

THE SECURITY OF THE ARAB EAST

by

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Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the  
requirements of the degree of Master of Arts  
in the Department of History, Arab Studies  
Program, at the American University of Beirut,

Beirut, Lebanon, June 1958

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## ABSTRACT

The Security of the Arab East is a study which is concerned with the security problems in the Arab-speaking regions of the Middle East and primarily treats of the period from 1950 to 1958. However, in order to provide proper background and continuity, a historical recollection of attempts at achieving a security for the area prior to 1950 is also presented.

Besides military considerations, an examination of the political, economic and social factors bearing on security are included in this study. The rival interests and influences of the principal foreign powers concerned with Arab East security (i.e., The United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union) are discussed and analyzed in relation to their past and present history within the area. Likewise, Arab interests and what they seek to attain in security for themselves are brought out. The events that have transpired from 1950 forward until 1958 are discussed in light of Arab and foreign powers' interests in an effort to establish definite characteristics that can be attributed to each of them and to show how each affects the security of the region.

The influence of both the oil of the Arab East and the problem of Palestine are treated in separate chapters in which the problem of security is illustrated to be irrevocably tied to, and vitally dependent on, each of them.

An analysis and evaluation of all of the important military pacts and political agreements bearing on Arab East security since 1950 are made to determine to what extent, if any, they contribute to the security of the region. Regional pacts now in existence are discussed in detail to

determine if these instruments do or do not meet the basic criteria for effective regional alliances.

Arab-West relationships are examined and evaluated to ascertain whether any common ground exists for achieving a greater military, economic, social and political security for the region in the future. Based on this analysis certain recommendations are made for improving future relationships between the Arabs and the West.

The strategic importance of the entire Arab East is re-emphasized in consideration of developments that have affected the security of the area since 1950. The growing intensity of the East-West struggle for supremacy within the region is frequently pointed out and the dangers inherent in the present successful Soviet penetration of the area are discussed. This study reveals certain fundamental errors in Western foreign policies for the region and suggests re-evaluation of national strategic interests and consequential revision of Western-Arab policies as matters of vital urgency to forestall further losses of the region to Soviet influence. It emphasizes that neglect to do so can only result in failure and eventual piecemeal surrender of the entire Arab East to the Soviet Union.

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PART I: INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

No known work on the security of the Middle East treats with the security of the Arab East exclusively during the period 1950-1958. It was felt that an examination of the Middle East area in terms of the Arab East only has been lacking for a number of years inasmuch as any discussion of the Middle East security problem tends, usually, to generalize about this region and its ethnic groups, often treating its problems in common with those of Turkey, Greece, Iran, etc. This is believed to be in error inasmuch as the Arab area is separate and distinct in a number of ways.

First, it is a geographically isolated area.<sup>1</sup> It is delimited by the high mountain ranges in the north of Syria and Iraq on their borders with Turkey, and to the east likewise on the Iraqi-Iranian border. The Nile Valley on the west of this Arab region is bordered by the formidable and sizeable Libyan desert. The Mediterranean, the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf provide the remaining geographical limitations and hence define the area which is to be analyzed, the Arab East, as outlined on Reference Map A, Appendix 1. It consists of Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the Persian Gulf and South Arabian coastal Sheikdoms and Protectorates, Yemen, and Egypt.

Secondly, this area contains an ethnic group with a common religion, language and history. Within this region one can, of course, find some minor exceptions to this statement, but on the whole it is valid and

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<sup>1</sup> See Reference Map of Arab East, Appendix 1



applicable and the problems of the Arabs of this area are different from the problems of, say the Persians or the Turks.

Thirdly, there seems to be a common philosophy or attitude prevailing in all these Arab countries, even though their outward expressions of government may at this time differ from one country to the other. They, nonetheless, have had a common experience with the East and with the West, the result of which has been the adoption of certain fixed attitudes toward both of them. One traveling throughout the Arab lands and dealing with the responsible people in government soon becomes aware of this attitude and scarcely recognizes differences between one state and the other in their general attitudes. Even in recent times this has proven true despite some news accounts to the contrary.

Lastly, Western policies, whether American, French or British, must learn to treat with this region, the Arab East, as a complete and separate entity, distinct from the remainder of the Middle East if the Western world expects to make any real progress in the maintaining of good relationships in this area and at the same time safeguard their own national interests. A foreign policy developed for the entire Middle East area cannot, because of existing circumstance and history, be equally applicable to Pakistan and Egypt.

Prior research on the problem of the security of the Middle East was conducted in 1950 by the Brookings Institution. It covered in a general manner the historical backgrounds of the countries comprising what is generally accepted as the Middle East, and analyzed the various factors bearing on the problem of security.<sup>2</sup> The Brookings' study discussed several courses of action for United States foreign policy to follow and was

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<sup>2</sup> The Security of the Middle East, Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., 1950

primarily a systematic analysis of the situation as it stood in 1950.

Later in 1954, a citizen's committee, consisting primarily of clergymen, submitted to the President of the United States a report entitled: The Security of the Middle East, the Problem and Its Solution. This report appeared to be a propaganda scheme by a biased group to influence the political situation at the time. It was poorly written, sketchy and incomplete, disclosing a definite lack of background knowledge of the Middle East; it was positively slanted against the Arabs and for the Israelis. It put the whole Middle Eastern situation in an improper perspective, distorted facts and disclosed half-truths. So misleading a report was certainly not worthy of submission on such a high level.

A number of popular books about the Middle East has touched on the subject of security briefly but has not been primarily concerned with a discussion of the security problems. This study will deal primarily with an analysis of the international political interests in the area and the military pacts and political agreements made from 1950 until 1958 to determine to what extent, if any, they have contributed to the security of the Arab East. A number of other factors will necessarily need to be included in this study for proper evaluation of the facts bearing on the security problem. These factors are other than military forces that provide for the security of a nation and must be considered in evaluating the security of each Arab state. They include political, social and economic factors.

In analyzing the various pacts, agreements, foreign interests and attempts at improving the security of the Arab East an effort will be made to stress the Arab versus the Western point of view and what is wanted by each. A study of these ideas should prove fruitful and may lead to a solution of the problems of the area and provide suggestions for

improving future foreign policy and diplomacy on both sides.

In the light of all available historical facts for the period in question (1950-1958), recommendations will be submitted based on logic and analysis as to what would best contribute to the security of the Arab East.

## CHAPTER 2

### THE MEANING OF SECURITY

#### A. A Definition of Security

What is meant when we speak of security for the Arab East? Security for whom? The connotation of this word may be entirely different for the Russian, the Englishman, the American or the Arab, himself. The dictionary defines the word as a quality of being secure, a freedom from exposure to danger and a feeling of assurance of safety or certainty, a freedom from anxiety or doubt as well as a protection or a defense in the military sense.<sup>3</sup> When speaking of the security of the Arab East, it is in reference to maintaining a situation within the area that allows it to grow and develop itself, naturally and progressively, without the threat of, or actual interference of, an outside force. It at once means a defense in a military sense against invasion and aggression, and at the same time connotes a protection from dominating foreign propaganda and ideologies. It implies a stability of the recognized and legal instruments of the established governments but does not mean the maintenance of the status quo at the expense of political, economic or social backwardness. One American statesman submitted the following attitude in this regard: "Though the status quo is not sacred and unchangeable, we cannot overlook a unilateral gnawing away at it ... we cannot allow aggression to be accomplished by coercion or pressure or by subterfuges such as political infiltration ... we must make it clear in advance that we intend to act to prevent aggression, making it clear at the same time that we will not use force for any other purpose ... I am convinced that satisfactory solutions can be found if there is a stop

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<sup>3</sup> Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary, Merriam-Webster, Springfield, Mass., 1956

to this maneuvering for strategic advantage all over the world ... <sup>4</sup>

A resounding criticism by the Arab governments and people is that the foreign powers are interested in only their own security vis à vis the Arab East and not that of the Arab. This criticism is not without justification. In their efforts to maintain the stability of the area most of the nations having interests in the Middle East have supported the government they found in control at the time their interests developed; these local governments have not always been democratic in the Western sense of the word and often represented vested interests, political and financial. Many did not represent the will of the people nor did they institute reforms which would favor an increased standard of living for the masses. However, at the same time, consideration must be given to the fact that a foreign power, in all fairness to, and due regard for, the position of small nations, must deal with the recognized government in effective control of a country rather than with some dissatisfied political group that holds itself to represent more adequately the feelings of the masses. This problem will, however, develop more complexities and difficulties for the field of international politics with the passage of time.

The security of the Arab East, then, should mean preserving its present governmental structure against outside interference. At the same time political movements representing the sincere desires of the masses or demonstrating general dissatisfaction with their government should not be opposed by the foreign powers; the situation should rather be allowed to develop naturally and freely without outside interference by any of the powers. Such has not, however, always been the case in the Arab East, nor does it seem to be the pattern for the future in so strategic an area of

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<sup>4</sup> Byrnes, James, F., speech to Overseas Press Club, New York Times, March 1, 1946

world politics.

If, for the moment, security in the military sense, i.e., protection from armed aggression which implies immediately the intervention of the great powers is disregarded, there remain certain aspects of security for this region in peace-time, which are bound up in a single term, stability.

#### B. The Need for Stability

Security for the Arab East, in order for any real progress to develop, is closely tied to the stability of the various governments in the region. Because of their interdependence, this term means political, economic and social stabilities at one and the same time. For a number of reasons which will be brought out in the discussion which follows, the governments of the Arab states have been notably unstable since the close of World War II. This situation has, however, progressively improved through the years.

##### (1) The Political Factor

Some Arab governments hastily adopted Western concepts and institutions but there was not an accompanying assimilation of the ideals and democratic elements of those institutions. As a result, weaknesses and abuses in their systems developed which will probably continue to be condoned until internal strains bring on a severe crisis. Then, an accompanying change in their government may bring with it the collapse of the underlying institutions which turn out to be no more than a hollow shell. A good example of this is Syria and the coups d'Etat of 1949 when the democratic institutions went out un lamented and undefended. Democracy in the Arab East is not yet a reality even in the relatively advanced and

progressive states.<sup>5</sup>

It may well be that the democratic system of government in the Western sense of the word, with all due allowances for the differences between institutions and practices, is not the best suited for the Arab states. Saudi Arabia and Yemen, for example, make no pretense at being anything other than absolute regimes, yet are, in a sense, historically to date, more stable than some of their sister Arab states. On the other hand, the democratic system may in the end be applicable, given the time to take root and properly develop. If, however, democracy in the Arab East is assumed to exist today, the essential political and social reforms will be postponed; without these reforms there can be no genuine peace or security for the area.<sup>6</sup>

The fact that Arab politics revolve principally around individual leaders and not around basic issues has contributed to instability in government. With the growth of modern political parties based on broad and sound reform policies this situation is bound to improve. However, such political parties are at present non-existent in the Arab East. There is a growing political awareness by the people throughout the area and a demand that the leaders do something constructive to aid in the development of their countries to modern political states as well as to improve the general standard of living. This public opinion is at the present time not well-organized but it is being felt and being heeded at a rather astounding rate; in the end it is bound to have its affect in better government. That the Arab East is a politically unstable area in world politics today cannot be denied, but at the same time the situation is steadily improving

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<sup>5</sup> Speiser, E.A.; The United States and the Near East, p. 244-245, Harvard Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1952

<sup>6</sup> Ibid., p. 246

and the world can look for more enlightened and responsible leadership in the years that lie ahead.

(2) The Social Factor

The people of the Arab East have recently become more aware of the fact that they have not adequately shared in world progress and they and their leaders are demanding that something be done about it.<sup>7</sup>

Two of the causes for instability in the Arab East today are the growing restlessness of the illiterate, underprivileged masses and the pressure exercised by the feudal or tribal structure. A foreigner meets in the Arab East a generation that is not only dissatisfied with the West but with his own country's shortcomings as well and he is full of destructive criticism for the both of them.<sup>8</sup> An excess population in some of the areas of the Arab East has fostered the preservation of antiquated forms of land ownership and land use, permitting the landowner to occupy a favored position between the masses and external political and financial interests. Strengthened by tribal custom, local sheiks have consistently acted as the channels through which such outside influence operated.<sup>9</sup>

Demographic trends have added an additional factor to be considered. While population increases have not created a universal problem of land per capita or sufficient productivity for proper subsistence throughout the Arab East, that problem is very much in evidence in Egypt, Jordan

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<sup>7</sup> McGhee, George C., "The Challenges to Middle East Development", Middle East Resources, Problems and Prospects, p. 8, Middle East Institute, Washington, D.C., 1954

<sup>8</sup> Ali, Anwar, "The Present Situation in the Middle East as Seen by Middle Easterners", p. 11, The Evolution of Public Responsibility in the Middle East, Middle East Institute, Washington, D.C., 1955

<sup>9</sup> Reitzel, W., The Mediterranean; Its Role in American Foreign Policy, p. 144, Harcourt Brace, New York, N.Y., 1948



and Lebanon. "It is not unreasonable to join evidences of demographic trends and the fact of economic backwardness and see them as cumulatively interacting to break down the existing social structure."<sup>10</sup>

(3) The Economic Factor

Unfortunately, many of the states of the Arab East are not blessed with natural resources and cannot expect to participate in the development of the area within their present political framework. Only by inclusion within larger political groupings or entities can they hope to share in the general progress of the region.<sup>11</sup> This is at once a political as well as an economic factor that must inevitably be considered by the Arab states themselves.

Most of the states of the Arab East achieved independence and statehood in the period of World War II and its aftermath. Previously, and while under foreign domination, their economic advancement was allowed to develop only to the extent that it contributed to the interests of the foreign power concerned. It was largely the wealthy or privileged few upon whom the foreign power relied for support that benefited most from this situation. As a result the economic disparities between the "haves" and the "have-nots" have only grown wider as the years progressed.<sup>12</sup> It is only natural that these people blame the West for their present status, its accompanying frustrations and for maintaining so long an almost intolerable situation.

The usual recommendations for changing such a feudal agriculture economy, with its accompanying problems, consists of "reproducing under

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<sup>10</sup> Ibid, p. 143

<sup>11</sup> McGhee, op. cit., p. 8

<sup>12</sup> Ali, op. cit., p. 13

control and at a higher speed, the economic stages which Western Europe passed through in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, i.e., the rationalization of agriculture, industrialization, and emigration.<sup>13</sup> Only the first two are reasonably applicable to the area. Capital is the basis of industrialization, and where populations are increasing and economic development has been so retarded, the gradual accumulation of capital is too slow a process to accomplish the desired result. The only other available sources of capital are export capital from interested foreign powers and planned withholdings from internal consumption. Even foreign capital, if it can be assumed that it would be offered, and would be available for use, would have to be closely controlled in order to contribute to the establishment of social and economic stability. This, in turn, implies the existence of stable governments capable of giving continued effort to broad plans and of overcoming resistance to change by groups whose interests are involved.<sup>14</sup>

Industrialization requires an educated population on which to draw and develop the skilled workers necessary for such a process of evolution; the vast numbers of illiterates in a backward agricultural economy further complicates and limits the ability of any such nation to develop its industries.

The Arab East region as a whole does not offer great hope for such changes as have been outlined unless its economy can be made part of a still more comprehensive plan. Its resources are poor; it is deficient in coal and water power; world demands limit the use of petroleum as an alternate source of power. Minerals do not exist in important concentrations nor are

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<sup>13</sup> Reitzel, op. cit., p. 144-145

<sup>14</sup> Ibid., p. 146

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<sup>13</sup> Reitzel, op. cit., p. 144-145

<sup>14</sup> Ibid., p. 146

they complementary useful as a basis of industrial development. Because they are too similar, surpluses of goods do not permit a significant amount of interchange.<sup>15</sup> Of such are the economic problems contributing to the general instability of the area.

### C. Forces Acting Against Stability

Both external and internal forces are exerting pressures which help maintain the unstable conditions of the Arab East which have prevailed since World War II.

Internally, vested interests, powerful families and tribal leaders still maintain their strong control of the governments and are not willing to allow progress at the expense of their personal interests. The lack of public-spirited and responsible officials in many quarters has retarded the democratic processes.

The presence of numerous religious and national minorities further complicates and places limitations on the possibilities for internal stability in most of the Arab East; some countries such as Saudi Arabia and the Arab countries of the Persian Gulf, where the population is principally Arab and Moslem, have no such minority problem, yet to others like Lebanon and Iraq the problem is quite serious. The religious minorities include Jews, Christians, several sects which have branched off from Islam itself, such as the Shi'ites, the Druze, the Ismailis, the Alawites and the Yazidis. There are also national minorities such as the Kurds, the Turks, the Assyrians, the Armenians and the Circassians. In the past, when the state was theocratic, sectarianism was a natural thing and the loyalty of the individual was given to his particular denomination instead of the state; the continuance of this sort of sectarianism today acts to divide the Arab

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<sup>15</sup> Ibid, p. 146

society and breeds resentment and hatreds. The person who is incapable of transcending the interests of his own sect does not develop any feeling for the welfare of the country in general.<sup>16</sup> As for the national minorities, many of them live apart from the Arabs, maintaining their own language and customs, while some aspire to a separate national existence, such as the Kurds in Iraq who represent more than twenty per cent of the population of that country. In the past, foreign powers used racial fanaticism as they used sectarianism to divide the population in order to facilitate their control over the country; minorities' fears and suspicions of the Arabs still constitute a factor in retarding the growth of internal stability.<sup>17</sup>

Externally, pressures from various foreign powers act and react to divide the political forces and public opinion, and this obstructs the development of stability. It has been said that there is also a tendency for the region to fall back to its old role as a frontier between an Arab Moslem world and a European Christian world. Furthermore, the expansion of the Soviet Union into Eastern Europe has tended to split the area and has encouraged the growth of neutralism among the Arabs. An additional factor, of which we cannot yet judge the real importance, is communism, which provides opposition groups with alternate social and political objectives. When intermixed with the tendencies noted above, purely local issues become dynamic and motivate the most contradictory movements. Inevitably these local or internal issues become involved in international issues that can only be solved as the international issue becomes resolved.<sup>18</sup>

Mention should also be made of the conflicting international

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<sup>16</sup> Faris, N.A. and Husayn, M.T., The Crescent in Crisis, p. 112, University of Kansas, 1955

<sup>17</sup> Ibid, p. 114

<sup>18</sup> Reitzel, op. cit., p. 152-153

interests and competition for the highly prized and strategic oil reserves of the Arab East. This will be discussed further in a later chapter which deals with oil as a factor concerning the security of the region. It will suffice to mention that while this oil remains essential to the Western powers of Europe and to the United States, the Soviet Union will attempt to deny it to them in furtherance of her own strategic interests. That such circumstances exist can hardly be said to contribute to the stability of the area.

#### D. Preserving Stability

In the history of the past, the various foreign powers concerned achieved a stability in the area by a number of means, including: the application of direct military force, by political manipulations behind the scenes, and by permitting other powers with complementary interests to enter the zone. Persuasion and cooperation were also used when the desired result could be achieved in that manner. Gradually, political, economic and cultural ties developed and these links strengthened the influence of the foreign powers in the region. A temporary stability grew out of these relationships between the foreign powers and the Arab states.

Today, force is more likely to defeat the purpose of preserving stability. Nationalism and racism have reduced the possibilities of easy political manipulation. It is now generally accepted that the development of mutual interests supported by persuasion rather than threats is the more logical policy for a foreign power to pursue to achieve stability within the area. Economic power has been widely employed in the form of grants-in-aid, loans, gifts and charity.<sup>19</sup> It has likewise been applied in the form of equipment and technical advice to Iraq, Lebanon, Jordan and Saudi Arabia.

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<sup>19</sup> Ibid., p. 125, 158-159

Military power, too, is still being employed, although sparingly, to force a provisional stability. British military forces were used, however unwise, in controlling their position of influence and authority in Oman, Aden Protectorate, the Persian Gulf Protectorates, and in the Suez during the three-power abortive attempt against Egypt. With the United States, the use of military force has taken the form of conventional shows of naval power from time to time in the Mediterranean area. While there remains today in the Middle East a certain healthy respect for military power and the possessors of it, at the same time there is a growing resentment against the attempts at pressure or coercion by any and all foreign powers, whatever their intentions might be. Hence, future policies of all such powers must dictate the need for discretion in shows of force and in the employment of force as an instrument of preserving stability. Force is clearly not the key to preserving stability in the Arab East.

The Arab East is today undergoing a great social change. One of its primary needs is continued economic development and programs to relieve illiteracy and raise the standards of living of the masses. Education has to form an integral part of this program because the establishment of a sound and enlightened socio-political structure depends upon education.<sup>20</sup>

Only when the inequities of poverty in the midst of plenty have been alleviated and the Arab peoples are united in their struggle for a better life will they assume the place of responsibility they should occupy among the nations of the world. Then their distrust that separates them from the West will cease to exist.<sup>21</sup> This is the real key to attaining stability in the Arab East.

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<sup>20</sup> Ali, op. cit., p. 14

<sup>21</sup> McGhee, op. cit., p. 8

PART II: ATTEMPTS AT SECURITY IN THE ARAB EAST PRIOR TO 1956

CHAPTER 3

A HISTORICAL RECOLLECTION OF REGIONAL SECURITY EFFORTS IN THE ARAB EAST  
PRIOR TO 1950

A. Early Ideas for Unity

(1) Initial Stirrings for Unity

While the scope of this paper is primarily devoted to aspects of Arab East security during the period 1950-1958, there must necessarily be a reference to some of the earlier efforts for security which are the foundations for that discussion. The ideas of Arab unity have been burning in the minds of Arab nationalists throughout the Arab East since the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the subsequent break-up of the area by the Western powers into its many small segments following the First World War. The political divisions which prevail in the Arab East should not blind us to the underlying cultural and psychological unity of the region as a whole.<sup>22</sup>

The signing of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930 was generally regarded by the Arabs as a forerunner to the liquidation of British and French mandatory controls. In November, 1930, the Iraq government felt this occasion an appropriate time to propose the formation of a federation to consist of Transjordan, Iraq and Saudi Arabia (then the Kingdom of the Nejd and H<sub>aj</sub>āsa). Ibn Saud opposed the plan for fear that any alliance with Iraq might extend British influence over members of the federation inasmuch as

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<sup>22</sup> Speiser, op. cit., p. 243



Iraq was still tied to Britain by close treaty relations.<sup>23</sup> Later, in the 1930's as Saudi Arabia abandoned its traditional isolationism somewhat, better chances for a regional unity began to appear.

In 1936 Saudi Arabia concluded a treaty of Arab Brotherhood and Alliance with Iraq which was open for the adherence of other states. It was the hope of Ibn Saud that this pact would be the basis for a unified Arab world, and in the same year he negotiated a Treaty of Friendship with Egypt. Yemen joined the original pact in 1937 but after that nothing further ever grew out of it.<sup>24</sup>

(2) The Greater Syria Plan

Amir Abdullah of Transjordan whose Hashimite family had been expelled from the Hejaz by Ibn Saud in 1925, cherished the restoration of a Hashimite rule to Syria by advocating a unification of Syria (in its original meaning, Palestine, Syria and Lebanon) and Jordan into a single state. He had come to Transjordan with the avowed intention of restoring Arab rule to Syria as well as his own domain. Colonel T.E. Lawrence had said of him: "He is obviously working to establish the greatness of his family, and has large ideas, which no doubt include his own particular advancement."<sup>25</sup> Amir Abdullah sent notes to the British government in 1940 expressing the desire of Syria and Jordan to be united; Abdullah felt

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<sup>23</sup> Glidden, Harold, W., "The Hashimite Question as a Source of Near East Tension", p. 8-9, Tensions in the Middle East, (ed. William Sands), Middle East Institute, Washington, D.C., 1956

<sup>24</sup> The Security of the Middle East, Brookings Institution, p. 29, Washington, D.C., 1950

<sup>25</sup> The Arab Bulletin, November 26, 1916, (reprinted in Lawrence, T.E., Secret Dispatches from Arabia, p. 37, London, 1939)

the time was ripe for such action inasmuch as France had just collapsed leaving the government of Syria and Lebanon somewhat undetermined. The British responded emphasizing that unity was up to the Arabs themselves and discouraged any action in view of the existing unstable circumstances. Syria, herself, was more concerned with putting an end to the French mandate and establishing a constitutional government of its own. Hence, Abdullah found little response to his enthusiastic plans to achieve full Syrian unity, namely to unite Syria, Lebanon, Palestine and Transjordan into one state.<sup>26</sup> Amir Abdullah continued to propagandize his Greater Syria scheme by publishing Al Kitāb al-Urdunī al-Abyad (the Jordan White Book), in which he stated his fundamental ideas on unity:<sup>27</sup> (1) Syria, Palestine and Jordan to be unified (with Lebanon to have choice of union or not, as she desires), in a "natural Syrian unity". (2) This Syrian unity be within the Arab League structure. This would be the first and most logical step toward realization of the aims of the liberating Arab Revolt. (3) Eastern cooperation with world cooperation would be carried out to realize the objectives of the United Nations and to establish peace in the Near and Middle East. He also put the question before the Alexandria Conference (1944) which was held to lay the foundations of the present Arab League. Though the project was at first sympathetically received by a number of Syrian nationalists, they were, in general, dissatisfied with Transjordan's approach. Most favored a republican system of government and

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<sup>26</sup> Khadduri, Majid, "The Scheme of Fertile Crescent Unity, A Study in Inter-Arab Relations", p. 141 and p. 174 (Note 7), The Near East and the Great Powers, (ed. Frye, R.N.), Harvard Press, 1951

<sup>27</sup> Al Kitāb al-Urdunī al-Abyad (The Jordan White Book), p. 101-103, 238-246, 277, ca. 1947, place of publication unknown. (Al Wathā'iq al-Qawmiyah fi al Wahdat al-Sūriyah al-Ṭabī'iyah or National Documents on the Unification of Natural Syria)

felt that Greater Syria could better be achieved by annexation of Transjordan to Syria.<sup>28</sup> Lebanon was generally opposed to any scheme of unity; leading writers and politicians there severely criticized the plan, arguing that Lebanon accepted the principle of cooperation with other Arab countries on the understanding that her political and territorial integrity would be respected and preserved; circumstances led the Maronite Patriarch, Antūn Aṛīḍa, to declare his hostility to the scheme and to request the guarantees of the great powers for the protection of Lebanon's independence.<sup>29</sup> Amir Abdullah subsequently became King Abdullah when Transjordan became nominally independent of Great Britain in 1946; he continued to press for his Greater Syria Plan and announced it as a principle of Transjordan's official foreign policy (November 11, 1946), thereby arousing the immediate indignation and opposition of both Syria and Lebanon who felt the scheme an encroachment both on their sovereignty and national aspirations. Their complaints led to a joint declaration by the Arab Foreign Ministers to the effect that no member state of the Arab League would encroach on the independence or sovereignty of another member state nor interfere in its form of government. Further, region-wide Arab criticism to Abdullah's plan was published in the book, Kalimat al-Sūriyīn Wal-Arab fi Mashrū' Sūriyah al-Kubrā; the attack refutes the points of Abdullah's scheme and derides his rule and system of government in Jordan. It represents official and

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<sup>28</sup> Sūriyah al-Kubrā (Greater Syria) or Al-Wahdah al-Sūriyah al-Tabī'iyah (The Natural Syrian Unity), p. 7, 8, 9, 48, 59, Damascus, ca. 1947. (In support of the Jordan White Book published by the permanent office of the Jordanian National Conference in answer to the book: "The Word of Syrians and the Arabs on the Project of Greater Syria", published in Damascus.)

<sup>29</sup> Khadduri, op. cit., p. 143-144

unofficial opinions in Lebanon, Egypt, Syria, Palestine and even Jordan.<sup>30</sup> Notwithstanding, King Abdullah continued to make statements to the effect that he would never cease efforts to achieve Syrian unity. Later, in 1947, he and his Greater Syria plan was publicly denounced by the Syrian President, Shukri al-Quwatli, who accused Abdullah of trying to further his own personal ambitions. He was also violently and openly attacked by Saudi Arabia for meddling in Syrian affairs. This marked a change in Abdullah's foreign policy and thereafter it was hinted that Syria preferred a unity with Iraq to one involving Abdullah and Jordan. However, with the death of Abdullah by an assassin's bullet on July 20, 1951, the Greater Syria scheme died too.<sup>31</sup>

### (3) The Fertile Crescent Scheme

The Arab countries of the Fertile Crescent, (Palestine, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq) though relatively more advanced socially and culturally than the others, were the ones subjected to the mandatory controls between the two world wars. The nationalist movements became very strong in these areas due to the fact that the leaders could rouse Arab national consciousness against Western imperialism. With the rise of Arab nationalism in Iraq and its subsequent manifestations, including the Rashid Ali revolt against the British in 1941, Britain eased her policies declaring: "His Majesty's government will give full support to any .... scheme that the Arabs desire for a greater degree of unity than they now

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<sup>30</sup> Kalimat al-Sūriyīn Wal-Arab fī Mashrū' Sūriyah al-Kubrā (Syrian reply to the Jordan White Book, Damascus, 1947; published by a group of cultured Arab youth)

<sup>31</sup> Khadduri, op. cit., p. 150-151  
Faris and Husayn, op. cit., p. 80-81  
Sūriyah al-Kubrā, op. cit., p. 48-59, speech of al-Quwatli attacking Greater Syria plan

enjoy".<sup>32</sup> One reply to this British offer of assistance to Arab unity was the Fertile Crescent Unity plan of General Nuri es-Said of Iraq which was submitted to Mr. R.G. Casey, Great Britain's Minister of State in Cairo. It was compiled in what was known as the Blue Book (printed in Baghdad in 1943 but circulation was limited to about three hundred copies); its covering letter was addressed to Mr. Casey. The principal document was entitled: A Note on Arab Independence and Unity with Particular Reference to Palestine. The following is a summary of the Fertile Crescent scheme.<sup>33</sup>

- (a) Geographical Syria, i.e., Syria, Lebanon, Palestine and Transjordan to be united as one state.
- (b) Form of government, monarchy or republican, unitary or federal, to be decided by the people.
- (c) An Arab League to be formed with Iraq and geographical Syria as basic members, open to other Arab states to join when they desire.
- (d) A permanent council nominated by the member states of the Arab League to be established, responsible for defense, foreign policy, currency regulations, communications, customs and protection of the rights of minorities. The permanent council to be presided over by one of the rulers of the states in a manner acceptable to all states concerned.
- (e) Jews in Palestine to have semi-autonomy with their own administration of schools, health institutes and police but subject to general supervision of Syrian state and under international guarantee.
- (f) Jerusalem to have special status as a holy city, free access to all faiths for pilgrimage and worship; special commission composed of

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<sup>32</sup> The Times, London, 30 May, 1941

<sup>33</sup> Es-Said, Nuri, General, Arab Independence and Unity; A Note on the Arab Cause with Particular Reference to Palestine and Suggestions for a Permanent Settlement, 1943

representatives of three religions to insure this, under international guarantee.

(g) If they demand it, Maronites in Lebanon shall be granted a privileged regime as existed during the days of the Ottoman Empire, under international guarantee.

Nuri's ideas were based first, on the formation of a Greater Syria and union with Iraq which he expected would solve the problems of Palestine by reducing the fears of the Palestinian Arabs of becoming a minority. Secondly, he felt that Arab unity should be based on a joining together of those countries closest in political and social conditions, i.e., the Fertile Crescent, and that such a union would be strongest if it was small and cohesive. He called for the sacrifice of sovereignty and a surrender of vested interest to achieve this Arab union.<sup>34</sup>

Nuri es-Said is sometimes called the "Father of the Arab League" for it was his initial efforts that supplied the necessary impetus to call a general Arab conference to discuss the establishment of a league. Prior to this, Nuri put forth his Fertile Crescent unity ideas to the other Arab countries but they found them unacceptable. Many Arab nationalists argued that a larger Arab unit would only increase rather than diminish the dangers of Zionism, giving the Jews a larger area in which to extend their economic roots. The Maronites of Lebanon feared a return to their pre-1914 status and although it would allay the fears of some Christians of being swallowed-up in an Arab Moslem state, it would at the same time revive many of the disadvantages of the past such as, limited opportunities, a feeling of separation and distinction and the encouragement of outside loyalties without any new or positive advantages. Finally, many Arab leaders felt it

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<sup>34</sup> Ibid

would also be unwise to establish any league without Egypt in the basic organization for it might be difficult to induce her to join it at a later date. Further, that Egypt would give an international status to the new organization that the Fertile Crescent states alone could not give it.<sup>35</sup>

The proposals of Nuri Said and King Abdullah for unity in the Fertile Crescent countries were not in opposition to each other but rather supplementary as both aimed at unification of the Fertile Crescent area and only differed in the details and the form that such a union would take. Both plans made no mention of future relations with Egypt, Saudi Arabia and other states of the Arab Peninsula except for the general provision of Nuri's plan to allow other Arab states to join in when they so desired.<sup>36</sup> Both Nuri's and Abdullah's plans come under the heading of Hashimite schemes of unity.

The Hashimite concept of Arab unity is based on a feeling of the oneness of the Arab community of pre-World War I days which joined in common efforts against the Ottoman Turks' regime to win recognition of political and cultural independence for itself. On the other hand, the Arab states that opposed this unity, i.e., Saudi Arabia, Lebanon and Egypt, are distinguished by a religious or historical separateness from the rest of the Arab world east of Suez. Lebanon is largely Christian in population by tradition; Saudi Arabia practices a more strict form of orthodox Islam than most of the rest of the Moslem world and Egypt, which possesses a rich history as a separate nation, has only recently begun to think of itself as being Arab.<sup>37</sup>

With the advent of Egypt into the world of Arab politics the scheme

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<sup>35</sup> Hourani, C., "The Arab League in Perspective", p. 128, Middle East Journal, vol. I, no. 2, 1947

<sup>36</sup> Khadduri, op. cit., p. 140

<sup>37</sup> Glidden, op. cit., p. 10

for Arab unity as put forth by Nuri Said was substantially altered. Prior to World War II Egypt had, in general, pursued an independent course toward achieving her national aspirations but Cairo had taken on new importance as an Arab capitol during World War II, a natural result of its location as a vital communications center and its role in allied military strategy. The circumstances of the war made Egypt realize the advantages of leading a bloc of Arab states in the post-war period. Passage of leadership to Egypt was facilitated by the only partially independent status of Syria and Lebanon in 1943 and by a temporary overshadowing of Iraqi sovereignty after the Rashid Ali revolt in 1941. Egypt's leadership for the cause of Arab unity encouraged other Arab countries such as Saudi Arabia and Yemen to join also. Hence, Mustafa Nahas Pasha, then Prime Minister of Egypt, took the next steps that led to the formation of the Arab League after consultations with Nuri Said in July and August of 1943.<sup>38</sup>

## B. The Arab League

### (1) The Birth of the League

Nahas Pasha conferred with Arab leaders of Transjordan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen during the fall and winter of 1943-1944; their favorable reaction to the idea of an Arab League resulted in his calling the Alexandria Conference of September 25 - October 8, 1944. The Alexandria Protocol adopted by the conference delineated the outlines of the proposed Arab League and characterized the participants as "desirous of ascertaining the close relations and numerous bonds which unite all Arab peoples; anxious to strengthen these bonds and to direct them toward the well-being of them all to improve their situation, to insure their future and realize their aspirations; and answering the appeal of a public opinion

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<sup>38</sup> Hourani, op. cit., p. 129-130; Khadduri, op. cit., p. 140



throughout the Arab world."<sup>39</sup> There were special annexes to the Protocol regarding Lebanon and Palestine. The first reaffirmed the independence and sovereignty of Lebanon within its (then) present boundaries; the second, declared the rights of the Arabs in Palestine could not be disturbed without affecting the stability of the Arab world as a whole and called for Great Britain to carry out her promises to end Jewish immigration, to safeguard Arab lands and to lead Palestine to independence.<sup>40</sup>

Between the publication of the Alexandria Protocol and the creation of the Arab League on March 22, 1945, governmental and constitutional changes took place in Egypt, Syria, Lebanon and Transjordan. Partly as a result of these changes and partly hesitation on the part of some Arab governments, the original protocol was changed to a weaker document that more carefully safeguarded the sovereignty of the member states. So instead of a tight, small union as Nuri Said had envisioned the League became a loose confederation to satisfy the desires of both local and dynastic interests.<sup>41</sup>

Reference is made to the part of the Arab League, Appendix 2, to this paper, which changes the original protocol statement in the prologue from "desirous of strengthening the close relations ...." by adding the phrase: "upon a basis of respect for independence of these states". The pact omits the clause of the protocol: "in no case will a state be permitted to pursue a foreign policy which would be detrimental to the policy of the League or any of its member states." Further, the pact specifically binds each member not to interfere in the government of others whereas the original document had no such clause. It omits the guarantee of Lebanon's

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<sup>39</sup> Hourani, Ibid., p. 131-132

<sup>40</sup> Ibid., p. 132

<sup>41</sup> Khadduri, op. cit., p. 140

independence in that the pact already contains sufficient guarantees for the sovereignty of all member states. A special annex recognizes the independence of Palestine, de jure, and allows it to participate in the work of the council; this was in conformity with public opinion in the Arab world which could not have regarded a league complete without the inclusion of Palestine. Another annex which obviously has reference to the Arab countries of North Africa provides for their participation in League committees and pledges the League to work for the interests (and independence) of these countries with all the political means at its disposal.<sup>42</sup>

Probably in deference to the aspirations of the Fertile Crescent countries for any future union, Article 9 of the pact provided for: "those states of the Arab League that are desirous of establishing stronger bonds than those provided in the present pact" to conclude among themselves "whatever agreements they wish for their purpose." This was interpreted by Jordan and Iraq as a basis for continued advocacy of Fertile Crescent unity.

## (2) An Evaluation of the Arab League

There is no doubt that the Arab League was the first concrete step forward in the history of attempts at regional security inasmuch as other schemes were merely theories having a small group of followers. That the League's formation was encouraged by Great Britain is well-known; Britain saw the need to revise her relationships with the Arab world in order to find a more realistic accommodation of her own interests and Arab nationalism. She had hoped for the development of a friendly Arab-bloc with a common foreign policy and cooperating with her in economic and

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<sup>42</sup> Hourani, op. cit., p. 132-133; See Appendix 2

cultural relations so that she could peacefully work out her foreign relations in the Arab areas. Instead the League became a sounding board for agitating Anglo-Arab issues and the member states were more concerned with their own internal political problems than those facing the region as a whole.<sup>43</sup>

The Arab League is sometimes accused of being reactionary, xenophobic and pan-Islamic, however, an examination of the actions of the League and the men who created it reveals that these charges are in error for the men who framed the League were persons brought up in the traditions of nineteenth century liberalism and not pan-Islam. Pan-Islam has long ceased to be an effective factor in Arab politics, if it ever was one. Neither do the ideas of twentieth century totalitarianism express the concepts of Arab nationalism which were incorporated into the Arab League; the ideas of Mazzini perhaps best express the dominant concepts.<sup>44</sup>

It is dangerous to compare conditions in Arab countries with those of European society as there is a radical difference between Arab and European ideology. In Europe, nationalism has been built on the concept of the state (inherited from the traditions of the Roman society and law) and the homogenous racial group. Arab nationalism is built on neither. Arab society has never had a concept of a strong sovereign state nor has it ever been exclusively racial, but instead, consisted of racial and religious heterogenous groups bound together by a common Arabic culture and Arabic thought. The failure to grasp the heterogenous character of Arab society is a common failing among many Western "experts" on the Arab world.<sup>45</sup>

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<sup>43</sup> Reitzel, op. cit., p. 87

<sup>44</sup> Hourani, op. cit., p. 134

<sup>45</sup> Ibid., p. 133, p. 134-135

The League worked well until 1948 and the arrangement embodied in it might have become generally acceptable had Arab forces been able to achieve a victory in Palestine.<sup>46</sup> Popular opinion has attributed some of the failures of the League to foreign influence, i.e., that Britain created the League and that Jordan and Iraq were instruments of imperialist policy (which, in part, was true) and lastly, that the chief difficulties in the organization of the League was due to the fragmentation policy of the Western powers after World War II. The more important fact remains that these small states created during and after World War II quickly congealed into separate and distinct nationalisms which won the minds of the people and secured the vested interests of the ruling group. However strongly people might speak of and dream of Arab unity there is no doubt that the kings, presidents and parliaments are almost unanimous in their intentions to maintain separate identities of their states and for any plan of unity presented, each state seems to feel that it should be the more important unit on which to build.<sup>47</sup>

However, the conflicts which exist in the Arab world determines the strength and the character of the Arab League; the front which it presents in international affairs is only as strong as the compromise of purely Arab interests on which it rests. Through the League, the Arab states have had a bigger voice in the more important world affairs and as a potentially coherent force their joint response to Russian, British and American influence in the Middle East becomes more meaningful. The Arab League, despite its shortcomings, was a forward step toward some real kind of unity and with

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<sup>46</sup> Faris and Husayn, op. cit., p. 84  
Dawn, C.E., "The Quest of Nationalism in Syria and Lebanon", Tensions in the Middle East, (ed. William Sands) Middle East Institute, Washington, D.C., 1956

<sup>47</sup> Little, T., "The Arab League, A Reassessment", Middle East Journal, Spring, 1956, p. 144

modifications in its charter could well serve as the vehicle of a stronger union of the future. Noteworthy are the numerous advantages that have already accrued to the member-states in presenting a single stand in the United Nations, developing their economies to be complementary and the adoption of uniform customs and postal regulations. The League, too, had served a useful purpose as a public sounding board for joint Arab policy and as a vehicle for the expression of Arab ideas; on an international basis it has already been accorded such recognition. The Joint Economic Council has functioned with considerable success, especially in applying the Arab embargo against Israel. Recently, too, the Arab League Political Committee took a stand against Iran's claim to Bahrein Island calling it: "exclusively, an Arab area."<sup>48</sup>

### C. Other Unification Ideas, Past and Present

#### (1) Iraq and Jordan

When King Abdullah failed in his attempts for a Greater Syria plan, Iraq and Jordan reconsidered their own relations vis-à-vis the other Arab states. Iraq generally supported the expansionist policy of Jordan on the grounds that what would benefit Jordan now might benefit Iraq in the future. They, therefore, strengthened their own ties by a formal treaty and also, sought the support of a non-Arab power, Turkey. They discussed the possible unification of the two countries into a federal union in 1946, then modified this plan so that each country would retain its identity, but would unify military, cultural and diplomatic affairs. Fear of Transjordan interference in Iraqi affairs reduced the plan to merely a Treaty of Alliance and Brotherhood (signed April 15, 1947); this was approved and came into force on June 10, 1947. The Treaty provides that

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<sup>48</sup> New York Herald Tribune, November 9, 1957

military intervention by one party is permitted to suppress disorder or rebellion in the other and that both parties will consult on matters of security and cooperation and would seek a complete mutual understanding on matters affecting the interests of the two countries.<sup>49</sup> Treaties were signed by Turkey with Iraq on April 29, 1946, and with Iraq and Transjordan on April 15, 1947; the objective of Turkey was to complete a chain of treaties in the Middle East to meet the new balance of power there. It resulted in accentuating the differences between the Hashimite and Saudi Arabian-Egyptian blocs and made it difficult for Turkey to conclude treaties with Syria and Egypt. When General Nuri approached Syria in 1946 to join a pact of Near Eastern countries, he failed completely because Syria believed his scheme to be directed against the Arab League. Probably, if Turkey had first approached Egypt, the leading Arab League country, the Middle East bloc would have become more a reality.<sup>50</sup>

(2) Iraq and Syria

The failure of Arab unity was demonstrated by its inability to maintain a stability during the Palestine Wars in 1947-1948. This led to a coup d'etat in Syria on March 30, 1948. The immediate cause of the coup was said to be the defeat of the Syrian army by the Israelis, however, complaints of corruptions and personal aggrandizements of the Quwatli regime had long been the subject of accusations by rival politicians.<sup>51</sup>

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<sup>49</sup> Middle East Journal, v. I, 1947, no. 4, p. 449-450, Treaty of Brotherhood and Alliance between the Hashimite Kingdom of Transjordan and the Kingdom of Iraq, Washington, D.C., 1947, (from the Transjordan Official Gazette, no. 909, dated June 10, 1947)

<sup>50</sup> Khadduri, op. cit., p. 153 and Note 38, p. 175

<sup>51</sup> Carleton, Alford, "The Syrian Coups d'Etat of 1949", Middle East Journal, v. 4, January, 1950, p. 1-11

The initial coup by Colonel Husni al-Zayim became the basis for Iraqi-Syrian unity. Feeling his position insecure at the beginning, because he had only the support of the army, Zayim appealed to Iraq for cooperation and support; unity plans were discussed. However, when Zayim was assured a lavish financial support by the Egyptian-Saudi Arabian bloc, (who were suspicious of an extension of Hashimite rule to Syria) Zayim suddenly turned hostile toward Iraq, preferring the support of Egyptian diplomacy and Saudi Arabian financial aid.<sup>52</sup>

Zayim's tenure of office was short-lived; he was liquidated in a second coup d'etat on August 14, 1949, by opponents of his pro-French policy and by those who were jealous of his personal ambitions. Colonel Sami al-Hinnawi, who led the revolt, favored Iraqi-Syrian unity. Following the coup he turned over the authority of government to the leading Syrian politicians. Subsequent discussions with Iraqi officials led to a decision which would implement the union of the two states. However, a third coup on December 19, 1949, changed the whole stand on the question of unity with Iraq. A number of army officers, headed by Colonel Abib al-Shishakli, in cooperation with a number of republican bloc leaders (opponents to an Arab unity, led by Akram Hourani and Abdul Baqi Nizam ad-Din) executed the last of the coups. Shishakli, after completing his coup in Damascus, headed a military mission to Cairo and was favorably received. From there he proceeded to Riyadh to repair Saudi friendships. As a result of these visits and those by subsequent cabinet ministers, Saudi Arabia supplied the new regime with a six million dollar loan and promoted commercial relations with Egypt. The new government paid lip service to cooperation with Iraq and possible unity, but actually Syria had gone over once more to the Saudi-

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<sup>52</sup> Khadduri, *op. cit.*, p. 155-159

Egyptian bloc.<sup>53</sup> Of such was the history of the attempts at Iraqi-Syrian unity that twice almost came into being.

The foregoing presentation of attempts at regional security in the Arab East was felt necessary in order to pursue the development of the period from 1950-1958. Many of the actions and attitudes demonstrated by the various Arab governments developed in the period preceding 1950.

Hence, the following discussion will deal with the history of the period to which this study is primarily concerned, from 1950-1958, with special reference to those incidents which occurred during the period which have a bearing on the security of the area.

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<sup>53</sup> Khadduri, Ibid, p. 159-167



## CHAPTER 4

### A HISTORY OF MAJOR INCIDENTS AFFECTING THE SECURITY OF THE ARAB EAST

1950-1958

#### A. The Tripartite Declaration and the Collective Security Pact of the Arab League

The foregoing discussions regarding the attempts at security in the Arab East prior to 1950 did not emphasize the deleterious affects of the Arab-Israeli War on the possibilities of reaching stability and security in the area. The problem of Palestine as a factor in the security of the region will be dealt with separately in a chapter to follow. However, much of what transpired in the way of international and inter-Arab relationships during the period under consideration had their origins in the Palestine War or was related to it; this will be brought out frequently in the discussion which follows.

The Collective Security Pact of the Arab League (of 1950), for example, was ostensibly proposed by the Egyptians in order to protect all the Arab states from Zionist danger; but the real motive of Egypt was to disrupt any Syrian-Iraqi unity scheme. The idea of unity with Iraq had been advocated by the Syrians who sought protection from the Zionist threat by means of it.<sup>54</sup> As early as October, 1949, general agreement on the Collective Security Pact had been reached by the member states of the League and it was approved by the League council on April 13, 1950. This was the first step of any real significance taken toward achieving an actual regional security for the Arab states and could have been the basis

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<sup>54</sup> Khadduri, *op. cit.*, p. 166; See Appendix 3, Collective Security Pact of the Arab League.

for a sound defense organization had the idea been approached realistically by all the states concerned. However, other events occurred which had their damaging effects on these important negotiations.

At about the same time of the Security Pact discussions, the Tripartite Declaration of May, 1950, was promulgated.<sup>55</sup> This joint American, French and British declaration was felt by the West to be necessary to relieve the growing tensions in the Middle East and to prevent an arms race from developing between the Israeli and Arab states. The three powers required assurance from all states in the area to which arms would be shipped that their weapons would not be used to undertake acts of aggression. Further, the powers declared their deep interest in the security of the area, and warned that they would intervene, within and outside the United Nations to prevent any aggression or violation of frontiers and armistice lines.<sup>56</sup>

The Israelis reacted favorably to the announcement inasmuch as it seemed to guarantee their present status and borders. The Arab states, however, were wary of its implications and replied (on June 17, 1950) to the declaration that they considered themselves solely responsible for the maintenance of peace in the Middle East, felt a profound sense of responsibility for internal security and legitimate self-defence, and did not possess aggressive intentions. They rather resentfully accepted the intention of the three powers to prevent aggression but cautioned the West not to favor Israel in the supplying of armaments, nor to use pressure to attempt to force a settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute.<sup>57</sup>

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<sup>55</sup> Appendix 4, Tripartite Agreement of 1950 (May 25, 1950)

<sup>56</sup> Ibid, see paragraph 3 and 4, Tripartite Agreement

<sup>57</sup> Keesings Contemporary Archives, 1950-1952, v. VIII, p. 10812

On the same day that the League replied to the Tripartite Agreement, the Collective Security Pact met a mortal blow, for all signed it with the exception of Iraq and Jordan. Jordan refused to sign it and Iraq abstained for technical reasons, probably because Iraq would not sign without Jordan's adherence to it.

Jordan's non-agreement grew out of the Palestine issue, for an earlier meeting of the League (in March and April of 1950), was marked by internal frictions between Jordan and the other Arab states. At this session and over Jordan's objections the council of the League invited the Arab Palestine government in Gaza, which King Abdullah did not recognize, to send representatives. Further, the council resolved that no Arab state has the right to make a separate peace with Israel and declared any annexation of Arab Palestine by a member state is a violation of the League charter, subject to sanctions. This was directed principally at Jordan which had been previously rebuked for making separate agreements with the Israelis and it squarely opposed King Abdullah's ambitions of annexing Arab Palestine to Jordan. When in violation of this, Jordan annexed Western-occupied Palestine on April 24, 1950, an extraordinary session of the League was called to consider Jordan's action; Egypt and Saudi Arabia demanded firm and energetic action be taken against Jordan, including expulsion from the League. On May 15 the council voted unanimously that Jordan had violated the resolution of April 13 (1950) and all wanted Jordan expelled from the League except Iraq and Yemen, who asked for more time to consider the matter.

Later in June when the council met again, Jordan submitted a memorandum to the effect that its annexation of Arab Palestine was irrevocable. Most of the Arab states still favored the expulsion of Jordan but Iraq supported her on the grounds that the people of the region had wanted

union with Jordan. Finally, no action was taken against Jordan inasmuch as she agreed to relinquish the territory if and when the borders of Palestine (as under the British mandate) were restored, and if the people so desired.<sup>58</sup>

Finally, Jordan was in disagreement with a League resolution of 1950 which favored the United Nations' plan for the international status of Jerusalem, i.e., placing the city under international control. Jordan, in agreement with Israel, was in control of half the city including the old city of Jerusalem.<sup>59</sup>

The economic rivalry on purely nationalist lines of Syria and Lebanon, which caused the break in commercial relations between those two countries in 1950, is another factor which worked against Arab unity and cooperation during this important period. The trade barriers which were erected between Syria and Lebanon, states of complementary economies, have destroyed the mutual benefits which could have been derived from an economic cooperation.<sup>60</sup>

Such factors as these undermined the foundations of the Arab Collective Security Pact and limited its chances of survival at birth. Jordan did not adhere to the Pact until February 16, 1952, when its differences with the League were in part resolved. Despite Jordan's non-adherence to the Pact and Iraq's hesitation to cooperate, the defense objectives of the agreement were never pursued in earnest and it remained for the most part "ink on paper".

The Arab Collective Security Pact first came into force on

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<sup>58</sup> Ibid, p. 10812

<sup>59</sup> Ibid

<sup>60</sup> Brookings Institution, op. cit., p. 26

August 24, 1952, following its formal ratification by Iraq (August 17, 1952) and Saudi Arabia (August 20, 1952). At the initial meetings of the Arab Supreme Defense Council, composed of foreign ministers and defense ministers of the adherents to the Collective Security Pact, it was decided that all ideas of a common defense system in association with Western or Balkan defense organizations had been abandoned. They stated that there could be no contact between the Arab Collective Security Pact and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization because such a relationship would be that between "master and servant".

It had been decided to set up a permanent military committee in Cairo, as envisioned in the Pact, and to concentrate on modernizing, strengthening and standardizing the existing military forces in the various Arab countries rather than raising an Arab union army under a single command, as had been suggested. The standardization of equipment was known to present a major problem as the Egyptians, Jordanians and Iraqis had British equipment, whereas the Lebanese and Syrian armies had French and American equipment.<sup>61</sup>

Actions, however, rarely got beyond the planning stage and the Pact was never capable of being put into force for it had no backbone nor did it have more than the verbal support of its participants. The machinery existed within the arrangements of the Pact to provide for a regional security for the Arab East areas but was never developed or pursued by the member states.

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<sup>61</sup> Keesings, op. cit., p. 13710 and p. 13183, v. VIII, 1951-1952

B. The Middle East Command Proposals

In the fall of 1951 a series of events took place relating to the security of the Arab states and the interests of the Western powers in establishing some sort of regional defense arrangement within the area. Egypt had been aware of the fact that for some time the Western powers had been discussing new and far-reaching defense arrangements of the area which would include her. The Western powers, in order to prevent or forestall any Egyptian action which might preclude her working with the West, notified the Egyptian government of an impending invitation to join a projected Middle East Command as a basic member.<sup>62</sup> Feeling the time was ripe to draw some concessions from Great Britain, Nahas Pasha, then Prime Minister of Egypt, announced Egypt's intention to abrogate the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 and the Sudan Condominium Agreement of 1899. This drew sharp reactions from both Great Britain and the United States who had already concluded other plans for Egypt. Great Britain stated it did not recognize the legality of a unilateral abrogation of an international treaty and that she would continue to adhere to her treaty rights to maintain troops in the Suez Canal until other arrangements for the defense of Egypt could be reached in open agreement with Egypt. The United States government supported the British position stating that "proper respect for international obligations requires that they be altered by mutual agreement rather than by unilateral action of one of the parties".<sup>63</sup> A strong anti-British feeling prevailed in Egypt at the time

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<sup>62</sup> Hurewitz, J.C., Middle East Dilemmas, p. 92, Harper New York, 1953

<sup>63</sup> Acheson, Dean, United States Secretary of State, statement at the Tenth Annual Press Conference, Washington, D.C.

of the pronouncements of Nahas Pasha, and his declaration set off a wave of demonstrations and rioting in Cairo, Alexandria, Ismailia, Port Said and other Egyptian cities demanding the evacuation of the British. Such an atmosphere should have been an obvious indication to the Western powers that any new offers to include the Egyptians in any defense arrangement, at the expense of any part of her sovereignty, or the inclusion of foreign garrisons on her territories, could not meet with anything other than absolute failure.

Yet the American Secretary of State naively came forth with the following statement: "The United States considers that a new proposal shortly to be offered to the Egyptian government should serve as a sound basis for an agreement which will not only satisfy the interests of all parties concerned but also contribute to the defense of the free world in which the Middle East plays such an important part."<sup>64</sup>

Just five days after the Anglo-Egyptian frictions, the Western powers presented their new plan to include Egypt in a Middle East Command, although Egypt had not been previously consulted in the preliminary discussions concerning her future. The governments of Great Britain, the United States, France and Turkey invited Egypt to participate as an equal partner in the establishment of a new allied Middle East Command, which would supersede the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936. This plan was submitted to the Egyptian Ambassador by the Ambassadors of the four powers concerned on October 13, 1951. The proposals provided for the formal handing over of the British bases in the Suez Canal area on the understanding that it would, at once, become an allied base with full Egyptian participation. Other Arab countries and Israel had also been informed of

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<sup>64</sup> Ibid

the substance of the defense measures and other Middle Eastern countries might be included in the new allied Command, at a later date if they desired to join, but not as full partners.<sup>65</sup>

The proposal could not have been more ill-timed; furthermore, the tenor and language of the British note reflected her resentment and disdain at Egypt's preceding actions (regarding her intention to abrogate the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement of 1936). For example, the preface of the British note included the following: "Although His Majesty's government are at a great loss to understand the reason for the action taken by the Egyptian government (regarding the introduction of legislation to abrogate the 1936 Treaty) and cannot recognize its legality, they have, nonetheless, decided ... to present proposals ...."<sup>66</sup> It is hard to imagine that the Egyptians would do other than what they did. On the 15 of October Egypt replied: "The Egyptian government cannot consider these proposals or any other proposals concerning differences outstanding between United Kingdom and Egypt while there are British forces in occupation of Egypt and Sudan."<sup>67</sup> Egypt followed this up by passing decrees abrogating the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 and the Sudan Condominium Agreement of 1899 on the very same day. The British government seemed to have expected such a reaction and may not have been hopeful, or entirely desirous of, achieving success. This was evident in the remarks of British Foreign Secretary Morrison on receiving the Egyptian reaction when he stated that the reaction by Egypt of these proposals was received "with regret" but had caused no

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<sup>65</sup> Keesings, op. cit., p. 11173-11179, v. VIII, 1950-1952

<sup>66</sup> Ibid., p. 11173 (Britain's note to Egypt, October, 1951)

<sup>67</sup> Ibid., (Egyptian reply to Sir Ralph Stevenson, October 15, 1951, Cairo)



"surprise".<sup>68</sup>

Following the Egyptian rejection of the Middle East Command proposals and her unilateral abrogation of the 1936 Treaty and Sudan Condominium Agreement, there occurred serious disorders and anti-British demonstrations in Port Said and Ismailia which prompted British authorities to occupy the two towns. Egyptian officials reacted by putting into effect a number of measures denying facilities to British forces in the Canal Zone and unsuccessfully attempted to stop British military shipping through the Canal and at its ports. British troops in a counter-move took over all public utilities and key communication ports, as well as control of all road and rail traffic and port operations at Port Said, Suez and Abediya. Strong British reinforcements, naval and military, were moved into the zone.<sup>69</sup> The situation could not have become more serious or inflamed.

The idea of a Middle East Command had its origins with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and its proposal and timing were closely associated with the visit of the three Western military commanders, General Omar N. Bradley, Field Marshall Slim and General Lechères to the Middle East. Agreement was reached with Turkey that defense of the Middle East was of common concern and that a Middle East Command should be established. Turkey recognized the value of such a command. At the same time, NATO headquarters issued a protocol which, if ratified, would bring both Greece and Turkey into the NATO organization, and this subsequently took place.<sup>70</sup> It was intended that the Union of South Africa, Australia and New Zealand

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<sup>68</sup> Ibid, p. 11774

<sup>69</sup> Ibid, p. 11776

<sup>70</sup> Ibid

be original signatories in the declaration of the establishment of such a Middle East Command inasmuch as they had participated in earlier discussions concerning it; agreement could not be reached in the desired time for presentation of the proposal to Egypt, which the Western powers felt was so urgent. Hence, it was presented by the four powers only, i.e., United States, Britain, France and Turkey.

