

**MUHAMMAD ALI  
AND THE  
BRITISH CONSULS**

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**by**

**KHALIL MICHAEL AYYUB**

**American University of Beirut.  
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## PREFACE

The following pages are intended to give the reader some first hand information on <sup>the</sup> designs of Muhammad Ali Pacha as effected by the general policy of the British Government and the personal attitude held towards him by the British consuls in Egypt and Syria. The choice of the subject was almost dictated by the fact that I am unable to read French, the knowledge of which in modern historical research in the field of modern oriental history, is indispensable.

But if one of the purposes of writing a thesis is to afford the student the training necessary for further research, I feel confident that this work has achieved its purpose.

Khalil Ayyub.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

- I. The Designs of Muhammad Ali.
- II. British Near - Eastern Policy in the  
Period of Muhammad Ali.
- III. Muhammad Ali and the British Consuls.

## THE DESIGNS OF MUHAMMAD ALI

The Turkish forces sent to join the British against the French in Egypt arrived at the Bay of Abu-Kir early in the spring of 1801.<sup>1</sup> With those forces was a young Albanian officer by the name of Muhammad Ali.<sup>2</sup> At the time of the French evacuation Muhammad Ali had obtained the military rank of Sar-cheshme.<sup>3</sup> His manners and courage in the operations against the French and in the events of the two succeeding years gained for him the affection and admiration of the army<sup>4</sup> as well as of the people of Cairo.<sup>5</sup> At this period of time there were too many contending military factions in Egypt to allow anyone exercise real authority. But by 1803 Muhammad Ali had become so popular and influential with his troops<sup>6</sup> that he was able five months later to utilise them in expelling from Cairo his former allies, the Mameluks, and possess himself of the citadel.<sup>7</sup>

With this instrument - the army - Muhammad Ali, according to Missett, "arrogated to himself an absolute authority" disclaiming at the same time any sort of responsibility.<sup>8</sup> Consequently, he liberated Mahomet Pacha (the wali of Medina) from his confinement and caused him to be proclaimed Pacha of Egypt<sup>9</sup> with the expectation of ruling under his name.<sup>10</sup>

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1. Al-Jabarti, *Ajaib-ul-Athar fi at-Tarajim wal-Akhbar*, Egypt, 1322 a.h. v. III p. 162
  2. Wilkinson, Sir Gardner, *Modern Egypt and Thebes*, London 1843, v. II p. 521. Paton A.A., *A History of the Egyptian Revolution*, London 1870, v. II p. 2.
  3. Wilkinson, *op.cit.* p. 521. Al-Jabarti attaches to M. Ali the same rank when he first makes mention of his name. Al-Jabarti *op.*

But Mahomet Pacha was compelled to quit Cairo the moment he was appointed to its government,<sup>11</sup> and the Pacha appointed in his place found his position exceedingly precarious, owing to his inability to appease either the army or the populace.<sup>12</sup> And so, at the persuasion of Muhammad Ali the Ulemas and the Cadi deposed Khourchid Pacha and raised Muhammad Ali to the dignity of that office<sup>13</sup> (May 13, 1805), an action confirmed by the Porte a month later.<sup>14</sup>

That the Pashalic of Egypt was the object of Muhammad Ali's ambition was first revealed by the British and French Consuls. As early as June 1804, Missett observed that "that Albanese chief had...given orders to his banker at Constantinople to spare no expenses in endeavouring to procure for him the dignity of Viceroy."<sup>15</sup> Two months later Missett had his view strengthened by a letter he received from Mr. Petrucci, British agent at Rosetta,<sup>16</sup> and in April 1805 Missett wrote that Muhammad Ali no longer concealed his pretensions to the vice-royalty of Egypt.<sup>17</sup>.....

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- op. cit. V. III p. 240 (events of Jumadah II 5, 1217).
4. Wilkinson op. cit. p. 521-2.
  5. al-Rag'ii, Abdul-Rhman, Tarikh al-Harakah al-Qaumiyyah wa Tatawwur Nisam al-Hukm fi Misr, Cairo 1929, V. II p. 358.
  6. Missett to W. Drummond, Cairo, Sep. 30th, 1803 Douin, Georges, L'Angleterre et l'Egypte - La Politique Mameluke 1803-7, Cairo, 1930 v. II p. 34
  7. Missett to Lord Hobart, Alexandria, March 18th, 1804. Ibid p. 136-7. 8. Missett to Lord Hobart, Alexandria, April 26th 1804, Ibid. p. 153
  9. Missett to Lord Hobart, Alexandria, March 29th, 1804, Ibid; p. 145
  10. Missett to Lord Hobart, Alexandria, May 28, 1804, Ibid. p. 159
  11. Missett to Lord Hobart, Alexandria, March 29, 1804, Ibid; p. 145
  12. Wilkinson op. cit. p. 519.
  13. Missett to Earl Camden, Alexandria, May 28th, 1805. Douin op. cit. V. II p. 228.
  14. Missett to Camden, Alex. July 23rd, 1805. Ibid. 234.
  15. Missett to Lord Hobart, Alex. June 16, 1804, Ibid. p. 147.
  16. Missett to Lord Hobart, Alex. August 10, 1804, Ibid. p. 177-8.
  17. Missett to Lord Camden, Rosetta, April 28, 1805, Ibid. p. 221.

The French Consul, Drovetti, however, had recognized the designs of Muhammad Ali apparently in 1805. In a report which he despatched to Paris he wrote, "the measures of the enterprising Albanian leader make me think he hopes to become the Pasha of Cairo without fighting and without incurring the displeasure of the Sultan...."<sup>18</sup>

But by 1805 Missett had observed that Muhammad Ali was not aiming only at ruling in Egypt, but what was more, at rendering himself independent of the Porte.<sup>19</sup> Later events, however, were only to confirm Missett's views.

In November 1806, Muhammad Ali was reconfirmed in the government of Egypt, and no sooner had the British evacuated Egypt in 1807, than he set work to establish himself permanently in his Pashalic. The first thing he did was to lay hands on Alexandria which city was under the independent command of its commandant.<sup>20</sup> Secondly, in 1808, taking advantage of ancient tradition in the Nile Valley going back to pre-Islamic times, and relying upon the Hanafi view of land-holding, Muhammad Ali reasserted the claim of the Sultan to be the sole proprietor of all land. As the Sultan was weak and ineffective this measure of the Pacha made him the real controller of all land in Egypt.<sup>21</sup> And finally, in 1811 he managed to get rid of his rivals in power, the Mameluks.

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18. Douin, Mohamed Ali Pacha du Cairo, p. 35. Cf. Dodwell, H., The Founder of Modern Egypt, Cambridge 1931, p. 20.

19. Missett to Lord Camden, Alexandria, September 18th, 1805. Douin op.cit. V. II p. 242.

20. Missett to Earl Camden, Alexandria, October 20th, 1805. Ibid. p. 248.

21. This was given by Prof. Rustom. See also the Arabic version of Clot Bey, Aperen General Sur l'Egypte, Paris, 1840, translated by Muhammad Masud V. II p. 284

The chief factors which permitted Muhammad Ali attain his object so far were the chaotic situation in Egypt, the ineffectiveness of the Ottoman central government, and, to be discussed later, Anglo-French rivalry in Egypt. The instruments of policy Muhammad Ali employed in dealing with each of these factors differed accordingly. To win the Egyptians over to his side he made them look at him as the defender of their rights and the only person capable of establishing order and security in the country. In his dealings with the central government he depended first on his military force, on his presents to the members of the Divan, and by posing as the defender of Islam. And lastly, with regard to the French and the English he accelerated their dissensions by playing them off one against the other. Now that Muhammad Ali became well established in Egypt, his ambition for independence became accordingly more firmly rooted in him. And as later events showed, he continued to attach still greater importance to those instruments of policy I have alluded to.

In 1810 and 1812 he offered alliance to both the French and the British respectively if only either of them would recognize him as ruler of Cairo. But both rejected his offer.<sup>22</sup> Failing thus to attain his object through foreign assistance he resorted to his other two instruments of policy to which the Wahabi affair lended itself beautifully.

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22. Driault, *l'Empire de Mohamed Ali (1814-23)*, p. 93; Kissett, June 20, 1812. Cf. Dodwell *op.cit.* p. 39



Although the Hijaz campaign seemed to have been intended by the Porte to weaken the power of Muhammad Ali, as the commissioning of "one rebel to act against another, is a practice that has long maintained its ground at the Porte",<sup>23</sup> yet Muhammad Ali, as I have already <sup>observed</sup> saw in it an opportunity for the advancement of his views in Egypt and for the enhancement of his prestige and influence this time not only in Egypt, but in the Ottoman and Moslem world as well. From the very beginning that campaign provided him with pretexts that would confirm my view. Writing to his agent at Constantinople in 1810, Muhammad Ali desired him to approach the Porte for the purpose of granting Egypt a privileged status all through the duration of war in Hijaz.<sup>24</sup> Again, Suleyman Pasha, the wali of Saïda, was communicating with the Mamluks, and therefore, for the good of the Hijaz Campaign his removal from office was necessary.<sup>25</sup> Still more, the ex-wali of Damascus who had sought refuge with Muhammad Ali, and who the Porte wished to have ~~him~~ beheaded,<sup>26</sup> was of vital importance for the success of the expedition;<sup>27</sup> consequently, not only was he to be pardoned but to be reinstated in his previous pashalic.<sup>28</sup>

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23. A. Straton to Lord Hawkesbury, Pera, March 24, 1804.  
Doubin op.cit. p. 140

24. Muhammad Ali Pasha to Muhammad Nejib effendi, Shawwal 27, 1225. Rustum, A.J., A Calendar of State papers from the Royal Archives of Egypt relating to the Affairs in Syria, Beirut, 1940. No. 8

25. Muhammad Ali Pasha to the Sublime Porte, Shaban 25, 1225.  
ROSPRAE op.cit. No. 2. See also Ibid. Nos. 4, 6, 7, 14, 23.

26. Ahmed Shakir Pasha to Muhammad Ali Pasha, Ramadan 12, 1225.  
Ibid. No. 5

27. Muhammad Ali Pasha to the Sublime Porte, Safar 29, 1225.  
Ibid. No. 15

28. Muhammad Ali Pasha to Agha Dar-us-Sa'adah, Abd bk. 1, Dec. 31, Muharrem 1, 1227. Ibid. No. 19. See also Ibid Nos. 2, 4.

The Porte, actually unwilling to comply with Muhammad Ali's desires but at the same time anxious to have him sent to Arabia, had to appease him in one way or another. Kinj Pasha, therefore, was pardoned and promised the province of Gedda,<sup>29</sup> and Suleyman Pasha was ordered to help in provisioning the expedition.<sup>30</sup>

But for the achievement of one's plan two things are necessary: moral prestige and material strength. The Hijaz expedition provided Muhammad Ali with the first but not with the second. As such the Pasha, if he wished to achieve his object, had to turn his face somewhere else. Very soon, however, he found<sup>a</sup> prey in the land of the Upper Nile.

The expedition to the Sudan lasted two years (1820-2). It was less costly and its issue was less significant than the Hijaz expedition. The timber which Muhammad Ali was after could not be easily transported,<sup>31</sup> the gold mines were never found,<sup>32</sup> and the Sudanese slaves proved to be valueless for military service.<sup>33</sup> And so the only real thing the expedition achieved was the extension of Muhammad Ali's dominions.

In the course of the Sudan expedition, however, Muhammad<sup>AL</sup> started on a huge program of military preparations. Agents were sent to Europe to purchase raw materials as well as manufactured articles of war.<sup>34</sup> Others were sent to Syria and Asia Minor to obtain timber required for ship building.<sup>35</sup>

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29. Muhammad Ali Pasha to the Sublime Porte, Safar 29, 1226.  
Ibid. No. 15

30. Ahmed Khourchid Pasha to Muhammad Ali Pasha Bahr Barr, case No. 3 doc. 96, Shaban 14, 1229. Ibid. No. 29

31. Rustam, Royal Archives of Egypt and the Origins of the Syrian Expedition to Syria, Beirut, 1936, p. 64

32. Dodwell op. cit. p. 51

Military instructors were picked up.<sup>36</sup> And soldiers were very carefully recruited from among the Egyptian farmers.<sup>37</sup> As to where those military preparations were intended originally to be employed, I do not know as yet. At any rate they were actually employed in Greece.

In 1821 Muhammad Ali received from the Grand Vizier the news of a Greek rising in the Morea accompanied with an appeal for help.<sup>38</sup> At that time Muhammad Ali was engaged in his Sudanese expedition. Could he, therefore, undertake a simultaneous expedition to the Morea? Supposing that he could, what would that expedition bring him? More fame and prestige?<sup>39</sup> Perhaps, but the Hijaz expedition may have taught him that these things alone would be insufficient. And so, it was only after Muhammad Ali concluded his Sudan expedition and promised the island of Crete that he acceded to the Sultan's desire of suppressing revolution in that island.<sup>40</sup> And similarly it was probably after his son was promised the Morea itself,<sup>41</sup> that Muhammad Ali consented to despatch an expedition thither.

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33. Rustum, at supra, p.68

34. Muhammad Raouf Pasha to Muhammad Ali Pasha, Bahr Barr, case No.4, doc.139, Zul-Qidah 9, 1232. ROSPRAE op.cit.No.56  
See also ibidem nos.72, 81.

35. Muhammad Ali Pasha to the governor of Ioh Il, Rajab 29, 1236. Ibid.No.77

36. Muhammad Ali Pasha to Ibrahim Pasha, Zul-Qidah 27, 1238. Ibid.No.124

37. To Ibrahim Pasha, Rajab 6, 1237. Ibid.No.88

38. Salih Pasha to Muhammad Ali Pasha, Rajab 12, 1236. Ibid.No.74

39. Dodwell believes that Muhammad Ali thought the conquest of the infidel would raise his name as the conquest of the heretic did. Dodwell, op.cit.p.71

40. Dodwell op.cit. p.70

41. Muhammad Pasha to Muhammad Ali Pasha, Shaban 2, 1239. ROSPRAE No.147

But the expedition to the Morea proved to be more fatal to Muhammad Ali's designs than any of his previous expeditions. His fleet was completely destroyed and the province he cherished of acquiring was not only lost to him but to the Empire at large. Muhammad Ali attributed the disaster that befell him to his enemy, Khosrew Pacha, who was by this time all influential with the Sultan. And so, in his distress, Muhammad Ali wrote to his agent at Constantinople "let them (the Turkish authorities) expect no service hence-forward from us. Let them leave us to our own affairs."<sup>42</sup>

But the troubles of the Sultan had by no means come to an end. On refusing to comply with the Power's demands respecting Greece, war broke out with Russia. As usual the Sultan appealed to Muhammad Ali for help.<sup>43</sup> But the latter had probably gone through enough experience to know how to deal with the Porte in such cases. And so, with his usual declarations of submission he showed his readiness to obey orders and send the required military force, provided it would be sent by the land-route through Syria.<sup>44</sup> This provision, however, was only to increase suspicion on the part of the Porte of Muhammad Ali's aggressive designs on Syria.<sup>45</sup> And so the military <sup>aid</sup> of Muhammad Ali against the Russians was never realized.

