UNITED STATES WITHDRAWAL OF THE ASWAN DAM OFFER
TO THE ARAB HEADS OF STATE MEETING

Although, between the spring of 1965 and the summer of 1966, there were some signs that the Lebanese government leadership was tending toward a policy that could upset the balance between the Arab and the Lebanese nationalist elements in the country as well as Lebanon’s status as a neutral in the Arab world as a whole, no sufficiently drastic foreign policy move had been taken to warrant a claim by one side or the other that the provisions of the National Pact had been broken. But a storm was soon to arise, again due to an American policy move in the Middle East and the reaction to follow in the Arab world, and then in Lebanon.

In the middle of July 1966 the Egyptian Ambassador to Washington returned to the United States after consultations with his government on negotiations which had begun the previous winter for an American loan to help finance the Aswan high dam project. He had instructions to apply formally for the American aid on the basis of the previous talks between the two governments. The ambassador announced this, and, moreover, said that Egypt had decided not to accept a rival Russian offer (there had been unconfirmed press reports that Shepilov had made such a bid while visiting Cairo in June). However, on the day the Egyptian envoy returned to Washington the United States Senate Appropriations Committee approved a resolution asking the administration not to give any money to Egypt.
without consulting Congress. Secretary of State Dulles did not object to the Senate's action. In fact "he seemed pleased." 173 The American foreign policy chief, it should be noted, had been displeased with Egypt since it bought arms from Czechoslovakia, and was disconcerted with what to him appeared to be Egypt's policy of playing the two chief Cold War opponents off against one another to achieve its own aims.

Two days following the Senate committee action, on 18 July, the State Department issued a statement announcing that the American offer was withdrawn.174 Britain, who was also to have contributed to the Aswan project, followed suit. And an offer by the World Bank, which was conditioned to Anglo-American support, lapsed automatically.175

In Beirut the press was not silent concerning the latest United States move. The American action was considered by many as a personal slap at Egyptian President Gamal Abdel-Nasser—the man the Arab nationalist masses considered their leader.

Comment on the withdrawal of the United States loan offer began to appear in the papers on 25 July. Beirut Press (Muslim, Arab, opposition) that day said: "In a moment of folly the United States and the United Kingdom have bared their hatred for Nasser because he recognized Red China and purchased Czech arms. Anti-Communist Egypt should not be blamed if it turns to the East to finance the dam. The Americans wanted access to the Mediterranean; they will have their way, thanks to the dam on the Nile. Congratulations to the West for its policy and let it be happy and content with the friendship of Israel." 176

173 Wint and Calvocoressi, op.cit., p. 69
174 Bulletin, op.cit.,
175 Wint and Calvocoressi, op. cit., p. 69
176 Arab World, op.cit., 25 July 1966
On the following day *Le Jour* (Christian, Lebanese, neutral) warned it would be easy to criticize Nasser. But, the paper said, those who criticize him ought to stop and think. The West's "rebuttal" of Nasser is a point marked by Israel and by the promoters of the Baghdad Pact and of greater Syria (which the paper regarded as bad). It is not by pushing Egypt into desperate corners, *Le Jour* commented, that calm and stability will be restored in the Near East. 177

*Al-Jayet* (Muslim, not determined, neutral) expressed the wish that the situation would not be allowed to deteriorate into an out-and-out quarrel. It noted with satisfaction that the West had not completely shut the door, and that an agreement was still possible. 178

*Al-Mahar* (Christian, Lebanese, neutral) said it knew full-well that neither Nasser nor the Egyptian people were Communists. Yet, it warned: "Nasser's own opinion on communism is not alone sufficient to prevent Egypt's foundering into its wake should she be directed toward the current by vital needs and interests." The West should know that, the paper remarked. The *Al-Mahar* article pointed out it was not supporting Nasser but explaining the dangers to which the Arab world might be exposed by Western policy. 179

Resuming its comment of the previous day, *Beirut MASSA* of 24 July called the whole affair a "victory for Moscow" and warned the West that reprisals against the Arabs would only inspire greater love for the Soviets.180

*Al Jarida* (Christian, Lebanese, neutral) wondered what the West hoped to gain by its move. It said there could have been one of two

177 ibid., 24 July 1966
178 ibid., 24 July 1966
179 ibid., 24 July 1966
180 ibid., 24 July 1966
reasons for the United States decision: Either the British had
managed to persuade the United States to move away from Nasser, or
the Republican party, on the eve of the presidential elections, was
bidding for the valuable Jewish vote. Why, the paper asked, should the
United States otherwise penalize Egypt because she purchased arms behind
the Iron Curtain, while it continued its aid to Yugoslavia which had
excellent relations with the Soviet Union? The paper recalled that it
was the unfriendly demeanour of the West with regard to the Arabs that
opened the way for the Arab-Soviet rapprochement in the first place. 161

Taking a typical Lebanese nationalist line, Beyrouth (Muslin,
Arab, neutral) hoped Egypt would consult with other Arab states on the
action to be taken following the American move. "We do not want Egypt,"
the paper said, "to jump into the unknown." 162

Less cautious, Telegraph (Christian, Arab, opposition) appealed
to the patriotism of the Arabs in the demand that they rise in holy
wrath against the West. 163

Although the Lebanese reaction, as indicated by the press, was
as usual varied, in general the sympathy was with Nasser in the face of
the latest evidence of United States political foreign policy in the
Middle East. The Lebanese government did not express an official opinion
on the withdrawal of the American offer of a loan to Egypt, but if the
individual leaders had expressed their points of view they would likely
have been even more varied than those of the press.

161 ibid.
162 ibid.
163 ibid.
In this situation of tension between Arab nationalist Egypt and the United States, representative of the West, the Lebanese leadership did not have to take a stand and thus subject their policy to criticism by one or the other of the segments of the Lebanese population. The American action however caused very shortly, a reaction in Egypt which was to bring the whole relationship between the Arab world and the West into a situation of crisis and cause a dramatic disturbance of the Lebanese balance.

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On 26 July 1956 President Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal and set in movement a chain of events that led to the United States' next great policy initiative in the Middle East and, indirectly, to Lebanon's formal alignment with the United States on the question of Middle East defense.

The overwhelming majority of the Beirut press approved of the Egyptian move. Government leaders also expressed their favor. Premier Yafi said: "The Lebanese government fully supports the Egyptian resolution of nationalizing the Suez Canal Company." House Speaker Adel Gessirin said "President Nasser's move is but a means to an end. This end is the liberation of Egypt from imperialism, exploitation and servitude. As an Arab citizen, I welcome this step." And Minister of State Saeb Salam felt that "America and Britain, no doubt, made a grave mistake in their recent action against Egypt. It is about time these two big powers realized that it is their duty to change their policy towards the Arabs." Foreign Minister Selim Lahoud called the move a "daring step." He added: "We still do not know the purpose of the recent vague policy which the West followed towards Egypt." 184

184 Ibid., 30 July 1956
Beirut newspapers were unceasing in their expressions of support for Nasser, and the Lebanese parliament on 30 July voted unanimously on a motion by Speaker Qasemian calling for full support of Egypt's nationalization of the canal. Deputy Kamal Frangieh, former foreign minister and then a member of the parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee remarked that there could be no objection to the nationalization of the Suez company so long as the freedom of shipping was maintained. Pro-West Deputy Chazzan Tebout said Lebanon, like Egypt, was fighting to recover her rights from foreign companies. 185 "We must therefore support Egypt." 186

Pro-West Deputy Kamal Bustani approved of parliament's support for Egypt, but he urged Lebanon to try to preserve what was left of Arab-Western friendship. Lebanon, he said, could be a fine interpreter of Arab feelings for the West. 187

Premier Ya‘fai again spoke out at the parliament session in backing of the Egyptian move. He said: "A day will come soon when Lebanon will demonstrate her support for sister Egypt not only in speeches but also in action. I warn the Western powers that any measure they take against Egypt would be regarded as being directed against the whole of the Arab world." 188

Meanwhile there were demonstrations of support for the nationalization of Suez in Beirut, Sidon and Tripoli. L'Orient (Christian, Lebanese, neutral) said the Najjadeh party, a para-military type Arab

185 Tebout was referring to the current dispute between Lebanon and Tripoli and IPC on the question of taxes.
186 Ibid., 1 August 1956
187 Ibid.,
188 Ibid.
nationalist organisation was the prime mover of the demonstrations. It also reported that the Kataeb (Phalangist) party, a similar group—but Lebanese rather than Arab nationalist—planned to call at the Egyptian embassy to express its support for Egypt. 189

It may be noted that the President of the Republic, the single most powerful man in Lebanese politics and government, had not yet officially been heard from on the subject of the Suez Canal nationalisation. The question was raised in the Beirut press of 1 August as to whether Chamoun had or had not congratulated Nasser on his move. Al-Jarida (Christian, Lebanese, neutral) thought not. But it pointed out that Yafi and Omeiran had, and wondered if this was a sign of lack of harmony between the government and the President. Telegraph (Christian, Arab, opposition) and al-Rayyouth (Muslim, Arab, neutral) said Chamoun had congratulated Nasser and that he was taking the nationalisation as a fine opportunity to reassert the enmity between Egypt and Iraq, split since the Bagdad Pact. 190

Le Jour (Christian, Lebanese, Neutral) of 5 August repeated reports that President Chamoun was doing his best to persuade Iraq to side openly with Egypt. The paper also said that the Arab League would meet to form a united front to the West, and predicted it might be held at the chief of state level. 191

In a speech on 5 August President Chamoun publicly voiced his complete support for Egypt's nationalisation of the Suez Canal company 192

189 ibid.
190 ibid.
191 ibid., 5 August 1956
and warned the West against "losing for the present and the future and probably forever what trust it still enjoys in this area and every hope of cooperating with its peoples, even those with whom it is bound by treaties and agreements." The President urged both Egypt and the West to abstain from any action likely to increase the current tension. The same day an official Iraqi communiqué was issued in Baghdad supporting Egypt in her struggle for dignity, sovereignty and independence and saying Iraq regarded nationalisation as the unquestionable right of independent nations.

On 20 August President Nasser of Egypt, in an interview with Beirut newspaper Al-Dyar (Christian, Arab, opposition), for the first time since the Baghdad Pact paid tribute to Iraq for siding with Egypt on the Suez Canal issue. He dismissed the two countries' quarrel as a family quarrel caused by differences of outlook rather than by Iraq's evil intentions. Nasser said Lebanon had given a startling example of Arab solidarity. He said Chamoun's speech had dispelled talk of Lebanese neutrality. Nasser said: "President Chamoun did not content himself with a speech; but he has displayed colossal efforts to strengthen Egypt's position. We have benefited and we are still benefitting from Lebanon's top-rate diplomacy."  

While the Lebanese government was expressing its support for Egypt's nationalisation of the Suez Canal, the United States was doing its best to seek a peaceful solution to the situation which resulted from the angry attitude taken by Britain and France against the Egyptian action. The Big 3 met on 31 July to discuss the nationalisation. They

192 ibid., 6 August 1956
193 ibid., 21 August 1956
ended their talks on 2 August calling for a 24-nation conference to be held in London on 16 August to work out an international system of control for the Suez Canal. In the meantime however the British and French were reported making military preparations.

The London conference on the Suez Canal problem met as scheduled on 16 August. Secretary of State Dulles proposed four steps to settle the dispute: 1) An international group should be set up by treaty to operate the canal. Egypt should be represented but no single power allowed to dominate it. 2) Egypt should have the right to an equitable return from the canal. 3) Compensation should be paid to the nationalised Suez Canal Company. 4) Any difference over Egypt's income or compensation should be settled by arbitration under the World Court of Justice at The Hague.

Although President Nasser on 16 August turned down any plans for internationalisation of the Suez Canal, 186, 18 of the 24 nations meeting at London on 21 August adopted an amended United States plan. 187 A five-nation committee was sent to Cairo to present the plan adopted by the conference to President Nasser. The Egyptian President however again rejected any proposals for internationalisation of the canal before the committee reached Cairo. He did however express willingness to discuss the situation with the committee, and talks were held between 3 and 9 September. 188 The committee left Cairo without having changed the position of Egypt.

185 Ibid., August 27, 1956, p. 259
186 Arab World, op.cit., 28 August 1956
188 Ibid., September 24, 1956, p. 457
The attitude of the French and British meanwhile was getting more and more belligerent. On 29 August permission was granted for French troops to land on Cyprus and on 30 August the British landed reinforcements for their garrison there. On 5 September President Chacon reportedly met with the United States and British ambassadors in Beirut to complain of the British-French troop concentration on Cyprus. Al-Nahar (Christian, Lebanese, neutral) said the President also asked the American ambassador to convey his wish that President Eisenhower intervene to prevent hostilities over Suez. 199

After the failure of the 5-nation committee in its efforts in Cairo, Egypt immediately took the initiative, proposing a conference of all users (except Israel) to create a 'negotiating body' to discuss free passage, development and tolls. 200 The Lebanese government issued an official communiqué supporting Nasser's plan, saying with its proposal "Egypt has left the door to negotiations wide open." 201

On 12 September Eden told Commons of an American-Anglo-French plan for a Suez Canal Users Association. The British and French saw the plan as a means of pressuring Egypt—"either by running a provocative convoy through the Canal and daring Nasser to obstruct it and so finally put himself on the wrong side of the 1956 Convention, or by securing control of operations, services, and dues and so outing Nasser's company and forcing him economically to his knees." Secretary Dulles however opposed economic as well as military warfare and came to regard the Users Association proposal as merely a negotiating body. 202

199 Arab World, op.cit., September 6, 1956
200 Wint and Calvacorelli, op.cit., p. 75
201 Arab World, op.cit., 12 September 1956
202 Wint and Calvacorelli, op.cit., pp. 75-76
A second London conference on the Suez Canal was called, to discuss the new proposal. It ended on 21 September after having accepted the plan. Before the Association could be organised however, the British and French asked for the Security Council to meet to discuss the situation created by Egypt's nationalization of the canal. The debate opened on 5 October and ended on 15 October after Russia voted against, and thus vetoed, the second part of a revised Anglo-French resolution which endorsed international control, the London plan, and the Users Association. This marked the end of international discussions on means of finding a peaceful solution to the crisis.

The Lebanese government meanwhile pursued its stand of support for Egypt. The cabinet on 15 September had declared itself in permanent session and said it was taking steps to maintain order at home and preserve the independence of the country in case of an armed showdown between Egypt and the Western powers. A conference was held between the President, Premier, Minister of State and Foreign Minister plus Chief of Staff of the Lebanese Army General Fuad Chehab. They reviewed the situation surrounding the Suez crisis and decided to maintain close liaison with Syria and Egypt.

The Beirut press expressed varied opinions concerning the belligerent attitude of the British and French and the adamant refusal

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203 Bulletin, op. cit., October 1, 1956, pp. 505-508
204 This plan had been revised to include principles proposed by Egypt in reply to the Anglo-French resolution in its original form. After revision it included six principles similar to those proposed by Egypt and was sometimes called the Six-Point Plan.
205 Wint and Calvocorese, op. cit., p. 77
206 Arab World, op. cit., 14 September 1956
of Egypt to surrender to pressure for international control. Al Amal Christian, Lebanese, usually pro-government), spokesman for the Kataeb party, said it didn't believe in war for the sake of the Egyptian President's personal prestige and warned against the danger of Soviet support to Egypt in the event of armed conflict. The paper said "Nasser is sending us to war without arms", and told the Lebanese people their first concern should be for independence and secondly for Palestine.

"We are not at all prepared to take any step that would jeopardize our independence and sovereignty just for the pleasure of fighting the strong without ourselves being armed," it claimed. The left-wing and Arab nationalist papers of course berated Eden and Nasser for their campaign against Egypt and maintained that all Arabs should give their full support for Nasser's cause.

On 24 October Minister of Justice Alfred Naccache, former President of the Lebanese Republic, was quoted by Al Nahar (Christian, Lebanese, neutral) as saying: "I should regretfully state that Egyptian trends are overcoming general trends of Lebanese foreign policy. In my time as foreign minister Lebanon's neutrality was clear and firm. This neutrality has now become shaky and unstable. The reason is excessive deference to the Egyptians, and this is a mistake." The paper insisted this was a direct quote of Naccache's reply to a question on his opinion of Lebanese foreign policy trends. Deputy Ghassan Tseni, in the same paper's editorial (the paper is owned by Tseni), supported Naccache's train of thought, saying there was nothing wrong with the Egyptian policy per se, but that it was not the best for Lebanon to adopt.
The next day however the statement by Naccache was denied in an official communique issued by the Ministry of Information. 209

The Kataeb party continued its campaign against a pro-Egyptian foreign policy for Lebanon as late as 29 October 1956. On that morning Al Anad carried an open letter from party leader Pierre Gemayel to President Chamoun. "The Lebanese policy today is being carried out on instructions from abroad," Gemayel charged. He said Lebanon had fallen under an "Arab mandate." "I have a great respect for President Abdel Nasser...who thinks of nothing but the interest of Egypt..., but those who followed him...did so because they were weak...at the expense of Lebanon's interest... It has become clear that Lebanon, because of the policy of its officials, has moved from a French mandate to an Arab mandate. This is not why we fought the French mandate... We fought the mandate because it determined for us what we should determine for ourselves. We stand against mandate, be it French, Anglo-American, Soviet or Arab. We refuse a mandate coming to us under the pretext of Arab brotherhood." Gemayel warned the Lebanese officials against continuation of their present policy. He asked: "Which of these two slogans is the basis of Lebanon's policy -- 'Lebanon is above all' or 'Arabism is above all'?" 210

That same day Israel attacked Egypt. The United States called an emergency meeting of the Security Council and introduced a resolution calling on Israel to withdraw its forces behind the armistice lines and

209 Ibid., 25 October, 1956
210 Arab World, op.cit., 29 October 1956
asking all United Nations members to refrain from the use of threat of
force, to assist in insuring the integrity of the armistice agreements,
and to refrain from giving any military, economic, or financial assist-
ance to Israel "so long as it has not complied with this resolution." 211

Britain and France however elected to act on their own and issued
an ultimatum to Israel and Egypt demanding a ceasefire, withdrawal by both
sides 10 miles from the canal area, and acceptance of British-French
occupation of key canal points. In the Council the two powers vetoed the
United States draft resolution which was amended to call for an immediate
cease-fire. 212

In Egypt President Nasser rejected the British-French ultimatum.
In Beirut Lebanese Premier Yafi summoned the British, French and United
States ambassadors at 11 p.m. on 30 October to tell them Lebanon "rejects
the Anglo-French ultimatum addressed to Egypt, and protests against the
entry of any foreign troops into the canal zone." Lebanon itself was
declared in state of emergency. President Chamoun reportedly talked
personally with the ambassadors of the United States, United Kingdom,
and Iraq to repeat Lebanon's condemnation of the Israeli aggression.
According to Le Jour (Christian, Lebanese, neutral) United States
Ambassador Donald Heath told the President: "My government will honor
its pledges and will give assistance to the country which is the victim
of aggression." The Iraqi ambassador reportedly said his country was
prepared to support the Egyptian army. A Foreign Ministry official also
talked with the Soviet military attaché. 213

212 ibid.,
213 Arab World, op.cit., 31 October 1967
On 31 October the Security Council called for an emergency session of the General Assembly under the Uniting for Peace resolution, and on November 2 the Assembly adopted a United States resolution calling for an immediate ceasefire, urging withdrawal of all forces behind the armistice lines, and urging that "upon the ceasefire being effective," steps be taken to reopen the Suez Canal (closed by British-French air attacks begun the day before). On 3 November Britain, France and Israel rejected the United Nations ceasefire demand. 214 On 5 November British and French paratroops landed in the canal zone.

In Beirut President Chamoun on 31 October issued an invitation to the heads of all Arab states to a conference to examine the current situation. Jordan's King Hussein was the first to accept. And various newspapers, *Al Jarida* (Christian, Lebanese, neutral) for one, reported that Chamoun had sounded out Nasser on the idea through the Lebanese Ambassador in Cairo and his reply was regarded as encouraging. 215 All the Beirut press was against the Israeli action and its support by the two Western powers. Those papers which were ordinarily pro-West even expressed doubt that the Arab peoples would ever be persuaded of the sincerity of Western intentions.

Lebanese leaders representing sectarian and political groups met at the invitation of President Chamoun to discuss the situation in the Middle East. "We must face the present situation united," Chamoun said. The joint statement at the end of their talks voiced indignation at the "joint aggression on Egypt" and called on the Lebanese parliament to

214 *Bulletin, op.cit.*, November 12, 1956, p. 747

215 *Arab World, op.cit.*, 1 November 1956
take the measures necessary to serve Lebanon's interest and support Egypt and the Arab states. The House discussed the situation and adopted a motion calling on the government to take measures "as dictated by the Arab fraternity, the United Nations Charter, the Arab League Charter, and the Arab Collective Security Pact." 217

On 6 November both Al Dyr (Christian, Arab, opposition) and Al Hayat (Muslim, undetermined, neutral) reported that Chamoun had asked Dr. Charles Malik, former Lebanese Ambassador to the United States, to carry a personal message to Eisenhower. Al Dyr reported the letter said Eisenhower alone could save what remained of the confidence enjoyed in the Middle East by the West. Very rightly, the letter said, the Arabs were losing their faith in the West. Should Eisenhower abstain from intervening at once to stop the aggression on Egypt, all the Arabs would identify the West with imperialism. Eisenhower had just been victorious in the presidential elections.218

The Soviet Union on 5 November asked the United States to join forces with it to stop the aggression on Egypt. The proposal was rejected in a White House statement which said the offer was to divert world attention from the Hungarian tragedy. It also pointed out that the Soviet Union the night before did not vote for the organization of the United Nation force and insisted that reliance should be on the United Nations, not on the entry of more military forces into the Middle East. A step such as the latter, the statement said, would demand United States opposition. 219

In Beirut the United States Ambassador talked to the Lebanese Foreign Minister about the United States attitude toward the Soviet offer. 220

216 ibid., 5 November 1956
217 ibid.
218 ibid., 7 November 1956
220 Arab World, op. cit., 8 November 1956
Israel and the two Western powers finally accepted the United Nations withdrawal resolution, and the Suez crisis became a long series of delays in accomplishing the complete withdrawal.

In Lebanon the after-effect of the aggression on Egypt was a recurrence of the factional dispute over the government’s foreign policy in Arab affairs. On 12 November there were press reports of the insistence by certain political groups that Lebanon follow Egypt and Syria and break its relations with the United Kingdom and France. It will be recalled that there was opposition from some quarters even before the aggression to the government’s apparent pro-Egypt policy and, consistently, there was strong opposition both inside and outside the government to such a move.

L'Orient (Christian, Lebanese, neutral) reported that House Speaker Osceiran was strongly opposed to such a break in relations. His opinion, according to the paper, was that a diplomatic break would be contrary to the interests of Lebanon and the Arabs in general. The Constitutional-Democratic bloc in parliament, represented in the cabinet by two ministers, made it known that it would break its truce with the government if such a decision were taken. Kataeb party leader Pierre Gemayel quoted a recent speech by Nasser and said Lebanon, as much as Egypt, did not like anybody else to dictate her policy. He said, according to L'Orient, that to break with Britain and France would not only be useless sacrifice, but a suicide from which all the Arab states would suffer. Nasser meanwhile replied to Chamoun’s telegram of support, thanking the Lebanese President and paying tribute to the patriotism of all Lebanese.

