

T
171

Translation Of Section Two,
Minutes And Memoirs
Of Sati' al-Husri's
* The Day of Maysalun *
With
Collation Notes

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Translation Of Section II

Of al-Husri's

The Day of Maysalun

With Notes

Foreward And Translator's

Notes

Among works in Arabic concerned with the Faysal Government at Damascus, Elie Kedourie speaks of Yaum Maysalun as being of exceptional artistic merit. For a solid, factual account of the period, however, he refers us elsewhere, notably to Amin Said's History Of The Great Arab Revolt, which he describes as being of basic importance to the period. (1)

Yet a comparison of Sati al-Husri's memoirs of the last days of the Faysal Government at Damascus with accounts of the period in English and French shows that al-Husri's artistry is also built on a sound historical foundation. The events momentous for the history of the Middle East

(1) Kedourie, Elie, England And The Middle East, London, 1952, p. 214.

against which the drama of Maysalun is played out are not, it is true, systematically recorded in Yaum Maysalun, but they are nonetheless accurately and comprehensively set forth in the background. Moreover, al-Husri's frequent references to background material - to mention a few instances, his calling attention to Count Sforza's "new policy in the Middle East," doubtless the results of the still-born treaty of St. Jean de Maurienne, his characterization of United States foreign policy as isolationist coupled with the American public's unusual interest in the Holy Land, his frequent quotations from the English and French press - show his exceptionally broad understanding of the times and make clear, incidentally, that the Faysal Government had available much of the information needed for the making of sound policy.

Also of special interest to the historian is al-Husri's discussion of the place of the Arab Revolt in the history of World War I and that of the Middle East, which is found in the concluding chapter of Section Two of Yaum Maysalun. Apart

from a dubious claim that a victorious Germany would have left the Middle East entirely free from occupation - made, moreover, by quotation from the speech of a member of the Turkish Parliament - and although contained in a letter to a member of the Kemalist Government at Ankara, and intended as a forceful appeal for assistance against the French, it is nonetheless characterized by a lack of extravagant claims and a balanced evaluation of the immediate affects of the Arab rebellion on the Middle East.

Particularly illuminating for the western reader, who usually searches in vain for a frank description of Middle Eastern personalities, are al-Husri's memoirs concerning his various government colleagues, particularly in their reaction to the Ultimatum Crisis, which forms the central core of the book. For while refraining from "directly censoring or laying blame"- to use his own expression - and although making clear that the Damascus Government was determined "to defend our rights with all the strength that God has given us,"

he also shows that there was much room for doubt, and a considerable difference of opinion among the Damascus Government's members as to how Syrian independence ought to be defended. Even Yusuf al-Azma, the hero and martyr of Maysalun, admitted that he had been trying to bluff the French about the strength of the Syrian army when "matters," in al-Husri's opinion, "had gotten beyond the limits of a bluff."

After the Government accepted the first Ultimatum, al-Khury and al-Shahbandar are pictured debating the reactions of the people, while the Damascus mob roams the streets outside shouting for the overthrow of the Government. A week later, when the Government retires to al-Kuswah, Prime Minister al-Atasi's panic, and his reluctance to take charge of publishing the reasons for his Government's withdrawal from Damascus, are charitably attributed to the "charged atmosphere" of the railroad station where the members of the Government are waiting to take the train.

The traitors and hirelings, as al-Husri

calls those who collaborated with the French, are never named as such. Al-Durubi, it is true, is reported to have come to an agreement with the French before the exile of the Faysal Government, but his death as the Prime Minister of a French sponsored Ministry is only the occasion for recalling his amusing characterization of the Hurani, at whose hand he met his death. Al-Ulshi, the chatterbox, whose indiscretions had made al-Husri's delicate negotiations with Gouraud considerably more difficult, is not mentioned again after the nightmare return from Aley, except for a passing reference to his inclusion in the al-Durubi Ministry.

But the most interesting portrait which emerges from the Ultimatum crisis is that of Faysal. First pictured by Yusuf al-Azma as "not having gone along with us on all of our policy," he is next seen in his besieged palace in a state of agitation "not known in him before . . . shouting, 'I will not be threatened.'" At the first stage of exile, before he had been formally asked by the

French to leave, he is still preoccupied and "inclined to conceal something from us." It turned out that he was "hoping for an understanding with the French," although, as al-Husri points out, "his optimism was very much misplaced."

It is only on board ship, during their subsequent trip to Europe that the author talks out past events with the King, "who many a time . . . changed his mind . . . and regretted some incidents and attitudes . . . (and) occasionally also directly blamed me."

"But above all, (king Faysal) thought about the future . . . and in less than a year after Maysalun," he became King of Iraq, and was able to profit "from the experience which he had acquired, both before and after Maysalun, in Syria and in Europe."

* * *

Notes

As regards the Translator's notes, it is

hoped that they support, in some measure at least, his conclusion that Yaum Maysalun was written with a scrupulous regard for historical fact.

With reference to the Preface notes, because one of the immediate causes of the "Replacement Crisis" was doubtless the longstanding, over-all British authority in Syria, coupled with France's failure to send an adequate army to the Middle East even after the September 1919 Franco-British Agreement allowed her to garrison the Syrian littoral on her own, an effort has been made to describe, in some detail, the Occupied Enemy Territory Administration in Syria. Moreover, it was doubtless these circumstances which misled "most Syrian Statesmen into the assumption . . . (held) to the point of its being an idée fixe . . . that the English would not allow the French to occupy the Syrian interior."

* * *

Text and Symbols Used in Translation

The text used for translation is the January 10, 1948 Edition, of the Kashshaf Press, Beirut, PP 90 - 189.

Footnotes which are an integral part of the translated text are indicated by a cross: (+).

Page numbers of the Arabic text are indicated in the upper left hand margin of each page of the translation.

The end of each page of the Arabic text is indicated by double bars' being placed after the translation of its final complete Arabic sentence: (//).

When Arabic sentences have been combined or divided in translation, a double asterisk is placed after the combined sentence, or after the last in the series of a divided one: **.

Words which have been added to the translation are placed in brackets.

The Translator's notes are numbered by Chapter and are found in the Appendix.

Table Of Contents

The Day Of Maysalun
Section Two
Minutes And Memoirs

<u>Chapter</u>	<u>Page No.</u>
Preface, The Replacement Crisis	1
November - 1919	2
The Ultimatum Crisis	14
On The Way To Aley	40
In Aley With General Gouraud	49
At Damascus	81
The Day Of Maysalun And The Week Following	97
Between Damascus And al-Kuswah	98
Conclusion, After Leaving Syria	122
* * *	
Notes	186
Bibliography	217

Preface

The Replacement Crisis

196/

The memoirs which I am publishing today in the following pages are limited to those which are directly connected with the Day of Maysalun. But I saw that I would want to write an introduction to my recollections of another crisis which preceded Maysalun by eight months. This was the crisis which resulted from the decision to replace the British by the French army (1) in some sections of the Eastern District. This I wanted to do because I believed that the referred to decision was, to a degree, the first attempt to realize the objectives which the French had set for themselves in their last ultimatum issued shortly before Maysalun. Thus it is possible for me to say that the events ending on the day of Maysalun were really only the military movements aimed at putting an end to the effective

resistance which had begun in the Eastern District (2) at the time of the British Army replacement crisis. //

* * *

November - 1919

06/07

Several days after my retirement had become effective and while I was busy reading at home, I was surprised by a late evening visit from Yasin al-Hashimi (1) who began to talk to me with great care and show me the dangerous changes which had occurred in the foreign situation during the last few days.

Yasin began the conversation by saying:

"I have come to ask you to put aside educational matters now, and to be present at the Director's Council (2) tomorrow in order to take part with us in repelling the great danger which has lately befallen us . . . "

I had offered my resignation from the Department of Public Education because of differences with the Military Governor General (3) concerning many

07/08/

of the Government's procedures and activities, in general, and with reference to the organization of educational affairs, in particular. These differences had been going on for a long time but, during the last few days of October, they had reached such a degree of acuteness that I was certain of the impossibility of fruitful work and believed in the necessity of resigning in order to rid myself of responsibility for activities which were contrary to the principles which I held and the plans which I desired to follow. Actually, Prince Zaid, who at the time was deputizing for his brother, Prince Faysal, (4) did not accept my resignation and asked me to continue in office. But I saw no advantage in bearing administrative responsibility under these circumstances, so I actually retired from my position and voluntarily remained confined at home in spite of Prince Zaid's insistence and the intervention of many friends.

Yasin's previously mentioned visit had come during these days of retirement and seclusion.//

Yasin, explaining to me in every detail the foreign crisis which had occurred since my retire-

198/

ment, talked with ardor and concern in order to convince me of the necessity of postponing matters connected with education and of returning to work without delay.

"The English have decided to withdraw their armies from the Western and Eastern Districts so that the French army can replace them in the sub-districts of Rasheya, Hasbeya and Baalbek. * * They have announced this decision to us and informed us that the occupation of these sub-districts by the French army will soon be carried out in fulfillment of this decision - that is in complete accord with the Sykes-Picot Agreement. So if we permit them to take these steps now, we will thereby completely lose all hope of retrieving the situation later on. It is essential that we prevent the enforcement of these decisions and the occupation of these sub-districts whatever the cost."

Then he said very movingly:

"The Military Governor General favors peace and is disinclined to fight, while our other collea-

∟98/

gues are very fearful and hesitant and ∟show/ little ∟disposition to be/ courageous and daring. Therefore it is essential that you also come to the Council which meets tomorrow so that we can overcome the spirit of hesitation and defeatism, together, and decide on resistance and defense. I believe that you will agree with me that this problem is extremely grave and should take precedence over all educational questions, however important they may be."

And he completed his remarks with these words:

"If you are not present at the council, I am afraid that we will not obtain the necessary majority for a decision in favor of resistance. Therefore, I personally ask you to postpone the education question, for the time being, and help us to handle this grave problem before it is too late."

The replacement crisis, as I had previously observed, affected me very profoundly and I found myself obliged to admit that this critical problem should take precedence over all those which had

[98][99]

induced me to resign and retire. // However, I wanted to make certain about the real state of our armed forces, so I asked Yasin this question:

"Do you believe that the army which we now possess is sufficient for resistance and defense?"

Without hesitating, he replied to this question saying:

"I do not doubt it at all."

I knew that Yasin possessed distinct military abilities, which were appreciated by both the Ottoman and German military commands, so it was therefore incumbent on me to rely on his judgement and necessary that I quickly carry out the duty which was mine in this grave situation. I therefore decided to accede to Yasin's request. **

Abandoning my retirement the next morning, I was present at the Director's Council and supported the resistance idea to the maximum. And thus it quickly won out over the spirit of hesitation and defeatism. ** Even the Military Governor

[/92/

General was obliged to go along with us and share in the resistance decision. (5)

The Government immediately made all necessary arrangements for preventing the occupation of the sub-districts, and both the French and English were given to understand that the advance of the French army into any part of the Eastern District would inevitably lead to bloody clashes and serious consequences.

The Allies tried to alleviate the offensiveness of this decision of theirs by saying that "it was a temporary decision which would have no affect whatever on the final settlement." (6) But such interpretations and declarations no longer deceived anyone, and they did not succeed in removing the anxiety concerning the fate of the country which had begun to preoccupy the minds /of the people/. **

Among the several measures taken by the Government was the convocation of the Syrian General Congress so that the opinion of the people might be made known in this grave situation. //

/100/

This Congress met (7) on the 22 of November, 1919 (having previously adjourned after it had expressed the people's opinion to the (8) American Inquiry Commission), and listened to a speech given by the Military Governor in the name of Prince Zaid. Then a secret session was held which issued a firm report declaring that the "duty of the Nation, as exemplified in the aspiration and desires of the people, requires the defense of national unity and independence in accordance with the people's expressed desires, as well as guarantees of the country's unity, when in peril of loss." And the report ended with the proposal that the complete independence of the Syrian Fatherland be declared "free from intervention - protection or guardianship - within the boundaries which the Syrian Congress specified in its report submitted to the American International Committee." (9)

All the newspapers, parties, clubs, and associations also began to show great interest in the matter supporting the idea of defending the country and its independence in the course

400/401/

of various demonstrations, and in numerous speeches and articles.

At the same time, negotiations and a large amount of correspondence were carried on between Damascus and Beirut, on the one hand, and between these two cities and Paris, on the other, and, in the third place, between Prince Faysal and Clemenceau in Paris with the result that the French were obliged to abandon their plan to occupy the sub-districts and were content to send liason officers to each of the towns of Hasbeya, Rasheya and Ryak. (10)

And thus the crisis of replacing the British army ended in the interests of Syria. Consequently, the British army was evacuated from the sub-districts and from all parts of the eastern district without its place being taken by the French. ** //

* * *

I learned afterwards, when I studied King Faysal's papers and became acquainted with

401/2 ✓

the files containing his memoranda concerning Clemenceau, that the question of replacing the British army was one of the problems which had interested the French a long time before the crisis itself. Previously, during the last few days of Prince Faysal's first trip (11) to Paris, and before the departure of the Commission of Inquiry for Syria, Clemenceau had talked with him about this subject. He had said to him during a meeting which had taken place between them April 16, 1919, at the War Ministry:

"The English are going to withdraw from Damascus and Aleppo, and I should like to have our army assume the military position of the English there."

Prince Faysal replied immediately:

"I am unable to agree with this point of view. Syria does not need a foreign army and if, in the future, she should need foreign soldiers, then she will not hesitate to ask you for a helping hand."

401/2 ✓

But Clemenceau replied to the Prince's explanation with the following words:

"I do not want to occupy the country. I say this knowing conditions as they are now, and if the matter were referred to me alone, I would not disagree with you for one minuite, but would concur in everything you want. However, the French people will not accept there not being some indication of the French presence in Syria. If France is not represented by her flag and army in Syria, then the poeple will consider it a dishonour like the desertion of a soldier from the field of battle."

Then he added to these remarks of his the following words:

"We do not want to send a large force, but only a small contingent . . . and there will be nothing to prevent you from putting your flag beside ours."

Thus in the eyes of the French people, the non-representation of France in Syria - by her flag

~~101/102~~

and her army - would be a dishonourable affair,
like the disgrace of military desertion !//

When I read these remarks, which were made by Clemenceau seven months before the replacement crisis had occurred, I found it strange that during the crisis itself he had withdrawn his insistence on occupation, and I searched for the reasons for this withdrawal.

It seemed to me that his retraction had been the result of the following political reasons:

First, at the time, the French did not have sufficient military forces to impose their will on the Syrian Government. (12)

Second, they had not yet come to a mutual understanding with the British which would guarantee them freedom of action within the interior of Syria.(13)

Third, at that time Clemenceau was negotiating with King Faysal to conclude a treaty which would reconcile Arab aspirations and French interests. Therefore, so long as he could hope to solve the entire Syrian problem by means of negotiations and

∟102∟

mutual understanding, he did not think it was sensible to muddy the atmosphere, which had prevailed at these negotiations ∟up to that time∟, by occupying a few small cities.

But in any case, whether for these reasons or for others, Clemenceau had effectively abandoned the earlier decision to replace the British army by the French in the sub-districts under discussion, and thus these regions remained under the Syrian Government's administration, and in charge of the Syrian security forces until the ultimatum crisis occurred.

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Led by Poincaré, French statesmen bitterly criticized the policy which Clemenceau had followed in this question, and they claimed that the concessions which he had made at this time were the original source of all the problems with which France was afterward faced in Syria until Maysalun. (14) //

1037 /

The Ultimatum Crisis

July, 1920

Day to day news coming to us from Paris and Beirut informed us that the French were undertaking to mobilize a powerful military force on the borders of the Eastern District.

From secret ^ASûr^xété Générale reports, we also learned that French lackeys and their agents were carrying on a widespread propaganda campaign in various parts of the Eastern District and that traitors, among civil servants and non-civil servants, working for the account of France, were foisting various intrigues to propagate a spirit of discontent and defeatism among the citizens.

Compared to this, the recruitment movement in the Eastern District was driving ahead at top speed. (1) The Defense Minister was sending us a series of bulletins with the object of keeping us informed about the progress of this movement in the various parts of the country. The newspapers continued to publish enthusiastic

403/404

articles to kindle the fires of nationalism in the hearts of the people. From time to time, the crowd joined in clamorous demonstrations in the streets and public squares, making known in this way the readiness of all to make every kind of sacrifice for the independence of the country and the glory of the fatherland. //

After the long months of hesitation and waiting through which Syria had passed since the announcement of the Armistice and the end of the World War, everything now pointed to the approach of a grave crisis which would finally decide the fate of the country. With the receipt of news concerning a French ultimatum, this crisis suddenly burst forth on the 11th of July.

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King Faysal had decided to go to Europe in order to present the Syrian question to the Peace Conference, so he sent to Beirut Nuri al-Said, who was among the King's aides at that time, in

104/2 ✓

order that the preparation of travel facilities might be requested from General Gouraud. But the General declined to accept this request and informed Nuri al-Said that an official ultimatum had already been prepared and that he would send it to the King in a few days time. King Faysal would not be permitted to travel to Europe until he had accepted the terms contained in the ultimatum. General Gouraud mentioned to Nuri al-Said the most important of the terms which would be demanded in the ultimatum. They were:

- A. Place the Ryak-Aleppo railroad at the disposal of the French Army.
- B. Acceptance of the French Mandate.
- C. Cancellation of compulsory recruitment, and the demobilization of recruits.
- D. Acceptance of the paper currency issued by the Bank of Syria
- E. Punishment of the criminals who had freely indulged their hostility toward France. ** (2)

The news of this ultimatum and its terms raised a great deal of anxiety and excitement in

104/105

all government circles, and among all classes of people.

As for the attitude which the Government should take in the face of demands such as these, it had already been fixed by all the events which had occurred during the last few months. The existing Government in Syria had immediately assumed the responsibilities of authority after the announcement of the San Remo decision concerning the Mandates. **/(3) It had openly announced that its primary mission was the perfection and organization of means to defend the country's independence and, since assuming authority, it had taken a series of effective measures to guarantee this defense. The Syrian General Congress, which represented the people, had also approved all of these measures. All of this had made it mandatory for the Government to refuse the French demands altogether.

At this juncture, the government also saw the wisdom of appealing to the conscience of the civilized world and the principles of the Allied

405/L /

Powers as well as that of asking for the reference of its case to arbitration. And this was done immediately without waiting for the delivery of the official ultimatum.

In addition, the Government decided to announce its stand to the nation and the world from the platform of the Syrian General Congress and, the 13th of July, a declaration was read which concluded with the following terms:

"Our Government, having protested the acts of General Gouraud, which are not in accord with the alliance, and having requested the reference of our case to international arbitration, declare from this platform to the nation, and to all the world:

1. We desire only peace and the preservation of our independence and our honour, inviolate.

2. We are innocent of all the charges preferred against us which seek to accuse us of desiring the disruption of good relations with our French ally and with our other allies.

∟105/∟106/

3. We do not refuse to negotiate: we are prepared to enter into ∟negotiations/ and, this being the case, a delegation under the chairmanship of his Majesty the King is ready to leave to continue ∟negotiations/. We will accept any solution which does not infringe on our honour and independence, and which is founded upon a basis of right and independence.

4. We are in all ways ready and unalterably determined to defend our honour and rights with all the strength that God has given us.

"This is ∟our/ present position, gentlemen set forth before you. May God be with us if we seek anything but our rights, and the defense of our existence." //

The official ultimatum arrived the day after this announcement was read.

And it appears that the French purposely delivered the official ultimatum on the anniversary of the ∟French/ Revolution ∟because/ they limitlessly pride themselves on this ∟event/ holding that it is the source of freedom for the entire world.

406/L /

The ultimatum began with a long introduction that reviewed the events which had occurred since the withdrawal of the British army, and charged the Syrian Government with organizing guerilla bands, which had attacked the French army and instigated the people to hatred of the French. Then the terms which France was demanding from Syria were recalled - they were the same as those communicated to Nuri al-Said orally - and it was made clear that the free disposal of the Ryak-Aleppo railroad could only be accomplished by the French army's occupying the railroad stations of Ryak, Baalbek, Homs, Hama, and Aleppo, including the city of Aleppo itself. **

In addition to all of this, the ultimatum stated that the five terms having been submitted as a whole, their division would not be acceptable, and it would be necessary to either reject or accept them as a whole, without exception; fulfillment would have to be completed within four days, or before midnight of the 18th of July and, in case of acceptance, it would be necessary to issue orders

406/407

to the Syrian authorities not to obstruct the movement of the French army which would advance to occupy the previously mentioned stations. Similarly, it would also be necessary to issue the necessary orders to implement the carrying out of the terms before the 18th of the month, so that the fulfillment of the referred to conditions would be completed altogether by the end of the month. And in case of refusal, the warning declared, the French Government would be free to act, the moderate guarantees stipulated in the ultimatum would not be sufficient, and the responsibility for the harm which would befall the country in this eventuality would rest on the shoulders of the Damascus Government, alone. //

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Everything indicated that Damascus would be the basic objective of the French Army's movements. And, of course, the distance which separated that city from the French bases was very small, not exceeding sixty kilometers. This unusual situation quickly made the Government's position

∟102∟

critical. So I decided to submit to my colleagues in the Ministry a recommendation to transfer the Treasury and the important archives to Deraa preparatory, if necessary, to transferring the Government ∟there also∟. But Ala al-Din al-Durubi took to disapproving of this suggestion, in every way possible, saying:

"You don't know the people of Huran. By God, they will cut our throats."

And he repeated the words ∟cut throat∟ several times while striking his right hand over his left in imitation of the motion of slaughtering. ** (4)

I tried to defend my point of view by showing the necessity for precautions. But al-Durubi repeated his carving ∟motion∟ several times, each time with the ∟same∟ movement of his hands. As for the rest of ∟our∟ colleagues, they showed no interest in the matter. Even Yusuf al-Azma, himself, did little about the question. Faced with this unanimity, I saw no reason to insist.

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∟107/ ∟108/

Yusuf al-Azma used to act energetically, and he gave the impression of great optimism in everything he did. (5) He even wanted to start issuing official bulletins about the military movements. But we objected to this and recommended that he wait and see in order that it would not appear to the world that we were the aggressors, after we had declared our readiness to submit our case to arbitration.

Yusuf completed the necessary military arrangements and asked us to name the leaders who would be charged with administering the movement on the various fronts. ** The most important front was that of Majdal Anjar, the leadership of which was entrusted to Prince Zaid and the Army's Chief of Staff, Yasin al Hashimi. //

After the evacuation crisis, which I mentioned earlier, Yasin al-Hashimi was interned by the English and he did not get out of internment, nor return to Damascus, for two months. (6) After his return from internment, I had met him several times, but following my last meeting with him more

108/ /

than a month had passed, so I decided that it would be appropriate to visit him again before he left for the front.

