THE STRUGGLE FOR ARAB UNITY

by

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ARAB UNITY

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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the idea of Arab unity as it manifests itself in the contemporary political thought of the Arab people by following its history from its beginning up until the present time. Since the events which occurred in February 1958 culminating in the formation of three unions of formerly independent Arab states, the idea of Arab unity has become a by-word repeated and repeated not only throughout the countries of the Arab world, but throughout the entire globe. Historians have earmarked February 1958 as a landmark in modern Arab history, for during this month they saw the establishment of the United Arab Republic between Egypt and Syria, the Federal Arab States between Iraq and Jordan and finally the United Arab States, a federation formed between Yemen and the countries of the United Arab Republic.

Questions immediately arose in the minds of those who were not familiar with the history of the Arab world, if this idea of unity was something new and unique? Were the unions which were formed between the various particular Arab states foreseeable and predictable? Was unity, as attained, the desire of the peoples of the particular states involved, or was it the handwork of their leaders which was more or less forced upon them? If unity was desired, why did it manifest itself in three unions rather than one complete and total union of Arab states? To answer these and all other questions concerning the formation of the unions it is necessary to analyze the entire idea of Arab unity, and to trace its progress and development from its inception up until

-iv-
February 1958.

In an effort to discuss the embryo of the idea of Arab unity within the area presently referred to as the "Arab World," it will be necessary to reflect upon the early history of the Arabs. Therefore, this paper will begin with the initial union of the Arab world, which was a result of the Islamic Conquest, and will progress through the era of Ottoman Rule and the partition of the countries of the Arab world during the inter-war period.

Finally, it should be added that it is not the intent of this paper to delve into the progress and development of Arab nationalism, except insofar as it manifested the growth of Arab unity. It is at times most difficult to divorce the two ideas. Although their relationship is extremely close, they are certainly not one and the same. Nationalism does not necessarily beget unity, nor does unity beget nationalism. It is true, however, that Arab nationalism has had as one of its primary goals, Arab unity. But while Arab nationalism was born from a desire by the Arabs for self-determination and political independence, Arab unity is the outward manifestation and insuring device for the maintenance of these desires. As Cecil A. Hourani said, "the struggle for unity among the Arabs cannot be disassociated from their struggle for independence."¹ This statement in itself recognizes that

Arab unity and Arab independence, which has exerted itself through Arab nationalism, are two distinct forces which have traveled a parallel course. Arab independence has been attained by the countries of the Arab world. Arab unity remains yet an unfulfilled factor in the "Arab Question."
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PART ONE: BACKGROUND FOR ARAB UNITY

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

A. The Arab World

Such terms as "Near East" and "Middle East" have always been confusing and have had no unanimity of meaning whatsoever. The term "Arab world," a comparatively new term, suffers from the same difficulty as a great amount of diversity also exists in its definition. This diversity may be attributed to the various yardsticks selected in forming an idea or opinion as to those countries which should be included in a definition of the Arab world. Normally it is said that the Arab world includes all those lands wherein the majority of the population is Arab and the Arabic language is utilized as the main means of communication. If this be true, then the yardsticks or common denominators become "Arab population" and "Arabic language" and the Arab world includes a wide expanse of land from the Atlantic Ocean on the east to the Persian Gulf and the borders of Iran on the west, and from the Indian Ocean and the steppes of central Africa on the south to the Taurus Mountains of Turkey and the Mediterranean on the north. From the Arab nationalists' point of view, such an all-inclusive definition of the Arab world would be accepted and approved.

But the Arab nationalist point of view does not necessarily represent the feelings and desires of all the Arabic-speaking peoples of
Asia and North Africa. The countries of this area vary widely to the degree in which they have accepted or rejected Arab nationalism and the call for Arab unity as it has been expounded in the past and as it is presently being expounded today under the leadership of the United Arab Republic's President Jamal Abdul Nasser. If the desire to accept Arab nationalism and Arab unity were to be added to the usual common denominators of Arab population and Arabic language, the size of the Arab world might be greatly narrowed down. Tunisia, for example, has a predominant Arab population, but the people of Tunisia have never had, nor do they have now, a desire to accept Arab nationalism or Arab unity as a basic concept of their internal or foreign policy. The same can be said of the remainder of the Maghreb, Morocco and Algeria, which countries, with Tunisia, do not even share a common history with the Arab east.\(^1\)

The primary idea of unity among these countries is Maghrebian unity rather than Arab unity.\(^2\)

It is not even completely true that the Arabic language is utilized in these countries as the main means of communication. French

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2. Ibid, p. 110. This and other comments made regarding Tunisia and the Maghreb are also based on the writer's personal observations in this area in March 1959 and through interviews with persons in that area including local government as well as American diplomatic officials.
is still the language of the governments and of the educated people of these countries. Geographically, this area is not a part of the Near or Middle East, but rather it is a part of the Western Mediterranean Circle which includes Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, Spain, France and Italy, with Sicily closing the circle. Its economic livelihood is within this area.

Professor Rom Landau writes in his book *Islam and the Arabs*, "The emergence, in 1956, of Morocco and Tunis as independent states has helped to emphasize the historical fact that, while we are entitled to speak of one Arab world, it cannot be denied that that world is composed of two distinct sections: The eastern one, comprising the Arabian peninsula, Egypt and the Fertile Crescent, and the western known as the Maghreb, and consisting of Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco. Though the two share Islam, the Arabic language and innumerable historical and cultural traditions, the Maghreb still does not belong to the Near East, geographically forms a part of the West, and both in history and culture has an individuality of its own."

Although Professor Landau notes the many differences, he still hesitates to separate the Maghreb from the Arab world. This is being

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unrealistic. The analogy between the two is similar to that between the United States and Canada, where the likelihood of unity is not outside the realm of possibility, but due to inherent differences, is not particularly desired by the peoples of either nation.

It is contended by some that the people of the Maghreb are not Arab, but they are Muslim, and here is the source of the confusion. If and when these people are asked, "What are you?" they reply that they are "Arab." This is misinterpreted by most to mean that they lean politically toward the Arab world and accept the principles of Arab nationalism and Arab unity as presently being expounded. This is certainly not the case. Their real meaning in saying that they are Arab is to say that they are Muslim. They feel the brotherly affinity that any other Muslim community feels toward the Muslim world, but they are more politically and economically oriented towards the West. This group feel that the contention by others that the Maghreb is a second Arab world or another section of the Arab world is not true. It is a play on words

4. It has been brought to the writer's attention that when the United States of America was formed, no one could ascertain that it would grow to 49 or 50 states, and therefore for this and similar reasons, the Maghreb should be included in the Arab world. The reader is referred to the purpose of this paper as given in the first sentence of the Abstract, p. iv, above which is "...to analyze the idea of Arab unity as it manifests itself in the contemporary political thought of the Arab people by following its history..." It is not within the writer's ability to prognosticate what countries the Arab world will be comprised of in five or fifty years. This paper only considers the past and present.
and is caused by this misinterpretation mentioned above.  

On the other hand, Iraq cannot be taken out of the Arab world because of its policy of rejecting Arab nationalism and Arab unity since the July 14, 1958, coup d'état of General Abdul Kerim Kassem. Unlike the Maghreb countries who have never favored Arab nationalism or Arab unity, and who lack common unbroken historical and cultural traditions with the Arab east, Iraq and its former leaders were charter members in the Arab nationalist movement and in the call for Arab unity. Their record in the struggle for Arab unity is possibly second to none. At present Iraq must remain in any listing of countries comprising the Arab world.

Even Egypt, which is presently at the forefront in the call for unity of the Arab world, in spite of its close cultural and religious ties with the Arabs and its membership, indeed its leadership, in the League of Arab States, only recently began to consider itself as an Arab country.

Lebanon has received special consideration from her Muslim rulers and neighbors for centuries due to the fact that the majority of

5. The above view is that of Dr. Omar A. Farrukh, a member of the Arab Academy, Damascus, of the Islamic Research Association, and a Professor of History at the University of Damascus. It was given to the writer in an interview on March 27, 1959. Dr. Farrukh, as can be seen, is not an Arab nationalist, but the view which he expresses is shared by many throughout the Arab world.
its population has almost always been Christian. Muslims and Christians alike do not fail to point out her "particular status" within a predominantly Islamic area. Most agree that she is geographically a part of the Fertile Crescent, but due to this "particular status" she should receive a special position. Mūsā al-ʿAlāmī writes in his book ʿIbrāt Filastīn, "Let this position be recognized for her. In return for such recognition Lebanon should agree with full consent that her cooperation in the Fertile Crescent should be greater and the bond shall be firmer, than in the Arab League."⁶

Dr. Nābih A. Fāris not only excludes Lebanon from the Fertile Crescent, but also excludes it from the Arab world. In so doing, however, he explains that, "Lebanon is in the very heart of the Arab world geographically, economically and culturally. When the national concept is established and becomes dominant among the Arabs, we will find that Lebanon will not refrain from joining any form of an Arab Federation, and will serve as the corner stone in the Arab edifice. Until that time, however, there should not be imposed upon it a status which it does not choose for itself at its own accord."⁷

Another yardstick in addition to those already mentioned should also be considered, and that is "reality." Many definitions of the Arab

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⁶ Al-ʿAlāmī, Mūsā, ʿIbrāt Filastīn, Dar Al-Kaṭshāf, Beirut, 1949, p. 56.

world will include Palestine due to the fact that the state of Israel has never been recognized by the Arab countries. Yet, there is no real doubt in the minds of all Arabs that Israel does exist, rightly or wrongly, as a thorn in the side of the Arab world. If reality be used as the yardstick then Palestine should never be included in a definition of the Arab world. This is also true of Algeria, a part of Metropolitan France since 1848, and Aden Colony, a part of the British Commonwealth.

Sudan is included in many definitions of the Arab world. In the realm of reality, Sudan is not an Arab country. Although two-thirds of its population is Muslim and 51.4 percent of its people utilize the Arabic language, only 39 percent of its population is Arab.

After weighing all of these yardsticks; i.e., Arab population, Arabic language, adherence to the Arab national movement and its call


9. Ibid., p. 20; The Philosophical Society of the Sudan, The Population of the Sudan, University of Khartoum, Khartoum, 1958, pp. 36-37. This latter document also reveals "If we group all Arab tribes, Miscellaneous, Beja, and Nubiyin in one group called Northerners, and the Nuba Westerners with the Southern tribes, we find that there are 98 Africans in this country per each 100 Northerners. Should we agree to add to the African total the 165,000 Westerners among the Foreigners, then we shall find that the Arabs have been in a minority, two years ago, of some 50,000. Due to the higher rate of natural increase the majority of Africans over Arabs increase by probably 50,000 a year."
for Arab unity, and the reality of the actual present, a new definition of the Arab world becomes necessary. The Arab world is all those countries of Asia and North Africa, which are not presently an integral part of a non-Arab nation, whose population is primarily Arab utilizing the Arabic language as its main means of communication, and whose people are basically in accord with the Arab nationalist movement and its primary aim towards Arab unity. It includes Libya, the United Arab Republic, Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq and the countries and Shaikhdoms of the Arabian Peninsula, with the exception of Aden Colony.

This definition of the Arab world and the countries included therein is reasonable and acceptable when viewed in the light of the possible realization of Arab unity under a centralized form of government as it has been expounded for years and as it has become to be known today. Since Arab unity as such has not yet been achieved, it may be argued that the definition of the Arab world as given above is too restrictive or even too liberal. However, an Arab nation is not yet a nation in being, but a nation in becoming. If it is true that those people are a nation who think they are a nation, then all four common denominators must be considered, and the Arab world could be no more or less than as defined.

The principle geographic characteristic of the Arab world is its vast expanse of desert throughout the entire area, a factor which has affected its economic growth and progress as well as its social structure and makeup. It has caused its inhabitants to be constantly on the
move in search of water and food, and it has determined the location of
its settled inhabitants near underground springs and the great rivers.

Its known resources, other than oil, are comparatively few and
widely scattered. This lack of natural resources has caused the area to
lag far behind the western world both economically and industrially.
Great strides have been made in both Iraq and the Arabian Peninsula
since the discovery of oil, but this enormous disparity in natural
wealth has resulted in extremely rich areas coexisting side by side with
Arab neighbors who are economically impoverished.

The Arab world has been stimulated by the events which have
occurred within it during the latter part of the nineteenth and the
first part of the twentieth centuries. No longer is it thought of as a
land of wandering nomads—a land which is little known and of little
interest to the peoples and governments of the western world. Arab oil,
the Suez Canal, and the strategic location of the Arab countries are
only a few of the factors which have effected the security and well-
being of the entire world, and have been responsible for placing the
Arabs and the Arab world in the international limelight of world
politics.

B. The Arab People

In defining the Arab world as those lands wherein the majority
of the population is Arab, it then becomes necessary to determine what
is an Arab, for as Sir Hamilton A. R. Gibb has stated, "it is very sig-
nificant of the extreme confusion and uncertainty in which all popular
thought about the Arabs is involved that every person who speaks about
Arabs has to begin by defining his term.\textsuperscript{10}

The word "Arab" to denote any particular race or political group
in the Near or Middle East, other than the nomads of the desert, is a
comparatively new word. Even as late as the nineteenth century "the
word 'Arab' was mainly reserved for the Bedouins of the desert and for
all non-town dwellers in the Near East."\textsuperscript{11} Dr. Zeine wrote, "...in the
nineteenth century, there was as yet no 'Arab Question' in international
politics. Indeed the word 'Arab' itself as a designation for the
inhabitants of the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire rarely occurs in
the books and documents of the period. The general terms 'Mohammadan'
and 'Christian' were used to describe the majority and minority
inhabitants of this area... As to the great majority of the Muslim sub-
jects of the Sultan, whether Turks or Arabs, they were 'brothers in the
Faith,' i.e., they were Muslims before being Turks and Arabs."\textsuperscript{12}

To the question as to whether we should include the Iraqis, the
Syrians, the Lebanese, the Palestinians, the Egyptians, the North Afri-
cans, as well as the inhabitants of the Arabian Peninsula in a

\textsuperscript{10} Gibb, H.A.R., "The Future for Arab Unity", \textit{The Near
East: Problems and Prospects}, ed. Philip W. Ireland,

\textsuperscript{11} Zeine, Zeine N., \textit{Arab-Turkish Relations and The
Emergence of Arab Nationalism}, Khayats', Beirut,
1958, p. 36.

\textsuperscript{12} \textit{Ibid}, pp. 36-37.
definition of Arabs, Professor Gibb feels that the real criterion "is the complex of feelings, traditions, sympathies, and aspirations. If these are not only linked up unbrokenly with the Arab past, but also, notwithstanding individual variations or reservations, associated with a restored and reinvigorated Arab culture in the future, then the members of the groups concerned share the name of Arab over and above their specific local appellations..." 13 The same historian in answering the question, who are the Arabs, once wrote, "there is...only one answer which approaches historic truth: all those are Arabs for whom the central fact of history is the mission of Mohammed and the memory of the Arab Empire, and who in addition cherish the Arab tongue and its cultural heritage as their common possession." 14

It should be noted that this definition tends to imply that only Muslims are Arabs and Christians are excluded. Professor Gibb is a student of Islam and his definition coincides in essence with that which is given by many of the Muslim Arabs of the Arab world. When they think


or speak of an Arab, they are referring to a Muslim Arab. All others are Maronites, Copts, Greek Orthodox, Christians, Jews, but not Arab. If it had not been for this deep rooted religious factor of the Arabs considering themselves first and foremost to be Muslim, they would not have willingly submitted so often to the ruling dynasties of the Seljuks, the Buyayyids, or the Mamluks, for example, or to the Ottomans for four long centuries.

Arabs who are active in the present Arab Nationalist movement publically disavow this theory. They admit that there are a certain number of conservative Muslims in the Arab world who consider that they, as Muslims, are Arabs and that Christians are excluded in the meaning of

15. Saab, Hassan, *The Arab Federalists of the Ottoman Empire*, Djambatan, Amsterdam, Netherlands, 1958, pp. 17-18. Dr. Saab, after giving several definitions of an Arab writes "To this devine human tirade, i.e., the Arabism of God's word, the Koran, the Arabism of God's prophet Mohammad, and of the Prophet's vicegerents, the Khulafa; and the Arabism of the people who formed the earliest core of the Islamic community, the Peninsula Arabs, the Arabs owe, since Mohammad, their historic existence as a whole whether this whole is called today an Arab nation, an Arab homeland, or an Arab world." From this it can be seen that a modern Muslim educator credits the whole historic existence of the Arabs and the Arab world to God, Islam, the Koran, and the Prophet. This is a fact, and one which is indisputable throughout the Arab world. It is only natural that Muslims think only of themselves as Arabs.

the word "Arab." However, they are quick to point out that this is in no sense a majority view. In accordance with the concepts of present day Arab nationalism, as publicly expressed, an Arab is a person who lives in an Arab country and speaks the Arabic language, and who has a feeling of common destiny regarding the future, and at the present, reacts with other Arabs to the stresses and strains through which they are going.¹⁷ No particular distinction between Muslims and Christians is emphasized. It is obvious that it is not politically wise to make such a distinction, whether it is actually felt or not by the leaders of the movement. Arab nationalism needs all the advocates and backers it can muster within the Arab world for realization of its aim towards unity of the Arab countries.

On the other hand, many Christians born in Arab countries, whose mother tongue is the Arabic language, have no doubt in their minds that they are Arabs. Among the most rabid Arab nationalists, not only in the nineteenth century, but also in recent years, may be counted many of the Christians from Lebanon. Christians also are numbered among those who have struggled long and hard for Arab unity. However, today the majority of the Christians living in the Arab world are first and foremost Christians; secondly they are Lebanese, Syrian, Iraqi, etc.; and thirdly they are Arabs. In contrast to this, the Muslims are first and foremost Muslims, a fact which is more or less understood rather than a

¹⁷. This definition was given verbatim to the writer by an extremely well educated Muslim Arab who considers himself to be an Arab nationalist.
distinguishing factor; secondly they are Arabs; and, thirdly, they are Lebanese, Syrian, Iraqi, etc. Religiously speaking it is only meet and right that all God-fearing men should consider themselves, first and foremost, children of God. Only in the Arab East, the cradle of the great religions, with its background of religious conflicts, it has become necessary to identify oneself according to faith and/or sect.

Bernard Lewis quotes a definition given by a group of Arab leaders in these words, "Whoever lives in our country, speaks our language, is brought up in our culture, and takes pride in our glory is one of us."18

Professors Faris and Husayn, a Christian and a Muslim respectively, sum up a group of definitions of an Arab by saying, "The accepted criteria for an Arab, therefore, according to the preceding views, include a common territory, language, history, traditions, customs, culture, and society. The religious criterion, alluded to by Gibb, is considered by some, particularly those among whom religion still holds sway and national consciousness is still weak...as it is the case today in the Peninsula and North Africa...to be one of the principal bonds of unity. Modern nationalist Arabs are as proud of the mission of Mohammad and of the glories of the Arab Empire as the conservative Muslims, but they look upon them as products of Arab genius.

18. Lewis, Bernard, The Arabs In History, Hutchinsons
and mentality."

The Peninsula and North Africa cannot be held up as particular areas within the Arab world where the Muslim inhabitants place religion over national consciousness. To the majority of the people in the Arab world the Islamic "religion still holds sway" whether they be provincial nationalists or Arab nationalist.20 Religion and national consciousness go hand in hand in the Arab world. In the light of this, Faris* and Husayn's definition in effect, whether they meant it to or not, agrees with Gibb's.

It is not the Westerners' prerogative to judge this most important question, but the prerogative of the Arabs themselves. For the purpose of this paper it is sufficient to say that there is diversity even among the Arabs as to what is meant by the appellation "Arab."

However, it can be said that the majority of those people living in the


20. Nuseibeh, Hazem Z., The Ideas of Arab Nationalism, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, N.Y., 1956, p. 29. "The attitude of the Arab nationalist is that the entire legacy of Islam, insofar as it is expressed in Arabic and arose in an Arab milieu, is his heritage. He makes no distinction between the philosopher Al-Kindi, a pure-blooded Arab, and Al-Farabi, of Turkish stock, or between them and Ibn Sina of Persian stock." But here Dr. Nuseibeh does make a distinction when he includes only Muslims and no Christians.
Arab world are Muslim and the two words "Muslim" and "Arab" have a tendency to be used synonymously. This is not to say that all Muslims are Arabs, but rather that the majority of the Arabs are Muslims and that "religious nationality" is still held prevalent in the Arab world.

All of the foregoing being considered, the most important distinguishing characteristics in determining today who is an Arab seem to be that an Arab is a person of the Arab race who is conscious and proud of his Arab culture, and who has an Arab national consciousness along with a desire to be an Arab and to actively and dynamically strive for a better position in the world for himself and for his fellow Arabs.

21. In an interview with Dr. Omar A. Farrukh, a member of the Arab Academy, Damascus, of the Islamic Research Association, and a Professor of History at the University of Damascus, the writer posed the question "What is an Arab?" In answering, Dr. Farrukh referred to the long Islamic history, tradition and culture which was so important in distinguishing the Arab people. He stated that an Arab is a Muslim. Non-Muslims within the Arab world may be referred to as Arabic-speaking people, but the Muslims do not consider them to be Arabs. "How can they be Arabs," asks Dr. Farrukh, "when the whole world of the Arabs revolves around the religion--Islam?"
CHAPTER II
UNITY UNDER THE ARAB CONQUEST

A. Islamisation and Arabisation

The Arab world never knew complete political unity except during short periods prior to the end of the second Muslim century and during the first three centuries of Ottoman rule. This first unity was attained under the stimulus of Islamic conquest. Dr. Hitti points out in *The History of the Arabs* that "The campaigns seem to have started as raids to provide new outlets for the warring spirits of the tribes now forbidden to engage in fratricidal combats, the object in most cases being booty and not the gaining of a permanent foothold. The moves acquired momentum as the warriors passed from victory to victory. It was then that systematic campaigns began, and the creation of the Arab Empire followed inevitably." Dr. Bertram Thomas agrees with Dr. Hitti when he writes "The Arabs marched from victory to victory, from ambition to ambition, the

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23. Nuseibeh, *op.cit.*, p. 20. "The first and foremost achievement of the Islamic movement was the unification of the Arabs for the first time in their history. Thus, in a historical setting, Arabism owes to Islam its very existence."

modest pillaging raids grew to be wars of territorial conquest, Arab sovereignty came to be the inspiration of the desert hosts. 25

It is therefore a mistake to think that this first union of the Arabs began as the result of a fanatical religious desire to build a united Arab or Islamic Empire, or an eagerness to share with others the blessings of Islam, for Islam had only recently been imposed upon these same warriors. The truth probably lies somewhere between this idea of fanaticism and eagerness to share the blessing of Islam and the ideas expressed above by Hitti and Thomas. Hunger and avarice constituted the impelling forces, but Islam supplied the essential unity and the central power.

The moment the soldiers stopped marching, however, political unity crumbled. The lack of a desire to unite and to remain united was evidenced by the rapid decline of the Arab Empire. The Empire which was built by the sword, perished by the sword. This was caused not only by foreign invaders, but also by internal disunity and strife, such as the split between the Qaysites and Yamanites, 26 and the struggle of the various dynasties for the caliphate. What did remain, however, in place of a political unity was a kind of vague religious unity in the sense


26. The Qaysites were the North Arabian tribes who traced their descent to Ishmael, and who referred to themselves as 'Adnamites. The Yamanites, on the other hand, were South Arabs who claimed to be descendants of Qahtan, the Joktan of Genesis 10:25.
that each Muslim was the brother of every other Muslim.

In spite of the comparative shortness of the period within which the Arab world had its first taste of unity, albeit forced unity, there had still been sufficient time to lay the ground-work for many of the basic factors which are inherent within the structure of a "nation."

This period was the beginning of the process of "Islamisation" and it marked the wide expansion of the process of "Arabisation," which had begun centuries before the rise of Islam. The Islamic religion, the primary unifying factor, was spread throughout the Arab world, and in fact, beyond. Dr. Nuseibeh writes in The Ideas of Arab Nationalism, "to Islam is due the birth of a nation, the birth of a state, the birth of a national history, and the birth of a civilization... Whereas the pre-Islamic period had witnessed the emergence of an Arab nationality, the Islamic (period)...carried the Arabs far toward the development of a full fledged national consciousness."  

However, it should not be understood from this that the conquering Arab tribes swept to the west and the east, forcing all people in their wake to accept Islam immediately under the threat of annihilation, for such was certainly not the case. Nor should it be understood that a new Islamic or Arabic civilization was automatically stamped upon the areas conquered, for in fact, these Arabs had no such new

27. Antonius, George, The Arab Awakening, Khayat's College Book Cooperation, Beirut, 1938, p. 15.

civilization to impose. It has been clearly established that the early
cry was "Islam, tribute, or the sword," and since tribute had become
most important for the maintenance of the large armies necessary for
both continued advance as well as defense of the areas already conquered,
peoples were actually discouraged from accepting Islam. For in the
beginning Muslims were not required to pay taxes, whereas those who
retained their former religions were subject to tribute to the new state
as well as poll tax and land tax.

Islam cannot be considered as a force which over-ran Asia and
North Africa in the period of a century, immediately solidifying and
unifying all of the peoples and countries with which it came in contact.
At the end of the Umayyad period the population of Lower Egypt, then
Arab ruled for nearly a century, was still predominantly Christian, and
five hundred years passed before Muslims were actually in a majority.
Even Syria, which was one of the first to receive the Muslim force, was
predominantly Christian in the ninth century, and Baghdad had a Christian
population of forty to fifty thousand as late as A.D. 900.  

Although Arab infiltration into the Sudan began immediately
after the conquest, wholesale migration of Arab tribes did not begin
until the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Complete Islamisation
and Arabisation has not been accomplished in the Sudan even today.  

29. Kirk, George E., A Short History of the Middle East,

30. See Footnote 9, Page 7 above.
The same is true of a new civilization, for when the Arabs entered upon the scene they had no learning, no system of philosophy and no system of laws other than the Qur'an. They were for the most part unlettered, but they did have keen minds and were eager to learn. The followers of other faiths, the People of the Book, were assured recognition within the world society. As time passed, however, the new Arab conquerors became accustomed to their position of dominance and they tended to invigorate the scattered civilizations which they had found in a state of decline and to give them new life and character of their own.\textsuperscript{31} The chief factor in the spread of the Arab way of life, in addition to Islam, was the gradual settlement of the nomadic tribes within the conquered areas, their acquiring of land, inter-marriage and social contact which eventually forced the peoples of the conquered lands to abandon their former languages and accept the rich Arabic language—the language of the Qur'an.

In referring to the effect of Islam and the Arabic language and the part they played in building a new civilization, George Antonius writes, "While the new religion preached by the invaders was far from being universally accepted, the whole population, with a few scattered exceptions, adopted their language and, with their language, their manners and ways of thought. The new civilization which arose in place of the old was in no material sense imported by the newcomers. It was a compound product resulting from a process of reciprocal assimilation;\textsuperscript{31} Thomas, \textit{The Arabs}, \textit{op.cit.}, p. 123.
from the impulse which the Muslim conquerors gave to the resources of intelligence and talent which they found, disused and moribund, and quickened into life. In its external manifestations the new civilization varied in each country, in keeping with the variations in the culture aptitude of the local populations. But two features were common to all: its faith and its language, with all that these implied of new standards and new outlook. And while the religion of Islam allowed large communities in the conquered countries to retain their old faith, and had itself to suffer a schism as between its Sunni and Shi'i adherents, the Arabic language had unity and became uniformly dominant everywhere."

Whereas Antonious feels that it was the Arabic language which "had unity and became uniformly dominant everywhere," Dr. Nuseibeh lays the main force on unity at the doorstep of Islam when he writes, "...Islam refers to an area of civilization and culture,...which bears an unmistakable impress of unity. Two processes were set in motion by the Arabs, which though intimately interrelated, were by no means identical. The first and broader process was the dissemination of Islam as a religion in various lands and among different races and cultural backgrounds. The second and narrower process was Arabisation, that is, the development...of an Arab community of language, of race, and of culture."
But the expansion of Islam into Persia, Afghanistan, India and beyond, far surpassed the expansion of the Arab language, which resulted in one world within another: the Arab world within the Muslim world. All of the countries within the Arab world accepted Islam, but the reverse is not true, as all of the Islamic countries did not accept the Arabic language or Arabisation.

B. Political Unity Disintegrates

The completion of these phases of Islamisation and Arabisation were not attained until after the political unity of the Arab Empire had been permanently shattered.\(^ {34} \) Spain had declared its independence in A.D. 756, Morocco in 788, Tunis in 801, and Egypt in 868. In 877 Egypt seized Syria and ruled most of it until 1076, under the Tulunid and Fatimid dynasties. The Hamdamids, who were Shi‘ī Muslims, captured northern Mesopotamia and Syria in 929 and ruled that area until 944.\(^ {35} \) Later came the Buwayhids, the Samanids, the Seljuks, the Ayyubids, Mongols, Mamluks, Turcomans, and the Safawids. Rival caliphates were proclaimed and fell one by one and side by side. Political unity seemed neither possible nor desired. The Arab world eventually lost its identity, but Islam and the Muslim world remained, although through the

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34. *Ibid.*, p. 26. Dr. Nuseibeh contends that "The truly Arab period in the history of Islam came to an end with the downfall of the Umayyads...The principle of nationalism, which was the mainstay of the Empire, gave way to Islamic universalism.

continuously changing complex of these local and foreign dynasties. Also remaining—even advancing—in the areas where it had penetrated was the Arabic language.

Political disunity of the Arab world prevailed from the inception of the dynastic rivalries at the beginning of the ninth century and for seven centuries thereafter. In spite of this disunity, Islamic culture flourished and the tills of the various Sultans were kept filled from profits earned from Western trade and tariffs charged for the use of overland trade routes from India and the Far East. Towards the end of the Mamluk period, in 1492, America was discovered, and in 1498, the Portuguese navigator, Vasco da Gama, found his way around the Cape of Good Hope, thereby establishing a new route for trade to India and the Far East. Both of these discoveries greatly affected the Arab world economically.

Also during this period the threat of the Ottoman Turks began to loom in the face of the Arab world. To meet this threat the Sultan of the Mamluks who controlled Egypt, Syria and the Holy Cities, secretly aligned himself with the Safawid Shah of Persia, the arch-enemy of the Ottoman Sultan. In 1515, after the battle at Chaldiran with the Persians (1514) the Ottoman Sultan Selim I occupied Tibriz, Upper Mesopotamia and part of Armenia.36 When the Mamluk Sultan came to the aid of his Persian ally, Sultan Selim’s Janissaries proved superior to

the backward Mamluk army of Syria and Egypt. By 1517 Upper Mesopotamia, Syria, the Hijaz and Egypt, the heart of the Arab world, had been added to the Ottoman Empire. This was the beginning of the new unity of the Arab world, not under their own rule, but under the suzerainty of another Muslim dynasty—-the Ottoman Empire.
CHAPTER III
UNITY UNDER THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

A. Political Regrouping of the Arab World

Upper Mesopotamia, Syria, Egypt and Hijaz were in unity with the Ottoman Empire before the end of the first quarter of the sixteenth century, insofar as the suzerainty of the Ottoman Sultan was recognized by each country. Actual unity was yet another thing.

Upon returning from Egypt to Constantinople, Sultan Selim spent some time in Damascus and Aleppo for the purpose of organizing his new acquisition as he had previously done in the case of Upper Mesopotamia. At this time Syria was fully incorporated into the Turkish Empire and it remained so, with minor exceptions, until it was taken from the Empire as a result of World War I and was divided into mandates of France and Great Britain.

Egypt, on the other hand, which comprised the entire territory of the Mamluks including Upper Egypt, and Hijaz, was not incorporated into the Empire in the same way and to the same extent as Upper Mesopotamia and Syria. Mamluks were entrusted with the administration of the country by Selim, and they soon regained full power, reducing to puppets the pashas appointed from Constantinople.


38. Ibid, p. 113.

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During the reign of Solyman the Magnificent (1520-66) the provinces of Mosul and Baghdad became a part of the Ottoman Empire. Later the coastal areas of Algiers, Oran and Tripoli were added as a result of the splendid naval and fighting ability of such pirates as Barbarossa and Dragut, who had been made admirals of the Turkish fleet by Sultan Solyman. Tunis finally fell to the Turks in 1574. By the middle of the sixteenth century the Ottomans had occupied almost the entire Arab area from the eastern border of Morocco on the west to the Persian Gulf and the borders of Persia on the east. Morocco and the Sudan were not included in this area. The inland regions of the North African countries as well as the greater part of the Arabian Peninsula were never in unity with the other Arab countries as a part of the Ottoman Empire or controlled by it for any appreciable length of time.

An incident of utmost importance towards unity occurred with the Ottoman victory over the Mamluks of Egypt. The Mamluks, as "Protectors" of the twin Holy Cities of Mecca and Medina, had maintained a puppet Caliph of the Abbasside dynasty to fulfill the responsibilities incident


40. See Map, Appendix C.

41. As Dr. Hitti points out "The deterioration of the Ottoman fleet from the seventeenth century onward loosened the Ottoman grip on the African provinces and gave their governors...the opportunity to practice an even larger measure of local autonomy than their opposite numbers in Egypt and Syria." Hitti, op.cit., p. 711.
to that position. While still in Egypt, Sultan Selim had the Caliph, Al-Mutawakkil, banished to Constantinople. Through some obscure means the Sultan assumed for himself the title and position of Caliph with all of its sacred symbols of office. 42

Although the theory of the synonymous terms of Caliph-Imam or Caliph-Sultan for every righteous ruler had been accepted long before the obscure transfer of the Abbasside Caliphate to Selim, 43 its importance was later to increase, as the Sultan of the Ottoman Empire was to be held up as the Amir Al-Muminin and the only recognized Caliph of the Muslim world. This meant that the Arabs, in part, were again united as Muslims within a Muslim Empire and under a Muslim Caliph-Sultan. "The fact that the Ottoman Empire was 'Turkish' did not matter so much as the

42. "The popular account at the present day of the relations between the Sultan Selim and the Khalifah Mutawakkil is that the Caliph made a formal transfer of his office to the conqueror, and as a symbol of this transference handed over to him the sacred relics...but of the alleged transfer of the dignity of the Khalifat there is no contemporary evidence at all." Arnold, Sir Thomas W., The Caliphate, The Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1924, pp. 142-43.

fact that it was Muslim."

