ASPECTS OF LEBANON'S REACTION
to the
MIDDLE EAST POLICY
of the
UNITED STATES
(May 1960 - August 1968)

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LEBANON'S REACTION

to

UNITED STATES POLICY

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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study is to demonstrate, through observation and analysis, certain aspects of Lebanon's reaction to the Middle East policy of the United States between May 1950 and August 1958. The major problem faced in accomplishing such a study was the fact that Lebanon, in the political field, had very few direct relations with the government of the United States. Thus, her attitude toward the policies carried out by the United States in the Middle East was most often resultant from, or influenced by the attitude of one or more of the other Arab countries. These then also had to be considered in the course of the presentation. Another factor adding to the problem of determining Lebanon's attitude toward United States Mid-Eastern policy during this period is that there is actually more than one attitude commonly expressed in Lebanon on matters of foreign policy—and these are often quite divergent. Since these factors made it impossible to discuss a singular attitude of Lebanon, and since the different attitudes themselves were reactions to other Lebanese and Arab opinion concerning United States policy, the term 'Lebanon's reaction' has been used in the title of this work, in place of 'Lebanon's relations with' or 'Lebanon's attitude toward the U.S.'

In gathering data for this presentation a chronological survey was made of periodical materials dealing with events in Lebanon. Newspapers, the best spokesman of a variety of political views, were used to determine not only the chronological order of events, but also the points of view of
the various factions represented in Lebanon. In this way it was possible to accumulate not only statements by important representatives of Lebanese political thought, but also the wider range of opinion expressed in the columns of the individual journals. The newspaper accounts then were the sources of the bulk of the reaction. For the United States policy itself, United States State Department documents, and speeches and statements by American statesman concerned with the Middle East were employed. Where it was deemed applicable, opinion expressed by the authors of books written about the events with which the study is concerned was employed.

Specifically, two things were indicated from the trend taken by the reactions of Lebanon to United States foreign policy in the Middle East during the period studied. First of all, Lebanon's relations with any country are affected more than those of most countries by the two primary divergent attitudes maintained among its citizens. Second, and similarly, these divergent points of view held within the country cause Lebanon as a whole to be extremely touchy to the attitudes, concerning its foreign policy with countries outside the area, held by other Arab countries. The details of this involvement are the findings of this study. They provide the demonstration of the causes for this phenomenon in international relations.

It is hoped that the comprehension of the strange pattern of initiative, reaction and counter-reaction that may determine the relationship of one country with another makes the effort involved in a study of this kind worthwhile.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

FOREWORD

CHAPTER I --- Tripartite Declaration to the Baghdad Pact.
   Part 1 --- Tripartite Declaration.
   Part 2 --- The MEDO proposals.
   Part 3 --- The visit of United States Secretary of State Dulles to the Middle East.
   Part 4 --- Towards the Baghdad Pact. p. 70

CHAPTER II --- Baghdad Pact to the Eisenhower Doctrine. p. 111
   Part 1 --- Baghdad Pact to the United States withdrawal of the Aswan Dam offer. p. 111
   Part 2 --- Withdrawal of the Aswan Dam offer to Arab heads of state meeting. p. 114
   Part 3 --- Heads of state meeting to parliament's approval of the Lebanese-American communique on the Eisenhower Doctrine. p. 149

CHAPTER III --- Eisenhower Doctrine to the Election of President Chehab. p. 145
   Part 1 --- Acceptance of the Eisenhower Doctrine to the Henderson mission.
   Part 2 --- Henderson mission to the formation of the United Arab Republic.
   Part 3 --- United Arab Republic formation to the outbreak of the revolt.
   Part 4 --- Outbreak of the revolt to the landing of the Marines.
   Part 5 --- Marines' landing to the election of Chehab.

OBSERVATIONS

- vi -
FOREWORD

The relations of no two countries with one another may be properly considered as if they existed within a void. Such is more obviously the case when one of the two countries involved exists, acts and reacts as a segment of a larger political area. It would be impossible to discuss solely the relations between the United States of America and the Republic of Lebanon unless the discussion were limited to such matters as the legal and technical agreements transacted between these two states. And even these could not always be entirely isolated from outside political considerations.

The United States, existing as a nation with a certain degree of geographic separateness, was at one time able to isolate itself and its political actions from the rest of the world—remaining uninvolved. This isolationism was ended during and after World War II. Thanks to its great technological advancement and to the weakening, due to the war, of the great Western and central European countries, the United States emerged the world's strongest nation and thus the leader of the Western world. And, once it had assumed such a role it could no longer act without considering, and having its policies tempered by the interests of its allies.

In the case of Lebanon the situation is more complicated. The Republic of Lebanon is one small unit within a much larger geographical body which is composed of other Arab countries. This larger area is called the Arab world and to a considerable extent is felt to be the
physical basis of what will one day be a greater Arab nation. Since
the birth of the political movement that is today called Arab nationalism,
and more specifically since these Arab countries today gained their in-
dependence, the international relations of each have been carried out with
an eye to the reaction and opinion of the others. Lebanon is no exception.

A further complication arises in the case of Lebanon due to the
fact that the population is divided, almost equally, according to religion.
The major split is between Muslim and Christian, each group claiming 50
percent or more of the population. Where government policy is concerned
the problem arises in that each group reacts differently—maintains a
different attitude—to political activity which either stems from one of
the other Arab countries or is directed at one of them.

The Muslim population, for the most part, feels itself firmly a
part of the Arabism, or Arab nationalism, mentioned above, and demands
that the government act, or react, as an Arab country. The Christians,
(particularly the members of the Maronite Catholic sect) nearly evenly
represented in Lebanon, but amounting to a small minority in the Arab
world as a whole, are forever apprehensive to the face of the Arab
nationalist movement. They fear, despite all assurance to the contrary,
that they will one day be overwhelmed in an Arab tide, losing their
privileges if not their identity and even their lives.

Thus there are two types of nationalism existing in Lebanon, both
of which must be understood before the reactions of their adherents to
political developments can be successfully considered. We have mentioned
Arab nationalism. The adherents to the philosophy of this movement consider
that Lebanon should exist primarily as a segment of the Arab world—the future Arab political nation. Most advocates of this Arab nationalist line would readily admit that Lebanese nationalism might have its place within the greater Arab unit but would insist that the Lebanese feeling should not be developed at the expense of what they consider to be Lebanon's duty towards the other Arab countries.

To the Lebanese nationalist, on the other hand, concern for the maintenance of Lebanon's entity and independence is pointe finale. Such a feeling may be shared by one of sympathy for Arab nationalism, but where there is a conflict, or the hint of conflict, between the two concepts the first would always be supported.

These two political forces at work within Lebanon were reconciled to one another on the occasion of the termination of the French mandate and the struggle for Lebanese independence. A compromise formula popularly known as the National Pact was devised in 1943 by the leaders of the two main sects—namely, Rida Solh and Bechara Khoury. ¹ In this compromise the Muslim side gave up the idea of a Western protectorate and the necessity for the Western physical presence in Lebanon in return for the acceptance by the Christian side of the concept of Lebanese sovereignty and integrity, meaning they would refrain from demands for union with other of the Arab countries. The Arab League, formed in 1945, further embodied these principles, signifying the unity of Arab purpose but recognizing the

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¹ The National Pact is not in fact a separate document or formal agreement, but really refers to certain passages in a speech made by Rida Solh in parliament on 8 November 1943, which was universal-ly accepted at the time as being the pattern for future Lebanese government policy.
political individuality of each country.

The Lebanese government could not, and cannot, follow a policy which runs counter to the feelings of either of these groups, nor one which disregards its accepted position as one of a group of Arab countries, and expect the country to remain calm.

These factors set the pattern for the study to follow. When the presentation appears to deviate from the subject of Lebanese reaction to one or another of the policy moves of the United States in the Middle East it is because the Lebanese reaction was often determined by the reaction of one of the other Arab countries. And, again, we cannot consider Lebanon's reaction as being singular. The responses of the various segments within the Lebanese population to outside political activity in turn reacted on each other. And the government, finally, reacted with a mind to both, but at the same time individually from either.

With this in mind the maze can be approached, followed through, and emerged from with some result other than exit itself.

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In the discussion to follow newspaper reports and comments will provide a considerable portion of the material concerning Lebanon's point of view toward the various circumstances resulting from the foreign policy moves of the United States in the Middle East. The various journals will be described according to three characteristics—religious affiliation, nationalist tendencies, and attitude toward the government.

The designations Christian and Muslim in themselves are clear, and the difference between Lebanese and Arab nationalist has been pointed
out above. It will be noted however that while the papers which represent the Christian population will most often also be Lebanese nationalist and pro-government, there are many distinct exceptions. And, with relation to the government, the fact that the cabinet changed several times during the period concerned has led to the use of the terms opposition, pro-government and neutral solely with reference to the government in power after October 1956. Even so there is much variation in the attitude of some papers, making these designations very general.
CHAPTER I
TRIPARTITE DECLARATION TO THE BAGHDAD PACT

Part 1
TRIPARTITE DECLARATION

The basic tenet of United States foreign policy with regard to the Arab countries at the turn of the half-century was maintenance of the status quo. At that time the greatest tensions were being generated from the conflict between the Arab states and Israel. The Western powers feared the development of an arms race between the Arabs and Israel, resulting in another outbreak of their armed conflict.

This fear of a renewed Arab-Israeli war and its probable results in Middle East instability led the Western powers on 25 May 1950, to make a statement stressing that they would not tolerate such a renewal. Their warning was also addressed to those of the Arab countries whom they estimated might be considering punitive action against Jordan for its un Counselling action in annexing Arab Palestine.

The Big 3 communiqué was as follows:

The governments of the United Kingdom, France, and the United States, having had occasion during the recent Foreign Ministers meeting in London to review certain questions affecting the peace and stability of the Arab states and of Israel, and particularly that of the supply of arms and war material to these states, have resolved to make the following statement:

1. The three governments recognize that the Arab states and Israel all need to maintain a certain level of armed forces for the purposes of ensuring their internal security and their legitimate self-defense and to permit them to play their part in the defense of the area as a whole. All applications for arms or war material for these countries will be considered in the light of these principles. In this connection the three governments wish to recall and reaffirm the terms of the statements made by their representatives in the Security
Council on August 4, 1949, in which they declared their opposition to the development of an arms race between the Arab states and Israel.

2. The three governments declare that assurances have been received from all the states in question, to which they permit arms to be supplied from their countries, that the purchasing state does not intend to undertake any act of aggression against any other state. Similar assurances will be requested from any other state in the area to which they permit arms to be supplied in the future.

3. The three governments take this opportunity of declaring their deep interest in and their desire to promote the establishment and maintenance of peace and stability in the area and their unalterable opposition to the use of force or threat of force between any of the states in that area. The three governments, should they find that any of these states was preparing to violate frontiers or armistice lines, would, consistently with their obligations as members of the United Nations immediately take action, both within and outside the United Nations, to prevent such violation.\(^1\)

The Lebanese government reacted not unfavorably to the three-power declaration. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in a communiqué issued 26 May, said it felt it "necessary to declare that the governments of the United States, Great Britain and France made known to it, relative to the import of arms that Lebanon could make, that they would be desirous of obtaining the ensigned guarantees."

"The Ministry of Foreign Affairs," the communiqué said, "has communicated its response to the three powers pointing out that the Lebanese government has always been anxious to collaborate with the other Arab states towards the consolidation of the security in this region of the world, and that a new declaration in this sense certainly responds to its desire for peace and to its duties in its position as member of the Arab League and the United Nations.\(^2\)

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1 Kessing's Contemporary Archives, v. 8, (1950-1952) p. 10312
2 L'Orient, Beirut, 27 May 1950
The Beirut press however sounded its suspicions. In its editorial of 27 May the French language newspaper, L'Orient (Christian Lebanese nationalist, neutral) said the tripartite declaration implied that the Arab countries were engaged in the Western camp. The declaration, it said, called for the assumption of a new position. The paper asked if acceptance of the Western position was to accept peace with Israel without negotiation and without condition. Was it to give the armistice lines the same value as a frontier? And, it demanded, is respect for the territorial status quo actually tacit recognition of the union of the two banks of the Jordan River (in other words Jordan's right to incorporate the Arab portion of Palestine)?

L'Orient's editorial writer felt that the Arabs could receive with joy the engagement of the powers to protect them against armed aggression, and, likewise, could be happy over the promise of the "three" to protect them against themselves.

But, regarding the questions asked, the writer said the Arab League must clearly define its policy and engage in precise acts so as not to be caught before a fait accompli.

In its press review of the same day L'Orient remarked that the three-power declaration had been widely covered by the Beirut press without it being made known that the three powers were accepting to arm the Arab countries and Israel only on condition that the material sent not be used for aggression between the states.

Questions as to the Western intentions behind the tripartite declaration also began soon to crop up in parliament. On 1 June, Foreign
Minister Philip Yaqqa received the representatives of the U.S., Britain and France in Beirut in order to get a clarification of the declaration. He wished to be able to reply more fully to deputies' questions at a meeting of the Foreign Affairs Committee of parliament on 2 June.

An Arab League Council meeting meanwhile had been called for 12 June to discuss, among other things, the tripartite declaration. Contacts were being made between the Arab capitals to prepare a common response to the declaration. The Beirut press as a whole agreed with the necessity for a League meeting to discuss the tripartite declaration and form a reply to it. The more moderate papers were satisfied in pointing out the need for the Arab countries to form a unified front in preparation for any eventualty.

Others were more violent. L'orient's press review of 1 June quoted the newspaper Al Chark (Muslin, Arab nationalist, opposition), in a condemnation of the declaration as a menace to the security of the Middle East. Also, Al Watan (Muslin, Arab, opposition) was quoted as noting the "movement of indignation and reprobation provoked by the declaration in the group of Arab countries," and saying it was motivated by a general factor—the national, political and economic aspirations of the Arab peoples and more particularly the position of each Arab country as regards its independence and sovereignty. The newspapers called on the government to clarify its policy concerning the latest Western policy statement.

The Arab League Council met as scheduled on 12 June 1950 in Alexandria to discuss the three most pressing matters of concern to
the Arab states: 1) An Egyptian motion calling for revision of the League pact to allow the expulsion of Jordan (The motion evidenced the intransigent Egyptian position with regard to Jordan's annexation of Arab Palestine); 2) formation of an inter-Arab collective security pact; and, 3) the Arab response to the tripartite declaration.5

On the second day of its deliberations the Council postponed discussion of the touchy annexation problem until a later meeting and passed on to the subject of the tripartite declaration. On this matter the Political Committee on 15 June reached agreement, formulating reservations toward the declaration on three points: 1) The eventual use of force against Arab countries; 2) possible action by the three powers outside the United Nations authority; and, 3) the guarantees given in the declaration to the frontiers of Israel. These questions were considered by the committee as constituting interference by the three powers in internal Arab affairs and a threat to the independence of Middle Eastern countries in general.4

The most solid result of the Alexandria meeting was formulated on 17 June when five of the seven Arab League states signed a collective security pact. Iraq and Jordan declined. Where the Western powers, and the United States particularly, were concerned the formation of the Arab League Collective Security Pact was to prove a frustration to its efforts in the ensuing years to induce the Arab countries to join a Western backed organization for the defense of the Middle East. Egypt herein was provided with a good case for not entering any such defense engagements at the side.

5 _Abid_, 15 June 1950
4 _Abid_, 15 and 16 June 1950
of the West and for inducing the other Arab League states, except for dissenting Iraq, to follow its neutral line rather than create a further split among the League countries.

The Arab League Council session was closed on the same day. Concerning the third point on the agenda, formulation of a response to the three-power declaration, the Arab representatives decided to accept the terms of the Western policy statement but to point out to the three governments their individual reservations as to the intent of the declaration. Notes in this sense were to be sent to each of the three powers on 12 June by each Arab government.

The Lebanese reply to the governments of the Big 3 was sent, and made public, on the appointed date. It was worded as follows:

The governments of the Arab states have examined separately and collectively the common declaration emanating from the governments of the United Kingdom, France and the United States on the date of 25 May. The exchange of views concerning this declaration was one of the principal reasons which led the Arab States to hasten the meeting of the Arab League Council to 12 June 1950. This question was among the principal subjects inscribed on the agenda of that meeting.

The Arab states are in agreement on the following declaration:

1) The Arab states do not seek anything but the establishment and maintenance of peace in the Middle East. Raging high among the peaceful states, the Arab states have many times proved their total respect for the Charter of the United Nations.

2) If the Arab States have been interested, and are interested, in increasing their armament, it is because of the deep feeling they have towards their responsibility to assure their internal security and their legitimate defense, with an aim to uphold their obligation to the defense of international security in this region, an obligation which affects them directly as well as through the Arab League according to the regional agreement registered by Article 52 of the United Nations Charter.
This statement of the Lebanese government went on to say that the Arab states had previously stated many times their peaceful intentions and that arms asked from the three governments would serve only peaceful ends. The Arab states assume from the declaration, the note said, that the three powers do not want to favor Israel, exert pressure on the Arab states to enter negotiations with Israel, pre-judging that that would be a solution to the Palestine problem, or to maintain the status quo -- but that their intention was to oppose themselves to any recourse to force or a violation of the armistic lines.

The Lebanese note also expressed the assumption of the Arab states that the declaration was not an attempt to divide the Middle East into zones of influence and constituted absolutely no threat to the independence and sovereignty of the Arab states.

The Lebanese note pointed to the doubts raised in the minds of the Arab countries due to paragraph 5 of the declaration which said if the said (Big 3) governments felt that the Middle East states were preparing to violate frontiers or armistic lines they would undertake immediate action both inside and outside the United Nations. The note called for the declaration to be applied in a manner to dissipate the doubts it caused, demonstrating that the three governments seek, with complete impartiality, the maintenance of peace in the Middle East on the basis of law and justice and the respect of the sovereignty of the states, with no spirit of domination or influence.

The Lebanese government's point of view was summed up in the last point of the note:
9) In conclusion, the Arab States can only affirm one more time that their sincere desire for peace notwithstanding, they could not admit any act of a nature indicating an attempt on their sovereignty or on their independence.5

The Beirut press was relatively quiet concerning the Lebanese government's reply to the tripartite declaration — an indication that the newspapers, and the factions they represent, were satisfied by the stand the government and the Arab League had taken.

Separating Lebanon and the United States from their partners in the Middle East and in the West, the relationship established, purely on the basis of international politics, in early 1950 was formal and not unfriendly. The United States was as yet not fully christened in the matter of Middle Eastern policy and had not formulated any definite plan as to the path it was to follow in that area of the world. What the United States policy makers did know—and this obviously was their most specific reason for joining in the tripartite declaration—was that the Soviet Union was interested in making inroads to the Middle East. The American reason for desiring the maintenance of a status quo in the Middle East was likely not because it favored, or disfavored any of the opposing elements in Middle Eastern politics, but because it wanted to try to insure, in an unspecific sort of way, that no violent conflict would break out in the Middle East and provide the Soviets further opportunity to maneuver the tensions to suit their own ends.

5 Ibid, 22 June 1950
The position of the Lebanese government with regard to the United States, and the Western powers in general, is simple. Lebanon has been historically friendly to the West, but on the other hand the Lebanese, like all other Arabs, were shocked by the Western part in establishing a Jewish state on Arab soil in Palestine. Lebanon had its independence and was not under the control or direct influence of any Western nation—although it had been. Its policy then could easily take the form it did—agreement with the other members of the Arab League to assume an attitude of coolness towards any Western move in the area until it was proved valid in terms of Lebanon's own, and the broad Arab interest.

Part 2
THE MELO PROPOSALS

The next major United States foreign policy step with relation to the Middle East was taken a year and a half later when, in partnership with the other two of the Western Big Three and their strongest Mediterranean ally, Turkey, the United States offered to participate with the Arab countries in a Middle East Defense Organisation. By this time the Cold War with the Soviet Union had become considerably more intense and the United States was willing to commit herself drastically to safeguarding an area considered to be subject, and susceptible to Soviet encroachment. Lebanon continued to follow the Arab League line.

However it appears the MEO idea was not entirely conceived in the minds of American diplomats. While the MEO proposals were formally presented to Egypt in late October 1951, talk of an eastern
Mediterranean security system of this nature began to be heard as early as March. L'Orient published an article on 3 March credited to the French Agence France Presse and the British Broadcasting Corporation reporting that the United States State Department the day before revealed that the Turkish ambassador had proposed to it on 25 January that the United States adhere to a treaty of alliance concluded between Turkey, the United Kingdom and France in 1939. The United States government was reportedly studying the proposition but had not yet made known any response.

According to the same article the State Department also was examining other suggestions made by the Ankara government during the last months in an attempt to obtain United States aid in case of an attack on Turkey. These suggestions were believed to be:
1) Participation of Turkey, as a full member, in the Atlantic Pact. (At that time Turkey was participating only indirectly); 2) creation of a Mediterranean defense alliance which would group Middle Eastern nations not belonging to the Atlantic Pact, on condition that the United States would also adhere to this alliance.6

AFP reported on 4 March that informed Washington sources had said that although the United States was not yet ready to sign a formal defense alliance with Turkey, since it would be from six months to one year before its forces were sufficiently expanded, it would in the meantime guarantee Turkey against any attack without a formal agreement.

6 Ibid. 5 March 1951 (If the AFP report mentioned on line 2, this page, is correct, the State Department either did not issue a formal statement to that effect or did not publish it in the State Department Bulletin.)
Meanwhile, the report said, the State Department was studying three possibilities for giving Turkey the guarantee it demanded:

1) Extension of the United Kingdom, French, Turkish pact to include the United States; or, 2) full participation of Turkey in the Atlantic Pact; or, 3) establishment of a Middle East defense pact. The report pointed out that the latter possibility was considered the least practical due to the complications caused by the existing divergences between the Arab countries and Israel and the first two would retain the serious consideration of Washington.7

A month later on 9 April AFP filed a story from Ankara noting observations by political observers that the Turkish government appeared to be abandoning the desire to adhere to the Atlantic Pact and was demanding the creation, with United States participation, of a security system for the eastern Mediterranean. The report said Prime Minister Adnan Menderes had spoken to a reporter of the American Columbia Broadcasting System of "the necessity to create in the eastern Mediterranean a system of security which would constitute a branch of the Atlantic union." The Turkish foreign minister meanwhile, was carrying out a campaign against Turkish participation in the Atlantic Pact, saying it would weigh Turkey down with more obligations than it would be assured advantages. AFP commented that it was becoming more evident that the Turkish public opinion was little disposed to wait the few months which, according to Washington reports, would be necessary before the United States could accept new obligations.8

7 Ibid, 5 March 1951
8 Ibid, 10 April 1951
Returning to Beirut from Geneva on 25 May, Lebanon's permanent United Nations representative, Charles Malik, answered a question as to his views on Lebanese security in a manner which showed that he, too, favored the establishment of a Mediterranean defense organization. "It depends," he said, "on that of the Mediterranean....I think that to protect ourselves from Israeli expansionism, like the Communist expansionism, we must adhere to a Mediterranean pact. Because, whether one likes it or not, Israel is a danger for Lebanon...." For the Jewish state, Malik said, the natural route of expansion is to the north.9

The broad United States policy with regard to the security of the Middle East at this time, aside from the question of whether it was ready to assume further political obligations, was stated by President Truman in a speech to Congress on 24 May appealing for funds for the Mutual Security Program. The President mentioned, generally, United States objectives in the Middle East and the current plans for reaching them. He pointed out that the Middle East countries were of great importance to the free world's security; that there was no simple formula for increasing stability and security in the Middle East, and that the Middle Eastern countries should be helped to withstand pressures and advance towards stability and improved living conditions. The President stated:

To these ends I am recommending 415 million dollars in military aid for Greece, Turkey and Iran; a portion of this aid will be available for other Middle Eastern nations if necessary. I am also recommending 126 million dollars in economic aid for Middle Eastern countries.

