



AMERICAN UNIVERSITY OF BEIRUT

MINORITY ALLIANCES, GROUP IDENTITY AND  
INTERGROUP RELATIONS: MARONITE AND DRUZE  
PERCEPTIONS TOWARDS THE STATE OF ISRAEL

by  
JEFFREY GHASSAN KARAM

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for the degree of Master of Arts  
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
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
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# AN ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS OF

Jeffrey Ghassan Karam for Master of Arts  
Major: Political Studies

Title: Minority Alliances, Group Identity and Intergroup Relations: Maronite and Druze Perceptions Toward the state of Israel

The main objective of this thesis is to determine the relationship between group identity and intergroup relations and perceptions. It deals with the perceptions of the state of Israel by Lebanese Maronite and Druze college students. More importantly, it intends to examine the modern day perceptions of these college students towards the state of Israel, the Jewish community and the Peace Process. The perceptions will be weighed and measured in light of historical actualities and realities.

These perceptions will be assessed and evaluated in the general context of the evolution of relations between Lebanon and Israel. A historical survey will cover the relations between Lebanese minority groups and the Zionists starting in 1920 – in the Yishuv Period – and ending in 1985 – following Israel’s withdrawal to the Security Belt. Additionally, the prospects of peace between Lebanon and Israel will be investigated in light of the data that emerges from survey research. This form of quantitative research is necessary to retrieve modern day opinions and attitudes.

The historical survey of the study at hand illustrated several important historical landmarks that shaped the relations between the Maronites and the Druze with the state of Israel. Additionally, several historical incidents provided for these minorities to form alliances in their attempt to counter common perceived threats in light of their perceived self – identity. The constant existential threats in the period at hand – 1920 – 1985 - mainly emerged from the Muslim communities in Palestine and Lebanon in the Yishuv Period and the Palestinian communities in Lebanon and Israel.

The findings indicated that the overwhelming majority of the surveyed college students favor and encourage peace between Lebanon and Israel. More importantly, these respondents claim that peace between Lebanon and Israel provides economic benefit and gain for both parties. Additionally, the vast majority of the respondents have firm belief that peace between Lebanon and Israel is an important benchmark and actuality in context of the Arab – Israeli Conflict. These respondents believe that peace between Lebanon and Israel is an essential component for overall success in the Peace Process.

## PREFACE

Chapter 1 primarily deals with the socio – political composition of the Middle East and Lebanon’s confessional actuality. It highlights the essential role minorities play in the development of events within the Lebanese system, thus emphasizing the importance of studying minorities’ intergroup relations, self – perceptions and attitudes towards the state of Israel. The main research questions focus on determining the relationship between group identity and intergroup relations.

Chapter 2 primarily deals with the historical framework of relations between the state of Israel and the Maronites. In addition, the historical determinants of these relations will be highlighted for the discussion and analysis of the findings and results.

Chapter 3 primarily deals with the historical framework of relations between the state of Israel and the Druze. Moreover, the historical determinants of these relations will be discussed for the discussion and analysis of the results and findings.

Chapter 4 primarily deals with the theoretical framework of the study. The pertinent review of literature is essential for designing an appropriate research instrument. The main components of this chapter deal with the theoretical dimensions of group identity and intergroup relations.

Chapter 5 primarily deals with the methodological aspects of the study. The operationalization of the research questions will be thoroughly discussed in light of transforming the research variables into measurable factors. Additionally, the contours of the questionnaire and quality of the findings will be discussed.

Chapter 6 primarily deals with discussing the data that was collected from survey research. The findings will be investigated according to the components of the main argument. The findings and results will be discussed and explored for the necessary analysis.

Chapter 7 primarily deals with analyzing and examining the findings in light of the proposed research hypotheses and assumptions. Additionally, the modern day perceptions and attitudes of the respondents will be assessed in light of the historical determinants mentioned in earlier chapters.

Chapter 8 will primarily assess and evaluate the relevancy of the findings in light of the existing studies on the subject at hand. More importantly, the research assumptions that need to be revisited in future endeavors will be mentioned. This chapter will provide guidelines for future research on variables related to the evolution of Lebanese – Israeli relations.

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To My Loving Mother Graziella

# CHAPTER 1

## INTRODUCTION

### **A. Main Objective**

The main objective of this thesis is to determine the relationship between group identity and intergroup relations. This thesis deals with the perceptions of the state of Israel by Lebanese Maronites and Druze. In addition, it intends to examine the modern day perceptions of Maronite and Druze College students toward the state of Israel, the Jews and the Peace Process, in light of the historical evolution of relations between Lebanon and Israel. The combination of the latter research variables provides the necessary structure for investigating and exploring historical actualities and modern day perceptions. Additionally, it provides grounds for exploring the prospects of peace between Lebanon and Israel in context of the Arab – Israeli conflict. This author intends to examine these attitudes and perceptions mainly through conducting survey research.

### ***1. Introduction***

Chapter I primarily deals with a concise overview of the geopolitical makeup of the Middle East. More importantly, there will be a focus on the religious composition of the system that finds relevance in the long years of colonial dominion and foreign intervention. The confessional system that prevailed in the most of the emerging nation states in the Middle East produced a political and economic system of competing minority and majority groups. The geopolitical structure of the region came to be defined based on the compositions and dynamics of these various groups. The historical and modern path of the Lebanese state is shaped by its minorities. This chapter attempts

to portray Lebanon's interactions and relations with its local and regional environment in the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The two Lebanese minority groups: the Maronites and the Druze, will be chosen as the focus groups for studying the relations within Lebanon and themselves, and relations with Israel<sup>1</sup>. Several research questions arise from observing these groups, leading to the creation of an instrument of study to assess and measure intergroup relations and their interactions with Israel.

It is noteworthy to mention that there exist different approaches to studying the geopolitical structure of the Middle East. However, for the purpose of the study at hand – Lebanese – Israeli relations – it becomes crucial to assess the situation from a 'minority approach'. This approach provides the framework for the informal and covert relations between different Lebanese minorities and the state of Israel. The state of Israel was created on grounds that the Zionist Jewish minority would assume power and leadership in light of creating a homogenous society based on the ideals of one minority group – Zionist Jews. Even when the state of Israel deals with non – state actors – minority groups – existing in different nation – states, it remains justifiable to mention that the relations between Israel and Lebanese minorities is understood as relations between different minorities. The Zionists in the Yishuv period sought alliances and partnerships with Lebanese groups, remained the same group that later formed the state of Israel. As a result, it becomes justifiable to claim that the evolution of the Zionist minority in the Yishuv Period to the establishment of the state of Israel preserved its characteristics as a 'minority group'. This minority group evolved into the creation of the state dominated by this specific minority.

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<sup>1</sup> The reason behind choosing these minority groups will be later justified and explored in Chapter I.

## **B. Research Justification**

The ability to study and observe the relations between Lebanon and Israel can only be done through examining the body of contacts between the Zionist Jews and different minority groups – mainly Maronites and Druze. These contacts originated as early as the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century<sup>2</sup>. The reason for choosing these groups – among others - is deeply interrelated to existing facts that emerge from historical realities and actualities.

More importantly, these relations – between minority groups – primarily find legacy in Zionist political thinking. The Zionists have always contended that an isolationist attitude will keep the Jewish ‘homeland’ in Palestine under continuous threat from the neighboring Arab countries. As a result, they were willing to give support and assistance to any minority or group that will help break their walls of seclusion<sup>3</sup>. For that specific purpose, Zionist policy makers proposed the formation of minority alliances<sup>4</sup>. The initial condition for these alliances was that these minorities should have firm belief that they share common interests, objectives and goals with the Zionists. Furthermore, the Zionists extended their invitation to include all individuals, groups, agencies and states that would support the emergence of a separate Jewish homeland. Many partial factions of homogenously confessional and political groups favored the emergence of a Jewish state. These confessional and political factions were

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<sup>2</sup> The historical overview of the relations between the Maronites, Druze and the state of Israel will be thoroughly discussed and explored in Chapters II and III.

<sup>3</sup> Kirsten Schulze (1998), *Israel’s Covert Diplomacy in Lebanon*, pp. 1 – 10.

<sup>4</sup> Laurie Eisenberg (1994), *My Enemy’s Enemy: Lebanon in the Early Zionist Imagination, 1900 – 1948*, pp. 28 – 37.

mainly supportive in light of the personal and economic benefits that might emerge from collaboration with the Zionists.

The prospect of examining relations between these minorities and not interstate relations is specifically grounded in the fact that Lebanon and Israel have only one official state level agreement: the Armistice Agreement of 1949<sup>5</sup>. Apart from this official agreement, all the other forms of relations took place between leaders and members of these communities and Israeli officials. Therefore, it is not realistic to study inter –state relations between Lebanon and Israel because such relations do not exist.

The specific interest in exploring Maronite – Israeli relations is deeply rooted in understanding Maronite ethos<sup>6</sup>. It is noteworthy to mention that the Maronite community has never been unified in its political vision or orientation. As a result, it is crucial to understand that in context of Maronite – Israeli relations, this ethos is defined as the segment of individuals or smaller groups in the Maronite community that nurtured and favored relations with the Zionists and the state of Israel. It does not represent in any form the overall and unified orientation or guiding beliefs of the Maronite community.

For that purpose studying Maronite relations with Israel heavily depends on their belief in common aspirations and ideals that shape their perceived self identity as non Arabs. More importantly, they share a common fear from the Arab Muslims. They commonly share aspects of survival that emerge from existential threats. The Maronite

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<sup>5</sup> Apart from the Armistice Agreement in 1949, the most recent attempt to formulate an official interstate agreement was the May 17 1983 Agreement that was abrogated in 1984.

<sup>6</sup> Ethos is defined as the distinguishing character, sentiment, moral nature or guiding beliefs of a person, group or institution. The definition of ethos is taken from Merriam – Webster Online Dictionary. (<http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ethos>).

Church had extensively supported the creation of a separatist Jewish entity in Palestine in the Yishuv Period<sup>7</sup>. Throughout Lebanon's history a blend of Maronite political and military leaders formed alliances with Israel on the grounds that they were "only natural". In addition, Israeli officials vibrantly felt that Lebanon's pluralistic society curses it with a fragile system wherein the Maronites would never be fully assimilated. As a result, they would always feel threatened and would seek a regional power that supports their political dominance. Ben Gurion lavishly argued that Israel finds the Lebanese Maronites as "natural allies" in their vision and aspiration for creating a state in a surrounding Arab Muslim majority. Through history different segments in the Maronite community have extended their support extensively- in comparison to other groups- to the state of Israel, in light of their interests.

On the other hand, the Druze constitute as another minority with which the Zionist entity sought to create alliances. This element is assessed by understanding Druze transnational identity that has maintained their existence and through their perception of communal survival patterns in the Middle East mainly in Israel, Lebanon and Syria. The spread of the Druze population in these countries exposes the underlying causes for the different forms of alliances they undertook for the conservation of their perceived self - identity. The capacity to safeguard their political and social autonomy remains as one the fundamental tenets of their identity. In Israel, members of the Druze community are allowed to serve in the Israel Defense Forces and as a result are given relatively similar rights in comparison to the Israeli Jews. More importantly, they have accepted Israeli nationality and constitute one of the important elite groups within the

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<sup>7</sup> Yishuv Period is defined as the 'Jewish settlement in the Land of Israel' referring to the body of Jewish residents in the 'Holy Land' before the establishment of the state of Israel. (<http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/isdf/text/halamish.html>)

Israel Defense Forces that maintains and fights for Israel's existence. On the other hand, the Druze minority in the Golan Heights are not Israeli citizens and have refused the similar fate of their brethren in Israel. In addition, the Syrian Druze community is garishly supportive of the Syrian regime and consists of fervent citizens in the Syrian nation. It is noteworthy to mention that the situation of the Druze in Syria is different from Lebanon and Israel. As a result, this form of political equilibrium has maintained the survival of the Druze community in all three states. More importantly, in Lebanon the Druze frequently followed the vision of "natural alliances" with Israel frequently, specifically when they felt they were faced with existential dilemmas<sup>8</sup> exerted by other groups – mainly the Maronites. This existential dilemma that transcends national and state borders has created a unified political vision and stance for the Druze in the Middle East. On several occasions, the Israeli Druze lobbied their government for the support of the Lebanese Druze. In addition, Syrian Druze members hastily rushed to Lebanon to support the Druze in the Mountain War<sup>9</sup>. The ability to understand Druze – Israeli relations is primarily possible through understanding these forms of relations in Lebanon, Syria and Israel alike. More importantly, any attempt to study the Druze community in Syria or Israel should focus on studying the Druze in Lebanon. There is mutual and concrete acceptance that the heart of the Druze community in the Middle East is Lebanon.

The Maronites and Druze share fairly common traits and characteristics that have helped shape their history and political discourse. These minorities have always

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<sup>8</sup> These existential dilemmas mainly include existence and survival fears.

<sup>9</sup> Theodor Hanf (1993), *Coexistence in Wartime Lebanon: Decline of a State and Rise of a Nation*, p. 277



had divisions on crucial political and socio – economic affairs that led to bloody massacres. Nevertheless, they maintained good economic relations. More importantly, this method of ‘Para – diplomatic’ maneuvering exercised by the Maronites and Druze creates an essential platform for comparing these groups. Moreover, the Druze communities in Lebanon, Israel and Syria have been able to maintain and safeguard its identity, in light of its alliances with other groups and fundamentally its support to the states it was part of. Moreover, the Maronites have practiced similar diplomatic maneuvering in Lebanon, where different Maronite groups create and form alliances with other groups internally and regionally<sup>10</sup>. The embodiment of these forms of alliances among these three minorities finds spirit in the notable Middle Eastern and tribal adage: “my enemy’s enemy is my friend”.

### ***1. Research Questions***

The Maronite and Druze of Lebanon have had their share of alliances with the Zionists at various time periods in the history of Lebanon and the Middle East. How were these alliances shaped and in what specific circumstances and time periods did they flourish? What factors defined the relationships between the Maronite and Druze, the Maronite and Israel, and the Druze and Israel? More importantly, how are these relationships still relevant today and how are they viewed from the perspective of the Lebanese minorities, the Druze and the Maronites?

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<sup>10</sup> Examples of these alliances include the Memorandum of Understanding between the Free Patriotic Movement and Hezbollah. In addition, the alternative alliance between the Lebanese Forces and the Future Movement. These internal alliances have an additional regional scope. The 1<sup>st</sup> example finds spirit in an alliance with Syria and Iran, while the other finds spirit in an alliance with the United States and Saudi Arabia.

## ***2. Main Argument***

The required approach for dealing with the mentioned research questions requires two relative dimensions. This approach involves two correlated dimensions that need to be addressed separately in ‘essence’ and connectedly in ‘product’. The ability to investigate the level of intergroup relations requires a thorough exploration of group dynamics and interactions. It is crucial to develop the structure that allows for groups and individuals to interact within any given system. Therefore, the first dimension of this twofold argument requires a thorough investigation of the nature and structure of intergroup relations within a given system. The dynamics of group identity are crucial in understanding how individuals perceive themselves within their relative units and how they perceive others in distinct groups. As a result, it becomes vital to institute the contours of group behavior and attitude that would eventually serve the purpose of conducting survey research. The practicality in conducting survey research requires support from theoretical evidence that provides the basic elements for measuring perceptions and attitudes to any relative concept or phenomena.

The second dimension of this twofold argument emerges from providing the theoretical contours of group dynamics and behavior. The ability to observe the evolution of relations between Lebanon and Israel requires three fundamental components. The first component involves understanding the foundations of Zionist diplomacy that persistently call for an interventionist approach in dealing with Arab nation – states. This approach was modeled after the ‘divide and conquer’ strategy. (See Figure 1.1)<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>11</sup> This strategy will be further explored and investigated in Chapter II and III.




Fig. 1.1- The Elements of Zionist Diplomacy

The second component involves understanding minority fears and concerns<sup>12</sup> and how and why groups form ‘minority alliances’ against a common perceived threat<sup>13</sup>. These forms of alliances depict the ‘sense of – direct and indirect - commonality’ between minority groups. The third component entails the perception of group and self – identity within the framework of intergroup relations that includes mutual interests and aspirations<sup>14</sup>. The perceived self – identity of groups explains how these individuals identify the ‘other’ and how they support their ‘logic’ for dealing with this group specifically. (See Figure 1.2)

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<sup>12</sup> The nature of these fears and concerns as expressed in Lebanon (Maronites and Druze)

<sup>13</sup> The dimensions of group survival and continuity

<sup>14</sup> These mutual interests involve economic, security and ideological elements




Fig. 1.2- The Dynamics of Commonality

### C. Background of Middle Eastern Politics

The wealth of information on the Middle East includes all forms of open- ended speculations, qualitative studies, assertions, opinions, and empirical findings that aim to answer a body of questions and inquests. An investigative study of any issue pertaining to the Middle East will always attract individuals, because it is constantly in swamps of brawls and showdowns. The depiction of these countless rivalries has been pinned to various incidents that have produced variable outcomes. As a result, there have always been conjectures and distant assumptions on how to reshape these pools of differences that will pave way for peace and stability. A major problem with the diagnostic reasoning of the causes of the different conflicts has been left primarily to non – Middle Easterners and individuals conducting armchair research. The studies on practical and pragmatic resolutions have been largely carried out by investigators that have little or

irrelevant experience to the history of these contending nations in the Middle East.

However, there should be an acknowledgement that these forms of investigations have provided several important elements that constitute pieces in the larger picture.

The diversification in the field of studies from different backgrounds has provided numerous approaches to understanding the nature of Middle Eastern politics. Therefore, there has not been an accurate benchmark that can be utilized to rationally weigh the cause and effects of the long history of protracted conflicts. However, there has been an attempt to romanticize and idealize some major factors that have interrelatedness, presumably at least. In additional support for studying the region from a minority approach', Gabriel Ben – Dor<sup>15</sup> (1977) asserts that the region has served as a “naturally given laboratory”, where there exists a variety of similar features between the different groups; however, these similarities have evolved into distinctions that helped form “tremendous diversity within its bounds {Middle East} makes it susceptible to intra – as well as inter – region comparisons”.

### ***1. General Background of the Middle East***

The land cannot support both victor and vanquished. The terrain is barren, the water scarce... an unspoken commandment echoes through the region: destroy your enemy or see him rise again to steal your well and cut your throat. Victory in battle is not enough; one has to annihilate the enemy.  
Steve Posner<sup>16</sup>

The general understanding in the Middle East and specifically in the Levant is that the majority of the problems are studied through the overall depiction of the Arab – Israeli conflict. The long years of struggle between the Arabs themselves, have been

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<sup>15</sup> Gabriel Ben – Dor (1977), Political Culture Approach to Middle East Politics, p. 44

<sup>16</sup> Steve Posner (1987), Israel Undercover: Secret Warfare and Hidden Diplomacy in the Middle East, p. 1

transposed to continuous struggle against the Jewish state. The source of problems in the Middle East mainly includes territorial expansion, security objectives and resource acquisition. These problems have been mainly introduced by long years of colonial and imperial ambition in the region.

The composition of the different Middle Eastern states originates from the makeup created by the foreign contending players in the region. Each colonial power had dominion over a certain geographic spot that constituted part of their empire. As a result, the people residing in these regions were under direct influence<sup>17</sup> that encompassed cultural and religious spheres. The main players in the Middle East before the awakening of different nationalisms were mainly European powers and the Ottoman Empire. These international hegemonies shaped the region according to their motives and aspirations. Furthermore, these international powers favored certain groups based on an array of preferences. However, the dominant preference had roots in religious inclinations. More importantly, the fall of direct colonial rule and hegemony on the Middle East – following the end of World War I - ignited a nationalist spark for all the different minorities. Harald Suermann<sup>18</sup> (1998) contends that the “shaping power of the dhimmi status... and the millet<sup>19</sup> system of the Ottoman Empire led to the self – conception of the confessional groups as nations”. Furthermore, these newly emerged

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<sup>17</sup> This influence came in form a ‘mandate’.

<sup>18</sup> Harald Suermann (1998), *Maronite Historiography and Ideology*, p. 129.

<sup>19</sup> Benjamin Braude (2000), *Foundation Myths of the Millet System*, p. 69. Braude defines millet as “religiously defined people”.

nations<sup>20</sup> conceptualized a perceived national identity based on the dimensions of: ethnicity, culture, geography and history<sup>21</sup>.

The dynamics of favorable attitudes towards one group provoked other entities in their belief to feel marginalized. As a result, the local groups became dependent on foreign interference that would ensure their survival. The long years of support for groups against each other and the pursuit of imperial ambition left the region's fate directly linked to that of the colonial powers... As a result, internal conflict between the international players had direct effects on the relations between the different Middle Eastern groups.

The collapse of the Ottoman Empire paved the way for territorial allocation between the major European players – the United Kingdom, France and Russia. The San Remo Conference<sup>22</sup> ensured these players could exercise their spheres of influence and more importantly guarantee their share of interest in the region. The different Middle Eastern groups fell between the crafted territorial allocations agreed upon between the hegemons. With the exception of the region of Palestine that was slated for international administration, all the other regions were left to the powers to divide and decide future state boundaries.

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<sup>20</sup> These newly emerged nations produced different nationalistic orientations – different forms of nationalism.

<sup>21</sup> Mordechai Nisan (2002), *Minorities in the Middle East: A History of Struggle and Self - Expression*, pp. 13 – 16.

<sup>22</sup> The San Remo Conference that began on April 19 and ended on April 26, 1920 ‘determined the allocation of mandates for administration of the former Ottoman – ruled lands of the Middle East’ ([http://www.palestinefacts.org/pf\\_ww1\\_arab\\_result.php](http://www.palestinefacts.org/pf_ww1_arab_result.php))

The geopolitical makeup of the Middle East should be understood in light of the Sykes – Picot Agreement and more importantly the 1917 Balfour Declaration<sup>23</sup>. The fundamental reason the region of Palestine was left for international administration is directly related to Lord Balfour’s promise that favored the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine. Great Britain’s support for establishing a Jewish homeland introduced one of the earliest struggles that would follow. In addition, Ralph Crow<sup>24</sup> (1962) contends that for centuries, Middle Eastern societies hosted different “semi – autonomous communities, each of which lived according to its own custom and frequently in a distinct fashion”. Religion became the primary factor that embodied these customs, norms and values. Furthermore, the international powers began establishing state boundaries according to a spool of interests and concerns.

#### **D. Background of Lebanon**

Lebanon comprises a patchwork of religious communities. Its hallmark is the absence of national integration.

Robert Rabil<sup>25</sup>

While it is an exaggeration to hold that all things political in Lebanon are fundamentally religious, it is nevertheless, true that any explanation of Lebanese politics will be incomplete unless the role of religious attitude and organizations are taken into account.

Ralph Crow<sup>26</sup>

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<sup>23</sup> The Balfour Declaration of 1917 was a formal statement that favored the establishment in Palestine of ‘a national home for the Jewish people’ (<http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace%20Process/Guide%20to%20the%20Peace%20Process/The%20Balfour%20Declaration>)

<sup>24</sup> Ralph Crow (1962), *Religious Sectarianism in the Lebanese Political System*, p. 492

<sup>25</sup> Robert Rabil (2003), *Embattled Neighbors: Syria, Israel and Lebanon*, p. 46.

<sup>26</sup> Crow, p. 489.



The formal boundaries of Lebanon have undergone two different formations. On September 1, 1920, French General Gouraud proclaimed the establishment of Greater Lebanon. The geographic landscape of Greater Lebanon included the former territory of Mount Lebanon, in addition to territories that were formerly under Ottoman rule. These territories mainly included Tripoli, Sidon and the Bekaa Valley. The original sectarian composition of Mount Lebanon mainly included Maronites and Druze. However, under the French Mandate the borders were expanded to include vital regions for agricultural production. These additional territories were heavily populated with Muslim inhabitants. In 1943, in collaborative efforts between the Maronites and Sunnis – drafted in the National Pact - Lebanon was declared as an independent nation - state. The main component of the National Pact was that it constituted a power – sharing agreement based on a confessional structure. The Pact enticed that the religious communities would share adequate and equal power in the political institutions, yet vital political positions and powers were reserved for the Maronites exclusively.

It should be noted that the historical and geographic composition of Lebanon has always followed religious and confessional lines. During the Ottoman Empire and under French request, the district of Mount Lebanon was given relative autonomy. Itamar Rabinovich (1985) on describing Mount Lebanon claims that it became “l’asile du Liban”, a safe haven for minorities<sup>27</sup>. Many groups<sup>28</sup> that fled religious persecution sought Lebanon as a refuge and place for religious diversity and freedom. All the confessional groups in Mount Lebanon were able to practice their religious practices freely and more importantly were able to attain economic benefits, mainly through agriculture.

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<sup>27</sup> Itamar Rabinovich (1985), *The War for Lebanon, 1970 – 1985*, p. 22

<sup>28</sup> These groups included mainly the Maronites, Druze, Shiites and Jews.