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42. Muhammad Ali Pacha to Sheikh effendi Zul-Hijjah 9, 1243.  
Ibid.No.250

43. Ahmed Khulusi Pacha to Muhammad Ali Pacha, Rabi I 18, 1244.  
Ibid.No.257

44. Muhammad Ali Pacha to Qabu-Katchuda, Jumadah II 1, 1244.  
Ibid.No.263

45. Ahmed Khulusi Pacha to Abdullah Pacha, Rajab 2, 1244.  
Ibid.No.264

Now let us proceed to discuss the designs of Muhammad Ali as revealed by the greatest undertaking of his life, namely the Syrian expedition.

Muhammad Ali had cast an eye on Syria ever since 1810. In that year it was understood from one of Muhammad Ali's conversations that he desired his son Fousson Pacha to be nominated to the pachalic of Acre.<sup>46</sup> In 1811 he expressed his intention more openly to M. Drovetti of acquiring Syria at the payment of seven or eight million piastres to the Sultan's treasury.<sup>47</sup> In the same year it was actually rumoured that the military forces recruited for the Hidjaz affair were intended for a Syrian expedition.<sup>48</sup> And in the course of the following three years Muhammad Ali seemed to have approached the Porte on the subject,<sup>49</sup> apparently without success.

But if Muhammad Ali was determined on the annexation of Syria at the same time that the Porte would not consent to such a thing, the only way open to him in order to achieve his object, would be to resort to force. But for the next five years Muhammad Ali was too busy in the Hidjaz to attempt the annexation of Syria by force. Further still, he had not as yet developed an adequate military force to execute such a plan.

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46. Driault, Ed., Mohamed Aly et Napoleon, Le Caire, 1925, pp;91-2  
Cf. Abu-Issiddin, Suleyman, Ibrahim Pacha fi Sariyya, Beirut, 1929, p. 35.

47. Driault, ut supra pp. 119, 120. Ibid.

48. Muhammad Ali Pacha to the Sultan, 1226 ROSPRAE no. 18.

49. Muhammad Ali Pacha, Safar 15, 1230, Ibid. No. 39.

Therefore, soon after the war in Hijaz came to an end he started on his military preparations to which I have alluded, and to which the expedition to Sudan was partially undertaken. But the appeal of the Sultan to Muhammad Ali for help in the Morea and the promise to grant Ibrahim Pacha that pachalic, had apparently delayed Muhammad Ali's Syrian project. However, as soon as that expedition entered upon its final stage, and the loss of the Morea became manifest, Muhammad Ali, through his agents at Constantinople, endeavoured once more to secure the possession of Syria, probably with the idea that his services in the Morea entitled him to such a request. But it was of no avail.

The failure of the Morea expedition and the refusal of the Porte to grant Syria to Muhammad Ali in 1827<sup>50</sup> seemed to have marked a final breach between Muhammad Ali and the Porte. Recalling his troops from the Morea by a private negotiation with Admiral Codrington,<sup>51</sup> and evading the Sultan's orders of help in the war with Russia, Muhammad Ali started on an extensive program of military preparations to which his previous similar programs could not be compared. The complaint of Muhammad Ali that Abdullah Pacha of Acre gave refuge to some Egyptian deserters and that he sequestered some goods belonging to Egyptian merchants were only pretexts for the invasion of

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50. Muhammad Nejjib Effendi to Muhammad Ali Pacha, Jumadah 27, 1243. Ibid. No. 239.

51. Muhammad Nejjib Effendi to Muhammad Ali Pacha, Rabi I 15, 1244. Ibid. No. 259.

Syria. In the first place, Muhammad Ali expressed his determination on war before he made mention of the above incident.<sup>52</sup> Secondly, the Emir Bechir, while the siege of Acre was still going on conceived that Muhammad Ali was fighting Sultan Mahmud<sup>53</sup> (and implicitly not Abdullah Pacha). Thirdly, Muhammad Ali himself, very shortly after the fall of Acre, assured Mr. Briggs - a British merchant and Consul in Egypt - that Syria was his (Muhammad Ali's) destiny; that he had requested those concerned to confer that country upon him before and after the fall of Acre; now that Acre had fallen, whether those authorities would or would not comply with his request, he would take possession of the said territories.<sup>54</sup> And finally the implication of Ibrahim's Pacha's statement to Sami Bey "had not all the firmans issued stated that war would end in Aleppo"<sup>55</sup>, confirms still more the view I have been trying to ascertain, that the case of Abdullah Pacha was only a pretext for the conquest of the whole of Syria.<sup>56</sup>

The Porte, however, was fully apprehensive and aware of Muhammad Ali's intention of annexing Syria by force. In 1826 a high authority at Constantinople said that Muhammad Ali, in the course of time, would demand Syria at the threat of arms.<sup>57</sup> On the eve of the campaign the Grand Visier, Ahmed Khulusi Pacha, had expressed his apprehensions to Muhammad Ali himself, that

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52. Muhammad Ali Pacha to Ibrahim Agha, Zul-Hidjjah 7, 1246. Ibid. 307

53. Hanna Bahri to the Bash-Muawin, Ramadan 27, 1247. Ibid. 596.

54. Muhammad Ali Pacha to Mr. Briggs. Muharram 5, 1248. Ibid. 1084

55. Ibrahim Pacha to Sami Bey, Rabi II 3, 1248. Ibid. 1682

56. Compare this with what Prof. Rustom writes on the case of Abdullah Pacha. Rustom, Origins of the Egyptian Exp. to Syria pp. 17-22

57. (Muhammad Hejib effendi) to Muhammad Ali Pacha, Jumadah 7, 1248 ROSTRAN no. 213.

the forces recruited by the latter, apparently to help in suppressing the rebellion of Mustafa Pacha the Soudrian, were really intended to be employed against the Pacha of Acre.<sup>58</sup> But in another letter of the same Grand Vizier, the case of Acre was only a pretext and stronger designs were attributed to Muhammad Ali. To the Grand Vizier Syria had been the aspiration of Muhammad Ali, and the latter's desire of acquiring it was strongly reflected by his energetic military preparations.<sup>59</sup>

Although such was the official idea concerning Muhammad Ali's designs, the Porte had tried to minimize the dispute with Abdullah Pacha, and had offered to intermeditate between the two Pachas. But in view of the failure of this attempt and in view of Muhammad Ali exceeding the limits of his pretended disciplinary measures against Abdullah Pacha, the Porte could not but recourse to war. That war, however, proved only the ineffectiveness of the Sultan's troops. And so, by the summer of 1832 all of Syria fell into Muhammad Ali's hands.

Now that Syria passed into the hands of Muhammad Ali, what were the motives that made the great Pacha so insistent and so determined on the annexation of Syria? Muhammad Ali gave three official reasons why Syria should be annexed to Egypt. In the first place, owing to its proximity to Egypt, Syria was essential for its safety.<sup>60</sup> Secondly, the possession of Syria was necessary to safeguard pilgrimage to Mecca. And thirdly,

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58. Ahmed Khulusi Pacha to Muhammad Ali Pacha, 1247. Ibid. No. 312

59. Ahmed Khulusi Pacha to the Wali of Damascus Rabi I 3, 1247  
Ibid. No. 317.

60. Muhammad Ali Pacha to Muhammad Nejjib effendi, Muharram 2,  
1248. Ibid. No. 1060.



for the development and reconstruction of the country.<sup>61</sup>

All this may be very well, but why should Muhammad Ali annex Syria in order to protect Egypt, safeguard pilgrimage, and reconstruct the country? Here the question of Muhammad Ali's design of independence introduces itself.

In a letter to his father Ibrahim Pacha reflected strongly his desire for independence. To him that war was national and racial.<sup>62</sup> As such his objective might have been to deliver the Arab and neighbouring lands, and rescue the pitied nation from the disaster that had befallen her.<sup>63</sup> The individual should sacrifice his life for his people,<sup>64</sup> and he himself had given his body and soul to raise up high their "independent Egypt."<sup>65</sup>

But how far Muhammad Ali shared these sentiments and views with his son needs further discussion. In a conversation with general Boyer in 1825, Muhammad Ali had actually disclosed his intention of hoping to become independent.<sup>66</sup> On the eve of the Syrian expedition he was accused by Abdullah Pacha of having revolted against the Sultan with the hope of ruling independently over all the Arab lands.<sup>67</sup> Around the same period the Grand Vizier, Ahmed Khulusi Pacha, charged Muhammad Ali with the desire of becoming independent in Syria.<sup>68</sup> In the course of

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61. Muhammad Ali Pacha to Qabu-Katkuda, Jumadah II 26, 1243.  
Ibid. No. 241

62. Ibrahim Pacha to Muhammad Ali Pacha, Safar 23, 1248 Ibid. No. 1415

63. Wahid effendi to the Bash-Muawin, Safar 20, 1248 Ibid. 1388.

64. Ibrahim Pacha to Muhammad Ali Pacha, Safar 23, 1248. Ibid.  
No. 1415.

65. Ibrahim Pacha to M. Ali Pacha, Rabi I 9, 1248. Ibid. No. 1720  
See Also Ibid. No. 1659.

66. Douin, G., Une Mission Militaire etc. p. 50 of. Rustom, Origins  
of the Egyptian exp. to Syria, pp. 59-60.

67. Hanna Bahri to the Bash-Muawin, Muharram 14, 1248 ROSEPRAX No; 1168

68. Ahmed Khulusi Pacha to the Wali of Damascus Rabi I 3, 1247.  
Ibid. no. 317

the campaign Muhammad Ali wrote his son to keep in mind the welfare and future of their family.<sup>69</sup> And lastly in 1834<sup>70</sup> and in 1838<sup>71</sup> he communicated to the consuls of the powers his intention of declaring himself independent.

All these incidents show well enough that Muhammad Ali might have really cherished designs of independence. yet on the other hand, he had on several other occasions disavowed such designs publicly and confidentially. From the very beginning and all through the campaign Muhammad Ali never failed to express his submission to the Sultan. From the very beginning he tried to legalize his action against Abdullah pacha.<sup>72</sup> Even after the fall of Acre and the defeat of the Syrian Pachas he worked to have the Sultan sanction his hold upon the territories already in his possession.<sup>73</sup> In his confidential correspondence with his son, Muhammad Ali revealed a similar attitude. He censured his son for having adopted the title "Geraskies of Arab Lands",<sup>74</sup> He himself had not adopted any title that expressed the ideas of independence.<sup>75</sup>

As such, how can we reconcile these two sets of facts which appear to be contradictory? In the first place, it should be noted that inspite of the success of his arms, Muhammad Ali could not put himself on an equal footing with the Sultan for

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69. Muhammad Ali Pacha to Ibrahim Pacha Rabi I 6, 1248. Ibid. 1489

70. Muh. Ali Pacha to Ibrahim Pacha, Jumadah I 6, 1250. Ibid. 3667.

71. Campbell to Palmerston, May 25, 1838. Cf. Hall, Major Gohn, England & the Orleans Monarchy, New York, 1912, p. 233.

72. Ahmed Khulnsi Pacha to the Wali of Demasous Rabi I 3, 1247. ROESPAN No. 317.

73. Muh. Ali Pacha to (Khalil)Qapudan Pacha, Rabi I 26, 1248. Ibid. No. 1623.

74. Muh. Ali Pacha to Ibrahim Pacha, Muharram 7, 1248. Ibid. No. 1103

75. Muhammad Ali Pacha to Ibrahim Pacha, Rabi II 12, 1248. Ibid. No. 1746.

two reasons: first, the European Powers would object to his becoming as such; and secondly, the Sultan, as the Caliph of Islam, was in possession of a forceful weapon which before a Moslem public Muhammad Ali could not ignore. As to the first I shall defer its discussion to a later chapter, and for the present I shall concern myself with the latter reason.

The effectiveness of the Sultan's religious weapon may be seen through Muhammad Ali's apprehensions of that weapon being employed against him by the Sultan.<sup>76</sup> This explains to a large extent why Muhammad Ali at the very outset of his Syrian expedition endeavoured to secure the Sultan's sanction for his expedition, so that he would not be looked upon as a rebel.<sup>77</sup> Again in the course of the campaign Muhammad Ali laboured to win over to his side the Moslem public, not only in the conquered territories,<sup>78</sup> but in Constantinople itself,<sup>79</sup> in order to fight the Sultan with his own weapon.<sup>80</sup> And so, by the summer of 1833 Muhammad Ali thought he had created to himself enough religious prestige to communicate to his son his resolution that Ibrahim pacha should take the necessary measures to declare the deposition of the Sultan.<sup>81</sup>

Whether Muhammad Ali's intention of deposing the Sultan was really intended or simply in order to bring the Sultan into

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76. M. Ali Pacha to Ibrahim Pacha, Ramadan 17, 1247. Ibid. No. 550

77. Ahmed Khulusi Pacha to the Wali of Damascus Rabi I 3, 1247. Ibid. No. 317.

78. M. Ali Pacha to Ibrahim Pacha, Muharram 13, 1248. Ibid. No. 1158. See also Nos. 1179, 2181, 2289, 2456.

79. S. Canning to Palmerston, March 7, 1832 Cf. Hall op.cit. p. 151

80. M. Ali Pacha to Ibrahim Pacha, Ramadan 17, 1247. RCPFRAN No. 550

81. M. Ali Pacha to Ibrahim Pacha, Rajab 8, 1248. Ibid. No. 2289

terms I can not tell at the present. But, at any rate, the intervention of the powers compelled him to drop that project. In May 1833 the dispute between the Sultan and Pacha was settled at Kutahiyah, and Muhammad Ali for the time being appeared to have been satisfied.<sup>82</sup>

Now that his position in Syria seemed ensured, and implicitly accepted by the Powers, Muhammad Ali might have thought it was a good opportunity to declare his independence. A pretext was afforded him by the Porte in the spring of 1834 by their preparation to renew the struggle against him. Accordingly in September of the same year he officially informed the consuls of the Powers that he was resolved to proclaim his independence.<sup>83</sup> But owing to the interventions of the Powers and their unanimous declaration that the policy of Europe could not allow him to realize such a project, Muhammad Ali was compelled to postpone the execution of that project.<sup>84</sup>

But in 1838 Muhammad Ali's attempt of declaring his independence seemed to have been less genuine than that of 1834. As in 1838 the Pacha knew well that the Powers would not help him against the Sultan, as the Porte at the same time was preparing for the renewal of war in which case Muhammad Ali would be diplomatically the loser, and as Muhammad Ali (according to confidential and official correspondence) could not overlook the interests and future of his family<sup>85</sup>, in view of all

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82. M. Ali Pacha to Baghos Bey, Sul-Hidjjah 21, 1248. Ibid.No. 2938

83. Muhammad Ali Pacha to Ibrahim Pacha, Jumadah I 5, 1250.  
Ibid. No. 3667.

84. Palmerston to Campbell, Oct. 26, 1834. Grenville to Palmerston, Oct. 27, 1834. Cf. Hall op.cit. p. 220.

85. Muhammad Ali Pacha to Ibrahim Pacha, Rabi I 6, 1248. RO SPRAN No. 1489. Campbell to Palmerston May 26, 1838. Cf. Hall op.cit. p. 233

this, can not we infer that Muhammad Ali attempt to declare his independence in 1838 was a defensive measure on his part?

Nevertheless, the intervention of the powers again checked the fulfillment of Muhammad Ali's attempt at independence, this time on a far larger scale.

