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THE EISENHOWER DOCTRINE - AN ANALYSIS OF ITS AIMS
IN RELATION TO UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY
WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO LEBANON

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THE EISENHOWER DOCTRINE

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ABSTRACT

The problem: how do the aims of the Eisenhower Doctrine fit in with the aims of American foreign policy - particularly in the Middle East.

The broad aims of peace and its contributing elements, national security and survival filter through from the world aims of American foreign policy to the United States Middle East policy. Peace is the aim; power is necessary to maintain peace; and prestige helps maintain and acquire power. Other supports to peace are the struggle against communism and the United Nations.

When the aims are determined, the environment of these aims must also be determined, i.e. her power position in international politics, the actual position of the United States and the position she desires; or, in other words: the position she must have to be able to realize her aims - a peace on her terms.

The policies are then formulated according to interests and the estimation of power relations as they exist between different nations at a certain moment.

To analyze the aims of the United States and the Eisenhower Doctrine, it is necessary to proceed further and determine if the policies set forth by the United States and the Eisenhower Doctrine were adequate to realize those aims.

The general and specific aims of United States foreign policy were discovered by a study and interpretation of fairly recent (mostly 1956, 1957, and 1958) events and American reaction and action; by a study of speeches by Eisenhower, Dulles, and other high governmental officials, foreign policy experts and private citizens.

Study of the Doctrine itself was a matter of compiling, filtering, and clarifying the implicit and explicit aims by examining House and Senate speeches during the two months of debate and discussion; the main points brought out in the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees, and the House Foreign Affairs; the debates on general United States policy, the Eisenhower Doctrine and amendments to the Eisenhower Doctrine, amendments defeated and amendments passed. Outside speeches and reports by Congressmen were evaluated as were the interpretations of, and comments on, the Eisenhower Doctrine by foreign policy experts and spokesmen of foreign nations.

For realization of the aims the Richards' Mission was studied, as well as his statements of purpose and his results, the communiqués issued by the Middle Eastern Governments, and events during the pre-Richards' months of inner-Arab struggle and building up tensions. Representatives of the American Embassy and former officials of the Lebanese Government were interviewed.

For realization of aims, Lebanon's unique position - two concentric circles, one West and Christian, the other Arab and

Muslim - was studied, as were the changes it underwent during the presentation of the Doctrine and the following year. Lebanon was chosen because she alone 'accepted' the Eisenhower Doctrine.

A brief evaluation of her interpretation of the resolution's aims brought out the differences in theory and practice.

A study of the events from January, 1957, through July, 1958, showed the ready-made tensions and the sharpening of tensions.

The Eisenhower Doctrine was created out of necessity to meet the tensions of the Middle East, to strengthen her sagging prestige, and to secure peace for the immediate future, as the United States felt that peace on her terms was being threatened.

The aims of the Eisenhower Doctrine were a continuation of aims of United States foreign policy even though it was presented in such a way as to suggest a 'bold new policy'.

The Eisenhower Doctrine was a continuation of the stopgap nature of American policies and emphasized the importance the United States put on realizing immediate peace rather than planning for a final peace.

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CHAPTER I

PRE-EISENHOWER DOCTRINE - AIMS OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Peace is the aim; power is necessary to maintain peace; and prestige helps maintain and acquire power.

PEACE

The broad aims of peace and its contributing elements, national security and survival, filter through from the world aims of American foreign policy to the United States Middle East policy.

Peace is the central purpose of American foreign policy; consequently, peace must be maintained in the Middle East, for a flame in that area might leap to other parts of the world, bound across the retaining width of the United States' perimeter and containment policies, challenge her security pacts with forty-two nations, and burst into a global holocaust.

President Eisenhower's Second Inaugural, January 21, 1957, many hailed as the proclamation of a new deal in world affairs, a new look in peace. "We are called to meet the price of this peace... The economic need of all nations -

in mutual dependence - makes isolation an impossibility..." Eisenhower may have dedicated his country to a 'generous Nationalism'.¹ Were the benefits worth the price?

It is not a peace at any price. Peace must be on United States terms. Peace can always be secured - on Russian terms; therefore power is essential to secure United States terms. Eisenhower said there is no alternative to peace. Mere survival is not enough. Bargaining is destructive. The United States, formulating policy within the territory of a peace with freedom, sought survival in freedom for the rest of the world.

POWER

The United States pursues power as her interest is peace - her kind of peace - and power secures interest. To further and maintain one's interest, which is power, the United States' policies then, understandably, seek either to keep power, to increase power, or to demonstrate power. In Hans Morgenthau's definition according to her power position, to keep power, a country attempts to maintain the status quo; to increase power, the policy is imperialistic; and to demonstrate power, a country will pursue a policy of prestige.²

1. Nicholas, H.G., "The New Administration and United States and United States Foreign Policy," Yearbook of World Affairs, vo.11, (1957), p.17.

2. Morgenthau, Hans, Politics Among Nations, p.36.

PRESTIGE

Prestige helps the United States maintain her power, and prestige cloaks her attempts to acquire more. Prestige is often sought for its own sake, although in international politics its ultimate objective is not the reputation for power but the substance of power or actual power.

As the United States can no longer isolate herself from her world environment, she must determine her status in world power relationships.

World War II had raised the United States from a position of self-inflicted isolationism to an immediate post-war offensive. With the offensive, the United States retained the margin of safety in power politics, but she soon slid into a defensive position from which until recently, she has been unable to recover herself.

In the post-war years following Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the United States co-existed with Russia in an atomic stalemate.³ Even though the United States had military superiority then, she created a stalemate because she never translated the military advantage into a political advantage.

She hung onto her margin of safety until 1954-55 when the United States policy makers realized that the United States no longer held the lead in nuclear weapons. But when the lead was lost, the offensive position was lost too. Its death exposed the polarization of power, the possibility of war through modern technology, and the United States miscalculation

3. Kissinger, Henry, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, p.11.

of Russia's capability of translating her potential into power.

The confidence of action had been replaced by the insecurities and introspection of reaction.

America's reputation for power was much lower than its actual power at the beginning of World War II when Japan attacked Pearl Harbor. The United States, not realizing that a wise policy of prestige is to demonstrate to the world one's power, revealing neither too much nor too little, was not as smart as Russia. As the prestige of the United States has decreased, Russia's has increased as both her reputation and substance of power have ballooned.

Within the framework of their cold war, the United States and Russia try and impress allies, hostile alliances, and uncommitted nations with their military might, economic potential, and political principle. As the United States realized that their military prowess was no longer superior or even equal in most fields to that of Russia, and her prestige was thereby in danger of becoming inferior, she had to place new emphasis in the area of economic aid and public opinion. Military strategy, economic aid, and public opinion are elements of prestige.

Military strategy. Eisenhower said, "We seek peace (peace with justice) from a position of strength".⁴ It was

4. Eisenhower, "Foreign Policy and Foreign Aid", United States Department of State Bulletin, v. 36, May 4, 1957, p.846.

recognized, though, by the United States military that in a general war against the Soviet Union, there would be little point in trying to plan and prepare for an organized defense of the Middle East because the United States does not have sufficient ground forces for defense.⁵

But the importance of military preparedness had not been lost. In the jumpy Middle East, force had not been buried. Eisenhower says that the American resolution to use force, if necessary for national self-defense is constant, while Dulles states, "Our purpose is peace and justice. But never have these been achieved anywhere without power..."⁶

For preparedness, the United States added two billion to the defense budget. But the \$38 billion the budget provided for fiscal year 1958 (July 1957-June 1958) would not buy any more all over defense than the \$36 billion she was spending in 1957. Part of the "\$2,000,000,000 will cover the increased cost of the same items; another additional expense - new weapons ordered in the past but just now coming into production."⁷ Yet there were complaints. From the Senate came a plea, "We cannot endorse a foreign policy of tranquilizing pills, under whose influence the American people are put to sleep while their power and vigor seep away."⁸

5. Campbell, John, Defense of the Middle East, p.163.

6. Dulles, John Foster, "Statement by Dulles", USDSB, v.38, January 6, 1958, p.8.

7. Congressional Record, v.103, p.902.

8. Ibid., p.2529.

The United States tactics - defensive - depended on collective security, deterrence and containment.

a) Collective Security. The United States, militarily plodding, looked to strength in numbers. Collective Security was a one-for-all and an all-for-one arrangement. The Atlantic Charter of 1941 and the Declaration by the United Nations in 1942 foretold of the times to come, the necessity for strong overall organizations, and the likelihood of a trouble maker.

Outer strength could not disguise collective security's inner weakness. Although the communiqué issued at the end of the two-day NATO meeting in Bonn, Germany, May 2,3, 1957, proclaimed that the Atlantic Alliance has always been and remains purely defensive and was created to protect its members from any aggression,⁹ Great Britain cut her defense forces from 600,000 to 375,000.¹⁰ A statement by Eisenhower in a later NATO meeting announced that the "North Atlantic Treaty, as originally conceived, was essentially a collective-defense organization, and defense must under the present circumstances continue to be a major aspect of our activities."¹¹

b) Deterrence. Deterrence, according to General LeMay, head of Strategic Air Command, "is achieved by the capacity to inflict a level of damage which an enemy would

9. New York Times, May 4, 1957, p.2.

10. Ibid., April 8, 1957, p.3.

11. Eisenhower Statement, USDSB, v.38, January 6, 1958, p.6.

Economic aid. The United States with parental care, adopted economic aid. Frank Coffin in his article on the Middle East and Future Foreign Policy, February 20, 1957, asks three questions in determining a program of economic aid:

1. What does the nation need?
2. What can it use effectively?
3. What can it receive with self-respect?

Too often, he feels, the United States has asked only the first question.¹⁴

It was the third point which the United States most frequently violated. Economic aid offers to Arab countries in 1948 had not been accepted because of America's accompanying insistence that recipients enter into firm obligations to recognize the existence of Israel and agreed not to be an aggressor against it or any other neighbor. The United States re-emphasis on aid given during the last four years, made available aid without insistence upon peace treaties and covenants against aggression.

Even a nation's wants conflicted with public frugality, which was vocalized in the Senate. One Senator asked, "What has happened to the famous line, 'millions for defense, but not one cent for tribute,'" when he referred to the alleged Arab blackmail of the participants in the cold war;¹⁵ while

14. Congressional Record, op.cit., p.2372.

15. Congressional Record, op.cit., p.1953.

American Zionist leaders warned the United States must not, in supplying economic aid, use it "merely as an instrument of appeasement."¹⁶

But in the opinion of an American Senator, "it takes more than just dew to dampen a desert."¹⁷ In other words, small bits of economic and technical assistance certainly are not sufficient.

Public opinion. Because of the diminishing number of nuclei of the world, the resulting cold war, and the advent of nuclear warfare, peace has become vulnerable in the struggle for the minds of men. Prestige is a weapon in the struggle.

For ultimate peace comes when there are no opponents, or when national interests coincide. Man's control over the mind and actions of other men becomes power. Truman realized during his Presidency that "unless we get the real story across to people in other countries, we will lose the battle for men's minds by default."¹⁸ The United States too often says that those who are not with us are against us; while Russia says those who are not against us are with us or for us.

16. New York Times, January 14, 1957, p.12.

17. Middle East Development Conference, January, February, 1958, p.83.

18. Major Problems of US Foreign Policy, 1950, p.192.

SUPPORTS OF PEACE

Defensive strategy with its inherent weakness was no protector of prestige. Inadequacy bred fear. But fear from the dizzying height of uncertainty begot a sudden and sometimes involuntary reaction. Fear, while detrimental to prestige, became a motivation to find other supports. The framework under peace is a vacillating, ever changing thing. As Eisenhower sees it, "In the situation now existing, the greatest risk... is that ambitious despots may miscalculate."¹⁹ The dynamic framework of peace must be given as firm supports as possible but supports that allow for changes, changes that will take into account the area of dynamism.

The United Nations. There was hope and there was optimism in the United Nations. Hope was hot in 1943. Secretary of State Cordell Hull, after the Moscow Conference had laid the groundwork for the United Nations, said, "the new international organization would mean the end of power politics and usher in a new era of international collaboration,"²⁰ for the United Nations was created in order to eliminate the struggle for power from the international scene.

This support has weaknesses. If totally leaned on by one country, it would collapse. Australia's Prime Minister,

19. Congressional Record, op.cit., pp.225-5.

20. New York Times, November 19, 1954, p.1.

Robert Gordon Menzies, felt that it was not a policy to say, "we will take it to the United Nations... You must determine that policy before going to the United Nations... What the United Nations could do must depend on what the United States would do because the United States was the greatest power in the world."²¹

Hubert Humphrey, Democratic Senator, saw a new trend in the United States foreign policy in putting more reliance on the moral force of the United Nations and less on her own military might, but felt the United States offset her efforts by her inconsistent shifting.²² Mike Mansfield, another Democratic Senator, cried that the United States should not make the United Nations a scapegoat of United States responsibility.²³ Moving toward the 1950's, with less reason for hope but with more need for it, the United States, turned often to the United Nations as did Harry Truman in the partition of Palestine when partition seemed but a prelude to war. "But the matter had been placed in the hands of the United Nations..." he said, and the General Assembly's decision "would reflect the will of the nations of the world."²⁴ The United States turned again during the Suez Crisis when the Grand Alliance became ill. Yet the United States was not

21. New York Times, April 4, 1957, p.2.

22. Congressional Record, op.cit., pp.289-290.

23. Ibid., p.2602.

24. Truman, Harry S., Memoirs by Harry S. Truman, p.157.

willing to surrender her weight to one support and her waning prestige with it.

Anti-communism. As the United States was looking for a place to put her foot, she found another support - anti-communism.

The position of the United States is defensive and she must negotiate from that underdog position. This position makes essential the acquisition of more power. In the myopic vision of the United States, Russia looming large and close, like Beowulf's Grendel, was the only clear object.

There was some reason for her near-sightedness, for what changed was not the basic power struggle, but the frame of reference within which it was being waged. In this new struggle, the main problem as the United States saw it up to 1957, was Russia. Moscow was soft-peddling communist ideology. Lenin's phrase in 1920 that "'it is necessary to wage a determined struggle against painting the bourgeois-democratic liberation trend in backward countries in Communist colors'"; and, that communism "'must enter into a temporary alliance with bourgeois democracy in colonial and backward countries but must not merge with it'" had been adopted by Khrushchev up to 1957 in his attempts to prove that Middle East liberation movements and 'bourgeois-democratic' nationalism are in temporary alliance with communism.²⁵

25. New York Times, April 15, 1957, p.28.

To stop Russian aggression channeled American efforts to gain its position as the leader not of the West alone but of global matters. The Russian aggression was eating away: bites seemed to be bigger and less cautious than the preceding ones. Bites in the free world occurred in September 1948 when Russia exploded an atomic bomb; in October 1949, when the Chinese Peoples' Republic was proclaimed; and again on December 10, when the National Government retired to Formosa. Russia's appetite in other parts of the world was watched and anticipated. To the United States, it appeared to be voracious and insatiable.

On the offensive, Russia perfected her stalling tactics, such as her flexibility and propaganda in acquiring power with which she dictated to the minds of men. Russia's actions falsified the reliability and worth of prestige. The United States, to increase her prestige, must accordingly reduce Russia's. The dilemma is on what grounds she can attack Russia's prestige without harming her own.

According to Hans Morgenthau, "The moral commitment to anti-Communism as the standard by which to judge the foreign policy of nations is likely to have supremely immoral consequences."²⁶ The policy is not only blood-letting prestige, but the anti-communist crusade as an instrument of foreign policy is likely to destroy all nations, communist and anti-communist alike, and in the process destroy the prestige of the United States.

26. Morgenthau, Hans, "Neutrality and Neutralism", Yearbook of World Affairs, p.74.

OBSTACLES TO PEACE

Moral Principles versus Power Politics. The United States has vacillated between multilateralism and principle on the one hand and power politics and a unilateral approach on the other. Their clash was inevitable when both were used as justifications for policy.

American foreign policy in the past century was either "an improvisation in the face of an urgent problem which had to be dealt with somehow or the invocation of some abstract moral principle, in the image of which the world was to be made over."²⁷ The United States, guided by moral principles to restore the balance of power, had been thrust into an environment of sophisticated nations during World War II. Once knowledgeable, she could not return to her naiveté and her isolationism. She was unable to excuse herself from the international scene, to come in and then leave by the same door. The door to isolationism had closed. If the United States policy had been improvised, the United States was fortunate that the improvisation as a substitute for foreign policy was largely successful. Power politics on the international scene made the formulation of a foreign policy necessary, and at the same time moral principles were blighted. Although the realism school of political thought and the rational moral school of order cannot easily exist

27. Morgenthau, Hans, "The Mainsprings of American Foreign Policy", Readings in American Foreign Policy, p.178.

together, it appears that as guide posts for American foreign policy, particularly so in the Middle East, the two are bedfellows, and uncomfortable ones.