The composition of Lebanon has always included confessional groups with different religious backgrounds. During Ottoman Rule, non – Sunni individuals and groups felt marginalized in the system and as a result were inclined to separate themselves in their desire to survive. This form of separation was encouraged by foreign support that took different forms<sup>29</sup> from different players that had strategic interests in the region. Furthermore, as William Harris (1997) claims “sectarian identifications and frictions” were embossed and highlighted with European intervention in the 19<sup>th</sup> century. For that purpose, sectarianism became the “main obsession of Lebanese political life, debilitating the Lebanese political entity”<sup>30</sup>. As a result, religious divisions aggravated and augmented locally, when these foreign powers disagreed internationally. A classical example is the 1860 civil war between the Maronites and Druze. These minorities had coexisted for numerous years, and the nature of their conflict was not solely religious. However, it enticed numerous dimensions, mainly including a class struggle between the feudal lords and the commoners. In addition, the main catalysts in what explains sources of conflict that extend beyond a religious scope are principles of: social change and mobilization, repression and conflict<sup>31</sup>. However, the direct intervention of the foreign players translated this conflict into intercommunal strife. Colonial rule helped nurture a form of foreign dependency that emerging nation – states have always been victims of. More importantly, the Lebanese state is considered as a direct product “of colonial scramble”<sup>32</sup>.

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<sup>29</sup> One of the classical examples is education. Protestant and Catholic missionaries established universities, mainly the American University of Beirut and the University of Saint Joseph.

<sup>30</sup> William Harris (1997), *Faces of Lebanon: Sects, Wars, and Global Extensions*, p. 42

<sup>31</sup> Nisan, p. 16 – 17

<sup>32</sup> Hanf, p. 49

The nature of struggle and conflict in the Lebanese state could be comprehended by the conceptualization of fear that has taken hold of the different minority groups constituting society. This type of fear involves numerous acts of bitterness, resentment, fierceness, and hostility<sup>33</sup>. In addition to the dimensions of conflict, Theodor Hanf<sup>34</sup> (1993) contends “as a rule, conflicts are fueled by many forces: economic interests and cleavages, ideals and ambitions, convictions, jealousy and envy; any analysis of conflicts should consider these factors separately and jointly”. Furthermore, minority groups are defined “as a collection of persons in the population of a given state or given region who are numerically inferior or politically powerless. They identify themselves through a shared language, culture or religion, or a combination of these factors”<sup>35</sup>. All minority groups attempted to dominate the system in their capacity to impose a form of rule and ideology, yet history enumerates that this has never been possible in Lebanon. The political – communal nature of Lebanese politics is similar to understanding the functioning of politics in general: the distribution of power and wealth<sup>36</sup>. As a result, the fragile composition of the Lebanese system gives adequate precedence for conflicts to follow. The shaky grounds and covert interests in the National Pact act as the starting point in dissecting the communal problems that have shaped periods of war and relative peace. Nevertheless, the National Pact was a fundamental oral agreement that provided the Lebanese state with a framework for a functioning democracy<sup>37</sup>.

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<sup>33</sup> Ibid, p. 5

<sup>34</sup> Ibid, p. 5

<sup>35</sup> Kirsten Schulze, Martin Stokes, and Colm Campbell (1996), *Nationalism, Minorities and Diasporas: Identities and Rights in the Middle East*, p. 1.

<sup>36</sup> Hanf, p. 32

<sup>37</sup> Ibid, p. 192

Another crucial dimension in understanding communal strife in Lebanon, according to Michael Hudson<sup>38</sup> (1976) is deeply related to “corporate identities... colored by historical memories of persecution or revanchism as well as deep prejudice against the neighboring communities – religious, ethnic, tribal, or racial”. The precarious nature of the Lebanese confessional system made it facile for foreign states to intervene, dominate and support local actors against each other. The clash of ideological trends<sup>39</sup> contending within the region could not spare this small fragmented country. The Lebanese republic seemed to be “artificial and archaic, built on shaky demographic and political foundations; therefore, doomed to be destroyed by domestic and external foes of its political system”<sup>40</sup>. These trends include all form of nationalisms that varied in scope and mission that encompassed all state boundaries. The recognized clash in nationalisms within the Lebanese society was mainly divided into: Arab nationalism and Lebanese nationalism. In reality, the Maronites favored a Western orientation and the Muslims favored Arab orientation – Syrian and Egyptian. More importantly, within the same array of competing nationalisms, Zionism emerged as a contending school of thought. As a result, the absence of a cohesive Lebanese identity forced the different groups to align with the different contending groups. The groups were inclined to support trends and ideals that took precedence over national interests. These inclinations and tendencies were fundamentally essential for group survival within a weak state “enjoying a quasi – democratic system, it became a playground for competing

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<sup>38</sup> Michael Hudson (1976), *The Lebanese Crisis: The Limits of Consociational Democracy*, p. 111.

<sup>39</sup> These trends included mainly Syrian Social Nationalism, Arab Nationalism, Pan Arabism, and Lebanese Social Nationalism.

<sup>40</sup> Rabinovich, p. 17

movements in the Arab world”<sup>41</sup>. The perfect axiom that could symbolize the differences within the Lebanese community finds spirit in the “well worn adage: my enemy’s enemy is my friend”<sup>42</sup>. This proverb explained the realities of the Lebanese political system. Groups formed alliances based on the portrayal of a common enemy. The majority of these alliances transcended state borders<sup>43</sup>.

The Lebanese communities have failed to evolve and advance their political capacities beyond their communal vision, because they do not share a common vision of their past<sup>44</sup>. Therefore, it is quite simplistic and hard to isolate certain historic and fundamental turning points in the modern history of Lebanon. There are several historical factors that contributed to the collapse of the system and more importantly that encouraged local communities to seek foreign assistance and support. The combination of several factors – different communal vision, different perception of their past and external influence – has made the Lebanese state as a weak entity in the structure of the Middle East.

### **E. Lebanese – Israeli Relations**

A fruitful resolution to the Arab – Israeli conflict heavily relies on the positive and negative role each country in the Middle East has to play. The conflict encompasses state boundaries, conflicting identities and group nationalisms. As a result, the process of understanding the general scheme and craftsmanship of the Middle East Peace

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<sup>41</sup> Robert Rabil (2003), *Embattled Neighbors: Syria, Israel and Lebanon*, p. 46.

<sup>42</sup> Laurie Eisenberg (1994), *My Enemy’s Enemy: Lebanon in the Early Zionist Imagination, 1900 – 1948*, p. 24.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid*, p. 28 – 32

<sup>44</sup> Kamal Salibi (1998), *A House of Many Mansions: The History of Lebanon Reconsidered*, p. 126.

Process requires an overall assessment of the different attitudes and perceptions of the Arabs among themselves and towards the state of Israel<sup>45</sup>. The internal clashes between the Arab states have been the key element in the survival of the state of Israel, and its immutable attitude toward its surrounding neighbors. The Arabs have failed to unite their stances militarily and not just morally with the Palestinian cause<sup>46</sup>.

One of the powerful components in Israeli foreign policy has always been focused on supporting less advantaged minority groups; vividly and covertly<sup>47</sup>. This form of support has included groups within Palestine and more importantly groups within neighboring countries<sup>48</sup>. The initial foundations of Israeli doctrine are focused on the survival of the Jewish state amidst the Arab world and more importantly on the containment and possible settlement of the Palestinians outside their territory<sup>49</sup>. On that note, it is crucial to understand that Israel's objective in forming alliances with minority groups, finds spirit in the initial principles and history of Zionism. The formation of alliances mainly included individuals and groups within Palestine- mainly the Druze,

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<sup>45</sup> See Hilal Khashan (1996), *Partner or Pariah? Attitudes toward Israel in Syria, Lebanon and Jordan*. Hilal Khashan (2000), *Arab Attitudes toward Israel and Peace*.

<sup>46</sup> Simon Murden (2000), *Understanding Israel's Long Conflict in Lebanon: The Search for an Alternative Approach to Security During the Peace Process*, p. 25.  
See Kirsten Schulze (1998), *Israel's Covert Diplomacy in Lebanon*, p. 1 – 10.

<sup>47</sup> Schulze (1998), p. 1 – 10.

<sup>48</sup> See Hillel Cohen (2008), *Army of Shadows: Palestinian Collaboration with Zionism, 1917 – 1948*

<sup>49</sup> Murden (2000), p. 25 – 27.

and individuals and groups within Lebanon- mainly the Maronites. These alliances have taken shape and form over the course of time, depending on the situation<sup>50</sup>.

The different forms of contact between Lebanese groups and the Zionists began to shape in the Yishuv period, starting mainly as early as 1907<sup>51</sup>. The Jewish Diaspora persisted in their goal to create a Jewish homeland in Palestine and more importantly found support from groups residing in the Middle East. A partial segment of the Maronite community supported and endorsed the creation of the state of Israel, and a partial segment of the Arab community – the Druze –shared similar sentiments. These claims of support found roots in the number of meetings carried out by Jewish immigrants in Palestine with different Arab groups and in Lebanon with different Maronite political and church officials. The original rationale behind these contacts originated from a perception, that these groups shared common aspirations and ideals<sup>52</sup>. More importantly, they had a firm belief that they shared common fears and a common enemy. As a result, it was believed that forming alliances would produce mutual benefit and survival.

## **F. Expected Contribution**

This research study finds spirit and relevancy in an array of substantial empirical studies. These studies include quantitative research carried out by numerous scholars on the perceptions of college students, and specifically focused on similar sample groups in

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<sup>50</sup> Schulze, p. 11, Laurie Eisenberg (1994) *My Enemy's Enemy: Lebanon in the Early Zionist Imagination, 1900 – 1948*, and Sasson Sofer (1998), *Zionism and the Foundations of Israeli Diplomacy*.

<sup>51</sup> Eisenberg (1994), p. 39.

<sup>52</sup> The bulk of literature supporting these claims finds spirit in Eisenberg (1994) and Schulze (1998).

light of a similar topic. One of the noteworthy and relevant studies include Hilal Khashan's<sup>53</sup> (1990) study – the earliest research findings on Maronite students - on the political values of Maronite college students. In addition, a similar study was conducted by Simon Haddad<sup>54</sup> (2001). Furthermore, Jeffrey Karam<sup>55</sup> (2009, 2010) revisited Khashan's findings in an attempt to study modern day political values. In addition Khashan<sup>56</sup> (1992) studied the different perceptions and opinions college students have on confessionalism. Khashan's sample included students from all religious backgrounds. Furthermore, Khashan<sup>57</sup> (1996, 2000) carried out two different studies exploring Arab attitudes towards Israel and the Peace Process. In addition, Simon Haddad<sup>58</sup> (2002) studied Lebanese Christian attitudes towards the Peace Process and the state of Israel.

Judith Harik<sup>59</sup> (1993, 1995) studied the Druze community in Lebanon following the Lebanese civil war in an attempt to expose Druze perceptions and attitudes toward

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<sup>53</sup> Hilal Khashan (1990), *The Political Values of Lebanese Maronite College Students*, (pp. 723 – 744)

<sup>54</sup> Simon Haddad (2001), *A Survey of Maronite Christian Socio – Political Attitudes in Postwar Lebanon*, (pp. 465 – 479)

<sup>55</sup> Jeffrey Karam (2010), *Revisiting The Political Values of Maronite College Students*, unpublished.

<sup>56</sup> Hilal Khashan (1992), *Inside the Lebanese Confessional Mind*

<sup>57</sup> Hilal Khashan (1996), *Partner or Pariah? Attitudes Toward Israel in Syria, Lebanon and Jordan*. Khashan (2000), *Arab Attitudes Toward Israel and Peace*.

<sup>58</sup> Simon Haddad (2002), *Lebanese Christians' Attitudes Toward Israel and the Peace Process*, (pp. 403 – 420)

<sup>59</sup> Judith Harik (1993), *Perceptions of Community and State Among Lebanon's Druze Youth*, (pp. 41 – 62) and Harik (1995), *The Effects of the Military Tradition on Lebanon's Assertive Druzes*, (pp. 51 – 70)



the Lebanese state. Furthermore, several studies by Israeli scholars<sup>60</sup> have been carried out to study relevant Druze identity patterns residing in Israel.

The bulk of literature on the Druze community in Israel has undertaken a qualitative form distinctive from the studies carried out in Lebanon and Syria. Apart from the few empirical studies that analyze and expose Maronite political values, the existing literature largely entices qualitative methods that are part of larger studies on the nature of the Lebanese confessional system.

As a result, the expected contribution from this research study can undertake several dimensions. For the sole purpose of this research at hand, the expected contribution would involve three added values. The first contribution is a comparative analysis that entices the process of identity formation between the Druze and the Maronites in respect to different social factors in light of historical actualities. The second contribution is exposing the perceptions of the Lebanese Druze towards the Druze community in Israel and more importantly understanding Druze opinions on collaborationism theory. The third and final contribution will expose modern day political perceptions of the Maronite and Druze towards the state of Israel and the Peace Process.

## **G. Concluding Remarks**

Chapter I presented an overview of the socio-political composition of the Middle East and Lebanon's confessional actuality. It highlighted the essential role minorities

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<sup>60</sup> Ilana Kaufman (2004), *Ethnic Affirmation or Ethnic Manipulation: The Case of the Druze in Israel*, (pp. 53 – 82), Zeidan Atashe (1995), *Druze & Jews in Israel*, Gabriel Ben – Dor (1979), *The Druzes in Israel: A Political Study*, Hillel Cohen (2008), *Army of Shadows: Palestinian Collaboration with Zionism, 1917 – 1948*.

play in the development of events and political realities within the Lebanese system, thus emphasizing the importance of studying these minorities' intergroup relations, self-perceptions, and attitudes towards Israel. The main research questions centers on determining the relationship between group identity and intergroup relations of the Maronites and Druze in their perceptions towards themselves, each other, and the state of Israel.

Chapter II will deal with the historical framework of relations between the state of Israel and the Maronites. This chapter will establish the historical determinants that are going to be utilized in the discussion and analysis chapters. These historical determinants are crucial for investigating and exploring the relevancy and validity of the findings and results in light of assessing the modern day perceptions and attitudes of the groups at hand. In addition, this chapter will investigate the historical framework of relations between the Maronites and Zionists in light of several importance phases.

## CHAPTER 2

### HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK AND NORMATIVE BACKGROUND: MARONITE – ISRAELI RELATIONS

Chapter I discussed the introductory background of the study at hand. The main argument for this research study was mentioned in light of providing the adequate research justification for choosing a specific population sample. In addition, the broader elements of the research design were discussed, that mainly involve the facets of survey research. More importantly, the nature of the Lebanese confessional system was discussed in concise manner.

Chapter II seeks to review the historical framework of relations between the Maronites and the state of Israel. The introduction part explained that an in depth study of these relations requires investigating the form of contacts between different minority groups and the state of Israel. This chapter will examine such relations beginning in the Yishuv period as early as 1920 and ending in 1985<sup>1</sup>, the same year Israeli forces withdrew to the Security Belt. This chapter will be divided into two main sections: the first part will primarily deal with Zionist political thinking and their vision of Lebanon – pre and post the birth of the state of Israel<sup>2</sup> and the second section will deal with the relations between the Maronites and the Zionists, In addition, the sections will undertake five historical phases. The first phase is from 1920 up till 1948 – the creation of the Jewish state. The second phase begins post the creation of the Jewish homeland

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<sup>1</sup> The primary justification for this period has to do with the change of Israeli policy towards Lebanon primarily and the demise of relations between the Maronites, Druze and the state of Israel. In addition, the emergence of a ‘new enemy’ to Israeli hegemony in Lebanon – Hezbollah – transformed the entire elements of the conflict between Israel and Palestinian Resistance groups.

<sup>2</sup> This section is necessary for Chapter II and Chapter III simultaneously.

in 1948 up till the first Lebanese Civil War in 1958. The third phase carries on from 1958 up till the Six Day War in 1967. In addition, the fourth phase will cover the aftermath of the Six Day War up to the outbreak of the second Lebanese Civil War in 1975. And the final phase carries on from 1975 up till Israeli withdrawal from the Mountains to the Security Belt in 1985.

## **A. Introduction**

The preface of Chapter II sets the stage for the purpose of this section in this research study. However, it should be mentioned why it is crucial to undertake a historical investigation of this indicated time frame (1920 – 1985). The simplest explanation for choosing this time period finds relevant support in the bulk of literature that explores these decades of covert and overt relations between Lebanese groups and the state of Israel. The majority of the historians<sup>3</sup> that examine this period at hand focus primarily on archival research<sup>4</sup> that tends to present principal documents and material that can shape a proper and lucid understanding of these historical events. The primary justification for choosing to examine this historical framework for this quantitative study is to establish a line of historical determinants and patterns. Consequently, the narration of the political history of Lebanese – Israeli relations constructs a certain line of thought, attitude and opinion that is necessary for weighing and measuring modern day opinions. However, it does not necessarily mean that the opinions of the respondents today effectively reflect and verify the historical array of relations between

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<sup>3</sup> This section primarily relies on primary research carried out by Laurie Eisenberg (1994), *My Enemy's Enemy: Lebanon in the Early Zionist Imagination, 1900 – 1948* and Kirsten Schulze (1998), *Israel's Covert Diplomacy in Lebanon*. However, other secondary resources will be used that explore similar approaches and tendencies.

<sup>4</sup> The main archives include the Central Zionist Archives, Ben Gurion Archives, Haganah Archives, Weizmann Archives, Israel State Archives, United Nations Archives,

their community and the state of Israel. Rather it exposes probable similarities and modern perceptions of how these individuals identify and observe the history of their community and how they relate to historical precedents and realities. The historical framework is crucial and essential for creating a measurable platform for the analysis and discussion of the findings.

The preface of Chapter II indicated the five historical phases that are going to be explored, yet it should be noted that there will not be an attempt to cover each and every single detail in these mentioned time frames. Rather, there will be a focus on certain historical landmarks that have had a direct effect on Lebanese- Israeli relations. As a result, the historical determinants are defined as crucial landmarks in light of a relevant historical background which have had a deep influence on these relations.

An important note should be made ahead of investigating these forms of relations. None of the minority groups at hand had ever consolidated one common view in the manner they undertook their alliances with the state of Israel. On the contrary, these minorities neither had a uniform policy nor constituted a unified community. Moreover, specific individuals and segments from these groups – from the two sides (Maronites and Druze) - created such form of contact and collaboration. The same reality applies to the divergent Zionist schools of thought. Even though one may argue that the Zionists were relatively more cohesive on their set of goals; however, it remains that there was not full coherence on the outcomes of certain political and military strategies.

## **B. Zionist Political Thinking and Realities**

Prior to understanding the nature of relations between Lebanese groups and the state of Israel, it is crucial to examine the foundations of Zionist political thinking and their vision of Lebanon. The constant feature in the policies of the Jewish Agency in Palestine and later on in the state of Israel is the prospect of intervention. This form of intervention consists of meddling in the “political affairs of neighboring Arab states”<sup>5</sup>. This political strategy is the cornerstone in ensuring the survival of the Jewish homeland amidst the Arab world. Such form of intervention constantly keeps the Arabs divided and consequently fighting each other instead of uniting their forces against Israel<sup>6</sup>. In addition, the foundations of Zionist political diplomacy called for “natural harmony of interests” with any group that expressed warm sentiments with the Zionist project. In the earliest stages in the Yishuv period, the perception of a natural harmony of interests was pursued with the Maronites and “shared economic interests with the rest of the Lebanese population”<sup>7</sup>. The purpose of Zionist diplomacy was to establish and produce evidence of “Arab support” for the establishment of the Jewish homeland. The Zionists were adamant in portraying to the international community that the creation of the Jewish state finds acceptance in the Arab world<sup>8</sup>.

From the outset of Zionist diplomatic strategy, the importance and usefulness of the natural resources of Northern Palestine and Southern Lebanon have constituted a focal aspect of this strategy. As a result, Zionist policy in the Levant involved searching

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<sup>5</sup> Schulze (1998), p. 1.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid, p. 3

<sup>7</sup> Eisenberg (1994), p. 26

<sup>8</sup> Ibid, p. 27

for a partner – mainly a Lebanese – that would allow the exploitation of the region’s water resources<sup>9</sup>.

### ***1. Divergent Schools of Thought***

The two main schools of thought during the given period at hand could be highlighted into two different realities and strategies. However, what remains a constant feature in Zionist political strategy revolves around containing the Palestinians following 1948. In the Yishuv period, the Zionists were cognizant that they will always be faced “with irreconcilable opposition from the Palestinians” and as a result would have to bypass such resistance by “forming alliances with neighboring states”<sup>10</sup>.

The first school of thought – Interventionist School - which has been dominant in Israeli political realities and rationale is high scale intervention and military superiority. The main promoters of such intervention and military superiority find roots in Ben Gurion’s perception of the survival of the state of Israel and more importantly fortified in Menachim Begin’s Likud decision making. The policy making of the Likud was “nationalistically oriented, emphasized national security and was explicitly anti – Arab”<sup>11</sup>. Moreover, Ben Gurion claimed that “we must not wean ourselves from the preposterous and totally unfounded and baseless illusion that there is outside the state of Israel a force and will in the world which would protect the life of our citizens. Our own capacity for self – defense is our own security”<sup>12</sup>. The primary support for such

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<sup>9</sup> Ibid, p. 27

<sup>10</sup> Schulze (1998), p. 8

<sup>11</sup> Ibid, p. 94

<sup>12</sup> Ibid, p. 40

intervention is that military power is the strongest method to force Arab neighbors “into accepting Israel and making peace”<sup>13</sup>.

The second school of thought - Anti –Interventionist School - advocated a cautious approach to Lebanon and the different minority groups taking into consideration the political realities of the Lebanese confessional system. More importantly, it focused on weighing and measuring the capabilities of the groups that approached the Zionists with the concept of alliance formation. The main difference in these schools of thought is the manner and type of intervention that is to be utilized by the state of Israel to safeguard its survival and more importantly secure peaceful Arab neighbors. It does not call against intervention; rather it stipulates a cautious form of meddling in the domestic affairs of neighboring Arab countries.

## ***2. Perception of Lebanon***

The main Zionist perception of Lebanon as stated by Laurie Eisenberg is that “Lebanon differed significantly from other Arab entities and that mutually rewarding relations with it were all the more possible for this reason”<sup>14</sup>. The Zionist vision of Lebanon in the creation of a Middle East favorable to the Jewish state, initially finds roots in David Ben Gurion’s perception and vision. Israel’s first prime minister perceived Lebanon as a natural ally and more importantly the weakest link in the Arab chain<sup>15</sup>. An array of reasons support Ben Gurion’s claims that mainly include the confessional nature of the Lebanese system and more importantly the concentration of

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<sup>13</sup> Ibid, p. 7

<sup>14</sup> Eisenberg (1994), p. 13

<sup>15</sup> Schulze (1998), p. 3



power – prior to the Taef Accords – in “non Muslim hands”. In addition, Lebanon was perceived as one of the rare Arab states that has a pro-Western orientation, and as a result was seen as ‘less Arab’<sup>16</sup>. This fragile composition of the Lebanese system with contending groups that have a different sense of their history and orientation led to the conception that Israeli political and military intervention is facile. The initial component in the policy of intervention is to ensure domestic divisions. When the Christians and Muslims are able to coexist in this mosaic political system, they are definitely moving away from Israel<sup>17</sup>. This remains one of the fears projected by the state of Israel. The probable nature of coexistence in the Middle East forces the state of Israel to forge peace with the Palestinian nation. More importantly, individuals within the Jewish Agency for Palestine that felt enthusiastic in forming an alliance with Lebanon began developing several clichés. Among these clichés was that Lebanon was a “window in the wall of Arab enmity, a flash of light in the darkness of Arab opposition, or an island in a vast Muslim sea”<sup>18</sup>.

Following the 1948 Arab – Israeli War, the state of Lebanon remained on the sidelines in fully committing itself to fighting for the Palestinian cause. Kirsten Schulze (1998) claims that Lebanon had no incentive to fight in any war against the state of Israel; rather it was committed to finding a “peaceful settlement so it could get on with its own affairs”<sup>19</sup>.

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<sup>16</sup> Ibid, p. 3

<sup>17</sup> Ibid, p. 5

<sup>18</sup> Eisenberg (1994), p. 15

<sup>19</sup> Schulze (1998), p. 4.

### a. Economic and Resource Factors

The earliest perception of the Lebanese entity envisioned an active economic partnership. Zionist views “held a perception of Lebanon as a country where economic interests took priority over ideology”<sup>20</sup>. The Jewish Agency for Palestine felt that the Lebanese entity was totally dependent on markets in Palestine and that the main tourist sector was heavily dependent on Jewish vacationers in the resorts. As a result, the Zionists perceived a passive Lebanese attitude in the emergence of a Jewish homeland, in light of their attempt to safeguard their lucrative sources of income. Following the Balfour Declaration in 1917 that promised the creation of a Jewish homeland, the Zionists appealed to the British claiming the state should include “sufficient water resources and a defensible border... Zionists suggested that if God and man had been less than precise about where the border should be, Mother Nature offered the Litani River as a natural frontier”<sup>21</sup>.