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221 Iraq and Jordan broke with France only.
222 ibid., 12 November 1956
223 ibid.
Chamoun's call for an Arab heads of government conference to be held in Beirut was meanwhile bearing fruit. On 12 November censorship was lifted in Beirut to permit the newspapers' reporting that the Arab leaders were already arriving. Representing their countries were the Kings of Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Jordan, delegates of the rulers of Yemen and Libya, Syrian President Kumatli and Egypt's Ambassador to Lebanon, Abdul Rashid Ghaleb representing President Nasser. Also visiting Beirut was Syrian newspaper Mustafa Amin, co-manager of Cairo newspaper Al-Ahmar, who was reported to have brought a personal message from Nasser to Chamoun. 224

The exact purposes of the conference were kept secret. Press reports however indicated the chiefs of state and their representatives were to lay down the main lines of a unified Arab policy, the need for which was emphasized by the aggression against Egypt, and enable all Arab states to have a say in the future determination of Arab policy. The Lebanese press as a whole welcomed the conference. 225

Underneath all this talk of Arab unity—a report in Al-Ahmar (Christian, Lebanese, pro-government) said that "the cabinet may fall within a few hours" because of the split over the question of breaking off Lebanese relations with Britain and France. The paper predicted former Premier Sami Solh would be asked to form a new cabinet. 226

The Arab heads of government conference opened formally on 13 November. President Chamoun formally opened the conference and

224 ibid., 13 November 1956
225 ibid.
226 ibid.
was elected chairman. In his speech he welcomed the distinguished guests and highly praised Egypt's heroic stand in defense of its territory and rights. The purpose of the conference, he said, was to adopt a common attitude of solidarity with regard to Egypt, for the defense of the rights and interests of the Arabs in all their lands. "It is Lebanon's awareness of the gravity of the current situation and our feeling of the absolute necessity for the Arabs to adopt one and the same policy in facing developments both local and international, which have prompted this conference," he said. 227

Censorship was heavy on the meetings in Beirut. The Beirut papers however guessed that there were long discussions on the agenda. The Damascus papers were free to express their opinions. Left wing Al Rai Al Ass said the difficulties within the conference were over the question whether the Arab states should cut off relations with Britain and France. The paper said Syria insisted this question of diplomatic relations with the two "aggressive powers" should be placed on the agenda while "certain Arab states" refused to do so. 228

Limited in their coverage of the conference, Al'Orient (Christian, Lebanese, neutral) and Al Nahar (Christian, Lebanese, neutral), as well as other Beirut papers gave importance to a meeting between United States Ambassador Heath and President Chamoun. Al Nahar said the United States government was highly interested in the Beirut conference—to the extent that the Lebanese Ambassador in Washington had telephoned Chamoun to give him the United States viewpoint on certain matters being discussed or to

227 ibid., 14 November 1966
228 ibid., 15 November 1966
be discussed at the conference. These reportedly included the situation arising from the determination of certain Arab states to bring about closer contact with the Soviet Union. 229

The conference ended on 15 November and a communiqué was issued. It contained three resolutions: 1) British, French and Israeli troops must quit Egyptian soil, Gaza included, or else the United Nations would be asked to apply sanctions under Article 41 of the Charter; 2) The Suez Canal problem should be separated entirely from the question of aggression against Egypt and dealt with on its own merits, taking into account the sovereignty and dignity of Egypt; 3) Support for the Algerians in their fight for independence. L’Orient considered the communiqué as an expression of Arab determination to maintain the dispute with Egypt’s attackers within the bounds of international procedure and custom. Arab World said this was the view of the majority of the press. The body of the communiqué said the conference was called to examine the situation arising from “the aggression committed by Great Britain, France and Israel” and decide what measures should be taken to support Egypt. It did not say that a joint Arab breaking of relations with the two Western powers should be one means of showing this support. 230

Along with reports of the closing of the conference L’Orient and some other papers reported that Premier Yafi and Minister of State Saeb Salim resigned and then withdrew their resignations, for reasons undisclosed. Their move was reportedly without consultation with their colleagues who, as a result, reportedly called on President Chamoun to

229 Ibid.
230 Ibid., 16 November 1956
state their refusal to cooperate any longer with Tafsi and Salem in the government. The papers thus regarded the cabinet crisis as open. Chamoun, they said, was ready to begin consultations towards forming a new cabinet. Al Mass' (Christian, Lebanese, pro government) version of the story said that Salem submitted his resignation to Premier Tafsi on 14 November because the cabinet refused to agree to his proposal calling for the break of relations with Britain and France. The announcement of his resignation had been postponed until after the conference was over, the paper said.

By one procedure or another however, both Salem and Tafsi had resigned. The dispute in the cabinet came to a head with the Suez crisis as the two Muslim leaders voiced the demands of their followers that the Lebanese government toughen its policy towards the West and increase its support for Egypt. The climax came on the occasion of the heads of state conference in Beirut, called by Chamoun, as the pro-Egyptian leaders were forced by public opinion to use this opportunity to express their support for the President and the rest of the ministers to accept the other Arab countries' request that the Arabs all break relations with the Western aggressors.

On the other hand, Lebanese nationalist public opinion, as most obviously expressed by the Kataeb party and its leader Pierre Gemayel, was opposed to Lebanon taking as drastic an action as breaking relations with Britain and France in showing its support for Egypt and its disapproval of the Western Powers' military action in the Middle East.

231 Ibid.
232 Ibid.
President Chamoun and the other ministers evidently agreed with this point of view. The President, in whose hands the decision ultimately rested, would not be forced by one side to take a stand of open defiance to the opinion of the other. And, as it turned out, the insistence of Ya'fid and Salem instead led to the formation of a cabinet that was totally opposed to the extreme stand forced on them by their supporters.

Chamoun appointed Sami Solh as the new Premier. Only one minister was kept from the Ya'fid cabinet, although the other former ministers were evidently against the extent at least of his and Salem's pro-Egypt policy demands. The new foreign minister was Charles Malik, former Lebanese ambassador to Washington, permanent United Nations delegate, and philosopher—strongly anti-Communist. Also picked from outside the parliament were Commander in Chief of the Lebanese army General Fawzi Chehab, widely popular throughout the country, and Marzi Maslouf, editor of Al Jarida (Christian, Lebanese, neutral), a newspaper which had consistently attacked the previous cabinet. The new government was reported to have the support of the majority in parliament although there was some criticism of the fact that the new ministers were non-parliamentarians.235

That the new government was to be pro-West is easily determined from the opposition, and support, offered by the various opinions in the press. Telegraph (Christian, Arab, opposition) said if Lebanon was to retain her independence she must support the other Arab states, particularly Egypt. The paper objected not to the principle, but to the means used by the new premier in forming the new cabinet. It asked Sami Solh why he

235 *ibid.*, 19 November 1956.
looked outside the parliament for ministers? And it objected to Malik as Foreign Minister since "he has known foreign friendships." Finally Telegraph repeated that it had supported the Yafi cabinet because of its declared intention to reject all foreign pasts and give full support to Egypt. It said it would oppose the new cabinet pending proof that its fears were unfounded. 234

Similarly inclined Beirut Massa (Muslim, Arab, opposition) said: "We will not support the new government. Actually we would recognize no government which would not take the pledge to serve the same principles for which the former cabinet resigned." 235

On the other side, Al Nahar (Christian, Lebanese, neutral) said at long last a cabinet had been formed that knew what it wanted, "a government capable of governing and of leading instead of being led by others. A government which could not be expected to be swayed by the cheap successes of demagogy." Al Nahar especially praised General Chahab, saying he was the Lebanese personality who all the Lebanese respect and obey. As for the choice of Charles Malik as foreign minister -- the move was interpreted by the paper as meaning that Lebanon had at last decided which foreign policy course it should take in the future. 236

An interesting sidelight of the heads of state meeting was also reported by Al Nahar. It said President Chamoun and King Saud had four long private talks which resulted in Lebanon and Saudi Arabia, and Iraq, joining arms in a bid to wipe out communism from the area. The paper said further contacts were expected among the three Arab nations to

234 ibid.
235 ibid.
236 ibid., 20 November 1956
discuss the details of their joint action. 237

The ill feelings caused by the latest government upset were already creating a somewhat tetchy situation in Lebanon. Fears of a break in the National Pact prompted Maronite Patriarch Koushki to call a meeting of political and sectarian leaders. On 27 November the new Solh cabinet received parliament's vote of confidence. The majority of the members of parliament then had approved a government which did not include representatives of the Arab nationalist segment of the population which was devoted to the policies advocated by President Nasser of Egypt. At the House confidence session former Premier Yafi spoke in justification of his cabinet's policies. However, according to Arab World, Yafi's foreign minister, Selim Lasbou, "contradicted Yafi and stated that to the best of his knowledge there had been no understanding that all Arab nations were to sever diplomatic relations with Britain and France, nor was there any promise to this effect made by Lebanon." Yafi evidently had accused President Chamoun, the only other person with the authority to make such a promise, of having agreed to break relations with Britain and France. 238

Deputy Chassan Tulem rejected Yafi's justification of his foreign policy and stated that to take Yafi's word for it, only he and Baâb Salam supported Egypt, and the fate of Egypt depended on the withdrawal of Lebanon's ministers from Paris and London. 239

237 ibid.
238 ibid., 28 November 1956. (More details concerning the question of Lebanon's stand at the Arab heads of state conference and whether Chamoun did or did not promise to break off relations with Britain and France are presented in the Observations at the end of this study.)
239 ibid.
Lebanon's reaction to the Suez crisis had brought about a marked change in the composition of the government and, therefore, that body's ability to continue as the fulcrum of the balance between the opposing factions in Lebanon. This was especially the case since the Arab nationalist and the Lebanese nationalist elements, also as a result of the Suez crisis, were now openly at odds.

From the description of the new cabinet provided above the attitude of the Lebanese government concerning foreign relations—inter-Arab, Arab-Western, and Lebanese-United States—could easily be predicted. The expression of this attitude was, as usual, to occur in the form of reactions to the policies and actions of others. And the United States was to make the move that would give impetus to the chain reaction that commenced with the United States withdrawal of its offer of a loan to Egypt to help finance the Aswan dam project. What then was the intent of United States policy for the Arab world and the Middle East as the heat of the Suez crisis cooled in the late fall and winter of 1956-57?

For one thing the United States was still concerned, in fact more than ever, about the intentions of the Soviet Union toward the Middle East. In a speech on 29 November 1956 Deputy Undersecretary of State Robert Murphy said: "It has become apparent that the achievement of a just and lasting
peace in the Middle East would run counter to Soviet objectives. The Soviets are clearly planning a procession of events starting from the reduction of Western influence and proceeding to the eventual incorporation of the nations of the area into the Soviet orbit. In contrast, United States policies support the political independence and territorial integrity of the states of the Middle East. Recent United Nations actions amply demonstrate to all who wish to know that the vast majority of the free people of the world share these beliefs.”

To combat this considered Soviet threat the United States was counting to some extent on the Baghdad Pact. On the same day as Murphy’s speech the United States State Department issued a statement in support of that organization: “The United States reaffirms its support for the collective efforts of these nations to maintain their independence. A threat to the territorial integrity or political independence of the members would be viewed by the United States with the utmost gravity.”

At the same time the United States foreign policy makers felt the attitude toward them held by the Middle East nations was more friendly since their stand against their allies in the Suez crisis. Vice President Nixon, speaking on 6 December “In the Cause of Peace and Freedom” said “...if we had supported our friends and allies, Britain and France, in Egypt, they might have won a military victory in that area. But they and we would have lost the moral support of the whole world.

“Because we took the position we did, the peoples of Africa and Asia know now that we walk with them as moral equals, that we do not have

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240 Bulletin, op.cit., December 10, 1956, p. 911
241 Ibid., p. 918
one standard of law for the West and another for the East. They know too that the United States has no illusions about the 'white man's burden' or 'white supremacy'...." 242

Although the United States may have felt their British and French allies had not lost the moral support of the whole world due to their action against Egypt, the reaction to the aggression in the Arab world made it plain that the two European powers had lost completely their former position of power and influence in the Arab world. Or, if they had not lost everything, what influence and strategic position was left (in the case of Britain) was on a very shaky foundation. There was considerable talk in the United States at that time of the 'power vacuum' existing in the Middle East. As Murphy's comments indicated, the United States was afraid the Soviet Union might move in to fill the hole if the West did not move first. And the United States was the only Western power with the hope of being accepted as the protector of the small, underdeveloped Middle Eastern countries. United States foreign policy was cast accordingly.

On January 5, 1957 President Eisenhower asked, in a message to a joint session of Congress, authorization for a United States economic program and a resolution on Communist aggression in the Middle East. This amounted to a new United States policy for the defense of the Middle East against the Soviet danger. Tipped on the proposal beforehand the United States press had nicknamed the new proposal the Eisenhower Doctrine.

242 ibid., December 17, 1956, p. 944
The President told Congress:

The action I propose would have the following features. It would, first of all, authorize the United States to cooperate with and assist any nation or group of nations in the general area of the Middle East in the development of economic strength dedicated to the maintenance of national independence.

It would, in the second place, authorize the Executive to undertake the same region programs of military assistance and cooperation with any nation or group of nations which desires such aid.

It would, in the third place, authorize such assistance and cooperation to include the employment of the armed forces of the United States to secure and protect the territorial integrity and political independence of such nations, requesting such aid, against overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by international Communism.

These measures would have to be consonant with the treaty obligations of the United States, including the Charter of the United Nations. They would also, if armed attack occurs, be subject to the overriding authority of the United Nations Security Council in accordance with the Charter.

The present proposal would, in the fourth place, authorize the President to employ, for economic and defensive military purposes, sums available under the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended, without regard to existing limitations.

The legislation now requested should not include the authorization or appropriation of funds because I believe that, under the conditions I suggest, presently appropriated funds will be adequate for the balance of the present fiscal year ending June 30. I shall, however, seek in subsequent legislation the authorization of $200,000,000 to be available during each of the fiscal years 1958 and 1959 for discretionary use in the area, in addition to the other mutual security programs for the area hereafter provided for by the Congress.

Meanwhile, the press had already announced in advance Eisenhower's new proposal. In the Arab world meanwhile, the advance press reports of

\[245\] JPD., January 21, 1957, pp. 85, 86. (For the text of the proposed resolution on economic and military cooperation in the Middle East, sent to the House of Representatives on 5 January 1957, see Bulletin, January 26, 1957, p. 162.)
the Eisenhower proposals had caused Egypt and Syria to express their wariness. President Chamoun of Lebanon however met with United States Ambassador Heath in Beirut to discuss the new orientation of American Midast policy. A scheduled mission to Washington by Foreign Minister Malik had been postponed in light of the American move and Chamoun, in his meeting with Heath, reportedly emphasized the importance he attached to the success of Malik’s mission. 244

The primary purpose of Malik’s mission was reportedly to seek, with President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles, a solution to the crisis in the Middle East through the engagement of the Arab countries in the fight against communism. 245 The United States and Lebanese government aims thus were nearly identical. Also, the Lebanese cabinet asked Malik to discuss certain problems of particular interest to Lebanon. Premier Solh emphasized the necessity for substantial United States aid in order that Lebanon might complete its large projects of economic and social development. 246

However, Lebanon was still formally attempting to keep on cordial terms with Egypt. In a pre-departure news conference on 7 January Malik said he would carry a personal message from Chamoun to Eisenhower expressing Lebanon’s appreciation for the United States attitude toward the latest ordeal suffered by Egypt and which all the Arab countries shared with her. Asked the government’s attitude towards the Eisenhower Doctrine Malik replied: "We have not, to this date, received any official

244 L’Orient, op.cit., 5 January 1957
245 ibid., 4 January 1957
246 ibid.
document concerning the new Eisenhower doctrine. We do not possess, in this domain, information other than that reproduced in the press. We cannot form an opinion in the light of simple press reports. 247

However, on his arrival in Cairo where he was to have stopover talks with President Nasser, Malik told newsmen that Lebanon intended to cooperate with the United States within the limits authorized by its independence.

"Lebanon," he said, "sees in the Eisenhower plan several propositions as well as several guarantees for its independence and its sovereignty, but it wishes to coordinate its policy with that of the other Arab states."

 Asked about the existence of Communist danger in the Mideast Malik said "....the symptoms of Communist infiltration exist in diverse parts of the Middle East." 248

The Lebanese press meanwhile had not been silent toward the Eisenhower Doctrine. The first comment was from Communist weekly Al-Sabah on 1 January. It said Lebanon's official attitude (although not formally expressed) "has spread panic throughout Lebanon." The paper also attacked Foreign Minister Malik, saying his resignation "is a necessity for the stabilization of peace in the Middle East." 249

L'Orient (Christian, Lebanese, neutral) said editorially on 5 January that "now that Western, British-assumed, defenses are crumbling everywhere, the United States proposes to take over alone the defense of the Near and Middle East." 250 Al Anab (Christian, Lebanese, pro-government)

247 ibid., 6 January 1957
248 ibid., 6 January 1957
249 Arab World, Opusc., 2 January 1957
250 ibid., 5 January 1957
organ of the Kataeb party, welcomed the Eisenhower plan on 3 January saying "everything that contributes to the checking of Communist aggression, whether ideological, military or subversive, is highly welcomed in Lebanon." 251 And on 4 January, Al Khaw (Christian, Lebanese, neutral) said it did not see how the Arabs could reject aid offers, "as long as they need them, and so long as they have nothing to fill the 'vacuum' but medieval regimes." 252

An opposition point of view was expressed by Telegraph (Christian, Arab opposition) which asked for unconditional United States aid and charged that the Eisenhower Doctrine would make the United States lose in an instant all the prestige she gained when she stood, side by side, with the Soviet Union against the aggression on Egypt. 253

Malik arrived in New York on 15 January. He told the press he was in accord with Dulles in estimating that the Middle East situation was 'very serious' because of the danger of communism which had recently become more pressing. He pointed out that his country was ready to accept the broad lines of the Eisenhower Doctrine, especially since the President had made it clear that the United States intended no interference in the internal affairs of Middle Eastern nations. 254

The new United States policy move meanwhile had prompted a meeting of King Saud of Saudi Arabia, President Nasser of Egypt, the prime minister of Syria, and King Hussein of Jordan. At the end of their talks a joint communiqué announced their rejection of the Eisenhower plan for the Middle

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251 Al Anaa, Beirut, 3 January 1957
252 Arab World, op. cit., 4 January 1957
253 ibid.,
254 NYT, op. cit., 15 January 1957
East, saying the Arab leaders did not recognize the existence of a
clear vacuum in the Middle East. That region, they said, belongs to
no sphere of influence. Arab nationalism is all that is necessary to
fill the vacuum. King Saud was charged by the three other Arab leaders
to be their spokesman and intermediary during his forthcoming trip to
Washington. 255

At a press conference on 24 January Premier Sa'id Solh said he
was attentively following the current United States Congress debate on
the subject of the Eisenhower doctrine. Lebanon, he said, is disposed
to benefit from United States offers in the measure of its economic needs
and within the limits of its independence and sovereignty. He said
Lebanon would adopt a positive attitude towards the program. 256

While the Eisenhower Doctrine was meeting with favorable reaction
by Lebanese government leaders it had not yet met with the approval of
the United States Congress. In the House the primary objection seemed
to be not the intent of the proposal, but its method. It was feared that
by asking Congress for its 'blank check' authority to move in case of
Communist activity in the Middle East the government was diminishing
the innate powers of the presidency. It was felt that the resolution invited
Congress to undertake the principle that without delegation of authority
by Congress the Executive would not be authorised to implement United
States foreign policies by use of military force or otherwise.

Representative Udall concisely stated the opinion of many, saying:
"This new principle may, I fear, be fraught with peril for our country. In
the years ahead our Presidents, to properly defend our interests—or the

255 L'Orient, op.cit., 20 January 1957
256 Ibid., 25 January 1957
interests of the world community—may have to act overnight with
swift decisiveness. I foresee circumstances where the precedent
we set here today may deter future Chief Executives from acting
when the national interest requires a course of bold action." 257
This was a commonly expressed view of the press in the United States
at the time also.

The Eisenhower proposal was most strongly objected to in the
Senate. Here the debate centered around the actual need and reason
for the plan. The administration's foreign policy itself was under
strong attack. The two most active opponents to the administration's
bill were Senators Wayne Morse of Oregon and Hubert Humphrey of
Minnesota. Morse told the Senate "I do not believe we should hasten
into action on any resolution on the Middle East issue until the
administration comes forward with at least one competent witness who
can testify before our committees and submit at least a scintilla of
evidence that there is an imminent threat of an armed attack on any
Arab country by the Soviet Union. 258

Humphrey followed the same line, saying "the burden of proof
rests at least upon the Secretary of State in his presentation as to
whether or not the formula and the alleged policy which are now being
considered will meet the crisis which everybody knows is evident." 259

Senator Morse made another point that "part of the case of the
administration is that it must get this blanket authority from Congress
now, so that the world will know, and particularly so that Russia will
know, what the United States will do in case of military aggression by Russia." Morse felt that it was an insult to United States independence and that of its allies since "Every thinking person in the world knows what we will do. We do not intend — and we have demonstrated it clearly — to stand by and let freedom be overrun by Russia or by any of her puppets or satellites." 260

Dulles had stated clearly the essential purposes of the Eisenhower Doctrine — "to deter Communist armed aggression in the Middle East area" by removing any doubt that an armed Communist attack there would be 'met, if need be, by the armed forces of the United States.' Resistance to Communist aggression was a set principle of United States foreign policy and Congress was not disagreeable. But, as indicated above, certain Congressmen doubted the form, substance and timeliness of the specific measure. The Senate, as a result, took two full months to consider the plan despite Dulles' appeals for haste. 261

Although the Senators recognised the explosiveness of the area, they were not immediately convinced of the danger of Communist armed aggression — even those who accepted the "administration view that the recent Anglo-French debacle had created a 'power vacuum' in the region. To many observers it seemed that the really pressing problems in the Middle East were more localised in character and only indirectly related to Communism." 262

260 ibid., p. 1158
261 The United States in World Affairs, op.cit., 1957, p. 57
262 ibid., p. 58
The Senators were incensed at the alarmist tones of administration pleas for the doctrine. Eisenhower, they felt, had been reflected on the understanding that all was well with foreign relations. "There was considerable criticism of Secretary Dulles' past handling of Middle Eastern affairs, and attempts made to trace all recent difficulties back to his refusal of funds for the building of Egypt's Aswan High Dam in July 1958." 263

Also there was a serious constitutional question. Representative Udall, quoted above, was stating his version of a "view widely held that authority to employ the armed forces under the circumstances in question was already inherent in the powers of the Presidency, and that a specific authorization would merely shift to Congress a responsibility that properly belonged to the executive branch." 264

Dulles' answer to this objection was that ...."Whatever may be the correct constitutional view of the authority of the President to use the Armed Forces of the United States, the fact is that the Soviet rulers feel more deterred if the Congress has spoken. Also the fact is that the people who are subjected to the threat feel more secure if the Congress or, in the case of treaties, the Senate has spoken..." 265

Eventually however the key phrase of the administration's draft proposal was rephrased to lessen the implication that the President's authority to act in the instances cited was dependent wholly on the prior approval of Congress. Changed, it read; "Furthermore, the United

263 ibid., p. 41
264 ibid., p. 42
States regards as vital to the national interest and world peace the preservation of the independence and integrity of the nations of the Middle East. To this end, if the President determines the necessity thereof, the United States is prepared to use armed forces to assist any such nation or group of nations requesting assistance against armed aggression from any country controlled by international communism. Provided, that such employment shall be consonant with the treaty obligations of the United States and with the Constitution of the United States."