The natural clash between policies based on moral principles and those on power politics had weakened her prestige in the Middle East. The United States was unwilling to define the exact areas of either. Middle Eastern nations were often left to guess at the motives.²⁸

Israel. Israel's creation was an application of United States moral principles; her survival, to the United States now, is seen mostly in terms of power relationships. The United States signed the Tripartite Declaration in 1950, to guarantee the armistice lines and also agreed to stop any preparation by any one to violate the armistice lines. The United Nations Charter would also be applicable as it carried commitments to suppress any breach of the international peace.

The clash of moral principle with reality and power politics, sadly underlines this dissonance. In his 1953 tour of the Middle East, Dulles even while pledging the Eisenhower Administration to the Tripartite Declaration, declared, "'We cannot afford to be distrusted by millions (of Arabs) who could be sturdy friends of freedom.'"²⁹ In

28. The offer of the United States to help build the High Aswan Dam in late 1955 was withdrawn June 1956. Don Beal's book on Dulles reveals the motive as a calculated slap-in-the-face for Nasser and to call Russia's hand in the game of economic competition.

29. Congressional Record, op.cit., p.974.

September 1953, Dulles suspended economic aid to Israel for five weeks because Israel had refused to stop work on a Jordan River water division project as ordered by the United Nations.

Oil. Another evidence of moral and political confusion was oil. The United States cannot divorce her Middle East policy from oil as she deems oil essential in terms of western security. By 1958, Middle East oil production had increased from a 1946 total of 700,000 barrels a day to 3,500,000 a day. The United States was aware that the Middle East had 70 per cent of total world oil reserves including Russia, but uses only 1 per cent of the world's annual production;³⁰ the United States has but 15 per cent and Venezuela, 6 per cent.

The United States felt obligated to her European allies and hence, was committed to maintaining a continued flow of oil. The last of April 1956 when Bulganin and Khrushchev visited London, Eden told them the British would fight for the vital Middle East oil rather "than be strangled by the loss."³¹

Neutrality and Nasser. The United Nations, giant organ of collective security, in theory had doomed neutrality

30. David Rockefeller's report in Congressional Record, op.cit., p.8162.

31. Congressional Record, op.cit., p.976, reported by Chalmers Roberts in an article "America and the Middle East - Arab Unrest due to Soviet's Policy."

to die. Aggression was to create almost global collective security. The flaw in the theory was the main participants in a 'cold war' who strove to line up nations within and outside the United Nations. There were new nations, especially the Arab Nations who thought in terms not with which side they would align themselves but how they would avoid alignment with either. The United States was either unaware or did not want a growth of neutral nations; and Nixon, following the United States pattern of wanting definite signs of friendship to feel secure, had proclaimed that the choosing of sides would determine the outcome.³²

June 1, Dulles declared neutrality pose is obsolete in foreign affairs. "It is immoral for one nation to be indifferent to the fate of others."³³ Humphrey voiced subtle approval of neutralism."... the so-called vacuum in the Middle East can be filled with genuinely independent Middle Eastern nations. It should be our policy to encourage growth and strength of those independent nations."³⁴

King Saud told the four-power Arab Conference, February 1957, composed of Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt, and Syria, that he had detected in Washington a considerable shift in the United States attitude on Israel. He revealed that the United States did not mind Arab neutralism as long

32. Ibid., p.2697.

33. New York Times, June 10, 1956, p.1.

34. Congressional Record, op.cit., p.493.

as it was not biased in favor of the Soviet Union.³⁵

The United States in the Middle East has been accused of blindness because of her unawareness of realities in the post-Suez world and distorted because she sees Middle East problems only in reference to communism. But the phenomenon of Nasser has distorted the United States vision. We can wonder how much is this anti-Nasserism emphasis a permanent distortion or but a shadow before the eyes. To the United States groping for a hold on prestige, Egypt, openly flirting with Russia with the acceptance of Czech arms in 1955, became a threat to her prestige.

In the Middle East, Nasser and neutralism increased their attraction. Nasser, according to Campbell, was attracted by the possibilities of neutralism, particularly after the Bandung Conference and his meeting with Nehru and Tito on Brioni.³⁶

Halle on the other hand saw a notable shift of the United States Government from a policy of containing communism to a policy of containing Egypt.³⁷ A United States representative said that Nasser showed double indemnity - by attracting both the United States and Russia in her "positive Neutralism" posture.

35. New York Times, February 26, 1957, p.1.

36. Campbell, op.cit., p.72.

37. Halle, Louis, "United States Policy: The First Problem in the Middle East," New Republic, August 18, 1958, p.11.

The United States taste for Nasser turned sour during the late summer 1956. America side-stepped to anti-Nasserism. Still able to pivot, she backed Egypt against aggression; but pivoting again after the Suez attack, she refused Egypt's request for \$14,000 of the \$40,000,000 in frozen funds in the United States to buy medicine for Port Said victims and refused Egypt when the Arab country wanted to buy supplies of American wheat. A further rebuff: the CARE program was not renewed.³⁸

Did the United States think a beaten Egypt would give her prestige a boost? Or was the United States, according to some, no longer able to stomach Nasser's tactics long enough to recognize the importance of local leadership?

Did the United States caution and vacillation appear as if she were trying to win international popularity rather than international responsibility? Should the United States assume responsibility for security and peace in the Middle East? Was she shirking responsibility or was she reacting carefully within her defensive position?

According to B.A. Speiser, the modern Near East is much like a feather bed: you cannot punch it in one spot without causing it to bulge out in several other places."³⁹ Hence, any foreign policy in the Middle East which is not a comprehensive regional policy is an invitation to bankruptcy.

38. Nolte, Richard and Polk, William, "Toward a Policy for the Middle East", Foreign Affairs, July, 1958, p.656.

39. Speiser, Ephraim Avigdor, The United States and the Near East, p.48.

THREAT TO PEACE

The pre-Suez events. The pre-Suez events made the United States aware of her political bankruptcy:

1955 was mainly a year of reaction only to be confronted by further action, and reacting again only to find it had not solved the problem. The United States portrayed cautious actions with an urgent undertow and waiting with an outstretched hand.

Reaction left one in an unfavorable position. September 25, 1955, the United States declared herself willing to sell arms to Egypt to make sure that Egypt would not buy arms from Russia. But because the selling price was \$27,000,000 and Czechoslovakia wanted only rice and cotton in exchange for her arms, Egypt, lacking dollars announced on September 27, her acceptance of the Red arms and thus, helped the Russians vault right over the 'Northern Tier'.

October 17, Russia was alleged to have offered a \$200,000,000 loan for construction of the Aswan Dam. The United States was thrown further off balance.

The United States moved again and on November 10, told Israel and Egypt that she would align herself against the side which started a war in the Middle East.

One move was not enough. The United States attended in the capacity of observers the first official meeting of the signatories of the Baghdad Pact in November. There she

expressed her intention to establish permanent political and military liason with the council and to have an observer present at the organizational meeting of the economic committee.

Britain had been urging the United States to join the Baghdad Pact to give it more solidity and to cut off oil revenues to Saudi Arabia if she did not cease inciting violence in the Middle East. The United States was "reluctant to take either step."⁴⁰

The United States appreciated the value of the Baghdad Pact in terms of anti-communism and a less advertized anti-Nasserism, but the United States could not take the jump into a danger spot by joining and driving Nasser away from the Western Camp or antagonizing King Saud. The policy makers of the United States saw in Nasser a stabilizing force. "Perhaps through him the entire Middle East could be unified and brought into the Western Camp."⁴¹ The United States felt she could contribute more by remaining outside the Pact. An American alliance with Iraq, the only Arab League member of the Pact, would evoke an Israeli counter-demand for a mutual defense treaty. "A treaty with Israel under the present conditions would cause the Arabs, including Iraq,

40. Dean, Vera Micheles, "The Unacceptable and the Unattainable", Foreign Policy Bulletin, v.33, June 1, 1954, p.4.

41. New York Times, February 2, 1956, p.5.

to reject alliances with the United States and make them increasingly receptive to Soviet overtures."⁴²

But two small jumps were followed by a third and the United States, with Great Britain, offered Egypt \$70,000,000 for the Aswan High Dam.

January 1956, the United States, still wavering, moved into the crucial 1956 year by informing Israel on January 25, that at this time the United States was not prepared to comply with Israel's request for arms to carry out the offer made on November 6, 1955.

February 1, 1956, Eisenhower and Dulles signed the Declaration of Washington. Among other things, it said there was urgent need for Arab and Israeli settlement... backed Tripartite Declaration... Baghdad Pact serves the interests of the area... West will never initiate violence... yet will fight communism... free nations must retain the power to deter aggression.⁴³

The United States grew bolder and March 6, 1956, at a SEATO council meeting in Karachi, Dulles and Pineau, representing the United States and France, were both cool toward Lloyd's (Great Britain's Secretary) proposals for a 'tough' policy toward the Arabs.⁴⁴

42. Perlmann, M., "Facts versus Pacts", Middle Eastern Affairs Journal, v.9, December 1955, p.38.

43. New York Times, February 1, 1956, p.1.

44. Stanford, Neal, "Scope of the Eisenhower Doctrine", Foreign Policy Bulletin, v.36, February 1, 1957, p.75.

Also in June, Dulles warned that deep cuts in the United States defense and Mutual Security spending could invite the danger of war. "When dealing with the peace and security of this nation, it is risky to seek bargain-counter prices... Cut prices may not save money - except by increasing the risk of war." Dulles said the foreign aid program, which the House voted to cut by \$1,500,000,000 was a vital part of the United States \$40,000,000,000 peace insurance program. The program is composed of about \$36,000,000,000 for national defense and about \$4,000,000,000 for Mutual Security.⁴⁵

The United States withdrew their Aswan Dam offer. Various reasons given: Egypt had shown increasing signs that she was not financially sound; the United States gambled to show an empty Russian offer, and Nasser, perhaps mindful of the United States struggle for prestige, announced that Egypt had nationalized the Suez Canal Company.

July 27, Great Britain and France protested Nasser's actions and froze Egyptian assets; the United States paused - then froze.

It appeared that the United States, even as her defenses crumbled, attempted to hang onto her prestige. She began to shift with greater facility between unilateral initiative and the moral force of the United Nations. But

45. New York Times, June 10, 1956, p.1.

she did not renounce the demonstration of power. When Eisenhower said at a news conference, September 11, "if, after all peaceful means are exhausted... there is some kind of aggression on the part of Egypt against a peaceful use of the canal,... we would recognize that Great Britain and France had no other recourse than to continue to use it even if they had to be more forceful than merely sailing through it."⁴⁶ The weight of the United States was still on one foot - defense. If her other foot was for balance, the results did not show it.

Dulles followed with this statement: "the user nations have rights under the 1888 treaty. These rights cannot legally be nullified by unilateral Egyptian action." Dulles quoted Eisenhower as saying "that... force if justifiable at all, is only justifiable as a last resort... if there are alternatives to the use of force, we believe that they should be fully explored and exhausted. But, it is not our purpose to try and bring about a concerned boycotting of the canal."⁴⁷

The Grand Alliance too had its internal ailments.

September 15, the Paris magazine, Match, said, "It is clear that the common Western front exists only in the imagination. In the Suez, America and Russia have found a point of contact and they have found it against Europe... One has to unite Europe in order to defend the Europeans in

46. Ibid., September 12, 1956, p.1.

47. Ibid., September 23, 1956, p.4.

the West as well as in the East."⁴⁸ October 2, Dulles stated, "The Suez Canal... is not an area where we (the United States, Britain, and France) are bound together by treaty... There are... other problems where our approach is not always identical."⁴⁹

Dulles in a September 26 news conference, stated, "the purpose of the United States in relation to the Suez situation is precisely that which is set forth in the first article of the Charter of the United Nations, namely, to seek a settlement by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law."⁵⁰

October 27, Israeli mobilization was reported and Eisenhower pleaded to Ben Gurion to avoid endangering the peace. He sent the message again the next day. But on October 29, the Israeli army penetrated into Egyptian territory.

Eisenhower's personal message to the Prime Minister of Israel expressed his grave concern and renewed a previous recommendation that no forcible initiative be taken which would endanger the peace.

The United States took action - but through international and personal pressure.

48. Deadline Data, Middle East, p.29.

49. New York Times, October 3, 1956, p.1.

50. United States Department of State, United States Policy in the Middle East, August 1957, p.87.

Russia acted, and Bulganin, one week after the French, British, and Israeli attack on Egypt, wrote in a letter to Eisenhower, "the Soviet Government turns to the United States Government with an appeal to join their forces in the United Nations for the adoption of decisive measures to put an end to the aggression." The same day Eisenhower rejected the Soviet proposal to use force in Egypt, reprimanding her for her failure to vote the previous night in favor of the organization of a United Nations police force to stabilize the situation, pending a settlement. "Neither Soviet or any other military forces should enter the Middle East except under United Nations mandate. Any such action would be directly contrary to the present resolution of the United Nations which has called for the withdrawal of those foreign forces which are now in Egypt."⁵⁵

November 6, saw a cease fire in Egypt. In Washington there was the almost obsessive pre-occupation with not 'provoking' Russia. A result of this was the United States withdrawal of the 6th fleet from the Eastern Mediterranean, and repeated statements to the press that although America has alerted all her forces she is being careful not to be provocative about it so that Russia "will not feel driven into a corner."⁵⁶

Eisenhower followed this hesitation with a stronger

55. Ibid., pp.180-182.

56. Washington Report of London Observer,
January 11, 1956, p.11.

move - a message to Ben Gurion in November: "the General Assembly of the United Nations arranged a cease fire in Egypt, to which Egypt, France and the United Kingdom, and Israel have agreed." Eisenhower stated that the United States views these reports (that Israel does not intend to withdraw from Egyptian territory) "if true, with deep concern."⁵⁷

November 28, the United States found reason for more concern: Soviet arms were shipped to Syria. The United States Ambassador expressed American anxiety.

December 22, the last British and French military units left Egypt.

The bankruptcy of United States foreign policy was exposed; Russia was moving in to collect.

Abraham Lincoln, in a reply to Horace Greely, August 22, 1862 said:

My paramount object in this struggle is to save the Union, and is not either to save or to destroy slavery... I shall do less whenever I shall believe what I am doing hurts the cause, and I shall do more whenever I shall believe doing more will help the cause.⁵⁸

Does the United States admit as much. Does American foreign policy show United States attempts to regain the offensive in the Middle East? For national security and national good feeling, there must be more than a small margin of safety in this military force, so that, as Finletter points

57. United States Department of State, United States Policy in the Middle East, op.cit., p.211.

58. Morgenthau, Hans, "Neutrality and Neutralism", op.cit., p.75.

out: 1. The United States will not be surprised by a suddenly revealed or concealed Russian jump forward in weapon development, and 2. there will be no doubt about Russian understanding how clearly deterrent it is - thus to avoid miscalculations.⁵⁹

The United States and her policy makers seem aware of the necessity to act, a leadership in terms of clear-cut policies not only to its administration and American people but to the world. Awareness to act should be followed by a definition of objectives and methods to achieve the objectives. The United States is weakest in pursuing her objectives because her means have not always led to her ends.

There have been attempts at positive action. Positivism according to the Eisenhower Administration has not been lost sight of.⁶⁰ Yet, some feel that so far, the United States has been able to do little more than meet the crises as they arose. Her diplomatic efforts followed the two roads of mediation and compromise: Suez, and the settling of the Anglo-Iranian oil, and the building of a barrier - the Eisenhower Doctrine.⁶¹

59. Finletter, Thomas K., Foreign Policy: The Next Phase, 1958, p.52.

60. Such as the idea of peaceful liberation of captive peoples. Dulles presented the doctrine of liberation in the 1952 Presidential campaign but because there were criticisms of provocations, the move was placed down; now, it is used again.

61. Campbell, op.cit., p.346.

It can be wondered if the Eisenhower Doctrine belied the remark made by the London Economist at the height of the Suez Crisis that American policy was to affirm responsibility for the world but not to have a policy for any particular part of it.⁶²

As Lord Salisbury put it, "the only bond of union that endures among nations is the absence of all clashing interest."⁶³ A more realistic and more accessible approach: to find and concentrate and emphasize objectives that can be agreed upon as in common objectives, aspirations, and beliefs in the Middle East.

With her kind of peace being shaken, could the United States wait to determine common interest. The United States identified a risk the national security of the Arab Nations as a risk to hers. She had to operate within her terms of peace.

