

T
367
0.1

IBN-KHALDUN'S CONCEPT OF MULK

By

Muhammed Z. Yakan

Submitted in Partial Fulfilment For
the Requirement of the Degree
Master of Arts

In the Department of Political Studies and
Public Administration
Of the American University of Beirut
Beirut, Lebanon
May, 1961

IBN-KHALDUN'S CONCEPT OF MULK

YAKAN

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

My deep gratitude is hereby expressed to Professor Yusuf Ibish for his guidance, valuable advice and continuous encouragement.

Muh. Z. Yakan

ABSTRACT

The main purpose of this thesis is to bring into focus an aspect of Ibn-Khaldun's political thought, namely, his concept of *mulk*. The importance of this study lies in the fact that Ibn-Khaldun the great social scientist, was not properly studied as a political thinker.

The first section of the thesis deals with the importance of Ibn-Khaldun's political theory; his life and age and their impact on his thought; his Islamic background, and; his concept of history and its relation to his political thought.

The second part surveys Ibn-Khaldun's concept of the Caliphate - *Imāmate*. More definitely it tries to show how he justified its necessity and conditions by comparing him to the principal *Sunni* Jurists. Moreover it questions the meaning of the Caliphate as an institution and examines its administrative organization as perceived by Ibn-Khaldun.

The third part deals with his theory of transformation from Caliphate to *mulk* by which he attempted to justify the actual existing political conditions of his age in relation to the theoretical validity of the Caliphate. At the same time, it compares, in this respect, his approach to those of *al-Māwardī*, *Abū Ya^clā*, and *al-Ghazzālī*.

The fourth part deals with his theory of *mulk*. More particularly with human association as an outcome of human need; *ḥasaḇiyah* as the bond that unites a tribal group and drives it toward self-assertion, domination, and establishment

of mulk; the stages in the growth of states, i.e. development, prosperity, and decline; the ideal ruler and economic life of a dynasty; urbanism as a prerequisite of civilization, and lastly; the administrative organization of mulk.

Finally, the fifth section discusses Ibn-Khaldun's legacy and gives an appraisal of his concept of mulk.

It should be noted that the basic problems related to the nature, scope, and methods of political studies as well as the political issues related to rulership were recognized by Ibn-Khaldun. He conceived of politics as an intergroup and interstate relationship in terms of struggle for power and predominance.

However, he was not concerned with legitimacy. He did not attempt to find legal justifications for mulk or those sultans and rulers who possessed mulk. On the contrary, he took the then actual existing orders as they were with an attempt to convey the causes underlying their existence.

^cAsabiyyah, to Ibn-Khaldun, was no more than the mutual affection and willingness of the members of a human group to fight and die for each other. Likewise, he did not perceive of mulk as an institution or organization independent from the person of a ruler. Simply speaking, he looked upon it as being domination (taghalub) and the power to rule by force.

The study is not motivated by an apologetical objective, though the contribution of Ibn-Khaldun as a political thinker must be recognized.

To understand the present and future developments in the Middle Eastern politics we have to understand the past. The study of Ibn-Khaldun serves as a background to the contemporary developments, without such a study the present is not meaningful and the future direction obscure.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	PAGE
<u>INTRODUCTION</u>	1
(I) Why is the study of Ibn-Khaldun's political theory important.....	2
(II) Ibn-Khaldun's life and age.....	5
(III) The Islamic background of Ibn-Khaldun's political theory.....	23
The object of "Good Life"	
(IV) Ibn-Khaldun's concept of history and its relation to his political thought..	46
<u>THE CALIPHATE-IMĀMATE ACCORDING TO IBN-KHALDUN</u>	63
(I) Necessity, meaning, and conditions.....	64
(II) The administrative organization of Caliphate.....	82
<u>THE SULTANATE IN IBN-KHALDUN'S THEORY</u>	87
(I) Theory of transformation.....	88
(II) The Caliphate and the Sultanate and Shari ^c a.....	100
Al-Māwardī, Abū Ya ^c lā, and Al-Ghazzālī	
<u>IBN-KHALDUN'S THEORY OF MULK</u>	121
(I) Human associations.....	122
(II) Ibn-Khaldun's concept of al- ^c aṣābiyah..	132
(III) The "State" according to Ibn-Khaldun...	141
(IV) Ibn-Khaldun's theory of mulk.....	152
(V) Ibn-Khaldun's concept of the ruler.....	176
The ideal ruler	
Economic life and rulership	
(VI) Urbanism and MulK.....	197
(VII) The administrative organization of MulK	203

	PAGE
<u>CONCLUSION</u>	213
Ibn-Khaldun's legacy.....	
Appraisal of Ibn-Khaldun's theory of Mulk.	
<u>BIBLIOGRAPHY</u>	239

INTRODUCTION

(I)

WHY IS THE STUDY OF IBN-KHALDUN'S POLITICAL
THEORY IMPORTANT

Referring to Ibn-Khaldun, Arnold Toynbee writes: "Ibn-Khaldun's star shines the more brightly by contrast with the foil of darkness against which it flashes out; for while Thucydides and Machievelli and Clarendon are all brilliant representatives of brilliant times and places, Ibn-Khaldun is the sole point of light in his quarter of the firmament. He is indeed the one outstanding personality in the history of a civilization whose social life on the whole was 'solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.'⁽¹⁾"

A view at Ibn-Khaldun's age and on what he has written shows the soundness of this statement. Moreover it shows, how deep he thought, how he came to sum up the different trends of thought that were known in the Muslim domains, and how, through his penetrating insight, he came to mold them in what is known as the science of civilization (al-^cUmran), wherein lies his originality.

His importance, in this respect, is determined by the fact, that he summed up Muslim thought, commenting on the different schools, attempting to study how most men live, to learn their hopes, desires, and true purposes, to find out the limits they face and the failures that they might confront; and to

(1) Toynbee, Arnold, A Study of History, V. 8, pps. 321-322.

discern the existence of societies, their developments, growth, change, dissolution, decline, and functioning.

As Charles Issawi said: "Ibn-Khaldun's claim on our attention rests on firm ground, for his Prolegomena represents the most comprehensive synthesis in the Human Sciences ever achieved by the Arabs, and gives the modern non-specialist reader an accurate and vivid picture of the range of knowledge available to the medieval Muslim world."⁽¹⁾

In his works, Ibn-Khaldun surpassed any other Muslim thinker in the understanding of social, political, and economical problems. He devoted long chapters to the study of political institutions, forms of government, and public offices, attempting to relate politics, and other social sciences to a whole embracing innovation, the science of al-^cUmrān.

His importance to our contemporary thought lies in his attempt to answer the same problems that preoccupy our thinking, namely, the nature of society, the character of groups, the relation of social sciences to each other, and the educational methods; that he stands as an outstanding ring in the chain of Muslim thought, the understanding of which is essential to the understanding of contemporary Muslim thought and its continuity which traces back to the 7th century; and that his Muqaddimah's value lies "in the light it sheds upon details in Ibn-Khaldun's political, sociological, economical and philosophical thinking... the scholarly details of its

(1) Issawi, Charles, An Arab Philosophy of History, p. 1.

composition are not without significance for the proper appreciation of the work and its author; its main interest is as contribution to human thought."⁽¹⁾

It should be noted that until now, studies on Ibn-Khaldun were mainly concerned with his social philosophy, as such, without elaborating on his political philosophy. This thesis attempts to study one aspect of his political thought, namely, his concept of Mulk (royal kingship).

Irrespective of the lapse of centuries his thought still maintains its value and vigorousness. His achievement in relation to Muslim political thought is as important as his contribution to history and sociology.

However, our proper understanding of his political thought cannot be achieved without answering the following questions: What was his Islamic background? and what were the factors that shaped his thought?

To answer these questions we have to study the tempo of his age, and his life.

(1) Rosenthal, Franz, The Muqaddimah, V. I. p. lxxi

(II)

IBN-KHALDUN'S LIFE AND AGE

A person irrespective of who he is, is an outcome of society; an outcome of its thought, of its perspectives, and of its actions and reactions. This rule applies to Ibn-Khaldun as it applies to any other person. Although it is very difficult, and sometimes impossible, to trace the roots of such influences, we cannot avoid looking at some general trends in society life that mold the thought of a certain human being.

It is the object of this chapter to examine Ibn-Khaldun's thought against his Islamic background, and against the perspective of thought and events that he came to know and meet, respectively, and which, to a greater or lesser extent, came to shape his thought.

No positive result, in this respect, can be achieved unless we examine the general tempo of his age, the factors and thoughts that passed throughout his life, and the events in which he took part.

As a preliminary point, ^cAbd-al-Rahmān Ibn Khaldun was born in Tunis on the 27th of May, 1332 (Ramadān 1, 732). "His given name was ^cAbd-al-Rahmān, his ethnic denomination al-Hadramī, derived from Hadramawt, the ancestral home of his clan in South Arabia. The scholarly title of his later years was Wali-ad-Dīn "guardian of the religion."⁽¹⁾ His family was distinguished

(1) Ibid, p. XXXViii

as a leading family in the political and intellectual life
 of Muslim Spain and Tunis. ⁽¹⁾

His life covered the "last two thirds of the 14th
 century and most of the first decade of the 15th". ⁽²⁾ This
 age was one of general decline and disintegration. "Western
 North Africa, where Ibn-Khaldun spent fifty years of his life
 before going to Egypt, was the worst part of the Islamic world
 in this respect. It presented him with a spectacle of chaos
 and dissolution. If Muslim civilization in other parts had
 declined, in North Africa it had virtually ceased to exist." ⁽³⁾

The domains of Islam were, successively, subject to
 attacks from all directions from the Seljuks, the Crusaders,
 the Berbers, the Nomads and Bedouins, and the Mongols.

North Africa, where he lived, was undergoing many
 changes, upheavals, attacks, coups, and mutinies. Since its
 conquest by the Muslims in the seventh century it did not
 enjoy peace. Being a border region it had to suffer the
 struggle with the Berbers and the Christians. In one respect
 it presented a theatre of violent political upheavals. More-
 over, it presented a show of continuous revolutions, usurpation
 of power by different persons and dynasties, succession of
 kingdoms and principalities, and the trembling fate of all
 the thrones of North Africa.

(1) Ibn-Khaldun, ^cAbd-al-Rahmān; Al-Ta^crīf Bi Ibn-Khaldun, pps. 1-8.

(2) Mahdi, Muhsin; Ibn-Khaldun's Philosophy of History, p. 17.

(3) Ibid., p. 26.

The courts of the many kingdoms and principalities "were the seats of ambition and rivalry, the centres of intrigues and plots and the goal of the chiefs and rivals seeking supremacy and power. Thrones and Emirates were constantly raged between dynasties or branches of the same dynasty. Yet those disturbed Courts flourished in the few intervals of peace and vied with each other in splendour and luxury and attracted intellectual and literary men... It is to be remarked in the history of North Africa, during this interval, that the intellectual movement flourished, settled, and moved according to the conditions and vicissitudes of these states; and, like the states, was always disturbed and unsettled; and that the sooner it gathered round a certain court than it hastened to another when it began to decay."⁽¹⁾

The many changes of the ruling dynasties made it impossible for the region to maintain a political tradition standing on firm foundations. The sultans who came to rule were greatly dependent on their personal qualities in their⁽²⁾ rule.

Amid such conditions and circumstances Ibn-Khaldun lived, participating in the political destinies of this region.

(1) Enan, M. Abdullah; Ibn-Khaldun His Life And Work, p. 10.

(2) Mahdi, op. cit. p. 38.

He not only participated actively in the political life of Western North Africa, but also of Muslim Spain and of Egypt to a certain extent.

The contemporary historical literature, accounts of ambassadors, travellers, and pilgrims, were to make him familiar with the contemporary history of that region in particular and the Muslim world in general. He was not only "intimately acquainted with the contemporary history of these regions", but he knew also of "the important events taking place in the rest of the Islamic middle and far east, of the desperate, yet continued, resistance of Byzantium against the Ottoman Turks, and of the Renaissance of Western Europe..."⁽¹⁾

His life was subject to many instabilities. It was subject to many functional offices under different and various dynasties, kingdoms, and principalities.

He often shifted his loyalty, whenever he felt a better opportunity awaited him. He was at times in the entourage of some sultans and their counsellors, living their struggles, the establishment of their dynasties, as well as the termination of their rule. He entered in conspiracies against some regimes, giving allegiance to some rulers against others, finally isolating himself in Ibn-Salāmah castle (Qal'at), where he translated his life experiences and the ideas he had acquired molding into what is known as the "History", to lead a scholarly career the rest of his life.

(1) Ibid., p. 17.

His memory lived through the struggles among the Hafsids of Eastern Algeria, Tripolitania, and Tunisia; the Ziyānids of Western Algeria; and the Mazinids of Morocco, the three Berber dynasties who challenged the unity of North Africa around the middle of the 13th century extending their struggles to cover all the 14th century.

He observed the internal weakness of those dynasties, and how the members of the ruling families used to fight to dislodge each other.

He was familiar with the raids of the nomadic tribes and their seizure of power, as he witnessed the continuous raids of the fleets of the maritime Christian states.

This background helps "to explain the ease with which Ibn-Khaldun shifted his loyalties throughout his life."⁽¹⁾ This detachment was to give him a remarkable objectivity with respect to the historical events that he witnessed. It enabled him to observe those events with impartiality, irrespective of his many personal involvements. "He did not feel bound by "group feeling"⁽²⁾ as he might have called it, or by the ties of a common cultural heritage."⁽³⁾

His early education was of significance in shaping his future. It represented decisive years of his life; because

- (1) Rosenthal, Franz; The Muqaddimah, V. I, p. XXXVI.
- (2) Franz Rosenthal uses this term as the translation of "asabiyah".
- (3) Rosenthal, op. cit., p. XXXVI.

it represented "a time of extraordinary upheaval in the history of North West Africa",⁽¹⁾ exemplifying the worst eclipse of the Hafside's rule over Tunis, accompanied with the terrible plague that struck Tunis in 1348-1349 carrying off many of Ibn-Khaldun's Shaykhs and instructors.

We know little about his childhood and early youth, but we can assume that he shared his family's active participation in the intellectual and political life of Tunis. The household, in which he grew, was frequently visited by the political and intellectual leaders of Western North Africa. As was said before, Ibn-Khaldun was "the descendant of an old, prominent and learned family. He was brought up in the cradle of this legacy which he inherited from his family, guided by its fortunes and traditions."⁽²⁾

In Al-Ta^criif he gives us a general account of those whom he met and who instructed him, showing that "his early education followed customary lines;"⁽³⁾ that he had his study of the Qur'^ān and the Qur'^ānic sciences with the guidance of Muhammad Ibn-Sa'd Ibn-Burrāl; that he learned Arabic with his father and a number of other scholars as al-Ha'irī, al-Zarzali, al-Qassār, and al-Bahr; and that his education included the reading of the Qur'^ān, the studying of the Traditions, the

(1) Ibid., p. XXXIX.

(2) Enan, M. Abdullah; Ibn-Khaldun His Life And Work, p. 6.

(3) Rosenthal, Franz; The Muqaddimah, V. I, p. XXXVIII.

religious sciences (^culum dīniyah), the elements of mysticism, the logic (mantīq), al-Ta^cālīm (mathematics, arithmetics, and geometry), metaphysics (^cilm 'ilāhī), music, and the historical sciences.

He maintains that he studied the traditions of the dialectical theology (^cilm al-kalām) and jurisprudence (fiqh) of the Malikites, with different scholars and jurists as, al-Jayānī, al-Hawārī, al-Ṣattī, al-Ḥaḍramī, al-Zawāmī, and al-'Abbillī,⁽¹⁾ and that he was first initiated into metaphysics and philosophic sciences by 'Abbillī who was among the scholars of the Marinid ruler Abū Ḥassan of Tunis (1347d.), joining his circle for three years.⁽²⁾

Moreover he shows how the functional offices to which he was arrogated provided him with many opportunities to meet different scholars, jurists, and notables, distinguished in the above mentioned fields, and from whom he benefited a great deal, how Malikism was the dominating school in the Maghreb, and how it was the focal center of his studies.

Under these circumstances, Ibn-Khaldun had to face the basic problem of Islamic political thought, namely, the polemics between Sunnism that found the ultimate truth about 'man' and society in the Qur'ān, the Traditions, and the General Consensus of the Muslim community; and the philosophers who upheld the

(1) Ibn-Khaldun, Al-Ta^criif Bi Ibn-Khaldun, pps. 19-21.

(2) Ibid., pps. 19-21, p. 37.

primacy of rational inquiry in both the theoretical and the practical sciences. (1) At the same time he had to face the controversies of the different Muslim Juristic schools, namely, Malikism, Shafi'ism, Hanbalism, and Hanafism.

All these above mentioned factors and problems were behind the accommodation of his deep thought, the systematization of his wide knowledge, and the ability of sound interpretation of events.

In 1354, Ibn-Khaldun accepted Abū 'Inān's invitation to come to Fez and join the circle of scholars there. This opportunity was of a great significance to Ibn-Khaldun's life. It not only enabled him to associate himself with different scholars and finish his studies, but it marked, moreover, the "beginning of that great political activity which, for about thirty years, carried him from one state to another and from one palace to another, sometimes to fame and sometimes to downfall, sometimes to riches and at others to adversity." (2)

As a member of Abū 'Inān's circle of scholars, Ibn-Khaldun had to attend public prayers with him. Towards 1355 he became his secretary recording his decisions and other documents submitted to him.

However, it was not too long before he was suspected of plotting with the Hafsid Abū 'Abdallāh against the prince Abū 'Inān, and was imprisoned (Feb. 10, 1357) for more than

(1) Mahdi, Muhsin, Ibn-Khaldun's Philosophy of History, p. 37.

(2) Enan, M. Abdullah, Ibn-Khaldun His Life and Work, pps. 13-14.

22 months. He remained in prison until Abū[̄] Inān's death on the 27th of November 1358, when he was released by al-Sa[̄]id, Abū[̄] Inān's infant son at the instigation of the vizier al-Ḥasan Ibn-⁽¹⁾Umar. Although vizier al-Ḥasan Ibn-⁽¹⁾Umar treated Ibn-Khaldun respectfully and in good manner, yet he preferred to accept the invitation of king Abū Salīm, Abū[̄] Inān's brother, who was deported by Abū[̄] Inān to Andalusia after wresting the throne from his father.

This took place in July 1359. Ibn-Khaldun did not remain long in this office. He resigned in the autumn of 1361 after the death of Abū Salīm.

Ibn-Khaldun tells us that his resignation aroused the suspicions of ⁽²⁾Umar Ibn-⁽²⁾Abdallāh, Abū Salīm's vizier, and that he was permitted to leave Fez on condition that he would go to Spain.

Accordingly he left "to Granada, the only important Muslim state left in the Iberian peninsula."⁽³⁾ He arrived, there, on the 26th of December, 1362, to become the close advisor, and one of the viceroys of Muhammad the fifth (1354-1359), the ruler of Granada, and the friend of his vizier Abī[̄] Abdallāh Ibn-al-Khatīb, whom he knew when they came to Fez as fugitives.

(1) Ibn-Khaldun, Al-Ta[̄]riif Bi Ibn-Khaldun, pps. 67-68

(2) Ibid., p. 77.

(3) Rosenthal, Franz; The Muqaddimah, V. I, p. XiiX.

He did not remain long in Granada. He began to feel that Ibn-al-Khatib was displeased with his growing influence. He did not want to lose his friendship.

Taking advantage of the Hafsid Abū^c Abdallah's invitation, who gained control over Bougie in June, 1364, he left Granada to reach Bougie (Bijāya) in March 1364 and become the prime minister (Hājib) of Abū^c Abdallah's dynasty. (1)

His experience "in Bijāya was as important for his future political and scientific career as his failure in Granada." (2) He had to retain the rule of Abū^c Abdallah which was challenged by the claim of his cousin, Abū^c Abbās. The problem became more acute with the death of Abū^c Abbās. Ibn-Khaldun felt that it was impossible to maintain the rule for his children. "Realizing the hopelessness of their situation, he took the sensible step of going over to Abū^c Abbās in order to salvage as much of his own position as possible." (3)

Although the next nine years were deeply precarious for Ibn-Khaldun, they were of great importance to his political life. He felt the hopelessness of associating with Abū^c Abbās. Many changes were taking place in the political pattern of Western North Africa. These circumstances left Ibn-Khaldun with deep speculations, namely that there must be some forces

(1) Ibn-Khaldun, op. cit., pps. 94-95.

(2) Mahdi, Muhsin, Ibn-Khaldun's Philosophy of History, p. 45.

(3) Rosenthal, Franz; The Muqaddimah, V. I, p. L.

which he had not understood and which he could not control. "He began to suspect that, behind the everchanging political scene, there might be an inner necessity, and that the rise and decline of states might not be the product of deliberate human action or contingent upon human knowledge or ignorance. He began to reflect upon the ambitions and hopes that had led to his successive failures..."⁽¹⁾

To answer these questions he withdrew from political activity, to settle, after a trip to Granada, in Ibn-Salamah's castle (Qal'at) where he spent four years in writing his twenty year experiences "The History", the first draft of which was completed in November 1377. He tells us; "I completed its introduction (Muqaddimah) in that retreat, with words and ideas pouring into my head, until the finished product was ready."⁽²⁾ After four more years he finished his great historical work, Kitāb al-^cIbar wa-Diwan al-Mubtada' wal-Khabar fi A^cyan al-^cArab wal-^cAjam wal-Barbar wa-man ^casarahum min dHawi al-Sultan al-Akbar.

Meanwhile, he began, in 1378, his teaching career in Tunis, where he met the opposition of the great jurist Ibn-^cArafah al-Warghami (1316-1401), who was an eminent representative of Malikite jurisprudence.

Feeling that he was suspected by the ruler, Abul-^cAbbas, he decided (in October 1382) to leave for Egypt.

(1) Mahdi, Muhsin; op. cit. pps. 45-46.

(2) Ibn-Khaldun, Al-Ta^criif, p. 299.

He asked the permission of Abū-^cAbbās, maintaining that he wanted to make the pilgrimage to Mecca. The permission of Abū-^cAbbās was granted, thus, enabling him to sail on October 24, 1382 and reach Cairo in December of the same year.

In Cairo he quickly gained the confidence and respect of al-Malik al-Zahir Barqūq. He appointed him to the professorship of Malikite jurisprudence in the Qamhiyah college, the Surghatmishiyah college, and the Zahiriah and Mausoleum college, respectively. He was soon promoted to the Malikite Grand judi-
(1)
cature, besides teaching in al-'Azhar.

Ibn-Khaldun's life in Egypt was profoundly different from that of Western North Africa. "In Egypt Ibn-Khaldun lived as an ordinary personality who had nothing to do with the great affairs of the state.... He divested himself of the garb of the political adventures to wear the robe of the great scholar, and to derive his limited influence from this
(2)
quality...." In North Africa "he lived principally as a statesman successively occupying posts of distinction in the Berber states and courts, and taking part in endless intrigues and adventures. But in Egypt he lived as a scholar and a
(3)
judge..."

To al-Mahdi, Ibn-Khaldun's retreat into Egypt "pointed to a new conception of the role of the learned in social affairs..."

(1) Ibid., pps. 253-255; 279; 285-286; 293.

(2) Enan, M.A. Ibn-Khaldun His Life and Work, p. 68.

(3) Ibid., pps. 76-77.

taking the form of a return to the more philosophically and religiously orthodox view of the duality in the leadership of society: that of the political ruler, on the one hand, and the learned (ulama) and particularly the learned who are in a position to apply the law (i.e. the judges), on the other... the learned should understand, interpret, and apply the law; and thus save the community from the internal weakness and moral dissolution that would result if animal passions should reign unchecked."⁽¹⁾

In the year 1399, Ibn-Khaldun visited Damascus in the company of the ten year old ruler, Faraj, who succeeded his father, Barquq, after his death in the same year. There Ibn-Khaldun met Tamerlane (January 10, 1401), staying in his camp for 35 days, after which he returned to Egypt (March 1401) where he spent five years before he died on the 17th of March, 1406. In the interim he added new marginal additions to his history and wrote his autobiography.⁽²⁾

To al-Mahdi, Ibn-Khaldun's thought in his old age "went deeper and deeper.... the more he learned about different peoples, the more he was convinced about the unchanging pattern according to which they all live and die... He had searched his soul, confused out the secrets of the world, and done his deeds."⁽³⁾

(1) Mahdi, Muhsin; Ibn-Khaldun's Philosophy of History, p. 56.

(2) Ibn-Khaldun; Al-Ta'riif, pps: 349-350; 368-374; 377-384; 314-315.

(3) Mahdi, op. cit., p. 61.

Commenting on Ibn-Khaldun's life, Franz Rosenthal says: "As is often the case with men of genius, Ibn-Khaldun's actions and aspirations were simple and uncomplicated. With great single-mindedness he endeavoured to acquire leadership in the organization of his society and to master the intellectual development of humanity at its contemporary level. His background and upbringing had taught him to consider these the most desirable achievements in this world, and, by and large, he was able to realize them. Recognizing that all means were necessary and therefore justified, Ibn-Khaldun's actions to achieve the first goal were ruthless and opportunistic. Recognizing further that the more enduring achievement of intellectual leadership is largely incompatible with the search for worldly success, he strove to strike a sound balance between the active and the contemplative aspects of his personality. Aided by great ability and endurance, as well as by circumstances that, though harsh, were favorable to his aspirations, he became the great thinker and doer he set out to be."⁽¹⁾

So far we have reviewed the decadence of Ibn-Khaldun's epoch, how the political organization of the Western African societies was full of abuses, and how their composition was an obstacle toward their unity. It should be noted that the area was composed of different peoples of different ideas and races which made it very difficult to have any kind of conciliation. The fact that they presented three types of "lives",

(1) Rosenthal, Franz; The Mugaddimah, V. I, pps. lxxv-lxxvi.

namely nomadic (badāwa), semi-nomadic, and urban (hadāra), added to the impossibility of having a social unity.

These circumstances were of great influence upon Ibn-Khaldun. They explain why he did not attempt to reform such societies. Moreover they explain why Ibn-Khaldun "en l'étudiant, ne pense pas à la sauver et ne se présente pas comme réformateur, il ne prétend pas répondre à des exigences sociales; mais plutôt montrer le chemin de la mort; comment s'évanouir. Ainsi, on ne trouve pas dans sa sociologie l'idée de réforme, de développement ou de progrès, mais bien plutôt celle d'évanouissement, de décadence et de chute. Peut-être est-ce dû à son échec complet dans la vie politique? Peut-être encore à sa vie troublée?"⁽¹⁾

When Ibn-Khaldun thought about his society, he thought as a historian. He approached it with a historical mind, taking its processes as they are with an attempt to find out the general norms and the elemental laws to which its events were subject. When he spoke about his age "il s'en considère comme l'historien, et quand" il a parlé "de l'histoire, il s'en considère comme le sociologue..."⁽²⁾

His life and age were of great influence on his thought "surtout par ce nuage noir et pessimiste qu'elle jette sur elle..."⁽³⁾

(1) Ezzat, Abd El Aziz, Ibn-Khaldoun et sa Science Sociale, p. 16.

(2) Ibid., p. 18.

(3) Ibid., p. 19.

Ibn-Khaldun says that the method to be employed in discerning what is true or wrong is a "règle fondée sur l'appréciation du possible et de l'impossible," qui "consiste a examiner la société humaine."⁽¹⁾

The influence of his life and age on his thought are obviously indicated in the subject matter of the Muqaddimah, namely when he speaks about the nature of establishment, development, and dissolution of dynasties, when he speaks about the nature of civilization in its different aspects, and when he speaks about solidarity (ʿasabiyah, l'esprit de corps) and its importance in the establishment of dynasties.

It should be noted that his professional life was of particular importance to his thought; for "les idées d'un homme sont toujours plus ou moins la traduction de ses occupations professionnelles..."⁽²⁾ Moreover when Ibn-Khaldun wrote the Muqaddimah he did not write it for writing's sake, "mais pour exposer ce qui lui est resté dans la mémoire de son expérience politique dans les différents milieux de l'occident musulman."⁽³⁾

His functions as an ambassador, chamberlain (Hajib), and as a politician enriched his political experiences and aided him in formulating his political conceptions.

His intellectual occupations as a historian, a professor, and a judge were of a great help to him in distinguishing between

(1) Ibid., p. 18.

(2) Ibid., p. 28.

(3) Ibid., p. 29.

different sciences and elaborating on them, as they aided him in systemizing his thoughts.

His education and scholarly life were of great importance in shaping his thought.

His practical life was to sharpen his power of observation, to enrich his knowledge, and to formulate his independent thought.

All these factors were to convey, to Ibn-Khaldun, a character which made him a serious, unstable, pessimistic and ambitious person.

His seriousness is observed in his attempt to acquire more knowledge and learning. His instability and pessimism could be explained by the instability of his age and society, and the many failures that confronted him during his political career, respectively. His ambition is reflected in his perseverance and self-conciety as exemplified in his shifting of loyalties whenever a better opportunity appeared to him, and his high estimation of himself throughout his autobiography, respectively.

in

Moreover, the circumstances/which he lived were to condition his approach to things. "Loin de se borner à envisager chaque matière sous son point de vu ordinaire et a apprécier chaque chose ou chaque individu d'après son caractère particulier, et de rester au rivage; il se lança sur les vagues de la spéculation poursuivant des principes et des lois générales pour les gouvernements, et les états, sans

accorder une grande considération aux particularités externes... en un mot, ce fut un savant, un profond penseur et non un politique, incapable d'aborder les abstractions." (1)

As a last point we can say that the Muqaddimah of Ibn-Khaldun "seraient... des inductions issues de l'observation et de l'analyse des conditions historiques propres aux états arabes issus de la conquête musulmane, principalement ceux de l'Afrique du Nord. D'ailleurs, les prolégomènes ont été écrits presque en même temps que l'Histoire des Berbères,... ces rapprochements ainsi que tout ce que nous pouvons supposer de sa tournure d'esprit, ainsi que les faits eux-mêmes, et les conclusions qu'il énonce, montrent qu'Ibn-Khaldun a fondé sa philosophie de l'Histoire en raisonnant surtout sur les renseignements qu'il possédait de première main." (2)

In other words Ibn-Khaldun's Muqaddimah is "a lively picture of the social life, age and different environments which he lived." (3)

(1) Ibid., pps. 31-32.

(2) Bouthoul, Gaston; Ibn-Khaldun (sa Philosophie Sociale), p. 19.

(3) Al-Jur, Khalīl; Tārīkh al-Falsafah al-^cArabīyah, p. 477.

(III)

THE ISLAMIC BACKGROUND OF IBN-KHALDUN'S POLITICAL THEORY

The central problem which Islamic thought and philosophy faced during the Middle Ages was that of faith (revelation) and reason presenting itself as the contrast between divine and human law.

Ibn-Khaldun as a Muslim thinker, who lived in a Muslim community during the last two thirds of the fourteenth century and most of the first decade of the fifteenth, was faced with this problem. More definitely he had to provide an answer to the relationship between philosophy (Hikmah) and the revealed laws, and to show the method of communicating the results of his investigations to a community based on the revealed law.

These conditions allow the following question to be raised: What was Ibn-Khaldun's Islamic background? In other words where did Ibn-Khaldun stand in relation to his Islamic background?

The answer to this question is found in Ibn-Khaldun's distinction between two kinds of sciences, namely, the transmittable sciences (al-^cUlūm al-Naqliyah) and the philosophic or natural sciences (al-^cUlūm al-^cAqliyah), and his evaluation of them.

While he sees that the transmittable sciences are known through the Lawgiver with no place for the intellect (^caql) except in relating the parts (furu^c) to the sources

(Usūl), he views that the philosophic sciences as being natural to human beings and are known through man's reasoning. (1)

When considering metaphysics (ilm 'ilāhī), he says that dialectical theology (ilm al-kalām) deals with the dogmatic beliefs (aqa'id al-imān) as derived from the religious laws (al-sharī'a) with no reference to the intellect (aql). (2)

At the same time he rejects the subjection of dialectical theology to philosophical reasoning (hikmah), on the assumption that their respective sources, problems, and subjects are different, and that the perceptions of the prophet are wider in scope because he draws his support from the divine light. (3)

He maintains that we must give preference to the perceptions of the lawgiver and have confidence in them without any attempt to prove their correctness rationally, even though they appear or might contradict our rational perceptions. We must believe in what he has commanded, and accept, without hesitation, what we cannot understand, keeping the intellect out of them. The articles of faith are not among the intellect's perceptions, (4) and their subjection to reasoning renders many damages to the religion.

(1) Ibn-Khaldun; Tārīkh Al-^cAlamah Ibn-Khaldun, V. I, pps. 779-780.

(2) Ibid., p. 921.

(3) Ibid., p. 922.

(4) Ibid.

He adds that rational arguments, in this respect, and in any way, are insufficient and inadequate to perceive the questions pertaining to the articles of faith. (1)

He attempts to refute the philosophers' (falāsifah) assertion that happiness consists in arriving at the perception of all existing things, both the sensibilia and what lies beyond them, with the help of rational argumentation and speculation, by asserting that their view is wrong in all respects, and their arguments are in no way sufficient because conformity between the results of thinking and the outside world, is not unequivocal, and all the judgements of the mind are general in character whereas the existents of the outside world are individual in character. He asserts that the essence of the science of metaphysics and the spiritualia, are completely unknown, and we cannot get at them, nor can we prove them by logical argumentation (burhān). We cannot perceive the spiritualia essences because the senses can't perceive them, having no way whatever of affirming their existence. (2)

To Ibn-Khaldun, man is composed of a corporeal part and a spiritual part, the latter being mixed with the former, and each has its own perceptions though the part that perceives in both cases is the spiritual part, perceiving at times spiritual perceptions and at other times corporeal perceptions, but with one important qualification, namely, that it perceives

(1) Ibid., pps. 993-996.

(2) Ibid., p. 997.

the spiritual perceptions through its own essence (bizātihah) without any intermediary (wāsītah), and it perceives the corporeal perceptions through the intermediary of the organs of the body, as the brain and the senses. ⁽¹⁾

Out of these considerations he concludes that philosophic sciences are of no use, since the limits that human thinking can reach does not go beyond the realm of existents; ⁽²⁾ that the arguments and proofs belong only to the category of corporeal perceptions, because they are produced by the powers of the brain that is, imagination, thinking, and memory; that existence is too vast to be completely encompassed or perceived, either spiritually or corporeally; and that the happiness which the Lawgiver promised is something that cannot be encompassed by anyone's perceptions. ⁽³⁾

To Ibn-Khaldun the philosophers cannot realize their avowed intentions due to the inadequacy and insufficiency of their means. However he reserves one single benefit to reasoning and logical argumentation, by saying that it sharpens the mind and its power of argumentation. ⁽⁴⁾

Ibn-Khaldun recognizes the existence and necessity of a rational element to support the transmitted sciences. He subjects that rational element, to the end sought by the transmitted sciences, saying that it should be used to ascertain and to apply the commands of the religious laws. Apart

(1) Ibid., pps. 997-998.

(2) Ibid., p. 997.

(3) Ibid., p. 998.

(4) Ibid., pps. 1001-1002.

from this qualification, he refutes philosophy attempting to show its theoretical fruitlessness, and practical danger.

