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THE ADMINISTRATIVE RELATIONS
BETWEEN
THE UNITED STATES OPERATIONS MISSION TO LEBANON
AND
THE LEBANESE MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE

By

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POINT IV - LEBANON

AGRICULTURAL ADMINISTRATION

HOMSI

ABSTRACT

The United States of America is rendering technical assistance to underdeveloped countries as part of its policy to encourage local economic progress in such countries and to counter communist propaganda and influence in them.

Lebanon is receiving such technical assistance, and in the field of agriculture, this assistance is designed to improve the quality and quantity of local production by the use of improved techniques and materials with a view to encouraging exports, reducing imports and raising the standard of living of Lebanon's population generally.

The administration of technical assistance is officially entrusted to the Ministry of Agriculture with the advice of United States technicians. In practice, however, administration is jointly in the hands of United States technicians and their Lebanese counterparts, with initiative and informal leadership coming from the technicians. The administration of projects is complicated by the absence of formal, unitary leadership at the project level, and by other factors relative to organization and personnel practices within the Government of Lebanon and the International Cooperation Agency and its field offices in Lebanon.

The purpose of this thesis is to study and analyze those problems of joint project administration in agriculture.

It is felt that Lebanon could obtain more rapid benefits from the technical assistance program if it could revise its methods of administration and the structure of authority lines within the Government of Lebanon, and if the United States Operations Mission to Lebanon could more carefully adjust its operations to meet the demands of Lebanon's political and social structure.

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CHAPTER I

OBJECTIVES, PROCEDURES, AND OBSERVATIONS

In the years since the end of the Second World War two armed camps have risen in the world, based on two different viewpoints of man's function in society and of the distribution and control of wealth and power within society. The military power of the two camps is of a nature that an armed conflict between them would probably result in their total destruction. For that reason, the struggle between Communism and Democracy takes place on an ideological and economic plane, with each side making a determined bid for the politically uncommitted and economically underdeveloped countries of the world. As part of this struggle and in an attempt to win over such countries to their political and economic camp, the United States and Soviet Russia each proffer technical assistance to underdeveloped countries. This assistance plays a large part in the foreign policy of both countries, who use it as a method of persuasion and as a demonstration of what each has to offer, in terms of technique, ideology and material goods. To a large extent, the effectiveness of what is offered depends on the skill with which the technical assistance programs are administered and implemented.

This thesis is a study of the joint administration of technical assistance projects in agriculture as implemented by agencies of the Governments of Lebanon and the United States. It is also a study of the various problems which such an administration creates and of the factors within the agencies of both governments which affect the implementation of the projects. These factors relate to fiscal management, to personnel problems and to the structure and organization of each agency and the distribution of authority within them.

Since Point IV, as American technical assistance has come to be known, has a twofold political and economic purpose, it is advisable to consider these purposes in regard to Lebanon before attempting to analyze the administration of technical assistance in this country.

By long association, Lebanon is oriented towards the West, and its role in history has been described in relation to its capacity and ability to present and interpret the East to the West and the West to the East.¹ The political purpose of Point IV in Lebanon is therefore to strengthen rather than establish a tie with the West, since that tie already exists. In practice, Point IV has left Lebanon's relations with the West, & of course with the United States,

1. See A.H. Hourani, Syria and Lebanon, (Oxford University Press, London, 1954) pp. 133 and following.

on the same plane as that which would have existed if no assistance were being rendered. Hence, exigencies of local politics can make the Prime Minister who once praised American aid, denounce it vehemently.¹ To a small extent, in the areas where Point IV has come into contact with people, several technicians have reported a warmly receptive attitude and a favourable feeling towards the United States. Such a feeling, however, remains secondary to the main issue with the West, which is the problem of Palestine. The feeling is that a grave injustice has been committed, and the United States is credited with doing much to create and underwrite the progress of Israel. The attitude of the United States towards Israel in the latter's relations with the Arabs, in the matter of German reparations to Israel, and in the financial support Israel finds in the United States, is a prime determinant of American political influence and popularity in the region. The upsurge of American prestige following President Eisenhower's stand on the Anglo-Franco-Israeli attack on Egypt is evidence that the Palestine question and ancillary problems hold the key to relations with the West and with America. It is doubtful that the average man in the street fully understands the aims of Point IV -- there is evidence that to some extent he misunderstands it -- and hence his attitude is lukewarm towards it.

1. See L'Orient, 7th April 1957, No. 9373, Beirut.

Because the rendering of technical assistance is designed as a teaching and demonstration method, rather than as outright economic aid along the lines of the European Recovery Program (Marshall Plan), the economic effects of Point IV depend on the spread of the techniques demonstrated and the rapidity with which they are adopted. It is hard to determine the economic effects of Point IV aid in agriculture in terms of the total production of the country because it is difficult to attribute all technical progress to such assistance. Improved techniques would have been adopted to some extent in the ordinary course of events. At any rate, technical assistance has contributed substantially to the improvement of agriculture in such fields as marketing, breeding, animal husbandry, irrigation and the like. Over the past few years, the agricultural exports of Lebanon have increased considerably. Insofar as technical assistance in Lebanon, in agriculture, aims at improving the quality, quantity and marketability of produce, such assistance can make a more valuable contribution to the Lebanese economy and standard of living.¹

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1. Animal and food products constitute the biggest single item of the country's exports. Within this category the most important items are fruits and vegetables; they have increased from LL 25 million to LL 40 million in four years 1952-1955, according to Khalil W. Sanbar, The Economy of Lebanon with Special Reference to the Impact of Existing Development Programs,

Nature of this Study

In preparing this thesis a study was made in Chapter II of the laws establishing technical assistance, the duties of a recipient country, the structure of assistance administration, and of the administrative concepts of implementation. A similar study was made in Chapter IV in regard to the Agreements in force in Lebanon, and to the administrative structure of the Point IV Mission to Lebanon and the method of planning, inception and implementation projects. There followed an examination of various writings on Point IV explaining the principle of technical assistance, especially with reference to countries of the Middle East. Material on the importance of agriculture to the economy of Lebanon was considered, together with those factors which can influence the implementation of aid, arising from the history, administration and economy of the country. Chapter III presents a brief survey of Lebanon as based on this study.

To determine the day to day workings of joint administration at the project levels, the writer interviewed Lebanese and American officers to obtain a balanced picture. The positions of the officers interviewed ranged from senior

unpublished MA draft thesis, 1957 who considers the figures in The Balance of Payments of Lebanon 1951 and 1952, by E. Fei and P.J. Klat, Economic Research Institute, (Dar al Kitab, 1954) together with figures privately supplied.

administrative posts to the posts of project officers cooperating together in field implementation. Although the interviews were mainly geared to the administrative side, the writer concerned himself with the operation of projects as a means of reaching administrative aspect of project implementation. The writer also read monthly reports for the whole Point IV operation in the early years of its activity in Lebanon, and annual reports of the Agricultural Division of Point IV in later years. These reports gave a detailed picture, complementary to the information obtained from the interviews. The information gathered from a study of the projects is presented in Chapter V together with a description of the Agriculture Division of Point IV. The presentation of each project is intended to show that the cooperative efforts of the Government and Point IV encompass the main lines of agricultural activity in Lebanon.

Chapter VI presents the administrative analysis of the joint administration of technical assistance in Lebanon as determined by the whole study, with particular emphasis on the questions of fiscal management; personnel and related fields, such as recruitment, training and problems of leave; organization and structure in relation to co-ordination, lines of authority, the presence of informal authority and related matters.

An Evaluation of Joint Administration

The problems of joint administration exist in three loci: in each of the two governments cooperating on joint projects and in the area common to both. On the American side, problems occur in the fields of personnel and organization. In personnel, the most important point is the familiarization time required by technicians before they can work effectively in their fields. To some extent this is natural because they must have time to get to know their team mates and their counterparts, and to become acquainted with the particular problems of Lebanon. Added to the time required for familiarization is, at times, a certain delay in recruitment of technicians and in the rapidity with which they are cleared for service. It is not always easy to find an appropriate technician because many seem to feel that service abroad had a hampering effect on their careers. The home leaves enjoyed by technicians retard progress on the projects during the absence of the technician, for then he is replaced by one or more technicians who already have their own projects to attend to. Although Beirut is the medical center of the Middle East, health has been a factor in the morale and efficiency of Americans, as some of them catch diseases peculiar to hot climates. In some instances, there have been technicians who required medical attention because of exhaustion from trying to work

too rapidly and too hard in a new environment. The frequent change of counterparts assigned to projects by the Ministry of Agriculture results in a loss of the training acquired by the counterpart, so that the technician has to train a new counterpart. This is often discouraging to technicians and reduces their morale, since they feel that they have to begin all over again. Technicians also resent having their experience and training set aside by the International Cooperation Administration in Washington or by the United States Operations Mission to Lebanon in matters affecting technical decisions. It is to the credit of the technicians that, on the whole, they are a group of capable men with long experience in their respective fields, and that they ultimately see the problems peculiar to Lebanon and resulting from its administrative procedure and local practices. It is when the technician understands Lebanon's problems that he becomes most effective.

From an organizational point of view, the main problem on the American side is that the authority of technicians within the projects is purely informal, depending on the personal qualities of leadership of each technician and his personal relationship with his counterpart. Communication between a technician and the Government or Ministry, if it is formal, passes through the Division Chief to the Director General, and then through him to the depart-

ment concerned. The American side of the Point IV operation is fairly decentralized, but at times there appears to be a lack of coordination between the USOM/L and its headquarters in Washington, especially in purchasing and in recruitment.

The flow of ideas is impeded by the language difficulties existing on both sides, and by the necessity of adjusting to a different method of thinking and of working.

On the Lebanese side, problems occur in three areas: fiscal management, personnel and organization. The fiscal problems on the Lebanese side stem from the fact that passage of the budget is sometimes delayed by the Parliament, or else, if the budget is passed, the breakdown of funds by project is delayed. In addition, the two systems of expenditure of budgeted funds, although simple, are not coordinated because the Lebanese spending process requires more time than the related Point IV process.

A lack of trained personnel in administrative and middle-management posts hampers the work of the Ministry of Agriculture, and tends to strengthen the centralization of power in the Director General. When trained personnel are found, they are, fairly often, recent university graduates with little practical experience. This has a two-fold result: it takes them time to feel "at home" on the

project, and since most such graduates have been trained in French Universities, a language problem arises in the exchange of ideas. Personnel recruitment is complicated by the sectarian pattern in government, with the result that efficiency and merit must sometimes be sacrificed to expediency. The hours of work of the Ministry do not always coincide with those of the USOM/L and this sometimes results in an interruption of work. Frequent change of counterparts, either because of resignation or in-service transfers, delays progress of the projects and renders the problem of a lack of trained personnel more acute because valuable training is lost by the transfers. Most of the counterparts are energetic young men, quick to learn and to adapt; they find it discouraging because they have to refer, constantly, to their superiors for decisions, or because a superior "adopts" an idea they had put forward. Their morale is further affected by a generally low scale of remuneration as compared to opportunities in business.

The strongly centralized pattern of administration within the Ministry of Agriculture is most frequently cited as the chief problem of joint project administration. It is due partly to historical evolution and partly to the lack of trained and qualified personnel referred to earlier. In some cases where decentralization has been tried, it has caused more problems than it solved because the pattern of

seeking the instructions of a superior is strongly ingrained, and at times, because the officer to whom authority was delegated lacked competence or judgment. Within technical assistance projects, the lack of a unitary authority causes a certain fluidity and a dependence on the informal authority of confidence earned by the American technician. The authority of counterparts is not commensurate with their responsibility, so that they must constantly refer matters for decision to their superiors, thus causing delay. The flow of communications is slow and the authority exercised by the Director General over subordinate departments is not in keeping with the centralized power which he holds. Both communication and direction are hampered by the overextended span of control of the Director General. Lebanese administration is also affected by political interference of persons in power and by a subtle French influence. This influence, in the top positions, tends to be political, while in the lower positions it stems from the educational background - and hence possibly the sympathies of the employee.

Lebanese administration also suffers from a lack of long range planning, due partly to a preoccupation with daily routine and partly to the failure to accept any set method of formulating such plans. This is a serious defect when projects concerned with development are involved, since development is essentially a long range proposition.

The proper administration of any program requires that the results be evaluated from time to time by objective reports. Despite the requirement of the General Agreement signed between the United States and Lebanon on technical assistance, Lebanon has not issued any reports on the joint projects in agriculture, and this, coupled with the lack of long range planning, tends to put the projects on an impermanent basis without a continuing pattern for which to aim and against which they can be evaluated.

The full meaning of technical assistance is not understood by some officers of the Ministry of Agriculture, who confuse it with other forms of aid, with the result that too much is expected of the technical assistance program. To a lesser extent, it appears that the program is distrusted and it is viewed as part of a policy not entirely to the advantage of the country.

Concomitantly with its receipt of technical assistance, the Ministry of Agriculture has expanded both in its activities and in its understanding of its function in relation to the economy of the country. It is not possible to judge to what extent this is due to technical aid, but that expansion would be greater if the Point IV projects were more fully integrated into the functions of the Ministry, instead of being regarded as somewhat outside

its direct interest. The coordination of the function of USOM/L and the Ministry occurs usually at the level of the Director General and the Chief of the Agriculture Division of USOM/L, and takes place informally at lower levels between technicians and their counterparts, although formal communication must take place through the hierarchy of each side.

Within the Government of Lebanon, there is insufficient coordination between the Ministry of Agriculture and the Customs Department. This causes considerable delay in the implementation of projects because necessary imported items are delayed in Customs by custom formalities.

Despite the different procedural speeds and methods, the Ministry and Point IV are aware of each other's problems, make allowance for them, and understand, if impatiently, that patience is a necessity and is a vital contribution to the harmonious and courteous cooperation of their personnel in their joint work towards joint aims.

The outstanding characteristic of joint administration of technical assistance projects in agriculture is delay in getting decisions implemented. The day to day causes of this delay are to be found, primarily, in the general organizational weakness and involved procedure of the Ministry. Probably much greater and more rapid benefits would be obtained if the Ministry improved its administration. Such improvements can only come gradually, and will be permanently

assimilated if they are nurtured within the Ministry. Other problems, not within the sole jurisdiction of the Ministry, such as matters of recruitment, salary scales and matters that require Cabinet decisions, need action at Government or Parliamentary levels, and will be dealt with more slowly.

Technicians and counterparts feel that the rate of progress is now beginning to accelerate however, possibly indicating that the two organizations are now more fully receptive to each other than in previous years. Progress will be most rapid when administrative differences are reduced to a minimum and when a method is found of creating a modicum of formal authority within the projects and subjecting both teams of a project to that authority.

CHAPTER II

LEGAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE BASES

In his inaugural address on January 20th, 1949, in Washington, President Harry S. Truman recommended, in the fourth point of his speech, that a "bold new program" be undertaken to aid the development of backward countries. The President cited the poverty of such countries as a handicap and a threat, both to themselves and to more prosperous areas of the world.¹

One and a half years passed between the President's speech and congressional action on the proposal which the Administration submitted six months after the Inaugural Address. During these six months, the Administration tried to crystallize its views and compromise on the divergent viewpoints concerning technical skill and capital. After the proposal was submitted to Congress, there was lengthy debate on the cost and the duration of the program. However, the Act for International Development was finally passed in substantially the same form proposed by the Administration, except that the funds which were voted were reduced from \$ 45 million to \$ 34.5 million.²

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1. Inaugural Address of President Harry S. Truman, Department of State Bulletin, January 30, 1949, pp. 126-136.
 2. Walter R. Sharp, International Technical Assistance, (Chicago, Public Administration Service, 1952), p. 26.

The Act for International Development

Public Law 535, Eighty-First Congress, was approved on the 5th of June, 1950. In Section 402, Congress declared that the freedom and economic progress of all peoples was of common interest to the United States and to other nations, and that economic and social progress furthers the growth of democratic ways, beneficial commerce, international understanding, goodwill and world ¹ peace.

Congress also found that the efforts of people in underdeveloped areas can be furthered by "the exchange of technical knowledge and skills and the flow of investment capital".² Congress also declared it to be the policy of the United States to:

Aid the efforts of the peoples of economically underdeveloped to develop areas and their resources and improve their working and living conditions by encouraging the exchange of technical knowledge and skills and the flow of investment capital to countries which provide conditions under which such technical assistance and capital can effectively and constructively contribute to raising standards of living, creating new sources of wealth, increasing productivity and expanding purchasing power.³

In order to make sure that the most effective utilization of United States resources would be secured, it was declared to be the policy of the United States that the

1. Title IV, Public Law 535, Eighty-First Congress (H.R. 7797).

2. Public Law 535, Sec. 402.

3. Ibid. Sec. 403.

Government, in reviewing requests for assistance from foreign governments, would take into consideration:

- 1 - Whether the assistance applied for is an appropriate part of a program reasonably designed to contribute to the balanced and integrated development of the country...
- 2 - Whether any works or facilities which may be projected are actually needed in view of similar facilities existing in the area and are otherwise economically sound.
- 3 - With respect to projects for which capital is requested, whether private capital is available either in the country or elsewhere, upon reasonable terms and in sufficient amounts to finance such projects. 1

Duties of a Recipient Country

Assistance is made available to a country only when the President determines that:

- 1 - The recipient pays a fair share of the cost of program.
- 2 - Provides all necessary information concerning such program and gives the program full publicity.
- 3 - Seeks, to the maximum extent possible, full coordination and integration of technical co-operation programs carried on in that country.
- 4 - Endeavours to make effective use of the results of the program, and
- 5 - Cooperates with other countries participating in the program in the mutual exchange of technical knowledge and skills. 2

Further duties of recipient countries were elaborated in the Mutual Security Act of 1951, which provided that such

1. Loc. cit.

2. Ibid. Sec. 407.

countries cooperate to maintain world peace, eliminate international stress, care for their own defense and make effective use of American military assistance (where such assistance is given). The Act also stressed that recipient countries must do their utmost to help themselves and cooperate with one another in the interest of mutual security.