Although this feeling of unity within the Dar Al-Islam existed generally among the people of the Asian section of the Ottoman Empire, there were still brief periods of disunity of various political areas of the Arab world. This was brought about for the most part by ambitious Emirs and local feudal lords as the majority of the people themselves were aloof from the ruling class. However, in certain instances, particularly in the far reaches of the Empire, complete disunity and independence were attained.

Local independence for all of the Arab lands, insofar as possible, was the order of the Empire. As Gibb and Bowen pointed out in their survey, "The aims of Sultans Selim and Solyman in the organization of their Arab provinces were to maintain them in the condition in which they were taken over and to preserve the supremacy of the Ottoman Sultanate...The keynote of the Ottoman administration was conservatism, and all the institutions of the government were directed to the maintenance of the status quo." The Ottoman system was more towards lack of rule rather than overrule. There was no attempt made to Ottomanize the Arab

44. "The Turks and the vast majority of the Arabs were members of one great Muslim Community united by their faith and their allegiance to a Muslim sovereign... Moreover, in the minds of the European writers on the Ottoman Empire, the word Turk included all the Muslim inhabitants of that Empire regardless of their race or nationality. The word 'Arab' was specifically reserved for Bedouins and the nomads of the desert." Zeine, op.cit., pp. 15-16.

lands and the Arabs maintained their own language and customs. But this system had its drawbacks, for as early as 1850 Algeria had become almost independent of Ottoman control, and by 1705 Tunisia had thrown off Ottoman domination.

Dr. Fayez Sayegh states in his book Arab Unity, "There had been, indeed, brief and sporadic moments of independence in one Arab part of the Ottoman Empire or another. But they were neither sustained nor extensive; and were achieved as a rule, by ambitious vassals acting under the impulse of personal lust for power, not by national uprisings emanating from the people." If Dr. Sayegh meant by this that these movements were not made in the name of Arabs against Turks, then he is correct, for, as has been shown above, there was very little feeling of racial consciousness. However, in many cases, there was no small support by the people for movements towards independence from Ottoman rule. Especially was this true among the nomadic and semi-nomadic tribes, who were the Arabs at the time, and who never did quite accept Ottoman rule. The Turkmens in Northern Syria, the Kurds in Mesopotamia and Iraq, the Berbers in North Africa and the Bedouins throughout the Arab lands and in Egypt were continuously rebellious towards the local Turkish

governors. There was no idea of unity of Arabs at this time. It was merely the traits of individuality and desire for independence, which characterize the Bedouins, coming to the fore.

In Iraq an independent Mamluk dynasty sprang up in the first part of the eighteenth century, "whose all but independent rule lasted till 1831." In Northern Palestine the government of Zahir Al-Omar was independent of Ottoman rule for almost thirty years. He was succeeded by Anmad Jazzar who eventually became Pasha of Sidon and Damascus, where he conducted an independent reign of terror until 1804. However, it cannot be said that the reign of the latter was supported by the people as there was great rejoicing in Damascus when it ended for the first time in 1795. Nevertheless, he lived to be appointed twice again as Pasha of this same area.

In Egypt the authority of the Mamluks came to rival that of the Pashas appointed by the Porte. They even had the right of deposing the Pashas without consulting the Porte. The lack of rigid control from Constantinople for almost two centuries had resulted in the Egyptians' consciousness of their own individuality. Gibb and Bowen point out that

47. "But the absence of a definite policy towards the Kurds and nomad Arabs, or rather the policy of laissez-faire alternating with the savage repression, was to prove one of the cardinal weaknesses of Ottoman rule in Arab Asia," Gibb and Bowen, op.cit., pp. 204-05.


49. Al-Jazzar means "The Butcher".
"They were collectively known as 'Misrliya,' 'Egyptians,' and Cabarti in many passages shows that they were sharply distinguished from 'Ottomans, Turks, and strangers from Syria and Aleppo.' 50

In spite of these instances and rebellious forces, Ottoman authority had remained supreme over the heart of the Arab world. There was unity, but even at this early date, it was a sort of a Pan-Islamic unity, rather than an Arab unity or even a Turkish unity. 51 Practically without notice, however, a force was building up in the desert of Arabia which had the ability to greatly affect not only this Islamic unity, but also the political unity, of the Empire.

B. The Effect of Wahhabism on Political Unity

The influence of the Ottoman Empire had never reached the heart of Arabia nor the shores of the Persian Gulf. The struggles of the various Lords of the Desert were of little consequence to the unity of the remainder of the Arab world within the Dar al-Islam under its Turkish Caliph-Sultan. In the middle of the eighteenth century a religious teacher by the name of Mohammad ibn Abdul Wahhab had set out on


51. "The psychological basis of Pan Islamism was already present in the universal reverence for the Sultan as the representative and defender of the Sunni faith against the infidels of Europe and the heretics of Persia." Ibid, p. 233. And Dr. Zeine says: "...the most important factor which bound the Arabs to the Turks and made the former acquiesce in the rule of their nationally alien masters, was Islam." Zeine, op.cit., p. 15.
his mission of the revival of Islam. Due to the austerity of his teachings he had not been accepted by the people of Nejd until he had finally taken refuge with the Lord of Dar'iya, Mohammad ibn Saud. With ibn Saud as the Imam of the revived religion and ibn Abdul Wahhab as the Shaikh al-Islam, and a promise between the two to wage war in God's cause and to bring all of the rest of the world to practice the religion as they advocated, Wahhabism soon became a power to be reckoned with by all rulers with whom it came into contact. The real effect of Wahhabism upon the political unity of the Empire did not occur until the beginning of the nineteenth century. It was directed against the Ottoman Sultan and Turkish domination of the Dar al-Islam because of its religious laxity and its acceptance of Western ideas. 52 Wahhabism tore at the heart of the Empire as well as at the heart of Islam when it advanced not only to the holy cities of Iraq, but also to the capture and control of the cities of Mecca and Medina.

The Wahhabi movement was not a national movement. It was a religious movement. Its aim was not directed towards the political unity, although it did have an effect upon it, but rather it was directed towards the Islamic unity under the Ottoman Caliph-Sultan and his corrupt Islamic Empire. Dr. Nuseibeh called it "the first throb of life of modern Islam" to which could be traced all of the great modern Islamic movements, such as the Senusi movement of Libya, the Pan-Islamic

52. Zeine, op.cit., p. 37.
Movement, and others. 53

Its importance to this survey of Arab unity is in the fact that it was the first concerted move of any importance made by Arabs to separate parts of the Arab world from Turkish domination in an effort to restore Arab-Islamic sovereignty.

C. Western Intervention and the Emergence of Egypt

While the Wahhabi threat towards the unity of the Arab world within the Islamic Ottoman Empire was looming from within, another new and different threat appeared from without. This latter threat was the beginning of a force which was to have a far reaching effect upon the lives and thought of the people within the Arab world and upon its political unity.

Out of the West came Napoleon. In an attempt to strike at England by attacking its trade routes to India, Napoleon landed in Egypt in 1798. In addition to his "Army of England" which was superbly staffed by a number of generals of great renown, Napoleon carried with him an entourage of chemists, mathematicians, engineers, geologists, architects, surveyors, archaeologists, arabists, librarians, and historians. He also had a number of printers and a press. Egypt was to be Westernized under French rule.

Napoleon's attack on Egypt was propagandized as an attack upon England, and an aid to the Turkish Empire in ridding the country of

Mamluk rule, but to Sultan Selim the attack was "both insulting and
damaging." He soon declared war on France and with the British,
defeated Napoleon's forces in Syria. Napoleon left the Arab world, but
his influence and the influence of the West remained and increased.

Along with the force sent by the Ottoman Sultan Selim to drive
the French from Egypt was a young ambitious Albanian officer by the name
of Mohammad Ali. By 1805 this brilliant leader had gained the support
of the Shaikhs of Cairo and was appointed by the Ottoman Sultan as Pasha
of Egypt. Seizing the opportunity of the influx of Western ideas,
social, cultural, economic and military, Mohammad Ali immediately began
to modernize "his" country. He hired French advisers of all types to
reorganize his army and navy and to initiate economic reconstruction,
both agricultural and industrial.

In 1811, at the request of the Ottoman Sultan, his Egyptian army
set out on a seven year campaign in Arabia, which finally lead to the
temporary settlement of the Wahhabi threat to the unity of the Empire.
Later in 1822 Mohammad Ali added the Sudan to his territory.

The zeal and ambition of Mohammad Ali was destined to make Egypt
the second force from within which would effect the political unity of
the Arab world with the Ottoman Empire. After halting the forces of

54. Marriott, Sir John A.R., The Eastern Question,

55. The first force was the House of Ibn Saud in the
name of Wahhabism.
Wahhabism, Mohammad Ali was later called upon to aid the Sultan in quelling the rebellion of the Greeks. In recompense for his services the Sultan had promised to him control of certain areas of the Empire. When he was denied these areas, and was given only the island of Crete, Mohammad Ali attacked at the heart of the Arab world overrunning Palestine and Syria and adding these countries to his Arab empire. He placed his son, Ibrahim Pasha, in control of this area which extended as far north as Adana, Turkey.

It was obvious that the ambitious Pasha of Egypt was determined to add to his control as much of the Turkish Empire as he could take from his Sultan, even to the point of becoming Sultan of the Ottoman Empire if that were possible. But the European Powers in concert, and particularly Lord Palmerston, the British Foreign Secretary, were equally determined that the Empire should not be divided at this time. Mohammad Ali was forced to give up his claim to Arab lands by an official protocol in March, 1841, but he was restored as Pasha of Egypt with a hereditary rule under the suzerainty of the Ottoman Sultan.

Thus, for almost ten years, Syria and Egypt, to include Mecca

56. "Mohammad Ali's cooperation in quelling the Greek insurrection was to have been repaid by control not only of Crete but also of the Peloponnesus." Lenczowski, George, The Middle East in World Affairs, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, N.Y., 1956, p. 16... "Mohammad Ali only consented to lend his army and fleet on the express promise that the Pashalics of Syria, Damascus, Tripoli (in Asia) and Crete would be given to him..." Eversley, op. cit., p. 281.
and Medina, were in political unity as an Arab world under Egyptian rule. Antonius has called this unity "A False Start." In discussing Mohammad Ali and his son, Ibrahim Pasha, Antonius insinuates that they were the architects of a new Arab Empire when he writes "Their driving motive was personal ambition, and their desire to revive the Arab Empire sprang primarily from their desire to acquire an empire." There is no historical proof that Mohammad Ali had any desire to "revive the Arab Empire," nor that he had any "nationalist" feeling towards the Arabs as a race or a nation. Mohammad Ali was an ambitious empire builder but whether that empire be Egyptian, Arab, or even Turkish was of no consequence to him. His personal ambitions seemed to have been to establish an hereditary empire which he could pass on in his name to his children and their descendants.

On the other hand, the Arab people, at this time, had no active nationalist desires to establish an Arab sovereignty over the Arab world. Again quoting Antonius, he writes, "Thus the ambitious plans of an Arab Empire, conceived by Mohammad Ali and nurtured by Ibrahim, failed to find in Syria the sustenance it needed and was more easily stifled by England's hostility. Its great weakness was that it was formed out of time, in advance of the birth of Arab nationalist consciousness." Firstly, as mentioned above, Mohammad Ali had conceived of no plan to form an "Arab Empire" as distinct from any other type of

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57. Antonius, *op.cit.*, p. 27.

empire. If he had any conception of a title for his empire, it would have most likely been an "Egyptian Empire."

Secondly, it was not formed in advance of the birth of Arab national consciousness, but only during a stage of its dormancy. The origin of Arab national consciousness is deeply rooted in Arab history, and was born centuries before the time of Mohammad Ali. But it had given way to the Islamic Idea. The Arab world had been in unity with the only recognized Muslim Empire of the time. The Egyptians were merely usurpers of that Muslim power. As for the people of the other religions of Syria, it would have been merely a case of turning from one Muslim rule to another.

Although Arab national consciousness was present, but dormant, the desire for Arab sovereignty within a union of Arab States had not been generated at this time. Or to state it another way for the purpose of this survey, the birth of the idea of Arab unity had not taken place.

Rather than bringing unity of the Arab world closer to realization, the outcome of Mohammad Ali's adventure was to increase the distinction and disunity between the Asian Arab countries and the North African Arab countries in general, and Egypt in particular. Egypt had

59. "Although the structural requisites of an Arab nationality were present in adequate measure, Arab nationalism as an ideological system had no solid background in the historical consciousness of the people... Arab national consciousness played a decisive role in the founding of the first Arab Empire. But it was a nationalism based largely, if not wholly, upon consciousness of race." Nuseibeh, op.cit., p. 43.
gained recognition as a nation-state, separate and apart from the Arab countries, and she retained this separate distinction up until the 1940's and the establishment of the League of Arab States.

It was not until the turn of the century that the Asian Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire, especially in the Levant, began to conceive the idea of Arab nationalism. To a very large extent this conception was produced by the Westernization process which this area was experiencing and had been experiencing for quite some time. It was the first active intercourse with the West, which was of any consequence, since the Crusades. It was the introduction of a period of modernism in social, political and economic forces after three hundred years of decadence and darkness under Ottoman rule.

D. Westernization

Westernization influences have been at work within the Arab world since time immemorial. During the pre-Islamic period it was primarily the Greek, the Roman and the Byzantine empires who were continuously overflowing into the East. Predominantly the reasons were commercial but other occasions were mere cases of expansion. In each instance Western thought and knowledge had a great effect upon the East. The East, for example, accepted much of the Greek philosophy which was introduced during the period of empire-building by the Macedonians, but the Greeks "did not succeed in giving the East the Greek concept of
citizenship and liberty."  

Later came the Romans and the Byzantines who left traces of their culture throughout the Arab world. The coastal areas of the Levant, Syria, Lebanon and Palestine, as well as Egypt received the Westerners to a much greater extent than the interior.

The same was true in the case of the Crusaders, when again primarily the coastal areas were affected by the Western innovations. But the direct effect upon the West as a result of the Crusades, was probably more important, for the purposes of this paper, than that upon the East, for the Crusades had stirred up nationalistic feelings among the peoples of the Western countries and they ended in an economic revolution that heralded and financed the Renaissance.

It was not until the nineteenth century that the West effected a political penetration into the Arab East. Napoleon's invasion into Egypt and Syria constituted the first important penetration and in 1882, almost a century later, Great Britain occupied Egypt.


61. Ibid, p. 60 "Among the peoples of Christendom national jealousies had been increased and national differences brought into prominence by association in a common enterprise...the crusades had begun as a bond of religious and Christian union...but as they proceeded they developed into an important factor in the awakening of the nationalism of the Western peoples."

But more important to the idea of Arab unity was the penetration of Western principles and ideas into the Arab world. This was the period of "Tanzimat" and a period of reforms and attempted reforms within the Ottoman Empire. The period of the Tanzimat is not a period which can be definitely described as beginning in a certain year and ending abruptly in another. Throughout the long existence of the Ottoman Empire there were a number of Sultans as well as Grand Viziers who attempted to initiate various reforms within the Empire. In the forefront are such men as Sultan Mustapha II (1695-1703) and a line of Grand Viziers before and during his time from the one family of Küprülü. Still later there was Sultan Mahmud II, (1808-1839) who has been criticized for his military failures, but praised for his reforms. The real period of the Tanzimat, however, was that period in which the three important documents of reform were issued between 1839 and 1876. These were the Hatti Sharif of Gulhanə of November 3, 1839, the Hatti Humayum of February 18, 1856, and the Hatti Humayum of September 10, 1876.63 The latter document is more commonly known as the Constitution of Midhat Pasha.

63. Hatti is the Turkish word for Khaṭṭ meaning a writing. Shirif means honorable. Gul means roses and hani means house. The Gulhanə, (house of roses) was a section of the Seraglio in Constantinople. Therefore this was the Honorable Writing of Gulhanə. On the other hand, Humayum means humane and Hatti Humayum means the Humane Writing. This and the above information has been taken from Zeine, Zeine N., Lecture Regarding the Tanzimat Period, delivered at American University of Beirut, April 2, 1956.
The reformers were Turks and Arabs who saw the need and who worked untiringly for modernization of the machinery of government and institutions within the decadent empire. In the background, however, were the Western Powers.

Most of the reformers had been exposed to the West and to Western ideas, either through travel, association, or education. They had been impressed by the European principles of equality, fraternity and liberty which had caused the French Revolution. They strived to initiate these principles into the Ottoman Empire by advocating a Western democratic form of government. None desired to do away with the Monarchy, but they did desire to limit the absolute power of the Sultan and to establish a constitutional type of monarchy which was limited as in Britain.

It should not be understood from the above that there was a great change in the feelings of the people and that widespread public opinion clamored for constitutional government, independence and freedom, for this was certainly not the case. These reforms were heralded by only an educated few and their attempts ended in practically total failure. As for the majority of the people in the Arab provinces and throughout the empire, they were completely indifferent concerning the question of a constitution.

Westernization in the Levant, and particularly in Lebanon, was much more intensive than in any of the other Arab provinces. Western
missionaries had been active in Lebanon for almost two centuries, but during the nineteenth century their activities increased sizeably. These missionaries introduced a printing press as well as schools and text books, and they fostered the rehabilitation of the Arabic language.

But even here, it must be remembered that the activities of the missionaries influenced primarily the Christians, and the majority of the Muslims were not directly affected by this form of Westernization.

The importance of all these factors of Westernization, however, is that they were the beginning of influences which were later to have a great bearing upon the dissatisfaction of the people of the Arab provinces with the archaic and despotic rule of the Ottoman Empire. This dissatisfaction eventually led to a rise in Arab nationalism and the call for Arab unity. But first the Arab world and the entire Ottoman Empire were to experience a period in which another type of unity was to be heralded throughout the Muslim world. This was Islamic unity and the idea of Pan-Islamism.

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64. The Jesuits' connection with Syria dates from 1625. However, in 1773 their order was suppressed in that area and they did not return until 1831. The first Americans had come in 1820. Antonius, *op. cit.*, pp. 35-36.
PART TWO: THE ARAB IDEA

CHAPTER IV

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PAN-ISLAMISM AND PAN-ARBABISM

A. The Call for Unity By the Beirut Secret Society

The last quarter of the nineteenth century was a period of extreme change in the life and thought of not only the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire, but of the entire Muslim world. The Western powers were beginning to exert their influence and pressure upon the area in general and the Ottoman Empire in particular. Sultan 'Abdul 'Aziz, (1861-1876) was deposed for reasons of incompetency in May 1876, in favor of his nephew who was an incurable epileptic. Finally on August 31, 1876, 'Abdul Hamid II was proclaimed Sultan, marking the beginning of the despotic Hamidian Period of the Ottoman Empire (1876-1909).

The influx of Western ideas, influences, and institutions into the Eastern world prior to and during this period had presented a situation which the Muslim world was unable to ignore. This challenge was met by a call for unification of the Muslims as a defensive measure against the Christian West. The unification desired, however, remained within the framework of Islam and in the form of Pan-Islamism\(^\text{65}\) as a

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manifestation of Muslim nationalism. As Dr. Zeine states "The Muslim's answer was to try to strengthen the influence of Islam both as a means of progress and as a defensive mechanism against the West." 

The nationalist idea as thought of in the modern concept of Arab nationalism was still non-existent. However, it was during this period, according to the story of Arab nationalism as related by George Antonius, that a small group of Christians initiated the idea of Arab nationalism and Arab unity.

In 1875 a group of five young men, who had attended the Syrian Protestant College in Beirut, Lebanon, formed what has been referred to as the Beirut Secret Society. During the course of time the size of the society increased from five to twenty-two persons, as not only other Christians, but also Muslims and Druzes were recruited into the society.

66. Dr. Nuseibeh writes "it was as plausible, therefore to resuscitate a 'Muslim Nationalism' as an Arab one. In the consciousness of the people the Ottoman Empire was a continuation of general Islamic history and not an unfortunate interruption of the Arabs' history...Hence the appeal of the Pan-Islamic movement..." Nuseibeh, op.cit., p. 44.

67. Zeine, op.cit., p. 56; Dr. Zeine continues "They had no thought of either destroying Ottoman sovereignty or seceding from the Ottoman Empire. All that they asked for were political and economic reforms so that they might progress and place themselves on an equal footing with the Westerners. On the other hand, the vast mass of the illiterate, the peasants and the poor continued to live their lives undisturbed by the new forces of enlightenment."

to carry on its revolutionary aims of inciting the Arab population to rise in rebellion and overthrow the evil Turkish rule. The first point of its program was "the grant of independence to Syria in union with the Lebanon." 69

In referring to this first plank of the society's program Antonius writes, "here...is the root of the idea of Arab unity, which spreading out from Syria, has embraced the whole of the Arab Nationalist world and taken a place in the forefront of Arab aspirations. It was in pursuit of that idea as it bore on the problem of Syria that the authors of the programme of 1880 adopted, for the first time on record, the plank of an independent state embodying the national (as against the sectarian) concept of a political entity." 70

The importance of the activities of the Beirut Secret Society has been questioned in recent years by historians who claim that Antonius' account is exaggerated and unsupported by any serious historical evidence. Dr. Zeine, after discussing the importance of the activities of the Beirut Secret Society with Dr. Faris Nimr, the only surviving member of the "young conspirators" writes, "Two assertions, are, however, unsupported by any serious historical evidence, namely: (a) that a small group of 'enlightened elite', through their secret society in Beirut, spread the seeds of Arab nationalism, and (b) that

69. Ibid, p. 84.

70. Ibid, p. 87.
"the first organized effort in the Arab national movement can be traced back to the activities of that group."71

Also concerning the Beirut Secret Society, Dr. George Kirk writes "George Antonius, who alone records this first incident in the history of Syrian nationalism, has been at some pains to demonstrate... that the appeal of this 'enlightened elite' to Arab national sentiment had a widespread effect... his patriotism seems to have led him to exaggerate the influence of these pioneers..."72

The truth was that in spite of the introduction of Western and European secular political thought into the Arab world prior to and during the nineteenth century, the secular idea of nationalism and unity outside of the primary Muslim State of the world, the Ottoman Empire, did not occur to the people of the Arab world as a desirable form of government. In speaking of this period, the latter part of the nineteenth century, Dr. Nuseibeh writes, "...the idea of a united Islamic state was still the axis around which the movement rotated, and the religious impulse still predominated over the national."73 Except for this insignificant movement referred to by Antonius, Arab nationalism and Arab unity, as opposed to Islamic nationalism and Islamic unity, was

71. Zeine, op. cit., p. 56.
unheard of in Syria during the nineteenth century.74

B. Al-Kawakibi's Idea of Islamic Unity

Although the movement was Islamic, the emphasis was toward the Arab-Islamic reaction. The first manifestation of the Arab character to this religious reform movement was in the person of Abdur-Rahman al-Kawakibi, a Syrian who was born in Aleppo in 1849 and who was educated in the leading Muslim college of that city, "in the unscientific but profoundly humanistic tradition which prevailed at the time."75 He was the first writer and thinker of the time to throw suspicion on the right of the Ottoman Turks to the Caliphate, "a matter which had been taken for granted for nearly four centuries."76 Like other writers and reformists of his time, al-Kawakibi preached that the revival of the Muslim world was to be found in the unity of the Islamic countries, but he differed from his contemporaries in that he "drew a sharp distinction between the Arab and the non-Arab peoples."77 He advocated the

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74. "For the next twenty-five years (after the Beirut Secret Society) Arab Nationalist activity was conducted in the main from the safe remoteness of Cairo and Paris. In Syria...the movement lay prone as though in sleep, held down by 'Abdul Hamid's tyranny, and drugged by the opiates of his pan-Islamic policy." Kirk, op.cit., p. 105.

75. Antonius, op.cit., pp. 95-98.


77. Antonius, op.cit., p. 97.
education of the masses and the return of Arab-Muslim sovereignty over a 
united Islamic world with the transfer of the caliphate to an Arab and 
its return to Mecca as its capital. 78

Al-Kawakibi's call for a distinction of Arab Muslims from all 
other Muslims of the Islamic community was certainly the first signifi-
cant sign since the Umayyad Caliphate of an Arab national consciousness 
existing within the framework of Islam. Al-Kawakibi entertained no 
thoughts of secular nationalistic division of the Muslim world, however 
his desire to unite all the Arabs first and then all Muslims was an 
attempt "to free himself more than any of his Arab co-religionists from 
the power of religious loyalties." 79 Yet he hesitated to go further 
than advocate more than the substitution of an Arab Caliphate for an 
Ottoman Caliphate. Concerning this departure from the traditional con-
cept of Islamic union, Dr. Saab writes "This might have been for al-
Kawakibi's time, and in his circumstances, one of the boldest steps in 
his daring program for religious and political reform. However it is 
symptomatic of the neo-religious character of at least one current, the 
predominant Islamic current of Arab nationalism as (was seen) again with

78. Ibid., "Two requisites seemed to him of fundamental 
importance: one was that a serious and organized 
effort be made to combat the obscurantism of the 
theologians and the ignorance of the masses; the 
other that the function of the Arabs in the des-
tinies of Islam be restored to its proper place."

the Federalists of al-Ahd. 80

C. **Egyptian Nationalism**

In contrast to this religious revival and Pan-Islamic movement was the first outbreak of Eastern nationalism, which occurred in the 1880's. But it proved to be entirely an Egyptian nationalist movement rather than an Arab nationalist movement. The reasons for this nationalistic feeling among Egyptians were as wide and varied as were the motives for which the people of various walks of life united themselves into the common front which finally led to rebellion against the existing regime.

There was dissatisfaction with the Dual Control of the government exercised by Great Britain and France, which had been initiated as a result of the bankruptcy of the country, as well as dissatisfaction with the reforms of Prime Minister Riyad Pasha. The immediate cause for the rebellion which ensued from this burst of nationalism was found in the Egyptian Army. The majority of the senior officers of the army for many years had been Circassians. The junior Egyptian Army officers, led by Colonel 'Arrabi, were jealous of this fact and felt that they were

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80. *Ibid*, pp. 205-06. Al-Ahd (the Covenant) was an Arab secret society formed in 1914 by then Major 'Aziz 'Ali al-Masri. Its members were all Arab officers in the Ottoman Army. Its primary aim was the establishment of a dual monarchy of Turks and Arabs using the Austro-Hungarian federal pattern as its basis. See also Antonius, *op. cit.*, pp. 118-21.
"more deserving than (the Circassians) of higher positions." They soon mustered the bulk of the dissatisfied elements, and together they formed the common front against the regime of the Khedive and the British. Through a bloodless rebellion at Abdin Palace, on September 9, 1881, Colonel 'Arrabi forced the Khedive to dismiss his cabinet and to initiate reforms, the most important of which was the acceptance of a parliamentary government.

Mohammad 'Abduh, one of the leading Egyptian thinkers of the time, who as Chief of the Department of Publications supported Riyad Pasha, was not in agreement with 'Arrabi as a leader of such an important movement. He once said "As for 'Arrabi, it had occurred to him neither to reform the government nor to change its head. Such matters were above his powers of imagination. All his thoughts and his only dominant motives, were fear for his position, a violent hate of his Circassian colleagues, and his detestation of 'Uthman Pasha (the Minister of War)." Mohammad 'Abduh desired governmental reforms also, but he advocated a slower process of education and training of the Egyptians in order to prepare them for parliamentary government, whereas the 'Arrabi party, made up of such a conglomeration of Egyptians from all

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walks of life, desired immediate reforms toward a parliamentary government in an effort to build an Egypt for the Egyptians.

But when it became clear that England intended to destroy the Egyptian nationalist movement, not only Mohammad 'Abduh, but the whole Egyptian nation accepted the movement and patriotically followed the "'Arrabi" cause. This course of action eventually led to the short conflict between 'Arrabi's army and the British navy at Alexandria on July 11, 1882, and the subsequent occupation of Egypt by Great Britain.

As was stated in the beginning, the 'Arrabi affair was an outburst of purely Egyptian nationalism backed by the idea of "Egypt for the Egyptians" rather than the idea of "the Arab world for the Arabs." The idea of unity was not prevalent in any sense.

D. Jamal ad-Din Advocates Pan-Islamic Unity

Although the idea of Islamic unity was characteristic of the Hamidian period, and its emphasis was towards Arab-Islamic reaction, it did not usually take the form of Arab Islamic unity, as opposed to the call for unity of the entire Islamic world. The rivalry among the Western powers had affected much of the Muslim world. Great Britain was active in India, Egypt and the Persian Gulf areas. Russia was also vying for her share in the Middle East. France had taken her prizes of Algeria and Tunisia in North Africa, and Germany had made her economic overtures into the area through the Ottoman Empire. It was not surprising then that one of the most influential figures in the Pan-Islamic movement
and the campaign against the West should be a most brilliant and capable student, teacher and politician, born in Afghanistan in 1839 and educated in Persia. His name was Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani. After being forced to leave Afghanistan in 1869, due to political reasons, Jamal eventually arrived in Egypt, where he began to teach and write concerning his anti-British beliefs and the dangers of foreign intervention and control. He gained a large following in the fertile ground of Egypt, but because of his radical views he was forced to leave the country in 1879, finally taking up residence in Paris, where he could continue his anti-British propaganda. In 1884 he was joined by one of his former Egyptian pupils, Mohammad 'Abduh, "one of the leading spirits of the 'Arrabi movement," and together they began the publication of the journal al-'Urwah al-Wuthqa (The Indissoluble Bond) "with the object of arousing the Muslim people to the need of uniting their forces against Western aggression and exploitation." Only eighteen numbers of this journal were published, but they were secretly distributed throughout the Muslim world. In spite of the comparatively short existence of this publication, from March 13 to October 16, 1884, it was extremely effective in accomplishing its aim within the Islamic world. Muhammad Rashid Rida, a disciple and biographer of both Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani and


Mohammad 'Abduh, and editor of the monthly Arabic review, al-Manar, was of the opinion that "had the paper continued it would have occasioned a general Muslim uprising."85

The principal ideas expounded in al-'Urwah al-Wuthqa were those of Jamal ad-Din for which he worked untiringly and for which he exerted a ceaseless agitation. The uppermost of these aims was the "accomplishment of the unification of all Muslim peoples under one Islamic government over which one supreme Caliph should bear undisputed rule, as in the glorious days of Islam."86 At the time of the publication of the journal there was no one particular Muslim power advocated by Jamal which should become a center for all nations and the possessor of the Caliphate. At various times in his life he advocated first Egypt, then Mohammad Ahmad al-Mahdi of Sudan, later Persia and finally the Ottoman Empire. The naming of a particular country or a particular ruler as protector of the Faithful was somewhat inconsistent with his contention that the religion of Islam is the one bond which unites Muslims of all countries and obliterates all race, distinction, nationality and

85. Ibid, see footnote, p. 45; Rida, Muhammad Rashid, Al-Manar, Cairo, 1907, p. 455, "The paper was the organ of a secret organization bearing the same name, founded by Jamal ad-Din, composed of Muslims of India, Egypt, North Africa, and Syria, the purpose of which was to unite Muslims and arouse them from their sleep and acquaint them with the dangers threatening them and guide them to the way of meeting these dangers."

competition within the body of Islam. According to Jamal ad-Din, any Muslim ruler who exhibited his devotion to the Shari'ah; showed his contempt for lust of luxuries, titles and honors; and resisted the encroachment and expansion of the Western powers towards mastery of the Muslim lands and people, could win distinction and gain great influence in the Muslim world. He chided the rulers of Islamic countries for giving a freehand to the foreigners in the affairs of their states which allowed the Europeans to enter the Muslim world and destroy their religious unity, when rightfully, they should have resisted such advances and should have concentrated upon strengthening the bonds of unity by making the mosques and schools centers for the creation of a spirit of unity.

To further define his views on unity, Jamal wrote, "I do not... (say)...that the supreme ruler over all should be one person, for this perhaps would be difficult; but I do urge that the supreme authority over all should be the Qur'an, and the aspect in which they are united should be their religion, and that every ruler, each in his own state put forth every effort for the protection of others as far as possible."

From this it would seem that the type of unity desired was a form of religious confederation with each state having its own head, but

87. Adams, op. cit., pp. 50-60.
88. Ibid, p. 60.
89. Ibid; Rida, Muhammad Rashid, Tarikh, Cairo, 1931, Vol. II, p. 284.
all under the authority and protection of the Caliphate and the Shari'ah. Later Mohammad 'Abduh insisted upon the duty of all Muslims to support the Ottoman Caliphate as the protector and defender of Islam.

Jamal had also advocated the Ottoman Caliphate as the central head of this unity, but he and 'Abdul Hamid disagreed on constitutionalism. In his later years Jamal was more in favor of a federation with the transforming of the Ottoman Empire into a "Kingdom of Kingdoms" but this was unacceptable to Sultan 'Abdul Hamid.

E. The Political Pan-Islamism of 'Abdul Hamid

The Ottoman Empire was experiencing the lion's share of the impact of the West but was hardly capable of "vindicating the integrity and independence of the Islamic World as a whole." Nevertheless Sultan 'Abdul Hamid did accept the Pan-Islamic idea of unification from Jamal ad-Din and utilized it generously as a political measure in an attempt to save his sinking Empire.

'Abdul Hamid had come to the throne in 1876 at the instigation of a group of young constitutional reformists led by Midhat Pasha, whom the Sultan selected as his Grand Vizir, and whose constitution he inaugurated almost immediately, not only as an act of demonstrating his faith in those who had placed him in power, but also to appease the Western nations who were clamoring for reform within the Empire.

