

The Arab Principalities of Eastern Arabia

Leonard W. Wegner Jr.

submitted in partial fulfillment for the requirements
of the degree Master of Arts
in the Arab Studies Program
American University of Beirut
Beirut, Lebanon
1958

Arab States: Eastern Arabia
Wegner

Preface

This paper is intended to deal with the Arab principalities on the eastern coast of the Arabian Peninsula. They include Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the Trucial States and the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman. All except the Sultanate are British-protected states. Little is known about some of them primarily because the rigors of climate and terrain and primitive isolation, coupled with lack of security, have in the past effectively closed off these areas to western visitors.

Today others of the states are known to overlies part of the largest oil deposits yet discovered, which has served to focus the eyes of the world and their Arab neighbors upon them.

It is hoped that this paper will bring out some of the problems and factors that do and will influence the ability of these states to assume a role that the age and their importance now require.

Much of the material included was gathered on a recent visit to the Persian Gulf and considerable assistance was rendered by various individuals in Kuwait, Bahrain and the Trucial Coast. Particularly valuable were the facilities offered by the Arabian American Oil Company at their Arab research center at Dammam, Saudi Arabia.

The maps included are taken from various sources which in most cases are acknowledged. That covering Qatar and the Trucial Coast and Northern Muscat and Oman was reconstructed and modified from one accompanying an article by Ronald Codrai in the National Geographic Magazine of July 1956.

June 1958

Leonard W. Wegner Jr.

The Arab Principalities of Eastern Arabia

This is a survey of some problems and factors bearing directly upon the Persian Gulf Shaikhdoms and the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman. It begins with a background of the British position in the area, covering its origins and present official status. It then continues with a discussion of oil and includes its development, current operations, the oil future of present producing states and a study of several characteristics and developments that could have some impact on the industry in the Gulf. This is followed by a general examination of the individual states and deals with their governments, their particular internal problems and some external ones, and with British influence.

The concluding portion treats of the indeterminate status of present boundaries, both offshore and on land, between the states and their neighbors. Detailed discussion is given to the Buraimi dispute.

Table of Contents

	Page
Preface	iv
Chapter 1 The British Position in the Gulf	1
Early History	1
Piracy	2
Slavery	3
British Relations with the Shaikhdoms	8
The Present British Official Position	11
Chapter 2 Persian Gulf Oil - Facts, Figures and Prospects	17
Bahrain	27
Kuwait	31
Neutral Zone	34
Qatar	38
Trucial Coast	40
Oman	42
The Japanese-Saudi Agreement	44
All-Arab pipelines and the development bank	47
The oil companies' pipeline plan	51
Prices, markets and production	54
Chapter 3 The Shaikhdoms at Close Quarters	61
Bahrain	61
Kuwait	78
Qatar	90
Trucial Coast	96
Sultanate of Muscat and Oman	110

Chapter 4	The Boundary Problems	129
	Water Boundaries	129
	Land Boundaries	133
	Buraimi	136
Appendix	The Treaty of Sib	151
	Bibliography	152

List of Maps
found at end of paper

- Map 1 The Persian Gulf and Southeast Arabia
Map 2 Bahrain
Map 3 Kuwait and the Neutral Zone
Map 4 Qatar, the Trucial Coast and Northern Muscat and Oman
Map 5 Buraimi
Map 6 To illustrate the Buraimi dispute

Chapter 1

The British Position in the Gulf

The original importance of the Persian Gulf states lay in their strategic position on the Gulf route to and from the Indian Ocean. In World War I the Gulf was the sole route of access for the British campaign against the Turks in Mesopotamia, and in World War II it was a route by which 4.5 million tons of vital supplies were carried to Russia via Iran. In both the wars the Gulf was an objective of the Central or Axis Powers as affording access to the Indian Ocean.

Britain's special interest in the region was to safeguard her sea-borne commerce and her sea communications with India, and to prevent the establishment of a strategic position by another power which could dominate the land and sea routes to the Indian sub-continent. The agreements gradually concluded with the local rulers in the Gulf mirrored those objectives. At first they were directed toward the establishment of peace among the local shaikhs and the elimination of piracy, and then toward a consolidation of the British position.

Early History.

British political relations in the Persian Gulf date from 1616 when the British East India Company sent ships into the Gulf to trade with Shah Abbas of Persia. It was a venture taken in sharp competition with other commercial interests already established there, namely the Portuguese and the Dutch. The oldest established interest was that of the Portuguese who had been carrying on trade in the Gulf since the early 16th Century. In 1600 they were in occupation of the principal ports on both sides of the Gulf -- Hormuz and Qishm, Muscat and Bahrain.

But at the time the British appeared in the area, the power of Portugal was decaying. Her collapse began with the loss of Bahrain to the Persians in 1602. It was speeded, under the pressure of the Persians and the Dutch and British East India Companies, by the loss of Hormuz in 1622, and was completed with finality in 1650 when the Portuguese were driven from Muscat by Omani Arabs.

In the succeeding two centuries, the British East India Company, based first at Bandar Abbas, then at Bushire, gradually eliminated its Dutch rival and became the most important maritime and naval power in the area. During the same period, the East India Company was acquiring an important territorial position in the Indian sub-continent. British relations with the Persian Gulf states, and at times with Persia, were conducted through a Resident appointed by the East India Company. After the transfer of the Company's administrative functions to the Crown in 1858, relations with the Gulf were carried on through the Bombay Government, and through the Government of India after 1873. With the independence of India and Pakistan in 1947, these relations were assumed directly by the Foreign Office of the home government.

Piracy.

Pirates, both European and Arab, were very active during the 17th and 18th Centuries in both the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf, and constituted a formidable menace to international trade. To counter them the East India Company formed a navy. At first the commanders of the ships were instructed to act only in self-defense. Knowing this, the pirates were emboldened to step up their raids on native shipping. By 1805 the Wahhabis of Central Arabia had established supremacy over the entire Arabian Gulf coast and with their encouragement, the already notorious Qawasim tribe of northwest

¹
 Oman so increased their attacks on all shipping, native and foreign alike, that the Company found it necessary to send expeditions against them. Two punitive missions undertaken in 1806 and 1809 had only temporary results. In 1819 a more powerful force was sent against the main Quwasim stronghold at R'as al Khaima on the northwest coast of Oman, (about this time it had become known as the "Pirate Coast") and other pirate harbors. The immediate objectives were realized, and on 8 January, 1820, a General Treaty of Peace was concluded between the Government of India and the shaikhs of the Pirate Coast. By the treaty, all hostile aggressions at sea by the signatory shaikhs, other than against each other, were to be regarded as acts of piracy and unlawful; there was to be peace with the British Government; and provision was made for the exchange of envoys. In 1835 the shaikhs were persuaded to abandon sea-warfare against each other (which often developed into piracy) for six months. This truce was continually renewed for ever-increasing periods, until on 4 May, 1853, a Treaty of Peace in Perpetuity was concluded with all the shaikhs of what had become known as the Trucial Coast. It established a "perfect maritime truce", barring all hostile acts at sea. The maintenance of the truce was to be watched over by the British Government, who was authorized to take the necessary steps to this effect.²

Slavery.

In the late 18th and early 19th Centuries, a strong movement for the suppression of slave trading and of slavery itself developed in Britain. A profitable trade in slaves from Africa to India, Persia, and other Asian

1. Their fleet comprised over 60 large vessels and 800 smaller ones manned by 19,000 men. Wilson, Arnold T., The Persian Gulf, (London 1928), p.204.

2. Ibid. pp.209-210.

destinations had been carried on for centuries by shipowners and middlemen in Arabia. Action to combat it in the Persian Gulf area could be effectively taken only against slave trading by sea. The treaty concluded with the Pirate Coast shaikhs in 1820 had contained a clause to the effect that the transport of slaves was piracy and the signatory shaikhs should not carry on this traffic. However, the clause was little observed.

The first definite step to stamp out the trade was taken in 1822 in a treaty concluded between the Indian Government and Sultan Sa'id of Muscat. It prohibited trade in slaves between his dominions and Christian nations and was intended to cut off the slave traffic between the Sultan's East African possessions and India. Further progress was made in 1839 and 1845 agreements with Sultan Sa'id, in which he undertook to prohibit the importation of slaves from his African territories (Zanzibar, Mafia and parts of the adjacent coast line) into his Arabian dominions. Under a later agreement, moreover, British warships were authorized to seize and confiscate vessels from Muscat engaged in this traffic.

Similar engagements were entered into with the Trucial Coast shaikhs in 1838-39 and 1847. By the last agreement the five shaikhs bound themselves to prohibit the exportation of slaves on board their vessels or vessels of their subjects, and consented to detention and search and, in case of guilt, to confiscation of the vessel.

In 1861 the Shaikh of Bahrain subscribed to the agreements accepted by the Trucial shaikhs, which now included an engagement to seize and deliver up to the British any slaves brought into territory within their jurisdiction.

Up to 1852, in view of the varying conditions in the Gulf, much had to be left to the discretion of the individual officers engaged on

the scene and to the personal effort and good faith of the chiefs involved. But, in the above year, agreements on the slave trade were negotiated with the Turkish and Persian Governments and then British naval vessels were able to carry on general organized patrolling in the Gulf, but mostly in adjacent waters. It was thought best to avoid serious political difficulties within the Gulf by intercepting slavers at a distance. Initially they met with only moderate success. In the early '60's the trade still flourished, with the number of slaves exported annually from East Africa northward estimated at 10,000.³ In due course, as more effective methods of control were adopted, the slave traffic in these waters was considerably repressed over the remainder of the century.

It had a temporary revival during the '90's when slave traders, who were subjects of the Sultan of Muscat, used the French flag to protect their vessels from seizure. The French at the time, in the face of British opposition, were trying to obtain a foothold in Arabia,⁴ and as a means of advancing their influence were issuing French papers to owners of native vessels who were not their subjects. The issue came to a head in two disputes. The first concerned a sailing vessel flying French colors which was detained by the Shaikh of the Bani bu-Ali, an Oman tribe, and the second arose when five inhabitants of Sur, a notorious slave port on the Muscat coast, attempted to break the quarantine regulations at Muscat town, were seized by the Sultan, and claimed French protection. The French pressed for the release of the ship and their proteges, but the Sultan, backed by the British, refused them. The matters were referred to the Hague Tribunal for arbitration in what became known as the Muscat

3. Ibid. p.220.

4. A specific objective was the establishment of a coaling station at Muscat.

Dhow Case. In 1905 an award was made substantially in favor of the Sultan which curtailed the French practice of issuing flags. It was a positive check to slave traffic.

The work of controlling slavery and occasional acts of piracy was carried into the 20th Century by British naval units. After an anti-slavery resolution, introduced by a New Zealand delegate, was taken in the League of Nations in 1926, they were joined by navies of other nations in attempting to suppress it in the Red Sea. The task was difficult. The slaves could be embarked in small boats at night in Africa, cross the narrow Red Sea, and by morning be landed anywhere on the 1,000 mile Arabian coast. In 1934 it was estimated that 5,000 slaves were being carried into Arabia annually in this fashion.⁵

Official Moslem opposition to the slave trade came in 1926 when The Moslem World Congress, held at Mecca, adopted a resolution denouncing slavery. In 1927 a slavery commission of the League of Nations exacted treaties from Ibn Saud and Haile Selassie of Abyssinia, in which they undertook to cooperate by all means at their disposal with the British Government in the suppression of the slave trade.⁶

In recent years, largely through British encouragement, the United Nations has taken an interest in the slavery issue. The functions of the 1926 League of Nations Slavery Convention were transferred to it by a protocol in December 1953. In September 1956, a United Nations Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery, based on a draft submitted by the United Kingdom, was adopted as a supplement to the original League Con-

5. DeJohn, Garrett E., "Slavery in Arabia", The Moslem World, Vol. XXIV, No. 2, April 1934, p. 127.

6. Ibid. p. 141.

vention. Signed by the representatives of thirty-three nations, it was designed to intensify national as well as international efforts towards the abolition of slavery, and declared slavery a criminal offense in the signatory states.⁷

In the upper Persian Gulf states, i.e. Kuwait and Bahrain, the traffic in purchased slaves has for all practical purposes ceased entirely. Domestic slaves (those born in captivity of slave parents) are admitted to exist there in many households.⁸ On the other hand, in Arabia the traffic in bought slaves continues. In 1956 a dispatch, originating in the French Legation in Jidda, and regarding a continuing trade between Africa and Saudi Arabia was discussed in the British House of Commons.⁹ About the same time, during the Buraimi affair, the British reported evidence had been found that that place was being used as a way-station on a slave route into the Saudi interior. Philby affirms that slave traffic continues in Southeast Arabia and that slaves from Persia and Baluchistan are received in villages of Oman and the Trucial Coast from which places they are forwarded to Al Hasa and Najd.¹⁰ British efforts to halt this traffic are directed through measures in the United Nations, interception patrols on land by the Trucial Oman Scouts, and patrols by the Royal Navy at sea.

It might be added here that British naval vessels, in addition

-
7. Commonwealth Survey, Vol.2, No.21, 16 October 1956, Reference Division, Central Office of Information, London, pp.861-862.
 8. Dickson, H.R.P., Kuwait and Her Neighbors, (London 1956), pp.497-498.
 9. Commonwealth Survey, Vol.2, No.15, 24 July 1956, Reference Division, Central Office of Information, London, p.575.
 10. Philby, H. St. John, Forty Years in the Wilderness, (London 1957), pp.169-170.

to bearing the load of slavery control in the Gulf, have carried out certain other tasks, including the suppression of illegal trade in fire-arms and narcotics, and the surveying and charting of the Gulf's hazardous waters.

British Relations with the Shaikhdoms.

It can be deduced from the character of the early agreements concluded with the Gulf rulers that the British initially were concerned with keeping the peace at sea and took little or no interest in events on shore unless those events had repercussions on the maritime situation.

The latter half of the 18th Century saw the rise of the Wahhabi movement in the Najd. It began as a puritanical Moslem sect, but through its advocacy of a holy war against other less strict Moslems, as well as against all unbelievers, it developed a resemblance to imperialistic militarism. The rule of Najd and the Wahhabis quickly extended over much of Central Arabia. The Quwasim tribe in (Trucial) Oman was subdued in 1805 and Muscat was threatened shortly thereafter. Despite fluctuating fortunes due to disputed successions and interventions by the Egyptians, Najd was able to maintain a pressure on the shaikhdoms and Muscat through the 19th Century. Little notice was taken of them by the British other than was signified in the attacks against the Quwasim in 1806, 1809, and 1819. While those measures were intended to destroy the power of the pirates, a secondary object was to restore the power and prestige of Sayyid Sa'id, Ruler of Muscat, whose lands were threatened with a Wahhabi
11
invasion.

But events on land took on a more pointed significance when Mohammed Ali extended his domination to the Arabian Peninsula. By 1838,

11. Wilson, op.cit. p.204.

his armies were in control of almost the whole of Arabia, including the Yemen, and were operating northward along the Euphrates toward Baghdad. At the same time, he was in sinister correspondence with the Shah of Persia when the latter's forces were attacking the Indian frontier fortress of Herat.¹² The British found these moves incompatible with their own position in the area and moved to defeat them, generally by attempting to sustain the Turkish authority in Arabia. River steamers were sent to Iraq; a naval expedition occupied Kharag Island off the Persian coast, mainly to compel the Shah to raise the siege of Herat, but also to serve as a show of strength to Mohammad Ali. A flotilla was sent to the Gulf in 1839 and the Political Resident made a personal tour of the principal Gulf ports to lend moral support to chieftains wavering under Egyptian pressure.

In general, the efforts were unproductive until the full-scale intervention of the Powers in Syria in 1840 forced Mohammad Ali to withdraw. With his going, the local chiefs began to return to the British fold. From then on the British position in the Gulf was steadily strengthened by the conclusion of the succession of agreements, already described, covering piracy and slavery. These were followed in the latter half of the century by a number of exclusive treaties that provided the basis for Britain's present legal position. Out of them Britain obtained full control over the foreign relations of the Gulf states, with the exception of Muscat, and the states were virtually placed under British protection. By the treaties, the Rulers bound themselves not to enter into relations with or cede territory to any other

12. Hoskins, Halford L., "Background of the British Position in Arabia", Middle East Journal, Vol.1, No.2, April 1947, p.141.

power without British consent. Such agreements were concluded with the Ruler of Bahrain in 1880 and 1892, with the Trucial Shaikhs in 1892, with Mubarak of Kuwait in 1899 and with the Ruler of Qatar in 1916. A Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, mainly commercial in nature, was signed with the Sultan of Muscat in 1891. It contained an additional agreement in which the Sultan agreed not to dispose of his territory to anyone but the British, but it did not contain a pledge on the part of the Sultan not to enter into relations with foreign governments.

Additional agreements were concluded with the Rulers during the first quarter of the present century that made their granting of rights for exploitation of natural resources (particularly pearls and oil) within their territories incumbent upon British approval.

This ascendancy of British influence was opposed along the way by the Ottoman Government which sought to re-establish its authority in Arabia. Successes over the Wahhabis at various times were utilized by the Turks to lay claim to Qatar and Bahrain, and from 1896-1901 strong pressure was put on Kuwait to accept Turkish officials and grant concessions to Turkish nominees. It was that pressure that had led Mubarak to seek British protection. The British at first did not grant it, being reluctant to interfere any more than was necessary for the maintenance of peace in the area. But they were led to extend their protection to Mubarak through fear that the Russians or the Germans with their railway schemes would establish their influence at the head of the Gulf.

Recognition of the special position of Great Britain as the protecting power vis-a-vis these states was obtained from the Ottoman Government which, by the (unratified) Anglo-Turkish Convention of 1913, abandoned all claims to Bahrain, Qatar, the Trucial Shaikhdoms and the

Sultanate of Muscat. Similar recognition was given by Ibn Saud in the Treaty of Jidda concluded with the British in 1927.

The Present British Official Position.

The above described agreements made with the Gulf rulers, though many of them were negotiated by the Government of India, are officially regarded as existing between the ruler concerned and the British sovereign. Until 1949 the relationship of the Persian Gulf states to Britain as established by those agreements was simply described as a special treaty relationship with His Majesty's Government. That year the British Protectorates, Protected States and Protected Persons Order in Council of 1949 stated that for the purposes of the British Nationality Act of 1948, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar and the Trucial States were looked upon as independent states under British protection. This had the effect of placing those states in the same international status as the Malay States, Brunei, Tonga and the Maldives Islands.

13

Muscat does not fall into the same category as the other principalities but is considered a fully independent sultanate. Its independent status was first recognized and guaranteed in an agreement concluded between Britain and France in 1862, during the period of their rivalry in Southeast Arabia, and was later affirmed by the Hague Court of Arbitration in its decision in the Muscat Dhow Case in 1905.

British relations with the Sultanate are regulated by the second and latest version of the original 1891 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation. This version, concluded in 1951, describes the Sultanate as

13. Liebesny, Herbert J., "Administration and Legal Development in Arabia: The Persian Gulf Principalities", Middle East Journal, Vol.10, No.1, Winter 1956, p.33.

being "an independent state in treaty relations with the United Kingdom".¹⁴ It further provides for reciprocal national (treatment on the same basis, within the territories of a state, as the subjects of that state) and most-favored nation treatment between the signatories for commerce, shipping (with the exception of the coastal trade) and taxation.

A month after the treaty was concluded, the nomenclature of the British representative in Muscat was changed from Political Agent to Consul.

As has been noted, Persian Gulf affairs were the concern of the Indian Government until 1947. When Indian independence came that year, those affairs were transferred to the Foreign Office, and officials on the spot were gradually changed over from members of the Indian Political Service to those of the Foreign Service. The highest British official in the Gulf was and still is the Political Resident. He formerly sat at Bushire on the Persian coast, but during the Second World War his Residency was shifted to Bahrain Island where it is today.

The Resident's job is the over-all direction of British relations with the various local rulers. It is three-fold: conducting the foreign relations of the protected states, keeping the peace and watching over British interests. He is supported in his tasks by Political Agents and their assistants posted in Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and Dibai on the Trucial Coast. The Political Agent in Dibai is responsible for the entire Trucial Coast and in addition to his Assistant Political Agent, has the aid of a Political Officer. The latter, probably the last of a vanishing breed to bear that title, is encharged, as far as can be determined, with representing the Political Agent at Abu Dhabi, eighty rough and sandy miles west

14. The Arab States of the Persian Gulf, Pamphlet R3387, Central Office of Information, London, August 1956, p.1.

along the coast from the Dibai Agency. All the above officials are subordinate to the Resident, as is the British Consul-General in Muscat. The Resident exercises a judicial jurisdiction over British subjects and, to a varying degree, over foreigners. These functions are defined in a series of British Orders in Council, issued separately for each territory. The Orders deal exclusively with the exercise of British extra-territorial jurisdiction. The latest ones were issued for the Trucial States in 1950, Bahrain in 1952 and Kuwait and Qatar in 1953. They reflect an effort, begun in 1949, to systematize and simplify the British judicial establishment in the Gulf. Revision became necessary following the independence of India, for the original establishment was tied to the Indian judicial system and utilized Indian codes and other comprehensive legislation.

Criminal Procedure Rules for the British courts in the four shaikhdoms were separately issued in 1955. They actually are penal codes designed to replace the primarily British Indian Law which previously applied. Indian codes still make up a large part of the law applied by the British courts, but the law is also based on certain Parliamentary acts, Orders in Council, Queen's regulations, and local custom.

Under the present judicial system as regulated by the latest Orders in Council, British jurisdiction basically extends to all British subjects, British-protected persons and foreigners in the various principalities. The Composition of the group is broadest in the Trucial States where it covers all persons other than Trucial Coast subjects, and includes subjects of the other Gulf principalities. British jurisdiction is most restricted in Kuwait where local courts exercise jurisdiction over Kuwait subjects, nationals of Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Muscat and Oman,

15. Liebesny, op.cit. p.36.

the other Gulf principalities, Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Iraq and Iran and over stateless Moslems of Palestinian origin.

In Qatar local courts exercise jurisdiction not only over subjects of Qatar but also over nationals of Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Kuwait, Bahrain, Muscat and Oman and the Trucial States.

Jurisdiction of Bahrain's local courts extends to its own subjects and nationals of Qatar, Kuwait, Muscat and Oman, the Trucial States, Saudi Arabia, Yemen and Iran.

In 1956 the British Government extended its jurisdiction to include non-Arab, non-Moslem persons in the Saudi Arabia-Kuwait Neutral Zone.

The British judicial organization presently functioning in the Gulf is composed of a Chief Court for the Persian Gulf and Courts in the various principalities. The Chief Court sits at Bahrain under the judgeship of the Political Resident and one or more assistant judges, and has unlimited original jurisdiction in all cases either exclusively or concurrent with the Court of each principality.¹⁶

The judge of the Court in the principalities is the Political Agent, with the Assistant Political Agent the assistant judge. There sometimes is a Registrar in the territorial courts who is authorized to handle cases of minor offense.

Judgements may be appealed from the Registrar to the Court of the individual territory and from that court to the Chief Court at Bahrain. Appeal of decisions of the latter court lies to a Full Court for the Persian Gulf, consisting of two to three judges appointed by the Resident. Appeal from this court lies to the Privy Council in London.

In all the principalities, except Kuwait, mixed cases, involving local subjects and foreigners are dealt with by a joint court made up of

16. Ibid. p.35.

the Political Agent and the local ruler or their appointees. Appeal lies
 to a Joint Court of Appeal, similarly composed.¹⁷

A more complicated system for handling mixed cases exists in Kuwait.

In the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman, under the 1951 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, the United Kingdom has extra-territorial jurisdiction over non-Moslem citizens of the U.K. and colonies and, with certain reservations, over nationals of other countries of the
¹⁸
 Commonwealth.

* * *

The British firmly insist that the shaikhdoms (with the exception of Muscat) are protected states and not protectorates. It apparently is not a meaningless play on words. Unlike the Aden Protectorate, the shaikhdoms are outside the Colonial organization and the British Government has not claimed any over-all right to make laws for peace, order and good government. No protectorate establishment has been set up into which the administration of the area can be fitted. Their administration by the Foreign Office would appear to substantiate their character as basically independent states under British protection. British officials in the Resident's organization have no official capacity as advisers to the Rulers, and, in fact, they scrupulously avoid any overt association with the conduct of internal affairs within the shaikhdoms. The influence these officials wield varies with the individual states. In some it is considerable. In all it is largely personal, sparked by the official's personality, and a confidence and respect for his office that has been built up through long association. In contrast to some in the past, the present staff of British officials in the Gulf appears to have been carefully chosen and, in general,

17. Ibid. p.38.

18. The Arab States of the Persian Gulf, op.cit. p.11.

is experienced, talented, and of high-caliber. Sir Bernard Burrows, the Political Resident, is considered to be top-notch.

While the influence of the political people is unobtrusive, it was at their suggestion that several of the states have taken on adviserate systems. The first began in Bahrain in 1926.

Through these systems, staffed primarily by Britishers, influence is more directly applied. Both the local and British governments hasten to emphasize that the advisers, many of them retired military and foreign service people, have no official connection to the Political Resident and his subordinates, but are hired and fired employees of the ruler concerned.

The introduction of the adviserate system came when other developments were taking place in the Gulf's general situation that changed the emphasis of British interest there. After the First World War, the principalities lost much of their strategic significance since the danger of the Germans or Turks establishing themselves close to the Indian Empire had faded. That significance was further reduced when India and Pakistan became independent and the security of sea routes no longer was a primary British concern. However, this loss has been balanced by a growing commercial importance now that the Gulf is known to over-lie at least half of the world's oil reserves.

The British declare that the discovery of this oil has influenced and does affect their political responsibilities in the Gulf; but does not decide them. They go on to say that this might not be easily believed by people with no long-lasting imperial tradition.

Chapter 2

Persian Gulf Oil - Facts, Figures and Prospects

The oil reservoirs of the Persian Gulf states make up a part of what is commonly referred to as the oil province of the Persian Gulf Basin. The greatest oil basin in the world, it includes, in addition to the Persian Gulf, the Tigris-Euphrates valley and the Rub'al-Khali desert. Its area comprises roughly 600,000 square miles; extending in length some 1800 miles from the foothills of northern Iraq to Wadi Hadhramaut in southern Arabia, and varying in width from 200 miles in the Tigris-Euphrates valley to 450 miles in the Rub'al-Khali.

In the northern portion of the Basin are the oil fields and seepages of Iran and Iraq. In the center are the fields in the coastal area of the western Persian Gulf, extending from Kuwait to the Qatar Peninsula. Further down lies Southeast Arabia and its Rub'al-Khali desert, still to a large extent unexplored and with its petroleum potential yet to be determined. Oil exploration has been active in that area in recent years and oil shales have been reported along its southwestern extremity in the Wadi Hadhramaut area and Dhofar province of the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman.

Before 1931 all the proved oil fields in the Persian Gulf Basin were in Iran and Iraq, on the line of foothills between the main Zagros range to the east and the great depression of the Tigris-Euphrates valley and the Persian Gulf. The numerous oil and gas seepages of Iran and Iraq gave appreciable evidence of the vast quantities of petroleum trapped beneath the surface, and made that area the focal point of Middle East oil. Oil was first found in commercial quantities at Masjid al-Sulaiman in Persia in 1912 by the Anglo-Persian Oil Co. Exploitation of Iraq's

prospects was delayed pending the outcome of complicated concession negotiations and partnership adjustments in the Turkish Petroleum Company, and it was not until 1923 that a small discovery was made south of Khanaqin, followed in 1927 by the famous gusher, Baba Gurgur Number 1, that brought in the big Kirkuk field.

To the south, despite the presence of a number of small oil seepages found along the western littoral of the Gulf, the fact that the sediments that had proved productive in Iraq and Iran occurred there in strata of minor thicknesses led to the belief that that area was of minor importance as an oil bearing region.¹⁹

One of the first to show more than idle interest in the Gulf's petroleum prospects was a New Zealander, Major Frank Holmes, representing the Eastern and General Syndicate, a young and small London prospecting company. In May 1923 after five months of negotiations, Holmes obtained from Ibn Saud an oil exploration license covering Al Hasa province and a two year option valid for a subsequent concession. He then busied himself in Kuwait, hoping to acquire rights over that state and its share of the Saudi Arabia-Kuwait Neutral Zone. Because of the rival interest of the Anglo-Persian Oil Co., the cautious counsels of the Political Agent and the suspicion of the Ruler, he failed to secure rights over Kuwait proper, but in 1924 he was able to obtain, from both the Ruler of Kuwait and Ibn Saud, exploration rights and an option for a future concession in the Neutral Zone.