The Act for International Development also encouraged the flow of investment capital to underdeveloped areas, provided such capital was used to conserve and develop local resources, and provided that investors observed local laws, paid taxes and adequate wages and provided suitable working conditions for labour. The recipient country was to guarantee, through intergovernment treaties, that investors will not be deprived of their property without prompt and effective compensation, that they will have reasonable opportunities to remit earnings and withdraw capital, and that they will have the opportunity to run their business without undue interference and will not be discriminated against in¹ taxation.

Termination of Aid

United States participation in a technical cooperation program may be stopped by the President if he determines that

1. Ibid. Section 402. While these provisions are not relevant to the understanding of the operation of agricultural technical assistance

such cooperation is no longer consistent with the national interest or security or the aims of the Act, if continuance contravenes a United Nations decision, or if the House and ¹ Senate recommend termination.

Administrative Structure

The administration of the Act for International Assistance was entrusted generally by Section 408 to the President, and through him, to the Secretary of State or ² other officer of the United States Government. The actual administration has undergone many changes. After Congress passed the Act in 1950, the Technical Cooperation Administration was responsible for operations. In 1953, this Agency was abolished and replaced by the Foreign Operations Administration, which was set up as an independent administration receiving guidance from the Secretaries of State, Defense and the Treasury, and from other Executive departments. In requesting the creation of FOA, President Eisenhower stated that the conduct of foreign affairs had been built on a patchwork of statutes, which needed careful ³ study as the basis of future legislation. By the creation

in Lebanon, they are essential to an understanding of the general duties of a recipient country in regard to overall United States Policy.

1. Ibid., Section 411 and Mutual Security Act of 1951, Public Law 165, Eighty Second Congress, (H.R. 5113) as amended, Section 529.
2. Ibid. Section 412.
3. Reorganization Plan No. 7, transmitted to

of FOA, the duplicate administration of foreign aid by both the Mutual Security Agency, which administered military aid, and the Technical Cooperation Agency was eliminated. In 1955, FOA was replaced by the International Cooperation Administration, an agency within the State Department. ICA was created to coordinate foreign assistance and United States Foreign policy, and to differentiate between programmes of military aid, which are fairly short range, and technical aid, which now comes under the jurisdiction of a permanent agency, "providing a long-range basis... under a permanent government establishment... for thinking of international cooperation."¹

There are four administrative regulations laid down by Congress, regulating the administration of assistance to underdeveloped countries:

- 1 - No commitment can be made for more than three years.
- 2 - No funds are to be spent in duplication of any program to which the United States is a major contributor.
- 3 - Funds are not to be used except for purposes of demonstration or instruction.
- 4 - Assistance granted in the making of surveys or preparation of projects does not obligate the United States to make loans or grants.²

Congress June 1, 1953 by President Eisenhower,
18 F.R. 4541.

1. United States Department of Commerce, "New Agency Set Up to Administer U.S. Mutual Security Program" Foreign Commerce Weekly, July 18, 1955, p. 28.
2. U.S. Statutes at Large, Vol. 64 Part I, 62 Stat

Point IV Administrative Concepts of Implementation

When President Truman first spoke of the "bold new program" in his inaugural speech on the 20th of January 1949, the world reaction was strong and favorable. The new policy of the United States was recognized as a challenge to the miserable conditions prevalent in so many areas of the world.

Toward the end of 1951, the Technical Cooperation Administration (TCA) staff planners adopted a statement setting out concrete goals. This statement recognized two things: First that the overall program should be built around people rather than governments, and second, that preference should be given to activities that will provide results on a person-to-person basis." Accordingly, projects affecting a number of people over a wide area would ordinarily take precedence over projects geared to more limited groups.¹

Within the framework thus outlined, ten goals were experimentally chosen for the program. It was obvious that the emphasis would not be the same in all countries where Point IV would operate, because the needs of indivi-

137, General Appropriations Act,
approved September 6, 1950.

1. See Walter Sharp, International Technical Assistance, (Public Administration Clearing House, Chicago, 1952) Part I, p. 38.

dual countries vary. The aim was to produce long run benefits with a minimum of imported U.S. commodities.

The ten goals are:

- 1 - increased food production,
- 2 - better health,
- 3 - basic education,
- 4 - development of natural resources,
- 5 - increased productive enterprises (especially small, locally financed businesses),
- 6 - better transportation,
- 7 - better and safer water supply,
- 8 - improved conditions of labour,
- 9 - better tools,
- 10 - Fuel for cooking and heating.¹

Achieving the ten goals enumerated above will serve the economic, social and political motives of the United States and will also serve the interests of the underdeveloped countries. Speaking of the aims of Point IV, and stressing the fact that it was his own personal interpretation that he was giving, Dr. Afif Tannous, then Acting Program Director of TCA, Lebanon, said:

"As a whole, it is a positive affirmation of American democracy and way of life - reaching out to build economies and friendships in the world. Not really a "bold new program", new only in its size and official recognition. It is aimed basically at the welfare of the people, not specific groups, aimed at the

1. Loc. Cit.

This latter point is very important. Likewise it is very often forgotten, it would seem, by the recipients of technical aid, who often look forward to a rapid solution of their problems.

Mr. Hayes warned further that a lot of ground-work, involving considerable time must be done in an underdeveloped area before modern techniques can be fruitfully used. He said that the people of the area concerned must be ready for aid. Progress must be wanted. It is wrong to assume that better methods have only to be demonstrated to be desired. While the 1949 session of Congress regarded Point IV as charity, the Administration did all it could to convince it that it was "an enlightened, business-like attempt to solve one of the most crucial problems with which our world is confronted".¹ Professor Sharp said: "The novelty of the idea, along with... hostility to additional foreign spending, produced skepticism and led to inaction."²

Aims in Lebanon

In Lebanon, Technical Assistance - as distinct from Economic Aid - operates in five major fields: water development, agriculture, public health, basic education, and

1. Undersecretary Webb, quoted in W. Sharp
Op. cit. p. 26.

2. Sharp, op.cit. p. 26.

stimulation of social, and economic development by cooperation...aimed definitely at self-help." 1

Dr. Tannous stressed the fact that the joint program was aimed at mutual stability, prosperity and peace. He also pointed out that Point IV is limited primarily to technical aid, and not to any large-scale economic aid.

Mr. Samuel P. Hayes, Jr. Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs gave an official interpretation of Point IV:²

- 1 - The first of six points Mr. Hayes mentioned, was the application to backward areas of modern technology and capital.
- 2 - The program must be one mainly of self-help. "Foreign assistance can help, but can never take the responsibility for economic growth".
- 3 - The Program must be international in scope. In other words, the U.S. wants to work also through the United Nations.
- 4 - Mr. Hayes said that Point IV is not solely or predominantly a government program, "a great emphasis will be placed on private enterprise, with government as facilitator and cooperator".
- 5 - Another point mentioned in the official interpretation is that to the U.S. this is supposed to be a relatively inexpensive program.
- 6 - Finally, it is a long range program.

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1. Dr. Afif Tannous, Lecture on January 6th, 1954, Marquand House, A.U.B.
 2. Samuel P. Hayes: "An Official Interpretation" Department of State Bulletin, 22; pp. 214-217, February 6, 1950.

industry. 60 to 65 percent of funds and personnel were used in the fields of agriculture and related water development.¹ In Lebanon, Point IV operates on the following four basic principles:

- 1 - That the services of Lebanese governmental agencies will be strengthened. U.S. technicians working with Lebanese Ministry Counterparts will increase governmental services, encourage the philosophy of public service to their people, and help show new techniques for bettering their local activities.
- 2 - That the U.S. technicians and their Lebanese counterparts will work with the people themselves in the villages and community groups.
- 3 - That a vital part of the overall program is the demonstration project - a "show how" technique concerned with demonstrating and proving to individuals and to groups what they themselves can do by their own efforts to improve their conditions and raise their standard of living.
- 4 - That all Point IV project activities are jointly undertaken in a spirit of cooperation. Point IV does not by itself do something for the government or the people, it must work with them to do it jointly. 2

The four principles enumerated above describe the aims of Point IV and the manner of attaining them. There is an emphasis on 'showing', on 'demonstrating' and on 'joint undertakings'.

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1. Dr. Afif Tannous, op.cit. (Lecture).
 2. Point IV in Lebanon, (U.S. Technical Cooperation Service in Lebanon, Beirut, 1953), pp. 5-9.

It must be understood that countries receiving Point IV aid do so at their own request. This is stated in the Preamble to the Program Agreement between the two governments.

When a country requests Technical Aid, it enters with the United States into a "General Agreement" which outlines the broad intentions of both countries to cooperate, and describes the basis of that cooperation. The General Agreement for Lebanon was signed on the 29th of May, 1951, and ratified by the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies on the 13th of December, 1951. The Program Agreement which actually set up TCA/L (Technical Cooperation Administration, Lebanon - later USOM/L meaning United States Operations Mission, Lebanon) was signed on the 26th of June, 1952. The Program Agreement which has now been replaced, mentioned in some detail the engagements of both governments and the financial contributions of each.

Unfortunately, Point IV is not understood in Lebanon as a long term technical assistance program. "Lebanese political leaders", says the pamphlet Point IV in Lebanon, "are interested primarily in short term, grant in aid projects..." Apparently, much is being expected of Point IV too quickly.

Another regrettable thing is the dearth of private funds, American and local, in investment. At its inception

Point IV established the objective of working through private capital and took steps to guarantee any capital invested.

This chapter endeavours to outline the legislative basis of technical assistance as well as the administrative structure established by that legislation.

Secondly, the chapter presented a review of the aims of the technical assistance program in general and in Lebanon in particular with a view to an understanding of the background of aid.

CHAPTER III

A SURVEY OF LEBANON

For the full evaluation of the functions, problems and achievements of the Point IV Program in Lebanon, it is desirable to comprehend the structure and economy of the country as well as its position in the Middle Eastern region of the world.

Location of Lebanon

Lebanon is a small country situated on the Eastern shore of the Mediterranean Sea. Its total length from North to South is about 190 kilometres, and its maximum width is 75 kilometres. The total area is 10400 square kilometres.¹ Lebanon thus forms part of the coastal strip of land which is the Eastern end of the Mediterranean, and as such, has been part of the land bridge between Asia,² Europe and Africa. To the North and East lies Syria, co-

1. Government of Lebanon, Bulletin Statistique Trimestriel, Vol. 11 No. 1, Beirut, 1951, p. 5.

2. This fact is strikingly demonstrated by the inscriptions at Nahr el Kalb (Dog River) of the various conquerors and invaders, from the earliest Assyrians to the British Armies of World War II.

partner with Lebanon under France's Mandate.¹ To the South lies the newly created state of Israel.

Topographically, Lebanon consists of a large upfold of rocks that runs parallel to the coast. The coastal strip is very narrow, except for segments near Sidon, Tyre, Tripoli and Akkar. Running through the center of the country, North to South is the mountain range that gives Lebanon its name.² Along the Western slopes of the range, there is a rapid drop towards the Mediterranean, and on the Eastern slope, another rapid drop leads to the fertile Beka'a plain, which is really a plateau some 1000 meters above sea level. The Beka'a plain leads off, on its Eastern side, to the Anti-Lebanon range, the water divide of which is the boundary line between Lebanon and Syria.

The physical formation of Lebanon has, of course, influenced its history, its people, its economy and development. Historically, being part of the land bridge between three continents, Lebanon was repeatedly traversed and occupied, yet managed to retain its own characteristics without being totally subjugated. Like mountain people

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1. The boundaries of Syria and Lebanon were drawn by France to suit herself under the Sykes-Picot Agreement. See George Lenczowski, The Middle East in World Affairs, (Ithaca, N.Y. Cornell University Press, 1952), p. 72.
 2. "Lebanon" is said to derive from the Aramaic word "Laban" meaning white, a reference to the snow-capped mountains of the Lebanon range.

in other parts of the world, the Lebanese developed into a hardy, individualistic and agricultural people, not easily subdued. At the same time, their frequent contact with traders passing through their country made the Lebanese a commercial people of legendary achievements.

Climate

The climate of Lebanon is of the type generally described as "Mediterranean" meaning that fairly cold, wet and windy winters are followed by hot and humid summers. The coastal region is sub-tropical, with heavy rainfall and dry summers. The mountains have a heavier rainfall, and precipitation is often in the form of snow, so that cultivation is interrupted in the winter; while the mountain in summer is dry and temperate. This temperateness of her mountain areas has been responsible for Lebanon's desirability as a place where tourists escape from the scorching Middle East sun in summer and enjoy winter sports in a region where snow is a rarity. The Beka'a has the lowest rainfall in the country. Major precipitation is between November and March, necessitating irrigation for summer crops.

Agriculture

The different climatic conditions have had a marked effect on the agriculture and vegetation of the country. On

the coastal plains, subtropical plants grow, like citrus fruits, bananas, pomegranates, olives and winter vegetables. Temperate zone conditions in the foothills, mountains and the Beka'a allow the growth of food cereals, (wheat, barley, and corn) and deciduous fruits like apples, pears, peaches, plums, apricots, cherries, grapes, forage like sorghum and grasses; as well as some legumes and summer vegetables.¹ Agricultural lands account for 45% of the total area of Lebanon, according to the Director of the Ministry of Agriculture.²

The majority of the population depends directly or indirectly on agriculture for its living. It is estimated that between 50% and 60% of the population of Lebanon is connected with agriculture.³

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1. Agriculture Staff, United States Operations Mission to Lebanon, 1955 Annual Report, Report of the Marketing Adviser, Mr. W. W. Bowman.
 2. Alfred Chamoun, "Wizarat al Zira'a" (The Ministry of Agriculture) in Dirāsāt 'an Hukūmat Lubnan (Studies of the Government of Lebanon) (Public Administration Department, American University of Beirut, 1956), p. 196. USOM Lebanon 1955 gives the figure 40% (p.6).
 3. - Sir Alexander Gibb and Partners, The Economic Development of Lebanon, Westminster, London, 1948, p. 4 estimate the rural population at 66.5%.
- Albert Y. Badre, National Income of Lebanon, Mimeograph No. 1, 1951, p. 8, estimates it at 50%. This figure is also given by the United States Operations Mission to Lebanon, USOM Lebanon 1955, Beirut, June 1955, p.6.

While the density of population for the whole of Lebanon is 135 persons per square kilometre,¹ the density is 195 in Mount Lebanon, 114 in North Lebanon,¹¹⁸ in South Lebanon, 43 in the Beka'a and 1170 in Beirut.²

The Agriculture of Lebanon is strongly influenced by the system of land tenure and ownership prevalent in the Middle Eastern countries as influenced by Sharia (Islamic) Law. Without going into details of the various titles and classes of land, or into the complexities arising from litigation inspired by the various classes of ownership, it is only necessary to point out that the land tenure system is of prime economic and social importance causing unclear title to land and resulting litigation and misappropriation of title, and causing excessive fragmentation of holdings on the one hand, and an extreme of concentration of ownership on the other hand, and finally causing an inefficient use of the land and the use of exhausting methods of cultivation.³

- The Central Office of Statistics, Government of Lebanon, gives the rural population at 60%, 47% of whom are directly engaged in agriculture. Quoted in Conference on Agricultural Credit, Report on Agricultural Credit, Beirut, 1953, p. 2, footnote 3.

1. United Nations Relief and Works Agency, The Present Economic Structure of Lebanon, Beirut 1954, p. 1, (unpublished report dated May 17, 1954).
2. Bulletin Statistique Trimestriel, op.cit. Vol. II, Nos. 1 and 4.
3. Paul J. Klat, "Whither Land Tenure in the Arab World" in the Middle East Economic

Of the 270,000 hectares of cultivable land, 50 per cent is owned by 171 owners with holdings of 10 hectares and above. Fifteen percent is owned by 991 owners with properties above five hectares but below ten hectares, and 84,111 owners own 35% of cultivable land in holdings of less than five hectares.¹ These figures show a relatively small group owns most of Lebanon's agricultural land.

History

By historical evolution and by the nature of its easily defensible mountains and valleys, Lebanon developed as a frontier region of successive empires and as a region of religious minorities. The colonies of the various empires lived in a state of tension with their central

Papers, (Dar el Kitab, Beirut, 1953) gives a study of the sociological and agricultural significance of the system. See also Nejjib Alamuddine, Practical Proposals for the Solution of the Land Tenure Problem in Lebanon, Madison, University of Wisconsin, 10th October 1951. (Printed Address).