62. Neibuhr, Reinhold, "The Eisenhower Doctrine", New Leader, February 4, 1957, clipping, p.8.

63. Morgenthau, Hans, Politics among Nations, op.cit., p.8.

CHAPTER II

THE EISENHOWER DOCTRINE - INGREDIENTS

January 5, 1957, a little over two months after the Tripartite action in Egypt, President Eisenhower came before a joint session of Congress with an unprecedented pre-State of the Union speech. The time was urgent and so was the tone. Even though the message had been leaked to the newspapers a few days before, there was anticipation.

OUTLINE OF DOCTRINE

As Eisenhower pointed out, America's basic objective in international affairs remained peace, but the risk to peace was dangerously flirting in the Middle East; the risk - the possibility of communist aggression, direct and indirect. The reason for Russia's interest in the Middle East is solely that of power politics; therefore, Eisenhower feels that a mere proclamation will serve to halt a contemplated aggression.

These were his terms:

1. It would, first of all, authorize the United States to cooperate with and assist any nation or group of nations in the general area of the Middle East in the development of economic strength dedicated to the maintenance of national independence.

2. It would, in the second place, authorize the executive to undertake in the same region programs of military assistance and cooperation with any nation or group of nations which desires such aid.

3. It would, in the third place, authorize such assistance and cooperation to include the employment of the armed forces of the United States to secure and protect the territorial integrity and political independence of such nations, requesting such aid, against overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by international communism.

These measures would have to be consonant with the treaty obligations of the United States, including the Charter of the United Nations and with any action or recommendations of the United Nations. They would also, if armed attack occurs, be subject to the overriding authority of the United Nations Security Council in accordance with the Charter.

4. The present proposal would, in the fourth place, authorize the President to employ, for economic and defensive military purposes, sums available under the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended without regard to existing limitations.

The legislation now requested should not include the authorization or appropriation of funds because I believe that, under the conditions I suggest, presently appropriated funds will be adequate for the balance of the present fiscal year ending June 30. I shall, however, seek in subsequent legislation the authorization of \$200 million to be available during each of the fiscal years 1958 and 1959 for discretionary use in the area, in addition to the other mutual security programs for the area hereafter provided for by the Congress.

Eisenhower explained further that the proposed legislation is primarily designed to deal with the possibility of communist aggression, direct and indirect, for experience shows that indirect aggression rarely if ever succeeds where there is "reasonable security against direct aggression, where the government disposes of loyal security forces, and where

economic conditions are such as not to make communism seem an attractive alternative." The program, Eisenhower suggested, deals with all three aspects of the matter: security against direct aggression, available forces, good economic conditions (thus with the problem of indirect aggression).

Eisenhower anticipated a future misunderstanding for he noted that the program does not represent the totality of American policies for the area, nor solve all the problems of the Middle East, as Palestine, relations between Israel and the Arab states, the future of the Arab refugees, and the future status of the Suez. "International communism aggravates them but the problem exists apart from the threat." The purpose of the resolution does not deal directly with these problems; "the United Nations is actively concerning itself with these matters and the United States is supporting the United Nations."⁶⁴

The text of the Administration's proposed resolution to carry out the Middle East program, submitted to Congress as Senate Joint Resolution 19⁶⁵ and House Joint Resolution 117, read and sent to the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees holding joint hearings, and the House Foreign Affairs Committee, varied slightly in tone, meaning, and in limitations.⁶⁶

64. Congressional Record, op.cit., pp.224-227.

65. For text of resolution sent to Congress, see appendix.

66. For example, the resolution failed to mention an "hour-to-hour contact with Congress".

REACTION

Reaction outside Congress. Reaction to this 'bold new policy' had already formed. The American public found its voice. Private citizen and former Secretary of State, Dean Acheson cried, "military blank check." He recalled Eisenhower two months previously had said that there would be no American involvement in the present hostilities. This revealed the hypocrisy of the Republican campaign and bankruptcy of the United States Middle East policy.⁶⁷

The National Democratic Advisory Committee, which listed Stevenson, Kefauver, Truman, Mrs. Roosevelt, and Harriman as its members, accused Eisenhower and his Administration of having "sided with Communist Russia against free Britain and France and with the dictator-controlled Egypt against free Israel" during the Suez Crisis.⁶⁸

Arab reaction took shape. Their rejection of the theory of a power vacuum was unified in its spirit. They resented attempts to fill the non-existent vacuum with military power, and maintained that peace and security in the Middle East was their responsibility. In general they welcomed American support of full sovereignty and the complete independence of Middle East nations. Egyptian sources underlined their Nasser neutralism. The United

67. New York Times, January 4, 1957, p.13.

68. Keessing's contemporary archives, 1957, pp.15419-15420.

States "should support us to remain neutral and keep the Middle East out of the East-West conflict;"⁶⁹ while a man of a different country and a different stress, Charles Malik of Lebanon, said, "the United Nations was the best instrument now available to settle the main problems facing the Middle East."⁷⁰

Reaction was not confined to the West and Arabs. China, Russia, and her satellites en masse denounced the President's proposals and foreign policy. They assumed the 'this-proves-what-we've-been-saying' attitude in attacking the United States in her attempts to "rekindle the flames of war in the Middle East;" and "enslave the peoples from the Straits of Gibraltar to the Arabian Sea."⁷¹

Among Europe's tepid reaction and 'watchful waiting' was that of many Britons who found the resolution hypocritical. France and the Netherlands spokesmen feared a return to the status quo ante which should not be a "recondition of settlement."⁷²

Reaction within Congress. But it was only in Congress that reaction could be most constructive. The Senate Committee hearings, meeting from January 14 - February 11, ran simultaneously to floor debates, and settled into fifteen some private, some public sessions in which witnesses appeared.

69. New York Times, January 6, p.40; January 11, p.1; January 13, p.1(E).

70. Ibid., January 11, 1957, p.5.

71. Ibid., January 6, p.2, January 7, p.8.

72. Ibid., January 7, p.11; January 13, p.10.

The Foreign Relations Committee: (Democrats) Green - Chairman, Fulbright, Sparkman, Humphrey, Mansfield, Morse, Long, and Kennedy; (Republicans) Wiley, Smith, Hickenlooper, Langer, Knowland, Aiken, Caprehart. Russell- Chairman, Byrd, Johnson, Kefauver, Stennis, Symington, Jackson, Ervin (Democrats); and Bridges, Staltonstall, Flanders, Mrs. Chase Smith, Case, Bush, and Barrett (Republicans), composed the Armed Services Committee.

Dulles gave testimony for six days; Admiral Radford for two. Former Ambassadors to the Middle East as George Wadsworth - Saudi Arabia, Joseph Green - Jordan, Henry Byroade - Egypt, Jefferson Caffrey - Egypt, James McDonald - Israel, and Raymond Hare, present Ambassador to Egypt appeared. Representatives, Senators, and members of the military as General Alfred Gruenther, former chief of SHAPE gave testimony. Among organizations represented were the American Legion, Zionists Committees, Friends Committees on National Legislation, Arab-Asian Institute, Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, American Association for the United Nations, Committee for Security and Justice in the Middle East, and private citizens as Alfred Lilienthal and Dean Acheson.

February 15, by a vote of 20-8, the Committee on Foreign Relations and Armed Services ordered the joint resolution favorably reported with an amendment in the nature of a substitute, Senate Joint Resolution 19.⁷³

73. For text resolution, see Appendix.

The Suez Crisis with the almost total destruction of Britain's and France's vestigial prestige, and the re-emergence of Nasser as the most viable leader of Arab Nationalism, and the increasing clearness of Russian designs, left the United States policy makers panicky. Panic bred policy and the Eisenhower Doctrine was born. Its birth brought strong criticism in Congress and the justification of its birth brought even stronger attack.

Dulles had the occasion and the necessity to be most articulate on the event. Dulles pointed out that the Eisenhower Doctrine was not new in principle but an expansion of policies first enunciated in 1947 - The Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, Intervention in Korea, Declaration regarding protection of Taiwan, and the United States Mutual Security Pacts with forty-two nations. The Eisenhower Doctrine shifts the same policies to another region - a vulnerable Middle East, he had declared.

Policy or precedent? Was the Eisenhower Doctrine a continuation of American foreign policy in the Middle East - principally a defense against communism and its usefulness to Nasser; or was it a bold new policy - a product of the reevaluation and reassessment of power relations of East and West with the Middle East.

There was resentment within the Senate that the Eisenhower Doctrine was being passed off as a dynamic new policy; whereas, it was a restatement of a policy that had

allowed events to create it instead of it establishing events. And even if it was a reaction policy, it disregarded the true events of the Middle East: the Palestine problem, Arab-Israeli situation, the Arab refugees, and Suez Crisis which Eisenhower dismissed as intra-regional affairs; therefore, United States intervention was not warranted.

If the Eisenhower Doctrine was a continuation, why continue a policy that had proved a failure.

Some Senators denied a history of precedents. They saw few parallels in the Truman Doctrine, the Formosa Resolution, and the Monroe Doctrine. Even though, the Truman Doctrine dealt with communist aggression, the Greeks had asked the United States to come in originally and no American troops were involved. The Truman Doctrine was specific and limited legislation, with specific details, the Eisenhower Doctrine was not; the United States already had a treaty with Formosa, the United States fleet was already in the vicinity where the Formosa Resolution sought to continue what they were doing - not to seek to change the status quo; and the Monroe Doctrine was dissimilar although there were similarities in that no specific mention of just how or when United States foreign policy would be employed. A Senator recalled that Churchill had said once "that if the present takes up a quarrel with the past, we might lose the future."⁷⁴

74. Congressional Record, op.cit., p.1168.

A warning, an urgency? Fulbright feels that there is a danger in that people will assume that the resolution does something constructive when it actually does not. The Administration cries 'wolf'. When fear grips, there is a tendency for public opinion to panic which creates an unnecessary sense of urgency. To a majority Congressional opinion, there was no urgency. They deplored the timing and the publicity that accompanied the resolution. Dulles underlined the urgency and the need for speed. He warned there would be a "'very great likelihood of United States troops fighting in the Middle East if Congress rejected the Eisenhower Doctrine', but 'very little likelihood' of such an eventuality if the resolution was accepted." Speed was essential, for the Administration had received 'desperate appeals' from Turkey, Iraq, Persia, and Pakistan for assurances that the U.S.A. would come to their aid if they were attacked by the Soviet Union. Dulles stretched the urgency: "Any long delay or division (of opinion) would be disastrous" as far as the Middle East was concerned; if the Middle East was lost, the trend to global submission was eminent, and possibly without war.⁷⁵ The Senate wanted the Administration to examine, if the resolution was presented on the basis of urgency, what was the basis of urgency. Might not the Eisenhower Doctrine further inflame the Suez situation and the Arab-Israeli dispute making a real need for urgency?

75. Keesing's contemporary archives, op.cit.,
p.15417.

Closer to Eisenhower's interpretation was the definition offered by the Senate Committee Report. The Eisenhower Doctrine was a program, not a complete blue print for progress, but a warning. The Eisenhower Doctrine is a first step to the problems of the Middle East; it is to reduce the tensions so that the other basic, immediate problems can then be attacked without increasing the tension. The Doctrine is a warning to Russia and the Middle East countries that expansion of international communism by force would be regarded by the United States as a threat to her national security and comfort to Middle East countries that they are not alone in their efforts to defend their independence and to raise their standard of living. Therefore, the Eisenhower Doctrine was not a new approach the report declared and touched very little of the most critical problems. Although the Eisenhower Doctrine was stopgap in nature, and an example of a short term solution, and a delay in the ultimate and final solutions, it would have its psychological effects, would act as an insurance premium,⁷⁶ was a counteraction to fear that exists in some of the Middle East countries that a communist buildup of arms cannot or will not be met, and above all, the resolution was an American prestige builder.

A necessity? There was no need to give advance notice because primarily, as Senate Humphrey said, "We have demons-

76. For the United States does not have the actual power to stand alone. Resolution would demonstrate strength, said Radford.

trated clearly what we will do."⁷⁷ Every country including Russia knows that the United States will not stand idly by while Russia overruns freedom with military aggression anywhere in the world. It is an insult to the intelligence of the United States and allies. While Morse, a Democratic member of the Foreign Relations Committee, added that Russia was too cunning and farsighted to make the mistake of starting an armed aggression in the Middle East now, and secondly, because there was no evidence of armed aggression by the Soviet Union.⁷⁸

The attack on the Eisenhower Doctrine as unnecessary brought the strongest anti-reaction by some members who felt that justification of the resolution could be in its prevention of the outbreak of war by miscalculation. Not only the Korean War, but possibly World War II would not have occurred if the North Korean and Chinese Communists in the first case, and Hitler in the second, had not miscalculated the United States apparent indecision. All that is necessary then is a simple statement of purpose, retaliated Fulbright, for Congress to authorize the President to use military forces against communism. Fulbright's proposal which would have not the force of law was defeated in the committee, 17-10.

77. Congressional Record, op.cit., p.1139.

78. Salem Badar, President of the U.S. Arab-Asian Institute said, "It is impossible for them (Arabs) to be Communists." New York Times, February 5, 1957, p.4.

Confusion, inconsistency, and vagueness. The Eisenhower Doctrine caused confusion in the Senators' minds. There might be confusion to allies and friends of the United States, too. Congress attacked the resolution and its authors. Eisenhower gave room for doubt and room for Middle Eastern discouragement to cooperate with the United States, when in a news conference, January 23, he said he had implied that the United States might well have to use small atomic bombs in opposing any communist armed aggression in the Middle East;⁷⁹ although Dulles had said, January 14, that nothing in the Eisenhower Doctrine would authorize the use of atomic weapons in any conflict or hostility originating in the Middle East.⁸⁰

One Senator expressed his confusion: was not Syria a communist-dominated country, and yet the Eisenhower Doctrine proposed to give the President authority to aid a Soviet-dominated country! Did not the Eisenhower Doctrine in effect guarantee the status quo in every country in the Middle East? Humphrey asked who would request aid if the country were controlled by communism, and how could a country already covertly dominated by communism ask for help?

Congress also was alarmed at the condition of the 'Grand Alliance'. Before preparing and announcing the Eisenhower Doctrine, the Administration had no understanding

79. New York Times, January 24, 1957, p.13.

80. Keesing's contemporary archives, op.cit., p.15417.

or agreement with her allies. Did this not show the collapse of United States relations with Great Britain and France "apparently within the space of a few months."⁸¹ Dulles further admitted in testimony that the United States Ambassadors in the Middle East had not been consulted, nor the program planners of the International Cooperation Administration (ICA), and Heads of Missions under ICA or USIA; therefore, these United States representatives had not given the alarm. A further discovery, that there was but a single subdivision, headed by one assistant secretary which handled reports from the Near East, Southern Asia, and Africa, "everything from Kashmir to Syria, Egypt, Cyprus, Israel, Morocco, and the witch hunts of South Africa."⁸²

Senator Long, a member of the Foreign Relations Committee, disclosed on the floor that even in secret session, Dulles had not been able to tell the Senators a single project that is proposed to be carried out with any of the money; in spite of Administration's explanation that no set plans give flexibility for multilateral plans and programs when Richards talks with the Middle East Nations. One Senator backed up Dulles that it was not good to telegraph the specific plan; it is wise to keep the opposition from knowing what the United States is going to do in the greatest detail. But a majority

81. Keesing's contemporary archives, op.cit.,
p.15418.

82. Congressional Records, op.cit., p.1137.

of the Senators were suspicious of giving the Administration a blank check for blank plans even though past appropriations and allotments had been allowed for Presidential and on-the-spot decisions. The New York Herald Tribune had reported that King Saud left the United States with an arms agreement - an arms and economic deal between 150 and 200 million dollars. Not reported were rumors that the Administration had already decided how to spend the money, such as a kind of TVA for the entire Nile River Valley, widening and deepening of the Suez Canal, a group of land reclamation projects, and maybe the Aswan Dam again.⁸³ Congress limited one blank - time, with a House amendment that the Eisenhower Doctrine shall be terminated by concurrent resolution,⁸⁴ and when the President determines that the peace and security of the Middle East countries are reasonably assured.

a) Oil. Congress was not content with this attack. Many, including Kefauver (Democrat) accused the Eisenhower Doctrine of being simply an oil resolution because it was a pledge to use American boys, if necessary, to protect the oil lines so vital to West Europe's economy; a serving notice to Russia that she is not going to get the oil without a

83. Ibid., p.2518.

84. A concurrent resolution requires no Presidential approval and only a majority of Congress.

fight with the United States; and to preserve the flow of oil "without calling on any of the fifteen nations to contribute a single one of its sons or a single penny of its money."⁸⁵

Kefauver felt he spoke for the American people who would not want to have their foreign policy based upon the judgment of the large international oil companies as Texas Company, Socony-Vacuum Company, Standard of California, and Standard of New Jersey - the big four in the Middle East. Morse stood up for Kefauver in terms of political morality - the American people can not be asked to grant tax payer dollars to Arab countries which have a potential revenue from oil of \$98,400,000,000.⁸⁶ It is the Arabs, some 270 million (sic) of them, said Mr. Ervin of the Armed Services Committee, who are primarily dependent upon the continued flow of oil.⁸⁷

b) Israel. United States position with Israel emphasized the resolution's limitations and Eisenhower's confusion of moralizing with moral strength.⁸⁸ Should the United States approve sanctions against Israel or not. Israel refused to finish troop evacuation from the Gaza Strip and Sharm el Sheikh unless a guarantee be afforded

85. Congressional Record, op.cit., p.1120.

86. Ibid., p.2527.

87. Ibid.,

88. Ibid., p.1873.

for the specific protection of Israel-bound shipping. The United States refused to make a definite promise that the United Nations police force would replace Israeli troops moving out, neutralize the area, and protect the right of free access, because the United States had already provided Israel with the maximum assurance that it could expect. A return to the status quo was demanded, and Eisenhower raised a basic question of principles: should a nation which attacks and occupies foreign territory in the face of United Nations disapproval be allowed to impose conditions on its withdrawal? Humphrey felt that "simple moralism is always pathetic when it obscures the power realities which underlie moral issues."⁸⁹ The voice of the Senators cried 'diplomatic hypocrisy' to impose sanctions on Israel and not on the Soviet Union, for Israel was the only state where human freedom is protected to the extent that Americans seek to protect it. She would like a little delivering before she evacuates finally, not the after-the-fact action she has been getting from the United States, specified Morse. Humphrey further pointed out that since October 26, active relations between the United States and Israel have ceased; \$25,000,000 of Mutual Security funds for Israel have been frozen and tourists have not been allowed. A return to a status quo ante would be a worse situation from a bad situation. "In Israel we

89. Ibid., p.1878.

witness the determination of Nasser backed by the Soviet Union to destroy that brave little country."⁹⁰

c) Dictatorships. More attacks followed King Saud's visit to the United States. Some Congressmen wondered whether the resolution would make secure "shocking distatorships in the Arab World,"⁹¹ and protect states, most of which were totalitarian. Didn't the Eisenhower Doctrine propose sending economic aid to "tremendously wealthy" Arab countries?

