THE EFFECTS OF SECTARIANISM ON THE
LEBANESE ADMINISTRATION

By

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SECTARIANISM IN ADMINISTRATION
PREFACE

This dissertation is not meant to be an analytic study neither of sectarianism nor of Lebanese administration, but a study of administration in the light of sectarianism. Administration is studied as it is affected by sectarianism, and sectarianism is surveyed in order to render the study of its effects intelligible.

The study of Lebanese administration, although centered on the civil service, was not confined to it, for it included a treatment of the subject in its wider scope, thus dealing with the system of government and the general political setting. A historical background was presented not as much as a history of Lebanon in the last century but as a head light in Lebanon's sectarian road.

Sectarianism was dealt with through the problems it creates in the Lebanese life so as to clarify its nature and determine its magnitude. It was also studied in its relations to the independent Lebanese state because, although sectarianism plays a major role in all aspects of Lebanese life it is perhaps particularly influential on the political science. The study did not stop at the exposition of administration in the light of sectarianism, for these followed an evaluation of the existing conditions, which terminated in a prognosis of its possibilities and perspectives.
ABSTRACT

Sectarianism is a force that had and still has far-reaching effects on Lebanon. To it is attributed the special status Mount Lebanon enjoyed in the Ottoman regime, the division of the country into two sectarian districts or Keim Makaniyya in 1841, the Protocol of 1864, the enlargement of Lebanon in 1920, and the present sectarian formula reached in 1943.

Although not of the essence of religion, sectarianism is the national and political expression of religious factions. In Lebanon sects are subjects in politics each with its peculiar situation and aspirations. This is so because sectarianism is manifested in the Lebanese life in three important fields: in personal status laws, in the electoral law, and in the constitutional provision for apportionment of ministerial posts and civil service positions among the sects. Over and above this there is the Christian - Moslem dilemma over the essence and future of the country. There is a competition for power between the two groups together with a belief that although Lebanon is a partnership between the two still its raison d'être is its Christian element.

The Lebanese system of government reflects the sectarian formula in as far as the cabinet system allows for a dual executive, which is in keeping with the requirements
of the sectarian partnership. Lebanese administration is also open to sectarian pressures. Political interference in administration is aggravated, internal control within the service is weakened, the quality of personnel is negatively affected, and national and professional duties are sometimes undermined. The extent to which sectarianism is present in Lebanese life, its scope, and magnitude are indicated in a study of the attitudes of political parties, politicians, the press, and religious leaders towards it. Finally in an attempt at suggesting methods for attenuating the effects of sectarianism on administration, the study terminates with a general evaluation of sectarianism, its potentialities and prospects. Sectarianism is shown to be a problem the treatment of which affects the very existence of Lebanon and a challenge to their ingenuity that the Lebanese people have to meet.
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I HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

A. Before 1861
   1. Composition of population
   2. Intersectarian relations
   3. Millet system
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B. Mutasarrifiyyah in 1861
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Sectarianism is a phenomenon associated with the Lebanon throughout its history; for though a small country, the Lebanon has never been inhabited by a religiously homogeneous population. This small mountainous region around Mount Lebanon, from which the considerably larger modern state of Lebanon derives its name, was a place where persecuted or unorthodox sects formed semi-autonomous social groups. Here they enjoyed a considerable measure of safety, which was possible because of the mountainous nature of the country that made it difficult of access and thus placed its inhabitants in a strong defensive position. "Pays coupé, d'accès difficile, le Liban sort de refuge à tous les dissidents".

In the seventh century the Maronites, who constitute a branch of the Oriental Catholic church and are allegedly the most numerous sect in modern Lebanon, were establishing themselves in what is now Northern Lebanon. The Druze, a dissident sect in Islam, grew in importance in Wadi Attiam and Mount Lebanon in the 11th century. In the 18th century, their two factions, the Kaisis and the Yamaniis, clashed in a battle that resulted in the emigration of most of the Yamaniis to Jebel Druze in what is now Syria. This was followed by a southward move of Christians, who partially occupied some of the districts that were previously inhabited by Druze. This emigration considerably reduced the number of the Druze in the Lebanon.

where they fell numerically to third place among the inhabi-
tants with 49,812 adherents as contrasted to 229,680 Maronites,
54,208 Greek Orthodox, 34,472 Uniate Catholics, and 30,422
Moslems.

The intersectarian relations in the Lebanon were often
tense. The sects were usually willing and ready to resort to
arms in order to defend their interests or to avenge insults.
There was no national feeling; instead there were barriers
which rose to a climax at the opening of the 20th century.

This atmosphere was both a cause and a result of sec-
tarian factionalism and of the pitched battles that were
fought not only between Moslems and Christians but between
rival sects of the same religion as well. Back in 1539, the
Greek Orthodox and the Maronites clashed, in 1634 the Sun-
nites and the Shia' clashed, and in 1726 the Maronites and
the Shia' clashed too. These battles increased after the
coming of the Egyptian Ibrahim Pasha in 1831. Maronites and
Druze clashed in 1841 and again in 1845. The Shia' and the
Druze also attacked each other at this time. Finally in
1860, Maronites and Druze were antagonists in massacres that
by far excelled all previous outbreaks. The following is a dis-
cription of the atmosphere that prevailed at the opening of the

(2) William Miller, The Ottoman Empire and its Successors,
(Cambridge, University press, 1913), p.305.
(3) Anees Sayigh, لبنان اطماني (The Sectarian Lebanon), Beirut,
Dar As Sira' Al Fikri, 1952), p. 85.
(4) Ibid., p. 91.
the twentieth century:

"Christians versus Mo‘alim: this was my first notion of collective human relationships. To my mind at the age of 5 or 6 the world consisted entirely of Mo‘alims and Christians in antagonism to one another... By the time I was 8 or 9, I had developed, or rather in-herited, a definite outlook common to all Syrian Christians at that time, a feeling of averseion for the Mo‘alim and Druze whom I learned to consider as our natural enemies." (5)

The old Lebanon had a tradition of semi-autonomy. Califs, crusaders, and Ottomans alike refrained from demanding more than tribute and recognition of their suzerainty. They left the internal affairs of this mountain region to the care of the local dynasts. (6) The Lebanon was ruled by a coexistence of feudalism and sectarianism. The millet system, which prevailed during the Ottoman rule and continued to prevail, to a lesser extent, afterwards, is an embodiment of sectarian semi-autonomy. The word millet means sect, and so the system as a theocraticbasis. Politically it's a device to ease the relations with the central government. "As human cattle, the conquered were to be milked, sheared, and allowed to live their own lives as long as they gave no trouble." (7)


In all matters that concerned one of the sects, the head of the sect was the person to whom the government turned. Civil as well as judicial functions devolved upon the spiritual leaders; they administered the sect's property and institutions, and they handled matters of personal status. This millet system, which provided for self-administering communities, resulted in widening the gap between the different sects. It was a device that reserved for religious minorities in a theocratic state the freedom to arrange their affairs as their creeds dictated.

"Since the Moslem law (the Sharia) was not applicable to the non-Moslem majority (in the Lebanon), they were left under the jurisdiction of the civil code which had obtained before the conquests. Such jurisdiction was placed in the hands of their own religious dignitaries. This was the origin of the system of self-administering religious communities or millets". (8)

Until 1841, the Lebanon had for a long period been ruled by its feudal princes (Amirs). They were of two families; the Ma'ans and the Chihabs. The princes differed in their sectarian allegiance. Fakhriddin II, a great Ma'an prince, did not publicly profess his faith; the Druze, the Maronites, and the Sunniites each claim that he had adhered to their own sect. In 1841, when the disturbances occurred between the Maronites and the Druze, the Ottoman government

was persuaded by the European Powers to promulgate a new constitution for the Lebanon dividing it into two districts: the Northern under a Maronite governor and the Southern under a Druze governor. Each of the two districts was called a Kaim Makamyyah. The dividing line between the two was the Beirut-Damascus road. This situation lasted until 1861 and proved to be unstable and unsatisfactory. Sects were pulled further from each other and unity was further undermined.

During the 19th century the Lebanon was left neither to itself nor to the Ottomans; the European powers actively meddled in its affairs. These powers acquired capitulations from the Ottoman government and started to exert increasing pressure in many fields. They regarded themselves as the protectors of the various Lebanese sects, which in turn regarded them as such. The following statement throws light on the situation that had developed.

"If ever there was a country in which every conceivable influence, divine and mundane, physical and moral, inherent and extraneous, militated against national unity and the formation of a patriotic sentiment, that country was Syria before 1914."

Each major European power concerned itself with particular sects in Lebanon. France was the protector of the Maronites and the Greek Catholics. This relationship between France and the Maronites was rooted in history and tradition.

(9) Hourani, opcit., p. 31.
(10) Atiyyah, opcit., p. 1.
Back in 1250, the king of France sent a letter to the Maronites saying that the Maronite people are a part of the French people and that they must enjoy the same protection the French enjoy. In 1649, Louis XIV, king of France, in a letter to the Maronite community through the Patriarch of Tripoli, assumed for himself the task of protecting the Maronites and all the Christians in the Lebanon. Russia was the protector of the Greek Orthodox since it was the major Orthodox power. Britain did not find enough Anglicans or Protestants in the Lebanon to open its way to political ambitions through them, and so it championed the cause of the Druze. Turkey, the nominally sovereign power in the area, was not in the least interested in diminishing sectarian tensions; it played sects against each other to preserve its own interests and position. So sectarian hatred was aggravated; it burst forth in 1860 when two persons, a Druze and a Maronite, quarreled in the village of Beit Mary. This incident was the spark that started the atrocities in which villages were burned and thousands were massacred.

These massacres gave the European Powers the excuse for direct and formal intervention. France sent a battalion to Beirut at the end of the civil war. Later an international

(11) Duwayhi, op.cit., p. 110

investigatory commission representing France, Britain, Russia, Prussia, and Austria was set up to make proposals for the future organization of the Lebanon. The commission drew up a law formulating and defining the autonomy of Mount Lebanon. This law was promulgated in 1861 and later amended in 1864 as a result of a meeting in Beirut of the international commission and the Turkish foreign minister. According to this law, which is called the Protocol of Mount Lebanon, the country became a Mutassarrifiyyah. It was to be governed by a governor called Mutassarif, who had to be a Christian (in practice a non-Lebanese Christian) and whose appointment had to be approved by the major European Powers. The Mutassarif was responsible to the Ottomans and was assisted by an Administrative Council (Majlis Edare) in which all the major sects were represented. The seats in the council were distributed in the following proportion: Maronites 4, Druze 3, Greek Orthodox 3, Moslems 2. These twelve members were elected by the mayors (Shaykhs) of the villages; their function was to give their opinion in the matters the Mutassarif brings before them and to examine expenditures and revenues. Administratively the Mutassarifiyyah of Mount Lebanon was divided into seven districts called Kaim Makamiyyah, each of which was governed by a Kaim Makam appointed by the Mutassarif from the dominant sect in the district. In each Kaim Makamiyyah there were two councils: one administrative, the other judicial. Each
of the two councils was composed of six members, three of whom were Christian and three Muslim. The seven districts were:

1. Batroun governed by a Maronite
2. Kefrawa " " Maronite
3. Matta " " Maronite
4. Jeszeen " " Maronite
5. Shouf " " Druze
6. Ksura " " of Orthodox
7. Zahlé " " a Greek Catholic

To these districts was added Deir al Kamar, a town which was made a separate administrative unit called Mudiriyya. The special status of Deir Al Kamar resulted from the fact that it was inhabited totally by Maronites within the Halhif district, which is predominantly Druze and is governed by a Druze Kelis Makm.

Each village elected a mayor (Shaykh), and in each group of villages (Nahiya) there was a judge for each sect. A number of Nahiyas formed a Mudiriyya in which there was a judicial council composed of 12 members: 2 from each of the six major sects. It was also provided that if Protestants or Israelites had cases or interests each sect could delegate one judge to the council. All of these officials
were nominated by the religious leader and the notables of their sects and subsequently appointed by the government.

The Lebanon retained its position and autonomy until the first World War when the Turks decided to put it under military rule. During the war the Allies found time to worry about the future of the various parts of the Ottoman Empire, which was to be dissolved and in 1916 Britain and France signed the Sykes-Picot agreement dividing Syria and Iraq. According to this agreement, which was later approved by both Russia and Italy, Syria and Mount Lebanon were to be left to France, and so at the end of the war, France found herself in the Lebanon, a place where she always had liked to be.

France started its regime with a clear idea about its interests, its objectives and the means to realize them. It conceived of the Maronites as its permanent allies and proceeded to strengthen them and improve their status, thus indirectly strengthening her own position.

The first basic measure along this line was the enlargement of Mount Lebanon by the addition of Beirut, Tripoli, Tyre, Sidon, Baalbeck, Rashaya and Harbaya. "Grand Liban" was thus created in September 1920, with a size three times that of Mount Lebanon.

(13) Bulus Has'ad, (Lebanon and the Ottoman Constitution) مطالب لبنان للسُلطنة العثمانية, (Egypt, Al Ma'rif Press, 1929), p. 10.
France took this step in an attempt to detach Lebanon from Syria by making Lebanon able to stand on its own feet. It also created a state in which the Maronites, her close allies, had, or rather kept, the upper hand. This was planned to ensure France a favored position in Lebanon.

The enlargement changes the sectarian composition of the country because the annexed territories were inhabited mainly by Moslems. The population at the time of the enlargement was as follows:

"While the 200,000 Maronites, devoted to France had previously formed a majority in Lebanon, they were now joined by 135,000 Christians of various denominations, in addition to 30,000 Armenians, and 20,000 foreigners together with 250,000 Sunnites and 100,000 Shi'a and 44,000 Druze".(14)

The enlargement was a sort of a reward to the Maronites for their affection towards France. They were increased in power and importance, and Lebanese political life "was dominated by the problems arising from the extension of the frontiers."

The annexation of the new districts to the Mountain was not taken seriously by the people because both countries, Syria and Lebanon, were administered by one authority and because the division did not actually break the vital lines and connect

tions. The following is what a prominent journalist wrote about the annexation:

"To the Lebanon, Tripoli (a large annexed city) entered not forced and not of its free will but almost without attention and considera-
tion". (16)

The annexation and the formation of a separate state independent from Syria, besides not being taken seriously, caused certain opposing reactions. Representatives from Lebanon participated in the Syrian Congress that convened in Damascus in 1920 and voted for Syrian unity. Later, in 1928 another convention convened in Damascus; it was called the convention of the Syrian unity. Delegates from all the annexed districts were sent to it and the convention demanded that these districts be reincorporated into Syria. The creation of the Lebanese state as separate from Syria was primarily a sectarian issue in its background and essence. The creation of Lebanon was primarily an expression of the Maronite will and not of Lebanese nationalism, just as the demand for unity with Syria was primarily an expression of the Moslem will and not of Syrian or Arab nationalism.

It was stated previously that the French authorities conceived of the Maronites as their permanent friends and

allies. It was only natural therefore that France would favor them, and this is what actually happened:

"The French authorities were believed to be not altogether impartial in their efforts to hold the balance (between Christians and Moslems), and to show excessive favor to the Maronites and other Uniates (Catholics). Thus the other communities became hostile both to France and to the Maronites. This hostility in its turn cemented the alliance between the two." (18)

The French policy was to spread both the French language and Western culture. This policy was more acceptable to the Maronites and the other Christians than to the Moslems. The French bias towards the Maronites and Catholics particularly and the Christians generally was demonstrated both in the public services it performed and in the public employees it recruited. Generally, Christian districts were better cared for in matters of public utilities and developmental activities; preference was given to Christians in the public service, where Moslems were under-represented.

"In judicial posts, Moslems were not found in any considerable number although they had the necessary training and experience during the Ottoman rule". (19)

In concluding we can safely say that:

(18) Hourani, op.cit., p. 183.

"The French have shown a marked tendency to give an undue proportion of offices, concessions and the like to the Christians of Syria. Non-Catholics complain that the same discrimination is shown in favor of Catholics and Maronites". (20).

The mandatory period is the climax of foreign interference as channeled through sectarianism. France entered Lebanon through the sectarian door; she decided that the sectarian argument was the most powerful, and that the sectarian basis of rule was most in keeping with her aims. France decided that playing sects against each other was the surest way for her to get what she wanted and that sectarianism was the strongest guarantee against national uprisings and movements. Thus sectarianism continued to be an element that troubled the Lebanese life, causing anxiety and distrust.

(20) King-Crane Report, reported in Editor and Publisher, Volume 55, (December 2, 1922), p. 12.
II  SECTARIANISM AND SUCES

A. Nature of Sectarianism
   1. Analysis
   2. Lebanese sectarianism
   3. Lebanese sects
   4. Comparative standing of sects

B. Legal Manifestations of Sectarianism
   1. Personal status laws
   2. Electoral law
   3. The public administration
      a) The constitution
      b) The National Pact
         i) sectarian balance and fraternity
         ii) Lebanese independence and Pan Arab movements
         iii) method for distributing political posts.
Sectarianism is not of the essence of religion but is, nevertheless, a phenomenon that often associates itself with religion. It is a religious factionalism, a feeling of loyalty to a group formed along religious lines, and a feeling of remoteness from the other groups. The political and social effects of sectarianism is a dominant factor in a situation where the major social and political groups are, to a great extent, based on religion.