In his criticism of the philosophers he was merciless without restricting himself to those of his times. He attacks "the attributed or real Neo-Platonic doctrines of Farabi and Avicenna, and criticize both for confusing their art with that of the dialectical theologians and mystics."⁽¹⁾

He criticises al-Fārābī and, especially, Avicenna, "for altering the philosophy of the ancients in metaphysics, and for departing from the 'way of demonstration' and ending with rhetorical and dialectical conjectures and opinions alien to philosophy."⁽²⁾

In this respect he sides with Averroes' and al-Ghazzālī's criticism of that art, demonstrating that philosophers should uphold the religious laws, and acknowledge the limits of human reason, and that true happiness is only that which was promised by the prophet.

He asserts that whoever studies philosophy, should do so, after he has been saturated with the religious law, and has studied the interpretation of the Qu'rān (tafsīr) and jurisprudence. Without that knowledge a person can hardly remain safe from its pernicious aspects.⁽³⁾

(1) Mahdi, Muhsin; Ibn-Khaldun's Philosophy of History, p. 108.

(2) Ibid.

(3) Ibn-Khaldun, Tarīkh Al-^cAlāmah Ibn-Khaldun, V. I, p. 1002.

In this respect we see that Ibn-Khaldun did not belong to the falāsifah school of Islamic thought. He did not agree with their main assertions; in contrast, he rejected their main premises, to the extent that he considered dialectical theology as no longer necessary, at his times, due to the sufficient arguments that were written by the orthodox jurists ('a'imat ahl al-Sunna),⁽¹⁾ and that its only achievement is for individuals, as such, and the seekers of knowledge (ṭalabat al-^cilm), for it forwards to them the theoretical arguments justifying the dogmatic beliefs.⁽²⁾

Al-Tawhīd (the belief in the oneness of God) is the inability (al-^cajzu) to perceive the causes and the ways in which their influences are channeled, and the reliance, in this respect, upon the Creator and the things issued by Him. What we know about the Creator is limited to what we have received from Him. In other words he sees that the inability to perceive is the perception of the oneness of God, (al-^cajzu ^can al-idrāk idrāk).⁽³⁾

Perfection, in this regard, is not acquired by one's declaration of faith, but in the acquisition of an attribute, a habit, to which the soul becomes adjusted (tatakayaf). The object of all obligations (takālīf) is the acquisition of a habit, deeply rooted in the soul, out of which emerges a necessary knowledge, al-tawhīd, on which the attainment of

(1) Ibid., pps. 922-923.

(2) Ibid., p. 837.

(3) Ibid., p. 826.

(1)
happiness depends.

Faith, to Ibn-Khaldun, is the basis, as well as, the source of all obligations. In this respect he disagrees with the falasifah, siding with the orthodox theologians as al-Ash^cari, al-Baqillani, and Imam al-Haramain. He maintains that the philosophers study existing bodies (ajsam) in so far as they move or are stationary, and that the theologians (mutakalimin) study them in so far as they serve to indicate their Maker. Moreover he shows that the philosophers study, existence, (al-wujud al-mutlaq), as such, and what it requires for its essence, and that the theologians study existentia, in so far as it indicates the creator, to conclude that dialectical theology deals with the dogmatic beliefs which the religious Law laid down as correct, and to prove them with the help of rational arguments (adilah ^caqliyah).⁽²⁾

In other words, dialectical theology to Ibn-Khaldun, is the science that deals with the arguments justifying and defending the dogmatic beliefs (al-^caqaid al-imaniyah) as indicated by rational arguments (adilah ^caqliyah), and that the basis of these dogmatic beliefs is al-Tawhid.⁽³⁾

Out of the afore mentioned points we can observe that the main difference between the philosophic sciences and transmitted sciences, to Ibn-Khaldun, lies in their different sources,

(1) Ibid., p. 827.

(2) Ibid., pps. 827-836.

(3) Ibid., p. 821.

concerns and ends. While the former are due to human reasoning, the latter are due to revelation and the Prophet's legislation. While the philosophic sciences are concerned with what reason may come to know, the transmitted sciences are concerned with ^{what} was taught or commanded. ⁽¹⁾ Moreover, while the former's scope is made within an overall unity of method ⁽²⁾ that of rational demonstration, the latter has to deal with 'Man's' actions as based on the Qu'ran and the Tradition encompassing a very wide scope of affairs related to every aspect of the human life.

To Ibn-Khaldun, human reason cannot, and in no way, come to understand existētia and the causes of every existing thing, as a whole. Moreover, it is impossible to understand the spiritualia by reason, because human reason has its own limits. If it is used in its proper frame, the results would be sound, but when it passes its limits then ⁽³⁾ the achievements are definitely misleading.

Thus we can say that Ibn-Khaldun claimed that reason is a valid criterion of things, and when it is based on actual demonstrations its judgements admit no falsity. It points to the limits of human reasoning. On the other hand he viewed that the revealed law (al-Shar^c) supplies the believers with definite dogmas (^caqā'id) about both the existētia and the

-
- (1) Mahdi, Muhsin; Ibn-Khaldun's Philosophy of History, p. 74.
 (2) Ibn-Khaldun, op. cit., pps. 824-825.
 (3) Ibid., pps. 824-825.

spiritualia, prescribing which acts are obligatory, recom-
mandable, permissible, blamable, and forbidden, as it des-
cribes the rewards or punishments that such acts entail,
respectively.

The Lawgiver, to Ibn-Khaldun, is not bound by the
limits of human reason, and what He announces must be accepted
and never be doubted, even when they appear to contradict
human reason. He maintains that the Legislator saves the
believers from the arduous task of searching for the nature
of the dogmatic beliefs, whose real meaning is hidden and not
clear. In other words he asserts that what was announced by
the Prophet should have priority over rational knowledge.

"Ibn-Khaldun, thus, intimates that between philosophy
and the Law, and between philosophers and communities based on
the various Laws, there is an essential distinction, if not
incompatibility, contradiction, and conflict."⁽¹⁾

Like other Muslim thinkers Ibn-Khaldun was concerned
with this problem; however, he did not mention the proper
relation of philosophy to Law. This might have been because
"he did not want to commit himself publicly concerning the
proper relation of philosophy to society..."⁽²⁾

Looking upon the Islamic Community as a community
based on the religious laws, owing its character to revela-
tion, and standing on the Prophet's teachings, makes it

(1) Mahdi, op. cit., p. 81.

(2) Ibid., p. 83.

impossible to us to understand the central problem of Islamic political thought without understanding the nature of Prophecy. To Ibn-Khaldun, Prophecy stands as "the source of important social values, institutions, and attitudes."⁽¹⁾ It is a human phenomenon. The Prophet is a human being with human traits, knowledge, powers, acts, and purposes; however, not each person is a prophet or can be a prophet. "On the contrary, . . . Prophecy is, in a sense, the highest form of human existence. The Prophet is an extremely rare individual who possesses special, and rarely attainable, natural powers from birth, and leads a correct life prior to, and during, his mission as a prophet."⁽²⁾

The Prophet attains his knowledge through the movement of the human intellect to the sphere of angelic knowledge back to the representation of that knowledge to his fellow men. He does not arrive at that through reasoning, but through his possession of an innate ability (*fitrah*) that enables him to perceive what is beyond the domains of the senses and attain the knowledge of the spiritualia directly. His powerful intelligence enables him to persist in this practice until it becomes a habit."⁽³⁾

(1) Ibid., p. 85.

(2) Ibid., p. 85.

(3) Ibn-Khaldun; Tārīkh al-^cAlāmah Ibn-Khaldun, V. I, pps. 171, 159, & 846.

To Ibn-Khaldun the perception of the knowledge of the spiritulia depends on the degree to which a man remains chained to his existentia. In accordance he sees that the lowest degree is the knowledge attainable within the sensible world (al-^calam al-jismānī), that is the sensual perceptions (al-madārik al-hisiyah). The second degree of knowledge is that attainable in the world of sleep (^calam al-nawm) which he calls the imaginatory perceptions (al-madārik al-khayāliyah wal-tasawūr). The third one is the state of death (^calam al-mawt) in which men are totally divested of their bodies seeing the same things seen by the Prophet. Finally the state of prophethood. It is free from the states of sleep and death. It is a state of intense, and direct apprehension. The Prophet in this state becomes a part of the Angelic world, ⁽¹⁾ with a certain and direct vision admitting of no errors.

The Prophet, to Ibn-Khaldun, has to preserve the knowledge of prophethood in order to communicate it "through the intervention of imagination and common sense, the faculty which supplies the sensible forms and the commonly understandable language used by the Prophet in communicating his ⁽²⁾ visions to others."

In other words Ibn-Khaldun sees that "the essential sign of prophecy is the possession of the capacity most directly related to the realization of its ends" which is

(1) Mahdi, Muhsin, Ibn-Khaldun Philosophy of History, pps. 87-88; & Ibn-Khaldun, Tarikh Al-Alamah Ibn-Khaldun, V.I, pps. 170-171.

(2) Ibid., p. 88.

the guiding of "the nation to which they - the prophets - were sent to the right path and to improve men's life."⁽¹⁾

In this respect, Ibn-Khaldun, sees the whole created nature as representing a "system or structure composed of hierarchic grades or levels", which are not, ..., absolutely closed from one another but have intermediate links (ittisāl)... (and that) it is possible that certain members of one species progress to the higher species."⁽²⁾

'Man', to Ibn-Khaldun, reveals a double nature, a corporeal and a spiritual. By virtue of the latter he - 'Man' - stands at the threshold of the Angelic realm. Some souls "have a (perfected) capacity to jump out of (insilākh or inqilā^c) humanness into angelicness... after the perfection of their own spiritual character..."⁽³⁾

To F. Rahman "Ibn-Khaldun has devised this scheme in order to meet the requirements both of philosophy and Orthodox Kalām represented, e.g., by al-Shahrastānī... Actually the doctrine is fundamentally the same as that of the philosophers; only these had not expressed their distinctions formally... (and) Ibn-Khaldun is able to make the distinction only by adopting the Kalām-doctrine in toto and by giving up all talk of natural faculties of the soul."⁽⁴⁾

(1) Ibid., p. 89.

(2) Rahman, F. Prophecy in Islam, p. 105.

(3) Ibid., p. 106.

(4) Ibid., p. 107.

Ibn-Khaldun's main departure, in this respect, from the philosophers' doctrines is in his belief in revelation and al-Shari^ca as "the human form of the purely spiritual (1) divine."

As such "His account of prophecy seeks to reconcile the Orthodox and the rationalists' claims and attempts to rationalize the supernaturalism of the Orthodox Kalam." (2) However, he maintains the view that one's aim should be devotion to God and not the gaining of occult knowledge. In this respect he sides with the Sunni thinkers.

While the philosophers maintain that the Prophet "receives Revelation by identifying himself with the active Intellect," (3) to Ibn-Khaldun he receives it by identifying himself with the angels. While they maintain that the natural capacities of the human soul does not allow of any limit where ordinary humanity stops and prophecy begins", (4) Ibn-Khaldun speaks of the natural powers of the human soul, emphasizing that the prophet's natural capacity enables him to contact the angels and be identified with them.

Accordingly, we can see that Ibn-Khaldun as a Muslim thinker, emphasizes the political function of prophecy seeing that the prophet possesses the virtue of deliberation about human actions, deciding what is best good for them, and creating in the community, for which he legislates, the attitude of

(1) Ibid., p. 107.

(2) Ibid., p. 105.

(3) Ibid., p. 109.

(4) Ibid., p. 109.

dogmatic belief concerning the divinity of the Law, the truth of his teachings, the necessity of obeying God's prescriptions, and the certainty of rewards and punishments in the world to come.

When speaking about human association, Ibn-Khaldun criticizes al-siyāṣah al-madaniyah which was propagated by the falāsifah school of Islamic thought and especially al-Fārābī. He maintains that their concepts, in this respect, and in relation to ⁽¹⁾ the Ideal City "are hypothetical as they, themselves, admit".

He differed from the falāsifah, in this regard, by reproducing "the classical theory of the Jurists, seeing in the Caliphate the frame within which the shari^c determines the life of the Muslim community and insures the Muslim's happiness in the world to come." ⁽²⁾ It is the focus of his preference representing the end to which the Muslims ought to seek, namely, their salvation and bliss in the world to come.

Accordingly we can say that Ibn-Khaldun's thought was purely Islamic. It was derived from a Muslim culture and from his own experiences in Muslim societies. His Muqaddimah represents him "comme un homme qui a bien connu la vie islamique dans ses differents milieux." ⁽³⁾ It shows how he came to know the different trends of thought, as well as the important

(1) Ibn-Khaldun, Tārīkh al-^cAlāmah Ibn-Khaldun, V. I, p. 540.

(2) Rosenthal, E. Political Thought in Medieval Islam, p. 59.

(3) Ezzat, A. al-Aziz; Ibn-Khaldun et sa Science Social, p. 52.

events that the then Muslim world experienced. Moreover, it indicates how he molded his knowledge and experiences to result in what he called the "Science of Civilization" (al-^cUmran̄). His knowledge, his practical life, the different factors and events he lived, were to shape his works and thought without affecting his Sunnism. He continued to hold the view that the Caliphate is "the choicest fruit of a God guided and God centred human association. It is the ideal, the best way to the fulfilment of man's destiny, to the attainment of happiness in this world and in the world to come."⁽¹⁾

In his account on prophecy and human association, respectively, Ibn-Khaldun expands the Sunnī jurists' view. He "was not only a Muslim, but as almost every page of the Muqaddima bears witness, a Muslim jurist and theologian, of the strict Mālikī school. For him religion was far and away the most important thing in life... and the shari^c the only true guide."⁽²⁾

His work indicates that he was "not concerned with religion, i.e. Islam, as such, but only with the part played by religion in the outward course of history. The state occupies the central place, because it is the subject of his study. But a careful examination of the chapters which constitute the first three books of the Muqaddimah will show that he

(1) Rosenthal, op. cit., p. 85.

(2) Gibb, H.A.R. 'The Islamic Background of Ibn-Khaldun's Political Theory', Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, VII, (1933-1935), p. 28.

uses the term religion in two different senses. On the one hand is religion in the true or absolute sense, when the whole will of man is governed by his religious conviction and his animal nature is held in check. Opposed to this is "acquired religion", a second-hand and relatively feeble thing, which saps his manhood and fails to control his animal impulses. This distinction underlies also the chapter "That a religious rising (da^cwa) unsupported by ^casabiya is doomed to failure"... for Ibn-Khaldun makes it quite clear that he is speaking of religious movements which have no divine commission behind them, and thus are religious only in the outward sense." (1)

"The ethical and Islamic basis of Ibn-Khaldun's thought is, however, implicit throughout his exposition, quite apart from his constant appeal to texts from Qur'^{ān} and Tradition. His doctrine of causality and natural law... is simply that of the Sunnat Allah so often appealed to in the Qur'^{ān}." (2)

In this respect he saw human associations for mutual assistance as fulfilling God's wise purpose for Man's survival and preservation of the species. Likewise he saw Mulk as an institution ordained by God, "whether it be good or evil, and the ^casabiya which furnishes the mechanism whereby it is attained is itself due to the aid of God. Thus even the civil state exists as part of the divine purpose." (3)

(1) Ibid., p. 29.

(2) Ibid., p. 29.

(3) Ibid., p. 30.

These considerations show that he was, like the other Muslim jurists of his time, concerned with the problem of reconciling the shari^c with the facts of history.

Here two questions could be posed, namely, what was Ibn-Khaldun's objective in writing his History? and what was the incentive that instigated him to do that apart from his ambition and scholarly mind?

We have observed that his age and life were of great importance in shaping his thought and defining his character, at the same time they were the true incentive that made him write his History. Ibn-Khaldun "a senti l'insuffisance de l'histoire telle qu'on la concevait en énumération de faits, de noms et de dates. Il a voulu s'élever a la connaissance de ce que nous appellerions les lois historiques... Il a voulu comprendre et expliquer, indiquer les origines des nations, reconnaître les causes des évènements, les différences et les analogies qu'ils peuvent présenter entre eux... "M'introduisant par la porte des causes générales dans l'étude des faits particuliers, j'embrasse dans un recit comprehensif l'histoire du genre humain... J'assigne aux évènements politiques leurs causes et leurs origines."⁽¹⁾

This objective, as is the case with his Muqaddimah, could not be understood without understanding the tempo of his age, and his life, because they reflect the general sequence of events that he perceived, lived, and participated in.

(1) Bouthoul, Gaston, Ibn-Khaldun (Sa Philosophie Sociale), p. 2.

Apart from the above mentioned reason, Ibn-Khaldun had a more important and deep objective, which we can observe in the title of his book.

In citing the title of his book, Ibn-Khaldun said: "I called it: the Book of the ^cIbar, the record of the origins and events of the days of the Arabs, Persians and Berbers, and those of their contemporaries who were possessors of great power."⁽¹⁾

The word ^cIbar seems to be the key word in the title, and the Book is of the ^cIbar before being a Book of the history... of the Arabs, Persians, or Berbers.

The word ^cIbar in Arabic has many meanings. It is "the plural of ^cibra, a noun derived from the verb-root ^c-b-r... It means passing on, over, through, by, or beyond;..."⁽²⁾

It could be observed out of the mentioned connotations that the word "^cIbar" "connates the existence of a barrier, but also the bridging or crossing of that barrier... it points to chasm that may exist between two persons, and also the possibility of communication between them".⁽³⁾

With the advent of Islam, it was used in the Qu'rān and in the Prophet's tradition where it acquired the meaning which urged man to take evidence of the past experiences in order to acknowledge the unseen. It was a stimulus through

(1) Ibn-Khaldun; Tārīkh Al-^cAlāmah Ibn-Khaldun, V. I, p. 8.

(2) Mahdi, Muhsin; Ibn-Khaldun's Philosophy of History, pps. 65-66.

(3) Ibid., p. 66.

which it attempted to awaken man's moral sense and enhance him to act in accordance to God's demands warning the community against certain actions and urging them to imitate the good deeds of the past. It indicated that man through his experiences of the past events can realize his apprehensions in the management of the practical affairs of life. As such, and in relation to the religious, moral, and practical aspects of a man's deeds, by experiencing the teachings of God and past events.

However, and under the succeeding Greek and Persian influence in the field of politics and history the word cibar acquired additional meanings. It "emphasized that the study of history should lead to reliving it, and being educated by it. They wrote history for the explicit purpose of widening their reader's experience, particularly their political experience, and of imparting to them the prudence for future political action."⁽¹⁾

Those who were subject to the Greek and Persian influence had the contention that history respects itself, due to constant causes which "do not vary significantly from one age to another or from one people to another."⁽²⁾ Due to such perspective they attempted to penetrate behind the changing events and conditions seeking the nature of the causes that effected the historical events in a certain or other direction.

(1) Ibid., p. 70.

(2) Ibid., p. 70.

Ibn-Khaldun in calling his Book "the Book of the ^cIbar tried to encompass the universal history, by passing through the particular events to their intelligible happenings.

His experience of the decline of the Islamic world in general and the western part of the Islamic world in particular had been of great assistance to his achievements.

However, his main objective was not to relate history as it was or pass beyond it. "He intended to learn from history and not merely to pass through it... He intended also to interpret history and reveal its secrets through comparison, theoretical comprehension, and the analysis of the nature and causes of historical events."⁽¹⁾ External events were of concern to his research only as exemplifications of the general laws that effected them, and as data through which such laws might be discerned.

As such Ibn-Khaldun attempted to pass from the external embodiments of history to its internal nature. ^cIbra was the bridge over which his mind crossed historical events to their nature and causes, and back to the events...⁽²⁾

"... ^cIbra, therefore is not only the link between history and wisdom, but also the process through which history is contemplated with the aim of understanding its nature and of utilizing the knowledge thus gained in action."⁽³⁾

(1) Ibid., p. 70-71.

(2) Ibid., p. 71.

(3) Ibid., p. 71.

In doing so, Ibn-Khaldun was faced with some problems; as how to control and direct his thought, how to avoid social ostracism, how to interpret the revelation without disrupting its verbal integrity, how to explore new dimension of knowledge without destroying the existing one, and how to propagate the results of his research without breaking the social order.

Out of these considerations we can conclude that Ibn-Khaldun's objective behind the writing of the Muqaddimah was: (1)

An attempt in historical criticism, through which an empirical and objective study of history could be achieved.

An attempt to explain the social events with respect to economic, political, psychological and sociological considerations.

An endeavour to study political institutions, behaviours and the factors underlying any political phenomena.

And furthermore, to create a reliable source of data that benefits an interested person, who seeks social activity, by providing him with the knowledge of the factors, stages, and manifestations of any social change or happening.

In other words his object was solely "to establish criteria for the rectification of historical narratives." (2)

Ibn-Khaldun as a thinker is distinguished from all Muslim historians who preceded him, by the fact that he considered history as a science in itself, and not merely a

(1) Bouthoul, Gaston; Ibn-Khaldoun (Sa Philosophie Social), p. 35.

(2) Gibb, H.A.R., 'The Islamic Background of Ibn-Khaldun's Political Theory', Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, VII, (1933-1935), p. 25.

narrated record of events, names and dates. He looked upon it as a science worthy of being studied "in the light of a new method of explanation and reasoning."⁽¹⁾

He conceived of it as an independent science having a particular subject matter and tackling problems of a particular nature; and that its object is no more than the explanation of all the phenomena and conditions pertaining to it, to distinguish truth from falsehood in the recording of events, and to mark what is possible and what is not in these events. He subjects all human society and what is connected with it to this science, whose originality he was well aware of knowing that he was its discoverer.⁽²⁾

The subject matter of this science is all that is related to Human Civilization (al-^cUmrān al-Basharī). Accordingly we see Ibn-Khaldun dividing his Muqaddimah into the following sections:⁽³⁾

1. Human civilization at large.
2. Bedouin civilization (al-^cUmrān al-Badawī).
3. States, the Caliphate, Mulk (Royal kingship), and monarchical ranks and offices (Marātib sultāniyah).
4. Sedentary civilization.
5. The various aspects of making a living (al-Ma^cash wa wujūh).^h
6. And, the various kinds of sciences (al-^cUlūm wa

(1) Enan, M. Abdūllah; Ibn-Khaldun, His Life and Work, p. 81.

(2) Ibn-Khaldun, Tarikh Al-^cAlamah Ibn-Khaldun, V. I, pps. 3-6 & 61-62.

(3) Ibid., p. 68.

asnāfuha).

His originality "is to be found in his detailed and objective analysis of the political, social, and economic factors underlying the establishment of political units and the evolution of the state, and it is the results of this detailed analysis that constitute the "new science" which he claims to have founded. The materials on which his analysis is based were derived partly from his own experience... and partly also from the historical sources to his hand relating to the history of Islam, which he interpreted with a striking disregard of established prejudices. But the axioms or principles on which his study rests are those of practically all the earlier Sunni jurists and Social philosophers." ⁽¹⁾

(1) Gibb, H.A.R. 'The Islamic Background of Ibn-Khaldun's Political Theory', Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, VII, (1933-1935), p. 25.

(IV)

IBN-KHALDUN'S CONCEPT OF HISTORY AND ITS
RELATION TO HIS POLITICAL THOUGHT

In a general survey of Ibn-Khaldun's Muqaddimah we can locate, clearly, his attempt to formulate a philosophy of History. In his study of history and civilization he looked upon social sciences, in their different manifestations and subject matters, as the occupant of one inter-related frame. When he studied the economic or political features of a society, he studied them as manifestations of one common field, namely, that of civilization.

Although he does not appear to have been inspired by predecessors in his chosen field of intellectual activity, yet his understanding of history was, to a great extent, based on his intensive study of the different branches of knowledge that had been known to the Arabs, as it was also, based on the experiences that he gathered out of Muslim-Arab history.

His knowledge, on the one hand, and his experiences, on the other, made him aware of certain permanent features in society that transcend time and place. In other words he conceived of permanent laws and norms that are not accidental or subject to chance causes. (1)

(1) Hussein, Taha; Falsafat Ibn-Khaldun Al-'Ijtima'iyah, p. 30.

His Muqaddimah, in this respect, is no more than an attempt to find out the chain that relates and unites the past with the contemporary and the future. (1)

His deep insight made him recognize in the historical narratives many events which contradict such permanent laws. His findings, in this respect, were an incentive for the development of a new method and approach to the study of history, to locate the scope and frame of historical study, and to define the nature of 'history'. (2)

As a point of departure he recognizes 'history' as "a discipline widely cultivated among nations and races." (3) On the surface it is no more than a recitation of the political events, dynasties and happenings of the remote past. Its objective, in this respect, is no more than entertainment and acknowledgement of human affairs without explaining how the human affairs are affected by the change of conditions and how dynasties come to emerge or perish.

To Ibn-Khaldun "the inner meaning of history... involves speculation and an attempt to get at the truth, subtle explanation of the causes and origins of existing things, and deep knowledge of the how and why events..." (4)

(1) Ibid., pps. 30-31.

(2) Ibid., p. 31.

(3) Rosenthal, Franz; The Muqaddimah, V.I, p. 6.

(4) Ibid., p. 6.

As such 'History' seems to be a discipline having the objective of seeking the truth and the fundamental laws that cause any change or event. It needs a critical insight into the data of facts presented to sort out the causes and origins of existing things. It needs judgement to locate which part of the material presented is spurious and which is not, because "civilization in its (different) conditions, contains (different) elements to which historical information may be related and with which reports and historical materials may be checked."⁽¹⁾

Ibn-Khaldun believed that "every event or (phenomena), whether (it comes into being in connection with some) essence or (as the result of an action), must inevitably possess a nature peculiar to its essence as well as to the accidental conditions that may attach themselves to it."⁽²⁾ Only by knowing the nature of events and their circumstances in the world of existence, true historical information is possible. The knowledge of the nature of civilization makes it easy to differentiate between similar things by making possible critical investigation. This is so, because the truth and soundness of an information or explanation about a factual event is recognized only when it conforms with the general conditions.

Accordingly, he asserts that the normative method for distinguishing right from wrong information, on the grounds

(1) Ibid., p. 8.

(2) Ibid., p. 72.

of inherent possibility or absurdity, is the method to be applied in investigating human social organization. "We must distinguish the conditions that attach themselves to the essence of civilization as required by its very nature; the things that are accidental (to civilization) and cannot be counted on; and the things that cannot possibly attach themselves to it. If we do that, we shall have a normative method for distinguishing right from wrong and truth from falsehood in historical information by means of a logical demonstration that admits no doubts."⁽¹⁾

Any student of history, as a primary task, has to seek and search for the beginnings of conditions, and the fundamental principles on which the various dynasties build their organization. He has to investigate the reasons which lead to the subjection of some dynasties by others and to answer the question why they succeed each other, as he has also to explain the reasons that made "for mutual separation or contact among the dynasties."⁽²⁾

In other words, a historian in trying to explain and prove the deep meanings of history has to discern first the truths of human association, the organization of civilization and dynasties, and the factors that affect the changeability of those conditions.

(1) Ibid., p. 77.

(2) Ibid., p. 10.

Ibn-Khaldun comments on his work by saying: "In the work, I commented on civilization, on urbanization and on the essential characteristics of human social organization, in a way that explains to the reader how and why things are as they are, and shows him how the men who constitute a dynasty first came upon the historical scene."⁽¹⁾

Although he conceived of history as an independent science, in the sense that it has its own peculiar subject matter - that is, human civilization and social organization - and its own peculiar problems - namely, those related to the explanation of the conditions that attach themselves to the essence of civilization, one after the other - yet he does not reject the intimate relation between it and other social sciences as rhetoric and politics.

In discussing the scope of the science of history Ibn-Khaldun says: "In the field under consideration here, we encounter (certain) problems treated incidentally by scholars among the arguments applicable to their particular sciences, but that in object and approach are of the same type as the problems we are discussing. In connection with the arguments for prophecy, for instance, scholars mention that human beings cooperate with each other for their existence and, therefore, need men to arbitrate among them and exercise a restraining influence. Or, in the science of the

(1) Ibid., p. 10.

principles of jurisprudence... mention is made of the fact that people need means to express their intentions because by their very nature, cooperation and social organization are made easier by proper expressions. Or, in connection with the explanation that laws have their reason in the purposes they are to serve, the jurists mention that adultery confuses pedigrees and destroys the human species; that injustice invites the destruction of civilization with the necessary consequence that the (human) species will be destroyed. Other similar things are stated in connection with the purposes embedded in laws. All (laws) are based upon the effort to preserve civilization. Therefore, (the laws) pay attention to the things that belong to civilization. This is obvious from our reference to these problems which are mentioned as representative (of the general situation)."⁽¹⁾

However, if any separation is to exist, it is not due to Ibn-Khaldun's belief that the social sciences provide different subject matters, as it is due to his belief that "the accidents involved in every manifestation of nature and intellect deserve study. Any topic that is understandable and real requires its own special science."⁽²⁾

As such, when he discusses politics, as manifested in human organization, he discusses it as an aspect of one field of study, namely human civilization.

To Ibn-Khaldun "Man" is distinguished from other living creatures by his ability to think, his need for a wazi^c and strong authority, and by his desire to seek livelihood by

(1) Ibid., p. 80.
 (2) Ibid., p. 79.

obtaining and acquiring the means of life.

Those distinct qualities necessitate civilization which "means that human beings have to dwell in common and settle together in cities and hamlets for the comforts of companionship and for the satisfaction of human needs, as a result of the natural disposition of human beings towards cooperation in order to be able to make a living..."⁽¹⁾ It may be either Bedouin or urban.

In all these conditions there are factors that influence civilization. History to Ibn-Khaldun "is information about human social organization, which itself is identical with world civilization. It deals with such conditions affecting the nature of civilization. As, for instance, savagery and sociability, group feelings, and the different ways by which one group of human beings achieves superiority over another. It deals with royal authority and the dynasties that result (in this manner) and with the various ranks that exist within them. (It further deals) with the different kinds of gainful occupations and ways of living, with the sciences and crafts that human beings pursue as part of their activities and efforts, and with all the other institutions that originate in civilization through its very nature."⁽²⁾ It "makes us acquainted with the conditions of past nations as they are reflected in their 'national' character."⁽³⁾

(1) Ibid., p. 84.

(2) Ibid., p. 71.

(3) Ibid., p. 10.

These points rest on his view that "the past resembles
the future more than one (drop of) water another."⁽¹⁾

To Ibn-Khaldun "Dynasty and government serve as the world's market place attracting to it the products of scholarship and craftsmanship alike. Wayward wisdom and forgotten lore turn up these. In this market, stories are told and items of historical information are delivered. Whatever is in demand on this market is in general demand every where else. Now, whenever the established dynasty avoids injustice, prejudice, weakness, and double dealing, with determination keeping to the right path and never swerving from it, the wares on its market are as pure silver and fine gold. However, when it is influenced by selfish interests and rivalries, or swayed by vendors of tyranny and dishonesty, the wares of its market place become as dross and debased metals. The intelligent critic must judge for himself as he looks around, examining this, admiring that, and choosing that."⁽²⁾

Ibn-Khaldun feels that the scholar in the field of historiography, in order to achieve the best researches, needs "to know the principles of politics, the (true) nature of existing things, and the differences among nations, places, and periods with regard to ways of life, character qualities, customs, sects, schools, and everything else. He further

(1) Ibid., p. 17.

(2) Ibid., p. 56.

needs a comprehensive knowledge of present conditions in all these respects." ⁽¹⁾ He must be aware of the varying origins and beginnings of different dynasties, religious sects and groups, and the causes and circumstances that brought them out.

Through the knowledge of the fundamental principles and laws, a student of historiography can locate the 'exact' causes of every event. "A hidden pit fall in historiography is the disregard for the fact that conditions within the nations and races change with the change of periods and the passing of days." ⁽²⁾ This is mainly due to the fact that the customs and seats of the different nations are not constant but subject to change and alternation with the succession of time.

Ibn-Khaldun's acknowledgements, in this respect, are based on the changes he observed in the particular institutions, in respect to dynastic and territorial arrangements, the politics, crafts, languages, technical terminologies and cultural institutions, of the old Persian nations, the Syrians, the Nabataeans, the Tubba's, the Isrealites, the Copts, as well as the Arabs. "The old institutions changed and former customs were transformed, either into something very similar, or into something distinct and altogether different." ⁽³⁾

He justifies such changes by maintaining that the customs of each race depend on those of their rulers. "When

(1) Ibid., p. 56.

(2) Ibid., p. 56.

(3) Ibid., p. 57.

ambitious men overcome the ruling dynasty and seize power, they inevitably have recourse to the customs of their predecessors and adopt most of them. As the same time, they do not neglect the customs of their own race. This leads to some discrepancies between the customs of the (new) ruling dynasty and the customs of the old race." ⁽¹⁾ Gradual increase in discrepancy continues with the succession to power of new dynasties, resulting in an altogether indistinct customs and institutions. "As long as there is this continued succession of different races to royal authority and government, discrepancies in customs and institutions will not cease to occur." ⁽²⁾

To Ibn-Khaldun it is very important that a historian be aware of such changes.

Ibn-Khaldun observed that by the middle of the 14th century, "civilization both in the East and the West was visited by a destructive plague which devastated nations and caused populations to vanish", ⁽³⁾ wiping out good things of civilization, overtaking/that had reached their limit of duration, lessening their power, curtailing their influence and weakening their authority. He felt that the dynastical "situation approached the point of annihilation and dissolution" and that civilization decreased "with the decrease of mankind", giving way to general change of conditions. He felt that a world was "brought into existence anew" needing

(1) Ibid., p. 58.

(2) Ibid., p. 58.

(3) Ibid., p. 64.

someone to set down systematically the situation of the world among all regions and races, as well as the customs and sectarian beliefs that have changed for their adherents...⁽¹⁾ He felt that such conditions necessitate a new task for historians.

The procedure of historians has been confined to the mentioning of the various dynasties, enumerating the names of their rulers, the names of their ancestors, mothers, fathers and wives; their surnames, seal rings; and their judges, doorkeepers and wazirs. Their objective was to provide "their histories for members of the ruling dynasty, whose children wanted to know the lives and circumstances of their ancestors, so that they might be able to follow in their steps and to do what they did, even down to such details as obtaining servants from among those who were left over from the previous dynasty and giving ranks and positions to the descendants of its servants and retainers."⁽²⁾

He observes that historical interests by his time, concentrate "on the rulers themselves and on the mutual relationships of the various dynasties in respect to power and predominance."⁽³⁾ Ibn-Khaldun sees a change, in this respect, from mere enumeration of events and names to the concentration on whether a "nation could stand up to the ruling dynasty."⁽⁴⁾

It should be noted that he looks upon the subject matter of history as being divided into two categories, namely,

(1) Ibid., p. 65.

(2) Ibid., p. 62.

(3) Ibid., p. 63.

(4) Ibid., p. 63.

- (1) that related to geographical and economic factors, and
- (2) that related to psychological factors and which are, mainly, an outcome of those pertaining to the first category.

Accordingly, the task of historian is to explain, as well as to show, the relation between the two categories as exemplified in a particular event or date of information. In other words he has to explain the causes and origins of events by focusing systematic and critical attention and insight upon any data of information.