White paper. The Senate called on the Administration to examine their policies. Fulbright, backed up by the Committees' unanimous decision, demanded a full inquiry into American foreign policy in the Middle East from 1946 to the outbreak of the Suez Crisis - a white paper to be submitted before action on the resolution be taken. Fulbright said, "I regard the policies which he (Dulles) has been following as harmful to our interest, calculated to weaken the influence of the free world in the Middle East, as disastrous to NATO, and as damaging to our friendship with Great Britain and France."⁹² Congressional action on the Eisenhower Doctrine is to be completed first, ruled Chairman Green as Dulles failed to defeat Fulbright's proposal on the grounds that it would take months to prepare, "'almost

90. Ibid., p.452.

91. Ibid., p.1003.

92. Keessing's contemporary archives, op.cit., p.15418.

insuperable difficulties', 'vital aspects', explained in terms of 'highly confidential communications', a 'slow process to obtain consent of involved governments', danger of 'irreparable damage' to America's association with Britain and France."⁹³ Stevenson summed up the Committee's feeling and a majority of Congressional opinion, more pithily: "the first vacuum that should be filled is in the State Department, not in the Middle East."⁹⁴

Dulles was attacked by both Senators and Representatives. They called for the resignation of Dulles, the "quick change artist", "a luxury" in the State Department which can no longer be "afforded", a "misguided missile" (travels fast, makes a lot of noise but never hits the target). He had "outlived his usefulness". Dulles was cited as having committed the United States to defray the extra expenses of rerouting the tankers around the Cape of Good Hope and withdrawing the offer, of having proposed the Suez Canal User's Association and then withdrawing it. Humphrey said the burden of proof rests on Dulles whether or not the formula and the alleged policy would meet the crisis. Bush, Republican, defended Dulles. He called upon his Democratic friends to cease making a scapegoat of Dulles as it would "gravely injure vital interests of the United States."⁹⁵

93. Ibid.,

94. Ibid., p.15420.

95. Congressional Record, op.cit., p.1262.

Specific criticisms. The Congressional airing of dissatisfaction with American foreign policy and the Eisenhower Doctrine was scarcely constructive. The New York Times reprimanded the Senate and its "policy of fight, dodge, and delay, and even dawdle."⁹⁶ Congressional diversity of opinion was heard too by the Middle Easterners and further damaged United States prestige.

a) Constitutionality. When specific criticisms began, so did the changes - amendments. The most recurring debate: constitutionality. Article 1, section 8 of the Constitution says that Congress solely has the power to declare war, and that power cannot be delegated. Implied in this is the requirement that Congress name the country against which war is declared. Fulbright was the most articulate. He saw the question of Presidential power as divided into two constitutional doctrines: 1. the doctrine of inherent or residual power that the President has legal authority in cases of compelling necessity to do whatever needs to be done to protect America's vital interest; and 2. the doctrine of emergency power that if a genuine crisis arises, the President should take whatever action he deems necessary to protect the vital interest of the United States. Viewed in the light of number 1, the resolution is confusing and superfluous and might just establish a formal granting

96. New York Times, February 27, 1957, p.26.

of such power; some may presume that the President may not or should not exercise such powers in the absence of a Congressional resolution. Viewed in the light of number 2, the resolution might destroy the principle of emergency power. Is Eisenhower willing to share his constitutional responsibility with Congress; the trend then would be a more and more limited President, although Watkins, another Senator, mentioned that according to a Supreme Court statement in the Prize cases of 1863, "if a war be made by invasion of a foreign country, the President is not only authorized but bound to resist force by force. He does not initiate the war, but is bound to accept the challenge without waiting for any special legislative authority."⁹⁷

Dulles said that Congress cannot delegate the power to declare war, for "wars," he explained, "are not declared anymore, after all. A state of war is upon us, and what we do is recognize that a state of war exists."⁹⁸ Fulbright summed up his impressions: The Eisenhower Doctrine "asks for a blank grant of power over our funds and Armed Forces, to be used in a blank way, for a blank length of time, under blank conditions, with respect to blank nations, in a blank area; we are asked to sign this blank check in perpetuity or at the pleasure of the President - any President."⁹⁹

97. Congressional Record, op.cit., p.3127.

98. Ibid., p.1004.

99. Ibid., p.1175.

Fulbright agreed with Alexander White of the First Congress in 1789 who said then, "I say it would be better for the executive to assume the exercise of such a power on extraordinary occasions, than for us to delegate to him authority to exercise an extraordinary power on all occasions."¹⁰⁰ Senator Morse seconded Fulbright. He agreed that the President has the inherent right and duty to send troops to protect America's vital interest if at stake but that the President must report to Congress for its approval or disapproval. If Eisenhower orders troops into the Middle East, then he must immediately notify Congress for approval or disapproval of his action. But Congress has the authority to order troops back home.

An amendment was proposed and agreed upon to change the resolution from:

He is authorized to employ the Armed Forces of the United States as he deems necessary to secure and protect the territorial integrity and political independence of any such nations or group of nations requesting such aid against overt armed aggression from any nations controlled by international communism.

to:

"The United States regards as vital to the national interest and world peace the preservation of the independence and integrity of the nations of the Middle East. To this end, if the President determines the necessity thereof, the United States is prepared to use armed forces to assist any nations or group of nations requesting assistance against armed aggression from any country controlled by international communism."

100. Ibid., p.1157.

The change from "he is authorized" to "the United States is prepared to use armed forces" is stronger, feels the Committee because it substitutes the whole government for the executive branch alone and avoids constitutional debate.

Knowland, in summing up the constitutional question, said that the purpose is not to declare war, nor to propose the making of war, but the purpose is to prevent the outbreak of war.

b) Unilateral versus United Nations question. The Senate in general objected to the policy of go-it-alone-intervention, a unilateral action on America's part. Many of the Senators itemized their pro-Israeli feeling. They wanted the UN role to be stronger - a multilateral role - through the UNEF or permanent police force. A United Nations Emergency Force would help maintain a buffer zone between Egypt and Israel, to prevent military aid being turned against Israel,

Three proposals by Mansfield, another Democrat on the Foreign Relations Committee, attempted to affirm America working through the United Nations: 1. by encouraging Eisenhower to seek international control over flow of armaments in the Middle East from Soviet and other sources; 2. by reaffirming United States moral and material support of UNEF; and 3. by making clear United States expectations that aid is to be a specific program to facilitate the

settlement of the Suez dispute and Arab-Israeli conflict. Department pressure tabled Mansfield's first proposal and his third; the second was incorporated into the final resolution.

James Warburg, reported in the Congressional Record, his ideas for more United Nations intervention. He recommended that a United Nations Middle East Development Authority be authorized to place a levy upon all oil shipments from Middle Eastern ports, and that, in addition, the development authority should take over and operate all Middle East pipelines charging an additional levy to cover operating costs and existing charges for transit rights. The proceeds from both would then be contributed toward an approved economic development program for the entire area. It would seek security for companies and customers, revenues channeled through the United Nations. The Middle Eastern countries would have reasonable assurance that these funds would be equitably shared and applied most beneficently.¹⁰¹

While most Congressmen feared that the United States might find herself isolated in her unilateral declaration, there was equal fear of the United Nations. "The United Nations can always be helpful, but it cannot be a wholly dependable protector of freedom - when the ambitions of the Soviet Union are involved."¹⁰² The United Nations is slow too. "Nations can lose their freedom while delegates

101. Ibid., p.1886.

102. Ibid., p.1174.

at the General Assembly talk."¹⁰³ Time is a factor.¹⁰⁴ The policy of the United States would be subject to the veto of the Security Council of the United Nations if the resolution remained "... provided that such employment (of United States armed forces) shall be consonant with the treaty obligations of the United States and with the Charter of the United Nations."¹⁰⁵ O'Mahoney proposed an amendment to substitute that phrase with "such employment shall be consonant with the treaty obligations of the United States and with the Constitution of the United States". The amendment would affirm United States moral leadership and delete the superfluity because the United Nations Charter is included in the phrase "with the treaty obligations of the United States as the United States adopted the United Nations Charter as a treaty. His amendment passed by 82 yeas to 0 nays.

Knowland, Republican and minority leader, suggested the greatest reform in a February speech at Georgetown University, "The US and the UN." He advocated the expulsion of the Soviet Union from the United Nations - so that the

103. Ibid.

104. Belgium was invaded, overrun, and surrendered in 22 days; it took the UN 45 to pass 10 resolutions (Hungary).

105. In the General Assembly, the United States might run into the Afro-Asian-Communist bloc of votes which could constitute a veto.

United Nations could be turned into an anti-communist collective-security organization.¹⁰⁶

c) Economic aid. The Senate objected first to the change in the joint resolution draft sent to Congress in that it struck out every restriction contained in the original appropriation of \$200,000,000.

Many Senators were unable to understand that the economic and military aid sections and the \$200,000,000 were already appropriated and that Eisenhower and the Eisenhower Doctrine were not asking for the appropriation of more money, but simply of greater flexibility in spending already existing funds. There were doubts even then that economic aid might not have helped but produce further suspicions of United States motives "precisely in the countries in which we have given the most."

But there was question as to how \$200,000,000 could be spent in two ^{years} months. Humphrey pointed out that during the past five years, with military funds available in the Middle East, the United States Government was not able to obligate or contract for the use of funds which had been authorized or appropriated. The Senators were informed that between July 1, 1951 and June 30, 1956, the United States allotted a total of \$136,295,000 to five Arab States, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia. Of this allotment, \$129,627,500 was obligated (earmarked for specific purposes)

106. Congressional Record, Ibid., pp.2075-79.

and of the obligated funds only \$73,054,000 has actually been spent; therefore, it was impossible to spend 45 percent of the money the United States planned to spend.¹⁰⁷

Russell, Chairman of the Armed Services Committee proposed a substitution, which would empower the President to come to the aid of Middle East nations threatened by communist aggression but would deny the President authority to spend the \$200,000,000 in economic and military aid in the Middle East. His substitute was not a vote against economic aid, he said, but to give time to the Senate to deal with the other aspects. His substitute was defeated 58-28 with 10 not voting. The State Department urged its rejection because it might be interpreted that the United States has no concern for the economic plight of the peoples of the area.

Aid was defended by Radford on the grounds that the United States had sufficient military strength and capability to successfully carry out any obligations. Gruenther emphasized economic aid. Both military and economic aid were indispensable, though, he had said.

A Representative insisted on prospective, for the cost of Mutual Security must be weighed with the staggering costs which would be involved if the United Nations plunged into a nuclear World War III. More than one Senator felt that it was more important to win friends and influence people

107. Ibid., p.1368.

in the Middle East than win affection of Americans. Economic aid would help the President prevent aggression, and deletion of economic aid would let the President deal with aggression only after it had occurred. Symington, Democrat, on the Armed Services Committee, wondered if one wing of the United States Strategic Air Command, ready to fly with one nuclear bomb, would have a greater deterrence than any amount of millions that the United States might spend on arms assistance in the Middle East.

Kennedy, Democrat, on the Foreign Relations Committee, revealed that the bulk of Middle East aid with economic assistance expenditures of \$237 million has gone to Israel. Of the total amount received by all Arab States (Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Egypt, Sudan, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria) in approximately five years, about \$73 million, there has been no military grants to speak of, just economic and technical assistance.

Senator Douglas, Democrat, proposed an amendment, while lessening the danger of war by making the Eisenhower Doctrine subject to the provisions of the Mutual Security Act, it would correct the resolution's weakness: the possibility that the armed aid could be used instead by Middle East countries to make war upon each other. It was defeated.

Morse tried another amendment to retain the control of the armed forces in the Congress:

Prior to the employment of armed forces, the President shall give notice to Congress. If, in the judgment of the President, an emergency

arises in which such notice to Congress is not possible, he shall, upon the employment of armed forces, forthwith inform Congress and submit his action for approval or disapproval.

The Department of State opposed his amendment because it would appear to question the President's power to use the armed forces under the resolution.

One Senator showed that the President would have over \$200,000,000 without violating Section 105 of the Mutual Security Appropriations Act of 1957: except for the appropriation extituled 'Special Presidential Fund' not more than 20 per cent of any appropriation item made available by this act shall be obligated and/or reserved during the last two months of the fiscal year.¹⁰⁸

As of October 31, 1956 more than 2 billion in military aid funds were not obligated or reserved, one Senator clarified, but all except \$300 million of this \$2 billion have been programed (for specific countries), and all of this \$300 million could be used without violating Section 105. 20% of \$2 billion is \$400 million. (under Section 105). \$167.5 million was appropriated for economic aid to the Middle East and Africa. 20% of \$167.5 is \$33.5 million. The President has about \$95 billion in his emergency fund that has no restriction. Add \$95 million and \$33.5; the total is \$128.5 million in economic aid without violating section 105. If the \$128.5 is added to the \$300 million, the full total is

108. Ibid., p.2231.

over \$400 million. Therefore, there is no need for the aid section in the Eisenhower Doctrine.¹⁰⁹

But Dulles and the President stressed flexibility and removal of Section 10 of the Mutual Security Act which would require "continuous, observation and review by United States representatives of the program for assistance."¹¹⁰

The Congress added to the joint resolution and removed certain restrictions on the use of the Mutual Security funds and gave him greater discretion on the funds already appropriated:

The President is hereby authorized to use during the balance of fiscal year 1957 for economic and military assistance under the joint resolution not to exceed \$200,000,000 million from any appropriation now available for carrying out the provisions of the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended, in accord with the provisions of such an act; Provided that, whenever the President determines it to be important to the security of the United States, such use may be under the authority of 104 (a) of the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended (except that the provisions of Section 105 (a) thereof shall not be waived), and without regard to the provisions of Section 105 of the Mutual Security Appropriation Act, 1957; Provided further, that obligations incurred in carrying out the purposes of the first sentence of Section 2 of this resolution shall be paid only out of appropriations for military assistance, and obligations incurred in carrying out the purposes of the first section of this joint resolution shall be paid only of appropriations other than those for military assistance. This authorization is in addition to other existing authorizations with respect to the use of such appropriations."...

109. Ibid., p.2690.

110. Ibid.

In general the feeling was that although the Eisenhower Doctrine was no panacea for the ills of the Middle East, the good outweighed the bad. As one representative expressed it, he felt toward the Eisenhower Doctrine like an elderly man toward a new step child. The child is not his own blood, nor too bright and far from handsome. "But the Child is all he has got or is likely to get."¹¹¹

The House of Representatives first passed the joint resolution January 30, with 355 yeas, 61 nays. The House had debated for one day under a closed rule, or gag rule, which permitted no amendment except those offered by the members of the Committee; the House had then acted as a Committee of the Whole House.