1. Prepared by the Ministry of Agriculture and quoted in United States and International Bank for Reconstruction and Development Sources. Also quoted by Khalil W. Sanbar, The Lebanese Economy With Special Reference to the Impact of Existing Development Programs, Unpublished draft M.A. Thesis, 1957.

governments, and expressed this tension in the form of heresy. Thus the Maronite Church began as a heresy against the Byzantine Church, in Northern Lebanon. In the South, a mosaic of Muslim heresies appeared, from Moderate Shi'ism¹ to Druzism. Nevertheless, Mount Lebanon was predominantly Christian with a considerable Druze minority² and the present precarious balance between Christians and Muslims in the country's estimated 1,400,000 population is largely the result of the expansion of the original area known as Mount Lebanon under the Ottoman Empire, to the present boundary set up under the French Mandate, by the inclusion of Muslim areas in the North,³ the South and the Sanjak of Beirut.

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1. Kamal S. Salibi, Studies on the Traditional Bibliography of the Maronites on the Period (1100-1516), Ph.D. Thesis, London University, and interview with Dr. Salibi, 17th March 1957.
 2. Albert H. Hourani, Syria and Lebanon, (Oxford University Press, London, 1945) p. 129.
 3. Hourani, op.cit., p. 172 says: "The State of Greater Lebanon was created by the addition of the pre-war Sanjaq of the towns and surrounding districts of Beirut, Tripoli, Sur and Saida, the wheat producing regions of Baalbeck and the Beka'a; and the districts of Rashaya and Hasbaya."

Ottoman Lebanon occupied a special position within the Ottoman Empire because of the Christian majority inhabiting it, and was allowed a certain autonomy which became even more pronounced after 1860.¹ The special position of Lebanon created in 1861 endured till the beginning of the First World War, when it was abolished because of military necessity. It is necessary to mention the Protocol of 1861 because it set the sectarian principle as a fundament of government and administration.

At the end of World War I, the League of Nations granted Lebanon and Syria to France as "A" mandates, and the administration of these territories was entrusted to a High Commissioner. In 1926, the Lebanese Republic was created, three years behind schedule according to the mandate.² The Constitution drafted by the Representative Council was amended in 1927, 1929 and suspended in 1932. The 1926 Constitution was reinstated in 1937. In March 1943, a provisional Government was set up in Lebanon, and the Chamber was elected on a sectarian basis.

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1. For an account of the troubles and the results of it, see George E. Kirk, A Short History of the Middle East, (Methuen and Co., London, 1955).
 2. George Grassmuck and Kamal Salibi, A Manual of Lebanese Administration, (Public Administration Department, American University of Beirut, 1955), p. 5.

Government

Lebanon is today governed under the Constitution of 1926, as amended. It is in turn based on the French Constitution of 1875,¹ modified so that a strong executive was created, to enable the French to run the country through that executive during the mandate.² Today, the executive is still very strong. Except for impeachment the President, whose powers are considerable is answerable to no one. He is elected for a six-year term by the Chamber, and may not succeed himself.³ By custom, he is a Maronite. The Prime Minister is by custom a Sunni Muslim, the Vice Premier a Greek Orthodox, and the Speaker of the Chamber a Shi'i Muslim. Other creeds are also represented in the cabinet.

Administration

On both the local and national levels, the administration of Lebanon shows a strong centralized pattern inherited from the Ottoman and French régimes.⁴ The Central

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1. Cecil Hourani, Lectures on the Comparative Constitutional Law of the Near East, Unpublished lectures delivered at the American University of Beirut, 1954.
 2. George Kirk, The Middle East in the War, (Oxford University Press, London, 1952) pp. 62 and following and p. 92.
 3. By special Parliamentary action, Bishara el Khoury was elected for a second term.
 4. The structure of Government is described in Grassmuck and Salibi, op.cit., passim.

Government is composed of 14 Ministries, some of which are of comparatively recent formation, such as the Ministry of Social Affairs, the Ministry of National Economy or the Ministry of General Planning. The Administrative regime is subject to special law and to special courts. In addition to the Ministries, there are a number of autonomous bodies with separate budgets, answerable to the Council of Ministers. These autonomous bodies are gradually being incorporated into the general budget.¹ The structure and functions of the central government are much the same as in any other country of the world, and do not warrant any detailed description of the functions of each Ministry.

The Social Structure

The population² of Lebanon is a heterogenous mixture of races and creeds, more or less bound by a loose national consciousness, bearing several loyalties at the same time. Underneath the lip service paid to national unity and to national "Lebanese" consciousness, lurk the

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1. For a comparative table of budgetary expansion, see Grassmuck and Salibi, op.cit., p. 16.
 2. UNRWA gave the population of Lebanon, as at June 1956, as 1,400,000 and 103,000 refugees.

For a detailed breakdown of Lebanon's population see footnote on next page.

old prejudices and distrusts or religious intolerance, bigotry and separatism.

The sectarian difference is further complicated by the fact that through the history of the country, each group has at one time or another been associated with some foreign power or movement, either in the search for protection or the search for political ascendancy; and this association with foreign powers has been used by those powers for their commercial, political and educational ends. The influence of the foreigner widened the breach existing as the result of normal differences between people professing different creeds, a difference which is tolerated by Islamic religious law and practice, as evidenced by the Millet system. Subsequently, the importance of sectarianism in the political life of the country became firmly entrenched as a result of the Protocole of 1861.

According to the Ministry of National Economy, Service de Statistique Générale; Bulletin Statistique Trimestriel, Beirut, 1951, Vol. II, No. 1, the population of Lebanon in 1950 was 1,267,579 divided on the following sectarian basis:

<u>Christians:</u>		<u>Moslems:</u>		<u>Others:</u>	
Maronites	369,048	Sunnis	263,498	Israel	6,920
Greek Orthodox	126,084	Chi'is	232,314	Others	6,551
Greek Catholic	76,120	Druze	81,192		
Armen.Catholic	65,208				
Armen.Orthodox	13,856				
Protestants	12,464				
Syrian Catholic	5,831				
Syrian Orthodox	4,284				
Latins	3,892				
Chaldeans	1,317				

Character Traits

The Lebanese are an adventurous, hardy people with a shrewd and quick mind for commerce and a penchant for the lighter things of life. They can be aggressive in their work, without being bitter. Easily adaptable, they are quick to seize an opportunity, even if the supposed opportunity lies in the far corners of the world.¹ They are a gregarious people, but like most Mediterranean peoples, they are quick to anger, and the expression of violence is condoned by their culture, though not by the law of the country. It may be interesting to note that two studies conducted by psychologists² showed the Lebanese, among other things, as being opportunistic and superficial.

The Westernization of the Lebanese,³ in general, has resulted in a conflict of cultures on a personal level; and

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1. Sanbar, op.cit., figures that 73.6% of the number of people who emigrate from Lebanon every year are between the ages of 15 and 44, when their productive economic capacity is in its prime.
 2. Studies in Stereotypes: IV Lebanese Business Men and Cross-Cultural Patterns of National Stereotypes, both by E. Terry Prothro, Department of Psychology, American University of Beirut. It may be significant that the adjectives "opportunistic" and "superficial" were not applied by the subjects to any other national group.
 3. Interview with Professor Levon Melikian, Department of Psychology, American University of Beirut.

this conflict is solved in one of three ways: either it fosters a feeling of inadequacy in the individual, with the result that he becomes jealous of his rights, and it fosters a cautious and aggressive conduct and an anxiety to prove his value; or else, the individual solves this conflict by identifying himself with Western culture, adopting the externals of that culture, seeking to prove his adequacy without ever gaining a penetrating insight into the adopted culture. The third group is a small minority which understands the cultural interplay at work in the country, and seeks to combine the best of each of the cultural currents.

As a nation, the feeling that they are as good as anyone else causes the Lebanese to strive to equal the West. Unfortunately, the practical effect of this feeling is too often a shallow imitation of the West. To the discerning observer, this only shows the basic and prevailing feeling of inadequacy.

Pattern of Economic Development:

Although the figures quoted by Dr. Albert Badre for the national income of Lebanon are for 1950, the relative position of each sector has not changed in the years since, showing that development has been fairly even in all sectors, without any

one sector losing its place to another.¹ In the concluding remarks of his speech to the Cénacle Libanais, in April, 1955 Dr. Albert Badre stated that the aim of any economy must be to raise the per capita income of the population. For the future, Dr. Badre suggests that the production sectors of industry and agriculture should be fostered, without, however, allowing their growth to encroach on the income from the services sector. Dr. Badre expressed the hope that the creation of the Industry Institute and the Agricultural Credit Bank would stimulate the growth of the production sectors of the national economy.²

Education

Perhaps, the educational pattern of a country is a reflection of that country's culture and historical development. In Lebanon, like the other Arab countries and many of the Asian countries, education has been primarily a foreign import with a different slant than the traditional education of the country. Mention must be made here, that

1. Sanbar, op.cit., has a table showing estimates based on UNRWA Economic Section reports in support of this thesis on the relative position of sectors.
2. Badre at Cénacle.

foreign educational establishments have long been the predominant influence in Lebanon, and caused the revival of the Arabic language and national feeling.¹ The influence of education, rather than its techniques, must be considered on the thinking pattern of the population: it can be broadly stated that Lebanese society, above the worker and peasant level, is either French- or Anglo-Saxon- oriented. The first group have been subjected for long to French literature, culture, history and feeling: they think, to a surprising extent, like Frenchmen, and they behave as though they were an intellectual colony of France. The Anglo-Saxon oriented group are not immersed in the culture and way of thinking of their educational medium; they retain an intellectual freedom not shared by the other group. The first group is influential, especially in Government, and it strongly resists the advent of members of the "Anglo-Saxon" group. To the Anglo-Saxon trained student, the French-educated person becomes a junior edition of a Frenchman without individuality or objectivity, while the opposite is believed by the French students. Curiously enough, students from the two systems find it difficult to get on with one another: such is the divisive effect of education.

1. George Antonius, The Arab Awakening.
Khayat's College Book Cooperative, Beirut,
1955, p. 35.

Although many people speak Arabic, English and French, the majority of people speak only two languages, if they are educated: "A Near Easterner must live in at least two language worlds to be effective and 'in touch'."¹ Since the second language is either English or French, and since Arabic is probably poorly learned,² there is an effective communication barrier impeding the flow of ideas amongst citizens of the same nation, with the result that each group lives more or less alone, pretending the other group, although it exists, does not count.

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1. Charles Malik, "The Meaning of the Near East". Journal of International Affairs, New York, Vol. VI, No. 6, p. 12.
 2. Hourani, op.cit. p. 36 and pp. 83, 84. Speaking of the bilingual student, he says: "Many, in the attempt to master two languages and two cultures fail to master either." See also, Faris, N.A. and Husayn, M.T., The Crescent in Crisis University of Kansas Press, Lawrence, 1955, Ch. XIII for a discussion of the divisive influence of education.

CHAPTER IV

POINT FOUR LEGISLATION AND ORGANIZATION FOR LEBANON

The implementation of Technical Assistance in Lebanon is based on two agreements signed by the United States and Lebanese Governments. The first is a General Agreement, signed on the 29th of May, 1951, by John H. Bruins, Chargé d'Affaires, for the United States, and Hussein Oueini, Prime Minister, for Lebanon, and ratified by an act of the Parliament of Lebanon on the 13th of December, 1951. This agreement shows the willingness of both parties to "cooperate in the interchange of technical knowledge and skills... in activities designed to contribute to the balanced and integrated development of the economic resources and productive capacities of Lebanon."¹

The Government of the United States agreed to furnish the services of experts, pay their salaries and transport costs to and from the United States, to provide for the training of Lebanese personnel in the United States and elsewhere, with an arrangement for paying the cost of such training, and to supply certain machinery and equipment purchasable with United States dollars.²

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1. Technical Cooperation General Agreement, As quoted in Point IV in Lebanon, Technical Cooperation Service, Beirut, 1953, pp.52-53, Article 1.
 2. Loc. cit. Article 2.

As required by the provisions of Public Law 535, Lebanon has to bear a "fair share of the cost" of the programme. The Agreement requires Lebanon to provide:

- 1 - office space, equipment and supplies, secretarial and translation services,
- 2 - pay cost of lands, buildings, local materials and labour necessary to "the effectiveness of the experts' work",
- 3 - pay transport and other costs of American personnel within Lebanon, as may be agreed upon,
- 4 - assign Lebanese staff and technicians to work with United States technicians, and
- 5 - to pay agreed costs for the training of Lebanese personnel abroad. 1

In compliance with the provision of Section 407 of Public Law 535, Article 4 provides that Lebanon undertakes to coordinate the Technical Aid programs in Lebanon, and agrees to facilitate the interchange of information with other friendly nations.²

Lebanon also agrees to exempt all employees of the United States Government, and their families, from the payment of Lebanese taxes and customs duties on their personal effects, unless such personal effects are sold within three years of the time of their entry to Lebanon. Similarly, equipment imported by the United States Government in fulfillment of the Agreement is also exempt from import and customs duties.³

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1. Ibid., Art. 3.
 2. Ibid., Art. 4.
 3. Ibid., Art. 5.

Both governments undertake to give full publicity to the objectives and achievements of the program, and to make annual reports.¹ The Agreement can be revoked upon three months notice from either party.² It came into effect on the day the Lebanese Parliament approved it, December 13th, 1951.

Article 7 of the General Agreement provides that subsidiary arrangements would be agreed upon for carrying out particular projects. In compliance with this article, and pursuant to a note dated January 5th, 1952, which the Prime Minister acting as Minister of Foreign Affairs submitted to the United States Minister,³ requesting the cooperation of the United States in a number of fields, a second agreement, known as the Program Agreement, was drawn up, and signed by Harold B. Minor, Ambassador for the United States and Sami Solh, Prime Minister for Lebanon, and came into force on the 26th of June, 1952, which was the date of its signature. It was to remain in force for one year, and was to be renewed automatically, or until three months notice of the intention to terminate it was given by either party.⁴ The Program Agreement was allowed to lapse in 1955, but its stipulations are still used as guide lines, and a summary of it will clarify the position of joint administration of Technical Aid projects.

1. Ibid., Art. 6.

2. Ibid., Art. 8.

3. Program Agreement, as quoted in Point IV in Lebanon, op.cit., pp.53-54.

4. Ibid., Preamble and Art. 10.

The Program Agreement stated that the two governments would undertake technical cooperation programs in water and natural resources development, agriculture, forestry, fisheries, health, education, industry, tourism, communications, social affairs, training of Lebanese technicians and such other fields as would be agreed upon to "improve and develop the economy in Lebanon and to stimulate and increase the interchange between the two countries of knowledge, skills and technical ability."¹

The obligations assumed by the United States, according to the Program Agreement, would be performed by the Technical Cooperation Administration, in conjunction with the appropriate Ministries of the Government of Lebanon, and they should participate jointly in the planning, budgeting, scheduling and administering of the cooperative program. The Technical Cooperation Administration in Lebanon was to furnish technicians, subject to the approval the Lebanese Government, for execution of the program. Each Technical Staff would be headed by a Chief, and would serve as the principal adviser to the Director of the Technical Cooperation Service in Lebanon.² The Agreement also described the form which project agreements must take, and stated that by agreement between the two parties, cooperation may be extended to municipal agencies, public or private organizations, and

1. Ibid., Art. 1

2. Ibid., Art. 2, para. 4.

international organizations of which both Lebanon and the
United States are members.¹

For the purposes of this thesis, Article 5 is of particular interest since it related to the joint administration of projects. The article provided that the Director of the Technical Cooperation Service and the Lebanese Ministry having jurisdiction over a given project would jointly agree on the general principles and procedures of each project, on the payment of funds and accounting thereof, on the use, control and disposition of property, the appointment and discharge of personnel, the terms of their employment and on all other administrative matters.² The Article further provided that Lebanese employees attached to a project would be considered employees of the Ministry concerned, but would be under the technical direction of the Chief of Technical Staff.³ Paragraph 3 of the Article provided that each party had the right of access to the books, records and documents of the other, so as to ascertain the use made of project funds. Paragraph 4 of the Article stipulated that upon the "substantial" completion of a

1. Ibid., Art. 3, para. "d".

2. Ibid., Art. 4.

3. TCS became USOM/L - United States Operations Mission to Lebanon, on the creation of the Foreign Operations Administration. Chief of Technical Staff became Division Chief.

project, a completion report would be drawn up, showing the work done, the objectives attained, the problems encountered and solved and related matters, and would be signed by the Director and the Ministry having jurisdiction over the project.¹

Other provisions of the Program Agreement related to the financial contribution of each Government, and stated that in addition to the funds listed, the Government of Lebanon, at its own expense, would provide such services, personnel, office space equipment and furnishings and other facilities, supplies or services as would be agreed upon.²

The Agreement stipulated that funds made available by either government would continue to be available notwithstanding the fiscal year of either government, and that all materials provided by the United States, would, unless otherwise specified, become the property of the Lebanese Ministry having jurisdiction over a project.³ Unexpended funds, however, reverted to the government which made them available.⁴ United States funds were exempt from seizure, garnishment or legal process.⁵

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1. Program Agreement, op.cit., Art. 5, paras. 1-4.
 2. Ibid., Art. 6, para. 3.
 3. Ibid., Art. 7.
 4. Ibid., Art. 9.
 5. Ibid., Art. 10.

When the Program Agreement was cancelled in 1955, it was replaced by project agreements for each field of activity. These project agreements are renewable yearly. The procedure related to funds and administration which the old Program Agreement established continue to be followed despite its cancellation.

