AMERICAN UNIVERSITY OF BEIRUT

THE STUDENT MOVEMENT AT THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY OF BEIRUT 1967-1975

by

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To Nouf
AN ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS OF

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This thesis tells the story of the student movement at the American University of Beirut with special emphasis on the Student Council.

This study will highlight the events of the period between 1967 and 1974 which had a major impact on Lebanon in general, and on the AUB in particular. During this period, two factors combined to energize student activism on the AUB campus in a special way. One was 1967 War and the second was the rise of the Palestinian Revolution.

The 1971 and 1974 10% student strike and the occupation of University buildings is also covered by this study, as well as the reason and motive of both the administration and the students actions during the course of these strikes.

The AUB Student Council after its reestablishment has been viewed as being no more than a front for the Palestinian Revolution on campus, but receiving its orders from outside, so that its behavior invariably reflected the policy of its superiors. In reality, however, the Student Council’s actions, as will be demonstrated in this thesis, were not always in agreement with the strategy of the PLO or that of its Lebanese allies. One has to keep this fact in mind to understand some of the key events of the 1974, as will subsequently be shown.
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To

My Beloved Family
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

The AUB Student Council was first established in 1949 by Stephen Penrose whose brief term as AUB president (1948-1954) saw the University begin to break with its missionary legacy, and transform itself into a pioneer center of higher education for the Middle East and even beyond. This thesis will attempt to trace the evolution of the AUB student movement from that time until the final suspension of the Student Council in 1974, focusing especially on the years 1967-74 when campus politics became ancillary to the Palestinian Revolution.

The importance of this subject lies in the fact that the AUB campus was an incubator to a number of political movements which, positively or negatively, have directly affected the Arab world. Student activists who graduated from AUB more often than not returned home to assume positions of leadership and participate in one way or another in the molding of their respective countries. Others, who had no home to return to, founded some of the most revolutionary groups in the history of AUB and the region. This study represents the first attempt of its kind focusing exclusively on the AUB student movement.

This thesis will highlight the events of the period between 1967 and 1974 which had a major impact on Lebanon in general, and on the AUB in particular. During this period, two factors combined to energize student activism on the AUB campus in a special way. One was the global student revolution which swept mainly through Europe and the United States starting from the mid-1960s and the second was the rise of the Palestinian Revolution.
The students involved in AUB campus politics, far from being of one heart and mind, comprised different factions, each with its own agenda and style of operation, as this chapters that follow will hopefully show. However, of the student factions in the vanguard of events between 1967 and 1974 were Fateh¹ and the Lebanese Student League, or the Rabita (al-Rabita al-Lubnanyya). Fateh, the leading faction within PLO, dominated the Student Council from its reestablishment in 1969 until its closure in 1974,² so much so that this thesis may give the impression at times of being a history of Fateh. What one needs to bear in mind in this connection is that details relating to the Palestinian Revolution and of Fateh in particular, are often indispensable to the reconstruction of the history of the AUB student movement in the period under consideration.

While Fateh in AUB was the local student chapter of a Palestinian liberation movement of many parts, the Rabita, was a Lebanese student group established on campus in 1958-59 to oppose the Arab unity movement in its heyday under Nasser, which survived to become the only serious opponent to the Palestinian Revolution and its Leftist allies on campus. The transformation undergone by the Rabita in 1971 will be examined in the light of the different roles it played in the 1971 and the 1974 strikes.

The AUB Student Council after its reestablishment in 1969 has been viewed as being no more than a front for the Palestinian Revolution on campus, but receiving its orders from outside, so that its behavior invariably reflected the policy of its superiors. In reality, however, the Student Council’s actions, as will be demonstrated in this thesis,

¹ It is important to note that in this study, the term Fateh, which is the name of the leading Palestinian liberation movement, is also used to denote the AUB Fateh student chapter called in Arabic the al-Tanzim al-Tullabi.

² Four out of the five Student Council presidents were affiliates of Fateh: Fouad Bawarshi (1969-70), Maher Masri (1970-71), Mohammad Dajani (1972-1973), and Mohammad Mattar (1973-1974).
were not always in agreement with the strategy of the PLO or that of its Lebanese allies. One has to keep this fact in mind to understand some of the key events of the 1974, as will subsequently be shown.

The story of the AUB Student Council can only be understood when considered in its historical perspective, starting from the time when the university was still a small missionary establishment called the Syrian Protestant College (1866-1919). The second chapter will present the early clashes between the students and the administrations which took place on two separate occasions, the Lewis affair and the chapel-attendance controversy. Also covered in the same chapter is the establishment of the early students organizations al’Urwa al-Wuthqa and later the Harakat al-Qawmiyin al-Arab who set the pace for political activism during the decades that followed. The rest of the chapter is devoted to the story of the establishment of the first AUB Student Council, which was dissolved in 1952, and of the circumstances that lead to the dissolution of al’Urwa in 1954.

The third chapter provides a sketch of the Lebanese political scene in its regional setting starting with the Palestine War of 1948, moving on to the 1952 Free Officers Movement in Egypt and its repercussions in the Arab world, and ends with the establishment of the PLO and Fateh and the Arab Naksa (defeat) in 1967.

Meanwhile, the majority of the AUB student body kept calling for the re-establishment of the Council, while the administration temporized on the issue. As early as 1965, the American exchange students at AUB became involved in the campaign to re-establish the Council.

The Palestinian Revolution is introduced in chapter four, with special emphasis on the increasing influence it had on the student body. The reasons and driving motives behind the frequent brawl which broke out between pro-fedayeen and anti-fedayeen
elements in AUB are examined at length. The growing tensions between the Palestinians and the Jordanians after the events of Black September had its immediate effect on campus which was the establishment of *al-Tanzim al-Urduni* (in short, the *Tanzim*). The chapter ends with the announcement of a 10% tuition increase by the administration for the following year and the initial student reaction to this announcement.

The fifth chapter covers the story of the 1971 student strike from start to end. Also discussed is the course of the student strike and how it was influenced by the power struggle between the University’s senior administrators. Next to be considered are the Student Council’s demands, the negotiations with the administration and the factors which influenced this process. Also examined in this connection are the reasons why the *Rabita* and the *Tanzim*, first joined the strike, then walked out on it, which led to its collapse and later on the dissolution of the Student Council by Kirkwood and the suspension of 22 student activists involved in the strike.

Chapter six starts by explaining how the *Rabita* lost its independence as a Lebanese vigilante student group and was transformed into a front for right-wing Lebanese Christian parties; as well, how this transformation affected AUB politics. The October occupation of Nicely Hall by pro-Student Council elements secured a pledge from the administration to reinstate the Council and readmit the 22 students who had earlier been suspended. While Fateh wanted the Student Council restored in its old form, more radical Palestinian and Lebanese elements pressed for the establishment of an independent AUB student union instead. But Fateh was ultimately able to impose its will. The elections of the new Council saw the return of Fateh to power. The violent fight that broke out at the time in the School of Engineering between the Palestinians and their allies on one side, and the *Rabita* on the other, led to temporary closure of the
University pending the negotiation of a Lebanese-Palestinian arrangement whereby clashes of the kind can be prevented in the future.

The last section of this chapter examines the radicalization process which occurred within the Fateh student sector, presaging the strike that led to the final suspension of the Student Council the following year.

Chapter seven provides a detailed account of the 1974 student strike and the occupation of the University buildings, in response to the administration’s decision to raise tuition fees once more. The role played by individual faculty members to resolve the mounting crisis by acting as go-betweens is highlighted, as are the intransigence of the Student Council and the inflexibility of the Kirkwood administration which was clearly bent on a showdown. The chapter ends with the police storming the campus and arresting the students found occupying buildings.

A. Sources

1. Oral History

For the most part, this study utilizes sources of information that are as yet untapped. First and foremost comes the interviews conducted with student leaders, youth party leaders, and members of AUB faculty and staff of the period. The material deriving from interviews with people who had first-hand knowledge of its untold story and what went into its making is indispensable for a study such as the present one. Such material is even more important when it comes from a people who, in one way or another, participated in an event of the past and not only remember it, but also interpret it and recall their place in it.3

Because different witnesses of the same event do not always remember it in the same way, material derived from interviews needs to be handled with much care, and variant accounts of the same story must never be left untold. Thus, it becomes possible to check one account against another. More importantly, in using material derived from oral history, one ought to bear in mind that the “facts and viewpoints may be remembered but the attitude one had towards them at the time may have been forgotten and replaced by new viewpoints.”\textsuperscript{4} In the case of this account of the AUB student movement, material derived from interviews is juxtaposed to documents obtained from archival sources.\textsuperscript{5} Having had earlier experience in oral history interviews under expert guidance, I have conducted the interviews for the present study in accordance with the standard practice as stipulated in guides and manuals.\textsuperscript{6}

2. Student Publications

A large collection of primary sources comprising political communiqués, leaflets, streamers and statements by the AUB Student Council and different political factions on campus, some dating back to the 1950’s, is to be found in the closed area of the Jafet Library, where it seems to have remained totally unused to date.\textsuperscript{7} Much of this rich archival material relates to the student demands, strikes, demonstrations or commemorative events.


\textsuperscript{5} Ibid, 110.

\textsuperscript{6} Research assistant for Prof. Betty Anderson working on the Oral History Project. \textit{The Oral History Manuel, Doing oral history}.

\textsuperscript{7} I had to virtually excavate this material and get it properly filed with the help of the archive librarian Iman Abdullah Abu Nader, before I could use the relevant material form it for this thesis.
A complete sets of the AUB student weekly *Outlook* (1949-1974), and annual *Campus Yearbook*, are also available in the Jafet Library archives, along with other periodical publications produced in the University at different times and including the *Student Council Bulletin* (1971-74). As important as the official student publications are the dissident occasional publications such as *Look Out* and *Our Struggle* which different AUB student factions produced in the course of confrontations with the administration.

3. The University Senate Minutes

Also used in this study are the circulars and decisions of the University administration which were distributed to the AUB community through the *AUB Bulletin*, or which survive in some other form in the archives. Particularly important in this respect are the minutes of the University Senate, of which this study makes the first known use. The Senate minutes 1971-82 were initially lost, but were excavated in the course of this research from the records of the Registrar, who was the *ex-officio* secretary of the Senate. Today, they are again available for use in the Jafet archives.

4. The Local and International Press

The Beirut press is an important source for the study of student activism in Lebanon starting from 1968, when most Lebanese newspapers began to cover the subject extensively often employing AUB students as their correspondents.\(^8\) For this reason, student activism at AUB was particularly well covered. In using the Lebanese press, however, one has to keep in mind that each daily or weekly newspaper was, at

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least to some extent, the mouthpiece for different a Lebanese political party. In times when events on the AUB campus had national or regional repercussions, they did even make the international press.
CHAPTER II

AUB STUDENT ACTIVISM: THE GENESIS

The march which ultimately led to the establishment of student government at the American University of Beirut (AUB) was a long and arduous one; it achieved its objectives with the country’s independence. This march derived its motive force from the political activism of AUB students during a period which witnessed radical transformations on the Arab Middle Eastern scene. The process virtually started during the decades immediately following the First World War, when the region first fell under British and French mandate, and when the modern Arab states were created by the French and British mandatory powers to the satisfaction of some sectors of the local population and the dissatisfaction or open opposition of others. Because the AUB student body represented a wide array of the conflicting and often incompatible political opinions which prevailed in the Arab world at the time, it was only natural that the University in due course, came to constitute a venue for the expression and interaction between these opinions.

The AUB administration did not object to political activism by its students in principle provided such activism did not obstruct the educational operation of the University. It is even possible that the administration tacitly favoured participation by its students in organized movements seeking political improvement or reform. This seems to have been the position of the founding fathers of AUB when it was still the Syrian Protestant College (SPC), who made it abundantly clear that they did not merely intend to teach youth, but also to create a socially conscious generation of men capable of raising not only their own status, but that of the region as well. Daniel Bliss, the
college’s first president, reaffirmed the institution’s mission in his farewell address in the following words: “to make noble men manly men, perfect men…. to make the youth of the Orient noble men which is in the line of God’s purposes for the human race.”

This view of the purpose of the college envisioned it as an institution where young men pursued their academic studies while being prepared to assume positions of social leadership and public responsibility in due course. This, indeed, was what the students themselves aimed to achieve, regardless of what the policy of the college was in this regard. Accordingly, the college administration – and later the University administration – would curtail political activism on campus only when it disrupted the institution’s academic operation, as in open strikes and the disruption of classes by force.

Under the careful watch of the Ottoman authorities, student activism at the SPC avoided openly political questions, addressing itself instead to academic issues that were sometimes no less controversial. Two of these issues deserve special mention, considering the impact they had on shaping the institution in the short as in the long term. First, in 1882 came the so-called Lewis affair, also remembered as the Darwin affair; and second, in 1908-1909, came the chapel-attendance controversy.

A. The Lewis Affair

At the SPC’s commencement exercises of 1882, Edwin Lewis, professor of chemistry and geology, delivered an address entitled “Knowledge, Science and Wisdom” which was interpreted as being unduly supportive of the Darwinian theory of evolution. The delivery of this address unleashed a barrage of criticism from the conservative protestant members of the faculty and their supporters, which ended in the

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dismissal of the popular Professor Lewis from the college. Thereupon all the medical students (around fifty in all) went on open strike and abstained from attending classes in protest. However, the demands of the striking students never touched on the contents of the Lewis address, but called instead for a change in the academic curriculum that would enable SPC medical graduates to begin practice as physicians without sitting for the accreditation examination in Istanbul, as hitherto required by the Ottoman authorities.  

It has further been observed that the students at the time were seizing an opportunity to rebel against an institution administered by hardcore missionary conservatives; and the administration’s attitude only intensified the confrontation with the students as the conservative trustees, managers and faculty refused to budge fearing that any conciliatory move on their part may ultimately lead to a change in the religious character of the college.

The Lewis affair ended in the permanent expulsion of seven students, who tried to continue their education in Egypt or Istanbul; it also resulted in the administration’s persecution of liberal professors accused of being student sympathisers, and the resignations of two Arab instructors -- Yaqub Sarruf and Fares Nimr-- who later gained fame in Egypt. This episode of student unrest in the history of the institution was the first recorded incident of student dissidence in the East and was portrayed by Jurji Zeidan -- one of the expelled students, who became a leading journalist and publisher in Cairo—as “a new incomparable renaissance of students in the East.” Yet the real issues underlying this first case of student rebellion what we may call AUB’s history


11 Ibid, 77.

were left for the time being unattended by the administration; the first movement of student protest in the known history of the Arab world petered out.

**B. The Chapel-Attendance Controversy**

The chapel-attendance controversy was another issue in the college’s early history which saw student demands take on a structured shape. This controversy erupted in early January 1909, when a number of SPC Muslim students declared their refusal to attend the compulsory chapel and Bible classes, arguing that such compulsory attendance infringed on their religious freedom. Ninety-eight of the 128 registered Muslim students submitted a petition requesting that attendance of these Christian religious services be made non-compulsory.  

13 This followed an earlier refusal by the administration to permit the establishment of a student society for the study of Islamic culture and civilisation. But this time the petitioning Muslim students were fortunate to receive the support of their Jewish colleagues, thereby securing the formation of a broader non-Christian front against the administration.  

14 As a Christian missionary institution functioning in the Muslim political environment of the Ottoman Empire, the SPC administration found itself facing a crisis far more serious than the one it had faced in connection with the Lewis affair. In 1882, the parties to the dispute were two: the administration and the rebellious students. This time, a third party was involved. In confronting the Muslim student strike, the SPC administration had to be careful not to appear to the Ottoman authorities as suppressive of the religious Muslim sensitivities. Somehow, a formula had to be found whereby the

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14 Ibid, 55.
administration could partially concede to the demands of the protesting students without compromising the image of the college as a missionary institution. Accordingly, by a middle-of-the-road arrangement, the administration exempted Muslim students from the compulsory attendance of chapel services or Bible classes when they were in conflict with Muslim times of worship. As a further concession the administration would take no disciplinary measures against the student strikers.¹⁵

This half measure was not well received by the protesting students, as it only applied to that particular academic year and did not gain Muslim students a special status in the religious system of the college. Yet, the protesting student’s attitude throughout the whole confrontation was characterized by such moderation and composure that “a visitor to campus would never have noticed that a strike was in progress.”¹⁶ The administration, for its part wanted to emphasize its tolerance of other religions while still maintaining the fact “that the college was not established merely for higher secular education or the inclination of morality.” On the contrary, the administration re-affirmed one of its chief objects is teaching “the great truth of scripture.”¹⁷

Once again, the SPC conservatives were successful in averting a full scale confrontation with the student body without losing the college’s missionary spirit. The outcome of the controversy was the quiet withdrawal of eight Muslim students from the institution who did not accept the compromise settlement, in a way leaving the administration with a tightened grip over the operation of the institution.

¹⁵ Munro, A Mutual Concern, 56.


¹⁷ S.D. Dodge as quoted in Penrose, 139.
C. The Establishment of Al-‘Urwa al-Wuthqa

The end of the First World War, the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the establishment of the State of Greater Lebanon, with Beirut as its capital, had a profound effect on the Syrian Protestant College, forcing it, to begin with, to change its name in 1919 to the American University of Beirut by a unanimous vote of the Board of Trustees. With regards to student activism in the institution, its nature was radically transformed by the transition of power from the Ottoman to the French mandatory regime. The sporadic clashes of the past between random groups of students and the SPC administration over exclusively academic issues were quick to give way to sustained student action relating to more consistent and purposeful agendas. Furthermore, the new mandatory regimes in the Arab Levant opened the way for political activism and the free expression of political opinion for the first time.

Right after World War I, the principal political issue in the region centred around the question of the legitimacy of the freshly-imposed mandatory system, with loud popular cries for its immediate termination and replacement by some form of Arab national independence. The AUB administration was sympathetic towards this popular outcry, and so indeed was the United States government under the Woodrow Wilson administration. In the course of the Paris peace conference, in a response to a suggestion made by Dr. Howard Bliss,18 President Wilson had actually appointed a special commission -- the so-called King-Crane Commission -- to determine how the Arab people of the region envisaged their political future; and the findings of this commission

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gave a strong boost to the Arab nationalist claims. Meanwhile, in 1918, a student society called al’Urwa al- Wuthqa was organized in the AUB, apparently with the blessings of the administration; the society’s declared purpose was the promotion of the Arabic language and the practice of Arabic rhetoric. Considering the pan-Arab composition of the AUB student body, it was only natural for this society to provide, in due course, a platform for the promotion of Arab nationalist sentiments.

D. Student Organizations. The Origins

Starting during the last decades of the Ottoman Empire, Arab nationalism was first promoted by secret societies, among them the one known as al-Jami`yya al-‘Arabiyya al-Fatat (in short, al-Fatat). In the course of the First World War, al-Fatat became associated with the Arab Revolt led by Sharif Hussein of Mecca. Following the war it emerged into the open under the name Hizb al-Istiqllal. In due course this party, having lost its original popular appeal, was replaced in 1936 by the so-called ʿUsbat al-ʿAmal al-Qawmi, or League of Nationalist Action, whose aim was to press for Arab national independence and keep aspirations for Arab national unity alive.

Such were the aims of a clandestine group founded a year earlier, in 1935, in Beirut, largely at the initiative of Constantine Zurayk: a young Arab nationalist from

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19 The King-Crane commission, assigned to poll the people of the Levant about the upcoming mandate, was instrumental in establishing ties with the fathers of Arab nationalism. The US was now a rising world power, which eyed the oil business in the region, and sought to get its share from its Anglo-Franco Monopoly. (See Kamal Salibi. *The Modern History of Jordan*. London: I.B. Tauris, 1993, 173.

20 The name meaning Tight Bond was inspired by a publication of two famous Islamic reformists Jamal Din al Afghani and Mohammad Abdu.


Damascus who had joined the AUB faculty five years earlier after receiving a PhD in history from Princeton University. Appointed as faculty adviser to al-‘Urwa in 1934, Zurayk, in association with a number of young Arab nationalists from Beirut and elsewhere, proceeded in the following year to organize this clandestine group and provided it with a written covenant entitled Kitab al-Qawmiyya al-‘Arabiyya (meaning The book of Arab nationalism and published as a booklet with a red cover. Not having any official name, this group came to be branded by those who knew of its existence as Jama‘it al-Kitab al-Ahmar or (the Red Book group). This Red Book group, with Zurayk at its helm as well as being advisor to al-‘Urwa, used the society to recruit a new breed of activists who, after their graduation formed an impressive nationalist network covering most of the Arab world.23

With the outbreak of the World War II in 1939, the Red Book group, like other political organizations of its kind, fell under close watch by the mandatory authorities and so became virtually inoperative. Meanwhile, due to the war circumstances, al-‘Urwa was closed down, although its journal continued to be issued under the supervision of Zurayk, merely as an AUB student publication.24 It was only in fall of 1945 following the end of the mandate, that al-‘Urwa was allowed by the Lebanese authorities to resume its activities and become, once again, the leading student society on campus. Zurayk had meanwhile been appointed Syrian ambassador to Washington D.C., so the supervision of the society was passed on to Nabih Amin Faris who had just returned from Princeton University to join the AUB department of history. Like Zurayk, Faris was an ardent supporter of the Arab nationalist cause.


24 Ghanma, 143.
E. The Movement of Arab Nationalists (*Harakat al-Qawmiyin al-Arab*)

The first two years of the history of *al-’Urwa*, following its reactivation in 1945, were uneventful. It was only in the fall of 1947, after the United Nations General Assembly voted to partition Palestine, that the society re-assumed its former position as a focus of Arab student activism. The day following the announcement of the partition, *Al-’Urwa* led massive demonstrations of protest against the UN decision through the streets of Beirut, in association with students from different institutions and other supportive elements. A call for AUB student volunteers followed, ostensibly to join the pan-Arab force that would hopefully be formed before long to redeem the Arab cause in Palestine. Later, following the proclamation of the State of Israel in May 1948, the outbreak of the first Arab-Israeli war, and the humiliating defeat suffered by the pan-Arab force (*Jaysh al-Inqad*l or the Army of Deliverance) in the first weeks of this war, *al-’Urwa* organized a hunger strike demanding direct Arab state military intervention in Palestine. By following this proactive line, *al-’Urwa* seemed to be indicating that it was no longer an ordinary student society functioning under University rules and regulations, but a political organization formulating and pursuing its own agenda.

The harsh reality of the Palestine debacle, and the shame generated by the ineptness of the joint Arab military performance against Israel in the 1948 war, led to the emergence of a new type of Arab political activism marked by extreme vigilance and militancy. This vigilante phenomenon was perhaps best manifested by the undercover group known as *Shabibat al-Tha’r* (Youth for Vengeance) which emerged from the ranks of *al-’Urwa*. Although functioning mainly in and around AUB, the *Shabiba* group were not an AUB student society, and as such did not require a faculty advisor. For a while members of the group continued to meet with Zurayk to seek his

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25 Ghanma, 167.
guidance, as they also did with Faris. Before long, however, the group’s relations with Arab nationalist university figures, while remaining polite, became increasingly tenuous, and ultimately lost any real significance.26

As a self-formed and self-regulating body subject to no external influence of any kind, Shabibat al-Tha’r was, indeed, a phenomenon without precedent in the history of Arab student activism. Rather than following preset political dogmas, the Shabiba were trendsetters who generated and defined their own ideas and guidelines. Most important of all, their devotion to the ideals they set for themselves was such that they could envision the sustainability of their political activism after graduation in a manner to affect the Arab world at large.27 For three successive academic years (1948-1951), the Shabiba movement completely controlled al-‘Urwa, so that membership of the ‘Urwa cabinet became a Shabiba monopoly. The most charismatic member of the Shabiba was George Habash of Lidda, Palestine, who was elected president of al-‘Urwa in 1948, then elected again in 1950, at the start of his last year at medical school.28 Following his graduation in the early summer of 1951, Habash, at an informal gathering held in a Beirut seaside café with the members of his ‘Urwa cabinet, proposed that he and his colleagues continue their political activism after graduation as a secret organization to be called Harakat al-Qawmiyin al-‘Arab (Movement of Arab Nationalists), while maintaining their organic links with al-‘Urwa as their AUB chapter.