9 Ibid. 24 May 1951
exclusive of Greece and Turkey, for whose economic aid is provided as part of the program for Europe.....

In the Arab states and Israel, the fundamental requirement is a regional approach to the basic problems of economic development.

The program I am now proposing is a balanced program for strengthening the security of the Middle East. It will make a solid contribution to our hopes for peace.10

Thus the situation as regards schemes for the security of the Middle East, as it appears to have been some five months before NSC-68 was proposed, shapes up generally in this way. Turkey was the prime proponent of formation of a security system in the eastern Mediterranean with United States participation. The Turks were concerned that the increasing Russian power following the war would sooner or later lead their northern neighbor to make another attempt to bully its way into control of the Turks' most jealously guarded possession—the Straits. They wanted official, unqualified assurance by the United States that Turkey's uncomfortable position on the underside of the Soviet Union would not be put in physical jeopardy by its feared northern neighbor without inviting the wrath, and if necessary the armed might of the strongest Western power. The Turkish idea for Middle East-Western, rather than a Turkish-Western defense arrangement probably stemmed from the realization that the United States concept for protecting the area from Communist expansion was in terms of just that—the area as a whole rather than individual countries separately. The Turks were probably right in believing they could elicit more interest from United States diplomats by setting themselves forth as the gateway to the oil of the

10 The Department of State Bulletin, v. 24, June 4, 1951
Middle East, the greatest bulwark against Communist expansionism, and thus the natural hub around which should be built any Western plans for the defense of the Middle East.

As pointed out however the United States was not quite yet ready to assume full responsibility for the defense of either Turkey or the Middle East as a whole. Its policy was to offer military aid and economic aid with the aim of increasing stability and to state its concern for the security and well being of the area, and, in the case of Turkey at least, to enlist that country's association in the broader Western system of defense against communism without signing a stricter bilateral military defense agreement. Also, the United States apparently realized that the tension in the Arab world caused by the dispute with Israel was not conducive to an effective, coordinated security system for the area as a whole. And, finally, the United States' ally Great Britain was still in a position to effectively safeguard for the West the vital strategic positions, outside of Turkey, in the Middle East.

Nallik's remarks on Lebanon's needs as regards security arrangements in the Middle East most probably could be traced to two things. First, he may have been approached by the Turkish representative at the United Nations concerning his country's attitude towards the possibility of an eastern Mediterranean defense pact. To the Lebanese statesman, Western educated and oriented, defense against communism appeared as a much greater necessity than it did to many of his Arab colleagues. Thus his opinion that a Mediterranean pact was necessary did not reflect the viewpoint, necessarily, of even his own government. The Lebanese,
and in general the Arab point of view was however acknowledged in Malik's statement when he saw the Israeli threat as reason for Lebanon joining a Mediterranean pact. To the Arabs, Zionism, not communism, was the principal threat. The West's commitments in respect of Israel however would not permit the recognition of such a danger even in order to gain Arab cooperation in the formation of a common stand against the other—the Communist—threat.

The situation described for the period a short five months before the Western proposal of MEPO was obviously not conducive to such an offer. And it does not seem reasonable to assume that Turkish efforts to elicit more solid United States backing for its own defense by pulling in with it the whole of the strategic Middle East would, in themselves achieve the forthcoming result. Nor, in light of the apparent American broad policy in the Middle East, does it seem to follow that the United States' expanded military power would lead it to agree suddenly to participate in a project on the order of MEPO unless some other factor in the situation also had changed.

As late as a week before the MEPO proposals were offered to Egypt, the United States does not seem to have drastically changed its immediate plans for insuring the security of the Middle East. On 6 October, the Paris correspondent of the influential Beirut Arabic daily, Al-Hayat (Maliki, undefined, neutral) reported that the Big 5 had formulated plans for the defense of the Middle East. However, he said, the plan developed in theory in Washington would not function before the settlement of problems dangling between the Arabs and Israel. The American point of view, he said, had triumphed over that of the other two Western powers in the matter.
The proposed plan, it was reported, envisaged the participation of British, United States and Egyptian forces in such a defense set up. The French too, however, had insisted on taking part and it was decided finally that in case of an accord being reached between the Arabs and Jews—an accord on which the application of the military defense plan depended—French troops would also be sent to the Middle East. The Al-Hayat correspondent also reported that the current efforts of American diplomacy were concerned with bringing about an Israeli-Arab reconciliation.\footnote{11}

On the same day, Al-Chark (muslim, Arab nationalist, opposition), in its editorial comment, gave the argument most often used in denouncing Western plans for the defense of the Middle East. Against whom, the Al-Chark editorialist asked himself, do the Big 5 want to defend the countries of the Middle East?

"We are told," he said, "that one seeks to save us from the Chinese, the North Koreans and the Russians. But we reply to this that it is not China, North Korea, nor Russia, that occupies Iraq, Jordan and Egypt. They are not at all responsible for the Balfour Declaration and the catastrophes suffered by the Arabs in Palestine and the sufferings undergone by hundreds of thousands of Palestinians in the refugee camps of their neighboring countries."

"If there is cause to defend oneself it is against the Big 5 themselves, and not against other powers."\footnote{12}

The question still remains why did the United States change its mind, or allow its mind to be changed as to the practicability of

\footnote{11} L'Orient, op.cit. 7 October 1951
\footnote{12} Ibid.
initiating plans for the formation of a Middle East security system in October 1951. The other factors influencing such a decision apparently remaining equal, it was an action on the part of one of the Middle Eastern countries that led to this haste on the part of State Department planners and diplomats.

Egyptian Premier, Nahas Pasha, called the play. On 8 October 1951, he presented the Egyptian parliament with a decree-law abrogating the Anglo-Egyptian condominium agreement on the Sudan of 1899 and the Anglo-Egyptian treaty of friendship of 1936. The Egyptian government had chosen this moment to assert their complete independence and demand the withdrawal of British protective forces from Egyptian territory—including the vitally important strategic point of the Suez Canal.

The immediate reaction from London was that the 1936 treaty was still valid and that it could not be unilaterally abrogated. L'Orient (Christian, Lebanese nationalist, neutral), in an article datelined London said London diplomatic observers had the impression that Britain, placed before the “immaculate of Cairo,” would be forced to call upon the powers who were pledged to take part in the defense of the eastern Mediterranean to use their influence to return the Cairo government to a path of reason.15

On 20 October, United States Secretary of State, Dean Acheson was reported by APF from Washington as saying the United States also felt that the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian treaty of alliance and the Anglo-Egyptian condominium agreement on the Sudan of 1899 should not be

15 Ibid. 9 October 1961
abrogated unilaterally. This act, he said, endangers normal international procedure. Acheson also noted that in the past months several new propositions for Anglo-Egyptian relations had been made, and that others would be submitted in the coming days. The United States, he said, felt that the new propositions to be presented soon would give a solid basis for an accord which would be satisfactory to all parties concerned as well as contributing to the defense of the whole free world, in which the Middle East plays such an important role.

Acheson let it be known that the propositions to which he referred were those which would be submitted by the United States, Britain, and France to countries interested in the defense of the eastern Mediterranean region.  

A report from London the same day, said these propositions had already been the object of exchanges of views between the ambassadors of Great Britain, France, Turkey and the United States in Cairo. In view of the Egyptian action of 8 October, the diplomats had decided to refer to their respective governments for instructions. The hope in London was that quick agreement would be reached among the four capitals so that the propositions could be communicated to Mahas Pasha at an opportune time.  

Beirut press reaction to all this activity surrounding the Cairo move was sympathetic to Egypt and either cautious or plainly hostile to the Western counter-moves. L'Orient (Christian, Lebanese nationalist, neutral), perhaps the least emotional of the Beirut journals, said in

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14 ibid., 11 October 1951 and Bulletin, v. 23, October 22, 1951, p. 647
15 ibid.
its editorial appearing 10 October that "the desire of the Nafdlist cabinet to liberate Egypt from the last vestiges of British imperialism cannot but elicit sympathy." But in the present circumstances, the writer said, the denunciation of the Anglo-Egyptian treaties seems less a truly revolutionary act than a clever move designed to have more results for the internal policy of Nafas Pasha than for external policy aims. "The abolition of the Anglo-Egyptian treaties is not a point of arrival. It is a turning which brutally places Egypt—and the Arab countries that support her—before a new horizon."

Commenting on Egypt's denunciation of the Anglo-Egyptian pact of 1936 the press of 11 October unanimously recognised the right of Egypt to total sovereignty and envisaged with sympathy the eventuality of its victory over British colonialism. Papers known for their support of Pan-Arab nationalism, enthusiastically hailed the initiative of Nafas Pasha. A great number of editorials appearing on 12 October, commenting on the support given by the United States and France to Great Britain after Egypt's denunciation of the 1936 treaty, were in accord in placing the responsibility for the tension, trouble and insecurity in the Near East on the Western powers.

18 Ibid, 10 October 1951
17 Ibid, 12 & 15 October 1951

Egypt meanwhile had begun to react to the talk of forthcoming Western proposals for eliciting Egyptian cooperation in plans for the defense of the Middle East—plans to shore-up the Western security position through a mutual enterprise—following the shaky situation created by Cairo's denunciation of the right of British military forces
to remain in control of the vital Suez Canal base, Egyptian Foreign Minister Mohammed Salaheddin, said in Cairo on 11 October that the question of Egypt's joining a regional defense organisation was premature since Egypt was concentrating on the realisation of its national rights. The Minister said he would be disposed to envisage such participation on the condition Britain withdrew all its forces from the Suez Canal Zone and from Sudan.\footnote{Ibid, 12 October 1961}

Still, on 15 October 1961 the new Allied proposals for the formation of a Middle East Defense Organisation were presented. In Cairo, Foreign Minister Salaheddin, in a statement on receipt of the MEDE proposals, said: "The Ambassador of Great Britain placed in my hands what he said were proposals to put an end to Anglo-Egyptian differences and concerning the defense of the Middle East. The three other ambassadors (U.S., French, Turkish) have supported the proposals concerning this defense."\footnote{Ibid, 14 October 1961}

The proposals said that if Egypt was willing to cooperate in an Allied Command Organisation, the United Kingdom would be willing to agree to the supersession of the 1956 treaty and to withdraw from Egypt such British forces as were not allocated to the Middle East Command by agreement with Egypt and the other powers. Egypt could participate by providing bases, communications, ports, etc., and designating officers for integration in the Allied Middle East Command headquarters staff.
The present British base in Egypt would be finally handed over to the Egyptians on the understanding it would become simultaneously an Allied base within the ANOC, with full Egyptian participation in running the base in peace and in war. The strength of the Allied force supplied by the participating nations to be stationed in Egypt in peacetime would be determined among the participating nations, including Egypt, from time to time as progress was made in building up the force of the ANOC. An air defense organization would be set up which would be responsible both to ANOC and the Egyptian government with both Allied and Egyptian forces, for the protection of Egypt and the Allied bases.20

If, on the other hand, the Egyptian government refused the plan of defense just submitted, the British government would hold to the terms of the 1936 treaty, and the other interested powers would be forced to follow through with their plans for the defense of the eastern Mediterranean without Egypt's cooperation.21

In Beirut, meanwhile, the Lebanese government too had been informed of the Allied proposals, at a meeting between Foreign Minister Charles Helou and the Ministers of Britain and Turkey and the Charges d'Affaires of the United States and France. No official declaration was made until 15 October when a Foreign Ministry statement said Helou had been presented with the text of the proposals made to Egypt before it was presented to the press. Since, the statement said, the proposals were submitted only to Egypt in the present stage of the situation, and since they are limited to general principles, "I (Helou) do not see the necessity of commenting on them for the moment."22

20 Bulletin, op. cit., v. 25, October 22, 1951
21 L'Orient, op. cit., 16 October 1951
While Helou was refusing to comment on the proposals in Beirut, the Egyptian government had already decided to reject the Allied offer. On the evening of 14 October, Egyptian Minister of Interior Faud Seragedin announced to parliament that "the propositions of the four-powers are rejected by the Egyptian government. "I am," he said, "are familiar with the new British propositions and the invitation to Egypt to participate in a defense organization for the Middle East. The Council of Ministers yesterday examined the invitation, and the propositions, and took a decision on this subject: The Council of Ministers unanimously decided to reject the propositions and the British invitation and to hold itself to the plan outlined by Mustapha Mahfuz Pasha, Prime Minister, in his speech before parliament on last October 8."22

Beirut press reaction to the Allied proposal for Egypt's participation in the defense of the Middle East was varied. In its editorial of 16 October, L'Orient said the West again had refused to go beneath the surface of the problem of their relations with the Arab countries. Is it surprising therefore, the writer asked, that they have been refused again?

The writer said, the defense of the Middle East has been considered everywhere but in an Arab capital. It took the denunciation of the Anglo-Egyptian treaties to bring the Three—discounting Turkey—to Cairo. But their offer was conceived in such a fashion that they could have only been rejected. The editorialist said that before inviting Egypt to join a collective defense engagement the powers should have at least given her some satisfaction in principle by first evacuating the British troops.

22 ibid.
Concerning the Arab world in general, the editorial said, the invitation to Egypt only to sit in a council of defense of the Middle East with the title of 'founding member' is the negation even of the existence of the Arab League. Also, unlike Turkey, Egypt does not feel the urgency of collective defense, and has, besides Sudan, a certain number of matters pending which it is up to the West to settle—notably Palestine.

"In these conditions and with the over-excited state of emotions which reigns in the Arab East, to participate in a system of collective defense can appear, to Cairo, like an almost free service rendered to the West.........Finally, it must be understood that the resistance of Arab opinion to Western alliances has two fundamental causes: the Palestine affair—and the material presence of Britain in three of its countries. The counterpart, 'collective defense', seems secondary .... to an exaggerated opinion."23

Other papers reacted thus: Telegraph and Al-Chafr (Muallim, Arab nationalist, opposition) were the most violent, Telegraph saying the four power plan constituted a very grave peril not only for Egypt but also for the Arab countries as a whole because it meant military occupation for all of the Middle East.

Beirut (Muallim, Arab nationalist, neutral) and Beirut-Massaa (Muallim, Arab nationalist, opposition), to the contrary, said perhaps the proposals were not perfect but that they offered to Egypt and to the other Arab countries the chance to take a new step on the road to

23 ibid.
liberation. Beyrouth asked Cairo leaders to reflect and consult their League partners before finally rejecting the Middle East defense plan. Beyrouth-Hassan said the four-power suggestions would lead definitely to the evacuation of Egypt, abdication of the 1956 treaty and the integration of the kingdom of Egypt in the system of common defense of the Middle East. 'That is logical and reassuring,' it said.

Al-Jayyid (Muallim, undefined, neutral) recognized that the four-power proposals neglected the most important problems to be settled, but said Arab leaders could all the same take considerable benefit from them if they knew how to maneuver well. Al-Nabar, (Christian, Lebanese nationalist, neutral), the first paper to comment on the rejection, said the decision revealed the lack of accord between the League states, because as Egypt rejected the Allied offer, Saudi Arabia officially proclaimed its adhesion to the Western camp.24

While the Lebanese press thus stated its opinions, the parliament, too, stated an opinion, but failed, in so many words, to say what it actually thought of the four-power proposals. At a three-hour session on 18 October, the House passed a motion in support of Egypt's current policy. It said: "The Lebanese parliament sends its brotherly greetings to Egypt, its government and its people, assures the Egyptian government of its support in the present situation and asks the Lebanese government to work with the other Arab governments to support the cause of Egypt."

24 Ibid, 17 October 1961
25 Ibid, 19 October 1961
The four-power proposal and Egypt's rejection caused considerable activity on the part of the government itself. Foreign Minister Helou immediately contacted Syrian Foreign Minister Faydi Atassi. It soon became apparent that neither the Lebanese nor Syrian government was ready to take an official stand regarding the MDRO proposals without consulting the other Arab League member states. It was reported on 19 October, in fact, that the two governments had proposed a meeting of the Arab League Political Committee but that Cairo had not yet responded to the suggestion. Also, the press began publishing reports of mediation by Lebanon and Syria in the Anglo-Egyptian conflict, but these were never officially confirmed. An editorial in L'Orient (Christian, Lebanese nationalist, neutral) on 27 October, reviewed a statement made by Syrian Foreign Minister Atassi a few days earlier, which generally summed up the stand of both the Syrian and Lebanese government leaders on the four-power proposals. "In Beirut," he had said, "as in Damascus, the four-power plan for the defense of the Middle East has visibly interested those in responsible positions. But there is Israel and a public opinion over-excited against the creators of Israel, and no government may act to pronounce itself, neither for nor against collective defense."26

On 26 October Foreign Minister Helou received the ministers of the four nations authors of the Middle East defense plan. The four diplomats said afterwards their visit was to present the Lebanese government with a note of the same sort as that presented to the Syrian government the day before. It was not known immediately whether the note was in the form of information or if it contained an offer. Helou declared

26 ibid, 27 October 1951
it was not possible to offer an opinion, or clarify the note until
it had been considered by the cabinet. This was due for 29 October.

The following day, the editorial in L'Orient supposed (it was
to prove correct) that the government had now been invited to define
its position as regards the Middle East defense plan. This being the
case, it said, Lebanon must now either refuse to collaborate and take
the risk of being defended despite itself, or accept, and negotiate
the conditions of its collaboration. The editorialist pointed out
also that it was not only Lebanon that had been placed in that
position. All the Arab League countries, it said, must have received
the same offer.

The same day, 27 October, Foreign Minister Helou received the
ministers of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Jordan in Beirut. Following
the meeting, Helou stated that the four had had an exchange of views on
the propositions of the four powers. He asked that journalists "refrain
from publishing rumors propagated by certain agencies concerning the
split of the countries of the Near East into zones of influence for
the great powers and the eventuality of their occupation." L'Orient
believed that the Lebanese government had asked the Arab League govern-
ments, by ordinary diplomatic means, to let it know their intentions
concerning the four-power plan. This was believed to be the reason
for the meeting with the envoys of the four Arab states. Helou also
talked with the Syrian minister to Beirut. The Lebanese government was
taking all possible steps to gather sufficient information to enable
it to make a decision on the four-power proposals. This information

27 ibid, 28 October 1981
included the attitudes of all the Arab League states and the possible repercussions from all directions which might result from Lebanon's adhesion to the plan. The Lebanese government certainly did not want to act independently, or differently, on this or any matter.

L'Orient said on 30 October that the Lebanese government would undoubtedly like, as usual, to align itself with the opinions of the Arab League. But there was no League meeting as yet in sight and indications were that the members were, in any case, split on the question. Saudi Arabia, the paper said, already had taken a stand favorable to the West. Iraq and Jordan were linked with Great Britain. Egypt, of course, had formally refused the four-power plan. Only Syria and Lebanon were left uncommitted. Helou had talked with Atassi for an hour and a half on 28 October at Chtaura, the paper reported, and later announced that the two governments would continue their consultations. No decision had been taken. Following a meeting of the parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee on 29 October, Helou said the government did not want to take a decision before proceeding with wider discussions, evidently meaning with all the Arab League countries. The cabinet on the same day decided to put off its discussion of the four-power offer.28

Prime Minister Abdullah Yafi and Foreign Minister Helou, on 30 October, attended a meeting of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, during which Helou made a statement clarifying the contents of the four-powers' communications to the Lebanese government. The declaration showed that the government had received two notes from the four powers.

28 ibid. 50 October 1951
The first informed the government of the propositions made to Egypt. The second told of Egypt’s rejection and of the decision of the four to organize the defense of the Middle East all the same, and of their desire to know the opinion of the Lebanese government concerning that intention.

As a result of the Foreign Minister’s declaration, the committee made these statements and recommendations: 1) The government knows nothing precise about the four-power plan; 2) The government does not know why the four want Lebanon’s opinion; 3) Lebanon must consider the opinion of Egypt; 4) The other Arab League countries, except Syria, which hasn’t taken a stand, are linked by treaties which must be taken into consideration; 5) The government must concern itself with the safeguarding of Lebanese independence. After the session, committee reporter Sab Salam told reporters “We have just heard the government’s opinion on the question of collective defense. After an exchange of views, we adjourned the meeting to a date to be set later. The committee and the government are in perfect agreement on the subject.”

Diplomatic activity remained considerable in the following days. On 31 October, Egypt sent out invitations for an inter-Arab conference to be held in Cairo on 2 or 3 November to examine the situation resulting from the Anglo-Egyptian conflict and the four-power plan. The Lebanese government was reportedly in favor of the meeting but continued to seek the Syrian response. The conference was not held on either 2 or 3 November as proposed, though it was reported the Lebanese government, in expressing its agreement to the meeting, had left the time and place to

29 ibid., 31 October 1961
Egypt. On 2 August, Premier Yafi's government again declared its stand, saying it would not take any decision before consulting the other League states. And, in any case, it would remain bound by the principles of the United Nations charter and the Arab League pact.

The positions of some of the non-governmental segments of the Lebanese political community had also been made public. Pierre Gemayel, leader of the Kataeb (Phalangist) party, perhaps most aptly described as a Lebanese nationalist, came out in support of an 'integral independance' for Lebanon. He expanded this point of view by saying that Lebanon, in no circumstance should accept the stationing of foreign troops on its territory. Commenting, L'Orient (Christian, Lebanese nationalist, neutral) said that the Kataeb would accept cooperation with the West on the condition that 1) no attempt be made on Lebanese independance, and 2) that Lebanese territory must not be defended except by the Lebanese.

The Lebanon-Arab nationalist Nida al-Koum party declared that Lebanon should make no choice between East and West. It ignored the collective defense problem because it saw it as nothing but an inadmissible attempt by the West to interfere and disturb the national sovereignty of the Arab countries. The Progressive Socialist party of Kamaal Jumblatt also maintained that Lebanon's position was not with either East or West, but neutral. 50

In Beirut, consultations continued among government and political leaders, former ministers, etc. It was reported that Foreign Minister

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50 ibid, 5 November 1961
Hailou, on the evening of 2 November, also met with the envoys in Beirut of the United States, United Kingdom, Turkey and France. The powers, it seemed, were not able to supply Hailou with the details of the four-power plan that he was seeking. He later pointed out, however, that he was not pressing the matter and that the 'Plan', to that time, was only in the form of a proposition in principle. During a cabinet meeting on 5 November, the Foreign Minister outlined in detail the meetings he had held with chiefs of foreign diplomatic missions during the past week. And, at a following meeting of the consultative council, a body of extra governmental political leaders and dignitaries representing other segments of the population, three points concerning Lebanon's stand towards the four-power plan were outlined. The group decided, in line with opinions expressed previously, that the plan must not involve any danger to the independence and sovereignty of Lebanon. Second, the fears of the Arab states of having Israel associated in the defense of the Middle East must be taken into consideration by the 'four'. Third, the four-power plan must not be initiated except in case of war.

The consultative council also charged Foreign Minister Hailou with the task of leading the chiefs of the Arab delegations to the forthcoming United Nations meeting in Paris in contacting the representatives of the four powers to convince them of the opportunity to present new propositions which might be accepted by Egypt. The desire was thus expressed by Lebanon's leaders that their country assume the role of mediator between Egypt and the four-powers—a role that was to prove not unique in the practice of Lebanese foreign policy. 31

31 Ibid, 6 November 1951
Nothing further happened before the Arab League ministers met in Paris. Their meeting, scheduled first for 8 November, was postponed until 10 November. The four-powers, however, acted again on that date. The ministers now had broader proposals to contend with.

The ministers of the four powers in Beirut presented Prime Minister Yafi, on 10 November, with the clarification of the four-power plan the Lebanese government had been asking. This clarification involved the proposal of a broader plan for a Middle East Defense Organization under which any Middle East state could join. The original offer, it will be recalled, was made only to Egypt. The four inviting powers published a statement of principles in which they reiterated the view that peace was 'indivisible', that the defense of the Middle East was 'vital to the free world' and could be 'secured only by the cooperation of all interested states'. The proposed Middle East Command, the statement said, was 'intended to be the center of cooperative efforts for the defense of the area as a whole; the achievement of peace and security in the area through the Middle East Command will bring it social and economic advancement'.