**BRITISH NEAR EASTERN POLICY IN THE  
PERIOD OF MUHAMMAD ALI**

The territory that was to be ruled by Muhammad Ali and his descendants ever since the opening of the nineteenth century, formed a scene of Anglo-French rivalry, occasionally interrupted by the interference of Russia and Austria, as early as the seventies of the previous century. The conclusion of the Seven Years War, the growing weakness of the Ottoman Central Government, and the resulting chaotic state of affairs and the strategic importance of the said territory, all these factors invited the two great Western Powers to interfere in its affairs.

As early as 1777 France saw in Egypt a possible compensation for her recent colonial losses and a means of competing with the English in India.<sup>1</sup> Eight years later, French activities in Egypt became so menacing that they caused a great deal of uneasiness to the British Government and the East India Company. Writing to the English ambassador at the Porte, the English Foreign minister instructed him to press on that government not to help the attainment of French views in Egypt and to abstain from allowing France the two ports of Suez and Jeddah; both objects being dangerous to the safety of

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1. I refer to the visit of a certain Baron de Tott, the purpose of which was to study and report on the means effecting a French conquest of Egypt, of opening a French route to India through Egypt, etc... Baron de Tott, *Mémoires sur les Turcs et les Tartares* (Paris, 1784), IV, 72; cited by Charles - Roux, p. 94. Cf. Hoakins, H.L., *British Routes to India*, New York, 1928, p. 17.

East India trade and establishments.<sup>2</sup> This remonstrance was followed in the year to follow by the appointment of an English consul at Alexandria. That consul was "to watch the motions of the French and their particular designs... (and to) transmit to his majesties ministers (his) discoveries and observations upon their proceedings, which may have a tendency to effect in any shape the interests of Great Britain;<sup>3</sup> and to negotiate a treaty with the Beys of Egypt "which will put his majesty's Government at least on an equal footing with the French."<sup>4</sup>

The English Consul, however, succeeded in concluding the contemplated treaty only eight years after his arrival in Egypt (1794). As to his other duties regarding the French he had very little to do. The French seemed to have been too busy in their internal affairs to continue their vigorous external policy.

But French inactivity was not of long duration. The Republic assumed a very aggressive Eastern policy, more aggressive than that of the monarchy. In 1793 a French Consul was appointed in Alexandria; in 1796 a French agent was despatched to treat directly with the Beys for the opening of a regular trade communications between the Suez and India; and in 1798 a French expedition set sail for the conquest of the country.<sup>5</sup>

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2. I.O. Factory Records, Vol. 5, Extract of a letter from the Marquis of Carmarthen to Sir Robert Ainslie, 19 May, 1785. Ibid. p. 30.

3. I.O. Records; "Instructions to George Baldwin as Consul to Egypt." Ibid. p. 35.

4. I.O. Records. "Heads of Instructions to Mr. Baldwin." 19 May, 1785. Ibid. p. 36.

5. Hoskins Op. cit. pp. 52-3.

The English, on the other hand, did very little in Egypt between 1794-8 to counteract French doings there. But the latter's occupation of the country, coupled with the building of a series of forts on the road to the head of the Red Sea seemed to have been more than what the English could ignore, and so war was carried into the East.

Up to the French occupation of Egypt the English, for the attainment of their policy there, undertook to treat directly with the Beys of Egypt, at the same time that the French approached the Porte, as the sovereign power, for the same purpose.<sup>6</sup> But the French occupation of the country marked a reversal of French Egyptian policy, to be followed almost immediately by a reversal in British Egyptian policy. The British far from being confident in the ability of the Turks to protect or maintain themselves in Egypt<sup>7</sup> at the same time that they did not wish to retain it,<sup>8</sup> and in view of the great assistance that could be derived from the Mameluks<sup>9</sup>, or the danger of throwing themselves into the hands of the French, they, the British, promised the Mameluks amnesty and protection.<sup>10</sup> That is, British policy was directed to effect a reconciliation between the de facto and the de jure rulers of Egypt." 11

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6. Ibid. p. 6

7. General Hutchinson to Henry Dundas Alexandria, 3rd April, 1801; General Hutchinson to Lord Elgin, Abukir, 25th April, 1801; General Hutchinson to Lord Hobart, 2nd June, 1801. Douin op.cit. pp. 6, 8, 18, respectively.

8. The Minister to General Hutchinson, 19th May, 1801; Lord Hawkesbury to Lord Elgin, May 19, 1801. Ibid. pp. 11, 13 respect;

9. General Hutchinson to Lord Hobart, 2nd June, 1801. Ibid. p. 17.

10. Hutchinson to Lord Elgin, July 25th, 1801. Ibid. p. 44.

11. The Minister to Lord Elgin, Jan; 27th, 1802. Ibid. p. 210.



At this point, however, a departure in Anglo-Turkish policy took place. The Turks, by accepting British alliance, had as their object not only the recovery of Egypt from the French, but apparently the suppression of the irrepressible Beys as well. Hence it was only natural that that British policy of reconciling them to the Mameluks would cause them anxiety at the continuance of British troops in Egypt which would not permit them to act systematically against the Beys.<sup>12</sup> But this fact, coupled with their desire to prevent the interference of the French ambassador in the affairs of Egypt,<sup>13</sup> the Porte consented reluctantly to the temporary arrangement of granting the Mameluks the province of Assuan in Upper Egypt.<sup>14</sup>

In the meantime, however, the French were not inactive. Soon after their evacuation they had endeavoured to cultivate good relations with the Porte by signing a treaty of friendship with it (Oct. 9, 1801).<sup>15</sup> At the same time they attempted to create discord between the British and the Porte. For that purpose Col. Sebastiani was despatched to Constantinople where he did not fail to impress even the Turkish ministers with the truth of the original professions of Bonnaparte "that the invasion of Egypt was for the purpose of aiding the Turks in exterminating the Beys."<sup>16</sup> In Egypt, for the same purpose, Col.

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12. Lord Elgin to Lord Hawkesbury, Constantinople, Jan. 15, 1803. p. 366.

13. Captain Lord Blantyre to General Stuart, March 3rd, 1803. Ibid. pp. 390-1.

14. Ibid.

15. Lord Elgin to Lord Hawkesbury, Nov. 22nd, 1801. Ibid. pp. 134-5. Also p. 136 note 2.

16. Lord Elgin to Lord Hawkesbury, Jan; 5, 1802. Ibid. 166.

Sebastiani appeared to be dictating the departure of the British troops, a thing not inacceptable to the officers of the Porte.<sup>17</sup> And lastly, to destroy the Mameluks good faith in the British, Sebastiani opened negotiations with the Beys, assuring them of the first Consul's friendship and influence at the Porte which would be exerted in their favour.<sup>18</sup>

But these French intrigues at Constantinople and Cairo were promptly checked by the British. They nullified the Franco-Turkish treaty of October 1801. They continued to retain the Mameluk's confidence by settling their question, at the same time that the French were not given an opportunity for intervention. And finally, by evacuating Egypt the British did away with the Porte's apprehensions relative to the continuance of their troops there.

Yet, the failure of the French to win over the Mameluks to their side, by no means ended their intrigues to establish adherents for themselves in Egypt. In a very short time they found one in Muhammad Ali who by 1804, according to Missett, was able at the instigation of the French consul to arrogate to himself absolute authority in Cairo,<sup>19</sup> and two years later to be officially appointed to the governorship of Egypt.

The British, on the other hand, if they could not tolerate a French occupation of Egypt, still less they could not tolerate the assumption of power in that country by one -

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17. General Stuart to Lord Hobart, January 20th, 1803.

18. Ibid.

19. Missett to Lord Hobart, March 12th, 1804, Ibid. V II pp. 119 - 20.

according to Missett<sup>20</sup> not only sold to French interest but to facilitate a second French landing there. Hence their intrigues at Cairo and Constantinople to overthrow Muhammad Ali.<sup>21</sup> But their failure in that attempt, their belief in the inability of the Turks to protect Egypt against the French, and stimulated by the Anglo-Turkish rupture of 1807, the British undertook their second expedition to Egypt.

At the same time that the British were endeavouring to prevent Egypt fall into French hands, other attempts were made to increase their influence in the Arab East. It was thought that the establishment of an immediate commercial intercourse with Egypt would very well accomplish that end.<sup>22</sup> In Egypt, however, during the government of the Beys, the British found it impossible, owing to the frequent revolutions and the ensuing lack of security, to make any calculation or act on a fixed principle.<sup>23</sup> But inspite of this and inspite of the high duties imposed upon merchandise, the merchants in India found it advantageous to carry on trade with Egypt; and actually trade would have been carried on to a great extent had the India Government given them the best support.<sup>24</sup> Any way by 1802 things had changed.

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20. Missett to Lord Hobart, August 6, 1804.

Ibid. p.176

21. Ibid. ut supra; Missett to Charles Arbuthnot, September 29, 1805. Ibid. p.248

22. Sir Home Popham to Hosrew Mehemet Pacha, April 22, 1802. Ibid. V I p.226

23. Popham to Marquis Wellesley, April 23, 1802. Ibid. p.228

24. Ibid.

As the Porte, had resumed authority over Egypt, the Mameluks precluded from any participation in its government, and the French had apparently lost all influence there, the British thought that commercial relations with Egypt could be resumed advantageously.<sup>25</sup> Accordingly, Sir Home Popham came to Egypt with the proposal of opening a trade for the ensuing year between the East India Company and Settlements and the Porte of Sues, which might form the basis of a permanent treaty.<sup>26</sup> To this proposal Mahomet Pacha of Egypt (not to be confused with Muhammad Ali) replied that the capitulations included trade between Egypt and India;<sup>27</sup> but nevertheless, he declined to accede to the proposal "on the principle that, in his opinion, all negotiations of a similar nature should originate and be brought to maturity at the Porte."<sup>28</sup>

In other parts of the Arab world the British were not less active. As early as the French occupation of Egypt "an English delegation under Mr. Harford Jones was sent to Baghdad with the double object of arranging with the Pacha for the regular transmission of official despatches through his province, and to observe and counteract the work of the French Agents."<sup>29</sup> In the South of Arabia contacts were first made in connection with the sending of a naval force from India to Egypt in 1799.

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25. Popham to Mahomet Pacha, April 12, 1802. Ibid. p. 224

26. Ibid.

27. Popham to Mehemet Pacha, April 22, 1802.

Ibid. p. 226

28. A. Stratton to Lord Hawkesbury, July 24, 1802.

Ibid. p. 255

29. Hoskins, op.cit. p. 64

Forced to quit the Island of Perim to Aden, the admiral of the British expedition was offered a treaty of alliance by the Sultan of Lahej who controlled Aden. Although the British admiral ( Popham ) refused to sign a treaty, yet he promised aid in case of any French attack. Again in 1798 the native agent of the East India Company at Bushire negotiated a treaty with the Imam of Muscat providing for the expulsion of French Agents. And lastly, other series of arrangements were formed about the same time with the semi-nomadic Arabs on both sides of the Persian Gulf.<sup>30</sup>

But British activities in Arabia were destined to be interrupted by the appearance of the Wahabis who were able in a short time to conquer the larger part of the Peninsula. In 1803 the Wahabis had become so powerful that they were able to occupy Mecca and drive its Sheriff to Jedda.<sup>31</sup> In 1805 Medina surrendered to them and Jedda was besieged.<sup>32</sup> And in the meantime the Wahabis were enabled to carry on some piratical activities in the Red Sea which, according to Missett, inflicted " a fatal blow" to the commerce of Egypt.<sup>33</sup>

The Ottoman Porte was frightened at the expansion of the Wahabis.<sup>34</sup> And inspite of the fact that several pachas were commissioned to fight them,<sup>35</sup> the task of suppressing them effectively was left to Muhammad Ali who was able to achieve that end by 1818.

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30. Ibid. p.65

31. Missett to Lord Hobart, May 14, 1803. Douin, op.cit. V II p.17

32. Missett to Earl Camden, October 20, 1805.

Ibid. p.249

33. Missett to Lord Hobart, May 14, 1803. Ibid. p.17

34. A. Straton to Lord Hawkesbury, March 10, 1803. Ibid. p.5

The conquest of the Wahabis followed by the conquest of Sudan few years later made Muhammad Ali the controller of the two coasts of the Red Sea, thus bringing him still into a closer contact with the British in India. The conclusion of the general European war in 1815 was followed in England by a vast development of English industry and trade. While in 1790 British imports from India amounted to 27,000 tons and exports thence to almost the same; in 1817 imports amounted to 80,000 tons and exports 110,000 tons. This increase in British trade indicated that India was becoming much more essential to British welfare, and at the same time it demanded more speedy channels for business correspondence.<sup>36</sup>

Such being the circumstances, it was natural that the British should acquire greater interest in the political developments in the countries surrounding the Red Sea. We have seen that the British viewed the Wahabis controlling the eastern coast of the Red Sea not with a small degree of uneasiness; therefore, when Muhammad Ali undertook to subdue them, Salt thought "it would undoubtedly be far better that (Muhammad Ali) should have a preponderating influence there than that such pirates as the Wahabis should have possession of the sea."<sup>37</sup> It seemed that the Company's Government had adopted a similar view, as we find a certain Captain Sadlier sent to congratulate Ibrahim Pasha on his success at Dariyah and propose joint action in the Gulf against the piratical activities of the semi-nomadic Arabs on its coast.<sup>38</sup>

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35. W. Drummond to Lord Hawkesbury, September 9, 1803. Ibid. pp. 35-4

36. Hoskins, op.cit. pp.86-7

But Muhammad Ali declined to accede to the company's proposal.<sup>39</sup>

British attitude towards Muhammad Ali acquisition of the Sudan was, however, a little different. It was thought that Muhammad Ali would soon march to Abyssinia. Accordingly, Salt was instructed to inform Muhammad Ali at once that such an event would be unwelcome in England. Muhammad Ali immediately declared that though the country was full of gold and jewels, and its conquest certain, he would relinquish it rather than compromise his relations with Great Britain.<sup>40</sup>

But that supposed amicable relation between Muhammad Ali and the British<sup>41</sup> was fraught with danger in the eyes of the Porte. They therefore, seized every opportunity to weaken that relation. Accordingly, Muhammad Ali was persuaded to help the Pirates of the Persian Gulf,<sup>42</sup> and the Grand Vizier wrote him to be on his watch-guard against British designs in Yemen and Bahrein and that he should resist their occupation of Mokka by force if necessary.<sup>43</sup> But Muhammad Ali seemed to have

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37. Salt, June 15, 1816. Cf. Dodwell, op.cit. p.58

38. Hissett, March 9, 1816. Cf. Dodwell, op.cit. p.59

39. Cf. Dodwell, op.cit. p.56

40. Salt, November 20, 1820. Ibid. p.59

41. It should be observed that M. Ali wanted to develop amicable relations with the British and he was encouraged in that by the British agents and the East India Company. But how far the British government was ready or aware of the Pacha's endeavours to establish that relation should not be over-exaggerated.

42. Dodwell op.cit. p.60

43. Ali Pacha to Muhammad Ali Pacha, Jumadah II 16, 1235; the same, Rabi I 22, 1236. ROSPRAE Nos.66, 73.

been too shrewd to accede to the demands of the central government and thus spoil the amicable relations which he was endeavouring to establish with the British. And so Mekha was duly bombarded and a treaty was imposed upon the Imam of San'a.<sup>44</sup>

In the few years that followed the conquest of the Sudan, Muhammad Ali continued his endeavours to establish good relations with the British and his withdrawal from the Morea was undertaken partly for that purpose. But that amicable relation which Muhammad Ali wanted to establish with the British for the purpose of achieving his designs<sup>45</sup> was destined to be never realised.