Organization of the United States Operations Mission to Lebanon.

The United States Operations Mission to Lebanon is headed by a Country Director, who, in turn, serves under the general leadership of the United States Ambassador.¹ The Country Director is in charge of supervising all the field missions and directing them, developing a country program, projects and budgets and maintaining the necessary relations with the Government of Lebanon. He must also coordinate all the field activities and projects into one overall program, subject to the availability of funds.

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1. "...The Chief of the United States Diplomatic Mission in each foreign country must provide effective coordination of, and foreign policy direction with respect to, all United States Government activities in the country..." from President Eisenhower's Memorandum to Heads of Executive Departments, dated June 1, 1953, regarding the conduct of foreign affairs. United States House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Document 38459, (Government Printing Office, Washington, 1953), p. 197.

He studies, with his staff, the requests made by the Government of Lebanon for aid, and reports to the International Cooperation Administration in Washington. The Country Director is assisted by the Program Officer who is his deputy.

The United States Operations Mission to Lebanon is set up on the basis of an Administrative Section and five Divisions: Agriculture, Natural Resources, Education, Industry and Mining, and Health and Sanitation.¹

The Administration Section handles all accounts, approves disbursements, negotiates matters relating to Technical or Economic Assistance, and translates major documents.

Each division is headed by a Division Chief and staffed by American technicians assigned to various projects. The Division Chiefs are the principal advisers of the Country Director in the fields that relate to their divisions and to the equivalent Lebanese Ministries. The country Director is the counterpart, organizationally, of all Lebanese Ministers. Each Division Chief is the counterpart of the Director General of the equivalent Ministry. In the field, each technician has, or is supposed to have, a counterpart. The Lebanese Counterpart plays a dual role: he learns from the

1. The information in this section is based on various interviews.

American Technician and helps in the joint project administration. Quite often though, an American technician does not have a counterpart either because none is available, or because the government cannot spare one. In his project, the technician ascertains the needs of the country, suggests methods of meeting those needs and improving actual practice, demonstrates techniques, prepares cost estimates, is in charge of the disbursement of project funds, subject to approval of the Lebanese Government and the Administration of USOM/L, and serves as adviser to his Division Chief.

Since the implementation of technical assistance requires close and continuous cooperation between the Government of Lebanon and the United States Operations Mission, a Liaison Officer works to reduce friction, reconcile divergent viewpoints and generally keep the two organizations in touch. He is a Lebanese, and half his salary is paid by each Government.

Government of Lebanon Arrangements

Within the Government, no single body is responsible for the administration of technical aid joint projects. Each Ministry connected with such projects cooperates directly with the USOM/L division and officers concerned.

The Economic Development Board had an administrative function insofar as the study of projects was concerned. Now, however, since the integration of the Board within the Ministry of Planning, this function of the Board has ceased to exist.

Funds are obligated by Act of Parliament and assigned to each Ministry within the budgeted amounts. The Minister signs payment orders and sends them to the Treasury for payment. Later the cour des comptes audits the transaction within each Ministry. The Director General coordinates the activities of his department with the USOM/L Division Chief concerned.

Inception, Planning and Implementation of a Project

The procedure whereby a project develops from an idea into a signed agreement between two governments has undergone some change. In the formative days of United States Technical Assistance to Lebanon, the United States Technician and his Counterpart planned a project, on the initiative of either of them, and then submitted the draft to their respective superiors. The Lebanese Ministry receiving such a draft would send it to the Economic Development Board, which was set up in November 1952, for a study of the economic necessity of the draft project. The Economic Development Board - EDB - was composed of six economic experts, four directors general of ministries, one

full time secretary, and the Chairman, who was the Minister of National Economy.¹ If the EDB approved the draft, it was sent to the Liaison Committee, composed of three experts of the EDB, three members of the Country Director's office, usually the Director, Program Officer and Executive Officer, and the Chairman, who is the Minister of National Economy, and the Deputy Chairman. The Committee would meet with the Technician and the Ministry Representative to determine details and write the project agreement.²

Now, however, the procedure has been simplified. In theory, requests for aid are formulated by a Ministry of the Lebanese Government. In practice, an officer or technician of the United States Operations Mission may notice the need for a given project, and suggest it to the Mission, which then suggests it to the Government of Lebanon. The Government then submits a formal request for aid. The Mission sends a report on the request to ICA in Washington. If the proposed project is approved, a project agreement is drawn up between the two governments, obligating the necessary funds, describing the purpose of the project,

1. The Economic Development Board was created by Government of Lebanon Law No. 32 of 17th February, 1953 and abolished by Law No. 2 of 30th November, 1954, Art. 31; this law created a Ministry of Planning with a new Board within the Ministry. The new Board is not connected with Point IV.

2. Interview with Dr. Albert Badre, July, 1954.

its justification, location and cost, together with the manner in which costs will be shared by each Government. The Project Agreement also describes what services, personnel, commodities, equipment, and the like are needed, and how they will be supplied. However, in recent times, more of the initiative is coming from the Government.¹ Funds can be carried over for two years, in addition to the year in which the Agreement was signed. Funds for personnel can be carried through the year of signature and one additional year.

In the implementation of the project, the United States Technician and his Counterpart are jointly responsible, and each refers policy matters to his superior for decision. The Government of Lebanon authorizes expenditure of its obligated funds, while United States fund expenditures must be approved by the Technician, the Division Chief, the Country Director's Office, the Director General of the Ministry.

The administration of a project, formally, lies with the Ministry. The Director appoints a "Project Adviser" - the technician - to advise the Ministry counterpart. Both must prepare plans for the project and consult

1. Interview with Program Adviser, 22nd April, 1957.

regularly with USOM/L and the Ministry of Agriculture.¹

Upon the completion of a project and its transfer to the Ministry, a complete report is signed as indicated in the old Program Agreement.²

The complexity of the Legislation which was passed in both the United States and Lebanon to allow and implement the Technical Assistance programme, and to list the duties of each country as incurred by participation in the programme, now becomes apparent.

Likewise, it is obvious that the method of program administration is dependent not only upon the laws of both countries, but also upon the administrative procedures which exist within each of the governments concerned as well as between them. Perhaps the brief outline given of the method of routing a project from an idea into reality serves to emphasize the complexity of joint administrative operations.

1. Project Agreement No. 22 (01-58-00)
Agricultural Development of Lebanon
provides for a "Project Director" acceptable to the Director of USOM/L, and appointed by the Ministry.

2. See above page

CHAPTER V

TECHNICAL COOPERATION PROJECTS IN AGRICULTURE

The Administration Section of the Agricultural Division of USOM/L comes directly under the Chief Agriculturist, who is responsible for coordinating and supervising all projects, and coordinating the work of his Division with the work of the Ministry of Agriculture. He is assisted by a Program Adviser and Liaison Officer.

Under the Chief Agriculturist come three sections, each with its own Chief: the Animal Science Section comprising projects in Animal Husbandry, Poultry and Veterinary; the Plant Science Section, comprising projects in Agronomy, Horticulture, Forestry and Irrigation; and the Extension Section, comprising Extension (and entomology), Farm Machinery, Credit and Cooperatives and Marketing. These three sections were created in 1955 to reduce the number of people reporting directly to the Chief Agriculturist, thus enabling him to spend more time in the field and reducing the amount of paper work he has to attend to.

To maintain close touch the Director General and the Chief Agriculturist meet as often as needed, usually twice a week, at the Division offices. These meetings, if

connected with technical problems, may be attended by the United States Technician and his Counterpart from the Ministry, together with the Program Adviser, who attends most meetings. At these meetings, the reports and problems of the various projects are discussed as raised by the technicians concerned. No technician has access to the Ministry except through his Counterpart and the Division Chief. In practice, these meetings settle questions that could not be handled jointly by the United States Specialist and his Counterpart in the Field.

In addition to rendering technical assistance, the Division is also entrusted with administering that part of the Special Economic Assistance allotted by the United States for the Agricultural Development of Lebanon.

The twelve projects on which the Government of Lebanon and the United States Operations Mission to Lebanon are cooperating, in the field of agriculture, are a comprehensive effort to study the needs of Lebanon in Agriculture and to meet those needs by adequate research, technology and education.

The projects have been designed to meet existing conditions of topography, climate and resources. For instance, machinery has been imported to aid in terracing mountain slopes; research is conducted on the best plants,

extension agents are trained to meet the different requirements of Lebanon's three climate regions and cheap methods of livestock improvement and simple herd management are taught.

Agricultural Extension

The Agricultural Extension project was designed to "assist adult farmers and their families in using newer methods and techniques resulting from research to increase the productivity of the land, and through increased returns, to provide a more profitable and a more healthful environment for rural purposes." ¹ In other words this project aims at communicating with the farmer and informing him of new techniques and spreading knowledge of modern methods of agriculture.

The food shortage in Lebanon calls for methods of farming that will result in increased production of improved quality. The Ministry of Agriculture has an extension service under the Department of Agricultural Affairs. In cooperation with Lebanon's Extension Service, the Project has set up five specific objectives:

- 1 - To assist in developing local agricultural policies and programs.
- 2 - To assist in analyzing and applying research information and other factual data to the solution of the agricultural problems of Lebanon.

1. Agricultural Extension Project, No. 68-11-007, (USOM/L 1952, Beirut).

- 3 - To disseminate scientific and technical information in agriculture to the farmers of each region in an effective and timely manner.
- 4 - To develop a proper organization and procedure for effective agricultural extension work in Lebanon.
- 5 - To train personnel to assist the Ministry of Agriculture to continue effective extension work among Lebanese farmers.¹

To implement these aims, the Government has set up a number of centers in the various parts of Lebanon and the United States Operations Mission helped supply these centers with furniture and equipment. The Agents in these Centers have been trained by the Agriculture Staff of USOM/L.

Training is an important part of the project, and since its inception, 19 people have been trained in Lebanon and five were trained in the United States and Holland in 1953.² The Extension Officers of USOM/L also train from one to three counterparts each.³

A sub-project of the Extension Project is in the field of Entomology Extension, designed to protect crops and stored grains from damage by insects. Experiments have been undertaken to determine the simplest and cheapest

1. Loc. Cit.

2. USOM/L, 1953 Report, (USOM/L Beirut 1954), p. 28.

3. Hubert L. Lasater and Fred, E. Delzell, "Report on the Extension Project for 1955", Annual Report, Agricultural Division, USOM-Lebanon, (USOM/L Agriculture Division, 1956), p. 2 and following.

methods of control.

Through demonstrations conducted by the Extension Centers, the knowledge gained from all the Agriculture projects is channelled to farmers in the various parts of Lebanon. This requires the Extension Project Officers, both Lebanese and American, to keep in constant touch with other sections of their organizations, to maintain the continual flow of information gathered through tests and research, and to demonstrate it to farmers all over the country.

Since the beginning of the program, the following amounts have been obligated:¹

	<u>U.S.</u>	<u>Lebanon</u>
1952	\$ 79,550	\$ 15,625
1954	56,500	7,354
1955	10,000	64,060
1956	3,750	66,500
	<hr/>	<hr/>
	\$ 149,800	\$ 153,530
	=====	=====

Horticulture

Fruits and vegetables constitute 78% of the general agricultural produce of Lebanon,² and as such can be factors in the international trade of Lebanon as well as necessary

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1. Controller's Office, USOM/L - All other information in this chapter concerning funds is from the same source.
 2. USOM/L Lebanon - 1955, Annual Report, (Beirut, 1956), p. 35.

supplements to the high cereal diet of Lebanon's population.

The Program is planned with two objectives in mind: the first comes under applied research, and runs various tests to determine how to improve horticulture practices in regard to planting, terracing, fruit and vegetable varieties, vegetable breeding, and also to determine which trees are suitable for windbreaks and for cold climates. The second objective of the program comes under extension in that it aims at teaching growers and nurserymen the best practices by demonstration, individual contact, meetings, articles and radio.¹ The program also encourages home vegetable gardens in the rural areas. Training of counterparts is also an important part of the program.

Laboratory facilities have been developed² for the identification of insects and diseases, and for tests of control measures.

The following amounts have been obligated:

	<u>U.S.</u>	<u>Lebanon</u>
1952	\$ 15,350	\$ 10,940
1954	3,500	3,440
1955	9,500	2,560
1956	8,700	5,660
	<u>\$ 37,050</u>	<u>\$ 22,600</u>
	=====	=====

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1. Horticulture Project, No. 68-13-008, USOM/L, Beirut, 1952.
 2. Jean C. Miller, "Report on Horticulture Project" Annual Report Agricultural Division, op.cit.

Agronomy

In relation to the area available for agriculture, Lebanon is densely populated, and the yield of wheat and other grains is fairly low, thus necessitating importation of 60% of its food grain requirements, and 75% of its livestock needs. The level of importation can be reduced, or maintained to keep up with population growth, only if there is a greater return of cereal crops and livestock forage.¹ Improved forage would increase the production and quality of livestock.

To attain the objectives of the program, many experiments have been made to compare local wheat with imported specimens, and new crops have been introduced for forage. Other tests were made with potatoes, barley, corn and fiber crops. When the superiority of a given plant is proved by test plantings, seed is distributed to farmers in exchange for their old, low-yield types. This has been done in wheat. Similar tests proved the local variety of potato a poor producer, and seeds for the new variety of high-producing Bintje potato were distributed.

When the Seed and Soil Laboratory is completed, it will provide facilities for the analysis of soils and for germination and purity tests.²

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1. Agronomy Project, No. 68-13-009, (USOM/L, Beirut, 1952).
 2. John E. Osguthorpe, "Report on Agronomy Project for 1955" Annual Report, op.cit.

The funds for the Agronomy project were allocated as follows:

	<u>U.S.</u>	<u>Lebanon</u>
1952	\$ 48,750	\$ 11,250
1954	24,500	14,375
1955	2,400	6,560
1956	2,700	15,000
	<u>\$ 78,350</u>	<u>\$ 47,185</u>
	=====	=====

Animal Husbandry

Lebanon's production of meat and milk is very low. In 1950 some 400,000 sheep and 30,000 cattle were imported to meet the country's needs.¹ Between 50% to 60% of the cattle are diseased, and the prevalence of tubercular cows, and animals suffering from brucellosis has caused concern. In addition, the feeding practises of farmers result in poor meat and milk production.

The aims of the Animal Husbandry project are:

- 1 - By research:
 - a - to produce through breeding practices better and more productive livestock.
 - b - to improve the livestock feed supply and nutrition of animals, through use of selected forages, more efficient preservation methods, and testing of available factory by-products to determine their value as animal feed.
 - c - to advance ways of combatting diseases in livestock through surveys to determine their prevalence and through finding ways to combat them.

1. Animal Husbandry, Project No. 68-13-010, (USOM/L, Beirut, 1952).

- d - to improve the housing of farm animals and other farm structures used in managing farm animals.
- e - to discover simple but effective sanitary methods and practices in the handling of meat and dairy products.
- f - to train personnel in Lebanon to organize, supervise and conduct experiments in animal husbandry.

2 - By extension:

to teach farmers the best methods of live-stock management through demonstration and through lectures, meetings, bulletins, newspapers and any other means that can be used. 1

In the implementation of this Project, an artificial insemination centre has been set up at Sin el Fil, and other areas. Bulls were imported from Holland and have since been used to service several thousand local cows. Trench silos were dug to show their value as a cheap and effective method of keeping fodder. An open shed barn was constructed at the experimental farm at Terbol, and another in the Beka'a, to demonstrate healthier and cheaper methods of housing the animals.²

As in other projects, training of Lebanese personnel is an important part of the program, and in Animal Husbandry,

1. Loc. cit.

2. USOM/L (then Technical Cooperation Services) Point IV in Lebanon, (TCS, Beirut, 1953), pp. 19-20.

several technicians have been trained in artificial insemination, herd management, and feed practices.

The funds allocated to this Project are as follows:

	<u>U.S.</u>	<u>Lebanon</u>
1952	\$ 195,500	\$ 35,815
1954	47,000	27,655
1955	16,300	62,690
1956	-	-
	<hr/>	<hr/>
	\$ 258,800	\$ 126,160
	=====	=====

Poultry

The local production of eggs in Lebanon does not meet the demand, and some 50,000,000 eggs and 400,000 kilograms of poultry have to be imported every year, mostly from Syria.¹ It is estimated that Lebanon needs 370 million additional eggs a year to satisfy the nutritional needs of the population, and some 3.5 million additional hens are needed to produce those eggs. The main problem facing the poultry industry was two-fold, because of bad nutrition and disease. Three-fourths of the baby chicks died before maturity.

The Poultry Project was set up to increase production and improve quality, to improve the poultry breeding stock of Lebanon by rigidly selecting native stock,

1. USOM/L - Point IV in Lebanon, op.cit., p. 21.

and cross breeding it with imported breeds.¹ Other aims were that the production of feeds would be increased and a balanced poultry diet developed, that a poultry disease laboratory would be established to stock and maintain vaccines for disease control and prevention, in conjunction with the livestock laboratory; that housing adaptable to the climate of the country, be developed, that grades and standards be developed for poultry products, and that the government be assisted to formulate laws, regulations and rules to determine the needs of public health and maintain a poultry population as free as possible from disease; that a poultry demonstration farm be set up, and that poultry specialists be trained in research and extension methods.