One of the command's functions would be to assist and support cooperating states in the defense of the area against external aggression. It would not 'interfere in problems and disputes arising within the area' and would not affect existing arrangements relating to such matters, notably the 1949 armistice agreements and the tripartite declaration of 25 May 1950. The MEC was to be an 'Integrated Allied Command, not a National Command'. The sponsoring states also left room for change in
the initial form of the proposal. Their belief was that through mutual understanding, the Arab states 'should evolve in the manner which will enable it most effectively to provide for the defense of the Middle East area as a whole'.

In Beirut, the government did nothing. In Paris, the chiefs of the Arab countries' delegations to the United Nations met and decided, according to Lebanese Foreign Minister Charles Helou, "to follow their common task to prevent any isolated action". The parliament on 15 November decided to discuss the four-power plan, while the government was reported seeking more clarification from the 'four' before stating its opinion. Helou, it was reported, had been asked to get clarification on what was meant by the phrase "international crisis" which was named in the latest proposals as a case in which Allied troops could be stationed in the Middle East. Premier Yafi declared the government's position was one of "waiting".

The opinion of the Beirut press meanwhile, was divided. One group, including primarily Bayrout (Muslim, Arab nationalist, neutral), Al-Nayat (Muslim, undetermined, neutral), Bayrout-Kassas (Muslim, Arab nationalist, opposition) did not reject, a priori, the principle of collaboration with the West, but subordinated such collaboration to the primary necessity of realizing Arab national aspirations. A second group, including Telegraph (Arab, opposition), Al-Chark (Muslim, Arab, opposition) and Hadaf (Muslim, Arab, Opposition) rejected the

proposals from their point of departure. Hedef said it was opposed to the plan because those who concluded the plan themselves were extending their influence over the sector and fighting the patriotic and liberal sentiments of the local peoples. Al-Chark and Telegraph denounced the plan simply, but vehemently, as another evidence of Western imperialism.

Al-Mabhar (Christian, Lebanese, neutral) and Al-Ismal (Christian, Lebanese, government), which were not opposed to the principle of an entente with the West, attempted to get to the bottom of the problem, keeping above all the wish to safeguard Lebanon’s dignity and sovereignty. Al Mabhar said the defense of the sector could not be compatible with the United Nations Charter unless it was organized by the states of the sector themselves and not by foreign blocs which sought to impose them. The newspapers were united in noting the solidarity of the Arab countries as shown by the strikes and manifestations of support for Egypt in the Arab capitals and saying it was thus clearly shown that the League states would not adhere to a common defense project unless it was approved by Egypt.33

The government continued its policy of waiting, and saying nothing. When the parliament met on 21 November to discuss the four-power proposals the government refused to state its position, preferring to attend the meeting as an auditor, since, it said, it still had not enough information on the problem to be considered. The House therefore, passed a motion for adjournment. It began to appear obvious, as perhaps it might have from the beginning, that the Lebanese government would

33 L'Orient, op.cit., 15 and 16 November 1961
make no direct, forthright statement for or against the Western plan. The country itself was undecided. However, as activity concerning the four-power proposals for a common defense organization for the Middle East began to simmer down in the Arab capitals, the third interested party in place for the defense of the Middle East— the party which the plans in question were designed to defend against—decided it was time to make itself heard.

On 21 November, the government of the USSR sent notes to the governments of the various Arab countries, stating its opinion of the proposed Western-conceived plans for the formation of a Middle East Command. Similar notes were forwarded to the governments of the four powers on 24 November. The note received by the United States State Department is Washington read, in part, as follows:

In connection with the message of the Governments of the United States of America, England, France and Turkey, to the Governments of Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Israel, and Transjordan regarding the creation of the so-called unified Middle Eastern Command, the Soviet Government considers it necessary to state the following to the Government of the United States of America:

As seen from the proposals contained in the mentioned message and equally in the declaration published November 10 by the four Governments on this question and transmitted to the Governments of the stated countries in the Near and Middle East, the Governments of the United States of America, England, France, and Turkey foresee: the subordination of the armed forces of the countries of the Near and Middle East to the so-called unified command; the disposition of foreign armed forces in the territories of Near and Middle East countries; putting at the disposal of the mentioned command by the Near and Middle East countries of military bases, communications, ports, and other constructions; the establishment of a connection between this command and the Atlantic bloc organization.

The proposals and declarations of the four governments give evidence that plans of the organization of a so-called Middle East Command represent nothing other than
an attempt to draw the countries of the Near and Middle East into military undertakings being realized by the aggressive Atlantic bloc. In this connection certain of the four government initiators of the creation of the Middle East Command who maintain their troops and military bases in the Near Eastern countries already are strengthening their military forces presently there.....

If speaking of the threat to the independence and sovereignty of these countries, then such a threat rises exactly from the countries initiators of the organization plan for the creation of the Middle East Command who continue unwilling to reconcile themselves with the idea that the peoples of the Near and Middle East, as all other sovereign peoples, have unalienable rights to conduct their own independent national policy free from any kind of external pressure.

The Government of the USSR considers it necessary to direct the attention of the United States of America to the fact that it cannot pass by these new aggressive plans expressed in the creation of the Middle East Command in an area situated not far from the borders of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Government considers it necessary also to state that the responsibility for the situation which can arise as a result of this will rest with the Government of the United States of America and other initiators of the creation of the mentioned command.

It took the United States government nearly a month to formulate a reply. It finally was communicated to the Soviet government on 18 December 1951:

The Government of the United States has given careful consideration to the note of the Government of the USSR of November 24 concerning the proposed establishment of Middle East Command.

It is apparent that the Soviet Union has placed a completely erroneous interpretation upon the Middle East Command and has chosen to ignore the clearly stated purposes and principles upon which the Middle East Command will be founded.

The allegation of the Soviet Union that the Middle East Command is aggressive in intent is utterly without foundation. On the contrary, the statement of principles published by the United Kingdom, France, Turkey, and the United States on November 10, made it abundantly clear that the Middle East Command is designed (1) to create a voluntary cooperative defense organization to provide for the security of the Middle East area as a whole in the event that that area should become
a target for outside aggression, and (2) to assist the states in the area to preserve and strengthen their independence and freedom so that their economic well-being and social institutions can develop in an atmosphere unclouded by fear for their security.

The Middle East Command proposals and principles are based upon the inherent right of self-defense set forth in article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations. Such self-defense is facilitated by cooperative measures like the Middle East Command. The need for these cooperative measures arises from the concern over present tensions in the world situation which have been created by the Soviet Union's aggressive actions. Soviet efforts externally and internally at subversion against the states of the Middle East do not contribute to lessening these tensions....

The Middle East Command proposals and principles, based on the concept that these states choosing to participate in the Command will do so voluntarily as equal members, have been placed before the governments of the sovereign and independent Middle East states for their study and evaluation in the light of their own national interests. The decisions as to whether they will elect to participate in the Command and freely accept the benefits and responsibilities of such participation belongs to these states alone and not the Soviet government. The recent Soviet threats to these states warning against their participation in the Middle East Command constitute interference in the affairs of these countries. The United States Government believes, as the Soviet Government professes to do, that the peoples of the Middle East have the right to conduct their national policies 'free from any kind of external pressure'. The government of the USSR bears the responsibility for the present situation, not those states which, either individually or collectively under the Charter of the United Nations, take legitimate measures of self-defense in the interest of their own security and of international peace.34

Although the Soviet note of 21 November did not elicit a reply from the Lebanese government, the Beirut press reacted, as usual with varied opinions. To cite two examples, there were the comments of Al-Awâl (Christian, Lebanese, government), spokesman for the Kataeb party, and Telegraphe (Muslim, Arab, opposition), giving the point of view of the more extreme anti-Western segment of political opinion. Al-Awâl said, 34

For the complete texts of these notes, see Bulletin, op.cit. v. 25 December 51, 1961
'We had no need of an official Soviet note to know the opinion of the
Soviet Union on common defense'. Nevertheless we receive this
document with satisfaction because we hope it will incite the Four to
deny the affirmations and accusations it contains. We also hope that
it will permit us to observe a neutrality from which we would not want
to diverge.'

Telegram, on the other hand, said the Soviet note constituted
'sufficient guarantee' for peace in the East and threw a new light on
the wish of the USSR to collaborate with the Arab peoples.35

Meanwhile, the Foreign Ministers of the Arab states continued
their discussions in Paris on the 'common action' they should take with
regard to the four-power proposals. On 21 November, L'Orient (Christian
Lebanese, neutral) reported the news from Paris as being less encouraging.
The tendency, it said, was to accept the opening of negotiations with
the West but that developments in Egypt prevented Cairo from being
flexible, and the other Arab League countries could not break their
solidarity with Egypt. In Beirut, there continued to be considerable
internal political pressure on Prime Minister Yafi to state his govern-
ment's position on the Western-sponsored common defense plans for the
Middle East. Yafi replied on one instance that if it depended on
Lebanon alone, the government would have already stated its position.
But, he said, the proposition had been put to all the countries of the
Arab League.

At a meeting of the parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee on
24 November, Yafi was again asked why he had not taken a definite position.

35 L'Orient, op.cit., 26 November 1961
It was pointed out to him that Saudi Arabia and Syria had already stated that they would not accept to discuss the plan with the four powers before a settlement was reached between Egypt and the United Kingdom. The Prime Minister was under strong fire from some deputies who demanded to know why the government maintained its policy of waiting. The committee debate however showed that Yafi was not alone in his policy. Three lines of opinion concerning the proper action to be taken by the government were evidenced: 1) To keep its neutrality and reject the plan; 2) to open negotiations with the West; or, 3) to wait. 56

The safest way was that adopted by the Yafi government and nothing was done. The Paris meeting of the Arab League Foreign Ministers also came to naught since Egypt would not deviate from its original refusal of the common defense plan, and for various reasons all of the other Arab countries could not accept a policy as hostile to the West as that of the Cairo government. All the diplomatic activity during the month following Egypt's abrogation of the treaties with Great Britain came to naught. And the mutual accusations of 'aggression' by the United States and the Soviet Union proved to be wasted breath.

Where Lebanon and the United States—more accurately the West as a whole—are concerned, this episode in their relations might be best described as one of frustration. The United States, on the one hand, was forced by the insecurity caused in the British strategic position in the Middle East due to Egypt's sudden nationalistic move to commit itself physically in the Arab world—something it was not quite ready to do. Lebanon, although on the whole not unfriendly to the West in principle,

56 ibid., 25 November 1961
was governed both by internal public opinion split as to the degree of cooperation Lebanon should show to the West, and by a natural desire not to alienate the affections of her fellow Arab neighbors.

Lebanon's position at this time with regard to the West can not be separated from the whole of the Arab position. Summing up the chapter in Western-Arab relations marked by the MRDO proposals and the reaction to them, John C. Campbell, in his book entitled "Defence of the Middle East", puts the situation in this light:

"The most obvious miscalculation," he says, "concerned the attitude of Egypt. The Western powers made the proposal in terms they thought reasonable, but if they had correctly gauged the Egyptian mood they would have hardly thought it worth while to make it at all. Egyptian nationalism made it virtually impossible for a government in Cairo, whether of the king's favorites or of the Wafd or of General Naguib, to accept anything but the evacuation of British troops from Suez, certainly not a proposal which looked like a plan to keep them there under an 'Allied' label. The miscalculation in Egypt, moreover, practically eliminated the chance of winning over any other Arab states to military cooperation with the West. Iraq was favorably inclined toward just such an arrangement, to substitute a multilateral undertaking for the existing bilateral treaty under which Britain held two bases in Iraq. Lebanon was generally sympathetic to the Western powers, as was Ibn Saud. Syria, though divided on the issue, and Jordan, closely tied to Britain by treaty and subsidy, might well have gone along. But none of them could be expected to defy Egypt on a decision taken against
the 'imperialists' in the name of nationalism and the sacred sovereignty of an Arab state." 57

Thus MEGO, as an example of a Western policy maneuver with regard to the Arab countries, was a failure. For the purposes of our subject, however, it would not be fair to say, without qualification, that United States political policy with regard to Lebanon in the same period ended at exactly the same sort of loggerheads. First, it is apparent that it was not the idea of the United States to spring the concept of mutual defense on the Arab countries as early as October 1961. It went along with the consensus of its two major allies, with the additional prompting of Turkey, when Britain's strategic position in the Middle East took a turn for the worse. It was not as if, in the eyes of the Arabs, the United States by itself represented the ogre from the West.

Lebanon for its part showed during this period that it was not dead set against Western policy approaches—speaking, that is, in terms of the government, representing the whole population, and not of the extremist elements. Lebanon's position was simply that it had no desire to injure its economic and cultural ties with the West for the sake of carrying the tune of the more violent Arab nationalists. Neither, however, did it wish to endanger its position as "gateway to the East" by overruling the objections of its fellow Arab countries to the untimely Western policy moves.

Where the United States and Lebanon alone are concerned then, the broad Western failure did not block or effectively disrupt the route of future political interchanges.

57 Campbell, John C., "Defense of the Middle East", Harper & Brothers New York, 1966, p. 48
Part 5

THE VISIT OF U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE DULLES TO THE MIDDLE EAST

The year 1952 did not bring any noticeable change in the overall political scene of Arab-Western relations. The only high-level exchanges that did take place were between British and Egyptian negotiators over the question of British evacuation of the Suez base now that the treaty governing the stationing of British troops in Egypt had been abrogated. These negotiations came to naught, but this in itself—the Egyptian-British differences—was to be the most significant determinant of the role of the United States in the Middle East and thus the reaction to it. Lebanon did not budge from its Arab stand, reacting to Arab-Western exchanges as an ideal member of the Arab League and giving no cause for worry to either side represented in the National Pact.

If the overall political scene did not markedly change, the actors did. In Egypt, July 1952 brought a revolution, sparked by a group of young army officers, against internal government corruption. What was even more important about the Egyptian revolution in terms of inter-Arab and Arab-Western relations was that it carried the seeds that were to sprout into an effective leadership of the whole Arab nationalist movement. Heading the revolutionary government was General Naguib, while directing the activity from behind was a young colonel, Gamal Abdul Nasser, later to become the President of Egypt and the idol of the nationalist-minded Arab masses throughout the Arab world.
In Lebanon, a change of government also took place with the election of a new president. The election of Camille Chamoun to take the place of Fuad Shukri was not revolutionary in the sense of the change which took place in Egypt, although Chamoun came in on a slate of promises for reform in administration. This change in Lebanese presidents is important in that Chamoun was to play a key role in the marked turn of Lebanese–United States relations which followed sometime later, and, in turn, the revolt in his country.

A change in actors for the United States' parts came with the November 1952 presidential elections and the change in administration that followed the next January. President Dwight D. Eisenhower took the place of President Harry S. Truman, and brought with him as Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles. A change of administration in the United States need not signify any major policy change, and in fact in terms of Middle Eastern, or more specifically, Lebanese policy, did not. Such a change however would naturally bring about some changes in emphasis and tactics, if not in strategy. And certainly the personal character of the individual is always a major factor in politics, even on the international level.

Thus the year 1952 passed without any major changes in the stand of relations between the West and the Middle East, or the United States and Lebanon. In the case of Lebanon and the United States, however, an opening was made by the United States for the possibility of increased relations in the future by the simple act of elevating the status of its diplomatic representation in Lebanon from that of a legation to a
At this juncture it would be interesting, especially since we
have been discussing actors in the political scene, to note the attitude
concerning Western-Near Eastern relations of Lebanon's most renowned
scholar and statesman, Dr. Nazir Malik, later to become President
Chamoun's Foreign Minister.

In a magazine article published in January 1952, Malik rather
sadly points out his opinion that it was the Western world which was
responsible for the situation in the Near East, on every level. This
Western educated, Western oriented gentleman, then Lebanon's permanent
United Nations representative, enumerated in his article the points on
which the Western actions with regard to the Near East might be criticized.
In the summary of his thoughts, though, is shown his deep feeling of
sympathy for the West, and his hope that the West and the Near East would
reunite:

The Western world today is disturbed by the challenge of
Communism. But this is nothing; for communism will pass away,
and so will 'Heaven and earth!', but the vision and world of
the Near East will never pass away. In fact, communism with
its radical immaturity is a challenge only because the trans-
scendental challenge of the Near East has long ago overcome the
West and will never let it go. Only as the West comes to the
'cradle of its civilization, recognizing in all responsibility,
truth and love the relics of its origins; and only as the Near
East regains a glimpse of its own lost transcendent visions,
casting aside all doubt, negativity and childishness and
crushing hands with all those who first drank from the well of
its life; only as these two movements reach for and meet each
other can peace and righteousness come, not only to the Near
East, but to the whole world. 32

Dr. Malik then hints that though the West is to be reprimanded for
its activity in the Near East, the results of which were evidenced in the

32 Malik, Charles E., "Near East: the search for truth."
Foreign Affairs, v. 30, pp. 221-264, January 1952

33 Bulletin, op.cit., v. 27, September 9, 1952, p. 370
current relationship between the two, it is not to be abandoned, since, in the long run, the Near Eastern heritage of the West will lead it to follow the proper track.

As we have pointed out, the only important exchanges that took place between the Arabs and the West during that period were between the British and the Egyptians, and these surely did not indicate that either side was aware of the wisdom of Malik's remarks.

The next high-level political move by the United States government with regard to the Middle East, and Lebanon, was to come in the form of an official visit by the new Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, to the Middle East in May 1955. Dulles announced his forthcoming trip as early as March. On 9 March, in a press conference at the United Nations headquarters in New York, he included the news of his trip in a broad and noncommittal statement of the U.S. attitude and interest in the area. Similarities may be noted between Dulles' opening remarks and those made by Dr. Malik in his magazine article of the previous year.

"President Eisenhower," Dulles said, "is keenly aware of the importance of the Near East and South Asia. The peoples of that part of the world have a rich culture on which we of the United States have largely drawn. The President, therefore, asked me to go personally to the Near East and South Asia to show our friendship for the governments and peoples of these areas.

"I hope to find it possible to leave the United States in May and spend as much time as my schedule will permit in the area. Final
details of the trip," he said, "will be announced later."

The Secretary continued: "I should like to mention, however, the underlying approach which will guide me during this trip. I am going to get first-hand information. I shall listen carefully to what I am told and consider the problems presented to me with utmost sympathy. I shall not bring with me any specific plan or program, nor do I expect to ask the governments I visit for any decision. I am going to renew old friendships and, I hope, make new ones.

"Needless to say, I am looking forward to this trip with keen anticipation. I shall be the first Secretary of State to visit these countries. I look upon this trip as an opportunity to develop close relations between the United States and these friendly nations."

Around the beginning of May it was announced that Dulles, accompanied by Mutual Security Director Harold Stassen, would arrive in Beirut on 15 May for a two-day visit. The news reports again pointed out that the Secretary would propose no plan nor demand any engagement from the leaders of the Middle East countries he would visit. His principal task would be to hear these leaders.

However, Beirut's Al-Awal (Christian, Lebanese, Government), spokesman for the Kataeb party, hinted that Dulles had other reasons for his trip than just listening. Looking forward to Dulles' forthcoming Middle East visit, the newspaper said on 5 May that Anglo-Egyptian negotiations were evolving in a fashion which might make Dulles' visit without object. The Secretary of State, the paper said, given the virtual accord between the two parties, would have no motive

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for interference..."the essential thing for a certain policy."

"Up to now," said Al-jami, "the Arab states have succeeded in preventing common defense in its American form. The Arab interests find themselves in perfect agreement with the British interests; because we do not only mean to say that British policy put a check on the defense project.

"In fact, the common defense no longer has its reason for being since there will be a two-party defense; English and Egyptian." 41

Whether the paper was right in its interpretation of the reason for Dulles' coming visit or not is not known. It was, however, mistaken in its prediction of a quick Anglo-Egyptian agreement, thus obviating the need for further American efforts to organize a collective defense system for the Middle East. That agreement was to come over a year later and have just the opposite result. The paper's comments do, however, clearly show that the leadership of the segment of the Lebanese population the paper represents, Christian and usually pro-West, were themselves not interested in entering any collective defense system as long as the British, or someone else, would take care of it without involving them.

In Washington, meanwhile, newly appointed Lebanese ambassador to the United States Charles Kalik on 4 May, presented his credentials to President Eisenhower. The President's comments at this meeting are interesting in that they clearly indicate the purpose United States foreign policy had in mind for Lebanon—a purpose not alien to the 'traditional' role of neutral and mediator that circumstances had

forced on that country and its politicians.

President Eisenhower told Malik, "in these troubled times, the conception and the function of Lebanon have acquired an increasingly extensive significance and value. There, where there exist geographic and cultural differences, intentions may be sometimes misunderstood and sincerity placed in doubt." But Lebanon, "in that it is a traditional bridge between the West and the East, lessens these distances through time and spirit, and brings closer a fruitful synthesis between these two parts of the world."

Dr. Malik, in his reply, was speaking perhaps for the Western-oriented and hopeful—the politically moderate portion of the Lebanese population. "We believe," he said, "that the United States can aid the Arab world to resolve its problems. The friendship which we seek is based on justice, equity, mutual respect and the cult of truth which has marked the history of the United States. A great epoch could open itself under such auspices, not only in that which concerns relations between Lebanon and America, but also for the development of the Middle East."42

The following day, the President outlined broad American policy in the Middle East in his annual budget message to Congress. Eisenhower asked a 475 million dollar appropriation for the Middle East—to better living conditions, help people help themselves towards liberty and democracy, and thus help maintain the United States' own defense and security.

42 ibid, 5 May 1953
Speaking in more current terms, Egyptian Ambassador to Washington, Ahmed Hussein, also in Washington, said on 5 May that the Egyptian government hoped the United States would exercise a mediating as effective as that which permitted the accord between the United Kingdom and Egypt on the Sudan—to obtain a rapid evacuation of Britain from the Suez Canal zone. He said this was one of the major foreign policy problems which Egyptian leaders would study with Dulles while he was in Cairo on his forthcoming Middle East trip.

Hussein, probably thinking along the lines of "Al-Anal's writer concerning the reason for Dulles' visit, said British evacuation of the Suez was the primary condition to any agreement Egypt might come to on the defense of the Middle East. And, this evacuation, he said, must precede all negotiations destined to re-establish harmony and stability in the Middle East, notably concerning the relations between Israel and her Arab neighbors.

"Under the form presented by the Western Powers," Hussein said, "the creation of a Middle East Command was rejected. It would be when British evacuation of the Suez Canal zone was an accomplished fact that Egypt could negotiate its participation in a system for the defense of the Middle East. Egypt is decided to take the measures which will keep her from being the victim of another occupation."45

Meanwhile the foreign ministers of the states of the Arab League were preparing to meet in Cairo to prepare a common list of claims to

45 Ibid., 8 May 1955, (APF report)
be presented to the United States Secretary of State during his unprecedent visit. The three main points reportedly would be: the unconditional evacuation of Suez; Arab insistence on reinforcement of the inter-Arab security pact rather than any other defense arrangement; and, the question of Israel. Foreign Minister George Hekia was to represent Lebanon at the meeting.\textsuperscript{44}

Before leaving for Cairo, Hekia told Beirut newspaper \textit{Al-Jarida} (Christian, Lebanese, neutral), he would propose to the conference, in the name of Lebanon, that the Arab countries be entirely frank in speaking to Dulles of their problems. Hekia felt that among the questions to be brought up, the first must be that of the evacuation of Suez. "Lebanon," he said, "supports Egypt completely. We must tell Dulles that we will not accept to discuss common defense before Egypt obtains satisfaction. We must publicly proclaim," he continued, "that the Arabs are the only ones responsible for the defense of this region."