"His recognition of the fact that knowledge is conditioned by experience suggests his belief that historical writing cannot be wholly objective. If the basis of all knowledge is sensation, as he believed, and man gains greater knowledge than that afforded by the five senses only if he can grasp the concepts abstracted from precepts, it follows that all knowledge, and especially that of history, is relative to the experience of the one who possesses it. Nevertheless, to recognize some of the important sources of error often made in writing history was an important step in the direction of that objectivity which Ibn-Khaldun endeavored to attain."⁽¹⁾

We can observe that his approach to the study of history rested on:

1. The law of causality, through which the causes

(1) Chambliss, Rollin; Social Thought From Hammurabi to Comte, p. 294.

of events are studied in relation to the events. (1)

2. The law of similarity, through which Ibn-Khaldun conceived that societies are similar in many respects, and what might be applicable to one at a certain stage of its civilization, is also applicable to other societies at the similar stages of civilization. He justifies its validity with reference to reasoning, the quality common to all man-kind. The law manifests itself in many ways such as the inclination to imitate; the people their rulers, the conquered their conquerors, and the conquerors their conquered. (2)

3. The law of distinction, through which Ibn-Khaldun acknowledged the fact that societies are not absolutely similar, and that their conditions, customs, traditions and religions are apt to change from time to time depending on their geographical, natural, economic and political conditions. (3)

To Ibn-Khaldun, by recognizing these laws a student of history is enabled to judge the events soundly, as well as to differentiate between true and false information.

As such we can conclude that the 'science' of history to Ibn-Khaldun is not "merely a matter of the names of kings and of descriptions of battles, nor yet a story of the shift of power and the transference of countries from one empire to another..." (4) It is a discipline that attempts to explain

(1) Hussein, Taha; Falsafat Ibn-Khaldun Al-Ijtima'iyah, pps. 32-33.

(2) Ibid., pps. 40-42.

(3) Ibid., pps. 42-44.

(4) Farukh, Omar, Arab Genius, p. 131.

the historical phenomena by tracing the causes and origins of things and showing what patterns of laws and principles they follow.

In other words the study of history ^{must} scrutinize, understand, and explain the outcomes of actual and factual phenomena. Such an objective is impossible except through the perception of the general principles, factors, and causes of any particular change. In this sense, any peculiar event should conform with the nature and temperament of civilization and the time and place in which it has occurred. Through this process future events could be predicted and conceived.

In this respect "Ibn-Khaldun's history is a generalizing science and not merely a record of events. He was searching for uniformities in social phenomena comparable to the laws of nature. 'The past and the future resemble each other', he says, 'as two drops of water'. He was persuaded that the discovery in historical events of patterns, sequences, and uniformities would make possible the prediction of the future of any ⁽¹⁾ society."

Thus the subject matter of this science is human society at large. It is not the individual or any one aspect of human activity. Its objective is to discover "in social phenomena ⁽²⁾ 'the transformations that succeed each other,'" and in fact "He was not merely the first to discover certain uniformities

(1) Chambliss, Rollin; Social Thought From Hammurabi to Comte, pps. 294-295.

(2) Ibid., p. 295.

in history; he saw and described some causal relationships in social phenomena not less meaningful to our age than to his own."⁽¹⁾

When approaching history he does not provide a sharp distinction between society and state. He looks upon them as two unseparable phenomena. They are to each other as 'form is to matter'. Society in all its aspects and activities is the subject of his science. Thus when he treats politics he does not attempt to formulate a separate science; "instead, he augmented his general theory of society with data derived from political history and from his own experience in political life and left somewhat blurred the line between the social and the political."⁽²⁾

According to this perspective he looked upon mulk and the Caliphate, in particular, and states, in general, as aspects of his science. The state is a natural outcome, "a human community, established through the force of circumstances and arising with natural necessity as a consequence of ambition to rule and love of power."⁽³⁾ As such political organization is natural, as well as, necessary for any human society.

In this manner he recognizes the status quo as it exists without any attempt to argue the legal justification for the establishment of a certain dynasty or 'house'. He does not

(1) Ibid., p. 295.

(2) Ibid., p. 301.

(3) Ibid., p. 301.

endeavor to find out or search for the best type of government or state due to his belief that states are apt to change, to be succeeded, altered, and to be established or destroyed at definite times. Moreover due to his belief that power, as exemplified in ^Casābiyah, is the only determining factor that provides for authority. (1)

As such, politics in relation to Ibn-Khaldun's concept of history stands as an aspect of the various aspects that contribute to civilization and changes in human societies. Moreover it stands as an aspect of human life subject to the same principles and laws of change which if known might contribute to a sound exercise, behaviour, and action on the part of a ruler.

The mere fact that Ibn-Khaldun called his book, the book of the ^Cibar, reveals that rulers as well as historians are able to acknowledge the fundamental laws that cause changes, and as such, be aware of them and behave in accordance to their implications.

History which stands to Ibn-Khaldun as the record of human society, the study of human life in its different manifestations, and as exemplified in civilization, reveals itself in political stages; in a process passing through savagery, "sociability and group solidarity; of revolutions and uprisings by one set of people against another with the resulting kingdoms

(1) Al-Jur, Khalīl; Tārīkh Al-Falsafah Al-^CArabīyah, p. 504.

and states; with their various ranks; of the different activities and occupations of man..., and in general of all the transformations which society undergoes by its very nature."⁽¹⁾ Conceiving of 'political' as intergroup and intragroup power relations in a particular human society or societies, Ibn-Khaldun's concept of history and its relation to politics, as was displayed, are intimately related.

(1) Farukh, Omar; Arab Genius, p. 133.

THE CALIPHATE-IMAMATE ACCORDING TO IBN-KHALDUN

(I)

THE CALIPHATE: NECESSITY, MEANING, AND CONDITIONS

To Ibn-Khaldun the Caliphate is the institution concerned in leading the "mass to act in accordance with the religious laws in all affairs touching both this world and the other world... It substitutes for the (prophet)... in as much as it serves, like him, to preserve the religion"⁽¹⁾ and administer the world in its light.

The Caliphate is necessary not by reason, but by the consensus (ijmā^c) of the companions of Muḥammad (al-Saḥābah), and the second generation that followed them (al-Ṭabi^cīn). Being as such, and because the ijmā^c constitutes one of the sources of Muslim Law, Ibn-Khaldun looked upon the institution as a community duty (fard al-kifāyah).

In exposing his idea of the necessity of the Caliphate by the religious laws he argues against three views:

1. That of the philosophers who say that the necessity of the Caliphate is indicated by the intellect (mudrak wujūbiḥā al-^caql), and that the consensus which took place was determined by reason (qadā'un bi hukmi al-^caql). He says that their premise, in this respect, depends on their belief that the wazi^c comes, only, through a revealed law to which the mass submit

(1) Ibn-Khaldun, Tarīkh Al-^cAlamah Ibn-Khaldun, V. I, p. 338.

out of belief and conviction. To Ibn-Khaldun their premise is not valid because, sometimes, the wazi^c comes into being as a result of the impetus of mulk (saṭwat al-mulk), and the forcefulness of the mighty. He maintains that this was the case among the Magians (Majūs) and some other nations who did not have Scriptures and had not been reached by the Prophetic mission. He concludes by saying that the falāsifa's premise does not stand up to such considerations, which are in themselves an indication of the Caliphate necessity by al-sharī^c as was determined by the general consensus. (1)

2. That of some of the Mu^ctazilites, as al-Asamm, the Kharijites, and some others, who considered the Caliphate not necessary by reason, nor by the religious laws, and that what is necessary is the observance of the religious laws. When Muslims do that no Imām would be needed, and the people would not infringe upon the rights of each other or commit injustices. To Ibn-Khaldun those notions are in no way valid because they were refuted by the general consensus of the Muslims, (2) by deciding its necessity by the religious laws.

3. That of the Shi^cites, who consider that the Imāmate (3) is not a general public interest to be delegated to the considerations of the umma, that it is a pillar of the religion (rukṅ al-dīn) and a corner stone of Islam (qā^cidat al-Islām),

(1) Ibid., pps. 339-340.

(2) Ibid., pps. 340-341.

(3) Ibn-Khaldun uses the terms Caliphate and Imāmate interchangeably.

and that it is inconceivable that the Prophet neglected the questions pertaining to it, to delegate them to the considerations of the umma. On the contrary, it is incumbent upon him to appoint an Imām to the umma. He should be of an impeccable and infallible character. In fact it was ^cAlī whom Muhammad appointed.⁽¹⁾

To Ibn-Khaldun the Shī'ites' considerations depend on certain traditions which they transmit in support of their views, interpreting them to suit their claims. They are, to a greater or lesser extent, supposititious, suspectable, and of wicked interpretation. To Ibn-Khaldun the true meaning of the Imāmate is to rule and judge in accordance to God's Ordinances, as exemplified in His statement "O ye faithful, obey God and the Apostle and those set in command amongst you."⁽²⁾ He disagrees with the Shī'ites' premises by seeing the validity and soundness of the general consensus at Sakīfah.

In all these respects Ibn-Khaldun was in agreement with the Sunnī Jurists' interpretations concerning the necessity of the Caliphate by the religious laws, and in justifying this necessity by the consensus of the umma at Sakīfah. Following their path he leaves the election of an Imām to the choice and discretion of ahl al-hall wa al-'aqq (those who loosen and bind). He maintains that once an Imām is chosen it becomes the duty of Muslims to obey him and observe his guidance in accordance with

(1) Ibn-Khaldun, op. cit. pps. 348-350.

(2) Qur'ān, (V.59:62).

the Qur'ānic verse: "O ye faithful, obey God and the Apostle and those set in command amongst you." The umma has to give the chosen Imām an oath of allegiance (bay'at), which is no more than "a contract to render obedience. It is as though the person who renders the oath of allegiance made a contract with his amir, to the effect that he surrenders supervision of his own affairs and those of the Muslims to him, and that he will not contest his authority in any (of those affairs), and he will obey him by (executing) all the duties with which he might be charged, whether agreeable or disagreeable (alā al-manshat wal-makrah)."⁽¹⁾

Although Ibn-Khaldun gives us an account of how an Imām is elected, yet he does not provide us with the conditions that constitute "ahl al-hall wa al-'aqq", or the number of votes necessary to validate a certain election. In other words he keeps silent as to whether one person of "ahl al-hall wa al-'aqq" is sufficient to elect an Imām, or whether it is necessary to have more than one person. Moreover, he keeps silent as to whether the choice needs the presence of some people to testify it.

To Ibn-Khaldun it is possible to appoint two Imāms at the same time. Although he sees that the religious scholars are inclined to prohibit the appointment of two Imāms with reference to the general consensus, yet he sees no evident

(1) Ibn-Khaldun, op. cit., p. 370.

proof in their prohibition, because some leading jurists as Abū Ishāq al-Isfārāyīnī, and Imām al-Ḥaramain saw the possibility of appointing two Imāms at the same time. (1) He maintains that the "opinions of the Spaniards and Maghribis often make it evident that they, too, were inclined toward it. The numerous religious scholars in Spain rendered the oath of allegiance to the Umayyads and" (2) gave them the title of Commander of the Faithful a characteristic of the Caliphate, though the Abbasids were entrusted the Caliphate in the Orient. (3) "Somewhat later, the Almohads in the Maghrib did the same thing."

To Ibn-Khaldun, if there existed a general consensus which prohibits the appointment of two Imāms, "neither Professor Abū Ishāq nor the Imām al-Ḥaramayn would have opposed it. They knew better (than any one else) what the consensus meant." (4)

He argues the view which favors a single Imām with the argument of mutual antagonism referred to in the verse "If there were other gods except God in the two (heaven and earth), they (heaven and earth) would have been destroyed," (5) by saying that nothing "of relevance in this connection can be deduced in the field of the intellect. God called our attention to (the verse), so that we might have a rational proof of the

(1) Rosenthal, Franz; The Muqaddimah, V.I, p. 392; See Imām al-Ḥaramain, Kitāb Al-Ḥirshād, p. 425.

(2) Ibid., p. 393.

(3) Ibid., p. 393.

(4) Ibid., p. 393.

(5) Qur'an 21.22(22), Ibid., p. 394.

oneness of God in which we are enjoined to believe, and so that, as a result, (this dogma) might be more firmly grounded. (On the other hand,) what we want to find out in connection with the Imāmate is why it is forbidden to set up two Imāms (at the same time), and that is something that belongs to the field of religious law and religious obligations (rather than to the field of the intellect). Thus, the (verse of the Qur'ān quoted) cannot be used for any deduction (in this connection), unless we establish it as belonging to the field of the religious law by the addition of another premise, namely, that (quite generally) from an increase in number there results corruption, and we are to keep away from anything that may lead to corruption. Then, (the verse) can be used for deductions in the field of religious law.⁽¹⁾"

From the above mentioned considerations we can ask the following question: What are the conditions governing the Caliphate, as seen by Ibn-Khaldun?

Ibn-Khaldun enumerates four conditions that should be present in the person of an Imām, namely:⁽²⁾

1. Knowledge (^cilm), to be able to execute God's Ordinances (ahkām). His knowledge would be satisfactory, only, when it enables him to be an independent decider. Imitation is a shortcoming, and the Imāmate requires perfection in conditions and qualities.

(1) Ibid., p. 394.

(2) Ibn-Khaldun, Tārīkh Al-^cAlāmah Ibn-Khaldun, V.I, pps. 371-372.

2. Probity (^cadālah). It is required because the Imām's office is a religious office that supervises all the other offices that require probity. It all the more necessary that probity be a condition required of the Imāmate.

3. Competence (kifāyah), to be able to fulfill his functions of protecting the religion, fighting the enemies, observation of the "limits" (iqāmat al-hudūd), and maintenance of public interests.

4. Freedom of physical and mental infirmities that affect his capacity to carry out the responsibilities and duties of his office such as insanity, blindness, muteness, deafness, or loss of limbs. He must also be free from curtailments of liberty such as captivity or placement under restraint (hajr) by force (qahr).

He maintains that there is a controversy as to whether the Qurayshite origin constitutes a fifth condition governing the Imāmate. In his view the condition was first inserted at Sakifah. The consensus of the companions (ṣahābah) determined it to be among the conditions governing the institution.

They depended in their decision on certain Traditions as:

"The Imāms are from Quraysh" (al-a'ima min Quraysh). He quotes Abū Bakr al-Bāqillānī on the assumption that he denied that Qurayshite descent is a condition of the Imāmate, maintaining (1) that he did so because he perceived the degeneration of Quraysh

(1) Ibid., p. 345.

and the dissolution of their ^casābiyah. (1)

To Ibn-Khaldun all the religious Ordinances have purposes and significant meanings of their own. The insertion of the Qurayshite conditions, in the same way, had a purpose which was not, **only**, due to the blessing that lies in the fact that Muhammad belonged to Quraysh. This blessing could not be regarded as one of the religious purposes. There should have been a public interest which motivated the insertion of such a **condition**. In fact, this was due to the powerfulness of the Qurayshites' ^casābiyah. It was felt that by inserting their descent as a condition of the Imāmate the umma would be safe from division (furkah) and controversy. (2)

He maintains that the Qurayshites were the outstanding leaders of Mudar. Their number, their ^casābiyah, and their nobility gave them the power over all Mudar. All other Arabs acknowledged their distinguished status. They submitted to their superiority. Had the rule been entrusted to anybody else dissensions might have arisen. They were the only Mudar clan that could sway away the umma from their oppositions and disobedience. This was the main purpose for inserting the Qurayshite descent among the Imāmate's conditions. (3)

(1) As far as we know al-Baqillānī definitely considers Qurayshite origin a condition of The Caliphate, a fact which could not have been unknown to Ibn-Khaldun. However, it is very possible that he was referring to one of his lost works. See Al-Baqillani, Abū Bakr, Al-Tamhid fi Al-Radd, pps. 181-183.

(2) Ibn-Khaldun, Tārīkh Al-^cAlāmah Ibn-Khaldun, V. I, p. 346.

(3) Ibid., p. 346.

Out of these considerations he concludes by saying:
 "If it is established that the condition of the Qur'ishite's descent was inserted to cope with dissension..., and we know that the Lawgiver does not specify the ordinances (al-ahkām) for any one generation (jīl), period (ʿaṣr), or nation (umma), we would know that this condition belongs to competence (kifāyah)."⁽¹⁾ Accordingly the condition should be viewed under the heading of competence, dismissing the purpose that lead to its insertion. He asserts that we have to consider, as the condition, for the person "in charge of the affairs of the Muslims his belongingness to people of strong ʿaṣabiyah, superior to that of their contemporaries, so that they can force the others to follow them,"⁽²⁾ and to secure effective protection.

To Ibn-Khaldun when we consider what God meant the Caliphate to be, we would dismiss such polemic, because God "made the Caliph His vicegerent (nāʾibān ʿanhu) on earth, to administer the affairs of His slaves (ʿabīdih),"⁽³⁾ and to lead them to what is in their interest. The Caliph is expected to do so (mukhāṭabun bizalik), and God does not set in command (yukhātibu bil ʿamri) except those who are able to manage it. The management of the affairs of an umma or a generation (jīl) of it belongs to those that God gives

(1) Ibid., p. 347.

(2) Ibid., p. 347.

(3) Ibid., p. 347.

the rule to them. "The religious laws would hardly ever make a requirement in contradiction to the requirements of existence."⁽¹⁾

These considerations lead us to believe that Ibn-Khaldun was not of the opinion that the Qurayshite's descent was among the conditions of the Imāmate. Although he does not express this view explicitly, yet we can detect it through his general discussion of the controversy. If he was of the opinion that it was a condition he would have inserted it among the four conditions.⁽²⁾

Ibn-Khaldun discussed the dissolution of the Qurayshites' power. He felt that the dissolution of their ^Casabiya led to the dropping of the condition of competence, thus discharging their Caliphs from the powers that enable them to perform their duties. In his view if a Caliph's strength disappears with the dissolution of his ^Casabiya, his competence too, disappears. "And if the condition of competence be eliminated, that will reflect further upon knowledge and religion."⁽³⁾ The conditions governing the institution would no longer be considered, and this would be contrary to the general consensus.

The above mentioned points do show that Ibn-Khaldun did not consider the Qurayshite descent as a condition governing

(1) Ibid., p. p. 347.

(2) See Grunebaune, Gustave, Ḥadārat Al-Islām, p. 203.

(3) Rosenthal, Franz; The Muqaddimah, V. I, p. 399.

the institution of the Imāmate. He regarded the presence of a dominating ^casābiyah as the necessary condition that should be found in the person in charge of the affairs of the umma. It was a condition when the Qurayshites had a powerful ^casābiyah, but this condition lost its incentive by the dissolution of their ^casābiyah.

So far we have seen that the Imāmate, to Ibn-Khaldun, supervises the interests of the Muslim umma in both their worldly and their religious affairs, and that the Caliph is the Guardian and trustee of the Muslims who looks after their affairs as long as he lives.

To Ibn-Khaldun, it follows that the Caliph also looks after the Muslims affairs after his death by appointing someone to take charge of them as he had done while alive.

Following the line of the Sunnī Jurists' interpretations, he sees the possibility of appointing a successor, justifying its permissibility and binding effect with reference to the general consensus of al-Ṣahābah in their approval of Abū Bakr's appointment of ^cUmar as his successor, and ^cUmar's appointment of the six persons, ^cUthmān, ^cAlī, Ṭalḥa, al-Zubayr, Sa'd Ibn Abī Waqqāṣ, and ^cAbd al-Rahmān Ibn-^cAwf, to be members of an electoral council (shūrā), leaving the election of one of them to their discretion.

Since the Companions recognized the legality of the procedure and its binding effect on the Muslims, Ibn-Khaldun felt that it constitutes a part of the religious law, because

consensus, in his view, constitutes proof (hujah).⁽¹⁾

It is possible for an Imām to appoint, as his successor, his father or his son. Such an appointment should not be met with suspicion. The Imām should be trusted, in this respect, as he was trusted during his life. He should not be suspected especially if there exists some reason for the appointment, such as the desire to promote the public interest or fear that some harm might result if no successor was not appointed.

On the other hand, if the purpose of the appointment is merely to preserve the ruler's inheritance to his children, the appointment would not be binding and will not be of the religious purposes. It is necessary to have good intentions in appointing a successor.

For the same reasons, he justifies, the Imāmate of the less perfect (muḥdūl) in the presence of the perfect (fādil),⁽²⁾ if the public interest requires so.

Ibn-Khaldun disputes the Shi'ites claim which maintains that Muḥammad appointed ^cAlī as his successor, by saying that this is not correct, because no reliable transmitter of Traditions has reported such a thing. He maintains that the Imāmiyah of the Shi'ites view, in this respect, is due to the fact that they consider the Imāmate as one of the pillars (rukṅ) of

(1) Ibn-Khaldun, Tarīkh Al-^cAlāmah Ibn-Khaldun, V. I, p. 372.

(2) Ibid., p. 373.

the faith. This is not true for Ibn-Khaldun, because the Imāmate is one of the public interests. It is delegated to the umma to take care of it. If it was a pillar of the faith, it would have been something like prayer, and Muhammad would have appointed a Caliph. Had he done so, the appointment would have been known. ⁽¹⁾ The controversy which led to Abū Bakr's election as a Caliph, is another proof showing that the Prophet did not appoint a successor.

In this respect, also, he was upholding the Sunnī Jurists' interpretations, not only by seeing that the Imāmate is a public interest delegated to the umma's considerations, but also by perceiving the binding effect of the consensus.

Looking upon the Caliphate as the institution concerned with the safeguarding and the supervising of the interests of the umma in both their temporal and religious affairs, show how wide in scope are a Caliph's functions. This wide scope of functions might suggest that his rule is of an infallible nature. Ibn-Khaldun says: "In accordance with the need... for political leadership in social organization, the human species must have a person who will cause them to act in accordance with what is good for them and who will prevent them from doing things harmful to them. Such a person is the one who is called a ruler." ⁽²⁾

(1) Ibid., pps. 375-376.

(2) Ibid., pps. 371-372.

Such an assumption would have been correct and sound in the absence of the religious laws, that stand to Ibn-Khaldun as the criterion which defines to a ruler what is good as well as what is harmful to his subjects.

The Caliph is not an absolute ruler, in the general sense of the word, but he is an absolute ruler in the sense that he controls all the affairs of his subjects with the object of safeguarding and protecting them from internal and external dangers. He is weak by himself. He carries a heavy load. He is always in need of the help of his fellowmen in order to rule his own people, "the creatures and servants of God whom God entrusted to him as subjects."⁽¹⁾

The authority of a Caliph is affirmed on contractual basis through the process of "al-bay^ca". It is dangerous to look upon the resulting authority as being absolute in nature. Irrespective of the fact that the handling of such authority is affirmed on contractual basis (theoretically if not practically), the ruler to Ibn-Khaldun, is not an absolute ruler because he is expected to abide to the shari^ca laws and religious prescriptions and act in accordance to them.

He observes that in ay'mān al-bay^ca, the declaration of loyalty in connection with the oath of allegiance the "Caliphs used to exact an oath when the contract was made and collected the declarations of loyalty from all Muslims."⁽²⁾

(1) Ibid., p. 408.

(2) Ibid., p. 370.

The oath of allegiance does not affect the status of a Caliph's subjects, who are entrusted to him by God, to protect and defend them from internal corruptions and external dangers, to act in their own best interests, and to supervise matters involving their livelihood. Being so, Ibn-Khaldun maintains that a ruler must not infringe upon those rights prescribed to them by the religious laws. (1)

He observes that there is a mutual two sided obligation falling upon the person of a Caliph or ruler, on the one hand, and on the umma on the other. While the Caliph or ruler has an obligation to see and observe his subjects' interests, they in turn have the obligation to observe his rule and pay him obedience. Such interests, to Ibn-Khaldun, are prescribed in the religious laws which govern "all the actions of human beings." (2) Those essential rights are no more than the preservation of the religion of a person, the life of a person, his intellect (ʿaql), his progeny (nasl), and his property. (3)

In this respect Ibn-Khaldun was in disagreement with the Shiʿite theologians who attributed infallibility to the person of Imam. It should be noted that his disagreement extends to all their premises. They have "always laid especial stress on the doctrine of legitimacy, and have confined the Caliphate not merely to Quraysh but still further to the

(1) Ibid., p. 510.

(2) Ibid., p. 416.

(3) Ibid., p. 510.

family of ^cAlī. They (with the exception of the Zaydīs) reject the principle of election and maintain that ^cAlī was directly nominated by the prophet as his successor, and that ^cAlī's qualifications were inherited by his descendants, who were pre-ordained by God to bear this high office. Shiah theory has been developed in forms still further divorced from actual facts than has been the case with the Sunnī theory, for when there was no living Imām... on earth, the Imām became credited with super-natural characteristics, and it is correct to say that spiritual powers were claimed for the Shiah Imām such as he entirely lacks in the rival Sunnī theory." (1)

To the Shī'ites "each Imām possesses superhuman qualities which raise him above the level of the rest of mankind, and he guides the faithful with infallible wisdom, and his decisions are absolute and final..." (2) Furthermore, the Imāmīyah Shī'ites considered the Imāmate as a pillar of the faith and a corner stone of the religion. They looked upon it as a divine right (ḥaq ilahī), and that the Imām is appointed by God, through His prophet. (3)

In this respect all Shī'ites agree that the Imāmate is not an elective office. Accordingly they reject leaving it to the considerations of the umma. Actually they believe that the prophet, Muḥammad, named ^cAlī as the Imām of the umma. They look upon him and those of his descendants who succeeded him as

(1) Arnold, Thomas W. The Caliphate, p. 185.

(2) Ibid., p. 186.

(3) Nadir, Albert N. 'Aḥam Al-Firak Al-Islāmīyah, p. 180.

being infallible and impeccable, on the assumption that they were entrusted to protect the shari^ca. All Shi^cites' sects agree on the Imāmate of ^cAlī and his two sons, al-Hasan and al-Hussain, but they disagree on the Imāms that follow them.

Ibn-Khaldun, as was seen, disagreed with them regarding these premises. His views, in this respect, were those of the Sunni Jurists, who never questioned the Imāmate's public nature. They always looked upon it as an elective office, laying down rules as to the qualifications of the electors and believing in its necessity by the religious laws and as determined by the general consensus of the Muslims. Moreover they always rejected the Shi^cites claim that it devolved to ^cAlī and his descendants upon the prophet's appointment, justifying their rejection by maintaining that if such a thing had taken place it would have been known, and it would have been transmitted by the leading transmitters of Traditions.

Ibn-Khaldun in his exposé was reproducing the Sunni views, interpretations, and argumentations.

His Sunni approach is seen in his rejection of the views of those philosophers who put forward a rational basis for the necessity of the Imāmate, and in his opposition to the Kharijite's view which claim that the Imāmate is the right of any Muslim, by inserting, as a condition, the necessity of belonging to a dominating ^casabiyah.

It should be noted that while Ibn-Khaldun agrees to the basic premises of the Sunni Jurists, he differed with them, as

they differed among themselves, in his elaborations on the questions pertaining to it.

(II)

THE ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION OF CALIPHATE

So far we have seen that the Caliphate is intended to be a substitute for the Prophet with regard to the preservation of the religion and the management of the world (*siyāsāt al-dunyāh*). In this respect the Prophet was concerned with both; religion in his capacity as a person commanded to transmit the duties imposed by the religious laws and causing people to act in accordance with them, and with management of the world in his capacity as the person in charge of the public interests. Being as such, Ibn-Khaldun came to look upon the Caliphate as a kind of great mainspring and comprehensive institution, holding in its scope the religious laws relative to both, the religious and worldly affairs of the Muslims. ⁽¹⁾

These considerations bring out the following question, namely, what are the functions and offices peculiar to the Caliphate institution as perceived by Ibn-Khaldun?

To Ibn-Khaldun the religious character of the Caliphate necessitated special functions (*khuṭaṭ*) and ranks (*marātib*) peculiar to it. He perceives that all the religious functions of the religious laws are embraced under the *Imāmate*. They are branches of it and they fall under its offices.

(1) Rosenthal, Franz; The Muqaddimah, V. I, p. 449.

Those functions and offices are the following:

The leadership of prayer (imāmat al-salāt).⁽¹⁾

To Ibn-Khaldun the leadership of prayer is the noblest ('arfau^c) of all the Caliphate's functions and offices. He does not elaborate on the laws and conditions governing this office; however, he maintains that they are properly explained in al-Mawardi's books on the Ordinances of Government (al-'Aḥkām al-Sultānīyah) and others.

The office of mufti (al-futyāh).⁽²⁾

It is the office concerned with passing religious interpretations and decisions, and educating the Muslims. Ibn-Khaldun feels it imperative that the Caliph considers properly the conditions and qualifications of those who undertake to act as muftis, so that the people would not be led astray. In other words it is his duty to consider the conditions of the scholars and teachers and entrust the futyāh to those who are qualified for it. He is the person to supervise their actions, appointing or dismissing them as may be required by the public interest.

The office of judge (qadā').⁽³⁾

This office, to Ibn-Khaldun, "serves the purpose of settling suits and breaking off disputes and dissensions... along the lines"⁽⁴⁾ of the religious laws and ordinances as derived from the Qur'ān and the Traditions.

(1) Ibn-Khaldun, Tārīkh Al-^cAlāmah Ibn-Khaldun, V. I, pps. 387-388.

(2) Ibid., p. 389.

(3) Ibid., pps. 390-391.

(4) Rosenthal, op. cit. p. 452.

(1)

The police (al-shur'tah).

This office serves for controlling crimes and the imposition of punishments required by the religious law. "It makes it possible for suspects to be brought before the court. It decides upon preventive punishments before crimes have been committed. It imposes the punishments required by the religious law where they are not due, and determines compensations in cases of bodily injury where the law of talion applies. It imposes punishments not provided for by the religious laws and provides corrective measures against those who did not execute the crimes (they planned)."

(2)

The position of official witness (c^c adālah). (3)

This position to Ibn-Khaldun is related to the office of judge. The men holding it "give testimony - with the judge's permission - for or against people's (claims). They serve as witnesses when testimony is to be taken, testify during a lawsuit, and fill in the registers (sigilāt) which record the rights, possessions, and the debts of people and other (legal) transactions."

(4)

It is the function of the judge to consider their conditions and qualifications. It is essential that they possess the quality of probity, and the necessary knowledge of jurisprudence that enables them to carry on their functions and to ensure the people's rights.

(1) Ibn-Khaldun, op. cit., p. 393.

(2) Rosenthal, op. cit., p. 457.

(3) Ibn-Khaldun, op. cit., p. 397.

(4) Rosenthal, op. cit., p. 461.

Market supervision (hisbah).⁽¹⁾

This office, to Ibn-Khaldun, falls under the religious obligation "the commanding of good and the forbidding of evil" (al-'amr bil-ma^crūf wan nahī^c an al-munkar). It is concerned with investigating abuses and applying the appropriate punishments and corrective measures. Moreover it is concerned in urging the people to act in accord with the public interest.

The mint (sikah).⁽²⁾

This office is concerned with protection against possible falsification or substandarding (clipping) of coins, and every other monetary matter, (as the stamping of coins).

The office of the holy war (jihād).⁽³⁾

Ibn-Khaldun maintains that this office ceased to exist when the holy war was no longer waged, save in some dynasties which classify it under the governmental and not the caliphal authority. It was concerned with prosecution of the holy war.

The positions and offices of amirate, vizirate, warfare, and taxation (al-kharāj).⁽⁴⁾

All these positions and offices, to Ibn-Khaldun, used to pertain to Caliphate. They were adopted among the positions and offices of mulk to become positions and offices of rulers (wazā'if sultānīyah).

(1) Ibn-Khaldun, op. cit., pps. 398-399.

(2) Ibid., p. 399.

(3) Ibid., p. 400.

(4) Ibid., p. 400.

The office of marshal of nobility (nikābat al-'ansāb). (1)

This office used to consist of the relatives of the Caliph, whose descent gave them a claim to the Caliphate or to an official pension. It disappeared when the Caliphate ceased to exist.

Ibn-Khaldun noted that the features (rusūm) and positions of the Caliphate were merged with those of mulk, in his time. He devotes several chapters of his Muqaddimah to the discussion of the factors that led to such transformation. In the following section we would attempt to discuss such transformation as seen by Ibn-Khaldun and several Muslim theologians.

(1) Ibid., p. 400.

THE SULTANATE IN IBN-KHALDUN'S THEORY

(I)

IBN-KHALDUN'S THEORY OF TRANSFORMATION

We have seen that Ibn-Khaldun's concept of the Caliphate was no more than a reproduction of the classical theory of the Sunni jurists, seeing in it the frame within which the Shari^ca determines the life of the Muslim community and ensures its Salvation and Bliss in the Thereafter. It was to Ibn-Khaldun the ideal and best way for the fulfilment of 'man's' destiny, because it represented to him "a God guided and a God centred human association."⁽¹⁾ Accordingly, he never questioned its theoretical validity, though he observed that the actual political conditions were, in no way, reflecting such an institution. On the contrary, he attempted to justify the gulf that separated the Caliphate from the factual political conditions by propagating the theory of transformation, through which he saw that the Imāmate, was naturally, transformed into mulk. He regarded such transformation as something natural and inevitable as a necessary "result of psychological conditions which largely determine political developments."⁽²⁾

He does not condemn such a transformation as long as a ruler fulfils his obligations towards his subjects and acts in the light of the religious laws.

(1) Rosenthal, Erwin; Political Thought in Medieval Islam, pps. 85-86.

(2) Ibid., p. 98.

Mulk to Ibn-Khaldun is the natural goal of ^casābiyah and its realization is not a matter of choice "but a necessary consequence of the natural order and disposition of things."⁽¹⁾ No laws or religions (diyānāt) could be actualized without ^casābiyah. In this respect ^casābiyah is an indispensable requirement for the Muslim community (milah) in order to play the role which God has chosen for it."⁽²⁾

When the Lawgiver (al-shāri^c) censured ^casābiyah, and mulk and its possessors ('ahlihi), and urged to reject them, he did so with the intention of propagating deep cooperation (ilfah) among the Muslims and as a warning against discord and dissension.

In other words when the Lawgiver censured (zamma) mulk and its possessors he "blamed them because of their enjoyment of good fortune, their senseless waste, and their deviation from the path of God."⁽³⁾ Likewise, when he censured al-^casābiyah, he censured those devoted for worthless purposes.

Ibn-Khaldun believed that, to the Lawgiver, this world is no more than a vehicle (miṭyah) for the Hereafter and whoever loses al-miṭyah cannot reach his destiny. When "the Lawgiver forbids or censures certain human activities or urges their omission, he does not want them to be neglected altogether. Nor does he want them to be completely eradicated,"⁽⁴⁾

(1) Issawi, Charles, An Arab Philosophy of History, p. 137.

(2) Ibid., p. 137.

(3) Rosenthal, Franz; The Muqaddimah, V. I, p. 415.

(4) Ibid., p. 415.

and to disrupt (yuc^catīl) all the powers that are potential in them. On the contrary, "he wants those powers to be employed, as much as possible, for their right aims"⁽¹⁾ and purposes (maqāssid). Likewise, when he censured wrathfulness (ghadab), he did not do so "in the intention to eradicate it as a human quality,"⁽²⁾ because if he did so, then 'man' would have to lose the incentive "to help the truth become victorious",⁽³⁾ and "there would no longer be holy war or glorification of the word of God."⁽⁴⁾

In other words the Lawgiver did not censure wrathfulness, as such. He only censured the wrathfulness employed for reprehensible purposes and not used in the service of God.

Likewise, he did not censure desires altogether, for that would have meant making 'man' inferior and defective. On the contrary, he wanted them to be used for permissible purposes as to serve the public interests and to act actively in the service of God.