In general, resistance to the original Eisenhower plan reflected uncertainty as to whether the administration's intentions in the Middle East were very concrete; what was the real purpose of a plan developed so hastily; what countries were included in the term Middle East, and against which Communist controlled nations the Middle East was to be protected. The State Department conceded that no nation in the area was currently so controlled. The House of Representatives passed the bill on 30 January, 355-61. The Senate, after amending it, did likewise on 5 March, 72-19. The House concurred in the Senate amendment on 7 March, 550-60. President Eisenhower signed the joint resolution on 9 March 1957 making his 'Doctrine' a reality.

Lebanese Foreign Minister Charles Malik was still in Washington.

On the occasion of the completion of his talks with the United States


267 For statements by Eisenhower on 9 March and by Dulles on 5 March expressing delight in the passage of the resolution by the Senate, see Bulletin, op. cit., p. 491. For the text of the resolution (H.J. Resolution 117, as amended), see Bulletin, op. cit., March 25, 1957, pp. 490-491.
leaders and his imminent return to Lebanon, President Eisenhower, according to the "special correspondent" of Beirut newspaper Al Hayat in Washington, congratulated President Chahin on the wise and rational administration of Lebanon and thanked him for the positive attitude taken by his government towards the Eisenhower Doctrine. The message expressed the hope that there would be close collaboration between the two countries that would produce prosperity and peace.

Foreign Minister Hallik returned to Beirut at the same time as United States Ambassador James P. Richards who had been sent by President Eisenhower to visit various Middle East countries and determine their attitudes, and if possible initiate agreements for action to be taken under the Eisenhower Doctrine. Richards arrived in Beirut on 14 March. After two days of discussions with the Lebanese authorities a joint communiqué was issued:

On his visit to Lebanon from 14 to 16 March 1957 as Special Assistant to President Eisenhower, Ambassador James P. Richards discussed with the Government of Lebanon President Eisenhower's proposals for the Middle East and the application of these proposals to Lebanon. This exchange of views has shown that the Governments of Lebanon and the United States share the following purposes:

1. In their relations with each other and with other nations, they are guided by the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and by respect for the sovereign equality, rights and legitimate interests of all nations. They are interested in the establishment of a cooperative relationship between themselves based on trust and confidence and on complete respect for each other's independence and sovereignty and without any interference in each other's internal affairs.

Al Hayat, Beirut, 6 March 1957
2. They are determined to defend the political independence and territorial integrity of their respective nations and the right of each to choose its own form of government and to develop in freedom its own social and cultural life.

3. They oppose any form of intervention or interference in the internal affairs of one state by another.

4. They consider that international communism is incompatible with national independence and constitutes a cause of permanent trouble for world peace and security.

5. They are dedicated to the social and economic progress of their peoples and to this end welcome opportunities to enter into mutually beneficial and cultural relationships, on the basis of complete respect for each other’s sovereignty and independence.

6. They are of the opinion that both nations should work, through the United Nations, and by all other peaceful means, toward just solutions of the various problems which create tension within the area. The Government of Lebanon considers that the proposals of the President of the United States are helpful in furthering the purpose set forth above and has so informed Ambassador Richards, who has welcomed on behalf of the President of the United States this understanding of the broad identity of interest which exists between the two nations. The Government of Lebanon and the special Mission of Ambassador Richards have examined various activities that might be undertaken in accordance with the proposals by the President of the United States. They have decided in principle that projects in the fields of workers’ housing, rural electrification, village water supply, irrigation, flood control, highway construction and airport development would best contribute to the needs of Lebanon. These will be in addition to other United States aid projects already in effect or currently planned. Ambassador Richards has agreed further in principle that the United States Government shall provide the Government of Lebanon certain equipment needed to strengthen the Lebanese armed forces. This is in addition to a recent grant of military equipment for the same purpose.

The two governments will immediately initiate such legal and technical steps as may be required to give effect to these projects. The two states intend further to develop cooperation between themselves to serve their common interests. 289

In accepting the Eisenhower Doctrine the Lebanese government took its greatest step in international relations, within and without the Arab world. The communiqué amounted to a mutual defense agreement between Lebanon and the United States—above all against communism, but also against any other form of campaign against what might be considered the territorial integrity or political independence of either country. Strictly speaking the Lebanese government could no longer make a good case for a claim of neutrality, either in the struggle between East and West, or within the Arab world, considering the attitude taken toward the doctrine by certain other Arab countries.

The opposition, no longer represented in the councils of government, spoke out in increasingly sharp terms against the move. Opposition leader (former Prime Minister and Minister of State) Saeb Salam was reported on 18 March as having said the position taken by the Lebanese government risked the isolation of Lebanon from the rest of the Arab community and the disruption of national unity as expressed in the National Pact of 1943. 270

On the other hand, the Foreign Minister Malik "the United States-Lebanese agreement is the most serious and most important diplomatic document in Lebanon's history." 271 The opposition might have agreed, but for opposite reasons. Deputy Hassan Touma, owner of Beirut daily Al Ashar, blessed the agreement and echoed Malik in saying that the joint Lebanon-American communiqué was the most important diplomatic step ever accomplished by Lebanon. 272

270 Arab World, op.cit., 18 March 1957
271 ibid.
272 ibid., 19 March 1957.
In the case of the Lebanese government, the agreement outlined in the Lebanese-American communique of 16 March had to be ratified by parliament before becoming effective. National elections were scheduled for the coming June. The government forced the issue, outlining its foreign policy before the House on 4 April, demanding a vote of confidence. The government listed the main bases of its foreign policy as follows:

1. Complete independence of Lebanon.
2. Lebanon is an integral part of the Arab world.
3. Lebanon is an official member of the Arab League determined to realise its objectives.
4. Palestine is Lebanon's major problem.
5. Freedom of cooperation and interaction with the world at large.
7. Lebanon opposes and fights communism. 273

In the following debate the opposition based its case on six primary points of criticism:

1. Lebanon has isolated herself from the other Arab states.
2. Lebanon did not consult with the rest of the Arab states.
3. Lebanon has declared against international communism and tied itself to the wheel of United States policy.
4. The United States will only defend Lebanon against communism.

5. The government has violated the national charter (muqata) of 1945. 274

The opposition did everything in its power to keep the cabinet from demanding the vote of confidence. They obviously felt the majority was already assured for the government. In one effort of obstruction, opposition deputies Abdullah Iafii, Ahmad Assad, Kemal Assad, Sabri Hamade, Abdullah Haffj, Rashid Karani, and Hamid Frangieh said they would resign their parliamentary mandate in sign of protest if the question were put to a formal vote. 275

The four main speeches during the final day of debate, 5 April, were made by Abdullah Iafii and Hamid Frangieh for the opposition and Charles Malik and Ghassen Toumi for the government.

Iafii claimed that, "contrary to what some deputies have said, the external policy of the government is a new policy. This government came in unusual circumstances and should go when these special circumstances come to an end. (He was speaking of the state of emergency following the attack on Suez). Instead of resigning, the government prefers to link the country to a new policy, and to call for a vote on its new policy on the eve of its (the government's) end.

"What is that new policy?" Iafii continued, "It is a policy of isolationism towards the Arab countries, especially Egypt and Syria."

274 Arab World, op.cit., 6 April 1957
275 L'Orient, op.cit., 6 April 1957
The West wants to entangle the Arab liberation movement with pacts and military projects. The West suggested the common defense project. It failed. And then it tried to win over the Arab countries by using economic aid as a camouflage."

Yafi praised Egypt and her rulers. He said: "Western policy aims to isolate Egypt in order to oblige her to accept the Eisenhower Doctrine. The West did the same thing with Jordan and Syria—tried to force them into collaboration with it." The former premier said America wanted to have a belt of security around Russia and was using economic aid to convince hesitant countries to become enemies of Russia. Yafi said "I am not a Communist, but I differentiate between communism and the state of the Soviet Union." He noted that the Soviet Union gave wheat to Egypt when America refused to do so.

Yafi wondered what was the interest of Lebanon in being partial to either of the two large blocs. And who, he asked, was to be responsible for exposing Lebanon to the danger of bombs and missiles. He also wondered what was the purpose in enlarging Lebanese-American relations from the level of Point IV to the level of the international conflict and the fight against international communism. He asked what the government's reason was for not consulting the Lebanese personalities before accepting the Doctrine as former President Bechara Khoury did when confronted with the common defense (MDP) project.

The opposition leader reminded President Chamoun of a speech in which he (Chamoun) said that the position of Lebanon toward the West is the function of the position of the West toward Arab problems. Yafi asked if the West's position had changed so that "we should thus place
ourselves in its hands."

On another course, Yafi said the Lebanese-American agreement was a violation of the National Pact of 1943 by which it was agreed that a privileged position should not be given to any foreign state. He said he preferred to see Lebanon a friend of Britain, France, Russia and the United States at the same time.

Yafi concluded by saying that he "cannot approve this new policy based on the approval of direct or indirect pact," but to the contrary he approved "neutrality that prevents Lebanon from the dangers of cold or hot wars." He said he was ready to resign should the parliament give the government confidence. He begged the government not to ask for confidence in order to use it in applying a new policy for Lebanon. 276

Speaking after Yafi was Ghassan Tueni, a representative of the Christian, Lebanese nationalist segment of the population. He said:

The group resignation that Yafi threatened is undemocratic and contrary to the parliamentary spirit. It does not change the idea of any one of his colleagues. The opposition wants to give the impression that the government took advantage of the martial law in order to plot against Lebanon, the Arabs, the world and international communism in collaboration with the monster called America.

The reality is the contrary. The plot was not from that side but from the other. The government used the authorities given it by the martial law in order to defend Syria and Egypt from being attacked by the Lebanese press and opinion. And the government protected Yafi and those with him from being attacked, and not the contrary.

Yafi accuses the government policy of being new. We are going to give this government confidence because it brought a new inspiration. What did the old policy bring Lebanon? Did it restore Palestine? Did it bring prosperity to Lebanon or to

276 Al Hayat, op.cit., 6 April 1967
any Arab country? Did it strengthen our army? The old policy brought nothing of the sort. Maybe it brought some advantages, but nevertheless it should not be renewed.

On the question of neutralism Tueni said that when (former premier) Riad Solh spoke about neutralism of Lebanon he did not mean between communism and the West but between the Oriental East and the Arab world on one side and the Western world on the other. "We cannot say there is a traditional neutralism in Lebanon in the sense Yafi is speaking. There is traditional neutralism in the sense meant by the words of Riad Solh."

Among other things, Tueni accused international communism of being much more cruel than Western imperialism. He declared also that Lebanon should have no neutralism between religion and atheism. 277

Deputy Hamid Frangieh, former foreign minister, expressed a moderate Lebanese nationalist, but opposition point of view. He said the question was not that of America or communism, but the reflection of the Lebanese-American agreement on internal problems. He said the opposition wanted to preserve the national past and the government did not consult any personality about this important question.

"We must have a plebiscite in order to know the consensus of the country," Frangieh said. "In the past in every similar case personalities have been contacted, and the preceding president invited the present president to consult him on some similar cases. 278 And Dulles and Stassen said our reasons were valid. 279 Why didn't you

277 Al Nahar, Beirut, 6 April 1957
278 Frangieh assumed referred to the common defense and MEDO projects.
279 Here Frangieh seems to be saying that during Dulles' 1955 visit he told the Lebanese government leaders, of which Frangieh was one, that their reasons for not accepting the then current plan for a common defense organization for the Middle East were valid.
follow the same procedure now? It is a tradition in our part of the world to keep the external policy far from the internal policy. Because of that the opposition is consulted in every country before any external policy decision is made in order to have a policy backed by everyone and separated from internal conflicts."

Frangieh continued to say that the government should not take the responsibility alone. He repeated that the question was not that of the United States vs. communism but the reflection of external policy on internal politics. "We do not want an external policy which divides Lebanon internally," he said.

Concerning the attitude of the other Arab countries, Frangieh said there were two alternatives as to what might follow Lebanon's acceptance of the Eisenhower Doctrine. Either the other Arab countries would accept the pact and thus "all we have done is to lose the idea of Arab collaboration for no reason; or they will refuse the pact and we will be alone. And what is the importance of a pact with one Arab country," he asked, "both alternatives are wiser."

Frangieh said the pact talks only about the enemy of America, while Lebanon has another enemy, Israel. Also he said that the position of America in the aggression against Egypt was very honest and important. "The initiative of Eisenhower was great," he said, "but are we sure that America will do the same thing in any aggression?"

In another point of opposition Frangieh said that before fighting international communism Lebanon should fight communism inside the country.
He said that communism is cunning and can accomplish much if there is not a social program protecting the country from it.

Franqieh too preferred to see the government ask for a vote on external policy after the coming elections, 280

Foreign Minister Dr. Charles Malik stated the case for the government. In a long speech he replied point by point to the arguments presented by the opposition against Lebanon’s accepting the Eisenhower Doctrine. He said:

This meeting is historical. The problems raised are basic—namely the Lebanese being and its relation with the two worlds, Arab and Western, and communism. There are two ways of replying to the deputies. One is to analyze what they said. This I cannot do because I have not the originals of their speeches. Another way is to choose problems that they raised and try to answer each.

First the problem of the isolation of Lebanon: Isolation is to be understood in two ways—international isolation or Arab isolation. From the international point of view Lebanon is not isolated. At no time before was Lebanon as respected and liked internationally as she is now. And in relation to the Arab world Lebanon is not isolated. Even towards Syria and Egypt she is not isolated. The Arab world is something much broader than Egypt and Syria. In spite of the fact that these two states may be closer to us than others.

If isolation is meant in the sense that Lebanon is isolated from others on the basis of the principle of communism, that would be a very good thing. For if any Arab country is being communized, the isolation of Lebanon would be the best thing, for Lebanon and the Arab states.

Therefore, communism is the thing which threatens Lebanon and others than Lebanon. If Lebanon fights it, it is a source of pride for her. Lebanon has solidarity with Arab countries to the utmost, but not through the way of communism.

As to the argument that Lebanon did not consult other Arab countries before taking this decision, I am afraid that the

280 Al Hayat, op.cit., 6 April 1957.
thing which is meant is that Lebanon has not taken her
decision after the decision of other countries. If what
is meant is that Lebanon should wait until other countries
decide and then follow them, this government cannot accept
this kind of thinking. Lebanon is an independent country.
It consults everybody and exchanges opinions with every-
body, but follows no one.

Lebanon has always consulted Arab countries but in this
matter we did not find any response. When I went to Egypt
I happened to declare my opinion about the Eisenhower plan
and I talked with Nasser several hours on the subject. He
did not mention at all that he was against the policy of
Lebanon toward this project. Naturally he said to me that
he was still studying the project but did not criticize the
position of Lebanon at all.

On the other hand, consultation presupposes interchange.
I would prefer to hear from the deputies not only criticism
of Lebanon, but also some mention of circumstances and
occasions where others took decisions without consulting us.

I now come to the third point—the fight against communism
and the accusation against Lebanon that she links herself
to the wheels of America. Lebanon did not declare war
against communism but declared her intention or resolution
to defend herself if communism attacked her. And this is
a very legitimate position. Lebanon did not link herself to
the wheels of anyone. But, on the contrary, she preserved
the best relations with Russia and all states. But Lebanon
has seen that communism does not coincide with international
independence and means disturbance of the world peace. And
three days ago an important Communist said that communism
and nationalities are two opposing concepts. Therefore we and
America are resolved to defend ourselves in the case of any
Communist aggression against us. And I accept the idea that
we did not formulate a social program which can resist
communism.

As regards the fight against communism Lebanon did not ask
America to protect her but declared that she would protect
herself and would not ask for American aid, except in the
case of Communist aggression. We are not bound to America.
America is bound to us, if an aggression occurs.

A fourth point was that the agreement between Lebanon and
America mentions only Communist aggression and does not
mention imperialist and colonialist aggression and the
Zionist aggression. The reply to this is that if two sides
agree on a, b, and c, and not on d, e and f, does that mean that an agreement among them is impossible? This does not mean that if we sign this agreement we are sacrificing our points of view in other things in which we and America do not hold the same opinions.

The Eisenhower project concerns the fight against communism and Richards did not come to discuss the problem of Palestine or the canal. Therefore the argument that the agreement did not mention either colonialism or Zionism does not stand.

When I mentioned to Eisenhower and Dulles the problem of Palestine their answer was: In our position in the canal crisis we have proved how we act in such things and we will do the same thing with any Arab country that faces an aggression.

You ask why we did not put these words in a written document. I in my turn ask you, do you want us to go and sign a treaty with America in order to protect us from any aggression. I suppose you do not want this, I say to you that I understand that the United States administration is ready to improve relations with the Arabs. King Saud understood the same thing and took profit of it. We must exploit the three coming years in order to get profit from the good intentions of the current American administration.

A fifth point of the opposition concerned the violation of the National Fact. Malik said "I do not believe there is any violation. If there is any communist arrangement or movement taking place here or there this is condemned both by the government and the people."

To the claim that the government's policy was a new policy, Malik replied that a new policy was not a barren or a treason. Every policy he said, should often be renewed. His only condition was that the renewal should not be improvised and arbitrary. "And" he said, "I have not heard that the agreement was vague."

On the question of the need for a plebiscite Malik said the country "is soon coming to elections and the country may accept or refuse what you are now voting for." 291

291 Al Nahar, op.cit. 6 April 1957
The government, as planned, called for the confidence vote on the question of acceptance of the Eisenhower Doctrine. And as they had threatened six opposition deputies resigned. Declaring the resignation in the name of all six Yafi said: "As I see that the intention is still present to vote for the confidence in spite of the fact that we asked the government not to put the question to a vote, and as the government is still persistent in its position, I declare my resignation from the parliament, in my name, and also in the name of all my colleagues who have the same position as I. I congratulate the government on its total confidence as shown by parliament. 282 I declare also that we have nothing in mind but the interest and service of Lebanon," 283

The parliament voted in favor of confidence for the government—and for the Eisenhower Doctrine—by 50 votes to 1, with one abstention. The policy of the Lebanese government toward the United States and its policy in the Middle East was finally perfectly clear and solid.

In reacting so clearly and solidly, and in such an openly partisan manner, to the preferred American alignment as embodied in the Eisenhower Doctrine, the government of Lebanon, at least in the minds of its opponents, had completely separated itself from the policy prescribed by the National Pact of 1943. Having been forced out into the open, the opposition's reaction to the government move

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282 This decisive remark by Yafi was obviously made in reference to the fact that those resigning represented a very large portion of the Lebanese seawhose Musulim population. Kamal and Ahmed Assad are leaders of the southern Sh'ite community, Hamadi of the Sunni majority in Tripoli, Hamadi of the Bik'a Sh'ite group and Yafi of the Beirut Sunnis. Frangeh represented one of the few moderate Maronites.

283 Al Hayat, op.cit., 6 April 1957
was, in turn, more direct and outspoken. And the fact that the Arab nationalist leadership outside Lebanon was openly opposed to the current Chamoun cabinet's stand increased the unwillingness of the internal opposition leaders to put up with the government in power. At the same time it can be said that the opposition attitude toward the government's action was simply a sympathetic reaction to the attitude manifested by other Arab countries.

Thus the duality in the pattern of the Lebanon's reaction to United States foreign policy in the Middle East had taken on a new trait. Even following the signature of the Baghdad Pact the Lebanese government had acted, officially, as the balancing point at which the effort was employed to neutralise the conflicting natures of the two major factions within the country. The government now had thrown its weight to one side, leaving the other to grasp more firmly to the support offered by sympathetic forces outside Lebanon in the Arab world.

United States policy in the Middle East, and more recently the Arab world, specifically, had been the cause for the varied reactions and counter-reactions which led to the situation in Lebanon in the spring of 1957. It was perhaps inevitable that the creator, however unwittingly, of the unbalance should in some way be involved in the re-establishment of a balance.
CHAPTER III
KISSENHOWER DOCTRINE TO THE
ELECTION OF PRESIDENT CHIRAB

Part I
ACCEPTANCE OF THE KISSENHOWER DOCTRINE
TO THE HENDERSON MISSION

With its acceptance of the Eisenhower Doctrine the Lebanese
government had deviated noticeably from the policy pattern outlined
in the National Pact of 1943. Thus the equilibrium within the country
was upset and strained feelings were created with the leading exponents
of Arab nationalism among the other Arab countries who saw the Eisenhower
Doctrine as another stumbling bloc set in the way of their 'positive
neutralist' policy. And, this situation having been established, the
reaction of Lebanon to further United States policy moves, or actions
under the terms of the Eisenhower Doctrine, was to assume a different
pattern.

Lebanon's reactions to United States policy manifestations in
the Middle East previous to the Eisenhower Doctrine had been almost
totally indirect, at least on the political level which we are
considering. Lebanon's attitude had been a function of the reactions
in the other Arab countries and tempered, finally, according to the
provisions of the National Pact. But, now that the government was no
longer making an effort to operate the country's external political
affairs according to the wishes of both factions in the country, the
side that was ignored reacted more violently to any political step
taken by the leaders who did not take its views into consideration.
Since the Eisenhower Doctrine was the culmination of American political foreign policy in the Middle East during the period under consideration here, Lebanon in fact was no longer reacting directly, or even through the reactions of the other Arab states, to United States policy. The country was simply disputing, within itself, but with some incentive from activities in other of the Arab countries, its government's reaction to the Eisenhower Doctrine.

The Eisenhower Doctrine itself produced no basic change in the purpose of United States foreign policy in the Middle East. The broad United States intention in that area remained to promote peace, prosperity and military security in order that the ever-feared threat of communism would not be able to make any major progress in the Middle East. Territorially speaking, the United States policy makers favored the maintenance of the status quo in the Middle East, in order that the turmoil of change would not afford the Communists an opportunity for subversion, and so that the West would be assured of the continued support of those countries it considered as fast friends. The Eisenhower Doctrine was offered as a means to shore up the weakened position of the West after the Suez crisis by applying a more specific statement of how the United States would react in the event peace, and thus its security, was endangered in the Middle East. It thus came in addition to the former Tripartite Declaration of 1950 and the United States supported Baghdad Pact of 1955. It signified a change in United States policy only in that the United States had until that time been unwilling to take such an outspoken and firm stand in the Middle East,
United States Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs William N. Rountree spoke on 16 May 1957 of "The Middle East--Fundamentals of American Policy." He noted four objectives of United States policy in the area:

"First, we believe in and hope for the creation of strong and independent nations which are able to resist the efforts of international communism to subvert the area.

"Secondly, we believe in contributing, if requested by the nations of the area, to their security. In a broad sense, their security is our security.

"Thirdly, we wish to assist the countries of the area in resolving their disputes in accordance with the principles of the charter of the United Nations.