To Midhat Pasha and his group the "constitution was a threefold necessity—it would provide unity among the subjects of various races and creeds, create more harmony between the provinces and the central administration and...by forming a free united conscious public opinion, would put an end to the interference of foreign powers in the domestic affairs of the Empire." 91 Although 'Abdul Hamid was desirous of political unity, he was not desirous of limiting his authority for the sake of achieving that unity. Also he "no doubt realized that it was not possible to conduct the policy of his multi-national and theocratic Empire in accordance with nationalist principles and constitutional methods of government." 92 When the first opportunity presented itself, the Sultan dismissed the Parliament and revoked the constitution. In its stead he embarked upon a rigorous policy of Pan-Islamism.

It has been said that while Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani was the spiritual father of Pan-Islamism, 'Abdul Hamid was its political father. 93 Through the idea of Pan-Islamism, the Sultan intended to revive the position and integrity of the Caliphate in an effort to rally all Muslims to unity in its defense against outside influences. In referring to this move, George Antonius writes "His assumption of the role of pious Caliph would earn him not only the more willing allegiance of millions of his own subjects, but the reverence as well, and perhaps

91. Saab, op. cit., p. 185.
a good deal more than the mere reverence of many more millions of Muslims outside his empire...He aspired to become the head of Islam, in influence as well as in name."

'Abdul Hamid placed particular attention upon the Arab provinces and upon uniting them among themselves and especially with the Ottoman Empire. He saw the need for interesting the peoples of the Arab provinces in religious unity as a defense against the influences of the West within them.

F. Pan-Islamism Revived the Idea of Unity

Pan-Islamism, *per se*, as a movement and as a vehicle toward unity of the whole or of any part of the Islamic world in the nineteenth century, ended in complete failure. In discussing this future, Toynbee contributes it to two main reasons. First is the fact that all but a few fragments of the core of the Islamic world had succeeded in


95. "The resourceful Sultan, indeed, besides encouraging the revival of Muslim sentiment by such measures as the construction of the Hijaz Railway to Medina, had systematically bestowed benefactions on Arab learned institutions, had spent large sums on the Muslim Holy Cities, had employed large numbers of Arabs in his personal service, and had had an Arab battalion in his royal Guards. In these ways, and through his far-reaching spy-system, the incipient growth of political thought among his Arab subjects was diverted from a nationalist direction into the safer channel of Pan-Islam." Kirk, *op. cit.*, p. 105.

remaining independent of French, British, and Russian control, and this took the edge off of the appeal of Islamic solidarity. In spite of Western influences and penetration in many sections of the Muslim world, there were a large number of nations and peoples who retained their independence and were not adversely affected by the West. For this and other reasons, the mass of the people were indifferent to not only nationalism but also to Pan-Islamism. Secondly, Toynbee feels that when 'Abdul Hamid tried to translate Jamal ad-Din's ideas into practice he largely stultified the reformer's intentions by seeking in Pan-Islamism a political prop for the declining strength of Turkey rather than attempting to use Turkey's residual strength as a pillar for the support of Pan-Islamism.  

Hans Kohn agrees that Pan-Islamism as a movement failed in its immediate aims, but he feels that it did help to pave the way for nationalism. In speaking of 'Abdul Hamid's use of Pan-Islamism as a political weapon against the European powers, Kohn writes, "it was still more a tool used by 'Abdul Hamid in his effort to maintain the conditions of the past unchanged, and to prevent all innovations, particularly the infiltration of the modern European ideas of freedom, democracy, and nationalism. He felt the advance of the nationalist idea as a menace to the stability of his empire... But these efforts proved


fruitless. Pan-Islamism itself served to smooth the path of national consciousness and liberalism. It stimulated the realization that reforms were needed in order to give the Mohammedian peoples the strength to resist Europe."

For the purposes of this paper it is felt that the Pan-Islamic movement had a greater effect upon the idea of unity directly, than it had upon the idea of nationalism. As has been shown throughout this paper, the idea of Arab nationalism was nonexistent during the nineteenth century. Arab national consciousness, which is practically as old as the Arabs themselves, was present, but, for the most part, dormant. It did exert itself in fairly insignificant ways, as in the case of the Beirut Secret Society and in the feeling that the sovereignty of the Caliphate should be restored to the Arabs, as expressed in the writings of al-Kawakibi.

The idea of unity within the framework of Islam was something which not only the more fortunate educated Arab, but also the uneducated Arab could understand. The ideas of nationalism, on the other hand, were for the most part, ideas of the educated, enlightened, or traveled Arab. As for the masses, although they were cognizant of the despotism of the Hamidian rule, they were left "torn between loyalty to

99. Ibid.

100. "(The) crisis of consciousness, (whether Arab consciousness, Muslim religious national consciousness or Christian secular consciousness), was in the second half of the Nineteenth Century still the crisis of a limited leading minority." Saab, *op.cit.*, p. 207.
the Muslim Sultan in Istanbul, which was revived by 'Abdul Hamid's Pan-Islamism, and local sectarian, tribal, economic, and provincial loyalties. ¹⁰¹

Therefore the idea of unity was revived in the latter part of the nineteenth century, whereas the idea of secular nationalism had not been born. Granted that the idea of unity was religious unity and granted that a religious nationalism did exist. During this period the idea of unity went through a process of analysis and reform. Even Jamal ad-Din was aware of the difficulties in the way of complete Islamic union. It was evident that while unity was being advocated throughout the Islamic world, actual political unity of the whole area was impossible so long as these countries were not independent from foreign rule and/or influences. Therefore the practical effect was a complete misfire of what was actually intended. This, according to Toynbee, was "the birth of a parochial movement in Persia, and thereby (the effect was the creation) of new, and perhaps insurmountable, obstacles to the political unification of the Islamic World."¹⁰²

It was the birth of such a parochial nationalism among the Turks themselves, which was to fain the national desires of the Arab world and result in an eventual call for Arab unity.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² Toynbee, op.cit., p. 694.
G. Pan-Turanianism and the Birth of Pan-Arabism

"In July of 1908 the Young Turk Revolution broke out like a crash of innocuous thunder." Thus begins Dr. Ramsaur in his book *The Young Turks* where he gives a detailed account of the actual overthrow of the government of 'Abdul Hamid by the reformers of the Ottoman Empire.

The history of the growth of the Young Turks and their Committee of Union and Progress is beyond the scope of this paper. However, certain policies which they adopted, particularly their policy of Pan-Turanianism, are indeed pertinent to this study, and must be analyzed briefly insofar as they affected the birth of Arab nationalism and especially the resultant call for Arab unity.

The Young Turk Revolution of July 1908 was a well-planned coup d'état by a group of reformers who had been active since the rule of 'Abdul 'Aziz in the 1860's, and who had "come to the conclusion that the Ottoman Empire was doomed to extinction if drastic steps were not taken to check the decay which had set in..." The several groups which were existent in Macedonia united in 1906 to form a Central Committee which met in Salonika. A similar committee was formed in Paris in 1907, and the two committees established as their aim the putting into


104. Ibid, p. 3.

effect of Midhat Pasha's 1876 constitution. These members finally
revolved into one leading group which took the name "Committee of Union
and Progress" or C.U.P. 106

Swiftly the C.U.P. gained support throughout the Empire, and
most important, it gained the backing of the Third Army Corps in Mace-
donia. Realizing their strength, 'Abdul Hamid yielded to their demands,
and on July 23, 1908, he proclaimed the reinauguration of the 1876 Con-
stitution. However, in April 1909 another revolution broke out. This
time 'Abdul Hamid was attempting to overthrow the C.U.P. and regain his
power. 107 His efforts failed and on April 27, 1909, 'Abdul Hamid was
deposed by order of the Parliament and with the confirmation of the
Sheikh al-Islam, at which time the C.U.P. was restored to full
authority. 108

In the beginning of the regime of the C.U.P. there was complete
compatibility between the Turks and the Arabs. Liberty and equality
prevailed throughout the Empire. Various Arab societies with quasi-
nationalist platforms were organized in Constantinople with branches
within the provinces.

The Young Turks continued, however, to give lip service to Pan-

106. Ibid, pp. 284-85, "By union, they meant that of all
races and of all creeds in the Empire...What they
wanted was to get rid of absolutism and to estab-
lish representative government which would provide
good government throughout the Empire."


108. Pears, op.cit., p. 320.
Islamism as they recognized it to be the unifying force within the Empire. In spite of this fact, the nationalist spirit began to appear among the Turks more prominently than in the outlying provinces, 110

109. "Between 1908 and 1911, the Young Turks believed that the Constitution could do away with Pan-Islamism... But the leaders of the revolution soon realized that the binding force of Pan-Islamism was much stronger than they had anticipated and it seems most certain that by the year 1911, the Committee of Union and Progress had definitely adopted the Pan-Islamic programme, in their foreign policy, at any rate." Zeine, op.cit., pp. 75-76.

110. "A movement of purely Turkish nationalism was beginning to assert itself. It had its roots in a new assertion of the Turanian origins of the Turkish people, which had given birth to the creed that the path to the regeneration of the Turkish race lay towards reunion with the kindred populations of Turanian descent, of whom the majority were under Russian rule... Turanianism, with its idea of exalting the Turkish nationality and stressing the affinity of the Turks in the Ottoman Empire with their racial brothers in Central Asia, was the negation of the doctrine of Ottomanism which aimed at uniting the different races of the empire into one nation on a basis of equality for all. The C.U.P. failed to see the incompatibility of the two policies... they only succeeded in alarming the other races, and more particularly the Arabs, into a belief that the Ottomanism which they were asked loyalty to accept was a sham, and that, if it meant anything, it could only mean that they would have to abandon their Arab cultural aspirations and allow themselves to be Turkified for the sake of unity." Antonius, op.cit., pp. 106-07. And Uriel Heyd comments, "The enthusiastic spirit of fraternity among all the communities, which prevailed in the first months after the revolution of the Young Turks, quickly cooled down. The desire for national independence had become so strong that mere promises of equal treatment by the rulers could no longer imbue the Christian and even the non-Turkish Muslim subjects of the Sultan with loyalty
until eventually an active policy of Pan-Turanianism, as opposed to the former policies of Pan-Islamism and Ottomanism, was not only adopted by the government of the Young Turks, but was also advocated by popular public opinion. It was in defense of this policy that the Arab idea was once again rejuvenated and the national feeling began to grow among the peoples of the Arab provinces.  

Dr. Hans Kohn writes, "Of a different nature than Pan-Turanianism was the Pan-Arab movement. Its first beginnings fall also in the period after 1908; in fact, it was a counter movement to the strong emphasis on Turkish and Turanian nationalism, destroying the unity of the Islamic world. Pan-Arabism wished to unite definitely the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire, the Fertile Crescent of Mesopotamia and Syria, which stretched from the Persian Gulf to the Suez Canal, and the nomad inhabitants of the Arab desert, of which only the fringes, especially Hijaz with the holy cities of Mecca and Medina, were under Ottoman control..."  

111. "Hence, when the Young Turks made the nationalist idea and their racial superiority the basis of a new Turkey, culturally and politically united and strong, the Arab leaders' reaction was to think precisely in the same terms about the future of the Arab lands." Zeine, op.cit., p. 80.

Thus the particularist national movements were beginning to assert themselves in the Islamic world by such feelings as "Turkey for the Turks," "Egypt for the Egyptians," and the "Arab world for the Arabs." The idea of total unity within Islam had begun to lose its magic effect. The feeling of Islamic unity was still predominant, but instead of the accepted meaning of unity of the whole, it had acquired the Western particularistic concept. In referring to this period, Dr. Saab writes, "Although Islam was more intense in its feeling of unity and more unified in its outlook than medieval Christianity, the challenge of European particularistic concepts was bound to effect increasingly and destructively Ottoman universalism."\(^{113}\)

This particularistic concept of unity adopted by the Arab world was definitely something new in Islam. It was new because of the fact that, in the beginning, all of the various nationalist parties were accepting, in theory, the Pan-Islamic idea insofar as it pertained to the unification of Muslims under one Caliph, and in this case, the Ottoman Caliph. However, the Pan-Islamic call for political unity, as such, had lost ground. Although the cognizance of the nationality had been prevalent for centuries in spite of the fact that one of the main concepts of Pan-Islamism was the lack of distinction of nationality or

\(^{113}\) Saab, _op. cit._, p. 95.
race within Islam, a new force had now entered the scene. This was
the rebirth of the Arab idea by a consciousness of Arab nationality as
advocated by the various secret societies which were formed to enhance
the political and cultural position of the Arabs. Yet it had not
completely divorced itself from the religion. It was not entirely a
secular nationalism. The majority of the Arabs was neither prepared for

114. In summing up the ideas of Pan-Islamism as advo-
cated by Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani, Adams begins with
"The religion of Islam is the one bond which unites
Muslims of all countries and obliterates all traces

115. "In fact the Arab idea, in spite of its deeply
rooted origins and its appearance in various ideolo-
gical, social and political forms during the
course of time, did not crystalize until just after
the proclamation of the Ottoman Constitution in
1908 with the advent of the Turanian movement and
its activity through the hands of the Committee of
Union and Progress. The Arab idea sprang primarily
as a reaction to the Turanian movement, which tried
to fuse all of the racial groups of the Ottoman
state in the crucible of Turkification, and to a
lesser extent by the adoption of the national con-
cept and the withholding of Arab confidence from
the Islamic idea in the form its banner was raised
by the proponents of Pan-Islamism. Secret
societies arose igniting the Arab spirit and
calling for an Arab renaissance which would restore
the past glory of the Arabs and would also restore
for them their denied right in the Ottoman
Caliphate. In spite of this fact, some of these
secret societies, and not a small number of those
active in the Arab cause, continued to look forward
to a dual state which would organize the Turks and
the Arabs under the Ottoman Caliphate." Faris,
secular government, nor did they desire it at this time.

Louis Wirth writes "A nationality may be conceived of a people, who, because of the belief in their common descent and their mission in the world, by virtue of their common heritage and historical career aspire to sovereignty over a territory or seek to maintain or enlarge their political or cultural influence in the face of opposition. Nationalism refers to the social movements, attitudes and ideologies which characterize the behavior of nationalities engaged in the struggle to achieve, maintain, or enhance their position in the world." 116

If Wirth's definitions are accepted, then from the period 1909 and thereafter, the Arabs had advanced beyond the mere feeling of national consciousness, which according to Wirth, is only an aspiration, to full particularistic nationalism, 117 which involved a social movement toward the realization of their national aspirations.

The unity desired, however, was not Arab unity independent of


117. "A...major type of nationalism may be referred to as particularistic nationalism is based upon the secessionist demand of national autonomy. Such movements characteristically begin with a striving for cultural autonomy or toleration, which, when the movement makes headway, takes a political significance and finally develops into the demand for political sovereignty. This has been the case in Norway, where the movement was successful, and in Ireland, where it was unsuccessful." Wirth, op. cit., p. 729.
the Ottoman Empire, but merely a decentralized Arab state or states functioning within the framework of the Empire. It was not until World War I that the idea of Arab independence and the desire for a United Arab World began to manifest itself.
CHAPTER V

THE ARAB REVOLT

A. Confused Loyalties

On the eve of the First World War the loyalties of the people of the Arabic-speaking provinces of the Ottoman Empire were divided between the central Ottoman government, the local home government, and, in some instances, even another foreign government. The intelligentsia and political minded Arabs were confused, to say the least, with such a variety of ideas as Islamic unity, Ottomanism, Pan-Turanianism, Pan-Arabism, centralized government administration, decentralization, French protection of the Christians, British protection of the Druzes, Arab unity, constitutionalism, nationalism, imperialism and a wealth of other old and new political trends, policies and isms which seemed to be playing a more important role in their lives than ever before. There were reasons, of course, for the growing importance of these trends and institutions and their increased effect upon the individual.

Firstly, the reinauguration of the constitution for the people of the Ottoman Empire in 1908 was an important date and landmark to be remembered by all. It was the Period of al-Ḥurriya (liberty). It was also a period of rejoicing; an exodus from Hamidian despotism and an

118. Even today older Arabs refer to al-Ḥurriya as a beginning point of increased freedoms in their land. They also use it as a date mark by use of such terms as "I was born ten years before al-Ḥurriya."
entrance into the new experiences of freedom, justice and equality. From the time of the French Revolution up through the Westernization of the nineteenth century, these ideas had been creeping into the Arab world. Finally the opportunity of experiencing them seemed to have been made possible.

Secondly, the period of translation of Western literature and the acceptance by the East of modern journalism was at a new peak. This period had begun with Napoleon's invasion of Egypt, had been enhanced and exploited by Mohammad Ali in his building of an empire in Egypt, and during Ibrahim Pasha's governorship in Syria, and was continued in Syria, and especially Lebanon, by the efforts of the French Catholic and American educators. In the ten year period from 1894 to 1904 there were 18 newspapers and 17 magazines established in the Arab countries. However, between 1904 and 1914 there were 283 newspapers and 79 magazines,

119. Speaking of the news announcement of restoration of the 1876 Constitution on July 26, 1908, Henry H. Jessup writes: "The whole empire burst forth in universal rejoicing. The press spoke out. Public meetings were held, cities and towns decorated; Muslims were seen embracing Christians and Jews, and inviting one another to receptions and feasts... The universal voice of the Muslims was... 'Now we are brethren and we can live in peace. We shall henceforth know each other only as Ottomans. Long live liberty! Long live the army! Long live the Sultan!' The pent-up feelings of the populace everywhere burst forth in loud hurrays in the public streets... The Golden Age seemed to be dawning." Jessup, Henry Harris, *Fifty-Three Years in Syria*, New York, 1910, Vol. II, p. 787.
or a total of 362, established. This was an increase of 850 percent. Through the media of these books, journals and newspapers an increased number of people were affected by this variety of ideas as they were able to receive the current political trends, not only of their own area, but also of foreign areas.

Thirdly, imbued with the ideas of freedom, justice and equality, and having the opportunity to be more knowledgeable concerning these ideas and the actual turn of events, not only within the Empire but throughout the entire world, the Arabs were faced with the conflict of the new ideas against the old. They were also faced with the doubt that in spite of the high sounding phrases of the new constitution, was it backed up with actual sincerity by the Turks. "In (this) scene of tangled loyalties," E. A. Speiser writes, "there was first of all the religious nationalism—loyalty to Islam and the Caliph. The nascent ethnic nationalism could be reconciled with it if the Ottoman Constitution of 1908 was given a liberal interpretation by the authorities and


"Newspapers and magazines established in Arab countries:

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<td>TOTAL</td>
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79
was backed up with sincerity." 121 But if such was not the case, Arab nationalism would begin to strive for complete independence and eventual unity among the Arab provinces.

And fourthly, somewhat different from the above, was the ever increasing challenge of foreign control or threat of foreign control by the British, the French, and the Italians, which was being resisted by the growing nationalist movements. Dr. Nuseibeh claims that "only where a challenge exists--a foreign control, threat of control, or mere animosity--does the national consciousness arise, and then only where it finds anchor in the solid foundations of an over-all general awakening. This was true in Egypt." 122

Not only was it true in Egypt, but also in Syria, and particularly in Lebanon. The Christian community of Lebanon, and particularly the Maronites, had sought the protection of the French for many years and as a result, a growing French influence had developed in this area. Similarly, the British had assumed a position of the traditional protectors of the Druzes. But these were minorities. According to Antonius, "The rest of the population, including the preponderant Muslim element... looked sullenly at the threat of foreign domination, and, sharing their disinclination, the leaders asked themselves whether it were not better for them if it did come to a choice, to continue bearing the Turkish rule


they knew than fall under some other rule not less alien and infinitely more powerful."

Such was the confusion in the minds of the Arab people when on October 30, 1914, they suddenly found themselves, as a part of the Ottoman Empire, at war with the Western powers.

B. The Call for Unity Within the Empire

At the beginning of the war there was no one particular statesman, group or society which could be singled out as "Leader of the Arabs." "Arab unity" and "Pan-Arabism" were phrases and ideals which had been brandished about by many but had been accepted by few as a media or as a plan of action for rallying the Arabs to solidarity. The idea of unity within Islam as expressed by Pan-Islamism remained the basic force of solidarity. Although there seemed to be contradiction between Pan-Arabism and Pan-Islamism, to the Arabs no such contradiction existed in fact. The confusing factor causing this seemingly apparent


124. "It is said that Pan-Islamism and Pan-Arabism are contradictory. Owing to an historical accident the Pan-Arabs had acquired the reputation of being opposed to Pan-Islamism. Pan-Islamism was used by the Ottomans to provide a support for their Empire; when the Pan-Arabs rose, they necessarily had to emphasize the opposition between Pan-Arabism and Pan-Islamism. In Egypt, of course, there was no place and no need for such opposition; the enemy was Britain, not the Ottoman Empire. Islamic sentiment and Islamic solidarity gave body and passion to the struggle against the foreigner." Kedourie, Elia, "Pan-Arabism and British Policy," The Middle East in Transition, ed Walter Z. Laqueur, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1958, p. 105.
contradiction lay in the rebirth of the Arab idea insofar as the Arabs desired again to be politically predominant over their own governmental affairs. In spite of this political factor there was no desire to destroy the Islamic unity.

Explanation of this can best be made by examining briefly the aims of the two most important Arab secret societies of that time, Al-Fatat and Al-Jahd.

Al-Fatat was founded in Paris in November 1909\footnote{The information concerning Al-Jam"iyah Al-"Arabiyah Al-Fatat referred to in this paper will be that recorded by Dr. Zeine N. Zeine in his book Arab-Turkish Relations and the Emergence of Arab Nationalism, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 80-82} by a group of Muslims who were studying in that city at the time. It has been pointed out that it is worthy of note that al-Fatat was "an entirely Muslim Arab organization.\footnote{Zeine, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 81} The aim and purpose of Al-Fatat was "politically, to obtain Arab independence within the framework of a bi-racial Ottoman Empire, Arab and Turk, on lines similar to the Austro-Hungarian Empire. In addition, the society's aim was to raise the Arab "Umma" to the level of the social and educational advance made by the Western nations. But all this was to be done without breaking down the unity or destroying
the existence of the Ottoman Empire.\(^{127}\)

Al-Fatat sponsored a conference of Arab, substantially Syrian, reforming elements in Paris in June 1913. It was attended by twenty-four delegates and it received wide and responsive coverage and recognition by the French press. In the resolutions adopted none suggested secession from the Empire, but they did demand Arab rights in the constitutional and administrative fields.\(^{128}\) These resolutions were conveyed to the leading European Powers and to the Ottoman Government, who paid little to no attention to them other than to agree further to consider the proposals and to issue a Decree of little substance.

Corresponding to al-Fatat was the organization known as al-‘Ahd (the Covenant) which was established by a young Egyptian officer of the

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127. *Ibid.* According to Antonius the object of Al-Fatat was to work for the independence of the Arab countries from Turkish or other foreign rule whereas other movements were advocating only autonomy within the Empire. The aim and purpose of Al-Fatat as given by Dr. Zeine seems to coincide with the societies\(^2\) later cooperation with Al-‘Ahd and the political party of Lamarkazia. Dr. Saab writes concerning this cooperation "The leaders of Al-‘Ahd were, during the early period of the war, keeping in touch in Damascus with the leaders of al-Fatat, and in Cairo with the leaders of al-Lamarkazia and consulting secretly with them about the best course to adopt in light of the development of internal and international circumstances." Then he goes on to say "Antonius suggested that al-‘Ahd was to the military what al-Fatat was to the civilian Arab nationalist." [Saab, *op. cit.*], p. 239.

Ottoman Army, 'Aziz 'Ali, in 1914. Its membership was made up entirely of Arab officers in the Ottoman Army. Al-`Ahd also advocated a dual Turco-Arab Kingdom on the pattern of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. At first al-`Ahd did not visualize anything other than an Arab Kingdom within the wider unit of the Ottoman Empire. By so doing al-`Ahd was calling for both "Ottoman Islamic universalism and particularistic Arab nationalism." It is significant that although al-`Ahd was truly nationalistic, it did not advocate Arab unity independent of the Ottoman Empire. As young Arabs "raised in the Pan-Islamic atmosphere of `Abdul Hamid's military schools (the founders of al-`Ahd) could stand for a marriage between Islamic institutions and European institutions but not for a substitution of one for the other." The basic reason for al-`Ahd's refusal to call for complete independence from the Empire was the belief of its members in Islamic universalism from which they could not divorce themselves. To substantiate this Dr. Saab quotes from the late Nuri as-Said and his understanding of Arab nationalism. Nuri Pasha contended that ". . . despite all political partition, all Arabs, and


130. Ibid, p. 246, Dr. Saab continues, "It does not seem to be much to the credit of the Arabs that since the Wahabi revival, the modern Arab mind has thought of "institutional reintegration" only in terms of restoration of old Arab Islamic institutions, of borrowing Western institutions, or of "marrying" the two. This "self-repetitiveness" and "other's repetitiveness" would appear... as characteristic of the Arab mind." Ibid, pp. 247-48.
particularly those living in the Near and Middle East... (feel) in the depths of their hearts that they are like parts of one body. Their nationalism springs from the Islamic feeling of brotherhood with which the Prophet Muhammad filled their hearts in his last farewell speech. Therefore their nationalism is different from European nationalism. The Arabs are instinctively very loyal to their homelands. Nevertheless their nationalism defies frontiers and culminates in their hope of reviving the great tolerant civilization that they had under the Khilafa."

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C. Desire for Unity Manifested in the Damascus Protocol

As Turkey was now a full member with Germany in the Great War against the Western powers, the membership and activities of these organizations of necessity had to remain secret. The only obvious opposition to the Sultan and his Turkish policy from within came from Husain, the Grand Sharif of Mecca and the scion of the ancient and noble Hashimite family. Even this opposition was well guarded and magnificently handled in the couched diplomacy of which Sharif Husain was so capable of displaying. Secret overtures had been made by the Sharif to Great Britain prior to Turkey's entrance into the war in the person of the Sharif's second son, 'Abdullah, who had approached Lord Kitchener, the British Agent and High Commissioner in Egypt and Mr. Ronald Storrs,

the Oriental Secretary, to determine what aid Great Britain would afford
the Arabs in realizing their desires of independence from Ottoman rule
and unity of the Arab countries. These overtures had not been suc-
cessful. However, as soon as Turkey entered the war, Lord Kitchener, who
was now Secretary of State for War, instructed Mr. Storrs to send a
message to 'Abdullah which stated in part, "If you and His Highness your
father still favor a movement such as would lead to the full independence
of the Arabs, Great Britain is prepared to assist such a movement by all
the means in her power." After receipt of this message, the Sharif sent his third son,
the Emir Faisal to Constantinople, but Faisal was to pass through Damascus where he contacted the leaders of the two nationalist secret
societies, al-Fatat and al-'Ahd. Long talks were held between Faisal
and these leaders. As a result of these meetings, the leaders of the
nationalist movements drew up the Damascus Protocol which defined "the
conditions on which the Arab leaders would be prepared to cooperate with
Great Britain against Turkey." As given by Antonius, the protocol was
as follows:

132. 'Abdullah, King, Memoirs of King Abdullah of Trans-
jordan, ed Philip P. Graves, Jonathan Cape, London,

133. Ibid, p. 133.

pp. 135, 139, 140.

"The recognition by Great Britain of the independence of the Arab countries lying within the following frontiers:

North: The line Mersin-Adana to parallel 37° N and thence along the line Birejik-Mardin-Midiat-Jazirat (Ibn Umar)-Amadia to the Persian frontier;
East: The Persian frontier down to the Persian Gulf;
South: The Indian Ocean (with the exclusion of Aden, whose status was to be maintained);
West: The Red Sea and the Mediterranean Sea back to Mersin.

The abolition of all exceptional privileges granted to foreigners under the Capitulations.

The conclusion of a defensive alliance between Great Britain and the future independent Arab State.

The grant of economic preference to Great Britain."\(^{136}\)

Armed with this protocol and the oath of the leaders to recognize him as spokesman of the Arabs, Sharif Husain continued his negotiation with Great Britain in what was later known as the Husain-McMahon correspondence,\(^{137}\) a series of eight letters which "culminated in a mutually acceptable military alliance but in an ambiguous political understanding that was not clarified at the time...indeed (it) was destined never to be clarified, and the ambiguous interpretations of the


\(^{137}\) Great Britain, Miscellaneous No. 3 (1939) Correspondence Between Sir Henry McMahon, His Majesty's High Commissioner at Cairo and the Sherif Hussein of Mecca, July 1915-March 1916, Cmd. 5957.
imperfect instruments caused boundless troubles in later years."¹³⁸

The mutually acceptable military alliance resulted in the Arab Revolt when the leaders of the nationalist movements "in order to survive and achieve the degree of nationhood and statehood that they failed to achieve in the Empire,...preferred to revolt and throw in their lot with that of Great Britain."¹³⁹

D. The Arabs Revolt for Independence and Arab Unity

It is not the purpose of this paper to record the history of the Arab Revolt. This has been ably accomplished by Lawrence, Antonius, and others. It is significant however, to determine, if possible, to what extent the idea and desire of Arab unity was involved.

Prior to and at the time of the establishment of the Damascus Protocol, the politically-minded Arabs were speaking of Arab independ-ence and Arab unity, but still within the framework of the Empire, as has been stated before. Even as late as May 1916, Sharif Hussain, in answer to a request from the Sublime Port that he should declare a Holy War (jihad) from Mecca had replied: "Before a Holy War can be declared, and the necessary troops raised, the Arabs must be given their rights. The first step would be the declaration of a general amnesty for politi-cal prisoners; the next to grant Syria and Iraq an autonomous


administration; the third to recognize the Sharif’s position in Mecca as his hereditary right.”

This indicates that Husain, as the accepted leader of the Arab nationalist was still attempting to gain Arab autonomy within the Empire by peaceful means right up until the time of the Revolt.

In addition Dr. Saab feels that al-‘Ahd’s position had not changed from the desire for political statehood within a dual monarchy and was still reflecting its previous stand in the Damascus Protocol. After repeating the frontiers which the leaders of that organization and al-Fatat established as a basis of King Husain’s negotiations with Great Britain, he writes, “As the...program of al-‘Ahd did not mention specific frontiers, we are inclined to suppose that al-‘Ahd meant these frontiers to be the frontiers of an Arab Kingdom within the Ottoman Khalifa... ‘Aziz ‘Ali and his party were at least momentarily concerned with the Arab provinces which were still effectively under Ottoman control.”

In spite of the prior preparation of Sharif Husain and the Arab nationalist leaders to seek guarantees from Great Britain if the Arabs

140. 'Abdullah, op.cit., p. 136.

141. It is meant here to refer to Husain as the leader of the Arab nationalists, but not leader of the Arabs, a title which he later accepted when he became known as "King of the Arabs." This was objected to from many quarters, and particularly from Emir ibn-Saud of Nejd. See Zeine, op.cit., pp. 105-06; Faris & Husayn, op.cit., pp. 66-67.

142. Saab, op.cit., p. 249.
were to join the Western powers in their war against Turkey, it has been seen that the Arabs were leary of having to exchange one foreign rule for the other. If this were to be the case, all were in agreement that they would prefer to remain under Turkish rule. However, this feeling began to change rapidly when Jamal Pasha, the Ottoman Military Governor for Syria, began his despotic rule upon his return to Syria after the failure of his Expedition against Egypt in February 1915. Many writers feel that the Arab Revolt began as a direct result to the drastic purge of nationalist leaders in Syria, carried out by Jamal in 1915-1916 and the prospect that similar measures might be carried out in the Hejaz.\textsuperscript{143}

*Abdullah writes in his Memoirs, "My father... requested Ahmed Jamal Pasha through my brother Faisal that the Arab countries should not be governed tyrannically, and that the Government should fulfill its promise to the Syrians by granting them the autonomy that they wanted. Both these requests were refused by Ahmed Jamal..."\textsuperscript{144}

Dr. Zeine feels that not only the call for complete independence from Turkish rule came as a result of Jamal Pasha's tyranny in Syria, but also as a result of this tyranny, Arab national sovereignty became a tangible reality. Regarding this change of feeling, Dr. Zeine writes, "...the consequences of Djemal Pasha's anti-Arab policy were to widen still further the gulf between Arabs and Turks and thus to intensify the

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144. *Abdullah, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 135-36.
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Arab struggle to obtain their independence. Indeed, it may not be an exaggeration to say that Djemal Pasha’s rule in Syria was one of the determining factors which helped most of the Muslim Arab leaders to make up their minds once and for all to break away completely from the Turkish Empire. After the executions of May 6, 1916, Arab nationalism gathered momentum and strength. Arab political independence and Arab national sovereignty became a tangible reality and an absolute necessity for sheer survival if for no other reason. 145

After the long period of engagement, the Islamic idea and the Arab nationalist idea, which included the desire for Arab unity, were married finally at the time of the Arab Revolt. Most of those who joined in the Revolt were fighting not only for Islam and the restoration of the Khalifa to its proper home, but also for Arab independence and eventual Arab unity. This was borne out by King 'Abdullah when he wrote, "Arabs rise or fall with Islam and the Arab revolution carried out in our days by King Husain and his companions from among the notables of the Hejaz together with the leaders and notables of Syria, Lebanon, Palestine and Iraq, was a rightful revolution for the defense

of Islam, that the Arabs might take the position which God favored them." 146

In speaking of this revolution Dr. Nabih Faris writes, "...it is still considered in modern national Arab history as the Great Arab Revolt, not for the success it attained, but rather for what it symbolizes—the first revolt against the Caliph-Sultan aimed at Arab unity in which the Muslim Sharif of Mecca, the descendant of the Arab Prophet, drew an Arab sword in the face of the foreign Caliph for the sake of the national idea." 147

With such high ideas and ideals to fight for, the Arabs showed

146. "Abdullah, op.cit., p. 57. (In a review on the subject of Arab Union 'Abdullah later stated, "If the teachings of the Koran are obeyed it makes no difference to the Arab whether his overlord is an Arab or not, provided he is Muslim." Then he went on to state the causes for breaking of the union between Arabs and non-Arabs which began with the establishment of a new administrative system by the Turks and the abandonment of Muslim teachings in favor of a Western form which was not understood even by those who introduced it." He referred to the reign in Syria of Jamal Pasha "which spread fear and distrust by his violent methods. ...on this basis the Arab revolt was staged with the object of establishing a unified Arab state." Ibid, pp. 243-247.