Prior to the signing of the treaty of Unkiar Skelessi (June 8, 1833) the Sultan had appealed to King William IV for naval help against Muhammad Ali. But the British cabinet, with the possible exception of Lord Palmerston,<sup>46</sup> was too busy in the Belgian question to be able to comply with the Sultan's appeal.<sup>47</sup> Two months later, however, Ibrahim Pasha won a victory at Koniah and had the road to Constantinople open to him. At that moment Russia interfered. Mauravieff, a Russian general, was sent to Constantinople with the outward purpose of proceeding to Egypt and persuade Muhammad Ali to cease hostilities. The real purpose of his visit, however, was to offer the Sultan military assistance against Muhammad Ali.

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44. Bruce to Salt, January 20, 1821 (I.O., Egypt and the Red Sea, 7). Dodwell, op.cit. p.61

45. See pp

46. Stratford Canning to Lord Palmerston, Dec.19, 1832. Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy, Cambridge, 1923. V II, appendix C, p.638

47. Palmerston to Mendeleville Dec.5, 1832. Hall, op.cit. pp.153-4



But the Sultan refused the Russian offer and instead he delegated Khalil Rifat Pacha to arrange for a settlement with Muhammad Ali. On January 22, 1833, the said pacha arrived at Alexandria<sup>48</sup> to be followed a few days later by the Russian general. However, neither Khalil Pacha nor Mauraireff were able to induce Muhammad Ali to discontinue the march to Brusa.<sup>49</sup>

Under these circumstances the Porte had only one way open to him, and that was to demand Russian help. In vain did the two charges d'affaires of Britain and France induce the Porte to withdraw his demand of Russian help. "A drowning man," said the Reis Effendi, "will clutch at a serpent."<sup>50</sup> Consequently on February 20, 1833, a Russian squadron entered the Bosphorus and anchored at Buyukdere.

The appearance of the Russian squadron at the Bosphorus was immediately followed by admiral Roussin's threat that unless the Russian fleet would depart he should consider his mission at an end.<sup>51</sup> At the same time the Admiral wrote to Ibrahim Pacha expressing his apprehensions of Turkey falling under the Russian yoke, and apparently requesting him to discontinue his march, so that a peaceful settlement may be arrived at between Egypt and Constantinople. The Admiral thought that

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48. Muhammad Ali Pacha to Ibrahim Pacha, Ramadan, 1248, RCSPRAE No. 2556.

49. Muhammad Ali Pacha to Muhammad Khosrew Pacha, Ramadan 12, 1248. Ibid. no. 2594.

50. Mendeville to Palmerston, February 15, 1833. Hall op.cit. p.157

51. Ibid. p. 158.

Ibrahim would be satisfied by the annexation of the districts of Acre, Nablus, Tripoli, and Jerusalem to the government of Egypt, but Ibrahim replied that he could do nothing without orders from his father.<sup>52</sup> Muhammad Ali's attitude, however, was uncompromising. The call of the Russian fleet and the pressure exerted by the French ambassador, he wrote to his son, were due to the intrigues of Khosrow Pasha to compel him to accept peace (at any cost). Therefore, he would advise his son to press on the government of Constantinople, arouse the people against her, and send soldiers to the (Dardanelles), so that the Egyptian authorities would obtain a favourable settlement.<sup>53</sup>

However, in the negotiations that followed between Ibrahim Pasha and Mustafa Reshid Bey (the Turkish delegate) in the presence of Baron de Varennes, the first insisted on the annexation of Adana and Ioh-Il in addition to Arabistan which de Varennes thought Ibrahim Pasha would be satisfied with alone.<sup>54</sup> But at the insistence of the French commissioner Ibrahim Pasha gave up Ioh-Il,<sup>55</sup> and the Porte, after its usual reluctance, and after Muhammad Ali threatened the acquisition of Ioh-Il, consented to the cession of Adana. And so, in May 1833, the Porte officially conferred all Syria upon Muhammad Ali,<sup>56</sup> and the district of Adana upon his son as its "revenue collector."<sup>57</sup>

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52. French Ambassador to Ibrahim Pasha, Shawwal 3, 1248; Ibrahim Pasha to the French ambassador Shawwal 3, 1248. ROSEDAE Nos. 2698, 2699.
53. Muhammad Ali Pasha to Ibrahim Pasha, Shawwal 23, 1248. Ibid. No. 2766.
54. Ibrahim Pasha to Muhammad Ali Pasha, Zul-Qidah 18, 1248. Ibid. No. 2851.
55. Ibrahim Pasha to Muhammad Ali Pasha Zul-Qidah 21, 1248. Ibid. No. 2870.
56. M. Ali Pasha to the Grand Visier, Zul-Hidjjah 19, 1248. Ibid. No. 2935

Now that a peaceful settlement between Muhammad Ali and the Porte was arrived at, the Russian fleet and troops were out of place. Accordingly on July 9 and 10 the Russian troops were embarked and the fleet sailed out of the Bosphorus.<sup>58</sup>

But the Russians before their departure left a sting behind them. On July 8, 1833 they concluded with the Porte an offensive defensive treaty which contained a secret clause to the effect that Turkey would close the Strait of the Dardanelles to the foreign vessels of war in case Russia would be at war with any other Power.<sup>59</sup> Although there was no mention in the secret article of the right of passage to and from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean, yet it was in this light that Lord Palmerston looked upon it.

But at the time the treaty of Unkiar Skelessi was signed neither Turkey nor Russia were threatened by war with other European Powers, and the only possible danger that would probably arise at that time was a renewal of war between Muhammad Ali and the Porte. Therefore, in order to prevent Russia utilizing that instrument war should not break out between Muhammad Ali and the Sultan. This was on the whole Lord Palmerston's policy with regard to Muhammad Ali between 1833 and 1839.

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57. Ibrahim Pacha to Muhammad Ali Pacha, Zul-Hidjrah 20, 1848  
Ibid. No. 2937.

58. S. Goriamov, *Le Bosphore et les Dardanelles*, pp. 33-37.  
Hall, op.cit. p. 163.

59. Hertelot, Edward, *Map of Europe by treaty*, London, 1876,  
V II pp. 926-7.

But in those years the Sultan, on several occasions, showed his determination on the renewal of war. In 1834, on the breakout of some disturbances in Syria, he was on the verge of renewing the struggle had it not been for the protests of the Powers. In 1836 and 1838 he solicited help from England for the same purpose. But in both cases his appeal was rejected and Lord Palmerston made it clear that if Great Britain would assist the Sultan "to repel any attack on the part of Muhammad Ali, it would be a different question if the war was begun by the Sultan."<sup>60</sup>

At the same time, however, Palmerston was endeavouring to obstruct the projects of Muhammad Ali and curtail his power. To him "the real design of Muhammad Ali was to establish an Arabian kingdom including all the countries in which Arabic was spoken." As this would necessarily imply the dismemberment of Turkey he, Palmerston, could not agree to it;<sup>61</sup> consequently, Muhammad Ali could not obtain his independence in 1834. Again the Egyptian revenues were derived from three sources: taxes, customs, and the surplus from the agricultural and industrial monopolies. The last was regarded as the most important single source of revenue for Egypt.<sup>62</sup> Should Hall be faithful to his documents, Palmerston thought that if a commercial treaty with the Porte would be concluded and abolish monopolies in the Ottoman Empire, a direct blow would be inflicted upon Muhammad

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60. Palmerston to Ponsonby, march 15, 1839, Affairs of Levant, V I, No. 7, p. 4.

61. Bulwer, Sir Henry Lytton, The life of Henry John Temple, Viscount Palmerston; with selections from his diaries and correspondence, London, 1870. VII p. 145.

62. Puryear, V.J. International Economics and diplomacy in the Near East. California, 1935. p. 73.

Ali's economics. Partly for that purpose Henry Bulver negotiated successfully a treaty of that nature with the porte, concluded on August 19, 1838 and abolishing monopolies.<sup>63</sup>

But in spite of all this Lord Palmerston still had the apprehension that "if Muhammad Ali finds the least disunion between the great Powers of Europe, he will endeavour to make himself independent, and take his chance of the split which consequent events may produce among them." To guard, therefore, against Muhammad Ali taking that step, or in case he would take it to guard against its consequences Palmerston thought that a concert of the five Powers would be most desirable. In the first place such a concert would make Muhammad Ali abandon his intentions, and secondly it would afford the best security against a general European War.<sup>64</sup>

But to bring the European Powers to agree on the Eastern question seemed to have been a difficult matter to the British Government. As early as 1833 Lord Palmerston's views of Russia and Austria were that the first was "pursuing a system of universal aggression on all sides,"<sup>65</sup> and as to Austria he wondered whether Metternich would allow any alterations to take place in Turkey.<sup>66</sup> In the case of France, however, it was only six years later that Palmerston declared that "the great and only aim of the French was to do as much as they possibly could

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63. Hall, op.cit. pp. 231-2

64. Palmerston to Grenville, July 6, 1838. Bulver, op.cit. V II pp. 270-1.

65. Palmerston to William Temple, Dec. 3, 1833, Ibid. p. 176.

66. Palmerston to W. Temple, April 19, 1833. Ibid. p. 184.

for Muhammad Ali, without caring a pin for the Sultan."<sup>67</sup>

But Anglo-French relations at the end of 1833 and the beginning of 1834 were in perfect agreement,<sup>68</sup> and the only power with which Britain was likely to come to a real quarrel was Russia.<sup>69</sup> But neither Britain nor Russia were prepared to go to war,<sup>70</sup> and the latter had perhaps thought it better to take Turkey "by ssp than by storm."<sup>71</sup> Therefore, in resisting the schemes of Russia and checkmating her Emperor, Austria should join the Western Powers.<sup>72</sup> These were Palmerston's views on the political situation in 1834.

In the course of the five following years, however, developments of far reaching consequences in European diplomacy had taken place. In 1836 the Duq de Broglie was dismissed and his place given to M. Thiers. The first, as I have alluded, had worked in complete harmony with Lord Palmerston on the Turkish question, and M. Thiers, Lord Palmerston thought would behave similarly. "There will be no change of policy in France," Palmerston wrote, "Louis Philippe is really minister and Thiers is all for the English alliance."<sup>73</sup> But M. Thiers had actually pursued a different policy from his predecessor, as he initiated a secret negotiation at Constantinople and Cairo for the purpose of establishing, under the guarantee of the French Government, the relation between the Sultan and the Pacha on a more secure foundation.<sup>74</sup>

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67. Palmerston to Bulver, Sept. 24, 1839. Ibid. p. 302.  
68. Granville to Palmerston, Jan. 24, March 14, April 18, 1834. Hall, op.cit. p. 221.  
69. Palmerston to W. Temple, Dec. 3 1833. Bulver, op.cit.p. 176.  
70. Palmerston to W. Temple, April 21, 1834. Ibid. p. 182.  
71. Palmerston to W. Temple. March 3, 1834. Ibid. p. 179.  
72. Ibid. ut supra.  
73. Nowat, R.B., The Near East and France, Cambridge Hist. of B.F. Policy, op.cit. VII p. 169.  
74. Hall, op.cit. pp. 226-7

The intrigue of Thiers was discovered by Campbell and accordingly communicated to Palmerston, who since that time seemed to have become more cautious in his dealings with the French. Events in the Iberian Peninsula in the following year were only to increase Palmerston's distrust of the French, and he unjustly accused the new French minister, Mole, of being anti-English.<sup>75</sup> In 1838 the breach was still widened over the success of Bulver in concluding the commercial treaty with Turkey. According to Palmerston, the French had the apprehension that the treaty would be bad for Muhammad Ali, and it would drive him to declare himself independent in order to escape from its obligations but Palmerston would not concur in that. He felt quite able and willing to keep Muhammad Ali's pashaship in order upon a point like this<sup>76</sup>. In brief, Lord Palmerston seemed to have been determined to help the sultan against Muhammad Ali, with France or without her,<sup>77</sup> and for that purpose he had intended "to order the mediterranean fleet immediately to Alexandria, in order to give Muhammad Ali an outward and visible sign of his inward resolve."<sup>78</sup>

The truth, however, was that Lord Palmerston was greatly embarrassed at the breaking of the alliance with France and of its consequence of England's isolation, especially when the danger of a combination between France and Russia was still conceived as not impossible.<sup>79</sup> Therefore, it should have been

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75. Palmerston to Granville, Jan. 2, 1837. Bulver, *op.cit.* V II p. 243, see foot-note.

76. Palmerston to Bulver, Sept. 13, 1838. *Ibid.* p. 285.

77. Palmerston to Granville, June 5, 1838. *Ibid.* p. 265.

78. Palmerston to Granville, June 8, 1838. *Ibid.* p. 287.

79. *Ibid.* ut supra.

a great relief to Palmerston when Mele was dismissed and Marshal Soult formed the new government. "Soult is a jewel; "Palmerston wrote, "nothing can be more satisfactory than his course with regard to us, and the union of England and France upon these Turkish affairs will ..... save Europe."<sup>80</sup>

But Palmerston's delight at the coming of Soult was of short duration. On June 24, the armies of Ibrahim Pasha defeated those of the Sultan at Nezib. On June 29, Sultan Mahmud died,<sup>81</sup> and almost immediately afterwards the Capudan Pasha went off with the Turkish fleet and delivered it to Muhammad Ali at Alexandria. In view of these events it was natural that Lord Palmerston should expect Marshal Soult's cooperation against Russia who might enter the ports and territory of Turkey under the pretext of protecting the Empire against the Egyptian invaders<sup>82</sup>. Actually Palmerston's instructions to the Lord commanders of the admiralty were drawn up in that spirit.<sup>83</sup> But Marshal Soult, although he expressed his entire concurrence in the opinion of Palmerston in regard to the impolicy of continuing the then present relative position of the Sultan and of Muhammad Ali, yet he was not prepared to assent to Palmerston's proposition that "no settlement would be satisfactory which did not restore the whole of Syria to the direct authority of the Sultan."<sup>84</sup>

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80. To Granville, July 19, 1839. Ibid. p. 295.

81. Beauvale to Palmerston, July 11, 1839. Affairs of Levant, V I p. 181. No. 137.

82. Palmerston to the Lords Commrs. of the Admiralty, June 25, 1839. Ibid. p. 96. No. 70.

83. Ibid. at supra. See also Ibid. pp. 82-6, No. 69.

84. Granville to Palmerston, July 2, 1839. Ibid. p. 153. No. 191.



Soult's hesitation to accede to Palmerston's view seemed to have arisen from his doubt of the possibility of obtaining Muhammad Ali's acquiescence in that arrangement, and secondly, that Muhammad Ali was entitled in consequence of his successes, to terms more favourable than would have been offered to him before.<sup>85</sup>

But to Lord Palmerston Soult's apprehensions of the inability of the Powers to bring Muhammad Ali into acquiescence was groundless. If Muhammad Ali should resist, his fleet might be taken and given over to the Sultan. If Muhammad Ali should attempt to send supplies to Syria by land across the desert, there would be no great difficulty on the part of the allies in cutting off that communication also, by occupying some position on the coast in the line of march. Again, the same hundreds of merchantmen under the Egyptian flag sailing in the Mediterranean, all these would either be shut up in Alexandria, or be captured by the Allies. And lastly, Palmerston thought there would be no difficulty in blockading Alexandria itself by the combined squadrons or even of capturing it by the Sultan forces, with the help of the Sultan's allies.<sup>86</sup>

Similarly Lord Palmerston could not agree with Marshal Soult on allowing Muhammad Ali retain Syria. If the immediate object of the Powers were the maintenance of the Turkish Empire, Palmerston argued, "that object could be only achieved by putting an end to future chances of collision between the Sultan and Muhammad Ali". But as long as Muhammad Ali would "continue to occupy Syria, there would be danger of such collision." For

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<sup>85</sup>. Ibid. ut supra.