"Fourthly, we wish to contribute to the progress and development of the nations of the Middle East." 284

While the fundamental objectives of United States foreign policy in the Middle East, as expressed by Rountree, had not changed, the Eisenhower Doctrine surely represented a new method of seeking the accomplishment of these objectives. To the extent that it was now more outspoken and firm in its resolution to prevent Communist encroachment in the Middle East, and more specific in pointing out what it would do to fulfill this resolution, the Eisenhower Doctrine amounted to a new United States policy for the Middle East. We have pointed out how the acceptance of this newest feature of United States policy in the Middle

East by the government of Lebanon amounted to a drastic change in its part in the matter of foreign policy. The task now is to describe the results of these two expressions of policy.

In Lebanon we have seen how the acceptance of the Eisenhower Doctrine further annoyed an already rankled opposition. This annoyance became more intense on the occasion of the parliamentary elections begun in June 1957. At an opposition rally on 12 May 1957 leaders of different religious sects leveled charges at the government. Hadi Frangieh, a Maronite Catholic candidate from north Lebanon, charged the government with promoting sectarian friction and neglecting Lebanon's relations with the Arab states in favor of cooperation with the West. Ahmed Assad, Muslim Shia of south Lebanon, also attacked the government for promoting sectarian strife and for "pulling Lebanon out of the Arab community." Saeed Salam, Muslim Sunni of Beirut charged the government with "terrorising the electorate", and attacked the government's foreign policy for working with the imperialists who were interested only in Zionism, oil and defense pacts." 285

At the same rally, organised by the opposition National Union Front, the front's political platform was outlined by Salam and another former premier and Sunni leader Abdullah Yafi. It was briefly:

1. No amendment of the constitution to permit the reelection of the president. 286

285 Arab World, op. cit., 15 May 1957

286 Opposition to the government had gradually turned to opposition of personal policies of President Chamoun, who the opposition leaders blamed, along with Foreign Minister Malik, for being the prime mover of the government's pro-Western policy.
2. Total neutrality for Lebanon.
3. Rejection of foreign military bases and military pacts like the Baghdad Pact.
4. Rejection of any aid which seemed to compromise Lebanese sovereignty.
5. Close, impartial and effective cooperation with other Arab states.
6. Replacement of the present government by a caretaker cabinet to supervise the national elections. 287

On 28 May Premier Saeb Salih said the government was determined to subdue agitation in the country during the electoral campaign. He said it was propagated by foreign elements in the country. Referring to the government’s relations with other Arab countries Salih said "Lebanon, while maintaining its solidarity with other Arab States, is firmly attached to her independence. She will see to it that the Lebanese alone handle their internal affairs and settle their internal disputes." 288 This was probably the first official hint of the growing enmity between the Lebanese government leaders and the Arab country most opposed to their newly publicised pro-Western policy—Egypt.

The next day government security forces killed five and wounded several score in pre-election clashes. Most of the casualties occurred when police attempted to break up a mass opposition demonstration. Opposition leader Seeb Salam was personally beaten and arrested. An official government communique later said that non-Lebanese elements had

287 ibid., 18 May 1957.
288 ibid., 30 May 1957.
taken part in the demonstration. Two Syrian intelligence officers were reportedly arrested in the crowd, and there were reports that some Soviet and Czech arms were found in the possession of demonstrators. These were believed, the reports said, to have been smuggled from Syria. The army was subsequently placed in full control of the country. 289

The election began on 9 June and ended some three weeks later with pro-government deputies in complete domination of the parliament. In the Beirut vote, the two most influential opposition leaders, Salem and Yafi, both lost, thus being eliminated from the parliament. They were dropped from the cabinet the previous fall after the dispute over breaking off relations with Britain and France. Both opposition leaders and newspapers leveled charges of intrigue, conspiracy and forgery at the government for its alleged election activity. 290 More specifically, however, the government win was due to some timely gerrymandering. The electoral law of 1957, which went into effect before the election, redrew the electoral districts to deprive opposition deputies of some of their supporters and put other, sometimes pro-government areas in their place. In the Beirut district, which was previously divided into five constituencies, the new law established only two. As a result, the constituency in which Salem and Yafi ran now no longer included a majority of their supporters.

Another factor in the opposition defeat in Beirut was that Premier Solh decided to throw down the gauntlet and run in the same

289 Ibid., 31 May 1957
290 Ibid., 11 June 1957
constituency, as the two opposition leaders. While it was expected that Solh, Salam and Yafi would all win, or at least one of the opposition leaders, the newly-drawn constituency provided Solh with enough backing that he not only won his own seat, but drew along with him other pro-government candidates, leaving the opposition out entirely. The fact that Salam and Yafi later claimed they had received 65 percent of the Muslim vote indicates that the gerrymandering had down the constituency with a Christian majority, or at least enough that they, plus Solh's traditional followers in the constituency, were able to give the opposition leaders a sound drubbing. 291

The tone of the opposition reaction to the government win indicates that it was a surprise. The government's maneuver then evidently did not assure it in advance of success. The assumption then must be that the broad issue at stake in the election had something to do with the result. In any case, throughout the country, whether through gerrymandering or true support, the government won a sweeping victory. There was no longer any effective opposition voice in the parliament.

Meanwhile the Lebanese acceptance of the Eisenhower Doctrine had begun to pay off in military equipment furnished. On 8 June Lebanon received its first shipment of arms provided under the terms of the Eisenhower plan. This included 40 Jeeps equipped with anti-tank rifles. 292 The second shipment arrived on 16 July and amounted

292 Arab World, 10 June 1957
to 1,600 tons of heavy vehicles and tractors, 105 mm. howitzers, ammunition, road-building equipment, including road-rollers and a complete rock-crushing plant, heavy cranes, telephone and radio equipment, tools and spare parts. Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces General Fuad Chehab declared on the latter occasion that "we are much better equipped than ever before and better prepared to maintain our country's independence." United States Ambassador Donald Heath said this American aid showed "how nations with mutual respect for each other can cooperate to everyone's benefit." Foreign Minister Charles Malik said that with United States military and economic aid Lebanon would be freer and stronger, could expand her economy and raise her standards of living. 298

And, at the same time, the attitude of the Lebanese government towards the United States was reflected in an exchange of notes between the Soviet and Lebanese governments concerning a point made by Foreign Minister Charles Malik in an official interview with the Soviet Ambassador in Beirut. Soviet news agency Tass announced on the evening of 11 June that Ambassador Kiktev had submitted earlier that day to the Director General of the Lebanese Foreign Ministry a declaration of his government in which accusations made against the USSR by Malik were rejected. 294

After pointing out that the activities of Lebanese national organisations concerned no one but the Lebanese people, and after having affirmed that the Soviet Union remained true to its policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries, the Soviet note

293 ibid., 16 July 1957
294 As an example of such allegations, Malik was reported to have said "the USSR could have mixed in the activities of the Lebanese opposition."
declared: "The USSR has shown on several occasions its favorable attitude towards the Arab states who shake off the yoke of imperialism. It is normal—the Eisenhower doctrine for the Middle East being an instrument concluded in order to transform the territories of the Middle East into military bases directed against the USSR—that it should feel within its rights to raise its voice to attract attention to the danger that this doctrine represents for peace."

A Foreign Ministry spokesman said after receiving the Soviet note that the Ministry had made no declaration on the subject, but that Malik had raised the question in the course of an official interview with the Soviet Ambassador on 26 May. The Ministry had kept secret the object of that interview, feeling it was a matter of diplomatic conversation of concern both to the USSR and Lebanon which could not be divulged except with the consent of both parties.

On 12 June Malik called the Soviet envoy to an interview. Malik reportedly told the ambassador he was very surprised to read in the Arabic newspapers which appeared that morning in Beirut the text of the note which the official agency Tass had communicated to them. He said diplomatic traditions followed in all the countries of the world imposed upon every state the duty not to publish official notes presented by it to another state without the consent of the latter. The reports said Malik told Kitev his government had published the note which he had presented yesterday without having asked or received the Lebanese government's previous agreement. He told the envoy that the unilateral initiative which the Soviet government had taken in
publishing the note which Kiktev presented, without the previous agreement of the Lebanese government, constitutes an unfriendly act and an interference in Lebanon's internal affairs.

Kiktev reportedly replied briefly, denying entirely that his unilateral act and the text of the note constituted an interference of any sort in the internal affairs of Lebanon. 295

This sidelight serves only to show once again, in another way, the attitude of the Lebanese government in respect to foreign relations with the West's Cold War with communism, as represented by the Soviet Union and its policies. Malik had hitherto been the most public of the Lebanese leaders in his support for the Eisenhower Doctrine. President Chamoun, however, in his annual speech at his home village of Deir el Qamar, took the opportunity to support officially the policy of the American government. He defended the Eisenhower Doctrine on the grounds that it was no more than an unconditional encouragement to the struggle against the infiltration of communism into the area. 296

On other topics of interest—Chamoun referred to the bad state of Arab relations and said the trouble was due in the first place to the habit of certain Arab states of taking major political decisions without prior preparation or consultation with the other Arab states. It was also due, the President said, to the "overt meddling" of certain Arab states in the affairs of others. Chamoun paid respect to Jordan and the courage and wisdom of King Hussein which had kept his country

295 L'Orient, op.cit., 13 June 1957
296 Arab World, op.cit., 5 August 1957
from being completely overrun by subversive elements. Chamoun said that despite all that had happened, however, there was still a chance of restoring Arab solidarity and he urged that a top level conference be held either in Riad or Cairo.

Concerning the Lebanese general elections, the President said they had been completely free. He complained of certain "external" interference in the elections which he said were particularly lively due to the current international situation. Chamoun said his view in that respect was that the "great majority" of the Lebanese people had shown their support for the government's foreign policy.

Chamoun's speech shows the effect that the pressure of the Lebanese opposition, and its supporters outside the country, was beginning to have on the government. The reaction to the current Chamoun government's policy had become even more bitter after the opposition candidates were for the most part beaten in the election. There was no longer any means within governmental procedure for the opposition to effectively show its disagreement with government policy. Chamoun's reference to "meddling" was the first time he had publicly hinted that the opposition was receiving support, through propaganda media at least, from the Arab nationalist leaders of Egypt. This type of statement would have been to elicit the solid backing of the Lebanese nationalists in the country for the president's policies, for from their point of view any interference in the affairs of Lebanon by an outside Arab power on the side of the Arab nationalists was also a breach of the National Pact. It did not matter that the cause for this deviation

ibid.
was another, previous deviation, at least in the eyes of the Arab nationalists, on the part of the traditionally neutral government.

In any case it is clear that the government's policy was beginning to prompt reactions of a serious nature both within the country and in the Arab world. Malik perhaps was trying to awaken the interest of the United States with his hint that the Soviet government might in some way be abetting the cause of the Lebanese opposition.

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Part 2
HENDERSON MISSION TO THE FORMATION
OF THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

While Lebanon was becoming more and more deeply immersed in a dangerous internal situation due basically to its government's foreign policy and the reaction to it, the foreign policymakers in Washington were becoming increasingly concerned over the political situation in Lebanon's neighbor, Syria. The Communist party in that country had become very active and influential, both in the government and the army. Syrian relations with the Soviet Union were becoming too congenial to suit the United States, and at the same time were becoming drastically anti-American. In early August Syria charged the United States with being involved in a plot against the Syrian government through its diplomatic envoys in Damascus. Three officers of the American embassy were declared persona non grata and their recall was demanded. The United States replied
in kind on 14 August by declaring the Syrian ambassador and second secretary in Washington persona non grata and protesting the "slanderous campaign" the Syrian government had been waging against it. 298

Toward the end of that month the State Department sent special Ambassador Loy Henderson to the Middle East to evaluate the situation. He was to get in particular the evaluation of those in the area—"our ambassadors in the area and the representatives of the neighbors of Syria, who...are very genuinely alarmed themselves about what is going on." 299

Henderson met in Ankara with Turkish Prime Minister Nenderes and Kings Feisel and Hussein of Iraq and Jordan to discuss the Communist gains in Syria. He arrived in Beirut on 28 August and met the United States Ambassadors to Baghdad, Amman and Beirut as well as Lebanese Foreign Minister Malik and Premier Solh, and later President Chamoun. L'Orient reported that the purpose of Henderson's visit was to check the Communist advance in the Middle East as evidenced by the USSR-Syrian relations. 300 Henderson remained in Beirut until 31 September when he returned to Istanbul. It had been reported during his stay that he exchanged views with Lebanese leaders on methods of carrying out the fight against Communism and reducing Communist infiltration in the Middle East. 301 Also during the American envoy's visit Malik was

299 Ibid., September 16, 1957, p. 461
300 L'Orient, op.cit., 29 August 1957
301 Ibid., 29, 30 August 1957
reported to have conferred with the Ambassadors of Saudi Arabia and Italy and the Indian minister. The Saudi Ambassador denied reports that his country had offered to mediate between Syria and the United States. Malik's meeting with the Italian Ambassador was reported to have been held to consider the possibility of Italian mediation.

Al Dyar (Christian, Arab, opposition) said on 2 September that Henderson's mission to Beirut had failed because Lebanese relations with Syria were so bad that Malik and the Lebanese government were unable to perform any mediatory services. 302 The Lebanese press in general refrained from commenting on Henderson's visit, although the papers reported what facts there were concerning his talks with the government leaders.

On his return to the United States on 4 September Henderson said the situation in Syria "is most grave" not only for the Middle East but for the free world in general. According to Henderson officials of both Lebanon and Jordan had declared that their countries wanted new proof of American support. 303 On 5 September a shipment of United States arms was sent by air to Amman, reportedly a result of the Henderson talks. 304

On 7 September United States Secretary of State Dulles made it known that in a meeting held that day between himself, Henderson and Under Secretary of State Breitner with President Eisenhower, the president "affirmed his intention to carry out the national policy, expressed in the Congressional Middle East resolution (Eisenhower Doctrine) which had been adopted, and exercise as needed the

502 Arab World, op.cit., 2 September 1957
503 L'Orient, op.cit., 5 September 1957
504 ibid., 6 September 1957
authority thereby conferred on the President. In this connection the President authorized the accelerated delivery to the countries of the area of economic and other defensive items which have been programmed for their use." 306

However in a speech on 9 September Deputy Under Secretary of State Robert Murphy reminded that the Eisenhower Doctrine, "which is the cornerstone of United States policy toward the Middle East, operates only on the request of the countries concerned and is designed to strengthen their independence against the threats of international communism." 306 And, in his news conference of 10 September Dulles said the situation in Syria was a "borderline" case. The President, he said, would not likely make a decision as to whether Syria actually was dominated by international communism without further evidence. Dulles said that the President would not make the decision "until it was of practical significance to do it rather than an academic exercise."

A newsmen said "In short, Syria has to commit an act of aggression with her neighbors before the United States would characterize it as Communist-dominated?" Dulles answered, "That is the way I see the situation today." 307

The further evidence did not present itself in Syria and the President did not find it "of practical significance" to decide that Syria was dominated by international communism and call for the application of his doctrine. It was to be events in friendly Lebanon that ultimately provided the basis for a physical action by the United

306 ibid., P. 485
307 ibid., September 30, 1957, pp. 528-529
States in the Middle East.

While Henderson was in Beirut evaluating the dangerous situation in Syria the Lebanese political situation was itself becoming more and more dangerous. In fact throughout the past summer the government had become increasingly touchy to criticism, which was plentiful. On 25 June the cabinet approved a bill authorising detention of any journalist whose writing was considered to offend the government prior to a judicial inquiry. Newspapers began a strike on 1 July which lasted until 15 July when the government accepted a substitute bill drafted by the newspaperman's syndicate. Still, on 22 July the owners of two opposition newspapers were arrested and charged with publishing attacks on President Chamoun. On 1 August they were each sentenced to 15 days imprisonment.

On 18 August another loyalist cabinet was formed by Premier Solh. On 21 August his government asked parliament for emergency powers to arrest anyone considered to be a threat to the country's security. On 23 August the Internal Security Council held an urgent meeting to cope with a wave of which was beginning to spread in the country. On 31 August, after two days of parliamentary debate in which the government was strongly attacked by opposition deputies, the new cabinet received a vote of confidence, 58-17. Foreign Minister Malik again defended his foreign policy saying Lebanon just could not be friends with everyone, and that his policy of cooperating with the United States was "the most realistic", ensuring Lebanon the most friends and rendering her the least isolated of the Arab states. He said the opposition would have been the case if Lebanon had followed the policy adopted by Egypt and Syria.

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508 Arab World, op. cit., 2 September 1967
Malik defended Lebanon's acceptance of the Eisenhower Doctrine as a safeguard against aggression without in any way affecting her independence or carrying any obligation, with the United States undertaking to come to Lebanon's aid in the case of any attack against her, without Lebanon being similarly obliged to aid the United States in the case of war. He went on to say that Lebanon was resolved to do her best to improve relations with Egypt and Syria but would not sacrifice its foreign policy as the price for this.

While Malik may have not considered Lebanon was isolated from the majority of the Arab states, his government was surely, as indicated in his own remarks, becoming more and more at odds with Egypt and Syria—the latter sharing Lebanon's borders. On the opposite side of the balance, the Eisenhower Doctrine so far had been helpful in the fact that Lebanon had received two shipments of military equipment from the United States under its provisions and had been promised (on 15 July 1957) 10 million dollars economic aid and 4,700,000 dollars military aid during the 1958 fiscal year. This policy, if anything, inclined rather than prevented the wave of subversive acts such as shootings, bombings, sabotage and arms smuggling that had been increasing throughout the country since the past spring.

Both government and opposition were adamant in their points of view concerning the Eisenhower Doctrine. The opposition voices in parliament asked the government to "clarify" its position with regard to the communique of 26 March. The government did so by making even

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309 ibid.,
310 ibid., 16 July 1957 (United States Embassy announcement).
more plain its defiance of opposition to its pro-Western policy. Malik and Solh called for another confidence vote on 26 November, Malik said his foreign policy was aimed at obtaining unlimited, un-conditional American aid. He said a system of equal sharing of development projects and expenditures was being revised to Lebanon's advantage. Also he said America would help Lebanon sell its apples and other produce. On the question of the Eisenhower Doctrine Malik made three points. He said it did not constitute a mutual defense treaty. Under it the United States was committed to defend Lebanon in case of Communist aggression, but within the framework of her foreign policy the United States was bound to defend Lebanon against any sort of aggression, whether from Israel or elsewhere. And he said the doctrine did not pave the way for a settlement with Israel. Premier Solh, explaining his government's internal policy, said the current terrorism was caused by "external inspiration" and was mostly conducted by foreigners and Palestinian refugees, 511.

While Malik's statement's might have answered some of the moderate objections to the communiqué of Lebanese adherence to the Eisenhower Doctrine, it could not dispel the feeling of personal bitterness held by many opposition leaders towards the policy followed by President Chamoun in ignoring their positions as leaders of an Arab-nationalist group which could not accept a government that was so obviously contrary to the policies championed by the leader of revolutionary Egypt and his allies in Syria. Nevertheless Chamoun,

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511 ibid., 27 November 1967
Sollh and Malik had the majority in parliament in their favor. The vote of confidence was again won on 27 November 1957.

The Beirut press reported on 25 December that the Lebanese Foreign Ministry had sent a note to Egypt proposing a meeting between the Lebanese and Egyptian governments to settle outstanding questions and disputes. At the same time Al Hayat (Musulim, undetermined, neutral) reported that Premier Sollh had expressed surprise at a recent speech by President Nasser in which he said that Beirut was being used as a base for "imperialistic plots" against Egypt. And the Syrian press on 26 December reported an accusation by Syrian Foreign Minister Salah Bitar that Lebanon had become a "center of imperialist activities and a base against the security of Syria." 512 The Lebanese cabinet meanwhile was reported considering stronger security measures to deal with the prevalent terrorism. Syrians were barred from entering Lebanon between Christmas and New Year. The situation was anything but amicable and conducive to the settlement of differences.

Foreign Minister Charles Malik made another bid for support in his policy as regards the United States in a statement to the Parliament on 30 December. He said that following talks with United States government officials the United States would no longer require Lebanon to assume half the expenditure of every project granted American aid. He said aid in the future would be granted without Lebanon being required to assume any particular amount of expenditure. (One of the chief concerns of deputies who had backed the government's policy was the amount of American aid to be received as a result of their foreign policy stand, and the freedom with which it could be spent.)

512 ibid., 31 December, 1957
Kataeb party Deputy Joseph Chader hailed the news while Maile Bustani (middle-of-the-road politician and industrialist) wondered whether the current administration inspired sufficient confidence to be allowed to dispose of the American funds. Opposition leader Philip Takla, chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, pointed out that what was important was not so much to abolish the 50-50 system of expenditure, but to increase United States aid to Lebanon. He said in comparison to USSR aid to Egypt and Syria, United States aid to Lebanon was "insignificant". Takla suggested that the whole matter of United States aid be revised in light of the Soviet aid currently being given to the Middle East.

Meanwhile the rumors that President Chamoun was considering using his parliamentary support to have the constitution amended to allow him to run for a second term were causing more and more alarm among opposition and middle-of-the-road politicians who were against the move for constitutional as well as current political reasons. The opposition just could not stomach the idea of Chamoun being president again and the middle-of-the-roaders were afraid of the resulting violence and permanent damage that might result from such a move on the part of the president. A group of the latter called on President Chamoun on 30 December to ask him what he proposed to do. According to statements issued after the meeting by the "Third Force", a group of moderate, neutral, politicians and personalities, the President said he had already made a decision but would not make it

513 Ibid.
public before the coming June or July. He said he was in principle against the amendment of the constitution but "should no candidate emerge who would be capable of assuring the continuity of my policy, I say it now, I shall reconsider my position." 314

Meanwhile also, the Egyptian propaganda radio station, "Voice of the Arabs", was waging a full-scale battle against the Lebanese government. Its chief, Ahmed Said, was quoted in Beirut Nassa (Muslim, Arab, opposition) on 1 January 1988 as saying that the Lebanese government was exposing its country and all the Arabs to grave dangers because of its support for Western policies. 315

Chamoun's reported statement to the Third Force delegation set off a full-scale attack on his seeming intentions by influential members of that group. Veteran Lebanese politician Henry Pharaon published a statement on 7 January against the amendment of the constitution to enable a second term for Chamoun. 316 The Third Force (also including right-wing politicians and personages such as Ghassan Tuuni, editor of Al Nahar) issued a manifesto on 17 January objecting to Chamoun's supposed intention to run for a second term. Referring to Chamoun's recent statement, the manifesto concluded that there was no doubt left that Chamoun was seeking reelection on the basis of his foreign policy. It said this was wrong since Lebanon's foreign policy was not the making of one man. It said the chief executive does not make policies but executes them. And besides, it was not up to the president to pick his successor. 317

314 Ibid.
315 Ibid., 2 January 1988
316 Ibid., 8 January 1988
The opposition was not quiet either about Chamoun's alleged intention to run for a second term. In his newspaper Al Siassa (Muslim, Arab, opposition), former Premier Abdullah Yafi insisted that respect for the constitution was of prime interest to the country and that the president would gain far more popularity by announcing unequivocally his intention to respect the constitution.