In the implementation of the program, several poultry demonstration centers were set up, a number of chicks were imported from the United States, vaccinations were made against Newcastle disease, and booklets prepared on the subject were distributed.²

	<u>U.S.</u>	<u>Lebanon</u>
1952	\$ 57,150	\$ 13,495
1954	36,500	9,375
1955	9,700	22,350
	<u>\$ 103,350</u>	<u>\$ 45,220</u>
	=====	=====

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1. Poultry Project, No. 68-13-011, (USOM/L, Beirut, 1952).
 2. Boyd A. Ivory, "Report on Poultry Project for 1955" Annual Report Agricultural Division, USOM-Lebanon, op.cit.

Veterinary

The prevalence of tuberculosis, Bang's disease, brucellosis and other diseases among livestock in Lebanon result in a heavy loss of meat, milk, hides and wool. The Improvement of animal and poultry health in Lebanon will contribute to increased food production in Lebanon and a resulting decrease in imports.¹

The veterinary project was set up:

- 1 - To establish a veterinary diagnostic laboratory, clinics, and mobile animal disease control units.
- 2 - To reduce communicable diseases of livestock and poultry by improving sanitary conditions through vaccination and immunization.
- 3 - To improve the health of livestock and poultry through elimination of nutritional deficiencies.
- 4 - To control livestock and poultry parasites.
- 5 - To establish a serum production unit.²

The Project also undertakes the training of Lebanese personnel and the in-service training of Government Veterinarians. Also under the Project administration, Government Veterinarians were brought together as a group for discussions of their mutual problems. These meetings result

1. Veterinary Project, No. 68-13-012, USOM/L, Beirut, 1952. See also Boyd A. Ivory, "Report on the Veterinary Project" Annual Report, op.cit.

2. Veterinary Project, op. cit.

in more effective service to the livestock industry.¹
Funds for the Veterinary projects were allocated as follows:

	<u>U.S.</u>	<u>Lebanon</u>
1952	\$ 55,895.55	\$ 10,940
1954	25,000.00	53,440
1955	<u>9,400.00</u>	<u>43,590</u>
	\$ 90,295.55	\$ 107,970
	=====	=====

Irrigation

It is estimated that less than 0.25 hectares of land are available per capita in Lebanon, and this is well below the area required to feed the total population. This represents a population pressure on arable land of some 1500 people per square mile.² As there is little additional land to be brought under cultivation, it is necessary that production from available land be increased as much as possible, and this can be done through the improvement of all "phases of crop and livestock selection and management, and soil management, including adequate drainage of certain land, development of additional water supplies and the use of improved irrigation and drainage

1. Boyd A. Ivory, acting for Dr. Theo Beechwood, "Report on the Veterinary Project for 1955" USOM/L Annual Report, op.cit.

2. Irrigation Project, No. 68-12-013, (USOM/L, Beirut, 1952.

methods".¹

Since summer is a dry season in Lebanon, it is necessary to irrigate most summer crops.² The methods now used are wasteful and inefficient, and the drainage of land is bad.³

The irrigation project agreement has six main aims:⁴

- 1 - To assist in the development and distribution of irrigation water supplies from underground or surface sources.⁵
- 2 - To obtain basic data on the relationships between irrigation requirements and existing crops, soils, climate and topography.
- 3 - To improve the efficiency of the use of irrigation water on farms.
- 4 - To improve the drainage of wet lands.
- 5 - To develop specifications and instructions for efficient irrigation methods and procedures and to publicize this information.
- 6 - To initiate, within the Ministry of Agriculture, a continuing program of irrigation experimentation and technical assistance to farmers and to train a number of technicians to carry on this work in the future. Funds for research will be provided by T.C.S." (Technical Cooperation Service - now USOM/L).

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1. Irrigation Project, op.cit.
 2. USOM/L - USOM Lebanon 1955, op.cit., p. 45.
 3. Kenneth Back, "Report on Irrigation Project for 1955" USOM/L Annual Report, op.cit.
 4. Irrigation Project, op.cit.
 5. USOM/L - USOM Lebanon 1955, Loc. cit.

In the implementation of this project, irrigation activities at experimental stations were used for demonstration purposes and were observed by farmers and visitors to the stations. Automatic rain gauges have been installed at a number of stations and the data accumulated at these stations is coordinated with other data collected by other agencies and published in a monthly report. The data so collected is necessary to evaluate¹ the water reserves of Lebanon.

The funds for this project were allocated as follows:

	<u>U.S.</u>	<u>Lebanon</u>
1952	\$ 63,500	\$ 10,390
1954	8,000	4,530
1955	12,300	11,880
1956	3,200	11,880
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	\$ 87,000	\$ 38,680
	=====	=====

Agricultural Marketing

The favourable geographical and climatic conditions of Lebanon encourage the growing of a number of agricultural products which find a ready market in Lebanon itself and in the neighbouring countries. If such commodities are

1. Loc. cit.

"properly packed, graded and marketed, they can compete favourably with any similar world product."¹ However, little or no attention is paid to proper grading and marketing, with the result that the reputation of Lebanon's agricultural exports has suffered: e.g. Cyprus had banned² the importation of Lebanon's bananas.

Proper methods of packing and marketing would enable Lebanon to compete favourably on world markets, and will have a fortunate effect on the Lebanese economy, because the number of farms connected with marketable produce are favourably distributed in small holdings among the people.

The general objectives of the project are:

- 1 - Standardization of marketing methods in Lebanon.
- 2 - Demonstrating the practical use and value of modern equipment in marketing.
- 3 - Helping the Ministry of Agriculture develop laws and regulations for the control of exported agricultural produce.
- 4 - Assisting the Ministry of Agriculture develop an efficient Inspection Service which will supervise agricultural products marketed for export.
- 5 - Assisting in the development of quarantine and disinfection facilities for the use of the Inspection Service. 3

1. Agricultural Marketing Project, (No.68-15-014, USOM/L, Beirut, 1952).

2. Point IV in Lebanon, op.cit., p. 26.

3. Agricultural Marketing Project, loc.cit.

In the implementation of this project, the technician and his counterpart accompanied a citrus shipment to Trieste, and made temperature and humidity readings of the cargo, and a detailed examination on arrival of the 540 cases of fruit.¹ As a result of this trip, different methods of boxing and packing were introduced.² A similar trip was made to Cyprus. Demonstrations were made of grading equipment, and some equipment was bought by private firms. The packing house which was first set up under the project, fell when the scaffolding was removed, but another has been built, and the machinery will soon be installed. Methods of harvesting were improved by the use of fruit clippers rather than pruning shears. Pamphlets have been distributed and motion pictures made of proper marketing practices.

The funds allocated to this project are:

	<u>U.S.</u>	<u>Lebanon</u>
1952	\$ 85,150	\$ 34,565
1954	30,000	48,905
1955	1,000	55,780
1956	3,500	20,000
	<hr/>	<hr/>
	\$ 119,650	\$ 159,250
	=====	=====

1. Point IV in Lebanon, Loc. cit.

2. Ibid.

Administration

The Administration Project covers the details not specifically agreed upon in the various project agreements.¹

Specifically, the aims of the project are:

- A. Training Administrative Staff. The Ministry and the Director agree to cooperate through their representatives in the training of Lebanese personnel in Agricultural Administration.
- B. Agricultural Experiment Stations. Both sides agree to provide, equip and staff Agricultural Experiment Stations.
- C. Temporary Supplemental Payments to G.O.L. employees. USOM/L agrees to pay the cost of temporary supplemental services rendered by the Government of Lebanon employees selected by the Ministry of Agriculture to assist in the implementation of the various projects.
- D. Additional Expenses. The Operation Mission agrees to provide supplies, equipment, transportation, warehouse and office space which cannot be charged to specific projects, and which will be mutually agreed upon.

Although the project is supplemental to the other Project Agreement, there is a specific agreement to train not more than three administrative personnel each year in the United States for a period of three months. The training of such personnel will be by the observation of, and participation in U.S. private, State and Federal organizations in the Trainee's field of interest.

1. Administration Project, No. 68-11-015
USOM/L, Beirut, 1952).

	<u>U.S.</u>	<u>Lebanon</u>
1952	\$ 10,250	\$ 5,140
1954	<u>34,500</u>	<u>27,970</u>
	\$ 44,750	\$ 33,110
	=====	=====

Credit and Cooperatives

The majority of farmers in Lebanon are owners of small holdings which cannot, in themselves, be operated economically on modern lines and requiring the use of considerable machinery and technology. Very little credit is available to farmers and when it is available, the interest rate is high "and the repayment terms unsuitable."¹ Furthermore, the limited experience and time of the individual farmer does not enable him to be a specialist in purchasing, packing, marketing or grading. These things can best be done by cooperatives, which could also supply much-needed equipment, leaving the farmer to the production² of improved crops.

The aims of the project are:

- 1 - To provide a specialized and dependable source of credit at a reasonable rate of interest. Agricultural credit in Lebanon is not only scarce, but costly, and is not adapted primarily to the needs of the farmer. Therefore a lending agency should be set up which will provide the kind of credit the farmer needs at an interest which he can afford to pay.

1. Credit and Cooperatives Project, (No.68-14-016, USOM/L, Beirut, 1952).

2. Loc. cit.

	<u>U.S.</u>	<u>Lebanon</u>
1952	\$ 10,250	\$ 5,140
1954	34,500	27,970
	<u>\$ 44,750</u>	<u>\$ 33,110</u>
	=====	=====

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1. Credit and Cooperatives Project, (No.68-14-016, USOM/L, Beirut, 1952).

2. Loc. cit.

repayments on the loan of the machinery, a special revolving fund will be used to finance "poor risk" cooperatives. A committee has been set up by the Ministry of Agriculture, with the American Technician as one of the members,¹ to further the development of the project. Two counterparts have been trained in this project, and one of them now works in the Agricultural Credit Bank. Several hundred tons of fertilizer were distributed to Cooperatives through the Ministry of Agriculture. A training course for cooperatives and credit, designed to instruct representatives of existing cooperatives, has been organized.²

Allocations for this project were:

	<u>U.S.</u>	<u>Lebanon</u>
1952	\$ 4,263.79	\$ 15,625
1954	30,000.00	1,405
1955	7,900.00	12,500
1956	3,000.00	3,830
	<hr/>	<hr/>
	\$ 45,163.79	\$ 33,360
	=====	=====

Farm Machinery

Although Lebanon is a small country, the topography, climate and soil conditions are as varied as those found in a large continent.³ Semi-skilled labour is expensive,

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1. Richard E. Kely, "Report on Agricultural Credit and Cooperatives Project for 1955". Annual Report, Op. cit.
 2. Loc. cit.
 3. USOM Lebanon, 1953 Report, op.cit., p. 25. See also Chapter III above.

and in rush seasons, not sufficiently available. The use of machinery in the modernization and mechanization of agriculture in Lebanon is important if the production of agricultural foodstuffs is to be maintained at an optimum level. In the mountains, land has to be terraced and the manual way of doing it was costly and delayed the planting of crops. The selection "of the proper types of farm machinery, the training of special operators and of farmers in the proper use of machinery, and the provision of fixed and mobile workshops in the different parts of the country will have a great effect on increasing producti-¹ vity and reducing cost of production."

The aims of the Farm Machinery project are: ²

- 1 - To help improve the use of machinery on farms, particularly adapting some makes and models to local conditions.
- 2 - To organize a training center and summer course for teaching the proper methods of operating and maintaining agricultural machinery.
- 3 - To develop workshops and repair centers in the four districts of Lebanon.
- 4 - To serve in cooperation with the Ministry of Agriculture as a consultant to individual farmers, owners of custom-operated agricultural machinery and to cooperative groups.
- 5 - To develop and widen the scope of Agricultural Engineering in Lebanon to include other phases such as Farm Structures, Rural electrification,

1. Farm Machinery Project, No. 68-19-017, (USOM/L, Beirut, 1952).

2. Loc. cit.

Soil and Water conservation, and farm shop including farm plumbing, carpentry, blacksmithing, etc.

In the implementation of this project, machinery obtained through Special Economic Aid was placed in the four Farm Machinery Centers in Lebanon, and is being used extensively, both in the field and for training purposes. Heavy bulldozers were used to demonstrate terracing techniques in the mountains.

The Technical Assistance funds allocated to this project, other than Special Economic Aid, are:

	<u>U.S.</u>	<u>Lebanon</u>
1952	\$ 202,050	\$ 15,155
1954	50,000	23,125
1955	4,500	54,310
1956	11,000	54,310
	<u>\$ 267,550</u>	<u>\$ 146,900</u>
	=====	=====

Forestry Project

Two World Wars have depleted Lebanon's forest resources.¹ Some half a million acres of forest land need reforestation to check soil erosion, increase the area of watershed forest, produce more wood for the nation's economy (demand exceeds production by 60%)² and help the national tree, the Cedar of Lebanon, regain its former "range" in the country.

1. Forestry Project, No. 68-17-018, (USOM/L, USOM/L, Beirut, 1952).

2. USOM Lebanon 1955, op.cit., p. 42.

The impact of this project will be felt in the wood provided and in other benefits.

The aims of the Project are:¹

- 1 - To help in the reforestation scheme of Lebanon.
- 2 - To help establish erosion control, watershed and timber plantings on the non-agricultural lands, using cultural practices to promote growth, and analyzing the results of different methods.
- 3 - To help restore Cedrus Libani at the higher elevations.
- 4 - To encourage the protection of forest areas against damage.
- 5 - To help establish tree windbreaks on the agricultural land.
- 6 - To help train men in forestry and conservation work.

In the implementation of this project, the sand dunes along the road to the Beirut International Airport were stabilized with the help of a thousand soldiers. The cost of the operation was one quarter the amount spent yearly to sweep the blow-sand off the roadway.² A nursery was started at Terbol Agricultural Station, and is being expanded. Over 2000 dunums of land have been reforested in the Cedars area.

1. Forestry Project, Loc. cit.

2. USOM Lebanon, 1955, op.cit., p. 42.

The allocations for this project were:

	<u>U.S.</u>	<u>Lebanon</u>
1952	\$ 25,650	\$ 5,000
1954	11,000	5,155
1955	19,000	38,280
1956	19,000	82,750
	<hr/>	<hr/>
	\$ 55,650	\$131,185
	=====	=====

Other Projects

A small project in Fisheries, costing \$ 890.66 was started and abandoned in 1952. An animal resources project was signed in 1956 with an allocation of \$ 8500 from the U.S. and \$104,620 from the Government of Lebanon.

Special Economic Aid

The Economic Aid Agreement signed in 1954 provided that the United States would give \$ 9,470,000 worth of aid. A total of \$ 2,500,000 was offered in the field of Agriculture, to a Lebanese contribution of \$ 794,840.¹ Subsequently, another two million dollars were contributed by the United States as Earthquake Relief. The Special Economic Assistance in Agriculture was made available for the procurement of supplies, equipment, contractual services and other costs of the various project agreements, and is divided into six sub-

1. Project Agreement No. 68-13-001 Agricultural Development of Lebanon; The government agreed to make available LL 1,688,485 for local currency costs plus LL 855,000,

projects: commercial fertilizer, farm machinery, grain storage, control of plant pests, protection of animal farm power, and extension service equipment and supplies.¹

Commercial Fertilizer: The S.E.A. Project Agreement allocated \$ 250,000 for the purchase of commercial fertilizer to be used in field demonstrations of the benefits of improved soil management in increasing crop yields. The Government of Lebanon contributed \$ 57,800 to this project.

Farm Machinery: An amount of \$ 712,000 was allocated to the Farm Machinery sub-project for the purchase of tractors and other equipment for land preparation, planting, harvesting and transportation. The funds were also allotted to cover the training of Lebanese personnel in the operation and maintenance of the equipment purchased. The contribution of the Lebanese Government was \$ 44,500.

Grain Storage: An amount of \$1,000,000 was allocated to the Grain Storage sub-project for the erection of grain storage facilities in Lebanon.² The project ran into several difficulties that delayed its effective implementation however.

1. which was the estimated cost of providing 19 extension centers. Annual Report (op.cit.) "Special Economic Assistance for the more Complete Agricultural Development of Lebanon" Annual Report for 1955, op.cit., p. 1.

1. Loc. cit.

Control of Plant Pests: An amount of \$ 150,000 was allocated to this sub-project for the purchase of equipment and supplies to be used in the control of plant pests.¹

Protection of Animal Farm Power: The S.E.A. Project Agreement allocated \$ 188,000 to this project, with a contribution of \$ 62,500 from the Government of Lebanon, for the purchase of trucks, jeeps, office furniture, sprayers, artificial breeding equipment, vaccine and other supplies.

Extension Equipment and Supplies: A sum of \$ 200,000 was allocated for the purchase of vehicles, equipment, office furniture, audio-visual equipment and other supplies to be used in the Extension Centres set up by the Ministry of Agriculture.²

While the foregoing has been an extensive description of agricultural projects, it must be noted that the exposition is based on documents and reports. It needs scarcely to be reiterated that it is the duty and responsibility of administration to achieve the established objectives by implementing each of these projects. There remains then the problem of analyzing the administration in its actual operations.