<sup>86</sup>. Palmerston to Beauvale, August 1, 1839. Ibid. pp. 232-4. No. 174.

Muhammad Ali could not "hold Syria without a large military force constantly stationed there; as long as there would be an Egyptian force in Syria, there must necessarily be a Turkish army in that place of Asia Minor which borders on Syria. Each party might agree to reduce those forces to a given amount; but neither could be sure that the other was not, after a time, secretly increasing his amount of force; and thus at no distant period the same state of things which had existed of late, would again recur; for the motives and passions which have led to it would still be in action. Therefore, there can be no end to the danger with which these affairs menace the peace of Europe, until Muhammad Ali should have restored Syria to the direct authority of the Sultan."<sup>87</sup>

But while this disagreement in opinion over the Eastern Question was existing between the British and the French governments at home, their ambassadors at Constantinople, however, were acting in concert. On July 27, 1839 they presented to the Porte in conjunction with the ambassadors of Austria, Prussia, and Russia, a collective note by which they declared to the Porte "that agreement was being assured among the Five Great Powers over the Eastern Question," and requested the Porte "to suspend any definitive determination without their concurrence."<sup>88</sup>

But that note signified no change in the policy of the French Government. According to Palmerston, "she would not take

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87. Palmerston to Beauvau, June 28, 1839. Ibid. pp.118-121, No. 81;  
Palmerston to Clauricarde, July 9, 1839, Ibid. pp.157-160, No. 106  
88. Collective note Of the Five Powers, July 27, 1839.  
Ibid. p.300

willingly the slightest step of coercion against Muhammad Ali, either for the purpose of getting back the Turkish fleet, or in order to enforce any arrangement which the Five Powers may agree to propose to the two parties."<sup>89</sup>

However, that note was not without effect with regard to Britain's relations with Russia. Palmerston, as we have seen, had always apprehended Russia utilizing the treaty of Unkiar Skelessi. During the five years following its conclusion Anglo-Russian relations were at great straits, reaching a climax in 1838. In that year Palmerston complained to the Turkish minister at London of continued Russian interference in the internal affairs of Turkey under the articles of that treaty, and suggested to him to get rid of that treaty by merging it "in some more general compact of the same nature."<sup>90</sup> Now, that Russia adhered to the Collective Note of July 27, the treaty of Unkiar Skelessi became virtually on its death bed; a thing not unpleasant to Lord Palmerston in view of his disagreement with France.

The causes of that change in Russian Policy were chiefly due to the Tsar's personal dislike of Louis Philippe and his desire to isolate France, as well as to his convictions of the impracticability of his treaty with Turkey.<sup>91</sup> Consequently, on August 27, Count Nesselrode informed the British Ambassador at the Russian court that the Tsar, "having reason to believe that the British Government was better disposed towards Russia, was

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89. Palmerston to Bulwer, Sept. 1, 1839.  
Bulwer, op.cit. V II p.297

90. Palmerston to Ponsonby, Sept. 13, 1838.  
Ibid. p.282.

91. Howat, op.cit. p.172-3

desirous of improving that disposition to the utmost," and accordingly he directed Baron Brunnow "to visit London and discuss unreservedly any view or policy which the British wished to discuss."<sup>92</sup> On September 15, Baron Brunnow arrived at London, and in his interview with Lord Palmerston he said "that the Emperor would entirely agree with the views of the British Government as to the affairs of Turkey and Egypt, and would join in whatever measures necessary to carry those views into effect; that Russia would unite with Britain, Austria and Prussia either with France or without her; and that though politically speaking, the Emperor saw the advantage of having France of the party, personally, he would be better pleased that she should be left out."<sup>93</sup>

However, there was some disagreement between Palmerston and Brunnow on the question of ships of war passing the Dardanelles in case Muhammad Ali would be in a position to threaten Constantinople, and negotiations were suspended at this point. But Russia seemed to have been prepared to do much in order to achieve her policy of isolating France. Consequently, late in 1839 the Tsar came to agree to the British point of view that "if a Russian force should enter the Bosphorus, ships of war of all other cooperating powers would enter the Dardanelles."<sup>94</sup>

In the meantime, the shifts and changes in the opinions and the schemes of the French Government were by no mean discontinued. It seems that Lord Palmerston had really regretted "that

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92. Clauricarde to Palmerston, August 22, 27, 1839. Affairs of Levant V I pp. 392-3. Nos. 290, 291

93. Palmerston to Bulver, Sept. 24, 1839. Bulver op.cit. pp. 299-300.

94. Palmerston to Granville, Dec. 6, 1839. Ibid. p. 305.

France should not be a party to the proceedings" for the settlement of the Turco-Egyptian question,<sup>95</sup> and he felt confident that if France would join the other Powers the whole affair would be settled as peaceably as anything.<sup>96</sup> But nevertheless, Palmerston was determined to carry on his policy whether France would join or not,<sup>97</sup> for he could never allow that "Muhammad Ali acting through a fictitious public opinion in France should dictate to the other powers."<sup>98</sup>

The change of ministry in France and of the French ambassador in London brought no fundamental change in the policy of that country. France still declined to join in hostile measures to compel the evacuation of Syria by the Egyptians.<sup>99</sup> Consequently, Lord Palmerston decided to go on jointly with the other three Powers. The increase of French naval preparations in the Mediterranean caused him the least alarm, for although Lord Palmerston did not underrate the force of France,<sup>100</sup> he felt confident that the French would not go to war with the Four Powers in support of Muhammad Ali.<sup>101</sup> And so Palmerston went on to execute his policy against Muhammad Ali together with the other three Powers, and on July 15, 1840 the Four Powers signed the famous convention.

According to that convention Muhammad Ali was to withdraw immediately his forces from Arabia, Candia, Adana, and all other parts of the Ottoman Empire which were not comprised within

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95. Palmerston to Bulwer, Sept. 24, 1839. Ibid. p. 302.

96. Palmerston to Granville, Dec. 6, 1839. Ibid. p. 307.

97. Ibid. ut supra

98. The same, March 11, 1840. Ibid. p. 308.

99. Palmerston to Beauvale, March 12, 1840; Granville to Palmerston, April 3, 1840. Affairs of Levant, pp. 629-636, No. 512, and pp. 649-650. No. 533.

100. Palmerston to Granville March 11, 1840 Bulwer, op:cit; p; 309

101; Ibid. ut supra

the limits of Egypt and within those of the Pashalic of Acre. Against this the Sultan promised to grant Muhammad Ali for himself and for his descendants in the direct line the administration of the southern part of Syria with the title of Pasha of Acre. If Muhammad Ali, however, would not accede to that arrangement within a space of ten days the Pashalic of Acre would be withheld from him. If within a space of another ten days Muhammad Ali should not accept the hereditary Pashalic of Egypt, the Sultan would consider himself at liberty to withdraw that offer also, and would follow in consequence such ulterior courses as his own interests and the counsels of his allies might suggest to him.<sup>102</sup> If things, however, would develop into that last stage the duty of cutting off all Muhammad Ali's communications by sea between Syria and Egypt was assigned to Great Britain and Austria.<sup>103</sup>

That Convention was immediately followed by instructions from Lord Palmerston to the British agents in Syria to facilitate communication between the all ready rising Syrians and the British naval commanders.<sup>104</sup> To the naval commanders instructions were sent to supply the rising Syrians with arms and ammunition.<sup>105</sup> And to Ponsonly instructions were sent to urge the Porte to send arms and ammunition for the use of the insurgents in Syria and five or six thousand men to cooperate with them.<sup>106</sup>

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102. Hertslet, op.cit. pp. 192-3.

103. Ibid. p. 193.

104. Palmerston to Consul Werry, July 18, 1840. Affairs of Levant V II p. 5, No. 5.

105. Palmerston to Ponsonly, July 17, 1840. Ibid. p.5, No. 6.

106. The same, July 24, 1840. Ibid. p. 22, No. 18.

Thus military operations against Muhammad Ali in Syria began.

Subsequent events need not detain us at present. Suffice to note that in the four months following the commencement of hostilities the allies were able to capture the chief Syrian Ports. In view of this and in view of the failure of the French to help him, Muhammad Ali was compelled to comply with the Powers' demands. After some negotiations with Sir Charles Napier, Muhammad Ali promised to order his son to retire with all his troops,<sup>107</sup> and to return the Turkish fleet. In return the British commodore promised that Egypt would be preserved to Muhammad Ali in hereditary possession,<sup>108</sup> an agreement that was ratified by Lord Palmerston very shortly after.<sup>109</sup>

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107. Gravelle to Palmerston, November 27, 30, 1840. Ibid. V II pp. 381, 383, Nos. 58, 63.

108. Ibid. p. 408 - 11 (correspondence between Napier and Boghos Bey).

109. Palmerston to Ponsonby, December 17, 1840. Ibid. p. 416. No. 93.

## MUHAMMAD ALI AND THE BRITISH

### CONSULS

The consular system in the East with its commercial and political functions was an offspring of the capitulatory system which in its turn was a product of the commercial intercourse between Christian Europe and the Moslem East. Originally, the Consular institution existed in the cities of Medieval Italy and in certain provinces of Southern France. It consisted then of local officers "charged with the settlement of trade disputes whether by sea or land." Owing to the growth of European trade in the twelfth century, the institution was introduced into the East by the Italian cities.<sup>1</sup> But in view of the differences in origin, faith, and ideas between Christian Europe and the Moslem East,<sup>2</sup> and in view of the desire which both communities exhibited to carry on trade with each other<sup>3</sup>, the consular institution was bound to be controlled by regulations which, as much as possible, would not infringe upon the legal status of any of the communities concerned. These regulations were inserted in what we usually refer to as the capitulations as such, the consular institution in the East, in general, was a co-existent with the capitulatory system, and to this the British consular institution was no exception.

In the capitulations granted to Queen Elizabeth by Murad III in 1579, which capitulations were renewed, confirmed, and augmented in the course of the seventeenth century,<sup>4</sup> and as

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1. Consul (writer anonymous), *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 11th ed. V. 7, p. 20.
  2. Van Dyck, Ed. A., *The Capitulations*, Cairo, 1880, p. 8.
  3. *Ibid.* p. 12.
  4. *Articles of Peace*, published by the Levant Co. London, 1817. pp. 12, 19-21, 27-30, 35-8, 44.



such continued to govern the political and commercial relations of the two States up to the nineteenth,<sup>5</sup> in those capitulations it was stipulated "that the English ambassador shall and may, at their pleasure, establish consuls in the ports of Aleppo, Alexandria,.... Tripoli of Syria...and Egypt."<sup>6</sup> In the same capitulations the duties of consuls were clearly stated. Those duties were to help Englishmen, or subjects of England who might happen to be enslaved in Turkey,<sup>7</sup> to decide on any suit, or any other difference or dispute among the English themselves, according to their custom,<sup>8</sup> to be present at any law-suit or other affair connected with law in which an Englishman might be involved,<sup>9</sup> to look after the property of any Englishman who might happen to die in Turkish dominion<sup>10</sup> and to offer himself as surety for English merchants, or other Englishmen, on the point of departure, who by reason of any debt or demand upon him should be asserted by Turkish authorities.<sup>11</sup>

Similarly, the privileges of the consuls were also stated in those capitulations. Regardless of their minor privileges as the "making of wine in their own houses for the consumption of themselves and families,"<sup>12</sup> or the "taking into their service of any janizary or interpreter they please"<sup>13</sup> their real

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5. Van Dyck op.cit. p.16

6. Articles of Peace, op.cit. p.9, art.XIV

7. Ibid. p.8, art.XII

8. Ibid. p.9, art.XVI

9. Ibid. p.14, art.XXIV

10. Ibid. p.16, art.XXVI

11. Ibid. p.48, art.LXXIX

12. Ibid. p.16, art.XXIX

13. Ibid. p.16, art.XXVIII

privilege was that they shall never, under any pretence, be imprisoned, nor their houses sealed up, nor themselves sent away; but all suits or differences in which they may be involved shall be represented to (the) Sublime Porte, where their ambassadors will answer for them."<sup>14</sup>

But inspite of the fact that the British secured for themselves, through the capitulations, commercial and political privileges in the Ottoman Empire as early as the sixteenth century, yet their interest in that Empire did not take a serious shape until late in the eighteenth and early in the nineteenth centuries. During the two preceding centuries "England did not regularly maintain consular officials in Egypt and Syria, and such small commercial interests as remained in the ports of the Ottoman Empire were usually left in the hands of Italians."<sup>15</sup>

But around the end of the eighteenth and the beginnings of the nineteenth centuries England found herself becoming interested in the Ottoman Empire in general and in Egypt in particular for strategic and commercial reasons.

Prior to 1825 the organization of the British consular institution in the East was different from its organisation after that year. Before 1825 English trade in the Turkish dominions was a monopoly of the Levant Company,<sup>16</sup> and as such the Company's General Court had the "right to appoint and remove consuls and vice-consuls at its discretion, and full rights of jurisdiction over all English subjects trading therein were bestowed upon the

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14. Ibid. p.14, art.XIV

15. Paul Masson, Histoire du Commerce Français dans le Levant

Dixseptième Siècle. (Paris, 1896). Cf. Hosking op.cit. p. 10

16. Wood, Alfred G., A History of the Levant Co., Oxford, 1925

agents." These agents were stationed in the various ports where there were English factories or where English ships traded. In large centres like Aleppo, consuls "were appointed by the Company in London; but the smaller vice - consulates, generally held by Levantines, were filled by the ambassador" and in certain cases by the consuls. With the exception of a few consular officers stationed at important trading centres like Aleppo, the rest of them "received no salary and had to pay their own expenses, but they were allowed to retain for their own use the two ~~consulates~~ consulage paid on goods belonging to members of the Company which passed through their ports."<sup>17</sup> "At first, the consuls seem to have been allowed to trade for themselves, but as early as 1688 it was resolved that none of them should indulge in trade or act as a factor, and this regulation remained in force throughout the rest of the Company's existence."<sup>18</sup>

However, by the end of the eighteenth century until its final dissolution in 1825, the Levant Company's "exclusive right of nominating all consuls and agents within the Turkish dominions"<sup>19</sup> seemed to have cracked under the rising political contingencies of the time. In 1804 the company's association with the embassy at Constantinople was finally closed.<sup>20</sup> On an earlier occasion George Baldwin was appointed consul-general in Egypt by the British Government and the East India Company<sup>21</sup> against the protests of the Levant merchants who pointed out

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17. Ibid. p. 217

18. Ibid. p. 218

19. Ibid. p. 173

20. Ibid. p. 184

21. Hoskins, op. cit. p. 34.

that such an appointment was an infringement upon their rights.<sup>22</sup> Major Missett, again, was appointed by General Stuart<sup>23</sup> in consequence of the War Secretary's instructions to the latter,<sup>24</sup> apparently to the necessity of establishing in Egypt a British agent "to counteract the progress of French intrigue there."<sup>25</sup> And similarly, Henry Salt was appointed consul-general by the Home Government. Although in the case of Salt the company made use of its right by confirming his appointment, yet this was only formal. The political functions of the company's agents had been for all intents been handed over to officers responsible to the crown.<sup>26</sup>

Nevertheless, the company continued to retain its commercial monopoly in the Ottoman Empire for the next decade. But again, the new economic doctrines of free trade resulting of the immense increase in British industry gave the company another blow which proved to be fatal. On February 11, 1825 George Canning made the following communication to the General Court of the Company which decided its fate: "I cannot refrain from suggesting to you whether it may not be expedient to give up the remaining privileges of your Charter, which being no longer connected with the protection of public interests may be deemed by parliament and the public to be useless and injurious restrictions upon trade."<sup>27</sup> Accordingly the members of the company, who themselves shared those sentiments, resolved to

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22. Wood, op.cit. p. 173.