### ***3. Concept of Minority Alliance***

The foundations of the minority alliance between different Lebanese groups and the state of Israel date back to the pre-creation of the Jewish homeland. The primary claims were built on a “sense of commonality”<sup>22</sup>, the prospects of a common enemy and common fate in light of the geopolitical makeup of the Middle East. The concept of minority alliances has been a central constituent in Israeli foreign policy. This approach called for establishing links with any non – Arab and non – Muslim minorities in the

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<sup>20</sup> Eisenberg (1994), p. 25

<sup>21</sup> Ibid, p. 41

<sup>22</sup> Schulze (1998), p. 5

Middle East. These potential minorities mainly included the Kurds, Druze, Shiites, Circassians, or Maronites<sup>23</sup>. More importantly, it should be mentioned that the invitation for establishing such alliances was intended to include all the different groups. There was a dire need to establish a framework of contacts with any Middle Eastern group regardless of “denomination and demographic status”. The common framework of these contacts was accepting the creation of a Jewish homeland in Palestine<sup>24</sup> on condition; these groups felt a sense of commonality with the Zionist political entity. The justification for these alliances was influenced on the premises of ‘my enemy’s enemy is my friend’<sup>25</sup>. Regardless of the sincerity of relations, this premise allowed for the creation of shared goals and more importantly a common enemy. The fruition of these alliances was based on mutual interests and concerns.

### **C. Maronite – Israeli Relations**

The Maronites were the first community to approach the Jews in Palestine proposing the formation of a minority alliance. The common factor between the Jews and the Maronites was their extensive ties to the West, and more importantly both minorities had adequate power in their respective emerging states. The Lebanese Christians have a proverb that “once the Muslims do away with the Jews, they will turn on the Christians. After Saturday, Sunday”<sup>26</sup>. In addition, the Maronites and Jews alike viewed themselves facing the same destiny surrounded by a hostile Arab Muslim sea.

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<sup>23</sup> Eisenberg (1994), p. 21 and Schulze (1998), p. 6

<sup>24</sup> Schulze (1998), p. 14

<sup>25</sup> Eisenberg (1994), p. 13

<sup>26</sup> Ibid, p. 13 - 15

The aftermath of the creation of the state of Israel in 1948 created the Palestinian refugee problem. Consequently, the Maronites<sup>27</sup> perceived the Palestinians as a threat to the precarious demographic balance of the Lebanese system. The earliest sense of commonality post 1948 was that the Maronites and Israelis mutually feared the political and military potential of the Palestinians. The Maronites feared losing their political superiority and dominance in Lebanon and the Israelis feared the creation of a Palestinian state in the Israeli Occupied Territories<sup>28</sup>.

### *1. Normative Background*

The Maronites constitute the largest and major Christian community in Lebanon. The Maronites have always spearheaded any approach to ensure and safeguard Christian interests. Their long years of struggle against the continuous forms of occupation and persecution emerging from different conquests, led the community to flee Syria – place of origin – and find refuge in the rugged mountains of Mount Lebanon. The Maronites perceive themselves as a separate people with “a historical self – consciousness and sense of common destiny... possessing distinctive ethnic characteristics, a single religion and a long history”<sup>29</sup>. The traditional Maronite ethos postulates the “unarabness” of their allegiance and history, more importantly a perception of themselves as “the successor of the Phoenicians”<sup>30</sup>. More importantly, in

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<sup>27</sup> The ‘word of caution’ mentioned earlier applies to the entire study at hand. The political history of the Maronite community involves historical accounts of individuals, groups, and segments of the community. As a result, when the term ‘Maronite’ is used it does not represent the overall orientation of the community.

<sup>28</sup> Eisenberg (1994), p. 14

<sup>29</sup> Schulze (1998), p. 13

<sup>30</sup> Rabinovich, p. 21

light of the long years of intercommunal strife and struggle, the Maronite and Druze communities established a sense “religious solidarity and religious hatred”<sup>31</sup>. In addition, two main components supported a high level of group cohesion in the Maronite community: the omnipresent influence of the Maronite Church and the Patriarch and more importantly their political ethos that stressed a Western orientation, separate from the other Arab groups with a superseding fear of the Muslims<sup>32</sup>.

From the outset of these relations, the Maronite community had been divided into two dominant schools of thought. The first school of thought supposedly supported by the Maronite Church advocated full support to the creation of the Jewish homeland and more importantly called for a full fledged alliance against the threat of Islam. The second school of thought shared similar fears from the threat of Islam, yet advocated accommodation with the Muslim majority to safeguard existence. Furthermore, these Maronites felt the creation of a Jewish state in the Muslim Arab world threatens their own existence and that of other minorities<sup>33</sup>.

#### a. The Maronite Church

Laurie Eisenberg contends that the “original and permanent aspect of Maronite self consciousness was of a compact community, the Maronite Church, living by itself under its own hierarchy, protecting itself from attack by Muslim rulers of the cities and plains”<sup>34</sup>. Accordingly the Maronite Church came to reflect Maronite political and

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<sup>31</sup> Ibid, p. 18 - 19

<sup>32</sup> Eisenberg (1994), p. 51

<sup>33</sup> Schulze (1998), p. 15

<sup>34</sup> Eisenberg (1994), p. 47

religious ethos. More importantly, the Patriarch embodied the religious and secular authority of the Maronite community<sup>35</sup>. The main actor in nurturing contacts between the Palestinian Jews in the Yishuv period and later on with the creation of the state of Israel is the Maronite Church and its clergymen. Indeed, it was the Maronite clergy that approached the Jewish Agency in Palestine with the concept and proposal of a minority alliance against the surrounding Muslim Arab neighborhoods<sup>36</sup>.

The main actors in the Maronite Church in the Yishuv period that helped nurture contacts between the Maronites and Zionists were Archbishop of Beirut Ignace Mubarak and more importantly Patriarch Antoine Arida. Mubarak envisioned an alliance with the Zionists as a means for Maronite continuity and group survival. In addition to the support expressed by the Maronite Church, Alfred Naqash and Charles Corm were actually promoting and encouraging Jewish emigration to Lebanon as well as Palestine in order to counter the growing Muslim population<sup>37</sup>.

## ***2. Relations in the First Phase: 1920 – 1948***

The first wave of contacts between the Maronites and Palestinian Jews was established as early as March 1920. In that same year, the Zionists and Maronites concluded an accord that recognized the Jews' right in creating a separate Jewish state in Palestine and more importantly stressed the creation of an independent Christian state<sup>38</sup>. However, these first waves of contacts emerged with individuals from Syria and

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<sup>35</sup> Matti Moosa (1986), *The Maronites in History*, p. 284

<sup>36</sup> Eisenberg (1994), p. 52

<sup>37</sup> Ian Black (1986), *Zionism and Arabs: 1936 – 1939*, p. 279

<sup>38</sup> Eisenberg (1994), p. 56

Lebanon that were paving the way for “fruitful trilateral relations between the future independent states of Lebanon, Syria and Palestine”<sup>39</sup>. In addition, before the establishment of a joint commission involving individuals from Syria and Lebanon, in 1913 the representatives from the Maronite community already “expressed support for Zionism and proposed the formation of a Jewish Christian bloc to counterbalance the preponderant Muslim presence in the region”<sup>40</sup>.

On the outset of these relations, the striking feature in these contacts mandatorily included an economic factor. The initial contacts began between the ‘National Group in Syria and Lebanon’ and the Zionists and aimed at the possibility of buying land in Palestine. The ‘National Group’ felt the settlement of Jews in neighboring Palestine as positive actuality. Furthermore, the Maronites, represented by Najib Sfeir, extended their contacts to include further economic discussions and arrangements. Sfeir approached Chaim Weizmann proposing to “divide the region by denomination: Lebanon for the Christians, Syria for the Muslims and Palestine for the Jews”<sup>41</sup>. Apart from a sense of commonality facing an external Muslim threat, the Maronites and Zionists felt as natural allies in light of their economic partnerships mainly in trade, land settlement and tourism<sup>42</sup>.

The time phase between 1920s and the 1930s included all forms of contacts, relations and negotiations with the Zionists, irrespective of religious background and political orientation. One of the prominent Muslim Lebanese figures that had contacts

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<sup>39</sup> Neil Caplan (1983), *Futile Diplomacy: Volume I*, p. 68

<sup>40</sup> Eisenberg (1994), p. 30

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid*, p. 30

<sup>42</sup> Black, p. 277

with the Zionists was Riad as – Sulh<sup>43</sup>. The rift between the Zionists and Muslim groups emerged from the opposition of the Arab states in the region to such form of relations. As a result, the Maronites felt closer to the Zionists and began to claim the revival of “the historical ties between the Phoenicians and King Solomon”<sup>44</sup>. In 1933, Patriarch Arida, fully endorsed and supported by Emile Edde, called for a general partnership with the Zionists a broader political and military union<sup>45</sup>, based on mutual interests. The turning point in the 1930s emerged with the Arab Boycott and Revolt in 1936. The initial causes for the boycott and the aftermath fortified Maronite conviction in safeguarding an alliance with the Zionists. The economic losses in tourist and agricultural sectors were abundant and the Maronites stressed extensively on a partnership that provides the fruition of common interests – mainly containing the Muslim threat. In the same year, the Zionists formulated a ‘Treaty of Friendship’ based on the claims presented by Arida and Edde. However, the Maronites desired a covert treaty and were intimidated by French rejection to such separate agreements in the Middle East. However, French rejection could not contain President Edde’s support for the Peel Commission report in 1937 which primarily favored the creation of the Jewish state in Palestine<sup>46</sup>. Nevertheless, with Bishara al – Khoury’s election to the Presidency in 1943, the culmination of a Treaty between the Maronites and the Zionists had weakened. Al – Khoury represented the second school of thought in Maronite political thinking, which called for accommodation with the Arab Muslim majority<sup>47</sup>. However,

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<sup>43</sup> Caplan (1983), p. 54

<sup>44</sup> Schulze (1998), p. 17

<sup>45</sup> Neil Caplan and Ian Black (1983), *Israel and Lebanon: Origins of a Relationship*, p. 48 - 58

<sup>46</sup> Yehoshua Porath (1981), *History of Friendship*, Jerusalem Post

<sup>47</sup> Eisenberg (1992), *Desperate Diplomacy: The Zionist – Maronite Treaty of 1946*, p. 151



it did not end the efforts carried out by the Maronite Church and Emile Edde continuously advocating a full partnership with Israel. In 1945, Edde submitted a proposal calling for Zionist annexation of Tyre and Sidon because of their 100,000 Muslim residents<sup>48</sup>. In addition, the contacts that began and nurtured in 1920 leading to the 1930s culminated in 1946. Arida traveled to Jerusalem to sign an agreement on behalf of the Maronite Community with Chaim Weizmann on behalf of the Yishuv. The agreement postulated mutual recognition and concerns. The Zionists recognized the Christian character of Lebanon and the Maronites supported the creation of a Jewish homeland in Palestine. The draft of such a pact resulted in a formal agreement between the Jewish Agency and the Maronite Church on 30 May 1946 which stressed the earlier positions portrayed by both sides<sup>49</sup>. Furthermore, in the same year, Archbishop Mubarak approached the Anglo – American Commission “with the recommendation of partitioning Palestine and giving the Jews their own state”<sup>50</sup>. In addition, in 1947 the Maronites remained genuine in their support for the Jewish homeland in Palestine and as a result submitted a memorandum to the United Nations endorsing and supporting the establishment of the Jewish state in Palestine<sup>51</sup>.

The common feature from 1920 leading to the creation of the state of Israel in 1948 can be highlighted in Emile Edde’s view of the Maronite – Jewish partnership in 1936 claiming that these minorities have a similar situation in their superior cultures to

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<sup>48</sup> Schulze (1998), p. 21

<sup>49</sup> Eisenberg (1992), p. 147

<sup>50</sup> Schulze (1998), p. 24

<sup>51</sup> William Haddad (1977), *Christian Arab – Attitudes towards the Arab – Israeli Conflict*, p. 129 – 130.

that of their Arab neighbors. More importantly, they “were struggling for the same goal – to build a constructive bridge between Eastern and Western culture”<sup>52</sup>.

### ***3. Relations in the Second Phase: 1948 – 1958***

In the first phase from 1920 up till the creation of the state of Israel in 1948, Jewish – Maronite relations centered on common interests and mutual fears. The Yishuv period highlighted Zionist intention in breaking their isolation in the Arab world by creating alliances with groups that shared similar tendencies and aspirations.

On 30 November 1947 the United Nations passed the resolution that called for the partitioning of Palestine. The aftermath of the resolution led to severe conflicts between the Palestinians and the Jews for a period that lasted for 16 months. The Jews called such strife as “a war for independence” and the Arabs were firm in maintaining Palestine as an Arab nation. In 1949, the aftermath of the war was followed by an array of armistice agreements and pacts under the supervision of the United Nations, between Israel and the neighboring countries: Jordan, Syria, Egypt and Lebanon. On 14 January 1949, the first and sole official agreement on the level of the state was concluded. The Armistice Agreement of 1949 was easily concluded and ratified between Lebanon and Israel<sup>53</sup>. However, some Lebanese delegates privately said to the Israeli delegates that they were forced against their will in their support for Palestine and in reality they were not really Arabs<sup>54</sup>.

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<sup>52</sup> Schulze (1998), p. 23

<sup>53</sup> Sydney Bailey (1990), *Four Arab – Israeli Wars and the Peace Process*, p. 60

<sup>54</sup> Avi Shlaim (1988), *Collusion Across the Jordan: King Abdullah, the Zionist Movement, and the Partition of Palestine*, p. 391

The birth of the Jewish state intensified the level of contacts between the Maronites and the Zionists. The prominent individuals that led such forms of contacts in the Yishuv period, mainly Emile Edde among others, were consistently presenting vibrant and fresh proposals to the newly established state. On 3 July 1948, Edde speculated a possible Christian revolt that would emerge supporting an Israeli intervention in South Lebanon. Edde's promises revolved around destabilizing the lenient Al – Khoury government that manifested a sense of political accommodation in the Lebanese system. It is noteworthy to mention that these different camps within the Maronite community represented a substantial portion of the Maronite population. This sense of accommodation threatened Zionist – Maronite interests that felt isolated and separate from the Arab Muslim world<sup>55</sup>. Following Edde's proposals, another Maronite player joined the array of contacts with the newly emerged state of Israel. In autumn of 1948, the Lebanese Maronite Kataeb began communications with the state of Israel, focusing on a similar line of thought that involved common goals and desires<sup>56</sup>. In addition, in 1949, Archbishop Mubarak vociferously re-strengthened the earlier positions of the Maronite Church by sending a letter to the Secretary General of the United Nations claiming that "Lebanon was not an Arab state, but Phoenician in origin and Christian in faith"<sup>57</sup>. The Kataeb party under the leadership of its main founder Pierre Gemayel portrayed its objectives to Israeli officials claiming they "wanted to take Lebanon out of the Arab League and that its political aims include making peace and

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<sup>55</sup> Schulze (1998), p. 31

<sup>56</sup> Ibid, p. 33

<sup>57</sup> Ibid, p. 35

reestablishing economic relations with Israel”<sup>58</sup>. The latter arguments were given in support of Elias Rababi’s – Kataeb liaison in the United States – request for funding the Kataeb election campaign in 1951. During the same period, the Lebanese government maintained an anti – Israeli stance in light of the Muslim population and the Arab world. All sort of contacts between the newly established state of Israel and Lebanese groups had to remain covert and secretive.

The turning point in the second phase of relations between the Maronites and the Israelis was the rise of Gamal Abdel Nasser in 1952. The ‘Free Officers’ that deposed King Farouk were calling for Arab unity that promoted an anti – Western orientation. In addition, this anti – Western orientation included an anti – Zionist stance that began as early as 1955<sup>59</sup>. As early as 1954, Israel had identified Egypt as its main enemy and as a result Israeli military strategists were looking for a window of opportunity that would eventually lead to a showdown with Nasser<sup>60</sup>. The ideological clashes between anti – Western and pro – Western factions were transported to the Lebanese state. The Maronites – that supported Camille Chamoun - spearheaded the constituencies that associated themselves with pro – Western orientation and the Muslims led the coalition influenced by Nasser that called for an anti – Western stance. The Suez Canal Crisis in 1956 ignited Israeli interest in producing a Middle East favorable to the security and survival of the state of Israel. Schulze asserts that “Nasser provided Israel with the required casus belli to implement Ben Gurion’s interventionist plan. Not Lebanon, but

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<sup>58</sup> Benny Morris (1984), *Israel and the Lebanese Phalange: The Birth of a Relationship 1948 – 1951*, p. 133

<sup>59</sup> Schulze (1998), p. 45

<sup>60</sup> Patrick Seale (1965), *The Struggle For Syria: A Study of Post – War Arab Politic: 1945 - 1958*, p. 247

Egypt would be the trigger to restructure the existing political order in Israel's favor"<sup>61</sup>. Following the Suez Crisis, Ben Gurion restructured his vision of the Middle East mainly stating that "the general plan is: oust Nasser, partition Jordan – eastern part to Iraq – so that it will make peace with Israel thereby enabling the refugees to settle there with the aid of American money. The borders of Lebanon will be reduced and it will become a Christian state"<sup>62</sup>.

The importance of the 1957 Parliamentary elections in Lebanon is directly correlated with President Camille Chamoun's foreign policy orientation. Following the Suez Crisis in 1956, Chamoun replaced the pro - Nasser dominant cabinet and replaced it with a cabinet that had firm pro – Western allegiances. The pro- Western orientation of Chamoun reignited an Israeli assessment of Maronite – Israeli common interests and goals. The ideological clashes between the pro – Western factions and pro – Nasser factions led to the eruption of the first Lebanese civil war in 1958. Chamoun was envisioned as a "symbol of their {pro – Western leaders in the Middle East} common antipathy toward Nasser"<sup>63</sup>. The Cabinet of President Chamoun represented Maronite superiority and dominance in the Lebanese system. More importantly, it maintained the political ethos of the Lebanese structure – mainly influenced by the Maronites - that expressed pro – Western sentiments. The ideological clashes that were transported to the Lebanese state introduced an additional feature that subsequently led to a struggle on confessional grounds that drew relative association with regional and international powers. The absence of the Lebanese Army in containing the eruption of the conflict

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<sup>61</sup> Schulze (1998), p. 46

<sup>62</sup> Ibid, p. 47 - 48

<sup>63</sup> Ibid, p. 53

resulted in the emergence of different militia groups that were set up to safeguard communal interests and concerns<sup>64</sup>. Among these militias, the Kataeb party spearheaded the coalition that was constituted to safeguard Christian interests and Maronite political dominance. The Maronite – Israeli partnership started manifesting itself in the arsenal of light weapons supplied to the Lebanese Kataeb militia. Israel wanted to show the Maronites its sincerity in its manner of relations and as a result followed Pierre Gemayel’s request in supplying weapons and military equipment to the main Christian militia<sup>65</sup>. On the eve of the first Lebanese Civil War, certain influential individuals in the Maronite Diaspora were contacting Israeli offices – especially in the United States of America – discussing the long tradition of Hebrew – Phoenician ties and more importantly exchanging views on the threat posed by Nasser. The fear of Nasser’s ideological practices was not the initial component for such discussions and contacts. The Maronites had to portray that Nasser’s victory in Lebanon meant another hostile neighboring country to Israel’s borders. Emile Khoury Harb, founder of the Lebanese Overseas Foundation, claimed “Nasserism as a dangerous pan – Islamic movement directly not only against Lebanese Christians but also against Israel”<sup>66</sup>.

The second phase of Maronite – Israeli relations introduced two major dimensions. On one hand, Israel kept its end of the bargain through fully supporting the Maronites on the eve of the First Lebanese Civil War and granted a small budget for the Kataeb’s election campaign in 1951. Furthermore, the second dimension introduced the emergence of Israel as a dominant military force in light of the Suez Canal Crisis. This

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<sup>64</sup> Ibid, p. 54

<sup>65</sup> Ibid, p. 62

<sup>66</sup> Ibid, p. 63

second dimension introduced Israel's interventionist military strategy that had always been envisioned by Ben Gurion. The different Lebanese groups were assured that Israel would not remain on the sidelines of any ideological clash on Lebanese soil that might have a direct or indirect effect on the composition and balance of power in the Middle East. Israeli and American support in 1958 ensured and safeguarded Maronite political dominance.

#### ***4. Relations in the Third Phase: 1958 – 1967***

The aftermath of the First Lebanese Civil War produced a fresh government under the leadership of military army commander President Fuad Chehab. The Maronite – Israeli relationship relatively went into a cool period following the inclusion of the Maronite Kataeb in the formation of the cabinet. For the first time following independence in 1943, the Lebanese Kataeb – the main Israeli partner – was part of the ruling government. However, the turning point in this phase is the Six Day War in 1967 and the direct events that emerged in the aftermath. As Ben Gurion mentioned in his diary that the clash with Egypt was inevitable and was bound to happen<sup>67</sup>. The aftermath of the Six Day War reignited Israeli focus on the importance of Lebanon in safeguarding Zionist security. The direct consequence in the aftermath involved the emergence of “a political and military presence in Lebanon”<sup>68</sup>. The Lebanese government was too weak to contain Palestinian commandos from attacking the state of Israel.

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<sup>67</sup> Roger Louis and Roger Owen (1989), *Suez 1956: The Crisis and its Consequences*, p.147

<sup>68</sup> Schulze (1998), p. 68.

The aftermath of the First Lebanese Civil War produced the end of the ideological clash between pro – Western elements and pro – Nasserite subjects. Nevertheless, a substantial segment of the Maronite community remained consistent in exhibiting their fears of another Nasserite production. The United Arab Republic remained a constant threat to Maronite dominance, as well as the security of the state of Israel. To an extent, that several individuals like Georges Abi Fadel approached the Israeli embassy on behalf of a Maronite priest claiming that the Maronites and Jews alike need to be unified in light of any emerging threat. In May 1960, President Chehab approached different news agencies in the demand that Israel sparks “a little incident along the joint border”<sup>69</sup>. The main concern with Chehab was to ignite a minor conflict along the border lines, where pro – Nasser groups would rush to the Southern border in their attempt to resist against Israeli intervention. In addition, Chehab’s reform plans included a strategy for transparent and accountable elections. President Chehab was seeking to ensure the parliamentary elections would happen without any foreign interference – mainly Nasserite influence. The inclusion of pro – Israeli Maronite representatives in Chehab’s cabinet made the relations between Maronites and Zionists of lower priority.

The Six Day War in 1967 repositioned Lebanon as the main concern for Israeli political strategy. The creation of the refugee problem in 1948 with the birth of the state of Israel transformed the Palestinian community post 1967, into “a revolutionary movement, a community in transition, a people at the centre of Arab support, to regain their country”<sup>70</sup>. The manner of resistance attacks against Israel began as early as 1965.

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<sup>69</sup> Ibid, p. 69

<sup>70</sup> Ibid, p. 70



However, following the defeat of the Arab armies in 1967, this type of resistance became consistent and as a result became a regular feature in the Arab – Israeli conflict. Jordanian and Maronite fears emerged from Israel’s reprisal policy on these cross – border insurgencies. The main tenet of the reprisal policy was to convince the Jordanian and Lebanese authorities to contain Palestinian attacks, otherwise Israel would have to retaliate against them. The inability of the Lebanese Armed Forces to contain Palestinian cross – border attacks produced numerous skirmishes and clashes between these two entities. As a result, the different Lebanese communal groups began arming themselves and more importantly were looking for a foreign sponsor and protector<sup>71</sup>.

The third phase of relations between the Maronites and the Zionists involved several turning points. Following the First Lebanese Civil War, the pro- Israeli Maronites became part of the ruling government and as a result the form of covert relations was no longer a necessity. However, with the defeat of the Arab Armies in the Six Day War in 1967, the majority of the Palestinian refugees transformed into a revolutionary unit, that carried out consistent cross border attacks. The Maronites feared the demographic composition of the country on the outset of the creation of the state of Israel; however, in 1967 they feared the military potential and presence of the Palestinian movement. The sense of commonality between the Israelis and Maronites following the Six Day War focused on containing the Palestinian threat, domestically and regionally.

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<sup>71</sup> David Kimche (1991), *The Last Option: After Nasser, Arafat and Saddam Hussein: The Quest for Peace in the Middle East*, p. 126

### ***5. Relations in the Fourth Phase: 1967 – 1975***

Following the Six Day War in 1967, Lebanon became the battleground for the Arab – Israeli conflict. Israel maintained its reprisal policy against Jordan and Lebanon, punishing the Lebanese and Jordanian governments in their inability to contain the Palestinian movement. In addition, the cross border attacks from Lebanese territory increased and intensified. It created a window of opportunity for Nasser to avenge the Arab's drastic loss in 1967. Following Israel's victory in the Six Day War, Israeli Prime Minister Levy Eshkol reestablished Israel's security policy claiming: "Israel's policy would never permit a return to a situation of constant threat"<sup>72</sup>.

The Lebanese state became fully submerged into the Arab – Israeli conflict following the Beirut Raid in 1968. The Palestinian movement claimed responsibility for an attack on an El Al Plane at Athens Airport. The Israeli Air Force retaliated attacking Beirut Airport and destroying 13 civilian aircrafts<sup>73</sup>. The aftermath of the Beirut Raid commenced a long journey of Lebanese impotence in curtailing the actions of the Palestinian movement. Israeli political and military strategists became conscious of the fact that they had to take matters into their own hands. The Lebanese Armed Forces and the major positions in the Lebanese government were under Maronite dominance. Yet, they should not contain the outburst of Palestinian cross – border attacks.