In the Senate, after eighteen days of debate, the Senate Joint Resolution was passed by 72 yeas to 19 nays (Byrd, Chavez, Eastland, Ellender, Ervin, Frear, Jenner, Johnston, Kefauver, Keer, Long, Malone, McCarthy, McClennan, Morse, and O'Mahoney, and Russell, Scott, and Talmadge).

The preamble was stricken and the title amended so as to read: "Joint Resolution to Promote Peace and Stability in the Middle East."

In the House, which then had to either pass the Senate version or call for a conference of both House and Senate, it was decided that the House should concur in the Senate amendment. It was passed March 7 with 350 yeas, 60 nays. The President signed the resolution March 9th, and Ambassador Richards left for the Middle East, May 12.

111. Ibid., p.1181.

THE EISENHOWER DOCTRINE
THE RICHARDS' MISSION

James Richards, of South Carolina, former Representative and Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, was selected by President Eisenhower as his special envoy and Ambassador Plenipotentiary to the Middle East to explain the Eisenhower Doctrine to the Middle Eastern countries.

Richards left the United States, March 12, five days after the joint resolution had been passed by the House and three days after President Eisenhower had signed it.

He travelled almost 30,000 miles, visiting fifteen countries of which twelve, according to Richards, publicly declared their support of the purposes and objectives of the Doctrine. The divergers: Israel who subsequently endorsed it, and the Sudan and Yemen who, although they believed it undesirable to take a public position then, "did not reject the American concept."¹¹²

Richards had called the Eisenhower Doctrine, a new departure, a new responsibility to help the people of the Middle East at their request to maintain their national independence and territorial integrity. Of the eighteen which may be said to lie in the general area of the Middle East, fifteen explicitly invited Richards and his mission to visit them.

112. Ibid., p.8159.

Richards' fourfold task:

1. To explain the spirit and purposes of the joint resolution of the Congress on the Middle East;
2. To determine which countries wished to participate;
3. To make commitments for programs of economic and military assistance, within the provisions of the joint resolution and within the limitation of funds appropriated by the Congress, which I deemed to be essential and urgent to accomplish the purposes of the program; and
4. To report to the President my findings and make appropriate recommendations.¹¹³

Richards was accompanied by a small staff drawn from the Departments of State, Defense, International Cooperation Administration, and USIA. This group went to Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Greece, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Tunisia, Turkey, and Yemen.

April 18, Richards sent to the Senate Foreign Relations, the Senate Armed Services and the Senate Appropriations Committees, the House Foreign Affairs, Armed Forces Committee and the House Appropriations Committees an interim report. He explained his procedures to the six committees:

1. Making Mission clear - basic purpose of the Eisenhower Doctrine - to help the Middle East states maintain their national independence against the encroachments of communism.
2. Then the individual country decided whether it wished to participate in the program.
3. On basis of such participation, Richards, in consultation with other United States agencies in the country concerned, determined what kinds of assistance can help in implementing the desired cooperation.

113. Ibid., p.8159.

4. Upon leaving each country, a joint communiqué has been issued covering the general area of agreement and setting forth a statement of common purpose.¹¹⁴

May 8, Richards ended his tour of the Middle East and participated in a nation-wide radio and television broadcast the following day. "The United States has assumed a heavy moral responsibility," he said.¹¹⁵ Richards told the American public that most of the Middle Eastern countries recognized the danger of international communism; some, however, were more conscious of the dangers than others. There was no need for an immediate increase in the level of military aid which was being administered to several countries there as part of the Mutual Security Program. Military aid did not attempt to cover the entire military aspirations of each country but concentrated on those things which would anticipate an increase in resistance ability to overt or covert aggression by international communism. Economic aid was channeled especially to projects involving regional co-operation. Richards reported his concern about the influence of foreign propaganda broadcasts in some countries; his mission had allocated funds for the expansion of broadcasting funds.

Richards' May 27 report to a closed session of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee duplicated optimistic statements. He claimed that the Eisenhower Doctrine had

114. United States Department of State Bulletin, v.36, May 6, 1957, p.724.

115. New York Times, May 10, 1957, p.2.

already achieved a notable success and that this assurance has brought vast relief to countries of the area, especially to those on the borders of the Soviet bloc and to the responsible military men.¹¹⁶

He had not visited three countries, he explained: Syria, because his mission received no formal invitation;¹¹⁷ Egypt, the attitude of the government showed clearly that there was no real desire for frank and sincere discussion though Nasser proposed to let any West or East proposal be judged by the precepts of Arab Nationalism, independence, and non-alignment, positive neutrality in international affairs, opposition to Israel, Arab unity, and collective security;¹¹⁸ and Jordan because the developments there made it appear preferable to extend United States economic assistance through other means.¹¹⁹ The Economist supplemented Richards' report to the Senate committees. Richards had

116. Keesing's contemporary archives, op.cit., p.15656.

117. Syrian Ambassador to the United States, Farid Zeineddine, had said that the US had no legal basis for unilateral action in the Middle East. New York Times, January 1, 1957, p.6.

118. New York Times, May 1, 1957, p.1.

119. "Ambassador Richards' Mission to the Middle East," United States Department of State Bulletin, v.36, May 27, 1957, p.841.

disposed of about \$119 million which included all the military assistance. By the end of June, agreements had been made covering \$174 million: \$51 million for military aid and the remainder for economic development programs.¹²⁰

The heavy emphasis on economic aid further gave some meaning to previous criticisms by Middle East experts that the emphasis on military aid would prove a major tactical error.¹²¹

The Christian Science Monitor found the Richards' Mission successful if judged solely as a fact-finding service on building stability,¹²² although Richards found the determination to maintain independence and to achieve economic and social progress never varied. Yet Richards found it necessary to dispel the idea that the United States was asking for the right to send armed forces into the Middle East at its discretion and offering economic aid in return. He also found that the Middle East countries asked for guarantees against France, Great Britain, and Israeli attacks. In general summarization, Richards found and termed the mission "successful."¹²³

Richards' first step was March 14 in a pre-softened

120. Economist, September 14, 1957.

121. New York Times, January 17, 1957, p.3.

122. Christian Science Monitor, May 3, 1957.

123. New York Times, April 9, 1957, p.15.

Lebanon. Charles Malik, foreign minister, had, with the help of President Chamoun and Prime Minister, Sami Solh, tenderized the self-appointed mediator among the Arab nations - Lebanon. Malik had told Eisenhower in early February that he would try and win general Arab support for the Eisenhower Doctrine but "nobody knows better than I do," he added, "how hard it is to get full Arab co-operation."¹²⁴

If part of the significance of the Eisenhower Doctrine was that it gave those who were alarmed by the drift away from the West a chance to reaffirm their position - and retain their political office, the adoption of the Eisenhower Doctrine by Malik and Chamoun before its final legislation, negated that significance. The hastiness pulled Lebanon from her inter-Arab neutrality and exaggerated her internal differences.

A communiqué and bi-lateral agreement was achieved in three days. A joint statement followed talks with the three men. The Lebanese Government supported the resolution, the statement ran; and Mr. Richards had agreed in principle that the United States Government should provide the Lebanese Government with certain equipment needed to strengthen the Lebanese armed forces, in addition to a recent grant of military equipment for the same purpose. The communiqué announced the determination of both countries to defend their political independence and territorial integrity: to choose

124. New York Times, February 7, 1957, p.1.

their own form of government and of social and cultural life; and to oppose any forms of intervention or interference in the internal affairs of one state by another. They were convinced also that internal communism was incompatible with national independence and constituted a cause of trouble for world peace and security. They declared too, that both countries would work through the United Nations and by all other peaceful means towards just solutions of the various problems which create tension within the area.¹²⁵ The welcome of the Eisenhower plan had irritated existing tensions; and the March 16 statement scratched them into pre-election nervousness.

Lebanon had verbal company. Libya, visited March 20, had announced their welcome four days previously. Mustafa Halim, the Premier, gave the Eisenhower Doctrine the most enthusiastic endorsement. "We, like the American people, abhor international communism."¹²⁶ The two governments agreed that "the aggressive intentions of international communism offer the greatest threat to national independence and the peace and security of the world community."¹²⁷

125. "Ambassador Richards' Mission to the Middle East", United States Department of State Bulletin, v.36, May 6, 1957, p.724.

126. New York Times, March 16, 1957, p.3.

127. "Ambassador Richards' Mission to the Middle East", op.cit., p.724.

Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, and Iraq, members of the Baghdad Pact, were visited and statements announced March 22, 27, 21, and April 8 respectively, received two special commitments from the Richards' Mission: 1. if invited, the United States was prepared to join the military committee of the Baghdad Pact and 2. an assurance that the United States is prepared to assist in the development of certain regional programs under consideration in the economic committee of the Baghdad Pact.¹²⁸ Iraq's communiqué was representative of the four countries which stressed cooperation between the United States Government and countries of the Middle East to protect their national independence and integrity against the threat of international communism. During his spring visit to the United States, Prince Abdul Ilah of Iraq had spoken of the Palestine problem, communism, and the persistence of some western powers in their old imperialist attitudes and policies as the three great dangers.¹²⁹ In Iraq, too, Richards announced signature of an agreement for a United States grant to the Baghdad Pact of \$10,000,000 for improving communications.¹³⁰

The United States had been forewarned of the Saudi appraisal. King Saud returned from his spring visit to the United States impressed by the sincerity and good intentions

128. Ibid.

129. Congressional Record, op.cit., p.3022.

130. New York Times, April 14, 1957, p.1(IV).

of Eisenhower. In an early March statement that "There were excellent prospects for good relations between America and the Arab world, provided the United States remained the champion of freedom and self-determination,"¹³¹ King Saud's and Richards' communiqué revealed the month's contentions among Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria, and Egypt. The communiqué revealed a vague and general line of unity but no mention of the Eisenhower Doctrine. It omitted any special emphasis of the menace of international communism but reaffirmed that they would "continue to oppose communist activities, other forms of imperialism, and any other dangers that threatened peace and stability in the area."¹³²

Could the United States have expected favor from Egypt and Syria? Was there any basis for such hope? It is unlikely that the authors of the Eisenhower Doctrine could have failed to realize that the Doctrine would be unacceptable to Egypt and Syria. With anti-communism as the apparent core of the Eisenhower Doctrine, the doctrine required Egypt to choose sides in the cold war. Perhaps it was hoped that Egypt, already physically weakened by the Tripartite blow of late 1956, might realize the advantages of further and firmer friendships with the United States. But the United States did not realize that Egypt was already morally strengthened by her firm stand on the Suez Canal issue,

131. Ibid., March 4, 1957.

132. "Ambassador Richards' Mission to the Middle East," op.cit., p.724.

by the discrediting of Israel, and by public opinion that supported the righteously indignant underdog. And Egypt, morally strengthened, who was helped also by the United States support through the United Nations and by the Soviet Union with the announcement of 'volunteers' and threats of nuclear reprisals against the three attackers, held on to her 'positive neutralism'. The Eisenhower Doctrine was unacceptable to Egypt also because it seemed to indicate that the United States was seeking to replace the British - a United States who was even more of a fearsome protagonist than Great Britain as she was the main protector and supporter of Israel; and because the United States by joining the military committee of the Baghdad Pact which had in 1955 appeared to isolate Egypt, had made her tactics clear. The realization of Egypt's reaction and the increasingly tense Middle East political situation came and Eisenhower recalled the Richards' Mission home before Egyptian and Syrian opposition was broadcast.

A Red-influenced Afghanistan and the Richards' Mission produced, April 2, this communiqué: "They are determined to defend the political independence and territorial integrity of their respective nations and the right of each to choose its own forms of government and to develop its own social and cultural life."¹³³

Diverse statements had emanated from Jordan. Jordan's

133. Ibid.

Premier, Suleiman Nabulsi was quoted as saying that Jordan would accept any foreign aid which was offered without any strings attached and that Jordan would not be hostile to the East or the West except in as much as either bloc was hostile to the Arabs.

Nabulsi's statement was interpreted to mean that Jordan was ready to accept United States economic aid without committing herself in favor of the West against the East. The government in April barred Jordan's participation in the Eisenhower Doctrine, when the same Premier, Nabulsi, but with a change in cabinet, spoke of Jordan as intending to maintain a policy of 'positive neutralism'. He said he would refuse to sign any anti-communist pledge with Richards.¹³⁴ By April 14, King Hussein, not getting his way on stronger anti-communist pronouncements, replaced Nabulsi with Abdel Halim Nimr. This action was seen as a compromise between the extreme pro-Egyptian forces and the more moderate, pro-Western forces.¹³⁵ April 24, the throne of Hussein was in jeopardy, and the United States showed its implicit invitation to the Government to ask for American assistance in meeting her problems by her statement of April 24 that the United States regarded "the independence and integrity of Jordan as vital."¹³⁶

134. New York Times, April 17, 1957, p.2.

135. Ibid., April 14 (IV), 1957, p.1.

136. Ibid., April 25, 1957, p.1.

Hussein had blamed international communism for efforts to destroy Jordan. By April 30, Jordan accepted \$10,000,000 in offered American aid - a grant - but outside the provisions of the Eisenhower Doctrine. By May 1, a more secure Hussein announced he had no intention of binding Jordan to any commitment under the Eisenhower Doctrine. "If it is a matter of stopping the spread of communism," he said, "we are already doing that..." "Those who work to spread communism are a threat and danger to the tradition and beliefs of the whole Arab world."¹³⁷

Ethiopia's Emperor Haile Selassie had assured Richards of "cordial support" of the Eisenhower Doctrine.¹³⁸ Greece, after ten years experience with American aid and cooperation pledged support of the doctrine, May 2. She said that the independence and freedom of all peoples "were not jeopardized by the doctrine."¹³⁹

Tunisia, was the stopover May 6. The talk with Prime Minister Bourguiba was a reiteration of his previous endorsement of the Eisenhower Doctrine. Morocco's position was unchanged since Nixon's visit when the Sultan had expressed his approval of the doctrine, although he felt that economic aid was more vital to combating communism than military guarantees.¹⁴⁰

137. Ibid., May 1, 1957, p.1.

138. Ibid., April 18, 1957, p.14.

139. Ibid., May 31, 1957, p.2.

140. Ibid., March 3, 1957, p.3.

The Sudan, recently independent, and economically thirsty was polite and supported with a policy of non-intervention. There was feeling in the Sudan that the Richards' Mission would lead to a 'cold war' in the Middle East with Russian retaliation.¹⁴¹ This feeling frosted into noncommitment by May 29, when Sudan's Foreign Minister, Mohamed Ahmed Mahgoub, said that the Sudan would not reply to the United States Government about the Eisenhower Doctrine proposals nor announce any decision on them now or later.¹⁴²

Israel's dilemma in relation to the resolution was less obvious but perhaps more acute. Although she omitted in a May 21 statement any reference to international communism, and emphasized peace, co-operation, national independence, and loyalty to the United Nations Charter, by associating herself for the first time, however subtly, with the objects of American foreign policy in the Middle East, she partly lost her neutralist stand.¹⁴³ The Knesset approved 59 to 5, but there were 39 abstentions.

In Eisenhower's report to Congress, August 6, 1957, he said, "the Eisenhower Doctrine for the protection of the Middle East against communist aggression has played a central role in improving the prospects of peace in this vital area."¹⁴⁴ The New York Times editorial in August was less restrained:

141. Ibid., April 24, 1957, p.15.

142. Ibid., May 2, 1957, p.12.

143. Eystan, Walter, The First Ten Years: a diplomatic History of Israel, p.146.

144. Congressional Record, op.cit., p.13706.

"The Doctrine has not only aligned most of the Middle Eastern states on the side of the West and has thereby checked President Nasser's Soviet-backed Arabic and ultimately pan-Islamic empire, it has also averted a major conflict centering around Jordan that could have brought Soviet Russia onto the scene."¹⁴⁵

Twelve nations had issued joint communiqués with Ambassador Richards which had for the most part restated the aims contained in the Eisenhower Doctrine. What was the position of the United States then? The Eisenhower Doctrine on the surface was simply a statement of national concern and a deterrent to Soviet aggression.

The situation in the Middle East smelled vaguely of danger - a danger to her peace. The Eisenhower Doctrine was an immediate answer to an immediate need; it was a stopgap program to secure immediate peace.

Lebanon was one of the smaller openings which the Eisenhower Doctrine sought to plug.

145. New York Times, August 6, 1957,

CHAPTER III

FRUITION IN LEBANON?