Accordingly, Ibn-Khaldun views that ^casābiyah was not censured altogether, otherwise "the religious laws would no longer be, because they are realized only through ^casābiyah."⁽⁵⁾ Likewise, the Lawgiver did not censure mulk for gaining domination through truth, for forcing (qahr) the masses to accept the

(1) Ibid., p. 415.

(2) Ibid., p. 415.

(3) Ibid., p. 415.

(4) Ibid., p. 415.

(5) Ibn-Khaldun; Tarikh Al-^cAlamah Ibn-Khaldun, V. I, p. 359.

religion, and to safeguard the public interests. He censures it only when it is diverted toward achieving domination through worthless means and for the satisfaction of self desires.

In this way Ibn-Khaldun justifies the transformation of the Caliphate into mulk without depreciating the resulting outcome if it is directed toward truthful purposes. On the other hand he justifies this transformation by stating that it was an outcome of the many abundances which the Muslims gained in their occupations and expansions that made them pass over the Bedouin stage.

To Ibn-Khaldun the conflict between Mu^cawīyah and ^cAlī was accompanied by the reappearance of ^caṣabiyah as a determining factor. When Mu^cawīyah acceded to authority it was very natural that he claimed all glory to himself. It is in the nature of mulk to do that. To Ibn-Khaldun, if mulk is obtained by a person "no objection can be raised if he uses it for the various ways and aspects of the truth."⁽¹⁾

The Umayyads until the rule of Marwān Ibn-al-Hakam and his son were kings and "their royal ways were not those of worthless men and oppressors. They complied with the intentions of the truth with all their energy, except when necessity"⁽²⁾ forced them to do worthless things.

The blameworthy actions, intentions and purposes, of the later Umayyads, were the main cause for censuring their rule and the acceptance of the ^cAbbāsīd's call (da^cwa).

(1) Rosenthal, F. op. cit., p. 422.

(2) Ibid., p. 423.

The ^cAbbasids' probity was outstanding. They used mulk "to further, as far as possible, the different aspects (1) and ways of the truth."

Among the descendents of al-Rashid "were good and bad men. Later on, when the power passed to their descendents, they gave royal authority and luxury their due. They became enmeshed in worldly affairs of no value and turned their backs on Islam. Therefore, God permitted them to be ruined, and (He permitted) the Arabs to be completely deprived of their power, which He gave to others." (2)

Ibn-Khaldun concludes the afore-mentioned considerations by saying, "It has thus become clear how the Caliphate is transformed into mulk. The form of government in the beginning was a Caliphate. Every body had his restraining influence (wazi^c) in himself, that is (the restraining influence of) Islam. They preferred (Islam) to their worldly affairs, even if (the neglect of worldly affairs) led to their own destruction, while the mass (of the people, at least,) escaped." (3)

However, he perceives that the mulk, which resulted from the transformation of the Caliphate, was shaped by certain traits (ma^cani) that were characteristic of the Caliphate, namely, the preference for Islam and its doctrines, and the adherence to the path of the Truth. The only change that took

(1) Ibid., p. 423.

(2) Ibid., p. 424.

(3) Ibid., p. 426.

place was in the wazi^c which was religious and became dependent on ^casabiyah and force. "That was the situation in the time of Mu^cawiyah, Marwan, his son ^cAbd-al-Malik, and the first ^cAbbaside Caliphs down to ar-Rashid and some of his sons. Then, the characteristic traits of the Caliphate disappeared, and only its name remained."⁽¹⁾ The form of government became purely mulk. Domination (ghalb) "attained the limits of its nature and was employed for particular (worthless purposes, such as the use of force and the arbitrary gratification of desires and for pleasure."⁽²⁾

In other words the Caliphate and mulk were intertwined. They came to coexist. Yet "when, ... the solidarity of the Arabs began to weaken, their numbers to fall off, and their power to decline, a further change took place. Absolute Monarchy grew up in the East, under non-Arab rulers, who, because of their religious sentiments, recognized the authority and the titles of the Caliphs, but who kept the substance of power for themselves."⁽³⁾ The Caliphate, by time, came to lose its identity. The form of government became purely and simply mulk.

Out of these considerations we can observe that Ibn-Khaldun distinguished three stages through which the Caliphate passed before being transformed into mulk.

(1) Ibid., p. 427.

(2) Ibid., p. 427.

(3) Issawi, Charles, An Arab Philosophy of History, p. 138.

1. The first stage was relative to the first stage of Muslim history when the Caliphate existed alone without mulk.

2. The second stage was relative to the first phases of both the Umayyads' and 'Abbāsīds' dynasties where Caliphate and mulk coexisted.

3. And finally the third stage which was distinguished by the existence of mulk independantly of the Caliphate leaning on a power and 'asabiyah distinct from that of the Caliphate.

Such considerations show the awareness of Ibn-Khaldun to the gulf that seperated the classical theory of the Caliphate from the actual political reality in the last phases of the 'Abbāsīd dynasties. At the same time they show Ibn-Khaldun's attempt to justify such a divergence through what he called the transformation of the Caliphate into mulk.

Ibn-Khaldun's treatises on the transformation of the Caliphate rest on the assumption that the religious impulse, in its very nature "is of short duration. As the prophet dies and the generation which had known him and was directly influenced by him passed away, the miracles are forgotten and the impact of the extraordinary feats starts to decline. Since the regime of Law is not based on worldly interests but on inner faith, there is no external cause which can preserve the regime after the inner faith declines. The Law may remain, but once the inner impulse vanishes and the Law as a moving force in the hearts of men ceases to exist. Natural solidarity ('asabiyah) re-emerges to assert itself, and unless a

rational regime is substituted for the regime of Law, the latter is bound to degenerate into natural rule serving the lower impulses of whoever happens to have the stronger solidarity."⁽¹⁾

The outcome of such considerations show that Ibn-Khaldun has distinguished between three types of mulk:

1. That based on ^casabiyah alone;
2. That based on the religious laws in addition to ^casabiyah;
3. And, that based on reason in addition to ^casabiyah.

The religious laws, as well as, their institution are dependent on ^casabiyah. It is not that ^casabiyah which was condemned by the Lawgiver, but that which is directed towards the Truth and the establishment of God's word. As such ^casabiyah does not have a static shape. It could be modified by reason or by the religious laws, and in the case of the Caliphate it was modified to suit the purposes and aims of the latter. This is the immediate cause which brought the Caliphate into existence and determined its character. It was strengthened by the inner compulsion to obey the prescriptions of Islam, the truth of Muhammad's Message, and the belief in the promised rewards and punishments in the Hereafter. The subjects of this regime - Caliphate - need not be forced to obey the Laws, on the contrary, they will obey them, and even die for them, for the sake

(1) Mahdi, Muhsin; Ibn-Khaldun's Philosophy of History, p. 268.

of God hoping that they will be rewarded for such piety in the Hereafter. The impetus in such circumstances would be the result of a strong, united, and obedient community able to conquer whoever opposes it.

In this respect Ibn-Khaldun's contribution to Islamic political thought "consists in two important findings. They are the result of the blending, in his searching mind, of empiricism and traditionalism, and they are: (a) that the khilāfa has survived in the mulk of the Islamic empire, and (b) that religion, if not the determining factor as it is in the khilāfa, still remains an important factor in the mulk. He thus combines a primarily theological with a power-political concept of the state, without in any way abandoning the accepted Muslim position, since the spiritual and the temporal powers are united in the Caliph or imam."⁽¹⁾

These considerations indicate a two sided rule, namely, "the weakening of the religious élan must strengthen the temporal component of the khilāfa and inevitably lead to its transformation into absolute monarchy in the form of mulk."⁽²⁾ "As long as religion unites ruler and ruled by stressing the higher purpose of man and his salvation, the life of the state is guaranteed."⁽³⁾

Accordingly, we can say that the transformation of the Caliphate into mulk was a natural and inevitable thing. In any

(1) Rosenthal, Erwin, Political Thought in Medieval Islam, p. 96.

(2) Ibid., p. 96.

(3) Ibid., p. 97.

case if mulk is Islamic, "it comes second in rank after the khilāfa, and they are linked together."⁽¹⁾

His treatises, in this regard, are an outcome of his perception of the deterioration of "the spontaneous faith which dictates the believer's actions, and the gulf that separates the masses from the learned guardians, teachers and interpreters of the religious law which had to be mastered by prolonged, intensive study..."⁽²⁾ of the first phases of the Islamic Mission. The ever increasing complexities, differences, and heterogeneities of the Islamic empire were to add complexity to the religious laws making them more and more precarious to the Muslims than they were at the beginning of the Caliphate.

Ibn-Khaldun "stresses no less forcefully the adverse effect of religion on the manly virtues which are needed for an active political life, once spontaneous faith has given way to guided obedience and meek submission."⁽³⁾

Thus the transition of the Caliphate into mulk, as perceived by Ibn-Khaldun, is based on political considerations. ^cAsabiya the main factor that actualized the successful expansion of Islam was also the main reason that preserved the Caliphate. "It is the ^casabiya and not the reality of the shari^ca which preserved the khilāfa, even though it was only a shadow of its former self."⁽⁴⁾

(1) Ibid., p. 98.

(2) Ibid., p. 265.

(3) Ibid., p. 265.

(4) Ibid., pps. 265-266.

His evaluations, in this regard, were relative in nature. They were occasioned by the changing political conditions and situations into which he inquired as a non-partisan and as a detached observer.

In this respect, Ibn-Khaldun developed his theory of the state along strictly logical lines. The sequence of his chapters shows that his first considerations culminate in the Caliphate. "Having reached this point he halts to discuss in elaborate detail the organization associated with the Caliphate, before passing on to investigate the causes of the decay of the state and its final destruction."⁽¹⁾

Accordingly, he explains the transformation of the Caliphate into mulk, "as due to the force of ^casabiya amongst the Umayyad family... regaining an ascendancy over the religious enthusiasm which had restrained it in the time of the early Caliphs."⁽²⁾

It should be noted that when he spoke about sultan's he was actually speaking about mulk. MulK and Sultanate were no two distinct things to Ibn-Khaldun. They were the same, and as we have seen, in accordance to this criteria he developed his theory of transformation.

In the following chapter we will compare Ibn-Khaldun's theory of transformation to that of al-Māwardī, Abu Ya^clā, and

(1) Gibb, H.A.R. 'The Islamic Background of Ibn-Khaldun's Political Theory', Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, VII, (1933-1935), p. 30.

(2) Ibid., p. 31.

al-Ghāzālī, respectively, seeing how they attempted to find a relationship between Sultanate and Caliphate.

(II)

THE CALIPHATE AND THE SULTANATE AND SHARĪ'AH

(AL-MĀWĀRDĪ, ABU YA'ĀLA, AND AL-GHAZZĀLĪ)

In Islamic political thought we can observe many writers who were motivated to explain, as well as to justify, the actual political conditions of the latter phases of the 'Abbasid's dynasty against the theoretical validity of the Imāmate. We will consider, in this regard, al-Māwārdī, Abū-Ya'ālā, and al-Ghazzālī, who preceded Ibn-Khaldun, Although their approaches and motivations differ from one another, yet their considerations, all of them, devoted much interest to the above mentioned problem.

It was at the period "of the degradation of the Caliphate that the earliest systematic treaties on the theory of this institution... was compiled" ⁽¹⁾ by al-Māwārdī (d. 540 H).

His book Al-'Aḥkām Al-Sultānīyah (Ordinances of Government), was "the result of blending reasoning derived from the traditional bases of law (Qur'an, Sunna, Hadīth, Ijmā' and Qiyās) with historical and political deductions from the formative period of Islam, supported by the views of the salaf (the early Muslims), and a realistic appraisal of the contemporary political scene." ⁽²⁾

He was motivated in this regard by the desire to "assert the authority of the 'Abbasid Caliphs against the Buwaihid emirs

(1) Arnold, Thomas W., The Caliphate, p. 70.

(2) Rosenthal, Erwin, Political Thought in Medieval Islam, p. 236.

who were in effective control of their state." (1) In fact his treatise intended to found the theoretical delimitation of the "spheres of authority between the Caliph, in charge of religious affairs, and the emīr, in effective control of civil administration on the basis of a negotiated agreement." (2)

In this sense his concept of the Imāmate and his interpretations of its scope tend to harmonize the then existing conditions with the shari^c a. However, it should be noted that he saw the "Caliphate at the lowest ebb of its degradation, and the theoretical character of his account of it is in striking contrast to the actual historic facts of the case." (3)

The Imāmate, to al-Māwardī, as other Sunni Jurists, is necessary, not by reason but by the religious law as determined by the general consensus of the Muslims after the death of the prophet Muhammad. It is established as a substitute to prophecy in the defence of the faith and the administration of the world. Being as such, he looks upon it as a community duty (kifāyah) binding on the Muslims. More particularly it is the duty of ahl al-ikhtiyār, the people who loosen and bind, to nominate, chose, and elect an Imām, as it is the duty of all Muslims to recognize and obey that Imām once he is elected. (4)

As Ibn-Khaldun "he draws a distinction between government based on reason and the higher form of government based

(1) Ibid., p. 27.

(2) Ibid., p. 28.

(3) Arnold, op. cit. p. 70.

(4) Al-Māwardī, Al-'Ahkām Al-Sultāniyah, pps. 3-4.

on revealed law." (1) While he regards the Imāmate as the best form of government having its criteria the revealed law, he regards al-hukm al-Sultānī (2) which is based on power, as a secondary form of government.

"With an entire disregard for the facts of history during the four preceding centuries of the Muhammadan era, he maintains that the office of Caliph or Imām is elective, and he lays down as qualifications for the electors that they must" (3) satisfy seven conditions, namely;

1. ^cAdalah (probity), since an Imām's primary function is the administration of justice.

2. ^cIlm (knowledge) comprising the traditional Muslim sciences necessary for interpreting the religious laws. It is required to enable the Imām to make independent decisions and pass judgements pertaining to the religious laws.

3. Freedom (salāmat) of the senses from any defect that might hinder the performance of his functions.

4. Freedom of the limbs from any defect that might prevent an Imām from discharging his functions.

5. Shajā^ca wa najdah (courage and determination) to be enabled to wage holy war and to defend the realm of the Muslims.

6. Sound insight and judgement (rā'y) enabling him to govern his subjects, manage their affairs, and secure their welfare.

(1) Rosenthal, Erwin, Political Thought in Medieval Islam, p. 29.

(2) Al-Māwardī, op. cit., p. 2.

(3) Arnold, Thomas W., The Caliphate, p. 70.

7. Nasab. He must be of the Qurayshite's descent in accordance with the prophet's statement that Imāms should be from Quraysh and the consensus of the Muslims at Sakīfah where it was decided so.

At the same time he, al-Māwardī, inserts three conditions that should be satisfied by ahl al-ikhtiyār, namely:

1. Al-^cadālah.
2. Al-^cilm, and;
3. Sagacity (rā'y wa hikma).

In this sense, al-Māwardī, intended to secure an Imām capable of administering his administrative, judicial and military functions. He perceives ten functions subject to the Imāmate, namely, (1) defence and maintenance of the faith, (2) resolving of the legal disputes and the preservation of justice, (3) the protection of the territory of Islam, (4) the punishment of wrong doers and offenders, (5) the garrisoning of the frontiers, (6) the waging of jīhad against those who refuse to accept Islam or the Muslim rule, (7) the collection and organization of taxes, (8) the administration of the public funds and the payment of salaries, (9) the appointment of competent officials, and (10) the supervision of the details of government. He sums up these functions under the title: defence of the religion and the administration of the state (^calam).⁽¹⁾

In this respect he "ignores the dependent position into which the Caliphate had sunk and the rise of independent Muslim-states that disregarded its authority."⁽²⁾

(1) Al-Māwardī, op. cit., p. 14.

(2) Arnold, op. cit., p. 72.

He continues stating that authorities are not agreed on the number of ahl al-ikhtiyār required to make an election valid. In this respect he was, also, disregarding the factual conditions of his period in which "such an electorate could never have acted."⁽¹⁾

He stresses the elective nature of the Caliphate by maintaining that though a Caliph might designate his successor, yet the people who loosen and bind, must consider the qualifications of the appointed, after the death of the Imām, seeing if they satisfy the Imāmate's conditions. Moreover he views that the designated successor should be consented by the Caliph as to whether he accepts the office or not.⁽²⁾

In this respect, his treatise, irrespective of its expositions on the respective administrative functions of Caliph and emir,⁽³⁾ are no more than theoretical stipulations intended to clothe such considerations with legality. "In an ingenious manner he endeavors to make the theory of election fit in with what he knew to be the actual fact, viz. that almost every Caliph had nominated his successor."⁽⁴⁾

(1) Ibid., p. 71.

(2) Al-Māwardī, op. cit., pps. 9-10.

(3) Rosenthal, Erwin, Political Thought in Medieval Islam, p. 32.

(4) Arnold, Thomas, The Caliphate, pps. 70-71.

Al-Māwardī treatise shows his endeavor to save the Ḳabbāsīd Caliphate and the unity of Islam. The political conditions of his times exemplified the deterioration of the power and authority of the Caliphs. "Compromise in practice was no longer sufficient but had to be carried right into the theory of the khilāfa".⁽¹⁾

From these considerations we can observe how al-Māwardī's approach to the problem differed from that of Ibn-Khaldun. While the former approached it with an insight to harmonize and adjust it to the actual conditions, Ibn-Khaldun accepted the actual conditions justifying his acceptance through his theory of transformation. In other words, while al-Māwardī disregarded the actual conditions of his time, Ibn-Khaldun looked upon them as being natural and inevitable.

One of al-Māwardī's contemporaries was Abū Yaḳlā Muḥammad Ibn-al-Hussein al-Farā' (d. 1040). He approached the problem in the same manner as that of al-Māwardī.

It is amazing to note that Abū Yaḳlā wrote a similar book to that of al-Māwardī, having the same title, viz. Al-'Ahkām Al-Sultāniyah, the same subject matter, similar headings, and with slight variation in the structure of sentences.

Such similarity, their living in the same age and under the same conditions, suggest that they must have known each other if not each other's works. However, there is an ample variation in the criterion used in each of the books. While

(1) Rosenthal, E. op. cit., p. 241.

al-Māwardī's treatise has Shaffism as its point of reference with a regard to the polemy between Malikism and Hanbalism, (1)
 Abū Ya^clā's books has as its criterion Hanbalism.

However, this judgement is not final because Abū Ya^clā mentions in the preface to his book that al-'Ahkām al-Sultānīyah was a revision of one of the sections of his book Kitāb al-Mu^ctamad fī usūl al-Dīn, and in which he cancelled the polemics related to the Imāmate. This notion could be taken as a point of departure to justify the striking similarity (2) between the two treatise.

In any way, Abū Ya^clā's account on the Imāmate is very similar to that of al-Māwardī. He mentions in the preface to his book that the main objective in writing it is to enlighten the Imāms as to what they can do. In this (3) respect he was disregarding the degradation of the Caliphate's status in his age, and ignoring the actual political conditions which placed the effective power in the hands of emīrs and sultans leaving the ^cAbbāsīd's Caliphs with nominal authority. He was not ready to accept the actual conditions as they were or to justify them as was done by Ibn-Khaldun. On the contrary, he saw the validity of the Imāmate, its existence, even under the above mentioned circumstances.

(1) Abū Ya^clā, Al-'Ahkām al-Sultānīyah, p. 44
 (preface of the editor).

(2) Ibid., p. 3.

(3) Ibid., p. 3.

The Imāmate is necessary not by reason, but by the religious laws as was determined by the general consensus of the Muslims at Sakīfah. Being^{as} such he looks upon it as a community duty (fard kifāyah). It is the duty of ahl al-ijtihād (the people who loosen and bind) to nominate, choose and elect an Imām, as it is the duty of every Muslim to obey (1) and recognize the rule of an Imām once he is elected.

As al-Māwardī did, he stresses on the elective nature of the institution by stating that those eligible to Imāmate must satisfy four conditions, namely: (1) be of a Qurayshite descent; (2) possess the qualifications of judges such as liberty (hurīyah), maturity (bulūgh), intelligence (^caql), knowledge (^cilm), and probity (^cadālah); (3) be able to wage war, administer the realm, and execute the "limits" (hudūd) and protect the nation; and (4) they must be among the best of those eligible to Imāmate in knowledge and piety. (2)

As to ahl al-ijtihād they must possess three qualifications, viz. (1) al-^cadālah, (2) the necessary knowledge that enables them to chose the proper Imām, (3) and the sound insight, judgement (rā'y), and experience in government (tadbīr) that enable them to chose the person most fit to the office. (3)

His concern with legality made him reject the accession to Imāmate through force and domination (al-qahr wal ghalab) by noting that at Sakīfah it was assigned to Abū Bakr on contractual basis. Such being the case he regards the acceptance

(1) Ibid., p. 3 & p. 8.

(2) Ibid., p. 4.

(3) Ibid., pps. 3-4.

of the chosen as very essential. Although it is not reprehensible to claim the office, but it is necessary that such claim should be considered by ahl al-ijtihād.⁽¹⁾ In such regards he was ignoring the actual political conditions of his times. "Obviously, such an electorate could never have acted under the conditions of life in that period."⁽²⁾

He continues enumerating the functions of a Caliph, which are drastically the same as those perceived by al-Māwardī with a very slight, inconsiderable difference.⁽³⁾

At the same time he discusses succession, justifying it with Abū Bakr's and Umar's precedents, maintaining, as al-Māwardī, that the designation should be considered by ahl al-ijtihād after the death of the Caliph.⁽⁴⁾

Such considerations do show that Abū Ya'qūb's treatise was no more than an attempt to level the Caliphate with the political developments that took place. As many other Sunnī jurist of that period he was not ready to accept its actual degradation. It represented to him the principle of established law and authority, and the link that leads back to the founder of the faith. He looked upon the Caliph as the commander of the faithful, the successor of the Prophet, and the source of all authority and honour.

(1) Ibid., pps. 7-8.

(2) Arnold, Thomas, The Caliphate, p. 71.

(3) Abū Ya'qūb, op. cit., pps. 11-12; and Al-Mawardi, Al-Ahkām Al-Sultāniyah, p. 14.

(4) Ibid., p. 10.

In this respect he was subject to the Sunnī jurist's evaluations. "Whatever shape the course of external events might take, the faith of the Sunnī theologians and legists in the doctrines expounded in their text-books remained unshaken, and even though the Caliph could not give an order outside his own palace. They still went on teaching the faithful that he was the supreme head of the whole body of Muslims."⁽¹⁾

Although this was the general trend followed by the Sunnī jurists, we can find some of their authorities, as al-Ghazzālī, Abū Hāmid (d. 505 A.H), leading a different course in their attempt to accommodate the Caliphate to the actual realities of the then period.

Al-Ghazzālī was among those who tried to safeguard the Caliphate's existence by amending its rules, conditions, and functions to suit the actual realities of the period. In contrast to al-Māwārdī and Abū Ya^clā, he was not concerned with a legal exposition of the theory "speculatively derived from the basis of theology and with the application of the classical jurists' theory to contemporary facts."⁽²⁾ Rather, he was concerned with accommodating "all movements and tendencies in contemporary Islam."⁽³⁾

(1) Arnold, Thomas, The Caliphate, p. 77.

(2) Lambton, Ann K. S. "The Theory of Kingship in the Nasihāt ul-Muluk of Ghazali", Islamic Quarterly, V. I, i, p. 49.

(3) Rosenthal, Erwin, Political Thought in Medieval Islam, p. 245.

To al-Ghazzālī the Imāmate is necessary by the religious laws as was determined by the general consensus of the Muslims at Sakīfah. (1) Although he looks upon ijma^c as one of the sources of law, yet he feels hesitant to consider it sufficient for keeping the religious order (nizām al-dīn). It is necessary to have an obeyed Imām (Imām muta^c), because the good order of religion is not possible except through having an obeyed Imām. (2)

Al-Ghazzālī was aware of the contemporary conditions of his period. As long as sufficient power was attached to the Caliphate the Sunnī jurists faced no problem. But when the Caliph lost control of his affairs they had to find justifications to retain the institution. As we have seen al-Mawardī's and Abū Ya^clā's treatment was in no way adequate. They never departed from considering the Caliphate's character as being derived from the Imām's duties as the executor of the religious laws. Their omission to apply a criteria of authority to the Caliphate, under these conditions, was to permit "theorists of the post-Abbasid period to apply the criteria of circumstantial authority to the actual but 'unconstitutional' holders of power. The inevitable corollary was the establishment of power as the constitutive authority of the Caliph." (3)

(1) Al-Ghazzālī, Al-Iqtisād Fil Iy^ctiqād, pps. 95-96.

(2) Ibid., p. 96.

(3) Binder, Leonard, "Al-Ghazali and Islamic Government," The Muslim World, V. XLV, April 1955, p.232.

Al-Ghazzālī's concept, in this respect, departs from the well established pattern of the Sunnī jurists. Although he seems to be in favor of one-man-government, yet his expositions do show that he was prejudiced to a multi-lateral government. This notion is clearly expressed in his association of the Imām, the nominal possessor of authority and power, with the sultan, the actual holder of power.

To al-Ghazzālī, the purpose of the good order of the world is to make possible the protection of the people and the safeguarding of their properties. This is not possible except through an obeyed sultan. Human beings in their different classes, inclinations, and opinions are in need of a forceful (qahr) and obeyed sultan, otherwise their differences and conflicting interests and desires would lead them to extinction. Accordingly, he views that religion and temporal power (al-sultān) are twins (taw'āman). While religion stands as the foundation (uss), the sultan stands as the guardian (hāris) of that foundation. In the absence of either of them (1) anarchy inevitably emerges.

Al-Ghazzālī concludes from these considerations that the sultan is necessary for the good order of the world which is, in itself necessary for the good order of the religion. Once the good order of the religion is established, the achievement of the ultimate happiness in the Thereafter (sa^cadat

(1) Al-Ghazzālī, op. cit., p. 97.

al-'akhirah) becomes possible. (1)

Such considerations show al-Ghazzālī's attempt to justify the actual existing political conditions. At the same time they show his awareness of the need to have an institution to execute the religious laws. He felt that material security is necessary to actualize such task. His evaluations in this respect, were subject to the functional and circumstantial authority of the Caliphate.

In other words he felt that it is intrinsic in the nature of the religious laws to have a civil-religious institution provided by the sultanate as a coercive power.

In this sense he looks upon the Caliphate as a necessary institution for the execution of the religious laws. Although he stresses the essential function of the Sultanate in executing the purpose of the Caliphate, yet he does not explain the relationship of the sultan to the Caliph.

Out of these considerations we can observe that the Caliphate, to al-Ghazzālī, a) "comprehends the necessary power to accomplish the maintenance of order, b) It represents or symbolizes the collective unity of the Muslim Community and its historical continuity, c) Deriving its functional and institutional authority from the Shari^ca, it is the only legitimate form of government in Islam." (2)

(1) Ibid., p. 97.

(2) Binder, op. cit., p. 236.

Al-Ghazzālī tries to face the problem of the inactivity of the Caliph and the related problem of his qualifications by stating that an Imām should be able to manage the affairs of the people and cause them to act in their own best interests.

Accordingly, he maintains that an Imām should satisfy the following conditions, namely, competence (kifāyah), knowledge (ilm), piety (wara^c), and Qurayshite descent. He does not refer to courage and prowess. Instead he refers to shawkah, the force and power which guarantees the najdah required from the Caliph. (1) Although these conditions, with the exception of shawka, were also stipulated by al-Māwardī, yet he modifies them "to meet the general political situation of the latter phases of the Abbasid period." (2) For instance he would dispense with kifāyah, ilm and adālah if necessity required such a step. To al-Ghazzālī such qualifications are desirable to be possessed by an Imām. If a Qurayshite does not possess them but he is able, at the same time, to impose his rule and procure the obedience of the people, his Imāmate would be valid, necessary and required. (3)

He justifies his view with reference to four reasons, (4) namely:

-
- (1) Al-Ghazzālī, Al-Iqtisād Fil Iy^ctiqād, p. 97.
 - (2) Rosenthal, E. Political Thought in Medieval Islam, p. 40.
 - (3) Al-Ghazzālī, op. cit., p. 98.
 - (4) Ibid., pps. 97-98.

a) If attempts are made to depose such person dissensions and conflicts would arise, thus breaking the unity of the community. To al-Ghazzālī necessity (unity in this case) permits the prohibitions, (an unqualified Qurayshite).

b) That the true objective is to have an obeyed Imām who causes the people to act in their own best interests in this world and for the Hereafter (fi al-ma^cāsh wal mu^cād).

c) The religious laws could be fulfilled as long as the Caliph is supported by scholars and a conscientious vizier.

d) The prophet did not require kifāyah, ^cilm and ^cadālah as necessary conditions for the public interest (maṣlahah).

It should be noted that while al-Ghazzālī would dispense with kifāyah, ^cilm, and ^cadālah if necessity required that, he stresses the condition of piety, the "fear of God, a pious way of life, and the refraining from dubious practices."⁽¹⁾

To al-Ghazzālī, there are four ways in which one of those qualified for the Imāmate may be chosen:⁽²⁾

1. By the designation of the Prophet. This never took place.
2. By the designation of the ruling Imām.
3. By the designation of the actual holder of power, a person of shawkah who by passing obedience to his appointee

(1) Rosenthal, E. op. cit., p. 41.

(2) Al-Ghazzālī, op. cit., ppa. 98-99.

makes others do the same.

4. And by the imposition of oneself with the help of shawkah, kifāyah and the ability to derive obedience.

The confirmation of such designations takes place with the oath of allegiance. The Imāmate of a Qurayshite is validated when the people who loosen and bind confirm the designations that appointed him for this office (bay^{ʿa} ⁽¹⁾).

Although al-Ghazzālī regards al-bay^{ʿa} as important, and even essential, yet he does not look upon it as being constitutive in nature. He sees that a qualified Qurayshite may appoint himself as Imām if he is the actual holder of power.

He was motivated in these considerations by the view that it is necessary to have an obeyed Imām. Faced with the "ugly political reality" he "unashamedly" declares "accession by usurpation lawfull." ⁽²⁾

The actual political conditions which never made circumstantial authority sufficient to legitimize the government of the sultan made him insert the recognition of the Caliph as the prerequisite of its legitimacy. In other words he sees that "the validity of the government of the sultan is established only upon the sultan's oath of allegiance to the Caliph, and the Caliph's appointment of the sultan." ⁽³⁾

(1) Ibid., p. 99.

(2) Rosenthal, E. op. cit., p. 238.

(3) Binder, L. "Al-Ghazali and Islamic Government", Muslim World, V. XLV, p. 239.

In this manner the Caliph, to al-Ghazzālī, is "enjoined to delegate authority to one possessed of shawka, who in return swears him allegiance... It is he, not his delegate, the wielder of effective power, who restrains men from bloodshed and ensures their welfare in this world and in future life (ma^cash wa-ma^cad). He must consult the ^culamā and act on their (1) advice."

In this respect he was reflecting a general norm which was adopted to legitimize the power of a sultan and to recognize, at the same time, the constitutive authority of the Caliph.

By accepting such a norm he was delimiting the functions of a Caliph, assigning the actual circumstantial authority to sultans, and confining the functions of ^culamā to the interpretation of the shari^ca . In this sense he looked upon the Caliphate as possessing three elements, namely, 1) the Caliph, 2) the sultan, and 3) the ^culamā, to each of whom corresponds some aspect of authority and function. While the Caliph stands as the principal representative of the Imāmate, the sultan stands as the possessor of a delegated authority to preserve law, order and to establish Islam. In the same way the ^culamā stand as the body concerned with the interpretation of the shari^ca in terms of the problems facing the realm.

(1) Rosenthal, Erwin, Political Thought in Medieval Islam, p. 41.

Such considerations were an outcome of al-Ghazzālī's political realism, his preparedness to make concessions to expediency, and his desire to preserve the institution of the Caliphate as the symbol of the unity of the Muslim community. (1)

The functioning of the Caliphate in the way he prescribed was relative to the continued cooperation between the Caliph, the sultan, and the ^culamā.

In any case the outcome of his accommodation was no more than an explanation of "the political conditions of his own times in terms acceptable to traditional Sunni thought." (2)

So far we have considered al-Ghazzālī's attempt to accommodate the classical theory of the Caliphate to the actual political conditions of his times. In other words, we considered al-Ghazzālī's accommodation of the circumstantial authority, as represented in the Sultanate, to the constitutive authority, as it was reflected in the Imāmate.

It should be noted that he devoted one of his books, Al-Tibr Al-Masbūk Fi Nasīhat Al-Mulūk, to the study of rulership and the practical results of kingship. In this book he uses the terms sultan and malik interchangeably and draws attention to the nature of mulk and good rulership.

(1) Ibid., p. 38.

(2) Binder, op. cit., p. 241.

To al-Ghazzālī, vilayah (al-wilāyah) is a great privilege. Whoever carries its responsibilities acquires full happiness, and whoever falls short in accomplishing them falls into tribulation. (1)

We can discover in his general discussion that a ruler is not likened to a shepherd of his people or a patriarch, but rather of a despotic monarch. Likewise his ideal community differs from that of the early Islamic community of al-Madīna defined by the shari'ca and headed by an Imām. (2) The sultan and the malik are directly responsible to God. They are the shadow of God upon earth and obedience to them as the chosen of God is incumbent upon the people so long as they conform to the shari'ca. (3)

Al-Ghazzālī "attaches to the conception of divine right an emphasis hardly warranted by Islamic tradition, though he nevertheless seeks to give Quranic sanction to his interpretation. 'It must be understood', he writes "that God gave him (the king) kingship and the divine light. For this reason he must be obeyed, loved and followed. Opposition to kings is not seemly. One must not have enmity towards them because God most high said "O ye faithful, obey God and the Apostle and those set in command amongst you". (4)

Al-Ghazzālī interprets the verse to mean that "you should obey God and the Prophet and your amīrs. Thus he to

(1) Al-Ghazzālī, Nasihat Al-Muluk, p. 10.

(2) Lambton, Ann K. S. "The Theory of Kingship in the Nasihat al-Muluk of Ghazali", Islamic Quarterly, V: I, i, p. 49.

(3) Al-Ghazzālī, op. cit., p. 41.

(4) Ibid., p. 41, & Lambton, op. cit.,

whom God has given religion must love kings and Sultans and obey them. He should know that it is God most high who gives kingship and Sultanate to whomsoever He wills... One He makes honoured by (His) grace and another He abases by (His) justice." (1)

To al-Ghazzālī, God selected the kings to prevent the people from attacking each other, to safeguard their interests. He empowered them to execute and carry on their functions.

Accordingly al-Ghazzālī maintains that Sultans and kings must be just and of determination. They are the substitutes of God on earth. "The sultan in truth is he who spreads justice among people (ʿibād) and avoids injustices and depravity. A tyrannical sultan is a disaster. His mulk will not last because the Prophet said "Kingship remains with unbelief but not with tyranny." (2)

In his view religion depends on kingship; kingship on the army; the army on wealth; wealth on material prosperity; and material prosperity on justice. He concludes out of this notion that the ruin and prosperity of the world are both from kings. (3)

The afore-mentioned considerations show how al-Ghazzālī attempted to explain the gap that existed between the constitutive authority as implied in the Caliphate, and the circumstantial authority as represented in the actual rule of sultans.

(1) Ibid., p. 41.

(2) Ibid., p. 41 & p. 62.