I went to see him at his home. But I emerged from this visit completely at a loss, my mind confused, because Yasin told me very frankly and with the firmness of certainty:

"The present army cannot defend the country . . . at the outside estimate, it cannot hold out against the enemy more than two hours." **

This statement altogether contradicted the spirit of optimism which had radiated from Yusuf al-Azama's conversation. I found this altogether extraordinary and put this question to Yasin:

"During the British Army replacement crisis, did you not tell me that we could defend ourselves very easily?"

Yasin answered this question without hesitation:

"Yes, but the situation has greatly changed

/108//109/

since that date. The French have brought up new forces, while we have done nothing worth mentioning." (7)

To make it clearer, he added this:

"The artillery units which pass before you in the reviews have very little ammunition and /what they have/ would be insufficient in a war lasting more than one hour. It is possible to say that if the army is involved in an organized war, after two hours, it will be without ammunition." (8)

These statements shattered my morale and put me into a /state/ of profound perplexity. //

After I left Yasin's house, my thoughts turned towards Mustafa Ni'mah. I had known him well during his service as the Military Governor General's deputy, and I had found him to be a man of peaceful intentions and good conscious. So I went to his home and asked his opinion about the general military situation. He answered me with perfect calm:

/109/

"We will fight when we are ordered to, without thinking about whether we will win the battle or lose it."

Then I said to him:

"But I would like to know. Do we have sufficient ammunition for a serious war?" **

He answered my question with great simplicity:

"The truth is that we do not have ammunition in sufficient quantity. But God, may he be praised and exalted, will make things easy for us and enable us to seize enemy supplies in the first clash which takes place, and then we will fight with enemy ammunition - taken from him - as happened in the wars of West Tripoli."

And this remark altogether astonished me because I very well knew that the engagements which would take place in the mountains, and on the plains, of Syria would not be comparable to the wars which had occurred on the deserts and beaches of West Tripoli.

/109//110/

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After this meeting, I decided that it was my duty to make the matter clear to Yusuf al-Azma, himself. So I met him and told him what I had heard from Yasin, and then I asked him if this was in agreement with the actual situation.

He did not conceal the truth of the matter from me, and added in Turkish:

"Yes, my dear friend, I was bluffing in order to deceive the French."

Then I said to him:

"But you realize that matters have gotten beyond the limits of a bluff. We are faced with actual threats. Can we hope to repel the enemy by force of arms?" //

In replying to me the tone of his voice indicated profound regret:

"If, from the beginning, King Faysal had gone along with us on all our policy, then probably we could have done something . . . but now . . ." (9)

410

And then the gravity of the situation was clearly revealed to me. For the Eastern District, which was under our control, had been deprived of a seacoast and, except for the deserts of Nejd and the Hejaz, was surrounded on all sides by territory occupied by the English or the French. Consequently, without the agreement of France or England our provisioning in war munitions - especially artillery - was difficult, for it was natural that the French should refuse us these supplies, while the English were obliged to follow a policy similar to that of the French. And it should be added that even during the war, they had both furnished supplies to the Arab army parsimoniously. ** The army's need for artillery was especially great. All the efforts it had made to supply itself with these weapons had gone in vain. For these reasons Syria, its army without enough supplies to hold out against the attacks of a regular army for more than a few hours, was taken unawares by the latest ultimatum. These facts, and the military secrets which I suddenly learned about in this way, overturned my conception of the crisis, head over heels.

410/111/

To refuse the terms of the ultimatum would result in war, and war would end in the rapid defeat of the army, while Syria, falling under French administration - direct administration - would lose everything, without having the honour of dying in defending herself. Therefore, it would be more in the interests of the country to accept the ultimatum terms and then to make an effort to mitigate and alleviate them by means of negotiations and diplomatic memoranda.

After I had formed this opinion for myself, I did not hesitate to confront my colleagues with the whole question. // I then learned that most of them had been convinced of the necessity of accepting the ultimatum even before they knew of the critical military situation, but they did not dare reveal this opinion of theirs to me . However, when I confronted them with the question, they took to supporting the idea of accepting the terms firmly and openly. **

As for King Faysal, I learned that he was also convinced of the necessity of accepting the

111

terms. I also learned that he had met with Yasin al-Hashimi and, after this meeting, he was even more convinced of it than before. ** What had strengthened this conviction of his was that the English, themselves, had advised him not to refuse the terms. (10) But nevertheless, the King wanted to assure himself again about the military situation, so he called the important men in the army to a meeting. And the impossibility of effective defense also emerged from this meeting.

Thus general opinion was in agreement on the need to accept the terms.

* * *

But General Gouraud's letter, which enclosed the ultimatum, had also frankly asked for a change of government. (11) Thus it said:

"The carrying out of the guarantees which I have the honour of presenting to your Royal Highness cannot be depended upon if the present government remains in office. Consequently, its remaining in power will imply hostility to France because it has

411/112/

exerted every effort to draw your country into war and deliver it up to disaster." **

Thus it was necessary for our government to resign and withdraw from power immediately. As for the new government, public interests would best be served by having Yasin al-Hashimi preside over its formation.

Therefore, King Faysal called Yasin al-Hashimi and charged him with forming the ministry, and he consulted General Gouraud and asked him for an extension of the time limit by two more days. General Gouraud agreed to extend the ultimatum time until the end of the twentieth day of the month, but Yasin remained hesitant during part of this period and did not make his decision quickly. ** // I learned from him afterwards that before making a final decision he had wanted to get in touch with the French to find out their intentions. When he did not achieve the results desired, he decided to excuse himself from forming the ministry, pointing out that it would be preferable that the acceptance of the ultimatum terms be completed in the hands of the existing government, and that he would look into

/112/

the formation of a new government after the end of the ultimatum crisis.

Consequently, the ministry remained in office until the last day of the time assigned for accepting, or refusing, the ultimatum terms and, finally deciding to accept the terms in the afternoon of the twentieth, it took all the measures necessary to carry out this decision. And among these measures was the issuing of the orders necessary to demobilize the army.

After the activity in connection with accepting the ultimatum had ended, Faris al-Khury said philosophically:

"There is no doubt that we undertook what was required by national duty and dictated by the interests of the country. But the people will not appreciate this and will think that we missed their opportunity for victory. There will always be some of them who will say: 'I wish they had rejected the ultimatum and chosen resistance and war.'" **

But Abd al-Rahman al-Shahbandar took to replying to these observations by saying:

"No, sooner or later the people will appre-

~~412~~ /113/

ciate this. They will understand that we have rid them of an extremely difficult situation, and they will realize that by doing this we have joined those who deserve their fullest appreciation."

As for myself, I paid no attention to the remarks of the first or their rejection by the second, because I felt very sincerely that we had undertaken to carry out a painful duty, and I simply did not want to think of anything beyond this painful duty. //

The decision which the Government had taken in this matter aroused a great deal of agitation in public opinion. Because the people were ignorant of the real reasons which had prompted the Government to accept the terms, they thought it had done so from love of authority and with the object of remaining in office. ** They did not know that the ultimatum letter had asked for a change of Government and that acceptance of the ultimatum terms meant, at the same time, accepting the abandonment of office.

Consequently noisy demonstrations began to call for the overthrow of the ministry and urged the people to defend the nation. Groups of demonstra-

413

tors turned toward the citadel with the object of breaking into it and arming themselves with the arms there, thus compelling Yasin al-Hashimi to go to the citadel himself to turn back the agitators.

Other groups of demonstrators, shouting for the fall of the ministry, started to rove the streets and approach, little by little, the King's palace. And, from time to time, from among the demonstrators, some voices were raised which accused Faysal of treason and called for his overthrow with that of the ministry. **

The King was very disturbed by the reports concerning these demonstrations. And when the news came to him that the demonstrators were approaching the palace, his agitation rose in a form not known in him before, for he began to shout saying, "I will not be threatened," and he wanted to order out the guard to disperse the crowd of demonstrators. ** Faced with these critical developments, we all began to discuss a plan which would include the non-withdrawal of the guards from the palace, on the one hand, while preventing the demonstrators from

/113/114/

reaching its neighborhood, on the other, and we only agreed on /means for doing this/ after an exhausting effort. (12)

We remained at the palace until after midnight trying to quiet the King's nerves, on the one hand, while taking the necessary measures to calm the agitation of the crowd, on the other, and I did not return home until shortly before dawn. ** // I threw myself down on the bed, exhausted, and began to think of the difficult tasks which would weigh on our shoulders during the days to come. I believed that our ministry would now definitely, and finally, resign from office and I with it. ** And I began to think of the civil phase of the struggle with the French, which would begin after the completion of this military one.

* * *

But the next day we were surprised by fresh news, /the nature of/ which had not occurred to any of us. For in the morning, news reached us that the French army had advanced from Chtura and Zahle

414 /115/

necessary orders for the units to remain in the localities where they were already stationed, pending the issuance of new orders fixing their next destination. //

In the afternoon Cousse came back and said:

"The delivery to General Gouraud of the telegram concerning the acceptance of the ultimatum was delayed because the wires were cut in the vicinity of Sirghaya. Thus the General issued marching orders before the telegram reached him. **

Cousse gave this account of the affair and suggested the sending of one of the Government's men to Aley in order to try and reach a mutual understanding about the question with Gouraud.

And why I don't know, but my colleagues immediately concurred in conferring the responsibility for this mission on me. Then King Faysal, who was present at the meeting, approved this proposal and ordered his secretary, Awni Abd al-Hadi, to prepare letters of delegation. Afterwards, he asked me to see him in his room, before I left the Palace, in

/115/

order to take delivery of the letter and to receive certain instruction.

In the meantime, Yusuf al-Azma approached me and, whispering in my ear, said:

"I am going to the front to reorganize the army within the limit of possibilities, and I hope that you will so act as to gain for me as much time as possible."

Wishing him well, I said good-bye and then went into King Faysal's room where he showed me two telegrams about which we had known nothing. The first of these, dated the 18/19 of July, 1920, was directed from him to General Gouraud and informed the General of the decision to accept the terms. The second, the General's answer to this telegram, thanked King Faysal for accepting the terms and asked him to send a final acceptance telegram mentioning the terms in detail. **

The existence of these two telegrams was to be of great importance because they were sufficient to do away with the excuse which the General was

/115/116/

using - according to Cousse's statement - for giving /his army/ marching orders. I therefore carefully took copies of these two telegrams and /noted/ their dates. I then said good-bye to the King and left his room to get ready to carry out the grave mission which had fallen on my shoulders in these critical circumstances. ** //

When I returned to the ministry room with the intention of saying good-bye to /the ministers/, they suggested to me that I should be accompanied by a military aide who could be consulted, whenever necessary, about military matters. I was just about to agree to this proposal when Abd al-Rahman al-Shahbandar came up to me, (he had been talking in a corner of the room with Jamil al-Ulshi), and said:

"I suggest that you take along as aide, Jamil al-Ulshi." **

I knew that /al-Ulshi/ was one of His Majesty the King's aides and that, previously, he had been representative at Beirut, but my knowledge of him personally had been limited to a few meetings which had occurred here and there. Thus I knew nothing

/116/

about his character or leanings. However, I saw no need to inquire /further/ and, not believing that military questions would be a subject for discussions with General Gouraud, I agreed to /al-Shahbandar's/ suggestion.

* * *

On The Way To Aley

I left Damascus in the afternoon, in an open car, accompanied by Colonel Toulat (1) and Jamil al-Ulshi.

Our car moved along very slowly because the road was crowded with cars, convoys and military units. And the car was obliged to stop, from time to time, waiting for the road to be clear of traffic.

And when our car stopped at Duma, because of the large number of soldiers we happened to meet there, al-Ulshi began to question them /concerning/ where they came from, where they were going, what their number was, and what they were doing. And because Toulat understood Arabic, I noted that

416/4117/

questions such as these were very harmful to our interests. So I said to al-Ulshi in Turkish:

"Don't forget that our friend knows Arabic. Consequently, he will profit from these questions and learn by means of them a great deal about our military situation. Therefore, you should not ask questions such as these of any of the soldiers. ** //

And so in accordance with this warning of mine, al-Ulshi stopped his inquiries. But when our car stopped another time, he again began to question the soldiers whom we chanced upon there, deliberately forgetting my first warning. So I was obliged to repeat my remarks in Turkish and in a firmer tone than the first time. **

"Did I not tell you that you should not ask such questions?" You are a soldier, and you should be more appreciative of the dangers which might result for us . . ."

And when our car stopped a third time, I decided to repeat beforehand my previous warning so he would not forget and take to talking to the soldiers again.

/117/

After these repeated warnings, Jamil al-Ulshi gave up his conversations with the soldiers, but he /now/ started to talk with Toulat in an oddly prating sort of way, strongly criticizing the advance of the French army. So then Toulat said:

"The question is irrelevant. I believe that the problem will be easily solved and that the army will stop advancing . . . the Chief of Staff and the officers will enter Damascus, as token satisfaction, and that will be the end of it."

Without /stopping/ to consider, al-Ulshi began to reply to Toulat's remarks in a stronger tone than the first time. Consequently, I was obliged to caution him about avoiding discussions and to be careful about showing his opinions on each, and every, subject.

When we had passed Khan Maysalun and arrived at the base of the mountains overlooking the Wadi al-Zarzur, we saw a large number of troops and learned that Yusuf al-Azma had chosen this place

~~117~~ /118/

for concentrating his troops and making a new front. He had started to fortify the district by digging trenches in various places.

Our officers then told us what had happened there a short time before. Just before sunset, the French army had arrived at the mouth of the Wadi al-Kurn, where their scouts were observed with two tanks. Our soldiers immediately met them with rifle and artillery fire, which obliged them to withdraw from the entrance of the valley. // And since the scouts' withdrawal from the mouth of the valley, no one knew their whereabouts . .

From all this, it appeared to us that we were approaching the area of French army movements and that in a short time we would meet some of its units.

When I said good-bye to all of our people and went toward the car, Yusuf al-Azma took me by the arm and whispered in my ear:

"I repeat what I asked of you at Damascus. Save for us as much time as possible."

∟118∟

* * *

Our car descended the mountain slopes very slowly because of the roughness of the road, and the many curves. Then we cut across the Wadi al-Zarzur laterally and, arriving at the entrance of the Wadi al-Kurn, we began to go along the twisting road which extends throughout the length of this valley.

The darkness of evening was beginning to fall, and we were obliged to go slower than before. After we had cut across the hollow of the valley for a few kilometers, we happened upon a French unit, with two tanks, which was cautiously and warily retreating. When the officer who was leading the unit saw Colonel Toulat in his French military uniform in our car, he approached and began to tell us in a bewildered and excited voice, what had happened to them a ∟short∟ time before.

"They fired on us and obliged us to retreat."

Toulat immediately got out of the car and went with the officer to the side of the road at a

418/4119/

distance from us. After talking to him for a while, he returned and said that we would soon reach Expeditionary Force Headquarters. ** //

* * *

The car moved along the curves of the Wadi al-Kurn until we reached the Judaidah desert. We saw a great many lights in the distance and learned that it was there that the Expeditionary Force Command was camped.

When we reached the camp, Toulat got out of the car, left us, and went toward the tents in order to meet the Commander of the Expeditionary Force. He was away for some time. Then he returned and went with us to the Command tent and there introduced to me, General Goybet, the Expeditionary Force Commander, and Colonel Pettelat, General Gouraud's chief staff officer.

After I had met these two officers/ I began the conversation by saying:

"The Government accepted all of the terms sent in the ultimatum and, in accordance with these

119

terms, demobilized the army. No doubt you have verified this during your advance here, for you have not come across any military units . . . it therefore appears that your army's advance was the result of an unfortunate misunderstanding. ** I am now on my way to meet General Gouraud at Aley. I therefore request that your army stays where it now is until I am able to meet him.

But Colonel Pettelat replied to my observations by saying:

"We are soldiers who know nothing about the workings of politics and we never think about them. Our authorities give us orders to march, and we march. And we will not go about putting a stop to our march to carry out a plan contained in any political observations." **

After these decisive comments, he continued the conversation saying:

"However, since we are responsible for military movements, we can conclude a twenty-four hour truce with you on the basis of the acceptance of a few military conditions."

/119/120/

Saying this, he led me to a large table on which was detailed map, lighted by a lamp, and indicated on the map the location of the camp. Then he said:

"We are now in this position. ** // We see no objections to an agreement to stop here until the morning of day after tomorrow, providing that you accept the following conditions:

"First, the valley which passes below the Khan Maysalun slopes will be considered as the separation line between the two armies and, consequently, the Arab army will withdraw beyond this valley and the French army will acquire freedom of movement on this side of it.

"Secondly, the supplies which the French army will need while it is stationed here will be transported by rail from Ryak to the al-Takiyya station.

As he talked Pettelat indicated the valley, station, and railroad on the map. Then he concluded his remarks saying:

"But if you do not accept these two terms, then we shall be obliged to complete the carrying

/120/

out of the plan which we have set for ourselves." **

What I knew about the latest position of the Syrian army left me no room for hesitating about accepting the two conditions.

So I returned to the Maysalun foot hills to carry the news of this armistice to our front and to announce its terms to our command.

There I met Yusuf al-Azma and Prince Zaid and told them what I had agreed to with the Expeditionary Force Command. I noted that they were very much pleased with this development. **

* * *

After that, we returned to al-Judaidah and from there continued toward Aley.

When we had cut across the Judaidah desert and had entered into the valley which comes after it, we began to meet a great many convoys of cars, mules, soldiers, and artillery going toward al-Judaidah. Thus we were obliged to stop, from time to time, and we drove along the whole length of the Wadi al-Harir

120/121/

very slowly. ** //

At dawn, we reached al-Murayjat and began to see along the sides of the road piles of munitions and supplies.

In the morning, we finally reached Aley and went into a large garden. Toulat led us to a corner of it overlooking the sea and Beirut and then left us for a long time. Then he came back to tell me that General Gouraud was ready to see me in his office.

* * *

In Aley With General
Gouraud

The General received me standing in front of his large desk and, after he shook hands with me with his left hand, he motioned for me to sit down on the chair placed in front of the desk. (1) While he was standing, I noticed that the sleeve of his right arm was suspended from his shoulder, empty . . . and I remembered that he had lost his

421/

right arm in the Dardenelles campaign. (2)

The General sat on his chair with military bearing, his torso straight, his head held high and, after he had read the letter of delegation signed by King Faysal, he began to talk in a quiet, cold tone.

He began by enumerating the stipulations mentioned in the ultimatum, one after the other, with the exact wording and details, as if he were repeating its text, out loud and by heart, without omitting or adding anything. **

Afterwards, he mentioned how it had been necessary for him to send the ultimatum, and how he had accepted the extension of the time limit by two more days - until he came to the question of answering the acceptance. Then he said:

"I waited for your answer until midnight, and continued to wait for a while after that. When no answer came to me, I issued orders to the army to advance . . . as for the telegram accepting the terms, it reached me half an hour after the orders

421 / 122 /

to advance were issued."

He said this and then stopped talking. //

Without once interrupting, I listened to his prolonged remarks very attentively. When I saw that he had stopped talking, I followed up his last words by saying:

"At the same time, you must inevitably have known that the telegram in question was delivered to your Damascus representative six hours before midnight."

He answered me immediately:

"Yes, I knew that too. But unfortunately the telegram in question was delayed in transmission by more than ten hours. I afterwards learned that the delay had resulted from the cutting of the telegraph wires between Zabadani and Sirghaya which, I also found out, was the act of one of the guerilla bands."

Then he followed his remarks with a sharp comment:

/122/

"Since previously, the policy followed by your government allowed for the formation of guerilla bands, from the nature of the case, the responsibility for this delay must fall on the shoulders of your government.

Then I decided to go into the incident further, and I said to him:

"Your representative must inevitably have informed you that /my/ government was not satisfied with /just/ accepting the terms, but it also undertook to carry them out. It issued orders to demobilize the army. It withdrew units from their bases and, exposing itself to public indignation in carrying out /these measures/, it was obliged to use arms to quiet down public agitation. From the very first step of their advance, your Expeditionary Force leaders themselves must inevitably have witnessed, with their own eyes, the fulfillment of the terms, because they did not encounter any military force in Majdal Anjar in spite of its strategic importance, nor did they come across any prolonged resistance at Wadi al-Harir despite its natural

~~422~~ /123/

defense features." //

Gouraud replied to me:

"Yes, I know, and acknowledge, all of that. But what could I do? The telegram did not reach me on time."

Then I thought of reminding him of the personal telegram which King Faysal had sent to him.

"But General, you will no doubt remember that King Faysal sent to you a telegram dated the 18/19 of July informing you that he had accepted all of the conditions. This telegram was delivered to you, the proof of it being that you sent a reply thanking King Faysal and expressing your satisfaction." (3)

Here, the General interrupted me saying:

"Yes, but in the reply itself I asked for an official confirmation of the contents of the telegram. Also, my request was not restricted to acceptance of the terms, but included implementation of the terms as well."

"The request set forth in the ultimatum

123/124/

included that of starting implementation, and this had become effective. As for completing implementation, the ultimatum itself fixed a longer time period, and this period, according to the text of the ultimatum, extends to the last of the month and has not yet expired. But in the telegram which I sent in reply to the Prince's telegram, I asked for an official, documentary confirmation of acceptance which would set forth the terms, one by one."

I immediately replied:

"In any case, the details which you requested concerned formalities. After the receipt of the King's explicit telegram, I do not believe that the advance of the French army to occupy positions, which had been left by the Syrian army in accordance with the provisions of the ultimatum, can be justified by the delay of a telegram containing formal details." //

But the General reverted to his original word bandying:

"However that may be, the telegram was late,

/124/

and waiting longer than I waited would not have been possible."

Then I decided that it would be better to change the direction of the discussion, so I said to him:

"Let us put aside all of these problems. You admit that the acceptance telegram reached you a half hour after issuance of the marching orders. But /then/ - at that time - should you not have issued orders stopping the advance?"

With a thin smile, the General answered this question saying:

"You are not a soldier and consequently you are unable to give the seriousness of this question the value it merits. If an army starts to march it cannot just halt anywhere; it cannot stop before it reaches a locality insured against all eventualities and contingencies, and which is provided with the water needed by the soldiers and animals. ** This is one of the principles of the

124/

art of war which no one with a knowledge of the condition of armies and their needs is able to deny . . . consequently, half an hour after issuing orders to march, it was not possible for me to issue orders to halt." (4)

He said this, and the smile, which had settled itself upon his lips at the beginning of these remarks, broadened. Then he shook his head in a way which showed his heavy reliance on the strength of the proof which he had just shown.

But I immediately realized that the excuses, which he was giving so confidently, had given me a powerful weapon which would help me to quickly break down his argument, so I said to him:

"Let us put all the past aside, General. Your army is now stationed in places which include everything you mentioned in the way of conditions of security and supply. Therefore, I believe that there remains no obstacle which prevents you from

124/125/

ordering it to advance no further. // ++

It appeared that the General had never thought of this argument, which greatly shocked him, deprived him of his calm and poise, and generated in him a jumble of words which resembled a shout:

"Ah ! ca non . . . !