Before the Suez crisis in the fall of 1956 there had been no true opposition to the government in power in Lebanon, both factions in the country being represented in the cabinet. But now that the one side had been discounted in the formation of policy and forced into open opposition, its attacks on the makers of that policy were causing them to react in a manner which was to make the dispute even more critical. In their reactions and counterreactions to matters of foreign policy the government and its Lebanese nationalist supporters, on the one hand, and the Arab nationalist-inclined opposition on the other were forcing each other into un-retractable positions.

Part 5

WAR FORMATION TO THE OUTBREAK OF THE REVOLT

Between the Lebanese government's two most determined enemies in the Arab world, Egypt and Syria, meanwhile plans were being formulated for a move that was to have an enormous impact upon the Lebanese scene. Lebanon's reaction to this move provides a good example of the influence of Arab politics on Lebanon's policy.
In Syria in the middle of January, 1958, there were reports of a Socialist-Communist struggle for control. The question of unity with Egypt was reportedly the subject of the dispute. The nationalist-Socialist Baath party, according to L'Orient (Christian, Lebanese, neutral) of 12 January, had lined up with the right-wing Peoples party and the Nationalist party against the Communists and their allies. These groups had reportedly resisted the growing influence of Communist, or fellow-travelling officers in the army. 319

On 18 January Syrian Foreign Minister Salah Bitar and Chief of Staff Colonel Affif Bari were in Cairo for talks with Egyptian President Nasser. Papers reported that unity of the two countries was expected soon. 320

On 1 February 1958 Egypt and Syria announced they had decided to unite. The new country would be named the United Arab Republic. Reports were that the initial call for unity came from Syrian leaders who were disturbed by the increasing influence of the Communists in their country.

Saeb Salam, former Premier and opposition leader, described the attitude of the Lebanese opposition to the Egyptian-Syrian unity in a statement published in Cairo’s Al-Ahram on 2 February. He said: “It remains for me to say that we in Lebanon are very glad about this historic event and see in this blessed union a guarantee for the existence of Lebanon which all the Arabs agree to regard as a national

necessity; if it we also see an impervious shield protecting the independence of Lebanon from the evilddoing of the foreigner and repelling the intrigues and reactions of imperialism."

In another statement printed in Beirut's Telegraph (Christian, Arab, opposition) Salas said: "Lebanon was created and became independent on clear bases and by agreement of all her children. I should go further and say by agreement of two parties which decided to cooperate and act in brotherly fashion within her boundaries... We will not accept that others should drag Lebanon into a union that is not agreed upon by all the Lebanese. I am saying this, confident as I am that I am expressing the views of every loyal Lebanese, no matter how much he may be inclined towards union." He concluded this statement by saying that: fears concerning the future of Lebanon could be dispelled by means of a return to Lebanon's traditional policy (neutrality). Salas clearly felt that the unity of Egypt and Syria, already unified in their policy of non-alignment, would mean the first step toward the realisation of the dream of Arab nationalists, thus eliciting the support of the Lebanese opposition populace. This added prestige for the opposition might weaken the position of the Lebanese government to a point where the opposition's will could finally be effectively asserted—constitutionally.

L'Orient (Christian, Lebanese, neutral) and other Beirut newspapers of 2 February described the reaction to the announcement of the formation of the UAR in Lebanese diplomatic circles as "reserved."

321 Ibid., 3 February 1958.
Opposition papers however headlined reports of rallies staged by "Arab nationalist patriots" in Beirut, Tripoli and Sidon in celebration of the UAR proclamation. Al Amal (Christian, Lebanese, pro-government), organ of the Kataeb party, was concerned in its editorial about the effect the union would have on Lebanon's internal Christian-Muslim structure. Would the population be split, it asked, or would the enticement of union be resisted? The paper declared itself squarely for the maintenance of Lebanon's present form of free Christian-Muslim cooperation and stressed that Lebanon would not agree to any decrease in her territory nor to transfer of persons or property. 322 (Here, in the views of this representative of a large segment of the Lebanese Christian population, one can see the source from which President was to gain his support against the multiplying attacks from the opposition, which was primarily Muslim.)

The government remained reserved toward the Egyptian-Syrian unity proclamation. Opposition leaders however continued to express open enthusiasm for the UAR, while at the same time following the theme of Lebanese independence. Former Premier Yafi in Al Rosea (Muslim, Arab, opposition) of 4 February concluded: "The Lebanese people, who are related to the peoples of Egypt and Syria by strong bonds of brotherhood, common history and interests, will for their part contribute to the success of the union and to the elimination of whatever difficulties might crop up in its way, because they regard it as a true element of strength for them and a guarantee of their freedom and independence." 325

322 Ibid.
325 Ibid., 4 February 1958.
These expressions of the opposition's insistence on the maintenance of Lebanese independence drew the approval of the Christian Kataeb party spokesman Al Amal (Christian, Lebanese, pro-government) which paid tribute to Salam and others for their statesmanship in welcoming the union while appreciating the special position of Lebanon. Opposition newspapers also insisted on the theme of Lebanon's independence and freedom. And members of the Third Force, as well as various other Christian leaders such as former President Bishara Khouy, expressed their welcome for the union as an "added guarantee for Lebanon's independence and freedom," following in the footsteps of the Muslins, opposition leaders.

Before long however there appeared some indications that the opposition leaders and the pro-government factions did not have exactly the same thing in mind, or at least feared the intentions of one another, in their associations of Lebanese independence with the establishment of the UAR. With President Chamoun and his supporters at least this appeared to be the case. He saw the UAR as a threat to Lebanon's independence rather than a protection for it. In a speech on 9 February at the celebration of the Feast of St. Maron, Patron Saint of Lebanon, Chamoun stressed Lebanon's determination to retain her independence forever while loyalty cooperating with the newly created union, which, however, he did not mention by name. "Our Arab nationalism is serene, loyal, enlightened and far removed from the oppression and the opportunism of some," he said. "It seeks the happiness of all the Arab peoples, cooperation with them to the farthest limits. It tells us not to interfere in the affairs of the Arab states and, in turn, we have but one demand,

525 ibid., 6 February 1966.
and that is that we should be treated the same." 326

On the same day Nasser (Muslim, Arab, opposition) quoted former Syrian President Kwatli as saying he fully appreciated Lebanon’s own peculiar position. "The United Arab Republic," he reportedly added, "fully respects the particular character and independence of Lebanon with her present boundaries and her present form of government." Kwatli concluded however, the paper said, that the UAR at the same time stretched her hand to her neighbor Lebanon, inviting her to federate if the Lebanese so desired. 327

The opposition and Muslim papers of 11 February bitterly blamed President Chamoun for his attitude as expressed in the St. Maron day speech. Salim bitterly criticized Chamoun, saying in a statement to the press that the Lebanese people as a whole were looking for some opportunity for Lebanon to welcome her "big sister", and that the President took the opportunity instead to provoke unduly the feelings of "others". Salim reportedly insisted that the provocation was the more gratuitous as both Nasser and Kwatli had expressed their deep friendship and affection for Lebanon and their respect for Lebanon’s independence. 328

Al Asal (Christian, Lebanese, pro-government) however, and Telegraph (Christian, Arab, opposition) instead stressed the "Arab" and "friendly" remarks in Chamoun’s speech. Al Asal said editorially that it was those people who plaster Nasser’s portraits to the exclusion

325 Ibid., 10 February 1958.
327 Ibid.
328 Ibid., 11 February 1958.
of those of their own president, and to those who flourished Egyptian and Syrian flags to the exclusion of Lebanese, who were responsible for the distortion shown by some Lebanese for the UAR. These people, the paper said, were causing untold harm to the UAR when they assumed or alleged that Lebanon might in any way divest herself of her most cherished independence. Should such "intolerable provocations" continue, Al Anfal warned, "the consequences will be such as to cause joy only to the Arab enemies." 329

A plebiscite was held in Egypt and Syria on 21 February in which the union was formalized and Nasser was confirmed as President of the United Arab Republic. At a rally staged by the para-military Muslim youth organization called the Najdah party on 25 February Saeb Salem said "Lebanon will be the country which will profit most from the union of Egypt and Syria." He expressed strong opposition to Chamoun's alleged intention to run for a second term. 330

The Beirut press of 24 February announced that Lebanon had been the first country to officially recognize the UAR after the plebiscite, and that similar notes of congratulation were sent by Premier Soleh and President Chamoun to Nasser and Vice President Kewaddi. 331 On 26 February the papers headlined the United States recognition of the United Arab Republic.

The newspapers in Beirut on 5 March reported quotes from a speech made by President Nasser in Damascus on 26 February in which he said that Lebanon "forms an integral part of the great Arab nation, where she has her place." Nasser, Kewaddi and other UAR leaders paid

329 ibid.
tribute to Lebanese support of Arab nationalism. In a second speech welcoming the Lebanese delegation which had gone to Damascus to welcome him as UAR president (the total number of visitors amounted to an estimated 200,000 persons) Nasser declared this effort to share in the rejoicing of the Arab people over the UAR confirmed the solidarity of "Arab Lebanon" with it. Nasser assured the visiting delegation that "the United Arab Republic will be the best support of Lebanon.... and will always help the Arab people of Lebanon in their struggle under all circumstances." 532

In reply to Nasser's message of welcome Lebanese Speaker Adel Cassirian declared that "Lebanon will sooner or later join the Arab community." He said the delegation was in Damascus to affirm the "Arab character" of Lebanon and her "sincere and unwavering solidarity with the United Arab Republic." 533

In the opinion of L'Orient (Christian, Lebanese, neutral) on 2 March the "unionist" manifestations in Lebanon following Nasser's arrival in Damascus, and their official encouragement by UAR leaders, had "reduced to naught" efforts exerted by the Lebanese authorities to improve relations between Beirut and Cairo. The fact that the Egyptian and Syrian leaders were deliberately ignoring the Lebanese authorities in their speeches and addressing themselves to the Lebanese "people" could be considered as a call to subversion, in addition to

332 Ibid., 5 March 1956. (It must be noted here that a large portion of the Christian population of Lebanon, the extreme Lebanese nationalist group, do not consider themselves to be truly Arab.)

333 Ibid.
being contrary to all international practice between friendly countries. In particular, the paper said, Oseiran had exceeded the limits reached by the Lebanese opposition and National Front in declaring that Lebanon would join the UAR (Oseiran said the "Arab community") and had violated the 1943 National Pact.

Oseiran's speech had, L'Orient said, resulted in urgent consultations between cabinet ministers and deputies. The paper reported Minister of Information Farid Comna had declared that "Lebanon would join no other state or federation," but maintain firmly her independence and sovereignty, adding that this Lebanese resolve had been underlined in various speeches by deputies at the last parliament meeting. Comna went on to stress that Lebanon's concern over her independence did not signify "separatism". On the contrary, it showed that Lebanon had her doors open to all the Arab states, 534

Al Nahar (Christian, Lebanese, neutral) said also on 2 February that a "serious crisis" had been provoked between "official Lebanon" and the UAR as a result of "hostile slogans" broadcast by Egypt's Voice of the Arabs, Cairo Radio, and Damascus Radio against Lebanese statesmen (Chamoun and Malik), echoing the statements made by certain Lebanese visiting Damascus. The paper said the Ministry of Social Affairs was taking measures to prevent Lebanese or foreign organizations from hiring Syrian nationals and that the question of UAR nationals presently employed in Lebanon was being reviewed. Al Nahar also quoted "informed sources" as saying there was a move to cancel the visit of an official Lebanese

334 ibid.
delegation to Cairo and Damascus to present Lebanon's congratulations to the UN as a result of the anti-Lebanese government "campaign" in Damascus. 355

Also appearing in the Lebanese press on 3 March was an official United States Embassy communiqué issued in answer to questions which had arisen over the United States recognition of the UN. It gave the following explanations:

"1. The recognition indicates that the United States government is satisfied that the United Arab Republic represents the desire of the citizens of the new country, and that the United Arab Republic is willing to assume its international obligations.

"2. The United States, as has been stated by the Secretary of State, hopes that the new nation will contribute to the peace and stability of the area.

"3. The number of representatives which the United Arab Republic will have in the United Nations is a matter to be decided solely by the United Arab Republic and the United Nations.......") 356

The internal security situation within Lebanon meanwhile was worsening. On 8 March for the first time there were reports that unknown persons had fired on the presidential summer palace at Baabedine, and Egypt's Voice of the Arabs continued to broadcast denunciations of the leaders of Lebanon as being unrepresentative. 357

The newspaper Al Ahrar (Christian, Lebanese, pro-government) of 11 March gave prominence to a speech by Lebanese Progressive Socialist

355 ibid.
356 ibid.
357 ibid., 10 March 1958.
Party leader Kamal Jumblatt (also the leader of the Druze religious minority in the country) on the occasion of his visit to Damascus to congratulate Nasser. He was quoted as declaring: "We are all Muslims in equality and Christians in love and brotherhood." The Cairo papers of the same day headlined a speech by Maronite Catholic Patriarch Nasouchi in which he stressed the need for Lebanon to cooperate with her Arab neighbors. 358

On 12 March the cabinet of Premier Solh resigned in a move seen by many as an attempt to enable a reshuffle of the cabinet.

L'Orient (Christian, Lebanese, neutral), Al Hayat (Muslim, undetermined, neutral) and other leading papers agreed that the old cabinet could not have faced parliament when it came out of recess on 19 March and that the reshuffle was thus necessary. Al Nahar (Muslim, Arab, opposition) and Al Siasa (Muslim, Arab opposition) believed the main reason for the reshuffle was to bring to power people more disposed to support a constitutional amendment which would enable Chamoun to run for a second term. 359

L'Orient (Christian, Lebanese, neutral), Al Nahar (Christian, Lebanese, neutral) and others objected to Chamoun's alleged desire to seek a second term at the cost of amending the constitution and on 15 March these papers reported that groups of Chamoun supporters were beginning to campaign here and there for his second term. They reported an incident in the predominantly Christian section of Beirut called

358 ibid., 12 March 1956. (Nasouchi was one of the many Christian leaders who were non-Chaouinist if not pro-opposition. It was the Christian rank and file which was nearly completely pro-government. Nasouchi himself was personally at odds with Chamoun.)

359 ibid., 15 March 1956.
Ashrafish in which shots were fired in honor of the President in front of a portrait of Chamoun some 100 yards from the National Security Department. An intervening policeman they reported was beaten up. L'Orient warned against taking the second term question from parliament to the "street" where it could cause untold harm to the country. The paper said it was perhaps clever to create a "climate of national safety" (Chamoun's speeches denouncing tyrants and oppressors) around the person of the President and Malik's diplomacy. But it said the national safety policy Lebanon needed was one consisting of the reinsertion of the question of presidential succession within a purely Lebanese and constitutional framework.

Concerning the increasing tension between the Arab nationalist, pro-UAR, opposition portion of the population and the Christian, Lebanese nationalist, anti-UAR, pro-Chamoun group, Dahr Masa (Muslim, Arab, opposition) said on 13 March: "We wish to avoid a battle, but won't be afraid if one does take place." The paper said the "best way to avoid a national split is for the current leaders to nominate Rashid Karami (liberal opposition leader) for Premier so that he could liquidate the Chamoun era and bury the national split so that the country should be prepared to welcome a new neutral president and the liberated policy with unanimous joy,"

A new Lebanese cabinet was formed on 14 March 1958 with Saad Solh as Premier and Charles Malik again Foreign Minister. Christian

540 ibid.
541 ibid.
groups and newspapers supported the new cabinet. Opposition circles denounced it as a "reelection cabinet". L'Orient (Christian, Lebanese, neutral) said on 16 March that the new cabinet was "not a cabinet" but "an army" representing one third of the loyalist majority in parliament. (The new government was composed of 14 ministers). Al Hayat (Muslim, undetermined, neutral) and others quoted Premier Solh as saying "our policy is one of neutrality between feuding Arab blocs." He added: "Our foreign policy will be based on cooperation with all Arab states and on support for all Arab causes, particularly in Palestine and Algeria. We propose to work loyally and without wavering in the interest of the greater Arab nation." Egyptian and Syrian papers said the new cabinet deserved the same hostility as the last. 542

On 25 March the new government asked parliament for a vote of confidence on the following foreign policy:

1. Lebanon should remain firmly attached to her independence.

2. The government should conclude no agreement with anyone that might curtail or restrict the country's full independence and sovereignty.

3. Lebanon should not interfere in the internal affairs of other states and would not tolerate any external interference with her own internal affairs.

4. Lebanon would serve all Arab causes as in the past.

5. Lebanon would adopt an attitude of strict neutrality between the new Arab bloc (UAR and the Arab Federated State of Jordan and Iraq), wholeheartedly welcoming both.

542 ibid., 17 March 1968
6. On the internal plane the government would work for greater economic expansion and give attention to social problems. 343

After a hot debate which carried over until the next day’s session, the government received its vote of confidence—58-15 with 12 abstentions and absences. The main target of the attack by opposition deputies was Hallik’s foreign policy. 344

On 27 March an anti-re-election conference was held by some 84 leaders of all sects and nearly all political parties and groups. It was called by veteran political Henri Pharaon, leader of the middle-of-the-road Third Force, to discuss the restoration of national unity and the means of accomplishing this task. The conference decided that the necessary means consisted of denouncing any attempt on the part of the President to change the constitution to allow a second term.

Much of the Beirut press of 28 March published a statement issued at the end of the conference which said in part that “we did all we could to persuade the President to proclaim his intention of retiring at the end of his current term, but it was all to no avail. We realized unfortunately that he considered the arguments that he himself had used against others (former President Bechara Khoury) were intolerable when addressed to him.” The statement also said: “External events do not constitute a danger for us; they are no danger for our independence, if only we welcomed them with the same heart and the same common purposes. The peril that really menaces us comes from inside the country.” 345

343 ibid., 26 March 1958
344 ibid., 27 March 1958
345 ibid., 28 March 1958
On 5 April five persons were killed in Tyre, south Lebanon, when gendarmes opened fire on demonstrators. There had been a general strike in that city for a week after rioters against severe court sentences given to three people charged with insulting the Lebanese flag. Newspapers of all denominations criticised the government for letting the gendarmes deal so severely with what they described as a peaceful demonstration. After the shooting incident the army was called in to restore order. A delegation of opposition leaders including Ahmed Asad, prominent Shia leader of south Lebanon and Kamal Jumblatt, Druze leader and head of the Progressive Socialist Party, called on General Chehab, reportedly to ask his intervention to spare the country further bloodshed. 346

While the bitterness and tension in Lebanon resulting from the government's unbending stand on its pro-American (Western) policy continued, there were indications that not all the cabinet ministers were satisfied that the financial aid the United States was providing Lebanon under the Eisenhower Doctrine was sufficient to balance the trouble Lebanon's acceptance of the American policy for the Middle East had caused. Moderate L'Orient (Christian, Lebanese, neutral), Al Jarida (Christian, Lebanese, neutral) and other papers on 10 April reported a cabinet meeting the day before at which the insufficiency of United States aid was the main topic. It was reported also that Foreign Minister Malik had also been queried on the promised American aid at a meeting of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. At the cabinet meeting he reportedly had to answer many questions from the other ministers.

346 ibid., 3 April 1958.
These reportedly complained about the "procrastination" of the United States Overseas Mission, the organisation which arranges for and directs specific aid programs. The ministers said that most of the proffered aid was of a technical nature (as in the past), and not in dollars, at a time when Lebanon needed capital the most. The cabinet reportedly decided to notify the American authorities that "the government would henceforth reject any offer of equipment that would not be coupled with an offer of cash."

Independent L'Orient found many faults with Malik's overall performance as Foreign Minister. The paper said editorially: "Has there really been a let-down in American aid? What were the obligations assumed by each side (under the terms of the Lebanese-American communique of March 1967)? Were they the subject of written agreements? Did these agreements provide for the payment of specific amounts at specific times? It seems that, in this controversy, we have nothing to base our valid rights upon except the words of Mr. Charles Malik." Al Amal (Christian, Lebanese, pro-government) also deplored the "insufficiency" of United States aid. Both Al Amal and L'Orient however stressed that the American aid was no "price" for Lebanon's adhesion to the West. 547

The internal tension had about reached the bursting point. There were reports in the press of 11 April that Druse and Shia Muslim supporters of Kamal Jumblatt and Deputy Sabri Hamaideh had risen in "open rebellion" against the government. Jumblatt had lost in the 1967 elections, he charged, due to interference by the government in his district. Hamaideh had won, but he claimed this was despite opposition

547 ibid., 10 April 1968
from, and interference by the administration. Both Jumblatt and Hamadeh professed to be strongly attached to Lebanon’s independence while advocating a policy of closer understanding with the UAR.

The newspapers carried many versions of the fighting, reports of casualties varying from zero to 3 dead and from “many wounded” to around 20. L’Orient described the incidents as the beginning of an “armed rebellion” and added that police reports from the Béqaa area, in the northern part of the Béqaa valley, signaled that the leaders of some tribes were “moving” and had gone to Syria for “money and arms”. 348

In a speech on 13 April in the Syrian Catholic cathedral in Beirut President Chasoun referred to the partisans of Jumblatt as law-breakers and as an “insignificant minority.” 349

The Damascus newspaper Al Rai Al Aan on 14 April criticized the Lebanese government for a border incident in which it said four Syrian customs policemen were arrested by Lebanese gendarmes chasing a group of smugglers in the border area. 350

L’Orient of 14 April carried an official government communique the text of which is as follows: “Certain news agencies have disseminated in various European capitals a report according to which President Chasoun asked the American 6th Fleet in the Mediterranean to be ready, as a revolution had broken out in Lebanon. The Lebanese government categorically denies this news as completely baseless.” 351

348 ibid., 11 April.
349 ibid., 14 April.
350 ibid.
351 ibid.
On 21 April Chamoun paid the traditional visit on the occasion of the Muslim feast Ramadan to Premier Solh instead of the Mufti (Muslim religious head) because the latter had joined the opposition in cancelling all functions on the grounds that the country was still mourning the victims of the recent clashes. 352 At a reception held at the Premier's home the President delivered a strong speech in which he recalled Lebanon's and his own services to the Arab cause. Al Nahar (Christian, Lebanese, neutral) of 22 April speculated that Chamoun had offered the opposition to withdraw from the presidential race on condition that they acknowledge his services to the Arab cause -- which they refused -- and to compromise with the opposition on a candidate acceptable to all. 353

L'Orient (Christian, Lebanese, neutral) commented that it did not deny the President had performed valuable services to the Arab cause, but on this terrain, it said, he was far from the equal of Nasser. "Whom are we going to fool with all these professions of faith?", the paper asked; "Everybody cannot have lost his memory. The Arab career of the Beirut statesman began in 1943 with General Spears (British occupation general). It has been conducted most honorably over these past 15 years, and President Chamoun has performed services which will not be contested. But to pretend to give lessons in this chapter to the Arabs themselves -- to declare oneself an Arab in 1958 against Nasser and Nasserism -- is the sort of a test that could have better been avoided." 354

352 The Mufti-opposition move was actually a calculated gambit to the President and an important index of Muslim rejection of Chamoun.
353 Ibid., 22 April 1958.
354 Ibid.
The question of American aid to Lebanon came up again on 24 April when the House Foreign Affairs Committee published an official resolution: "The Foreign Affairs Committee urges the government to insist with the Government of the United States for a prompt and detailed clarification of this matter and for the granting of sufficient aid in cash and in kind to justify Lebanon's continued acceptance of American aid." At the meeting of the committee after which the resolution was published Deputy Emile Bustani demanded Lebanon's withdrawal from the Eisenhower Doctrine and its denunciation of United States aid agreements with Point IV. Foreign Minister Malik told the committee he apologized for not being able to furnish all the information required, but that talks with the American authorities were proceeding normally.