Following the impotence of the Lebanese government in curtailing Palestinian cross – border insurgencies, it was inevitable for the Lebanese government to reach an agreement with the Palestinian Movement. The main concern behind establishing such

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<sup>72</sup> Ibid, p. 70

<sup>73</sup> Richard Falk (1969), *The Beirut Raid and the Law of Retaliation*, p. 415 - 417

an agreement was to counter the harsh and aggressive Israeli reprisal attacks on the Lebanese state. The Cairo Agreement in 1969 served as an “impetus” for the renewal of relations between the Maronites and Israelis. The low intensity of relations following the First Lebanese Civil War had to be re-strengthened and fastened following the Six Day War in 1967 and the Beirut Raid in 1968. The Maronites envisioned that their primary concern was the “Palestinian hold” over Lebanon<sup>74</sup>. On 3 November 1969, the Cairo Agreement formalized and institutionalized the military presence of the Palestinian movement. Under pressure from Nasser, Syria, Saudi Arabia and Jordan, Lebanon had to formalize and legitimize the cross border attacks and “complete freedom of movement” for the Palestinian Liberation Organization<sup>75</sup>. Each partner that pressured the Lebanese state into such an agreement had its own motives and interests. More importantly, the major players that pressured for an agreement were Jordan and Egypt. Jordan had its own share of domestic problems with the Palestinian movement and Nasser wanted to take “away attention from his own defeat in 1967”<sup>76</sup>. By March 1970, Israeli raids became consistent on different regions where the PLO was operating. The PLO continued and intensified its cross – border attacks and Israel aggressively retaliated. The Maronites were in a constant security dilemma and began arming themselves for a possible imminent showdown with the Palestinians and sympathetic Muslim groups<sup>77</sup>.

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<sup>74</sup> Schulze (1998), p. 72

<sup>75</sup> Ibid, p. 72 - 73

<sup>76</sup> Kimche (1991), p. 126

<sup>77</sup> Ian Black and Benny Morris (1992), *Israel's Secret Wars: A History of Israel's Intelligence Services*, p. 265

In September 1970, the Jordanian army attacked the Palestinian refugee camps and expelled the majority of the Palestinian population to the neighboring countries. Lebanon was one of the neighboring countries that already had a Palestinian refugee camps. The inability of the Lebanese government to curtail Palestinian activity was a momentum for Palestinian settlement from Jordan<sup>78</sup>. In 1971 the official bureau of PLO operations was relocated from Jordan to Lebanon. While the Maronites feared yet welcomed the Palestinian refugees in 1948 on the outset of the birth of Israel, in 1970, following Black September, they feared the military presence and influx of Palestinian resistance fighters. The existential fear that was claimed on grounds of shifting the demographic balance in favor of the Muslims had an added component. The Maronites feared their political dominance in this system and more importantly feared their existence as a Christian minority in the Middle East.

The emergence of the Palestinian threat following 1967 and its primary intensification in the aftermath of Black September created a necessity for the Israelis to reevaluate the concept of minority alliances in Lebanon. The expansion of Palestinian presence in Lebanon forced the Zionists to seek additional alliances to the earliest Maronite – Israeli partnership. The Israelis had to seek partners in the most important zone between Lebanon and Israel. The borders between these two countries had to be maintained at all costs. The security of Israel in light of Ben Gurion’s strategy had to establish peaceful borders with neighboring countries of the Jewish homeland. The Israelis approached Saad Haddad, the commander of the Lebanese Armed Forces in the Southern Lebanon, who portrayed Palestinian cross – border attacks as acts of “terrorism under Lebanese cover”. As early as 1972, Haddad indirectly indicated that

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<sup>78</sup> Schulze (1998), p. 74 - 75

an actual Israeli intervention would bring about the demise of the PLO in Southern Lebanon. The first series of massive Israeli ground operations were carried out in 1972 where the Lebanese Army operating units in the South “stood idly by or only made perfunctory display of resistance”<sup>79</sup>. The Lebanese government came under heavy pressure following Israeli reprisals on the Palestinian commandos operating in Lebanon. As a result, in June 1972 they drafted a Commando – Lebanese Accord suspending all forms of attacks on Israel from Lebanese soil. The initial claim behind concluding such an accord was to spare Lebanon from Israel’s aggressive reprisals<sup>80</sup>. Nevertheless, the change in Israeli policy began in November 1972. The change in military strategy called for preemptive strikes against the Palestinian refugee camps and military bases all over the Lebanese state. The IDF spokesperson announced: “We are no longer waiting for them {PLO} to hit first. This is the operative phase of our pledge to hit the terrorists wherever they are and they are in Lebanon”<sup>81</sup>.

In 1973 the level of tension and hostilities on Lebanese soil between Israel and the PLO escalated. Following the Munich massacres in 1972, an Israeli commando retaliated in April 1983 by assassinating top three Palestinian leaders in Verdun. The direct consequence of this act of vengeance created waves of clashes between the PLO and the Lebanese Army. The entire structure of the Lebanese political system was deteriorating. The Prime Minister resigned from office stating that the Lebanese Army should have intervened to contain Israeli intervention in its different asymmetric

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<sup>79</sup> Ibid, p. 75

<sup>80</sup> Ibid, p. 76

<sup>81</sup> Lester Sobel (1974), *Israel and the Arabs: The October 1973 War*, p. 17

forms<sup>82</sup>. The impotence of the Lebanese government and the incumbent fear of an outbreak of a civil war between the different local and foreign groups forced the Lebanese authorities into another accord with the PLO. On May 17 1973, the Melkart Agreement was concluded in its reaffirmation of Lebanese support for the Palestinian cause. This agreement actually came as a complimentary document to the principles of the earlier Cairo Agreement in 1969. On the level of the Arab – Israeli conflict, the Yom Kippur War in 1973 provided additional ground and reason for Israeli military superiority and confidence in the Middle East. The Arab Armies once again reunited their forces in their plan to preemptively attack and destroy the Jewish entity. However, the keen sense of the military strategists in the Israeli Army was able to sustain the earliest attacks and as a result was able to counter and vanquish the Arab armies. The direct consequence of the failure of the Arabs to destroy the state of Israel, led to the initiation of the peace talks between Israel and Egypt.

The main concern in the Israeli – Maronite partnership following 1967 was the containment of the military presence of the Palestinians in Lebanon. The Lebanese government – mainly pro – Maronite factions – were looking for solutions that would not threaten their dominance and presence in the precarious Lebanese republic. The main concern was with the growing Palestinian population following the events of Black September. The state of Israel's main objective was securing a 'friendly Lebanon' where insurgency attacks would not threaten the Northern borders of the Jewish homeland. The sense of commonality between the Maronites and Israelis was finding an alternative method that would contain the PLO and as a result spare Lebanon from Israeli acts of reprisal and an outbreak of a civil war.

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<sup>82</sup> Kamal Salibi (1976), *Crossroads to Civil War: Lebanon 1958 - 1976*, p. 66

## ***6. Relations in the Fifth Phase: 1975 – 1985***

The fifth phase of Maronite – Israeli relations brought forth the primes of this minority alliance in light of Operation Peace for Galilee in 1982 and the fall of this alliance following the abrogation of the May 17 1983 Agreement. This period is highlighted with Menachim Begin’s assumption of power in 1977. The policy making of the Likud Party called for an overt and full partnership with the Maronites. Following Ben Gurion’s line of thought, Likud policy making focused as early as 1977 on achieving political goals and aspirations in using military capabilities. The full scale invasion in 1982 produced the highlight of Maronite – Israeli partnership in their sense of commonality. The common goals were eradicating and exterminating Palestinian presence in Lebanon and more importantly establishing peace with Lebanon, under the tight leadership of Zionist sympathetic regime. The conclusion of peace between Egypt and Israel created an important model and victory in Israeli political strategy. After Jordan and Egypt and the ‘peaceful settlement’ of the Golan Heights with Syria, Lebanon became the final destination for concluding peace. Israel’s national security objectives – on its borders - would have been achieved in light of a concluding peace arrangement with Lebanon.

The relocation of the PLO Headquarters from Jordan to Beirut transformed Lebanon as the primary security concern for the survival of the Jewish homeland. The center of Muslim decision making was transferred from Cairo to Damascus<sup>83</sup>. The importance of a strong alliance between the Maronites and Israelis had an additional feature, containing Syrian influence on the region. The Maronites feared the absorption

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<sup>83</sup> Rabinovich, p. 37

of the Palestinian refugees in the delicate power – sharing structure of the Lebanese entity. As soon as the fighting began in 1975 between the Kataeb and the Palestinians, the Maronites were looking for political and military equilibrium when they approached yet again the state of Israel<sup>84</sup>. The Maronites approached the Zionists claiming their sense of commonality in facing and containing the PLO, in their request for military assistance and support. On the outset of the Second Lebanese Civil War, the official Israeli position was ‘helping the Maronites to help themselves’. The military strategists were not interested in a full scale alliance that might endanger Israeli domestic goals and as a result were hesitant in offering full support. However, Israel was searching for a ‘friendly’ Western oriented government and the PLO were benefitting from a weak confessional nature and were endorsing a strong Muslim government<sup>85</sup>.

The regional indirect clash between the PLO and the state of Israel was transformed into a confrontation between Syria and Israel in Lebanon. The regional powers – Israel and Syria – had their own proxy factions in Lebanon. As early as 1976, the Israelis created their own proxy faction in their area of concern, Southern Lebanon. The Good Fence Policy was established between the Christians and Israelis on the Northern borders of the Jewish homeland<sup>86</sup>.

In 1975 the different Christian factions that had partnerships with the state of Israel were requesting assistance. The state of Israel responded by providing “weapons, food and medication” to the newly created South Lebanon Army; in addition, the

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<sup>84</sup> Ze’ev Schiff (1985), A History of the Israeli Army, p. 241

<sup>85</sup> Schulze (1998), p. 83

<sup>86</sup> Ibid, p. 85



Israelis supported the Maronites in Beirut with “weapons and training”<sup>87</sup>. The earliest contacts between the Kataeb and the Israelis on the outset of the Second Lebanese Civil war involved recurring themes of previous experiences. However, it should be mentioned that the founder and leader of the Kataeb, Pierre Gemayel never advocated overt contacts with the Israelis. Nevertheless, on the grounds of Maronite survival and existentialist fears, Gemayel sent Joseph Abu Khalil as an emissary to request Israeli assistance<sup>88</sup>. The earliest encounter between Abu Khalil and Shimon Peres focused on the common fate of Maronites and Israelis in the Middle East in facing their common enemy, the PLO. More importantly, Abu Khalil reminded Peres that the Maronites in several important incidents defended the Jews of Lebanon in Wadi Abu Jamil<sup>89</sup>.

In this same phase, the Maronite community devised a diplomatic strategy that kept their alternatives lucid and open. Within the Gemayel family, the divisions of the Maronite community were embodied. More importantly, the divergence in opinion in the Gemayel family maintained a crucial balance with the level of their foreign policy orientation. Bashir Gemayel was promoting the Israeli option, while his brother Amine and father Pierre were advocating a Syrian one. Schulze asserts that Bashir Gemayel believed in military power as the foundation of political power; in addition, she claims that he did not believe in co-existence<sup>90</sup>. Similar Maronite sentiments were expressed by the adversaries of the Gemayel family, mainly the son of Camille Chamoun, Tigers militia leader, Dany Chamoun. Chamoun expressed that Israeli assistance enables the

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<sup>87</sup> Ibid, p. 86

<sup>88</sup> Joseph Abu Khalil (1992), *Qissat al – Mawarinah fi al – Harb (Les Maronites Dans La Guerre Au Liban)*, p. 51

<sup>89</sup> Ibid, p. 52

<sup>90</sup> Schulze (1998), p. 88

Maronites to ‘slaughter the Palestinians’<sup>91</sup>. The Israeli considered the Chamoun family as more reliable allies in comparison to the Gemayel family. Nevertheless, Bashir Gemayel was able to convince the Israelis in portraying his commitment claiming that: “Lebanon must go hand in hand with Israel, because the two countries find themselves in the same situation and both loathe the Arab world”<sup>92</sup>. In the same period, another individual emerged with pro – Israeli sentiments: Etienne Saqr. The latter argued that the salvation of Lebanon comes on the hands of Israeli assistance and support in light of an imminent threat from Syrian intervention. More importantly, Saqr’s sentiments came in light of Gemayel’s and Chamoun’s request for Syrian intervention to safeguard the Christian community. The ideology of the Guardians of the Cedar, Saqr’s militia was a line of thought that advocated militant Phoenicianism<sup>93</sup>. In addition, the majority of the Maronite Clergy remained constant in their support of the Maronite – Israeli alliance. Father Sharbel Qassis, Superior General of the Maronite Order, advocated a ‘pure Lebanon’, opposing all forms of Palestinian presence<sup>94</sup>.

The earliest form of Israeli support to Maronite dominance in Lebanon and their assistance in containing the PLO with the outset of the Second Lebanese Civil War emerged with Operation Litani in 1978. In that same year, the Israelis with the support of their proxy faction institutionalized and created the Security Zone, which later became known as the Security Belt<sup>95</sup>. The transition in power from a Labor coalition to

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<sup>91</sup> Ze’ev Schiff and Ehud Ya’ari (1985), *Israel’s Lebanon War*, p.18

<sup>92</sup> Schulze (1998), p. 90

<sup>93</sup> Rabinovich, p. 70

<sup>94</sup> *Ibid*, p. 68

<sup>95</sup> Schulze (1998), p. 93

the radical Likud in 1977 brought forth an innovative strategy in Israeli political and military strategy. The main focus in Likud's strategy was to produce a solution on the grounds of an effective and potent military campaign<sup>96</sup>.

The Likud's national strategy continued with the foundations of Zionist diplomacy and military strategy. The fundamental concerns were focused on containing Syrian hegemony in the Levant and more importantly on restraining the widespread orientation of Palestinian nationalism to the Israeli Occupied Territories. The initial fear was that the spread of such nationalism might help establish a Palestinian state in the occupied territories<sup>97</sup>. Begin's active political and military strategy in assisting the Maronites was tested in light of the Zahle Crisis in 1981. Upon Bashir Gemayel's request, the Israeli Air Force intervened and shot down two Syrian helicopters that were threatening the Christian population in the Bekaa region<sup>98</sup>. Begin's consistent military strategy came as continuity to the reprisal policy introduced against insurgency attacks from Jordan and Lebanon, as early as 1965. Prime Minister Begin justified "retaliation as a policy, saying those who kill Jews in our time cannot enjoy impunity and that Israel will cut off the evil arm of the PLO"<sup>99</sup>.

The period prior to the 1982 invasion introduced a series of Israeli preemptive strikes against any Palestinian training base and camp in Lebanon<sup>100</sup>. The primary change in the manner of relations between the Maronites and Israelis was the nature of

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<sup>96</sup> Ibid, p. 95

<sup>97</sup> Ibid, p. 96 – 97

<sup>98</sup> Ibid, p. 98

<sup>99</sup> Black and Morris, p. 363

<sup>100</sup> Ibid, p. 110

these contacts. After 1977, the nature of these relations developed from a covert to an overt partnership. With the beginning of Begin's second term in 1981, he was heard claiming that he would "order the IDF to go as far as Arafat's bunker, meaning PLO headquarters in Beirut"<sup>101</sup>. Begin's dual policy revolved around considering the PLO as the 'ultimate enemy' and more importantly the perception of the Maronites as Phoenicians, not Arabs<sup>102</sup>, thus qualifying them as allies. The main principle and support for an invasion was envisioned in Ariel Sharon's and Menachim Begin's political strategy. The prime incentive for the invasion was to destroy the PLO's territorial infrastructure in Lebanon. Supposedly, the Likud government was imagining Maronite support<sup>103</sup> for the invasion and accomplishment of this security objective. The political accomplishment of the intended invasion was to bring peace and stability to the Northern borders of the Jewish homeland. More importantly, it was focused on containing any possible solution to the Arab – Israeli conflict. Among the numerous solutions, there was possibility to create a Palestinian state that would be able to coexist with the Jewish state. Nevertheless, the Likud were totally against any form of coexistence and territorial partnership<sup>104</sup>.

Apart from the obvious Israeli security objectives in the invasion of Lebanon, they also assumed that the Maronites were the 'junior' allies in accomplishing a fruitful invasion<sup>105</sup>. Bashir Gemayel voiced the sentiments of a fraction of the Maronite

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<sup>101</sup> Schiff and Ya'ari, p. 60

<sup>102</sup> Schulze (1998), p. 115

<sup>103</sup> The main Christian militia: the Lebanese Forces under the command of Bashir Gemayel

<sup>104</sup> Schulze (1998), 122 - 123

<sup>105</sup> Ibid, p. 124

community claiming that “we expect you to invade Lebanon, and when you do we will denounce you. We expect you to remain here for three months”<sup>106</sup>. Gemayel was calling for a three month period that would steadily allow his transition to the presidency unchallenged. Sharon on the other hand, envisioned Lebanon under the leadership of the pro- Israeli Gemayel that would undoubtedly lead to the conclusion of a peace treaty. The constant objectives in supporting a full scale invasion had two main components. The first and primary concern was to eradicate Palestinian presence and as a result diminish any aspiration in creating a Palestinian state in the Israeli Occupied Territories. The second objective was to establish a new political order in the Lebanese system, under pro – Israeli Maronite dominance that would definitely enable the signing of a peace treaty with Israel<sup>107</sup>. The original plan called for an invasion that included a 40 kilometer security zone; however, defense minister Sharon insisted that the invasion should consider “either all of Lebanon or none at all”<sup>108</sup>. The Maronites failed to keep their end of the bargain. As early as January 1982, the Maronites confirmed their active participation and support to the Israeli invasion in vowing to contain and capture West Beirut<sup>109</sup>. However, as soon as the invasion, codenamed Operation Peace for Galilee, began in June 1982, Gemayel refused to stay committed to his earlier promises. Nevertheless, Sharon refused the waves of advice that advocated the failure of the Maronite – Israeli partnership on grounds that the Maronites were never reliable allies. Sharon insisted on supporting Gemayel’s bid for the presidency and went as far as

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<sup>106</sup> Schiff and Ya’ari, p. 52

<sup>107</sup> Schulze (1998), p.127

<sup>108</sup> Ibid, p. 130

<sup>109</sup> Kimche (1991), p. 144

“buying votes and threatening Lebanese citizens into voting for him”<sup>110</sup>. The direct aftermath of the Israeli invasion produced a Lebanese political reality that embodied Israel’s security objectives. The Israelis were able to eradicate and contain the Palestinians, yet they could not achieve a peace treaty with the assassination of President Elect Bashir Gemayel on September 14, 1982. There was not a potent Maronite leader that could continue what Gemayel failed and refused to accomplish<sup>111</sup>.

The political vacuum created by the assassination of Bashir Gemayel led the Likud administration to reassess the given situation in Lebanon. The Maronite – Israeli partnership had failed in concept and practice. The aftermath of Gemayel’s assassination resulted in the vicious massacres of the Sabra and Shatila camps. Following these bloody massacres, the Likud government was pressured to resign. On the international level, the Maronites and Israelis were seen as brutal butchers, massacring civilians on the grounds that they were resistance fighters. The Israelis fully supported the Maronites in their quest to restoring political dominance; however, the Maronites did not keep their promise in occupying and capturing West Beirut, on the eve of the invasion.

Under the auspices and supervision of the United States of America, there was a final attempt to draft a peace treaty between Lebanon and Israel. A series of discussions began as early as December 1982 and ended with the signing of the treaty on 17 May 1983<sup>112</sup>. The prime concern of these discussions was not to establish a peace treaty, which seemingly was out of the question; rather, it was a series of discussions on

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<sup>110</sup> Schiff and Ya’ari, p. 231

<sup>111</sup> Rabinovich, p. 144

<sup>112</sup> Ibid, p. 140

security arrangements between Lebanon and Israel. The incentive of any Israeli policy making always took into consideration and gave primacy to security concerns.

Nevertheless, following enormous waves of pressure from Syria and proxy groups in Lebanon, the Lebanese Cabinet on 5 March 1984 decided to abrogate the 17 May Agreement. The abrogation of the document left Israel with a shattered dream with no political success of establishing peace with Lebanon.

The abrogation of the May 17 Agreement meant the collapse of the minority alliance between the Maronites and Israelis. The Israelis kept close correspondence with Haddad's South Lebanese Army that maintained a safe and secure border alongside the Jewish homeland up till the Israeli withdrawal in 2000. Nevertheless, with the failure of concluding a peace agreement with Lebanon, the prospects of an alliance with the Maronites was diminished and decapitated. In the summer of 1985, the state of Israel withdrew its forces from Beirut to the Security Belt. The main focus of minority alliances was now concentrated on maintaining the partnership with the Christians in the Southern villages and more importantly on establishing contacts with other communities<sup>113</sup> on the border line.

#### **D. Evaluating Maronite – Israeli Relations**

The important feature in Zionist policy towards the Maronites was to pursue a steady and concrete relationship that would ensure Israeli hegemony over Syria and the Levant and more importantly that would involve a 'friendly' neighboring country. However, it should be noted that the Maronite community was never politically unified in dealing with any foreign player. The community was always divided on crucial

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<sup>113</sup> The Shiites were the main community the Israelis approached in 1985.

decisions and policy orientation with local groups and foreign entities. The historical evolution of relations between the Maronites and the Zionists never involved the Maronite community at large. This latter statement fundamentally expresses similar divergent Zionist positions in dealing with minorities and the Maronites specifically. The Maronites expressed warm sentiments towards the creation of a separate Jewish state on the grounds of balancing the Muslim threat in the Levant and primarily in Lebanon. More importantly, the Maronites felt that an alliance with the Zionists would help strengthen their political dominance in the system against the incumbent fears of the Muslim communities. However, the historical determinant in the relations between the Maronites and Zionists is primarily concerned with Muslims in general and the Palestinians specifically. Before the birth of the state of Israel in 1948, the Maronites feared that the demographic balance was changing in favor of the Muslims. On several accounts the Maronite Church and different individuals expressed these fears and sentiments and as a result approached the Zionists claiming they had common fears and concerns. Following the creation of the state of Israel, Maronite fears intensified gradually with the influx of Palestinian refugees. Nevertheless, the relations between these minorities continued with a lower degree of intensity in comparison to what happened later on. The climax in the historical relations between the Zionists and Maronites began with the aftermath of the Six Day War in 1967. The additional influx of Palestinian refugees and resistance fighters embossed and confirmed Maronite and Israeli fears simultaneously. With the ratification of the Cairo Agreement in 1969, and the additional influx of Palestinian refugees following Black September in 1970, the form of relations between the Maronite and Israelis changed in nature and scope. The relationship between these political entities became overt in nature and practice. The



Israelis had to neutralize the situation of the PLO in Lebanon, whereby securing its Northern borders from any cross border attacks carried out by the PLO in South Lebanon. More importantly, the radical change in Israeli policy towards Lebanon happened with the rise of the Likud to power in 1977. Consequently, massive ground operations began in 1978, where the Likud government persuasively argued that security and military superiority are the most important constants in the continuity and survival of the Jewish state. The highest point the alliance between the Maronites and Israelis was in 1982. The main objectives for Operation Peace for Galilee was to expel the PLO from Beirut, install Bashir Gemayel as President of the Lebanese state and more importantly achieve a peace treaty between Lebanon and Israel. Nonetheless, Israeli security objectives were accomplished, yet installing a friendly government and achieving peace was out of question. The assassination of President Gemayel and the Sabra and Shatila massacres provided the impetus for the downfall of relations between these political entities. In light of Israel's invasion of Lebanon, the Lebanese Forces under the leadership of Gemayel did not keep their promise in attacking and capturing West Beirut. Consequently, the relations further deteriorated when Amine Gemayel rose to the Presidency filling the vacant seat of his slain brother.

The sense of commonality in the relations between the Maronites and the Zionists in the Yishuv period was for mutual survival. These entities feared that eventually they would be outnumbered by the Muslim communities. The Maronites feared that the demographic balance would change and they would become a minority in a country in which they assumed political dominance and superiority. The Zionists feared that the Jewish homeland would never be established in light of the growing number of the Muslim population. The overall determinant in these relations was

communal survival in what they perceived as the ‘Muslim Arab world’. However, the mutual concerns changed with the creation of the state of Israel. The projected enemy in the Yishuv period was the high birth rate in Muslim communities. Following the creation of the Jewish homeland, the fears took a ‘newer’ form and shape. In Lebanon, the Maronites feared the influx of Palestinian refugees expelled in the aftermath of the creation of the state of Israel. In Israel, the Zionists feared that the Arabs would unite to fight Israel and as a result end their existence as a nation – state. Moreover, the Israelis feared its neighboring Arab countries, specifically nation – states that hosted Palestinian refugees. The elements of Israeli national security became the top priority in the continuity of the Jewish homeland. Their primary fears were that the Palestinians in the border countries would reestablish themselves and find manners to counter the existence of the state of Israel. The Maronites feared the Palestinians would support their adversaries<sup>114</sup> in the system that would eventually lead to the demise of Maronite political dominance. As a result, the principles of Israeli national security and Maronite existential fears coincided in containing and eradicating the Palestinians. Their sense of collaboration and mutual concerns from 1948 leading to the downfall of the Israeli – Maronite partnership in 1982 was focused primarily on schemes and means to contain and ‘finish’ the Palestinian question. Israel’s objectives were to secure its borders and more importantly wash away any attempt that might create a Palestinian entity. Maronite objectives were to secure and safeguard their political superiority in the Lebanese mosaic system.