The shout was accompanied by a violent jerk /of his whole body/ and succeeded by the following words:

"We no longer trust you . . . and we must request new guarantees of you . . . "

He said this, stretched out his hand toward his desk and, pulling out one of the drawers, took out a previously prepared memorandum which he waved /in the air/ saying:

++ The translation of the final clause of this sentence actually reads: "which prevents you from ordering it to return to where it was."

125/

"And these are the guarantees which we are demanding of you now."

He put the memorandum on the desk and began to read it to me with perfect calm for, during this time, and in the course of these movements, he had regained his composure.

The memorandum began with a short introduction:

"Although the requested confirmation was not received during the delay set for that purpose, nevertheless the General - in view of the procedural arrangements which the prince had already undertaken - agrees to order the army to halt on the following conditions."

After the introduction, the General read to me the first condition:

"The Damascus Government will publish the attached bulletin explaining the French army's advance to Damascus: how the army's advance was launched, and how it happened that a halt was declared."

425/126/

After reading this first condition, the General took another document, which had been previously prepared along with the memorandum, and read to me the bulletin concerning the French army's advance which, in spite of the acceptance of the ultimatum terms, the demobilization of the army, and the withdrawal of military units from their bases, he was now demanding be published in the name of the Damascus Government. //

As I listened to the text of this bulletin, it appeared very clear to me that General Gouraud, himself, felt that there was in this move of his a violation of the most important bases of international law and an evasion of the most elementary moral principles, and thus he wanted to clear his conscience by the issuance of this long bulletin which excused and justified the military advance and made it appear to be an inevitable move . . . and all this from the tongue of the Syrian Government itself.

After completing the bulletin, the General returned to the memorandum and began to read the

226/

other terms:

2. "Pending complete implementation of the terms, which the prince agrees to carry out in full, the Expeditionary Force will remain in those districts which it now has reached. These are the districts bound on the east by the Takiyyah River. ** The strength of the Expeditionary Force will be reduced as the orders to carry out the terms are issued."

3. "During all of this period, the Expeditionary Force will have an exclusive right to dispose of the Ryak-Takiyyah Railroad."

4. "The Sharifians units stationed north and west of the previously mentioned river, including the Bekaa, will retreat from their positions toward Damascus, and the state police in this district will be placed under the orders of the French Authorities as a guarantee of the security and safety of the army."

5. "Must cease immediately, the assistance which the Damascus Government is giving to guerilla bands active in the western district, especially that given to Shaikh Salih's band." (5)

426/127/

6. "The disorders caused by the guerilla bands - which have brought matters to their present state - and the incidents which occurred at Damascus on the 21st of July, confirm the dangers which arise from arming the poeple . . . Consequently, demobilized soldiers must deliver their arms to the depots, after which, arms must also be gradually removed from the hands/ of the people." // (6)

7. "A French Mission, accredited to the Government, will be set up at Damascus with the following assignments:

A. Temporary Assignments:

Observation Committee assigned to supervise the carrying out of the terms accepted by the Government.

B. Permanent Assignments:

Study methods of applying the French Mandate in the eastern district: i.e. cooperation in the organisation and conduct of ministerial administrative affairs and the general welfare."

127

"At the outset, this committee will be under the chairmanship of Colonel Cousse and composed of the following branches:

Military Branch

Financial Branch (Tax, audit, state properties, land survey and post office affairs)

Administration Branch (General welfare and health affairs)

Economics Branch (Agriculture, mining and public works affairs)

Justice Branch

Public Education Branch." (7)

After he had read these seven conditions, the General arrived at the eighth, and last, and read it with great care:

8. "In case of the non-fulfillment of any of the provisions, or in case of controversial incidents involving the French army in any place, whatever, the Expeditionary Force will recover its absolute freedom of movement."

After he had finished this last paragraph he handed me the memorandum saying:

127/128/

"These are our terms." //

All of these terms very clearly indicated that the French had not modified their plan of finally occupying Damascus. Rather, by these terms, they sought to devise an excuse for undertaking another expedition and for letting fall a new blow. This last article, in particular, left them ample room to realize this circumvention of theirs; for thanks to these provisions, the person who had taken the delay of the telegram as an excuse justifying the advance and occupation of strategic positions after their evacuation by the Syrian army, now could find, whenever he wished, new justification for another blow. Whenever a dispute arose in any place, whatever, he would have the right to advance and occupy Damascus in a single campaign. **

I realized all this while I was listening to the text of the memorandum, so I said to Gouraud:

"These new demands altogether astonish me, for we accepted all of the terms included in your ultimatum and we began to carry out the terms in

128/129/

accordance with your demands. ** We see no justification, whatever, for presenting new demands and conditions such as these."

But General Gouraud answered me saying:

"These are not new terms, but rather new guarantees, and we see ourselves duty bound to obtain these guarantees."

I was certain that a discussion of this matter would be of no use, whatever, so I said to him:

"Words will change nothing in the facts of the case. You are demanding new conditions of us and, this being the case, I seek only to return to Damascus in order to place these conditions of yours before my King and colleagues there. //

The General objected very strongly to this request of mine saying:

"No, I see no necessity of delaying a solution of the problem, because the Prince delegated full powers to you . . ."

129

He said this, then he took in his hand the letter of delegation, which he had put to one side on his desk, and began to read a few of its paragraphs:

"We delegate to you Our Minister of Education, Mr. Sati al-Husri, with full authorization . . ."

Gouraud repeated the last expression and then said:

"You see, the Prince says full authorization . . . therefore, you are now the bearer from him of full powers, and it is up to you to use these full powers without returning to Damascus. It is for you to accept or refuse. But it is up to you to do it here, without postponement or delay."

But I objected to these remarks:

"It is true that the King wrote this, but I assure you that it never occurred to him that you would demand new conditions of us. Neither the King, nor any of my colleagues, thought of a contingency such as this. We all of us firmly held the likely belief that when you learned of the carrying out of what you had demanded, you would not hesitate

129/130/

to withdraw your troops from the places and districts which have been occupied contrary to the stipulations of the ultimatum terms. This being the case, I do not find myself provided with powers to take any decision, whatever, in connection with these new demands, which altogether surprise me."

But the General repeated his previous remarks:

"I tell you again that I am not requesting new conditions of you, but rather new guarantees for the carrying out of the old conditions, themselves, and you have been delegated with full powers. Therefore, it is up to you to decide immediately, either to accept the terms, or to reject them."

And I, in turn, repeated what I had said to him before:

"I know what the King and my colleagues in the Ministry intended when they sent me here. // I cannot make any decision, whatever - either to accept, or to refuse - before I consult with them about the matter."

But this time, the General answered me empha-

/130/

tically and with violence:

"I will not allow the matter to be delayed. The Prince provided you with absolute powers and you must use those powers immediately, and answer at once, yes or no."

Faced with the extraordinary persistence which the General was now showing, I decided to resort to some other means of persuasion, so I said to him:

"But General, I do not see the wisdom of your insistence on this question because I have not requested a new delay from you. Troop movements have stopped for a period ending tomorrow morning, as required by the armistice concluded with your command and, it now being ten o'clock, if I leave immediately, I can reach Damascus before two in the afternoon and present the case to the King and the Ministry. The Government will inform you of its decision before the end of the armistice time agreed upon yesterday."

The General repeated what he had said previously:

~~130~~/~~131~~/

"Nevertheless, a delay is unnecessary. You have full authority to decide the matter, so it is up to you to make a decision and say, yes or no."

After I had exhausted everything within reach in the way of logical arguments, recourse to emotional factors was all that remained to me, so I said:

"But permit me to ask you, General, do you mean by this to cancel the armistice which was decided upon between me and your representative? One would never expect this from an officer representing France and responsible for her honour. And if you hold to the point of view which you are now showing, the effects on me will be most painful because it will be one of the greatest disappointments which I shall know in my life. I shall believe that everything that I have read and heard about France is only delusion and falsehood. //

I noticed that while I was talking, the General began to be affected. This affect became greater, particularly, when I mentioned the honour of France. And it induced him to modify his stand

431/

on the problem because he said, and he stuttered
/in saying it/:

"Let it be as you wish on condition that no
new delay occurs."

So I immediately said to him:

"I promise you that . . . Before the end of
the armistice period agreed on between us, I shall
immediately and with all possible speed, send the
Government's decision."

Then I personally received the memorandum
and the bulletin and got up saying good-bye. And
he also got up and bid me good-bye saying:

"Above all, no delay. **

Reassuring him again, I left the room.

I felt as though I had been delivered from
a nightmare which had been haunting my mind. But
I had only taken a very few steps before I forgot
the nightmare, and began to think of the magnitude
of the disaster which the memorandum I was carrying
in my hand held in store for us. **

431/132/

* * *

I went out into the garden. Walking over to where Colonel Toulat and Jamil ul-Ulshi were sitting, I said to Toulat:

"Let us go without delay." **

Toulat got up saying:

"Let us prepare the car."

He then disappeared from sight . . . and after a while came back and said:

"The General would like to see Jamil Bey."

I did not see the reason for this request, nor did I see occasion for objecting to it, although I was afraid that Jamil would revert to the chattering which I had noted during the trip. // Therefore I said to him in Turkish:

"Express no opinion, whatever. I refused to reveal my opinion in any way at all. Be careful about saying anything which will make him realize

432/

what our position on the new demands will be. **

In order that we might leave immediately /afterwards/, I stayed /in the garden/ waiting for Jamil al-Ulshi to return from his meeting with the General. After about half an hour, he came back with Colonel Toulat. Turning to me the Colonel said:

"The General hopes that you will wait for a short time because he is writing a personal letter to the Prince. This delay will not be at all detrimental to /your plans/ because there is a train leaving from Ryak at twelve thirty. We shall travel by /that train/ and arrive at Damascus shortly before evening." **

The idea of traveling by train made me extremely apprehensive. But I saw no advantage in disclosing /my/ fears, and was reluctantly obliged to keep silent.

After a while, I was called /to join/ the meeting. The General received me standing. He handed me a personal letter directed to King Faysal, saying:

"I request you to deliver this letter to

432/133/

His Highness the Prince. In it I appeal to his patriotism and his great wisdom."

* * *

The Return Journey

After this last meeting, we got into the car and left Ryak. When we arrived at the Ryak station, I saw the affects of large scale activities and preparations. There were piles of rails and sleepers which were being transported by freight cars, and I then realized the basic purpose they were aiming at when they undertook to change our travel plans. They wanted to profit by our trip in order to transport what they needed to repair the railroad. ** //

After this observation, another question immediately pictured itself to my mind. If the railroad were to be cut in several places, what would be our fate and that of our mission? ** As for the answer to his question, it was clear: we would not get to Damascus before the end of the time set by the armistice, and the General would seize on the non-arrival of our reply as the excuse for

433/

a final military advance.

Because I was unable to tell anyone about my fears and apprehensions, I felt extremely anxious as I thought of this. ** I took to walking the station platform and searching in my mind for a way to save ourselves from the even greater danger of this new stratagem.

A quarter of an hour passed after the time appointed for the departure of the train - then half an hour. In the meantime, transfers and loading continued in a way which left no room for anticipating an approaching departure of the train. ** I determined to profit from this delay by talking to Toulat firmly:

"We are very late and this delay creates some apprehension in my mind. We will be in the valley about nightfall, and I am afraid that something might occur which will oblige us to delay a great deal. ** After entering the valley, we will lose all means of communication with the General, so it seems to me essential that we change our plan to travel by train and leave by car so that on the road

133/134/

we can communicate with the General, whenever necessary."

Colonel Toulat replied to me:

"Unfortunately, this is no longer possible because the car which brought us here has returned to Aley."

Obviously this excuse was extremely feeble. So I said to him:

"We are at a military base, next to a large military camp, where there are a great many automobiles, and it is within your authority to ask for one of them." //

But he continued to argue:

"I have no authority over this camp and these cars."

I replied immediately:

"How can you pretend that? I am sure that a ranking officer who is escorting an official delegation can use any car on the road."

In the meantime, a military car appeared on the road and stopped near us. So I said to Toulat:

434/

"I hope that you will ask for this car."

He took refuge in a new argument:

"Traveling by car is very tiring, while going by train is much more restful, so I am of the opinion that it will be more agreeable for you to . . . "

At this point, Jamil al-Ulshi interrupted the conversation and added this remark to Toulat's comment:

"Especially since you are not a soldier, and are not accustomed to the hardships of travel."

I replied immediately:

"This is not the time to discuss hardships and comfort. After the delays which have occurred up until now, I cannot travel by train."

Then I directed my remarks to Toulat:

"If you are unable to find a car here which can take us to Damascus, at least you should be able to find one which will take us to Expeditionary Force Headquarters. Doubtless Headquarters can provide us with the car necessary for us to reach Damascus. So I again ask you to request this of

234/135/

the people in that car."

Thus Toulat was obliged to go to the car. After he had talked with the officer, he came back saying:

"All right, he will take us to Tanayil where Command Headquarters is located. ** //

We got into the car and left Ryak. But we had hardly covered the distance of two hundred meters before the car suddenly stopped because of a defect occurring unexpectedly in the motor.

Toulat said:

"What rotten luck !"

Then he reverted to his first suggestion saying:

"I hope that you will give up your idea of traveling by car . . . let us go by train."

And Jamil took to supporting this argument saying:

"Travel by train is more comfortable, especially since you are not among those used to hardship."

435

But I did not hesitate in forming my opinion that the question of the car stopping because of the motor had been an arranged affair between Toulat and the officer with whom he had talked at Ryak. So I decided to make a final decision:

"This is impossible. I am ready to walk whatever road will enable me to keep in communications with General Gouraud. After what has happened in the way of delays in the departure schedules, I cannot leave by train."

And I actually began to walk . . .

My knowledge that the Expeditionary Command Headquarters at Tanayil was within eye sight, encouraged me in this.

I kept on my way. Toulat and al-Ulshi were obliged to come along after me. From time to time, each of them repeated his usual tune, in his own special style. But I paid no attention to what they were saying and continued to go along without saying anything to either of them except: "that is impossible, my decision is final, and no travel by train."

435/136/

After we had gone along for some time, we saw an ambulance coming toward us, which was going in the direction of Ryak, so I said to Toulat:

"That car is coming up to us. It is within your authority to order it to turn around and take us to Tanayil." //

Having dispaired of convincing me otherwise, Toulat agreed to my request and stopped the car when it came near us. We got into the car which took us to General Goybet's Headquarters at Tanayil, the time by then having already reached five o'clock.

I met General Goybet and said to him:

"I left General Gouraud more than six hours ago, and I am still here. If things go on this way, I have no idea when I can cross your district to get to Damascus. More than half the time set for giving an answer has expired in getting myself to you here. I do not believe that what is left will be sufficient for just crossing your district. I hope that you will make the necessary arrangements to guarantee me a telephone communication with General Gouraud so that I can explain the matter to him."

136/137

General Goybet said hesitatingly:

"It is extremely difficult to get in touch with General Gouraud. We don't know where he is." **

I replied immediately:

"It is not easy for me to understand how it could be difficult for the Expeditionary Force Command to get in touch with the Commander-in-chief. The problem is extremely important, General. It is essential that I get in touch with General Gouraud immediately, to explain the question to him in detail, and to ask him to handle this unusual situation, as required, purely on a basis of reason and logic. From the beginning of your arrangements, it is essential that the time spent in your district remain outside the time granted for giving an answer, otherwise the whole delay will have been spent here without my being able to deliver the General's letter and memorandum to King Faysal." **

Then Goybet said:

"I will do everything in my power." //

He was gone for a while and then came back saying:

437/

"They are trying to get in touch with the General."

Inviting me to sit down on a rise of ground overlooking the Bekaa plain, he began to talk in generalities saying, among other things:

"I like the Arabs very much, and am very fond of the Moslems . . . because I am an African and lived in Africa thirty years." (1)

I listened to this conversation while my mind was occupied with getting in touch with General Gouraud, and persuading him to listen to my request.

I waited impatiently and very anxiously, hardly able to take a deep breath until the communication with General Gouraud had been completed and he had agreed to add the following day to the armistice period, and had thus decided to wait for our answer until midnight, the 24th of July.

By this turn of events, we had gained twenty four hours more for Yusuf al-Azma.

After the matter of communicating with Ge-

137/138/

neral Gouraud/ had been completed, General Goybet provided us with a car to take us to Damascus. We left Tanayil late in the day, arrived at the Wadi Zarzour late in the evening and, having met with our army in the Maysalun foot hills, continued our journey to Damascus.

* * *

At Damascus

I returned to Damascus thoroughly convinced that these people were determined to occupy our country completely and that they would work to perfect the means of accomplishing this occupation, however much circumstances and conditions might change. Even if we submitted to their new demands and carried out everything in them, we could not prevent the results of their decision from taking effect, for they would not consider it beneath them to find new excuses for presenting new demands to fulfill their numerous desires. //

The moment I arrived at Damascus - which was late in the evening - I went to the King's Palace.

138/

I delivered to the King Gouraud's personal letter together with the official memorandum and, in the presence of some of the ministers who were there at the time, I told him everything which had happened during the carrying out of my mission.

The personal letter, which I had received from General Gouraud at the last minute, urged King Faysal, "to dismiss the extremists from among his advisers in order to guarantee the foundation of friendly relations between Syria and France," and "to implement the Mandate which France had accepted in accordance with the decision of the League of Nations, in an atmosphere imbued with a spirit of mutual understanding." (1) This was followed by the General's previous assurances that the Mandate would not mean impairment of the country's independence. (2)

King Faysal appeared to be extremely tired. He read the letter and memorandum, and listened to my comments without expressing an opinion. Then he ordered the convocation of the Minister's Council in the morning in order that it might study the

438/4139/

problem at length.

* * *

The following morning - the last day of the armistice delay - the Minister's council met at the Palace. I read the new terms which I had brought from Aley in King Faysal's presence. **

During the meeting I told the Council, in summary, about the talks which had taken place between Gouraud and myself. I explained to the ministers the opinion which I had formed concerning French intentions after my direct relations with them during my trip - which had lasted about twenty eight hours - and I read to them the General's terms. Most of them listened to my account in silent perplexity, some were distracted, while others were reticent about giving their opinions. ** I noticed on the faces of most of them a lack of conviction in my personal conclusions. I also noticed that King Faysal was far from sharing my opinions on the subject. // There was not doubt that the letter which General Gouraud had written at the last moment,

∟139∟

after his meeting with Jamil al-Ulshi, had a powerful influence in orienting ∟the King's∟ opinion. For, while promising and giving assurances that the Mandate was not intended as an infringement in any on ∟our∟ independence, ∟the letter∟ was written in support of placing confidence in the King, and attributed the succession of incidents to the extremists.

But before the end of the Council of Minister's meeting, events themselves took over, exposing the intentions of the French, and supporting my point of view. During the meeting, Colonel Cousse came to the Palace. He delivered to the King a new telegram from General Gouraud which asked permission for the French army to advance to Khan Maysalun on the pretext that this was necessary in order to guarantee its supply ∟lines∟. (3) And this is the text of the telegram:

Urgent Telegram With Priority

To: Colonel Cousse Damascus No. 2/358
Date Of Issue 7/23/20, 10 o'clock
Place Of Issue Summer Headquarters, Beirut

/139/140/

The truce terms were delivered to the Minister of Education, yesterday. He was given a car to return to Damascus.

The General in Charge also informs me that the twenty four hours which he has spent in the Ain Jadida-Batroum district leads him to point out the impossibility of the Military Unit's remaining in the said district in view of the scarcity of water, and the state of the road leading to the al-Takiyyah station, which is suitable only for travel by mule. He considers it a vital necessity that the army be transferred to another position having sufficient water, and connected to the railroad by a road suitable for vehicle traffic. //

Inform the Prince that tomorrow, at six o'clock, the Army's Chief of Staff will be at the valley which has been made the separation line between the armies of the two parties in order to decide with the Prince's representative the question of the unit's being stationed in a place provided with the said conditions.

/140/

It appears from information coming from the district /in question/ that the camp must be set up at Khan Maysalun.

Apart from this, no modification has occurred in the Armistice terms.

Gouraud.

This telegram was tantamount to a new proof of the accuracy of my opinion concerning the actual intentions of the French. Yesterday, after having given me the terms which he had formulated for stopping the /army's/ advance, and after having tried so persistently to persuade me to accept or refuse them immediately without consulting the King or the Ministry, General Gouraud was adding by this telegram, today, new terms which would guarantee to his troops the crossing of the Wadi al-Zarzur, the ascent of the Maysalun foot hills, and access to the copious springs which gush out near the Inn known as Khan Maysalun. Unquestionably in demanding that his army be advanced to within

~~140~~ /141/

twenty five kilometers of Damascus, General Gouraud was only waiting for a new pretext for making new demands that would advance his army into the heart of the capital, itself.

This telegram left no room for anyone to say that it was necessary to accept the terms.

So it was decided to write telegrams immediately, again appealing for aid from all nations. It was also decided that the consuls of the foreign powers would be invited to a meeting for the purpose of informing them concerning the details of the situation. And this new task was also thrown unto my shoulders.

Yusuf al-Azma followed me when I left the Council - he had met the situation coolly, collectedly, and with moderation - and, after thanking me for my success in extending the armistice by twenty four hours, he informed me that he would endeavor to benefit from the extension of the truce in every way possible. //

Doubtless he knew that the non-acceptance

141

of the terms would lead to clashes, and that the clashes would end in defeat, but he was trying, in so far as possible, to make the struggle an honorable one.

* * *

The Consuls met at the Italian Consulate General because the Marquis de Paterno was senior in rank.

We had known for some time that Count Sforza, who was in charge of the Italian Foreign Ministry, had decided that he would pay particular attention, and follow a new policy, with reference to Eastern Affairs. (4) Consequently, he decided to send to Syria, to carry out this policy, a distinguished personality. ** The Marquis we refer to had come to Damascus following this change which had occurred in Italian Foreign Policy, and he had begun to show great sympathy with the Arab problem, in general, and that of Syria, in particular, but this effort had come too late.

I went to the Italian Consulate General to talk to the Consuls who were assembled there.

141/142/

I began my remarks by citing the development of events, and afterwards explained what had happened during the last three days. I drew everyone's attention to the methods of deception which General Gouraud had used in occupying the mountains and valleys, and in advancing his army, after our Government accepted the ultimatum terms, started to demobilize the army, and evacuated the military garrison stationed at Majdal Anjar.. I made every effort to emphasize this deception by explaining the most important phases of the discussion which had been carried on between myself and Gouraud at Aley.

The Marquis de Paterno showed regret and disapproval as I told of the various phases of the problem. The Spanish Consul, Darena, shared this regret and disapproval. // However, at the beginning of the talk, the Consul of the United States of America told me that "for some time now his Government had decided not to interfere in European political affairs."

So I replied to him saying:

A42/

"We do not ask you to interfere in the matter, but we would like to explain the facts of the case to enlighten public opinion in your country. Doubtless, while the citizens of the United States would not like to have their Government interfere in European politics, yet they still keep themselves informed about world political events and they are anxious to know about what takes place in the world, especially in this part of the East. All we ask of you, is that you inform yourself about the facts of the matter in order to inform your compatriots."