Similarly, in Bahrain in 1925, he obtained for the Syndicate an exclusive two year exploration permit and an option for a future concession for the entire island principality. It was understood that

19. Pratt, Wallace E. and Good, Dorothy, eds. World Geography of Petroleum, (New York 1950), p.203.

those rights in Bahrain could be transferred only with the concurrence of the British Government.

Holmes and his small Syndicate, unable to support the costs of development of the rights they had obtained, set about attempting to sell them to any acceptable major company. They were offered to both Anglo-Persian and Shell, but were declined. In the United States some interest was shown by American companies, but because of the unpromising geological structure of the areas in question, the political instability and low level of security in Arabia, the remoteness of the Persian Gulf, and the exclusiveness of British interest in the region there, no one wanted to gamble. ²⁰ Unable to find a buyer, the Syndicate saw its Saudi rights in Al Hasa province lapse in 1927. Later in the same year, a week before the date when the Bahrain option was to lapse, the Gulf Oil Corporation, a United States company, accepted an option on the Holmes rights and concluded separate agreements with his Syndicate for Bahrain and the Neutral Zone.

Reports of geological surveys carried out in Bahrain by Gulf Oil the following year were optimistic, but Gulf's prospects of exploiting Bahrain's petroleum promise were effectively stymied by the conclusion of the Red Line Agreement in the summer of 1928. The Agreement was a self-denying rule concluded by the shareholders in the Turkish Petroleum Company under which each agreed not to engage in oil production outside what was then T.P.C.'s area of operation, unless such production was undertaken in association with the other T.C.P. shareholders. The restric-

20. Longrigg, Stephen Hemsley, Oil in the Middle East, (London 1954), p.101.

tion did not apply to oil operations in Kuwait or Egypt.²¹ At this time a United States group, largely through high level government negotiations, was securing a 23.75% share of the closely guarded oil interests of T.P.C. Gulf Oil Co. was a member of that American group and as such was subject to the self-denial clause and obligated under it to offer its rights in Bahrain and the mainland to T.P.C., or secure the approval of its T.P.C. associates to exploit those rights independently. T.P.C. neither accepted Gulf's rights, nor allowed Gulf to retain them. As a result, Gulf sold its Bahrain rights to Standard of California, a non-T.P.C. company, late in 1928. The British hinted that they would use their prerogative under their exclusive treaty arrangements with the Ruler of Bahrain to advise against the transfer of those rights to a non-British company.²² That problem, in turn, was settled after a short exchange of Anglo-American diplomatic correspondence by the formation early in 1930 of the Bahrain Petroleum Company (Bapco) as a Canadian subsidiary of Standard of California.

Bapco began drilling operations in October 1931 and in May 1932 struck oil in commercial quantity in the Awali structure, a large and simple anticline, situated in about the center of Bahrain Island. (See Map 2)

Although the Bahrain discovery was small, the event was of high significance for the whole of Arabia, encouraging companies to reconsider with new interest the oil prospects of that area. Holmes' pursuit of concessions in the '20's had been paralleled by some activity on the part of other groups. Anglo-Persian had sent geologists to Oman in 1924, and had helped block Holmes' endeavors in Kuwait. In 1930 it sent a repre-

21. Arabian American Oil Co., Middle East Oil Development, 4th Ed., (1956), p.25.

22. Longrigg, op.cit. p.102.

sentative, acting on behalf of the Iraq Petroleum Company (the former Turkish Petroleum Company whose designation was changed in 1929), to Qatar where he obtained a two year exploration permit from the Ruler, Shaikh 'Abdullah. By early 1933 the initial survey and map of the agreement area had been completed. The strike at Bahrain was recognized as the opening of new sources of supply of oil to world markets, and I.P.C. moved quickly to follow up its Qatar prospects, finally concluding a concession agreement with the Shaikh in May 1935. Other contenders for the concession, i.e. Holmes and his Syndicate, and Standard of California, were effectively warded off by advice from the Political Resident in Bushire, counselling the Ruler against their offers.²³

Elsewhere in the Gulf, Standard of California, encouraged by the success of Bapco in Bahrain, sought and gained a sixty year concession for Al Hasa province from the Saudi Government in May 1933, in the face of a rival offer by I.P.C. In addition it gained preferential rights to a concession for the Saudi half of the Neutral Zone. Gulf Oil, holding Holmes' exploration permit for the Kuwait half, was faced with the restrictions of the Red Line Agreement which it was unable to overcome, and in time its permit lapsed. The Kuwait concessionary rights to the Zone were to remain unallotted until after World War II.

Turning from the Neutral Zone, Gulf Oil took up competition with Anglo-Persian for a concession in Kuwait, which was specifically excluded from the Red Line. After two years of negotiations, which included State Department efforts on Gulf Oil's behalf to surmount a British closed-door policy in Kuwait, a compromise was reached between the two competing companies. It resulted in their formation of a joint organization, the

23. Ibid. p.105.

Kuwait Oil Company,²⁴ which applied for and obtained the concession in 1934.

The years 1937-39 saw the last available land areas on the western shore of the Gulf, except for the Neutral Zone, taken up in petroleum agreements similar to those current at Bahrain and Kuwait. In 1937 the Trucial Shaikhs of Dibai and Sharjah granted concessions over their lands to Petroleum Concessions Ltd., an I.P.C. owned company, in return for modest immediate payments and annual dead rents. The same year the Sultan of Muscat granted a concession to the same company for the main portion of the territory over which he claimed sovereignty in the extreme south-east of the Arabian peninsula, while granting an option for a concession, again to Petroleum Concessions Ltd., for his detached southern province of Dhofar. Late in 1938 permits for exploration with options for concessions were obtained for the Shaikhdoms of Ras al-Khaima and Kalba, and in 1939 Abu Dhabi awarded a concession for its oil resources and a five year exploration permit was granted for Ajman. In all the above agreements concluded on the Trucial Coast and in Muscat and Oman the royalty was fixed at three rupees a ton and the area covered was in each case defined²⁵ as including the territorial waters and islands belonging to the Ruler.

While the latter agreements were being concluded, several prolific fields were discovered in the concession areas in the north. The first was in Saudi Arabia at Jebel Dhahran, about five miles inland from the coastal village of Dammam, where the discovery well was completed in March 1938. It was followed closely in April by the discovery of

24. Rights of the parent companies to be exercised by subsidiary companies, D'Arcy Exploration and Gulf Exploration.

25. Longrigg, op.cit. p.116.

Kuwait's Burghan field. (See Map 3) In Qatar, although the first well was started or "spudded in" in October 1938, exceptional drilling difficulties were encountered and it was not until the last weeks of 1939 that oil was reached in the Dukhan structure, an anticline marked by a line of low hills in the southwest corner of the concession area. (See Map 4).

Development toward production in Kuwait and Qatar was interrupted during World War II. Wells were plugged as a denial to the enemy, equipment placed in storage or removed from the country, and camps were deserted.

Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, by the outbreak of the war, had come into production. Bahrain possessed a refinery capable of processing over 30,000 barrels a day, and assured markets; it had established installations and residences, and had little to fear from the war except some interruption of supplies and markets. Standard Oil in Saudi Arabia had shipped its first production from the Dhahran field in 1939, some 510,000 tons. Both these states received high priorities for the supply of critical materials and transport required to rapidly expand their facilities. These measures were taken to provide additional oil to support United States reserves then being subjected to the heavy drain of urgent wartime needs.

Kuwait, less fortunate than Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, was held in a state of arrested development until the fall of 1945, when it was able to start an intensive field work and construction program as part of an Allied program of increasing available supplies, both for a possibly prolonged war in the Far East and for the heavy demand that would come with the early years of peace. This made it possible for K.O.C. to ship its first oil from an offshore berth in June, 1946.

The close of the war and the beginning of 1946 opened a period of remarkable accelerated development of the oil industry everywhere to meet the mushrooming postwar domestic demand that had been anticipated. In the Persian Gulf, early 1946 saw only Bahrain's and Saudi Arabia's medium-sized fields at Awali and Dhahran in production, both served by refineries of considerable capacity; but by 1956, Kuwait, Qatar, and the Neutral Zone had brought the number of producing Arabian territories to five, and Persian Gulf production had skyrocketed from a 1945-46 figure of 6 million tons to over 110 million tons per year. Intensive exploration during that period had brought in spectacular new finds that bounced estimates of Gulf state reserves from a modest 7.8 billion barrels in 1946 to a phenomenal 86 billion in 1956.

From the following charts it can be seen that the prolific growth in the Persian Gulf picture generally paralleled a like growth in the Persian Gulf Basin as a whole. In 1955 the Basin supplied over half of all oil in international trade and had become a critical source of oil not only for Western Europe, which it now supplies with 90% of its crude oil requirements, but also for the Far East and East Africa. A contributing factor to the growth of the Middle East oil industry was that the United States, although remaining the world's largest producer, has also, within the past decade, become the world's largest importer of

-
26. Distribution of Middle East oil, 1955; 146 million (m.) tons exported:
- 65 m. via Suez Canal, 40 m. via pipeline
 - 41 m. other shipments
 - 25 m. tons to United Kingdom
 - 67 m. tons to Western Europe
 - 18 m. tons to Canada, United States, and Latin America
 - 36 m. tons to Indian Ocean and Far East

Middle East Oil, Pamphlet R 3398, Reference Division,
Central Office of Information, London, 27/8/56, p.4.

Growth in Persian Gulf

27

Crude Oil Reserves

(Millions of Barrels)

	1946	1956
Bahrain.....	300	205
Kuwait.....	4,000	50,000
Qatar.....	500	1,500
Neutral Zone.....		650
Saudi Arabia.....	<u>3,000</u>	<u>34,000</u>
Total.....	7,800	86,305
Total Middle East.....	10,800	138,355

Growth in Persian Gulf

28

Crude Oil Production

(Thousands of Barrels Daily)

	1946	1950	1952	1956
Bahrain.....	22	30	30	30
Kuwait.....	16	344	747	1,144
Qatar.....		33	69	123
Neutral Zone.....				37
Saudi Arabia.....	<u>160</u>	<u>547</u>	<u>825</u>	<u>986</u>
Total.....	198	954	1,671	2,320
Total Middle East.....	682	1,747	2,075	3,488

27. Arabian American Oil Co., op.cit. pp.13-15.

28. Ibid.

oil. Further stimulus resulted in effect from the nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. At the time the company was nationalized in the summer of 1951, it was the largest Middle East producer. Following the nationalization, its supply of Persian oil to world markets was interrupted, and the gap it left was closed up by a renewed surge in crude oil production in neighboring producing states. As a result, the loss of Persian crude was more than offset in less than a year, largely through the effort made by the companies operating in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, Bahrain and Qatar. An additional consequence was that by the end of 1951 Saudi Arabia and Kuwait had risen to become the number one and two producers in the Middle East.

Those years also saw the search for new deposits extended to the coastal waters of the Gulf. It was attended by the introduction of the continental shelf concept as it pertains to extra-territorial waters. The idea originated in the United States in 1945 with the proposal that seaboard states should exercise authority over the inlying or continental area of the sea-bed off their coasts and over underlying oil deposits. Previously the sea and sea-bed beyond territorial limits had been considered either as owned equally by all or as incapable of being owned.

The theory was quickly accepted by the Gulf Rulers for the obvious reason that it placed sizeable areas of submerged land at their disposal. Much of it lay beneath shallow waters where drilling would be practicable and thus was considered as possible new concession territory that could be sold to the oil companies. After 1945 the various governments laid claim over their continental shelves to various seaward limits, and in 1949, at the suggestion of the British Foreign Office, those Persian Gulf Rulers in treaty relationship with Britain asserted

their claims by official proclamation. The assumption made, apparently agreeable to the states concerned, was that the continental shelf of each state would extend outward from its coasts to a median line between the coasts of Arabia and Iran.²⁹

Oil companies, holding rights on the mainland under concession agreements that extended to "territorial waters and islands" or "the whole extent of the Ruler's dominions" claimed the new territory as being within their concessional area by virtue of the comprehensiveness of the original agreements. Other companies, however, with no share in Persian Gulf oil, but hoping to gain one, took the opposite view and sought concessions for the continental shelf. They had the happy approval of the Rulers who regarded them as new customers. The first concession was granted in 1949 by the Ruler of Qatar to the Superior Oil Co. It covered the marine areas adjacent to Qatar, but beyond a three mile limit. The agreement was promptly challenged by the existing mainland concessionaire, Petroleum Development (Qatar) Ltd., but was upheld in arbitration proceedings held at Dohah in 1950. The decision was reinforced by the results of a similar arbitration in 1951 concerning a marine concession granted by the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi.

Those rulings have since been considered as precedent and affirming that the continental shelf is eligible territory for the granting of new concessions.

A more detailed discussion of oil developments in the individual Persian Gulf states follows.

Bahrain. The two years following the discovery of the Awali field were

29. Longrigg, op.cit. p.199.

spent in preparing it for production. By 1934 gas separation and storage installations had been built, a pipeline laid to the east coast of Sitra Island with submarine lines extended from there to off-shore tanker loading berths, and the company's foreign employees had settled down at their new-built oil town at Awali. Bapco exercised its second option and secured an exclusive concession from the Ruler covering an area of 100,000 acres and valid for 55 years. The royalty rate was set at 3 rupees, 8 annas per long ton with minimum annual payments to be not less than 75,000 rupees. In addition, 1934 saw the first exports of Bahrain crude oil with about 40,000 tons shipped that year. This figure rose to 170,000 tons in 1935 and 620,000 tons in 1936. In 1937 exports levelled off at about one million tons of crude oil a year, a rate that was steadily maintained up to 1948. The initial production years found a scarcity of markets for Bahrain's crude. This led to an early decision to erect a refinery on the island. The first installation was completed in 1932 and with the addition of further units the refinery, by the outbreak of World War II, had a capacity of 33,000 barrels a day, about 4,400 tons. The marketing problem was considerably allayed in 1936 when the Texas Company acquired a half interest in the Bahrain concession and transferred to Bapco its marketing facilities in the Far East and South Africa.

As has been noted, the war years did not disrupt Bahrain production. It was maintained throughout the war at the 1939 level. In 1943 the company was given high-priority allocations of steel for the expansion of the refinery, doubling its capacity to 65,000 barrels per day. At the same time an undersea pipeline was constructed from Dhahran to Bahrain, a joint Bapco, Aramco venture, facilitating the refining of Saudi crude that since 1939 had been carried to the Bahrain refinery by

barge from the mainland.

Since the war Bahrain's oil history has been one of expansion of the refinery. By 1956 it operated at a throughput of about 200,000 barrels per day, the bulk of it Saudi crude. A second 12-inch line from Dhahran to Bahrain was completed in 1952, and additional terminal and shipping facilities have since been constructed.

Between 1946 and 1948 Bahrain's own production of crude was gradually raised to an optimum rate of approximately 30,000 barrels per day. Since that time the rate has not varied.

Several modifications of the concession agreement have been made since it was granted in 1934. Following intermittent discussions during the prewar years, it was altered in 1940 to extend the exclusive area to all of the Rulers' present and future land and marine territories. It also extended the concession term for five years and raised the minimum annual payment to the Ruler to 1,250,000 rupees. In 1950 the royalty rate was raised to 10 rupees per long ton. In December 1952, following a pattern established by Saudi Arabia and Aramco, a 50-50 profit sharing arrangement was enacted, retroactive to January 1, 1952.

It involved the payment of taxation in addition to the tonnage royalty, the net effect being that the profits attributable to operations in Bahrain were to be evenly divided between the Ruler and the company before the deduction of foreign taxes.³⁰ By virtue of this arrangement oil company payments to the Ruler were doubled, jumping from \$3 million paid in 1951, to \$6 million in 1952. The 1957 payments to the Ruler were \$11 million, and included revenues accrued from taxes on Saudi crude refined in Bahrain. At the time the 50-50 deal was concluded, the term

30. Arabian American Oil Co., op.cit. p.33.

of the concession was extended for twenty-five years, making the expiration date 2024.

However, it appears likely that Bahrain's present proved reserves will become exhausted many years before the concession expiration date is reached. Three deep test wells, seismic surveys, and stratigraphic tests of such outlying areas and waters as are clearly within the Ruler's territories have discovered no reserves to supplement the original small field. At the end of 1956, Bahrain's crude reserves were estimated at 205 million barrels,³¹ a mere puddle, compared to the vast pools of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Iran that measure tens of billions of barrels each. (As an example, the entire land area of the six principal islands of the Bahrain archipelago add up to only one-eleventh the acreage of Saudi Arabia's Ghawar field.) Theoretically, Bahrain's reserves, even at the present modest rate of production of 30,000 barrels per day, are sufficient for only twenty years' supply. But actually, the field is expected to be able to hold its current output rate only another nine years, then gradually taper off to nothing over the next eighteen to twenty years.³² The search for new reserves is continuing. A ten-month seismic survey was completed in the spring of last year. Preliminary studies of the data did not lead to any new optimism.

Bapco hopes to try one more deep test in 1958 in an effort to find a new field, or deeper pay zone below Bahrain's two original shallow producing horizons (Bahrain zone at 2,200 feet and a thin section of Arab zone at 4,300 feet.)

In the offshore waters, results of thirteen stratigraphic tests

31. Oil and Gas Journal, 28 January 1957, p.25.

32. Petroleum Week, 22 March 1957, Vol. 4, No.11, p.35.

tests conducted to the east and north of Bahrain Island were discouraging. The only remaining untested structure lies on a shoal approximately thirty-five miles north of Bahrain and some twenty miles northeast of the Ra's Tanura promontory of Saudi Arabia. This shoal - Fasht bu Safah - lies in waters the sovereignty over which had not been determined until recently. Some sources in the Gulf consider it a very promising structure. However, it has been subjected to only cursory examination by both Aramco and Bapco because of its heretofore indeterminate territorial status.

The question of its status was settled by a recent territorial water agreement concluded between Ibn Sa'ud and Shaikh Salman bin Khalifah, Ruler of Bahrain, and announced on 1 March of this year. Under the terms of the agreement, the boundary line separating the territorial and extra-territorial waters of the two states was defined. A roughly triangular area, lying north of the line and which includes the Fasht bu Safah shoal, was declared to be under the sovereignty and administration of Saudi Arabia, but subject to special arrangements. Those arrangements provide that the oil resources of that specified area are to be exploited in a manner which Saudi Arabia shall choose, but the net income to Saudi Arabia of that exploitation is to be shared equally with Bahrain.

Kuwait. The Kuwait Oil Co.'s concession agreement with Kuwait, concluded in December, 1934, was in terms similar to those of the first Bahrain contract. It covered all of the Ruler's territory except his interest in the Neutral Zone and was valid for twenty-five years. It further provided for an immediate payment of 475,000 rupees, an annual dead rent of 95,000 rupees, and 3 rupees per long ton in royalty plus 4 annas per long ton in lieu of taxes.

K.O.C.'s first test well, drilled north of Kuwait Bay in 1936 was a dry hole. But, shifting south of the bay, their second test well, drilled in the Burgan area, struck oil in commercial quantity in April, 1938. By 1942, when the war forced a suspension of field work, the drilling program had completed eight additional potential producing wells.

In a six-year postwar period from 1946 to 1951, K.O.C. undertook an intensive field development and construction program. It spent the first two years rehabilitating the existing wells and facilities that had been mothballed during the war. The first overseas shipment of Kuwait crude, as noted earlier, was in June 1946. Major construction projects - including an eight-berth tanker loading jetty and refinery at Mina al Ahmadi (named after the late ruler), a tank farm on Ahmadi Ridge, and a connecting pipeline system - had been completed by the end of 1949. At the same time, twelve drilling rigs were being employed in a combined program of exploration and exploitation of the Burgan field. The program, extending over a five-year period, saw more than one hundred wells completed without a dry hole, and resulted in discoveries at Magwa in 1951 and on Ahmadi Ridge in early 1952.

Kuwait's petroleum activities in the 1951-57 period were marked by concession negotiations similar to those which took place in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, and by greatly increased production. A profit-sharing plan, identical with that of Bahrain took effect from 1 December, 1951. The period of the concession was extended by seventeen years, to 2026, and agreement was reached on the seaward boundary of the area covered by the concession, thereby avoiding future difficulty that might attend the granting of extra-territorial offshore rights.

A major result of the new arrangement was that the Shaikh's annual

income from oil, figured at less than \$10 million in 1949, boomed to \$139 million in 1952 and to a staggering \$300 million in 1956, and has given impetus to elaborate and costly development plans. The effects of this sudden wealth on Kuwait will be discussed in a later chapter.

The consequences of the nationalization of the Iranian oil industry and its effect on Persian Gulf oil producers have been touched on elsewhere, but it is pointed out that Kuwait was its chief beneficiary as it became Anglo-Iranian's principal source of crude. Daily production expanded tremendously, from 344,000 barrels per day in 1950 to 952,000 barrels per day in 1954. This high production was maintained following the resumption of Iranian production. By early 1958 the Burgan and Ahmadi fields were producing at a rate of over 1.2 million barrels a day and had a productive capacity of close to 1.5 million barrels per day. Also by 1958, Kuwait had moved past Saudi Arabia to lead both the Middle East as number one producer, and the world in reserves, with estimates placed at 50 billion barrels.

Kuwait's current plans are for greater production, through development of its new discoveries at Raudhatain, fifty miles north of Kuwait town. The discovery well, brought in at Raudhatain in 1955, revealed half a dozen pay zones adding up to a total net thickness of 1500 feet, fantastic even when compared to Burgan's famed net pay sands of 800 to 1000 feet (in the center of the field). However, production is likely to be more complicated as the oil sands are interspersed with water, while those at Burgan are all above the water line.

A 70-mile, 30-inch pipeline from the Raudhatain field to Mena al-Ahmadi is expected to be completed by late 1959 or early 1960, to coincide with the completion of a new \$23 million pier now under construc-

tion four miles north of the present jetty at Mena al-Ahmadi. The new pier will be able to accommodate tankers of 100,000 tons and over and handle one million barrels per day. Ahmadi terminal, whose existing jetty and submarine lines were recently expanded to 1.5 million barrels per day capacity, already handles more oil than any other single crude loading point in the world. It seems certain to hold its lead following the envisaged jump in production which will bring Kuwait's export capacity to 2.5 million barrels per day, more than double the current output of any other Middle East producing nation.

33

Neutral Zone. (See Map 3) There were no oil activities in the 2,000 uninhabited square miles of the Kuwait-Saudi Arabia Neutral Zone, after the lapse of the Holmes' rights, until the postwar period. Development of the nearby Burgan field in Kuwait revived interest in the Zone and a number of British and American companies entered bids for Kuwait's petroleum rights there. The award of the concession to the American Independent Oil Company (Aminoil) was announced on July 6, 1948. It was an exclusive 60-year concession covering Kuwait's undivided half interest. The Ruler received \$7,250,000 upon signature, and was to be given an annual rental of \$625,000 until discovery. With discovery, he was to receive a royalty of \$2.50 per long ton (approximately 33 cents a barrel), with guaranteed minimum annual payments of \$625,000. In addition, the Ruler was to be a minority partner, holding shares in producing and refining companies eventually to be formed and tapping an eighth share of locally made profits. The terms were formidable and set an unprecedented mark. It is likely that the severity of the terms played a

considerable part in encouraging Aramco, later in 1948, to relinquish its development rights in the Saudi undivided half-share, which it had held since 1933, in favor of confirmation and clarification of its rights in the Saudi Arabia offshore area. That left Saudi Arabia free to drive a harder bargain over its Zone rights with the Pacific Western Oil Company (84% owned by the J. Paul Getty interests.) Under the 60-year concession agreement, signed in January 1949, Pacific Western was obliged to make a signature payment to the King of \$9.5 million, pay an annual dead rent of \$1 million, a royalty of 55 cents a barrel, and to construct a refinery. The Saudis were to have preference in subscribing up to 25% of publicly-issued shares, were to draw a one-eighth share of production profits, a quarter share of refinery operation profits, and refinery products were to be delivered to Riyadh and Jidda without cost. All payments were to be in dollars.

A working organization³⁴ was arranged between the two concessionaires and Aminoil was designated as the operating company. It commenced exploratory work in the fall of 1949. The succeeding three and a half years saw \$33.5 million paid out in concession dues and operation costs, with five dry holes the only result. But, the sixth exploratory well started in 1953 struck commercial oil at Wafra in March. Further drilling has since proved Wafra a moderate sized field with reserves currently estimated to be 500 million barrels. Commercial export began in January 1954 when the first cargo was lifted from an offshore berth at Mina Abdullah in Kuwait. In 1955, at the insistence of the Saudis, who held out for a port inside their own territory,³⁵ Pacific Western (renamed Getty Oil) built a new loading

34. Not a joint company.

35. Middle East Report, Vol.VII, No.19, 15 June 1955, p.2.

terminal at Mina Saud, ten miles south of the Kuwait frontier, to handle half the production of Wafra. The other half is pumped by Aminoil to Mina Abdullah in Kuwait.

In May, 1956, Getty Oil became an operating company in the Zone like Aminoil. Previously it had merely pumped away its half-share of the Aminoil output, and paid its half of the costs. It began exploitation of a shallow zone of heavy, sour crude, lying above the paying zones of lighter, sweeter oils being developed by Aminoil at Wafra. The major advantage of working the shallow zone was fast and cheap drilling.

Since then Neutral Zone development has ballooned. Aminoil and Getty do not publish production figures; however, Aramco sources estimated their production in 1955 at 25,000 barrels a day and in early 1957 it was reported to be in the neighborhood of 46,000 barrels a day with a goal of 100,000 barrels per day by 1958.³⁶

A significant development took place in the field of oil agreements in December, 1957 when Saudi Arabia awarded a Japanese company, The Japan Petroleum Co., an exclusive two year exploration license for its undivided half-share of the Neutral Zone's extra-territorial waters, with provision for the granting of a 40-year exploitation lease on discovery of oil in commercial quantities. By the terms of the agreement, called the "56-44", it is then required that a fully integrated international oil operation be established in which the Saudis may participate. The company must be an entity that does its own drilling, producing, refining, transporting, storing, exporting and selling, with the Saudi government receiving a 56% cut of the profits from all those phases of operation, both inside and outside Arabia.

36. International Oilman, Vol. XI, No. 11, October 1957, p.319.

Further, the company must employ Saudis for 70% of its operations within Arabia and for 30% of its operations outside of Arabia. If Saudis are not available, the Japanese must give preference to nationals of Arab League member states. The Saudi Government will have the option to participate by 20% in the development company after a commercial discovery is made, or by a 10% share if the Japanese company acquires a similar concession for Kuwait's half interest in the offshore area. Similarly the Saudi Government will nominate one third of the company board, one sixth if Kuwait participates. In no case will Saudi Arabia be represented by less than two members.

Also, among other things, the company must build a refinery in Arabia within two years of its crude production reaching an average of 30,000 barrels a day for 90 days. It must consult the Saudi Government on producing practices, must make all payments in dollars, must build hospitals, schools, roads and mosques after commercial production has been established, and in purchasing goods and materials it must give preference to Saudi Arabia or friendly Arab states.

Prospecting cannot start in the concession area until Kuwait has made a grant for her half. The Japanese, Royal Dutch Shell, and H. L. Hunt, a Texas oil man, have all made offers. The offshore waters of the Zone are considered a choice plum, particularly since Aramco has made two rich offshore strikes at Saffaniya³⁸ and Manifa a few miles south of the Neutral Zone's southern border. It is likely that the Shaikh of Kuwait will hold out for a very lucrative offer. It is known that the Japanese have offered him terms identical to those that the Saudis have accepted.