The historical determinants in the relations between the Maronites and Israelis emerged from all Arab – Israeli Wars. Each and every war between the Arabs and the

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<sup>114</sup> The Muslim groups and political parties

state of Israel had either a direct or an indirect effect on Lebanon. The birth of the state of Israel created the Palestinian refugee problem in Lebanon. As early as 1965 and enormously in the aftermath of the Six Day War in 1967, the Palestinian movement began carrying out cross – border attacks on Israel. Israel initiated its ‘reprisal policy’ punishing the Lebanese government for its inability to contain the Palestinian attacks. Following Black September in 1970, another influx of Palestinian refugees entered Lebanon and Maronite fears reemerged. This eventually led to the showdown between the Maronite Kataeb party and the PLO in 1975. The region of South Lebanon provided the optimal battleground for the PLO to carry out their cross – border attacks. As a result, Israel launched Operation Litani in 1978 to contain the Palestinian insurgencies and more importantly to establish the Security Belt with its proxy forces, the South Lebanon Army. In addition, Israel’s latest attempt to conclude a Peace Treaty with a ‘friendly’ government in Lebanon began in 1982 with Operation Peace for Galilee and shattered in 1984, following the abrogation of the May 17 Agreement. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that Israel accomplished its security objectives; it was able to neutralize the Palestinian threat in Lebanon following ratifying peace with Egypt. The downfall of relations between the Maronites and Israelis meant that no peace treaty was achieved, yet Israel extensively fulfilled its security goals. (See Figure 2.1)




Fig 2.1- Historical Determinants in Maronite – Israeli Relations

## **E. Concluding Remarks**

Chapter II explored the historical relations between the Maronites and the state of Israel. The various phases in Maronite – Zionist relations were extensively explored and narrated. In addition, the various historical phases were covered starting in 1920 and ending in 1985. Furthermore, the historical determinants in the historical evolution of relations between the Maronites and Israelis was thoroughly discussed and investigated.

Chapter III will deal with exploring the relations between the Druze and the state of Israel. In comparison to Chapter II, the various phases in Druze – Zionist relations will be thoroughly discussed and investigated. In addition, the historical determinants in the relations between the Druze and the state of Israel will be mentioned. Consequently, this chapter will include an assessment and evaluation of the common framework of relations between Zionist policy from one side and the Maronites and Druze communities from the other.

## CHAPTER 3

### HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK AND NORMATIVE BACKGROUND: DRUZE – ISRAELI RELATIONS

Chapter II explored and discussed the historical relations between the Maronites and the state of Israel primarily focused on the time period that began in 1920 and ended in 1985. In addition, the historical determinants in the relations between the Zionists and the Maronites were thoroughly explained and mentioned. These relations were studied in light of providing the necessary historical background for the discussion and analysis of the current findings.

Chapter III seeks to review the historical framework of relations between the Druze and the state of Israel. The introduction part of this concerned study explained that an in depth study of these relations requires investigating the form of contacts between different minority groups and the state of Israel. This chapter will examine such relations beginning in the Yishuv period as early as 1920 and ending in 1985, the same year Israeli forces withdrew to the Security Belt. This chapter will be divided into two main sections: the first part will primarily deal with the relations between the Druze and the Zionists and the second part will deal with establishing a connective framework between the principles of Zionist policy towards the Maronites and the Druze alike. In addition, the sections will undertake five historical phases. The first phase is from 1920 up till 1948 – the creation of the Jewish state. The second phase begins post the creation of the Jewish homeland in 1948 up till the first Lebanese Civil War in 1958. The third phase carries on from 1958 up till the Six Day War in 1967. In addition, the fourth phase will cover the aftermath of the Six Day War up to the outbreak of the second

Lebanese Civil War in 1975. And the final phase carries on from 1975 up till Israeli withdrawal from the Mountains to the Security Belt in 1985.

### **A. Druze – Israeli Relations**

The ability to construct the framework of Druze – Israeli relations cannot follow the direct model exhibited in Maronite – Israeli alliances. The direct model of historical interpretation portrayed in Maronite – Israeli relations involves mutual concerns and goals without the involvement of a third party. As a result, it is quite facile to understand the wealth of information and dimensions of direct collaboration between the Maronites and Zionists. However, on the Druze level it is unimaginable and farfetched to study and explore the relations between the Zionists and Druze in Lebanon without assessing the situation between the Druze and Jews in Israel. The narration of historical cooperation between the Jewish community and the Druze community has been undertaken extensively. As a result, it becomes quite mandatory to discuss the historical determinants in Zionist – Druze relations in order to understand the indirect relationship between the Druze in Lebanon and the state of Israel.

The capacity to observe and assess the dynamics of Druze political ethos<sup>1</sup> in the Levant is undoubtedly an overwhelming task that involves multiple factors, variables and constants that need to be explored meticulously. From the Maronite perspective, certain factions within the community opened channels and contacts with the Zionists that continued with the state of Israel and definitely shattered following Israeli withdrawal to the Security Belt in 1985. The highest point in Maronite – Israeli cooperation was culminated in Operation Peace for Galilee in 1982. However, the

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<sup>1</sup> This ethos is defined as the guiding beliefs of the Druze communities in their history in the Middle East in given context of the study at hand.

failure and downfall of this alliance occurred following the assassination of Bashir Gemayel and the abrogation of the May 17 Agreement in 1984. On the other hand, Zionist – Druze cooperation is a continuous political reality. The Druze community in Israel is fully integrated in the political system and more importantly they serve in the Israeli Defense Forces. To a certain extent, the Druze in the Jewish homeland are fully integrated in Israeli political ethos and identity. In addition, and in comparison to the other Arab communities in Israel, the Druze are the closest to acquiring equal and similar rights with the Israeli Jews.

It might be out of the ordinary to assume that the form of cooperation between the Druze and Jews in Israel has anything to do with the Druze community in Lebanon. As a result, it becomes fallible to discuss the relations between the Lebanese Druze and Zionists based on historical realities that depict the situation in the Jewish homeland solely. However, as this section will enumerate, the political ethos of the Druze in the Levant has involved a sense of commonality between all the Druze communities regardless of their geographic location. Bernadette Schenk<sup>2</sup> (2005) contends that the focus on Lebanon’s Druze community is “explained by an internal Druze perspective. Syrian and Israeli Druze say... the key to understanding the Druze lies in Lebanon”. More importantly, the Druze community in Lebanon is considered to be the “religious and intellectual centre of their faith, particularly for Druze communities in the Diaspora”<sup>3</sup>.

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<sup>2</sup> Bernadette Schenk (2005), *Druze Identity in the Middle East: Tendencies and Developments in Modern Druze Communities since in the 1960s* (published in *The Druze: Realities and Perceptions*), p. 80

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid*, p. 80

Therefore, a mindful assessment of Druze perceptions and realities constructs a visible line of cooperation and collaboration between the Druze and other communities in any given context of any political situation, regardless of the geographic location. As a result, it becomes justifiable to discuss and explore the magnitude of relations between the Druze and Jews in Israel in light of extracting relative and common themes that narrate the relations between the Zionists and the Druze in Lebanon. The major difference with the Lebanese Druze in comparison to the Maronites is the manner and sense of relations with the Zionists. The Lebanese Druze nurtured an indirect alliance emerging from the contacts and alliances carried out between Palestinian Druze and the Zionists. The form of alliances carried out by any of the Druze communities in the Levant has always had an effect on the political ethos of the community at large. While from a Lebanese perspective it might seem imperfect to assume that the Druze have been more passionate concerning their overt relations with the state of Israel; however, it remains a matter of political discourse and authority that differentiate between assessing the tenets of Druze survival and actual political history.

On the dynamics of Druze – Zionists relations, Iman A. Hamdy<sup>4</sup> (2008) contends that Israel utilizes a “successful oppressive policy of separation and co-option of the Druze minority”. In the previous claim, Hamdy establishes the recurrent theme in Israeli political strategy in dealing with minorities. In relevance to the earlier section on the foundations of Zionist diplomacy, the ‘divide and conquer’ strategy was not used on an international level solely, yet it was incorporated in Israeli domestic policy making with the Palestinian Druze. The Zionists approached the Druze in an attempt to separate them from the Arab population in Palestine. Furthermore, the Zionists targeted the

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<sup>4</sup> Iman A. Hamdy (2008), *The Druze in Israel: A Less persecuted Minority* , p. 408



Druze in their attempt to portray to the international community, a successful model of coexistence between the Arabs and Jews in the state of Israel<sup>5</sup>.

### ***1. Normative Background***

The foundations of Druze religious ideals emerged in 11<sup>th</sup> century Egypt under the Fatimid Caliph al- Hakim bi- Amr Allah. The religious preference of the Druze finds roots as an offshoot of the Shiite Ismaili brand of Islam. Following years of persecution, the Druze community left Egypt and sought refuge in the Levant. The Druze Holy Writ binds believers to three main precepts<sup>6</sup>. Zeidan Atashe<sup>7</sup> (1995) discusses these teachings, observing that the second precept calls for the ‘the Protection of brothers (“Hefz – Akhwan”). This means that each member in the Druze community is responsible for protecting and safeguarding the existence of another member in the community “even if there is a high price to be paid. This rule ensures the cohesion and survival of the community”. In addition to the Druze Holy Writ that binds believers to certain norms, the prospects of land ownership – through inheritance or purchase – are equally important. The ownership of land and “its cultivation and defense, have always been a supreme value” ensuring Druze survival. The Druze believe that defending the land assures both spiritual and physical survival. As a result, all members of the Druze community are called to protect their lands against any invasion or conquest. The Druze

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<sup>5</sup> Ibid, p. 409

<sup>6</sup> These three precepts are: Guarding One’s Speech (“Sidq al- Lissan”), the Protection of Brothers (Hefz- Akhwan”), and the Prohibition of Idolatry (“A’dam Ibadat al- Awthan”). See Zeidan Atashe (1995), *Druze and Jews in Israel – A Shared Destiny?*, p. 3

<sup>7</sup> Atashe, p. 3

believe that when they protect and safeguard their land's existence, they are safeguarding their own personal existence<sup>8</sup>.

The modern political history of the Levant narrates that the Druze settled between Lebanon, Syria and Palestine. In Lebanon, they settled in Mount Lebanon which was considered as the safe haven of minorities, where each group could freely adhere and perform their religious practices. In Mount Lebanon, the Druze community began to develop “as a closed community and a semi – autonomous political force”<sup>9</sup>. Fuad Khuri (2005) claims that the Druze throughout their history have displayed a lucid level of “internal cohesion and strong attachment to ethnic identity”<sup>10</sup>. Furthermore, the high level of their group cohesion is reflected in a metaphor put forth by Paul Florsheim and David Gutmann (1992)<sup>11</sup> : “a plate of copper that resonates as one if a single edge is touched”. The secretive nature of the Druze religion allows for a higher level of group solidarity. Moreover, the Druze community lack an “authority structure” and “institutions that openly and publicly teach dogma and ways of worship. Tawhid beliefs and practices are the privileges of those who speak to acquire them”<sup>12</sup>.

The Druze in Lebanon and Syria were successful in enjoying a considerable share of power with respect to their numerical representation. The Druze in Lebanon and Syria were able to maintain their prominent role in any ruling society, largely due to

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<sup>8</sup> Atashe, p. 9 – 10

<sup>9</sup> Hamdy, p. 408

See Laila Parsons (2000), *The Druze between Palestine and Israel 1947 – 49*, p. 2

<sup>10</sup> Fuad Khuri (2005), *Aspects of Druze Social Structure: There Are No Free- Floating Druze* (published in *The Druze: Realities and Perceptions*), p. 61

<sup>11</sup> Paul Florsheim and David Gutmann (1992), *Mourning the Loss of Self as Father: A Longitudinal Study of Fatherhood among the Druze*, p. 163

<sup>12</sup> Khuri, p. 64

the existence of wealthy families that ruled and governed the community. On the other hand, the Druze in Palestine essentially lacked a powerful leadership and had no viable means for maintaining a healthy socioeconomic status. The Druze in Palestine were a group of peasants who were able to identify with religious and traditional loyalties primarily. In order to secure their interests in the Levant, the Palestinian Druze had to rely on the leadership capabilities of their brethren in Lebanon and Syria<sup>13</sup>.

The most pivotal element of Druze particularism has to do with the tenets of religion that stipulate the dynamics of group survival, as mentioned in Druze Holy Writ. The aspects of “self – preservation” constitute one of the fundamental components of Druze identity. This perception of group survival assures a collective Druze identity and reinforces internal cohesion through a “redefinition of its {Druze identity} historical, political and religious position in state and society”<sup>14</sup>. The ultimate objective in maintaining a cohesive sense of collective identity is for the survival and functioning of the Druze community in the Levant. Harik (2005) contends that Druze survival depends primarily on “members’ solidarity and cohesiveness” in any given political situation<sup>15</sup>.

The self perception of the Druze communities in Lebanon, Syria, and Israel is similar and cohesive. The ultimate goal is to maintain a cohesive identity that would be able to survive and function in the Middle East. However, there is a major difference in the levels of cooperation with the governing body in these nation– states. The Druze in Lebanon and Syria are influenced by “Arab nationalism” and are relatively accepted as

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<sup>13</sup> Kais Firro (1999), *The Druzes in the Jewish State: A Brief History*, p. 19 - 21

<sup>14</sup> Schenk, p. 83

<sup>15</sup> Judith Harik (2005), *Coping with Crisis: Druze Civic Organization during the Lebanese Civil War* (published in *The Druze: Realities and Perceptions*), p. 198

‘genuine’ Arabs and Muslims. While the Druze in Israel perceive themselves as a separate and distinct group that shares nothing in common with the Muslims. Israeli Druze perceive a sense of commonality with the Arabs on the grounds of language solely<sup>16</sup>.

## ***2. Relations in the First Phase: 1920 – 1948***

The bulk of literature that depicts Druze – Zionist relations in the Yishuv Period leading to the birth of the state of Israel can be primarily found in the Haganah Archives. In addition, the archives of the Joint Bureau for Arab Affairs at the Jewish Agency maintained the exchange of personal letters between the leading notables in the Druze community and the Zionists<sup>17</sup>.

Following the Balfour Declaration in 1917, the Arabs intensified their dissent in a possible establishment of a Jewish state. They mainly opposed all forms of Jewish immigration and settlement. Consequently, during 1920 – 1921 numerous clashes and hostilities broke out between the Jewish and Arab communities. On the outset of these clashes in 1920, the earliest indication of Druze neutrality became apparent and plain obvious<sup>18</sup>. Moreover, in 1929 a series of disputes and riots renewed between the Muslims and Jews. On the outset of Jewish – Arab conflicts, the Druze persuasively refrained from supporting the Palestinians – Arab population - claiming it was a

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<sup>16</sup> Schenk, p. 87

<sup>17</sup> Yoav Gelber (1992), Antecedents of the Jewish – Druze Alliance in Palestine, p. 352 – 373

<sup>18</sup> Atashe, p. 22 – 23

religious struggle between the Jews and Muslims. They claimed they had no interest in supporting either sides of the conflict<sup>19</sup>.

The official forms of dialogue between the Druze and Jews began in 1930. The fundamental mission of the Joint Bureau for Arab Affairs was to secure and extend contacts with the different Arab minorities in Palestine. The main focus of Zionist domestic policy in Palestine – in the Yishuv period - was to ensure general acquiescence to Zionist vision of creating a Jewish state. More importantly, the Jewish Agency encouraged relations with the Druze community on the grounds of extending and creating bonds with the Druze in Lebanon and Syria. The Bureau's Agent in Damascus, Tuvia Ashkenazi reported after visiting several Druze villages in the Levant that: "the Druze, do not like the Muslims, but they are likely to assist any Arab revolt and without the Druze, the Arabs are worth nothing"<sup>20</sup>. From the earliest contacts, the Zionists understood the precarious situation of the Druze community in Palestine. More importantly, they knew that the majority viewed themselves as Arabs; however, with a separate perceived identity that called primarily for survival and religious freedom. Ashkenazi's report that the Arabs are worth nothing without the Druze boosted Zionist aspirations in creating a solid alliance that would actually separate them from the rest of the Arab communities in Palestine. The main determinants in the sense of neutrality expressed by the Druze community emerged from inter – Arab clashes. The intensity of rivalries between the different Arab communities forced the Druze to seek "ways and means of safeguarding their own future and status"<sup>21</sup>. As a direct consequence, the

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<sup>19</sup> Hamdy, p. 409

<sup>20</sup> Ibid, p. 352

<sup>21</sup> Atashe, p. 27

Druze approached the Jewish community expressing mutual fears and concerns from the surrounding Arab communities. This sense of ‘isolation’ and ‘uncertainty’ paved the way of the Druze and Zionists supporting one another against any common perceived threat.

In 1930, the earliest clashes<sup>22</sup> between the Druze and other Arabs in Palestine produced the required precedent for relations that would follow after the creation of the state of Israel in 1948. Itzhak Ben – Zvi was among the prominent members in the Joint Bureau that kept on calling for a solid alliance with the Druze. As a result, Ben – Zvi requested that Aaron Chaim Cohen from the Political Department should spend adequate time in Druze villages that would help “increase awareness of how they {Druze} perceive us {Jews}”<sup>23</sup>. More importantly, the Zionists did not cease to stress the importance of establishing relations with the Palestinian Druze that would easily extend and improve links with Syrian and Lebanese Druze. In 1934, Eliahu Epstein who studied at the American University of Beirut was able to establish the first contacts made between Al – Atrash family – exiled from Jabal Druze to Transjordan – and the Political Department<sup>24</sup>.

The major turning point in the history of relations between the Druze and Zionists began with the riots and disturbances of the Arab Revolt from 1936 – 1939. Several rumors emerged as soon as the riots commenced. The rumors spread that exiles

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<sup>22</sup> A Druze bandit killed an Arab policeman and the community under the leadership of Sheikh Salman Tarif sent a deputation to complain to the chairman of the National Council (in the Joint Bureau), Itzhak Ben – Zvi. Ben – Zvi’s introduced the deputation to high ranking officials and as a result the Druze were able to settle their problems ‘peacefully’ with Zionist support (Gelber, 352).

<sup>23</sup> Gelber, p. 353

<sup>24</sup> Ibid, p. 353

from Jabal Druze were forming their own military ‘gangs’ and were joining the Arab groups in Palestine. The Al – Atrash family that was exiled from Jabal Druze to Transjordan rushed to the Zionist authorities claiming the fallibility of these rumors. Sultan Pasha of the Al – Atrash family was motivated to send emissaries to deny the assumed allegations of the Druze supporting the Arab groups in the belief that the Zionists would induce the French – Jewish Prime Minister to pardon and allow him to return to Jabal Druze<sup>25</sup>. Throughout the Arab Revolt, numerous reports were given to the Jewish Agency claiming the neutrality of most Palestinian Druze and their aspirations to be separated from the Muslims. In addition, these reports claimed that the Druze wanted to “rid themselves of the Mufti’s forced leadership and establish an independent community”<sup>26</sup>. Nevertheless, numerous exiles from Jabal Druze joined the Arab groups in the Arab Revolt. Ben – Zvi the main supporter of an alliance between the Druze and the Zionists pressured the Palestinian Druze to urge their “coreligionists” from joining any Arab groups and more importantly abstaining from anti – Jewish activities. Ben – Zvi’s approach was for the Palestinian Druze to use their contacts and pressure the Druze in Lebanon against joining any Arab ‘gang’. Sultan Al – Atrash needed the support and influence of the Jews with the French Premiership that would enable him to return to his homeland. In addition, Al – Atrash maintained his approach towards the Jews based on the similar situation expressed by the Palestinian Druze. The local Druze population in Palestine was requesting Jewish assistance in its conflicts with its Arab neighbors<sup>27</sup>. The prospects of the ‘Transfer Plan’<sup>28</sup> emerged with the Peel

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<sup>25</sup> Ibid, p. 354

<sup>26</sup> Ibid, p. 354

<sup>27</sup> Ibid, p. 355

Commission's partition plan in July 1937. The main mission of the Peel Commission was to investigate the major reasons leading to the Arab Revolt in 1936. The primary findings indicated that the viable solution for Palestine was to partition the territory and induce transfer between the Arab and Jewish populations. The majority of the Druze population lived within the boundaries of the proposed Jewish state. As a result, the Political Department was envisioning a linkage "between the minorities in Palestine" that would develop into an "alliance between two political entities"<sup>29</sup>. The dynamics of developing a minority alliance with the Druze formulated the array of discussions and negotiations between these two minorities that began from 1937 – 1940. In 1937, the Zionists kept their end of the bargain in influencing the French Premiership for issuing a pardon for Sultan Al – Atrash. Consequently, the Sultan in expressing his gratitude for Jewish support claimed that the Druze were pressured to support "the rebels in Palestine, but had resisted". More importantly, he conveyed his hope that the "Partition Plan would materialize and therefore undertook to conclude an alliance with the forthcoming Jewish state"<sup>30</sup>. Similar to the clashes in 1930, a new wave of incidents erupted between the Druze and other Arab communities in 1938<sup>31</sup>. The Transfer Plan between the Druze and Jews was revisited in March 1939. The discussions were taking place between notables from Druze families in Palestine and the Political Department in the Jewish Agency. The majority of the Druze notables encouraged the relocation of the

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<sup>28</sup> The Transfer plan stipulated the relocation of the Palestinian Druze to Jabal Druze. Such a transfer would pave the way for the creation of a Druze independent entity and more importantly a homogeneous Jewish homeland in Palestine.

<sup>29</sup> Gelber, p. 355

<sup>30</sup> Ibid, p. 358 – 359

<sup>31</sup> These incidents recurred in 1938 and again the Zionists utilized this opportunity to "widen the gap between the Druze and Arabs in Syria and Palestine" (Gelber, 359)



Druze population in Palestine to Jabal Druze. However, one Druze leader was prudent claiming that the plan should happen in a manner where “our Muslim brothers will not regard us as traitors”<sup>32</sup>.

In 1940, the publication of the White Paper land laws diminished the prospects of achieving the Transfer Plan laid out by the Peel Commission in 1937. Regardless of the White Paper, the Druze and Zionists were still searching for pragmatic solutions that would enable the creation of their homogenous independent entities in Jabal Druze and Palestine respectively. Throughout the year of 1940, the discussions between the Zionists and Druze did not cease but were consequently strengthened in their common assertion that an Arab revolt is bound to recur following an Axis invasion of the Levant. More importantly, in 1940 the Druze proposed a defense plan for “the Druze villages and the Jewish settlements in the northern part of the country”<sup>33</sup>. The Zionists were cautious in accepting the majority of Druze proposals. Their primary fear was that the Palestinian Druze might reject the probability of an alliance with the Zionists if their interests and objectives were not meant. The assumption laid out by the Zionists was that “the Druze may find a different solution, since they make take care of their own safety”<sup>34</sup>. In September 1942, the Zionists resurrected the Transfer Plan. Certain individuals in the Jewish Agency reminded the Palestinian Druze of the ‘Transfer Plan’ that depicted relocating and concentrating the Druze population in Jabal Druze<sup>35</sup>.

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<sup>32</sup> Ibid, p. 361

<sup>33</sup> Ibid, p. 366

<sup>34</sup> Ibid, p. 366

<sup>35</sup> Ibid, p. 369

The Political Department remained firm in its conviction that an alliance between the Druze and Jews was necessary and essential. Its fervor was strengthened with the anticipation of the Anglo – American Committee in 1946. The Zionists feared another Arab – Jewish confrontation in the wake of the report that followed the 1946 Committee. As a result, the Zionists were cognizant that the Arabs needed the Druze in any brawl that might erupt between the Jews and Arabs. Nevertheless, any attempt to formulate a concrete Jewish – Druze alliance materialized only after the First Arab – Israeli War in 1948<sup>36</sup>.

The Druze were cautious in overtly supporting the Jewish minority in the Yishuv Period. Prior to the creation of the state of Israel and the defeat of the Arab Armies in 1948, the fate of the showdown between the Arabs and Jews was undecided. The Druze were vigilant in accepting an overt partnership with the Zionists in the wake of the emergence of the Jewish homeland in Palestine.

### ***3. Relations in the Second Phase: 1948 – 1958***

The different forms of contact between the Zionists and Druze culminated in the First Arab – Israeli War in 1948. The main concern for the Zionists was to encourage a minority alliance with the Druze in the probability of a brawl with the Arabs. Even though a fortified alliance between the Druze and Zionists was not concluded prior to the creation of the state of Israel in 1948, the Arab in Revolt from 1936 – 1939 depicted Druze neutrality and limited support to the Arabs. The Zionists rushed to secure an

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<sup>36</sup> Ibid, p. 370

alliance in light of Druze neutrality towards the imminent conflict that erupted in 1946 and ended in 1949<sup>37</sup>.

During the First Arab – Israeli War, the majority of the Druze refused to attack the Jewish settlements. In addition, the Druze have always had superior military skills that were extended in support to the Jews. Judith Harik<sup>38</sup> (2005) claims that the “Druze have long been perceived as feisty mountaineers with superior military skills and strong communal solidarity”. In light of Druze support for the creation of the state of Israel, the Zionist military force allowed the Druze to “harvest their fields” and consequently were not expelled from their villages<sup>39</sup>. In addition, Israel rewarded Druze support by giving historical references to ‘Prophet Nabi Shuayb’ claiming the existence of a blood linkage<sup>40</sup> between the Druze and Jews. In 1949, the Zionists made it an annual gathering for the Jews and Druze to meet at the Nabi Shuayb shrine praising and renewing the ‘blood covenant’<sup>41</sup>. In addition, the shrine was used as the site for the ‘swearing- in’ ceremony of the Druze recruits to the IDF. The shrine represented the newly found historical connection between the Druze and the Jews<sup>42</sup>.