26 This information comes from a prominent member of the group who requested anonymity.


28 A control which it was able to maintain for several years in succession, initially because three of the movement’s founding members—George Habash (Palestine), Ahmad Khatib (Kuwait) and Wadi` Hadad (Palestine)—were medical students who still had two or three years to graduate.
The proposal was accepted unanimously. 29

F. Triumph of Student activism: the Establishment of the Student Council

These last developments on the AUB student scene coincided with a new departure in the history of the University. Until the retirement of President Bayard Dodge in the summer of 1948, AUB had retained much of its original character as a small-time missionary institution dependent on private Protestant funding, which was why students were required to attend weekday chapel services and a Sunday evening service, with the president at the pulpit. The appointment of Stephen Penrose to succeed Bayard Dodge as president was "a departure from former practice, in that for the first time the University had at its head a man who had been closely associated to the U.S. Government." 30 During WWII, Penrose had served in Cairo as head of the Office of Strategic Services (the predecessor of the Central Intelligence Agency), and was also confidential assistant to U.S. Secretary of Defence James V. Forrestal. His tenure in the AUB presidency brought radical changes to the institution, one such change being AUB’s adoption of the Columbia University core curriculum. Penrose, himself a graduate of Columbia, believed in the efficacy of his alma mater’s core curriculum and its superiority to the one followed by AUB to date. More fundamental, however were the changes related to the University’s new sources of funding. To raise the standards of the University and broaden the scope of its academic offerings, reliance on missionary donations was no longer sufficient, and other sources needed to be tapped. One was President Harry Truman’s Point Four program, meant to promote a steady and


30 Munro, A Mutual Concern, 100.
increasing rate of recovery and security in the world, through providing underdeveloped areas the chance to acquire and use the scientific advances available to the United States.\textsuperscript{31} The American government funds channelled to AUB through this Point Four program were used to take on bursary students of various age groups and backgrounds, from Arab and non-Arab lands, to undergo training in advanced skills needed for the development of their countries. Equally important as a new source of funding were the non-governmental American foundations which could be persuaded to sponsor and finance new teaching and research programs responding to regional needs. Such were the new School of Engineering, the Regional Program in Public Health and the Department of Public Administration (1951), the School of Agriculture in (1951-1952) and the Economic Research Institute (1953). Focusing on both regional and American needs was the Arab Studies Program established in 1949 and funded by the Rockefeller Foundation. Although aiming mainly at the study of the modern Arab world and its problems, the course offerings of this program, leading to an M.A. degree, attracted a wide variety of students of whom the majority were members of the U.S. Foreign Service or armed forces, or young Americans intent on pursuing diplomatic or teaching careers.\textsuperscript{32}

This phenomenal expansion of AUB commencing with the term of Penrose as president, coupled with the presence of increasing numbers of multi-national students on campus, helped promote the image of AUB as an international forum for academic excellence and enriched the composition of the student body. What remained to be attended to was the restructuring of the extra-curricular side of student life in a manner compatible with the changing image of the University. As Penrose probably saw it, it

\textsuperscript{31} \textit{Al Kulliyah}, November 1952.

\textsuperscript{32} Munro, \textit{A Mutual Concern}, 104.
was important for all AUB students, and especially those on Point Four scholarships, to partake in such extra-curricular activities, as would be useful for character building and social networking, and would acculturate them to democratic practice and values. More important was the students’ assumption of such responsibilities as would make them feel that they had a say on issues relating to student life on campus. Following this logic, Penrose sought to give his students the chance to get involved in a democratic process alien to most of them, by getting them to elect their representatives to a student Council with extensive powers, so they could have “the final action in solving student problems within the bounds of University regulations.”

Such a Student Council could not be established merely by broadening al-‘Urwa’s prerogatives. Al-‘Urwa, after all, was a student society with set aims that excluded syndical work. As well, it had developed since 1947 into a strictly Arab nationalist forum, unrepresentative of the student body as a whole. Moreover, the secrecy and exclusiveness which had come to mark al-‘Urwa after its takeover by Shabibat al-Tha’r was incompatible with the openness and transparency of democratic practice. Not that Penrose was opposed to what al-‘Urwa stood for. As a former official of the U.S. government, Penrose continued to adhere to its foreign policy. His personal sympathies, however, where the Arab predicament over Palestine was concerned, appeared to be genuinely pro-Arab. At a banquet held in his honour by the AUB Alumni Association in Beirut on 25 June 1950, Said Taki-Deen, the President of the association, proclaimed Penrose unequivocally a friend of the Arabs:

He earned our affection and admiration when, in Washington D.C., he identified himself with a cause that for thirty years, we have always held, and will always hold, as most sacred, and the most directly affecting our very existence. The struggle emanating from this cause we will always consider as proving grounds where men and nations do

33 *Outlook*, 30 November 1971.
identify themselves as either our friends or foes.  

One might say that it was as a friend of the Arabs that Penrose sympathised with the Arab nationalist platform of al-‘Urwa and was somewhat tolerant of its covert activity. As an administrator, however, with a university to run, he needed to keep track of the political developments on campus to the maximum degree possible. For this purpose, he apparently thought that a Student Council representing the whole student body, and operating in the open, would be an ideal mechanism whereby Arab student activism could be brought to comply with university regulations.

The idea of a Student Council for AUB was not an entirely new one. In the course of the opposition which terminated the French mandate over Lebanon in November 1943, the AUB administration appointed a short-lived student Council, as a pre-emptive measure to contain the more militant students involved in this insurgency. Apart from not being a democratically elected body, the functions assigned to it were so minimal that it hardly deserved its name.

Elections for the first true Student Council took place on 14 of November 1949, with 68 students competing for 28 seats. Three days before, the first issue of Outlook appeared, and has since remained the official AUB student newspaper. The new Student Council however did not monopolize student representation, as al-‘Urwa remained alive and active on the scene, publishing its own periodical and expanding its student base in the face of rival groups, most notably, the Ba’th Arab nationalists Party, the Communists and the followers of the Syrian Socialist Nationalists Party. In fact,

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34 As quoted in Munro, *A Mutual Concern*, 103.


36 Ibid.
hardly had the student Council become operative when it became clear that it was under near-total ‘Urwa control.

Once, the administration’s purpose in forming the Student Council was not to encourage student political activism, it tried to ensure that politics would not become its primary concern. Long before it was created, the AUB student handbook, in the section regarding student societies, had regularly stipulated that “only recreational clubs and academic professional societies are allowed to operate, the latter only in connection with academic departments.” Additionally, it stipulates that no “political regional national or sectarian societies are to be permitted.”37 In compliance with these provisions, the administration could take punitive actions against any student involved in demonstrations and rallies of a purely political or partisan nature, as happened on 10 October 1950, roughly one year after the first Student Council was elected. These regulations became stricter with the advent of Penrose, who was determined to keep politics off campus at whatever cost. Thus, when three Communist students in collusion with the President of the Student Council, Abdul Halim Saadi, publicly distributed political pamphlets attacking France, Britain, the United States, the AUB administration went as far as to expel them, sending a clear message to the student body not to venture into the realm of political activism.38 This, however, did not deter students from pursuing their ideological convictions as two weeks later, on 22 October, AUB students participated in a demonstration protesting British policy in the Middle East.39

On 26 January 1952, a major demonstration in which the AUB student body participated was organized by al-‘Urwa, to protest the repressive measures the Syrian

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38 *Outlook*, 21 October 1950.

39 *Outlook*, 22 October 1951.
police had used to suppress an Arab Nationalist student rally in Damascus. The AUB demonstration was supported by the Student Council which urged all students, through Outlook, to join it in the following headline: “Demonstration at Noon, Student Council asks students to support ‘Urwa move.” This demonstration turned violent, as AUB students for the first time clashed with security forces after they attempted to gain their way through the Medical Gate to proceed with their march off campus. The police thereupon stormed the campus and arrested 51 of the students involved. The AUB Senate responded by lodging a complaint against the police for “rough handling entirely innocent individuals both from the faculty and students”, in the course of their raid. Meanwhile, Penrose decided to suspend the Student Council, and his decision was ratified by the AUB Senate on 23 February 1952. All students were henceforth required to sign the following pledge before registration:

As long as I am a student I agree to obey all the University regulations as established and interpreted by the Faculty of the University. I will neither individually nor with a group take any action which will disturb the academic functioning of the University or interfere with the rights of other students to pursue without interruption their course of study. Furthermore, if I feel that I cannot conscientiously obey the regulations of the University at any future time I will withdraw from the University quietly and of my own volition.

For the brief time that the first AUB student Council lasted, it was the only elected body representing all the students of the University and empowered to speak on their behalf. By throwing its full weight behind a political demonstration organized by al-‘Urwa it had brought about its own downfall, while al-‘Urwa, for the time being, remained alive and well even though some of its members were suspended or received

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40 Outlook, 26 January 1952.

41 Outlook, 14 December, 1971.

42 Outlook, 23 February 1952.

43 Outlook, 15 March 1952.
oral warnings from the President on an individual basis.\footnote{Ghanma, 196.} In fact, following the closure of the Student Council al-‘Urwa survived as the sole outlet for AUB student activism.

A student poll taken a few months later, however, revealed that most AUB students wanted their student government back. In a campaign he waged for the reinstatement of the Council, its former President, Mansur Abi-Naim promised that if the students were given the chance again, they will be more cautious and rational in their decisions so as not to disturb the academic process.\footnote{Outlook, 15 March 1952.} The response of the administration came at the start of the academic year 1952-53, with the following evasive statement:

The Administration and Student Life Committee are studying at the present the question under what form student activities may take place this year. Formation of the Student Council as it used to be is out of the question at the moment. The Senate and administration of the AUB believe in the principle of student government and wish to see it applied at the University in such a way as to produce the best and most fruitful results for the student body and for the University as a whole. The administration has not forsaken its belief in student government and for the successful realization of this aim as soon as possible, it has authorized on an experimental basis the establishment for this year of a coordinating committee on student affairs.\footnote{Outlook, 25 October 1952.}

Clearly, the administration was not willing to invest in any form of student government in the near future. Instead it resorted to establishing a committee that would monitor and regulate the now militant student body. The students did not consent to this unilaterally imposed authority, which they attacked vigorously. Sameer Shehadi’s editorial in \textit{Outlook}, entitled “Government from Above,” warned of the consequences of this decision, stressing that “the sheer act of enforcing the new system, the mutual understanding between the administration and the students will be poisoned and the
whole edifice of our student government will fall to the ground.”

This state of affairs would continue for the next two years as the administration went on ignoring student demands. Before long, however, events were to unfold which sealed the fate of student government at AUB for years to come.

These events related to the proposed treaty of mutual cooperation between Iraq and Turkey under the patronage of Great Britain, which enraged many Arabs including many students of the American University of Beirut. On 27 March 1954, the still active ‘Urwa society mobilized the AUB student body to protest the flagrantly pro-western policy of the Iraqi government, by marching out off campus to join a larger demonstration heading to government headquarters. Kamal Salibi, the prominent Lebanese historian and long-time member of the AUB faculty recalls the events of that day in his memoirs:

A day came when a large demonstration was organized, to protest the Iraqi pro western policy, al-‘Urwa al Wuthqa wanted to lead this demonstration to Bliss Street where they would join a group of protestors. The Lebanese government was adamant on preventing this demonstration at any cost. I was in George Grassmuck’s office near the Medical Gate, when we heard commotion on Bliss Street as a number of non AUBites were trying to gain access to campus and the security forces were trying to prevent them. Gunfire was heard which resulted in the death of Hassan Abu Ismail, a supporter of Kamal Jumblatt, who tried to climb the University walls. The security forces stormed the University and started arresting the protestors. Later that evening the University disbanded al-‘Urwa upon the request of the Lebanese government.

The events of that day gave the student movement in Lebanon its first martyr, and brought the 34 years of al-‘Urwa existence to a sudden end. The AUB administration, however, did give al-‘Urwa a chance to remain operative provided it

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47 Outlook, 8 November 1952

reformed its constitution to make it fully compatible with university regulations. Accordingly, elections for a new cabinet were held at the start of the following academic year. This cabinet was not supposed to transact any business before it had attended to the amendment of the ‘Urwa constitution; and while it temporized over the issue, Penrose died suddenly of a heart attack on 9 December 1954, and Constantine Zurayk became acting president pending the search for Penrose’s replacement. The ‘Urwa constitution was still unamended when its cabinet called for a plenary meeting in West Hall auditorium on 14 January 1955, without authorization from its faculty advisor. The subject of the meeting was what to do about a visit which the Turkish Prime Minister Adnan Menderes was expected to make to Beirut in connection with the pro-western pact Turkey and Iraq had already signed. This highhanded action on the part of al-‘Urwa was to be the last nail in its coffin. At a meeting held on 19 January and presided over by Zurayk, for a long time the spiritual guide of al-‘Urwa, the University Senate decision to terminate the existence of al-‘Urwa was finally taken:

The ‘Urwa al-Wuthqa society has violated the University regulations by holding an unauthorized meeting in spite of the warning of the University authorities (Ref. 4, page 13 of handbook) printing and distributing unauthorized pamphlets (Ref. on public statements page 17 of handbook) and evading to revise its constitution in accordance with the senate decision of May 21 1954, governing all societies which revision was the condition set by the Senate for the lifting of its suspension.

The University Senate decides: That the ‘Urwa al-Wuthqa society be dissolved.49

Acting President
C.K Zurayk

49 Outlook, 22 January 1955.
CHAPTER III

THE LEBANESE POLITICAL SCENE AND ITS REGIONAL SETTING

In speaking of the student troubles that led to the closure of the first AUB Student Council in 1952, and of al-‘Urwa in 1954-55, reference was made to events that were unfolding at the time on the regional scene. Before proceeding any further with the story, to reach the crucial years 1967-1974 which are the subject of this thesis, it would be necessary to summarize the developments on the international and regional scene to the extent that they affected Lebanon, as AUB’s host country.

Immediately following the end of the World War II, the two Levant republics of Lebanon and Syria ceased to be under French mandate; but Britain still exercised mandatory power over Palestine and the kingdom of Trans-Jordan. In principle, Egypt was a sovereign and independent kingdom, as was Iraq; but Britain retained military bases in both countries, in accordance with the treaty relations on the basis of which these two countries had gained their independence. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Imamate of Yemen were both independent monarchies. All seven of the countries mentioned were founding members of the League of Arab States (or Arab League) which was established in 1945, and all except Trans-Jordan were founding members of the United Nations Organization (UN).

The countries of the Arab League were not of one heart and mind except when it came to the question of Palestine: the one Arab country in the area whose future was still undecided. The Zionist movement had emerged from the war determined to establish a Jewish state in Palestine by whatever means and whatever help it could get;
and Britain, no longer able to bring the Zionists and the Palestinian Arabs to agree on a workable formula to share the country, handed over the problem to the United Nations, where the U.S., with its growing influence in the post-war world, had the power to sway the vote. At a meeting of the UN General Assembly held on 29 November 1947, the vote was taken to partition Palestine into two states, one Arab and the other Jewish. Britain next announced her intention to terminate her mandate over Palestine on 15 May 1948: the day the Jewish Agency in Palestine proclaimed the independence of the State of Israel on the Jewish share of the Palestinian land.

Having never recognized the Zionist claim to Palestine as a Jewish land, the Arabs had refused to accept the UN resolution on the partition of the country; and hardly had the State of Israel been proclaimed when a pan-Arab volunteer force (Jaysh al-Inqadhal or the Army of Deliverance), hastily brought together, crossed the international border to engage the Israeli army, with disastrous results. Next, the armies of five of the Arab states (Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria) were drawn into the war, which ended in 1949 with a series of UN-brokered armistice agreements which amounted to a de facto recognition of Israel. To Arab nationalist everywhere, this Palestine debacle was ample proof that the Arabs can never hope to regain Palestine without first reconsidering their relationship with the West, which was so clearly a friend of Israel, and without searching for new sources of arms, other than the western sources on which they had hitherto depended.

It was as Arab Nationalist sentiments where beginning to take this turn away from the West that Britain and the U.S., having fallen out with the Soviet Union which had been their war ally, began to advance plans for the regional alliances to defend the Middle East against communist infiltration and possible Soviet aggression. One such plan proposed by the British envisaged the establishment of a “treaty of mutual
cooperation” between Britain, Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, and possibly other adherents: what ultimately became known as the Baghdad Pact (1955). To ordinary Arabs, this pact and other regional defense plans that were proposed at the time seemed pointless, considering that the area was still under western stewardship, and that the real danger to the Arabs came from the seemingly unconditional western support of Israel, rather than from an imagined threat from the Soviet bloc. In an around AUB the position taken by the Harakat al-Qawmiyin al-‘Arab echoed the feelings of the ordinary Arab. In the words of Ahmad Khatib (see chapter 1, footnote 28), as reported by Kamal Salibi in his memoirs:

The West has a problem with the Soviets, which does not concern us as Arabs. Our own problems are with the West, which supports Israel and continues to occupy and dominate most of the Arab world, and forces us to buy obsolete and defective weapons exclusively from western sources, while it provides Israel with advanced weaponry free of charge. The West now asks us to join foreign dominated alliances to protect western interests in the Middle East, which we have no interest in. There are countries like us in the world which have no interest with the East or the West, such as India, Yugoslavia and the countries of Latin America. These countries can form with us a neutral coalition between the Eastern and Western blocs, and equidistant from both, in what maybe called positive non-alignment. We will thus be enabled, for example, to purchase weapons from any source we choose, under our own conditions and not necessarily from the Soviet Union but, for example, from Czechoslovakia.50

Following the closure of al-‘Urwa, in 1954-55, such ideas generated by Harakat al-Qawmiyin al-‘Arab were propagated through the venue of the Arab Cultural Club. Established in Ras-Beirut in 1944 by Arab Nationalists who were formerly ‘Urwa members, this club had since served as surrogate of al-‘Urwa where AUB alumni and students could politically interact.51 Once al-‘Urwa had ceased to exist the Arab


Cultural Club replaced it as the focus of Arab Nationalist student activism on campus. This became evident from as early as 1956, when the club organized the first of its annual Arab Book Exhibits in West Hall.

By now the Middle Eastern scene had already begun to undergo major changes – not the least among them, the overthrow of the monarchy in Egypt by the Free Officers Movement in 1952, the assumption of the presidency of the Egyptian Republic by Gamal Abdul-Nasser in 1954, the Suez War of 1956, which brought Nasser to the height of his pan-Arab popularity, and the establishment of the United Arab Republic (UAR) of Syria and Egypt under Nasser’s presidency in 1958.\(^{52}\) The phenomenal pan-Arab success of Nasser was mirrored by growing tensions between Muslims and Christians in Lebanon where the former clamoured for Lebanon to join the union between Syria and Egypt, while the Christian took the opposite stand. The outcome was a mini-civil which ended with the landing of American Marines in Beirut in July 1958.

The AUB campus, with its largely pan-Arab student body, could not fail to be stirred by such epoch-making changes in the region; and in the circumstances, it was only natural that the question of re-establishing the Student Council should have been raised once again in student circles. A year prior to the outbreak of the 1958 civil war, the presidency of AUB had been assumed by John Paul Leonard, formerly the President of San Francesco State College. In his first press conference as president, Leonard hinted at the possibility of reinstating the Student Council, provided that students exhibit “self control and judgment in selecting their representatives,” whatever that may mean.\(^{53}\) Next on 10 November 1957, Leonard proceeded to invite those whom he considered to be the student leaders to Marquand House to poll them on the issue of

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\(^{52}\) This Egyptian- Syrian union under Nasser fell apart in September 1961.

\(^{53}\) *Outlook*, 26 October 1957.
reinstating student government; and other meetings of the same kind followed, without any consensus on the issue being reached.\textsuperscript{54} All that was agreed on was the formation of an Arts & Sciences student society, along the same lines as other university school societies, the elections for which were held on 1 December 1957, resulting in a resounding Arab nationalist victory.\textsuperscript{55} One cannot tell what the new president thought of these electoral results; but he seems to have taken a pointedly permissive attitude on 6 March 1958, when AUB and International College students joined in a peaceful demonstration -- the first public political manifestation on campus since the infamous 1954 demonstration-- to protest the death sentence pronounced by a French military court upon the Algerian freedom fighter Jamileh Abu Hayrid.

A. The Birth of the \textit{Rabita}

The civil war which broke out in Lebanon in May 1958 created a serious rift between pro-Nasserite and anti-Nasserite elements on the AUB campus and before long the latter group had organized its ranks in what they called the Lebanese Student League (\textit{Rabitat al-Tullab al-Lubnanyya}, or \textit{al-Rabita}). This rift between the pro-Nasserites and anti-Nasserites on campus came to the open for the first time on 21 February 1959, when a grouping of Arab nationalist students staged a rally to commemorate the first anniversary of the UAR. Once their march began a small group of \textit{al-Rabita} students attacked it and clashed with the demonstrators.\textsuperscript{56} A similar clash between the two groups took place on the same occasion in the following year; and this appears to have finally convinced the AUB administration that the time for reinstating the Student

\textsuperscript{54} \textit{Outlook}, 9 November 1957.

\textsuperscript{55} \textit{Outlook}, 7 December 1957.

\textsuperscript{56} \textit{Outlook}, 28 February 1959.
Council was not yet ripe.\textsuperscript{57}

On 22 October 1960, Leonard, addressing a meeting of faculty and administrative staff held in the Chapel, announced his wish to retire from the AUB presidency effective 1 January 1961. He was subsequently replaced by Norman Burns, then Head of the U.S. Operations Mission to Jordan. Student activism under Burns did not go beyond the limited scope of the existing AUB student societies, which continued to lobby for the reinstatement of the student Council. As before, these societies were still dominated by the Arab nationalists, and their activities were frequently political, such as the panel organized by the A&S society on 8 March 1961 on the subject: “Algeria, after independence. What?”\textsuperscript{58} As the pressure for the reinstatement of the Student Council continued, the University Senate meet on 30 April and 7 May 1963 to consider a draft constitution submitted by students, which envisaged the establishment of an over-all student Council. Faculty opinion, it seems, was sharply divided on the issue which may explain why the decision of the Senate left the question of the Council in limbo:

The Senate reaffirms its belief in an advisory student Council but finds that the draft constitution of a student Council submitted at its meeting of April 30, 1963 as unacceptable. The Senate believes that the question of a student Council organization needs time for serious consideration, and that therefore, no action [i.e. no final decision] on a proposed constitution will be taken during the present academic year.\textsuperscript{59}

When Burns, however, informed the presidents of the AUB student societies of this Senate decision, he gave them the option of continuing to work with the Student Life Committee on the wording of the draft constitution they had submitted, and even

\textsuperscript{57} \textit{Outlook}, 27 February 1960.

\textsuperscript{58} \textit{Outlook}, 11 March 1961.

\textsuperscript{59} \textit{Outlook}, 11 May 1963.
went so far as to invite them to sit on the Student Life Committee as regular members. Clearly, Burns wanted to do his best to maintain the channels of communication with the student activists open.

When Burns left the presidency in the summer of 1965, he was succeeded as acting president, then as president by the Samuel Kirkwood, the Dean of the faculties of the Medical Sciences who had earlier served the U.S. government as Chief of the Public Health Division of the International Agency for Development in Iran. In the preceding year, an Arab summit conference meeting in Cairo had decided to establish what was to become the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO); and this organization was to command a military arm called the Palestine Liberation Army (PLA). The first leader of the PLO was a Palestinian lawyer, Ahamd Shuqayri, who had once represented Syria at the Arab League and Saudi Arabia at the UN. Shuqayri established his official headquarters in Amman, but he also maintained a summer residence in Mount Lebanon, where he began to train recruits for the PLA. Meanwhile, with encouragement from Saudi Arabia, a group of young Palestinians working in Kuwait had founded a secret organization called Fateh, with a military arm called al-`Asifa. The leader of Fateh was a Palestinian engineer who came to be commonly known as Yasser Arafat or Abu Ammar; and the existence of the movement was announced after an operation carried out by al-`Asifa inside Israel. By the time Kirkwood assumed the AUB presidency, the PLO and Fateh were already on their way to become a problem with which first, Jordan, then, Lebanon had to deal.

B. The Stearns Affairs

As happened time and again before, these new developments in the region were reflected by a new surge of political activism in AUB and a resumption of the
drive to re-establish the Student Council. This time the international student community on campus, which had earlier tended to keep its distance from Arab student affairs, became visibly involved in the dialogue between the students and the administration in an unprecedented manner. In fact in 1964-65, one of the leading student activists was an American Junior Year Abroad (JYA) called Richard G. Stearns, International Vice President of the CIA- funded National Student Association (NSA).\(^60\) The covert side to the NSA was not known until the outbreak of a scandal in the American press in February 1967 regarding the CIA infiltration of student groups through subsidies.\(^61\) As the president of NSA explained at the time: “the CIA funds had been used to help finance the association’s international activities, including sending representatives to student congresses abroad and funding student exchange programs.”\(^62\)

One must note in this connection that the organizational structure of NSA restricted the functions of its president to purely domestic affairs, which left the international VP with unrestricted control over activities abroad.\(^63\) The functions under the VP’s direction outside the U.S. have been described as follows:

Students representing the NSA over-seas would compile data on the personalities of foreign student leaders and the policies and objects of foreign student organizations. Some of this information apparently

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\(^60\) The fact that Stearns was at AUB in that academic year is beyond doubt; the end of the first semester of that year saw him on the Dean’s honours list with an average of 88 (See Richard Stearns CV; available at http://pview.findlaw.com/view/1363486_1?channel=LP & Outlook 13 March 1965.


was passed directly to the CIA employees and some of it, in the course of normal business, went into the files of the NSA. Those students having signed secrecy oaths with the CIA would then be bound under penalty of law to keep their knowledge of the ultimate benefactor from the public and the rest of their organization.64

Another source adds:

Within the NSA international department there were, on average, about twenty former-students working full time. At almost any student conference or seminar anywhere, no matter how localized or parochial, one of these itinerant representatives could be depended upon to turn up: always ready to push an enlightened liberal-radical picture of American studentdom; generally with readily available supplies of dollars to disburse as NSA largesse should the occasion seem appropriate; and invariably anxious to deliver strident condemnation of the latest American atrocity, in order to demonstrate conclusively NSA’s total independence of, and indeed distaste for the U.S. government and all its works. Immediately following the conference or seminar the representatives would send back to headquarters a careful detailed report covering the events of the meeting, the political balance currently prevailing in the organization, the standing of the NSA vis-à-vis the organization, and —especially—detailed analyses of all key personalities present at the meeting.65

The AUB campus had always attracted the interest of regional and foreign intelligence, considering that the pan-Arab nature of its student body, with its vibrant activism, provided an ideal testing ground and a political indicator for the area. With respect to the Stearns affair, however, one is left wondering as to why the International Vice President of the NSA, who had “all the CIA connections anyone would have needed at that time,”66 should have chosen AUB, out of all places, for his 1964-65 operation; more importantly, that he should have attended to this operation in person rather than to have delegated it to any of the professional information gatherers at his disposal? More likely than not, the reason for the direct involvement of Stearns in this


65 McDonald, 16.

operation had something to do with the new Arab stirrings regarding the Palestine question which, among other things, brought the PLO into being. According to people who recall this episode in the history of student activity at AUB, Stearns, apart from joining or possibly re-launching the campaign for the Student Council, and openly supporting anti-Western Arab causes, “cultivated a number of personal friendships with Palestinians and paid frequent visits to Palestinian refugee camps where he would sometimes stay overnight.”