Where sectarianism is dominant, its effects can be seen in the individual's conscience and his institutions, in the state's system of laws, in the frequency with which the clergy interfere in politics, and in the sectarian alignment on political questions. Sectarianism is self perpetuating because when once present in the people it makes its way into their customs, conventions and laws, which in turn works to preserve and strengthen it in the people. Moreover, when sectarian feeling is present in one sect, it works to arouse antagonistic sectarian reactions in the other sects. Consequently sects come to view each other as separate entities each with its life, traditions, interests, and destiny. Thus sectarianism breaks social solidarity and undermines national consciousness.

(52) Fayer Sayegh, (Sectarianism, (Beirut, Thabet Press, 1947)), Pp. 47.
Sectarianism has long been an important factor in Lebanese life. At certain periods, such as in the time of the early Christian expansion, differences between sects were mainly theological and metaphysical, e.g. one sect believing in one nature of Christ (monophysites) the other believing in two natures of Christ. At other periods, sectarianism was mixed with other factors to a degree that makes its isolation from them for purposes of analysis difficult. Such was the case in the 16th century when sectarianism was mixed with feudalism and in the 19th century when it was united with imperialism and foreign interference.

In the final chapter an attempt will be made to show the complex interrelation of sectarianism with other social forces in the twentieth century.

Although sectarianism plays a role in determining the political and social life of many countries, its influence in Lebanon is particularly strong. Although a small country, Lebanon is a crossroads for religions and sects. Here Muslims, Christians, and Jews have lived side by side for centuries. Religions are also divided into numerous sects among the more important of which are:

- Maronites
- Syrian Catholics
- Sunnites
- Latins
- Syrian Orthodox
- Alawites
- Greek Catholics
- Armenian Catholics
- Druze
- Greek Orthodox
- Armenian Orthodox
- Protestants
- Copts
- Jews
Besides this plurality of sects, there is the plurality of major sects; they are six: Maronites, Catholics, Greek Orthodox, Sunnites, Shi'a and Druze. To this complexity is added the fact that the Lebanese sects do not stem from one religion; there is no common ground or common basis of belief, and so another line of division is introduced: Christian sects and Moslem sects; there are groups within larger groups.

In modern Lebanon no one group constitutes the majority of the population. No one sect or even one religion has a clear majority. Christians were considered to be slightly more than 50%, but Moslems are increasing more rapidly; so the population is split approximately half and half. The absence of a clear majority creates a situation where there is a precarious balance requiring great efforts to preserve it.

There is also the cultural and national significance of sectarianism. In Lebanon Moslems look to the Islamic and Arab cultures while Christians turn to the West with its Christian elements. There is a Christian belief that Lebanon is not an integral part of the Arab World, but rather a part of the Mediterranean culture. This point of view regards Lebanon not as an outpost of the East linked to the West but rather an outpost of the West.
linked to the East. Few major political issues are mainly
the result of religious differences as well. The most
outstanding issue is the relation of Lebanon to the neigh-
boring countries. Moslems want this relation to be as close
as possible while Christian have certain reservations in this
respect. Lebanon as an entity or political unit is accepted
by different groups with varying degrees of enthusiasm ac-
cording to one's sectarian loyalty.

The points enumerated above are the major features
of Lebanese sectarianism. There remains to sketch the
major sects in order to render the discussion of their
relations more intelligible. The following tables give
an idea of the distribution of the population among the
sects in old and modern Lebanon.
### Table 1
Sectarian Composition of the Lebanese Population (1)

<table>
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<th>1913 (Old Lebanon)</th>
<th>1932 (Census)</th>
<th>1932 (Emigrants Included)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maronites</td>
<td>242,308</td>
<td>227,880</td>
<td>351,197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greek Orthodox</td>
<td>52,356</td>
<td>77,312</td>
<td>134,343</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greek Catholics</td>
<td>31,936</td>
<td>46,709</td>
<td>76,336</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestants</td>
<td>2,815</td>
<td>6,869</td>
<td>9,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenian Gregorians</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>26,102</td>
<td>28,072</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenian Catholics</td>
<td>5,890</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jacobites</td>
<td>2,783</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syrian Catholics</td>
<td>2,803</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nesterians</td>
<td>190</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chaldean Catholics</td>
<td>548</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Christians</strong></td>
<td><strong>329,482</strong></td>
<td><strong>396,726</strong></td>
<td><strong>512,790</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunnites</td>
<td>14,529</td>
<td>178,130</td>
<td>195,335</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shi'ite</td>
<td>23,413</td>
<td>155,035</td>
<td>165,945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Druze</td>
<td>47,890</td>
<td>53,334</td>
<td>68,082</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Muslims</strong></td>
<td><strong>85,832</strong></td>
<td><strong>386,499</strong></td>
<td><strong>423,364</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews</td>
<td>86</td>
<td></td>
<td>4,003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diverse</td>
<td>6,393</td>
<td></td>
<td>7,696</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total (Grand)</strong></td>
<td><strong>441,800</strong></td>
<td><strong>793,426</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,047,813</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(1) Rondot, op.cit., pp. 28-29.
### Table 2
Population by Sects (1956)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sect</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sunnites</td>
<td>286,238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shia'</td>
<td>250,655</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Druze</td>
<td>88,131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maronites</td>
<td>423,708</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greek Catholics</td>
<td>90,788</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greek Orthodox</td>
<td>148,927</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestants</td>
<td>14,363</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin</td>
<td>4,446</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenian Catholics</td>
<td>14,631</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenian Orthodox</td>
<td>63,679</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chaldeans</td>
<td>1,466</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syrian Catholics</td>
<td>5,699</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syrian Orthodox</td>
<td>4,798</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews</td>
<td>6,692</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>7,193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,411,416</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(1) An Nahar, Beirut, No. 6249 of 26 April 1956. These figures are compiled by the personal status offices through birth and death registrations.
Maronites

The Maronites are a branch of the Oriental Catholic Church, which is in turn affiliated with the Roman Catholic Church. They go back to St. Maron, an abbot who is said to have lived near Antioch in the fourth century. They moved to Lebanon at the opening of the 8th century under the pressure of the Jacobites in Antioch and the valley of the Orontes.

The most important figure in the history of the Maronites is St. John Maron, who became their first patriarch in the year 702. He is known as the great organizer, and he led the Maronite migration to the Lebanon. Prior to their arrival the war-like Syrian Christians, who came to be known by the name Maradates or Rebels, were already in Lebanon. The Maradates joined forces with the Maronite newcomers to form the Maronite sect in the Lebanon.

Although the Maronites recognize the authority of the Pope, they have preserved the Syrian rite and a certain degree of autonomy from Rome. There is a growing tendency however to submit to Rome. This tendency is exemplified by their acceptance of the Pope's action in 1953 when, on the death of the Maronite patriarch, he selected his successor. Previously the Maronite bishops had always chosen their patriarch.
Unlike the other major sects in Lebanon, the Maronites have only an insignificant number of communicants in other countries, excepting of course the large number of emigrants who have left Lebanon to settle all over the Americas. The fact that the Maronites are centered in Lebanon makes it possible for them to accept the Lebanese state and Lebanese nationality with greater enthusiasm than is possible for the other sects. The traditional Maronite tie to France is also worthy of note. This relationship had its religious basis, but its political implications and significance came to have priority.

The Druze

The Druze spread in Lebanon during the Fatimide rule in Egypt when, at the time of the Calif Al-Hakim, missionaries were sent to Syria to preach a new faith. One of the early preachers was called Nessimkeen Al-Darazi. His name, Darazi, became associated with the followers of the new faith. The adherents themselves however prefer to be named Huwashidden (believers in the One).

Historically and culturally, the Druze are a descendant Moslem sect. But theologically they are a separate religion. Some of their religious practices are Islamic in form, but their beliefs and doctrines differ from the beliefs and doctrines of both the Sunnites and the Shi'a.
The Druze have traditionally been a secret sect. In the past, they had to surround themselves with secrecy because dissident sects were subject to persecution. For this reason, they maintained a practice of isolation from the other sects and of internal unity. Inter-marriage with other groups was almost unknown until recently and still is a rarity.

The Druze are a non-proselytizing sect; they believe in the re-incarnation of the soul. They are present in considerable numbers only in Syria, Lebanon and, to a lesser extent, Palestine. In Lebanese politics, they preserve their independence and generally remain aloof.

Historically they had more of Lebanon, which was known at one time by the name Mount of the Druze, than they have at present. The Lebanese dilemma was one between Druze and Maronites rather than Muslims and Christians, and the Old Lebanon was the creation of Maronites and Druze. The latter, next to the Maronites have the least reason to feel a divided loyalty between Lebanon and an international religion or a larger state. The Druze in Syria are not of a sufficient number so as to form a state in competition with Lebanon for the loyalty of the Lebanese Druze.

The Shia

The Shi'a are a Moslem sect whose separation from the
Sunnites had a political rather than a theological basis. They originated in the early period of Islam as a group that wanted Ali Bin Abi Talib and not Musawiyah to be the Calif after the death of Uthman. In general the Shia came to believe in a free interpretation of the Koran while the Sunnites adhere more closely to the text. Historically they were persecuted by the Sunnites, and they still have bitter feeling towards them. The Shia in turn are split into factions and groups. Those in Lebanon are called Ismā'īlī Shia or the Mātāwilī, for they believe that they had twelve Imams or guides. Other Shia groups have different beliefs as to the number and personnel of the Imams that have appeared.

Besides their presence in Lebanon, the Shia are strong in Iran and Iraq. In Lebanon they are found mainly in the South, a large part of which is called Mount Ameal. It was so named after an Arab Yemenite tribe called Ameela, which established itself in that district in the 11th century.

The Greek Orthodox

The Church of the Eastern Empire, founded by Constantine, was the Greek Orthodox or Eastern Church. At that time, the Roman Empire split into two: the Western with Rome as its capital, and the Eastern with Constantinople as its capital. A century and a half later, through a
decision of the Council of Chalcedon (451) the Bishop of Constantinople gained supremacy in the East and became equal to the Bishop of Rome. The Greek Orthodox consequently did not recognize the authority of the Pope, and they resisted and still resist all efforts made by the Roman Church to bind it to its yoke.

The Greek Orthodox Church in the Arab countries broke away from Greek control in the early years of the present century. Its headquarters are in Damascus and its service is now in Arabic. Its communicants are thus more open to unification movements than are the Maronites, but their aspirations are not so much along pan Arab lines as they are along the Fertile Crescent or Greater Syria lines. This is thought to be so because Greek Orthodox are found in this part of the Arab World. It is also probable that this group is the least actively sectarian as it is the least closely knit of the major sects and therefore its sectarianism is more a reaction to competing sectarianism than an original motivating force.

Greek Catholics

The Greek Catholic Church was formed by a branch of the Greek Orthodox Church that recognized the supremacy of the Roman Pope. They are also called Uniate Catholics. Like the Maronites they maintain their own rite, and they conduct their liturgy in Greek. Numerically they are the fifth sect in Lebanon, and politically they are to a large extent, united with the Maronites.

Sunnites

The Sunnites are the Orthodox Moslems. They came to Lebanon at different times starting with the time of Muawiya, the first Umayyad Calif in Damascus. Muawiya encouraged Moslem tribes to migrate and inhabit the Mediterranean shores. This encouragement was repeated a few times before the Crusading was, when Moslems were moved by the Moslem Mamlouk and Ayyoub leaders to the shores in an attempt to cut communications between the Crusaders and the Christians of the Lebanon.

Sunnites are the second largest sect in modern Lebanon. They are found in greater numbers in the Northern and Southern part, which were annexed to Lebanon in 1920. The Sunni religious hierarchy is not as strong or as organized as that of the Christian sects. The Sunnites' loyalty to Lebanon is more severely tested than is that of the other major sects. They are less willing than the Shi'a to take into consideration the to them minor differences between the Moslem sects, and they believe the Moslems outnumber the Christians. This is why they insistently demand that a general census of the population be taken, and they do not believe that the population figures prepared by the Census and Personal Status Service through addition of births and subtraction of deaths is sufficiently reliable. Sunnites are open to pan Arab influences, and their attachment
to Lebanon, where the Maronites and other Christians have a sort of preeminence, is sometimes less than whole hearted.

Armenians

Armenians are split into two sects: Armenian Orthodox and Armenian Catholics, but they are viewed by the Lebanese as one sect, Armenians. Their number is over 80,000, and they play an important role in the economic life of the country. But they are not to be dealt with in this dissertation because they are more of an ethnic or national group than a religious sect. Since they are Christians, however, they are an asset on the Christian side.

After sketching the various sects in an introduction to the study of sectarianism, one has to consider their situations and their comparative standings. This is to be attempted in the light of the following questions:

1. Is geographical grouping based on sectarian basis and if so to what extent?

2. Are there social differences among the various sects?

3. Is there a difference in educational standards?
Geographical grouping is, to a considerable extent, based on religious and sectarian lines. In Beirut, certain sections are Islamic, such as Basta, and others are Christian, such as Jimmaysi. The mountain is inhabited predominantly by Maronites and Druze, mixed in many towns and separate in the others. The Shia' are centered in the South and the Beka'. Sunnites predominate in and around Tripoli while Maronites inhabit the mountainous parts of the North. The Orthodox are mainly centered in the North. The table presented below throws light on the subject.
## Table 3
Population by Sects and Districts (1956)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sects</th>
<th>Beirut</th>
<th>Mount Lebanon</th>
<th>North Lebanon</th>
<th>South Lebanon</th>
<th>Bekaa</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sunnites</td>
<td>76,116</td>
<td>22,425</td>
<td>118,203</td>
<td>29,889</td>
<td>37,067</td>
<td>286,238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shia</td>
<td>17,562</td>
<td>22,716</td>
<td>1,337</td>
<td>148,448</td>
<td>61,044</td>
<td>250,655</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Druze</td>
<td>2,457</td>
<td>71,569</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>6,893</td>
<td>7,193</td>
<td>88,131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maronites</td>
<td>18,101</td>
<td>224,921</td>
<td>111,917</td>
<td>39,509</td>
<td>29,260</td>
<td>423,708</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greek Catholics</td>
<td>3,417</td>
<td>21,520</td>
<td>3,864</td>
<td>23,147</td>
<td>35,630</td>
<td>90,788</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greek Orthodox</td>
<td>25,276</td>
<td>32,239</td>
<td>62,767</td>
<td>10,784</td>
<td>17,861</td>
<td>79,627</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestants</td>
<td>5,482</td>
<td>3,045</td>
<td>1,357</td>
<td>2,493</td>
<td>1,088</td>
<td>14,365</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin</td>
<td>2,771</td>
<td>963</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>265</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>4,446</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenian Catholics</td>
<td>6,809</td>
<td>3,782</td>
<td>345</td>
<td>298</td>
<td>1,448</td>
<td>14,951</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenian Orthodox</td>
<td>42,768</td>
<td>15,600</td>
<td>1,579</td>
<td>1,833</td>
<td>1,903</td>
<td>65,679</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chaldeans</td>
<td>1,178</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>1,466</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syrian Catholics</td>
<td>4,757</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>705</td>
<td>5,599</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syrian Orthodox</td>
<td>2,745</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1,861</td>
<td>4,798</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews</td>
<td>5,382</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>1,108</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>6,992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>447</td>
<td>6,064</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>265</td>
<td>7,193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>220,849</td>
<td>422,193</td>
<td>397,695</td>
<td>264,716</td>
<td>101,053</td>
<td>1,411,416</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is evident from the table above that geographical grouping is on sectarian basis. The fact that members of the same sect tend to live together has led them to form and, to a lesser extent, to maintain separate social units. This in turn leads to the perpetuating of distinctive customs and traditions along sectarian lines. The social position of woman, for example, is not the same in all sects because, on the whole, Christian sects owing to their traditional ties with the West and to the various Western institutions that operated in this country, have adopted a more "modern" attitude toward woman's place in society.

There are certain customs, practices, and outlooks that are peculiar to certain sects. These enable a person, generally, to tell to what sect an individual belongs by his speech and dress. The Druse have the most distinctive accent because they pronounce the Zaf (ጌ) which other Lebanese pronounce as a glottal stop. Men's dress can to an extent be indicative of the sect although this may equally be influenced by the place of origin. Moslem women are to be generally differentiated by the veil whether black or white. But this criterion is gradually disappearing because of the growing tendency against the veil. Names are frequently indications of religion and to a lesser extent of sect. Families are often known to be of a particular sect. First names are often indicative because John is seldom a Moslem and Mohammed is seldom a Christian.
Economic conditions are important in shaping social life. In Lebanon, the economic conditions of the sects vary. Since the Sunnis generally live in cities, they include a large class of traders and merchants. The Shias, the Druze and the Maronites of the North are predominantly farmers. The summer resorts are mainly inhabited by Christians and Druze since these places are in the mountains. These places came to have better economic conditions. Lebanese emigrants are mainly Maronite, Orthodox and Druze; remittances from them are an important source of income. The Shias of the South have a considerable number of emigrants too, but their migration is a more recent one. Sunnis do not migrate probably because they live an urban life and because of political religious and social factors as well.

It is safe to say that the Christian sects owing to their geographical positions, their economic and social conditions, their attitude toward education, and the presence of Western Christian institutions and missionaries, have greater access to education. "The Christian communities as a rule are more highly educated than the Moslems". This difference was greater in the past, as in the last ten years Moslems have been able to give their children better education, as a result of the increase in government and

private domestic schools.