Le Jour (Christian, Lebanese, neutral) and other papers on 30 April reported a growing awareness of the fact alluded to by Malik in recent statements concerning the aid Lebanon was supposed to be getting from the United States. The aid was delayed, he had once said, because the appropriate Lebanese departments had not taken the trouble to produce sufficiently studied projects for the Americans to finance. According to Le Jour, following prompting by Premier Solti various departments had submitted projects for United States aid. These went to the Public Works Ministry for technical study. Le Jour, Al Sahar (Christian, Lebanese, neutral), and other papers said Public Works Minister Selim Lehoud "let them sleep in his drawers for several months."

555 Ibid., 26 April 1968.
The papers mentioned a "scandal" and the possibility that these projects were "willfully delayed." Al Nabar said the scandal was "double" insofar as complete projects had been submitted to U.S. officials and this also produced no response. 356

At this point the tension existing between opposition and government was at its highest. And the tenseness of the situation was causing those who might normally not be classified with either group to take sides, or come out openly with their complaints. The formation of the UAE, and its subsequent support of the opposition cause only made Chamoun more determined to carry his policies through to the end of his term—at least. Thus the reaction in Lebanon to the Eisenhower Doctrine was forming a circular picture. The government had been for some time reacting in turn to the attitude of the opposition towards its foreign policy. The circle would not be drawn completely however until the United States re-entered the picture.

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Part 4

OUTBREAK OF THE REVOLT TO THE
LANDING OF THE MARINES

While a storm was brewing between the two sides in the now disregarded National Pact, and the recently formed United Arab Republic was throwing its weight to the side of one faction, there was as yet no public sign of official concern on the part of the United States government as to the situation in Lebanon.

356 ibid., 30 April 1958.
At a news conference on 15 April Secretary of State Dulles was asked: "...How do you view the growing unrest in the Middle East? I am referring particularly to the threat of civil war in Lebanon, demonstrations in Gaza against King Hussein, and what I consider intensified name-calling from Cairo against those nations not joining in the United Arab Republic?"

Dulles answered: "Well, it is difficult to evaluate those particular instances you refer to, and indeed I have no evaluation of them. They only happened within the last 24 hours. But when you speak about growing unrest, I am afraid that is a little bit of an exaggeration, because there has been quite a considerable amount of unrest in that area for some little time now." 357

In Lebanon the unrest broke out into open revolt early in May. On the evening of 3 May one of the most articulate opposition journalists in Beirut, Nasib Natul, editor of Telegraph (Christian, Arab, opposition) was shot and killed by an unknown assassin. The Beirut press called a newspaper strike of three days in mourning for their colleague and the opposition politicians took the opportunity to take their battle with the government more into the open. An opposition manifesto was issued on 9 May by a group of "personalities and notables representing political groups and parties," calling for a general strike against the government. "The government," it said, "is to be held as responsible for all past, present and future provocative actions, for all past and future consequences resulting from these actions." It said "political crimes are

denounced," and "a general strike is to be observed in all of Lebanon."  558

The government meanwhile issued a communique saying: "The government deeply regrets the incident. It will spare no effort to pursue the criminals responsible. Some people are exploiting the incident to call an unjustified general strike. The government warns anyone about to disturb order that he exposes himself to severe prosecution."  559 Thus the government showed itself ready to put its strength openly against any opposition action. The opposition manifesto calling for the general strike had been signed by such leaders as Saeb Salam, Ahmed Assed, Kamal Jumblatt, Abdullah Yafi, Adnan Hakim (leader of the Majaden party), Rashid Karami, and Fuad Amoun (former Director General of the Foreign Ministry).

The Third Force, although considered a mediatory body, was held in esteem by the opposition in view of its opposition to the re-election of Cheaum. That group too, on the day following the death of Metni, issued a manifesto, referring to the one of the opposition leaders and endorsing both the general and the press strike.  560

The strike and the demonstrations that accompanied it had the greatest immediate effect in the primarily Muslim city of Tripoli, where Rashid Karami was the leader. Wishing perhaps to minimize the internal character of the troubles and at the same time to catch the American eye, the authorities reported that in Tripoli, where a USIS Library was burned, the troublemakers were led by Communists and

558 Arab World, op.cit., 11 May 1988
559 Ibid.
560 Ibid.
Bashists (a political party favoring unity with the United Arab Republic)." Premier Sami Solh also stated that "certain subversive elements infiltrated into the ranks of the demonstrators with the sole object of causing trouble." 361 Beirut-Massa (Muslim, Arab, opposition) urged General Fuad Chehab, Commander-in-chief of the Lebanese armed forces, to act to stop the catastrophe menacing the country. The paper called on the military leader to perform the same feat as he had in 1952 when he formed an interim cabinet to govern during the unsettled period before President Chamoun took over from President Khoury. 362

On 12 May the government closed the border with Syria. The cabinet decided to lodge a complaint with the UAR against alleged interference by that country in the political situation in Lebanon. Pro-government Al Hijarq (Christian, Lebanese, pro-government) charged a certain Arab embassy with the assassination of Nahi so as to find a pretext for the overthrow of the current regime. On the border five Lebanese customs guards were killed in a raid on their post by an estimated 500 armed men which the government claimed came from Syria. 363

On 15 May Foreign Minister Charles Kalil formally accused the UAR of instigating and aiding the rebellion. President Chamoun called in the United States, British and French ambassadors to report that the nation was under attack from the outside. There were bombings and clashes in Beirut and the summer palace at Beiteddine was again attacked. 364

On 14 May the United States announced it was doubling the amphibious Marine strength of the 6th Fleet in the Mediterranean. The
same day the Lebanese government received the first airlifted shipment of police equipment from the United States under the provisions of the Eisenhower Doctrine. The United Arab Republic refused to accept the Lebanese note complaining of interference by that country in Lebanese internal affairs. The opposition parties which had combined to form the National Union Front announced that the general strike would continue until Chamoun resigned. 355

Opposition leader Saab Salem, speaking for the National Union Front, on 15 May struck out at a statement by Malik accusing the opposition of getting support from the UAR. He said for the past 14 months the opposition had been warning Chamoun and his followers against changing the constitution for re-election purposes. "Had the President paid attention to the interests of the nation alone," he said, "the country would not have reached the present situation and the regime would have expired quietly." Salem said Malik knew the truth but that his greed, ambition and pride inspired him to misrepresent the facts and say that the rising of the people in defense of their constitution was due to the wall of outsiders, across the border. He said it was not the opposition which was influenced by foreigners. "God knows who pays attention to foreign interests." He said that Malik's statement was actually worded to drag in foreigners to interfere, perhaps intentionally. 356

The United States Embassy in Beirut announced on 16 May that its government would send tanks to Lebanon in the near future under

355 ibid., 15 May 1968.
356 ibid., 16 May 1968.
the provisions of the military assistance program. The next day
the State Department confirmed reports that consideration was being
given to sending troops to Lebanon if Chamoun asked for them. 567

In his news conference of 20 May Secretary of State Dulles
answered more questions about the United States position as concerned
the Lebanese crisis. "During the earlier phases of the Lebanese crisis," a
reporter said, "there seemed to be some non-understanding as to
whether the Eisenhower Doctrine applied in this case. However, it seems
that later we came to feel that we liked Lebanon, although/Eisenhower
Doctrine probably did not specifically apply, and therefore would aid
her if requested. I wonder if you would clear up this confusion?"

Dulles replied: "I suppose that by the Eisenhower doctrine
you refer to the Middle East resolution that was adopted by the
Congress. That resolution contains several provisions. It is not
just one thing. It authorizes the United States to assist economica-
ly and militarily nations which want such assistance in order to
preserve their independence. It says that the independence and
integrity of these nations of the Middle East is vital to world peace
and the national interest of the United States. It says that, if they
are attacked from a country under the control of international communism,
then the President is authorized, upon request, to send forces to resist
that attack.

*Now we do not consider under the present state of affairs that
there is likely to be an attack, an armed attack, from a country which

we could consider under the control of international communities.
That doesn't mean, however, that there is nothing that can be done.
There is the provision of the Middle East resolution which says that
the independence of these countries is vital to peace and the national
interest of the United States. That is certainly a mandate to do
something if we think that our peace and vital interests are endangered
from any quarter...

"...I would say that we are not anxious to have a situation
which would be in any sense a pretext for introducing American forces
into the area. We hope and believe that that will not be called for,
and the situation, to date, does not suggest that it would be called
for." 568

Dulles also was asked if the United States government
considered the 1950 Tripartite Declaration on the Middle East ap-
licable in the case of Lebanon.

"We do regard it as applicable," he said. "We don't regard
it as powerful, you might say, as the phrase in the Middle East
resolution that I referred to, because that Tripartite Declaration
has never had specific Congressional approval." 569

In another question, a reporter said: "You spoke about what
the government of Lebanon considers serious evidence that there has
been interference by the UAR. And yet there has been no appeal at
this time to the Security Council. Could you tell us whether, in

568 Bulletin, op.cit. v. 58, June 8, 1958, p.945.
569 ibid., p. 948.
view of this outside interference, we are suggesting to the
Government of the UAR that it should stop this outside inter-
ference?"

The Secretary answered: "My impression is that the United
States considers that it is up to the Government of Lebanon to try
to get the UAR to stop. And while the Government of Lebanon has
talked with us about the matter and about possible action in the
United Nations, it has made no decision on that point as yet." 370

Dulles' attitude towards the possibility of Communist
activity in the Lebanese crisis was also of interest to the reporters.
"Since you do not absolve the Communists from their responsibility in
agitating in Lebanon, and since you have indicated that the UAR may
also be responsible for some of Lebanon's troubles," he was asked,
"would you consider that perhaps these two elements are joined in
the present disorder in Lebanon?"

Dulles said "It might very well be." 371 (Dulles had been
criticised a few days previously by Saeb Salam for a statement which
Salam considered to have implied that the anti-government movement
in Lebanon was Communist inspired and not a purely nationalistic
uprising.)

In a speech the previous day, Deputy Under Secretary of State
Robert Murphy had detailed more specifically the official American
attitude towards the trouble in Lebanon. "We do not believe," he said,

370 ibid.
371 ibid., p. 945.
"that the subversive activities now going on in Lebanon in an effort to overthrow the regime of President Chamoun...are part of a co-ordinated Communist effort..." 

"The principal source of instigation for the troubles in Lebanon are extremist nationalist elements inside and outside Lebanon aided and abetted by violent propaganda from Radio Cairo and Radio Damascus. This is supplemented by arms and armed men infiltrating from the Syrian sector of the United Arab Republic. The purpose of this attack is to overthrow the pro-Western regime of President Chamoun. We have no doubt that Communist elements in Lebanon are helping to fan the flames of this insurrection, as it would seem most unnatural for them not to seize upon this opportunity to create trouble for the United States and for a country friendly to the United States. We are inclined to believe that the troubles in Lebanon, although they are doubtless being exploited by the Communists, arise out of developments primarily concerning the Near Eastern Arab world and are not directly connected with the situation in Algeria or recent events in South America."

"The USIS installations were burned (in Tripoli and Beirut early in May) by the extremist mobs, perhaps with Communist participation, because they were easily accessible symbols of the principal Western power and the nation which symbolized the political principles to which the present Lebanese government has given its support. The Arab extremist nationalists oppose what they consider to be United States efforts to line up the Arab world on the U.S. side in the East-West struggle. The Soviet Union through inflammatory broadcasts
in the Arabic language is attempting to exacerbate the situation in Lebanon. There is also little doubt that the Soviet Union is attempting also to influence Cairo and Damascus in their propaganda and other activity directed against the present Government of Lebanon. 372

The official American attitude towards the disturbances in Lebanon thus was pretty much in line with that of the Lebanese government itself. The United States officials however were somewhat more cautious in their accusations. And, it appeared at the time that, while supporting the incumbent government both morally and physically with the arms shipments, the United States had no intention of intervening physically as a result of present conditions.

The political activity within Lebanon meanwhile was aimed at finding a compromise solution to the opposition-executive dispute and thus find a way out of the chaos and bloodshed that had resulted. The Third Force on 16 May issued a statement saying that General Chehab was the only man who could, within legal limits, unify every sect in the present circumstances as he was outside the existing struggle.

"The most dangerous thing in the current Lebanese crisis," the statement considered, "is the danger of carrying it to international and sectarian levels..." by resorting to force or casting doubts on the nationalism of the opposition, whose leaders have never ceased to announce their sincerity towards Lebanon and their adherence to her sovereignty and independence. 373

372 ibid., pp. 998-999.
373 Arab World, op.cit., 19 May 1958.
Another mediatory group, headed by Raymond Edde, head of the National Bloc and Minister of Interior to be, drove to opposition-controlled Tripoli on 19 May to fetch Rashid Karami to Beirut for mediation talks among the other opposition and mediatory leaders. The group stopped at Jounieh on their return for consultations with General Chehab. Edde's plan for the settlement of the crisis was said not to differ much from that of the middle-of-the-road Third Force. It consisted, according to *Al Hayat*, (Muslim, undetermined, neutral) of Chehab assuming the premiership and Chaouni continuing in office, but not seeking a further term. The new cabinet would set a date for elections and would require and obtain wide powers from parliament. 574

Karami's views were reported to be that the President must resign before anything was done to stop the insurrection. However he would not make a final decision on the propositions of the mediators until he had conferred with the other opposition leaders. Thus his trip to Beirut. It was reported afterward that all parties concerned—that is mediators and opposition—agreed on a course of action. 575

General Chehab meanwhile was reported by *Al Hayat* as "always telling those who go to see him that he would not assume any political duties in the present tense atmosphere. His participation in the government in the present circumstances is fraught with dangers that would place the army in conflict with this or that group. This is what the General would neither like for himself nor for the army." 576

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574 Ibid., 20 May 1966.
575 Ibid., 21 May 1966.
576 Ibid.
No matter what the opposition and mediatory leaders decided, or General Chahéb thought, President Chamoun’s stand was unwavering. Al Hayat also reported the executive’s views on the mediation efforts—that the primary condition for any settlement is that peace be restored first (in other words that the opposition cease their anti-government activity outside the parliamentary framework). "This is the President’s view," the paper said, "and he would not budge from it." And it was quite obvious that Chamoun had no dissenters in his cabinet. A group of deputies who met with the President to discuss various mediation proposals were reportedly dismissed and told to discuss such matters with the government. Cabinet ministers said in turn that Chamoun was at liberty to decide what course of action to take. Any mediation ought to be discussed with the President directly, they said. The government would raise no objection to any settlement the President would agree to. 377

On 21 May the government asked for an immediate meeting of the Arab League Council to hear Lebanon’s complaint against alleged interference by the UAR in her internal troubles. The cabinet also reportedly decided to lodge a complaint with the UN Security Council against the UAR. Chamoun wanted international recognition of his claim that the crisis in Lebanon was not internally caused. Foreign Minister Charles Malik said however that the purpose of the complaint was not to incite foreign interference. He said he had always shunned foreign interference in Lebanese affairs. 378

377 ibid.
In a news conference on 22 May President Chamoun pretty well summed up the points of his attitude toward the current situation in his country. He insisted there was "massive interference by the UAR," and that it was only the "natural thing to continue the present government." He said that the candidacy of Chehab was being considered for the premiership and that it might be accepted "if it could really end the fighting."

"I never said I would run for a second term," the President remarked, but "I will never say I would not run."

Chamoun again accused the UAR of having a hand in the current troubles. "Without UAR support," he said, "there would be no possibility of revolt." And, he said, "I believe in the support of the free world." 379

On 23 May the Lebanese government formally lodged its complaint against the UAR at the Security Council. Malik said the reason was not to inspire foreign intervention but to cause the pressure on Lebanon to stop. Mediator Raymond Edde voted for lodging the complaint, saying "perhaps international mediation will succeed where we have failed." The Beirut press of 24 May reported a State Department spokesman as saying the United States would support any complaint Lebanon lodged in the UN against UAR interference in its internal affairs. 350

The opposition reacted strongly to the government's action. Abdullah Yafi said the government's move in complaining to the Security Council was made to get international support for extending Chamoun's

379 ibid.
350 ibid., 24 May 1958
tenure of office. He considered it a threat to Lebanese independence and existence, externally and internally. The government action he said was a conspiracy against the UAR and the Arabs. "We will not allow them to turn the country into a second Korea," he said. "We will foil moves to cause sectarian strife. We will preserve Lebanon's special character and independence and keep Lebanon from becoming a passageway for imperialism or a seat of imperialism." Saeb Salam made a statement against Chamoun, saying the crisis was purely a Lebanese internal affair and that Chamoun did not speak on behalf of Lebanon. He said the president was directly responsible for splitting the country. 561

While the charges and counter-charges continued between the Lebanese government and the opposition, concerning not only each other but the United States and UAR actions as well, the Arab League Council prepared in Benghazi to take up the Lebanese complaint. The Lebanese complaint to the UN Security Council was postponed at the request of the Lebanese delegation to give the League a chance to consider the matter.

The possibility of mediation again arose after a statement by Premier Solh on 28 May that Chamoun had never mentioned to him any desire to run for a second term. Members of the Third Force were reported to have immediately contacted Solh and Speaker of the House Adel Qasseirn about the prospects of finding a solution to the crisis. 562

The next day however, Abdullah Yafi wrote in his newspaper Al Siasa.

561 Ibid.
562 Ibid., 29 May 1958
(Muslim, Arab, opposition) that the opposition could not trust the assurances given by Solh that a second term for the President was out of the question. "The main thing," he said, "is the question of trust. Trust would be restored only if the President resigned." 383

On 30 May the UAR replied to the charges being brought by Lebanon before the Arab League Council, insisting the dispute in Lebanon was purely an internal affair between "opposition leaders of note" and a "pro-imperialist government." 384 Lebanese Premier Solh on 2 June issued a point-by-point denial of the UAR note. In Beirut the govern-
ment repeated that there would be no mediation before the rebels gave up.

In this atmosphere the Arab League Council met on 1 June to consider the Lebanese complaint. The meeting ended five days later on 6 June, having passed a weak resolution calling for the formation of an Arab League committee to be installed in Lebanon to soothe the crisis. It asked that a halt be put to any activity likely to trouble relations between League member states; that Lebanon drop its complaint against the UAR in the Security Council; and, that all the Lebanese factions end the disturbances and resort to constitutional means to settle their problems.

Lebanon refused to accept the resolution produced by the Arab League, saying it was too weak to account for the charges brought by Lebanon against the UAR. The Lebanese cabinet decided to press its complaint against the UAR in the Security Council. In New York

383 ibid., 30 May 1968.
384 ibid., 31 May 1968.
Foreign Minister Malik presented the Council with Lebanese accusations against the UAE, which included charges of gun-running, training of terrorists, and waging a press and radio propaganda war. 385

It was not yet clear what the United States intended to do. As the Lebanese complaint was brought up in the Security Council U.S. delegate Henry Cabot Lodge remarked: "We must note the statement of the UAE representative that his government has no intention to interfere in Lebanese affairs or to threaten Lebanon's independence. But the charges presented by Lebanon are very serious and gravely disturbing." 386

Some Beirut newspapers on 9 June reported that the "reserved" support the U.S. seemed to be giving Lebanon was a source of disappointment to loyalists who expected that the United States would line up more firmly on the Lebanese side against the alleged UAE interference. And meanwhile negotiations were continuing on the aid Lebanon was to receive under the provisions of the Eisenhower Doctrine. 387

United States Secretary of State Dulles in a statement to the press on 10 June said there was "irrefutable evidence" of interference by the UAE in the troubles in Lebanon. 388 But on 11 June the Security Council passed a resolution creating an "United Nations Observer Group in Lebanon" (UNOIL) to determine for the world body directly whether further, more drastic action was necessary in view of the Lebanese complaint which included an accusation of massive interference on the

385 ibid., 7 June 1958.
388 Bulletin, op.cit., v. 39, June 10, 1958, p. 1069
part of the United Arab Republic. UNOIL did not, however, have the strength of a police force to seal the frontiers as the govern-
ment would have liked.

The Lebanese government and its supporters however were evidently elated by the Security Council's decision to send the "watchdog team" to Lebanon to observe its borders with the UK. The Foreign Ministry issued a statement which said "official Lebanese quarters are satisfied that the resolution is a victory for the Lebanese cause. The Government hopes that it will cause the interference to stop, so that the country can recover its security and stability." 390

The opposition reaction to the Security Council decision was to blame the government for internationalizing a completely internal affair. Former Premier Abdallah Yafi said that "from the time Nabil expressed the government's adhesion to the Eisenhower Doctrine we have feared that the Cold War would move to Lebanon." Those who listened to the Security Council debates and envisaged the outcome, such as the observers, Yafi said, "are afraid for the independence of Lebanon and afraid she will lose the reputation as a nation capable of defending herself," 391

On the other hand Al Anal (Christian, Lebanese, pro-government) interpreted the Security Council action as a conviction of UK President Nasser. It said however that the conviction should be firmer. It was not satisfied that the Council had expressed the wish to gather more

389 ibid., v, 39, July 14, 1968, p. 90.
390 Arab World, op.cit., 12 June 1968.
391 ibid.
assurances and evidence, but still considered the action a victory.\textsuperscript{392}

The United States was evidently satisfied that the observer team, proposed by a Swedish resolution, would constitute sufficient action in the Lebanese situation for the time being at least. This was despite the feelings expressed in Dulles' statement of 10 June and another the same day by United States Ambassador Lodge during the debate in the Security Council. Lodge said: The conclusion is clear that there has been outside interference in the internal affairs of the Republic of Lebanon and that this interference has been designed to promote civil strife and to impede the efforts of the constituted authorities to restore order and tranquility, and that the interference has occurred from the territory and via the facilities of the United Arab Republic. \textsuperscript{395}

Meanwhile efforts at mediation toward a settlement of the political dispute in Lebanon and the resulting revolt continued, but were unsuccessful. It was reported that on 4 June a group of businessmen-mediators had been told in a meeting with Chamoun that he had changed his mind about considering calling on General Chehab to form a neutral government. This group of mediators later announced they had suspended their efforts due to "obstinacy" on the part of government officials. \textsuperscript{394}

On 5 June House Speaker Adel Qasadran set 24 July as the date for the presidential elections. \textsuperscript{395} A few days later Al Nakar (Christian,

\textsuperscript{392} ibid.
\textsuperscript{393} \textit{Bulletin}, op. cit., v. 29, July 14, 1958, p. 88.
\textsuperscript{394} \textit{Arab World}, op. cit., 5 June 1958.
\textsuperscript{395} ibid., 7 June 1958. (According to Art. 15 of the Lebanese constitution the election of a new president must be held two months before the incumbent president's term expires — in Chamoun's case, 25 September 1958).
Lebanese, neutral) said the opposition had picked General Chehab as its candidate for president. That paper and others reported that it was former Premier Hashid Harad, opposition leader in Tripoli, that urged Chehab to assume the Presidency. 596

All this political activity, internally and internationally, did not prevent the battle from going on inside the country. Heavy fighting was taking place in many sections of the country—primarily around Tripoli in the north, the Bekaa valley to the east, in the Chouf mountains a few miles from Beirut, and in the Basta (primarily Muslim and opposition) quarter of the capital itself.