1. Loc. Cit.

2. See footnote 1, p. 80, supra.

CHAPTER VI

AN ANALYSIS OF JOINT PROJECT ADMINISTRATION IN AGRICULTURE

Fiscal Management

The various project agreements stipulate that "each party will be responsible for accounting for and disbursement of, the funds which it has contributed, in accordance with the fiscal requirements of each government."¹ The difficulties arising in fiscal management stem from the fact that at times, there is a lack of coordination in the spending on a given project, and this invariably delays the project. The cause of this delay, when it occurs, is the slowness of the fiscal system of the Government of Lebanon.² The procedure is usually time-consuming and not sufficiently responsive to the needs of some projects. In the United States Operations Mission to Lebanon, the expenditure of funds is started by the submission of a purchase

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1. See text of any project agreement, under paragraph on "Joint Project Financing".
 2. As an example, see USOM/L, Program Summary, February 1953 (Beirut), p. 7: "Delay of GOL in making appropriations available has delayed taking possession of the building, and will delay the start of artificial insemination". See also Nejjib Sadaka "Wizaret at-Tarbiah" Dirasat, op.cit.

order by a technician, and its approval by the Division Chief and the Country Director's office. It is then sent to the Director General of the Ministry of Agriculture for approval, which may take a few days or a few weeks, and then returned to the Country Director's office for obligation.

Until the end of 1954, it was necessary for the Lebanese Parliament to pass a special law to enable the Government to carry over development funds from one year to another, and this used to hinder the continuity of projects.¹ A new public accounting law, however, provided that, contrary to previous practice, budgeted capital expenditure items that remain outstanding at the end of a current fiscal year are automatically carried over into the next fiscal year.²

More serious are the weaknesses in the fiscal and budgetary practices of the government in regard to the whole budget. In some years, for instance, although Parliament voted the total amount for a joint cooperation program, the breakdown of the amount by project was delayed considerably.³

1. Government of Lebanon, Public Accounting Law of March 19th, 1953.

2. Government of Lebanon, Public Accounting Law of December 29th, 1954. It is to be noted that the Development Works Fund, created under Law of 5th April, 1954, to finance major capital works in the country, enjoys this fiscal continuity from its inception.

3. USOM/L Monthly Program Summary, April, 1954, Beirut, p. 2.

In 1953, as a result of the dissolution of Parliament, only one twelfth of the previous year's budget was allowed each month,¹ and this also considerably hampered the progress of projects. Since a budget is in effect the work-plan of a Government, it is apparent that confusion is created by the lack of a budget voted in time.²

Personnel

Recruitment

The recruitment of Government of Lebanon employees for work with the United States Operations Mission to Lebanon is similar to the recruitment pattern for the whole Lebanese civil service, in that there are no uniform standards applicable to candidates and enforced by a firm Civil Service Commission or similar body. With few exceptions, most of the personnel assigned by the Government of Lebanon to work with USOM/L Technicians are fairly recent graduates of colleges or universities.³ They, therefore, lack a basic foundation of practical experience, and the

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1. TCS/Lebanon. Monthly Program Summary, June 1953, Beirut, p. 11.
 2. George L. Grassmuck, Public Fiscal Management, Collection of In-service Training Lectures, (Public Administration Department, American University of Beirut, Beirut, 1956) Lecture No. 5.
 3. Interview on 10th May, 1957. It must be noted that in most cases the interviewees

self-confidence that would be the result of that experience. Further, their academic training is usually of the French type, completely dissimilar to that of the Americans. In the absence of rigidly enforced standards by an impartial body, some employees have found government employment through patronage and the spoils system of politics, with the result that a number of inefficient people have been assigned to the cooperative program although they lack a real interest in their job.¹

The effect of sectarianism on the politics and administration of Lebanon already has been discussed.² It must be mentioned that this factor must be kept in mind by the Government in recruiting employees. Perhaps it is more surprising to know that in its employment of Lebanese personnel, USOM/L also pays due regard to this problem and tries to equalize the number of employees from each of the

have required that their identity be kept confidential. For this reason, most of the interviewees are identified by date only. In the Bibliography, the officials interviewed and their positions have been listed. It should be further added that even when interviewees were assured that their identity would not be disclosed, they were reluctant to speak unreservedly. This attitude, in the opinion of the writer, was especially marked among the Ministry officials in comparison to the advisory staff.

1. Ibid.
3. For a study of Sectarianism in Lebanese Administration, see Halim Faris Fayyad, The Effects of Sectarianism on the Lebanese Administration,

two main religions in reference to the mores of Lebanon.¹

The problem of job security as a factor in recruitment applies mostly to the American Technicians of USOM/L. These men are competent men in their fields in the United States, and they usually enjoy some professional reputation in their field or in the organizations to which they belong. Some technicians in the United States feel that an assignment in a foreign country, or with an international organization, has a "hampering effect on their careers."² The time-consuming American security clearing process has discouraged some people who resigned their jobs in the United States on being offered work with the Mission in Lebanon, but had to take new employment because they could not afford to "endure a period of indecision."³

The lack of trained personnel is felt both at the administrative and middle management levels and causes delay in the implementation of projects and in the time in which the Ministry can accept responsibility for projects.⁴

M.A. Thesis, Department of Public Administration, American University of Beirut, 1956.

1. TCS Monthly Report, July 1952, p. 35.
2. The American Assembly, The Representation of the United States Abroad, (Graduate School of Business, Columbia University, New York, 1948), p. 180.
3. TCS Monthly Report, July 1952, p. 112.
4. As an example; see John E. Osguthorpe,

Another result of the lack of trained personnel is that the work-load of technicians is increased considerably because their attention to detail becomes necessary. The time spent on detail work could be more fruitfully spent.

Recruitment of technicians for USOM/L is often slow to the point that several months, and in one or two cases, more than a year, pass before a technician's replacement arrives in Lebanon. The result is that most replacements do not arrive in Lebanon in time for a brief orientation period by their predecessor. This is particularly important, because such orientation would save the newcomer many months of study and acquaint him with the "feel" of the project he is assigned to, and with the personal knowledge of the problems which had been encountered by the outgoing technician in his work, personal

"Report on Agronomy Project for 1955"
Annual Report Agricultural Division,
op.cit., p. 7: "The lack of trained personnel is perhaps the weakest point in the whole agronomic program. Men with the qualifications and limited training of the present ... agents ... are not sufficiently trained to plan and coordinate a research program by themselves. However, they can carry out the field work ... once the details and working plans have been laid out." See also H. Lasater and F. Delzell
"Report on the Extension Project 1955", op.cit.
p. 5: One of the chief problems encountered is the lack of GOL personnel trained for administrative and supervisory positions. Leaders are lacking in vision

contacts with Government employees and counterparts,¹ and similar aspects of work in Lebanon. For instance, a position of entomologist was approved for service in December 1952, but a technician did not fill the post until July 1954. In Horticulture, the delay in replacement was 16 months, in cooperatives and credit, 13² months.

Turnover and Transfers

After spending some time as Government of Lebanon counterparts, and working with USOM/L technicians in the implementation of projects and learning from the technicians, some employees leave government service to go into private employment, to which they are attracted by greater pay, more chances of promotion, and to a lesser extent, a certain recognition. The result of such transfers is that the training of these counterparts is completely lost to the Government, and the Technician has to train a new counterpart, with resulting delay in the progress of the joint project.

of the benefits to be derived from such a service."

1. Agricultural Division, USOM/L, Annual Report, USOM/L, Beirut, 1955), "Report of Chief Agriculturist", p. 17.
2. Ibid.

Without exception, no project now has the same counterpart it had at its beginning. There is a frequent change in counterparts who are reassigned to other divisions of the Ministry of Agriculture, and there is a similar loss to the project and delay until a new counterpart is assigned. Quite often, a long period passes without a counterpart to work with the technician. This problem is particularly serious since it delays the transfer of projects to the Government, and since it is avoidable by more careful assignment on the part of the Government.¹ Within this category must be mentioned the problem of counterparts who, in addition to their counterpart duties handle regular government posts,² with the result that progress of a project is delayed and the efficiency of the employee reduced by his workload and his concentration on two jobs.

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1. John E. Osguthorpe, "Report on Agronomy Project for 1955", USOM/L Agricultural Division, Annual Report for 1955, op.cit., says: "It is discouraging to spend valuable time and effort with a counterpart to explain technical assistance procedures and to teach research methods in the field, only to have him transferred to other duties when he is becoming a real help.. to be of maximum value, the counterpart must not only be educated in the field of study to which he is assigned,...but he must also be continuously assigned..." , p. 6.
 2. Boyd A. Ivory, "Report on the Veterinary Project for 1955" Annual Report, 1955, op.cit., estimates that his counterpart devoted only 25% of his time to the Cooperative Veterinary Project, because of his duties as head of the GOL Veterinary Service.

Within the problem of in-service transfers must be mentioned the counterparts who, because they show interest and ability, are sent to the United States for training. This training is no doubt valuable when the trainees return, but since they have to be replaced by other counterparts, the project is delayed until the new counterpart learns enough from the technician assigned to the project, and develops a satisfactory personal relationship with him.

American technicians are entitled to several months home leave after completion of the project concerned. The result is that during the period that the technician is absent, his project "marks time" or advances very slowly.¹

Although most technicians return to Lebanon for a further tour of two years after enjoying home leave, a few do not return, and this has a delaying effect on the progress of the project, partly because of the delay of obtaining the services of a new technician, partly because it takes approximately two years for a technician to become fully acquainted with the problems in his field and to establish the necessary personal relationships with, and earn the confidence of the Ministry of Agriculture personnel

1. USOM/L Monthly Program Summary for May, 1954 (USOM/L, Beirut, 1954), p. 1.

and others with whom he is to work.¹ In recognition of this, some technicians prefer not to take their home leave when it is due, but remain for another tour rather than risk the interruption of project progress.

Remuneration

The low level of salaries paid by the Government of Lebanon does not attract competent employees, even so, Government employees usually need outside work to be able to make both ends meet, and the working hours of the Government make it easy to find supplemental work in the afternoons. For purposes of comparison, the salaries paid by USOM/L to its Lebanese employees are quite high. Whenever the services of a counterpart are needed beyond the usual hours of Government work, it is necessary for the payment of extra salary, and this is usually borne by USOM/L.²

Morale

Lebanese counterparts are often discouraged by the fact that they have no authority despite their project responsibilities, so that they must constantly refer to

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1. Interview on 26th May, 1957.
 2. TCS - Monthly Operations Report, April, 1952, (TCS., Beirut), p. 34, also Interview with Placement Officer on June, 1954.

their superiors in the Ministry of Agriculture. When they do have authority, and the authority is usually of recent origin, they are afraid to take action unless they have something in writing to justify their action.¹ On the other hand, young counterparts seem to sense the opportunity they have of learning from the technicians, and look to increased opportunity as a result of their training. The problem of low morale is also created by the supervision exercised over Ministry employees, engendering a feeling that the Ministry has no confidence in the man.

The morale of American technicians also fluctuates, depending on whether they think of the benefits of their projects, or of the obstacles to implementing those projects. Americans are not accustomed to the slow Middle Eastern way of doing things. Slowness may be caused by administrative difficulties, such as budgeting, allocations, customs clearance, or by certain cultural prejudices. For instance, at one time it was hard to find employees willing to work in certain laboratories because they considered it "dirty", or because employees refused to live in the villages they were supposed to serve.²

A cause of poor morale is the previously-mentioned frequent change of Government counterparts after several

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1. Interview on 23rd May, 1957.
 2. TCS - Monthly Report, April 1952, (TCS., Beirut), p. 4.

months of training and work with the technician. When the counterpart is transferred from a project, the technician feels he has lost valuable time.

Sometimes, decisions of a technical nature are made in Washington reversing the opinion of experts in the field. When this has happened, it has lowered morale. Americans are hurt when their motives are suspected, usually out of ignorance or malice, and the frequent criticism they read in the press also discourages them, because they feel that their efforts are not understood.

Organization and Methods

Organization within the Ministry of Agriculture:

Conception of Functions: The growth of the ministry has been stimulated by technical aid. The Ministry is now in

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1. Clyde McKee, "Report of the Chief Agriculturist for 1955" USOM/L Agricultural Division, Annual Report for 1955, op.cit., two paragraphs of the annual report of the Chief Agriculturist are devoted to this problem, in a protest against the tendency of Washington and USOM/L Headquarters to disregard the technical competence and experience of the Agriculture Staff of USOM/L.
 2. See Ruth Benedict, "Patterns of American Culture" in the series Lectures on American Life, delivered at International House, Columbia University, February 21, 1948, to members of the U.N. Secretariat and Delegations to the United Nations.
 3. Interview on 22nd April, 1957 and 2nd May 1957.

the process of understanding its functions in a technical field rather than acting as an administrative unit for law-enforcement in agriculture.¹ It is a basic concept of the Agriculture Division of USOM/L to aid the understanding and function of the Ministry in technical services, and to set these services up on a permanent basis.²

Centralization: The administrative pattern of Ottoman and French rule has resulted in a highly centralized government administration requiring frequent reference to the top echelons of Government. This over-centralization has been described by all persons interviewed, Lebanese and American, as the most important single problem facing joint project administration in technical aid particularly, and Ministry affairs generally. The result is that centralization delays Ministry and project affairs to a great extent by the reference of even relatively trivial matters to the Director General of the Ministry, who is the nerve center of the centralized system. The span of control of the Director is overextended both by the number

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1. Interview on 23rd April, 1957 and 24th April, 1957.
 2. See USOM/L Monthly Program Summary for April 1954, (USOM/L, Beirut), p. 29, recognizing the absence of organization necessary to assume responsibilities and aiming to develop a sense of responsibility in the following year so that GOL could gradually assume overall direction of projects.

of people reporting to him, and by the large number of matters which require his attention. Centralization also results in setting up a high administrative level for decision making which could well be done on a lower level.¹ The Director General does not have enough authority over all the departments reporting to him, so that there is a conflict between the formal and informal lines of organization.² The downward flow of orders and communications is delayed by the large amount of work assigned to the Director General and by the general procedure of the Ministry.

Authority and Responsibility: Closely related to the principle of centralization is the administrative criterion of whether authority is commensurate with responsibility. In the various Ministries of the Government of Lebanon, the authority of various officers is not commensurate with their responsibility, and this is also true of the counter

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1. As an example, see Clawson Y. Cannon, "Report on Animal Husbandry Phase, Animal Resources Project for 1955" Annual Report Agricultural Division, USOM/L, op.cit., p. 5, under "Special Problems Encountered": "Has the Ministry of Agriculture made sufficient progress in delegating or decentralizing responsibilities and authority... For example, when it has been jointly decided by the Head of the Veterinary Service and the American Livestock Specialist to sell an animal... should it be necessary to obtain the approval of the Director General before the animal can be sold?"
 2. Interviews on 2nd April, 1957, and 1st May, 1957.

parts assigned to American technicians in USOM/L. It is a delaying factor in project administration because under the USOM/L organization, the Technician takes decisions on matters pertaining to implementation of his project, while his counterpart must send the question up for decision to his Section Head, and possibly the Section Head will route it to the Department Head and Director General. The Ministry is aware of the necessity of reducing the level at which decisions can be taken, and has attempted decentralization to some extent but decentralization does not always solve the problem because the officer to whom authority was granted lacks the competence to exercise independent judgment, or because the habit of reference to his superior is so deeply ingrained that he continues to refer matters, even when he is no longer required to do so.¹ Often this is done to seek official sanction for a decision which an officer has already determined to take.²

Staff Function: There is no provision for a staff service within the joint projects for collecting intelligence, and the function is handled by the project team as part of their line duties. The counterpart can obtain intelligence from Ministry Departments, and the technician refers to the

1. Interview on 23rd April, 1957.

2. Ibid.

International Cooperation Administration in Washington, to United States Government Departments and to International Organizations like the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.

Auxiliary Services: Auxiliary services are handled by the Government of USOM/L, depending on the agreement. Project technicians prepare a list of their requirements and submit it to their respective organizations, but do not handle the actual procurement. Procurement is made by the suitable departments of each organization.

Formal Organization of Projects

Determinant of Structure: A unique problem arising from technical cooperation between two sovereign governments is that a dual set of structures, parallel to each other but hierarchically autonomous, **must** administer the joint projects. The Agricultural Division of USOM/L is not part of the Ministry of Agriculture, nor does it have any authority over it, and the Ministry likewise has no authority over the Division. The level at which the two organizations meet consistently is in the field of the separate projects. The two are linked together by the community of interests arising from the projects and from the mutuality of service they render to each other.

Pyramidal Structure: Each of the two organizations is set up on the scalar principle of organization, but in the projects, no such structure of authority exists. The team members working on a project remain responsible to their respective hierarchical systems, with no hierarchy common to the technicians of USOM/L and the Government counterparts. Thus there is no single fountainhead of legal authority.

Leadership: Formally, the leadership or direction of projects is in the hands of the Ministry of Agriculture.¹ However there is no definition of the method by which the Ministry will operate the project, and there is no functional definition of the duties of the counterpart provided by the Ministry. Presumably, the main duty of the counterpart is to receive training preparatory to the time when he can take over the administration of the project, but in the absence of a definition of his administrative duties within the project, the conception of the position of counterpart will vary from individual to individual depending on his personal ambition, initiative and interpretation of his duties. The result of this state of affairs is twofold:

1. Article 9 of any project signed in agriculture between USOM/L and the Ministry of Agriculture states: "The Lebanese Ministry of Agriculture will operate this project in cooperation with USOM/L, which will provide technical assistance. The Ministry... agrees to provide a technician to be trained to assume leadership of the project."