147. Faris, Dirasat 'Arabiyah, op.cit., p. 106. (Also Dr. Saab recognizes this relationship of Islam in the nationalist movement when he writes, "We should remind the reader...about the neo-religious character of Arab nationalism. We should also mention that Sharif Husain of Mecca joined with his Arab Revolution the allies on behalf of both Islam and Arabism, and that he proclaimed himself King of the Arabs and Khalifa of the Muslims." Saab, op.cit., p. 246.)
well in their revolt and in fighting side by side with Great Britain until the battle was won. On the 3rd of October 1918 Emir Faisal entered Damascus with his forces "amid a riot of delirious thanksgiving" and was in complete control of the situation. At last it was beginning to appear that the Arab hopes of independence and unity were about to be fulfilled.

Then on November 7 Great Britain and France issued a joint declaration\textsuperscript{148} stating in calming phrases and protective sounding words their aims in the Near East, which in effect, tended to soothe the nerves of the Arabs and mislead them into a feeling of complacency.

How this could happen, however, is beyond the apprehension of any normal person. During the course of the war, Russia's new Revolutionary Government had already published the secret agreements and treaties among the Great Powers which concerned the future of the Arab countries after the completion of the war.

Among these agreements were two in particular which ran counter to the Sharifian-British agreements in the Husain-McMahon correspondence and to the Arab desires for unity of the area defined in this correspondence and in the Damascus Protocol. The first was the Tripartite

\textsuperscript{148} This declaration read in part "The object aimed at by France and Great Britain in prosecuting in the East the war let loose by the ambition of Germany is the complete and definite emancipation of the peoples so long oppressed by the Turks and the establishment of national governments and administrations deriving their authority from the initiative and free choice of the indigenous populations." Hurewitz, \textit{op.cit.}, p. 30.
Agreement for the Partition of the Ottoman Empire, a series of agreements made between Britain, France and Russia during the period April 26 to October 23, 1916. It is more commonly labeled the Sykes-Picot Agreement. This treaty in effect divided the areas of Syria and Iraq between France and Great Britain for both direct and indirect administration. The fulfillment of the treaty would have meant the loss of independence and unity to the Arab countries.

The second agreement, concluded in November 1917, was the Balfour Declaration of British sympathy with Zionist aspirations. Unlike the Sykes-Picot Agreement, the Balfour Declaration "was not intended as a secret document and (it) appeared in the press shortly after its issuance." This declaration stated in part "His Majesty's Government view with favor the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavors to facilitate the achievement of this object..." The Arabs could see in both of these agreements stumbling blocks toward their desire for a United Arab World.

The complete revocation of these agreements was to be the difficult task assigned to the Emir Faisal when he was sent by his father, Sharif Husain, to the Paris Peace Conference to represent the Arab cause for independence and Arab unity.

149. Ibid, pp. 18-22.
CHAPTER VI
THE ARABS PETITION FOR UNITY

A. Emir Faisal's Proposal of Unity to the Peace Conference

The Emir Faisal arrived in Europe in November 1918 to represent his father, King Husain, in the forthcoming Peace Conference, and immediately he was to receive the pangs of distasteful diplomacy. He was shunned and politically ignored by the French from the date of his arrival in Marseilles on 26th of November until his return to Syria in May 1919, but in London, quite to the contrary, he was attacked from all sides, by strangers as well as by friends, "on the part of the British Government to give his assent in principle to the objects they had in view." 152

Faisal first presented the Arab's case to the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference in the form of a memorandum on January 1, 1919. 153 This memorandum began by defining the Arab world in broad general terms and then it immediately stated the aim of the Arabs to be one of Arab unity. It read in part, "The aim of the Arab nationalist movements (of which my father became the leader in war after combined appeals from the Syrian and Mesopotamian branches) is to unite the Arabs eventually into one nation." The memorandum explained the feeling of the Arab leaders in the "ultimate triumph of the idea of unity, if no attempt is made now


to force it, by imposing an artificial political unity on the whole, or to hinder it, by dividing the area as spoils of war among the Great Powers." In view of the present economical and social difference, however, it is impossible to constrain them into one frame of government. Syria is "sufficiently advanced politically" to manage her own affairs in an independent government advised technically by foreign experts, the services of whom the Arabs are willing to pay in cash. The system of government in Iraq will have to be buttressed by a great foreign power, but the Government should be Arab, and its main function should be to "oversee the educational processes which are to advance the tribes to the moral level of the towns." The enormous majority of the people in Palestine are Arabs, not Jews. The memorandum ended by stating that the Arabs ask "that no step be taken inconsistent with the prospect of an eventual union of (the Arab) areas under one sovereign government...In a word, we ask you not to force your whole civilization upon us." In return, the Arabs could offer "little but gratitude."

In his personal address to the Supreme Council on February 6, 1919, Faisal again stressed the claims of the Arabic-speaking peoples of Asia to independence and unity "laying down the cultural, geographical and economic factors that made for cohesion amongst them." Then Faisal reminded his listeners of the promises they had made concerning

"the liberation and unification of his people." 155

In writing about the Peace Conference two years later, former American Secretary of State Robert Lansing observed that Faisal had come to the Peace Conference "with the purpose, and I believe with an expectation, of founding an Arab kingdom extending northward from the desert wastes of the Arabian Peninsula to the Taurus Mountains and the borders of old Armenia, and from the Euphrates to the Mediterranean...The Emir's desire seems to have been to include Palestine within the boundaries of the proposed state, a not unreasonable desire in view of the fact that nearly nine-tenths of the population of that territory are today of Arab blood..." 156

Undoubtedly Faisal had presented well his case for the Arabs and

155. Dr. Harry N. Howard infers that these promises were made by President Wilson to the Emir Faisal in a meeting on January 23, 1919, between President Wilson, Emir Faisal and Colonel T. E. Lawrence. This meeting was called at the insistence of Rabbi Stephen S. Wise. Howard, Harry N., An American Experiment in Peace Making: The King-Crane Commission, 1942, Ch. I, p. 22. An unpublished manuscript compiled by Dr. Howard from the private papers of such men as Dr. Henry C. King, Commissioner of the King-Crane Commission, Prof. Albert H. Lybyer, General Technical Adviser of the Commission, Capt. William Yale, Technical Adviser, President Woodrow Wilson, Secretary of State Robert Lansing, Chief Justice Felix Frankfurter, and others. Dr. Howard kindly placed this manuscript at the disposal of the writer.

for Arab unity for he had unquestionably "impressed his hearers strongly with his calm and judicial way in which he gave his reasons for the rebirth of Syria as an independent state."\(^{157}\)

It should be noted that Faisal's request to the powers of the Peace Conference in regard to Arab unity was only for the immediate union of Syria. The Syria which he wished to unite was not that area which is known today as the Syrian Sector of the United Arab Republic, or before 1958, as the Republic of Syria. The Syria which he wished to unite was geographical Syria, which comprised a much larger area. It included the "whole of the Levant coast between Anatolia and Egypt and its hinterland as far as the Euphrates and the Desert..."\(^{158}\) Alexandretta, the States of the Alawis, Aleppo, Lebanon, Damascus, Jebel Druze, Palestine, and Transjordan were all subsidiary parts of this area known as Syria.

This area was, in fact, united at the time of the Peace Conference and was later to become the Kingdom of Syria with Faisal as its monarch. Faisal's immediate aim was not an Arab union. His immediate aim, in the light of the Sykes-Picot Agreement and the Balfour Declaration, was first and foremost to insure the union of this area, Syria, the heart of the Arab nationalist movement.

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This was in accordance with Arab political thinking at the end of the war which had taken a turn toward complete independence and some form of Arab unity. The former Decentralization Party or Hisb al-Lamarkaziya had been reorganized in Egypt in 1918 "largely by Arab nationalist leaders from Syria"\textsuperscript{159} into the Hizb al-Ittihad as-Suri (The Syrian Federal Party). Its new platform was for the "national unification of Syria." It protested to the partition of Syria in any form and worked toward the promoting of Syrian unity "organized on the image of the United States of America."\textsuperscript{160}

Al-Fatat, on the other hand, had been reformed into Hisb al-Istiqlal al-Arabi (Arab Independence Party), and under its new platform advocated "the independence and unity of all Arab lands,"\textsuperscript{161} but only after a full and complete union of Syria.

In addition to these two main parties was al-Hisb as-Suri al-Mu'tadil (The Moderate Syrian Party) which advocated a "United States of Syria" made up of local independent states and "united under a central parliamentary and secular government."\textsuperscript{162} Also there was al-Hisb al-Watani as-Suri (The National Syrian Party) which advocated a union of Syria plus the "promotion of the national, cultural and economic

\textsuperscript{159} Sayegh, Arab Unity, \textit{op.cit.}, pp. 59-60; see also Faris and Husayn, \textit{op.cit.}, p. 75.

\textsuperscript{160} Saab, \textit{op.cit.}, p. 247.

\textsuperscript{161} Sayegh, \textit{op.cit.}, p. 60, see also Antonius, \textit{op.cit.}, p. 292.

\textsuperscript{162} Saab, \textit{op.cit.}, p. 152.
relations between the various parts of the Arab world."  

It has been established that from the beginning the Government set up by Emir Faisal when he entered Damascus "was Syrian," although it continued to be called "Sharifian" only through habit and ignorance. "The aim of the Administration was from the first day...to consolidate an Arab State of Syria." Faisal did not request at the Peace Conference that Iraq be united with Syria as a basic proposal for peace; however, he did foresee future union of the two. This was in keeping with the agreements in the Husain-McMahon correspondence and indicative of the fact that the Arabs were at least attempting to abide by the agreement.  

They were in hopes that Great Britain would follow the lead. 

Mr. Lansing names an obstacle to Arab unity other than the secret treaties made between the Great Powers and their colonial ambitions. This, according to Lansing, was the "antipathy toward the Mohammedan faith" which had existed for generations throughout the Christian world.  

To the West the "savagery and depravity" of modern Islam had become intolerable and this atmosphere of hostility to Muslim rule "made the purpose of the Emir Faisal to create a New Kingdom of  

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163. Faris and Husayn, op.cit., p. 74.  
164. Great Britain, Cmd 5957, op.cit. In the Husain-McMahon Correspondence Britain requested "...as regards the two vilayets of Baghdad and Basra, the Arabs recognise that the fact of Great Britain's established position and interest there will call for the setting up of special administrative arrangements..." Antonius, op.cit., p. 420.  
Syria—which, remember, was to be a new Muslim Kingdom—difficult of
accomplishment. 166

Nevertheless, the real cause of failure of Syrian unity remained
the ambitions of some of the Great Powers and the jealousies which
existed between them, as well as their determination to realize the
economic possibilities available to them in the Sykes-Picot Agreement,
rather than the acceptance of a United Syrian Nation which would net
them comparatively little.

B. The Western Powers View the Idea of Arab Unity

At the Peace Conference America backed the Arab request for
unity from the beginning. The first American recommendations which were
submitted on January 21 by the Intelligence Section of the American Com-
mission to Negotiate Peace recommended the establishment of three
separate states of Mesopotamia, Syria, and Palestine. 167 No obstacles
were to be placed in the way of Mesopotamia or Syria for membership or
incorporation into an Arab confederation, if such a confederation were
to be later deemed advisable. However, Palestine and the Arabian
Peninsula were to be treated individually and separately. 168

166. Ibid, p. 171.

167. For the portion of those recommendations relating
to the Arab world see Hurewitz, op. cit., pp. 40-45.

168. Howard, op. cit., Ch. I, pp. 11-12; Hurewitz,
   op. cit., pp. 43-44. The recommendation for a
   separate Palestinian State did, of course, differ
   from the Arab request.
The Intelligence Section also recommended that the King of the Hejaz and his sons should not receive support in an attempt to establish an artificial domination over tribes unwilling to accept his rule. However, if it could be shown that the movement of Arab unity was natural and real, and that such unity could be developed without the use of force, the movement should be given encouragement and support.

The original British policy, on the other hand, "held that in the Arab lands the wishes of the inhabitants would best be met, and peace and stability best be secured, by the establishment of independent states." Great Britain showed her colors in the battle for complete Arab unity when she concluded in her memoranda that ultimate federation of the Arab states was "a question for the Arabs themselves," but "all parties would probably agree in regarding immediate federation as out of the question..."

But in her determination to keep the French completely out of the Arab world in spite of the Sykes-Picot Agreement, she strongly recommended that Syria should be recognized as "an independent Arab

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169. Ibid, Ch. I, p. 17. Dr. Howard extracted this British policy from the papers of Prof. W. L. Westerman, which are in the Hoover War Library, Stanford University, and the papers of H. C. King.

170. Ibid.
unit."\textsuperscript{171} Britain held that Syria constituted a natural subdivision of the Arab world which could "neither be split up internally nor separated by rigid frontiers from the neighboring Arab units." By this it seems that Great Britain felt confident that Faisal was expressing the true feelings of the majority of the people of Syria when he asked for Syrian unity. It appears that at this time Britain also felt confident that an undivided Syria would not accept France as a mandatory power, but would remain a true ally to her in the long run, which was in definite accord with her interest.\textsuperscript{172} By following the policy of recommending a United Syria she was upholding her bargain with King Husain, while at the same

\textsuperscript{171} \textit{Ibid.} Antonius adds, "The Sykes-Picot Agreement was at that time one of the topics of the day. Clemenceau had been in London and had had a tussle with Mr. Lloyd George on the question of whether or not the Agreement was still valid. Lloyd George wanted it annulled, on the plea that Russia—one of the three parties to it—had denounced it; Clemenceau held that it was none the less binding on the two other parties." Antonius, \textit{op.cit.}, p. 281.

\textsuperscript{172} "In the period which had elapsed since the conclusion of the (Sykes-Picot) Agreement, the divergence between France's and Great Britain's aims and interests in the Arab countries had become more apparent to the statesmen of both Powers. The British view now was that the Agreement was not only in practice unworkable, but that, so far as it could be applied at all, it ran counter to British interests in two important respects: one was that it assigned the Vilayet of Mosul with its rich oil fields to France; the other, that it placed Palestine under an international administration of a kind that would necessarily preclude...British control..." Antonius, \textit{op.cit.}, pp. 281-82.
time she frankly admitted that the dilemma of Sykes-Picot "remains unsolved."\footnote{173}

The French view toward Arab unity, like Great Britain, was determined by her view of either pressing for or discarding the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916, and on this point there seemed to be no doubt that France "insisted that the agreements with England were binding on both countries."\footnote{174} France's policy therefore remained the recognition of the full "letter of her rights" in the secret agreements.

Antonius points out that the Sykes-Picot Agreement was the "only deed in which France's share of the Ottoman spoils had been clearly and specifically recognized by Great Britain."\footnote{175} She had become suspicious

\footnote{173. The experts who prepared this basic document on British policy admitted that Great Britain had entered into certain secret commitments, some 19 in all, concerning the future of the Ottoman Empire. They frankly acknowledged that some of these commitments were contrary to the spirit of the Wilson principles. This was especially true of the French claim in Syria...Of great interest in the analysis of the commitments to King Hussein is the seeming belief that "All commitments hitherto made" by His Majesty's Government to the Sharif on the one part and the other independent Arab rulers on the other, appear to be compatible with one another. On the other hand, the "problem of retaining the good-will and securing him the position required by British and French desiderata in Mesopotamia, Palestine and Syria, while at the same time retaining the confidence of the other independent Chiefs, remains unsolved." \textcite{Howard}, pp. 20-21.}

\footnote{174. \textit{Ibid}, Ch. I, p. 10.}

\footnote{175. Antonius, \textit{op.cit.}, p. 282.}
of British patronage of the Arabs and her "safest course was to uphold the validity of the Agreement as a whole."

Therefore, with the Great Powers at political loggerheads over the question of partition or unity of the Arab countries, it was evident that the desire of the Arabs for unity, either in the form of a union between Syria and Iraq, or in its basic form of Syrian unity, was destined for a struggle against external forces. The Arabs were, however, going to have their chance to air their views before a committee sent to their area by the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference for the purpose of determining their desires and reporting the findings to the Peace Conference.

C. The Arabs' Case for Unity--The King-Crane Commission

The possibility of sending a committee of inquiry to the Arab countries to determine the basic desires of the Arab people had been present since Faisal's original request. The Tentative Recommendations by the Intelligence Section of the American Delegation to the Peace Conference had recommended on January 21, 1919, "that a mixed commission be sent to Syria to learn the actual desires of the Syrians and report to the Peace Conference."176 However, when President Howard Bliss of the American University of Beirut "called for the sending of a commission to Syria to find out the facts in the case,"177 the idea of a neutral mixed


commission was germinated. This idea ultimately led to the King-Crane Commission.

It is not the purpose of this paper to discuss the King-Crane Commission in full, however, certain of its findings concerning the feelings and desires of the Syrian people at this crucial period in the struggle for Arab unity are of definite interest to this study.

The idea of sending a commission to Syria was accepted early by the American delegates at the Peace Conference. Secretary of State Lansing suggested on February 18, 1919, the sending of a commission to Syria, but the question was postponed. The reason given by the other Powers for not approving of such a commission was that it might arouse the people with false hopes and sow the seeds of popular discontent, whatever conclusions it might reach. 178 Finally, on March 20, 1919, at a secret meeting of the Supreme Council the principle of a mixed commission to Syria was approved.

Opposition still existed, however, among the French and the British, not only among the diplomats, but also among the so-called "Arabists." On March 25, 1919, Mr. Henry Wickham Steed of the London Times interviewed a number of British and French "Arabists" for almost six hours. Among those present were such persons as Colonel T. E. Lawrence, Miss Gertrude Bell, Sir Valentine Chirol, Robert de Caix, Philippe Millet, Mr. Henri Brewer and others. During this meeting all

of these experts disagreed with the sending of a commission to Syria to
determine their "state of opinion" on grounds that it "might unsettle
the country." Colonel Lawrence stated in the interview that he "did
not believe that the movement for Arab unity had any serious political
value for the present or near future." As Faisal's friend and companion,
Lawrence's statement seems to confirm Faisal's lack of desire in imme-
diate unity, other than Syrian unity, as expressed in Faisal's memoranda
and speeches before the Supreme Council.

The opposition against the mixed commission finally won out and
only the American appointees to the commission went to Syria and con-
ducted the inquiry. They arrived first at Jaffa on June 10, 1919, and
40 days later, on August 28, they filed the report of their findings.

The first tentative report to the commission summing up what had
been found from interviews in Jaffa was made by Professor Albert H.
Lybyer on June 13. It was concluded that the non-Jewish population
of Jaffa, which constituted approximately "80% of the whole" of the
area, was "unanimously opposed to the Zionist plan." The Arabic
groups were likewise opposed to the "political separation of Palestine
from Syria." The reason given for their stand was that there was no
racial or natural differences among the two areas on which such a

179. Ibid, Ch. II, p. 4.

180. Ibid, Ch. III, pp. 7-9. "Tentative Conclusions
After Three Days at Jaffa," June 13, 1919, Lybyer
Diary. This document is summarized by Dr. Howard.
separation could be based. A Syrian union within an Arab Federation was desired by the majority of the population. 181

The inquiry in Palestine was completed on June 25, 1919. In summing up the Commission's findings from the many individuals and delegations with whom they talked of Muslim, Christian and Jewish faiths, only the Zionist Jews, who numbered about one-tenth of the total population, favored the establishment of a National Home for Jews in that country. The rest of the population, Muslims and Christians alike, desired to preserve the unity of the country with Syria, of which they considered Palestine to be both historically and geographically a part. 182

As soon as the Commission arrived in Damascus in the late afternoon of June 25, 1919, it was presented a series of demands which had been distributed as leaflets in the "suks" of Damascus and which were offered up to the Commission as the "demands of the people of the coast

181. "Possibly a majority of the population favored the independence of the entire region between the desert and the sea, Aleppo and Akaba, with a more or less decentralized or federal political structure, related to the other Arabic-speaking peoples within a larger federation. The Arabs promised a democratic secular government, with equality for all elements." Ibid, Ch. III, p. 7.

182. "Except for certain official groups, the Commission felt that the people of Palestine were practically unanimous for the independence of a United Syria." Ibid.
now found in Damascus." This leaflet demanded "the complete political independence of Syria with its natural boundaries, the Taurus Mountains in the North, the two rivers of Khabour and Euphrates in the East, the line between Akaba and Rafa in the South, and the Mediterranean Sea in the West." The leaflet protested and refused "Article 22" of the League of Nations regarding the necessity of a Mandate. In addition, it refused French claims to Syria and the immigration of the Zionists to "our country." This initial demand which greeted the Commissioners upon their arrival was well representative of what they were to determine later as the feelings of the majority of Syrians.

By July 2, after having been in Damascus five days, Captain William Yale had sketched out his impression of the Syrian situation. Yale was skeptical of any genuine sentiment of nationalism in Syria. He had concluded that through "well organized and thorough propaganda" the Muslims had united on a program which "superficially has every sign of being Syrian nationalism, but which is basically Islamic." He further felt that the masses of the Syrians had no conception of "western

183. The copy of these demands was found in the papers of Prof. Lybyer under the title "Demands of People of Coast - Distributed in Bazaars of Damascus at 3:40 P. M. Wednesday June 25, 1919". Ibid, Ch. V, pp. 1-2.

184. A memorandum, "Strong National Feeling" was written by Capt. Yale on July 1 and is included in the papers of Prof. Lybyer. A summary of this memorandum is given by Dr. Howard. Ibid, Ch. V, pp. 8-9.
nationalism," but they followed the program "because they were ordered to." Yale noted that Muslim and Christian forces in Syria were directly opposed to each other and that the Christians also feared the Jews of Palestine. The real issues involved "had been obscured in Christian minds and thus their support of the Muslim program of unity had been won."

However, he felt that the character of the program of nationalism and unity was better understood in Mount Lebanon "where the Christians were stronger" and were not "allowing themselves to be deceived" by a "National Propaganda," which they recognized as "essentially Islamic propaganda."

Dr. Nicola Ziadeh confirms Captain Yale's observation regarding Lebanon. He writes in his book *Syria and Lebanon*...the Lebanese wanted their own independence outside the Syrian unity. If help were to be sought, it should come from France alone." Dr. Ziadeh claims that this point was made clear to the King-Crane Commission, to the Syrian Congress and to the Peace Council by two Lebanese delegations which visited France in 1919. The Lebanon which these men were referring to "was not that of the administrative unity created in 1861, but the

185. In a sense this trend of Christian fears was repeated in that part of the final report of the Commission which reads, "As a predominantly Christian country Lebanon naturally fears Muslim domination in a unified Syria," but the Commission went on to recommend complete Syrian unity, including Lebanon and Palestine. Hurewitz, *op. cit.*, pp. 66-74.

historical and natural Lebanon which included the districts of Tripoli, Bida, Sidon and Tyre."

Except for his contention concerning the Christians of Mount Lebanon, Captain Yale's views were not representative of the Commission as a whole. Professor Lybyer, in summing up his views on July 2, noted that the Muslims were almost unanimous in advocating "the unity of Syria within historical limits," which includes Palestine and "the Lebanon District." After summing up the situation, Professor Lybyer concluded that there were five possible schemes for the settlement of the Syrian problem, and he enjoyed the approval of Dr. King in his findings. These schemes were:

1. Complete independence. Lybyer did not recommend this scheme due to "the evident fear which the Christians and Jews" felt "toward an Arab government."\(^{188}\)

\(^{187}\) Taken by Dr. Howard from "The Apparent Situation in Syria" a memorandum written on or about July 2, 1919, by Prof. Lybyer. Howard, \textit{op.cit.}, pp. 10-13.

\(^{188}\) This seems at first inconsistent with what Capt. Yale and Dr. Ziadeh had written, although in fact it is not. The independence of which they were writing and for which the Lebanese were striving was complete Lebanese independence from Turkey or from Syria. However, Prof. Lybyer's views seem to have found their way into the final report which read in part "As a predominantly Christian country, it is also to be noted that Lebanon would be in a position to exert a stronger and more helpful influence if she were within the Syrian State, feeling its problems and needs, and sharing all its life, instead of outside it, absorbed simply in her own narrow concerns. For the sake of the larger interests, both of Lebanon and of Syria, then, the
2. Unity under an American mandate. Lybyer preferred this scheme, however, he felt that it was not a likely one due to the fact that the American people would not accept the mandate.

3. Unity under a British mandate. Such a scheme would "destroy the understanding between Britain and France, and upset the balance of the world."

4. Unity under a French mandate. This would involve a great amount of force as it is obviously against the wishes of the Syrian people.

5. Division of the country. This scheme is "very strongly opposed by nearly all Muslims" and would also require a large force to put it into effect. The most serious objection "is that it cuts one nation into three parts along geographical lines which tend to become lines of religious separation."

It is interesting to note that Dr. King was in general agreement with these findings. He added that the Zionist program could be "established and maintained only by force," a statement which holds true even up to this day.

D. The General Syrian Congress

In the middle of June when the King-Crane Commission was still in Palestine, rumors had begun concerning a forthcoming congress in Damascus. At this time the Arab individuals and delegations being

unity of Syria is to be urged." Hurewitz, op. cit., p. 68.
interviewed had told the Commissioners that the problem of a mandatory power would be decided by a "conference shortly to be assembled in Damascus." 189

The new Arab Independence Party had taken the initiative to call together a national assembly for the purpose of framing a statement reflecting the Syrian position. Elections had been called and executed hastily for the selection of 85 delegates from Syria and Palestine. Those delegates who were elected to the Congress in the French Zone of Lebanon were not allowed by the French to attend the Congress in Damascus. Thus only 60 delegates arrived in Damascus to participate in the National Syrian Congress of July 2 and 3, 1919. 190

A resolution adopted by the Congress was presented to the King-Crane Commission on the afternoon of July 3, 1919, by a delegation of 15 members. In brief the desires of the people, as determined by the Congress were first and foremost "absolutely complete independence for Syria" within boundaries that made up a united Syria. 191 The resolution asked for a decentralized democratic civil monarchy with the Emir Faisal as their King. The Sykes-Picot Agreement and the Balfour Declaration

189. Howard, *op. cit.*, Ch. IV, p. 13, taken from Lybyer Diary entry of June 18, 1919.

190. *Ibid.*, Ch. V, p. 14. The Congress actually convened on June 20, however, the resolution which it adopted was firmed up on July 2-3.

were denounced and Article 22 of the League of Nations was rejected. The resolution asked that "there should be no separation of the southern part of Syria, known as Palestine, nor of the littoral western zone, which includes Lebanon, from the Syrian country. We desire that the unity of the country should be guaranteed against partition under whatever circumstances." 192

Immediately after the delegation of 15 had presented the resolution to the King-Crane Commission, the Emir Faisal made an address to the Commission which lasted for about an hour and a half. 193 In this address Faisal emphasized that the Syrians did not want to have their country "divided or partitioned." He asked for the formation of an Arab Government in Iraq with no customs or "strict boundary considerations" between Syria and Iraq, and that the same educational system be adopted in the two countries in order "to prepare the Arab people for unity in the nearest possible future." Faisal told the Commission that the Syrian people were "agreed and determined on Syrian unity." He was convinced that the call from Lebanon for severance from Syria was "inconsistent with the common welfare," as the Lebanese desired freedom and unity as much as did all other Syrians regardless of religious faith. Here he was insinuating that the French were coercing the Lebanese to separate their country from Syria. This view of severance, Faisal claimed, was supported by the Christian Clergy.

192. Hurewitz, op.cit., p. 64.
E. The Shattering of Hopes for Arab Unity--The Mandates

Thus came the call for Arab unity as regenerated and rejuvenated through a process of purification through such filtering agents as the Islamic idea, Pan-Islamic unity, Westernization, Pan-Arabism, the Arab Revolt, and a Western experiment in peace-making. This process had taken years, actually centuries, for its development, but the final product was beginning to take the form of a pure unadulterated idea of Arab unity.

As the resolution and Faisal’s speech to the Commission became known throughout Syria, mass demonstrations of approval broke out in all of the cities and towns which were not occupied by French forces, and large delegations came to Damascus to cheer both the Congress and the future of King Faisal. There seemed little question that the resolution represented the general sentiments of the country as a whole.

In general, the final report of the King-Crane Commission recommended for the various points which the people of Syria had petitioned. It recommended an American mandate for Syria, with Great Britain as a second choice, and it recommended that a British mandate be given for Iraq. It further recommended “that the unity of Syria be preserved” and that it be placed under one mandatory power “as a natural way to secure real and efficient unity.”

196. Ibid, p. 68.
One of the most unfortunate occurrences of the peace settlement was the fact that the King-Crane report "was not discussed at the Paris Peace Conference" but was "simply buried in the archives of the American delegation, and ignored by the conferees." 197 The result was that in April 1920 at San Remo, the European statesmen signed an agreement on the mandates with France taking Syria and Great Britain taking Iraq and Palestine. These mandates were formally approved by the Council of the League of Nations in July 1922 and became effective in September 1923. 198 The principle of self-determination and the desires of the people of Syria had been completely ignored. The hopes of Arabs for unity had been miserably shattered. Armed uprisings occurred in Syria, Palestine and Iraq, and the Arab world was "seething with discontent expressing itself in acts of violence." 199

Dr. Sayegh contends in his book Arab Unity that from this point on, "the desire to preserve an existing unity was transformed into the desire to restore and re-establish a recently destroyed unity. Unity became a principal goal of the Arab national movement. "The idea of Arab unity was born." 200

The birth date of an idea is a relatively unimportant matter. The more important matters are whether or not an idea does in fact exist

197. Lenczowski, op. cit., p. 90.

198. RIIA, The Middle East, op. cit., p. 27.

199. Antonius, op. cit., p. 312.

and what were the factors which brought that idea into being. From what has gone before in this paper, one has to disagree with Dr. Sayegh when speaking of Arab unity he writes, "Born, as it was, in the aftermath of the First World War, it had been conceived in the four turbulent years which intervened between the Armistice of 1918 and the final imposition of the post-War Settlement in 1922." 201

The idea of Arab unity was conceived in the pre-Islamic period and was born in the seventh century. It was cared for and nurtured through the years by Islam. The idea of unity was not, therefore, a "longing for the recent past," as Dr. Sayegh points out, but the continued struggle for the full unity which the Arabs had been denied since the seventh century. Full unity, however, had come to mean during World War I immediate unity of Syria, and future unity of the Fertile Crescent—no more, no less.

This unity having been denied, every politician from that date to the present was to use the term "Arab unity" at some time or another to gain the popular support of his people. Therefore, during the following years there were to be proposed almost as many schemes for Arab unity as there were politicians.

201. Ibid, p. 64.
A. The Arab Movement in Iraq

Syria had been the birthplace of the Arab nationalist movement. As has been seen in the preceding Chapter, Arab unity, in the post-war period, had become more than a "catch-phrase" for the Arab leaders; unity and independence had actually become a reality in Syria, the taste of which was appealing to the political palates of the majority of the Syrian people.

The fervor of the nationalist movement felt in the hearts of the Syrians, however, was slow in spreading into Iraq. The situation there had been somewhat different than in the Western parts of Arab Asia. Basra had been occupied by the British on November 22, 1915, and Baghdad was taken on March 11, 1917, only after considerable loss of men and money by the British.

The pre-war nationalist feeling in Iraq was occasioned, much in the same manner as in Syria and Hejaz, by the desire for autonomy from Turkish rule. Arab unity, as such, was not a particular platform of this nationalist movement, except insofar as the Iraqis shared with other Arab nationalists the desire for the return of Arab dominance over a united Islamic state. 202

No Arab province supplied more officers to the Ottoman Army than did Iraq, and many of these officers had become members in al-*Ahd,\textsuperscript{203} the nationalist organization which, along with al-Fatat, had drawn up the Damascus Protocol. Among this Iraqi Officer Corps serving in the Turkish Army were such men as Nuri as-Sa'id, Yassin al-Hashimi, Taha al-Hashimi, Mewlud al-Mukhliss and *Ali Jawdet al-Ayubi, all of whom later became prime ministers of Iraq.\textsuperscript{204}

Before and during the Arab Revolt these officers were "particularly active in seeking the independence of Mesopotamia without Western European interference and with a view of uniting the country with an independent Syria under the sharifian family of the Hejaz."\textsuperscript{205} Immediately following the armistice they had conducted a propaganda campaign of independence and unity from Dar az-Zor while other Iraqis living in Syria corresponded with relatives and friends, urging them to follow Syria's policy of independence and unity. In addition, funds were sent from Syria to support the Iraqi nationalist movement.\textsuperscript{206}

\textsuperscript{203} "Most, if not all of the Arab officers who were members of al-*Ahd came from the Fertile Crescent, principally Iraq. Under *Abdul Hamid and the Union and Progress Committee no Arab province supplied more officers to the Turkish Army, or of high standard, that did Iraq." Saab, op. cit., p. 248.

\textsuperscript{204} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{206} Ibid.
Although he recognizes the effort and effect of the Iraqis abroad upon the Iraqi nationalist movement, Philip Ireland discounts the part they played as being the "only effective element in opposition to British policy." He contends that to hold such a view would be to ignore the history of the Iraqi nationalist movement and to disregard the fundamental Arab character.

However, other than the part played by the Iraqi members of al-'Ahd, there is no evidence to indicate that the immediate intention of the Arabs of Iraq was to strive for Arab unity. The nationalist movement in Iraq was one for complete independence, pure and simple, from foreign (first Turkish and later British) rule. As Mr. H. St. John Philby pointed out in an address to the Central Asian Society on June 23, 1920, to the people of Iraq, independence was desirable for its own sake.