The Foreign Minister followed the same track in briefing the parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee on the problems to be studied in Cairo and the policy to be followed with regard to each. There could be no collaboration between the Arabs and the West, Hekia said, unless Egypt's cause was achieved. He repeated that defense of the Arab world was entirely a job for the Arabs. He added that the Arabs could defend themselves easily if given the necessary arms. Concerning American arms aid to the Middle East, the Foreign Minister told the parliamentary committee that the Middle Eastern countries would point out to Dulles that there was discrimination, at their expense, in the distribution of United States

\textsuperscript{44} \textit{Ibid.,} May 8, 1955
financial aid. Israel, he said, benefits itself from a sum equal to that allotted to all the Arab countries together. The Arabs would demand that the aid be re-divided in proportion to the number of inhabitants of each country.45

The Beirut press in general, attached a great deal of importance to the Arab League ministers' meeting in Cairo. The papers emphasized, as did Hakim, that the Arab countries would unite to demand from Dallas the backing of the United States for the execution of the United Nations decisions on Palestine and that the United Nations position regarding the Arab-Israeli frontiers be reconsidered. The consensus was that the Arabs were not ready to recognize the frontiers set after the last truce. The papers also felt the foreign ministers in Cairo should consider, in the light of Dallas' coming visit, their stand on the refugee problem, including the questions of repatriation and financial aid for refugees.

The newspaper Beyrouth (Musulim, Arab, neutral) also emphasized the fact that the questions of the Middle East defense and United States aid to the Arab countries would be discussed in Cairo. The paper was sure that the League states were in agreement to back Egypt, estimating that there was no reason to foresee any sort of a rapprochement between the West and the Near East before the Egyptian aspirations were realized.

And, questioned by one paper directly about the forthcoming visit of Dallas to Lebanon, Foreign Minister Hakim said: "We have no precise idea of the propositions the American Secretary of State will make us; but we are confident that we will reach favorable results due to the evolution of American policy since the Republicans came to power."46

45 ibid., 3 May 1965
46 ibid., 3 May 1965
The government, while maintaining its policy of solidarity with the broad Arab point of view regarding issues of controversy between the United States and the Arab League governments, seemingly was hopeful that Dulles would offer some means to allow Lebanon to profit from America's generosity without suffering a consequent estrangement with any of its brother Arab governments, or criticism from the more extreme Arab nationalist, anti-imperialist, non-alignment factions operating on the political stage within the country.

Thus, as Secretary Dulles prepared to leave the United States for his 'fact finding' trip to the Middle East, the Arab foreign policy chiefs were preparing a coordinated policy in the face of any proposals Dulles might have to make concerning issues of interest to both sides (the conference of Arab League foreign ministers on 9 May promised "total support" for the efforts of Egypt's revolutionary leader General Naguib relative to the Suez evacuation question) and the Lebanese government independently hoped for the best in future relations with the United States. Dulles himself, however, repeated immediately before leaving Washington on 10 May that his mission was not to make offers, but only to listen and learn.

Also, in Washington, Lebanon's Ambassador to the United States, Charles Malik, took the occasion of Dulles' departure for the Middle East and the resulting interest in the area by the American press—and thus the people—to point out in a speech, some of the failings of United States policy in the Middle East and suggest some possible ways to correct.
the unfortunate situation that had resulted. He first referred to the reason behind American interest in his part of the world, quoting a statement made by General Eisenhower before he was elected President. Eisenhower had said: "There is no region in the world that is more strategically important for the Western World than the Near East."

Malik continued by saying that Secretary Dulles had said a few days before (the speech was made on 11 May) that 'Western, and even American prestige in this area has been deteriorating steadily.'

The Lebanese envoy outlined six factors having something to do with this situation: 1) Rivalries among Western powers with respect to the Near East; 2) Material and moral weakening of the Western world as a result both of two world wars and of the setting in of certain processes of spiritual decay; 3) A certain degree of equivocation on the part of the Western world whereby certain values are conceived of as good for home consumption but not for export—"As a result the West has tended to treat the Near East not as an end in itself, worthy of respect in its own right, but as a means, an instrument, a region on a map, a general area, a stopping-station on the caravan route to the Orient;" 4) The waver, the indecision, the lack of firmness, the lack of long-range planning in Western policy with regard to the Near East; 5) British and American policy with respect to Palestine; 6) Into this situation...Communist ideology moved with might and main.

Malik saw no simple way out of the situation since the process of estrangement had gone far. The Near East situation, he said, had become so complicated that it was not likely to be settled positively and permanently except within the context of a total world settlement.
He did not, however, suggest that nothing be done about the Near Eastern situation until the issue of communism had been solved.

"The proof that something can and should be done is the fact that today the Honorable Secretary of State is taking a trip to the Near East," Malik said.

It was then that the Ambassador stated his ideas as to what should be done. First, he said, the Western powers must coordinate their high policies, and this coordination must percolate to their representatives in the field. Second, with regard to Egypt, he said the Nasser revolution was one of the most significant events in recent years in the Near East. There was more hope "today" he said, about the whole Near East picture as a result of Nasser's intervention than there had been for decades, and he pointed out that a healthy realism seemed to determine the attitude of the present regime. "I believe a golden opportunity opens up before the West which should not be missed," Malik said. "The present negotiations between the United Kingdom and Egypt are crucial. Egypt is fully entitled to complete sovereignty over her entire territory. Every Arab state supports Egypt to the hilt in her demands. The United States can significantly help in this impasse, for here we have an acid test of far-sighted statesmanship."

Malik made two general observations on the defense of the Middle East. "The Western world," he said, "is anxious that the Near East be defended in an emergency. Now among themselves, the Arab states have devised an Arab defensive security pact. This is the core around which any defensive system must be built. The Western world must adapt its
ideas to the Arabs' own view of how they want to be defended." He continued: "The enlisting of the cooperation of the Arab countries involves both military and political factors. On the military side, these countries must be armed so as to enable them to feel that they can defend themselves, whoever attacks them. On the political side, the Arab world must feel that the West intends this time to deal with it justly with respect to Israel; otherwise the Arabs cannot willingly and wholeheartedly throw their lot with the Western world."

Concerning the Palestine situation, Dr. Malik estimated that it would be on the hands of the governments concerned for decades and perhaps generations to come. He said nobody would forget that that unhappy situation is a function of the will of the Western world, especially of the United Kingdom and the United States. However, the Ambassador said there were five things that could be done: 1) Initiate a much stronger commitment than the Tripartite declaration to disabuse the Arabs of their conviction of "Jewish" expansionist aims; 2) Solve the refugee problem and provide for adequate compensation; 3) the United States must cease to view the Near East through the eyes of a powerful small minority; 4) The West must urge Israel to perform significant acts of restitution to the Arabs; and, 5) The West, under United States leadership must lift the question of Jerusalem above the expediency and politics and help honor the United Nations decision willing Jerusalem a corpus separatum.

Concerning other aspects of the deteriorating situation between the West and the Arabs Malik said, for one thing, that foreign corporations must radically change their policies—be satisfied with less profits and equalize their practices of employment of foreigners and locals. And he
said economic help should be extended. Specifically Point IV should be extended and enlarged.47

In Beirut, politicians and government leaders were active. The Foreign Ministry was kept busy preparing a dossier of subjects to be discussed with Dulles, presumably covering the same points considered by the Arab League foreign ministers in Cairo. It was reported that a meeting of Lebanese leaders both in and out of politics would meet to discuss the decisions taken in Cairo regarding defense, among which was the proposition that the defense of the Middle East is up to the countries of the area and the Arab League collective security pact is the organization to perform it. And, United States Ambassador Harold Minor made it known that Dulles would bring up the subject of common defense of the Middle East during his talks with Lebanese leaders.

While some discussed others berated. The more radical newspapers of course, did their utmost to make the atmosphere for Dulles' visit unfriendly in order that the government would be less-inclined to see its way clear to reacting favorably to whatever suggestion for cooperation Dulles might present. From the political leaders personally, the sharpest outcry against the American policy in the Arab world came from Progressive Socialist Party leader Kamal Jumblatt. At a press conference held 14 May, Jumblatt, an Arab nationalist whose views are tempered by a Lebanese feeling, reproached American diplomacy for being without logical foundation and for being aimed at a consolidation of Western imperialism under its diverse forms. Jumblatt even denied to the Arab governments, in general, the right to speak in the name of the Arab peoples.48

48 L'Orient, op. cit., 15 May 1965
It must not be assumed from these examples that the entire Lebanese public was opposed in opinion either to Dulles' visit or the policy he was considered likely to advocate. The friendly and the curious, however, are usually the least outspoken.

The day before Dulles was to arrive in Beirut, the Foreign Affairs Committee of parliament met with Foreign Minister Makki and heard the results of the Cairo session from which he had just returned. The members studied the note prepared for presentation to Dulles by the Lebanese government. Points:

1) Egyptian affair — Lebanon supports Egypt in its fight for independence and asks the United States to intervene directly to see that the evacuation of Egyptian territory takes place without conditions.

2) Palestine — Lebanon does not cease to claim, as an equitable solution of the Palestine problem, the application of the United Nations resolutions concerning the partition plan, the repatriation and indemnification of the refugees. Also, it protests against the aid which America does not cease to provide to Israel which permits her to develop and arm herself.

3) Peace with Israel — Lebanon, in accord with its partners of the League, rejects any project of peace with Israel, even if that state accepts application of the United Nations resolutions.

4) Common defense plan — Lebanon will conform to decisions taken by the Arab League in this matter.

5) Financial aid — The note asked the United States to furnish more substantial technical and financial aid to the Arab countries in general, and Lebanon in particular. It made clear that Lebanon would not accept that aid unless it were unconditional.
6) Finally the note pointed out the friendly lines which unite the Lebanese and American peoples — Lebanon desires the reinforcement of these lines and hopes that the United States will follow, on the international scene, a policy as liberal and humane as it does internally.

In conclusion, the note confirmed that Lebanon professed a great admiration for President Eisenhower and formulated the wish that he show himself understanding as regards the Middle East, as he promised in his first presidential message ......

Still, the more radical political elements in the country were stirring up resentment against Dallas. As the Foreign Affairs Committee studied the government note, a meeting was held of representatives of several political parties and other associations and syndicates. This group, including leaders of Jumblatt’s FSP and the Muslim-Arab nationalist Najadeh party, decided to call a general strike for the following day, when Dallas was to arrive, in protest against his country’s policies with regard to the Arab world. A statement issued after the meeting, signed by the FSP, Najadeh, a group called the National Committee and different syndicates and community organizations, denounced any effort towards peace with Israel and, above all, any move to create a Middle East defense organization combining Western and Arab efforts.49

The United States Secretary of State arrived as scheduled, on 16 May, in Beirut. In a communiqué issued upon his arrival, Dallas said, "We are convinced that friendly Lebanese-American relations will be reinforced by the direct exchanges of view which we will have with

49 Ibid., 16 May 1953
President Chamoun and the leaders of the country." A peaceful student demonstration was held to protest the possibility of peace with Israel and plans for the common defense of the Middle East. Premier Sabi Salim told the demonstrators that his government was of the same mind as they.

As a whole, the Beirut press of 16 May showed hostility in principle to any proposition Dulles might make. Some, however, felt the Lebanese-United States conversations could be facilitated by a radical change in United States policy in the Mideast. Most of the newspapers reviewed in Orient renewed their denunciations of the United States for its policy concerning Israel, including the refugee problem. The United States was awarded the complete responsibility for the misfortunes and unhappiness of the Arabs. However, while some papers were satisfied with calling names and placing blame, others saw certain indications that the United States wanted to repair, at least partially, its faults. El-Jom (Muslim, Arab, opposition) wished Dulles would try to get a clear idea of the Near Eastern questions and carry through to re-establish the confidence of the Arabs in his country by repairing the damage they had suffered from ex-President Truman and the Democratic party.

El-Aam (Christian, Lebanese, government) wished Dulles welcome. The paper noted that common defense, Point IV agreements, the status of American companies in Lebanon, etc., would be discussed and said all these questions must be regulated with justice and equity. Also, it said, it was necessary that Lebanon's independence be safeguarded integrally and that Lebanon have no discriminatory treatment to complain of. *It is in

50 ibid., 17 May 1955
this hope," the newspaper said, "that we would like to believe that Lebanese-American friendship would be more enforced after the visit of Mr. Dulles...."

Beirut (Muslim, Arab, neutral) also was opposed to Dulles being received with hostility—which it said would have no concrete result. It is time, the paper's editorialist wrote, that we be realistic and discuss clearly and logically all the problems outstanding with the United States. The Beirut writer also commented that the Arabs needed the West, neutrality was an illusion, and Lebanon was called upon to play a prime role in such a realistic and constructive policy.51

The United States Secretary of State continued to carry out his meetings with the Lebanese President and government leaders. Although nothing was published concerning the exchanges that took place during these meetings, there was obviously no commitment or change in attitude registered by either side. Dulles was presented with the prepared Lebanese memorandum, made public the day before his arrival, registering a friendly but aloof attitude and stating a policy in accordance with the Arab League states. There is no indication that either the President or any other Lebanese government representative went beyond this framework. For his part, Dulles listened to the viewpoints expressed, as he had come to do, presented President Chamon with a personal note from President Eisenhower, and said before leaving Beirut: "In Lebanon, where the East and West meet, we have found a comprehension of the two aspects of the problem." 52

51 ibid., 17 May 1955
52 ibid., 18 May 1955
Dulles and Stassen returned to the United States from their Middle East trip on 29 May 1955. In his statement on return, the Secretary of State noted some of the problems facing American policy in the Middle East. He said that although the countries he visited had political freedom, they did not as yet have strength and well-being. They were, he said, preoccupied by quarrels and fears which deny them tranquillity and endanger their national existence. "They want and need the friendly inspiration and guidance we once provided. But they feel that, in our maturity, we have grown materialistic at the expense of idealism and justice, and that our friendship has grown cold."

The Secretary mentioned the Suez base dispute between Egypt and Britain, the uneasy armistice and economic warfare between Israel and the Arab states and the problem of Arab refugees, among others, as being typical of conditions creating fear, bitterness and weakness in the area and opening the way for Communist gains. Communism, Dulles said, strives frantically to profit from these conditions at United States' expense. Dulles said everywhere he had been on his trip it was the Communists who sought to disrupt the mission and prevent it from achieving its intended purpose. These efforts failed, however, Dulles said, and the leaders of the countries he visited "were abundantly hospitable, and they talked with us as those who could be trusted."

"We return," Dulles said, "with refreshed ties with our valiant allies, Greece and Turkey, and with information as to other areas and their problems which can be of great importance to the United States. We of the State Department will be better qualified to advise President Eisenhower in relation to foreign policy, and Mr. Stassen, Director of
Mutual Security, will be better able to help that program implement our foreign policy....

Two days later, the Secretary of State made a major policy speech on the Middle East. In his reference to Lebanon, Dulles gave a clue as to the theme of his discussion with President Chamoun in Beirut two weeks before. "President Chamoun of Lebanon," he said, "talked to us of his high hopes for his country and pointed to the role it might play, representing uniquely a meeting of East and West." Chamoun evidently had expressed to Dulles his desire to make use of his country's tradition-al role as mediator and neutral, serving as a go-between in Arab-Western exchanges while maintaining its basic position of solidarity with the other Arab nations and friendship with the West--this in exchange for expanded U.S. aid and technical assistance without coordinate demands for Lebanon's entry into pacts of mutual security or common defense.

Dulles' speech made it perfectly clear that the United States was ready to spend on the Middle East. In his conclusions, Dulles said, "There are ..... ways in which the United States can usefully help, not with masses of money but by contributing advanced technical knowledge about transport, communication, fertilization, and use of water for irrigation. Mr. Stassen and I feel that money wisely spent for this area under the mutual security program will give the American people a good return in terms of better understanding and cooperation."

Regarding American efforts to garner Arab goodwill, Dulles said...

"In an effort to calm these contradictory fears (Arab fear of Israel

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\textit{Bulletin, op.cit.}, v. 28, June 8, 1955, page 804.
expansion and Israeli fear of being pushed into the sea) the United States joined with Britain and France in a declaration of May 25, 1950, which stated that the three governments, should they find that any of these states (of the Near East) was preparing to violate frontiers or armistice lines, would, consistently with their obligations as members of the United Nations, immediately take action, both within and outside the United Nations, to prevent such violation. That declaration, when made, did not reassure the Arabs. It must be made clear that the present United States administration stands fully behind that Declaration. We cannot afford to be distrusted by millions who could be sturdy friends of freedom. They must not further swell the ranks of Communist dictators."

And, speaking of a possible Middle East defense organization, Secretary Dulles made it clear that he had learned from his trip that there was not the time for further efforts of the same sort as made in 1951 to establish a defense organization for the eastern Mediterranean linked with the West. He said:

"A Middle East Defense Organization is a future rather than an immediate possibility. Many of the Arab League countries are so engrossed with their quarrels with Israel or with Great Britain or France that they pay little heed to the menace of Soviet communism. However, there is more concern where the Soviet Union is near. In general, the northern tier of nations shows awareness of the danger."

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54 This is the much referred to 'northern tier' statement by Dulles. The statement gave the hint, if it had not been made earlier in private talks, to Turkey, Pakistan, Iran and Iraq. The problem arising from the defense pact that resulted was that Iraq was invited, and accepted to join.
There is a vague desire to have a collective security system. But no such system can be imposed from without. It should be designed and grow from within out of a sense of common destiny and common danger.

While awaiting the final creation of a security association, the United States can usefully help strengthen the interrelated defenses of those countries which want strength, not as against each other or the West, but to resist the common threat to all free peoples.”

While there was nothing in Dallas’ speech to elicit a public response from the Lebanese government, the Beirut press vented its opinion freely. And the wide range of opinion thus expressed, reflecting the attitudes of the various factions of the Lebanese public, again helps to account for the middle-of-the-road position taken by the government.

Haifa (Muslim, Arab, opposition) saw in Dallas’ discourse an “important change in United States policy in the Middle East.” Sa’ouf Moussa (Muslim, Arab, opposition), on the other hand, wrote that the “American expose is deceiving.”

Al-Hayat (Muslim, undetermined, neutral) said, “We had hoped for more than that,” and reproached Dallas for not having treated clearly and frankly the question of Jerusalem—and failing to allude to the refugee problem. Concerning Egypt, the paper said, Dallas limited himself to an offer of his government’s mediation when he should have upheld the legitimate aspirations of Egypt. The Arabs, said the Al-Hayat writer, do not want a neutral attitude by the United States between the Arabs and the Zionists nor mediation between Western Imperialism and

ibid., v. 28, June 15, 1963, pp. 381-385
the Arabs, but a real change in American policy.

The editorialist in Al-Jarida (Christian, Lebanese, neutral) recalled that before Dulles' visit, American diplomacy used its ignorance of the situation in the Middle East to excuse and justify the faults it committed. "But today," the writer said, "when the American government is familiar with the situation, no mistake may be any longer considered as a simple error. We are all waiting for the American authorities to act in order that we may judge the sincerity of their intentions." In another article, the Al-Jarida political editor said, the advice Dulles gave in his speech did not produce a good impression on the Arabs. "In signaling the necessity of putting an end to the hate between Arab and Jew, the chief of the Department of State indicated the contradictions that make up the United States foreign policy. It tries to satisfy both camps at the same time, even though it is impossible. One should not, therefore, be surprised if, even after this speech, the Arabs still keep their reserved attitude." 56

Thus Dulles had come, gone, and caused a reaction which showed no evident change in the attitude of the Arab countries toward the United States and its policy. Nor was there any immediate indication that the policy of the United States would change after Dulles' listen-and-learn visit. There was an indication of a variation in the United States plans for guaranteeing the security of the Middle East. In his speech, the Secretary of State made it clear that it was pointless at

56 L'Orient, op.cit., 5 June 1963
the time to continue efforts to link the majority of the Arab countries with the West in a common defense organisation. His talks with the Arab leaders had made this point clear. His hint that the 'northern tier' countries might be more cognisant of the Communist danger indicated that the efforts of United States diplomacy in terms of a Middle East defense organisation would be concentrated on these northern fringe countries, as proved to be the case.

Where Lebanon specifically is concerned, the attitude of the Beirut government remained cool but cordial toward the United States. Its policy was in harmony with that of the other Arab governments, but not nearly as hostile as some where the Western powers were concerned. As mentioned previously, however, there was a hint in Secretary Dales' comments about his visit with President Chamoun that this Lebanese leader might be willing to make use of his country's detached position as regards Western-Arab diplomatic maneuverings to serve the cause of the United States as a mediator and pacifier in return for increased United States financial and technical aid backing and the political prestige and power that could result. The first real indication of an arrangement of this sort began to appear in something over a year following Dales' visit.

Part 4

TOWARDS THE BAGHDAD PACT

The next major United States policy move in the Middle East came in May of 1954. On 11 May the twelve United States Ambassadors accredited to the countries of the Middle East and Southeast Asia met in Istanbul, their task reportedly being to evaluate the possibilities of a system of
defense in this combined region. The framework for this system was to be supplied by Turkey and Pakistan who, having Secretary Dulles' 'northern tier' hint had signed on 19 February 1954 a political, economic, and cultural agreement. The new defense system was to have the direct support of Washington. United States Assistant Secretary Henry Kissinger of State for Middle Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs presided over the ambassadors' meeting.

The eagerness of the United States to have such a defense system for the Middle East created was heightened by recent Communist successes in Southeast Asia, such as in Indochina (Viet Nam). The task was, as in previous efforts, made difficult by the differences existing in the Middle East between Israel and the Arab states and Egypt and the United Kingdom, as well as latent quarrels between the various Arab capitals, not to mention the neutralist policy of India. In Southeast Asia, the task had been facilitated by obvious, physical, Communist successes which made the governments of the area conscious of the imminence of the danger.

The ambassadors ended their conference in Istanbul on 15 May. It was reported in L'Orient that Arab-Israel tension and the fight against Communist influence were the main themes of their talks. The ambassadors, the paper said, considered these factors to be interrelated because it was due to the Arab-Israel dispute that the USSR was able to find a fertile ground for its propaganda and the extension of its influence.

57 The announcement was made in the form of a statement of intention by the two governments. There was no official, formal treaty, nor official designation for the agreement.
The first task of the United States therefore was to reduce Arab-Israeli tension. The ambassadors, it was believed, were convinced that recourse to the United Nations would be insufficient since the Soviets have means to impede any action by that body. The ambassadors thus felt it would be useful to give a more precise form to the 1950 Tripartite Declaration in support of the status quo in the region, and to specify clearly that in case of either an Israeli or Arab aggression the 5 Powers would intervene, armed, to put an end to it. They believed a declaration to this effect could calm the apprehension manifested by the parties concerned, the paper said.

The ambassadors reportedly felt also that American diplomacy should multiply its efforts to create a calm atmosphere, and to insist that both Arab and Israeli leaders refrain from any gesture which could aggravate the situation.

Concerning the Turkey-Pakistan pact and the possibility of its extension, the ambassadors felt, according to L'Orient reports, that the treaty was useful, and would be more so in the future, but could not envisage for the immediate future the admission of the Arab countries.

The American envoys, in the case of Iraq, realized that an eventual return to power by Nuri Said (former Prime Minister) after the Iraqi elections could open new perspectives, but the ambassadors did not underestimate the difficulties that a government which decided to join this defense system would encounter.58

58 Ibid., 16 May 1954 (The ambassadors' conference evidently did not publish a communique. L'Orient's article is thus based, apparently, on reports from sources in Istanbul. If not, it is mere speculation, however probable.)
In Beirut, the newspaper _Neaera_ (Musulim, Arab, neutral), on the same day was reproaching United States Near Eastern policy, with regard to Israel in particular. The paper accused the United States of deliberately aiding Israel to the detriment of the rights and interests of the Arabs. And, an article posed the question whether Byroade and the American ambassadors' meeting in Istanbul had not finally become aware of the eventual consequences of their government's attitude in this affair, which, the paper said, necessitates above all a just and reasonable solution. This one article gives an indication that the Arabs would not be satisfied with another Western guarantee to maintain the status quo in the area, and tensions therefore would not resultingly decrease.  