C. The 1967 War and the Return of the Student Council

The debate over the restoration or non-restoration of the Student Council was still going on in the following academic year, when the third Arab-Israeli war broke out on June 5 1967 to end six days later with a total Arab defeat and the Israeli occupation of Sinai and the Gaza strip (from Egypt), the West Bank (from Jordan) and the Golan Heights (from Syria). The enormity of this Arab defeat convinced most Palestinians that they can never hope to reclaim their homeland unless they take matters into their own hands, rather than continue to rely on an Arab military initiative which had repeatedly proved ineffective. David Gordon, an American member of the AUB faculty was a witness to this phenomenon:

The Palestinians had lost confidence in the Arab leaders to assist them. They would now turn to their own devices and increasingly started to behave as if they had an identity and a nationalistic sentiment that was distinct from the Arabism or the local nationalism of the various established Arab States.

One Palestinian student at AUB at the time, Mohammad Dajani, was, by his

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67 Kamal Salibi, Interviewed by author, Beirut, Lebanon.

own admission, the scion of a well-to-do family from Jerusalem who had never cared much for politics before 1967. Subsequently, he became the leader of Fateh’s *tanzim* (as its AUB chapter was called) and the president of the 1972-73 Student Council.

Responding to an interview, Dajani described how he and his generation were personally affected by the Six Day War:

> We were so excited; we wanted to be part of [the war]. The Arab nationalist Ba’th [party] brought buses. They took us that first day to [the neighborhood of] Aley. Shuqayri had a palace [there to which] they took us, and for one day they instructed us in [using] explosives and how to fight, and then they took us to Syria. The PLO and the Syrian government opened boxes of Chinese rifles [and] gave us each a rifle and two boxes of ammunition. By morning we were out of Syria, [and] by the time we arrived at the border, the Jordanian soldiers coming back from the West Bank told us it was all lost. [They said this] to justify why they did not fight. 1967 was the time I was radicalized, and I shifted from Kennedy to Guevara.69

This was the beginning of the self-proclaimed Palestinian Revolution and the new type of student activism that came with it: an activism whose agenda was synchronized to that of the PLO and the various fedayeen fronts sprouting under its umbrella, the most prominent of them being Fateh. And by accident or design, the Kirkwood administration was quick to provide this movement with the AUB campus as a leading platform. The patronage extended by the University to this new activism was obvious from the very start. In a clear breach of the policy earlier established by Penrose, the AUB authorities, following the Six Day War, began to condone and even encourage protests and rallies on campus that dealt with the Palestine question, even when such activities disrupted the University’s academic functions.70 These political activities included commemorative occasions such as Balfour Day (2 November) and

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69 Mohammad Dajani Interviewed by author, Beirut, Lebanon.

the UN Partition of Palestine (29 November), which although previously observed now became practically unofficial holidays on the AUB calendar.71

In addition, the AUB administration lost no time to initiate the process of re-establishing the Student Council, probably with the full knowledge that the Council, given the political circumstances at the time, would be dominated by the Palestinian Revolution and its fellow travellers. This act on the part of the administration, in the wake of the Six Day War, was oddly reminiscent of the establishment of the first student Council in 1949 following the Arab defeat in the first Arab-Israeli war. Perhaps the Kirkwood administration, like that of Penrose nearly two decades earlier, conceived of the Council as the ideal means to contain and regulate the justified rage of the students over their tragic national predicament.

Whatever the truth of the matter, the first step taken by Kirkwood towards re-establishing the Council came on 25 March 1968 with the appointment of an ad hoc committee to study student participation in university affairs. This committee, whose functions were purely advisory, was composed exclusively of faculty members involved in student life, and its duties were “to hear suggestions related to various issues such as the establishment of the Student Council and the existing mechanism for contact between the students, faculty and administration.”72 The committee held successive meetings over a period of five weeks, and its recommendations were not publicly disclosed.73 Next, on 9 May 1968, Kirkwood announced to the student body his plan to restore the Student Council for the following reasons:

- This Council can provide a constructive mechanism for

71 Outlook, 2 December 1967, 2 November 1968.

72 Outlook, 1 April 1968.

73 Outlook, 4 May 1968.
the solution of problems which a modern university must face

- The majority of students are deeply conscious of the educational mission of the University in Lebanon and the Arab world, and that the decision to establish the student Council will make possible a greater combined effort in this purpose.\textsuperscript{74}

This decision was well received by the vast majority of students. Among the few who were openly critical of it, the main fear expressed was that the Student Council will be politically manipulated and prevented from serving real student needs.\textsuperscript{75} As yet, however, elections for the Council could not be held, as they had to await the approval of the Kirkwood plan by the Senate.

It is important to note, in this connection, that Kirkwood’s announcement of the plan to restore the AUB Student Council coincided with the student strike at Columbia University in New York, which brought about the closure of the institution for a whole year; as well, with the massive French student demonstrations in Paris (May '68). These events, and others like them in the U.S. as in Europe, were closely followed on the AUB campus because of the full coverage they were given in the local press and in \textit{Outlook}.\textsuperscript{76}

The raid on Beirut International Airport on 31 December 1968 by Israeli commandos elicited an immediate reaction from university and high school students throughout Lebanon, who called for a public trial of the Lebanese army command for its failure to deal with the raid. The AUB students were in the vanguard of this movement of protest. Everywhere students launched a strike which continued for two weeks, and included hunger strikes and rallies calling for the resignation of Prime Minister

\textsuperscript{74} \textit{Outlook}, 11 May 1968.

\textsuperscript{75} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{76} Ibid.
Abdullah al-Yafi and the Defence Minister Hussein Oweini. On the AUB campus, the Voice of the Students, a small clandestine radio station echoing the student demands, called upon the government to train the youth of Lebanon in the use of firearms, to build shelters in parts of the country adjacent to Israel, and to support the Palestinian resistance. The administration did not seem to mind the student strike on its campus, especially as it was addressed to broad national issues and not to anything that had to do with the University. In an open letter addressed to Kirkwood, the striking students made it a point to apologize to him for the disruption of classes caused by their action which aimed at securing “the future of a nation and the life of a people.” This show of goodwill was obviously meant to indicate to Kirkwood that the time for implementation of his plan to resurrect the Student Council had come.

On 18 February 1969, President Kirkwood, bypassing the University Senate, announced that the revised Student Council constitution was passed unanimously by the Student-Faculty Committee on Student Affairs, and that the elections of the Council would take place in March. The decision also included a statement explaining the purpose for the reestablishment of the Council and a definition of its functions, stressing the non-political nature of this student institution:

> The Council shall concern itself with student affairs. In all its deliberations and actions the Council becomes an indivisible part of

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78 *Voice of the Students* communiqué, 10 January 1969.

79 Open letter to President Kirkwood by the Student Strike Committee, 11 January 1969, AUB archives.

80 The Student-Faculty Committee on Student Affairs was formed in 1968 by the Senate to regulate Student Affairs.
the University. The University is an educational institution and as such does not take a political stand.\textsuperscript{81}

\textsuperscript{81} AUB Bulletin, 22 February 1969.
CHAPTER IV

THE STUDENT COUNCIL REBORN

Monday 3 March 1969 saw AUB’s democratic tradition reignited, as 1888 out of its 3352 students elected 22 representatives to the first student Council in fifteen years and the second in AUB’s history.\(^82\) The outcome of the elections was a Council composed mainly of moderates whose agenda could hardly be described as political. So, while some students considered the mere realization of the Council a triumph, others took it to be no more than a manoeuvre to keep the student movement within bounds. The *Outlook* editorial of 8 March 1969 entitled “The illusion of student government” attacked what was assumed to be the AUB real policy behind the resurrection of the Council as:

Successfully channelling the students’ opinion into one body without letting it affect policy… and so we are given the illusion of participating in the machinery which governs our life at the University. This institution has been created for us by the Trustees, the President and the Faculty. It will remain ours as long as we let them run it. But we must play the game by pretending that we are free agents with a whole student Council to ourselves.\(^83\)

Joining this expression of disappointment by the Outlook associate editor, the chairman of the Publication Council, Maher Masri,\(^84\) writing in the same issue of Outlook urged the need for a greater student response if the elected Council was to break away from the domination of the administration and work on drafting a new

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\(^{82}\) *Outlook*, 8 March 1969.

\(^{83}\) Ibid.

\(^{84}\) Masri was elected in 1971 President of the Student Council.
constitution, to replace the one in use, the better to face “the challenging task ahead.”

To Maher Masri, a Palestinian activist enjoying the support of Fateh, the “challenging task ahead” perhaps implied the subordination of the Council’s work to the agenda of the Palestinian revolution; this, of course, was not possible as long as the Council’s constitution ruled against its being a focus for political activism. Remove this proviso from the standing constitution, and free elections would take care of the rest.

The sheer size of the Palestinian sector of the student body, and of the Arab Nationalist and Leftist factions that supported it (what were called Ansar al-Thawra), was enough to pass the Palestinian political agenda as that of the whole student body. The only group which the Palestinians and their allies had to guard against was the Rabita, or Lebanese Student League, although it was generally considered too small to count. In fact the membership of the Rabita had declined considerably since 1967, when the Syrian Socialist Nationalists, along with the Lebanese of Palestinian origin broke with the Rabita and declared themselves for the Palestinian revolution. These being the facts on the ground, the elections for the replacement of the outgoing Council, held on 26 May 1969, yielded a Council which was totally dominated by Palestinians and their Lebanese supporters. According to Nidal Saab, the former Council only acted as a transitional body which paved the way for amendments to the Student Council

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85 Outlook, 8 March 1969, “needed a greater response”.

86 In 1969-70, 57.3% of the 3828 students registered at AUB were non-Lebanese. Numbers published by the AUB Office of Development. Al-Kulliyah, autumn 1974.

87 Nidal Saab. Interviewed by Author, Beirut-Lebanon.

88 Kamal Salibi. Interviewed by Author, Beirut-Lebanon. The Syrian Nationalist Socialists established a rival Lebanese Student League also called the Rabita, whose ranks were open to any student carrying Lebanese nationality.

89 Outlook, 26 May 1969.

90 Nidal Saab. Interviewed by Author, Beirut-Lebanon.
constitution, giving the political parties on campus more room to operate.  

By 1969-70, the AUB campus had been transformed more than ever before into a microcosm of the Arab world and a sneak preview of what was soon to become the Lebanese-Palestinian tug-of-war. The Arab Nationalists, originally the predominant group on campus, saw themselves losing ground to a Palestinian particularistic movement which refused to subcontract the struggle for Palestine to another party. The rising star of Fateh, already in control of the PLO, eclipsed other political factions in AUB, as this organization had been recruiting partisans and supporters extensively since the Six Day War. In due course, joining the ranks of the Palestinian Revolution by following Fateh came to be regarded as the proper thing for any true Arab patriot. And the lesson was not lost on George Habash, the leader of the Movement of Arab Nationalists. As early as 11 December 1967, Habash had formed the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) which, by 1969-70, was already becoming a rival to Fateh. In the words of Amal Jamal:

The PFLP introduced a more stringent model of organization and action… Its origins in the Arab National Movement, which was well known for its pan-Arab ideology and for its relations with Gamal Adel Nasser’s Egypt, led the PFLP to criticize Fateh for its Palestinianism and its neutrality towards the conservative Arab regimes. The PFLP presented a relatively radical and strict ideological program that was political as well as socioeconomic. The PFLP… united revolutionary Marxist-Leninist ideology and the use of force for the accomplishment of its goals.

Yet, Fateh remained the pre-eminent force within the PLO. As described by Kamal Tannir, a student member of al-Rabita from 1969 to 1972:

91 Some amendments actually took place at the end of the term of the 68-69 Council.

92 Mohammad Dajani. Interviewed by Author, Beirut-Lebanon.

Fateh were like the political Beatles. There was a mass hysteria about them, as all people except the Maronites were with Fateh. It was a totally different game, although there were others, the likes of the SSNP, the Iraqi Ba’th and the PFLP. The elite, however, academically, financially, socially whether Lebanese or Palestinians were Fateh. After the Arab defeat of 1967 it was the vogue for rich ladies, at social events, to canvass for donations in return for al-Asifa key chains, carrying the crest of the Palestinian resistance. In academic circles most notably at AUB, there were Palestinians sympathizers.94

The beginning of the academic year 1969-70 in AUB witnessed the first student clash between the pro-fedayeen and the anti-fedayeen elements on campus, which took place on 29 October 1969. On that day, the Palestinian-dominated Student Council organized a rally to protest an attempt by the Lebanese army to curb the freedom of fedayeen movement in the parts of Lebanon bordering Israel. After a panel discussion on the subject in the Assembly Hall, the pro-fedayeen elements in AUB marched over to Nicely Hall, occupied the building, barricaded the entrances with desks and chairs and hoisted the Palestinian flag and revolutionary Palestinian posters over the front entrance. Repeated attempts by the Dean of Students to get the occupiers out of the building proved useless. Thereupon, the anti-fedayeen elements, headed by the Rabita, took matters into their own hands, charged the building, cleared its occupiers and replaced the Palestinian flag with that of Lebanon.95 This clash was extensively covered in the local press, each newspaper reporting on what happened from its own partisan point of view, but in no instance explaining exactly why the clash took place. Al-‘Amal (the Kata’ib mouthpiece), for example, depicted the Palestinians as having provoked the incident, while the leftist al-Yawm accused the “isolationists” (meaning the anti-Arab-

94 Kamal Tannir. Interviewed by Author, Beirut-Lebanon.

95 Outlook, 4 November 1969.
nationalist Lebanese) of being the aggressors. The only source which treated the subject even-handedly was *Outlook*, which explained exactly why and how the clash took place. The Editor-in-Chief of *Outlook*, Bassam Kawwas, had been appointed by the preceding Council in the spring of 1969, and was not a politically committed student. His policy was to preserve the neutrality of his paper and the objectivity of its reporting. In due course, however, Fateh and its allies waged a public attack on Kawwas, accusing him of being subservient to the administration and indifferent toward the cause of the Palestinian revolution; and when his term as editor came to an end in the spring of 1970, the Student Council appointed one of its own outspoken partisans--Leila Shahid--to succeed him.

The Nicely Hall 1969 clash in AUB was the first of its kind between the Palestinians and their Lebanese allies on one side, and the anti-fedayeen factions on the other. This new phenomenon was to become a pattern of political behaviour on campus, as every action on the part of the pro-fedayeen groups was directly followed by a violent reaction on the part of *al-Rabita*. As Kamal Tannir puts it, “We wanted to send a message to the Palestinians and their allies that any action violating what we saw as an invasion of Lebanese sovereignty would elicit a reaction, even if that meant resorting to violence.” The pro-fedayeen, on the other hand considered the Nicely Hall clash as another stage in an attempted “counterrevolution” engineered by the Lebanese government and its Rightist supporters to contain Palestinian agitation on campus.

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97 Fouad Bawarshi. Interviewed by Author, Beirut-Lebanon.

98 *Outlook*, 12 December 1969.

99 Kamal Tannir. Interviewed by Author, Beirut-Lebanon.
before it gained additional momentum.100

A. The Speaker’s Corner

One achievement of the Student Council in that year, shortly after the Nicely Hall incident, was the establishment of a Speaker’s Corner directly facing the student lounge known as the Milk Bar, itself the most popular student hang-out on campus. The reasons behind establishing this public platform was a belief by the members of the Council that a Speaker’s Corner, modeled on that of London’s Hyde Park, was “a useful platform to let off steam and express oneself freely and, most importantly, to avoid physical confrontations between students.”101 This AUB institution soon became a popular attraction for all students who wished to debate hot topics from the existence of God, the validity of Palestinian armed struggle, to purely academic issues such as comprehensive examinations. In addition to its valuable contribution to student life, the Speaker’s Corner also served the interests of the pro-fedayeen front by providing them with a weekly event in which they could demonstrate their dominant positions on the AUB student scene.

At the end of that same academic year, the Student Council took a further step in transforming itself into a more distinctly political body when it decided to intervene in the commencement exercises of June 1970. In preparation for this intervention, Victor Kashkoush, a graduating student and a Fateh affiliate, was asked to deliver a speech on the occasion attacking AUB’s role in serving western interests. As he took the microphone to speak, the administration arranged for the power to be cut off. But the Student Council had distributed copies of the speech to all present. In it, Kashkoush

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100 *Free Palestine*, 3 July 1969.

101 Nidal Saab. Interviewed by Author, Beirut-Lebanon.
quoted U.S. Assistant Secretary of State, William Scranton as saying, “Had it not been for AUB, the relations between Israel and the Arab World would have been worse.”

Kashkoush read this quote and then proceeds to demand that AUB rather provide its students with “a patriotic culture” and not “a culture without patriotism” or “a culture imported from the U.S.”

A conversation with Fouad Bawarshi, who was the President of the Student Council at the time, provides a clearer perspective on this incident. The real instigators of this incident were not Fateh, but the “old Arab Nationalist group” — Munah al-Solh, Bishara Merhej and Ma’an Bashshur among others — who were known as Jama’at Mat’am Faysal because they frequented the famous Faysal restaurant (today a McDonald’s) facing the Main Gate. Of the three figures Bawarshi mentioned by name, Munah al-Solh who was a freelance Arab nationalist journalist, and both Murhej and Bashshur were active members of the Iraqi wing of the Baath party. These nationalists argued that the Council should be allowed to have its say in the commencement, urging that this was what all the students demanded. Having no wish to clash with the administration, Fateh was initially hesitant to accept this suggestion, and when it finally accepted it, it was on condition that the speech was delivered by someone other than Bawarshi, and preferably by a student who is not a member of the Council.

This story, as recalled by Bawarshi, indicates that strong as it was on campus,

102 La-Potter, 4.

103 Fouad Bawarshi. Interviewed by Author, Beirut-Lebanon.


105 Fouad Bawarshi. Interviewed by Author, Beirut-Lebanon.
Fateh labored under restraints of two kinds. On the one hand there was the need to keep the goodwill of the administration, so as to keep the Student Council operative. On the other, Fateh was subject to political pressures from political allies and factions having different domestic agendas; and to keep such allies Fateh more often than not had to compromise.

1. Black September and AUB

Until 1970, the center of fedayeen activity was not in Lebanon, but in Jordan where the PLO initially received ample support from the people of Jordan, and used the country’s territory as a principal training ground and base for launching guerilla attacks against Israel. By the summer of 1970, however, the PLO in Jordan had become a state within the state, infringing on the sovereignty of the Jordanian monarchy to an extent that provoked a violent anti-Palestinian reaction. Pro-Palestinians in the country, for example, created an autonomous police force and a radio station, and even went as far as interfering with appointments in the Jordanian army.106 The response to these and other encroachments came on 16 September 1970 (to the Palestinians “Black September”) when the Jordanian army launched a military campaign which continued, off and on, until the last of the Palestinian holdouts were subdued almost exactly a year later.107 By then, the social as well as the military infrastructure of the Palestine Revolution in Jordan had been destroyed, forcing the PLO to look elsewhere for a new command post.

Fedayeen infiltrations into south Lebanon had already started in October 1968,


spreading later into the Palestinian refugee camps in different parts of the country. Clashes between the fedayeen and the Lebanese army began to occur in due course, assuming the proportions of a major crisis by October-November 1969. As a result of Egyptian mediation efforts, a Lebanese army delegation met with a PLO delegation in Cairo and signed the Cairo agreement, whereby the Palestinian armed presence and PLO control of the refugee camps in Lebanon was legitimized, and fedayeen movements across the Lebanese border with Israel were made subject to coordination between the PLO and the Lebanese army. Thus, by the time the PLO presence in Jordanian had been liquidated, Lebanon, effectively, had become available to the Palestinian Revolution as a substitute command post.108

The shift of the base of this revolution from Jordan to Lebanon had a direct effect on the Lebanese political tempo, and more blatantly on the student movement at AUB. The General Union of Palestinian Students (GUPS) established in 1954 by Yasser Arafat — an engineering student at the University of Cairo, who later founded Fateh (see chapter 2) and assumed the leadership of the PLO in 1969 — had become an organ of the PLO since 1964, and was an umbrella organization for all the Palestinian student societies all over the world.109 In 1969, Mohammad Dajani al-Daoudi, AUB student leader of the Fateh chapter on campus, was elected as the Vice President of GUPS. This student union gained considerably in importance after the PLO moved it base to Lebanon, especially as many Palestinian students left Jordan at the same time to enroll in Lebanese schools and universities — most notably, at the Egyptian-run Arab

108 Hussein Sirriyyeh, the Palestinian Armed Presence in Lebanon Since 1967, in Roger Owen’s, Essays on the Crisis in Lebanon, 78-79.

109 Free Palestine, 1 January 1970.
University of Beirut. The fact that Dajani was both, the head of the AUB Fateh chapter and the Vice President of GUPS, placed AUB starting from 1970, at the center of events in the country.

2. Junior Year Abroad Students

For the time being, however, Dajani remained in the shadows, leaving the Student Council in the hands of other adherents of Fateh. The president of the Council who succeeded Fouad Bawarshi was Maher al-Masri (1970-71), the scion of a leading family of notables from Nablus, in the Israeli-occupied West Bank. A soft spoken person with exquisite social manners, Masri was the ideal choice for a Council president who would project a good image of Fateh and the Palestinian revolution both on- and off-campus. Over the years AUB had come to attract increasing numbers of students from Western countries amongst whom the most important contingent, perhaps, were the Americans on the Junior Year Abroad Program (JYA). Masri it seems made it a point to maintain good relations with these students and win them over to the Palestinian cause before their return home. Six weeks after his arrival in Lebanon, JYA student Rick Wellons wrote a long exposé of the first impressions he had gained of the area in an article entitled “US involvement is too deep for passivity”. Here is an excerpt from the article to demonstrate its general tone:

As U.S. citizens JYAs have a duty and a right in at, the very least, expressing their opinion towards all U.S. Government decisions that here in the Mid-East have such immense worldwide implications. I hope that every JYA in our program will exercise this right both this year and when we return home to the states. In such drastic situations, events will not stand still for one year, while we refrain out of politeness from protesting. Second chances for correcting errors are

110 Fouad Bawarshi. Interviewed by Author, Beirut-Lebanon.

111 Kamal Salibi. Interviewed by Author, Beirut-Lebanon.
rare, and this year, those JYA who so choose, will do all they can to ensure that our country’s policy towards the Mid-East commits no more errors…. I as an American have no other choice but to make this year a politically active one, I hope that there are other JYAs who will join me.112

Another JYA student, Maureen Churchwell; she was won over to the cause of the Palestinian Revolution and in fact carried it back home with her. As *Outlook* reports:

A former JYA, Miss Maureen Churchwell, lectured last month on “The other (Palestinian) Side of the Middle East Crisis” to members of the Findlay Rotary club in her stateside hometown. Large excerpts of her talk were carried in the Findlay Republican Courrier. “There are two sides to the Israeli question and the United State hears mostly of the Zionist cause.” Her year at AUB, Miss Churchwell said, had given her a deep understanding of the Palestinian Arab side of the question.113

Such Western sympathy with the Palestinian cause was also manifested on campus through organized activism in other ways. A group of American students, for example, among them Ted Swedenburg (currently Professor of Anthropology at the University of Arkansas) and Edward Danforth, formed the Beirut Action Committee, with the aim to establish a lobby group based in the U.S. to “actively work to raise the level of consciousness of the American people regarding Palestine through nation wide teach-ins and information campaigns.” Additionally they wished to “express solidarity with the Palestinian Revolution through demonstrations, petitions and building a strong popular front which will confront American imperial interest in the Middle East and prevent American military aggression in the area.”114 Whether anything substantial came out of this idea, one cannot tell. But Swedenburg was not another Richard Stearns (see Chapter II). Today, he remains a leading figure in the International Solidarity

112 *Outlook*, 27 October 1970.
113 *Outlook*, 16 November 1970.
Movement that aids in the everyday resistance of the Palestinian people against the Israeli occupation.115

That Maher Masri was in contact with such western student sympathizer on campus, and encouraged their involvement in pro-Palestinian activism, can hardly be doubted. In addition, however, Masri found time to get involved in student activities abroad. For example, he was a member of the GUPS delegation which went on a four-week tour to Finland, Czechoslovakia and the USSR. He also found time to attend a series of conferences, among them the Tenth Congress of the International Union of Students (IUS) held on 3 February in Bratislava, Czechoslovakia.116

B. AUB Students and Lebanese University Demands

When the students of the Lebanese University (LU), in emulation of student stirrings taking place in different Western countries, declared an open strike to protest the neglect of their demands for educational reform, the AUB Student Council gave them what ultimately amounted to token support. In a press conference to explain why the AUB Student Council walked out on the strike, Masri explained that the demands of the LU students “do not constitute a genuine rejection of the ‘Rotten Educational System’ and cannot engender real change.”117 In that same press conference, however, Masri made it clear that the real reason for the walkout was the refusal of the leaders of the LU strike to join the AUB Student Council in condemning the upcoming visit of U.S. banker David Rockefeller to Beirut and the presumably anti-Arab policy this visit


116 Outlook, 6 March 1971.

117 Outlook, 16 March 1971.
represented. What this essentially meant was that Fateh was not going to waste any of its energies on supporting student movements outside AUB which were unwilling to adopt its political agenda. An alternative explanation is given by Gaelle Le Pottier in her study of Student activism in Lebanon on the eve of the Lebanese civil war according to her:

The Student Council decided to focus its attention on AUB matters, to preserve its improving relations with the administration and avoid getting involved in a strike which did not seem to promise any real tangible or positive outcome.\(^{118}\)

Masri was President of the AUB Student Council during the year that saw the destruction of the Palestinian Revolution in Jordan and the massive movement of its cadres to Lebanon. In the circumstances, it was only natural for the Student Council to have started the academic year by spearheading a violent campaign against the Jordanian regime. On 29 October 1970, the Student Council invited the famous women commando skyjacker Leila Khaled to address a massive student audience at the Speaker’s Corner, where she denounced the Jordanian monarchy as being “a hireling with the intention of wiping out the Revolution and the Palestinian people.”\(^{119}\) In response to this attack on their country, Jordanian students who were loyal to the monarchy organized themselves into what came to be known as al-Tanzim al-Urduni (Tanzim). They were supported in their move by some Lebanese Rabita elements and members of the Kata`ib party; they chose Kamal Salibi, the faculty adviser to the Rabita, to be their adviser as well.\(^{120}\)

\(^{118}\) Le-Pottier, "Student Activism at the Eve of the Civil War." 25.