Table 4

In 1935 the illiteracy ratios of the sects were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sect</th>
<th>Illiteracy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shia'</td>
<td>83%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunnites</td>
<td>66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Druze</td>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orthodox</td>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maronites</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholics</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The following tables throw a light on the educational standards of the various sects. The first three tables deal with higher education while the other two deal with elementary and secondary education in both private and public schools.

(26) Presented by the government to the Haut-Commission in 1935, see L'Orient, Beirut, 24 January, 1935. It was not possible to know on what these figures were based.
### Table 5.
**GRADUATES of A.U.B. with their sectarian distribution**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Orth.</th>
<th>Sunni</th>
<th>Druze</th>
<th>Shia'</th>
<th>Maronite</th>
<th>Protestant</th>
<th>Cath.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1927</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The Lebanese Graduates of all schools in A.U.B. with the exception of the school of nurses and the degree of B.A. in medicine.*

### Table 6.
**(27)**
**GRADUATES of St. Joseph University with their sectarian distribution.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Orth.</th>
<th>Sunni</th>
<th>Druze</th>
<th>Shia'</th>
<th>Maronite</th>
<th>Protestant</th>
<th>Cath.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*(27) Law graduates, dentists, pharmacists and physicians are included.*

**XX**

These graduates are not totally Lebanese, however the ratio of Lebanese to the whole student body in St. Joseph is approximately 3 to 4. Moreover the sectarian distribution of the non-Lebanese does not vary greatly from that of the Lebanese.
Table 7

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Total Non-Christians 1346</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Armenian Catholic</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alawite</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chaldean Catholic</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahai</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coptic Orthodox</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Druse</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greek Catholic</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hindu</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greek Orthodox</td>
<td>823</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamic</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gregorian</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jew</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maronite</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant</td>
<td>374</td>
<td>1010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunni</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roman Catholic</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No religion</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syriac Catholic</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zoroastrian</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syriac Orthodox</td>
<td>22</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Christians</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand Total</td>
<td>3340</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(28) Registrar's Office, American University of Beirut.

X These figures are for students of various nationalities. They are not exclusively Lebanese. But it is believed that the sectarian ratio of the Lebanese students is not considerably different from that of the whole student body. Out of the 3340 students there are 1919 Lebanese. Syrians, Jordanians, Saudi Arabsians are 200, who are predominantly Sunnis. Iraqis and Iranians are 68 of whom a large number is Shia'. Christian non-Lebanese are large in number too.
These first two tables are a small sample. For that reason they lack some strength in proving that they show. Nevertheless they are presented because they throw light on the subject at hand. The following points can be deduced from the two tables printed above:

1. Protestants have proportionally a very high educational standard; they started to acquire education a long time ago. The A.U.B. is their preferred center of learning. (In Table 5, Protestants had a proportionally large number of graduates in 1926 and 1927).

2. The Shia' had practically no access to higher education in the twenties. (In Table 5, there is not a single Shia' graduate in both 1926 and 1927). Moreover their present educational standard is still proportionally the lowest.

3. The Orthodox have a satisfactory number of graduates, in the twenties and in the fifties, at A.U.B. and at St. Joseph.

4. Maronites and Catholics have a large number of graduates most of whom are at St. Joseph (In 1954, 46 Maronites graduated from St. Joseph while 3 graduated from A.U.B.)

5. The Sunnites and the Druze had a restricted access to higher education in the twenties. (In 1927, 5 Sunnites
graduated from A.U.S.) The number of their graduates at present is proportionally less, but not by far, than the number of graduates of Christian sects. However, one factor must be taken into consideration namely, the Sunnites, are more likely than others to pursue higher education in Damascus and Cairo.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Math</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Science</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 8:* Private Schools, Boys' Commercial and Secondary.
Studying these two tables one can deduce the following points:

1. The number of Shia students in elementary and secondary private schools is proportionally less than the number of Sunnite and Christian students. (Table 8 - in South Lebanon where 5 of the deputies are Shia, there are 5,597 student in elementary schools in a district of 8 deputies, while in the North, where all deputies are Sunnite and Christian, there are 7,343 students in a district of 9 deputies.

2. Foreign educational institutions are to be found more in Christian districts. This gives Christians greater access to education. (Table 9 - in Mt. Lebanon and in North Lebanon there are respectively 9,183 and 6,443 students in foreign schools while in South Lebanon there are only 3,061 students in foreign schools. In Beirut the number is the highest, but not all of these students are from Beirut itself.

LEGAL MANIFESTATIONS

There is perhaps no country in the world today where a man's religion is of so great a political importance as in Lebanon. Sectarianism, in modern Lebanon, is legally recognized and manifested in three spheres: in personal status laws, in parliamentary representation, and in the public administration.
Matters of personal status such as family, inheritance, marriage, and divorce are left to the sects themselves. The sects set up their own courts in accordance with the tenants of their faith. These courts, with the exception of the Moslem tribunals, are not under the control of the Ministry of Justice. The Moslem tribunals have a different relation to the state because of the fact that from the Moslem conquest to the fall of the Turkish empire, the state applied the Sharia law of Islam in this area. This means that with respect to the law of personal status, the millet system of the Ottoman rule is still partly in effect.

Sectarianism is also incorporated in the electoral law. Each sect has a definite number of seats in the house of representatives. There is a sort of a ratio of Christian to Moslem seats of 6:5, a ratio that was introduced in 1943 after some disagreement. In the present parliament, which has 44 seats, the distribution is as follows:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Maronites</th>
<th>Cath.</th>
<th>Orth.</th>
<th>Sun.</th>
<th>Shi'a</th>
<th>Druze</th>
<th>Armenians</th>
<th>Minorities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Beirut</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mount Lebanon</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Lebanon</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Lebanon</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bekaa</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>17</strong></td>
<td><strong>3</strong></td>
<td><strong>5</strong></td>
<td><strong>9</strong></td>
<td><strong>8</strong></td>
<td><strong>3</strong></td>
<td><strong>2</strong></td>
<td><strong>1</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Since deputies to parliament are elected on geographical basis, they are not elected exclusively by their own sects. There are a total of 33 constituencies of which 11 are two-member districts and 22 are single member districts. In the single member districts a single sect predominates, and in the two member districts two sects are nearly equal in strength. The constituencies are defined and the religion of the representative of each is determined by the electoral law. For example, the representative of Al Kura district, a constituency in the North, must be a Greek Orthodox. So all the residents of Al Kura, regardless of their religion or sect, can only choose between the various Greek Orthodox nominees. In areas where two sects are so intertwined that geographical division along sectarian lines into two constituencies is impossible, a larger constituency is created and provision is made for two deputies. An example of this is the constituency of Ras Beirut and its neighborhood where Sunnites and Shias have each one deputy.

The third manifestation of sectarianism is in the public administration. Article 35 of the constitution reads as follows:

"As a transitory measure and for the sake of justice and concord, the communities shall be equitably represented in public employment and in the ministry without,
however, the welfare of state being prejudicially affected thereby". (31)

This article appears to be contradicted by article 12, which reads as follows:

"All forms of public employment shall also be open to all Lebanese citizens in accord-
cordance with the conditions laid down by law, preference being solely to merit and capacity". (32)

The ambiguity resulting from these conflicting constitutional provisions is clarified, however, by an important convention that supplements the constitution: namely, the National Pact of 1943, the year Lebanon won its independence.

The National Pact is an agreement among the various sects accepting the reality of Lebanese independence and providing for the joint direction of its destinies. The pact is based on two factors: sectarian balance and sectarian "fraternity". Its authors realized that Lebanon can continue only if its sects can manage to live with each other peace-
fully and cooperatively. On the other hand, they wanted to guard against the dominance of one of the sects, thus the idea of the balance came into existence. The pact also supported the proposition that Lebanon has one important


(32) Davis, op.cit.
reason for being a separate state namely, its Christian majority. If it were not for this alleged Christian majority and character there would have been no reason to keep Lebanon separate from the neighboring states.

"After the Islamic conquest, if it were not for the presence of the Christians in Mt. Lebanon, it would not have had its independence,... and there would not have been a reason to make it separate from the rest of the countries surrounding it." (34)

The national pact provided for a state that is acceptable to the Christians as well as to the Moslems. It was a compromise that put an end to the previous situation in which the Christians tended to support France and Moslem wanted unification with Syria. The compromise is "An independent Lebanon with an Arab character". This phrase is in the ministerial declaration of the first cabinet after the independence. It is also referred to in an appendix to the covenant of the League of the Arab States. The League guaranteed the independence of Lebanon, on condition Lebanon sticks to its Arab policy vaguely mentioned in the ministerial declaration of 1943.

(34) Hashi, op.cit., p. 10.
(35) Beirut, No. 1969 or 8 October 1943.
(36) Hourani, op.cit., p. 304.
Although extra-constitutional, the National Pact came to be a binding convention in Lebanese life. It determined the distribution of the various high political posts among the principal sects in Lebanon. The Lebanon of the Pact is a federation of sects. The Maronites are entitled to the Presidency of the Republic; the Sunnites are entitled to the Presidency of the Council of Ministers. The Shia' have the Presidency of the Chamber of Deputies; the Greek Orthodox have the vice-presidency of the Council of Ministers and of the Chamber of Deputies. The Druze and the Catholics each have at least one ministerial post.

Sectarianism is thus at the very root of Lebanese political life. It is the cause of Lebanon's creation, the reason for its continued existence as an independent state, and the means through which its governmental institutions operate.
III. SECTARIAN PROBLEMS AND CONTROVERSIES

A. Sectarian Organs
1. Christian religious conventions
2. The Moslem Supreme Council
3. The Sectarian Press
4. Sectarian Political Parties

B. Conflicts and Controversies
1. Clericalism vs. secularism
2. Individual sects vs. the state
3. The Christian - Moslem "struggle".
   a) General statement of the two points of view
      1) "Lebanon is a national home for Christians"
      2) "Moslem Lebanon today"
   b) Differences over major issues
      1) Over distribution of posts
      2) Over abolition of sectarianism
      3) Over taking a census
In the first chapter the historical role sectarianism played in shaping the destinies of Lebanon was discussed, and in the second chapter sectarianism was analyzed through a study of sects and their comparative standings and through its basic concept and manifestations. There remains to study the impact of sectarianism on the Lebanese political life. Does it present a problem, and if so, what is the scope and nature of this problem?

Each sect is organized for both religious and political purposes, and in a study of sectarianism it is essential to describe the sectarian organs, for most of its manifestations are channeled through them. Each has its own religious leaders to handle the matters they think are of their concern, whether they be of a religious, social, or political nature. Religious leaders take an active part in politics partly because of their traditional interest and participation in rule and partly because sects regard themselves as interest groups each striving to further its own cause and defend its own interests.

Besides their religious hierarchies, sects also have organs, councils, and organizations that are set up primarily to champion the temporal interests of the sects. As a deputy remarked in parliament, 'The sects not only represent
religious bodies; they are political parties."

But in spite of the deputy's remark, they are not really political parties because they do not aim at assuming office; they are nevertheless interest groups with organs that make it possible for them to function as such.

One of these organs is the Maronite Council, which is composed of the notables representing the various points of view within the Maronite community. This council is supposed to, and often does, unite the different Maronite factions and speak for the sect as a whole. The Greek Orthodox have their Council of the Community (Majlis Al Mila). Moreover, representatives of all the Christian sects meet together in Bkirké, the seat of the Maronite Patriarch, when it is necessary to take united stands. The Moslems have a council called the Moslem Supreme Council (Al Majlis Al Islamy Al A'lsa) that represents both Sunnites and Shi'ites. They also have a federation of organizations called the Permanent Federation of Moslem Organizations in Lebanon composed of the Moslem Young Men's Union, the Moslem Neighborhood Society, the Moslem Family Union, the Moslem Bloc, and others. This federation was established in 1953 in an attempt to further the interests of the Moslems.

(37) This remark is attributed to Farid Al Kharz, a Maronite deputy. 27 August 1937. See Houdart, op.cit., p. 23.
Of its first acts was publishing a pamphlet called "Mualem Lebanon Today" that will be discussed further on.

All of these organs are openly sectarian; they are sectarian in form and content. There are other organs that are sectarian in content but not in form. They take different forms among which newspapers and political parties are most common. Newspapers are sectarian organs in as much as they are sectarian in inclinations and objectives. A paper's sectarianism is demonstrated either through its willingness to echo sectarian claims or else through the sectarian issues it originates. What is important in this respect however is the fact that sects have papers that represent them and defend their interests, such as Al Amal and Al Busrak on the Christian side and Beirut Al Maqas and Al Shakar on the Mualem side.

Political parties can be sectarian organs as well. They are sectarian organs in as much as they stand for sectarian interests and objectives. Parties that are primarily motivated by sectarian issues and through which sectarian claims and conflicts are channeled are sectarian organs. In Lebanon the ambiguity between sectarianism and political ideologies was brought about by the close association relating Christian interests to Lebanese nationalism and Mualem interests to Arab nationalism. This phenomenon

(38) See the press section in chapter V.
is exemplified by two political parties: Al Kataeb on the Christian side and An Najjada on the Moslem side.

Sectarian organs are present in the Lebanese life; they are both explicit and implicit. The result is that sects can always find organs through which sectarian claims and points of view are formulated, expressed, and advanced.

Sectarianism is at the basis of many national problems and controversial issues in modern Lebanon. These problems can be divided into three categories: 1) conflicts between the religious leaders on one side and the lay or secular interests on the other, (2) conflicts between the sects and the state, and (3) conflicts between Christians and Moslems.

The conflict between the religious leaders of the different sects and people of secular turn of mind, who want to limit the powers of the clergy and establish an essentially secular state, was exemplified by the demands of lawyers at the beginning of 1952 to the effect that the laws governing personal status be amended. At that time the lawyers went on a strike for two months. The force of "religion" countered by organizing a partial strike of the city of Beirut and by issuing many religious proclamations. The

(39) See the political parties section in chapter V.
problem here is not essentially sectarian in nature; rather it is the struggle between clerical and anticlerical attitudes and interests. It is worthy of note that sectarian antagonisms in Lebanon in spite of their profundity and tradition do not prevent the clerical interests from uniting against the dangers of a lay state.

The conflicts between the individual sects and the state arise from the fact that each sect wants to get as much as possible of everything for itself whether it be governmental posts, services, or influence. We hear protests from practically all of the sects regarding their unrecognized rights or the injustice with which they claim to be treated. An example of this is the message sent by the Orthodox convention that met in Beirut on 23 December 1954 to the Lebanese President.

"The Orthodox convention in Lebanon convening today in Beirut... calls your attention to the injustice with which the Orthodox sect is treated in the way of usurping from it the equitable representation in the public administration according to Art. 95 of the constitution. We insistently demand that the Orthodox sect be given its full rights and be equitably treated". (40)

The most sensitive and dangerous type of problem is that dealing with the struggle between the Christian sects.

(40) Al Hayat, Beirut, No. 5831, of 29 December, 1954.
and the Muslim sects for dominance in Lebanon. This struggle has become acute during the last three years, and the following examples are an indication of its nature and scope.

After the second World War when a settlement for Lebanon was being discussed, a pamphlet appeared in Beirut entitled "Lebanon is a National Home for the Christians in the Near East." It was prefaced by a statement of the Maronite Patriarch A. Arida that reads as follows:

"It is essential that the hopes of the Christians in the Orient be stated at a time when the major powers are attempting to establish peace and to ensure happiness for all peoples".

This pamphlet goes on to say:

"In this small state, Christians of all sects and the Islamic minorities that took refuge in it under the pressure of persecution by the Sunnites, all lived in peace and justice. But this place of liberty is now threatened by a grave danger namely, losing what characterizes it. This is so because of the ambiguity that arises from such false concepts as Arab, Arabism and Arab outlook".(42)

The pamphlet goes into a historical survey of the relations between Lebanon and Arabs to conclude that:

"Arabism can not be separated from Islam... Islam as a theocratic state does not admit the civil rights of non-Muslims... The Christians of the Orient must have a Christian national home; that home is Lebanon".(43)

(41) Lebanon is a National Home for Christians in the Near East. The names of its authors and publisher are not mentioned. It appeared in about 1946.
(42) Ibid., p. 6.
(43) Ibid., p. 46.
Whatever one may think of this pamphlet, one has to question the assertion that Christians and Moslems in Lebanon have traditionally lived side by side in peace and justice. This assertion is confuted by the historical facts presented in the first chapter of this study.

A few years later, in 1953, a counter pamphlet was published in Beirut entitled "Moslem Lebanon Today". Its appearance caused a considerable amount of tension. The opening phrase reads as follows:

"A frank discussion of the struggle on the part of Lebanon's non-Christian majority to secure a proportionate voice in the government in order to work effectively for the abolition of state sectarianism in the interest of the national unity and equality for all citizens".

The pamphlet included a manifesto of the Permanent Federation of Moslem Organization of Lebanon composed of the following main points:

1. Constitutional revision
2. Preparation of a census of the inhabitants of Lebanon.
3. Cessation of propaganda depicting Lebanon as a Christian state.
4. Complete separation of church and state

(44) *Moslem Lebanon Today*, The names of the authors and publishers are not mentioned. It appeared in 1953.