While the King-Crane Commission was gathering its information in Aleppo, a "committee of representative Mesopotamians" called upon the Commission to present the Iraqi case. In the program the Iraqis asked

207. Ireland, op. cit., pp. 242-43.

208. Mr. Philby said in part, "What they (the Iraqis) want, like the people of Arabia and Syria, and want because they are Arabs, is complete independence, nothing more and nothing less, and that is exactly what the British Government promised them in the most unequivocal terms by joining with the French in the momentous proclamation of November, 1918. Ibid, p. 243.

for complete independence of Mesopotamia to include Diarbekir, Dar az-Zor, Mosul, Baghdad and Muhammadah. In addition they asked that the government be in the form of a constitutional civil monarchy with its king being one of the sons of the King of Hejaz, 'either 'Abdullah or Zeid.' Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations was protested against, but after Iraq's independence was recognized, it would accept technical and economical assistance from America. It objected to immigration of Hindus and Jews. It demanded complete independence of Syria with no French interference. The program made no mention whatsoever of unity, other than that inferred in the request of an independent Iraq within certain boundaries, which in itself was a request to unify Iraq into one country rather than to allow it to remain in the old subdivisions of the wilayats of Basra, Baghdad, and Mosul. Present or future unity with Syria or any other Arab state was not contemplated or made a part of the program.

The religious aspect of the Iraqi nationalist movement was as great, if not greater, than it was in Syria and Hejaz. Although the movement was begun by laymen, it rapidly acquired the necessary support
of the priesthood and of religious dignitaries. To them, and particularly to the Shi'a Ulama, nationalism meant religious nationalism and the erection once again of the Islamic State, with the priesthood in their rightful dominant position. It meant a state freed from the contaminating influence of the West, purified from tendencies to exalt secularism and able to stamp out opposing sects and millets. Either because of or in spite of this religious nationalist tendency in Iraq, the movement was able to bring about a rapprochement between the Shi'a and Sunni sects and to initiate a cooperative religious nationalist effort. According to Ireland it was "at times almost impossible to discern whether the Movement was being directed by the priesthood of Najaf, Karbala and Kadhimain or by the political leaders of Baghdad, Mosul and Syria."  

On March 8, 1920, the General Syrian Congress met and proclaimed Syria a sovereign constitutional monarchy and it named the Emir Faisal as

210. "In a part of the world where differences of religion and of sect are synonymous with difference of races and of nationality, where religious fanaticism still lies close to the surface, and where allegiance to religious authority has still to be replaced by allegiance to state, it is not surprising that Nationalism begun as a political movement fostered by lawyers, teachers, writers and soldiers, should assume the support of the priesthood and of religious dignitaries." Ireland, op.cit., p. 245.

211. Ibid, p. 246.

212. Ibid, p. 246.
the King of Syria. 213 At the same time, according to Brockelman, the "Iraqi section of the officers' society al-'Ahd proclaimed Husain's son 'Abdullah King of Iraq." 214 Both the French and the British Governments "announced that they would not recognize any validity to the proceedings at Damascus..." 215 and Faisal was never recognized by either government as King of Syria. Needless to say, the effort of the Iraqi proclamation was also fruitless, and 'Abdullah was not recognized by the British or the French as King of Iraq.

However, the two proclamations did stir Great Britain and France into immediate action concerning the mandates. Steps were taken by the two governments to convene an early conference of the Supreme Council. On the 25th of April, 1920, the Supreme Council met at San Remo and on May 5 the decision it had taken was made public. All of Syria and Iraq had been placed under the mandatory rule to "suit the ambitions of each Power." 216 Syria was divided into three separate units, Lebanon, Palestine and the remainder of Syria. France was given mandatory power over Syria and Lebanon. Great Britain took Iraq and Palestine. Total disunity of the Arab world prevailed.


216. Ibid, p. 305.
With the mandates having been assigned, France prepared to take its final step towards complete control of her area. General Gourand had been appointed in November 1919 to be commander-in-chief and later High Commissioner for Syria and Lebanon. On July 14, 1920, he sent an ultimatum to King Faisal demanding that the Ryak-Aleppo railway be surrendered to France; that the French mandate be accepted; that the Syrian army be disbanded and conscription be abolished; that bandits be punished; and that the French-issued paper currency for Syria be accepted.²¹⁷ Faisal accepted all of the terms of the ultimatum.

In spite of his acceptance or because of it, General Gourand sent French military forces towards Damascus. Hearing of this the population of Damascus rose in anger and marched out to meet the attacking force. At Maisalum Pass, 2,000 Syrian patriots bravely attempted to halt the French military machine which with Great Britain and the United States had only recently defeated the German Army. This of course was impossible.²¹⁸ By July 27 the French were in full occupation of Damascus. The following day Faisal was forced to leave the country. He traveled to Italy and remained there in retreat until December when he traveled to London at the request of the British Government.

B. The Struggle for Unity Becomes Secondary

Upon the assigning of the mandates by far the most serious

²¹⁷. Ziadeh, op. cit., p. 49.

²¹⁸. Antonius, op. cit., p. 308.
uprising had taken place in Iraq. The army of Iraq, made up of various tribes, had risen in Jihad against the British. The Iraqi Insurrection was not as easily dispelled as the Syrian, and it was only after considerable cost of casualties and funds that it was finally quelled in the latter part of 1920. Afterwards the question of a ruler for Iraq, was uppermost in the problems of the Arab world for the British for the next few months. 219 It was for this reason that Faisal had been invited to London.

Faisal was first offered the throne of Iraq on December 17, 1920, at which time he refused declaring that it "belonged to his brother *Abdullah and he could not accept it." 220 However, after *Abdullah was compelled by the British to accept the Amirate of Transjordan, Faisal became more receptive. In a meeting in Cairo from March 12 to the 24, 1921, it was decided that the British would place Faisal on the Iraqi throne. After much political wrangling Faisal was proclaimed King of Iraq and was confirmed by Iraqi Council of State on July 11, 1921, "provided His Highness' government shall be a constitutional, representative, and democratic government limited by law." 221

The statement is usually made that after 1921 the center of Pan-Arabism shifted from Damascus to Baghdad under the leadership of King Faisal and his nationalist entourage, who followed him to Iraq when he

221. Foster, op.cit., p. 95.
became King of that country. Majid Khadduri wrote that "from 1921 to 1941 Iraq became the most promising country to lead the Arabs toward the attainment of their national aspirations...the only truly Arab national regime would be that in which Iraq would form a part of a united Arab State."

The disturbing fact is that from 1921 and for almost twenty years thereafter, the struggle for Arab unity was very meager and enjoyed very little popular support. This twenty-year gap in which the Arab movement, as such, made little or no progress is readily noticeable in all of the books and documents concerning the Arab movement. How could one call for unity when unity was practically impossible, and certainly unforeseeable. By 1922 geographical Syria had been divided into eight separate autonomous areas, all of which, with Iraq, were under foreign domination.

222. "The hotbed of the Arab nationalist movement before and immediately after the First World War was in Syria; but the fall of the Arab Government in Damascus in 1920 and Faisal's accession to the throne of Iraq moved the center of Pan-Arabism from Damascus to Baghdad." Khadduri, Majid, "The Scheme of Fertile Crescent Unity; A Study in Inter-Arab Relations, The Near East and the Great Powers, ed. Richard N. Frye, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1951, p. 137. Also see Ireland, op. cit., p. 259.

223. "In 1922 geographical Syria had been divided into no fewer than eight autonomous areas: the Sanjaq of Alexandretta, and the States of the Alawis, Aleppo, Lebanon, Damascus, the Jebel Druze, Palestine, and Transjordan, all for less than seven million people." RIIA, "The Greater Syria Plan," op.cit., p. 16.
This inter-war period, according to Dr. Zeine, is the third stage in the evolution of Arab nationalism. It was a period of "frustration and disappointment in Western promises of independence." During this period regional nationalism or provincialism was accentuated and, while the idea of Arab unity was maintained, the first and foremost aim was that of independence.

"Arab provincialism," writes Dr. Faris, "may be described as the feeling among the inhabitants of one Arab country that it is their only homeland, that they should be proud of it and promote its independence, and that the inhabitants of other Arab countries, though Arabs like them, are so remote that there is no need to become united with them. It is even more accurate to state that the idea of union does not enter their thinking."

Dr. Sayegh in his book Arab Unity also states that "while the national movement expressed itself in the form of uprisings and insurrections for independence during the two decades of the inter-War period, the active struggle for unity was halted. The dedication to

224. Zeine, op.cit., p. 126. The first stage was the birth of Arab nationalism with the rise of Islam and the second stage was the "political nationalism" from the nineteenth century up until the post World War I period.


226. Ibid, p. 124. The words underlined were done so by the writer of this paper.
unity as an ideal persisted in the Arab heart; but the progress towards unity was to remain confined to the realm of the mind, where the idea of unity was to undergo a process of refinement, clarification, and evolution." 227

C. The First Post-War Unity Scheme (1932)

During the first few years of the mandates various political parties were formed for campaigning for independence, but their activities were strictly regulated by the Mandatory Powers. 228 Some of these parties represented the Arab nationalist views, while others were active for regional or provincial causes. Among the first of the political parties formed in Syria and Lebanon was the National Syrian (Socialist) Party. It was secretly inaugurated in Lebanon in 1932 by Anton Sa'adah, a Lebanese Christian. The party, although strongly nationalist, was vigorously opposed to Arab nationalism. According to the first principle

227. Sayegh, op. cit., p. 68.

228. Speaking of political activity in Syria and Lebanon during the early period of the mandate, Dr. Ziadeh writes, "It must be borne in mind, however, that down to 1925 the French High Commissioners were all military men, who could not easily tolerate political freedom, so that party life during this early period was fragmentary, and many leaders found it expedient to go to the newly created Emirate of Transjordan or to Egypt." Ziadeh, op. cit., p. 191, and Philip Ireland writes in his book Iraq concerning "The law of Associations under which parties were strictly regulated..." Ireland, op. cit., p. 358.
of the party as set out by its leader "Syria is for the Syrians who constitute a nation complete in itself." This new element of Syrian nationality as opposed to an Arab nationality was the central doctrine and the axis around which the new party revolved. Its other principles were as follows:

2. The Syrian national cause is an integral cause completely distinct from any other cause.

3. The Syrian cause is the cause of the Syrian nation and of the Syrian Homeland.

4. The Syrian nation is the product of the ethnic unity of the Syrian people...

5. The Syrian Homeland is that geographic environment in which the Syrian nation evolved. This region is that of the Syrian Fertile Crescent, the island of Cyprus being its star.

6. The Syrian nation is one society.

7. The Syrian Social Nationalist Movement derives its inspiration from the genius of the Syrian nation and its cultural political national history.

8. Syria's interest supercedes and is prior to every other interest.

The party claimed that the Arabs were a race distinct and


separate from the Syrians. In fact, Sa'adah held that what was often "referred to as the Arab nation is in reality nonexistent." It was the first political party in the Arab world to preach the separation of religion and state. Dr. Ziadeh writes in his book *Syria and Lebanon* that "to a number of people, especially Christian thinkers, living about 1900, a nationalism based on Islam *per se* could not be considered as sound. Arab Nationalism, with the Arab historical background, could not, they thought, be divorced from Islam. Therefore something which did not depend on Islam was needed. It was some time before this idea caught the imagination of the late Anton Sa'adah..."

The party's strong call for unity at the time of its beginning in 1932 was like a voice out of the wilderness. As the party itself claims, "at a time when the call for unity weakened and shrunk, and when Arabism meant only singing the praises of Arab heritage and Arab glory, the Syrian Social Nationalist Party declared, in 1932 its social nationalist creed which included the call for Syrian unity on the basis


232. The Baath (Renaissance) Party which later spread its branches throughout the Arab world, was the first Arab nationalist party to demand separation of religion from state.

233. Ziadeh, op.cit., p. 198. And the party claimed that "neither nationalism nor the national state can be founded upon religion." Sa'adah, op.cit., p. 25.
of the Party's scientific definition of the Fertile Crescent."

According to the Syrian Social Nationalist Party the unity which is desired and natural is the Fertile Crescent which is the "natural environment in which the Syrian Nation originated and which has distinct geographical boundaries extending from the Taurus Mountains in the northwest and the Zagros Mountains in the northeast to the Suez Canal and Red Sea in the south, including the Sinai Peninsula and the Gulf of Aqaba and the Syrian Sea in the west, including Cyprus Island, to the bow of the Arabian Desert and the Persian Gulf in the east."

Dr. George Kirk has said that Arab nationalists have always looked back to Faisal's kingdom as their political pattern for Syria. This, he says, is the Greater or Natural Syria. They would improve on Faisal's kingdom only by adding to it those lands which would round off the whole of geographical Syria as a single Arab State. The Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party was not an Arab nationalist party. It was a Syrian nationalist party. But it was the first to emphasize after World War I an organized call for unity within the form of a Syrian unity. In its basic form the call for unity was exactly that—a Syrian unity. However, in later years the area has been extended to include Iraq.

234. Headquarters, The Syrian Social Nationalist Party, Latest Unions and Present Affairs, 1920, a pamphlet, quote is from a translation and exact page is unknown.

235. Ibid.

Kuwait and Cyprus.

The party and its call for unity has had no small effect upon the Syrian people. As stated before, the Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party was formed in 1932, and, although it has encountered much difficulty, has been, through the course of time, banned in Lebanon and Syria, today it is still extremely active in its call for Syrian unity and in its campaign against Arab nationalism. Its success in Iraq, however, has been meager, "for the Iraqi is capable of understanding that he is an Iraqi because he lives in Iraq...but he cannot in any way understand that he is Syrian."\(^{237}\) Dr. Faris claims, that although the movement has caused a break in the ranks of Arab nationalism and adds to the many disunifying factors within the Arab nation, it has, on the other hand, rendered a great service in the fact that it has stirred Arab nationalists from their apathy, warned them of the necessity for clarifying their aims and unifying their forces and has impressed upon them the importance of coordinated and positive action among the rank and file of the Arab public.

D. The Muslim Scheme for Unity--The Muslim Brotherhood

E. A. Speiser writes that "...on the surface Arab nationalism appears to be ethnic, yet its mainspring is religious, at one with the hardy socio-political core of Islam...in other words, Pan-Arabism is in reality an aspect of Pan-Islamism and the failures of the leaders to

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\(^{237}\) Faris & Husayn, \textit{op.cit.}, p. 149.
integrate the two movements has produced many internal conflicts and is certain to sow others."

Throughout the Arab nationalist movement and the call for Arab unity the parallel call for Islamic unity has been prevalent, and for the most part, even predominant. The two movements sometimes seem to be one, and at other times they separate with gulfs between them as the political situation at the time emphasizes their divergence. There is no doubt that their long range aims compete with one another, but their immediate aims during the inter-War period were in agreement.

According to 'Elie Kedourie, "the Pan-Arabs desired the unification of the Arab lands; they desired to expel the foreigner. These aims (were) acceptable to, and indeed mandatory on, Muslims, for the Arab world is the cradle of Islam and to expel the foreigner from it is a meritorious action. Such (was) the agreement in principle between Pan-Islamism and Pan-Arabism."


239. "In spite of the fact that the Islamic movements disagree with the Arab movements on the long-range aims, there is agreement on immediate aims. The most serious and urgent of these immediate aims is the liberation of the Arab countries from colonialism and from foreign manipulation. The second of these agreed aims is the unification of all Arab countries and the co-ordination of their economic resources for the general welfare of all." Faris & Husayn, op.cit., p. 154.

Although the Islamic movements advocate and strive for expulsion of the foreigners and for Arab unity, they do so because they consider the Arab world only as a part of the whole Islamic fatherland. Therefore the liberation and unity of the Arab world is a prerequisite to their greater long-range aim of liberation of the Islamic world and the eventual formation of a Pan-Islamic Union.

The most important purely Islamic movement possessing these aims is al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin (The Muslim Brotherhood or Muslim Brethren) which was founded in 1928 in the city of Ismailia, Egypt, by Hasan al-Banna, a 22-year old school teacher, who seemed to have been most capable in the abilities of organization and leadership.

Al-Banna spread his movement by speaking in coffee shops and in mosques as well as by the use of pamphlets, letters, and newspapers. He did not go to the intellectuals but rather he concentrated his efforts on the simple people, selecting supporters among them and using them to spread the movement by also speaking and establishing branches throughout Egypt. He looked beyond Egypt and found that "the circumstances were favorable for the spread of the movement." Sudan was the first Muslim country outside Egypt to receive members and to establish branches. In the late 1930’s the movement spread to Palestine and later


to Syria, Lebanon and North Africa, Iraq discouraged the Muslim Brethren from operating in that country for fear that its activity might stir up the age-old differences between the Sunni and Shi'a Muslim Sects.

To the Muslim Brethren Islam is a Holy Book, a nation, a faith, a sword and a way of life. Among its principles are "the liberation of the Nile valley and all of the Arab countries and all parts of the Islamic fatherland from all foreigners; ...the unqualified support of Arab unity; steady progression towards an Islamic league; ...and the institution of a sound state which would put the rules and injunctions of Islam into practice."  

In his various writings al-Banna declared that the Muslim Brethren "believe in Arab unity and in Islamic unity." To the Brethren Arab unity means the union of all Arabic-speaking peoples. However, Islamic unity is their eventual goal and it is the duty of the Brethren to "work for the unity of all Muslims and the strengthening of the brotherhood of Islam." The Brethren believe that their fatherland is every land where there are Muslims. Each person should, therefore, work for the fatherland and place it above all others. After that, "he

244. Ibid, The Muslim Brethren is actually Sunni.
246. Ibid, p. 44.
should support Arab unity as being the second link, then Pan-Islam as being the perfect boundary-wall about the universal Islamic fatherland. There is no conflict between those concepts of unity."

The Muslim Brethren also believe in the revival of the Caliphate as they consider it to be the "symbol of Islamic unity and the outward sign of the bonds uniting the nations of Islam."247 But first there must be complete cultural, economic, and social cooperation among the Islamic nations, followed by alliances, treaties and the formation of a league of Islamic nations so that "being so constituted they could rally about the Imam who would be the focal point of the union."

Thus is the scheme of unity as advocated by the Muslim Brethren. It is indeed a scheme of Arab unity, but its final goal is one of wider scope than Arab nationalism, to which it is in opposition, as it transcends the boundaries of the Arab countries to reach all Muslims.

E. King Abdullah's Greater Syria Scheme

The foregoing schemes of unity were schemes advocated by political parties which were formed during the late 1920's and the early 1930's. As such they were not particularly effective as they did not enjoy the backing of any particular government or influential block within a government. They were, however, the most important schemes of unity advanced during that period.

It was not until 1940 that further schemes of unity were to be

247. Ibid.
boundaries of Egypt to Iraq and Turkey, is detrimental to Arab interest...To accept this division is to submit to an idea which the Arab nation has rejected and which exposes it to the ambitions of the Jews and their supporters in Palestine."²⁵⁰

In July, 1940, immediately following France's collapse of the previous month, Emir 'Abdullah forwarded two communications to the British Government expressing the desire of Syria and Transjordan to reunite into one state.²⁵¹ But 'Abdullah's requests were premature because of the uncertainty of the French position as well as sympathies of the Pan-Arabs towards the Axis Powers,²⁵² whom they felt could help them in their drive for independence and eventual unity.

In July 1941 another communication was sent by 'Abdullah to the British Government in the form of a resolution, which had been adopted by the Transjordanian Council of Ministers on July 1, 1941, and which requested the realization of a Syrian unity in order to conform to its geographical unity. The reply from the British Government was to the effect that this was an Arab matter and that any movement for further unity was up to the Arabs. On the other hand, the reply discouraged any

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²⁵⁰ 'Abdullah, op.cit., pp. 246-49.


²⁵² Khadduri, "Fertile Crescent Unity", op.cit., p. 141.
such movements under the present conditions.  

A second communication in the form of an invitation was sent on July 11, 1941, to the new British Minister of State in the Near East, Mr. Oliver Lyttelton, to visit the Emir 'Abdullah in Amman in order to discuss the unification of Syria. The reply to this second communication also emphasized that Syrian unity was an Arab matter and should be "undertaken under more favorable conditions."  

'Abdullah's requests and efforts toward unity were still premature. However, the Minister of State, Mr. Lyttelton, did visit the Emir in Amman, but he reminded 'Abdullah that there were many interests involved at that time and he asked him "to be patient until after the war." By so doing the British Government had refused to aid 'Abdullah in his quest for Syrian unity, but at the same time they had also assured him that his personal endeavors towards such a unity would not be obstructed. British encouragement to unity had also been given only three months prior by Mr. Anthony Eden in what has come to be known as his Mansion House Speech delivered on May 29, 1941. In it Mr. Eden  

253. Ibid, pp. 33-35. In July 1941 "the Transjordan Legislative Council, nominated by 'Abdullah, and some tribal chiefs sent telegrams to the British and Free French authorities stating that it was Transjordan's national aim to achieve (Syrian) unity." RIIA, "The Greater Syria Plan", op.cit., p. 19.


said, that a few days previous he had said in the House of Commons "that His Majesty's Government had great sympathy with Syrian aspirations for independence. I should like to repeat that now. But I would go further. The Arab world has made great strides since the settlement reached at the end of the last war, and many Arab thinkers desire for the Arab peoples a greater degree of unity than they now enjoy. In reaching out for this unity they hope for our support. No such appeal from our friends can go unanswered. It seems to me both natural and right that the cultural and economic ties between Arab countries, and the political ties, too, should be strengthened. His Majesty's Government...will give their full support to any scheme that commands general approval." 257

As far as Emir 'Abdullah was concerned, he had received the "green light" from the British Government. His next step was to feel out the public opinion of Syria. This he did through correspondence with certain leading Syrian politicians, and in particular one Faris al-Khuri, a notable Christian Syrian and Arab nationalist who was "well disposed to the Hashimi family." 258 In his correspondence, 'Abdullah pointed out to al-Khuri that since Syria had been promised her independence, now was the opportune time to strive for Syrian unity. He also stressed that his motives were national rather than personal, as he was


willing to let the Syrian people "decide whether they wanted a monar-
chial or republican form of government." However, as Syria was more
preoccupied with the actual gaining of her independence which was her
natural course before considering unity, Ḥ Abdullāh's efforts fell
practically upon deaf ears.

Still determined to achieve his goal, Ḥ Abdullāh addressed a pub-
lic appeal in the form of a proclamation to the Syrian people to unite
the divisions of Syria which had been divided, after World War I as a
result of the mandates. 259 In the appeal he reminded the people of the
Arab Revolt which had been fought by all Arabs, side by side, but which
resulted in independence for Ḥejāz, Nejād, and Yemen, with Iraq gaining
her independence later in 1931, but only Syria had remained divided and
under foreign control. Then he reminded the Syrian Arabs of the resolu-
tion of the General Syrian Congress for an independent and united Syria.
In the appeal he stated that the Arab leaders were endeavoring in the
light of the new Atlantic Charter of 1941 to realize the reunification
of Syria "in the firm belief of our rights and depending upon the sup-
port of our people and our allies." The appeal concluded with an invita-
tion to the leaders of Syria, saying that "at the same time we call upon
those concerned with this question in Syria to discuss Syrian union or
federation through the medium of a special Syrian Congress which they
are welcome to convene at our Capital at any time they so desire." 260

259. Ḥ Abdullāh, op.cit., p. 266.

In spite of Britain's previous statements regarding her desire to help the Arabs in their steps toward unity, both she and the Free French authorities would not allow the publication of 'Abdullah's proclamation in the newspapers or its announcement over the radio stations of Palestine, Syria and Lebanon. 261

The Greater Syria Scheme as advocated by 'Abdullah is explained in his Memoirs. It is actually two schemes, or as he has put it, "two solutions of the Syrian problem." 262

Both solutions considered mainly the unity of Syria but the first did envisage the inclusion of Iraq with a proviso that other Arab countries may join if they so wish. The only substantial differences were whether the form of government should be a united state under a constitutional monarchy or an Arab Federation. In either case 'Abdullah proposed himself as the head of the Syrian State.

In the first solution the formation of a United Syrian State was proposed. It would be composed of Syria, Transjordan, Palestine and Lebanon according to the resolution of the General Syrian Congress of 1920. Special administrations would be set up in "parts of Palestine and Old Lebanon for the safeguarding of the rights of the Jewish minority and the preservation of the Holy Places in the one and for the protection of the special rights of Old Lebanon (the privileged province formed in Syria in 1861) in the other." The Balfour Declaration would

261. Ibid.

either be withdrawn or reinterpreted to maintain Palestine at a one-third Jew, two-thirds Arab ratio. After the Syrian State had been formed, Iraq and the United Syrian State would unite to form the Arab Federation which would organize the common defense, the general culture and the national economy of the two States."\textsuperscript{263}

The second solution was the foundation of a Syrian Federation composed of the states of Syria, Transjordan, Lebanon and Palestine with a generally elected Legislature, a council of Representatives and the Prime Minister and his Cabinet elected from the Legislative body. In the second proposal he considered the special position of Lebanon by adding that if she declined to join the Federation then "those Syrian territories which had been attached to the Lebanon against the will of their inhabitants should be allowed to revert to Syria by free plebisite."\textsuperscript{264}

'Abdullah gave five reasons for his own claim to the throne of the future Syrian State. These were (1) his legally established right to the throne of Transjordan, an important section of Greater Syria; (2) his effective assistance to the Allies in the war; (3) his being the first

\textsuperscript{263} Ibid, p. 264.

\textsuperscript{264} Ibid, p. 265. It is interesting to note that in 1946 'Abdullah was "reported to have said, 'I believe that when union between Transjordan and Iraq is realized other countries will follow their example.' In the same statement he made an important concession to the hard facts of the situation by confirming, apparently for the first time, that he did not wish to include Lebanon, but only the Syria of King Faisal," RIIA, "The Greater Syria Plan", \textit{op.cit.}, p. 19.
heir to the right of his late father, King Husain; (4) the promise given to him in 1921 by Mr. Churchill that he would be the head of the Syrian State; and, (5) the desire of the Syrians for a constitutional monarchy in the event of a Syrian unity or an Arab Federation.265

The entire Greater Syria Scheme, as has been seen, was based on the scheme of unity as advocated by the old Syrian Congress for a united Syrian State. But Dr. Faris points out that 'Abdullah had failed to take into consideration the changes which had taken place in the intervening twenty years. These changes were evident, such as the penetration of Zionism into Palestine as well as the backing it had gained in the Western world; the entrenchment of the British in Palestine and Trans-Jordan during the mandate period; the development of the nationalist movement in Syria and Lebanon; and of great importance, the change of the attitude of the people towards the Hashimi family and towards a monarchical form of government.266

'Abdullah had thoroughly propagandized his scheme throughout the Arab world, but the opposition to the scheme had countered his every move. In spite of its Hashimi character, "to some it was nothing but a British plan, using 'Abdullah, Britain's friend,...to drive out the

265. 'Abdullah, op.cit., p. 263.

266. Faris and Husayn, op.cit., p. 79.
vestiges of French influence in the area and to displace it by her own." To others it was a Zionist plan to extend their influence beyond the borders of Palestine. To all its opponents it was a dream of 'Abdullah's personal ambition to sit upon the Syrian throne which he had felt was his right from the beginning, and with the death of Faisal in 1934, and was now also his inherited right.

Therefore, the scheme encountered difficulty from every quarter of the "Fertile Crescent." The Arabic-speaking Christians of Lebanon did "not relish the idea of being merged in a Greater Syria that would be predominantly Muslim". Even those Muslim families of Lebanon who participated in the government, the ruling class, so to speak, were not desirous of seeing any authority transferred from Beirut to Damascus.269 Riad as-Sulh, then the Prime Minister of Lebanon, "was very emphatic when he declared that the independence of Lebanon provided for friendly

267. Ibid, p. 80. Regarding this feeling of 'Abdullah being a "creature of the British" George Kirk writes, "In the spring of 1939 in which Syrian Nationalists' hopes were dashed by the French change in policy, students of the University of Damascus decided that the time had come to proclaim a King of Syria, but their choice was not 'Abdullah, but his nephew Ghazi of Iraq, who was their own age and was reputed to share their uncompromising nationalism." RIIA, "The Greater Syria Plan", op.cit., p.18.


269. Ibid; see also Faris and Husayn, op.cit., p. 79. Here Dr. Faris writes "In Syria and Lebanon there grew up a ruling class whose concern was to maintain its sole control over government."
cooperation between her Christian and Muslim population, which was a more vital matter than the establishment of an empire." 270 Similarly, the ruling class of Syria might have been favorable to a Greater Syrian Republic, but they would not accept any scheme at that time which would have meant diminution of their influence or subordination to a higher authority. And it was opposed by Iraq as the Iraqi branch of the Hashimi family had also proposed their own scheme of unity.

F. Nuri as-Said’s Fertile Crescent Scheme

In speaking of the ambitious ideas of unity which Arab nationalists had eventually adopted, Musa al-‘Alami suggested after the Palestine War that "we must narrow the field. Here the Fertile Crescent suggests itself. It was in Syria and Iraq that the idea of Arab nationalism and Arab independence developed in the time of the Turks; it was on the banks of the Barada and the Tigress that the idea of Arab unity was born... The people of these two countries had the most understanding of the Arab nationalism and Arab unity and the most enthusiasm for and belief in them." 271

270. Ziadeh, op.cit., p. 95.

271. Al-Alami, Musa, "The Lessons of Palestine" (a translation of Ibrat Filastin), Middle East Journal, October 3, 1949, p. 390. Al-Alami writes in this same article, "Let us then be convinced of regional unity which will bring together the countries of this (Fertile) Crescent, and can be a pattern for general unity, while the door remains open for those other Arab countries which may wish to enter." Ibid, p. 375.
It was just such a unity of the Fertile Crescent which Nuri Pasha as-Said, the Prime Minister of Iraq proposed for his solution of the Syrian problem. However, 'Abdullah's Greater Syrian Scheme which proposed 'Abdullah as the head of the Syrian State was conflicting with the efforts of Nuri Pasha and others to get the leaders of the Arab states together for a discussion in preparation of a conference for the creation of an Arab League. Nuri Pasha is reported to have visited 'Abdullah in Amman to urge him to desist from his propaganda to secure the Syrian throne, which was bound to antagonize the Syrian nationalists and King ibn Saud, the old enemy of the Hashimi family. 272

In order to see the conflict between 'Abdullah's scheme and Nuri Pasha's Fertile Crescent Scheme, if such a conflict actually does exist, it will be necessary to first examine the latter.

Nuri Pasha's scheme for Fertile Crescent unity was prepared in the latter part of 1942 and was presented to Mr. Richard G. Casey, the British Minister of State Resident in the Middle East in Cairo at the beginning of 1943. 273 It was presented in the form of a Memorandum. 274


274. Government Press, Istiqal al-'Arab wa Wahdatuhum: Mudhakkira fi al-Qadiyyah al-'Iraqiyyah (Arab Independence and Unity: Memorandum on the Arab Cause). Baghdad, 1943, pp. 19–22. The translations of this memorandum which have been utilized for this paper were the translation of Hurewitz and a translation prepared and furnished to the writer by Dr. Mohammed Khalil, Professor of Political Science, American University of Beirut.
In the beginning the scheme called for the reuniting of Syria, Lebanon, Palestine and Transjordan into one state, the form of government of which, "whether monarchical or republican whether unitary or federal," was to be decided by the people themselves. After the State of Syria had been formed, it and Iraq would immediately join an Arab League "which can be joined by the other Arab states at will."

The envisioned Arab League was to have a "permanent Council nominated by the States' Members of the League" and it would be presided over by one of the heads of the States "chosen in a manner acceptable to the States concerned." This Council was to be responsible for the defense, foreign affairs, currency, communications, customs and the protection of minorities of all of the States of the League.

The Jews in Palestine were to be granted autonomy in the areas where they constituted a majority, and the Maronites in Lebanon were to be granted a privileged administration comparative to that which they "enjoyed during the last years of the Ottoman Empire" if they so desired.

Much of the remainder of the proposal concerned the solution of the Palestine Problem, which, it seems Nuri Pasha felt must be solved before union could be accomplished.

*Abdullah had not specified why he had failed to include other Arab countries in his scheme other than to mention that they might join his Arab Federation if they so desired. Nuri Pasha, on the other hand, explained immediately before his conclusion that the states of the Arabian Peninsula had an economic system which differed from that of
Syria and Iraq, and that Egypt was a backward country with its own problems in the Sudan and elsewhere. For these reasons he assumed that these states were not inclined to join an Arab Union or an Arab League from the start.

As can be seen, Nuri Pasha’s Fertile Crescent Scheme and ‘Abdullah’s Greater Syria Scheme were not contradictory, but, if anything, supplemented each other. Both aimed at the unification of Greater Syria plus Iraq and both were rather cool about the joining of other Arab states, although they did leave an opening for such an event. However, there were other similarities which were to give them difficulty insofar as the other Arab countries were concerned. First was the fact that if they succeeded they would strengthen the position of the Hashimi kingdoms; and, second, they both appeared to have British sanction and backing. The mere idea of these two points was immediately politically obnoxious to the rest of the Arab world in general and to Saudi Arabia and Egypt in particular. The extreme enmity between the families of Saud and Hashim had been a factor in Arab politics since World War I. Ibn Saud never felt quite certain that the sons of King Husain would not seek revenge upon him for the severe thrashing his Ikhwan had dealt out to the army and people of Hejaz when he took that territory in 1925. As for the second point, any scheme that had the slightest appearance of being sanctioned by the British was automatically questionable to the nationalists of Egypt, who were still at this time struggling toward complete independence from Great Britain.
It was this latter consideration, coupled with the fact that Egyptian hegemony over the Arab world might be completely lost to Iraq if either of these two schemes of Fertile Crescent Union were allowed to succeed, which brought Egypt into the sphere of Arab politics. Before this time Egypt had constantly stressed its separate entity, and had not interested itself in Arab affairs. 275 "Egypt, it is true, had followed in the past an independent course toward the achievement of her national aspirations, but the new circumstances of the last war made her realize the advantages if she led a bloc of several Arab states in the post-war period. But Egypt's leadership of the movement of Arab unity...had compromised the possibility of achieving a close and integrated union as that contemplated by General Nuri." 276


CHAPTER VIII

THE ARAB LEAGUE

A. British Policy Towards a Union of Arab States

It cannot be denied that British policy was basically directed towards a close federation or confederation of Arab states in the post-World War I period. However, once the mandates were assigned and the division of the Arab world became a reality, British policy changed to coincide with reality. During the inter-war period Great Britain could not back the various schemes of Arab unity, because to do so would mean treading on the toes of the French and the Zionists. She was not willing to go to this extent, or to publicly indicate that she was in favor of a union of Arab states prior to the beginning of the influence which the Axis Powers began to acquire in the Arab world.