(3) Ibid., p. 44.

In this regard his approach differed from that of Ibn-Khaldun. While the former endeavored to accommodate the classical theory of the Imāmate to the actual political conditions of his times, the latter, without challenging its theoretical validity, attempted to justify the circumstantial authority by looking upon it as a natural outcome of the transformation of the Caliphate. In other words, while al-Ghazzālī accommodated the Caliphate to the actual political developments, Ibn-Khaldun upheld the actual political conditions as inevitable.

Al-Ghazzālī and Ibn-Khaldun, in this respect, were deeply aware of the gulf that separated the classical theory of the Caliphate from the actual developments. In contrast to al-Māwardī and Abū Ya^clā they were more positive in dealing with the Caliphate. In other words while al-Māwardī and Abū Ya^clā ignored the actual political developments of their times in upholding the classical theory of the Caliphate, even in the days of its - Caliphate's - deepest humiliation and degradation, al-Ghazzālī and Ibn-Khaldun were more aware of the cleavage as their discussions show.

IBN-KHALDUN'S THEORY OF MULK

(I)

HUMAN ASSOCIATION

In displaying his concept of human association Ibn-Khaldun did not take human association as a for granted existing thing, rather he attempted to reason the causes of such association, how it came into being, what were the incentives that made it emerge, and what are the different aspects through which it manifests itself.

As a preliminary fact, the differences in conditions among peoples, to Ibn-Khaldun, are due to the different ways by which they make their living. The need for making a living results in social organizations which enable the peoples of a certain community to cooperate in seeking that end, starting with the simple necessities of life before getting to its conveniences and luxuries.

Some people adopt agriculture and animal husbandry. Such people, to Ibn-Khaldun, "cannot avoid the call of the desert, because it alone offers the wide fields, acres, pastures for animals, and other things that the settled areas do not offer,"⁽¹⁾ due to the reason that such a living cannot provide them except with the subsistence needs. "Subsequent improvement of their conditions and acquisition of more wealth and comfort than they need, cause them to rest and take it easy."⁽²⁾ Their cooperation in the succeeding

(1) Rosenthal, Franz, The Muqaddimah, V: I, p. 249.

(2) Ibid., p. 249.

stage will go beyond the subsistence level, leading them to the formulation of the most developed luxury customs, thus paving the way for the emergence of the "sedentary people" (al-ḥadar), who live in cities and countries.

To Ibn-Khaldun the sedentary people earn "more and live more comfortably than Bedouins, because they live on a level beyond the level of (bare) necessity, and their way of making a living corresponds to their wealth."⁽¹⁾

The Bedouins, or the inhabitants of the deserts, and the sedentary people, or those who live in cities and countries, are natural human groups (ajiāl). The Bedouins who restrict themselves to what is necessary for living are the most savage human beings that exist. Compared with sedentary people, they are on the level of wild, untamable (animals) and dumb beasts.⁽²⁾ To Ibn-Khaldun such people are the Arabs, the nomadic Berbers, the Zanatah, the Kurds, Turkomans, and the Turks. All of these are natural human groups who, out of necessity, exist in civilization.

As such the difference that exists between the Bedouins and sedentary people is due to the difference in their conditions of living. The difference between each of them, in themselves, is also due to the difference of their standards of living. In other words, due to the difference in the degree of their wealth and luxury.

(1) Ibid., p. 250.

(2) Ibn-Khaldun actually meant the bedouin Arabs.

Out of these considerations, Ibn-Khaldun conceived that the existence of Bedouins was prior to, and the basis of, the existence of sedentary peoples. Likewise, "the existence of cities and towns results from luxury customs pertaining to luxury and ease, which are posterior to the customs that go with the bare necessities of life."⁽¹⁾

However, the Bedouins, who were considered by Ibn-Khaldun as savage peoples, were in his view "closer to the first natural state and more remote from the evil habits that have been impressed upon the souls (of sedentary people) through numerous and ugly, blameworthy customs."⁽²⁾ The sedentary people to Ibn-Khaldun are more disposed to laziness and ease, in contrast to the Bedouins. This is due to the fact that they live in well being and luxury, entrusting the defense of their property and their lives to governors, rulers, and militia to rule and guard them, in contrast to the Bedouins, who defend themselves by themselves, without relying upon others.

The sedentary people, to Ibn-Khaldun, constitute the last stage of civilization, and the point at which their degeneration and decay begins. Such a view rested on his belief that the soul in its first natural state (^calā al-^{fi}ṭrah al-^ulah) is in a condition which enables it to accept whatever good or evil that may arise.

(1) Rosenthal, op. cit., p. 253.

(2) Ibid., p. 254.

Man, to Ibn-Khaldun, is no more than a child of the customs by which he was raised. He is not the product of his natural disposition and temperament, but of the conditions to which he was accustomed.

In conformity with the above mentioned views, he maintains that not everyone is the master of his own affairs. Man by necessity must be dominated by someone else. "If the domination (malakah) is kind and just and the people under it are not oppressed by its laws and restrictions, they are guided by the courage or cowardice that they possess in themselves. They are satisfied with the absence of any restraining power. Self-reliance eventually becomes a quality natural to them. They would not know anything else. If, however, the domination with its laws is one of brute force and intimidation, it breaks their fortitude and deprives them of their power of resistance as a result of the inertness that develops in the souls of the oppressed."⁽¹⁾

To Ibn-Khaldun, whenever laws are enforced by punishment they generate in the person who cannot defend himself a feeling of humiliation which destroys and breaks his fortitude. The same results would appear when laws, so enforced, since childhood with the intention of educating and instructing the people. For that reason he felt that the Bedouins are of greater fortitude than the sedentary people who are subject to laws.

(1) Ibid., pps. 258-259.

Yet he made a notable distinction to this rule by asserting that the companions (al-ṣahābah) "observed the religious laws, and yet did not experience any diminution of their fortitude, but possessed the greatest possible fortitude."⁽¹⁾ Such an exception was explained by Ibn-Khaldun, in accordance with the view that those laws were the ordinances of the religion which they received and came to observe out of their belief in its articles and prescriptions. However, and with the decrease of the religion's influence, they were reoccupied with the ensueing of restraining laws leaving the religious laws as a branch of learning to be acquired through education. In other words when the Muslims turned to sedentary life they assumed the characteristic trait of submissiveness to law, thus loosing of their fortitude.

Thus, while Ibn-Khaldun thought that the governmental and educational laws destroy fortitude - when oppressive - "because their restraining authority (wāzī^c) is something that comes from outside (ajnabī),"⁽²⁾ he felt that the religious laws do not produce the same results because their restraining authority comes from within (zāṭi).

All the above mentioned views do show the importance of customs in the making of "man". Evil to Ibn-Khaldun "is a quality that is closest to man when he fails to improve

(1) Ibid., p. 260.

(2) Ibn-Khaldun, Tārīkh Al-^cAlāmah Ibn-Khaldun, V: i, p. 222.

his customs and (when) religion is not used as a model to improve him." ⁽¹⁾ The great folk of mankind are subject to those conditions. Evil qualities are no more than injustice and mutual aggression. "He who casts his eye upon the property of his brother will lay his hand upon it to take it, unless there is a wāzi^c to hold him back." ⁽²⁾

Governments and authorities in towns and cities occupy themselves with the job of holding back the masses from infringing upon the rights of one another. With the absence of the influence of force and governmental authority, nothing would prevent the masses from mutual injustices. Although the influence of force and governmental authority prevents mutual aggression, yet it cannot prevent the injustices that come from the rulers themselves.

In Bedouin tribes the wāzi^c is derived from the shaykhs and leaders, and the great respect and veneration they - shaykhs and leaders - enjoy among their fellowmen. They can cope with the aggressors "only if they are a closely-knit group of one common descent." ⁽³⁾ The feeling of their closeness and their relation stand, to a great extent, on blood ties. "Compassion and affection for one's blood relations and relatives exist in human nature as something God put into the hearts of men. It makes for mutual support and aid, and

(1) Rosenthal, op. cit., p. 262.

(2) Ibid., p. 262.

(3) Ibid., p. 263.

increases the fear felt by the enemy." (1)

To Ibn-Khaldun there exists a constant and perpetual need for ^caşabiyah (solidarity, l'esprit du corps, group feeling). Tribes, cities, prophecies, mulk (royal kingship), and the propaganda (da^cwa) for a cause, are always in need of ^caşabiyah in order to succeed. Nothing could be achieved, in this respect, without fighting. "'Man' has the natural urge to offer resistance, and for fighting one cannot do without ^caşabiyah." (2)

Blood ties are natural among human beings. They lead to affection for one's relations and relatives. They create the feeling that no harm ought to befall them.

Clients and allies stand in the same category, because their relationship leads to close contacts which are, somewhat, similar to those of common descent.

To Ibn-Khaldun leadership exists only through domination (ghalab), which is dependent on ^caşabiyah. It is a necessary condition for leadership to belong to a ^caşabiyah which is superior to each individual ^caşabiyah in a tribe. "Leadership, must of necessity be inherited from the person who is entitled to it, in accordance with the fact ... that al-taghalub is a result of ^caşabiyah." (3) Only, he, who shares in the ^caşabiyah of a group can acquire the title of nobility and prestige, which in itself gives to his successors the

(1) Ibid., p. 263.

(2) Ibid., p. 263.

(3) Ibid., p. 274.

respect of their fellows.

Ibn-Khaldun sees that the prestige in a single "house" rests within four successive generations, originating with the builder of the glory, and passing to his son who is inferior to him in practical experiences. The third generation is that which contents itself with imitation and reliance upon tradition. The fourth generation is that whose "member has lost the qualities that preserved the edifice of their glory."⁽¹⁾ The member of the fourth generation, "imagines that the edifice was not built through application and effort. He thinks that it was something due to his people from the very beginning by virtue of the mere fact of their (noble) descent, and not something that resulted from group (effort) and (individual) qualities... He keeps away from those whose (C^aṣabiyah) he shares thinking that he is better than they. He trusts those that obey him because "he was brought up to take their obedience for granted, and he does not know the qualities that made obedience necessary. Such qualities are humility (in dealing) with (such men) and respect for their feelings. Therefore, he considers them despicable, and they, in turn, revolt against him and despise him."⁽²⁾ They transfer, through the course of revolution, political leadership to others. The family of the new political leader grows, while that of the original house collapses. To Ibn-Khaldun this rule applies to the leaders of tribes as it applies to rulers and kingships.

(1) Ibid., p. 279.

(2) Ibid., p. 280.

Although the rule of four generations holds true with respect to prestige, yet it may happen "that a house is wiped out ... in fewer than four (generations), or it may continue unto the fifth and sixth (generations), though in a state of decline and decay."⁽¹⁾

To Ibn-Khaldun the desert life conditions its inhabitants to be brave, and enables them, as a result, to achieve superiority over other nations. The "more firmly rooted in desert habits and the wilder a group is, the closer it comes to achieving superiority over others."⁽²⁾

The different manifestations which we have come to acknowledge were concerned with Ibn-Khaldun's view that 'man' is political by nature. The needs of livelihood and protection are the incentives for such association. However, human association in the process of its establishment, development, and senility, is determined by fixed laws, and is, always, in need of a certain restraining authority ($\bar{w}azī^c$). All societies to Ibn-Khaldun are in need of some form of government, a leader or ruler to promote justice, protect the people from striving against each other, and to defend them from external dangers.

Authority which copes with 'man's animal inclination toward aggressiveness is not given willfully, but is appropriated and acquired by force and power which are, in themselves, dependent on c asabiyyah.

(1) Ibid., pps. 280-281.

(2) Ibid., p. 283.

Ibn-Khaldun conceives of five stages that lead to
 (1)
 authority.

1. The first stage being phased with a struggle and conquest for achieving domination (ghalab).

2. The stage of establishing individual superiority and the defense against rivals.

3. The "stage when the urge to acquire the fruits of kingship wanes. This comes when the dynasty is safe from the envy of its opponents, and when it has reduced the people to subjection."

4. The "stage when the people are satisfied with the king, when peace is made with enemies and opponents and earlier rulers are imitated."

5. The stage of senility and decline.

However, we should mention that Ibn-Khaldun, who conceived of the tribal life as the first manifestation of human association did not bother, to discuss how such an association came into being. Moreover, he did not discuss the status of the family, as such, and its role in human association. (2) His observations were not to take him beyond the simple tribal institutions which are naturally inclined to have some kind of government and authority with the aid of ^caṣabiyah.

(1) Farukh, Omar, Arab Genius, p. 141.

(2) Hussein, Taha, Falsafat Ibn-Khaldun al-Ijtima^cīyah pps. 85-86.

(II)

IBN-KHALDUN'S CONCEPT OF AL-^CAŞABIYAH

To Ibn-Khaldun ^Caşabiyah is "the mutual affection and willingness to fight and die for each other."⁽¹⁾ It stands as the fundamental factor by which aggressive and defensive strength of a certain definite community is established. It is an intrinsic peculiarity of tribal life, and a natural propensity of the human nature. It is the result of two factors, namely, the respect of customs among the peoples of a tribe, and the recurring need for defense and invasion. Those two factors associate the members of a tribe in a common bond. Its development is relative to the degree of superiority achieved or present in a house of a particular tribe. Such acknowledgement rests upon Ibn-Khaldun's differentiation between the general ^Caşabiyah that exists in the different houses of a certain tribe. The superiority of an ^Caşabiyah gives that house which has it accession to authority. The resulting authority is not absolute or despotic in nature. It is apt to be transferred from one house to another depending on the superiority relations.

In accordance to his four generations rule, Ibn-Khaldun perceived that the authority of a certain ruling house in a tribe undergoes, normally four generations rule, after which it passes to other houses in the same tribe.

(1) Rosenthal, Franz, The Muqaddimah, V: I, p. 313.

However, the effectiveness of ^Casabiyyah in a tribe was not conceived to be constant by Ibn-Khaldun. Its stamina might be weakened, if 1) a tribe pays dues or taxes to another authority, an act which stands in contrast to a tribe's dignity, 2) when a tribe becomes subject to an external rule without being able to resist it, and 3) when a tribe settles in a territory which provides abundances and luxuries.

Al-^Casabiyyah to a tribe, in Ibn-Khaldun's view, is the source of its power, existence, and development. With its help wide occupations take place and dynasties are established.

To Ibn-Khaldun royal kingships (mulk) and dynasties were originated by those peoples who lived a tribal life and who acceded authority as a result of their ^Casabiyyah and its action in a certain occupation, expansion, aggression, or attack.

It is not so astounding a fact that Ibn-Khaldun believed in the effective power of al-^Casabiyyah, when we know that he concluded from many events that the most successful and drastic expansions were carried by tribal peoples such as the Arabs, Mongols, Turks, and Turkomans.

To Ibn-Khaldun the above mentioned "facts" are not so acknowledged by the masses of the people, because the masses are subject to forgetfulness. They do not question the forces that led to the establishment of a certain dynasty. "They do not know how it was at the beginning and what difficulties had

to be overcome by" ⁽¹⁾ its founder.

However, to Ibn-Khaldun, a dynasty once established can dispense with the main factor of its existence, i.e., ^Casabiya. The reason for that lies in the fact that "people find it difficult to submit ... at the beginning, unless they are forced into submission by strong superiority" ⁽²⁾. New governments are looked upon, by the people, as something new and not familiar to what they have been used to. With the emergence of a new dynasty *mulk* passes, by inheritance, to the succeeding generations. The beginnings and the ways through which it was established begin to be forgotten by the people. The successors of the new emerging dynasty would be acknowledged as "marked leaders", to be helped at any instance of trouble. At that time such leaders would be, no more, in need of their ^Casabiya.

The rulers would maintain their regimes and dynasties "with the help ... either of clients and followers who grew up in the shadow and power of ^Casabiya, or (with that) of tribal groups of a different descent who have become their clients." ⁽³⁾

To Ibn-Khaldun, al-Ṭarṭuṣhī was wrong in maintaining "that the military (strength) of a dynasty, as such, is identical with the (size of its army that receives a fixed pay every month," ⁽⁴⁾ because such a statement does not attempt

(1) Rosenthal, Franz, The Muqaddimah, V: I, p. 313.

(2) Ibid., p. 314.

(3) Ibid., p. 314.

(4) Ibid., p. 316.

to discern "the original foundation of large dynasties. It applies only to late stages, after the dynasty has been established and after (mulk) has become firmly anchored in a given family and its people have adopted (their) definite coloring." (1) As such, al-Tartūshī did not endeavor to show how dynasties come to be established, nor did he observe that the formation of a dynasty is dependent on the power of the ^Caṣābiyah shared by those who established it.

Ibn-Khaldun maintains that a member of an established royal family may establish a dynasty even though the ^Caṣābiyah in the original center of his dynasty is no longer supporting him. This happens when the ^Caṣābiyah shared by a member of a royal family is existent among the peoples in the remote regions of his (original) dynasty. In this respect, he was conceptualizing the political life of the Maghrib where he lived most of his life, and where he saw how different dynasties were established, maintained, retained, and safeguarded.

Powerful dynasties and royal kingships, to Ibn-Khaldun, do have their origin in prophecy or in truthful propaganda, because "when the hearts succumb to false desires and are inclined toward the world, mutual jealousy and widespread differences arise. (But) when they are turned toward truth and reject the world and whatever is false and advance toward God, they become one in their outlook." (2) When such a situation exists the divergent jealousies and differences disappear to be replaced by mutual cooperation and support.

(1) Ibid., p. 317.

(2) Ibid., p. 319.

As to religious or truthful propaganda they do away with mutual jealousy converting attention toward the "truth". Although dynasties are superior without the additional power of religion, yet religious propaganda affirms their foundations. Ibn-Khaldun asserts that religious propaganda cannot be established without the existence of ^Casabiyyah, because "every (political) undertaking by necessity requires it." (1)

He draws a line between the functions of jurists and scholars, and those of amirs and rulers, by maintaining that although "many religious scholars ... come to revolt against unjust amirs" (2) with the intention to materialize good actions, yet their action, in this respect, is in contrast to what God destined them to do. They should be kept away from gaining the support of a ^Casabiyyah. The person who manipulates religion to gain political leadership "deserves to be hampered by obstacles to fall victim to perdition." (3)

These observations do show that al-^Casabiyyah occupies a basic and fundamental position in his general frame of thought.

Al-^Casabiyyah which stands as a mutual affection and willingness to fight and die for each other, is a peculiarity of the tribal life. It stands as the source of power through which the members of a tribe acquire the means of defending themselves, as well as, carrying on their invasions, expansions,

(1) Ibid., p. 322.

(2) Ibid., p. 323.

(3) Ibid., p. 324.

and occupations. It is a bond uniting the members of a tribe, having its existence on blood relation or common descent, on cliency and alliance, and, moreover, on servitude resulting from the acquiescence of slaves and servants. (1)

The accession to authority or leadership in a tribe depends on the superiority of ^caṣābiyah, in the tribe itself, and on the ^caṣābiyah that form the general ^caṣābiyah of the tribe.

The superiority of a house in a tribe gives the members of the "house" the far-most dignity and respect of the tribe. Such respect to the ruling "house" in a tribe, and the general and deep respect to the customs and traditions of a tribe stand as the main source of a ^caṣābiyah power.

To Ibn-Khaldun, ^caṣābiyah has a potentiality and an inclination toward mulk. No mulk could be established except through enforcement, which in itself depends on the exertion of ^caṣābiyah.

The enforcement action carried through the impetus of ^caṣābiyah of a tribe, when diverted to external targets, as other communities, stands as the basis on which dynasties and states are established. However, and with the establishment of a dynasty or state the need for al-^caṣābiyah becomes secondary, and a ruler can dispense with it. This is one way through which it gets weakened, namely, when a tribal institution is converted into a dynastical institution.

(1) Al-Jur, Khalīl, Tārīkh al-Falsafah al-^cArabīyah, pps. 509-511.

Other ways through which it becomes weakened take place; when it is subjected to the rule of an authority other than itself; when it pays tributes to others; and when its tribe settles in a territory subjecting itself to the excessives and luxuries of life.

While Ibn-Khaldun felt that religions, in order to be propagated, are in need for ^caṣābiyah, and a powerful one, he believed that al-^caṣābiyāt are not in need for religions, though they become more powerful when they are associated with religion.

Ibn-Khaldun's stress on al-^caṣābiyah could find justification when seen in the light of the times in which he lived; victories and conquests were not determined by the kinds of weapons a people did have, rather they were determined by the psychological, ethical, and physical qualities they possessed, and out of necessity those who lived a tribal life were the most adjusted, by the nature of their living, to fight and win, especially when their targets were sedentary areas used to easy and comfortable lives. (1)

Al-^caṣābiyah which stands as the corner stone of Ibn-Khaldun's theory was no more than a conceptualization of the then norms of living. His conceptualization was made in such a way which permits us to look upon his achievement, in this respect, as a theory of collective human association bound together, out of necessity, in common bonds that make them act as a unit. Such bonds were not present among sedentary

(1) Ibid., p. 514.

peoples, among whom Ibn-Khaldun did live. The religious affiliation was of no political effectiveness in creating a united whole. ⁽¹⁾ His work, in this respect, is justified by the factual happenings which took place in his time and his knowledge of history pertaining to the ages that preceded him.

Although some scholars attempt to criticize his concept of ^casabiyyah, on the assumption that it is not the only factor behind the establishment of states and dynasties (citing the Greek and Latin ⁽²⁾ cities as examples), they disregard the facts that what we know to-day was not known, in many respects, to Ibn-Khaldun; that Ibn-Khaldun was particularly devoting his studies to the then Muslim world, and moreover; that Ibn-Khaldun's concept holds true, to a certain degree, even to the experiences of ancient Greece and Rome.

So far we have discussed Ibn-Khaldun's concept of ^casabiyyah as it exists among tribes; however he observes that it exists also in sedentary areas. He justified such an acknowledgement by stating that it is "in the nature of human beings to enter into close contact and to associate (with each other), even though they may not have a common descent." ⁽³⁾ He maintains that the ^casabiyyah that results from associations in cities is not as powerful as that resulting from common descent.

(1) Bouthoui, Gastone, Ibn-Khaldun, Falsafatuhu al-'Ijtima'iyah, pps. 87-88.

(2) Hussein, Taha, Falsafat Ibn-Khaldun al-'Ijtima'iyah p. 99.

(3) Rosenthal, Franz, The Muqaddimah, V:II, pps.302-303.

Parties and groups are normal scenes in cities. They come to emerge as a result of intermarriage. Another reason which lead to their emergence in cities is the need for protecting the affairs and interests of a certain group. With the advent of senility to a dynasty, cliques, followers, clients, partisans, and allies come into existence. Every concerned tries to form a group with his fellows. Leadership and the intent to pass it to successors becomes very familiar. ⁽¹⁾

To Ibn-Khaldun such are the symptoms of senility in a dynasty. Leadership, in such situations, might pass to members of great and noble "houses". Sometimes it passes to a person of the lower classes who, out of his association with the mob, obtained their backing.

He believes that the ^casabiyyah that exists in cities does not have the intensity of that which exists among the members of a tribe. The former is temporary and is apt to vanish easily, in contrast to the latter.

(1) Ibid., p. 305.

(III)

THE STATE ACCORDING TO IBN-KHALDUN

In trying to define the scope and object of his new "science", Ibn-Khaldun negated it as being politics (*siyāsah madaniyah*), because politics "is concerned with the administration of home or city in accordance with ethical and philosophical requirements, for the purpose of directing the mass toward a behaviour that will result in the preservation and permanence of the human species."⁽¹⁾

Such a definition of the field of politics has its justification in Ibn-Khaldun's belief that human social organization is necessary. "The philosophers expressed this fact by saying: 'Man' is political by nature,"⁽²⁾ meaning that he cannot do without the social organization.

To Ibn-Khaldun the above mentioned acknowledgement could be explained by the fact "that God created and fashioned 'man' in a form that can live and subsist only with the help of food."⁽³⁾ Due to the fact that the power of the individual human being is not sufficient to obtain the food he needs and requires in order to live, 'man' realized that the combination of many efforts from among his fellow beings was necessary to obtain food for him and for them. He became conscious that through cooperation, and with view of a common objective, the

(1) Ibn-Khaldun, Tārīkh Al-^cAlāmah Ibn-Khaldun, V:1, p. 62.

(2) Ibid., p. 69.

(3) Ibid., p. 69.

needs of a number of persons could be satisfied.

But this does not mean that food is the only motivation for cooperation, because "each individual needs the help of his fellow beings for his defense."⁽¹⁾ Aggressiveness is natural in living beings with a special reservation to 'man' who has the ability to think and prepare crafts to serve him in his livelihood.

The power of one individual human being cannot withstand the power of any one dumb animal. He is generally unable to defend himself against them, alone, nor is his power sufficient to make use of the existing instruments of defense. It is absolutely necessary for him to have the cooperation of his fellow men, and only, with mutual cooperation can he obtain food for his nourishment and weapons for his defense.⁽²⁾

As a consequence social organization emerges as a necessary condition to the human species. When this is achieved people realize a need for someone to exercise a restraining authority to keep them apart and to cope with aggressiveness and injustice. The weapons furnished to defend human beings against the aggressiveness of dumb animals are not sufficient to stand "against the aggressiveness of man to man because all of them possess them."⁽³⁾

This authority, to Ibn-Khaldun, belongs to the person who comes to exercise his dominance (ghalabah) and power (sultān) over them. He calls the emerging authority "mulk" (royal kingship).

(1) Ibid., p. 70.

(2) Ibid., p. 71.

(3) Ibid., pps. 72-73.

He conceived that the existence of human life and organization does not have as a prerequisite the existence of prophecy. Existence and human life can materialize through injunctions. "A person may impose his authority by himself or with the help of ^caṣābiyah (l'esprit du corps) which enables him to force the others to follow him. Moreover, those people who have a divinely revealed Book and follow prophets are few in number in comparison to the Magians (Majūs) who have no divinely revealed Book. (1)

As such we can say that Ibn-Khaldun looked upon the state as a natural outcome of human life which is in need of organized societies to meet its needs, and to preserve, defend and protect it from internal as well as external dangers. Experience, to Ibn-Khaldun, made 'man' realize the benefits of association. As man's excellences give him a life of ease and leisure, the will to power stimulates competition. The person who has the dominant ^caṣābiyah establishes himself in authority.

When he deals with politics, as such, he deals with it as a part of his general philosophy of al-^cUmrān. Al-^cUmrān, to Ibn-Khaldun, is "synonymous with madaniyah and haḍārah, settled "urban life" (as distinct from badāwah, "tribal life"). Hadarah in turn is equivalent to tamaddun: to live or become organized in a city." (2) Both tribal and sedentary lives,

(1) Ibid., pps. 72-73.

(2) Rosenthal, Erwin, Political Thought in Medieval Islam, p. 84.

with the former as the natural foundation of the latter, are necessary for the growth and development of civilization.

Political organization in any society is in need of ordained political norms and certain standards which are accepted by the mass and to whose laws it submits in order to cope with the possibility of deviation on the part of a ruler and to maintain the rule of a certain dynasty. To Ibn-Khaldun if these norms are ordained by the notables, sages and wise men of a dynasty, the policy is said to be established on reason, and it is useful, only, in this world. If they are ordained by God through a prophet who transmits them, the policy is said to be based on a religious basis, and is useful in this world and the world to come. The latter kind is the best, because the purpose of human beings is not only their worldly affairs, but their religion which leads them to happiness in the Hereafter, and guides them, in all their dealings, toward salvation and bliss.

When evaluating the different basis of these states he asserts the view that the institutions that dictate coercion, conquest and wrathfulness are oppressive and aggressive in nature, and are reprehensible and blameworthy both by the Lawgiver and by political wisdom. Likewise are those regimes that are based on human statecraft, because they lack the
(1)
light of God.

(1) Ibn-Khaldun, op. cit., pps. 336-338.

To Ibn-Khaldun, only the Lawgiver "knows the interest of the people in matters of the other world", and His mere object is their salvation in the Hereafter, in contrast to political laws which consider only their worldly interests. He feels it imperative, by the very nature of religious laws, to have the people conform themselves to the religion - Islam - in matters concerning both this world, and the next. In his opinion this authority belongs to the prophets and those who succeed them, i. e. the caliphs, (in the case of Islam).⁽¹⁾

Out of these considerations we can say that the character of the state to Ibn-Khaldun, is determined by its relation to its matter, that is, by the relation of the ruler to the ruled; which is based primarily upon the ends they seek.

Accordingly he observed three kinds of states:

1. The one concerned with the good of the subjects both in this world and in the world to come.
2. The one concerned with the good of the ruled in this world.
3. And, the one concerned, primarily, with the good of the ruler in this world, and secondarily, with the good of the subjects in this world.

The basis of the state of the first kind is "siyāṣah shari'ya" (religious government based on the shari'a, the divinely revealed prophetic Law of Islam), depending on Law of Divine origin, that is on revelation.

(1) Ibid., p. 338.

The basis of the second and third kind of states is "siyāṣah ^caqliya" (government based on reason and rational human laws), depending on 'man's' practical reason and experience, and a ruler's arbitrary rule, respectively (mulk tabi^ci).

Although he observed that power politics has, in his time, set aside the shari^ca, yet he always was convinced of its theoretical validity. He never questioned its determining authority, and never doubted that the religious Laws of Islam are the best and are far superior to those of a human lawgiver guided, only, by his reason and experience.

The foregoing considerations indicate that Ibn-Khaldun did perceive certain basic factors necessary for dynasties and mulk. In our contemporary thinking we attribute to a state certain factors in the absence of which a political entity would not be considered as a state. Those factors are no more than 1) a definite territory, 2) a population, 3) a government, 4) and the ability to enter in foreign relations.

I would not attempt, in this discussion, to subject Ibn-Khaldun's thought to our contemporary evaluations, but I do intend to show that he was able to recognize those elements, as well as some others, as being necessary and intrinsic in the nature of a dynasty or a state. However, it would be advisable to note, in this regard, that the interrelationships between states in the Middle Ages did not have the same definite and strict procedures as in our days. Relations between states in the Middle Ages were determined by power considerations. There existed phases of war as well as of

peace determining the necessary procedure among states, respectively.

Coming to Ibn-Khaldun's acknowledgements we observe that each "dynasty has a certain amount of provinces and lands,"⁽¹⁾ over which are dispersed the people who support it. It is necessary for the maintenance of a dynasty that those who established it, or support it, to spread all over the provinces and border regions of **t h e** dynasty, because by such arrangements it would be possible to protect it against enemies and to enforce its laws.

The extention of a dynastic territory to Ibn-Khaldun is relative and proportionate to the number of supporters distributed over certain regions. "When the (various) groups have spread over the border regions and provinces, their numbers are necessarily exhausted. This, then, is the time when the territory (of the dynasty) has reached its farthest extention, where the border regions form a belt around the center of the realm."⁽²⁾

The military force is essential for a dynasty. In accordance to the ability of a dynasty to protect itself, actually, and enforces its rules over a region, such a region could be called, actually, a part of its territory. "If the dynasty then undertakes to expand beyond its holdings, its

(1) Rosenthal, F. The Muqaddimah, V: II, p. 327.

(2) Ibid., p. 328.

widening territory) remains without military protection and is laid open to any chance of attack by enemy or neighbor. This has the detrimental result for the dynasty of the creation of boldness towards it and of diminished respect for it."⁽¹⁾

In describing such a situation Ibn-Khaldun maintains that as "the light rays that spread from their centers" are most luminous at the center, but get less and less luminous as they spread around. "A dynasty is stronger at its center than it is at its border regions. When it has reached its fastest expansion it becomes too weak and incapable to go any further."⁽²⁾ He justifies this view by maintaining that when a dynasty "gets weak, it begins to crumble at its extremities."⁽³⁾

In proportion to the numerical strength of the supporters of a certain dynasty its greatness, extent of territory, and its duration is determined. "The more numerous the tribes and groups of a large dynasty are, the stronger and longer are its provinces and land...

"... The temper of dynasties is based upon group feeling. If the group feeling is strong, the (dynasty's) temper likewise is strong, and its life of long duration. Group feeling, in turn, depends on numerical strength..."⁽⁴⁾

Moreover, large dynasties last long, because "when collapse comes it begins in the outlying regions, and the large dynasty has many such provinces far from its center.

(1) Ibid., p. 328.

(2) Ibid., p. 328.

(3) Ibid., p. 329.

(4) Ibid., pps. 329-331.

Each defection that occurs necessarily requires a certain
 (1)
 time."

Another factor necessary for a dynasty is homogeneity among its inhabitants. When a region includes many different tribes and groups, different opinions and desires collide. Each tribe or group would have its own group feeling; a situation such as this causes disunity within the dynastic framework. "Each group feeling under the control of the ruling dynasty thinks that it has in itself (enough) strength and
 (2)
 power" to establish a typical dynasty. The absence of ^casabiyyah among the peoples of a definite land facilitates the establishment of a dynasty in their region.

A manifestation of the original power of a certain dynasty is found in its monuments. That is to say in its buildings and large edifices (haykal). The reason for that is implied in the fact that the original power which brought a dynasty into being, materializes itself in monuments. Monuments cannot be established except "when there are many workers and united action and cooperation. When a dynasty is large and far-flung, with many provinces and subjects, workers are very plentiful and can be brought together from all sides and
 (3)
 regions."

As such, Ibn-Khaldun conceived that "(superior social organization) together with engineering skill, made the construction of large monuments possible."
 (4)
 This could not reveal

(1) Ibid., pps. 330-331.
 (2) Ibid., p. 332.
 (3) Ibid., pps. 356-358.
 (4) Ibid., pps. 356-358.

itself except when the original power of a certain dynasty is in existence.

However, ^casabiyyah remains to Ibn-Khaldun the most basic factor of a dynasty. As was mentioned before it is "something composite that results from (the amalgamation of) many groups, one of which is stronger than all the others." It is "able to overcome and gain power over (all the others), and, eventually, brings them all under its sway,"⁽¹⁾ resulting in social organization and dynasties.

The highest ^casabiyyah, to Ibn-Khaldun, is affirmed only in those who have a "house" and leadership among a tribe, as exemplified in the rule of the one. This is very natural because egoism is an innate trait in human beings, and because politics in itself determines "that only one person exercise control."⁽²⁾

What has just been said shows that Ibn-Khaldun's concept of what constitutes the ingredients necessary for a dynasty are the following:

1. A government which is not independent from the person of a ruler. It is either based on the religious Laws, or on human reason and practical experience. In other words, it is related either to the religious laws - Caliphate - or to royal kingship (mulk).

(1) Ibid., p. 337.

(2) Ibid., p. 337.

2. A population constituting its subjects. It is very necessary for its permanence to have a homogenous population. If the government is based on the religious Laws the subjects constitute a community of faithful. If it is based on mulk then its population would be constituted of a ruler's partners in ^Caṣabiyah, and those whom they come to dominate.

3. A territory, which is, to Ibn-Khaldun, dependent on the strength of a ruler's ^Caṣabiyah and the numerical strength of the same ^Caṣabiyah, in case of mulk, and the potential and efficiency power of the nation, in the case of Caliphate.

4. Power as exemplified in the impetus of an ^Caṣabiyah, in case of mulk, and in the impetus of the religion and the faith of the community in it, on one hand, and the available forces it possesses, on the other, in case of Caliphate. To Ibn-Khaldun, the degree of power determines the status of a dynasty among other dynasties and the nature of relation between them.