5. Granting of Lebanese citizenship to resident Palestinian refugees desiring it.

6. Abolition of dual citizenship for Lebanese emigrants.

7. Compilation of statistics reflecting the proportionate number of officials and employees of each sect within the government and the relative importance of their respective posts.

8. Abolition of the use of textbooks in governmental schools that teach Lebanese history and sociology from the viewpoint of one sect to the exclusion of equal prominence for Arabism.

The manifesto asserts the existence of a discontented force in the Lebanese politics. Moslems according to the manifesto seem to feel that they do not have their proportionate say in government; they seem to feel that their actual population is larger than official figures show, and that their actual share of public positions is less than their proportionate share. So they ask for a general census and for statistics reflecting the sectarian composition of the civil service. In short the Moslem trend of opinion as expressed by the manifesto seems to be unimpressed with the proposition that Lebanon is a Christian state whose raison d'être is its Christian character and color. Moslems want their alleged rights to be fully recognized whether sectarianism is preserved or abolished. They ask for complete
separation of church and state but on condition that no
sacrifice on their part and no injustice to their cause be
entailed. They want a sort of anti-sectarianism that will
not fail to satisfy them both with regards to their anti-
sectarian and their sectarian measurements.

The reaction to this pamphlet was very strong. The
press entered into heated arguments about it and the matter
was brought before the court. The spiritual heads of the
Christian sects met in Bkerki in a convention and discussed
the situation. They issued a declaration which reads as
follows:

"Lebanon has had from the beginning a special
position that it should retain. We definite-
ly do not accept any change in this permanent,
traditional position, and we want Lebanon to
be for its people both residents and emigrants. The
heads of the Christian sects in Lebanon
have received with astonishment the manifesto
of the provisional committee for the Permanent
Conference of Moellem Organizations of Lebanon
because they find it destructive of the basic
principles on which the Lebanese state rests;
they also find in it a tendency not in keeping
with the history and tradition of Lebanon."(46)

In the summer of 1954, a Lebanese Christian named
George Shaker was brought to court for publishing a book
that was alleged to be disrespectful of the religious

feelings of the Molesms. The book was published a few years before it caused any sensation, and the author claimed that the statements that aroused public opinion were not originally in the book and were inserted at a later date in a second, unauthorized printing. On the day of Shaker’s trial, Molesms called for a strike that was followed by a demonstration in which 25 persons were wounded. At that time the press dealt at length with the problems of sectarianism; attacks and counter attacks appeared in the papers primarily motivated by sectarianism.

The Maronite and, to a degree, the Christian view was expressed by a manifesto that the Lebanese Palms (Al Mazaab) presented to the President of the Republic on 13 August 1954, which contained the following statements:

We all know how the Oriental Moslem states used to extol the Moslem religion to the point of fanaticism, which made Moslemian majorities injure the non-Moslemian minorities... The Moslem organizations want "the realization of social justice and the equitable distribution of public position", and we want this request to be answered within the coming 24 hours, on condition the positions be given to persons who are academically and morally qualified and on condition equality of taxation is also realized, so that the Christians would not pay 80% while the others pay the remaining 20% and so that distribution of public money among sects is reconsidered... The Moslem organizations want "to abolish sectarianism", but the abolition of sectarianism, or its partial abolition, can only be accomplished by the elimination of religious tribunals, the secularization of the state, and the subjection of all Lebanese to one civil law of personal

status... We do not understand how a
Lebanese is blamed for cooperating with a
foreigner for the purpose of self defence
while any one who supports the abolition
of Lebanese sovereignty and independence
through (an Arab) union is considered a
great patriot... Let us suppose that the
sectarian struggle terminated in the triumph
of a Moslem front. Do those who would treat
the Christians with tyranny and injustice
think that the Christians will accept defeat
and not start a violent resistance that will
make it possible for the foreigners to enter
through any door or window, thus causing pain
and suffering to Lebanon itself but to all the
Arab countries?" (43)

In other words, the Kataeb wanted to freeze the exis-
ting situation; it wanted to leave everything as it is, but
it did not say so directly. Its tactics were to counter
attack in an attempt to keep the 'enemy' in its original
position. To the Moslem Organizations' demand of propor-
tional representation in the public administration, the
Kataeb answered by stressing qualifications and by raising
an economic argument claiming that Christians pay 80% of
the taxes. The Kataeb also raised the issue of the Moslem's
support of a super Arab union that affects the independence
of Lebanon. It puts this on the same plane with cooperating
with foreigners for the purpose of self defence (implying
alliance with European powers). Thus the compromise on which
the Lebanese state rests was placed under a real threat.

A week later, a conference of the spiritual heads of the Christian sects was held. It discussed the problem that had become acute and issued a statement defining its stand with regards to sectarianism and to Lebanon itself. The statement reads in part as follows:

"The continuance of the present political and religious compromise in Lebanon is a necessary condition for its continuance as an independent state. It is this thing that gives Lebanon a special and peculiar status, which is, in our opinion as well as in the opinion of all civilized nations, one of the major justifications for its existence. Lebanon should maintain its basic general policy and its special status because that status has taken shape in the past and has since been cemented with new pacts and agreements... The participation in government and administration on the basis of equality and respect of the rights of sects is a principle that is in the interest of Lebanon to carry out, on condition that the qualifications of applicants are taken into consideration". (49)

The government could no longer ignore the problem. It decided to investigate whether or not certain sects were proportionally under-represented in the public administration. Consequently it issued the following proclamation:

"Desiring to make every citizen feel that the various elements of the Lebanese community participate in a just ratio in the public service according to the letter and spirit

(49) Al Hayat, Beirut, No. 2549 of 27 August 1954.
of the Constitution, the government has decided to set up a committee (composed of six directors) whose responsibility is to collect enough information about the number of public employees of each sect together with their ranks and salaries, and to prepare an inclusive report with the necessary suggestions for equitably representing all Lebanese in public positions. The committee has been given a period of two months to perform this duty.(50)

Although this committee was set up and started its work, it ceased functioning after a short time. Its accomplishments were negligible, however, and it never submitted a report. This is not so unusual in Lebanon.

In conclusion we find that the sectarian difficulties and problems between Christians and Moslems boil down to a fundamental difference as to the justification of the Lebanese state. The difference is on Lebanon. What is its essence? What should be its outlook? Where lies its future?

The Christians claim that Lebanon has a special position and characteristic that it should maintain. They want an independent small country where they can have their say. This sector of the population always keeps in mind memories of the inferior status that was given to non Moslem minorities in the past. In short they believe that the raison d'être of Lebanon is its Christian majority and character;

(50) Beirut, Al Nasse, No. 1429 of 17 August 1954.
they also believe that Lebanon must have some sort of a tie to the West.

The Moslems, on the other hand, maintain that after the enlargement in 1920, Lebanon became basically different from the old Lebanon, and that the National Pact of 1943 gave it an Arab character. They say that no matter what the Christians see in Lebanon, the fact remains that the Moslems compose at least one half of the population; thus, their equal share in directing the policies of Lebanon and in shaping its character should be recognized. They firmly believe that Lebanon is an Arab state in the midst of an Arab World.

"Basically the sectarian conflict is a conflict between Christians and Moslems over the purpose and the future of the Lebanese state. But the sectarian conflict, besides its ideological basis, also has deep non national and non ideological roots. It is fed by strong currents of passions and unreasoned fanaticism, which are to be attributed to the political and utilitarian implications of sectarianism. Sectarianism is a factor often ignited and manipulated for the attainment of personal or political interests and gains. It is a factor that lends itself easily/political manoeuvres aiming at achieving goals that might be totally extraneous to the sectarian ideological cause. Sectarianism is some-
time’s a mask hiding personal or political claims; it is a force that not only utilizes other forces for its own expression but also is utilized for the crystallization of the other forces as well.

Although the fundamental difference is over Lebanon, it nevertheless is manifested through various sectarian controversial issues that arise out of the comparative standings and situations of the sects. The major manifestations or issues are: distribution of public positions, abolition of sectarianism, and taking a general census.

When the question of distribution of public positions among the sects comes up, the Moslem sects demand unconditioned proportional distribution and their just share of positions at all levels, including the top. Although the Christians agree to these demands in principle, the Maronites and the Catholics attach a basic reservation, namely that qualifications be taken into consideration so that the interest of the state be protected, as provided by article 95 of the constitution.

When the abolition of sectarianism is debated, the Christians say that sectarianism ought to be abolished in the consciences of the people before it is abolished from the laws, but they are not eager to raise the question of
sectarianism at all. The Moslems, on the other hand, demand that sectarianism be deleted from laws as a step towards its abolition from the consciences of the people. They raise the problem often demonstrating that they are not satisfied with the status quo. When the Moslems go this far, the Christians prepare a counter attack declaring that the abolition of sectarianism necessarily entails the abolition of the religious tribunals and the institution of a general personal status law applicable to all the Lebanese. They know that Moslems would not agree to this because they do not want to give up the Sharia' law. And thus an impasse is reached.

Another problem arises when the possibility of taking a census of the population is considered. The last census was taken in 1932, and although the law provides that a census be taken every ten years, twenty-four years have passed and no new census has been prepared. The reason for this is that a new census might show that the Moslems are now in the majority and therefore the raison d'être for Lebanon would be undermined. When the Moslems insist on the necessity of taking a census, the Christians demand that the emigrants, who are predominantly Christian, be counted. The Moslems do not agree to this condition and counter by saying that Lebanese citizenship should be given to Kurds (who are Moslem) and to Palestinian refugees residing in
lebanon and desiring citizenship. The Moslems claim that it is much easier for a Christian to acquire citizenship; they mention the ease with which Armenians, who are Christian, acquired Lebanese citizenship. It has also been claimed that Christian Palestinian refugees are given citizenship while Moslem Palestinian refugees are refused it. (51)

The sectarian set up in Lebanon looks to be complicated, and intricately balanced. Still the Lebanese manage to live with it and to keep it functioning, sometimes smoothly and sometimes roughly but without the system totally collapsing. This is to be attributed to two factors: the ingenuity of the Lebanese, and their traditional willingness to accept compromises and half solutions. They do not push issues to their extremes or logical conclusions. Moreover they respect traditions and are willing to accept the customary way of doing things. They are lenient and flexible, and so their controversies continue without either being solved or leading to open violence. So far in moments of stress and of crises the Lebanese traditions of "peaceful coexistence" of "national fellowship" and of "sectarian fraternity" have carried the day.

(51) Kalk Shafi', Beirut, of 15 June 1955. This claim was made by Adnan Al Hakeem, president of an Najiada organization.
IV. SECTARIANISM IN ADMINISTRATION

A. Actual distribution of Posts Among Sects
   1. Evolution of the Distribution
      a) Distribution in 1942
      b) Distribution in 1945
      c) Distribution in 1955
   2. Characteristics of the Sectarian Distribution
      a) Its significance
      b) Its justifications

B. Effects of Sectarianism on System of Government
   1. Dual Executive
   2. Difficulties in forming cabinets
      a) Traditional distribution of ministerial posts.
   3. No blocs in legislature
   4. Strife within sects

C. Effect of Sectarianism on Recruitment
   1. Equitable representation
      a) Sects' quotas
      b) Pass examinations instead of competitive examinations

D. Effects of Sectarianism on Administration
   1. Poorly qualified personnel
   2. Continual increase in the number of public employees.
   3. Strong political interference
   4. Weakened internal control
   5. Divided loyalty
Positions in the public service are considerably in demand in Lebanon for three reasons: one of which is historical, one economic, and the other political. Historically, and especially during the Ottoman regime, a government official was viewed with great respect; he wielded real power and enjoyed a high social status. The acute unemployment in Lebanon and the fact that the educational system provides a large number of boys with a secondary education but with no specialization whatsoever makes the public service an attractive profession for large numbers of citizens. Moreover, since "...government and its administration are Lebanon's biggest business..." (52) it is not surprising that government posts are greatly in demand. In a country like Lebanon, where major favour a politician can grant is a job, the political pressures brought to bear on the service are obvious. Politicians do their best to open the service to applicants they recommend. All of this makes the question of distribution of public positions highly important.

Posts whether political or administrative are distributed among sects. The highest political post, the presidency of the republic, is reserved for the Christians. The first president of the constitutional regime was a Greek Orthodox, who remained in office from 1928 to 1932. As the Greek Orthodox community was at that time showing sympathy to the Moslem and Arab movements the French chose an Orthodox for the presidency in an attempt to win their support. In 1932 a new president was to be elected. A Moslem, Sheikh M. Al Jier, was a candidate, and Moslems started to think in terms of a rotating presidency between Christians and Moslems. But this election was prevented by the dissolution of parliament in 1932. Some people hold that parliament was dissolved by the French authorities in order to prevent the accession of a Moslem to the presidency. Once again in 1952 the temporary shift of authority to a Moslem was prevented. When the president resigned under popular pressure, power was not left to the cabinet with a Sunni prime minister. Instead the leader of the army, a Maronite, became the chief executive until a new president was elected.

The authorities in Lebanon have been always aware of the importance of the sectarian apportionment of posts. Time

(53) Riachi, op.cit., passim.
after time they stated their approval of this principle and

guaranteed its just application. In the French Lebanese
treaty of 1936, which was never ratified by the French, the
following guarantees were made:

"A fair and just representation of the
various elements of the population in
the public offices of the state".

"A proportionate distribution of public
utility expenditures so as to benefit
all regions equally." (55)

These promises were reaffirmed in a letter of the
representative of Free France to the president of the re-
public declaring the independence of Lebanon in November
1941;

"The Lebanese government will ensure an
equitable allotment to the various elements
of the country of the high offices in the
state and in the ensemble of government
employment". (56)

In 1942 the Moelem organizations undertook the laborious
task of finding out how the administrative posts are dis-
tributed among the various sects. This was done in detail
and inclusively. All the names of the employees were listed,
with their ranks, grades and salaries indicated. The following
tables illustrate the distribution at that time. These tables
have not been published because of the atmosphere of unde-

(55) An Nahar, No. 365 of 15 November 1936.

(56) Ad Dirar, Beirut, No. 36 of 25 November 1941.
standing and cooperation among the sects that culminated in the National Pact of 1943. This is the first time these statistical tables are reproduced.

(57) These statistical data were given to me by the Moslem Organization that collected them.

**Table II**

Distribution of Top Positions (1942)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Maronite</th>
<th>Cath.</th>
<th>Orth.</th>
<th>Sunni</th>
<th>Shia</th>
<th>Druze</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Directors</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inspector General</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>79</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
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<td>3</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
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**Note:** The table contains data for the years 1972 to 1976. Each row represents a year, and the columns indicate values for different years. The data seems to be numerical in nature, possibly representing some form of statistical or financial data.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>366.66</td>
<td>231.74</td>
<td>279.64</td>
<td>242.87</td>
<td>373.30</td>
<td>370.91</td>
<td>279.98</td>
<td>224.66</td>
<td>250.14</td>
<td>252.80</td>
<td>254.73</td>
<td>2,278.96</td>
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<td>190.73</td>
<td>233.84</td>
<td>225.69</td>
<td>345.76</td>
<td>347.03</td>
<td>236.54</td>
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<td>197.30</td>
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<td>150.68</td>
<td>192.31</td>
<td>185.81</td>
<td>286.81</td>
<td>285.13</td>
<td>189.59</td>
<td>139.20</td>
<td>152.82</td>
<td>155.73</td>
<td>158.65</td>
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<td>153.86</td>
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<td>116.56</td>
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<td>152.99</td>
<td>148.77</td>
<td>229.19</td>
<td>226.72</td>
<td>149.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>109.50</td>
<td>112.40</td>
<td>115.30</td>
<td>878.00</td>
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*Note: The table represents data from 1966 to 1976.*
Table 14
Distribution of Top Positions among Sects
(1946) (58)

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<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Maronites</th>
<th>Cath.</th>
<th>Orth.</th>
<th>Sunni</th>
<th>Shiite</th>
<th>Druze</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Directors General</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Directors, Service Chiefs</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muhafiz</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 15
Distribution of Top Positions among Sects
1955

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Maronites</th>
<th>Cath.</th>
<th>Orth.</th>
<th>Sunni</th>
<th>Shiite</th>
<th>Druze</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Directors General</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Directors</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muhafiz</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambassadors &amp; Ministers</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service Chiefs</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(58) Rosset, op. cit., p. 89.
These tables show:

1. The Maronites are dominant in key positions. Their actual share is more than their proportionate share. In 1946 they had 12 out of 31 key positions, which is about 40 per cent. In 1955 they had 45 out of 111, which is still about 40 per cent. In 1942 their share out of all public positions was 55.07 per cent. All of these percentages exceed the proportionate percentage to which their population entitles them, which is under 30.

2. The Maronites' allies, the Catholics, are over represented. In 1942 they had 9.50 per cent of positions as contrasted to 5.68 per cent which was their proportionate share. In 1955 their actual share of key positions was 10 out of 111, which is about 9 per cent.

3. Previously the Sunnites were slightly under-represented, but in the last few years they have entered the service in large numbers. In 1955 they had 31 out of 111 key positions, about 21 per cent, which is at least equal to their proportionate share based on their population. The Sunnites however seem to be benefiting more than the Shia' and the Druze from the efforts at compensating for the previous Moslem under-representation.