The United States Department of State announced on October 24, 1951, that despite Egypt's rejection, the United States would continue to work for the establishment of a Middle East Command. This was followed on November 10, 1951, by a joint four-power statement of Britain, France, United States and Turkey concerning their plan to establish a Middle East Command and enunciated the guiding principles of the proposed organization. It stated the defense of the Middle East is vital to the free world and that defense against aggression can only be achieved by the cooperation of the interested states; further, that the achievement of peace and stability would bring social and economic advancement as well. It invited membership on an equal basis, with no impositions on natural sovereignty or independence. It promised assistance and arms support and non-interference in the problems or disputes of the area. But, at the same time, it stated that the Middle East Command in no way affects existing armistice agreements or the principles of the Tripartite Declaration of May, 1950. The broad general mission was declared to be the cooperative defense of the region. The organization was primarily to be one of planning and providing assistance by advice and training of the armed forces of the countries participating. It was pointed out that participation in this defense program did not necessarily require placing military forces at the disposal of the NATO Supreme Army Commander in the Middle East, nor was the initial plan of the

organization unchangeable.<sup>71</sup>

This new attempt at securing a Western-sponsored regional defense organization in the Middle East was accompanied by the announcement of a 160 million dollar program of economic and technical aid to the area. Despite this fact, the proposals were unappealing to the Arab states and especially to Egypt, who made great efforts to influence her brother states to likewise reject them. During the months that followed, one modification after another was made to the original plan in hope that it might be more acceptable to the Arab states and Egypt in particular. Nearly a year passed before the American government, realizing the lack of progress, decided to drop the idea of a "command" and substitute for it a defense "organization", limited to liason with the states of the area and with joint consultation on matters of defense. The British opposed this view and desired a functioning command or headquarters, which they felt might have more chance of including both Israel and the Arab states eventually. The result was a compromise; MEDO (Middle East Defense Organization), sponsored by the United States, Great Britain, France, Turkey, Australia, New Zealand and the Union of South Africa. It consisted primarily of a military planning committee to deal with the defensive problems of the area and the issues which contributed to instability.<sup>72</sup> One feature significant to this plan is a tentative British proposal to establish the operating headquarters of the organization on the island of Cyprus. This indicates how, at that time, the British began to realize that at some time in the near future its Suez Canal base would have to be given up to the Egyptians.

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<sup>71</sup> Ibid., p. 11832; and Hoskins, H.L., The Middle East, Problem Area in World Politics, p. 283, MacMillan Company, New York, 1954

<sup>72</sup> Hoskins, Ibid., p. 284

who were clamoring for British withdrawal. Indications were that the British would, once the Sudan matter was settled, make a phased withdrawal from the Suez Canal zone and hand it over to the Egyptians. This action, it was hoped, would bring Arab goodwill and provide some new basis for achieving a cooperative defense organization in the area. But Cyprus would, in reality, not be a suitable alternative for the Suez bases for a number of sound military reasons. Britain well realized this. Both strategically and politically Egypt is the key nation in any Middle East defense, politically because of its influence over other Arab states, and strategically because of its geographical position relative to other important land and sea areas.<sup>73</sup>

C. The "Northern Tier" Concept

The MEDO (Middle East Defense Organization), however, did not grow nor take root with the Arab states and when in May, 1953, Mr. John Foster Dulles (American Secretary of State) visited the Middle East, he became convinced that Egypt would not join a Western-sponsored defense alliance. He then conceived the idea of the "Northern Tier" defense concept.

Further, during Mr. Dulles' visit to the Arab region (May 10-30, 1953), the Arab states presented him with a memoranda concerning the defense of the region which indicated that the members of the Arab League had irrevocably decided to defend the area themselves and that a defensive system would be established within the framework of the Arab Collective Security Pact. Further, the Arab states would not accept any Middle East defense system drawn by nations not forming a part of the area but would accept assistance, when needed.<sup>74</sup>

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73 Ibid, p. 265-266, 268, 270

74 Keesings, op. cit., v. IX, p. 12957

In a June 1st, 1953 radio broadcast, Mr. Dulles revealed that a Middle East defense organization was a future rather than an immediate possibility. He stated that during his recent visit to the Middle East he had found only a "vague" desire for such a collective security system. Further, that no such system could be imposed by the Western powers and that little could be done in achieving a collective security system until Israeli and Arab states had settled their differences.<sup>75</sup>

Because previous schemes of both Britain and America had failed to attract the Arab states, Mr. Dulles proposed a new purely American concept for the defense of the Middle East from possible Soviet aggression. Soon after his return from the Middle East Mr. Dulles proposed the "Northern Tier" idea; a defense running through Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Pakistan. The response was not spontaneous but prolonged negotiations led to, first, a signing of the Turkish-Pakistani Alliance in April, 1954, then the Turco-Iraqi Pact of February 24, 1955, which later became expanded into the Baghdad Pact with the adherence of Great Britain and Iran.<sup>76</sup> Thus, the West had finally achieved its objective in the Middle East of developing some sort of regional alignment. True, it only included one of the Arab states, but it was one strategically located, Westernly-oriented and reliable.

D. The Turco-Iraqi Agreement and the Baghdad Pact

Early in January, 1955, Prime Minister Adnan Menderes took the initiative to establish new treaty relations with Iraq to stabilize and provide for the security of the area. Menderes and his foreign minister, Mr. Köprülü, discussed the new alignment from January 6-14 with the Iraqi Prime Minister, General Nuri es-Said. In announcing their intention to

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<sup>75</sup> Ibid

<sup>76</sup> Ibid

conclude a new treaty, the two governments stated: "The Turkish and Iraqi governments believe that since a treaty will serve to establish security in the Middle East ... they deem it useful and necessary that other like-minded states, taking into consideration their geographical position and means at their disposal, should join this treaty. Consequently, before the treaty is drawn up, Turkey and Iraq will remain in close contact with those states which express a desire to act in concert with them and will make every endeavour to persuade those states to sign the treaty simultaneously with them ... ".<sup>77</sup>

Hence, on his return to Turkey, Menderes visited Syria and Lebanon presenting invitations for them to join the proposed pact and gave assurances that Turkey would not enter into similar arrangements with Israel. Syria turned down this proposal; Lebanon, which desired to see a Middle East defense organization, was willing to act only with Arab League approval.

When the news of the impending treaty reached Egypt, she reacted immediately by calling an emergency session of the Arab League and a meeting of the Prime Ministers of all countries which had signed the Arab Collective Security Pact to discuss "this blow to Arab unity". The meeting was to convene on January 22, 1955, in Cairo. Nuri es-Said, however, avoided this meeting and was undeterred in his efforts to conclude a treaty with the Turks. Iraq felt its greatest threat was from the north whereas the rest of the Arab states were more concerned with the spread of Zionism. The Turco-Iraqi Pact came into effect on February 24, 1955.<sup>78</sup>

Great Britain was the first country to adhere to the pact of Iraq and Turkey on April 4, 1955, after it had been announced and open to

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<sup>77</sup> Keesings, Ibid., v. X, p. 14057 and 14105

<sup>78</sup> Ibid., p. 14057-14058; See Appendix 6, Turco-Iraqi Pact

participation of other countries. Britain had a special reason to join the alliance inasmuch as Iraq was pressing her for termination of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930. Hence, when Britain adhered to the Pact in March, 1955, she signed a separate agreement (Appendix 7) with Iraq providing for termination of the 1930 Treaty, giving Iraq sovereignty over British military and air bases there and the maintenance of "close cooperation" between the two countries.<sup>79</sup> With the subsequent adherence of Pakistan on September 23, 1955, and Iran on November 3, 1955, the five nation alliance on the "Northern Tier" became known as the Baghdad Pact; probably because the first phase of it was concluded in Baghdad and because its permanent organization took that city as its headquarters. The Baghdad Pact, Appendix 6, obligates its members to cooperate for their security and defense but does not require military commitments such as found in the North Atlantic Treaty alliance; such defensive measures as the parties agree to take are included in special agreements between them.<sup>80</sup>

The United States, which had encouraged this regional security arrangement, did not join it; instead, it tried to maintain its policy of "impartial friendship" in the Middle East. It did, however, have observer representation at the Baghdad Pact meetings and accepted membership in the economic committee, the anti-subversion committees, and more recently, in the military planning committee.<sup>81</sup>

The Baghdad Pact linked the Middle East with NATO through Turkey and Great Britain, and with SEATO (South East Asia Treaty Organization) through Pakistan. It includes only one Arab state, Iraq, but provides a

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<sup>79</sup> See Appendix 7, special agreement between United Kingdom and Iraq

<sup>80</sup> Stone, William T, "Great Power Commitments", p. 25, The Middle East in the Cold War, (ed: Grant S. McClellan), 14 W. Wilson, New York, 1956

<sup>81</sup> Ibid, p. 25-26

protective barrier for the others against possible Soviet aggression. It marked the conclusion, at least on paper, of a chain of United States' sponsored alliances stretching from Norway to the Phillipines, which had the objective of preventing further expansion of the Sino-Soviet axis. It was concerned more as a political and ideological cordon sanitaire than as a military front against possible armed aggression. It is primarily regarded as a means of combating subversion and suppressing internal unrest and is not expected to be able in the foreseeable future to be capable of holding or of significantly delaying an armed Soviet attack. The strongest member of the pact is Britain who, with her world-wide commitments would be delayed in assisting the regional members. In the region the Turks have been the strongest army, numbering close to 850,000 troops. Pakistan has an army of 190,000; Iran 125,000 and Iraq, 40-50,000. Iran is considered the weakest link in the chain due to its internal difficulties and sweeping purges of army officers that have taken place from time to time. The signatories realize that the effectiveness of the pact depends upon the United States, hence, its strength is potential, not actual. The member states look for ultimate American adherence and hope for the inclusion of other Arab states, but this is unlikely.<sup>82</sup>

Iraq had hastened to mention that its adherence to the pact in no way conflicted with its membership in the Arab League. An implication of Iraq's announcement was that the pact might be used to aid an Arab state which might become the object of aggression. Nevertheless, the Baghdad Pact split the Arab world quite violently.<sup>83</sup>

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<sup>82</sup> Spector, Ivar, The Soviet Union and the Moslem World, p. 125, University of Washington Press, 1956; and Stone, op. cit., p. 27-29

<sup>83</sup> Spector, op. cit., p. 125.



E. Decline of British Influence in Jordan; Dismissal of Glubb

An example of this was Great Britain's ill-timed effort to secure Jordan's adherence to the Pact in December, 1955. Early in 1955 King Hussein, unready to commit Jordan in the feud dividing Iraq and Egypt, visited both Egypt and Pakistan. A visit by the Turkish President, Jalal Beyar, to Amman in December, 1955, was the beginning of an attempt to bring Jordan into the Baghdad Pact. Egypt interpreted this move as a betrayal of Arab solidarity against Israel. Next followed the visit of General Sir Gerald Templer, British Chief of Staff, who had all but achieved his goal of having Jordan join the alliance in exchange for increased aid to that country when popular reactions, no doubt helped by Egyptian and Saudi efforts to prevent such action by Jordan, forced King Hussein and his government to reverse their views. Demonstrations and riots brought on the downfall of the government and dissolution of parliament. This showed the underlying fears of the Arabs of any further treaty obligations with Britain which might insure their continued domination and, thus, Jordan broke away from its traditional friendship with Iraq. Soviet writers who had been acclaiming the Arab states for their successful resistance to Western pressures, interpreted the Jordan riots as representative of the opposition of all the Arab states. They welcomed and no doubt helped to instigate the Jordan riots.<sup>84</sup> Without Jordan's adherence to the pact, Egypt won a crushing victory, for Lebanon would not join without Jordan and neither would the other Arab states.

The British move was countered by the attempt of Cairo to bring Jordan into an alliance with Egypt-Syria-Saudi Arabia. King Hussein tried to maintain a neutral position between the rival defense groups. The

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<sup>84</sup> Ibid., p. 125

anti-British feeling that followed General Templer's efforts at pressuring Jordan into the Baghdad Pact, plus the discontent and agitation of nationalist elements in the Arab Legion forced King Hussein to dismiss on March 1, 1956, Lieutenant-General John Bagot Glubb (Glubb Pasha), the British officer who for thirty years had developed the Arab Legion and served as its chief of staff. It is doubtful that the British could have maintained their position in Jordan after their unsuccessful attempt to bring Jordan into the Pact; it was a great blow to British prestige in the whole Arab world. Actually, it is doubtful that the King could have maintained himself, had he not taken the action that he did.<sup>85</sup>

British-Jordanian relations further deteriorated in the fall of 1956 when a newly-elected Jordanian government announced its unilateral abrogation of the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty of 1948 with the encouragement of the Egypt-Syria-Saudi Arabia bloc which promised to replace the financial support formerly given by Great Britain that Jordan needed in order to survive. This new independent action was hailed throughout the Arab world and is indicative of a general anti-Western trend coming to the fore everywhere.

Subsequent events in Jordan in 1957 led to an abortive coup d'Etat in May of that year and a falling out with Syria and Egypt who were said to be responsible for the attempted revolution. The uncertain situation in the days that followed caused international concern prompting the United States to deliver a stern warning to Israel and other nations not to interfere and to order the United States Sixth Fleet to the Eastern Mediterranean in readiness to support the Jordanian regime. Iraq too,

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<sup>85</sup> Stone, op. cit., p. 27; and Kern, Harry F., "The Cold War Moves South", p. 4, Tensions in the Middle East, Middle East Institute, Washington, D.C., 1956

reassured Hussein that her troops and tanks would stand by on the borders. Saudi Arabia as well, placed troops at Hussein's disposal to maintain law and order. Only Syria and Egypt stood as a strong Arab bloc which hoped "Jordan's destiny would be to disappear".<sup>86</sup> Only Saudi Arabia made good her promise of financial assistance, the government of King Hussein having fallen into disfavor with the Egyptian-Syrian axis. However, Jordan would not return to the British fold but instead requested United States aid, financial and military, which she was given. The United States has to date during the past year (1957-1958) made commitments to Jordan totaling over 40 million dollars and shows continued interest in maintaining the status quo and preserving the territorial integrity of Jordan.

#### F. The Suez Canal Crisis (1953-1956)

Among the basic pledges of the leaders of Egypt who accomplished the successful and bloodless coup d'Etat on July 23, 1952, were the promises to do something about securing evacuation of foreign troops and to settle the status of the Suez Canal and the Sudan. Consequently they pressed the British for new treaty negotiations with reference to all three items. Negotiations were opened between Great Britain and Egypt on April 27, 1953, but bogged down after six unsuccessful sessions and were adjourned indefinitely on May 6, 1953. The British stated that Egypt had insisted on conditions entirely unacceptable to His Majesty's government, notably, that all British military installations and stores in the Canal be handed over to Egypt within a short time of the evacuation of British forces and that any remaining British technicians be placed under Egyptian control.<sup>87</sup>

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<sup>86</sup> Time, May 6, 1957, p. 18-19, v. LXIX, No. 18, Time Inc., New York

General Neguib, speaking in Cairo on May 10, 1953, declared that Egypt had "washed her hands" of Anglo-Egyptian negotiations and referred to Britain as "the enemy". He stated that Egyptians should be prepared to wage a great battle and be ready to make the "supreme sacrifice". Later, in another statement, he accused the British of having been an "aggressor" for decades and demanded immediate evacuation of the Suez Canal. He emphasized that the defense of the Middle East by means of a regional defense arrangement, as had been suggested by Sir Winston Churchill, was "impossible" and that it could only be accomplished by the cooperation of the completely independent nations of the area. Phrases such as "evacuation or death", "the British will be forced to go if they do not go of their own free will" and "fight to the death" became commonplace, and indicated the general tenor of the masses. The Egyptian government indicated further that she would not afford British military forces the right to return in the event of war nor would she give air base rights and facilities to the Royal Air Force. She rejected a British proposal that the American government act as an intermediary in the dispute. Mr. Jefferson Caffery, the then American Ambassador in Cairo, stated that the United States had no desire to take part in the discussions unless asked to do so by both sides but would inquire of both governments and offer its assistance.<sup>88</sup>

Britain had proposed that its 1936 Treaty be replaced with a military agreement lasting for a limited term, with rights to re-occupy the zone and base in the event of hostilities; it agreed to evacuate the army but hoped to keep a skeleton force to maintain the bases in readiness. During the negotiations and the period following, prior to reaching

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<sup>87</sup> Keesings, op. cit., p. 12914, v. IX, 1953-1954

<sup>88</sup> Ibid

agreement, the American influence was felt. The United States encouraged Britain to make concessions and the American Ambassador (Jefferson Caffery) constituted himself as an informal mediator. American sympathies lay with the Egyptians and saw the prime element in the dispute as the struggle of nationalism versus imperialism.<sup>89</sup>

Mr. John Foster Dulles, American Secretary of State, visited Egypt during the period May 11-13, 1953, and discussed the Suez problems with General Neguib and Colonel Nasser. He commented that "the defense and well-being of this important part of the world are of great concern to the United States government" and that the theme (regarding the Suez Canal dispute) should be "a solution consistent with full Egyptian sovereignty, with a phased withdrawal of foreign troops" and the essential matter was to make the necessary arrangements so that the Suez Canal, its bases and depots, remain in good working order, available for immediate use, on behalf of the free world in the event of future hostilities.<sup>90</sup>

Agreement was finally reached between Egypt and Great Britain on July 27, 1954 (The Anglo-Egyptian Agreement of 1954, Appendix 5). Both countries stated that they were desirous of establishing their relations "on a new basis of mutual understanding and firm friendship". The Agreement provided for: (1) complete withdrawal of British troops from the Canal zone within twenty months of the date of signature, and the Agreement would remain in force for seven years; (2) a part of the Canal bases would be kept in a state of readiness for immediate use in case of an armed attack by an outside power upon Egypt, Turkey, or any state in the Arab League which were signatories to the Arab Collective Security Pact;

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<sup>89</sup> Wint, Guy and Calvocoressi, Peter, Middle East Crisis, p. 44-45, Penguin Books, Middlesex, 1956

<sup>90</sup> Keesings, op. cit., p. 12957, v. IX

(3) Egypt would provide Britain with facilities to place the bases on a war footing; (4) the United Kingdom had the right to move equipment and materials in and out of the bases; (5) the Suez Canal was recognized as an integral part of Egypt and as a waterway of international importance; the convention of 1888 would be upheld guaranteeing freedom of navigation in the Canal; (6) after the withdrawal of British forces, Egypt would assume responsibility for all supplies and all bases in the Canal zone.<sup>91</sup>

Sir Anthony Eden, commenting on the 1954 Anglo-Egyptian Agreement on July 28, 1954, to the House of Commons stated: "It is the conviction of the government that the agreement will preserve our essential requirements in the area ... we are convinced that in the Middle East our defense arrangements must be based on consent and cooperation ...." He reaffirmed the support of the Tripartite Declaration of 1950 relating to peace and stability in the area and concluded that "the agreement should contribute to a reduction of tension throughout the Middle East as a whole".<sup>92</sup> The Suez Group in the House of Commons violently attacked the American Ambassador in Cairo for his part in bringing about the Agreement and criticized American pressures on the British government. Mr. Dulles remarked on the same day of Eden's speech that the agreement provided: "a new and more permanent basis ... for the tranquility and security of the Near East."<sup>93</sup>

The 1954 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty was followed by an "era of good feelings" and a re-evaluation of relationships between the two nations. The atmosphere was further improved by the lifting of the arms embargo against Egypt which Britain had imposed following the unilateral abrogation of the

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<sup>91</sup> Ibid, p. 13701, v. IX; See Appendix 5, Anglo-Egyptian Agreement of 1954

<sup>92</sup> Keesings, op. cit., p. 12957, v. IX

<sup>93</sup> Ibid

of the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty. The embargo was lifted August 30, 1954, on the condition that licenses for military supplies would be granted if assurances were given not to use the arms for aggressive purposes, in accordance with the Tripartite Declaration of 1950.

Such harmony prevailed between the Arabs and Britain that the Arab states presented a memorandum to the British Foreign Minister, Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, on September 17, 1954, saying: "Not since the end of World War I has there been such a favorable moment for cultivating good relations ... between the Arab states and the great powers of the West." The note claimed that there exists "complete harmony" between the needs of the Arab countries and the requirements for world peace; the Arab countries needed economic aid against potential aggressors and the West was willing to give this help because it knows that "economic development and reform are the best guarantee against the use of communism, just as military preparedness, in any region, is the best deterrent to aggression".<sup>94</sup>

The previous month the new Egyptian Prime Minister, Abdul Nasser, had stated that Egypt needed peace in order to solve her internal problems and suggested the United States act as mediator between Israel and the Arab states. There followed a new air of cordiality and rapprochement between Iraq and Egypt as a result of an exchange of official visits in August and September, 1954.<sup>95</sup> There were also friendly overtures and public avowals of mutual interests and affections between Egypt and Turkey, including a serious interchange of discussions which could possibly have led to Egypt's inclusion in a regional defense alignment. (However, all chance of any such agreement was lost when Turkey approached Iraq first in early 1955.)

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<sup>94</sup> Ibid., p. 13787

<sup>95</sup> Ibid., p. 13788

All during the fall of 1954 there was a peaceful calm and quietude in the Middle East that did not at all resemble its normal condition. Things were going too well; it was the quiet before the storm.

1955 was marked by renewed tensions between Great Britain and Egypt; first, as a result of Britain's adherence to the Baghdad Pact in opposition to the Egyptian stand, and also their later clash over the attempt to draw Jordan into the Pact. Secondly, as a result of Egypt's decision to buy arms from the communist-bloc nation, Czechoslovakia, for this caused new fear about eventual communist infiltration in the area and interference in Egypt, and in the vital Suez Canal waterway.

In February, 1955, the Israeli army made one of the most crushing reprisal raids in its history in the Gaza Strip, directed at the Egyptian army. Prior to this time the Israeli-Egyptian frontiers had been relatively inactive and the border was only lightly guarded by Egyptian troops, hence, the surprise raid resulted in a humiliating defeat for the Egyptian forces. Further, it was a shock and embarrassment for the military regime of Colonel Abdul Nasser; it aroused his fears for the future and made it imperative that steps be taken to increase the strength of his armed forces as quickly as possible. A military dictatorship cannot suffer military humiliation without endangering its internal position. Nasser felt he needed security against future raids and also wanted revenge when the opportunity would present itself. Clashes continued to occur through the summer of 1955, in July and August. After the Gaza raid, Egypt openly sought to purchase an increase of arms from the West; when these efforts failed Nasser gave formal notice that he would seek to buy weapons elsewhere. Thus, the arms deal with Czechoslovakia, announced in September, 1955, came to pass.<sup>96</sup>

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<sup>96</sup> Wint and Calvocoressi, op. cit., p. 57-59



Britain had not been prepared to give Egypt the quantities of weapons she wanted and the United States made the condition of supplying arms dependent on the signing of a mutual security pact. The Western powers underestimated Egypt and the extent to which she would go to procure armaments. Brother Arab states hailed Egypt for her achievements in concluding the arms deal with the Eastern bloc and applauded her independent action in defying the Western powers. In the year that followed the Egyptian leaders reflected a new attitude of jingoism and xenophobia; incidents and guerrilla war actions against the remaining British troops in the Canal zone were commonplace. The withdrawal of the last of the British troops was accomplished on schedule but it nearly resembled an actual combat withdrawal from contact.<sup>97</sup>

Egypt quickly became oriented toward the East by the conclusion of trade agreements with Red China on October 14, 1955, and with the Soviet offer of October 17, 1955, to build the high dam at Aswan. Although the Czech-Egyptian arms deal was termed "purely a commercial agreement" by the Egyptians, it is now obvious to the outside world that it meant a great deal more to the Eastern-bloc.

The West countered the Russian offer to build the high dam at Aswan with an announcement on December 18, 1955, of a joint American-British grant to assist Egypt in building the high dam. It was to be a grandiose electrical power and irrigation project that would increase the cultivated area of Egypt by two million feddan; its net result would be to increase Egypt's national income by 200 million Egyptian pounds per year.

On the 19 and 20 of July, respectively, the United States and Britain withdrew their offer to build the high dam, after seven months of

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<sup>97</sup> Keesings, *op. cit.*, p. 14449a and 15013a, v. X, 1955-1956; and Newsweek, September 24, 1956 and October 15, 1956

non-agreement and indecision, stating that the project was "not feasible under the present circumstances". Important among the United States-United Kingdom considerations were: (1) there had been no satisfactory solution to the Nile water dispute between Egypt and Sudan upon which the loan was contingent; (2) Egypt had demonstrated that she was unwilling or unable to concentrate her economic resources on this program as the government of Egypt was pressing an ambitious program of industrialization which must necessarily eat into its foreign exchange reserves; (3) also, the recent arms deal with Czechoslovakia and barter agreements with Communist China meant that much of the cotton crop (Egypt's most important product) was no longer a source of foreign exchange; (4) American congressional elements representing the southern states opposed any barter arrangement by which Egypt's cotton would be brought into competition with, or undersell southern cotton in the United States. Senator George is known to have expressed this opinion in the Congress. On July 24, 1956, the World Bank announced its proposed offer of 200 million dollars had automatically expired with the withdrawal of United States-United Kingdom offers.<sup>98</sup>

On July 26, 1956, the Egyptian leader, Abdul Nasser, reacted by nationalizing the Suez Canal Company, twelve years prior to the expiration date of its Charter, and bitterly attacked the United States and Britain for withdrawal of their aid. In his now famous speech at Alexandria on July 26, 1956, Nasser stated: "We shall build the high dam and we shall obtain our usurped right. We shall build the high dam we desire. We are determined. Thirty-five million pounds annually is taken by the Canal Company. Why not take it ourselves? One hundred million dollars is collected by the Suez Canal Company for the benefit of Egypt. We desire

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<sup>98</sup> Ibid (Keesings)

to make this statement hold good, and the one hundred million dollars would be collected by us, also for the benefit of Egypt."<sup>99</sup>

The nationalization of the Canal startled the Western powers, principally Britain and France, who raised questions of its legality and who were at the same time vitally concerned with the political and economic aspects of it. The sovereign rights of Egypt over the waterway had not been limited by the concession agreement originally granted de Lesseps by the Khedive of Egypt (and now vested in the Universal Maritime Suez Canal Company). They were only limited by the later Convention of Constantinople of 1888, under which Egypt is bound to keep the Canal open and free to navigation by all nations. Not until Egypt by incompetence or malice impeded free navigation would she be in violation of the Convention. It remained principally a blow to the pride of the major powers and a possible threat to the interests of the users.<sup>100</sup>

The Western powers reacted by denouncing the nationalization and the French government declared they would never accept it. Tripartite talks planned a countermove to establish international control of the Canal. A twenty-two nation conference met on August 16, 1956, and proposed a new plan for an international operating board; these proposals were presented to Egypt by Mr. Menzies during the period September 3-9, 1956, but discussions collapsed with non-agreement. Egypt proposed that all users create a "negotiating body" to discuss free passage, development and tolls; this led to the formation of SCUA (Suez Canal Users Association), and subsequently proposals led to referring the matter to the Security

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<sup>99</sup> United States News and World Report, August 3, 1956

<sup>100</sup> Wint and Calvocoressi, op. cit., p. 72-73

Council of United Nations for settlement. An Anglo-French resolution calling for international control was defeated by the Russian veto but private meetings and basic agreements between Egypt and Britain raised hopes for a negotiated settlement. As a result of Mr. Dulles' remarks preceding the Security Council sessions and the American stand during the meeting, there was a widening of the breach between the Americans on one hand and British and French on the other. Mr. Dulles had admitted the existence of fundamental differences between the United States and its allies (Great Britain and France), particularly as concern colonialism, for the United States' sympathies were with nations struggling for their freedom.<sup>101</sup>

New troubles broke out in the Arab East with tension running high on the Israeli-Jordanian borders; on October 11, 1956, Israel made a strong reprisal raid into Jordan. Iraq warned she was sending troops to assist Jordan; Israel, recalling that Iraq had not signed an armistice agreement with her declared this would be an act of war. Iraq withdrew her orders to send troops but it was announced by Jordan that Iraqi troops would enter the instant Israel attacked. New elections in Jordan found pro-Egyptian elements victorious. A joint Egyptian-Syrian-Jordanian Army Command was established and it was announced: "the time has come for the Arabs to choose the appropriate time to launch the assault for Israel's destruction".<sup>102</sup> Israel mobilized its armed forces; diplomats reported that war was imminent. Everyone expected an attack on Jordan to begin. President Eisenhower sent two urgent warnings to Ben-Gurion without, however, the backing of France or Britain. On October 29 Israel invaded Egypt.

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<sup>101</sup> Ibid, p. 75-78

<sup>102</sup> Ibid, p. 79

The United States immediately called an emergency session of United Nations Security Council to consider an American resolution requiring Israel to go back to her borders and all to refrain from using force. The British representative had instructions to veto the resolution; all this, however, was unknown to the Americans.

At the same time (within half of an hour), the French and British governments handed ultimatums to Egypt and Israel, so phrased as to invite Israel to advance 100 miles into Egyptian territory. Concurrently with this, tripartite discussions were underway for the implementation of the Tripartite Declaration. President Eisenhower had announced on April 9, 1956, at the British request, that the United States would stand by its commitments in the area, and again on October 28, 1956, just two days prior to the convening of the tripartite session, declared that the United States would honor its pledges in the Middle East. Britain and France, by engaging in the tripartite talks, indicated they were prepared to consider some sort of joint action. Eden had decided that the declaration did not apply and so informed the House of Commons, but the Americans were not informed; hence, the talks were but a farce.<sup>103</sup>

The British and French ultimatums were delivered on October 31, 1956, to both Israel and Egypt, stating that if conditions were not complied with within twelve hours they would occupy Port Said, Ismailia and Suez. Joint Anglo-French air attacks began on Egypt the following day.<sup>104</sup>

The United Nations General Assembly met on November 1-2, 1956, and voted: an immediate cease-fire, withdrawal of Israeli and Egyptian troops to their borders, a general embargo on military supplies to the area,

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<sup>103</sup> Ibid., p. 79-80

<sup>104</sup> Ibid., p. 80

and immediate steps to re-open the Canal after a cease-fire. Britain and France announced that they would comply with the resolution if: (1) a United Nations force would be sent to maintain the peace until the Canal and Arab-Israeli disputes were settled, and, (2) that Israel and Egypt should agree to such a force. The resolution was accepted by Egypt on November 4 and by Israel on November 5. The British and the French had not yet landed any troops or occupied the ports as they declared was their intention. At dawn on November 5, British and French paratroops landed at Suez and Port Said. A cease-fire was given Anglo-French forces the following day and a phased withdrawal followed.<sup>105</sup>

British and French aggression was denounced world-wide and a majority of the United Nations members opposed it. Privately, the Americans threatened economic sanctions against both France and Britain; the incident threatened the breakup of the whole system of alliances of Western nations. The attack on Egypt was even less popular with the British nation and a shaky government rode through the crisis after the resignation of two of its key members (Mr. Anthony Nutting, Minister of State, and Sir Edward Boyle, Economic Secretary to the Treasury). The Prime Minister, himself, retired from the scene, an exhausted and broken man.<sup>106</sup> The Russians capitalized on the event with threats of shooting rockets on Western capitals and the sending of "volunteers" to assist Egypt if the aggression was not halted. The combination of all these pressures convinced the aggressors that retreat was their only line of action. Subsequently, British and French forces were replaced by United Nations Emergency Forces and Israeli forces withdrew to their borders.

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<sup>105</sup> Ibid, p. 81

<sup>106</sup> Ibid, p. 82

The world accepted Egyptian sovereignty over the Canal and its right to nationalize it. A final settlement with the Canal users and the Suez Canal Company shareholders had not yet come about. Some of the nations still hope to achieve the adoption of so much of the United Nations' resolution that was acceptable to Egypt in its October, 1956 sessions, i.e., collaboration between an international users' association and the Egyptian operating company, and also the acceptance of international regulation of such things as tolls and the proportion to be set aside for canal development.<sup>107</sup> Nevertheless, Egypt has, since nationalization, demonstrated its ability to aptly manage and improve the Canal operations, and except in the case of Israel has provided passage to ships of all nations.

The aftermath of the Suez crisis left British and French reputations and influences irreparably damaged in the Arab world, and found the Americans and the Russians in excellent favor, for both had demonstrated their sympathies for the Egyptians and were prepared to back up their warnings to stop the aggression. The three-power aggression had a profound effect on the whole of the Arab East and resulted in several new alignments. It revealed again the disunity among the nations of the area in that the Collective Security Pact of 1950 was not implemented; the only real support given Egypt was the blowing of the Iraq Petroleum Company pipe lines and T-2, T-3 pumping stations by Syria to prevent the flow of oil to Britain and France. Diplomatic representation remains severed between Syria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Jordan for both France and Britain. And as a result, Britain and France have lost, and Abdul Nasser has gained new prominence and his actions have now been accepted as justified everywhere.

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<sup>107</sup> Ibid., p. 120

G. New Security Alliances -- 1950-1958

(1) Egyptian-Syrian-Saudi Arabian Military Pact of 1955

As a reaction to Iraq's participation in the Baghdad Pact, Egypt hurried to make alliances of her own within the Arab League states. On March 2, 1955, a little more than a month after the signing of the Turco-Iraqi pact, Egypt concluded a mutual assistance alliance with Syria. This document developed into a military alliance signed by the two countries on October 20, 1955, in Damascus.

The Egyptian-Syrian Pact, Appendix 8, provides for: (1) a Joint Command of Syrian and Egyptian forces which will control both in peace and war, all "striking units, including troops stationed on the Palestine borders"; (2) the establishment of a Supreme War Council, consisting of the Chiefs of Staff of both countries; (3) political authority would be exercised by a Supreme Council which would include Foreign and War Ministers of the two countries; (4) military planning would be financed by a joint fund of which sixty-five per cent would be contributed by Egypt and thirty-five per cent by Syria.<sup>108</sup>

A treaty of similar provisions to the Egyptian-Syrian arrangement was signed between Egypt and Saudi Arabia on October 27, 1955. In this Pact, Appendix 8, it was agreed that an attack on either nation is an attack on the other; also that immediate consultations would be held whenever international tension threatened their frontiers or independence, and that neither country would conclude a separate agreement without the consent of the other.<sup>109</sup>

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<sup>108</sup> Keesings, *op. cit.*, p. 14485, v. X, 1955-1956; See Appendix 8, Egyptian-Syrian Pact

<sup>109</sup> See Appendix 8, Egyptian-Saudi Arabian Military Pact and Egyptian-Syrian Pact.



This was in furtherance of an earlier Egyptian-Saudi Arabian unification of army commands under the Arab Collective Security Pact which was announced on June 11, 1954, when the two countries agreed to cooperate in defense and foreign policy. The two countries were reacting to the Turco-Pakistani alliance of February, 1954 and stated their opposition to the association of any Arab state in the alliance; they also rejected any move to join a Western-sponsored defense organization.<sup>110</sup>

The Pacts (Egyptian-Syrian-Saudi Arabian) were intended to counter-balance the Western-sponsored Turco-Iraqi agreement and strike a blow at the rising influence of Iraq. Egypt and the other Arab states saw Iraq remaining under British influence and domination and serving as a pawn in Western strategy of playing off nations against the East; they resented this and feared a return of British or Western power to the Arab areas. In view of past history their fears were justified. The general line of the new treaties proposed to strengthen the military, political and economic structures of the three countries; they all pledged not to join the Baghdad Pact. The concluding of these treaties meant, by implication, the abandonment of the original Egyptian project for a defense pact embracing all Arab countries. Yemen expressed its support of the pact but neither Jordan nor Lebanon committed themselves in any way.<sup>111</sup>

(2) Egyptian-Yemeni Agreement of 1955

An unsuccessful attempt by Seif al-Islam Abdullah and Seif al-Islam Abbas, brothers of the King, Imām Seif al-Islam Ahmad, in April, 1955 to overthrow him resulted in Egypt sending a special mission to arbitrate

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<sup>110</sup> Keesings, op. cit., p. 13710

<sup>111</sup> Ibid., p. 14485

and reconcile both sides.<sup>112</sup> It recommended to the Imām that he abandon his traditional policy of isolation and to open Yemen to cooperation with Saudi Arabia and Egypt. This was followed in July, 1955 with an Egyptian-Yemeni Agreement, Appendix 9, for an Egyptian military mission to train the Yemeni army in modern warfare by the introduction of artillery, planes and tanks.

In November, 1955, the Soviet Union, following its trend of showing new interests in the Middle East, concluded a five year Treaty of Friendship and extensive trade agreements with Yemen.<sup>113</sup>

The new arrangement with Egypt and Yemen is significant for it marks a departure of Yemen from its isolation and aligns itself with Egyptian leadership. It naturally followed in 1956-1958 that Yemen received considerable quantities of armaments and military supplies from the communist-bloc nations which she needed and which she desired to acquire for use in her struggle against the British in their territory and border disputes.

#### H. New Alignments and Orientations

As a result of the historical events of 1950-1958, there developed new political orientations among the Arab states, notably, the declared "positive neutrality" of Egypt-Syria-Yemen, which was really a neutrality biased against the West, and favorably inclined towards the East.

Both Egypt and Syria accepted economic aid from USSR which is expected to have widespread and lasting consequences. Both have received

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<sup>112</sup> The Mission was headed by Lt. Col. Shafei, Egyptian Minister of Social Affairs. (Also Abdullah and Abbas were subsequently arrested and executed.)

<sup>113</sup> Keesings, op. cit., p. 14486, 14522, 14959, v. X, 1955-1956

large shipments of armaments from the communist-bloc countries and their entire weapons system is now based on, and dependent on, the Eastern bloc.

Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, have concluded agreements for the purchase of arms from the United States. A military aid group is now assisting Iraq as a result of an April 25, 1954 agreement. In Saudi Arabia a large army-air force training mission (nearly 300) assists in the organization, advising and training of the Saudi Arabian Army and Air Force as provided in the Dhahran Air Base Rights agreement. This was renewed in 1957 for an additional five years, hence, the states named are tied to a Western weapons system and dependent on the West for resupply.

As a result of the Suez War both Britain and France lost all of what position and prestige remained prior to that action. The Arabs could not be expected to accept the promises of the big Western powers or to believe that they (the West) would in the future honor their accepted obligations in the area. In a word, the West had lost its honor and its trust because of the Suez debacle. The world accepts, and the West does not deny, French-British complicity in the Israeli assault on Egypt. At the end of the Suez War the American position was more favorable than ever in the Middle East, due to her efforts to secure a cease-fire and withdrawal of aggressor forces.

After her internal crisis in 1957, Jordan disassociated herself from the Syrian-Egyptian axis and requested help from the United States which was readily proffered. The ostentatious efforts of the United States government to strengthen Jordan in face of a Russian economic advance in Syria appeared to many Arabs merely as an attempt to take the place of position formerly occupied by the British. The use of pressure and the

threat of force to maintain order was not generally well-received. This, in conjunction with an organized press and radio campaign by USSR, Syria and Egypt against so called "American meddling", complicated and compromised the issue, culminating in dismissal of American diplomatic personnel from the American Embassy in Damascus in July, 1957, and the bringing of charges by Syria to the United Nations Security Council to debate the question of an alleged American-Turkish plot (and NATO forces) to overthrow the peoples' government of Syria. Hence, America after Suez appeared as first, a "savior" and then was condemned for her subsequent actions; in a scant few months she lost much of the prestige and influence she had gained and all because of distortion of facts and because of unrealistic and illogical diplomacy. It all could have been avoided but those things are sometimes easier seen in retrospect.

I. The Eisenhower Doctrine, an American Plan for Security in the Middle East

The American intervention to bring the fighting to an end in the Suez War required some sort of positive policy to be followed in the Middle East after that time. Never was the United States' position or its prestige higher in Arab eyes. President Eisenhower, on January 5, 1957, presented the Congress with a three-point economic and military aid program designed primarily to secure and protect the territorial integrity and political independence of the nations in the area. President Eisenhower proposed that the United States:<sup>114</sup>

- (1) "cooperate with and assist any nation or group of nations in

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<sup>114</sup> Text of speech of President Dwight D. Eisenhower before Joint Session of Congress, January 5, 1957, United States Government Printing Office, 1957, Washington, D.C.

the general area of the Middle East in the development of economic strength dedicated to the maintenance of national independence."

(2) "Undertake in the same region programs of military assistance and cooperation with any nation or group of nations which desire such aid."

(3) "Authorize such assistance and cooperation to include the employment of the armed forces of the United States to secure and protect the territorial integrity and political independence of such nations requesting such aid, against overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by international communism."

The basic ideas were translated into the Eisenhower Doctrine, a resolution subsequently passed by the Congress. However, the fundamental thought of America acting as a protector for the area was lost because of the wording given the Eisenhower Doctrine by the Congress.

The Doctrine was so constructed that the wording made "communism" the enemy and the target rather than just guaranteeing a Middle East stability. The result was that it was not whole-heartedly accepted by the Arab states as many felt they were "in between" the East and the West and had no obligation to declare an internal hostility to either side. The document is important, principally, because it reaffirms America's interest in the Middle East, its strategic importance to the United States, and recognizes the need for a fixed announced policy in regard to it.<sup>115</sup>

#### J. Security Problems in South Arabia

##### (1) The Buraimi Dispute

Seriously affecting the security of the area was the Buraimi Oasis dispute which had existed since 1952 between British (taking the part

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<sup>115</sup> Cook, Don, "United States' Policy in the Middle East", New York Herald Tribune, October 30, 1957; Refer Eisenhower Doctrine, Appendix 10.

of the Sheik of Abu Dhabi and the Sultan of Muscat) and the Saudi Arabian government which also claims sovereignty over the area. During the course of hearings of 1955 to settle the matter by an international arbitration commission, the British member, Sir Reader Bullard, walked out, accusing the Saudi member, Sheik Yusuf Yasin of duplicity and bribery. Hence, the negotiations failed. After this boycott of proceedings of the arbitration commission, The British proceeded to occupy the Buraimi Oasis and the areas to the west of it. International relations were strained to the breaking point between Saudi Arabia and Britain, and the United States was unaware that the forceable occupation would occur until notified by the British just three minutes prior to its taking place! The settlement of this question is important to the security of South Arabia and necessary to peaceful relations with Great Britain.

(1) Muscat and Oman

The security of the Southern Arabian region was disturbed again by a clash of revolutionary forces of the Imam of Muscat and Oman in 1955 and 1957 with those of the British-protected Sultan of Oman. The dispute is of long standing between the Sultan of Oman and the Imam of Muscat and Oman and goes back to 1793. The 1920 Treaty of Siab was negotiated by the British to settle the matter. Possible oil, and the determination of the British to maintain their position and influence in the Persian Gulf region probably prompted the British in July-August, 1957, to send the Royal Air Force and also British land troops, plus British-trained tribal levies from Trucial Oman, to assist the Sultan of Muscat in restoring order. The Arab states were en masse in criticism and opposition to British intervention; they took this sort of action to be representative of what they in the future might expect from the West, i.e., uses of force and acts of violence

to serve only the interests of the foreign power concerned. The rebel forces in Oman were dispersed but not thoroughly defeated; the problem has not been solved and unpopular leaders now subsidized by the British are sure to be challenged in the future.<sup>116</sup>

(3) Aden and Yemen

During this period of 1950-1958, Britain has been involved in a spasmodic but continuing dispute over territories and borders between Aden Protectorate, Western Aden Protectorate (Hadrumaut) and Yemen. Yemen claims the whole areas in which the British are now in control; subsidized tribal leaders still pay allegiance to the British and clash with Yemeni tribes along the borders. In retaliation for border raids the British have employed the RAF as a striking force, destroying small villages and strafing the border areas. While these methods have been rather effective up to now for "keeping the situation in hand", i.e., British control of the situation, it nonetheless invites the wrath of the entire Arab world against the West, and assists the Soviet cause of infiltration. The Yemeni are eager to acquire new and modern weapons with which to fight the British. They have already received considerable arms shipments and others are expected to follow; Egyptian advisors and technicians are helping them to build their army and air force for the eventual show-down with the British in the area. The security is certain to be disturbed unless diplomats drastically alter their present course of policy.

K. Recent Developments Toward Unification

The long dreamed-of ideas of Arab unity have achieved reality in two instances occurring within two weeks of one another. The first was

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<sup>116</sup> Newsweek, August 5, 1957, p. 18-19; August 12, 1957, p. 15

the proclamation of the United Arab Republic on February 1, 1958, uniting Syria and Egypt; this was followed by the announcement of the Arab Federated State of Iraq and Jordan on February 14, 1958. Both actions have rather taken the world and the Arabs themselves by surprise for they occurred with such suddenness after years of only talk about unity. What provoked these unions and what the underlying motives are is a question for later discussion and for history to answer. Its implications will be discussed in a later part of this study.

(1) Egyptian and Syrian Union: The United Arab Republic

Al-Jumhūriyah al-Arabīyah-al-Muttahidah (the United Arab Republic) was established by joint declaration of the Egyptian and Syrian heads of state on February 1, 1958. The new state has one president, one cabinet, one capitol city (Cairo), one parliament, one army and one flag. It unites 22 million Egyptians and four million Syrians under a republican form of government. The President of the new state, Jamal Abdul Nasser, was elected by the people in nation-wide plebisites held February 21, 1958, in Egypt and Syria.<sup>117</sup> Many problems will, of course, face this new state but transitional measures are being worked out. It is, however, difficult to imagine a successful union of these two countries without the benefit of the natural land bridge of Jordan and Palestine.

Some of the other Arab states may adhere to this new Republic, for example, Yemen joined in a federal status to the already constituted United Arab Republic on March 8, 1958. Other unity ideas are emerging throughout the Arab world (i.e., the proposed federation of North African states) and since Egypt and Syria have merged, it is not unlikely that the rest of the

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<sup>117</sup> El Hayat, Beirut, Lebanon, 2 February, 1958, and February 22, 1958



Arab peoples will stand idly by, but may demand union in spite of their rulers.<sup>118</sup>

(2) Iraq and Jordan: The Arab Federated State

Al Dawla al Ittihad al-Arabi (the Arab Federated State) of Iraq and Jordan was proclaimed by joint resolutions of King Hussein of Jordan and King Feisal of Iraq on February 14, 1958, just two weeks following the Egypt-Syria merger. The new federated state will have one army, one foreign ministry and one economy. Abroad diplomatic posts will be combined although they will keep separate representation in the United Nations. It has been approved by the parliaments of the two countries and all details of the federation will be completed in three months. The highlights of the unification agreement were as follows:<sup>119</sup>

(a) Union is open to all Arab states who wish to join.

(b) Each state preserves its territorial integrity and separate existence and retains its existing regimes.

(c) Any international treaty, alliance or convention which either state has signed before federation does not commit the other, but any such alliance, treaty or convention signed after federation is binding on both through the federal authority.

(d) Steps will be taken to unify the army (to be known as "the Arab Army"), foreign policy and diplomatic representation abroad, customs and law, and education.

(e) Agreements will be made as soon as possible on unification of currency and coordination of economic and financial policy.

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<sup>118</sup> Beirut El Masa, Beirut, Lebanon, 21 January, 1958, and El Hayāt, Beirut, Lebanon, March 9, 1958

<sup>119</sup> El Hayāt, Beirut, Lebanon, February 15, 1958

(f) Federal authority will be responsible to supply any aspect not mentioned in Article 4.

(g) The flag of the new state (and of each individual state) is the flag of Arab Revolt (red, green, white and black; the flag of the Federated Arab state is the same except for the addition of an eagle emblazoned in the colors).

(h) The federal authority will consist of executive and legislative bodies. The executive body will be appointed according to the federal constitution. An equal number of members will be chosen from each existing parliament to comprise the federal legislature.

(i) Head of federal state will be King Feisal of Iraq; in his absence the King of Jordan takes his place. Each king preserves his constitutional authority in his kingdom. Head of state question to be reviewed if any other state joins the federation.

(j) The federal capitol will be six months in Baghdad and six months in Amman each year.

(k) The present constitutions of Iraq and Jordan will be amended according to the requirements of the federal constitution, which will be based on the unification agreement and will be enacted within three months of the signing of the unification agreement.

#### L. Consequences of the Period 1950-1958

From this review of major events that affected the security of the area during the period 1950-1958, it can be noted that the period was anything but secure. It reflected the fact that policies of the past, if continued, will only lead to continued disruption in an area where nearly everyone in and outside the area desire a stable and secure condition to obtain. It follows logically that we should review the policies and inter-

ests of the Arab nations, plus those of the foreign interests in order to arrive at common ground on which to base future policy. From that point, corrective action can be discussed and it will be part of the purpose of this study to undertake such an analysis.

Certain consequences stand out as a result of the history of the period just discussed. They are;

(1) A decline of Western influence and prestige in the Arab states (a general distrust of Western diplomacy).

(2) A corresponding rise in the influence and prestige of the Soviet bloc (a new respect for a growing power).

(3) A more definite trend toward "neutralism" and "positive neutralism", as well, on the part of all the Arab states.

(4) An open acknowledgement by Great Britain that she intends to hold her interests in the Persian Gulf Sheikdoms and Protectorates of Southern Arabia "at all costs" (continued colonialism).

(5) Successful economic and political penetration of the Arab states by USSR.

(6) Realization of Arab unity on a small scale; the birth of new unions and federations, possibly as a step to eventual complete Arab union.

(7) New alignments of Arab states; some Western-oriented, others orientated towards the East.

(8) A successful intervention of United Nations in ending a war in the Arab East and in restoring and maintaining the peace. A hope for the future.

(9) Failure of the Eisenhower Doctrine to achieve its objectives.

In order to analyze the various pacts, alliances and agreements,

and to answer the question (do military pacts and political agreements contribute to the security of the Arab East?), one must first know and understand the primary interests of the great powers exerting influence in the Middle East and the interests of the Arab states as well. The next section will treat with the interests of the rival powers and their concepts of security for the area, and will include the ideas of the Arab states and their leaders.

PART III: RIVAL INTERESTS IN THE ARAB EAST

CHAPTER 5

INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES AND ITS CONCEPT OF SECURITY FOR THE  
ARAB EAST

A. Development of United States Interests

1. Prior to World War II

Before the Second World War American relations with the Arab East were primarily cultural and commercial. Religious and educational establishments in the Levant during the nineteenth century, sponsored by private American societies, represented the humanitarian impulses which had founded them. From them America derived a good reputation for seeking to assist the people of the area without the taint of ulterior motives to further national objectives or to serve vested interests. To the United States, the area seemed remote because she had no political interests there and preferred to remain isolationist, fully confident in her own security, protected by two oceans and by the absence of any threat to her.

Politically speaking, the United States government showed its first interest in the Arab East during the conduct of the Peace Conference at Versailles in 1919 following the First World War. President Woodrow Wilson declared the American position on the "question of Syria" to be indifferent to the claims of France and Britain over the people of the area, unless those people wanted them to be in control, expressing the principle of "the consent of the governed". He saw no right of Britain or France to give the country to anyone. Later in the same year President Wilson sent the King-Crane commission to Syria, Lebanon, Palestine and Iraq to

investigate conditions there for the League of Nations in order to make recommendations on the future status of the area. The commission found through their inquiries and investigation that the majority of the people of geographic Syria preferred complete political independence and repudiated the mandate system of government but were overwhelming in favor of an American "assistance", and if this was not possible, British help, but in no case French, if some control were to be imposed. This shows the extent to which the American reputation for integrity and fair-dealing had grown in the area. The commission had recommended that the United States undertake a single mandate for all of geographic Syria, (i.e., Palestine, Syria, Lebanon and Jordan) and that Great Britain take the mandate for Iraq. In 1924, too, United States interests were demonstrated when the Anglo-American convention on Palestine endorsed the principles embodied in the League for Britain's mandate of Palestine, (i.e., to assist establishing a national home for the Jewish people in Palestine).<sup>120</sup>

Practical United States interest in the region date back to the discovery of extensive oil fields in the Mesopotamia area. The British and French governments divided the oil interests of the area between them by the San Remo Agreement of April, 1920. American oil companies, however, resented being excluded and insisted on an "open door economic policy". Determined efforts by the United States government followed, protesting the Anglo-French arrangement, and finally resulted in American oil companies

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<sup>120</sup> Antonious, George, The Arab Awakening, p. 288-298, p. 443-458 (King-Crane Report), Khayat's College Book Cooperative, Beirut, Lebanon, 1955; and

Zeine, Zeine N., "From Palmerston to Eisenhower", One Hundred Years of the Eastern Question, p. 10-11, Middle East Forum, July, 1957, Beirut, Lebanon

(Standard Oil and Socony Vacuum) acquiring a one-quarter share of the Mosul oil fields. Later in May, 1933, the Arabian-American Oil Company (ARAMCO) obtained oil concessions in Saudi Arabia. Thus, the United States was gradually becoming more deeply involved in the affairs of the Arab East as private companies expanded their oil holdings.<sup>121</sup>

## 2. World War II and After

With the entry of United States into World War II came her direct concern for the affairs of the Middle East as a part of her national policy. In 1941, President Roosevelt had declared that "the defense of Turkey was vital to the defense of the United States" and later, in 1943, expressed America's "desire for maintaining the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iran".

United States' power first asserted itself in the area in 1943 when the French attempted to re-establish their authority in the Levant. The occupation of Syria and Lebanon by the Free French and British troops in June, 1941, had been accompanied by a declaration of Syrian and Lebanese independence. General De Gaulle in London had promptly intervened to define this as meaning not a grant of independence but rather a willingness to discuss the question; this view was contradicted by Sir Winston Churchill. Independence was proclaimed by General Catroux and a year later the two states were recognized by the United States. In June, 1943, General De Gaulle and the French Committee of National Liberation attempted to re-establish control in the Levant, asserting that France had mandate authority from the League of Nations, and stated the British decision had been unilateral. In November, the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies was

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<sup>121</sup> Ibid; and Speiser, op. cit., p. 82 and 242

dissolved; the President, Prime Minister, and other cabinet members were arrested and replaced by new ones of French choice. Britain received the protests of Egypt, Trans-Jordan and Iraq. The United States supported the British position and forced the French to back down; France remarked that American power was obviously placing itself at British disposal to serve a purely British interest. In May, 1945, the French again tried to establish itself in the Levant, sending French troops to Lebanon on the cruiser Jeanne d'Arc. The American government applied political pressure in a note to France declaring "an impression has been created that French representatives have been using the threat of force to obtain from Syria and Lebanon concessions of a political, cultural and military nature. It is important that, at the very time, when the International Security Organization is in the process of being created ... all nations ... refrain from any act which might give rise to a suspicion ... that a member of the future organization may be pursuing a policy not in conformity with the spirit and principles which that organization is being established to defend."<sup>122</sup> Concurrently, Great Britain declared its troops in Syria would intervene to restore order if necessary and requested the French to return their troops to barracks to avoid incidents. These ultimatums were accepted with some delays. American power was making itself felt in new areas of vital interest to her.<sup>123</sup>

In 1943, American oil companies came to satisfactory working agreements with British companies and looked forward to expanding their operations in the region. Although it was primarily a commercial interest

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<sup>122</sup> United States Department of State Bulletin, June 3, 1945, v. XII, No. 310, p. 1013

<sup>123</sup> Reitzel, op. cit., p. 20-21, p. 66-67



it became identified with strategic considerations. American oil companies had for years attempted to persuade the American government to participate in their activities in order to counter the effect of the British government. The State Department had consistently avoided becoming involved. However, in 1943, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other government agencies in the United States became alarmed at the drain on the nation's domestic oil reserves. They proposed a new policy which included government buying of privately-held concessions in the Arab East; the Department of State continued to oppose this view stating: "such a step might incline the American government to shape its decisions on Middle East affairs on wrong grounds". Direct participation in oil affairs did not come to pass as the oil companies themselves wanted government protection, not government ownership. However, as a result of the discussions held, Arab East oil took on a general strategic interest not previously known and it came to be considered as a factor in the security of the United States.<sup>124</sup>

Perhaps the first general intimation that the United States had assumed a long-range commitment in the Arab East was the dramatic meeting of President Franklin D. Roosevelt and King Abdul 'Aziz Ibn Saud on February 14, 1945, on board the U.S.S. Quincy in the Great Bitter Lake of the Suez Canal.<sup>125</sup>

With the end of World War II, American armies had occupied Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia; forces were stationed in Egypt and Iran and representa-

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<sup>124</sup> Reitzel, op. cit., p. 117-118

<sup>125</sup> Eddy, William A., F.D.R. Meets Ibn Saud, American Friends of the Middle East, Inc., New York, 1954; and Speiser, op. cit., p. 243

tives of the American government were traveling regularly throughout all of the Near East. As a result of her great power potential which developed her to maximum strength and an allied victory in the Great War, the United States loomed as the greatest power in the world (especially at that particular time for America appeared to possess a monopoly on atomic weapons). Hence, it followed logically that wherever the interests of the only other power capable of opposing American developed (i.e., USSR), that here, too, the United States must develop a stand and adopt a policy. With the rapid deterioration of British means to carry out her former Mediterranean policies, the Middle East and the Arab East became such a place (of opposing strategic interests of the USSR and United States). With the defeat of Italy after World War II the ground was clear for the basic conflict of Britain and Russia in the Middle East; the United States' government was placed in an awkward position in relation to this conflict as it sought to honor the Big Three Agreement, but at the same time was committed to Anglo-American control of the Mediterranean. It became clear, however, to the American leaders that the foundations of international stability depended upon a rapid stabilization of Europe, hence, the preservation of the Anglo-American position in the Middle East took precedence. The fact was, that by control of the Mediterranean the United States could bring a great deal of influence to bear in what takes place in Europe. Gradually, the course of all the events of the Near East became a matter of vital concern to the United States, i.e., Palestine, oil resources of the area, the independence and stability of the Arab states and the efforts of the Russians to obtain a control over the Eastern Mediterranean and Persian Gulf areas. <sup>126</sup>

The newly realized importance of the Arab East and Middle East region was reflected in the statements and speeches of the American leaders and can be clearly traced through the years that followed the Second World War. In September, 1945, President Truman appealed to the British government to admit 100,000 Jews to Palestine; on April 6, 1946, his Army Day address indicated that the United States had more at stake in the region than oil reserves which can be seen from his following statement: "This area contains vast natural resources. It lies across the most convenient routes of land, air and water communications. It is, consequently, an area of great economic and strategic importance, the nations of which are not strong enough individually or collectively to withstand powerful aggression. It is easy to see, therefore, how the Near and the Middle East might become an area of intense rivalry between outside powers and how such rivalry might suddenly erupt into conflict".<sup>127</sup>

Even remote areas such as Yemen received American attention. The United States concluded an agreement on May 4, 1946, looking for the establishment of closer relations and this was followed by a United States' token loan of one million dollars. Recognition was given the newly-appreciated importance of Yemen's geographical position when she was admitted to the United Nations, September 30, 1947.<sup>128</sup>

President Truman, in his message to Congress on March 12, 1947, brought an unprecedented change in United States' foreign policy with the

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<sup>126</sup> Speiser, op. cit., p. ix-xi, Introduction by The Hon. Sumner Welles; and Ritzel, op. cit., p. 102-103

<sup>127</sup> Army Day Address of President Harry S. Truman, April 6, 1946

<sup>128</sup> Speiser, op. cit., p. 217

declaration of the "Truman Doctrine" in which he warned that if Greece and Turkey should fall under the control of armed minorities supported from the outside, "confusion and disorder might well spread throughout the Middle East".<sup>129</sup> With the aid to Greece and Turkey, the United States had begun to assume British commitments in the Middle East because of the growing disparity between the British responsibility (to maintain a system to serve both United States and British interests), and the means to carry out this responsibility. President Truman said of this responsibility: " ... this is no more than a frank recognition that totalitarian regimes, imposed on free peoples, by direct or indirect aggressions, undermine the foundations of international peace and hence the security of the United States".<sup>130</sup>

When the United States' government recognized the establishment, de facto, of the new state of Israel on May 14, 1948, she became forever entangled in the complicated web of Arab East politics, with all its pitfalls and frustrations.<sup>131</sup> Moreover, she placed herself in the difficult and awkward position of supporting the desires of a minority against the violent opposition of the majority. The result was to create a complex problem wrought with many injustices. Henceforth in the Arab East, America faced prejudice and resentments in attempting to carry out a foreign policy and her chances at success were compromised from the outset.

