to set right or to correct the tracks of the free will. When justice grants or refuses the "salutary circumstances" this simply means that it takes into consideration what was unavoidable to the delinquents, what was in

(1) See also A. Rey, Logique et Morale, Paris, Rieder et Cie 1921 chap. XXVIII. La liberté, constatation de la liberté humaine.
other words in a certain sense imposed upon them by external circumstances (insanity or even simple traces of heredity), and what was willingly adopted by the delicacy of their moral conscience.

Such were the arguments presented by Sociology and Law in favour of the liberty of man; and it appeared to us that not only is liberty implied in these sciences, but that Law and justice would be meaningless if man were not free.

If now we pass to the domain of Ethics, we find that there also the liberty of man is considered as being an essential factor in the understanding of any moral system in the one hand, and in the admission, on the other, of its existence at all. If we believe, as Kant did, that Morals presuppose freedom, and freedom constitutes a property of our free will ("You must, hence you can") we will recognize that it is of great absurdity to propose rules to a person who is not in the required state to apply them, i.e. if that person were not free. Also the very fact of the moral duty appears to me to be the victory of our reason over human weakness in obedience to a moral ideal. How victory is the very proof of the existence in man of a faculty which enables him, after reasoning and judging, to decide on the side of the ideal settled by Morals: the faculty, namely, of our will. This freedom we succeed in having not in a very easy way: it is the result of deep suffering and struggle against ourselves, it is when we feel the "lee" invading our soul and we think and say to ourselves: "If I strive against my feelings I shall be victorious, and I will also prove my liberty." This liberty
is that of the wise man whose will appear to have combined feelings and motives and reason in such a way as to result in a free act. This freedom of the wise man is probably the true freedom: that which reveals the real nature of man, bringing into conflict his reason and ideal on the one hand, and his humanity, weak and vain, on the other. It is in this case of inward struggle of the "angel" against the "beast", that man shows himself to be responsible and willing - if ever, and not a pure object into the hands of his passions of his ambition. This freedom is truer than any form of freedom, since man has to free himself from himself, has to win the victory not over external things but over his humanity. Corneille, the French tragedian of the XVIIth century, makes his hero of the tragedy of Cinna, Auguste, say: "Je suis maître de moi, comme de l'univers": "I am my proper master, as I am the master of the universe", meaning that Auguste, after violent and painful strife against his own feelings and ambitions, accepted the dictates of his reason, which was in a better position than his heart to judge whether or not he must act in such and such a way.

This liberty of the wise man brings us naturally to think of the aim of Education: what is its meaning, if not the deviation of the violent instincts of man for the benefit of some reasonable attitudes, which attitudes will be in the future preferred and chosen by the scrupulousness of the conscience. Now if such is the aim of education, education of man's will, or even of his emotions, this simply means that there is a belief in the mind of the educators that
the youth they are educating presents a possibility of change i.e. of passing from a present character to another, and education as a whole implies the possibility of polishing and civilising our emotions i.e. of modifying the current of our psychical and instinctive life and also giving to us the possibility of acquiring new faculties. Now this modification, this civilisation, this acquisition of new ways of living and thinking imply, I repeat, the fact that man is free, i.e. not determined once for all to think and feel and act in certain definite forms.

Thus far I have tried to show how the problem of the freedom of man arises, how freedom must be understood in the being of man and not independently of the existence of a necessity i.e. of a determining object. I have also tried to show that the problem of the freedom of man is a problem which is taken into consideration any time human nature is concerned, any time man comes into relation with his fellow man. This was the meaning of the different arguments which I presented from Psychology, Sociology, Ethics and Education.

In the next part my endeavour will be to follow liberty in its devious course in history; starting from Antiquity, passing by Christianity, Islam and Modern thought, I shall try to see how much, and where, man had illusions about his own nature, when he recognised himself to be free, and, consequently, really human and reasonable.
PART II.

Historical Exposition.
In general, we can say that Antiquity considered the cosmos as a harmonious and rational system in which all phenomena were enchaîned and determined, and where, consequently, liberty had a very little place. This is especially true of Antiquity before Socrates, for all the philosophers of that time were philosophers of nature and of the universal, and it was reserved to Socrates to bring back the attention and intelligence of man to himself.

Let us throw a quick glance at the kind of activities of those first philosophers, and determine the meaning of their being philosophers of nature and of the universal.

The first philosophers of Greece had not had to give a solution to the problem of freedom, for the simple reason that the problem had no meaning at all for them. They were much more busied by questions of nature and physics, and were unable to distinguish between the idea of matter and the idea of life and spirit; their thought was at the same time concrete, synthetical and confused (1). They all tried to explain the world, and were much more concerned with causes and effects, with phenomena and astronomy, than with man and his nature. From Thales to Anaximander, from Zeno to Xenophanes and Parmenides and the Pythagorians, the main issue that was raised was: what is the nature of the first principle of things; and they found it to be water, infinite atmosphere, fire or number.

(1) See Janet et Séailles. Les Problèmes et les écoles p.325.
Accordingly the Ionians (4) derived the whole world and its innumerable shapes from one being, matter, water, air or fire, to which they sometimes, as Heraclitus and Diogenes of Apollonia did attributes intelligence. The principle of the world, which is at the same time physical and spiritual, thus becomes, by a natural evolution, the human soul. Anyhow the problem of liberty is foreshadowed by the Pythagoreans, for according to them, it is the sins it has committed that the human soul enters a human body; after death, the soul goes either to the Kommos or to the Tenstare according to its merits, where it is condemned to make new pilgrimages through the bodies of men and even of animals. This theory, we can say, at least foresees liberty. Yet 'we do not know whether the Pythagoreans have considered the union of the soul with its body as based on a choice; it may be based only on a natural affinity, or also on the arbitrary will of the divinity' (2). Probably they did not even ask that question, but rather considered this transmigration of the souls in the ensemble of the harmonious movements which are taking place in the universe.

The Eleatics professed a kind of pantheism; they believed in the unity of the supreme principle which is eternal and immutable; and they confused the corporal and the incorporeal. According to Parmenides and Democritus, the same principle which is at the same time Destiny and Justice, is also the Providence and the cause of the Universe. There is for the thinker but one single being, the All one, in whom all individual differences are merged. The being that thinks, and the being that is thought, are the same thing (3). However, this is true only in part for Democritus, to whom the final reality is the atom and its movements. The

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(1) See Heber and Perry, *History of Philosophy* p. 9, I8-I9, 35, see also the whole chapter 49-49.
(2) Zeller, trad. *S. T. I* P. 431
soul even consists of the finest, smoothest and therefore nimble atoms. These atoms are endowed with perpetual motion, which they do not receive from a transcendental principle, but which belongs to their essence. Now, this force which moves them acts according to necessity; Memoritus rejects teleology or finality, but he also denies chance, which, according to him, expresses man's ignorance of the real causes of phenomena. Nothing in nature happens without cause; all things have their reason and necessity (1).

But as we advance through antiquity we approach the philosophers of man. It seems as if wondering at the world has disappeared, and the minds of the philosophers have been turned towards a new wonder: man himself. The philosophy of the elements gives up to the philosophy of man. The transition from the former interest to the latter was effected through the beneficent and happy state of scepticism culminating in Protagoras; the conclusion they came to is 'that the world is a perpetual metamorphoses; the senses show only the things that pass away and do not reveal the immutable, necessary and universal. Hence, if we would know the truth, we must derive it from a better source than our deceptive senses; we must appeal to reflection and reason' (2). The many truths found out by Democritus Anaxagoras, Heraclitus at the school of Miletus are purely hypothetical, and cannot be demonstrated; and what they taught us is that there is no truth for man except in what he perceives, feels and experiences. And as sensations differ for different individuals, a thing seeming blue to one and green to another, if follows that there are as many truths as individuals; that the individual is the measure of the true and the false; that there are no universally valid truths or principles; or, at least, that we have

(2) Ibid, p.61
no certain criterion by which to recognize the absolute truth of a meta-
physiological or moral proposition. The individual is the measure of the true
and the good. Metaphysical controversies are therefore utterly vain. It
is not possible for us to prove anything but the particular fact of sen-
sation; still more impossible is it to know the causes or ultimate con-
ditions of reality which escape all sense—perception. Let man there-
fore occupy himself with the only really accessible object: with himself.
Let him abandon his sterile speculations concerning ultimate causes, and
concentrate his attention upon what is, after all, the only problem of im-
portance—the question concerning the conditions of happiness (I).

Anyhow, let us not expect that with these new philosophers, the pro-
blem of liberty is more in favour. Man is now, indeed, the object of
their philosophical inquiries, but you rarely find there a real study of
man and his being (save in the case of Socrates, Plato and Aristotles who,
as we shall see, made of man the only center of their philosophy). But any-
how, in this period what was most important was the establishment of a sys-
tem of Ethics, a system which gives to man the best way of living, the su-
rest way to happiness. With such an aim the philosophers of course made
of man the center of their intellectual activities; they were all anxious
to establish for him a system of morals. But this very system was not
built upon a real understanding of man himself i.e. his humanity as such;
but rather, these systems were based upon a certain conception of happi-
ness i.e. on his psychology, be it virtue, pleasure knowledge etc. Now,
with such a point of departure, we can not expect a real study of the lib-
erty of man. Liberty is only spoken of in an indirect way; we can only de-
duce its presence, and say whether the philosophers implied it in the mature
of the 'ought'. Except in Aristotle, I repeat, the problem of liberty,

(§) Weber and Perry p. 41-42.
taken as a property of man's being and characters, has not been really approached by philosophers of antiquity. We have already seen one of the reasons why it was so vis., the anxiety of the philosophers to know the ultimate reality they come in contact with.

... Let us now advance a little further through Antiquity, and let us take from it as much light as we can on this problem. If the first philosophers had nothing to tell us about our freedom, the message of the Sophists, i.e. those who made of man the measure of all things, on the same subject was neither deep nor serious. Socrates, who reacted against them, was the first philosopher whose approach to the question, by way of Ethics, is worthy of consideration. Though sceptical in cosmology, Socrates does not extend his scepticism to the field of morals. We never know what is the nature of the world, its origin and its end; but we do know what we ourselves ought to be and do. What is the meaning and aim of life, the highest good of the soul: this knowledge alone is real and useful, because it is the only possible knowledge. Outside of ethics there can be no serious philosophy. Speaking of Socrates Cicero said: 'he brought philosophy from heaven on earth', that is, he turned the mind from the former field of interest, which was the physical, universal interpretation of the world, to a new one which is man, the individual precise entity on earth. Hence, there is no more necessity for studying the laws of nature, nor for deciding as to what is the real nature or the first element of the world, since all these enquiries have proved to be deceiving and changing; on the contrary, let us concentrate our efforts for: the things which are lasting and important i.e. our life and actions, our moral life.
The first long pause that I shall make on the philosophers of Antiquity is on Socrates, not only because he was the first philosopher of liberty, but also because he was the founder of Ethics in general.

It must be emphasised from the beginning that Socrates does not believe in freedom of choice, in the sense of a liberty by which one chooses either the good or the bad; he rather believes in the necessity of the good; the good, he says, once it is known, imposes itself upon man's will and intelligence. Let us expound a little more fully the implication of these words.

Callimachus in the Gorgias declared, as a good, i.e. a practical and a wise man, that the only rule of conduct is the satisfaction of all desires. To this declaration Socrates objected, that to be governed by desires and passions, is not a sign of freedom at all, but rather that it proves that one is the play of a tyrannical and capricious nature. In a violent reaction against sophistry, Socrates confuses morals and science, virtue and knowledge. He holds moreover that the good is identical with the true; and that when it is known, it imposes itself irresistibly upon the will and the intelligence of man. Accordingly every man wants necessarily his good and his happiness; all his particular acts are but means through which he reaches that end. Now, the good of the individual is also the general good or the good in itself; he who knows it, does it, and whoever does evil, is simply an ignorant man who does not see clearly, and who consequently makes a bad choice of the means which are in relation to his end. In fact the most outstanding doctrine of Socrates is his identification of virtue and knowledge. When asked, once, whether he called 'wise' those persons who know what they ought to do, and who yet did the contrary, he replied: (according to Xenophon in
the 'Memorabilia' (1) : 'They are not less ignorant than unwise; because all men, I think, do prefer among things that are possible, those which they believe to be the most useful for them if they realize them. Therefore I think that the people who commit evil are neither learned i.e. having knowledge, nor wise, in their conduct. Justice and other virtue is science (knowledge); for the things made justly and according to virtue are all good and beautiful, and those who know them cannot prefer any other thing to them'. Again in the 'Memorabilia' Xenophon, speaking of Socrates, says: 'And Socrates never separated wisdom from wise conduct; and he used to consider wise and happy those who, knowing the good things, do them, and, knowing the shameful things, refrain from doing them.'

Also Aristotle in his Nicomachean Ethics (2) writes: Socrates used to combat strongly this proposition that a man can knowingly be incontinent, because nobody acts contrarily to the good, knowingly; he does so only by ignorance.'

The following discussion arises in the Protagoras between Socrates and the Great Sophist, about the teachability of virtue; and then it extends to the unity and multiplicity of virtue:

'Uncover your mind to me Protagoras', says Socrates (3) 'and reveal your opinion about knowledge that I may know whether you agree with the rest of the world. Now the rest of the world are of opinion that knowledge is a principle not of the strength, or of rule, or of command; their notion is that a man may have knowledge, and yet that the knowledge which is in him may be over-mastered by anger, or pleasure, or pain or love, or perhaps by fear – just as if knowledge were a slave, and might be dragged about anyhow. Now, is that your view? Or do you think

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(1) Memorabilia III, 9.
(3) 352 b – c.
(as I do) that knowledge is a noble and commanding thing, which cannot be overcome, and will not allow a man, if he only knows the difference of good and evil, to do anything which is contrary to knowledge, but that wisdom will have strength enough to help him? In this passage Socrates clearly states that knowledge is invincible and that it is impossible to know the good without doing it; so that to be virtuous is to possess the science of the good. Socrates believes that ill-doing has no other reason than this; man in general has no other standard to act save that of pleasure and pain; and there is, for common sense, no other way than to explain evil by pain, and good by pleasure. As common sense has termed 'ill-doing' being overcome by 'pleasure', Socrates shows the contradiction lying in it, and concludes that only knowledge contributes to the salvation of human life.

To say that man does evil because he is overcome by pleasure means that a man does evil because he is overcome by good—which is an absurdity. In a knowledge of measuring and weighing pleasures and pains, then, would be the salvation of human life. This science of measuring is virtue. Men in their choice between good and evil choose the latter only through ignorance. To prefer evil to good is not in human nature, and when a man is compelled to choose one of two evils, no one will choose the greater when he may have the less.' 'No man voluntarily pursues evil or that which he thinks to be evil.'

Is knowledge a mere capacity of measuring, and distinguishing between pleasure and pain, between the evil and the good? Is it possible that Socrates, the man to whom the moral voice was made clear, made our salvation the privilege of those who measure well? In fact what was the moral sense according to Socrates? Are we all able to follow it?
Is there any free choice? We said that Socrates was sceptical as regards all fields of knowledge when cosmology and metaphysics were concerned, but that he believed that we have a real absolute knowledge of what we are and do, the question arises whence comes this certainty of our knowledge? from whom does man attain it? Socrates believed that man can know himself with great certainty as a moral being; and that human nature in general is endowed with an immutable moral law. He himself based his proper life, his conduct, on this unchanging immutable moral law, declaring himself ignorant of all things save of this one fact that it is better for a man to be just than to be unjust, and better to suffer wrong than to do wrong. What Socrates did, then, in opposition to the sophists, was his declaration that there is such a thing in human nature which is absolute, immutable and knowable. But such apprehension of the absolute is impossible without a knowing faculty enabling man to discover, to reach the absolute beneath the superficial changing layer; and Socrates assumed the existence in man of such a faculty, namely 'reason'.

What did Socrates mean really by the word 'reason'? It is an inner infallible sense, bringing us into contact with the moral absolute. Reason, then, was to Socrates some-thing very similar to what we call 'the moral conscience'. What does Socrates say about this moral sense. In the IVth book of the Memorabilia, Socrates, talking about this supreme gift bestowed by the gods upon mankind, says: 'And more, when we are unable to foresee what is advantageous for us in the future, the gods are still with us, telling us of what we were consult them, of things to come by the voice of prophecy and teaching us what is best'. 'But with you Socrates, they seem to deal more kindly than with other men, since even without your asking, they forewarn you of what should be done and what not'. Socrates acknowledges the truth of this favour but deela -
res that any man may attain to the same harmony with the divine 'if he will not want to see the gods in their actual forms, but will be content with discerning their works to honour and worship them'. And a little later he speaks of a divine immanence in man, which man should recognize and honour. Of this moral sense Socrates made a divine inspiration, a spark of the divine intelligence implanted in every soul by God; and he often compares it to a supernatural guide (δαίμον) inspiring the human individuals. His famous moral principle 'Know thyself', is itself a divine order from the Delphic oracle. Not only in its origin does the moral reason seem divine, but even also in its functioning: it seems as if Socrates admitted every moral act to be the object of a divine inspiration.

This moral sense, or reason, is also intuitive; it tells us immediately the truth; it is intuitive, and it gives us knowledge of our moral being, which is absolute; this knowledge, being a 'commanding thing' provokes necessarily the action conformably to itself. The knowledge of the good, intuitively, through the moral reason, imparted to us by God, and influenced actually by Him - is the condition necessary and sufficient for the accomplishment of the good.

Men err only when he does not know or when he does not hear the voice, or attend to the divine warnings. Does then moral responsibility, which is the identification of virtue and knowledge, consist at least in our attending to the 'daimon'? Are we free, in other words, to take it or not to take it? to hear it or not to care for it?

This does not seem to be the case: Socrates as interpreted by Xenophon and as shown in the Lesser Hippias rejects the freedom of choice. It is for him an absurd notion: 'He who runs bad voluntarily, is supe-
rior to him who would do it without knowing it: for the former would have at least the knowledge of the good and the power to realize it (I). Then freedom of choice and will, if admitted, leads first to this conclusion: that the guilty person is better than the innocent; and this is obviously untrue. But further, why would he, who possesses the knowledge of the good, not do the good? The good runner runs badly for the purpose of reaching some higher good, which leads to a higher interest; and the possibility of running bad diminishes as his highest interest tends to coincide with his race. But the man who possesses the knowledge of the good cannot be determined to do bad—to run bad—by the idea of a good that is superior to the real good which he already knows. His highest interest coincides exactly with his race. Is it not absurd to say then, that he may still 'run' bad when he has all the power to run well. He cannot help but do the good.

What a paradox indeed! To affirm morality and at the same time to undermine its very foundation! How did Socrates solve it? As far as we know, we can say that he did not solve it. Let us see how Plato, his pupil par excellence, faced the problem.

I shall not lay much emphasis upon Plato's attitude. As a matter of fact, this problem, as well as all the problems discussed in the Platonic Dialogues, may as well be ascribed to Socrates; or at least, no one can surely say where the Socratic teachings stop, and where the Platonic ones start; so that one is not very much wrong if he speaks of this problem as being a Socratic-Platonic problem. Both of them believed that virtue is knowledge: in many a place, among the different Platonic dialogues, (e.g. in the Charmides, in Lysis and in Protagors) virtue is

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(I) Lesser Hippias, 371d 272a.
spoken of as being a science. '..... temperance or wisdom, if implying a knowledge of anything, must be a science of something' (I). 'For I say that justice, temperance and the like, are, all of them, parts of virtue, as well as courage'. In the Laches (2) '..... the terrible things as I should say, are the evils which are future, and the hopeful are the good or not evil things which are future ..... and the knowledge of these things you call courage' (3). Also in the Eutypho 'what is piety? Do you mean that it is a sort of science of praying and sacrificing? Is it a science of asking and giving?'

Plato then identifies virtue with knowledge; and, like his master, believes that our evil is determined by the good; yet Plato brings some extenuation to his master's doctrine. There is, according to him, in the soul of man, a part which is not reasonable, which is always ready for rebellion; pure opinion is not sufficient to fight or to appease it, so that man can say the contrary of what appears to him to be the good. 'Science alone is true and invincible, opinion is but ignorance'. Virtue, according to Plato and Socrates, is then the evil determined by the science of the good; it is then freedom, the true freedom, the true happiness. The ignorant man is also an evil doer and a miserable slave. Plato moreover seems to have given man a perfect freedom, when, as he does in the Xth book of the Republic (4), he represents the souls choosing their future conditions on earth. Man is responsible for his choice:

God is innocent. 'Mortal souls, behold a new cycle of life and mortality, for genius will not be allotted to you, but you will choose your genius; and let him who draws the first lot have the first choice, and the life which he chooses shall be his destiny. Virtue is free, and as a man honours or dishonours her he will have more or less of her; the responsa-

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(1) Charmides 165 c.
(2) Laches 195 b.
(3) Ibid. 196 c.
(4) 618 c. 619 b.
bility is with the choosen. God is justified.' One reading this, asks himself: Did Plato mean, as Kant did later do, that man decides once, for all of his life, by a free choice? Is the liberty foreshadowed by Plato, this same intelligible liberty of Kant? (1) It seems not; for the choice is determined by the state of the soul which chooses, and depends then upon its relative knowledge of the good; so that, for a free good choice, man should turn all his efforts to the only science which is profitable: the science of the good.

Aristotle refutes both Socrates and Plato, and proves the existence of liberty by the mere presence of responsibility, and also by a pure psychological analysis.

'Nothing is more irresistible than science' says he in Nich. Ethic (2) Socrates and Plato had admitted this; but what they did not accept is the fact that one can do things though they do not appear to him to be the best, so much so that they claimed that the incontinent is he who, blinded by pleasures, possesses not a science but a pure opinion. Now, says Aristotle, if it is true that the incontinent possesses only opinion, i.e. but a feable conception, and if he is not capable of resistance as are those people who doubt, we must pardon him, for he was not able to resist strong passions. Yet we do not forgive him: there is no real forgiveness for wickedness (3). Responsibility then implies liberty. If we accept the theory of Plato and Socrates, virtue is not praise-worth, and vice is not reproachable. To say that vice is not an act of will is to forget that we have done it by a free choice, i.e. to forget that man is the principle and father of his actions.

(1) See Janet et Séailles. Les problèmes et les Écoles.
(3) See Les problèmes et les Écoles p. 328-29.
So far, liberty has been proved by the fact of man's responsibility, but there is another proof of free will—psychological analysis. He says: Will is an inclination, a reasonable and painless inclination, the object of which is the good—be it real or apparent; it is a form of a desire, which leads with it the whole nature towards perfection. Now the end of the will is the good; yet this general end does not determine the means; the particular acts are contingent and depend upon our choice. The choice is something different from the desire and from the passion, since sometimes it goes against them; it is also different from opinion and science, since it is not always the case that he who thinks well and has the fairest ideas, acts best. We deliberate, i.e. we reason about, and measure things which have to come in the future; and it depends upon us to do things of which there is a possible choice. The reflective determination is not then reduced to a pure inclination, and it is not reduced to a pure thought. It presupposes both of them: the inclination, since it tends towards the good; and the reasoning, since it comes only after deliberation. Hence a definition of the free act is that it is the action which is deliberated in advance. Liberty pertaining to a being, who is at the same time reasonable and sensible, and who is neither determined by his thoughts nor by his desires, but in whose actions happiness interferes.

Aristotle then believed in the free choice of man; and his belief is based upon two proofs: psychology and the existence of responsibility. Now as a consequence of such a belief it follows that there is no such thing as a strict succession of phenomena; man might introduce into the world actions which were not in the least expected of him—so
that of two things which must happen in the future it is not necessary
that one must be good, and the other false, at the moments at which we
judge them.

Liberty is also hidden in a peculiar way in Aristotle's concep-
tion of matter. For matter, according to him, is not the not being of
Plato, but the potential being, the possibility or capacity of being,
the germ and beginning of becoming. Now the concrete being represents
the development of this germ, the realisation of this possibility; it
is the potential actualised. Matter becomes this or that under the in-
fluence of the idea or the form towards which it aspires and under
which it develops. Example of this is given by Aristotle when he says
that brass is a potential statue; the statue itself is the actualiza-
tion of the brass. Matter, in other words, is a contingent creation,
and if there is a liberty et alii in Aristotle's philosophy it has to
be found precisely here: in the contingency in the possibility which
matter possesses to become this thing or that other. Now if we come
to relate this metaphysics of potentiality with the Aristotelian ethics
of freedom and choice, or rather if we come to summarize Aristotle's
unified teaching on freedom, we can say that his conception—be it in
matter, or in the moral field—can be schematised as follows: freedom
between two determinations i.e. a freedom between two aims (1). First
there is the good to which the will tends, there is the Form to which
the matter tends; this good and this form are the real being, though
not determining necessarily the means, give at least the most obvious
ways. There is no haphazard in nature, there is no chance in moral li-
fe, but there is reasoning. Now freedom takes place: it consists in
the best choice, reasonable choice when man's actions are concerned to
reach the good or to realise a piece of art, and somehow blind choice

(1) Ross, W.D. Aristotle, Methuen, London 1937. Teleology and necessity
p. 76. See also same book: Aristotle's problem of the being and
becoming, priority of the being to the becoming.
when works of nature have to be realised. How these good and form are present in the beginning and at the end of the actions. Freedom though very true is not to be confused with free choice or haphazard, it is the real freedom which is not understood without the existence of necessity.

... In Epicurus we find the transposition of the matter of Aristotle. He is but an equivocal matriarch, for he also, in his conception of the universe, has left a place for chance. Matter for him is not a non-being, as it was for Plato; but a positive, and the only principle of things; it is the universal substratum of which soul, mind and thought are mere accidents. How matter is composed of innumerable, uncreated and indestructible atoms in perpetual motion. According to Democritus the corpuscles naturally and necessarily move downwards; but, says Epicurus, in as much as they are joined together and form bodies, it is certain that they deviated from the perpendicular lines. How this force according to which the deviation is operated is the clinamen, and the deviation could only have been the result of chance. This 'freedom' (or the deviation, i.e. lack of perfect regularity in phenomena) is but a cosmological freedom, and has nothing to do with the freedom of men. Anyhow Epicurus is not an absolute determinist, for he assumes chance i.e. the possibility of an effect without a cause; and this same view allows him to recognise in the field of ethics the freedom of indifference, that is of the existence of causes without effect.

... With the Stoics comes the apotheosis of the will, i.e. the glorification of the will, and consequently, we expect that in their philosophy greater attention will be paid for the problem of freedom than
was paid in antiquity. Let us state very briefly their way of reasoning on the human reason, and the conclusion they reached.

Though not denying a weakness in the reasoning faculty of man, the stoics have, however, insisted upon the importance of judgement in order to show how passions depend upon us. Chrysippus in particular has shown the fact of judgements in one way to escape from the action of passions. The stoics do not believe that human reason can deduce from the pure spontaneous inclinations, the good and virtue; but they do believe that it is by reason itself that man discovers the end, in view of which all actions are made, so much so that the basis of all moral life is precisely the kind of our spontaneous choice, that our inclinations lead us to do for the sake of our conservation: the aim of life is to live, and to choose reflectively and voluntarily things which are in conformity with the universal nature. At least this is the meaning attributed to the words of Zeno when he defined the aim of man to be 'living according to reason': Nature i.e. Reason and Destiny are equivalent terms. Happy is the sage who, versed in the secrets of nature, knows himself and others who is freed by his knowledge from the guardianship of men, time, social prejudices, and law themselves, in so far they are human caprice and not of reason. Every-thing, according to the stoics, comes through the universal reason; and they call this reason God's will, and destiny. Hence the attitude of man must necessarily consist in an inward attitude of our will: come what may, the stoic is resigned in the deepest of his heart. Alone an unwise reason tries to resist the universal good - Nature Reason - and to oppose to it the fantsamagory of an individual good, be it richness, health or honour.

The wise is he who accepts, after reflections, the events which come

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from the device of Destiny directing himself voluntarily to the direc-
tion that destiny leads him; while the evil doer shows resistance the
wise man accepts even his misfortune, if such is the order of God—will,
Nature. 'Non parce Deo sed assentor' said Semeus. 'I do not obey God,
I simply adhere to what he has decided'. The stoical resignation is
not a blind and forced one; it is, on the contrary, a positive and
pleasing attitude of men towards the world. 'We must act in such a way
that our will comes in accordance with the events'. Follow Nature,
follow Reason, follow God; and Nature, Reason and God are like the
Christian Trinity, i.e. three entities into one simple being. That was
the message of the Stoics as to the will and freedom of man; it can be
summarized in these words: To seek happiness through reason, for this
alone frees us from our passions. Knowledge and reason mean freedom.
He alone is free, who has overcome the world as well as his passions;
and this freedom is attained by an attitude of our will, towards the voi-
ce of Universal Reason, which is Nature, which is God.

With the Stoics we thus reach, at last, a real approach to the
problem of the freedom of man, and with them a definition of freedom
can be drawn: a free man is he whose knowledge/reason/enable him to
get rid of the human individual passions. For the first time in the
history of the thought, moral emancipation, in the real sense of the
term, is considered an ideal.

Though what has been said in this small chapter is very little,
nevertheless is enough to give a somehow true image of the conception
of the freedom of men in Antiquity. We have seen that the problem has
completely unknown by the first philosophers; lightly and equivocally
approached by some of them; and given importance only by the stoics. We have also seen that, not only did Antiquity hardly know the problem at all, but also it did not know even man himself!

Now, if we try to find out the reason for this, we can say that it was probably the fact that the whole problem of spirituality and immortality of the soul remained meaningless to Antiquity, save for Plato and Socrates. Were this problem real, the freedom of man would have been raised with sharpness; for immortality brings with it the problem of evil and good, of betterment, of the ought instead of moral discipline and of moral freedom. The Greek mind was neither ontological (I) or existential, nor spiritual; the soul was not of great interest to it. The Greek mind was much more concerned with form, beauty and harmony, than with man and the problem of his being. What is ultimate for the Greeks is the present: to live well, to be wise and happy this is most important, example their moral system, happiness, wisdom, aims of every man, and one is not mistaken if he believes that antiquity set the problem of freedom of man but did not know its anguish!

(1) Study of the being in his essence, as he is really and not as he appears through his action.
CHAPTER II

THE PROBLEM IN CHRISTIANITY.

It was reserved to Christianity to give to the freedom of man its highest and noblest form. In fact, the whole story of Jesus Christ his taking of the cross, his death and resurrection, or, in a word, Christianity as a whole, has no meaning save in that way: Man is a sinner; Jesus Christ, his redeemer and Saviour. Jesus Christ’s only aim in this world was the saving of humanity from sin, in order to give man the eternal life of peace and joy, and, therefore, of freedom.

Before going further in my exposition of the problem of liberty in Christianity, I would like to make clear my understanding and use of these words: "Liberty of man in Christianity". I do not intend to state the problem as it is treated by the Christian philosophers; and St. Augustine, or St. Thomas Aquinas, or Luther or Pascal, will find no place in my small essay. My whole endeavour will be to find out, as clearly as it is possible for me, how the problem of the liberty of man is contained in the teachings of Jesus Christ, and how it has been solved, or rather interpreted and presented, by such Biblical writers as St. Matthew, St. Luke, St. John, or St. Paul. A longer pause will be made at St. Paul’s teachings; because it is he who, among all apostles, was called the Apostle of salvation; and, moreover, because it is by reference to his teachings that the doctrine of predestination has been elaborated. Some words will be also said on the Old Testament Age, for two reasons: in order to emphasize the new element brought by Christianity concerning the problem; and in order to show the resemblance that one finds between the writings of that age, and some Koranic verses.

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A study of the problem of liberty in Christianity will make manifest the fact that, on the whole, Christianity has taken the liberty of man as an axiom. And liberty here is by no means equivalent to the caprice of a will or to the liberty of indifference of which we have already said some words. It rather constitutes an essential trait of the spiritual and moral nature of men. It is this kind of liberty that one proves, when, faced by different possibilities of acting or thinking or feeling, he deliberately (i.e. with reason and will) chooses only one of them. For a Christian there are two ways of living and dying; that is, he can attribute to his life one of two meanings; the beautiful and eternal on the one hand, the temporal and mean on the other; eternal life through Jesus Christ on the one hand, and the law of sin and eternal death on the other. The Christian manifests his freedom by following Jesus Christ.