POLITICAL MILIEU OF LEBANON

Lebanon's National Pact of 1943 which was based on a statement of policy delivered by Riadh es-Solh, Premier, in the Lebanese Parliament in October 1943 gave spoken form to emerging principles. Such principles were: that the Christians would give up idea of foreign protection including treaties with Western Powers, and the Muslims were to cease agitation for unity with Syria.^{145a.}

Half of its population are emigrants in a home-away-from-home; its commercial economy imitates an occidental business structure; and much of its cultural inheritance is a legacy from the French mandate. Lebanon has more western-orientated reactions than her Arab neighbors because of three main factors. The Royal Institute of International Affairs in its Political and Economic Survey of the Middle East, listed the following:

1. The Maronites - who relied upon France for support

145 a. Dib, George, Middle East Documents, Middle East Forum, v.34, January, 1959, p.6.

2. The Lebanese outside Lebanon - in the Americas and West Africa, who often send back money.
3. The trade - which created a variety of interest in continuing foreign contacts.

Lebanon reacts involuntarily Arabwards to outside threats to the Arab world and in spite of western leaning, is dedicated to reconciling inter-Arab differences.

Division dominates the structure. To divide the population elements completely might mean death - if not to the political entity than to many of its population. Lebanon has therefore moved within her self-imposed boundaries against a dynamic Syro-Egyptian growth and an absorbing cold war, and has kept her schizophrenic tendencies under control.

The boundaries set in August 1920 after expansion of the old Sanjaq of Lebanon incorporated predominantly Muslim populations, held a bare Christian majority. This numerical distribution gave a closer division but a greater potential for dissension.

Partly owing to such internal factors as her traditional weak governmental structure and to inter-Arab clashes, Lebanon's sensitive position has been recently disturbed. The biggest relapse in recent Lebanese politics occurred during the Suez Crisis.

The Cabinet of Abdullah al-Yaffi, which had assumed power in March 1956, fell November 16 the same year. Sami Solh became Prime Minister with Dr. Charles Malik as Minister

of Foreign Affairs and General Fuad Chehab as Minister of Defense. Solh, a moderate, was, according to Le Monde, an advocate of French-Lebanese friendships.

It was understood that Yaffi's cabinet had been sharply divided on the policy Lebanon was to pursue in the Middle East Crisis on the eve of the Tripartite attack on Egypt. Even though Chamoun had been first to suggest a break with Great Britain and France as a gesture of solidarity with Egypt, he reversed his position to support them. Because the majority of other Arab nations severed relations, Chamoun's support was negative. It was on Chamoun's initiative that the Conference of the Arab Heads of State and Ministers was called for November 13-15. The participants in a November 16 statement unanimously agreed on the need to apply the United Nations resolution in the Middle East. They, too, demanded the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of the British and French troops in Egypt and the withdrawal of Israeli troops to armistice lines. "If hostilities were resumed by them, France, Great Britain, and Israel would be held jointly responsible for collaborating to continue their aggression." In that event, all the Arab States at the Conference would "immediately take effective measures of legitimate defence" in accordance with Article 41 of the United Nations Charter and Article 2 of the Joint Arab Defence Treaty.¹⁴⁶

146. Article 2: all participants would undertake to employ all means, including armed force, to repulse aggression against a member or members. Keesing's contemporary archives, p.15236.

Yaffi and Saeb Salam, both of whom were known to be supporters of Colonel Nasser's policies, were believed to have urged the breaking off of diplomatic relations with Britain and France following the similar action taken by Syria. The other Ministers in the cabinet were understood to have opposed such severance. It was commented abroad that Yaffi had resigned almost immediately after the meeting of the Arab Heads of State in Beirut at which Chamoun, known to be western-orientated, resisted Syrian pressure. He was supported against the pressure of Kuwatly by King Feisal and King Saud probably out of fear for their oil interests through Syria's blowing up Iraqi pipelines and the closing of the canal.

The Suez Crisis, Fall, 1956, precipitated a state of emergency in Lebanon while Lebanon was trying to balance. At the same time, anti-government policy precipitated local disturbances at Tripoli and Beirut.¹⁴⁷

Chamoun and Solh were supported by the Chamber of Deputies, and relations with Great Britain and France held. This affront to the leader of Arab Nationalism and the leading exponent of "positive neutralism" damaged Lebanon's unique position as a ready-made mediator not only among the Arabs but between the East and West and caused a near relapse into disintegration.

147. The Middle East - Lebanon, Europa Publications Limited, 1958, p.270.

As Lebanon had grown healthier, her position had been slowly reenforced by her refusal to join the Baghdad Pact in 1955, and by signatures to commercial treaties with Eastern Germany in November 1955, with Communist China in December 1955, and with Poland in January 1956. At the Bandung Conference, April 1955, organized by the five Colombo powers, for Asian and African states, Sami Solh, one of Lebanon's representatives, listed three obstacles impending human brotherhood: fanaticism, excessive nationalism, and hatred of foreigners.¹⁴⁸ It was said at the conference that, "the Lebanese delegates expressed themselves in terms unfavourable to Communism."¹⁴⁹

In August 1955, the International Bank granted Lebanon a loan of \$27,000,000 for the Litani River scheme. Ten months later, Lebanon welcomed the Russian foreign minister, Shepilov, and according to reports, was offered Soviet economic assistance. Chamoun was also invited to visit Moscow at a later date.

Lebanon accepted an American grant of \$3,670,000 for airport improvements which raised the total United States aid to Lebanon following July 1, 1955 to \$7,760,000. At this time, the Lebanese Minister of Information, in a public statement praised United States aid to Lebanon and the similarity of both economies in that they are based on freedom and individual initiative.

148. Keesing's contemporary archives, p.14181.

149. The Middle East, Europa, op.cit., pp.265-87.

Beirut was able to pivot easily. In May, she announced, following a Lebanese meeting between Major-General Innab, Glubb's successor as Jordanian Army Commander, and Lebanese military heads, that Jordan and Lebanon had agreed to coordinate their military efforts to face the common Israeli danger.

But the neutralism of Nasser remained the strongest in the Arab world, but at the same time, it gave stimulus to older and more local Arab nationalism. As the communists seek to prevent any local trend from stabilizing the situation, and seek to attract friends in the 'cold war', Lebanon, with fewer charms for Russia, was able to vacillate, pick and choose with fewer consequences.

Instead of the Cairo-Damascus breed of "liberation" - neutralism, Lebanon had set up her brand of neutralism and was fairly unattached within the recognized two blocs and within the Arab community. But in the November action, she strengthened the differences, not her neutralism.

Lebanon was unaware that the second and more shattering blow to her eroded position was close. Confidently, and seemingly unaware, Charles Malik declared December 31, 1956, that he would welcome a more active United States policy - to fill the vacuum of power.¹⁵⁰

150. Deadline Data, op.cit., p.13.

REACTION TO THE EISENHOWER DOCTRINE -
1957 ELECTIONS

Into this fluid post-Suez environment came the American proposal for peace and stability in the Middle East.

On January 2, 1957, when asked what Lebanon's policy would be, a Lebanese deputy and member of the Foreign Affairs Committee replied that Lebanon's policy would be one hundred per cent Lebanese. Her interest would come first, he said, while she will continue to cooperate to the utmost with other Arab states, according to the Charter of the Arab League. Under the present government he said, Charles Malik alone would be in charge of the execution of foreign policy and is responsible for it.¹⁵¹ But he had forgotten the President.

When the Richards' Mission arrived in Beirut on the 14th of March, the face it saw was familiarly friendly although two months of a tug-of-war between the Arabs, and the forthcoming elections, had etched out a more articulate opposition than was customary in general elections.

The joint statement issued following talks with Chamoun, Sami Solh, and Malik said that Lebanese Government supported the Eisenhower Doctrine and had agreed with Mr. Richards in principle that the United States Government should

151. Arab World, 1957, January 3, p.1.

provide the Lebanese armed forces with certain equipment needed to strengthen her forces in addition to a recent grant of military equipment for the same purposes.¹⁵²

But with the acceptance of the Eisenhower Doctrine, Lebanon had lost her position of mediator in inter-Arab conflicts. Her political equilibrium was broken, and her neutralism shaken. Why was Lebanon willing, even overly anxious to accept the Eisenhower Doctrine? Was she in such unanimity with American principles of anti-communism and national integrity and political independence? Was her need of aid so desperate that she would risk her almost forty years of a viable compromise? Was she not aware of the blow to Egypt, when, in the controversy over the resolution's acceptance, Egypt realized that for the second time in a year, whatever her means, she was powerless to rally the Arab leaders around her? Or did Lebanon seek the formation of a Riyadh-Baghdad-Beirut camp to challenge Nasser with a version of his own Arab Nationalism? There were indications of such a conception when Chamoun secured an invitation to visit Saudi Arabia at the end of February. Did she seek to isolate Egypt or seek merely to push for the Arab Cause with her brand and direction of Arab Nationalism? Was an isolation of Nasser the only alternative or did Lebanon wish for unchallenged leadership? Or what about Chamoun?

152. See Appendix for Lebanese communiqué.

There were enough reasons for apprehension in the Middle East. Lebanon, whose existence and status quo continued by the tacit sectarianism of her one-million-plus population was worried about recent events: Syrian and Egyptian orientation to external politics, the nationalization of the Suez, and Soviet influence. Relations with Syria had blackened because Lebanon held men, wanted by Syria, accused of conspiracy, and refused to relinquish them to the fate of the Deuxieme Bureau's whims.

Can Lebanon's action be explained in terms of making possible a less negative 'positive neutralism' than the Cairo-Damascus ideal? For did not the Eisenhower Doctrine permit the monarchs and Lebanon to set themselves up as vigilantes of subversive ideologies and as against the imperialism of Great Britain who was intervening in the protectorates of Saudi Arabia and France with her drawnout struggle in propaganda-potent Algeria? Didn't she reason that each accepting country could act separately and directly with Washington under the Eisenhower Doctrine? In fighting communism, international communism which attempts to submerge Arab Nationalism, would be displaced by Arab Nationalism. Did Malik represent a 'Lebanon-first'?

Was Lebanon's fervor against imperialism and communism compensation for risks to her prestige? Was she equally fervent in her enthusiasm for non-interference and non-intervention in the affairs of other Arab countries, and the

maintenance of her sovereignty and national independence to counter-balance such risks?¹⁵³ Or were the risks to the Christian and especially Maronite position, apparent or unapparent, more important than the risk to Lebanon's position?

Alone, such feeling would not be sufficient. The neutrality of Lebanon was practical in terms of global affairs; strong Arab and internal opposition made it impractical. Aid to Lebanon and personal political aims rounded the picture. To secure America's support and much desired aid, Lebanon perhaps judged it practical to organize a fight against international communism.

The Lebanese Government must have foreseen the result or at least by-products of acceptance. Chamoun, feeling strong and popular enough to anticipate a second term after constitutional changes, unwisely separated foreign policy from internal policy, paid more attention to the former, and carried the Eisenhower Doctrine banner.

Eisenhower's resolution gave Lebanon the chance to play the role of strengthening the cooperation between the Arab states and the United States. The January 3 issue of the Arab World reported that by indications of the free press, the reaction to the Eisenhower Doctrine was then rather favorable, especially in the right-wing quarters. Chamoun

153. Communiqués of Saud and Lebanon, and of Lebanon and the Sudan heralded non-interference and self-decision on foreign aid according to one's own national interests.

was reported to have talked to United States Ambassador, Heath, about Malik's February trip to the United States. The Foreign Ministry declined to give its opinion because it had not officially been apprised of Eisenhower's plans. An early January meeting, attended by Solh, reflected the chances that such projects as the Housing Scheme and the National Development of Lebanese Waters would benefit from American willingness to step up financial and technical aid to Lebanon.¹⁵⁴ It was said that Solh was bidding for \$1,500,000 principally for housing projects.

Most factions resented the American assumption that she should step into the Middle East to fill the vacuum. Most reaction would welcome United States aid, if unconditional; for, it was felt, a disinterested friendship is most desirable. Al-Nahar, said Arabs can not reject aid offers if needed and so long as Lebanon had nothing else to fill the vacuum but 'medieval' regimes.¹⁵⁵

The two months preceding Richards' visit showed increasing complexity and Lebanon's desire to have both her position and aid.

The Government faced a vote of confidence for its support of the Eisenhower Doctrine and its acceptance of American military and economic aid. Before the vote, the Government listed seven principles of Lebanese foreign policy:

154. Arab World, January 3, 1957, p.1.

155. Ibid., January 4, pp.1-3.

total independence; Lebanon is a part of the Arab world; Lebanon is a member of the Arab League; Palestine is a major Arab problem; freedom of cooperation with all; links with Lebanese overseas; and finally that Lebanon opposes communism. The Government was given a strong vote of confidence, 30-1, but seven opposition deputies resigned in protest: Yaffi, Hamid Frangiah, Ahmed el Assaad, Kamel el-Assaad, Sabry Hamadi, Abdullah Hajj, and Rashid Karami. The Opposition had objected strongly to the hasty manner in which the Eisenhower Doctrine had been accepted; even though it was pointed out that in 1951, Salam and Yaffi had asked for approval of Point IV because American policy was in line with Lebanon's goals and did not conflict with Lebanon's national interest.¹⁵⁶

Lebanon saw flexibility in United States policy - for Lebanon's needs.

Malik, ostensibly leading Lebanon's delegation to the United Nations, said in a January 7 statement to the press: "Lebanon is the most eager of all Arab states for coordinating policies and Arab affairs with its sister countries" and in a pre-departure meeting with the Foreign Affairs committee said he would try to allocate "wider assistance" for Lebanon and was advised by the Committee that new trends of United States policy were in line with the goals which Lebanon was trying to accomplish in both the

156. Ibid., April 5, 1957.

international and regional field.¹⁵⁷

Malik's itinerary included Cairo, Rome, Paris, London, and Washington. In Cairo, Malik built up flattery to the Eisenhower Doctrine. "Lebanon wished to cooperate with the United States to the fullest possible extent, within the bonds of Lebanon's independence and sovereignty". "The Communist danger had infiltrated many parts of the Middle East", he said. He saw the supreme external issue of the moment to be the communist challenge - with every other problem being subordinate to it.¹⁵⁸ And he tried to bring in Nasser.

Malik's stop in Cairo indicated a mostly self-appointed role, the role of intercessor. The goal was a more accommodating attitude by Nasser towards the West.

But Malik, before the Eisenhower Doctrine division was known, added more kind words to the West in Paris and to Le Monde; he said, "Nothing could affect the excellent relations existing between France and Lebanon, not even the passing disputes which may break out between our two countries or between France and our Arab neighbors."¹⁵⁹

Criticism in Parliament belied the backing of the Lebanese Government. Deputy ^HMajj felt Lebanon would be singling herself out - in an independent policy without

157. Ibid., January 7, 1957.

158. Ibid., January 8, 1957, pp.1,2.

159. Ibid., January 14, 1957, p.2.

consultation of the other Arab states. The Eisenhower Doctrine, he felt was devised to counteract the revolution wrought by Egypt in Arab foreign policies, while Deputy Gabriel Murr thought that Lebanon should accept any unconditional form of aid. Another deputy called the Eisenhower Doctrine - international bribery, but a justification came from Parliament that if most of the Arab countries, including North Africa, accepted the Eisenhower Doctrine, as reports seemed to show, it would be Egypt and Syria in isolation, not Lebanon.¹⁶⁰

Lebanon, feeling an inner conflict, had to place her hope on King Saud as mediator between the Egypt-Syrian and Iraqi camps and between the Arabs and the West in Washington. But outwardly firm, Malik, in Washington was ready to begin cementing. Chamoun's letter to Eisenhower expressed the hope that Palestine - the basic issue in the Middle East - and in the world, would receive a happy solution under Eisenhower's leadership. Lebanon expects more aid, wrote Chamoun, and is willing to cooperate with the United States in all three aspects of the Eisenhower Doctrine.¹⁶¹

Russia added to the tension with her counteraction to the American resolution. A February 12th, six-point note that the West should give up what she has in the Middle East in return for Russia's giving up what she had not, interjected

160. Ibid., January 14, 1957, p.2.

161. Ibid., January 7, 1957, p.2.

a disquieting pause. Her points and policy were received cautiously, and negatively as an element of the cold war, but two of the points, refraining from foreign military pacts and recommending an explicit Arab neutrality, were received more favorably.