\(^{119}\) Outlook, 3 November 1970.

\(^{120}\) Kamal Salibi. Interviewed by Author, Beirut-Lebanon. The Palestinians dismissed the Tanzim as being the creation of Jordanian military intelligence, but Salibi affirms that all their actions and activities were done in consultation with him and with his approval and they received no support or instructions from their government.
C. The Good Friday Clash

The Speakers’ Corner which took place on Thursday 8 April 1971 witnessed the initiation of *al-Tanzim al-Urduni* as a player on the AUB political scene. Since the visit of Leila Khaled, the Hashemite monarchy had been a regular target for attack at the Speaker’s Corner by Palestinian activists and more so by their Lebanese allies. On that particular Thursday, the attacker was, Ghassan Haidar, a member of the SSNP and his attack on both the Jordanian regime and the Lebanese Kata’ib party was particularly virulent. What followed was a scuffle between the Rabita and the Tanzim on the one hand and the SSNP and its supporters on the other, in which Haidar received minor injuries. In the evening, the pro-Palestinian Lebanese elements on campus met to plan revenge for the setback they had suffered. On the following morning—which was the morning of Good Friday—they waylaid and assaulted several Rabita and Tanzim students on their way to class, wounding no less than nine. Shortly after, the two sides began to mass and non-AUB elements—some of the Kata’ib party; others from the PLO security apparatus—started arriving outside the gates of AUB, armed and prepared for intervention. Shooting broke out when Lebanese Security Forces arrived to disperse the gathering, and one Lebanese gendarme lost his eye. The incident ended four and a half hours later, with the arrest of all armed elements involved and their subsequent release. Perhaps significantly, the PLO security patrol that arrived on the scene made a public apology for their involvement excusing themselves on the grounds

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123 *An-Nahar*, 10 April 1971.

that they had been tricked into intervening in a purely Lebanese student with which they were totally unconcerned.\textsuperscript{125}

Although this scuffle was reported in the local newspapers as a being a clash between the students of the PPS and \textit{al-Kata`ib}, which got out of hand, the fact of the matter remains that the different elements on campus each wanted to mark their territory. The Jordanian \textit{Tanzim} following the example of \textit{al-Rabita}, wanted to send a message to all concerned, that no insult directed against their country or its king would be tolerated. The Palestinians, fearing that the nascent cooperation between \textit{al-Tanzim} and its new Lebanese allies was only the beginning of a challenge to their hard-earned political standing on campus, mobilized the forces at their disposal to nip this Jordanian-Lebanese alliance in the bud. The PPS and other parties supporting the Palestinian Revolution wanted to seize the opportunity of the on-going Palestinian-Jordanian quarrel to claim a place on the AUB political map.

As for the \textit{Rabita}, the motive behind its involvement in that quarrel seems to have been more complex. The organization had apparently reached the conclusion that it needed a role to play on the Arab arena, so that it would no longer be branded as a Christian Lebanese ‘isolationist’ movement. By making common cause with the \textit{Tanzim}, the \textit{Rabita} was entering into an alliance with a predominately Muslim Arab partner. A broad hint to the effect that a change of image was at hand may be noticed in the press conference of the \textit{Rabita} president Walid Hajjar on Independence Day 1970, as reported in \textit{Outlook}:

\begin{quote}
We might somewhat be pretentious (\textit{sic}). But we humbly believe that the Lebanese experience has so far proven to be the most successful [\textit{Rabita}] experience in the Arab World. We believe that our experience is worth attracting wide attention and worth being advocated in the Arab countries because it is bound to be of benefits
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{125} \textit{Al-‘Amal}, 10 April 1971.
to others. We also believe that Lebanon should be spared the experience which failed in some of the other Arab countries inflicting on them heavy material and moral loss. And if there is isolation in this latter point, then we are isolationists.126

D. From Russia with Love

Originally, AUB student involvement in activities requiring international travel was restricted to privileged students. After 1967, Palestinian student activists such as Mohammad Dajani and Maher al-Masri began to travel abroad in their capacity as officers and members of GUPS. In the spring of 1971, however, no less than 190 students traveled by air to the USSR on a trip organized by the Student Council presumably in coordination with the Soviet government, at a cost of LL 500 (less than US $ 220 per person) to cover travel and accommodation. The two planes required for the expedition took off from Beirut on 9 April, while the Good Friday clash was still raging, and the party returned to Beirut ten days later.127

Jacques Ekmekji, a member of the 1971 Student Council and one of the coordinators of the USSR trip, believes that this trip was particularly instrumental in tightening up the team spirit among the participating students, as the events that followed on campus were to show. What triggered the idea of the trip, according to Ekmekji, was the visit of US President Richard Nixon to China. As he explains, “We believed that if Nixon can visit China, why can’t we visit the USSR. So we did.”128

126 Outlook 24 November 1970

127 Outlook 27 April 1971

128 Jacques Ekmekji. Interviewed by Author, Beirut-Lebanon. In retrospect, the administration after the student strike of May 1971 condemned this trip as part of a greater scheme to destroy the University and this, Ekmekji, believes, was the real reason why he was expelled along with 21 other student activists.
E. The Bustan Symposium

On Monday 10 May 1971, at the invitation of the AUB Student Affairs Committee chaired by Elie Salem, ten Student Council members, the editors of *Outlook* and *Campus ‘71* and three other students participated in a one-day symposium at al-Bustan Hotel in the summer resort of Beit Merry, “to discuss university affairs outside the walls of the University”\(^{129}\) with their hosts, who included Provost Samir Thabet and Dean of Students Robert Najemy. A pleasant atmosphere prevailed during the meeting, until Salem, all of a sudden, changed the subject to announce that the AUB administration had decided to increase tuition fees for the following year by 10 %. In vain did the Student Affairs Committee try to justify this increase in fees on the grounds that this has been forced upon AUB; that the fees paid by students do not cover more than 20 % of the actual expenses of their education; that 40 to 50% from the increase in fees would be allocated to scholarship funds. The following days at a meeting of the Student Council, a unanimous decision was passed to issue a statement calling for an open strike starting Thursday 13 May “to protest the unilateral and surprise decision of the administration.”\(^{130}\)

\(^{129}\) *Outlook*, 17 May 1971.

\(^{130}\) Ibid.
CHAPTER V
THE 1971 STRIKE

The student uprising which broke out on 13 May 1971 was the first open strike directed against the AUB administration since the Lewis affair of 1882, and the first ever based on a synidcal platform. So, at least, was the surface appearance. It is possible, however, that lurking underneath were realities that were far more complex. President Kirkwood, for example, could have intentionally announced the 10% tuition increase in the theatrical manner he did in order to offer the Student Council a synidcal issue to act upon, for which he had a solution in store, which would reflect well on his performance as president. Otherwise, why did Elie Salem’s announcement at the Beit Merry symposium present a package deal which included the problem (10% increase) and the solution (doubling of the student scholarship fund)? Furthermore, one also wonders why the administration picked the middle of the spring semester to announce this increase instead of waiting for the less-attended summer semester, when mass protests on campus are extremely hard to organize. One must bear in mind, here, that the Student Council had been re-established in AUB essentially at the initiative of President Kirkwood, which means that he had a personal interest in its success . Another possible explanation for the timing of the announcement could have been shortsightedness on the part of the administration. More likely than not, the student activists were aware of this fact, and could surmise from the beginning the nature of the game Kirkwood expected them to play: (1) call for an open strike on an issue which no student could reasonably oppose; (2) agree after extended negotiations to a solution which would substantially increase the scholarship funds of the University; (3) give the
Student Council a decisive say in the manner in which these funds would be distributed.

**A. Struggle from Within: Kirkwood vs. Prothro**

Further complicating the issue was a bitter power rivalry between Kirkwood and the Dean of the Faculty of Arts & Sciences, Edwin Terry Prothro, who enjoyed the support of Calvin Plimpton, the Chairman of the AUB Board of Trustees. At a turning point in the strike, Kamal Salibi, faculty advisor to the Rabita and the Tanzim, was told by Kirkwood of the imminent arrival of Plimpton to Beirut with the intention of sacking him and appointing Prothro to be president in his place.  

To former AUB Professor and Associate Dean of the Faculty of Arts & Sciences John Munro, the issue was not as clear cut. “Plimpton did not want to undermine Kirkwood, but he would have liked Prothro to be president.” Prothro was disliked among Palestinian students, who considered him unsympathetic to their cause, but he enjoyed considerable support among the faculty, and particularly anti-Establishment Americans some of whom openly hoped that he would one day preside over AUB.  

Interestingly, as the student strikers began to occupy university premises, Prothro’s office, which for some reason he had already vacated, became the first AUB administrative office to fall under their control. Munro remembers the whole AUB setting of that time as highly politicized:

> Everybody hated Sam Kirkwood, basically because he was rather dictatorial and would try to stifle any kind of dissent. He was a stolid American who mumbled and could bore anyone. You would fall

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131 Kamal Salibi. Interviewed by Author, Beirut-Lebanon.

132 John Munro. Interviewed by Author, Beirut-Lebanon.

133 Kamal Salibi & Fouad Bawarshi. Interviewed by Author, Beirut-Lebanon.

134 Kamal Salibi. Interviewed by Author, Beirut-Lebanon.

asleep listening to him, which I think was a deliberate strategy to divert criticism. Meanwhile, there was the Dean of Arts & Sciences Terry Prothro who fancied himself as the new President, and Lutfi Diab was one of his supporters, as I was. Moreover, there were several people who tried to take advantage of the strike so they would discredit Kirkwood to enhance their own status; and so you had people running around trying to show they had political sympathizes in tune with the political milieu, and people who were fed up with the way Kirkwood was running the University. There were genuine academic concerns mixed in with the political. Everybody was fishing in troubled waters.\textsuperscript{136}

When the strike began, Kirkwood was outside the country on a stateside visit and Prothro was serving as acting president, while negotiations with the Student Council were being handled by Elie Salem and Provost Samir Thabet. It was clear from the first day that the \textit{Rabita} and the \textit{Tanzim} were fully supportive of the Student Council on the issue of the strike;\textsuperscript{137} and when acting president Prothro, on 15 April, issued what amounted to a warning to the striking students, the \textit{Rabita} president Walid Hajjar, interviewed by \textit{Outlook} on the matter, declared that this warning is “utter nonsense.”

\textit{Outlook} further added:

\begin{quote}
The League of Lebanese Student supports with all its members the current strike calling for the elimination of the projected 10 \% increase in tuition fees…The Lebanese Student League will be with the strike until positive results are achieved. [Hajjar] explained positive results as any decision which favors the students. Hajjar expressed satisfaction over the fact that this strike is of a non-political nature, expressing the hope that it will continue to be so. Students must prove that they are more responsible than the Administration.\textsuperscript{138}
\end{quote}

Observers on campus must have been at a loss to explain why the \textit{Rabita} and the \textit{Tanzim}, who were the bitterest enemies of the Student Council, decided to join it in its venture. The Palestinians and their partisans thought that the move on the part of

\textsuperscript{136} John Munro. Interviewed by Author, Beirut-Lebanon.

\textsuperscript{137} \textit{An-Nahar}, 13 May 1971.

\textsuperscript{138} \textit{Outlook}, 17 May 1971.
their former adversaries was sincere because an increase in tuition touched the interests of all students regardless of nationality or political standing. But the reality was different. When he was interviewed on the question 37 years later, Kamal Tannir, the second man in command in the Rabita at the time, had a blunt and ready answer; “We took part in the strike so we can blow it up from the inside. We were against the strike because we knew that eventually the scholarships were going to go to the rich, and to the leftists and communists.”

The open strike, which began on a low key, started to gain momentum as it began to catch the attention of the national press, which unleashed a barrage of accusations against the University administration. AUB was accused of being a lackey to the US government and it was alleged that the 10% tuition increase was no more than a front for a plan to move AUB from Lebanon to Iran. Objections to the freedom of operation enjoyed by AUB were raised along with demands that the institution be subjected to government supervision. AUB news even attracted comment in the international press, where the University administration was invariably blamed for the breakdown of communication with the students. Here, for example, is an excerpt from a comment published in The Economist:

The ostensible cause of a three week student strike is a 10% rise in tuition fees; the true reason is the students’ lack of respect for an administration that used to be venerated… The American administration are cut from their students by their suspect official links and by the alarmist advice of some of their Arab staff.

139 Nidal Saab. Interviewed by Author, Beirut-Lebanon.
140 Kamal Tannir. Interviewed by Author, Beirut-Lebanon.
141 Al-Sh’ab, 19 May 1971.
142 Al-Hawadith, 11 June 1971.
143 Al-Hurriyya, 14 May 1971.
members…The AUB administration tends to look at their students as bloodthirsty revolutionaries when most of them are moderate disciplined youngsters whose principal unspoken demand is that their university should once again be unafraid and rooted in the area.144

In due course, a new and more serious imported rhetoric, probably introduced to AUB by American JYA students, began to gain ground on campus, demanding student participation in the running of the University.145 This issue, however, had not yet been raised when, in a first escalation of the strike, the students on 14 May organized a sit-in in front of College Hall, where the principal administrative offices were located, closing the entrances to the building. The next escalation came on 17 May when the Student Council called for a general assembly attended by approximately 2000 students, where Masri declared that annual tuition increases are planned for by the AUB administration for the coming four years so as to ultimately reach 46% by 1975. A massive silent march followed the assembly, in the course of which the entrances to one after the other of the University buildings were blocked by students and chairs. It was this sight that met Kirkwood upon his return from a stateside visit on that day.

B. Student Demands

At a meeting between Kirkwood and Masri that evening Kirkwood asked for a 48-hour period of “reflection” to resolve the matter, to which Masri agreed.146 True to his word, Kirkwood announced to the AUB community the following five-point proposal in the early morning of 19 May: (1) No student currently registered in the University will be compelled to withdraw as a result of tuition increase; (2) all income

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144 The Economist. “High Dam on Campus” (5 June 1971).


146 Outlook, 25 May 1971.
derived from the 10% increase will, if the need arose, be spent on scholarships and financial aid for needy students; (3) the University Scholarship Committee will be organized to include an equal number of student to faculty representatives who will have equal voting power in the determination of the use of the funds that as a result of the 10% increase will be allocated to needy students on basis of need (sic); (4) there will be no tuition increase for the academic year 1972-73; (5) a special committee of Student Council members and faculty members will be formed to study new sources of funds in the Middle East. This proposal was unanimously rejected by the Student Council and the student body at a general assembly held immediately after its announcement. Exiting the assembly hall where the general assembly had been convened the students marched to Marquand House which they besieged while Kirkwood was chairing a meeting of the University Senate. Two Lebanese faculty members who were cabinet ministers at the time — Najib Abu-Haydar and Elias Saba — volunteered to mediate between the Senate and the Student Council, and eventually succeeded only in persuading the students, on the morning of 20 May, to lift the siege of Marquand House. At this point, Maher Masri warned that “if the Senate decision [regarding the student demands] is negative, we shall escalate the strike violently.”

On the role of the intervention of Abu-Haydar and Saba, John Munro recalls:

Elias Saba and Najib Abu Haydar, got involved, I remember they were negotiating on behalf of the students. Abu Haydar kept on saying: “No victor no vanquished; we have to solve this problem amicably.” Saba and Abu Haydar had political ambitions of their own. Everybody started capitalizing on the strike; they did not quite know what they can do with it, but they saw an opportunity to take advantage of the situation, it spilled outside the campus.

\[147\] *An-Nahar*, 20 May 1971.


\[149\] John Munro. Interviewed by Author, Beirut-Lebanon.
Remaining in session until 1:00 am, the Senate listened to suggestions from both students and faculty members on how to resolve the continuing crisis. Agreement was finally reached on amending two points of Kirkwood’s earlier proposal then referring the whole to the student body for acceptance or rejection. The amendments touched points two and three which were now made to read (with the changes underlined):

- (2) The Senate accepts the principle of adding the ten percent tuition increase for 1971-1972 to the budgeted university scholarship funds for 1970-71 for scholarships and financial aid for needy students, and that this be continued for 1972-73

- (3) Representation on the University Scholarship Committee shall have a majority of students. Representation on a Faculty Scholarship Committee shall be from faculty and students of that faculty.\textsuperscript{150}

The next morning, a general assembly was convened at 11:00 am to decide on the latest Senate proposal. Masri was convinced that this proposal represented a great triumph for the students, as it granted them “more participation in the life of the University”\textsuperscript{151}, and therefore urged its ratification by the general assembly. Speaking for the Leftists, however, one member of the Student Council, a Lebanese with leftist tendencies [communist], Tony Shuwayri, challenged Masri from the floor, demanding that a referendum be held to decide on the matter. An uproar followed as the general assembly divided over the issue, in the course of which Masri tendered his resignation.\textsuperscript{152} Interpreting the proposal as a purely a Fateh-victory which would ultimately give the pro-Palestinian party control over the University scholarship funds

\textsuperscript{150} Minutes of the University Senate Meeting, 19 May 1971.

\textsuperscript{151} As quoted in Le-Potter, "Student Activism at the Eve of the Civil War", 26.

\textsuperscript{152} \textit{Outlook}, 25 May 1971.
as well as over campus politics, the Rabita for the first time joined forces with the Leftists to defeat the proposal. In the circumstances, Fateh dismissed the thought of an early compromise settlement with the administration, as the former risked the loss of the political gains it had since the Council was re-established. So on the following day Masri went back on his resignation and joined the attack on Kirkwood’s revised proposal, urging all students to vote against it in the referendum scheduled for Monday 24 May 1971.  

The referendum was held under the supervision of a joint student-faculty committee, yielding an 85% majority vote rejecting the proposal. Kirkwood backed by the Senate, promptly responded by suspending the academic year 1970-71, fixing 14 June as the date for the graduating students to sit for their final examinations and canceling the commencement and the baccalaureate ceremonies, an announcement to this effect being communicated to the student body at a general assembly. A secret vote taken by the Senate in the same session dissolved the Student Council and suspended its constitution, the timing of the announcement of this vote to be left to the discretion of President Kirkwood. While Outlook and the Beirut press were led to believe that the decision to suspend the semester was taken by Kirkwood after the referendum results were known, the minutes of the University Senate indicate that Kirkwood got the senate to approve the decision, paragraph by paragraph, on the morning of Sunday 23 May 1971, one full day before the referendum was held. (This might explain why Dean

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154 Of the 2693 votes cast, 2288 were against, 381 with, 24 blank. Faculty members on the committee were Halim Barakt, Adnan Haidar, Richard Blackstone, Marwan Buhayri, and Ohanas Balian.

155 Minutes of the University Senate Meeting, 23 May 1971 (the same date appearing on the three pages of the document). (See Appendix I)
Prothro, as an ex-officio member of the Senate, had time to vacate his office before it was occupied by students on 24 May.)

What immediately followed in fact was the student occupation of Jessup Hall where Dean Prothro’s office was located. Then three other buildings were occupied in the course of that night: Fisk Hall, the Agriculture building and West Hall. The following morning Bliss Hall, the Chemistry building and the School of Nursing fell under student control, and by noon College Hall had been occupied jointly by the Rabita and the Tanzim, who broke into Kirkwood’s office and established their headquarters there. The University responded to all this by withdrawing its two previous offers to the students, and by trying to find out from the Lebanese judicial authorities whether or not charges could be filed against unnamed occupiers of University buildings. Meanwhile, a group of American and other foreign students calling themselves “concerned students,” and issuing communiqués supporting the strike, came forth with the suggestions first, to look into the books and have students sit on the Senate in a student-faculty committee which would look into issues pertaining to budgeting and expenditures; and second, to hold an open faculty-student meeting to discuss the disputed issues. The Lebanese University Student Union (LUSU), for their part, reiterated their support for the strike.

The next morning, the main headline in the Lebanese daily An-Nahar made the first open reference to a covert rivalry between Kirkwood and Prothro over the AUB


158 Outlook, 25 May 1971.

159 An-Nahar, 26 May 1971.
presidency. Interviewed while he sat conducting the business of his office under a
tree on the upper campus, Prothro was asked whether or not he actually sought to
become AUB president. According to the report, he angrily denied the charge, adding:

    I am the Dean of Arts & Sciences and I only want to go back to my
office and to see university life go back to normal. The real crisis is
the absence of trust between the students and the administration, and
the best solution would be for the students to go back to classes and to
cooperate in the resolution of the problem we face.161

    This press interview, conducted by two AUB students, was clearly an attempt
by pro-Kirkwood elements to depict Prothro as the mastermind behind the ongoing
controversy, and the supporters of Prothro, it seems, lost no time to react. On the very
day the interview was published, AUB students marched through the streets of Ras
Beirut at noontime, shouting abuses against Kirkwood and the U.S. government and
ending their march outside Marquand House, where they raised the cry: “Kirkwood go
home!” Immediately following the march, the Student Council sent a cable to Calvin
Plimpton, the Chairman of the Board of Trustees in New York, urging him to come to
Beirut right away to attend to the resolution of the worsening AUB crisis in person.162

    Plimpton must have been expecting to receive these messages, considering that it took
him no more than 20 hours to arrive in Beirut after receiving the second one.

Meanwhile, in an attempt to exert more pressure on Kirkwood, the students occupied
the Security Office which was commonly considered to be a front for Lebanese and
foreign intelligence activities.

    Plimpton was met at Beirut International Airport by Najib Abu Haydar, by
virtue of being the Lebanese Minster of Education, accompanied by members of the


161 Ibid.

AUB Student Council who gave him a cordial reception and presented him with a bouquet of flowers. From the airport, he was escorted first, to the home of Abu Haydar for a brief rest and second, to the AUB Alumni Club where arrangements had been made for him to stay. Here the students offered him a car to use for the duration of his stay in Beirut, and proceeded to drive him to Marquand House to meet Kirkwood. Next, he was taken by Robert Najemy, the Dean of Students, to West Hall to meet the Student Council president Maher Masri, and discuss the campus situation with him.\textsuperscript{163} The Rabita and the Tanzim, who were not represented on the Student Council, insisted on having their own meeting with Plimpton, and the Faculty Room of Marquand House was used for the purpose. In sharp contrast to the royal treatment which the Student Council had accorded the Chairman of the AUB Board of Trustees, the Rabita and the Tanzim waged a relentless attack on him accusing him of mischievous intent and warning him that they will not stand aside and allow him to implement his hidden agenda.\textsuperscript{164} It might have been at this juncture that Plimpton decided to bail out from the whole affair and to leave the matter for Kirkwood to resolve. Whatever the truth of the matter, the minutes of the University Senate meeting attended by Plimpton the next day note the following:

Dr. Plimpton spoke about the concern of the Board, and he stated he came to Beirut to acquaint himself with the situation and to support the President and the Senate. He hopes that the present situation will be resolved and that things will return to normal at the University.\textsuperscript{165}

That same night, Plimpton personally informed the Student Council of his full support for Kirkwood and the 10% increase in tuition fees, and went as far as to issue a

\textsuperscript{163} \textit{An-Nahar}, 30 May 1971.

\textsuperscript{164} Kamal Salibi. Interviewed by Author, Beirut-Lebanon.