As the United States embarked on a general world-wide program of

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<sup>129</sup> President Harry S. Truman's message to Congress, March 12, 1947

<sup>130</sup> President Harry S. Truman's address to Congress, March 12, 1947; and Reitzel, op. cit., p. 50

<sup>131</sup> Zeine, op. cit., p. 11

technical and economic assistance as stated in "Point Four" of President Truman's inaugural address of January 20, 1949, renewed emphasis was placed on the countries of the Arab East.<sup>132</sup> Gradually, as operations got under way and United States' advisors and experts were sent abroad, the influence of the United States was making itself felt in all the Arab states.

In 1950, the issuance of the Tripartite Declaration of United States, France and Britain showed the concern the United States now had for the peace and stability of the general area. By this time the United States had, by logically related steps, reached a point at which it had to choose between fairly clear alternatives. The decision it asked of the American people was not whether they would accept new responsibilities but rather confirm those already assumed in the Middle East (which could not be abandoned without fundamental changes in its international relations).<sup>133</sup>

There was a growing feeling, too, among the NATO powers that their position was insecure so long as they possessed an open or exposed "southern flank in the Mediterranean area", especially as concerns Italy and France. Greece controlled the eastern Mediterranean strategy. The feeling was that if Greece should turn communist, Turkey could be outflanked and without Turkey, Iran would not be able to stand alone. Hence, it was not surprising to see the entrance of Greece and Turkey into the NATO covenant in 1952 as a step toward securing the area.

After 1950 and the advent of the Korean War, the United States and Russia drifted further apart and international tension became more strained.

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<sup>132</sup> Inaugural address, President Harry S. Truman, January 20, 1949

<sup>133</sup> Reitzel, op. cit., p. 91

This condition only served to underline the strategic importance of the Arab East and Middle East in the defense of Europe, itself. President Truman brought this forcefully to the attention of Congress on March 6, 1952, stating: "The Near East presents a sharp challenge to American statesmanship. The countries of these areas are of vital importance to the security of the free world, but the problems of achieving constructive and orderly development are extremely difficult".<sup>134</sup>

America's concern for the Arab areas was reflected in her efforts which followed from 1952-1954 to secure a regional defense arrangement in the form of a Middle East command and finally MEDO (Middle East Defense Organization). When these efforts failed, she compromised on the "Northern Tier" defense system of Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Pakistan.

The period 1953-1956 saw a decline in British influence and prestige throughout the Arab world and witnessed, likewise, a rise in the influence and prestige of the Russians. Quite naturally the United States reacted to these changes by attempting to exert her own influences politically and economically. Hence, there followed a period of increased activity in the affairs of the Arabs by the Americans and increased interests in the area as a whole. This was reflected in an American-Iraqi Mutual Security Agreement in 1954; also, the United States agreed to supply military equipment, aid, and technical advice to Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Lebanon.

The climax of this rising United States' interest was reached in 1956 when the United States had to choose between siding with her allies, Britain and France, or siding with the Arabs in the Suez War. The United States' government was vitally interested in the Suez Canal and in the developments which followed the nationalization of the Canal Company but

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<sup>134</sup> President Harry S. Truman's address to Congress, March 6, 1952

acted separately and on its own strategic interests in rapidly bringing the fighting to an end. She followed this through the announcement of the "Eisenhower Doctrine" of President Dwight Eisenhower on January 5, 1957, in which a three-point program of economic and military aid was extended to the Middle East, reflecting the United States' intention to secure and protect its territorial integrity and political independence just as one hundred years earlier (1856) Lord Palmerston, British Prime Minister, had proclaimed to the world to "guarantee the political independence and territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire".<sup>135</sup> Events of 1957 in Jordan saw the Eisenhower Doctrine implemented and the United States standing ready to back up its pledges by the use of armed forces, if necessary, when the United States' Sixth Fleet was dispatched to Beirut in July, 1957, to "stand-by for action". The tense and uncertain political condition in Jordan plus threats along her borders caused the United States concern for her weakening government; it is worthy of note that this was the first time in her history that America had threatened the use of force to carry out her policy in the Middle East.

"To every action there is an equal and opposite reaction" (Newton's third law) is well-known. With the advent of a new Russian economic offensive in 1957-1958, which included loans and technical assistance in a development program in both Syria and Egypt, the United States is reacting by competing with USSR for favor and by matching her offers, or bettering them, in most of the Arab countries. USSR loaned Syria approximately 300 million dollars for development projects. The Syrian-Russian economic agreement provides that the loan be repaid at two and a half

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<sup>135</sup> Zeine, op. cit., p. 7, 11

per cent interest, that the salaries of technicians and cost of the preparatory work (surveys, etc.), regarding the project all be taken from the amount loaned (300 million).<sup>136</sup> The United States has previously, and continues to make more attractive offers to compete with those of the Russians as, i.e., (1) the United States generally makes no interest charge; (2) the salaries of the technicians and cost of preliminary work is usually borne by the American government, not the loan-recipient. However, the USSR's economic assistance program is well-propagandized and well-received in all the Arab countries. It will take a well-planned, well-publicized program to offset it. The USSR at the Afro-Asian Peoples Conference held in Cairo in January, 1958, offered economic assistance, without any ties, to all nations of the area who desired it. These offers of the Communists will be difficult for under-developed nations to refuse because there appears to be no commitments on their part. The renewed Russian interest and the economic warfare embarked upon by USSR is a matter of vital concern to the American government. Consequently, there is an increased effort of United States' diplomats and government officials to shape United States' policy to prevent any further Soviet penetration in the area.<sup>137</sup>

From the above, the development of United States' interests in the Arab East areas can be readily traced, from almost indifference in the nineteenth century to vital national concern in the twentieth century.

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<sup>136</sup> Commentary by United States Department of State on Syrian-Russian Economic Agreement of 1956, Appendix 11

<sup>137</sup> Daily Star, January 17, 1958, Beirut, Lebanon. Speech of Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, to National Press Club Luncheon (January 16, 1958), stating the United States proposes to counter economic threat posed by Russia against areas of Africa and Asia.



Gradually during this period the present concepts for the security of the area took shape.

B. United States' Concept of Security for the Arab East

When the United States entered the picture as a power in the Mediterranean during World War II, it did so as a part of a joint Anglo-American team. The British took the view that American power was a new and permanent factor in the area that would support British policy and British interests. At the time there was no obvious American interest to be supported; it seemed to other nations, having traditional Mediterranean interests, that the United States was tacitly serving the British.

The United States' government was faced with the consequences of accepting a share in the position of power and influence in the Middle East; as a result of its actions during World War II, the American position in the area was so far developed that the United States could not make a decision to abandon its new gains and leave the region to a struggle between a powerful Russia and a weakening United Kingdom. The United States professed to be indifferent to its strength in the area, reluctant to become entangled in Middle Eastern affairs.

The Arab view was that the United States was being drawn into sustaining British imperialism; the communists attacked the Americans and British as two capitalist nations making common cause to exploit the area. Hence, the Americans were faced with a problem of supporting the British system of authority and influence in the Arab East and Middle East or of developing an equivalent American system. The first choice was not desirable, but the second choice was impossible at the time, due to the need for long-term planning and the lack of American opinion and knowledge of the

area. The only practicable solution was to relieve Great Britain in agreed-upon sectors and thereafter to develop her own policy. Hence, United States' support for Greece and Turkey through the Truman Doctrine came about in 1947.<sup>138</sup>

Until recently, the United States had no direct interests comparable with those which Great Britain would wish to defend or comparable to those which the Soviet Union might hope to develop except the strategic oil issue. The United States is principally concerned with the value of a position of power and influence in the Arab East and in achieving desired ends elsewhere, i.e., Europe, and of course, the United States is vitally concerned with the necessity of keeping the Soviet Union and Soviet influence out of the region. Any American policy for the area must first prove its validity by showing that it will support the national interests of the United States.<sup>139</sup> The strategic oil reserves are an important means of supply to American allies in Europe. Likewise, the Middle Eastern flank of NATO must be kept covered and safe from Soviet infiltration, if the Western allies defensive strategy is to function properly. From a strong Middle Eastern position America can insure and assist her European position, the control of which the United States still considers to be the key to world power.<sup>140</sup>

However, if the control of Arab East areas is of international concern there is no major power that can afford to ignore it and that

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<sup>138</sup> Reitzel, op. cit., p. 49-50, 89

<sup>139</sup> Ibid., p. 118-119

<sup>140</sup> Western Europe with its power potential in the form of heavy industries, raw materials and skilled labor is considered one of four major power-potential areas in the world, the others are found in N.E. America (United States and Canada), Manchuria, and USSR.

applies to the United States equally as well as Britain or Russia. All the major powers are believed to possess a common interest in maintaining world peace and security, although it has been to Soviet advantage to encourage the Korean conflict and the Arab-Israeli Wars. The United States, however, cannot surrender by default her right to determine whether it will be peace or war in the Middle East.<sup>141</sup>

It has been said that "a dynamic nation cannot be an isolationist nation", hence, the United States abandoned its former policies as its political, strategic and economic interests developed in the Middle East. New policies were developed to correspond with new interests. A foreign policy cannot be properly implemented unless it brings into balance foreign commitments and the nation's policy to meet those commitments.<sup>142</sup> The discussion which follows will attempt to show the basic policy of the United States for the Arab East and its concept of security for the area, and will include the commitments of the United States in the area.

Essentially the United States' concept of security for the Arab East area is embodied in the following precepts:

(1) Maintenance of stability and the status quo (i.e., support of the established regimes in the area)

If the object of policy is to maintain stability and if stability is dependent upon a reduction of social and political tension within the state and social groups, then it is necessary that the operating causes of instability should be thoroughly understood. The United States has attempted to strike at the source of these tensions through

(a) financial and technical assistance to aid local progress;

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<sup>141</sup> Speiser, op. cit., p. 240-241

<sup>142</sup> Reitzel, op. cit., p. 235

(b) reassurances to the nations of the area that she will safeguard the political independence and territorial integrity of the region without interfering with natural growth and progress.

The United States wants the Arab states to be a strong and healthy structure, free from external influence and able to participate in international life. America's own security requires that such a policy be accompanied by the means to prevent the Soviet Union from interfering, directly or indirectly, with this political growth.<sup>143</sup>

(2) Denial of the Area to Soviet Influences and Communist Ideologies

Aside from the fact that Soviet influences would adversely affect the natural growth and political development of the region, world events have marked the area out as an obvious place to check Soviet expansion, both direct and indirect.

If it is assumed that, truly, there are but two great powers in the world today, i.e., Russia and the United States, with conflicting ideologies and purposes, this situation anticipates an inevitable conflict (probably deferred some years). In any case the Arab East area appears as a key region. The United States would be automatically drawn into any war in which a single power threatens to dominate the continent of Europe because the United States cannot accept the potential power of Europe's materials, manpower and industries in the hands of a single world power because such strength would accrue to it that it would outweigh all American potential. If Russia were able to rise and engulf the material, industrial, agricultural and manpower resources of both Europe and Asia,

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<sup>143</sup> Ibid, p. 173, p. 166-167

the German menace of World War II would seem feeble by comparison. Further, the Arab East provides strategic land area and air communication routes which might allow USSR to outflank the European position. Lastly, and what looms probably largest in the minds of America's European allies, are the highly prized oil reserves of the region, the denial of which in peace or wartime would be a tremendous Soviet advantage.<sup>144</sup>

(3) Development of Regional Solidarity

The United States has urged the formation of regional alliances and agreements to promote a common defense and a cooperation between the states of the area. Diplomatic efforts to secure Western-sponsored defense alignments have not been successful. Often, assistance programs to the various Arab states have given rise to criticisms and charges of intervention and imperialism. Notwithstanding, the United States continues to work for and hope for regional cooperation and encourages natural unities.

(4) Military Assistance for Self-defense and Internal Security

The military assistance programs for the Arab East have stressed the principle that arms are supplied for non-aggressive purposes, only recognizing the need of each country of providing for its self-defense and maintaining internal order. Hence, there has been a rationing of arms to the area to prevent a re-occurrence of Arab-Israeli wars. The formation for this rationing up to date has been not to allow Israel to arm in excess of the total armaments of all the Arab states combined, which may act to prevent hostilities but is not a fair distribution for each of the Arab states to adequately provide for its own self-defense. Otherwise,

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<sup>144</sup> Ibid, p. 184-188

military assistance and technical advice has been offered on a wide scale to all the states of the region.

(5) Employment of United States' Military Forces to Maintain the Security of the Area

The United States would employ its armed forces, if necessary, as a means to maintain its promises for security of the Arab East area. This has been pledged by the President and approved in principle by the Congress. The United States would intervene, however, only upon request of the nation being attacked. Though British military power is suspect because of memories of past interventions, the Americans do not at the present time face that difficulty. Military power still has an understanding response in the area, provided it does not appear to be coercive. It is reassuring to those states and peoples who look to United States for protection and for guarantees of maintaining the peace.<sup>145</sup>

(6) Non-partiality in Arab-Israeli Dispute

Despite large scale economic support for Israel since 1950, the American government has exaggerated its efforts to show a non-partial or unbiased attitude toward the Arab states and Israel in order not to further alienate either of them.<sup>146</sup> This policy has not, however, been effective in regards to either side. The United States' concept for maintaining the peace in the area includes:

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<sup>145</sup> Ibid, p. 145

<sup>146</sup> Middle Eastern Affairs, v. III, No. 11 (November, 1957), p. 388 gives total official United States' grants in aid to all Arab states as totaling 187 million dollars against 454 million for Israel during the same period (up to 1957)

(a) rationing of arms to both sides and obtaining assurances from each side against further aggression,

(b) opposes the use of armed forces to settle disputes; generally favors settlement of disputes through the United Nations,

(c) continues her efforts for a peaceful settlement of the Palestine problem based on the United Nations' resolution of 1947 for the partition of Palestine.

The main United States' liability in the Arab East is the continuation of the Arab-Israeli conflict for it adversely effects the attitude of both the Arabs and the Israelis toward almost every United States' activity in the region. The appearance of Soviet influence now assisting the Arabs, whereas in the past it assisted Israel, confuses and weakens the United States' attempt to play the part of a peacemaker. However, the greatest asset the United States possesses in the Arab East is its good name and reputation, for most Arabs and Israelis alike trust in the fairness and good faith of the American people.<sup>147</sup>

(7) Cooperation and Coordination with Great Britain: Recognition of British Spheres of Influence

While the United States has supplanted the British in many sections of the Arab East, and the United States has assumed its commitments and responsibilities, at the same time the American government recognizes British areas of influences and avoids becoming involved in purely British affairs. For example, the Persian Gulf Sheikdoms and the

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<sup>147</sup> Hoskins, H.L., "The Need for More Effective American Representation", Tensions in the Middle East, Middle East Institute, Washington, D.C., 1956

British Protectorates of South Arabia (i.e., Oman and Aden), are regarded as British zones of influence. While there exists no Anglo-American policy for the Middle East, the United States has tied itself closely with Britain's former policies and cooperates somewhat in regional policy and in pledging protection and defense of the area against aggression.

The American and British governments possess fundamental differences in their attitudes toward nations struggling for their freedom and independence. The United States' concept of "self-determination" for small nations has served to caution Britain against indiscreet employment of force in the Arab areas.

Both nations are members of NATO and fundamentally linked with the Baghdad Pact and the defense of the Middle East, hence, cooperate for defense. The United States, while not a full member of the Baghdad Pact, actively participates in committee planning work, yet hesitates to join the alliance formally for fear it will further alienate its Arab friends. Other explanations given for United States' wariness of the Baghdad Pact have to do with Israel; the United States fears that Israel may try to join the Pact as well if the United States joins in or lacking that, Israel will ask for a mutual defense security pact with the United States. Also, if United States adhered to the Baghdad alliance she would find it difficult not to accept the Iraqi-British Agreement regarding making efforts toward a settlement of the Palestine problem.<sup>148</sup>

(8) Views the Middle East as a Whole, Vital to Defense of Europe and to the Security of the Arab East

As previously stated, the United States regards the Middle

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<sup>148</sup> This exchange of letters regarding Palestine followed the Baghdad Pact and Anglo-Iraqi Agreement of 1955



East as an "exposed southern flank" to the NATO defense of Europe. The present "Northern Tier" defense acts as a protective barrier to the countries of the Arab East and is vital to its security, i.e., protection from a potential aggressor. Hence, it follows that any country in the Middle East area outside the Arab East which falls to an aggressor will place the Arab East countries in jeopardy as well. Whereas the Arab East is treated as a separate area within the scope of this study, to point up special problems relating to its security, normally, the United States' government treats with the Middle East as a unit in its defensive thinking and all areas within it are of vital concern.

(9) Public Information and Education Programs to Spread Ideas

The United States' government believes that one of its best possibilities for achieving security in the Arab East region is by spreading the ideas of the free world to the peoples of the area. By public and private press, radio (Voice of America), and by audio-visual means, it transmits its story to offset the effects of Soviet propaganda and influence. The vast program of the United States Information and Education Service aims to keep the public informed of the efforts the United States is making to assist the countries of the Arab East and to counter falsehoods and half-truths of those who oppose the United States' position.

Educational assistance programs of United States Overseas Missions (Point IV) help qualified youth to train at home and abroad in technical schools and colleges to prepare them for their tasks of participating in their own country's development. Those who study in the United States usually return to their own countries as strong supporters of America and

are convinced of the sincerity of its people in their desire to assist the less fortunate nations of the world.

(10) Seeks to Insure Security by a System of Protective Air Bases in the Middle East

Part of the United States' concept for maintaining a security in the Arab East is the development of a system of air bases throughout the Middle East to implement its defense strategy, project its influence and protect its oil interests. As early as 1951 the United States, on the basis of NATO defense studies, sought permission from Britain to station warplanes at fourteen British airfields throughout the Middle East. However, the opposition of Egypt and Jordan to these concessions, plus the fear of Iraq that Russia might be provoked into some form of retaliation, and a general lack of enthusiasm for the plan throughout the Arab East nullified United States' efforts. The United States does maintain its air installation at Dhahran Base in Saudi Arabia but restrictions by the Saudi government do not permit it to grow into a combat-ready air base. However, military airports in south-eastern Turkey at Adana and Diarbakr, plus others within general supporting distances, provide adequate coverage of the Arab East area, considering the increased range of modern military aircraft and the relative geographical position of the Arab East to a possible threat.<sup>149</sup>

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<sup>149</sup> Hoskins, H.L., op. cit., p. 264, 273; Great Britain also has rights to use bases in Iraq in the event of hostilities in accordance with the Anglo-Iraqi Agreement of 1955, see Appendix 9

C. An Evaluation of the United States' Concept

(1) The Need for a Regional Approach

While it is believed that much of the United States' concept for achieving security is sound, yet it will not be effective in the Arab East unless a regional policy is pursued. It appears that the United States abandoned its attempts to treat with the region as a unit after it failed to promote a Middle East defense organization in 1952-1953, and since that time has been treating with the various Arab states by diversified contacts. This approach has encouraged the growth of inter-state, inter-political and inter-social group rivalries. It has emphasized the existing differences between class groups, and dynastic competitions within the states have given opposition groups a lever to seize upon to work against those in power; many of these opposition groups have defected to Soviet influences as a natural means of opposing the pro-Western groups in power. Had the region been treated as a whole this condition probably would never have been obtained, at least not on the scale which now exists.

It is true that regional solidarity has not generally characterized the Arab East area for external pressures have encouraged competition and made use of racial, religious and political differences to control the zone. Today, the Arab nations are suspect of all foreign powers' assistance to them if it is in any way accompanied by intervention, and especially if it includes the stationing of foreign nations in their sovereign territories.<sup>150</sup> Such intervention gives rise to charges of

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<sup>150</sup> This includes as well the reluctance to accept military advisors and technicians to assist in mutual defense assistance programs.

imperialism; while it is true that there will always be some such response by small groups of malcontents, a clearly defined regional policy should be more acceptable as there would be little foundation for such criticisms inasmuch as the policy and relations would be uniform for the whole region and would not be developed with special reference to any one state. This can be accomplished by the development of an agency to work with the Arab states as a whole, a single unit, probably on the level of the Arab League or some other similar agency, equally acceptable to all the states concerned. Certainly, then, the United States cannot be accused of favoring one state over the other, or becoming involved in local political issues. The American government would simply be extending aid, without prejudice, to the Arab area. There is a much less chance for the United States to be charged with imperialism or accused of covert design to use the region for United States' interest and purposes solely. There would be little chance that one Arab state would be able to accuse the United States that it is supporting another Arab state against it or plotting its overthrow. Such a change in policy cannot help but improve the American position in the area.

An additional advantage of the regional approach is that it guards against American domestic pressures which urge the adoption of this or that particular course of action in the region of the Arab East. Domestic group interests exert effective political pressures in the United States which are difficult for Congress to resist because of the American system of government. Sometimes these pressures act to adversely affect the real national interests.<sup>151</sup>

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<sup>151</sup> Reitzel, op. cit., p. 175

The change to a regional approach does not offer more, at first, than mental obstacles because the differences between it and the existing method of working through diversified contacts requires only a broadening of the field of vision. Gradually, with practice and experience in handling the area as a unit, and thinking of it as an entity, decisions will be made to conform to the new point of view. The United States can profit more quickly from experience in the area by the regional approach as well. Without adhering to the regional concept there is a real danger of ending up with a complex structure of dispersed local commitments and as a result, attention is constantly shifting from the need to support a strategic position to the need to deal with purely local issues.<sup>152</sup>

One function of a regional policy could be to assist the Arab states meet their area-wide problems such as absorbing the accumulating effects of demographic changes (i.e., increasing population and its accompanying problems), and to develop its economic potential on a regional basis rather than on a national basis. It would encourage, rather than resist the growth of political structures which have genuine indigenous roots and seek to strengthen those political elements most able to provide the basis for a more stable equilibrium.<sup>153</sup> With the emergence of such unions as the United Arab Republic (Egypt and Syria) and the Arab Federated State (Iraq and Jordan), the United States should be able to foresee the eventual union of all the Arab East and encourage natural political unity within the area. A new regional approach to the Arab East

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<sup>152</sup> Ibid, p. 176-177

<sup>153</sup> Ibid, p. 175

not only would facilitate future American policy but it would be the basis for dealing with the eventual oneness of the zone. Likewise, the Arabs would be gratified that United States recognizes their national aspirations and continues to promote the cause of self-determination and independence for small nations. The American government is mindful of the need to prevent a dangerous power-vacuum from forming in the Middle East in that such a condition might further tempt expansionist tendencies of the Soviets in the area. One of the most effective ways to avoid the existence of a power-vacuum in the area is to strengthen the Arab bloc itself, hence, there is a need to convince the Arab world that its political unification has the cooperation and non-interfering interest plus the encouragement of the United States.<sup>154</sup>

The characteristic disunity of the Arab East in the past has caused the United States to shun a regional outlook. However, beneath the surface of this troubled area one finds a fundamental uniformity. The present differences between them arose with the break-up of the region into a group of impotent, competitive sovereignties, whereas actually there are hidden sources of unity in the region that logically suggests that the stability of the whole area can be improved if the internal conflicts are understood. The success of any policy to stabilize the area depends upon finding the common factors in the conflicts of the area and developing a plain regional policy toward understanding and dealing with them.<sup>155</sup>

The combination of economic assistance and American military

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<sup>154</sup> Ibid., p. 157

<sup>155</sup> Ibid., p. 128

power are likewise applicable on a regional basis to create a strategic unity and an over-all internal stability. Together these two influences create a favorable psychological atmosphere, if the Arab states are assured of economic assistance and protection without interference in their affairs. Add to this the effects of humanitarian, educational, cultural and religious efforts in the area which all reduce the fears and the antagonisms toward power and the chances of a successfully area-wide policy are greatly improved.<sup>156</sup>

The United States needs a single comprehensive policy toward the Arab East region as a whole that logically and carefully considers and integrates, by analysis, the United States' national interests, competing foreign interests, and local interests. It must be a policy representative of the American government as a body and not one reflecting the desires of a particular government agency or department, or one influenced by congressional pressures and sympathies.<sup>157</sup>

(2) The Need for an Independent and Decisive Policy for the Arab East

An effective United States' policy toward the Arab East requires two characteristics which it does not now possess; decisiveness on major issues and independence in its attitudes, i.e., free from the influence of its allies, Britain and France, and pressures from the local American scene. Probably no other one aspect of American policy since 1950 has prejudiced her relations with the Arab world as the unwillingness

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<sup>156</sup> Ibid., p. 159

<sup>157</sup> Speiser, op. cit., p. 243

of the United States to take a stand on such major issues as British imperialism in South Arabia, the Cyprus question, the Arab-Israeli dispute, the Algerian independence movement, etc.,.<sup>158</sup> The adoption of an "on-the-fence" neutralist point of view has not won the Americans support of either side in the case of the disputes in question, rather both sides have been alienated and disappointed in America's inability to arrive at a stand on a matter of vital international importance. It is presumed that this indecisiveness is based on a sympathy for American allies (i.e., Britain, France, Turkey, Greece, etc.), and an unwillingness to offend any side.

Previously, it was stated that United States' policy proposes impartiality to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Impartiality is not authentic when it assumes the form of a reluctance to take a stand on issues which are just or unjust. Real impartiality would be the taking of an impersonal position towards both sides and declaring what it believed to be right and what is wrong without regard to relations with the parties concerned. Silence is not impartiality.<sup>159</sup> As a result, United States, by its silence on matters of vital importance to the Arab states, is linked as a co-imperialist with France and Britain. Lack of force and decision in American policy has permitted her allies to use NATO weapons and warplanes to carry out their colonial controls in the Arab world, thus corrupting

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<sup>158</sup> Regarding the Palestine issue, United States has come forth with several offers, notably the Dulles' Plan of 1955 to lend United States' assistance for a settlement but has never pursued the issue aggressively and decisively to conclude one. United States' position could force a temporary settlement.

<sup>159</sup> Sayegh, Fayez A., "Arab Attitudes Toward the Emerging United States' Middle East Policy", p. 69, A New Look at the Middle East, (ed. William Sands), Middle East Institute, Washington, D.C., 1957.



the avowed purposes for which NATO was created and losing the confidence and trust of the Arab peoples as a protector of free nations.

American policy for the Arab East may be coordinated in the long-run with the policy of its allies but it must be independently arrived at and have as its primary objective United States' national interests, not British, Greek, French, Israeli, or Turkish. To try to attempt to satisfy all nations tends merely to confuse the picture and really satisfies no nation. The United States must be willing to formulate her decisions on the basis of fairness and impartiality and be willing to stand alone on her own policies, living up to the principles which has guided her since birth and gives her the finest reputation among free nations of the world for honor and fair-dealing.

The United States became a first-rate power with influence in the Mediterranean at a time of instability in the Arab East. External and internal forces coupled with social trends are helping to maintain that condition. In the early days of its experience in the Mediterranean area, America felt obliged to accept the British system of authority and influence already developed in the area and considered the British as "experts" on Middle Eastern affairs. Gradually, as the United States has assumed British responsibilities and commitments in the area, the need has become increasingly obvious to develop a separate and independent policy, void of British influences, in order to reflect the traditional ideas of America toward other independent and sovereign areas of the world.

It is imperative if policy is to succeed to have friendly working relations with the states concerned. The United States has experienced difficulties in creating a receptive and amiable atmosphere in her Arab

relations because of the American view that certain areas of the world are to be considered British or French, either as colonies or as spheres of influence. Such an American attitude would be justified if the areas in question accepted the British and French without protest, and that the British and French could maintain their preferred positions without major political and social uprisings. However, neither of these conditions has been obtained in the Arab East. Further, the British and French have not gracefully, or of their own free-will withdrawn from any area in the Arab East. The states which have achieved independence have had to struggle against imperialistic efforts at continued domination and control. So long as the United States endorses these policies of her allies, then so long will she come to be identified with imperialist nations and receive the resentment of the Arab region.<sup>160</sup> Although America is tied to a vital interest in her NATO alliances and in maintaining a network of world-wide bases, she need not subscribe to their unpopular and outmoded policies in the Arab East to achieve her end. By submitting to a temporary expediency for the sake of temporary goodwill and cooperation among allies, the United States is giving up American ideals of democracy and self-determination which are, in any war, cold or hot, a distinct moral advantage.<sup>161</sup>

The British method of buying strength through subsidies has never been acceptable to the American people as a method in which to obtain assurances of international goodwill and anti-communist attitudes.

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<sup>160</sup> Faris and Husayn, op. cit., p. 102-103

<sup>161</sup> Lenczowski, George, The Middle East in World Affairs, p. 535-576, Cornell University Press, New York, second edition, 1956

Instead, a more satisfactory method might be an attempt to create an independent and internally stable bloc, on the basis of persuasion and mutual interests, the aim being to develop the Arab East to sufficient strength and unity that it could not be coerced by a single strong power without driving it to the side of another competing strong power. In this way the area can markedly effect the balance of power in the world. Regardless of the smallness of size of the Arab bloc, it would be an effective force.<sup>162</sup>

The rapid and decisive action that was taken independently by the United States to bring about a cessation of hostilities in the Suez War in 1956 was universally hailed by the Arabs. It seemed to signal a new approach in American policy but America's follow-up action in 1957-1958 failed to capitalize in her newly-found favor. Instead she reverted to unwillingness to make a stand on Arab East problems and failed to suppress British imperialist military actions in the Persian Gulf and French actions in Algeria and Tunisia which were no different than the Suez affair except in scale. The panicky reaction of United States to a Syrian-Soviet economic agreement, that had been propagandized for months previously, demonstrated the government's lack of knowledge of the actual facts and its inability to compete with the Soviets in the Arab East influence drive. Threats to use American armed forces and intervention gave pro-Reds in the area the opportunity to exploit it, charging United States with attempts at domination of the Arab states and linking America with the Britain and France of the past. Although the United States possesses a sincere desire to do what is best to assist the Arab states in

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<sup>162</sup> Reitzel, op. cit., p. 182

their natural growth and development, this fact is not making itself known. Instead, a collection of half-truths and misconceptions about American intentions in the Arab East has grown-up. Policy must be clearly stated along broad lines, regional in concept, and the areas must be dealt with as a whole instead of separate vacillating policies for individual states of the region. It is not in the best interests of the region to have a United States' foreign policy contaminated with British or French trappings or otherwise directed by foreign influences, nor will such a policy succeed in present day circumstances. A successful American policy must be independent, decisive and consistent in order to provide the necessary security for the area.

### 3. The Need for United States' Policy to be Consistent

One of the most puzzling and frustrating things to the Middle Easterner is the numerous changes and reversals of attitudes, and inconsistencies, in American foreign policy. The fact that today the United States is allied with both Japan and Germany whom she fought against in World War II is not clearly understood by many in the Arab world. At the same time the Arab states feel that they have equal rights to maintain their traditional friendship with nations like Russia and Germany, and do not comprehend fully the Western opposition to these ties (i.e., with Soviets especially). To the Arabs this is a consistent policy or a consistent tie that they have had no provocation to break-off.

The fact that American government displays "vital concern" one day and is seemingly indifferent or unconcerned the following day (as in the case of the Syrian-Jordanian affair in July-August, 1957) is difficult for most Arabs to understand. The withdrawal of the American loan-offer

to build the Aswan Dam in Egypt is another such reversal of attitude that confounds the Arabs.

Firm, announced policies, applicable to the area and consistently followed, will do much to stabilize the region for it will give the Arab states clear concepts of American thinking upon which a solidarity can be built.

The fact that American financial aid to Arab countries is dependent upon United States' Congressional approval seriously limits long-range programs which would have more continuity and likewise would achieve better results than the present system. An economy-minded Congress might in one year seriously damage an assistance program which is just getting underway. There is a vital need for consistent and long-range fiscal policies in this regard in order that trust and confidence in United States may develop among the Arab states. Such changes are possible within the scope of the present legal structure if Congress will so deem them.

Perhaps American abandonment of its stand to protect Arab interests in Palestine, a pledge made by President Franklin D. Roosevelt to King Ibn Saud in 1945, was the most serious reversal of a United States' attitude. This has alienated all of the Arab states and they see the United States as a protector of Israel, and as her benefactor it insured her establishment and continued existence.

It is not, however, too late to establish a consistent set of broad-operating policies for the Arab East and to adhere to them, unless they prove fundamentally unsound. Frequent policy changes or attitudes are confusing, particularly when they are in direct opposition to a former policy and there is little or no reason given for the change. Confidence

and trust can only be built on easily understood and consistent policies that reflect traditional American attitudes and principles toward the free nations of the world.

(4) The Need for Understanding the Area

A chief factor in establishing good relations and pursuing a foreign policy that will provide for the security of the Arab East region is knowledge of the area and a thorough understanding of its problems. This presumes an adequate American representation both at home and abroad in the Arab states. To deal effectively with the problems and conflicts within the area one must thoroughly understand its background and history and the basic causes of its social, economic and political problems. It has been said that the United States has not in the past accepted a full responsibility in the Arab East due to its lack of knowledge and lack of concern for the area, and that this American refusal to accept responsibility has limited the growth of stability in the region.<sup>163</sup>

Some progress is being effected in this area through a comprehension training program for specialist personnel. The United States' Department of State through its Foreign Service Institute prepares its foreign service officers for their future tasks by including Middle East studies in its basic program before sending these personnel abroad. Also, small groups of officers who show specific interest and special ability in the study of languages are selected for two years of advanced

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<sup>163</sup> Young, T. Cuyler, "The Present Situation in the Middle East as Seen by Americans", p. 6, The Evolution of Public Responsibility in the Middle East, (ed. Harvey P. Hall), Middle East Institute, Washington, D.C., 1955

study. This group specializes in attaining a language fluency in Arabic and studies, on a university-level, the history and culture of the Arab region.

Annually a Near East seminar is conducted for 25-30 selected representatives from various United States' government agencies which includes a three month study and travel throughout the Middle East. Most of the study takes place at the American University of Beirut, Lebanon. In this way personnel who deal with the day-to-day problems of the area from their desks in Washington or elsewhere acquire a first-hand personal knowledge of the Arab East that will facilitate their future work.<sup>164</sup>

Past history of the implementation of American policy in the Arab East reflects that such understanding did not always exist among American representatives. There is a need for the application of the principle (of providing qualified personnel) on increasingly wide scales to meet the demands of our vast commitments in the area. American representation is not limited to the diplomatic group but includes a growing number of other government agencies at work in advising and assisting in agriculture, industry and in the military field. All these personnel must be properly orientated in order to accomplish their mission of promoting a better understanding between the Arabs and the aims of United States' policy.

A fallacy in American thinking and planning has been that

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<sup>164</sup> Hoskins, H.L., "The Need for More Effective American Representation in the Middle East -- Private and Government", p. 36-37, Tensions in the Middle East, (ed. William Sands), Middle East Institute, Washington, D.C., 1956

financial assistance to foreign areas would automatically breed friendship and gratitude and create allies for them, whereas in fact, there is a tendency toward resentment when the offer of assistance is gratuitous, and an accompanying attitude that the gift is only rightful compensation for past injustices. A "give-away" program does not really satisfy its recipients. The only successful way to gain lasting friendships and trusts in the Arab area is by sincere personal contacts accompanied by long-term pledges of assistance which are followed by consistent American attitudes and dependable fiscal policies. A long-term loan or economic agreement which provides for the orderly development and progress of the nation concerned is far more appreciated than a gratuitous offer which involves the granting of concessions such as the stationing of foreign troops or the establishment of an air base within the country's territories. The Arab mind quite naturally in view of his past experiences with colonial powers is repugnant to the slightest tendency toward infringement on his sovereign rights and the American policy must recognize this fact and learn to deal with it. After a number of years has passed and the Arab states develop a sincere trust and understanding with the United States and its aim in the area, the situation is bound to improve and the Arab outlook will probably be one of making concessions for the purpose of satisfying mutual interests.

Arab-American understanding can best be promoted on the individual level. Hence, our representatives, both in the United States and those abroad in direct contact with Arab peoples, should strive to gain a knowledge of Arab history, culture, customs and social-political-economic problems in order to understand the Arab mind. Coupled with that,



individuals at all levels must seek to develop close associations and friendships that will result in mutual understanding and they must show a sincere desire of cooperating one with the other. This may seem to be an over-simplification of a very complex problem facing United States' foreign policy in the Arab region, but it is, in fact, a fundamental truth that has long been overlooked.

## CHAPTER 6

### BRITISH INTERESTS AND CONCEPT OF SECURITY FOR THE ARAB EAST

#### A. THE BRITISH POSITION IN THE ARAB EAST; THE DEVELOPMENT AND CHANGE OF INTERESTS

##### (1) Prior to Second World War

Great Britain, of all the great powers who competed in the Arab regions, has maintained a position of supremacy for 150 years. In developing her commercial interests and protecting her land and sea routes to India, the key to the British Empire, Great Britain successfully managed to fend off French, German and Russian efforts to dominate the area. A "cold war" with Russia lasted over one hundred years during which time Britain denied Russia the objectives of the Turkish Straits and the Persian Gulf.<sup>165</sup> She built up a system of authority and influence in the zone which served a double purpose; it preserved the strategic unity of the area and made it available for the support of British interests elsewhere. Also, it was the nucleus of a vast system of British commercial, cultural and diplomatic interests within the whole of the Middle East.

At the turn of the present century Britain did not separate commercial interests, imperial defense and international influences from problems of internal stability within the Arab area. The British attitude was to adjust the region to the world-wide interests of Great Britain instead of Britain adapting her policy to the region. It was rather making the Arab East fit into British plans, a view that still strongly prevails. Strategic consideration always took precedence in settling local

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<sup>165</sup> Lenczowski, op. cit., p. 517

conflicts or internal problems and the proper settlement of them, in the British view, had to complement British policies.<sup>166</sup>

In the process of protecting her "economic lifeline" to India Britain established strong trade links and economic supremacy in the Middle East area. Banks, shipping and insurance companies, commercial export-import companies, chambers of commerce, tourist bureaus, and air lines (more recently), as well as extensive oil production and refining grew up. British interests were highly diversified and involved hundreds of thousands of individuals, hence, the internal condition of the region became a matter of vital concern to her. Great Britain took to the use of military force and political means when necessary to assist her in maintaining regional stability.<sup>167</sup>

The British have been willing to fight wars, put down local uprisings and become deeply involved in the affairs of the region because of the tremendous national interests that have developed there. The first of these interests involved the protection of the Arab East as a vital communications zone, land, sea and air, and the development of friendly relations with the people therein. The second interest has been the mineral wealth of the region itself, inasmuch as the oil of the Arab East had become one of the primary sources of British income even before World War II.

Long ago Great Britain realized that in order for her to remain a world power it was necessary that she maintain her position in the Middle East. Nations like Russia, France and United States, in the past

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<sup>166</sup> Reitzel, op. cit., p. 5, 6

<sup>167</sup> Lenczowski, op. cit., p. 517

and today, could maintain themselves as powers without a solid foothold in the Arab East. Britain cannot do likewise, hence, British interests in the Arab East have grown so that they are now a basis for the overall British policy and for maintaining her Empire and herself as a world power.<sup>168</sup>

Because of the importance of the region the British government has always had since the eighteenth century a positive policy in some form for the Arab East. However, as much as the British may now be criticized for their past "imperialism", their policy always possessed three virtues: (1) a general imaginative concept; (2) it was consistent and free from partisan considerations; (3) it was well-executed by experts who knew their job. Normally, the British did little to reform the social and economic orders established in the Arab states but accepted the existing regimes and subsidized them. The British had no desire to become entangled more than necessary in the mechanics of rule or to create a social upheaval by advocating sweeping social and political changes. They were, rather content to effect a stability through patriarchal rulers and tribal chieftains and to leave the backward countries to their own struggle for progress and freedom. The British did, however, respect the culture and dignity of the peoples they dealt with and did not try to force a new social structure upon them. Whenever the British did have direct responsibility for the administration of an area, they gave it three improvements: (1) better internal and external security; (2) sound financial structure and (3) good roads and communications.<sup>169</sup>

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<sup>168</sup> Speiser, op. cit., p. 165-171

<sup>169</sup> Lenczowski, op. cit., p. 520

Actually, then, Britain's interests in the Mediterranean area were a by-product of her efforts to protect the Empire "lifeline" to India. Indian policy caused her to infiltrate into Mesopotamia, the Persian Gulf and the coastal lands of Southern Arabia. Aden was annexed in 1839. The construction of the Suez Canal made the eastern Mediterranean vital, especially as it cut the sea route distance by more than half. As Britain acquired financial controls by buying Canal Company shares from the bankrupt Khedive of Egypt, political control came along with it. There followed a gradual penetration of Egypt in coordination with France who had the majority of the remaining shares. Both were managing the economic affairs of Egypt in order to assure that the Canal Company would be a "going concern" and allow Egypt to pay off its international debts. In 1880 Britain occupied Cyprus; two years later she occupied Egypt on the pretext of restoring order to the country. In 1899 Britain created the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium in the Sudan; by the twentieth century the Persian Gulf was a British lake. French influence was gradually eliminated in the early part of the twentieth century in exchange for a free hand in Morocco.<sup>170</sup>

In order to develop stability in the Middle East and protect Britain's link with her Empire, it became a tenet of British policy to preserve the Ottoman Empire. Britain felt that a strong and friendly Sultan would assure stability in the Moslem states and also form a more powerful bloc with which to resist Russian expansion. This policy was not altogether successful; however, the Ottoman Empire managed to maintain some order and surface stability until the First World War. At the close

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<sup>170</sup> Speiser, op. cit., p. 172

of the War the Ottoman Empire had been broken up and the vacuum of government in the Arab regions had to be filled. The British were unwilling to give the Arabs the opportunity to rule themselves as a single state, regarding them as too politically inexperienced and too socially and economically retarded to establish independent states or an independent nation. Great Britain was vitally concerned over the increasing importance of the Middle East in her own strategy and could not take a chance on the development of unstable conditions and possible chaos.

Britain compromised by giving the Arab states a modified form of imperialism; she permitted partial local rule but maintained the essential controls. Theoretically, she proposed to train the Arabs for self-government. This decision was a reversal of wartime promises made to the Arabs and Sharif Hussain by way of the McMahon correspondence of 1915-1916. Also by the conflicting promise of the Balfour Declaration of November 2, 1917, for a Jewish national home, Britain prejudiced the Arab rights in Palestine.

The British policy of striking a balance between imperial interests and self-determination of nations was not well-received by the Arabs who wanted no deferred independence. The British stressed that their motives were pure and noble in the granting of independence to Iraq and in the helping of the Jews to establish a national home in Palestine (without prejudice to rights of the Arabs), however, on all sides, the Arabs could see only the British self-interest features of this policy. The granting of mandates to France in Syria and Lebanon after World War I further aggravated the situation as the strict imperialist methods of France were aimed at stamping out all movements for national independence. The Arabs in the states neighboring Syria and Lebanon regarded the

French practices as indicative of what Britain eventually had in store for them. The British were displeased with their own general situation in the Arab areas for they were constantly involved in struggle with the peoples. Little by little nationalist uprisings and anti-British public feeling forced the British to give ground in both Iraq and Egypt until the onset of World War II which stemmed the tide temporarily. Then, except for some minor political uprisings, Britain was able to regain much of her former control; under the rigorous test of wartime she demonstrated the vitality and vigor of the British system in mobilizing the area for the war effort.<sup>171</sup> The expansion and development of her Suez bases as a key strategic installation from which to conduct wartime operations and the establishment of the Middle East Supply Center gave Great Britain a renewed and almost complete control in the Middle East once again.

(2) After World War II

With the close of the Second World War Britain remained well-aware of Arab nationalist aspirations and sought to encourage the development of a union of friendly Arab states with which she could more easily conduct her relations in the region. The idea of an Arab bloc stems in part from Lord Kitchener's proposals for the formation of a defensive chain of friendly Arab states. Britain felt that she could more profitably further her own interests by mutual consent than by coercion and control, and that the states of the new League (1945) would be grateful to Britain

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<sup>171</sup> Hurewitz, J.C., "The Eisenhower Doctrine and Other United States Commitments in the Middle East: An Evaluation", p. 31, New Look at the Middle East, (ed. William Sands), Middle East Institute, Washington, D.C., 1957

for her attitude and encouragement. Britain's idea was to achieve a condition of minimum interference in the Arab East in exchange for an assurance that cooperation would be freely given. The Arab League, however, did not serve British purposes but rather pressed a strong campaign for expulsion of British and all foreign interest from the Arab areas.

Britain gave up her mandate in Transjordan in 1946 and Palestine in 1948 but remained in substantial control of the Arab East through treaty arrangements with Iraq, Egypt and Jordan. She held air base rights in those three countries and had naval control in the Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea. Until quite recently (1956) she had virtual control of Jordan's Arab Legion and was entitled to keep large forces of troops in the Suez Canal (until 1955). Hence, Britain, even though she was forced by economy measures to turn over her commitments in Greece and Turkey to United States in 1947, still remained a force to be reckoned with insofar as the Middle East was concerned.

Immediately following the War in the period 1946-1947, Britain felt the pressure of popular Arab hostility inasmuch as political ferment in Egypt and Iraq was pressing for early evacuation of all foreign troops and withdrawal of concessions to foreign nations. Arab nationalism was rising to its apex. Egypt, in return for her war-time services demanded a revision of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 and declared the Treaty had been signed under duress.<sup>172</sup> Egypt demanded in December, 1945, withdrawal of all British troops and recognition of "unity of the Nile

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<sup>172</sup> Duress here might be interpreted as fear of Mussolini and Italy's expansion in the 1935 period.



Valley", i.e., Egyptian sovereignty over Sudan.<sup>173</sup> Negotiations which followed were ineffective and inconclusive; British troops evacuated Cairo but mob violence and riots prevailed with a xenophobic spirit that shocked the British into new strategic considerations.

Imperial defense planners in Great Britain examined a new concept of providing for Arab East security, i.e., that of transferring British Middle East bases and installations to the relatively secure East Africa area of Kenya, Tanganyika and Uganda. World War II had taught the British that the sea lanes of the Mediterranean and the Suez Canal were quite vulnerable to interdiction during hostilities. Wartime supplies for the Middle East campaign had to be sent via the Cape route around Africa. Secondly, the upsurge of Arab nationalism and popular opinion in Iraq and Egypt made it difficult for the British to retain former bases in those countries. The East Africa region would be located close enough to the Arab East for the British to employ mobile units to influence troubled areas and would be void of the political difficulties of the Arab countries. There was, with the change in home government, (to the British Labor Party) an accompanying liberal attitude and a softening policy toward the Empire and areas of influence as a whole. Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin began a series of discussions with Iraq and Egypt to revise former treaties. However, by 1948 it was evident to Britain that the USSR was making new expansionist efforts in the direction of the Middle East and intended to pursue their own game of domination and imperialism. Hence, British concepts reverted to preserving her position

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<sup>173</sup> Bullard, Sir Reader, Britain and the Middle East; From Earliest Times to 1952, p. 147, Hutchinson's University Library, London, second edition, 1952

in the Arab East as long as possible.<sup>174</sup> As a result of this change of attitude, British-Egyptian relations deteriorated steadily until the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1954 and the Suez Canal crisis which followed.

This concept of the use of African bases to supplement or replace those of the Arab East was reborn in May, 1953, and resulted in the establishment of the East African Command; it was to include nearly all of the territory of the old war-time British Middle East Command and some island outposts in the Indian Ocean. The zone of responsibility of the Command includes the French naval base at Madagascar and French air and supply bases at Reunion and Madagascar. A few years ago these places would have been judged as remote but today, with the reduction of time and distance, they are close enough to seriously influence the Middle East situation and are of strategic value.<sup>175</sup>

It has been previously mentioned that it became apparent in 1947 that Britain could not preserve her position in the Mediterranean and that she, at the time, acknowledged her inability to further aid or defend Greece and Turkey. However, Britain continued to think and act in terms of her former supremacy which in reality had shrunken a great deal. This view is well-expressed by the following official statement made in 1948 which justifies British interference in the region: "It need alarm no one provided the fact is kept constantly in view that Britain has a direct responsibility for the security, social advancement and prosperity of the peoples of the Middle East".<sup>176</sup>

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<sup>174</sup> Lenczowski, op. cit., p. 518-519

<sup>175</sup> Hoskins, H.L., op. cit., p. 271

<sup>176</sup> Lenczowski, op. cit., p. 519

Britain has four strategic interests in the Arab East:

(1) The defence of the oil resources and oil reserves in Iraq and the Persian Gulf, and the safeguarding of the refineries, pipe lines and port facilities.

(2) She is concerned with preventing a power vacuum from occurring in the Arab East area so long as there is a possibility that an unfriendly power may fill that vacuum. (Presently this refers to USSR or any state subject to Soviet influence.)

(3) The essential tie with NATO defence; the fact that the southern flank of NATO is anchored in the Middle East and all states in the Arab East are considered vital to its successful implementation for various reasons.

(4) The Suez Canal as a vital international waterway linking Britain with her remaining Empire, her Commonwealth sisters, and her sphere of influence in the Persian Gulf. Britain puts 32 million tons of shipping through the Canal each year. Irresponsible management of the Canal or denial of international free navigation would seriously damage British economy. She wants international control on rates, tariffs, Canal upkeep and insulation from politics, but accepts Egypt's right to have sovereign control.<sup>177</sup>

The events of 1953-1956 caused Great Britain to make further changes in her Middle East policies inasmuch as withdrawal from Suez bases in 1954-1955 to Cyprus marked the virtual end of her predominance.

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<sup>177</sup> Wall, Patrick H., "An Appraisal of Britain's Attitudes in the Middle East Conflict", p. 60-64, New Look at the Middle East, Middle East Institute, Washington, D.C., 1957

on the mainland of the south-east Mediterranean. Her further withdrawal of forces from the Sudan completed the picture of diminishing British influence in these areas. In 1955 the emphasis shifted to Iraq and the Persian Gulf area as the last British strongholds in the region, no doubt brought about by the realization that this area provides over fifty per cent of the sterling balances to the British nation. This is the richest oil area in the world, containing nearly eighty per cent of the oil wealth of the Middle East, and is virtually a British colony. There is no doubt that the British aggressive actions demonstrated in Oman, Buraimi, and her role in shaping the Baghdad Pact are all related to her renewed interest in the Persian Gulf.<sup>178</sup>

The British hoped to compensate for its retreat elsewhere in the Middle East through its membership in the Baghdad Pact. However, when Britain failed to bring Jordan into the alliance, and the dismissal of Glubb Pasha followed, some doubt was raised as to whether British membership had become more of a handicap than an asset.<sup>179</sup> This passed with time inasmuch as the adherents all well-knew that the alliance was only as strong as Britain could make it because without great power backing it would be weak and ineffective.

The British have become highly sensitive to any intrusion or to any outside influence entering the area of the Persian Gulf. They have been willing to risk the use of force and the threat of hostilities to maintain the region as a British stronghold. They have also been willing to accept the consequences of disrupting relations with their American

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<sup>178</sup> Lenczowski, op. cit., p. 519

<sup>179</sup> Spector, op. cit., p. 127

allies as a result of such actions. The Buraimi dispute and British action in 1955 provides a good example of this. In August of that year Great Britain notified Saudi Arabia that she had unilaterally drawn a frontier through the undefined regions (in the disputed areas between Saudi Arabia, abu Dhabi, Muscat and Oman) whether Saudi Arabia liked it or not. British levies of troops from the Trucial coast forced ARAMCO (Arabian-American Oil Company) personnel to abandon a camp in the southern part of the desert and they had to leave all equipment behind. In September, 1955, the British broke off from the arbitration proceedings (of an International Arbitration Commission which had been established to settle the Buraimi question) at Geneva, charging Saudi Arabia with bribery and gun-running in order to secure the support of the Arabs within the disputed area.<sup>180</sup> The walkout of Sir Reader Bullard, the British member of the Arbitration Commission, was followed up by the British occupation of Buraimi Oasis and the areas to the east and west of it. This caused a temporary crisis in Anglo-American relations for the United States, which highly prized its good relations with the Saudis, was given only three minutes notice before the brusque maneuver took place; they were told that at a certain hour British forces would occupy the area and they could read about it on the news tickers. The British provoked a reaction which they did not expect; they sorely wounded the pride and dignity of the Saudi monarch and placed the United States in an awkward, if not embarrassing position. King Saud felt it was a blow directed at

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<sup>180</sup> One British accusation was that a bribe of 84 million dollars had been offered to one tribal leader to buy the loyalty of the tribes in the area. The Saudi Arab Prince Faysal replied that "for that sum, we could have bribed the British".

him personally, at his authority, and at the whole government of Saudi Arabia. To such lengths will the United Kingdom go to protect her interests in the region of the Persian Gulf for her strategic considerations have changed from one of protecting the route to India to safeguarding the oil of the Persian Gulf. The British interests have changed from strategic to economic, for the Persian Gulf resources are needed to maintain the sterling area. If the sterling area cannot be maintained, the United Kingdom cannot survive. Approximately 600 million dollars come annually to Britain from the Persian Gulf and therein is the vital interest of Great Britain in the area.<sup>181</sup>

Neither has Britain hesitated to use force in the Southern Arabian coast in support of its subsidized leaders such as the Sultan of Oman or in the Aden Colony and Aden Protectorate areas. Britain provoked region-wide Arab animosities by her employment of RAF and ground troops in Oman in July-August, 1957, in repelling the uprising backed by the Imam of Muscat and Oman. Continued skirmishes occur also in the Aden-Yemen areas between the border tribes in which Britain freely employs her air forces to enforce a temporary control. Britain claims that Yemen arms hostile Aden tribes to stir up trouble on the southern tip of the Arabian Peninsula.<sup>182</sup> Yemen is pursuing an age-old claim of her sovereign right over the entire area and possesses a good case for her argument.

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<sup>181</sup> Keen, Harry F., "The Cold War Moves South", p. 2-4, Tensions in the Middle East, (ed. William Sands), Middle East Institute, Washington, D.C., 1956

<sup>182</sup> Daily Star, Beirut, January 1, 1958; Colonial office announcements dated December 31, 1957, said Yemen had distributed 2000-3000 rifles to tribes in Aden territory to stir up trouble in British-protected lands; further that Yemen had detained 200 Protectorate tribesmen as hostages to ensure rifles would be used to cause a disturbance in the Protectorate.

An improved Yemeni army, as a result of Egyptian assistance in training and imports of large quantities of Eastern-bloc weapons, promises to make this area a hot-bed of unrest and armed clashes for some time to come.

Despite the fact that Britain was forced to accede to international pressures and world opinion and withdrew from her aggressive co-adventure against Egypt, she still maintains a tremendous and vital interest in the Suez Canal and its future control. While she has accepted Egyptian sovereignty she will never whole-heartedly agree to the exclusion of international controls by which the users of the Canal have a voice in rates and tariffs, etc. Although most of the rest of the world (France excluded) seems content today with Egyptian management and policies, it is expected that Britain (and France) will, from time to time, seize the opportunity to attempt to gain some voice in Canal policies. Great Britain has not written off the Suez and should the occasion present itself in, who knows what form, in the future, it can be expected she will involve herself to restore as much of her former position as is possible.

After the Suez War, it was generally conceded that British power and influence in the Middle East was finished, that Arab hostility for her aggressive action was so strong that her position in the area was irreparably damaged. However, such has not been the case when one examines the region. In the Persian Gulf and on the Southern Arabian coast her position has survived intact; British forces remain in control of the Island of Cyprus and she has large forces stationed in near-by Libya (and good relations with that nation). Through her adherence to the Baghdad Pact, Britain has projected herself into a position of great influence, and assumed a great responsibility as a protector against communist aggression.

Further, this action protects Britain's primary region, the Persian Gulf area. The British influence is still strong in Iraq. The British representatives are highly respected in many of the Arab countries. The affect of anti-American propaganda circulated by the radio and press after the Suez War has tended to blame the United States for all the troubles of the Middle East and have taken the United Kingdom out of the limelight; as a result there has been a softening effect toward the British. While it remains that British-Arab policies are still under attack and while it is true that the Arabs have lost much of the former confidence and trust that they had in Britain, it would be wrong to write off the United Kingdom as a force in the Middle East. British supremacy has given away to American and Russian inroads in the area but there is a possibility, however remote it may seem at this time, that the United Kingdom can re-establish relations with the Arabs on a new basis and may again achieve a place of great prominence in the area.<sup>183</sup>

B. The British Concept of Security for the Arab East

Great Britain believes that security for the Middle East region can best be achieved by the following.

(1) Maintaining "Spheres of Interest and Influence" (American, British and possibly Russian).

Britain feels that the delineation of the area into zones of responsibility and mutually-acknowledged supremacies makes for greater understanding and stability. She feels there is less likelihood of encroachment in areas where lines are firmly drawn and agreed upon between the powers. Also, the United Kingdom concept is that these areas are

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<sup>183</sup> Hurewitz, op. cit., p. 29



incapable of defending themselves and need foreign protection to assure them from aggression.

(2) A Joint Anglo-American Policy Should Exist for the Area  
(making use of United States power and British know-how).

With the decline of British influence in the region after World War II, Britain attempted to maintain her position through (a) formation of the Arab League; (b) preferential treaties with Egypt, Iraq and Transjordan; (c) the British Middle East Office to bring economic aid under British tutelage. When these means failed, Britain turned to United States to share in the aims and objectives of British programs for the region as a matter of mutual strategic interest. In 1947-1948 the British government, although wary of introducing American influence into her domain, made the decision to endorse Anglo-American collaboration. Britain needs America's military and financial means to physically implement a successful Middle East policy. Accompanying such a joint policy is the need for mutual understanding in how policy will be carried out once it has been decided upon. It precludes agreement on the major problems of the area such as Arab-Israeli disputes, the refugee problems, the building of economies and military forces, the distribution of financial assistance, and differences of Britain and United States toward the granting of independence and freedom to small nations.<sup>184</sup>

(3) Development of a Regional Security System

For years Britain has maintained a temporary security throughout the Arab East by ties in a series of bilateral treaties which

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<sup>184</sup> Hoskins, H.L., op. cit., p. 277-278

give Britain military concessions and authority to intervene and defend the state concerned in the event of outside aggression or internal disturbances. British treaties with Iraq and Jordan and the Persian Gulf Sheikdoms protected her interests and secured the Suez from the north and east. Prior to 1949 the British were more concerned with protecting their own interests than they were with regional security until the Soviet threat became apparent. In 1952, however, joint Anglo-American efforts failed to develop an Arab-bloc participation in regional defence, as the plan ran into Arab animosities over Palestine and Egyptian demands for evacuation of Suez and Sudan. The "Northern Tier" defence was a logical substitute for Britain to encourage and to join. At the same time she has hopes that the "southern tier" countries of the Arab area will some day come into a Western alliance because without them there is only half a regional defense system and there is the ever-present danger of communist or Soviet penetration across the natural lines of communication to the rear of the "Northern Tier".<sup>185</sup> It is apparent now that at least the new United Arab Republic of Egypt and Syria will continue to oppose the Baghdad Pact and any Western-sponsored alliance. On the other hand, with the union of Jordan and Iraq to a federal state the implications are that the Baghdad Pact has a new adherent, though indirectly (terms of the union do not require Jordan to come into the Pact, although with one army acting under federal authority, Jordan is in reality supporting the Pact).