Tension passed to the President's chair, and Chamoun, apparently searching for rationalization, exposed the mythical nature of Egypt's Arab Neutrality and the nature of Lebanon's, in a February 15 statement: "We expose ourselves to get trampled on." Malik could give no definition.¹⁶²

Solh told the Foreign Relations Committee that the Government agreed to the Eisenhower Doctrine on a basis for future negotiations but there must first be adoption by the United States Congress and presentation of concrete offers by the United States Government.¹⁶³

Although the early 1957 events were uneasy, the conference to be held upon Saud's return was mainly to take up the question of the Eisenhower Doctrine. The uneasiness increased. Chamoun and Lebanon were not invited to the Conference and disagreement among the leaders present, Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia, was evident as the February communiqué gave no direct reference to the Eisenhower Doctrine. The communiqué, which was called a triumph of positive neutrality - defense from within, accomplished

162. Ibid., February 15, 1957, pp.1-5.

163. Ibid., February 25, 1957, p.7.

little. It was reported that Syria's rejection of the Eisenhower resolution and overt sympathy with the Soviet Union, and Israel's obstinacy in rejecting American bids to withdraw from Sinai and Gaza, were two definite detriments to alignment with the West.

Saud sought support in Lebanon and Iraq. Chamoun's trip to Riyadh produced a communiqué in which he and King Saud declared the necessity of combating communism, imperialism, and Zionism. Chamoun stopped in Baghdad before and after his Saudi Arabian visit.¹⁶⁴

Early March, the underground current of opposition clarified itself and branched off, and followed the line of positive neutrality versus anti-positive neutralism. Salam gave it greater distinction. He said American moral support was more important than the material aid. The Government, meanwhile prepared lists of projects for implementation through the Eisenhower Doctrine.¹⁶⁵

Malik tried to pacify. Lebanon has a positive attitude toward the Eisenhower Doctrine, he said, yet Lebanon's policy must be coordinated with those of other Arab states. The Richards' Mission, while quieting fears that America wished to establish military bases in Lebanon, announced that Lebanon would receive assistance to the amount of some \$20,000,000. The American Government, shaken by Arab and Senate criticisms,

164. Ibid., March 27, 1957, pp.1-3.

165. Ibid., March 4, 1957, p.1.

tried tranquilizers. The New York Times, according to a reliable source, said that the United States had agreed to grant \$2,000,000 worth of arms to fill an order that had been standing for more than two years and for which Lebanon was willing to pay. It was reported too, that loans totaling about \$30,000,000 would be presented for the development of highway and water projects and for equipping Lebanon's army which amounted at the present time to one undersized infantry division.¹⁶⁶

The Opposition felt that the Government had no right to determine Lebanon's destiny especially when Lebanon was still under a Suez time martial law and about to have general elections. The Opposition condemned the Government for its hastiness thus risking isolating Lebanon from the rest of the Arabs and affecting national unity as expressed in the 1943 Charter. Yet Osseyran, Speaker of Parliament, prophesied that the coming election would be fought on in local platforms, between parties where they existed, and between individuals where there were no parties.¹⁶⁷

But the Bermuda Conference between Eisenhower and England's new Prime Minister, MacMillan, gave more substance to the views of the Opposition. The American agreement to join the military committee of the Baghdad Pact was viewed by Egypt as further proof of United States schemes to isolate Egypt and Syria.

166. New York Times, March 17, 1957, p.1.

167. Arab World, op.cit., March 6, 1957, p.2.

By May 7, the Opposition had formed a National Union Front and demanded a caretaker government to ensure impartial elections and a rescindment of the Emergency Law and press censorship, which they felt hurt placed them unfavorably. Their big strike called for early May, materialized weakly for the demonstration contained an obviously disproportionate number of Palestinian refugees and Syrians.

April found the emergence of the Lebanese Government in psychological control. The Opposition weakened themselves in expressing that they were opposed to the Government on electoral not political grounds. A vote of 11-25 cancelled their efforts to enlarge the Parliament to 88; they had to settle for an increase of 22 over a previous 44.

The United States Senate Foreign Relations Committee was notified that the new Eisenhower Middle East program was underway and the State Department intended to provide emergency economic assistance of approximately \$10,000,000.¹⁶⁸

On May 3, Richards was called home. On May 7, the Lebanese emergency law was cancelled. A new electoral regulation, which limited attendance at political rallies to people of the constituency and forbid a candidate to hold rallies except in his own constituency, further weighed down the Opposition.

The month of May saw a tightening of tension. Egyptian

168. New York Times, April 4, 1957, p.67.

publications were stopped in Lebanon, and the Egyptian Embassy was warned to keep out of the Lebanese electoral campaign. The communists were given an underdog's encouragement when the Roman Catholic hierarchy told Catholics not to vote for parties who stood for separation of religion from state. The communists refused to support the Opposition because Antoine Tabet, their man, was refused a place on the Opposition Ticket.

The Conservative Government was disposed to cooperate with the West. It was challenged by an alliance of leftist and nationalist elements, backing the Syro-Egyptian line of 'positive neutrality'. This neutrality, as construed by Nasser, meant rejection of the Eisenhower Doctrine and acceptance of Soviet arms and diplomatic support.¹⁶⁹

Lebanon tried to quiet the rising discord. But June and the four weekly elections lay ahead. The Orient, one of Beirut's leading newspapers, said parties and programs were to be subordinated to electoral deals, family rivalries, local quarrels.¹⁷⁰

Lebanon tried to assume her old place when in June a Lebanese delegation visited Amman during King Saud's visit there. It was understood that Lebanon had offered to mediate in the dispute between Jordan and Egypt.

The Government, more sure of itself, added two neutrals to the cabinet and Chehab assumed command of all police and

169. Ibid., June 31, 1957, p.1.

170. Orient, April 27, 1957, p.26.

security forces.

One can wonder at the non-interfering role of the United States at this time. The day of the Beirut and South Lebanon elections, the first concrete military aid under the Eisenhower Doctrine reached Lebanon with 37 jeeps, K2 106 mm guns.

The first election results gave victory, but a slim one, to the Government: Solh and Edde were returned, but Salam, Abdullah Mashnouq, Ahmed El-Assaad, Ghassan Tuani, Yaffi, and Antoine Tabet lost. In the south, three won on the Opposition National Front, as opposed to the five winners on a straight Government ticket.¹⁷¹ The New York Times called it a sweeping victory for the United States pro-Western Government.^{171a} Next week, the Government won 17 out of 18 seats in the Central Lebanon area. Socialist Jumblat was defeated and the anti-Government feeling grew. The election tactics of the Government who campaigned heavily even in areas where there was no opposition gave further irritation. The two neutral members of the cabinet, Dr. Joseph Hitti and Mohamed Ali Beyhum, placed as a concession to the Opposition, resigned when fifteen people of the Frangieh and Doueihis family were killed in a family feud quickened by political differences. Their resignation reason: they disliked the election 'atmosphere'. In Kesrouan

171. Arab World, op.cit., June 10, 1957, p.10.

171a. New York Times, July 2, 1957, p.26.

there has been open campaigning by the President's brother and members of the cabinet.

Lebanon's external affairs reflected the dissension. She neared a break of relations with the Soviet Union because Russia published, unilaterally, the contents of a Lebanese memorandum to the Soviet Union urging it to stop interference in Lebanese internal, especially electoral affairs, and published also the Russian reply which was openly hostile to the Eisenhower Doctrine.

In spite of hostile opposition, the Government, with constituencies favorably arranged and Malik's opponent, Fuad Ghosn, persuaded to withdraw, retained control of Parliament. Of the 66 deputies, the Government took 46.¹⁷²

July 15, the American Embassy announced that Lebanon would receive \$10,000,000 in economic aid and \$4,700,000 in military aid during the fiscal year 1958 under the Eisenhower Doctrine¹⁷³ and a second shipment of military aid with 1,600 tons of equipment was on its way.

August 14, Solh formed a new cabinet following elections; his new Foreign Minister was Malik.

Lebanon, feeling the effects of the hasty Eisenhower Doctrine acceptance, tried to regain her position. In the United Nations General Assembly, Malik, October 7, 1957, declared that Lebanon unreservedly rates itself on the side of the free world, but she would immediately come to the support of Syria if she were attacked.

172. Middle Eastern Affairs, January, 1957, v.8.

173. New York Times, July 16, 1957, p.7.

October 22, Lebanese acting Foreign Minister Jamil Mikkawi confirmed that Lebanon had asked for revision of the joint Lebanese statement on the Eisenhower Doctrine. He said that Lebanon was not prepared to take any obligations to enter a war against the Soviet Union in which the United States might be involved. The Lebanese want it made clear to the other Arab countries... that nothing in the March 16 communiqué obliges them to enter peace negotiations with Israel... Lebanon objects to the fact that the Eisenhower Doctrine restricts American aid to defense against international communism... We cannot accept foreign decisions on what is good for us.¹⁷⁴

The United States seemed aware that Lebanon's almost solo acceptance had tended to isolate her from her neighbors. As Lebanon's interests had become hers, the United States announced she was willing to supply Lebanon with all the necessary defensive weapons, including rockets and virtually unlimited economic aid. Malik brought this news to the Lebanese Parliament November 26, 1957, and December 30, 1957, the United States announced that she no longer required the Lebanese Government to provide half of the cost of any of its development projects undertaken with American aids.

The Eisenhower Doctrine, stopgap in nature, sought to seal up Lebanon, even though Lebanon though not endangering peace, was a potential danger. But the potential had become

174. New York Times, October 23, 1957.

realized. Were pressures, already present the stimuli to increased tensions, or was it the Eisenhower Doctrine that had irritated and inflamed the area because it was not only inadequate but not applicable?

1958 CRISES - AIMS REALIZED?

If the stated aims of the Eisenhower Doctrine had been to combat international communism and lessen its danger by bringing out the awareness against it, unstated aims were to fatten a weakened prestige by a show of moral strength and by a show of military force if necessary.

Was Lebanon's verbal acceptance with the accompanying military and economic aid accompanied by a realization of either the implicit or explicit aims?

Judged by objectives for additional stability in the Middle East and alleviation of tensions prerequisite to solving the basic problems of the area, the Eisenhower Doctrine was a failure.

It is probable that the resolution actually inflamed tensions by uncovering rivalries and differences that had been either ignored or thankfully forgotten by some of the rulers. In terms of Lebanon, the success or failure of the Eisenhower Doctrine depended on outside Arab feeling. Were the monarchs of Jordan, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia to forget so easily that a considerable part of their populations

accused them of being lackeys of imperialism whose only worry was to keep their positions even though it might mean dragging their country into an aggressive military alliance? They could not so soon forget that Nasser's popularity among the Arabs and among their own people came from his policy of 'liberation'. It was impossible to break completely with Nasser whose example of disposition of an unpopular monarch - Farouk - could be equally threatening to their thrones. Lebanon was internally and demographically unable to place herself as a defender of Islam menaced by communists as the monarchs could. Could Lebanon justify her acceptance of the alliance as an anti-colonialist alliance. Would not Lebanon's economy be indirectly menaced if Saud, Feisal, and Hussein were to fall. Lebanon's oil transit revenue might be intimidated if the principles of 'liberation' were utilized by the protectorates in Saudi Arabia to take over the oil within their country.

Would Lebanon be seen as compromising her adherence to the Arab goal - the elimination of Israel, by accepting the Eisenhower Doctrine? Lebanon who again aspired to her pre-Suez position could not neglect the position as a defender of the Arabs against Israel. Lebanon would be open to attack, for acceptance might imply a laxity in disapproving the American long-term policy to bring Arabs and Jews to a peace co-existence.

If the United States aims were realized to even a small degree by Lebanon's participation in the Eisenhower

Doctrine, then even those aims changed color towards the end of 1957 and found their present shade in the Lebanese crisis of the spring and summer of 1958.

Moral force had failed; the alternative was military force.

Lebanon was faced with a President who would change the constitution in order to run for a second term. She saw in the reappointment of Solh and Malik after March 14, a determined move to reaffirm and maintain pro-western policy. A vote of confidence was given the new government on March 27, by a 38 to 15 vote, but resistance to Chamoun dissolved into chaos and crises, catalyzed by the assassination May 6 of Nassib Matni, editor of the Telegraph and an anti-Chamounist who had campaigned against the pro-western policy of Solh's government. The murderer was unknown. The Opposition was molded into effectiveness and attacking power by Karami, Salam and Jumblat in Tripoli, Beirut, and the mountains of Lebanon. Complications were fed by an outbreak of fighting between pro-government and anti-government Druze tribesmen in South-east Lebanon. Tripoli, Karami's outpost, had her USIS library wrecked. The trouble boiled over into Beirut. Anti-Chamoun feeling heated anti-west feelings and boiled over from inner Lebanese difficulties to intra-Arab ones.

May 13, Malik openly accused UAR of direct responsibility for the disturbances and of "massive interference" in Lebanon's internal affairs. Similar accusations by Chamoun

came the following week. The Belgium Consul-General in Damascus was arrested on the Syrian border carrying submarine guns, pistols, and ammunition.

May 17, the Department of State forewarned of United States troops. The United States, it said was considering dispatching them not under the provisions of the Eisenhower Doctrine, but as an exercise of the President's powers to use the armed forces to protect American citizens.¹⁷⁴ The United States, reported the New York Times, prepared three days earlier, when she began an airlift of policy equipment to Lebanon and announced the same day that the marine strength of the 6th fleet was being doubled.¹⁷⁵

By May 27, the Lebanese Government announced that Chamoun had no intention of submitting a constitutional amendment bill to enable him to be re-elected thus eliminating the only acknowledged issue between the Government and the Opposition.

But chaos had found a healthy environment. The Opposition's demand that Chamoun resign immediately was answered with Chamoun's intention to complete his term "unless I am dead."¹⁷⁶ But Opposition stated that they were not prepared to live with Chamoun as President for another day. The Maronite Christian Patriarch, Mgr. Paul

174. London Times, May 5, 1958, p.19.

175. New York Times, May 16, 1958, p.16.

176. Keesing's contemporary archives, op.cit.,
p.16182.

Meouchi, pinpointed the trouble as due fundamentally to internal, not external causes; nor was the acceptance of the Eisenhower Doctrine a valid reason for the present crises, he said.

Lebanon shifted responsibility to the Arab League in May and to the United Nations Security Council to locate and eradicate the cause of her crises and settle her dispute. The Arab League was ineffective as Libya and the Sudan tried unsuccessfully to mediate between the UAR and Lebanon. The Security Council approved of the Swedish resolution calling for the urgent dispatch of a United Nations observations group to insure against illegal infiltration and authorized Hammarskjold to take necessary steps to that end. Malik complained that "the unmistakable aim is to overthrow the present regime in Lebanon and to replace it with one that would be more subservient to the will of the UAR... the only sin of the Lebanon is that it is independent and follows a policy of friendship towards and co-operation with the Western world."¹⁷⁷

Chamoun got the agreement of his cabinet, June 17, that at his discretion, he might ask for international aid to keep peace in the country.¹⁷⁸ Dulles expressed the readiness of the United States to participate physically in an effort to support such action as the United Nations Secretary might

177. Ibid., p.16294.

178. Beirut report of the New York Times, May 18, 1958.

ships were concentrated in the east Mediterranean. The same morning an emergency meeting of the United Nations Security Council was held at American request. Privately, officials of the United States Government said... Eisenhower committed American forces first then notified the United Nations, lest Lebanon, Jordan, and possibly Saudi Arabia fall with Iraq under sway of UAR, while the United Nations was deciding what might be done to prevent it."¹⁸²

Other talk in Lebanon and the United States claimed that United States main concern and concentration was Iraq - to reseat the old regime, and reestablish the status quo, although the United States delegate to the United Nations, Henry Cabot Lodge spoke of American action under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter: "We must... be prepared to meet the situation whatever the consequences."¹⁸³ Eisenhower, explained the same day: "This action is required to support the principles of justice and international law upon which peace and a stable international order depend."¹⁸⁴ He was more terse to newsmen: "Lebanon had been the victim of clear aggression from without,"¹⁸⁵ less so to Congress: that United States unilateral action was necessary even though the dispatch may have serious consequences and risks involved, for the events in Lebanon represent indirect aggression from without, but that the United States wants to recall forces

182. New York Times, op.cit., July 16, 1958, p.1.

183. Ibid.

184. Ibid.

185. Dulles said US Intelligence Services had ample documented proof that international communism gave inspiration and aid to revolt.

as soon as the United Nations has taken further effective steps designed to safeguard Lebanon's independence. The mission of these forces - to protect American lives (2,500); and by their presence, assist the Lebanese Government to preserve its territorial integrity and political independence.¹⁸⁶ Lebanon's territorial integrity and independence had been deemed vital to America's national interests and world peace. Lodge broadened the justifications in his United Nations speech: it has been over a month that "the situation arising from the intervention of the UAR in the internal affairs of Lebanon, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security" has been present.¹⁸⁷ Lodge referred to Article 2 of the United Nations Charter which enjoins all members to "refrain in their international relations from the threat of force or the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state."¹⁸⁸ The Russian delegate introduced a resolution calling on the United States Government to cease armed intervention in the domestic affairs of the Arab States and to remove its

186. Eisenhower, "The Crises in Lebanon", op.cit., pp.612-13.

187. Lodge, Henry Cabot, "Lebanon Asks for Help", Vital Speeches, v.24, August 1, 1958, pp.613-15.

188. Nixon, Richard, "Events in the Middle East", Vital Speeches, v.24, August 1, 1958, pp.615-19.

troops from the territory of Lebanon immediately, although Russia had voted against a subsequent United States resolution to send the United Nations Emergency Force to Lebanon.