In 1950, following the creation of the Jewish homeland in Palestine, Israel had been promoting a separate identity for the Druze minority. This distinctive identity was modeled on the religious background and social structure of the Druze community. It

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<sup>37</sup> Parsons, p. 25 – 30

<sup>38</sup> Harik (2005), p. 197

<sup>39</sup> Hamdy, p. 409

<sup>40</sup> See John Maher (2009), *Between Israel and Lebanon: The Druze Intifawda of October 2007*. Maher claims that the relationship was based on a “blood bond”, p. 416.

<sup>41</sup> Firro (1999), p. 77

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid*, p. 43

depicted a sense of geographic isolation, a closed religion and more importantly the victimization of the Druze population by Muslim and Christian persecution<sup>43</sup>.

Moreover, in 1956 Israeli political strategists further attempted to separate the Druze from their Arab surroundings by recognizing them as an independent religious community. Such Israeli recognition was the first of its kind following the creation of the state in 1948.

During the First Arab – Israeli War, the Zionists made it a point to recruit Druze individuals in promising them future benefits<sup>44</sup> after the Jewish state was firmly established. In addition, Firro contends that the main Zionist objective behind recruiting Druze members to their military campaign was to use them “as the sharp blade of the knife to stab the back of Arab unity”<sup>45</sup>. However, in 1956 the state of Israel imposed compulsory service for the younger generations in the Druze community. In addition, the new Druze recruits were stationed exclusively with other Druze units, mainly for ideological orientation. This ‘ideological indoctrination’ depicted the high degree of loyalty to safeguarding and protecting the state of Israel. This ideology mainly focused on encouraging a ‘sense of commonality’ that enumerated a common destiny in preserving the security of the Jews and Druze against the threats posed by the Arabs<sup>46</sup>.

The situation greatly differed in Lebanon. The dominant ideology in Israel was focused on particularizing the Druze into accepting Israeli identity and aspirations.

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<sup>43</sup> Hamdy, p. 410

<sup>44</sup> These benefits mainly including the right of the Druze population to maintain their land property

<sup>45</sup> Firro (1999), p. 41 - 42

<sup>46</sup> Lisa Hajjar (2000), *Speaking the Conflict, or how the Druze Became Bilingual: A Study of Druze Translators in the Israeli Military Courts in the West Bank and Gaza*, p. 310

However, with the rise of Gamal Abdel Nasser in 1952, Kamal Jumblatt, unchallenged leader of the Lebanese Druze had already emerged as the vanguard of Arab Nationalism and Progressive Socialism as early as 1949. Jumblatt felt that the 1958 Lebanese Civil War made Lebanon “an arena for rivalry between the superpowers”. As a result, Jumblatt supported Nasser in the uprising against Camille Chamoun and “his pro – Western policies”. The aftermath of the uprisings made Kamal Jumblatt, the undisputable “kingmaker” in the Lebanese political system<sup>47</sup>.

#### ***4. Relations in the Third Phase: 1958 – 1967***

Following the recognition of the Druze as a religious community in Israel in 1960, the Israelis denied the Druze right to celebrate official Muslim holidays<sup>48</sup>, replacing them by Druze holidays. In addition, in 1962, the final institutionalization and foremost important Israeli strategy in separating and nurturing a separate Druze identity from the Arab population was accomplished by establishing separate communal courts<sup>49</sup>.

In 1963, an outbreak of German measles occurred in four Druze villages. The means of transportation to these villages was difficult and as a result the required medication for fighting this epidemic disease was not allocated. The inability of the Israeli government to provide for the welfare of its Israeli Druze citizens resulted in the death of many infants. The aftermath of this event created inter – Druze riots that echoed complaints that Israeli “achievements” with the Druze community were weak

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<sup>47</sup> Eyad Abu Chakra (2005), *The Druze and Arabism* (published in *The Druze: Realities and Perceptions*), p. 178

<sup>48</sup> Ramadan is one of these Muslim holidays.

<sup>49</sup> Hamdy, p. 410

and empty. The government promised equal recognition and concern for the Druze community, yet it failed to provide the basic medical services<sup>50</sup>. More importantly, the government of Israel knew it had to take strict measures to safeguard the alliance and partnership with the Druze community. In addition to compulsory conscription, religious independence and the creation of separate Druze tribunals, supplementary measures had to be taken. The state of Israel initiated a policy that aimed to control the Druze population through economic independence. The government had to increase available jobs for non – Jewish Israelis and more importantly it had to augment and enhance the role of the Druze in the IDF. Consequently, the period from 1963 to 1967 was a crucial historical period for the Zionist government to maintain a tight grip over the Druze community by establishing adequate and fair reforms. In the latter period, the state of Israel made the Druze community economically dependent on the opportunities and services provided by the government. The sense of physical and material survival of the Druze community was primarily based on the services provided solely by the government, with no other alternative<sup>51</sup>. The Zionists feared that if the Druze felt neglected they would resort to their adversaries – Arab communities - and as a result Israel would lose its depiction of coexistence with the Arabs in the Jewish homeland.

In 1967, Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol claimed that there is a Druze – Jewish brotherhood in facing common threats and fears. Eshkol expressed “you are as we”, stating that there is a sense of equality between the Jews and Druze in Israel in any related issue<sup>52</sup>.

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<sup>50</sup> Atashe, p. 117 - 118

<sup>51</sup> Ibid, p. 118 - 123

<sup>52</sup> Schenk, p. 91

### ***5. Relations in the Fourth Phase: 1967 – 1975***

In 1956, Israel imposed compulsory service for the younger factions in the Druze community. Consequently, the Druze unit participated in all Israeli wars. They participated extensively in the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza in 1967. From the very beginning, the Druze unit in the IDF were “notorious for their brutality” against the enemies of Israel<sup>53</sup>. Prior to the Six Day War the Druze soldiers in the IDF patrolled borders between Israel and surrounding countries. The aftermath of the Six Day War in 1967 involved several dimensions. The earliest change was that the Druze had an additional function; they had to maintain and preserve the security in the ‘newly’ occupied Arab territories. More importantly, the Druze soldiers in the IDF were forced to put an end to any quarrel and conflict that erupted between the Arab communities in these occupied zones. The important dimension following the Six Day War was that the Druze had to maintain and protect the Golan Heights. The Druze community in the Golan Heights stayed on their land and the Israeli Druze had to bridge the gap with their brethren. They fundamentally had to compensate for the loss of the Syrian Druze with their nation – state. The Druze in the Golan Heights were “outwardly receptive” and cooperative with the Israeli governing body. The Israeli Druze intensely managed the interaction between the Israeli government and the Syrian Druze. The role of the Israeli Druze is widely acknowledged in maintaining a ‘peaceful’ situation in the Golan Heights<sup>54</sup>.

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<sup>53</sup> Hamdy, p. 412

<sup>54</sup> Atashe, p. 134

The government of Israel publicized the role of the Druze in ending continuous disputes between the Arabs themselves in their protection of Israel. On 21 April 1969 the Hebrew newspaper Yedioth Ahronoth stated that Israeli negotiators threatened Arab prisoners that “they would be turned over to a Druze interrogator” for retrieving forthcoming information<sup>55</sup>. The Israelis once again depicted the brutality of the Druze officers in the IDF and the Police Force. From 1967 – 1970 the numerous accusations put forth by the Israeli government towards the Druze forced them to protest “being used as scapegoats”<sup>56</sup>. In light of Druze protest against the government for the abundance of accusations and rumors, on 13 March 1970 Ezer Weizmann resurrected the archaic ‘Transfer Plan’. Weizmann stated that “the solution is to get rid of the Israeli Arab minorities by sending – transferring – the Muslims to Jordan, the Christians to Lebanon and the Druze to Syria”<sup>57</sup>.

#### ***6. Relations in the Fifth Phase: 1975 – 1985***

The challenge to these Israeli patterns in particularizing the Druze community emerged in the Yom Kippur War in 1973 and Land Day in 1976. Several members of the community<sup>58</sup> challenged the traditional communal leadership. The leadership had been maintained by the Druze notables and Sheikhs that favored Israeli governance and rule of law. Consequently, the numerous provisions undertaken by the Israeli government to ensure the Druze would no longer associate themselves with the Arabs had been carried out in attempts to strengthen the role of Zionist sympathetic Druze chieftains. The

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<sup>55</sup> Ibid, p. 124

<sup>56</sup> Ibid, p. 125

<sup>57</sup> Ibid, p. 125

<sup>58</sup> These were mainly intellectuals and individuals from the younger generations



Israelis were cognizant that religion is the fundamental concern of individuals that adhere to Druze faith and practice. In 1976, and in light of inter – Druze confrontation, the state of Israel pushed for another policy to calm the waves of Druze anger and despise towards the Jewish state. The policy created a separate educational system<sup>59</sup> for the Druze that was entirely different from the ‘Arab’ system. In the Druze school system, individuals were taught Druze religion, history and culture<sup>60</sup>. In addition, Kais Firro (1999) argues that the Israeli authorities rewrote the history of each Druze village using popular myths, describing the various shrines and explaining the different meanings of Druze holidays<sup>61</sup>.

The events prior to and following Operation Peace for Galilee in 1982 constituted one of the most important historical landmarks in relations between Israel and Lebanese minority groups. This historical actuality includes two correlated dimensions. The first dimension involves the transnational cooperation of the Druze in Lebanon and Israel for safeguarding and protecting the existence of each other. The second dimension involves the concept of minority alliance between the Druze and Zionists from one hand and the Maronites and Zionists from the other. Atashe observes that despite Israeli’s security objectives in Lebanon- eradicating the PLO and ensuring Maronite political dominance – the Druze of Lebanon were not among Israel’s claimed targets even when they fully supported the Palestinians<sup>62</sup>. The IDF forces that invaded Lebanon contained sizable amounts of Druze soldiers. Once these forces marched into

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<sup>59</sup> A separate school system

<sup>60</sup> Hillel Frisch (1997), *State Ethnicization and the Crisis of Leadership Succession among Israel’s Druze*, p. 586

<sup>61</sup> Firro (1999), p. 236

<sup>62</sup> Atashe, p. 145

Beirut, the Israeli Druze soldiers hastily calmed their Lebanese brethren, claiming ‘that they were not Israel’s targets and that they will be protected from any incumbent Israeli attack’. As a result, the Lebanese Druze felt a sense of security in expressing their fears and concerns to the Israeli Druze community and the Israeli Druze soldiers. Their primary fears were that the IDF were confiscating their weapons and that they were worried to clash with the Kataeb unarmed and weak. The Lebanese Druze claimed that they were facing the “threat of genocide”<sup>63</sup>. The Israeli Druze community pressured their government from confiscating the weapons of their Lebanese brethren, because they believed that a showdown with the Kataeb was imminent. The leaders of the Druze community in Israel expressed their sentiments to Prime Minister Begin, and his reaction was that “inter alia, that he would not permit that a hair should fall from the head of any Druze in Lebanon”<sup>64</sup>. The Kataeb were consistently harassing the Druze population and were expecting to ‘recapture’ the Shouf Mountains from the Druze and accordingly reestablish their uncontested political dominance. The Israeli Druze kept pressuring their government that they were not taking necessary measures to curtail the hostilities carried out by the Kataeb. As a result, the Israeli Druze established the “Druze Follow-up Commission on behalf of the Druze of Lebanon” whose primary task was to ensure the survival of the Druze community in Lebanon and more importantly neutralize Kataeb – Israeli hegemony<sup>65</sup>. The united stance of the Druze community in Israel in protecting their brethren in Lebanon, “recorded a most glorious chapter in its

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<sup>63</sup> Ibid, p. 146

<sup>64</sup> Ibid, p. 147

<sup>65</sup> Ibid, p. 147 – 148

history”<sup>66</sup>. The basic mission statement for the ‘Druze Follow-up Commission’ was to ensure the continuity and survival of the Druze in Lebanon. In addition, it included various methods in transferring weapons and funds to the Druze leadership in Lebanon from the Druze community in Israel. More importantly, it called for fostering an understanding between the Lebanese Druze and Israeli Druze through the IDF for mutual benefits and concerns. The ‘Follow up Commission’ additionally included an article that called for refuting the Kataeb claims that the Lebanese Druze were giving support and “asylum to thousands of fleeing Palestinians”<sup>67</sup>.

The Follow up Commission was one the channels established by the Israeli Druze to fortify and strengthen contacts and relations between the Lebanese Druze and the state of Israel. The government of Israel proceeded with its relations with the Druze community in Lebanon on behalf of their solid alliance with the Druze community in Israel. The direct form of relations between the Druze brethren in Israel and Lebanon instigated the indirect structure of relations between the Druze in Lebanon and the state of Israel. The remarkable element of this form of transnational cooperation between Israeli and Lebanese Druze has similar grounds within Zionist diplomatic patterns. The notable leaders of the Druze community in Israel expressed their concerns to Begin supporting their arguments in light of their long years of struggle and support for the existence and survival of the Jewish homeland. More importantly, they frequently explained the aspects of Druze religious doctrine that calls for the protection of the Druze community regardless of their geographic location. Trudy Rubin, correspondent of the Christian Science Monitor explains that the Israeli Druze expressed a high level

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<sup>66</sup> Ibid, p. 148

<sup>67</sup> Ibid, p. 149

of solidarity with their Lebanese brethren in light of the Kataeb threat. Rubin's report included statements that depicted the unified and cohesive elements of Druze identity, where Lebanese Druze approached Israeli Druze asking for support based on common religious grounds.

The Sabra and Shatila massacres became another impetus for Druze fears and concerns. Lebanese Druze expressed to their Israeli coreligionists that they feared that a similar fate might be in store for them<sup>68</sup>. The Israeli Druze had to strengthen their efforts in pressuring the Israeli government for immediate action against any hostility that might be undertaken by the Kataeb. On 19 October 1982, the Israeli Druze intensified their concern for their Druze brethren by organizing a demonstration against the Israeli government. This form of public protest initiated by the Israeli Druze was the first of its kind in the history of the state of Israel. The initial objective of the demonstration was to denounce the collaboration between Israel and the Kataeb at the expense of the Druze in Lebanon<sup>69</sup>. This demonstration came as a result of intensive meetings between Lebanese and Israeli Druze officials. The level of meetings took place between the highest ranking officials on both ends. At the beginning of the war, Shimon Peres met with Walid Jumblatt at his palace in Mukhtara "through the good offices of President Mitterand under the auspices of the Socialist International"<sup>70</sup>. Following such meetings, Zeidan Atashe met Walid Jumblatt and discussed several critical issues. These issues included the continuity and existence of the Druze community in the Levant, and more importantly the strengthening of relations between the communities in Israel and

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<sup>68</sup> Atashe, p. 152

<sup>69</sup> Ibid, p. 153

<sup>70</sup> Ibid, p. 155

Lebanon. Atashe observes that Jumblatt expressed sentiments of ‘suspicion and mistrust’ towards the Israeli Druze; however, they changed when Atashe explained the loyalty of the Israeli Druze to the state and more importantly their role in the security that gave them “freedom for establishing contacts with the commanders of the local Druze militias”<sup>71</sup>. Upon the request of Jumblatt, Atashe began an international campaign for advocating ‘the Druze position’ and arguing with American and British officials that the Druze community in Lebanon had to be protected from any hostilities carried out by the Maronite Kataeb Party. In addition, he stressed that if the situation of the survival of the Lebanese Druze deteriorated, that Druze – Jewish relations were “liable to be affected”<sup>72</sup>.

The culmination of efforts between the Lebanese and Israeli Druze was obvious in the aftermath of the withdrawal of the IDF from occupied regions in 1983. The withdrawal of the IDF Forces from the Shouf Mountains in 1983 produced a security vacuum and more importantly left the Druze and Christians in a showdown for control over the territory<sup>73</sup>. The Druze militiamen were to reoccupy various locations from the Kataeb in the Druze provinces without any hindrance from the IDF. More importantly, under the passive attitude of the IDF, the Druze were able to take control of the “entire area of the Shouf completing the link –up between Jabal Lubnan, the mountain of Lebanon and the Mediterranean”<sup>74</sup>. The success of Druze lobbying in Israel maintained the survival and existence of the Druze in Lebanon and more importantly forced Israeli

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<sup>71</sup> Ibid, p. 155

<sup>72</sup> Ibid, p. 158

<sup>73</sup> Maher, p. 414

<sup>74</sup> Atashe, p. 158

policy makers to consider Druze interests – communal survival - in any policy towards Lebanon. The form of collaboration and solidarity between the Druze communities in the Levant gave authenticity to the principles of Druze survival. The essence of survival “does not depend on having an independent state, but rather can be assured by striving for integration and equality within the countries in which they live”<sup>75</sup>. This sense of survival can be exemplified in John Maher’s<sup>76</sup> (2009) metaphor: ‘blow with the wind’ – “the strengthening of the ‘life chances’ of the minority community in the face of ongoing uncertainty and threat”.

## **B. Connective Linkages and Associations**

The concise historical overview presented in Chapter II and Chapter III discussed the dynamics of relations between the Zionists and Maronites from one side and the Druze and Zionists from the other respectively. The major observation that can be made on these minorities is that they share similar concerns and fears. Regardless of the nature of alliances between these minorities- be it direct or indirect – the majority of these groups’ objectives were accomplished.

The sense of commonality between the Druze and Maronites in their alliances with the state of Israel has been to safeguard their survival. This sense of survival has been thoroughly shaped according to a perceived common threat which has taken several forms, following several historical incidents. More importantly, the principles of group survival primarily emerge from an existential threat within a mixed political system. The dimensions of minority survival mandatorily include elements of the economy and security.

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<sup>75</sup> Ibid, p. 186

<sup>76</sup> Maher, p. 413

The foundations of Zionist diplomacy were based on several components; however, the constant practice in policy making was constant: intervention. The principles of the interventionist approach were to ensure that the creation of the Jewish homeland would survive if it cooperated with some Arabs neighbors and neutralized others. The interventionist school called for any measure that would break the walls of seclusion and isolation following the creation of the Jewish state. The founding fathers of the Zionist state knew that the Jewish homeland would be surrounded by hostile enemies and opponents; however, they had to find measures to contain and end any endeavor that would join the Arabs in their resistance against the Jewish state. As a result, the founding fathers of Zionism knew they had to approach and ally with any group or individual that was willing to accept the establishment of the Jewish homeland. Some individuals within the Jewish Agency were constantly calling for a systematic approach that involved dealing with states, rather than groups and minorities. Nevertheless, they knew that the majority of the nation – states would not accept the creation of the Jewish homeland in Palestine and as result would always refrain from having overt relations with it. As a result, the Zionists had to pursue every other possible opportunity – form an alliance – with any group that did not conflict with their vision. However, their support for such groups was conditional and conservative; yet when it coincided with Zionist interest it was always given top priority. In addition, the Zionists sought such alliances to show the international community that coexistence between the Jews and Arabs in the Jewish homeland and the Middle East was possible and realistic.

The availability of natural resources in the neighboring countries and primarily Lebanon made it vital for Zionist interests and aspirations. Consequently, the Zionists

forged contacts with all Lebanese groups based on two dimensions. The first dimension involved groups that shared mutual concerns and aspirations. These alliances were based on a perceived common threat which called for cooperation between minority groups that would eventually safeguard their survival. The level of cooperation includes all levels of assistance, mainly security and defense. The second dimension included contacts with groups based on mutual economic benefit and gain. This school of thought called for alliances shaped on material benefit that consciously disregard ideological differences and concerns. The Zionists thought that the Arab communities would be amazed by Jewish productivity and economic prosperity. They felt the Arab communities would shun their resistance against the creation of a Jewish homeland, in light of benefiting and learning from Jewish tradesmen and entrepreneurs. The assertion in the Middle East and specifically Lebanon was that economic interest took priority over ideological preferences<sup>77</sup>.

It should be noted that the Zionists did not favor relations with one group over the other. Yet, officials in the Jewish Agency favored relations with the Arabs in Palestine and on the Lebanese Southern borders. The group that has presence in these primary geographic localities in Zionist policy making is the Druze community. The Druze population is spread around the provinces of South Lebanon along with the Shiite community that constitutes one of the largest groups in the neighboring Lebanese southern villages. Moreover, there exist different Christian communities in the villages of South Lebanon directly on the borders. In light of Zionist political strategy that calls for ‘peaceful neighbors’ it seemed obvious that the Druze and Shiites, as well as the Christians in the Southern border villages were the perfect candidates for forming

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<sup>77</sup> Eisenberg (1994), p. 15



alliances. However, from the existing literature on the relations between Lebanon and Israel, the majority of scholars dominantly observe Maronite – Israeli military cooperation and collaboration during the Lebanese Civil War, with deep focus on Operation Peace for Galilee in 1982. The alternative forms of contacts between Israel and other Lebanese groups have been addressed within the general framework of relations between the Maronites and Israel. For that specific purpose, the ability to construct relations between Israel and Lebanese groups – apart from the Maronites – is focused on understanding Israel’s approach specifically to these communal groups in light of certain historical incidents<sup>78</sup>.

The Zionists extended their invitation to any group that would accept the partition of Palestine and would eventually ensure the establishment of the Jewish homeland. They constantly looked for domestic, regional and international allies. Their security and economic concerns had to be met regardless of the partner or group. Nevertheless, the few groups that cooperated with the Zionists were not among the groups that were favored.

### ***1. Evaluating Druze – Israeli Relations***

On the Maronite level, the relations with the state of Israel were direct in form and nature. When the Likud party assumed leadership in 1977, the traditional covert relationship between the Maronites and the Zionists changed into an overt relationship. The collective efforts in this overt partnership were visible in Operation Peace Galilee in 1982. Nevertheless, the prospects a Peace Treaty were never achieved.

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<sup>78</sup> This chapter illustrated several examples, for instance Israeli cooperation with the Lebanese Druze following Operation Peace for Galilee

On the Druze level, the relations with the state of Israel have had different approaches. There is not a systematic approach in understanding the relations between the Israelis and the Lebanese Druze, without giving reference and legitimacy to the relations between the state of Israel and the Druze community there. The relations between the Druze in Lebanon and the Israelis do not fall out the realm of relations between the Israeli Druze and the state of Israel. As a result, the ability to construct a fruitful assessment of the situation between the Druze in Lebanon and Israel needs to take into consideration the dimensions of Druze transnational identity. It is noteworthy to mention that the Druze and Zionists formed a concrete and overt alliance, following the defeat of the united Arab Armies and the creation of the state of Israel in 1948. The Druze feared they would be attacked by the Arab communities if they fully and overtly supported the Jews against the Arabs in the First Arab – Israeli War. When the state was established in 1948, the Druze formally established relations with the Zionists and consequently accepted and cooperated with the state of Israel. Prior to the creation of the state of Israel in 1948, the Druze covertly supported the Jewish militias in their clashes with the Arabs. On this specific issue, the Druze community was divided. Some factions supported the Arabs against the Jews and others the total opposite. This indefinite nature in Druze diplomacy constitutes as a fundamental element of group survival. As John Maher (2009) contends the Druze political and military maneuvering can be best described as ‘blowing with the wind’<sup>79</sup>.

The Zionists approached the Druze in Palestine on the grounds of common and mutual fears. From the very beginning the Druze expressed neutrality in the brawl between the Zionists and the Arabs. Following the Balfour Declaration in 1917, the

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<sup>79</sup> Maher, p. 413

Zionists were given hope that the creation of the Jewish homeland was achievable. As a result, the Arabs intensified their efforts against the Jewish community, fearing the emergence of a Jewish homeland in Palestine. These expressed fears led to the eruption of clashes between the Jews and Arabs in 1920. In light of these clashes, the Druze did not support any of contending sides. This sense of Druze neutrality gave interest and curiosity to the Zionists. The Jewish Agency wanted to make 'use' of such neutrality expressing their common threats and mutual fears to the Druze. They tried to project a mutual enemy: Muslim Arabs. The relations between the Zionists and Druze intensified in 1930. The Zionists formed alliances with the Druze community in Palestine, based on the assumption that such an approach would strengthen relations with the Druze in Lebanon and Syria. The Arab Revolt that erupted in 1936 yet again depicted Druze neutrality in supporting the Arabs against Zionist plans that called for a separate Jewish state. In 1937, in light of these clashes the Peel Commission investigated the causes of the revolt and consequently suggested the Partition Plan that gave credible evidence for the creation of a Jewish homeland in Palestine. The Peel Commission equally called for the 'Transfer Plan' that suggested the relocation of Arab and Jewish populations from one location to another. The 'Transfer Plan' was supported by the Druze and Zionists. The Zionist plan was to create a homogenous Jewish homeland and the viable solution was to send the Druze population to Jabal Druze where they could join their brethren and consequently establish an independent state. In the First Arab – Israeli War in 1948, the Druze covertly supported the Zionists in fear of losing their lands if the Jewish homeland was created. Their form of support was primarily in military assistance and intelligence. The majority of the Druze community in Palestine lived and worked in the 'Jewish' region as partitioned by the Peel Commission in 1937. More importantly, the

Druze Holy Writ enumerates the importance of land possession and ownership. According to Druze identity, the survival of the community meant safeguarding their land and property.