The next day, the newspaper _Neaera-Masa_ (Musulim, Arab, opposition) commented on the failings of American diplomatic thinking in regard to the menace to the Middle East. The Americans, the paper wrote, are right in believing that because they love liberty the Arabs would never support a Communist movement. But they forget that the first enemy of the Arabs is Israel and that to free themselves from the Zionist menace they would not hesitate to ask support from any power willing to help them, despite its political or ideological tendencies.

The Western Powers evidently planned to wait for the Arab reaction, both official and non-official, before committing themselves further in a declaration that might be both refused and denounced. And, although there

59 _ibid.,_ 16 May 1964
60 _ibid.,_ 17 May 1964
were no reports of such activity, it seems likely that the three govern-
ments contacted the Arab governments to seek their reaction. It was just
two weeks later that the subject of the Tripartite Declaration came up
for debate in the Lebanese parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee.

All this activity must be viewed with an eye to the Anglo-
Egyptian negotiations on the withdrawal from the Suez Canal zone, and
the delay in their conclusion. The Western powers must have felt that
the Arab countries would not likely accept any move of reappraisal on
the order of a restatement of the Tripartite Declaration before Egypt
had achieved its aims in the Suez dispute. Although some of the Arab
states may have been impatient with the delay, they were not willing to
chance a break in the Arab League.

In the discussion of Lebanese foreign policy that took place on
4 June, the majority opinion expressed was that "the Tripartite Declara-
tion does not constitute a sufficient guarantee for the Lebanese frontiers
since it is a unilateral agreement which the signatories could denounce
at any moment."

This point of view, however, was opposed by the government. Prime
Minister Abdullah Tari told the committee: "This declaration is un-equiv-
cal and assures Lebanon of all the desired guarantees for the security
of its frontiers." But the majority of deputies on the committee demanded
instead that the government seek guarantees outside the Tripartite
Declaration by concluding bi-lateral pacts with the United States, Britain
and France. Deputy Raymond Eide upheld the latter point of view, maintaining
that the Arab League pact did not prevent Lebanon from concluding separate
treaties. And Deputy Reile Bustani, stating his support for the proposal,
asked the government to clarify its foreign policy without fear of extremists' reactions.

The debate in the committee was closed with a proposition by committee president, Hamid Franjih, that the government open discussions with Syria, Jordan and Iraq to adopt a common attitude as regards the Western powers and the question of concluding alliances with them. The recommendation of Franjih was adopted in consideration of the fact that Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and Iraq constitute a single zone and that they have common interests in the affair. The purpose of the discussions would be the opening, by the four interested countries, of common negotiations with the three Western powers. Yafi revealed that he had already asked the ambassadors of the three Western powers to inform their governments of Lebanon's desire to know if they were still disposed to fulfill the engagements they made in the Tripartite Declaration. He had received no answer. 61

The following day the government issued a declaration regarding the procedure to be followed in implementing the committee's decision: "The Minister of Foreign Affairs will proceed, in the course of the next ten days, with the opening of negotiations with Syria, Jordan and Iraq, in conformity with the recommendations of the committee. These discussions will aim, for a first step, towards the realization of an agreement between Lebanon and Syria on the policy to be followed by the two countries. They will be extended, in a second step, to Iraq and Jordan, on the basis of the agreement reached between Beirut and Damascus.... The new foreign policy of the government aims to make

61 Ibid., 5 June 1964
clear to Egypt that Lebanon—and Syria, Jordan and Iraq—if they are in accord on this subject—can no longer refrain from taking an official position as regards the West until the solution of the Anglo—Egyptian conflict on the Suez Canal." Certain Lebanese factions were obviously impatient, but they could not force a move outside the Arab League framework.

The editorialist in L'Orient (Christian, Lebanese, neutral) had this to say about the Tafl argument that further engagements with the West were not necessary: "If it is true that Lebanon cannot follow a foreign policy which does not take into account its attachments with the Arab League, it is also true, on one hand, that some Arab League countries often follow a foreign policy which is not taken into account their attachments with Lebanon; and, on the other hand, that the Arab countries who are directly menaced by Israel are already engaged in the path of collaboration with the West." Tafl, the writer said, seems to have lost his sense of realities, considering there are 150,000 Israeli soldiers under arms, when he says there is no necessity for the modification of Lebanon's policy inaugurated in 1943; and, to say that Lebanon would get no real profit from military alliances, the editorialist said, is easy. "In this tone Tafl could also proclaim, for example, that Litani (the Litani River hydroelectric project) is of no use as a Lebanese hydroelectric system...." In any case, the writer pointed out, "no one among the partisans of accord with the West envisages, for a fraction of a second, limitation of the exercise of Lebanese sovereignty." The editorialist was expressing the point of view of the liberal, Western oriented segment of the population.
In an article appearing in the same edition of L'Orient, there was a report of a conflict between Prime Minister Yafi and Foreign Minister Maccache on the question of whether Lebanon should enter into closer relations with the Western powers. The article said Yafi would like, in effect, to protect his popularity among certain groups, Muslims, Arab, while Maccache was trying to follow a realist policy, conforming to Lebanon's interests without taking into account reactions of the street. 62

On 9 June, Prime Minister Mohammed Ali of Pakistan stopped in Beirut on his way to Ankara. L'Orient reported that he talked with Yafi on the subject of the Turk-Pakistan accord of the previous April, and a possible extension of this axis. The paper said, the two leaders limited themselves to an exchange of views since the initiative in the affair lay with the United States, because United States military and economic aid would be needed in the establishment of a regional defense system for the Middle East. 63 It seems more likely that talks between the two leaders were concerned with the current frame of mind of public opinion in the Arab countries as regards their attachment to the Ankara-Karachi axis, and with the benefits to be received by the Arab governments that would align themselves to the northern tier pact. The United States did not seem to have changed its opinion as expressed by Dulles the year before that there were yet too many conflicts within the Arab world to allow them to join a broader mutual security alliance.

62 Ibid., 6 June 1964. The comments of the newspaper's writer concerning the Yafi-Maccache conflict should have been made in an editorial. By the reactions of the street were meant those of the more radical Arab nationalist elements. These sentiments are thus described in a derogatory sense while those of Maccache are labeled realistic.

63 Ibid., 11 June 1964
Still the public opinion in Lebanon, as reflected in the
government, was divided as to the policy to be followed in its relations
with the West. On 9 June, the Beirut newspapers expressed views on
Lebanon's foreign policy ranging from Al-Sahafa's (organ of the Lebanese
emigrants') plea for Lebanon to get rid of its "inferiority complex" and
to have the courage to give its opinion and to remove itself from the
tutelage of the Arab League, which the paper said had been profitless
(the paper advised collaboration with Washington to escape the real
dangers surrounding Lebanon), to Telegraph's (Christian, Arab, opposition)
energetic opposition to any political agreement with foreign powers
because, it said, the Lebanese are jealous of their independence and
sovereignty and will not let themselves be involved with any camp, West
or East. 64

Meanwhile, a high government official was quoted by a reporter
of L'Orient as saying on 10 June that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
had decided to call for an extraordinary session of the Arab League
Political Committee to define the attitude of the Arab countries towards
the Western powers. This move would be in line with Lebanon's past action.
But, the official reportedly said, if Lebanon's partners refused to depart
from their hesitant attitude as regards the West, Lebanon would use its
freedom of action and follow a policy in compliance with its interests. 65

On 11 June several Beirut papers published a statement by
Premier Yafi concerning Lebanese foreign policy in which he repeated that
he had always said Lebanon would sign no agreement with another (outside,
non-Arab) power. The Prime Minister said he would always insure Lebanon's

64 ibid., 10 June 1954
65 ibid., 11 June 1954
sovereignty and it would not be be he who would lead the country in a manner dangerous to the independence obtained under the regime of Schemra Khoury and Riad Solh. Asked about the attitude of the Lebanese government concerning the Turko-Pakistan alliance, Yafi said Lebanon has nothing to do with it and the question was not even brought up when Pakistani Prime Minister Mohamed Ali was in Beirut.

To another question Yafi denied that the American government had made Lebanon an offer of military assistance similar to that made to Iraq. And, he said, Lebanon, for its part, had made no request for aid (military) to anybody. Finally, Yafi insisted, the Lebanese position was in perfect harmony with that of the other League states.

Al-Jayyam (Muslim, undetermined, neutral) that day reported it had learned that the Egyptian government was preoccupied with the recent Lebanese press reports about a new orientation of its foreign policy and had asked an explanation from the Lebanese government. The government, the paper said, made it known that "these versions published by the newspapers have no basis." 86

The position of the government was something like this: It was under pressure from a group of deputies in parliament who wanted Lebanon to undertake a more 'realistic' attitude toward the West, to the extent of entering mutual defense alliances with the Western powers, for the reason that the Tripartite Declaration was not enough guarantee for the security of Lebanon. But it could not risk, even if the current ministers had wanted to, a rejection of the policy expressed in the national pact

86 Ibid., 16 June 1954
of 1943. And at this point, the advocates of the so-called 'realistic' attitude did not have the power to force their wishes on the country as a whole. Probably a more accurate reason than fear of insecurity for this desire of a change in orientation of Lebanon's policy with regard to the West, and with the United States in particular, was the hope that a more firm commitment by Lebanon to the cause of the West would facilitate and enlarge the loans and grants Lebanon might get through the United States foreign aid—technical assistance program. The topic was current when the subject of foreign policy came up in the Foreign Affairs Committee since Lebanon had asked for some $1 million dollars in aid in the middle of May. The United States had replied with an offer of only 6 million, and with some conditions the Lebanese government did not consider acceptable. Negotiations for this American aid were still going on in the middle of June when the foreign policy debate came into the open. While certain factions were thus calling for a reorientation of the government's policy, the political groups backing Premier Yafi were those most opposed to a Lebanese foreign policy of alignment with the West, regardless of the financial and technical improvements the country might accrue. Thus the government, torn as always between two oppositely oriented political groups, decided on the only policy it could, and said it would coordinate its foreign policy with that of its Arab League brothers, but would not wait indefinitely for a solution of the Anglo-Egyptian dispute before taking a position officially as regards the West.

On 14 June Premier Yafi flew to Amman to see King Hussein of Jordan and Saudi of Saudi Arabia to justify, or explain, Lebanon's newly
oriented foreign policy, and, in keeping with the government's declaration, to begin efforts to work out a unified Arab attitude as regards the West. On the same day, it was reported that President Chamoun had offered his mediation between the United Kingdom and Egypt on the Suez Canal dispute. Before being elected President, Chamoun had been Lebanon's ambassador to London.

A week later, on 11 June, Egyptian Minister of National Guidance, Salah Salem, outlined his country's opinion on current political activity in the Arab countries. Pacts with the West, he said, even assistance pacts, would mean, fatally, peace with Israel. He maintained the Arab countries should proclaim openly the futility of the League and recognize their disunity. They should be frank with each other and let public opinion decide the outcome of present difficulties. 67

After another week, Salem was in Beirut carrying a personal message from Naguib to Chamoun. His presence in Beirut was reportedly the first step in an Egyptian move to reconstitute the Arab front. After Salem's arrival on 25 June, Beirut papers reported also that the Egyptian envoy would discuss with Lebanese leaders the Anglo-Egyptian dispute. And Chamoun was expected to use his good offices to hasten the solution of that problem. The Egyptian interest in discussing the Anglo-Egyptian dispute with Lebanese leaders more than likely stemmed from the Lebanese government's foreign policy statement of the previous month that it could not await the results of dragging negotiations.

67 ibid., 22 June 1954
between Egypt and the United Kingdom before itself taking an attitude towards the West in its own right, and calling on other Arab governments to join it in deciding on a coordinated policy. Evidently Cairo felt contacts initiated by the Lebanese leaders with other Arab countries might actually produce some result. Egypt would not have liked its favored position as leader of the battle for Arab rights as regards the imperialist powers, gained due to its struggle to bring about British evacuation from Syria, to be forfeited due to the efforts of the smallest of the Arab countries.

The Beirut press was generally happy about Salem's visit, praising Egypt's move to re-unify the Arabs. The Arab nationalist papers hoped Salem's talks with the Lebanese authorities would complete the step begun earlier with talks between Egypt and Saudi Arabia and bring a reconfirmation of a unified Arab policy. However, some of the liberal, pro-Western journals denounced Egypt's policy for attempting to lead the Arab world in a neo-neutral direction. 68

Conversations between Salem and Lebanese leaders began on 30 June. Foreign Minister Hasnache and Salem would say nothing following their meeting about the object of their discussions-only that they were held in all frankness. L'Orient (Christian, Lebanese, neutral), however, said it "learned" that Hasnache asked Salem the details of developments in the Anglo-Egyptian conflict over the Suez Canal. He reportedly asked the degree of truth in statements supposedly made by United States Ambassador Jefferson Caffery, in which he said an agreement would be

68 Ibid., 30 June 1954
forthcoming, in principle, According to L'Orient, Nacroche emphasized to Salem the particular interest Lebanon attached to ending the Anglo-Egyptian crisis in a manner conforming to the desires of Egypt—a factor which conditioned the attitude of Lebanon with regard to the Western powers. Salem reportedly answered that nothing definite had been concluded, but that when it was, the Lebanese authorities would be informed.

The Nacroche-Salem meeting also, according to L'Orient, concerned the current crisis in the Arab League. The paper said Nacroche submitted to Salem a proposition for calling a League foreign ministers conference to examine "very frankly" the problems between their countries. Salem reportedly received this proposal favorably. The Egyptian minister also met with President Chamoun and reportedly presented him with two messages, one from Nasser and the other from Nasser, expressing the wish of the Egyptian leaders 1) to see a close collaboration established between Egypt and Lebanon, and 2) to 'refloat' the Arab League. The two messages also, it was said, indicated that Egypt received favorably a previous Chamoun proposal for the organization of a conference of kings and chiefs of state of the Arab countries to iron out their problems. The Lebanese president also passed in review with Salem the steps in the Anglo-Egyptian conflict and offered his good offices to hasten the solution of this affair "which Lebanon considered as its own." Also they discussed foreign policy of the Arab countries in the light of the contacts Chamoun had established with King Saud and the leaders of other Arab countries.69

69 ibid., 1 July 1954
On 1 July, it was reported in the Cairo papers that Salem had proposed to the Lebanese leaders 1) the formulation of a Lebanese-Egyptian common defense agreement similar to that Egypt had concluded recently with Saudi Arabia; 2) an agreement to oppose any attempt to modify the status quo in the Middle East; and 3) the sending of Egyptian military instructors to Lebanon. If these points were agreed upon Lebanon was to reject any accord with the West until the inter-Arab differences were settled. In Beirut, Al-Sayad (Muslim, undetermined, neutral) pointed out that the exchanges between Salem and the Lebanese leaders also took up the subject of the relations between Egypt and Iraq. Cairo, the paper said, feared Iraq would adhere to the Turk-Pakistan pact. Lebanon was prepared to play the role of mediator between the two.

The press as usual voiced varied attitudes as regards Egypt's policy. Many papers were in favor of Salem's proposals while others said Egypt was not really seeking Arab unity. Al-Sayad (Christian, Arab, opposition) said never had the Egyptian press so violently attacked Syria and Iraq. Why, the paper asked, was Egypt taking sides in the differences between Iraq and Saudi Arabia or between Syria and Lebanon? 70

On 2 July, Salem, still in Beirut, courteously declined Beirut's mediation between Cairo and London. The underlying reasons for all this political interchange seems to be this: Lebanon's activity was begun with the intention of finding a middle road between the pro and anti-Western policy demanded by the opposing sides in the Lebanese parliament by seeking to divide the responsibility among the other Arab countries—except

70 Ibid., 2 July 1954
Egypt—by calling for a coordinated Arab policy with regard to the West. Egypt, feeling sure that it was going to win its diplomatic battle to get British troops out of the Suez Canal zone, did not want the Lebanese activity to foreshadow the prestige that would be hers once this struggle against British imperialism had been won. Egypt also hoped, once the victory was hers, to use this added prestige to bring the other Arab countries under her policy wing and from there on be able to deal with the West as the recognized leader of the Arab countries. Thus Salem came to Beirut to offer a substitute for any guarantee Lebanon might seek from the West, play up to Lebanon's chosen role as a mediator—between the disputing Arab governments—and at the same time forestall the formation of any united Arab policy as regards the West until Egypt was in a better position to bargain for all the group. Chamoun and his ministers were willing, first because they realized they could not find a common Arab policy that would be satisfactory to both factions in their own country, and secondly because they probably thought there was more to be gained to serve both Arabs and Western powers as a mediator than to take a position with one side or the other. Egypt was not ready to accept Lebanon's mediation in its dispute with Britain. And for the West, Egypt and Lebanon itself, Lebanon's mediatory role proved to serve the best purpose when it was between disputing Arab factions, the government keeping itself formally aloof from the West and at the same time no more than vocally in sympathy with either of the Arab points of view.

Thus the pattern was set for the activity of Lebanese diplomatic activity for the ensuing months—mediation between the divergent camps in
the Arab world, in an effort to get the Arab leaders together to work out a unified policy with regard to the West so that Lebanon itself would not be forced by internal opinion to take a position on its own. Premier Yafi went to Damascus to discuss Salem's propositions with the Syrian leaders, and to consider prospects for an Arab heads-of-state conference. In Beirut, Foreign Minister Naccache reaffirmed that Lebanon would remain neutral between Iraq and Egypt. Yafi returned from Damascus and left again for Cairo. His talks in Damascus reportedly were encouraging. In Cairo it was said that Salem would go to Damascus to follow up Yafi's efforts, and the Lebanese Prime Minister was reportedly going on to Baghdad and other Arab capitals to clear up misunderstandings and prepare for a heads of state conference.

Yafi returned 'encouraged' from Cairo on 10 July. A day later, however, a new element entered the Middle East political picture and took the limelight away from inter-Arab conciliatory efforts. Negotiations between Egypt and Britain on the Suez Canal dispute began again on 11 July. London made new proposals to the Cairo government. A week later, on 17 July, 'authoritative' American sources were reported to have predicted an Anglo-Egyptian agreement within a month. It was also learned, according to French news agency AFP, that American specialists were seeking a formula which would permit Egypt to eventually play a role in a Middle East defense organisation. MEMO, AFP speculated, was considered a dead letter, but the United States sought a new project inspired by the experience of the Turk-Pakistan treaty. 72

72 ibid., 18 July 1964
On 27 July representatives of Egypt and the United Kingdom initiated a basis of agreement on the Suez Canal conflict. Its terms: 1) The last English troops were to quit Egyptian territory by January 1956; 2) Britain would reoccupy the canal bases in case of aggression against an Arab state or Turkey; 3) The operation of the canal installations would be handed over to civil enterprises. 72

In Washington, the day after the agreement, Secretary of State Dulles stated the obvious United States reaction to the Anglo-Egyptian agreement. He said:

President Eisenhower has expressed the gratification of the government at the conclusion of an agreement in principle on the Suez base between the governments of the United Kingdom and Egypt. I join most heartily in his congratulations to both countries.

What has occurred is a major step in the evolution of the relations between the states of the Near East and the nations of the West. This agreement eliminates a problem which has affected not only the relations between the United Kingdom and Egypt but also those of the Western nations as a whole with the Arab states. I hope that it marks the beginning of a new era of closer collaboration between the states of the Near East and those of the West.

Thanks to the agreement a new and more permanent basis has been laid for the tranquility and security of the Near East. 75

Dulles also sent a message of congratulations to Premier Nasser and Foreign Minister Fawzi of Egypt. Nasser's reply also was optimistic. "Egypt," he said, "is confident that this agreement will start a new era of closer cooperation with the United States as well as with all other friendly countries. I am grateful for the help and assistance of the leaders and the government of the United States in bringing about this agreement." 74

75 Bulletin, op. cit., v. 51, August 9, 1954, p. 198
74 ibid., v. 51, August 16, 1954, p. 234
Dulles' prediction of future "closer collaboration" was likely an expression of the hope that, as observed by the AFP report, now was the time to push ahead with plans for Middle East defense. Recognizing the obvious, the United States would not ask Egypt directly to join any such common defense arrangement, but would try to link as many other of the Arab countries as possible to the Ankara-Karakoi axis. Thus in a roundabout way it would link Egypt, who was pledged to go to the aid of its Arab League brothers already. And, under the terms of Egypt's new agreement with the United Kingdom, British troops would be allowed to re-enter their bases in case either an Arab state or Turkey were attacked. Perhaps later public opinion would allow the revolutionary leaders to join more formally a Western-backed organization for the defense of the Middle East.

A majority of the Beirut press approved of the agreement, congratulating Egypt and expressing the hope that other Arab problems would be settled in as satisfactory a manner. Others expressed dis-appointment, saying the Egyptian terms were not strong enough and that her sovereignty was still incomplete. The opinion was also expressed that the accord was a victory for neither party, but left the United Kingdom with the opportunity to return at the slightest provocation. The agreement was also said to mean Egypt's entrance into a Western defense organization. 75

The month of August passed with increasing diplomatic activity in Cairo growing out of the Anglo-Egyptian heads of agreement. Both the

75 L'Orient, op.cit., 30 July 1954
American and British Ambassadors met with Egyptian Foreign Minister Mahmoud Fawzi on 31 August to discuss the possibility of American aid to Egypt, how Egypt could reorganize her army with Western military aid, and how the raising of the United Kingdom arms embargo could affect the possibilities of development of the Egyptian army. Nothing was to come of these exchanges. The surprising thing is that the Western powers could expect a major change in attitude from the Egyptian government because of an agreement which the Egyptian considered their right all along. The Egyptian government did not fail to warn the West that its basic attitude had not changed. In an interview with the American Newsweek magazine on 31 August, Nasser said the Arab countries would organize their own defense without adhering to foreign alliances. "However", he said, "that does not mean we will not accept American military aid: That aid is very useful to us in organizing our defense on effective bases." Concerning Egypt's general attitude with regard to the West, Nasser said the West, in its negotiations with Arab countries, "must not forget the sentiments of the people of the Middle East and their aversion for the term 'unified command'." 76 This should have been a clear enough warning.

Meanwhile, Lebanese Premier Yafai had been to Baghdad to continue his mediatory efforts. He reported back to President Chamoun on 2 September but would say nothing more specific to the press than that the discussions he held with King Faisal, King's Regent Abdul Ilah and Premier Nuri Said would contribute in a large degree to an amelioration of the relations

76 Newsweek, 31 August 1954.
between the different Arab League countries. He was unreasonably optimistic.

In its review of the Beirut press of 5 September, *L'Orient* published the view of Al-Mahar (Christian, Lebanese, neutral) that the mission of Lebanese Ambassador to the United States Charles Malik, due to return to Beirut on 5 September, was to inform the government of the broad lines of American policy in the Near and Middle East. Al-Mahar said it had learned from well-informed sources that after Turkey, Lebanon was to become the center of United States diplomatic activity. The State Department, the article said, had given Malik formal assurances of the maintenance of the independence of Lebanon within its present frontiers. The newspaper said it followed from those assurances that an important evolution in Lebanese exterior policy could be expected—and also a great American diplomatic activity not only in Lebanon but also in other Arab countries. The prediction was to come true, but probably not as soon as the paper expected. However, in support of Al-Mahar's information the United States announced on 4 September its reaffirmation of the Tripartite Declaration, the policy decided on by the United States heads of diplomatic missions meeting in Istanbul in May.