4. The Orthodox and the Druze are almost equitably represented. In 1942 the Druze share of positions was 6.75
per cent while their share of salaries was 6.66 per cent; this indicates that, although they had their proportionate share of posts, the positions they occupies were not high in general.

5. The Shia' definitely under-represented both in key positions and in the over all picture. In 1942 they had 11.26 per cent as contrasted to 19.53 per cent, which was their percentage of the population. In 1955 they had 4 out of 111 key positions, which is only about 3.5 per cent.

The following are the main factors that account for the particular distribution exposed above.

1. A close inverse relation exists between the ratios of the sects' actual shares of public positions and their illiteracy rates and educational standards. The under-representation of the Shia' is in part explained by the high illiteracy rate among this group.

2. There has been a considerable change in the attitude of Sunnis towards the Lebanese state. In the twenties and thirties they were not enthusiastic about it, and this explains why they were not as much present in the service then as they are now. In the early years it was said that:
The Muslim population of Lebanon who have always stood for complete independence and general Arab unity or federation have, since the formation of the "Greater Lebanon", adopted a negative policy towards its various governments."

This negative attitude was changed, however, after 1943, the year of the independence and of the National Pact, and the Sunnites came to enter the service in greater numbers.

3. The Maronites and their allies, the Orthodox, occupy a large number of top posts because during the mandatory period they had a greater access to the service because of their greater willingness to cooperate with the French and because their education was along French lines, and the French wanted to recruit people with French education as certain records were kept in French.

4. It is believed by many that the raison d'etre of Lebanon is its Christian element. A preponderance of Christians in key positions is compatible with this notion.

5. The Maronites and the Sunnites, being the major sects in the Christian and Moslem groups, seem to be closer to government and to enjoy a larger proportional access to the civil service. They, more than the other sects, have a feeling of direct and more active concern in public affairs because they do not feel in the least that they are minorities. This is the traditional attitude of the Maronites

(59) A letter presented by the Moslem organizations to the President in 1942. A copy of which was shown to me.
and consequently of their close allies, the Catholics. It is also being acquired by the Sunnis. The significance of this attitude becomes more evident when viewed from its other side. The Protestants, for example, have a higher educational standard, but still they are practically unrepresented in the civil service. They are a minority that feels far from government; their attitude towards government and its administration is different from that of the Maronites and the Sunnis.

Effects on System of Government

It is widely held that in Lebanon there can be no strong rule, no rule of a strong man or a strong body of men. Many people, after witnessing the coup d'état in the neighbouring Arab countries, concluded that Lebanon is not a fertile land for such occurrences. This is believed to be so because of sectarianism. Power in Lebanon can not be assumed by any number of people regardless of their sectarian allegiances. Thus, a coup d'état does not take place because sectarian considerations can not be disregarded. A coup d'état then can be attempted only by a group representing the major sects, which is impractical, or else the struggle would become a sectarian one.

The major sects not only have to have their say but also their proportional say in government; thus governing
is a joint action of the sects. Consequently the governing process is greatly complicated because of sectarianism. In Lebanon there is a dual executive; the President of the Republic is not only nominally but also actually the chief executive. Still Lebanon has a cabinet system of government, which provides for a prime minister who also can be powerful and can eventually be the second executive. There are two executives who have to work together. Thus the two major sects are both in key positions. Moreover, both the Christian sects and the Moslem sects are present within the governing authority.

Although the factor described above is at least in part responsible for the absence of coup d'état, it also must bear a major part of the blame for the inefficiency that is manifest in the Lebanese system of government, an inefficiency resulting from the fact that responsibility is not clearly defined. The prime minister does not have enough power, and the president, although he has authority, is not sufficiently accountable to the people.

Forming cabinets is a complex and tiring job in Lebanon, far in a cabinet, equitable apportionment of seats among sects is a rule that cannot be violated. To this is added the fact that certain ministries are almost always given to certain sects, as will be shown in the table presented below. These two factors stem from sectarianism and constitute a major difficulty in forming cabinets.
Other difficulties, however, have to be mentioned namely, partisan and regional considerations. Moreover, the fact that cabinet members are often members of parliament, although not a sectarian rule, adds to the complexity of forming cabinets because the choice of the prime minister would be still more limited and restricted. For example, a Druze has to be on the cabinet, and in fact one of the three Druze deputies is chosen. The result is cabinets that lack homogeneity and political cohesion.

The following tables show the traditional way in which ministerial posts are distributed among sects.
### Distribution of Ministerial posts among sects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Ministry</th>
<th>I</th>
<th>II</th>
<th>III</th>
<th>IV</th>
<th>V</th>
<th>VI</th>
<th>VII</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. 6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
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</tr>
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<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
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</tr>
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</tr>
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<td>2</td>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. 8</td>
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<td>1</td>
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</tr>
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<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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"A" "tions, The Lebanese State, (Beirut, in Najaf Press, 1952."
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<tr>
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<th>IX</th>
<th>XI</th>
<th>XII</th>
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<table>
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<table>
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<td>Sunni</td>
<td>Sunni</td>
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<td>Sunni</td>
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<td>Sunni</td>
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<td>Sunni</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The tables about the distribution of ministerial posts among sects show that:

1. The Ministries of Education and Foreign Affairs are almost always the share of Christians, most often Maronites and Catholics.

2. The Catholics and the Orthodox do not have more than one member each in any cabinet.

3. The Shia' and the Druze are generally limited to a single cabinet member, but the Shia' had two ministers in two cabinets and the Druze in three cabinets.

4. When the cabinet is composed of six members each of the six major sects is given a post. When it is of more than six the rule is to give the additional posts to the Maronites and the Sunnites.

The tradition in distributing ministerial posts among sects adds to the difficulties which are entailed in forming cabinets. A minister might not be given the ministry he is most fitted for. A good example of that is presented by the cabinet of Bashid Karameh formed in the summer of 1955. A Maronite engineer was the minister of Foreign Affairs while a Sunni ex-diplomat was the minister of Public Works. This was so because of the tradition that gives the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Maronites.
In talking about sectarianism in the system of government one has to study it in relation to the legislature. In the legislature there are no strong blocs so as to more certainty and consistency in rule.

This is partly because sectarian considerations do not allow the formation of such blocs. A bloc is likely to disintegrate whenever an issue arises that divides the legislature and the public along sectarian or religious lines. Sectarian blocs do not form in part because rivalry between individuals of the same sect is keen.

Sectarianism in the system of government results strangely enough in splitting each of the sects into opposition factions. This division or 'state of war' within each sect is, in most times, serious and critical. In each sect there is a struggle for influence and political priority. The sectarian basis of rule implies that each sect is to be represented within the governing authorities. So there issues a bitter rivalry for occupying the political seats of the sect. If a particular deputy is assigned a ministerial post the deputies of the other faction of the sect almost always side with the opposition.

The internal struggle within the sect is more acute and apparent in sects that still have effective feudal set ups and institutions. The Shia and the Druze rank first and second in this respect. A good example of this bitter
struggle is presented by the leaders of the Shia' of the South; Ahmed Al Assad violently opposes the present regime, which is allied to the other faction of the Shia' deputies.

Does this internal division of the sects lessen the effects of sectarianism? As a matter of fact, it diminishes the possibility of having sects play exclusively against each other. But the internal sectarian strife is in itself an integral part of the sectarian process of government.

It is a practice that is sectarian in nature and that adds to the complexities of rule. Factions within sects may oppose each other, but they all function along sectarian lines and with sectarian mentalities.

Effects on Recruitment

It was shown in the previous section that sectarianism has far-reaching effects on the system of government in general. In this section, the discussion is to be more specific, it aims at showing how recruitment, which is an important, perhaps the most important aspect of personnel, is affected by sectarianism.

According to the legislative decree of 1952, recruitment to the civil service was based on competitive examinations. Candidates for positions had to meet certain academic requirements before they sat for a competitive examination. But the competitive examination was abolished in the legislative decree No. 14 dated 7 January, 1955. In its place
there is only a pass examination that qualifies the applicant for admission. The examination is conducted by an examining committee appointed by the minister concerned.

Sectarianism is not mentioned in these decrees. But the fact that it is present in the constitution and that people care so much about the spoils each sect is entitled to are not without influence. According to Emir Jassal Chihab, a member of one of Lebanon's distinguished families, a respected civil servant, a Maronite, and the ex minister of Finance, the competitive examinations were abolished and replaced by pass examinations for the reason that they interfered with the proportional distribution of posts among the various sects. When, as occurs in a system of competitive examinations, the applicant with the highest grade is chosen, the criterion of equitable or proportional representation will have to be disregarded. On the other hand, pass examinations leave the recruiting officer the discretion to choose any applicant from among those who pass the examination regardless of their scores. Thus sectarian distributing of public positions can be provided for.

The recruiting authority is subject to the following pressures: the constitutional provision that all Lebanese

[61] Ministry of Justice, Lebanon, Compilation of Legislative Decrees, 1955, decree 14, articles 13 and 17, p. 34.
are equal and have equal rights, the constitutional provi-

sion that positions should be distributed equitably among
sects, the constitutional provision that the interest of
the state should not be injured as a result of the previous
provision, the provision for examination and educational
requirements, and the various political and sectarian
pressures. In what does all of this result?

When few positions are vacant in a certain department,
those who apply and meet all the requirements are given an
examination. Let us say that the vacant positions are 17 in
number. Those who pass the examination are the only appli-
cants that are considered for recruitment. In case 30
applicants pass the examination, on what basis is the choice
made? There is a combination of two principles: 1) dis-
tribution of positions among sects and 2) choosing the best.
The idea of a competitive examination is theoretically
applied as limited by the requirements of sectarian dis-
tribution. For example if 3 positions are to be given to
the Maronites the 3 Maronites are chosen from among all the
Maronite applicants on the basis of their scores in the
examination. This is the case when political considerations
and pressures are not given priority.

According to this practice an applicant who scores 60
in the examination may be chosen while another who scores 55
may not be chosen because choice is provided for and discretion
is given primarily to make room for sectarian considerations. This explains why the competitive examination of the previous legislative decree was done away with; the previous practice did not provide a legal method for apportioning appointees by sect.

Another basic principle, which politics tries to impose on recruitment, is the assignment of a quota or a percentage of public positions to each sect. This percentage is roughly equivalent to the percentage of each sect within the whole Lebanese community. It averages about 7% for the Druze, for example, so if there are 20 vacant positions, the quota of the Druze would most probably be 2. This takes care of the bulk of positions, of the common and ordinary positions. But what about the key and highest administrative positions?

In this case no large number of positions become vacant at one time so that the quota system can be applied. Here the equilibrium is maintained in the following way. When a top position becomes vacant an attempt is usually made to recruit an employee to that position who belongs to the sect to which his predecessor belonged. If this is not possible then the principle of compensation is followed according to which another top position is later on given to the sect which lost the post it had formerly occupied.

Effects on Administration

The effects of sectarianism on the system of government
were discussed because they have their bearing on the civil service, which is the center of this study. Effects on recruitments were dealt with separately, and there remains to examine the civil service proper in the light of sectarianism.

The civil service is influenced by the social, political, and economic conditions of a country and by cultural and historical factors as well. This explains the fact that pressures that are brought to bear on the administration are so many in number and so varied in magnitude. Certain features in the Lebanese administration are to be pointed out and discussed, and although sectarianism is primarily responsible for them, they are influenced by other but less important factors as well, such as partisanship, family, and personal pressures. The influence of sectarianism is marked and more important than that of any of the other factors because sectarianism is present in more situations and acts fast and effectively.

The effects of sectarianism in administration and personnel practices can be grouped into five major headings:

1. Poorly qualified personnel.
2. Continual increase in the number of public employees.
3. Strong political interference.
4. Weakened internal control, and
5. Divided loyalty.
When the main criterion for recruiting to the civil service is not a man's merit but his sectarian allegiance, the recruit is not likely to be the best person qualified. In Lebanon sects are entitled to equitable representation in administration. The dual rule for recruitment, which considers both merit and apportionment among sects, leads to significant and grave results because of the differences in the conditions and standards of the sects. In certain times sectarianism is given priority, and the authorities would want to recruit from a particular sect either because it is in a high political favour or else because it is under-represented. In such cases, other criteria besides sectarian allegiance, except for certain formal requirements that have to be met, have practically no influence in the selection. What is important here, however, is the fact that sectarianism is responsible for the appointment of persons of inferior qualifications.

Examinations were changed from competitive to pass examinations for sectarian reasons as has been shown in the previous section. These examinations become void of meaning because of the poor examinations system that is followed. Examination committees are ad hoc committees; in most cases, they are unskilled, and the result is examinations that are poorly drafted, unstandardized, and sometimes unreliable. Examinations are given for small groups at one time. When
let us say five recruits are to be taken into the service, the five new recruits can not all be of one or even two sects, although they might have been were it not for the nature of sectarian balance and proportional representation. Sometimes twenty or more recruits are to be taken at one time. In such cases each sect has not only to be included but represented proportionally in the group that is to be chosen. Out of a group of twenty, for instance, four or five have to be Sunnites, and so this result has to be attained even if it is necessary to disregard certain provisions and qualifications.

The civil service in Lebanon is growing explosively. In 1933 the Lebanese budget listed positions for about 300 people while in 1954 their number became 11,036. In other words the civil service increased in twenty years about 200 per cent. The Syrian administration, which underwent the same general changes and developments, increased from 1933 to 1954 about 125 per cent. The number was 10,036 in 1933 and 22,709 in 1954.

The growth of the Lebanese administration is not to be attributed wholly to the increase in government functions.

(63) Grassman and Salibi, op. cit., p. 8.
(64) Ministry of Finance, Lebanon, Budget of 1953.
(65) Ralph Crow, unpublished research work about Syrian Personnel, 1954.
especially because Lebanon can not be considered a socialist or even a semi socialist state. Government does not interfere in various fields, and its impact on the national economy is not greatly felt. It does not provide many services. There is no social or health insurance, no old age or unemployment pensions or similar social legislation. Government is not considerably active in the field of public corporations; nationalization is still on a narrow scope.

The civil service in Lebanon grew rapidly although some of the common factors of growth are not particularly present. This superabundance of public employees is to be partly explained by sectarianism in as much as it is a force that adds to the attractiveness of the service, allows for a sectarian race for securing public positions, and presents the problem of equitable distribution of positions among sects. Sectarianism adds to the attractiveness of the service because it creates competition for power among sects, a competition that gives the sectarian apportionment of positions special meaning and marked significance. This has led to multiplying the number of employees because most of the sects feel that they are under-represented in the service. Consequently they strive to make for this under-representation by recruiting more and more. Unequitable representation is corrected not by diminishing a number of the employees of the over-represented sect but by recruiting additional employees from the sect or sects that are under-represented.
In Lebanon the electoral process has its sectarian basis. The spoils system, which is primarily channeled through the electoral process, is aggravated because of sectarianism. In opening the service for people of his constituency, a member of parliament would be most probably helping people of his own sect, because of the inter-relation between the sect and the constituency. And a politician, once he reaches a responsible job, sees to it that some people from his sect are recruited to the service because of the sensitivity and significance of the sectarian distribution of positions.

With respect to political interference in administration, sectarianism does not only give this interference a sectarian color; it also increases it and allows for its continuance. Sectarianism affects political interference both in nature and magnitude. This is for a direct and an indirect reason. The direct reason is the fact that politics itself is, to a great extent, based on sectarianism and shaped by its considerations. The indirect reason is the impact of sectarianism on politicians and the pressure it brings to bear on them to secure positions and services for their sects. The various sects are very much concerned in bringing to the service as many of their own people as possible; the sects compete for public positions, and this is not contradicted, as a matter of fact, by the notion of the quotas that each sect is entitled to out of the public positions, because the matter of quotas is some-
thing that is not definite and not applied literally. This
race for reaching public positions makes politicians of the
sects as well as their religious leaders do every thing
within their power in order to further the cause of their
sects in the race.

Political influence in administration may also be
present in states where sectarian influence is insignificant
because it could be brought about by other factors such
as partisanship, political immaturity, and spoils. Never-
theless political influence in administration is a matter
of degree, and sectarianism is responsible for its excess
in Lebanon. Pushing the sectarian basis of rule, which is
applied in Lebanon, to its extreme, we can say that no
responsible person whatsoever represents the whole nation.
Thus sectarian representation is increased in significance.
An Orthodox, for example, turns to the Orthodox representa-
tive whether a minister or a member of parliament or a senior
public servant. The sect's representative therefore is
viewed as the authority that is obliged to defend the in-
terests of his sect. The result is continuous strong
political influence in administration.

The deep concern in public positions and the inter-
ference in administration explain why it is so difficult
and complicated to make any reshuffle of personnel in
administration. Transferring a top employee constitutes a very important political problem especially when the transfer is likely to have sectarian connotations. Recruiting or promoting for top positions is, in some cases, controversial owing to sectarian preference. An example of this is the problem of recruiting a director general for the Ministry of Health in June 1955. The Prime Minister wanted to recruit a Sunniite for the job while the Minister of Health, a Christian, wanted to recruit a Maronite. In such cases neither side yields willingly because of the sectarian pressures.