23. General Stuart to Lord Hobart, March 9th, 1803. Duin op.cit. V II pp. 1, 2.

24. Missett to Lord Hobart, May 9th, 1803. Ibid. p. 16.

25. General Stuart to Missett March 8th, 1803. Ibid. p. 2.

26. Wood, op.cit. 185.

27. P. recessing of the Levant company, pp; 4-6. Ibid; p; 200

surrender their charters to the Crown, and on May 19, 1825 the company's authority finally passed away.<sup>28</sup>

With the collapse of the Levant Company, the British Consular institution entered, accordingly, upon a new phase of its development. The Act of 1825 put "the management of the service under the control of a separate department of the foreign office, created for the purpose,"<sup>29</sup> thus becoming completely controlled by the British Government.

The appointment of British political agents in Turkish Arab dominions, directly responsible to the Home Government, was due in a large measure, to the importance attached to those territories in regard to British Asiatic possessions, and to the British belief in Turkish inability to protect those territories against foreign invasion. As Egypt was the first of Turkey's Arab dominions on which certain European Powers cast an aggressive eye, it was only natural that political agents should be first established there.

The first of the British political agents appointed in Egypt in the period of our concern was Major Missett. He was appointed at the time of the first British evacuation, and it may be of some interest to remark, that his appointment coincided closely with the emergence of Muhammad Ali as an influential character in the direction of affairs in Egypt.

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28. S. P. 105, 125, Ibid. p. 202.

29. Consul, Encyc. Brit. 11th ed.

From the very beginning Major Missett associated Muhammad Ali with French interest in Egypt. As early as March 1804 Missett had "the strongest reason to believe that (Muhammad Ali) had been gained over to the French interest and would assist an army of that nation in the conquest of Egypt."<sup>30</sup> As the object of the British Government's policy in Egypt was "to secure that country against any project on the part of the French", and in order to achieve that object "it was of the utmost importance that some arrangement should be made which would be capable of providing, as far as possible, for the peace of that country,"<sup>31</sup> it was Missett's duty to make every exertion on his part "to conciliate between the Beys and the Turkish Government in Egypt."<sup>32</sup> As the British Government was in favour of the Beys,<sup>33</sup> and as Muhammad Ali became their adversary, thus giving rise to new complications, Missett thought that "Muhammad Ali, guided by the French agent, must oppose every measure tending to the restoration of a steady and firm administrations"<sup>34</sup> in Egypt, thus counteracting British policy there.

Nevertheless, Missett was under no illusion that Muhammad Ali was not solely guided by the interest of France. To him, Muhammad Ali was guided by his own private interest as well.<sup>35</sup> On this point, however, Missett did not form a high opinion of Muhammad Ali. Having declared once to him "that

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30. Missett to Lord Hobart, March 12, 1804. *Duin*, op.cit.V II p. 119

31. To Mr; Drummond, December 20, 1803, *Ibid.* p. 71.

32. Sullivan to Missett, Dec. 20, 1803. *Ibid.* p. 69.

33. *Ibid.* ut supra

34. Missett to Lord Hobart, May 28, 1804. *Ibid.* p. 159.

35. Missett to Lord Hobart, August 5, 1804. *Ibid.* p. 176.

whatever government paid him best should command his services," Missett looked upon him as "a man devoid of every principle of honour,"<sup>36</sup> the more so, at Missett's belief that Muhammad Ali would assist "an invading French army if sufficiently tempting advantages were held out to his ambition."<sup>37</sup> X

In view of what have been said it would be natural that Missett should think the removal of Muhammad Ali from the Government of Egypt would save British political interest there.<sup>38</sup> Accordingly, he persuaded the ambassador at Constantinople to press upon the Porte for that purpose. But as it has already been noted, neither the Porte nor the British themselves were able to remove him.

After 1807, however, Missett's attitude towards Muhammad Ali underwent a change, and the same changed attitude continued to be held by Missett's successor, Henry Salt. On the massacre of the Mameluks, contrary to the expectations of the French agent who thought that that "terrible execution had deprived the British of their few remaining friends" Missett came up to congratulate Muhammad Ali.<sup>39</sup> Again, during the war in Arabia, Missett "feared the Pacha would be lured on to destruction" and "were he to meet with a pre-mature death (Egypt) would again re<sup>LAP</sup>prise in that state of revolution from which he drew it."<sup>40</sup> Similarly when Muhammad Ali "urged upon Salt, in view of

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36. Ibid.

37. Ibid. p. 177

38. Ibid. p. 176.

39. Letter to Missett, May 6, 1813. Dodwell op.cit. p. 36

40. Missett, March 9, 1815. Ibid. p. 59.

the growing depredations of the Wahabi pirates, the need of having some sort of naval force there to repel their insults," the English consul-general supported the request "on the grounds that "it undoubtedly would be far better that (Muhammad Ali) should have a preponderating influence than such pirates as the Wahabees should have possession of the sea."<sup>41</sup> And on another occasion Salt rejoiced at the destruction of a <sup>b</sup>band of robbers who had proved themselves more bigotted, intolerant, and far greater enemies to the progress of civilization than the very followers of that religion which was their object to supplant".<sup>42</sup>

Those views of the two British Consuls-general with regard Muhammad Ali, however, seemed to have had little bearing on the policy of Great Britain in the meanwhile. After 1807 the general European situation seemed to have been far more important to the government of Great Britain than the question of Egypt. Accordingly, the British troops were withdrawn from Egypt not merely because they suffered defeat and loss there, but because they were urgently needed in Sicily to act against the French in Italy as well.<sup>43</sup> Again the Franco-Russian agreement at Tilsit put the safety of the Ottoman Empire at stake. As British policy after 1791 had undergone a change with regard to Russia's policy on Turkey,<sup>44</sup> and as the Turks were apprehensive of Russian

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41. Salt, June 15, 1816. Ibid. p. 58.

42. Salt, Oct. 8, 1818. Ibid. p. 49.

43. Sir Arthur Paget to General Moore, 5th September, 1807. Duin, G. and Fautier-Jones, R.O., *L'Angleterre et l'Egypte La Campagne de 1807*, Cairo, 1928, p. 162.

44. Hunt, *Political History of England*, V X pp. 326-7.



designs over their territories, the British and the Turks drew closer to each other; hence the peace treaty of 1809 by which the British became the most privileged nation,<sup>45</sup> and the British active interference for the settlement of peace between Russia and Turkey in 1812.<sup>46</sup> Again, after the fall of Napoleon, England continued to adopt the same policy towards Turkey so that when Russo-Turkish relations reached a crisis over the Greek question a decade later, England intervened to prevent Russia "swallow Turkey."<sup>47</sup>

Such being the Anglo-Turkish relations during the terms of office of both Missett and Salt, it seems improbable that the British Government would attach primary importance to the friendship of Muhammad Ali. Under those circumstances the good will of the Porte was far more important.

Between 1826 and 1830, the interference of Muhammad Ali in the Greek affair and his disposition to engage in the Algerian question brought him into a more direct contact with British policy. As the British were desirous to put an end to the Greek question as soon as possible, and as the interference of Muhammad Ali increased the obstinacy of the Porte to come to an agreement with the Powers, the British had probably thought that by persuading Muhammad Ali to withdraw from the scene matters would become easier. To achieve that purpose Major

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45. Wood, op.cit. p. 191.

46. Extracts from Stratford Canning's Despatches from Constantinople, 1812. Cf. Cambridge History of B. F. Policy op.cit. V I, Appendix H. pp. 599-602.

47. Cambridge History of B. F. policy, V II pp. 95-6.

Craddock was sent to Muhammad Ali in October 1827. But Muhammad Ali seemed to have been too shrewd to accede to the British demand without taking something in reward. Ever since his rise to effective power Muhammad Ali had been aspiring for an alliance with Britain, and just in 1826 he actually told Salt that he would recall his son if the British would only accept his alliance; but it was all of no avail. Now that the British had sent one to urge him to withdraw, why should not he take the opportunity and endeavour to secure that alliance! But the British Foreign Secretary, Canning, showed that he was unaware of what the Pasha was contemplating, and he ordered Craddock to communicate to him that "the consequences of the Pasha's identifying himself with the Porte... might be fatal to those plans of maritime and commercial improvement which have hitherto been pursued by him."<sup>48</sup>

That communication should have disappointed Muhammad Ali and in the words of Salt the British "have to ask from Muhammad Ali a neutrality which may compromise him altogether with the Porte, and have nothing specific to offer in return." As such the two British agents may have thought it would be difficult to urge upon Muhammad Ali to withdraw his forces, and probably it was for that reason that they, in variance with the official view, gave Muhammad Ali personal assurances that England would not desert him, and "if Egypt established and maintained her

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48. Craddock's instructions, July 14, 1827. Dodwell, op.cit. pp. 87-8.

independence it would be recognized by England."<sup>49</sup> Whether rightly or wrongly Muhammad Ali seemed to have cherished hopes on the personal assurances given to him by Salt and Cradock, and in consequences he "hinted to them that his troops should be kept inactive in the Morea"<sup>50</sup>

Such was the relation of Muhammad Ali with the British at the time John Barker was appointed consul-general in Egypt. It was vague and apparently contradictory. As such, if we were to accept the account given by Barker's son that the consul-general "had never been informed by his government what policy he was expected to carry out towards the Viceroy,"<sup>51</sup> indeed Barker should have found himself in a dilemma. However, from the very beginning, even before he became the consul-general, Barker seemed to have adopted a negative attitude towards Muhammad Ali. The first interview he had with the Viceroy may throw some light on that point. "His Highness", Barker wrote, "condescended to give me a lesson how he expected me to behave. (He) spoke in general terms of praise of my predecessor, Mr. Lee. He mentioned particularly his prudence, and the proof he gave of his understanding by never making any opposition to his will, or disputing any of his opinions, - which, he observed, was very easily done, because they were always founded on reason and justice." He "never had a master," Muhammad Ali told Barker, a statement which made the British consul think that the Pasha wanted him to be undeceived if he "had placed any reliance on

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49. Cradock to Stratford Canning, Aug. 21, 1827 Cf. Temperley, Foreign policy of George Canning pp. 148 sgg. Dodwell pp. 8809.

50. Ibid.

51. Barker Edward, B.B., Syria and Egypt under the Last five sultans of Turkey, London 1876, V II p; 241

support from His Majesty's mission at Constantinople. "And Barker concluded his account by remarking that he "retired from His Highness presence with the impression that (Muhammad Ali) meant to insinuate that he was a little awed by the power of the sovereign of Great Britain as by that of the Sultan."<sup>52</sup>

But that impression which according to Barker, Muhammad Ali meant to insinuate, seemd to have had quite ~~opposite~~ the effect originally intended by Muhammad Ali, as six months later we find Barker writing that "the ground to go upon" in dealing with Muhammad Ali was "to command his fear."<sup>53</sup> It is evident that this view was contrary to the one actually held by Salt with regard to Muhammad Ali almost at the same period. Barker, apparently, continued to hold a hostile attitude towards the pacha almost all through his term of office. In 1832, in a communication made by the pacha himself, allusion was made to Muhammad Ali's pleasure at the cessation of the old enmity which had existed between him and the consul-general.<sup>54</sup> But if that was the attitude of the consul-general in his five years of office, that of the British Government, in the same period, was not so consistent, as the two British Foreign Secretaries who succeeded Canning, held different views towards Muhammad Ali's military projects. On the Algerian question, when Muhammad Ali was thought to have come to an understanding with the French, Lord Aberdeen had almost threatened Muhammad Ali

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52. Barker to under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, November 25th, 1826. Ibid. p. 47-49.

53. Barker to Francis Werry, 19th June, 1827, Ibid. p. 52.

54. Muhammad Ali Pacha to Ibrahim Pacha, Muharram 29, 1248. ROBPRAE No. 1267.

by communicating to him that he should "weigh well the serious consequences of the enterprise in which he seems disposed to engage."<sup>55</sup> That policy may have conformed well with Barker's attitude, but by no means did that of Lord Palmerston prior to 1833 conform with the views of the consul-general. When in the course of the Syrian campaign Barker "disapproved of Ibrahim's victories, refused to pay Muhammad Ali a visit of congratulation on the fall of Acre, and delighted after the promulgation of the Viceroy's removal from office by the Porte to refer to him as the "ex-viceroy" or "the rebel", Palmerston reproached him "for thus venturing to take for granted the decision of his Majesty's Government."<sup>56</sup> And it was too late for Barker to write to Palmerston of the "personal friendship and private good understanding happily existing between (him) and the Viceroy of Egypt,"<sup>57</sup> for on January 7, 1833 Col. Campbell was directed to proceed to Egypt to replace him as Consul-general there.<sup>58</sup>

The appointment of Campbell as consul-general in Egypt coincided closely with Ibrahim Pasha threatening Constantinople and the Sultan appealing for Russian help. Thus, the integrity of the Ottoman Empire appearing to be at stake, Lord Palmerston issued instructions to the new consul-general explaining to him that "H.M. Government attach great importance to the maintenance of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, considering that state to be a material element in the general balance of power in Europe, and they are of the opinion that any

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55. To Barker, Jan. 29, 1830. Dodwell op.cit. p. 102.

56. To Barker, October 3, 1832. Ibid. P. 112.

57. Barker op.cit. p. 192.

58. To Campbell, January 7, 1833. Dodwell, op.cit. p. 113 N. 1

considerable encroachment upon the Asiatic territories of the Sultan, and any consequent defalcation from the resources which he might bring to bear for the defence of his European dominions, must operate in a corresponding degree upon his relative position with respect to neighboring powers, and must thereby have injurious bearings upon the general interests of Europe. H.M. Government therefore deem it of importance to prevent not only a dissolution but even a partial dismemberment of the Turkish Empire."<sup>59</sup>

But we have seen that four months previous to the issue of those instructions the British Government did not or could not respond to the Sultan's appeal for naval assistance against Muhammad Ali. Therefore, if Palmerston was determined to prevent the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, at the same time that he was unable to employ physical force either against Russia or against Muhammad Ali, what methods did he adopt in order to achieve that end?

With regard to Russia we have seen that the method adopted was to bring general diplomatic pressure upon her. In the case of Muhammad Ali, however, it was a little different. At the beginning (1833), Lord Palmerston thought that by concerted European action Muhammad Ali could be made to abandon his projects.<sup>60</sup> But when the difficulty of applying that method manifested itself, he came to the conclusion that coercive military measures against the Pacha were essential. However, to assume that

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59. To Campbell, Feb. 4, 1833. Ibid. p. 117.