This being, in a few words, the meaning of Christian freedom, let us now approach the problem more carefully and try to prove our last assertion.

I have said that some words on the Old Testament Age will emphasize the value of the new teaching brought by Jesus Christ concerning our freedom. Here also, I have to make it plain to the reader that I do not intend to discuss, much less to determine, the real part of freedom contained in the sin of Adam - this, being the subject of endless philosophical as well as theological debates, has nothing to do in this rapid glance cast upon Christianity as a whole. By approaching the Old Testament Age I simply intend to know the nature of the atmosphere in which one lives when he goes, for instance, thru the Psalms of David or the Lamentations of Jeremiah. The spirit dominant
in the Old Testament Age is that of a complete domination of man by God his Creator; and, consequently, very little place is left for freedom and responsibility. In fact, what the Mosaic Law primarily taught was: God as an almighty and omnipotent person. Such a God is nothing but a free determinant of all that comes to pass - the almighty maker of all that is. He is the supreme ruler of all that He has made. (1)

Even the common language of life was affected by his persuasive point of view so that, for example, it was rare to meet with such a phrase as "it rains"; and men by preference spoke of God sending rain (2).

"Thou visitest the earth and waterest it, thou greatly enrichest it with the river of God, which is full of water: thou preparest them corn, when thou hast so provided for it." (3)

All things without exception are indeed disposed by Him, and His will is the ultimate account of all that occurs. Heaven and earth and all that is in them are the instruments thru which He works His ends. Nature, nations, and the fortune of the individual alike present in all their changes the transcript of His purpose. The winds are His messengers, the flaming fire His servant: every natural occurrence is His act; prosperity is His gift, and if calamity falls upon man, it is the Lord that has done it. (4) "Out of the mouth of the most High proceedeth not evil and good?" - we find in the Lamentations of Jeremiah (5)

It is He that leads the feet of men, it is He that opens or hardens the heart of man, and creates the very thoughts and intents of his soul. So much so that man in front of his Creator does not claim any will, nor any freedom:

"Who is he that saith and it cometh to pass when the Lord commandeth it not?" (6).

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(2) Ibid., vol IV Art. 'Predestination' by B.B. Warfield, pp. 47-63.
(3) Ps. LXV : 9
(4) Art. 'Predestination' op.cit.
(5) La. III : 38
It is very easy to conceive what, with such a conception of God, the Jew of that time had the only feeling of fear and respect. David addressing the Jews, says:

"Come ye children, hearken unto me: I will teach you the fear of the Lord". (I)

Nor could we conceive of any equality whatsoever between the Creator and his creature. If the latter is good, he cannot hope to be more than the servant of God, his master.

Of course what has been said so far about the Old Testament Ages far from being sufficient to allow us to conclude anything decisive concerning the conception of the freedom of man in that age. However, it would be neither untrue nor exaggerated to believe that, with an almighty God, creator of all that is, on the one hand, and with a sentiment of fear of, and trembling before, this God, in the soul of man, on the other hand, freedom has but an apparent existence.

... But now, leaving the age of the fear of God, of the Old Testament, we reach the age of the New Testament, and with it the reign of Love and Liberty. In fact, the divine message of Jesus Christ, his earthly life and suffering, his crucifixion, his death and resurrection, is a message of the eternal life in Heaven where the Lord, his Father, sits. The immortality of the soul, its real life after the earthly passage, that life of peace and joy - this was the promise of Jesus Christ, this was the meaning of his life, and it is to this life of beauty and rest that the example of his own life invites us. This promise of rest by Jesus Christ, we find in the simple verses which he addressed to his followers:

"Come unto me all ye that labour and are heavy laden, and I will give you rest. Take my yoke upon you and learn of

(1) Ps. XXXIV: XI.
me, for I am meek and lowly in heart; and ye shall find rest in your souls." (1).

This also is a promise of freedom.

In fact, what is the meaning of the very coming of Christ to earth, if not the redemption of humanity, and making it worthy of God the Father? What would the very resurrection of Jesus mean, if it were not the symbol of our own resurrection from our sinful existence? It is of course, because the soul is immortal, and because it is capable of being saved from darkness unto light and truth, that the problem of our freedom is so important. But now, should we commit the error and believe that it is after death only that our freedom is realised? Surely not, for the effect of redemption starts during our earthly life, and it is only in proportion to the freedom we have attained for our souls on earth, that freedom, or eternal life of peace and joy, is granted to us in Heaven. If the immortality of the soul is the supreme proof for salvation, it certainly does not imply that salvation is in any way less real and evident for man while he is living:

"Jesus said to those Jews which believed on him: 'If ye continue in my word, then are ye my disciples indeed; and ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free.'" (2)

But this freedom is an inward freedom, a spiritual and moral emancipation of the soul from sin; it is a state of perfect purity of heart and mind - that state, namely, which makes of man the true follower of Christ. But, as it happened, such freedom was not understood by the Jews, who answered Jesus saying:

"We be Abraham's seed and were never in bondage to any man: how sayest thou, ye shall be made free?" (3)

And Christ replied:

(2) Jn. VIII : 31-32.
(3) Jn. VIII : 33.
"Verily, verily I say unto you, whosoever committed sin is the servant of sin. And the servant abideth not in the house for ever; but the son abideth ever. If the son therefore shall make you free, ye shall be free indeed."(1)

Let us try to understand, in our turn, the meaning of Jesus Christ's words. Jesus spoke of Truth. What is it, if not Jesus Christ Himself, and our faith in Him and in what He teaches? Is it not the Credo of the Christian - the belief, namely, that Jesus is the son of God coming to earth for the sake of all human beings; the belief that Jesus died, and that He liveth again, and that he is sitting now at the right hand of the Father in order to be continually pleading for us? It simply teaches Love and Humility. In fact, no truer interpretation could be given to the coming of the Son of God to earth, of his taking our earthly form, of his suffering and death. Jesus taught us also that this Love and Humility are but the means for the highest purpose destined for man, namely, the Love of God and Eternal Life. Of this purpose Jesus gave us a vision through His resurrection, which is, I repeat, the symbol of our own resurrection; and He gave us also the vision of the Love of God by the example of His love to His Father.

Jesus spoke also of Freedom. What is it, if not our knowledge of that truth? And what is that knowledge, if not the confirmation of one’s life to the teachings of Christ?

Jesus spoke also of Bondage. What is it, if not the sin or the law of the flesh which, hindering us from seeing that truth, keeps us slaves for ever?

And yet, there is a way to escape from that state of slavery; there is a way for us to free ourselves from sin - the way, namely which consists in our conformity to the law of the spirit. St. Paul, ------------

(1) Jn. VIII : 34-56.
speaking to the Romans, says:

"For the law of the spirit of life in Jesus Christ hath made me free from the law of sin and death." (1)

Could we not, indeed, say that the supreme argument for the reality of our freedom is precisely the fact that Jesus Christ has the power to liberate humanity from the power of sin, and that to be free is the destiny of man?

...

Now, since we are destined to be in the state of freedom, a question naturally arises: How can we free ourselves from the bondage of sin? And are we all able to know the truth and become the children of God? It is, indeed, a double question; and we will try to face the first part of it at the moment, reserving the discussion of the first to the latter part of this chapter, when it will be dealt with in conjunction with St. Paul.

...

"How can we free ourselves from the bondage of sin?" To this question Christianity gives the answer: There is one way to free yourselves from the bondage of sin, and this way is Love. Liberty, the glorious state of the children of God, constitutes the noblest goal of men; and it is only by love, love of God and love of man, that man can attain it. (2) Is it strange that the religion of Christ has made of Love the means of the purification of our souls? Is He not Himself the first personification of Love? Jesus Christ loved His Father; and it is because He loved Him that He came to earth and suffered and died. He loved His Father, and He loved us also, we human beings — for He is our saviour, and can the saviour help but love those who are lost? His love for His Father was the proof of His freedom, and

(1) Romans, VIII : 2.
(2) Romans, VIII : 2.
the promise of our freedom.

It was the proof of His freedom, and His freedom was the ideal one, for it consisted in His perfect conformity to the word of God; all of what Jesus did was what His Father had commanded; and He said to the people:

"I can of mine own self do nothing; as I hear, I judge; and my judgment is just; because I seek not mine own will, but the will of the Father which hath sent me."(2)

Self-will for Jesus Christ is not freedom, and the true freedom for Him was the will of His Father.

But we, human beings, how can we manifest our freedom, how can we free ourselves? Jesus's answer is: By loving men, your companions; for he who really loves, is he who possesses that perfect freedom; it is by loving our companions that we prove our love to God, but also not before we have the love of God deeply rooted in our souls are we capable of loving other men. The question remains: How can love give us freedom?

First of all, let us keep in mind that "freedom" in Christianity is nothing else than freedom from the bondage of sin; it is then a purely moral emancipation from the state of corruption to that of purity of heart; it is an emancipation from our human weakness and from the darkness into which our soul is sinking; it is then a purely spiritual and moral freedom for the highest reward: Love of God, eternal life. Yet this supreme emancipation can not be done save by the way of love. What does Christian Love mean?

It is very difficult, of course, to define it. In fact, it has never been given justice, for it has been often treated as a sentimentality of poor kind; and it has been claimed that to love in a Chris-
Christian way is the attribute of the weak, of all those who are not capable of strong actions; and thus Christian love has always been opposed to might and power.

Christian love has the same beauty as the sublimest love of which human nature can ever conceive; and yet it surpasses any love precisely because it contains that very element which, according to some constitutes its holiness, and grandeur, while it is for the others the source of its weakness—the element, namely, of Charity and Humility. St. Matthew records a definition of Christian love as follows:

"Love your enemies, bless them that curse you, do good to them which despitefully use you and persecute you." (1)

"For if you love them which love you, what reward have you? Do not even the publicans so? And if you salute your brethren only what do you more than others? do not even the publicans so?" (2).

In spite of the simplicity of its appearance, and the weakness of its adherents, Christian love appears to be the most difficult task that man undertakes. Only the purest minds can apprehend its meaning; only the strongest characters can admit its practical realisation. Very few, in my opinion, are Christian, if that love is Christianity. Very few are, according to me, the free men!

In fact, what does the love of enemies mean? What it means is nothing other than the purification of your soul from remour and hate and resentment, from anxiety and interest; and the love of something higher than you, nobler, and more spiritual, for the sake of which you suffer, you are humble, and you take the cross. Freedom is precisely that state of peace and rest which you attain when, after self-conquest and suffering, you have become higher than sin, higher than revenge and hate, higher than these human vanities which incite

(1) Matt. V: 44.
you to treat your enemy as you have been treated by him. Freedom is that refinement, whereby your soul remains pure and grand, while all around you is wicked and vile. It is of course the freest gesture to give the left cheek when the right one had been offended by a slap; it is not weakness, it is not cowardice, it is not the morals of the feeble, but rather of the boldest and freest men.

... This is the meaning of Christian Love and Christian Freedom. It is the meaning of Redemption. It is the meaning of Jesus Christ's life and sufferings, death and resurrection.

But then the second question arises: Are we all capable of loving God? of freeing ourselves from the bondage of sin? Has Christ died for all of us? and is the effect of redemption real in all of us? If our freedom is an ideal, the highest one which man can pursue, is it attainable by all of us? Is it not rather the reward of the few, those whom God has predestined since the beginning of the world to inherit the celestial kingdom?

This sentiment of unrest and anxiety comes to man, not as a consequence of the development of his reason, but through the very teachings of Jesus Christ as recorded in the Gospel, and thru the strange contradiction in the writings of Paul (who, among all the apostles of Jesus understood him best.) This anxiety and unrest, I say, form the subject matter of the problem of predestination; a problem for ever raised and never solved. Let us first state it as it is generally found in the New Testament, and then pass to St. Paul.

Though the New Testament brought a new and strong emphasis of the Fatherhood of God, this was not done at the expense of His majesty
and might. He is spoken of as the Heavenly Father, whose throne is in Heaven, while the earth is but the footstool under His feet. (1) There is no limitation admitted to the reach of His power; the minutest occurrences are as directly controlled by Him as the greatest.

"The very hairs of your head are all numbered," (2) no one of them is forgotten by God."(2)

so that man must learn with what confidence he might depend upon the Father's hand. Already and from such a description of God, man asks himself, But what am I, poor creature, in the hands of my Creator? Do I have any will? Do my actions depend on me? Am I responsible for the sins I commit? This is the beginning of the anxiety, which will get to be sharper and more vivid when man knows that God surveys all things and leads the whole world to the end which He has appointed for it - the Kingdom of God. This kingdom is the heritage of those blessed ones for whom it has been prepared from the foundation of the world.

"Then shall the King say unto them in his right hand, Come ye blessed of my Father inherit the Kingdom prepared for you from the foundation of the world."(2)

These are the blessed ones, and the Christian asks himself: Am I one of them? Shall I be among the few who shall be chosen? - for "Many are the called, but few are the chosen."(3)

Will God choose me? What can I do in order to be chosen by Him? The answer is very discouraging of course - for God chooses according to His own pleasure, distributing as He wills, that which is His own. Either you are since your birth among the called; or, you are not and never will be; Either you are condemned, you fall, and nobody can help you for standing again; or you are among the elect, who are guarded from falling away, and at the last day will receive the inheritan-

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(1) Matt. 6: 26; 61: 24-32.
(3) Matt. XXV: 34.
oe prepared for them from eternity. Not only this, but the very teachings of Christ will be veiled from them to whom they are not directed, so that

"Seeing they may see and not perceive, and hearing they may hear and not understand",

while to the others it is given even to know the mystery of the kingdom of God.

... 

So much for the elementary exposition of the problem as presented in the sayings of Jesus. But now if we imagine the Christian, seeking comfort and peace to his disturbed soul, which is anxious about its destiny, and desiring to know whether it will be among the few who will be saved, and coming to St. Paul's teaching, we will immediately notice that his anxiety is not in the least appeased. For it is by reference to the very teachings of St. Paul that theologians and philosophers have professed and proved a strict doctrine of predestination, i.e. a salvation due to the prerogative of God, independently of any consideration of the work of man.

Yet, if we were to examine the truth implied in such a conviction, it would not take us a long time to discover its instability. For at once the objection would arise, undermining two of the essential convictions of Paul. In the first place: If Paul believed that only a few are saved, this also would mean that he believed that Jesus Christ had died not for all, but only for a few human beings - this being in no way conforming with his mission. In the second place: If we remember that Paul was continually exhorting men to do the good (which implies that he was considering man responsible for his soul, and capable of working for his own salvation) we can hardly be-
lieve that he himself could preach a doctrine of predestination, where man has neither will nor freedom. For Paul used to say:

"For we must all appear before the judgment seat of Christ; that every one may receive the thing done in his body according to what he hath done, whether it be good or bad." (1)

Over and above this double contradiction, we find that the whole doctrine of St. Paul concerning freedom and predestination, contains two disharmonious elements: Man is a sinner who can never be saved by his own means; and it is up to God alone to save him, if it pleases him so to do; and yet man does not remain passive in the task of his salvation, but is rather a conscious, responsible and free active agent. Shall we say then that there is a contradiction? Not at all, for he who knows St. Paul's love of God does not find it strange that he has made our salvation, and our happiness, dependent upon God's initiative and will. This new light on which the issue is discussed has the merit that it changes the form of our anxiety: having been at first full of despair and rebellion, we now become humble, submissive, and hopeful.

Paul was called the apostle of salvation, a salvation for all men. What does this mean, if not that Paul believed first of all, that all human beings, Jews as well as Greeks, are under the weight of sin? This sin, according to him, we commit all along our life simply because we follow the law of the flesh, simply because we all are humanly weak and vain. Evil we do naturally and almost in spite of our will, simply because sin is dwelling in us. He says:

"For the good that I would, I do not, but the evil which I would not, that I do; if I do that I would not, it is no more I that do it, but sin that dwelleth in me." (2)

Man, then, according to Paul, is a sinner; he knows it and he laments:

"O wretched man that I am, who shall deliver me from the body of the death." (1)

But Paul believes that there is a salvation for all men, Jews and Greeks who are under sin; he does not leave men under the painful reality of their loss: on the contrary, he declares that God has planned to have pity on us, and to give us the help which neither nature nor law have been able to provide us with. God's righteousness shall be then manifested in sending us his unique Son Jesus Christ, with a promise of redemption for all those who believe:

"Thank God through Jesus Christ our Lord. So then with the mind I myself serve the law of God." (2)

So that -

"There is no more condemnation to them which are in Christ Jesus, who walk not after the flesh but after the spirit, for the law of the spirit of Life in Christ Jesus hath made me free from the law of sin and death." (3)

God, then, our unique Creator, is also the universal saviour; Jesus Christ, the only son of God, is also the universal mediator between God and his creation; there is no salvation outside of Him, and it is to Him that all must return when they are lost. St. Paul in more than one instance emphasizes the Character of the universality of our salvation through Jesus Christ:

"Is He the God of the Jews only? Is He not also of the Gentiles? Yes of the Gentiles also; seeing it is one God which shall justify the circumcision by faith, and uncircumcision through faith." (4)

"For there is no difference between the Jew and the Greek, for the same Lord over all is rich unto all that call upon Him." (5)

Now, making us sure and confident of the fact that salvation is granted to all of us, Paul goes on and emphasizes the greatness of our hope in God. In fact, we have so many reasons to be hopeful: God has sent us his son, who came to earth as a man, suffered, and died on the

(1) Ro. VII : 24.
(2) Ro. VII : 25.
(3) Ro. VIII : I-2.
(5) Ro. X : 12.
cross, for the expiation of our sins; his death was but for a few days - for Jesus Christ, the Son of God, could not die an eternal death, for he has followed the law of the Spirit, which is the word of God. His resurrection is the symbol of our resurrection, if like Him, we follow the law of God: Jesus is now sitting at the right hand of the Father, so that his help for us remains for ever real and effective. Now, who is it that doubts the love of God for us? Who is that denies Jesus Christ's love and sacrifice for the sake of humanity? Nothing can really separate us from the Love of God through Jesus Christ. Says Paul:

"I am persuaded that neither death nor life, nor angels nor principalities, nor powers, nor things present, nor things to come, nor height, nor depth, nor any other creature shall be able to separate us from the love of God which is in Jesus Christ our Lord."(1)

And now, for such certitude concerning universal salvation, Paul exhorts every man to work and labour, knowing however that this can be done only thru sufferings and sacrifices; he exhorts him to work, for if one knows the truth and does not follow its path, he is lost; and being responsible for it, his loss is still deeper.

"Wherefore", says Paul to the Philippians, "my beloved, as ye have always obeyed, not in my presence only, but now much more in my absence, work out your own salvation with fear and trembling."(2)

If, then, man must work for his salvation, a question arises: Are we all able to work and save ourselves? What kind of work have we to do, in order to be saved? Here Paul's doctrine of predestination becomes clear: To all these questions his answers are of a predestinarian form, i.e. to all of them Paul answers in terms of the will of God, of the choice of God, of election through a call of prescience and predestination.

(1) Ro. VIII : 38-39.
(2) Phil. II : 12
Let us first inquire into the question: What kind of work should we do in order to be saved? and then pass to this other: Are we all capable of such a work?

Paul believes that this work of salvation is of a different nature from that of the Mosaic Age, which consisted in living according to the Law and working according to it. It is summarized in these words: "Have faith in Jesus Christ". Faith alone justifies man: all those who are saved through the Law or the works are not justified by God. "Abraham had faith; he believed in God; and it was accounted to him for righteousness."(1)

"Know ye therefore that they, which are of faith, the same are the children of Abraham... So then they, which are of faith, are blessed with faithful Abraham... But no man is justified by the law."(2)

But it happened that though Paul preached salvation and faith for all men, he nevertheless saw exemplified before his eyes the fact that some heard the word of God and understood it, and others heard it and either did not understand it or else rebelled against it. In fact, all those who love God and believe in Him are saved, but all are not able to love God and to have faith in Him. Why? It is true that the Law of the Spirit delivers us from the law of the flesh; it is not less true that in all of us it is not the law of the spirit that triumphs. Why? The answer leads us to Paul's conception of faith: We are all saved and justified not by work, nor by the effect of the law, but by a pure act of faith; and this faith is neither the work of men, nor an object of his will, but a pure gift of God. Paul, speaking to the Ephesians, says:

"For by grace are ye saved through faith; and that not of yourselves: it is the gift of God: not of works, lest any man should boast."(3)

(2) Gal. III : 7-11.
(3) Ephesians II : 8-9; see on man's contribution to his faith in Christ, Vol. I, p.147.
Now, it is not only the case that this grace is not given to all men but only to the few whom God has chosen, but, moreover, this very choice of God is undertaken according to his own pleasure and will:

"For He saith to Moses, I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy, and I will have compassion on whom I will have compassion, so that it is not of him that willeth nor of him that runneth, but of God that sheweth mercy." (1)

In sum: Salvation through faith is an act of God, an act of choice and freedom; it is given to sinners of all races and nations. Those to whom it is given are predestined by God to be saved, and they form the class of the elect.

Part (2) distinguishes in the act of salvation different phases dependent one upon the others: The first one is the prescience of God, the last one is the glorification by God. In the first place, there is the PRESCIENCE of God—that is, his anterior knowledge of things before their existence. This knowledge is followed by an act of PREDESTINATION; which is also an eternal act of God, since it existed before the foundation of the world; it is an absolute and free act, since it depends only and exclusively upon the counsel of God and His will. This predestination, according to Prat, is universal in the sense that all, being known by God, are also predestined by Him to salvation—or rather, speaking in terms of grace, we can say that all are predestined to receive the grace of God, or that the grace is predestined to all. But though all of us are predestined to the grace of God, yet very few are those who have faith. God makes a choice; He elects. ELECTION, according to Prat, comes after Predestination, and is also eternal. It contains a new element, non-existent in the pure act of predestination, the element namely of favour for those who are its objects, which is an element of

(1) No. IX: 16-16.
preferences in the act of God. Then, those who are elected are justified by God, and finally glorified. As it has been said:

"For whom he did FORK-BOW, he also did PRE Destinate to be con-
formed to the image of His Son, that he might be the first
born among many brethren; moreover, whom he did predestinate,
them he also CALLED; and whom he called, them he also JUSTI-
FIED; and whom he justified, them he also GLORIFIED."(1)

... It is really strange that Paul believed in the grace of God, when
he was the first object of the effect of that grace itself? One, on
the contrary, is very much inclined to believe that the final argument
which had led Paul into this conviction was the apparition of Jesus
Christ to him on the road to Damascus, while he was going to persecute
the few Christians living there. Prat says (2)

"In the conversion of Paul the work of the grace becomes qui-
tе evident"

and he describes this effect of the grace to be as quick as the light-
ing where man's will has nothing to do:

Le revirement est instantané; c'est un éclair, un éblouisse-
ment, l'adhésion rapide à l'appel divin d'une volonté qui n' a
pas connu par conséquent d'avoir consenti. Qui a connu pareil-
le crie a le sentiment plus net, l'intuition plus vive que
tout l'honneur du changement revient à Dieu; il aime à se
représenter l'opération comme un acte d'obéissance libre sans
doute, mais qui une fois posé, vous jette tout d'un coup en
un monde nouveau de droits, de devoirs, d'obligations et de
privilèges".

This is the operative effect of the grace of God in our heart, an effect
quick and absolute, which transforms the whole being of man. Man becomes
all of a sudden, the pure voice of God, acting according to His word.

Shall we say, then, that God has sent his grace to all (since
he sent it to Paul), but some only received it and made profit of it,
while in the heart of others it remained sterile? St. Paul at first

(1) No. VIII - 29-30
thought in this very way, attributing to man full responsibility; but
he did not retain for a long time his conviction that man possesses a
free will; for he says:

"But the grace of God I am what I am, and his grace which was
bestowed upon me was not in vain; but I laboured more abund-
antly than they all: yet not I, but the grace of God which
was with me.(1)

Or shall we say that it is unjust of God to have done so, and
to condemn a man for the fault he commits, because He did not send him
His grace? Not at all; for

"Who art thou, O man, that repliest against God? Shall the
thing formed say to him that formed it, Why hast thou made
me thus?"(2)

The truth is that this distribution of the graces of God remai-
med for Paul a mystery - a mystery which makes him exclaim:"O altitudin!"(3)

... No. That Paul preached a doctrine of predestination is not a
strange thing at all. For, in the first place, the grace of God (as
already seen) had been manifested in him, and has been the reason and
cause of his conversion. But, Paul, the persecutor of the followers of
Christ, has become the bearer of the testimony of Christ's resurrec-
tion; and he preached the Gospel all through his life.(4) In the se-
cond place he preached such a doctrine because of the rôle that was as-
signed to him - to establish Christianity in the world. Had he not
believed that all Gentiles are not condemned, but can be saved, provi-
ded God sends to them His grace, his whole preaching would have no mea-
ning whatsoever. For, what is the use of preaching at all to all those
are eternally lost? When St. Paul used to be asked:

"Even us whom he hath called, not of the Jews only, but also
of the Gentiles"

(1) I Co. XV : 10.
(2) Ro. IX : 20.
he used to answer:

"I will call them my people which were not my people; and her beloved, which was not beloved. And it shall come to pass that in the place where it was said unto them, Ye are not my people; there shall they be called the children of the living God." (1)

In the third place, one may attribute St. Paul's doctrine of predestination to his love of Jesus Christ his Lord:

"No man ever had a more intense and more vital sense of God the uncorruptible one, the only wise who does all things according to his good pleasure, before whom men should bow in the humility of absolute dependence, recognizing in him the one moulding power as well in history as in the life of the individual; of him and through him, all and in all." (2)

Now, before such a God, how vain it is of man to claim any right to action—except such action as is permitted by God. The very intents of our souls are but His work, so that, if man has faith, it is because God has wanted it. This predestination that Paul preached is much more the result of such a conviction, that it is the mere desire to throw the weight on man of an invincible fatality; God's prevision is but the result of His presence. It is not quite contrary to the freedom of man but man must know that he can not do anything by himself had not God known it and wanted it.

It seems as if St. Paul wanted his doctrine of salvation to satisfy two conditions; it must be universal, and it must also reduce to nothing the vain glory of man in the work of a complete salvation by himself. He succeeded in both: we have said that according to him salvation is done neither by work nor by law, but by pure faith; now faith is an act of pure spontaneity; there is no other act simpler and more general than it; yet this faith is a pure gift of God, a kind of charity which we receive from the hands of God, and our attitude is ve-

(1) Ro. IX : 24-26.

chig of St. Paul.
ry much like that of a beggar receiving the alms from the hands of a benefactor. These two entities, God's will and grace on the one hand and the freedom of man and his responsibility, on the other, remain real from the beginning to the end of his teachings, and he did not resolve the antithesis at all. J. Weiss remarks (1):

"The ethical sense of responsibility, the energy for struggle, and the discipline of will was not paralyzed in Paul's case by his consciousness of redemption and his profound spiritual experiences. He believed in divine election, pre-knowledge and predestination, and without attempting to resolve the antithesis placed human determination side by side with these."

In fact, St. Paul says:

"For it is God which worketh in you both to will and to do of his good pleasure"(2)

...  

That was St. Paul's doctrine of Predestination, and it was also the problem as it is found in Christianity - a problem, or rather a source of anxiety and suffering for the Christian, from which he never recovers.

But now to say that, by introducing the doctrine of predestination, Christianity denied the freedom of man will be a grave error. For hold that liberty - that inward and spiritual emancipation of the soul, which implies a moral progress, a betterment, an ascent from the is to the ought above it - this liberty constitutes the positive and actual message of Christianity regarding the freedom of man.

Of course it is not an ontological and discursive exposition of the free will of man, that we find in Christianity. For Will here is replaced by Love; and it is by loving in a disinterested manner, both our friends and our enemies, that we prove our freedom.

(1) Paul and Jesus, Eng. Trans., London 1909 p. 113
(2) Philip. II: 13.
Moreover, Christian liberty is such that, though it is very difficult for man to attain, is yet a "human" attribute. By so describing it, I mean that Christian liberty is not necessarily dependant upon any belief in God, spiritual and unseen; and that it can be attained without any such belief.

...

If now we were to give a justification, a raison d'être, for the problem of predestination, we may interpret it as a "test" for our faith in God—though of course, a very hard test, since it puts our whole life in danger. (By saying that it puts our whole life in danger, I have in mind those beings whose moral life depends upon their religious convictions; for the others—or rather, those of the "others" who are not sceptics—morality is as vivid and real with religious convictions as without them.)

And, not only may the problem of predestination be looked upon as a "test" for our faith, but it may also, in the second place, be considered as a way through which we return with more humility to God, our almighty Creator, in whose hands lies our whole destiny and life. It is this last interpretation that we will meet in Islam; and it is in the light of the conception of a God, the Creator and Maker of all things, and of man, a creature quite different from its creator, that Islam, as we shall see, will raise and never solve the problem of the freedom of man.
Under the heading of this chapter "the problem in Christianity" comes also, though not chronologically in this essay, the problem of liberty as it has been treated by the writers in the Middle Ages in the West. In fact St. Paul's teachings on predestination raised, to the theologians and philosophers of that age, one of the most important problems in human life; and Sts. Augustine, Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus gave for its solution a great deal of their intellectual energies, above the infinite depth of their personal sufferings and religious experiences.

For what is the meaning of the problem of the freedom of man for a believer? or in other words, why is there such a problem at all? The answer is simple, and we shall try to state it. The Christian, or a believer, is he who before everything else, believes in God i.e., a creator almighty and good; and this God does not only possess goodness and knowledge, but also is the maker of all that happens, so that whatever comes to man is but His act and gift. Omnipotence and omniscience are the most striking divine attributes in any religious faith (at least so far as Christianity and Islam are concerned). A believer, moreover, accepts the system of morals appropriated to his religion; thus there is the Christian Ethics as well as the Moslem. This system of Ethics prescribes to man certain actions and forbids him from certain others; and man either accepts the system, and then he is counted among the real believers, or he refuses to adhere to these prescriptions, and he is then counted among those non-believers who will be later condemned to eternal death. Now, this capacity that man possesses, either to accept or to refuse a moral law, is called his liberty.
In other words any system of morals, as we have seen it, implies or takes for granted the liberty of man i.e. his capacity to do a certain action rather than another. Now, if all that we are, and do, is an act of God, and if on the other hand there is such a thing as the moral codification, the problem inevitably arises, how will my beliefs in such and such attributes of God, the almighty maker, the omniscient creator, go hand in hand with a system of morals, which implies my freedom? For, if it is God, and not I, who is responsible for what I do, my good and my bad actions included, then He is not only the doer of evil which is already a contradictory thing in the conception or understanding of God, but He also condemns me without any apparent reason to sin and death and that is perfect injustice on his behalf. If, on the other hand, it is I, and not God who is responsible, I then work for my salvation and I either conform myself to God’s teachings, or I reject them. In other words I determine myself freely; and if by so believing I deny some of the attributes of God, I yet save God’s justice. That is the meaning of the problem of freedom of man for him who has any religious beliefs. In fact, as it appeared to the theologians of the Middle Ages, the problem raised through the teachings of St. Paul assumed the following form: since the free will of man must be taken for granted for the justification of God, i.e. for the belief in his justice, and the establishment of a system of morals, how, shall we reconcile it with the preexistence of God and with His grace? (1)

Of course, there is no room, in this rapid and general review of the problem in the history of human thought, to state fully the doctrines of St. Augustine or of St. Thomas Aquinas; and we shall be contented with stating very briefly the solutions given by them to that dilemma.