The British viewpoint (as well as the American) is that the creation of regional defense alignments greatly reduces the likelihood of

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<sup>185</sup> Rustow, Dankwalt, "Defense of the Near East" p. 280, Foreign Affairs, January, 1956, v. 34, New York, 1956

aggression. Statements of Western powers' intentions to defend the Arab East against armed attack tends to discourage that line of thinking by the Kremlin leaders inasmuch as the Russian borders have no buffer-satellites in these areas.<sup>186</sup>

(4) Control of Stability Through Subsidies and Direct Interference in Foreign Affairs of the Area Concerned

The United Kingdom feels that the security of the Arab areas in which she has her influence can best be assured by maintaining peace and traditional loyalties (British-Arab). For example, in the Persian Gulf region and South Arabia littoral Britain subsidizes tribal leaders in exchange for their loyalties and assurances of maintaining good order. Britain considers the areas too backward, in reality, to govern themselves properly or carry out their foreign relations. Hence, normally by treaty arrangements British agents carry out some governmental administrative functions and conduct the foreign policy of the area concerned. Troops to maintain internal order are usually British-trained tribal levies; however, actual United Kingdom forces stand ready to back up the local ruler whom they have subsidized if need be. This British policy has been very successful with tribal potentates and patriarchal rulers but when it faced the parliament, press and political parties of a Western democracy it has not been able to hold up.<sup>187</sup>

(5) Pledges of British Protection

The United Kingdom feels that pledges like those made in

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<sup>186</sup> Ibid, p. 283

<sup>187</sup> Ienczowski, op. cit., p. 520

the Tripartite Declaration of 1950 and those which she gives to tribal leaders in the Persian Gulf and South Arabian littoral tend to stabilize the area and make for greater peace and security. Such promises give confidence to the existing governments in the event of internal disorder and at the same time tend to discourage external forces from interfering in the region.

(6) The Defense of Suez Canal Remains Vital to the Security of the Middle East

Although Britain is no longer in a position to effect an "on-the-spot" defense of the Suez Canal, she still considers the Canal vital to her as a maritime nation and as a shipper of oil to Western Europe. It is unlikely that she will allow it to slip into the hands of a potential enemy. World War II taught Britain of the great vulnerability of the Canal but events since then have not made the Canal less important to Britain. Her forces will always be so deployed in the Middle East as to influence the defense of the Suez Canal against outside attack.

(7) Denial of the Area to USSR and Its Influence

Realizing the strategic importance of the Arab East area both as a land mass and because of its oil resources, both Britain and United States seek to deny USSR the area and seek to prevent its influence from infiltrating it. British methods differ somewhat from American; the United Kingdom usually, in the past, has resorted to physical means whereas United States wages a battle of ideals. The British technicians and advisors normally closely control the policies of its government and accomplish their goals of excluding Russian influence by physically

eliminating opposition, i.e., imprisonment of communists, deportations, restricting public meetings, etc. The British-Russian clash in the Middle East has been going on since the days of Queen Victoria so it is not new to the United Kingdom; the British automatically react whenever the Russian influence is felt. This was particularly noticeable in the case of the Czechoslovakian-Egyptian arms deal, to which Britain and United States reacted by making the Aswan Dam offers, and a withdrawal of that offer when it appeared the Russians were unwilling to finance it so that it could be useful as a lever for economic pressures on Egypt.

(8) Use of Force to Maintain Security and Stability

If necessary to maintain stability of troubled areas or to prevent outside aggression, the United Kingdom envisions the use of her armed forces or threats of force to intervene to establish peace and security. As previously mentioned, Great Britain does not hesitate to use this force in furtherance of her own interests as well as to preserve stability. This was made clear by the Tripartite Declaration of 1950 and practically demonstrated up till the present time in a number of cases, such as Buraimi, Oman, Aden-Yemen, and Suez.

(9) The Granting of Economic and Technical Assistance

Britain recognizes the need for a sound economy and area development in order to provide an over-all stability. She has responded to these needs in the Arab countries by providing loans, gifts and grants-in-aid. In some cases this assistance, as in the case of Jordan, was to assure viability in an area of British interests. The budget support given to Libya since 1948 to make up the annual deficit is another example of this type of assistance. The British Middle East Office, successor to

the Middle East Supply Center, was established to bring economic aid and a better standard of living to the peoples of the area, however, it never really took hold due to growing Arab hostility to Britain's continued presence in the region and as a reaction to the Palestine issue.<sup>188</sup>

(10) Impartiality in the Arab-Israeli Dispute

Britain's contention regarding the Palestine issue is that she should remain fair and impartial to both sides and that peace should be maintained in the area at all costs. This can hardly be said to be representative of the actions she recently displayed for her part in the three-nation aggression on Egypt. However, regarding Israel, the British position, upon close examination, is really better than the American. The United Kingdom opposed the United Nations partition plans for Palestine from the beginning, favoring a federal state or an all-Palestine government for Jew and Arab alike. The partition plan was approved, however, in November 1947; Britain announced she would not use force to establish a policy which was not equally acceptable to Jew and Arab and would withdraw from Palestine by May, 1948. Britain withdrew in May, 1948, and the Jewish state was proclaimed. It was recognized by Russia and United States immediately, however, Great Britain did not recognize it until 1949.<sup>189</sup> The British had failed to establish a properly functioning indigenous government in Palestine, being unwilling to let go of controls in their own hands and neglecting to properly train

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<sup>188</sup> Hoskins, H.L., op. cit., p. 277-278

<sup>189</sup> Bullard, Sir Reader, op. cit., p. 152-153

officials to replace the British authorities. Hence, they face the dilemma of Jewish and Arab hostility alike: Arab hostility for the injustice that occurred to them and Jewish hostility for the lack of sympathy shown for the Zionist cause. Britain has not been, contrary to United States, afraid to speak out against Israel or against the Arabs and take a definite impartial stand on the side of right. Certainly the Palestine War of 1948 is responsible for much of the trouble in the Arab East today and Britain feels that to maintain the security of the area and prevent outbreaks of violence on both sides she must take a strong neutral stand, but speaks up clearly and firmly for her ideas of an eventual settlement and for bringing about justice and fair-dealing.

(11) Security of the Arab East and Middle East, Essential to NATO Defense

Because of the essential ties between Europe and the Middle East in the global concept of defense today, Britain must consider in her concept for security of the Arab East that, conversely, the link with NATO is necessary to secure the Arab areas. The southern flank of NATO and the Arab areas are one and the same for all practical purposes, hence, Britain (and the United States) use their Middle East and Mediterranean positions to achieve results elsewhere in Europe. An unstable Arab East, in danger of infiltration by USSR, or in danger of collapse, or aggression, unquestionably deserves the vital concern of Britain (and United States) to preserve a world-wide position and the strategy of its defense. Britain feels that most Arab states are incapable of defending themselves or incapable of building modern effective armed forces and, hence, the United States and British forces must stand ready to intervene. In the absence

of an over-all regional pact, Britain finds satisfaction with the "Northern Tier" concept which provides the best defense possible against movement of Russian ground forces by establishing the main defence on the rugged mountain terrain of the Taurus-Zagros of Turkey, Iraq-Iran, and Pakistan. The Western powers are pledged to defend Greece and Turkey through NATO and linked to Pakistan through SEATO; Britain, Turkey and Pakistan are in turn pledged to aid Iran and Iraq; hence, by way of global thinking there exists a coherent regional defense system for the Middle and Arab East.<sup>190</sup>

C. An Evaluation of the British Concept for Security of the Arab East

(1) British Empire Interests Versus Arab Regional Interests

There is a good deal to be said in favor of much of past and present British policy for maintaining short-term stabilities which assist in carrying out British interests. However, at best these policies are temporary measures for assuring settled conditions and for the most part limit the natural growth and progress of the region. The British have, generally speaking, been too busy looking after their own interests to try and develop strong governments and assist in regional planning in pursuit of interests in common with the Arabs. British policy has been characterized by an indifference to the local peoples and rulers so long as British interests were accommodated; only rarely was there any attempt to alter the established economic and social order.<sup>191</sup> The continued pursuit of such a policy today will not provide for the security as in the

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<sup>190</sup> Rustow, op. cit., p. 283

<sup>191</sup> Lenczowski, op. cit., p. 520



past for a number of reasons, including the growth of Arab nationalism and the desire for independence and freedom throughout the area. Modern radio and press, plus the shortened world communication networks have brought the Arab world in daily touch with the rest of the world. Widespread education has created a nucleus of patriots and independence fighters who will campaign to safeguard the freedom of their various states and improve general conditions for the Arabs, probably leading to greater Arab unities or federations. Yet in the Persian Gulf Sheikdoms, and elsewhere in South Arabia, Great Britain is content to let nineteenth century treaties (made with tribal chiefs to control piracy, slave trade and keep the peace in the area) serve as a basis for conducting their modern affairs today. They are simply changing the method (in which they are applied) or precedents rather than the texts of the treaties, i.e., the rulers of Bahrein and Kuwait are being encouraged to deal with purely Persian Gulf affairs or relations with their Arab neighbors on their own, without Britain acting as a go-between on foreign affairs.<sup>192</sup> (Yet, in fact, principal control will continue to be with the British agents.)

One of the real difficulties that will face the British systems in the near future is that in such places as the Persian Gulf she has not developed any real political security or governmental structure or framework and traditions, even though she has been in power there for more than a century. Certainly the void of power after a British withdrawal in such an area will be filled with a long period of instability and opportunism for communism or related influences.

The United Kingdom's concept of security in the past has meant

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<sup>192</sup> Cook, op. cit., p. 4

just securing the area for the peaceful pursuit of British interests with minimum local interference. Britain parried great power inclinations toward the area by military and diplomatic moves. She thought, and continues to think in terms of self-interests, such as, (a) Persian Gulf-Iraq-Iran oil; (b) Middle East and Arab East trade; (c) sterling balances; (d) the Suez Canal as a vital waterway to a maritime nation; (e) maintaining prestige and privilege in the area.

Great Britain has long been a target for world-wide criticism against the exercise of her "imperialism" in the Arab East (defined as the domination of an unwilling, underdeveloped society by an advanced state). In the past, territorial expansion was a normal phenomenon of world relations; the powers or victors in warfare automatically acquired new lands as spoils of battle or in the normal process of their expansion; it has been the expected and the universally-accepted process in the East and the West since the beginning of time. In the nineteenth century the peoples of Asia and Africa acknowledged the supremacy of the European powers and acquiesced to a dependent status. With the spread of nationalism since World War I, the superiority of the European powers has been questioned and challenged. Actually, European military superiority over Africa and Asia has grown rather than retarded because of the tremendous progress made in modern weapons and the large power potential necessary to produce them. What is being challenged, and in these days is far more important than military might, is the concept of government. Whereas in the past the responsibilities of government were primarily preserving peace and stability, providing for justice and limited public services, today the idea of the socialist or welfare state has won almost universal acclaim. People everywhere are demanding from their governments broad responsibilities for

health, education, communication and economic development and social services; including health and unemployment insurances and retirement and social security assurances. In the past, colonial powers tailored their governments to what could be supported by local revenues. The rising costs of financing such new concepts in government as the people now demand, plus the cost of maintaining modern military establishments, will seriously threaten the capacity of Britain or any other European power to preserve their positions in the Arab East, except in the oil-rich countries.<sup>193</sup>

The United Kingdom has attempted to clarify her intentions with regard to her future actions in the Arab and Middle East in reply to imperialist charges. Her attitudes in this connection are perhaps best expressed in the following statement made by Sir Edward Spears in 1947:

"... we stand for peace in the Middle East ... this power (British) is threatened by one thing only, our own timidity and the deprecating attitude we adopt towards the perfectly legitimate influence we acquired in the past. It is not to interfere ... it should be evident that Britain has no desire to dominate the Middle East. The moderating influence she can so well exercise is a menace to no one. Her vital interests must, however, compel her in the future as they did in the past, to oppose the attempt of any outside power to control and rule the Middle East in its own interest. We cannot but insure that this vital landbridge ... be in the hands of friendly people."<sup>194</sup>

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<sup>193</sup> Hurewitz, op. cit., p. 30

<sup>194</sup> Quoted by Seton-Williams, M.V., Britain and the Arab States, Luzac and Company, London, 1948 (from Daily Telegraph, January 3, 6, 7th, 1947)

One author has described the British position in the Middle East as one of "increasingly more considerate imperialism".<sup>195</sup> Gradually the visible forms of power are being laid away in favor of persuasion and the seeking of mutual interests, in spite of evidence to the contrary, such as Britain's numerous armed interventions into the Arab areas, 1956-1957. However, the rate of change of British policy to accommodate itself to modern conditions has generally, in practice, been slower than the desires of the people and therein lies a great difficulty for the future. Britain is trying to make the old policies, the old treaties and antiquated political agreements "do"; she only makes changes when the situation forces her to do so. The stage is set, theoretically, for a new order of British-Arab relationships. If Britain is now capable of looking ahead and planning her long-range policies for the Arab areas based on mutual benefits, her still-favorable position in the area may not be sacrificed. When she junks the antiquated thinking of "what is good for Britain is good for the Middle East", the British system may still hold up and work effectively in conjunction with American resources and American policy.<sup>196</sup>

Perhaps one of the best opportunities open to future British policy would be to give support to the principle of self-determination within the area and to encourage rather than discourage the development of new Arab unities. By seeking to promote close relations and friendly ties with a stronger regional unit, the British will ensure goodwill and their own future advantages in the region as a whole.

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<sup>195</sup> Speiser, op. cit., p. 244

<sup>196</sup> Reitzel, op. cit., p. 161

(2) The Need for Greater Coordination of United States--British Policies

Since 1947 down to 1958 the United States has been perceptibly drawn into the Arab areas to replace withdrawing British power. Britain has continued to act, however, as if her supremacy in these areas still existed. There has existed wide differences and attitudes in conduct of Anglo-American policy, indeed, if there has been any joint policy at all. Britain had for a number of preceding years resented any American intervention in the area, feeling that this would be a trespass on her private property. The insistence of the United States in March, 1951, that an American naval officer command NATO naval forces in the Mediterranean first shocked the British into the realization that they were giving way to American power.<sup>197</sup>

While there exists today a great number of common factors in the interests and concept for security of both United States and Britain, there is a great divergence of methods employed for serving those interests. Absence of a consistent and sound joint United States--British policy has tended to undermine the constructive efforts that have already been undertaken in the area by each of them. Also, the Arab leaders have tended to lose confidence in wisdom and foresightedness of Western diplomacy. Joint policy decisions that may be depended on for long-range planning and interstate relations are necessary because they affect not only Britain, United States and the Arab states, but the interests of at least a half-dozen governments outside the Arab East, some having security commitments with

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<sup>197</sup> Hoskins, H.L., op. cit., p. 280

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the West.

No better illustration can be given to show the lack of coordination in Anglo-American Middle East policy than the recent Suez crisis and the hostilities which followed it in November, 1957. The divergent views of United States and Britain were brought sharply into focus. Prior to the attack on Egypt the United States was kept in a diplomatic blackout and had no knowledge of Anglo-French attack plans. Nor was there any greater coordination in its aftermath.

Today, the British concept of American power in the Mediterranean area is that it is present by British invitation to serve a mutual interest of keeping the Russians out. They conceive that this American power, just as British power in the past, should serve British interests. There must be a compromise on basic thinking as the Americans do not accept this view.

The wide divergence of ideas on some fundamental issues may prove too difficult to adjust. For example, the British position on maintaining the areas intact without change versus the American principle of self-determination; the United States will seek to have the British give more concessions to small Arab states and Sheikdoms struggling for their freedom and independence. Also, the British cannot expect the United States to forever bear the financial burden in the Middle East and elsewhere and still not have a dominant voice in the Anglo-American policy for the region concerned. Britain will necessarily have to compromise if United States provides the means of both finance and military power.

Most problems in the Arab East stem from the Arab-Israeli dispute; it is the first and greatest problem in the Middle East. The second biggest problem has been the wide difference in British and American policy for the

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198 Ibid, p. 288

area. Many believe that the Arab-Israeli dispute is susceptible of settlement in the foreseeable future. The same cannot be said, however, regarding the outlook for coordination between United States and British policies. The respect that the Arabs now hold for the British is reluctant and lacking in confidence whereas with the United States the Arabs have experienced, regarding American support of Israel, only a temporary emotional anger such as for a friend who has disappointed them. Judging this difference in feeling toward Britain and United States, it appears that British policy must conform closer to United States' policy in that the Americans have a better basis on which to build future relations.<sup>199</sup>

(3) A Deficit in Policy; Moral Strength

In these days of mass-destruction weapons, the international arbitration agencies and the United Nations Organization are gaining more respect and popularity. A world fear of the consequences of a new and more terrible world war increases the chances of dealing with international problems, effectively, and short of war by international agencies.

The "cold war" that has existed between East and West almost since the end of the last World War is a battle of ideas, principles, pressures and propaganda. The moral force behind the ideology of the West can lend it considerable mettle. The principle of good and right can gain the popular support of world opinion which is so necessary when attempting to develop a world society through agencies like the United Nations Organization.

Britain's Middle East policies lack that moral consideration and

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<sup>199</sup> Kern, op. cit., p. 2

her actions reflect that only too severely. The open disavowment of international pledges and agreements and the flaunting of joint power declarations, (i.e., Tripartite Declaration) have hurt British prestige and lost them the trust and confidence of the Arab world.<sup>200</sup> Hence, it is folly for Great Britain to base her security concept on pledges she has made to the area, for the Arabs feel that they will not be honored.

The off-hand, inconsiderate manner in which Great Britain often treats with the area has brought her the general resentment of its peoples. For example, Britain has in the past many times made extensive plans for organization of the Arab East, having international aspects (such as Sykes-Picot Agreement, Middle East Defense Command, etc.), but has not once carried out consultations with the Arabs themselves on their own future. The flagrant discourtesy has given rise to Arab resentment and animosity for Great Britain. This is related to the moral issue; it appears to the Arab that Britain is working only in her own behalf and selfish interests and does not have a single altruistic motive.

Perhaps the greatest stain on the moral character of any nation is armed conspiracy against another nation while outwardly professing friendship and lack of prejudice or bias toward that same nation. Great Britain's obvious involvement in the three-power complicity against Egypt lost her more in moral standing than her reputation had suffered in a hundred years previously. The reason for this is obvious; changing times and changing concepts of conduct for the powers. The British can never feel as free to employ force in the area again, in consideration of not just Arab

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<sup>200</sup> These pledges include the promise of an Arab nation to King Hussein after World War I (McMahon Papers) and a promise to safeguard Arab rights in Palestine.



reactions but world reaction against employment of force, especially for the purpose of a large nation enforcing her will on the small. The moral issue demands submitting problems to international agencies for solution.

Likewise, the former and present British policies which support unpopular regimes, vested interests and feudal land systems display a definite lack of moral consideration. It guarantees and supports injustice, intolerance, and backwardness. In general, British policy has feared the rise of the "big man", the popular leader, as they felt their interests would be endangered if the area was united and the foreigner driven out through a rise in Arab national spirit. Hence, the strong British reaction to such men as Colonel Irabi, Sharif Hussein, Habib Bourgiba, and Abdul Nasser. Britain continues to discourage Arab nationalism and popular individual leaders; she prefers to back men who will be loyal to British interests in the area.

In the Arab-Israeli dispute, Britain has confused both sides and lost the moral confidence of each. Britain, firstly, failed to develop an all-Palestine government under the mandate and, that, in conjunction with her proclaiming the Balfour Declaration, is the source of the troubles in Palestine. However, for all this, Britain continued through the years 1922, 1930 and 1939, to issue White Papers clarifying her stand relative to the Jewish community in Palestine and assuring the Arabs that their rights would be safeguarded; these official papers sought to limit Jewish immigration and ruled out the possibility of a Jewish state being established.<sup>201</sup> Great Britain opposed the United Nations partition of 1947 and did not rush to welcome Israel as a new nation. She denounced

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<sup>201</sup> Bullard, Sir Reader, op. cit., p. 96, 107

Israel in 1955 — then assisted Israel by bombing Egypt in 1956 during the Suez War. The British stand is not well-defined today; neither the Jews or the Arabs hold British honor in a high position and both find British policies void of moral considerations.

Also, use has been made by the United Kingdom of racial and religious differences in order to continue local governments. Political manipulations and subsidies were used to play off one group against the other in order to maintain the British position. The populations seem well aware of this today and for that reason resent British actions and attitudes; they want truly independent "home" rule. Many minorities of national groups have sought Western protection through the years to safeguard their status in a larger, possibly violent community. Some Arab tribes have likewise sought British backing in order to predominate in a certain area. In general, it may be said that these Arab groups and national minorities welcome the idea of protection, so long as there is no intervention in their local affairs. Too often, however, British troops or threats of their use on the local scene were sufficient to justify the use of the term coercion in conjunction with British methods.

(4) Needed: Re-evaluation of Security Alliances and Mental Attitudes

The British, with limited armed forces and limited financial means, seek to hold their present position in the Middle East and to carry out their commitments for the Arab East area by a system of air and military bases secured through unilateral and multilateral treaties throughout the region. They have attempted to build up the armed forces of friendly Arab states and develop British-trained troop levies to enforce

their policies. Mobile airborne striking forces within striking distance of the vital region complete the pictures of their forces on hand. British officers, military advisors and technicians are on duty in Iraq and throughout the Persian Gulf region. Generally, these British personnel think of the native forces in terms of British troops and tend to over-control them (such as was the case with Glubb Pasha in Jordan), and envisage using them primarily for pursuance of British interests and objectives. There is a new stir among the peoples everywhere in the Arab East that demonstrates they are aware of being used; a new national spirit throughout the region indicates that Great Britain cannot for long depend on native forces to carry out her own policies.

Too, the British concept of NATO interferring in the Arab East may be far-fetched, unless, of course, a NATO adherent is involved. For example, a local attack on Iraq by rebellious forces, even if armed by the Russians, indirectly, probably would not bring NATO aid. Secondly, NATO is only as strong as a joint United States-British policy desires to make it. Thus, Britain should not rely too heavily on NATO support for "brush-fire" wars in the Middle East.

It appears far more likely that the Soviet penetration of the Arab regions will be economical and ideological rather than overt aggressive action. Any hostilities will probably begin as a result of a fifth column infiltration, arming an indoctrinated-opposition to unpopular government. In such a case the native forces may be disloyal to the British; NATO forces probably would not interfere; this, theoretically, leaves Britain to handle the situation alone.

Hence, to improve her own future relations in the area, a new mental approach is needed by the British. Their antiquated-thinking in

terms of British "superiority" and their concept that a Britain is "born to rule" must perish. New views must be adopted based on mutual cooperation and sincere friendships with the Arabs, treating with them as co-equals in order to develop goodwill and long-term confidence. It is truly their only hope of preserving what is left of their status in the Middle East and of building for the future.

## CHAPTER 7

### THE SOVIET INTERESTS IN THE ARAB EAST AND ITS PURPOSES

#### A. Russian Interests in the Arab and Middle East

##### (1) Prior to Second World War

Russia has long been an imperial power, in the classic sense, and possesses a history of expansion southward in the direction of the Middle East areas since 1552. At that time Ivan the Terrible, then Czar of Imperialist Russia, subjugated the Tartan Khanate of Kazan. From that time on the Muscovites systematically extended their control to the south by a combination of economic and political penetration as well as armed force. A large Asian colonial empire was conquered and colonized at the same time the European powers were expanding overseas. One Moslem state after another fell before their advance until they reached the present Iranian-Russian border in 1881. To some of these Moslem states they gave "satellite" status, others they destroyed. As a result of the Soviet expansion there are today living in USSR about 20-30 million Moslems, mostly Turkish-speaking, living on the sites of ancient Moslem kingdoms and centers of civilizations such as Samarkand, Bokhara, the Caucasus and Transcaucasia.<sup>202</sup>

The exerting of Russian pressure on the Middle East has been a constant factor over a period of 250 years. This pressure has met head-on with other conflicting great power interests in the region. In the main,

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<sup>202</sup> Ege, Ismail, "The Extent and Significance of Soviet Penetration in the Middle East", p. 12, New Look at the Middle East, Middle East Institute, Washington, D.C., 1957; and, Lewis, Bernard, "The Middle Eastern Reaction to Soviet Pressures", p. 130, Middle East Journal, v. 10, No. 2, Spring, 1956

however, it has been a struggle between Great Britain and the Russians for supremacy, inasmuch as all other powers, i.e., France, Italy and Germany held positions of a secondary order in the area. In the eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth centuries the decline of the Ottoman and Persian Empires left a partial power vacuum; Britain, France and Russia all sought to fill the void. Historically, the strategic aims of Russian interests were: control of the Turkish Straits, an expansionist drift toward India and the Persian Gulf region, and establishment of power in the Balkans; they were both defensive and expansionist. Russia was forced by Great Britain to accept control over the northern and adjacent parts of the Middle East area and prevented from interfering with Western influences and interests in the main Arab zones. Russia and Britain emerged as the two opposing poles of power in the region; they only came together in common cause when it appeared a third power might also attempt to establish itself there.<sup>203</sup>

The most aggressive policies of the Russians began during the reign of Peter the Great (1682-1725), but his successes in expansion were only temporary. Catherine the Great (1762-1796), resumed where Peter had left off and during the Russo-Turkish War of 1768-1774 her Russian naval units under Admiral Spinkoff bombarded Beirut, and after a two months seige occupied it at the request of the Druze chief, al-Amir Yusef, who wanted assistance to regain control of the town, now fortified and in the hands of insurgents under Ahmad al Jazzar who refused to obey the Amir. This intervention lasted from October, 1773, to February, 1774, at which

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<sup>203</sup> Taxis, S.G. Colonel, "Middle East Responsibility Toward Regional and World Security", p. 35, The Evolution of Public Responsibility in the Middle East, Middle East Institute, Washington, D.C., 1955; and Reitzel, op. cit., p. 101, 110-111

time Russian forces effectively controlled Beirut and the Muscovite flag flew over the city. The Arab population was obliged to do reverence to the portrait of the Empress which was raised over the principal gate. In Egypt, the Russians supported the uprising of Ali Bey who had declared Egypt independent of the Ottoman Empire in 1768; likewise, they supported Dahir al-Umar who had declared the independence of Syria.<sup>204</sup>

By the treaty of 1774 (Kuchuk-Kainardji) which concluded the Turko-Russian War in which Russia extracted the promise of Turkey to permit freedom of religion in Moldavia and Wallachia; also, she obtained for the Orthodox Church possession of the Keys of the Church of Bethlehem. In so doing Russia emerged the champion of Orthodox Christians in the Ottoman Empire which even today facilitates her relationships within the area. This position, too, was used as a lever and as an excuse by Russia in the Crimean War for attacking Turkey and demanding these rights be restored (after Turkey had given the Keys to Roman Catholics under pressure from France).

Russia was never wholly successful in her Middle East expansionist attempts primarily because of Great Britain's efforts to keep her out of the area. Britain felt that the Ottomans were as good "an occupier" of the area that there could be, if they could not themselves physically occupy it; this region was vital to Great Britain as her principal land routes to India passed through it. Hence, Great Britain sought by policy to "preserve the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire" which came to be known as the "sick man of Europe" and the problem of its impending break-up,

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<sup>204</sup> Person, William, "The Russian Occupation of Beirut, 1772-1774", Royal Central Asian Journal, v. XLII, July-October, 1955, p. 284; and Spector, op. cit., p. 1-2; and Zeine, Z.N., "Russia in the Near East", p. 13, Middle East Forum, v. XXXIII, March, 1958

the "Eastern question". Though victorious in a series of wars with the Turks, the Russians usually lost by diplomacy what they had gained through armed strength and hence, her "sphere of influence" was restricted to the periphery of the Middle East area. (For example, the Treaty of Berlin of 1878 revised the Treaty of San Stefano of the same year in disfavor of the Russians.)

It was not until the First World War that Russia came close to realizing her dreams of Mideast expansion. Had the so-called Secret Agreement in regard to Constantinople (March 4-April 10, 1915), and the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916 been honored at the close of the War, Russia would have acquired Constantinople and ownership of the Dardanelles and its controlling territories, substantial parts of Turkey, and Southern Kurdistan, placing her in a position to dominate the Middle East. However, the Kerensky Revolution, followed by the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917, knocked Russia out of the War and voided the agreements in the eyes of the other members of the Triple Entente (Britain and France).

As a result of World War I, Great Britain became supreme in the Middle East. Russia was concerned with her internal problems and could only devote her principal energies in that direction. She did not, however, give up the old expansionist policies of the Tsars and subsequently resurrected the old Russian claims. Shortly following the successful Bolshevik seizure of power they published the Allied Secret Agreements pertaining to Turkey and the Middle East for propaganda purposes in hope for external support; this disclosure created a world-wide sensation. They also began an intensive propaganda drive aimed at the Moslem peoples inside and outside of Russia's borders, inasmuch as they did not have whole-hearted support in Russia, especially of the Slavic element at that time, and wanted to



bolster their strength. On December 7, 1917, the Council of Peoples' Commissars issued the appeal to the Moslems of the Orient that the Bolshevik Revolution (as distinguished from the March revolution) had as its mission the liberation of the Moslem peoples of the East.<sup>205</sup>

This was followed by the Baku Congress of 1920, the main purpose of which was to set-up the organization needed to sovietize the Moslem world; the invitation extended by the Third International to the peoples of the East included: "Peasants of Syria and Arabia, the English and French have promised you independence, but now their troops have occupied your country, imposing upon you their laws; and you, after liberating yourselves from the Turkish Sultan and government, have now become slaves of the Paris and London governments, the only difference from the Sultan being that they will keep a stronger hold on you and will plunder you more effectively ... the peasants of Mesopotamia are rebelling against the English army of occupation ... in Syria, they are unable to establish peace ... Make every effort to reach Baku ... in order to discuss how to free yourselves from the chains of slavery to form a fraternal union ..."<sup>206</sup>

The Soviets did not, however, find the enthusiastic support among the Arabs that they had expected; communist propaganda was generally unsuccessful in exploiting the poverty and blatant social inequality present in the Middle East. The Arab peoples were physically isolated and conscious of British power, not Russian; also, they were largely uninformed on ideologies and were devoted to their religion; hence, the new communist

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<sup>205</sup> Spector, op. cit., p. 15, 18, 24

<sup>206</sup> Izvestia, July 3, 1920, quoted by Spector, op. cit., p. 25-27

idea did not take hold.<sup>207</sup> There was little relationship between USSR and the Arab region during the period between the wars; the Arab East was effectively controlled by Britain and France who did not encourage links with revolutionary Russia. The Soviets did establish diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia and Yemen in 1926 and 1928 respectively, and a Russian commercial mission was sent to Yemen. At that time there was little opportunity for the Russians to stir up any revolutionary activity as the regions were remote and isolated and there was no strong anti-Western feeling, nor was there a proletariat class. Lacking diplomatic relations in most of the Arab areas, the Soviets worked through the Comintern to build up small communist parties in Palestine and elsewhere; the official party line was to favor Arab nationalism and stand against Zionism. However, the Russians also sponsored a Jewish communist party in Palestine, taking care to separate it from that of the Arab communists. In general, the structure was weak and the parties ineffective. The Comintern, however, until the outbreak of World War II, followed with considerable success their line of liberation of colonial and semi-colonial peoples from the imperialist yoke, mainly directed at Britain and France. The failure of Great Britain to stand by her promises to the Arabs provided the needed fuel to make the Arab East a hot-bed of resentment and hostility against the English in the interwar period. Russia from outside the area was achieving her objective of making Britain's position inside the area untenable.<sup>208</sup> The outbreak of the Second World War was to provide her

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<sup>207</sup> Frankel, J., "The Middle East in Turmoil", p. 104, The Year Book of World Affairs, 1956, Stevens and Sons, London, 1956; and Lenczowski, op. cit., p. 525

<sup>208</sup> Lenczowski, ibid., p. 523-524; and Ebon, Martin, "Communist Tactics in Palestine", Middle East Journal, July, 1946, Washington D.C.

with further opportunities.

(2) During and After World War II

Just prior to World War II the USSR made plans to penetrate further southward in the direction of the Arab East; Baghdad and Cairo were selected for new centers of espionage and subversion by the Soviet Military Intelligence. Stalin intended to turn the Persian Gulf area into a center of aspirations for the Soviet Union. Secret negotiations were carried out between the Russians and the Germans in the period 1939-1941 in which they sought to define their respective spheres of influence in the Middle and Arab East. The Soviets in a 1940 agreement with the Germans insisted that "the area south of Batum and Baku in the general direction of the Persian Gulf is recognized as the center of aspiration of the Soviet Union".<sup>209</sup> Even though the German attack on Russia in 1941 precluded the implementation of this program, the Soviets probably expected to obtain similar concessions from the West.

As a result of Britain's war-time policy with her Russian ally the ban on Soviet diplomatic missions in Arab capitols was lifted. Between 1942-1943, the Russians sent numerous diplomats, cultural and commercial representatives, and Soviet agents to infiltrate Cairo, Baghdad, Beirut and Damascus. They established firm contacts with the existing trade unions and helped organize new ones. The Soviet World Federation of Trade Unions sent visiting missions and played an active role in supporting labor movements and such local leaders as Mustafa el-Aris in Lebanon. Soviet friendship and front organizations took root and there appeared a number

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<sup>209</sup> Ege, op. cit., p. 16; and Spector, op. cit., p. 112; and Taxis, op. cit., p. 34 (quoted from telegram from the German Ambassador in USSR (Schulenberg) to the German Foreign Office, Moscow, 0534, November 26, 1940)

of pro-Soviet daily newspapers and magazines. Communist literature, exhibits of Soviet art, and Soviet motion pictures were introduced to the area, dedicated to the cause of culture. Great stress was given to the fact that there existed freedom of worship in the Soviet Union and goodwill of its government toward Islam. In the latter part of the war, Soviet Moslems made pilgrimages to Mecca and at the same time spread propaganda acclaiming Russian treatment of Moslems. Soviet Moslems were included in the diplomatic staffs of the legations and embassies; these officials pointedly made their Friday prayers at the most-frequented mosques. Russia was ready to avail herself of the marvelous opportunity afforded by war circumstances to permit her again to freely influence the people of the Middle East.<sup>210</sup>

By 1944 the allies were assured a victory in their World War II European campaign. Soviet interests in the future of her neighbor, Iran, were aroused by the effort of Britain and France to obtain oil concessions there in late 1943 and early 1944. In September, 1944, Russia sent Sergi Kawtaradze, Assistant Commissar for Foreign Affairs, to negotiate with Iran for an oil concession; the Soviets demanded an omnibus concession in the five northern provinces. It was deduced that the Soviet policy was to frustrate the designs of the English and Americans and mark this area out as her sphere of influence. As a result of the Russian action the perplexed Iranians rejected all foreign bids for concessions.<sup>211</sup>

Soviet concern for Arab affairs was again demonstrated in May, 1945, when France sought to re-establish her control over the Levant.

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<sup>210</sup> Lenczowski, op. cit., p. 525-527

<sup>211</sup> Spector, op. cit., p. 114

The USSR was silent until after both the American note and the British ultimatum had been sent to the French. Then, suddenly, it adopted a vital interest, informing all the powers that it viewed the situation with alarm and "insisted that speedy measures to stop military operations in Syria and Lebanon must be taken and the conflict which has arisen must be settled in a peaceful manner". France welcomed the Russian intervention as a balancing force and recommended a Big Four conference on all unsettled problems of the Middle East. Naturally, the Americans and the British disregarded this proposal and considered Russia's complaint to be propaganda and irrelevant.<sup>212</sup>

Almost immediately following the conclusion of the Second World War Russia set her new aggressive Middle Eastern policy in motion. Her plans included a large pincer movement from Greece and Turkey to Iran, aimed at reducing Greece and Turkey on the west and Azerbaijan on the east. The Soviets wished to follow up their World War II success with some material benefits of enforcing old Russian claims in Turkey and conquering Iran by installments, which they had tried earlier in 1921 without success.<sup>213</sup>

In November, 1945, the United States proposed that she, Britain and USSR should withdraw their troops from Iran in accordance with the provision of the Tripartite Treaty of January 29, 1942. Russia rejected this proposal and the Red army remained. The main reason for the Soviet violation of the 1942 Treaty was her desire to annex the northern Iranian province which had provided such fertile soil for communist activities. During the war years of occupation the Red army had dismantled military,

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<sup>212</sup> Reitzel, op. cit., p. 74-75

<sup>213</sup> Rossow, Robert, Jr., "The Battle of Azerbaijan, 1946", p. 17-32, The Middle East Journal, v. X, No. 1, Winter 1946, Washington, D.C.; and Spector, op. cit., p. 114

customs, and police posts along the border and virtually extended the Russian frontier to include Azerbaijan. The local Tudeh party, with the help of the Red army, aroused demands for local autonomy. On December 12, 1945, an autonomous Republic was proclaimed. Iran turned to the United Nations Organization for support; the Russians made the mistake of demanding autonomy for the Soviet puppet regime in Azerbaijan, continued occupation of parts of Iran by Soviet troops, and the establishment of a joint-stock oil company (of which Russia was to control 51% of shares). Also, instead of withdrawing as requested, the Soviets reinforced northern Iran with troops and tanks, threatening a military coup d'etat. As the result of strong United States protests (twice to United Nations), and a storm of world-wide adverse publicity, the Soviet leaders became convinced of the desirability of agreement and subsequently withdrew in May, 1946.

The Azerbaijan incident is brought out to show its effects on the Arabs vis-à-vis the Russians. After the War Russia had considerable tactical and psychological advantage in the Middle East. Had the Soviets been willing to let the Azerbaijan dispute remain a purely Iranian affair, at least on the surface, the sympathies of the Arabs would not have been affected. However, Russia failed to carry out her promise to remove her occupation troops from Iranian territory and exercised her power to back a rebellious regime and an ethnic group, the Kurds, in opposition to the established regime. Hence, there arose a general fear of Russian moves in the direction of the Arabs. Iraq particularly was concerned in that the Soviets might try to organize the Kurds (one-fifth of her population) to once more revolt (which subsequently the Soviet did organize into a communist stronghold in Iraq). Even though the Azerbaijan dispute was justly settled and the Russians eventually withdrew, the Soviets had lost

their psychological advantage with the Arabs, at least temporarily.<sup>214</sup>

The Soviet government which had during World War II watched with displeasure the two-faced neutrality policy of Turkey (in favor of the Germans) was anxious at the end of the War to secure a revision of the Montreux Convention, governing the Turkish Straits. Stalin referred to the arrangement as Turkey's "hand on Russia's throat". As early as 1943 at Teheran and again at Yalta in 1945 Stalin raised the question of the future of the Straits. At the Potsdam Conference in the same year, Russia pressed for the return of the districts of Kars and Ardahan to USSR, which had been ceded to Turkey in 1921.<sup>215</sup> At the close of the War Turkey was ready to discuss the Treaty revision and negotiate a new treaty of friendship and non-aggression with the Russians, provided such negotiations did not involve the sacrifice of Turkish rights or integrity. In June, 1945, however, Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov notified the Turkish Ambassador in Moscow that "revision" of the Montreux Convention involved: (1) ceding to USSR a base on the Black Sea Straits together with the districts of Kars and Ardahan, in return for which the Turks could look for compensation from Syria in the form of a city and railway junction at Aleppo; (2) granting Soviet bases in the Dodecanese Islands off the coast of Turkey. The USSR expected that the United States and England would permit her to have a free hand in the Straits problem after the War. However, the Turks were encouraged by the United States and Britain to take a firm stand. Turkey rejected Russian demands on the grounds that the Montreux Convention was a multi-lateral treaty and could

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<sup>214</sup> Speiser, op. cit., p. 188-189

<sup>215</sup> In 1921 the Soviet Union had transferred these districts to Turkey without expressing any solicitude for the rights of the Armenians there.

not be legally revised without the participation of all the regional signatories.

At about the same time the Soviet government sought to outflank Turkey by attempting to establish a communist regime in Greece. The weakening British position was assumed by an already alarmed United States brought to Soviet realities from its experience in Iran as well as in the Turkish Straits. American naval forces in the Mediterranean were brought to full strength and United States official policy followed in the promulgation of the "Truman Doctrine". The Russian government promptly labelled it "a scarcely concealed declaration of preparation for war against the USSR". However, since Stalin's death, Soviets have assured Turkey that they believe the question of defense can be settled on mutually satisfactory terms and state they have no claims on Turkey. The Turks, aroused by Soviet pressures on them, and alarmed by Soviet intrigues among the Kurds and the Armenians, first looked to the Arab world for support. Iraq and Turkey signed a pact of mutual assistance on the question of maintaining public order on March 29, 1946, designed to prevent further communist encroachment.<sup>216</sup>

The Arab-Israeli Wars of 1947-1948 provided the Soviets with another opportunity to participate directly in the affairs of the Middle and Arab East. Previously, the Russians had ostensibly backed Arab claims in Palestine and outwardly denounced the Zionists. When in 1948 the Jewish state was proclaimed, the Soviet Union completely reversed its policy and immediately gave recognition to the new state. Their action in supporting Israel was probably predicated, and quite correctly so, on the fact that

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<sup>216</sup> Speiser, op. cit., p. 118



this action would weaken Great Britain's position and foment continued troubled conditions which would ultimately prove to be to Soviet advantage.<sup>217</sup> This goal, thus accomplished, Stalin began to "mend his fences" with the Arabs and began in 1948 an anti-Jewish drive at home and abroad; pro-Israeli trends in USSR and in the satellites were violently suppressed. In February, 1953, just three weeks before Stalin's death, diplomatic relations with Israel were broken off on the pretext of the Israeli bombing of the Soviet Mission in Tel Aviv. Although relations have since been re-established, the course of policy remains the same -- anti-Jew, anti-Zionist, anti-Israeli and pro-Arab -- in order to enhance the Russian position in the Arab East; at the same time, it reflects the Soviet "home attitude" toward Jews and Zionists in Russia.<sup>218</sup>

When the United States and other Western powers failed to include Egypt in a Western-sponsored defense alignment for the Middle East, the USSR at once shifted its line of approach to the Egyptians. The Soviet press lauded the Egyptian stand, where previously it had been attacking her. This was an opportunity to encourage the already far-developed anti-Western policy. Previously, most of the Arab countries had received Soviet notes in the fall of 1951, warning against joining alliances hostile to the Soviet Union. Iraq was similarly cautioned in a note of March, 1954, that the adherence of any Arab country to a Middle East defense pact would be viewed as "an unfriendly and hostile act" by the Soviet Union.

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<sup>217</sup> Dallin, David, J., "Soviet Policy in the Middle East", p. 337-344, Middle Eastern Affairs, November, 1955, From the Middle East in the Cold War (ed. Grant S. McClellan), H.W. Wilson Company, New York, 1956.

<sup>218</sup> Ibid, p. 138-139

Having been frustrated in her attempts to secure an Arab alliance, the United States turned to the "Northern Tier" countries, only one of which was Arab, Iraq. However, Iraq was more aware of a communist threat than the remaining Arab states. The United States won a major diplomatic and strategic victory by bringing about the Turco-Pakistani Mutual Aid Agreement (April 2, 1954), which was the first step in developing a pro-Western defense arrangement in the Middle East. The Pact united 100 million people or one-quarter of the Moslem world, and because the Russian people are still impressed by manpower, at times even more than by technology, the impact on the Soviet Union was strongly felt. It resulted in a re-distribution of the Moslem population inside Russia for security reasons; this involves some 30 million people living in central Asia. An official note of protest was sent to Turkey denouncing the Pact for in the Soviet view, "The agreement would aggravate the situation in the Near and Middle East, and Southeast Asia; it would have a direct bearing on the security of the Soviet Union". It accused the United States of planning to use "human resources" of this area to carry out American policy and of forging a bloc by installments. Russia also tried to incite Arab opposition by frequent allegations in the press concerning Turkey's latent ambition toward territories in Syria and other Arab states.<sup>219</sup>

Neither Turkey nor Pakistan became intimidated by Russian threats. On the contrary, it seemed that pressure only served to hasten their completion of a series of alliances which comprise the Baghdad Pact. In a last minute effort to forestall Iran from joining the Pact, the Russians returned eleven tons of long-promised gold and took steps to repay

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<sup>219</sup> Keesings, op. cit., p. 13519 (1954); and Spector, op. cit., p. 121-122, 124

(3,000,000 pounds sterling) Iran for wartime supplies appropriated during the Russian occupation. The United States came upon the scene by concluding a Treaty of Friendship with Iran on August 15, 1955; two days later the Export-Import Bank made loans to Iran totaling \$14,000,000. The United States won out and Iran adhered to the Pact on October 11, 1955 (Iraq and Turkey had previously signed alliances on February 24; Great Britain adhered on April 24, and Pakistan signed on September 23, 1955).<sup>220</sup>

As a reaction to the Turco-Pakistani Agreement of 1954 and the United States Arms Deal with Pakistan, Russia concluded a series of agreements with Afghanistan which included economic assistance, in an effort to keep her out of the Baghdad Pact. Soviet Kirghizia, which lies to the northeast of Afghanistan, is a center of atomic research, hence, the USSR could not permit by default the joining of such a strategically-located nation to an American-sponsored alliance. With Afghanistan out of the Baghdad Pact, Russia has an opportunity to outflank both Pakistan and Iran. This interest was further emphasized by the visit of Bulganin and Khrushchev in December, 1955, and by the granting of long-term loan credits to Afghanistan.

Russia displayed a grave concern for the Middle Eastern alliance directed against her which was reflected in the launching of a new large-scale diplomatic and political offensive throughout the Arab and Middle East. It was keynoted by the publication of the official government statement on "security in the Near and Middle East", on April 16, 1955. Had the United States succeeded in bringing about just an Arab alliance against communism the Russians would not have been so alarmed as the Arab

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<sup>220</sup> Spector, Ibid, p. 124-125

states were weak and divided. However, the Baghdad Pact was a solid chain of alliances from Turkey to Pakistan, including Iraq. The Soviets felt that if Iraq joined such an alignment the other Arab states might eventually join too, no matter how reluctantly, for it might be in their own interest to follow suit.<sup>221</sup> Hence, the Russians moved to regain the initiative in the struggle for the Middle East; they moved to the most logical area open to them, the Arab East, a land already openly hostile to the West and imperialism; it offered the best chance for introducing their influence into the region.

The period 1955-1958 showed a markedly new Soviet interest in the Arab East and the timing for their participation in Arab events could not have been more favorable to them. They were in a position to join "popular front" movements and support the Arab nationalist movement against the Western powers and imperialism; this was a far more subtle method of establishing their influence than by communist propaganda. In the spring of 1955 the Soviet press fundamentally changed its tone toward Egypt and the other Arab countries from previous criticism and abuse to praises for Egypt's "neutrality" and opposition to Western-sponsored defense pacts (especially the Baghdad Pact). In the spring and summer of 1955 there occurred numerous cultural and religious exchanges, offers of increased trade and economic assistance. Egypt, after the Israeli attack on Gaza the previous February, was uneasy and anxious to obtain new arms and equipment for her army. The West, wary of starting new Arab-Israeli hostilities and under the spell of Zionist influences, refused to arm Egypt. This literally opened the door for Russia to establish herself in

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<sup>221</sup> Dallin, op. cit., p. 40; and Spector, op. cit., p. 122

the Arab East. The USSR refrains from trading in arms, although her policy is to provide arms to anti-Western governments. She instead works through her satellites to provide the requirement and to avoid the stigma of interference, thus she avoids international criticism and protests. The expanded Skoda Munitions Works of Czechoslovakia serves the USSR in producing and exporting arms where Soviet policy requires. Thus, Czechoslovakia offered Egypt arms in exchange for cotton from stocks that were steadily declining in value. From that point on, in time, the Soviets were "in" with the Arab world.<sup>222</sup> Nor was the Soviet Union slow to realize this new point of vantage.

Moscow immediately unleashed a diplomatic offensive throughout the Arab area from Syria to Yemen and arranged wide-scale trade operations in favor of Egypt. Communist China bought 23 million dollars worth of Egyptian cotton in exchange for long-term credits (which probably represent substantial losses but will be written off as a cost of political maneuvering). Russia made a vague offer to underwrite the Egyptian Aswan Dam project in October, 1955. A Treaty of Friendship was signed with Yemen and Soviet representation there was raised to Ambassadorial level; an offer of economic development for Yemen was also presented. Trade agreements were made by the Soviets and her satellites with numerous other Arab countries, proposals were made to take over development schemes, including revival of the Hejāz railway from Damascus to Medina, and Jordan was offered a substantial subsidy in place of British support. Following Sudan's proclamation of independence amid Soviet congratulations were offers of trade and diplomatic relations. Khrushchev, who took over

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<sup>222</sup> Dallin, *ibid.*, p. 39; and Little, *op. cit.*, p. 148

Russian leadership from Georgi Malenkov in 1954, placed his country resolutely behind Egypt and the Arab states in his December 29, 1955 speech to the Supreme Soviet, branding Israel as an "aggressor". Likewise, in the United Nations Security Council the Soviet delegate supported Syrian claims against Israel. Nothing he would do could more endear him to the hearts of the Arabs who have felt since 1948 that they have been standing alone in their struggle against Israel. An indication of the trend of Soviet influences in 1955-1956 was the Syrian and Egyptian governments' official recognition to the Communist China regime and the concluding of trade agreements with her.<sup>223</sup>

The Suez crisis and the series of somewhat related events that took place as a forerunner to the Suez War, such as the Jordan riots, dismissal of Glubb, the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company, all revealed traces of Soviet influences in their background. Although indirect, they achieved their goal of ousting the Western powers and discrediting their general position in the area. Soviet envoys are credited with organizing the Egyptian-Syrian-Saudi Arabian defense cooperations of 1955 as a counter to the Baghdad Pact and the influence of Iraq. The Egyptian-Syrian Pact of November 7, 1955, became the basis for Czechoslovakian arms to those two Arab states on financial terms arranged by Soviet representatives.<sup>224</sup> Communist agents were believed to have had a hand in organizing the Jordan riots that foiled Britain's attempt to

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<sup>223</sup> Frankel, op. cit., p. 105-106; and Dallin, op. cit., p. 40-41; and Little; op. cit., p. 148. On April 16, 1955, the USSR published the document "Security in the Near and Middle East" which contained no new ideas or political positions but marks the start of a large scale Russian diplomatic and political offensive in the Arab East.

<sup>224</sup> Dallin, ibid

bring that country into the Baghdad Pact and in the aftermath of that incident, continued to foment anti-British hostilities to the point where King Hussein was forced to break off British control of his armed forces in order to save his throne. When Abdul Nasser proclaimed the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company on July 26, 1956, he was promptly backed and applauded by the USSR for his actions, and in the international discussions which followed the Russians firmly took the Egyptian side in opposition to the Western powers. There is a good reason to relate the visit to Cairo of the Russian Foreign Minister, Shepilov, in June just prior to the nationalization of the Canal Company; perhaps the Russians encouraged Egypt to act as they did, assuring them of support for the Aswan Dam and economic development.<sup>225</sup> When the issue of international control of the Canal was taken to the United Nations, Western proposals were vetoed by the USSR.

With the Israeli attack on Egypt and the subsequent joint Franco-British operations conducted against Egypt in open support of the Jews, the Soviet Union was given its "golden opportunity" in the Arab East. By attacking Egypt, the French and the British gave the Russians the one chance in a million to send troops into the area with Arab consent which they threatened to do.<sup>226</sup> Russian notes threatening to shoot rockets on Western capitols if hostilities did not cease were widely publicized; the almost immediate cease-fire that followed indicated to most Arabs that

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<sup>225</sup> Wint and Calvocoressi, op. cit., p. 67

<sup>226</sup> The Russians offered to send "volunteers" to assist Egypt repel the aggressors; this offer was refused by Egypt and a prompt and unequivocal American warning to intervene if she did so probably prevented it.

the Soviet Union had saved them and forced the stopping of the war.<sup>227</sup>

Since Suez, Russia has re-established her claim to participate in Middle East affairs, having found great favor with the Arabs, and has extended her influence throughout the region. In the period 1957-1958 the USSR has supplied new shipments of arms, aircraft and naval vessels, including submarines to Egypt to replace equipment destroyed or lost during the Suez encounter; she has similarly supplied the Syrian armed forces and sent technicians and advisors to assist in training the forces of both countries. Economic loans and development programs have been concluded with Egypt and Syria in the amounts of approximately \$300 million each; Yemen also has been granted economic aid for development and has received shipment of Egyptian and Czechoslovakian armaments. Strong vocal support is given Yemen and the Imam of Muscat and Oman against British interventions in South Arabia; Russia encourages them in their struggle against imperialism.

Perhaps the strongest Russian influence can be seen in the accusations of a Turkish-American (and NATO forces) plot in October and November, 1957, to direct a coup against the pro-Soviet government of Syria. A month-long Soviet-sponsored press campaign of invective attacked the United States and Turkey in particular. The Syrians managed to bring the matter before the United Nations Security Council for debate and the Russians moved strong troop concentrations on the Turkish borders as a "counter-threat" to alleged massing of Turkish troops on the Syrian borders. This all took place during the time of combined NATO force maneuvers involving Turkish troop movements and hence, gave the appearance of having some

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<sup>227</sup> Wint and Calvocoressi, op. cit., p. 92-93



factual basis. Nothing of real import occurred and Syria withdrew her protests from the United Nations after the immediate objective had been realized, that of discrediting the Americans and demonstrating that Russia is "mother-protector" to the Arab states. It also seemed to strengthen a wavering Syrian home regime which was experiencing considerable internal instability.

At the Afro-Asian Peoples' Conference held in December, 1957, in Cairo, the USSR offered unlimited economic assistance to all the nations of Asia and Africa, with "no strings" or conditions attached, a proposal which is difficult for most of those economically-backward nations to turn down. Likewise, it counters American aid programs throughout the area and launches the Soviets in an "economic war" to ultimately secure even more of the region under her control or influence.<sup>228</sup> Russia gave her blessing and recognition to the new United Arab Republic in February, 1958, and is continuing their economic support and arms supply. This applies equally to Yemen which has joined the UAR as a federated state.

Following the principle of encouraging the termination of pro-Western governments, Russia continues to attack the regime of Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Jordan, both directly and indirectly. The Arab Federated State of Iraq and Jordan is openly denounced for its motives of preserving the thrones of its rulers and for indirectly bringing Jordan into the Baghdad Pact (inasmuch as the Federation has but a single army). King Saud is likewise the target of Russian criticism for his pro-Western attitudes in granting air base rights to the Americans and accepting an American

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<sup>228</sup> Newsweek (International), January 13, 1958

military training mission. Lebanon's government, too, comes in for her share of denunciation for its acceptance of the Eisenhower Doctrine and its markedly favorable stand on the side of the United States.

Russia, during 1957, made effective propaganda in conjunction with her scientific achievements, i.e., the successful launching of two earth satellites (Sputnik I and II). The result was keenly felt by the Arabs, many of whom came to doubt that the United States still maintained a superiority in technology over the Soviet Union and began to re-examine and re-evaluate their "in-between" position to determine what course will better suit their own future.

There is little doubt that between 1950-1958 the Soviet Union had developed specific and lasting interests and influences in the Arab East that would be a matter of vital concern to the Western powers and Russia, herself. Furthermore, these interests and influences would remain for years to come and would do much to shape the future destiny of the Arab East.

#### B. Russian Objectives in the Arab East

Although Russian interests in the Middle East are not as vital as the Western powers, the objective of that interest is substantially the same, i.e., to secure the (1) strategic land mass and accompanying communications advantage; (2) to provide for her own security, and (3) to obtain the resources of the area, if only to deny them to the West.<sup>229</sup> These are the basic factors to consider but they may easily be elaborated into others, more numerous but less general in nature, which more clearly define Russian aims and will be discussed in what follows. The Soviet Union seeks:

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<sup>229</sup> Speiser, op. cit., p. 182

(1) To Establish an Anti-Western (Pro-Soviet) Bloc in the Arab East

In this regard Russia has been very successful to date for both Syria, Egypt and Yemen can be said to be well within the Soviet fold. By encouraging Arab nationalism and by giving full support and sympathy to Arab causes (which the West has to date been unable to do), this pro-Soviet bloc may grow even larger. In turn if Russia uses economic and technical assistance in conjunction with a military build-up she may create some situations of real strength for herself in the area; this strength may be easier for the Russians to control if it has a single governmental authority, hence, it will be to the advantage of the Soviets to encourage Arab unions so long as they can control their future direction. By establishing an anti-Western Arab bloc, Russia may ultimately be able to deny the land mass and its oil resources to the Western powers and her potential enemies. There is also a very natural desire of any large nation to surround itself with friendly neighbors in order to provide for its own security, and Russia seeks that security as well through the friendship of the Arab East.

(2) To Provide for Soviet Security to the South

The Soviet Union is interested in assuring that the countries which surround her do not threaten her security, directly or indirectly; Soviet policy aims at aligning all bordering nations into friendly or cooperative alliances for the defense of the region. She quite naturally looks with disfavor on any neighboring nation that joins pacts directed against her. Hence, she has every right to attempt to influence them on her own behalf. Because there are no Russian satellite states between

Russia and the Middle East on the south, Russia views with alarm the Baghdad Pact arrangement and hopes to detach the signatories one by one. Hence, the USSR attacks the Pact as a "tool of the imperialist powers", but refrains from (in general) attacking the signatories. As examples, Nikita Khrushchev made friendly reference to Turkey in his December 29, 1955 speech; the Shah of Iran and official Persian delegations made state visits in the spring of 1956 in pursuit of better relationships.<sup>230</sup> It is known that the USSR has been (since the Baghdad Pact signing) highly cooperative with the Persian government and has offered her economic and technical assistance.

Turkey, however, was singled out for attack in the fall of 1957, accused of plotting a coup against Syria, in cooperation with an alleged American conspiracy. Iraq, too, on occasion has been criticized for allowing itself to be used by the Western powers.

It should not be presumed that the Soviet Union deliberately plans expansion in the direction of the Arab East, even though this policy-concept is well-known. There is a natural tendency for a dynamic state to move where it finds no resistance. The Arab areas offer a great opportunity in this connection for once Western influence is driven out there will be a power-void.<sup>231</sup> The securing of Russian military and naval bases in the Mediterranean and Persian Gulf areas would satisfy the long sought-after desire for warm water ports and would firmly implant Soviet power in a position to influence and control the whole of the Middle East.