37. Petroleum Week, Vol.5, No.25, 20 December 1957, p.34.

38. The largest offshore field proved to date in the world.

Qatar. During World War II, Qatar was the least fortunate of the Gulf oil producing states. Development of its Dukhan field, discovered at the end of 1939, had no place in wartime projects; the shareholders of the responsible company, I.P.C., were more interested in bigger and better projects elsewhere. Its wells were plugged with concrete in 1942 and its installations stripped when the company suspended operations for the duration of the war. Its rehabilitation with the coming of peace was arduous, due in large measure to supply difficulties in the United Kingdom and I.P.C.'s competing priorities in other countries. Field activities could not begin until late in 1947. During the following two years the company completed a modest drilling program and the laying of a 75 mile, 12-14 inch pipeline from the field to the east coast at Umm Sa'id, 20 miles south of Dohah, where terminal facilities were constructed. The first shipment was made from the Umm Sa'id offshore berths in December 1949. Since that time Qatar production has risen steadily to a 1957 rate of 160,000 barrels a day, the calculated optimum to give maximum normal recovery of the present proven reserves. ³⁹

In 1951 the royalty was raised from the original concession rate of 3 rupees per ton to 10 rupees, but in 1952 this arrangement was replaced by a 50-50 profit-sharing agreement, on the pattern of those that had been adopted in the other oil producing Gulf principalities. The new arrangement resulted in a sizeable increase in oil revenues to the Ruler. In 1952 they were \$5.6 million, in '53 \$22.4 million, \$28 million in '55 and \$33.6 million in 1956.

Early seismic surveys in Qatar delighted company officials because they indicated that the peninsula formed a broad, limestone anticline,

39. Petroleum Week, Vol.4, No.14, 12 April 1957, p.42.

and chances were favorable that the paying zones of the string-bean-shaped Dukhan discovery field on the west coast would be found to extend through the structure into the interior. However, deep tests, conducted since 1953, to the south of the existing field and in the center of the peninsula have found only water and have revealed that the field is smaller than originally thought. Unless more oil is discovered, Qatar's current reserves of 200 million tons (1.5 billion barrels) will be sufficient for only 25 years' supply at Qatar Petroleum Co.'s present production rate. Output, of course, would start falling off well before then, and could probably continue for a long period at reduced rates.⁴⁰

Qatar, like Bahrain, hopes to find additional oil in the seabed under its territorial waters. Superior Oil, the original offshore concessionaire whose rights were upheld in the celebrated arbitration case, relinquished those rights in 1951 after exploration did not reveal any formation that warranted drilling.

A second offshore grant was awarded to the "Shell" Overseas Exploration Company in December, 1952. It was a 75-year exclusive concession and covered an area of approximately 10,000 square miles. The Ruler received an immediate payment of 260,000 pounds sterling, and the company agreed that a profit-sharing arrangement would be applied in the event of the discovery of oil.

Drilling of an exploratory well commenced in 1954 at a site some 25 miles at sea northeast of Dohah, but it was abandoned a year later. A second well started soon thereafter, at a site 44 miles east of Dohah, was also abandoned after reaching 11,800 feet, and it was planned to make a final try at a third site even further at sea to the

40. Ibid. p.43.

east. Unfortunately, Shell's \$2.5 million mobile sea drilling rig was demolished with loss of life in a freak accident as it was being prepared for a move to the new site. The consequences have been a two year suspension of operations, the loss of a \$2.5 million rig, and an estimated \$2.8 million spent in maintaining a standby base operation during the two years. Added to the \$21 million already spent on the offshore venture, Shell's total bill in Qatar to date is \$26.3 million.⁴¹

Latest information indicates that Shell plans to continue exploration of its concession, and rather than wait two years for the construction of a duplicate floating rig, it is expected to expedite resumption of operations by hiring an American drilling contractor with immediately available facilities.⁴² It is likely that operations, when resumed, will be directed upon the formation that was to have been the next and final site when the accident occurred.

Trucial Coast. (See Map 4) This area witnessed no petroleum activity from the late 30's, following the granting of the individual exploration permits and concessions, until 1949 when Petroleum Development (Trucial Coast) Ltd. sent in seismic and gravity meter parties to locate promising structures. The first Trucial Coast test well was spudded in on one such structure at Ra's Sadr in Abu Dhabi territory in February, 1950. Drilling was carried on for a year under exceptional technical difficulty, compounded by the problems of supply and labor in that remote, primitive land, but the well was finally abandoned, bone-dry, at 13,000 feet. Another test well, sunk at Jebel 'Ali in the Shaikhdom of Dibai, was abandoned at 12,350 feet. A third wildcat was started late in 1952 at

41. Petroleum Week, Vol.4, No.4, 1 February 1957, p.22.

42. International Oilman, op.cit. p.336.

Murban in the Shaikhdom of Abu Dhabi, some miles west of the capital. Indications of oil were found, but dangerous gas conditions and mechanical difficulties forced a shutdown of the well. When reopened, it failed to test oil and has since been known as the "mystery well" or "I.P.C.'s jinx" among I.P.C. oilmen on the Coast.⁴³

A fourth wildcat was taken to 12,500 feet at Gezira in the western extremes of the Trucial Coast and abandoned dry.

A fifth was started at Shuweihat near the Gulf Coast, in late 1956, and was also abandoned in November '57 after reaching a depth of 12,360 feet.

At present the company is drilling their sixth well at Juweiza, 20 miles inland from Sharja.⁴⁴

In the waters off the Trucial Coast, concessions are held by Abu Dhabi Marine Areas Ltd. and Dibai Marine Areas Ltd., jointly owned by British Petroleum and Compagnie Francaise des Petroles. To date their marine operations have been confined to drilling off Das Island, belonging to the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi. Drilling began early this year with the arrival of a 4,000 ton mobile offshore rig and platform towed 6,800 miles from Germany.

Latest reports say that traces of oil have been found in the Das Island offshore venture, but as yet it is not known if the oil is present in commercial quantity.⁴⁵

With the start of these drilling operations in the Abu Dhabi waters, other Trucial Coast Rulers may find buyers for their subsea oil rights, and the Shaikh of Dibai undoubtedly will pressure the BP-Cie. Fran-

43. Petroleum Week, Vol.4, No.19, 17 May 1957, p.37.

44. Petroleum Press Service, Vol.XXV, No.3, March 1958, p.114.

45. Gilmour, Ian, "Middle East Notebook", The Spectator, No.6774, 25 April 1958, p.510.

cause combination to drill tests in their concession off his coasts.

Oman. Like the Trucial Coast, during the war Muscat and Oman was left undisturbed by the oil companies. The concession holder, Petroleum Development (Oman and Dhofar) Ltd., did little or no work in the Sultanate up to early 1951, largely because of the inhospitable character of the region -- its harsh climate and terrain, and absence of security. In fact, exploration in Oman was confined in those years to a few weeks' work by a party in 1950 in a section of the central mountains, studying for general Arabian tectonic data, and that of another which briefly visited Dhofar early in 1948. The company relinquished its separate concession for the province of Dhofar in 1951, retaining its rights over the remainder of Oman.

The 32,000 square mile Dhofar concession was picked up by Cities Service, an American company, in 1953.⁴⁶ Following the start of drilling operations, the company had three dry holes. However, the third one, Mazraq #1, 25 miles north of Marmul, found "encouraging oil shows", and led the company to continue the search.⁴⁷ In August 1957 it was announced that a fourth wildcat, Marmul #2, had struck oil. According to the report the well tested out at 2,000 barrels per day of heavy crude oil (22°API, near the consistency of molasses) at a depth of 3,200 feet. The structure is 11 miles long by 5 miles wide, and is only 35 miles from the Arabian Sea. The enthusiastic report, carried in International Oilman, (August 1957), described the find as the most important discovery in Arabia in years, in that it has moved the limits

46. The concession was negotiated by Wendell Phillips who now holds a share in the operation.

47. Petroleum Week, 17 May 1957, op.cit. p.34.

of proven petroleum-bearing zones southward 500 miles. However, many oil circles are reserving judgment pending further developments.

Petroleum Development (Oman) Ltd., since giving up its Dhofar concession has been directing its attention to the western belt of foothills of the Hajar mountains in the interior of Oman. Company officials believe that their best hopes in all Southeast Arabia lie in Oman, mainly because they consider the Hajar a continuation of the oil-productive Zagros range of Iran.

They were highly enthusiastic over a formation at Jebel Fahud which they regarded an ideal textbook example of a potential oil-bearing structure. They drilled there for over a year under very difficult conditions. The site was remote, in interior Oman, cut off on the north and west by deserts of heavy sand and on the east by the 10,000 feet high Hajar, and posed serious logistical problems. Part of the heavy equipment was brought in by air lift and entailed nine flights from Umm Sa'id in Qatar to Fahud, while other supplies and equipment were brought 900 miles by sea to Ra's Duqqam and then were trucked 350 miles across the desert.⁴⁸

However, in May, 1957, the well was abandoned as "hopeless" at a depth of over 12,000 feet. The company has since selected a new drilling site at Gharb, about 85 miles southeast of Fahud.⁴⁹ Current expenditures of the I.P.C. associates operating in the Trucial Coast and Oman are now running at \$10 million a year.

* * *

Certain developments in the field of oil, both local and otherwise,

48. Petroleum Press Service, Vol.XXIV, No.6, June 1957, p.227.

49. Petroleum Press Service, March 1958, op.cit.

require special discussion because of their present and potential import on the industry in the Gulf. Of the Gulf states, Kuwait as the dominant producer figures more closely in these developments. More isolated Bahrain and Qatar with their limited oil horizons are less concerned. However, if new discoveries are made in these two states and in the Trucial Coast and Oman, then the following trends may become more important to them. The first development, already touched upon, is the "56-44" Japanese-Saudi Arabia agreement on the offshore waters of the Saudi undivided half-share of the Neutral Zone. (See above, p.36.)

The Japanese-Saudi agreement is, in effect, the first formal break with the principle of 50-50 profit-sharing heretofore universal in international oil concession agreements and in the Gulf. The immediate question it poses is: if the agreement becomes effective, does it mean that existing concession agreements elsewhere will be revised? Not necessarily. It must first be seen if any oil is found and what profits there would be to divide.

The general tenor of comment among most observers is that the divisible profits per ton from Japanese-produced offshore oil would not, at least for some time to come, approach the present rate of profits from production in the established onshore areas of the Gulf. It is upon the rate of profit per ton and the volume of oil marketed that the final test of the agreement and its attractive terms rests. The observers point out that although the offshore waters hold great promise, the Japanese have to face the great expense and risk of marine drilling (witness Shell's experience in Qatar) and the everyday problems of meeting the conditions of the agreement. They are subject to a number of burdensome obligations which most oil companies would consider as unworkable

and incompatible with sound managerial practice. For example, the Saudi Government must be consulted at every stage of the entire operation: selling prices, marketing arrangements, the number of barrels to be produced from each well or field. All expenses and purchases of the company must be examined and supervised by a committee composed of equal numbers of government and company representatives.

The observers also point up the fact that although the Japanese group is made up of about 60 various concerns, a number of them large industrial oil consumers, it does not include any oil interests. It offers only very limited prospects of disposing of oil in Japan. It will have to force its way into the Japanese market in the face of existing local competition among the well-established importers and marketeers, and it will have to do so with the risk of large investments in the full range of facilities which would be required.⁵⁰

Fundamentally the Japanese proposition, like an Italian-Iranian deal recently closed on Persian offshore waters, is made by consumers seeking cheaper oil. If through their operations the Japanese and Italians obtain discounts off the posted prices, the resulting competition could tend to depress oil prices generally and the owners, not the consumers, would be the losers. Hardest hit would be the producer countries which have no other resource than an income dependent on the price of oil.⁵¹

The Japanese-Saudi deal could be a threat to the other concession agreements if oil were scarce and in heavy demand. However, it has been concluded at a time when the opposite is true.

50. Petroleum Press Service, Vol.XXV, No.2, February 1958, pp.47-48.

51. The Economist, Vol.CLXXXV, No.5964, 14 December 1957, p.947.

At present the oil market is a buyers' market. Productive capacity is rising faster than the demand for crude oil. Early 1958 has seen a slackening of growth in world demand, largely because of mild weather and industrial repression, particularly in the United States. Coupled with a government imposed quota on imports of competitive Middle East oil into the U.S., it indicates a large surplus capacity in the United States, Canada, Venezuela and the Middle East. It is likely that the abundance will continue for many years with the discovery of new fields and the expansion of productive capacity in existing producing countries, such as Kuwait. While the long-term expansion of production, with a corresponding swelling of the oil producing countries' revenues, will continue, competitiveness is going to become sharper all around. It is going to become more difficult for new contenders in the competitive race to sell oil in competition with the established marketeers. However, although there is a well-settled pattern of production, sellers will prefer to sell the oil which brings the best returns -- that means the oil that costs the least overall. Under those circumstances it is conceivable that some producing countries, in order to make their oil more attractive, may find it desirable to offer concession territory on better terms to the concessionaire than 50-50, as opposed to the severe terms of the Japanese-Saudi agreement.

The terms that Saudi Arabia exacted from the Japanese, whereby the profit-sharing arrangements are to apply to a fully integrated operation, mirror a common trend in thinking among Arab circles on the division of oil profits. Their ideas envisage the extension of Arab oil interests to include the transport and marketing of oil, thereby acquiring a greater

52. "50-50: More or Less", Petroleum Press Service, Vol. XXV, No. 3, March 1958, pp. 81-82.

share of the profits from the Arabs' main natural resource.

Most of the ideas have not passed the talking stage. Early this year Egypt called for a Pan Arab Oil Cooperative Congress to be held in Cairo in February, with a purpose "to adopt a common cooperative policy between Egypt and the Arab states in oil affairs," and to encourage all the existing cooperative societies in Arab countries to "conquer new and hitherto unventured fields" by moving into cooperative oil marketing in Western Europe and other areas where there is a demand for Middle East oil.⁵³ The results of the meeting are not known. However, the marketing angle is just a new twist to an old idea of coordinated oil policies which the Arab League has periodically approved, but which apparently has been paid little more than lip service by the member states.

A more concrete proposal has been made in the field of transport. The acceptance of a Saudi pipeline scheme was urged by Shaikh Abdullah Tariki, Saudi Arabian chief of Petroleum and Mineral Affairs at a meeting of Arab League oil experts held in Baghdad in October 1957.

All-Arab pipelines and the development bank. The Saudi scheme called for the construction of a \$560 million all-Arab trunk pipeline to the Mediterranean, via Jordan, Syria and Lebanon, and serving Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq and Iran.⁵⁴ Financing according to the Saudi plan could be sought collectively by the Arab states through the United Nations, the World Bank, or other international groups, with guarantees provided by the oil producing and transit states in proportion to their volume of oil output or their pipeline mileage. Alternatively, the Arab states themselves could finance the system as a common carrier by selling shares.

53. Announcement in Al Gounhouria, as reported in Petroleum Week, Vol.6, No.3, 24 January 1958, p.39.

54. "Arab Eyes on Pipelines", The Economist, Vol. CLXXXV, No.5959, 9 November 1957, p.504.

The Saudis feel that international banking groups will be encouraged to participate because the line, as an all-Arab venture, will guarantee a large measure of security. The Saudis point out that it would not be in the interest of any Arab state to stop the flow of oil since it would thereby suffer considerably itself.⁵⁵

The Saudis presented the plan earlier to the Economic Council of the Arab League and lately have been trying to promote it with other oil producing states, notably Iran and Kuwait.

Iraq, for its part, has shown little enthusiasm for the scheme and is generally opposed to outside meddling in its oil affairs. Further, she would prefer not to participate in the building of a pipeline if there is someone else who would do the job for her, the oil companies for example. Instead, she would rather divert her funds into programmed development projects.⁵⁶

In fact, it has been the transit states who have shown the most interest in the idea of the Arabs acquiring a larger chunk of oil profits. Lebanon, Syria and Jordan in the past have felt that they were being badly served in the matter of oil distribution and were receiving too little revenue from transit dues in comparison with the huge royalties accrued by the producing states. Emile Bustani, a Lebanese industrialist and government figure, has suggested that it is this sense of unbalance and injustice that keeps pipelines insecure, and that the oil producing Arab states could purchase goodwill and security from those which have no oil by contributing to "an Arab Development Bank" for financing development in the territories through which the pipelines pass. Dr. Ali

55. Petroleum Week, Vol.5, No.19, 8 November 1957, p.11.

56. "Pipelines in the New Year", The Economist, Vol.CLXXXV, No.5965, 21 December 1957, p.1029.

Amini, Iranian Ambassador to the United States, made an almost identical suggestion at a recent conference of the Middle East Institute in Washington in which he proposed some pooling of oil incomes by Middle Eastern states, including Iran, for the purposes of regional development. Bustani's plan does not include Iran, but is restricted to Arab states only; the "have-nots" and the "haves" -- Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar -- and the operating oil companies. The World Bank would be called upon to assist in setting up the Arab Bank. To provide the capital, each "have" state would invest a 10% cut of the profits of its oil operations before distribution of royalties, taxes and profits to either the oil producing state or the oil company. The Bank would consider applications for loans submitted by National Development Companies or Corporations, formed in each state under government supervision and part government ownership to plan and carry out development projects. Rate of interest on loans granted would not exceed three per cent. Safeguards to oil flow would be further provided by internationally recognized treaties between the transit and producing states. Representatives of these two groups would form an all-Arab Oil Council to study problems and differences and dictate oil policies.

Such a scheme could solve several problems. As Mr. Bustani points out, pipelines would be secure. But, a more obvious advantage would be that the pool would provide the bulk of the funds needed for local development, thereby considerably reducing, if not eliminating, the rankling dependence of the "have-not" states on foreign aid. Syria recently negotiated a development loan from the Soviet Union at two and a half per cent interest, while the Shaikh of Kuwait, at about the same

57. Bustani, Emile, "Sharing Oil Benefits", Middle East Forum, Vol. XXXIII, No.1, January 1958, pp.9-13.

time, invested a roughly similar amount in the London money market at about the same rate. Doing away with the reliance on outside help could do away with a lot of the political footballing that attends it and might help to move the Middle East further away from the cold war.

Realization of Bustani's plan hinges upon: the approval of the producing states, who must be willing to give up some measure of control of their oil affairs; and upon the approval of the oil companies who must be willing to part with five per cent of their profits for a return of two and a half per cent interest, and in turn participate in a joint venture with the Arab states. The outcome is a matter of conjecture, but the plan offers a greater opportunity for a balanced sharing of profits than does the all-Arab pipeline scheme. Whether under the Saudi plan a new line is built or existing lines are taken over, the costs will be considerable. The World Bank has been mentioned as a possible backer, but it is a lender of last resort and may not consider the rich oil producing states eligible for a loan. However, given that it or another group grants such a loan, the largest share of the repayment of the loan will fall to those states best able to handle the load -- those producing oil. The natural assumption follows that the oil producing states, in turn, would then expect a correspondingly high share of the transit dues, with the possibility of increasing the existing and objected-to disproportion between the transit states and themselves. The same assumption could follow if the scheme were financed by the Arabs themselves where the oil producing states would provide the largest share of initial capital. Likewise, participation in financing the scheme by private investors, and, as has been suggested, by oil companies already operating in the area would further reduce the expectation of profit of the Arab governments

58

concerned.

Some form of participation by the oil companies in the venture would appear necessary. The existing pipelines in the area are owned by the operating companies or their affiliates. Either those lines would be taken over under the all-Arab scheme or their throughput shared with a new line. In any case, under existing concession agreements, the Arab owners would be dependent upon the companies for oil to transport through their lines because the producing countries in fact do not own any production. Pumps, degassing stations, tanker berths, etc. are owned by the operating companies, while the countries only share in the profits from the operation of those producing facilities within their territories.

As far as the foreign oil companies are concerned, the idea of Arab-owned lines is objectionable because it injects politics into decisions about where to transport and sell oil. These decisions they would prefer to make on a flexible commercial basis. They believe that once Arab interests have bought or built pipelines to the Mediterranean, they will demand that they be used fully, no matter what the condition of markets, transport and demand, and will regard every new supertanker and every sale to new markets east of the Gulf as threats to Arab prosperity.⁵⁹

In fact, the oil companies have their own pipeline plan and it was as an alternate to that plan that the Saudi proposal was made.

The oil companies' pipeline plan, drawn up by eight Middle East oil operating companies in London in May 1957, called for the construction of an \$840 million giant Gulf to Mediterranean system. It was motivated

58. The Economist, 9 November 1957, op.cit.

59. "Arabs Talk Oil", The Economist, Vol. CLXXXV, No. 5959, 9 November 1957, p.480.

by the Suez crisis and was intended to secure an outlet as a bypass for the Canal and the Syrian bottleneck. The oil companies were to finance the building of the line, and its operation and security were to be covered by a series of inter-governmental treaties, whose signatories would be the governments of the Middle East oil-producing countries served by the line, those states through which the pipeline would run, and the governments of the western oil companies participating in the investment (United States, United Kingdom, Holland and France).⁶⁰

Iraq, with pressing plans for expanding its oil production was particularly interested in a portion of the above program which suggested that the line run from Kuwait through Iraq's Basrah and Kirkuk fields and thence to the Mediterranean. That arrangement, Iraq felt, would give her an insurance outlet to the south in the event of new emergencies that might close the Mediterranean outlet.⁶¹

As late as October 1957, the question of where the proposed line would terminate on the Mediterranean had been left open, but it was known that the companies' ideas centered about a terminus in Turkey, avoiding Syria.

Iraq, on the other hand, prefers exporting its oil only through Arab countries and, no less anxious than the companies to secure safeguards for the line, favors inter-governmental treaties, but wants them confined to the oil producing and transit countries involved. The treaties would be registered with the United Nations and the World Court, and in cases of dispute the matter would be submitted to the latter body for arbitration. Iraq feels that the exclusive "Arab neighbor" character

60. Petroleum Week, Vol.5, No.17, 25 October 1957, p.52.

61. See interview with Nadim Pachachi, Iraqi Minister of Economics, reported in "Iraq Wants Treaties on New Oil Pipelines", Petroleum Week, Vol.4, No.15, 19 April 1957, p.23.

of the treaties will guarantee a greater measure of security for a line than will either treaties to which the West is a party or the normal commercial transit agreements concluded between the companies and the transit countries. She believes that if such a treaty as she proposes had been in existence between Iraq and Syria at the time of the Suez affair, Syria would have reconsidered before blowing up the pipeline.

Some Iraqi officials also favor Arab League guarantees for the treaties, but others do not. These last fail to see how Iraq's oil affairs could be of any concern to other League members, particularly those without oil.

At the same time it is questionable whether the oil companies will accede to any plan not covered by treaties to which the Western governments are signatory. Further, there is no indication that even if such treaties were accomplished the companies would accept transit through Syria. The oil companies are divided in opinion. Some feel that the recurring crises in the eastern Mediterranean enhance the alternate possibility of using more tankers -- at greater cost, but less risk, than a pipeline.

Be that as it may, with the recent deterioration of relations between Iraq and Syria, the oil company plan has become a suspended issue. Iraq's efforts to conclude an agreement with Syria guaranteeing the safe passage of I.P.C. lines failed early this year. The talks broke down when Syria refused to accept arbitration by the World Court in any disputes about the interpretation of the agreement, and suggested instead that the disputes be arbitrated by the council of the Arab League. This Iraq rejected, perhaps because, as The Economist (January 25, 1958,

62. Ibid.

63. Petroleum Week, 25 October 1957, op.cit.

p.300) infers, she lacks confidence in the Arab League and those member states without oil who would be "only too willing to vote for sacrifices by those that have it."

In any case, the giant pipeline could only be considered a long-term project, and Iraq in the meantime had entertained several possible quick-pay measures to assist in stepping up her production. One was a proposed short line from the Basrah fields to Kuwait's deep-water harbor, intended to by-pass Iraq's present terminal at Fao. Located at the mouth of the Shatt al-Arab, Fao has a serious and expensive silting problem and poor harbor facilities which limit the size of the tankers that can be accommodated. Through construction of a terminal at Kuwait harbor capable of handling supertankers of 100,000 tons and over, Iraq hoped to double Basrah's production to about 340,000 barrels per day.

However, according to latest I.P.C. reports, negotiations between Iraq and Kuwait for acquisition of the necessary leases and transit rights have foundered. Although inter-governmental contacts are still being made, I.P.C. has decided to go ahead with plans for construction of an artificial island at the edge of deep water off the mouth of the Shatt al-Arab upon which it will build a tanker-loading terminal.

Prices, markets and production. The emergence of the Middle East after World War II as a major supplier of petroleum has been described. It was pointed out that by 1956 the Middle East was supplying the bulk of the crude oil entering international trade. In addition, new discoveries had brought estimates of Middle East reserves at that time to 138 billion barrels, about 65% of the world's proved reserves. Yet, despite this predominant position in size of reserves and the steep rise in oil produc-

tion in the postwar period, Middle East output now stands at about 20% of total world production, far below its productive capacity. The factor that limits the output is the availability of markets. Prices and production costs are not obstacles.

Middle East crude oil prices, including Persian Gulf prices, have been closely linked to the American price structure in the sense that any change in American oil prices is almost automatically reflected in the price of Middle East oil. This naturally follows since the world oil industry to a very large degree is concentrated in the hands of a few big concerns. At the end of 1956, 57.8% of Middle East crude oil reserves was under the control of United States companies.⁶⁴

The present price system was established in 1949 when all the companies established the price of \$1.75 for a barrel of crude of 36° API gravity f.o.b. Persian Gulf ports. The price was some 80 cents lower than the East Texan price for crude of similar quality.

The system is explained by an equalization point theory which contends that since Middle East crude now supplies the whole European market and has even penetrated the American market, its delivered price at the east coast of the United States must not be lower than the delivered price of comparable Caribbean crude at the same point; otherwise, it is asserted, serious trouble might ensue for the American oil industry. On the basis of the above theory, when American crude prices rose 25 cents in mid-1953, Persian Gulf crude prices went up almost the same amount.

But actually the theory is not valid. The posted price is a determinant for only a small part of the crude supplies -- the part sold

64. Aramco Economics Division, Middle East Petroleum Data, 17 February 1957, p.7.

to outsiders -- and the price has no effect upon the volume of imports of crude oil from the Middle East to America. The bulk of the Middle East crude is sold to the affiliates of the producing companies engaged in the transport, refining, and distribution of the oil and payments, and involve little more than bookkeeping operations. The determinant, as far as the large integrated companies are concerned, is the overall profit on the sale of refined products, rather than on the sale of crude alone, and their decisions on marketing the crude depend upon its production cost and not on the posted price.

None of the Middle East operating companies has ever divulged its precise costs, but it is known that Middle East crude is the cheapest in the world and could successfully compete almost anywhere. In many of the Middle East fields the oil is held under heavy pressure resulting in just a few wells being needed to tap a large area. The oil often rises without much pumping. Another factor that reduces operation costs is the open nature of the terrain in a number of the fields. In Kuwait, for example, with its flat surface, drilling rigs can be towed, without dismantling, from one well site to another, with an average elapsed time of ten hours between the closing out of the first hole and the spudding in or starting in of the next. In 1956 the direct physical cost of production of Kuwaiti oil was unofficially estimated to be not much more than 10 cents a barrel. Aramco's straight production costs were placed at between 30 cents to 40 cents a barrel, the actual expense incurred in bringing the crude to the tanker berths at Ra's Tanura. At Ra's Tanura the posted price per barrel of crude was \$1.97. Subtracting the lower estimate of cost from the \$1.97 market price resulted in an apparent gross profit of \$1.67 a barrel. Half of

it, however, went to the Saudi Government in royalties and taxes under the 50-50 agreement, leaving Aramco an 83.5 cent profit per barrel from which to meet its heavy capital expenses (in 1956 they were \$80 million) and auxiliary costs, such as the health and welfare services it is obligated to provide under its concession agreement. The per barrel profit of 83.5 cents was about the same as that obtained by a good producer in the United States, where, with such a profit, many U.S. producers are now finding it difficult to make ends meet.⁶⁵

As has been said, Middle East production in the main is tied to the Western European market. The demand for oil from that area is expected to steadily increase in the coming years because of a natural increase in oil consumption resulting from rising energy requirements and from the tendency to replace coal by oil. In recent years, Europe's consumption has risen by some 12% annually with a resultant equivalent increase in Middle East output,⁶⁶ and early forecasts this year were for a 15% increase in demand for Middle East oil from those markets in 1958.⁶⁷ Similar gains have been recorded in non-European countries and may be larger in the future, depending on the progress of various development programs being carried out in several underdeveloped countries. But by and large, Europe's growing demand will be matched by a probable equal demand in other major markets and will be accompanied by a general expansion of world production as a whole. The Middle East's proportional share of the world total will not be substantially increased unless it

65. Murphy, Charles V., "Oil East of Suez", Life, Vol.21, No.10, 12 November 1956, p.86.

66. Yaari, S., "Marketing Middle East Oil", Middle East Affairs, Vol.III, No.6-7, June-July 1956, p.218.

67. "Demand for Middle East crude to exceed four million barrels daily in 1958", Petroleum World, Vol.29, No.2, February 1958, pp.34-35.

is able to corner a greater share of the world markets outside Western Europe. The United States, as the world's largest oil importer, would appear the logical target. Middle East production costs, as has been pointed out, are so low that producers can go a long way toward meeting competition from American producers, despite the 8,500 mile haul from the Gulf to the east coast of the U.S.