St. Augustine. When, in St. Augustine, it is the psychologist who speaks, the freedom of man is a fact of great certainty; when on the contrary, it is the theologians who speaks, the liberty of man has no meaning whatsoever (1). In fact, for St. Augustine the pure concept of will implies liberty. It is according to him a pure sophism to oppose the causal chains of facts to the freedom of the will. The will is not an effect, but on the contrary the cause of all human actions; it is the will which constitutes the substratum of all acts of our spiritual life: "Voluntas est quippe in omnibus, imo omnes nihil aliud quam voluntatibus sunt" (Aug., de Viv Dei, XIV, 6). Will is not at all determined by the intelligence, but proceeds it all the time. That was the message of St. Augustine the psychologist, but what he grants us as a psychologist he retracts as a theologian. In fact, St. Augustine shows indignation, if one comes to take away from the divine providence the human determination. He says: Dieu a parlé une fois, et tout a été dit et nos volontés libres sont comprises dans l'ordre des causes, ordre certain en Dieu, ce qui fait qu'elles ne laissent pas d'être libres. Tout ce qu'elles peuvent, elles le peuvent très certainement, tout ce qu'elles doivent faire, elles le feront effectivement" (Civ., Dei III, 9). Les mots jamais, avant alors n'ont pas de sens dans la vie divine (Conf. XI, 13,14,50). God is the spectator, and also the real author, of all phenomena which happen in time. The contingent (2) things do not happen because God has foreseen them, but God foresees them because they will happen.

Now, St. Augustine believed in the undeserved grace of God. Adam according to him, was free before the sin; he had the capacity to remain in a state of sinlessness; but after the sin, it became impossible

(1) Les problèmes et les Ecoles, Janet et Séailles p.334
(2) Contingent, that which is not necessary.
for man not to sin; and St. Augustine believed that by himself man is able at all to save himself and to become the child of God, without the help of God's grace, so that whatever good man accomplishes, it is not of him but of God who acts in him. God is, so to speak, our inward power to do the good; the very desire of the good is the act of God's grace. With such a conception, we are led by St. Augustine to a strict doctrine of predestination, so that, if we ask St. Augustine what has become of our freedom which seemed so naturally human, we find that he has made of it the privilege of one man—Adam—who out of the wickedness of his human nature, used his liberty once only, and that was to his loss. St. Augustine was rather pessimistic in his conception of human nature; and freedom in his doctrine finds not a smaller place than it does even in St. Paul's teachings.

With St. Thomas Aquinas (1) freedom also is not very well come; taking again the theory of St. Augustine and insisting upon the prescience of God, he affirms that God knows even the contingent things; he says (Sum Theology I q. 14 a.13) God knows all things not only when they become actual, but also when they are in a state of potentiality(2) So that all the future contingents, as they are in themselves, are known by God in an infallible manner. "L'Éternité existe toute ensemble et enveloppe tout le temps, d'où il est clair que les contingents sont infailliblement connus de Dieu en tant que soumis par prescience à la vue divine et que cependant ils sont futures contingents quand on les compare à leurs causes prochaines." He says: Imagine a man who, from a high tower sees in one glance many travellers passing in the way but from a lower place, sees them only one after the other. Similar

(1) Les problèmes et les écoles p. 326
(2) Potentiality, actuality are Aristotelian words, they correspond also to virtuality and reality.
with God; from eternity He perceives by a simple glance the successive acts of His creatures; He sees them by His presence, and determines them by His providence. According to St. Thomas, not only are our actions foreseen by God, but they are also required by Him to be what they are; and yet these very actions are free; for God, says St. Thomas, determines me to act freely in such and such manner; or in other words, my actions are at the same time free and necessary—which is quite a strange solution, which seems to identify two contradictory things!

Yet the Middle Ages had the philosopher of liberty in the person of Duns Scotus, the most eager opponent of St. Thomas. Duns Scotus, first of all, asserts the contingency of the world, and maintains that there are some causes which are free to act or not to act, and some facts which may or may not happen. He asserts also that will is superior to intelligence. *Voluntas est superior intellectu*; and it is by an act of free adhesion that one accepts the truth of faith which can not be proved by pure logical demonstration.

But this freedom of man depends upon, or rather is understood only under the light of the freedom of God. God is before everything a free Creator. He does not find in His intelligence the ideas necessary for the Creation; it is by a purely act that He created the true and the good. Of course, D. Scotus believes if the first cause, i.e. God acts in a necessary way, the second causes, i.e. man would act in a necessary way, and consequently necessity would have been reigning over the world, and liberty would not find a place at all. This is not the case. The first cause acts freely; the world is the result of a completely free act; and we ourselves are the free causes of our
actions (Opus. Oseon 1, I,fol.26 et fol.130, ed. Venst) (I)

This is very briefly and very imperfectly what has been said in the Middle Ages of the Christian Philosophers on the freedom of man. We say Christian philosophers as if philosophy belongs to a religion and a nationality. But as a matter of fact, for that problem at least, philosophy can be spoken of in terms of a religion - be it Christian or Mahommedan; for as we have seen, the Holy Bible had been a point of departure of the problem of freedom for the Christian writers; and the Holy Koran, as we will see later, will be the safe guide for the solution of the same problem to the Moslem philosophers of the Middle Ages in the East.

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CHAPTER III

THE PROBLEM IN ISLAM.

If liberty plays such an important part in the life of the Christian, if it constitutes one of his most difficult problems, for the follower of Mohammed its importance is also great. The same anguish and the same anxiety which overwhelm the heart of the Christian when he desperately asks himself: "shall I be able to free myself from the bondage of sin and become worthy of the eternal life", invade also that of the moslem. But, just because he is a moslem (1) this anxiety and this anguish take the form of resignation and submissiveness before the unlimited will of God.

The problem of the freedom of man is as Christian as it is Mohammedan, for both religions believe in the immortality of the soul, and in the day of judgement; both of them believe in Heaven and Hell, in the good and in the evil; both of them believe in God who rewards and punishes man according to his actions. Yet, in both religions the same problem is differently raised, understood and solved - if at all it is solved. The Christian freedom attained by love and suffering has no meaning whatsoever to the moslem; that inward moral emancipation, that freedom of the soul which follows the knowledge of the truth is not found in the Koran. In other words, as far as my understanding of both religions goes, it appears to me that the problem of the freedom of man, though constituting an essential part of Islam, is yet not as vital in that religion as it is in the religion of Christ. The debates around it, those theological and philosophical controversies concerning the will of God and the responsibility of man in Islam, seem

(1) A moslem, ـ means in Arabic, he who surrenders to the will of God.
acute and critical than they are in Christianity.

...

When I try to make clear to myself the reasons of this, I find them to be as follows: first, Mohammed, the founder of Islam, is not Jesus Christ, the saviour and the Redeemer; secondly, salvation is Islam can be achieved through man's own deeds; and finally, resurrection, as found in the Koran, does not have the same spiritual meaning that it has in the religion of Christ: it is rather, as we shall see, a simple and universal phenomenon of life.

I have said that the first and most obvious of all reasons why the problem of the freedom of man is not as vital in Islam as it is in the religion of Christ is the fact that Mohammed, the founder of Islam, is not Jesus Christ, the saviour and the Redeemer. In fact, Jesus Christ's life and death and resurrection are the symbol of our salvation: we are saved, or rather, we can be saved, because of Jesus Christ. The way to free our souls from sin, was his teaching; and redemption through Him was his message.

Now the message of Mohammed, on the other hand, was different: Mohammed, the Saint-Apostle of God, was first and foremost the bearer of the message of the One and Unique God; and we can say that Redemption through a historic person is not found in Islam: in fact, man as the Koran presents him is an individual who has to bear the burden of his own actions, whom no other being whatsoever can help, who is left to his own personal efforts, and who is the trustee of a free personality which he accepts at his peril (1)

"Verily, we proposed to the Heavens and to the Earth and to the mountains to receive the 'trust', but they refused the burden and they feared to receive it. Man undertook to bear it (2)


(2) Koran Chap. XXXIII: 72
It is precisely this fact, namely, that man is fully responsible for his own actions, and that the sin of Adam is not inherited by his descendants, that is the cause of the lack of redemption in Islam. When man commits sin, this sin is imputed to him alone, i.e. it remains his own; it can be neither received from others, nor given to others. Adam sinned and his sin, according to the Bible, is inherited by all men, so that all are necessarily sinners and are in need of a Redeemer or a Saviour; hence the Christian belief in redemption through Jesus Christ.

A Moslem, on the other hand, believes that he is not born with the sin i.e. he is not a fallen being; he consequently does not need a Redeemer; he may not fall at all, and whenever he falls he can save himself, as we shall see a little further. A Moslem, then, is not, since his birth, the slave of sin, and Mohammed is not sent by God to redeem him: Mohammed came to preach to the Arab of the desert the One and Unique God, and to guard him against evil. Speaking of the Koran, Mohammed says:

"This book, there is no doubt in it, is a guide to those who guard (against evil)(1)."

Nevertheless, though the Christian phenomenon of Redemption has no meaning to the Moslem at all, yet a Moslem believes in salvation. There is salvation, in fact, to him who acts well; here again there is a difference between Islamic salvation and Christian salvation. While Christian salvation is done first of all by God's grace, Islamic salvation is done through man's efforts and actions.

"Blessed is He in whose hands is the kingdom, and who has power over all things, Who hath created death and life that He may try you which of you is the best in point of deeds. He is the Mighty and Forgiving"(2)

Men then acts, and God judges him; if his deeds are good, God rewards him, and if bad He punishes him. One is not astonished at such belief

(1) Koran Ch. II :2
(2) Koran Chap. LXXVII : 1,2.
at all, for it is but a corollary of another more fundamental one - the belief namely about the nature of God. God, as we shall see later on, has no connection whatsoever with His creatures, and consequently does not intervene at all in their actions.

The last reason which seems to make clear the fact why the problem of freedom is not so real to Islam is that of the resurrection of the soul. The resurrection of the soul, i.e. its passage from death to life, has not in the religion of Mohammed the same spiritual, and mysterious meaning as that given to it by Christianity. In fact, as M. Hadkour (1) suggests, Islam does not encourage the study of the soul at all. It is quite a dry subject, which is left to Revelation and the divine science. It is even said in the Koran that Mohammed, asked once, about the soul, answered that he knows very little about it, and that it pertains to God. While Christianity had made of the resurrection of the soul something quite enigmatic, a jump into the unknown, Islam, on the contrary, simplified it, and made of it a natural universal phenomenon of life, true even of birds and animals (2)

"And there is no animal that walks upon the earth nor a bird that flies with its two wings, but they are like yourselves; we have neglected nothing in the book then to their Lord shall they be gathered" (3)

Is it wrong to believe that the more a faith requires a supernatural effort, the more does a believer work in the supernatural in the spiritual sense, and the more does the problem of his soul become vital and serious? - for when he compares his soul and its states to the supernatural ideal, he realises its state of imperfection and the ultimate need of improvement; while, when things appear to be natural, he accepts his being as it is, with no anxiety in his heart, but with a

(1) M. I. Hadkour. La place d'al-Farabi dans l'école philosophique musulmane, Maisonneuve, Paris 1934 p.162; see also XII, 87.
(2) See Preface of the Koran (Life after death).
(3) Chap. VI, 36.
state of self-content of submissiveness. This result of the comparison of Islam and Christianity, which applies to all religious-moral questions, applies in particular to the question of liberty.

These are some of the reasons which, according to me, explain the fact namely, that the problem of the freedom of man is Islam is not as important as it is in the religion of Jesus Christ.

... 

Coming to the desert, meeting there a people in complete ignorance of the existence of the One God, a people namely which was living in nature, adoring its strange forces, the Saint Apostle of God decided that there is nothing which it is more imperative to preach than the One and Unique God. All that he spoke of was in terms of God sun and earth, plants and animals, man and his actions are but the manifestations of God's existence and attributes; so that, when the problem of the freedom of man is raised, it will also be in terms of God and of His attributes. If a parallel between the two religions on that subject is possible, we can say that Christianity is personal: it appeals to, and works itself out within, the personal existence of man. Very little critical mention is made of cosmological suns and moons and stars:

"The Kingdom of God is within you".

We find in the Bible. And since Christian freedom is a highly personal phenomenon - and not abstract theoretical determination of our actions by hidden dark causes, be they called God or Nature - Christian freedom at least is not a Moslem phenomenon. Freedom, if it exists in Islam, differs from the freedom of the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, which exists in Christianity.

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Speaking of the Old Testament Age I have said that some of its teachings resemble those found in the Koran. I refer precisely to those teachings concerning God and his attributes. This can be easily understood by the fact that both ages had the same mentality as regards religious experience: the Jew known by Moses strongly resembled the Beduin of the desert, who followed Mohammed. What the Mosaic Law had taught concerning God, was later on taught by the Koran: God the Almighty had created all things, mountains and rivers, man and plants and animals. So that, the same feelings of man towards the Creator are found in the Jewish heart and in that of the Moslem — feelings, namely of veneration, fear and respect; and the same attitudes of submissiveness and resignation are shared by the followers of Moses and of Mohammed. Of course, there is a fundamental difference between the Old Testament Age and Islam as regards the fact of Liberation, namely: the Jews are waiting and will always be waiting for the Messiah or the Liberator — a unique Jewish phenomenon — who will be from the family of David and the tribe of Juda; nevertheless, the feeling of fear of the Jews is also a fact, for they accepted the chastisement of God, and they were continually living in the fear of God, and their every day life was directly depending upon God.

... And now, before going further in tracing the development of the problem of the freedom of man in Islam, I would like to make clear my using of these words "liberty in Islam". It is not my purpose at all — for this would be too long and a hard work — to state the many philosophical and theological doctrines written on that subject; and the Djasbarites' (1) views as well as those of the Kadrites (2), Mutasilites (3)

(1) those who completely deny the freedom of man.
(2) those who are midway between the Djasbarites and the Mutasilites. deny completely any freedom, the Mutasilites.
(3) or those who believe man has perfect freedom.
and Asharites (I), will find no place in this small chapter. My only purpose will be - as it has been in Christianity - to find out as clearly as possible in the Holy Koran how the problem of the freedom of men can be raised, and how the fact of predestination commonly known under the title of fatalism, can equally be proved.

After all these preliminary ideas, an in a way of pure introduction, I allow myself to make this assertion - built up on the facts above cited upon my personal reaction to the Koranic teachings on that subject - that liberty as I understand it, and as I found it in the religion of Christ, is not found in Islam: Islam does not believe in the freedom of man (it does not even realize the necessity of such moral, and consequently internal, self-conquest); or, if it does then in an indirect way.

... I have said that the problem of the freedom of men in Islam is spoken of in terms of God and of His attributes, and what I meant thereby is simply that the question whether man is or is not free, is not raised in the Koran by reference to man's nature or being: - sufferings and will - and that it simply amounts to this: given the nature of God, is it possible for man to possess a free will? is he the master of his own destiny? Let us then state as clear as possible the Islamic conception of the divine nature. What is God in Islam? Let us keep in mind the fact that when the St. Apostle of God came to the desert, the people he met there were, I repeat, of very primitive mentality as regards religious experiences. The Bedouins of the desert adored all forces in nature; there were for their mind and their hearts, as many gods as there were strange natural phenomena. Mohammed then had nothing better to do than to bring to these people the belief not...
only in deity, but in the One and Unique God. Islam in fact, it is said, has the superiority of separating radically the Creator from the creatures. Nature does not present many gods, Nature is but the creation of the only One God. The Apostle of God brought then to the Arabs of that time – and that was his divine message - the truth that there is only one and Unique God: La ilah illa lah. 

Being the only One, He is the universal and unique creator, who possesses all the attributes of Might, Power and Knowledge. This God was placed by Mohammed so much above all creatures, that men have to raise their minds and souls in order to apprehend His nature. We find here also the origin of another fundamental difference between Islam and Christianity - the difference, namely, that in Islam God is not incarnated in a person, as He is in Christ Jesus. Of course "the highest aim of religion is communion with God, but according to the holy faith of Islam, this communion is not attained by bringing down God to man in the sense of incarnation, but by the rise of man gradually towards God by spiritual progress, and the purification of his life from all sensual desires and law motives. The perfect one who reveals the face of God to the world, is not the Divine Being in human form, but the human being whose person has become a manifestation of the Divine attributes, by his own personality having been consumed in the fire of the love of God." (1) The God of Islam therefore is a transcendent God. He is the cause of all things; all the forces are his creations; and He is the only acting Force. The Mohammedan conception of Allah is purely negative, says Ewemer (2). God is Unique and has no relation to any creature that partakes of resemblance. He cannot be defined in terms other than negative (3).

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(2) Ewemer, S.W. Arabia, Cradle of Islam p.171
(3) A popular song says: "Kulle ma yakhtaru fi belik ferabbuna mukhali-fun an thalik.
Now, these two Moslem conceptions of God lead to the belief that God is the only actually existing thing thru all the worldly existences. Mountains and suns, men and his actions are but God's actions.

All that wills, all that is, is but God willing them to be and to will.

"This one supreme Being is the only Agent, the only Force, the only Act existing throughout the universe, and leaves to all beings else, matter or spirit, instinct or intelligence, physical or moral nothing but pure unconditional passiveness, unlike in movement or in quiescence, in action or in capacity. The sole power, the sole Motor movement, energy and deed is God, the rest is downright inertia and mere instrumentality, from the highest archangel down to the simplest atom of creation."

This oneness of the Supreme being who has not even a son is found in the Koran (1):

"Wonderful Originator of the Heavens and the earth! How could He have a son when He has no consort, and He Himself created every thing, and He is the knower of all things."

All great attributes are centred in this One and Unique impersonal Creator; and the most obvious of these attributes are His Absolute sovereignty and ruthless omnipotence:

"Allah is the Creator of every thing and He has charge over every thing." (2)

"He is Allah the Creator, the Maker, the Fashioner: His are the most excellent names; whatsoever is in the Heavens and the earth declares His glory and He is the Mighty and Wise." (3)

"Thus unmeasurably and eternally exalted above, and dissimilar from all creatures, which lie levelled before him on one common place of instrumentality and inertness, God is one in the totality of omnipotent and omnipresent action, which acknowledge no rule, standard or limit save his own sole and absolute will. He communicates nothing to his creatures, for their seeming power and act ever remain His alone and in return he receives nothing from them; for whatever they may be, that they are in Him, by Him and from Him alone." (4). God, then, being the

(1) Chap. VI : 103.
(2) Chap. XXXIX : 62.
(4) Zwemer, Arabia, the cradle of Islam, p.177
Almighty Creator does anything He wants; and conversely, everything reflects the will of God. Moreover, He not only does the things He wants, but He also does them according to His own pleasure, (which pleasure, far from being a capricious will, is a will that loves harmony.) He foresees things and fashions them with measure. So that every thing that is, exists for the purpose that God has appointed for it. It is because He so wanted it, that you are a moslem i.e. that you are a believer and not an atheist. Everything occurs and will occur in the order prepared for it by the Lord.

"If your Lord had pleased, surely all who are in the earth would have believed, all of them."

"And it is not for a soul to believe except by Allah's permission; and He casts uncleanness on those who will not understand." (1)

"Surely we created you, then we fashioned you" says also the Koran (2)

As a consequence of such attributes, another one follows: viz: being our Creator and Maker, He has perfect knowledge. His knowledge is quite different from ours, since He knows not only the present but also the past and future, since He is the supreme Maker of all that exists: the intents of the soul, the thoughts of the mind, have no secrets for Him; it is He who possesses the key of our life and destiny; it is He who knows how long a soul shall live and where she will die:

"And a soul will not die but with the permission of Allah, the term is fixed and whoever desires the reward of this world, We will give him of it and whoever desires the reward of the hereafter, We will give him of it; and We will reward the grateful."(3)

Moreover, God our Creator and Maker is not only an Almighty One,

(1) Chap. X : 99, 100.
(2) Chap. VII : II.
(3) Chap. III : 144.
who possesses the perfect science, but he is also characterized by a more distinctive attribute which brings more emphasis upon the fatalistic spirit of Islam: is the attribute expressed by the word "written":

God has written all things that exist and that will occur.

There are some Hadiths relative to the fact, which it is of value to relate here: e.g. God created the pencil before everything, and ordained it to write; and the pencil replied "But O Lord what do you want me to write?", and the Lord answered: "Write the destiny of men."

Another Hadith relates the following conversation between Adam and Moses: Moses is reproaching Adam for his fault: "You Adam," said Moses, "the first creature whom God trusted, have failed to this order"; and Adam answered: "You Moses who are scolding me, you to whom God had given the Laws fourty years before I was created, have you not read that: God created Adam and Adam disobeyed his God?" (1)

... . . .

And now, with such attributes of God, the Almighty Creator, who possesses the perfect knowledge, who moreover had written all things that happen and will ever happen, what becomes of man? What is he? Has he any will? Are his actions the acts of a free being, responsible and willing?

Only one answer to this question can be given, thru such verses as the following:

"Surely we have placed chains in their necks and these reach to their chins, so they have their heads raised aloft." (2) or:

"We have exalted some of them above the other in degree..."

These and many other similar verses all point to the same fact - namely, the unlimited power of God over his creature, and the consequent small-

(1) Chap. XXXVI: 8, 9
(2) These two hadiths are found in the book of al Hanbal: Shafak al Ahl min al-Asil al Kada wa al Kada

"النبي النبلي: هتان الطلب من عالم العلماء الغرير"
ness of man in the hands of the Creator; and the feeling of nothingness and complete dependance of man upon his Creator is found in the religion of Mohammed, even more emphatically than in Christianity.

There are two different spirits in which the interpretation at this answer can be done. The first one— with which I do not personally agree—is exemplified by the spirit of Zwemer, who qualifies this Oneness, Omnipresence and Omniscience of God by a kind of jealousy and pride of God, who not only does not even accept a Son, i.e. a creature similar to Himself, but who, also, wants to keep the creatures in a state of complete slavery, making them feeling at every moment their dependance upon Him. Zwemer, speaking of the Islamic God, says: "It is his singular satisfaction to let created things continually feel that they are nothing else than his slaves, his tools and contemptible tools also, that thus they may the better acknowledge his superiority, and know his power to be above their will, his pride above their pride; or rather that there is no power, cunning will or pride save his own." (I) And evidently, with such state of mind the author of these lines, and all those who believe like him, do not even conceive of the idea of liberty in Islam: man being, like any other created thing, nothing but a tool, created by God's will, and remaining for ever under His capricious and autocratic will.

The other spirit, by which, this dependency of man upon the Creator can be interpreted, is that of a pure calm submission of the creature to the creator. Of course man has no liberty whatsoever, yet this submissiveness, the peace which the moslem makes with his God, is an act of obedience and love, fear and veneration of Him who has created all things and who has power over all things; for, not only are

(I) Zwemer, Arabia, the Cradle of Islam, p.173
we made by Him, but also we depend upon Him in the coming life. "Islam is a significant name" we find in the preface to the preface to the Qur'an by Nawawi Muhammad Ali, "it is the making of peace. - Peace as a matter of fact is the dominant idea in the Qur'an. A Moslem is he who has made his peace with God and man, with the creator as well as with the creature. Peace of God means complete submission to His will, and peace with man implies the doing of good to one's fellow man."

"Yea whoever submits himself entirely to Allah and he is the doer of good to others he has his reward from his Lord."(1) and that, is also salvation.(2)

So far then, as the teachings of Mohammed about God are concerned, one is justified to conclude that Islam means a submissiveness of man to the will of God, and consequently his acceptance of the destiny that God has appointed to him. In other words, Islam means a complete denial of freedom; hence the name fatalism attributed without any precaution to Islam.

Yet to say that Islam means a complete fatalism would be inadequate and false. In more than one verse Mohamed is heard speaking of men's actions and will: e.g.

"And the soul and its perfection; so He intimated to it by inspiration its division from truth and its guarding against evil. He will indeed be successful who purifies it; and he will indeed fail who corrupts it."(3)

"Whoever does evil it is for his own soul, and whoever does good, it is against it and the Lord is not the least unjust to his servants."(4)

Moreover in certain places, in order to make impossible any doubt whether man has any real actions, his actions are separated from those of God, for it is said:

"Whatever affliction befalls you it is on account of what your hands have wrought and (yet) He pardons most of your faults."(5)

(1) Chap. II : 112.
(3) Chap. XCV : 7-10.
(4) Chap. XII : 45.
And:

"Whatever benefit comes to you (O man!) it is from Allah, and whatever misfortune befalls you, it is from yourself." (1)

Shall we say then that the Koran believed in the freedom of man and in his will and in his actions? Why did Mohammed speak of man's actions? Probably it is because, as we have said, man in Islam works for his own salvation, which depends upon his own actions. But we have seen how salvation, though it is made by man's deeds - as opposed to God's grace and Redemption - is purely an act of God. It is God who wanted you to pray and to be a believer; or it is He who kept light from your eyes so that you could not see the true path. And we made sure that God's relation to man is not a direct one, but that we, and our actions, are but a part of the universal creation (which is an act of God) and that God never intervenes directly with one of his creatures.

If it is not chiefly because of salvation that Mohammed spoke of man's deeds, is it because of the presence of evil in the world? For the question is raised: If whatever exists in this world is His creation, then evil also is His; and can such a thing be possible? Or, if it is not because of this reason, is it because of the other one given by the Nastasilites later on - that of the justice of God? For the question is also raised: If God is the perfect being, then He is just; and how can He be just, when He condemns certain men, and saves others, by pure acts of His own will? God being in His essence just, can not condemn man for good of for evil.

Which of these alternatives did Mohammed face when he spoke of man's actions and liberty?

Some writers such as Grime, believe Mohammed to be an opportunist and claim that he might have been once faced by the question: "How do you conceive of a God, perfect in goodness and justice, and yet pu

(1) Chap. IV: 79
nishing man for actions of which He himself is alone responsible?" So that, in answer to such scrupulosity of the conscience, and surely in order not to discourage his questioners, he broke the rigid fatalistic teachings, and spoke of the justice of God, of the will of man, and of the perfection of the soul. Is it true that such was the solution given by Mohammed to the problem of this freedom of man? Did Mohammed really face this problem at all? This I do not think so; but what one can be sure of is this: Mohammed, the St. Apostle of God believing God to be the perfect One, surely believed that God is just; he surely believed that evil can not possibly come from Him, and that evil, i.e. imperfection, can not be derived from perfection; and consequently that evil comes only through the hands of man. It is, in other words, not because he wanted to save God from injustice that Mohammed spoke of man's action; Mohammed must have been convinced of God's justice, this being by no means a problem for him.

Mohammed, it is clear, did not face the problem of man's nature, but rather of God's. God was for him, as it was later on for Al-Ghazzali, all in all. The freedom of man, as a matter of fact is spoken of in terms of decrees of God " فَضْلُ الله مَنْ شَاء مِنْهُ " Kada² we Kadar; Kada² being the universal decree of God, and Kadar the actual realization of the Kada² in a given time. (I)

As we have seen, the problem of freedom of man takes in Islam the two opposite alternative answers: both beliefs can be proved: the existence of liberty and its negation.

Yet in the sense in which I myself understand liberty, viz. the inward moral progress of the soul, Islam, I believe, denies the freedom ————

(I) This is the definition given by the Encyclopaedy of Islam, and is commonly accepted by all students of Islam.
of man, most probably, let us repeat it, because of God's nature. For nowhere in the Koran do we find an incentive to the state of freedom; nowhere are we given the way to free ourselves from the state of darkness, in order to reach the perfect state of happiness and holiness by which we become the children of God. Of course the duality of beliefs is also found in the Bible - since the problem remained a subject for intense debates among philosophers and theologians, as we have seen in the Middle Ages.

Mohammed, it is said, had seen the difficulty implied in this problem, and many hadiths relate his perplexity concerning it. E.g. When he was asked about the Kada and Kadar of Allah, he once replied:

"It is a secret of which God alone possesses the key."

I believe that the Prophet of God was right; for why should we be at all anxious to believe in only one of two things - the omnipotence of God, or his unlimited will; and the freedom of man? Both may be true, and we should never sacrifice the one for the sake of the other. It appears to me that the wise and the moral man is he who, believing in God's will and power, has enough liberty to consider himself as a free being, and consequently to hold himself responsible of his acts, the good ones, as well as the evil.
CHAPTER VI

The Problem in Modern and Contemporary Times.

For the philosophers of Modern Times the problem of the freedom of man was as important as it was for the philosophers of the Middle Ages - but, of course, from another point of view.

Starting with Descartes in the XVIIth century and ending in the XXth, Modern Times knew two currents of thought regarding this vital question of the freedom of man: the rationalistic and the idealistic leaving out of consideration the empirical and the sensationalistic views, which explain the spiritual laws of life by external phenomena and their relations, and which, consequently, deny initiative in man's actions.

The position of the rationalistic philosophers, such as Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz, is characterized, as their name indicates, by a great confidence in, and love of, reason. Thus the differing as to the results of their philosophical inquiries (I) these philosophers have one common attitude towards freedom. All of them find an intimate relation between Reason and Freedom. Leibniz as we shall see is a little further, makes of Reason the safest guide to the perfect freedom. Reason, in other words, according to these philosophers is that faculty of ours which guides us to freedom, or, at least, enlightens us as to its nature!

Without going further into general considerations regarding the rationalistic point of view, let us throw a quick glance on the philosophies of these wise men, and find out their definite attitudes towards freedom.

(I) Descartes believes in complete freedom; Spinoza rejects it; and Leibniz partly admits its existence.
DESCARTES' philosophy may be called the philosophy of liberty. The soul, according to him, is not only intelligence but also liberty. "By the use of my understanding", he says (in the fourth meditation), "I can neither affirm nor deny anything, I can simply conceive ideas of things which I might either affirm or deny." In is then the will which gives its consent to what has been perceived by the understanding. Intelligence, in other words, is subordinate to liberty; to judge is to will. Now what characterises the will is its freedom, and freedom according to Descartes is "a positive faculty to determine one's self to any one of two contraries i.e. either to follow or to avoid one and the same thing."

With such a point of departure the philosophy of Descartes seems to be sinking in a complete and general indeterminism; but that is a wrong and superficial appreciation of the Cartesian philosophy, for Descartes calls on God, who by his infinite wisdom, establishes order in the world, and by so doing, saves a philosopher, and makes him affirm that a complete determinism reigns over the natural facts - at least! An analysis of Descartes' conception of the freedom of God, in comparison to that of man, makes the preceding statements clearer. God, according to Descartes (1) has perfect freedom of will. He does not affirm a thing because it is so; on the contrary, it is so because He affirms it (2); similarly a thing is good simply because He wills it. Every thing, even the eternal verities, is dependent upon God's good pleasure; and therefore His will cannot be conditioned by His intelligence. While it is quite otherwise with men, with him to believe and to be good are identical with willing. Then, concerning

(1) See Erdmann, History of Philosophy, p.26
(2) See Ghazzalli on that point in this essay p.
God, Descartes is a Scotist ;(1) concerning man, he is a Thomist. He does not however suffer men to lose his indifferentiation arbitrii : for we may recollect that we have known something to be good, and therefore desired it, and this recollection may become the motive of an act of will ; thus man, by accommodating himself to act in accordance with what was previously known to be right, may become able to oppose what appears to him at the moment to be good. Nor does this imply any loss of freedom, but rather the gain of a higher freedom than the equilibrium arbitrii. Descartes conceives of the divine will as perfect freedom from necessity, but it must not therefore be supposed that he believes freedom from determination to be the highest quality of the human will. Rather he expressly says (2) that indifferency is the lowest stage of will, and that the man who always knew clearly and plainly what was true and good, would never hesitate to choose. Such a one would be perfectly free, but he would not be indifferent.

Descartes is on the cross-road : his calling on God, who by his wisdom establishes the order in the world, is the proof of his consciousmess of the fact, that the freedom of man is in contradiction with a scientific notion of the universe. This entinomy will go more and more accentuated.

SPINOZA (3) rejects completely any existence of freedom :"nothing", he says, "is contingent in the nature of the beings ; all things, on the contrary, are determined by the necessity of the divine nature to be and to act in a given manner."(4) There is in the soul no absolute free will:

(1) See Duns Scott in this essay p. 66.67 und St Thomas 65.66.
(2) Meditation IV.
(3) Janet et Séailles. Les problems et les écoles p. 343.
(4) Ethi.,prop. XXIX part I.
the soul is determined to will, by a cause; which, in turn, is determined by another; and so on to the infinite (1). This argument of

Spinosa of the non existence of liberty, he calls an a priori argument; and he accompanies it by an a posteriori argument, taken from psychol-

ogy. He says: there is in the soul no other volition (i.e. no other affirmation or negation) except that of the enveloping idea. (2) This

means simply that, for Spinosa, understanding and will are one and the same thing; so that when we say that a man has suspended his judgement,

we simply mean that he does not perceive clearly and adequately the ob-

ject of his intention. As to our "consciousness" of our liberty, it is

an illusion which comes from the fact that a man is conscious of his act

and is ignorant of the causes which have determined it.