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<sup>230</sup> The Manchester Guardian, December 31, 1955; and Frankel, op. cit., p. 106

<sup>231</sup> Reitzel, op. cit., p. 181

As long as the Bosphorus and the Dardenelles are in non-Russian hands and so long as she does not completely control the Black Sea, the Soviet Union will be concerned for her political and economic security. Also, Russia will attempt to influence and win the friendship of Arab states and other Middle Eastern countries so long as Turkey remains unfriendly to her. This fact, coupled with the knowledge that another great power is trying to establish itself in the Middle East (namely, the United States), naturally draws the Soviet Union into a position of contention.<sup>232</sup>

(3) To Keep the Arab East in a State of Turmoil (Until Western Influence is Driven Out)

A prime objective of Soviet policy in the Middle and Arab East (as well as elsewhere in the world) has been to promote troubled conditions and turmoil, for these conditions are most favorable to the securing of new adherents to the communist philosophy; the creation of a class of malcontents and have-nots that are ready to trade anything and everything for a chance to improve their lot. Of course, once the Western influence is driven out of the Middle East it is to Soviet advantage to have peace and stability in the area. But so long as it is an Anglo-American domain, Russia will seek to multiply the sources of instability and make it difficult to control the existing ones.<sup>233</sup>

Apparently Russia chose Egypt as her protege in 1955 for the same reason she had selected Israel in 1948. Egypt was the key to the Arab East; she influenced and controlled the majority of the Arab states.

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<sup>232</sup> Zeine, op. cit., p. 14-15

<sup>233</sup> Reitzel, op. cit., p. 146

At the same time, due to Egypt's violent anti-British campaign over the Suez Canal and Sudan issues from 1953-1955, she was ripe to foment unrest in the area if it would displace the British. Here Russian and Egyptian interests were on common ground. Too, Egypt offered an excellent outlet for Soviet propaganda as the center of communications and culture in the Arab East. The Russians capitalized on: Egyptian ambitions for leadership in the Arab world, violent attitudes in Palestine, hatred of the British, and the grave economic situation facing Egypt if large cotton supplies for export were threatened by release of American stockpiles.<sup>234</sup>

The Arab-Israeli issue will continue to force unstable conditions to obtain in the Middle East for some time to come. This is all in favor of the Russians, for until a mutually satisfactory settlement is arrived at, she can continue to use Palestine as a "wedge" between the Arabs and the West. Truly, the Soviets have no desire to solve the Palestine problem but intend to use it for their own purposes. Russia has the position of vantage of backing the Arab states against the Jews, whereas, the West tries to appease both sides and only receives the enmity of both. The target of Soviet military supplies sent to Syria and Egypt will inevitably be Israel. When war breaks out again, and Russia will not be unhappy to see a localized war occur in the Arab East, she will support the Arabs, at least financially and politically, if not physically. When the day arrives to settle the conflict the Soviet government will be seated at the peace table to decide the settlement, as she was in the case of the Korean and the Indo-Chinese Wars.<sup>235</sup>

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<sup>234</sup> Frankel, op. cit., p. 106

<sup>235</sup> Dallin, op. cit., p. 41; and Loomis, Henry, "The Soviet

National minorities with aspirations of separate sovereignty offer fertile fields to sow discontent. The Russians have not neglected the Armenians nor have they overlooked the Kurds who have been very receptive to Soviet propaganda; as a result, conditions remain unsettled in Iraq, Iran and Turkey in the Kurdish populated areas.

The USSR has likewise been successful in keeping anti-British, anti-Western attitudes stirred-up in Kuwait, Bahrein and the South Arabian littoral, including Yemen and Oman. Radio Cairo and pro-Russian Arab dailies are the mediums and the Egyptian and Syrian governments spread the official Moscow line while the Russians for the most part rarely intervene directly. The Egyptian MENA (Middle East News Agency), which has offices in all Arab capitals, has an agreement for a free exchange of news services with the Soviet news agency TASS; thus, Soviet items go out of Cairo to the Arab world press through an Arab medium. (An article originating in Moscow is included nearly every day in Egyptian and Syrian newspapers, and some less frequent in Jordan, the Sudan and Lebanon. TASS agencies and Soviet embassies likewise feed the Arabic press at least one bulletin per day. "Sawt-al-Arab", or "the voice of the Arabs" is Egypt's most effective propaganda medium and is religiously listened to throughout the Arab world, where Abdul Nasser has a greater popularity than in his own Egypt. It keeps the Palestine issue, Western imperialism, plots and intrigues against the Arabs, etc., constantly before the masses and keeps their emotions at a high pitch. They tell "the story" often and emphatically until it becomes universally accepted and established. As

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Propaganda Campaign in the Middle East; Themes and Methods", p. 20, New Look at the Middle East, Middle East Institute, Washington, D.C., 1957

propagandists they are well-trained by the Russians and the ex-Nazi Germans who the Egyptians had hired as advisors after World War II.

By keeping the area in a state of turmoil, the USSR can facilitate the ideological penetration of the communist philosophy, directly or indirectly. As insecurity spreads in an area the number of malcontents is multiplied rapidly, and these people are given simple explanations and formulae to solve their problems by means of communist doctrine; such explanations are not difficult to accept. The already deep cleavage between the lines of the rural and urban populations and the uneven distribution of wealth are seized upon as a working basis for communism and it aligns itself with already established nationalist tendencies, utilizing local slogans that call for the "freedom from capitalist and imperialist landlords".<sup>236</sup>

(4) To Deny the Strategic Oil of the Arab East to the Western Powers

Soviet interest in the oil of the Arab East is a negative one, to deny it to the Western powers, for it is vital to them, whereas, it is not vital to Russia herself, as she has sufficient quantities to provide for her present and future needs. In the game of power politics, Mideast oil becomes a pawn between East and West. The USSR in a number of ways, directly or indirectly, can influence the situation to achieve her objective of denying oil to the West. With her increased influence in Syria and Egypt she is in a position to control the flow of oil through the pipelines of Syria and through the Suez Canal; only the future will show to what extent and how soon that influence may be felt.

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<sup>236</sup> Reitzel, op. cit., p. 153



By propaganda means, working on tendencies already apparent in the area, Russia can encourage "nationalization" of oil industries and support the exclusion of pro-Western foreign interest. An inflamed xenophobia, directed at imperialist nations (i.e., Great Britain and United States) might touch off a chain of events that would see the end of Anglo-American domination of Arab East oil concessions. If the Soviet Union is able to further extend her influence to more of the Arab East, the pro-Soviet governments would ultimately take action in line with Moscow desires. The present situation as regards Middle Eastern oil can at best be regarded as a temporary one in which the West will do well to hold their present advantage. For that reason it may be expected that Western powers holding oil concessions will give increasingly-better contract conditions to the states concerned in order to hold on as long as possible.

(5) To Develop "Positive Neutralism" in Areas Where a Pro-Soviet Attitude is Not Immediately Practicable

An early Russian objective in the Arab East is the development of an attitude of "positive neutralism", i.e., a neutralism favorable to the USSR and unfavorable to the West, if a pro-Russian area cannot be developed immediately. Hence, if there is no real Soviet influence in the area, it will at least be a zone oriented against the West.

Neutralism, between East and West in general, is finding great popularity these days, especially now that there is some question in the minds of the Arabs as to which side has the greatest scientific and military potential. Most Arab states do not want to be directly involved on either side of the power struggle but would like to play one side against

the other in order to gain the maximum benefit to themselves. The geographical nearness of the Russians placed them at a definite advantage and more recent direct Soviet participation in the affairs of the Middle East cautions pro-Western states to review and re-evaluate their position; most are tending toward a neutralism as a result. This appreciably favors Soviet policy.

(6) To Further Expand Russian Trade and Cultural Relations With the Arab East

The objective is part of a larger aim of establishing Soviet influence in the area. At the same time the new trade ties over a period of years can prove profitable to the USSR from an economic point of view. At the same time, this would replace former traffic with Western powers who will have to look elsewhere for their markets. Such an action could adversely affect the economy of Great Britain, in particular, which has about fifty per cent of her trade with Middle East markets. A combination of the Sino-Soviet axis plus all the satellites can bring a great deal of pressure to bear in an "economic offensive"; unfavorable contracts can be entered into initially in consequence of their ultimate political and economic values. A large volume of trade formerly conducted by Syria and Egypt with the West now is carried on with Eastern-bloc countries, long-term barter agreements concluded up to date can place the future economies of these countries at the Russian whim. It is not unrealistic to presume that at some time hence these states may be called upon to make political concessions in exchange for freeing their mortgaged economies. None of the Russian offers were made conditional on military or political alliances, a complete reversal of

American tactics, which has allayed Arab fears of foreign intervention. Russia has by her economic war threatened to displace Western power and influence; the challenge is real and formidable.<sup>237</sup>

The expansion of Soviet-Arab cultural relations is just another facet of the many-sided plan to implace the Russians firmly in the Arab East picture. Through trade fairs, music festivals, visits of athletic teams, performances of troupes of Russian artists of all kinds, exhibitions and the establishment of cultural centers, the Soviets seek to impress the Arabs of their sincere desire to win their friendship and that their culture is as good as, if not better than, the West. A large number of Arab students have accepted scholarships to states of the Soviet orbit and the Russian language is now being introduced in the Egyptian and Syrian universities. Large quantities of Russian literature at inexpensive prices have flooded Egypt and Syria and recently Cairo University was the recipient of 2,000 Russian technical works from the Oriental Institute in Moscow. Friendship societies are popping up in profusion; Syrian-Chinese, Syrian-Soviet, Sino-Egyptian and Polish-Egyptian, this gives an indication of their scope. Visits of top ranking Arab officials and parliamentarians to Moscow are becoming commonplace; for example, the last two years Abdul Nasser, Shukri Quwatli, Hakim al-Amer, Afif Bizri, and numerous others all made official visits to Moscow. Industrial exhibitions and trade fairs are conducted to build up new trade but at the same time have the objectives of showing the progress that can be made by state controlled socialism; often trade fairs lead to Soviet contracts for industrial installations, which have as a fundamental

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<sup>237</sup> Shultz, Lillie, "A New Struggle Shapes Up", p. 44-45, The Middle East and the Cold War (ed. Grant S. McClelland), H.W. Wilson Company, New York, 1956

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<sup>237</sup> Shultz, Lillie, "A New Struggle Shapes Up", p. 44-45. The Middle East and the Cold War (ed. Grant S. McClelland), H.W. Wilson Company, New York, 1956

requirement, a large scale introduction of communist technicians.<sup>238</sup> The Russians have taken an initiative in the field of developing cultural ties that will be increasingly difficult to overcome.

C. An Evaluation of Russian Objectives in the Arab East

Russian objectives in the Arab East seem to be sound and well thought-out and their policies appear to be more promising of success than those of the West. The relations of the modern independent Arab states and the USSR are of recent origin; the Arabs have found in that relationship no cause for suspicion or fear of Russia and have no hostility toward her. On the other hand, the Arabs have in common with the Soviet Union deep-seated suspicions and fear of the West. This, taken into consideration with a lingering resentment and hostility toward the West on the part of the Arabs, accounts for the great strides the USSR has made in the area in the last two years where she had never penetrated previously.<sup>239</sup>

The Russians, in the Arab view, are free of the stigma of imperialism for they remained outside the zone while France and Britain pursued their distasteful policy of domination that fomented xenophobia and fostered a violent Arab national spirit. The USSR has been able to pledge full support to the Arabs and avoid the dilemma of the West of trying to satisfy both parties in the Arab-Israeli dispute; this, more than any one factor, has won her universal praise among the Arabs. Early Soviet recognition of Israel in 1948 has been conveniently forgotten and the "enemy of my enemy is my friend" is the prevailing Arab attitude. An April, 1956

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<sup>238</sup> Loomis, op. cit., p. 25-27; and Ege, op. cit., p. 17

<sup>239</sup> Zeine, op. cit., p. 29

statement of the USSR, however, regards Israel as a permanent manifestation in the Middle East.<sup>240</sup>

The economic offensive launched in 1957 by the USSR may prove to be her most effective weapon yet, for by maintaining the initiative in this important field she may be able to best the United States at her own game: "spending money to win friends", i.e., economic and technical assistance and the sponsoring of development programs. Often times Russia may not have to spend her own money to attain the political benefits for having made the "first offer". She need only make vague offers, compelling the Western powers to compete with her on more favorable and on more concrete terms. (For example, a vague Soviet offer to build the Aswan Dam resulted in a joint Anglo-American proposal to assist with a 25 million dollar loan and 200 million to follow by the World Bank.) Too, Soviet offers make Arab nations unwilling to accept conditions placed on loans by the Western powers. In cases where the USSR does provide the goods and money for economic development or military support, it offers an opportunity to send technicians, advisors and agents to further influence the internal situation in her behalf. However, it is possible that even with recent Soviet offers of condition-free, area-wide economic assistance that the West will out-bid her as a reaction, and will relieve her of the necessity of spending her own funds. Yet at the same time the advantage and the favorable position will accrue to her for having taken the first initiative. Due to United States congressional attitudes it is not likely that any large scale Western initiative will be in the offing; usually congressional

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<sup>240</sup> Frankel, op. cit., p. 108-110

action is in the nature of a reaction to possible Russian interference, in fear of the spread of communism.<sup>241</sup>

Underlying immediate Russian strategic objectives and natural aspirations toward the Arab East is the desire to spread world communism. This ideology may have some appeal among young Arab idealists as a spiritual solution to their problems, freeing them from the restrictive traditions of Islam and the complex ideologies of the West, but in general it is expected to have few adherents. Communism has adopted the Arab nationalism front and will continue to adopt its popular slogans, linking the evils of imperialism of the West with its capitalistic system. Islam and communism are said to be fundamentally incompatible as communism is materialistic and atheistic; hence, a religious person could not accept its principles. However, the struggle does not exist on questions of principle between the Koran and Marxism, communist propoganda appeals not reason but to emotion and uses any cry that will arouse a local reaction. It can be altered to meet the existing situation.<sup>242</sup> Communism is not needed to accomplish Soviet objectives in the Arab East although with the concurrent introduction of Russian influences it is bound to grow. What is more important is the adoption of communist government methods in establishing strict internal controls, in emulation of Russia and other communist states. It is apparent that the internal security measures of both Syria and Egypt have grown more rigid in recent months; it is expected that both now and in the future a well organized system of

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<sup>241</sup> Ibid

<sup>242</sup> Faris, Nabih, Dr., "The Islamic Community and Communism", p. 28-31, The Islamic Review, v. XLIV, No. 6, June 1956; and Bullard, Sir Reader, "Changes in the Middle East in the 20th Century", p. 18, (Montague

security police and special agents will be employed to maintain an absolute control over the existing governmental authority. The army will always remain a principal factor in future politics of the area. While Arab leaders profess to be aware of the dangers of communism, they, at the same time, naively believe that they can develop close political, economic and cultural ties with the Soviet Union and still remain masters of their own destinies. Unfortunately, there are always men in the world, who may not be communists, who would willingly cooperate with Soviet desires in furtherance of their own personal aggrandizement.

It appears as though all Soviet objectives in the area can be obtained short of war with the Western powers, although that certainly remains for the future to answer. Russian policy will certainly not offend the present favorable situation by adopting a stronger attitude toward the Arab states; she wants and needs their friendship and cooperation in furtherance of her own interests. In all probability she will continue to champion anti-Western Arab nationalism and independence until all effective Western influence is driven out. At that point she may well attempt to exert her influence to assume positive control over the entire Arab East for there would be no effective resistance remaining to oppose her. Perhaps, on the other hand, she does not need or desire physical control so long as she already possesses effective political control.

It is unlikely that the Western powers will allow the Arab East to fall to Russia by default. However distasteful it may be to the West, they now realize that no final decisions about the problems of the Middle East and the Arab East can be made without Soviet participation. Peace in the



Arab East and peace throughout the world may depend on the solution of these problems.<sup>243</sup>

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<sup>243</sup> Zeine, op. cit., p. 29

## CHAPTER 8

### ARAB INTERESTS AND THEIR CONCEPT OF SECURITY FOR THE ARAB EAST

#### A. General Arab Points of View and Desires

##### (1) Independence

Since their domination by the Ottoman Empire in the early part of the sixteenth century the Arabs have remained under one sort of foreign control or another. Even after the close of World War I when the Ottoman power collapsed, foreign influence remained in the newly-created Arab sovereignties. It has only been recently, since World War II, that any real independence has been experienced throughout the greater part of the Arab East region. Then, quite naturally the Arabs have come to prize this independence highly and zealously guard against intrusions on it. However, independence has not been gained for all peoples in the region inasmuch as the Persian Gulf and South Arabian coast are still, for the most part, under British control; the Arabs of the independent states, as a matter of principle and sympathy, strongly support the cause of these brother Arabs who remain struggling for freedom and sovereignty.

The new state loyalties brought about by the break-up of the region in the aftermath of the First World War, have somewhat eclipsed the larger feeling for an Arab fatherland. Separate nationalisms, such as Syrian, Lebanese and Egyptian, also act to weaken the Arab national concept. The existing independent states only enter into new unions or federations of their own free-will when they gradually come to realize the mutual benefits of such an arrangement; regardless of this trend, each state continues to covet its freedom and independence dearly.

The principle interest prevailing among the Arabs is to protect their independence and sovereignty. The inner feelings of the Arab are perhaps best reflected in the speech of Nahas Pasha to both Egyptian Houses of Parliament in 1951, after presenting bills proposing the abrogation of the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty and the 1899 Condominium Agreement: "You have taught those who boast of democracy an admirable lesson in respect of rights. You have taught them that people lose patience if they wait too long. You have taught them that rights are not granted or given -- that they are won by struggle".<sup>244</sup> This seems to fit the pattern of all Arab countries which have gained their independence; they had waited a long time and had to struggle desperately for their present freedom; they will not quickly forget nor will they sacrifice it without first giving their lives. It is wrong to say that the Arabs desire complete independence and sovereignty; it is perhaps better expressed in the idea that they will not accept less. Hence, to realize a security of the Arab East, the Arabs are not willing to act in any way which will infringe upon their sovereign rights as free and independent nations in dealing with the East or with the West. This is a sensitive and psychological factor that is often overlooked.

(2) Arab Unity and the Arab Nation

Although 400 years under Ottoman domination, the Arabs preserved a sense of community; they have shared a common past of which they are justly proud. The binding tie of a single language, possessing a vast and splendid literature nourished men's minds; a common religious

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<sup>244</sup> Keesings, op. cit., p. 11774, v. VIII (1951-1952)

bond, related to their greatness in history, developed Arab society and character. The Arabs, through history, have resisted external pressures and disintegration because of these factors and maintained their identity as an Arab nation.<sup>245</sup> The present political divisions which exist in the Arab East should not blind non-Arabs to the underlying cultural and psychological unity of the area as a whole. Whatever differences exist between the individual states will be subordinated if there is an outside pressure of threat or pressure brought to bear which endangers or coerces the Arab peoples.<sup>246</sup> Although, temporarily, state or regional loyalties and patriotisms overshadow the Arab nation concept, one should realize the fundamental oneness of the region and the basic psychological attitude beneath the surface of Arab politics and nationalisms.

The Arab League was a first step in the direction of achieving such a unity; its aims were lofty, a composite of memories, dreams broad political goals and specific political desires, held together by a hard core of purpose, to consolidate the Arab world on racial, religious and nationalistic grounds. The grand objective would have been a self-contained, self-supporting and self-directed regional bloc, held together by a common religious tie and social traditions.<sup>247</sup> The failure of the League to realize these goals was probably due to premature attempts at such a grandiose ideal; the existing divisive factors which have beset the League since its inception are well-known. Perhaps, a rejuvenation of the League might occur in the not-too-distant future which will result in a gradual

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<sup>245</sup> Hourani, op. cit., p. 126

<sup>246</sup> Speiser, op. cit., p. 243

<sup>247</sup> Reitzel, op. cit., p. 114, 156

realization of these objectives.

The Pan-Islamic or Arab-Moslem movement envisages a similar unity of the Arab nation. It found its vehicle in the now almost extinct Moslem Brotherhood movement. A combination of religious patriotism and secular nationalism, the composition and purposes of which have remained rather nebulous, it had no real success in stirring the majority of Arabs to its following. The modern Arab awakening has, however, been a part of the general Moslem awakening which was led by Hussein ibn-Ali, the Sharif of Mecca, descendant of the Prophet and hero of the Arab revolt of World War I. The Islamic movements promote Arab unity only as a first step toward a greater Islamic nation, whereas Arab nationalist movements rest on the premise that the Arabs are one nation, distinguished from the remaining Islamic countries. Islamic movements consider all Moslems to belong to a single Islamic state and seek to establish that state on social, economic and political foundations drawn from Islam. The aims are so general that they can be applied to support almost anything one chooses and for that reason lacked general appeal among the Arab nationalists, even though Pan-Islam coincided with their desires for the establishment of an Arab nation as a step along the way to its goals.<sup>248</sup>

The problem of Palestine has been a great catalyst to broader thinking in terms of nationalisms and the Arab Fatherland. The Arab failure to maintain their rights in Palestine, their weakness shockingly revealed to themselves, resulted in an awakening of the need for an eventual combining of their efforts and coordination of their plans and policies into a single Arab nation. The Arab world was struck as a single

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Faris and Husayn, op. cit., p. 151-155

man by the tragedy of Palestine; the Arab feeling is profound, real and growing in intensity beneath a surface of shame, hatred, resentment and humiliation. Intelligent Arabs throughout the region realize that the Arab East cannot face up to the great powers or to Palestine except as a solid bloc of states with the same objectives; they also realize it must be a gradual process and they are building today for the eventual ideal.

New unifying factors are at work that will assist the greater unity idea; the spread of education, modern economic developments, the press, the radio and the cinema are all bringing the masses closer together, strengthening the already similar Arab temperament and mentality. The growth of political parties based on concepts of broad social reform and advocating federated or united Arab states has fostered a generation eager to espouse Arab nationalist ideas and universally conscious of the Arab national spirit. The development of a growing middle class of merchants, trained technicians, and skilled labor, brought about by internal economic development, provides the mainspring of the Arab nationalist movement and makes greater demands for political-social progress and good government.

It is apparent to one who travels the length and breadth of the Arab East that there is a oneness of attitude, mentality, language and religion -- this sameness came as a result to those who shared the same burdens and humiliation under foreign rule and occupation. They experienced a common struggle for freedom and independence; they will in all probability continue to maintain to move forward to the singleness of purpose that has always prevailed in the background, to preserve the Arab nation, to re-establish its lost prestige.<sup>249</sup> Hence, it may be concluded that one of the

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<sup>249</sup> Ibid., p. 21-56

primary desires of the Arabs is the establishment of unity, although they are prepared to settle for something less as an intermediate step.

(3) Freedom from Foreign Influences

It should suffice to mention that a quick glance at Arab history would justify the Arab attitude toward foreign governments. They have learned not to trust the word of the big powers for it has not been honored in the past. They have experienced domination, occupation and exploitation by foreigners all during a time when national spirit was bursting at the seams. The Arabs had to struggle to drive out foreign occupation, and as yet have not completely succeeded. No wonder that the stationing of foreign troops on their soil is repugnant, or the granting of concessions to foreigners is avoided, for in the past these concessions were a lever to internal controls.

In principle, the Arabs want no foreign intervention. The future of the peoples of the Arab East will no longer be shaped wholly by the attitude and the policies of the powers.<sup>250</sup> The last few years in the Arab East has seen this fact effectively brought to light with the elimination of the British from Jordan and Egypt and the French from the Levant. It helps to explain Abdul Nasser's attitude toward the terms of a proposed mutual defense security pact with the United States; further, it clarifies Egypt's position relative to the Baghdad Pact. Egypt stood for an independent system of defense for the Arabs versus Iraq's position which committed that country to association with foreign powers and put Iraq under their possible influence and domination.<sup>251</sup> The Arabs are equally suspicious of

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<sup>250</sup> Middle East Journal, v. I, No. 1., January, 1947,  
p. 2, (editorial forward)

<sup>251</sup> Little, op. cit., p. 150

foreign intervention by the East or the West, however, the West is at a marked disadvantage in that their already blotched record in the history of the region gives them double attention.

From the Arab viewpoint then, non-interference by foreign powers or outside influence is a matter of vital concern. In realization of other objectives this feeling may be somewhat compromised, though indirectly; it is difficult to visualize otherwise in view of the Arab position. Theoretically, however, the elimination of foreign influence in Arab affairs is a fundamental Arab precept which can be universally accepted as an axiom of modern Arab politics.

#### (4) Neutrality

From their own rather narrow perspectives, the Arabs, who have had little actual contact with the Soviet Union, tend to see the present East-West struggle as just another dispute resembling those which took place among the groups of European powers in the past. From their "in between position" they want to avoid being classed with either camp; they are dubious as to which side is the potentially stronger and do not wish to jeopardize their own future by provoking the hostility of one side or the other. Quite naturally they do not wish to be drawn into the struggle and suffer the destiny of being a pawn for either of the powers.

At the same time, the Arabs are being subjected to the extreme outside pressures of both East and West which are attempting to develop positions of influence in the area. There exists a temptation to try to profit from this keen competition in order to promote purely Arab political and economic aspirations. This is not a new attitude on the part of the Arabs for it was utilized during World War I to evoke British



assistance to throw off Ottoman rule, and again in the Second World War the Egyptians (Ali Mahir and followers) and the Iraqis (Rashid Ali's Revolt of 1941) attempted to align their countries with the Axis powers to rid themselves of British rule.<sup>252</sup> Their present position would be favorable to allow them to draw on the financial and technical assistance of both East and West to develop their economies if at the same time they have the diplomatic skill to avoid coming under the permanent influence of either party.

Arab politicians have in their neutralist attitude been influenced by India's Nehru. The basis of Abdul Nasser's policy is neutralism in world affairs; most other prominent Arab leaders, such as King Saud, Shukri Quwatli, King Hussein, etc., have declared similar policies. However, the "positive neutralism" of Syria and Egypt seems to be a neutrality unfavorable to the West, but favorable to the East. The general trend of neutrality was adamantly demonstrated, however, when the United States attempted to introduce the Eisenhower Doctrine to the Arabs; it was almost wholly unacceptable to the Arabs who did not want to move from their chosen neutral course to denounce Russia and international communism. Syria, Egypt and Yemen assailed it; Jordan refused it, and Saudi Arabia belatedly acknowledged she would have no part of it. Only Iraq, already committed to an anti-Soviet stand by Baghdad Pact membership, and tiny Lebanon's over-eager pro-American regime announced its ready acceptance even before the United States' Congress had approved it, came to the side of the West.<sup>253</sup>

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<sup>252</sup> Rustow, op. cit., p. 279

<sup>253</sup> Even Lebanon has suffered some misgivings over its hasty action; independents and strong government opposition continue to campaign for changes in the text of the

As tensions continue to grow between East and West so does this lend effect to an even stronger neutralism on the part of the Arabs. This is a normal and natural reaction for they do not wish to be caught up in the maelstrom of international disputes; they have troubles enough at home and desire to concentrate on settling their own internal problems and economic development. It is an attitude that needs to be understood and must not be resented. In their own eyes and perhaps it may be so, their only hope of remaining as sovereign entities may be in preserving a strict, impartial neutralism.

(5) Eradication of Israel as a State

The ultimate hope of every Arab is to see justice done in Palestine; the only rightful settlement in their minds is the elimination of Israel as a state and giving the Jews some special status such as an enclave, autonomous in administration, such as the status of Lebanon in the Ottoman Empire. The existence of a sovereign Jewish state in the heart of the Arab East is incompatible with Arab nationalism; this, coupled with the national humiliation suffered as a result of their failure to defeat the Jewish armies in the 1947-1948 Wars, has nurtured an explosive situation. Though the Arabs have accepted a truce, it is only a temporary expedient; they will not let it be converted into peace. Anxious for revenge and emotionally stirred to irrationalism, they can only see the next round of war before their eyes. This is a fixed topic of Arab East politics that next generations will have to face.<sup>254</sup>

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agreement previously accepted by Lebanon in order to limit Lebanese commitments and there is strong pressure to annul the whole of the pledge made. A change in Lebanese government might see this occur.

<sup>254</sup> Wint and Calvocoressi, op. cit., p. 24

The announced policies of the new UAR (United Arab Republic) and FAS (Federated Arab State of Iraq and Jordan) include securing Arab rights in Palestine. Saudi Arabia supports this view and even Lebanon, to a lesser degree, endorses the general policy. There cannot be other than trouble ahead. Certainly the USSR will support, at least indirectly, her charges Syria and Egypt; it would be difficult for the Western powers to interfere without touching off World War III. Properly trained and fully supported by the Soviets, the Arabs will have a good chance to succeed in the elimination of Israel as a state; however, this will be discussed further at another point in this study.

Some Arab statesmen, like Lebanon's Charles Malik, believe that the Palestine problem can be amicably settled short of war by a combination of cession of territories by Israel (Western Galilee and the Negeb), re-settling refugees in Arab lands and in the ceded territory (Western Galilee in this case), granting of compensation for Arab properties seized and implementation of 1947-1948 United Nations' Palestine resolutions. He also advocates an international agreement between the great powers (i.e., permanent member of the United Nations' Security Council) which would: define "spheres of influence", adjust respective interests of the Soviet Union and United States in the Middle East, "including concessions to the Russians in matters of strategy and even oil". Mr. Malik calls on "Objective truth and justice" to still the emotions and to bring about a peace in Arab-Israeli problems; he calls attention to the "theological dimensions" of the establishment of Israel and predicts a great transformation in Arab thinking and attitudes when their initial reactions to the Israeli state have matured. Malik asks the world, including Israel

and world Jewery, to base their relations with the Arabs on "manifest principles of truth and justice".<sup>255</sup>

Notwithstanding Mr. Malik's views, the general Arab attitude can be accepted as one which demands resolute action and elimination of Israel by force. This is what the masses want and what they have heard preached to them will come to pass. It is difficult to imagine that they will settle for less than full realization of their rights in Palestine; it is too great a historical issue which the Arabs have lived with too long.

(6) Regional Security; Alliance with the Arab World Only

The Arab point of view is to avoid foreign entanglements and foreign-dominated alliances. The Baghdad Pact, for example, was a reaffirmation of Western intent to maintain bases in the Arab East. The Arabs resented attempts of the West to include them in the alliance; as they saw it, the West was attempting to use them as pawns in the "cold war" against Russia. It reinforced their suspicions that the West would never give them anything without entangling them in its military plans to prevent the spread of communism in the world. They also saw themselves treated as satellites and not as sovereign and co-equal. Most fear a re-encroachment of Western power influence in Arab affairs, a continued imperialist domination gained through small but creeping concessions (i.e., air bases, military training missions, advisors in government, etc.).<sup>256</sup> Their past historical experience with Great Britain justifies this attitude.

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<sup>255</sup> Malik, Charles, "Call to Action in the Near East", p. 641-644, *Foreign Affairs*, v. 34, No. 4, July, 1956, New York

<sup>256</sup> Wint and Calvocoressi, op. cit., p. 51-52

Abdul Nasser, through his spokesman, Colonel Abd Al Qadir Hatim, explained his position regarding the Baghdad Pact as being one in "fundamental conflict" with Iraq, which was committed to the great powers, that Egypt stood for an independent defense system for the Arabs. The unity for which the Arabs call must be denied until Iraq will join with Egypt in a "regional neutralism" outside the Baghdad Pact.<sup>257</sup>

When they had been approached by the Western powers in 1951 with proposals to adhere to a Middle East defense command the Arabs turned it down. They replied that the Arab East defense could be supplied through the mechanics of the existing Collective Security Pact of the Arab League of 1950 (Appendix 3) -- that this alliance could be made effective by Western supplies of arms to each state "without strings". The Arab states in turn would organize among themselves and establish relationships with their "friends" in the world. This policy was too nebulous for the Western powers and it complicated their concern to avoid a new Arab-Israeli war. After the "Northern Tier" system of defense was established some Western statesmen still held out hope that the Arab world might see the logic to what they had planned and eventually acquiesce and join the alliance.<sup>258</sup> The fears and suspicions of the West are too deep-seated and Arab independence is still too new and too greatly cherished to make concessions to foreign powers in exchange for defense considerations. A good many years need pass before the Arabs will feel themselves strong enough to bargain as a co-equal with the great powers and before they will be willing to grant military bases and concessions to a big power in

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<sup>257</sup> Little, op. cit., p. 150

<sup>258</sup> Ibid., p. 147

exchange for "protection".

The Arabs realize the value of a regional cooperation for defense; the Arab League Collective Security Pact gives testimony to this. As a counter to the Baghdad Pact, Egypt concluded, in 1955, two treaties involving a regional alignment; the Egyptian-Syrian Alliance and the Egyptian-Saudi Arabian Alliance (Appendix 8). While no single treaty binds all the Arab states together, except the now defunct Collective Security Pact, there exists a good possibility to build further in such an arrangement among the Arab states. The fundamental desire is there; if inter-state and leadership rivalries, personality clashes and petty jealousies were to cease, there is an excellent chance that all the Arab states would agree for a common defense. While it remains a fundamental Arab precept and desire, regional security based on alliances within the Arab world, only, truly does not exist. It should be considered, however, as a general Arab desire that could in the future be realized.

(7) Political and Social Reforms

The peoples of the Arab East are aware that they have not shared adequately in the world's progress and they are demanding of their leaders broad social and economic reforms to bring this about. They are likewise dissatisfied with outmoded political forms and corrupt regimes; they demand good government in the general public interest. No place in the world is more politically conscious than the Arab East; it is reflected in their daily lives, their topics of conversation, their press and radio and in their social organizations. The whole of the region is undergoing vast and comprehensive changes, the result of which may substantially

alter the geographical maps of the area; it brings new and powerful forces into play. Arab nationalism is just one of those forces. There is a new concept of what people expect of their governments; it involves wide-scale socialism and approaches the idea of the "welfare state". The old governmental institutions which cannot accommodate their forms to meet these demands must fall; the vested interests and powerful landlords will eventually disappear for the masses have been awakened and aroused. There will be no stopping this dynamic force. The nationalist movements in many Arab states have achieved their objectives of ridding themselves of foreign influence and imperialism and they now are devoting their energy to internal reforms and development.<sup>259</sup>

Hence, it may be said freely that among the primary desires of the Arabs are far-reaching political and social reforms and that this condition can be applied area-wide.

(8) Cooperation with East and West and Economic and Technical Assistance

While maintaining a neutral attitude, the Arabs desire to effectively cooperate with the powers, both the East and the West. They do not want to be isolated from world technical, scientific and cultural progress but desire to share in both what the East and the West have to offer.

The Arabs want, and desperately need, economic and technical assistance which both the East and the West are willing to offer to gain their own strategic ends. All the powers are eager to have the friendship and cooperation of the Arab East and are willing to contribute to the

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<sup>259</sup> Ali, op. cit., p. 18

economic development of the area in exchange for it. The Arabs rightly feel that there is no reason why they should not profit from the competition now existing between the powers to exert their influences over the region. Their desire is to play a neutral role of friendly cooperation with both sides and to create an atmosphere of cordiality in their international relations. They desire increased trade and cultural exchanges; they want to promote the investment of foreign capital to aid them in plans for industrialization and basic internal development, but at the same time, they desire to avoid foreign influences and commitments that would infringe on their sovereignty or make them dependent on a single power.

(9) World Cooperation Through the United Nations

The Arabs have a great faith in the principle on which the United Nations Organization was founded. They believe that a stronger United Nations is needed in order to safeguard the rights of small nations of the world and indeed, the peace of the world. They have seen how the United Nations has provided them with an opportunity to participate effectively in world affairs and have realized the strength of an Arab bloc or Afro-Asian bloc in making their voice heard by other nations of the world, particularly the great powers.

Despite the fact that the United Nations' resolutions concerning the partition of Palestine have been repugnant to them, the Arabs continue to work with and sincerely respect the United Nations. They were pleased with the effective action taken against two major powers (i.e., France and Great Britain) in the 1956 attack on Egypt; even though the initial cease-fire and withdrawal resolution was vetoed by Great Britain and France.

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it served to gather world opinion in favor of the Arabs and the outcome was to their advantage. The United Nations Emergency Force now serving to keep the peace between Egypt and Israel, although a token force, represents much more than that to the Arabs who see it as the implementation of a United Nations' resolution, proving that the United Nations can work and effectively.

The Arabs feel that the United Nations is competent and qualified to deal with all world security problems, including the present Arab-Israeli dispute, but they feel the United Nations has lacked the power and the will to implement its decisions; there has been over seventy resolutions adopted by the United Nations concerning Palestine since 1947 and only one, and that one only in part, has been implemented. The Arabs want a United Nations strong enough to enforce its decisions.<sup>260</sup>

(10) Nationalization of Oil Industries and Pipe Lines

Most all of the veteran employees of the various foreign oil companies holding concessions in the Arab East will freely disclose that they feel that nationalization of the oil industries and the pipe lines is just a matter of time. The handwriting nearly covers the wall. Just as soon as the Arabs are capable of assuming control and running things entirely by themselves, and perhaps before that time, nationalization will take place. It follows the familiar pattern of history of the oil industry in Mexico, Iran, etc. This condition, however, is not being approached at a rapid rate today due to the lack of experienced workers, technicians and trained management-staff in the Arab oil states, yet there is a gradual

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<sup>260</sup> Sayegh, Fayez, "Arab Attitudes Toward the Emerging United States Policy", p. 68, New Look at the Middle East, Middle East Institute, Washington, D.C., 1957

transformation taking place within the administration of the oil companies; the percentage of Arabs now in the management staff is rising steadily. For example, ARAMCO is replacing its skilled workers and some of its staff positions, where possible, with qualified Arabs when the American employee's contract terminates, whereas, previously all replacement employees were recruited from the United States. New ARAMCO personnel policies are offering fewer career assignments in the company except in highly skilled technical fields; many American employees are instead hired on an eighteen months or thirty-six months contract only. (Previously the majority was hired on a career basis, looking forward to a retirement after 15-20 years) This is a good indication of what kind of future the company expects. While the changeover may be moving at a slower pace in Iraq, the Iraq Petroleum Company voices similar opinions among its leaders.

It is only natural that a people and a nation would want the full benefit of the exploitation of its own natural resources. As rapidly as they acquire the management and marketing techniques and can secure assurances of the cooperation of the powers in delivery to their world markets, they will take over the industries themselves. If nationalization occurs prematurely there is good reason to believe the oil states can carry on effectively by the hiring of foreign experts and technicians as is the case in Iran.

More recently there has been inter-Arab conferences and meetings to discuss nationalization of petroleum pipe lines passing through their various sovereign states, hence, this is a matter of vital concern to all the Arab states, save Egypt. The present plan calls for nationalization of any new pipe lines constructed and envisages charging a tariff or freight rate on the amounts of oil passing through them to benefit each state

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concerned. It is not difficult to visualize an extension of this idea to the existing pipe lines as well.

This prevailing attitude on nationalization of oil and its pipe lines will do much to determine the future course of Arab politics as well as influence the security of the area.

(11) Communism and Islam Incompatible

It is a fundamental Arab precept that communism and Islam are incompatible. Hence, there exists no general fear of penetration by the communistic ideology. This view is not, however, shared by all Arabs and that fact is reflected in the foreign policy of Iraq whose defense is oriented against communist expansion and subversion. It is also noted in the internal policies of all the Arab states, which outlaw the communist party. The suppressive measures against the communists taken by Abdul Nasser in Egypt are well-known. Dr. Charles Malik, however, disputes the incompatibility of Islam and communism and discloses that the Arab East is not basically opposed to communism.<sup>262</sup> Iraq's Nuri es-Said and Jordan's King Hussein have publicly assailed the communists' efforts in the Arab East and Lebanon is vigilant against communist activities in that country. Their greatest freedom of operation has been in Syria until recently when

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<sup>261</sup> This plan was proposed by a former ARAMCO employee, Sheik Abdullah Tariki, who after leaving ARAMCO, was educated in the United States, taking a degree in Petroleum Engineering from Texas University. Since his return to Saudi Arabia he has become the Director General of Petroleum and Minerals in the Ministry of Finance and is making increasing demands on the American Company.

<sup>262</sup> Malik, Charles, "The Near East Between East and West", p. 16, The Near East and the Great Powers, (ed. Richard Frye), Harvard Press, Cambridge, 1951

all political parties were to have been officially disbanded. The communists, however, refused to disband and will continue to work underground.

Despite the above, there is a general and sincere belief on the part of the majority of the Arabs that communism is not a threat to them and that it is, in fact, not acceptable to the Moslem because it has an atheistic basis. This concept can have wide-reaching effects on the future and on the security of the entire region.<sup>263</sup>

B. The Arab Concept for the Security of the Arab East

The Arabs feel that security can best be provided for their own lands by pursuing a policy based on the above-mentioned aspirations and beliefs. These may be reconstituted slightly and summarized as follows:

- (1) Friendly cooperation with East and West.
- (2) Avoiding foreign alliances and entanglements, i.e., concessions that might provoke the hostility of either East or West.
- (3) Adoption of a "neutralist" foreign policy.
- (4) Developing Arab regional security arrangements; cooperation for defense.
- (5) Strengthening military establishments to adequately insure internal security and provide for self-defense.
- (6) Expanding its program of social and political reform.
- (7) Preparation for the eventual struggle with Israel; meanwhile, enforcement of the economic blockade of Israel and working through United Nations to secure legitimate rights of Arabs in Palestine.
- (8) Accepting aid for economic development from both East and West.

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<sup>263</sup> Faris, Nabih, A., "Islam and Communism"

(9) Development of greater strength through regional unities.

(10) Temporary cooperation with oil concessionaires but feel oil and pipe lines would be safer in Arab hands and that the elimination of foreign influence in the oil industry would provide greater security for the region.

### C. An Evaluation of Arab Views

While the Arab points of view and aspirations appear fundamentally logical and sound when written down, upon examination a number of fallacies become apparent.

Firstly, the acceptance of economic or military assistance, direct or indirect, like it or not, causes some sort of dependence on the giver by the recipient nation and introduces the influence of the benefactor. It is difficult to obtain, even by the most skillful diplomacy, long-term aid without some sort of concessions. The Arab states are incapable of successfully playing the West against the East and visa versa. The present state of the European satellites of the USSR gives adequate testimony to the fact that the Russians ultimately will have their way. Hence, a choice will have to be made eventually to stand with the Western powers or with the Eastern bloc for even though the USSR does not require satellite status of their Arab friends, the least they will accept is an anti-Western orientation. (They are at an advantage here for that situation already exists in most parts of the Arab East.)

Secondly, the neutralism that the Arabs profess has been greatly overrated for as already pointed out, this is a neutrality favorable to the East, brought about by the lingering hatred for the imperialist Western powers, and an inherent distrust of them.

Thirdly, the general attitude toward communism breeds a dangerous possibility, for communism can be difficult to combat when it is carried by the germs of infiltration. Wearing the mask of Arab nationalism and having the socio-economic goals that appeal to the masses, it can be resourceful enough to overcome and possibly make use of the religious sentiments. Then too, the religious sentiment may not be strong enough to withstand such a social and political onslaught. Communism has always flourished in conditions of poverty, unrest and malcontent; there is good reason to believe that religion would prove no obstacle to its acceptance, if it can relieve the misery of the masses. Added to this is the supernationalism idea of the Soviet Union which may be able to overcome a narrower nationalism; this may have great appeal for a region which has known an imperial existence far more than nationalistic fragmentation.<sup>264</sup> At the present time this seems illogical in view of the high emotional expression of Arab nationalism, state and regional, however, it is not out of the realm of possibility. The Arab states often fail to realize the imminent danger of their being submerged physically and spiritually by the non-Moslem world; this would be a fate far worse than that which was imposed on them by Western democracies. The Russians have made wide claims as to the freedoms afforded Soviet Moslems, yet today in Tashkent there are only eighteen mosques versus 300 some forty years ago; 450,000 Moslem members of the young communist league (Komsomol), inhabitants of the Crimea, were later expelled and dispersed for security reasons. In publications, the Soviet Union belittles Moslem practices, depicts Moslems eating pork and drinking vodka, defying the prohibitions of the Koran. Large Moslem populations (numbering to the millions) have been displaced and shifted

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<sup>264</sup> Ibid

throughout the Soviet Union from their homes in central Asia to offset a Moslem internal threat to the Soviet Union, as these people had proved unreliable in their allegiance to the Soviet Union during World War II.<sup>265</sup>

The communist penetration of the Arab East has reached a serious point; it has greater influence than first observances suspect. Agents are present in key positions of government, press, radio, trade unions and the community at large. In some Arab states (Syria and Egypt) not a single word of criticism of the communist world finds its way into the press, yet every day the same publications are filled with defiant abuse of the Western world; some sections of the press are liberally subsidized by international communism. Communist classics are available in Arabic and bookshops have been flooded with a variety of communist literature at give-away prices. The Greek Orthodox Church has become an institution specifically cultivated by the communists. Large sections of government and even the army is falling under its influence in some countries. The communists have seized on real or imagined grievances, nationalism and national need, anti-Westernism, religious fanaticism and petty rivalries, and has used them as a vehicle to attain their objective. They are achieving their ends through those individuals not readily identified with the Reds and even through those persons who try to persecute and outlaw the communist party. Three or four years ago it was popular to criticize communism in public, today it is not; the atmosphere has changed; one used to be able to talk with pride of being pro-Western. Today, it is a source of embarrassment or shame; people who are Western supporters are becoming consciously restrained from talking about or defending the West.

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<sup>265</sup> Spector, op. cit., p. 120, 122

In the opinion of some prominent Arab statesmen, the communist penetration is much more important than the Arab-Israeli dispute or any other Arab East problem.<sup>266</sup>

Fourthly, while Arab unity is a national by-word, the birth of regional unities in 1958 has not served to strengthen the Arab East but rather widened and emphasized the existing differences. The two unions, Syria and Egypt in the United Arab Republic, and Iraq and Jordan of the Federated Arab State, directly oppose one another in their sympathies, attitudes and orientation toward the powers. Rivalry for leadership in the Arab world and efforts to gain adherents to their unions will certainly widen the gulf between them; already each side has violently denounced the other; there have been threats of plots, assassinations, counter-plots and intrigues that are so fundamentally characteristic of Arab politics. Minorities are still dissatisfied with programs toward Arab unity thus far; many, such as the Kurds, have maintained their national aspirations and are fertile ground for communist activities. Local loyalties still seriously rival the Arab nation idea; in Lebanon the country's Christian and Moslem populations are undergoing severe tensions as there is a popular demand of Moslems favoring union with Abdul Nasser's new United Arab Republic, while the Christian-Maronite majority insists on the eternal separateness of Lebanon. Saudi Arabia prefers to remain isolated and neutral in the current drive for unifications.

Some authors question whether Arab unity can ever be obtained, other than by force; many question whether Arab unity ever existed in the past except under similar circumstances of imposed rule. The empire created by

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<sup>266</sup> Malik, op. cit., p. 638-639



Islam fused the Arabs into a single purpose but did not give them any real unity beyond that purpose; however, Islam and the Arabic language have given the Arabs a feeling of oneness. There is a general attitude prevailing among them that they were historically one and that enemy aggressions broke their union. This is probably fallacious thinking for subsequent opportunities have shown their inability to unite politically. A good example is the Arab League, the Arab states believed that union was a natural condition for their peoples which only needed political formation; unfortunately, history proved this to be untrue.<sup>267</sup>

The bitter rivalries for leadership between Iraq and Egypt that reappeared with the birth of the Arab League in 1945 and grew to open insult and violent tirades with Iraq's participation in the Turco-Iraqi (Baghdad) Pact will be continued by the two new unions, the United Arab Republic and the Federated Arab State, under the opposing leaderships of Abdul Nasser and Nuri es-Said. This is, in reality, a continuation of a long-time struggle of the Nile Valley versus the Tigris-Euphrates Valley for domination of the Arab East in which the prize and key to control has been the possession of geographic Syria. Both now have a piece of it; the remainder and probably most important part is in Palestine. Egypt will seek a protective base to her north to defend her canal and her geographic position as well as to extend her political influence. Iraq desires Mediterranean ports and bases and equally seeks to further its political control. The future does not promise good chance of lessening inter-Arab rivalries and tensions. Today, the possibilities of achieving a natural and voluntary Arab unity are more remote than at any time in the

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<sup>267</sup> Little, op. cit., p. 138-139

recent past, despite almost universal public support for the popular ideal.

Fifthly, the desire of the Arabs to restrict military and regional alliances within themselves does not afford them sufficient strength to stand against either East or West. Generally the Arab states lack organization and their pacts have no well-defined aims or objectives. Unfortunately, very few Arabs understand the need for Western and Arab solidarity. (Also, not all Western nations understand that they must be strong in manpower as well as in technology if they are to stand off the communists.) The Arab East cannot hope to contain Eastern aggression without the United States, and likewise, without the Arab East the United States cannot hope to build a system of effective alliances to block the Soviets.<sup>268</sup>

After 1950 the United States faced the problem of developing a series of alliances to counter the Soviet Union-Red China alliance which resulted in the union of 800 million people. The answer to the staggering manpower figure was the large reserves of Asiatic manpower. Hence, the United States needs alliances with the Moslem world to accomplish its objective of containing the Soviets and offsetting its manpower. The leading Moslem states are strategically located to the south of Russia in the "soft-underbelly"; their populations are sufficient to balance, if not outnumber the Moscow-Peking orbit.<sup>269</sup>

There occurred a good possibility of such an alignment of the West and the Arab East after the revolution of 1952 in Egypt. The

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<sup>268</sup> Spector, op. cit., p. 120-121

<sup>269</sup> Ibid

government of Abdul Nasser was not prepared to readily adopt the Arab East policies of the preceding regime it had destroyed. It came close to a decision in favor of closer ties with Iraq and experienced a rapprochement in its relations with Turkey in the autumn of 1954; further, it recognized the ineffectiveness of the Saudi Arabia alliance. However, confusion, bad timing and misunderstanding between Salah Salim and Iraqi leaders after the Sarsank conferences headed-off this tendency. When Turkey approached Iraq first to negotiate a regional alliance, the possibility was completely destroyed.<sup>270</sup> (Had Turkey approached Egypt first, acknowledging her leadership in the Arab world, the picture might have been substantially changed.)

Sixthly, although Arab leaders and government pay lip service to social and political reforms the situation has not substantially changed over the years. Existing regimes, strengthened by more modern military arms and equipment have increased their internal control and tend to stabilize and insure their position. Reforms have limited to the superficial; there has been some progress in education and public health. Land has been redistributed on limited basis; there has been no grand or wide-scale progress. Wealth and influence still remains in the hands of the few; the landed-class, the vested interests and the tribal leaders. Likewise, these groups continue to exercise most of the influence and control in government.

Neither does a dictatorship, built on a republican structure, as exists in UAR offer the best solution to social reforms; limited reforms are made to pacify the masses but inequities remain and power is held in the hands of a dangerous few. In such a state, government tends to become

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<sup>270</sup> Little, op. cit., p. 146

more absolute, imposing greater restrictions, resulting in losses of freedom, rather than the gaining of new rights.

There are, of course, certain basic factors such as the effect of population pressures and the inherent complexities of change in a feudal agricultural economy to be considered. Even in the richest oil state social and political reforms can not substantially change the standard of living of the average peasant farmer, who represents the largest percentage of the population. Reforms being undertaken now including agriculture, irrigation schemes, reclamation of land, building of dams and power stations, may not have any great effect on the lives of the peasants for one or two generations to come. Too slow a process in introducing social reforms may contribute to further instabilities and bring on an internal revolution or a coup d'etat. The peasant masses, especially in the oil countries, could easily be aroused by the promises of a supra-socialism of the Reds; they are already discontent with the efforts of their own governments on their behalf.

Lastly, Arab intransigence on the Palestine problem will not solve it. The Arabs would do far better to be content with "small gains" made increasingly over a period of time through international agencies and pressures of the powers to see justice done. Gradually, Israel would be reduced to enclave size and status and as a result of increased Arab military strength and technical progress, the Arab states could force Israel to "toe-the-line" and live peaceably with her neighbors. She would be reduced to the point, and the Arabs so strengthened, that she would no longer constitute "a threat" to Arab security.

Refugees should not be made to suffer indefinitely but instead

some large-scale attempts at resettlement should be made with international guarantees that it would not prejudice their future rights in Palestine.

Any attempt at a hasty solution, i.e., a third round of war, accepting the assistance of a "dangerous partner" may prove more tragic in the long run, for an outbreak of hostilities anywhere in the Arab East immediately enjoins the vital concern of all the major powers of the world today. Indeed, the peace of the world may depend on the Arabs' patience to settle the Palestine issue short of violence. This, however, does not seem to be apparent to current Arab leaders as threats of war and preparation for war with Israel are going ahead at a very rapid pace, especially in the new United Arab Republic. The strength of armaments in the military establishments of Syria and Egypt far exceed their requirements for maintaining internal order and providing for their adequate self-defense. All indications are that a third round of war will occur, subject only to the intervention of the United Nations or the major powers, and who knows what the results of that might be. Yet a change in fundamental Arab attitudes could reverse this whole procedure. Unlikely as it seems to be, this seems a major task for world statesmen if they are to prevent World War III.

PART IV: INFLUENCING FACTORS: OIL AND PALESTINE

CHAPTER 9

OIL AS A FACTOR AFFECTING THE SECURITY OF THE ARAB EAST

A. Why Oil is a Factor in World Security

The life blood of modern industrial nations is oil; fortunately, or unfortunately, the economies of nearly all the advanced states of the world are geared to it. No single substance is more vital to every material activity of our present civilization; surely it will, too, be of great or greater value and utility in the years to come.<sup>271</sup> It is often remarked that the present era is an atomic age, but truly, it would better be dubbed "The Oil Age", for no substance is more vital today to the world at large; it is a strategic material of highest priority in an industrial economy, in peace and in war. Petroleum has become a necessity of life without which modern factories cannot operate and the large machine products they manufacture are useless without it.<sup>272</sup> This applies particularly to the industrialized West where petroleum, in terms of its many diversified by-products, supports an enormous number of industries and has become essential to the welfare of the society organized around them. Oil in one form or another has attained a value far in excess of any other commercial commodity. When it is considered that oil is far more essential to war activities (i.e., to move the jeeps, tanks, trucks and airplanes

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<sup>271</sup> Longrigg, S.H., Oil in the Middle East: Its Discovery and Development, preface, p. v, Oxford University Press, London, 1954

<sup>272</sup> Fanning, Leonard N., Foreign Oil and the Free World, p. 3-4, McGraw-Hill, New York-London, 1954

and warships) than to those of peace, it becomes deserving of even higher regard in its relationship to the security of a nation. War, the threat of war, or simply the continuing demands of providing for readiness and national defense creates a permanent necessity and urgency to fulfill oil supply requirements; both for now and for the future no single material is so vital. Some guarantee of its availability as a matter of national policy becomes imperative under those considerations.<sup>273</sup>

The significance of oil's strategic importance is not newly realized; it is apparent in the plea of France's Premier Clemenceau to President Wilson for American oil in 1917: "Oil is as necessary as blood in the battle of tomorrow; the safety of the allied nations is in the balance".<sup>274</sup> After World War I, Lord Curzon remarked: "The allies floated to victory on a sea of oil".<sup>275</sup> Henry Berenger, French industrialist and senator, who was wartime oil commissioner, so well-expressed the urgency of safeguarding the allies' future oil interests in a note to Clemenceau on the eve of a British-French conference to discuss the disposition of oil spoils of Europe and Asia on December 12, 1919: "Who has oil, has empire; control of the ocean by heavy oils, control of the air by light refined oils, and the land by petrol and illuminating oils. The empire of the world, through the financial power attaching to a substance more precious, more penetrating, more influential in the world

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<sup>273</sup> Hoskins, H.L., p. 189, op. cit.; and Fanning, op. cit., p. 3

<sup>274</sup> Quoted by Denny, Ludwell, We Fight for Oil, p. 16, Alfred Knopf, London-New York, 1928 (from note of December 15, 1917, to President Wilson.)

<sup>275</sup> Ibid., p. 16 (address to Inter-Allied Petroleum Council, London, November 21, 1928)

than gold itself".<sup>276</sup> In the 1920's, economists recognized that modern international power was bound-up in oil, raw materials, foreign markets and credits and that the nation which could control them could dominate the world.<sup>277</sup>

Oil represents power. It is a fact that today this power and its significance is greater than at any previous time in history. Oil represents power in peacetime; power to develop and maintain an industrial economy and its accompanying transport system. In wartime it serves to expand that industrial base to produce and support weapons of war and carry them into effective action; it is the basic muscle of which a powerful, modern nation is made. Its use in a number of synthetic derivatives such as rubber contribute to its strategic importance in addition to its primary employment as a fuel or lubricant. Existing military establishments are largely mechanized and dependent on liquid fuels and lubricants; atomic power is still largely non-existent and undeveloped for use by modern combat forces as a replacement for petroleum fuels.<sup>278</sup>

The problem of oil supply has become a matter of strategic political concern for most all of the industrial nations of the world today because of the fact that it is so unevenly distributed to meet the world needs. The three outstanding oil producing areas are, the United States, the Middle East and Venezuela; of these the United States is the greatest, producing about one-half the world's oil. The Middle East ranks

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<sup>276</sup> Quoted by Tramerger, Pierre l'Espagnol de la, p. 12, World Struggle For Oil, George Allen and Unwin Ltd. London, 1923 (third edition)

<sup>277</sup> Denny, op. cit., p. 4 (cf. New York International Conciliation, January, 1927, "Raw Materials and Their Effect Upon International Relations")

<sup>278</sup> Hoskins, H.L., op. cit., p. 189-190



second. The United States, however, does not at the present produce sufficient to meet her own needs and most of Venezuelan oil is consumed in the Western hemisphere. Hence, the Middle East becomes the principal supplier to the industrial countries of Great Britain and Western Europe. The USSR is the only great industrial nation that is self-sufficient in oil; this is probably due to the simple mode of living of the majority of Soviet and satellite peoples, and their rather extensive employment of coal, hydro-electric power and manpower for industrial purposes. Hence, their needs in proportion to industrial output and population are considerably less than most Western countries.<sup>279</sup>

Oil exists in other areas such as Canada, Indonesia, Latin America, the Far East and in Soviet satellite countries, but not on appreciable scales, nor is it developed to the extent of the above three regions. Oil also is known to exist in stretches of the Arctic but because of its remoteness and the difficulty of extraction in the extreme cold, it is of little practical value. Increasing world demands for petroleum since the close of World War II have all but eliminated the procuring of oil from the Western hemisphere. Europe, outside and Soviet and Soviet-controlled areas, was able to supply less than twenty per cent of its needs in 1951 and that situation is not improving. It places a heavy reliability on the only large source of oil available to them, the Middle Eastern fields. There is a good possibility that the United States as well may have to look to the Middle East to fulfill her steadily rising petroleum requirements for only there are found the enormous amounts of oil necessary to meet the

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<sup>279</sup> Wint and Calvocoressi, op. cit., p. 128, Appendix IA, Oil Facts and Figures; and Ibid., p. 225

increased demand.<sup>280</sup>

It is apparent that the control of the developed oil regions of the world affect the balance of power in a world so dependent on petroleum. It becomes vital to all Eastern and Western nations alike which count themselves in the free world and oppose communist expansion and aggression. Thus, in world politics oil becomes a strategic consideration of the first order.