Nixon had his turn at explanations. He cited one hundred twenty-five instances of intervention in which arms and other war material were poured into Lebanon from across the Lebanese border and propaganda broadcasts. He said that the trouble indicated Soviet help by her rapidity in recognizing the new government in Iraq and by her supply of arms to Syria of such quantity so as to release old French arms to the rebel forces. Nixon acknowledged United States action as stopgap in nature: "We realized, too, that it is at best a temporary expedient to send forces from one country into another country to help sustain a government unless that government in the long run has popular support."¹⁸⁹

The United States, though, hinted at the application of the Eisenhower Doctrine. Dulles said there was ample evidence that international communism had inspired the revolt in Lebanon as stated in the resolution (the United States regards as vital to the national integrity...), but he did not present the documented proof. Fulbright refuted an Eisenhower Doctrine application. Even if the Lebanese revolution were basically pro-Nasser, he asked could Nasser be accused of promoting communist interest? He pointed out

189. Ibid., p.617.

Nasser's visit to Tito.¹⁹⁰ Both the Eisenhower Doctrine and Article 51 of the United Nations Charter were invalid, said the Senator, as there was no armed attack. An even weaker explanation was the Tripartite Declaration, as frontiers were not open to clear threat.¹⁹¹

Although Article 51 of the United Nations Charter was cited by the United States and Chamoun as the real reason for troop landing, it seemed on the surface that the implied purpose of the troop landing was parallel to the underlying purpose of the Eisenhower Doctrine - anti-communism. Perhaps we can even suggest the deeper, more implicit underlying purpose of the troop landing found an parallel in the Eisenhower Doctrine - a show of force.

Some critics saw United States action, at its best, as undefined, and at its worse, not only an abandonment of a bankrupt policy under pressure, but a provocation for a third World War. The marines were protecting the independence from what, for whom and for how long.

If American action was a distant demonstration of the Eisenhower Doctrine, an attempt to get off the merry-go-round of reaction and defense with its core - status quo, was not American action an attempt to defend the status quo, a continuation of American foreign policy to support as allies

190. New York Times, July 16, 1958, p.13.

191. Ibid.

those states which would accept United States support. Morgenthau saw the hollowness of applying a status quo policy; for such a policy is "sound only when it seeks to defend a status quo viable in itself." He feels that Lebanon was threatened not only by her "congenital inner weakness" sharpened by the simultaneous collapse of Western influence and power in the Middle East, but by the rise of Arab Nationalism and the entrance of the Soviet Union in the Middle East.¹⁹²

What are the benefits to defend one's interests at any price. The benefits must be worth the price to be paid. The United States forgot the price, for in showing her force she further eroded her prestige.

Accomplishment: peace restored - temporarily. The Eisenhower Doctrine, though most likely not the main cause for Lebanese trouble, had exposed scarcely compatible factors, and had uncovered truths which had changed Middle East power alignments and strengthened Arab Nationalism to the expense of Lebanon's neutrality. The insecurities of a Christian population were uncovered, and political reality, most likely, was revealed to Chamoun and Malik often their political misconceptions.

Forecast: a dangerously feeble status quo. And dangerous to those who wish to maintain it at almost any

192. Lebanon was a test case, not a case study. Morgenthau, Hans, "The Lebanese Disaster". New Republic, August 4, 1958.

cost. The Eisenhower Doctrine was dead as the United States would not exhume the body, a redefinition of American policies is seen.

CHAPTER IV

ANALYSIS

The aims of American foreign policy are not difficult to determine. In the field of international relations and international politics, with power politics directing the field, there could be little confusion as to the aims or the expectations. The explicit aim was peace. If there were implicit aims, they too spelled peace and the methods to get it and maintain it. But an immediate peace and a final peace were peace with no price and no alternative. It had to be peace on United States terms.

Some obscurity does occur with a decrease in power; for with the lessening of power, the struggle between morality and power as guide-posts for foreign policy, becomes more intense. The policies of the United States intensified the struggle further by her vacillation between multilateralism and principles on the one hand and a unilateral approach and power politics on the other.

As the power position of the United States is defensive she has had to place more emphasis on acquiring prestige, and because the environment in which the United States lies, had changed, prestige must realize its success in the struggle

for the minds of men, to be able to promote one's own interests by changing the mind of an opponent, for the control over the minds and the actions of other men is another aspect of power.

American policy makers recognized the need for improving her prestige; a prestige which could be increased by emphasizing one's reputation for power. The specific methods and specific objectives were less clear. The United States was in a self-defeating defensive position where she had to react.

Although one often by a policy of prestige seeks to build up a reputation for power even though one's actual power may not coincide, the actual power of the United States was known. The United States knew, and the Soviet Union knew, but the Middle East did not know. American prestige, though sagging, had been reenforced by her condemnation of her allies during the November 1956 attack. The Middle East held almost ultimate importance. But it was the immediate peace that she sought, and she was willing - as the events in the 1958 showed - to risk prestige to secure peace on her terms.

The importance of controlling the Middle East was self-evident, for if Russia ruled the Middle East she might rule the world or decide the fate of it. He who has interests in the world is bound to concern himself with the Middle East.

For while the United States acted under a policy of prestige - i.e. a reputation for power - she risked her prestige because she did not show a self-restraint in using it. The 1956 events in the Middle East had exposed the weakness in her foreign policy. The United States found it expedient to attempt an offensive move.

The aims of the Eisenhower Doctrine, both implicit and explicit aims were not as clearly stated as those of American foreign policy in general. But they did not diverge. Although a different stress was placed on the means to arrive at a stable situation, peace was the objective in the Eisenhower Doctrine too. While the explicit aims listed the fight against communism, and strengthening the Middle East countries both militarily and economically so that they themselves could parent their own peace, the implicit aims were a show of force, and a show of strength with the help of a show of friends. In other words, the presentation of the Eisenhower Doctrine demanded that friends and would-be friends stand up and be counted. By stating her intention to use force - if necessary - to deter Russia, the United States hoped to build up her prestige to secure her kind of peace. When the proclamation of intention was not sufficient, the United States fell back on force, and Lebanon, apparently ready and willing to realize these aims, endangered her peace and the United States' peace by her acceptance. And into this maze of complexities crept communism - a countercurrent to the Eisenhower Doctrine.

By this analysis, the aims of the Eisenhower Doctrine were but a continuation of American foreign policy. The Eisenhower Doctrine was motivated by the desire to create events. We cannot discount the importance of a policy which portends action and offers aid with fewer strings.

That the United States was unsuccessful in a realization of her aims was not surprising. But the United States had little choice on her policy; she was not in a position, morally or realistically, to implement a bold new policy.

As the Eisenhower Doctrine was a continuation of American policy aims and stopgap methods - a procurement of immediate peace - the weaknesses of American foreign policies were inherited. The Eisenhower Doctrine revealed that although the United States knew where she wanted to go, she did not know how to get there, nor could she agree on how to get there. There was disagreement among the Congressmen, the American people, the Democrats and the Republicans, but more important, there was disagreement with the peoples to which the policy was being applied.

The general aims of American foreign policy and the Eisenhower Doctrine were sound, and sound also in view of the United States power position, but specific methods which formulated definite policies and which should have taken more in consideration the Arabs interests and wants, if definite at all, were inappropriate.

An application of these aims to Lebanon - showed clearly the inadequacies of these aims, and how they could

be misinterpreted and twisted for personal interest: a Maronite population, fighting the tide of Arab Nationalism, was willing to grasp and sought to use the Eisenhower Doctrine as a dike, even when the hole was already there, and a President, who, perhaps unaware, was motivated by his Maronite loyal ties and political aggrandizement; and a Minister of Foreign Affairs who was out of touch with the tide.

We can analyze the aims in terms of its success or failure. In terms of desired reactions and the present situation in the Middle East, the Eisenhower Doctrine must admit defeat, but in a future perspective, the Eisenhower Doctrine might realize success.

The Eisenhower Doctrine was valuable in a negative sense as it uncovered truths. In putting the spot light on realities - and on a nervous status quo, the Eisenhower Doctrine perhaps benefited the United States more than it did the Middle East, because it revealed the sickness of the status quo and the sickness of United States policy in attempting to hang on to the status quo.

It revealed to the Middle East as well as to the United States the psychological potential and future military position of the 'third force' - as an example and hope of the 'have-not' nations in the bi-polar world and the ego-orientated possibilities of neutrality.

It revealed the finale of the cold war, and revealed in more realistic terms the dangerous situation which is

like two scorpions in a bottle, each capable of killing the other, but only at the risk of his own life.

And sadly too, the Eisenhower Doctrine revealed the dilemma of the present position of the United States. While the resolution sought to build up her economic strength and military strength via the Arab countries and gain the edge on diplomatic moves to support her no longer viable prestige, the United States had to expose the hollowness, the facade of prestige so as to unmask the true motives of Russia and international communism.

The Eisenhower Doctrine might be termed a success in that it revealed a situation which necessitated either United States action or a change in policies.

The first step to halt the defensive avalanche is for the United States to define her wants, and her objectives in the world instead of just stopping Russia and China from getting what they want. The United States must change her focus on anti-communism, to positive actions, and she must look positively for common interests and objectives in the Middle East. If the needs are for unity and the trend, socially and politically, is Arab Nationalism, then the United States can work with it, not against it.

There is a necessity for clarity as well as change. The United States could clarify her aims in relation to Israel for example, in that even though she is committed to Israel's continued independent existence, she is not committed to the existing boundaries or policies.

There is necessity for flexibility - a flexibility that would be derived from an essential minimum of objectives rather than a gauge to the maximum so that anything less than the maximum would not be considered a defeat. With flexibility, the United States can move with the changes in public opinion.

While the Eisenhower Doctrine was often called stopgap in nature, its emphasis on a policy of a short term character was necessary to try and meet the needs of the moment, but the goals of the future were obscure.

The Eisenhower Doctrine was similar to many of the policies of the United States in that it attacked the symptoms, not the disease; but the Eisenhower Doctrine, in doing so emphasized not only the existence but the danger of the disease.

APPENDIX A

ADMINISTRATION'S PROPOSED RESOLUTION TO CARRY OUT MIDDLE EAST PROGRAM

To authorize the President to undertake economic and military cooperation with nations in the general area of the Middle East in order to assist in the strengthening and defense of their independence.

Whereas a primary purpose of the United States in its relations with all other nations is to develop and sustain a just and enduring peace for all, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations; and

Whereas the peace of the world and the security of the United States are endangered as long as international Communism and the nations it controls seek by threat of military action, use of economic pressure, internal subversion, or other means to attempt to bring under their domination peoples now free and independent; and

Whereas such danger now exists in the general area of the Middle East. Therefore be it

Sec. 1. Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, that the President be and hereby is authorized to cooperate with and assist any nation or group of nations in the general area of the Middle East in the development of economic strength dedicated to the maintenance of national independence.

Sec.2. The President is authorized to undertake, in the general area of the Middle East, military assistance programs with any nation or group of nations of that area desiring such assistance.

Furthermore, he is authorized to employ the armed Forces of the United States as he deems necessary to secure

and protect the territorial integrity and political independence of any such nation or group of nations requesting such aid against overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by international Communism.

Provided, that such employment shall be consonant with the treaty obligations of the United States and with the Charter of the United Nations and actions and recommendations of the United Nations, and, as specified in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, measures pursuant thereto shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.

Sec. 3. The President is hereby authorized, when he determines that such use is important to the security of the Middle East, to use for the purposes of this joint resolution, without regard to the provisions of any other law or regulation, not to exceed \$200,000,000 from any appropriations now available for carrying out the provisions of the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended. This authorization is in addition to other existing authorizations with respect to the use of such appropriations.

Sec. 4. The President shall within the month of January of each year report to the Congress his action hereunder.

Sec. 5. This joint resolution shall expire when the President shall determine that the peace and security of the nations in the general area of the Middle East are reasonably assured by international conditions created by action of the United Nations or otherwise.

APPENDIX B

JOINT RESOLUTION TO PROMOTE PEACE AND STABILITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

That the President be and hereby is authorized to cooperate with and assist any nation or group of nations in the general area of the Middle East desiring such assistance in the development of economic strength dedicated to the maintenance of national independence.

Sec. 2. The President is authorized to undertake, in the general area of the Middle East, military assistance programs with any nation or group of nations of that area desiring such assistance. Furthermore, the United States regards as vital to the national interest and world peace the preservation of the independence and integrity of the nations of the Middle East. To this end, if the President determines the necessity thereof, the United States is prepared to use armed forces to assist any such nation or group of nations requesting assistance against armed aggression from any country controlled by international communism: Provided, That such employment shall be consonant with the treaty obligations of the United States and with the Constitution of the United States.

Sec. 3. The President is hereby authorized to use during the balance of fiscal year 1957 for economic and military assistance under this joint resolution not to exceed \$200,000,000 from any appropriation now available for carrying out the provisions of the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended, in accord with the provisions of such Act: Provided, That, whenever the President determines it to be important to the security of the United States, such use may be under

the authority of Section 401 (a) of the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended (except that the provisions of Section 105 (a) there of shall not be waived), and without regard to the provisions of Section 105 of the Mutual Security Appropriations Act, 1957: Provided further, That obligations incurred in carrying out the purposes of the first sentence of Section 2 of this joint resolution shall be paid only out of appropriations for military assistance, and obligations incurred in carrying out the purposes of the first section of this joint resolution shall be paid only of appropriations other than those for military assistance. This authorization is in addition to other existing authorizations with respect to the use of such appropriations. None of the additional authorization contained in this section shall be used until 15 days after the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and the House of Representatives and, when military assistance is involved, the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives have been furnished a report showing the object of the proposed use, the country for the benefit of which such use is intended, and the particular appropriation or appropriations for carrying out the provisions of the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended, from which the funds are proposed to be derived: Provided, That funds available under this section during the balance of fiscal year 1957 shall, in the case of any such report submitted during the last fifteen days of the fiscal year, remain available for use under this section for the purpose stated in such report for a period of twenty days following the date of submission of such report. Nothing contained in this joint resolution shall be construed as itself authorizing the appropriation of additional funds for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of the first section or of the first sentence of Section 2 of this joint resolution.

Sec. 4. The President should continue to furnish facilities and military assistance, within the provisions of applicable law and established policies, to the United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East with a view to maintaining the truce in that region.

Sec. 5. The President shall within the months of January and July of each year report to the Congress his action hereunder.

Sec. 6. This joint resolution shall expire when the President shall determine that the peace and security of the nations in the general area of the Middle East are reasonably assured by international conditions created by action of the United Nations or otherwise except that it may be terminated earlier by a concurrent resolution of the two Houses of Congress.

APPENDIX C

LEBANON JOINT COMMUNIQUE -

MARCH 16, 1957

1. In their relations with each other and with other nations, they are guided by the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and by respect for the sovereign equality, rights and legitimate interests of all nations. They are interested in the establishment of a cooperative relationship between themselves based on trust and confidence and on complete respect for each other's independence and sovereignty and without an interference in each other's internal affairs.

2. They are determined to defend the political independence and territorial integrity of their respective nations and the right of each to choose its own form of government and to develop in freedom its own social and cultural life.

3. They oppose any form of intervention or interference in the internal affairs of one state by another.

4. They consider that international communism is incompatible with national independence and constitutes a cause of permanent trouble for world peace and security.

5. They are dedicated to the social and economic progress of their peoples and to this end welcome opportunities to enter into mutually beneficial and cultural relationships, on the basis of complete respect for each other's sovereignty and independence.

6. They are of the opinion that both nations should work, through the United Nations and by other peaceful means, toward just solutions of the various problems which create tension within the area. The Government of Lebanon considers that the proposals of the President of the United States are helpful in furthering the purposes set forth above and has so informed Ambassador Richards who has welcomed on behalf

of the President of the United States this understanding of the broad identity of interest which exists between the two nations. The Government of Lebanon and the special Mission of Ambassador Richards have examined various activities that might be undertaken in accordance with the proposals of the President of the United States. They have decided in principle that projects in the fields of workers' housing, rural electrification, village water supply, irrigation, flood control, highway construction and airport development would best contribute to the needs of Lebanon. These will be in addition to other United States aid projects already in effect or currently planned. Ambassador Richards has agreed further in principle that the United States Government shall provide the Government of Lebanon certain equipment needed to strengthen the Lebanese armed forces. This is in addition to a recent grant of military equipment for the same purpose.

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