60. Palmerston to William Temple, April 19, 1833. Bulwer, op.cit. p. 154.

in the meantime the British Government, as John Barker's son claimed, was to wink at Muhammad Ali's ambitious projects, or that Campbell was despatched to Alexandria because he had a yielding disposition towards Muhammad Ali,<sup>61</sup> had not been confirmed by the subsequent events. For we know that shortly after his arrival at Alexandria, Campbell threatened Muhammad Ali that should he (Muhammad Ali) persist in claiming Adana, the coast of Egypt would be blockaded by the British fleet.<sup>62</sup> In 1834 Campbell was to press upon the Pacha to abandon his project of declaring himself independent.<sup>63</sup> Similarly in 1837 Campbell urged upon the Pacha that the Powers would not permit him to keep large armaments.<sup>64</sup> And lastly, in 1838 when Muhammad Ali showed intentions of declaring his independence another time, Palmerston was the only one of the European ministers who showed his readiness to act forcibly against Muhammad Ali<sup>65</sup>. These incidents do not show that the British Government's policy between 1833-8 was to wink at Muhammad Ali's ambitious views.

Nor can we claim that the despatch of Campbell had anything to do with the favourable attitude that consul-general held towards Muhammad Ali. In 1834 Campbell thought "that so far as regards the resistance to Russian encroachments and aggrandizement on the side of Asia, perhaps the establishment of an Arab Caliphate under Muhammad Ali would be a better barrier and more likely to afford effectual opposition to Russia than the Porte could now

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61. Barker, op.cit. V II p. 241

62. Campbell to Palmerston, May 2, 3, 7, 9, 13, 15, 1833.  
Hall, op.cit. p. 162.

63. Palmerston to Campbell, October 26, 1834. Ibid. p. 220.

64. Campbell, Dec. 21, 1837. Dodwell op.cit. p. 160.

65. Palmerston to Granville, July 3, 1838. Hall, op.cit. p. 233.

ever be expected to offer, and in case of need Muhammad Ali could give great assistance to Persia (supposing him to rule over Baghdad) in any struggle of Persia against Russia."<sup>66</sup>

From this quotation it is quite evident that the consul-general had given an idea that was not in conformity with the spirit of his instructions as to the preservation of Ottoman integrity. Again, from the same quotation it appears that Campbell had adopted the view that Russian aggression was the chief danger to which British interests in the East were exposed, and so the establishment of a strong state in the Near and Middle East seemed to him as a better barrier that might afford effectual opposition to Russian aggressive designs. Campbell based this view of his on the belief that the Porte was too weak to stand against Russia. But Palmerston could not agree to this and returned a most uncompromising answer.<sup>67</sup> Although the Foreign Secretary agreed with Campbell that Russia should be checked,<sup>68</sup> yet as he expressed it a year earlier "Turkey is as good an occupier of the road to India as an active Arab sovereign would be," and as to Turkey's ineffectiveness Palmerston believed that Britain "must try to help the Sultan in organizing his army, navy and finances; and if he (the Sultan) can get those three departments into good order she still hold his ground."<sup>69</sup> Such being the opinion of Palmerston in 1833-4, and in view of the actual policy Campbell was instructed to adopt towards Muhammad Ali, it seems improbable that the despatch of Campbell to Egypt was because the latter had a more yielding disposition towards

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66. Campbell to Ponsonby, Aug. 21, 1834, Dodwell, op.cit. p. 130.

67. Despatch to Campbell, Oct. 26, 1834. Ibid. p. 132.

68. Palmerston to Campbell, Jumadah II 17, 1249. ROXBOROUGH No. 5255

69. Palmerston to William Temple, March 21, 1833. Bulwer, op.cit. p. 145.



Muhammad Ali, as Ed. Barker had written, probably in defence of his father.

Never-the-less, it cannot be denied that from the previous quotation Campbell did actually hold a favourable attitude towards the plans of Muhammad Ali as it is also evident from the same quotation that difference in opinion between the Foreign Secretary and the consul-general was one in the method and not in the principle, a reasonable inference would be that Campbell's policy was to endeavour to reconcile the interests of his country with that of Muhammad Ali. But as to how far was the consul-general influenced by the Pasha of Egypt to adopt that policy, I cannot answer presently, as it needs an acquaintance with fuller consular correspondence in English, a thing not available at the present moment.

In the following years Campbell's policy towards Muhammad Ali, which as we have seen, was no less than granting him independence, had undergone a modification. In 1837 he wrote that he could not "but feel that if it were possible for Muhammad Ali to be secured against any aggression on the part of the Porte, and that he were at the same time obliged to reduce his army and navy to a fixed standard, and prohibited from raising conscriptions in any part whatsoever of his governments, the beneficial change of these measures would be speedily visible in every part of the country."<sup>70</sup> That change in Campbell's policy may have been due to a change in Muhammad Ali's plans. In view of the Porte's preparations for the renewal of the struggle in which case Muhammad Ali would be only the loser, and in view of the

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70. Campbell, December 21, 1837. Dodwell, op.cit., p. 161.

European Powers objecting to his independence, it seems natural enough that the Pacha should ask for such a guarantee. But unfortunately for the Pacha that guarantee was not given to him.

Nevertheless, the same line of policy continued to be adopted by Campbell with a slight modification. As long as the Powers showed no willingness to secure Muhammad Ali against the Sultan; as the Pacha, according to Campbell, "had more than once told (him)....that he would not assert his independence in order to avoid any direct collision or dispute with any of the Great Powers,"<sup>71</sup> and as Sultan Mahmud, who was predominated in all his actions by a feeling of revenge towards Muhammad Ali,<sup>72</sup> had passed away, Campbell hoped "there will not be difficulty in an amicable arrangement between the young Sultan and his powerful vassal."<sup>73</sup> However, the Pacha would not according to Campbell, "come to any terms so long as Hosrew Pacha remained in power,"<sup>74</sup> and the consul-general thought "it would be the greatest calamity that could befall the Turkish Empire were the same rancorous spirit to be transmitted, through Hosrew Pacha to the new Sultan."<sup>75</sup> Accordingly, Col. Campbell begged the Ambassador at Constantinople <sup>SK</sup> "to bring the weight of (his) influence to the noble task of accomplishing a reconciliation with Muhammad Ali." In his request the consul-general appeared to have been motivated by the hope of regenerating the Ottoman Empire. To him "Muhammad Ali gave the first impulse to reform in Turkey," and his "ambition had always been to restore his nation to its former power.

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71. Campbell to Palmerston, July 13, 1839. Affairs of Levant, V I, pp. 228,-9. No. 170.

72. Campbell to Ponsonby, July 16, 1839. Ibid. p. 262, No. 194, inc 2

73. Campbell to Palmerston, July 11, 1839. Ibid. p. 228. No. 169.

74. Campbell to Palmerston, July 17, 1839. Ibid. p. 261, No. 194.

75. Campbell to Ponsonby, July 16, 1839. Ibid. p. 262, No. 194, inc. 2

and to place it in a situation to resist encroachments.<sup>76</sup> In view of these services rendered by (Muhammad Ali) to his nation and as "there does not exist any ground for suspecting him of views of aggrandizement" beyond what he was already in possession of, Campbell argued that in the contemplated arrangement between the Sultan and the Pacha, the family of the latter was entitled to some considerations. Those considerations were to grant him the hereditary succession of Syria in addition to that of Egypt.

With Palmerston, however, Campbell based his argument on different grounds. "I am fully convinced," wrote the consul-general, "that if the Porte were now to obtain possession of Syria, on the same footing as before its occupation by Muhammad Ali, that country would for many years be the scene of the direct anarchy and misery, and all European commerce would be destroyed and rendered impossible."<sup>77</sup> Ten days later, Campbell added to that argument another one; "Relative to the hereditary succession of Syria... the chief reason for my opinion," Campbell wrote, "is the misery which would ensue to the christian and Jewish populations in Syria if that country were to be constituted as before."<sup>78</sup>

At the same time Campbell endeavoured to strengthen his argument by the view that "the expulsion of Ibrahim Pacha from

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76. Compare this with what Professor Rustum observes in his pamphlet, *Origins of the Egyptian Expedition to Syria*, op.cit. pp.41-6

77. Campbell to Palmerston, July 28, 1839. *Affairs of Levant*, V I. pp.333-4, No.255; Campbell to Ponsonby, August 6, 1839. *Ibid.* pp.357-8, No.261, inc.

78. Campbell to Palmerston, August 7, 1839. *Ibid.* p.357, No.261.

Syria would prove a most difficult understanding."<sup>79</sup> For the same purpose Campbell emphasized the great influence which Muhammad Ali had acquired in the Ottoman Empire especially after the victory of Nezib. According to Campbell, Muhammad Ali "had not only strong friends in the Divan, but he (was) regarded by all parties as the only person who can help the Sultan to sustain the Ottoman Empire."<sup>80</sup> Similarly, on the occasion of Campbell's suggestion that the removal of Hosrew Pacha was called for by circumstances, the consul-general wrote, "it must be borne in mind as a certain fact, that such is the influence of Muhammad Ali in the Turkish Empire, he could raise up in his favour not only Constantinople but every part of Turkey; and, if he desired it, he could by those means overthrow Hosrew Pacha at his will."<sup>81</sup>

But Lord Palmerston was convinced that there was no possibility of a permanent settlement without making Muhammad Ali withdraw into his original shell of Egypt."<sup>82</sup> As Campbell's opinion of Muhammad Ali's power and influence he considered to be "incorrect and exaggerated," the consul-general was recalled,<sup>83</sup> and Colonel Hodges was sent to replace him.<sup>84</sup>

Hodges arrived at Alexandria on December 14, 1839.<sup>85</sup>

From the very beginning he seemed to have possessed the most

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79. Hall, op.cit. p.251

80. Campbell to Palmerston, July 11, 1839. Affairs of Levant, p.228, No.169

81. Campbell to Palmerston, July 17, 1839. Ibid. p.261, No.194

82. Palmerston to Bulwer, September 1, 1839. Bulwer, op.cit. pp.297-8

83. Palmerston to Campbell, September 26, 1839. Affairs of Levant, V I p.422, No.318.

84. Palmerston to Hodges, September 27, 1839. Ibid. p.423, No.319.

85. Hodges to Palmerston, December 16, 1839. Ibid. pp.561-2, No.431.

uncompromising attitude towards Muhammad Ali. Just two weeks after his official reception by Muhammad Ali, Hodges announced to the Pacha "the positive determination of His Majesty's Government to adhere to the line of policy which it had definitely adopted on the subject, and of which an additional proof was afforded to his Highness, by the nomination of a new agent to enforce it... Any opposition offered by his Highness could only entail upon him the most serious consequences." To this language, "Muhammad Ali... burst violently that much words were useless, I do not deny the power of England," the Pacha said, "nor can I tie her hands; but I will never consent to the cession of (Syria and Adana) during my life-time." These words, however, seemed to have had little effect upon the new consul-general and he wrote "that Muhammad Ali (would) submit as soon as he would see a force able to compel him to do so at hand."<sup>86</sup>

As if he intended to give Hodges a visible sign of his determination to resist, Muhammad Ali started on preparing for defense.<sup>87</sup> But again Hodges seemed to have <sup>not been</sup> intimidated, and in one of his interviews with the Pacha he told him "that he (Muhammad Ali) must well know such preparations would have no effect whatever in thwarting <sup>the views</sup> of Great Britain and her Allies, or of turning them from their unalterable determination of supporting the Sublime Porte and restricting him within his due limits." To this Muhammad Ali "with some impatience of manner (according to Hodges) replied, 'there is no use in all these talking. I am

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86. Hodges to Palmerston, January 4, 1840. Ibid. p.600-1, No.472

87. Hodges to Palmerston, January, 13, 14, 1840. Ibid. pp.611-13, Nos.483, 484.

determined; you may write to your government and tell them so'." But once more via Hodges express his idea, "the Pacha will give in as soon as he sees at hand a force capable of compelling him to submit."<sup>88</sup>

According to Hodges, the intelligence that reached Muhammad Ali of the agreement of the Four powers "filled Muhammad Ali with alarm, and in vain did the Pacha labour to fortify the country against attack, as his project of raising national guards had failed and similarly his attempt to raise the moral of the Turkish navy supposed to be at his disposal."<sup>89</sup> And what was worse, according to Hodges, "Muhammad Ali did not appear to be satisfied with the condition of the public mind in Cairo itself, (and the Pacha had) warmly reproved Abbas Pacha for not having suppressed certain manifestations of popular feeling."<sup>90</sup>

But inspite of all this Muhammad Ali, according to Hodges, seemed to have still cherished hopes of disunion amongst the Powers, and that France would still continue to support him. "There is now more disunion than ever amongst you," and though a change has taken place in the French ministry, there<sup>s</sup> as little probability as before of any alteration in the policy of that country, as far as regards my interests."<sup>91</sup> Actually Hodges had the suspicion that Muhammad Ali was "backed by the support and the assurances of a first rate European Power,"<sup>92</sup> and it was asserted confidentially

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88. Hodges to Palmerston, January 14, 1840. Ibid. p.613, No.484.

89. Hodges to Palmerston, February 21, 1840. Ibid. p.639, No.522.

90. Hodges to Palmerston, March 20, 1840. Ibid. p.655, No.540

91. Hodges to Palmerston, March 27, 1840. Ibid. p.669, No.554

92. Hodges to Palmerston, April 18, 1840. Ibid. p.683, No.560

to him that a French steam packet which arrived at Alexandria on June 6, brought with it 300,000 dollars from Marseilles to the Pacha.<sup>93</sup> Two months later Hodges had a talk with the Count Walewski and the latter told him "very distinctly, that backed by the strong manifestations of public opinion in France, and highly dissatisfied with the uncourteous communication of Lord Palmerston to his Excellency M. Guizot, the French Cabinet was resolved to resist at once any measure of coercion against Muhammad Ali." Hodges seemed to have taken as true what the French envoy had told him, and apparently, to disallow the French time for intervention he suggested to Ponsonly "that if coercive measures are to be adopted, it is essential to strike at once and energetically. Delay may be fatal... as to a blockade... it would prove useless."<sup>94</sup>

But again, Muhammad Ali attached primary importance to the declarations of a consul-general; this time <sup>it was</sup> the French Consul-general, M. Cochelet "declared at the palace before the Pacha and several individuals present, that such was the force of public opinion in France, that he had hardly a hope that war could be averted." According to Hodges, such language would produce only injurious effects on Muhammad Ali and those around him.<sup>95</sup> Actually, one day after that communication was made by Hodges "Muhammad Ali has made a formal application to the French Government for its protection and mediation," and on the following

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93. Hodges to Palmerston, April 20, 1840. Ibid. p.684, No.561

94. Hodges to Ponsonly, August 16, 1840.

Ibid. V II, p.149, No.117, inc.2

95. Hodges to Palmerston, August 25, 1840. Ibid. p.167, No.124

day Hodges observed "that Muhammad Ali would definitively reject the terms proposed by the Sublime Porte."<sup>96</sup>

In vain did the consuls-general of the European Powers endeavour to dissuade Muhammad Ali from the course he decided to adopt, for the Pacha seemed to have been determined. He even told the consuls-general not to come to him in a body or give him any more advice. "I can no longer tolerate this bow-wow-wow" the Pacha said to them, "and am wearied to death with you."<sup>97</sup>

But if Muhammad Ali was determined to resist, still more Lord Palmerston was determined to coerce him to submit even against the wishes of France. Accordingly the Foreign Secretary instructed Hodges to undeceive Muhammad Ali that the Five Powers would accept the mediation of France. The arrangements they have determined upon will be executed.