B. Arab East Oil and the Powers

(1) The Relationship of NATO and Arab Oil

A factor of prime importance that bears close consideration is the indisputable reliance of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization on the oil of the Middle East; its continued flow to Western Europe is imperative if such an organization is to be effectual. The powers which framed the NATO pact considered the defense of Western Europe to be vital to the survival of the free world in its struggle against communism; the alliance included the idea of basic economic security as well as military security.<sup>281</sup> Following the Second World War, the United States undertook plans in the form of the European Recovery Program to assist Western Europe to recover from the affects of World War II and to assist in rearming her on the premise that Western Europe could be successfully defended in case of a third world war. Oil requirements could not be provided from within the European area so initially the United States drew all the major portion of these requirements from Western Hemisphere production. However, in

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<sup>280</sup> Chapman, Alex H., "Middle East Oil and the World's Increasing Demand for Power", p. 64, Tensions in the Middle East (ed. William Sands), Middle East Institute, Washington D.C., 1956

<sup>281</sup> Fanning, op. cit., p. 5

1948, it became obvious that the United States could not continue to supply the European community due to a phenomenal increase of oil consumption within her own borders and her concern over dwindling national reserves. Hence, America turned to the tremendous potential of the Arab East as a source for the oil needed to rebuild the Marshall Plan countries. By 1950 the Atlantic pact nations had all but completed their adjustment to oil shipments from the Arab East. For Western Europe, Arab oil had two distinct advantages; first, it could be produced more cheaply than American oil, and secondly, it could be procured from outside the dollar area with sterling or with francs which made possible the maintaining of Europe's dollar resources which were so important to the return to a stable economy. Hence, after 1950, any serious interruption of the flow of Middle Eastern oil to Western Europe could only mean it would suffer partial paralysis, possibly spelling disaster if it occurred at a time when its strength was vitally necessary to the defense of Europe.<sup>282</sup> Thus, the relationship of global defense and Western strategy, the preservation of the free world through the NATO alliance, and its absolute dependence on circumstance in the Arab East with regard to the supply of oil, points up the need for a strategic consideration of the security of the Arab East. The United States is committed to insuring the flow of oil to Western Europe does not stop and the European powers, themselves, likewise, are aware of the implicit dangers of a national policy that does not give vital considerations to preserving the security of the Arab East. The necessary interdependence of the various areas of the world becomes more obvious every day. That the United States and other powers must concern

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<sup>282</sup> Hoskins, H.L., op. cit., p. 190-191, 195

themselves with global-thinking was recognized early by President Wilson who expressed a foresight that has only been recently heeded. "We are participants whether we would or not in the life of the world. The interests of other nations are ours also. We are partners with the rest. What affects mankind is inevitably our affair as well as the affairs of the nations of Europe and Asia".<sup>283</sup> Western Europe and the Arab East should recognize their economic interdependence for truly, there is no oil-consuming area of the magnitude of Europe that needs the enormous quantities of oil that pour from the Arab region; Russia and her satellites can supply their own; the United States can obtain her needs from the Western Hemisphere more readily, and the remaining markets for Arab oil are negligible. Likewise, just as Europe is the only market for Mideast oil, the Arab East is the only place that Europe can at the present time fulfill her requirements. Great effort should be made to improve relations and promote mutual understanding in view of the natural interdependence that obtains.

(2) Great Britain and Arab Oil

In addition to the fundamental strategic consideration for the Middle East, Great Britain's chief financial and commercial interest in the world today is in oil of the Mesopotamia and Persian Gulf regions. It represents a large and profitable investment in which the British government participates as an actual stockholder; thus, Britain not only is a guardian of strategic resources, she is also looking to protect her own investments in the area. Up to date this had not required a costly system of authority and administration but as has been previously

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<sup>283</sup> Quoted by Denny, op. cit., p. 5

mentioned, the British have subsidized and protected certain tribal chiefs in exchange for their loyalty, oil concessions and British control of their foreign affairs.

Though Britain's strategic interest with the land mass of the Middle East far preceded her present oil interest, the latter factor has come to displace the former in importance. For truly, the future of what remains of the entire British Empire depends on the financial income of Persian Gulf oil. Since the days of 1913 when Sir Winston Churchill, as the First Lord of the Admiralty, changed the British navy from the use of coal to the use of oil, strategic considerations have placed oil and the continued supply of it to her armed forces on a par with the regard for safeguarding routes to India. It is true, however, that the two ideas are interlocked and inseparable inasmuch as the flow of Arab oil to Britain depends on keeping open her traditional routes to it.

Britain first concentrated her efforts on Persian oil, Baron de Reuter having obtained the first concession, as early as 1872 to exploit the natural resources of the entire country. Development did not begin, however, until much later under the guidance of William Knox d'Arcy, an Australian financier who first struck oil there in 1908. The British government became interested early in the Mesopotamia region but did not secure concessions there until June, 1914, when the Ottoman government promised the Turkish Petroleum Company (seventy-five per cent British; twenty-five per cent German) oil rights in the vilayets of Mosul and Baghdad. Terms of the San Remo Agreement of April 24, 1920, gave France the German interests (twenty-five per cent) in the Turkish Petroleum Company. In 1929 this organization became the Iraq Petroleum Company.

an international concern of British, French, Dutch and American interests. By 1931, however, Britain had secured additional concessions in the Mosul area and west of it, and in 1938 enlarged this to include the Basrah area in the south of Iraq.<sup>284</sup>

Great Britain has long maintained a position of influence in the Arab areas to the south of Iraq and except for Saudi Arabia has managed to obtain sole rights to grant oil concessions in the area. By a treaty of 1899 and a further agreement in 1913, the Sheikdom of Kuwait agreed to not enter into formal relationship with foreign governments without British consent and agreed specifically to grant oil concessions only to appointees of the British government. A similar arrangement was made in Bahrein in 1914.<sup>285</sup> Likewise, the British are the sub-concessionaires along the Trucial coast and in Qatar, having secured a seventy-five year concession from the Sheik of Qatar in 1935 and abu Dhabi in 1939. Elsewhere along the fringes of Southern Arabia, subsidiaries of Iraq Petroleum Company hold oil rights so that in effect the area is solidly in British hands. Saudi Arabia, too, could have remained a British holding as it once was, but when early explorations failed to disclose the presence of oil, Britain defaulted on payments and failed to continue exploration attempts which were conditional to the agreement made with Ibn Saud. Their concession was formally terminated, only to be later taken up by the Americans.

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<sup>284</sup> Hoskins, H.L., op. cit., p. 198-202; and The Middle East, A Political and Economic Survey, p. 15, London and New York, Royal Institute of International Affairs, second edition, 1955.

<sup>285</sup> Ibid., p. 204-210. Despite this fact, after initial concessions had been made to British subjects, the options were in turn transferred to American companies in both Bahrein and Kuwait; however, in the latter case a joint Anglo-American company was formed as a compromise to British protests.

When Iran nationalized the petroleum industry on March 15, 1951, and subsequent non-agreements resulted in seizure of the oil properties by the Persian government, and British personnel were ousted, the oil areas of Iraq and the Persian Gulf took on a new and greater importance. Production was increased in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Iraq in order to make up for the loss of Iranian oil. Since that time, Britain's chief interests have been tied up with securing her position in Iraq and the Persian Gulf for this is her last oil stronghold and the key to her economy.

Perhaps for this reason the British government has long been a participant and shareholder in the major oil companies which have developed Middle Eastern oil. In contrast to the United States which has considerable supplies of her own and has avoided a "corporative state approach", Britain has found oil to be of such national strategic importance that she cannot wholly trust the supply of it to private enterprise. Hence, she has become more politically involved in the Arab East with the growth of oil interest there and has secured a dominant political hold over the foreign affairs of the area of her interests. She continues to maintain that grip so long as it is politically practicable and sometimes when it is not. It is an imperialist concept that fifty years ago was accepted as the "norm" among dynamic industrial nations seeking new raw materials and expanding their influence naturally. Today it is outmoded, but the British dilemma is that she cannot surrender her control without also giving up the safeguards to her interests, which remain more than ever imperative to her existence as a power at the present time. However, the dogged attitude of Great Britain to "hold on as long as possible" in the regions where she still has power and authority is certain in the end to be her downfall.

There is a concept prevalent among many of the British that they must continue to extract the maximum wealth from the Arab East region in order to survive the next ten to twenty years when they will be developing nuclear power to replace the large quantities of oil used for power. By this time they feel they can strike a balance with their needs for oil and its availability from other areas. This is probably wishful thinking and a grave underestimate of the future of petroleum and its derivatives. By failing to recognize the need for a new and fresh approach based on mutual interests, mutual benefits, Arab friendship and understanding, the British seriously jeopardize their chances of even surviving in a short term view. Perhaps their best solution is to arrive at some Anglo-American joint understanding and to devise a common policy which will satisfy the Arab aspirations and at the same time give guarantees of continued flow of oil to Western Europe. America is in a position to negotiate such a pledge; without it, there seems doubt that either power will survive the onslaught of Russian diplomacy in winning the Arabs, and at the same time, Arab oil.

### (3) The United States and Arab Oil

Arabian oil became a matter of American strategic interest during World War II, however, private enterprise had for some years previous undertaken operations to "share the wealth" of the Middle East region with Britain and the other powers holding oil concessions. In 1920 American oil companies strongly criticized the San Remo Agreement which excluded them from concessions in Mesopotamia; subsequently, pressure on the United States' government resulted in an official protest to the British Foreign Office and proposed an "open door" policy to all nations



in organizing oil concessions in the Middle East. The American government seemed satisfied when the Turkish Petroleum Company was re-organized in 1928 to include a twenty-six per cent American share in that concession, (it became IPC in 1929) and with private interests quieted, did not pursue any further national concern in oil matters of the region.<sup>286</sup>

Private American oil companies were limited in their activities by the terms of the "Red Line Agreement" of July 31, 1928, which restricted oil exploration and production in the Arab East to the corporate components of the Turkish Petroleum Company (which could act only through jointly-owned operating companies comprised of the members of that company and to be governed by British law). Needless to say, this cartel was not favorably viewed by the American companies which desired to expand their operations. However, as a result of events that transpired in World War II this agreement was held invalid by the British and Americans in 1946. Thus, the door was open to expand American oil company operations.<sup>287</sup>

Subsequently, American interests acquired concessions in Saudi Arabia (1933), organizing the Arabian American Oil Company; in 1934 concessions were taken over from a British syndicate in Bahrein Island; both by the Standard Oil Company of California. Also in 1934, the Gulf Oil Company secured a fifty per cent share in the concession for Kuwait (transferred from a British subject). In 1947 operations were extended to the diamond-shaped neutral zone of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia where the American Independent Oil Company was granted full rights for all oil in

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<sup>286</sup> Ibid., p. 202

<sup>287</sup> Ibid., p. 203. The British viewed the restrictive clauses of the agreement had been voided by the German occupation of France in 1940, at which time delivery of oil to the French interests had been suspended.

the half of the zone belonging to the Sheik of Kuwait, and in 1949 an American Company, the Pacific Western Corporation, secured oil rights in the Saudi Arabia half of the neutral zone.<sup>288</sup> The two American companies operating in the neutral zone coordinated and cooperative exploration was carried on in the joint interest of both companies. British concessions throughout most of the remainder of the Arab East limited the American oil interests to the aforementioned, however, due to the "fickleness" of the discovery of oil, the fortunes and misfortunes of the game, the American's position was enhanced at the expense of the British for certainly the best producing wells and the largest oil reserves lie within the American concessions. The British had formerly possessed concessions in Saudi Arabia but gave up hope of finding oil there. "Lady luck" smiled on the American firms when large petroleum deposits were discovered in the Dammam-Dhahran area in 1938, just five years after the concessions had been granted them. The discovery of oil on Bahrein Island occurred in 1932 and fortunately for the Americans, Standard Oil of California was holding the option that had been secured from a British syndicate in 1927. The Bahrein Island oil-find was significant for it gave the first concrete indication that important oil deposits existed in the Persian Gulf. Only the onset of the Second World War slowed operations to a virtual standstill.<sup>289</sup>

Official United States government interest in Arab oil dates from 1943-1944 when concern for world petroleum resources and the drain on continental American oil reserves made the issue strategic and national,

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<sup>288</sup> Ibid., p. 207-208. ARAMCO surrendered her claims to rights in the neutral zone for secure title to Saudi Arabian off-shore rights.

<sup>289</sup> Ibid., p. 204-205; and Middle East Oil Development (fourth edition) p. 14-15, ARAMCO, 1956

affecting the security of the United States. This alarm at home resulted in the formation of the Petroleum Reserves Corporation to engage in oil operations abroad. It was the plan of the then Secretary of the Interior, Harold L. Ickes, to construct a network of pipe lines from the Persian Gulf to Mediterranean ports, as a wartime measure and to aid in the post-war reconstruction of Europe. Opposition by the American oil industry reduced the plan to only providing loans to finance these proposed pipe lines. The project was not realized, however, until 1950. The owners of the Arabian-American Oil Company (ARAMCO) (which had been organized in 1938) had established the Trans-Arabian Pipe Line Company (TAPLINE) in 1946 to construct the line. The role of the United States' government was limited to issuing of licenses for the manufacture of steel pipe and providing the necessary diplomatic support for the project.

Surveys and preliminary work for the TAPLINE project had begun in 1947 but were interrupted by the Arab-Israeli War. The Arab League, because of American recognition of Israel, had taken steps to oppose all United States' undertakings in the Arab zones. Hence, Syria, upholding the League resolution, refused to ratify a previous agreement to allow the pipe line to cross her territory to its terminus in Lebanon. Construction was suspended until Syria learned that Egypt was secretly offering proposals that the line be terminated within her borders. The project, initiated in 1947, was brought to completion in October, 1950; extending a thirty-inch pipe a distance of 1,067 1/2 miles from Abqaiq field in Saudi Arabia to Zahrain, near Sidon, Lebanon.<sup>290</sup>

It had been mentioned previously in this study that both Great Britain and the United States sought oil concessions from Iran in 1944;

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<sup>290</sup> Ibid., p. 218-220

this was a further manifestation of American strategic interest born during the war years. The intervention of the Soviet Union in Iran had necessitated that both the British and the Americans withdraw from the oil negotiations they had initiated in order that Iran could be afforded the opportunity to refuse the Russian demands. The Soviet interest coming on the scene raised the specter of strategic interests and international competition for Mideast oil. As American strategic interests in the petroleum reserves of the region crystalized, this automatically brought the United States into the complexities and the pitfalls of Middle East politics. It raised the question of relations with the Arab states and in turn presented problems concerning her allies -- the position of the French in the Levant and North Africa, the disposition of the Italian colonies and the British position of power and influence within the Arab world.<sup>291</sup> America's future policies for the Arab East were destined to be irrevocably linked with her "oil policy". The political struggle for oil obviously was to ultimately become a great power struggle.

Increased post-war demands for American oil, plus her alarm at dwindling reserves, resulted in a gradual weaning of Western Europe to Arab oil which was completed by 1950. It has been pointed out that the United States' concept and that of other free nations is based on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The oil policy of the United States and the Western European community relies on Arab East oil; this is a basic deficiency in the concept, because as the NATO reliance on Arab oil grows steadily greater, so does, at the same time, the capacity to safeguard these sources and routes of supply grow weaker. This is due

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<sup>291</sup> Reitzel, op. cit., p. 56-57

principally to the decay of the British position in the Arab East and her loss of control of the Suez Canal. Some sixty-five per cent of all petroleum shipments pass through the Canal and it additionally serves as the shortest sea-link between NATO members and their allies in Southeast Asia and the Far East. Hence, the United States' interest in the Suez Canal parallels that of Great Britain but for different reasons. The United States' economy does not significantly depend on the Suez Canal but as a user and supplier of NATO forces she is interested in safeguarding free passage and maintaining it open at all times.<sup>292</sup> All this is closely linked to United States' "oil policy" and is well brought out by Rear Admiral Ernest M. Eller, USN (retired), a great expert on global strategy and logistics of fuel supply: "It is a stark fact that every American should know that the United States and allies would be crippled, if not brought to disaster, if we lost the Middle East oil and control of the sea that makes it possible to use it".<sup>293</sup>

The United States, acting through its private petroleum interests, enjoys a favorable relationship with the oil states of the Arab East. This is due principally to the fair-dealing which has so typified American oil operations and to the "private point IV" conducted by the United States' oil companies in the places where they hold concessions. The introduction of revised oil agreements providing for an equal division of profits between the concessionaires and the proprietor-states was a welcome innovation to the Arabs who had been so exploited in the past.

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<sup>292</sup> Hurewitz, op. cit., p. 33; and Speiser, op. cit., p. 130-131

<sup>293</sup> Quoted by Chapman, op. cit., p. 67

The business relationship and the method of operation of the oil companies considerably affect the official relationship of the Arab oil regions with the United States. By programs of education and training for Arab employees, the promoting of indigenous private enterprise, providing of fair wages and adequate family housing and cooperation with the states concerned in internal development and progress, the oil companies have won a substantial amount of goodwill for the United States. This so-called "private point IV" goes well beyond what is normally expected in an ordinary business contract. Simple courtesy, understanding and an attempt to develop mutual relations based on friendship and sincerity, without meddling in the "internal politics" of the country, has given American oil companies and consequently, the United States a deep and lasting appreciation that may do much to preserve America's future position in the Arab East.

(4) Other Powers and Arab Oil

Although prominent in Arab oil politics in the past, French influence and interest in Arab oil as a concessionaire diminished to an almost imperceptible degree by the close of World War II. Her interest today remains as that of other NATO powers, dependent on Mideast oil, one of concern for the future and trusting in the power and influence of the United States and Great Britain to keep the flow of oil constant and adequate to meet her needs. Meanwhile, she is pursuing alternate plans of her own to develop recent oil-finds in Algeria and has obtained concessions for oil rights in Libya and elsewhere in North Africa, where there exist fair-to-good-prospects of oil discovery. Her strategy is probably founded on the idea that once she has adequate amounts of oil in

near-by North Africa under her control, she can by-pass the reliance on Arab oil and avoid the uncertainties of access to the Suez Canal and sea lanes to the Arab East, plus the imponderables of Arab politics. Possibly she sees herself gaining renewed prominence and importance as an oil-supplier to Western Europe, which is so dependent on oil today.

The Soviet Union is not a concession holder for oil rights at any place in the Arab East at the present time. She is said to be the only major industrial nation today self-sufficient in oil; estimates put Russia as having an access to eight-ten per cent of the world's total oil production and this is adequate to meet her foreseeable needs.<sup>294</sup> This does not mean, however, that she is not interested or concerned with Arab oil; on the contrary, the Soviet Union is vitally interested, if only to deny the petroleum to the West. This fact was aptly demonstrated when the USSR foiled the attempts of Britain and United States to secure oil concessions in Iran in 1944.

Even though excluded from holding petroleum rights in the Arab oil states, Russia can still exercise a degree of control and influence over the flow of Arab oil to the West. For more than twenty-five per cent of the area's production moves to market through the pipe lines of IFC and TAPLINE (ARAMEO); the three IFC lines from Iraq pass through Syria to termini in Lebanon and Syria (Tripoli, Lebanon and Banias, Syria); the TAPLINE system from Saudi Arabia also runs through Syria and Jordan, and approaches within a few hundred yards of the Israeli-Syrian border. Another thirty per cent of Arab oil reaches Europe by tankers via the Suez Canal. The total amounts of oil passing through Egypt and Syria en

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<sup>294</sup> Speiser, op. cit., p. 129

route amount to more than sixty per cent of the present oil shipments. By virtue of the recent Soviet successes in establishing her influence in Syria and Egypt, she is placed in the position of potentially controlling more than half the Arab oil movements.<sup>295</sup> Perhaps, the USSR has deliberately planned to enter the sphere of Arab East politics through the vehicle of the "oil-less" Arab states inasmuch as certain rivalries and petty jealousies already existed between them and the oil areas. It is logical to assume also that the well-rooted influence of the West in the oil states would be more difficult to supplant for there has grown up a great feeling of interdependency and friendship between the Western oil companies and the proprietor-states. There is no doubt that the spectacular increase in oil wealth in Kuwait, Bahrein, Iraq and Saudi Arabia has given rise to resentment and jealousy on the part of those states that had little or no oil at all, i.e., Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Egypt. The Soviets can capitalize on this attitude by encouraging the Syrians and Egyptians to place such administrative controls and tariffs on Western oil shipments through the pipe lines or through the Canal that it would be a costly and unfavorable operation. She is likewise in a position to cut off the flow of oil through these places if and when circumstances permit. It does not appear that it will be too difficult to convince the Arabs that they should pursue such a policy, due to the already deep-rooted hatreds and resentments of the West which remain in the region. It is unlikely that Russia will try to physically exploit Arab oil because first, she does not need it, her own

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<sup>295</sup> "Western Oil Interests Get Caught in Crossfire", Business Week, p. 160+, April 21, 1956, from The Middle East in the Cold War, p. 124-125, (ed. Grant S. McClelland), H.W. Wilson Company, New York, 1956



resources are adequate;<sup>296</sup> secondly, if she has indirect political controls through indigenous Arab leaders, she can accomplish her objectives of denying oil to the West without implicating herself. Ultimately, with the recession of Western influence, Russia may attempt to seize control of Arab Eastern oil.

Russian interests and designs on the Middle and Arab East existed long before the presence of oil gave the area new strategic meaning. The geo-political position of the Middle East is still the dominant factor in the Soviet point of view; the original interest in the area has not in any way diminished. Moreover, the presence of oil in large quantities only acts as a stimulus to extend Soviet control to this area for a number of reasons, including:<sup>297</sup> (1) An extension of their span of control would provide a defensive "buffer zone" for Soviet oil fields in the Caucasus, still their most productive fields; (2) Actual and potential Western air bases would be eliminated by such an expansion, improving general security of the Soviet Union; (3) New wealth would accrue to the Soviet Union from acquisition of the rich oil fields of Iraq, Iran, the Persian Gulf and the Arabian peninsula; the control of this oil would theoretically be used to establish Soviet control of the Indian Ocean as far as East Africa and India; (4) Oil supplies to Western Europe could be cut off; possibly causing NATO to become weak and ineffective; (5) Present Arab East oil fields are largely unprotected and tempt the Soviet to act direct or indirectly, to seize them for her own strategic ends. Arab East states

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<sup>296</sup> Hoskins, H.L., op. cit., p. 225; estimates place oil reserves of USSR between 165-195 billion barrels, twice that of the United States.

<sup>297</sup> Ibid., p. 229-230

would be expected to offer no more than token resistance and allied ground forces would probably not intervene if aggression was carried out by a satellite-Arab state -- if the allies did intervene, they would probably arrive too late to save the oil fields and would be faced with Soviet intervention as well.

It is improbable that the Soviet Union envisages bringing the oil of the Arab East to Russia in that she, at the present time, already possesses petroleum from within her own borders and her Eastern-European satellites sufficient to meet her needs. Likewise, the shipment of oil from the region would pose a tremendous problem since the construction of pipe lines over extremely rugged terrain to the Caspian Sea would be a difficult and arduous undertaking; shipment by ocean tanker from the Persian Gulf or the Mediterranean termini of pipe lines already in existence would necessarily presume her full control of the Mediterranean and Turkish Straits.<sup>298</sup>

In the absence of any direct attempt by the USSR to take over Arab oil in the future, there may be strong encouragement for nationalization of oil industries, which would serve an immediate Soviet interest, i.e., that of lessening or eradicating Western influences in the area. After nationalization occurs, the continued shipments of oil to Western Europe would be less dependable inasmuch as the whim of the supplier-nation could turn the flow on or off; this would be a splendid opportunity for the USSR to work behind the scenes ostensibly for Arab national interests, but at the same time, to promote her own interests.

It would be folly of the most extreme to presume that the USSR does not fully realize the worth of Arab East oil to NATO and the free

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298 Ibid

nations of the world. In the struggle for power of today and that which lies ahead, it can be certain that the Middle East and Arab East oil fields are a primary target for the Soviet Union.

C. Oil and the Arabs

The discovery of vast oil deposits in the Arab East has brought those oil-bearing regions greater prominence in world politics and broaches new security problems for them. The fickleness of oil discovery has resulted ironically in giving the oil wealth of the Arab East to the countries least-developed and least-populated. Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrein and Qatar are the recipients of a tremendous wealth, whereas Syria, Lebanon and Jordan derive only a small return from pipe line and refinery concessions. Egypt, also, takes her relatively smaller share from Canal tolls of oil tankers. This has given rise to a feeling of deprivation and resentment among the non-oil states, which need capital for internal development and progress; the spendthriftness, graft and lavish personal luxury-spending of the rulers in the oil countries has been repugnant to the more enlightened Arabs who see this wealth as a means of industrialization, modernization and raising the standards of living of the masses. Countries like Egypt have to import fairly large quantities of oil for their domestic needs.<sup>299</sup> In the general scheme of Arab unity most educated Arabs feel that the wealth of the Arab fatherland should be used to aid the entire region and should be a source of strength in bringing all Arab states together. One such plan has been proposed by Emile Bustani, Lebanese businessman-politician, who suggests the formation of an Arab Development Bank to be financed through a ten

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<sup>299</sup> Ibid, p. 212-213

per cent revenue on the gross profits of all Arab oil production, and dedicated to social development projects in oil-transit Arab states.<sup>300</sup> However, the oil states feel they need the money derived from oil royalties to develop their own economies first before extending a helping hand to their brother Arabs.

There has, however, been some inter-Arab financial help offered by the oil states. For example, Iraq has supported the Jordanian National Guard prior to the formation of the Federated Arab State, and Saudi Arabia made up a part of the subsidy to Jordan formerly paid by Great Britain before 1956. Saudi Arabia used her oil money other ways as well, i.e., to buy influence in Arab politics in Syria, Lebanon and Egypt. For the most part, however, the oil regions have kept the money in their own pockets.

This wealth has been put to good use in a few cases and is deserving of mention. Iraq, for example, has since 1952 embarked on a special internal development program, using seventy per cent of her oil income to bring about new sources of power, industries, communications, and to provide improvements in irrigation and flood-control. In Kuwait, its ruler, Sheik Ahmad ibn Jabir al-Sabbah, inaugurated a program of social and civic development in 1946, laying the foundations for a welfare state. His successor, Sheik Abdullah ibn Salim al-Sabbah, continued and expanded elaborate and costly development programs largely concerned with education, health and fresh water. There has been some progress on a lesser scale in Bahrein with some development of social and economic progress; the ruler, Sheik Sulman ibn Hamad al-Khalifah, began development

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<sup>300</sup> Bustani, Emile, Doubts and Dynamite, p. 140-145, London, Allan Wingate, 1958

of its governmental structure during World War II but did not consider elaborate plans after it was definitely established Bahrein's petroleum resources were of minor size. In Saudi Arabia developments have included: the construction of the Riyadh-Dammam railroad, the creation of a new deep water port at Dammam, improvement of communications, construction of schools and medical facilities and the improvement of public utilities.<sup>301</sup> Sizeable amounts were also spent for maintenance, repairs and improvements to the holy places in Medina and Mecca; likewise, Saudi Arabia has abolished the head-tax for pilgrims to Mecca, long a major source of revenue.

The non-oil states of the Arab East, however, are in a position to control over fifty per cent of the flow of petroleum from the oil areas inasmuch as pipe lines and the Suez Canal are in their hands. The financial returns from pipe line revenues have been small in comparison to what the oil states derive in royalties from production; noting how the oil-states have managed to increase their royalty rates from time to time, the pipe line states have recently begun to insist on greater revenues to themselves. The idea of nationalization of pipe lines is not far removed from the current thinking in many of these regions. Egypt and Syria of the UAR are now in a position to assume almost complete control of all oil to Mediterranean ports, being in commercial control of the Suez Canal and the pipe lines that pass through their territories. Such controls and tariffs could be imposed as to seriously impede transportation of petroleum and reduce profits to a non-attractive figure, possibly inhibiting the desire of Western companies to expand or even continue their Arab East oil operations. The fact that there exists no over-all authority with super-

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<sup>301</sup> Middle East Oil Development, op. cit., p. 15-16

visory and regulatory powers that can guarantee a reasonable and fair business arrangement between the oil companies and these states may seriously limit future oil developments in the area.<sup>302</sup>

In the oil states as well, oil operations have become more hazardous for Western companies than in the past; the fifty-fifty profit-sharing contract that was such an innovation just a few years ago is becoming unacceptable. The Saudi Arabian government in December, 1957, concluded an oil concession agreement with the Japanese on the basis of a 56-44 per cent sharing of profits; this and even more favorable terms will prove to be the pattern of the future. The Japanese had already approached Kuwait with a similar contract in the same month.<sup>303</sup> It is only natural that each of the oil areas want to derive as much gain as possible from their natural resources. However, the rising costs of taxation, the costs of materials and labor, the costs of training skilled labor, providing housing and medical facilities and the necessity of re-investing a substantial amount of the profits gained into further exploration and expansion, coupled with the growth of political hazards in the Arab East, are making oil operations seem less and less attractive to the Western companies.<sup>304</sup> There may soon come a day when the present

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<sup>302</sup> Hoskins, H.L., *op. cit.*, p. 212-213. This has placed a new emphasis on the employment of super tankers to transport oil by sea and includes plans to by-pass the Suez Canal.

<sup>303</sup> Lindley, E.K., "Statesman with a Mission", *Newsweek*, p. 16, December 23, 1957; and *The Daily Star*, Beirut, Lebanon, December 28, 1957

<sup>304</sup> Hoskins, H.L., *op. cit.*, p. 208. (For example, ARAMCO has been under pressure by the Saudis to refine and market its own oil; this would place ARAMCO in competition with its American owners, cost enormous sums and reduce profits.)

concessionaires will welcome nationalization from a commercial point of view and would be happy to get out from under these many headaches.

Certainly there have been numerous advantages brought to the Arabs of the oil-bearing areas as a direct or indirect result of oil operations. The tremendous income brought to their otherwise poor and underdeveloped countries has provided a base for economic reforms and internal development. The oil companies have been responsible for the growth of a new and rising middle class, a vast army of skilled and semi-skilled workers, which in most cases had to be first taught a basic education. The companies have been responsible for the introduction of sanitation and health measures, providing of medical facilities, workers' and family housing projects, encouragement of private enterprise, improved diets, recreation and sports programs, and have succeeded in raising wages and the general standard of living for the affected areas. In most all cases, they have maintained friendly community relationships and assisted in the promotion and development of local projects that would benefit the peoples of the community. As a matter of courtesy to migrating desert tribes, the water points along the pipe lines are offered to the Bedouin tribes to water their flocks in transit; semi-permanent camps even grow up along side these places for nothing is so rare as water in a desert; in effect these desert communities have become wards of the uncomplaining company.<sup>305</sup>

#### D. Oil and the Security of the Arab East

In view of the foregoing discussion it may be concluded that the

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<sup>305</sup> Ibid., p. 220. There is no doubt that the oil companies create goodwill and insure greater protection for their pipe line at the same time.

continued flow of oil to Western Europe is vital to the security of the free world and hence, no less vital to the security of the Arab East. The United States is pledged to insure the delivery of Arab oil to the West; she has declared her intention not to permit it to stop.

Likewise, Great Britain has avowed that she will not release her oil holdings in the Persian Gulf, nor does she seem willing to change her methods of retaining control by forceful means. Instead, she will probably attempt to expand her operations in the contested areas such as Buraimi, Muscat and Oman, which is bound to bring on renewed frictions and strife. It may well invite the intervention of a third force, perhaps the direct interference of the UAR which is seeking to assist Arab areas struggling for their independence, and hopes to add oil-rich lands to her meager economy. Backed by the Soviet Union she can exert a tremendous force in the future.

The Soviet Union is no less interested in the Arab East oil than the other powers. She has good reason to want control of Middle Eastern oil and recognizes its strategic importance. The effective entrance of the Russians into Arab politics since 1955 points up the possibilities of a keen struggle for the possession of control of Mideast oil. She may not have to enter the scene directly if she can obtain her objectives by not committing herself, but instead working through Arab nationalist forces, such as the UAR or similar movements with similar motives. Her first aim is to eliminate Western control, then, if possible, deny Western markets petroleum deliveries or, perhaps better yet, institute an "oil-blackmail" by which she can influence the situation so that oil will or will not be shipped at her discretion.



In the event of any all-out aggression in the Middle East, the oil resources should probably be written-off. They are remote from NATO concentrations of power; they are accessible to land forces and within easy bombing range of any potential aggressor. They cannot be easily defended and surely not by air power alone. Armed forces in the Middle East could offer no more than token resistance. Hence, any strategic considerations that depend upon Middle Eastern oil in a large-scale war (i.e., in contrast to a "localized war"), are resting on a false base.

Even in peace-time the total dependency of Western Europe and the NATO strategy on Middle East oil is a flimsy structure and in need of serious re-evaluation. In view of the nationalistic trends and new political forces at work in the area, the availability of petroleum at all times from this region is jeopardized considerably. Any over-all plans for the security of the free nations, economic as well as military, cannot depend on such a hopeful concept. Alternate measures must be taken, probably at considerable costs, to provide for this deficiency; this may include: location of vast new oil deposits, accessible and adequate to meet West European needs; establishment of large-scale synthetic processing of coal or oil shales, and the development of new sources of cheap substitute power, possibly nuclear or others yet to be discovered.<sup>306</sup>

Notwithstanding the importance of the above, the security of the Arab East is bound-up with the security of its oil as strategic considerations of the major powers, for the tendency of democratic countries is not to undergo such costly operations to find alternatives when there is an easier choice. Because of its oil, the Arab East seems marked for future conflicts in the struggle to control it.

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<sup>306</sup> Ibid., p. 231

PALESTINE AS A FACTOR AFFECTING THE SECURITY OF THE ARAB EAST

A. Origins of the Palestine Problem

(1) Prior to World War II

A major factor in the security considerations for the Arab East is obviously the problem of Palestine. To understand this dilemma more clearly a brief background sketch on its origins is necessary.

Ever since the diaspora, the Jewish people have kept before them a hope to return to the land of their historical greatness, Zion, or Palestine.<sup>307</sup> In their religious songs and literature this theme constantly appeared; it was their fervent hope and theory that the Messiah would return to lead them triumphantly back to their native land. The idea of forceful return was nowhere present for it was to be a divine thing and any attempt to further the idea of return to Zion by human endeavor was thought to be blasphemy.<sup>308</sup> However, this feeling was gradually overcome and with the rejuvenation of the Zionist idea under Theodore Herzl, founder of modern Zionism (1896), Palestine became a target for eventual peaceful colonization under the protection of some great power. Britain ultimately became that benefactor to establish a Jewish national home in Palestine. Herzl envisioned the establishment of a Jewish state and developed the theory and organization of it. He opposed any process of gradual immigration and colonization but sought to obtain rights in Palestine or elsewhere to establish, by mass immigration, the new Jewish state under the guarantee

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<sup>307</sup> Lillienthal, Alfred M., What Price Israel?, p. 2, Henry Regnery Company, Chicago, 1953

<sup>308</sup> Singer, I., Jewish Encyclopedia, Zionism, Funk & Company, New York, 1901

of the major powers that would protect it and insure its existence.<sup>309</sup> Zionist leaders that followed Herzl were not content to wait for the powers to provide such guarantees so in conjunction with the pursuit of that Zionist objective they began a wide-scale program of land-purchase, colonization and development in the Palestine area. After Herzl's death (1904) Zionist's leadership subsequently passed to Dr. Chaim Weizmann, an energetic scientist-politician whose dynamic personality and sincere persuasive manner won favor and wide-support for the Zionist cause with the statesmen and politicians of the major powers. By the time of World War I (1914-1918) he had succeeded in gaining a strong influence with responsible British officials. His fame as a chemist and his contribution to developing new and important chemical compounds enhanced his chances to win political objectives. He became the real leader and political genius of the Zionist organization and was later to become first president of the Jewish state.<sup>310</sup>

In 1917, the British government, in order to win Jewish support against the Central powers at a crucial time in the conduct of military operations and perhaps in gratitude for Dr. Weizmann's discoveries, announced the Balfour Declaration of November 2, 1917, in which "His Majesty's government view with favor the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people and will use their best endeavors to facilitate the achievement of this objective, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious

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<sup>309</sup> Herzl, Theodore, The Jewish State, p. 81, American Zionist Emergency Council, New York, 1946

<sup>310</sup> Gottheil, R., The History of Zionism, Jewish Publication Society, New York, 1914

rights of existing non-Jewish communities (i.e., Arabs) in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country".<sup>311</sup>

This announcement was contradictory to earlier British promises to the Arabs in the McMahon Papers (1915-1916), which envisaged an Arab nation under King Hussein, the Sharif of Mecca.<sup>312</sup> Such expedients, however, have typified British policy in the past when it was necessary to gain an immediate short-term benefit. The British never seriously challenged the Arab contention that Palestine had been included in the pledge to King Hussein and in January, 1918, a special envoy, Commander Hogarth, was sent to assure King Hussein after the announcement of the Balfour Declaration that Jewish settlement would only be allowed insofar as it would be consistent with the political and economic freedom of the Arabs.<sup>313</sup>

When peace settlements at San Remo in 1920 placed Palestine in mandatory status under the British, there were said to be two principal objectives to the arrangement. First, the League of Nations envisioned Great Britain as the logical power to implement the Balfour Declaration; secondly, Great Britain was anxious to hold such a strategic bit of

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<sup>311</sup> Davis, Helen, M., Constitutions, Electoral Laws  
Treaties of States in the Near and Middle East,  
p. 217, Duke University Press, Durham, North  
Carolina, 1947 (revised edition)

<sup>312</sup> Sir Henry McMahon's second note to Sharif Hussein, Cairo, October 24, 1915; (McMahon Correspondence -- annex to es-Said, Nuri, "Arab Independence and Unity, p. 5). Great Britain declared to King Hussein: "that subject to certain modifications (which included Mersin, Alexandretta and portions of Syria lying to the west of Damascus-Homs-Allepo), Great Britain is prepared to recognize and uphold the independence of the Arabs in all regions lying within the frontiers proposed by the Sharif of Mecca."

<sup>313</sup> Morrison, S.A., Middle East Survey, p. 18,  
SCM Press, London, 1954

territory as Palestine as it provided her with a military stronghold to protect the Suez Canal from the north and gave her protected land-routes to India and Mesopotamia (in that she also had ultimate control of adjoining Transjordan and Iraq). The Arabs were quite naturally bitterly disappointed at being placed in a mandatory status and being denied their promised full independence, for in 1918 a joint French-British mandatory declaration had stated it was the main aim of the two powers to establish national governments in Iraq and Syria which would derive their authority from the initiative and full choice of the indigenous population. Further, the assurance of America's President Wilson that the post-war settlement was to be based on "the free acceptance of that settlement by the people immediately concerned, and not on the basis of any other nation or people for the sake of its own exterior influence or mastery",<sup>314</sup> removed any doubts the Arabs may have had concerning their future. The self-interests of the powers prevailed and the cause for which the Arab revolt was fought was not realized; the Arabs' confidence in British and French policy was so shaken by that post-war settlement that it never fully recovered thereafter.

The mandate for Palestine of July 24, 1922, promulgated by the League of Nations, placed on Great Britain the responsibility of carrying out the Balfour Declaration, in that the principal allied powers had all agreed to it. The mandate recognized the historical connection of the Jewish people with Palestine and the grounds for establishing their national home there. It further established a Jewish Agency to advise and cooperate with the mandatory government in the interests of the Jewish

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<sup>314</sup> Ibid, p. 18-20. (President Wilson quoted by Morrison)

people and the establishment of the Jewish national home. The mandatory power was directed to facilitate Jewish immigration and land settlement and at the same time was to ensure the rights and position of the Arab population were not prejudiced.<sup>315</sup> Arab resentments and apprehensions became immediately apparent; not only did they object to the mandate because of their understandable desire to achieve independent rule, but now they feared that the establishment of a Jewish national home might ultimately completely deprive them of any chance for independence. In 1920 there were but 65,000 Jews in Palestine against a total population of 648,000, mostly Arabs; even up until 1939 the Jewish population was never greater than thirty per cent of the total and during World War II this ratio remained fairly constant.<sup>316</sup> It appeared to the Arabs that the purpose of the mandate was to establish and care for the minority at the expense of the majority. There was constant friction and the Arabs never fully accepted the growing Jewish population as any thing but intruders. It had been presumed that national, political and administrative institutions would be established largely controlled by the Palestinians, Arab and Jew alike, but Great Britain as the mandatory found herself in a perplexing predicament, unable to carry out these implications of the mandate. The Arabs were unwilling to approve any special political status for Jews beyond what would be their normal rights as citizens of a country governed by majority rule.<sup>317</sup> This conflicted

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<sup>315</sup> Davis, op. cit., Mandate for Palestine, p. 209-211

<sup>316</sup> Cook, Hedley V., Challenge and Response in the Middle East, Harper Bros., New York, 1952

<sup>317</sup> Nathan, Robert R., Gass, Oscar and Greamer, Daniel, Palestine, Problem and Promise, p. 75, Public Affairs Press, Washington, D.C., 1946

with the Zionist idea and the intent of the Balfour Declaration that the Jewish community should enjoy a life built on Jewish cultural patterns without the necessity of conforming to alien ideas on social, economic, philosophical and cultural lines. There were wide social, cultural and economic gaps between Jew and Arab; likewise, the Zionists were too impatient and enthusiastic for a rapid development of a national home to wait until those (social, cultural and economic) gaps would be closed. Neither would they wait until they achieved a greater proportion of the population. The mandatory government was never able to solve this problem.<sup>318</sup>

The Jews in Palestine, however, anxious to establish some sort of going concern as a future government structure, set up quasi-governmental structures on their own; these leaders ruled the Jewish community in most aspects of administration and controls to include conscription and taxation. The general assembly of the Knesseth, an elective legislative body, also came into being; the executive council of this assembly, known as Vaad Leumi, enforced the legislative acts and supervised Jewish education, public health and welfare activities. These two organizations were officially recognized by the mandatory. In purely Jewish communities a local government, approved by the general assembly, received official recognition.<sup>319</sup> Hence, the Zionists were well-organized and looking ahead for the day when they would expand their national home idea into a separate and sovereign state.

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<sup>318</sup> Cooke, op. cit., p. 203-204

<sup>319</sup> Ibid., p. 204

To forestall Arab fears regarding the Jewish position in Palestine and to clarify the somewhat vague phraseology of the Balfour Declaration, Great Britain published White Papers in 1922, 1930 and 1939, declaring that it was not a part of British policy that Palestine shall become a Jewish state. Winston Churchill as Colonial Secretary assured the Arabs that a Jewish national home did not mean a "Jewish government" to dominate Arabs. "We cannot tolerate the expropriation of one set of people by the other."<sup>320</sup> In 1939 the British had declared: "(1) The objective of His Majesty's government is the establishment, within ten years, of an independent Palestine state in treaty relations with Great Britain. (2) The independent state should be one in which Arab and Jew share in government, in such a way as to insure that the essential interests of each community are safe-guarded".<sup>321</sup> The White Paper of 1939 limited the Jewish national home to the Jewish communities then present in Palestine plus 75,000 additional Jews who would be allowed to settle in Palestine during the five year period 1939-1944. This meant by 1944 that the Jews would constitute about one-third the population and thereafter remain a permanent minority. The British government declared that by 1944 she would consider her pledge of the Balfour Declaration fulfilled and a Jewish national home in Palestine established. However, the Permanent Mandates Commission of the League of Nations decided in June, 1939, that the proposal of Britain to set up an Arab state with a Jewish minority was contrary to the interpretation which had always been placed on the

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<sup>320</sup> Hymanson, Albert, M., Palestine: A Policy, p. 112, Methuen, London, 1942 (from Lilienthal, *op. cit.*, p. 25)

<sup>321</sup> Quoted by es-Said, Nuri, *op. cit.*, p. 17



mandate. Britain replied that it had been found impracticable to form both an independent Arab state and an independent Jewish state but that "one of the possibilities which the mandatory power had in view is the establishment of a federal constitution".<sup>322</sup>

The British government, perplexed at the impossible situation of satisfying two conflicting nationalisms, and experiencing one bloody outbreak after another between Arab and Jew, sent commission after commission to study the situation and make recommendations. The Shaw commission in 1929 and the Peel commission in 1936 underscored the inconsistent objectives of Arab nationalism and the establishment of a Jewish national home; a struggle between two nationalisms was inevitable. This was further complicated by the fact that nowhere in the world in the period between World War I and World War II was nationalism more intense or more deeply-seated than in Palestine.<sup>323</sup> British policy vacillated first in one direction then in the other, depending upon where the pressure was coming from, Arab or Jew.

## (2) World War II and After

By the time of World War II, leadership in the Zionist organization had passed from Great Britain to the United States. Nazi Germany's policy of persecuting and exterminating the Jews and United States' pressure forced Britain to admit more Jews to Palestine contrary to the terms of the 1939 White Paper. In 1942, the Zionists held their

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<sup>322</sup> es-Said, Nuri, op. cit., p. 9; Nuri es-Said suggested a unitary state or special status for the Jews (enclaves) similar to the position of the Maronite Christians in the Ottoman Empire.

<sup>323</sup> Morrison, op. cit., p. 33-34

now famous meeting in New York, termed the "Biltmore Conference"; by this time they had become convinced that the only solution of their problem would be by the establishment of a Jewish state; the program demanded Palestine be a Jewish commonwealth with unlimited Jewish immigration under control of the Jewish Agency.<sup>324</sup> Palestine, itself, was a very unstable area just prior to the outbreak of the Second World War; it was a vital area in its strategic location. With the advent of war, internal unrest was temporarily subordinated to the larger cause of defense of the free world. The Jews took an active part in the war in aiding the allies; some thirty thousand having served with allied forces in Africa and the Middle East. The industrial facilities of the Zionist organization also gave considerable valuable help to the British. The Arab population of Palestine on the other hand, was largely indifferent to the issues of the war and showed no desire to take an active part in it; the Arabs were the true neutrals of World War II.<sup>325</sup> No doubt that the military experience of the Jews during World War II plus their opportunity to build up their underground organization, Haganah, and along with it a cache of arms for the future, all helped immeasurably to turn the tide against the Arabs in the fighting which ensued in 1947-1948.

United States' sympathies for European refugees and displaced persons of World War II ran high. Recalling the persecution suffered by the Jews and their unsuccessful attempts to reach Palestine during the war years (the Patria-1940, the Struma-1942, and the S.S. Exodus), President Truman, in August, 1945, requested that Great Britain issue 100,000

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<sup>324</sup> Ibid., p. 35; and Lillienthal, op. cit., p. 31

<sup>325</sup> Hoskins, H.L., op. cit., p. 102-103

certificates of immigration to Palestine to alleviate the refugee situation; an Anglo-American committee of inquiry on Palestine likewise affirmed the recommendation. However, the end of the war did not improve conditions for the British mandatory government. There followed a period marked by the lack of any long-term, constructive British policy and increased Arab-Israeli violence. The Jews encouraged and strengthened by their experience during the war-years sought to make political capital of it and increased their demands on the mandatory. Early in 1947 the British government made a last attempt to conciliate between Arab and Zionist positions, proposing admission of 4,000 Jewish immigrants for two years and future admissions to depend on the absorptive capacity of the country. The Jews turned this offer down along with the proposal of 100,000 Jewish refugees for they felt strong enough to ask for more and on a continuing basis; they demanded open immigration settlement and ultimate statehood.<sup>326</sup>

The British dilemma in Palestine after the war was in the problem of readjusting her foreign policy to the changing political situation and increased Arab-Jewish outbreaks of violence; although the British were favorable to Zionist aspirations and considered the mandate to be outmoded, at the same time they felt the retention of British control in Palestine was essential to their strategic interests. It was apparent that Egypt was going to terminate British naval and air base concessions and eventually take over controls of the Suez Canal. Haifa seemed to offer the best substitute for the loss of Alexandria as a naval base. The location of British troops in Palestine could effectively influence the situation in Transjordan as well. Britain was also becoming aware of the existence

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<sup>326</sup> Ibid., p. 103; and Lillienthal, op. cit., p. 28, 32 and 50

of a Soviet threat to the Middle East and realized that she could not alone protect the routes to the East which were now taking on new importance. The United States was her logical partner to assist in arriving at a solution in the Palestine situation. Hence, in December, 1945, an Anglo-American commission of inquiry was established and it subsequently investigated and reported its findings and recommendations, which envisioned the establishment of a unitary state under international guarantee and called for the issuing of entrance certificates to Palestine for 100,000 Jews who had been victims of Nazi and Facist persecution. The committee had concluded that Palestine alone could never meet Jewish immigration needs and that United States and Britain, in association with other countries, must find new homes for the displaced persons; the Zionists violently opposed this view, and insisted nothing less than Jewish statehood would be acceptable.<sup>327</sup> The committee findings had little effect on settlement of Arab-Jewish differences which by this time degenerated into a more or less covert civil war as both sides had armed and organized themselves semi-militarily. Almost 500,000 new Jewish immigrants had come into Palestine by the end of World War II. During the war the British had given arms and equipment to the Jews for their own self-defense against the threat of approaching Nazi German forces. A goodly amount of this military equipment remained hidden away to arm the Haganah once the fighting had begun in earnest.<sup>328</sup> Terrorist activities of the Irgun Zuai Leumi and the Stern gang fought the British as well as the Arabs, bombing government buildings and installations; Stern gang members even assassin-

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<sup>327</sup> Ibid., p. 103-104; and Lillienthal, op. cit., p. 30-31

<sup>328</sup> Lillienthal, op. cit., p. 39-40

ated the British Minister of State for the Middle East, Lord Moyne, in November, 1944.

By 1947 the situation had become intolerable; the British as mandatory were no longer able to control the situation even with 90,000 troops employed to do so. The problem clearly called for international intervention. The Zionists were more violent and uncooperative than ever, insisting on a Jewish majority to secure a Jewish state; the British were adamant on not changing their former policy of limited Jewish immigration. The Arabs were fighting both the British and the Jews and demanding an independent state of Palestine. The Anglo-Arab conferences in September, 1946-January, 1947, ended in failure.

The Bevin plan (of Britain's Foreign Minister, Ernest Bevin), which called for semi-autonomous Arab and Jewish control for a five year period and the admission into Palestine of 100,000 displaced persons, was rejected by both parties; hence, Britain announced it was not her intention to enforce any plan. Further outbreaks of violence followed and when the Jewish Agency refused to cooperate with mandatory authorities in action against terrorists, Britain decided to give up any further attempts at reaching a peaceful solution. In February, 1947, the British Foreign Secretary announced the entire Palestine issue would be turned over to the United Nations.<sup>329</sup>

A special session of the United Nations General Assembly convened on April 28, 1947, to consider Palestine and resulted in the appointment of a committee to investigate the Palestine situation and report to the regular session of the United Nations General Assembly to be held in

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<sup>329</sup> Ibid., p. 42-43

September, 1947. The committee majority opinion recommended in November, 1947, the partition of Palestine into a Jewish and an Arab state as the only practicable solution but since the size and resources of each unit would make economic survival difficult, economic union of the two states was also proposed. Neither the Jews or the Arabs found this plan acceptable and local warfare broke out. Britain, discouraged with this unhappy situation and unwilling to jeopardize its then Arab policy, refused to be a party to the enforcement of any settlement not equally acceptable to both the Jews and the Arabs. She announced her decision to withdraw her troops and terminate the mandate by May 15, 1948.

While Great Britain went ahead with plans to evacuate Palestine and the United Nations pondered over proposals to establish a temporary United Nations trusteeship in Palestine, Zionist leaders were meeting hurriedly to forestall the imposing of any new controls on the area. Few Palestinian Arabs believed that Great Britain actually intended to withdraw, leaving such a state of chaos and anarchy in her wake. The United Nations General Assembly, after much serious debate and a tremendous amount of international politics and external pressures, passed the Partition Resolution on November 29, 1947. The day before Great Britain was to surrender her mandate, Zionist leaders in Tel Aviv proclaimed the establishment of an independent state of Israel in the area allocated the Jews in the United Nations partition plan. The President of the United States, even without informing the American delegation to the United Nations General Assembly, promptly announced United States' de facto recognition of the new state on May 15, 1948.<sup>330</sup> This was contrary to the

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<sup>330</sup> Hoskins, H.L., op. cit., p. 104-105

official United States' Department of State position which had just issued a statement endorsing United Nation trusteeship as the only way to prevent bloodshed. In fact at the time of official United States' recognition of Israel, American representatives were still proposing trusteeship for Palestine.<sup>331</sup> The United States action seemed hasty and bewildered her allies, particularly Great Britain which had voted against partition and continued to oppose it; the lack of coordination and consistency in policies pursued by the Department of State and the Executive tended to make the United States appear immature and irresponsible. The United States' decision to give early recognition to Israel was said to have been snap judgement and possessed political overtures, for 1948 was an election year. Three days after the American recognition of Israel, the Soviet Union followed with de jure recognition of the new nation. Other states joined in as well, although many including Great Britain decided to await the outcome of the Arab-Israeli War that had already begun.<sup>332</sup>

#### B. The Crisis and the Aftermath

##### (1) The Arab-Israeli Wars of 1947-1948

Following the United Nations partition resolution in November, the Arab states challenged the validity of the United Nations action from a legal point of view, charging that the General Assembly had no authority to make a binding decision (according to United Nations Charter) but only a recommendation. In February, 1948, the Arab Higher Committee

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<sup>331</sup> Lillienthal, op. cit., p. 83-86. Twenty-four hours after President Truman's recognition of Israel, the Department of State received a cable from the provisional government of Israel requesting United States' recognition.

<sup>332</sup> Ibid., passim, p. 80-87; and Hoskins, H.L., op. cit., p. 105

emphasized: "Any attempt to establish a Jewish state in Arab territory is an act of oppression which will be resisted in self-defense by force".<sup>333</sup>

Armed detachments of Arabs recruited from neighboring states had already begun to enter Palestine and undertook a campaign against Jewish settlements. Casualties ran over 2,500 by February and grew as the days passed on. When British forces withdrew and the Jewish state was proclaimed the fighting broke out in earnest; the armies of five Arab states (Syria, Lebanon, Transjordan, Iraq and Egypt) invaded Palestine to prevent by force the implementation of the partition resolution. The United Nations General Assembly called on the Security Council to restore order, which seemed a stupendous undertaking. The fighting continued intermittently throughout 1948; the Arabs in spite of their superior numbers suffered a series of severe set-backs and demonstrated a lack of organization, unity and esprit. The Jews on the other hand, fighting for their very existence, had an ardent zeal for fighting and an élan that was incomparable.

Mr. Musa Alami in his book, The Lesson of Palestine, explains that the Jews conducted the war with a coordinated organization, a unified command, and total conscription, whereas the Arabs displayed only disunity, no single command or authority, a diversity of plans, and most important of all, a lack of heart for fighting and winning the war. The Arab armies put the blame for their battlefield failures on their own politicians who had declared war without making proper plans or adequate preparations. There were scandals, too, of war profiteering, and accusations brought against King Farouk of Egypt and his advisors for having made fortunes

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<sup>333</sup> Hurewitz, op. cit., p. 336; and Leonard, L.L., "The United Nations and Palestine", p. 650, International Conciliation, October, 1949, New York



from the purchase of defective armaments.<sup>334</sup> These incidents were to have a resounding effect on the internal security and stability of governments in Syria and Egypt. Coups d'etat followed in Syria in 1949, 1950 and 1952, and a bloodless coup was to bring down Egypt's King in 1952; all had their origins in the failures of the Palestine war and various facets of that dilemma.