Sectarianism undoubtedly weakens internal control over an employee. A person who is recruited as a result of political sectarian pressures can always rely on the support of the same pressures, thus becoming independent of his superiors and breaking hierarchical lines of command. Thus the hands of superiors are tied; they have no effective control over their subordinates. They are not in a position to implement the sanctions that are important in eliciting the employee's obedience. If there is a vacant position to be filled by promotion, the one with the strongest political sectarian backing is promoted. If there is a position to which employees dislike to be assigned,

the one who is least protected is transferred to it. In
disciplinary actions too, ‘strong’ employees can manage
in most cases, to avoid discipline. Internal control as
an institution is a simple “system” as stated above.
A system based on sound hierarchical lines of responsibility and
accountability is seriously weakened by sectarianism.
Sectarianism “dismissal of an employee might be
viewed as dismissal of a Sunnite or a Shiite.” In a partisanship
situation, dismissal of an employee might also be viewed as the
dismissal of a member of this or that party. But the sec-
tarian situation is more significant in its effect on ad-
mnistration because of the difference in the nature between
sectarianism and partisan politics. The former has more of
a constant and static nature while the latter is evolving
and changing. Sectarianism has a much wider scope because
each civil servant has a sectarian color while only some have
partisan colors as well.

The problem of internal control is demonstrated in
the relations within the service. The relations between
civil servants and the public present another problem, that
of divided loyalty. These civil servants are torn between
allegiance to their administrative superiors on one hand
and to their sectarian leaders and interests on the other.
A man in this position is apt to be motivated by contradictory
forces, and he may choose to give priority to his sectarian
interests. Bias and partiality are the result, and they are
demonstrated in applying laws and regulations as well as in deciding cases and suggesting policies. Sectarian partisan-ship can be manifested in a civil servant's behaviour towards members of his own sect. For example, the head of the Census Service, a Christian, has been accused time after time of using his discretion in favor of Christians who seek the Lebanese citizenship and against non-Christians. As a public servant, a census officer is supposed to be impartial and to apply the laws uniformly, but as a Christian a census officer is apt to grant the citizenship to Christians with relatively greater ease. Christians are not increasing in number with the same speed Moslems are, and this might upset the sectarian balance. The example of this Service head, who is attacked by Moslem circles for granting the citizenship to Armenians and Christian Palestinian refugees and at the same time withholding it from Kurds (Moslems) and Moslem Palestinian refugees who desire to reside in Lebanon, throws light on the problem of divided loyalty; sectarianism is thus ignited, and administration is consequently affected.

Another example shows that sectarian partiality cannot be tolerated in certain cases; it sometimes gets so serious as to interfere strongly with the administrative practices. Sometimes when the people of Basta, a Moslem section of Beirut, are demonstrating, the government sees to it that the 'right' policemen are sent to maintain or restore
order. By the 'right' policemen is meant Christian policemen, who are not likely to over-sympathize with the people. Since these policemen are not Moslem, their sectarian allegiance would not be at variance with their public duty. Thus sectarianism as it results in divided loyalty comes to be considered a threat to hierarchical, functional, and even national loyalties.

The civil service in Lebanon is markedly affected by excessive sectarianism rooted in the public life. The effects have been enumerated above, and the result is poor and inefficient administration. The spoils system is an attribute of Lebanese administration, and the absence of competitive examinations, which is necessitated by sectarianism, is a factor that invites the spoils system. The concept of charity prevails in the administration inasmuch as administration is considered a means for making an easy living to which all sects are entitled. Lack of discipline together with diffusion of responsibility are apparent because of political sectarian interferences and contradicting loyalties between which employees are torn.

As long as sectarianism remains a major factor in the Lebanese life, the civil service will continue to suffer from the difficulties at hand. Sectarianism will have to lose much of its strength before any administrative reform can be seriously and effectively implemented.
V. ATTITUDES TOWARDS SECTARIANISM

A. Political parties
   1. Reasons for their weakness
   2. Antisectarian parties
   3. Sectarian parties
      a) On the Christian side
      b) On the Moslem side

B. Politicians
   1. Reluctance to fight sectarianism
   2. Typical treatments
      a) Of the Christian side
      b) Of the Moslem side

C. The Press
   1. Diversified public opinion
   2. Sectarian papers
      a) On the Christian side
      b) On the Moslem side

D. Religious Reasems
   1. Traditional concern in politics
   2. The prevailing atmosphere
Before attempting to evaluate sectarianism and before drawing conclusions as to its influence and making suggestions for strengthening or abolishing it, we must examine the attitudes of different organizations and groups towards sectarianism, to see how it is practiced and to what extent it is an inherent part of the various political parties of the Lebanese system. In this chapter, we will discuss the relationship of sectarianism of political parties to certain economic, social, and cultural conditions that Lebanon has experienced as well as to the political parties.
The weakness of political parties in Lebanon can be explained in part by the fact that parties in this part of the world came to be known only about twenty-five years ago. But the fact that political parties in the other Arab countries are, on the whole, more powerful than they are in Lebanon is due in no small part to sectarianism. This is so although the contrary would be expected to be the case owing to the better educational, social, and economic conditions that Lebanon enjoys. Literacy in Lebanon is higher than it is in any other Arab country. Mount Lebanon has a long tradition of political activity due to the special status of internal autonomy it enjoyed during the Ottoman regime. Economic and social conditions in Lebanon do not result, as they do in other Arab countries, in a large class of fellahin or serfs, the thing that prevent sound political or partisan life in other Arab states.

So although sectarianism contributed to Lebanon by giving it its special status and its better educational and social conditions, it nevertheless stopped short of reflecting these better conditions in advanced institutions such as political parties.

In Lebanon two factors explain the fact that sectarianism weakens political parties, the first is related to the leadership of the parties and the second to their objectives and policies. A party formed around a Maronite leader, for example, would not, generally speaking, be attractive to
Sunnites. Moreover, political principles adhered to by one sect would not easily find fertile soil in another one owing to the gap in social as well as in political spheres between the sects. Objectives and policies of parties are also a factor that limits their spread especially when these objectives and policies are sectarian in particular. Arabism and "Lebanonism" as political objectives are an example of this; the former is favoured by Moslems and the latter by Christians. So the party that professes Arabism would not spread widely among Christians just as the party that professes Lebanonism would not arouse much enthusiasm among Moslems. Sectarianism then is an important factor responsible for weak political parties. It stands in the way of growth or spread of parties, which are organizations that endeavor to win popular support on the basis of policies, principles, or leadership for the sake of assuming power.

In Lebanon there is some difficulty in determining what organizations meet the standard of political parties. Once this is done another difficulty arises namely, determining what parties are basically sectarian in inclination, composition, and objectives. This makes generalizations about the inter-relations between political parties and sects difficult. Is it true that each political party in Lebanon has as its basis one of the sects? Are political parties organized sectarian pressure groups in disguise?
Are ideological differences regarding the nationality of the Lebanese a mere reflection of sectarian and religious interests and outlooks?

The distinction between sectarian and non-sectarian parties can not be undertaken on the basis of written programs and principles of the parties because at least superficially all parties tend to disapprove of sectarianism. The sectarian inclinations and interests of parties become apparent, however, in a study of their behavior. A sectarian party supports sectarian issues and applies sectarian approaches. Sectarian parties can also be distinguished on the basis of the sectarian composition of their membership. A party predominantly composed of one sect or religion is by necessity a sectarian party.

On the basis of behavior and membership, political parties can be divided into two groups: sectarian and non-sectarian parties. The non-sectarian parties are: The Socialist Progressive Party, the Syrian National Social Party, the National Call Party (An Nida’), and the Communist Party. The Socialist Progressive Party is anti-sectarian in principles and behavior, but to a great extent, sectarian in composition since a larger number of its members are Druze who adhered to it because it was founded by a Druze feudal chief. The Syrian National Social Party does not accept the Lebanese
entity as a final truth and is outlawed. Its attitude towards the Lebanese entity is a sufficient reason to keep devoted Maronites out of it.

The Communist Party is outlawed too. The National and Party, which has a restricted number of adherents, is anti-sectarian in principles and composition, but its anti-sectarianism is of the consociatory and not genuine type; it is based on the sectarian conciliation of the National Pact in 1943. By the expression consociatory anti-sectarianism, I refer to political doctrine that accepts sects as political groups and that strives for an equilibrium among sects, while genuine anti-sectarianism requires that allegiance to a sect be basically transformed to allegiance to the whole community.

Sectarian parties on the Christian side are: the National Bloc (Al Kutla Al Watanlya) and the Phalange (Al Kataeb). The former is activated almost exclusively at election times; it is a party de masse as distinguished from a party de masses. "Il s'agit de faire des élections, pour préserver des élections, les conduire et garder le contact avec les candidats."

The Kataeb, on the other hand, has its recruits mostly from among the youth. These parties do not admit that they

are sectarian; they claim to be the expression of Lebanese nationalism. The Kataeb has its support among Maronites and Catholics, and it is also agreeable to minority Christian sects, which find it in their interest to preserve the present status of Lebanon. Here is what Mr. Launsen says about Al Kataeb in a master's thesis:

"It is the opinion of almost every politically informed Lebanese that the Kataeb is more than 95 per cent Maronite."

(69)

The Kataeb want to preserve Lebanese independence at all costs, so that Christians will not become a minority in a greater Arab state, and this is how Al 'Atal, the Kataeb paper, clarifies the relationship between sectarianism and the Lebanese state:

"The importance of political sectarianism is not only for ensuring equality and justice but also because it is the means for adhering to Lebanon and for defending its independence in an entity that has its unique national character." (70).

The sectarian parties on the Moslem side are: the Pioneers (An Najjada) and the National Committee (Al Hayaa' Al Matanlyya), both of which have their major power in Beirut.

(69) Richard Hane Launsen, The Kataeb, unpublished Masters Thesis submitted at A.U.B. 1951, p. 56. The present Vice President of this party is a Protestant.

(70) Al 'Atal, No. 2389 of 17 November 1954.
itself and depend for their activities on a few members or officers at the top. These two parties are sectarian because of the many sectarian issues they raise and champion, such as redistribution of parliamentary seats and taking a general census. These and similar issues, although might be sound and justified in principle, are raised because of sectarian incentives; they serve sectarian interests and have sectarian repercussions. The Muslim Brotherhood, a movement strong in Egypt and to a lesser extent in Syria, and based on the belief that Islam with its Koran, traditions, and culture is the genuine solution to all the present problems, is not present in Lebanon because Lebanese Muslims do not go as far as to advocate a theocratic state in Lebanon such as the Brotherhood supports.

Sectarianism found its way to political parties and principles after it was challenged by nationalism and the notion of deep social unity in a state. Nationalism maintains that all the citizens of a country, regardless of their sect or district, constitute a whole to whom loyalty is due, but sectarianism is incompatible with it and with the notion of social unity. So sectarianism masked itself with a cover of modernism, namely, political principles and ideologies. Sectarianism was transformed, deliberately or undeliberately, into political parties that profess anti-
sectarianism and are sectarian in their goals and ultimate purposes. The saying that Lebanon is a national home for Christians is definitely not acceptable to non Christians. A much better phrase is Lebanese nationalism because it does not fail to serve the interests of Christians and can be at the same time accepted by non Christians; it is also "modern" in its implications and concept. The same is true of Arabism as related to Moslem interests and objectives. Arabism is more acceptable to non Moslems than are a Moslem union or a Moslem empire. However a distinction must be made here between popular and scholarly Arabism, the former being an offshoot of religious feeling, and the latter a political conviction of belief in Arab nationalism.

Politicians

Politicians in Lebanon profess the belief, sincerely or otherwise, that sectarianism should disappear, but the fact remains that these politicians do practically nothing to eliminate sectarianism. This attitude of politicians is, in a sense, only natural because they operate along sectarian lines and gain power because of sectarian considerations; they do not want to defeat their own interests.

(71) See Nicola Ziadí, Arabism and Nationalism (Beirut, Dar Al Hira Lilma'ayen, 1950).
In the ministerial declaration of the first cabinet of independent Lebanon in 1943, the following statement was made:

"The hour in which sectarianism can be eliminated will be an hour of blessed national awakening in the history of Lebanon. We shall work to bring about this hour in the near future... Naturally its realization requires much hard work of many kinds, and all of us are willing to cooperate in order to make every one want this profound national reform realized."

Little or nothing, however, has been done along these lines. And although sectarianism has been a frequent topic for incidental remarks in parliament, it is nevertheless not often raised and discussed at length in parliament. This is not a reflection of the unimportance of the subject as it might seem to be. On the contrary, it indicates that sectarianism is a highly sensitive and deeply controversial problem the public treatment of which is avoided. There is no attempt to settle sectarian problems in parliament because parliament is, in a sense, the creation of sectarianism. Subsequently they are tackled outside the official process of government and in an informal manner. Issues that divide the public along sectarian lines are not reflected in parliament in the same way. Every effort is made not to give issues this sectarian

(72) Beirut, No. 1903 of 8 October 1943.
The basic change between Christian and Moslem sentiment on sectarianism is clearly brought out by the following statements of the typical points of view of the two factions. The representatives of the two sides are Mr. Hamed Franjiyyah, a Maronite deputy, an ex-minister of foreign affairs, and a prospective candidate to the Presidency, and Mr. Mohammad Jameel Bakhum, a prominent Sunni who is the head of many Moslem organizations and who is intensely interested and active in this field although not a deputy.

Mr. Franjiyyah believes that the sectarian feeling is the legacy of hundreds of years and so cannot be dispensed with in a short time especially since we are not doing much to fight it.

He believes that sectarian feeling has increased during the past few years for the following reason: politicians do not refrain from stirring sectarian passion whenever they find it in their personal interest to do so, (although this is usually done outside of parliament). When they want power to back them and can not get it in a better way they are not beneath masking themselves as champions of their sects. Liquidating sectarianism has to take place in the consciences of the people, and eliminating it from the laws is a superficial action besides
its being one that might result in a counter reaction in case a group feels that the action is directed against it. We should start in our daily and social life and on an individual basis; sectarianism may be abolished from laws only after a long preparation and when people are unanimous in their desire to get rid of it; they have to accept the fact whole heartedly and with confidence. It can be abolished when every Lebanese is convinced that he can have what he is entitled to in his capacity as a citizen without resorting to sectarian arguments and considerations.

Mr. Franjiyyah believes that the state can not and should not take steps to that end. He cited the example of Turkey under Atatürk and said that the state reforms cause a reaction and fail in the long run. He believes that it is unwise to continually try to re-examine or reconsider the sectarian compromise that was reached in 1943. It is not essential to have a census. Sectarianism in a psychological problem and it should be treated psychologically. Political parties can help in this connection because they transform the allegiance into a partisan one. Finally he said that the present electoral law, which is based on one or two member districts, stifles sectarianism because the deputy will have to think in terms of what the people in his constituency want; they, being predominantly of one faith, would likely
be more sectarian minded. He suggests the reinstating of the list system in elections because in it the deputy will have to appeal to an electorate that is composed of different sects.

Mr. Mohamed Jameel Bahrin believes that the state should fight sectarianism by eliminating it from the masses and then by eliminating it from the laws. He said that taking a census is essential and would, if realized, eliminate all doubts that have arisen because it has been neglected. He said he approves of all measures that are directed against sectarianism, including the drafting of a civil law for personal status.

Mr. Bahrin maintains that nationalism should replace sectarianism. This cannot be done until the state assumes supervision and control over education. Education should not be directed by foreign and missionary institutions; guidance should be national and universal. Finally, he said that his suggestion is to institute compulsory military training because it is one of the means of education and guidance; it brings hearts closer to each other thus weakening sectarianism.

(74) Interview with Mr. Rameed Frangiyeh, Beirut, 17 March, 1955.

(75) Interview with Mr. Mohamed Jameel Bahrin, 24 February, 1955.
Studying these two statements, one can easily notice difference in approach between the two politicians. Both profess antisectarianism, but in their statements each stresses the points that are most in keeping with the interests of his side. Mr. Frenjiiyyah does not believe that a census should be taken. Moreover he is reluctant to admit the state's role in the fight of sectarianism, and his support of a new electoral law is not in effect an approval of the state's fight against sectarianism. The new electoral law he advocates, which embodies the list system and which subsequently puts the deputy in a position where he has to appeal to an electorate composed of different sects, can not be considered a step against sectarianism. The list system had been applied and no antisectarian effects were demonstrated. Moreover there is a return to it in the new electoral law that has been drafted by the government. In the absence of strong political parties, the list system continues to result in freezing the present sectarian system.

On the other hand, Mr. Belhum is of the opinion that the state should take steps in the fight of sectarianism. He also attacks missionary and foreign educational institutions. Taking a census, the question of foreign educational institution, reluctance to the state's role in the fight of sectarianism, and similar points are sectarian in so much as they serve particular sectarian interests.
In viewing sectarianism as displayed in politics, a distinction has to be made between two kinds of anti sectarianism: inclusive pure anti sectarianism, and partially sectarian anti sectarianism. One who fights sectarianism in all fields and at all occasions, regardless of other considerations, is purely anti sectarian. But one who fights it at one time and ignores it at another, as the interest of his sect dictates, is at the first time sectarian only anti sectarian. Anti sectarianism, in certain issues, would be inkeeping with the interest of one sect rather than the other. So anti sectarianism on the part of the first sect in such an issue is neither pure nor genuine. The fight against sectarianism on the political plane can not be effective unless it is of the first variety namely, inclusive and pure. It necessarily entails objectivity, consistency, sincerity to the anti sectarian cause, and willingness to sacrifice personal gain through sectarian alignments.