In 1954 Middle East crude oil accounted for about one-fifth of the crude handled at all U.S. east coast refineries, and it is likely that its share would have increased steeply if given its own way.

However, largely because of the pressure of independent American oil producers and the coal industry, the United States Government in 1954 passed an amendment to the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Program which enables the President to impose quotas on oil imports if he finds them so high as to endanger national security.

The highly controversial quota is now in effect. Instituted through the Department of the Interior by means of a voluntary reduction program, it limits imports to a yearly average of 756,000 barrels per day, about 12% of U.S. domestic production.⁶⁸ So for the time being, the U.S. market is effectively insulated against heavy inroads of Middle East imports. Whatever can be achieved in the way of a further increase in the region's oil output is now conditioned by the extent to which demand goes up within the limits of its present markets. Even that marginal increase could be endangered by certain outside developments. One is the discovery of new fields. The Sahara already promises to become a big producing area, and within a relatively few years may rival the large exporting areas of the Middle East while being well placed in regard to

68. "The Imports Question", World Petroleum, Vol.28, No.12, November 1957, p.124.

the markets in the West. A second is competition from other available sources of supply. The productive capacity in most existing producing countries will be greatly expanded, including Communist bloc countries. By 1954 Russia and Rumania had reappeared as oil sellers in Western markets, selling 32 million barrels. Their 1957 exports are estimated at 53 million barrels. Three-fourths of it went to the free countries of Western Europe as one of the few acceptable commodities the U.S.S.R. can offer against its purchases of machinery and equipment. A last danger, but at longer range, is atomic energy. England visualizes an atomic power demand nearly equal to oil by 1975, while the United States is planning 24 plants to consume atomic energy equalling 27 million barrels of oil by 1965. However, many sources agree that even given a major technological breakthrough in the field of fusion or fision, such as the results of the latest Harwell laboratory experiments, nuclear power plants will be able to do little more than help supply the increasing power needs of the world. The day will undoubtedly come when nuclear fuel will replace coal and oil in the generation of power, but it is generally believed that it will not be in this generation or the next. Furthermore, it is quite probable that countries such as the United States which have an abundance of coal and oil will be among the last to convert completely to atomic power.

* * *

The foregoing pages of this chapter have been intended to outline the growth of the oil industry in the Persian Gulf principalities, to

69. "Communist Aid and Trade", Petroleum Press Service, Vol.XXV, No.3, March 1958, p.100.

70. Eltham, Eric, "Suez Crisis Spurs Hunt for New Energy Sources", World Petroleum, Vol.28, No.12, November 1957, pp.89-94.

describe its present state of development, and to discuss certain factors and recent trends that may have consequences upon it.

The coming of oil has also brought into focus another group of questions, long neglected, namely those of land and sea frontiers. Some of the borders separating the Gulf principalities are defined, but in general most are undefined; all are undemarcated. By necessity, definitions of areas allotted in oil concession agreements have been couched in unrestrictive general terms, broad enough to secure the advantages of any future territorial settlement. Petroleum exploration in the fringe areas of some of the concessions has led on occasion to friction between rival companies, and the prospect of petroleum deposits lying beneath heretofore uninteresting wasteland has led to the sovereignty of large areas being placed in dispute and to armed conflict between states. These complicated problems are discussed further in later pages. Suffice it to say here that their solution is a necessary condition of satisfactory future oil operation and of general security in the Persian Gulf.

Chapter 3

The Shaikhdoms at Close Quarters

* * *

Bahrain is both a strategic center for Britain and an administrative center for her political influence in the Gulf. In addition to being the seat of the Political Resident, it bases the Persian Gulf Squadron and a sizeable R.A.F. detachment. Lying in the "V" formed by the Qatar peninsula and the Saudi Arabian coast, and situated about midway between the Straits of Hormuz and the head of the Gulf, it enjoys the advantage of a central position.

It is ruled by the Al Khalifah family, whose direct ancestors drove the Persians from Bahrain in the 18th Century. The present Ruler is Shaikh Sulman bin Hamed al-Khalifah, a Sunni and the tenth Khalifah shaikh to rule the island since their conquest. He has had the throne since 1942.

His government has been variously described. James Belgrave calls it a benevolent autocracy with the Shaikh governing his state through Arab and British officials, who are in charge of the various governmental departments.

Its existing structure has come about mainly as a result of the Adviserate government system established in 1926 with the coming of Charles Belgrave. Belgrave, in answer to an advertisement in The Times, came to Bahrain as adviser to the Ruler at a time when squabbles over the succession, and enmity of the oppressed Shia islanders threatened the position of the family. Given practically a free hand during his tenure, he built up a Secretariat, organized separate government depart-

71. Belgrave, James H.D., Welcome to Bahrain, (Stourbridge, England 1954), p.32.

ments under British directors, and became the most powerful man in Bahrain and one of the most influential in the Middle East. The results of his work have made Bahrain for years a shining example of governmental administration in the Middle East. Its high standard of order is exemplified by the regular publication of an Official Gazette and annual government reports. An annual budget is published to show revenue and government expenditures. Censuses have been taken and regular statistics are compiled by the various government departments. That the administration has remained sound is due to Belgrave's early establishment of effective customs and finance departments and the institution of budgetary and accountability procedures in control of Britishers employed by the Ruler as an adviserate staff.

In 1954 the principal government departments were the Adviserate (The Secretariat), Customs, Education, Electricity, Finance, Judicial, Lands, Police, Public Health, Public Works, Passports and Religious Endowments. In addition there were municipal administrations in the towns of Manama, Muharraq, Hedd and Rifaa. The government was by the Ruler's appointment, with the exception of the municipalities of Manama and Muharraq which were controlled by bodies half appointed and half elected. The functions of the government departments were coordinated through the Secretariat headed by Belgrave. Belgrave had also been deputized by the Ruler as head of the State Police and Chief Magistrate and head of the Court of Appeal.

There were no assemblies for elected members, no popular representation, no democratic processes except the elections of members to the Municipal Council in Manama and Muharraq. Although democratic practices were unknown in the Gulf, democratic theories were known and discussed.

Bahrain is a nation of merchants. Over the course of a generation of prosperity many of their sons have been educated at home and abroad. In 1952 a group of these young educated Bahrainis grouped together to form the Higher Executive Committee. A nationalist-reformist group, it was self-appointed, yet claimed to be the voice of the people. It had no official existence and was ignored by the government. Whenever it wished to be heard, it issued proclamations.⁷² It pressed for various moderate modifications in the system of administration in Bahrain. Early complaints centered about the local court system where most of the senior judges were members of the royal family, who, with little training, often tended to be capricious in their judgements. Also, Bahrain's Shias complained of inequality of treatment in the Sunni dominated Sharia courts. Several violent Sunni-Shia clashes took place in late 1953 and during 1954. The last occurred (on the 10th of Muharram) in September 1954 and grew out of unpremeditated mischance during the procession of mourning. But, beyond the obvious religious excitement lay evidence of social and political dissatisfaction. Objectives were confused. There appeared obscure demands for more equitable representation in the government and in government jobs, and even for the removal of the al-Khalifahs in favor of membership in the British Commonwealth. These were coupled, on the other hand, with accusations that the British had staged the riot as an excuse to bring in troops and establish direct rule.⁷³

The Ruler's first reaction to the pressure was to appoint a

72. Owen, Roderic, The Golden Bubble, (London 1957), p.70.

73. Affairs in Bahrain were further confused in September 1954 when 3,000 taxi drivers went on strike in protest against a government order compelling drivers to take out third party insurance policies. The order was issued following a heavy increase in loss of life and property from auto accidents. "Developments of the Quarter", Middle East Journal, Vol.8, No.1, Winter 1954, p.82.

British Judicial Adviser in 1954 to act as a consultant in court work and in the application of legal actions. Drafting was begun of a new general criminal law that was to be compatible with Bahrain precedents involving conventional and religious traditions.

In 1955 the British attempted to persuade the Ruler to introduce a Penal Code. Their proposed code was a modified version of the one instituted in the British Courts in the Shaikhdoms that same year, and they hoped to see it adopted in all the local courts. However, it was opposed by Bahrain's reformists, because they did not participate in the drafting, and by conservative religious groups, with the result that the Ruler postponed his decision.

During 1955 the Committee concentrated on the labor question. The government achieved a measure of cooperation with them by appointing a committee to draft a new labor law. The committee was in effect a pioneer movement in the Gulf. It was made up of government officials, employers, and representatives of workers elected by secret ballot and had the assistance of a British labor adviser. Its assigned task was to draft legislation, based on labor laws of other Middle East countries dealing with trade unions, labor disputes and employer-employee relationships.

The Higher Executive Committee enjoyed wide popular support although the merchants, content with conditions as long as Bahrain continued to prosper, were highly disturbed because of the unsettled situation. More and more, with considerable justification, the committee began to associate Belgrave as the major obstacle to its requested reforms. ⁷⁴ By 1956 it was demanding his removal. He was labeled imper-

74. Owen, op.cit. p.71.

ialistic, against the people, unjust and unnecessary. Criticism of the Ruling Family continued, and the Ruler was accused of being under Belgrave's thumb. The Committee's early obscure requests had by then crystallized into positive demands for fundamental administrative changes in the government.

The key demands were for the election of a legislative assembly and for elected councils for more important government departments. The demands were basically constitutional in nature, but were in effect an attempt to gain participation in the operation of government departments at a high level. They were temporarily shelved when the Ruler agreed that elected representatives would participate in committees to supervise the Education and Health Departments. However, agitation for more representation revived in early 1956. It was exacerbated when the elected half of Muharraq's Municipal Council walked out after discovering that it could be outvoted by the appointed half. Troubles reached a peak in March when rioting broke out and a general strike of refinery workers was declared during the visit of Selwyn Lloyd. Following the disorders, the Ruler tacitly accepted the idea of political opposition by recognizing the Higher Executive Committee as a political organization under the title "Committee of National Union", (C.N.U.). Further, he announced certain administrative modifications and the appointment of a Secretary of the Bahrain Government as part of a comprehensive plan to modify the adviserate system. But the key demands were not met. A spokesman for the C.N.U. in Cairo, exiled from Bahrain following the March riots, listed them and others. The C.N.U. wanted:

1. Engagement of an Egyptian jurist to draw up Bahrain's civil and criminal code, to replace "Rule by decree exercised by the Ruler and

his adviser."

2. Legislative council elections.

3. Curtailment of Pakistani, Indian, Persian and Adenese workers into Bahrain. The spokesman claimed that migrant workers received the best jobs in the islands, while 18,000 Bahrainis had to go to Saudi Arabia to find work with Aramco.

4. More efficient use of oil royalties. The spokesman claimed that Bahrain was lagging behind Kuwait in improvements in education and social welfare.⁷⁵

Continued trouble threatened, but was forestalled when Belgrave resigned upon the advice of the British Government and against the wishes of the Ruler.

Then came the Suez crisis in November 1956. Sympathy strikes and destructive demonstrations led to a calling in of British troops to restore order. The Ruler dissolved the C.N.U. and its key leaders were brought to trial for treason before a tribunal composed of members of the Ruling Family. Three were subsequently sentenced to exile for 14 years on St. Helena.

Shortly thereafter the Ruler announced that he would appoint members to a number of councils: Commerce, Education, Health, Minors Estates, Religious Endowments and the Committee of Agriculture and Water. Elections were not to be considered until after the expiration of the 12-month term of the newly appointed councils. At the same time the practice of election to the municipal councils was revoked and all members were to be appointed. Like the councils to the government departments, elections were to be considered after a year.

75. The Christian Science Monitor, 18 April 1956, p.3.

The Ruler, at the urging of the British, permitted resumption of elections to the Manama and Muharraq Municipal Councils in March 1958, with elections for the municipalities of Al Hadd and Ar Rifa promised for later in the year. Manama's Council is composed of 12 appointees, 12 electees; Muharraq, eight and eight. All are headed by members of the Ruling Family. The Councils' responsibilities extend to cleaning, lighting, fire service, meat inspection, street paving and repair, etc. These municipal administrations are based on Sharia traditions that have existed for many years, such as the regulation of sanitation and shopkeeping practices. Other progressive steps have been taken elsewhere. A government pension scheme has been started, a civil service has been established and codified, and Bahrainis are moving increasingly to higher posts of government responsibility. Elections of members for the advisory councils to the government departments are expected shortly.

Also, by the beginning of 1958 the labor law committee, formed as a result of C.N.U. pressure, had completed the drafting of a new comprehensive labor law. It took effect the first of the year. The C.N.U. had wanted a country-wide labor union but the British wanted reduced power, a union organization that could not become a political force. The result is a guild system labor law based on an Egyptian model. To date it has been fairly well accepted.

The position of Adviser ended with the resignation of Belgrave, and has been replaced in part by the creation of the post of "Secretary of the Bahrain Government". It is occupied by G.W.R. Smith, formerly head of the Customs and Port Departments. As such, he heads the Secretariat which is composed of Department Heads, and he probably serves a coordinating function as did Belgrave. It remains to be seen if he

will be more receptive to new administrative reforms than was his predecessor.

It is generally believed that the British would like to see a liberal democratic system established in Bahrain, and that they have encouraged education programs and other reforms with that objective in mind. They hope such a system will strengthen Bahrain and their position. They are aware of the growing public criticism of the extravagances and indolence of the Ruling Family and the danger to the British position by their association with them. But Shaikh Sulman is a strait-laced autocrat of the old school who sees neither the need nor the advantage of democratic processes. His permission for elections in the municipal councils was given grudgingly as were the concessions made earlier to C.N.U. pressures.

He likes his association with the British, and has found it convenient to let them handle his foreign affairs. His negotiation of the water boundary treaty with Saudi Arabia at the beginning of the year was the first international agreement concluded by himself or any Shaikh in treaty relationship with the U.K. in the absence of British advisers. It indicates to some that a change in precedent has begun, a loosening of the British grip, and that the future will see some of the local Rulers continue to be encouraged to deal with purely Persian Gulf affairs, or relations with their Arab neighbors on their own.

Bahrain has been outwardly demonstrative in its sympathy and support of the Arab stand in the Palestine problem. In June 1956 the Ruler publicly proclaimed a complete boycott of Israel; tankers that had visited that state would not be served in Bahrain. His government was

76. Cook, Don, "Britain and the Persian Gulf", New York Herald Tribune, 27 October 1957, p.4.

the first outside the Arab League to join the boycott. Further participation by Bahrain in Arab League affairs is not known. It is certain that it has no official representation.

Shaikh Sulman is getting old; he is 64. He recently designated his eldest son Isa as his successor. The decision was popular with the merchant group, the most influential element of public opinion now that the C.N.U. is dissolved, since Isa is business-minded. A mild mannered individual, Isa is fairly well traveled but not well educated. Observers consider him indecisive and feel he may have difficulty in taking a stance when required. However, he is regarded a better choice than two others who have been considered as likely candidates. One is the Ruler's brother, Shaikh Khalifah bin Hamed al-Khalifah, head of Police and Public Security, and the one thought most likely to succeed. The merchants disfavor him and it is probable that they persuaded Shaikh Sulman to reject him in favor of Isa. Khalifah has a sharp mind, speaks English fluently, but has uncertain health and the reputation of being an unscrupulous rascal and a heavy drinker. The second is Shaikh Daij bin Hamed al-Khalifah, who is another brother of the Ruler, a Judge in the Bahrain Senior Court, and is also labeled a winebibber and a scalawag.

* * *

Bahrain faces several problems. The first, already referred to, is existing social tension among the various factions of her population.

Bahrain has a multi-group society largely resulting from her geographical position and her maritime commerce. Her population, counted at about 110,000 in 1950 includes 91,000 what are termed Bahrain subjects, 6,900 Persians, 3,000 Indians and Pakistanis, 6,250 other Arabs and 2,200 Westerners. Sects among the Moslems were not recorded primarily

because of objections by the Sunnis who interpreted it as a plot by the British to divide the Moslems against each other.⁷⁷

The two largest groups are the Sunnis and the Shias. The Sunnis are the most influential and act as the majority group, which naturally follows since the Ruling Family is Sunni. Most of them are engaged in trade, fishing, or in work with the oil company.

The Shias are all Baharnah, a group whose ethnic origin is unknown, but who are considered to be the original inhabitants of the island. They speak Arabic and consider themselves as Arabs. They are mostly engaged in agriculture. Once they owned the date gardens, but for many generations they have been cultivating them under Sunni landlords. They constitute the poorer and lower classes of Bahrain society.

Both the Sunnis and Shias have lived in their own exclusive communities and seldom mixed except in violent clashes as in 1953 and 1954. For a long while the Manama Municipal Council was not formed because of a lack of agreement over the number of seats to be allotted each of the two groups.⁷⁸ In general their animosity is based on a growing discontent on the part of the Baharnah with Sunni domination, and on the fear of the Sunnis, believed to be slightly in the minority, of losing their present position.

However, the isolation of the two groups one from the other is gradually beginning to break down as many of the Shias are leaving agriculture for jobs in the towns and with the oil company where they come more into everyday association with the Sunnis. In addition to the economic impetus, secular and technical education and nationalism are all

77. Qubain, Fahim I., "Social Classes and Tensions in Bahrain", Middle East Journal, Vol.9, No.3, Summer 1955, p.270.

78. Ibid, p.272.

operating to bring the two groups together. They have begun to cooperate with each other as non-religious groups in certain areas of common interest. 79

The Persians are the largest group of foreign origin. They are well integrated into Bahrain life and compose a prosperous merchant community. They are somewhat resented by the Arabs who regard them as an aloof minority draining away the country's wealth. As Shias they tend to look toward Persia for religious and political association. Their open sympathy for Moussadeq during the Anglo-Iranian affair brought on the resentment of the British.

In recent years, the Bahrain Government has enacted certain travel and citizenship regulations that have tended to be detrimental to the Persian community.

Another influential foreign group is the Indian community. It includes Pakistanis, Goanese, Anglo-Indians, and Indians, all of whom in general are prosperous and fairly well educated. Most of them work for the government, the oil company, the British military and civil establishments or other foreign business houses in the islands, and are employed mostly as clerks, foremen, cooks, waiters and domestic servants. Their days in Bahrain number from the time when the administration of the islands was tied to the Indian Government and British officials drew their labor from the Indian political establishment. They are resented by the Bahrainis mostly because they hold coveted jobs in government and business and wield a power far beyond their number.

The sentiment, however, is transitory and is expected to disappear as Bahrainis, now receiving education at an increasing rate, replace Indians and other foreign employees in clerical and intermediate positions.

The large population of foreign Arabs living in Bahrain is divided into two main groups, those from Saudi Arabia, Oman, Muscat, Qatar and Yemen, and those from Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and Palestine. Those in the first group are mostly itinerant laborers employed by the oil company, while the majority of the second group are white collar workers. They hold many of the teaching positions in Bahrain schools and exert some influence as missionaries of Arab nationalism.

* * *

A second problem confronting Bahrain is its dwindling reserves of oil. Oil is the mainstay of Bahrain's economy, with three-fourths of her national income being derived from petroleum activities. But for many years before oil was found, Bahrain prospered as the center of the pearl fishing trade in the Gulf and as a main entrepot port. Oil came when both these livelihoods were starting to decline, and probably saved Bahrain from difficult times. The pearl trade had been dealt crippling blows by the depression and the introduction of the Japanese cultured pearl. The over-all effect was a drastic decrease in the number of men and boats employed in the trade. Whereas at the beginning of the century there were almost 3,000 boats and some 40,000 men engaged in the entire Gulf pearling industry, by 1951 there were hardly one-fifth that number.⁸⁰ This past season (1957) saw only 35 Bahrain-based boats at work on the banks compared with 509 in 1930, the last year of the industry's golden age.⁸¹

Much of Bahrain's importance as an entrepot port was due to

80. Bowen, Richard L., "The Pearl Fisheries of the Persian Gulf", Middle East Journal, Vol.5, No.2, Spring 1951, p.163.

81. Reuters, dispatch reported in The Christian Science Monitor, 21 January 1958, p.2.

import and export trade from Al Hasa province of Saudi Arabia and its hinterland. Lately, however, Saudi Arabia has seen the advantage of conducting this trade for itself and is now increasing the port and market facilities at Dammam and Al Khobar opposite Bahrain. Qatar and Kuwait are also increasing the direct imports. The full effect of this division of trade has not yet been felt by Bahrain who still re-exports over 40% of its imports.

The social and economic changes brought about in Bahrain by the discovery of oil have not been as spectacular as those in Kuwait for two main reasons. First, much order and progress had already been brought about before oil was found, and second, her oil revenues have been modest in comparison to her neighbors. At the same time, the first oil found in the Gulf was at Bahrain, so the industry has had the most time to affect the situation.

By bringing about increased contact with the Western way of life, the oil industry, along with radio, newspapers and foreign travel, has spurred the awakening political consciousness in Bahrain and has, directly or indirectly, touched the lives of each Bahraini.

The oil company provides work for 5,850 Bahrainis in addition to about 1,150 Westerners and several hundred Indians and Pakistanis. It has brought many local industries to the island by its policy of employing local contractors. It hires cars and trucks from local businessmen and it contributes to the island's road-making and health services. Merchants and shopkeepers profit indirectly from the large number of foreigners and the greatly increased purchasing power of the local population.

The company is bound by its concession agreement to employ as many Bahrainis as possible. It attempts to do so but its senior posts are still filled by Americans and British, and it employs a large number

of Indian and Pakistani clerks and craftsmen. It claims it is forced to do this by a lack of educated Bahrainis capable of doing the job. So far, those who have the capability have preferred to find jobs in business with its promise of quick and large profits.⁸² Few young Bahrain men are interested in a technical education, consequently there is no professional class. Because of this some observers predict that it will be a long time before the company will be able to offer a substantial number of Bahrainis appointments on the senior staff.

When oil was first discovered, the Shaikh was persuaded by Belgrave to accept what was, at the time, a revolutionary proposal. He agreed to share the oil royalties. One-third would go into the privy purse, one-third into capital projects for the community, and one-third would be invested against the day when finally the oil would run out.

Between 1933 and 1956, the Bahrain Government received about \$59,000,000 in oil royalties. Of this, \$18,500,000 was invested, mostly in Britain and India.⁸³ Roughly another third was spent on capital projects such as schools, hospitals, electricity supplies, water schemes and the construction of a new harbor.

The last third that goes to the privy purse is divided proportionately and according to seniority among about 300 members of the Ruling Family.

As has been pointed out in the preceding chapter, Bahrain's oil reserves are expected to expire within 25 years, barring new discoveries

82. Hay, Ruper, "The Impact of the Oil Industry on the Persian Gulf Shaykhdoms", Middle East Journal, Vol.9, No.4, Autumn 1955, p.365. Also, Royal Institute of International Affairs, The Middle East, (London 1954), p.132.

83. It presently yields an annual income of about \$640,000. Birtwistle, Ross, "Bahrein's 25 Years of Oil Production", Cyprus Mail, 8 October 1957, p.2.

at Fasht bu Safah or elsewhere. Without oil, the shaikhdom's income from trade, investments and other sources should be enough to maintain existing government operating expenses. But it will not be enough to expand its economic and social services.

In the next 25 years, Bahrain wants compulsory free schooling for all its children, free hospitals, an expanded irrigation system that will draw part of its water from submarine springs in the Gulf, and a free port when its new harbor is completed.

When its reserves are exhausted, Bahrain will rely on Bapco's large refinery to provide the needed income. The refinery presently employs 25% of the total labor force of the islands and the bulk of the crude it processes is imported. Revenues from refining it account for about 25% of total oil payments, or approximately \$2.5 million each year. It is planned that when reserves run out the refinery will continue to operate on Saudi crude and will remain a mainstay of the economy.

* * *

Bahrain's last problem to be dealt with concerns the Iranian claim.

The Persian Government has never ceased to extend a claim to sovereignty over Bahrain, and at intervals has protested against treaties and agreements that the Shaikh has concluded with various parties. The British Government since the 1840's has upheld Bahrain's independent status in opposition to the Persian claim. The main arguments of each side were stated in two Persian notes of protest following the Treaty of Jeddah (May 1927)⁸⁴ and in two British notes of reply. The correspon-

84. An Anglo-Saudi treaty which bound Ibn Sa'ud not to interfere with the Shaikh of Bahrain and other "Gulf chiefs."

dence was registered at the League of Nations, to which the matter had been referred. Iranian claims have since been frequently asserted -- notably in 1930 and 1934 when the Shaikh granted oil concessions to western companies, in 1946, and in 1952 when Moussadeq mustered volunteers for a "jihad" to "throw the British usurpers and their Arab stooge (the Shaikh) into the sea."⁸⁵ The claim has since been maintained by the Zahedi Government, and in November 1957 Iran served notice it would⁸⁶ institute legislation making Bahrain an Iranian province.

Iran's argument is that Bahrain has always constituted an integral part of its territory except during the Portuguese occupation from 1521-1602. According to the argument Bahrain's shaikhs have never been independent, but have had a status similar to that of local khans in Persia. Iran asserts that they paid recognition to Persian sovereignty up to the end of the 18th Century, and after, by documented statements of loyalty and payment of taxes to the Persian State. That situation only came to an end, it claims, when the shaikhs were instigated into rebellion by the threats, pressure and direct intervention of a foreign power (the British).

In support of its case Iran has produced two documents which it says are proof that, in the past, the British Government had recognized the Persian right of sovereignty over Bahrain. The first is the Treaty of Shiraz concluded in August 1822 between the British Resident in the Gulf and the Prince-Governor of Shiraz, and the second, correspondence exchanged between Lord Clarendon, British Foreign Secretary, and the Persian Representative at the Court of St. James in April 1869.

85. Quoted from UP (United Press) article, New York Herald Tribune, 20 June 1957, p.1.

86. Reuters, The Christian Science Monitor, 13 November 1957, p.1.

Iran bases the legality of its claim on an alleged principle of international law (stated in its note) that a territory of a sovereign state as lawful owner of the territory officially transfers the right of ownership by treaty or whatever or officially recognizes the territory's independence or its annexation by another State. Iran states that since it has never done any of the above Bahrain is still under its sovereignty. 87

The British will admit to Persian rule over the Bahrain Islands only for the period following the Portuguese occupation to the conquest by the Khalifahs, 1602-1783. Bahrain's history prior to the Portuguese conquest, they maintain, is too obscure to permit an accurate fixing of sovereignty. With the Khalifah conquest, they assert, "the authority of Persia ceased, never to be re-established." 88

Legally they say the effective establishment by a territory of its independence is the deciding factor in the question of international title, and Britain regards as untenable the proposition that 145 years of effective Khalifah possession and administration of Bahrain could be affected simply because the Persian Government has not signed a document formally recognizing the fact of the Khalifah's independence.

They further deny the significance of the two documents that Iran poses as proof of British recognition of its sovereignty over Bahrain. As for the Treaty of Shiraz, they state that the Resident had no authority to negotiate it and in fact was relieved of his post because he had done so. In regard to Clarendon's note, they say it involves a question of wording and that it was never intended to constitute a recognition of Persian sovereignty over the Island, as the Persian

87. Adamiyat, Fereydoun, Bahreïn Islands, (New York 1955), pp.204-252.

88. Ibid, p.213.

Government interprets it.

And so that is how the question stands. It is difficult to gage the importance or the outcome of the claim. Iran has sent strong protest notes to Egypt and Iraq during the past few years when they claimed the island was Arab territory. Iran has also protested numerous times to foreign organizations which have invited Bahrain delegates to international conferences and it has boycotted meetings attended by representatives of the Shaikhdom.

Feeling still runs high. A foreigner whose passport carries a Bahrain indorsement is not permitted to enter Iran. However, observers believe that Iran's claims constitute solely a matter of prestige and that they will be held down to token protests and will probably continue that way for some time.