Under these circumstances United States Secretary of State Dulles observed on 14 June that the present situation in Lebanon was "serious but not alarming." 597 The next day United States Ambassador Robert McClintock announced that all United States government personnel who so requested would be evacuated, and Norwegian General Odd Bell arrived in Beirut with a three-man advance/observer team.

Dulles' attitude was apparently still calm on 17 June when he gave another news conference. Further clarifying the American point of view regarding possible action as a result of the Lebanese crisis, however, Dulles recalled "the fact that, even though at the moment the disturbance assumes in part at least, the character of a civil disturbance, it is covered by the United Nations resolution of 1949 on indirect aggression. 598 This denotes the fomenting from without

596 ibid., 12 June 1958.
of civil strife. Therefore we watch the situation with concern." The Secretary said the United States would support an increase in the size of the observer team if that were approved by UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold, who himself was leaving that day for Lebanon. 399

In a statement on 19 June President Eisenhower said that any United States action in Lebanon would depend on the judgment of the UN 'armistice team' and Hammarskjold. 400 The Secretary General was reported by the Beirut press to have advised Lebanon against making an immediate request for U.S. military assistance. 401

Meanwhile the United States was attempting through diplomatic channels to bring about an end to the rebellion in Lebanon. Al Ahram, a Cairo newspaper usually well informed on the policies and opinions of the UAE government, reported that the U.S. Ambassador to Egypt, Raymond Hare, had asked Nasser to persuade the Lebanese opposition to stop the rebellion. The paper also said Hare suggested that the U.S. mediate between Chamoun and Nasser. Nasser reportedly replied, in one of the meetings which were held on May 20 and 30 and June 7, that "if you agree that we should conduct this common effort, I would be prepared to contact the leaders of the opposition and convey to them suggestions which might lead to a settlement." He later is reported to have said "I am prepared to seek a solution for Lebanon, but it seems to me it is a solution to the problem of Shamoun that you are seeking." 402 The day following the publication of this account of the

399 ibid., v. 59, July 7, 1968, p.8
400 NYT, op. cit., 20 June 1968.
401 Arab World, op. cit., 21 June 1968.
402 ibid., 16 June 1968.
Nasser-Hare meetings the State Department issued a statement saying it was inaccurate. In any case the exchanges had no tangible results.

The Lebanese government leaders by this time were becoming impatient. Their pride was suffering by not being able to put down the uprising within their country despite their claims of massive interference from outside. The President may or may not have intended to run for a second term, but he was certainly determined to remain in office at least for the remainder of his current term. But his army could not, or would not, exert an all-out effort against the armed opposition forces and the latter were getting stronger rather than weaker.

On 24 June Al Anal (Christian, Lebanese, pro-government) reported Premier Sami Solh as saying Lebanon would ask for British and U.S. help should the United Nations not act to bring about justice and stop the UAR interference in Lebanon's national affairs. The paper reported that Solh said America was obliged to support Lebanon if the latter asked for support, under the Eisenhower Doctrine. He complained that "the situation is the same as before, and infiltration is still taking place on a large scale." 405

In a news conference on 25 June President Chamoun again summed up his government's point of view, policy and intentions. Chamoun said again the revolt was due to no local dispute. He said Egypt wanted to overrun the rest of the Arab world. He denounced infiltration by the UAR army and interference through radio propaganda. The President said Lebanon had not yet asked for another meeting of the Security

Council concerning the Lebanese situation because it wanted to give Ungil time to prove itself, (and the U.S. was supporting Ungil). Chamoun said that although the problem in Lebanon was considered vital to the United States and Britain, the Lebanese wanted to settle the problem themselves. 404

Concerning the local political aspects of the crisis, Chamoun said the compromise plan of Raymond Edde which called in part for the resignation of the President after the elections were held on 24 July instead of on 23 September when the term of office would normally expire was not acceptable. Chamoun said he was not fighting the domestic issue of a second term for the presidency but that of outside intervention in the affairs of Lebanon. Asked if it was possible to settle the dispute by appointing General Chehab premier, the President said Chehab was commander of the army and enjoyed the complete confidence of the government in that capacity. But he said Chehab was never a policeman and didn't think he would like to be one. He said there was no change in the government contemplated. And he insisted he intended to serve his term until September "if I am not dead." 405

On 30 June the government was reported by L'Orient (Christian, Lebanese, neutral) and its sister paper Al Jarida to have empowered Foreign Minister Malik to call for a further meeting of the Security Council. This was in the light of the first reports by the US observers which indicated that according to their observations the interference by the UNR in the Lebanese uprising, while undeniably present, was not as

404 ibid., 27 June 1968.
405 ibid.
massive or as damaging as the Lebanese government had made out. And
the government was upset at the optimism concerning the situation
expressed by UN Secretary General Hammarskjold himself. The opposition
on the other hand was elated at the attitude being taken by the re-
representatives of the United Nations. 406

L'Orient reported on 1 July that Malik was to ask the Security
Council for a police force of 7000 men to seal off the borders with the
UNR, and that he was pushing to get the Council to meet within three
days. If this report was true, Malik's efforts were not successful. 407
On 1 July President Chamoun was visited by the Ambassadors of the
United States, Britain and France. The Beirut newspapers carried
different versions of the purpose of the visits, one of which said
the envoys called to affirm the pledges of their governments to support
the Lebanese government. Chamoun reportedly told them that Lebanon did
not want foreign troops but wanted to know how long the observer ex-
periment would last before it could expect a police force to be sent.
A second report was that the President asked the ambassadors simply to
clarify their governments' positions. 408

In Washington on 1 July U.S. Secretary of State Dulles gave
such a clarification of what the United States might do in Lebanon if
a certain, as yet undefined situation were to arise out of the current
crisis. Dulles appeared to be inclined towards the attitude of the
Lebanese government towards Hammarskjold's and the Unogil opinion of
the charges of intervention and interference. Dulles was asked if the

406 Ibid., 1 July 1958.
407 Ibid., 2 July 1958.
408 Ibid., 3 July 1958. (By this time Chamoun was not only annoyed with
Unogil but also impatient with U.S. support
of it.)
Hammarskjöld reports indicated there was less urgency about the crisis in Lebanon than seemed the case before he went there.

The Secretary said he thought Hammarskjöld felt the observers' presence had slowed up, if not stopped, the arms smuggling between Syria and Lebanon. And, Dulles said the Secretary General was in a better position to judge than he. However, he pointed out that it was evident that a large amount of support had already been acquired by the rebels within Lebanon so that stopping the flow would not completely correct the situation.

A reporter quoted President Chamoun as having said that morning that if UN action failed he would appeal to the friends of Lebanon and the West for direct military assistance under Article 51 of the UN Charter. Dulles was asked to define the circumstances under which the United States would be willing to render direct military assistance to Lebanon. His reply: "...Now we have never believed that you could only act under such processes (normal UN procedures); Indeed, Article 51 was put into the Charter to meet the contingency that it might be impractical, because of the veto power or otherwise, to obtain appropriate action from the United Nations. Article 51, as you will recall, talks about collective defense if an armed attack occurs. Now we do not think that the words 'armed attack' preclude treating as such an armed revolution which is fomented from abroad, aided and assisted from abroad..."

Another questioner said the Lebanese government, through President Chamoun and the Foreign Ministry, had in a variety of cases said it would be desirable for the United Nations to put enough people into Lebanon to
seal off the border. What is our view (the United States view) toward such an operation? Dulles said "I doubt whether it is practical to carry on an operation of that magnitude, and I think that perhaps that is not required." He said he would not pass final judgment until he saw what kind of a case the Lebanese government could make.

"Is it realistic to think," another reporter asked, "keeping in mind the role the United States played in discouraging, at least, the invasion of Suez, that we would participate in any kind of military intervention in Lebanon except under the most extreme circumstances?"

"I don't think," the Secretary of State answered, "that there is any analogy whatsoever between the situation in Lebanon, where the lawful government is calling for assistance, and the Sues case, where the armed intervention was against the will of the government concerned. There is no parallel whatever between the two cases. We do believe that the presence in Lebanon of foreign troops, however justifiable -- and it is thoroughly justifiable from a legal and international law standpoint -- is not as good a solution as for the Lebanese to find a solution themselves. It would be, as you put it, a sort of measure of last resort." 409

Thus the U.S. policy on the first of July 1958 towards the situation arising from the revolt against the government in Lebanon of President Chamoun could not be described as being totally in support of the Lebanese leaders' point of view. The United States was willing to grant that the Lebanese government had a case against the UAR and

had agreed in the Security Council to have UNogil observe the extent and seriousness of these charges. It did not, however, appear willing to admit the situation called for as extensive a UN operation in Lebanon as called for by the Lebanese government. Neither did it, at the time, appear inclined to incur the international wrath that would surely be generated by the introduction of American troops to quell the uprising in Lebanon. On the other hand, not knowing yet to what dangerous circumstance in relation to its own security the crisis in Lebanon might involve the Middle East, the United States had prepared a case that would justify such a move when it might be deemed necessary.

The opposition in Lebanon was not willing even to concede the legal justification for the possible intervention of a foreign power. Commenting on Dulles's statements to the press a few days before, former Premier and opposition leader Abdullah Yafi held that Article 51 of the UN charter should not apply in the case of Lebanon since it was not bound to the United States or any other state by a defensive pact. If such a pact did exist, he asked, where are the conditions of self defense which must exist to justify intervention? He said the observers' report would confirm that the Lebanese revolt is internal. And he denied that the Eisenhower Doctrine could be an instrument to justify American intervention. 410

The situation inside the country did not change. Opposition and government both claimed the first report issued by UNogil on 4 July was a victory for their case—the opposition because the report discounted claims of "massive infiltration" from the UAR, and the government

410 Arab World, op.cit., 4 July 1968.
because it admitted that assistance to a certain extent had reached the Lebanese opposition forces from the UAR. Chamoun kept in close contact with U.S. Ambassador MacArthur concerning measures which might be taken in case the UN failed, in the Lebanese government's opinion, to secure the safety of the Lebanese borders. The Lebanese government still favored a UN police force being sent for that purpose, but repeated that if that idea went unimplemented it would study the possibilities offered by Article 51, the Tripartite Declaration of 1950 and the Arab Collective Security Pact, i.e., help from Iraq. The government tried to make the best of the Ungol report but its disfavor at the tone of the observers' findings was made plain. Chamoun was reported to be "deeply disappointed" by both the Secretary General's statement and the Ungol report. He said they seemed "to be doing absolutely nothing." Premier Boulh insisted that "massive interference" had been and was taking place.

Anti-Chamoun, anti-Doctrine Deputy Emile Bustani took the report to signify a failure of "Malik's policy of resorting to the Security Council," and said there "remains only one solution on which all will agree: Malik should go immediately, together with the government which has supported him." 412 Al Hayat (Muslim, undetermined, neutral) of 8 July quoted Third Force leader Henri Phavon as saying the observers' report indicated the matter was an internal one that would end only on the internal level, and that he hoped to find a solution for the crisis soon. 413

411 ibid., 9 July 1958.
412 ibid., 8 July 1958. (This represented a great change in attitude on the part of Bustani who had been a great friend and supporter of Chamoun even in the spring of 1957, after the Sour crisis and the Lebanese-American communiqué.)
413 ibid.
Meanwhile House Speaker Qasseirn had again declared that the parliament would meet on 24 July to elect a new president. And in an interview on 10 July Chamoun affirmed that he would step down at the end of his term on 25 September. He would not bow to opposition pressure, either political or military, and resign earlier. And he still intended to see the uprising put down before he gave up his leadership of the country.

In his interview with the correspondent of Newsweek magazine on 10 July the President was asked if U.S. intervention would be justified under the Eisenhower Doctrine as a result of the present circumstances. "I have said repeatedly," Chamoun recalled, "that we intend to do the job ourselves, using our own means. Yet if, through continued infiltration, our forces collapse, this would threaten not only Lebanon's independence, but the peace and stability of the Middle East. In that case, eventual United States intervention under the Eisenhower Doctrine would be justified." Chamoun's view was nearly identical to that earlier expressed by Dulles.

The Lebanese government, while officially expressing a preference to settle the internal dispute by itself, had for some time indicated that it was not completely satisfied with the amount of support it was getting from the United States. That country, however, would not take the risk involved in dispatching its own forces to the area unless the aggression was more serious than that indicated by the UN observers in Lebanon.

President Chamoun thus was in a very frustrating position.

The reaction, both on the part of the opposition factions in Lebanon and

416 Newsweek, July 24, 1958, p. 20
the leaders of Arab nationalism outside the country to the Lebanese government's acceptance of the Eisenhower Doctrine, and the government's refusal to bend in the face of such criticism, had led to internal revolt. The fact that the UAR supported the revolt gave Chamoun and Malik the opportunity to try to utilise the United States support they figured they had insured by accepting the Eisenhower Doctrine. The broader international aspects of the situation that had resulted however prevented the United States from jumping blindly to the aid of the Chamoun government and thus the circle of reaction was as yet incomplete.

It might be wondered why the Lebanese President, whose term of office was to expire in a bit over two months, was so anxious to have physical help in putting down the revolt, from the United Nations if not from the United States. The simplest, and probably the most likely answer would be that his pride would not allow Chamoun to leave office under duress, if an alternative solution, no matter how drastic, could be found. Thus the problem of picking a successor to President Chamoun who would be acceptable to all sides, a problem which was occupying the efforts of nearly all the political personages in the country in the middle of July, 1958, was not the primary concern of the President himself. He was still seeking a way to put down the revolt and leave office gracefully, with his power intact.

The opportunity offered came from an unexpected source,
The problem of picking an acceptable candidate for the impending Presidential elections was drastically thrust to the sidelines on 15 July 1968 when the Lebanese government's foreign policy, and that of the United States with regard to Lebanon and the Middle East, reached a new and sudden climax. On that day a unit of United States Marines landed on the Lebanese beaches both to the north and south of the capital city of Beirut.

The reason for this sudden move was plain. On the morning of 14 July there was a revolution in Iraq, the West's most solid ally among the Arab countries--a member of the Baghdad Pact. President Chamoun of Lebanon acted immediately, sending an urgent plea to the United States for help in maintaining security. The President most likely figured that the U.S. policy-makers would consider the revolution in Iraq as a result of the nationalistic efforts of the United Arab Republic, possibly connected with the revolt in Lebanon in broad strategy, and thus worthy of some physical action. The United States policy was not prepared to accept forceful methods in the acquisition of Arab unity.

And so the Marines came to Lebanon to protect that country's security and independence. What effect on the situation inside the country Chamoun thought the American troops would have is not clear. As it turned out any expectation would have been too much. Nevertheless,
in this manner the United States involvement with Lebanon had now
gone the full round. If it had not been for the Eisenhower Doctrine,
and the Lebanese reaction to it, Chamoun would probably never have
had the occasion to request the sending of U.S. troops, no matter
what happened in Iraq.

The official explanation of the American action came in the
form of a statement by President Eisenhower released the same day the
Marines landed. Before quoting the text of the Eisenhower statement
the White House document announced that after the overthrow of the
government of King Feisal II of Iraq on 14 July 415 President
Eisenhower ordered a contingent of U.S. forces to Lebanon "to protect
American lives and by their presence there to encourage the Lebanese
government in its defense of Lebanese sovereignty and integrity."

Eisenhower's statement itself said:

Yesterday morning, I received from President Chamoun of
Lebanon an urgent plea that some United States forces be
stationed in Lebanon to help maintain security and to
evidence the concern of the United States for the integrity
and independence of Lebanon. President Chamoun's appeal
was made with the concurrence of all of the members of the
Lebanese Cabinet.

President Chamoun made clear that he considered an immediate
United States response imperative if Lebanon's independence,
already menaced from without, were to be preserved in the
face of grave developments which occurred yesterday in
Baghdad whereby the lawful government was violently over-
thrown and many of its members martyred.

In response to this appeal from the government of Lebanon,
the United States has dispatched a contingent of United States
forces to Lebanon to protect American lives and by their
presence there to encourage the Lebanese government in defense

415 Units of the Iraqi army under the command of Brigadier General
Abdul Karim Kâ'âbeh surrounded the palace of King Feisal early
in the morning of the 14th, subsequently killed the King,
his family and his Prime Minister, Nuri Said, and took over
the government.
of Lebanese sovereignty and integrity. These forces have not been sent as any act of war. They will demonstrate the concern of the United States for the independence and integrity of Lebanon, which we deem vital to the national interest and world peace. Our concern will also be shown by economic assistance. We shall act in accordance with these legitimate concerns.

The United States, this morning, will report its action to an emergency meeting of the United Nations Security Council. As the United Nations charter recognizes, there is an inherent right of collective self-defense. In conformity with the spirit of the charter, the United States is reporting the measures taken by it to the Security Council of the United Nations, making clear that these measures will be terminated as soon as the Security Council has itself taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.

The United States believes that the United Nations can and should take measures which are adequate to preserve the independence and integrity of Lebanon. It is apparent, however, that in the face of the tragic and shocking events that are occurring nearby, more will be required than the team of United Nations observers now in Lebanon. Therefore, the United States will support in the United Nations measures which seem to be adequate to meet the new situation and which will enable the United States forces promptly to be withdrawn.

Lebanon is a small peace-loving state with which the United States has traditionally had the most friendly relations. There are in Lebanon about 2,500 Americans and we cannot, consistently with our historic relations and with the principles of the United Nations, stand idly by when Lebanon appeals for evidence of our concern and when Lebanon may not be able to preserve internal order and to defend itself against indirect aggression.

At the meeting of the Security Council that day United States Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge followed the same line as the President in explaining the United States action. He however admitted, as Dulles

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For this statement, and two other statements by President Eisenhower on the same day, plus an exchange of messages between President Eisenhower and the Shah of Iran and the President of Pakistan and Turkey, in which the latter expressed their gratitude for the U.S. action in Lebanon see, Bulletin, op.cit., v. 39, August 4, 1956, pp. 181-185.
had before, that "the despatch of United States forces to Lebanon is not an ideal way to solve present problems and they will be withdrawn as soon as the UN can take over." Lodge attempted to lend more reason to the United States move in Lebanon by saying that with the outbreak of revolt in Iraq the infiltration of arms and personnel into Lebanon from the UAR "in an effort to subvert the legally constituted government" has suddenly become much more alarming. 417

In a speech two days later Vice President Nixon again defended the U.S. action by reviewing its legality and the fact that it had been called for by the constitutionally elected government of Lebanon. He also repeated the evidence of UAR interference in the Lebanese uprising. Instead of moving U.S. forces beforehand, Nixon said that although he would have preferred submitting it to the UN first, the U.S. decided on a course of submitting it to the UN and moving its own forces at the same time as Chamoun requested, because "our intelligence information disclosed to us that there was a very substantial chance—much more than an even chance—that if we did not move quickly Lebanon would go the way of Iraq." 418

The landing of United States armed forces in Lebanon was the climax point in American-Lebanese relations. Or, it could perhaps be termed the second climax, following upon and deriving from Lebanon's acceptance of the Eisenhower Doctrine, but where future relations

between the two countries were concerned it was really an anti-climax, for the two weeks following the arrival of American Marines on the shores of Lebanon were to determine the new pattern of things.

For Lebanon, President Chamoun himself offered the official explanation for the government's call, and the subsequent arrival of American troops on Lebanese territory. In his statement, also made on the day of the landing, Chamoun reflected on the events leading up to his latest move and continued his accusations against those he blamed for fomenting the revolt in Lebanon.

The President denounced "the ambitious, the embittered, those who sold themselves for either money or for arms and to those who negate the existence of God and fatherland (the Communists) in order to plot against the tranquility, the happiness, the freedom and integrity of our country." He described the "courageous fight" against these forces, and went on to describe the legal efforts which had been made to stop the alleged interference.