LEIBNIZ refutes both Descartes and Spinosa.

To begin with Descartes' theory of free will shocked him. His

aim was the conciliation between faith and reason. Descartes said that

all actions of men are acts of the will of God. If follows that the

good as well as the evil acts are attributable to God. The theory of

equilibrium, held by Descartes, is denied by nature, and it is incompa-

tible with the very laws of the soul, which do not show at all such a

state of perfect equilibrium. "The universe is not like an ellipse or

other such oval which the straight line drawn through its center can di-

vide into congruent parts. The universe has no center and its parts a-

re infinitely varied. Thus it will never happen that all will be perfec-

tly equal and will strike equally from one side and from the other. There

is always some thing though infinitely small (petites perceptions) which

determines and brings about actions." (3)

(1) Ethii. prop. XLVIII part II.

(2) Ethii. prop. LIX part II.

(3) Letter to Mr. Coste on contingency and necessity. (See Duhem G. M. The phrase.

Sophical works of Leibniz.)
As to Spinoza, Leibniz says that his error lies in his confusion between the real, the possible and the necessary. "It is possible all that taken absolutely, does not imply contradiction"(1), says Leibniz. The contrary of all that is happening in the world was possible and consequently all phenomena are contingent. It is necessary for a triangle to have three angles, but it is not necessary for the universe to have this special form. The world as it is, is not a logical deduction from the nature of God, and God could have chosen for it any other form or figure, and if He has given it this or that special form or figure, it is because He had a reason for so doing.

Refuting both philosophies, the Cartesian liberty, and the Spinozistic determinism, Leibniz believed that there is a moral necessity, but a necessity which inclines without any constraint "inclinat non necessitat"; there was before God an infinity of possible worlds, yet He chose only one; and this one obeys the only necessity, which is the necessity of the good. The world as it is the best possible one; all phenomena in it are foreseen and coordinated by God. "Every thing is determined in advance in man as in every other place," says Leibniz in his Theodicy,(2) "and the human soul is a spiritual automaton." The soul is also compared by him to a balance, the weights of which are the motives. He also compares the soul to a force which deploys itself on many sides, and yet has an effect only on the side which presents least resistance. Now the inclinations of the soul are directed towards all the good things which present themselves; these are called its antecedent wills; but the consequent will, which is their result (is determined by) what affects it more.

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(1) Letter to Mr. Coste on contingency and necessity.
(2) Theodicy p.52.
Yet we may admit to man a certain freedom. First of all let us see what liberty implies. Liberty, according to Leibniz, requires three main characteristics: the intelligence (or the faculty to choose), spontaneity, and contingency. Intelligence is the distinct knowledge of the object upon which we deliberate; it is the exact and complete perception of the differences existing between possible things and their relations. Now this perfect use of our reason, which consists in having clear and distinct thoughts, does not belong to any nature, but we in particular possess this kind of intelligence characterized by hesitation, and the faculty to choose which is required by liberty.

Spontaneity is the faculty to act and to be the principle, i.e., the creator, of action. According to Leibniz, we possess this spontaneity since we are composed of monads, i.e., of spiritual atoms without any direct or reciprocal actions existing between them; in itself every monad is a world, independent and free, with no window at all to the outside; every act of this monad is a free one; and if it has any relation with the action of the other, it is because of the harmony preestablished by God.

The third factor required by liberty is contingency: we have already seen that any thing is contingent which is not absolutely impossible, i.e., which is not contradictory; in this sense all phenomena of the universe are contingent, and the acts of men are also contingent.

Apparently then, according to Leibniz, we are strictly necessitated; all our actions have one motive or another. These motives incline the soul, though they do not necessitate it. Yet we are free and our
freedom is in proportion to the clarity of our reason. God possessing the perfect reason is the freest man. Yet his freedom consists in following the necessity of the good. Man, who does not have a perfect reason at all, has but a relative freedom.

... 

So far a conciliation between the rigid determinism of facts, and liberty, seemed to be impossible. It was reserved, however, to KANT to bring a new hypothesis which, recognizing both facts, determinism on the one hand, and freedom on the other, reconciles them together through an intermediate factor: namely, the distinction between the phenomenal world and the world of noumenon. Before fully expounding Kant’s doctrine, let us express it in a few words: Kant believes that man as a phenomenon, is ruled by strict determinism, but as a thing in itself, is free. Also man as a phenomenon receives the moral law: man as a noumenon gives it.

The Kantian message, which is also that of the idealists, consisted in limiting our knowledge to the appearances, or to the world as we perceive it. And so far, it appears to us only under the rules of cause and effect or of sufficient reason. Now our reason is right when it denies to this world and to man’s actions any liberty; but, when it tries to extend its knowledge to things which do not fall under its control, namely, the world of the thing in itself, it fails to attain the truth, and it is precisely in this latter that freedom is hidden.

Now, let us approach more carefully Kant’s doctrine of freedom. I have said a moment ago that Kant made a conciliation between two
opposites which seemed irreconcilable, and that the human mind can
now at one and the same time affirm two contradictory things. Accor-
ding to the philosopher of Koenigsberg, we can perceive phenomena on-
ly under the forms of space and time - these forming the thread of
our minds, and the necessary conditions of all our experiences. Now
these phenomena, in order to be at one with the unity and identity
of the consciousness, or in other words with the "I", must in their
reciprocal actions be enchain'd by an inflexible determinism (princi-
ple of causality). But, since all the concepts and principles of our
understanding are vain outside the limits of experience, reason is com-
pletely wrong and illusioned when it gives an objective value to such
subjective maxims as God, freedom and immortality of the soul. By so
doing Kant frees us from fatalism. For the world as it appears to us
is subject to a strict determinism; but it is only a world of appear-
ances: the world of realities, or of the noumena is not subject at
all to the laws of our sensibility (Space, Time and Causality). In o-
ther words, says Kant, we have no right to conclude what is from
what appears. His Critique of Pure Reason establishes the possibility
of liberty, while his Critique of Practical Reason establishes its
necessity - Why? For the simple reason that the "ought", the catego-
rical imperative, has no meaning whatsoever save through and by the exis-
tence of liberty. Of course, in the present life, the ensemble of our
acts, which are pure phenomena, forms a system whose terms are enchai-
ned one to the other by the laws of determinism. But this multiple,suc-
cessive, and divisible series in time is but the expression of a simple
and unique act which is free outside Time in the eternal. Necessity is
but the appearance, liberty is the reality; and so science is reemplaced by faith (says Kant in the Preface to the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason.) So that for Kant there are two worlds: the world as it appears, the world of phenomena, which is subject to the forms of space and time, and which cannot be thought of save under the law of determinism; and the world of the noumena, which exists outside time, and to which we have no right whatsoever to apply any of the categories of sensibility. In the world of phenomena, empirical causality reigns; in the world of the noumena, there is no more time, nor the notion of "before" and "after," nor antecedents and consequents; it is the reign of the intelligible causality, i.e. liberty.

Let us now apply this principle to man. There is the phenomenal man and the noumenal man. Man as he appears to others and to himself is but the phenomenon of what he is in himself. All actions of man, as phenomena, fall in time and are subject to a strict determinism, so that if we can know the many principles which govern the actions of man we could surely know what his actions will be in the future, as strictly as we can predict the eclipse of the moon.

Yet whence comes this empirical character of man, this law or general rule which governs the life of the individual? Kant says: the empirical character of man as well as all that falls in time, is but the expression of the thing in itself, the absolute eternal reality. What constitutes the empirical character of man, its raison d'être must be the ought in his intelligible character. We freely will - outside time - all our actions in their principle. It is precisely this free choice in the extra-temporal which justifies - in spite of determinism - the remorse
in the heart of the guilty; is this free choice which provokes our indignation when we are face to face with certain acts of which we disapprove, although we believe in the fatality of the weakness of those who committed them. Man as a phenomenon receives the moral law; man as a noumenon gives it. The fact that the moral law speaks as an imperative, yields an important consequence: that I unconditionally ought I can feel simply, because I at the same time feel that I can. Therefore, the fact of the ought does not make certain "the can" or freedom (this could not be proved) but it makes me sure and certain of it. Since without freedom there is no "ought" i.e. no moral law could be possible, there is a ground of knowledge of (or rather of certainty about) freedom; and it again is a real ground of the moral law (1). The certainty of that freedom is purely subjective; it comes to us from the fact that we ought.

This was very briefly the Kantian message concerning the freedom of man; and now, before closing this small chapter on the freedom of man in what is called Modern Times, we shall state the doctrine of the philosopher who is the philosopher of liberty par excellence in that age - the doctrine of Fichte.

There is one principle which turns through all the Fichtean philosophy, even in its two distinct phases (pre- and post-Revolutionary). This principle - the central notion of the Fichtean philosophy - is, as Weber describes it, "the most exalted and at the same time the most paradoxal notion ever formulated by philosophy."; it is the monism of the moral will. Fichte thereby affirms both the moral ideal (as Kant did), and the unity of the "two worlds." (as Spinoza did) simultaneously. "Hence his philosophy is a synthesis, unique in
its kind for modern times, of what seemed forever irreconcilable: monism and liberty. Identity of the ethical principle and the metaphysical principle: that is the fundamental dogma of his system. "(I)

So according to Fichte, the real reality is the Good, active Reason, pure Will, the moral Ego. What is considered by commonsense to be real, is merely a phenomenon, a manifestation. The highest principle of everything, the final aim of everything, is not what is, but what ought to be; not being, but duty. Being, in reality, has no value nor existence: its alleged stability is a mere appearance. It is all movement, tendency, will.

All the universe is a manifestation of this will. We ought, therefore, to recognize the insanity of the phenomenal world apart from its intelligible essence—to regard the objective world not as the effect of outside causes, but as the product of the ego itself: as the objectified ego.

Ultimately, there is no science except this science of the Ego; knowledge is only a function of this Ego—it is not, wholly or partly, the product of sensations, but rather the product of the Ego itself.

In other words, if the sensible world (which has the appearance of something existing outside of the Ego) exists at all, it owes its very existence to the activity of the Ego itself; the apparently-objective limitation of the subject is, in reality, a subjective limitation, self imposed by the subject himself. "Suppress the Ego, and you suppress the world:"

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This self-imposed, subjective, apparently-objective limitation of the Ego is, however, the product of an inner necessity on the part of the Ego, and cannot be escaped by thought alone. Indeed, thought itself presupposes a "thought object", and thought cannot think without affirming the existence of a thought object other than the Ego.

This dualism of the thinking subject and the thought object, is an inescapable illusion of theoretical reason: only action can free us from it. Hence, practical activity is the real triumph of reason. And, tho' the will in reality is not more successful in completely conquering the resistance of matter than the understanding, and tho' we cannot escape the fatalism of the phenomenal world, yet the absolute autonomy of reason is always an ideal which the Ego pursues.

Fichte thus establishes the primacy of practical reason. Freedom to him is the highest principle - superior even to truth; it is the essence of things; the highest truth. It is not an abstraction; it is the supreme reality. Being so - and precisely for being so - it cannot be an empirical datum, or a brutal, fatal fact - but it creates itself, it realizes itself.

This self-realization means self-development in a series of stages; it thus implies duration or time. If time is the intuitive faculty itself, it follows that the understanding - or the faculty which divides the Ego into subject and object - is the auxiliary of practical reason, the organ of the will, the servant of freedom.

Hence, the dualism of the two reasons - practical and theoretical - is done away with: The understanding is simply a phase in the develop-
ment of Freedom: Knowledge is the means, action the final goal, of being.

Liberty, in short, realizes itself in time, and by means of thought - by distinguishing between the perceiving, thinking subject and the perceived, thought object.

... The problem in Contemporary Times.

As time passes on, and, as centuries are added to centuries in the history of humanity, the belief in Liberty grows weaker, while the claim of indubitable Determinism stands firm, and invades science, bringing rest and satisfaction to our minds. (I) In fact, with the development of science, the certainty of universal and necessary laws appears more and more obvious. Whatever appears to be without cause, (the notion of miracles, for instance), whatever falls in the domain of the mysterious or the uncontrolled, is rejected; science even goes to the extent of trying to explain the haphazard, which it defines as being the imprevisible meeting of two or several series of causes and effects, which in themselves are very clear and knowable. Hence for a thinker of the XIXth century, living amidst the continual revelations given by the many sciences, everything appears to be mathematicised, and liberty is not accepted by him as a simple fact.

Now if this thinker speaks of liberty, his attack of it would be as follows: determinism since some years is invading domains which at that time, were considered as citadels of free acts. The phenomena (I) If Voltaire, the French philosopher of the XVIIIth century, could come again to this world, he surely would revise his Zadig. In fact Zadig claims that everything is the object of chance; neither merit nor knowledge can strike against Destiny. Fate claimed also that it is useless to seek the good for this can be derived from Evil and vice versa.
or our soul, considered by most of the thinkers as quasi-divine manifestations, are now the laws of psycho-physiology and psycho-physics. Fechner and Weber have tried to find that the relation existing between excitation and sensation is a logarithmical form. Binet measured the intelligence by way of tests. Piéron wrote an essay and tried to represent the curve of fatigue, or even of the attention, of a person according to his age, or to the class to which he pertains. Psychologists of Freud's school worked even on the unconscious and explained the reasons of our behaviour which sometimes appears to us to be spontaneous, i.e. without cause, i.e. free. In a word what seemed to be free, or at least outside of any rigorous determinism, is now ruled by general and universal laws.

This thinker of the XIXth century would add to the list of fields where laws have invaded apparently free domains, the further field of political and economic phenomena — where laws are held to establish the relations between psychological states of the individuals and the material processes of things. This science of Political Economy was considered as mysterious domain, but now it is considered as a mechanics of exchanges based upon the psychological principle: "have the maximum of satisfaction with the minimum of work." (I) Sociological studies in general, by the help of statistics, claim that when the individuals are grouped, their free will is somehow neutralized. Statistics pretend also to describe on a map, the curves of marriages, suicides, crimes — which are free acts — with the same clarity in which it describes on this very map longitudes and latitudes. For example: suicide is a function of religion; for very few cases of suicide are

(I) It is the French scientist Cournot who conceived this principle; the German Gassen applied it; and the English Stanley Jevons spoke of it as the seminal theory of Political Economy (1891).
found among the Jews, and they are a little more numerous among Christians and specially Protestants. Lamarck, Montesquieu and Durkheim tried to explain society by the many influences of climate, food adaptation etc. What do all these show but the application of the stamps to all collective acts? In fact social groups are the object of experiments of Psychology, Education, Economy, Sociology, every thing (cinema, radio, press, school) has been so arranged as to lead the crowd to the destiny been appointed to it: appointed by whom, by what? – probably by the leaders: Nazism, Communism transformed free beings into automatons. Now we might probably one day witness the return of Life, and the individual will again be detached from the group in order to live his proper life. Now the science of life, Biology, is attempting to explain mechanically, physically and chemically all the manifestations of life; and it says for instance, that all beings have the tendency to go this way or that way.

That is very briefly the argumentation of the thinker of the XIXth century against the fact of our freedom. In the depths of his heart, he generally does not believe at all in any spontaneity in any freedom. Every thing appears to him to be mathematicised, mechanically enchained by causes and effects. And if we ask him how and whether there is a possibility for the belief in liberty, he would find only one channel: the channel, namely of doubting in the value of science; for only by doubting in our capacity to know the real nature of things, and by believing that there is some other reality outside the domain of science, can we think that liberty is hidden in that reality (this suspi-

(1) Durkheim, Suicide, Paris, Alcan, 1930.
cian as we can easily remember is already brought by Kant when he affirmed that our knowledge is but of the apparent world.

In this state of mind we can see that scientists have left a room for what they call the unknown. E.g. in France, science is represented by Dalbeuf, Boutroux, and Poincaré, in such a way that it leaves us written the supposition that, in between the scientific laws, there is a haphazard which can be considered as being the index of liberty. Their conviction on that subject can be summarized in the following words of Poincaré: "Laws of nature are but approximate" and the reasons of this are many, the most obvious of them all being that we cannot practically know all the conditions involved or implied in a given law, i.e. in a given time!

Let us consider, says he (1), the law of gravitation. This law permits us the prevision of the movements of the planets. When I use it for instance to calculate the orbit of Saturn, I neglect the action of the stars and by so doing I am certain not to commit any mistake because I know that the stars are at too far away from Saturn, so that their influence may be equal to zero. But now, I announce with a quasi certainty that the coordinates of Saturn at this given moment will be comprised between such and such limits; is this certitude absolute? No, it is only a probability. In fact what Poincaré says about this peculiar law may also be applied to all others; moreover, the probability character of the scientific laws is a fact recognized by all scientists; and yet we see that they are not discouraged at all, they are always hoping to find one day a perfect law for they do believe. In complete determinism.

(1) Poincaré, La science et la réalité, p. 26
However, and up to that time, the perfect mathematicisation brought by sciences is not yet fully adapted to phenomena of life, i.e. phenomena of human existence. Any determinism applied to the science of life seems a dangerous extrapolation which can be interpreted as an index of the love of unity in our minds.

Bergson standing on an other basis proclaims that if we wish to know life at all, we should abandon the scientific language and make a return, i.e. a reflexion to our own being; we can, then, by a sudden illumination, which he entitles the "intuition", see the truth of our being.

But any belief in spontaneity, any escape from determinism and scientific laws, is held by the determinist, to be dangerous.
CONCLUSION TO PART II.

From this general glance cast upon the problem of liberty in the history of human thought we could see that liberty had followed quite a devious course. Almost absent in the first period of what we might call the dawn of thought, it foreshadowed itself a little time before Christianity, and with Christianity it took its sharpest form. In fact, the problem had been raised since Christ; and the philosophers of the Middle Ages made of it the main point of their inquiries. Islam, standing on an other basis raised also the problem of liberty, and the oriental Middle Ages had also its philosophers of liberty. Christianity and Islam raised then the problem of liberty – the problem which harassed and unset the heart and mind of theologians and philosophers.

But, as after every crisis, and every deep suffering with no apparent issues, this search for liberty had its end; and after the lapse of time, human thought and human anxiety followed a new direction. Instead of making of man's being the center of his inquiries, man turned his mind to a new interest: the external world; sciences and art. Since the period of the Renaissance and that of the Reformation, man by a "facing about" found himself in front of a new problems. The questions of religion, of faith, of grace and liberty, appear to be quite difficult and unreachable by human reason. They require a jump into the unknown which is incompatible with the faculty of our reason. Reason can apprehend all forms of the beautiful; it can also apprehend the most difficult problems of nature of external world; it can solve all kinds of philosophical problems; why then, if such is the case, not to abandon these terrible questions of faith of liberty and turn to
these easy problems which we solve by this faculty of reason? Sciences and arts thus became the center of man's activity; Mind became positivist and even materialistic, quite confident in the power of reason. But after a full and complete confidence in Reason, the latter was abandoned and man doubted even in it, as he also doubted in his senses; and a kind of scepticism was then in favor. We know only—and as a matter of fact nothing exists save it—phenomena or appearances and their causes, reason does not possess any innate faculty of knowledge, so that all that we finally know comes from experiences. However, the time of scepticism did not last, and man recovered his faith in reason, though this time with great care. Reason knows phenomena, but it does not know the real nature of things, it knows only their appearances. What is the nature of things became the problem of man; many trials have been made to answer it, proving themselves not to be successful; so much so that I believe man decided not to care any more of it and to satisfy his curiosity with appearances, and their relations one with the other. What has become of the problem of our freedom? Well, it has also followed the same course. With the reign of Reason many reasonable solutions have been adopted: knowledge in a word means freedom, to know a thing is to liberate oneself from it, and the more man is reasonable the more he is free. When scepticism came, when the only real thing was matter, the problem of liberty has been solved in terms of psychical sensuous causes and effects. When the time came and it had been decided that man's reason apprehends only the appearances while it knows nothing of the other world of realities (or noumenal world) it was decided that liberty is a problem which can
not be solved by reason and that it pertains only to the noumenal
world; it became of a transcendental nature. How liberty may be con-
sidered to be there since it has no real existence nowadays. If now,
we ask ourselves what are the reasons why the problem of liberty has
taken such a devious course, or also, what are the forces which bring
man to face the problem of liberty or to deny it, we find that these
two forces are Religion on the one hand, and science on the other.
Christianity and Islam have posited the problem; Nature, the external
world, science and scientific laws judges it to be non-existent. Which
of these two forces is the force which dominates more the human mind,
we cannot really say: man is at one time living in his proper sphe-
re composed of his sentiments and reason, and religion, and this sphe-
re is placed in a external sphere of the universe; there are then two
realities the one placed into the other and depending upon it. Religion,
the soul and its life, its eternity and its death evil and sin form the
problem of this internal sphere; science, nature form the problem of
the outer sphere. It happens sometimes that we consider as solved the
problem of our internal sphere and we direct all our efforts to the ex-
ternal one, and we arm ourselves with Reason; as a result we deny our
freedom, since every thing appears logically enchained by cause and ef-
fact. Sometimes, on the contrary, we forget all about this other sphe-
re external to us, and considering it as a simple momentary support,
we direct our attention, heart and reason, love and suffering, to the
problem of our religion i.e. of our soul, and we ask desperately oursel-
ves: Am I free or determined to sin? to be a moral being? Am I de-
termined to the eternal condemnation or can I save myself i.e. Am I free?
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Such was the dilemma, the two realities which humanity has faced and will ever face. The solutions it gave of it were, most of the time, a kind of compromise between the two. Yet there have been great lovers of God, beings namely who had the love of God so deeply rooted in their hearts that they believed in our freedom but placed it into the hands of God. We are free in so far as we love Him and it is God who determines us to will and to act. This solution was that given by St. Paul, and will be that of Al-Ghazzali the great theologian of Islam.

...

What I have said in this part of this work being only general, I shall in the next part expound the theory of three men who, because of the importance they attached to this problem on the one hand, and, on the other because of the peculiar mark which their doctrine bears, can represent clearly enough those periods called Islam, Modern Times and Contemporary times: Al-Ghazzali will stand for the general view of Islam, which is, as we have seen, a complete determination of man by God's will; Schopenhauer and his transcendental freedom will represent a current of thought of Modern Times; and Bergson, of course will represent contemporary time. Antiquity having not really studied the problem of freedom, I shall not build upon it further, contenting myself with what I have reported on Socrates' and Aristotle's views. As to Christianity we have already dwelt upon its eminent representative in the person of St. Paul.
PART III.

The Problem as treated by Al-Ghazzali,
Schopenhauer and Bergson.
CHAPTER I

AL GHAZZALLI'S DOCTRINE OF FREEDOM AND DETERMINISM.

What is most interesting in the study of al-Ghazzalli's doctrine of freedom is not — according to me — the doctrine itself, nor the results to which it leads (for the doctrine, indeed, preaches the severe fatalism that is generally found in Islam), but rather what it reveals to us about the man himself — for in the case of al-Ghazzalli, life and doctrine are both rooted in the man's personality; and this doctrine reveals to us a deep and sincere love of God on the one hand, and a strong philosophical mind, logical and dialectal, on the other (2)

Al-Ghazzalli's greatest problem was the reconciliation between Faith and Reason. Brought up in the religion and practice of the Sufis, he soon realized that the whole structure of their beliefs was insecure and unable to stand in the face of his Reason; he was, accordingly left in a state of deep suffering. Al-Ghazzalli, gifted with a great intellectual faculty — the very faculty which he greatly despised in others and in himself, when he came to know the truth — and living amidst the significant intellectual and religious movements of his day, could not remain long without asking himself and others about the real value of

(1) Al-Ghazzali, b. 450 H. (1066) at Tus in Khorasan; spent a great part of his life at Naisabur, where he studied under al-'Ism al-Haramin. From Naisabur he went to the court of Nizam al-Mulk, and he served him as one of his jurisconsultes and theologians, until, in the year 484/1091, he was called to Bagdad to teach in a Madrasa. It was there that he had studied the many philosophical doctrines of his time. He made the pilgrimage to Mecca, 490/1097, after which followed 9 years of silence and quietness; during that time he composed the Ihya in Jerusalem. He visited Damascus where he gave lectures on his Ihya. He died at Tus 605/1112. For Ghazzalli's life and Works see Encyclopedie de l'Islam, article D.S. Macdonald, Vol.II p.166. See also, Munk, Mélanges de philosophie juive et arabe.

(2) In fact al-Ghazzalli was surnamed 'Haggatu-l-Islam, or Islam convincing proof.
all religious beliefs, about Revelation and Prophecy, and how they could be consilicated with Reason, which, in her turn, gives so many proofs of her insight into them and into the truth. He was also haunted by the afflicting problem of the value of our knowledge, and whether it can yield any certainty about the truth: Where is the truth? Is it in God? Or, is it in human reason?

Al-Ghazzalli then started his life with doubt and scepticism about all things, theology as well as law, which he had studied in his early manhood. But this state of mind could not remain long, for al-Ghazzalli's love of God was so deeply rooted in his soul, that throughout all his sufferings, and his denial of any certain knowledge, there constantly remained in him the certainty of the reality of God. At Baghdad, after years of conflict between faith and reason, he succumbed to a severe nervous breakdown, and left the capital in search of quiet and peace; when he regained his capacity for orderly thought, he set himself to study afresh the 'four ways' which claimed to lead to the truth: 1. The scholastic theology, 2. The Ta'limites, who believed that there was an infallible teacher, 3. The Aristotelian philosophers, and 4. the Sufis, or mystics, who held that God could be mystically apprehended in ecstasy. He went carefully through all these systems, and finally emerged out a mystic. MacDonald (1) relates the conversion of Al-Ghazzalli as follows: after tragi-cal strife, where his physical and intellectual forces were exhausted, the conversion came to his soul; he was delivered from the snare of vain learning and worldly ambition and became convinced of the truth and the moral power of Islam. He left Baghdad, where he was a professor in a madrasa, and his life became that

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(1) Encyclopédie de l'Islam. Art. Al-Ghazzali by D. B. MacDonald t. II p. 164-166
of a derwish in pilgrimage. "He then sought, in the ascetic life, peace to his soul and certainty for his mind, and both were granted to him." Hence, continues Macdonald, his view became that of a pragmatist: he taught that the intellect serves for nothing, save for its own destruction (1); that the only certain knowledge is that which is acquired by a personal experience; and that a purely philosophical system has no solid basis (2); he held moreover, that this purely speculative part introduced in Theology by the Mutakallimun (3) lacks certainty.

This is a very brief and inadequate summary of al-Ghazzalli's scepticism; to state it fully would be too long a task here, and I shall content myself by following Munk (4) and point out the many themes against which Ghazzali turned his polemic; I shall also make a pause on his refutation of the principle of causality since it is here that his scepticism culminates. His polemic was directed against the philosophical theories which are contrary to the religious dogma, such as creation ex-nihilo, the resurrection of the bodies, and the divine attributes, his endeavour is confined to show the weak side of the philosophers, and the lack of solidity of their views, in order to warn people against great confidence in them. He also believes that it is quite artificial on the part of these philosophers to maintain that their metaphysical studies deep and obscure as they are, presuppose some mathematical and logical studies. Ghazzali's view is that mathematics has no relation whatsoever to metaphysics (save that part of metaphysics concerned with astronomy); yet this latter can be admitted by any man, though he does not possess any mathematical know-

(1) See however in MPO VIII (1922) the positive task of the intellect according to Alghazal, articles "Algazaline" p.479-82.
(2) Al-Ghazzalli's dialectic, his denial of certainty and of the first principle, is said to be as inexorable as that of Hume. See for instance, Tahefut al-felesifa p.86.
(3) Mutakallimun is this sect of believers who introduced the rational discussion upon religious subjects. They gave rise to the Mutakallimun.
(4) Munk, Mélanges de philosophie juive et arabe, p.374
ledge, in the same way as we can admit that a house has been built up solidly by an architect acting freely, though we know nothing about the geometrical forms of the house, the number of its beams, or its stones. As to Logic, it is true that it is necessary for him who enters upon metaphysics, but it is not proper to philosophers. Theologians also know it and its forms in their works a particular part called speculative studies. Now the philosophers, in order to dazzle the vulgar have changed this name into that of logic.

The objections which Ghazzali raised against the principle of causality form the culminating and most important point of his scepticism. "It is not necessary at all", says al-Ghazzali, "that in things which generally happen, we seek or try to find a relation which we call cause and effect. Cause and effect, on the contrary are things perfectly distinct, the one of which is not the other; and when the one ceases to exist, the other does not. So that any relation between thirst and drinking, hunger and eating, and the things which have a visible relationship, is real only because of the divine power which has established this relation between them, not because this relation exists by and for itself. It is God's power alone which makes that when we eat we are satisfied. This is true also wherever there are two things apparently related to one another. What Ghazzali meant to say was simply this. Ist, Of two circumstances, existing simultaneously, nothing proves that one is the cause of the others. Example: a man bereft of sight since his birth, and recovering it during the day, imagines that he perceives things because of their colors, and forgets that it is because of the light of the sun
that these colours now impress his eyes. 2nd: Though we admit or
acknowledge the action of certain causes by a simple law of nature, it
does not necessarily follow that in the same analogous circumstances
and even on some analogous objects, the effect must be the same. Exam-
ple: cotton sometimes, without ceasing to be cotton, takes - by the
will of God - some quality which prevents the action of fire. In a
few words, what the philosophers believe to be a law of nature, or a
principle of causality, is a habitual thing because it is God who
wanted it to be so; and if we admit it as certain, it is God, in his
prescience, knowing what things will always be, gave us the conscious-
ness of it. But there is no immutable law in nature which enchains
the will of God.

Here is a glimpse of Ghazzalli’s scepticism; it was necessa-
ry for me to give it, simply because, as we shall see, it forms the
point of departure of al-Ghazzalli’s own mystical philosophy. The ge-
neral conclusion to which Ghazzalli came is this: we can know nothing
by pure rational knowledge; nothing exists rationally (i.e. a law of
nature), nor apprehended by the force of reasoning. If we are to know
anything, and specially things concerning Religion and Revelation, it
will be by a direct knowledge which God puts into the heart of the be-
liever; it is by a personal experience, "ma’rifah", that the reality of
revelation can be established. In a few words, what characterizes
Ghazzalli’s philosophy is, first of all, the mysticism of a great lo-
wer of God; in fact, Ghazzalli’s mysticism penetrated all his philoso-
phical doctrines, and it constitutes the main character of his doctri-
ne of freedom.

But in spite of the victory of Religion over Reason, of faith
over argument, al Ghazzalli was after all a philosopher, a rationalis-
tic philosopher; and his philosophical studies were continually enl
lightening his religious convictions. He, of course, delimits the pro-
per sphere of Reason; an yet, we see him referring to its logical ar-
guments whenever he has to strengthen any of his religious beliefs, or
to reject any views of his opponents. It is also this logical rati-
onalistic argumentation that we meet in his doctrine of freedom. He re-
futed the Aristotelian philosophers of Islam (I), with an Aristotelian
logic. Though he came to the conclusion that only 'wetasty' can yield
the truth, yet, in coming to this conclusion, he took into considera-
tion what every one of the philosophers of his time said about reli-
gious discussions. I repeat, what constitutes the beauty and force
of Al-Ghazzalli's metaphysics in general, and of his doctrine of free-
dom in particular, is this mysticism lined with the philosophical clar-
ty of his arguments; it is this conviction of the truth revealed by
Religion, supported, defended, and approved by his reason.

Al-Ghazzalli expounds his doctrine of freedom in his great
work the _Ihya_ (2). As most of his writings, the work was a reply to
his opponents, the rationalistic philosophers, who greatly influenced
by Aristotelian theology and logic, had introduced logic everywhere in-
to Islamic theology, and applied it even to Allah. This theological
intellectualism held by the Mutazilites (3) and revealed in their doc-
trine of the free will, constitutes the central point against which
Al-Ghazzalli formulates his doctrine.