Following the creation of the Jewish state in 1948, Israeli policy makers were conscious that they had to continuously ‘reward’ the Druze for their unquestioned assistance and acquiesce in the newly established state. In addition, they had to make sure that the Druze community would never resort to their Arab neighbors in any showdown with the Arabs. They adamantly had to be assured that the Druze would only support the Israelis without question in any possible war. The Druze supported Zionist initiatives in light of securing and safeguarding their land. More importantly, they were safeguarding their primary source of income: agriculture. The Zionists honored the members of the Druze community that supported and fought the creation of the Jewish state by reestablishing the importance of the ‘Nabi Shuayb’ Holy Shrine in 1949. This holy site became the location for the annual gatherings between the Israelis and Druze honoring their ‘blood bond’ against all foreign enemies. In addition, the Nabi Shuayb Shrine became the official site for the ‘swearing in’ of Druze recruits to the IDF. In 1956, Israeli policy makers issued two main policies that primarily and solely encompassed the Druze community. The state of Israel imposed compulsory service for all young individuals in the Druze community. This policy had been supported by Druze religious leaders that urged the government to establish ‘special’ Druze units in the IDF; because they knew it had become the main source of income. Furthermore, in 1956 the state of Israel recognized the Druze as an independent and separate religious community. In 1962, the Israelis went on an additional step in establishing separate communal courts for the Druze.

In similar comparison to the Maronite – Israeli partnership, the relations between the Druze and Israelis took a new form following the Six Day War in 1967. In the aftermath of the war, Israel succeeded in occupying the Golan Heights, West Bank, and Sinai simultaneously. Prior to the Six Day War, the Druze patrolled the borders between Israel and its neighboring countries. After the war, their primary function was to safeguard and maintain the tight leadership of the IDF over the Golan Heights. The Druze were chosen specifically for the Golan Heights because it had an important and large Druze community. Israel envisioned that the Druze in the Golan Heights would follow in the path of their Israeli brethren in supporting the Jewish homeland and thus accept Israeli citizenship and identity. The mediator between the government of Israel and the Syrian Druze in the Golan Heights, were the Israeli Druze. In 1970, Ezer Weizmann brought reference to the ‘archaic’ Transfer Plan proposed by the Peel Commission in 1937. Among the claims proposed by Weizmann was to send the Druze population in Israel to Jabal Druze in Syria.

In 1973 and 1976, the Druze community faced turbulent challenges from within. The younger generations were challenging the traditional leadership of the Druze community. Among these sentiments was that they did not favor the form of relations carried out between the Israelis and Druze against their ‘Arab brethren’. As a result, Israeli policy makers had to find measures to contain a possible conflict within the Druze community. The government of Israel established a separate educational system for the Druze schools that mandatorily taught Druze history, religion and culture. More importantly, this educational system was tailored to suit Israeli interests. The program included historical references that gave importance to the ‘blood covenant’ created between the Hebrews and Druzes in ancient times.

In 1982, Israel launched Operation Peace for Galilee that aimed to install Bashir Gemayel as President and more importantly focused on eradicating the Palestinian threat from Lebanon. The security objectives of this operation were accomplished, yet achieving a peace treaty was out of question. The junior allies of the IDF in Lebanon were the Kataeb – spearheading all the Christian militias. The history of Mount Lebanon frequently enumerated intercommunal conflict between the Druze and Maronites. During long periods of time, these minorities cooperated and coexisted peacefully. However, in certain periods bloody clashes erupted between these entities. In light of historical antecedents, the Druze community feared that the Maronites would seek revenge under Israeli cover and support. As a result, the Druze community in Lebanon approached their brethren in Israel for guarantees and assurances that the Druze would not be harmed. The Druze pressured and lobbied the Israeli government for measures that called for supporting and safeguarding the survival of the Druze community in Lebanon.

The Druze community in Israel persuasively argued that if their Druze brethren in Lebanon were harmed, it would eventually lead to the deterioration of the relations between the Druze and state of Israel. As a result, the pressure initiated by the Israeli Druze was productive. A war between the Maronites and Druze was inevitable, but the aftermath came in favor of the Druze. Following the withdrawal of IDF Forces from the Shouf Mountains, the Druze gained political dominance and autonomy over the entire Shouf. The Maronites failure in keeping their promise to the Israelis in occupying West Beirut paid off in granting the Druze full autonomy over the Mountain.

The historical determinants in the relations between the Druze and Israelis find roots in the policies carried out by the Israeli government following the creation of the

state in 1948. In the Yishuv period, the mutual fears were similar for the Maronites, Jews and Druze: they feared Muslim presence and hegemony. Following the creation of the state of Israel, the Druze were allowed to keep their land and property as signs of good faith following their military support and assistance in the establishment of the Jewish homeland. Furthermore, Israeli pursued several schemes and policies that assured the Druze would remain loyal to the Jewish state. They recognized the Druze as an independent religious community, established their religious courts and more importantly gave them access to Israel’s primary source of income: the defense industry. In addition, the historical narration of Operation Peace for Galilee gave lucid and fortified evidence that the Israelis were keen in safeguarding their ‘sacred’ alliance with the Druze by succumbing to Israeli Druze lobbying and demands unquestionably. This form of solidarity initiated by the Druze community in Israel gave ample evidence that Druze identity is beyond the borders of nation – states. In moments of threat and fear, the Druzes coordinated their efforts that eventually led to their survival and existence. (See Figure 3.1)




Fig. 3.1- Historical Determinants in Maronite – Druze Relations

### C. Historical Observations and Realities

From reviewing the historical evolution of relations between these minority groups, a few observations are noteworthy. The primary sense of commonality for these three groups is: survival and land ownership. (See Figure 3.2)




Fig. 3.2- Sense of Commonality between Maronites, Jews and Druze

The Maronites and Druze sought refuge in Lebanon following years of religious persecution, which was primarily carried out by Muslim conquests. As a result, Lebanon became the safe haven for minorities and had to remain as such for the survival and continuity of these smaller groups. The Maronites overtly expressed their fears from demographic changes in the Lebanese system that might eventually lead to the downfall of their political dominance. The Druze covertly supported the Zionists in the creation of the state of Israel, fearing that if they did otherwise they would face a similar fate with the Palestinians. As a result, the influx of Palestinian refugees to Lebanon happened in light of collaborative efforts between the Zionists and the Druze in Jewish state. The fruition of this alliance strengthened Maronite fears that the influx of Palestinian refugees would undermine Maronite political superiority. The Druze in Israel were allowed to keep their land, in light of being loyal to the state. The Zionist perspective of loyalty towards the state was a nicer form of neutrality. This sense of



Druze neutrality was not created by the Zionists in the Yishuv period, rather it surfaced as early as the Balfour Declaration in 1917.

Israeli policy makers fortified their alliances with the local Druze community by instigating policies that favored Druze distinctiveness. They recognized the Druze as an independent religious community; they established separate Druze courts and more importantly provided the Druze with an opportunity to serve in the IDF. In addition, they established and maintained the sanctification of Druze Holy Shrines. The Israelis went on further by establishing a separate educational system for the Druze. In sum, the state of Israel had to ensure that the Druze community would remain loyal and faithful to the Jewish state in light of all these 'privileges'.

The Israelis extensively had to issue policies that would favor the Druze community in order to keep them devoted and loyal to the state. However, the partnership with the Maronites mainly included security objectives and goals. The Israelis extended their support to the Maronites in light of neutralizing the emerging threat from a neighboring country. The geopolitical makeup of the Levant makes Lebanon a vital region for hegemony and dominion. The founding fathers of Zionism were cognizant that the Jewish homeland would solely survive when the Arab neighboring states are internally and externally divided. The Zionists had to make use of the internal fighting between the Arab states. As long as the Arabs were fighting among each other and not against Israel, the Jewish homeland would survive and exist. The presence of the Maronites in Lebanon and their political dominance provided a window of opportunity for the Israelis. The partnership with the Maronites meant access to Lebanon's resources and more importantly it enticed a 'neutral and friendly' peaceful neighbor. The Maronites were in need of a strong foreign power that would maintain

their dominance in the system in a country, they fought dearly to establish. The joint security objectives against the Muslims and then against the Palestinians provided concrete grounds for lavish cooperation and military coordination between these political entities. The Maronites wanted to eradicate and terminate Palestinian presence in Lebanon following 1948. Israel wanted to expel the Palestinians with an indefinite return to Palestine. As a result, it becomes quite dubious and improbable to imagine that relations between the Maronites and Israelis could ever include anything beyond the objectives of security and resources. The Maronites exploited Israeli military superiority in their conquest against the Palestinians in Lebanon, without fulfilling their promise in achieving a Peace Treaty. The Israelis exploited the precarious nature of the Lebanese political system by supporting one group against the others. The final product of this partnership was eliminating the PLO from Lebanon and ensuring a 'neutralized' neighboring Arab state.

### ***1. Zionist Policy Making***

The Zionists in the Yishuv Period and in the state of Israel primarily adhered to the interventionist school of thought. The 'divide and conquer' strategy remains a Zionist trademark and legacy. For that purpose, it can be argued that this strategy includes three main functions. More importantly, these three functions go hand in hand and build up on each other for the fulfilling the main objectives. The first function is the approach towards a 'specific minority' with the prospects of 'minority alliances' in a system that has many contending groups and entities. The second function includes the creation of 'buffer zones' and mediators. This dimension involves expanding dominion through proxy groups and players. The third function involves 'ideological exploitation' on the premises of mutual concerns, existential threats and security objectives. This

dimension creates the ‘illusion’ based on fear that the alliance ‘equally’ benefits both entities in the partnership. The methods conducted in light of these three main functions have had parallel ends. However, in Lebanon the environment produced different circumstances and outcomes that the milieu in Israel. The Zionists took advantage in understanding the nature of the political system in Palestine and Lebanon in the Yishuv Period. The contacts initiated in the Yishuv period laid the foundations for forming alliances with the minorities following the creation of the state of Israel in 1948. (See Figure 3.3)




Fig. 3.3- Zionist Policy towards Minorities in Lebanon and Israel

The Zionists had to follow one systematic approach in dealing with minority groups, regardless of their location. However, the final product of this approach was similar regardless of the group, yet the means and procedures in achieving it were different. The political incidents and historical ‘accidents’ in the relations between the Zionists , Maronites and Druze provided variable outcomes for the latter two groups and constant outcomes for the Israelis. The fundamental approach in Israeli policy making towards minority groups was to separate and isolate these political entities from their

surroundings. As a result, the foundations of Zionist policy making takes into consideration the precarious environment of the nation – states in the Middle East and more importantly the position of the minority group within a certain milieu. The Zionists assessed and understood the position of the Maronites in the Lebanese political system and simultaneously explored and investigated the sensitive nature of the Lebanese confessional system. Furthermore, the Zionists assessed and evaluated the position of the Druze in Palestine and simultaneously investigated and understood the nature of Druze seclusion and inter Arab rivalries. The Zionists had to make use of these shaky surroundings for the purpose of isolating the minority group that would form alliances and break away from their ‘original’ circle and milieu.

The Zionists were successful in forming alliances with the Maronites in Lebanon and Druze in Israel primarily because these minorities have a distinctive perceived self – identity. More importantly, the Maronites and Druze view themselves as totally different from other communal groups and as a result they feel constantly threatened from other groups. In addition, the sense of commonality between these groups has been nurtured differently. The Druze want to safeguard their religious freedom and physical existence amidst the Arab communities in Israel and Lebanon. As a result, they had to form different types of alliances with different players, in different nation – states. The Maronites needed guarantees that they would not be expelled from Lebanon in light of any demographic change and more importantly that they will always have a say in the Lebanese political system. The Zionists need to take advantage of any group willing to assist their objectives in safeguarding the state of Israel and more importantly they need any domestic, regional or international player that can contain the possible emergence of a Palestinian state.

From 1920 – 1985<sup>80</sup>, the adage ‘my enemy’s enemy’ finds bridges in these alliances across the Levant. The Zionists remain the central player in creating these partnerships based on mutual concerns and objectives. On the regional level, the Zionists formed alliances in Lebanon with the Maronites primarily against the Palestinians and more importantly against Syrian hegemony over the Levant. They envisioned Lebanon as a ‘neutral’ country with prospects of achieving a Peace Treaty under the political dominance of the Maronites. On the local level, the Zionists needed the Druze to portray to the international community that coexistence between the Arabs and Jews was realistic. However, this objective was obviously shallow and fragile. The genuine objectives were to ensure neutrality from within the Arab camp. In light of Druze existential fears from the Muslim communities in Palestine, the Zionists knew they would be the logical alternative. More importantly, the Zionists wanted to benefit from the Druze remarkable military skills. The final product in Lebanon and Israel was that the Zionists were giving top priority to their security objectives. The short lived partnership between the Maronites and Israelis produced a ‘safe Palestinian – free’ Lebanon. The continuous partnership between the Druze and Israelis has made the latter group fervent and zealous citizens of the state of Israel. (See Figure 4.5)

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<sup>80</sup> The period from 1920 – 1985 depicts the nature of alliances between the Maronites and Israelis. On the Druze level, the main concern for this study is to assess the role of the cooperation between the Lebanese Druze and Israeli Druze.




Fig. 3.4- Zionist Security Policy towards the Maronites and Druze

#### D. Concluding Remarks

Chapter III explored the historical relations between the Druze and the state of Israel. The various phases in Druze – Zionist relations were extensively explored and narrated. More importantly, the various historical phases were covered starting in 1920 and ending in 1985. The historical determinants in the historical evolution of relations between the Druze and Israelis was thoroughly discussed and investigated. The sense of commonality between these groups was thoroughly discussed and narrated. The historical determinants in the historical evolution of relations between the Maronites, Druze and Israelis were thoroughly discussed, investigated and correlated.

Chapter IV will investigate the theoretical framework of the study which is primarily essential for designing an appropriate research instrument. The main components in this section will deal with the dimensions of group identity and

intergroup relations. The levels of group solidarity and cohesion will be measured in light of the broader scope of group identity. In addition, the dimensions of collaboration and alliance formation will be analyzed within the context of intergroup relations.

## CHAPTER 4

### THE PERTINENT REVIEW OF LITERATURE

Chapter II and Chapter III thoroughly explored and discussed the historical relations between the Maronites and the state of Israel from one side and the relations between the Druze and the state of Israel on the other, respectively. In addition, the historical determinants in these relations were mentioned and highlighted in context of understanding how these relations were shaped and constructed.

Chapter IV will primarily deal with the theoretical framework of the study. The pertinent review of literature is essential for designing an appropriate research instrument. The main components in this section will deal with the dimensions of group identity and intergroup relations. The levels of group solidarity and cohesion will be measured in light of the broader scope of group identity. In addition, the dimensions of collaboration and alliance formation will be analyzed within the context of intergroup relations.

#### **A. Introduction**

The ability to comprehend the attitudes and perceptions of individuals within their respective societies or groups is deeply intertwined with understanding the larger framework of intergroup relations, more importantly recognized as group dynamics. Donelson R. Forsyth<sup>1</sup> (2006) explains group dynamics as “the study of groups and a general term for group processes”. This latter phrase sets the stage for a further elaborate understanding of group relations, which normally involves several

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<sup>1</sup> Donelson R. Forsyth (2006), Group Dynamics Resource Page. University of Richmond, (<https://facultystaff.richmond.edu/~dforsyth/gd/>), p. 1



interconnected dimensions. The individual is the most important player in group formation and more importantly has a major role in constructing the cohesive group identity and vision. Furthermore, the ability to fully evaluate the values, ambitions, aspirations and fears of any individual is deeply related to understanding the group that person belongs to. To fully analyze the values of any individual, one must take a deeper look into the surroundings that shape the norms and patterns of that person. Group dynamics involves a field of group relations and attitudes that presumably fall within the framework of organization behavior. Like any individual that can be studied in any related field of science, groups tend to pose a harder challenge in deconstructing the blend created by a mixture of different people with their respective ideas and behaviors. Their mixed and collective values, norms and fears are major catalysts in forming a group. Such group formation set stages for a cohesive vision and statement.

## **B. Group Dynamics**

Group dynamics has grown out of two needs or necessities, a scientific and practical one - Kurt Lewin.

The aptitude to better understand the formation of group dynamics in the field of social science is linked to research and theory development conducted by two of the pioneers in the field: Dorwin Cartwright and Alvin Zander<sup>2</sup>. These scholars find spirit in the original platform on Group Dynamics initiated by Kurt Lewin<sup>3</sup>. Lewin asserted that social science is an integration of sociology, cultural anthropology, and psychology combined into “an instrument for studying group life”<sup>4</sup>. In addition, Cartwright and

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<sup>2</sup> Dorwin Cartwright and Alvin Zander (1968), *Group Dynamics*, (pp. 3 – 21)

<sup>3</sup> Kurt Lewin (1945), *The Research Center for Group Dynamics* at Massachusetts Institute of Technology, p. 126.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid*, p. 126

Zander contended that for researchers to “understand what is happening on Earth, {they} would have to examine rather carefully the ways in which groups form, function and dissolve”<sup>5</sup>. Furthermore, the primary focus in the study of group dynamics is associated with the comprehension of the social and psychological forces connected with the process of acquiring knowledge on the essence of group formulation and composition<sup>6</sup>. This intellectual incentive serves as a vital catalyst in revealing the underlying social functions and attitudes interconnected with the nature of groups, concentrating on the aspects of social relationships and individual behavior. Cartwright and Zander assert that “a basic premise of group dynamics [in the field of social science] is that the methods of science can be employed in the study of groups”<sup>7</sup>. This assertion gives ground for the importance of conducting empirical research derived from the existing theories in literature on group theories and relations. More importantly, these scholars argue that an empiricist revolution emerged in this course of study, especially in an attempt to differentiate between “objective data and subjective impression”<sup>8</sup>. In friendlier dialect, the field of group dynamics involves inquiry methods – with deep reliance on empirical research - that seek to enhance knowledge on the nature of groups, the interrelations that groups form and dissolve, and more importantly a process that augments the basic understanding of social development and practice, starting from individual behavior and concern<sup>9</sup>.

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<sup>5</sup> Cartwright and Zander, p. 3

<sup>6</sup> Ibid, p. 4

<sup>7</sup> Ibid, p. 11

<sup>8</sup> Ibid, p. 5

<sup>9</sup> Ibid, p.19

For the concern of this study, several dimensions of group relations are going to be used to better serve the intended purpose of this work. This author is concerned primarily with the dynamics of identity that includes two interrelated factors. It can be addressed as a socially constructed reality that forms the group and it can be viewed as an inner reflected actuality that serves as a guideline for understanding the perception of an individual towards their own group. Furthermore, there will be an attempt to study the intensity of group cohesion and solidarity that will seemingly reflect the levels of group commitment and the acceptance of a unified vision and stance. Intergroup perceptions and relations will be better exemplified in theories that deal with alliance formation and collaborationism theory.

The mixture of these group processes will assess the values of individuals within a group in comparison to the values of individuals within another. The capacity to understand any group should not be taken out of the larger framework of events and environment that help shape and nurture a certain attitude or behavior. For that purpose it is mandatory and necessary for efficiency and accuracy to take into consideration the context and milieu of any group in the goal of understanding their state of mind.

### ***1. Group Theory and Minority Identity***

The definition of group dynamics has been briefly elaborated, in spirit of Cartwright and Zander's research methods and theory. Nevertheless, the important component required for relevancy in the intended purpose of this study requires a deconstruction and clarification of the term "group", and more importantly its correlation with the constructed identity of any minority.

Inspired by May Brodbeck's<sup>10</sup> (1958) definition of social entities, Cartwright and Zander reflect that groups consist of amassed individuals with connective and similar relations to each other<sup>11</sup>. As mentioned earlier, the primary actor in any group is certainly the individual, and their commitment to a shared vision with other individuals is the inception of group membership and thus the embodiment of set collective ideals that forms the 'group'. Kurt Lewin<sup>12</sup> (1948) asserts that individuals commit and become members of different groups, not as a process that involves similarities and dissimilarities, rather their social interaction, cooperation and other forms of social interdependence<sup>13</sup>. These notions of social interaction could possibly involve any form of intergroup and intragroup relations. There is not a clear definition to the framework of social interactions that can happen within groups and between different groups and as a result the importance of every function is evaluated and analyzed according to its specific relevancy and value.

Cartwright and Zander put forth the point that "any group in society originated at some point in time, and its formation was determined by a particular set of conditions"<sup>14</sup>. This remarkably explains the vital necessity to understand what shaped and formed this certain group, with a certain inclination and aspiration. More importantly, the tools of measurement determined to compare between different groups needs to take into consideration the patterns and events that shaped a particular stance

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<sup>10</sup> May Brodbeck (1958), *Methodological Individualism: Definition and Reduction*, (pp. 1 – 22)

<sup>11</sup> Cartwright and Zander, p. 45 – 62

<sup>12</sup> Kurt Lewin (1948), *Resolving Social Conflicts*.

<sup>13</sup> Cartwright and Zander, p. 46

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid*, p. 53

and vision. The importance of studying the groups' behavior in context needs to be crucially stressed and understood. The particular manner in which individuals and their respective groups behave has to do primarily with their setting and social environment. Another pivotal point is that group theory revolves around the nature of "spontaneous formation"<sup>15</sup> that undoubtedly involves involuntary membership and participation. The notion of individual satisfaction is an important aspect in group theory and the overall framework of group dynamics. A particular feature of group dynamics is deeply concerned with "phenomena that arise"<sup>16</sup> and shape the general stance and trend of an independent group. The capacity of any independent group to challenge any social emergence or challenge deeply increases the level of commitment and membership to that particular entity. The power to adequately meet and withstand external challenges provides better stimuli for an enhanced internal power base. More importantly, these challenges that affect the group from outside their membership "circle" provide a lucid example of how internally cohesive this group really is.

Hilal Khashan<sup>17</sup> contends that the formation of minority groups has taken place with the "appearance of larger groups in given geographical locations", where these groups were focused on coordinating their collective efforts in shaping their internal structure<sup>18</sup>. Khashan's argument deeply focuses on studying the emergence of minority groups with their aspirations as a direct product related to the formation of larger much

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<sup>15</sup> Ibid, p. 55

<sup>16</sup> Ibid, p. 57, these mainly include determinants, effects and interrelationships that emerge.

<sup>17</sup> Hilal Khashan (1992), *Inside the Lebanese Confessional Mind*, p. 24.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid, p. 23 – 24

powerful dominant groups<sup>19</sup>. The concept of minority identity is visibly rooted in a comparative approach undertaken by the individuals themselves within a certain group that feel their status is less important and to some extent marginalized in essence and nature. Furthermore, Henri Tajfel's<sup>20</sup> enumeration of minority group characteristics and traits is classical and vital in understanding the underlying functions of minority entities. Foremost, Tajfel argues that minority groups are inferior fractions that exist within intricate political systems, and more importantly these group members feel they share common traits and are equally bound together in what they perceive as common fate<sup>21</sup>. Furthermore, in line with Cartwright and Zander, Khashan plausibly asserts that minority formation undergoes a process that exists beyond time and more importantly is shaped in "the aftermath of important political junctures or social upheavals"<sup>22</sup>.

The association between group theory and minority identity is explored in the work carried out by Jarlah Benson<sup>23</sup>. The author assumes in line with Tajfel that certain characteristics help shape individuals into a group and several important traits transform and shape their minority identity. Benson argues that people that tend to identify with one another and actively engage with each other are defined by others as a group because they share common values and beliefs<sup>24</sup>. Their self perception as a group with distinctive features and characteristics helps establish their identity as a minority unit within the overall framework of society factions and elements. For that purpose, one

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<sup>19</sup> Ibid, p. 24

<sup>20</sup> Henri Tajfel (1981), *Human Groups and Social Categories: Studies in Social Psychology*

<sup>21</sup> Ibid, p. 309

<sup>22</sup> Khashan, p. 24

<sup>23</sup> Jarlah Benson (2000), *Working More Creatively With Groups*

<sup>24</sup> Ibid, p. 5

could assert that as long as individuals within their respective groups feel they have ‘different’ attributes and values in comparison to others, their status as a separate entity is embossed and thus are labeled as a form of minority groups. The condensed relationship between group theory and minority identity is relevant when one is able to categorize the relevant traits that are associated in these two dimensions. Nevertheless, it should be noted that minority identity is wholly constructed on the grounds that some groups do not identify with the aspirations and values diffused by the dominant majority group. In line with Khashan’s assertions, minority groups can only view themselves as a smaller entity in light of a stronger overwhelming group that claims to be the majority.

In the previous section, this author has tried to explain the relationship between group theory and minority identity, in light of the broader scope of group dynamics. However, it is fundamentally crucial to understand how the concept of identity is developed and how social factors, such as, the “emergence of certain phenomena” help shape and transform individual and group identity. Minority identity was defined by ‘spontaneous formation’, determined by a ‘particular set of conditions’ – these conditions include common values and shared beliefs – and more importantly it is shaped when individuals are equally bound together in what they perceive as ‘common fate’.