The final Anglo-Egyptian agreement was signed in Cairo on 19 October. Reporting the signature, AFP said London diplomatic circles, and undoubtedly those in Washington, were asking themselves if, and

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77 *L'Orient*, op.cit., 30 July 1954
78 ibid., 4 September 1954
79 ibid., 5 September 1954
hoping that Egypt would now take the initiative in creating a Middle East defense organization and profit from her 'complete independence' by normalizing her relations with Israel. The AFP article, however, recognized that an immediate defense collaboration between Egypt and the United Kingdom was not likely. A certain amount of time, it said, was necessary to heal the wounds inflicted on the Egypt-United Kingdom 'mère-propre' by the long tutelage of the West. The initiative, as it turned out, was taken not by Egypt but by Iraq. Premier Nuri Said had long desired to unify the Arab countries under his guidance, with the support of the West, and to this end had aligned Iraq with Great Britain. He now feared the growing popularity of the revolutionary government in Egypt would eclipse his hopes of Arab leadership, and that if Egypt became more friendly with the West his favored position would be lost. Nuri thus proceeded full-steam with his plans to join the Turk-Pakistani alliance. He was in London talking over his plans with the British government even before the Cairo-London accord was reached on the future of the Suez Canal bases. It was this activity on the part of Nuri that had caused the ill-feeling between Cairo and Baghdad—one of the main cases in point where Lebanese mediation was concerned.

In Beirut, the primary concern of the government was foreign affairs. The Lebanese leaders were still hopeful of getting the Arab League heads of government together at the forthcoming League session. Foreign Minister Hacche was following closely the activity of Nuri Said after his recent visit to London. Reports of a probable Iraqi

80 ibid., 20 October 1954
adhesion to the Turk-Pakistan pact even before the meeting of the League Council provoked a profound discontent in the minds of the Lebanese leaders. A statement by the Foreign Ministry on 22 October said Huri was seemingly seeking to prevent any meeting of the Arab heads of government during which the question of Iraq's joining the Turk-Pakistan pact might be raised. An article in L'Orient (Christian, Lebanese, neutral) said this attitude was evidenced by the fact that the Iraqi Premier had already taken a large step towards the formation of a front linking Ankara to Karachi by way of Iraq and Iran. He felt, the paper said, that any discussion of the question would retard the execution of his projects and "that is why he would prefer to put his League partners before the fait accompli and afterwards invite them to follow his example."

The Foreign Ministry statement noted that Lebanon was not indifferent to the actions of Huri Said. In effect it expressed the feeling that the taking of an isolated position by Baghdad was in flagrant contradiction to the spirit of the Arab League. L'Orient remarked that Huri seemed to be making Lebanon's request for an adjournment of the coming League Council meeting until after a scheduled visit by King Faisal to Beirut a pretext for deferring indefinitely the date of that visit. Thus Foreign Minister Naccache sent a telegram to Baghdad asking a definite confirmation of the date of Faisal's visit to Lebanon.

While Lebanon was maneuvering to produce some results from its role as mediator in Arab affairs, it was being approached as to the possibility of entering the pact which was the cause for the Arab dispute it was
attempting to soothe over. Foreign Minister Naccache announced on 26 October (coincidental with the signing of the final Egypt-United Kingdom accord) that he had received an invitation from the Turkish government to visit Ankara to discuss Lebanon's adhesion to the Turk-Pakistan pact. Naccache said he would not for the moment reply to that invitation since he was waiting the visit of King Feisal of Iraq and Premier Menderes of Turkey to Beirut. There was no denunciation from the government of the pact itself. The Foreign Ministry announced that Naccache had been informed of Menderes' desire to make a turn through all the Arab capitals to invite them to join the Ankara-Karachi alliance. The Foreign Minister told a reporter of L'Orient that Lebanon would consult its League partners before making a decision as to what to do about the affair. It would seek above all to reconcile the Arab points of view in order to prevent a split in the League. 61

Two days later the Foreign Ministry, evidently touchy about being the target of any charges of non-neutrality, denied that Naccache had received a formal invitation to visit Ankara. He had actually received, the Ministry said, only a report from the Lebanese Delegation in Ankara saying the Turkish authorities would be happy to receive a visit from Naccache to discuss political problems concerning the two countries. And the same day, the United States finally showed openly its interest in Lebanon's attitude toward the adhesion of certain Middle East countries to the Ankara-Karachi pact. Fouad Amoun, director General of the Foreign Ministry, conferred with American Charge d'Affaires, Armin Mayer. L'Orient quoted 'informed sources' as saying their discussion concerned the attitude of the Lebanese government on this matter. 62

61 Ibid., 29 October 1954
62 Ibid., 31 October 1954
The Arab League Council opened its meeting on 30 October. At the request of the Lebanese delegate, however, the meetings were suspended in order to wait until the foreign ministers and heads of state could attend the sessions in Cairo. The situation remained static until the end of November when King Feisal arrived to visit Lebanon as scheduled. This was on 20 November. Feisal's visit proved not as helpful to Lebanese aims for a heads of state meeting as had been hoped. The authorities in Beirut reportedly hoped for such an encounter to take place before the end of November. They had assumed that Nuri Said would accompany King Feisal to Beirut and that that would be their chance to convince him to come to Cairo and talk over his attitude towards the Turk-Pakistan pact with the other League leaders. But Nuri did not come to Beirut and a telegram sent by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Baghdad asking if the Iraqi Premier was disposed to take part in the meetings of the Arab League Council scheduled for 24 November apparently received a negative response.

On 22 November, King Feisal received, in Beirut, a message of friendship from Egyptian Premier Nasser. The Egyptian leader evidently hoped to convince the King, and perhaps through him the real ruler of Iraq, Nuri Said, to change his mind about openly defying the Arab nationalist opinion as expressed by Nasser and joining the Western-blessed 'northern tier' alliance. In Cairo, Minister of National Guidance Major Salah Salem outlined current Egyptian foreign policy with regard to the West in an interview with a German journalist. He said, the adhesion of Egypt to the Turk-Pakistan pact was out of the question for the moment.

83 Ibid., 21 November 1954
that in case of a conflict, nothing obliged Egypt to fight at the side of England; and that Egypt was waiting, before taking a position vis-à-vis the West, until the West straightened out the other Arab problems which were yet in suspense. 84

While Feisal was still in Beirut, Syrian Premier Faris al-Khoury and a delegation also arrived. Lebanese diplomats were reportedly making use of the opportunity to effect a rapprochement between Cairo, Baghdad and Damascus. It seems likely that the Lebanese leaders were also hoping to maneuver towards a coordinated policy towards the West among as many of the Arab governments as possible before the forthcoming Arab League meeting in order that something would come out of that conference to justify all their negotiation and satisfy local demands that the government take a stand. The government, as pointed out previously, did not want to make such a stand on its own. After one meeting with Iraqi Foreign Minister Naseer al-Chambadi on 22 November, Naccache announced that 27 November had been decided on for the meeting of the Arab League Council.

The Arab League foreign ministers met finally in Cairo on the evening of 28 November. The delay was caused by an unexplained move by Cairo—a decision not to delegate Foreign Minister Feisal to the meet, but to substitute his deputy. This decision was retracted after bitter complaints from Beirut and the other Arab capitals. The day before the meeting a government spokesman in Beirut specified, to a reporter of L'Orient, the questions to be discussed. These were: 1) The attitude of

84 Ibid., 25 November 1954
the Arab countries, notably Iraq, as regards adhesion to the Ankara-Karachi pact; 2) The question whether to accept United Kingdom mediation towards a solution of the Arab-Israel conflict; 3) The attitude of the Arab countries with regard to the project of a military alliance with the West—in light of the recent Anglo-Egyptian agreement on the Suez Canal; and 4) the question of the Palestine refugees. 85

The League Council meeting continued with nothing official emerging. However, in Cairo on 5 December, Lebanese Foreign Minister Naccache made a statement of Lebanon's hopes for the results of the conference. "Our policy is based," Naccache told the Cairo journal Akbar al-Yom, "on the two following foundations: 1) Close and sincere collaboration with our partners in the League, with the view to adopting a common policy; 2) The search for a reciprocal understanding between the Arab countries and the foreign powers with a view to cooperation based on the respect for the sovereignty and independence of these countries." And, although nothing official had come of the ministers meeting, L'Orient reported, also on 5 December, that the League Council had decided to reinforce the inter-Arab defense pact before considering the adhesion of League countries to a regional pact of any sort. Such adhesion would be conditioned by the solution of the Palestine problem and the internationalisation of Jerusalem. 86

The League Council meeting ended on 11 December with no decision having been taken on the most important topic of discussion—the question

85 ibid., 28 November 1954
86 ibid., 6 December 1954
whether the Arabs should link themselves in a common accord with the
Western countries. The Council put off to a future meeting (a conference
of Arab country Prime Ministers had been decided on for sometime in the
latter part of December) the question concerning a common Arab foreign
policy. Nevertheless, returning from Cairo on 10 December, Foreign
Ministry Director Fouad Amoun, said, a meeting had "rarely been so
fruitful." He said, the efforts of the League had resulted in unanimous
agreement on all the political, economic and military problems broached.

It was not until five days after the session ended that specific
information was made available as to the results of the conference.
After continual hinting in the press and increasing demands for clarifica-
tion, Foreign Minister Heccache, on 15 December, made a statement that the
Arab League Political Committee had adopted a recommendation previewing
great cooperation between the Arab countries and the Western powers.
This recommendation included, notably, a provision that the West would
get strategic bases in the Arab countries—depending on a solution of
the four principal problems left unsettled between them and the Arabs.
The four: The Palestine affair; the North African affair; military
assistance to League countries to the end that they be able to put the
inter-Arab Collective Security Pact in application, and the increase of
economic assistance to the League countries.

It is no wonder that Amoun had seemed delighted with the result
of the Cairo meeting on his return to Beirut. From the Lebanese point
of view the result was ideal. Both factions of opinion in the country

87 ibid., 15 December 1964
88 ibid., 17 December 1964
would be pleased. The Arab nationalist—anti-imperialist group could not very well denounce cooperation with the West if it was hinged on the settlement of all the outstanding differences in the relations between them. On the other hand, those who would have more cooperation with the West could not, and keep the respect of the public, call for such a move when such a bitter point as the Palestine problem had not been solved. And there is every reason to believe that those in the highest government posts would more than welcome increased foreign aid—called for by no less a group than the Arab League ministers assembled—for with foreign aid would come increased internal political power and prestige.

The Foreign Minister, when asked about Egypt's reaction to all this, said: "The truth is that the Egyptian delegates at first manifested a certain reticence, believing that the other countries of the League were divided. They reconsidered their attitude, however, after having realized that the Foreign Ministers of Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Jordan were decided to take a decisive attitude." ⑨ This statement would seem to indicate that all the Lebanese 'mediation' had accomplished something after all, even though it was not a solution of the dispute between Egypt and Iraq. The positions of those two countries could have hardly been expected to be changed anyway. Both were inflexible policies. The Egyptians could not afford to waver in their nationalist fervor supported by a public which had long suffered, physically or mentally, under foreign domination. The Iraqis had commitments to the West already in the form of treaties with Great Britain. Nuri Said was not prepared to give up his powerful

⑨ Ibid.
position and allow his country to come under the influence of Egypt's rising leader Gamal Abdel Nasser.

The Lebanese government now had a definite position on which to stand in the face of parliamentary and press opposition. And the neutralist and anti-imperialist sounding boards did not fail to use the occasion to denounce the Arab League decision to extend a hand to the West and adhere, even conditionally, to the Western camp. On 21 December, Foreign Minister Naccache outlined the activity in the League meeting before the House Foreign Affairs Committee. He pointed out the diverse considerations (unspecified in the press) which led the Political Committee to ask for the creation of an Arab organization for Middle East defense backed by Western military aid. He said only the Syrian delegation was reserved towards this subject. Naccache also told of the Iraqi attitude. He said the Iraqi foreign minister made clear to his colleagues that Iraq intended to maintain its liberty of action to conclude bilateral agreements with foreign (non-Arab) countries. He explained that attitude by the desire of his government to ask the revision of the Anglo-Iraqi treaty. He also made it clear that Iraq intended to conclude a bilateral treaty with Iran. A long debate followed the Naccache declaration. Parliamentary opinion was widely split and although a call for debate on foreign policy was considered by several (opposition) deputies, it was decided against. The government itself would not consent to a full-dress debate on its foreign policy, contenting itself with Naccache's statement. 90

On 23 December it was announced by the Foreign Minister that Turkey's Prime Minister Menderes would make an official visit to Lebanon

90 Ibid., 22 December 1954
immediately following his visit to Cairo in January. It also was announced that President Choueifat was planning a trip to Turkey—date as yet unset. On 28 December Naccache again met with the House Foreign Affairs Committee for a debate of the government's foreign policy in the light of the recent League decisions. The committee asked the government for specific information as to whether it had accepted to put strategic bases at the disposition of the West. Naccache answered that nothing had been decided and that parliament would be consulted before any final decision was taken. The committee also showed concern as to whether Iraq's repeated insistence for an official consecration of Arab cooperation with the West signified that Iraq would enter into cooperation with the West independently of the League countries.

Naccache answered that Iraq had given assurances that it would consult the League before concluding an alliance with Turkey and Iran and that in any case that alliance would be envisaged in the framework of a revision of the Anglo-Iraqi treaty. Naccache at this meeting reportedly stated the government's readiness to submit its whole foreign policy to a full parliament debate. The committee however decided it would be content with Naccache's expose. 91

As pointed out, Lebanon now had a safe, neutral position to maintain in the face of diplomatic advances from the West and the unfavorable local opinion they would surely produce. These advances were to come from Turkey. A Turkish mission was in Cairo on 30 December to sound out the Egyptians on the possibility of their joining the Ankara-Karachi pact and to prepare for the scheduled visit of Prime Minister

91 ibid., 29 December 1954
Menderes in January. Although received cordially, the mission was made aware that the time was not ripe for discussions of an official nature of the sort projected. Menderes was now scheduled to visit Beirut immediately after Baghdad, on 14 January. On 6 January Menderes began his talks in Baghdad. In Beirut, Nacache told parliament the government intended to take no isolated decisions concerning agreements with the West. It would conform its attitude to that 'taken by the other Arab countries."

The Turk-Iraqi conversations ended on 15 January 1955. The closing communiqué announced, as expected, the decision of the two countries to conclude a treaty for cooperation towards stability and security of the Middle East. No treaty had as yet been signed but the communiqué said the two countries would attempt to elicit the cooperation of other interested countries, both before and after the signing of a pact—which would be "open to all". The announcement was received with profound satisfaction in Washington and "agreeable surprise" in London. Cairo, however, was unhappy. Foreign Minister Fawzi said that as a partner in the Arab League defense pact, Egypt should have been kept in knowledge of the Iraqis' intentions. According to Fawzi, Egypt saw the proposed Iraq-Turkey pact as a shut-door to Arab policy. Egypt would hold to her policy of entering no pact outside of the inter-Arab collective security alliance and no agreement for common defense outside of that pact.

Arriving in Beirut on 14 January, Premier Menderes of Turkey said he hoped to reach an agreement with the Lebanese leaders on the question of the organization of Middle East defense. Official Lebanese

92 ibid., 21 December 1954
93 ibid., 7 January 1955
94 ibid., 14 January 1955
circles, however, were somewhat disturbed over the decision of Iraq and Turkey. Nasrallah justified the government's silence by saying it had not received information on the discussions between the two countries. Many officials were surprised by Iraq's move because, like Egypt, they felt that the Arab League charter as well as the Arab collective security pact implied the necessity of consultation among the member states before taking any initiative likely to affect League policy. Some sources felt Iraq had imperiled the unity of the League.

Mendares reportedly told Lebanese Prime Minister Saïd Solh and Foreign Minister Nasrallah in the course of one meeting, that Turkey was ardently desirous to see an accord between Lebanon and the Arab countries and the Western countries, which he said are particularly interested in the defense of this region of the world. Nasrallah answered that Lebanon harbored the same interest as Turkey in the matter and that "we ardently desire to work towards the tightening of relations between Lebanon and Turkey." Nasrallah was asked before his discussions with Mendares, what Lebanon's reaction would be to an invitation by Mendares to join the proposed Ankara-Baghdad pact. Nasrallah answered: "That question would naturally be settled by the Council of Ministers. I can assure you, however, that Lebanon will take no decisive attitude towards this subject except in accord with the League. If it was invited to adhere to an Ankara-Baghdad pact, the first thing it would do would be to submit the question to the League and consult the Arab countries on the subject. It

95 Ibid., 15 January 1955
96 Saïd Solh had become Prime Minister after the resignation of Abdullah Yafi's cabinet on 8 September 1954, due to an internal political matter.
is settled that Lebanon will follow, in its foreign policy, the lines on which accord could be realised with that of the League. Cairo, meanwhile, called an emergency meeting of the Arab prime ministers to discuss the move by Iraq and Turkey. 97

The Lebanese leaders continued to study the Menderes proposals for a Turk-Arab pact while receiving reports from diplomatic representatives in Cairo, Baghdad, Amman and Jidda on the reaction of these capitals to the Turk-Iraq communiqué. Long discussions also continued between Lebanese leaders themselves, and between Menderes and Chamoun. On 18 January the communiqué was issued to close the Menderes visit. It said the conversation would be continued. Menderes returned directly to Ankara from Beirut. The Cairo reaction to the Turk-Iraq decision to join in a mutual defense pact convinced Menderes of the inutility of a visit to the Egyptian capital. Lebanese Prime Minister Saïd Solh said Lebanon was going to the Arab prime ministers meeting free from any engagement. Solh said he would inform the Arab governments of the Lebanese talks with Menderes and ask them to state their positions regarding the offer of adherence to the Ankara-Baghdad alliance. 98

The Menderes visit turned out about as the Beirut press had predicted it would on his arrival. Most of the newspapers wished Menderes welcome but felt that Lebanese-Turk relations would not be regulated unless Ankara renounced its friendly policy with Israel. Some said there was no need for Turkey to serve as a mediator in Arab relations with the West. The Arabs could reach out to the West themselves when the circumstances

97 Ibid., 16 January 1955
98 Ibid., 19 January 1955
were right. Others were more outspoken, calling Turkey the agent of the Western powers, trying to form a general defense alliance extending to all the Near and Middle Eastern countries. As an agent, Turkey could not be received except with distrust, this argument went. 99

Lebanon's official policy remained non-committal as regards the Nasser proposals, resting on the results of the Arab League Political Committee decisions taken in December. On 22 January, the Arab prime ministers' meeting opened in Cairo, without Nuri Said. Lebanon, again assigning itself the role of mediator, invited Nuri personally to come---to no avail. On 25 January, AFP reported that "all the Arab prime ministers present in Cairo have accepted not to join the Turkey-Iraq pact or any other system of defense pact other than the inter-Arab security pact. Also, they accepted not to close the current Cairo conference without having pronounced their views on the Egyptian proposal to put in practical application the inter-Arab collective security pact."100

However, the ministers' meeting closed on 28 January to give itself time to reflect on the Egyptian and Iraqi points of view. Nasser said Turkey could not cooperate with the Arabs while at the same time cooperating with Israel, having military and economic engagements with that country. Egypt asked Iraq to decide between the League and Turkey. An official communiqué from Baghdad announced that "we have the right to conclude any accord judged useful to preserve our interests and the integrity of our territory". There was no formal closing communiqué from the Cairo meeting.101

99 ibid., 16-17 January 1955
100 ibid., 27 January 1955
101 ibid., 28, 29, 30 January 1955
Iraq and Turkey signed what was to become known as the Baghdad Pact in Baghdad on 24 February 1955. Summing up his views on this result of the previous months political activity in the Arab world John Campbell in "Defense of the Middle East" says: "Once again, a Western initiative to organise the defense of the Middle East had run afool of Arab nationalism and Arab politics. The American decision to grant arms aid to Iraq and to encourage its participation in regional defense had involved the risk that in gaining Iraq the West might have to write off the rest of the Arab world. But there was at least the chance that Iraq's 'realism' would find an echo in other Arab capitals. On this point it is possible that more careful preparation and execution might have brought Lebanon, Syria and Jordan into the arrangement along with Iraq. The initiative for collective security, Mr. Dulles had said, must come from the Middle Eastern countries themselves. Premiers Menderes and Huri es-Said took the initiative on this occasion. It was their decision to go ahead when and as they did.\[102\]

"Following the conclusion of the pact, it was Menderes who undertook to sell it to Lebanon and to press it strongly, even threateningly, upon Syria. Lebanon, however, stuck to its traditional middle position. Syria discarded its relatively moderate government for a new one more susceptible to Egyptian influence and more suspicious of the West. An American decision to join the alliance at the start might have made the difference in persuading Lebanon, Syria or Jordan to come in, but Washington chose caution and the initiative was left to other hands."\[102\]

This is one version of a long period of extensive political and diplomatic activity in the Arab world which was climaxd by the signing

\[102\] Campbell, op.cit., p. 58
of the Baghdad Pact. The task here now is to specify the role of Lebanese policy as regards the United States part in this intergovernmental maneuvering. First, however, the role of the United States must be elucidated.

The obvious American activity in the Arab world during the period following Secretary of State Dulles' Middle East trip in May 1953 was small. Except for applying friendly pressure on Great Britain to make the necessary concessions to end her dispute with Egypt over the Suez Canal base question, the United States did not exercise her diplomatic initiative in the Middle East to any evident political end. Still, there is little room for doubt that the activity on the part of the Turkish government towards the formation of a mutual defense arrangement for the Middle East was sponsored and guided from Washington, at least once Ankara had taken the initiative.

Although Dulles' speech in May of 1953 on his return to the United States acknowledged that the time was not then ripe for a collective defense arrangement for the Middle East along the lines of the 1951 MDPO attempt, he did not suggest that American desires to see the formation of such an organisation, linked to the West, were any less. And, as a substitute he came up with the suggestion of a 'northern tier' alliance among those countries whose contact with the Soviet threat were greater and who thus were more cognizant of the necessity of such a defense pact. The first result of Dulles' suggestion was the agreement between Turkey and Pakistan in the winter of 1954. In July of that year Britain and Egypt reached agreement in their Suez dispute and Washington evidently
estimated that the resultant warming of opinion in the Arab world was
enough to make a further attempt to get Arab participation in
the defense arrangement initiated by Turkey and Pakistan. The reason
that the United States refrained from utilising its own diplomatic
efforts to this end is evidently because, knowing that "NEDO had aroused
the suspicion that it was intended to be a puppet organization of the
Western great powers, he (Dulles) kept the United States aloof from the
alliance (Northern Tier), though it was understood that American aid
might be available to it". 105

But Turkey began, in the fall of 1954, preparing to offer
participation to the Arab countries. Iraq, linked already by treaty to
Great Britain, showed immediate interest, while the other Arab countries,
aside from Egypt, who quickly made it known that the time was not yet
ripe, showed either hostility or skepticism. The Lebanese government,
pressured by a significant group in its parliament to make a definite
stand towards Western approaches, and facing stern nationalist, anti-
imperialist voicings from another side, decided to pass the buck. It
used all its efforts to elicit from the combined Arab League countries
a policy statement. In this it succeeded, and thus prevented itself
from being drawn into the swelling inter-Arab dispute over Arab-Western
relations. At the same time it used its self-appointed status as
mediator to try and salve the differences arising out of the prestige
struggle between revolutionary Egypt and feudal Iraq. The Lebanese
diplomats were perhaps blessed in this attempt by the United States.

105 Wint, Guy, and Calvooreedi, Peter, "Middle East Crisis", (1967) p. 50
The Beirut press indicated on several occasions that Lebanese representatives to inter-Arab discussions were briefed on the American point of view by the United States envoy in the Lebanese capital. Of course any effort by the Lebanese authorities to mediate in inter-Arab differences on behalf of the United States were not made public. That this intention might have been present, however, seems likely in light of Dulles’ hint, referring to his talks with President Amin in his speech on returning to the United States after his 1958 Middle East trip, that the Lebanese president viewed his country as a meeting place for East and West.

Lebanon’s reaction to American relations with the Arab world between Dulles’ visit and the Baghdad Pact can be broadly described only as friendly but aloof—attracted to the West but jealously protecting its position among its more extreme nationalist, anti-imperialist Arab brother countries, and at the same time preserving the basis of the National Pact within the country.

The point has come in this consideration of Lebanon’s reaction to United States policy in the Middle East to attempt a summation of the two countries’ relationship for the nearly five year period discussed so far. Lebanon’s attitude towards the United States, its policy in Lebanon and the Arab world, may be described as friendly and often cooperative—but proper; sympathetic but not aligned.