As for the Consul of Iran, his position was most strange. Thus he said:

"It is difficult for us to know the truth of the matter because we have not heard the opinion of the second party to this case. ** I learned that they are certain that the telegram was late because of guerilla activities . . . "

Therefore, it was necessary for me to draw his attention to what had been shown by the telegrams which had been exchanged between General

~~142~~ / 143 /

Gouraud and King Faysal, so I said to him:

"If you like, I am prepared to inform you about the telegram which was received from General Gouraud thanking the King for accepting the terms."

Then I added to this the following observation:

"If, for purposes of argument, we assume that the General was not informed at all about the acceptance of the terms, then the army's advance was justified, but after the facts had been shown, the non-withdrawal of the army cannot be justified under any circumstances whatever. (5) And to seize on this as a pretext for presenting new demands is something which cannot be justified in any way at all." //

I finished my remarks by directing my comment to all of them saying:

"In any case, you, yourselves, have all witnessed the most important part of the events. The Government accepted the ultimatum terms and started to demobilize the army with the result that the people became greatly excited and the

443

Government was obliged to use arms in order to put down the demonstrations. Afterwards, you learned that in spite of all these measures, the French army started to march toward Damascus and is still determined to continue marching."

My talk made an obvious impression on the Marquis de Paterno, for he frankly supported me and also promised to do all in his power to enlighten Italian public opinion - rather European public opinion - concerning this shocking aggression.

* * *

At the end of my talk with the Consular Committee, I started out toward the Palace. In the street leading to it, I found an enormous crowd. I noted that the crowd increased in density in front of the Palace itself, and I soon learned that the "decision to resist" had spread among the people.

I entered King Faysal's room and began to

/143/144/

give a summary account of the talks which had taken place between myself and the consuls. During this conversation, Shaikh Kamil al-Qassab (6) hurriedly entered the room and, stretching his arm out toward King Faysal, said:

"As long as you have decided on resistance, I promise you to recruit ten thousand rifle carriers by this evening."

After this, a general movement to volunteer, together with enthusiastic demonstrations, started up in the city.

* * *

In the evening, Colonel Cousse came to the Palace to ask for the Government's replies to General Gouraud's memorandum and telegram. //

When he learned that answers had not yet been written, he asked for some paper and wrote two drafts, the first of which accepted the terms, the second refusing them. Then he handed them to al-Shahbandar saying:

144

"In order to facilitate your task, I have prepared two drafts for you. ** Choose one of them so that we will have evidence of your decision."

But the form in which Cousse framed both of his replies failed to obtain the agreement of anyone.

He wrote the replies in a more flexible style:

"We reject war, but the acceptance of the terms contained in your last ultimatum would inevitably lead to civil war."

"We are prepared to fulfill the ultimatum dated July 14, in its entirety. Up until the present time, we have carried out four of the conditions, and we promise on our honour to carry out the remainder, faithfully, so that the French army may be withdrawn from the places which it has recently occupied."

* * *

444/

After supper, Yusuf al-Azma came to bid us good-bye saying that he was going to the front. But before leaving us, he went with me to a corner of the room and said to me, in Turkish, in a voice choked with tears:

"I am going ! I am leaving Lylia to in your care, and I hope that you will not forget her."

The Lylia to whom he referred in these words of his, was his only daughter who, two weeks before the date of these events, or shortly before this whirlwind had swept down upon us, had come from Damascus with her mother.

I realized immediately what he meant in saying this: he was going to the front firmly determined that he would never return.

On this solemn occasion, I did not want to show him my own opinion in any way, so I said to him very calmly:

244/145/

"You can rest assured as to that." + //

+ Three nights after this sad evening, circumstances would have it that I would discharge the trust which Yusuf al-Azma had placed on my shoulders. During the night which we spent at Damascus, after our return from al-Kuswah, I went to his house accompanied by the Chief Secretary. There we met his bereaved wife and his daughter, Lylia. We extended to the Mother King Faysal's condolence, on the one hand, /while informing them/, on the other, of his Majesty's promise to assign a monthly payment of twenty dinars to Lylia. ** At the same time, we told Lylia that King Faysal would send this payment wherever he might be, and whatever the circumstances. I was destined to continue taking charge of the fulfillment of this promise - in Baghdad, too - until the last days of the late King Faysal. **

/145/146/

The Day Of
Maysalun
And The Following Week

The armistice which we had concluded with General Gouraud was to end on the morning of the morning of the 24th of July. Thus it was natural that a French attack on the Maysalun foot hills should begin at dawn on this day.

Beginning early in the morning, a few news items began to come to us about the battle which had actually begun at the time mentioned. //

But after all I had learned concerning the condition of our army, and after all the French army equipment I had seen, I was unable to reassure myself with any hope of victory. I could find no room for doubt concerning the painful results with which the battle would end, although I hoped it would be as long as possible, and I wished that it would be a violent one for that, at least, would help to preserve our military honour. **

∟146/

The outcome was soon known; before ten o'clock, news had arrived of the defeat of the army, and the breaching of the front. (1)

They said that Yusuf al-Azma had been killed at Maysalun.

However, my reply was: no, he had committed suicide and, in any case, he had died a martyr.

All that it had been possible to collect together in the way of soldiers and material, and everything they had been able to improvise in fortifications, were not to survive more than a few hours when faced with the violent attacks launched by the French army, which was equipped with all the means of fighting - heavy artillery, tanks and planes. (2)

* * *

Between Damascus And
al-Kuswah

It was decided to transfer the Ministry

~~146~~ /147/

to al-Kuswah, and that King Faysal would go there by motor.

But I proposed that before we left, we should issue a bulletin to the people announcing the Government's departure from the capital in order that it might continue to defend the country's rights and its independence. All of ~~my~~ colleagues were agreeable to this suggestion, so we wrote a draft of the bulletin and delivered it to the government office for the making of a clean copy, to be signed by the Prime Minister, Hashim al-Atasi, so that it could be sent out for publication.

Then we separated, each going to his home to get his luggage, in order to return and gather at the Hejaz Station at one o'clock in the afternoon, ready for the journey to al-Kuswah. //

* * *

After I had taken from the house a few of my clothes and papers, I arrived at the station and

447/

found it crowded with a large number of patriots who had seen the necessity of leaving Damascus before the arrival of the French. Some of them were in a state of considerable alarm, their ears open to all kinds of talk, their minds ready to believe every news item, and their imaginations inclined to enlarge every danger. It was natural for all sorts of rumours to spread in this charged atmosphere; this one said that the French had reached the Ghuta and were beginning to advance toward Qudam; one ran to the affect that the people of Midan had begun to gather ready to burn down the station and blow up the train, and another claimed that only a short time remained before the French would arrive at Damascus. All of these rumours aimed at demanding that the departure of the train be advanced before the danger became greater, or before it was too late. We exhausted ourselves quieting excited nerves, denying these powerful rumours, and trying to prevent the train from moving before the regular, scheduled time of departure.

47/48/

In the meantime, it occurred to me that I should reassure myself about the fate of the bulletin which we had decided to publish for the people and, learning that it had been delivered to Hashim al-Atasi, I asked him about it and found that he had not yet read it. He now took it out of his pocket and began to read it with concern.

* * *

As the time for departure approached, all of the ministers were present at the station, except for Faris al-Khury and Ala al-Din al-Durubi. We discovered that Faris al-Khury had sent his valise but that he had not yet arrived, and we began to wait for him impatiently. ** // As for Ala al-Din al-Durubi, we knew nothing about him, but we later learned that he had informed the Prime Minister that, in his opinion, his remaining in Damascus in his capacity as Minister of the Interior would be more in the general interest than his departing for al-Kuswah, and he clung to this idea of his in spite of the objections of the Prime Minister.

448/

Finally, the departure time drew near, and we got up to get on the train. As I started to walk toward it, I decided to ask Hashim al-Atasi what he had done with the bulletin. ** But I heard him burst forth angrily, and at the top of his voice:

"The bulletin, the bulletin, why do you insist so persistently on that?" **

I observed that his nerves, influenced by the charged atmosphere which had filled the station, had been very much strained so I said to him very calmly:

"If we leave without issuing the bulletin, I am of the opinion that we will be deserting our obligations at a time when we are leaving, not to escape the duties which devolve upon us, but rather, to enable us to discharge those duties in the best way possible."

As I was saying this, the excitement of some of the refugees in the station began to increase, and their persistent demands that the train leave without delay were becoming stronger. In this excited atmosphere, Hashim al-Atasi became

148/149/

very embarrassed. So it was necessary for me to reassure him by saying:

"Having undertaken to shoulder the responsibilities of government up until now, we have no right to leave this place without issuing the bulletin. It is inadmissible that we should desert the battle field at a time like this." **

These words calmed down al-Atasi's anger and obliged him to sign the bulletin. Afterwards, he ordered that it be taken to al-Durubi to make sure that it would be published in various forms. We learned afterwards, however, that al-Durubi purposely neglected having the bulletin published.

* * *

We arrived at al-Kuswah and took the pulmans which connected us with our office and living quarters. // Between these cars, was a private saloon car, prepared for King Faysal as living and office quarters, for such time as he should arrive at al-Kuswah.

449/

In the evening, shortly before sunset, King Faysal and his suite arrived by motor. He was in an unusual state, which differed greatly from his normal condition. All of his movements and his reticence indicated that he was in a very disturbed state of mind. From following his movements, it seemed to me that he was preoccupied with something which he was inclined to conceal from us. I said to myself: "perhaps he continues to hope for an understanding with the French, and is waiting for the arrival of news which will be of assistance in bringing about this understanding." And a short time afterwards, it appeared to me that this supposition of mine was consistent with actual events. ** He had delegated Nuri al-Said to meet the French and was postponing all of his decisions, pending the arrival of news of this meeting. It was on this account that he was impatiently waiting for news and had avoided talking, or disclosing his opinion, on any subject whatever.

As for the news which the King was waiting for, shortly thereafter they arrived in a telegram from Nuri al-Said, which said:

A49

His Excellency The
Prime Minister

Temporary agreement that the old Government remains on condition that it considers what happened contrary to its peaceful intentions and will publish an announcement accordingly. French will temporarily remain at al-Mazzah. Will not interfere with affairs except for the fulfillment of the known first provisions. Organized army to remain at al-Qadam and the gendarmerie and security police to remain in Eastern District. For sake of preserving order, transfer of regular units to gendarmerie authorized. His Majesty's being closer to Damascus necessary. Waiting delegation in writing to resume political negotiations. Forbidden to go out after eight o'clock at night. City perfectly quiet. No reason for concern.

Nuri al-Said

This telegram did not convince me at all. //

250

I had no doubts but what its contents showed its author's lack of understanding of the real intentions of the French, and his non-appreciation of the extent of their indulgence in deception and guile.

But at the time, King Faysal, who was looking for a thread of hope to which he could cling in the gloom of this pitch black atmosphere, became optimistic as a result of the telegram and, curiously enough, continued to indulge in his optimism.

The next day, a number of oral news items, similar to the contents of the telegram, reached him and this increased his confidence and induced him to take a momentous decision in the way of reaching a mutual understanding with the French. Thus he decided to commit the formation of a new ministry to Ala al-Din al-Durubi, and he sent his chief secretary to Damascus to negotiate with al-Durubi about this matter.

Recent events had very clearly shown that

/150/

Ala al-Din al-Durubi had reached a mutual understanding with the French and his remaining behind at Damascus, when we had gone to al-Kuswah, had resulted from this previous understanding. Therefore, King Faysal supposed that al-Durubi would be able to form a ministry which would guarantee an understanding with the French.

I fully realized that King Faysal's optimism was very much misplaced, and that he would find his sacrifice useless. And shortly thereafter, events confirmed this /assumption/.

* * *

Ala al-Din al-Durubi formed a government immediately, and three members of our ministry were included in it. They were Faris al-Khury, Jalal-al-Din and Yusuf al-Hakim. ** He added to these four new ministers: Jamil al-Ulshi, Ata al-Ayyubi, Abd al-Rahman al-Yusuf, and Badi al-Muayyad.

The new government received its investiture and King Faysal began to look forward impatiently

250/2151/

to the results of this arrangement. //

* * *

But the same day, the actual intentions of the French were once again disclosed without delay. While he was at Damascus the Chief Secretary, Ihsan al-Jabri, met the Consul General of Italy, the Marquis de Paterno, and learned from him that the French had decided to announce the end of the Faysal regime and were trying to justify their decision by a popularly signed petition which had been taken charge of, and arranged by, their lackeys. They said in the petition that the oath of allegiance to King Faysal had become void following his departure and flight from the capitol. **

The Marquis communicated this information to Ihsan al-Jabri and told him, that in his opinion, for the carrying out of policy, it would be preferable for the King to return to Damascus in order to confound French intrigue, and to strengthen his position with reference to European political circles.

451

Following these suggestions, King Faysal thought that he would anticipate events and return to Damascus.

So we took the train from al-Kuswah to Damascus.

* * *

After this, events moved very fast.

General Goybet, Commander of the Expeditionary Force which had occupied Damascus, called together the officials of the new Government and read to them a long bulletin which pointed out that: "Prince Faysal has dragged the country to within two finger lengths of destruction, and his responsibility for everything which has happened in Syria within recent months in the way of bloody disturbances is clear, and self-evident, to the extent that it is not considered possible that he should continue to govern the country." **

When King Faysal learned of this, he protested Goybet's statement by a telegram addressed

151/152/

to General Gouraud, which said:

"I protest against the statement in which the Commander of your Expeditionary Force slandered my Government, yesterday. I personally deny all the responsibility of which you seek to make me the bearer. // I will consider, without exception, all declarations and instructions which you send to my Government, either directly or in some other way, as null and illegal before the League of Nations."

* * *

But this protest had scarcely been sent before Colonel Toulat, in the name of the French Government, delivered to the King a formal letter which invited King Faysal to leave the country. This is the text of the letter:

"I have the honour to inform your Royal Highness of the decision of the Government of the French Republic. You are requested to leave Damascus by the Hejaz Railroad with your family and suite with all possible speed. **

"A special train leaving from the Hejaz

152

Railroad Station, tomorrow, the 28th of July, at five o'clock in the morning, will be put at the disposal of your highness and those who are with you."

* * *

King Faysal answered this communication with a strong protest which said:

"I do not recognize that the French Government has any right to expropriate the authority to administer the Eastern District, which was officially conferred upon me by the Peace Conference, or that it can revoke the title of honour bestowed upon me by the Syrian people." He also stated, "that the entrance of the French army into Damascus is a breach of the decisions of the Peace Conference, contrary to the principles of the League of Nations, and inconsistent with international morality."

Copies of this long protest were sent to all States.

However, he inevitably had to submit to the terms of the communication, and actually leave Damascus.

152/153/

* * *

Thus/ for the second time, I went to the Hejaz Station and took the train.

This time I was with King Faysal without the others. For although al-Shahbandar did join us later on, some of my previous colleagues had become members of the new Government, and others preferred to remain at Damascus. //

It was during the last few hours of night. But the sky was red and inflamed due to the large fires which had broken out in the city.

Leaving the station, the train crossed the Ghuta and, having passed al-Kuswah and the Khirbat al Ghazalah, stopped at Deraa.

* * *

At Deraa

We stayed at Deraa until the morning of the

∟153∟

first of August. +

As we had previously done at al-Kuswah, we used the train as headquarters for meetings, eating, and sleeping. But we ∟also∟ pitched a tent near the train so that King Faysal could receive the tribal Shaikhs and confer with them about various local affairs.

Deraa was a cross roads from two points of view, one actual and the other abstract; for three railroad lines met there of which the first, coming from the north, was connected with Damascus, the second, going west, was connected at Haifa, and the third, leading south, passed through Amman.

We had arrived at Deraa by the northern route, and it was now up to King Faysal to choose one of the other two routes - ∟either∟ the western or the southern one.

+ After a quarter of a century had passed, I was destined to return and enter this station another time. This was during the ∟1946∟ Evacuation Celebrations.

∟153/∟154/

Actually, choosing between these two routes meant a choice between two lines of actions, and two policies.

Thus departure for Haifa would mean King Faysal's leaving the country he had governed, which would oblige him - in the last analysis - to exile ∟himself/ from Syria altogether. // In return, it would take him to Europe thus opening up before him the possibility of getting in touch with important statesmen and giving him an opportunity to defend the rights of the country before the Peace Conference, the League of Nations, and the world press.

As for ∟choosing/ to leave for Amman, that would lead him to the southern part of the country, which was loyal to him, and he would remain in contact with Syria, on the one hand, and the Hejaz, on the other; but as against this, it would keep him far away from Europe, and would complicate his relations with the Peace Conference and the League of Nations.

In short, ∟to choose/ the first route would

∟154/

be to ∟travel/ a road of politics and peaceful endeavor. As for the second, it would be one of revolutionary activity and violent struggle. **

Each of these two lines ∟of action/ had its good points and its bad, its advocates and those who were opposed, and for a long time the King remained perplexed and hesitant between the two.

There were other factors which added to his uncertainty and obliged him to postpone his decision. Thus he left Damascus with ∟almost/ nothing ∟worth/ mentioning in the way of money. (1) Consequently, he would have to ask his father, King Husain, for the money he needed, finding out ∟at the same time/ what his father's opinion would be about these problems, on the one hand, and the position that the English would take toward the latest events, on the other.

* * *

But the French did not give King Faysal much time at Deraa. They were afraid of the move-

154/ 155/

ments of the Hurani tribe, and intimated to Ala al-Din al-Durubi that he should send an urgent telegram to inform the King that he would have to leave for the Hejaz. And the next day, or the 29th of July, 1920, a telegram arrived for delivery to us, and this is its text:

Urgent, No Delay Permitted Not
A Single Minute

To: The Mutasarrif of Huran

Submit to His Majesty The King our telegram written below and reply to us. //

To His Majesty the King at Deraa. The French Authorities have notified us that a train will be put at the orders of your Majesty for travel to Hejaz without stop-over at Deraa, by whichever route you may choose between the two lines of Maan and Haifa. I earnestly beg of your Majesty to hasten your Majesty, My Lord's travel, in order to preserve the District of Huran from disaster and ruin.

July 29, 1920

Prime Minister

Ala al-Din

∟155∟

At the same time, a French airplane flying over Deraa, and the various villages of the Huran, was dropping a great quantity of pamphlets which called on the people to expel King Faysal from the country:

From the General In Command of The French
Forces To The People of Deraa And The
Surrounding ∟Country∟

Prince Faysal has received an order to leave Damascus and travel directly to his country. He promised to obey this order. However, we are informed that contrary to what he promised, he has remained at Deraa and has begun to deceive the people by inducing them to ∟commit∟ acts damaging in results, and harmful to the interests of a country with which he no longer has the least connection. He has been ∟informed∟ in writing to continue his journey without delay.

We now invite the general public to assume responsibility for his immediately leaving the country, because his remaining among

/155/156/

you renders your country liable to bombing.

We now give you ten hours delay for directing the Prince to terminate his journey to his country. If he objects to this, his train must return to Damascus.

* * *

Faced with this situation, the King decided to go to Haifa. To prepare means of travel, he asked Prince Adil Arslan to get in touch with Sir Herbert Samuel, who at that time was the High Commissioner for Palestine. (2) At the same time, he intimated to the Chief Secretary, Ihsan al-Jabri, that he would like to have a reply telegram sent to Ala al-Din al-Durubi. //

It was pointed out in this telegram that, "although His Majesty the King is staying in a part of the country which is loyal to him," he had decided to leave Deraa on the first of August, "because he will always strive for the happiness of the country, and does not desire that harm come

156/

to any son of the Fatherland on his account."

Ala al-Din al-Durubi replied by repeating the French demands. He stated in his answering telegram as follows:

Urgent

Deraa

Chief, Royal Secretariate

Reply:

I have communicated to the French Authorities what you mention concerning His Majesty's concern to lessen danger, and they show gratitude. They informed me that if the travel of His Majesty, and his suite, is delayed beyond the time fixed in your telegram, the French Authorities will be free to act.

Prime Minister

My Lord

Ala al-Din

31 /July/

But Prince Adil Arslan sent a numbered telegram recommending that we take our time, and which endeavored to direct our attention southward.

156/157/

This is the text of the telegram:

Herbert Samuel advises that His Majesty come to Haifa meet the Governor. Has given orders for necessary arrangements, or the preparation of special pullman from Lud. Afterwards, possible he will come to meet Herbert Samuel, Jerusalem. British act as if crisis over. Therefore see no reason to hurry until Jaafar's answer comes. He arrives Egypt today. ** From Ajlun considered safe from all interference from French side, Carefully consider again last sentence. Answer immediately. Waiting at machine. //

* * *

This telegram anticipated, and was indicative of two important problems.

First, the English favored King Faysal's turning towards the west. ** For this reason they had accepted the idea of his coming to Haifa with great satisfaction. They also found in this a

∟157∟

means to relieve themselves, somewhat, ∟from responsibility∟ for the severity of the crisis.

Secondly, the southern part of Syria, beginning from Ajlun, would remain under the British Mandate. (3) It would be safe from French aggression. Thus if the King crossed to Transjordan he could continue his activities without fear of pursuit by the French.

But the telegram did not alter in any way the King's intentions or decisions.

The trip to Haifa was completed the first of August.

* * *

Thus King Faysal crossed the borders of the Kingdom which he had actually governed for almost two years.

Afterwards, circumstances gradually favored King Faysal's remaining away from Syria. In less than a year after Maysalun, these ∟same∟ circums-

/157/158/

tances were to lead him to Iraq and make of him a King, chosen by the people, to whom wide possibilities of showing his ability to found a new, firmly based, kingdom were /thus/ opened up. And /through- out this period/ he benefited from the political and administrative experience which he had acquired, /both/ before and after Maysalun, in Syria and in Europe. ** //

* *

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Conclusion

After Leaving

Syria

My memoirs concerning the period which followed our departure from Deraa, and our arrival at Haifa, have no relation to events connected with Maysalun. On this basis, consequently, they should remain outside the limits of this book. Nevertheless, I decided that I /ought/ not to conclude /my/

158/159/

book without a few rapid glances at the most important phases through which Faysal passed after his departure from Deraa - until he left for Iraq.

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King Faysal chose to go to Haifa because he proposed to travel from there to Switzerland in order to get in touch with the Peace Conference and the League of Nations.

And because his traveling to Switzerland via France was an impossibility - in view of what had occurred between him and the French - he was obliged to go there via Italy.

After investigation and inquiry, it appeared that the nearest departure date for a ship going to Italy was the twentieth of August. On that date a large British steamer, coming from Australia en route to British ports, would reach Port-Said. **// For the embarkation and debar-kation of passengers, and to take on and unload cargo, this ship was scheduled to stop at the ports

∟159/

of Suez, Alexandria, and Naples.

There was nothing to do but wait until the approach of the date of this ship's arrival at Port-Said.