* * *

Kuwait in contrast to Bahrain has had its oil wealth fall upon it in a sudden deluge. In a few years' time it has progressed from a relatively poor community with few natural resources to a state with the largest per capita income in the world. Its government, which has never been well organized, has had a difficult time keeping up with the requirements placed upon it by Kuwait's rapid development.

Before the discovery of oil, it consisted only of the Ruler, his Secretariat, a council of elders, a department of finance, a small customs organization, sharia courts, a small police force and the Ruler's personal guard. Revenues were very small and funds were doled out as they became available. There was little or no finance control at the center and no budget.

Since the discovery and exploitation of oil, the tendency has been to rapidly create a welfare state without first establishing a sound

government administration. The ambitious development has resulted in the creation of a large number of semi-autonomous government agencies, all of which are headed by a member of the Ruling Family, Al Sabah. They include: Public Works, Health, Education, Courts of Kuwait (Ministry of Justice), Religious Trusts (Awqaf), Electricity, Port and Customs, Public Security, Police, Municipality, Finance Bureaus, Social Affairs, Telephone and Telegraph, and Press and Publications. In addition, a Development Board was set up in the early days of the program to plan and coordinate Kuwait's economic development activities. Its membership has varied, but heads of the Departments of Public Works, Finance, Education and Electricity have participated under the chairmanship of the head of Public Works.

There is no legislative council. Theoretically all legislation and all authority spring from the Ruler. But in fact, the members of the Ruling Family who are heads of departments do just about what they please with little control by the Ruler ⁸⁹ who is reluctant to make decisions. Some of those who head the key departments have come to wield considerable power. Those most influential are: Abdullah al Mubarak al Sabah, uncle to the present Ruler and son of old Mubarak, heads Public Security, Kuwait's army, and Bedouin Affairs; Fahd al Salim al Sabah, the Ruler's half-brother, heads the Development Board, Public Works, Health, Postal, Telephone and Telegraph, Housing and Administration, and Municipality.

It is natural since most of the Shaikhs have little or no administrative training or ability that they quite often leave control of the routine in their departments to selected employees. Of necessity many of the latter are non-Kuwaiti since competent Kuwaiti administrative and technical personnel are scarce. Egyptians, Palestinians and other non-

89. Hay, op.cit. p.368.

Kuwaiti Arabs have reached senior positions in many of the departments. For example, the Inspector General of Public Works is a Lebanese.

In addition, the government has employed British experts in most of the departments where they work in subordination to the Kuwaiti heads. They played important parts during the early days of the development program as advisers, but since 1954, when the program began to lose momentum, they have been gradually relegated to the status of senior employees.

Since 1953 there has been an Investment Board in London, headed by the Ruler's agent, a British national, which invests one-third of Kuwait's oil revenues in long and short-term obligations. A second third of the revenues is delegated to current operating expenses, i.e. maintenance of public utilities, salaries of government officials including members of the Royal Family, etc. The last third is devoted to capital investment in development. Finances are controlled by the Ruler who has the advice of several British experts employed in the finance department, but no budgets or records of government expenditures are published.

Kuwait's development boom began in 1952 under a five year program with an estimated \$255 million budget. \$66 million was to be spent by the end of 1953. In addition to health and education, \$42 million was to be spent on government buildings, \$28 million on a power plant and electrification system, \$14 million on airport improvements, \$19.5 million on water distillation and distribution, \$17 million on a sewage system, \$22.5 million on port improvements, \$8.5 million on a new hotel, \$5.5 million on distribution of natural gas and \$5.5 million on a new palace.

The program was prepared by a British engineer, and contracts on a cost-plus basis were awarded to five British contractors each of whom

took a Kuwaiti partner and shared with him a regulation 15% profit. There was much discontent among the Kuwait merchants who were left out, and they agitated for a share of the work. There was a general feeling that the British were making too much out of Kuwait. The upshot was that the contracts were abandoned in mid-1953 and since that time jobs have been put out to tender from firms of all nationalities.

The large incursion of foreigners, both Western and Arab, that oil development has brought about, and the increasing tendency of wealthy Kuwaitis to travel and send their sons abroad for education, has created social tensions and some political repercussions in Kuwait. In general, the Kuwaitis are more independent-minded and democratic than the people of Bahrain and are more conscious of their Arab nationality. Their early complaints voiced mostly in students' and teachers' clubs and similar societies were directed against housing priorities given to foreign technicians, and against extravagant spending on unnecessary ornamentation. In time these hardened into attacks on the large incomes and irresponsibility of the Ruling Family and on inefficiency and malpractices in the administration. In response, the Ruler, in 1954, appointed a High Executive Committee composed of four shaikhs and two merchants to study Kuwait's government and propose reform measures. The committee lasted until 1956 when it faded out with no apparent results to show for the time spent. It was immediately followed that same year by the creation of a Supreme Council for the purpose of discussing general policy and making recommendations to the Ruler. Details of its composition and functions are not clear.

During the past year pressure was placed on the Ruler to establish citizen councils to some of the government departments. It was a revival

of a short-lived scheme that had been put into effect in 1952 when committees were elected to advise the departments of Education, Health and Awqaf. The committees were ineffective because the elected members were arbitrarily overruled by the department heads. The latest movement started in the clubs and among the merchants and gained the active support of Shaikh Jabir al Ali, a nephew of the Ruler, and a number of other young progressive Shaikhs. Pressed by them and by the merchants, the Ruler, in March 1958, resolved to appoint ten-man advisory councils with executive power to six government departments. All are relatively minor: Health, Municipality, Education, Social Welfare, Courts and Awqaf.

Following the decision, the merchants requested that the council members be elected and have immunity from veto by the department heads. The latest information was that a compromise had been reached by which the Ruler would appoint a group of candidates for the councils and the group would elect from among themselves the required number of council members. The Ruler also promised them immunity, but it remains to be seen if the independent department heads will permit an infringement on their authority. Two of the departments designated to receive councils are within Fahd's bailiwick. He is a true autocrat, has a dominating personality and is not likely to favor relinquishing any of his power.

These councils are as close as Kuwait has come to a democratic process in organized institutions. They have been granted mostly in deference to the merchants who are a powerful body in Kuwait and who have considerable influence over the Ruler. The latter, however, like the Shaikh of Bahrain, is not convinced there is a need for any more than the old tribal system of rule. He continues to hold a majlis and sits every working day at his sea front palace to receive petitions. He is a

rigid orthodox Sunni, does not drink or smoke and has forbidden liquor to his Moslem subjects. He is generally popular with the Kuwaitis because he does not abuse his power, but at the same time he is criticized for his inability to control the worldly excesses of other members of the Ruling Family. Like most of the Gulf Rulers, he is content with the existing relationship with Britain that serves to protect his position and to handle numerous administrative details that Kuwait is not yet prepared to take on itself in the fields of foreign relations and economics. The level of influence that the British have upon him and upon Kuwait affairs is difficult to assess. Their position was considerably weakened during the development boom by the creation of the departments, but was strong enough to survive the Suez crisis when anti-British feeling ran high in Kuwait. As in Bahrain, they are encouraging the Ruler to institute internal reforms, particularly in the courts. They are presently interested in promulgating a joint traffic law, yet to be completed, that would alleviate some of the ticklish problems arising from mixed cases. It appears that at no time do they direct the Kuwaitis in what to do, but rather that they are tolerated and used because it is found convenient to do so.

To the British, Kuwait is the most vital interest in the Gulf because it is a mainstay of the sterling bloc. Half the shares in the Kuwait Oil Co. are held by the British Petroleum Co., 56% of which in turn are owned by the British Government. It is reported that these shares in Kuwait oil provide 10% of the United Kingdom's hard currency, and that Kuwait's investments in the U.K. are the largest single supply of monies coming into the London market.⁹⁰ This factor, more than any

90. Alsop, Joseph, "Britain and Middle East Oil", New York Herald Tribune, 23 March 1956, p.4.

other, ties Britain to Persian Gulf affairs and the maintenance of her treaty relationships with the Rulers. It is a matter of conjecture how long her protective relationship with Kuwait will continue. When it does end British interests may be just as easily watched over by a strong embassy as by a Political Agency. But it is necessary that British interests dovetail with those of Kuwait in order for them to enjoy long life, for if they fail to do so, there are quarters with their eyes on Kuwait's oil that will quickly call attention to it. The thinking Kuwaitis realize that, like the British, their big Arab neighbors have interest in them primarily for their oil. Some of the articulate are willing to share Kuwait's oil money with the "have-not" Arab states, but to a limited degree. But predominantly, Kuwait, like Iraq, welcomes no interference in its oil affairs and has shown no interest in schemes like the all-Arab pipeline⁹¹ which would entail some sharing of control of those affairs. The Kuwaiti attitude leaves no doubt that they regard the oil as theirs and theirs alone. It is reflected in the pronounced employer-employee relationship that exists between them and the non-Kuwaitis, Arabs and Westerners alike, who have come to work in Kuwait. Palestinians, Lebanese, and Egyptians, particularly those in government jobs, are resented because Kuwaitis believe they are working solely for their own interests and not for the good of Kuwait. Indeed, those most willing to open Kuwait's coffers without restriction to her Arab neighbors are the non-Kuwaiti Arabs. That is not to say that an Arab nationalist spirit does not exist in Kuwait. On the contrary, Gemal Abdul Nasser's picture

91. However, the Ruler has entered the oil transportation field. In 1956 he, in consort with several prominent merchants, formed a Kuwait Oil Tanker Company with a nominal capital of 3,700,000 pounds sterling.

is as prominently displayed in Kuwait as it is in Beirut or Damascus, and Voice of the Arabs booms in loudly on local radios. The spirit finds its expression mostly in the clubs. There are about thirty in Kuwait, some more casual and moderate than others. All are confederated, and are subsidized by the Kuwait Government. This is not so much in an effort to buy their cooperation as it is probably to keep them above ground. The noisiest and most active is the Cultural Club. Membership in the main is held by young educated Kuwaitis, with some Palestinians, Egyptians, and Lebanese. It publishes tracts denouncing imperialism, the British, the French, and the Americans. When Committee of National Union leaders were evicted from Bahrain during the recent trouble, many were welcomed and housed by clubs in Kuwait.

Among the guiding lights of these clubs, the most prominent is perhaps Dr. Ahmed al Khatib. He formerly worked in the Department of Internal Medicine in Kuwait and was popularly considered to be the top candidate for the position of Director in the Department of Health. However, he resigned, some say to avoid a connection with the government that could prejudice a future political career. Some observers say that among Arab nationalists he is the "face of Kuwait", biding his time, working behind the scenes, and influencing every major movement in the clubs. Others connect him with the Syrian Baathist party as its Gulf representative. Still others deny that he plays any more or any less of a role than others in Kuwait's political affairs.

Meanwhile, the tendency has been for the Kuwait Government to act more independently in outside affairs than the other shaikhdoms under British protection. There have been several state visits by the Ruler or his representatives to neighboring Arab states and at the time this was being written, he and Abdullah Mubarak were in Baghdad.

Also, Kuwait, although not an official member, has been active in certain Arab League affairs, especially the Boycott Committee. Other committees on which it is represented are Cultural, Passports and Residents, and Social Welfare. Mubarak in Beirut in 1953 promised that Kuwait would assume full membership in the League "as soon as it completed its internal renaissance."⁹²

A question that could throw Kuwait affairs into a cocked hat is that of succession. In Kuwait, a succession to the Ruler is not always the eldest son, but in accordance with tribal custom is selected at a conclave of the Ruling Family from amongst its senior members. This could lead to much uncertainty and intrigue even though the present Ruler, Abdullah al Salim al Sabah, probably has many years of life ahead of him. On the other hand, the succession may not be closely contested since the likely candidates already occupy positions of considerable power. The top prospect is Abdullah Mubarak. The British may be happy with him since he has frequently expressed pro-Western sentiments in the past. In Kuwait he has a reputation as a lover of liquor and women, and is known to be impulsive and subject to violent moods. As head of Public Security he has summarily ordered public whippings conducted on the steps of his headquarters. Fahd seems better qualified for the job. He is austere, but sober; has a dominating personality; runs the Development Board and usually heads the Supreme Council meetings in the Ruler's absence. But in fact, he stands little chance of succeeding to the rule because he is a Negro; his mother was a slave.

Two others who have been mentioned as candidates are:

92. "Developments of the Quarter", Middle East Journal, Vol.7, No.4, Autumn 1953, p.329.

Jabir al Ahmad al Sabah, son of the previous Ruler. He is head of Public Security at Ahmadi, the oil center, and is in effect governor there. He also exercises control over the Kuwait detachment in the Neutral Zone. Like Fahd, he is proud and sober. He is unostentatious in behavior, educated, intelligent, and well liked by K.O.C. His disadvantage is his youth. He is only twenty-seven.

Sabah al Salim al Sabah, a brother of the Ruler and President of Police.

Kuwait presently has several problems in the field of neighborly relations. One concerns Saudi Arabia and the Neutral Zone. On the whole, affairs with Saudi Arabia are good, but they were not always so. During the years 1920-1932, Kuwait was subject to sporadic Ikhwan raids and was successfully sustained only through the active intervention of the British. Friction between the Najd and Kuwait had been partly alleviated by a settlement of their boundaries in a convention signed at Uquair in 1922. The convention defined the actual area of Kuwait and delineated a Neutral Zone to the south of the new frontier. Sir Percy Cox's settlement, made in favor of Ibn Saud, pushed back the frontier claimed by Kuwait some 150 miles, reducing that kingdom to an area of six thousand square miles. Saud for his part had claimed all of Kuwait up to the walls of Kuwait town. Having to settle for less he apparently felt that he had been outwitted by Cox, and so decided on a policy of diverting his people from their trade with Kuwait, forcing them to get their necessities from the Saudi ports at Uquair, Qatif, and Jbail.⁹³ Kuwait was hard hit by the Saudi blockade which was maintained for over

93. Dickson, H.R.P., Kuwait and Her Neighbors, (London 1956), pp.276-277.

fourteen years. Most of its merchant fleet lay idle. With little water it had no agriculture, and had to import fodder for its livestock. It eked out an existence from the declining pearl trade until the coming of oil.

The blockade no longer exists, but a potential problem is posed in the Neutral Zone. By the terms of the Uquair agreement, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait are to share equal rights including those to subsurface resources such as oil, pending a further agreement to be reached through British offices. This last had not been accomplished by 1948 when the oil concessions were granted. Up until that time the administration of the Zone, which was without settlements and inhabited only by transitory herdsmen, had not been considered important.

However, since oil operations began in 1953, both Kuwait and Saudi Arabia have extended some governmental activities into the operation areas of their respective concessionaires. As the Zone's oil production increases in importance, the exact meaning of an undivided half-share in the Zone will have to be defined. With the probable growth of a settled population about the oil fields, some administrative machinery will have to be set up to handle such things as public services and taxation. The possibility of the Saudis and Kuwaitis meeting on common ground to settle the problem may be prejudiced by Britain's treaty relationship with Kuwait that will bring them into any discussion over the Zone. On the other hand, it is quite possible that the British, to avoid any friction over the Zone, either between Kuwait and Saudi Arabia or the United Kingdom and the United States (Zone concessionaires are U.S. companies), will stand aside and let the Kuwaitis negotiate for themselves.

A complex problem exists between Kuwait and her other neighbor,

Iraq. Their mutual border was defined in 1923 and was identical with that indicated by the Green Line of the Anglo-Turkish Agreement of 1913 which recognized the special British position in relation to the Shaikhdoms. The settlement was substantially in favor of claims put forth by Kuwait, especially those extended to certain islands.

Friction and distrust between the two states has risen from a number of sources. One is the question of certain date groves in Iraq owned by the Ruling Family of Kuwait. These groves had been guaranteed tax free by the British to the Family in return for their help in the capture of Basra during World War I. However, on the termination of the mandate, no agreement was made for continuing the arrangement with the result that the Iraqi Government has been levying heavy taxes on the groves.⁹⁴

The breach has been widened by open proposals by some nationalists in Iraq for the annexation of Kuwait. They argue that Kuwait in Ottoman days formed part of the Vilayet of Basra, and that Iraq as successor to Turkish authority has in turn inherited its sovereignty over Kuwait.⁹⁵ These claims, particularly prevalent during Ghazi's reign, resulted mostly from annoyance with Kuwaiti non-cooperation over smuggling and a desire for an alternate Gulf port.

This distrust is blocking two projects that could be of considerable benefit to both states. The first, mentioned in the previous chapter, is Iraq's plan for a badly needed oil loading terminal to be constructed on the Kuwait coast and to be connected by a pipeline to I.P.C.'s Basra fields. The second scheme is for a pipeline or canal

94. Seton-Williams, M.V., Britain and the Arab States, (London 1948), p.210.

95. Longrigg, Stephen H., Iraq, 1900 to 1950, (London 1956), p.272.

to be built to carry water from Iraq's Shatt al-Arab to Kuwait. Both projects have been discussed for some time. As far back as March 1956, the Shaikh of Kuwait authorized I.P.C. to survey a route for a \$28 million pipeline from the Basra fields to the Kuwait coast between Kuwait town and Mina al Ahmadi. But no agreement has been reached. Iraq is apparently prepared to give the water away, but Kuwait has asked that before either project is agreed upon, there should be a proper fixing of the undemarcated border between the two states. Kuwait feels that demarcation of the frontier will amount to Iraq's tacit acceptance of Kuwait as an independent entity. Her wish to fix that border has been intensified by the discovery of oil close to it at Raudhatain. Iraq for some obscure reason refuses to put up border markers. Some speculators see an agreement in the offing as a result of the current visit of Kuwait's Ruler to Baghdad. Others go so far as to predict that Kuwait will seek some sort of participation in the Arab Federal State of Iraq and Jordan. X

* * *

Qatar (see Map 4) juts northwards into the Persian Gulf from the southern or Arabian shore about midway between Kuwait and Ra's Musandam on the Straits of Hormuz. A barren peninsula, it is by far the largest feature of its kind along the entire littoral. Its surface consists of a great arch of limestone, and rainwater collected in its sand-filled pockets and seams supports good grazing in the winter and spring. Low-lying sabkhahs or salt flats extending across its narrow base indicate the likelihood that at one time in the past Qatar was an island. From the base to the tip of the peninsula is a distance of approximately eighty miles, and at no point is the breadth much in excess of forty miles. Its interior has been described by some as "the ugliest stretch of territory

that God has created." ⁹⁶ The only geographical features worthy of note other than the oil field at Jebel Dukhan, are its watering places, its coastal settlements and its coastline. The latter, like the rest of the Arabian shore of the Persian Gulf, is generally low, so much so that it often varies several miles between low and high tides. It is devoid of good harbors and is encumbered with numerous reefs and similar obstructions dangerous to navigation that extend several miles offshore. Qatar's population, estimated to be in the neighborhood of 20,000, is largely tribal in origin and illiterate. The greater majority of the people live in small towns and villages along the coasts and may be counted as settled tribesmen. Nearly half of them live at the capital, Dohah. Prior to the discovery of oil a meager subsistence was gained from pearling and fishing. There was practically no education and little direct contact with the world outside Arabia and the Persian Gulf. Almost all of the things needed for existence were brought in from Dibai, from ports on the Persian coast, or from Bahrain in native sailing craft.

The leading settled tribe of Qatar, though not the largest, is the Ma'adhid, to which the Ruling Family belongs. The Family first came into prominence in Qatar's affairs in 1863. Ali ibn Abdullah ibn Qasim Al Thani is the present Ruler, while his father, who abdicated in his favor in 1949, lives in quiet retirement in Dohah, the tribe's principal center.

The administration of Qatar under the Ruling Family before 1949

96. Hay, Rupert, "The Persian Gulf States and Their Boundary Problems", The Geographical Journal, December 1954, p.437.

followed a loose rudimentary system. But several changes took place that year. One, as mentioned, was the abdication of Abdullah ibn Qasim Al Thani in favor of his son Ali. He stepped down under pressure of disturbances resulting from family dissension and dissatisfaction over the virtual monopoly of oil royalties by himself and a small group of favored merchants. Immediately following Ali's succession, the British took measures to strengthen his government by appointing a resident representative, a Political Officer, to Dohah. Prior to that time Qatar had been visited by representatives from Bahrain. Further strengthening measures were taken in 1950 when the Ruler was persuaded to accept a British adviser. In short order additional British experts were taken on to set up and operate government departments in a pattern similar to early Bahrain development. Under the system the British enjoy considerable influence and have wide authority in matters of administration. The adviser is responsible to the Ruler for the work of the departments which at present are the Adviserate, Customs, Education, Police, State Engineers and State Medical. Because of the lack of local trained personnel, people to fill administrative and technical jobs in the government, as well as in the oil company, have been recruited from outside Qatar. They include Pakistanis, Indians, Palestinians and Lebanese.

As in Bahrain and Kuwait, the adviser and the experts are employees of the Ruler, in whom, theoretically, all executive and legislative powers ultimately reside. His approach to government is paternalistic and tribal. He is assisted in his tasks by other members of Al Thani and much influence is wielded by his secretary and members of the leading merchant family of Darwish. His secretary is his nephew, Ahmad ibn Hamad. The Ruler, a retiring person, sometimes described as a misplaced poet, leaves much of the Shaikhdom's routine to him. Ahmad

has a good reputation and is regarded by some as the likely successor to Shaikh Ali.

However, still a dominant personality in Qatar is the Ruler's father, Shaikh Abdullah. Now in the middle 80's, he is in good health and his virility is a local legend. Townspeople boast of the birth of his latest son five years ago.

There are several indications of Qatar's progress. A local law court has been established to handle cases other than personal status. It is composed of two shaikhs of the Ruling Family with the British adviser acting in an advisory capacity. It is based on customary law and equity, although the qadi is frequently consulted. A trim-looking police force has been built up under British officers. The government publishes an annual budget. 75% of the Ruler's total oil revenues go to the state. A third of this (or 25% of the total) is set aside for investment in gilt-edged securities or deposited in banks. In the past five years, Qatar has saved about \$35 million⁹⁷ in this way against the time, some twenty-five years hence, when its present proved reserves will be exhausted. Funds devoted to development have given Dohah, once a struggling, half-ruined fishing village, a sea water distillation plant, a piped water supply system, a power house, a supply of electricity, six primary schools, and a \$10 million state hospital with 130 beds and 128 baths. Five or six other primary schools have been constructed in outlying villages.⁹⁸ Marine landing facilities at Dohah have been greatly improved, but the harbor is not suitable for development as a port because of the shallows that will not permit ocean-going

97. Petroleum Week, 12 April 1957, op.cit. p.28.

98. In 1950 there was not one school in all Qatar except for a few Koranic lesson schools.

vessels to approach nearer than ten miles. At present the deep water anchorage at the oil loading terminal at Umm Said is being used for the off-loading of cargoes into lighters which are towed north twenty miles to Dohah.

Thus far, however, the economic activity resulting from oil seems to be concentrated in a few hands, and the old pursuits -- pearling, fishing and small trade -- continue to be the principal activity of those living on the coasts. Because of the primitive state of Qatar's society, recent economic development has had as yet no political effect beyond causing the many members of Al Thani to continually agitate for a bigger cut of the oil profits. Demands for popular reforms are probably a generation away and it appears that the Ruler's main internal problem will spring from the ambitions of his relatives.

Bedouins, in smaller numbers than Qatar's townsmen, range the interior. While furnishing many laborers for the oil company, they are still mainly engaged in pasturing their camels, sheep and goats on the peninsula's scanty vegetation. In seasons when there is poor rainfall in the area south of Qatar, the Bedouin population is increased by elements of various Saudi tribes of Al Hasa and the Rub al Khali which visit the peninsula in search of better grazing and water. Reported to be frequent Saudi visitors are large groups of the Bani Hajir, the Manasir and al Murrah. They mingle with sections of many tribes and it would be difficult for one of these or any other tribe to claim the peninsula as its exclusive range. But the questions of tribal ranges, loyalties, and ownership of waterholes have taken on considerable importance as determinants for territorial claims.

This is important to Qatar since its one land boundary -- that

with Saudi Arabia -- is not only undemarcated but is also undefined. The question of the settlement of this boundary arose in 1932 when the Ruler of Qatar granted exploratory privileges to the Anglo-Persian Oil Co. When the movement of that company's geologists was restricted in the area of Salwah in 1933 by representatives of the governor of the Hasa, the Ruler of Qatar brought the question to the British Resident at Bushire and was reportedly advised to consult with the King of Saudi Arabia. At this time Saudi Arabia is said to have maintained that its sovereignty extended over the entire Qatar Peninsula with the exception of the town of Dohah and the pastoral lands immediately adjacent to it. In 1934 Britain opened the question of the Qatar boundary with the Saudi Government, but negotiations during the subsequent three years failed to bring agreement. Further developments in the problem of Qatar's boundary have been linked with the Buraimi question and will be discussed with it in later pages.

Qatar's relations with Bahrain are also unsettled, primarily because of a claim by Bahrain to sovereignty over certain portions of the peninsula. The Khalifahs base their assertions on their early history in Qatar when, prior to driving the Persians from Bahrain in 1783, they had established a paramount position there. They had migrated to Qatar from Kuwait in 1765, that being in fact the first significant event in Qatar's modern history. During the remainder of the 18th Century and for the first half of the 19th, while Britain was establishing and maintaining its position in the Gulf, it appears that Qatar was considered a dependency of Bahrain. None of its chiefs were party to the General Treaty of 1820 or to subsequent engagements such as those calling for a ten-year maritime truce, the abolition of the slave trade, or peace

in perpetuity. What control Bahrain had over Qatar ceased when the peninsula was occupied by the Turks in 1872.⁹⁹

Yet, the Khalifahs continue from time to time to extend their claim. It has centered on an area in the northwest of Qatar around al Zubarah. This district was occupied for many generations by a small group of the tribe of Nuaim, who professed allegiance to the Al Khalifahs. The Shaikh of Bahrain treated them as his subjects, issued them free passports and made their allegiance to him an argument in his claim to sovereignty over the area. Tribal disputes arising in the district in 1937 resulted in the Ruler of Qatar establishing customs inspectors near al Zubarah. The Ruler of Bahrain then complained, at the request of members of Nuaim residing in the troubled area, that Qatar was infringing on the rights of Bahrain. Attempts at negotiating a settlement were of no avail, and fighting took place between the forces of Nuaim and Al Thani with the result that most of the members of Nuaim subsequently withdrew to Bahrain, with some eventually settling in Saudi Arabia. Traffic between Qatar and Bahrain was virtually suspended for several years, and only after 1944, when a rapprochement was reached between the two Rulers, was normal intercourse resumed. It appears that Qatar's sovereignty over the disputed area was recognized at that time, but there have been subsequent reports of a revival of claims to the area by the Ruler of Bahrain.¹⁰⁰

* * *

The Trucial Coast (see Map 4) consists of a string of seven principalities that extend along the Arabian shore of the Gulf from the base of the

99. Seton-Williams, op.cit. p.211.

100. Arabian American Oil Company, Oman and the Southern Shore of the Persian Gulf, (Cairo 1952), p.229.

Qatar peninsula to the Gulf of Oman. The continuity of the line is broken by the tip of the Musandam Peninsula (Ruus al Jibal) which is part of the Sultanate of Muscat. Five of the shaikhdoms face northward across the Gulf toward Persia: Abu Dhabi, Dibai, Ajman, Umm al Qaiwain, and Ra's al Khaima. The combined state of Sharja-Kalba also lies along this stretch, although a part of Kalba adjoins the seventh shaikhdom, Fujaira, on the Gulf of Oman. The boundaries separating these states from each other and their neighbors have never been defined.

The territories on the Persian Gulf side are for the most part dry, barren and inhospitable. The shores consist mainly of low, glaring, uninhabited beach, broken by tidal inlets, salt flats and occasional fishing villages composed of small clusters of palm frond huts. Above and inland from the beach at varying distances is a belt of low sand dunes and gravel plateaus spotted with patches of stunted acacia and small oases. Beyond the belt, the sand dunes are higher and march southward into the Rub al Khali. To the northeast, beyond Ra's al Khaima, the shore and sands disappear entirely, pinched out by bleak limestone hills that descend steeply into the sea from the razor-back ridges of the Musandam Peninsula. There are no roads, only desert tracks which often are motorable. However, the oil company, Petroleum Development (Trucial Coast) Ltd., is building roads of a sort in its areas of operations.