Let us review the reactions evidenced by Lebanon which led to the choice of the above description.

The Big 3 Western powers in 1950 declared themselves in favor of the maintenance of the status quo in the Middle East and ready to
assure the stability of current boundaries with force if necessary. The Lebanese government's reaction was favorable. In 1961, Lebanon let drop, with no definite action, a proposal by the Big 3 plus Turkey that it enter, along with the other Arab states, a system of common defense for the Middle East. The public opinion inside the country was split in two, as was the attitude of the other Arab countries. The government decided the best move was to hinge its response to a common action by the Arab League countries together. Such unity of Arab purpose was not found and nothing resulted.

United States Secretary of State Dulles visited the Middle East, including Lebanon, in 1963 on a fact finding mission. He was brought to realize and state the obvious—that the Arab countries were not as yet prepared to join with the West in a common defense arrangement. Dulles, however, suggested that countries to the north of the Arab world and on the edge of the Soviet Union might be more so inclined, and hinted that any efforts by such countries to unite for their common defense would be looked upon favorably by the United States. In the spring of the following year, Turkey and Pakistan signed just such an arrangement. And the same fall British-supported Premier Nuri Said of Iraq showed his intention to take the first Arab step into the 'northern tier' defense organisation envisaged by Dulles. The pride of revolutionary Egypt was wounded by the Iraqis' apparent flouting of its desire to rid the Arabs of foreign influence just when it had been successful in negotiating the withdrawal of British troops from its own territory, and its leaders considered American and British attempts to thus form a defense arrangement with Arab participation as a move to split the Arab world.
The Lebanese government's reaction to all this was conditioned by the fact that it represented two internal factions, one of which was pro-Western and called for the assumption of a definite (positive) attitude towards the Western desire to form a Middle Eastern defense system, and the other in full support of the Arab nationalist attitude maintained by the government of Cairo. The Lebanese leaders thus decided to follow a position of neutrality, based on the National Pact, predating any assumption of position on their part on a unified position of the Arab countries. They even used their mediation to this end, but as in 1951 the split was wide and the disputing Arab factions could not be united. When Premier Menderes of Turkey formally invited Lebanon to join Iraq and Turkey in what was to become known as the Baghdad Pact, the government refused, but admitted that they would be willing to continue talks on the proposition at a later date. This lent credence to the opinion of some observers that the currently pro-Western leaders would have liked to join but could not risk the effect of the inevitable propaganda attack by Egypt on the already turbulent internal political scene.

This chain of events, and the Lebanese government's reaction to them, gives rise to the description of that government's attitude toward the United States as being sympathetic but not aligned.

104 One such observation is made by Wilton Wynn in his book "Masses of Egypt".
Lebanon's refusal to join with Iraq and Turkey in the Baghdad Pact was marked evidence of the government's respect for the provisions of the National Pact and the Arab League. However, it did not prevent the country from being drawn further into the affairs of the Arab world and the United States, the latter, following the British agreement to withdraw from its bases in Egypt, personifying the Western bloc's role in the Middle East was concerned.

And as the climate of opinion between the Arab nationalistic elements in the Middle East and the Western powers became more and more tense, it became more difficult for the Lebanese leadership to adopt a foreign policy that would balance the reactions to international political exchanges registered by the opposing segments both in the Arab world and inside the country itself.

For some time however, the government was able to successfully maintain its position as the fulcrum of the political see-saw.

The signature by Iraq and Turkey of the Baghdad Pact on 24 February, 1955, brought into being one of the greatest subjects of attack on Western foreign policy in the Middle East. Although the
United States did not enter the pact, Secretary of State Dulles had conceived the idea of such a 'northern tier' defense arrangement and the United States had vocally supported the Turk-Pakistani agreement and the proposed Turk-Iraqi alliance. Attacks on the Baghdad Pact then must be considered at least in part as denunciations of American foreign policy in the Middle East.

The purpose behind United States enthusiasm for mutual defense arrangements among the countries of the Middle East was easily apparent. In his "State of the Union" message to Congress on 8 January 1955, President Eisenhower mentioned the "military threat" which was "but one menace to our freedom and security". To see that this threat did not succeed, the President in his budget message of 17 January called for an expenditure of some 4,300,000,000 dollars on mutual assistance programs, appropriately stressing military assistance, but pointing out that the national interest required "direct assistance to certain less developed countries where a rate of economic progress which would be impossible without such assistance is essential to their becoming and remaining strong and healthy members of the community of free nations capable of resisting Communist penetration and subversion". United States dollars were available to any foreign government willing to exert its influence to the benefit of the fight against the spread of international communism.

The Lebanese government, headed by President Camille Chamoun, had maintained its traditionally neutral position during the inter-Arab

105 Bulletin, op. cit., January 17, 1955, p. 79
106 ibid., January 11, 1955, p. 183
dispute over the entry of Iraq into the Western-backed Baghdad Pact. Lebanese diplomacy, however, was far from stagnant, employing all its effort towards preventing a total break between Iraq, which was with the West, and Egypt, the most important country, ultimately, where the defense of the Middle East is concerned.

There was no immediate government comment in Beirut to the announcement of the Pact's signature. *L'Orient* (Christian, Lebanese, neutral) however, said the Iraqi move caused 'bewilderness' and 'bitterness' in Lebanese official circles which were hoping until the last minute that Iraq and Turkey would agree, for the sake of Arab unity, to postpone the signature. *Fayrouz* (Muḥāfaẓa, Arab nationalist, neutral) said editorially the Arab League could not be broken up by the pact and that Lebanon should continue its mediatory efforts and Iraq be given the chance to justify its action at the forthcoming League meeting in Cairo. *Al-Jarida* (Christian, Lebanese, neutral) said it was not logical to think that the benefits that Iraq would obtain through its alliance with Turkey would ever justify the deep loss caused to the Arabs by the resultant split within the League.

In other press comment — *Sada Lubnan* (Christian, Arab, opposition) opposed the Pact and urged the government to take a courageous stand and join other Arab nations in condemning Nuri Said's move. *Al-Awal* (Christian, Lebanese, pro-government) denounced the pact and held that it was, besides everything else, meant to restore Turkish supremacy over the former Ottoman Empire. *Beirut Masra* (Muḥāfaẓa, Arab, opposition) saw only danger in the pact—danger that the Arabs should join the West before obtaining satisfaction for their national aspirations. \(^{107}\)

107 *Arab World, op.cit.*, 25 February 1955
Reacting with a move designed to isolate Iraq from the rest of the Arab countries as a result of its acceptance of the alliance with Turkey, Egypt and Syria on 3 March 1965 initiated a draft agreement for political, economic and military collaboration. Another impetus to the move was the Gaza raid on Egyptian army installations by the Israeli army which took place on 28 February. Director General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Fuad Asmaoun the same day received United States Charge d'Affaires Amaun Mayer who inquired as to Lebanon's attitude toward the Syrio-Egyptian accord and the conversation being held by Major Salah Saleh and Syrian Foreign Minister Khaled Asa with officials in Amman.

The government again adopted a neutral attitude between Cairo and Baghdad. But there was evidently pressure from both sides. Lebanese Ambassador to Washington Charles Malik returned to Beirut 5 March and held consultations with President Chamoun. The Ambassador reportedly gave the point of view of the State Department regarding the Baghdad pact as well as information received in London and Paris concerning political developments in the Middle East. L'Orient (Christian, Lebanese, neutral) suggested that Malik told Chamoun that the United States would offer Lebanon all the arms it needed and increase its economic and financial aid if it would adhere to the Baghdad pact. 108 According to Al-Dunia (Christian, indefinite, opposition) however, Malik had suggested that the government should not remain isolated and that it would be better for Lebanon to join the United States in a direct

108 L'Orient, op.cit., 5 March 1965
pact — that is a pact with the West that was not through the inter-
mediary of Turkey.109

On 6 March, Salah Salem and Khaled Assi arrived in Beirut and
met with Chamoun, Naccache, Assoun and Sami Solh. L'Orient reported
that "during this meeting Major Salah Salem submitted to the Lebanese
leaders the agreement concluded with Syria and proposed to them that
they adhere to that agreement". The Lebanese representatives told
Salem and Assi they would not adhere right away, but would have to
examine the accord in all its details. They would not take a definite
decision before the other Arab states—including Iraq—had clearly
defined their attitudes. Salem and Assi had presented their proposals
to King Saud in Riyadh the day before and received his approval.110 The
Lebanese could no more afford to be aligned with Egypt and Syria in a
counter-pact to the Baghdad alignment than with Iraq against the wishes
of Cairo. Lebanon's prestige and individuality rested on its ability
to maintain its neutral bargaining position. The Egyptian-Syrian pact
by the way included an agreement on 1) non-adhesion to the Turko-Iraqi
alliance or any other alliance, 2) creation of an Arab defense organiza-
tion, and 3) the opening of a conference during the current month of
March between chiefs of government, foreign ministers, ministers of
defense, finance, economy, and chiefs of state to establish the basis
of a pact.111

109 Arab World, op.cit., 7 March 1955

110 L'Orient, op.cit., 7 March 1955

111 Ibid.
The attitude of the United States towards the Egyptian-Syrian-Saudi proposal was not one of opposition. Beirut's Al-Mahar (Christian, Lebanese, neutral) and other papers quoted the new United States Ambassador to Egypt Henry Byroade as saying at his first press conference on 10 March that his government would welcome any pact serving the common interests of the signatories, and in fact would be prepared to assist such a pact to be successful. However, he added, the United States was not attempting to impose any particular formula on Egypt. He said the Turk-Iraqi pact alone could not insure the defense of the Middle East since not all the Arab League states were in it.\footnote{112}

L'Orient (Christian, Lebanese, neutral) later quoted Byroade as saying that "any accord which would be accepted by Egypt to resolve the problem of the defense of the Middle East would be the only way to organize that defense". This was considered by the newspaper as further proof that the United States would be disposed to envisage the adoption of a system of defense which would not necessarily be based on the Turk-Iraqi pact. According to a Lebanese government spokesman this new look in American policy left hope for the arranging of a compromise between the Turk-Iraqi pact and the proposed Egypt-Syria-Saudi Arabia pact.\footnote{113}

The Turks, however, evidently considered the recently effected inter-Arab alliance as an affront. The Turkish government on 15 March sent a note to Syria saying "We consider that the adhesion of Damascus to the inter-Arab alliance is directed against Turkey". Syrian Foreign Minister Haled Assi, however, denied any hostility by Syria towards Turkey.\footnote{114}

\footnote{112 Arab world, op.cit., 11 March 1955}
\footnote{113 L'Orient, op.cit., 15 March 1955}
\footnote{114 ibid., 14 March 1955}
Amman meanwhile was preparing a mission to Baghdad to persuade Iraq that the proposed Arab defense pact was not directed against Iraq. The delegation reportedly would ask Iraq to join the pact in light of the apparent evidence that the West desired to use the Baghdad Pact to further Arab-Israeli rapprochement.\footnote{Amman was reportedly ready to promise King Saud that the clauses in the proposed Arab pact requiring Iraq's denunciation of its pact with Turkey would be removed. There would be no demand that Iraq abandon the Baghdad Pact but only the request that she join the Egyptian-sponsored pact in order to save Arab unity.\footnote{The talks in Baghdad, however, came to naught. Iraq was not willing to let its policy be in any way affected by the neutralism of Egypt.} The tension between Syria and Turkey increased. Several notes were exchanged and rejected. Lebanon's activity turned to mediation again. \footnote{Premier Sami Solh on 23 March talked with the Turkish, Iraqi and United States ministers in Beirut and reportedly expressed the desire of the Lebanese government to see Iraq intervene with Turkey to bring about an end to the campaign against Syria. The Turkish and Iraqi diplomats promised to submit the proposal to their governments. Both Lebanese Ambassador to the United States Charles Malik and Director General of the Lebanese Foreign Ministry Fadl Ammoun were present at these talks. Ammoun later received United States Ambassador Heath and reportedly pointed out that United States intervention with Turkey to ease the tension between Syria and Turkey.}}
atmosphere of Turkish-Syrian relations would be particularly desirable.\textsuperscript{117} Solh also offered Lebanese mediation but was turned down by Syria.\textsuperscript{116}

The Lebanese authorities were apparently doing their best to soothe the feelings between Syria and Turkey and between Egypt and Iraq to prepare the way for a general accord on the problem of the defense of the Near and Middle East. Malik went off to Baghdad for talks with Nuri Said, and returned on 29 March to report the results in successive talks with United States Ambassador Heath, Egyptian Ambassador Ghaleb, Iraq Foreign Minister Houssam Chabandar and British Ambassador Chapman-Andrews. He also talked with Amoun. Amoun then talked with the American Ambassador.\textsuperscript{119} These talks apparently had no success in improving the atmosphere among the disputing camps in the Middle East. The close contact maintained between the Lebanese authorities and the United States envoy, however, is interesting, as well as the fact that Malik had returned from Washington to enter the diplomatic activity.

President Chamoun was not inactive. He had left on 21 March for a state visit to Italy but on 30 March Premier Solh left Beirut to meet the President in Ankara. Before leaving, Solh talked with Egyptian Ambassador Ghaleb to offer the assurance that Lebanon would maintain its neutrality on the matter of pacts. Solh said Chamoun's visit to Turkey had no political character but the Turkish Charge d'Affaires in Beirut said the Ankara conversations would naturally concern political questions of the day. He said the essential aim of the visit was to reinforce the

\textsuperscript{117} L'Orient, op.cit., 24 March 1965
\textsuperscript{118} ibid., 25 March 1965
\textsuperscript{119} ibid., 30 March 1965
links between Turkey and Lebanon.\textsuperscript{120}

Meanwhile, it was announced in London and Baghdad that Britain had adhered to the Baghdad Pact—as of April 6. There should have been no further hope that Iraq and Egypt could come to terms. Allying with Turkey was bad enough in Egyptian eyes but to be associated in a defense pact with Britain, who had finally agreed only a few months before to evacuate its Suez bases, was the ultimate denunciation of Egyptian policy of neutrality.

Foreign Minister Ma'azzeh, who had also gone to Ankara to meet President Chamoun, returned to Beirut the first of April. He had stated before leaving that Lebanese policy aimed at avoiding the conclusion of any alliance at present, while cooperating with the West for the maintenance of security and stability in the Middle East, provided, naturally, that form of cooperation was agreed on by the majority of Arab states.\textsuperscript{121}

President Chamoun was not so willing to concede to the point of view of the other Arab states. He said on his arrival in Ankara that an exchange of visits in the current troubled times could only tighten relations between Lebanon and Turkey. When such a visit was accompanied by positive achievements such as the raising of diplomatic representation to the embassy level, the signature of commercial agreements and the negotiation of a cultural agreement, a great step forward would be taken to preserve peace and create favorable conditions for the development of

\textsuperscript{120} ibid., 51 March 1955
\textsuperscript{121} Arab World, op.cit., 1 April 1955
the national life of both countries. Chamoun said that cooperation was to be ardently desired. He added that it would have to be based on understanding and respect of the rights of each country and their mutual duties.

Turkish President Ceylal Bayar welcomed Chamoun by declaring that in the world of today the importance of a country depends not on its size but on the attitude it maintains in the international community and the role it plays therein. He added that in his point of view, Lebanon was an enlightened country capable of rendering important services. 122

President Chamoun's state visit to Turkey ended on 5 April. The two sides issued a joint communiqué saying:

1. Peace and stability in the Middle East are an essential factor of peace and stability in the world at large.

2. Peace and stability require the development of the friendship existing between Lebanon and the Arab world on one hand and with Turkey on the other, and an active cooperation among all countries responsible for the prosperity of the Middle East, "it being well understood that in the interest of the region this cooperation should be allowed to remain open for participation of all countries which are considered by the above mentioned as being apt to contribute to the peace and well-being of the Middle East."

3. There exists no clash of interests between the Arabs and the Turks to preclude the development of their friendship and their cooperation on the basis of respect for their respective rights and interests.

122 Ibid., 4 April 1955
4. This cooperation should be complete in order to solve international problems of concern to all or part of these countries, in accordance with the United Nations Charter and decisions.

5. To achieve the above aims Lebanon and Turkey will establish close contacts and consult each other when necessary.\textsuperscript{123}

From the content of the communique, it appears obvious that the service Lebanon was capable of rendering, and that Chamoun was willing to give, was the effort by Lebanon to find a formula under which the Arabs—all the Arabs—could cooperate with Turkey in the defense of the Middle East and ultimately allow the Western powers to enter into such cooperative efforts. The Beirut newspaper L'Orient (Christian, Lebanese, neutral) remarked that by using Turkey, the West wanted to avoid a confrontation with the Arabs, who would insist on a fair settlement in Palestine as a condition to their cooperation with the West.\textsuperscript{124} This in fact had been the position adopted by the Arab League Political Committee meeting the previous November. The Telegraph (Christian, Arab, opposition) was irked by the cordial tone of the Ankara communique. The paper said the communique clearly meant Arab acceptance, in so far as the Arab opinion was represented by Chamoun, to cooperate with the West under Turkish auspices.\textsuperscript{125} Several papers reported the day after the communique was issued that Foreign Minister Nazarache received from United States Ambassador Donald Heath a note offering financial and technical help in enlarging and developing

\textsuperscript{123} ibid. 6 April 1956
\textsuperscript{124} ibid.
\textsuperscript{125} ibid.
the Beirut International Airport. Naccache said no conditions were attached to the offer but the papers said it was believed in well-informed quarters that the offer came as a reward to Lebanon for its general policy and its stability.126

Whether or not Lebanon's, or President Chamsoun's, policy of furthering the cooperation among Arab countries was responsible is not clear, but Egypt and Iraq agreed on 15 June to stop the press attacks against the leaders of each other's country. Lebanon had again kept itself in the middle, unaligned, but friendly to both the West — approved Baghdad alliance — the counter-proposed Arab alliance initiated by Egypt and Syria.

While the war of the pacts raged and abated, and Lebanon, under the increasing guidance of President Chamsoun was developing and demonstrating its "general policy and stability", still another tense situation developed in the Middle East.

Israel has become concerned for its security as a result of the Baghdad Pact. Fearing that Western efforts to formulate a Middle East defense organization including all the Arab League states would discount her presence and weaken her prestige, Israel decided to bring her presence dramatically to the attention of both the West and the Arabs. On 26 February 1955 Israel launched a heavy attack on Egyptian army headquarters in the Gaza Strip, seriously defeating the Egyptian garrison and wounding the pride of the Egyptian armed forces. The tension along the borders
mounted steadily and by the end of the summer the United States had decided it was time to make another attempt to bring peace and security to the area by a proposed unilateral action that would gain the support of the Middle Eastern countries and ultimately result in the long-sought-after, coordinated Middle East security arrangement with United States backing.

On 26 August, Secretary of State Dulles told the American Council on Foreign Relations that in the Middle East, "as in many other areas, security can be assured only by collective measures which commit decisive power to the deterring of aggression.

"President Eisenhower has authorized me to say that, given a solution to the other related problems, he would recommend that the United States join in formal treaty engagements to prevent or thwart any effort by either side to alter by force the boundaries between Israel and its Arab neighbors. I hope that other countries would be willing to join in such a security guarantee, and that it would be sponsored by the United Nations."

These remarks were made in the portion of Dulles' speech devoted to the problem of 'fear in the area'. The other two major problems he saw were those of refugees and boundaries. The Secretary suggested a United States loan to Israel to help Israel pay compensation to the refugees. On the boundary problem Dulles felt that "In spite of conflicting claims and sentiments ... it is possible to find a way of reconciling the vital interests of all the parties. The United States
would be willing to help in the search for a solution if the parties to the dispute should desire.\textsuperscript{127}

There was no formal reaction from the Lebanese government to the Dulles proposals. Egypt however responded, first by rejecting the Dulles offer and later by taking the initiative in a move that was to further entangle the relations between the Arab world and the West—and Lebanon's reaction to them.

Before continuing, however, it is necessary to point out the situation as regards Lebanese foreign policy. While Dulles was stating his government's views on the situation in the Middle East, Lebanese Foreign Minister Hikm Frangia\textsuperscript{128} was in Cairo discussing foreign policy matters with Premier Nasser. The communique published at the completion of the meetings stated that the two sides were in full cooperation and close harmony on their agreed aims which they called on the other Arab countries to seek as well. The communique previewed close political exchanges of view on all matters of interest to the two countries, more consultations between Beirut and Cairo between the ministers of finance, commerce and industry, etc., and encouraged joint meetings in Cairo and Beirut between the respective ministers of education, information and orientation to better the cultural and social agreements between the two countries.\textsuperscript{129} Frangia's mission in Cairo showed a certain deviation from the policy followed by Chamoun in his visit to

\textsuperscript{128} Alfred Beccache resigned as Foreign Minister in July after a quarrel with Premier Solh.
\textsuperscript{129} L'Orient, op. cit., 5 September 1955
Ankara earlier in the year, since the Egyptians and Turks were not on the best of terms.

This statement of the full harmony existing between Egypt and Lebanon was made on 2 September. Two days later Egypt officially announced her rejection of the Dulles plan saying she "will not accept any mediation in our conflict with Israel". The Egyptian statement insisted that country would not recognize a United States guarantee of Israel's borders such as suggested by Dulles. 130

Five days later Frangieh resigned from the Lebanese cabinet. Although there was an internal policy reason for his quitting (he presented his resignation along with that of Finance Minister Pierre Edde in support of the latter's insistence on revocation of certain "illegal" tax exemptions decreed in favor of certain companies), Frangieh said he could not continue with the diplomatic action he had undertaken because he "had no more confidence in the persons who shared with him the responsibilities of power". 131

L'Orient (Christian, Lebanese, neutral) reported that during a stormy cabinet meeting Frangieh told the ministers of his mission in Egypt and his discussions with Nasser. He was said to have made a point of the activity carried out in Cairo by a Lebanese deputy known for his attachments with the "high authorities" (the newspapers' term for Chamsun).

130 ibid., 5 September 1955. (Dulles had no intention that the United States should guarantee the present Israeli frontiers.)

131 ibid., 8 September 1955
and ... with a "certain foreign power", to disturb his conciliatory efforts. This deputy, he said, had distributed in Cairo nearly 5,000 copies of a speech made by Frangieh some months before in parliament in which he had taken to task the methods of the Egyptian leaders in foreign policy matters.\footnote{132} \textit{Al-Jarida} (Christian, Lebanese, neutral), and other papers also quoted Frangieh’s statement of no-confidence in some of his colleagues and his description of the parliament affair. Slightly more specific as to the cause for the dispute, \textit{Al-Hayat} (Muslim, undetermined, neutral) said that while in Cairo Frangieh had voiced some political opinions (no military alliances) which did not conform with the "higher authorities" views.\footnote{133} The newspaper said the next day that Frangieh’s resignation meant an open rebellion against the policies of Chamoun.\footnote{134}

Sparked by the Kdhe-Frangieh move the government of Sami Sulh fell on 15 September 1955. A new cabinet was formed by Rashid Karad on 19 September which was reported acceptable to the President but considered by the press as weak and makeshift. Karad reportedly had given Chamoun the choice of two cabinets—a "strong one" including ex-Foreign Minister Frangieh and ex-Finance Minister Kdhe, the former being known for his wariness of the West-sponsored Baghdad Pact, and a weaker "caretaker" cabinet that would include neither of these strong opinionated elements. Chamoun chose the latter.\footnote{135}

\footnote{132} Ibid.
\footnote{133} \textit{Arab World, op.cit.}, 7 September 1955
\footnote{134} Ibid., 8 September 1955
\footnote{135} Ibid., 20 September 1955
Egypt was disturbed by the change in Lebanese cabinets. L'Orient reported on 19 September that the Lebanese Ambassador in Cairo had informed both President Chamoun and the Foreign Ministry that Cairo was worried that Frangiah's exit from the cabinet was due to the joint communiqué he signed while in Cairo as Foreign Minister and which promised greater coordination between Lebanese and Egyptian foreign policies. Egypt, the ambassador was said to have reported, wished that the terms of the Cairo joint communiqué be applied regardless of who became foreign minister. New Lebanese Premier Karam satisfied the Egyptian wish and let it be known that his government would abide by the joint communiqué issued in Cairo by Nasser and Frangiah. The communiqué was evidently considered important by Nasser, because, although vague, it implied Lebanese assurance that she was not eager to join any pact at that time and would take no such step without consulting Egypt.