* * *

During our stay at Haifa, we remained in continuous contact with Deraa and Damascus. We received ample news ∟reports/ every day, most of them very painful. Some of them had to do with French oppression, while others were concerned with the acts of traitors and hirelings. **

While we were at Haifa we learned details concerning the fines which the French were imposing on various parts of the country, and we read the texts of decisions given by the Military Courts for the execution of a large number of patriots. (1) We also read, while there, the articles that some bribed Damascus newspapers were beginning to publish which carpingly criticized the National Government and welcomed the French.

459/160/

News reached us that the military courts had given their decisions without a hearing - or rather - without calling a hearing. (2) Some patriots even learned of the death sentences passed against them from the Official Bulletin - while sitting in their shops - and so they hurried to hide from the Government's vigilance until they could flee Damascus and seek refuge at Haifa.

Conditions were such that a large number of refugees were obliged to conceal themselves within the country, or seek refuge outside of it, and, we daily started to receive a not inconsiderable number of refugees at Haifa.

* * *

On the morning of the 18th of August, we left Haifa by train for Port Said. //

When we reached Lud, the High Commissioner for Palestine, Sir Herbert Samuel, was present to receive the King officially and have a private meeting with him.

169

When we arrived at al-Kantara, Abd al-Malik al-Khatib, Representative of the Hashimite Arab Government in Egypt, was there to transmit to King Faysal news of his father, King Husain, and King Husain's recommendations.

At Port Said, the King made a final decision concerning the persons who would accompany him to Europe. He was of the opinion that their number ought to be small. ** And when the boat sailed from Port Said we were a small group, indeed, surrounding the King. There was myself, Nuri al-Said, and Ihsan al-Jabri, on the one hand, and Prince Zaid and his two aides, Sabih and Rasim, on the other.

We were all carrying new passports, issued in the name of the Hashimite Arab Government, which had been provided us at Port Said, through the good offices of Abd al-Malik al-Khatib.

* * *

We remained on board ship until August 25.

160/161/

The calm atmosphere of these days made it possible for King Faysal to go deeply into his review of past events, on the one hand, while thinking about the possibilities of the future, on the other. It also gave me an opportunity to talk with him at length, and observe his personal predilections carefully. Actually, these conversations and reviews had started during our days at Haifa. But there the King had been obliged to receive a number of foreigners, and a great many Syrians and Palestinians. The result of these interviews on our work was to cut the thread of our conversations thus preventing us from completing our discussions.

But on the boat, this series of interviews had ended and the atmosphere aided, or rather induced us, to indulge in long thoughts. ** //

Thus many a time did King Faysal review past events critically and change his mind about policies and their soundness. He regretted some incidents and attitudes, and expressed his indigna-

161/162/

shown his sympathy for the Kemalist movement in a number of ways, and on a number of occasions. He had declared at a number of political meetings, and to several international newspapers, that the Arabs, in spite of their revolt against the Turks to obtain their independence, would disapprove of anything which might take place in the way of an aggression against the Turks, or a violation of Turkish rights, within their native country. (3)

The Syrian Government, itself, had not been content with expressions of sympathy towards this movement, but had effectively aided it by preventing the French from using the railroad to send munitions and supplies to the French forces stationed on the Urfa, Kilisse and Aintab fronts. (4) // The French were unable to supply these forces from Cilicia because of the length and roughness of the road, on the one hand, and the large quantities of snow with which it was covered in winter, on the other. This attitude which the Syrian Government had taken towards French demands, had been a valuable contribution to the Turkish cause because

162/

it had afterwards assured the Turks of decisively defeating the besieged French forces. Even General Gouraud had singled out this problem with great care in the last ultimatum which he had sent to the Syrian Government. He had also said in a speech which he gave after entering Damascus that, "the attitude of the Syrian Government concerning this problem was tantamount to giving effective aid to a mutual enemy, and like aiming a dagger blow at the back of the French army." (5)

In return for all of this, were we not right to expect comparable assistance from the Turks?

On a number of previous occasions, in several places, and through diverse means, contacts and negotiations had taken place between our men and theirs. (6) But at the time, and for a number of reasons, these contacts and negotiations had not ended in positive results. Now that the Turks had seen with their own eyes that we had given them effective assistance without a previous agreement - as indicated in what General Gouraud, himself, had

162/163/

said - was it not proper to hope for comparable sympathy from them concerning our cause?

It was up to me to find this out and clarify it by getting in direct touch with the Kemalist leaders. Consequently it was decided that I would leave King Faysal, after we arrived in Italy, go to Istanbul by the first available means [of travel], and return to meet [the King] in Switzerland after the interval of this mission. For this reason, during our trip, King Faysal singled me out for most of his conversations and projects, disclosing to me everything that occurred to him in the way of plans, beliefs, and hopes. //

* * *

We arrived at the Port of Naples, the 25th of August, or a full month after the day at Kuswah.

For several days on board ship, we had been cut off from all world news [reports], so it was natural when landed that we should want to obtain the news.

∟163∟

The first news vendor we came across on the sidewalk was carrying several kinds of newspapers, all of them in Italian. I bought several newspapers from him, hoping to understand the political news with the aid of what I knew concerning the roots of French words and their various derivations. When I glanced quickly at the headline subjects, I happened on a large heading which included the name of Syria. I started to read it carefully, and attentively, and learned that the Prime Minister in Syria, Ala al-Din al-Durubi, had been killed in the Huran together with one of his ministerial colleagues, Abd al-Rahman al-Yusuf. I also learned that the two ministers had been killed by having their throats cut. (7)

When I learned this, I immediately and vividly remembered how al-Durubi had formerly strongly opposed my suggestion ∟of Transferring the Government to Deraa∟ and ∟how∟ he had said with such fervor: "You don't know the Huranis . . . By God they will cut our throats," repeating these words of his while moving his right hand across his

163/164/

left forearm in imitation of the act of slaughter.

The coincidence that the Hurani should actually cut his throat was indeed strange. But what attracted ones attention, was that they had not done this because he had gone to the Huran/ in defense of the National Government, as I had suggested, but rather, they had killed him/ when he went there to quiet down disturbances at the desire of the French. //

* * *

The first thing I did at Naples - after reading this news item/ and passing it on the King and my/ colleagues - was to inquire about the sailing dates of ships going to Istanbul. I soon learned that there was a ship leaving the Port of Naples in two days time, or the 27th of August, which would arrive at Istanbul the 1st of September.

I therefore hurriedly traveled to Rome to carry out the necessary visa formalities for this

164

trip, and I said good-bye to King Faysal and his suite for an undetermined length of time. **

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The ship arrived at Istanbul in the morning, and dropped anchor within the bay and straits in front of the Young Maiden's Tower.

After a short time, a group of security Officers, including an Englishman, a Frenchman, an Italian and a Turk, climbed aboard and began to examine at great length the passports which all of the travelers were carrying. They questioned each passport bearer in detail. ** This continued for many hours before my turn came. I noticed that the powers of decision and final authority were in the hands of three officers: the Englishman, the Frenchman and the Italian. Each of them examined one of the passports, questioned its bearer, and recorded his answers on a special form. Then he signed the form and gave it to his other two colleagues for their signatures, without the other

164/165/

two examining it a second time. ** As for the Turkish Officer, without objection, he would finally mark down what the third officer had approved.

For a while, I began to follow what these three officers were doing and, noting that they refused debarkation signatures to several persons for reasons which I did not understand, I consequently became apprehensive about the fate of the passport which I was carrying. I had obtained it from Abd al-Malik al-Khatib at Port Said, it being one of the Hashimite Arab Government passports issued in the name of King Husain. According to its text, I was a subject of the Hashimite Arab State, but it also mentioned that I was Minister of Education in Syria. // If, by chance, this passport fell into the hands of the French Officer, it might raise his suspicions, and these suspicions would then possibly lead him to prevent my getting off the ship to land. Thus I began to hope, with all my heart, that my passport would not fall into the hands of the Frenchman. In an agony of worry, I waited a long time for the thing to happen

465/

that I so much desired: thus my passport came into the hands of the Italian Officer. And since my passport bore a visa from the Italian Foreign Ministry at Rome, including permission to leave Italy for Constantinople and return, I obtained the signature of the Italian Officer with all the facility desired, and it quickly passed back into my hands.

I heaved a sigh of relief and, while waiting for the completion of formalities in connection with the remainder of the passengers, I went out to enjoy the lovely views surrounding the ship.

After I got off the ship, I was able to meet with the Kemalist representative in the evening of that same day because he was one of their members with whom, over a period of time, I had had ties of long-standing friendship. He immediately informed me of some facts which I had not taken into account at all: thus communications between Istanbul and Anatolia had been cut off entirely because of the occupation of Istanbul by the Allied

165/166/

Armies (8) and the Caliph, Wahid al-Din's undertaking to fight the Kemalists. (9) Hence it had become impossible for the Kemalists men to communicate with Ankara except via Italy and Italian ports. ** From the nature of the case, communication by this means took a great deal of time and so, if I were in a hurry, it was up to me to go to Italy and get in touch with their men there.

Having learned of these conditions, I decided that after I had provided myself with the information and means which would assure my connections with the Kemalists in Rome, I would return to Italy by the first ship sailing from the port of Istanbul. //

But after inquiring, I learned that the first ship going to Italy would not sail for more than two weeks. Thus I was obliged to remain at Istanbul until the 18th of September.

During this period, I widened my circle of acquaintance with the Kemalists, and learned the details of their problems. I also informed them

166

concerning the details of our problem, and tried to correct some of the erroneous ideas which they had formed about us. **

I noted that in order to oppose the English, their policy was apparently directed toward a mutual understanding with the French. They had concentrated their anger and resentment on the English because they considered them to be their inveterate enemy with whom there was no room for an understanding. As for the French, the Kemalists had come to an understanding with them on most of their problems and, because the French were effectively helping them against the English - sometimes openly and sometimes secretly - they soon hoped to make an agreement with them concerning remaining questions. (10)

* * *

I left the port of Istanbul the 18th of September and arrived at Venice the 25th.

When I arrived at Venice, I knew nothing about the place where King Faysal was staying.

~~166~~ 167/

I learned that he had decided to go to Geneva, and I read news dispatches of his arrival at Rome and, in other reports of his arrival at Milan, but I had seen no cables concerned with his having reached Geneva. What had happened to make it necessary for him to change his previous decision? It was impossible for me to ascertain this at Venice, so I decided to continue on to Milan to inquire about the facts of the matter there.

But when I arrived at Milan, I found no hotel rooms available, for the day of my arrival happened to be the date for the meeting of an international conference which was undertaking to introduce the League of Nations and promote its cause. // (11) All of the hotels in town, from the largest to the smallest and from the most magnificent to the humblest, were crowded with statesmen and newspaper people from all parts of the world, and with thousands of spectators, who had come from everywhere, to enjoy the activity and splendor which would take place at Milan on the occasion of this historic meeting. (11)

△67

After a prolonged inquiry, I was obliged to go to the suburbs. I went to Varese where there was a magnificent hotel, famous at the time of the musician Verdi, which had many vacancies. The next morning, I learned by chance from the porter, that two days before Faysal had lunched in the hotel garden and that he had gone on to Cernobbio, on Lake Como, where he perhaps had stopped at the hotel known as the Villa d'Este. I communicated with the hotel in question and, learning that Faysal was staying there, I got in touch with him and informed him that I was at Varese. Afterwards I went to Como to meet him there. **

The same day, for the first time, I also met Rustum Haydar who had come from Paris a short time before.

I then learned the details of what had happened to King Faysal after we had parted; first he had gone to Rome, then he had moved to Milan and, finally, he had taken the train for Switzerland. But on the way, before his arrival at the Swiss

167 / 168 /

border, Hadad Pasha had met him and presented him with Lloyd George's greetings and the following oral message:

"His Britanic Majesty's Prime Minister is presently occupied in Switzerland with important meetings and conferences, and the arrival of King Faysal there at the present time would complicate these meetings and conferences, and create many problems which it would be to the interest of no one to raise under present conditions. For this reason Lloyd George requests that King Faysal change his plan of traveling to Switzerland and remain in North Italy." //

So the King was obliged to remain in Italy, and he chose the Villa d'Este as a place for himself and his suite to stay.

When I informed King Faysal of the results of my inquiries at Istanbul, he favored my going to Rome and staying there in order to get in touch with the Kemalists. He also decided to charge me with another mission: for previously members of

168/

the King's staff/ had gotten in touch with Professor Bonnefanti, a Professor of International law at the University, and had asked him to prepare a legal opinion on the Syrian problem, and the dispute which existed between /Syria/ and the French Government. They had promised to provide the documents and information which /the professor/ would need, and had come to an agreement /with him/ so that he would, occasionally, come to Como, while Rustum Haydar would, from time to time, go to Rome. ** But the King decided that I should stay at Rome to facilitate and carry out this mission, so that the first would not be obliged to move from Rome to Como, or the second from Como to Rome.

For this reason, I provided myself with the necessary papers and documents, and left for Rome to carry out these two assignments at the same time: getting in touch with the Kemalists, on the one hand, and helping Professor Bonnefanti to prepare his report, on the other.

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168/169/

Immediately upon my arrival at Rome, I very easily got in touch with the Kemalists, thanks to the information and facilities which had been provided me at Istanbul. Among them were individuals whom I had personally known a long time. Thus I very quickly obtained the information which I needed. I also obtained from them several of the newspapers published at Ankara, which I began to read carefully in order to form a clear idea of the Kemalist position in Antolia and their basic leanings. //

I then decided to re-open the door of communications by writing directly to one of their government people. To this end, I reviewed the names of agents who were working at the helm of administrative and political affairs at Ankara, and I decided to send a letter to Farid Bey who, at that time, was fiscal agent. +

I had known him very well as Professor of Political History at the Royal School, and Chairman

+ The Kemalists were accustomed to call their Ministers by this name because they considered them to be Agents of the Nation, whose authority as agents originated in the people.

469

of the Turkish newspaper, Afham's editorial committee. He was among those described as tending to be scholarly, who do not break away from this bent even in their political ideas. Before the 1908 coup d'etat - or according to Turkish phraseology before the declaration of the Mashrutiiyyah - and while he was studying in Paris, he had published a short pamphlet entitled Three Policies, in which he had compared the three basic policies which contended for the control of Ottoman State policy: the Ottoman policy, the Islamic policy and the Turkish, or Turanian, policy.

He was a Turanian, but a Turanian who had clearly joined theory with practice. He was among those who said that the true interest of the Turks required that they turn their attention from the south to the east. I very well remember that he once explained this opinion of his, frankly and courageously, by pointing out that it is not possible for the Turks to assimilate the Arabs, and that it is not in their interest to weaken themselves in trying to do so. Consequently, the Turks ought

169/170/

to come to any form of understanding possible with the Arabs and leave them alone. Then they can turn to caring for the Turkish race itself and concentrate their efforts on handling the problems directly connected with the future of the Turks. ** //

According to his point of view, the most important problem which concerned the future of the Turks was the problem of the eastern provinces: "for coming in between, in the center of the Turkish world, live two foreign races without ties with the Turkish inhabitants of Antolia or with the Turkish lands on the other side of Antolia. These two races are the Kurds and the Armenians. The Kurds can be easily assimilated because, like the Turks, they are Moslems. Furthermore they do not possess a distinctive culture or a recorded literature. Therefore the measures necessary to assimilate them should be quickly taken. ** As for the Armenians, their assimilation is not possible because they have a different religion and

179

possess a distinctive culture and a recorded literature. Thus an investigation concerning means to remove them from the road linking the two Turkish populations will be necessary."

When I learned that this Farid Bey was among the Agents who held the reins of power at Ankara, I immediately remembered these ideas of his, which he had publicly expressed long before the outbreak of the World War, or the beginning of the Arab revolt. His point of view being free from feelings of ill-will or a desire for revenge, I decided that he was the best possible person to consider our problem. ** So I wrote him a letter and give it to a special courier who was leaving Rome for Ankara by the Adalia sea route. I said in this letter what I translate below:

Dear Farid Bey:

In writing you this letter, I am taking advantage of our old friendship and relying on your frankness which I greatly respect.

170 / 171 /

I was in Syria for a year and a half and, during this period, I shared actively in its political life. But after its occupation by the French, I was obliged to leave. Although the struggle continues, I am staying at Rome. Inside and outside the country, we have brothers, colleagues, and associations carrying on the struggle. // We have a number of plans for organizing the activities of these groups, and I therefore decided to inquire of you concerning a few matters in order to complete these plans.

1. What are the Anatolian Government's views on the Hejaz Government, and what is its attitude toward it? **

2. What is its attitude toward Syria and Iraq?

3. Can your Government assist Syria in her struggle against occupation. Specifically, can it supply with arms and ammunition the national forces which are being formed on the northern fronts?

477

4. If it is necessary to send persons to organize and direct resistance activities, and it is not possible for them to reach the centers of activity from the south, will it be possible to guarantee their travel and transportation via Anatolia?

I respectfully request you to answer these questions. Please present my respects to those among the brothers whom I know.

October 29, 1920.

* * *

I attached to this letter a second, detailed one addressed to Yunus Nadi, the owner of the Yenni Koun, or New Day, newspaper, and asked Farid Bey to deliver it to Yunus Nadi after he had read it for his own information.

As for the reason for writing this letter,

171/172/

it was what I had read on the Arab problem and King Husain in one of the issues of Yenni Koun.

The details of the affair were that, when King Faysal arrived at Naples, the News Agencies confused him with King Husain - that is they confused the King of the Hejaz with the son of the King of the Hejaz - and they telegraphed announcements of the arrival of the King of the Hejaz at Naples, and his departure for Rome. // The newspaper in question seized upon this report as a means of attacking King Husain and violently and publicly criticizing the Arab revolt in a carping way. It published articles under the heading, "The King Of The Hejaz Goes To Europe," and, after giving the news referred to, it stated, "that the Hejaz is an Islamic Holy Land, and how can someone who sets himself up as the King of The Hejaz go to Europe." Then it asked: "What will he do in Europe - his son having been wrongfully driven from Syria, what will he beg for there?" In the course of this article, the newspaper also called the King a traitor and directed against him the most serious charges.

472

I had known the owner of the newspaper personally for a long time, and our acquaintance had become well established, particularly during my services at the founding of The New School, on the one hand, and in the course of my work with the Ottoman Press Association and my chairmanship of the Association's Conference, on the other, to the extent that it had reached the status of a firm friendship. He was one of those given to extremes in his writings and ideas. Although his articles did not show deep thought, they were always full of enthusiasm, and they were written in an exciting style.

So I decided to write a detailed letter to him, opposing the articles position, criticizing its implications, and explaining what I saw in the Arab problem from a purely scientific point of view.

After an introduction, I wrote to him what follows in translation:

" . . . When we were in Damascus, we believed in the unity of Arab and Turkish interests, and we provided the Turkish forces active north of

~~472~~ /173/

Aleppo with the military supplies which they needed. We also prevented the French from benefiting from the Syrian railroads in their movements against these forces. ** Influenced by these facts, General Gouraud even imagined that we had come to an official agreement with you.

"And because of all this I was unable to refrain from being troubled and perplexed when I read the paragraphs published in one of the issues of your newspaper, The New Day, which happened to fall into my hands. //

"You were infuriated by the incorrect news reports published by one of the News Agencies concerning the King of Hejaz's trip to Europe, and then you said: 'since the Arab revolt against the Istanbul Government, there remains no other catastrophe to befall either the Arab or the Turk . . . and the Turks and Arabs are not alone, rather, all of the Moslems are to become downtrodden under the heels of the victorious French and English.'

"As for myself, I believe that the time

473

has not yet come to decide where responsibility lies for recent events. In order to pass judgement accurately on problems such as these, it is necessary to get away from events much more than we have done up to the present time in order to inform oneself about the various relevant documents and facts, examine the various aspects of the problem, and see both 'the front and the back' of the question at the same time.

"Nevertheless, I am of the opinion that the results shown up until now do give us a right of decision and judgement regarding some problems. Thus I should like to discuss the claims made in New Day's previously mentioned article.

"Is it possible for one to say that if there had been no Hejaz revolt, then, the French and English would not have won against the Germans and would not have been able to take control of the Moslem world? I doubt that anyone can seriously claim this.

"Jamal Pasha stated in one of his speeches that 'we were on the point of taking possession of

173 / 174 /

Egypt, but Sharif Husain's treason prevented us from doing so.' But this speech was one of the political talks which aimed at misleading world opinion during the war, and I do not suppose that anyone can maintain that its claims are serious. ** // (12)

"The circumstances of the war were such that the fate of the Ottoman State, and those of the Islamic countries which followed in its wake, were tied in with the fate of Germany so, from the nature of the case, how could King Husain's Movement possibly have influenced the final results of clashes which took place on the battle fields of a world war between two such formidable forces? The breaking out, or the non-breaking out, of a revolt in the Hejaz, could this have had as a consequence a change in the course of the war? How could this revolt have had the weight and influence to lead to the victory or defeat of Germany?

"I believe that it was not possible for the Arab revolt to exert an influence such that it could have changed the course of the war and

474

deprive one of the parties of victory in favor of the other.

"Given the course of world events, the defeat of the Germans, and their surrender, was inevitable, regardless of whether or not the Hejaz revolt occurred. The surrender of the Ottoman state was also the inevitable results which followed the collapse of the German forces, regardless of whether King Husain revolted or remained loyal.

"I believe that there is no way of denying this course of events.

"The facts having been established, we are now in a position to ask if it would have been possible to keep Syria from being occupied after the victory of the allied powers and the defeat of the Ottoman State and the German armies on all fronts. The calamitous military occupation which was the fate of many cities and provinces, such as Adrianople, Brusa, and Smyrna - in spite of their distance from the battlefield - leaves no room for any doubt whatever about the answer to this question. No, even

174 / 175 /

if there had been no revolt in the Hejaz after the Allied victory, it would not have been possible for Syria to remain immune to occupation.

"This conclusion of mine is supported by what Envar Pasha once said to the House of Deputies because of the concern which some of the Deputies were showing about the English advance into Irak. He said: 'Gentlemen, we must face facts squarely. Our fate is tied up with the fate of Germany. Even if we lose some parts of our country during the war because of the Germans, when and if the Germans win and emerge safely from the war, all such country will revert to us. // But if Germany comes out of the war defeated - which God forbid - then we will lose everything, even if our country remains altogether free from occupation.'

"What Envar Pasha said at that time about all Ottoman countries, was especially true, and could have been said of Syria, for the fate of Syria was tied in with the outcome of the war, and after the defeat of Germany and the surrender of the Ottoman

[/175/

State, it was not possible for Syria to remain free from occupation.

"But it is /now/ suitable /for me/ to move along somewhat further in my assumptions and to ask what would have happened to Syria if the Arab revolt had not occurred, and the armies of that revolt had not entered /Syria/.