Rainfall in the region is scanty and capricious, averaging about three inches a year. The summers are long, hot and exhaustingly humid. As one proceeds inland from the coast, the humidity decreases but the temperature rises to about 120° F. in the shade. Gulf water temperatures in the summer often average over 100° F.

The very small populations of the territories (the total is estimated at 80,000) are concentrated mainly in the oases and in scattered coastal settlements. In the interior the economy is primarily pastoral, but some agriculture, chiefly the cultivation of dates, is carried on in the oases at Buraimi and in the dunes of Al Jiwa. Buraimi lies about 70 miles south of Dibai and stands out in this corner of Arabia as a center of population, trade and communications. Al Jiwa is a collective name for a string of tiny oases, nestled in the heavy sands about 60 miles south of Abu Dhábi. Both Buraimi and Al Jiwa lie in territory currently contested by Saudi Arabia and the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi.

The principal coast villages in each shaikhdom are usually the seat of the Ruler and the place from which the territory takes its name. They all possess shallow anchorages on an inlet, usually guarded by a bar off its mouth. Many of the towns are built around fortified towers or mud castles and resemble medieval city states. The resemblance is carried further by the presence of rusting smooth-bore cannon, posted here and there on the battlements, captured souvenirs of the Coast's pirate days.

Industry along the coast is confined mainly to pearling, fishing, and some boat building. The pearls are usually exported to India by way of Bahrain, and the fish are used locally for fertilizer and fodder
101
for livestock.

The chief commercial port is Dibai, with a population of some 15,000 Arabs, Persians and Baluchis. It carries on an active entrepot trade, re-exporting about 80% of its imported goods; some of it to other

101. Codrai, Ronald, "Desert Shaikhdoms of Arabia's Pirate Coast", The National Geographic Magazine, Vol.CX, No.1, July 1956, p.101.

Arab Gulf ports, some into the interior, but the bulk to Persia, with whom Dibai also carries on a lively gold smuggling enterprise. The main sources of Dibai's state revenue are customs dues and oil concession payments, the last providing about 20% of the total income. In 1956 the Ruler, Shaikh Said bin Maktum, at the suggestion of the British Political Agent, hired a young Bahraimi to handle his customs affairs. In 1957, because of the introduction of efficient methods and an increase in trade, income from customs dues was 2 million rupees more than the previous year's take, with total income from all sources estimated at about 6 million rupees.

Dibai has extensive plans for the future with top priority placed on improvement of harbor facilities. At present, steamers must anchor several cable lengths off the bar at the mouth of Dibai Creek and off-load their cargoes into lighters to be carried to the wharfs at the town. This system is further handicapped by the fact that the larger lighters cannot negotiate the bar at low tide. Under existing plans the bar is to be removed, the harbor dredged out to two miles and two quays are to be constructed. Dibai hopes that this project, by cutting down the turn-around time for shipping, will result in increased trade and more revenue. Already, Dibai is diverting much trade from Bahrain which formerly was the main port for the re-shipment of goods to the Trucial Coast, and if oil is found in the interior, Dibai could become very important indeed. Other plans call for a power plant and a municipal electrical system. A company has been floated and 850,000 rupees of an initial required capital of 1.5 million rupees have been subscribed by local merchants.

The first steps in municipal service anywhere on the Coast have

been taken in Dibai. It has a newly organized municipal council made up of about a dozen merchants. Its functions, however, are not clear. Last year a Dibai city police force was established under the direction of Major Lorimer, a Britisher, formerly of the Palestine Police. He is assisted by a number of Adenese instructors, and many local members of the force have been sent to Bombay for special instruction at a police school.

In addition, Dibai has two free elementary schools with a total enrollment of 600 pupils. The Iranian Government has offered to finance a third school to accommodate Dibai's Persian populace.

A hospital was opened in town about nine years ago with the assistance of the British Government, and is presently operated by a British doctor with the assistance of a woman doctor from India who handles the female patients.

In Dibai's courts, as elsewhere along the coast, Islamic law is observed in cases of personal status according to equitable rules and custom. All legal cases are referred to the Ruler or a member of his family. If either is unable to settle the case, it is passed to the qadi. Commercial cases are usually settled by a tribunal consisting of two or three merchants, but in view of Dibai's growing commercial importance, the Ruler has seen fit to employ a British legal expert to advise them.

102

The only other port of any importance on the coast is Sharjah. However, its trade is rapidly declining, partly because of its proximity to Dibai, but mostly because its anchorage is filling with silt. It formerly housed the Political Agency which has since moved to Dibai.

The old Agency buildings now serve as a mess for the British officers of the Trucial Oman Scouts, whose headquarters are on the outskirts of Sharjah. A short distance outside the town there is an airstrip that sites an R.A.F. detachment and also services daily commercial flights from Bahrain.

In town is the palace of the Ruler, Shaikh Saqr bin Sultan. There is also a free primary school for boys and girls, with classes in English. It is supported by the Shaikh of Kuwait and has an Egyptian teacher. In addition there is a technical school to train welders, carpenters, bricklayers, and other technicians for the day when and if oil is found. In the center of town there is a clinic operated by a woman medical missionary of the Arabian Mission of the Dutch Reform Church in America. There is no municipal service of any kind; no electricity, public water supply or sewage disposal system -- the beach, a few steps from the market, serves as the town convenience.

The other Trucial states are less fortunate than Dibai and Sharjah in that they have no medical facilities and, except for another Kuwait-sponsored school in Ra's al Khaima and scattered Koranic schools, no educational facilities.

Economic conditions are bad on the coast and all the states are too poor to undertake much in the way of development, but attempts are being made to develop the local water resources and start a program of land utilization. It is hoped that these steps might help stop a prevailing migration of the inhabitants to the richer shaikhdoms up the Gulf and Saudi Arabia in search of paying jobs. Crop and irrigation experiments are being carried out in an extensive area of red soil, some 20 miles inland from the coast in Ra's al Khaima. The work is carried on in an agricultural settlement under the sponsorship of the Foreign

Office and under the supervision of an Englishman, Robin Huntington, formerly an officer of the Trucial Oman Scouts. It is intended that the settlement later become a training center for agriculturists. The work faces several difficult handicaps; the most important is that all water in Ra's al Khaima is brackish. It remains to be seen whether crops in large quantities can be grown with it, and if so, whether such crops can be sold on a commercial scale to other parts of the coast.

In the matter of government, tribal organization still exists along much of the coast and only the Rulers and the tribal chiefs possess any political importance. The Rulers have absolute authority over their own subjects and administer it along patriarchal lines. They deal with their own internal affairs down to the least decision. There are no advisers and no built-up administrative machinery. Some of them have secretaries who, subject to the Ruler's approval, handle routine correspondence, financial affairs, or matters of protocol. On the whole, peace and order are maintained by the Trucial Oman Scouts. The organization was established in 1951 by King's Regulation #1 (Trucial States) and is commanded by seconded British Army officers, many of them old hands with native troops, having served in The Sudan Defense Force, The Queen's African Rifles and similar units. Many of the key enlisted ranks are held by non-commissioned officers on detached service from the Aden Levies. Recruits are drawn from all the Trucial Shaikhdoms. No effort has been made to organize them into individual tribal units, but rather they seem merely to have been thrown together. It has brought about frequent disciplinary problems in that those soldiers taken from the more prominent tribes often attempt to assert their dominance over fellow soldiers from lesser groups and even try to subvert the authority of their non-commissioned

officers. Most of the levies have no particular desire to serve, but are attracted by the pay and food. When one deserts, pressure placed upon his tribal chief usually succeeds in bringing about his return.

Apart from the Scouts, each Ruler has a retinue of body guards that assist in maintaining the peace about his capital. Tribal chiefs in the interior depend upon their retainers as well, and upon tribal loyalties to preserve some sort of order.

The foreign affairs of the Shaikhdoms are mainly confined to the other Persian Gulf states and are handled through the Political Agent. The Trucial Coast Rulers, however, often deal with each other without the Agent's mediation.

Some semblance of regional organization was started in 1952 when a council of Rulers was formed for the discussion of matters of common interest to the Shaikhdoms, particularly the settlement of their boundaries, and for the development of cooperation between them. Meetings have since been held every six months under the coordination of the Political Agent,¹⁰³ but their progress is unknown. There has been no talk or hint of a possible federation such as that the British are promulgating in the Aden Protectorate.

* * *

Abu Dhabi has been mentioned as being involved in a territorial dispute south of the Trucial Coast. The dispute has been left to the last chapter, but some general background information on the principality will be discussed here.

The Shaikhdom contains only a single town -- Abu Dhabi -- a fishing village of not more than 2-3,000 people. Other places named on

103. Pamphlet R3387, Central Office of Information,
op.cit. p.9.

the map are nothing more than coastal landings or distinctive terrain features. The town is surpassed in size, commercial activity and geographical advantages by Dibai and Sharjah. It is inconveniently located, except for maritime purposes, on the seaward side of a predominantly bare and sandy island, separated from the mainland by a ford which can only be crossed at low tide. Its anchorage off the town is a good one, but is unprotected. The town consists mainly of palm frond huts with a few stone buildings, notable among which are the main mosque and the two residences of the Ruler. Most of the town's water supply, poor in quality, is drawn from a few wells at the back of the town and from shallow pits near the center of the island. Additional water is brought by boat from rock pools on a nearby island and is sold in the markets. Little irrigation is practiced. Some dates are grown locally but are inferior and are used chiefly for fodder, while dates for human consumption are brought in from Buraimi and Oman.

Abu Dhabi is the largest of the seven shaikhdoms. Its territory runs along the southern shore of the Gulf for an undetermined distance both to the east and west of the capital town so as to abut on Dibai territory on one side and on territory claimed by Saudi Arabia on the other. In the direction of Dibai the coast consists principally of sterile, flat, and monotonous country with many sabkhas lying close to the sea. The northernmost arm of the Rub al Khali with its masses of sand reaches up to this coast and its hinterland. For some twenty miles along the coast northeast of Abu Dhabi town a jumble of islands and reefs separates the mainland from the open waters of the Gulf, resulting in numerous recesses and backwaters.

About twenty miles toward Dibai from Abu Dhabi town is the small promontory of Ra's al Sedr near which the oil company has established a

base for its operations in the field. A dozen or so miles farther on is the inlet or bay called Khor Ghanadhah, a point of conflict between Abu Dhabi and Dibai on various occasions.

Roughly four-fifths of the way to Dibai stands Jebel al-Ali, the one landmark of any prominence in the region. In the past the Ruler of Abu Dhabi, Shaikh Shakbut bin Sultan, has regarded his territory as reaching northwards at least to that point, mainly because it is a convenient place to fix a boundary.

West of Abu Dhabi town, Shakhbut's claim extends along the coast all the way to Qatar. The part of that stretch, however, that lies west of a point between al Mughairah and al Mirfa, is also claimed by Saudi Arabia.

The coast for 30 miles southwest of Abu Dhabi town consists of a string of close-lying, low islets separated from the mainland by creeks and tidal inlets as at Abu Dhabi. Beyond this stretch the off-lying islands are found, generally speaking, at a greater distance from the mainland coast. The shapes of these islands and the course of the coast are not accurately shown on most maps. Today the islands and the inlets behind them are less frequently visited than in the days when pirates took refuge there from British warships.

Shakhbut lays claim to about 300 islands of various sizes off his coasts. Among the largest of them are Sir Bani Yas, al Yasat, Dalma, Ghaghah, and Halul. His claim to Halul, the northernmost island, is disputed by the Shaikh of Qatar.

To the south of Abu Dhabi town is the large, almost completely covered, sand region of al Dhafrah. It extends from the Gulf into the Rub al Khali below latitude 23° N. and runs from Sabkhat Matti in the western extremes of the territory claimed by Abu Dhabi eastward to about

55° E. longitude, which is about midway between Ra's al Sedr and Jebel al-Ali. Present Abu Dhabi claims to the south and southeast include most of al Dhafrah.

The dominant tribe in the territory controlled by Abu Dhabi is Bani Yas. They are said to have appeared in force in the vicinity of the Trucial Coast about the middle of the 18th Century. A section of the Bani Yas, the Al Bu Falah, established the town of Abu Dhabi in about 1761. When the main tribe was split into several factions by internal rivalries shortly after its appearance on the coast, it was the Al Bu Falah who finally achieved unified leadership.¹⁰⁴

Since 1795 that section has ruled over the Bani Yas and Abu Dhabi. The seat of authority has been a precarious one. Since their ascendancy in 1795, all but two of their ruling Shaikhs have been deposed or murdered. The present Ruler, Shaikh Shakhbut was nearly assassinated when a child. His father was slain by his uncle in 1927 and Shakhbut succeeded to the throne in 1928 when the uncle in turn was murdered in a coup d'etat carried out by Shakhbut's cousin. The pattern was a familiar one repeated often in Southeast Arabia where regicide was a popularly accepted method of succession.

In 1833 the Abu Dhabi ruler, Shaikh Tahnun ibn Shakhbut, was murdered by his two brothers. In the contest for succession which followed, the tribe was again torn by dissension with the result that one section, Al Bu Falasa, withdrew from the main body of Bani Yas and left Abu Dhabi to establish themselves at Dibai. The withdrawal marked the beginning of a rivalry between the two towns that has

104. Aramco, Oman and the Southern Shore of the Persian Gulf, op.cit. p.76.

continued to the present day.

About 1944-45 Said ibn Maktum, head of the Rashidi family of Al Bu Falasa and Ruler of Dibai tried to push forward his frontier with Abu Dhabi to Khor Ghanadhah. Several years of intermittent fighting between the Bedouin tribes of the interior followed, and hostilities between the main forces of the states might have ensued had the British not intervened and imposed a truce in 1947. It is understood that the British intervened again in 1951 and since that time they have been attempting to establish a recognized boundary between the two states.

It is difficult to predict what lies in store for the Trucial Coast Shaikhdoms. At present they are desperately poor, backward and underdeveloped in the fundamental sense of the word. What limited improvements that have been introduced in the way of medical and educational facilities have been financed by money from the outside. Former incomes from slave trading, gun-running and pearling have disappeared and the Rulers, with the possible exception of Dibai's, haven't the capability of supporting such facilities themselves. A few of them receive dead rents from oil concessions, but the revenue is not sufficient to help basic needs.¹⁰⁵ The British have been criticized for their lack of activity in this regard, but several factors should be pointed out. First, under their agreements with the Rulers, they are not obligated to undertake internal improvements. They are able to render advice, and do so. In the initial stages advice was given with the objective of first establishing law and order. The Trucial Oman Scouts were established

105. Total income of Abu Dhabi from oil payments and customs duties is approximately 3 million rupees; Dibai: 6 million; the other states: 15,000-200,000 rupees.
Europa Publications Ltd., The Middle East, (London 1957), p.47.

at the advice of the British and with the consent of the Shaikhs. British opponents argue that the British emphasize security in order to sustain the Rulers and thus the dominant British position in the Gulf as well, while the British argue that security is a requisite to any economic or political development. There is truth to both sides. Interest is never selfless, but that does not imply that its exercise cannot be mutually beneficial. No one gains by continuous internal strife such as has been characteristic of the Trucial Coast and Southeast Arabia throughout their histories. British interests are threatened by such outbreaks, but at the same time, the Shaikhdoms suffer from the effects of such trouble -- interrupted rule, decreased trade, loss of lives and property, and the restriction of progress.

Now security of a sort has been established in the Trucial Coast. However, some animosities still exist, and the effectiveness of the Rulers' authority in the interior of their territories is subject to question. Still, there has been no serious trouble in the Shaikhdoms, except on their disputed fringe areas, for a number of years. In comparison to the old days the situation is quiet. It may mean that some attention can be turned to domestic improvement. It remains to be seen what part the British will play in bringing it about.

If oil is discovered the problem of money for development could be overcome. The prospect invites speculation. It would probably mean the institution of adviserate systems and an even firmer grasp by the British on the Coast. At the same time it is not likely that oil, if found, would turn up in each of the Shaikhdoms. It could be another case of the "haves" and "have-nots", but it is more likely that the British would push for a sharing of the wealth and for some type of

regional organization to implement uniform development, perhaps a federation. Those shaikhs who in normal days would be reluctant to join such a system because of an implied surrender of some of their sovereignty would probably be encouraged to join if it meant a cut of oil money.

On the darker side, I.P.C. has drilled six deep and expensive dry holes and the company has become skeptical of the Coast's prospects. If the company pulls out, their dead rent payments to the Chiefs goes with them and conditions could get worse than they are now. The British, aware of criticism of their past performance and a growing accusation that they by supporting the Rulers are supporting medievalism, would endeavor to take up some of the slack. Objectives visualized in the event of oil being discovered would be considerably reduced. The probability would be British support for basic needs in education and health, with their continued encouragement for the Rulers to improve their existing administrative structure and to join together in matters of common interest. Additional help could come from the outside. The Shaikh of Kuwait, as was noted, is already sponsoring two schools on the Coast. Whether he is doing so at the suggestion of the British, or to provide a supply of future students for his empty university in Kuwait, or with some idea of closer cooperation among the British-protected Shaikhdoms, is again speculation. But it leaves open the possibility that he would be willing to contribute more.

Across the Gulf is another possible benefactor. The Shah of Iran takes close interest in the Persians in the Arab Gulf states. In Dibai, where he has built the school for the Persian community, he has also cultivated the friendship of the Ruler. The latter, for the past few years, has spent his summers at the Shah's palace on the Caspian Sea. Unconfirmed reports have it that all six of the Trucial Shaikhs on the

Persian Gulf side have been invited to go this summer. In back of the Shah's interest lies recognition of the commercial importance of the Trucial Coast in the supply of goods to the Iranian coast, particularly to Bandar Abbas that is virtually cut off from supply from the interior of Persia. In the light of this apparent good will, Iran might also offer some material assistance.

* * *

The Sultanate of Muscat and Oman. (See Maps 1 and 4). In considering this last state, a problem arises over the use of the name Oman. Generally speaking, usage outside Arabia applies it to the whole of the great bulge of the Arabian Peninsula between the Trucial Coast and that part of the southern coast of Arabia running from Ra's al Hadd to the vicinity of
106
the island of Masira.

This usage is reflected in the application by Westerners of the name Gulf of Oman to the arm of the Arabian Sea on which the city of Muscat is built. Local usage in the Gulf, however, applies the name Oman only to the interior of the bulge. It defines its area as the main portion of the Hajar, the mountain chain that sweeps down along a course roughly parallel to the outer edge of the bulge, and the lands lying between those mountains and the Rub al Khali. According to this usage, Muscat lies outside Oman as does the Batinah, the region northwest of Muscat between the mountains and the sea. The Trucial Coast, sometimes called the Trucial Oman, and the Dhofar region to the east of Hadhramaut are also considered separate geographical
107
entities.

-
106. Fisher, W.B., The Middle East, (London 1950), p.433. See also: map Arabia and the Nile Valley, Philip-Stanford Inc., (London 1953); Goode's School Atlas, (Chicago 1948), p.150.
107. Aramco, Oman and the Southern Shore of the Persian Gulf, op.cit. p.4.

Oman is included in the territories claimed by the Sultan. These are enclosed in a rough triangle with a concave hypotenuse drawn from the eastern extremity of the Hadhramaut across the bulge to the vicinity of Buraimi. The shores of the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea form the triangle's two sides. The coasts extend for approximately 1,000 miles and the triangle covers an area of over 80,000 square miles with a populace hazardly estimated at one-half million. There are no boundaries to these lands that have been fixed by international agreement and the Sultan's territorial claims have been challenged by Saudi Arabia and a local leader in the Oman interior.

The Sultan, Said ibn Taimur, has his main capital at Muscat on the Gulf of Oman coast. It is also the principal port of the Sultanate, with its anchorage, reputed to be one of the hottest in the world, lying between the precipitous walls of a long, twisting cove. The rocky heights are the Sultan's visitors' book and are emblazoned with the painted names of hundreds of ships that have made Muscat a port of call. The walled town lies at the head of the cove. Backed by rough hills that step down to the water from the Hajar, it is difficult to approach from the land side. In addition to the Ruler's palace, it contains the buildings of the British Consulate-General.

Matrah, Muscat's sister town, lies in an adjoining cove and serves as the capital's market and merchant center. It is the starting point for the inland transport of goods mostly by pack animal. It also houses the one hospital on the Gulf of Oman coast, -- the medical mission of the Dutch Reform Church of America, established in the 1890's -- and is the site of an airfield serviced by Gulf Aviation. The two towns have a combined population of approximately 14,000, consisting mainly

of Baluchis, Indians, Pakistanis and Negroes.

Beyond Matrah, the Hajar range, starting at the coast, swings gradually in to a maximum distance of forty miles at a point about seventy-five miles north, and then bends symmetrically back to strike the coast again at a place called Khutma Malaha, Muscat's boundary with the shaikhdom of Sharjah-Kalba. It encloses between it and the Gulf a crescent plain, the Batinah, one of the chief regions of the Sultanate. The Batinah has a uniform three-fold nature throughout its great length. First, a stretch of sandy, gently-shelving beach; then a great palm grove, one of the largest in the world, which marches with the beach continuously for 150 miles and is two to three miles deep in some places. The last is a gravel plain that stretches back from the palm grove to the mountains. ¹⁰⁸ Sib lies in the Batinah and is the "resort" town of the coast to which the population of the capital flocks during the summer months.

The inhabitants of the Batinah are estimated at 200,000, predominantly Arab. They fall into three categories of occupation: fishermen, date cultivators, and Bedouins. The latter roam the gravel plain, raising sheep and camels. The fishermen, living in palm frond villages along the beach gain their livelihood by catching sardines and sharks. The sardines when dried serve locally as fertilizer and feed for livestock and also comprise one of Muscat's chief exports. Sharks are caught for their fins and tails which are exported to China.

The date palms, numbering several millions, produce the second of the Sultanate's chief exports, the brown Muscat date long famous for its flavor.

108. Thomas, Bertram, Alarms and Excursions in Arabia, (London 1931), p.123.

North of the Batinah and beyond Kalba and Fujaira is a fringe of the Muscat state, a rugged region with fjord-like coasts. It is called Musandam or Ruus al Jibal and is inhabited by an isolated hill people, the Shihuh. Little is known of them except that they live in caves or roofless houses of piled rocks and speak a language unlike Arabic. Thomas connects them with the Shuhites of the Book of Job.

109

Inland from the Gulf of Oman coast is the Hajar range with a central ridge, the Jebel Akhdar (lying west-southwest of Muscat), that rises to 9,000-10,000 feet above sea level. This mountain country is the least known inhabited territory in Arabia, seldom visited by Westerners. Numerous springs and steep-sided wadis are prominent features. The wadis in general contain the centers of habitation, fortified oases that are irrigated from the springs and from direct rainfall stored in tanks. Higher, in the Jebel Akhdar, the mountains resemble those of the Lebanon with vegetation plentiful and various, including cedar trees.

110

The Hajar's complex folds form a formidable barrier to trade and communication between the coast and the interior. They can only be entered at places on the seaward side where a cismontane wadi has cut its way through. Seven or eight such gorges exist in the entire great length of the Hajar, and only two of them are passable by motor vehicle.

Northwest of the Hajar and southeast of the Trucial Coast the interior of Oman consists of the Dhahirah or Highland. In the north it reaches up towards the peninsula of Ruus al Jibal, and in the south its edges are marked by outlying hills of the Hajar and water courses running towards the sand wastes of the Rub al Khali. West of the Dhahirah is

109. *Ibid*, pp.229-231.

110. Thoms, Wells, "Inland Oman", *The Moslem World*, Vol.XXXI, No.4, October 1941, pp.417-418.

nothing but the openness and emptiness of the sands, while to the east the region is shut in by the long steep wall of the Hajar, pierced here and there by the few gorges from which difficult passes lead to the coast. Its geographical limits are unfixed, but it is considered to end in the vicinity of Ibri. The Dhahirah is not rich in discovered natural resources or in human inhabitants, but deserves mention because of its strategic position. In this area the claimed boundaries and influences of the Sultanate meet with those of Saudi Arabia and the Trucial states. Though surrounded by powers interested in its affairs, the Dhahirah has remained relatively free of outside control for nearly a century. Yet, no form of central government exists there; rather, ancient rivalries and modern quarrels have broken the region into small districts ruled over by petty lords or tribal chiefs. All of these rely on the Bedouin to maintain their positions, and compete for their uncertain support with lavish hospitality and gifts.¹¹¹ The towns and villages are almost invariably found in clusters, for conditions are too insecure for solitary settlements to maintain themselves. The more prominent clusters are Ibri, Dhank and Buraimi. The main settled tribe in the area is the Nuaim whose elements hold property in the latter two towns. The principal nomadic tribe is the Duru, who have a reputation as bold and far-ranging raiders and fighting men. The Duru camels that graze along the fringes of the Rub al Khali are considered among the best of the Oman breeds, which in turn are rated very high throughout the Arabian peninsula. Many¹¹² of them are sold in the market towns of the interior.

On the landward side of the Hajar in southeast Oman is the

111. Thesiger, Wilfred P., "Desert Borderlands of Oman", The Geographical Journal, Vol. CXVI, Nos. 4-6, October-December 1950, pp. 139-140.

112. Ibid, p. 157.

district of Sharqiyah. Fed by two large wadis running from the mountains, it was at one time one of the richest districts in Southeast Arabia, with flourishing date groves and green fields of alfalfa, barley and wheat. In recent years it has suffered a disastrous drought. Many of the underground water courses necessary for the irrigation of the groves and fields have dried up, and several villages have been abandoned. In addition to the drought the people of the area suffer to a degree from the evils of absentee landlordism, as a number of the landowners live in Zanzibar and elsewhere.

The last district to deserve mention is the province of Dhofar lying at the southwestern extreme of the Sultanate on the borders of the Hadhramaut. Its significant feature is a crescent-shaped coastal plain -- a miniature Batinah -- some fifty miles long trapped against the sea by a belt of mountains. It once formed part of the incense coast so celebrated by ancient geographers, and sustained a rich and talented Sabaeen civilization during the first century B.C. ¹¹³ The Indian monsoon just touches that corner of Arabia and the plain's foliage is lush and semi-tropical. Coconut groves, sugar cane, plantains, wheat millet and indigo and cotton grow on the coast, but there are no dates. These are brought from Muscat.

The capital of the province is Salalah where the Ruler maintains a summer palace. In addition it is the site of an R.A.F. station.

Both the British and American Governments have long recognized the ruler of Muscat as the Sultan of Muscat and Oman, implying that the country of Oman was subject to his authority. In reality, however, until

113. Morris, James, Sultan in Oman, (London 1957), p.46.

recent years, the Sultans have exercised little effective control in the interior, where, in the narrow, inaccessible mountain valleys, towns have become virtually independent. The Sultans' domains were confined to patches along the coastal belt and communications between the different centers of their authority were maintained largely by sea.

Another decisive factor that made unification of the country difficult was an ancient rivalry among the tribes between Yamani and Nizari (southern and northern) Arabs. The feud resulted in a civil war in the first quarter of the 18th Century. After it was over the northern-¹¹⁴ers became known as Ghafiris and the southerners as Hinawis.

To the present day the two factions exist and when not at war they stand in opposition to each other. Any alliance is inevitably an uneasy one. Without a strong durable alliance between the two factions the development of a strong central power in the land would be very difficult.

The primary opponents to the Sultan's authority, the Imams of the Ibadhi sect that inhabits the mountains of inner Oman have succeeded in bringing some elements of the two factions together from time to time.

The Ibadhi Imamate goes back to the 8th Century, when Ibadhism developed as an offshoot of Kharijism, a movement of rebellious religious conservatism in the early days of Islam. The Kharijites broke away from the main body of the followers of Islam during the time of Ali, the fourth Caliph, and it is believed that a few of them made their way to eastern Arabia where they settled in the Hajar and propagated their

114. "Every tribe in Southeast Arabia is either Hinawi or Ghafari.....generally speaking the Hinawi label coincides with tribes of Qahtani descent, the Ghafari label with those of Maadic or Nizari. Within limits, therefore, the division is racial in origin."
Thomas, Alarms and Excursions in Arabia, op.cit. p.158.

beliefs. These were based primarily on early Islamic sources, the most important, the Koran and the Traditions of the Prophet. Their extreme conservatism has carried through until today. Medieval and modern ideas and practices are usually looked upon as innovations that have no place in the Ibadhi religion. They refuse to have minarets on their mosques. Even the severely plain Wahhabi type they reject as too ornamental.