Thus war between the two unequal parties became inevitable. Hostilities soon commenced to end in the triumph of Lord Palmerston's policy.

So far we have been concerned with the relation of Muhammad Ali with the five British Consuls-general who served in Egypt during the period of the Pacha's active career. Very little has been said of the Pacha's relation with the other British consular officers of minor ranks. In the case of those officers who served in Egypt, the consuls-general there seemed

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96. Hodges to Palmerston, August 25, 1840. Ibid. p. 168, No. 127  
97. Alison to Ponsonby, August 30, 1840. Ibid. p. 215, No. 166, line 2  
98. Palmerston to Hodges, Sept. 14, 1840. Ibid. p. 178, No. 132.



to have left them very little opportunity to influence the policy of the Home Government towards the Viceroy, although the latter had not failed to utilize some of them for the advancement of his policy with the British Government. Of those British consuls Briggs and Thurburn were foremost.<sup>99</sup>

But in the case of the British consuls in Syria, it was different. According to the Royal Archives of Egypt between 1833-39 and the Levant correspondence between 1839-41, those consuls, who engaged in trade, and communicated directly with the ambassador and the Foreign Secretary<sup>100</sup>, gave Muhammad Ali no little trouble, to which the failure of his administration in Syria was partly due. Those British consular officers were stationed at different trade centres in Syria. There was a consul at Damascus;<sup>101</sup> another at Beirut (Moore); a third at Jerusalem (young). Similarly Vice-consuls and consular agents were stationed at Aleppo (vice-consul ~~Werry~~<sup>102</sup>; another at Alexandretta (vice-consul Hays)<sup>103</sup>; a third at Tripoli (Gatziglis)<sup>104</sup>; a fourth at Sidon (Joseph Abella); a fifth at Safad (Moses); a sixth at Jaffa (Yusuf Farah Madbee); and the agent on the Baghdad way was Kahik Aga.<sup>105</sup> Other British consular officers were in other places in Syria as Acre and Haifa, but I have not been able to detect their names.

In the first four years of the Egyptian occupation of Syria, Muhammad Ali attempted to introduce into the country the economic system he had adopted in Egypt. He gave definite orders

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99. RUSPRAN, op.cit. Nos. 1084, 2450, 4454.

100. In 1833 the British consuls in Syria were to refer to the Consul general in Egypt in secondary matters; Muhammad Ali Pacha to Ibrahim Pacha, Jumadah I 23, 1249. Ibid. No. 3208.

101. In 1837 Consul Farren at Damascus was recalled and Mr. Werry previously consul at Aleppo replaced him; Muhammad Ali Pacha to Muhammad Sherif Pacha, Shaban 26, 1253. Ibid. No. 5197

102. He should not be confused with consul Werry of Damascus

to monopolize the trade in coffee<sup>106</sup> and at different periods he actually monopolized the trade in cotton,<sup>107</sup> olives,<sup>108</sup> silk,<sup>109</sup> and other articles of trade.<sup>110</sup> At the same time the Pacha endeavoured to encourage the development of agriculture and industry in the country. To the administrative council in Damascus he wrote to pay attention to the plantation of cereals.<sup>111</sup> To his son the Pacha wrote to encourage the production of snuff,<sup>112</sup> and on another occasion declared to him his resolve to establish an iron factory in the Druze district.<sup>113</sup> Similarly the Pacha wrote to Sheriff Pacha that he expected <sup>him</sup> to develop the industry of indigo.<sup>114</sup>

Apparently Muhammad Ali's intention was to render Syria economically self sufficient at the same time that he would become less dependent on the importation from Europe of materials required for his war or peace industries.<sup>115</sup> As these measures were essentially restrictive and as such would render European commerce in Syria to suffer, the objection of the consuls who engaged themselves in trade, was inevitable.

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103. In 1836 Mr. Hays was elected by some British merchants at Alexandrette in place of Sr. Martinelli who fell under the influence of the Jews; Muhammad Sheriff Pacha to Sami Bey, Ramadan 8, 1251. ROSPRAN No. 4378.
104. See Ibid. No. 4009; Affairs of Levant, V I No. 343.
105. ROSPRAE. op.cit. No. 4897.
106. Muhammad Ali Pacha to Ibrahim Pacha, Rabi I 11, 1249. Ibid. No. 3135.
107. The same, Rabi I 9, 1249. No. 3127
108. Muhammad Ali Pacha to Muhammad Munib effendi, Shaban 22, 1249. Ibid. No. 3344.
109. Abdul-Rahman Eff. To Sami Bey, Muharram 25, 1249; Muhammad Ali Pacha to Muhammad Munib effendi, Muharram 25, 1249. Ibid. No. 1242, 3088.
110. As the Hanna, Indigo and " " (Yanbeh)
111. Muhammad Ali Pacha to the Administrative Council in Damascus, Zul-Hidjiah, 1248.
112. Muh. Ali Pacha to Ibr. Pacha, Rabi I 9, 1249. Ibid. No. 3133
113. The same, Rajab 15, 1249. Ibid. No. 3309.

Upon the attempt to monopolize silk trade, however, the consular cry was loudest. As early as 1832 the Egyptian government attempted to purchase all silk produce in Syria.<sup>116</sup> Few months later orders were issued to the custom and other concerned government officers to prepare lists showing the quantity of silk passing through the custom houses, the names of merchants engaged in silk trade and the quantity of silk possessed by each.<sup>117</sup> Apparently these measures were taken so as to account for the increase in foreign silk in the markets of Cairo.<sup>118</sup> But if we were to take Puryear's inference as correct, Farren, the British Consul at Damascus, held the view that Muhammad Ali in doing thus had virtually monopolized the silk trade, and as such he reported on the matter to Ponsonly.<sup>119</sup> But we know from the Royal Archives of Abdine that although the Pacha, as I have said, might have shown his inclination to monopolize the silk trade, that monopoly was never realized in full, and just two months before Ponsonly had written his report to the Ambassador, Hanna Bahri and the Emir Bechir had decided to abandon that monopoly.<sup>120</sup> Nevertheless Ponsonly took Farren's report as being true and as such he had probably communicated it to Lord Palmerston. When Col. Campbell approached Muhammad Ali on the subject in obedience to his instructions from the Foreign office, the Pacha denied that he had ever given orders preventing the exportation of silk,

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114. Muhammad Ali Pacha to Muhammad Sheriff Pacha, Jumada I 3, 1251

115. Muhammad Ali Pacha to Ibrahim Pacha Muharram 6, 1252. Ibid. No. 4543.

116. Abdul-Rahman eff. to Sami Bey, Muharram 26, 1248. Ibid. No. 1242

117. Muhammad Ali Pacha to Muhammad Munib eff. Jumadah I 26, 1248. Ibid. No. 2073.

118. Muhammad Munib eff. to Sami Bey, Jumadah II 22, 1248.

119. Farren to Ponsonly, 12 July, 1834. Puryear, op.cit. p. 40

120. Hanna Bahri to Sami Bey, Muharram 19, 1250. RCHPRAE No. 2449.

and that he simply intended to regulate its trade but never to monopolize it.<sup>121</sup> But the matter did not stop here. Ponsonby, acting on instructions from Palmerston, requested the Porte "to disavow the proceedings of the Pacha of Egypt, and to issue orders to that governor to abstain from interfering with the commercial transactions (hence not alone with the trade in silk) of British subjects in any part of the Ottoman Empire." On December 26, 1835 a firman to this effect was delivered to Ponsonby for transmission to the Pacha through Campbell.<sup>122</sup> When Campbell visited the Viceroy and presented the firman to him, the latter replied that no innovations were introduced in Syria and that the monopoly of silk trade was groundless. And the Pacha concluded by inviting the British to request the despatch of an inspector from Constantinople accompanied by one to represent them so as to ascertain the truthfulness of his declarations.<sup>123</sup> At the same time, Muhammad Ali wrote to Constantinople that he did not monopolize the silk trade, neither did he collect one penny more than his predecessors collected either from the merchants or from the inhabitants. And as he did not interfere in any way in British commercial affairs, he wrote to Syria inquiring as to the real state of things, as that complaint might have arisen from some misunderstanding between the consuls and the government officers there; but the answer from Syria was

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121. To Boghos Bey, Shaban 23, 1251. Ibid. No. 4361.

122. Ponsonby to Palmerston, 26 December, 1835. Puryear, op.cit. p. 41.

123. To Boghos Bey, Ramadan 27, 1251. ROSPRAE, No. 4404.

that nothing of the sort took place. Not contented with this, the Viceroy despatched a representative accompanied by another on behalf of the European consuls, and after investigation they gave their decision that those complaints were merely conversational disputes, and so the affair ended, the consuls having nothing to say. As such the Viceroy was astonished to hear this complaint once more. Probably, the Viceroy continued, this was due to the British consul reporting on the subject to his government before the enquiry was made.<sup>124</sup>

That controversy over the silk trade seemed to have led some of the pacha's intimates to suggest to him the removal of all trade restrictions. Ibrahim Pacha wrote that such a thing would maintain the honourable position of the Viceroy.<sup>125</sup> Suleyman Pacha gave a similar suggestion. But Muhammad Ali disagreed with the latter on that point. To the Pacha the removal of restrictions on trade would bring upon him not only the wrath of Constantinople but that of the British as well.<sup>126</sup> Nevertheless, Muhammad Ali seemed to have complied with the Porte's "vague" firman<sup>u</sup> by removing the restrictions on the silk trade, and extending the privilege of trading in it freely to other European merchants besides the British.<sup>127</sup>

Indeed Muhammad Ali did impose certain restrictions on trade in Syria<sup>128</sup> which from the consuls point of view was a violation of the trade privileges granted to them by the

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124. Muhammad Ali Pacha to the Sublime Porte, Zul-Qidah 7, 1251. Ibid. No. 4442.

125. Ibrahim Pacha to Sami Bey, Zul-Hidjah 6, 1251. Ibid. No. 4441.

126. Muhammad Ali Pacha to Ibrahim Pacha, Zul-Hidjah 23, 1251. Ibid. No. 4506.

127. Muhammad Ali Pacha to Muhammad Sheriff Pacha, Rabi I 22, 1252.

128. Ibrahim Pacha to Sami Bey, Zul-Qidah 6, 1251. Ibid. No. 4441.

capitulations. Yet, some of the consuls had also violated the terms of the Ottoman tariff by refusing to pay the 3% fee on articles of trade although at the prevailing prices of 1835, the 3% fee amounted actually to 1 1/2%<sup>129</sup> But if the consuls had somebody to whom they could redress their grievances, Muhammad Ali had none, and as such he was in the majority of cases acting on the defensive.

The question of monopolies, however, was not the only question that had created dispute between Muhammad Ali and the British consuls in Syria. There was also the question of protection given by consuls to the natives. As "the consuls claimed to be exempt from all but certain fixed dues," and that they were "able to extend that privilege to all whom they employ," many of the natives to relieve themselves of Turkish jurisdiction were in the habit of putting themselves under the protection of the European consuls on the payment of a certain sum of money.<sup>130</sup> In 1833 there was a certain case of a number of masons, stone-cutters and other artisans who secured foreign protection and under that privilege they refused to work in government works at Acre.<sup>131</sup> Similarly some owners of vessels refused to transport lime required for the repairing of the fortress in the same town.<sup>132</sup> When the matter was communicated to Muhammad Ali, he assured his deputy at Syria that the extension of consular protection to the

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129. Puryoar, op.cit. pp. 41-2

130. Campbell, June 19, 1834. Dodwell, op.cit. p. 164.

131. Muhammad Munib eff. to Sami Bey, Jumadah I 5, 1249. ROESPRAK. No. 3199.

132. The same, Jumadah ' 27, 1249. Ibid. No. 3230.

natives was illegal and as such those natives should be taken to Acre by force.<sup>133</sup> This and other incidents of the same nature may have been the reason for Muhammad<sup>Ali</sup> instructing his son that the government officers in Syria should act boldly with the consuls so that they would be compelled to refer to the Seraskier who should show his indignance at their interference (in local affairs) and tell them to refer their complaints to their seniors at Alexandria, assuring them that thenceforward Egypt would be the place for the settlement of their disputes.<sup>134</sup>

But foreign protection was not sold only to the lower classes of people. In 1834 Campbell wrote that rich people as well paid large sums to secure such protection.<sup>135</sup>

The number of those natives who secured foreign protection seemed to have been so high in Beirut that Ibrahim Pacha issued a circular warning the inhabitants of Beirut not to apply for the protection of the consuls, threatening any one who would do so with corporal punishment.<sup>136</sup>

Apparently, the majority of those natives of Syria who were anxious to secure foreign protection did so in order to evade military service, and the Royal Archives abound with incidents of dispute between the government officials and the consuls over the recruitment of the latter's proteges. It seems that the consuls had communicated those disputes to their consuls-general at Alexandria. When those consuls-general protested to

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133. Muhammad Ali Pacha, Jumada II 29, 1249 Ibid. No. 3276.

134. Muhammad Ali Pacha to Muhammad Munib effendi, Jumada II 9, 1249. Ibid. No. 3245.

135. Campbell, June 19, 1834. Dodwell, op.cit. p. 164.

136. Military Order, Jumadah 19, 125. Ibid. No. 4241.

Muhammad Ali over these points, the Viceroy with no little indignation, reminded them of the deplorable condition of Europeans in Syria prior to its conquest by him; how they could not travel around at their pleasure, nor could they visit Jerusalem; how even a respectable English man was beaten in Damascus; and he reminded them also of the weak and unrespectable position of the consuls themselves there. But those words of Muhammad Ali seemed to have no effect on bringing the consuls in Syria to terms, and when Boghos Bey defined the number of consular employees who would be exempt from taxation or military service to six in the case of the vice-consuls and to 12 in the case of consuls, the consuls in general objected to that.<sup>137</sup>

But what was worse from the Egyptian point of view, the agreement of the native and foreign merchants for the purpose of reducing the custom dues,<sup>138</sup> and the attempt of the native merchants to enjoy the trade privileges of foreign merchants by resorting to very tricky methods,<sup>139</sup> this had probably led Muhammad Ali to realize the futility of not treating the native merchants on an equal footing with the foreign merchants<sup>140</sup>

And so Muhammad Ali's economic measures in Syria were thwarted by internal as well as by external opposition. In such a case it was not strange that his economic policy there should fail, which failure had a great deal to do with the ultimate collapse of his administration as a whole, in Syria.

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137. Muh. Sheriff Pacha to Sami Bey, Jumadiah 21, 1261. Ibid. No. 4226.

138. Muhammad Ali Pacha to Muhammad Sheriff Pacha, Shaban 12, 1262. Ibid. No. 4809.

139. Muhammad Sheriff Pacha to Sami Bey, Radjab 27, 1262. Ibid. No. 4787.

140. Muhammad Ali Pacha to Muhammad Sheriff Pacha, Shawal 9, 1262. Ibid. No. 4866.



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