The Mutazilites started with the Kedarite dictum that man is
the author of his acts; and in order to safeguard the ethical nature

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(1) According to Uberweg, _History of Philosophy_; Among all philoso-
phers it was the Aristotelian Theology which was fully adapted with the
rigid monotheism of the Muslim religion.
(2) _Ihya_ "ulūbdal-Dīn, or the 'revivification of the sciences of reli-
gion' was written during the period of peace which followed that of the
moral crisis at Baghdad. Ghazzalli was in his 40th, he died at the a-
ge of 84 at Tus.
(3) See Goldsicher. _Le dogme et le Loi dans l'Islam_, chap.V, les Sectes.
of God, they maintained the necessity of the justice of God. God is by essence just. His acts are necessarily just - so much so that the almighty power of God is limited by His justice. They say or: He is necessarily graceful. For such belief they certainly could quote the Kur'an; for such epithets as "al-Rahman" "al-rahiim", or the "Compassionate", the "Merciful", are in favour of an ethical conception of God, as are the following verses:

"God will not burden any soul beyond its power, it shall enjoy the good which it hath acquired and it shall bear the evil for the acquirement of which it laboured".(I)

and

"God is not unjust towards His servants."

In fact, "wronging" (zula) is precisely one of the actions most abhorred by Muhammad, so that the Mutazilites were not wholly out of tune when they emphasized the justice of Allah"(2)

Now because of God's necessary justice, the Mutazilites were led to such consequences as the following: punishments were more severe than in orthodox Islam because of the importance given not to Allah but to man's free will, as the cause of sin. Man being the second creator of his acts, the Mutazilites maintained that he decides upon and creates his acts, both the good and the evil; and that, consequently he deserves rewards or punishment in the next world for what he does; and so the Lord is safeguarded from association with any evil or wrong, or any unbelief and transgression. For, they say, if He created the wrong He would be wrong, and if He created justice He would be just. Finally, the rise of theodicy was a further consequence. "The Mutazilites unanimously declared that the wise can only do what is salutary (al-saleh) and good and that His wisdom keeps in view all that

(I) Sura II, 286, see also Sura IV, 44, Sura XXII, 10.
(2) Wensinek, A.D., The Muslim Creed, p. 60.
is salutary to his servants." The Mutasilites were rationalistic (1) and their highest norm was reason (saki). Things, according to them are not good or evil because God declares them to be so. No, God makes the distinction between the good and the evil account of their being good or evil. For the Orthodox Islam of the Koran, the beautiful and the good are those things which God has decreed to be so, and the bad and the evil are those things forbidden by God: for the Mutasilites, there is an absolute good, and an absolute evil, and it is reason which gives is the measure of this appreciation; it is reason and not the divine will which judges of it: things are not good or evil because God declared them to be so, but God makes this distinction on account of their being good or evil. This question of the absoluteness of things and of God choosing the salutary for his servants was of great importance to the Mutasilites, for it led them to this other question: "Is faith of absolute or relative nature?" (2), but we will not enter into the latter question for the moment.

This voice of reason, heard in the words of the Mutasilites, was the voice of the Antique Age; it influenced both philosophy and theology. "It is against this voice that Ghazilli, exchanging his former Aristotelianism with Platonio tendancy, found his personal salvation."(3).

Ghazilli starts with the most important and basic of all his beliefs: that belief, namely, that God is the Creator of all that exists. He is the only creator and maker of all that is. "God is our Creator." He created us and what we know.

Before going further into the development of al-Ghazilli's doctrine and into the ways through which he proves his beliefs, let us stop

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(1) Al Shahristani's, *Book of Religious and Philosophical sects*. For any reference on the Mutasilite doctrine, Corbo de Vaux declares this book of Shahristani ad Shahristani *p. 78* *p. 176* *p. IV.*

(2) See Wasmünder *p. 88*.

(3) Ibid.
a moment and enquire more closely into this fundamental category of al-
Ghazzalli's conception of creation. From the very beginning of what we
may call his doctrine of freedom, Ghazzalli shows himself to be, above
everything else, a true follower of Mohammed and the Koranic teachings.
His conception of God, the creator, and of the world, the creation, is
the basic ground of his teachings on the freedom of man. In other words,
Ghazzalli's doctrine of freedom is dominated at bottom by the concept of
cosmological creation, as opposed to human personal facts. Ghazzalli
considers and treats man first of all as being the creature of God, a
creature on the same plane as mountains, plants and animals, so that
in the same way in which the other creatures - mountains and plants -
obey the laws of the Creator, man, the creature of God, obey them. And
now with such a point of departure, his whole doctrine is turned against
his opponents' view; and in seven propositions, he shows that God is
free from any obligation to give laws, to create, to give reward, or to
take into account what is salutary for his servants; that it is not ab-
surd that He should command them to do what is above their power; that
He is not obliged to punish sin; and that it is not absurd that He
should send prophets.

And now, before hearing al-Ghazzalli's proofs of these theses,
let us try to indicate how he arrived at them from the mere conception
of God as Creator. What does this belief in God as Creator imply? It
implies, first of all, the actual existence of some thing which was for-
merly non-existent - be it the physical world, or man himself - through
the intermediary of the Acting Force. Without God, there might have
been no objective existence at all; and God could have remained the on-
ly real entity. We have already pointed out that Ghazzalli did not be-
lieve at all in the creation ex-hahiilo; that is to say, he did not believe that the world is eternal as is God himself. God the Creator, in other words, is an Acting Force, the manifestation of which is the creation of the world as well as of man.

Now Ghassili maintained that God was not obliged at all to create, nor to give law, nor to reward or punish, nor to send prophets, nor to send prophets, nor to take into account what is salutary for his servants etc. and all these follow naturally from his conception of God. For the fact that God is the creator implied that nothing was created without him, i.e. nothing co-existed with him; for had anything co-existed with him, it would have been self-created, and God would not have been the Creator of the world. There are, thus, no two eternal beings; and God being alone, could not have received any order from any being which is not himself. God creates freely, simply because such is His will; He created the world, and man, without regard to anything outside Him; He gave them laws only because He so willed it. If man is but the creation of God, and could not have been existent at all without Him, could he require reward or punishment from his Creator? In other words, does the pure act of creation imply the necessity of one single way of creation which is most salutary, as the Mu'tasilites claim? No, for creation is an act complete by itself, and is not bound to any other justifying reason. Having created man, i.e. given him existence, God is not at all responsible towards him, and is not at all under the obligation of sending him prophets to work for his salvation. Such responsibility, as the Mu'tasilites demand, prevails only thru human nature, and only so to a certain extent: the father is responsible for the welfare of his son, but only for a certain lapse of time; but God, the Creator
par excellence, can not be bound by obligations to any of his creature; man in His Hands is but a tool to serve the purpose of creation, or any other divine purpose. This relationship between God and man can be also understood if we compare our own attitude not towards a person to whom we have given life, but towards an object which we have fashioned ourselves.

That is the way through which Ghazzalli might have deduced, from the conception of God as a creator, the many theses above cited. Let us pass now to Ghazzalli's actual way of proofs:

There are two ways by which al-Ghazzalli - as we shall see - defends his point of view - the naturalistic proof, which, according to Carré de Vaux (I), is the favourite argument; and the proof found in the Koranic verses. In order to make clearer to ourselves this doctrine of freedom of Al-Ghazzalli, let us separate it into as many paragraphs as there are points defended by him against his opponents, the Mutasilites:

Every existing thing, says al-Ghazzalli, is God's act and creation; there is no Creator besides him; He alone created men and their actions; and they are dependent upon His unlimited will. This is proved many a time in the Koran:

"And Allah has created you and what you make."

He ordained to man to be careful in his words and actions and intents, because He knows what their results will be. Now, how can it be otherwise, asks Ghazzalli, if the whole nature and its movements and its accidents are His creation? God, says He, has an unlimited power and will; and in the same way we can not conceive of the wonderful work of the spider and the bee as non-controlled by him; we are unable to think of the actions

(I) Carré de Vaux, Al-Ghazzalli, Alcan, Paris 1922. La théologie de Ghazzalli.
(2) Qur'an XXXVII : 96
of man - which are similar to all movements in nature - as not being acts of His Creation (I).

God has created you and what you make, and no single movement escapes the power of God; and yet, says al-Ghazzali, the decision of man lies, to a certain extent, with himself. Every free act is in a way decided twice - once by God, and once by man; it depends upon God for its production, and upon man for the merit or demerit resulting from it. This quality of things being advantageous or disadvantageous exists only from the human point of view; man can make a choice and gain (kash) the advantageous only. God in fact has given man this capacity of the appropriation of things (iktisab), and this capacity (kidr) enables man to decide concerning his actions, though he does not create them at all. The choice therefore lies with man; the accomplishment of the action with God: the movement is man's; the creation, God's: God is the creator of the action decided by the human will.

... God created the choice and the thing chosen, the decision and the thing decided.

You may tell me, adds Ghazzali, that this is a perfect determinism, and I answer you, no; for man can easily discern between the actions depending upon his will, and those which are pure necessarily reflexes.

Then you may tell me: But why do you not say that the actions of man are his pure creation - and how can you conceive of a mode of relation between the capacity to act and the act itself, which is not that of creation? And to this I reply: the actions of man are not his crea-

(1) Ihya first proposition of the chapter III - Actions of God.
tion, for, had they been so, man would have known all about them and their details, while that is not the fact.

In order to prove that the relationship between man and his actions is not necessarily that of creation, and, in general, that the relation existing between the capacity to act and the act itself is not necessarily that of creation, Ghazzalli gives as example, the relationship existing between the eternal capacity of God to create the world and the world before the creation, i.e. when the world was not existing at all (according to Al-Ghazzalli, the world is not eternal). God, says he, had the capacity to create the world, and yet there was a time when the world was not existing (1) while the relation between God and the world had never ceased to be.

Having proved that all the actions of man are the creation of God, al-Ghazzalli goes further and insists that these actions are not only created by Him, but they are, also, objects of His will. This new idea is of great importance since it brings with it the problem of good and evil. God, according to him, created both good and evil, Islam and Heresy, calamity and happiness (2). Before going through al-Ghazzalli’s proofs of this statement (that all actions, the good and the bad, are acts of the will of God), let us see what is the difference between things being the pure creation of God, and things being his creation and also acts of His will.

Here Ghazzalli seems, as Descates does later on, to separate the intelligence of God from his will. God, the omniscient, may have created the world by pure act of intelligence i.e. God created things

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(1) Ihya Article II in Chapt.III, Actions of God.
(2) Ihya Article III
which He knows; he knew all things and he created all things. But, making emphasis on things being objects of God's will, Ghazzalli aims to say that these things - actions of man, the good and the evil - were not only known and created by God, but were also the object of His will, i.e. God willingly, by an act of decision, created all actions, the good as well as the bad, calamity and happiness, Islam and Heresy.

Here the problem, whose discussion we postponed above, arises: could God, who is perfect in goodness, have created evil willingly?

Here also Ghazzalli has recourse, not only to the text, but also to a logical argumentation; by a simple reasoning he convinces us of the being of God as the producer of evil. He says: there are good actions, and there are also bad actions; if we say God produces only the good, it follows that the bad are produced by his enemy, Iblis. Now, we all see that bad actions are the most prevailing in the world; should we then say that God had permitted his enemy to be more powerful than Himself, even in His own domain?

But here a difficulty arises in front of al-Ghazzalli, which does not arise in the doctrine of the Mutasilites. One may ask Ghazzalli: How can you conceive of a God who prohibits and punishes certain actions - for surely God punishes the evil - which are not only created by Him, but which also constitute acts of His will? (I) How did Ghazzalli solve the problem? Ghazzalli did not really solve this new problem, but he rather escaped from it by a subtle, though not a convincing, proof. He distinguished between the command (amr) and the will (irāda). He says: God willed the evil, because he willed every thing that is, but He did

(I) We said that this difficulty is not found in the doctrine of the Mutasilites; for this is the way in which they met it: The Creator, being wise and just cannot have any relation with evil (sherry); and it cannot be conceived that his will regarding His servants should be different from His command.
not command it in a positive sense; namely he did command it and did not want his command to be satisfied. Ghazzalli gives then the example of the master who had beaten his servant because the latter had not obeyed his order; they came before the sultan, who asked the master to repeat again the experiment. The master, in order to prove to the sultan the veracity of his deed, ordained his servant to do an action which he was sure the servant will not accomplish.

God willed the evil because nothing escapes His will, but He did not command the evil i.e. he did not require from us its accomplishment; He command it in a negative sense, i.e. He did not want his command to be satisfied. In other words, God permitted the evil by the mere fact that He created it; but He was sure that man's intelligence, and man's love of God would never let him choose the evil.

Having proved that Allah is the creator of all that is good as well as of all that is evil, Ghazzalli passes to the nature of this creation, and its motives; and he concludes that God had no obligation whatsoever to create the world. We have seen that for the Mutasilites man's responsibility, on the one hand, and the justice of God, as an essential trait of His being, on the other, led them to believe that faith is not a divine gift which is lavished upon some and withheld from others; they maintained that God's actions towards all men are determined by what is most salutary for them from the religious point of view and by what is best fitted to lead them into the ordered path (I). To this, Ghazzalli replied negatively. God created the world, and granted us faith, not by any obligation on his behalf, but by pure bounty and grace, that He has not to care for the best fitted to his creatures. Maintaining that

God created the world and faith by pure bounty (lutf) and generosity. Ghazzalli proves successively that obligation and justice have no meaning whatsoever for God. As to the idea of the 'benefit of the creatures' Al-Ghazzalli shows its fallacy by a simple example. The creation of the world is a free independant act of God. When there is any obligation, says Al-Ghazzalli, i.e., when an act is necessary, one at least of the following possibilities must fulfilled or satisfied (I): an act is necessary when it must avoid a harm, be that harm near or remote, or when its non-existence is a contradiction.

The first possibility (e.g. Man must drink in order to avoid thirst) is not applicable to God, for, if it were, God would be subject to harm - and yet we know that there is no "relation between Him and what gives profit"; that, "neither harm can touch Him, nor is He moved by hurt or pain"; and consequently that His actions are perfectly free, depending upon His will; moreover it is only His will, as we have seen, which prescribes to men what he could do and what he should avoid.

The second possibility by which an act is obligatory, is that its non existence is a contradiction, or in other words, that the contrary of this act, is an absurdity. This possibility also is not applicable to God, for his existence needs not to be proved by that of the world, or of the good actions and benefits of his creatures.

To say, therefore, that God had in view the benefit of his creatures, and that this is a result of His necessary justice, is false. For if it was true, He would have done better had He created his children directly in Heaven, sparing them the earthly sufferings.

Moreover, the fact that God did not have the benefit of the creature in view, is proved by the example of the three children. You Mut---

(I) Ihya, Art. 4.
silites, have claimed, says al-Ghazzali, that God must have in mind the benefit of his creatures (1). We have seen how from the point of view of God, He could have created them directly in Heaven. But as a matter of fact; the best for his creatures; what would you say to this discussion taken place between God, two adults, and a child? The child and one of the adults died in a state of belief, the other adult died in a state of heresy. Only the soul of the first adult went to Heaven, while that of the child went to Limbo. Then the soul of the child asked God: O God, why have you been so severe with me and so good with my brother. God answered him: because his life was long, and because he had suffered on earth, and strifed, and saved his soul, while you have done nothing. The child replied: but why have you not given me longer life and chance to save my soul? The Lord answered: because I know that you were to become a sinner. At this moment the soul of the second adult dead in a state of unbelief, desperately asked the Lord, but did you not know that I had to become a sinner? And why did you grant me so long a life?

Moreover, in spite of its apparent impossibility, God may require from his creatures actions which surpass their power, without being unjust. He may also, without any imputation of crime, without any promise of a future reward, makes his creatures suffer — and this is not in the least unjust, for God is free to act in whatever way He pleaseth in His kingdom. His absoluteness, says al-Ghazzali, i.e. His doing what He pleases without being bound by human rules, is the prevailing feature of Allah in the Kurān: He extends His bounty, His mercy, and His wisdom to whomsoever He pleaseth. He guideth in the right way, and He leadeth to go astray, whomsoever He pleaseth.
Besides these proofs given by the texts, Ghazzalli cites proofs from nature to the same fact; the example of the animal and children suffering without their doing any bad action, or any evil, and without any indemnity granted to them by God and this last pretention of the Mutasilites and this belief goes against all logic of the mind and the law. You may say, but that is perfect injustice. I reply unto you, there is injustice or wrongdoing (zulm) when there are two domains, the one belonging to you and the other to your neighbour; and you are unjust when you encroach upon what is not your own. But as a matter of fact all things belong to Him; and injustice, taken in that sense, can not be applied to God.

Ghazzalli is not contented only by making us depend entirely upon the free will of God; for he maintains that what constitutes the glory of man, that which gives him responsibility, and renders him the master of his own destiny, (in other words, his reason) is not infallible, and does not consequently lead us to the true path of salvation. Our good actions do not depend upon our reason, but upon God's law and Religion; the good is what God had proclaimed to be so, and not what Reason has called so.

By so doing Ghazzalli had in view the confirmation of the power of miracles and that of the prophets; reason can not play the rôle of the prophets; knowledge and reason can not take the place of revelation and prophecy. To Ghazzalli there is something behind and above the Intellect, which is Prophecy. The domain of Prophecy is above all other domains. Now the rôle of the intellect is to make us know the need for the prophets as physicians for our sick souls; it leads us to the prophets, and transmits to us what they dictated for
our souls.

Here ends Al-Ghazzalli's doctrine of the free will of man, (or, better the doctrine of the complete determination of man by God), as presented in the Ihya. In general what we can say about it is that it fits in very naturally within his entire metaphysics - which is nothing other than that of a mystic looking at the world, and at truth beyond it, through the vision of God. God with his unlimited will and power, embraces all things. From Him we came, and to Him we shall return; the body and its action, the soul and its aspirations and love, are from Him and to Him. To the unlimited power of God, Ghazzalli sacrificed not only man's will but what is more fundamental: God's justice. In fact this new conception of justice, being meaningless when applied to God, is quite characteristic of Ghazzalli, and pertain only to this great lover of God. According to Him, to believe in God's justice is to limit His will and Power - which, in fact, are not bound by any rule. God is the only owner of the world, the only master of our destiny and life. To Him we owe our being; we are His creatures; and how could the creature rebel against its Creator, and require from Him what does not pertain to Him (1). How can we speak of the injustice of God? and how can He be unjust, who deals in his own property in any way he likes.

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Let us now try to make an evaluation of al-Ghazzalli's doctrine of man and his relation to God. Or, in other words, What is man in al-Ghazzalli's view? Has he any will? and if so, of what does it consist?
First of all (and this is most striking in al-Ghazzalli's doctrine of freedom) the doctrine — and we have already pointed this out — is dominated at bottom by the cosmological creation of the world by God, and by the conception that the material world of the body, as well as nature and all its movements and accidents, the work of the bee and the spider as well as the actions of man, constitute the sphere of absolute necessity, where God's omnipotent will is all in all. Yet Ghazzalli tried to make certain concessions to man; he spoke of ikhtisab (appropriation) through a certain capacity called kidra. He made of this ikhtisab a gift of God bestowed upon man, in order to help him to decide, i.e. to choose between advantageous and disadvantageous things. But, in fact, it is but an apparent self-government of man by himself; for, as we have seen, the accomplishment of the chosen act lies in the hands of God; and the choice, as well as the thing chosen are God's creation — so that we can say that even this relative freedom, which he grants to man, he retracts when the accomplishment of that act is concerned.

Not only does freedom not stand firm in Ghazzalli's doctrine, but this doctrine is one of extreme determinism, and of mystical determinism, which can be understood only through the light of the love of God; for, according to Ghazzalli, to know God is to love Him, and to love him means to abandon one's life, its joys and sufferings confidently into His hands. With such confidence, how can a soul be tormented by the question of its freedom, or what would be the value of this relative freedom, which one enjoys in this material life, as compared to that which one enjoys in one's perfect love of God?
Ghazzalli thus leads us through complete determinism to perfect freedom. He preached a complete determinism since, according to him, we are directed in all our actions by God; and perfect freedom since, when we love God in a perfect way, we do not feel at all the effect of the slavery, but all that we do will be as spontaneous as if it has been done through perfect freedom.

Let us, then, see what was the meaning of the Love of God? and why is it so important in Ghazzalli’s philosophy? What I have tried to show in this chapter is that Ghazzalli was a mystic whose vision of the world was made through his religious faith; and that he came to mysticism through scepticism. In fact we saw him attacking reason and logic, and rejecting any “rationalization” of the divine attributes. There is no such thing as the immutable law of nature; reason apprehends things only because God gave us the consciousness of their being so. In other words, though sceptical as to human knowledge, Ghazzalli did not extend his scepticism to the fact of Religion and Divine Revelation. This latter is apprehended by man not by the help of his reason, but by a pure act of unity with God. Ghazzalli believed in such a capacity of communion of man with His creator by pure ecstasy; he perceived the difficulty of such a thing; and he required from men a kind of purification of the soul, and a mystical treatment for its health. The many medicines of it are: penance (السُّبْطَة), patience (الصبر), gratitude (السَّبْرَة), fear (الفَرَّ), hope (النَّبُوِّ), poverty (الفَقُور), renunciation of things of the world, abnegation of the will, and the love of God. Ghazzalli prescribes to man a gradual ascent of the whole of his spiritual being towards God, who is the only truth. The abnegation of the will, and
the love of God. Ghazzalli prescribes to man a gradual ascent of the whole of his spiritual being towards God, who is the only truth. The abnegation of the will, and not its affirmation is the culminating point which man reaches before the perfect state of complete union with his God. Love of God is the supreme aim of man. Here I cannot pass on this phase of the mysticism of al-Ghazzalli without remembering Christian Love, the love of St. Paul (1). From the complete negation of the will, i.e. the complete determination of man by God, Ghazzalli leads us to the perfect love, or the perfect freedom of the soul, when it abandons itself completely into the hands of its Creator. Again, then, (and with this I shall close the chapter on Ghazzalli's doctrine of freedom) what is the abnegation of the soul and what is God's Love?

Abnegation of the will (2) - the principle which lies at the bottom of this degree of perfection - is the faith, or the psychical and experimental vision of the unity of God (at-tawhid). It consists in the sure belief that God, and God alone, is the real cause of all that exists and can exist, that His acts are inspired by His infinite bounty, compassion and wisdom. When the mystic has attained such conviction, he realises that poverty and richness, death and life, honour and dishonour depend exclusively upon Him, so that man must fear Him only, have faith only in Him, and put his entire confidence in Him; in other words, abandon his will to that of the Divine will. If this faith never weakens, it creates in the heart of the believer a sentiment of absolute abandonment into God - a sentiment of three degrees of perfection, which Ghazzalli compares respectively, to the abandonment of a customer to his lawyer, of a son to his mother, and of a

(1) See on the influence of Christianity on Al-Ghazzalli the book of Swemer "A moslem seeker after God", last chapter.
(2) Ihya IV,172 ; see also MAF VII art. La mystique d'al-Ghazzalli, by Dr. M. Asin Palacios. See also by al-Ghazzalli: Kitab al Arbaïn fi Usul ad din.

الزراوي : "كتاب الأربعة في اصول الدين" مطبعة المدينة الإسلامية 1344 هـ
corpse into the hands of its burrier.

This abnegation of the will is not as passive as it seems to be; and it is quite useless, unless man has the conviction that in all his actions, mortification, sacrifices and suffering, he keeps in his mind the sure belief in the Revelation and the love of God. This latter is the sublimest and highest point attained by a spiritual perfection. Ghazzalli proves, against those who deny the possibility of such a sentiment, that the love of God is possible for two kinds of reason; that of gratefulness and Platonic love. We love God by gratitude because He is our creator and it is He who can preserve our life; we love Him in a disinterested Platonic manner, because we love the beautiful, and He is beautiful. Now what are the effects of such love on our souls? We love God and because we are far from Him we desire Him; that is why the mystic is he who, while on earth, desires most of all death. He desires death because he wants his suffering, for being separated from God, to have an end; in fact, after death, the soul will have the beatific vision, and during his life the mystic when expecting death the saviour makes of his life a pleasing image to God, and it is precisely in that fact, that consists his freedom.
Treading on the steps of Kant, and considering like him both aspects of the world, its empirical reality and its transcendental ideality, Schopenhauer like the philosopher of Koenigsberg was led to the conclusion that a strict necessity rules the world of appearances, while in the world of the noumena, or of the thing in itself, a complete freedom reigns.

In fact, in spite of the whole chapter reserved by Schopenhauer to "Criticism of the Kantian philosophy" (1) when the problem of freedom is concerned, Schopenhauer gives to Kant full justice (2). Now, it does not mean at all that Schopenhauer considered freedom as a moral postulate; but it is a fact, that both, Kant and Schopenhauer considered freedom to be of a transcendental nature, that is a property of the intelligible character of man, and consequently not perceived at all in the world of appearances, in which we are living and acting. So that, I believe, one cannot really write on Schopenhauer's doctrine of freedom without keeping in mind, if not referring from time to time, to the doctrine of Kant, since both doctrines are grounded upon the same fundamental principle.

To expound the schopenhauerian conception of freedom is, if not a hard task, at least a long one, for is derived from the spirit of his whole philosophy, and unless one has a comprehensive view of the whole, one cannot get the real range of one of the parts. So that, for fear of losing my reader, I shall do quite an unphilosophical thing, and state very briefly the doctrine all at once, and then proceed to its exposition.

(1) The world as will and Idea V.II ch.I
To Schopenhauer, as I have already pointed out, the world has two aspects: is pure appearance, or the world of phenomena and the real substratum of these appearances, or the world of "noumena" (1), or the "thing in itself". This view had already been professed before Schopenhauer by such philosophers as Plato, Descartes, Berkeley. He explains it as follows: the world (also my body) is real, i.e. has objective existence, only in so far as it is perceived by me. In other words, I do not know it directly; for what I know is simply an eye that sees, and a hand feels, etc. There is a world, which we call object, and only in so far as there is a perceiver, that is a subject does this object form the perception, or the representation, or also the idea, of the perceiver. Half the world, then, is a subject, and the other half an object; and both exist and vanish together. Now, this world of appearances or of ideas — my body and actions included — is necessarily presented to me under the forms of space, time and causality — which, as Kant found out, lie a priori in the sensibility of man. So that, whatever belongs to that world is perceived by me under the forms of space and time; and all space-temporal forms are related to one another by the rigid law of causality. To these a priori principles discovered by Kant, Schopenhauer adds a new one, which comprises them all: viz., the "principle of sufficient ground", with its four forms, of which the principle of causality is but one. Now, this principle forms, according to Schopenhauer, the general form of our understanding; and since the world exists only through understanding, it follows that the world is presented to me with the character of necessity derived from the principle, and consequently with no room for

(1) "Phenomena", "noumena", appearances" are pure Kantian terms.
freedom at all. He says (I): "Ma philosophie débute par la proposition que cause et effet ont seulement une signification dans le monde, que celui-ci n'existe qu'en présupposant ceux-là. Car le principe de la raison suffisante est seulement la forme la plus générale de l'intellect, et c'est uniquement en ce dernier que le monde objectif existe.

But, is the world composed of pure appearances, without anything that appears? Is it but a dream? Or has it a real, constant nature which remains for thought, even when there is no sensuous support whatever? And, if it actually has any real existence, in what does its nature consist? Schopenhauer, like Kant, believed that behind this apparent world of phenomena, there is another one, not visible at all, and yet existing: namely, an intelligible world, an ideal one which is the condition and the very basis of this one. So, if the world has an empirical reality, is also has a transcendental ideality. The transcendental ideality, let us repeat it, is the condition of the other, but is in itself conditioned by nothing; it exists by itself, independent of space, time and causality; it is simply what we call the "thing-in-itself". In this transcendental ideality of the world that is, of all things that are, my body, my actions and my character included, is also my intelligible character, i.e. my being, not as it appears (empirical character) but as it is. My intelligible character also, then, is outside the forms of space and time; it is self-existent and free; it partakes of the nature of the thing in itself.

Thus Kant as well as Schopenhauer believed in the thing in itself; and placed it beyond all sense; and thought of it, as of a

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free being; but, while Kant could say nothing of its nature, having
proved to himself the incapability of his reason, Schopenhauer went
further than him, and, leaving reason to its impotency, he had recourse
to a new mean. He made a simple return into his consciousness; and
the most immediate feature he got of himself was that of a willing be-
ing. He concluded, that we bear the thing in itself in our breasts,
and it is nothing else than a will, and a free will. Not only me, but
also natural forces, the plants, the animals are but manifestations of
the will; myself and the world are made of the same stuff; that is
why I have an insight into it at all. We and the world likewise, are
a will objectified, so that the inner nature of the appearances, i.e.
of all phenomena, is not an "unknown", it is not God, it is not a na-
turel force, but a will. From one point of view, every being in the
world is a phenomenon; from another it is in itself will, and indeed
an absolutely free will; for necessity arises through the forms, which
belong entirely to the phenomenon, through the principle of sufficient
reason. Now, in speaking of the problem of man's freedom, we can ap-
proach man equally as a phenomenon and as an intelligible character.
As a phenomenon, he is subject, as are all phenomena, to the forms of
space, time and causality; and it is then quite wrong to believe in
his freedom; but, as an intelligible character, man does have perfect
freedom. In other words, man’s freedom is a transcendental one, a
freedom not perceived in his acts (Operari) but presupposed in his be-
ing (Esse).

This is a very brief statement of Schopenhauer's doctrine of
freedom; let us now proceed to its exposition.
"The world is my idea"; with these words Schopenhauer begins his chief work, "The World as Will and Idea". This is a truth, says he, (I) which holds good for every thing that lives and knows; if man can bring it into reflective and abstract consciousness, he has attained to philosophical wisdom. It then becomes clear and certain to him that what he knows is not a sun and an earth, but only an eye that sees a sun, a hand that feels an earth; that the world which surrounds him is there only as idea, i.e., only in relation to something else; to the consciousness which is himself. No thought therefore is more certain, more independent of all others, and less in need of proof than this: that all that exists for knowledge, and therefore the whole world, is but a, object in relation to a subject, the perception of a perceiver, in a word, an idea.

That which knows all things and is known by none, continues Schopenhauer, is the subject; it is the supporter of the world, since all that exists exists only for the subject. Every one then finds himself to be a subject - yet only in so far as he knows, not in so far as he is an object of knowledge. But his body is object, and therefore from this point of view we call it idea. For the body is an object among objects, and is conditioned by the laws of objects, although it is an immediate object. Like all objects of perception, it lies within the universal forms of knowledge: time and space, which are the conditions of multiplicity. The subject, on the contrary, which is always the knower, and never the known, does not come under these forms, but is presupposed by them; it therefore, neither has multiplicity, nor its opposite, unity; we never know it, but where ever there is knowledge, it is the knower.

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The world as idea has two fundamental necessary and inseparable halves. The one half is an object whose forms are space and time, and through these, multiplicity; the other half is the subject, which is not in space and time, for it is present entire and undivided in every percipient being. These two halves are inseparable even for thought, for each one appears with the other and vanishes with it. They limit each other; and when the object begins, the subject immediately ends. The "universality of his limitation is shown", says Schopenhauer, "by the fact that the essential, and hence the universal, forms of object, space and time and causality, may be, without the knowledge of the object, discovered and known from a consideration of the subject". Now the way in which space, time and causality cooperate, is this: "What the eye, the ear or the hand feels is not perception; it is merely its data. By the understanding passing from the effect to the cause, the world first appears as perception extended in space, varying in respect of form, persistent through all time in respect of matter; for the understanding unites space and time in the idea of matter, that is of causal relation. So that as the world as idea exists only through the understanding, it exists also for the understanding (I).