\textsuperscript{165} Minutes of the University Senate Meeting, 30 May 1971.
communiqué through the AUB Office of Information to this effect before leaving Beirut on the morning of 31 May. 166 Now fully supported by the Board of Trustees, Kirkwood was clearly emerging from the confrontation as a winner on all the fronts, and it remained for the hitherto recalcitrant Faculty of Arts & Sciences to concede him this victory. This it did, albeit in a half-hearted way, in a stormy faculty meeting 167 held after the departure of Plimpton and chaired by Prothro in his capacity as Dean. At the end of this meeting, a carefully formulated motion was ultimately passed which gave support to Kirkwood while at the same time implicitly justifying the striking student’s actions:

We express the faith that a university is a locus of rational discussion. We regret that students have occupied university buildings and appeal to them to vacate them. We believe that a university is for students, and we as faculty will do all that we possibly can for them. We realize that all points at issue (tuition increase, student participation, examinations, etc.) need lengthy, rational discussion, and we will do everything to bring about a fair solution to these issues. 168

By now the strike was effectively at an end, and it only remained for the Student Council to announce its termination, as the end of the academic year was at hand. On 31 May, 500 graduating students met in West Hall to discuss their predicament as the chief sufferers from the strike. Their meeting however, was broken up by a brawl, whereupon they crossed over to continue their meeting at the University Christian Center on Makhoul Street. There they were soon joined by Masri, and at his urgent request, they agreed to give the Student Council a grace period of 48 hours to resolve their problem.

The following day, AUB students marched through the streets of Ras Beirut on their way to the Lebanese Parliament square where they were joined by students from

166 An-Nahar, 31 May 1971.
167 Munro, A Mutual Concern, 169.
168 Circular to all members of the University Community, dated 31 May 1971.
various universities and schools. The protesters hoisted streamers attacking the government’s indifference towards their predicament and declaring that “they will not pay for the luxury and the extravagant spending of the administrators at AUB.” Slogans and chants also took on a more political coloring, demanding the Lebanization and nationalization of AUB. On the footsteps of the House of Parliament Masri reiterated the demands of the students and attacked the government by saying:

The students have come here in front of the house of the people to press for demands which their elected representatives have obviously not heard over the radio or read in the papers…. We implore the state to intervene and stop the raise in tuition fees, which prevents the young generation from getting an education, meaning the right of a person to be a free human being striving to improve the status of his nation. The government in the person of Minister of Education Najib Abu Haydar has stood by as a spectator, instead of assuming the role of an arbiter who can enforce justice in the name of the state…. [The government keeps on behaving] as if AUB is a state within the state…. And in the same manner that we reject cultural imperialism, we refuse to have higher education remain a preserve for those who can afford it.169

On the day of this march, the American JYA students were instructed by their embassy to leave Lebanon immediately, which relieved the AUB administration of their unwelcome interventions in the strike.170

C. Fishy Things171

The next day, after the 48-hour grace period given to Masri was over without anything being achieved, the Rabita president Walid Hajjar, espousing the cause of the graduating classes, suggested that the Rabita join the Student Council in announcing an


170 Ibid.

171 Munro, A Mutual Concern, 169.
end to the strike. But Masri turned the suggestion down.\textsuperscript{172} Thereupon the Rabita with the support of the Tanzim decided to walk out on the strike and unilaterally announce its suspension. The reasons given through a communiqué were as follows:

With the start of the third week of the strike, posters appeared signed by an influential political group from within the Council asking for the Lebanization of AUB. Similar streamers also appeared in the 1 June March, which proved that the nature of the strike had become politicized and strayed from its original purpose. The strike no longer serves the students…. Since the arrival and departure of Plimpton, many fishy things have appeared in the form of mediations…. The Rabita will do everything in its capacity to return things to normal so as to permit students to prepare for their final examinations as soon as possible. The Rabita declares that students are under no obligation to answer to the decision of the Student Council which no longer serves the interests of the students but its own political agenda.\textsuperscript{173}

After the release of this Rabita statement, the Student Council called for a general assembly to update the students on the strike. Addressing the assembly, Masri announced the evacuation of the University buildings so as to make it possible for the graduating students the chance to sit for their exams. He then attacked the Rabita, describing the contents of its communiqué as pure fabrication and explaining that Plimpton’s visit to AUB was in response to the cable sent by the Student Council and not to any initiative by Abu Haydar. Furthermore, he affirmed that there were no hidden agenda of any kind governing the Student Council’s decisions. This attack on the Rabita provoked an uproar in the course of which members of the Rabita tried to assault Masri but were pushed back. Shortly after, however a scuffle between the Rabita and Student Council elements did take place at the AUB’s Main Gate and the adjoining Security Office, when Rabita members tried to drive away the students who were occupying these locations. In the course of this scuffle, three students were injured

\textsuperscript{172} Nida` al-Watan, 12 June 1971.

\textsuperscript{173} Nida` al-Watan & An-Nahar 4 June 1971.
before the police was able to intervene in force to restore order.\textsuperscript{174}

The following day, Maher Masri toured the campus with the Dean of Students Robert Najemy, handing him over the evacuated buildings and their keys. Officially, however, the strike was not called off, and the fact that it never managed to achieve its declared aims was laid at the Rabita’s door. Indeed, the role played by the Rabita in the whole affair puzzled all observers from the beginning, and so did the sudden switch in its position which brought the events of that year to an end. The interviews conducted with prominent Rabita figures affirm that its members realized that its walkout on the strike was more than enough to “blow it from the inside” after appearing to have espoused its cause to the limit.

On the other hand, the Palestinians and their Lebanese allies, who were unsuccessful in delivering their promises of abolishing the 10% tuition increase, accused the Rabita and the Tanzim of collaborating with the administration in order to dissolve the Student Council. In a communiqué issued by Maher Masri after the end of the strike, he made the following allegations:

The Rabita and the Tanzim have conspired with the AUB administration over the fate of the student movement, and Prof. K.S [Kamal Salibi] who supported the Rabita had promised the President of the University that if he dissolves the Student Council the Rabita would evacuate the buildings it occupied.\textsuperscript{175}

Be that as it may, the fact remains that the Rabita walkout deprived the Student Council of the much needed support necessary to prolong the confrontation with the administration. This prolongation would have ultimately secured the Student Council’s hegemony over student matters: a prospect of which the Rabita was perfectly aware, and determined to prevent. As matters stood now, the negotiations between the Student

\textsuperscript{174} \textit{Nida` al-Watan & An-Nahar} 4 June 1971.

\textsuperscript{175} \textit{Al-Anba`}, 19 June 1971.
Council and the University were to continue with the administration having the upper hand. Surprisingly, however, the University opted for leniency, announcing that it was reinstating the former proposal issued on 19 May (see above) concerning the 10% tuition increase and declaring that Haigazian University would be the venue where the graduating students would sit for their final examinations. This time, the proposal was accepted, without the strike being officially called off.

D. The End of the Tanzim

Things seemed to be returning to normal when, in the early morning of 14 July, Abdul Karim Kabariti, the leader of al-Tanzim al-Urduni was abducted by three masked gunmen as he was leaving his home to go on a geological field trip. Born out of the surge of Jordanian patriotic feeling set off by the events of Black September, the Tanzim was naturally hated by the Palestinians, all the more so at a time when the Palestinian resistance in Jordan was drawing to an end. Moreover, the fact that the Tanzim was inseparable from the Rabita, fighting regularly on its side against the Palestinians and their Lebanese allies, made it even more the object of hate. Hence, when Kabariti was abducted, suspicions immediately fell on representatives of the different Palestinian factions at AUB, six of whom were arrested on the same day by the Lebanese authorities for questioning. This happened after the King of Jordan personally intervened with Lebanese President Suleiman Franjiya to secure the safe release of Kabariti. The day following the arrest of the Palestinian suspects, a Speaker’s Corner

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178 Nabil Aylabouni, Khaled Ayed (PFLP), Muheeb Abu-Rahoum, Zahi Akra, Fayez Udwan and Eddie Zananiri (Fateh).
was organized at which the allegedly fascist methods of the Lebanese Security Forces were condemned, and the student speakers warned of a possible escalation if their colleagues were not immediately released. In due course, the detainees were released for lack of evidence against them, but the fate of Kabariti remained unknown for eleven days. Ultimately he was released to the custody of the Minister of Education, Dr. Najib Abu Haydar, who accompanied him to the offices of the Lebanese military intelligence. According to his affidavit, Kabariti confirmed that he was abducted by the PFLP and was taken to the Baddawi refugee camp, North of Tripoli where he was subjected to torture for the duration of his detention.

After his release, Kabariti, returned to Jordan to be welcomed home at the airport by King Hussein in person, who presented him with a brand new Mercedes Benz as a gift of appreciation. The king, however, would not hear of Kabariti returning to Beirut. To Jordan, AUB was not friendly turf. This much, the Jordanian students at the University now realized, and the Tanzip at AUB was never seriously reactivated.

E. Student Council Suspended

While the AUB community was still busy following up on the details of Kabariti’s abduction and release, Kirkwood, on 26 July, announced the dissolution of the Student Council and the suspension of its constitution. It seems that Kirkwood,

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181 Kamal Salibi. Interviewed by Author, Beirut-Lebanon.

182 Ibid.

183 Decision of President Kirkwood addressed to all members of the AUB Community, 26 July 1971.
who had secured the authorization of the Senate on this matter in principle two month earlier, felt that the timing for its announcement had finally come. This was followed on 19 August with the suspension of 22 students (Student Council members and Leftist activists), while 29 received warnings and 22 were served conduct probations.\footnote{Halim Barakat. \textit{Lebanon in Strife: Student Preludes to the Civil War}. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1977, 175.}
CHAPTER VI

STUDENT ACTIVISM RADICALIZED

By the late months of 1971, the Palestinian revolutionary factions headed by Fateh were fast becoming a state within the state in Lebanon, and the Rabita, small as it was, was the only student organization at AUB that openly defied the Palestinian student groups. This special standing of the Rabita became particularly noticeable after the key role it played in breaking the Palestinian dominance over the strike of May-June 1971, which earned it headlines in the daily press. In the circumstances, Lebanese Right-wing Christian parties began to compete for the control of the Rabita, each party establishing for itself a student ‘cell’, or chapter, within the AUB for the purpose. Originally, the members of the Rabita were students acting as individuals, regardless of whether or not they belonged to political parties; and certainly since 1967, its successive cabinets had never been occupied by individuals officially affiliated to Rightist Christian parties. With the end of 1971, however, this was to change. The Rabita cabinet elections in the late summer of 1971, brought George Bajk, a member of the Kata`ib party, to the presidency. Earlier accusations hurled at the Rabita as being no more than an AUB front for the Kata`ib party thus became an established fact. This to many was the end of the Rabita as an independent Lebanese entity whose aim was to defend Lebanon from any sort of slight or infringement on its sovereignty.

185 Mahmoud Chrieh. Interviewed by Author, Beirut-Lebanon.

186 The Lebanese Rightist parties and factions though opposed to the growth of Palestinian power in Lebanon, maintained contact with the PLO and negotiated with it whenever the need arose. The confrontation between the two sides only came with the onset of the civil war.

187 Kamal Tannir. Interviewed by Author, Beirut-Lebanon.
Consequently, Kamal Salibi relinquished his position as faculty advisor to the *Rabita*, after it became clear to him that its members no longer called the shots, and soon will be transformed into pawns in the Lebanese political game. Salibi was succeeded as *Rabita* advisor by George Frayha, assistant Professor of Public Health and a close relative of the Gemayal family, of the Kata’ib party.

A. The Striking Seven

The changed nature of the *Rabita* was made manifest from the first month of the academic year 1971-1972. At the start of the year, the rumor circulated that the administration was willing to reinstate the 22 students suspended in the course of the summer. Actually, Kirkwood had started meeting individually with these students, after which he allowed only three of them to be readmitted. The fate of the other nineteen had to await the return of Kirkwood from the November meeting of the Board of Trustees in New York. However, on 25 October 1971, which was the day that Kirkwood was due to leave Beirut, seven supporters of the dissolved Student Council calling themselves “the Striking Seven” and led by Mohammad Dajani, occupied Nicely Hall and distributed a communiqué to explain their sudden move:

For two tiring months we have been exhausting diplomatic means, negotiations, petitions, letters, dialogue etc to convince the administration to reaccept 22 of our colleagues. It has been extremely hard for us to practice self-control, but could successfully resist the enticement or “action,” i.e. severe action (*sic*). For two very tiring months we have restrained ourselves from disrupting exams, classes, registration, convocation etc. The result of this series of “goodwills”

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188 Kamal Salibi. Interviewed by Author, Beirut-Lebanon.


191 Communiqués issued by the occupying students, signed Striking Seven.
we had willingly shown is that 19 of our colleagues are still out [remain expelled].\textsuperscript{192}

The plain fact was, Fateh had been dealt a severe blow through the suspension of the Student Council and the expulsion of 22 of its members and supporters and nothing short of another show of force on its part could restore its image of omnipotence. Thirty six years after the event, however, Dajani, today Director of the American Studies Program in Jerusalem University, explains the motives behind the occupation of Nicely Hall by “the Striking Seven” somewhat differently:

In the summer, we started meeting as Leftist groups to see what we should do about the suspended students, and considered organizing a strike. But the student leaders I met with were afraid that they if they go ahead with a strike they will also be expelled. When school started, I felt Fateh was also against the strike. So I broke with Fateh, and I got seven people to take over Nicely Hall and ask for the reinstatement of the 22 students and the Student Council. The main point was that we did not want student leaders to be penalized for actions which reflected the will of the whole student body. In addition all the 22 students expelled were Leftists, although the Right was a part of the strike. I felt personally responsible [so I proceeded to act].\textsuperscript{193}

Other people who recall the event suspect that the organizers of the October 1971 occupation of Nicely Hall could have received cues to act from sympathizers within the University administration. This, however, does not necessarily mean that their actions did not reflect their own decisions.\textsuperscript{194} And to their good fortune, the Rabita, under its new leadership, took hardly any serious action against them beyond issuing a statement condemning the hijacking of student freedoms through the forced closure of classes.\textsuperscript{195}

\textsuperscript{192} Outlook, 16 November 1971.

\textsuperscript{193} Mohammad Dajani. Interviewed by Author, Beirut-Lebanon.

\textsuperscript{194} Ibrahim Khoury. Interviewed by Author, Beirut-Lebanon.

\textsuperscript{195} An-Nahar, 26 October 1971.
The Administration directly intervened through the Dean of Students, Robert Najemy who offered the occupiers a deal: that if they immediately vacate the building they will not be subject to any disciplinary action. This deal was refused and the occupation continued through the night. The next morning, a group of 15 workers, accompanied by the Dean of Students, tried to open the building by force but were repelled by the occupiers with fire extinguishers and sticks, injuring two workers in the process. The occupiers then declared that they would only leave Nicely Hall “to prison or to hospital.” By now, they had been joined by a number of other students. In response, the administration delegated Walid Khalidi, a prominent AUB Palestinian professor, and Najib Abu Haydar, whose pro-Palestinian credentials were well known, to mediate with them.

While this mediation was going on, the leaders and representatives of Lebanese Leftist parties met at the Arab Cultural Club and issued recommendations supporting the demands of AUB students and condemning the intransigence of the administration. Present at the meeting was Lebanese deputy Kamal Jumblatt, president of the Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) who went so far as to demand the “Lebanization” of AUB and the subjection of its administration to State supervision.

Khalidi and Abu Haydar informed Dajani that the University was willing to meet their demands at the start of the next semester, provided that the students occupying Nicely Hall be penalized for their breach of university regulations. Dajani would not accept this offer, and added to his previous demands the issue of student representation on the Scholarship Committee. While the mediators were passing this


197 Ibid.

198 *Al-Anba`, 5 November 1971.
message to the Senate, Dajani convened the occupying students in a classroom and
declared his intention to blow up the building so all those inside would die and become
martyrs of the world student revolt. A word to this effect reached the University
authorities who, apparently, were prepared to believe that Dajani, because of his known
affiliation with Fateh, had access to explosives. Whatever the truth of the matter was,
the administration, at this point conceded to all the demands of the students with hardly
a condition. By most unconvincing coup de théâtre, and for reasons virtually impossible
to fathom, the settlement was attributed the following morning by leading Lebanese
newspapers to the masterly political acumen of former Lebanese President Camille
Chamoun.

B. Change from Within

The four-day occupation of Nicely Hall helped project the image of Fateh as a
champion of student causes, which greatly increased its popularity on campus. With the
final expulsion of the PLO from Jordan, Lebanon was left as the only Arab country
where the Palestinian Revolution could be operative, and this naturally sharpened the
incentive for Palestinian political activism on campus, as in Lebanon in general. The
Fateh, of 1971-72, moreover, was somewhat different from the Fateh of the preceding
year, as its cadres were now enriched by a considerable inflow of Lebanese-born or
Lebanese-raised Palestinians who had joined the movement in high school before
enrolling at AUB. Mahmud Shurayh, a Lebanese-born Palestinian activist who had

199 Mohammad Dajani. Interviewed by Author, Beirut-Lebanon.

200 Mahmoud Chrieh. Interviewed by Author, Beirut-Lebanon.

201 An-Nahar, 29 October 1971. The wife of president Chamoun, Zalfa Thabet
was a relative of VP Samir Thabet, who probably engineered this coup de théâtre which
the AUB, in any case, seems to have endorsed.
completed his secondary education at the International College (IC), joined AUB in the fall of 1971, and was already active in the ranks of GUPS as far back as 1966. As he put it:

We entered AUB and we were many. We were all from Lebanon. The Palestinians were a minority in the midst of the Fateh Lebanese. We were approximately 36-37 students from the International College (IC), not to mention those from other schools. We joined a Fateh chapter which was huge; it was said that it counted about 500 between active members and supporters. Most importantly we, the IC chapter of Fateh, had already set up student cells in a number of Lebanese high schools, thus establishing breeding grounds for future Fateh members.\(^202\)

On the negative side, however, a latent discord was already coming to notice between Fateh and some factions of the Lebanese Left who had previously followed its leadership without question, but who were growing openly critical of its highhandedness, its conservative policies and its proneness to compromise. This discord came to the open directly after the occupation of Nicely Hall with the emergence of two factions: one headed by Fateh and calling for the reactivation of the Student Council, and the other headed by the PFLP and the radical Lebanese Left and calling for the establishment of a General Student Union—meaning an independent Student Council—legally recognized by the Lebanese government and totally independent from AUB control.\(^203\)

**C. Student Council Action Committee vs. General Student Union**

The Student Council Action Committee (SCAC), a Fateh front which made its first appearance during the Nicely occupation, directly started to campaign for the restoration of the Council once the occupation was over. *Outlook*, in its second issue of

\(^202\) Mahmoud Chrieh. Interviewed by Author, Beirut-Lebanon.

\(^203\) Barakat, 176.
the academic year 1971-72, started running a six episode feature story by Fateh’s Najib Azzam, documenting the history of the Student Council, with the intention of influencing student opinion in favor of its reestablishment.\textsuperscript{204} A more insidious campaign was waged by the SCAC through its publication \textit{Lookout}, which published documents seized from occupied buildings in May 1971, which exposed the corruption and devious practices of the AUB administration, such as the admission of students and the appointment of personnel under political pressure. In addition, SCAC published documents connecting AUB administrators to the CIA and the FBI, the likes of John Gill, a retired US Air Force colonel who had been appointed Director of Operations in AUB and Dwight Monnier, Vice President in charge of the security office.\textsuperscript{205} Furthermore, the SCAC unleashed a gale of criticism against the newly formed Student-Faculty Committee appointed by the president to supervise Student Life, and openly renounced the legitimacy of student representation on this committee.\textsuperscript{206}

The demand for the reestablishment of the Student Council, nonetheless, did not receive the support of the entire student body. The extreme Leftist Lebanese and Palestinian elements in AUB, fronting as the Committees for the Defense of Democratic Rights, called for the formation of a General AUB Student Union which would be totally independent of the administration and could, in due course, join other bodies of its kind to form a National Student Union. A shady student group calling itself the Organization for Student Struggle (\textit{Munazmat Kifah al-Talaba}), spearheaded this campaign. This group—generally believed to represent the Iraqi branch of the Ba’th party—was composed primarily of two members, Abdul Rahman Al-Assir and his

\textsuperscript{204} \textit{Outlook}, 30 November 1971.

\textsuperscript{205} \textit{Lookout}, undated 1971, (See Appendix II).

\textsuperscript{206} \textit{Outlook}, 30 November 1971.
brother Rabi’. In an article signed by the pen-name ‘Mao-Tse Tung’, which appeared in Kifah al-Talaba’s newsletter Our Struggle, this group declared:

We the students constitute the majority of the University community. We are refused even the right to rule ourselves, to determine our own type of student government, to define our own objectives and to draw up a constitution to govern us. The administration granted a constitution for the type of Student Council they wanted, when they saw even their constitution falling into the hands of progressives, they banned it and appointed “prefects” (sic), their nice little boys to their ad hoc committee, to represent us, and even to draft a constitution for us, their subjects!... That is why we call upon all students to take it as their first duty to form our own independent and self-sufficient Student Council and consolidate our forces with the progressive forces in the area.207

While the question was as to which form the AUB student government should take was being debated between Fateh and the Leftists, the University Senate, honoring Kirkwood’s earlier commitment to the students, passed a motion to reconstitute a Student Council. The Senate further decided “to consider the draft of the constitution of a Student Council submitted to the University Senate by the Ad-Hoc Senate Commission for Student Participation in University Affairs, dated January 31, as a basis for the new constitution of a Student Council.”208 This action by the Senate, however, was not publicized until twenty days later when, as expected, the SCAC, headed by Fateh, indicated its willingness to accept its terms, albeit with a token show of reserve. The Student Union faction, on the other hand, rejected the Senate action outright, attacking the projected constitution for the new Student Council as “only a legal framework for another attempt at coercing and containing the student movement.” Accordingly, it called for a boycott of the student elections scheduled for 15 March.209

207 Our Struggle, Issue # 3 1972.

208 Minutes of the University Senate Meeting, 31 January 1972.

D. Back to Business: the Engineering Brawl

Meanwhile, events off campus, as on campus, were to play into the hands of Fateh. Towards the end of February, the PLO was engaged in serious fighting on the Lebanese border with Israel, and rumors reached Beirut that the Lebanese army had intercepted a Palestinian supply convoy heading toward the battle front. These rumors sparked large-scale student demonstrations in the Muslim parts of Beirut; and in AUB, Palestinian and pro-Palestinian students joined the protest by declaring an open strike. After occupying Nicely Hall and thereby gaining control of the upper campus, they advanced to the lower campus to occupy the Engineering Building.210 The Rabita members were gathered there in force to prevent the occupation of the building, which was generally regarded as their turf, and a violent clash followed, in which thirteen students were wounded, in some cases seriously. 211

Once the fighting had subsided out of sheer exhaustion, Kirkwood declared the University closed until further notice.212 At the same time, he asked professors Charles Malik and Kamal Salibi acting as representatives of the Lebanese side, and Professors Walid Khalidi and Zuhayr Alami as representatives of the Palestinian side, to hold as many talks as needed among themselves, and with Fawaz Najiya who was the general supervisor of student activities in Fateh, with the aim of working out a mechanism to prevent Lebanese-Palestinian clashes on campus from occurring again.213 The

210 Nasri Nakhoul. Interviewed by Author, Beirut-Lebanon.

211 According to Fathi al-Biss, who was a Fateh activist in his first year at AUB, the Rabita tried to prevent the occupation of Nicely Hall with great savagery, which explains why the Palestinian and pro-Palestinian groups decided to challenge the Rabita on its own turf by trying to occupy the Engineering Building. Fathi al-Biss. Interviewed by Author, Beirut-Lebanon.

212 An-Nahar, 2 March 1972.

213 Kamal Salibi. Interviewed by Author, Beirut-Lebanon.
outcome was the formation of an unofficial body composed of the participants in the talks, to act as a crisis-response team and to maintain a hotline among them, so as to prevent any future buildup of tension which could result in clashes.214 Once the mechanism of this team was ready for application, Kirkwood announced the reopening of the University on 8 March, in time to prepare for the election of the Student Council. On the whole, Fateh was satisfied with the outcome, as it stood to gain nothing from repeated confrontations between Palestinians and Lebanese students on campus.215

E. Fateh Regains the Council

As the electoral campaign began, the SCAC, as a front for Fateh, was bombarded time and again with allegations of betraying the student movement by endorsing the formula for student representation stipulated by the Senate. In response to these allegations, the SCAC published *Lookout* on the morning of Election Day which contained an elaborate justification of Fateh’s stand. Interestingly, *Lookout* also contained a list of the SCAC-backed candidates, which, surprisingly, included the name of Rabi` al-Assir, the most prominent champion for the Student Union.216 It seems that the Organization for Student Struggle, after realizing that the Student Council was now a reality, decided to secure for itself a place on it, no matter the question of principle.

Despite the voices calling for a boycott of the elections, the electoral process proceeded calmly, with a voting percentage ranging between 50% and 90%. The result was a sweeping victory for Fateh, which gained an absolute majority on the Council;217

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214 Kamal Salibi. Interviewed by Author, Beirut-Lebanon.

215 Fathi al-Biss. Interviewed by Author, Beirut-Lebanon.


217 *An-Nahar*, 16 March 1972.
with this Fateh victory, Mohammad Dajani, the head of the Fateh chapter on campus, was elected as president.