The foreign policy of the Lebanese government then was still formally neutral in the battle between Arab nationalism, as led by Egypt's revolutionary government and its non-alignment policy, and the continued desire by the United States to see the formation of a Middle East security organization, backed by the West, to stand against the threat of communism. The change in the Lebanese government however, showed that there was not complete harmony between the President and other important political leaders as to the attitude Lebanon should be taking.

156 ibid.
Just one month following Dulles' proposals to bring an end to the troubled situation in the Middle East resulting from Arab, primarily Egyptian-Israeli border clashes, Nasser announced that Egypt had contracted with the Czechoslovak government to purchase arms with which its borders might be defended without outside help, or interference. The Egyptian move was not just another reaction to an American effort to create a mutually agreeable system for the maintenance of Middle Eastern security. The pride and prestige of the revolutionary government had been severely damaged by the defeat its army suffered at the hands of the Israelis in February. It was pressured both from without and within to do something to re-assert its position of leadership among the Arab nationalist-minded masses and political leaders in the Arab world. Nasser's nationalism could not tolerate an association with the West in order that the great powers might guarantee its security. The revolution was designed primarily to rid Egypt of the influence of the foreigner. And Nasser could not buy arms from the United States. In his announcement of the Czech arms deal Nasser said he made the move because Egypt had failed in almost continual attempts since 1952 to get sufficient arms from the West due to the "conditions" required by those governments.

The United States, he said, "required Egypt, in return for United States arms, to sign the mutual security agreement and to join Western alliances."\(^{137}\)

In Beirut, the press reaction to the arms deal was as usual varied. The nationalistic, anti-Western papers were elated. None were

\(^{137}\) Ibid., 26 September 1955.
outright against the move. Most papers, whether pro or anti-West, blamed Egypt's move on the failure of Western policy. Al-Wahab, (Christian, Lebanese, neutral) however, drew the attention of the Arabs to the inescapable dependence of the arms buyer on the arms supplier.138

Washington was extremely upset by the Egyptian move. Assistant Secretary of State George Allen was dispatched almost immediately to Cairo, and to Beirut, to try to prevent the arms race that the United States policy makers feared would develop. The United States concern was not only due to the probability of further friction between Egypt and Israel, per se, but because of its over-riding fear that tension in the Middle East would provide good breeding grounds for Communist activity.

The Lebanese government, following the only possible route of policy in light of the tremendous popularity the arms deal had gained for Nasser, backed the Egyptian move. New Foreign Minister Selim Laboud replied to a question put to him by the press that "Lebanon supports Egypt's stand, and considers that her move is perfectly sound, because it is based on the principle of self-defense." 139

Allen arrived in Cairo on 30 September. After meeting Nasser, he told newsmen: "Of course it is a natural attribute of the sovereignty of any country to buy arms anywhere it likes." Asked why the United States opposed the arms deal he said: "You are putting words into my mouth which I have not said." 140

138 ibid., 29 September 1955
139 ibid., 30 September 1955
140 ibid., 5 October 1955
While Allen met with the Egyptian leaders in Cairo, there was also intense political activity in Beirut. United States Charge D'Affaires J. Emerson met with Premier Karame to explain the United States point of view regarding the arms purchase. L'Orient (Christian, Lebanese, neutral) and other papers reported that Emerson told Karame the United States government was not happy over Egypt's decision to purchase arms from the Iron Curtain countries since the resulting upset balance of power in the Middle East might cause trouble. It was further reported that the United States envoy asked the Lebanese government to intervene in order to convince Egypt "to renounce its new arms policy." 141

The official United States policy concerning the supply of arms to the Middle East had been made public even before Nasser made his announcement. On 27 September, Secretary of State Dulles and British Foreign Secretary Harold Macmillan issued a joint statement after talks in New York saying: "Both governments base their policies on the desire, on the one hand, to enable the various countries to provide for national security and for their defense, and on the other, to avoid an arms race which would inevitably increase the tensions in the area. They will continue, and hope other governments will continue, to be guided by these principles." 142 This statement was obviously directed at the Soviet Union. There had been rumours to the effect that Egypt was planning to obtain arms from the Soviet bloc.

Allen arrived in Beirut on 4 October and met with President Chamoun. He later told the press the meeting was to seek information.

141 ibid.,
In Washington, Dulles told a news conference the same day that "it is difficult to be critical of countries which, feeling themselves endangered, seek the arms which they sincerely believe they need for defense. On the other hand, I doubt very much that, under the conditions which prevail in the area, it is possible for any country to get security through an arms race. Also it is not easy or pleasant to speculate on the probable motives of the Soviet-bloc leaders." 145

On 5 October Allen conferred with Premier Karame. The following morning all Beirut papers reported that the American envoy had offered to supply arms to Lebanon under one of two systems—free supply or against payment. In the first instance, it was reported, Lebanon would have to accept the provisions of the United States Mutual Security Act. The conditions under the second possibility were slightly different. Al-Hayat (Muslim, undetermined, neutral) said Karame told Allen that Lebanon was ready to accept the offer of free armament provided the conditions were "reasonable". Al-Jarida (Christian, Lebanese, neutral) reported nearly the same thing, but also quoted Karame as saying Lebanon was prepared to pay for arms if the conditions under the other method were not acceptable. The paper added that no definite agreement was reached but that the offer was left open. Allen was quoted as saying after his talk with Karame that they had exchanged their governments' viewpoints on matters of mutual interest. He confirmed that the supply of arms to Lebanon was one of the matters discussed but refused to say more until he had reported to Dulles. 144

Al-Jarida (Christian, Lebanese, Neutral) and other papers quoted Karame as telling the cabinet in a meeting after his talks with Allen that

145 ibid., October 17, 1955, p. 604
144 Arab World, op. cit. 6 October 1955
he had insisted that the West should find a fair solution to the Palestine problem before any cooperation could be envisaged. Any other attitude, he said, would expose the Arab world to internal troubles and revolutions. He added that in their present forms the Dulles proposals and the Johnston plan for the Jordan River were unacceptable.

On 6 October the United States Embassy in Beirut issued a communique denying reports of an American offer of arms to Lebanon. The release recalled that an offer for the sale of arms was made to Lebanon as far back as 1953 but that no transaction ever took place. The communique said Allen's mission was to "clear up misapprehension on the part of the Egyptian and Lebanese governments regarding the attitudes and policies of the United States and to get clearer understanding and appreciation of the Egyptian and Lebanese points of view." The communique added that "these purposes were achieved. In its edition of the following morning, L'Orient (Christian, Lebanese, neutral) replied to the embassy's statement, saying it was issued to "cover up" Allen's failure to persuade either Egypt or Lebanon to accept United States arms, Dulles' proposals for a settlement of the Palestine dispute or the Johnston plan.

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145 The Johnston plan entailed cooperation between the Arab countries and Israel on development plans for the Jordan River. The negotiations by the United States special ambassador had been going on for over a year but the Arabs of course would not agree to anything entailing cooperation with Israel.

146 ibid.

147 ibid., 7 October 1955
It is not essential for our purposes to determine whether or not Allen actually made an offer of arms to Lebanon. It is clear enough that if such an offer were made, the conditions attached would have had to be such that the American government could justify the sale of arms to an Arab country after its continued denunciations of an arms race. From the standpoint of Lebanon, it also appears obvious that the government would have been very unpopular if it had accepted such a conditioned offer. And the Lebanese leaders had no desire to suffer the loss in prestige in the Arab world that would follow the incurred wrath.

The attitude of the Lebanese government towards the West (the United States had by this time of course become the personification of the West due to its position as the greatest, most powerful Western country and its leadership in the battle against the communism of the East—Soviet Russia) in the period to follow must be determined from the tone of its relations with the Arab proponents of neutralism in the East-West struggle. An example of these relations was the Arab foreign ministers conference held in Cairo beginning 9 October 1955 to review all current Arab problems.

Lebanon's Foreign Minister Lahoud met Masser and reportedly submitted to him the outline for a new defense pact. The Lebanese government had won its vote of confidence in parliament on 4 October partially on the basis of its foreign policy statement which called for stronger Arab League unity and the conclusion of an Arab defense pact "that would include all Arab nations without exception, on condition that none of
these countries should extend its foreign commitments to others.

Lahoud, according to L'Orient, went to Cairo carrying two messages for Nasser, one from President Chamoun and one from Premier Karami. These were said to express Lebanon's desire to enhance relations with Egypt and cooperate fully with her in order to recreate the unity of the Arab front and reinforce the Arab League. Karami was reported to have said in his message that Lebanon was strongly attached to the contents of the joint communique issued in Cairo on 2 September by former Foreign Minister Frangiéh and Nasser.

Concerning the question of the Arab stand as regards the Johnston Plan, one of the topics of discussion at the Cairo meeting, Lahoud told Egyptian newspapermen that "Lebanon will agree to no project that in one way or another would imply recognition of, or economic or technical cooperation with Israel." The fervor of Lahoud's denunciation of the American sponsored plan was so intense that Beirut newspapers gave him credit for leading the Arab opposition to it. The conference ended in Cairo without taking any decision on the Johnston Plan, but Lebanon had had its chance to bid for Arab favor. Nothing, however, was said about the Lebanese idea (supported by Syria) for an Arab defense pact.

On the subject of pacts, the Beirut papers reported on 14 October a visit paid to Premier Karami by the Iranian Minister in Beirut. They said it was believed Karami told his visitor that the government was unable to go counter to the will of parliament that Lebanon should not adhere

148 ibid., 5 October 1955
149 ibid., 20 October 1955
150 ibid., 11 October 1955
to any defense pact other than Arab. Iran had joined the Baghdad Pact on 12 October.\textsuperscript{151} On 20 October, Egypt and Syria finally formally signed their proposed bilateral defense pact. And on 12 December, Foreign Minister Lhoud announced that Lebanon and Syria had decided to cooperate militarily on the basis of the Arab League Collective Security treaty of 1950.\textsuperscript{152}

Lebanon took the most drastic step yet towards giving evidence of its neutrality in the matter of pacts when in early March 1956, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia issued a joint communique, a portion of which ruled out Lebanese participation in the Baghdad Pact. This showed first of all that other Arab countries were concerned that the Lebanese government might sometime decide to make such a move, and second that the government at that time was prepared to formally commit itself to a policy of non-alignment with the West-sponsored pact.

It is interesting here to note the official American position as regards the Baghdad Pact at that time. A few months before, on 19 November 1955, the United States government announced it had been invited to establish military and political liaison with the organization, and added that "the United States has informed the pact members of its willing-

\textsuperscript{151} ibid., 14 October 1955
\textsuperscript{152} United States in World Affairs, 1955, p. 185 (This American Journal in its edition for 1955 had this to say about the position of the Lebanese government on matters of interest to the Arab world in the fall of that year: "...in Lebanon, hostility to Israel was less intense but officially intransigence nevertheless matched that of the other Arab states, because of domestic political instability and a desire to appear as strongly nationalist as did the Arab colleagues. Half-Christian Lebanon had no desire to weaken its ties with the West; though pressed by Turkey to join as a Baghdad partner, it preferred a middle position as mediator between Iraq and Egypt and did not wish to contribute to Arab disunity. It avoided the Egyptian alliance system as well as the Baghdad Pact, though late in the year its foreign minister proclaimed that the country would cooperate militarily with Syria under the provisions of the 1950 Arab League collective security treaty".)
ness to do so...." 153 At a press conference on 11 January 1956,
Secretary of State Dallas said in answer to a question about the United
States' position with regard to the pact: "On the question of its further
development, the United States has no particular views. We have not
urged any other countries to join the pact." 154 However, in a joint
declaration by the President of the United States and the Prime Minister
of the United Kingdom on 1 February 1956, concerning in part the tense
situation in the Middle East, it was stated that ... "We discussed the
work of the Baghdad Pact and agreed upon its importance for the security
of the Middle East. We noted that this association, in addition to its
defense aspects, has an important part to play in the economic and
political development of member countries. We believe that it serves
the interests of the area as a whole and provides no reason for impairing
the good relations we wish to maintain with non-member countries.

"The United States Government will continue to give solid support
to the purposes and aims of the Pact and its observers will play a
constructive part in the work of its committees"...155

The United States, still displaying an approving but somewhat
aloof attitude towards the Baghdad Pact, was not, publicly at least, upset
by Lebanon's latest show of neutrality. Both Iraq and Turkey however
protested the move although Lebanese Foreign Minister Lahoud insisted that
the move was only an expression of neutrality and that Lebanon also intended

154 Ibid., January 23, 1956, p. 120
155 Ibid., February 13, 1956, p. 235
to adhere to the tone of the communiqué issued in Ankara the previous April at the end of the talks between President Chamoun and President Bayar.

The Karame cabinet resigned on 16 March. The immediate reason was the question of government subsidies for private schools, to which the Premier objected. However, as Al-Hayat (Hujeir, undetermined, neutral) and others reported, the issue was but the last straw—the culmination of a long series of disagreements between the cabinet and the President and among the members themselves. Al-Hayat pointed out that Chamoun had never agreed to requests by Karame that Lebanon participate in the bilateral military alliances sponsored by Egypt and Saudi Arabia, or to the Premier's adoption of the wording of the joint Libano-Saudi communiqué which precluded Lebanon's entry into the Baghdad Pact, or to Karame's attitude with respect to Iraqi offers of military aid to Lebanon. The fact that Foreign Minister Lahoud remained in power is evidence that he personally was not at odds with President Chamoun or his policy and would not, as Frangieh evidently had, go further to be friends with Egypt than Chamoun wanted.

Abedallah Yafi formed a new government on 19 March. The new cabinet won a confidence vote in parliament on the following three policy points: 1) A more defined foreign policy that might enable Lebanon to recover the confidence of all the Arab states and to restore the unity of the Arab front; 2) Non-participation in the Baghdad Pact or any other pact that might provoke a break in the Arab League; 3) Rejection of the Johnston plan in its present form. 157

156 Arab World, op. cit., 16 March 1956
157 Ibid., 21 March 1956
The difference between the Yafi and Karaki governments is not apparent from their statements of foreign policy. However, in picking Yafi to follow Karaki, President Chamoun chose a man generally considered to be more liberal than his predecessor. Lebanese prime ministers must be Sunni Muslim in religion. Karaki represents the primarily Muslim district of Tripoli, noted for its ties and feelings of a common cause with Syria and Arab nationalism. Yafi, from Beirut, traditionally supported by a segment of the city's Christian population, could afford to be more liberal and thus would be more likely to establish rapport with the President's pro-Western policies.

In his message to Congress on recommendations for the 1957 mutual security program President Eisenhower restated the United States' broad policy towards the Middle East—to provide military and economic aid in support of mutual security pacts and to build economic security in order that the countries might adequately support their own defense effort. Economic assistance did not necessitate military assistance, and technical assistance would continue to be provided. There was no new policy indicated. 158

It was not long afterwards that President Eisenhower again publicly expressed interest and concern about the situation in the Middle East. The Arab-Israel tension was not abating and Eisenhower, in a news conference statement on 21 March said that the outbreak of major hostilities in the Middle East would be a catastrophe for the free world and that the United States would pursue every peaceful course to promote a settlement of the Arab-Israel dispute. 159 On 20 March, United States Ambassador to the United Nations Henry Cabot Lodge had requested that

the Security Council meet to discuss the Arab-Israeli position and prevent, if possible, a recourse to war in Palestine.160

After the Arab states, led by Lebanon and Syria, asked for a month and got a two-day postponement of the Council meeting so that they might prepare their position (they asked, and received invitations for the four countries with common borders with Israel to attend the meeting), the 11-nation body discussed and passed on 4 April the United States resolution calling for withdrawal of troops concentrated on the demarcation lines, full freedom for United Nations observers to inspect frontier areas, and the conclusion of local Arab-Israeli agreements to avoid friction.161 United States Secretary of State Dulles meanwhile made a statement to the effect that a hot war in Palestine might be cause for sending United States troops—with or without Congress's approval according to the haste demanded by the situation.162 At the United Nations both the Arabs and the USSR opposed this possibility. The last day of the Security Council debate concentrated on producing a clear definition of Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld's mission to Palestine, suggested in the United States' resolution. Both the Arabs and the USSR insisted that the Hammarskjöld mission and further proposals be kept within the limits of the Arab-Israeli armistice agreements—meaning the maintenance of the status quo. They wanted Hammarskjöld to have no power to propose military action. Lebanon's delegate, Director General of the Foreign Ministry Fund Aminoun, told the Council that Lodge had given him to understand that the

161 Ibid., p. 628
162 Ibid., p. 642
Secretary General's mission would be, as the Arabs demanded, kept within the limits of the armistice agreements, and that no further action would be ordered by the Council without further consultations with the interested parties.\footnote{183}

The United States resolution was passed unanimously and Hammarskjold asked to study the situation in Palestine and report to the Council within a month. All sides had apparently been satisfied that the United States was not likely to take any action outside the United Nations in case of trouble in Palestine. The interesting point in this brief episode of United States relations with the Arabs is that Dulles suggested the possibility that the United States policy of keeping peace in the Middle East might be put in effect in as drastic a move as unilateral American military action. There was, of course, no change in the Lebanese attitude on the Palestine question. Foreign policy there was not subject to change.

The specific United States policy with regard to the critical situation in the Middle East was stated again on 9 April by presidential press secretary James G. Hagerty shortly after Dulles and Eisenhower met to discuss the seriousness of the situation caused by repeated incidents of hostility. Hagerty said the United States would support fully the mission of Hammarskjold and called for others also to do so. This was his first point. He continued: 2) "The United States, in accordance with its responsibilities under the charter of the United Nations, will observe its commitments within constitutional means to oppose any aggression in the area. 3) The United States is likewise determined to support and

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{footnotes}{183} \textit{Arab World, op.cit., 4 April 1955.}\end{footnotes}{183}\end{footnotesize}
assist any nation which might be subjected to such aggression. The United States is confident that the other nations will act similarly in the cause of peace.\[154\]

At his news conference a week later Dulles was asked about speculation that the United States' call for support of United Nations action in the Middle East was a downgrading of the Tripartite Declaration of 1950. In reply the Secretary of State said that action would be taken "consistently with their obligations as members of the United Nations," and made it clear that the three powers looked upon the Council as providing a means of avoiding hostilities. That, he said, was the interpretation of the United States: "That is, as I say, the way which I think the declaration itself indicates as the preferable way to act. Now if that shouldn't work, then we would have a new situation. But, generally speaking, the action which is now being taken through the United Nations we regard as consistent with the 1950 declaration and not in derogation of that declaration."\[165\]

The impression to be gained from all these statements is that the United States' foreign policy leadership was just not quite sure at the time what pattern its action would take should a really serious hot conflict break out in the Middle East—under which declaration or within the limits of which commitment it could safely and legally act.

As it happened the outbreak of hostilities in the Middle East in the fall of 1956 presented a situation in which the United States had no choice of policy to be followed. For the sake of chronology though we must

165 ibid., April 30, 1956, p. 711
first consider another indication of the general attitude shown by the Lebanese government towards evidences of United States foreign policy efforts in the Middle East and in Lebanon directly.

On 20 June 1966 Lebanese Premier Yafi received the Russian ambassador for talks preparatory to the scheduled visit to Beirut by Soviet Foreign Minister Shepilov on 25 June. Yafi and the ambassador reportedly talked of the subjects to be discussed with Shepilov—Palestine, the backing Russia would give to the Arabs in the United Nations, and the possibility of Soviet aid to Lebanon.\(^{166}\)

Parliamentary Foreign Minister Lahoud told the Foreign Affairs Committee on 21 June that Shepilov wanted to discuss with the Lebanese leaders questions of interest to both countries. It was probable, Lahoud said, that the Russian Foreign Minister would make some interesting offers, likely to tighten the relations between the USSR and Lebanon. Lahoud said he had no knowledge of the nature of such offers, though \textit{L'Orient} reported they would be limited to the economic field. The majority of the deputies on the committee, the paper said also, were of the opinion that a prudent attitude should be maintained in regard to Shepilov's visit and asked the government to observe a certain reserve towards any Soviet offers so as not to offend the Western powers.\(^{167}\)

Shepilov meanwhile was in Cairo visiting Nasser. On 22 June the two issued a communique noting their "identity of views". It said "the development of political, economic and cultural relations between Egypt and the USSR responds to the interests of the two countries." The Soviet foreign minister then flew to Damascus.

\(^{166}\) \textit{L'Orient}, op.cit., 21 June, 1966

\(^{167}\) \textit{Ibid.}, 22 June 1966
On 25 June both Point IV and the Lebanese government announced an agreement by the American government agency to make available 5.67 millions of dollars "to help Lebanon improve its public road and transportation system."\textsuperscript{168} L'Orient (Christian, Lebanese, neutral) said the signature of the agreement just before Shepilow's visit was considered in some Lebanese political circles as a counter-stroke of American diplomacy. The paper recalled that Lebanon was originally offered a loan of 1 million dollars for the project but refused, requesting instead the aid to be provided in the form of a grant. According to L'Orient negotiations resulted in the 25 June accord, so opportune and announced by joint communiqué issued by Laboud and Point IV director Heath. On the same day Shepilow offered the Syrian government credits up to one million Syrian pounds to be utilised in the accomplishment of certain large projects.\textsuperscript{169}

Shepilow arrived in Beirut on 25 June and told the press:

"A sincere friendship has united our two countries for a long time, and the Soviet people have always followed with sympathy the efforts of Lebanon to achieve its independence. The Soviet Union recognizes for its just value, the service rendered by the Lebanese people in the cause of peace and for the fight of the Arab countries against the Baghdad Pact, the promoter of a new form of colonialism."\textsuperscript{170} The Soviet Foreign Minister remained in Beirut until 28 June having discussions with Lebanese leaders. On that day the two sides issued a communiqué expressing their 1) identity of views on international problems, notably those of the Arab world, 2) their desire to develop economic and cultural relations, and 3) the

\textsuperscript{168} Bulletin, op.cit., July 9 1956, p. 67
\textsuperscript{169} L'Orient, op.cit., 24 June 1956
\textsuperscript{170} Ibid., 26 June 1956
decided to raise their diplomatic representation to the embassy level. There was no mention of specific Soviet offers.\textsuperscript{171}

As pointed out by the front page editorial of \textit{El Orient} of 26 June, Lebanon’s choice between East and West had been made. The writer felt that the timing of Lebanon’s acceptance of the United States aid offer was adequate, and humiliating evidence of that fact. "No matter how the question is turned," the editorialist remarked, "there is nothing in it of honor to the government: Lebanon is engaged, economically and spiritually, by a thousand lines to the West; the semblance of political freedom that one tried to safeguard was destroyed in a phrase on the 23rd of June for 5 million dollars. The haste made by the Americans to sign and publish the agreement had no other aim; and Mr. Yafi apparently did not reflect on the interpretation that would be given, just as quickly, to his act."\textsuperscript{172}

It was clear, as the writer quoted above pointed out, that the Lebanese government, and through it the country, was attached economically to the West, and where aid was concerned especially with the United States. However, it has been pointed out earlier, and will again later, that the parliament was often reluctant to approve the United States aid deals because of the unfavorable reaction of other Arab countries and segments of the Lebanese population, or because some deputies honestly feared acceptance of American aid would endanger the country’s independence. The objection raised would have been even greater if the government move had involved an obvious political commitment to the West.

\textsuperscript{171} Ibid., 26 June 1966
\textsuperscript{172} Ibid., 26 June 1966