So far then, we have seen the meaning of the truth expressed by Schopenhauer, that the world is idea; we have also seen the relation between the subject and the object to be not one of causality (since this is possible only between objects), but one allowing us to say about the existence of the object that it is equivalent to its perceptibility (since space, time and causality are the a priori forms

See the World as Will and Idea Vol I ch. I
of our consciousness). On this last point, namely as to the a priori forms of sensibility, Schopenhauer has something to add to the discovery of Kant. He quite agrees with him as regards space and time, but he also believes with great conviction that there is another more fundamental a priori principle of which the principle of causality is but one form; it is the "principle of sufficient reason or ground" with its four forms. "I, however, go beyond this and maintain that the principle of sufficient reason is the general expression for all these forms of the object of which we are a priori conscious; and that therefore all that we know purely a priori, is merely the content of that principle and what follows from it; in it all our certain a priori knowledge is expressed."(1)

In general, and before going into the details of what the principle implies, let us state its meaning; Schopenhauer wants us to see, that every thing belonging to this world of appearances or ideas, is invested with the form of necessity, and that consequently it is vain to try to find any room for freedom: "every possible object comes under this principle, that is, stands in a necessary relation to other objects, on the one side as determined, on the other side as determining; this is of such wide application that the whole existence of all objects, so far as they are objects, ideas and nothing more, may be entirely traced to this their necessary relation to each other."(2)

It is of course taken for granted, that whenever Schopenhauer speaks of objects, he has also in mind— as we have seen— men's body, and men's actions so far as they are manifested under the forms of space and time. This is also what one must keep in mind if he has to find

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(2) Ibid.
the answer to the question whether man's actions are free, or whether there is freedom at all.

Briefly then, having established the fact that the world of phenomena is but a world existing as idea for man, Schopenhauer goes to prove that these ideas are strictly enchained according the law of sufficient ground. What is the law of sufficient ground or reason, and how does it operate in the world? Or, in other words, how does Schopenhauer refute the existence of freedom in the world of appearances? According to the many classes of ideas, (for there are many—each representing, as we shall see, a special objectification of the will) the principle of sufficient reason invests four forms which, if logically enchained one with the other, are: the principle of being, applied to space and time; the principle of the becoming, or the law of causality; the principle of motivation, or the reason why we act at all; and finally the principle of knowing, which presupposes and summarizes the three of them. Let us see now, how Schopenhauer expresses himself. This part of his philosophy is found in his essay on the fourfold root of the principle of sufficient Reason (I).

Where does the necessity of being manifest itself? Schopenhauer explains: the first class of objects for the subject is constituted by the formal element in perception, the forms of outer and inner sense, space and time. Space and time have the property that all their parts stand to one another in a relation in which each is determined and conditioned by another. This relation is a peculiar one, and is intelligible to us neither through understanding nor through reason, but solely through pure intuition or perception.

(1) An abstract of it is given in the work: "The World as Will and Idea", Vol.III as an appendix.
priori. And the law according to which the parts of space and time thus determine one another is called the law of sufficient reason of being; namely in space every position is determined with reference to every other position, so that the first stands to the second in the relation of a consequence to its ground. Also, in time every moment is conditioned by that which precedes it. Now, by the help of space and time, the outer and inner sense, we have ideas of perceptions; space and time together are their only forms by which they are capable of being perceived. If time were the only form there would be no coexistence, and therefore no persistence; if space were their only form, there would be no succession, and therefore no change; but the union of these two forms of existence is the essential condition of reality, and this union is the work of the understanding. Now, in this class of objects for the subject, the principle of sufficient reason appears as the law of causality, or the principle of sufficient reason of becoming, and it is through it that all objects which present themselves in perception are bound together through the change of their states. When a new state of one or more objects makes its appearance it must have been preceded by another, on which it regularly follows. This is causal sequence; and the first state is the cause, the second the effect. The law has then to do exclusively with the changes of objects of external experience and not with things themselves. In nature causation assumes three different forms (I), that of cause in the narrow sense, of stimulus, and of motive, on which differences depend the true distinctions between inorganic bodies, plants and animals.

It is only of cause properly called that Newton's third law of the

(I) The same exposition is found in the work of Schopenhauer entitled : Essai sur le libre arbitre. Chap. III. La volonté devant la perception extérieure.
equality of action and reaction is true, and only here do we find the
gree of the effect proportionate to that of the cause (second law of
Newton. Stimulus or Excitation is characterized precisely by the ab-
sence of these features of the cause properly so called. It is under
this last form of causality, stimulus, that modifications in the or-
genism are determined - that is, all the development of plants are pro-
duced under the stimulus of air, light, warmth and food. Motive requi-
res knowledge as its condition, and intelligence is only the character-
istic of the animal, and man. Motivation is then according to Scho-
penhauer the feature of those beings who having more or less complica-
ted needs, and who cannot give satisfaction to any one of these needs
by pure reaction, but require deliberation and choice. Of course, as
we shall see, an animal is not as capable of deliberation as man is;
yet it has a semblance of choice. Though different from the brute,
man yet sees his actions as strictly determined by motives, as their
own. Schopenhauer examines further the distinction between man and
the brutes (I). Man says, he, possesses reason; that is to say, he
has a class of ideas of which the brutes are not capable - abstract
ideas, general conceptions as the concepts. Now, it is precisely be-
cause man is capable of thought that he has another kind of determi-
ning motives than the sensible - which latter are the only determining
motives of an animal's behaviour. In the first place, both the actions
of man and those of the animals are determined by sensible motives. E.g.
a dog may either continue to eat the piece of meat, or run after the
eat passing at that moment. There is apparently, if not a deliberation,
then at least a kind of hesitation involved; but, be it deliberation

(I) In the essay on the fourfold root of the principle of sufficient
reason Ch, V, also Essai sur le libre arbitre pp.60-61, 62-63.
or not, the action performed by that dog is necessarily determined by a motive sensible and immediate. But man, in the second place, tho' having in common with the animals, the determinism by sensible and immediate motives (e.g. man runs away from fire for fear of death) is also determined to action by motives which are neither sensible nor immediate. For example: man acts in accordance with the idea of self-preservation; he abstractly realizes danger, though it is not present at all; but be it present and senseous, or invisible and abstract, it is always the motive that determines the acts of man. Without any external objective motive there is no action whatsoever. Moreover this, and not any other action happens necessarily because it has been determined by a series of causes and effect.

And finally, the forth form of the principle of sufficient reason is the ground of knowledge, or the logical necessity, means this general thing: whenever the premisses are given, the conclusion follows.

Now, of course, this necessity derived from the principle of sufficient reason, exists only in the world of mere phenomena, that is, in the world as it appears, in man and his actions only in so far as they manifest themselves under the space-temporal forms.

But the question remains whether we are only appearances, and the world but a dream. When all sensuous data vanish, when the flux of changes appears and disappears, is there not anything which remains for ever constant, depending upon nothing. This intellectual anxiety is very well presented by Schopenhauer when he writes (I).

"We are not satisfied with knowing that we have ideas, that they are such and such,——

(I) The world as will and idea Vol.I p.128
and that they are connected according to certain laws, the general expression of which is the principle of sufficient reason. We wish to know the significance of these ideas, we ask whether the world is merely idea; in which case, it would pass by us like an empty dream, or a baseless vision not worth our notice; or whether it is also something else, something more than idea, and if so, what?" Schopenhauer like Kant, believed that the world is more than pure idea; he believed like him that behind the phenomenon-idea, there is a reality of a quite different nature from that which we perceive. We are not what we appear to be; we are the expression of an eternal reality. This other reality, according to both philosophers, is the condition of that actually present one; it forms its basis; and yet it is in itself conditioned by nothing; it lies outside space and time and causality, and the law of sufficient reason has no access to it. This reality Kant calls the transcendental ideality of the world; so that now every thing has two realities, the one, purely empirical, and the other ideal. While the former is subject to the necessity of space, time and causality, the latter has a perfect freedom; being self-existent, it is what we may called the thing in itself. Man also has an empirical reality and a transcendental ideality, the one constituting his empirical character, the other, his intelligible character. In other words, man is a phenomenon, as well as a thing in itself; in the first instance he is subject to the strict law of causality; in the second instance he is a free being. Of the nature of the thing in itself Kant says nothing, for it lies beyond the reach of pure reason; he considered it as a mysterious unknown. For Schopenhauer the thing in itself revealed
itself, not of course, by the intermediary of reason, but by another new and purely personal way. He says: "Starting from the idea, one will never get beyond the idea i.e. the phenomenon. One will thus remain outside of things and will never be able to penetrate to their inner nature and investigate what they are in themselves. So far I agree with Kant; but as to the counterpart of this truth, I do say we are not merely the knowing subject, but we belong to the inner nature that is to be known; we ourselves are the thing in itself; that therefore a way from within stands open for us to that inner nature belonging to things themselves, to which we cannot penetrate from without as it were a subterranean passage, a secret alliance, which as if by treachery, places us at once within the fortress which it was impossible to take by assault from without. The thing in itself can, as such, only come into consciousness quite directly, in this way, that it is itself conscious of itself: to wish to know it objectively is to desire some thing contradictory." (I) This thing in itself that all of us seek to know, is the will. Will constitutes the most immediate aspect presented by our ego to our own consciousness, what we are, is but willing beings (2). In fact, every one of us soon realizes that the only object of our consciousness is our will; and by will we do not only mean the volitions, or the formal resolutions which manifest themselves in actions (that is in sensible facts), but also every psychological fact, every desire and wish, every hope and happiness, as well as every hatred, anxiety and sadness etc. - all of which are but the manifestations of will, the movements of different intensity and which correspond to the individual will. These movements are calm when the will is

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(2) See also, Essai sur le libre arbitre by A.Schopenhauer p.I6 ff.
free and satisfied; they are, on the contrary, intense when it is en-
chained and dissatisfied. What they aim at, is either the possession
of the desired object, or the avoidance (éloignement) of an undesired
one. Moreover, is not the sole meaning of pleasure and pain that the
will becomes conscious of itself in a state of satisfaction or dissa-
tisfaction?

If will is the substratum of all things in the world, the ques-
tion arises, what does Schopenhauer mean by will? How does it mani-
fest itself in the world? This will, in Schopenhauer’s mind, has no-
thing of the intellectual meaning which we generally give to it; it
is a will of a new kind. First of all it is of a metaphysical nature
i.e. we never find it in nature; Schopenhauer considers it as a stra-
ze for life or an impulse to be, he says (I): "the theists believe that
the world exists because a will from the outside has commanded it to be,
and this will guides and regulates the movements of the planets always
though a way external to them; that was their error, for I maintain
that will acts, much more from within the world than from without, and
the world is nothing else than the visible manifestation of it. Pan-
theism, he adds, calls this will God; I call it a will to live." This
will manifests itself in all things that are, from the lowest to the
highest, from these physical forces of nature, to the most conscious
being man. It was Schopenhauer’s merit, says Salmon Reimach ( ) to ha-
ve found the continuity of nature in the three domains of being. In
fact, he attributes will to all of them, the inorganic being as well
as the vegetable and the animal; and he says: "Even the merely empi-
rical consideration of nature recognises a constant transition from the

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(I) Essai sur le libre arbitre de Schopenhauer note p.55.
(2) ibid p.
simplest and most necessary manifestation of a universal force of nature, up to the life and consciousness of man himself, through gentle gradations, and with only relative, and for the most part fluctuating limits. Reflection following this view, and penetrating somewhat more deeply into it, will soon be led to the conviction that in all these phenomena, the inner nature, that which manifests itself, that which appears, is one and the same which comes forth even more distinctly; and accordingly that which exhibits itself in a million forms of infinite divinity; and so carries on the most varied and the strangest play without beginning or end, this is one being which is so closely disguised behind all these marks that it does not even recognise itself, and therefore often treats itself roughly."(I)

So that this will, which is the God of the Pantheists, is but a will to live. Everything, according to Schopenhauer, presses and strives towards existence - towards organised existence i.e. life if possible, and after that, towards the highest possible grade of it. The will to live is not a consequence of the knowledge of life; it is rather what is first and unconditioned, the premise of all premises. The will to live does not appear in consequence of the world, but the world in consequence of the will to live.

Let us throw a quick glance at the objectification of that will. In the lowest grades of being it expresses itself as a blind striving, an obscure, inarticulate impulse. It is the simplest and the weakest mode of its objectification. But it appears as this blind and unconscious striving in the whole of unorganised nature, in all those original forces, whose laws it is the work of physics and chemis-

(I) The World as Will and Idea, Vol.III. Transcendent consideration concerning the will as thing is itself.
try to discover and to study, and each of which manifests itself to us in millions of phenomena which are exactly similar and regular, and which show no trace of individual character. From grade to grade objectifying itself more distinctly, yet completely without consciousness, as an obscure striving force, the will acts in the vegetable kingdom, in which the bound of its phenomena consists no longer properly of causes, but of stimuli. Finally, the ever-ascending grades of the objectification of the will brings us to the point at which the individual could no longer receive food through mere movement following upon stimuli. For such complicated purposes, movement following upon motives, or consciousness, becomes necessary. The certainty and regularity with which the will worked in unorganised and merely vegetative nature is no more possible and here knowledge enlightens the blindly active will. Now, whether this knowledge is merely sensuous (mechanical instincts) or rational, it remains true that it proceeds originally from the will itself, and belongs to the inner being of the higher grades of its objectification.

Being the universal and fundamental nature of all phenomena, the will, or the thing in itself, manifests itself in the world through any one of them. It freely takes the form of my body and my sentiments and my career; it wills also freely to be the solidity and cohesion of the inorganic bodies. Every act of my will is at once and without exception a movement of my body. The act of will and the movement of the body are not different things; they do not stand in the relation of cause and effect; they are one and the same, but are given in entirely different ways: namely the will is given immediately, the body is given in perception for the understanding. So that the action of the body is nothing but the act of the will objectified i.e. passed into perception what ————
as an idea of perception I call my body I call my will so far as I am conscious of it; my body is but the objectivity of my will.

In a few words, the world as it is with its multiplicity of appearances, is but a will that objectifies itself. Schopenhauer calls every individual objectification of this will an Idea, referring to the famous platonic discovery; in their different grades, these objections represent also the hierarchy found between the Ideas; in man as a Platonic Idea, will finds its clearest and fullest objectification. But, in spite of the diversity of its appearances, the will as a thing in itself remains undivided, one, not subject to the principle of sufficient reason - that is groundless, i.e. free.

Now that we have seen very briefly the meaning of this will, and its objectification in the world, let us make a return; and recapitulate all what we have been taught hitherto by Schopenhauer, in order to face with a clear mind the problem of freedom.

The world has two aspects, the one is purely idea, the other is will. Under the first form, the world, the objective one, presents itself to the understanding through the principle of sufficient ground with its four forms. Now, in so far as I belong to that world, I am subject to the necessary law of the understanding i.e. the principle of sufficient reason, I am then an object among the objects, a phenomenon with space-temporal forms. Consequently, I possess no freedom at all.

Under the second aspect of the world, I am no more a pure idea; I am something more; I am a will, and an absolutely free will. That is, I, like all objects of the phenomenal world, possess a being which is no more subject to space, time, and sufficient reason; I am and the
world, a thing in itself, self-dependent and eternal. This being is what Schopenhauer calls my intelligible being, that is, what can be thought without any sensuous help or support whatsoever; it is what is hidden behind my actual being in this world. Thus, just as Kant, since he accepted both the empirical reality of the world and its transcendental ideality could realise both the necessity and the freedom of man's will - so also does Schopenhauer now when he says that what appears (my empirical character) reflects what I am (intelligible character). Put in terms of will, I, i.e. my character, is what my will wants it to be; my actions are once for all determined by my character. Put now in terms of freedom and necessity: I am free in my being (Esse), I am necessitated in my actions (operari); I am free in my intelligible character, but when this takes the forms of space and time, when it becomes my empirical character, it is then submitted to the law of sufficient reason under its principle of motivation (I). I shall not come back again to the question, how man's actions are determined by the motives, for enough has been said concerning it before, I shall simply consider man as a willing being, and enquire into his freedom. For that new purpose, let us keep in mind only this thing: man's actions are determined by two factors, the motives on the one hand, and his character on the other. This idea Schopenhauer states in his essay on the free will of man in many instances; he does not believe at all in the free will, liberum arbitrium, or in the liberty of indifference - for to one who believes in it "every human action appears as an unintelligible miracle, a cause without an effect." (1) and Ethics of course is contrary to the law of sufficient reason. Of how the actions of man are determined

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(1) See above p.
(2)
by the motives, or by the law of motivation, we have said some words; here it is however useful to add this new thing which we have learned from the second part of the Schopenhauerian world, the world as will. That which communicates to the motive its acting force, as well as the hidden spring of the movement which follows, is but the will. Let us now pass to the other determining motive of man's action, that is his character. First of all, let us recall to mind that, if the actions of men depend upon the motives, this has no other meaning than the external perceptions of ideas: for example, the sight of a friend incites a person to go to her home; this act of going is determined by the motive, "seeing of the friend". Now this motive, though possessing an acting force, would be effectless had not the person a force capable of reaction i.e. a will. But though all men possess a will, or rather are made of it, all of them do not respond in the same manner to a given motive; this depends upon their character. About the character of man, Schopenhauer has many things to tell us. First of all it is individual, and differs from one individual to the other, that is why we meet certain qualities in some persons, which are absent in others. It is also empirical, that if we come to know it after experience, we have generally illusions about it; when for instance, we are faced by a choice, we are sometimes embarrassed, our will tergiversates, we even have the illusion to do any action we like; but a strong motive interferes and determines our act.

The character of man is invariable; it is the same during his whole life; there are but apparent modifications in it, but man himself does not change at all; as he once acted, so he now acts, and so will
he act in the future. Because the character is invariable, the effect of the motive is necessarily the same. Yet, since the motives are judged by the understanding which is susceptible of modifications and perfectability, education as a result of which the intelligence of man can be worked out, is possible — and man has more insight into the abstract and the difficult motives.

Finally, the character of man is innate; it is not a product of the haphazard, nor of nature itself; the child of today is the man of tomorrow; as he is in his early childhood, he remains for ever. From this trait it follows that all virtues and vices are innate in man; for, if the character of man were the product of external circumstances, there would be no moral responsibility whatsoever, and yet this exists — as we shall see later. This moral responsibility, Schopenhauer recognises, does not stand at all in the conception of free will, where the actions of man have no "raison d'être" nor any cause; this again being refuted by the understanding itself, the form of which is the law of sufficient reason. Schopenhauer is led to the conclusion that, in the same way, as any physical effect in the inorganic nature is the necessary product of two factors, on the one hand a natural and primitive force (will), and on the other a particular cause, so also every action of man is the necessary product of his character, and of the motive, so that, because of his innate character, the great actions which man does, or the goals at which he aims are determined in his essence; and the means which he uses to reach them are determined on the one side by the external circumstances, or by the personal way by which he understands the world and on the other, by his character. And Schopenhauer, in spite of his being a great
philosopher, refers to a poem of Goethe which supports his theory of the innate character and the necessity of the actions; of this poem let us quote the very verses cited by Schopenhauer (1):

Comme le jour qui t'a donné au monde
Le soleil était là pour sejour les planètes
Tu as aussitôt grandi sans cesse,
P'après la loi selon laquelle tu as commencé
Telle est ta destinée, tu ne peux échapper à toi même
Ainsi parlaient déjà les Sibylles ;
Aucun temps, aucune puissance ne brise
La forme empreinte qui se développe dans le cours de la vie.

Every one then, acts according to his essence, this essence being always the same, so that to expect of man, under similar influences, to act in two different ways is to expect the impossible. Schopenhauer ends the chapter dealing with the necessity of the actions of man by two questions (2): "Can a given man in given circumstances perform equally two different actions? The answer of all deep thinkers is no."

He also asks the question: "Could the career of a given man - keeping in mind on the one side his immuable character, and on the other, the influence of the circumstances which themselves are strictly determined by external motives - could the career of that man in a given moment of its life be different of what it was? Here also the answer is negative. From these two principles the result reached by Schopenhauer was this: whatever happens, the smallest things as well as the biggest ones, all happen in a necessary way (qui quid fit necessario fit). So that, the life of man is predestined from beginning to end, so much that, if it were given to man to know the character of another, as also all the possible motives which can influence him, he will be able to predict the actions of that man from A to Z. Our actions reveal our nature, it is by

(1) Essai sur le libre arbitre, Ch. II. Volonté devant la perception extérieure p.115.
(2) Ibid. p. 106
them that we come to know ourselves, they have really no beginning. They present no novelty at all, for they proceed naturally from what we are (1). Schopenhauer was convinced of this truth, namely that as a phenomenon man has no freedom whatsoever. He even claims (2) that if any one shows a wonder at the hearing of such truth this simply means that this person has yet much to learn, that also when he becomes convinced like him of the fact that our actions are predestined, he then will realize, how, such a belief is helpful and how deep quietness it gives to the soul (3).

But, if it is true that necessity reigns over the actions of men, if it is true that these are determined by his character and the external motives, there is also another truth, no less obvious than the former, and from which Schopenhauer could not escape: this is the moral responsibility and the moral freedom. In fact, if we ask our consciousness, that is, if we ask ourselves, Am I free? Am I the real author of that act, and was I able to do another one? Consciousness will always answer positively. In other words, man always recognizes himself as the free author of every one of his actions; he expects a reward for some of them, as he fears the result of some others. Why is this so, unless man is sure of the freedom of his will? Moral responsibility means also the imputability of the actions to man; it then takes the form of such judgements of ours as: this is a good man, this is a bad man. This moral responsibility, recognizes Schopenhauer, is not to be found in the actions of man, but in what is more fundamental, that is, in his character; so much so that we judge a man sometimes not for the actions he has done, but for those he has not done yet, sim--


(2) Essai sur le libre arbitre.

(3) For the support of such theory of predestination Schopenhauer reserves in his essai on the free will of man the whole chapter that he entitles 'my predecessors'; in this chapter he passes in a quick review all the theories of great men philosophers as well as poets, who have preached like him a doctrine of predestination.
ply because knowing his character we expect from him such actions. Now, where the fault lies, there also the responsibility lies — i.e. in man's character. When I say to myself that I could have done this thing rather than that, I carefully add, provided I were not myself, that is, I had not this character.

Now, with what we know about the character of man, said Schopenhauer, let us inquire into its liberty from a purely philosophical point of view (I). Here, he says, it is convenient to recall to the reader the distinction made by Kant between the intelligible and the empirical character of man.

This theory pertains to what this man, or rather to what humanity as a whole has never produced, of great and beautiful production; by it are consolidated both liberty and necessity — the moral liberty, of which the feeling of responsibility is an obvious testimony, and the necessity of our actions. Its meaning is this: the empirical character of man, so far as it is an object of experience, is, like man himself, a simple phenomenon submitted to the forms of all phenomena — space, time and causality — and consequently ruled by their strict laws. The counter-part is also true, that is: the condition and the basis of the phenomenal character, which experience reveals to us an immutable thing in itself, is what may be called the intelligible character of man; it is nothing else in Schopenhauerian terminology than will. So considered this will, i.e. thing in itself, has absolute freedom; it is independant from space, time and causality.

But this liberty is not visible at all in the world of experience, it is a freedom of a transcendental nature. It exists only when, making

(I) Essai sur le libre arbitre, p. 168.
abstraction of all phenomenal appearance, we try to reach this mys-
rious reality, which, placed beyond and outside time, can be thought
of as being the essence of man as such.

With such liberty the actions of man are really his own work
in spite of their being necessarily derived from the character and
the motives. The empirical character of man is but the phenomenal ap-
pearance of the intelligible character. It follows, then, that the
will is free only in itself and outside the world of phenomena. In the
world of phenomena, on the contrary, it presents itself with a general
character prefixed, and in conformity with which actions are done. This
consideration leads us to look for human liberty (I) not, as human
beings generally do, in the individual actions of man, but in the na-
ture of man (existentia, essentia). This nature of man must be con-
sidered as a free act - which, when it manifests itself to the under-
standing, invests the form of space, time and causality. What we do,
reveals exactly what we are; or in other words, our actions are con-
sistent with our essence. But it is wrong to seek liberty in indivi-
dual actions (operari); for, in reality, we find it in the character
of the esse (being). Now moral responsibility lies precisely in the
fact that by what we do, we recognize what we are; and not in the
liberty of indifference, according to which we are able to do any ac-
tion we like.

Everything depends on what a man is; all what he does proceeds
naturally from his character; we are not wrong in supposing that our
actions are our own, provided we assign to liberty its proper place -
and this place is, not in the immediate realm of our actions, but fur-

(1) Essai sur le libre arbitre p. 189-196
ther, in a sphere unseen by the eye of those who are not wise; this feeling of the autonomy of our actions is similar to the needle which, pointing to an object placed at a long distance from the observer, is believed to be placed in the same direction, but at a shorter distance.

Schopenhauer ends his doctrine of freedom saying: I am not denying freedom to man; I am simply displacing it. I maintain that it exists not in individual actions, but in a sphere, the access to which is difficult for our intelligence. The freedom I proclaim is a transcendental freedom.
CHAPTER III

Bergson's rebellion against Determinism.

When at last we come to Bergsonianism, we find ourselves face to face with a profound philosophical rebellion. New values are assigned to the self and its modes of knowledge; in fact, Bergson transformed every thing, space and time, motion and causality, and came to the conclusion that man is free. Bergson, indeed, did not come to this as a conclusion; for "freedom" or "indetermination" is a fact which can not be separated from Bergson's fundamental philosophical beliefs: Man is free, Nature is made out of free objectifications of life, there was an act of freedom at the origin of the world, the latter proceeding from a creator possessing a sovereign liberty.

These things, said at the beginning of a chapter dealing with Bergson's rebellion against Determinism, are rather difficult to apprehend and consequently unclear. Yet, when one comes to Bergson he finds it necessary to say everything at once; for he himselfonce confessed it by saying: "our interior life helps us to understand the secret of life" or "Notre vie intérieure nous aide à deviner le secret de la vie en général" (1); and, when one knows the nature of the first principle — or God — every thing is cleared up to him. (2) As to the unity of the Bergsonian philosophy M. Jankelevitch said: (3) "One must seek it not in a

(1) Evolution créatrice p. 283.
(2) Ibid. p. 233.
(3) V. Jankelevitch, Bergson, Alcan, Paris 1931 Ch. II La liberté.
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(1) *Evolution créatrice* p.283.
(2) Ibid. p.253.
(3) V. Jankelevitch, *Bergson*, Alcan, Paris 1931 Ch. II La liberté.
principle but he finds it at the end, for we can say of his doctrine what he said himself of his Creative evolution, that it is directed towards an end though it does not fully fulfill the program it has made for itself."

So that in this small chapter we shall find ourselves treating of Bergson's general philosophy of nature, then of his philosophy of man's nature, then of his metaphysics of Time, again of his philosophy of nature, and join at the end some words of his conception of the supreme Being—all these things being strictly enchained one with the other. Let us start by Bergson's philosophy of nature.

As a philosopher, Bergson is ranged among those who have professed at least one kind of evolutionism, for he came at a time in which, as Hoffding said (1): "Every philosopher has to take a definite and precise position as regards the concept of evolution, this latter being considered as important as any one of the categories i.e. the essential forms of our thought, simply because this concept forms the point of departure of many new problems." Metz speaking of the first step of Bergson in the domain of philosophy and of his coming to the problem of freedom says: (2) Bergson studied all great materialistic philosophies of his time; the works of Renan, Taine, Spencer were quite familiar to his mind, as also the works of spiritualistic philosophers as Boutroux and Ollé-Laprun. But Spencer's transposition in philosophy of the theory of Darwin greatly impressed the youth of that time, and the young Bergson was much influenced by this idea of evol-

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(1) Hoffding, H. La philosophie de Bergson, n.67.
(2) Metz, A. Bergson et le Bergsonisme, Paris, Vrin 1933 p.10,11; see also, Chevallier, Bergson, Paris, Flon 1928 p.147 et ss.
(3) Le Bergsonisme, Paris 1926 p.57.
ution, of change of creation." so much so that M. Thibaudet writes (1): "The philosophy of Bergson resembled very much some notes, or a criticism written in the margin of Spencer's philosophy." In fact, he continues: "after careful study of Spencer's philosophy, after a deep criticism of this doctrine, Bergson wanted to apply his own ideas on that subject to the most classical of all problems 'the problem of the freedom of man'" (2). Bergson then is an evolutionist; he believed in evolution, or rather he considered it "as an explanation of the world - though not true - at least of great possibility", it is according to him "a hypothesis which finds application among fact" (3). Every thing happens as if evolution has taken place: evolution, perpetual change, life in perpetual creation, it is what Bergson retained from doctrines such as Transformism, Lamarckianism, Evolutionism, Finalism. Some words on these fundamental theses will make clearer Bergson's own views (4).

Transformism is this doctrine according to which the animal, as well as the vegetal, have not been since their origin as we see them today; they have been differentiated, by and by, under the influence of some natural causes, so much so that we can consider all of them as proceeding - by way of generation - from few primitive types or even from one and unique type only. Though transformism is most of the time referred to Darwin, it was Lamarck, in fact, who had the first primitive idea about it. Without going into details in Lamarckianism, we can briefly say that it considered transformism as the result of three factors:

(1) Le Bergsonisme, Paris 1925 p. 37
(2) See Bergson's study of Spencer's doctrine in Evolution creatrice Ch. I.
(3) Evolution Creatrice, p. 26, 27.
(4) On these doctrines see Problems of Philosophy, cies. Lahr, Ch. Cours de Philosophie T.E. Paris, Beauchesne, 1927 Ch. xiv.
environment, habit and need. By environment, Lamarck has in mind the climate, the food and the habitation. Now this factor is not, according to Lamarck, a real cause, but rather the occasion which determines the transformation; and the real cause is the vital energy which works according to two laws: the law of need, and that of habit or use; so that need according to Lamarck creates the organ, use or custom develops it, heredity fixes it and perpetuates it. But, unable to prove experimentally the real fact of creation Lamarck proves it by way of analogy and says that our every day life shows that our organs develop when we exercise them, and get weak when we do not often make use of them; and that if this state of inaction lasts, the organ perishes.

Darwin makes of these vague laws of Lamarck two definite laws: the natural selection and the struggle for existence. Transformism, in a word, means continual changes of species: creation of new ones and annihilation of old ones; in other words life manifesting itself in continual new shapes.

What is the meaning of Evolutionism? While the transformism of Darwin was but a scientific hypothesis destined to explain the origin of the species, Evolutionism has a character purely meta-physical, for it pretends to explain in one unique law the origin of all beings and all facts. Since Bergson has been much impressed by the doctrine of Spencer, let us throw a rapid glance on Spencer's fundamental ideas. He defined evolution as consisting essentially of a gradual passage from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous.
roganeous i.e. from the simple, to the more complex; and this passage is made according to a necessary and rythmical law. At the beginning, every thing was uniform and scattered and confused; then, through an imperceptible way every thing centers itself, or diversifies itself, or determines itself. And passing in a quick review of the multiplicity of phenomena, from the gradual constitution of our globe, to the apparition of life in its most genuine form, to the apparition of man with his sentiments and intellect, Spencer tried to show the exemplification of his principle of evolution, so much so that, according to him, the same law of evolution explains also the origin of morality, of the organization of society, and of art. In a few words, in matter, life and thought - everywhere - we notice this same rythmical movement which constitutes an integration, i.e. a concentration of facts depending one upon the other. This movement of concentration resembles at the beginning a struggle; but, thanks to the successive adaptations of all being, it comes to be a mere harmonious play: that is why the world incessantly tends towards the best, and all as we are, willingly or unwillingly, we are workmen in this unavoidable progress.

Finalism at last, is the doctrine which says that everything exists and develops, in order to realize the end to which it has been created. In this doctrine, the end, or the being - to use Aristotelian terminology - exists before the becoming, or the means, and realizes it. So that a plan of work is made first,
and it is then fulfilled by the developing thing. This end, or
the being - is also called the cause of the becoming, or also the
end to which it aspires. (1)

Now keeping in mind these general things said on Evolutio-
nism, Transformism, Finalism, let us see how Bergson reacted to
them, and what his final definite attitude was.