Even after Fateh won the Council elections, the contest between the pro-Student Council and pro-Student Union factions (PFLP and other Leftist organizations) continued, this time spilling out to the Speaker’s Corner where the legitimacy of the newly elected Council was challenged. Fateh, however, no longer had patience for such challenges to its now proven hegemony. From its point of view, the Student Council was trodden ground and something it could control, while a Student Union was a venture into the unknown.218 After one session of the Speaker’s Corner in which its policies were attacked, members of the pro-Student Union faction were rounded [by Fateh] and beaten.219

F. The Undeclared Peace

The peace which was brought to the campus by the formation of the Lebano-Palestinian crisis-response team in early March 1972 was to last for more than a year, giving Dajani adequate time to put his house in order. His first action, as president of the Student Council, was to amend its constitution, in preparation for the regular annual elections due to take place toward the end of the semester. These elections were held on 31 May 1972 and, in the same manner as before, the Student Union faction boycotted them, and this time proceeded to announce the establishment of a Student Union, which was initially joined by no more than 200 members then disappeared from the scene.220 Dajani was once again elected president of a Council dominated by Fateh and its

218 Mahmoud Chrieh. Interviewed by Author, Beirut-Lebanon.

219 Barakat, Lebanon in Strife, 177.

sympathizers, with a marginal *Rabita* representation.

It was only in the spring of the following year that a succession of events on the Lebanese scene brought the undeclared peace on campus to an end. The first of these events was related to the holding of what was called the First Congress of Education which was organized at the UNESCO Palace through the initiative of the Lebanese University Student Union, which called for the reform of government schools and the recognition of the rights of teachers in these schools.\(^{221}\) Students from different Lebanese universities later on went to the streets in support of the demands of this congress. And when the general assembly of the AUB Student Council, on 6 April 1973, decided to join the protest, Bliss Street was turned into a battlefield between the students and the Lebanese security forces.\(^{222}\)

The second event, which followed four days later, was of far more serious consequence. In the early morning of 10 April 1973, an Israeli hit squad landed in Beirut, made its way to the heart of the city, and assassinated three leading members of the PLO, (Kamal Adwan, Mohammad al-Najjar and Kamal Nasser), in their beds, and was able to retreat practically unharmed.\(^{223}\) Three days later, the funeral of the three slain leaders turned into a public protest against the failure of the Lebanese army and security authorities to respond to the Israeli raid. Further complicating the matter was a standoff between the Maronite Christian president Suleiman Franjiya and the Sunni Muslim Prime Minister Saeb Salam who demanded the immediate resignation of the

\(^{221}\) *An-Nahar*, 16 March 1973.

\(^{222}\) *Outlook*, 18 April 1973.

Maronite Army commander, Iskandar Ghanem for failure to engage the enemy.\textsuperscript{224} The refusal of Franjiya to meet this demand led to Salam’s resignation, and no other front-ranking Sunni politician was willing to replace him as Prime Minister. Accordingly, Franjiya had to search for a replacement among Sunni politicians of less prominent rank, his choice fell finally on Amin al-Hafez who was well-known for his pro-Palestinian sympathies.\textsuperscript{225}

Hafez had not yet completed forming his cabinet in late April when three Fateh commandos were arrested at Beirut International Airport carrying bags of explosives, as they were boarding a flight to Europe. Next, five commandos belonging to the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) carrying weapons and explosives were arrested in the vicinity of the American Embassy on the Ras-Beirut seafront. In response, the DFLP abducted three Lebanese soldiers for exchange with their arrested comrades.\textsuperscript{226} This action on the part of DFLP prompted the Lebanese army to take up positions around the Palestinian refugee camps in the suburbs of Beirut, and on 2 May fighting broke out between the two sides.\textsuperscript{227} From AUB, Palestinian and pro-Palestinian activists hastened to join the Palestinian resistance in the besieged camps.\textsuperscript{228}

This confrontation between the Palestinians and the Lebanese army continued for eighteen days during which the camps were subjected to repeated attacks, with the


\textsuperscript{225} Ibid, 67.

\textsuperscript{226} Salibi, \textit{Crossroads to Civil War}, 68.

\textsuperscript{227} Khazen, 277.

\textsuperscript{228} Fathi al-Biss and Nidal Saab. Interviewed by Author, Beirut-Lebanon.
Lebanese Air Force occasionally joining in the offensive.\textsuperscript{229} Intervention of the Arab League brought the fighting to an end, but the tensions which had meanwhile built up between the two sides could not be dealt with as easily. For the duration of the fighting, the educational institutions in the country were officially closed, but with the fighting over, they could now reopen. Accordingly, the government announced that all schools and universities would resume their normal functions on the morning of Monday 28 May. In AUB, the reopening of the institution was to provide the test as to whether or not the undeclared peace between the Rabita and the Palestinians still held.

G. The Day of the Slingshots

On the first day of the resumption of classes, a small group of approximately fifteen Lebanese leftists organized a march through campus to protest the events of the past three weeks.\textsuperscript{230} This march, had not been officially called for by the Student Council, but was nonetheless perfunctorily chaperoned by Mohammad Dajani in his capacity as president. Other than Dajani, there was not a single Palestinian student in the march.\textsuperscript{231} Upon reaching College Hall, the protesters stood under the window of Kirkwood’s office and started uttering obscenities against President Franjiya.\textsuperscript{232}

The following morning, approximately 100 Rabita members armed with batons and slingshots, and wearing hardhats, stood on the stairs of the Main Gate prepared to attack any Palestinian who tried to enter the campus. The Rabita was clearly on the

\textsuperscript{229} Khazen, 278.

\textsuperscript{230} \textit{Al-`Amal}, 30 May 1973

\textsuperscript{231} Kamal Salibi. Interviewed by Author, Beirut-Lebanon. Salibi recalls seeing the march from the window of his office on the fourth floor of College Hall and recognizing the participants.

\textsuperscript{232} Ibid.
warpath; and on the street outside, Lebanese security forces stood armed and ready to intervene. The Rabita explained the reason for its protest in a statement which condemned the insults hurled against Franjiya on the presumably pro-Palestinian march the previous day’s as an “attack on Lebanon’s sovereignty… which the Rabita cannot remain idle to (sic.).” Megaphones installed on the premises of the security office right by the Main Gate denounced the Palestinians as saboteurs. A skirmish followed at the Main Gate between the Rabita and a handful of pro-Palestinian students who managed to break through the Rabita blockade and get on campus. But the real fighting started when the Rabita advanced to attack the Palestinian boarding students who were having breakfast in the cafeteria. What aggravated the situation at this point was the Rabita’s use of slingshots and glass marbles in their attack, which the Palestinian students successfully repelled through the use of food trays available to them in the cafeteria and other defense means at their disposal. According to Outlook, the official mouthpiece of the Pro-palestinian Student Council “as it became clear that the Rabita would not be able to achieve a decisive victory over the Palestinians single-handedly, the service doors next to the Security Office were thrown open and the armed police waiting outside stormed the campus, throwing their weight on the side of the Rabita with no pretence to the contrary.” Then, somewhat mysteriously the security forces calmed down, and the University was closed for the rest of the day. A total of

233 Outlook, 8 June 1973.


235 Kamal Salibi. Interviewed by Author, Beirut-Lebanon.

236 Ibid.

237 Outlook, 8 June 1973.

238 Ibid.
eighteen students had meanwhile sustained injuries, three of whom were hospitalized.\textsuperscript{239}

The undeclared peace which had stood for more than a year was now shattered. Whatever efforts had been exerted by members of the crisis-response team to prevent the outbreak of violence once more between the Lebanese and Palestinian sides were nullified when Charles Malik came openly supported the \textit{Rabita} aggression.\textsuperscript{240} The Palestinians were indeed aware that the \textit{Rabita} they had once known and fought was something other than the one they confronted that day. As Outlook put it:

\begin{quote}
The Lebanese League has always assumed a defensive position deliberately, never [entering] a fight unless provoked…. It appears that a far more extreme right-wing element of a different mentality and leadership was the source [of the aggression], for \textit{Outlook} does not recall that the Lebanese League has ever prodded for violence, or that Malik ever had a central position in student disturbances, or the administration has ever invited the police to beat up progressive students.\textsuperscript{241}
\end{quote}

From this point on, there could no longer be any grounds for trust and understanding between the \textit{Rabita} and the Palestinian camp at AUB. Perhaps far more important was the conviction, which developed among the Palestinians, throughout the country, that the Lebanese state was out to get them. Similarly the conviction struck root among the Palestinians and their allies at AUB that the University administration was an accessory to this anti-Palestinian conspiracy.\textsuperscript{242}

\section*{H. The Council of Dbayeh}

The events of April and May 1973 greatly radicalized the Palestinians,

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\item \textsuperscript{239} \textit{An-Nahar}, 30 May 1973.
\item \textsuperscript{240} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{241} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{242} Fathi al-Biss. Interviewed by Author, Beirut-Lebanon.
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particularly at the lower echelon of their student cadres. Sometime during the summer of that year, approximately 50 AUB Fateh activists held a meeting in the church of the Debaye refugee camp, north of Beirut, to consider the restructuring of Fateh’s student sector. The Central Committee of Fateh was represented at this meeting by Hamdan Ashour who supervised Fateh’s activities in Lebanon, reporting directly to Yasser Arafat. Initially, membership in Fateh’s al-Tanzim al-Tullabi (student organization) entailed adherence to a ten-point code which regulated membership, discipline and even manners, and most importantly the recognition of the concept of “centralized democracy”. This form of tailored democracy involved the supervision of student activists not by elected but by appointed officers who, in most cases, were never to be held accountable except to their hierarchical superiors.

Originally, Fateh did not subscribe to any particular ideology, but was rather a coalition of diverse elements dedicated to the struggle to liberate Palestine. With time, however, there emerged a school of thought within Fateh that drew its inspirations from the teachings of Mao Tse-Tung; and this school of thought gained special popularity within the ranks of Fateh’s student sector. The chief ideologues of this school were Naji Aloush and Mounir Chafik, who called for the democratization of the Fateh movement. According to Fathi al-Biss, who was then a supporter of this Maoist school, the Debaye meeting, which he personally attended, was not concerned with any ideological issue, but it was in disapproval of Fateh’s “centralized democracy”:

We were of the view that as a student organization which operated in a restricted milieu, it was not proper for the Central Committee to appoint our officers. This right, we believed, should be given to the members of the student organization which should have a say in its

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244 Mahmoud Chrieh. Interviewed by Author, Beirut-Lebanon.
own affairs.\textsuperscript{245}

This call for democratization was directed mainly against the representatives of the Central Committee\textsuperscript{246} who wielded actual control of the Fateh student organization. In the case of AUB, it was directed against the person of Mohammad Dajani who, by 1973, had served for six consecutive years as leader of the AUB Fateh Chapter and was considered by many to be Arafat’s man. Dajani stayed in AUB for 11 years from 1963 to 1974. After 1967, he would go to Damascus every weekend, get the Fateh military communiqué and carry it on his person back to Beirut for circulation among the news agencies: an act which was considered illegal by the Lebanese authorities.\textsuperscript{247} Dajani had links with Arafat either directly or through Hamdan Ashour. Arafat allegedly liked Dajani because he came from a prominent and rich family from Jerusalem.\textsuperscript{248}

At Debye meeting, the Maoists and their supporters demanded that the officers of the Fateh student organization at AUB be elected. This demand was opposed by Dajani and his supporters, who had come to realize that they stood no chance of winning any future elections.\textsuperscript{249} Before too long, however, the demand of the Maoist faction could no longer be resisted, and elections were ultimately held at a PLO venue in the Sabra-Chatila refugee compound in the southern outskirts of Beirut. At these elections, the Maoist faction won by a landslide, and Dajani and his supporters walked out on the organization to form a front on their own. Eddie Zananiri, who replaced him as the Fateh strongman in AUB, was a man of a different temperament who stayed in

\textsuperscript{245} Fathi al-Biss. Interviewed by Author, Beirut-Lebanon.

\textsuperscript{246} Fateh Central Committee was chaired by Yasser Arafat.

\textsuperscript{247} Mohammad Dajani. Interviewed by Author, Beirut-Lebanon.

\textsuperscript{248} Mahmoud Chrieh. Interviewed by Author, Beirut-Lebanon.

\textsuperscript{249} Ibid.
the background and had other people front for him.

The democratic takeover of the Fateh student organization at AUB by the radicals set the trend for all other Fateh student chapters in Lebanon, as elections everywhere brought to office majorities sympathetic with the Maoists.\textsuperscript{250} The GUPS elections, which followed, were also won by the Fateh radicals, after they had forged an alliance with the PFLP and other Palestinian Leftists. In these elections, Zananiri won a seat on the Executive Committee of GUPS, running against the candidate representing the Fateh Central Committee.\textsuperscript{251}

According to Mahmud Shurayh who walked out of the Fateh student organization at AUB with Dajani, the reason why the Maoist faction took over the leadership of the student cadres of the movement everywhere in the country was the fact that Yasser Arafat, by 1973, was too preoccupied with the predicament of the PLO in Lebanon to pay much attention to the change of leadership in the Fateh student sector. Moreover, Arafat, never a man given to splitting hairs over ideological issues may not have realized the dangers of permitting his movement to develop Marxist orientation.\textsuperscript{252}

\textsuperscript{250} Fathi al-Biss. Interviewed by Author, Beirut-Lebanon.

\textsuperscript{251} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{252} Mahmoud Chrieh. Interviewed by Author, Beirut-Lebanon.
CHAPTER VII

THE 1974 STRIKE

The start of the academic year 1973-74 coincided with the outbreak of the fourth Arab-Israeli war. The newly elected Student Council at AUB, with Mohammad Mattar\textsuperscript{253} as president, mobilized the student body by creating four committees to support the war effort: a medical committee, a fund-raising committee, a follow-up committee and a ‘popular work’ committee.\textsuperscript{254} These committees turned AUB into a beehive of activity involving blood donation drives, fund-raising activities, and the digging of trenches and building of shelters in the Palestinian refugee camps. The Council also organized a series of lectures for the boosting of student morale.\textsuperscript{255} When the UN imposed a cease-fire bringing the war to an end seventeen days after it had started, and calling for the establishment of a just and durable peace in the Middle East, the PLO accepted the cease-fire but was reluctant to participate in peace negotiations, as such a move on its part would imply a recognition of Israel.\textsuperscript{256} In AUB, however, the Student Council, now dominated by the Maoists, took a far more radical position, organizing a march through the streets of Beirut which denounced the cease-fire and called for the continuation of the ‘armed struggle’.\textsuperscript{257} In a further defiance of Fateh

\textsuperscript{253} Mattar was a prominent member of the Maoist faction within Fateh’ student sector

\textsuperscript{254} The Student Council Bulletin, October 1973.

\textsuperscript{255} Outlook, 19 October 1973.

\textsuperscript{256} Kamal Salibi, The Modern History of Jordan, 255.

\textsuperscript{257} Outlook, 26 October 1973.
authority, the Council invited two outspoken critics of Fateh policy, Salah Salah of the PFLP and Tareq Ahmad of the Iraqi-backed Arab Liberation Front, to lecture on the occasion of Balfour Day.\footnote{Outlook, 3 November 1973.} Furthermore, AUB students joined in country-wide student demonstrations against the visit of US Assistant- Secretary of State Joseph Sisco, who was touring the area to set the ground for peace.\footnote{Le-Pottier, “Student Activism at the Eve of the Civil War”, 30.} In this connection, Rabi` al-Asir, first Vice President of the Student Council, was arrested by the Lebanese authorities at Beirut International Airport for verbally assaulting Sisco.\footnote{Outlook, 9 November 1973.} Clearly, the student discourse at AUB under the new leadership of the Student Council was going to be radically different from what it had been before.

A. The 10% Increase…Again

On 26 November, while AUB students were still preoccupied with the aftermath of the ‘October War’, the AUB Board of Trustees announced a 10% increase in tuition fees for the upcoming year 1974-1975. Normally, the student reaction to such unilateral decisions would go through stages, often to end with a compromise. This time however, the decision to increase tuition was interpreted by the Leftist student factions to be part of a more sinister scheme which involved the transformation of the University into an elitist institution restricted to the upper bourgeoisie of the area.\footnote{Outlook, 30 November 1973.} It would be interesting to consider here why the AUB administration chose that particular moment to announce this increase. Was this decision to raise tuition simply a poor decision on the part of the administration, or was AUB really facing financial complications?

\footnote{Outlook, 3 November 1973.}
\footnote{Le-Pottier, “Student Activism at the Eve of the Civil War”, 30.}
\footnote{Outlook, 9 November 1973.}
\footnote{Outlook, 30 November 1973.}
Possibly, the AUB administration was aware that the Fateh leadership on campus had passed into the hands of unpredictable radicals with whom it was necessary to have a showdown at the earliest opportunity. Or else, that the University authorities knew that a change had taken place in the nature of the Fateh leadership on campus, and chose the issue of tuition increase as a ploy to test the new grounds. In whichever case, the early and untimely announcement of the intended tuition increase indicates that the administration, for one reason or another was looking for trouble.

Before the Student Council started serious negotiations with the administration over the issue of the tuition increase, it launched through *Outlook* a ferocious attack against AUB for its alleged connections to the American imperialist policy.\(^{262}\) Next, on November 29, it met with Kirkwood who reaffirmed the University’s decision on the tuition increase as being final, while the students argued that the pursuit of such a policy by the University would disfranchise students of the “lower socio-economic sector of society.”\(^{263}\) Shortly after, the Council demanded to review the AUB financial records which, they maintained, would prove that the true cause for the deficit was not the increasing cost of education, but the extravagant expenditures resulting from the mismanagement of the budget.\(^{264}\) Kirkwood responded to the demands of the Council in a letter dated 18 December, which elaborated on the questions of the cost of education and budget management, to reaffirm the University’s need to raise tuition.\(^{265}\) Simultaneously and in reply to Kirkwood, *Outlook* ran an article entitled “AUB and its

\(^{262}\) *Outlook*, 30 November 1973, Arabic Supplement.

\(^{263}\) *Outlook*, 4 December 1974.

\(^{264}\) Open Letter to President Kirkwood, 4 December 1974.

\(^{265}\) Chronology of the AUB Student Strike- March 18 to May 6, 1974. (See Appendix III)
Role in the Arab World Since 1948” by a group calling themselves ‘Concerned Students’.266 This article attacked the AUB administration as “hysterically campaigning to convince the public of its fake financial crisis,” and proceeded to accuse the administration and the Board of Trustees of serving the CIA and American oil companies. In conclusion, the article declared:

Since 1948, AUB never was nor is now a private institution but rather an institution controlled by the government of a foreign country which pays one-third to one-half of its yearly budget…. AUB should not be free to offer an education geared towards the political, economic and perhaps military needs of a foreign power at the expense of the overall development of the people of this area.267

B. Ready for the Battle

For the next two months, negotiations between the Student Council and the administration continued monotonously without achieving any breakthrough. Finally, on 28 February 1974, the Council issued an ultimatum announcing that it is “ready to go to battle,” as it had done in 1971, unless its demands were met by 18 March.268 This time, the Council summarized its demands in a leaflet269 distributed to the student body and cabled to the Board of Trustees in New York, calling effectively for the following:

• The cancellation of the 10% increase in tuition fees

• Student participation in the Admissions, Scholarship and Curriculum Committees as well as in the Senate

266 *Outlook*, 19 December 1973. This group did make an appearance in the 1971 strike fronting for the JYA students (see chapter IV). However there is no evidence here to affirm the same.


269 Communiqué by the Student Council, 28 February 1974.
• The augmentation of scholarships and in particular those granted to new students
• The preservation of departments and schools that were due for closure or merger\textsuperscript{270}
• The amendment of the new entrance exam
• The appointment of a genuine Arab Dean of the school of Arts & Sciences

This last demand only appeared in the telegram sent to the Board of Trustees, and clearly involves a slur against Elie Salem who was being considered for the deanship at the time, and was considered by the Student Council to be an agent of the administration. Salem (an American citizen by marriage) was actually appointed Dean of the Arts and Sciences later in the same month.\textsuperscript{271}

The willingness to ‘go to war’ over these demands was reflected in \textit{Outlook}, which published a series of articles, dwelling on the lessons learnt from the students’ previous encounter with the administration in May 1971. One such article, entitled “Cleavage 1971: Bitter Lesson,” deals with the implications of the 1971 \textit{Rabita} walkout which ended the occupation of buildings, and warns of the need to avoid such a predicament in the future.\textsuperscript{272} Another article entitled “United We Stand, Divided We Fall” also appeared in the same issue of \textit{Outlook}, stressing the importance of a united student front against the administration that can “receive and deliver blows

\textsuperscript{270} A Program Study Committee was established in 1972 by the AUB Board of Trustees to investigate ways to cut down on expenditures. The committee recommended the closure of the School of Pharmacy and the discontinuation of a number of programs (Mass Communications, Fine Arts, Religious Studies, etc). \textit{Outlook}, 9 March 1973.

\textsuperscript{271} \textit{Outlook}, 9 November 1973, Arabic Supplement. This issue included an all-out attack against Elie Salem, and accuses him of showing pro-Arab sentiment to improve his chances for the deanship.

\textsuperscript{272} \textit{Outlook}, 4 March 1974.
effectively.273

While waiting for the administration’s reply to their list of demands, AUB students joined those of other universities and high schools in calling for a reform of the Lebanese educational system. On 5 March 1974, students in Beirut clashed with Lebanese security forces as they attempted a march to the House of Parliament, and the brutal manner in which they were manhandled unleashed a succession of student protests which swept the capital for the next week.274

On 16 March, two days before the end of the Student Council ultimatum, Kirkwood communicated the negative response of the Board of Trustees to the Council demands in a letter addressed to “all the AUB Faculty and Students.” In this letter, Kirkwood justified the Board’s action as being necessary for the academic and financial survival of AUB. The letter concluded by wishfully appealing to the students that:

The Faculty and Staff, the administration and, I am sure, students themselves and the people of the Middle East do not want to see AUB drastically changed in structure or forced to close for either financial or academic reasons. I believe that I can count on the support of all concerned in helping to prevent these dangers. I pledge also that the academic standards of the University’s program will not be allowed to fall nor its degrees to lose their value.275

Kirkwood’s reply to the demands of the students seems to have intentionally disregarded the position of the student activists who, by now, were uncompromising in their demands. Furthermore, the prevailing attitude among these activists, as most of their statements reflect, was extremely anti-establishment, some going as far as to call

273 Outlook, 4 March 1974.

274 Outlook, 11 March 1974.

275 Letter addressed to the Faculty and Students of the American University of Beirut, 16 March 1974.
their university “Hamburger U.”276 This being the case, the reply of the Student Council to Kirkwood’s appeal which Mohammad Mattar sent him the following day, was remorseless:

The Council became more convinced than before that this [tuition increase] does not aim at meeting the critical financial position of the University, but rather at making AUB more an elitist university in accordance with the aims of section 214 of the US Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 [to demonstrate to the people on a very selected basis American ideas and practices and advances in the fields of education and medicine], under which AUB gets about one-third of its yearly budget…. You asked for our help to support this institution. The manner in which you, the Senate, and the Board of Trustees responded to our demands shows your primary purpose was NOT to support this institution to serve the needs of the area but rather to fulfill the aims of Section 214.277

In its first act of escalation, the Student Council convened a general assembly on 18 March, where Mattar reaffirmed the refusal of the tuition increase and called for an one hour’s sit-in at College Hall. The students next proceeded to the third floor of College Hall, where the offices of the senior administration and the president were located, chanting: “No to the 10 %! No to Imperialism!”278 It was obvious by now that the scene was set for a full-scale confrontation.

C. Occupation! Occupation!

The next day, approximately 1000 students marched on campus, ostensibly at their own initiative, and started shouting “Occupation! Occupation!”, as they reached

276 In a press conference, Howard Page Chairman of the AUB Board of Trustees, made an analogy between the cost of the superior education provided by AUB and the cost of a high-quality hamburger sandwich served at the luxurious Saint-George Hotel, where he was staying. The majority of students thought this analogy socially inconsiderate. (Remarks of Fathi al-Biss as reported in Outlook, 4 March 1974).

277 Letter addressed to President Kirkwood from the Student Council, 17 March 1974.

Jessup Hall. Once the building was occupied, the march continued to the Agriculture Building and the Physics and Biology Building which were occupied in the same manner. Clearly, the Student Council was behind these moves, although it denied the fact to the press.\textsuperscript{279} It is worth noting here, that on the previous day, students at Beirut University College (BUC), now the Lebanese American University (LAU), occupied university buildings after the failure of negotiations with the administration over an 8% tuition increase.\textsuperscript{280}

After the student occupation of buildings at AUB and BUC, the student unions of all Lebanese universities and institutes of higher learning issued a statement on 19 March calling for a demonstration which would start from AUB and head for the Ministry of Education.\textsuperscript{281} The following day, 5000 students marched to the Ministry of Education and attempted to storm its building, but were stopped by the security forces who dispersed the demonstrators with considerable brutality. This was only the beginning of a succession of similar clashes which erupted that day in the streets of Beirut, ending with the arrest of 80 students, among them, Student Council president, Mohammad Mattar.\textsuperscript{282} The next day, AUB students occupied West Hall and the Security Office and took over control of all the university gates (Main Gate, Medical Gate, Sea Gate, Faculty Gate and the International College Gate).\textsuperscript{283} Once these measures had been taken, the Student Council sent a letter to the faculty requesting their

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{279} \textit{An-Nahar}, 20 March 1974.
  \item \textsuperscript{280} \textit{An-Nahar}, 19 March 1974.
  \item \textsuperscript{281} \textit{An-Nahar}, 20 March 1974.
  \item \textsuperscript{282} \textit{Al-Muharrir}, 21 March 1974.
  \item \textsuperscript{283} Chronology of the AUB Student Strike- March 18 to May 6, 1974. (See Appendix III)
\end{itemize}
support in their “struggle for cultural liberation and freedom.” In that same letter, the University administration was accused of concealing the fact that it had recently purchased half a million Lebanese pounds’ worth of real-estate in the vicinity of AUB, which proved that the claims of a budget deficit where suspect.