(IV)

IBN-KHALDUN'S THEORY OF MULK

So far we have seen that al-^caṣābiyah, in Ibn-Khaldun's view, is the determining factor which procures the members of a human community protection by making possible, mutual defense, the pressing of claims, and various kinds of social activities.

When citing its advantages he states that the coping of the mutual injustices among the peoples of a certain human association, as well as, the challenging of external dangers, is not accessible, only, by ^caṣābiyah. Human society is in need of a restraining authority (wāzi^c) to carry on this job. This sanction is attributed to a ruler, who out of the superiority and domination (taghalub) of his ^caṣābiyah, accedes to authority. Whence this takes place, mulk is established. In this respect, mulk to Ibn-Khaldun is no more than the realization of domination of one's ^caṣābiyah, and with the help of the general ^caṣābiyah to which he belongs.

Ibn-Khaldun believes that mulk should not be mixed up with leadership (ri'āṣah). In contrast to leadership which means "being a chieftain, and the leadership is obeyed, but he has no power to force others to accept his rulings,"⁽¹⁾ mulk means domination (taghalub) and the power to rule by force (qahr).

In other words, mulk, to Ibn-Khaldun, is distinguished from ri'āṣah by the fact that it has the means to enforce its

(1) Ibn-Khaldun, Tārīkh Al-^cAlāmah Ibn-Khaldun, V: II, p. 244.

rules. Leadership on the other hand, lacks the enforcing ability of *mulk*.

It should be noted that the criterion used to exemplify the acquiescence of an enforcement ability lies in the factual action of a dominating ^c*aṣabiyah*. Enforcement ability could not be observed in isolation from the actual process of events. It is related to a person's domination and accession to authority with the help of a dominating ^c*aṣabiyah*. The actual events, thus, determine the existence of such a domination.

A person sharing in the ^c*aṣabiyah* of a group and who reaches a certain degree of influence and superiority among the peoples of his tribe, would attempt to possess more domination. *Mulk* is a desirable and enjoyable goal. The more a person achieves of domination the more he seeks to achieve of it. The more power he assumes, the more power he desires. His objective, in this respect, could not be achieved without the help of an ^c*aṣabiyah* which effects the obedience of a ruler's subjects. Accordingly, Ibn-Khaldun sees that *mulk* is the goal of any ^c*aṣabiyah*.⁽¹⁾

In each tribe (*qabil*) there exists divergent ^c*aṣabiyāt*, but at the same time there must exist ^c*aṣabiyah* which is superior to all combined, "in which all the diverse ^c*aṣabiyāt* coalesce, as it were, to approach a greater ^c*aṣabiyah*. Otherwise, splits would occur leading to dissension and strife."⁽²⁾

(1) Ibid., p. 245.

(2) Ibid., p. 245.

Once the superiority of ^caṣabiyah is established over the diverse ^caṣabiyāt in a particular tribal association, it tends, naturally, to establish its domination over those of other human communities.

If the ^caṣabiyah of the rival people is equal in strength and is able to stave off the challenge of the competing one, each would maintain its sway over its own domain (hawzatih) and people... If the competing ^caṣabiyah overpowers the competed one and makes it subservient to itself, the two would enter into close contact, and the defeated ^caṣabiyah would add to the power of the victorious one, setting its goal higher than before. (1)

Such a state of affairs remains until the dominated ^caṣabiyah equates the power of the dominating one, and is able to take over power to itself. If the dominated ^caṣabiyah stands until the dominating one reaches the stage of senility, the seizure of power becomes easier, though it may happen that the power of a given ^caṣabiyah reaches its peak when the ruling state (dawlah) or group has not yet reached senility. "This stage may coincide with the stage at which (the ruling dynasty) needs to have recourse to the people who represent the various ^caṣabiyāt (in order to master the situation). In such a case, the ruling dynasty incorporates (the people who enjoy the powerful (^caṣabiyah) among its clients whom it uses for the execution

(1) Ibid., p. 245.

of its various projects." ⁽¹⁾ To Ibn-Khaldun this event marks the emergence of another mulk "inferior to that of the controlling one." ⁽²⁾

From these reflections we may note that mulk, as conceived by Ibn-Khaldun, is not independent from the action of a ruler. The accession to authority represents the realization of mulk, as well as the establishment of a state.

Ibn-Khaldun wanted to assert that mulk is the goal of ^casabiyyah. It is established either by seizing actual control and domination, or by clientship in an existing ruling dynasty. In either case, the impetus of ^casabiyyah is the determining factor in the actualization of such events.

Mulk to Ibn-Khaldun is natural to human beings because of the social implication that it has. It is a relation of a man to man. Man is by "his natural disposition and his power of logical reasoning... more inclined toward good qualities than toward bad qualities... In as much as he is a human being, he is more inclined toward goodness and good qualities." ⁽³⁾ Man's good qualities are appropriate to siyāsah and mulk, because goodness is appropriate to political authority. The glory pertaining to mulk is an attribute found in ^casabiyyah and the tribal group to which an individual belongs. Its realization is dependent, in addition to ^casabiyyah, on the personal qualities of the person exercising domination. "Good qualities attest the (potential) existence of mulk in a person who (in addition to his good qualities) possesses

(1) Rosenthal, Franz, The Muqaddimah, V: I, p. 285.

(2) Ibn-Khaldun, op. cit., V: I, p. 245.

(3) Ibid.,

^casabiyyah." (1)

To Ibn-Khaldun, mulk is God's gift to mankind. It serves as a representation of God among men with respect to His laws. Divine and religious laws reflect the true interests of men, and he who has ^casabiyyah and good personal qualities is appropriate for the execution of God's laws. "His creature is ready to act as (God's) substitute and quarantor among mankind." (2)

When God wants to deprive a nation of its mulk, He subjects it to blameworthy vice deeds which lead her to lose the political virtues possessed by its members, opening the way to another mulk. Such "would constitute - in addition - an insult to them, in that the mulk God has given them and the good things He has placed at their disposal are taken away from them." (3)

To Ibn-Khaldun the quality of perfection for tribes who possess ^casabiyyah and claim their right to mulk, is respect "for (religious) scholars, pious men, noble (relatives of the prophet), well-born persons, and the different kinds of merchants and foreigners, as well as the ability to assign every body to his proper station." (4)

Such respect would safeguard those controlling the ^casabiyyah from contending claims. The pious would "be respected for their religion, scholars, because they are needed for establishing the statutes of the religious laws, merchants in order to give encouragement (to their profession) so that

(1) Ibid., pps. 250-251.

(2) Ibid., p. 251.

(3) Rosenthal, F. op. cit., pps. 293-294.

(4) Ibid., pps. 293-294.

their usefulness may be as widespread as possible," strangers, on the other hand, would be respected "out of generosity and in order to encourage (them) to undertake certain kinds (of activity). Assigning everybody to his proper station is done out of fairness, and fairness means justice."⁽¹⁾

To Ibn-Khaldun, when a nation is observed to have lost such respects, it is a prophecy that the virtues which made her acquire or possess mulk have begun to disappear, and "it can be expected that the mulk will cease to exist in it."⁽²⁾

The obstacles that stand in the way of mulk are various. The most important of which is luxury and the submergence of a tribe in a life of prosperity. If such a situation takes place, the toughness of the desert life vanishes, thus weakening the ^caşabiyah. To Ibn-Khaldun the things that go with luxury and submergence in a life of ease break the vigor of the ^caşabiyah, which alone produces superiority. When this takes place the tribe would be no longer able to defend or protect itself. It becomes unable to press claims, and it will be swallowed up by other nations.

Other obstacles are meekness and docility to outsiders which break the vigor and strength of ^caşabiyah. People do not become fond of meekness until they are too weak to defend themselves.

(1) Ibid., pps. 294-295.

(2) Ibid., pps. 295.

The significance of the foregoing illustrations is embodied in the advantages that ^caṣabiyah might produce, namely, "the ability to defend oneself, to offer opposition, to protect oneself, and to press one's claims,"⁽¹⁾ To Ibn-Khaldun whoever loses his ^caṣabiyah would become too weak to do any of these things. In other words these points assert that whenever ^caṣabiyah is in existence the ability of those who have it, to stand against aggression, to offer opposition, and to press claims exists also.

To Ibn-Khaldun, the wilder a human group is, the farther the extension of its mulk. He justifies this notion by maintaining that that human group is more able to achieve domination, unrestrained control (istibdād), and to subject other groups to its control, because it is, in comparison to human beings, what beasts of prey are to dumb animals. The peoples of such a group do not have homelands or fixed places to live in. All regions and places are the same to them. They do not restrict themselves to their own or their neighbouring regions. On the contrary they swarm across, and sweep over faraway regions to press their domination over them.⁽²⁾

He conceives that the states of wide power and large mulk have their origin in religion based either on prophecy or on truthful propaganda. He justifies his notion by maintaining that mulk results from domination, which results from

(1) Ibid., p. 289.

(2) Ibn-Khaldun, Tārīkh Al-^cAlāmah Ibn-Khaldun, V: I, pp. 254-255.

the impetus of ^casabiya, and the agreement among the members of a human group to press their claims. This comes only through God's help in establishing His religion. When hearts succumb to false desires and incline toward the world, mutual jealousy and dissensions arise. When they turn toward the truth, rejecting whatever is false they get united. Their outlooks become one. Jealousies and differences will terminate giving the way for the promotion of mutual cooperation. These conditions, to Ibn-Khaldun, increase the power of a state by making possible the widening of its territories and extensions.⁽¹⁾

The same results apply to religious propaganda (da^cwah diniyah), because it does away with mutual jealousy among those who share the same ^casabiya. Their outlooks and objectives become one. Their unity of purpose makes it impossible to those whom they are attacking to withstand them.⁽²⁾

To Ibn-Khaldun the greatness of a state, and the extent of its territories, as well as, the length of its duration, are relative to the numerical strength of its supporters. This is due to the fact that those people who constitute its ^casabiya would infiltrate throughout its territories fighting for its cause and protecting it against claims and dangers.

(1) Ibid., p. 277.

(2) Ibid., pps. 278-279.

In other words, Ibn-Khaldun sees that the expansion and power of mulk in its first stages, corresponds to the numerical strength of the ^Caṣabiyah which it represents. The length of a state's duration, in the same way, depends on the same factor. The life of an existing thing is determined by its temper (mazāj), which is, in the case of states dependent on ^Caṣabiyah. If the ^Caṣabiyah is strong, the state's temper, likewise, would be strong and its life would be of a long duration. Ibn-Khaldun justifies these points by maintaining that an ^Caṣabiyah's strength corresponds to its numerical strength.

He points that the reason why states of wide extension last long, is due to the fact that when collapse comes, it begins in the outlying provinces, far from the state's center. Each defection that takes place necessarily requires time. Due to the fact that such states have many provinces, there must be a long duration of time between the collapse of those regions before defection reaches the center. (1)

He sees that states are rarely established, firmly, in regions of many different tribes and ^Caṣabiyāt, because of the many differences and desires that come to interplay. Each opinion and desire would be backed by ^Caṣabiyah defending it, increasing the possibilities of rebellions and revolts, in contrast to those regions which are safe from them. To Ibn-Khaldun those regions which are free of many ^Caṣabiyāt provide

(1) Ibid., pps. 287-289.

a state with tranquillity by making it safe from many seditions and rebellions. (1)

Among the natural attributes of mulk is the claim of all glory to itself (al-infirād bil majd). This is because mulk comes to exist through ^caṣabiyah which is composite in nature and a result of the amalgamation of diverse ^caṣabiyāt. Who gains power through ^caṣabiyah over the other ^caṣabiyāt eventually brings them under his sway. The dominating ^caṣabiyah can only go to those people who have a "house" and leadership among the tribe. One of those people must be the leader (ra'īs) having superiority over them. Being as such, he would be singled out as the leader of all the various groups. His accession to leadership gives him much pride in letting the others share in his leadership, and participate in the management of their affairs. To Ibn-Khaldun this is due to haughtiness (kibr), pride ('anafah), and egotism (khulk ta'āluh), some of the innate attributes of 'man's' nature. Moreover it is due to the nature of politics which requires that only one person exercises control.

While all these factors strangle the peoples aspirations to share and participate in the management of affairs, they, at the same time, press a ruler to claim all power and glory to himself. (2)

As it is in the nature of mulk to claim all power and glory, it is in its nature to enjoy the fruits of its undertakings. Once it is established, by taking the possessions and holdings of its predecessors, proceeds toward a life of luxury,

(1) Ibid., pps. 290-291.

(2) Ibid., pps. 293-294.

tranquillity, comfort, and ease. It adopts the customs, and enjoys the conditions of its predecessors, respectively. It stops furthering the tiresome chores it had been used to, preferring to enjoy their fruits. ⁽¹⁾ Ibn-Khaldun explains the afore mentioned points by maintaining that it is in the nature of a desert life to seek the conveniences of sedentary civilization. The desert civilization is inferior to urban civilization, because it lacks many of the necessities required for making a living. Bedouins do not have any carpenters, tailors, blacksmiths, and other craftsmen whose crafts provide the necessities required for making a living. Moreover they do not have coined money to use as a criteria for selling and buying. These factors make sedentary life a goal for the Bedouins, who need the conveniences of the urban life by the very nature of their mode of existence. ⁽²⁾ The impetus of a newly established dynasty, which is Bedouin in its first stage, accelerates this goal whence it comes to occupy sedentary areas, providing the members of the dynasty with a life of ease and convenience. ⁽³⁾

So far we have discussed the meaning of mulk, its nature, as well as, the ways through which it is established.

To Ibn-Khaldun so long as ^c aşabiyah retains its position among a human community, mulk does not necessarily come into extinction. He justifies this premise by saying that when

(1) Ibid., pps. 295-296.

(2) Ibid., pps. 269-270.

(3) Ibid., pps. 304-305.

establishing mulk some branches of an ^casabiyyah are singled out. Those who dominate the affairs of the nation become the actual rulers, while other ^casabiyyāt remain in the shadow of the dynastic power not affected by the fruits of the newly established mulk which naturally subject the ruling class to a life of ease, luxury, and pleasure.

Those who are far from the government and who are prevented from participating in the management of the dynasty's affairs remain in the shadow of its rule sharing in it by virtue of their belongingness to the same descent, and remain safe from being affected by senility, the chronic disease of dynasties. When the ruling branch undergoes the stage of senility, as a result of their submergence in the life of luxury, those branches that were singled out, advance with the hope of achieving mulk. Their prowess and vigourness which were not affected by senility make the people recognize their superiority. Because they are related to the established ^casabiyyah nobody would contest their claim in accordance to the fact that "^casabiyyah is proportionate to the degree of relationship." (1) The people would submit to them because they are used to the fact that the established ^casabiyyah has superiority over all other ^casabiyyāt. With their seizure of power, mulk devolves to them. It continues in the same nation until the force of the ^casabiyyah, in its different groups, ceases to exist. (2)

(1) Ibid., p. 258.

(2) Ibid., pps. 256-258.

To Ibn-Khaldun the newly established ^Caṣābiyah, naturally, and by necessity, will undergo the same experiences of its predecessors until a great change overtakes it. Such a change may manifest itself in "the transformation of a religion, or the disappearance of a civilization, or something else willed by the power of God." ⁽¹⁾ Such a change will effect a change of mulk by transferring it from one nation to another.

To Ibn-Khaldun, in the process of establishing a new mulk the vanquished always endeavour to imitate the victor, because "the soul always sees perfection in the person who is superior to it and to whom it is subserved exactly as children imitate their parents, or students their teachers." ⁽²⁾

Whenever a "nation" is defeated by another, it perishes because it loses control of its own affairs. The defeated becomes dependent on the victorious. Its ^Caṣābiyah disappears, civilization decreases, and business and other activities come to a stop, ending with the "peoples" ability to resist the aggressors.

To justify such an acknowledgement, Ibn-Khaldun maintains "that man is a natural leader by virtue of the fact that he has been made a representative (of God on earth). When a leader is deprived of his leadership and prevented from exercising all his powers, he becomes apathetic even down to such matters as food and drink. This is in human character..."

(1) Rosenthal, Franz, The Muqaddimah, V: I, p. 299.

(2) Ibid., pps. 299-300.

the group that has lost control of its own affairs thus continues to weaken and to disintegrate until it perishes." (1)

How such termination and division of dynasties takes place is plainly discussed by Ibn-Khaldun. He perceives that when senility enters a dynasty, that dynasty enters the stage of splitting. Whenever mulk establishes itself, and luxury and prosperity devolve to it with glory, the ruler becomes too proud and attempts to eliminate any one from sharing mulk with him. "He eliminates all claims in this direction by destroying those of his relatives who are possible candidates for his position and whom he suspects." (2)

As a consequence those who are endangered by such attempts try to save themselves by seeking refuge in the remote regions of the dynasty. Those who are under the same situation of becoming suspect, join them. By gaining more adherents their power increases. Eventually, they become, or almost become, equal partners in a dynasty. This process, thus, leads to splittings. It might lead to the formation of more than two or three dynasties that are controlled by members of the ruling family ('a^cyās al-malik), or some men who are not related to the malik. (3)

To Ibn-Khaldun this is the case with every dynasty. Senility is something natural in their life. It is a chronic disease that cannot be cured or made to disappear, "because it is something natural, and natural things do not change." (4)

(1) Ibid., p. 301.

(2) Rosenthal, Franz, The Muqaddimah, V: II, pps.114-117

(3) Ibn-Khaldun, Tārīkh Al-^cAlāmah Ibn-Khaldun, V:I, p. 519.

(4) Ibid., p. 520.

He sees no possibility of securing such situations because of the customs that come to develop, and which are in the position of natural things. Though some try to change and ameliorate the situation, yet their efforts are in vain. They give the impression that they made senility disappear. In reality what they do is like "a burning wick the flame of which leaps up brilliantly a moment before it goes out, giving the impression it is just starting to burn, when in fact it is going out."⁽¹⁾

When talking about the disintegration that befalls dynasties, Ibn-Khaldun departs from the assertion that ^Caṣābiyah is the sole factor in establishing mulk, by maintaining that the foundation (mabnā) of mulk stands on two factors, namely, forcefulness and ^Caṣābiyah as exemplified in soldiers (jund), and money that supports the soldiers and provides the structures needed by mulk.⁽²⁾ Moreover, he perceives that the disintegration befalls mulk through the shrinking of the first, and the lack of the second.

In other words, he sees that when luxury makes its appearance in a dynasty, the ruler begins to humiliate the people who share his own ^Caṣābiyah by using force against them and preventing them from participating in the affairs of the nation. He deprives them of the prosperity and luxury to which they became accustomed. At the same time he begins to depend on the power of clients and followers who lack the vigorousness of ^Caṣābiyah and close blood relations. In this manner the

(1) Rosenthal, op. cit., p. 118.

(2) Ibn-Khaldun, op. cit., pps. 521-522.

ruler is isolated from his family and helpers, those who have natural affection for him. He is deprived of his ^casabiyah, the main factor that established his mulk. He tries to hire militia to protect his mulk. The militia, to Ibn-Khaldun, in no way are sufficient to give him security. All these factors, ferment revolutions and rebellions. The revolutionaries choose the remote regions far from the reach of the ruler's militia. There, they carry on their revolutions and absorb new adherents. Eventually, they get closer to the center (markez) of the dynasty, while the mulk of the ruler, gradually, continues to shrink, until it is wiped out. (1)

To Ibn-Khaldun, a dynasty at its first stage is Bedouin in nature. Its Bedouin attitude (khuluq) determines a procedure of kindness to the subjects (rifq), moderation (qasḍ) in expenditures, and respect (ta^cafuf) for the peoples' property, by avoiding onerous taxation or shrewdness in the collection of money. This stage does not call for extravagant expenditures, and thus the dynasty does not need much money.

When domination and expansion take place, mulk flourishes. It begins to call for luxury which increases spending and expenditures. It calls for increases in allowances. Extravagant expenditures mount throughout the dynasty. It spreads to the subjects, because people, to Ibn-Khaldun, follow the religion and customs of their rulers (mulukihāh).

(1) Ibid., pps. 521-525.

To meet with such circumstances and to improve his revenues (idrār al-jibāyah), the ruler (sultān) begins to impose duties on articles sold in the markets.

Because of the increase in luxury habits and the insufficiency of the revenues the dynasty begins seizing the property of the subjects through customs duties, commercial transactions, or direct seizure and confiscation.

This stage, to Ibn-Khaldun, marks the beginning of senility and feebleness in the dynasty. Its need for money grows beyond what it gets. It begins to lose the greatness it used to possess. While feebleness and senility grow, in that dynasty, the people of other regions grow bolder, until it crumbles and reaches its downfall, by opening itself to the domination of claimants and aggressors. (1)

In this respect the dissolution of a dynasty undergoes a gradual course in the intermis of which its authority, when established, expands to its limits and then is narrowed in successive stages, until the dynasty dissolves and disappears to be overpowered by the nations around it, or by claimants related to the same ^Casabiyah of the mentioned dynasty. (2)

As such the origin of a new dynasty would take place in two ways: either the "provincial governors in the dynasty... gain control over remote regions when (the dynasty) loses its influence there", or "some rebel from among the neighboring

(1) Ibid., pps. 525-527.
 (2) Ibid., pps. 527-530.

nations and tribes ... revolt against the dynasty. He either makes propaganda for some particular cause to which he intends to win the people or he possesses great power"⁽¹⁾ and a great ^casabiyyah among his people. He would, constantly, attack the dwindling dynasty until he overtakes it.

A new dynasty to gain domination must pass through a period of perseverance; domination, to Ibn-Khaldun, over a ruling dynasty, cannot be achieved through sudden action. This is because victory in war, "as a rule is the result of imaginary psychological factors."⁽²⁾ A victory in a war cannot be consequated by the establishment of a new dynasty, except with the greatest difficulties; because "accepted custom has made obedience to the ruling dynasty a necessity and an obligation ... this puts many hindrances in the way of the founder of a new dynasty. It discourages his followers and supporters. His closest intimates may be fully intent upon obeying him and helping him. Still, others are more numerous, who are affected by weakness and laziness under the influence of the belief that they owe submission to the ruling dynasty. Their zeal slackens."⁽³⁾ In such a situation the founder of a new dynasty is hardly able to overtake the ruling one. As a result he might await, with patience and perseverance, the time in which senility breaks through the

(1) Rosenthal, F. The Muqaddimah, V: II, pps. 124-129.

(2) Ibid., p. 131.

(3) Ibid., p. 131.

ruling dynasty; if an open attack is carried at such a time, then victory and domination will be granted, because by that time the people would have lost "the belief that they owe submission to the ruling dynasty", and his followers would have "became sufficiently spirited to make an open attack." (1)

An interesting acknowledgement which Ibn-Khaldun states, in this respect, is his belief that at the end of dynasties, pestilences and famines frequently occur. He reasons his point by saying that these situations occur due to the degeneration of its political life, the decrease in the standards of living, the many seditions that come to occur, and the dynasty's frequent attacks on the people's properties. (2)

As a conclusion we can remark that Ibn-Khaldun conceived of mulk, as symptoned in dynasties, as having a natural tenure of life which does not exceed, normally, three generations distributed over five phases of a dynasty's life. Each phase of which determines the character of its citizens. (3)

In the first stage a ruler of a human group - Bedouin - and in accordance with the demands of ^casabiyah seizes mulk from a ruling dynasty. The ruler, at that stage, stands as the motivator of his group to gain authority, acquire property, and maintain the occupied territory. He acts as a model to his people, in the ways he acquires glory, collect taxes, defends property, and provides protection. He does not claim

(1) Ibid., p. 131.

(2) Ibin-Khaldun, Tārīkh Al-^cAlāmah Ibn-Khaldun, V: I, pp. 537-539.

(3) Rosenthal, Erwin, Political Thought in Medieval Islam, pps. 88-89.

anything exclusively for himself to the exclusion of his "nation".

Ibn-Khaldun maintains, that, such manners are determined by the attitude a Bedouin possesses (khuluq al-badāwah), and by the requirements of ^Casabiyah which gave him domination and which still exist as before. (1)

In other words, the first stage of a dynasty is that of success, the overthrow of opposition, and the appropriation of mulk from a preceding dynasty.

In the second stage, the ruler becomes the only exerciser and controller of power, preventing any other person from sharing his rule, by hiring men and acquiring clients. In that stage the ruler dispenses with ^Casabiyah and consolidates the rule in his house.

The third stage is typified by the devotion to acquire the fruits of mulk, namely, tranquillity and ease. It is a stage of leisure and tranquillity. The ruler acquires property, creates lasting monuments, regulates the affairs of his mulk, and supports the demands of his clients and followers.

To Ibn-Khaldun, this stage exemplifies the last stage during which the ruler is in full authority. Throughout this stage, as well as the previous ones, the rulers are independent in their opinions and activities. (2)

In the fourth stage the ruler feasts upon what his predecessors have established and regulated, imitating them

(1) Rosenthal, F. The Muqaddimah, V: I, p. 353.

(2) Ibid., p. 355.

in every possible thing. It "is one of contentment and peace-fulness."⁽¹⁾

"The fifth stage is one of waste and squandering."⁽²⁾
The ruler becomes subject to pleasures and lusts. To meet with the requirements of his desires he demands from the people and administrators more than they can provide him. Senility will dominate this stage, with no hope of stopping it. By the end of this stage the dynasty collapses either through the seizure of power by a singled ^casabiyah, or by a neighbouring one.

As such, to Ibn-Khaldun the state is subject to a cyclical movement, through which he saw "a connection between the upward and downward development of the state, the character of rulers and ruled, conditioned by psychological and economic factors, and the stability of the political order in its dependence on defense and security. There is no upward urge towards the millennium. The state is, like a natural organism, subject to growth, maturity and decline."⁽³⁾

It should be noted that Ibn-Khaldun, in speaking about states (duwal), mulk, (royal kingship), and dynasties, did not make a sharp and definite distinction between them. He does not differentiate between the tribal institution and absolute monarchy, although the whole of his theory is based on the distinction between the tribal life (badāwa), and the urban life (hadāra).

(1) Ibid., p. 355.

(2) Ibid., p. 355.

(3) Rosenthal, E. op. cit., pps. 89-90.

Moreover, he perceived the connection between the size of a state and the power of ^casabiyyah, the richness of a government and the high standards of living that richness effects, and the glory of a state and what it establishes of buildings and monuments, yet he did not conceive that the state of affairs in a dynasty might be improved, even when senility enters its life, or perceive a dynasty or mulk that could be established through means other than the enforcement of power.

Such general remarks must ^{not} disregard the fact that Ibn-Khaldun's concept of a state, dynasty, or mulk, were tempered by the social, political, economic, and religious life of his own time. The thought of nationalism as a basis of a particular human association was still nonexistent. Religion which was the dominant factor in unifying the Muslim world, was of no political significance in his time, due to its wide extension, and was unable to cope with the different claims, wishes, and desires to which the Muslims were subject. Due to such realization, Ibn-Khaldun, did not take religion as the basis on which dynasties and royal kingships are established.

Moreover, he did not take religion, namely Islam, as the factor underlying the emergence of different dynasties or mulks, because he recognized, observed, and perceived that power was the sole dominant and determining factor in the acquiescence of authority. He perceived that power, and

absolute power, was the determining factor in the establishment of control, the transference of authority, as well as in destroying a dynasty. Even more so, because he conceived of the existence of dynasties, mulks, and authority, before the revelation of Islam.

To cope with this premise, Ibn-Khaldun, felt that the only sound course to follow would be to discover the "permanent" factors by which authority is acquired and states are established, relying on the evidences of civilization before Islam, under Islam, as well as it is going to appear in future time. Such a course was in conformity with the main objective in his study of history, namely, to find the main and basic causes underlying any change.

He did not hesitate to disregard any attempt which considers the state as an "enlightened state" functioning through the norms of reason. In this respect, he was a realist in thought, an empiricist in evaluation, and descriptivist in his approach. He could not think of a situation not ruled by autocracy that was a familiar institution in the then Muslim world.

The environment in which he spent his life was a center from which both urban life, as well as, Bedouin life could be viewed. The urban centers were always subject to attacks and conquests by Bedouin tribes, and by revolting amirs and claimants, which established or swallowed dynasties.

Such an environment conditioned his mind. It convinced him that each society is in need of a restraining authority,

and that dynasties are established by the assistance of ^casābiyah and that their extinction comes with the forceful blow from other superior ^casābiyāt. In this manner he perceived that while some dynasties emerge others perish under certain definite patterns. Out of his observations he generalized his rule that each dynasty depends on power in its emergence, and that it feasts upon a dying dynasty when established. Power, to Ibn-Khaldun was not an isolated phenomenon, but a necessity for the restraint and for the achievement of superiority and domination.

As such we can conclude that the environment in which Ibn-Khaldun lived, and his knowledge of the preceding dynasties temporized and conditioned his thought in general, and his concept of mulk in particular. In this respect Ibn-Khaldun was expressing the experiences of his environment and knowledge. ⁽¹⁾

(1) See: Bouthoul, Gustone, Ibn-Khaldun (Falsafatuhu Al-'Ijtima'iyah), pps. 69-78.
 Al-Jur, Khalīl, Tārīkh al-Falsafah al-'Arabiyah, pps. 499-502.
 Hussein, Taha, Falsafat Ibn-Khaldun al-'Ijtima'iyah, pps. 105-126.

IBN-KHALDUN'S CONCEPT OF THE RULER

Ibn-Khaldun's concept of a ruler is related and connected with the human need for a wāzi^c. Due to the aggressive and unjust propensities of "man's" animal nature, every human society is in need of a forceful (qāhir) ruler, otherwise dissensions and hostilities would result. As such, a ruler to Ibn-Khaldun, in order to accomplish the demands of his position, "must be a forceful ruler, one who actually exercises authority."⁽¹⁾

Governments do not become a reality except when there is a ruler who rules over subjects and handles their affairs. The correlative relation with his subjects is called malakah (rulership).⁽²⁾ If this malakah and its concomitants are good and beneficial, it will serve the interests of the subjects. If it is bad and unfair, it will be harmful to them.

Good rulership, to Ibn-Khaldun, is revealed in the actions of a ruler, in the means he applies, and in the ways through which he attempts to safeguard his rule. If he uses "force and is ready to mete out punishment and eager to expose the faults of people and to count their sins, (his subjects) become fearful and depressed and seek to protect themselves against him through lies, ruses, and deceit."⁽³⁾

(1) Rosenthal, Franz, The Muqaddimah, V:I, p. 381.

(2) Ibn-Khaldun, Tārīkh Al-^cAlāmah Ibn-Khaldun, V:I, p. 334.

(3) Rosenthal, op. cit. p. 383.

To Ibn-Khaldun the consequences of bad rulership will be reflected in the character of the people. Lies, ruses, and deceit become a distinguishing aspect of their actions. The people become corrupted. They begin to abandon him in times of trouble and military expeditions. "The decay of (sincere) intentions causes the decay of (military) protection."⁽¹⁾ They begin to plot against their ruler.

Such conditions, to Ibn-Khaldun, are the symptoms of the dynasty's ruin. The forceful measures to keep the people obedient causes the destruction of the dynasty's *ḥaṣabiyah*. As such "the fence (which protects the dynasty) is torn down, for the dynasty has become incapable of (military) protection."⁽²⁾

Whenever a ruler treats his subjects with kindness, and is ready to defend and protect them, good rulership is realized. Only when he shows interest in how his subjects live is he able to recognize what is most beneficial for them. Good rulership reflects the true purpose and nature of *mulk*. It is the prerequisite for ensuring the love and help of the "subjects" whenever troubles arise. It is a symptom of the good order in the state.

To Ibn-Khaldun rulership whether good or bad is dependent on the character of the ruler. An alert and shrewd person

(1) Ibid., p. 383.

(2) Ibid., p. 383.

rarely can be kind. Mildness is an attribute "usually found in careless and unconcerned persons. The least (of the many drawbacks) of alertness (in a ruler) is that he imposes tasks upon his subjects that are beyond their ability, because he is aware of things they do not perceive and, through his genius, foresees the outcome of things at the start. (The ruler's excessive demands) may lead to his subjects' ruin". (1)

To cope with the possibility of such an end Ibn-Khaldun notes that a ruler should not be too shrewd and clever. Cleverness and shrewdness imply that a ruler thinks too much, just as stupidity implies that he is too rigid. Extremes are reprehensible and mean is the most praiseworthy. (2)

To Ibn-Khaldun it is very possible that a ruler deviates from what is right action. It is very necessary to respect the established political norms which dictate good rulership. Good rulership is safeguarded only when the ruler respects those political norms which are accepted by the mass and to whose laws it submits. Such norms might be based either on religious or rational basis. (3)

As such we can say that the position of a ruler is due to a human need and that rulership is the result of the need for political leadership in social organization. It is the result of the human need for a person who will cause the people

(1) Rosenthal, Franz, The Muqaddimah, V: I, p. 385.

(2) Ibn-Khaldun, Tārīkh Al-^cAlāmah Ibn-Khaldun, V: I, p. 336.

(3) Ibid., p. 337.

to act in accordance with what is good for them. Such an objective would be realized by preventing them, by force if necessary, from doing things harmful to them. The person who acts in this manner is the one who is called a ruler.

Ibn-Khaldun's acknowledgement that a ruler should not be too alert, shrewd or rigid, disregards the many attributes a person may have. It is very difficult, and even impossible, to categorize individuals in accordance to such a standard, irrespective of the fact that Ibn-Khaldun's notion is very general and it is subject to many questions. It is questionable if alert and shrewd rulers tend to demand from their people more than they can provide. The opposite alternative might be correct also. Why can't we say that an alert ruler, because he is able to recognize the limits of his subjects, won't demand from them more than they can provide. Moreover, it is questionable whether it is possible to classify any human being, who is in himself of indefinite attributes and traits, in accordance to such a category.

However, Ibn-Khaldun's acknowledgement has its own value, namely, that extremes are reprehensible and "The Golden mean" is praiseworthy.

Ibn-Khaldun's ruler seems to be no more than an "enlightened despot" who knows the true needs, desires, and interests of his people; he is not an absolute ruler whenever he recognizes the political norms of the society. Although, he should be a forceful one, yet his determination and ability to carry on the functions of his position should

be moderated by his kind character, if he has any, and by the recognition of the political norms that are upheld in his society.

In this sense, Ibn-Khaldun seems to be propagating what ought to be a ruler, the ideal ruler.

He perceives that a ruler cannot acquire his position without the help of his people.

"They are his group and his helpers in his enterprise. He uses them to fight against those who revolt against his dynasty. It is they with whom he fills the administrative offices, whom he appoints as wazirs and tax collectors. They help him to achieve superiority. They participate in the government. They share in all his other important affairs." (1)

To Ibn-Khaldun this situation applies to the first stage of a dynasty, because with the approaching of the second stage, the ruler shows himself independent of his people claiming all glory for himself. He pushes his people away from participating in the management of the state's affairs. "As a result, his own people become, in fact, his enemies." (2)

In order to cope with their antipathy, he attempts to have new friends who are willing to oppose his "own people from regaining the power that had been theirs and from occupying with him the rank to which they had been used." (3) This

(1) Rosenthal, Franz, op. cit., p. 372.

(2) Ibid., pps. 372-373.

(3) Ibid., pps. 372.

stands as an indication of the "chronic disease". The people would wait for an opportunity to change the situation, and affirm their ^casabiyaḥ. The mistakes of the ruler grow stronger with each successive generation and lead, eventually, to loss of the dynasty's identity.