"As /already mentioned/ there is no doubt that the non-occurrence of the revolt would not have influenced the course of the war, or its final results, but it did decisively affect conditions in Syria. After the end of the war, the foreign armies which advanced to occupy Syria did not meet with the opposition which they had encountered up to that time, (13) but when they were confronted with the National Government, which was born of the revolt, and when they clashed with the idea of freedom and independence, which had penetrated deep into the minds of the people because of the revolt, they were not able, in consequence, to occupy and govern the country quickly and easily. They found themselves obliged to exert a great effort to eradicate

475/176/

the seeds sown by the Arab revolt, and to remove the affects which temporary independence had left in the minds of the people.

"Therefore conditions in Syria and the remainder of the Arab countries would have been worse than they are now. //

"Also, events would not have been confined to this area, rather they would have reached beyond Syria to the adjacent countries. For if the Arab revolt had not occurred, and if the government which resulted from the revolt had not been formed, then the French could have dispensed with the military forces which they have been obliged to mobilize on the Syrian littoral for a year and a half, as well as with the Expeditionary Force which, during the last few months, has been sent against the Syrian Arab Government. Instead they could have sent all of these forces to Cilicia to consolidate their control and extend their authority. In other words, if the Arab revolt had not occurred, and if the Syrian Government had not been set up, then the French would have been able to add to their military forces now occupying Cilicia, all of the forces

176

which they have used to occupy the Syrian interior and which, as New Day points out, they used to drive out King Faysal. And this would have led to major changes in the course of the war in this sector. **

"These are established facts which it is not possible to deny in any way."

After citing this series of proofs and observations I said:

"Therefore under present conditions, what is the use of discussing the past? We are all of us still at the stage of making history not that of writing it. As the poet, Abd al-Haqq Hamid, (14) has explained, we should direct our attention to what is coming, and not to the past; we should adopt our acts in accordance with what is required, and useful, for the future and not in accordance with the emotions of the past, for in politics is there anything more harmful than acts dictated by by emotions? ** See how the Russians, who were considered to be the Turk's eternal adversary, have now

~~176~~ /172/

become the Turks only hope of aid against their new enemies. (15) This being the case, how can you allow yourself to go on holding an opinion about the acts of Sharif Husain and those of his sons, which you formed more than four years ago."

I then concluded my letter with the following observations:

"You are doubtless aware of what I said, even before I went to Syria, about the necessity of a Turkish Hejaz agreement. // You shared my views in this respect, and it was for this reason that I was greatly astonished by the article which I read in New Day. After you have carefully looked into the comments which I have just made, I have strong hopes that you will make a more profound and extended investigation of the problem and, in accordance with the facts ascertained in this new inquiry, that you will modify what you have published in New Day."

It is in this way that I explained in the letter my personal opinion - formed a considerable time before - on the role played by the Arab revolt

477

in the history of the Middle East, in general, and its part in the history of the Arab East, in particular - that is after I had reviewed the facts, turned the problems upside down, and repeatedly inquired into the matter by means of the question if, and if not.

Actually, when I wrote this, I had decided not only to reply to the paragraphs published in a Turkish newspaper, but I also intended to enlighten the opinion of a man who, in his capacity as the owner of an established newspaper, which had been transferred from Istanbul to Ankara, on the one hand, and in his position as an influential deputy in the National Assembly and an active member of the Foreign Affairs Committee, on the other, had played an important role in orienting Turkish public opinion. I also wanted to inform Farid Bey himself about this opinion of mine and, consequently I did not send the letter directly to Yunus Nadi, but put it in the special envelope for Farid Bey and asked him to deliver it to Yunus Nadi after he,

~~177~~ /178/

/himself/, had read it. //

* * *

Afterwards, curiously enough, circumstances were such that I was also obliged to elucidate and explain my point of view before a number of Arab meetings. This led me to discuss the problem before a large number of national thinkers who, although they had not for a moment thought about the subject of where the affairs of the Arab countries would have ended up if the revolt had not occurred, had taken shelter in carping criticism and objections to the Arab revolt, as is shown by the obstacles which were put in the way of progress in /solving/ the Arab problem. **

* * *

Farid Bey's answer did not reach me until after almost two months had passed. I translate /below/ the contents of this answer:

178

"The Turkish National Government naturally desires that all of the Moslem Kingdoms be freed of foreign occupation and it will not hesitate in making the sacrifices which are possible for this purpose.

"We did not know what the attitude of the Government Committee in the Hejaz would be towards us at the present time. But under present conditions, we supposed that the Government was subject to English influence. We desire that Moslems everywhere be happy and prosperous.

"We are especially desirous that Syria and Iraq be freed from all foreign fetters, or protection, so that they may freely develop and prosper. As always, we are prepared to unite our efforts with every Moslem society which adopts this as its aim.

"More particularly, we believe that our present advantage calls upon us to assist Syria in so far as possible.

"Thus persons who go there with the intentions of organizing and leading the Movement, may

178/ 179/

travel via Anatolia on condition that they are bearers of the documents necessary for this . . ."

* * *

During the time which elapsed between the sending of the letter and the receipt of the answer, important developments had taken place in our problems. Previously, the European powers had neither acknowledged the independence of Syria, nor King Faysal's reign. ** // (16) For this reason King Faysal had been received in Europe in his capacity as a son of the King of the Hejaz, and as the King's representative at the Peace Conference. Thus his activities were not limited to the Syrian problem, alone, but were concerned with all the various Arab problems. There were a number of question connected with the Hejaz which required getting in touch with Foreign Office men at Rome, and King Faysal also charged me with undertaking this mission.

* * *

After I moved to Rome, I was unable to tra-

179/

vel and meet and talk with King Faysal because I was suffering from a severe case of rheumatism in my right shoulder caused, so it seemed, from having been subjected to heavy rains, while inquiring for a city hotel room the day of my arrival at Milan. After several days of tests and consultations, the doctors decided that, for a period of time, it would be necessary to brace my shoulder and altogether prevent it from being moved. Thus they fastened my right arm across my chest with bandages, which surrounded my torso and resembled swaddling-clothes. Then they enveloped my shoulder and chest with a plaster cast, which surrounded this part of my body somewhat like a tortoise shell.** They left nothing outside this cast except the palm of my right hand and my left arm, and thus it became necessary for my wife to assist me while writing, at meals, and when getting up and down.

When I walked in the streets, or sat at table, I was wrapped in a flowing robe which made me look like an invalid war veteran.

179/180/

I remained in this condition three weeks, and then the surgeon removed the plaster cast and left my arm free. But during the period of immobility, I lost the ability to move my arm so the doctors referred me to a professional masseur who treated my arm every day with massage to bring back flexibility to the joints, and movement to the muscles.

This condition did not prevent me from moving about the city, or from going to the neighboring suburbs, but for a long time it did stop me from traveling to northern Italy.

However, I energetically continued my contacts and activities during this time. // Whenever I needed to write anything, I dictated my letters to my wife, Umm Khaldun, and when I needed to send important papers, I asked the people at Lake Como to come to Rome. And when, after several long sessions with me, Professor Bonnefanti finished his report, Rustum Haydar came to Rome to ask about my health in the name of King Faysal, on the one hand,

/180/

and to receive the report, on the other. During his stay in Rome, he informed me all about what had been going on in the way of discussions and negotiations since I had left King Faysal.

World political trends had made the return of King Faysal to Syria altogether impossible. The speeches given in the French and English Parliaments clearly showed that after their Mandates had been officially decided upon, and after the question of Mosul and Mosul's oil had finally been straightened out between the two states, (17) the French had come to an agreement with the English to leave them a free hand in Syria.

Most statesmen in Syria assumed that the English would not allow the French to occupy the Syrian interior. This assumption, which had reached the point of being an idée fixe with some persons, was very widely spread among the people and even continued to dominate the minds of many until Maysalun.

∟180∟∟181∟

But events had subsequently shown proof that France would not have gone ahead with her recent acts until after she had come to a complete agreement with England concerning the Syrian question. //

Millerand, the ∟French∟ Premier and Foreign Minister, had announced this frankly from the floor of the French Senate during the budget debate concerning Syria and Cilicia. During this ∟same∟ debate, Senator Victor Bérard, having shown himself to be apprehensive concerning the harmful results of the policy which France was following in Syria, had said that "it would lead to the loss of British friendship which would be a great detriment to the future of France." ** Millerand replied to him saying that "our ally has announced to us sincerely and straightforwardly that the work of France in Syria will not be marred by the least interference from them."

After the French ultimatum, but before the Maysalun incident, the English newspaper, The Daily Telegraph, also published an article on the Syrian

[/181/

problem. Having explained the San Remo decision concerning the Mandates, it pointed out as follows:

"This being the case, we have not sought to interfere in the question, or to control the military measures which France is taking in Syria, or to inquire into them, just as France is not seeking to interfere with the measures which we are taking in Iraq to suppress the Arab movement there. ** Thus General Gouraud will do in Syria whatever he believes to be right . . ."

After Maysalun, it was natural that the English did not change their attitude towards Syria.

And, in effect, they did state that they were unable to assist the national movement in Syria, and they did start to try and shift the King's interest from Syria to Iraq. Making this clear to him, they promised to support his candidature to the throne of Iraq. As for King Faysal, at the outset, he remained perplexed and hesitant when confronted with these declarations and promises, and he then told the English that he could not take charge of affairs in Iraq except on two conditions:

181/182/

1. That he would not acknowledge the Mandate but would conclude a treaty with the English which, without affecting the sovereignty or honour of the country, would guarantee to them their political interests.

2. That he would not go to Iraq unless the people of Iraq requested him to do so, and that he would not take over the throne of Iraq unless a plebiscite were run off showing public opinion to be in agreement with his mounting the throne. //

Negotiation continued to go on between him and the English. If an agreement on political principles could be reached, then King Faysal would go to London to discuss the matter personally with the English Government people.

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When I learned the details of this question, I immediately remembered its now distant beginnings, because it appears that the English had begun

/182/

to think of King Faysal's transfer to Iraq the day after Maysalun. (18) Nuri al-Said had mentioned this possibility when he joined us at Deraa. And ten days had not passed after the Maysalun incident, before the English newspaper, The Times, published an article suggesting this /possibility/ to the /British/ Government. During the first week of August, the French Newspaper, Le Temps, pointed this article out, and commented on it. Before we left Haifa and went to Egypt, even the newspaper, Al-Mukattam, had published this news /item/.

Concerning the reasons for this British policy, they were varied and numerous.

First, the English found themselves in a very embarrassing moral position relative to the French and Syrians, on the one hand, and, more particularly, between General Gouraud and King Faysal, on the other. **

In the House of Commons, Lloyd George had praised King Faysal very flatteringly saying that

~~182~~ 183/

"no one would find a man more straightforward and sincere, or more desirous of cooperating with the Allies, in times of peace, as in times of war . . ." And this was on the 29th of April, 1920 or, only two months and a half before the French ultimatum. //

On every occasion, British army men who had cooperated with the Arabs in the Hejaz and Palestine remembered the great services which the Arab revolt had contributed to the Allied cause, and they praised, in particular, the courage and bravery which Faysal had shown in organizing the revolt and leading the Arab army during the war.

The attitude which Englishmen adopted toward the latest Syrian events was one of disapproval, not only of the promises repudiated during the German War, but also of the pronouncements which had been made by their government men during the last few months. It was natural, then, that they should be searching for a line of policy which would remedy this critical situation in so far as possible.

483/

Secondly, leading English thinkers were aware of the Arab movement, and they felt that it should be taken into consideration. Thus the 21st of July, 1920, the Daily Telegraph even pointed out as follows:

"Although we were not directly involved in this war, we were nevertheless connected with it, because the Arab tribes do not distinguish between the various European nations. Thus these Arab tribes may attempt to revenge their compatriotes in Syria by attaching our military positions in Iraq, and this is what is actually taking place at the present time."

The newspaper also pointed out that the Mandate required respect for Syrian independence, and government by means of Syrian civil servants receiving their authority from the will of the people. Then, after pointing out that France accepted the Mandate in this spirit, it stated as follows:

"It is possible that France may be able to

183/184/

convince the Arab Nationalists that its military movements are designed only in order to prepare the way for pacifying the country, because this is the first essential condition of self-government.

"But as we learned by experience during the last few years, nationalism is a fast growing movement. // The Arab tribes, which were divided and backward before the war, are beginning to be conscious of their racial solidarity and unity. They have begun to resent having European officers take charge of their affairs, contrary to expectations. They have refused to be patient until they become capable of administering their own political affairs, as has been advised by the Great Powers who are handling their affairs."

The above/ lines might have expressed the opinion of many English statesmen who were concerned with Eastern Affairs. Thus it was natural that these statesmen/ should be contemplating a new policy which would win Arab approval in one form or another . . ."

284/

And finally a short time before Maysalun, another factor was added to these two, and that was the new direction taken by English public opinion concerning the Iraq question.

The Military Government in Iraq was faced with many problems which obliged the English to mobilize a large military force and to shoulder heavy expenditures.

Attacks against the English forces, which had first occurred with the occupation of Dayr al-Zur, October 11, 1919, (19) now began to recur frequently, and in numerous localities, especially following the declaration of Iraqi independence on March 8, 1920. The attack on Tall Afar occurred the 3rd of June, and that on al-Rumaytha the 1st of July, until Churchill announced on the 19th of July - or during the French ultimatum crisis in Syria - that the revolt had spread to the Euphrates region with British losses numbering four hundred killed. A violent attack took place against the British armies

/184/185/

July 24th - that is the day of the Battle of Maysalun - and afterwards during the month of August, the districts in revolt increased very rapidly to /include/ all parts of Iraq.

During this period, a large number of political leaders and newspaper people in England bitterly criticized the British Government's policy in Iraq to the extent that when, on the 25th of March, Lloyd George announced that the British Government would ask for a Mandate over Iraq, the well known /London/ Times published a forceful leading article which supported the opinion of Asquith, who had pointed out the necessity of limiting British responsibilities to the Basrah district, while leaving part of the interior of Iraq to be governed by the people themselves. ** //

On the 29th of April, one of the members of the House of Commons spoke concerning a project providing for the creation of "a state comprising Iraq, Syria, and Palestine," which would be under the administration of Prince Faysal, and joint

/185/

Franco-British supervision."

Following the example of the Times, in this respect, two /other/ newspapers, the Daily News and the Daily Express, demanded that the administration of Iraq be left to the Iraqis themselves.

The Maysalun incident had occurred at a time when British public opinion was concerned with the Iraq problem and during /a period/ when British efforts /were directed/ toward drawing up a new plan to solve this problem.

Thus since Faysal's name had begun to circulate in these inquiries before Maysalun, it was natural that it should occupy in the talks and discussions of British Political Meetings after Maysalun, an /even/ more important place than before.

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Although the idea of Faysal's candidature for the throne of Iraq had been reflected in the press within a week of his departure from Syria, this

185/186/

movement had come into being under the influence of these numerous factors.

The English newspapers which circulated this idea mentioned its many advantages, among which were those of satisfying the Arabs, freeing Britain from the cares of administering Iraq, and pleasing King Husain and his son, Faysal, who had given such valuable assistance to the Allied cause during the World War. These newspapers pointed out that King Faysal, in particular, deserved Great Britain's regard because of the cooperation and loyal friendship which he had shown in the war with Turkey. //

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At the outset, King Faysal thought of not showing interest in this problem and, for a while, he continued to think of the Syrian problem before everything else, and more than anything else.

One of the French newspapers even wrote that he had rejected the idea of Iraq, and was

186

continuing to hold fast to the Syrian throne and his interest in the Syrian problem.

However, when he became acquainted with the secrets of international politics, while staying in the Alpine foothills and on the shores of the Italian lakes, and when he was obliged to handle the Arab problem in all of its aspects because he had been charged, for the second time, with representing the Hejaz Government at the peace conference - he began to think of the Kingdom of Iraq seriously. He began to prepare such plans as would be necessary to obtain firm guarantees for Iraq's independence and progress. (19)

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During my stay at Rome, I was destined to play an important role in preparing the way for this.

In the course of getting in touch with some of the men at the Italian Foreign Office, I learned that the British Government was preparing a plan,

186/187/

including the text of a Mandate for Iraq, and another plan and text for a Mandate for Palestine, and that they had secretly sent copies of both these plans to the Italian Government so that the latter might express its opinion before the plans/ were submitted to the League of Nations.

When I learned this, I thought that detailed information concerning the two projects would be useful to King Faysal during his negotiations with the English. It would be of great use, because this information would give him an understanding of the actual intentions concealed behind the texts of the propositions and thus would help him in guarding against the political traps which the Europeans excelled, with unsurpassed proficiency, in setting. // So by various means I began to urgently request information about these two plans, especially the text of the Mandate plan for Iraq. **

At the outset of the matter, I obtained some oral information from one of the Foreign Office employees. This oral information added to

487

my conviction of the necessity of obtaining the original texts, so I asked the employee to provide me with copies of the two projects. But he told me that this would be altogether impossible because there was only one copy at the Foreign Office, and to make copies was a difficult matter. However, he promised to get the original copy for me in the evening, on condition that I returned it to him in the morning. **

That evening, after supper, he actually did bring it to me, and I promised to return it to him the next morning.

At the time, my arm and shoulder were still bandaged, and I still needed the assistance of Umm Khaldoun for everything. So I asked her to sacrifice her sleep that night in order to make complete copies of the two plans and, in effect, we remained awake the whole night together in order to finish the copies.

In the morning, we returned the original

187 188

copy to the employee, and hurried to send the copied texts to King Faysal.

King Faysal was extremely pleased with the copies/ and thanked us for them very warmly.

I learned afterwards that he profited from them very greatly during his negotiations at London.

This was the beginning of the services which I undertook to render directly to Iraq, and in connection with the Iraqi problems. //

* * *

The preliminary negotiations being conducted between King Faysal and the English were completed in October, and he therefore decided to go to London via Germany and Belgium.

As for myself, I saw no advantage in my accompanying him on this trip, and I decided that it would be more in the interests of everyone concerned for me to return to Egypt and get in

188

touch with the brethren gathered there.

Therefore, shortly before his departure for England, I said good-bye to King Faysal and, leaving Italy on December 5th, I reached Cairo on the 9th.

At Cairo, I learned all of the details concerning the National Movement.

Our compatriots active in this movement were divided into three branches: the first branch was hiding inside Syria, the second had gone to Amman, and the third had taken refuge in Egypt.

In order to organize a revolt, the first branch was trying to strengthen the spirit of resistance inside Syria.

The second branch hoped to make of Amman the center for the mobilization of nationalist forces.

As for the third branch, it was concerned with propaganda, and had decided that a delegation needed to be formed in order to take charge of

188 / 189 /

the defense in European countries of Syrian rights.

The Amman militants called for me to join with them, while those of Cairo suggested my becoming one of them. As for myself, I was of the opinion that either of these courses would plunge me into a sea of politics and draw me away from my original, special field. Thus I preferred going to Iraq with King Faysal in order to organize the foundations of education in that country in accordance with a desire which he had often expressed to me. **

So I made my excuses to the brethren who had sent for me to come to Amman, and to those who sought to have me go to Europe, and I waited at Cairo. //

King Faysal's negotiations with the English were not quickly concluded because of differences among the English themselves concerning the policy that should be followed in Iraq, on the one hand, French protests against the plan of Faysal's going to Iraq, on the other, and, in the third place, the difficulty of reconciling England's

189/

ambitions to exploit Iraq with Faysal's nationalist hopes. Naturally, all this would make it necessary to prolong the negotiations. **

However, the negotiations ended in March, and King Faysal left England during the last few days of that month, arriving at Cairo the 14th of April. Then he left for the Hejaz to see his father. ** From there he traveled to Iraq via Basrah, reaching Basrah the 21st of June, 1921.

Until he was elected King of Iraq, he traveled through the various sections of Iraq giving speeches and making known the plans which he was prepared to put into effect. His coronation took place at official ceremonies given at Baghdad, August 23, 1920. **

And thus King Faysal moved for good from Syria to Iraq. (21)

As for myself, when King Faysal went to the Hejaz, I remained in Egypt. Then, following receipt of a telegram from him when he left the Hejaz for Iraq, I left Egypt for Basrah. **

189

When I embarked from Port Said, almost a year had passed since my first having taken a ship from there. But this time I did not head north-westward, but rather, I went to the southeast. ** And after that, I spent twenty years of my life in the service of Iraq.

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NOTES

Preface

The Replacement Crises

1. The decision to replace the British by the French army had been agreed upon between Britain and France, September 15, 1919. (De Gontaut-Biron, Comte R., Comment La France s'est Installée en Syrie, Paris, 1922, pp. 297-332).

Although after the Armistice of Mudros, (October 30, 1918), Syria had been divided into three administrative zones - Occupied Enemy Territory East, South, and West, under Arab, British, and French administration, respectively - the British had actually retained supreme military and administrative control in all three zones until the September 15, 1919 agreement was put into effect. (De Gontaut-Biron, Opus Cit., p. 76).

Thus in the French zone, a French High Commissioner had been attached to the staff of the British Commander-in-Chief as Chief Political Advisor who was directly responsible to the Commander-in-Chief for the administration of OET, West. (Franco-British agreement of September 30, 1918, cited by De Gontaut-Biron, Opus Cit., pp. 65-66).

In the case of OET, East, Prince Faysal was recognized by the Commander-in-Chief as the highest authority in military and administrative matters who, however, was equally subordinate to the British Commander-in-Chief. (Allenby's telegram of October 21, 1921, The Milner Papers, quoted by Kedourie, Elie, England And The Middle East, London, 1956, p. 130).

According to De Gontaut-Biron (Opus Cit., pp. 102-103), the districts in which the French army was to replace the British in virtue of the September 15, 1919 Franco-British agreement, including Cilicia, were as follows:

"I. Vilayet de Beyrouth

"Ville de Beyrouth.

Sandjak de Saidi (cazas de Saida, Tyr, Merdjayoun).

Sandjak de Tripoli (cazas de Tripoli, Safita, Hosn-el-Akrad, Akhar).

Sandjak de Lattakieh (cazas de Lattakieh, Djible, Banias, Sahioun, Djisir-es-Shogur).

"II. Province du Liban

Cazas de El-Koura, Batroun, Kesrouan, Zahle, Metn, El-Chouf, Djessin, Mudirieh autonome de Deir-el-Kamar.

"III. Vilayet de Damas

Cazas de Hasbeya, Racheya et Baalbeck. *

"IV. Sandjak autonome d'Alexandrette

Cazas d'Alexandrette, Antooche, Harim et Beylan.

*(See, however, text and relevant notes).

2. The Eastern District, OET East, included interior Syria from Aleppo to Aqaba. (Antonius, George, The Arab Awakening, Beirut, 1955, p. 279). Cf., however, Lenczowski, George, (The Middle East In World Affairs, Cornell, 1952), who states that Maan and Aqaba were considered to be directly subject to the Kingdom of Hejaz.

November - 1919

1. Yasin al-Hashimi is described by Gertrude Bell, (quoted by Kedourie, Opus Cit., pp. 170-171), as: "a late adherent to the Arab cause. He was serving in the Turkish Army until the occupation of Damascus, and was left behind wounded when the Turks retreated. He is in touch with the Committee Of Union and Progress and with Mustapha Kamal, and his personal sympathies are probably Turkish. Meantime he has influence with Faysal and dominates Zaid who acts for Faysal during the latter's absence."