- i) it encourages the growth of informal leadership because a project cannot progress in the absence of leadership, and
- ii) it weakens the principle of accountability, since each member of the team is responsible to his own hierarchy. Within the project there is no sanctioning authority to demand an accounting of the implementation of the project.

Lack of Long Range Planning: Like many other countries of the Middle East, Lebanon's administration is weak on long range planning, with the result that project administration is left to the plan drawn up through the informal structure of organization in the projects, as envisioned by the technicians and their counterparts.¹ In turn, lack of long range planning causes implementation to lack a uniform pace.

Reporting: Although the General Agreement specifically requires Lebanon to submit annual reports, and despite repeated requests on the part of USOM/L for reports, Lebanon

1. Interview on 29th April, 1957. See also "Special Economic Aid" in Annual Report, 1955, op.cit. p. 10: "This work (establishment of a definite program for handling equipment) should have been done months earlier - but "Ma'lish, that can be done when the machinery arrives". Of course, the technician could have prepared the operational program but it is far easier but much slower to gain Lebanese support for an operational program which they themselves have developed." See Rashid Elbraway, "Some Problems of Economic Planning in the Middle East, With Special Reference to Egypt", Middle East Economic Papers, 1954, (Economic Research Institute, American University of Beirut, Dar al Kitab), p. 28 and the following for a general discussion of the problem of long range planning.

has not issued one single report on the operations of its activities in joint technical assistance projects with the United States.¹ The effect of the two problems of reporting and lack of planning is that there is no criteria by which to measure progress. In the absence of adequate evaluation of operations, a false sense of achievement is engendered.

Informal Organization

The Role of the Leader: The role of a leader has² been defined as "uniting people in pursuit of a goal". The formal leadership of projects is entrusted to the Ministry of Agriculture, and through it, to the officers to whom it delegates authority. In practice, counterparts, who represent the Ministry, cannot supply the leadership because of their inexperience, lack of training, lack of authority or lack of initiative. In the absence of effective leadership from the formal organization, it devolves, informally, on the American technician, who is formally an adviser to the project. The measure to which informal leadership is in the hands of the technician depends on his personality, his academic and professional status, his initiative, experience, and the inter-personal relations he

1. Interview on 22nd April, 1957.

2. H.A. Simon, D.W. Smithburg and V.A. Thompson, Public Administration, (Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1950), p. 103.

maintains with other members of the project team. His leadership becomes founded on an authority of confidence rather than on authority of legitimacy.

The full understanding and correct use of the informal leadership of American technicians is the most important single factor in the success of projects from the point of American contribution. ¹ USOM/L and the Government do not wish technicians to be invested with any formal authority over Ministry personnel, projects or property, hence the qualities of personality, patience, tact and a sympathetic understanding of Lebanon's problems are essential factors which combine with the technical skill of the technician to provide effective leadership. The technician cannot order, he must guide, suggest, urge and warn.

Unity of Command: Within a project, the technician and the counterpart receive instructions only from their formal superiors. In practice, however, the counterpart is urged and guided by the technician, and this influence carries a weight depending on the authority of confidence which the counterpart enjoys, so that for all practical purposes, the technician's guidance attains the importance of command. This duality of the sources of authority violates the principle of unity of command.

1. Interview on 23rd of April 1957, and 24th April, 1957.

Familiarization Time: As mentioned earlier, it takes approximately two years for a technician to become fully acquainted with all the problems related to his project and to establish, with his team mates, the inter-personal relation described above.¹ This excessive time requirement can be attributed to various technical problems, language difficulties, adaptation of U.S. methods to Lebanon and obtaining an understanding of the way of thinking in Lebanon. The time required could be reduced substantially if new technicians could be well briefed on Lebanon's administrative history, its special problems as a nation, and the major points of the project to which the technician is assigned. Because there is a time lag between the arrival of a technician and his maximum efficiency, there is delay in the technician's obtaining the authority of confidence from his counterparts, and in his purposefully implementing the project.

Effect of Informal Organization: On the whole, the aims of informal organization and influence coincide with the aims formally set up in the project agreements. The informal influence is valuable in bridging the difficulties which, if left to formal organization, could not be spanned.

1. Interviews on 26th April, 1957, 1st of May and 10th of May, 1957.

Through informal organization project leadership develops, plans for future action are formulated and attitudes changed. Only one case of serious conflict between formal and informal lines was observed.¹

Political Influence and Interference: Political influence on joint project administration is felt at many levels. On the general policy level, a given minister who may be favourable or unfavourable to the idea of Technical Assistance can have a marked effect. For instance, all 12 agriculture projects were signed with the "behind the scenes impetus" of the then Foreign Minister and Minister of National Economy.² The President of the Republic "took quick and decisive action in favour of Point Four" at a time when a segment of the country was militantly against it.³ On the other hand, a pro-French Foreign Minister, appears to have caused difficulties for the Technical Aid Mission because his resignation "brought about a decided improvement in the political atmosphere" as sensed by the Point IV Mission.⁴

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1. Interview of 21st April, 1955.
 2. TCS Monthly Program Summary, February 1953, TCS, Beirut. p. 23.
 3. Ibid., January 1953, p. 1.
 4. Ibid. February 1953, p. 11.

At a lower, operational level, Ministers sometimes try to interfere in projects that were well under way before their joining the Cabinet.¹ Such attempts are dealt with by the Country Director's Office, the Division Chief or the Director General, depending on the nature of the interference.

At the lowest level, politicians use their position for personal gain, patronage and as an election issue when others are lacking. Thus, politicians try to influence the appointment of people by the Ministry, or use positions of authority to have Technical Aid projects improve their land. They may also accuse the U.S. of colonialism, even though these same politicians welcomed technical aid when they were in power.²

Coordination and Communication at Various Levels

Processive Coordination: Policy matters requiring Cabinet action are coordinated through the Country Director's Office of USOM/L and, if necessary, through the Liaison Committee or through the Liaison Officer. Since most policy matters

1. Interview on 7th May, 1957.

2. Abdulla Yafi and Saeb Salam, see L'Orient of 1st April, 1957, p. 1.

were ironed out in the first years of operation of technical aid, it is seldom necessary to use this level to coordinate activities of the Agriculture Division of USOM/L and the Ministry of Agriculture. Usually these matters are handled in the frequent and regular conferences of the Director General and the Division Chief, and if necessary, by a technician and his counterpart when the subject under discussion warrants it.¹

The Director General and the Division Chief each coordinate the interior work of their respective organizations. Thus each of them is a mediator of his own domain, but they have to act jointly in matters affecting their joint interests.

Informally, a certain amount of coordination is done at the technician-counterpart level. To formalize the coordination reached at this point, it is necessary to communicate through the established hierarchies of the two organizations.

Within the Government of Lebanon, there is not enough coordination between Ministries and Departments. Often a Ministry is ready to act but is delayed by a lack of coordination with another Ministry or Department.

Effective Coordination:

The coordination process sometimes breaks down, usually in two areas:

1. Interview on 2nd April 1957.

a- Budgetary lack of coordination, which has been discussed in the Section on Fiscal Management above, or b- in the relationship between the Ministry and the Division on one hand and the Customs Department on the other. There is also a lack of coordination in certain areas between USOM/L and Washington.

The majority of Project Technicians report (that) long delay in obtaining essential supplies out of customs is one of the chief obstacles to progress. In fact, this lack of cooperation in processing Point IV acquired supplies through customs has far reaching effects, even to postponing seasonal technical activities for one year. 1

Although the situation has improved since the above report was made customs delay is still a factor to be reckoned with.

As an example of delay caused by the lack of effective cooperation between the Customs Department and the Ministry-USOM/L, an irrigation pump arrived in Beirut but did not obtain immediate customs clearance, causing "a loss of a whole year's work at the Terbol Station, and resulting in loss of irreplaceable feed for livestock"². In another case an electric generator had already been installed in a farm Machinery Project, but the electric panel was delayed in customs, effectively delaying the use of the generator.³

1. USOM/L Monthly Program Summary for May, 1954, (USOM/L, Beirut), p. 2.

2. Ibid., pp.3-4. Underlining in original text.

3. Ibid., p. 8.

Lack of coordination in a few instances between USOM/L and ICA, Washington are also serious. The problem of personnel recruitment delay has been mentioned already. At times, there are delays in procurement: Washington held up bids for heavy tractors and machines needed under the Special Economic Assistance to Lebanon. A full year of operation with this equipment was lost because of this delay, and resulted in criticism of USOM/L.¹

Sometimes, there is a lack of coordination in the procurement done by ICA, Washington in its own administration. In some cases, tractors arrived before the attachments with which they were to be used, and sometimes the attachments arrived before the tractors.² Often the procurement delay is one year from the time goods are requested from Washington and the date of their arrival in Beirut.³

Communication

Formally, communication between the Ministry and the Division is done in writing, with all correspondence registered and numbered at the Liaison Office set up jointly in the Division's office space. A technician wishing to make a

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1. Earle K. Rambo, "Report on Farm Machinery Project for 1955" Agricultural Division Annual Report for 1955, op.cit., p. 4.
 2. USOM/L, "Report on Special Economic Assistance" Annual Report, op.cit., p. 10.
 3. Richard E. Kiely, "Report on Agricultural Credit and Cooperatives Project for 1955" Annual Report, op.cit., p. 7: "Under present regulations and procedures...approximately one year passes

formal communication to his counterpart brings the matter to the attention of his Division Chief who then writes to the Director General. This procedure canalizes communication through the Liaison Office and through the top coordinating personnel on both sides, and it serves to avoid the conflict which could arise if technicians wrote directly to their counterparts about a project which was not progressing to the satisfaction of the technician. Thus the personal relationship of technician and counterpart remains smooth and pleasant. Complaints must be channeled through the hierarchy of each organization.¹ Informally, oral communication takes place at the technician-counterpart level to speed the formal communication system.

The flow of upward communication within the Ministry tends to be slow due to the fact that each hierarchical superior keeps the communication for some time. This discourages counterparts and delays project implementation. At times, the upward flow is used by superiors to take credit away from a junior in claiming an idea presented by the junior as their own.

Political and Related Attitudes

The most widespread misunderstanding of Technical Aid is that it is especially designed to supply Lebanon with

from the time (orders) are submitted...
and the time the goods are received
ready for use.

1. Interview on 23rd April 1957.

the equipment needed for her development. This concept stems from a complex that "we are as good as the next man" and that all that is required is money because technical knowledge is available in the country.¹ Some people believe that the real purpose of Technical Aid is to obtain commercial and political or military advantages.² For that reason they distrust it.

The political and commercial distrust of USOM/L has died down in recent times to a large degree, but a wide spread criticism often levelled at Technical Aid is that it does not accomplish tangible results soon enough. Those who formulate such criticism forget the essential fact of Technical aid, which is that it is primarily a teaching or demonstration program, and not a program of economic aid along the lines of the European Recovery Program popularly known as Marshall aid. These critics apparently overlook the fact that results depend on 1- the speed with which technical knowledge is assimilated by the host country, and 2- the extent to which the host country can apply.

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1. Interviews on 12th July, 1954, 1st of May, 1957 and 10th May, 1957. The last interviewee stressed, however, that the attitude changes as the work of the Mission becomes better known.
 2. Interview on 12th July, 1954: "Il y a une arrière pensée - de s'introduire sur le marché pour placer le sur plus de son industrie." See also TCS, Monthly Operations Report (January 1953, TCS, Beirut). p.1.

the newly-acquired knowledge to its problems. The direct benefit from a project may be quite insignificant, but the adoption of the methods demonstrated can have widespread effects - e.g. the spraying of one orange grove resulting in improved production by that one grove, may cause spraying methods to be adopted by several other growers.

Political influence delays the work of the projects. Some people try to "steal the show" from USOM/L-GOL projects and to discredit the United States. On a personal basis, many of the senior Government officials who are "pro-French" are thought to use legal obstructionism to hamper project administration while fostering French Technical Aid.¹

Less serious to the actual administration of projects, but serious in its possible public opinion strength is the leftist accusation often touted by TELEGRAPH newspaper and others that the Mission is "a state within a state", infringing national sovereignty and aimed at the domination of Lebanon.²

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1. TCS, Monthly Operations Report, (January 1953) Op.cit. p. 1-2 and Monthly Operations Report, (June 1953) p. 5. This attitude is particularly marked in the Education Division projects.
 2. TCS, Monthly Operations Report, (July, 1953) p. 17.

Many technicians feel that the Ministry is not really interested in the projects they are assigned to; partly because the Ministry does not understand the full significance of the project, partly because of administrative inertia. Either way, this attitude causes delay and much discouragement to technicians.¹

Within the Ministry of Agriculture, there is a tendency to regard technical cooperation projects as something apart from the Ministry's responsibilities, and this attitude results in poor coordination between the Ministry's regular activities and the technical assistance projects. To bring about a more effective integration of projects into the whole Ministry, technicians keep reminding the Government officials concerned that "this is your project and your country" or "this is your experimental station", thus using their informal leadership to strengthen the formal authority and urging it to accept more responsibility.²

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1. Jean C. Miller, "Report on Horticulture Project for 1955" Annual Report 1955, op. cit. p. 3 speaks of "increasing interest on the part of the Ministry", John E. Osguthorpe, "Report on the Agronomy Project for 1955" Annual Report 1955, op.cit., p. 2: To-date, the Ministry... has not given really concrete and conclusive evidence of their readiness to accept the responsibility of leadership of the Agronomy project".
 2. Interviews on 26th April 1957 and 2nd May, 1957.

The language problem also hampers the contact of technicians with the population they meet in the field-¹ work of their projects. This problem of language is quite significant because Ministries whose Directors' General² speak English cooperate with the Mission more readily.

The different backgrounds of technician and counterpart, the difference in their angle of approach to a problem and the value premises of each are factors that must be reconciled to obtain effective administration of projects. The reconciliation and understanding of different customs and outlook require effort on the part of both team members.

Summary and Conclusion

The administrative problems found in joint project administration stem, in part, from the unique position which such projects occupy, since they are joint efforts of agencies of separate sovereign powers, and in part from the organizational structure of the two agencies. Administrative timing is always a problem for one government. The problem of timing becomes even greater when two governments are involved, particularly if their administrative customs

1. H.L. Lasater and F.E. Delzell, op.cit.,
p. 5: "...remains one of the major barriers...
no Arabic words for... technical terminology"

2. Interview on 6.7.54.

and procedures are at a variance. In cases like this, it is not at all difficult to imagine that the governments may get completely out of phase with each other, and thus find it impossible to achieve any more than a small degree of success. Perhaps one of the fundamental problems in joint agricultural project administration is to move the Lebanese administrative side a little faster and to slow the Americans a little, so as to have a fairly uniform pace which both can maintain.¹

The problems of the Lebanese Government can be considered typical of a nation that has recently won its independence, and as such, lacks well established channels of rapid and effective implementation. In the urgency of the time we live in, and the impatience with which the imperfections of the past are viewed, the rate of progress in reforming Lebanon's administration seems slow. The Lebanese are aware of the needs of their country, and if progress is slow, it is because a more rapid pace would outstrip the present administrative potential of the country. Progress is permanent and effective only when it stems as an earnest answer to an urgent need. It is to be hoped that in the coming years, Lebanon will have the administrative competence necessary to reap the full profits of its own development projects as well as projects in which it cooperates with other countries.

1. This refers to the overall pace. Obviously, in the previously discussed areas of personnel and procurement, the American pace must be speeded and not delayed.

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APPENDIX 1

GENERAL AGREEMENT

The Government of the United States of America
on the one part, and

The Government of Lebanon on the other,

Desiring to cooperate in the interchange of
technical knowledge and skills with a view to the attain-
ment of higher standards of economic development and
social welfare and the promotion of international under-
standing and goodwill,

Having both accepted resolution No. 304 (IV)
adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on
November 15, 1949, approving the Economic and Social Council
Resolution No. 222 (IX) on technical assistance for
economic development and the guiding principles for
rendering such assistance,

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE 1

The Government of the United States of America and
the Government of Lebanon undertake to cooperate with
each other in the interchange of technical knowledge and
skills and in related technical activities designed to
contribute to the balanced and integrated development of the
economic resources and productive capacities of Lebanon.

ARTICLE 2

The Government of the United States of America agrees
to:

A. - Furnish, to an extent subsequently to the agreed
upon, services of technical experts and pay their salaries
and allowances as well as their transport costs from and to
the United States.

B. - Provide for training in the United States or
elsewhere of Lebanese nominated by the Lebanese Government
under arrangements covering the program of training and the
payment of expenses as may be agreed upon by the two
Governments in individual cases.

C. - Supply, to an extent subsequently to be agreed
upon, equipment and materials necessary to the effectiveness
of the experts' work but purchasable only with United States
dollars.

ARTICLE 3

The Government of Lebanon, in order to bear a fair share of the cost of the program, agrees to:

A. - Provide adequate facilities, office equipment and supplies, secretarial, interpreter-translator and related assistance necessary to the successful implementation of the projects.

B. - Pay costs of land, buildings, improvements, local materials and labor necessary to the effectiveness of the experts' work.

C. - Pay transport, communication costs and such other expenses of American experts within Lebanon as may be agreed upon by the two Governments in particular circumstances.

D. - Assign appropriate technicians and whatever other Lebanese staff is justified by the project, to work with United States technicians.