In a sense the Ibadhi Imamate is a survival in the modern age of the original Caliphate of Islam. The present Ibadhi Imams are still elected in much the same fashion as were the first Arab Caliphs of the seventh century. They are primarily religious figures, but in accordance with ancient Islamic practice no clear distinction is made in the structure of the state between religious and secular affairs. In theory the Imam rules with the advice and consent of his people, usually transmitted through chosen religious leaders. If he loses the popular support upon which his rule should rest, he may be deposed.

The Ibadhis differ from a number of other Islamic communities who have had Imams or Caliphs in their belief that it is not necessary to have an uninterrupted succession of rulers. Whenever a suitable candidate cannot be found, the office of Imam may be allowed to remain vacant. In fact, since the first Imamate there have been numerous interregna.

For the period from about the middle of the eighth century to about the middle of the twelfth there was an almost continuous succession of Imams. The interregna of this period were few and of relatively brief duration. For the period from about the middle of the twelfth century to the first years of the fifteenth it is believed that there was an interregnum of well over two hundred years. Early in the fifteenth

century the Imamate was revived and lasted about a century and a half, after which there came another break of 60-odd years. There then followed a continuous line of Imams until 1744. In that year Ahmad ibn Said, the founder of the Al Bu Said dynasty from which the present reigning Sultan, Said ibn Taimur descends, drove Persian invaders from the Batinah and shortly thereafter secured the election of himself as Imam of Oman. After his death his son Said was elected in his place, but he withdrew into seclusion in the mountains and the Imamate was allowed to wither away. The rulers of Al Bu Said transferred the center of power from the interior to the coast, and since the latter part of the eighteenth century they have ruled in Muscat as secular lords, and have claimed no religious sanction for their office. The greatest of the dynasty, Said ibn Sultan, who reigned from 1804 to 1856, called himself neither Imam nor Sultan, but assumed the title of Sayyid. Concerned above all with the welfare and expansion of his dominions overseas in Zanzibar and East Africa, Said allowed the grip of his Muscat government on towns and tribes in the hinterland to grow steadily weaker. When the Al Bu Said abandoned the Imamate in favor of mundane interests, the country was left, in the eyes of the Ibadhis, without a supreme chief. For some time there was an interregnum until the Imamate was revived in 1868 for a short period. The last revival of the institution took place in 1913. On that occasion as well as in 1868 resentment harbored by the Ibadhis against the Sultan led to attacks against Muscat. Outside Arabia these were popularly characterized as rebellions.

Much of the resentment was based on grievances primarily religious in nature. Practices such as the importation of tobacco and liquor were allowed or condoned in Muscat as a result of contacts with India and the West and were frowned upon or condemned by the Ibadhis.

In addition, a good deal of the hostility borne for the Sultan dated back to the times when he cooperated with the British in their campaigns to suppress the slave trade and gun-running. The Ibadhis took the position that slavery, not being forbidden by Islam, should not be interfered with, nor should gun-running. A further grievance concerned the admission into the Sultan's territories of foreigners and foreign practices, such as the levying of customs duties.

In pursuit of these grievances in 1913, the Imam after uniting the Ghafiri and Hinawi elements in his support, occupied Nizwa and two other towns. One of them, Samayil, commanded a pass into the hinterland vital to Muscat's trade. The British to bolster the Sultan's position dispatched a detachment of Indian troops to his capital, and in 1915 these were able to ward off an attack on the city walls. The Viceroy advised the Sultan to make peace with the Imam as the British, involved in a war, could not protect him with a garrison for an indefinite period.

Negotiations were opened and dragged on for over four years. In 1920 the Imam was assassinated by tribesmen with a personal grievance, and the conduct of negotiations fell to his successor Mohammad ibn Abdullah al Khalili. Shortly thereafter the Treaty of Sib was concluded through the mediation of R.E.L. Wingate, the British Political Agent, between Sultan Saiyid Taimur ibn Faisal ibn Turki ibn Said and Shaikh Isa ibn Salih. Isa had led the Hinawi faction of the Imam's forces. He was the dominant figure in the Sharqiyah, the recruiting ground for the Imam's army.

The terms of the treaty were not revealed for many years. The British claimed that since it was not an agreement to which they were a party, its publication was not their affair, but rather was a matter

to be disposed of as either the Sultan or the Imam saw fit. There was considerable speculation over its contents. The most authoritative comment was perhaps that made by Bertram Thomas, Wazir to the Sultan of Muscat from 1925-1930. He described the agreement as being reached on the basis of the status quo, with the Sultan remaining the de jure Sultan of Muscat and Oman, while the interior tribes were to have a de facto government of their own for the management of their purely local affairs.

115

A document, alleged to be the treaty, came to light last year. It was published in the Observer of London and was stated to have been obtained from American sources. Under the terms of that document, enclosed as an appendix to this paper, the Sultan pledged not to interfere in the internal affairs of Oman. If valid, the treaty could easily be interpreted as establishing two separate states. The obvious question was whether the Sultan still could be Oman's legitimate sovereign with such a limitation on his authority.

Following the treaty the Imamate continued undisturbed for nearly 35 years. Not all the Sultan's problems were solved, however. Within several years his regime had become so shaky that the British had to step in to prevent it from collapsing. Its troubles were mainly financial ones, stemming from heavy expenditures used in combatting the Imamate revival and, more seriously, from the severe curtailment of the market for Muscat dates. A former income from slaving and gun-running had disappeared and Muscat was forced to depend to a major degree on the export of dates and fish. The United States was a large market for its dates, but after the establishment of American importing firms

115. Thomas, Bertram, Arab Rule Under the Al Bu Said Dynasty of Oman, 1741-1937, (London 1938), p.29.

in Basra and elsewhere, and after the development of a flourishing domestic date culture in the southwestern U.S., American taste changed and Iraqi and California dates came to be preferred to the Muscat dates. No market as yet has been found to replace the vanished U.S. market.

British assistance to the Sultan took the form of a loan to liquidate state debts and enable the organization of a State Levy Corps, commanded by a seconded British officer. The law courts were reformed and a Council of State was called into being which could act for the Sultan in his absence. As a temporary measure, the Ruler was advised to employ a British Wazir.

Little more was heard of the state of relations between the interior and the Government on the coast until a few years ago. In the period following the treaty the interior was virtually sealed off. Early European explorers had penetrated the mountains with the Sultan's blessing in the days when his authority had been recognized in Oman, but after the treaty, travel in the back country was taken only at the permission of the Ibadhi chiefs and with considerable risk. The Imam was virtually inaccessible to foreigners. The only exceptions were several doctors from the hospital in Matrah whose passports were good will acquired by medical work in the interior. Wilfred Thesiger in 1950 was firmly denied entry to the Jebel Akhdar.

Toward the close of the 1940's the Imamate, though left relatively undisturbed, was experiencing a decline. Long years of drought, particularly in the Sharqiyah, had drained its vitality. In addition, the Imam was advancing in age, (in 1950 he was approximately 63) and was in poor health, suffering from malaria and eye trouble. In 1946, upon the

death of Shaikh Isa ibn Salih, he had been deprived of his strong right hand. Isa had been one of the architects of the new Imamate and one of the captains leading the assault against Muscat in 1915. Harrison in 1939 described him as "the greatest of all the independent Oman princes, the greatest ruler that Oman tribes have had for many decades."¹¹⁷

Immediately following Isa's death, the Imamate's military leadership fell upon Sulaiman ibn Himyar, ruler of the Jebel Akhdar and the Imam's second strong arm. He was the leader of the Ghafari faction in the Imam's coalition. Sulaiman was believed to have the broadest and most modern views and appeared to be more inclined to change with the needs of the age. In 1940, Dr. Wells Thoms of the mission in Muscat reported him interested in getting a radio, but not wanting cars or planes in his country. He had changed his mind by 1946 when P.W. Harrison, another of the mission doctors, reported him as hoping to buy a truck and build a road from Sib to Birkat al Mainz. In 1945 he had made his first trip to Muscat and saw the sea for the first time. Until then he had never seen a ship, car, electric lights or heard a radio or phonograph. In 1949 he stayed in Muscat for nearly two months, was given an American jeep by the Sultan, but was able to get it only part way home through the mountain passes. He also made a trip to India that helped to broaden his horizons and in the fall of 1951 he made the pilgrimage to Mecca.

His capital was at Tanuf above Nizwa. The inaccessibility of the mountainous parts of his territory probably made his militia, though not as numerous as the forces from the Sharqiyah, the strongest standing force in the interior.

117. Harrison, Paul W., Doctor in Arabia, (London 1943), p.228.

The first intimation of new discord between the government at Muscat and the Imamate came in December 1955 when it was announced that the Sultan had undertaken an expedition in force to reassert his sovereignty over inner Oman. It was officially stated that "certain disaffected shaikhs had been plotting to disrupt the Sultanate with the aid of foreign gold, arms and propaganda." In consequence "action had been taken to restore confidence, preserve peace and answer the petition of loyal

118 subjects." A direct objective of the campaign was the subjection of Imam Ghalib ibn Ali, (old Imam Khalili had since passed away) and his brother Talib, reputed to be the brain and ambition behind the Imam.

The Sultan's office stated that the above pair had tried to set up Oman as a totally independent state, had even issued their own passports, and with Saudi and Egyptian support had requested membership in the Arab

119 League. In the Sultan's view, which the British shared, the act was a direct contravention of the Treaty of Sib. It was admitted that under the treaty, the interior tribes had been given some level of autonomy, but it was asserted also that by the agreement the Sultan retained ultimate authority over the Sultanate unimpaired. In any case, the Sultan felt that the Imam, by attempting to establish a separate prin-
120 cipality, had broken the treaty and thus it was no longer in effect.

The need for aggressive action by the Sultan was intensified by the fact that I.P.C., whose parties were working in turbulent western Oman under the very eyes of the Imam, had become apprehensive about continuing work with the political future of the area in doubt. Some time before, the

118. Commonwealth Survey, Central Office of Information, London, Vol.3, No.16, 6 August 1957, p.686.

119. Morris, op.cit. p.23.

120. Commonwealth Survey, 6 August 1957, op.cit. p.687.

company had felt it necessary to assist the Sultan in financing a new private army, the Muscat and Oman Field Force,¹²¹ to provide some security. The Sultan, faced with the serious economic condition of the Sultanate, was anxious that the work continue.

The campaign, its strategy British inspired, was a bloodless one. The Muscat and Oman Field Force, stationed near the oil camp at Fahud, advanced on the Imam's capital at Nizwa, driving him and his people into the mountains. The two practicable escape routes over the mountains to the coast were blocked by another of the Sultan's private armies, the Batinah Force. To cap the campaign, the Sultan made what he hoped was a triumphant and dramatic motor journey from Dhofar through the Jaddat al Harasis to Nizwa to effect an instant and profound moral impact on the populace. Nizwa, dominating the gateway into the Jebel Akhdar, had fallen without a shot. The Imam had retired to a remote village in the mountains, while his brother Talib, after leading a vigorous resistance on the east side of the Hajar, also vanished. The Sultan received pledges of loyalty from the local chiefs and a courtesy call from Sulaiman ibn Himyar, then installed a loyal shaikh as his representative at Nizwa. A squadron of the Field Force was stationed outside the town to back the representative.

The resulting peace was only temporary and violence broke out again in the summer of 1957. It began when a tribal leader, Ibrahim ibn Isa, son of the old Shaikh Isa ibn Salih, attempted to raise a revolt in the Sharqiyah, then under the Sultan's control. It was put down by the Sultan's forces and resulted in Ibrahim's surrender. At about the same time, Talib returned to Muscat with modern arms and trained

121. Morris, op.cit. p.25.

men, and established himself in the mountains northwest of Nizwa. Gathering about 200 followers about him he occupied certain fortified villages.

The Sultan's forces and loyal tribes sent to deal with him suffered a reverse and other tribes were thereby influenced to defect. There was a good possibility of the disaffection spreading in the absence of a strong reaction from the Sultan. Consequently, on 16 July, upon the advice of his British Foreign Minister, he requested active British military assistance to "restore the position and to prevent further loss of ground and loss of confidence." The British assented and stated that their decision to assist was taken because the request had come from a friendly ruler who had always relied on them to resist aggression and subversion. Further, they did so because there was direct British interest involved. Selwyn Lloyd, in announcing the decision, differentiated between the formal and implicit obligations to the Shaikhdoms under British protection and the obligations of a long-standing relationship of friendship. He emphasized that the difference between the two obligations was not readily apparent to the local rulers and people and that a failure to respond in that one area could result in assumptions elsewhere that the British Government was no longer willing or able to help its friends.

Active British intervention first took the form of air attacks preceded by the dropping of leaflets warning the populace and calling upon them to submit. Those measures failed and British foot units were moved in to support the Trucial Oman Scouts and the Sultan's armies in a ground offensive. A representative of the Imam in Cairo appealed to the United States and the Soviet Union to take appropriate

action "to put an end to the British aggression against the people of Oman." The representative and Saudi Arabia submitted memorandums to the Arab League on the basis of which that body decided to take the case to the U.N. Security Council. Their complaint signed by ten Arab states said in substance that the British, in violation of the U.N. charter were undertaking armed aggression on the people of Oman, seeking to destroy the sovereignty of a country whose independence had been affirmed at Sib.¹²³ By the time the Council met on 20 August to hear and turn down the complaint, the fighting had ended. The Imam's fortresses were destroyed, and his followers scattered. Again he and Talib after a stout and skillful resistance had vanished into the mountains, where they were believed to have taken refuge with Sulaiman ibn Himyar in the Jebel Akhdar. Officers of the British Forces assisting the Sultan's Army said that if it had not been for air support and the presence for emergency use of the Cameronians, a regular British unit, it was unlikely that Talib could have been dis-¹²⁴lodged from his carefully chosen positions defending Nizwa. In Bahrain, other army spokesmen quoted captured Imam soldiers as saying that 200 of the Imam's recruits had been trained for seven months near Dammam in Saudi Arabia. Also, British officers on the spot identified captured grenades as U.S. made and implied strongly that they, like the recruits, came from Saudi Arabia. There were open hints from British sources that U.S. oil interests lay behind the Saudi support of the Imam. Their objective reportedly was the limitation of the territory of Oman with a corresponding expansion of the territory of Saudi Arabia and their concession area.

123. The Christian Science Monitor, 20 August 1957, p.2.

124. Cyprus Mail, 14 August 1957, p.1.

British troops have since been withdrawn and control of the area is in the hands of the Muscat armies and units of the Trucial Oman Scouts. Ahmed Ibrahim, minister of the interior of the Muscat Government, is at Nizwa with the job of consolidating the Sultan's authority.

To do so he must neutralize Talib and create conditions in the interior that will prevent a recurrence of mischief. Finding Talib in the Jebel Akhdar has proven extremely difficult to date. He is believed to have but only a small band or 100 or so hard-core followers with him, and in the opinion of Trucial Scout officers, he has not been the least bit chastised by his reversal. One factor working in the Sultan's favor is a split in the Bani Ryam, the tribe of Sulaiman bin Himyar who is believed to be sheltering Talib. Sulaiman's son has declared his loyalty to the Sultan which gives the latter a chance of undermining the authority of Sulaiman and winning at least part of the tribe to his side.

More important to the peace of the area is the question of whether or not the Sultan has the personality and the resources to stamp his authority on the local shaikhs. Twice in the space of two years a military expedition was necessary to put down trouble in the interior, and the last without British help could easily have been a disaster.

It is obvious that the British cannot be expected to intervene every so often to help a ruler who cannot help himself. The secret to control in Southeast Arabia is bribery and armed strength. The Sultan is too poor to pursue either course on his own. The income of his state, derived principally from customs duties, is approximately six million rupees. How this small sum is used is not known since finances are usually the Sultan's personal affair. His army is supported primarily

by British Government funds and by the oil company. A distant source of revenue might be oil -- the Sultan places great hope in the Cities Service discovery at Dhofar. But the need for public expenditure cannot wait. The British could find it advantageous to provide him with the funds if it would save more and expensive military campaigns in the future.

The most urgent requirement in the interior is for improvement of health and communications. Because of its isolation, the population is inbred, diseased and poverty stricken. A small start was made toward improving conditions following the incident in 1955. A new road was built between Muscat and Fahud via Nizwa, and a mobile clinic, supervised by an Indian doctor, has been visiting the villages. But much more remains to be done.

The Sultan has made little personal effort to impress his authority on the people of the interior. His triumphant tour in 1955 was the first time in his entire reign that he had visited the hinterland. It may be that if he made more frequent visits to hear petitions and mete out justice it would enhance his standing with the tribes and build a more firm foundation for their loyalty to him and consequently for the maintenance of some sort of peace in the area.

Chapter 4

The Boundary Problems

Prior to World War I the British concerned themselves with little more than the protection by sea of the ports in which the shaikhs had their capitals, and avoided the acceptance of any responsibility for maintaining peace on land. As we have seen, the Trucial Shaikhs continued to wage war among themselves up until the late 1940's. It was customary for the British to recognize a Ruler no matter how he came to power, patricide notwithstanding.

However, a change in policy became necessary, particularly in respect to the Trucial Coast, when airfields were established in the 30's and required security. Oil company operations soon followed that also required protection, and a need arose for fixing boundaries that were unmarked and in most cases undefined everywhere in the Gulf.

* * *

Water Boundaries. Offshore there are many islands scattered the length of the Gulf; most of them are small and barren. Many of them are in dispute, either between a Gulf state on the one hand and Saudi Arabia or Iran on the other, or among the states themselves.

Before oil was found, many of these rocks and sand bars were unowned. But lately there has been considerable competition to prove ownership, and as in the case of such islands, it is usually impossible to do so since most of the states cannot prove any constructive acts of policy in the past. Ownership was often claimed simply by erecting a marker on the island in question. At one time there was a multitude of markers which were in an almost continuous state of flux. They were being alternately put up by various claimants and torn down by contenders

who in turn erected their own monuments. In addition there was a practice, that still exists, of attempting to convert shoals or sand spits visible at only low tide into islands by building cairns on them. 125

In contrast, there has been no competition for the pearling banks which lie at depths of only a few fathoms. These are open to all inhabitants of the Gulf shores and no state has exclusive pearling rights over them.

As was brought out in the chapter on oil, competition became sharper for the islands and their territorial waters when the rulers found that they could sell their waters as new concession territories to the oil companies. All the states bordering on the Gulf, with the exception of Iraq, laid claim to their territorial and extraterritorial waters and the underlying seabed which were assumed to extend to the median line. In substance, in the decrees issued by the various states they said that the dominion over islands and the status of their seabed and subsoil of the sea under territorial waters shall not be affected. This would be interpreted to mean that an island and its territorial belt including the seabed under it could be under the control of one sovereign, while the seabed outside that belt could be subject to another. It could give rise to tangled, complicated problems especially in connection with oil operations.

Once offshore concessions had been granted, it became necessary to define the areas in which the companies concerned could work. It had to be made clear to the companies and to some of the shaikhs that the declarations in no way changed the character of the high seas or legally permitted any interference on their part with shipping and fishing.

125. Hay, Rupert, "The Persian Gulf States and Their Boundary Problems", *op.cit.* p.441.

Secondly, it was necessary to safeguard from avoidable damage the pearl banks which still provide a livelihood for many of the Gulf's inhabitants. After that only limited areas which were unlikely to be disputed could be assigned to the companies to operate in, pending a settlement of boundaries of adjacent territorial waters.

In 1947, before the declarations were made, one sea boundary was actually determined for a limited distance in the comparatively narrow channel between Qatar and Bahrain. The principle of a median line was used, although alterations had to be made to include certain islands. However, the decision which was reached has not been accepted by one of the parties.¹²⁶

The agreement concluded between Saudi Arabia and Bahrain early this year defining their seabed boundary was the first of its kind in the Gulf. It followed a two day visit of Shaikh Salman to Riyadh on 20 February 1958 where negotiations were carried on by the two rulers personally.

The boundary as indicated on Map 2 generally follows a closely defined median line which leaves certain specified islands to each side. Provisions of the agreement provide for the early surveying and marking of the line by joint parties. As indicated earlier, the agreement also specifies a six-sided area adjacent to the line northeast of Ra's Tanura, in which Saudi Arabia, to whom the area is assigned, agrees to share equally with Bahrain her proceeds from oil operations conducted there.¹²⁷

All other seaward boundaries on the Arab side of the Gulf

126. Ibid, p.442.

127. Bahrain Public Relations Dept., Bahrain Government Gazette, 3 March 1958, p.1.

remain to be settled. Only Oman seems to be without a problem. Along its coasts a continental shelf exists, and the land slopes steeply into the sea with no shoals beyond the territorial waters. No oil company has yet shown interest in offshore concessions since no oil has been found on the Muscat coast, and because the extraterritorial waters are too deep for profitable operations.

But in the shallow waters of the other shaikhdoms there are several attendant problems aside from hydrographic discourses and legal principles. Decision has to be made on the claims to shoals submerged at high tide, as to whether or not erected markers or beacons convert them to islands bearing territorial waters. Likewise an island recognized as belonging to one shaikhdom may be found within the territorial waters of another shaikhdom or state. It must be determined if such an island is entitled to its own share of the seabed.

Bays also present a problem in that it must be decided if territorial waters run along their shores or across their mouths.

Singularly important is a need to determine the course that boundaries extending outward from the coasts should follow. The outward limit, as has been indicated, is a median line in the Gulf. But it yet has to be said whether the boundaries stretching to meet that line should follow a direct extension of the land boundary from the coast, or run perpendicular from the line of the beach at the point where it is intersected by the land boundary, or whether it should be a perpendicular drawn from the median line to meet the point of intersection of the land boundary on the beach. The difference in the areas encompassed by these various schemes varies widely, and in waters off the Neutral Zone and Kuwait could affect the ownership of millions of barrels of oil.

A knotty problem exists at the head of the Gulf where Iraq's offshore waters are sandwiched between the claims of Kuwait and Persia. Prompted by the new concession activity of its neighbors and the growing international interest in Gulf offshore concessions, Iraq, while making no attempt to define its offshore limits, has claimed full rights under international usage to territorial waters. Reportedly, Iraq has not discussed offshore concessions with any oil company. It is further reliably reported to be preparing to ask Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Iran to get together with it to define their offshore rights. ¹²⁸ Other sources in Kuwait indicate that the Shaikhdom is considering granting Iraq a generous slice of Kuwait's offshore claims in the vicinity of Bubiyan Island, in the hope that it will open the way to settlement of its land frontiers with that state.

* * *

Land Boundaries. Kuwait's land boundaries were originally defined in the Anglo-Turkish Convention of 1913 which was never ratified. Official definition of the southern one was made in the Uquair agreement in 1927. The western and northern lines agreed with Iraq in 1932 have never been demarcated and have been a source of friction between the two states as has been pointed out.

Officially, the Kuwait-Iraq frontiers are described as running from the intersection of the Wadi al Aujah with the Batin to a point just south of the latitude of Safwan, then continuing eastwards passing just south of Safwan wells, Jebel Sanam and Umm Qasr, leaving them with Iraq, and reaching the coast at the junction of two estuaries, Khor ¹²⁹ Zubair to the north and the Khor Abdullah to the south. The vagueness

128. Petroleum Week, 20 December 1957, op.cit. p.35.

129. Dickson, op.cit. p.30.

of the description, which coincides with that outlined in the 1913 Convention, is apparent. "South of Safwan wells" was at one time interpreted as one mile south of the southernmost palm at Safwan. A post was set up in the vicinity along the Basra-Kuwait track to mark the supposed boundary, but after it had been removed several times, attempts to replace it were abandoned. In addition, the Khor Zubair estuary is more or less a continuation of Khor Abdullah and it is uncertain where one begins and the other leaves off.

The Uquair description of Kuwait's southern boundary differs substantially in terms of area from that defined in the Anglo-Turkish Convention and is more closely painted than that of the west-north frontier. It deserves remark only because of the unique geometrical manner in which it was drawn. It is defined as starting at the Wadi al Aujah-Batin junction and running in a straight line to the junction of the 29th parallel with the arc of a circle. The circle has as its southern limit a hill at Qurain, and reaches the coast just south of the promontory known as Ra's al Qalaiah.

Dickson says it is understood that the center of the circle is the old Political Agency in Kuwait town, with a radius extending to the center line of the junction of Khor Zubair and Khor Abdullah, although this understanding is not so specified in the agreement.

The Kuwait-Saudi line delimiting the Neutral Zone and described in the Uquair treaty is also finely drawn except for the description of its western portion. The border there is described as a mountainous ridge, Ash Shaqq, which Dickson asserts is a wide shallow depression.

130. Hay, Rupert, "The Persian Gulf Shaikhdoms and Their Boundary Problems", op.cit. p.434.

131. Dickson, op.cit. p.30.

132. Ibid.

It points up the obvious difficulty of defining frontiers in a land where little is known of the terrain and of which there are no accurately detailed maps.

Qatar's land boundary is subject to a triangular dispute between Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhabi. The margin of difference between Qatar and Saudi Arabia is not large, but Abu Dhabi's claim extends a considerable way up the east coast of the peninsula. No previous agreements exist, so it is not a case of demarcating a line already defined, but of reaching a settlement of where the line is to run. Developments toward that end are described below in conjunction with the Buraimi question.

In the Trucial Coast the boundary problems are extra-complicated. Political officers for several years have been trying to fix those boundaries the states have with each other. A considerable length of that between Abu Dhabi and Dibai has been defined, but the definition has only been accepted by one of the parties. ¹³³ Settlement of that between Abu Dhabi and Sharjah has also been undertaken, but the job is difficult. Points where the borders meet on the coast can be fixed with some accuracy, but the interior provides very little data to work on.

In the mountains in the northeastern projection of Arabia, the territories of Muscat, Ra's al Khaima, Sharjah-Kalba and Fujairah are hopelessly intermingled and even Dibai and Ajman own individual village enclaves amongst them. A mountainous belt just south of Muscat's Musandam territory is parcelled out among no less than three of the shaikhdoms. The extremities of the Musandam line are fairly well fixed,

133. Hay, Rupert, "The Persian Gulf States and Their Boundary Problems", *op.cit.* p.439.

but where it runs in between is uncertain.

Muscat's boundary north of the Batinah coast begins at Khutma Malaha and runs westward into the hills, then southwest toward Buraimi. Its course, likewise, has never been defined.

On the southeast coast the boundary between Dhofar and the Hadhramaut begins at Ra's Dharbat Ali, but its location inland also lacks definition. So far there have been no disputes over it.

This indeterminate status of boundaries between the Persian Gulf states has been brought into wide public notice by the Buraimi incident. The latter involves the entire problem of determining the border between Saudi Arabia and the coastal dependent areas. The immediate states concerned, in addition to Saudi Arabia, are Abu Dhabi, the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman, and Qatar. The areas in dispute cover the base of the Qatar peninsula, a section of the Gulf coast between Qatar and Abu Dhabi, the Dhafrah including the oases of al Jiwa south of the Trucial Coast, and the Dhahirah in western Oman. Buraimi is the key feature in contention. It lies in the western fringe of the Dhahirah at the edge of the Rub al Khali. Buraimi itself is the largest and most important of eight towns and villages and a few scattered estates that comprise the entire oasis. (See Map 5). These form a rough triangle about 5.5 miles long and 3.5 miles wide at the base. Approximately a fifth of the area is under cultivation. Water supplying the villages is the run-off of rain in the Hajar mountains to the east brought to Buraimi in underground aqueducts (aflaj).

134. Shaikhdom boundaries indicated on Map 5 are broadly approximate. They were taken from a 1:750,000 scale Aramco map of Arabia printed in 1949, and have been modified by the writer to include the amalgamation of Sharjah and Kalba in 1951.