The United Nations mediator, Count Folke Bernadotte, was successful in arranging a truce during a lull in the fighting which went into effect on June 11; however, neither side was ready to accept a final political settlement or an armistice, hence mediation proposals were rejected. The lull had provided the Israelis with desperately needed war materials from Italy and Czechoslovakia. When the warfare was resumed the Jewish army took the initiative and made wide gains. A stalemate in the fighting ensued and a second truce grew out of the stalemate; a United Nations warning was made on July 15, 1948, that it would interfere by force to establish the peace. General hostilities had ceased but both sides continued to violate the truce; the Israelis' dissatisfaction with truce lines was greater than the Arabs. Gradually, the Jews added more territory to their control; the Negeb in October, 1948, central Galilee, and occupied a portion of south-east Lebanon. By December of 1948, Israeli offensives had crossed into the Egyptian borders. Unsettled conditions throughout the Arab states' home governments, plus their acknowledged failure, induced the Arabs to sue for at least a temporary

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<sup>334</sup> Morrison, op. cit., p. 38; and Zurayk, Constantine K., The Meaning of the Disaster, p. 26, Beirut, Khayat's College Book Cooperative, 1956; and Glubb, Sir John Bagot, Lieutenant-General, A Soldier with the Arabs, p. 79, 96, 198-202, 210-211, 217, 227, 240-244, London, Hodder and Stoughton, 1957

peace and to agree to armistice negotiations.<sup>335</sup>

The first armistice agreement was signed on February 24, 1949, between Egypt and Israel on the Island of Rhodes, brought about through the patience, skill and understanding of Dr. Ralph Bunche, United Nations mediator. (He had replaced Count Bernadotte, who was assassinated on September 17, 1948, by Jewish terrorists for advocating a change in partition boundaries, assigning Negeb to the proposed Arab state.) Similar agreements followed between Israel and Lebanon on March 22 and with Transjordan (Jordan) and Israel on April 3. Lastly, Israel and Syria concluded armistice terms on July 20, 1949. Iraq never signed an armistice agreement but stated it would accept the armistice terms agreeable to Israel's immediate Arab neighbors. Saudi Arabia, wary of formal contracts, likewise declined to participate in a final settlement but the Saudis agreed to abide by any decision which might be adopted by the Arab League. The agreements did not bring about a state of peace or improve Arab-Jewish relationships; they remained armistice agreements only. The United Nations Organization is still concerned with efforts to make a final peace settlement.<sup>336</sup> In December, 1949, a United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine was appointed (France, United States, Turkey are the members), and instructed to assist both parties and "to achieve a final settlement of all questions between them". The commission has failed to bring about any settlement primarily because it for a very long time regarded its primary function as that of good offices, i.e., persuasion of the parties

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<sup>335</sup> Hurewitz, J.C., "The United Nations and Palestine", p. 97-98, The Near East and the Great Powers, (ed. Richard N. Frye), Harvard Press, Cambridge, Mass. 1951

<sup>336</sup> Ibid., p. 98-100; and Hoskins, H.L., op. cit., p. 107

to treat with each other directly, instead of conciliations; that is, not only bringing the parties together for negotiation but also taking an active part and assisting them in arriving at agreements. It has been said that the commission tended to be timid when it should have been bold and was obdurate when it should have been flexible. The junior members of the commission, Turkey and France, looked for America to take the lead, but its appeal for guidance has been in vain due to the vacillating attitude of America's policy toward the Jews and the Arabs. The American government has alternated its sympathies and favors between the Jews and Arabs, and has followed an inconsistent policy that was not independent of her allied interests. The commission's work suffered additional setbacks when the United States appointed four successive representatives to it in less than a year, being unable to find a qualified individual willing to devote himself to this important work. (The first representative resigned before reaching the area; the second man left after initial opening contacts were made, and the third remained but a few months.) A career diplomat was finally assigned to assure no further loss of time. However, even with the commission activities finally underway, there was really little hope to reach a permanent and lasting settlement because: (1) the Arabs insist the refugee question has absolute priority as a pre-requisite to settlement of any other question; (2) the Israelis are adamant in their view that the refugee question be included only as a part of an over-all settlement; (3) the Arabs refuse to have direct contact with Israel or to deal with the commission except as a group; (4) Israel presses for direct meeting with the Arabs, preferably with each Arab state separately.<sup>337</sup>

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<sup>337</sup> Ibid., p. 101-103

(2) Creation of the Arab Refugee Problem

At the beginning of the Arab-Israeli War there were 1,320,000 Arabs and 640,000 Jews in Palestine; at the time of the Armistice nearly seventy per cent of the Arab population had been displaced, which the Israeli government refused to readmit. George Antonious had written in The Arab Awakening ten years prior to the establishment of Israel as a state: "The cure for the eviction of Jews from Germany (and other European countries) is not to be sought in the eviction of the Arabs from their homeland ... The logic of the facts is inexorable. It shows no room can be made in Palestine for a second nation except by dislodging or exterminating the nation in possession".<sup>338</sup>

Nearly a million Arabs had been driven out of their homes as a result of the war and accompanying Jewish terrorist activities; there had been a general fear of Jewish reprisal by the Arab civilian populace and as well Arab political leaders had called for the evacuation of possible battle zones. The refugees made their way to parts of Arab-occupied Palestine and to the neighboring Arab states. According to the United Nations' reports on relief for Palestine refugees, a total of 940,000 were eligible for relief in the spring of 1949, distributed as follows: Arab Palestine, 357,000; Gaza Strip, 245,000; Lebanon, 127,800; Syria, 78,200; Transjordan (Jordan), 94,000; and in Israel itself, 37,600. (In 1952, Israel undertook the responsibility for Arab refugees residing in that country who had previously been

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<sup>338</sup> Antonious, George, op. cit., p. 411-412

dependent on UNRWA aid.)<sup>339</sup> In addition, there are between 12,000-20,000 refugees in Egypt who receive no assistance from UNRWA (United Nations Relief and Works Agency) and a few thousand in Iraq under care of the local government. These figures do not include 80,000 "economic" refugees in Western Jordan who do not qualify for rations inasmuch as they still live in their own homes.<sup>340</sup>

Both Israel and the Arab states have refused to accept responsibility for the refugee problem and the task of providing relief for the peoples involved. Israel contends the Arabs created their own problem and hence, must find a solution for it; they claim that Israeli authorities had urged the Arabs of Palestine to remain in place and that Arab commanders had ordered the Arab population to leave their homes. The Arabs claim that the blame lies with the policy of the Western powers, the Zionist movement and the United Nations Partition Plan; further, they charge Jewish terrorism, such as the massacre at Dar Yassin caused the Arab peoples to flee for their lives. Hence, the United Nations, admitting partial responsibility for the refugees, initiated relief measures which the Arabs regard as a United Nations' obligation and see it as an insufficient effort at achieving justice for their miserable status.<sup>341</sup> United Nations attempts at a solution of the refugee problem have been unsuccessful for Israel will not accept them, and at the

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<sup>339</sup> Lenczowski, *op. cit.*, p. 340-341; and Antonious George, *op. cit.*, p. 411-12; and Mr. Henry R. Labouisse, Director at UNRWA, gave the following refugee figures on January 14, 1958, speaking before American Women's Club, Beirut, Lebanon: Gaza, 220,000; Jordan, 500,000; Syria, 90,000, Lebanon, 105,000.

<sup>340</sup> Morrison, *op. cit.*, p. 45

<sup>341</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 45-46

present, could not absorb them if she wanted to. The Arab states and the refugees, themselves, are intransigent on any projects which involve permanent resettlement in the neighboring Arab states as a final solution for they feel that by so doing they will be relinquishing their future rights (and former rights) in Palestine and will be accepting the establishment of Israel as fait accompli, in effect according her recognition. So long as the refugees' plight can be kept before the Arab public, the Palestine issue can be kept alive; likewise, it can be used as a political lever to stir nationalist emotions in favor of existing regimes and to oppose Western influences in the area which are primarily blamed for the establishment of Israel and hence, the creation of the refugee problem.

Certainly the existence of a million or more Arab refugees (the population has increased considerably since 1949 as the birth rate in the refugee camps is high and exceeds the death rate by 25,000 per annum), does much to disturb the general security, internal and external, in the Arab areas. These people, in general, represent an idle, discontent, unhappy and resentful group which are fertile ground for extremist activities and leftist propaganda. In Jordan, out of a population of approximately 1,250,000, almost half are "official" refugees (470,000). These elements can be incited to mob violence, will support whoever promises support to them, and may bring radical elements into power in order to achieve their own objectives. For this reason, even where they represent substantially smaller proportions of the population, they have generally been unwelcome by the host Arab states, who desire to maintain a maximum internal stability and order. Probably the majority of the refugees today look with hope to Abdul Nasser and the newly formed United Arab

Republic to achieve eventual annihilation of Israel and lead them triumphantly back to their Palestine homes. It would not be unlikely to see the large number of refugees living in the Palestine "West Bank" of the Jordan demand cessation from Jordan in order to link-up with the UAR.

(3) Growth and Development of Israel

Soon after her emergence as a new state, Israel set about to increase her population on a mass immigration scale, probably in order to provide an immediately larger base upon which she might draw conscripts for an inevitable "second round" with the Arab states. During the first thirty-one months of her existence, 500,000 new immigrants were added to her population (which was 640,000 at the beginning of the Arab-Israeli War). By 1951 Israel's population had reached 1,400,000 of which 170,000 were Arab.<sup>342</sup> This total population figure has since grown to approximately 1,800,000. Another reason for the population build-up might be related to the idea of "packing" the new state with Jewish immigrants to make impracticable any return of Palestinian refugees to the area for the government could rightly plead that room no longer existed for them to be resettled and that is precisely what has happened.

An additional consideration in the mass "ingathering" of Israel is the necessity of her taking the position as a haven for persecuted Jews; her doors could not be closed on any Jew needing assistance or those anxious and able to come to the new state. The Jewish Agency extended aid to assist with transport and temporary support of all immigrants until 1950 when repatriating expenses ran so high that immigration had to be restricted to those able to finance their own travel

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<sup>342</sup> Lenczowski, op. cit., p. 341-342

and those able to establish themselves in their new homes. Exceptions were made to this to admit 100-150,000 Iraqi Jews in 1950 and fairly large groups of Yemeni and North African Jews when a wave of anti-Jewish feeling swept the Arab world. By the mid-1950s the character of the immigrants pouring into Israel had markedly changed from an eastern European type to the Oriental. Soon the Oriental Jews comprised over fifty per cent of the population and because of their high birth rates they are likely to remain a majority element. Being unskilled, largely uneducated, possessing low standards of living and little concept or appreciation of the culture and institutions already established, this group tends to retard the economic progress of Israel and adds a financial burden of health and educational expenses.<sup>343</sup>

Big power support, plus world-wide Zionist fund-raising campaigns have been principally responsible for providing the means for a rapid development of Israel, industrially and agriculturally. The presence of a large number of skilled and educated workers has enhanced their opportunities but at the same time, the current history of her progress cannot but reflect admiration for good organization and efficiency coupled with national pride, zeal and enthusiasm. While it is certain that such development could never have been attained without outside help, the comparisons of results achieved for proportional amounts of monies granted in other areas of the world do not reveal greater progress by a single state.

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<sup>343</sup> Hoskins, H.L., *op. cit.*, p. 108-109 and 111. In March, 1950, it was announced in Iraq that all Iraqi Jews would be "permitted" to leave the country within one year. This action caused a great deal of apprehension among the Jews living in Iraq, hence the majority fled the country to Israel.



American influence was largely responsible for the United Nations Partition plan and her early recognition of Israel as a state brought expectations of economic support which was granted in May, 1948; a \$100,000,000 loan made available through the Export-Import Bank. No Arab country had ever been given direct financial support from the United States to equal this. In 1950, a "point IV" agreement extended Israel further United States' assistance. American technical experts advised her on irrigation and industrialization. Contracts were concluded with United States' motor car companies for the establishment of assembly plants in Israel. Beside this, the voluntary contributions of American Jewry provided the necessary funds to avoid bankruptcy (and still continues to carry the deficit in the Israeli economy). In 1949-1950, the fund drives in the United States carried out by the United Jewish Appeal were 250 million dollars per year. In 1950, American Jews pledged one billion dollars over a three-year period for the resettlement of 600,000 Jews and this was followed by the floating of a 500 million dollar bond issue in the United States in 1951.<sup>344</sup>

Perhaps, just as important to Israel as economic existence and internal development is to insure her legal position and recognition as a state, world-wide. This she has succeeded in accomplishing by a series of steps through the years. She became a member of the United Nations on May 11, 1949, and has been given diplomatic recognition from the majority of the member-states, including Great Britain, France and Russia. The Tripartite Agreement restricting the sale of arms in the Middle East recognized the Israeli position in an Arab world and helped to guarantee

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<sup>344</sup> Lenczowski, op. cit., p. 342-343

her security.

The Western powers are held primarily responsible for the establishment of Israel as a state; the Soviet Union's part in according the Jewish state recognition and initial friendly assistance is often overlooked. Although the Lenin communist doctrine opposes Zionism and the official USSR policy was hostile to it prior to 1947 (calling it an "instrument of British imperialism"), the Soviet delegate at the United Nations spoke for and voted for the Partition Resolution, which provided the legal basis for the establishment of Israel. It gave almost immediate de jure recognition to Israel on May 17, 1947, whereas American recognition remained de facto for some time. More important, it was the supply of arms and aircraft from Czechoslovakia which enabled the Israelis to meet and repel the invading Arab armies during the first few weeks after the birth of the state. Without this aid it is unlikely that the Jews could have survived the Arab attacks. At the time of its occurrence, the Soviet Union was criticized and reproached by Arab leaders but not in any way resembling attacks made on the West. Great Britain, on the other hand, had opposed partition and refused to join in implementing it; for a long time she refused to have any dealings at all with Israel. Britain resumed her shipment of arms to the Arab states as soon as the armistice agreements were concluded inasmuch as the United Nations no longer restricted her from doing so after that time. Further, Britain abstained from voting when Israel's application for membership in the United Nations was presented. She did not, however, gain the Arab goodwill that she had expected as a reward for these actions and attitudes.<sup>345</sup>

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<sup>345</sup> Lewis, B., "The Middle East Reaction to Soviet Pressures", p. 125-127, Middle East Journal, v. 10, 1956

Despite Israel's existence as a nation for the past ten years and her well-established legal position as a sovereign state, her political future and very existence will remain in doubt due to the determination of the Arabs to see her eliminated. Their hostility toward her has not abated through the years, and this coupled with the change of Soviet attitude to all-out Arab support against her, seriously threatens her future. It is doubtful that the West's strategic interests in the Middle East would be sublimated in order to insure Israel's existence. The strength of the present Soviet attitude is well-expressed in the December 29, 1955, speech of Nikita S. Khrushchev: "From the first day of its existence, the state of Israel has been taking a hostile, threatening position toward its neighbors. Imperialists are behind Israel, trying to exploit it against the Arabs for their own benefit".<sup>346</sup> Fully aware of the dangers implied by the new Soviet entrance on the scene of Arab politics, Israel is abandoning her former neutralist policy in favor of closer ties with the West. American response to Israel's overtures has been far from cordial as since 1952 President Eisenhower's administration had adopted a policy of impartial friendship in the Middle East and seeks to allay Arab fears that the United States will back an aggressive or expansionist policy by Israel.

Since 1950 Israel had consistently acted in an aggressive manner, possibly trying to maintain the initiative with her hostile Arab neighbors and to demonstrate her combat-readiness in order to discourage any plans for an Arab attack against her. Because of this pugnacious and cocky attitude and the carrying out of full-scale military operations in reprisal for numerous Arab-Israeli border incidents, she has been four times censured by

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<sup>346</sup> New York Times, December 31, 1955

the United Nations Security Council and been found guilty of wanton killing and raiding. A well-organized military operation was carried out by 250-300 Israeli soldiers against Kibya in Jordan on October 14, 1953, in which 53 Arab villagers were killed, regardless of sex or age and their houses destroyed; it was unwarranted, indiscriminate massacre of civilians which probably had as its purpose to impress the Arab border population and to make them fear and respect Israeli force. The following year a similar incident occurred when two companies of the Israeli army attacked the village of Nahhalin in Jordan on March 28, 1954, killing nine Arabs and wounding sixteen others; the village mosque was also sacked. The well-known Gaza raid which startled Abdul Nasser into seeking increased arms came off the next year on February 28, 1955, when half a battalion crossed into Gaza destroying the Egyptian Army Headquarters there, killing 38 and wounding 31 Egyptians. The fourth Israeli raid came off late in the same year on December 11, 1955, in the Syrian territories east of Lake Tiberias where a strong Israeli military force attacked Syrian outposts and a village, killing 49 persons. The Israeli government openly admitted it was a premeditated raid in retaliation for sniping by Syrian border outposts against Israeli fishermen. World opinion was shocked at these irresponsible acts; even in Israel some newspapers criticized the action. The United Nations Security Council in all cases condemned Israel's conduct; in the last case the censure was the most severe ever recorded.<sup>347</sup>

Perhaps the Israelis resorted to these strong raids as retaliations for border infiltrations and incidents, and at the same time were endeavoring to bring the Arabs around to a general peace settlement by a show of their

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<sup>347</sup> Lenczowski, op. cit., p. 360-362

military superiority. However, the raids did not have the desired effect. They only served to arouse the Arabs of their weaknesses and heaped new fire on old hatreds and resentments; the Arabs now seemed more determined than ever that Israel must go; they became convinced she would never live in peace with her neighbors. Likewise in America, Israel was losing its previous appeal as a haven for Jewish refugees and a "bastion for democracy"; the unprincipled, reckless, wholesale killings in the retaliatory Israeli raids had made American public opinion come to re-evaluate the Zionist claims of being a humanitarian and religious state.

(4) The Suez War and Israel

It has been said that the one great hope of Israel after the armistice agreements were signed was to persuade the Arabs to make a permanent peace settlement during the lull which followed. The Arabs, however, were naturally opposed to accepting the existence of a Jewish state in the heart of the Arab nation. With the knowledge that it was the avowed purpose of the Arabs to eradicate her at the first opportunity, Israel, living under an impulse of fear, became increasingly more militant. She used fear as her protective weapon, striking terror all along her borders to keep the Arabs off-guard. The borders were never quiet. She built up a well-trained and well-equipped army of nearly one-quarter of a million men, more numerous than the combined armies of the Arab states, which were not so well-trained nor so well-equipped. By the mid-1950's, it was not Israel who stood in danger of attack, but rather the Arabs, to whom Israel now posed a real threat. The growing strength of Israel's military forces, coupled with the Zionists' aspirations, threatened to expand their present state to its biblical dimensions in "the Empire of

David and Solomon (1000-930 B.C.), northeast to the Euphrates River and south to Mt. Sinai. This attitude was emphasized early in 1955 when Mr. David Ben-Gurion, a militarist and expansionist, returned to power as the Israeli Prime Minister. Arab apprehensions proved to be well-founded for in February, 1955, the most violent raid ever delivered by the Israeli army took place in Gaza. Tensions increased and border fights continued to grow worse all through 1955. This was followed by a reaction the Israelis had not expected. The Arabs, awakened to their weaknesses and aroused to the dangers confronting them, sought to hurriedly build up their military strength for security against future raids.<sup>348</sup> The Czechoslovakian arms deal followed in the fall of 1955 and the balance of power began to shift once more in favor of the Arabs. In an attempt to counter Egypt's new strength, Israel obtained some weapons from France but gained comparatively little to offset the vast new amounts of arms from the Eastern bloc.

The devices set-up by the Western powers in the Tripartite Agreement of 1950 to prevent the outbreak of hostilities by limiting the arms sale to both the Arabs and the Israelis had worked well up till this time. But the entrance of the Soviet Union into the picture as an arms-supplier had nullified the controlling features of that agreement. The Soviets had everything to gain and nothing to lose in providing the much sought-after arms to the Arabs.

With new confidence the Arab states, and particularly Egypt, undertook an initiative of aggressiveness toward Israel. From bases in the Sinai Peninsula systematic raids were carried out by "Fedayeen" commandos

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<sup>348</sup> Winnet, Frederick, V., "Why the West Should Stop Supporting Israel", p. 4; reprinted in Daily Star Beirut, March 2, 1958, from MacLean's Magazine, Toronto; and Wint and Calvocressi, op. cit., p. 56-57

(mostly Palestinian refugees anxious to avenge the loss of their properties or the lives of loved ones) to terrorize the countryside; they were highly successful in spreading fear and insecurity, striking quickly and violently. The government of Israel, however, was developing a new conviction as a reaction to this warfare and to growing Arab military strength, a conviction that if it waited until the Arabs were completely armed and ready that it might be overcome. There was popular talk of a preventive war while time still favored them.<sup>349</sup> Meanwhile, the Suez Canal crisis grew; the Canal Company was nationalized in July, 1956, and Prime Minister Anthony Eden became determined to break the power of Gamal Abdul Nasser. The French, like the British, resented Nasser's powerful influence and interference in Africa and throughout the Arab East; Egyptian arms and vocal support to Algerian nationalists had not made Nasser extremely popular in France. His purchases of Russian arms and introduction of Russian influence into this region worried them, and of course there was the underlying fear that Nasser would eventually unify the Arab states and control its oil; hence, he would be in a position to dictate terms to Western users of that oil. All these were factors to be considered in addition to the fundamental strategic problem of the control of the Suez Canal.

The fact that Israel intended to launch a large-scale military operation against Egypt was probably well-known to Britain and France. During the summer of 1956 a well-known Israeli ex-terrorist was given the honor of addressing the French National Assembly; France increased deliveries of arms to Israel including aircraft and tanks beginning in

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<sup>349</sup> Wint and Calvocoressi, Ibid, p. 60-62

August, 1956, and would not disclose true statistics concerning them. In September, 1956, Mr. Ben-Gurion, referring to France, stated that at last Israel had found "a true ally". Shortly before the attack the Prime Minister of France referred to a "diplomatic secret" to be kept. By the Middle of October Israeli officers were attending planning conferences in Paris. The British, too, were keeping unusually quiet in diplomatic circles, so much so that Mr. Dulles, the American Secretary of State, complained of the new "blackout" and made special efforts to renew the normal flow of diplomatic information and intelligence. That some sort of British-French-Israeli collusion occurred is very generally presumed; to what extent, and on whose part, is of considerably less importance. The plan called for an Israeli attack followed by British-French interference to insure Israeli objectives and at the same time provide the powers with an excuse to seize the Suez Canal and to cause the downfall of Abdul Nasser.<sup>350</sup>

Though the Suez War failed in achieving its objectives due to the world-wide condemnation of the three-nation conspiracy, the Israelis can be said to have made some major gains, in spite of the fact that they were required to eventually withdraw within their own borders. The War was officially concluded on November 5, when the cease-fire order was finally honored by British and French forces which withdrew within 27 days and were replaced by UNEF token forces to maintain the peace. The Israelis, however, refused to honor early United Nations resolutions, flouting six successive United Nations Assembly orders to evacuate Egypt. They finally complied with the United Nations resolution of February 2,

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<sup>350</sup> Ibid, p. 82-89



1957, and withdrew to their own frontiers in the middle of February, a full three months after the end of hostilities, after having defied President Eisenhower's warnings of "pressure" and United Nations undertakings for "military, economic and financial sanctions". The United States, eager to get the Israelis out of Egypt without losing goodwill and without rewarding aggression, gave them certain assurances which are worth a great deal more than the territories that she would have gained, had she been able to; these assurances are the real gains of the Suez War for Israel. They grew out of an aide-mémoire presented Israel's Ambassador, Mr. Abba Eban, by the American Secretary of State on February 11, 1957, which includes: that as soon as Israel withdraws to her borders the United States would, (1) proclaim the right of innocent passage in the Gulf of Aqaba and, (2) support United Nations action to insure the Gaza Strip would not be again used as a base of operations for guerrilla raids on Israel. These considerations have been reinforced and have been given authority through public utterances of the President of the United States. To the Israelis, the freedom of the Gulf of Aqaba and the development of the port of Elath are far more important than the acquisition of new lands, at least for the present. Other advantages that have accrued to Israel as a result of the Suez War are: (1) the protective shield of UNEF forces in Gaza and Sharm El Sheik which permits them to pass freely into the Gulf of Aqaba; (2) renewed confidence that they can defeat the strongest of their Arab neighbors and conversely, a healthy Arab respect for their military prowess.<sup>351</sup>

All this, however, has not improved the prospects for security in the Arab East as concerns future Arab-Israeli conflicts. On the

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<sup>351</sup> Time (International edition), March 11, 1957, "Israel, the Watchman of Zion", p. 22-27

contrary, it has only fanned the fires of Arab hostility. Such humiliation and embarrassment as the Arab states have suffered must have resounding political repercussions which will be manifested in military preparations as well as "action" programs demanding Arab armed superiority and revenge. Tensions have been increased rather than subdued and the participation of the USSR on a wide scale has been invited to espouse the Arab cause and to provide the margin of arms superiority needed for launching a successful "final" round with Israel.

C. The Palestine Problem and the Security of the Arab East

From the foregoing discussion it can be logically concluded that the problem of Palestine unfavorably affects the chances for achieving a security in the Arab East for the following principal reasons.

(1) An Outbreak of Hostilities Remains a Constant Possibility

There remains for the Arab East no real peace or security so long as the Palestine problem lies dormant and unsolved. It will inevitably lead to outbreaks of small scale or full-blown warfare between the Arabs and the Jews. As both sides continue to arm in earnest, they are preparing for the ultimate showdown. Coupled with this there is the corresponding drain on financial resources and useful manpower in order to provide for the military establishment.

(2) The Refugee Problem is an Unstable Element that Adversely Affects the Security of the Area

This largely idle and malcontent class is a radical and extremist group which willingly follows any leader who can promise them an improved lot and realization of their just rights in Palestine. They

can materially affect the internal stability of Arab states and contribute to overthrow of governments. They are fertile ground for communism or other leftist socialist movements which promise them a better future. So long as they remain unsettled, the Palestine issue will be an open sore incapable of any solution short of war. There will be no real peace until these people are adequately settled and provided with equal and fair opportunities with all other Arabs.

(3) Great Power Conflict is Imminent and Chances for New Arab-Israeli War Increased Due to USSR Alignment with the Arabs

As a result of the Soviet Union having taken a positive stand with the Arabs against Israel, and openly avowing to assist in destroying her by military and political assistance to the Arabs, the Arab states are encouraged to commence new operations against Israel. This comes into direct conflict with the policy of the United States, which is committed to maintaining the peace in the Middle East and has attempted to maintain an impartial friendship for both the Arabs and Israelis. Any new round of warfare even indirectly supported by the USSR may well be opposed with the intervention of United States military forces which in turn could lead to Soviet counter-measures.

An additional factor which divides the Arabs among themselves is the use of the Palestine problem as a propoganda weapon to divide anti-West and pro-Western elements. The Palestine problem and the sad plight of the refugees is kept constantly before the Arab peoples, reminding them of United States and British responsibility for the existence of the problem itself. This keeps anti-Western emotions and attitudes high and promotes the growth of pro-Soviet line as a reaction to the hatred of

the West. Pro-Western conservative elements that recognize the dangers in dealing with the Russians are pitted against their brothers who would see Western influence driven out and replaced by the new Soviet friendship. This acts to keep the area stirred up and the states divided against themselves (i.e., Iraq and Jordan versus Egypt and Syria, and in Lebanon, internally). Ultimately each individual is forced to choose between the East and the West, regardless of his preference for neutrality.

PART V: AN EVALUATION OF REGIONAL SECURITY MEASURES

CHAPTER 11

REGIONAL, MILITARY AND POLITICAL ALLIANCES AND THE SECURITY OF

THE ARAB EAST

A. Do Regional Pacts and Military Alliances Contribute to the Security of the Arab East?

To answer this question satisfactorily it is necessary that the basic criteria for effective regional alliances be discussed. There is an axiom in world politics which states that "weakness invites aggression"; perhaps then, any joining together which would strengthen the area would likewise contribute to its security. Strength lies in alliances and in unity of purpose among the free nations of the world. There must, however, be a genuine will of nations to work together in common purpose and there must be a realistic attitude displayed by all the cooperating nations to build their strength to what is expected of them as partners in defense. Without these qualifications any such an alignment of states becomes simply "ink on paper". The basic criteria, then, of an effective regional alliance are: (1) that it be orientated to a danger common to all the participating states; (2) that it be indigenous in nature; (3) that there be a genuine desire upon the part of the nations involved to undertake their joint and several responsibilities; and (4) that the goals of any such pacts be realistic and obtainable. Only when these requirements are met does a regional alignment produce the desired result, i.e., that of providing for the security of the region concerned.<sup>352</sup>

There are both advantages and disadvantages in joining regional arrangements for defense and these considerations likewise affect the

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<sup>352</sup> Taxis, op. cit., p. 36-37

question as to whether or not any real security benefits are achieved.

Included among the advantages are the following principal points:

(1) Concerting for defense in a regional pact acts as a deterrent to aggression by an outside force which might otherwise be tempted to expand into an area where weakness existed. A specifically announced defense policy by a regional-bloc, automatically deters aggressive tendencies by foreign powers, and particularly if such alliances are in turn supported by a major force or power. On the contrary, if a state maintains its separateness in national defense and is small, weak and possesses an unstable government, it invites aggression of big powers with expansionist tendencies. And particularly in modern times when the world faces the battle of two conflicting ideologies and there looms only two great powers, the United States and USSR, if a small state takes a vague, non-committal attitude toward each, attempting to wear a neutralist face, it is in grave danger of falling prey to communistic influences and disruptive internal forces.

(2) Regional links also encourage stronger economic and political ties which result in mutual benefits to all participating nations. The development of complementary economies, the strengthening of rail, highway and electronic communications between them promotes an intra-development which might not otherwise come about. It serve to break down old frictions and economic rivalries and breeds a spirit of friendly cooperation for common benefit.

(3) Cultural exchanges as a result of treaty relationships do much to foster better understandings between nations and develop strong friendships.

(4) A national feeling of trust and confidence is engendered by the knowledge that borders are secure and there is a lack of suspicion of neighboring countries.

(5) Even though the alliance is indigenous it may have the outside backing of a major power which lends it strength and confidence. Often the cost of providing the necessary armaments and equipment is borne by this outside force, thereby relieving the participating state of that financial burden. It should be noted, however, that once the nations of such an alliance commit themselves to a particular weapons system, be it Russian, British or American, and bases its military establishment on such a system, then it will be henceforth tied to that power for re-supply, spare parts, ammunition and technical advice. This is an important factor that is often overlooked by nations eager to procure arms for their self-defense.

(6) Participation in alliances normally requires some additional build-up of military forces by adherent states in order to carry out their treaty obligations. This defense preparation strengthens the ability of small nations to cope with internal disorders and hence, makes their governments more stable. Often times provisions of these regional alliances provide for the assistance and intervention of member-states to quell internal disorder occurring in another member state; this, too, contributes to the confidence and stability of the governments concerned.

(7) Regional thinking and orientation toward a common danger unites the government and the peoples in a universal cause. This gives rise to patriotism and greater concern for the welfare of the state. It subordinates oppositions on purely local and political matters in favor

of the larger national objectives and engenders a feeling of public responsibility.

What are the disadvantages of adhering to regional pacts? Perhaps the chief factors to be considered are the following:

(1) Alliances are often disarming and illusory, giving a false confidence in a nation's real or actual strength and ability to carry out the terms of the pact. Particularly when the defensive goals presented are approached unrealistically by the adherent states such agreements tend to be worth no more than the paper they are written on since they can never actually be put into effect. Often times, though parties concert for defense, there is an honest desire lacking among them to carry out the responsibilities incumbent upon them to implement the alliance. Each nation tends to depend upon the strength of the others which in reality may be non-existent. Such attitudes breed a lethargy and misplaced confidence in their real defensive posture, both regional and separately.

(2) Regional pacts inevitably require increased costs for national defense and meeting the expenditures necessary for military build-up and the logistical support required to meet the terms of the agreements. The additional economic burden is an important factor to be considered by any small nation which needs its funds for general internal development and progress. The normal tendency for most nations of the world is to expend the minimum amount necessary to maintain their military establishments consistent with the need to provide legitimate self-defense and to maintain internal order.

(3) When regional defensive agreements are entered into there



is always a danger of provoking the aggression of the power against which the alliance has been orientated. Often times, a neutralist stand, void of alliances and regional groupments which may be directed against this power or that, may be a "safer" move for small nations which do not wish to provoke the wrath of any of the great powers. A regional pact directed against a major power may invite the hostility of that power which in turn could lead to indirect attempts to influence or even overthrow the existing government whose policy opposes it; even direct aggression might result, immediately or at some future date, to a single state or to the bloc.

(4) Alliances sometimes protect vested interests and existing corrupt political regimes, assuring their stay in power through the assistance of other pact members which often are permitted to intervene in a sister state to help in quelling internal disorders or rebellions. Such assurances are of course greater when the pact has the backing of a major power as well as the member-states of a region.

What then should be concluded from this analysis? It would appear that security would be more likely enhanced by the development of regional alliances than threatened. The development of a situation of strength in an area is more logically going to deter the intentions of a potential aggressor even though it may incur his hostility. The determined pronouncement of a clear unequivocal policy by a bloc of states, united in fear of a recognized common threat, is far more likely to ward off aggression than a vague, non-committal policy of neutrality or of indifference to the state of world affairs in general. Likewise, opposing poles of power will seek to encourage and strengthen such unities in

pursuance of their own strategic interests, and consequently lend strength and support to them; this might include financial as well as moral support and could well be extended to physical support of armaments and military forces, if such were requested by the pact-members.

The advantages of stronger economic, social and cultural ties and intra-nation development of an area far outweigh the possibilities of maintaining corrupt regimes. It would seem that, on the contrary, through the closer associations of states of a regional bloc in political, economic and social affairs that the more-advanced states would have greater influence in engendering a growth of progress in the less-advanced or backward states. Such associations could assist in bringing about social and political reforms, naturally and peacefully, by example and by degree, a step by step process forward.

In the last analysis it is necessary to go back to the basic criteria for pacts and alliances and examine each regional arrangement on that basis to see if it satisfactorily meets these requirements. Without a common and recognized danger to all concerned, be it remote or immediate, there is little basis for a regional pact. Without a genuine desire on the part of the adherents to undertake their responsibilities there is no additional security benefits, and without obtainable objectives, realistically and conscientiously pursued, there will be no new strength in the area. It is on these grounds that the existing alliances in the Arab East should be analyzed and discussed.

B. Regional Alliances and Political Agreements Affecting the Arab East  
Since 1950

(1) The Arab Collective Security Pact (Arab Joint Defense and

Economic Cooperation Treaty (1952))

According to its preamble, the Arab Collective Security Pact had as its purpose "to consolidate relations between the states of the Arab League ... for the realization of mutual defense and the maintenance of security and peace according to the principles of both the Arab League Pact and the United Nations Charter ... to consolidate stability and security and provide means of welfare and development in the countries" and in case of attack each state would take "individually and collectively, all steps available, including the use of armed force, to repel the aggression and restore security and peace".<sup>353</sup>

In comparing this alliance with the basic criteria suggested as standard for regional alliances, it would appear at first that the common danger recognized by all League states was the threat of Israel. However, this proved to be untrue, at least in the case of Iraq, which felt the primary threat to it came from the north from the direction of the Soviet Union. This became apparent when Iraq sought separate assurances through treaty relations with Turkey in 1955.

While it is true that this pact is indigenous and there was an outward attempt to show a genuine common interest, nonetheless, the member states were vague in their plans to implement it and were in reality unwilling to undertake the responsibilities incumbent on them. There were no well-defined goals or organizations for the attainment of an efficient defense body. None of the states approached the idea of the alliance with realism or enthusiasm. As a result the pact never attained any real strength although it could have been the basis for a sound defense organization

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<sup>353</sup> Joint Defense and Economic Treaty between the States of the Arab League, Appendix 3.

had its objectives been approached more realistically. The Arab states had neither the arms to create military strength nor the industry necessary for their manufacture. Intra-state political rivalries and internal problems narrowed the views of the member states from the bigger issue of regional security.<sup>354</sup> Although both Britain and the United States voiced public approval of the League defense arrangement and it appeared that military support would be forthcoming, the Tripartite Agreement of May 25, 1950, limiting arms sales to both the Arab states and Israel, plus Britain's support of Jordan's annexing of the west bank of Arab Palestine, provoked Arab resentments, hence, there was no meeting ground for the Arabs and the West, and no outside support was ever granted it. It became apparent to the Arabs that the United States and Britain would not give up their support and protection of Israel, even at the expense of losing an opportunity to develop an effective Arab East security system.<sup>355</sup>

With all its shortcomings there has been some value derived from the joining together of the Arab League states in this security pact. It served a vehicle for a considerable amount of collective thinking and planning; some strides were made forward in economic and political matters. There is evidence, too, of a greater mutual understanding through the experience of working together. It may have served as the basis for a sound security concept for the Arab East had not divisions within the League prevented it, namely the conflict of leadership between Iraq and Egypt. Egypt was said to have abandoned the pact completely

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<sup>354</sup> Taxis, op. cit., p. 38

<sup>355</sup> Hoskins, H.L., op. cit., p. 159-160

after the signing of the Turco-Iraqi Pact of 1955, although she (and Saudi Arabia as well) continue to voice her adherence and support to it. Iraq, on the other hand, continues to refer to it and argues that its adherence to the Turco-Iraqi Pact in 1955 is not incompatible with the joint defense treaty, opposing the Egyptian view that the Baghdad Pact will be used as a means to force a favorable peace settlement with Israel.<sup>356</sup>

Today the pact is in reality dead in spite of the fact that many of the signatories continue to refer to it as a living thing. It seems no one has the courage to call for its official burial. It had its good effect, however, and should, one day, the Arab League be revived as an effective body, it may well be resuscitated as the basis for a virile defense system for the Arab region.

(2) Egyptian Alliances with Syria and Saudi Arabia (1955-1956)

When Iraq signed the Turco-Iraqi Pact of 1955, Egypt violently denounced the agreement, stating it was contrary to the spirit of the Arab League Collective Security Pact and that it had split the Arab League into two sections. Saudi Arabia and Syria objected to the Pact also and announced their intention in February-March, 1955, to join with Egypt in an Arab Pact, a new defensive arrangement as a counter-measure to the Baghdad Pact. Lebanon and Jordan were to be asked to join but Iraq was excluded, unless she repudiated her pact with Turkey. The original treaty envisaged a political cooperation, amounting to a federation between Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia. It also involved the development of a single economic unit for the three states, considering the

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<sup>356</sup> Ziadeh, Nicola A., Syria and Lebanon, p. 273, Ernest Benn Limited, London, 1957

markets of all states as one internal market, without interstate restrictions or barriers; this required developing of unified civil, penal, financial and fiscal legislation in all countries concerned. The military phase of the planned pact provided for a unified command in war and peacetime, a unified Arab army, along with state armies directly attached to the unified command; a special fund to finance the unified army and the economic projects was to be provided by the adherent states; contributions for this fund were to be equal to ten per cent of their annual budget. Considerations of and discussions concerning the new Arab Pact were carried on until the fall of 1955 when on October 20th the Egyptian and Syrian governments signed a military pact to cooperate in the event of armed aggression against either of them. It provided for a Supreme Council of Ministers of Defense and Ministers of Foreign Affairs, a War Council composed of the Chiefs of Staff of the armed forces of the two states and provided for a joint military command. The cost of maintaining the combined force was to be shared sixty-five per cent by Egypt and thirty-five per cent by Syria. The Pact went into effect on November 5, 1955, after ratification by the Syrian parliament. Hakin al Amer, Egyptian Chief of Staff, was appointed commander-in-chief of the joint Syrian-Egyptian forces.<sup>357</sup>

On October 27, 1955, Egypt concluded a similar defensive arrangement with Saudi Arabia, the only differences worthy of note being: the length of the treaty (five years instead of ten years), the exclusion of Saudi natural resources for the benefit of the war effort, and a clause restricting the forces and bases available to the War Council.

While the Egyptian treaties never attained any actual strength

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<sup>357</sup> See Egyptian-Syrian and Egyptian-Saudi Arabian Pacts, Appendix 8

they were a good starting point and were in the process of development when inter-area political considerations caused a break-up of the new alignment. Even though treaty arrangements are still legally in force there is no accompanying spirit to participate so in reality it probably would fail to function. The disaffection of Jordan with the Cairo-Damascus axis in 1957 led to a bitter hostility and fear of revolutionary plots on the part of Jordan by her Arab neighbors, Syria and Egypt.<sup>358</sup> In 1958 the alleged plot of King Saud on the life of Abdul Nasser has strained relations to the breaking point. Perhaps the greatest benefit to come out of the Egyptian treaties has been the creation of the United Arab Republic. In March, 1956, President Quwatli of Syria, King Saud and Abdul Nasser met in Cairo to reiterate their desires for closer political, economic, military and cultural unity. In June, 1956, a new Syria coalition government under Sabri al Asali adopted the principle of unity with Egypt;<sup>359</sup> this ultimately led to the proclamation of the UAR in February, 1958.

Upon analyzing the Egyptian treaties one finds that with respect to the basic criteria for effective treaties that there was no recognition of a common danger to all states adhering to the pact (unless it was Israel and of this they were already in treaty relations through the Collective Security Pact of the League), and that these treaty relations were mainly directed as a counter-measure to the Baghdad Pact, in order

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<sup>358</sup> A joint Egyptian-Jordanian-Syrian Military Command had been set-up by terms of an agreement made on October 25, 1956, even though Jordan had refused to become an adherent to the earlier Egyptian treaties. Keesings, op. cit. p. 14793a and 15166d

<sup>359</sup> Ziadeh, op. cit., p. 275

that Egypt might continue to maintain a position of power and influence among the remaining Arab states and would exclude Iraq. The alliance, contained, however, all the mechanics necessary for setting up a strong and efficient defensive organization; it was set up on a sound basis having a permanent planning headquarters and a unified command and control. Proper follow-through could have resulted in thorough training, and by familiarization in working together, an able, modern military force pursuing a singleness of purpose could have been developed. The standardization of weapons, equipment and training techniques would have resulted in sizeable and progressive steps toward the development of a security force capable of withstanding at least local aggressions. It functioned effectively until the Suez War when it was not implemented due to the request of Abdul Nasser, who did not desire to see the other Arab states become involved in Egypt's dispute over the Suez with the French and British. Before Jordan's disaffection to the West (and ultimately to Iraq), Syrian troops were stationed in Jordan on the Palestinian borders under this unified command. After King Hussein thwarted efforts of Syrian-Egyptian origins to have him removed from authority, he requested the withdrawal of Syrian forces in his country; Syria refused to comply until orders were issued by the Commander-in-Chief, General Amer, in Cairo. With Jordan's falling out came a Saudi promise of assistance, inasmuch as King Saud was anxious that Jordan maintain its separateness.<sup>360</sup> Hence, the internal divisions within the alliance were its own greatest weaknesses. While it continues legally in effect for Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia, only the uniting of Syria and Egypt has preserved any part of it. Since

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<sup>360</sup> Ibid



the federation of Yemen to the UAR, Yemeni forces are now included in the total military capability of the alliance and extend its area responsibilities.

Another weakness of the Egyptian Pact which is generally characteristic of Arab alliances is the lack of genuine interest on the part of all participating states to carry out their obligations under the terms of the treaty and their preoccupation with their own internal problems. The goals were not well-defined, other than the broad outlines of the basic organization which appeared sound; the presence of definite, obtainable and realistic objectives is essential to stimulate an enthusiasm and initiative in order to achieve an effective result.

(3) The Baghdad Pact

The Baghdad Pact, a result of the extension of the Turco-Iraqi Pact of February 24, 1955, to include Pakistan, Iran and Great Britain, contains only one Arab state, Iraq. It has received a great deal of unfavorable attention and comment by the other Arab states, particularly Egypt and Saudi Arabia; this attitude was less strongly represented by the Syrians who opposed the Turco-Iraqi Pact for different reasons. Lebanon, the traditional peacemaker among the Arab League states, held that Iraq was free to conclude any treaty or enter into any agreements that would better insure the security of her own people. Iraq was primarily concerned with the Russian threat while Egypt and Saudi Arabia felt the Israeli danger was greatest.<sup>361</sup> With the support of a major power, Britain, for the Baghdad alliance, the majority of the Arabs see in it a chance for renewed domination through the lever of intervention in times

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<sup>361</sup> Ibid., p. 273

of disorder, rebellion or external aggressions. However, even before Great Britain adhered to the Pact it was violently denounced by Egypt; many writers believe that the Egyptian's main objection to it was that they saw in it the emergence of Iraq as a rival leader and center of power, subordinating the leadership of Abdul Nasser's Egypt which Nasser would not tolerate. At one time Egypt had shown favorable inclinations toward leading a Western-sponsored defense arrangement in the Middle East, particularly after Nasser had succeeded Naguib, and was in the process of establishing his own foreign policies. The rapprochement in relations with Turkey in the fall of 1954 led many statesmen to believe that an eventual defensive alignment involving Egypt as a basic member was a definite possibility. And, in December, 1954, the Arab League, which was well-dominated by Egyptian leadership, made overtures for Western cooperation and support with armaments and assistance to aid in solving Arab problems.<sup>362</sup> Had Egypt been approached first, instead of Iraq, a more realistic defense organization may have been achieved. Nonetheless, that opportunity has long since passed and there are new alignments throughout the region. Although the Baghdad Pact remains open for the adherence of all members of the Arab League and there has been considerable effort to secure their adherence, there is little likelihood that it will secure any new members from that group today. Only by the inclusion of Jordan into the Federated Arab State of Iraq and Jordan (February 14, 1958), has there been any new support realized, and that is only implied inasmuch as there is but a single army for the new state. Although Jordan denies being obligated to the Baghdad alliance, inasmuch

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<sup>362</sup> Ibid, p. 272

as treaties formerly signed by the two states (Iraq and Jordan) are not binding one upon the other, the reference is obvious that she cannot avoid being a party to disputes or hostilities that involve her sister state.

In spite of the fact that the Baghdad Pact is almost universally unpopular with the Arabs due to the tremendous amount of adverse propaganda concerning it, analysis proves that it well-satisfies the basic criteria for an effective treaty insofar as all the signatory-states are concerned. First, it is oriented toward a real danger, recognized by all, the aggressive intent of communism and the expansionist aims of modern Russia. It is indigenous in nature and there is a genuine desire upon the part of the member-states to meet their treaty commitments and responsibilities. The adherents face their common danger realistically, having lived under the threat of Russian expansion for years; they are well aware of its menace and are anxious to develop a situation of strength to fight subversive elements internally and present an efficient organization for defense outwardly. The goals are obtainable and they are being pursued enthusiastically. A build-up of military forces, with the aid of Western arms, equipment and training missions, improvement of roads and electronic communications, economic cooperation, and cultural exchanges have all contributed to strengthen this alliance since 1955. The indirect link of Iraq to NATO through its treaty relations with Turkey and its tie with SEATO through Pakistan lend strength to its strategic position. The Arab East to the west and south of Iraq are of equal importance to the defensive strength of the present alliance inasmuch as all primary routes of communication pass through them to Turkey and Iraq. If these areas are in unfriendly hands or under strong Soviet influence, the effectiveness

of the "Northern Tier" will be seriously jeopardized.

Undoubtedly there are certain benefits from the Baghdad Pact that have accrued to the non-participating Arab East, not the least among them is the "protective crust" or physical barrier provided by the Pact-states and envisaged in their strong natural defensive position across the Zagros and Taurus mountains. This provides a certain measure of confidence for the Arab East, particularly when it is considered that the planned and prepared defense has big power backing: Britain in fact, and the United States as a moral force which would probably rush to assist her NATO partner should any real difficulties occur. It is well-known that the strategic planning of the United States places great importance on the vitalness of the Baghdad Pact defense arrangement. Were it not for the adamant opposition of the Arab states, the United States probably would have joined the alliance long before now, but strategic interests in Arab oil and the geographical unity of the Middle East as a whole make it imperative that the United States do her utmost to remain on friendly terms with the Arab states. Russian expansion or aggression is far more likely to occur in the form of a cultural and economic penetration, a gradual undermining of the Western position and influence. An Arab world already hostile to the West over the Palestine issue would be even much less receptive should the United States choose to ignore their strong feelings toward the Baghdad alliance. The free world needs, and the United States recognizes, the urgent need of attracting the Moslem world to side with it against the Sino-Russian bloc and their satellites. The United States is faced with the problem of creating an effective system of Asiatic alliances to counter the combined population of 800 million existing in

the Sino-Soviet axis; the large reserves of manpower in the Moslem world can bolster American alliances as the leading Moslem countries of the world are located strategically along the "soft underbelly" of the Soviet Union and have sufficient manpower to balance, if not offset, the Sino-Soviet bloc. (For example, the Turco-Pakistani Pact of April, 1954, united 100 million people or about one-quarter of the Moslem nations located on the southern periphery of the Soviet Union.) These are important considerations, not from a point of military strength but due to the fact that the Soviet people are still strongly impressed by manpower, at times even more than by technology.<sup>363</sup>

In a world of two poles of power, the United States and Russia, no pact or alliance of strategic international importance is really effective without the backing of one of these powers. Hence, the Baghdad Pact, like other alliances, is only as strong as the United States desires to make it. True, Great Britain has lent great strength to the Pact and now uses it as a lever to support and protect her Persian Gulf position, but the real source of fibre in it is the knowledge that America will not stand idly by in case of aggression against the signatories. The minimal participation in the affairs of the Pact organization and the mere implied threat of full American support in the event of hostilities is its real source of strength. Thus, it can be concluded, in view of a demonstrated vital concern by the United States (and the fact that the Pact meets the

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<sup>363</sup> Spector, *op. cit.*, p. 120-122. The Sino-Soviet axis has under its control more than 50 million Moslems, more than there are Arabs in the whole of the world, yet has not created a single Moslem state. This may be a factor in future politics and could materially assist the Western powers should the Moslem world side with them in future hostilities.

required criteria for an effective regional reliance), that the Baghdad alliance truly contributes to the security of the Middle East region and hence, to the security of the Arab East as well.<sup>364</sup>

(4) The Eisenhower Doctrine

Among political agreements that have been drawn up in an attempt to provide a better security for the Middle East and Arab East regions, the Eisenhower Doctrine must be considered as a pronouncement of basic United States' policy and concern in the area. Fundamentally, it called for an Arab denunciation of international communism, and hence the USSR, in exchange for American assistance. This, unfortunately, was not the correct approach to the Arab East which preferred not to take a definite stand in the East-West struggle, even though their past cultural ties were with the West and their sympathies were largely with the West, despite their unhappy experience under British and French colonial policies. As a result, the Doctrine was not acceptable to Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Yemen or Saudi Arabia. Only Iraq, already tied to the West through the Baghdad Pact, and pro-Western, dominantly Christian Lebanon were willing to make such pronouncements. The fundamental error of the United States was in the wording of the Doctrine to make communism the enemy and the target; weak governments on the Soviet periphery were asked to declare their enmity toward Russia at a time when strong tendencies toward neutralism prevailed and there existed serious doubts of which side would attain eventual supremacy in the East-West struggle for power.

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<sup>364</sup> United States declared on November 29, 1956, that a threat to the integrity or political independence of Iran, Iraq, Pakistan or Turkey would be viewed by the United States with utmost gravity. Keesings, op. cit., v. X., 1955-1956

While the Eisenhower Doctrine was not wholly acceptable to the Arab East, it nonetheless contributed materially to the security of that region for it demonstrated, and forcibly pronounced, America's vital concern for the area; it recognized the necessary involvement of the United States in Arab affairs and showed a sincere interest to safeguard the independence and territorial integrity of the Middle Eastern states. The request of President Eisenhower to the American Congress to employ the armed forces of the United States to that end was an effective deterrent and an obvious warning to the Soviet Union not to apply direct aggression; further, it excluded her resorting to the use of other nations controlled by international communism to act in her place.<sup>365</sup> The offer of economic and military assistance contained in the policy were not a sufficient consideration for the Arab states to take an unequivocal stand, from which there could be no turning back in the East-West struggle.

The Arab East cannot be won to the Western fold purely by economic betterment and technical assistance or by large scale spending, grants, loans, gifts and charity. Perhaps the living ideas have more value in the minds of men than materialistic benefits. This idea is best expressed by the Adenauer government in Germany, which in 1956 declared that unless new spiritual values were found, the only difference between the East and West will be that the Russians are "materialists in theory" whereas the Western peoples are "materialists in practice"; the Bonn government called for a new ideology based on freedom, personal dignity, concern for the

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<sup>365</sup> Text of speech of President Dwight D. Eisenhower to United States' Congress, January 5, 1957, United States Government Printing Office Pamphlet

lives of our fellowmen and the truth of religion.<sup>366</sup> It may well be that the United States would find a greater common ground with the peoples of the Arab East by appealing to ethical and spiritual values which have greater nourishment for men's minds than victuals. General George C. Marshall, ex-Secretary of State, in declaring the Marshall plan at his Harvard University speech in 1947 called American enemies in Europe "hunger, poverty, desperation and chaos"; it was unnecessary to name communism and Russia as the target for they become natural enemies of states fighting these perils.<sup>367</sup>

(5) New Arab Unities; The United Arab Republic and the Arab Federated State

The emergence of two important Arab unions in 1958 is a matter of significance in the discussion of political agreements and alliances that affect the security of the Arab East.

Paradoxically, the two unities contribute to external security for the Arab East as a whole but give rise to greater internal tensions and instabilities. Inasmuch as both unions join the economies and military forces of the states comprising them, situations of greater strength are developed. Any reduction of the fragmentation of the Arab states appreciably diminishes the danger of a piecemeal aggression and penetration by an outside force and unites the peoples in common social and political goals. However, these two unions are directly opposed to one another and have different motives as the basis of their existence.

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<sup>366</sup> Spector, op. cit., p.145

<sup>367</sup> Cook, Don, op. cit.



The United Arab Republic came about in response to a popular demand for Arab unity under a strong popular leader who has promised and has instituted social and political reforms, whereas the Arab Federated State came into existence to strengthen unpopular regimes which feared the extension of the first union (United Arab Republic) and the growing demands of the masses for an Arab unity. The United Arab Republic was proclaimed before cheering throngs of exuberant peoples; the Arab Federated State was conceived in smoke-filled conference rooms of the Monarchs of Iraq and Jordan; it was not greeted with popular enthusiasm and has not yet satisfied the desires of the masses for nationalist aspirations or social-political reforms; Jordan particularly is teeming with malcontents on the Palestinian west bank, probably more anxious of joining the United Arab Republic. The Arab Federated State has not sought world recognition for no real new entity has been achieved; a federal structure has merely been superimposed on the governmental forms of the existing two monarchies.

There have been violent tirades and attacks by both unions, each side denouncing the motives of the other and as the tensions continue to grow this makes the internal security of the area more precarious and volatile than before the two unities came into existence. There appears to be even much less chance for a peaceful co-existence of these various Arab states now than existed a few months previous to their new status. However, the future can never clearly be foreseen and it is not wise to attempt to foretell such imponderables.

The natural rivalry of these two unions can probably be traced to ancient times when the kingdoms of the Nile Valley and the Tigris-Euphrates Valley were in similar competitions for the control of the Arab East;

geographic Syria has always been the key to that control. Today's competition for leadership would appear to be an extension of that age old struggle for supremacy.

It is comforting, however, to realize that the new unities in the Arab East have created greater military, economic and political strength and have given the Arab states concerned more confidence in themselves. Patriotism, nationalism and public responsibility in government have soared to a tremendous new high, particularly in the United Arab Republic. And with diminishing weaknesses there will be less opportunity and less temptation for outside forces to exert their influence and control these states, for weakness always invites aggression in one form or another and strength deters it. Inevitably the Arab East will attain an eventual over-all unity that will not only realize an Arab dream; it will realize a new and lasting stability and security that it has not known since ancient times. But this must come about naturally, as the will of the peoples, to unite for their common welfare and to realize their national aspirations, and not by the use of force or aggression, for if violence is resorted to it is highly probable that it will involve hostilities on a wide-scale due to the international strategic interests and alignments already present in the area.

PART VI: AN EVALUATION; CONTRASTS AND COMPARISONS

CHAPTER 12

THE ARAB EAST AND THE WEST: COMMON GROUND FOR SECURITY

A. A Basis for Ties with the West

Despite the strong anti-Western sentiment prevailing in the Arab East today there exist good reasons for the Arabs to maintain strong ties with the West. Historically, the Arabs have always been linked to Western culture, more so than to the East; the West itself owes to the Arab heritage all the ultimate values which it holds sacred. Although the Arab East was rejected by the West with the establishment of Islam and the advent of the Crusades, the Arabs have never wholly rejected the West. For the past one hundred and fifty years the Arabs have maintained political, economic and cultural relationships, primarily with the West; this provides a valuable foundation upon which to build future ties.<sup>368</sup> It has been mainly to the dynamic social and cultural progress of the West that the Arabs have looked as their ideal and it is from the West that they have sought assistance and guidance.

The religious concepts of the Arabs, too, are a basis for Western relationships; a belief in a single deity, the acceptance of Christian traditions by the Moslem Arab (despite his rejection of Christian thought), and the fundamental incompatibility of Islam with atheism and communist materialism provide a much greater and natural inclination of the Arab toward the West than to the East. Moslem culture is not, on the other hand, incompatible with European or American culture.

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<sup>368</sup> Malik, Charles, "The Near East", p. 12-19

Arab individualism is certainly incompatible with the communist totalitarian pattern and Arab nationalism could never truly accept the world-wide objectives of Soviet communism. Ideologically, communism does not appeal to the average Arab. He has gained a respect for the fundamental freedoms and rights of man for which the French Revolution and the American Revolution were fought. The Western concept of democracy and independence have become his ideal. Certainly, in this regard, the influence of Western teaching and Western established institutions of learning in the Arab East must be credited with inculcating these fundamental concepts among the important Arab leaders of today. Hence, communism as a doctrine, an ideology, or as a way of life is essentially alien to the Arab mind, whereas, the Western concept of government is more readily acceptable.<sup>369</sup>

Economically, the Arab region possesses a history of trade relations primarily with the West; its economic development to date has been mainly as a result of Western influence. Perhaps the prime factor to consider is the natural inter-dependency of Western Europe and the Arab East in oil operations. Europe is the only large consumer available that can find use for the vast quantities of Arab oil and likewise, the Arab area is the only producer capable of meeting European demands. Such an essential reliance of one upon the other should bring about close natural ties and the realization that their destinies are irrevocably enmeshed.

Enlightened Arab leaders who are conversant with the past history of Russia are aware of the menace of Soviet imperialism and aggression. There is a genuine fear of the perils present in the recent Russian

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<sup>369</sup> Sayegh, op. cit., p. 70

influence drive in the Arab East. The Arabs realize that they cannot alone protect themselves from outside aggression or the penetration of foreign influences. They know that the West, in spite of its ill-treatment of the Arabs and its indifference to Arab nationalist aspirations is historically opposed to aggression; the West aptly demonstrated this in fighting two world wars within the last thirty years to halt aggression. In Korea from 1950-1952 it was Western influence which brought the United Nations' intervention to stop a Soviet-sponsored aggression. Although the events of the Suez War have done much to shatter Arab confidence in Western integrity, still the fact that the strongest Western power intervened to halt the hostilities continues to give the West a creditable status in the eyes of many. The Arabs know that their best guarantee from outside aggression lies in the protection of the Western powers for they are too weak to protect themselves. Only rabid xenophobia which grew up with the passionate nationalism and heart-felt resentment over the injustice of the Palestine issue has prevented close security relationships from coming about. The present predisposition to seek economic aid from the Soviet-bloc has come about as a result of the opposition of Western powers to allow legitimate Arab nationalist aspirations to develop. The withholding of Western aid and Western assistance from some of the Arab countries in an attempt to control their national and internal policies proved to be a miscalculation and a mistake which drove these states to seek help elsewhere, whereas, in reality, there was a natural predisposition to ask for Western assistance.<sup>370</sup> These facts seem to be widely realized today and in light of new policies and approaches which are being

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<sup>370</sup> Ibid

adopted today, Arab trust and confidence in the West, with which she would prefer to be associated, may ultimately be restored.

Perhaps the fundamental ideals and values upon which the Western civilization were founded and developed offer the best basis for linking the security of the Arabs and the West for these ideals are equally cherished by the Arab peoples. They must, however, be applied and respected similarly in West-Arab relationships in conjunction with the development of sincere friendship and mutual understanding.

B. Common Interests: The Arabs and the West

Both the Arabs and the West possess a common interest in:

- (1) Developing stable and secure governments.
- (2) An economic stability and internal development of resources and industry.
- (3) Social progress to include improved standards of living, health, education and welfare.
- (4) Safeguarding the territorial integrity and independence of the various states and the region as a whole.
- (5) Continued development of the oil industry and expansion of its operations; safeguarding its installations and training of Arabs to eventually manage and operate it.
- (6) Settlement of the Palestine question on the basis of social and political justice.
- (7) Self-determination of the peoples of the area in choice of government and realization of independence.
- (8) The United Nations and other international organizations to serve as a means of settling international disputes and preserving world

peace.

(9) Maintenance of peace in the Arab East and the security from outside or internal threats to the peace.

(10) A recognition of the fundamental rights of man as envisioned in the United Nations Charter.

(11) Freedom from the forces of communism.

### C. Divisive Factors

What then divides the Arabs and the West if so many factors exist in common? Most of the principal factors have already been discussed throughout the course of this study. It may suffice to outline and discuss them.

(1) The Palestine Problem; the Arabs link the West with the establishment and maintenance of Israel as a state. Until this issue is justly settled, there can be no major Arab-West security arrangement. This issue, however, is capable of settlement and the solution may be nearer than generally expected.

(2) A history of Arab-Western relations which justifies Arab fears of Western imperialism and the lack of Arab confidence in Western promises and policies. Even though resentments are deep-seated and national pride has been injured, there exists good possibilities for overcoming these attitudes through the adoption of new policies and new outlooks toward the Arabs, aimed at guaranteeing their independence, territorial integrity and assisting in the development of their economies. The Arabs are still eager and hopeful for improved and stronger relationships with the West.

(3) Failure of Western allies to develop a long-range, consistent policy, acceptable to the Arabs throughout the region. The diversity of

aims and motives in the policy of the United States versus the policies of Britain and France in the Arab world invites failure. The failure of the United States to develop an Arab policy of her own, not parallel to those of her allies or subject to local pressure, certainly prevents the Arabs from joining in close relations with her.<sup>371</sup> More important, however, is the development of a joint coordinated policy, regional in concept, consistently and aggressively undertaken by all the Western powers alike. Such a common stand, if devoid of past British and French imperialism and selfish interests, brought about by a forceful United States' policy which is capable of moulding its allies to nobler and more idealistic objectives in the Arab East, can yet win the Arabs before Russian influence precludes it.