The ongoing strike, however, and the accusations hurled by the Student Council at the AUB administration do not appear to have provoked any reaction on its part, except for the successive communiqués it issued reminding the students and their parents of the necessity of resuming the University’s academic functions so that the semester would not be lost, and that AUB would not be compelled to be close down.

It is also further worth noting that the University Senate, considering that the survival of the University was allegedly at stake, did not convene once during the first week of the strike. The only official meeting that was held that week, on Sunday 24 March, was between the Student Council and the Deans of the faculties, but nothing was achieved at this meeting.

On the same day, the Harrington Committee, commissioned by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), arrived in Beirut to review AUB’s academic program for the purpose of funding, as it had done in 1966. According to the Student Council, however, the purpose of this committee’s visit was to check if AUB was still “applying on a very selected basis the American ideas and practices in the field of education and medicine.” Consequently, the Harrington Committee was given a very “warm welcome” the striking students attacking it because

284 Student Council Letter to AUB Faculty Members, 21 March 1974.


288 Outlook, 18 March 1974.
of United States support to Israel:

We are striking because we do not want to be divorced from the problems of our society. This concern is what the administration calls “politicized.” We refuse the ivory towers. We refuse section 214. We do not want help from those who gave 2,200 million dollars to Israel.289

D. Faculty Mediation

The absence of dialogue between the Student Council and the administration opened the way for some members of the faculty to mediate between the two sides; but the mediation failed because the administration refused to show any flexibility.290 In retaliation, students occupied Fisk Hall and the School of Medicine on 25 March.291 The Student Council had earlier attempted to rally the support of the Lebanese political factions to its side by arranging to meet Camille Chamoun, the President of the right-wing National Liberal Party (NLP). There is no record, however, of what transpired from that meeting. Next, the Council met with Kamal Jumblatt, the President of the left-wing Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) which was represented in the cabinet by two ministers. Jumblatt showed half-hearted support for the student occupation of AUB buildings and proposed that either the tuition increase be restricted to the students who were well-off, or that the government subsidize the tuition increase without otherwise interfering in the affairs of the University--- a major departure from the position he had taken in 1971 (see Chapter V).292 The members of the Student Council were naturally


290 An-Nahar, 26 March 1974. ( Fathi al-Biss affirmed this to be the case in an interview)

291 Chronology of the AUB Student Strike- March 18 to May 6, 1974.

disappointed with the outcome of this meeting, which is perhaps why the PSP newspaper *Al-Anba* made an attempt to placate them when it stated shortly after that the “AUB policy of education was directly connected to that of the United States which is attempting to stifle the Progressive National Movement.” As well, it is possible that Jumblatt was aware that Yasser Arafat and the PLO leadership did not support the decision taken by the youth chapter of Fateh to confront the AUB administration. According to Fathi al-Biss, he and other senior AUB student leaders of Fateh were summoned at the time by Yasser Arafat and told quite plainly that if they got themselves into trouble with the AUB administration or the Lebanese authorities the PLO will not lift a finger to help them.

**E. The AUB Administration Hits Back**

As the strike entered its second week, AUB commenced a campaign to de-legitimize the Student Council by showing that its actions did not represent the majority of the student body. A student group calling themselves “the Nucleus,” and believed to be acting in compliance with the administration, issued a communiqué reminding the students to speak up for themselves, express their own ideas, and not “let others think on their behalf.” Another move of this kind was made when two separate groups calling themselves ‘Concerned Graduates’ and ‘Concerned Parents’, and also believed to be serving the interests of the administration, petitioned Kirkwood to immediately end the strike regardless of the student demands. The Student Council dismissed the

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293 *Al-Anba*, 19 April 1974.

294 Interview with Fateh al-Biss.


attacks by these groups as being attempts to divide the student movement, and urged students to give unconditional support to the Council.\textsuperscript{297}

The Student Council, undeterred by the faculty’s earlier failure to resolve the ongoing crisis by mediation, approached Kamal Salibi, former advisor to the \textit{Rabita}, and asked him to intervene on their behalf. Salibi, known to be a die-hard Lebanese nationalist, surprised many when he suddenly turned to championing the student cause.\textsuperscript{298} As he explains it, he accepted to help the students after he observed the degree of organization which had gone into the running of the strike, which was in itself “an education which ought to be encouraged regardless of whether right or wrong.”\textsuperscript{299} On 27 March, Salibi, along with Abu Haydar and other faculty who felt that the ongoing crisis must be resolved “in a manner that preserves the dignity of the students,”\textsuperscript{300} met with the Student Council in Abu Haydar’s home and drafted a motion of four items to be presented to the University Senate:

- That an appeals Committee on Admissions be established within the framework of the Student Council with the right to study the files of rejected worthy students and recommend reconsideration by the Faculty Admissions Committees
- That student membership in the Faculty Scholarship committee be admitted, the students to be chosen by the administration from among a panel of Senior students of good academic standard presented by the Student Council
- That as much as necessary of the income accruing from the 10 % increase in fees be made available to supplement current scholarship funds, specially for worthy

\textsuperscript{297} Outlook, Arabic Supplement, 1 April 1974.
\textsuperscript{298} Gordon, p 198-199.
\textsuperscript{299} Interview with Kamal Salibi.
\textsuperscript{300} Ibid.
new students

- That upon the suspension of the strike and evacuation of the University buildings by the students the cabinet of the Student Council be immediately invited to the Senate to discuss the future of the University.\footnote{Minutes of University Senate, 27 March 1974.}

Salibi presented this motion to the Senate on the evening of the same day; it was tabled, and later removed from the table and defeated. What passed instead was a substitute motion reiterating the position of the administration “that it will not consider any issue under the condition of a strike or threat of a strike or the use of force of any kind, and reaffirms its support for the president in his implementation of this policy.”\footnote{Ibid.}

The Student Council responded to the vote taken by the Senate by issuing a statement accusing Kirkwood of refusing to negotiate even after the students abstained from escalating the strike for two days. The statement ended by throwing the ball into Kirkwood’s court: “as students, we can do no more than this. As the President of this university, how much more can Dr. Kirkwood do.”\footnote{Who is Refusing to Negotiate? Statement issued by the Student Council dated 28 March 1974.}

The firm position both sides took on this matter prompted 22 professors, most of them senate members, to issue a collective pledge that same evening, to the following effect:

> We the undersigned, members of the faculty, fully conscious that the AUB students have the genuine interest of the University at heart, and that they are concerned in a proper student representation on Faculty Admissions and Scholarships Committees, pledge ourselves, as soon as the situation on campus is normalized by the evacuation of buildings and the call off of the strike, to pursue the considerations of these questions, in the proper university bodies, in the most positive
and receptive spirit.304

Two days later, on 29 March, an open meeting of students and faculty was held in West Hall, at which at least ten senate members were present.305 In a moving speech, Constantine Zurayk reaffirmed to the student body that the pledge he and 21 other faculty members had signed was the best possible solution to the deadlock between the students and the administration, and that the students had “his personal guarantee that their demands would be met.”306 Taking the floor to respond, Mohammad Mattar assured the faculty present that the Student Council had the utmost respect to the pledge presented by his esteemed professor. As it stood, however, this pledge was incomplete because it responded to the demand regarding the concept of student participation, and to no other. As well, Mattar reminded his audience of a similar 1971 A&S faculty initiative which, according to him, only led to the dissolution of the Student Council and the suspension of 22 student activists (see Chapter IV). Mattar wondered, in conclusion, what would make the Senate and the administration that had refused to consider the student demands before the start of the strike suddenly, take a different position on the issue once the students call off their strike.307

Following this meeting, the idea of the faculty pledge was pursued no further, and it seems clear, in retrospect, that the days when AUB students could be swayed by faculty charisma were over.

304 Outlook, 1 April 1974.

305 An-Nahar, 30 March 1974. The Senate members present, Constantine Zurayk, Kamal Salibi, Lutfi Diab, Samir Seikaly, David Gordon, Nabil Shaath, Edmond Chouiri, Suhail Jabbour, Harry Mavromatis, in addition to Robert Najemy, in his capacity as Dean of Students.

306 Kamal Salibi. Interviewed by Author, Beirut-Lebanon.

On 1 April, the Student Council called for a general assembly to update the student body on the on-going events and brief them on the latest talks with the faculty. Addressing the assembly, Mattar commended the AUB faculty for their understanding and solidarity with student demands, and attacked the administration for closing all channels of communications with the students. Mattar declared that “the administration’s inflexibility will in no way affect our struggle to improve the University” and that “the students’ mission is still in its beginning and will be followed through to the end.” Upon the adjournment of the assembly, the students proceeded to march by College Hall and in the same manner as before started shouting Occupation! Occupation! The students next stormed the building and evicted the employees from their offices. Shortly after, they withdrew, leaving the Occupation Committee to guard the building. According to Fathi al-Biss, the occupation of College Hall was not planned by the Student Council, but was a spontaneous reaction to the inflexibility of the administration.

F. The institutionalization of the Strike

What is worth noting, and in fact admiring, was the efficiency with which the strike became institutionalized, so that within two weeks the Student Council was in virtual control of the University. Under its leadership, the students had organized themselves into subcommittees each of which having a specific function. Receiving their instructions from a Central Command, the Occupation Committees directly supervised the occupied buildings, each of these committees having a codename which

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308 An-Nahar, 2 April 1974.
309 Ibid.
310 Fathi al-Biss. Interviewed by Author, Beirut-Lebanon.
would be used to pass instructions over the internal telephone network or over the megaphones. The Security Committees guarded the access points to the campus, controlled entries and patrolled the grounds. The Rations Committee supplied all the committees on duty with food and refreshments, which were sometimes offered free of charge by some restaurants on Bliss Street. The Media Committee, equipped with a mimeograph machine and typewriters was alone responsible to reply to official correspondence and circulars. This committee also operated a small radio transmitter which broadcast over megaphones strategically placed around the campus, and frequently used in campaigns to harass the members of the AUB administration residing on campus.

The radio station made life on campus unbearable, as it would start its uninterrupted daily broadcast at five o’clock in the morning with a daily wakeup call to the president and his wife: “Good Morning Dr. Kirkwood! Good Morning Mrs. Kirkwood! or Good Morning Samuel! Good Morning Sunny!” Occasionally, the students went so far as to throw firecrackers at Marquand House or to make prank phone calls to the President and the Deans in the middle of the night. Although such actions were perceived by members of the University community as juvenile and in poor taste, the fact remains they were carried out upon instructions of the Student Council to achieve desired effects.

The complete breakdown of communication between the students and the administration opened the way for the AUB Alumni Association, and a free-lancing Committee for Educational Reform headed by Abdullah Mashnouk was called upon to

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312 Kamal Salibi. Interviewed by Author, Beirut-Lebanon.

313 Chronology of the AUB Student Strike- March 18 to May 6, 1974.
intervene in yet another attempt to resolve the University crisis. After a series of meetings with the parties concerned, these two bodies declared that they intended to establish a fund which would be used to cover the fees of any AUB student affected by the 10% tuition increase. The Student Council, however, refused to accept this initiative because it came from a party which had no influence over the administration and no power to guarantee the acceptance of the remaining demands of the students (see p.112).³¹⁴

On 5 April, this last effort at mediation having failed, Kirkwood announced the suspension of the academic program for the year 1973-74, now that it was no longer possible to make up for lost time.³¹⁵ The Student Council did not respond directly to Kirkwood’s decision to suspend the semester, but instead published one of a number of classified documents that had come to into its possession since the occupation of College Hall. This particular document, published in the Leftist daily *al-Muharrir*, was a memorandum addressed by AUB Comptroller Edwin Crocker to John Gill, Director of Operations, which showed that the AUB was indeed covering up its profits so as to remain eligible to receive US government funds.³¹⁶

G. The Rabita Walks Out Again

The *Rabita* had halfheartedly joined the strike shortly after it was announced, when its president, Mounir Karam issued a statement on 20 March calling on all students to “rally around the synidcal means at their disposal” to prevent the tuition

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³¹⁴ *An-Nahar*, 4 April 1974.


As far as the Student Council was concerned, the Rabita was a puppet of the AUB administration, externally backed by the Kata‘ib and the NLP and internally manipulated by Charles Malik and Provost Samir Thabet. Nonetheless, probably in an attempt to keep the Rabita on leash, the Student Council assigned to it the occupation of some university buildings such as Bliss Hall, the Engineering Building and the Pharmacy Building. This arrangement, however, only lasted until 9 April when the four Rabita members of the Student Council resigned, handing over the occupied buildings to the Council and appearing on TV to accuse the Student Council and its president of having “deviated from the aims of the strike.”

The following day, Mounir Karam, flanked by these four members, declared in a press conference that the Rabita had walked out on the strike because the Student Council did not honor its obligation to consult the student body on every action it took, as was customary. Furthermore, Karam accused the Council of refusing to accept the offers made by the Alumni Association and the Mashnouk Committee which, according to him, presented good terms for a settlement. The response of the Student Council to these allegations came on the same day when Mohammad Mattar described the Rabita resignations as “intentionally serving the administration’s plan to divide the student body.”

Mattar also noted that the theatrical appearance of these four Rabita representatives on TV to explain why they had resigned was no live interview but a recording made in advance of

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317 Communiqué by the Lebanese Student League (Mounir Karam), 20 March 1974.

318 Outlook, Arabic Supplement, 18 March 1974.

319 An-Nahar, 10 April 1974.

320 An-Nahar, 11 April 1974.

321 As-Safir, 11 April 1974.
the actual resignations.

The plain fact was, however, that the Rabita walkout did not affect the course of the strike in any significant way. Its change of strategy after 1971, whereby it began to seek representation in a Student Council it could not control rather than maintain its status as a free agent, placed it at an overwhelming disadvantage in a campus dominated by the Palestinians and their Lebanese allies. Moreover, the Student Council had been careful to take the necessary precautions against a possible Rabita walkout, and made it a point to have the buildings it had vacated quickly reoccupied.322

The unannounced arrival of Howard Page, Chairman of the Board of Trustees, to Beirut on 15 April did not break the stalemate between the Student Council and the administration. Contacted by Mattar, Page refused to meet him, declaring that he did not have on his itinerary “a solution to any crisis,”323 and that his trip was for fundraising.

**H. Forbidden Games**

The next day, in its continuing attempts to rally public support for its cause, the Student Council announced that a National Convention would be held on 23 April in which a number of public figures, political parties and syndicates would participate. On the day assigned for the convention, al-Muharrir published another set of classified documents seized by the students from College Hall.324 These documents confirmed AUB’s collusion with US government agencies through the intermediary of the US embassy in Beirut. One document, written by Professor of History Joseph Malone, was

322 Fathi al-Biss. Interviewed by Author, Beirut-Lebanon.

323 As-Safir, 16 April 1974.

324 Al-Muharrir, 23 April 1974.
a response to a request by the assistant military attaché at the American embassy Alfred Brados for an evaluation of four US military officers enrolled at AUB in the Middle East Area Program (MEAP). Another document, addressed by Kirkwood to the US cultural attaché in Beirut, warns that the possible closure of AUB would mean “an end to US financial interests in Beirut and in the region.”

According to Fathi al-Biss, the decision to publish these documents was taken by the Student Council after the complete breakdown of the communications with the administration and the realization that Kirkwood was acting in compliance with the US ambassador and the Lebanese President Suleiman Frangieh. Was the Student Council, at long last, carrying its game into the realm of the forbidden?

Perhaps it was so; for the next day, on 24 April at 2:45 am, 800 Lebanese security men stormed the campus and arrested 61 students occupying the University buildings. This crackdown was carried out with the utmost precision and accuracy after the security forces knocked down the Medical Gate while simultaneously breaking through the other AUB gates. The end of the 37-day occupation of AUB buildings, however, did not put a final end to the strike, as some members of the Student Council escaped arrest and proceeded to launch a campaign to rally public support for their cause. Some even attempted to reoccupy some of the buildings, but they were stopped by the security forces still stationed inside AUB. Meanwhile, the day following the student arrests, the AUB administration announced the suspension of the Student

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326 Fathi al-Biss. Interviewed by Author, Beirut-Lebanon.


328 Ibid.
Council, of* Outlook* and of the Campus yearbook.* Approximately two months later, on 19 July, 103 students were informed by mail that they would not be allowed to register for the next year because their “actions have shown they no longer wish to be associated with AUB.”* 

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330 Gordon, 200.
CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSION

The dissolution of the AUB Student Council, the closure of *Outlook* and the summary expulsion of no less than 103 student activists constituted a blatant departure from the AUB norm. Had the Kirkwood administration simply had enough of the students’ delinquent behavior and decided to put an end to it once and for all? Or were there considerations of some other sort that made the University opt this time for the hard line and pursue it without remorse? One might put the question in another way. Why did the same administration under Kirkwood in 1971, exhibit so much leniency towards the student uprising over the question of a raise in tuition fees, while the uprising on that same question in 1974 was suppressed with relentless severity.

Possibly, Kirkwood’s attitude vis-à-vis the 1974 strike was related to the political changes which occurred in Lebanon and the region between the years 1971-1973. Bearing on it as well was the radicalization undergone by the student sector of Fateh in 1973, which turned AUB into a bastion of the extreme Left, virtually isolated from the moderate Fateh mainstream (see Chapter V). Also important in this connection is the radicalization which also took place inside the AUB rightist factions thus augmenting their already deteriorating relationship with the Palestinians and their Lebanese allies.

The detachment of AUB from its missionary heritage, starting from Penrose’s time, had incurred financial burdens on the institution which could only be effectively made up for by increased reliance on US governmental funds or increased tuition. Thus by 1970-71, AUB was receiving seven million dollars annually in the form of US
government grants, which amounted to 61.9% of its budget. The financial
dependence of the University on US funds made it appear as a quasi-governmental
agency; and although there is no indication that the US government ordered the AUB
administration about, it is only natural to suppose that the AUB, in running its affairs,
did take the US local and regional policy into consideration.

Following the October war, a change was witnessed in the US regional policy,
mainly with respect to the Palestinians. The Americans now pursued a strategy of
dealing with each of the Arab states separately to achieve a settlement in the region
through peace talks, and the recognition of the Palestinians as a concerned regional
party was no longer on their agenda. This led to the development of a Palestinian
sense of insecurity which had its genesis in the 1973 May clashes with the Lebanese
army. As an American institution maintaining links with American academia and
research institutions, AUB was perhaps aware of this new American policy towards the
Palestinians, and felt that no concession should any longer be made to the Palestinian
political presence on campus. The AUB administration was also well aware of the fact
that the Palestinian and Lebanese Leftist activists were acting against the explicit wishes
of their leaders, none of whom could afford a total break with the West.

In summary, the development of AUB student activism between the 1930’s and
mid 1970’s went through different phases, starting from the gradual transformation of
the ‘Urwa from a literary society into an Arab nationalist forum and ending with the
deadlock between a Student Council that lost sight of its limits, and a hard-nosed

331 Nadim Khalaf. The Economics of the American University of Beirut: A
Study of a Private University in the Developing World. Beirut: American University of
Beirut, 1977, 36-37.

332 Mohammad Shadid. The United States and the Palestinians. London:
administration that wanted to keep the University running at whatever cost. It was also always, at least in some ways, of considerable significance as a microcosm of Arab public opinion. The Stearns affair discussed in chapter two is a clear indication of the importance the AUB student movement had on Lebanon and the region that the CIA and perhaps other intelligence agencies became seriously interested in its activities.

The sequence of events presented in this thesis, although sometimes suggesting that the AUB student movement mirrored the political tensions in the region, nevertheless the movement stood apart in a number of respects. The emergence of the PLO at the head of the Palestinian Revolution did indeed contribute greatly to the energizing of the student movement in AUB and elsewhere. However, the claim that the Palestinians hijacked the student movement to serve their own purposes is not entirely correct. Membership in the Palestinian student organizations was always open to individuals willing to commit themselves to the Palestinian cause, so that the Lebanese element inside these organizations became very substantial and capable of promoting its own agenda or issues where Lebanese-Palestinian interests converged. It is also important to note that although student activists were bound by a certain hierarchy; they nonetheless remained free to act independently, as frequently happened in the 1974 strike when it was not always clear who was taking whom for a ride.

The AUB Student Council, as instituted for the first time in the late 1949, was perhaps intended as a test to determine the degree to which the student body was prepared to practice democracy. On the three occasions when this Council was suspended, it was always with an eye to saving the academic program from the vagaries of student politics, and never because the University no longer wished to train its students in democratic procedures. Hence, every time the Student Council was dissolved, it was reinstituted as soon as circumstances permitted. To this day the AUB’s
democratic tradition still lives on inside the walls of a pluralistic campus, which is the one place in the country --and perhaps in the Arab world-- where annual student elections are regularly held despite the uncertainties that plague the country and the region.
APPENDIX I

MINUTES OF UNIVERSITY SENATE 23 MAY 1971

MINUTES OF THE UNIVERSITY SENATE MEETING
May 23, 1971


Absent: Messrs. R.W. Crawford (in the U.S.A.), A. Diab (in the U.S.A.) and W. Khalidy

CALL TO ORDER:

The meeting was called to order at 10:10 a.m. in the Faculty Room of Marquand House.

DISCUSSION:

Discussion followed about the present situation.

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT:

The Statement that was prepared by the President was acted upon paragraph by paragraph. All the paragraphs had unanimous approval with the exception of the section on the Student Council where some members were not fully in support of it. After each section was approved individually, the whole statement was put to a vote.

37-71 Voted Unanimously: To approve the following statement:

The American University of Beirut declares that its academic program for the year 1970-1971 is suspended. If conditions permit, examinations for all graduating students will be given on June 14. Other students will take examinations beginning August 30. Faculties will issue further directives to cover classroom work missed.

The Commencement and Baccalaureate ceremonies for this year are cancelled.

This action has been necessary because of the unlawful disruption of university operations by the strike called by the Student Council and continued under its direction. Despite established procedures for relationships between Student Council and the Administration and Faculties, methods were resorted to by the Student Council which are fundamentally opposed to the concept of ordered and productive university life.
Twice the University presented written proposals to the 
Student Council. Both statements were unfortunately given 
distorted interpretations by some members of the Student 
Council and by some others in open meeting.

On Wednesday, May 19, the following was given to the President 
of the Student Council by President Kirkwood:

"In facing the problems of University financing with the 
President of the Student Council, particularly in respect to 
the vital effect of the support shown by those directly 
connected with the University on fund-raising elsewhere, I 
have made the following commitment:

1. No student currently registered in the University will be 
   compelled to withdraw as a result of the tuition increase; 
i.e., as a result of financial hardship.

2. All income derived from the ten percent increase will, if 
   need be, be spent on scholarship and financial aid to needy 
   students.

3. The University Scholarship Committee will be reorganized to 
   include an equal number of students to the faculty representa-
   tives who will have equal voting power in the determination 
of the use of the funds that as a result of the ten percent 
   increase will be allocated for needy students on the basis of 
   need. This Committee will also be responsible for all other 
   funds for student aid.

4. There will be no tuition increase for the academic year 

5. A special committee of Student Council members and Faculty 
   members will be formed to seek new sources of funds in the 
   Middle East."

This was rejected by the Student Council and in an open meeting 
of students.

On Thursday, May 20, the University sent to the Student Council 
the following proposal, based on a counter-proposal which the 
Council had made:

"The Senate accepts the principle of adding the ten percent 
tuition increase for 1971-1972 to the budgeted University 
scholarship funds for 1970-1971 for scholarships and financial 
aid for needy students, and that this be continued for 1972- 

Representation on the University Scholarship Committee and 
Faculty Committees shall have a majority of students. 
Representation on a Faculty Scholarship Committee shall be 
from faculty and students of that Faculty.

A joint committee from the faculty and students be established 
to look into the ways and means of raising funds for the 
University."
Despite this action by the University, the Student Council declared continuation of the strike and its escalation.

The University, therefore, withdraws these offers. But it assures all students that it will continue to augment scholarship and student aid funds to aid, in the usual manner, those students who may suffer financial hardship. No student currently enrolled will be compelled to leave the University solely for financial difficulty in meeting the tuition increase for 1971-1972. Whatever of the ten percent increase is needed will be used for such purpose. Students enrolled after June 30, 1971 will enter under the new fees. There will be no further tuition increase in 1972-1973.

With a sense of great concern the University has seen the Student Council diverted from its original purpose. The University retains its firm belief in the contributions that students can make to its life. However, it is clear that the present organization of student participation has failed to achieve a workable arrangement.

The University, therefore, effective immediately, dissolves the present Student Council and suspends its constitution. With full consultation among students, faculty and administration studies will be conducted as to the ways and means of developing a more effective student involvement in the University, without prejudice to the possibility of reinstating a Student Council at A.U.B.

The University will announce later its plans for resumption of its academic program.

38-71 Voted Unanimously: To leave entirely to the President to release it at his discretion.

39-71 Voted: That the above statement should be considered confidential and should not be communicated except by the President.

PRESS CONFERENCE:

It was suggested that the President should hold a press conference to explain the events and the reasons for the University's action.

NEXT MEETING:

It was decided to have the next meeting tomorrow at 9:00 a.m.