During the 1930’s a number of treaties and agreements were concluded between the various Arab states. For example, as early as 1926 the Mecca Protectorate Agreement was signed between 'Asir, Hejaz, Najd and other Dependencies. Treaties of friendship between Saudi Arabia and Iraq and Saudi Arabia and Transjordan were concluded in 1930 and 1933 respectively. Then in 1936 Saudi Arabia concluded the Treaty of Brotherhood and Alliance with Iraq and other Arab states were invited to participate with them in this friendship pact. Yemen accepted this invitation and joined the pact in 1937. In the meanwhile Saudi Arabia and Egypt negotiated a treaty of friendship in 1936.

These agreements were "hailed by the Arab nationalists as a
token of Arab brotherhood and as patterns of future unity.\textsuperscript{269} Then in the latter part of the decade the Arab strike in Palestine occurred, and the Arabs began to realize, even more strongly, the necessity for a unified action against the growing menace of Jewish immigration and the building of the Jewish National Home, even if actual political unity did seem remote.

It is not the intention of this paper to discuss the Palestine Problem, but certain effects which it had upon Arab unity are important. In speaking of the bilateral and multilateral treaties which were entered into by the Arab countries during this period, Dr. Sayegh contends that probably the more important of these were the "inter-governmental conferences held in the late 1930's for devising common policies, planning common action, or making common representation to outside Powers with respect to specific Arab problems of concern to all Arabs, notably the Palestine Problem. The Palestine Revolt of 1936 furnished the first opportunity for concerted inter-governmental action by the Arab states..."\textsuperscript{270}

As a result of the Palestine Revolt, the British Government had sent a Royal Commission under the leadership of Lord Peel to determine the causes of the conflict and to make recommendations regarding the solution of the problem. The report submitted by the commission, especially insofar as it recommended partition of Palestine, became a highly

\textsuperscript{269} Sayegh, \textit{op.cit.}, p. 112.

\textsuperscript{270} Ibid, p. 113.
controversial subject, and was neither accepted by the Arabs nor the Jews.

In a debate in the British Parliament in July 1937 concerning this Royal Commission's Report,\(^{271}\) which recommended partition of Palestine, Lord Herbert Samuel, a Jew and former High Commissioner for Palestine from 1920-1925, criticized this recommendation. At the same time he proposed to the Parliament the "recognition of Arab aspirations and the attitude of Islam towards the Holy Places."\(^{272}\) He also recommended that "the ultimate aim of Great Britain should be to build up, with the assent of France and full cooperation of the Zionist movement, a Great Arab Confederation (to include Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Transjordan, Syria, etc.)."

Later, on September 11, 1937, an Arab National Conference was called to meet at Bludan in Syria. This Conference was made up of 500 representatives from Syria and other Arab countries including Egypt. It was held under the presidency of Nabih bey al-Azmeh, President of the Palestine Defense Committee.\(^{273}\) The Bludan Conference passed a resolution of non-acceptance of the Royal Commission Report and it added to

\(^{271}\) The report is sometimes referred to as the Peel Report.


\(^{273}\) Very few of these 500 delegates were official representatives of their respective government. Montange, Robert, "Pour la paix en Palestine," *Politique Etrangere*, August 1938, p. 393.
this resolution a "solemn declaration that the Arab nation and the Muslim people would continue to struggle for the Arab cause in Palestine, to achieve the liberation of the country and the establishment of an Arab government." 274

Between 1939 and 1941 the Nazi menace began to extend itself to the Arab world, and Great Britain found herself more free to act in the Middle East in accordance with her old policy of uniting the Arabs. The first formal act of British recognition of the right of the Arab states to act collectively was in February and March of 1939 when Great Britain sponsored a conference of Arab States in London to consider the problem in Palestine. By so doing she "set a pattern and a precedent for united Arab action under her protective wing." 275 As a result of this Conference the British issued their policy on Palestine in May 1939 which has come to be known as the White Paper. 276 This action proved to be the


276. "In February-March 1939 a pretense was made in London of conducting round-table discussions, to which were invited the Jewish Agency, representing non-Zionists as well as Zionists, spokesmen of the Palestine Arabs and delegates from the independent Arab states and Transjordan. But the Arabs refused to sit with the Jews. The British put forward proposals totally unacceptable to the Jews, because they were predicated on the desiccation of the Zionist movement and to an over-whelming majority of the Arabs, because they did not meet the Arab demands in full. The policy statement of May 17, 1939, incorporated with minor change the British proposals of two months earlier." Hurewitz, op.cit., Vol. II, p. 219.
turning point of British policy in the Arab world. During the inter-war period Britain had followed a divide and rule policy among the Arab states and among the various communities and minorities within these states. According to Hurewitz, "by giving the independent Arab states a voice in Palestine affairs on the eve of the war Britain had embarked on a new cause, designed to promote the unity of the Arab East by fostering the interests of the Sunni Arab majority, even at the expense of the Christian, Jewish, Kurdish, and Shi'ite minorities." 277

Britain's passive acceptance of 'Abdullah's efforts towards unity beginning in 1940 and Mr. Anthony Eden's Mansion House Statement of 1941, in which he declared that Britain would favor any scheme of Arab unity which commanded general approval, have already been discussed in this paper. Then on February 24, 1943, in the House of Commons Mr. Eden was questioned regarding Britain's efforts to promote greater cooperation among the Arab states with a view towards an ultimate Arab Federation. At this time Eden reaffirmed Britain's sympathy with any movement among Arabs to promote their economic, cultural, or political unity but "clearly the initiative...would have to come from the Arabs

277. Hurewitz contends that "this program aimed at the creation of a pro-British Arab block to check the growing pro-Axis feeling and to marshal the greatest possible support for the war effort." Hurewitz, J. C., The Struggle for Palestine, W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., New York, 1950, p. 117.
themselves. As far as he knew no such scheme which "commands general approval has yet been worked out."

By so stating it has been assumed that Eden was making the point clear that Nuri Pasha's Fertile Crescent scheme, which had only recently been presented to the British Government through Richard G. Casey, the British Resident in Cairo, was not universally accepted. In fact, both General Nuri's scheme and Emir 'Abdullah's Greater Syria Scheme were meeting opposition from all sides.

B. The Alexandria Protocol

It was Mustafa Pasha an-Nahhas, then Prime Minister of Egypt, who responded to Eden's House of Commons statement and the potential Hashimi threat and swiftly seized the leadership of the forces of Arab unity. On May 30, 1943, Nahhas began a drive for Egyptian hegemony over an Arab League by declaring in the Egyptian parliament that the Egyptian Government had decided to explore the opinions of the various Arab


279. "The first was Egypt, which feared that by the rise of a large united state in northern Arabia her own position of preeminence might be threatened. The second was Saudi Arabia, whose ruler was definitely opposed to any unification under the aegis of the Hashmite clan. And the third was Syria and Lebanon, whose 'forty ruling families' prominent in the movement of the Arab awakening, preferred their republican oligarchy to a merger into a larger kingdom." Lenczowski, op.cit., p. 502.
governments independently, and then would invite them to a conference to be held in Egypt in order to reach an agreement on the form of the proposed Arab union. 280

Between July 1943 and February 1944 Nahhas Pasha talked with either the prime minister, the foreign minister, or some other high representative of the governments of Iraq, Transjordan, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen regarding their official attitudes towards unity. 281 General Nuri as-Said went to Egypt in person to discuss the problem with Nahhas Pasha and their conversations lasted from July 31 to

280. Mustafa Pasha declared, "Since Mr. Eden made his statement (concerning Arab Union) I have been carefully studying the question and have found that the best means to attain a satisfactory result would be for the Arab governments to deal with the question themselves. I have therefore come to the conclusion that the Egyptian government should take up the matter officially and should discover the opinion of the various Arab governments and at what they aim. Having done this the Egyptian Government should proceed to reconcile the different contradictory views as far as possible, then hold a friendly meeting in Egypt so that we may work for the Arab Union with a united spirit." Al-Ahram, Cairo, May 31, 1943.

281. "The realization by the Arab governments that they could achieve through collective endeavor political ends unattainable by any one state was perhaps the most persuasive argument for reaching some sort of a permanent regional agreement." Hurewitz, Struggle for Palestine, op.cit., p. 191.
August 6, 1943.\textsuperscript{282} The Emir *Abdullah sent Tawfiq Pasha Abu‘l Huda with recommendations for "a loose confederation" of Arab states, but only with the acceptance by the other Arab governments of the "establishment of a Syrian Federation."\textsuperscript{283} All governments began to accept Nuri Pasha's Fertile Crescent Scheme as the basic beginning for discussions, after Saudi Arabia was convinced that she had nothing to lose by joining such a league and after Lebanon was assured of specific safeguards for her sovereignty.\textsuperscript{284}

Finally on September 25, 1944, the prime ministers, foreign ministers and other high-level representatives of the seven Arab states\textsuperscript{285} met in Alexandria as the Preliminary Committee of the General

\begin{footnotesize}

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{282} Ireland, Philip W., "The Pact of the League of Arab States", American Journal of International Law, October 1945, Vol. 38, p. 798. In a discussion between the writer and Mr. Philip W. Ireland on January 12, 1950, Mr. Ireland stated that he still felt that perhaps during these conversations Nuri Pasha turned over the organization of the Arab League to Nahhas Pasha and Egypt because of their being in a better position to form a union of Arabs.
  \item \textsuperscript{283} *Abdullah, \textit{op.cit.}, p. 254.
  \item \textsuperscript{284} Lenczowski, \textit{op.cit.}, p. 505. Also see Khadduri, \textit{op.cit.}, p. 762, where Khadduri states "General Nuri, as a veteran of the Arab Revolt in World War I and as a colleague of King Faisal I, has been the most helpful in laying down the provisions of the Arab Pact, and his proposals to Mr. Casey became the working plan for Arab conference".
  \item \textsuperscript{285} Musa al-`Alami attended this conference as a representative of Palestine.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
Arab Conference to discuss the formation of an Arab League.

These discussions continued with various solutions being offered, and with the two Hashimi Kingdoms presenting their Fertile Crescent and Greater Syrian schemes. Concerning these discussions Khadduri writes "At the outset it was realized that full union, with a central executive authority, was impossible at this stage of development of Arab nationalism...Only Syria stood for full-fledged Arab unity and was quite prepared to renounce her sovereignty in favor of a central executive authority of the Arab union...Iraq and Transjordan were not in favor of full unity, but advocated union on a federal basis. The Lebanon, while asserting her independence, pledged cooperation with the other Arab countries...Saudi Arabia and Yemen reluctantly agreed to join a loose association of independent states...Finally, Egypt, which took the role of mediator, did not advocate any definite plan of unity, but Nahhas Pasha...declared that his government was prepared to go along the path of Arab unity as far as any other Arab governments were jointly prepared to go." 286

Finally on October 7 the representatives drew up the Alexandria Protocol in which they agreed that "a League will be formed of the independent Arab States which consent to join the League." 287 It was to

286. Khadduri, "The Arab League as a Regional Arrange-
ment," American Journal of International Law,
October 1946, Vol. 40, pp. 763-64.

287. Arab Information Center, Basic Documents of the
League of Arab States, Document Collections No. 1,
have a Council in which all participating states were to be "represented on unequal footing."

The object of the League would be to control the execution of the agreements which the member states would conclude; to hold periodic meetings which would strengthen the relationship between these states; to coordinate their political plans so as to insure their cooperation; and protect their independence and sovereignty against every aggression by suitable means; and to supervise in a general way the affairs and interests of the Arab countries. 288

The Protocol forbade the members of the League to conduct policies detrimental to the League. It also proclaimed the principle of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of the member states. 289

The Committee adopted six subcommittees for drafting the details of a workable League. It emphasized its respect of the independence and sovereignty of Lebanon in its present frontiers, and it declared that it was of the opinion that Palestine constituted an important part of the

288. Ibid., p. 6.

289. "These two provisions were interpreted as a victory for British and Egyptian policies, respectively. The first meant that Syria and Lebanon would be prevented from concluding special treaties with France, thus confirming the gradual ouster--by British efforts--of France from the Levant. The second, by stressing the sanctity of the members' internal systems, was a rebuke to and a ban on the proroyalist unification propaganda hitherto conducted in Syria by the Hashites." Lenczowski, op.cit., p. 505.
Arab world and that the rights of the Arabs in Palestine cannot be
touched without prejudice to peace and stability in the Arab world. 290

Speaking of this Protocol Cecil A. Hourani wrote that "it was a
strongly popular document, appealing constantly to public opinion
throughout the Arab world, the Arab peoples, and the Arab Nation. It
was thus infused with the spirit of Pan-Arabism." 291

On the other hand, Dr. Ysef Haikal of Transjordan is reported to
have declared at the time of the Alexandria Conference that "it is
doubtful whether the union will be a political union; it is doubtful
whether, in case one of the Arab states is attacked, the others will
hurry to its aid. It is also doubtful whether an effectual cultural
union, or a union of some other kind, could take place, because the his-
tory, the legal codes, agriculture, and industry are necessarily dif-
ferent in the different Arab states." 292

Therefore, the views were both optimistic and pessimistic at the
time of the Alexandria Protocol, but the optimistic were the most pre-
dominant. However, the scene was soon to change.

It is important to note that between the time of the signing of
the Alexandria Protocol and the creation of the Arab League, from

290. Arab Information Center, Basic Documents #1, pp. 7-8.


292. Kedourie, "Pan-Arabism and British Policy",
op.cit., p. 110.
October 7, 1944, to March 22, 1945, many changes occurred in the Arab world. In this short period most of the independent Arab states declared war on the Axis powers as a step towards being able to join the United Nations. In addition governmental and constitutional changes occurred in Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, and Transjordan. Partly as a result of these changes and partly as a result of the hesitation on the part of some of the Arab governments, the Pact of the League was not to be as strong a document for unity as was the Protocol.

C. The Arab League is Formed

The six subcommittees created by the Alexandria Protocol were assigned the task of working out the details in the main fields of endeavors in which the Arab states were to unite their action and the drafting of a constitution for the future League. This it accomplished between February 14 and March 3, 1945, and on March 19 the Draft Pact of the Arab League was revised and approved. Finally on March 22, 1945, the committee met as an Arab Conference at which time it approved and signed the Pact of the League of Arab States.

293. Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East, op.cit., p. 245.


295. Hourani, op.cit., p. 132. In many cases the ministers who worked on the drawing up of the Protocol were replaced by new ministers who were to work on the formation of the Pact.

296. Sayegh, op.cit., p. 121.
This Pact is composed of twenty Articles. It established a League of Arab states which had as its purpose the strengthening of the relations between the member states, the coordination of their policies in order to achieve cooperation between them, and the safeguarding of their independence and sovereignty. 297

Article 5 prohibits any resort to force in order to solve disputes arising between two or more member states, and Article 6 describes the procedure taken by the League in case of aggression or threat of aggression by one member state against another. Article 8 enjoins each member state to respect the system of government of the other member states.

The League lost its strength and the member states retained their sovereignty in such stipulations in the Pact as Article 7, which directs that unanimous decisions of the Council of the League shall be binding upon all member states of the League but majority decisions shall be binding only upon those states which have accepted them. It continues that in either case the decisions of the Council shall be enforced in each member state according to its respective basic laws.

Article 9 left the door open for closer unity among the member states. It allowed states of the League which desired establishment of closer cooperation and stronger bonds than provided in the Pact to conclude agreements to that end.

297, Arab Information Center, Basic Document #1, op. cit., p. 10.
Articles 18 and 19 of the Pact are among the main factors which distinguish the League from a union. Article 18 allows a member state to withdraw from the League. Article 19 which lays out the procedure for amending the Pact "especially in order to make firmer and stronger the ties between the member states" also states that "if a state does not accept such an amendment it may withdraw at such time as the amendment goes into effect, without being bound by the provisions of the preceding article." 298

After countless years of struggling for unity it now appeared that the Arab countries had finally achieved a union. But the big question was whether or not it was, in fact, a union. The consensus was at the time, and still is at the present, that it was not. Dr. Sayegh writes in his book *Arab Unity*, "The League was not a union. The formation of the League did not herald the unification of the Arab countries. The League was an inter-governmental multiple link between independent states, a locus for their interrelations. But the relatees lost none of their independence-of-being in the process of entering into organized, permanent relations with one another within the League. The relatees remained ultimate and supreme...The League was not a state in itself; not a super-state; not a federation nor a confederation of states; and not a union of states—but merely a network of relationships among states." 299

299. Sayegh, op.cit., p. 121.
It could not be a federal union since it was not a "perpetual union of several states with a central government invested with the power, not only over the member-states, but also over their citizens, and to which, from the international point of view, the conduct of all foreign relations is confined." The constituent states of such a union have no right to separate themselves from the union, as do the states of the League of Arab States under Articles 18 and 19 of the Pact.

However, Khadduri gives the League the benefit of the doubt and does not go as far as Sayegh when he contends that it might "possess the legal nature of confederated states or confederation." Therefore, comparing it with the German Confederation of 1815 and the Confederation of United States, history supports the possibility of its eventual transformation into a federation.

According to Cecil Hourani the League of Arab States, as it was formed, represented a victory for the moderate Arab nationalists, who hold the beliefs that it is impossible to establish a single Arab state and that a union can only be formed as a result of evolution and gradual surrender of sovereignty.

Perhaps one of the strongest tirades against the Arab League as

301. Ibid, p. 770.
a force of union is given by the Royal Institute of International Affairs which describes the League of Arab States as having been developed "but of the opposite of unity: out of conflict between the emotional urge for the unity of the Arabs on the one side and, on the other, the separatism of the states which had been created by the post-war settlement. The second exaggerated the first; the first made it necessary for the states to preserve their identity at all costs, and in spite of the emotional urge. The result was the Arab League. In this the Arab statesmen gave living room to the idea of unity; gave it a warm comforting place in the hearts of the people. They guarded the ghost of unity and threw the real thing out the window." 303

Harsh as this view might seem, it is the accepted rule to place the blame for the failure of the Pact of the League of Arab States to form a strong Arab union upon the Arab leaders at that time. Dr. Sayegh followed his predecessors in this view when he wrote "...the League was not created by a constituent assembly of peoples' representatives, who as the ultimate source of power could have vested power in the creature institution, assigning perhaps some powers to the League and reserving others for the individual states. On the contrary, the League was created by a conference of accredited representatives of sovereign states acting exclusively in this capacity; it was created by states not by

people's."  

It appears from this statement that Dr. Sayegh became over-
enthusiastic in his mission "to articulate the feelings" of his country-
men concerning Arab unity "to the American reader." The time was 
1945, and the accepted procedure for concluding agreements between inde-
pendent states, was and is through "accredited representatives of the 
sovereign states."

The question seems to be whether the Arab people desired a closer 
union in 1945 than that which was formed by the Pact of the League of 
Arab States. There are many who contend that such was the case, and 
that in spite of this popular desire, the leaders of the various govern-
ments were unwilling to achieve this unity for their people, as it would 
have resulted in a great loss of vested interests and high positions to 
these leaders. There are others who claim that the Arab people did not 
desire a closer union than that which was formed by the League. It is 
felt that the truth lies somewhere in between these two extremes.

It must be remembered that monarchy was supreme among those Arab 
countries which formed the League of Arab States in 1945. The govern-
ments of Iraq, Transjordan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and Egypt--five of the 
seven states--had monarchical forms of government. Syria and Lebanon, 
the remaining two original states, were republics and had just received 
their independence after over twenty years of mandatory rule. It can

304. Sayegh, op.cit., p. 122.  
305. Ibid, see Preface, p. v.
also be said in support of the first view that the Arab leaders in Saudi Arabia as well as in Syria and Lebanon, where independence had only recently been obtained, feared the Hashimis and remained true to their own vested interests.

On the other hand, those who support the latter view point out that although there was a considerable amount of popular support for unity, it was certainly not strong enough to have become organized in such a way as to bring effective pressure on the leaders of the various Arab countries. The Arab nationalists, the Syrian Nationalist Socialist Party and the Muslim Brotherhood were all advocating unity, but each faction had different concepts of unity. Other political parties in the various Arab countries had been striving towards independence for so long that they either did not desire unity at this time, or were also not sufficiently organized to influence their leaders towards a closer union. The people envisaged the Arab League as a step towards unity—not unity itself—and this is precisely what their leaders accomplished for them.

There is also another factor worthy of mentioning and this is the factor of the idealistic feeling of many Arabs that it is not necessary to strive for Arab unity as its fulfillment is inevitable. All that is necessary is to sit back and await this fulfillment. In 1945 this idealistic feeling was certainly more prevalent than it is today, and it was a great detriment to the Arab unity movement at the time.

Thus the failure of the Pact of the League of Arab States to
form a closer union must be attributed to the Arab people as well as to their leaders. Lebanon and Syria had only recently gained their independence; other Arab States were still striving for theirs. None were prepared at this time to give up what sovereignty and independence they had achieved. This was to be made even more clear within the years that were to follow.
CHAPTER IX

THE FORMATION OF THE UNIONS

A. The Greater Syria Controversy

As has been seen, the framers of the Pact of the Arab League did leave an opening for those of its members who might desire real unity. This opening was contained in Article 9 of the Pact which reads in part, "States of the League which desire to establish closer cooperation and stronger bonds than are provided in this pact may conclude agreements to that end." 314

It was in light of this Article and the unfailing desire of King 'Abdullah to seek a full and complete union of Greater Syria, that the first signs of disunity and rivalry appeared in the Arab League.

'Abdullah's persistence toward a Greater Syria had caused disension since its initial proposal. At the preparatory conference at Alexandria in 1944, acting under instructions from 'Abdullah, Tawfiq Abu'l Huda had expressed the desire that a Greater Syria could be achieved within the framework of the Arab League Pact. 315 Abu'l Huda's efforts in this behalf, however, had placed both Syria and Lebanon on the defensive, and had aroused the interest of Saudi Arabia. As a result, these discussions had been dropped since it was felt that the

314. Arab Information Center, Basic Document #1, op.cit., p. 12.

315. 'Abdullah, op.cit., p. 254; see also Khadduri, "Fertile Crescent Unity," op.cit., p. 143.
scheme was not feasible under the circumstances. 316

Again in 1945 'Abdullah pushed his proposals for unity, but this
time they were couched in general terms and they stressed the importance
of the union of Arab Muslim countries. The Emir had instructed the
Transjordanian representative to the subcommittee of the Arab League
Conference which met in Cairo on February 14, 1945, to emphasize that
the "formation of Arab unity would be a great source of strength, not
only to the Arab countries, but also to other Muslim countries." 317
Such a union, according to 'Abdullah, would "support and strengthen the
ancient democratic states which with their majority of Muslim subjects,
have kept alive a flourishing Muslim culture from the beginning of our

316. In discussing Abu'l Huda's comments towards the
formation of a Greater Syria, Khadduri writes
"Jamil Mardam, Syria's accredited representative,
while he declared his approval in principle to the
scheme of Syrian unity, showed dissatisfaction with
Transjordan's approach to the problem. The accred-
dited representative of Saudi Arabia, Shaykh Yusuf
Yasim, inquired about the future form of government
if Syrian unity were achieved. Jamil Mardam replied
that Syria 'was always in favor of a republican
system. Therefore...Greater Syria could be
achieved by the annexation of Transjordan to Syria
as it had been a southern Syrian province under the
Arab regime of Faisal.' It was also stated that
since the Palestine problem was pending solution,
and Lebanon was opposed to joining, the scheme was
not feasible in the circumstances and dismissed as
premature." Khadduri, "Fertile Crescent Unity",
_op.cit._, p. 143.

317. 'Abdullah, _op.cit._, p. 256.
era to the present day.”318 It was just such policy statements as the above which kept the fears of the Christians of Lebanon, and throughout the Arab world, alive and leary of what their position might be within a Muslim Arab union.

The formation of the League without the achievement of Syrian unity meant only an increase in ‘Abdullah’s efforts. However, he realized his disadvantageous position in still being bound to the British Mandate. Therefore, his immediate goal was the gaining of independence for his country. This was accomplished on March 22, 1946, through a treaty with Great Britain.319 However, since it was felt that this treaty was “too restrictive” and would “lend too much colour to Arab nationalist criticisms of King ‘Abdullah’s dependence on Britain,”320 another Treaty of Alliance was signed on March 15, 1948.321 Independence having been achieved, ‘Abdullah requested and received from his Parliament the official inclusion of the Greater Syria Scheme as a principle of Transjordan’s foreign policy.322 The formal announcement of this fact brought loud cries of protest not only from

318. Ibid.


Syria, but also from Lebanon, who was "more sensitive since the achievement of the scheme would destroy or encroach on her sovereignty." 323

On November 28, 1946, Syria’s Foreign Minister, Sa’adullah al-Jabiri, brought the problem to the Arab League, but no final decision was made. 324 'Abdullah continued his efforts until finally, on September 14, 1947, Shukri al-Qwaltli, upon his re-election as President of Syria, publically denounced the Greater Syria Scheme in a speech in which he accused King 'Abdullah of furthering his own personal ambition and then he said "if Transjordan really wants unity, let her people join the mother country (Syria) as a free republic." 325

This Greater Syria controversy had caused a split in the Arab League. For fear of Transjordan’s insistence upon this scheme, Syria and Lebanon joined forces with Egypt and Saudi Arabia. In spite of local objections, Iraq had supported Transjordan throughout the controversy, and on June 10, 1947, both countries had ratified a Treaty of


324. The Foreign Ministers issued a public statement which read "There has been lately a discussion on the Greater Syria Scheme which prompted the Foreign Ministers of the Arab States to hold a special meeting in order to discuss the question from its various aspects. It appears that no member state has intended to encroach on the independence or sovereignty of another member state nor to interfere in its form of government." Government of Transjordan, op.cit., p. 267.

In addition, Iraq and Transjordan both signed treaties with Turkey as a counter measure to the block which had been formed between Lebanon, Syria, Saudi Arabia and Egypt.

B. Attempts at Syrian-Iraqi Unity

There was still diversity among the Arab countries when they entered the Palestine War. The only evident factor of solidarity among them was their unanimous opposition of Zionist claims to Palestine. This had been the one unifying factor above all others, which had been the bulwark of Arab unity since 1936. Although the Arab countries were unified in regard to the Zionist claims, they were incapable of becoming unified in regard to the action to be taken to nullify that claim, and as to how to solve the Palestine problem. Thus the effect of the war was disastrous to the countries individually, and to the League in general, and only tended to show that disunity exerted itself in war, as in peace.

After the war, the Arab League was split in the same manner as before. The emphasis remained on the anti-Hashimi element within the League and its struggle, as compared with the Egyptian-Saudi block's

struggle, to win over the other League members to its camp. Beginning March 30, 1949, with the fall of the Shukri al-Quwatli regime, a series of coup d'etat occurred which caused a wavering in Syrian opinion from one camp to the other.

The first coup d'etat in Syria was that led by Colonel Husni az-Za'im. The main support for Za'im's coup had come from discontented elements of Syria who were fed-up with the old-line type of nationalists, of which al-Quwatli and his Prime Minister, Mardam, were shining examples. They had fought so long and hard for independence that they had brushed aside the "dream of Arab, or at least Fertile Crescent unity." Among these supporters were Sa'adah's National Syrian Party and the People's

327. Little, T. R. "The Arab League: A Reassessment", Middle East Journal, Vol. 10, No. 2, p. 143. Little states "Of the seven votes in the League Council, Iraq and Jordan could count only on their own, while Syria and Saudi Arabia usually agreed with Egypt and either Lebanon or Yemen or both could be relied on to go with the majority opinion. Insofar as they were active, Iraq and Jordan had to seek their influence within Syria and Lebanon and not at the meetings of the League."

328. Of interest to the various reasons which brought about the union between Egypt and Syria, Dr. Faris writes "This first coup d'etat marked the beginning of a chain of military coups, the demoralizing effect of which continued to be felt until Friday, February 21, 1958, when Nasser was formally elected President of the United Arab Republic." Faris, Nabih A., "What Chance a Unified Arab State," an unpublished article written by Dr. Faris on March 17, 1958, p. 2.

Party which were both pro-unionist parties. 330

Nuri Pasha chose this opportunity to renew negotiations for a Syrian-Iraqi unity. His efforts did not come to naught, for after diplomatically placing the issue before the new Syrian leader, an answer was received to the effect that "Syria was desirous of a unity with Iraq on the basis of a full autonomous status for each country." 331 However, this attempt at unity was doomed to die, as others before and after it. Za'im was in need of quick recognition of his power, and he quickly turned from Iraq and unity to the Egyptian-Saudi block, which gained for him recognition of his regime as well as financial aid. Another attempt at Syrian-Iraqi unity was made by Nuri Pasha after Colonel Adib as-Shishakli came to power, but it was in turn foiled by Egypt.

Alford Carleton, President of Aleppo College, lists four results of the rise and fall of Husni Za'im which are of interest. They are "First, a demonstration that the maintenance of a high standard of public security and order is a basic condition of public favor in Syria. Second, a renewed demonstration that any sign of partiality for France will awaken opposition beyond that of any other external loyalty. Third, indication of the basic interest of the people of Syria in closer cooperation among the Arab States. And fourth, clear indication that, by and large, the people of Syria prefer the secularization of life


witnessed in Turkey to any effort to bind the people to the traditional culture pattern of Islam."

C. The Treaty of Joint Defense and Economic Cooperation

Due to this bickering and the existing rivalries; due to this failure at unity; and due to the fruitless endeavor of the League in the Palestine War, popular dissatisfaction with the League mounted. In order to appease this discontent, the leaders of the League decided that they would strengthen its existence by strengthening its defensive and military qualities into a solid organization. They attempted to do this within the framework of the League by agreement upon the Treaty of Joint Defense and Economic Cooperation,\footnote{333} which was approved by the council of the League in 1950.\footnote{334}

This Treaty purported to integrate the defense establishments as well as the economic standards of the Arab countries. It placed the armed forces of the individual member states at the disposal of the Arab League under one Joint General Staff. It made provisions for establishment of a Permanent Military Commission which would be responsible for


\footnote{333} For a complete translation of the Treaty see Arab Information Center, Basic Document #1, \textit{op.cit.}, pp. 21-25.

\footnote{334} The Treaty was signed by Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Saudi Arabia and Yemen on June 17, 1950; by Iraq on February 2, 1951; and by Jordan on February 16, 1952. \textit{Ibid}, p. 21.
formulating plans of joint defense and for implementation of these plans.

Article X of the Treaty was of special importance. It stated that "the contracting states undertake to conclude no international agreement which may be inconsistent with the present Treaty. They further undertake, in their international relations with other states, to pursue no course which may be incompatible with the purpose of the present Treaty." 335

In addition to coordinating and consolidating the defense effort of the Arab countries, the Treaty established an Economic Council "to cooperate in the development of their economies and the exploitation of their natural resources..." 336

If the Treaty had been made in good faith and given wholehearted cooperation by all of the Arab countries, it would have certainly been an important instrument towards unifying the Arab world, but the same frictions and jealousies came into play.

D. Iraq Vies for Real Defense—The Baghdad Pact

After the signing of the Treaty of Joint Defense and Economic Cooperation, Egypt was asked to participate in a defense alliance with the Western powers in their proposal for an Allied Middle East Command. Egypt was first approached on October 31, 1951, for participation in this

335. Arab Information Center, Basic Document #1, op.cit., p. 23.

336. Ibid, Article 7, p. 23.
alliance because the Western nations "feeling that they had to start somewhere,... decided first to approach Egypt, and only Egypt. The idea was that Egypt held the key position because of the Suez base and its leadership of the Arab League". 337 The proposal was met only with hostility by the Egyptian Government who "did not even give it the courtesy of careful study" and rejected it within two days after its receipt. After the revolution of July 1952, which brought General Nagib and his army council to power in Egypt, she was again approached to participate in the "northern tier concept" of defense for the Middle East with Turkey, Pakistan and Iraq, but Egypt again refused to join into any defense alliance with the West.

On January 14, 1955, Iraq announced her intention of signing an alliance with Turkey. Great pressure was brought to bear on Iraq by all of the Arab members, but by Egypt especially, to prohibit her from joining into a defense alliance with countries outside the Arab League. Nevertheless, the Turkish-Iraqi defense treaty was signed on February 24, 1955, and Iraq became an active member of the Baghdad Pact. 338 This was truly a turning point in the struggle for Arab unity, when Iraq, which had been a moving country in laying the foundation upon which the Arab League was based, and for unity in general, in the eyes of the League,


338. For the text of the Turkey-Iraqi Agreement see Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 390-91.
had chosen the West in preference to the Arab countries.

It should be pointed out that Iraq had never ceased its clamor for a tighter union of Arab states on a federal relationship, particularly among those states linked by geography and economics. As late as January 1954 Dr. Fadil al-Jamali, then Premier of Iraq, requested that the Council of the League give its blessings to the initiation of negotiations between such Arab states as were then favorably disposed towards union in order that they might go ahead and unite without awaiting the development of similar readiness among the other states. 339 The United States was asked to give its support to this proposal, but she would do nothing until other Arab states concerned would give their express desire for union. 340 Even Syria, who had made a similar proposal to the League in 1951, through its then Premier, Dr. Nazim al-Qudsi, was then opposed to unity due to the growing radicalism which had been built up within the country.