What he retained from these doctrines is the notion of
change, of life creating itself and transforming itself into va-
rieties of shapes and forms; but as to the procedure, or the pro-
cesses through which this change, and evolution is made, Bergson
refuted all that was proposed by these doctrines. He of course,
recognises the fact that evolution has taken place (hence the mul-
tiplicity of shapes and forms of beings and things); yet none of
these doctrines gave an adequate explanation of fact such as the
vision, for instance. Also, though he believes that the forms in
which life is incarnated are not stable and continual, yet he be-
lieves that life is essentially a continual current; it is essen-
tially duration. (2)

Here we approach suddenly a Bergsonian dogma: the dogma
of duration. In fact duration is the key, the only key, which in-
troduces us into the Bergsonian domain; to miss its meaning, means
to have missed a real understanding of this philosophy. This is
the meaning of these words of Bergson himself: "À mon avis, tout
résumé de mes vues les déformerait dans leur ensemble et les expose-
ra par là même à une foule d'objections, s'il ne se place de prime

(1) See on the notion of final cause the four causes of Aristotle.
See also in general Aristotle's teleology in N.D. Ross. Aristotle.
(2) About duration I shall note a very significant reflexion of
the above-cited Mr. Thibaudet. He says: when we generally speak
about it, we have in mind something which does not change, is al-
ways the same. But with Bergson, duration means living-changing.
abord et s'il ne revient pas sans cesse à ce que je considère
comme le centre même de la doctrine : l'intuition de la durée, la
représentation d'une multiplicité de pénétration réciproque toute
différente de la multiplicité numérique, la représentation d'une
durée hétérogène, qualitative, créatrice, est le point de départ
d'où je suis parti et où je suis constamment revenu.**(1)**

But now, precisely because of duration, or rather of the
nature of duration, we find ourselves face to face with the
problem of man; not only this, but we shall find ourselves dealing
also with the metaphysics of Time and Space, with the principle
of causality. So that, leaving for a moment the whole problem of
evolution, let us study the problem of man and that of his liberty,
after which we shall come again to the problem of nature in
general where we left it, and state in it the part of liberty. Let
us say it at once, that the Bergsonian problem of the freedom of
man is placed in his metaphysics of Time, this latter being a most
fundamental vital impulse, of a creative evolution of life.

I have said at the beginning of this chapter that Bergson
did not come to the conclusion that man is free, but that he ra-
ther believed in it and he rebelled against those who denied it.
His belief is this : if there is a problem at all of liberty, it
is because there is a confusion between space and time. Any ques-
tion concerning freedom invests, according to him, the following
form : can Time be adequately projected into space ? **(2)** And to
Space and Time, these two old discoveries of Kant, Bergson oppo-

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**(1)** This citation is found in the appendix of the work of H.Hoff-
ding on the philosophy of Bergson, fr.tred. Paris, Aelian 1918
p.160-161.

**(2)** Données immédiates de la conscience, Avant propos p.VII et p.169
sed his notion of Duration.

Let us first explain the fact that an error between Space and Time leads to a denial of freedom, and then, these, on the contrary, Duration (real and concrete Time) reestablishes it.

Bergson himself states the error predominant since Kant, and says (I): the error of Kant has been to believe that time is a homogeneous medium, but he failed to see that real time or duration is made out of moments interior one to the other and that when it invests a homogeneous form, it is then expressed in terms of space. The distinction he made between Space and Time means in reality a confusion of the one with the other, and between the symbolical representation of the self and the self itself. He found out that consciousness is unable to perceive psychical facts otherwise than a juxtaposition, and he did not see that a medium in which facts are juxtaposed and distinct one from the other is necessarily space and time. From this he was led to believe that the same states in the depth of consciousness are susceptible to be reproduced in the same way as are all physical phenomena; it is however what he meant to say when he gave to the principle of causality the same meaning and the same rôle in the external world as well as in the internal world of consciousness. Hence, with him freedom became an incomprehensible fact, and yet, he believed in it, he assigned to it such an importance that he placed it in the noumenal world. Not only did Kant make a confusion between duration and Space, but also he made of the self real and free - quite foreign to space - a self, foreign to space and to Duration and

(1) *Données immédiates de la conscience*, p.176, 176.
which cannot consequently be reached by our faculty of knowledge.
But in reality we perceive this self and we reach its intimate rea-
lity whenever, by an effort, we come back to ourselves. For in the
same way in which we can live in space, submitting ourselves to
the principle of causality, we can replace ourselves in pure dura-
tion, the moments of which are interior, heterogeneous, but where
the given cause does not necessarily produce the same effect. That
was the error of Kant after which has led to the denial of freedom
Bergson will restore it with his new discovery: Duration. From
now, one must continually keep in mind that Duration is nothing el-
se than Time in Bergson's terminology. What is duration, what is
its nature, what are its relations to space? I have said, a little
while ago that because of duration we find ourselves face to face
with the problem of man; the reason of this is simply: Bergson
found out, or rather discovered, Duration (real Time) by a keen analy-
sis of the self, i.e., of our psychical life, and he found out that
not only is duration an attribute of the self, but the self itself.
What does this mean? What is the self, and what is duration?

Duration, explains Bergson (I), is the form, which the
succession of our conscious states assumes, when our ego lets it-
self live, when it refrains from separating its present states from
its former states. Now, from the nature of our psychical state,
this new time i.e. duration, is not a homogeneous medium in which
we can state side by side states of consciousness, and say that this
state of consciousness is the cause of the other. Precisely because
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(I) Données immédiates de la conscience p.79.
of the nature of our psychical states, i.e. of duration, we can
by no means deny the novelty, the spontaneity, of any of our ac-
tions, i.e. freedom.

Let us follow as faithfully as possible the very evolution
of Bergson's thought. The first thing he does (I) is to explain
the nature of our psychical states. These states Bergson calls the
immediate data of consciousness. They are exactly and simply all
that we feel, all that we experiment, all that we live. Now starts
a radical Bergsonian notion: these states are of a qualitative and
not of a quantitative nature. What Bergson means here is that, For
instance, we can by no means say that the sensation of pain I present-
tly feel is two times greater than that I have felt yesterday, or
that the sentiment of love I live now, is three times weaker than
the one I experimented last year. In other words, sensations, senti-
ments, differ not in intensity but in quality: why? simply becau-
se states of consciousness, when they live for a moment, change, and
create new states; so that every sensation, every sentiment, is ne-
ver the same at the beginning of its life and at its end; it melts
and fuses with the other. While, says Bergson, any quantity differs
from any other in the same way as magnitudes differ in space (when,
for instance, one magnitude contains the other). Love, hate and suf-
ferring are entities which cannot be added one to the other. And yet
we attribute to what we feel a representation in the external world;
we do not remain passive to what the sense of sight, of hearing or of
touch, for instance, bring to us; on the contrary, we interpret the-

(1) The problem of the freedom of man in Bergson's philosophy is found
in his work called The Immediate data of consciousness.
se representations, we situate their objects in space, we attribute to them dimensions of all kinds and also all kinds of measurable quantities. By so doing, we introduce the quantity. But this act of spatialisation is, Bergson says, "an act of the mind which conceives in a whole and juxtaposes states which primarily are in-extensive." It is certain, he agrees, that we constantly speak of sensations of more or less great intensity, but when we do so, we take into account two different things: first, we evaluate the intensity of a sensation of pain; for instance, to the extent that it has been irradiated in the body; second, we introduce the notion of cause. For instance we say that a certain number of vibrations executed in a given condition, produce the sensation we usually call "sol", yet we know that the "sol" is not this sensation itself. It also happens that this very number of the "sol" equals one time and half that of another, let us say the "do", yet, we can by no means say that the "do" is the 2/3 of the "sol". What Bergson says about sounds he applies to every other sensation; viz., we can surely arrange in a certain order sensations of different intensities, yet we can by no means say that one sensation is two times or three times bigger than another; moreover, if we do so, we have in view not the sensations themselves, but their causes. He goes on and says that to believe in the law of Fechner (1) means to have introduced mathematics in a domain which does not belong to it at all; namely, a sensation can not be said to be two or three times greater than another. Moreover, sensation, insists

(1) The famous law of Fechner which says that a sensation grows in an arithmetical progression, when the additional existing grows in a geometrical progression.
Bergson, can never be repeated identically to itself; not only that, but the same cause of sensation for instance the "rê" does not produce on us the same impression at the beginning and at the end of a piece of music, because between the two "rê" the audition of the whole piece of music has taken place and had enriched and modified our self; every sensation is itself and nothing else; two sensations are not reducible to things; they succeed to each other, not in a form of juxtaposition, but they are inclined one on the other, they influence each other, they fuse and melt one into the other.

What Bergson says about sensations he applies to feelings, sentiments: every sentiment of joy, of pity, every aesthetical feeling shows how each one of them is a living thing which makes with itself a "snow ball"; each one shows that it is not a unity but a multiplicity; from homogeneity, a conscious state passes to heterogeneity. And in the same way a sensation becomes of greater intensity when it is irradiated to a greater part of the body, so also a sentiment becomes more intense when it has enriched itself with many other states. This point, namely the heterogeneity, the richness of a sentiment is very important and must attract our attention. For it is this point of view that Bergson will later proclaim that there are free acts, since every act proceeds from a new sentiment; and we can never predict action in the future precisely because every sentiment when it lives enriches itself and is transformed. But let us not build on this conclusion of Bergson; and before determining the real nature of du-
ration and its relations to Space let us make with Bergson the
distinction that he does between the two selves, i.e., the two
egos, for here one side of the problem can be cleared up. Berg-
son distinguishes two selves, the one he calls the superficial
self, that which, according to him can be apprehended by our in-
telligence and expressed by means of concepts and language, the
other, the fundamental self (le moi profond) which can be percei-
vied by pure intuition. Under the first aspect, the self presents
itself as made out of definite states, of definite ideas with pre-
cise outlines, which our mind, when it thinks them, finds them in
a state of immobility. Among these states Bergson ranges the scien-
tific ideas, as well as all beliefs which had been given to us when
we were young, but which, all of them, ideas as well as beliefs, ha-
ve remained at the surface of our consciousness as "the dead leaves
on the surface of the water of the lake." These ideas and even sen-
timents, passions, limited and precise in their nature, can be jux-
taped one along-side the other, without fusing one into the other,
and the relations existing between them can be of a logical nature,
of contiguity or association; but the nature of each one of them
remains unknown to the other. Their multiplicity resembles numeri-
cal multiplicity, where units can be juxtaposed in space. To these
ideas and sentiments, causal determinism can be applied, and when
one believes in determinism, it is of these states of consciousness
that he is thinking. The other self, or real consciousness is qui-
te different; it is characterised by mobility, by change, by crea-
tion; between mobility and consciousness there is an evident rela-
tion says Bergson: "Entre la mobility et la conscience il y a un rapport évident."(1) What characterizes this second self (moi profond) is first of all its continuity; namely, our psychical life is in continual movement, and when there is a discontinuity in it, this is due to the discontinuity of our attention which neglects one state for the sake of another "mais la discontinuité des appa-
rentions des États de conscience se dessine sur la continuité
d'un fond où ils se dessinent et auquel ils doivent les interval-
les mêmes qui les séparent. Ce sont des coups de timbale qui é-
clatent de loin en loin dans la symphonie"(2) Now the contin-
uity of these states is added another character, that of their being moving and creative; and this continual creative movement does not consist only in the passage of one state to the other, but also in the transformation of the one and same state.

We departed some pages ago from a definition of duration in order to explain the nature of our conscious states, and now, precisely from the nature of these conscious states we reach a new definition of duration. Duration is precisely this succes-
sion of the conscious states of "reciprocal penetration" which permeate and are fused one into the other; it is this passage of one state of consciousness to an other by a gradual and dynamical progress. Conscious states penetrate one into the other; and this mutual penetration makes that the succession of the conscious states does not resemble at all any other materialistic succession; it is not a succession in which need is to recall the past and to separate it from the present. On the contrary, in the succession

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(1) Evolution Créatrice p.119
(2) Ibid. p.8
of the conscious states present and past form but one whole as happens when we recall the notes of a tune melting so to speak into one another. Even, when these notes succeed one another, could we not, says Bergson, perceive them one into the other, so that their totality may be compared to a living being whose parts, although distinct, permeate one another just because they are so closely connected. We can thus conceive of succession without distinction and think of it as a mutual penetration, an interconnexion, an organisation of elements each one of which represents the whole and cannot be distinguished or isolated from it except by abstract thought. Such is the account of duration, he continues, which would be given by a being who was never the same and ever changing and who had no idea of space. (I) But familiar with the latter idea we introduce it unwillingly into our feeling of pure succession, we set our states of consciousness side by side in such a way as to perceive them simultaneously no longer in one another, but alongside one another: in a word we project time into space, we press duration in terms of extension and succession takes the form of a continuous line or a chain, the parts of which touch without penetrating one another, and Bergson makes us note that the mental image thus shaped implies the perception no longer successive, but simultaneous of a before and after, and that it would be a contradiction to suppose a succession which was only a succession and which nevertheless was contained in one and the same instant. When we come to speak of an order in duration, and of

(I) Données Immédiates de la Conscience, p.76-77
reversibility of this order, is the succession we are dealing with—asks Bergson—a pure succession without any admixture of extension, or is it succession developing in space in such a way that we can take in at once a number of elements which are both distinct and set side by side? The answer is that we cannot introduce order among terms unless we distinguish them comparing the places which they occupy, hence we must perceive them as multiple, simultaneous and distinct; and Bergson concludes that the idea of reversible series in duration, or even the idea of a certain order of succession in time itself, implies the representation of space and cannot be used to define it. And as a result of what has preceded Bergson concludes that pure duration is a succession of qualitative changes which melt into and permeate thru one another without precise outlines, without any tendency to externalize themselves in relation to one another; pure duration is a pure heterogeneity. (1)

Pure duration is wholly qualitative and differs radically from time, which is a symbolical construction made by our mind and modelled on space. All philosophers since Kant have considered it as a homogeneous medium in which phenomena can be reproduced again and again, set side by side, remaining constantly the same (as happens in space). True duration is not a quantity; and whenever we try to measure it, we unconsciously substitute space for it. (2) In fact what does the scientist when he studies the movement do? he notes the exact moment of the beginning of a movement.

(1) Don. Im. p. 79
(2) Idem p. 80
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(1) Don. Im. p. 79
(2) Idem p. 80
i.e. he notes the simultaneity of an external change; he also notes the moment when the movement ends, this also being a simultaneity; then he measures the space which is in fact the only measurable thing: namely movement is a dynamical progress, and what we call measuring time, by the speed of a movement is nothing else than counting positions in space, or also immobilities. Hence the error of the Eleates. (I)

The same thing happens when I try to measure time on the clock. "When I follow the movement of the needle which corresponds to the oscillations of the pendulum, I am not measuring time, as we usually believe; I am counting only simultaneities. Outside of my memory which has preserved their traces, there is nothing in space save one single position of the pendulum, all other having passed." (2) In a few words "beneath the homogeneous time — extensive symbol of pure duration — a keen psychology can discern a duration the moments of which permeate one into the other and are heterogeneous; beneath the numerical multiplicity of the conscious states, this same keen psychology discerns a qualitative multiplicity; beneath the self the states of which are definite, it discerns a self to which succession means fusion and organisation." And as we have already said, this duration for Bergson is not only an attribute of the self, but it is also the self itself. And to return to the error committed since Kant we find that all philosophers have considered time as a homogeneous medium while the contrary is true; moreover what is homogeneous in it is precisely what

(1) Domn. Impr. p. 84–85.
(2) Ibid. p. 19 ff.
does not change, i.e. space, in which simultaneities can be set side by side. Thinking that they were dealing with Time, it was with Space that these philosophers were concerned. Homogeneous time is pure illusion, real time, concrete duration means heterogeneity, quality, change, creation: any idea of analysis, of dissociation, of measure, of inertia is excluded.

But now, it is very difficult, of course, recognises Bergson to think of duration in its original purity. This is due to many reasons. One of them is that we do not endure alone; external objects, it seems, endure as we do. I shall not build further on this point for the moment, we shall meet it again in this chapter. Another reason is that it is the defect of the mind which, according to him, has always the tendency to substitute to the becoming, or the perpetual change, some series of immobile states; for instance he says: "in a rapid movement of our hands which we do and our eyes are shut" though we have the right impression that it was a unique and indivisible act, yet, we usually say that "our arm has executed this gesture and has passed through all the intermediary positions." "In reality those positions exist but in our imagination, for our arm might have passed through these series, but in fact it did not, and Bergson concludes that when we attribute divisibility to the movement, we forget that we can divide a thing and not an act." (1) I said that Bergson insisted very much on this tendency of the mind to which treats the movement as a series of immobilities, and doing so he has in mind this fact namely it is by no

(1) Bonn. Imm. p. 84
means possible to recompose a person by an accumulation of psychological states i.e. it is by no means possible to reconstitute a becoming with a series of immobile states. It is quite a different thing to consider a thing from the outside, and from the inside, example, the case of a stranger who in order to have a real idea of Paris, takes many designs, each one representing a part of the town; if he had not seen Paris before, these designs may be very numerous, yet he can never have a real grasp of Paris, while if he had visited and lived in, these designs would have been of great profit; from what he has seen, from the inward image of Paris, he would be able to set side by side the designs and relate them one to the other. So that to understand a thing, or to have a real grasp of its nature is not to look at it from the outside, but from the inside i.e. live in it. How do we come to nature of our conscious states, we can never understand it, except by an inward knowledge. This inward knowledge or rather mode of knowledge is the intuition; we know ourselves by pure intuition i.e. "an intellectual sympathy by which one is transported to the interior of an object in such a way as to coincide with it; and only in this way can we express its personal nature." According to Bergson this intuition is a very difficult thing for the mind: "Il faut que l'esprit se viole, qu'il renverse le sens de l'opération par laquelle il pense habituellement, qu'il retourne ou plutôt qu'il renverse le sens de l'opération par laquelle il pense habituellement, qu'il retourne ou plutôt qu'il réponde sans cesse toutes ses catégories." "Il y a là un effort pénible, douloureux même pour remonter la pente me-

(1) *Matter & Memory*, p. 86.
turelle du travail de la pensée pour se placer tout de suite, par
une espèce de dilatation intellectuelle dans la chose qu'on étudie."
Briefly then, it is by a pure intuition that one gets the real mea-
ning of duration. Let us now return to the problem of our freedom.
We have set the real nature of Time, and we have denounced the old
wrong conception, and now let us posit the problem again with Berg-
son "any question concerning freedom invests the following form:
can Time be adequately projected into space" we answer by the affir-
mative if it is with time which has already passed that we think, and
by the negation if it is with the time which is passing that one is
concerned; and freedom, or the free action, is produced in the pre-
sent time and not in the time which has already passed: all difficul-
ties about it, even if there is such problem at all it is because they
attributed to duration the same qualities as to extension, because
they transposed succession by simultaneities, and finally because they
put the idea of liberty in a language which is not the least fit for
it."(1)

In fact, what did the determinists do? To the first ques-
tion namely whether time can be adequately projected into space, or,
in other words, whether space and time are of the same nature, they
answered by the affirmative: they made of time a homogeneous medium
just because they need it in order to bear the psychical states (for,
how could one conscious state be the cause of another if when the one
appears the other has already vanished?) They projected our inner
life into space, and they took the principle of causality usually used
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(1) Donn. Imm. p.169
in science and applied it to our psychical life, and by so doing condemned man to a complete determinism. This is the case of the Associationist school, whose reasoning about this question very much resembles the writings of Stuart Mill (I) when he says: "I might have not killed, had my aversion of the crime and my fear of the consequences of such an act been weaker than the temptation which was compelling me to commit it"; or also, in another instance "his desire to do the good and his repugnancy of evil were great enough to prevent him from any contrary action." In other words they considered the self as an entity, and the psychical states, hatred, love, desires, other entities which can be set side by side and added one to the other, as if these states were not some living creative things, but simple pieces of matter made of inertia. Yet we know that such is not the case; for, the least sensation — and a fortiori sentiments — grows and is enriched by the mere fact that it endures.

The error of the determinists then, is twofold: first, they impoverished the self when they considered its states as being immobile; or rather, they used a wrong conception of the self, which is as we have seen — heterogeneous, living, creative, and consequently which is not only one and simple, but many at one time. Perhaps "many" is also a poor word to express the richness of a psychical state. When this latter endures, i.e. when it lives, it makes a snow ball with itself in such a way as to envelop the whole personality. In other words, because of its being living and perpetually fusing into the o-

ther sentiments, we can say that a sentiment, whenever it has reached a certain depth i.e. when ever it has lived during a certain lapse of time, represents the soul in its enternity, is such a way that we can say that the soul is revealed in it; so much so, says Bergson, that we can know a person if we know one or two of her sentiments. Now to say that the soul is determined by any one of these sentiments means simply that it is determined by itself. The associationist, or he who believes in cause and effect in the domain of psychology, considers these sentiments as if they were entities quite distinct from one another and having no personal individual aspect; he juxtaposes them one alongside the other in time; while if he comes to consider these psychological states with the particular colour they invest in every particular person, and if he gives to every one of them what comes to it from the others, it becomes then quite useless to associate psychological states, in order to reconstitute the person this latter, let us repeat it existing wholly in every one of them. Now here is a first definition of a free act: "the external manifestation of this internal state is precisely what we may call a free act, since the self, and the self alone, would have been the author, and since this act reveals the whole self"(1) "Et la manifestation extérieure de cet état interne sera précisément ce qu'on appelle un acte libre, puisque le moi aura été l'auteur, puis- qu'elle exprimera le moi tout entier."

Not to return to the error of the determinists, we see that they considered not the real self, but the superficial one. In fact,

(1) Données Immédiates de la Conscience p. 187
in this case strict determinism can be applied. For we remember well that what Bergson calls the superficial self is nothing but these violent emotions or even habits given or rather imposed by a wrong education; such emotions, such habits, cover only the surface of our consciousness and are not fused and melted with the whole self; they remain in a state of crystallisation, so that when we act under their influence our actions would lack freedom.

Ex. a violent emotion of love keeps us slaves and blind, and determines us to actions which we may disapprove at other times.

In a few words, Bergson insists and comes again to this fundamental idea; what constitutes the error of the determinists (i.e. those who denied freedom) is that they considered as being simple inertia, or immobilities in the movement, impersonality in a living psychical state; and that they considered as simple the law i.e. they get rid of quality and conserved only the quantity, while the simple and true is the perpetual movement of life of creation; and consequently no definite precise outlines of sentiments or actions.

As to the second face of their error, they used time in a wrong way; namely they have considered it as a homogeneous medium where psychical facts are set one by the side of the other, and they associated them one with the other. They considered the deliberation which usually precedes a voluntary action as taking place in space; they represented by lines the different directions of our inclinations; and finally they believed that one direction had to be followed and consequently one special action had to be done.

What is worse; they expressed their act by an argument similar to
that and they said: an action once accomplished is accomplished; that is, an action could not be different from what it is; or, an action is necessarily determined by what has proceeded it. Moreover they used concepts, i.e. definite forms of thought, to express a dynamic progress, they treated sentiments as if they were something quite impersonal and inert, while, let us repeat it with Bergson, the self is a perpetual becoming; and this is far from being a homogeneous medium; and the principle of causality has a quite different meaning, it is a causality of a psychical form, and we always fail when we come to translate into words any of the states of our souls. (I)

Now that we have determined the error of determinism, and stated by the same process one definition of free acts, before building on these free acts and precising the character of freedom, let us posit the problem of "prevision", or acts in the future, and inquire whether the prediction of acts is not a crucial fact against liberty. "What about actions which can be foreseen" the determinist would ask, and he would formulate such a problem as this: knowing, from to-day, all the future antecedents of our actions (futures antécédents) a great intelligence could not predict with absolute certainty the decision which will ensue. Bergson first of all notes the fact that there may be some probability in what we can foresee; for instance, knowing the sentiments of a person we can have - if not a real image of what she will do - at least an image of great probability, for our sentiments and our character, though they are in continual

(1) Donn. Imm. p.128
modification, are yet only rarely subject to a sudden change. But now to say that our knowledge of all antecedent actions can lead us to an absolute knowledge of a future act, is an exaggerated assertion. In order to prove this belief, Bergson imagines a person whom he calls Peter, and who is supposed to come to a decision which is apparently free. Bergson imagines also another person, or better, a philosopher, called Paul who, living a century before Peter, and knowing consequently all the conditions in which Peter was acting, asks whether Paul can foresee with certainty the actions of Peter. Bergson says, if Paul knows all conditions in which Peter is acting, this means that there is no detail whatsoever of the life of Peter that has escaped him, so that his imagination can live and build up the whole story of Peter. The question remains: how can one know with exactitude all the conditions of the conscious states of another person, and their importance in relation to one another? There are two means, two hypotheses to assimilate into ones being the sentiments of another person: the one is said to be dynamic, and the other is static. In the first instance, Paul places himself into the conditions of Peter and by gradual transitions he coincides exactly with him; so that, passing by the same series of conscious states, Paul reaches the action (which he was to predict) when it was accomplished; and of course the problem exists no more. In the second way, we presuppose the final act, by the mere fact that we not only indicate the psychological states, but also assign to them their quantitative values, in that way Paul does not live really the psychical states of Peter,
but he imagines them; i.e. he substitutes to their reality their pure images. Here also the problem does not exist, simply because we misinterpret their nature, assigning to them intensive qualities.

Provision, concludes Bergson, is a fact which can be true only of material impersonal facts, and not of psychical creative life. In fact, to predict an astronomical event, for instance, consists primarily in reducing as much as possible the interval of time which separates us from the event which we want to predict, keeping intact the relation of its different parts. Now is such a reduction of time possible when it is with our duration that we deal? Surely not; our duration is not quantitative but simply qualitative; and this whole problem arises only because the determinist uses for our psychological life the same conception of time which the physicist uses in physics: we can shorten a quantity, but never a quality i.e. duration...

Now making a brief recapitulation of the fundamental beliefs of Bergson on the problem of freedom, let us state new definitions of free acts; then we shall pass to the problem of liberty in general and how it is reflected in the world; and, at last, under the suggestion of Mr. Chevalier, let us try to establish the link, or rather the point of departure and the end of Bergson's conception of freedom.

What we have tried to expound in this chapter is, first of all, that Bergson was an evolutionist, or rather that he believed

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that evolution is the most probable hypothesis for an explanation of the world. We do not know yet how evolution proceeds, we know simply that every living thing, and more precisely, every psychical state of the individual, presents some moving, creative thing. From this idea of change and perpetual becoming, Bergson was led to transform the old conception of Time, and to replace it by that of Duration. Duration is heterogeneous, qualitative and creative, so that it is simply the succession of our psychical states; it is the self itself. If this is so, we easily see that there is no room at all for speaking of any principle of causality, since every sensation, every sentiment is not a homogeneous thing but a living creative one. Every sensation, every sentiment makes a "snow ball" with itself; that is, envelopes the whole personality. It follows, that if we say that the soul has been determined by a certain sentiment, this would simply mean that it has been determined by itself. For a better understanding of what Bergson called the "psychical causality", let us compare it with "physical causality". The principle of causality in the physical world implies the fact that a fact is not modified when it acts on another fact, or when it is said to be the cause of the other: in other words, facts remain identical with themselves during the whole experimentation - while this is not the case at all when psychical facts are concerned: internal causality would be a dynamical one, and in it any idea of reversibility, any idea of order are impossible: true duration cannot be foreseen precisely because it is creative, says M. Chevalier (I). All these things lead

(I) Chevalier, Bergson, p. 141
Bergson to such definitions of free acts as the following: First, the free act is the external manifestation of any internal psychical state when this latter has lived enough to reveal the whole personality. It is free because the self and the self alone would have been the author. Now, this same fact proves that liberty has not an absolute character, but that it admits of degrees, so much so that the free act is this act which belongs to a long dynamical series of psychical states and which tries to identify itself with the fundamental self, for: "C'est de l'âme entière que la décision volontaire émane, et l'acte sera d'autant plus libre que la série dynamique à laquelle il se rattache tendra davantage à s'identifier avec le moi fondamental." (I) and Bergson believes that the most severe education would be without any effect if it does not communicate to us sentiments capable of being fused in the soul as a whole. A final definition of free acts is this: "we are free when our acts reveal our whole personality, when they express it, and when they have with it this resemblance which we find between the artist and his piece of art." "Nous sommes libres quand nos actes émanent de notre personnalité entière. Quand ils l'expriment, quand ils ont avec elle cette indéniable ressemblance qu'on trouve parfois entre l'oeuvre et l'artiste." (2)

That was the meaning of the free acts of man; it is a freedom of a psychical nature i.e. proceeding essentially from the nature of our psychical life. But Bergson did not only believe in the freedom of man, but found it also in nature, let us see how.

At the beginning of this chapter I have stated Bergson's beliefs in

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(1) Bergson, Données Immédiates p.128
(2) Idem. p.132
evolution, and I have said that he saw everywhere in matter and thought a perpetual movement of life under multitudes of shapes; and I have said that, in spite of this belief, he could not accept any of the finalistic or evolutionistic explanation of this movement. Life for him was a continual process: duration. I have also pointed that according to him, to know the secret of our interior life is to know the secret of life in general. Let us here proceed to investigate into the way Bergson applied the notion of "duration" to the material world and showed the existence of liberty therein.

I have said that Bergson was very much impressed by Spencer's doctrine of evolution. In fact he transformed the materialistic evolution of Spencer into that of duration. Duration consists of the deep and profound imprevisible and continual change - the latter being the primordial fact of any consciousness. Duration is this continual progress of the past which grows into the future, and which swells as it advances. "La durée est le progrès continu du passé qui ronge l'avenir et qui gonfle en avançant." (I) Every thing is made up of time, i.e. change; so much so that Bergson rejects every other phenomenon and admits that of change. Change is everything and immobility is but an illusion. Let us take, says he, the most stable of our internal states: the visual perception of an object. This object might remain always the same, and I might look at on one side under the same angle, under the same light; yet the vision I have of it now differs from that which I had a moment ago, simply because it has become older, my memory being there and bringing to my present something of my past. In fact we change incessan-

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(1) Ev.Creat. p.5
tly, and even this entity of the "I" which we believe to be neces-
sary to support all conscious states, is but an artificial link: "it
is for our consciousness a sign destined to remind it to juxtaposit
a state of consciousness by the side of the other, while there is no
juxtaposition but simply a continuation" our psychical life is ma-
de of time, there is no stuff more resistant than it."(1) Of cour-
se, recognizes Bergson physics ascribes a material support to every
movement; yet as this science advances, this belief in material sup-
ports is getting weaker; for mass was looked at as if it were compo-
sed of pure molecules; then of atoms; then electrons and corpuscu-
les; and this support assigned to the movement is so small that it
is but a scheme, a symbol - "a simple concession of the scientist to
the habits of our visual imagination." All this is vain and useless,
and Bergson concludes that there are changes, but there is nothing
that changes; change does not need any support; there are movements
but there are no objects that move; movement does not imply a moving
object (2).

Of course, what is relevant to our present discussion, is to see
how Bergson applied this notion of duration to the universe. It
is certain that material objects seem immovable, yet succession in
an incontestable fact in the material world. Let us consider the
most simple fact: that which consists in preparing a glass of suga-
red water. First, I have to wait until the sugar melts in the water;
this fact means many important things for me, because the time which
I spend waiting for the melting of sugar is not a mathematical time,

(1) Evol.Creat. p.4
(2) La perception du changement p.24-25
simply because it corresponds to my impatience; that is, it makes a part of my proper duration. What is the general meaning of this experiment, if not that the glass of water, the sugar, the processes of dissolution of that sugar, are pure abstractions; and that the whole of which they have been cut out by my senses and my understanding, progresses also in the same way as does a consciousness."(1) The universe is not then ruled by mechanical and mathematical laws; and that in the universe which shows resistance is nothing else than life: every living being is transformed, then modified, and gets old: "ô quelque chose vit, il y a ouvert quelque part un registre ô le temps s'inscrit."(2) Bergson refutes all mechanical explanation of the evolution of the world; he also refutes finalism which "implies that things and beings realise simply a program."(3) The evolution of life is according to him similar to our interior evolution, that evolution namely which ends in a free act; and his philosophy of life pretends to surpass both mechanism and finalism, though it approaches the latter. As finalism, it presents to us the organised world as a harmonious whole; but this harmony is not as perfect as one seems to believe, for it admits many disharmonies. For every species, every simple individual retains from the global impulsion of life a certain impulse or energy which he uses for his own benefit. Species and individuals think only of themselves: that is why there is lack of harmony. Yet this harmony exists rightly for the general impulse of life is a common one, which, however, as we ascend the grades of being, slows more and more great tendencies.