The Press

The number of political papers in Beirut is high; it is unlikely that many other cities of its size have so great a number. In Beirut there are 76 political papers out of which 44 are daily papers. All of these papers are almost in their entirety journals of opinion as contrasted to journals of fact. Journals of opinion can be divided

into those that endeavor to further a particular point of view and those willing to espouse any cause they are paid to support.

These two types can generally be distinguished by the fact that the former group presents the news with a constant bias while the point of view expressed by the latter group undergoes frequent changes.

"Public opinion is highly divided and diversified, and this is partly accounted for by sectarianism because of the lines of division it introduces. Through the press we can, to an extent, understand public opinion and account for its divisions and factions. The press both reflects and formulates sectarian trends in public opinion. It can be loosely divided on sectarian grounds into three categories: papers that openly champion sectarian causes, papers that are wholly vociferously anti-sectarian, and a middle group composed of papers that profess anti-sectarianism but subscribe to sectarian positions in times of crisis. Papers of the third group are crypto-sectarian papers; they are basically sectarian but endeavor to keep their inclinations in disguise as long as possible. An important thing however is the fact that sects can always turn to papers that are ready to express their points of view, champion their causes, and defend their interests. There are papers that represent their sects more than any other thing whether a party, an idea, or an interest."
The Beirut Christian papers that are openly sectarian are: Al A'mal, Al Bahrak and the French language papers. The following passage from Al A'mal is an example of an open championing of the cause of the Christians in Lebanon.

"The Christians are not ready to live as minorities... in a state (Lebanon) they have set up through their efforts and blood, a state where they have preserved liberty and out of which they make a refuge for any one who desires to live in freedom".(77)

Another passage from the same paper shows that political sectarianism, which every body shuns including Al A'mal itself, was on one occasion thought to be 'a necessity for justice and equality':

"Under these circumstances political sectarianism is a necessity for justice and equality because it does not make us in need of a third arbitrator since Moslems ask the help of the Moslem states thus obliging Christians to ask the help of the Western states". (78)

"Before abdicating sectarianism we should master its application: for sectarianism is a sacrifice of much of our individuality for the national interest, which is realized by the harmony among the citizens." (78)

Among the Beirut Moslem papers that are openly sectarian are Al Bahrak and Al Sura. There are also

(77) Al A'mal, No. 248 of 15 March 1953.
(78) Ibid., No. 2327 of 15 November 1953.
pro sectarian papers in other towns, Tripoli in particular. Here is a quotation from Beirut Al Masa where it champions the Moslem cause:

"Where is the balance when the positions of directors general of the ministries of interior, foreign affairs, finance, public works, education, and agriculture are held by certain sects while Moslem directors general are only those for communications, information, economy, and health." (79)

Another quotation from the same paper also expresses its sectarian approach.

"Preserving sectarianism represents the reactionary attitude in the country, but those who seek justice in applying this evil (sectarianism) are not reactionists; they are practical and constitutional". (80)

Few papers are whole heartedly anti sectarian. This is because owners and editors, in general, are not free from sectarian feelings and prejudices, and more important than that because of the fact that the subscribers of a paper are in cases predominantly from a particular sect or religion, and so the paper becomes under a practical obligation to champion sectarian causes. For example almost all the subscribers to Beirut, are Sunnites. Thus this paper would

(79) Beirut Al Masa, No. 192 of March 1953.
(80) Beirut Al Masa, No. 194 of March 1953.
find it difficult to abstain from a partisan attitude in a sectarian controversy in which the Sunnites are deeply involved.

Al Hayat, an anti-sectarian, Shi'ite owned paper, the paper with probably the widest circulation, has the following to say on the problem of sectarianism:

"The existence of Lebanon as an independent state is not dependent on the size of its population but on a special political position that arose out of the readjustment of the balance between the Moslem Orient and the Christian West in the last century. So one cannot view religions in Lebanon as totalities in themselves separate from the world and influenced by the increase of Muslims over Christians or of Christians over Moslems.... The Christians in Lebanon constitute, religiously, an inseparable part of World Christianity, so they will not be a minority in Lebanon as long as they are related to hundred of millions of Christians in the World even if a hundred censuses are taken. The Moslem are in the same position. The religious balance in Lebanon is not dependent on figures but on regional and international positions that are related to things outside the boundaries thus making the internal religious or sectarian will unable to change a thing". (31)

The incident of Bsharri, mentioned before, caused the press to lay aside its mask of anti-sectarianism and to express its inclinations and feelings. The following is the reaction of three papers: Al Hayat said:

"George Shakar has not written his stupid pamphlet in defence of Christianity. The riots which have taken place were not in defence of Islam. He wrote his pamphlet to destroy the unity of this country. He must be unmasked as well as all those who attempt to break the unity of the nation". (82)

An Nahar, an antisectarian, Greek Orthodox owned paper, said:

"Even if the head of Shakar had been presented to the demonstrators on a plate, the riots would have gone on. They are the direct result, no matter what is said about Hamas in the dark provoking them, of a situation which is religious, social, and political". (83)

Al A'mal, a sectarian, Maronite owned paper, said:

"For this paper the truth is that the riots are not aimed at Al Yafi (the Premier at the time); they are the continuation of the booklet "Moslems Lebanon Today". The aim of the riots is the destruction of Lebanon". (84)

From the three quotations printed above, one can deduce the following: Al Hayat draws a line between religion and sectarianism. According to it, Islam and Christianity have nothing to do and nothing to win or lose because of the pamphlet and the riots. To it, writing the pamphlet is a sectarian action that is entered as an attempt to break the unity of the nation. The important thing then is to separate

(82) The Arab World. A daily digest of Arab opinion and press reports, of 2 August 1953.
(83) Ibid.
(84) Ibid.
religion from political behavior so that the unity of the nation is not broken. Al Makhr, on the other hand, believes that the whole situation has to be reformed. It considers sectarianism as a symptom of an out dated society that has to be replaced by a new society in which religious, social and political relations are different. Al 'A'mi seems to accuse Moslem public opinion, which is behind the riots, not only of an open sectarian reaction but also of aiming at the destruction of Lebanon. The first two papers are satisfactorily antisectarian, while the third is sectarian. Al Makhr isolates Christianity and Islam from the pamphlet and the riots; it does not associate the pamphlet with overall Christian attitudes or interests. Al Makhr attributes the riots to a religious, social, and political situation which can and should be reformed, as the paper goes on to imply. Al 'A'mi accuses the demonstrators, who represent the majority of Beirut Moslems, of deliberate work for the destruction of Lebanon.

Religious Leaders

Religion, as practiced and administered in Lebanon, is a factor that stimulates and encourages sectarian feelings and fanaticism; it is concerned, first of all, not with its spiritual and moral missions but with political and sectarian affairs. Religion conceives of sects as political parties or pressure groups and acts accordingly. Lebanese religious leaders are interested primarily in conducting relations be-
when their sects and the outside world, whether it is the state or other sects. They are most sensitive to sectarian issues and to the problems that arise out of the fact that, owing to differences in religious faith, people are divided into many groups. This leads to a situation where a person does not remember that he has a religion and a faith until he is provoked by a person of a different faith. It was once said that a Lebanese does not know that he is a Mohammedan until Mohammad is cursed in front of him or that he is a Christian until Christ is cursed in front of him.

Religious leaders interefere in politics; they command considerable power for the following reasons: the present sectarian basis of rule, the strong sectarian loyalties and feelings, and the long tradition of active clerical participation in handling the affairs of this country. Religious leaders are sure to be active in politics in order to realize "rights" of their sects since sects are subjects in Lebanese political life. They also strive to be as powerful as their predecessors were.

The clergy still follow a tradition of taking into their hands the affairs, temporal and political, of their people. This is done both directly and indirectly. In the past, they were allowed a wide area of control. They had
power de facto because the state was, and to an extent still is, viewed as an organ that exercises power delegated to it by the different communities that compose it. In this sense, the Lebanese state might be compared to the central government in a federal state, where sovereignty resides in the constituent states, i.e. sects.

Religious leaders have real political power. When the Lebanese constitution was being drafted in 1926, the religious leaders were among the first people to be consulted. In general elections, candidates do everything within their power to win the sympathy and support of the clergy. However, this is more true of Christian sect because they have a body of clergymen that is better organized and more powerful and independent than that of the Muslim sects.

Typical of the religious leaders' concern in politics and of their viewpoints of what comes under their jurisdiction, here are some statements made by religious leaders revealing the climate of opinion that dominates.

A Shia religious head said that:

"The Shia sect does not have its appropriate share of governmental posts. This is so because the government does not respect the rights of this sect and because the notables of the sect are disunited, divided, and scattered. The notables and political leaders of the sect are responsible for the injustice; they should unite and push forward the cause of the sect". (85)

(85) Interview with Sheikh Mr. Badéx, The Shia' Sheikh in Nabatiyéh, South Lebanon, 2 February 1955.
A Druze religious head said that:

"Sectarianism is an inseparable part of Lebanon. The continuance of Lebanon as a state is dependent, to a great extent, on the continuance of sectarianism. We would like to have no sectarian basis, whatsoever, in recruitment, but the political considerations make us suspicious of abolishing sectarianism in recruitment and elections before every one comes to feel the true Lebanese brotherhood". (86)

To show the extent of the interference of religious leaders in politics the following example is cited. The issue of taking a stand in Lebanese foreign policy was raised during the last two years; it was tackled by the Maronite Patriarch. He sent a letter to the President favoring siding with the West. The following is a quotation from his letter.

"Lebanon would like very much to remain neutral, but if it appears that exercising neutrality is not within our power, let us have an agreement with the West directly, without an intermediary, and on condition the agreement guarantees our safety, independence, and sovereignty". (87)

As long as the religious leaders of Lebanon devote a major part of their time and energy to political pronouncements of this sort, sectarianism remains vivid and alive.

(86) Interview with Sheikh M. Abu Shakra, the Druze Sheikh Akli (religious leader) Beirut, 9 Sept. 1955.

(87) Al As'al, No. 2702 of 21 April 1955.
it remains a source of controversial major issues in the Lebanese political life because the interests of the sects in the political sphere do not always coincide. In foreign policy, the Maronites wanted direct alliance with the West. Suppose the Muslim religious leaders announced that they wanted a sharp and final break with the West. Would not the issue have become a riddle and a deadlock in Lebanese politics? Religious leaders, if left to interfere in politics, cannot be but sectarian in approach and incentives. Their responsibilities to their communities and their exclusive concern in their sects make them unable to view politics except from a sectarian, narrow, and biased angle.

When the question of sectarianism is discussed, very few people are willing to support sectarianism as such; everybody expresses dislike of it. But when a person is asked to stop acting on a sectarian basis, to disregard sectarian considerations, and to have loyalty first and last to the whole Lebanese community, he is likely to reply in this fashion: of course I am against sectarianism and I am ready to act in an anti-sectarian manner, but I do not want to be the first to start practicing anti-sectarianism thus endangering the interest of my sect while the other sects do not follow suit. If you tell this person that other sects will also give up sectarianism, he will immediately
express his disbelief. The ordinary man in Lebanon does not feel or believe that sectarianism can be done away with at least in a generation.

There is little good will among the different sects. Moslems believe that Maronites are taking more than their appropriate share. Maronites are uneasy because of the continuing decline of their numerical importance and the consequent weakening of their present favored status.

"Nothing in Lebanon is more sensitive than the sectarian feeling. When Christians ring bells, Moslems use loud speakers (in mosques). Then Christians start to hang crosses in the streets. If the people of Basta (a Moslem section of Beirut) open fire in the celebration of the prophet's birthday, then the Ashrafiyah (a Christian section of Beirut) has to oust them in fire crackers and pyrotechnics in order not to upset the sectarian balance". (36)

(36) Kubra, ibid, p. 122.
VI. Evaluations and Suggestions

A. Sectarianism; Its Present and Future

1. The sectarian problem
   a) Its nature: factionalism
   b) Its uniqueness to Lebanon
   c) Arguments for and against it

2. Possibilities of eliminating sectarianism
   a) The public approach
      i) New "equitable representation" in administration
      ii) New provisions for representation.
      iii) Civil law for personal status
   b) The private approach
      i) Political parties
      ii) Antisectarian committees

3. Prospectives and trends
   a) Future of the Christian-Muslim dilemma
   b) Continuation of the sectarian order
   c) Emergence of Maronite and Sunni "dominance"
In its essence and general features sectarism is a kind of factionalism. It is a dividing force both in society and state; it divides society to cluster and build groups within it. Thus factions come into being, and through their belief and acts, each unites its adherents and pulls them from the others. The following is a classical definition of factions:

"By a faction, I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the right of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community." (89)

Sects are groups of people formed around a particular cult. Although its origin religion, a sect, once it begins to grow, comes to have national, social, and political implications that soon have greater significance than its theological basis. Sects function in society and leave their mark or imprint on its institutions and practices, and viewing sectarism in its course of action and through its marks and imprints is a sure way for understanding it.

In what capacity do sects function in society? They function in different capacities not only as religious groups, but

as tribes, races, national, sectional, social, cultural, and pressure groups as well. Moreover the traditional force of sectarianism together with its marked influence on the system of government, which is similar to the influence of federalism, can not be overlooked.

The Lebanese sects function as endogenous tribes each with its organization, leadership, and personality. This was more true in the past, but in modern Lebanon, although it has been reduced in significance owing to the impact of modernism, it nevertheless remains a phenomenon of prime importance. To a lesser extent sects partake of the nature of racial groups, each with its place of origin, history, relative isolation from others, and peculiar racial characteristics. This is especially true with sects that did not intermingle with others such as the Druze. Sects also partake of the nature of national groups each with its interests, objectives, and aspirations.

Sectarianism in Lebanon also draws from regional or sectional factionalism because geographical grouping is to a great extent based on sectarianism as has been shown in chapter II. This geographical factor in Lebanese sectarianism makes of each sect a self-contained social group with its own peculiar customs, traditions, and practices. Sects are not only social groups; they are also cultural groups, and in this light differences between
sects are deeper and more profound. The cultural line of division, however, is not so much sectarian; it is rather religious because it is between Christians and Moslems.

In the political sphere one might conceive of sects as political parties or, more precisely, as pressure groups. They are pressure groups because they function in the political field each pushing forward its arguments and points of view. Politically speaking too, sectarianism might be compared to federalism. In a federal state the process of government is channeled through the member states with which sovereignty lies and which have to be represented as states. In a sectarian state too, the process of government is channeled through sects, which function like union states.

The picture of sectarianism is not complete until two more elements are added, the force of tradition in its capacity as a factor that paves the way for sectarianism, and the utilitarian element, which drives people to the sectarian field in pursuit of their private interests and gains. The force of tradition is strongly felt in Lebanon. As Michel Chama remarked: "Le Liban est un pays où la tradition doit défendre contre la force"(90). Sectarianism is present in the institutions the Lebanese inherited from the past, and their present upholding of it can be attributed in part to the force of tradition, which is strong on them.

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The other element to be added to the picture is the utilitarian element. Sectarianism can be employed to serve other interests; it can be manipulated both in the private and public spheres. It can be utilized as a force in public policy, whether domestic or foreign, simply by playing on sectarian fears and enlisting sectarian support. It also can be utilized by an individual in his attempt to get what he wants. Thus sectarianism is continually reinforced by this utilitarian element, which ignites it and asserts its presence.

Sectarianism is an important kind of factionalism. Although not one of the above mentioned forces such as social and national groups, it partakes of the natures of all of them. It is a phenomenon with a complex nature; it is a picture with a whole combination of colors and shades.

Although associated with Lebanon, sectarianism is not unique to it. Sectarianism has played a major role in the history of many states. Civil wars have been fought in its name, in England, in Switzerland and elsewhere. Nations were divided because of it, and the examples of India and Ireland are outstanding in this respect. Conquests and expansions both in the East and the West had in part a sectarian religious temper. But in the East, perhaps more than in the West, sects have played a continuous role in the political sphere.
Sectarianism is not unique to Lebanon, but Lebanese sectarianism is unique. Certain characteristics together with certain factors in the present condition of Lebanon make it unique and give it a major importance. In creating Lebanon, sectarianism did not end the sectarian problem as was the aim in the case of India. It raised the problem anew and gave it a wider scope, a deeper nature, and a more controversial character. Sectarianism created the Lebanese state, which opened the way before sectarian issues, dilemmas, complications, and problems. It created the Lebanese state, and it continues to shape its destinies. It is a major factor in the Lebanese life, and consequently the very existence of the state depends on its smooth functioning. Sectarianism, then, is confronted with the difficult task of functioning smoothly; it has to constrain and check itself.

In the previous pages, sectarianism has been expounded, and in this light it is going to be evaluated. Is it desirable or not? Do its good points balance its bad ones? What are the arguments for and against it?

The arguments for sectarianism can be divided into two categories, positive and negative. On the positive side sectarianism has contributed to Lebanon and has helped in building up the Lebanese tradition. It has led to tolerance and
has made it possible for Lebanon to be a land of freedom and a refuge for all who seek it. Here there is no majority that can dominate and oppress, and consequently the weight of rule is not greatly felt. Moreover sectarianism, as long as it is constrained and checked, is a force for law and order. In its modern history Lebanon proved to be a stable country as compared to its neighbors, abrupt changes in its policies and governments were not known. It is the precarious balance between its factions and the excessive degree of diversification in the public opinion that gave it this measure of internal security and stability.