The oasis has paramount importance as a market for dates, sheep and camels, as well as foodstuffs, cloth and other essential items. In addition, it contains the only sizeable wells in the area. These factors have combined to make it the most important center of communications in that part of Arabia. The desert and steppes to the north and northwest of the oasis are used by some of the tribes in Buraimi to graze their herds. Others forage to the east on the slopes of the Hajar in Oman. ¹³⁵

Claims of the various parties to the oases are largely based upon their alleged command of the loyalties of the tribes living there. Abu Dhabi declares ownership of six of the villages: Muwaiqi, Mutaradh, al Ain, al Qimi, Qattarah and Qimi, which it claims are held by members of Al Bu Falah, of the ruling family of Abu Dhabi. The other two villages, Hamasa and Buraimi, are controlled by sections of the Nuaim. Their grazing grounds are those lying to the east in Oman where they have important holdings in the Hajar. They have additional property ¹³⁶ to the south in Dhank, Hafit and al Sunainah. The Sultan of Oman considers them his subjects and upon that basis has extended a claim to their two villages in Buraimi. The Saudis, however, say the loyalty of the Nuaim is to the house of Saud and in view of that tribe's control of the key towns of Hamasa and Buraimi and their dominance over the surrounding grazing lands, the Saudis assert claims to the oasis and ¹³⁷ their tribal area that extends over much of the Dhahirah. Saudi Arabia further claims the allegiance of Bani Kab and Bani Qitab in the hinterland of Sharjah and Ra's al Khaimah between the Hajar and the

135. Melamid, Alexander, "The Buraimi Oasis Dispute", Middle Eastern Affairs, Vol.VII, No.2, February 1956, p.57.

136. Thomas, Alarms and Excursions in Arabia, op.cit. p.181.

137. Memorial of the Government of Saudi Arabia, Vol.I, 31 July 1955, p.84, hereafter referred to as Saudi Memorial.

Persian Gulf.

Two tribes predominate in al Jiwa, the Bani Yas and the Manasir. Abu Dhabi commands the allegiance of the Bani Yas who, it says, is paramount in the oases. Saudi Arabia, which claims the loyalty of the Manasir, states that tribe is dominant and owns most of the date groves.

The Saudis refute Abu Dhabi's claim that the Bani Yas are the most powerful and influential tribe in the Dhafrah. They describe them as heterogeneous, discordant segments that are scattered from the Persian Gulf to East Africa with more of them living outside than in Abu Dhabi. Those in the Shaikhdom, the Saudis say, are engaged mainly in maritime occupations. The dominant tribes in the area, according to Saudi Arabia, are the Manasir and the Awamir who pay allegiance to the Saudi Government. As in the case of the other tribes, Saudi Arabia in its Memorial appends records of tax collections and police actions, and statements of allegiance from local chiefs to prove its claim to control. ¹³⁸

Saudi Arabia's claims in Qatar (see Map 4) cover the base of the peninsula which they claim to be the range of two Saudi tribes, the Murrah and the Manasir. Between them they are said to control water holes at al Sufuk, Majhud, Odaid and al Uqal. Al Sikak and Nibak, the Saudi Government says, were established as Bedouin agricultural settlements by Abdul Aziz early in this century. Salwah is allegedly occupied each summer by a Saudi police detachment.

Abu Dhabi's claim in Qatar at one time extended to the very outskirts of Dohah, but today reaches only as far as Khor al Odaid. The claim has risen out of Abu Dhabi's belief that the Bani Yas are the dominant tribe along the coast between Abu Dhabi town and the

peninsula. Their claim up the coast to Odaid stems from the fact that that place, since abandoned, was first settled by a splinter group of Al Bu Falah. It is kept alive mainly because of bad blood existing
139
between the ruling families of the two Shaikhdoms.

The diplomatic negotiations with the Saudi Government revolving about the disputed territory have been carried out by the British acting on behalf of the Shaikhs and the Sultan. They have issued no memorial on the dispute, such as that published by the Saudi Government, nor has there been found a complete treatment of their official claim. The summation of events and various arguments which follows has been gathered almost entirely from the documented Saudi record which was submitted to the arbitration panel.

The basis of the British legal case lies in the Anglo-Turkish Convention of 1913 and two subsequent developments. The Convention dealt with Turkish-British relations with respect to the Persian Gulf. Its second part established a Blue Line separating the Najd from Qatar, to the east of which the Ottoman Government recognized Britain's special position in relation to the shaikhdoms. The Convention was signed on 29 July, 1913 by both parties and a stipulation required ratification of the agreement by both governments within three months. Certain reservations were made by both sides which delayed ratification beyond the designated period, and a series of extensions followed. But World War I came, and the treaty remained unratified.

A second convention between the two governments had been concluded and ratified in June, 1914. It established certain surveyed and

139. Aramco, Oman and the Southern Shore of the Persian Gulf, op.cit. p.76.

marked boundaries between Aden and the Yemen and went on to provide for a Violet Line running northeast from the extremity of the surveyed boundary, across the Rub al Khali to join the Blue Line of the 1913 Convention. Again the line was to divide zones of British and Ottoman interests.

However, in May 1913, even before the first convention had been signed, Abdul Aziz had driven the Turks from Hofuf and Qatif, and within a month all Ottoman authority was gone from Hasa. The British claim that the following year, in May 1914, Saud entered into agreement with the Turks by which he received the title of Wali of Najd and consented to Turkish control of his foreign relations.

Out of this series of events the British claim that the Blue Line was affirmed. They say that in 1913 and 1914 Turkey was the internationally accepted sovereign in Eastern Arabia. They admit that the Anglo-Turkish Convention of 1913 was never ratified, but they state that the ratified Convention of 1914 defining the Violet Line referred specifically therein to the Blue Line, and thereby worked an adoption of the Blue Line which then became effective as a binding obligation on Turkey and Saudi Arabia. According to the British, Saudi Arabia was obligated for two reasons. First: as a successor State to the Ottoman Empire it was bound by the territorial dispositions of its predecessor until these were modified in some valid manner; and second: by his agreement with the Turks of 15 May, 1914, in which he accepted Turkish control of his foreign relations, Abdul Aziz recognized and consented to the prior Turkish boundary arrangement.

The Saudis in rebuttal point out that in the first place the 1913 Convention was never ratified and secondly, that the repeated postponement of ratification by agreement of the parties evidenced an

unreadiness to have it enter into force. They believe the Blue Line was mentioned in the 1914 Convention merely as a convenient method of defining a terminus for the Violet Line, one which would match the anticipated boundary coming down from the north without revision.

They also deny the inference that Saudi Arabia is a successor state to the Ottoman Empire. They take the view that by expelling the Turks in 1913 they were merely resuming control over a rightful possession of their Saudi ancestors of which they had been deprived during a period of weakness by a Turkish military occupation.

Further, even granting that Saud was a successor to the Ottoman Government, they point out that he had been established in Hasa for a year when the 1914 treaty was ratified and certainly could not be bound by any arrangement taken without his consent that became effective subsequent to his succession.

Concerning the last point, the alleged agreement of 15 May, 1914 (Wali of Hasa), they claim there are no records of such an arrangement in their government archives. Given that it did exist, they say it could only have been a transient maneuver, and certainly was not entered into in good faith by Turkey who, at the time, was actively supporting the House of Rashid against Saud. They further point out that the treaty, if it existed, was ignored by the British themselves when they entered into direct, independent negotiations with Saud through the Shakespear mission early in 1914.

According to the Saudi Government, the above British views first came to light in their reply to a Saudi note directed to the British Minister in Jidda after Saudi Arabia had received an inquiry from the United States Government concerning its eastern frontiers.

The Saudis immediately rejected the Blue Line concept. Ensuing negotiations resulted in 1935 in a Saudi proposal for a compromise line between Saudi Arabia and Qatar, and a second between Saudi Arabia and the Shaikhdoms (Fuad's Line). The British, in turn, in November 1935, submitted as a proposal the Ryan Line. The Saudis rejected it because it did not recognize Saudi claims to certain watering places in the base of Qatar. Contention over the Qatar boundary had been enlivened earlier in the year when Saudi Arabia, in direct correspondence with the Ruler of Qatar, had asked him to suspend his oil concession, granted to the Anglo-Persian Oil Co. in May 1935, until the frontier question had been settled.

Further discussions were carried on over the following year and a half until 1938-1939. Then the deteriorating world situation resulted in further postponement of the subject until the postwar years.

It was reopened in 1949 following an incident involving an Aramco exploration party working northwest of Sufuk at the base of Qatar, and British political officers who claimed the group was in Abu Dhabi territory. Ensuing negotiations saw the introduction of two new lines by the Saudis after what they termed "exhaustive study of the camping places of the tribes and an investigation of the actual situation."¹⁴⁰ One of the lines cut across the Qatar peninsula (see map) and encompassed considerably more territory than the previous Saudi claims. This they explained was a claim to their full legal rights over the lands inhabited by Saudi tribes, including Buraimi. These rights they said had been temporarily laid aside in the 1934-38 negotiations in discussing a compromise. The British, in defense,

140. Saudi Memorial, op.cit. p.423.

reverted to the Blue Line of the 1913 Convention and put forward the detailed arguments described above. They further proposed the appointment of a joint technical commission to make an objective study of the problem. To the last the Saudis agreed, suggesting that the commission be empowered to discuss the situation in regard to Buraimi.

Further correspondence attempting to reduce the agreement on a joint commission to definite terms continued into the spring of 1951. But the commission never came into being, for in that same spring the British proposed a new approach, a discussion between Foreign Ministers to take place that summer in London. The discussion took place in August and resulted in a decision for a second conference to be held at Damnam and to be attended by the Rulers concerned with the matter. In the meantime, movements and activities of the oil companies on both sides and of the Trucial Oman Levies (Scouts) were to be restricted to areas outside that which was to be the subject of discussion.

The conference took place from 28 January, 1951 to 7 February, 1952. The Saudi delegation was headed by Prince Faisal. Sir Rupert Hay, the British Political Resident, spoke for the Rulers of Qatar and Abu Dhabi who were in attendance. In the course of the discussions, the British claimed new Qatar and Abu Dhabi lines which took in more territory than their proposed lines of 1935. According to the Saudi memorial, claim to the Abu Dhabi line was based upon an alleged dominance of the Bani Yas west of Sabkhat Mutti and an assertion that Abu Dhabi collected taxes in al Jiwa where they supposedly maintained a governor.

The Saudis based their case on the allegiance of tribes, their tribal ranges and the administrative activities of Saudi officials

in the disputed areas.

Both sides held to their claims and the conference reached an impasse.

The Saudis assert that prior to the meetings and while they were going on, reports were received from Buraimi and surrounding areas that British and Shaikhdom officials were exerting pressure on the inhabitants to secure their allegiance. They say that Saudi officials were sent to Buraimi in August 1952 to counter that pressure.

The British protested the move, saying it was a contravention of the restrictions of the London Conference and that part of Buraimi territory lay within the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman. According to the Saudis, it was the first formal notice that any rights in Buraimi were claimed by the Sultan.¹⁴¹

Tension built up in the oasis in succeeding weeks that saw the arrival there of detachments of Trucial Oman Levies. Clashes took place between them and the Saudis.

A stand-still agreement was arranged in October 1952 through the offices of the U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia which was intended to stabilize the positions then held by both sides and to balance the forces until negotiations could be reopened. But Hamasa, occupied by the Saudi group, is located in the center of the oasis and columns moving to it to resupply the Saudis had to pass through or near Levy-held villages, and clashes continued to occur. The British claimed that the Saudi representative was attempting to subvert local loyalties with promises of food and money. This they considered a violation of the stand-still agreement. To settle the dispute, Saudi Arabia suggested

141. Ibid, p.444.

a plebiscite. The British in turn on 22 November 1952 proposed arbitration. The Saudi reply was non-committal, and heated accusations, violence and rumors of negotiations continued into 1953. The British in April of that year declared that in view of continued Saudi intrigue in Buraimi, which was contrary to the stand-still agreement, they had no alternative but to strengthen the authority of the rulers in question, and so reserved freedom of action in all matters restricted by the London and Dammam conferences. Shortly thereafter Trucial Coast Levies moved into the oasis in force.

Still negotiations continued and after some months resulted in an arbitration agreement. As a prelude the British consented to a general withdrawal of the Scouts. Policing of Buraimi was to be carried out by a small joint Saudi-Levy force. Each side was allotted a zone in the disputed area in which its oil companies might operate, without prejudice to the political claims involved. Buraimi and a space between the two assigned zones were declared an area of no operations.

The arbitration was to be conducted by a tribunal of five members with the purpose of determining a boundary between Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhabi within the Saudi line of 1949 and that claimed by Abu Dhabi at Dammam in 1952. In addition, sovereignty was to be determined in the Buraimi area enclosed by a circle as indicated on Map 6.¹⁴²

Sir Reader Bullard represented Abu Dhabi and the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman. Shaikh Yusuf Yasin, Saudi Arabia's Deputy Foreign Minister, was appointed to represent her. These two appointed two additional arbitrators, Judge Mahmud Hassan of Pakistan and Judge Ernesto de Dohaigo of Cuba. Dr. Charles de Visscher of Belgium, a

142. Ibid, pp.1,2.

former Judge of the International Court at the Hague, was selected as chairman of the tribunal.

The proceedings broke down while still in their infancy.

At the second meeting held at Geneva in September 1955, the leading counsel for the British charged the Saudis with attempts to influence by bribery the loyalty of the shaikhs in the disputed area. Further charges alleged that the Saudis attempted to influence the Pakistani member during his visit to Mecca the previous month, and that the Saudi member was not impartial.

143

The Saudi Arabs denied all these charges, stating that so far as the Pakistani judge was concerned, they had even abstained from presenting him with the gifts which are normally given to distinguished pilgrims.

On September 16, Sir Reader Bullard resigned giving as his reasons, that Shaikh Yasin, openly admitting that he was the Saudi official in charge of affairs at Buraimi, was, in Bullard's belief, in effective control of the conduct of the proceedings on behalf of the Saudi Government, and was therefore representing that government on the tribunal rather than acting as an impartial arbitrator. He asserted that Yasin had briefed a witness, prior to his giving testimony in the hearings dealing with the bribery charges, as to his evidence and conduct before the tribunal. This Bullard regarded as "completely vitiating the whole proceedings."

144

Bullard's resignation forestalled publication of the court's decision on the charges, a decision which the Saudi Arabs asserted

143. "Developments of the Quarter", Middle East Journal, Vol.10, No.1, Winter 1956, p.76.

144. Commonwealth Survey, Vol.1, No.20, 4 October 1955, p.852.

would have been in their favor by a vote of 4 to 1.¹⁴⁵

Shaikh Yasin declared in a statement on 18 September that the entire tribunal had always been aware that he had continued to act as Saudi Arabian Deputy Foreign Minister during the proceedings, that he had been responsible for issuing instructions regarding the application of the arbitration agreement in the disputed area, and that the neutral members of the arbitration tribunal had never raised any objections.

A few days later the chairman of the tribunal and the Cuban member also resigned.

On October 26, following further British accusations of bribery of individuals in the oases by Saudi Arabia in an attempt to win support for its case, Trucial Oman Levies forced the Saudi Arab guards out of the Buraimi oasis. At the same time, the British Government announced that it regarded a line well to the interior, first put forward in 1952, as a fair border, but by agreement with the local shaikhs, would uphold a line somewhat more favorable to Saudi Arabia.¹⁴⁶ The "more favorable" line was the 1935 line proposed by the British, known as the Riyadh Line (Ryan's Line), and as modified in 1937 in favor of Saudi Arabia.

The British action was justified in their own eyes by a belief that prolonged negotiation with Saudi Arabia would only lead to gradual encroachment on the territory of the shaikhdoms under their protection. To the Saudi Arabs, on the other hand, it was evidence of the weakening of Britain's substantive case.

In November 1955, Saudi Arabia proposed to Great Britain that

145. Melamid, op.cit. p.62.

146. Statement of the Prime Minister in the House of Commons on 26 October, recorded in Commonwealth Survey, Vol.1, No.22, 1 November 1955, pp.964-966.

"an international organization such as the U.N. should supervise the Buraimi oasis until its sovereignty is decided," and also suggested referring the dispute back to international arbitration. The British Government replied that the Saudi Arabian authorities had "systematically disregarded the conditions of arbitration," that the Saudi Government's conduct "had been fundamentally inconsistent with the arbitration agreement", and that "voluminous" documentary material which had come into their hands when Buraimi was seized confirmed these conclusions. In the face of these facts she rejected the Saudi proposals as "unrealistic".¹⁴⁷ The British went on to urge the Saudis to accept their declared solution and indicated their willingness to discuss any minor rectifications of the line that might seem convenient in the light of local circumstances.

The ensuing period witnessed a flurry of charges and counter-charges, Saudi threats and condemnations of the British action by the Arab League. Still the way was open to further negotiation. In February 1956, a correspondent of the London Daily Express, in reporting an interview with Ibn Saud, indicated that the King was willing to grant British oil companies special rights in the Buraimi area if the British would turn the oasis over to the Saudis.¹⁴⁸ In March 1956, Yusuf Yasin said that Saudi Arabia was negotiating with Britain for a peaceful settlement of the Buraimi dispute. That discussions were going on was confirmed in a Foreign Office statement on 2 June 1956. But before any results could be reached the Suez incident took place and diplomatic

147. Text of U.K. note in Commonwealth Survey, Vol.1, No.24, 29 November 1955, p.1054.

148. As reported in Petroleum Week, Vol.2, No.6, February 17, 1956, p.38.

relations were severed between the two states. A possibility for their resumption has been forestalled by British accusations of Saudi complicity in the Oman affair.

Beyond the border problem posed by the Buraimi dispute lies the question of the British-Western position in the Gulf. The British of course wish to preserve a relatively stable and friendly situation which has prevailed along the coasts of Arabia since they entered into treaty relations with the Shaikhs.

Opposed to this is the growing Arab desire to free the whole Arab world from foreign political control. This pressure is readily evident in Yemen's claim to Aden and in the Arab League's support of the Imamate of Oman.

The British insist that the importance of Buraimi is not oil. They point to the many dry holes drilled in the Trucial Coast and Oman and the growing conviction on the part of oil men that the area does not contain oil. Buraimi is vital to them because it is the interior gateway to the Coast and Oman. The loss of it would mean a deep Saudi penetration in those areas, but more important, it could result in a serious loss of British prestige and position in the other protected areas.

They now confront the Saudis with a fait accompli. Units of the Scouts occupy Buraimi and key villages in Western Oman. But this situation certainly cannot be continued for any length of time. The maintenance of troop units in the interior is expensive and armed control is an unsatisfactory solution. The British would like to see an amicable boundary settlement concluded, but they are handicapped by the absence of diplomatic representation. Observers on the spot believe

such a settlement is within easy reach and feel that Saudi interest is largely a matter of prestige. The Saudis are not concerned with oil in that area, but tend to discount any prospect of it being found there. In addition, they recognize the difficult problems of maintaining authority in an area so distant from their main administrative centers and separated from them by vast distances of trackless waste.

The British would do well to take a lesson from the recent Bahrain-Saudi territorial waters agreement and encourage the Shaikhs and the Sultan to deal with Ibn Saud themselves. The British as intermediary on behalf of the Shaikhs and Sultan in the disputes have been a constant source of irritation to the Saudis. Direct personal negotiations between the Rulers and without British interference wherein the Shaikhs would declare themselves willing to accept a Saudi decision could very well result in generous concessions being granted by Saudi Arabia, as were given to the Yemen in 1934 and to Bahrain. It would be worth a gamble.

Appendix

The Treaty of Sib (25 Sept. 1920)

As published in the Observer of London on 18/8/57 from American sources

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

This is the peace agreed upon between the Government of the Sultan, Taimur ibn Faisal, and Shaikh 'Isa ibn Salih ibn 'ali on behalf of the people of Oman, whose names are signed hereto, through the mediation of Mr. Wingate, I.C.S., political agent and consul for Great Britain in Muscat, who is empowered by his Government in this respect and to be an intermediary between them. Of the conditions set forth below four pertain to the Government of the Sultan and four pertain to the people of Oman.

Those pertaining to the people of Oman are: -

1. Not more than five per cent shall be taken from anyone, no matter what his race, coming from Oman to Muscat, Matrah, Sur or the rest of the coast towns.
2. All the people of Oman shall enjoy security and freedom in all the coast towns.
3. All restrictions upon everyone entering or leaving Muscat and Matrah and all the towns shall be removed.
4. The Government of the Sultan shall not grant asylum to any criminal fleeing from the justice of the people of Oman. It shall return him to them if they request it to do so. It shall not interfere in their internal affairs.


The four conditions pertaining to the Government of the Sultan are: -


1. All the tribes and shaikhs shall be at peace with the Sultan. They shall not attack the towns of the coast, and shall not interfere in his Government.
2. All those going to Oman on lawful business and for commercial affairs shall be free. There shall be no restrictions on commerce, and they shall enjoy security.
3. They shall expel and grant no asylum to any wrong-doer or criminal fleeing to them.
4. The claims of merchants and others against the people of Oman shall be heard and decided on the basis of justice according to the law of Islam.

Bibliography


- Adamiyat, Fereydoun, Bahrein Islands.
New York, Frederick A. Praeger Inc., 1955.
- Alsop, Joseph, "Britain and Middle East Oil", New York Herald Tribune,
6, (23 Mar 1956).
- "Arab Eyes on Pipelines", "Arabs Talk Oil", The Economist,
v. CLXXXV, 504, (1957).
- Arabian American Oil Company, Middle East Oil Development,
4th ed., (1956).
- (_____). Handbook: "Middle East Petroleum Data",
(1957).
- (_____). Oman and the Southern Shore of the
Persian Gulf.
Cairo, Misr A.E., 1952.
- Belgrave, James H.D., Welcome to Bahrain.
Stourbridge, Mark and Moody Ltd., 1953.
- Birtwhistle, Ross, "Bahrein's 25 Years of Oil Production", Cyprus Mail,
2, (8 Oct 1957).
- Bowen, Richard L., "The Pearl Fisheries of the Persian Gulf",
Middle East Journal, v.9, 270, (1955).
- Bustani, Emile, "Sharing Oil Benefits", Middle East Forum,
v. XXXIII, 9, (1958).
- Christian Science Monitor, 3, (18 Apr 1956); 2, (20 Aug 1957);
1, (13 Nov 1957); 2, (21 Jan 1958).
- Codrai, Ronald, "Desert Shaikhdoms of Arabia's Pirate Coast",
The National Geographic Magazine, v. CX, 101, (1956).
- "Communist Aid and Trade", Petroleum Press Service,
v. XXV, 100, (1958).
- Cook, Don, "Britain and the Persian Gulf", New York Herald Tribune,
4, (27 Oct 1957).
- Cyprus Mail, 1, (14 Aug 1957).
- DeJohn, Garrett E., "Slavery in Arabia", Moslem World,
v. XXIV, 127, (1934).
- "Demand for Middle East crude oil to exceed four million barrels daily
in 1958", Petroleum World, v.29, 34, (1958).
- "Developments of the Quarter", Middle East Journal, v.7, 329, (1953);
v.8, 82, (1956).
- Dickson, H.R.P., Kuwait and Her Neighbors.
London, Allen and Unwin, 1956.
- Economist, v. CLXXXV, 947, (1957).
- Eltham, Eric, "Suez Crisis Spurs Hunt for New Energy Sources", World
Petroleum, v.28, 89, (1957).
- Fisher, W.B., The Middle East.
London, Methuen, 1950.
- Gilmour, Ian, "Middle East Notebook", Spectator, (25 Apr 1958).
- Harrison, Paul W., Doctor in Arabia.
London, R. Hale Ltd., 1943.
- Hay, Rupert, "The Persian Gulf States and Their Boundary Problems",
Geographical Journal, 437, (Dec 1954).
- (_____). "The Impact of the Oil Industry on the Persian Gulf
Shaykhdoms", Middle East Journal, v.9, 365, (1955).


- Hoskins, Halford L., "Background of the British Position in Arabia",
Middle East Journal, v.1, 141, (1947).
- "Imports Question, The", World Petroleum, v.28, 124, (1957).
- International Oilman, v.XI, 319, (1957).
- Liebesney, Herbert J., "Administration and Legal Development in Arabia:
The Persian Gulf Principalities", Middle East Journal,
v.10, 36, (1956).
- Longrigg, Stephen H., Iraq, 1900-1950.
London, Oxford University Press, 1953.
(). Oil in the Middle East.
London, Oxford University Press, 1954.
- Memorial of the Government of Saudi Arabia. 3 v., 1955.
- Middle East, The.
London, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1954.
- Middle East, The.
London, Europa Publications, 1957.
- Middle East Report, v.VII, 2, (1955).
- Morris, James, Sultan in Oman.
London, Faber, 1957.
- Murphy, Charles V., "Oil East of Suez", Life, v.21, 86, (1956).
Oil and Gas Journal, (28 Jan 1957).
- Owen, Roderic, The Golden Bubble.
London, Collins, 1957.
- Petroleum Press Service, v.XXIV, 227, (1957); v.XXV, 114, (1957).
- Petroleum Week, v.2, n.6, (1956); v.4, n.4, 11, 14, 15, 19, (1957);
v.5, n.17, 19, 25, (1957); v.6, n.3, 4, (1958).
- Philby, H. St. John, Forty Years in the Wilderness.
London, Robert Hale Ltd., 1957.
- Pratt, Wallace E. and Good, Dorothy, eds., World Geography of Petroleum.
New York, Princeton, 1950.
- Qubain, Fahim I., "Social Classes and Tensions in Bahrain",
Middle East Journal, v.9, 270, (1955).
- Reference Division, Central Office of Information, London,
Pamphlet R3398, Middle East Oil, (1956).
(). Pamphlet R3387, The Arab States of the Persian
Gulf, (1956).
(). Commonwealth Survey, v.1, 852, 964, 1054, (1955);
v.2, 575, 861, (1956); v.3, 686, (1957).
- Seton-Williams, M.V., Britain and the Arab States.
London, 1948.
- Thesiger, Wilfred P., "Desert Borderlands of Oman", Geographical
Journal, v.CXVI, 139, (1950).
- Thomas, Bertram, Alarms and Excursions in Arabia.
London, Allen and Unwin, 1931.
(). Arab Rule Under the Al Bu Said Dynasty of Oman, 1741-1937.
London, 1938.
- Thoms, Wells, "Inland Oman", Moslem World, v.XXXI, 417, (1941).
- Wilson, Arnold T., The Persian Gulf.
London, Allen and Unwin, 1928.
- Yaari, S., "Marketing Middle East Oil", Middle East Affairs,
v.III, 218, (1956).






THE PERSIAN GULF
AND
SOUTHEAST ARABIA





MAP REFERENCE:
 ASIA
 PERSIAN GULF
 (WESTERN SHEET)
 1:868,400
 HYDROGRAPHIC OFFICE
 U.S. NAVY




MAP REFERENCE:
 ASIA
 PERSIAN GULF
 (WESTERN SHEET)
 1 : 868,400
 HYDROGRAPHIC OFFICE
 U.S. NAVY

IRAN


IRAQ

SAUDI ARABIA



KHARJ ISLAND

KUWAIT
THE NEUTRAL ZONE




MAP REFERENCE: ASIA, 1:1,000,000
(BASRA & BUSHIRE SHEETS)


IRAN

IRAQ

SAUDI ARABIA





KUWAIT
THE NEUTRAL ZONE





MAP REFERENCE: ASIA, 1:1,000,000
(BASRA & BUSHIRE SHEETS)

QATAR, THE TRUCIAL COAST, NORTHERN MUSCAT & OMAN




QATAR, THE TRUCIAL COAST, NORTHERN MUSCAT & OMAN



BURAIMI OASIS

MAP FROM THE
SAUDI MEMORIAL

SHADED PORTIONS INDICATE
POPULATION CENTERS



AL MUWAIQI'I




AL MUTARADH



AL JAHILI



PERSIAN GULF



- | | |
|--|--|
| | ABU DHABI CLAIM
30 JAN '52 |
| | QATAR CLAIM 30 JAN '52 |
| | SAUDI CLAIM 14 OCT '49 |
| | BRITISH PROPOSAL
25 NOV '35 (RYAN'S LINE) |
| | SAUDI PROPOSAL
3 APR '35 (FUAD'S LINE) |
| | ANGLO-TURKISH CONVENTION
1914 (VIOLET LINE) |
| | ANGLO-TURKISH CONVENTION
1913 (BLUE LINE) |

20 0 20 40 60 80 100
 STATUTE MILES
 1: 2,100,000

TAKEN FROM SAUDI MEMORIAL

JIDDAT
 AL-HARASIS
 19°N 56'E

19°N 53'E

17°N 52'E

ARABIAN
 SEA