It should be noticed that when Ibn-Khaldun uses the term "people" he means human groups having a dominating ^casabiyaḥ. In this sense the dynasty stands, as no more, than a manifestation of that particular ^casabiyaḥ and not of a person sharing it. It is theirs. The position of a ruler is no more than a trusteeship on behalf of the general ^casabiyaḥ. As dynasties originate through the forcefulness of ^casabiyaḥ, they dwindle with the eventual, inevitable, antipathy of the same ^casabiyaḥ.

It is questionable whether the "chronic disease" is, as Ibn-Khaldun says, an inevitable one, and whether a ruler cannot reform the general conditions of his dynasty whenever such disease catches it. Moreover, it does not necessarily follow that every ruler "must" pass through the same "mistakes" of his predecessors. It is very possible that a ruler recognizes the mistakes of his predecessors and as a result, sticks to his ^casabiyaḥ.

Moreover, Ibn-Khaldun seems to have disregarded the fact that the dangers that confront a dynasty are more than "internal-departure" from its own ^casabiyaḥ. There are external, as well as internal factors, which force a ruler to seek the

help of those who do not share his ^casabiyaḥ. Such factors may be the need to establish a balance of power among the surrounding states, to cope with the enmity of a powerful dynasty, or to seek the friendship and cooperation of other ^casabiyaḥ to solidify the regime.

Ibn-Khaldun justifies his view by stating that "seclusion of, and control over, the ruler (by others) may occur in dynasties." (1) When mulk is firmly "established in one particular family and branch of the tribe supporting the dynasty, and when that family claims all royal authority for itself and keeps the rest of the tribe away from it, and when the children of (that family) succeed to the royal authority in turn, by appointment, then it often happens that their wazirs and entourage gain power over the throne. This occurs most often when a little child or weak member of the family is appointed successor by his father or made ruler by his creatures and servants. It becomes clear that he is unable to fulfill the functions of ruler." (2) As such the functions of a ruler would devolve to his "guardian, his father's wazirs, someone from his entourage, one of his clients, or a member of his tribe." (3)

Such a situation, to Ibn-Khaldun, would definitely tempt the guardian to pass mulk to himself. To achieve that end he attempts to adapt the child or weak ruler to pleasures,

(1) Ibid., p. 377.

(2) Ibid., p. 377.

(3) Ibid., p. 377.

to be indifferent to the governmental affairs, and to be independent of his ^casabiyah. At the same time he concentrates the executive power and the supervision over the public offices in his hands. If the ruler does not become aware of his seclusion and deprivation, the guardian would succeed in transferring mulk to himself.

Ibn-Khaldun maintains/that such awareness rarely happens, because "once a dynasty has fallen into the hands of wazirs and clients, it remains in that situation.... such control by others) is mostly the result of living in luxury and of the fact that the royal princes have grown up emerged in prosperity,"⁽¹⁾ forgetting the ways of manliness. "They do not desire leadership. They are not used to exercising sole power, the prerogative of superiority."⁽²⁾ He recognizes that not each guardian attempts to pass mulk to himself. In any case such desire depends on the impetus and power of the guardian's ^casabiyah.

Ibn-Khaldun conceives that a ruler is always in need of the help of his fellowmen to execute the laws of the state. Taken as an individual he is too weak to enforce the restraining ordinances and laws. He has to have the support of his group, as he is in need to satisfy different inclinations and desires.

(1) Ibid., p. 378.

(2) Ibid., p. 378.

As such the help a "ruler seeks may be provided by one man, or it may be distributed among several individuals." (1) They may help him with the 'Sword', the 'Pen', or through their advices and knowledge.

Accordingly, the offices of the dynasty would be distributed among the "Persons of the Sword" or the "Pen". While the offices of chief of military operations, chief of police, chief of the postal service, and administration of the border regions, are allotted to the 'Persons of the Sword', the offices of chief tax collections and allowances and of minister of the army are allotted to the 'Persons of the Pen'. (2)

The degree of dependence on the 'Persons of the Sword' or 'the Pen' is relative to the stage through which a dynasty is undergoing. While in the first stage of a dynasty's establishment dependence is mostly on the 'Persons of the Sword', in its later stages its dependence is confined, to a great extent, to the 'Persons of the Pen'. (3)

Commenting on the activities of a ruler Ibn-Khaldun says that it is praiseworthy if a ruler does not engage himself in commercial and agricultural activities. He elaborates his point by maintaining that such engagements constitute a great erring, on the part of a ruler, as they may be of very

(1) Ibn-Khaldun, Tārīkh Al-^cAlāmah Ibn-Khaldun, V: I, p. 417.

(2) Ibid., p. 417.

(3) Ibid., pps. 455-456.

dangerous consequences. They cause harm to his subjects in many ways: "First, farmers and merchants will find it difficult to buy livestock and merchandise and to procure cheaply the things that belong to (farming and commerce). The subjects have (all) the same or approximately the same amount of wealth. Competition between them already exhausts, or comes close to exhausting, their financial resources. Now, when the ruler, competes with them, scarcely a single one of them will (any longer) be able to obtain the things he wants, and everybody will become worried and unhappy."⁽¹⁾ In other words the capital of a merchant or a farmer is minute in comparison with that of a ruler. As such when the ruler engages himself in commercial and agricultural activities, no single merchant or farmer can compete with him. As a result the merchants or farmers become inactive opening the way to a ruler's monopoly.

Though it is in the ability of a ruler to appropriate "much of (the agricultural products and the available merchandise).... by force, or by buying things up at the cheapest possible price,"⁽²⁾ yet he cannot "wait for a (favorable) market and a boom, because he has to take care of government (needs). Therefore, he forces the merchants or farmers... to buy from him. He will be satisfied only with the highest prices and more."⁽³⁾ In this way he would be exhausting the

(1) Rosenthal, Franz, The Muqaddimah, V: II, p. 94.

(2) Ibid., p. 94.

(3) Ibid., p. 95.

liquid capital of the merchants or farmers making them unable to further their activities. Whenever they need money "they have to sell the goods (that they were forced to buy from the ruler), at the lowest prices, during a slump in the market. Often the merchant or farmer has to do the same thing over again. He thus exhausts his capital and has to go out of business."⁽¹⁾

Such dangerous results are not confined to the ruining of the farmers' or merchants' capitals. They, at the same time, lower and reduce the tax revenues, because when the merchants and farmers, who stand as the main source of the tax revenues of a state, lose the incentives to effort and activity, the tax revenues that used to come from them vanish or become extremely low.

The fact that it is "unlikely that customs duties might be levied on (the ruler's commercial activities),"⁽²⁾ exemplifies the dangerous consequences of a ruler's commercial activity. It stimulates, as well as, it leads to the disintegration of a dynasty. "When the subjects can no longer make their capital through agriculture and commerce, it will decrease and disappear as the result of expenditures.⁽³⁾ This will ruin their situation."

(1) Ibid., pps. 95-96.

(2) Ibid., pps. 95-96.

(3) Ibid., pps. 95-96.

The finances of a ruler could be increased and improved, "only through the revenue from taxes. (The revenue from taxes) can be improved only through the equitable treatment of people" ⁽¹⁾ and respect for their properties. Amid such situations the people's hopes rise, "and they have the incentive to start making their capital bear fruit and grow." ⁽²⁾

Ibn-Khaldun warns against the situation that arises when a ruler comes under the influence of some merchants and farmers. He says that those would work with the ruler, "but for their own profit, to gain quickly as much money as they wish, especially through profits reaped from doing business without having to pay taxes and custom duties." ⁽³⁾ Only, by subjecting the ruler to their influence they can realize, quickly, such objective.

To Ibn-Khaldun nothing may increase one's capital through quick profits, as the exemption from taxes and custom duties.

Accordingly, he asserts that "the ruler must guard against such persons, and not pay any attention to suggestions that are harmful to his revenues and his rule." ⁽⁴⁾

He subjects this notion to "the Cyclic rule", by saying that at the beginning of a dynasty, the ruler and his entourage are restricted by the ^Casabiyah of their people.

(1) Ibid., pps. 95-96.

(2) Ibid., pps. 95-96.

(3) Ibid., pps. 96-97.

(4) Ibid., pps. 96-97.

Once mulk is established the ruler prevents his people from getting any part of the revenues, beyond their official shares. The treasuries of his dynasty become filled, his authority expands, and his wealth grows. However, whence senility enters his dynasty he begins to distribute the revenues to his allies, supporters, and soldiers with the intention to retain his power. The need for money becomes more urgent. At this stage the ruler begins to engage himself in business activities. "The dynasty becomes detestable... It loses its entourage and great personalities and its rich and wealthy intimates."⁽¹⁾

Although he seems to regard the ruler's engagement in business as inevitable, he acknowledges, at the same time, that a ruler ought not to do that.

To Ibn-Khaldun the dynastical territory stands as the "greatest market, the mother and base of all trade. (It is the market that provides) the substance of income and expenditures (for trade). If government business slumps and the volume of trade is small, the dependent markets will naturally show the same symptoms, and to a greater degree. Furthermore, money circulates between subjects and ruler, moving back and forth. Now, if the ruler keeps it to himself, it is lost to the subjects."⁽²⁾

(1) Ibid., p. 98.

(2) Ibid., p. 103.

In elaborating this point **he** maintains that the people's property ought to be safeguarded otherwise the owners would lose "the incentive to acquire and gain property."⁽¹⁾

They do not acquire property in order to lose it. If this is the case, they would never bother themselves to acquire any. "The extent and degree to which property rights are infringed upon determines the extent and degree to which the efforts of the subjects to acquire property slaken. When attacks (on property) are extensive and general, extending to all means of making a livelihood, business activity, too, becomes (general), because the general extent of (such attacks upon property) means a general destruction of the incentive (to do business). If the attacks upon property are but light, the stoppage of gainful activity is correspondingly slight."⁽²⁾ To Ibn-Khaldun civilization and its well being are dependent on the "people's efforts in all directions in their own interest and profit."⁽³⁾

Likewise, "the desintegration of (civilization) causes the desintegration of the status of dynasty and ruler, because (their peculiar status constitutes the form of civilization and the form necessarily decays,"⁽⁴⁾ when its matter decays.

(1) Ibid., p. 103.

(2) Ibid., pps. 103-104.

(3) Ibid., p. 104.

(4) Ibid., p. 104.

As such, to Ibn-Khaldun, the sound economic foundation of a dynasty is essential to its permanence and continuity.

The infringement upon the right of property constitutes an act of injustice which, necessarily, results in the ruining of the dynasty and its civilization.

To Ibn-Khaldun, "Injustice should not be understood to imply only the confiscation of money or other property from the owners, without cause."⁽¹⁾ Injustice is more general. It might take the form of confiscating one's property, subjecting a person to forced labor, pressing unjustified claims against him, or imposing on a person a duty not required by the religious law. Although in these acts injustice is committed towards a particular person, but in reality it is the dynasty that suffers from them.

The religious laws look upon the preservation (hifz) of the religion, the life (nafs), the conviction and intellect (^caql), the progeny (nasl) and property (māl) of a person as very essential. The infringement upon any of these essential rights constitutes acts of injustice which are not only contrary to Islam, but also to reason and existence.⁽²⁾ The commission of such acts leads, necessarily, to the destruction and ruin of a dynasty. If they are to be committed by every person or individual, they would lead to

(1) Ibid., p. 106.

(2) Ibn-Khaldun, Tārīkh Al-^cAlāmah Ibn-Khaldun, V: I, p. 510.

the destruction of the human species as a whole.

Since the restraining power and the ability to check unjust acts are confined to the ruler and his entourage Ibn-Khaldun feels that injustice can only be committed by such persons, because they have all power and authority. ⁽¹⁾

"One of the greatest injustices and one which contributes most to the destruction of civilization is the unjustified imposition of tasks and the use of the subjects for forced labor. This is so because labor belongs to the things that constitute capital..." ⁽²⁾ To Ibn-Khaldun gain and sustenance are no more than an expression of the value achieved from human labor. Labor is a mean to acquire capital and to make profit; if a person is forced to work outside the field of his interest, or in a frame unrelated to the natural ways of acquiring profit he would "no longer have any profit and (is) thus deprived of the price of (his) labor, which is (his) capital (asset)." ⁽³⁾ He would suffer, and all his incentive, which naturally contributes to civilization, would collapse.

Another great injustice is "the appropriation of people's property by buying their possessions as cheaply as possible and then reselling the merchandise to them at the highest possible prices by means of forced sales and purchases," ⁽⁴⁾ because "frequently the people have to accept (high) prices

(1) Rosenthal, Franz, The Muqaddimah, V: II, p. 107.

(2) Ibid., pps. 108-109.

(3) Ibid., p. 109.

(4) Ibid., p. 109.

with the privilege of later payment... with the hope that the market will fluctuate in favor of the merchandise that had been sold to them... But then, they are required to make payment at once, and they are forced to sell the merchandise at the lowest possible price. The loss involved in the two transactions affects their capital."⁽¹⁾ Such a situation would leave no hope for merchants. They would go out of business; and as a result business dwindles and declines. As a result, tax revenues would also decrease and deteriorate leading to the dissolution of the dynasty.

However, and if hostile acts are extended "to affect the property, the wives, the lives, the skins, and the honor of people",⁽²⁾ then a sudden desintegration and dissolution of the dynasty would take place. Such acts, to Ibn-Khaldun, originate troubles and disturbances which directly cope with the existing dynasty. In this respect, Ibn-Khaldun seems to depart from his original acknowledgement, namely the life span of a state, by seeing that a dynasty cannot persist four generations amid such situations.

Ibn-Khaldun maintains that the need for money is the primary cause for the infringement upon the essential rights of the people. At the beginning of a dynasty, "taxation yields a large revenue from small assessments. At the end of the dynasty, taxation yields a small revenue from large

(1) Ibid., p. 109.

(2) Ibid., p. 110.

assessments." ⁽¹⁾ When a dynasty is established her revenues would suffice the needs required, but with her growth the revenues needed become more; the "gradual increases in the amount of the assessments succeed each other regularly, in correspondence with the gradual increase, in the luxury customs and many needs of the dynasty and the spending required in connection with them. Eventually, the taxes will weight heavily upon the subjects and overburden them. Heavy taxes become an obligation and tradition, because the increases took place gradually, and no one knows specifically who increased them or levied them. They lie upon the subjects like an obligation and tradition. ⁽²⁾

To Ibn-Khaldun "the assessments increase beyond the limits of equity... the result is that the total tax revenue goes down, as (the number of) the individual assessments goes down. Often, when the decrease is noticed, the amounts of individual imposts are increased.

This is considered a means of compensating for the decrease. Finally, individual imposts and assessments reach their limit. It would be of no avail to increase them further. The costs of all cultural enterprise are now too high, the taxes are too heavy, and the profits anticipated fail to materialize. Thus, the total revenue continues to decrease, while the amounts of individual imposts and assessments continue to increase... Finally, civilization is destroyed..." ⁽³⁾

(1) Ibid., p. 89.

(2) Ibid., p. 90.

(3) Ibid., pps. 90-91.

with those symptoms, the fate of a dynasty is determined.

Out of the foregoing considerations we observe that a ruler is that person who handles the restraining power, manages the affairs of his subjects, protects and defends his people, and who actually has the enforcement measures. Such a concept, seems to be the standard through which an actual ruler is distinguished from a nominal one.

The art of a ruler is called rulership, "malakah". It determines the relation between a ruler and his subjects. There could be no ruler without subjects to rule and vice versa.

Rulership, however, might be good or bad. Its goodness or badness depends on the ruler, and on the response of his subjects to his rule.

A good ruler is the person who is not too clever and shrewd, or too weak and rigid. He is the one who looks after the interests of his subjects, who treats them kindly and mildly, who does not engage in agricultural or commercial activities or has in his entourage influential business men, who does not disregard his ^casabiyah, who does not indulge in pleasures, and finally who abides by the political norms accepted by his society.

It is correct to say that Ibn-Khaldun did not conceive of "his" ruler as an absolute ruler, a despot, unjust, unkind or cruel person, who treats his subjects through force only, but as an enlightened person who knows best their interests, desires, and needs. To Ibn-Khaldun such

would be the ideal-real ruler who reflects the true nature and purpose of mulk. Although he is a forceful one, yet he is dependent, at the same time, on his people's support and cooperation.

If a dynasty has to pass through definite stages, irrespective of the will and intentions of the ruler, then, what would be the value of human reasoning, that aspect which, to Ibn-Khaldun, distinguishes "man" from other creatures. Such question make us think that Ibn-Khaldun did not view the stages of dynasties as inevitable except when certain factors and conditions come to interplay in their life. In other words he perceived that if such factors, as the independence from one's ^Casabiyah and merging in pleasures, are actualized by a ruler then his dynasty would inevitably pass through the stages he prescribed.

The title of the book "The History" with its key word, Ibar, shows the soundness of this view. What would be the value of the title, if human reason cannot alter and reform certain conditions, or be aware of such conditions that entail disaster to a dynasty. As such Ibn-Khaldun's work is a survey, elaboration and explanation of those Ibar's of history that were perceived by him, the knowledge of which might save the human species from undergoing the same experiences as those of their predecessors.

When he spoke about the essential rights in general and those pertaining to property in particular, Ibn-Khaldun

was a forerunner of the concept of free enterprise. He looked upon property as something to be respected and not to be infringed upon or confiscated (illegally) by a ruler. The sanctity of property rights conforms with human incentives, as it generates and stimulates efforts. If properties are to be infringed upon by a ruler the disintegration of civilization and his dynasty would inevitably result. The state must not interfere in the property of any person, unjustly or illegally. Infringement upon one's property, by a ruler, does not render damage to the person concerned, only, as it renders damage to the whole state. Human beings should be left to decide the course or enterprise they wish to follow. They should not be forced to do things against their interests.

If injustices lead to the destruction of a dynasty, as stated by Ibn-Khaldun, then it follows that justices may safeguard it. Since both possibilities are apt to take place, we may conclude that Ibn-Khaldun, in this respect, was not deterministic. Dynasties are, but not necessarily, to follow certain stages of establishment, prosperity and dissolution.

URBANISM AND MULK

Ibn-Khaldun's experiences with Bedouin life and life in urbanized centers conditioned his mind to believe that the Bedouin life precedes the establishment of mulk and the access to sedentary life.

This acknowledgement was not merely a descriptive display of what he has come to see and observe, as it was an evaluation of the reasons that determine such a transformation.

With the adjustment to the new conditions that succeed a Bedouin life, the life of a dynasty becomes no more than the life of its towns and cities. The degree of flourishing of a town corresponds directly to the vitality of the dynasty. If the dynasty shows weakness, the life of its center would exemplify, at the same time, a general weakness. When a dynasty comes to its duration, its center would pass the same fate, with the exception of those towns which are surrounded by deserts and are subject to influx of population, contributing to the life of the dynasty.

He conceives that mulk has a natural call for urban settlement, which stands as an illustration of a change from a Bedouin life to a sedentary life.

In other words, dynasties, to Ibn-Khaldun, are prior to cities and towns. Accordingly, cities and towns are no more

than secondary products of mulk. **Building and city planning** are features of sedentary culture brought about by luxury and tranquillity that come after Bedouin life and the features that go with it.

Ibn-Khaldun asserts that it is in the very nature of mulk to call for urban settlement. When tribes and groups obtain mulk they are forced to take possession of cities and towns. He justifies this notion by maintaining that it is in the nature of mulk to cause the people to seek tranquillity, restfulness, and relaxation, and to try to provide the aspects of civilization that were lacking in the desert. Moreover, it is in its nature to seek security against its enemies by fortifying itself in cities which are not easily accessible.

He repeatedly asserts that the prosperity of civilization is relative to the strength of mulk which in itself depends on the numerical strength of its ^casabiyyah. Civilization, in order to flourish, is in need of coordinated action. When mulk is strong and "is large and far-flung, workers are brought together from all regions, and their labor is employed in a common effort."⁽¹⁾

Nomadic life "is as contrary to the progress of civilization as the sedentary life is favourable to it."⁽²⁾ However, he shows a marked preference for the Bedouins, but that is because he saw in them a vigorous "strength which provides the creative force in society, just as he saw in sedentary people

(1) Rosenthal, Franz, The Muqaddimah, V: II, p. 238.

(2) Chambliss, Rollin, Social Thought From Hammurabi to Comte, p. 301.

the weakness which he believed inevitably results from easy living. The nomads are the roots of society; the sedentary people are the flowers. Roots are gross, but they reach into the earth and draw forth the sustenance for hardy growth; flowers are lovely, but they fade."⁽¹⁾

Thus the civilized form of the state succeeds the nomadic one, as domination leads to luxury. Once the rulers of a dynasty have become sedentary they imitate in their ways of living those of the dynasty to which they have succeeded and whose condition they have seen and generally adopted.

Whenever a people overcome and dispossess the inhabitants of a previously existing dynasty, their wealth and prosperity increase and with them their wants, so that the bare necessities of life no longer satisfy, but only the amenities and luxuries.

As such, both Bedouin and sedentary life are necessary for the growth of mulk, the former being the natural foundation of the latter. Likewise, the establishment of mulk precedes the emergence of its typical sedentary civilization. In other words, the peoples of a tribe, due to the incentives of mulk, attempt to achieve the aspects of civilization that are lacking in the desert. Towns emerge as a consequence of the change that a tribe undergoes. However, their establishment does not give, directly, to their inhabitants numerous estates and farms, because "the acquisition and accumulation

(1) Ibid., p. 300.

of (real) property would be gradual,"⁽¹⁾ through inheritance, fluctuations, or one's efforts and activities. The real motive which stimulates a person to acquire estates and farms is not the accumulation of capital for the sake of extravagant living, as it is to safeguard the life, education, care, and upbringing of one's children. Whenever a person acquires a great number of estates and farms he attempts to seek rank and protection, in order to cope with the aggressiveness of others.

Sedentary culture, to Ibn-Khaldun, depends directly on the degree of subdivisions in crafts. The division of labour gives more experience and skill to the persons specialized in a craft. It adds to the crafts a particular coloring of their own. Sedentary culture remains "a condition that is the result of customs and goes beyond the necessary conditions of civilization."⁽²⁾ It has its own physical age which it cannot pass over. The symptoms of its fate are observed in excessive sedentary culture, luxury and the mount in the expenditures of the inhabitants of a city.

The city which is the seat of mulk crumbles as soon as its mulk falls. Ibn-Khaldun explains this notion by citing four reasons:

(1) Rosenthal, op. cit., p. 248.

(2) Ibid., p. 286.

1. This is because when mulk comes to be possessed by a new dynasty that knows little of luxury, the subjected people follow the character of the new dynasty acquiring its customs and traits either voluntarily or by force, and thus putting an end to the sedentary culture of the city. ⁽¹⁾

2. Another reason stems out of the natural hostility between the old and new dynasty. To Ibn-Khaldun this hostility shows itself in a "mutual disapproval with regard to (luxury) customs and conditions". ⁽²⁾ The victory of the one gives an end to the customs and traditions of the other.

3. The third reason comes out of the general tendency of nations to take as the center of their dynasty the places where they grew up. In this respect the center which was occupied becomes secondary to the occupying dynasty.

4. The fourth reason results from the tendency of new dynasties "to transfer the people and partisans of the previous dynasty to another region where it can be sure that it will not be secretly attacked by them." ⁽³⁾

Ibn-Khaldun sums up the relation between urbanization and mulk by stating that "the primary natural reason for this situation is the fact that dynasty and royal authority have the same relationship to civilization as form has to matter, (the form) is the shape that preserves the existence of (matter) through the (particular) kind (of phenomenon) it represents....

(1) Ibid., p. 298.

(2) Ibid., p. 298.

(3) Ibid., p. 299.

One cannot imagine a dynasty without civilization, while a civilization without dynasty and royal authority is impossible, because human beings must be by nature cooperate, and that calls for a restraining influence. Political leadership, based either on religious or royal authority, is obligatory as (such a restraining influence)", ⁽¹⁾ since the two coexist, Ibn-Khaldun conceived that the disintegration of the one, leads to the disintegration of the other.

(1) Ibid., p. 300.

(VII)

THE ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION OF MULK

To Ibn-Khaldun the person of a ruler is weak by himself. He carries a heavy load, which he cannot handle without the help of his fellowmen. The requirements of mulk are so many that he cannot manage them alone. He has to rule his subjects "the creatures and servants of God whom God entrusted to him as subjects."⁽¹⁾ He has to defend and protect them. He has to prevent them from committing mutual injustices by enforcing the restraining ordinances (al-ahkām al-wāzī^ca). He is the one responsible to cause them to act in their own best interests, and to supervise such matters involving their livelihood, mutual dealings, and public interest. He is in need of making them submit to him to the degree he desires with respect to his intentions regarding their interests as well as his.⁽²⁾

To Ibn-Khaldun such a ruler cannot carry on such functions without seeking the help of his fellowmen. In this respect it is better for a ruler to seek the help of those who are related to him through common descent, common upbringing, or old service to the dynasty, because they would be of similar temperaments and attitudes.

(1) Ibn-Khaldun, Tārīkh Al-^cAlāmah Ibn-Khaldun, V: I, p. 416.

(2) Ibid., p. 416.

The persons that help a ruler might do that with their pen (*qalam*), or with their swords (*sayf*) or with their advice and knowledge (*rā'y wa ma'arifih*), or by keeping the people from crowding upon him. In any way the help sought by a ruler might be given by one person or several individuals. The channels through which such help may be given are of many subdivisions.

To Ibn-Khaldun the governmental positions that pertain to a malik or sultan are necessitated by the nature of civilization and human existence. Accordingly, he distinguishes between the governmental positions and offices that pertain to Caliphate and those that belong to mulk.

In discussing the functions and positions that pertain to mulk, he had no definite concept of what they should be or ought to be. His work in this respect was merely a citation of the different ranks and offices that were functioning, and that functioned, in the various dynasties and states of the then Muslim world. He perceives the governmental offices as follows (*al-khuṭaṭ al-sulṭānīyah*):

The Vizirate (*al-wizārah*):

It is the highest of all governmental functions and royal ranks (*al-rutab al-mulūkīyah*). The name itself means help (*mu'āzarah, mu'āwanah*). It is derived either from *mu'āzarah*, or from *wizr* (load), as if the *wazīr* is helping (1) the person whom he supports to carry his burdens and charges.

(1) Ibid., p. 419.

However, the word was not known to the Muslims, but with the flourishing of mulk, the term wazīr came to be used differently among different Muslim dynasties. In the Umayyad dynasty the position of a wazīr was concerned with the supervision of matters delegated to it by the Caliph. The vizier had a consultative capacity. He had supervision over the office of the army (diwān al-jaysh) and the assignment of military allowances and other matters of defensive or offensive nature.

In the ^cAbbāsīd dynasty the position of vizier acquired more importance. The vizier became the "delegate (of the Caliph) in executive matters, having the authority to supervise the collection and distribution of the Caliphate revenues, the bookkeeping office of "the pen", and official correspondence. In addition he was entrusted to keep the deal. In other words Ibn-Khaldun sees that the vizerate in the ^cAbbāsīd dynasty came to include the functions pertaining to both the "sword" and the "pen".⁽¹⁾

To Ibn-Khaldun, by the end of the ^cAbbāsīd dynasty the vizirate was divided into two categories, namely, an executive vizirate (wizārat tanfīz), and a delegated vizirate (wizārat tafwīd). In the former the vizier had the sole authority of executing the ruler's decisions, while in the latter he had delegated powers to supervise the affairs of the Caliphate and give independent judgements.⁽²⁾

(1) Ibid., pps. 422-423.

(2) Ibid., pps. 423-424.

In the Turkish dynasty in Egypt the term deputy (nā'ib) was used as a synonym to wazīr. The nā'ib was in charge of legal decisions and supervision of the army. (1)

The Umayyads in Spain used the term wazīr in its original meaning, but later on, "they subdivided the functions of the wazīr into several parts. For each function, they appointed a special wazīr... One of the wazīr's was appointed liaison officer by the title of ... (Hājib)." (2)

The Ministry of financial administration and taxation, (Diwān al-amwāl wal jibayāt).

To Ibn-Khaldun this office is necessary to mulk because "it guards the rights of the dynasty in the matters of income and expenditures". (3) It originates only when a mulk is firmly established. It constitutes the third basic pillar of mulk, which requires soldiers, money, and the means to communicate with those who are absent. The ruler, therefore, needs persons to help him in the matters concerned with the sword, pen and finances." (4)

The Ministry of (official) correspondence and writing (diwān al-rasā'il wal kitābah).

Its basic function is to note the decisions received by a ruler. However, this diwan is not necessary for mulk, and many "dynasties were able to dispense with it completely,

(1) Ibid., p. 424.

(2) Rosenthal, Franz, The Muqaddimah, V: II, pps. 12-13.

(3) Ibid., p. 19.

(4) Ibid., p. 23.

as, for example, the dynasties rooted in the desert and which were not affected by the refinements of sedentary culture and high development of the crafts." (1)

These are, to Ibn-Khaldun, the three pillars of mulk. While the first concerns itself with defensive, offensive, and enforcement measures (delegative or executive), the second deals with the collection, checking, and distribution of a dynasty's revenues, and the third concerns itself in noting the decisions of a ruler, his correspondence and letters.

Ibn-Khaldun enumerates some ranks (rutab) which he considers to pertain to mulk. They are as follows:

1. Al-Hijabah (Chamberlain's office), the office that admits or gives appointments to those who want to see the ruler. The head of this office is called al-Ḥajib.

Ibn-Khaldun mentions that "the title of ... (ḥajib) was restricted to the person who guarded the ruler from the common people and would not give them access to him, or only in such ways, and at such times, as he determined." (2) He observes that this was the case in the Umayyad and Ḥabbāsīd dynasties. However, "in the Umayyad dynasty in Spain, the office ... was that of the person who guarded the ruler from his entourage and from the common people. He was - al-ḥajib - the liaison officer between the ruler and the wazirs and lower (officials)." (3)

He tells us that the ḥajib in the Ḥafṣīd dynasty was

(1) Ibid., p. 26.
 (2) Ibid., p. 14.
 (3) Ibid., p. 14.

charged with the apportioning and fixing the salaries, allowances, garments, kitchen and stable expenditures. "Occasionally, the function of signing (official) documents was added to his duties..."⁽¹⁾ Thus while the ruler stayed in seclusion, the hajib became the liaison officer between the people and all the officials. "In the later years of the dynasty, the offices of "the sword" and of war operations were added to his duties. At this time it also became his duty to give advice and counsel. Thus, his office became the highest in rank and included all government functions."⁽²⁾

In the dynasty of the 'Abd-al-Wādids' the title was used, occasionally, for the person in charge of the ruler's personal household affairs, bookkeeping, and signing of official documents.

In the Turkish dynasty in Egypt, the name of (ḥājib) was used for magistrates (ḥakim), who were in charge of enforcing the laws. They had jurisdiction "over the various classes of common people and over the soldiers only when a complaint (against them) is lodged with them."⁽³⁾ They were empowered to use force against those who do not want to submit to their judgements.

2. Al-Shurtah (The Police). The holder of this office, to Ibn-Khaldun, is called by different names in different dynasties. In Ifriqiyah he was called the magistrate (ḥakim);

(1) Ibid., p. 16.

(2) Ibid., p. 17.

(3) Ibid., p. 18.

in Spain he was called the townchief (ṣahib al-madīnah), and in the Turkish dynasty in Egypt he was attributed the name of governor (wālī).

This office as perceived by Ibn-Khaldun is "subor-⁽¹⁾ dinate to the person in charge of "the sword" in the dynasty." The office was created by the ^cAbbasids with the objective of checking crimes, investigating them, and to execute judgements. However, and occasionally, the person in charge of this office was "given sole jurisdiction over capital crimes and legal punishments", which "were taken away from the judge's juris-⁽²⁾ diction."

3. Qiyadatu Al-'Asātil (the admiralty). This office deals with the defensive, offensive, and enforcement measures on the seas. The holder of such an office was under the person of "the sword". In Ifriqiyyah he was called the Balimand.

The above mentioned offices and ranks are divided among the persons of "the sword" and those of "the pen". "The reliance on the one and the other depends on the stage as well as the conditions through which a dynasty is undergoing. So long as the people of a dynasty "are occupied in establishing power, the need for "the sword" is greater than that for "the pen"... The same is the case at the end of the dynasty when its group feeling weakens... and its people decrease in number under the influence of senility... The dynasty then needs the support of the military... for the purpose of protection and

(1) Ibid., p. 36.

(2) Ibid., p. 36.

(1)
defense."

In the interim of these two stages "the ruler can to some degree dispense with the sword... In this situation the men of "the pen" have more authority... At such times, "the pen" is the instrument the ruler uses to obtain the fruits of his royal authority. He uses it to supervise and administer his realm and to display its (excellent) conditions".⁽²⁾

However, this does not mean that in any particular case the ruler would depend solely on the persons of "the sword" or "the pen", but that the degree of reliance on the one, and not the other, varies relatively with the stage and conditions that a dynasty passes through or faces.

To Ibn-Khaldun emblems are very important to a dynasty, because they express its symbols and they stimulate, at the same time, the emotions and unity of its peoples. They are the result of pomp and ostentation. Of such emblems which he mentions are the following:

1) The outfit (al-'ālah), or the "display of banners and flags and the beating of drums and the blowing of trumpets and horns... This is an emotional element that plays a role on battle fields... The great number of flags, their manifold colors, and their length are intended to cause fright, (which produces greater aggressiveness in the soul...)"⁽³⁾

2) The throne (al-sarīr). To Ibn-Khaldun the "throne, dais (minbar), couch (takht), chair (kirsī); (they all mean) pieces of wood or ottomans (ar-rā'ik) set up for the ruler,

(1) Ibid., p. 36.

(2) Ibid., pps. 46-47.

(3) Ibid., pps. 48-50.

so that he may have a higher seat than the other people at court (1) and so that he will not be on the same level with them."

This has been always a royal custom, though dynasties in the first stages of their establishment do not desire them.

3) The mist (al-sikah), "refers to the stamp (khutūm), that is the piece of iron used for the purpose of (stamping the coins)..."⁽²⁾ To Ibn-Khaldun this is very important, because it enables the people to distinguish between good and bad coins in their transactions.

4) The seal (khātim), is used to mark the validity of a transaction, diploma, or letter.

5) The tiraz (al-tarāz). It "is part of royal and governmental pomp and dynastic custom to have the names of rulers or their peculiar marks embroidered on the silk, brocade, or pure silk garments that are prepared for their weary,"⁽³⁾ because this would increase of a ruler's prestige and distinguishes those honored by him, "by bestowing upon them his own garment."⁽⁴⁾

6) Large tents and tent walls (al-fasāṭīt wal siyāj). To Ibn-Khaldun those emblems express the wealth and affluence of a dynasty, as they distinguish the ruler's location in times of display and fowneys.

7) The prayer enclosure (al-maqsūrah) and the praying during the Friday khutbah. Ibn-Khaldun recognizes this emblem as typical to Caliphate. The enclosure secludes the Caliph (near al-minbar) from those who are praying. Moreover and during the Friday khutbah the Caliph's name is mentioned and

(1) Ibid., p. 53.

(2) Ibid., p. 54.

(3) Ibid., p. 65.

(4) Ibid., p. 65.

blessed.