2. The Arab administration at Damascus had set up the Director's Council, November 6, 1918. The Council was transformed into a Ministry, August 6, 1919, but after protest from the British Commander-in-Chief on the grounds that the administration of Occupied Enemy Territory should not in any way prejudice the final decision of the Peace Conference, it again became a Director's Council and remained so until the declaration of Syrian independence, the appointment of Faysal as King, and the formation of the al-Rikabi Ministry in March, 1920. (David, Philippe, Un Gouvernement Arabe a Damas, Le Congres Syrien, Paris, 1923, pp. 29-40).

3. The Military Governor General in October, 1919, was Ali Rida al-Rikabi. It was alleged that he did not fully support the Nationalists and he was forced to resign in December of the same year. (David, Opus Cit., p. 83). As noted above, however, he formed the first full-scale Ministry in March, 1920.

He is described by Brémont, General Ed., (Le Hedjaz Dans La Guerre Mondiale, Paris, 1931, p. 306), as a: "general turc qui . . . avait été chargé par Liman von Sanders d'organiser la défense du front de Kounéitra . . . Dès l'arrivée de la cavalerie anglaise . . . Ali Riza Pacha donna l'ordre de retraite, et, de sa personne, se porta dans les

lignes britanniques. Amené au commandant de la division britannique . . . il descendit l'escalier branlant d'une sorte de cave où celui-ci et son Etat-Major prenaient un frugal breakfast . . . Gros et lourd, Ali Riza descendit péniblement dans l'obscurité, et tomba pesamment dans la cave, renversant la table, ce qui fit la plus fâcheuse impression . . . C'est ainsi qu'il fut incorporé dans les rangs des Alliés, auxquels il donna tous les renseignements qu'il savait."

4. Faysal had left for London at the end of September, 1919, and returned to Damascus, January 14, 1920. (De Gontaut-Biron, Opus Cit., p. 327).

5. It was in November, 1919 that Yasin al-Hashimi's National Defense Committee, which is alleged by Kedouri to have had a determining voice in Faysal's Government, was set up. (Kedourie, Opus Cit., p. 169).

6. The author may have in mind one of Allenby's directives to the Allied administrators in the three Occupation Zones as contained in the Bols Instruction, which is quoted by David, Opus Cit., pp. 12-13), and De Gontaut-Biron, (Opus Cit., p. 77) as follows: "Les administrateur en chef et les gouverneurs militaires doivent bien se pénétrer de l'idée que l'occupation militaire est temporaire et provisoire, et ne peut en aucune facon préjuger du règlement final qui sera établi à la Conference de la paix.

7. General Gouraud, the new High Commissioner replacing George Picot, had arrived the day before, November 21. (Jung, Eugene, La Revolte Arabe, Vol. II, Paris, 1925, p. 130).

8. The Syrian General Congress, which had been elected according to Ottoman law within OET East, and included representatives chosen by local notables from OET West, and South, first met June 20, 1919. On orders from British the Commander

in-chief, its activities were restricted to the submission of a resolution to the King Crane Commission. (David, Opus Cit., pp. 51-63)

The Congress' resolution to the King Crane Commission (officially known as the American Section of the International Commission on Mandates, Antonius, Opus Cit., p. 295), after protesting against the idea of a Mandate and rejecting France as a Mandatary, mentioned the possibility of receiving economic and technical assistance from the Americans or, failing the Americans, the English "on condition that that assistance will not alter either the complete political independence or the unity of the country." (David, Opus Cit., pp. 65-69)

9. The Congress' resolution concerning boundaries is cited by David, (Opus Cit., pp. 66-67) as follows:

"Nous demandons l'immédiate et complète indépendance politique, sans protection ni tutelle pour la Syrie ainsi délimitée:

"Au Nord, le système Taurique;
Au Sud, Rafeh et une ligne partant, dans la Syrie méridionale, de El-Juf à Akabah et au Hedjaz;
A l'Est, l'Erphrate et la rivière Khabour, puis une ligne tracée à l'Est d'Abou-Kemal et de Al-Juf;
A l'Ouest, la Méditerranée."

10. During the period of British Military occupation, Allenby had stipulated that Hasbeya, Rasheya and Ryak, "be provisionally administered by the Arab governments." (Instruction of October, 1918, cited by De Gontaut-Biron, Opus Cit., p. 103)

At the time of the replacement crises, the British Commander-in-chief was reported to be apprehensive of serious trouble, and he requested the French to delay their occupation of the districts in question from the 22 to the 28 of November. In the evening of the 27, the French authorities received a telegram from Paris ordering them to put off their occupation of Hasbeya, Rasheya and Ryak indefi-

nately. (Goudot, Lieutenant-Colonel, Les Opérations de l'Armée Française du Levant, La Syrie et le Liban en 1921, Haut-Commissariat de la République Française, p. 81 Paris, 1922.)

11. During "his first trip to Europe," Faysal left Damascus, November 27, 1918, and returned April 30, 1919. (De Gontaut-Biron, Opus Cit., pp. 190 & 232).

12. According to Testis, (l'Oeuvre de la France Au Levant, Extrait de la Revue des Deux Mondes, February March 1921, p. 9), Clemenceau's order to Gouraud in November, 1919, was to put: "un poilu de chez nous partout où il y avait un Tommy britannique," but throughout the war, and until Gouraud's assignment as High Commissioner, the universal complaint of the French Military assigned to the Middle East was that the number of troops and the amount of matériel made available by the French government were ridiculously inadequate in comparison to French political ambitions in the area. (Brémond, Opus Cit., p. 180 and pp. 195-198).

Brémond (Opus Cit., p. 308) also quotes a telegram, dated November 14, 1918, which was sent by Picot to the Paris government during the first week of his assignment as first French High Commissioner to Syria. The telegram appears to very accurately predict the replacement crises:

"Aussi longtemps Armée anglaise occupera, il y aura doute dans l'esprit des populations, favorisant ceux qui nous sont hostile. Seul remède envoyer vingt mille soldats en Syrie et prier Angleterre nous abandonner cette charge. A l'heure actuelle, cela paraîtra naturel. Dans quelque semaines cela paraîtra un acte hostile à l'égard de l'Arabie. Si on hésite, les hésitants prendront parti contre nous, et notre situation sera ruinée en Syrie comme elle l'a été en Palestine."

According to De Gontaut-Biron, in September, 1918, (Opus Cit., p. 39), the French army in Syria numbered 7,000. Its increasing size during the

latter part of 1919 and early 1920, is shown by Jung's estimates, (Jung, Opus Cit., pp. 121-122):
October 1919: 13,000: November 1919: 17,000: December 1919: 27,000: July 1920: 61,000.

13. Cumming, Henry H., (Franco-British Rivalry in the Post War Near East, Oxford University Press, 1938 p. 77), seems to agree that the French and British had not yet composed their differences about Syria in the spring of 1919:

"Franco-British disputes at the Peace Conference culminated in a meeting which took place at Lloyd George's Paris flat . . . March 20, 1919 . . . Pichon brought the secret treaties before the meeting in a discussion of the Arab question."

14. A point of view echoed by Testis in his Revue des Deux Mondes article (Opus Cit., p. 22):
"On peut affirmer que l'affaire de la Bekaa fut le point de départ de nos difficultés en Syrie avec l'émir Faysal et son gouvernement."

The Ultimatum Crises

1. According to David, (Opus Cit., p. 21), the Syrian National Congress had passed a conscription law in December, 1919.

2. The text of the Ultimatum (l'Europe Nouvelle, No. 46, 12 December, 1920, pp. 1849-1851) is as follows:

"Au nom du Gouvernement français, j'ai l'honneur d'exposer une dernière fois à V.A.R. la situation dans laquelle se place l'attitude prise depuis le début de l'année par le Gouvernement de Damas.

"Alors que le calme avait régné en Syrie lors de l'occupation anglaise, les désordres ont commencé dès que nos troupes ont relevé les forces Britannique, ils n'ont fait que croître depuis.

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"Alors que le calme avait régné en Syrie lors de l'occupation anglaise, les désordres ont commencé dès que nos troupes ont relevé les forces Britannique, ils n'ont fait que croître depuis.

"Ils ont nuit davantage à la prospérité de la Syrie et à son organisation politique, administrative et économique qu'à la sécurité de nos troupes et à l'occupation française de la zone ouest elle-même.

"Le Gouvernement de Damas en porte toute la responsabilité vis-à-vis des populations syriennes auxquelles la France a reçu de la Conférence de la Paix mandat d'apporter les bienfaits d'un régime d'indépendance, d'ordre, de tolérance et de richesse.

"Au désir d'amitié et de collaboration que la France avait manifesté à V.A.R. en affirmant le droit des populations de langue arabe de toutes les confessions, fixées sur le territoire syrien à se gouverner elles-mêmes à titre de nations indépendantes, V.A.R. avait répondu en reconnaissant que les populations syriennes ont grand intérêt, en raison de la désorganisation résultant de l'oppression Turque et des dommages subis pendant la guerre, à demander les conseils et l'aide d'une grande puissance pour réaliser leur unité et organiser le fonctionnement de la nation, conseils et aide qui seront enregistrés par la Société des Nations lorsque celle-ci sera pratiquement réalisée.

"Au nom des populations syrienne c'est à la France que V.A.R. avait fait appel pour cette mission. Lorsqu'en janvier, pendant que vous négociez avec le Gouvernement français, les bandes parties de Damas envahissaient la zone ouest, M. Clemenceau m'avait télégraphié:

"Informé des attaques des Bédouins au Sud et au Nord de la Syrie, j'ai dit à l'Emir Fayçal que je m'étais mis provisoirement d'accord avec lui sur un certain nombre de principes et que je tiendrais entièrement ma parole, mais qu'une loyauté égale de sa part et le respect absolu de son autorité par ses partisans devaient répondre à mon attitude; si ces deux conditions n'étaient pas intégralement remplies, le Gouvernement français reprendrait

toute sa liberté et imposerait par la force l'ordre et le respect des droits qu'il tient de la Conférence.'

"Or l'exposé suivant montre clairement comment le Gouvernement de Damas n'a cessé de pratiquer une politique hostile et nettement opposée à la politique de collaboration prévue par le Président du Conseil et que vous vous étiez engagé à pratiquer.

1. Hostilités Caractérisées Contre Notre Corps D'Occupation

"Le refus obstiné de laisser l'autorité française disposer en toute liberté de la voie ferrée Rayak-Alep est de la part du Gouvernement de Damas un acte d'hostilité caractérisée.

"Ce gouvernement n'ignore pas que la ligne en question est indispensable pour vivre et combattre a une des divisions française du Nord.

"Or cette division est engagée contre des forces hostiles se recommandant de la Turquie a l'oppression de laquelle les Allies victorieux ont arraché la Syrie.

"Cette division combat précisément pour défendre les frontières du nouvel état syrien que doivent nous attacher aussi bien les liens de l'intérêt que ceux de la reconnaissance.

"L'organisation et l'emploi de bandes contre nos troupes d'occupation ont été érigés en principe par le gouvernement du Damas.

"La doctrine a d'ailleurs été proclamée solennellement le 13 avril par le commandant de la 3 division d'Alep dans les termes suivant:

"Puisque nous ne pouvons déclarer officiellement la guerre aux Français, inondons le pays de bandes qui les détruisent en détail. Elle

seront commandées par nos officiers et si certains d'entre eux sont tués, la famille de ces martyrs sera élevée aux frais de l'Etat.'

"Il suffit d'énumérer les preuves suivantes de l'application stricte d'un tel système.

"Le 13 décembre 1919, notre poste de Tel Kalaa est attaqué à l'instigation des Autorités Chérifiennes d'Homs.

"A la fin de décembre 1919, les Bédouins de Mahmoud Faour, que V.A.R. m'a signalé comme son ami personnel, massacrent les Chrétiens du Merdj-Ayoun où nos troupes sont attaquées, le 4 janvier, drapeau chérifien déployé.

"Le 5 janvier 1920 à Kirik Khan, peu après El Hamman, sous les ordres de Souraya Bey, la complicité de réguliers Chérifiens est reconnue chez ceux qui attaquent nos troupes.

"Le 25 janvier le capitaine Fouad Selim avec un détachement comprenant des réguliers attaque notre poste du pont de Litani.

"Après Harim et Antioche attaqués par des bandes arabes, Babana subit du 16 au 22 avril, un assaut ininterrompu que dirige l'officier chérifien Hassan Bey.

"En juin, on relève dans les bandes opérant au Merdj-Ayoun la présence du 1 colonel 1 capitaine, 6 lieutenants et 317 hommes de l'armée Chérifienne et l'emploi d'un matériel provenant de la même armée et comprenant 4 mitrailleuses lourdes, 2 légères et 50 caisses de munitions.

"La complicité des agitateurs de la zone est éclatée aussi en juin, dans les troubles marqués par les massacres d'Ain Ibel et la rébellion des groupement Chiites.

"Les professionnels de l'organisation de bandes de brigands sont traités avec honneur à Damas, en particulier Soubhy Bey Barakat dont les méfaits

contre nous sont connus de tous.

"Quand les bandes ne sont pas lancées de la zone est, c'est en zones française même que des troubles sont fomentés.

"C'est le cas de nombreux attentats commis contre les Chrétiens, et en particulier ceux de Djisrel Karaon le 29 décembre mettant en cause les deux officiers Chérifiens, Ouahed Bey et Tashin Bey.

"Au Djebel Ansarieh une aide effective et constante est apportée à Cheikh Saleh, champion du désordre et de la haine contre nous.

"Les exemples pourraient être multipliés. Ils ont été portés en leur temps à la connaissance de V. A. R.

2. Politique Agressive Du Gouvernement De Damas

"V. A. R. a jugé à propos de faire entrer dans son Gouvernement des hommes connus pour leur hostilité contre la France L'entraînement du milieu était tel que V.A.R. n' a pu elle-même partir en temps voulu pour se rendre à l'invitation de la Conférence de la Paix.

"C'est dans les rangs même de ce parti que le Ministère actuel est choisi. Son programme est déjà une insulte aussi bien pour la France dont l'aide est rejetée que pour le Conseil suprême qui lui a donné le mandat sur la Syrie.

"Le rejet pur et simple du mandat français, le 18 mai dernier, donne la mesure d'un aveuglement dont les conséquences peuvent être désastreuses pour la Syrie.

3. Mesures d'Ordre Administratif Dirigées Contre La France

"L'obstruction financière marquée par le rejet de la nouvelle monnaie syrienne émise pour le compte de la France par la Banque de Syrie, et l'interdiction édictée à Damas de toute relation commerciale et financière avec la succursale de la Banque de Syrie en Zone est, est une nouvelle marque d'hostilité d'ailleurs nuisible à la prospérité du pays.

"Il en est de même des interdictions, d'exportation du céréales à destination de la zone française prononcées à Hama en mars, étendues à Damas, puis à Alep.

"Débordant les limites de la zone, est, les autorités administratives chérifiennes ont été poussées progressivement à l'intérieur même de la zone ouest pour en marquer une prise de possession ayant comme conséquence notre exclusion.

"En mars, un poste chérifien est installé à Khalsa, peu après le drapeau Chérifien est arboré à Kadmus.

"En avril, le Gouvernement d'Alep organise le Kosseir en caza chérifien, un kaimacan chérifien est installé ensuite à Djisrech Chogur.

4. Actes Directement Hostile Contre La France

"Etre ami ou partisan de la France équivaut en zone Chérifienne à être suspect aux autorités et conduit souvent à être maltraité. Le retour à Rachaya de Farès Gantous et de Nessib Govril pourtant garanti officiellement par le Gouvernement de Damas est particulièrement typique à cet égard puisque nos partisans ont été dès leur arrivée violentés et emprisonnés.

"Le 22 janvier une délégation de Druzes du Hauran venus me saluer est attaquée à son retour à Ouadi Harim et une partie de ses membres sont tués.

"Les exemples pourraient être multipliés.

Ils sont particulièrement nombreux à Alep.

"Être notre ennemi est au contraire en zone est une titre à être honoré, protégé contre tous et à recevoir asile.

"Les Dandachlés sont fêtés à Damas après l'affaire de Tel Kalah. Amin Mahio qui a fait sauter le dépôt de munitions de Beyrouth, n'est aucunement inquiété à Damas.

"Tout récemment Kamel Bey Assad, rebelle notoire, proscrit à la suite des troubles en pays Chilite, dont il porte une grande responsabilité, est l'objet de démarches de rentrée en zone ouest de la part de V. A. R.

"Quant aux habitants de la zone est auxquels l'hostilité qu'il nous témoignent vaut des égards du gouvernement, leur nombre est également considérable.

"La propagande anti-française en zone ouest a revêtu de la part du gouvernement de Damas toute une série de formes différentes et également perfides sur lesquelles l'autorité française, décidée à poursuivre jusqu'au bout sa politique de crédit, a voulu longtemps fermer les yeux.

"Le dernier et le plus éclatant des actes de cet ordre est l'achat moyennant 42,000 livres égyptiennes de la plus grande partie des membres du Conseil administratif du Liban. Ces derniers ont été arrêtés par nos postes le 10 juillet au moment où, répudiant les vœux dès longtemps exprimés par la presque unanimité de leurs compatriotes, ils allaient à Damas vendre leur pays.

"La presse de Damas largement soutenue par le Gouvernement renouvelle sans cesse ses attaques contre tout ce qui est français.

"Elle flétrit les autorités occupant la zone ouest, elle répudie toutes les offres d'aide de la France, elle déforme les intentions généreuses

de cette dernière à l'égard de la Syrie, elle m'injurie grossièrement.

5. Atteintes Au Droit Des Gens

"Alors que d'après ce droit le commandement de l'armée du Hedjaz occupant le territoire syrien qui demeure ottoman jusqu'à ce que l'application du traité de paix en ait autrement disposé, ne doit agir qu'à ce titre en maintenant le statu quo dont il est le gardien, il se conduit, au contraire, en autorité souveraine.

"Cependant la conscription est décidée et appliquée dès décembre 1919 bien qu'il s'agisse d'un territoire étranger.

"Cette charge lourde et inutile est imposée au peuple, même dans les zones ayant un régime spécial, comme en Bekaa, même à des personnes couvertes par des immunités juridiquement valables comme les Libanais et les Moghrebins résident en zone est. Devant la résistance des intéressés, le recrutement devient un véritable racolage qui entraîne parfois l'effusion du sang.

"L'assemblée dite Congrès syrien composée et réunie dans les conditions irréguliers, légifère, et même gouverne pour le compte d'un gouvernement et d'un Etat dont l'existence n'est pas reconnue.

"Bien plus, elle confère irrégulièrement sans mandat ni droit l'y autorisant, la dignité royale à V. A. R. ce qui suivant sa propre expression, la place en état de rébellion vis-à-vis de la conférence de la Paix.

"Enfin les capitulations ne sont pas respectées puisqu'un de nos ressortissants, l'Emir Mouktar, qui représente une illustre famille traditionnellement attachée à la France, est arrêté dans les conditions scandaleuses à Alep.

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"Les conventions diplomatique ne le sont pas davantage puisque, malgré l'entente intervenue en décembre dernier avec M. Clemenceau et aux termes de laquelle aucune troupe régulière française ou chérifienne ne devait s'établir, en Bekaa, un bataillon de l'armée chérifienne vient d'être poussé sur Merdej Andjar.

6. Domages Ainsi Causes A La France Et A La Syrie

"Obligée de dépenser son activité et ses forces à réprimer sans cesse les désordres, à poursuivre avec le Gouvernement de Damas des négociations politiques laborieuses et stériles, l'autorité française n'a pu encore donner au pays l'Organisation qu'il attend d'Elle. Elle ne porte pas la responsabilité de ces retards.

"Mais sur elle pèse la charge militaire et financière qu'exige la situation maintenue systématiquement par le Gouvernement de Damas.

"Les frais ne peuvent d'ailleurs manquer d'atteindre le budget syrien tant par la privation de recettes qu'elle détermine pour lui aussi longtemps que le désordre règne, qu'en raison de la participation aux dépenses, souveraineté qui lui incombera plus tard.

"Or l'état d'anarchie dans lequel le pays a été plongé par les auteurs de désordres était tel qu'il fallut y amener des forces considérables, bien supérieures à celle qu'aurait exigé le simple remplacement des troupes anglaises dans un régime de paix.

* * *

"Ces raisons prouvent amplement qu'il devient impossible de faire plus longtemps crédit à un Gouvernement qui a manifesté si nettement son hostilité envers la France, qui a causé un si grave

"Les conventions diplomatique ne le sont pas davantage puisque, malgré l'entente intervenue en décembre dernier avec M. Clemenceau et aux termes de laquelle aucune troupe régulière française ou chérifienne ne devait s'établir, en Bekaa, un bataillon de l'armée chérifienne vient d'être poussé sur Merdej Andjar.

6. Dommages Ainsi Causes A La France Et A La Syrie

"Obligée de dépenser son activité et ses forces à réprimer sans cesse les désordres, à poursuivre avec le Gouvernement de Damas des négociations politiques laborieuses et stériles, l'autorité française n'a pu encore donner au pays l'Organisation qu'il attend d'Elle. Elle ne porte pas la responsabilité de ces retards.

"Mais sur elle pèse la charge militaire et financière qu'exige la situation maintenue systématiquement par le Gouvernement de Damas.

"Les frais ne peuvent d'ailleurs manquer d'atteindre le budget syrien tant par la privation de recettes qu'elle détermine pour lui aussi longtemps que le désordre règne, qu'en raison de la participation aux dépenses, souveraineté qui lui incombera plus tard.

"Or l'état d'anarchie dans lequel le pays a été plongé par les auteurs de désordres était tel qu'il fallut y amener des forces considérables, bien supérieures à celle qu'aurait exigé le simple remplacement des troupes anglaises dans un régime de paix.

* * *

"Ces raisons prouvent amplement qu'il devient impossible de faire plus longtemps crédit à un Gouvernement qui a manifesté si nettement son hostilité envers la France, qui a causé un si grave

tort à son propre pays en se montrant incapable de l'organiser et de le gouverner.

"La France se voit donc obligée de prendre elle-même des garanties pour assurer la sécurité de ses troupes et celle des populations des territoires sur lesquels elle a reçu de la Conférence de la Paix la mission d'exercer son mandat.

"J'ai l'honneur de faire connaître à V. A. R. que ces garanties sont les suivantes:

1. Disposition absolue de la voie ferrée de Rayak à Alep, pour tous les transports ordonnés par l'autorité française.

Cette disposition sera garantie par le contrôle entier du trafic exercé dans les gares de Rayak, Baalbeck, Homs, Hama et Alep par des commissaires militaires français, secondés par un détachement armé destiné à assurer la police de la gare, et par l'occupation de la ville d'Alep, noeud important de communications que nous ne saurions laisser tomber entre les mains des troupes turques.

2. Abolition de la conscription, le recrutement devant cesser, complètement et les libérations de contingents, ramener l'armée chérifienne aux formations et effectifs qu'elle possédait au premier décembre dernier.