Sectarianism gave Lebanon a peculiar composition and status, and it is in part this that makes it possible for Lebanon to play an important role both in the inter Arab relations and in the meeting of the East and the West and the subsequent impact of the latter on the former. Lebanon is by necessity a neutral force with regards to the possible splits in the Arab group; it cannot be committed to a wholehearted support of the interests of one of the existing camps, thus it can be the mediator of the Arab World. Perhaps more important is its role with regards to the meeting of the West and East. Owing not only to its geographical position but also to the composition of its population, Lebanon has proved to be a perfect place for the meeting of the two cultures. Lebanon in its Christian element is a
welcoming recipient of the Western culture; it is also an effective center for spreading this culture.

This is the positive side of the arguments for sectarianism, but these results appear to be more the result of the particular composition of the population than of sectarianism as a basis of rule. The negative side composed of arguments against its abolition comes next. If the sectarian order were abolished while sectarianism continues to be a major force in the Lebanese life, harm and evils result. The following are the negative arguments for it, and they are two in number, one political and the second religious. Politically we would be usurping from minority sects their just right to representation and participating in rule. The sectarian order guarantees minority representation which if abrogated results in a political injustice.

More important is the risk of conflict and strife that has to be taken in any immature abolition of the sectarian order. Second comes the religious argument, and here we find that religious freedom and tolerance might be undermined in case the sectarian order is done away with. Lebanon is the country of sects, and all sects feel the same freedom in practicing their religion. Justice requires that the sects be treated with equal dignity, and this requirement is guaranteed by the sectarian order. Moreover the sectarian order provides that sects maintain their own laws and
organizations, and in abolishing sectarianism these laws might be invalidated without replacing them with better laws.

These are the arguments both positive and negative for sectarianism. What are the arguments against it? There are three arguments against sectarianism as it is practiced in Lebanon, the first is social, the second national, and the third political.

On the social sphere sectarianism introduces a line of division that is marked, static, and everlasting. It divides society into different groups pulled apart by its various forces. Barriers are built between these groups, thus the natural inter-action between members of groups of society is made difficult. Society comes to have different sets of customs, traditions, and practices. The result is that social unity, which binds members of society together, is seriously undermined; society becomes a collection of groups whose component force is not as great as the sum of its different forces. On the national sphere sectarianism interferes with national loyalty. The popular will be live together and form a nation, which is an important factor in nationalism, is greatly weakened by sectarianism.

Grounds of agreement between all groups within a state would not be wide enough so as to make it possible for the state to function smoothly. There would not be consensus
on the very basic principles in the state, and this much
disagreement cannot be afforded by any state because
factional strife would then be dangerous to its very exis-
tence.

Politically, sectarianism results in diversified and
divided public opinion. It results in lack of unity and
forcefulness in the system of government. Lack of consol-
didation is manifest in all aspects of public life, in the
legislature, in the executive, in the superabundance of
newspapers and political parties, and in public opinion.

The individual element in politics, which breeds confusion
and uncertainty, continues to dominate. Moreover the evolu-
tion of the Lebanese public institutions towards sound
democratic and modern practices is handicapped by sectarianism.

Political practices in Lebanon are shaped to take room for
sectarianism. The result is a dualism in the Lebanese life
because modernism is placed side by side with inherited
institutions and systems; Lebanon tries to reconcile
contradicting concepts and mentalities as much as possible.

After this evaluation one can say that sectarianism,
such as practiced in Lebanon, is incompatible with the
vision of the modern state. This is so because sectarianism
is deep factionalism whose dangers arise from the fact
that at certain points the disintegrating element of fac-
tional rivalries and factional allegiances overpower the integrating forces of society. Sectarianism does not stop at being a healthy stimulant and a source of reasonable pluralistic tendencies; it goes out side this to become a serious threat to the binding force in society. How can this be faced? Should complete elimination of sectarianism be attempted? Or should it be enough to attenuate its influence in the administration and the public life?

Sectarianism in administration cannot be treated in isolation because it draws from the general reservoir of sectarianism which is in public life. Moreover, there are no clear lines of demarcation between politics and social conditions. For that reason the necessity of treating the subject on a wide plane becomes evident. One cannot seek to eliminate sectarianism only in administration. More administration is primarily a political undertaking.

The fight against sectarianism is something that does not occur spontaneously, it has to be started and carried through. So the most important thing is to start somewhere and to actually do something. This point seems to be obvious but in fact it is the basic factor in the whole matter. This attitude is lacking and another attitude dominates that can be described as follows: A large section of the people says that sectarianism should not be abolished from the laws before it is abolished from the conscience, but
these people do practically nothing to eliminate it from the consciences; moreover they violently oppose eliminating it from the law. This same section of the population believes that sectarianism should not be discussed, studied, and brought to the open, and goes as far as to say that the effective way to fight sectarianism is to forget it. But this is impractical because it cannot be forgotten. Moreover nothing would be done on the positive side to bring sects closer together.

Another section of the population believes that sectarianism should be eliminated from laws first of all and as a step towards eliminating it from the consciences. So we have a dilemma to start in the laws or in the consciences, in Arabic with the Riasos (laws) or the Rufous (consciences).

To have a change, people must believe in it; they must believe that they have an undesirable thing that should be changed. People must be aware that sectarianism is an evil and an exceedingly undesirable thing that has to be eliminated. They must be convinced that they are practicing or living something that is unbecoming. This is the only way to make them willing to change, anything can not be accomplished as long as there is a curtain to hide the problem from them. They must look at the problem in the light; they must discuss it, talk about it, and face it.
In treating sectarianism one is faced with the profundity of the problem. Sectarianism is not only one of the problems of Lebanon; it is the problem of Lebanon, of its existence as a political entity, of its functioning and continuance. It is at the basis of the Lebanese state since it entails a frame of reference that makes different sects accept the existence of Lebanon with varying degrees of consent and enthusiasm. Lebanese nationalism has found fertile soil among Christians as Arabism has among Muslims. This suggests that the problem of sectarianism is not confined to sectarianism proper; it transcends itself to Lebanon, its presence, essence, and future.

For that reason the fight against sectarianism has its repercussions and can not be undertaken by just any body or any sect. In case sectarianism is to be eliminated, a joint effort based on close cooperation between the government and people will be necessary. The government has to blow up sectarian fortifications such as sectarian laws and practices, and the people then can advance in their anti-sectarian march. The government has to do its part of the work, and the people have to do the rest of it by making of themselves a fertile soil for the measures and provisions that are directed against sectarianism.

The measures that can be taken by the government in
this respect are of two kinds: measures that, although directed against sectarianism, might actually stir it, and measures that would not have similar repercussions. Measures of the second type must be taken by the government without hesitation while measures of the first type can not be taken but with utmost care and caution. Provisions must be taken to restrict and check clerical powers. This is essential because it is in the interest of the clergy that sectarianism survive, and they, therefore, continue to arouse sectarian passions. Measures for secularization do not force sects to play against each other, thus the risk of sectarian strife is avoided. The struggle here would not be between sects but between clericalism and secularism. A civil law of personal status would be an example of such measures. Measures of the other type, which might end in arousing sectarian passion, must be taken with caution. In order to eliminate sectarianism from the electoral law, for example, provisions must be taken to guard against arousing sectarian feelings. Sectarianism must be fought in the legal and official field so as to weaken it in the public eye, but in so doing no sect should be given the opportunity to feel victimized and thereby to withdraw further from cooperation within a united Lebanon.

The notion of sectarian equitable representation should be fought publicly and officially; it should be detached from
its constitutional and legal side. The constitution provides for equitable representation, and this makes sects over sensitive to that notion and puts them in a psychological state that pushes them to believe they are either under-represented or in danger of being discriminated against. This current state of anxiety has to be ended if sectarianism is to be checked. In administration proper it is this notion that prevented the establishment of a merit system. Recruitment has to be brought in line both with the merit system and the antisectarian objectives. In pass examinations sectarianism remains a major criterion for selection. Pass examinations should be replaced by competitive examinations so as to keep sectarianism out of recruitment practices.

(in administration proper also, the power of superiors must be increased. They ought to be able to keep their subordinates in line and to check their insubordination and sectarian prejudices.) This reform requires measures of two kinds: first, immunities of employees should not be as extensive as they are so that the employee will become receptive to the wishes of his superiors, and second, political sectarian interference in administration must be reduced because it opens the way for sectarianism to meddle in administration and leave its effects on it.

On the public scene the electoral law should be amended so that its sectarian aspect is abolished. All
constituencies should be single member districts, and this would be made easier by eliminating sectarianism. The number of deputies should be increased so as to provide for minority representation not on the basis of sectarian laws. In talking about representation it should be mentioned that many of the sectarian complexities of the present system can be dispensed with if two measures are taken: first, encouraging professional representation, and second, devising some sort of exclusives sectarian representation such as a council on which sects are represented. This would attenuate the influence of sectarianism on parliamentary representation and would ease the evolution towards a sound and efficient system of government.

(Religious tribunals should give way to state courts. This is a sure way for checking the powers of religious leaders.) There are religious tribunals and personal status laws. Religious tribunals might, with a proportionate amount of ease, be replaced by state courts provided personal status laws remain religious and in accordance with the tenants of the different sects. But when it comes to abolishing the religious personal status laws, the major difficulty arises over the drafting of the civil law of personal status, which is going to be applicable to all. Can the various sects agree on one law? At present it would be exceedingly difficult for them to do so, but this difficulty might be overcome.
by providing that the civil law of personal status be applied side by side with the different religious laws as a transitory measure. In this case it would be left for the individual to choose between his religious law and the civil law of personal status. The important thing, however, is abolishing religious tribunals, and this is possible and necessary.

The question of education and private institutions must be considered with regards to sectarianism. Missionary educational institutions whether foreign or domestic must be reduced in effect because these institutions can not help but further sectarianism. Non-sectarian education helps in two ways: in providing principles of modernism and in providing for students of different sects to live and learn together and in the same institutions. The scout movement in Lebanon is split between Christian scouts and Moslem scouts with a group of Lebanese scouts in between. Every thing possible should be done to strengthen the Lebanese scouts at the expense of the other two groups. This is cited as an example of how antisectarian institutions should be encouraged both in the public and private fields.

The Lebanese constitution and institutions did not shoulder the responsibility of fighting sectarianism. They
recognized the inherited traditions and allowed for their expression. The constitutional structure of the state did not face the problem; it lived with it, and here is what one of the writers on this subject says:

"La véritable structure sociale et politique du pays échappe à ses dispositions, ou ne se trouve comprimée par elle que prématurément, pugilistiquement, comme à regret. Le politique a fait devant le réel, il convient de le rassembler par l'obstacle qu'il lui faut franchir". (91)

The Lebanese constitution, laws, and system of government did not face up to the sectarian problem. What was the attitude of the Lebanese leaders in public life? Did they face up to it? How did they affect sectarianism?

The Lebanese authorities did not face up to the problem. In a way they encouraged sectarianism because they failed to assert the authority of the state. They were over-lax, and confusion and turmoil are the result. In such conditions it is easier for sectarianism to flourish. Moreover responsible people are not taking measures against sectarianism, and perhaps this is not to be expected from them because they, in a sense, are ruling in its name. The state can not fulfill its mission in fighting sectarianism unless the people occupying the directing posts are detached

(91) Rouds, Les Institutions politiques du Liban, cit. p. 129.
from it. This is difficult to achieve because social and political conditions are reflected, to a great extent, in the personnel of governing authorities. Thus, these people, since they reach responsible posts on the basis of particular situations, do not want to defeat their own purposes. Sectarianism in the people is reflected in sectarianism in the government, which is not ready to undermine its own origin and source. The state, then, can not play its role in eliminating sectarianism successfully, surely, and effectively.

At this point we have to turn to the people themselves and see what they can do about this problem. The people can, of course, genuinely solve the problem by breaking down the social barriers among their groups. Intermarriage helps a great deal in this respect, and it is becoming less infrequent. But it is evident that it will not have enough extension so as to destroy the social basis of sectarianism.

People can be most effective in eliminating sectarianism because it has be obliterated from their consciences. Two solutions can be provided in this sphere: 1) political parties and 2) antisectarian committees. Political parties have their very important role to play provided they are not sectarian in inclination. They are important because they
replace the sectarian allegiance with a partisan allegiance; they form groupings that transcend the sectarian lines. Political parties eliminate sectarianism because, when they exist, sects would not be tempted to be political parties de facto.

Anti-sectarian committees can help a great deal. This is so because sectarianism is, to a great extent, a psychological problem that can be treated by psychological measures and approach. Such committees should have the fight against sectarianism as their only goal. Through their efforts, publications, and connections they can help to formulate attitudes that are antisectarian; they can be effective in breaking down the barriers among the sects that are built by ignorance, mistrust, and fear.

'Sectarianism will remain as long as people hold the following beliefs: 1) a sect as such has to be given all its alleged rights, and 2) individual interests are best protected through sectarian institutions. When the Lebanese come to feel that the sect as a body is not essential for him in order to get all he is entitled to, political grouping along theological lines will come to have no political significance. This can not be achieved in a short time; it has to wait until society and state are reformed basically and profoundly. But in the meantime what are the trends along this line? What are the prospects of sectarianism in the near future?
Studying sectarianism as it is evolving and as it is affected by changing conditions and situations, one can see certain trends. Sectarianism is basically incompatible with democracy, and considering the present temper of the Arab people and the rising force of nationalism in this area, it is only conceivable that the emotional appeal of nationalism would attenuate the influence of sectarianism. Modernism with particular stress on spread of education is also a factor that affects sectarianism negatively. Ease of communication and the subsequent mixing and closer contacts in political, social, and commercial fields result in removing barriers between sects. The retreat of religion as a result of the impact of the materialistic progress, and religious partial losing of its grasp on the masses together with the emergence of social, political, and economic doctrines, which claim to present the solution to all man's problems, is also an important factor in the retreat of sectarianism. The retreat of religion is not accompanied however by a compensatable retreat of sectarianism because the latter, as it is practiced in Lebanon, is not confined to religious interests and beliefs; it embraces social and political interests and passions as well. An Orthodox, for instance, might be totally indifferent to his faith and still a sectarian fanatic because what ignites his fanaticism is his belonging to the Orthodox group in its social and political implications.
On the other hand there are forces that come to the support of sectarianism most outstanding of which is the increasing sensitivity of the problem owing to the fact that the sectarian balance is becoming more and more precarious. Moslems are increasing in number and power; and there is a demand for an absolutely equal partnership in directing the politics of the country. The result is that sectarianism is kept alive and alert and is raised every now and then; it is succeeding in remaining an issue of major concern.

On the sectarian scene there are three attractions:

1) The Christian - Moslem 'opposition' on certain aspects of general policy,

2) The confirmation of the belief that Lebanon is the country of sects, and

3) The concentration of authority in the hands of Maronites and Sunnites.

The future of the Christian-Moslem dilemma is not totally or even primarily dependent on Lebanese Christians and Moslems nor on their internal or domestic affairs. It is strongly connected to the future of Lebanon as a state, and this, in its turn, is an integral part of the general developments in the Arab world and the Near East. However if external factors are disregarded, there is evidence that
the Lebanese people can manage to live with the dilemma and to keep the problem under control. This was possible in the last decade and there is no conceivable reason why it should not continue to be possible.

Sectarianism continues in Lebanon, and the proposition that Lebanon is the country of sects is accepted by all sects. Minority sects find in the sectarian order a device for their protection and representation, and "majority" sects are content because they can play a major role in the country. All sects as such, with the possible exception of Sunnites, basically approve of the sectarian order. Religious leaders of all sects cling to it because its continuity is the surest way for their continual power and authority. What is important here is the fact that destroying the sectarian order has to come from without. As long as sectarianism is under control, it does not bear the seeds of its own destruction.

Another attraction seems to be unfolding; it is the over proportional increase in power of not only Maronites but also Sunnites. Maronites and Sunnites are assuming for themselves the task of representing the Christian and Muslim communities. Thus the two sects seem to believe that they are the "two wings" that are alone absolutely essential for the continuance of Lebanon. There is an increasing tendency of Maronite and Sunnite dominance in politics and administration, and it is not improbably that these two
sects will come to be the privileged sects.

(Secularism is discouraged in one way and encouraged in the other; it is pushed forward from one angle and pulled backward from the other. It is however losing ground because time is working against it. In the near future it might have flare ups, but as long as these flare ups remain under control and are eventually put down, secularism will continue to lose ground until its becomes a minor and insignificant factor in the Lebanese life.)

Only thirteen years ago and for the first time in centuries, Lebanon became an independent democratic country. This throws great responsibilities on the Lebanese, responsibilities they themselves have to shoulder. There are no more arbitrators to see that disputes between the various communities are resolved so as to keep the state functioning. There are no more alien authorities to determine the objectives and goals of Lebanon. The Lebanese themselves have to set their own goals, and as they have to live cooperatively, they can no longer afford to split fundamentally and decisively; they can no longer disagree basically on their objectives, for then the state would collapse and the independence would be gone. The internal challenge, which is that of antagonistic hereditary factionalism, has to be met genuinely and positively or else the Lebanese state would be under a permanent threat of dissolution.
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