It is observed that Ibn-Khaldun's citations, in this regard, are typically descriptive. Moreover they reflect the nature of the governmental offices, ranks, and emblems that were typical of the then Muslim regimes.

CONCLUSION

CONCLUSION

Referring to Ibn-Khaldun Robert Flint wrote: "... Ibn-Khaldun must have been an altogether remarkable man. Living amidst circumstances the most complicated, combinations shifting from day to day, plots and intrigues, despotic arbitrariness and mean jealousies, he played an active and prominent part in many situations. Although often cast down, he as often rose speedily up again; and he remained from youth to age, through all the vicissitudes of a difficult and eventful career, distinguished and influential, courted or persecuted, dreaded or admired. He was a skillful politician, an accomplished courtier, a brilliant member of society, a man subtle in counsel, persuasive in speech, pliant in adapting himself to circumstances, qualified for the most diverse offices, a proficient in almost every liberal art and every department of science cultivated by his Mohammedan contemporaries. He was, perhaps, not wholly devoid of the spirit of intrigue, somewhat too conscious of his own superiority, and inclined to exercise power with rather high a hand. Obviously he was ambitious of eminence and fame both in politics and literature; but he cannot be charged with disregard of moral principles or indulgence in vicious habits. He was a devout and strict Mussulman."⁽¹⁾

(1) Flint, Robert; History of the Philosophy of History, p. 161 quoted in Chambliss, Rollin, Social Thought From Hammurabi to Comte, p. 292.

Such qualities and traits were to enable Ibn-Khaldun to observe the "course of events that led to the rise and fall of the Moslem Empire as no contemporary witness could have done." (1) Moreover it enabled him to produce a philosophic and sociological conception of history that cast him into oblivion. "As a theorist on history he had no equal in any age or country until Vico appeared, more than three hundred years later. Plato, Aristotle, and Augustine were not his peers, and all others were unworthy of being mentioned along with him." (2) In fact he stands "alone as the greatest historical genius of Islam..." (3)

George Sarton asserts that "Not only is he the greatest historian of the Middle Ages, towering like a giant over a tribe of pygmies, but one of the first philosophers of history, a forerunner of Machiavelli, Bodin, Vico, Comte, and Curnot." (4)

It should be noted that his History is not universal as the title suggests nor does it make much contribution to the knowledge of the history of the Arabs. Its value lies in its attempt to answer the question "What can we learn from history?"

(1) Chambliss, Rollin; Social Thought From Hammurabi to Comte, p. 289.

(2) Flint, op. cit., p. 87 quoted in Ibid., p. 292.

(3) Lewis, B. The Arabs in History; pps. 9-10.

(4) Quoted in Isawi C. An Arab Philosophy of History, p. xi.

In this respect, Ibn-Khaldun "... was a realist; but it is an exaggeration to declare that he was entirely lacking in idealism... His nature is reflected in his observations on human society, his rigorous demand that it be studied comprehensively and with scientific accuracy, and his faithfulness, so far as time and circumstances permitted, in meeting this requirement. He is a solitary figure, towering above his age, yet to be explained in the way he himself regarded as proper in the interpretation of every historic phenomenon. The law of growth and decay of social groups which he discerned cast him into oblivion; the same law has led to his discovery and the recognition of his genius."⁽¹⁾

A glance at what we have written suggests the profundity of Ibn-Khaldun's thinking. This acknowledgement does not disregard some ideas which seem strange and unsound to our contemporary thinking. It takes his age, his experiences, as well as the general tempo of his period's thought as the standard of judgement.

Our study shows that many of Ibn-Khaldun's ideas, which cannot be accepted in contemporary thinking, were valid, normal and sound in Medieval Islam. Moreover it shows that, irrespective of the influences that conditioned his thinking, he was not, only a forerunner of his age, but a philosopher intimate in many respects with contemporary thinking.

(1) Schmidt, Nathaniel, Ibn-Khaldun, Historian, Sociologist, and Philosopher, pps. 41-46.

It is true that Ibn-Khaldun had the advantage of distinguishing between urban and Bedouin life and the necessity of the former for the emergence of civilization; in postulating al ^casabiyyah as the principal driving force of political action; in projecting Islam into a universal human civilization; in realizing the causal interdependence of economic, military, cultural, and religious factors in the social and political life of a state; in his distinguishing between the parallel existence of the state based on prophetic laws and which were built on power; in his discussion of mulk as a composite structure whose law is a mixture of shari^hca and rational law; in the fundamental role of religion in the life of a state; in conceiving that not all mulks are based on a revealed law; and finally in postulating a causal law for the state that determines its development in a cycle of origin, growth, peak, decline and fall; ⁽¹⁾ but it is also true that Ibn-Khaldun is not a modern thinker although his ideas are close to contemporary thinking.

He was not an empiricist, a historicist, a determinist, a positivist, or a pragmatist; although he believed that the knowledge of the actual depends on an empirical approach; that the knowledge of the past, and the genesis of social life should explain the actual; that the physical, geographic, biological, psychological, and social factors determine the development and character of culture; that disciplined reflection could reveal certain tendencies and regularities in social

(1) Rosenthal, Erwin; Political Thought in Medieval Islam, pps. 105-106.

development and growth; and that the science of culture is a practical science, respectively. But he did not believe that the nature and causes of things are mere mental constructions which have no ontological foundation; that the stages of social life could explain or are comprehensive of the actual; that the stages of development of a particular society can give a complete explanation of its manifestations; that all of social life is governed by law, and all its aspects are determined by objective circumstances; that reason is capable of explaining the causes of certain happenings, regularities in human nature, and that success is the sole criterion of truth or that man's action exhaust the frame of his knowledge and decision, respectively. (1)

In these respects we cannot separate Ibn-Khaldun from the chain of events through which he lived. He not only perceived the relation between history and traditional political philosophy, but attempted to synthesize them in his philosophy.

To know the goal to which a society must be led, the actual conditions in a society over which a statesman exercises his political authority, and the experiences necessary for best ruling preoccupied Ibn-Khaldun's thought. They made him realize that political philosophy, in order to be established, needs knowledge of the actual circumstances, requires understanding and insight to history, to assist, as well as to prepare statesmen to rule and rule properly. (2)

(1) Mahdi, Muhsin; Ibn-Khaldun's Philosophy of History, p. 239.

(2) Ibid., p. 293, & pps. 285-289.

Ibn-Khaldun, who 'failed' in his political career, was to reflect a pessimistic trend throughout his works, which drove him towards deep observation of the actual with a disregard of abstract speculations, to regard the manifestations of civilization as factors that disrupt the elemental nature of man, and to consider, somehow, progress as an exemplification of dissolution. In this respect Ibn-Khaldun was typifying the spirit that swept all over Medieval Islam. (1)

As such we can say that "Ibn-Khaldun did not turn to history to find his standards and goal, or to see the idea progressively realizes itself and learn its future course so that he could join the predetermined course of history. For him, future action cannot be determined by any science. It continues to be the product of an art which requires the knowledge of the end of man and society, and the knowledge of the actual circumstances supplied by history, by which must be perfected through experience. Having equipped himself with such knowledge, it remains the responsibility of the wise man to decide what is best under particular choices." (2)

However, the impact of Ibn-Khaldun's thought was not great. The knowledge of his works, only came to be of interest to scholars in the 19th century.

Before that century we find slight explanations, criticisms or comments on his works. Such "disregard" could be explained by the decline of the Arabic philosophy after Ibn-Khaldun's death, the complexity of his style, the nature of

(1) Bouthoul, Gaston; Ibn-Khaldun (Sa Philosophie Sociale), pps. 125-126.

(2) Mahdi, op. cit., p. 296.

his subject matter, and his shadowing of the actual regimes
 of his age. (1)

In other words, the Muqaddimah was written in the age of the decline of the Muslim-Arab states, on the one hand, and of the Arab culture on the other. Thus it was not written in an age of cultural prosperity in order to have the proper attention and appropriate appreciation of Muslim or Arab thinkers. (2)

However, this statement does not disregard the influence of Ibn-Khaldun's Muqaddimah on some of his contemporaries. Al-Hāfiz Ibn-Hajār Al-^cAsqalānī tells us in his book The Judges of Egypt "that he often met Ibn-Khaldun and profited by his knowledge and works, particularly in history, and that he was very eloquent, a good essayist, a poet of medium ability with profound knowledge, particularly of the affairs of the state... But Ibn-Hajar violently attacks Ibn-Khaldun and cites in his biography of the historian many of the statements made against him. He ... disagrees with Al-Makrizi in his praise of the Prolegomena, and says that all that distinguishes it is rhetoric, play on words after the method of Al-Jahiz, and that its merits are few, but rehetoric embellishes its contents so as to seem excellent although they are not." (3)

At the same time we find a student and a contemporary of Ibn-Khaldun such as Al-Maqrīzī (Tabī^oy al-Dīn) who speaks of him with the greatest respect and veneration. In his book Durar al-^cUqūd Al-Farīdah he gives Ibn-Khaldun's "detailed

(1) Bouthoul, op. cit., p. 129.

(2) Ḥuṣarī, Sātī^c, Dirāsāt ^cAn Muqaddimat Ibn-Khaldun, p. 139.

(3) Enan, M.A. Ibn-Khaldun His Life And Work, pps. 70-71.

biography with admiration, and is very enthusiastic in his appreciation of the Prolegomena. He says: 'It is a unique work of its kind, an accomplishment too difficult to realize; in fact it is the essence of knowledge and science and the result of a sane mind. It reveals the truth of things, events and news; it explains the state of the universe and reveals the origin of all beings in an admirable, plain style.' (1) He not "only highly praised and appreciated Ibn-Khaldun but was also much impressed by his theories, as is evident in his book Ighāthat al-Umma bi Kashf Al-Ghumma..." (2)

Moreover Ibn-Khaldun's impact could be observed in the writings of Al-Sakhāwī. In his book Al-I^clān Bil Tawbīkh, which deals "with the value of history, and its effects in studying the conditions of nations", "Al-Sakhawi is influenced by his philosophical theory in explaining and understanding history", (3) "in spite of his controversy with Ibn-Khaldun". (4)

Abūl Maḥāsīn Ibn-Taghrī Birdī is another contemporary Egyptian historian who "shares with his master al-Makrizi his appreciation of Ibn-Khaldun and praises his abilities and impartiality when he was a judge. He tells us that he administered justice with high prestige and great dignity and was appreciated by all." (5)

Abūl ^cAbbās Al-Qalqashandī, a great Egyptian contemporary "quotes Ibn-Khaldun on various occasions in his work," (6)

(1) Quoted in Ibid., pps. 73-74.

(2) Ibid., p. 74.

(3) Ibid., p. 76.

(4) Ibid., p. 76.

(5) Ibid., p. 76.

(6) Ibid., p. 76.

Subh Al-A^cshā.

However, the disregard on the part of the then Western thinkers is rendered by the fact that when Ibn-Khaldun wrote his Muqaddimah, the West passed the stage of dependence on the universities of Andalusia. In other words, the last quarter of the 14th century, in which Ibn-Khaldun wrote his Muqaddimah was that of the Renaissance in Europe. Added to this was the disruption of the relations between the Christian West and Muslim Spain, and the devoted concern of the western thinkers of philosophy and science. In other words, the western thinkers were not as much interested in history books as they were interested in those dealing with philosophy and science. (1)

Western thought knew before Ibn-Khaldun, many Muslim historians such as Al-Masūdī, Abūl Fidāh, Ibn-Al-^cIbrī, Ibn-Khallikān, and Ibn-^cArabsh. (2) This was not only because "they appeared in the vigorous and flourishing ages of Islam, or because they treated subjects in which Western thought was interested," (3) but also because Ibn-Khaldun "appeared in an age when decay had crept into the power and domination of Islam, and Islamic thought had already declined. It was not the age worthy of study." (4)

Due to the above mentioned reasons Ibn-Khaldun's legacy remained "in oblivion for centuries, both in the East and the West, hardly known to the first and totally ignored by the second." (5) We can assume that he remained without any

-
- (1) Ḥusarī, op. cit., pps. 141-142.
 (2) Ēnān, op. cit., p. 112.
 (3) Ibid., p. 112.
 (4) Ibid., p. 112.
 (5) Ibid., p. 112.

responding echoes until the advent of the 19th century, irrespective of the slight regards as to the value of the Muqaddimah mentioned in the works of some Muslim writers. His works came to be known by the Turks and Westerners before being rediscovered by the Arabs. In Ottoman Turkey Al-Madrasah (school of thought) Al-Khalduniyah emerged in response to his impact. ⁽¹⁾ "From the middle of the 19th century European scholars began to study Ibn-Khaldun and his **social** theories with special interest. That the West was acquainted with the legacy of Ibn-Khaldun was a true scientific discovery, and the most *outstanding* of it was that the West found in the legacy of the Muslim thinker many philosophical, social and economical theories, which Europe came to know only long after Ibn-Khaldun. It was thus that Western scholars discovered, with astonishment and admiration, that Ibn-Khaldun had studied many of those theories which were treated by Machiavelli a century later, and by Vico, Montesquieu, Adam Smith and Auguste Comte, some three or four centuries later. It was believed that Western research was the first to discover the philosophy of history and principles of sociology and political economy, but it was then found that Ibn-Khaldun had long preceded the West, and had treated those subjects in his Prolegomena, and expounded many of their principles with intelligence and vigour. Thus Western research, after discovering and studying Ibn-Khaldun praised his legacy most highly and considers

(1) Huṣarī, *op. cit.*, pps. 249-260; 609-614; & 615-620; & *Ibid.*, pps. 189-194.

him a philosopher, a historian of civilization, a scholar of sociology and political economy, and moreover acknowledges him to be the first to treat these subjects." (1) In fact "Western criticism... raises his legacy to the highest level of appreciation and admiration, and ranks his work among the loftiest and most valuable fruits of human thought." (2)

The foregoing considerations clearly show that Ibn-Khaldun's political thought was the culmination of Medieval Arabic political thought. His works stand as the climax after which stagnation restricted any kind of intellectual activity.

Irrespective of his many conceptualized originalities his thought was an accumulation of the many different trends of Arabic political thought. In this respect he stands as the synthesizer, interpretizer, and describer of the Jurists' teachings, the Moralists' principles, and the Falasifahs' doctrines. The degree of amalgamation varied from one concept to another. At times he attempted to compromise. At others he endeavored to assert one school's point of view.

However, it is unjustifiable to regard Ibn-Khaldun as a mere eclectic philosopher. He, not only depended on these schools, but attempted, at the same time, to formulate his own philosophy, namely, that of history and civilization. When he depended on them, he did so with the object of justifying his originalities and presenting them in a systemitized and conceptualized frame. He depended on the works of history

(1) Enan, op. cit., p. 114.

(2) Ibid., p. 125.

of his predecessors, but in order to acquire the knowledge of the laws of change, development and decline.

"His reflections on history and his study of social life command the admiration of modern social scientists to the extent of claiming him as their true predecessor and originator of their science."⁽¹⁾ He seems to be the only Muslim thinker who perceived the relation between history and the science of society, and who attempted to accommodate the implications of such relation to the principles of the Muslim Jurists. He not only attempted to study "man" and society as they are, but he also attempted to utilize the results of such study within the framework of the shari'ah Laws.

His concern with the study of society made him question the origins of human association, the goals or ends to which such an association must be guided, and the best means and proper devices that lead or help in achieving these ends or goals with regard to the actual tempo of any human society.

His political life and experiences were of great help in insighting him in providing an answer to such speculations. The failures that confronted him in his political careers were to make him believe that he was lacking the appropriate knowledge of the actual and particular conditions and circumstances of society. They stood as an important "stop" in his life. In fact they were the true reasons which made him identify what he lacked with history. In this respect his History is

(1) Mahdi, Muhsin, Ibn-Khaldun's Philosophy of History, p. 285.

no more than a study and survey of the contemporary history with the object to understand the causes of his failures, on the one hand, and deduce the ^cIbar's that may help in coping with any possibility of such failures whenever their factors arise.

In other words his political failures made him realize that the good political order in society requires knowledge of the causes of things, factors attributing to any particular historical event, and the understanding of the nature and cause of any particular event.

Such an acknowledgement could be perceived in his devotion to teaching, in Tunis and Egypt, after a tiresome and extensive political activity. Such alteration could be explained as the outcome of Ibn-Khaldun's conviction that unless the ^cIbars of history are transmitted every politician has to meet his own experience.

These considerations show the impossibility of understanding Ibn-Khaldun the historian, without understanding Ibn-Khaldun the politician. Moreover they show that his study of history presupposed intellectual objectives. They show his dissatisfaction with isolated narratives and information. His main preoccupation was to locate the nature and cause of events and the ^cIbars they convey, as well as to study them and provide explanations for them.

However, his turning to history was not motivated by the desire "to find his standards and goal, or to see how the Idea progressively realizes itself and learn its future course

so that he could join the predetermined course of history. For him, future action cannot be determined by any science. It continues to be the product of an art which requires the knowledge of the end of man and society, and the actual circumstances supplied by history, but which must be perfected through experience. Having equipped himself with such knowledge, it remains the responsibility of the wise men to decide what is best under particular circumstances. He is not relieved of the task of making right choices. History, even when ascertained and explained in the light of the new science of culture, may help the wise man to make a better choice, but it does not and cannot choose for him." ⁽¹⁾

In this respect his concept of *mulk* is intimately related to his study of history at large. *Mulk* is a natural and necessary political organization. It is an outcome of the human need for a restraining authority. As we have seen it is something like a human organism having an end in itself, with a life of its own governed by the law of causality. Moreover it is a political unit that provides for civilization.

When he deals with it he does not show any interest in its patriarchal aspect. In contrast he deals with it with respect to the natural need for coordinate action.

Ibn-Khaldun recognizes that **any** human society is in need of some **means** to restrain its members. In this respect he could not perceive of a primary human association except

(1) Ibid., p. 296.

that of the Bedouins. He acknowledges it as the first form of human association. He asserts that it is in the very nature of such an association to call for an urban settlement and the establishment of mulk as a superior form of political organization.

He looks upon ^caṣābiyah as the basic factor in establishing authority and mulk. Although mulk originates as a result of the forcefulness of a ruler sharing in a dominating ^caṣābiyah, yet a ruler can dispense with its primary cause of being, ^caṣābiyah, once he consolidates his mulk.

His assertion that sound politics demands undivided rule was greatly influenced by the political developments of the Muslim dynasties. He could not perceive in the history of Muslim dynasties any single dynasty ruled by two or more persons. Such perception made him believe that it is in the very nature of political authority to have one and only one forceful ruler exercising power in a dynasty. He justifies his premise by stating that divided rule leads to dissensions and confusion. In this respect he was describing a living trend that featured the Muslim dynasties. In this way we should not be surprised to hear Ibn-Khaldun say that it is in the nature of mulk to monopolize all power leaving nothing to others, and enjoying alone the glory it derives.

In this sense he observed a dynamic chain through which ^caṣābiyah must pass. With the growth and prosperity of a mulk the power of ^caṣābiyah inversely gets weaker. Likewise when a mulk gets weaker other ^caṣābiyāt proportionally get stronger until they are able to actualize mulks representing them.

Each of the stages of mulk reflects itself in the character of its subjects. The first stage of assuming authority and establishing a dynasty reflects the impetus of ^Casabi-yah. The minds of the people remain conditioned by its exertion. Glory is equally shared by all those belonging to it. The second stage of luxuriousness reflects a weakness in the ^Casabi-yah that brought mulk into existence. The ^Casabi-yah gets weakened because luxury corrupts morals and induces evil and depraved habits ending with the praiseworthy qualities which were the sign of domination. This so because it is in the nature of mulk to immerse in luxury and abundance whence it is consolidated. Obedience to the dynasty becomes habitual. The third stage of docility, senility, and inaction stands as the symptom of a dynasty's fate. The king depends on mercenaries, subjects the people to heavy taxation, and immerses in commercial businesses. This stage increases the ruses and deception among the people. The fourth stage of complete breakage of the dynasty reflects the readiness of the people to help other claimors to mulk.

Ibn-Khaldun's acceptance of mulk as a natural organization was in no way a contradiction of his belief in the Caliphate as the best institution reflecting the true purposes of "man". Ibn-Khaldun, as we saw, never questioned the theoretical validity of the Caliphate or doubted its being the fruit of a God-guided and God-centred human organization. He saw that mulk exists even in the Caliphate for Islam is concerned with this worldliness as well as with other worldliness.

In other words while he considers the Caliphate as the Ideal institution that fulfills "man's" destiny, he accepts mulk as an advanced, and natural, stage in political development.

He did not try to challenge the actual existence of mulk by asserting that the Caliphate is the best and most proper institution that should be followed at any time and under any condition. In contrast his realism made him accept both institutions.

He defined the character of the state by the relation of the ruler to the ruled as revealed in the ends on which they are based. Accordingly, he distinguished between three kinds of states:

1. Those concerned with the good of the ruled in this worldliness and in the other worldliness.
2. Those concerned with the mundane good of the ruled.
3. And, those concerned with the mundane good of the ruler.

He called the relation between the ruler and the ruled, "siyāsah" (politeia). In this sense the character of any state is distinguished by the "siyāsah" it follows. He called the "siyāsah" of the first type "siyāsah shar^cīyah", while he called the "siyāsah" of the second and third type "siyāsah ^caqliyah". In this way the criterion in each case is determined by its focus of interest.

Those states that are based on "siyāsah shar^cīyah" are concerned with what pertains to the Hereafter. They have a divine origin and depend on the revealed Laws. Their concern

with the affairs of this world is primarily to guide the people toward Salvation and Bliss in the Hereafter. The belief of the ruled in God and His Laws is their main support. Obedience to them results from inner compulsion. The main example of such an institution is exemplified in the Caliphate which stands as a Vicegerancy on behalf of the Prophet in preserving the religion and ruling the Muslims. It has its origin in the general consensus of the Muslims at Sakīfah. Being as such it is a community duty.

Those states based on "siyāṣah^c aqliyah" and whose concern lies in the mundane interests of the ruled or ruler in this worldliness, depend on "man's" practical reason and experience. They are imposed upon the ruled by other men. They are obeyed due to their forcefulness and the expectation of some satisfaction from the ruler. They are exemplified in mulks which emerge out of the human need for forceful restrainers. As such they are natural and positive in character. The office of kingship is not an elective one. It depends only on the forcefulness of a person sharing a dominating^c aṣabiyah. Such person need not satisfy prescribed conditions. He must be able to impose his authority, force his rule, and acquire the obedience of his subjects.

While in the Caliphate the wāzi^c is religious in nature and the people obey the Imām out of their belief that such obedience constitutes a religious duty, the wāzi^c in mulk need not be religious in character. It depends on the forcefulness of a ruler and on the recognition of the established political norms.

In this manner Ibn-Khaldun does not condemn mulk. In contrast he asserts that it is a natural institution necessary for human existence. It is not reprehensible by the religious laws when it is directed toward "good" and praiseworthy ends. Likewise ^Casabiyyah is not blameworthy when it is guided toward the establishment of God's Word. The religious laws in no way contradict the laws of existence, the natural law of every existing being and thing.

Accordingly, he asserts that the impetus of ^Casabiyyah gets stronger whenever it is shadowed with a religious "Call". Even it is impossible for a religion to expand without the help of a dominating ^Casabiyyah. However, ^Casabiyyah has inevitably recourse back to its intrinsic nature whenever the faith in religion is weakened.

In this way he justified the actual political conditions of his times, namely, the existence of mulks and sultanates, by asserting that the Caliphate underwent a course of transformation. It was transformed into mulk with the weakness of the faith.

With the exception of his discussion of the transformation, he dealt with mulk independently of the Ideal Caliphate. This was due to his perception that mulk existed before Islam, coexisted with Islam, and existed apart from the Caliphate when the faith in religion got weakened.

His contribution to Islamic political thought, in this respect, is seen in his attempt to show how the Caliphate survived in the mulk, and that religion the determining factor in the Caliphate, is as well an important factor in mulk. In

this sense he blends a theological with a power-political concept of the state without abandoning his belief in the Caliphate as the Ideal form of government.

It might seem that his concept of *mulk* abandons his belief in the Caliphate. In fact this is not the case because he sees in the Caliphate two components, namely, a temporal and spiritual. In his concept of transformation he asserts that *mulk* was a natural and inevitable outcome of the weakness that passed over the spiritual component, thus strengthening the temporal component. Even after the transformation of the Caliphate *mulk* was guaranteed by the unity provided by the common reference, Islam, of both the rulers and the ruled.

In this sense he was concerned with the political relevance of religion, rather than with its moral aspects. The combination of temporality and spirituality in the Caliphate was the main aid for formulating his concept of transformation. In contrast to al-Māwardī and Abū Ya^clā, and to some extent al-Ghazzālī, he was not apologetic in his approach. He accepted the actual political conditions without abandoning his belief in the theoretical validity of the Caliphate. He saw that the kind of law that governs a political entity depends on its political and historical situation at any stage of development. However, Islamic civilization and the values of Islam were the determining factors in his evaluations, though his objective was mainly motivated by the desire to inquire into the origins and development of states, ~~as~~ such.

In other words, his concept of transformation seems to have been based on political considerations. It is the ^casabiyyah, as shadowed by its former self, that preserved the Caliphate and not the reality of the shari'ah. His remarks, in these respects, are relative to a certain situation at a particular stage of political development.

Looking upon politics as an aspect of his science of civilization, Ibn-Khaldun saw an intimate relation between mulk and the other aspects constituting civilization, namely, economics, urban life, and physical and geographical set up of a territory.

The fact that he endeavored to describe things as they are rather than they ought to be enabled Ibn-Khaldun to observe certain relations between economics and politics. Such concern is exemplified in his discussion of the profit motive, the influence of various occupations on society and its form, the state, and the influence of economic institutions on political organizations.

Looking upon labor and the desire for gain as a human characteristic, Ibn-Khaldun felt that the loss of such incentives as a result of arbitrary appropriation of property by the ruler through seizure or excessive taxation, slackens enterprise and leads eventually to economic stagnation, social decay, and political degeneration. The prosperity of enterprises in a society add to the prosperity of the state. Likewise the decline of production and enterprise stimulates the decline of a state.

Society is predominantly affected by the occupations of its members, because "man's" character is influenced by the way in which he makes a living. "Man's" freedom to choose his occupation should be sanctioned. Nothing can contribute to civilization and prosperity as one's efforts in his own interests.

Ibn-Khaldun asserts that any change that takes place in one area of behaviour of society, being religious, educational, or economic, necessitates a compensatory change in the political area.

He feels that such geographical factors as climate and soil affect the physical and psychological characteristics of a people. While physical environment sets limits to social development, civilization develops only in the temperate zones. In other words they affect the temperament of the people and their societies.

Although he believes that **tribal** life is not suitable for progress and civilization, he asserts at the same time that urban life which is favorable to civilization, carries in it the seeds of destruction.

In this respect he deduced out of history a fatalistic view of the course of states and dynasties. There are in societies forces that work ceaselessly without stop and beyond human control. They are not subject to capricious modification and they are the cause of the falling and rise of states. He saw that the end of victory is defeat and as a mulk rises it has to fall.

In this way he viewed an endless cycle chain through which states follow in their rise and fall. There is an intelligible sequence, a causal connection and an ascertainable order of development.

Such a sequence shows how pessimism pervaded his thought. Irrespective of his empiricism and objectivity this trend accompanies his observations.

Moreover, he occasionally speaks as a devout Muslim rather than a scientific observer. He sees such an external cyclical movement in society because people do not hold steadfastly to the religious laws. In this sense we may look upon him as a pessimist or determinist having a moral and religious standard.

It should be noted that Ibn-Khaldun's thought, in this respect, is relative to the particular circumstances of his own time and place.

In his concept of rulership we can see his attempt to consolidate things by applying the Golden rule and by prescribing that justice should be observed. Moreover we can see how he stresses the need to respect a person's essential rights, namely, life, property, progeny, conviction and religion, and how he lays down that the office of a ruler is a trusteeship on behalf of the community. In such token Ibn-Khaldun seems to be defining what constitutes an Ideal ruler who is really concerned with the interests of his people and their well being.

It should be noted that Ibn-Khaldun was among the rare Muslim thinkers who recognized the state, as exemplified in *mulk*, as an independent political institution. Although he does not provide us with a sharp distinction between society

and state, respectively, we can deduce out of his considerations that a state must have a government, a population, a territory, and power to enforce its rule..

He sees these factors as being intimately related and interdependent on each other. Moreover, he sees that the strength of each is relative to the strength of the others. The numerical strength of the people contributes to a state's power as exemplified in its ^Casabiya. Likewise the strength of an ^Casabiya determines the extent of a state's territory. The numerical strength of the people, the forcefulness of their ^Casabiya, and the extension of their territory necessarily results in a powerful government.

In all these respects Ibn-Khaldun was reflecting the nature of his times, when power depended mainly on the numerical strength of a people and their determined resolution to press common claims.

As a last point Ibn-Khaldun approached his questionings as a Muslim. In this respect his moral values were determined for him, and thus could be looked upon as a Muslim thinker. His contribution to Islamic thought in particular, and world thought in general can not be disregarded. "Ibn-Khaldun's star shines the more brightly by contrast with the foil of darkness against which it flashes out; for while Thucydides and Machievelli and Clarendon are all brilliant representatives of brilliant times and places, Ibn-Khaldun is the sole point of light in his quarter of the firmament. He is indeed the one outstanding personality

in the history of a civilization whose social life on the
whole was 'solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.'⁽¹⁾

(1) Toynbee, Arnold; A Study of History, pps. 321-322.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BIBLIOGRAPHY

ARABIC SOURCES:

- Al-Bāqillānī, Abī Bakr Muh. Bin Al-Taib, Al-Tamhīd Fil Rād,
Dār Al-Fikr Al-^cArabi, Cairo, 1947.
- Enan, Muhammad A. Ibn-Khaldun Hayātuḥu Wa Turāthuhu Al-Fikrī,
Maṭba at Misr, Cairo, 1953.
- Al-Farā', Abū Ya^clā Muh. Bin Al-Hussein, Al-Ahkām al-Sultānī-
yah, Imp. Halabī, Cairo, 1938.
- Al-Ghazzālī, Abū Ḥamid, Al-Tibr Al-Masbuk Fi Nasihat Al-Muluk,
Maṭba at Al-'Adab Wal Mu'aid, Egypt, 1317 (H).
- _____, Kitāb Al-'Iqtisād Fil 'Iṭiqād, Maṭba^c at
Al-Sa^cadah, Egypt, 1327 (H).
- Bouthoul, Gaston, Ibn-Khaldun (Falsafatuhu Al-'Ijtima^ciyah),
Trans. Zuayter, Adel, Dār 'Ihya' Al-Kutub Al-^cArabi-
yah, Cairo, 1955.
- Grunebaune, Gustave E. Hadārat Al-Islām, Trans. ^cAbd Al-^cAziz
Jawid, Dār Misr Lil Tibā^ca, Cairo, 1956.
- Husarī, Saṭi^c, Dirāsāt An Muqaddimat Ibn-Khaldun, Dār Al-
Ma^carif Bi Masr, Cairo, 1953.
- Hussein, Taha, Falsafat Ibn-Khaldun Al-'Ijtima^ciyah, Trans.
Enan, Muh. A., Maṭba at Al-'I^ctimād, Cairo, 1925.
- Ibn-Khaldun, A.R., Tārīkh Al-^cAlāmah Ibn-Khaldun, V: I, Dar
Al-Kitāb Al-Lubnānī, Beirut, 1961.
- _____, Al-Ta^crīf Bi Ibn-Khaldun, ed. Muh., Al-Tanjī,
Lajnat Al-Ta^c'līf Wal Tarjamah Wal Nashr, Cairo, 1951.
- _____, Muqaddimat Al-^cAlāmah Ibn-Khaldun, Al-Maṭ-
ba^ca Al-'Adabiyah, Beirut, 1900.
- _____, Muqaddimat Ibn-Khaldun, Lajnat Al-Bayān
Al-^cArabi, Cairo, 1958.
- _____, Lubāb Al-Muḥasil, Dār Al-Tibā^ca Al-Maghri-
biyah, Taṭwan, 1952.
- Imām, Al-Haramain, Kitāb Al-'Irshād, Maktebat Al-Khanjī, Cairo,
1950.

Al-Jur, Khalīl, Tārīkh Al-Falsafah Al-^cArabīyah, V: II, Dār Al-Mā^cārif Bi Bayrut, 1958.

Al-Māwardī, Abī Al-Ḥasan^c Alī Bin Muḥ. Ibn-Ḥabīb Al-Baṣarī Al-Baghdādī, Al-Abkām al-Sultānīyah Wal-Wilāyat Al-Dīnīyah, Al-Mahmūdīyah Press, Egypt. (n.d.)

Nader, Albert N., Les Principales Sectes Musulmanes, Imp. Catholique, Beirut, (n.d.)

Yāzījī, Kamāl, Al-^clam Al-Falsafah Al-^cArabīyah, Lajnat Al-Tā'īlī Al-Madrāsī, Beirut, 1957.

ENGLISH AND FRENCH SOURCES

Arnold, Thomas W., The Caliphate, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1924.

Chambliss, Rollin, Social Thought From Hammurabi to Comte, Holt Dryden, N. Y., 1954.

Enan, Muhammed A., Ibn-Khaldun His Life and Work, Kashmiri Bazar, Lahore, 1946.

Ezzat, Abd Al-Aziz, Ibn-Khaldun et sa Science Sociale, Imp. C. Thomas & Co., Le Caire, 1947.

Farrukh, Omar A., The Arab Genius in Science and Philosophy, American Committee of Learned Societies, Washington D. C., 1954.

Bouthoul, Gaston, Ibn-Khaldoun (Sa Philosophie Sociale), Librairie Orientale Paul Geuthner, Paris, 1930.

Ibn-Khaldun, A.R. The Muqaddimah, trans. by Franz Rosenthal, V: I, Bollingen Foundation, N. Y., 1958.

_____, The Muqaddimah, trans. by Franz Rosenthal, V: II, Bollingen Foundation, N. Y., 1958.

_____, The Muqaddimah, trans. by Franz Rosenthal, V: III, Bollingen Foundation, N. Y., 1958.

Issawi, Charles, An Arab Philosophy of History, Murray, London, 1958.

Lewis, Bernard, The Arabs In History, Hutchinson's University Library, London, 1950.

Mahdi, Muhsin, Ibn-Khaldun's Philosophy of History, Allen & Unwin Ltd., London, 1957.

Rahman, F., Prophecy of Islam, Allen & Unwin Ltd., London, 1958.

Rosenthal, Erwin, Political Thought In Medieval Islam, Cambridge, 1958.

Schmidt, Nathaniel, Ibn-Khaldun, Historian, Sociologist, And Philosopher, Columbia University Press, N. Y., 1930.

Toynbee, Arnold J., A Study of History, V: III, University Press, Oxford, 1948.

Flint, Robert, History of the Philosophy of History, Charles Scribner's Son, N. Y., 1894.

ARTICLES:

Binder, Leonard, "Al-Ghazali And Islamic Government", The Muslim World, V: XLV, July 1955, pps. 229-241.

Gibb, H.A.R., "The Islamic Background Of Ibn-Khaldun's Political Theory", Bulletin of the School Of Oriental And African Studies, V: II, 1933, pps. 23-31.

Lambton, Ann K. S., "The Theory of Kingship in the Nasihat ul-Muluk of Al-Ghazali", Islamic Quarterly, V: I, i.