During the preparation of the Treaty of Joint Defense and Economic Cooperation, Nuri Pasha had said that "to meet the needs of Iraq (the Treaty) should be designed as a defense against Russia as well

339. Sayegh, op.cit., p. 150.

as Israel". Iraq never felt that the Treaty did this. It was in
light of its defense against Russia that the leaders of Iraq pursued the
idea of alignment with Turkey, Pakistan and the Western powers. Mr.
John C. Campbell states in his book Defense of the Middle East, "Iraq's
course brought out into the open a real conflict of interest. Egypt,
itself not prepared to line up with Turkey and the West, could not
resign itself to see any other Arab state defy Egyptian leadership by
doing so; there could be but one collective defense pact and that was
the Arab League Collective Security Pact. In its own bargaining with
the West the Egyptian regime wanted the weight of the whole Arab world
behind it. But now Iraq had broken ranks and threatened to carry other
Arab states along with it."

341. Little, op.cit., p. 143. And Khadduri writes,
"General Nuri as-Said, in his speech on the Syro-
Iraqi unity scheme given in Baghdad March 7, 1950,
went so far as to argue that his chief motive for
advocating unity with Syria was his fear of commun-
ism, whether it came from the north (Russia) or
west (Israel)." Khadduri, "Fertile Crescent
Unity", op.cit., p. 173.

342. For an excellent account of the Iraqi-Egyptian rela-
tions and the steps leading up to the Baghdad Pact
see Khalidi, Walid, "Nasser and the Arab World",
Middle East Forum, April (1959), Vol. XXXIV, No. 4,
pp. 30-34 and 53.

343. Campbell, op.cit., pp. 54-55. Iraq's fear of the
weakness of the defense capability available to her
by virtue of her membership in the Arab League and
of the Joint Defense Treaty now appears to have
been valid, when one views it in light of the fact
that, as long as Iraq was an active member of the
Baghdad Pact, she was able to fight communism from
without and from within. With the coup d'état of
Both countries threatened withdrawal from the Arab League, but neither carried out its threat as neither wanted the responsibility of destroying the only outward manifestation of Arab solidarity. Iraq tried to rally the other states to follow her into the Baghdad Pact. But it was too late. Iraq's signing of the Baghdad Pact had been one of a series of events which had caused many Arabs to lose confidence in the Hashimis.

E. The United Arab Republic

During the sequence which finally led to Iraq's signing of the Baghdad Pact, Nuri Pasha had not failed to inform other members of the Arab League of his intentions. However, Egypt, true to form, had been so preoccupied with her own business of making special agreements with Britain, that she had little time for working towards the unity of the Arab world. The reality of the formation of the Baghdad Pact was enough

Abdul Karim Kasem and his denunciation of the Baghdad Pact, communism seems to have acquired a foothold in Iraq.

344. In a lecture on April 16, 1958, Dr. Walid Khaladi, Professor of Political Science, American University of Beirut, attributed this loss of confidence in the Hashimis to four main factors which have occurred over a period of thirty years or more. The first was the Faisal-Weizmann Agreement at the time of the Peace Conference in 1919. The second was 'Abdullah's persistence in his Greater Syria Scheme which began in 1941. The third was 'Abdullah's attitude toward the Partition of Palestine in 1948. And the fourth was Iraq's participation in the Baghdad Pact by the Agreement signed in 1955.
to impress upon President Jamal Abdul Nasser the importance of Arab nationalism and its call for Arab unity as a basic policy towards Egypt's continued hegemony of the Arab world.

Still thinking in terms of defense, President Nasser on September 27, 1955, concluded an agreement with Czechoslovakia for the purchase of arms and "by this one bold stroke he declared his independence of the West and proclaimed his leadership of the Arabs."346

There is no doubt as to the prestige among the Arabs gained by Nasser when the signing of the Czech arms deal became known. Dr. Faris writes, "With the signature of the arms deal, the jinx was broken, and the person whose name was associated with it became overnight the focal point of Arab hopes...From that day on, Nasser's conversion to Arab nationalism became irrevocable and his leadership in the Arab world became inevitable."347

Less than a month later, on October 20, 1955, Nasser began to take advantage of his rising prestige. This he did by joining Egypt with Syria, who was also a receiver of communist arms, in a Mutual

345. For an unofficial translation of this agreement see Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East, op.cit., Vol.II, pp. 401-05.

346. Campbell, op.cit., p. 73.

347. Faris, "What Chance a Unified Arab State", op.cit., p. 3.
Defense Pact, which was to replace the "moribund" Treaty of Joint Defense and Economic Cooperation. However, it was in its entirety a defense pact, and carried none of the aspects of economic cooperation.

Continuing the march towards unity Syria and Egypt concluded the Arab Cultural Unity Agreement on March 15, 1957, which aimed at "unifying educational methods and enhancing cultural cooperation" between these two Arab states. In 1956 Egypt and Syria had concluded an economic agreement for industrial cooperation. However, in September 1957 the two countries concluded the Syrian-Egyptian Agreement on Economic Union. According to this agreement a joint committee made up of representatives from both countries was established to develop concrete measures for the final economic unification of the two countries.

Then on November 18, 1957, unanimous approval for a "Federal Union" between the two countries was given in Damascus at a joint parliamentary session in which thirty-five members of the Egyptian Parliament sat with the Syrian Chamber of Deputies. An identical resolution was approved on the same day by the Egyptian National Assembly in Cairo. From this point on the stage was set, and it was only a matter of working out the details of a complete union, of a first union in modern times of formerly independent Arab states.

In spite of the numerous pacts and agreements made between Egypt

348. For an unofficial translation see Middle East Journal, Vol. X, No. 1, pp. 77-79.

and Syria, there was skepticism up until the very end that a union would ever be formed. As late as January 21, 1958, 'Abdullah Yafi wrote in Beirut's AS-SIYASAH that he frowned on "those circles which are trying to create doubt around the seriousness of this union," and AL-AMAL felt that a Syria-Egypt union is fine "provided it is wanted by the Syrian and Egyptian people." But in Lebanon the people wanted both Syria and Egypt to know, that although they preached Arab unity the "Lebanese believe that the existence of Lebanon as an independent entity is an Arab necessity...To them, Lebanon's independent entity is sacred." Then came the official announcement. "On February 1, 1958, in a historic session held at Kubbah Palace in Cairo, His Excellency President Shukri al-Quwatli of Syria and President Jamal Abdul Nasser of Egypt met the representatives of the Republics of Syria and Egypt." This was the beginning of the Joint Egyptian-Syrian Proclamation issued on the founding of the United Arab Republic. This proclamation went on to say: "The purpose of this meeting was to discuss the final measures to be taken for the realization of the Arab peoples' will, and the execution of what the Constitutions of both Republics stipulate, namely that the people of each of them forms a part of the Arab Nation. They, therefore, discussed the decisions unanimously approved by the National

Assembly of Egypt and the Syrian House of Representatives, that unity be established between the two countries as a preliminary step towards the realization of complete Arab unity... The participants declare their total agreement, complete faith and deeply rooted confidence in the necessity of uniting Egypt and Syria into one state to be named 'The United Arab Republic'.  

The proclamation was announced from a balcony in Cairo by President Nasser and President Quwatli to a cheering throng of Cairenes while "tears of joy came down from the eyes of men, women and children." In Egypt and Syria, February 1 was declared a national holiday in celebration of the birth of the United Arab Republic. Demonstrations and rallies celebrating the union of the two countries occurred in practically every country of the Arab world.

Yet Arab officials in other Arab countries had their doubts. Nuri as-Said is reported to have said ironically, "The union between Syria and Egypt is good since it has eliminated one of them." And Dr. Fadil al-Jamali said, "This union is a final step to separate Egypt and Syria completely from the rest of the Arab states. This is a bad thing. Communism is what separates Syria and Egypt from the rest of the Arab...


world." King Saud's opinion of the union was brought out the following month when President Nasser, who was then in Damascus, revealed a Saudi plot to assassinate him.

In contrast to the almost wild jubilation upon the announcement of the joining of Egypt and Syria into one country under one President, one army, and one flag, was the anticlimactic announcement made on February 14, 1958, that the two Hashimi Kingdoms of Iraq and Jordan would unite into one country to be known as the Federal Arab States. The immediate reaction in the rest of the Arab world was very far from being enthusiastic. Where the birth of the United Arab Republic seemed to have had the quality of magic, the creation of the Federal Arab States left the masses cold, even hostile. 357

Then finally on March 8, 1958, after several weeks of discussion, The United Arab States was formed through a federation of Yemen and the United Arab Republic.

Thus, in the period of almost one month, not one, but three Arab unions were formed. The Federal Arab States, however, was defunct within five months to the day after its creation, when the Iraqi Government was overthrown on July 14, 1958. Today the United Arab States is a union only in name. On the other hand, the United Arab Republic is experiencing growing pains, but is definitely alive. It is still left for the


future to decide, however, whether complete Arab unity is still a dream and a politician's by-word, or is an honest desire in the hearts of all Arab peoples, and therefore capable of fulfillment.
CHAPTER X

SUMMARY AND EVALUATION

This study has been made in an attempt to analyze the growth and development of the idea of Arab unity through the centuries and has ended with the formation of the unions in 1958. The procedure has been to limit this study to the past and the present. This chapter will not deviate from this procedure by attempting to prognosticate the future development of the idea of Arab unity or its future manifestations in one year or several years to come. It will summarize the struggle of the Arab people to achieve political unity and will discuss those internal and external factors which have affected this struggle.

There are those who contend that the idea of Arab unity was born in the aftermath of World War I, and was fulfilled, or partially fulfilled, with the formation of the unions in 1958. There are others who completely disavow that any real idea of Arab unity has ever existed as a natural condition of the Arabs, and that unity of the Arabs has never been accomplished. The confusion and differences of opinion as to whether or not Arab unity has ever existed and if so, when the idea of Arab unity was born, lay in the semantics of the meaning of the words "Arab" and "unity", but to stop at that would be an oversimplification of this confusion.

A vague sort of family and tribal unity existed among the Arabs in the pre-Islamic era, but it certainly was not sufficiently strong or
universal to be termed Arab unity. Real Arab unity was first accomplished by the impetus of Islam. All of the Arabs, as well as peoples who were later to become Arabs, were united into one Islamic Arab world. But the Muslim religion spread and engulfed peoples and civilizations which were non-Arab and which were never to accept from the Arabs any of their culture other than their religion. Therefore, it is argued that the unity of the Arabs from this beginning was not the unity of the Arabs but of the Muslims. This statement can only be refuted if one can understand that during this period the Arabs were the Muslims, and the Muslim religion was the Arab religion. The word of Allah, the Qur'an, was revealed in the Arabic language to the Prophet Mohammad, an Arab. From this beginning there has always been the tendency to use the two words "Arab" and "Muslim" interchangeably.

The Muslim's first loyalty is to God and his faith and to the community of the true believers, which is the Umma or the nation of Islam. It is written in the Qur'an, "Lo, this nation of yours is one nation, and I am your Lord, so serve me."358 And the Arabs did unite into one Islamic Nation.

Therefore the true birth of Arab unity coincided with the true birth of Arab nationalism, and the two traveled a parallel course during the rise of Islam. The first and foremost unifying factor among the Arabs was the Islamic religion; the second, an outgrowth of the first, was the Caliphate; and the third was the Arabic language, the language

of the Qur'an, the religion of the Arab people.

When the Arab idea gave way to the Islamic idea as a result of the reforms of 'Umar ibn 'Abd-al-'Aziz, so did the idea of Arab political unity give way to Islamic unity. This idea of Islamic unity remained prevalent throughout the history of the Arabs under the various rulers, Imams, and Sultans, including their rule under the Ottoman Caliphs, during the first three centuries of which the Arabs were again politically united.

In the nineteenth century when the Western form of secular nationalism injected itself upon the scene in the Muslim world, it only precipitated a revival of Islam and an active call for Islamic unity in the form of Pan-Islamism. However, the emphasis in this call was directed towards the Arab reaction, as the Arabs were recognized to be more susceptible to first, the general idea of nationalistic feeling, and second, the idea of unity itself. The desire of the Arabs to recover the political leadership of their own Islamic religion was stimulated by revivalists, such as al-Kawakibi, who acted only as catalysts to the infiltrating idea of Western nationalism in reviving the feeling of Arabic racial consciousness.

The efforts to muster complete Islamic unity as a defense against Western secular nationalistic political thought failed miserably in the latter part of the nineteenth century. But with the advent of Turkish nationalism, after the Young Turk Revolution in 1908, the idea of Arab Muslim union, as distinguished from complete Islamic union, to include
all races and countries within the Muslim world, began to come to the fore. This idea of racial distinction, or Arab nationalism, was a result of and in defense of the adoption of Turkification of the Ottoman Empire as an inherent policy of the new Ottoman government. The Arabs counter-attacked with Pan-Arabism and the call for Arab unity. But the form of unity desired was Arab unity combined with Turkish unity, and the two again united into one dual monarchy under the Ottoman caliph. Arab unity outside of the framework of Islam still could not be conceived of by the Arabs as a desirable form of government. It was with this concept of unity that the Arab world entered World War I, but not as an ally of the Ottomans, with whom they had wanted to unite under their caliph, but rather with the Western powers to gain their independence.

The idea of unity as the Arabs emerged from the short course of the war, had acquired a secular trend. The call was definitely for Arab unity, but this call was primarily for Syrian unity and only recognition of the right of the Arab countries to further unite in the future. Furthermore, the call for unity emanated from the Syrians. The Iraqis were interested primarily in the unity of Iraq, and their efforts towards this aim and towards Iraqi independence persisted within the framework of Islam. The people of the other Arab countries were either not interested or in no position to join the struggle for Arab unity. Even Christian Lebanon, at that time a part of Syria, was directly opposed to being united within a Muslim Arab union.
The division of the Arab world as a result of the peace settlement after World War I caused the emphasis of the Arab nationalist movement to direct itself more towards Arab independence than Arab unity. During this inter-war period the particularist national feelings such as Iraqi, Syrian, Egyptian and Lebanese nationalism grew, and in many instances completely overshadowed the idea of Arab unity.

During the 1930’s, however, various schemes for Arab unity, as well as Islamic unity, were proposed. Then in the 1940’s the Hashimi schemes of Greater Syria and Fertile Crescent unity were put forth, but they were locked upon as unity plans proposed only to fulfill the ambitions and enhance the prestige of the Hashimis.

Nevertheless, the Hashimi Fertile Crescent Scheme was utilized as the basis for the League of Arab States which was formed in 1945. The League proved not to be a union of Arab States at all, but merely a pact for intergovernmental relations between separate states. Diversity rather than unity has been the keynote of the League of Arab States.

In an attempt to strengthen the League and to form a tighter union the Treaty of Joint Defense and Economic Cooperation was entered into by its members, but it was found that this attempt at closer unity within the framework of the ill-thought of League was not the solution to the problem of diversity, as this diversity among the Arab countries lay much deeper. The rivalries, jealousies, ambitions of leaders, and lack of mutual understanding were not to disappear or be forgotten merely by another intergovernment pact between these countries which aimed little
more towards real unity than the original Pact of the League of Arab States.

The struggle for Arab unity received a setback when Iraq entered the Baghdad Pact, and the prestige of Iraq dropped to an all-time low in the eyes of the people of the other Arab-speaking countries. This was a turning point in the struggle for Arab unity, and Iraq, which with Egypt had shared a leading position in the call for unity, gave way to Egyptian leadership of the Arab cause in the person of President Jamal Abdul Nasser. President Nasser immediately took up the reins and directed his course of unity towards Syria in union with Egypt.

Seemingly due to the loss of dignity, prestige, and control of the government by the Syrian leaders, President Nasser and Egypt were publicly invited to save Syria from her deplorable situation by uniting the two countries under Nasser's strong leadership. Some day in the light of documents and original sources, future historians may discover other reasons for this union.

Thus a union of Arab countries was accomplished by the formation of the United Arab Republic in February 1958. But the struggle for Arab unity did not stop with one union. It went on to see the formation of the short-lived Federal Arab States between Iraq and Jordan, and the United Arab States, at the present time a union in name only, by a union of the United Arab Republic and Yemen.
CHAPTER XI

CONCLUSIONS

The formation of the unions was only one more step in the struggle of the Arab people for unity. Like the formation of the League of Arab States, the unions were not ends in themselves; but unlike the League, they did have the quality of closer unity. At least this was true in the case of the United Arab Republic. Regional unities had been accomplished before the union of Egypt and Syria. During the 1920's and 1930's Ibn Saud had united by force the greater part of the Arabian Peninsula into the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. With the help of the United Nations, Cyrenaica, Fezzan and Tripolitania, were united in 1951 to form the new Kingdom of Libya. But these unions did not carry the great impact of the unions of 1958.

The first conclusion to be drawn then is that the formation of the unions removed the struggle for Arab unity from the idealistic into the realistic stage. This in itself was a great moral victory for the Arab nationalist movement and for all of those elements which had advocated unity of the Arab countries since the birth of the Pan-Arab movement. Although the United Arab Republic and the Federal Arab States were no more than regional unions, as had been the case of the Kingdoms of Saudi Arabia and Libya, there were many additional factors surrounding their formation which meant the difference of life instead of death to the call for Arab unity. At a time when the Arab world was miserably divided and when the Arab cause for unity seemed practically
hopeless, this accident of history occurred breathing life into the ailing nationalist movement. It mattered not that it was Syria's only way out of the decadent position, in which she found herself after a decade of bad government and threatened communist control. All that mattered to the nationalist movement was that a union of formerly independent Arab states had been accomplished. But where the formation of the United Arab Republic was its lifesaver, the subsequent formation of the Federal Arab States was the first symptom of its immediate relapse.

The second conclusion is that the corresponding diversity caused by the formation of these unions was as great as the unity they produced. Although their formation was another phase in the struggle for Arab unity, it was at the same time another phase in the age old struggle between the Valley of the Nile and the Valley of the Two Rivers for hegemony of the Arab world, with each camp tugging at the political sympathies of the Arab countries for their recognition and allegiance. The U.A.R. was successful in winning over Yemen to its camp. The F.A.S., surprising though it was, enjoyed temporarily the backing of Saudi Arabia. Although Iraq has dissolved its union with Jordan, it is still active in its struggle for hegemony of the Arab world, and both Iraq and the U.A.R. are still vying for Libya, Lebanon, and Kuwait in the Arab world, as well as Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco in the Maghreb.

The third conclusion is that complete political unity of the Arab world is as remote today as it was before the formation of the unions. The formation of the unions did not prove that political unity of the
Arab world is inevitable as Dr. Sayegh concluded in his book *Arab Unity*.

The brotherly feelings between the peoples of the various Arab countries and the desire to unite is deeply rooted in the common culture, history, race and language of the Arabs. However, the particularist nationalisms which grew up during the inter-war period had a very damaging effect on these brotherly feelings and common heritages. In addition they have also been adversely affected by the constant and harsh propaganda campaigns which have been carried out in recent years by the various Arab countries against their neighboring Arab brothers. One might contend that these are only temporary factors when compared to the centuries of existence of brotherly feeling and common heritage, but the present damaging effects cannot be denied. Nevertheless, it cannot be concluded that the formation of the U.A.R. or the other Arab unions, whether because of being a step in the direction towards unity or because of falling short of Arab nationalists' desires, preclude the inevitability of future political unity of the Arab world.

The struggle between Cairo and Baghdad did not cease with the military coup against the then existing Hashimi government in Iraq on

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359. Dr. Sayegh wrote that since "actual attainment of unity" was less far-reaching than the idea of Arab unity, this partial success would only tend to spur the Arab nationalists "to continue to be 'on the move' until all Arab lands have been brought together within one political system." Sayegh, *op. cit.*, p. 216.
July 14, 1958, but only increased in intensity. The United Arab Republic has completely alienated itself from Tunis and the remainder of the Maghreb. In spite of the United Nations' reports to the contrary, many Lebanese people still contend that there was interference by the United Arab Republic in Lebanese internal affairs during the Lebanese Crisis in the spring and summer of 1958.

In addition to this, the Christians of Lebanon, and other non-Muslim minorities throughout the Arab world, are still not convinced that the Arab nationalist movement and its call for Arab unity, if fulfilled, would result in the formation of a secular Arab government rather than a separate Muslim state. The Arab nationalist movement and the call for Arab unity under the leadership of President Nasser wavers from signs of assuming a secular path in some instances, to signs of an Islamic state in others. An example of this may be found in the actions of the Nasser government towards Islam and the Muslim Brotherhood during 1954. The Egyptian Government was receiving much opposition from the Muslim Brotherhood, which was denouncing the Anglo-Egyptian negotiations regarding the Suez Canal bases as well as the Egyptian military regime. The Brotherhood went so far as to attempt the assassination of then Prime Minister Nasser, an act which led to the final dissolution of the Brotherhood in Egypt. Yet, in September of the same year, Egypt proposed the establishment of an Islamic Congress, which "would work through the Arab League," and whose aims would be to spread Islamic culture,

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culture, to harmonize the economic policies of all Muslim nations, and to bring to every Muslim nation the best financial and administrative system. The Congress affirmed its opposition to any form of fanaticism, meaning, of course, the Muslim Brotherhood, and it asserted its desires for Muslim unity. 361

The latest religious manifestations within the Arab nationalist movement appeared in March 1959, after the Mosul rebellion against the Kassem regime in Iraq. In addition to statements made in the United Arab Republic linking its cause and the cause of the Arab nationalist movement with the religious aspect, the Rector of Cairo's Muslim University of Al-Azhar called for a Jihad (Holy War) to fight against communism. At the same time he called upon Premier Karim Kassem to "Return to God and restore his usurped Arabism believing the white hands of Arabism are purer than Red imperialist hands." 362

While the Christian papers of Lebanon lit upon these religious actions and feelings as inherent within the Arab nationalist movement, the Arab nationalists' papers fought back at these attacks of the opponents of the Arab movement by claiming that such outbursts "give Communist propaganda an appearance of truth." 363

In view of the above, the final conclusion is that in order to

361. Ibid, p. 89.


be successful the movement towards Arab unity must establish a well-organized program, void of repugnant propaganda directed towards brother Arabs, with a clear-cut line of delimitation between the temporal and spiritual spheres which will completely remove religion from politics, and with a primary aim of gaining control and power by popular demand in order to succeed in the struggle for Arab unity.

Strong political organization with a well-developed plan and a dynamic program is something which the forces for Arab unity have never had. They have been plagued with idealistic followers, and in many cases, idealistic leaders, who simply felt that Arab unity would come to the Arab world as a gift from the blue, and that there was no real need to have to join in the struggle. This situation has been partially corrected by literature, which was published after the Palestine War and which had been written by those leaders and intellectuals who saw the urgent need for a unified dynamic program if Arab unity was to be accomplished. The Arab nationalist Baath Party, which has branches in the various Arab countries has become extremely well organized. Yet, as if fighting against their own cause, the U.A.R. has banned all political parties in the country. Such situations must be corrected to establish a united effort towards Arab unity.

The religious aspect in the unity cause is of definite importance not only to the non-Muslim minority of the Arab world but also to the Muslims themselves for building a strong modern United Arab State which can compete with all other nations in the world. Great strides
have been made towards secularization of the various Arab countries, but in many instances the problems of religion and a secular state are avoided as being too delicate and embarrassing to discuss. It is believed that the present Arab leaders as well as the Muslim youth and intelligentsia realize that in order to build a modern united nation, religion must be separated from politics. Only under this condition will the non-Muslim elements join whole-heartedly in the call for Arab unity.

It has been stated that as far as the cause for unity is concerned, there are four types of Arabs; those who want unity and work toward it; those who want unity and wait for it; those who do not want unity but give lip service to it; and those who do not want unity because of certain vested interests and who actively work against it. If the first two types of Arabs wish to fulfill their desires, they must unite with a well organized dynamic program and work towards convincing the remaining Arabs of the need to unite the Arab world.
APPENDIX 4

THE PRINCIPLES OF THE SYRIAN SOCIAL NATIONALIST PARTY

The Syrian Social Nationalist Party has passed through numerous changes in its make-up since it was organized by Anton Sa'adah in 1932. With the union of Syria and Egypt it is due for further change. Summarized below are the principles of this party which aims at a Syrian Union.

1. Syria is for the Syrians who constitute a nation complete in itself.

2. The Syrian national cause is an integral cause completely distinct from any other cause.

3. The Syrian cause is the cause of the Syrian nation and of the Syrian homeland.

4. The Syrian nation is the product of the ethnic unity of the Syrian people which has developed throughout history going back to even pre-historic times.

5. The Syrian homeland is that geographic environment in which the Syrian nation evolved. It has natural boundaries which separate it from other countries extending from the Taurus range in the north-west and the Zagros Mountains in the north-east to the Suez Canal and the Red Sea in the south and includes the Sinai Peninsula and the Gulf of Aqaba, and from the Syrian Sea (Mediterranean) in the
west, including the Island of Cyprus, to the arch of the Arabian Desert and the Persian Gulf in the east. (This region is also called the Syrian Fertile Crescent, the Island of Cyprus being its star).

6. The Syrian nation is one society.

7. The Syrian social nationalist movement derives its inspiration from the genius of the Syrian nation and its cultural political national history.

8. Syria's interest supercedes and is prior to every other interest.

9. Separation of religion from the state.

10. Debarring the clergy from interference in national political and judicial matters.

11. Removal of the barriers between the various sects.

12. The abolition of feudalism, the organization of the national economy on a productivity basis and the protection of the rights of labour and the interests of the nation and the state.

13. Preparing and organizing a strong army which will be effective in determining the destiny of the country and the nation.

The Aims and Program of the Party:

The aim of the Syrian Social Nationalist Party is the recreation of a movement which will fulfill its declared principles and
revive the Syrian nation, the establishment of an organization which will seek the complete independence of this nation, the vindication of its sovereignty, the setting up of a new order to protect its interest and raise its standard of living, and the endeavor to form an Arab front.
APPENDIX 5

THE PRINCIPLES OF THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD

Listed below are the principles of the Muslim Brotherhood as compiled by Ishak Musa Husaini from the various writings of the Brotherhood:

1--Avoidance of the battlegrounds of theological disputation.

It is meant by this that the Brethren belong to no one special sect but are devoted to the bare essence of religion; they want the unification of viewpoints because the direst of Moslem calamities has proceeded from conflict and disputation, while the basis of their victories has been love and unity. Differences among sects in religion are inevitable; for unanimity in all matters is an impossible demand and inconsistent with the nature of religion. It is God's wish that this religion endure everlastingly, keep pace with the times, and adapt itself to the age--for it is easy, pliant, and tractable, incapable of stagnation or rigidity. It is left for the people to build upon these foundations.

2--Avoidance of the domination of notables and important men: since rising movements attract them and mean riches and benefits for them.

3--Avoidance of political bodies and parties: implicit in them is contention and discord inconsistent with the brotherhood of Islam.

The mission of Islam is generic, gathering together, not rendering


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asunder, and no one can further the mission nor work for it unless he is devoid of all partiality and has become purely devoted to God.

4--Gradual process: because every movement must inevitably pass through stages before arriving at its goal. These are the stages of propaganda, and inculcation of the idea and the stages of application, action and production.

5--Seeking the help of power for the realization of their aims: ranging from the power of the doctrine and faith to the power of unity and solidarity and then to the power of the arm and weapon. But they will use force only where nothing else avails, when they are confident that they have completed the preparation of faith and unity; but they do not contemplate revolution nor do they believe in its efficacy or in its results. However, should it occur it would be from the pressure of circumstances and failure in carrying out reforms.

6--Setting up of the religious government: because Islam makes government one of its cornerstones, and is itself rule and execution, legislation and education, law and judicature and each is inseparable from the other. But they do not ask for this government for themselves; if they find anyone in the nation who is prepared to carry out this task and to rule by the Koranic-Islam program, then they will be his soldiers, supporters, and helpers. If they find no one, then taking over the government is part of their program and they will work towards taking it from the hands of any government which does not apply the rules of God. But they will never come forward to take over the duty of rule until
their principles have been accepted and are prevalent. They had seen that the governments contemporary with them had never taken up this task and were never really prepared to implement the Islamic idea. They have never been an instrument in the hands of any of these governments.

7—They believe in Arab unity and Islamic unity; they consider the first as "Arab speaking." As for the second, they believe in it and work for the unity of all Muslims and the strengthening of the brotherhood of Islam. They say that their fatherland is every span of land where there are Muslims. They are of the opinion that each person should work for his fatherland and place it above all others. After that he should support Arab unity as being the second link, then Pan-Islam as being the perfect boundary-wall about the universal Islamic fatherland. There is no conflict between those conceptions of unity. Each of them strengthens the other and realizes its purpose. If people start proclaiming special nationalities as a weapon to deaden the feelings for all others, then the Brethren are not with them.

8—The idea of the Caliphate and the work of reviving it is at the head of their program because they consider it the symbol of Islamic unity and the outward sign of the bonds uniting the nations of Islam. But they believe that the final, direct step of returning the Caliphate will necessarily be preceded by others. There must be complete cultural, economic, and social co-operation among all the Islamic nations, followed by alliances and treaties and the convening of assemblies and conferences, followed by the formation of a league of the Islamic nations
so that being so constituted they could rally about the "Imam" who would be the focal point of the union.

9--Their position vis-a-vis the European countries: they consider each country which has aggressed or is aggressing against the Islamic homeland to be a tyrannical state, which must be stopped from its aggression; Moslems must prepare themselves and work in mutual support, united in throwing off their yoke; Islam will not be content with less than freedom and independence with national sovereignty and the declaration of Jihad, even though it costs blood, for death is better than a life of slavery and humiliation.
APPENDIX 6

KING 'ABDULLAH'S GREATER SYRIA SCHEME

When Mr. Philip P. Graves edited and published in English the Memoirs of King ‘Abdullah, he included a summary of King ‘Abdullah's Greater Syria Scheme. The following is a copy of this summary along with Mr. Graves' comments:

The events of the last two years have so entirely altered the situation in Syria and Palestine that the proposals made by the Amir during the later stages of the war for the unification of Syria in the widest sense are now largely out of date. In these in so far as they concerned Palestine he took his stand on the British White Paper of 1939 which was designed, broadly speaking, to maintain the proportion of Jews at one-third of the total population of Palestine. Since then the greater part of Palestine has fallen into the hands of the Jews and a great part, perhaps more than a third of its Arab population, has fled, largely into King Abdullah's territory. And what is more important the United Nations Organization has recognized the Republic of Israel.

On the other hand the formation of a Syrian Federation with its centre at Damascus or, alternatively, the amalgamation of the three regions of Syria, Syria proper, Lebanon and Transjordan into a single state is possible. I therefore give a summary of what may be presumed

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are King Abdullah’s views today on this important subject.

May I add here that Syria (Ar. Suriya) to an Arab covers the whole region west of the desert from the Egyptian to the Turkish frontier and includes both Palestine and the Lebanon. Had Mr. Balfour and other British and Continental statesmen realized that the Arabs regarded these two regions as integral parts of Syria and not as separate countries their diplomacy might have been more successful.

In a preamble the author criticizes the apparent readiness of the Syrians to accept the division of Syria between four separate administrations including Palestine, a contradiction of the principles for which they fought in 1920 and rose in rebellion later. Syria, he argues, would have been in a far stronger position had she refused the agreement restoring Parliamentary Government and the treaty offered by the French Government in 1937, until her claims to Palestine and Transjordan had been internationally recognized.

He then proceeds to offer two solutions of the Syrian problem. The first is the formation of a United Syrian state. The Allies are to confirm by declaration the independence of Syria within its natural boundaries. Such a declaration would be ‘a confirmation of the country’s interests and of the desire of the Syrian people as expressed on many occasions after the first war and recorded by the American Plebiscitary Commission (the Crane Commission). The resolution passed by the Syrian Congress composed of representatives of all the regions of Syria, including Palestine and the Lebanon, at Damascus on March 8th, 1920,
expressed the true desire of the Syrian people and remains their national charter*. March 8th is the Syrian National holiday and the official flag "made for Syria on the basis of the declaration is the flag of the Transjordan Government".

The United Syrian state would be composed of Northern Syria, Transjordan, Palestine and the Lebanon. It would be a constitutional monarchy. Special administrations would be set up in parts of Palestine and the Old Lebanon for the safeguarding of the rights of the Jewish minority and the preservation of the status of the Holy Places in the one case and for the protection of the special rights of Old Lebanon in the other. The Balfour Declaration should be withdrawn or interpreted in such a manner as to relieve Arab anxieties: 'and this can be done if the present proportion of one-third Jews to two-thirds Arabs is accepted and Jewish immigration stopped. British and other foreign interests in Syria could be safeguarded by treaty on the lines of the British treaties with Egypt and Iraq.'

He then presents his own claims to the throne of Syria basing it upon the following considerations:

(a) His legally established rights on the Transjordanian Amirate which is an important section of the Greater Syria.

(b) His effective assistance to the Allies, which assistance during the second war included the Syrian front.

(c) His being the first heir to the right of his late father King Husain to watch over Syrian interests in particular and
Arab rights in general.

(d) A promise given to him in 1921 by Mr. Churchill, later Prime Minister of Great Britain, that he would be the Head of the Syrian State. With the collapse of France and the abolition of her mandate on behalf of the League of Nations...all obstacles to the fulfilment of that promise have been removed.

(e) The desire of the Syrians for a constitutional monarchy in the event of Syrian unity or a federation of the Arab countries being realized.

On the establishment of the Syrian state, the Arab Governments should proceed to the foundation by treaty of an Arab Federation comprising Syria and Iraq ('the lands of the fertile crescent'). The Federal Government should organize the common defence, 'the general culture, and the national economy' of the two states. Other Arab states may join the Federation if they so wish 'provided that the presidency of the Federal Council shall be held by rotation, or, if necessary, given by agreement to the richest, most influential and most populous Arab state'.