(1) Evolution créatrice p.10
(2) Ibid. p. 17.
(3) Ibid. p. 45
Bergson's most fundamental belief is that there is in the world, through every existing being, an impulse to life. It is this impulse to life, which takes the form of a movement in advance and explains the evolution of beings, and even evolution in general. It is this vital impulse which explains, for instance, such a simple and complete thing as vision, and the sense organ of vision itself, the eye. Neither finalism, nor physico-chemical mechanism, are capable of explaining the real development of the many parts of the eye in order to end to vision itself. The only thing which can explain it, according to Bergson, is the advance towards vision, through the original vital impulse of life.

In a few words, life is implied in every movement of this development. Now if we are asked (1) how and why is life so implied, we should answer that life is primarily a tendency to act on matter; of course the direction of this action is not determined, hence the manifold varieties of shapes which life presents on its way. This action presents to a certain degree a character of contingency; it implies a certain choice. Now a choice presupposes first the representation of many possible actions. It is then necessary that, there must be present to the living being before the accomplishment of any action many possible actions. Bergson believes in life and attributes to it the rôle of inserting indeterminism into matter. "Le rôle de la vie, dit-il, (2) est d'insérer de l'indeterminisme dans la matière. Indéterminées, je veux dire imprévisibles sont les formes qu'elle crée au fur et à mesure de son évolutions. De plus en plus indéterminées, je veux dire de plus en plus libre est l'activité à

(2) Ibid. p.137
laquelle ces formes doivent servir de véhicule." Of course, I have no time in this small chapter to state the whole doctrine of creative evolution. I shall be contented with tracing the very fundamental current as Bergson expounds it at the beginning of his Creative Evolution; and then I shall end the chapter by the suggestions of certain philosophers as to the probable Bergsonian conception of God, the very source of the vital impulse of life.

Bergson says (1) the creative movement would have been a very simple and easy thing, and we could have traced its direction very easily, had life taken one and unique trajectory similar to a shot thrown by a cannon. But this is not the case; and life is similar to a shell which has burst out of fragments, and these fragments, being pieces of shell, have burst out into new fragments destined also to burst out again, and so on. When a shell bursts out, its breaking into fragments depends upon two things; first the force of the explosive powder contained in it; and second, the resistance of its matter. Similarly the breakage of life, or its fragmentation in the individuals, depends upon two things: first, the resistance that life finds in matter; and second, the explosive force that life bears in itself. The resistance of matter is the first obstacle that life met; yet the latter succeeded however to win victory over it—though it was in a very humble way, since indeed life identified itself with the general physical and chemical forces of nature. That is why the first manifestations of life were very simple: they were like the simple protoplasm or amoeba that we observe to-day, possessing a tre-

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(1) Evol. Crét. p.107
mendous impulse which brought them to the superior levels of life. Life is a tendency; and the essence of a tendency is to develop itself into a sheave, creating, by the mere fact of its growth, many diverse directions to which it communicates some of its impulses. A simple objectification of the diverse directions of this tendency is the fact of our character when we look retrospectively at our being when we were growing. We can see that there were in us many personalities, and as all of them could not develop in one time, we were forced to give way to only one or two of them. Now though it is the same in nature, yet this latter, says Bergson (1) does not make the same sacrifices. Nature keeps these diverse tendencies, which as they grow take different individual roads. The bifurcations which life follows on its road are many yet we can distinguish three which lead to main roads, and among these three one leads to man and it is largely opened to give way to the great breath of life. Mineral specie, as well as the vegetal and animal are not as Aristotle has declared it Three different degrees of one and same tendency, they are three different directions of an activity which devides itself (2). "Ce sont trois directions divergentes d'une activité qui s'est scindée en grandissant." As we have said, life, inserting itself into every existing thing encountered the resistance of their matter; but, inserting itself in different quantities, it gave rise to the many shapes of things and of individuals. Hence the apparent lack of harmony as well as the contingency and imperishability of forms of life. In a few words, says Bergson, what we can notice in the inverse are two currents one (life) ascending and making itself, the other descending and unma-__

(1) Ev.Cr. p.109
(2) Ibid. p.146
making itself. "L'activité vitale est alors une réalité qui s'est faite à travers celle qui se défaît."(1)

Here we are approaching one most important thing and with it we shall end the chapter. A question arises whence comes this energy, this life which uses itself, continually inserting itself in matter? It appears necessary to admit that at the origin of the world there is a source of the many energies which appear in the world "il faudra nécessairement chercher l'origine de ces énergies dans un processus extra special" and M. Chevalier suggests, let us make an inference of the Bergsonian thought: we must look for an infinite energy which necessarily gives of itself without losing any thing of its primitive energy. This energy can be only one of the attributes of a being which we call God. From this point of view every thing becomes clear and as M. Netz also suggests, in fact Bergson himself speaks of a Creator (2), a center from which overflows the world as do the fuses from an immense bouquet - provided, we do not consider this center as a thing (chose) but as an incessant life, action, and liberty. By so doing, Bergson explains also the creation not as something mysterious, but as something which we experience whenever we act freely. Bergson seems to believe that if there was not a free act at the origin of the world there would have been no place at all for liberty. And concludes M. Chevalier, if the world proceeds from a creative act, from a sovereign liberty, then our liberty is not only possible, but also is true and real, i.e. realisable.

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(1) Ev.Gr. p.269.
(2) Ev.Gr. p.270.
PART IV.

Critique and personal conclusion.
CHAPTER I

CRITICAL APPRAISAL

Before starting the part which I dare to call personal conclusion, I shall do something even more pretentious; I shall try to show how al-Ghazzalli, Schopenhauer and Bergson have failed to see the most important factors in human freedom. For that purpose, I shall state what I consider to be the true conception of human freedom. These different factors, which are necessary for the existence of freedom, or of free acts at all, were already pointed out, though very vaguely, throughout the preceding parts. For instance, when I raised the problem of freedom, I have tried to show that liberty is primarily manifested not in the actions of man, but in his being, i.e. in his nature, reasonable, suffering and willing; and I have said that man may not be practically free because, there are many factors (such as society, for instance) which prevent him from realising himself freely; but that it was true however that man remains free in every one of his sentiments, in every one of his creative works. There was another point which I have tried to make clear: the point, namely that, to me, freedom is not at all this liberum arbitrium, or even this liberty of indifference, which consists in allowing man to do whatever thing he likes; but that liberty, true liberty, is manifested anytime man chooses responsibly, and deliberately, i.e. with reason and will, one way of living, one way of thinking, this way being for him the best; and I have called this fact, that of being determined, or necessitated to act, by something outside of man, or even inside of him; and I have said that such necessity does not only make possible the fact of our freedom, but that it is the only
light under which the freedom of man can be understood. Later on, I insisted upon christianity, and I said that christianity gave to freedom its highest and noblest form: meaning thereby that, to me, freedom is precisely this moral progress, this moral emancipation by man from his own weak and vanitious nature. Freedom as it is revealed in the religion of Christ has taken into consideration all the factors which are essential in the conception of freedom; namely it made of liberty the fact of a man reasonable, responsible, willing; all liberty which manifests itself not as a result of an equilibrium of forces or of a capricious will, but rather a liberty determined, or even necessitated by the love of God, by the hope of Eternal Life. In other words the real Christian is he who, after deep suffering, after strife against the many possible ways of acting, chooses responsibly and willingly the way which leads him to God, and only in so far does he prove his freedom.

Keeping in mind these different ideas, let us see how far have Ghazzalli, Schopenhauer and Bergson understood and expressed this kind of freedom.

A criticism of Ghazzalli is more difficult than that of Schopenhauer and Bergson, for the reason that Ghazzalli departed from a most difficult dogma: the belief in God. I say "difficult" because not every one can have this faith, or even this capacity to believe with reason and heart that God, and only He is the creator of whatever we do or feel. It is not an easy thing at all to place oneself in this very state of soul of Al-Ghazzalli, and accept with him, or even refute with him, the principle of causality. I believe that Ghazzalli
light under which the freedom of man can be understood. Later on, I insisted upon christianity, and I said that christianity gave to freedom its highest and noblest form; meaning thereby that, to me, freedom is precisely this moral progress, this moral emancipation by man from his own weak and vanituous nature. Freedom as it is revealed in the religion of Christ has taken into consideration all the factors which are essential in the conception of freedom; namely it made of liberty the fact of a man reasonable, responsible, willing; all-liberty which manifests itself not as a result of an equilibrium of forces or of a capricious will, but rather a liberty determined, or even necessitated by the love of God, by the hope of Eternal Life. In other words the real Christian is he who, after deep suffering, after strife against the many possible ways of acting, chooses responsibly and willingly the way which leads him to God, and only in so far does he prove his freedom.

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can not be refuted at all, for there is no arm in our hands which can be opposed to his. We have no means of proving to him that God does not exist; we can simply ask him: How do you know that He is our Creator—a question the only possible answer to which being: How do you know that He is not?

I find two ways of meeting him: the first way is that of accepting his attitude, his sentiments and his reason (and this involves the belief that all that we are or do is God's act). It is thru this way that we can fully appreciate his refutation of the principle of causality; accept that "injustice" has no meaning for God; and accept that He is the creator of evil of evil in the world. If we appropriate his beliefs, how well do we understand that we are not free, how well do we realise the good of being the slaves of God, and how well do we love this liberty he wants us to show when we have attained the degree of perfection such that we love God and we love Him deeply and entirely, so that we fully and entirely depend on Him. Every thing is then cleared up, and we do not ask Ghazzalli what about our will? What about our responsibility, what about our reasonable choice. In this doctrine, what is important, is the goal and the point of departure; both are one and the same: God. We cannot even ask Al-Ghazzalli what can we do in order to love God as he himself did, for to love Him, or not to love Him, is of God's will.

The second way of meeting Ghazzalli is, on the contrary, to reject completely his faith in God; the result will be that, all of a sudden, the logical chains with which everything is supported by Ghazzalli will fall down. But is this attitude (which is that of the posi-
tivist, or the atheist) really a refutation of this huge doctrine? I do not think so; for the question remains: How can you do this? how can you prove that God is not the Creator? If Fgazzalli had been dogmatic, we would not be less, so.

What about SCHOPENHAUER? When one comes to Schopenhauer he might consider him either as the philosopher of freedom par excellence, or even as the complete denier of freedom. In fact, it is very easy to consider him as the philosopher of liberty, since he has made of the essence of our being a free will, which freely manifests itself in me; i.e. it freely takes the form of my body, of my mind, of my thought, of my desires and love and hatred and anxiety, and my actions. There can be, of course, no more freedom for me than to be what I wanted to, and this will work within me, and I bear it in me. Yet Schopenhauer's transcendental freedom (since it is a freedom which is not at all in Space time and causality; and since it is not a perceptible but an intelligible freedom) does not really make us sure that we are free. Here I do not have in mind the determinism or even the kind of fatalism to which Schopenhauer leads us whenever he speaks of our actions and our empirical character; this point had been reached as a matter of fact by all philosophers; but in my saying that Schopenhauer's transcendental freedom does not make us sure of our freedom, I have in mind the distinction which the philosopher makes, after Kant, between the two worlds: the phenomenal world and the noumenal world. What does he really aim at saying is that freedom exists, but that we can never apprehend it by intelligence; that though it is true
yet it is never perceived; in other words, what Schopenhauer requires from us in order to believe in our freedom in an "acte de foi"; we need in fact this belief in order to realise that what we are is really what we wanted to be. I do not see any other way for one to be sure that this sentiment of hatred, his character, are the expressions of his proper will—that will which existed once some time before, hidden somewhere (we do not know where); it is only in so far as we believe in the noumenal world, that we recognise ourselves to be free. Now if we consider this free will, that which constitutes the essence of our being, we find it to be something, as a blind force with nothing of what is called intellectual, an natural force true even when animal, vegetal and mineral kingdoms are concerned: it is the same will, declared Schopenhauer, that works in the physical nature and works in me; it is the same strife for existence which wants to be a plant and takes the form of my soul, of my will and my sufferings. Can we really accept as true that when we find ourselves in a moral crisis; when we are asked to decide upon our own destiny, or the destiny of others; when, in other words, we take a reasonable attitude: is it only this blind force which acts in us? Are my sufferings really this will-force finding an obstacle on its road? And is moral happiness, or that quietness which we feel at the sight of a beautiful piece of art, or at the sight of a moral action, but this very force finding no resistance? Is not a human freedom something more spiritual and more reasonable, than this metaphysical will—true, as it is, only of our intelligible character?
When we come to Bergson's conception of freedom, it would seem to be easier and even more justifiable to criticise him. It is of course very easy to realise that Bergson's freedom resembles much more spontaneity than freedom; and that this spontaneity is also true of plants, and animals, as well. Is freedom, or the moral emancipation and progress, this liberty which Bergson defines to be "the emancipation of a sentiment, which has endured a certain time and has enveloped the whole personality of the individual"? Where lies the will of man? Where lies his reason? In what does his sentiment of responsibility consist? How would Bergson conceive of man's freedom when he is faced by one of the most difficult problems of his moral being; when, between two alternatives, he has to decide and choose one action only? I believe he would find nothing to say being absorbed, as he is, rather by the question of change and duration. Most probably, any moral problem in his system would not exist at all; since from the first moment of its existence it begins to enrich itself with new psychological states; so that, to think over one problem for a long time, is a contradiction in Bergson's doctrine.

Not satisfied by what he had made of our free acts - those acts which have that indefinable resemblance of the piece of art to the artist who has created it - Bergson added a new vagueness, and believed that we do not realise our freedom by an act of reason, and that it is neither by thought new concepts that we express it; for, on the contrary, any kind of intellectual work in the work of apprehending freedom leads us to deny it and to accept determinism. We perceive our freedom inwardly, i.e. by a kind of reflection into our being; we intuit.
our freedom, and the act of intuition may be anything but intellectual. To this point they addressed Bergson by the following remark saying: It seems quite a dangerous thing to bring into one common destiny the notion of moral liberty and the pure psychology of faculties; is it a true interpretation of liberty, of liberty in the sense of our moral experience the fact to separate from the intelligence, sentiment and will, to confine determinism in the plan of the intellect, to insist on I do not know what something quite mysterious which even surpass the limits of a psychical causality which is something like a spontaneity? Does not the sentiment of responsibility grow with the clear consciousness of the reasons which have determined us, and should not the real progress of a being be measured by the intensity of light which man succeed to bring to the deepest roots of his will?

To this last criticism it seems that Bergson never gave an answer. In a few words, what Bergson expound is freedom; but surely he had not in mind moral freedom; he proposed a new kind of freedom which might be called as well a spontaneity or even original acts which make their apparition in the current of our psychical life without our being knowing or willing.

Here I shall end this small chapter reserved to the criticism of the three philosophers, in the next and last chapter I shall try to expound as clearly as possible how in my actual way of living and thinking I would like liberty to be expressed in the human world.
CHAPTER II.

Personal Conclusion.

In the preceding chapter I gave a somewhat schematic view of what I understand to be a true conception of freedom. In this chapter, with which I shall close my work, I shall try to state as clearly as possible the meaning of such words as "freedom is a moral emancipation", as "reason", as "necessity", as "responsibility"; and to show the relations of every one of these words to the other. The whole treatment would form what I dare to call "Personal Conclusion" or my own conception of freedom.

Of course, I do not pretend to advance a new theory of freedom, nor do I pretend to solve the eternal dilemma of freedom required by religion and determinism required by science - my aim being merely to express how in my present way of thinking and feeling, liberty presents itself to me; how I see it expressed by others; and how I would like it to be expressed in me. So that, any remark from my reader concerning the foreign origins of what I call "personal" is welcome, specially if he has in mind the Christian one.

From my insisting on Christianity, I said, I wanted my reader to see that the only way in which I do believe in freedom is this: it is the inward, spiritual emancipation of man from his weak nature; it is precisely this moral progress which every one of us makes, when he wins victory over himself, for the sake of a higher good. Christianity then, had declared up to me, and given me the formulae of a free act or of a free person. But here stops my adherence to the Christian freedom.

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I do leave it when it made of Love, love of God and love of man, the
aim of that liberty, when it made of Eternal Life the determining ne-
cessity which brings man to a final action: as, for instance, that man
does not injure his enemy for, in so doing, he loses the Eternal hap-
piness. Personally I do believe in Reason, and to me freedom in which
I believe is rooted in it, and it is done by and by through its help
and it is Reason - which to me is also Heart - that makes us free to
be free.

Let me first delimit the word Reason, or at least precise its
meaning when I say that man's freedom is rooted in his reason, or in
other words, that freedom exists necessarily in man because he possess
ses reason. I do not have in mind the reason, this pure clever intel-
ligence of the scientists which enables them to solve difficult pro-
blems of mathematics and physics, or even to formulate scientific laws,
these final scientific judgements on certain natural events or geo-
metrical figures, or combinations of bodies; nor do I think of the witty
ironical and cynical intelligence of a Voltaire which enabled him to be
quickly impressed by what was wrong, in his society, what provoked a co-
mical disharmony in general, and to make fun of it. Surely these are
forms of reason, but none of them can lead us to freedom, nor to free
acts. The reason I am thinking of, is the reason of a Socrates for ins-
tance: this wise disinterested, deep and calm faculty of understanding
and judging and dealing consequently with one's self and with others.
To me this reason means also heart; it also means freedom.

Let us stop here and inquire more closely into the meaning of
these words and let us see how does reason mean heart, and how it means
freedom.

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How does Reason make us free to be free? Put differently what is the relation between reason and freedom and how does freedom come essentially from the fact that man possesses reason? Reason is the faculty that we possess and which enables us to understand, and see in every act, in every sentiment, in every idea, what is its real motive, what is its aim, what are its consequences; it is this faculty which though it does not pierce and reach the moral sense of man (this would be done only by the cooperation of what I call heart) and though does not even try to get into it, simply eliminates the superficial disturbing elements that often prevent us from seeing the reality behind them. We find ourselves face to face with the real meaning of the act of the thought or the sentiment we have to judge, and we judge it objectively, i.e. we see the good side of it and we also see its bad side, with no consideration of subjective preferences, but as simply as we face any mathematical problem. Now, when one sees i.e. knows a thing he can compare it to any other act or sentiment or thought; he can judge it to his own way of feeling and thinking; or he can judge and measure himself to it. Such knowledge provided by this reason places man in front of many possibilities; it, in other words, gives him the capacity to choose, or to will, any one of these possible forms of action, of thought and feelings, so that whenever there is reason i.e. knowledge, there is freedom (but not moral freedom yet, but the simple freedom of man to manifest his freedom). Now what we usually call responsibility is precisely that fact namely: the knowledge of an act, a complete knowledge of its "raison d'être", of its aim, and of its consequences; man's difference from the animal lies precisely here: in the fact that man is rea-
sonable whereas animals are not, so much so that (I believe) if Reason differentiates man from the animals, freedom is no less an essential difference between them.

So far, we have seen how freedom i.e. the capacity of man to choose between two or many possible actions, comes from reason. Let us make a step further and see how does Reason mean heart, and consequently freedom in the moral sense. I have said that the reason of which I am speaking, is this faculty which we possess and which enables us to understand and judge in a calm, deep and disinterested way, of actions, sentiments, and thoughts; and, at the end, either to formulate a judgement, or to come to an act; and I have said that this faculty leads us to the mere freedom of choice. Now I say that this reason, in order to bring us to moral freedom, needs another factor. This factor I shall call "heart"; but I shall call it also "the vision of the Ideas". Yes, for though I do not or can not yet believe in the promise of the Eternal life, and in God; I do believe in something more accessible to my reason than God: I do believe and I have always believed in the existence of perfection in any form it may be; Perfect Beauty, perfect Goodness, perfect Justice; this belief which, I think, most of us bear in the depths of our consciousness is what I also call, their individual vision of the domain of the spiritual, this idea of Perfection I found and I recognise in the Platonic Ideas. If I believe in the Idea it is because it is nearer to my human faculties of understanding and judging than any other belief. The Idea of Beauty for instance, is an image which I can get from passing from one image not perfect to another, more perfect image and so on; of course there comes a time when I find myself making a
certain jump into the unknown (i.e. from the last image of perfection to perfection itself); and it is a jump which requires a certain faith, a thing which I have declared to be unable to have, but which, nonetheless, I have and it is less difficult than that which I need in order to believe in a personal God. These eternal perfect moral and esthetic patterns are, I believe, the only judge and the only aim of the "heathens" of those people who have not reached a sufficient depth and spirituality which enable them to believe in God, or to have religious hope and fear.

The spiritual vision of these perfect Ideas is, in my opinion, that tender spiritual faculty which we call heart, or soul. Now, if we enquire as to the source of these ideas - is it outside man, somewhere in Heaven, or is it in our imagination, or is it in our reason? - I would personally be inclined to answer that they are the product of my reason; or, at least that they are surely supported by it: E.g. when I suffer from injustice - as manifested in a peculiar act - it is because I compare it to "Justice" in itself, and do this by the help of my reason.

Now with no further discussion as to the origin of the Ideas, and whether they are or not identical with reason, let us turn to the problem of freedom and see how we can manifest our freedom and our moral sense by way of heart and reason. Here then I shall take the problem where I left it some time ago, where I said that Reason or knowledge makes us free to choose. To this point, I believe, one can follow one of two paths, i.e. either he can show himself to be free morally and artistically, or he can show himself to be a slave.
Let us make it clear: in the process of comparison, of judgment on acts and sentiments, man has in view some standard, some pattern; and I said that this pattern, for a non-religious person, is these Ideas: of the good, of the beautiful, of the just etc. And now, according to the results he reaches, man shows either his freedom or his slavery: he is free in so far as he tries to reach through his acts and his sentiment the nearest image of the Idea; he is slavish, in so far he does not try and does not approach them. Here comes the moments for me to explain how freedom is a moral emancipation, an inward and spiritual progress, a victory over oneself. Let us consider, first, the most simple manifestation of freedom, and then a more complicated one: one does the good for the good's sake and not for any reward, ultimate or far; this is the first and most obvious form of freedom. For here, no egoistic motive whatsoever determines him to act; he is not the slave of hope or of rest or of happiness; the good in itself, something apparently of neutral benefit for him, determines him to act. What he looks at, is the satisfaction of his own spiritual ideal; and acting, he tries to realise fully his ambition, i.e. the resemblance of the Idea.

A more complicated and consequently a higher manifestation of freedom is revealed when one does the good to him who has injured him; this act shows the strife between one's own vanities, egoism, pride, society and its superficial evaluations of things honor, class, etc. and the simple idea of bounty and generosity. Reason then is here to have us understand the action of the enemy, and then turn to our own attitude: in understanding the other we see the weakness, the baseness of his action; we also think of our own action: shall I do the same as he,
shall I keep myself as near weakness and stupidity as he; or shall I keep myself far from them. Then I compare my attitude to what I believe is the "good" or the "just"; I suffer, I hesitate between slapping him and forgiving him. If I have attained in my previous life enough strength to stand firm and to not consider as being important the fact that I am socially and individually injured, if I am convinced of the reality and perfection of the judge I have appointed to myself i.e. the Idea, I will do the good for him who has injured me; and it is precisely here that my freedom consists - my moral freedom the Christian formula of freedom.

From this point I allow myself this generalisation, namely, that a person possessing this "reason-heart" cannot be a "wicked" person; he can not be the slave of his human personal vanities in his interpretation of persons and of things. I dare even say, that a reasonable person is a good person, he looks at the world not as a severe judge, but as a judge who understands and forgives, and who is consequently free. Freedom then is this continual conquest of humanity - sensuous, proud, vanitious, egoistic and instinctive; it is the belief in the Idea - be they the Idea of God, or the idea of the beautiful, the just, or the true. As to our actions, my belief is that we act in the way we understand, and we can say also, in the way we feel. I find in the act of understanding the assimilation of the thing understood in the whole being of him who understands; namely, to understand forgiveness is to forgive, to understand fully Christian love is to love in a Christian way.

But what about evil actions? what about those persons who though they are convinced of the reality of the idea, do in fact commit evil? Shall we say that freedom means always good and beautiful, and ungriness
and evil means slavery? So far I am inclined so to believe; in fact it appears to me that, when we commit evil, it is because we have not seen clearly enough neither in our soul, nor in the act itself, the real hidden ugliness, and the determining force of the Idea was not strong enough to counterbalance the hidden force which presses our nature to follow the easiest way. Does not he who does evil excuse himself by the remark, "I did not know what to do"? - implying thereby that he was out of his senses and that his "reason-heart" did not do faithfully its own work.

They may say that evil is not an accident in the life of the individual, an accident which comes from the fact that he did not have a clear knowledge, but evil comes because man is essentially guilty and willing evil. There are namely such phenomena as a conscious, purposeful determinates resolution to be wicked, i.e. there is what we may call the will to viciousness. It may be true, and I still believe that in so far as he is so, he lacks freedom; and only in so far as he succeeds in killing, or at least in appeasing this instinctive and natural trait, in so far as he renounces to power and force and sex, does he prove himself to be free.

Now, if it is true that liberty depends on our reason, and if there are degrees of "reason" there are then also degrees of liberty. In fact, it seems to me that there are degrees in both freedom and reason, so much so that freedom exists only among a certain category of people, the category of the elects and there are very few. Very few, indeed possess naturally this freedom. But this freedom may be attained sometimes - and attained lately in life - by those who have greatly
suffered, so much so that we can believe that suffering is a test for our being moral and free.

The possible effects of suffering upon moral character are two: suffering either makes man cynical, sceptical and wicked; or else it makes of him a good and free person—and these two types of character one often meets in life. Thus, on the one hand, there are those who have suffered the cruelty of life: terrible sickness, loss of dear persons, and other human misfortunes; and who after these experiences in suffering, became wicked and and sceptical, jealous of the happiness of others, and with no sentiments in their hearts, or they may have become sceptical, ironical to the appearances of happiness, not believing any more in the existence of God or in the good etc. When they judge of other persons, they do so with severity and injustice, their heart having become hard and insensible. From these persons of course we can not expect any free action or sentiment or will. And there are, on the other hand, those whom the test suffering proves to be good and free. The loss of her children makes many mother the most tender person and render her more fitted for understanding the pain and suffering of other bereaved mother. The loss of wealth and the poverty of a person makes of her a charitable person who appreciates hunger and humility. In other words, sufferings in these cases delivering people from happiness and from human vanities, and placing them in front of the other side of the social world which is not glory, but humility, not joy but tears, not ecstasy but strife and despair make of them these disinterested people who do not look at the world as severe judges but as judges who understand and forgive, those people namely who do not ask anything from the world—since it gives nothing to them; nay, it even takes from them!—but who gives to it, and

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do so generously and freely. It seems as if they have transported their
hopes from the deceiving world to another one, which is the contemplation
and the realization of what they bear in their souls, the good itself,
beauty in itself and generosity in itself. So much so that I believe
that the more man separates himself from society—and from its artifi-
cial conventional ways of thinking and feeling and living—the more he
becomes free; the less he asks from the world, the more he is free. Now
I do not mean that complete inaction, or a kind of nirvana, is the for-
rule of freedom; I do not believe that one having no peculiar, individ-
ual aim is condemned to no real advance morally in life. But there is
for him a simple transvaluation of things; he still continues to ask
from life, but what he asks is not what others ask, and what he gives is
different from what others give. But again I repeat: very few are the
free men.

And now before the last end, and as the objectifications of that
freedom in which I believe, I shall note briefly some free persons or
some free actions.

Of course Jesus Christ, is the first and sublimest objectification
of the free man: it is the personal God come on earth in a human form,
who suffered and died, who forgave and pitied those who persecuted Him.
In Him was the perfect knowledge of the actions of these men; in Him
was also the highest and sublimest aim: bringing on earth the word of
His father in order to return men to God. What He taught is freedom;
but He taught also Pity and Forgiveness. He taught us to do the good
to our enemies, and all these teachings are as many phenomena of moral
freedom.

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Those, moreover, who followed Christ, or who followed religion, and who gave up everything human, who abandoned the world and its glories, abandoned even their own lives, for the sake of the idea — for the sake of the free service and worship of God: these persons are free.

Socrates standing on another basis represents also to me the free man par excellence. Reason in Him was precisely that which leads to freedom; he did not utter one word, he did not give one judgment which was not through and through in obedience to Truth. The search for it in human soul, and in human actions, was his only aim; of the world he made no personal profit, and no one quitted it more freely than him. He drank the hemlock with no feeling of suffering and no regret; what he was looking at was unseen by others, but in him it was burning and giving him force.

Scientists, real scientists, are also free persons: they also believe in truth and concretize for it every thing in their power. Their life appears to us to be original; we condemn their confinement and their solitude, and we treat them as if they were the slaves of their folly; but, in truth, this folly made them free, free from other follies, free from other forms of attracting possibilities; the fire burning in them to reach the truth secures to them a free life — free from anxiety, free from jealousy, free from the vain glory of the world. A real scientist in my mind must be good and generous. He possesses so little and he cares so little for what he possesses, that he would by no means envy, and much less try to get anything from others. He is good, for he looks at others objectively, and what they do or think does not concern him. He is free when he approaches in his poor original appre-
rence the socially-great persons, for to him there is a transvaluation of things. When he measures his actions and his thoughts, surely the standard he uses is not worldly.

Scientists are free, and artists are non less free! The same severe judgements we pass on the scientist we also apply to the artist; we judge him to be an abnormal person, for most of the time he accepts a miserable life, because he lives only in the margin of life and does not follow its main current; we prefer to him a more common life with less sufferings from poverty and loneliness. But how wrongly do we understand him so far, how wrongly do we understand his sufferings! These are not the result of hunger or loneliness; they come more often when the sounds and the shades do not realise what he wants them to realise, when the argile or the marble refuse to give to the eyes of the statue that the sculptor is building, the real expression he wants them to give. The great part of the sufferings of the artist, I believe, come precisely from the relation between what he gave and what he wanted to give. The artist as the scientist has freed himself from the many possible necessities; and has made himself the slave of one necessity only. Any creative work is free for it comes wholly and exclusively from man's soul and reason, from his sentiments and sufferings, from his joys and hopes; any great artistic work the free expression of one genius.

Jesus Christ, Socrates, the martyrs, the scientists and the artists are only few objectifications of the free persons and free acts; but there are also the free actions, of those who are not martyrs who are not scientists, who are not artists, of those people who have only calm
reasoning, disinterested reasoning, those who have simply submitted their lives to the judgement of the Ideas. I spoke of those who do the good in itself; I also spoke of those who do the good for their enmity. There are yet even simpler manifestations of freedom in our every day life. I see lack of freedom in the severe judgements of some persons on others; it is in fact, our general attitude towards every act; most of the time we are, or pretend to be "shocked" by the evil done by others; and this simple reaction to be shocked means that this evil act is very far from us and that we condemn that person and her act. I see freedom, on the contrary, in the attitude of those who are not shocked— not because evil is not bad thing to them, but simply because before judging they understand, and before blaming they forgive.

I see freedom in the sincere appreciation of the good or the beautiful done by others— as opposed to that attitude which disdains and underestimates every action that comes from other. There is freedom in the heart and reason of those persons who recognise the good whenever it is. There is freedom of course in the judgements of those persons who recognise the good done by others even though the latter is made at the expense of one's own misappreciation: namely, to recognize the superiority of the others' deed upon one's own is also a mark of freedom. To wish and to contribute to the advance of others is also a mark of freedom. To accept one's own misfortune and not to show any shame of it, it is also a mark of freedom.

But though the manifestations of freedom are so diverse, i.e. though freedom can manifest itself in every one of our attitudes, judgements and sentiments, freedom is a very rare thing. I repeat very few are the free
people, for freedom requires perfection of a human being of his reason
and of his heart. It is nevertheless an ideal which we attempt to at-
tain, but which few are those who succeed to reach. Bergson, in refer-
rence to what type of freedom I do not know, uttered these words: "Beau-
coup vivent et meurent sans avoir connu la vraie liberté." (1) In fact,
freedom is a domain which we reach only if we succeed to pass through a
narrow gate and we have to: "Strive to enter in at the strait gate:
for many, I say unto you, will seek to enter in, and shall not be able." (2)

(1) Dommées Immédiates de la Conscience p. 126.
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