(4) Competition of USSR to supplant Western influence in the Arab East. The friendly overtures of the Soviet Union toward the Arabs in extending economic assistance and trade agreements on tempting, attractive terms, plus the Russian decision to back the Arabs against Israel, has been enthusiastically welcomed by the people throughout the region. With Russian influences naturally came Western denunciations and anti-Western propoganda, thus making it difficult for a population to find close Western relations acceptable once it has come under the Soviet spell. Falsities and distorted facts, designed to discredit the West, and particularly the United States, are readily believed by the average uneducated Arab. Even in Arab states not directly under Soviet influence, anti-Western propoganda finds ample space in the press and radio to have considerable effect on public opinions. Too, the reading public is inclined to believe the first story, allegation,

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<sup>371</sup> Faris and Husayn, op. cit., p. 102-103



plot or tirade that it reads and seldom pays much attention to the counter-story or explanation that may follow in answer to such charges, hence, the Soviets have become effective propagandists and are at present rapidly displacing Western influence throughout the area. This can only be offset by a strong, energetic, and honest counter-program by the United States and its allies but such a public information program first needs as a basis a sound coordinated allied policy which conforms to the requirements discussed above in section (3).

(5) Lingering suspicions and hatred of Westerners due to the fact that xenophobia became part and parcel of Arab nationalism. While this is a serious obstacle it can be overcome, particularly by the younger generations as they learn respect for a principled employment of Western power and develop mutual interests with the West. As Arab unities and independence become realized, hatred of the foreigner will also subside as the nation settles down to problems of its own internal development and progress.

D. Toward Developing a Security for the Arab East: Western Measures Necessary

If the Western powers and the Arabs are to possess common ground on which to develop, mutually benefiting security measures based on their like interests, as has been pointed out in section B above, certain basic changes of attitude and policy must be effected.

The first and most important of steps in this direction is a just settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute and the problem of the Palestinian refugees. The Western powers possess the power, political and military, to force a permanent peace and equitable settlement, either inside or outside of the United Nations Organization. Quite logically,

it would be preferable to seek such a solution through the United Nations Organization; however, that effort failing should not permit the situation to remain vague, shapeless and indeterminate. Western policy with regard to Palestine has been marked by indecision and weakness, whereas determination and firmness are needed to arrive at a fair and just settlement.

If Western policy is to succeed at all it must first overcome the Palestine issue. The United States, although preferring an Arab-Israeli peace has never made any real attempt to consummate peace; it has made only desultory attempts to seek a permanent solution and has permitted the refugee issue to become a political football.<sup>372</sup>

The longer that this problem lies dormant and the longer the West remains indifferent to use her power to enforce a solution, then so much more difficult does the task become of finding a solution short of a major war. The Arab-Israeli dispute has offered the Russians their best opportunity to interfere in Arab East affairs; her entrance on the scene further complicates a solution. Yet the problem is still capable of solution in spite of the many complexities that confront the West. Truly, a re-evaluation of basic national and strategic interests is needed by all the Western powers; then, their Middle Eastern commitments should be reviewed to see if their policies are serving their own national interests. On this basis, and adhering firmly to principles of international justice and to a clearly announced policy, the West should promote what is ultimately in the common interest of the Arab East and the West. This may not in itself succeed but it is the only alternative to failure should

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<sup>372</sup> Shultz, op. cit., p. 46

the present course continue to be followed.<sup>373</sup>

Western powers must closely coordinate and arrive at consistent and regional policy concepts that serve their common interests with the Arabs. This requires patience and understanding of Arab nationalist aspirations; it demands a Western assistance and friendship in developing the areas which need economic help and encouragement to the growth of independent Arab states plus their accompanying political institutions. There has been a past tendency to regard all nationalist movements as reactionary or communist-inspired; these views must be readjusted to the realities of the region and real understanding through knowledge and study of the area. At the same time, nationalistic movements cannot be allowed to infringe on the sovereign rights of states who wish to pursue their own separate development. Natural unities that come about as the will of the peoples to strengthen and improve their status and to realize their dream of an Arab nation should be encouraged and assisted. Only when the Arabs recognize that the West is sympathetic to their nationalist movements and possesses a common interest and common purpose in helping them attain their aspirations will the hard core of nationalist mistrust disappear.<sup>374</sup> This cannot happen overnight but must come gradually as perceptible and acceptable changes in Western policies and attitudes become apparent to the Arabs.

An accompanying element in Western policy toward the Arabs must be an understanding of their predisposition toward neutralism. The situation of the Arab East relative to the principal habitable parts of the world and its petroleum resources have such an important bearing on the

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373 Hurewitz, op. cit., p. 34-35 (Eisenhower Doctrine)

374 Ibid

balance of power among nations today that keen competition for power and influence is bound to continue to exist between rival powers. The majority of the Arab states need the economic support and assistance of the competing powers due to their own lack of resources and development, both agriculturally and industrially. In view of the East-West struggle for consolidating positions and advancing national interests and considering the long-time Arab experience with the methods employed by the powers to attain these objectives, there is little reason to wonder that the Arabs prefer to take a neutralist stand. The Arab East is extremely sensitive to the power factor. The retreat of Great Britain from one position to another under Arab nationalist pressures, a weakened NATO brought about by the lack of enthusiasm on the part of some NATO members for showing a common front, and the growing military strength of the Soviet Union, has demonstrated to the Arabs that the West has no monopoly on power.<sup>375</sup> Consequently, the Arabs, entertaining serious doubts of who will be the eventual victor in the East-West struggle, do not choose to take sides. In view of their proximity to Russia this stand does not appear illogical nor need it be inconsistent with favorable relations toward the West.

It is imperative that any joint Western policy for the Arab and Middle East have clearly announced objectives, consistent with Arab and Western interests. Such a policy demands unequivocal stands and unwavering direction of effort in maintaining a concise position on the major problems facing the area today, i.e., the Arab-Israeli dispute, the Buraimi question, the status of Cyprus, Suez Canal policies, the status of the Persian Gulf Sheikdoms, Aden-Yemen warfare and the aspirations for independence in Algeria.

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<sup>375</sup> Hoskins, op. cit., p. 291-292

The developed policies must be based on the ethical principles that are the basis of Western democracies; the legitimate rights of nations and peoples seeking self-rule and self-determination; fairness, impartiality, and international justice, in compliance with the fundamental rights of man as provided by the United Nations Charter. The moral and idealistic content of such a Western-approach may have far greater appeal than a multi-million dollar assistance program in winning general Arab support for it has been clearly demonstrated since 1917 that in the Near and Middle East when peoples have been confronted with a choice between better living standards and sovereignty, their natural tendency has been to choose independence.<sup>376</sup> Perhaps the greatest failure of Western policy has been in the psychological approach to the Arab peoples. The adoption of a decisive and aggressive regional policy by all the Western powers will be an extremely difficult step in view of the wide divergence of national interests and their present methods of conducting affairs in the Arab world; it requires drastic revisions of concepts and re-evaluation of strategic interests in order that a united common front be established, and equally important, that the aims of this evaluation be acceptable to the Middle and Arab East; while it cannot hope to satisfy all, it must be in conformance with the needs and hopes of the majority. In consideration of the vitalness of the region to maintaining the strength of the free world, such a policy is not only desirable, it is mandatory for survival. In the strategic view, the whole of the Arab East is of such importance to the security of the West, that it would warrant military occupation of the entire area to prevent it from falling into the hands of

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<sup>376</sup> Spector, op. cit., p. 145

a potential aggressor. Such measures, however, are inconsistent with the ideas of modern democracies; there remains only the alternative of directing national policies to win the region for the West through friendship and persuasion.

Large scale economic and technical assistance will be required by the Arab countries for some time to come to help them bridge the gap between their present status and modern world progress. Up to date Western assistance has not been visibly felt nor widely appreciated in the Arab regions. This is due to a number of reasons which have been previously discussed. The distribution of aid funds through diversified contacts with the separate states has led to charges of meddling in internal affairs, supporting unpopular regimes and vested interests; foreign aid is the target of the opposition element in local politics and comes in for violent criticism and accompanying attempts to discredit the giver-nation (most usually the United States).

The West can neither afford to divide the Arabs nor compromise her own position by the support of one state against the other, one union against the other, nor be associated with the support of corrupt governments or private interests. A joint Western economic agency which could offer aid to the Arab states on a regional basis through a regional Arab organization similar to the Arab League (or one equally acceptable to the Arabs), could avoid the stigma of imperialistic meddling. The Arab body could itself decide on where and how such aid should be distributed, based on needs of the area. Western advisors and technicians would only be sent where requested by the Arab agency and only assist in the planning and development of the region to the extent that the Arabs desired. From such

a philanthropic offer and from such an organized procedure the West cannot be charged with anything other than humanitarianism. In the whole of the area the American government and the American people are not trying to serve just their own interests but the interests of the people who should benefit from their undertaking. There is a corrupted point of view often used by the opposition elements in the Arab region which argues that United States' aid is a cover for all sorts of private aims and political objectives. Such is not the case and Western policy must exaggerate its efforts to show that it is not; the Western economic assistance program must be associated with democracy as a body of ideals which aims to serve the interests of the world.<sup>377</sup>

A coordinated Western policy should possess as a basic element assurances for the protection of the independence and territorial integrity against outside aggression of the entire Arab region. It must pledge non-interference in internal affairs and allow natural political development from within as demonstrated by the will of the peoples. In the event of aggression or the threat of aggression the Western powers must be capable and willing to intervene with adequate armed forces, readily available and in close proximity to the area in order to preclude the loss of the region, or any part of it, before allied forces have time to act, all normal delays considered.

Programs of assistance must include full support to assist in the development of healthy military establishments, capable of adequate

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<sup>377</sup> Gibb, H.A.R., Conclusion, p. 194-195, The Near East and the Great Powers, (ed. Richard N. Frye), Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1951

self-defense and maintenance of internal order. Gifts or sales of armaments should continue to require assurances that the weapons will not be used for aggressive purposes. Indigenous efforts to establish regional alliances for a common defense should be encouraged and assisted.

Subversion and communist infiltration can be successfully combated with truth and enlightenment. An efficient and forceful program of public information, guided by well-trained representatives, and based on lofty principals can counter adverse propaganda and anti-Western sentiment. Continued exposure of actual communist designs and goals and clearly explained replies to leftist accusations, promptly circulated, can do much to correct misinformation and distorted facts concerning Western motives. The West, however, must take the initiative in the battle of ideas and seek to anticipate her position; she must not remain, as in the past, purely on the defensive, not acting except in reaction to a Soviet move in a particular area.

Present conditions in the Arab East dictate only one possible course of action for the Western powers to follow vis-a-vis the existence of the USSR in the area, competition; competition with the Soviet Union to equal or excel her efforts at winning Arab support and friendship. Unfortunately, the immediate future favors the Russians in this rivalry and not the West for the West has many obstacles to overcome in re-establishing relationships with the Arabs on a stable and trustworthy basis, (namely, the stigma of responsibility for the Palestine problem and past history of Western imperialism). However, the future is not entirely without hope. The fundamental Western precepts of freedom, justice and democracy continue to hold a great deal of appeal for the Arabs. Regardless of their maltreatment by the West, the Arabs have an



affinity for, and respect of, the sacred principles which made the Western nations great; they are eager and willing to re-establish close relationships with the West on a revised basis which fully recognizes their sovereignty and national aspirations. If Western policy can move from a situation of strength, coordinated, consistent and characterized by well-conceived ideas in common interest and purpose with the Arab countries, and if Western diplomacy anticipates and organizes for future exigencies, rather than frantically reacting after the crisis has erupted, the West can gain a new and respected prestige among the Arabs and closer relationships can be developed as a result of it.<sup>378</sup> A strong area-wide neutralism may remain but it will be a true neutralism instead of the present one which is oriented toward, and favorable to, the Soviet Union. When past suspicions are removed and mutual interests are realized there may be provided opportunities to expand Arab-West relationships into treaty arrangements which will further guarantee Western strategic interests. Only time, patience and understanding can bring about the objectives of the Western policy suggested. However, without the adoption of this course of action, there is truly only one alternative short of a major war or forceful military occupation of the entire region, and that is the piecemeal surrender of the Arab East to the USSR.

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<sup>378</sup> Hurewitz, op. cit., p. 34

- CHAPTER 13

CONCLUSION AND COMMENT

A. Summary of Aims

This thesis has attempted to present a study of the security of the Arab East between the years 1950 to 1958 and has as its principal objectives:

- (1) To show the past attempts to achieve security in the region prior to 1950.
- (2) To review the developments aimed at providing security since 1950.
- (3) To analyze rival foreign interests and their effect on the security of the area.
- (4) To present Arab interests and attitudes toward attaining security for the region.
- (5) To show the influence of oil and the Palestine problem on Arab East security.
- (6) To evaluate the military pacts, alliances and political agreements bearing on the security of the area since 1950.
- (7) To evaluate Arab-Western relationships and to make certain recommended courses of action to improve them.
- (8) To emphasize the strategic importance of the security of the Arab East to world powers.

B. In Comment

The period covered by this study (1950-1958) represents an era of dynamic historical change in the area of the Arab East. Geographical boundaries have changed, new states have been erected; nationalisms have

taken on new spirit and new complexions; rival foreign influences have entered on the local scene which will have a profound effect on the future of the area. The Western powers have become vitally dependent on its petroleum resources. Tensions and rivalries continue to mount within and without the region. The Arab-Israeli dispute continues. A major war occurred and its settlement has still not been fixed. The security, both internally and externally, throughout the area has been uncertain and continues to remain so.

Such a vital region in world politics cannot help but become an arena for a power struggle in the future, be it political or combat. A conflagration can only hope to be avoided by a thorough knowledge and understanding of the security considerations of the region coupled with a knowledge of the area, its peoples and its problems. Even this is a hope at best but at least a hope worthy of the efforts of the free world upon whose future it depends.

A firm and lasting security for the Arab East can be brought about by the formulation of intelligent Western foreign policies, honestly pursued, and backed by a position of strength and a willingness to move from that strength to enforce and execute policies to achieve national strategic interests which are at the same time in conformity with Arab interests. The West owes it to the world and to its own peoples to attempt such efforts in consideration of the appallingly gloomy alternatives that face their indifference to act.



The Arab peoples, while anxious to achieve a stable security for themselves, are incapable of bringing it about due to the conflicting pressures of the foreign powers that will continue to exercise their

influence in the region. It is highly unfortunate that the Arabs are placed in this perplexing predicament at such a difficult time in their effort to achieve a unity of the Arab nation, for it places serious limitations on their ability to bring it about free of outside pressures. It remains for the Western powers to overcome purely local influences, group and individual interests, and outside pressures, and to act solely in their national interests by means of high-principled policies that are long range, calculated and scrupulous.

The security of the Arab East is no less important than the security of several powers of the world that are concerned with it, for truly, the destiny of peace depends on it. Should this study assist in amplifying that fact then its principal aim shall have been satisfied.

# Topographical Map

ELEVATION IN FEET



omies based on agriculture. Saudi Arabia, the focal point of the Islamic world, has developed an economy based upon trade, the pilgrimage and, to a minor extent, agriculture.

These three sovereign nations could survive as important political entities without the benefits derived from oil. However, their governmental, economic and social progress would be seriously retarded in such an eventuality. By coincidence, the discovery of oil within their territories came a few years after they had adopted their present forms of government. Hence the governments and the oil industries have been intimately associated during the formative stage.

### IRAN

Among these nations, Iran (formerly Persia) has the longest history of self-government, but its modern form of government dates back only to 1906. In December of that year the Shah accepted a written constitution. In 1907 a constitutional law providing for an elected Majlis (parliament) was adopted. Iran's present political structure evolved from these two basic documents. Oil in commercial quantity was discovered at Masjid-i-Sulaiman in May of 1908.

Neither constitutional law nor petroleum had any appreciable effect upon Iran until after World War I. The Majlis was only a paper organization, completely subservient to the Shah. Political development was retarded also by Anglo-Russian rivalry over spheres of influence and by military occupation during the war.

In 1921 Reza Khan, a relatively obscure army officer, rose to a position of prominence and authority. In 1925 he was strong enough to force the abdication of Ahmad Shah, the last of the Qajar rulers. In December of that year he had himself proclaimed Shah-in-Shah (King of Kings) and became the first of the Pahlevi dynasty.

Reza Shah's reign (1925-41) was one of the most notable in Iranian history. In the initial years, he instituted sweeping changes in the government, primarily in the legal system, the treasury department and the army. He also initiated

a number of social and economic reforms. Among them were health and educational measures, encouragement of light industry and enactment of labor laws. Perhaps his greatest contribution to the country's economy was the construction of the trans-Iranian railroad, completed in 1937.

The part played by the petroleum industry in this phase of Iranian development was of fundamental importance. It furnished the necessary financial resources. Unfortunately, the period in which Iran's financial requirements were mounting coincided with the world-wide depression years, and in 1930 and 1931 oil revenues dropped sharply. The concession agreement was abrogated by the Shah and was renegotiated in April, 1933, on terms more favorable to Iran. Following the Allied occupation of his country in 1941, Reza Shah abdicated in favor of his son, Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlevi.

Politically and economically, Iran stood still during World War II. After the war, its internal situation was complicated by the Soviet Union's occupation of the northern area and demand for majority participation in an oil concession which would cover the five northern provinces. These interlocked issues were resolved in the critical years of 1946 and 1947. Russian troops were withdrawn in May, 1946, after the oil agreement was negotiated but before it was ratified. In October, 1947, the Majlis refused to approve the enacting bill on the ground that the agreement had been illegally executed. Dr. Mohammed Mossadeq, a well-known politician, played an important part in the defeat of the bill.

Subsequently many Iranian political leaders became convinced that the country's known petroleum resources were being exploited without adequate return to Iran. All of these resources were within the concession area of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. Over the years 1947-9 there were numerous discussions between company and government, which resulted in the Supplemental Agreement of July 17, 1949. However, this agreement was never implemented. During the spring of 1951 the Iranian oil industry was nationalized



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ARABIAN AMERICAN OIL COMPANY

March 1956

APPENDIX 2

THE PACT OF THE LEAGUE OF ARAB STATES

(signed on March 22, 1945)

His Excellency the President of the Syrian Republic

His Royal Highness the Emir of Transjordan

His Majesty the King of Iraq

His Majesty the King of Saudi Arabia

His Excellency the President of the Lebanese Republic

His Majesty the King of Egypt

His Majesty the King of Yemen

With a view to strengthening the close relations and numerous ties which bind the Arab States,

And out of concern for the cementing and reinforcing of these bonds on the basis of respect for the independence and sovereignty of these States,

And in order to direct their efforts toward the goal of the welfare of all the Arab States, their common weal, the guarantee of their future and the realization of their aspirations,

And in response to Arab public opinion in all the Arab countries,

Have agreed to conclude a pact to this effect ....

Article 1 - The League of Arab states shall be composed of the independent Arab States that have signed this Pact.

Every independent Arab State shall have the right to adhere to the League. Should it desire to adhere, it shall present an application to this effect which shall be filed with the permanent General Secretariat and submitted to the Council at its first meeting following the



presentation of the application.

Article 2 - The purpose of the League is to draw closer the relations between member States and coordinate their political activities with the aim of realizing a close collaboration between them, to safeguard their independence and sovereignty, and to consider in a general way the affairs and interests of the Arab countries.

It also has among its purposes a close cooperation of the member States, with due regard to the structure of each of these States and the conditions prevailing therein, in the following matters:

(a) Economic and financial matters, including trade, customs, currency, agriculture and industry.

(b) Communications, including railways, roads, aviation, navigation and posts and telegraphs.

(c) Cultural matters.

(d) Matters connected with nationality, passports, visas, execution of judgments and extradition.

(e) Social welfare matters.

(f) Health matters.

Article 3 - The League shall have a Council composed of the representatives of the member States. Each State shall have one vote, regardless of the number of its representatives.

The Council shall be entrusted with the function of realizing the purposes of the League and of supervising the execution of the agreements concluded between the member States on matters referred to in the preceding article or on other matters.

It shall also have the function of determining the means whereby the League will collaborate with the international organizations which may be created in the future to guarantee peace and security and organize economic and social relations.

Article 4 - A special Committee shall be formed for each of the categories enumerated in Article 2, on which the member States shall be represented. These committees shall be entrusted with establishing the basis and scope of cooperation in the form of draft agreements which shall be submitted to the Council for its consideration preparatory to their being submitted to the States referred to.

Delegates representing the other Arab countries may participate in these Committees as members. The Council shall determine the circumstances in which the participation of these representatives shall be allowed as well as the basis of the representation.

Article 5 - The recourse to force for the settlement of disputes between two or more member States shall not be allowed. Should there arise among them a dispute that does not involve the independence of a State, its sovereignty or its territorial integrity, and should the two contending parties apply to the Council for the settlement of this dispute, the decision of the Council shall then be effective and obligatory.

In this case, the States among whom the dispute has arisen shall not participate in the deliberations and decisions of the Council.

The Council shall mediate in a dispute which may lead to war between two member States or between a member State and another State in order to conciliate them.

The decisions relating to arbitration and mediation shall be taken by majority vote.

Article 6 - In case of aggression or threat of aggression by a State against a member State, the State attacked or threatened with attack may request an immediate meeting of the Council.

The Council shall determine the necessary measures to repel this aggression. Its decision shall be taken unanimously. If the aggression is committed by a member State, the vote of that State will not be counted in determining unanimity.

If the aggression is committed in such a way as to render the Government of the State attacked unable to communicate with the Council, the representative of that State in the Council may request the Council to convene for the purpose set forth in the preceding paragraph. If the representative is unable to communicate with the Council, it shall be the right of any member State to request a meeting of the Council.

Article 7 - The decisions of the Council taken by a unanimous vote shall be binding on all the member States of the League; those that are reached by a majority vote shall bind only those that accept them.

In both cases the decisions of the Council shall be executed in each State in accordance with the fundamental structure of that State.

Article 8 - Every member State of the League shall respect the form of government obtaining in the other States of the League, and shall recognize the form of government obtaining as one of the rights of those States, and shall pledge itself not to take any action tending to change that form.

Article 9 - The States of the Arab League that are desirous of establishing among themselves closer collaboration and stronger bonds than those provided for in the present Pact, may conclude among themselves whatever agreements they wish for this purpose.

The treaties and agreements already concluded or that may be concluded in the future between a member State and any other State, shall not be binding on the other members.

Article 10 - The permanent seat of the League of Arab States shall be Cairo. The Council of the League may meet at any other place it designates.

Article 11 - The Council of the League shall meet in ordinary session twice a year, during the months of March and October. It shall meet in extraordinary session at the request of two member States whenever the need arises.

Article 12 - The League shall have a permanent General Secretariat, composed of a Secretary General, Assistant Secretaries and an adequate number of officials.

The Secretary General shall be appointed by the Council upon the vote of two thirds of the States of the League. The Assistant Secretaries and the principal officials shall be appointed by the Secretary General with the approval of the Council.

The Council shall establish an internal organization for the General Secretariat as well as the conditions of service of the officials.

The Secretary General shall have the rank of Ambassador and the Assistant Secretaries the rank of Minister Plenipotentiary.

The First Secretary General of the League is designated in an annex to the present Pact.

Article 13 - The Secretary General shall prepare the draft of the budget of the League and submit it for approval to the Council before the beginning of each fiscal year.

The Council shall determine the share of each of the States of the League in the expenses. It shall be allowed to revise the share if necessary.

Article 14 - The members of the Council of the League, the members of its Committees, and such of its officials as shall be designated in the internal organization, shall enjoy, in the exercise of their duties, diplomatic privileges and immunities.

The premises occupied by the institutions of the League shall be inviolable.

Article 15 - The Council shall meet for the first time at the invitation of the Head of the Egyptian Government. Later meetings shall be convoked by the Secretary General.

In each ordinary session the representatives of the States of the League shall assume the chairmanship of the Council in rotation.

Article 16 - Except for the cases provided for in the present Pact, a majority shall suffice for decisions by the Council effective in the following matters:

- (a) Matters concerning the officials.
- (b) The approval of the budget of the League.
- (c) The internal organization of the Council, the Committees

and the General Secretariat.

(d) The termination of the sessions.

Article 17 - The member States of the League shall file with the General Secretariat copies of all treaties and agreements which they have concluded or will conclude with any other State, whether a member of the League or otherwise.

Article 18 - If one of the member States intends to withdraw from the League, the Council shall be informed of its intention one year before the withdrawal takes effect.

The Council of the League may consider any State that is not fulfilling the obligations resulting from this Pact as excluded from the League, by a decision taken by a unanimous vote of all the States except the State referred to.

Article 19 - The present Pact may be amended with the approval of two-thirds of the members of the League, in particular for the purpose of strengthening the ties between them, of creating an Arab Court of Justice, and of regulating the relations of the League with the international organizations that may be created in the future to guarantee security and peace.

No decision shall be taken as regards an amendment except in the session following that in which it is proposed.

Any State that does not approve an amendment may withdraw from the League when the amendment becomes effective, without being bound by the provisions of the preceding article.

Article 20 - The present Pact and its annexes shall be ratified in accordance with the fundamental form of government in each of the contracting States.

The instruments of ratification shall be filed with the General Secretariat and the present Pact shall become binding on the States that ratify it fifteen days after the Secretary General receives instruments of ratification from four States.

The present Pact has been drawn up in the Arabic language in Cairo and dated 8 Rabi' al-Thani 1364 (March 22, 1945) in a single text which shall be deposited with the General Secretariat.

A certified copy shall be sent to each of the States of the League.

APPENDIX 3

TREATY OF JOINT DEFENSE AND ECONOMIC COOPERATION:

THE STATES OF THE ARAB LEAGUE

(June 17, 1950)

(Entered into force, August 23, 1952)

The Governments of:

The Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan

The Syrian Republic

The Kingdom of Iraq

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

The Lebanese Republic

The Kingdom of Egypt

The Motawakilite Kingdom of Yemen

In view of the desire of the above-mentioned Governments to consolidate relations between the States of the Arab League; to maintain their independence and their mutual heritage; in accordance with the desire of their peoples, to cooperate for the realization of mutual defense and the maintenance of security and peace according to the principles of both the Arab League Pact and the United Nations Charter, together with the aims of the said Pacts; and to consolidate stability and security and provide means of welfare and development in the countries.

The following government delegates of .... , having been duly accredited and fully authorized by their respective governments, approve the following:

Article 1 - The Contracting States, in an effort to maintain and stabilize



peace and security, hereby confirm their desire to settle their international disputes by peaceful means, whether such disputes concern relations among themselves or with other Powers.

Article 2 - The Contracting States consider any (act of) armed aggression made against any one or more of them or their armed forces, to be directed against them all. Therefore, in accordance with the right of self-defense, individually and collectively, they undertake to go without delay to the aid of the State or States against which such an act of aggression is made, and immediately to take, individually and collectively, all steps available, including the use of armed force, to repel the aggression and restore security and peace. In conformity with Article 6 of the Arab League Pact and Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, the Arab League Council and U.N. Security Council shall be notified of such act of aggression and the means and procedure taken to check it.

Article 3 - At the invitation of any one of the signatories of this Treaty the Contracting States shall hold consultations whenever there are reasonable grounds for the belief that the territorial integrity, independence, or security of any one of the parties is threatened. In the event of the threat of war or the existence of an international emergency, the Contracting States shall immediately proceed to unify their plans and defensive measures, as the situation may demand.

Article 4 - The Contracting States, desiring to implement fully the above obligations and effectively carry them out, shall cooperate in consolidating and coordinating their armed forces, and shall participate according to their resources and needs in preparing individual and collective means of

defense to repulse the said armed aggression.

Article 5 - A Permanent Military Commission composed of representatives of the General Staffs of the armies of the Contracting States shall be formed to draw up plans of joint defense and their implementation. The duties of the Permanent Military Commission which are set forth in an Annex attached to this Treaty, include the drafting of necessary reports on the method of cooperation and participation mentioned in Article 4. The Permanent Military Commission shall submit to the Joint Defense Council, provided hereunder in Article 6, reports dealing with questions within its province.

Article 6 - A Joint Defense Council under the supervision of the Arab League Council shall be formed to deal with all matters concerning the implementation of the provisions of Articles 2, 3, 4, and 5 of this Treaty. It shall be assisted in the performance of its task by the Permanent Military Commission referred to in Article 5. The Joint Defense Council shall consist of the Foreign Ministers and the Defense Ministers of the Contracting States or their representatives. Decisions taken by a two-thirds majority shall be binding on all the Contracting States.

Article 7 - The Contracting States, in order to fulfill the aims of this Treaty, and to bring about security and prosperity in the Arab countries, and in an effort to raise the standard of living in them, undertake to cooperate in the development of their economies and the exploitation of their natural resources; to facilitate the exchange of their respective agricultural and industrial products; and generally to organize and coordinate their economic activities and to conclude the necessary inter-Arab agreements to realize such aims.

Article 8 - An Economic Council consisting of the Ministers in charge of economic affairs, or their representatives if necessary, shall be formed by the Contracting States to submit recommendations for the realization of all such aims as are set forth in the previous article. The Council may, in the performance of its duties, seek the cooperation of the Committee for Financial and Economic Affairs referred to in Article 4 of the Arab League Pact.

Article 9 - The Annex to this Treaty shall be considered an integral and indivisible part of it.

Article 10 - The Contracting States undertake to conclude no international agreements which may be contradictory to the provisions of this Treaty, nor to act, in their international relations, in a way which may be contrary to the aims of this Treaty.

Article 11 - No provision of this Treaty shall in any way affect, or is intended to affect, any of the rights or obligations devolving upon the Contracting States from the United Nations Charter or the responsibilities borne by the United Nations Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Article 12 - After a lapse of 10 years from the date of the ratification of this Treaty, any one of the Contracting States may withdraw from it, providing 12 months' notice is previously given to the Secretariat-General of the Arab League. The Secretariat-General of the League shall inform the other Contracting States of such notice.

Article 13 - This Treaty shall be ratified by each Contracting State

according to the constitutional procedure of its own government. The Treaty shall come into force for the ratifying State 15 days after the receipt by the Secretariat-General of the instruments of ratification from at least four States. This Treaty is drafted in Arabic in Cairo on April 13, 1950. One signed copy shall be deposited with the Secretariat-General of the Arab League; equally authentic copies shall be transmitted to each of the Contracting States.

-MILITARY ANNEX-

1. The Permanent Military Commission provided for in Article 5 of the Joint Defense and Economic Cooperation Treaty between the States of the Arab League, shall undertake the following:

(a) in cooperation with the Joint Defense Council, to prepare plans to deal with all anticipated dangers or armed aggression that may be launched against one or more of the Contracting States or their armed forces, such plans to be based on the principles determined by the Joint Defense Council;

(b) to submit proposals for the organization of the forces of the Contracting States, stipulating the minimum force for each in accordance with military exigencies and the potentialities of each State;

(c) to submit proposals for increasing the effectiveness of the forces of the Contracting States in so far as their equipment, organization, and training are concerned; so that they may keep pace with modern military methods and development; and for the unification and coordination of all such forces;

(d) to submit proposals for the exploitation of natural, agricultural, industrial, and other resources of all Contracting States

in favor of the inter-Arab military effort and joint defense;

(e) to organize the exchange of training missions between the Contracting States for the preparation of plans, participation in military exercises and maneuvers and the study of their results, recommendations for the improvement of methods to ensure close cooperation in the field, and for the general improvement of the forces of all the Contracting States;

(f) to prepare the necessary data on the resources and military potentialities of each of the Contracting States and the part to be played by the forces of each in the joint military effort;

(g) to discuss the facilities and various contributions which each of the Contracting States, in conformity with the provisions of this Treaty, might be asked to provide, during a state of war, on behalf of the armies of such other Contracting States as might be operating on its territory.

2. The Permanent Military Commission may form temporary or permanent sub-committees from among its own members to deal with any of the matters falling within its jurisdiction. It may also seek the advice of any experts whose views on certain questions are deemed necessary.

3. The Permanent Military Commission shall submit detailed reports on the results of its activities and studies to the Joint Defense Council provided for in Article 6 of this Treaty, as well as an annual report giving full particulars of its work and studies during the year.

4. The Permanent Military Commission shall establish its headquarters in Cairo but may hold meetings in any other place the Commission may specify. The Commission shall elect its Chairman for two years; he may be reelected.

Candidates for the Chairmanship shall hold at least the rank of a high commanding officer. Each member of the Commission must have as his original nationality that of the Contracting State he represents.

5. In the event of war, the supreme command of the joint forces shall be entrusted to the Contracting State possessing the largest military force taking actual part in field operations, unless, by unanimous agreement, the Commander-in-Chief is selected otherwise. The Commander-in-Chief shall be assisted in directing military operations by a Joint Staff.

APPENDIX 4

TRIPARTITE AGREEMENT OF 1950

May 25, 1950

The Governments of the United Kingdom, France, and the United States having had occasion during the recent Foreign Ministers' meeting in London to review certain questions affecting the peace and stability of the Arab States and Israel, and particularly that of the supply of arms and war materials to these States, have resolved to make the following statement:

(1) The three Governments recognize that the Arab States and Israel all need to maintain a certain level of armed forces for the purposes of assuring their internal security and their legitimate self-defense, and to permit them to play their part in the defense of the area as a whole. All applications for arms or war materials for these countries will be considered in light of these principles. In this connection the three Governments reaffirm the statements made by their representatives in the Security Council on August 4, 1949, in which they declared their opposition to the development of an arms race between the Arab States and Israel.

(2) The three Governments declare that assurances have been received from all the States in question to which they permit arms to be supplied from their countries that the purchasing State does not intend to undertake any act of aggression against any other State. Similar assurances will be requested from any other State in the area to which they permit arms to be supplied in the future.

(3) The three Governments take this opportunity of declaring their deep interest in, and their desire to promote the establishment of, peace and stability in the area, and their unalterable opposition to the use of force in that area. The three Governments, should they find that any of these States was preparing to violate frontiers or armistice lines, would, consistently with obligations as members of the United Nations, immediately take action, both within and outside the United Nations to prevent such violation.



APPENDIX 5

THE ANGLO-EGYPTIAN AGREEMENT (SUEZ) OF 1954

1. It is agreed between the Egyptian and British Delegations that with a view to establishing Anglo-Egyptian relations on a new basis of mutual understanding and firm friendship, and taking into account their obligations under the United Nations Charter, an Agreement regarding the Suez Canal Base should now be drafted on the following lines.
2. The Agreement will last until the expiry of seven years from the date of signature. During the last twelve months of this period the two Governments will consult together to decide what arrangements are necessary upon the termination of the Agreement.
3. Parts of the present Suez Canal Base will be kept in efficient working order in accordance with the requirements set forth in Annex 1 and capable of immediate use in accordance with the following paragraph.
4. (i) In the event of an armed attack by an outside power on Egypt, or on any country which at the date of signature of the present Agreement is a party to the Treaty of Joint Defence between Arab League States and Turkey, Egypt will afford to the United Kingdom such facilities as may be necessary in order to place the Base on a war footing and to operate it effectively. These facilities will include the use of Egyptian ports within the limits of what is strictly indispensable for the above-mentioned purposes.  
(ii) In the event of a threat of an attack on any of the above-mentioned countries, there shall be immediate consultation between the United Kingdom and Egypt.

5. The organisation of the Base will be in accordance with Annex 1 below.
6. The United Kingdom will be accorded the right to move any British material into or out of the Base at its discretion. There will be no increase above the level of supplies to be agreed upon without the consent of the Egyptian Government.
7. Her Majesty's Forces will be completely withdrawn from Egyptian territory according to a schedule to be established in due course within a period of twenty months from the date of signature of this Agreement. The Egyptian Government will afford all necessary facilities for the movement of men and material in this connexion.
8. The agreement will recognize that the Suez Maritime Canal which is an integral part of Egypt is a waterway economically, commercially and strategically of international importance, and will express the determination of both parties to uphold the 1888 Convention guaranteeing the freedom of navigation of the Canal.
9. The Egyptian Government will afford over-flying, landing and servicing facilities for notified flights of aircraft under Royal Air Force control. For the clearance of any flights the Egyptian Government will extend most favourable nation treatment.
10. There will be questions of detail to be covered in the drafting of the Agreement including the storage of oil, the financial arrangements necessary, and other detailed matters of importance to both sides. These will be settled by friendly agreement in negotiations which will begin

forthwith.

ANNEX 1: ORGANIZATION OF THE BASE

Her Majesty's Government shall have the right to maintain certain agreed installations and to operate them for current requirements. Should Her Majesty's Government decide at any time no longer to maintain all these installations they will discuss with the Egyptian Government the disposal of any installation which they no longer require. The approval of the Egyptian Government must be obtained for any new construction.

2. Following the withdrawal of Her Majesty's Forces the Egyptian Government will assume responsibility for the security of the Base and of all equipment contained therein, or in transit on Egyptian territory to and from the Base.

3. Her Majesty's Government will conclude contracts with one or more British or Egyptian commercial firms for the up-keep and operation of the installations referred to in paragraph 1 and the maintenance of the stores contained in these installations. These Commercial Firms will have the right to engage British and Egyptian civilian technicians and personnel; the number of the British technicians employed by these Commercial Firms shall not exceed a figure which shall be agreed upon in the detailed negotiations. These Commercial Firms will have also the right to engage such local labour as they may require.

4. The Egyptian Government will give full support to the Commercial Firms referred to in paragraph 3 to enable them to carry out these tasks and will designate an authority with whom the contractors can cooperate for

the discharge of their duties.

5. The Egyptian Government will maintain in good order such installations, public utilities, communications, bridges, pipe lines and wharves, etc., as will be handed over to it according to agreement between the two Governments. The Commercial Firms referred to in paragraph 3 will be afforded such facilities as may be required in their operations.

6. Her Majesty's Government will be afforded facilities for the inspection of the installations referred to in paragraph 1 and the work being carried out therein. To facilitate this personnel shall be attached to Her Majesty's Embassy in Cairo. The maximum number of such personnel will be agreed between the two Governments.

The following is the text of the Heads of Agreement initialled by the representatives of the United Kingdom and Egyptian Government in Cairo on July 27th.

APPENDIX 6

PACT OF MUTUAL CO-OPERATION BETWEEN IRAQ AND TURKEY

(Baghdad, February 24, 1955)

Article 1 - Consistent with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter the High Contracting Parties will co-operate for their security and defence. Such measures as they agree to take to give effect to this co-operation may form the subject of special agreements with each other.

Article 2 - In order to ensure the realization and effect application of the co-operation provided for in Article 1 above, the competent authorities of the High Contracting Parties will determine the measures to be taken as soon as the present pact enters into force. These measures will become operative as soon as they have been approved by the Governments of the High Contracting Parties.

Article 3 - The High Contracting Parties undertake to refrain from any interference whatsoever in each other's internal affairs. They will settle any dispute between themselves in a peaceful way in accordance with the United Nations Charter.

Article 4 - The High Contracting Parties declare that the dispositions of the present pact are not in contradiction with any of the international obligations contracted by either of them with any third State or States. They do not derogate from, and cannot be interpreted as derogating from the said international obligations. The High Contracting Parties undertake not to enter into any international obligation incompatible with the present pact.

Article 5 - This pact shall be open for accession to any member of the Arab League or any other State actively concerned with the security and peace in this region and which is fully recognized by both of the High Contracting Parties. Accession shall come into force from the date of which the instrument of accession of the State concerned is deposited with the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Iraq.

Any acceding State party to the present pact may conclude special agreements, in accordance with Article 1, with one or more States parties to the present pact. The competent authority of any acceding State may determine measures in accordance with Article 2. These measures will become operative as soon as they have been approved by the Governments of the parties concerned.

Article 6 - A permanent Council at ministerial level will be set up to function within the framework of the purposes of this pact when at least four Powers become parties to the pact.

The Council will draw up its own rules of procedure.

Article 7 - This pact remains in force for a period of five years renewable for other five-year periods. Any Contracting Party may withdraw from the pact by notifying the other parties in writing of its desire to do so six months before the expiration of any of the above-mentioned periods, in which case the pact remains valid for the other parties.

Article 8 - This pact shall be ratified by the contracting parties and ratifications shall be exchanged at Ankara as soon as possible. Thereafter it shall come into force from the date of the exchange of ratifications.

APPENDIX 7

THE ANGLO-IRAQI AGREEMENT OF 1955

The Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the Kingdom of Iraq,

Considering that the United Kingdom intends to accede to the Pact of Mutual Co-operation between Iraq and Turkey signed at Baghdad on February 24, 1955; and desiring as equal and sovereign partners in the Pact to make a special Agreement in accordance with the provisions of Article 1 of the Pact;

Have agreed as follows:

Article 1 - The two Contracting Governments shall maintain and develop peace and friendship between their two countries and shall co-operate for their security and defence in accordance with the Pact of Mutual Co-operation.

Article 2 - The Treaty of Alliance between the United Kingdom and Iraq, signed at Baghdad on June 30, 1930, with annexure and notes exchanged, shall terminate from the date when the present Agreement comes into force.

Article 3 - The Government of Iraq by the present Agreement undertakes no obligations beyond the frontiers of Iraq.

Article 4 - The Government of Iraq assumes full responsibility for the defence of Iraq and will command and guard all defence installations in Iraq.

Article 5 - In accordance with Article 1 of the Pact, there shall be close co-operation between the competent authorities of the two Governments for the defence of Iraq. This co-operation shall include planning, combined

training, and the provision of such facilities as may be agreed upon between the two Contracting Governments for this purpose and with the object of maintaining Iraq's armed forces at all times in a state of efficiency and readiness.

Article 6 - The Government of the United Kingdom shall, at the request of the Government of Iraq, do their best (a) to afford help to Iraq: (i) in creating and maintaining an effective Iraqi Air Force by means of joint training and exercises in the Middle East; and (ii) in the efficient maintenance and operation of such airfields and other installations as may from time to time be agreed to be necessary; (b) to join with the Government of Iraq in (i) establishing an efficient system of warning against air attack; (ii) ensuring that equipment for the defence of Iraq is kept in Iraq in a state of readiness; and (iii) training and equipping Iraqi forces for the defence of their country; and (c) to make available in Iraq technical personnel of the British forces for the purposes of giving effect to the provisions of paragraphs (a) and (b) of this article.

Article 7 - Service aircraft of the two countries shall enjoy staging and over-flying facilities in each other's territories.

Article 8 - In the event of an armed attack against Iraq or threat of an armed attack which, in the opinion of the two Contracting Governments, endangers the security of Iraq, the Government of the United Kingdom at the request of the Government of Iraq shall make available assistance, including if necessary armed forces to help defend Iraq. The Government of Iraq shall provide all facilities and assistance to enable such aid to be rapid and effective.



Article 9 - (a) The present agreement shall come into force on the date on which the United Kingdom becomes a party to the Pact.

(b) The agreement shall remain in force so long as both Iraq and the United Kingdom are parties to the Pact.

APPENDIX 8

EGYPTIAN-SYRIAN MUTUAL DEFENSE PACT (OCTOBER 20, 1955)

EGYPTIAN-SAUDI ARABIAN MUTUAL DEFENSE PACT (OCTOBER 27, 1955)

(The text of these two Pacts is identical on most points; where variations occur, the wording of the Egyptian-Saudi Arabia Pact is given in a footnote.)

Article 1 - The two Contracting Countries affirm their keen desire for lasting security and peace and their determination to settle all their international differences by peaceful methods.

Article 2 - The two Contracting Countries consider any armed attack on the territory or forces of one of them as an attack on both of them. Consequently, and in exercise of the right of individual and collective self-defense, they undertake to extend speedy assistance to the attacked country and to take immediately all measures and use all means at their disposal, including armed force, to expel the attack and restore security and peace.

In accordance with Article 6 of the Arab League Charter and Article 51 of the United Nations Charter the League Council and the Security Council shall be immediately informed of the attack and the measures taken to deal with it.

The two Contracting Countries pledge that neither of them shall conclude a unilateral peace settlement or any kind of agreement with the aggressor without the consent of the other country.

Article 3 - The two Contracting Countries shall, at the request of either, consult with each other whenever serious tensions develop in international relations in a manner affecting the security of the Arab Area in the Middle

East, or the territorial integrity or independence or security of any or either country.<sup>1</sup> In the event of an imminent threat of war or a sudden international emergency of a menacing nature, the two Contracting Countries shall immediately take the preventive and defensive measures required by the situation.

Article 4 - In the event of a sudden attack on the borders or the forces of either of the Contracting Countries, they shall immediately determine the measures needed to put the provisions of this Agreement into effect in addition to the military measures taken to meet such an attack.

Article 5 - For the fulfillment of the purposes of this Agreement, the two Contracting Countries have agreed to establish the following organizational machinery: A Supreme Council, A War Council, A Joint Command.

Article 6 - (a) The Supreme Council shall be composed of the Foreign and War Ministers of the two Contracting Countries.

(b) It shall be the official authority from which the Commander-in-Chief of the Joint Command shall receive all directions relating to military policy. It shall have the power to appoint or dismiss the Commander-in-Chief.

(c) At the suggestion of the War Council, it shall organize the Joint Command, define its terms of reference and its duties and make any amendments therein upon the recommendation of the War Council. The Supreme Council shall have the right to set up any committees or subsidiary or provisional councils whenever such a step is deemed necessary.

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<sup>1</sup> The two Contracting Parties shall, at the request of either, consult with each other whenever serious tensions develop in international relations in a manner affecting the territorial integrity or independence of either country.

(d) The Council shall be empowered to examine the recommendations and decisions of the War Council on matters outside the jurisdiction of the Chiefs-of-Staff.

(e) The Council shall issue rules of procedures for its meetings and for the functions of the War Council.

Article 7 - (a) The War Council shall be composed of the Chiefs-of-Staff of the two Contracting Countries.

(b) It shall serve as the Supreme Council's advisory body. It shall submit recommendations and directives in connection with military planning and all the duties assigned to the Joint Command.

(c) The War Council shall make recommendations on war industries and on communications facilities required for military purposes, including their coordination for the benefit of the Armed Forces in the two Contracting Countries.

(d) It shall prepare statistical and other data on the military, natural, industrial, and other resources and potentialities of the two Contracting Countries and on everything related to their joint war effort. It shall submit to the Supreme Council proposals for the exploitation of these resources and potentialities for the benefit of the war effort.<sup>2</sup>

(e) The War Council shall study the programs drawn by the Joint Command for training, organizing, arming, and equipping the forces at its disposal. It shall also study the possibilities of applying them to the armies of the two Contracting Countries and shall take steps to carry them out. It shall submit its findings to the Supreme Council for endorsement.

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<sup>2</sup> This paragraph is not included in the Egyptian-Saudi Arabian Pact.

(f) This Council shall have a permanent military body to make all preparatory studies on the questions coming up before it. The Council shall organize the functions of this body by drawing up procedural rules for this purpose. It shall also draw up its budget.

Article 8 - (a) The Joint Command shall consist of:

- (1) The Commander-in-Chief
- (2) The general staff
- (3) The units detached for the security of the Joint Command and the conduct of its activities.

This Command shall be permanent, functioning in peacetime and wartime.

(b) The Commander-in-Chief shall command the forces put at his disposal. He shall be responsible to the Supreme Council. His duties shall be:

- (1) To draw up and implement the programs for training, organizing, arming and equipping the forces placed at his disposal by the two Contracting Countries so that they may become a dependable unified force; and to submit these programs to the War Council for examination or to the Supreme Council for endorsement.

- (2) To prepare and carry out joint defense plans to meet all eventualities arising from any possible armed attack on one of the two Contracting Countries of their forces. For the preservation of these plans he shall rely on the decisions and the directives of the Supreme Council.

- (3) To deploy the forces put at his disposal by the two Contracting Countries in peacetime and wartime in accordance with joint defense plans.

(4) To draw up the budget of the Joint Command and to submit it to the War Council for consideration prior to final endorsement by the Supreme Council.

(c) The appointment or dismissal of the Chief Aides of the Commander-in-Chief shall be undertaken by the War Council in agreement with the Commander-in-Chief. As for the post of the Command Staff, appointments and dismissals shall be undertaken by the Commander-in-Chief in agreement with the Chief of Staff of the Army concerned.

Article 9 - (a) The two Contracting Parties will place at the disposal of the Joint Command, in peace and wartime, all striking units including the troops concentrated on the Palestine borders. The War Council, in conjunction with the Commander-in-Chief, will fix the number of troops to be entrusted with each of the two tasks, the recommendations of the Council to be considered as final immediately on being approved by the Supreme Council.

(b) The War Council, on the recommendation of the Commander-in-Chief, shall make precise list of the installations and bases necessary for the carrying out of plans and will decide on priority.<sup>3</sup>

Article 10 - (a) a joint fund in which the two Contracting Parties will participate shall be established for the achievement of the following objectives:

(1) All expenses incurred by the Joint Command shall be equally

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<sup>3</sup> Article 9 - The two Contracting Parties will place at the disposal of the Joint Command, in peace and wartime, such forces as may be deemed necessary by the War Council in agreement with the Commander-in-Chief. This shall be done with the approval of the Supreme Council.

shared by the two Contracting Parties.

(2) With regard to the expenses for the maintenance of military installations mentioned in Article 9, paragraph (6), they shall be borne in the proportion sixty-five per cent by the Egyptian Republic and thirty-five per cent by the Syrian Republic.

(b) Each of the two Contracting States shall pay all salaries and indemnities for the military and civil personnel to be seconded for duty by it with the Joint Command, the War Council and other Committees in conformity with the financial regulations of each of them.<sup>4</sup>

Article 11 - None of the provisions of this Pact shall in any way affect the rights and obligations which may result from or which may accrue in conformity with the provisions of the United Nations Charter or with the responsibilities borne by the United Nations Security Council for the maintenance of world peace and security.

Article 12 - This Treaty shall be for a term of ten years automatically renewable for further terms of five years.<sup>5</sup> Each of the two Contracting Parties may terminate the Pact by notifying the other Party at least one year before the expiration of any of the above terms.

Article 13 - This Treaty shall be approved in conformity with the constitutional rules in force in each of the two Countries, the instruments of

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<sup>4</sup> Article 10 - Each of the two Contracting Countries shall pay the salaries and remuneration of the military and civilian personnel attached to the Joint Command, the War Council, and other Committees in accordance with its own financial regulations.

<sup>5</sup> This Treaty shall be for a term of five years automatically renewable for further terms of five years.

ratification to be exchanged at the Syrian Foreign Ministry in Damascus within a period not exceeding thirty days from the date of the signing of the Pact which will come into force immediately on the exchange of the documents.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> This paragraph not included in Egyptian-Saudi Arabian Pact.



APPENDIX 9

A SYNOPSIS OF

EGYPTIAN-SAUDI ARABIAN-YEMENI PACT OF APRIL 21, 1956

(Jeddah, Saudi Arabia)

(Main Provisions)

(1) That armed aggression against any of the signatories would be regarded as aggression against all of them.

(2) That the signatories would hold consultations in the event of international tension causing a threat to the integrity or independence of any of them.

(3) That they would take any necessary "preventive and defensive measures" that such a situation might warrant.

(4) That a Supreme Council, consisting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defense of the three countries would be set-up as a policy-making body, with powers to appoint and dismiss the Supreme Commander.

(5) That a Military Council, comprising the Chiefs of Staff of the three Powers, would be set-up.

(6) That there would be a permanent Joint Command, operating in peace and war, consisting of a Supreme Commander and a Chiefs of Staff organization. (Other articles provided for the joint organization, training and equipment of the armed forces of the three Powers; General Hakim Amer, Commander-in-Chief of the Egyptian Army, was appointed head of the unified Command set-up under the Jeddah Pact; he also headed the Egyptian-Syrian Joint Command.)

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(Refer: Keesings Contemporary Archives, V. X, 1955-1956,  
p. 14885a)

APPENDIX 10

EISENHOWER DOCTRINE

(Congressional Resolution signed by the President on March 9, 1957)

Whereas a primary purpose of the United States in its relations with all other nations is to develop and sustain a just and enduring peace for all, in accordance with the United Nations Charter; and

Whereas the peace of the world and security of the United States are endangered as long as international communism and the nations it controls seek by threat of military action, use of economic pressure, internal subversion, or other means to attempt to bring under their domination peoples now free and independent; and

Whereas such danger now exists in the general area of the Middle East;

Therefore be it resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America:

(1) That the President be, and hereby is, authorized to cooperate with and assist any nation or group of nations in the general area of the Middle East in the development of economic strength dedicated to the maintenance of national independence.

(2) The President is authorized to undertake, in the general area of the Middle East, military assistance programmes with any nation or group of nations of that area desiring such assistance.

Furthermore, the United States of America regards as vital to the national interest and world peace the preservation of the independence and integrity of the nations of the Middle East. To this end, if the

President determines the necessity thereof, the United States is prepared to use armed forces to assist any nation or group of nations requesting assistance against armed aggression from any country controlled by international communism; provided, that such employment shall be consonant with the treaty obligations of the United States and with the United Nations Charter.

(3) The President is authorized, when he determines that such use is important to the security of the United States to use for the purposes of this resolution, without regard to the provisions of any other law or regulation, a sum not exceeding \$200,000,000 from any appropriations now available for carrying out the provisions of the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended.

(4) The President shall in January of each year report to the Congress his action under this resolution.

(5) This resolution shall expire when the President shall determine that the peace and security of the nations in the general area of the Middle East are reasonably assured by international conditions created by action of the United Nations or otherwise.

APPENDIX 11

SYRIAN SOVIET ECONOMIC AGREEMENT

WIRELESS BULLETIN OF DEPARTMENT OF STATE TO AMERICAN EMBASSIES

The Syrian-Soviet technical and economic agreement, signed October 28 in Damascus, is a statement of intentions rather than a definite commitment.

No sum of money is mentioned in the text and the document provides that each envisioned project must be negotiated separately before work can begin.

Moreover, credit will be extended by the Soviet Union in rubles. The loans, at 2.5 percent interest, are to be repaid in convertible currency or syrian products in 12 equal annual instalments beginning one year after the credit is extended -- or long before any of the proposed projects begin making money.

While 2.5 percent interest is generally considered low, it does not reveal the cost of the Soviet credit. Included in the accord are a number of stipulations which will add considerably to the amount over and above the loans which Syria must repay.

An annex to the agreement lists 19 projects which will be surveyed by Soviet technicians, and which the USSR will help Syria build following negotiations on each project.

Under the agreement the Soviets will survey Syria's natural resources with a view toward exploitation. The USSR said it "is ready to cooperate" with Syria in improving transportation facilities, expanding power capacity, establishing a fertilizer factory and organizing an agricultural laboratory for scientific research.

The Soviet Union said it would supply, on credit, the materials and technical documents necessary for the projects.

The accord notes that the Soviet Documents will be free, but that the Syrians will pay "the actual expenses incurred by the Soviet organizations in preparing and delivering these documents."

Syria, according to the pact, "will undertake the setting up of the projects" listed and "assumes responsibility for the expenses resulting therefrom."

Syria will also provide the local labor, material and equipment for the work.

In addition, "the Syrian government will place at the disposal of the Soviet organizations all the preliminary informations necessary for the purpose of preparing the blueprints relating to the projects referred to in this agreement."

A detailed survey of many of the projects was made by the International Bank for reconstruction and development in 1955. Syria turned down any World Bank aid when the international financial institution stipulated it must approve basic projects before work was undertaken. This right, denied to the United Nations Agency, Syria has now granted to the Soviet Union.

Article five of the Syrian-Soviet accord lists the uses for the unspecified amount of credit in rubles the Russians may extend. The credit is to be used:

1. "To pay for the expenses connected with the work, studies, and surveys and the preparation of the blueprints carried out by the Soviet organizations,

2. "For the offer by the Soviet Union to Syria of the material and equipment necessary for the projects which will be set up with the assistance of the Soviet Union,

3. "For the travel expenses of the Soviet experts from the Soviet Union to Syria and from Syria to the Soviet Union ...,

4. "And for the expenses of training Syrian experts" in the Soviet Union.

Article nine lists another heavy "hidden" cost to Syria -- "The Syrian government will pay such expenses of the Soviet side as are necessary to meet the living costs of the Soviet experts sent in accordance with this agreement and for their movements on Syrian territory." This will be done by Syrian deposits to be made in the Soviet State Bank. In addition, "the sums credited to this account may be used for covering expenses of the Soviet organizations in Syria and for other purposes."

Payment of Soviet experts' expenses has proved costly to a number of nations. For instance, soon after Afghanistan concluded a credit accord with the Soviets, it found itself supporting hundreds of Soviet workers and technicians. Long before any of the proposed projects got underway, almost ten percent of the face value of the loan had been spent.

These costs, must, of course, be added to the 2.5 percent interest charged Syria to arrive at the actual cost of the ruble credit.

In regard to the list of envisioned projects, a Syrian government source estimated their total cost at about \$400 million. Were this the amount of credit extended by the Russians, coupled with a reported \$150 million worth of arms being sent Syria by the USSR and Czechoslovakia, it would amount to about four and a third times the total Syrian exports

during 1956, a year when her trade deficit was \$175 million.

Syria will most likely repay the credits in agricultural commodities and livestock products, if that is acceptable to the Soviet Union. The agreement provides that, for the settlement of the credit, each year "the two sides will agree on the list of goods which will be delivered every year, their quantity, prices and time of delivery."

In such deals, the Soviet Union's products are generally priced above world market levels, while the products of other countries are considered to be worth much less.

From this, it is inevitable that disagreement will arise as to how much a ton of Syrian wheat, for instance, will be worth in rubles at a given time. The value of the ruble is generally what the Soviet Union says it is. The official Soviet estimate of the ruble's value is many times the value of the ruble in free markets.

In addition, any sharp fluctuations in the price of agricultural commodities or a poor crop year could bring economic disaster to Syria.

In the event Syria should find it necessary to repay in convertible currency, the accord said, "such currency will be converted into rubles on the basis of the value of such currency in regard to the ruble at the time of payment." Again, the Soviet Union will be the sole judge of value of the ruble in relation to the Syrian pound at a given time.

Examination of the agreement makes it plain that the Soviet Union -- if the accord is implemented -- is making what promises to be a profitable deal for the Kremlin, instead of dispensing largesse to Syria as the communists have implied.

APPENDIX 12

FEDERAL UNION

YEMEN-UAR AGREEMENT

1. The United Arab States would be a federation of the UAR, the Kingdom of Yemen and "those Arab States which will agree to join this union."
2. Each State would "preserve its international personality and its system of government."
3. Defense and foreign policy would be unified and economic policies coordinated. A customs union and a common currency would be established later.
4. The heads of the member-States would constitute the Supreme Council of the union.
5. A permanent Federal Council, consisting of six representatives from each member-State appointed for three years, would assist the Supreme Council in the exercise of its duties, handle the political affairs of the union, and prepare plans and measures designed to achieve a closer unity. The members of the Supreme Council would preside in turn over the Federal Council for a year at a time, and their decisions would have to be unanimous.
6. Councils for defence, economic questions and cultural matters would be attached to the Federal Council.
7. The United Arab States would have a separate Federal budget of which the United Arab Republic would contribute 97 per cent and the Yemen three per cent.
8. A federal authority would define the frontiers of the United Arab States.



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