3. Acceptation du mandat français. - Le mandat respectera l'indépendance des populations syriennes, il demeurera entièrement compatible avec le principe du Gouvernement par les autorités syriennes régulièrement investies de leur pouvoir par la volonté populaire. Il ne comportera de la part de la puissance mandataire qu'un concours apporté sous forme d'aide et collaboration, mais en aucun cas ne prendra la forme coloniale d'une annexion ou d'une administration directe.

4. Acceptation de la monnaie syrienne. - Cette monnaie devenant la monnaie nationale en zone est, toutes les interdictions

ayant atteint jusqu'ici pour cette zone la Banque de Syrie sont levées.

5. Chatiment des coupables, les plus compromis par leurs actes hostile a la France.

"Ces conditions sont presentees en bloc, et c'est en bloc egalement sans disjonction possible qu'elle devront etre acceptees dans un delai de 4 jours commençant le 15 juillet a 0 heures et prenant fin le 18 juillet a 24 heures.

"Dans le cas ou j'aurai avant cette dernière date avis de V. A. R. que ces conditions sont acceptées, ses ordres auront du être donnés en même temps aux autorités intéressées pour qu'il ne soit fait aucun obstacle à mes troupes en marche pour réaliser les occupations indiquées. L'acceptation des conditions nos. 2, 3, 4 et 5 devra de meme etre consacree avant le 18 juillet par les actes officiels et leur execution integrale avoir lieu avant le 31 juillet, 24 heures.

"Dans le cas, au contraire, ou V. A. R. ne m'aurait pas avise en temps voulu que les conditions precitees sont acceptées, j'ai l'honneur de vous faire connaître que le Gouvernement français reprendrait toute sa liberté d'action. Je ne puis affirmer que dans ce cas, le Gouvernement français se contenterait des garanties ci-dessus indiquées.

"Ce ne serait pas la France qui porterait la responsabilité des malheurs qui pourraient s'abattre sur le pays. Elle aurait fait la preuve depuis longtemps et dans cette dernière circonstance de sa moderation. C'est le Gouvernement de Damas qui porterait tout entier le poids de la responsabilité des solution extremes que je n'envisage qu'a regret, mais auxquelles je suis prêt avec la plus résolue fermeté."

Signe: General Gouraud

3. By its resolution of May 18, the Syrian National Congress had supported the al-Atasi Government's decision to reject the Mandate. (David, Opus Cit., p. 129).

4. According to David, (Opus Cit., p. 88) the Hurani had refused to perform military service, and some disturbances had resulted from an effort to make them comply with the conscription law.

5. Al-Azma is described by Testis, (Opus Cit., p. 31), as a graduate of Berlin's Kriegsakademie, and a former Turkish army officer.

6. According to Kedourie, (Opus Cit., p. 171), "it was presumably for his relations with the Turks that the British arrested Yasin."

On the other hand, De Gontaut-Biron states that French intelligence sources had seized an al-Hashimi signed document giving plans for "a western offensive in anticipation of a war with a great power." (Opus Cit., p. 325).

Allenby subsequently ordered al-Hashimi to Cairo. (Idem, p. 326).

7. As already noted (Note 12 "November - 1919") French forces in Syria had increased from approximately 13,000 in October, 1919, to over 60,000 in the summer of 1920.

8. Kedourie, (Opus Cit., p. 161), quotes Miss Bell's evaluation of the Syrian army at the beginning of the replacement crises, (Syria in October, 1919, Department of Printed Books, British Museum) as follows:

"Some 7,200 is the present strength, out of a permitted 8,000, and this includes 400 officers above the prescribed number. It is an open secret that these additional officers are to be used to raise levies for guerilla warfare if resistance is offered to the French, but no protest against this breach of regulations has been made by us. . . . No one supposes that the Arab army would face regular troops. . . . The Arab leaders know that the army will be no good to them against the French, and they rely on guerilla warfare and local levies."

9. A careful reading of Kedourie's exceedingly well documented chapter on "Syria 1918-1920," (Opus Cit., pp. 142-174), would seem to indicate that Faysal, contrary to the suspicions of the Nationalists, had never intended to come to an

understanding with the French, except possibly after Maysalun

Al-Husri told the translator, moreover, (Beirut, 9/27/56), that while Faysal showed some willingness to deal with Clemenceau because of the latter's reputation as a socialist and his record of having opposed French expansionist ventures (notably that in Tunis), he did not sign an agreement with the French Prime Minister in the winter of 1919-1920 as is sometimes charged, (notably by General Gouraud, La France En Syrie, Extrait de la Revue de France, April, 1922, p. 7, also note text of ultimatum p. 150), but merely promised to take up Clemenceau's proposals with the members of the Damascus government when he returned to the Middle East.

Presumably the Nationalists complaint concerning the King's failure "to go along with us on all our policy," did not refer to Faysal's tendency to rely on the British. According to al-Husri, they considered that the French tendency to set up a centralized administration, wherever they were in control, would have made it impossible to retain any degree of independence in Syria. The English were believed to be more lenient: "They were content to post sentries at the doors and in the corridors while the French would insist on putting a guard in all the rooms too."

10. According to Kedourie, (Opus Cit., p. 173), Allenby's opinion was requested and he advised acceptance. Lord Curzon is also quoted as refusing to intervene. (Idem)

11. Gouraud presumably had in mind the al-Atasi Ministry which succeeded in office the al-Rikabi Government, May 3, 1920. (David Opus Cit., p. 102).

12. According to a statement issued by Faysal's staff to the London Morning Post, October 1, 1920 (Current History XIII, No. 2, Feb., 1924 p. 254), casualties during the ultimatum demonstrations amounted to "80 killed and several hundred wounded."

13. Cousse, described by Brémond, (Opus Cit., p. 338), as "d'éducation tunisienne et marocaine," had replaced the latter as head of the French Military Mission attached to Allenby's Command. He then served as liason to Faysal, being replaced after the fall of the Damascus government by Catroux. (Idem p. 343)

On The Way To Aley

1. Like Toulat, Cousse, Catroux and Gouraud, himself, most of the officers and administrators sent to Syria by the French Government after the war, had had North African experience. According to De Gontaut-Biron, however, and contrary to what these officers expected: "les méthodes d'administration marocaines . . . n'étaient aucunement applicables en Syrie . . . les musulmans de Syrie ont en effet une mentalité absolument différente de celle des Marocains, et beaucoup plus évoluées. A ces nouveaux débarqués . . . échappèrent trop souvent des propos maladroit, peu favorables aux Syriens et à leur pays." (Opus Cit., p. 226).

In Aley With General Gouraud

1. Henry Joseph Eugène Gouraud was born in Paris in 1867 and graduated from Saint Cyr, 1888. He served for long periods in North Africa, notably with Lyautey whom he replaced as Resident General of Morocco during 1916-1917, while the former served as French Minister of War.

He had taken the place of General d'Amadé as head of the French Dardanelles Expeditionary force and had then been in command of the IV Army on the Western Front.

As already noted, Gouraud arrived in the Middle East November 21, 1919, as the second French High Commissioner to Syria. (Larousse du XX Siècle, Vol. III, Paris, 1930, p. 835)

2. Gouraud later told a meeting of Orientalists in Paris that Yusuf al-Azma "boasted of having aimed the gun" which had shot off his arm in the Dardanelles campaign. (Gouraud, General, Exposé verbal du General Gouraud, l'Asie Française, No. 188, January, 1921, p. 8).

3. This being the telegram to which al-Husri first refers as the one "which we knew nothing about," it may be identical to a written message which Amid Said reports that Faysal sent to Gouraud, also on July 18, which accepted the ultimatum "but only in principle and in his personal capacity." (Amin Said, The Great Arab Revolt, Cairo, 1934, Vol II, Part I, p. 181, quoted by Kedourie, Opus Cit., p. 173).

4. Gouraud may have had in mind a doctrine which he said he had learned from Lyautey in Morocco:

"Lorsque la securité de vos troupes et le drapeau francais seront engagés imposez votre volonté; dans tous les autre cas, ne vous pressez pas . . . " (Gouraud, La France En Syrie, Opus Cit., p. 10).

5. Described by Gouraud in his first ultimatum (see text p.196) as operating in the "Djebel Ansarieh."

6. According to Gertrude Bell, (Opus Cit., quoted by Kedourie, Opus Cit., p. 161): "There were approximately two rifles for every man in the population."

7. David, Opus Cit., p. 128) quotes Section 7 B from General Gouraud's note to Prince Faysal of July 22, 1920, as follows:

"Une mission française sera chargées d'étudier l'application du mandat francais dans la zone Est. Elle comprendra:

Une section militaire;
Une section financiere (impôts,
comptabilité,
biens d'Etat
cadastre, postes);

Une section administrative (assistance, hygiène);
Une section économique (agriculture, mines, travaux publics);
Une section pour la justice et la police;
Une section pour l'instruction publique."

(Note du General Gouraud à l'Emir Faysal 22 juillet 1920)

The Return Journey

1. See On The Way to Aley, Note 1, p. 205.

At Damascus

1. The Mandates, of course, were not assigned in accordance "with the decision of the League of Nations," but at a meeting of the Supreme Council held at San Remo, April 25, 1920. (Boutant, C. A. Les Mandats Internationaux, Paris, 1936, p. 8).

The League eventually approved the San Remo assignments, but in the case of Syria and the Lebanon, not until September 29, 1923. (Rabbath E., l'Evolution Politique de la Syrie Sous Mandat, Paris, 1928, pp. 55-56).

2. The text is contained in Gouraud's Ultimatum. See The Ultimatum Crises, Note 2, p. 201

3. Jung's version of Gouraud's second Ultimatum, including the occupation of Khan Mysiloun, (Opus Cit., p. 147), is as follows:

Kham Mir Salum (?) doit être remise aux Français comme point d'eau;

Une mission française sera autorisée à se rendre à Damas pour s'assurer que l'on y adhère à l'ultimatum et pour s'informer des besoins du gouvernement arabe du point de vue du mandat français;

Une note du general Gouraud sera publiée à Damas informant les habitants que le telegramme d'acceptation était arrivé avec un retard de deux heures, resultant de ce que des Arabes avaient endommagé la ligne à Zebdany."

Apparently the French expected Faysal to accept the first, if not the second, ultimatum. Thus Brémond quotes one of Gouraud's information bulletins to his staff as follows:

"L'émir semble peu disposé à recourir à une solution extrême.

A une délégation venue lui apporter l'appui du Congrès syrien, pour la guerre, il a répondu par un discours très modéré.

D'autre part, il a procédé à une remaniement ministériel, qui toutefois est loin de réaliser l'amélioration souhaitable. *

Aux derniers renseignements, une certaine détente paraissait se produire, et l'acceptation de nos conditions semblait possible, sinon probable."

Pettelat

(Bulletin de renseignements du Haut-Commissariat, quoted by Brémond, Opus Cit., p. 346. *Apparently refers to the proposal that Yasin al-Hashimi should form a new Ministry. See text p. 111

4. Sforza's "new policy with reference to Eastern Affairs," doubtless was concerned with England and France's refusal - after Russian defection - to consider themselves bound by the 1917 Treaty of St. Jean de Maurienne, and Italy's desire to establish new claims in the Levant. (Howard, Harry, The Partition of Turkey, University of Oklahoma Press, 1931, pp. 186-187). Moreover, the League Council's delay in approving France's Mandate for Syria and the Lebanon was largely the result of Franco-Italian negotiations concerning this matter, (See Note 1., "At Damascus," p. 205

5. Brémond in his account of the acceptance telegram and the cut telegraph wires seems to echo al-Husri's point of view in this respect, (Opus Cit., p. 346):

"L'Emir Faical avait télégraphié son acceptation de l'ultimatum; je tiens le fait du colonel et du Mme. Cousse, alors auprès de lui à Damas, et le Roi Faical me l'a complètement confirmé le 20 août 1931; il fut bien étonné quand il apprit le lendemain que l'armée française continuait sa marche en avant. C'est que la ligne télégraphique avait été coupée. Il est évident que le devoir du commandement français était de se renseigner avant d'engager une bataille qui nous a coûté 100 tués et 300 blessés."

6. Al-Qassab, who had been one of the Seven Memorialists, was apparently in the forefront of those urging full-scale resistance. (Antonius, Opus Cit., p. 433). David, (Opus Cit., p. 99) quotes from one of his speeches to the Syrian National Congress as follows:

"Voici que La Nation prépare ses valeureux enfants à la protection de la Patrie, de même qu'elle a préparé les membres de ce noble Congrès à être les gardiens de l'indépendance . . . Que le Congrès se montre donc énergique et qu'il sache qu'une Nation voulant vivre une vie honorable ne dédaigne pas, pour la vivre, d'aller au devant d'une mort honorable . . . "

The Day Of Mysiloun And The Week Following

1. Gouraud, however, pays the Syrian army the tribute of having put up a good fight. "Le combat a été dur," he acknowledges. (Gouraud, Exposé Verbal, Opus Cit., p. 8).

Testis also pays tribute to the fighting spirit of al-Azma's troops:

"Organisées, commandés et inspirés par le ministre de la guerre de Faical, Youssef bey

Azmé, . . . les Chérifiens se battirent bravement et emposèrent des pertes à nos troupes." (Testis, Opus Cit., p. 31).

2. As for the significance of the battle, Rabbath, (Opus Cit., p. 267), taking an extreme nationalist point of view, insists that it was, above all, Faysal's defeat:

"La défaite de Meisseloun, quoi qu'on en dise, avait été surtout la sienne."

On the other hand, Brémond deplores the loss of life and implies that it was Gouraud's fault. He should have known how to handle Faysal as Allenby had handled Abdullah:

"On aurait pu en faire autant à Damas: question de commandement." (Brémond, Opus Cit., p. 347).

Between Damascus And Al Kuswah

1. According to Brémond, King Husain and his sons had been receiving from the British a stipend of approximately 225,000 pounds sterling a month. Faysal's share of this, while he was allied commander in OET East, Brémond estimates to have been about 140,000 pounds sterling a month of which 100,000 was expended in maintaining the army. (Brémond, Opus Cit., pp. 260-261 and 326).

De Gontaut-Biron, (Opus Cit., p. 198), speaks of an allied subsidy to Faysal of four million (presumably francs which at World War I rates of exchange would probably be approximately equivalent to 140,000 sterling) of which half was paid by the French.

2. Sir Herbert Samuel's term as first High Commissioner of Palestine had just begun, as he had assumed office, July 1, 1921. (Howard, Harry, Opus Cit., p. 319).

3. The southern part of Syria, which later was administered through Abdullah as Transjordan,

was under direct supervision of the British from the fall of the Damascus Arab Government until March, 1921. (Lenczowski, Opus Cit., p. 40). See also Note 2., p.187 under "Preface, The Replacement Crisis!"

Conclusion
After Leaving Syria

1. According to Jung, (Opus Cit., p. 147), after the exile of Faysal, a fine of ten million francs was imposed by the French on the Damascus Government.

2. Toynbee points out, (Toynbee, A. J., Survey of International Affairs, 1925, Vol., I., pp. 400-401, quoted by MacCallum, Elizabeth, The Nationalist Crusade In Syria, New York, 1928, pp. 74-75), that in the case of banishment - death penalties are not mentioned - an administrative act of the French Commander-in-Chief was sufficient to send a Syrian to the island prison of Arwad, or into exile in one of the French Colonies.

3. Mme. B.-G. Gaulis, (La Question Arabe, Paris, 1930, p. 111), quotes a statement made to her by Faysal in February, 1920, which indicates that his interest in the Turks was not confined to the immediate contribution which the Kemalists might have been able to make to the cause of Arab independence.

"N'oubliez pas combien le règlement de la paix turque influera sur nous tous, ici. Le bolchevisme serre la Turquie de plus en plus près; déjà ses émissaires sont partout. Ils ont franchi les barrages qui leur étaient opposés, les voici, aujourd'hui parmi nous, dans le sud. Ils propagent leurs doctrines et leurs adhérents se multiplient. Voici le fleau qui menace les civilisations d'Occident si vous ne donnez pas à l'ancien empire ottoman une paix satisfaisante, vous aurez rempu la dernière digue.

4. After the Turkish revolt at Marash, in

February, 1920, the question of communications for the French Army in Cilicia had become particularly urgent. According to Goudot, (Opus Cit., p. 48), it took about 48 hours to transport troops and supplies by the railroad, Beirut-Rayak-Aleppo, while the alternative sea route, Beirut-Alexandrette, and thence over land to Aleppo or Killis, required at least two weeks.

5. According to Gouraud, (l'Asie Francaise, Sept.-Oct., 1920, p. 307), the "dagger in the back" expression was used by Colonel Toulat in a verbal warning to King Faysal:

"En refusant la voie d'Alep vous poignardez nos soldats dans le dos."

6. Apparently contact between the Kemalists and Sharifians had been almost continuous during the winter and spring of 1920.

In March, the Sharifian Commander at Dair-al-Zor is reported to have received 100 cases of light arms from the Turks. (Kedourie, Opus Cit., p. 171). In the Meantime, local authorities at Homs and Baalbek were holding up supplies being sent to French in Cilicia while in June, Yusuf al-Azma is said to have gone to the Turkish frontier to propose military cooperation with the Turks. (Amin Said, Opus Cit., II, Part I, p. 149, quoted, Ibid).

7. According to Testis, the assassination took place August 20, at the al-Gazhala Railroad station. (Opus Cit., p. 52).

8. The Allies had occupied Istanbul March 16, 1920 following the Turkish Parliament's acceptance of Mustafa Kemal's National Pact. (Brockelmann, Carl, History of the Islamic Peoples, London, 1952, p. 440).

9. Following the entrance of Mustafa Kemal's troops into Smyrna, Walid-ed-Din had issued a Khatti-Humayan declaring the Nationalists to be rebels. (Luke, Sir Harry, The Old Turkey And The New, London, 1955, pp. 165-166).

10. In the fall of 1919, Picot had started tentative negotiations with Mustafa Kemal, but the French Government had not followed them up. (De Gontaut-Biron, Opus Cit., pp. 338-340). During the winter and spring of 1920, moreover, the Kemalists had increased their pressure on the French, who were eventually obliged to evacuate Marash. (Cumming, Opus Cit., p. 123). In May 1920, however, Gouraud's Secretary, Robert de Caix, was able to negotiate a twenty day truce which enabled the French to regroup their forces in preparation for sending the ultimatum to Faysal and the occupation of Damascus. (Testis, Opus Cit., pp. 41-42).

11. It is not clear what "historic meeting" in connection with the League of Nations is referred to in this passage. According to Walters, (F. P., A History of The League of Nations, Oxford, 1952, pp. 66, 81, 96, and 114), the Covenant of the League was adopted April 28, 1919, and became effective January 10, 1920. During the rest of 1920, the Council of the League met at Paris, London, Rome, San Sebastian, and Brussels. The Assembly of the League held its first meeting at Geneva, in the fall of 1920.

12. Apparently refers to the speech given by Jemal Pasha at Beirut, December 4, 1917, which refers to Russian publication of the Sykes-Picot Agreement. It is quoted at length by Antonius, (Opus Cit., pp. 254-256).

13. A description of the campaign in Syria confirmed by Liman von Sanders:

"The British forces found themselves fighting in a friendly country while the Turks, who were defending their own territory, found themselves fighting in the midst of a decidedly hostile population." (Fünf Jahr im Turkei, quoted by Antonius, Opus Cit., p. 227).

14. Abd-al-Haqq Hamid is described by Brockelmann, (Carl, History of the Islamic Peoples,

London, 1952, p. 390), as a disciple of Namik Kemal, "to whom it was granted to serve his country as a diplomat in Paris, London, and Brussels and, after the decline of the old empire, to rejoice in the rise of the national state until his death on April 12, 1937, at the age of eighty six. His dramas, influenced largely by the French classics, but also by Shakespeare, in addition to his Lyric poetry, opened new paths for Turkish literature. . . "

15. It was a year later, (October, 1921), that the Russians turned back Kars and Ardahan to the Turks and signed a treaty of mutual assistance with Mustafa Kemal "against an imperialist state which follows a policy of invading and exploiting the East." (Kirk, George E., A Short History of The Middle East, London, 1955, O. 252: Brockelmann, Opus Cit., p. 441).

16. At least until San Remo, the Allies continued to consider Syria as a part of occupied enemy territory in which all changes were to be considered as temporary until the conclusion of peace with the Turks. Thus on March 18, 1920, following the proclamation of Faysal as King of Syria, Lloyd George told the House of Commons that: "the Prince has been informed by the French and British Governments that they are unable to recognize the validity of his having been proclaimed King of Syria." (l'Asie Francaise, March, 1920, p. 97)

See also Gouraud's ultimatum p.

17. According to Cumming, (Opus Cit., p. 59), Clemenceau had conceded Mosul to the British as early as December, 1918. However, a formal agreement was not concluded between England and France until San Remo, (De Gontaut-Biron, Opus Cit., p. 322), and further delays were occasioned by negotiations with the United States concerning American oil interests in the area. (Cumming, Idem, p. 96).

18. l'Asie Francaise reports the fall of the Damascus Government and Faysal's refusal to

become King of "Mesopotamie" in the same issue, (July-August, 1920, p. 289).

According to Longrigg, (Stephen Himsley, Iraq, 1900 to 1950, Oxford, 1953, p. 131), "A. T. Wilson had suggested Faysal's candidature in July, 1920. Colonel K. Cornwallis, who had served as liason officer at Damascus, was, in December 1920, authorized by Curzon to offer him the Iraq throne. . . . the prince had refused it, alleging the higher claim of the Amir Abdullah, his elder brother."

19. Longrigg, (Opus Cit., p. 106), attributes the Dair-al-Zor disturbance to "the revived Ahd al-Iraq Covenant led by General Yasin Pasha al-Hashimi, ex-Corp Commander and now chief of staff to Faysal at Damascus."

See also, Note 6., this section.

20. The British are reported to have definitely decided on Faysal for Iraq at the March, 1921, Cairo Conference. In the meantime, Lawrence persuaded Abdullah to accept Transjordan. (Lenczowski, Opus Cit., p. 97).

21. The translator questioned al-Husri concerning his continued loyalty to Faysal, and was told that he, al-Husri, had frequently disagreed with King Faysal's policies in Syria - as, moreover, is indicated often enough in the text - but that he admired the King very much for his ability to profit by experience. Al-Husri is of the opinion that after his experience in Syria, Faysal was then better able to promote Arab interests as against those of the British in Iraq, a point of view, moreover, which he has already expressed in the text, although in a rather minor key. (See p.161 (9/27/56, Beirut).

Kedourie's thesis concerning Faysal seems to be quite different. "What was perhaps most in accord with his (Faysal's) temperment and abilities," he points out, "would have been an imposed settlement by England, or France, or both

together, leaving no scope for murmurs or manoeuvres. His misfortune was that the circumstances left nobody to impose a solution on him except his own violent followers." (Opus Cit., p. 164).

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