ADJOURNMENT:

The meeting adjourned at 5:00 p.m.

Fadi A. Fuleihan
Secretary
APPENDIX II

LOOK OUT, PUBLISHED BY THE STUDENT COUNCIL ACTION COMMITTEE. FALL 1971
وتوالى سرية خطرة من أرشيف الجامعة الأمريكية
الكتابات التي تناولت دور الجالية الأمريكية في التاريخ، يعود ذلك إلى العام 1917، حيث تمت مشاركة الرأي الأمريكي في النزاعات العربية-الإفريقي. هذه الكتابات تظهر كيف أن الرأي الأمريكي كان يدعم الجانب العربي في النزاعات العربية-الإفريقي.

ولكن في هذه الحالة، فإن العلاقات العربية-الأمريكية تبين أنها تعبر عن نوايا جدية في التفهم والتعاون في القضايا العالمية.

يشير هذا إلى أن الرأي الأمريكي كان يدعم الجانب العربي في النزاعات العربية-الإفريقي.

ويمكننا أن نستنتج أن الظروف الحالية تميل إلى الاعتماد على أفضل جهودنا في هذا الاتجاه.

ومع ذلك، فإن اليأس من أن نقول إن النزاعات العربية-الإفريقي قد تصل إلى الحل الأمثل، إلا أن نحن نضيف أنه من الضروري أن نعمل على دفع هذا الاتجاه إلى تحقيق أفضل النتائج.

وأخيراً، فإن النزاعات العربية-الإفريقي تظهر أن الرأي الأمريكي كان يدعم الجانب العربي في النزاعات العربية-الإفريقي.
THE INSTITUTE FOR EDUCATIONAL MANAGEMENT
GENERAL INFORMATION

Name: John

Address: American University of Beirut, Beirut, Lebanon

If married, spouse's first name: Betty

Age: 26

Date of Birth: July 15, 1912

Height: 5'6"

Weight: 158 lbs

Of what country are you a citizen? U.S.A.

Name of Institution or Company: American University of Beirut

Address: Beirut, Lebanon

Title or Position: Director of Operations

Description of responsibilities: As assistant to the Vice President, responsible for the organization, management, coordination, and performance of administrative activities within the University, to include grants administration, budgeting, controller activities, business services, personnel, physical plant, capital works, housing and food services. (See attached organization chart.)

Brief career history: Chronological order starting with present position, including any military service. If all in the same institution, please give major promotional sequence.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Status of Individual</th>
<th>Title or Position</th>
<th>From</th>
<th>To</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Permanent Military Establishment</td>
<td>Retired, 20 years of service with rank of full colonel</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Branch of Service: Army Corps of Engineers</td>
<td></td>
<td>1964</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAF, Civil Engineering</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1964</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American University of Beirut</td>
<td>Construction Project Manager</td>
<td>1964</td>
<td>1967</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Director of Operations</td>
<td></td>
<td>1967</td>
<td>present</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

الوثيقة رقم (0) تعود إلى جون بيث (جهنوة) وزوجته في منشأة التعليم...
THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST

May 16, 1970 to September 30, 1970

What began as one of the more placid periods in recent Middle Eastern history ended in a surfeit of violence and tension, with ominous implications for the future. Throughout the four months under review Western news media continued to attack the University's non-political position by repeated emphasis upon the connections, past or present, of a few Palestinian activists. This was the case in the hijacking recently of the El Al jet. It is emphatically the situation as presently, with one major journal referring to AUB as "guerrilla university." The effect of such writing on the student body in months to come may well be to encourage more direct attacks on the institution, as an alleged instrument of Western imperialism (which is AUB's role in the view of a section of Arab news media) and in response to calls for further action against "Western interests."

The most recent example of mass media activity which has had a potentially serious public relations impact on the University is the October 6, 1970 telecast of the NBC evening program First Tuesday. In this telecast, Sanders Vaneur introduced the program with the following statement: "Good evening. This is the First Tuesday in October, and I'm Sanders Vaneur. We'll be back with a report on Arab students at American University in Beirut, Lebanon. The university is supported largely by American funds. It's become such a breeding ground for Arab revolutionaries and terrorists that it's become known as "Guerrilla U." The sector of the program devoted to AUB follows this theme throughout, leaving the distinct impression on the viewer that AUB's purpose is to train terrorists and to sponsor guerrilla activities. We believe the increasing number of attacks on the University should not go unanswered. A cable was sent from Beirut to the President of NBC and further protests are being made from New York. In addition, each AUB graduate resident in the United States will be contacted directly by mail in the hope that he or she will contact his representative in the Congress, and, perhaps, encourage others to do so. BBC and French television crews have been on campus as a result of the Newsweek story. The President was interviewed by both teams. It is hoped that Mr. Knesso will be able to arrange an interview for the President on the Today Show during the first half of November. The University is thus making inroads upon as well as initiating a larger range surmise of public relations activities to call attention to its positive role in the area so that supporters of the University, and especially members of Congress, will have a chance to see and hear the truth.
Weekly Situatin Report

In general it was excellent and good clinical comedy. It was presented in the new Cocks theater between college hall. This has proved to be an excellent student theater site, but does to some degree interfere with the operation of the library. This will be considered in future decisions.

It is possible that some change in the location of the theater to the location of the Student Council and the university for the coming year. It would seem advisable to bring this plan closer to the faculty college hall to some immediate contact between student and university representatives. Also, I believe, that the assignment of the Student Council office as the present location already comes to inappropriate, since in some possible by-passing of whatever university official has been given the responsibility for student affairs.

Wednesday, June 2: The Bicentennial Fellowship Committee has made a new arrangement to seek a Public Health official for the residence hall and has named two to serve on the committee. The committee will meet on Tuesday at 2 p.m. to discuss the possible arrangements for the residence hall. The committee is made up of: Dr. John Smith, Dr. James Brown, and Dr. Robert Green.

Thursday, June 3: I have been discussing with various staff and faculty about the present political situation in support to the university. I am convinced that the situation is very serious, and we need to take immediate action to ensure the safety of all individuals involved.

The University has also taken steps to increase security measures on campus. All buildings have been checked, and additional security personnel have been deployed. The University has also issued a statement reminding students to report any suspicious activity immediately.

I am confident that we will be able to overcome the current challenges and ensure the well-being of our students and faculty.
paradise. February 3. Consultation activities. Discussed with Mr. Khmele his consultation activities in Abu Dhabi, he has been asked to consult with the Sultan on the political situation in view of his work in the history of the Gulf area. He discussed some general regulations as outside activities in the Faculty of Arts and Sciences. Since the time of the present government, there have been no political activities of the area.

The following is a summary of the committee of the Society of Friends to study the Middle East situation and has drawn up a white paper for presentation to the government authorities. He discussed the situation with me and later a copy of the same was sent to them.

Conclusion: The general matter of terminations, resignations, and end of contract status was discussed with the Permanent Secretary. A tentative notice was established. However, this will be discussed with the legal council before adding it to the academic manual. For those before retirement, payment is extended beyond the initial contract by as little as one month. In such cases, indemnity for the period of the initial contract is paid, but if the contract should be extended it is considered to have lapsed at the end of the specified period. Therefore, neither the term “termination” nor “resignation” are properly applied at the end of a contract but in all cases, indemnity is paid if the termination occurs before the end of the contract. In such a case, indemnity is paid if the termination is on the part of the University (unless said so) but no indemnity is paid upon resignation. In these circumstances, the term “indemnity is used as an euphemism for “ex-gratia payment.”

For three months’ notice, all personnel will retire at age 65 and are paid any salary at that time and the record is closed. They may be reengaged for any year at the University’s discretion and, therefore, will receive the indemnity at age 65. New personnel at any time are paid the indemnity at age 65. New personnel at any time are paid the indemnity at age 65. The University retains the right to renew the contract if an employee is 65 and wishes to continue in service. The new contract is not an extension but a new contract and is, therefore, not a matter of termination or resignation but merely the non-renewal of a contract.

Miss termination or resignation should take place 60 days before the year is completed. The University retains the right to renew the contract if an employee is 65 and wishes to continue in service. The new contract is not an extension but a new contract and is, therefore, not a matter of termination or resignation but merely the non-renewal of a contract.

For salaries, the following system will be used: U.S. nationals will be quoted and paid in dollars. All others engaged locally will be quoted and paid in Japanese Yen.

The salary scale is based on the average of the previous year. If inequities subsequently develop, the same determination and the different year’s starting rates, adjustments will be made in the succeeding annual increments.
جستوح الاستمرار، في الوقت الذي نحن فيه في الانتظار، ...

رغم ذلك، فإن التغييرات في النظام، والتحديات الاقتصادية، ...

وبالإضافة إلى ذلك، فإن التوجهات الجديدة ...

النظام السياسي: الأسس الأساسية ...

الساحة السياسية: الأسس الأساسية ...

...</foreign_text>
Mr. David Rukin
Director of Personnel
Vice President

Recommendation for employment

October 31, 1970

This applicant for a job is recommended by Mr. Edward Rukin, University Registrar and I speak to you about his personal aptitude. It is in the interest of the University to employ him so as to help solve some tax problems which A.U. is facing.

George Rukin
Vice President
المواطنة، مفيد على البيئة وتلبية بذلك، ان تنظر بالمثل.
المراجعة، الرجاء أن يزيد على ذلك، يمكنك أن تنقر على
1979، التعديل غير موجود.
أن السلمية الإبداعية نسبياً في لبنان، لا تصلح
جروح حربنا! أن نستمر في مساعدة الشباب، مما يجعل
ورغم ذلك، ونستطيع أن نفعل ذلك.

هدايا أخرى

هيما، وموضوع هذه القصة، تشمل

باكتجاح والائيان

ما هي الأمثلة الرسيرة الأخرى التي يمكنها أن كتب

وبهما، وموضوعات الأصدقاء، التي يمكن

في صيف عام 1979، لديم - شمبال - شمش، الجالية

ثورة ثورية إلى أن يمر، إلا شيء آخر.

ي.fc. الأشياء، الذين تقدموا، والموضوعات التي مثلاها،

ولنقشت بلغة جريدة نهجي، أنقل النص إلى:

الذين كتبوا، والجهود التي يبذلها،

تمتاط بمعالجة، ليس بإسلوب، أنقل النص إلى:

من بينها: أذكر ما جاء، وما أنقله، إلخ.

تعتبر من خلال، إلى اللغة العربية، و phêرى، وما أذكر.

أولى عام 1978، وتوزع على عدد، من الشعراء،

والموضوع، والديم، في يدي، وما هو.

لقاء، في نيويورك، في الثالث من

في الإسحاق الثاني، 1380، تحدثت إلى

استدب بقدر الله

"حاج " السيد المذكور، والمورد، أولاً: حاولت

الاستماع، وفقاً للنص، وفقاً للنص، يمكن أن

من الشخصيات، الذي يتحلى بها، ليس بإسلوب، أنقله، إلخ.

بمجرد أن نحن، وما أنقله، إلخ.

بعض الأمثلة الرسيرة الأخرى، التي يمكنها أن كتب

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في صيف عام 1979، لديم - شمبال - شمش، الجالية

ثورة ثورية إلى أن يمر، إلا شيء آخر.

ي.fc. الأشياء، الذين تقدموا، والموضوعات التي مثلاها،

ولنقشت بلغة جريدة نهجي، أنقل النص إلى:

الذين كتبوا، والجهود التي يبذلها،

تمتاط بمعالجة، ليس بإسلوب، أنقل النص إلى:

من بينها: أذكر ما جاء، وما أنقله، إلخ.

تعتبر من خلال، إلى اللغة العربية، و الفرع، وما أذكر.

أولى عام 1978، وتوزع على عدد، من الشعراء،

والموضوع، والديم، في يدي، وما هو.

لقاء، في نيويورك، في الثالث من

في الإسحاق الثاني، 1380، تحدثت إلى

استدب بقدر الله

"حاج " السيد المذكور، والمورد، أولاً: حاولت

الاستماع، وفقاً للنص، وفقاً للنص، يمكن أن

من الشخصيات، الذي يتحلى بها، ليس بإسلوب، أنقله، إلخ.

بمجرد أن نحن، وما أنقله، إلخ.

بعض الأمثلة الرسيرة الأخرى، التي يمكنها أن كتب

وبهما، وموضوعات الأصدقاء، التي يمكن
عفيف الصغير، يقع بعد اجتماعه بمديرية
الأمن (أ.ف. ه. أي) - شراء الآيات الأصلية

حول الوضع العام بسبب عناية المعلمة بدرجة
إدارة الطوارئ. فضلاً، نحن نشاط هذا لندن تحرير مسواة
العامة الجديدة في الحالة، ونعمل على مساعدة نفسه، ووقت
ملاحظة من الأئة السائدة، والقضايا التي الكويت، في
الجائحة في أي شكل صعب، أو تبنيه

من هو الدكتور بالاس؟

كان الدكتور بالاس من أعلام التاريخ في كل الحضارات،
en الأداء. وكان أعلم الاستاذ والجيدة ميدانياً
على مؤسسة شغل منطقة الشرق الأوسط، والدارية والداريةن،
التي يشكلها، فليب من أوائل الرحلات إلى أوروبا، و 발표
1168. وكان يشتمل على هل من قبل الأندلس، حتى أنه
كان يحدث في موقع المسرح، وأظهر فريقه كامل
التي قادها، وقامت أيضاً، بما خاصة، وفيه،
مع نظام التحليلي، كما،IRTQI، مما
بما ما قادتها، إلى التي تسبب
مذكور، إنها كانت
بروفيشنال نهاية. (ال机动)

لدت بأمة العظمى الشهيرة، ويستعير
الذين، وتعزية كلمة تعلهم، ويشتاء
تغطية لنظام الاستكشاف، وتعزية
لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، لا، ل
الرئيس الأول
المحقق العسكري الإردني / لبنان
(มงคล اسماء)

ينبغي / لقيادة العامة للقوات المسلحة
مدير المرجع العام لكتاب رقمن
 infamous / 1993 / 11 / 12

تلخيص الطلب
جمال عبد الكريم بروتي
نايل جيجيل يافلينسي
عبد الله محمد الحكاري
جمال عبد الله بن روز
سليم أكدر باركه
باس سليمان
رائد عبد العالي مراد
شادي عبد حمود
محمود يستعدين
لا يمكن توظيفها كمشروب للجماعة، بمانغ ولازة الدفاع...

ترمز غير الجرعة في الأطباق في أسيوي، وتتطلب مع نسيج
لأنواع من الأطاطس. ودهاء، يتيح، تلبية، وربما...

في مطلع أو أن تكون مخاطرا جمال
الإغلاق، فالتخريب ووضع:
ويتكون، فهذا مزيج النقاء، وتتعرض...

في معين من الجوانب، أي:

الاستنتاجات صارمة

يتحدث أن الجبري التي أكملها السيد سليمان قللاً.
وقال: إن فشل الجامعات والمدارس.
والمدارس الأدبية القاعدية.
ويعد، في ميزان الفهم والتحصين...

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من الجوانب، أي.

الاستنتج
APPENDIX III

CHRONOLOGY OF THE AUB STUDENT STRIKE - 18
MARCH TO 6 MAY, 1974

Chronology of the AUB Student Strike - March 18 to May 6, 1974

I Preliminary events:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nov 26</td>
<td>President Kirkwood reports Trustee decisions to Student Council.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec 4</td>
<td>Open letter from Student Council to President Kirkwood reporting conclusion of Council; President Kirkwood meets with Student Council to discuss content of letter.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec 18</td>
<td>Letter from President Kirkwood to Student Council discussing tuition increase, comparative costs and budget management, participation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb 28</td>
<td>General assembly of Student Council and announcement of March 18 ultimatum with five demands. Council states, &quot;If the administration does not satisfy our demands, escalation will start.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar 4</td>
<td>OUTLOOK publishes cable to Trustees with six demands from Student Council.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar 16</td>
<td>Letter from President Kirkwood to Student Council answering cable to Trustees; President Kirkwood letter to Faculty &amp; students explaining issues.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar 17</td>
<td>Letter from Student Council to President Kirkwood rejecting &quot;administration answers.&quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

II The Strike:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mar 18</td>
<td>General Assembly called by Student Council after breaking off contact with faculty advisors and Student Advisory Committee (SAC); 10:30 assembly calls for one-day strike; 11:30 one-hour sit-in in College Hall and elegant written on hall walls; fist fight at AHU as strike leaders force medical student participation; 13:30 demonstration march on campus followed by blocking of Nicely, Bliss, Fish Hall; loudspeaker set up in West Hall.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar 19</td>
<td>11:00 march along Bliss street leaving at Medical Gate; students/policemen throw stones and tear gas; street blocked by burning tires at 13:30; 26 treated in Infirmary, 17 at AHU emergency; four AUB students (including Student Council president) arrested in demonstration at Ministry of Education; 20:00 International College gate taken over; Jesup, Agricultural, Physics and Biology buildings occupied.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar 20</td>
<td>20:00 West Hall offices occupied; 21:00 Protection &amp; Safety office at Main Gate taken over. Medical Gate, Sea Gate and Faculty Gates also taken. Letter sent from President Kirkwood to parents of AUB students explaining situation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar 21</td>
<td>(mor.) Cultural Studies office occupied; 17:30 Engineering and Pharmacy buildings occupied; 22:00 President Kirkwood announces the necessity of using Saturdays and holidays to complete requirements for credit and meets with four Faculties and Administration Department heads.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar 22</td>
<td>Bliss Hall occupied; intimidation of students and faculty reported; Arts &amp; Science Faculty meet.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar 23</td>
<td>Nursing School occupied.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar 24</td>
<td>Senate meets and votes the suspension of regularly scheduled classes if disruption continues after Mar 27.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Mar 25 - General assembly called by Student Council at 10:30 votes two-day vote of confidence in the Council; glass in bulletin board broken and AUB Bulletins torn down; post office entered and distribution of information and mail further restricted; Student Council invites seven faculty to carry Student Council views to administration, meet with President Kirkwood; Van Dyke Hall occupied as well as Fisk Hall late in the evening.

Mar 26 - Student Council meets with about 350 faculty but non-council students not admitted to the meeting in West Hall; Dr. Najib Abu Haydar represents the views of the meeting to President Kirkwood; President Kirkwood receives call for a meeting of the Senate.

Mar 27 - Chemistry and Public Health occupied and then de-occupied; President Kirkwood meets with four Faculties prior to Senate meeting at 17:00; Senate reaffirms University policy to consider any issue at any time except "under conditions of a strike or threat of a strike or the use of force of any kind."

Mar 28 - Letter addressed to Student Council by 22 faculty (including all academic Deans) pledge continued work with Student Council and ask for end to the strike; Loudspeaker conducts harassment throughout the night; parents (60) publish letter calling for students to return to classes; 19:00 meeting called by Student Council with faculty and staff.

Mar 29 - 10:30 meeting of Student Council with some Senators who were contacted by phone.

Apr 1 - General Assembly called by Student Council for 10:00 and after march around campus students break into College Hall to occupy building; offices broken into and files broken open; Public Health reoccupied; The Committee for Educational Reform with 28 members headed by Mr. Abdullah Mashnouk formed.

Apr 5 - About 100 striking students begin early morning (01:00) harassment of Marquand House; President Kirkwood issues a statement that it is no longer possible to complete requirements necessary for credit for this semester; Student Council rejects the proposal of the Alumni Council to raise a fund for needy AUB students.

Apr 7 - Harassment at Marquand House continues; workers prevented from entering campus; night phone calls to President Kirkwood, Deans, and some faculty.

Apr 8 - Student Council president calls on Prime Minister who asks for the end of the strike.

Apr 9 - General Assembly called by Student Council for 11:00 to review strike developments; many students walk out on non-AUB speakers; four Council members resign and appear on TV to accuse the Student Council of "deviation from the aims of the strike." Legal action is initiated by the University against those occupying buildings and causing destruction of property. Harassment continues with loud fireworks.

Apr 10 - Student Council president attacks the Minister of Education in a press conference.

Apr 12 - Residents of Faculty Apartments II and III open legal action against students for "disturbance of the public peace and order" at the Faculty Gate in the early morning of Apr 5; a barricade of chairs is built at the
entrance to College Hall and at the Engineering building; occupying students in College Hall saw through iron bars on windows to enter the Comptroller's office and the Computer Center.

Apr 15 - A fifth member of the Student Council submits his resignation, an action denied by the Student Council.

Apr 18 - Office of the Chaplain broken into and typewriter, books and personal items stolen; an AUB student is beaten as "an informer".

Apr 19 - Inspector from the office of the Public Prosecutor is refused admission to College Hall by the Vice President of the Student Council; students favoring a referendum on the strike meet at the Alumni Club.

Apr 20 - 200 mothers of AUB students sign a public letter asking for a secret ballot referendum to end the continued "chaos and demagoguery" on the campus is published; Student Council replies with a parade of cars around the city to distribute flyers; on entering the campus the drivers conflict with Faculty Apartment residents as they drive through the parking area; Student Council president visits the Libyan Ambassador.

Apr 22 - 400 mothers meet with the Minister of Education at his office.

Apr 21 - President Kirkwood released a statement that classes would remain suspended over the Easter Holiday and until further notice; The Committee for Educational Reform headed by Mr. Mashnoun released a statement calling for the resumption of classes.

Apr 23 - About 2,000 signatures of students collected on petition asking the Student Council to hold a referendum. The National Congress in Support of AUB Students met at 16:30 at the Makassed Alumni Club and included representatives of leftist groups and student unions.

Apr 24 - The 37 day strike came to a close at 02:45 when 360 Lebanese security entered the campus and arrested 61 persons (45 AUB students) for illegal occupation and destruction of property.

III The Aftermath:

Apr 24 - A preliminary survey of damage indicates much defacing of walls in College Hall, Jessup and West Halls, desks and files broken into, leftist (Trotskyite) slogans written everywhere, and both University and private property broken or stolen.

Apr 25 - President Kirkwood dissolved the Student Council for "grave and continuing violations of University regulations" under article XII of the Student Council constitution; The constitution was returned to the Senate for reassessment; a number of MP's spoke in support of AUB in Parliament.

Apr 26 - Three molotov cocktails were found in College Hall (two were later found in a file drawer in the Office of Development.); the head of the Medical Students Society denies that AUB students have broken or stolen anything and accuses the security forces.

Apr 27 - President Kirkwood announced the opening of the University on April 29 beginning with Medical Sciences and Engineering and Architecture.

Apr 28 - Arts & Sciences Faculty met to adopt the "intensified selective system" to enable students to complete a maximum of three courses (10 credits) by June 30.
Apr 29 - Other Faculties meet to coordinate with the new program; a sit-in of medical students is organized near the entrance to the hospital; varied attendance reported in first classes.

Apr 30 - Classes in Agricultural Sciences and in the Sciences meet; Medical students call off sit-in after discussions with faculty and a general assembly of medical students.

May 2 - About 300 students listen to speeches at 10:30 on the Main Gate steps; following a march on campus 20 students stage a sit-in on the first floor of College Hall and a smaller group enter Jesup Hall thus disrupting the re-scheduling process; 17 students released on bail.

May 3 - Re-registration procedure completed with nearly 100% student participation.

May 7 - President Kirkwood issues a statement to students, faculty and staff calling for full support of the University as the new teaching program begins; individual spokesman for the dissolved Student Council declare that the strike will be continued and a small group block the entrance to Nicely Hall; Ten students are arrested as they try to disrupt classes; Security forces taunted with clapping and chanting.

May 8 - The University Senate met to discuss the conditions for the continuation of the academic program; 49 faculty request the withdrawal of the security forces from the campus and the withdrawal of the legal action initiated by the University.

May 9 - President Kirkwood meets with the four faculties and administrative staff to review the strike and set the basis for the continuation of the academic program.

May 11 - Increasing attendance of classes during the week.

May 12 - Lebanese Security forces withdraw from the campus.

May 13, 1974

Prepared by Art Whitman Director of Development, Unpublished 13 May 1974
APPENDIX IV

TABLE OF INTERVIEWS

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<td>Member of Fateh</td>
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<td>One of 103 student expelled in 1974</td>
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<td>Fouad Bawarshi</td>
<td>Fateh supporter.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>President of the 1969-70 Student Council</td>
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<td></td>
<td>One of the 22 students expelled in 1971</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mahmoud Chrieh</td>
<td>Member of Fateh 1971-1974,</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Member of the 1972-73 Student Council.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Outlook Editor-in-Chief Arabic Supplement 1972-73.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mohammad Dajani</td>
<td>President of AUB Fateh student chapter</td>
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<td></td>
<td>President of 1972-73 Student Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jaceques Ekmekji</td>
<td>Fateh supporter. Member of the 1970-71 Student Council</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>One of the 22 students expelled in 1971</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ibrahim Khoury</td>
<td>Independent AUB student and correspondent for the Daily Start and Al-Anwar newspaper</td>
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<td>John Munro</td>
<td>AUB Professor</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Associate Dean of the Faculty of Arts and Sciences</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nasri Nakhoul</td>
<td>Member of the <em>Rabita</em>, AUB staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kamal Tannir</td>
<td>Member of the <em>Rabita</em> 1969-1972</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nidal Saab</td>
<td>Member of Fateh.</td>
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<td>Member of the 1969-70 &amp; 73-74 Student Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kamal Salibi</td>
<td>AUB Professor Advisor to the <em>Rabita</em> and the <em>Tanzim al-Urduni</em> (1968-1971)</td>
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