E. - Pay such costs as may be agreed upon by the two Governments in connection with training provided for in Article 2 (B).

ARTICLE 4

The Government of Lebanon will endeavour to coordinate this program with other related technical cooperation programs in Lebanon. It will further facilitate cooperation in the mutual exchange of technical knowledge and skills with other friendly nations which may have technical cooperation programs similar to that carried on under this agreement.

ARTICLE 5

All employees of the Government of the United States of America assigned to duties in Lebanon under this Agreement and accompanying members of their families shall be exempt from : (1) Income and social security taxes with respect to salaries and emoluments paid to them by the Government of the United States of America and to any non-Lebanese income upon which they are obliged to pay income or social security taxes to the Government of the United States of America.

(2) Customs and import duties on personal household and professional effects and supplies including one personal automobile, on certificate being furnished by such employees, to the effect that these effects and supplies are for the personal use and consumption of such employees and members of their families.

Duty is liable to be paid in respect of any such article imported without payment of duty and sold or disposed of within three years, but there shall be no liability if such articles are reexported within the period. Any material and equipment introduced into Lebanon by the Government of the United States of America pursuant to this Agreement shall be exempt from taxes, customs and import duties.

ARTICLE 6

The Governments of the United States of America and of Lebanon will endeavor to give full publicity to the objectives and progress of the technical cooperation programs carried on under this Agreement. They will make public in their respective countries, not less frequently than once a year, periodic reports on the technical cooperation programs carried on pursuant to this Agreement. Such reports shall include information as to the use of funds, materials, equipment and services. They will mutually exchange information regarding other technical assistance programs which have been or are being requested of other countries or of international organizations by either party to this Agreement.

ARTICLE 7

For carrying out particular projects under this Agreement, subsidiary written arrangements or understandings may be agreed upon by the duly designated representatives of Lebanon and of the Technical Cooperation Administration of the United States of America, or by other persons, agencies or organizations designated by the Government.

ARTICLE 8

1. - This Agreement shall enter into force on the day on which it is duly ratified by the Government of Lebanon. It shall remain in force until three months after either Government shall have given notice in writing to the other of intention to terminate the Agreement.

2. - If, during the life of this Agreement, either Government should consider that there **should** be an amendment thereof, it shall so notify the other Government in writing and the two Governments will thereupon consult with a view to agreeing upon the amendment.

3. - Subsidiary arrangements or understandings which may be agreed upon may remain in force beyond any termination of this Agreement, in accordance with such arrangements as the two Governments may make.

4. - This Agreement is complementary to and does not supercede existing agreements between the two Governments except insofar as other agreements are inconsistent herewith.

Done in Beirut on the twenty ninth day of May 1951 in duplicate in Arabic and English languages, both texts being equally authentic.

For the Government of the
United States of America
sd.
JOHN H. BRUINS

For the Government
of Lebanon
sd.
HUSSEIN OUEINI

APPENDIX 2

TECHNICAL COOPERATION PROJECT AGREEMENT

BETWEEN

THE TECHNICAL COOPERATION SERVICE FOR LEBANON

AND

THE MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE OF LEBANON

ARTICLE I: JOINT PROJECT TITLE AND NUMBER

FORESTRY

Project No. . . .

This is a joint technical cooperation project in the field of forestry and conservation.

ARTICLE II: JOINT PARTICIPATION: Pursuant to the General Agreement for Technical Cooperation under the Point 4 Program between the United States of America and Lebanon signed on the 29th Day of May, 1951 and ratified by an Act of the Parliament of Lebanon on the 13th day of December 1951, and in accordance with Article 7 of this Agreement;

Pursuant to the Technical Cooperation Program Agreement between the United States of America and Lebanon signed on the 26th day of June, 1952 and,

Pursuant to the Act of the Parliament of Lebanon passed on the 21st day of November 1952, which appropriated the Lebanese funds necessary for the execution of this and other Point Four Agricultural Projects,

This project agreement is entered into between the Ministry of Agriculture of Lebanon and the Technical Cooperation Service for Lebanon.

ARTICLE III: JOINT AIMS AND OBJECTIVES:

A. Specific Aims and Objectives

1. To help in the reforestation scheme of Lebanon.
2. To help establish erosion control, watershed, and timber plantings on the non-agricultural lands, using cultural practices to promote growth, and analyzing the results of different methods.
3. To help restore Cedrus Libani at the higher elevations.
4. To encourage the protection of forest areas against damage.

5. To help establish tree windbreaks on the agricultural land.
6. To help train young men in forestry and conservation work.

Note: All funds required for research, equipment and training will be provided by T.C.S., Lebanon.

B. Justification of Project:

The last two World Wars have greatly depleted Lebanon's forest resources. Some 200,000 hectares (500,000 acres) of its forest land need restoration in order to check soil erosion, increase the area of watershed forest, produce more wood for the nation's economy, and help the national tree, the Cedar of Lebanon, regain its former range in the country.

C. Impact on the Economy:

The plantations established, in addition to their secondary benefits, will provide fuelwood from early thinnings; and box wood, building materials, and other forest products from later cuttings, thereby decreasing materially the great amount of wood now imported.

ARTICLE IV: JOINT PLAN OF ACTION:

A. Immediate Plans:

1. To fence and plant the northwest face (in Anti-Lebanon) of the ridge behind the new experimental farm at Terbol, using different species and planting methods to obtain a sound basis for a planting program in the eastern mountains.
2. To plant field windbreak demonstrations on the new Agricultural Experiment Station at Terbol Spring.
3. To assist the Lebanon Ministry of Agriculture expand its present plantings of Cedar of Lebanon at Beharre.

B. Future Plans:

1. To help establish demonstration areas showing the benefits of protection in securing natural regeneration with inexpensive cultural practices.
2. To help establish planting demonstrations on government land near Tyre, at Farraya and Mt. Kniesah on communal lands, and at other places to be selected later.

3. To help in the development of the forest tree nurseries of the Lebanon Ministry of Agriculture, introducing some American methods and equipment which may prove adaptable to local conditions in Lebanon.

C. Planting Demonstrations:

This project will utilize heavy equipment (tractors, bulldozers, angle-dozers, and rippers) which have proved to be useful here in reclaiming abandoned lands and putting them back to work. Preparation of planting sites is a "must" in Lebanon because of the arid conditions and the deterioration of the sites through soil erosion.

Work areas for demonstrations will be selected by the forestry representatives of the two Governments, subject to the approval of the Director-General of the Ministry of Agriculture for Lebanon and the Chief of the Agricultural Staff of the Technical Cooperation Service.

The demarcation of the demonstration areas will be done by engineers of the Lebanon Ministry of Agriculture, since this work must be official. Other engineering work, such as laying out contours for terraces will be done by engineers of either Government.

Different planting methods will be tried in the demonstrations to find out if planting costs can be reduced and still secure satisfactory results. The results of fertilizing tree legumes will be tested. Some exotic dry land species will be tested in the early plantings in the eastern mountains. In the main, however, species will be used which have already been proven suitable for use by the Lebanon Ministry of Agriculture.

Areas which are selected for work will be expanded from year to year until their possibilities are exhausted from a forestry standpoint. "Failed places" in plantations will be reinforced the next planting season unless the situation has proved to be hopeless.

The land to be worked will be either government property or in semiofficial or communal ownership. Work areas will be selected so that some are accessible in winter as well as in summer in order to maintain a year-around program.

D. Protection Demonstrations:

Demonstrations will be established to show the effect of protection in securing natural regeneration. The protected areas will be treated with inexpensive methods of site preparation, such as disking, to determine if any of these are economical aids to the natural regeneration. This will be accomplished by having treated plots and check plots on the same area.

These natural regeneration areas will be selected and handled in the same manner and under the same operational policies as the planting demonstrations.

E. Seeds and Seedlings:

A building containing at least 900 square feet of floor space will be secured, in which collected tree fruits can be assembled and the seed extracted. This building should have available ground immediately adjacent to it for solar drying purposes. Facilities will be provided within this building for the extraction, cleaning, pretreatment, germination testing, and storage of tree seeds. It must have a good water supply.

A small experimental nursery site will be selected on sandy loam soil in which the following phases of nursery management will be carried on in an effort to ascertain if American nursery methods, such as the following, are adaptable in Lebanon:

1. Fertilization of nursery soils.
2. The use of mechanical equipment in the preparation of seed beds and in seedling culture.
3. Chemical weeding of conifers.
4. Mechanical lifting, grading, and packaging of nursery stock.

Note: All funds required for equipment, research, demonstrations, etc., will be provided by T.C.S., Lebanon.

ARTICLE V: ESTIMATED DURATION OF JOINT PROJECT: The proposals made are beginning steps in a project which should be continuing. A continuing project is subject to annual appropriations of funds by both Governments. It is understood, however, that the project agreement may be terminated for any reason when so requested in writing by either party, to take effect one month after the date of such request.

ARTICLE VI: JOINT PROJECT FINANCING: The parties to this agreement shall contribute and make available to the extent provided below funds for use in carrying out the program during the period covered by this agreement in accordance with the following:

The Government of the United States shall contribute during the period ending March 31, 1953 the amount of \$9,500 in U.S. currency; it is anticipated that an additional contribution will be made by the Government of the United States for the remaining period of the U.S. fiscal year, subject to the availability of funds.

The Government of Lebanon shall contribute the amount of LL. 16,000 in Lebanese currency during the Lebanese fiscal year ending December 31, 1953.

<u>Objects of Expenditures</u>	<u>U.S. Dollars</u>	<u>Lebanon L.L.</u>
01 - Personal Service (exclusive of U.S. Technicians) Labor and expenses	\$ 4,450	12,000
02 - Travel (per diem expenses, auto expense and maintenance)	600	
03 - Transportation of things (Equipment, seed, trees, etc.)	300	
04- Communications	---	
05- Rents and Utilities	---	
06- Printing and Reproduction	---	
07- Other contractual Services maintenance of equipment site preparation	400	
08- Supplies and materials; seeds and seedling, fertilizers, fungicides, etc.	500	4,000
09- Equipment (truck, tools, scarafier)	2,850	
10- Lands and Structures	100	
11- Grants, subsidies and contributions	300	
	<u>\$9,500</u>	<u>16,000 L.L.</u>

Any additional funds which either government may contribute for use under this agreement may be provided for in supplementary agreements.

The United States funds herein provided are provided in addition to the costs of United States technicians which are borne solely by the United States. However, any direct United States expenditures or obligations (such as contract fees or equipment procured in the United States for the project, etc.) will be counted against the United States contribution.

The total amounts allocated by each government may be changed as circumstances warrant, but only by amendment to this agreement. Shifts between object classes may be effected by joint decision between the staff chief and his counterpart in the Lebanese Government.

Each party will be responsible for accounting for, and reimbursement of, the funds which it has contributed, in accordance with the fiscal requirements of each government..

ARTICLE VII: PROGRAM EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES (as distinct from personal equipment of the U.S. Technician or equipment and supplies of the U.S. Technical Cooperation Service in Lebanon.)

Program equipment, materials, and supplies purchased with United States funds for the use of the Forestry Project shall remain under the supervision and control of the U.S. project technician until the completion of project when ownership will be transferred to the Ministry of Agriculture. The equipment, materials and supplies will be subject to the following conditions:

- A. Use and disposal of the equipment and supplies will be determined by agreement, in writing, by the appropriate officials of the Lebanese Government and the Technical Cooperation Service in Lebanon.
- B. Equipment and supplies will be carried on the special property account of the Lebanese Government and will also be carried on the records of the cooperative project by the US Technical Cooperation Service in Lebanon.
- C. When not needed in a project, or upon the termination or completion of the project, equipment and supplies may be transferred to other approved cooperative projects, or may be turned over to the Lebanese Ministry of Agriculture without further restriction or American control of their use. Either disposition above shall be only with the agreement, in writing of the appropriate Lebanese and American officials.

- D. Certain types of demonstration equipment and supplies, including livestock, seeds, fertilizers, which are the property of the TCS., Lebanon, may be loaned or given to individuals or to groups of individuals (such as cooperatives) participating in the cooperative projects and may be dropped from the project property records. The determination of such loans or gifts for demonstration purposes, shall be only by agreement, in writing, of the Lebanese and American officials concerned. All equipment and materials on termination of project will become the property of the Ministry of Agriculture of Lebanon.
- E. The appropriate official of the Lebanon Government will submit to the TCS in Lebanon, an annual inventory of equipment, materials and supplies with a statement of disposition of any part of such property made during the year.

ARTICLE VIII: PROJECT INCOME: Any income that may be derived from this project will be used by the Technical Cooperation Service, Lebanon, in agreement with Ministry of Agriculture to advance the cooperative agricultural program.

ARTICLE IX: JOINT PROJECT ADMINISTRATION: The Lebanese Ministry of Agriculture will operate this project in cooperation with the Technical Cooperation Service, Lebanon, which will provide technical assistance. The Ministry of Agriculture, Lebanon, agrees to provide a Lebanese technician to be trained to assume leadership of the project.

ARTICLE X: TRAINING: Personnel training will be a major function of this project. For each member of the technical staff furnished for the project by the United States Government, the Ministry of Agriculture of Lebanon will provide a competent Lebanese Assistant or trainee in order to develop a technical staff in Lebanon which will carry on the forestry phases of the program at the conclusion of the project.

In addition to the specialized assistants and trainees, who will receive technical instruction, other non-technical workers selected by the Ministry of Agriculture will receive training.

In addition to student trainees to be sent to the United States to enroll in forestry colleges to receive academic training, other trainees may be selected for a practical type of training such as working with experienced personnel. All expenses of trainees sent by T.C.S., Lebanon, to U.S. of America for training will be borne by T.C.S., Lebanon.

ARTICLE XI: PROJECT REPORTING:

- A. A monthly progress report will be made by U.S. project technician on problems and accomplishments to TCS and Lebanese Ministry concerned, routed through the Agricultural Staff Chief.
- B. The annual report will detail specifically the various technical activities accomplished. It will cite the problem as it existed and the progress that was made during the year. It will contain documents and exhibits that are necessary to making a report comprehensive and meaningful. It will also contain recommendations on the conduct of the project for the ensuing year - for expansion, contraction or discontinuance. The report will also contain a complete inventory of equipment on hand, as well as a full financial statement and statement of all contributions received for the project, including services, equipment, supplies, property, facilities, etc.
- C. Upon substantial completion of a project, a completion report shall be drawn up and signed by the Minister of Agriculture of Lebanon and the Director of TCS, Lebanon, which shall provide a record of the work done, the objectives attained, the financial contributions made, the problems encountered and solved, and related information.

DONE IN BEIRUT THE _____ DAY OF _____ 195

FOR THE TECHNICAL COOPERATION
SERVICE IN LEBANON

FOR THE MINISTRY OF
AGRICULTURE

DIRECTOR, U.S. TECHNICAL COOPERATION
SERVICE IN LEBANON

MINISTER OF AGRICULTURE

TES:ms
1/5/53.

A. TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE ALLOCATIONS OF
LEBANON AND THE UNITED STATES

	F.Y. 1952		F.Y. 1954		F.Y. 1955		F.Y. 1956		TOTAL	
	G.O.L. Pt.IV	\$	G.O.L. Pt.IV	\$	G.O.L. Pt.IV	\$	G.O.L. Pt.IV	\$	G.O.L. Pt.IV	\$
1. Agricultural Extension	15,625	79,550	7,354	56,500	64,060	10,000	66,500	3,750	153,530	149,800
2. Horticulture	10,940	15,350	3,440	3,500	2,560	9,500	5,660	8,700	22,600	37,050
3. Agronomy	11,250	48,750	14,375	24,500	6,560	2,400	15,000	2,700	47,185	78,350
4. Animal Husbandry	35,815	195,500	27,665	47,000	62,690	16,300	-	-	126,160	258,800
5. Poultry	13,495	57,150	9,375	36,500	22,350	9,700	-	-	45,220	103,350
6. Veterinary	10,940	55,896	53,440	25,000	43,590	9,400	-	-	107,970	90,296
7. Irrigation	10,390	63,500	4,530	8,000	11,880	12,300	11,880	3,200	38,680	87,000
8. Marketing	34,565	85,150	48,905	30,000	55,780	1,000	20,000	3,500	159,250	119,650
9. Administration	5,140	10,250	27,970	34,500	-	-	-	-	33,110	44,750
10. Farm Machinery	15,155	202,050	23,125	50,000	54,310	4,500	45,310	11,000	146,900	267,550
11. Forestry	5,000	25,650	5,155	11,000	38,280	19,000	82,750	-	131,185	55,650
12. Animal Resources	-	-	-	-	-	-	104,620	8,500	104,620	8,500
13. Credit - Cooperatives	15,625	4,264	1,405	30,000	12,500	7,900	3,830	3,000	33,360	45,164
TOTAL	183,940	842,960	226,720	354,500	374,560	102,000	364,550	44,300	1,149,770	1,345,750

B. SPECIAL ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE
AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT OF LEBANON
UNITED STATES ALLOCATIONS

Commercial Fertilizers :	250,000.00
Farm Machinery :	712,000.00
Grain Storage :	1,000,000.00
Control of Plant Pests :	150,000.00
Protection of Animal Farm Power :	188,000.00
Extension Service Equip. & Supplies :	200,000.00
Sub-Total:	2,500,000.00