"Lebanon," he said, "resorted to the Arab League, but the League was incapable of taking an equitable, explicit, and executory resolution to stop the interference of Lebanon's neighbors in her affairs. The League could not stop these semenighbors from misleading the Lebanese and reposing them and supporting them against the legal authorities by means of their propaganda and the dispatch of men, weapons and funds. This is why Lebanon had to resort to the UN Security Council. The Security Council sent observers to Lebanon."
"These observers failed in time, in view of their small number, their lack of equipment, the obstacles raised by the rebels to prevent them from reaching into those areas where infiltration and smuggling were taking place, the ease in deceiving them and the little authority they wielded. When these observers failed to accomplish the very purpose of their presence here, as this was effectively demonstrated, there was no other course but to resort to some more efficient means." 419

The reaction throughout the country to the landing of the Marines was profuse and of course varied. Al Amal (Christian, Lebanese, pro-government) of 15 July headlined the news and colorfully described citizens welcoming the Marines on the beaches. Editorialy the paper said: "The troops that landed on Lebanese territory yesterday came in the name of the United Nations, at the request of the Government of Lebanon, to help in the maintenance of the independence and sovereignty of Lebanon, her integrity and status." Several other pro-government papers welcomed the Marines in the headlines. Some published Chamoun's message in place of an editorial. 420

L'Orient (Christian, Lebanese, neutral) said everything possible should be done to make the election the main issue in the country. "Foreign troops have landed here at the request of the Lebanese authorities. It is up to us to act in such a way as to prevent this external assistance, against real or imaginary foreign perils, from being turned into assistance for the settlement of our internal problems. There is only one way to achieve that national concord." 421

419 Arab World, op.cit., 16 July 1968.
420 ibid.
421 ibid.
Al Naher (Christian, Lebanese, neutral) also maintained that
"national feeling should prevail and submerge every other feeling....
The Lebanese are still capable of restoring their unity and of
throwing their disputes aside for the sake of the preservation of
Lebanon." 422

On the other hand, such papers as Telegraph (Christian, Arab,
opposition) and Al Hayat (Christian, Arab, opposition) did not even
bother to comment on the landing, but their headlines indicated their
disapproval, as did the statements by members of the opposition which
they published. 423

One such statement was made by opposition leader Saeb Salem
in the form of a message to his followers of the Popular Resistance
Forces issued the evening of the landing. He said: "We are turning
to you today as the country is going through the worst period of her
contemporary history; for danger is at hand, and imperialism complete
with troops has returned to the beloved fatherland as a result of a
lovly conspiracy it prepared with its hirelings, Chamoun, the traitor
and his criminal gang." 424

Former Premier Abdullah Yafi wrote in his paper Al Massa
(Muslim, Arab, opposition,) of 16 July: "We are neither deceived nor
afraid of the conspiracy that has been woven in the dark and which has
resulted in the landing of American troops on our land. Its purpose
is well known. It aims at setting up a bridgehead for foreign troops

422 ibid.
423 ibid.
424 ibid. (Arab World left a blank space in place of Chamoun's name
because of the censorship then in force.)
in this peaceful country preparatory to sending troops to Jordan for an invasion of the Syrian region of the UAR, and even perhaps of the two regions at once. One of its immediate purposes could be that of strengthening the hand of Lebanon's rulers and of promoting the election of a president capable of being a submissive tool in the hands of their ambassadors here." 425

On 16 July Premier Sani Solh called upon all Lebanese to lay down their arms and go back to work "for Lebanon's independence is now safe." He expressed his gratitude to Eisenhower for the U.S.' immediate response to Lebanon's request for aid. 426

Opposite in tone was the warning issued the day after the Marines' landing by Saab Salaa in the name of the Popular Resistance Forces. The warning was addressed to the "aggressive American forces," asking them to withdraw at once and proclaiming that "we will repulse the aggression with all the means in our power and we will ask for aid in any form from all the free peoples of the world, without discrimination or exception." Salaa also said the U.S. government had failed to produce "a single element of evidence" in support of its contention that the UAR was interfering in Lebanon. 427

Speaker of the House Adel Oseirian that day cabled both U.S. authorities and the Security Council to protest the landing. Le Jour (Christian, Lebanese, neutral) reported that some 50 deputies, including several loyalists, had joined with Oseirian to draft the protest. The dispatch reportedly said that parliament was the sole authority which

426 ibid.
427 ibid.
represented the people of Lebanon, the landings were effected without parliament being consulted, and the arguments used to justify the landing, particularly that concerning the protection of American lives and properties, had no basis whatsoever. (The statement by Saeb Salam also denounced the American "pretense that it wishes to preserve the safety of its citizens here." He said his movement prided itself in the fact that it had not touched "either the lives or properties of the foreigners there all through two months of bloody general revolution.") Oseirian's cable also said that the American action constituted a threat to the peace and security of the Middle East. 428

The newspapers of 17 July continued commenting on the latest and most striking evidence of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East. Al Aan (Christian, Lebanese, pro-government) said "We assume responsibility for the landing of the American troops as United Nations troops which have come to rescue us and save our independence. Those who regard these troops as 'foreign' only have to blame themselves and some others." The "same others", the Kataeb party paper added, included Gamal Abdel Nasser and Dag Hammarskjold, not to mention the USSR. 429

Al Ahmar (Christian, Lebanese, pro-government) expressed faith in Lebanon's independence and insisted the responsibility for calling in the foreign troops should fall on those "who lit up the strife and shed the blood of the innocents and sabotaged the country." 430 Al Chark

428 Ibid
429 Ibid
430 Ibid
(Muslim, Arab, opposition) denounced what it called the "American occupation of Lebanon." The paper said: "In Lebanon, there is a small group of people who have been misled by imperialist propaganda. They thought that American fleets, Marines and air forces could save Lebanon. This is a naive group indeed. Certain people just do not know the real goals of the American policy in the Middle East...where neither religion nor higher values are considered. It is enough to consider the changes constantly introduced in this policy to realise what kind of policy it really is... In Israel, America put on the garment of Judaism. In Pakistan, Turkey and Iran it donned the dress of Islam. In Lebanon, it is wearing the dress which misleads everyone.... But the Americans will fool no one.... Arab nationalism is speaking today. Americans had better open their ears." 451

The reactions voiced from the opposing factions in Lebanon continued along the same lines for a few days until it became evident that the American forces had no intention of forcibly quelling the revolt against President Chamoun, of sealing off the borders, nor in fact of doing more than encamping themselves in various strategic positions controlling the capital and waiting for they knew not what. This latter military maneuver of course could be explained as a precaution intended to prevent any major armed attack on the capital city of Beirut from the neighboring countryside, or any substantial force from entering to join with the forces led by opposition leaders within Beirut itself. In the mountains, however, and in the center of the

451 ibid.
city itself, the government supporters and those of the opposition could continue fighting with no danger of interference from the Marines.

Once it was evident that the American forces were not going to exert any effort to upset the existing status quo within Lebanon, the political question of the approaching election of a new president was returned to with vigor. Still concerned about the majority in the parliament of deputies who had so far been loyal to President Chamoun, opposition spokesmen renewed their vows that their side would give no allegiance to any president elected in the current circumstances. While before they had said they would boycott the election as long as Chamoun was in office, now they insisted that the foreign troops should first leave the country. 432

The appeal from the widest range of politicians however was that the elections should be held to elect a president who would be acceptable to all parties and who would supervise a return to normal in the country, removing the principal cause for the revolt.

Meanwhile the United States apparently reached the conclusion that the overall situation in the Middle East was not such as to justify its drastic move in sending troops to Lebanon. This it could not admit directly, but since the troops were already there, their presence could be used to find a way out of the Lebanese impasse. The revolution in Iraq was a fait accompli, but it had not, as feared, been a part of a wider bid for the expansion of the United Arab Republic. In Lebanon

432 ibid., 19 July 1958
therefore the United States forces found themselves in the position of inactive bystanders to a continuing internal revolt. Since the brunt of the revolution was directed against the office of the Presidency of Lebanon, the logical thing was to see if it that a successor to Chamoun be picked—one who, as local politicians insisted, would be acceptable to all sides.

The United States thus decided to become a mediator in the local political struggle. U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Robert Murphy arrived in Beirut on 17 July as the personal representative of President Eisenhower. He immediately began holding talks with government, opposition and other influential parties on the Lebanese political scene.

Meeting with opposition leaders on 22 July Murphy reportedly told them that an "internal settlement" to the crisis was necessary if further national and international troubles were to be averted. To soothe opposition fears Murphy insisted that the U.S. troops were not in Lebanon to impose an internal settlement. Al Nahar (Christian, Lebanese, neutral) and Al Tavar (Christian, Arab, opposition) both said Murphy was convinced the crisis was "wholly internal in origin." 435

Efforts at mediation did not succeed in reaching a solution to the problem of elections by the date originally set for the meeting of parliament. House Speaker Oseirian announced on 22 July that the election was postponed to an indefinite date. Parliament circles reportedly felt they needed more time to get together and decide on a

435 ibid., 23 July 1968
single candidate or group of candidates who would be acceptable to all parties. L'Orient (Christian, Lebanese, Neutral) reported that the loyalists in the parliament had declared their preference for a candidate from the House, but that should an outsider be found who was in a position to speed up the settlement of the crisis they would not hesitate to give him their support. 434 Neither opposition nor loyalist devotees at this stage were evidently willing to maintain their former unbending attitudes.

In a speculative piece concerning the continuing talks between Murphy and Chamoun, Al Nahar (Christian, Lebanese, neutral) said Murphy would have told Chamoun his views that the crisis was primarily an internal dispute over internal and foreign policy questions. The paper felt that the U.S. envoy would have told the President that the election of a new president could be the desired solution but that he did not expect Chamoun to step down before the end of his term. The article said Murphy had explained that attitude to the opposition leaders, who "understand it." And, the paper said, Murphy would have assured Chamoun that in any event the United States would not accept the prospect of Lebanon's independence being in jeopardy. Opposition papers at the same time were giving Murphy credit for having a good deal of influence in paving the way for a settlement of the crisis based on the election of a president acceptable to all parties. 435

The date of the election meanwhile was set again for 51 July. Mediation efforts went on persistently but quietly and intermittent statements by both loyalist and opposition spokesmen maintaining

434 ibid., 24 July 1958
their last ditch demands were not conducive to an optimistic view of the possibility that the election would take place as scheduled or that an acceptable and willing candidate would actually be found.

On 29 July however it was finally announced that the mediators had managed to effect the agreement by all sides that General Chehab should be the sole candidate for the presidency. It reportedly took a great deal of persuasion by Patriarch Mesougui, House Speaker Oseiran, Third Force leader Henri Pharan and others to persuade the General to accept to run. He did so, reportedly, on the condition that he be the sole candidate. Loyalist and opposition candidates were expected to withdraw. 456

Pushing for all it could get, the opposition on 29 July published a manifesto listing 15 demands which should be endorsed by any presidential candidate who wished opposition support. They demanded, as they had throughout the crisis, the resignation of President Chamoun, the withdrawal of American troops, the amendment of the electoral law, amnesty for those under warrant for arrest by the present government, a policy of sectarian balance in the administration, and a pro-Arab foreign policy. 457 Loyalists of course replied the next day that these demands were unreasonable and unacceptable and said it now appeared hopeless to try and settle the crisis while arms and orders were still coming to the opposition leaders from abroad. 458

All this talk did not prevent the election of General Fuad Chehab as President of the Lebanese Republic on 31 July, 1958, by a

456 ibid., 30 July 1958.
457 ibid., 31 July 1958.
458 ibid.,
House vote of 48-7 with one abstention—on the second ballot. Loyalists voted heavily for Chehab, reportedly at the insistence of Chamoun. The opposition population was elected at the election. Opposition spokesman however, continued to state their demands. And the strike went on to a certain extent.

On 1 August a statement was issued by the United States Embassy in Beirut. It said: "The American Embassy is glad to note that the representatives of the Lebanese people have met and elected a new President in accordance with constitutional procedures." A United States military spokesman however said the election would cause no change in the U.S. military plans in Lebanon. He said the U.S. forces would stay until they were reassured as to the safety of Lebanon against any further direct or indirect aggression.

On 5 August President-elect Chehab outlined his program to be initiated when he assumed office on 24 September. There were five points:

1. National unity as outlined in the National Pact of 1943.
2. Withdrawal of American troops.
3. Brotherly relations with the Arab states.
4. Friendly relations with all nations.
5. A greater sense of government responsibility; honesty; and a rational approach to certain problems.

439 The seven votes were for Raymond Edde, leader of the National Union Front, who ran in competition with Chehab because he said "I wanted to preserve democratic rules so that it shouldn't be said the elections took place in the shadow of the 6th Fleet."
440 Ibid., 2 August 1958.
441 L'Orient, op.cit., 1 August 1958.
442 Arab World, op.cit., 2 August 1958.
442 Ibid., 6 August 1958.
The Lebanese crisis was not yet ended. The formation of a cabinet after Chehab took over in September caused another few weeks of political and physical turmoil. As far as the United States was concerned however it was a matter of waiting for the internal situation to be calm before it could pull out its troops. Face would be drastically damaged if the United States forces began to leave before the revolution was finally and completely at an end. Chehab's statement of policy however gave the American authorities an official way out when the time came. They had been invited to the country by one legally elected president, and invited to leave by another.

The election of President Chehab, a neutral, mediatory candidate, in a period of turmoil when it was made certain by both sides that he was in fact as neutral as his policy statement indicated, brought to an end the period of extreme cordiality in the relations between the governments of the United States and Lebanon. They remained friendly as they had been before. And, similarly, Lebanon's relations with the other Arab countries began the return to normal. Within the country the new government began working to re-establish the balance signified by the National Pact of 1943.
OBSERVATIONS

We have noted, in the course of this study, a drastic change in the attitude toward, and the reaction to United States political policy in the Middle East evidenced by the various governments in power under the presidency of Camille Chamoun. Before the time of the Suez Crisis, in the fall of 1956, the governments had maintained the course plotted in 1943 and embodied in the National Pact. Although there had been occasional pressures applied in efforts to accomplish deviation to one side or the other, the governments had ultimately followed a straight-and-narrow line. The result, where Lebanon’s reaction to American policy was concerned, was a balance between the divergent points of view harbored by the other Arab countries and the different factions within Lebanon itself.

In 1956 the situation changed when the Lebanese government did not break its relations with Great Britain and France because of their aggression against Egypt. While this decision was in fact no real violation of the terms of the National Pact (the other Arab countries were not even unanimous in their decision to break with both the big Western powers) it caused a more serious reaction than normal on the part of the Muslim, Arab nationalist segment of the Lebanese population, primarily because of the outspoken attitude of Egypt’s leaders—who were by that time accepted as the overall leaders of Arab nationalism. All this is connected with United States policy in the Middle East in that the British-French aggression was caused
by Egypt's nationalization of the Suez Canal, which in turn was a reaction (the timing at least) to the United States refusal to grant a loan to aid in the construction of Nasser's project of a high dam at Aswan.

This change in 1956 was the beginning of the chain reaction, given a push by the formulation and subsequent Lebanese acceptance of the Eisenhower Doctrine early in 1957, which developed into the Lebanese revolt during the summer of 1958 and opened the way for the ultimate U.S. action in the Middle East—the sending of troops to Lebanon.

President Chamoun, primarily a Lebanese nationalist, likely figured that his policy, which appeared to be one of favoring the West, and cooperating with the West by employing Lebanon's position as mediator in inter-Arab conflicts to the benefit of the Western side in the Cold War, was being endangered by such anti-Western acts on the part of Egypt as the nationalization of the Suez Canal, even though that move was prompted by the United States withdrawal of its offer of a loan for the Aswan Dam project. And, what is more, it was a blow to the pride of the leader of a small Arab country who felt all the same that he should be consulted, and given the chance to mediate, when a decision of such import to the relations between the West and the whole Arab world was in the offing. His pride stung, Chamoun would have been more likely to classify the possibility of strong objections from the Arab nationalist segment of the population as a necessary inconvenience that could be dealt with once he had the added prestige resulting from American backing.
Chamoun's annoyance with the leadership of Egypt did not arise on the spur of the moment solely as a result of the Suez Canal nationalization. All his efforts at negotiation between Egypt and Iraq on the question of the Baghdad Pact indicate he would have preferred a climate of Arab opinion in which one Arab League country could conclude a profitable politico-economic agreement with the United States or any representative of the Western camp without being publicly denounced as a traitor to Arab nationalism. And, President Chamoun, being himself pro-West, would probably have wished that Nasser had not agreed to such an obvious slap on the face of the West as the purchase of arms from the Soviet bloc, even though this move also was prompted by Western and United States arms policy in the Middle East. It may be recalled that some Lebanese nationalist newspaper comment at the time warned against the dangers involved in giving the Communist movement a foothold in the Arab world.

Aside from these specific, tangible reasons for President Chamoun's annoyance with Egypt's leaders, there is another--more personal and likely the most important--explanation for the Lebanese President's decision to risk a break from the policy set forth in the Baghdad Pact. Chamoun, being the duly elected leader of his country, would not have been normal if he had not been upset by the sight and sound of a large portion of his compatriots lending their political devotion to the President of another country--Camer Abdel Nasser of Egypt. And this widespread Arab nationalist support for Nasser was at its height after the tripartite aggression against Egypt.
And, underlying all these reasons is the basic attitude of the Lebanese nationalist, as opposed to the Arab nationalist. The advocates of Lebanese nationalism, as pointed out earlier, have a basic distrust and fear of the moves of any Arab leader to unite the territories and the peoples of the Arab world -- a fear of being overrun by a Muslim-Arab tide. Chamoun, while considered an Arab nationalist at the time he took power, was probably only one of the more moderate Lebanese nationalists. And, himself being in power, he would be more likely to take the Arab nationalistic propaganda being effectively disseminated by Egypt as a personal threat, besides, as pointed out above, being damaging to his pride.

Thus it was in the fall of 1956, when the prestige of Gamal Abdel Nasser was at a new peak throughout the Arab world, that Chamoun must have made his decision to side openly with the Lebanese nationalist elements in the country, and hence with the West, in what he considered to be a fight for his right to lead Lebanon as he saw fit, despite reaction from any quarter, Arab or internal. What then are the specific circumstances surrounding this decision?

On 31 October 1956 President Chamoun issued a call to the Heads of State of all the Arab countries to attend a meeting in Beirut to formulate a unified plan of action in the situation caused by the aggression on Egypt which was begun two days before. Deputy Emile Bustani, at that time a friend and supporter of the President, said in an article printed in Al Jarida on 24 April, 1957, that Chamoun had decided to break relations with Britain and France while the physical aggression
against Egypt was still in progress. He had in fact, according to Bastani, said there was no other way out of the situation, and in so saying had the backing of Prime Minister Iafī and Minister of State Saeb Salama. 443

Chamoun however awaited the Heads of State meeting before making any move of his own toward breaking relations with the two Western powers. Lebanon's policy had never been to act separately, and at the time all the Arab states had not broken with Britain and France. The replies to Chamoun's invitation to meet in Beirut were slow in coming from some of the Arab heads of state. Bastani, in his article, says that Chamoun finally called in Egyptian Ambassador Abdul Nafid Ghaleb to tell him he was waiting Nasser's reply. Ghaleb, according to Bastani, told the President he had had no communications with Cairo because of the aggression, but asked if he sent a telegram, 'what is the reason for the meeting?' 'Is the purpose to cut relations?' Bastani said 'Chamoun answered him in the affirmative.' Ghaleb asked: 'Shall unanimity be a condition?' Chamoun replied that as far as Lebanon was concerned it would not, but that he wanted the meeting to examine all methods of dealing with the situation. 444

In this writer's opinion Chamoun never intended to break relations with Britain and France. He may even have felt Nasser deserved what he got for being so high-handed and putting all the Arab countries in the face of a crisis by nationalizing the Suez Canal.

443 Al Jarida, Beirut, 24 April 1957
444 ibid.
The President badly wanted the meeting of Heads of State to be held since he knew if Lebanon did not break with Britain and France the hue and cry both inside and outside the country would be great, and thus he hinted to the Egyptian Ambassador that Lebanon would make the break whether the conference decided unanimously to do so or not. The meeting’s indecision was to be his scapegoat.

By the time the meeting was opened on 13 November the fighting had ceased and the British and French had accepted the UN resolution calling for their withdrawal. According to the Bustani article, Chamoun felt that since the situation had changed, the means of dealing with it also should change, and “the breaking of relations was not an end, but a means.” Lebanon, according to the Bustani article, also argued at the conference that since not all the other Arab countries had broken with both Britain and France, how could Lebanon be asked to break? It should have been obvious all along that unanimity could not be achieved on such a subject as the breaking of relations with Britain, especially, since two of the Arab countries had treaties of alliance with that nation.

This one of two things had happened: Either Chamoun really had intended to break relations with Britain and France and was convinced otherwise by pressure from the Christian, Lebanese nationalist elements in the country, realizing the counter effect this failure would have on the other faction in the country and making his choice to end the government's neutrality; or, as previously suggested, his decision had already been made and his semi-promise to Ghaleb was simply to persuade

445 ibid.
the Egyptians to attend the conference that was to be the formal
cover-up for Chamsoun's break with the Arab nationalists under the
leadership of Nasser.

The conference of the Heads of State in Beirut also gave
Chamsoun, because of the matter of breaking relations, the opportunity
to rid himself of the two ministers who could do the most to stop any
intention he might have had of changing Lebanon's policy. In his
article, Emile Bustani recalled a meeting between Chamsoun, Yafi and
Salan at which he was present. Yafi had told the President that he
was in a very difficult position at the meeting of foreign ministers,
which was going on at the same time as the heads of state meeting,
since Lebanon's position on the question of breaking relations was not
clear. Chamsoun urged him to lead the discussions to other matters.
Yafi also said "our Syrian brothers insist on our breaking relations.
And brother Saeb (Salan) promised then this when he visited Damascus."
At this point Bustani quoted himself as asking "how is it possible for
brother Saeb, or for anyone else to give a promise in this way when
the cabinet has taken no decision in this matter?" 446 At the heads
of delegation meeting itself a dispute arose between the Syrian and
Iraqi delegates on the question of breaking relations. Chamsoun,
according to the Bustani article, said that that the breaking of
relations was a necessity in the past but now that the firing had
ceased and the situation had changed, he didn't see any advantage in
this measure. But, he said, Lebanon would conform to the majority of
the other Arab countries and cut its relations too if the majority
decided on that.

446 ibid.
The majority of course decided on no such thing, as could have been predicted even before the meeting was called. Yafi and Sallam had been placed in difficult positions, primarily because their followers in Lebanon were calling for a break of relations with Britain and France as strongly as were Syria and Egypt, and the presence of the dispute being waged in Beirut itself gave impetus to their pressure. Although this writer has no proof, the most common explanation for the resignation of these two ministers during the time of the Heads of State meeting in Beirut was that Chamoun in effect asked them to get out of the government. He evidently told them that if they could not live with his decision not to break relations with Britain and France he would accept their resignations.

In any case the two left the government and went into open opposition. On the question of the breaking relations however it could never be said that Chamoun had openly refused to break with Britain and France. Bastid recalls a message he passed to Yafi one evening before he entered the sub-delegates meeting at the UNESCO hall. Chamoun told his premier in the note that he did not prohibit the breaking of relations but hoped, or advised, that Yafi would not put Lebanon "in the muzzle of the gun," i.e. in a difficult or dangerous position. He hoped Lebanon's position would be completely in accordance with the decisions of the majority of the delegations. But, the message repeated, there was no harm in breaking off relations. 447

447 Ibid.
The jist of this message, ignoring the political doubletalk, was that while Chamoun was not going to put himself in the uncomfortable position of having told Yafi not to break relations, he was strongly advising the Premier not to make such a promise, but to maintain the completely harmless position of the majority. The Premier could not defy the President's wishes, but at the same time could not say, and prove, that Chamoun had directly told him not to break relations.

By the time the Arab heads of government conference was formally over Chamoun's decision to break with the Arab nationalist line had been made, and the first step had been taken and covered-up for. If he had really intended to break relations with Britain and France there was no need to await the decision of an Arab Heads of State meeting before doing so. The conference, through its lack of unanimity, was to give Chamoun the excuse he sought for not acting to break relations and Chamoun's sidewise promise to Egyptian Ambassador Ghaleb was the only way he could get the Egyptians, then the leaders of the Arab nationalist movement, to bother showing up at the conference and help give Arab unanimity to the useless decisions it was sure to make.

With all this Chamoun created a situation in which Yafi and Salam, representatives of the Arab nationalist segment of the population, could not remain silent. When they objected too loudly the President simply asked them to resign, and they could not refuse and save face. Chamoun then was free to choose a Premier who would be more inclined to play the game his way.

The new Premier was Saudis, a man Chamoun evidently knew he could deal with. The biggest indication of the route Chamoun had
picked for Lebanese foreign relations however was his choice of foreign minister—Charles Malik. Malik is a scholar, philosopher and statesman greatly respected both within and without his country. His philosophy of international relations as concerns the Arab world however was hardly in accordance with Lebanon's former policy of keeping on good terms with all the Arab countries, since Egypt and Syria by this time were advocating the policy of positive neutralism for the Arab world and Malik classified democracy, as exemplified by the United States as right, and Soviet-stype communism as bad, with no inbetween. Malik firmly believed that the choice between this right and that wrong would have to be made sooner or later by the Arab countries and he wished to make the proper decision early for his country. It was Foreign Minister Malik who, with Chamoun's backing, caused all the stir early in 1957 by stating his government's acceptance of the Eisenhower Doctrine before the United States Congress had yet approved it.

Thus Chamoun's decision had been made and he had succeeded in surrounding himself with a cabinet that would willingly follow his lead. And only a few months after Chamoun had stated his support for the case of Egypt (during the Suez aggression and before) his government formally accepted a gambit of American foreign policy (the Eisenhower Doctrine) that was against everything the Egyptian Arab nationalist leadership had been preaching since they reached agreement with the British in 1954 on the evacuation of the Suez base—non alignment and positive neutralism in the greater East-West struggle.
President Chamoun this showed that he would not be bullied into leading Lebanon into a policy of Arabism that ran against the grain of his pro-Western Lebanese nationalist feelings and which was being led, too widely and too obviously, from without the country. In showing his independence, however, the President initiated a storm of opposition that was to reverberate throughout the world and lead ultimately to revolt, and a return to a government, a president, and a Lebanese foreign policy which is little different from that which Chamoun himself followed before he changed his course.
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