The alternative proposal is for the foundation of a Syrian Federation composed of the Governments of Transjordan, Northern Syria, the Lebanon and Palestine with its capital at Damascus. The Federal Government would be responsible for 'defence, communications, national economy, foreign affairs, general culture (i.e. the general lines of education)
and the federal judiciary. The four territorial Governments would retain their autonomy in other matters. The Federation should have a generally elected Legislature and a Council of Representatives of the territorial Governments of the Federation. The Federal Prime Minister and the members of the Federal Executive would be elected from the Legislative body. The Federation should be established as a result of negotiation and agreement between its member Governments and the first step being negotiations between Transjordan and Northern Syria. The Federal Constitution should be drafted by a special committee and ratified by the representative council of the territorial Governments either in a general congress or by a general national assembly representing the different territories of the Federation and elected as a Constituent Assembly.

"His Highness the Amir Abdullah shall be nominated as Head of the Syrian Federation for the same reasons and considerations shown in...the first proposal, the administration of Transjordan to be entrusted to a deputy of His Highness." Provisions are made for the eventual adhesion to the Federation of the Lebanon and Palestine. Those that concern Palestine need not detain the reader. It may be noted, however, that the Amir records his view that "the Palestine problem is the main source of the poisoning of the relations between Great Britain and the Arab and Muslim world". If, for special reasons, the Lebanon should decline to join the Syrian Federation then those Syrian territories which had been attached to the Lebanon against the will of their
inhabitants should be allowed 'to revert to Syria by free plebiscite'.
APPENDIX 7

GENERAL NURI AS-SAID'S FERTILE CRESCENT SCHEME

December 1942

In my view the only fair solution, and indeed the only hope of securing permanent peace, contentment and progress in these Arab areas is for the United Nations to declare now:--

(1) That Syria, Lebanon, Palestine and Trans-Jordan shall be reunited into one State.

(2) That the form of government of this State, whether monarchical or republican whether unitary or federal, shall be decided by the peoples of this State themselves.

(3) That there shall be created an Arab League to which Iraq and Syria will adhere at once and which can be joined by the other Arab States at will.

(4) That this Arab League shall have a permanent Council nominated by the member States, and presided over by one of the rulers of the States who shall be chosen in a manner acceptable to the States concerned.

(5) The Arab League Council shall be responsible for the following:--

(a) Defence.

(b) Foreign Affairs.

(c) Currency.

(d) Communications.

(e) Customs.

(f) Protection of Minority rights.

(6) The Jews in Palestine shall be given semi-autonomy. They shall have the right to their own rural and urban district administration including schools, health institutes, and police subject to general supervision by the Syrian State.

(7) Jerusalem shall be a city to which members of all religions shall have free access for pilgrimage and worship. A special commission composed of representatives of the three theocratic religions shall be set up to ensure this.

(8) That if they demand it, the Maronites in the Lebanon shall be granted a privileged regime such as they possessed during the last years of the Ottoman Empire. This special regime like those to be set up in paragraphs 6 and 7 above shall rest on an International Guarantee.

If it is possible in the manner suggested above to create a Confederation of Arab States including Iraq, Syria, Palestine and Trans-Jordan at the beginning, to which other Arab States may later adhere, then a great many of the difficulties which have faced Great Britain and France in the Near East during the past two decades will disappear. The Arabs of Palestine at present fear that they will become a minority in a Jewish State, and therefore bitterly oppose the grant of special rights to the Jews, but this hostility would be allayed if Palestine became
part of a large strong Arab State. The Jews could establish their National Home in those parts of Palestine, where they are now the majority with a greater feeling of security, because there would be more goodwill on the part of their Arab neighbours, and as a semi-autonomous community in a much larger State their economic opportunities would increase.

The British Empire is not founded on negations but on positive ideals. Free institutions and free co-operation give it a living force of tremendous strength. Upon this foundation of free co-operation a true union of many diverse peoples and countries has been formed, depending less upon stipulations and statistics and more upon the nobler and more permanent principles which are written on the heart and conscience of man. If an opportunity is given to the Arab peoples to establish such a free cooperation among themselves they will be prepared to deal generously with all the Jews living in their midst whether in Palestine or elsewhere. Conditions and guarantees there must be, but let them not constitute a dead hand lest they become a dead letter, as so many minority provisions in European constitutions became during the past twenty years.

If my proposals meet with favour they will require careful examination, so that the appropriate steps are taken at the right time and in the right order. Obviously, the union of the various parts of historic Syria must come first. It may at first take the form of a federation of Syria, Lebanon, Palestine and Trans-Jordan, each state
continuing its own local administration, leaving defence, foreign relations, currency and customs to the Central Government. On the other hand it may be found possible to unite Syria at once, making provision for the Jewish enclaves and the Jerusalem regime at the same time. Steps should be taken at once to define these enclaves and for this purpose it would be necessary to prepare an accurate ethnographical map of Palestine showing the number of Arabs and Jews in each Nahya and town, also, a map on the same scale showing the land under cultivation and the land which can be cultivated intensely in the future. An inquiry should also be made as to the number of Jews who have settled in Palestine since the outbreak of the war in September, 1939.

To secure Arab union sacrifices of sovereignty and vested interests may have to be made. Similar sacrifices have been made in the British Dominions and can be equally demanded from Arab leaders.

I have throughout assumed that as France before the war declared that she was prepared to grant independence to Syria and the Lebanon she will not be allowed by the United Nations to repudiate her offers, nor to obstruct any federation of Arab States by insisting on old privileges or antiquated rights.
APPENDIX 8

THE ALEXANDRIA PROTOCOL

Anxious to strengthen and consolidate the ties which bind all Arab countries and to direct them toward the welfare of the Arab world, to improve its conditions, insure its future, and realize its hopes and aspirations,

And in response to Arab public opinion in all Arab countries,

Have met at Alexandria from Shawwal 8, 1363 (September 25, 1944) to Shawwal 20, 1363 (October 7, 1944) in the form of a Preliminary Committee of the General Arab Conference, and have agreed as follows:

1. LEAGUE OF ARAB STATES

A League will be formed of the independent Arab States which consent to join the League. It will have a council which will be known as the "Council of the League of Arab States" in which all participating states will be represented on an equal footing.

The object of the League will be to control the execution of the agreements which the above states will conclude; to hold periodic meetings which will strengthen the relations between those states; to coordinate their political plans so as to insure their cooperation, and protect their independence and sovereignty against every aggression by suitable means; and to supervise in a general way the affairs and interests of the Arab countries.

1. Arab Information Center, Basic Documents #1, op. cit., pp. 5-8.

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The decisions of the Council will be binding on those who have accepted them except in cases where a disagreement arises between two member states of the League in which the two parties shall refer their dispute to the Council for solution. In this case the decision of the Council of the League will be binding.

In no case will resort to force to settle a dispute between any two member states of the League be allowed. But every state shall be free to conclude with any other member state of the League, or other powers, special agreements which do not contradict the text or spirit of the present dispositions.

In no case will the adoption of a foreign policy which may be prejudicial to the policy of the League or an individual member state be allowed.

The Council will intervene in every dispute which may lead to war between a member state of the League and any other member state or power, so as to reconcile them.

A subcommittee will be formed of the members of the Preliminary Committee to prepare a draft of the statutes of the Council of the League and to examine the political questions which may be the object of agreement among Arab States.

2. COOPERATION IN ECONOMIC, CULTURAL, SOCIAL AND OTHER MATTERS

A. The Arab States represented on the Preliminary Committee shall closely cooperate in the following matters:

(1) Economic and financial matters, i.e., commercial exchange,
customs, currency, agriculture, and industry.

(2) Communications, i.e., railways, roads, aviation, navigation, posts and telegraphs.

(3) Cultural matters.

(4) Questions of nationality, passports, visas, execution of judgments, extradition of criminals, etc.

(5) Social questions.

(6) Questions of public health.

B. A subcommittee of experts for each of the above subjects will be formed in which the states which have participated in the Preliminary Committee will be represented. This subcommittee will prepare draft regulations for cooperation in the above matters, describing the extent and means of that collaboration.

C. A committee for coordination and editing will be formed whose object will be to control the work of the other subcommittees, to coordinate that part of the work which is accomplished, and to prepare drafts of agreements which will be submitted to the various governments.

D. When all the subcommittees have accomplished their work the Preliminary Committee will meet to examine the work of the subcommittees as a preliminary step toward the holding of a General Arab Conference.

3. CONSOLIDATION OF THESE TIES IN THE FUTURE

While expressing its satisfaction at such a happy step, the Committee hopes that Arab States will be able in the future to consolidate that step by other steps, especially if post-war events should result in
institutions which bind various Powers more closely together.

4. A SPECIAL RESOLUTION CONCERNING LEBANON

The Arab States represented on the Preliminary Committee emphasize their respect of the independence and sovereignty of Lebanon in its present frontiers, which the governments of the above States have already recognized in consequence of Lebanon's adoption of an independent policy, which the Government of that country announced in its program of October 7, 1943, unanimously approved by the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies.

5. A SPECIAL RESOLUTION CONCERNING PALESTINE

A. The Committee is of the opinion that Palestine constitutes an important part of the Arab World and that the rights of the Arabs in Palestine cannot be touched without prejudice to peace and stability in the Arab World.

The Committee also is of the opinion that the pledges binding the British Government and providing for the cessation of Jewish immigration, the preservation of Arab lands, and the achievement of independence for Palestine are permanent Arab rights whose prompt implementation would constitute a step toward the desired goal and toward the stabilization of peace and security.

The Committee declares its support of the cause of the Arabs of Palestine and its willingness to work for the achievement of their legitimate aim and the safeguarding of their just rights.

The Committee also declares that it is second to none in regretting the woes which have been inflicted upon the Jews of Europe by
European dictatorial states. But the question of these Jews should not be confused with Zionism, for there can be no greater injustice and aggression than solving the problem of the Jews of Europe by another injustice, i.e., by inflicting injustice on the Arabs of Palestine of various religions and denominations.

B. The special proposal concerning the participation of the Arab Governments and peoples in the "Arab National Fund" to safeguard the lands of the Arabs of Palestine shall be referred to the committee of financial and economic affairs to examine it from all its angles and to submit the result of that examination to the Preliminary Committee in its next meeting.

In faith of which this protocol has been signed at Faruq I University at Alexandria on Saturday, Shawwal 20, 1363 (October 7, 1944).
APPENDIX 9

PACT OF THE LEAGUE OF ARAB STATES

HIS EXCELLENCY THE PRESIDENT OF THE SYRIAN REPUBLIC;

HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS THE AMIR OF TRANS-JORDAN;

HIS MAJESTY THE KING OF IRAQ;

HIS MAJESTY THE KING OF SAUDI ARABIA;

HIS EXCELLENCY THE PRESIDENT OF THE LEBANESE REPUBLIC;

HIS MAJESTY THE KING OF EGYPT;

HIS MAJESTY THE KING OF THE YEMEN;

Desirous of strengthening the close relations and numerous ties
which link the Arab States;

And anxious to support and stabilize these ties upon a basis of
respect for the independence and sovereignty of these states, and to
direct their efforts toward the common good of all the Arab countries,
the improvement of their status, the security of their future, the
realization of their aspirations and hopes;

And responding to the wishes of Arab public opinion in all Arab
lands;

Have agreed to conclude a Pact to that end and have appointed as
their representatives the persons whose names are listed hereinafter:

The President of the Syrian Republic; who has appointed as repre-
sentatives for Syria: His Excellency Faris al-Khuri, Prime Minister;

1. Arab Information Center, Basic Documents #1, op. cit.,
   pp. 9-16.
His Excellency Jamil Mardam Bey, Minister of Foreign Affairs;

His Royal Highness the Amir of Trans-Jordan; who has appointed as representatives for Trans-Jordan: His Excellency Samir al-Rafa'i Pasha, Prime Minister; His Excellency Sa'id al-Mufti Pasha, Minister of the Interior; Sulayman al-Nabulusi Bey, Secretary of the Cabinet;

His Majesty the King of Iraq; who has appointed as representatives for Iraq: His Excellency Arshad al-'Umari, Minister of Foreign Affairs; His Excellency 'Ali Jawdat al-Ayyubi, Minister Plenipotentiary of Iraq in Washington; His Excellency Tahsin al-'Askari, Minister Plenipotentiary of Iraq in Cairo;

His Majesty the King of Saudi Arabia; who has appointed as representatives for Saudi Arabia: His Excellency the Sheikh Yusuf Yasin, Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs; His Excellency Khayr-al-din al-Zirikli, Councillor of the Saudi Arabian Legation in Cairo;

His Excellency the President of the Lebanese Republic; who has appointed as representatives for Lebanon: His Excellency 'Abd-al-Hamid Karami, Prime Minister; His Excellency Yusuf Salim, Minister Plenipotentiary of Lebanon in Cairo;

His Majesty the King of Egypt; who appointed as representatives for Egypt: His Excellency Mahmud Fahmi al-Nuqreshi Pasha, Prime Minister; His Excellency Muhammad Husayn Haykal Pasha, President of the Senate; His Excellency 'Abd-al-Hamid Badawi Pasha, Minister of Foreign Affairs; His Excellency Makram 'Ubayd Pasha, Minister of Finance; His Excellency Muhammad Hafiz Ramadan Pasha, Minister of Justice; His Excel-
lency 'Abd-al-Razzaq Ahmad al-Sanhuri Bey, Minister of Education; Abd-
al-Rahman 'Azzam Bey, Minister Plenipotentiary in the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs;

His Majesty the King of the Yemen; who has appointed as repre-
sentatives for the Yemen: His Excellency Sayed Hussein El-Kebisi.

Who, after having exchanged their plenary powers, which were
found to be in good and due form, have agreed upon the following provi-
sions:

ARTICLE 1

The League of Arab States is composed of the independent Arab
States which have signed this Pact.

Any independent Arab State has the right to become a member of
the League. If it desires to do so, it shall submit a request which will
be deposited with the Permanent Secretariat General and submitted to the
Council at the first meeting held after submission of the request.

ARTICLE 2

The League has as its purpose the strengthening of the relations
between the member states; the coordination of their policies in order
to achieve cooperation between them and to safeguard their independence
and sovereignty; and a general concern with the affairs and interests of
the Arab countries. It has also as its purpose the close cooperation of
the member states, with due regard to the organization and circumstances
of each state, on the following matters:
A. Economic and financial affairs, including commercial relations, customs, currency, and questions of agriculture and industry.

B. Communications; this includes railroads, roads, aviation, navigation, telegraphs, and posts.

C. Cultural affairs.

D. Nationality, passports, visas, execution of judgments, and extradition of criminals.

E. Social affairs.

F. Health problems.

ARTICLE 3

The League shall possess a Council composed of the representatives of the member states of the League; each state shall have a single vote, irrespective of the number of its representatives.

It shall be the task of the Council to achieve the realization of the objectives of the League and to supervise the execution of agreements which the member states have concluded on the questions enumerated in the preceding article, or on any other questions.

It likewise shall be the Council's task to decide upon the means by which the League is to cooperate with the international bodies to be created in the future in order to guarantee security and peace and regulate economic and social relations.
ARTICLE 4

For each of the questions listed in Article 2 there shall be set up a special committee in which the member states of the League shall be represented. These committees shall be charged with the task of laying down the principles and extent of cooperation. Such principles shall be formulated as draft agreements, to be presented to the Council for examination preparatory to their submission to the aforesaid states.

Representatives of the other Arab countries may take part in the work of the aforesaid committees. The Council shall determine the conditions under which these representatives may be permitted to participate and the rules governing such representation.

ARTICLE 5

Any resort to force in order to resolve disputes arising between two or more member states of the League is prohibited. If there should arise among them a difference which does not concern a state's independence, sovereignty, or territorial integrity, and if the parties to the dispute have recourse to the Council for the settlement of this difference, the decision of the Council shall then be enforceable and obligatory.

In such a case, the states between whom the difference has arisen shall not participate in the deliberations and decisions of the Council.

The Council shall mediate in all differences which threaten to lead to war between two member states, or a member state and a third state, with a view to bringing about their reconciliation.
Decisions of arbitration and mediation shall be taken by majority vote.

ARTICLE 6

In case of aggression or threat of aggression by one state against a member state, the state which has been attacked or threatened with aggression may demand the immediate convocation of the Council.

The Council shall by unanimous decision determine the measures necessary to repulse the aggression. If the aggressor is a member state, his vote shall not be counted in determining unanimity.

If, as a result of the attack, the government of the state attacked finds itself unable to communicate with the Council, that state's representative in the Council shall have the right to request the convocation of the Council for the purpose indicated in the foregoing paragraph. In the event that this representative is unable to communicate with the Council, any member state of the League shall have the right to request the convocation of the Council.

ARTICLE 7

Unanimous decisions of the Council shall be binding upon all member states of the League; majority decisions shall be binding only upon those states which have accepted them.

In either case the decisions of the Council shall be enforced in each member state according to its respective basic laws.
ARTICLE 8

Each member state shall respect the systems of government established in the other member states and regard them as exclusive concerns of those states. Each shall pledge to abstain from any action calculated to change established systems of government.

ARTICLE 9

States of the League which desire to establish closer cooperation and stronger bonds than are provided by this Pact may conclude agreements to that end.

Treaties and agreements already concluded or to be concluded in the future between a member state and another state shall not be binding or restrictive upon other members.

ARTICLE 10

The permanent seat of the League of Arab States is established in Cairo. The Council may, however, assemble at any other place it may designate.

ARTICLE 11

The Council of the League shall convene in ordinary session twice a year, in March and in October. It shall convene in extraordinary session upon the request of two member states of the League whenever the need arises.
ARTICLE 12

The League shall have a permanent Secretariat-General which shall consist of a Secretary-General, Assistant Secretaries, and an appropriate number of officials.

The Council of the League shall appoint the Secretary-General by a majority of two-thirds of the states of the League. The Secretary-General, with the approval of the Council shall appoint the Assistant Secretaries and the principal officials of the League.

The Council of the League shall establish an administrative regulation for the functions of the Secretariat-General and matters relating to the Staff.

The Secretary-General shall have the rank of Ambassador and the Assistant Secretaries that of Ministers Plenipotentiary.

The first Secretary-General of the League is named in an Annex to this Pact.

ARTICLE 13

The Secretary-General shall prepare the draft of the budget of the League and shall submit it to the Council for approval before the beginning of each fiscal year.

The Council shall fix the share of the expenses to be borne by each state of the League. This share may be reconsidered if necessary.

ARTICLE 14

The members of the Council of the League as well as the members
of the committees and the officials who are to be designated in the administrative regulation shall enjoy diplomatic privileges and immunity when engaged in the exercise of their functions.

The buildings occupied by the organs of the League shall be inviolable.

ARTICLE 15

The first meeting of the Council shall be convened at the invitation of the head of the Egyptian Government. Thereafter it shall be convened at the invitation of the Secretary-General.

The representatives of the member states of the League shall alternately assume the presidency of the Council at each of its ordinary sessions.

ARTICLE 16

Except in cases specifically indicated in this Pact, a majority vote of the Council shall be sufficient to make enforceable decisions on the following matters:

A. Matters relating to personnel.
B. Adoption of the budget of the League.
C. Establishment of the administrative regulations for the Council, the committees, and the Secretariat General.
D. Decisions to adjourn the sessions.

ARTICLE 17

Each member state of the League shall deposit with the
Secretariat-General one copy of every treaty or agreement concluded or to be concluded in the future between itself and another member state of the League or a third state.

ARTICLE 18

If a member state contemplates withdrawal from the League, it shall inform the Council of its intention one year before such withdrawal is to go into effect.

The Council of the League may consider any state which fails to fulfill its obligations under this Pact as having become separated from the League, this to go into effect upon a unanimous decision of the states, not counting the state concerned.

ARTICLE 19

This Pact may be amended with the consent of two-thirds of the states belonging to the League, especially in order to make firmer and stronger the ties between the member states, to create an Arab Tribunal of Arbitration, and to regulate the relations of the League with any international bodies to be created in the future to guarantee security and peace.

Final action on an amendment cannot be taken prior to the session following the session in which the motion was initiated.

If a state does not accept such an amendment it may withdraw at such time as the amendment goes into effect, without being bound by the provisions of the preceding article.
ARTICLE 20

This Pact and its Annexes shall be ratified according to the basic laws in force among the High Contracting Parties.

The instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Secretariat-General of the Council and the Pact shall become operative as regards each ratifying state fifteen days after the Secretary-General has received the instruments of ratification from four states.

This Pact has been drawn up in Cairo in the Arabic language on this 8th day of Rabi' II, thirteen hundred and sixty-four (March 22, 1945), in one copy which shall be deposited in the safekeeping of the Secretariat-General.

An identical copy shall be delivered to each state of the League.

[Here follow the signatures.]

(1) Annex Regarding Palestine

Since the termination of the last great war the rule of the Ottoman Empire over the Arab countries, among them Palestine, which had become detached from that Empire, has come to an end. She has come to be autonomous, not subordinate to any other state.

The Treaty of Lausanne proclaimed that her future was to be settled by the parties concerned.

However, even though she was as yet unable to control her own affairs, the Covenant of the League (of Nations) in 1919 made provision for a regime based upon recognition of her independence.
Her international existence and independence in the legal sense cannot, therefore, be questioned, any more than could the independence of the other Arab countries.

Although the outward manifestations of this independence have remained obscured for reasons beyond her control, this should not be allowed to interfere with her participation in the work of the Council of the League.

The States signatory to the Pact of the Arab League are therefore of the opinion that, considering the special circumstances of Palestine and until that country can effectively exercise its independence, the Council of the League should take charge of the selection of an Arab representative from Palestine to take part in its work.

(2) Annex Regarding Cooperation With Countries Which Are Not Members of the Council of the League

Whereas the member states of the League will have to deal in the Council as well as in the committees with matters which will benefit and affect the Arab world at large;

And whereas the Council has to take into account the aspirations of the Arab countries which are not members of the Council and has to work toward their realization;

Now therefore, it particularly behooves the states signatory to the Pact of the Arab League to enjoin the Council of the League, when considering the admission of those countries to participation in the committees referred to in the Pact, that it should do its utmost to
cooperate with them, and furthermore, that it should spare no effort to learn their needs and understand their aspirations and hopes; and that it should work thenceforth for their best interests and the safeguarding of their future with all the political means at its disposal.

(3) Annex Regarding the Appointment of a Secretary-General of the League

The states signatory to this Pact have agreed to appoint His Excellency Abd-ul-Rahman 'Azzam Bey, to be the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States.

This appointment is made for two years. The Council of the League shall hereafter determine the new regulations for the Secretariat-General.
APPENDIX 10

PROVISIONAL CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

PART I

THE UNITED ARAB STATE

I. The United Arab State is a democratic, independent, sovereign Republic, and its people are part of the Arab Nation.

II. Nationality in the United Arab Republic is defined by Law. Nationality in the United Arab Republic is enjoyed by all bearers of the Syrian or Egyptian nationalities; or who are entitled to it by laws or statutes in force in Syria or Egypt at the time this Constitution takes effect.

PART II

BASIC CONSTITUENTS OF SOCIETY

III. Social solidarity is the basis of Society.

IV. National economy is organized according to plans which conform to the principles of social justice, and aim at the development of national productivity and the raising of the standard of living.

V. Private property is inviolable. The law organizes its social function. Property may not be expropriated except for purposes of public utility and in consideration of just

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1. Arab Information Center, Basic Documents #2, pp. 10-20.
compensation in accordance with the Law.

VI. Social justice is the basis of taxation and public imposts.

PART III

PUBLIC RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS

VII. All citizens are equal before the Law. They are equal in their rights and obligations, without distinction of race, origin, language, religion or creed.

VIII. No infraction and no punishment may be imposed except by virtue of the Law. Penalties may not be inflicted except in respect of offenses committed subsequently to the date of the Law prescribing them.

IX. The extradition of political refugees is prohibited.

X. Public liberties are guaranteed within the limits of the Law.

XI. Defense of the Fatherland is a sacred duty, and the fulfillment of military service is an honour for all citizens. Conscription is obligatory in accordance with the Law.

PART IV

THE SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT

Chapter I

Head of the State

XII. The President of the Republic is the Head of State. He exercises his powers in the manner prescribed by this Constitution.
Chapter II

The Legislature

XIII. The legislative power is vested in an Assembly named the National Assembly. Number of the members of the National Assembly and their choice are determined by Presidential Decree. At least half of the number of members must be members of the Syrian Chamber of Deputies and the National Assembly of Egypt.

XIV. The National Assembly exercises control over the acts of the Executive in the manner prescribed by the present Constitution.

XV. To be a member of the Assembly, a person must not be less than thirty years of age according to the Gregorian Calendar.

XVI. The National Assembly has its seat in Cairo. It may be convened elsewhere upon the demand of the President of the Republic.

XVII. The President of the Republic convokes the Assembly and declares the closure of its session.

XVIII. Meetings of the National Assembly, without summons and outside its sessions, are null and void, and decisions taken therein are null and void, according to the Law.

XIX. Before admission to the exercise of their functions members of the Assembly shall take the following oath before the Assembly in public session:

"I swear in the name of Almighty God to preserve faithfully the United Arab Republic and its Regime, to watch over
the interests of the People and integrity of the Fatherland, and to respect the Constitution and the Law."

XX. The Assembly shall elect a President and two Vice-Presidents at the first ordinary meeting.

XXI. Meetings of the Assembly are public. Nevertheless, the Assembly can meet in camera following the demand of the President of the Republic or twenty of its members. The Assembly decides thereafter whether the discussion of the question under consideration should or should not be resumed in public.

XXII. No law may be enacted unless approved by the Assembly. No draft law may be adopted unless a vote is taken on each of its articles separately.

XXIII. The Assembly draws up its own internal regulations determining the manner in which it exercises its powers.

XXIV. Every member of the National Assembly is entitled to address to the Ministers questions or interpellations. Interpellations may not be discussed until after at least seven days from the date of their presentation, except in the case of urgency and with the consent of the Minister concerned.

XXV. Any twenty members of the National Assembly may ask for the discussion of a general question with a view to ascertaining the Government's policy and exchanging views on such a question.

XXVI. The National Assembly may express its wishes and proposals to
the Government regarding general questions.

XXVII. No impost may be established, modified or abolished except by a law. No one may be exempted therefrom except in the cases specified by the Law.

No other tax or duty may be exacted except within the limits defined by the Law.

XXVIII. The Law defines the basic rules of the collection of public revenues and the manner of their expenditure.

XXIX. The Government may not contract any loans, nor undertake any project which would be a burden on the State Treasury over one or more future years, except with the consent of the National Assembly.

XXX. No monopoly may be granted except by Law and for a limited duration.

XXXI. The Law prescribes the manner of the preparation of the Budget, and its presentation to the National Assembly.

XXXII. The draft of the State's General Budget must be submitted to the National Assembly for its examination and approval at least three months before the end of the financial year. Each section of the Budget must be voted separately.

The National Assembly may not introduce any amendments to the draft Budget except with the approval of the Government.

XXXIII. Every transfer of funds from one section of the Budget to another must be approved by the National Assembly, as well as
any expenditure for which no provision is made therein or exceeding the budgetary allocations.

XXXIV. The provisions relating to the Budget of the State are applicable to independent or annexed budgets.

XXXV. The Law determines the rules regarding the budgets of other public institutions.

XXXVI. No member of the National Assembly may, during the session, be subject to a criminal prosecution without the permission of the Assembly, except in cases of flagrante delicto.

The Assembly must be given notification in any case where prosecution is undertaken while the Assembly is in recess.

XXXVII. No member of the National Assembly may be deprived of his mandate except by a decision of a two-thirds majority of the Assembly, upon a proposal of twenty of its members, and this on the ground of loss of confidence and esteem.

XXXVIII. The President of the Republic has the right to dissolve the National Assembly. In this case, a new Assembly must be formed and convoked within a period of sixty days from its dissolution.

XXXIX. When the National Assembly declares a vote of no confidence in a Minister, he must resign.

A motion of censure concerning a Minister may not be submitted to the Assembly until after an interpellation has been addressed to him. Such a motion must be proposed by twenty
members of the Assembly. No decision may be taken before at least three days from the date of the presentation of the motion.

Withdrawal of confidence must be pronounced by the majority of the members of the Assembly.

XL. No one may at the same time be a member of the National Assembly and incumbent of a public function. The Law determines the other cases of incompatibility of functions.

XLI. No member of the National Assembly may be appointed to the board of a company during the period of his mandate except in the cases prescribed by the Law.

XLII. No member of the National Assembly may, during the period of his mandate, acquire or take or lease any State property, or lease, sell or exchange to or with the State any part of his property whatsoever.

XLIII. Members of the National Assembly receive a remuneration prescribed by the Law.

Chapter III

The Executive

XLIV. The Executive Power is vested in the President of the Republic, and he exercises it in the manner prescribed by the Constitution.

XLV. The President of the Republic may not, during his term of office, exercise a liberal profession or undertake any
commercial, financial or industrial activity. Nor may he acquire or take or lease any property belonging to the State, or lease, sell or exchange to or with the State any part of his property whatsoever.

XLVI. The President of the Republic may appoint one or more Vice-Presidents, and he may relieve them of their posts.

XLVII. The President of the Republic appoints the Ministers and discharges them from their functions. Ministers of State and Secretaries of State may be appointed. Each Minister supervises the affairs of his Department and executes the general policy drawn by the President of the Republic.

XLVIII. The Vice-President, or the Minister, may not, during his tenure of office, exercise a liberal profession, engage in commercial, financial or industrial activities, nor may he acquire or take or lease any property belonging to the State, or lease, sell or exchange any part whatsoever of his own property to or with the State.

XLIX. The President of the Republic and the National Assembly have the right to bring a Minister to justice for infractions committed by him in the exercise of his functions. The indictment of a Minister by the National Assembly is effected by a proposal submitted by at least one-fifth of the members of the Assembly. Such indictment must be approved by a majority of two-thirds of the members of the Assembly.
L. The President of the Republic has the right to initiate laws, to oppose and to promulgate them.

LI. If the President of the Republic opposes a draft law, it is sent back to the National Assembly within the thirty days following the date of its communication to him. If it is not referred back to the Assembly within this period, it is considered law and promulgated.

LII. If a draft law is referred back to the Assembly within the prescribed time, and is voted a second time by a majority of two-thirds of its members, it is considered law and promulgated.

LIII. While the National Assembly is in recess, the President of the Republic may enact decrees having the force of law, or take decisions originally lying within the competence of the Assembly, should the necessity arise. Such decrees and decisions must be submitted to the National Assembly at its first meeting. If, however, the Assembly opposes them by a two-thirds majority, they are no longer effective from the day of their opposition.

LIV. The President of the Republic enacts the regulations necessary for the organization of the public service departments and supervises the administration thereof.

LV. The President of the Republic is the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces.
LVI. The President of the Republic concludes treaties and communicates them to the National Assembly. Such treaties will have the force of law after their conclusion, their ratification and their publication in conformity with the rules in force. However, peace treaties, treaties of alliance, commercial and navigational treaties as well as all treaties entailing territorial changes or affecting the rights of sovereignty, or those involving expenditure by the Public Treasury for which no provision is made in the Budget, will not become effective until after ratification by the National Assembly.

LVII. The President of the Republic may declare a state of emergency.

LVIII. The United Arab Republic consists of two regions: Egypt and Syria. In each, there shall be an Executive Council appointed by Presidential Decree. This Executive Council has the competence to examine and study matters pertaining to the execution of the general policy in the region.

Chapter IV

The Judicature

LIX. Judges are independent. They are, in the administration of Justice, subject to no other authority save that of the Law. No power in the State may interfere in lawsuits or in the affairs of justice.

LX. Judges are irrelievable, in the manner prescribed by Law.

LXI. The Law organises the various jurisdictions and determines
their attributions.

LXII. Sessions of the Courts are conducted in public, unless a court decides, in the interests of public order or morality, to sit in camera.

LXIII. Judicial decisions are pronounced and executed in the name of the Nation.

PART V

GENERAL RULES

LXIV. Cairo is the capital of the United Arab Republic.

LXV. The Law determines the national flag and the regulations relative thereto.

The Law also determines the State emblem and the regulations relative thereto.

LXVI. The Law only legislates post-operatively; it has no retroactive effect. Nevertheless, provisions to the contrary may be stipulated in a law, except in criminal matters, with the approval of the majority of the members of the National Assembly.

LXVII. Laws are published in the Official Gazette within two weeks from the date of their promulgation, and come into force ten days thereafter. Nevertheless, this time may be extended or curtailed by a special provision in the Law.
PART VI

INTERIM AND FINAL RULES

LXVIII. All laws, decrees and regulations in force in each of the two regions of Egypt and Syria at the time this Constitution comes into effect shall remain valid within the regional spheres for which they were intended. These laws, decrees and regulations may, however, be abrogated or amended according to the procedure established in the present Constitution.

LXIX. The coming into effect of the present Constitution shall not infringe upon the provisions and clauses of the international treaties and agreements concluded between each of Syria and Egypt and foreign Powers.

These treaties and agreements shall remain valid in the regional spheres for which they were intended at the time of their conclusion, according to the rules and regulations of International Law.

LXX. A special budget, alongside the State Budget, shall be drawn up and put into force in the present regional sphere of each of Syria and Egypt until the coming into effect of the final measures for the introduction of a single Budget.

LXXI. The public services and administrative systems existing at the time the present Constitution comes into effect shall remain in force in each of Syria and Egypt until their reorganization and unification by Presidential Decree.
LXXII. Citizens shall constitute a National Union to work for the realization of national aims and the intensification of the efforts for raising a sound national structure, from the political, social and economic viewpoints. The manner in which such a union is to be formed shall be defined by Presidential Decree.

LXXIII. The present Provisional Constitution shall be in force until the announcement of the people's approval of the final Constitution of the United Arab Republic.
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