#### a. Social Identity Theory and Identity Formation

Social identity theory as a discipline in organizational identification emerged primarily with Henri Tajfel and John Turner<sup>25</sup>. This relevant theory details that “people tend to classify themselves and others into various social categories, such as

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<sup>25</sup> See Henri Tajfel and John Turner (1986), *The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup Behavior*

organizational membership, religious affiliation, gender and age cohort”<sup>26</sup>. The notion of social classification invites the assumption that individuals are able to define themselves in their respective environments, accordingly to their set of values and norms. As a result, any individual in any given society can manifest their political and social value according to their own structure and state of mind. As Tajfel and Turner contend that the definition of others and the self are “largely relational and comparative”, they define oneself relative to individuals in other categories<sup>27</sup>. This latter argument suggests that individuals are able to socially identify themselves in relevancy and comparison to different individuals with other constructed identities.

The process of categorization is a tool for understanding the differences conceptualized between different individuals in their concurrent quest in search for an identity. The procedure carried out in self- categorization in understanding social identity theory again reinforces the value of the individual emphasizing a reflective perspective. Jan Stets and Peter Burke<sup>28</sup> (2009) state that “through a social comparison process, persons {individuals} who are similar to the self are labeled in-group; persons who differ from the self are categorized as the out - group”<sup>29</sup>. Moreover, the broader concepts of social identity theory are deeply interconnected to the dimensions of self – categorization in the first place and social comparison in the other<sup>30</sup>. More importantly, Stets and Burke argue that the vital component of social identity theory is the notion of

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<sup>26</sup> Blake Ashforth and Fred Mael (1989), *Social Identity Theory and Organization* (pp. 20 – 39)

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid*, p. 21

<sup>28</sup> Jan Stets and Peter Burke (2009), *Identity Theory and Social Identity Theory*. (pp. 224 - 237)

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid*, p. 225

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid*, p.225



intergroup relations, revealed in how individuals tend to identify themselves within their group in comparison to individuals in different groups<sup>31</sup>.

This dimension of social interaction definitely sets stage for understanding the concept of ethnocentrism, where individuals can understand themselves solely through perceiving other individuals or groups, according to their central values and beliefs. More importantly, the definition of social identity theory has to do with understanding one of the important aspects of this field: mainly the function of social categories. According to Stets and Burke “social categories precede individuals; individuals are born into an already structured society. Once in society, people derive their identity or sense of self largely from the social categories to which they belong”<sup>32</sup>. It is quite imaginary and difficult to conceptualize identity formation without having solid grounds rooted in social identity theory. The function of social categories that shape and precede an individual’s mindset plays a primary role in an individual’s attempt to reshape and form their identity accordingly to the emerging social factors, environment and relations.

The formation of personal identity according to Steve Hitlin <sup>33</sup>(2003) is “a sense of self – identity built up over time as the person embarks on and pursues projects or goals that are not thought of as those of a community, but as the property of the person. For that specific reason, the aspects of personal identity stressed on individual perception and reasoning “rather than of communal involvement”<sup>34</sup>. One would

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<sup>31</sup> Ibid, p. 226

<sup>32</sup> Ibid, p. 225

<sup>33</sup> Steve Hitlin (2003), Values as the Core of Personal Identity. (pp. 118 – 137)

<sup>34</sup> Ibid, p. 118

understand that identity formation transposes an individual from their collective group identity into a parallel dimension, yet it is quite the contrary. In line with Stets and Burke's arguments, identity formation is clearly interconnected with the process of self – categorization and values. Identity formation cannot take form without the social structures they belong to and as a result the expectations and meanings from an envisioned set of values guide behavior and stances<sup>35</sup>. This view is supported by the active commitment individuals have towards their group, as they tend to accept the formation of their identity in light of a collective identity attributed to a certain accepted line of thought.

Karen Cerulo (1997) asserts that collective identity is a concept deeply rooted in the sociological constructs that find relevance in Durkheim's, Marx's, Weber's and Tonnies' theory conceptualization<sup>36</sup>. The relevancy in Cerulo's work focuses on the concept of "we – ness of group, stressing the similarities or shared attributes around which group members coalesce"<sup>37</sup>. This form of thought invites assumptions that identity formation is deeply connected with "natural" or "essential" characteristics as attributes that are derived from "physiological traits, psychological predispositions, regional features or the properties of structural locations... members were believed to internalize these qualities, suggesting a unified, singular social experience"<sup>38</sup>.

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<sup>35</sup> Jan Stets and Peter Burke (2009), *Identity Theory and Social Identity Theory*. (pp. 224 - 237)

<sup>36</sup> Karen Cerulo (1997), *Identity Construction: New Issues, New Directions*. (pp. 385 – 409)

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid*, p. 386

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid*, p. 386 – 387

The value of the individual cannot be fully stressed without understanding the abundant literature that aims to explain the importance of the “self”. Michael Hogg, Deborah Terry and Katherine White (1995) assert that social behavior is combined in analyzing the form of interrelations between self and society<sup>39</sup>. More importantly, the proposition put forth is that society affects social behavior through its vast influence on the individual. Furthermore, Hitlin asserts that identity theory<sup>40</sup> “holds that individuals are a compilation of discrete identities, often tied to their social roles, which become salient as situations calls for them”<sup>41</sup>. In addition to Hitlin’s assertions on identity formation, Stets and Burke claim that individuals do not need to enlarge and expand their effort towards showing affinity towards their group goals, they should only have a feeling that makes them associate thoroughly with the common “fate of the group”<sup>42</sup>. This latter argument puts forth a remarkable aspect in understanding social identity formation and personal identity construction. Moreover, some individuals can share common traits and characteristics with their social constructed group, yet they do not really need to be fully committed. Nevertheless, the striking point is that these individuals can still associate and identify themselves with the common fate {good} of the group. Furthermore, some individuals identify themselves with the failure and success of their respective groups. Their sense of pride and commitment to the group is measured in withstanding challenges and “loss and suffering”<sup>43</sup> from other competing

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<sup>39</sup> Michal Hogg, Deborah Terry and Katherine White (1995), *A Tale of Two Theories* (pp. 255 – 269)

<sup>40</sup> Steve Hitlin (2003), *Values as the Core of Personal Identity*. (pp. 118 – 137)

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid*, p. 121

<sup>42</sup> Stets and Burke, p. 225 – 227

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid*, p. 224 - 237

entities. In broader terms, social identity theory and identity formation theory are deeply connected and linked.

There are amounts of literature that tend to expose differences and dissimilarities between social identity theory and identity theory. These concepts provide a lucid anatomy of the “self – perception” within any given society and more importantly the dimensions of interrelations between the individual and their given social medium. For this specific purpose, and the general objective of this research study, the dimensions of self – perception theory will be briefly illustrated and explored.

Self – perception theory is the focal blend of social identity theory and identity theory, respectively in the course of this research paper. The notion of identity begins with the process of the individual – the self – and is later evaluated on the ground of self – categorization and social interactions. For that specific purpose, the process of self – perception involves a keen attempt for inner – reflective dynamics on one hand and social comparison with other individuals in their respective groups, on the other. Daryl Bem<sup>44</sup>, a pioneer in conceptualizing the dynamics of self – perception theory asserts that “individuals come to know their own attitudes, emotions, and other internal states partially by inferring them from observations of their own overt behavior and/or the circumstances in which this behavior occurs”<sup>45</sup>. This previous assertion stresses the importance of self – realization and perception in understanding the context and shape of behaviors and stances within a certain social structure, mainly the environment. Bem argues that the initial foundations of self – perception theory came to the realm of

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<sup>44</sup> Daryl J. Bem (1972), *Self – Perception Theory* (pp. 1 – 62)

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid*, p. 2

existence with its linkage to “philosophy of mind”, emphasizing the notion of self – attribution beyond the field of “purely analytic analyses”<sup>46</sup>. Furthermore, this latter scholar vindicates that private stimuli – certain factors and causes that affect the individual and the group- within any given society can help shape self – identity in respect to personal behavior and attitudes<sup>47</sup>. The primary concern with self – perception theory is that attitudes precede and come prior to behaviors. As a result, the construction of self – perception is associated with identity formation in its potentiality to account for social behavior and attitudes. Individuals are able to evaluate and compare their personal values and behavior in relevant approaches to other different individuals in different social structures. Moreover, the leading gimmick of self – perception theory is to encourage a method of analysis that relies on exploring self – perceived convictions that are initially constructed by observing the actions and values of others, in relevant juxtaposition.

In the previous section, the correlation between the dimensions of self – perception theory and identity formation is crucial in making sense of the attitudes and stances chosen by certain individuals in any different groups when faced with a certain dilemma or perplexity. Additionally, self perception theory is when individuals know their own attitudes by inferring them from observations from their personal behavior and circumstances. This form of behavior is nurtured from ‘psychological traits’ that suggest a unified and singular social experience. More importantly, the formation of personal identity has roots in personal interpretation and perception in line with the involvement of the community at large.

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<sup>46</sup> Ibid, p. 2

<sup>47</sup> Ibid, p. 4

## b. Group Cohesion

The definition of cohesion is derived from Latin origin “cohaseus” meaning to stick together<sup>48</sup>. The foremost aspect of cohesion is the ability to keep members within a group united and together. Kenneth Dion (2000) identified that the main value in investigating group cohesion, lies in its relevancy to small – group performance. More importantly, these social entities can include any military unit, business firm, ethnic group or any particular society<sup>49</sup>. The aspects of group cohesion, on the one hand and group solidarity on the other, are among the most important components of group dynamics.

More importantly, these two dimensions are essential in understanding group formation and minority identity. The general understanding of group cohesiveness is associated with the multitude of factors and actions that constitute individuals to stay in a certain group<sup>50</sup>. The level of group cohesion within a group can help shape an adequate picture of the members’ commitment in that respective unit<sup>51</sup>. Furthermore, it stands to illustrate the magnitude of a unified vision and desire of individuals in their belief and dedication to a certain line of thought. In addition, the individuals’ level of acquiescence and commitment to their group’s general performance relevant to any occurring event –that may include coercion - , can help evaluate their degree of pride and affinity to group membership and belonging.

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<sup>48</sup> Kenneth Dion (2000), *Group Cohesion: From Field of Forces to Multidimensional Construct*. (pp. 7 -26)

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid*, p. 7 - 8

<sup>50</sup> Leon Festinger (1950), *Informal Social Communication*. (pp. 271 – 282)

<sup>51</sup> Dorwin Cartwright (1968), *Group Dynamics*. (pp. 91 – 109)

The main element in group cohesion is the connection members' exhibit in their interactions with members from their own unit and interrelations with other members in different units. The social environment in any particular medium does shape the levels of commitment and group attraction members have. Furthermore, group cohesiveness is understood through investigating and measuring individuals' satisfaction and attraction to a certain group<sup>52</sup>. The valuable facet of group cohesion is that it helps provide power and influence for members within the group, in their capacity to target and attract indecisive<sup>53</sup> members towards the group<sup>54</sup>.

Basing their findings on Hagstrom and Selvin<sup>55</sup>, Cartwright and Zander assert that two factors are closely interrelated with the dimensions of group cohesion: "social satisfaction and sociometric cohesion"<sup>56</sup>. In the latter components, social satisfaction is focused on the opportunities groups provide in their course to attract members. Sociometric cohesion focuses on the form of personal relations and association members have with each other, within the same unit. The first factor is perceptibly rooted in the material gain that shapes higher levels of group attraction and membership, while the second factor purely gives value to personal relations and attraction. Furthermore, the similar feature in any investigation of group attraction is

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<sup>52</sup> Ibid, p. 92

<sup>53</sup> Certain members might not feel fully attracted and committed to a certain group, as a result they are not 'full' members.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid, p. 93

<sup>55</sup> Warren Hagstrom and Hanan Selvin (1965), Two Dimensions of Cohesiveness in Small Groups, (pp. 30 – 43)

<sup>56</sup> Cartwright, p. 95

rooted in understanding individuals' level of expectancy in favorable outcomes. These favorable outcomes are usually correlated with "organizational survival"<sup>57</sup>.

In parallel with the concept of personal gain and benefit, members are allured to "affiliative tendencies" in close proximity to their entourage. These affiliative tendencies formally include a form of anxiety and fear that is fundamentally shaped by looming threats and vague situations<sup>58</sup>. The sentiment of fear and concern arouses higher levels of cohesiveness and attraction, where individuals have a firm believe that their welfare is protected within the overall framework of their group. As a result, when members feel a certain imperil to their personal existence, they directly resort and accept any decision carried out by influential members within their certain unit. Moreover, this dimension of fear invites higher levels of interdependence within the group that helps manifest itself into a single vision, a common goal<sup>59</sup>.

The correlation between group cohesion and the common goal is the level of attraction and attachment members have towards their group, in any given circumstance<sup>60</sup>. In contrast to catalysts that can boost higher levels of group cohesion, certain factors can relatively weaken group coherence. Members within the same group can favor and have relations with members from different groups. As a result, the flow and exchange of ideas and perceptions can penetrate strong cohesive bond that keeps all

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<sup>57</sup> Cartwright asserts that organizational survival depicts individuals' attitude to benefit more extensively and favorably from the group's assets and sources, in a lesser form of contribution (pp. 95 – 96)

<sup>58</sup> Ibid, p. 96 - 97

<sup>59</sup> Ibid, p. 100

<sup>60</sup> These circumstances may include anxiety and peace situations.



members tight together<sup>61</sup>. This notion invites assumptions that better exemplify the level of attraction and commitment individuals have towards their group, in light of these different temptations<sup>62</sup>.

The main challenge in maintaining a stronger level of group cohesion is not solely necessary in times of anxiety and crises, rather in normal times where individuals independently engage in relations with ‘different’ members from other groups.

In the previous section, group cohesion was mainly defined in the level of commitment and attraction individuals have towards their own respective group. Additionally, the dimensions of group cohesion include two related functions. The first is ‘social satisfaction’ which focuses on the opportunities groups provide to attract members. The second is ‘sociometric cohesion’ which focuses on personal relations and associations members have with each other in their respective group.

### c. Group Solidarity

The term “solidarity” is etymologically rooted and modernized in the French word “solidarité”, yet its initial foundation comes from a Latin origin, which is “solidum”<sup>63</sup>. The main definition of solidarity is the unity of groups, entities or any form of class that is produced on the grounds of common interests, ideals and objectives. Another Latin etymological root portrays that solidarity derives its roots in the word “solidare”, which stipulates the formation and combination of several elements

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<sup>61</sup> J. T. Borhek (1970), *Ethnic – Group Cohesion*, (pp. 33 – 46)

<sup>62</sup> The aspects of temptation are different from the emergence of salient fear, because these attractions egress with no relative anxiety or group survival concern.

<sup>63</sup> The definition of solidarity is taken from Merriam – Webster Online Dictionary. (<http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/solidarity>)

into one strong whole<sup>64</sup>. Aafke Komter's assertions in line with Durkheim, Weber and Parsons contend that people through regulating their interactions and relations share and shape their norms. More importantly, these individuals base the foundations of their relations on self – interested motivation and identity<sup>65</sup>.

In addition, to the aspects of self – motivation and ideals, classical anthropologists Bronislaw Malinowski<sup>66</sup> (1950) and Marcel Mauss<sup>67</sup> (1990) argue that the feelings and sentiments of solidarity are deeply rooted in the perception of mutual recognition and obligation<sup>68</sup>.

Among the foremost complex forms of solidarity studied by social sciences, mainly anthropology and social psychology, the traditional and classical example is the group dynamics of the family. The main component of any family unit has to do with the fundamental definition of solidarity: a collection of individuals united with similar aspirations and motives in certain circumstances and cases. As a result, the capacity to measure a group's level of solidarity has to be weighed in comparison to other different units that share common solidary<sup>69</sup> attitudes. The notion of communal sharing is portrayed as a communication hub and unit for individuals to share their norms and

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<sup>64</sup> Aafke Komter (2005), *Social Solidarity and the Gift*

<sup>65</sup> *Ibid*, p. 9

<sup>66</sup> See Bronislaw Malinowski (1964), *Argonauts of the Western Pacific*.

<sup>67</sup> See Marcel Mauss and W. D. Halls (1990), *The Gift: The Form and Reason for Exchange in Archaic Societies*.

<sup>68</sup> *Ibid*, p. 9 - 11

<sup>69</sup> The definition of solidary is “marked by unity of interests and responsibilities” taken from Collins English Online Dictionary. (<http://dictionary.reverso.net/english-definition/solidary>)

form a unity of interests and ideals, while serving as a basic component of intimate group solidarity<sup>70</sup>.

The concept of “exchange of services” serves as an important attribute associated with group solidarity<sup>71</sup>. The explanation of what constitutes as an exchange of services is rooted in the concept of sacrifice. This sacrifice stipulates the material loss and personal loss individuals are willing to take in safeguarding their respective unit or group. Komter argues that classical sociologists at the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century were analyzing and studying the process of change and more importantly the sources and concepts that are affecting levels of group cohesion and solidarity in different societies<sup>72</sup>. This process of change is the introduction of intergroup relations that has brought opposite and different values between individuals from relatively different backgrounds. This assumption serves as the basic foundation for understanding the transitions within society from a traditional sphere into a modern society. Komter argues in line with Tonnies that the traditional community that was valuable and visible in small minority groups – families and closed neighborhoods- were being substituted and replaced by individual sentiments and desires<sup>73</sup>.

More importantly, the concept of mechanical solidarity defines an array of homogeneous entities that share relative similarities and traits. Durkheim contends that in a case of ‘mechanical solidarity’ there exists no distinction between individuals within the same group. The individuals’ conscience is dependent on collective

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<sup>70</sup> Komter, p. 22

<sup>71</sup> See Georg Simmel and Kurt H. Wolff (1950), *The Sociology of Georg Simmel*

<sup>72</sup> Komter, p. 102

<sup>73</sup> *Ibid*, p. 103

conscience, and the aspects of personal identity become part of collective group identity<sup>74</sup>. This type of collective group identity exposes the shared norms and values of individuals and as a result constitutes their behavior process and attitude. Such solidarity postulates that religion becomes a dominant factor in social life and the codes of morality become concrete and specific<sup>75</sup>. Furthermore, in line with Durkheim's work on "mechanical and organic solidarity", Komter asserts that the degree of societal functions and the extent of social cohesion is weighed accordingly to stronger bonds of cohesion that are shaped from a strong sense of solidarity<sup>76</sup>.

Talcott Parsons<sup>77</sup> (1991) inspired by Durkheim's work and recognized as one of the founding fathers of modern sociology, focuses on the contribution of common values exhibited by the individuals in their creation of common shared group identity. In addition, Parsons argues that loyalty is different from solidarity and as a result loyalty is the individual's stimulus and motivation to conform and confine to the interest and ideals of another person. This latter assertion designates that individual loyalty to any group acts as a prerequisite and fundamental component in understanding the level of unity and conformity that is measured in group solidarity. Moreover, Parsons' assumptions reflect that the attributes of loyalty are essential and crucial in their collective nature<sup>78</sup>, and as a result in understanding the initial foundations of group solidarity. The dimensions of solidarity explain that people feel commitment in a certain

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<sup>74</sup> Emile Durkheim (1984), *The Division of Labor in Society*

<sup>75</sup> *Ibid*, p. 181

<sup>76</sup> Komter, p. 105

<sup>77</sup> See Talcott Parsons (1991), *The Social System*

<sup>78</sup> The collection of values and norms that individuals share in shaping their common group identity

bond with each other. In addition, these individuals are commonly attracted to a certain group that expresses their perceived identity and personal loyalty.

The “systems of solidarity” as coined by modern sociologist Leon Mayhew<sup>79</sup> (1971) focus on the form of solidary attitude and belief and are organized in certain organizations and institutions. Mayhew asserts that the function of such solidary behavior is “encouraging, stabilizing, and regulating patterns of attraction, repulsion, loyalty and identity within a population”<sup>80</sup>. According to Mayhew, there exist four distinctive forms of solidarity. The first form is reflected in the ties of affinity between people, defined as attraction. In addition, to the concept of attraction, the second form, is the dimension of loyalty, where members care for the unity of their group. The third form focuses on the notion of identification, known as group belonging or indirect emotional attachment. The last form is based on the aspects of association, where this type transcends any established group identity or distinction<sup>81</sup>.

In line with Durkheim (1984), Simmel (1950), Parsons (1991), Mayhew (1971), and Komter (2005), there exists an important correlation between group cohesion and group solidarity. Durkheim asserts that a strong sense of group cohesion finds roots in a stronger level of group solidarity. Simmel argues that the concept of sacrifice is vital in understanding the sense of attraction and loyalty individuals have towards their entity in any given case. Parsons and Mayhew assume that loyalty is the precursor for understanding and measuring group cohesiveness and solidarity. More importantly, Mayhew accounts for the systems of solidarity that explore the facets of group

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<sup>79</sup> Leon H. Mayhew (1971), *Society: Institutions and Activity*

<sup>80</sup> *Ibid*, p. 68

<sup>81</sup> *Ibid*, p. 68 - 70

commitment and attraction, loyalty, group identification and group association. The social processes of group cohesiveness and group solidarity share common traits and characteristics.

These correlated dimensions within the framework of group dynamics include multiple functions of: membership, attraction, satisfaction, loyalty, sacrifice, and association. These variables are essential in empirical research that focuses on understanding intergroup relations and group identity. The components of group solidarity and cohesion are crucial in the formation of group identity.

In the previous section, group solidarity is defined as the unity of individuals or entities in different units on the grounds of common interests, ideals, and objectives. Additionally, group solidarity involves the concept of ‘exchange of services’ that is defined as sacrifice individuals are willing to shed for the well being of the group. This form of sacrifice is understood in light of common values and aspirations. More importantly, group solidarity includes encouraging and regulating different patterns of ‘attraction, loyalty and identity within a population’.

## ***2. Intergroup Relations and Attitudes***

There is a need to define the term relation before explaining the function of intergroup relations. Werner Landecker<sup>82</sup> (1940) contends that relations set forth conditions for each subject that functions as an object of the behavior “of each other participating subject”. As a result, relations explain how individuals can be the subject, as well the object of behavior. With such an explanation, there is a relationship between attitudes individuals expose and their actual behavior towards ‘different’ individuals.

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<sup>82</sup> Werner Landecker (1940), *International Relations as Intergroup Relations* (pp. 335 – 339)

However, an accurate assimilation of intergroup relations reflects that such type of contact are not common relations between individuals, rather they constitute forms of relations between individuals that belong to different groups<sup>83</sup>. As a result, intergroup relations set stage for understanding the system of interaction that occurs between groups, be it positive and negative situations.

The foundations of intergroup relations are interconnected with the aspects of self – identity and levels of group cohesion and solidarity. More importantly, individuals are usually inclined to find people who have similar ideals and motives. This perception that stipulates a form of comfort and trust forms and shapes the nature of the in-group<sup>84</sup>. Intergroup relations come as a result of this latter assertion; the in-groups are formed on individuals' self –perceptions that entice different traits and characteristics in comparison to other in-groups. This type of distinction is explored in the dynamics of intergroup relations that enables a medium for the exchange of affirmative and uncertain stances.

When individuals feel associated with a certain group, usually their perceptions of an outer-group are conveyed as entities threatening their existence and their collective unit<sup>85</sup>. These types of sentiments emerge from a form of biases. Social psychologists have been constantly exploring the different forms of biases that take form in different systems of intergroup relations. One of the founding fathers in social

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<sup>83</sup> Ibid, p. 335

<sup>84</sup> Susan Fiske (2002), What We Know About Bias and Intergroup Conflict, the Problem of the Century (pp. 123 – 128)

<sup>85</sup> Ibid, p. 123

psychology, Gordon Allport<sup>86</sup> (1954) explores the nature and causes of intergroup relations relating to a form of prejudice. This form of prejudice is explained in terms of biases, which mainly include, discrimination reflect and stereotyping<sup>87</sup>. These types of biases reflect individuals' affective, cognitive and behavioral attitudes and perceptions towards other individuals that belong to different groups. This consortium of attitudes, perceptions and relations begins initially when humans tend to differentiate themselves into different units that praise illusive differences<sup>88</sup>.

Intergroup discernment includes lines of ethnic, religious, racial, national and class differences. Furthermore, individuals perceive and differentiate between social categories and as a result have a tendency to affiliate with certain aspects that help define and shape their personal identity<sup>89</sup>. The initial distinction crafted by in-group members towards out-group members creates a flood of negative stereotypes, devalued and hostile behavioral attitudes and perceptions. Members that share different aspirations and ideals from other members within society are inclined to judge and catalog other and different members into their own cognitive social categories. As a result, a torrent of misconceptions and false judgments are based on the lack of knowledge of the 'other'.

On that crucial assertion, an attempt to explore intergroup relations has to begin with understanding the formation of group identity within the framework of contending

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<sup>86</sup> See Gordon Allport (1954), *The Nature of Prejudice*.

<sup>87</sup> Fiske, 2002

<sup>88</sup> Ulrich Wagner (2008), *Improving Intergroup Relations: Building on the Legacy of Thomas F. Pettigrew* (pp. 1 – 10)

<sup>89</sup> *Ibid*, p. 1



groups. When members within their categorized units have a separate perceived self and group identity in comparison to other individuals, their perceptions and attitudes will include numerous flaws and failings. Social psychologists, like Thomas Pettigrew<sup>90</sup> (1998) mainly following Allport's work have been exploring mechanisms and methods to decrease negative images groups have towards each other. Pettigrew's main concern is establishing practical methods that can contain and restrain groups from falling into the traps of conflict. In line with Allport, Thomas Pettigrew argues that positive intergroup relations require situations that provide: "equal group status within the situation; common goals; intergroup cooperation; and the support of authorities, law or custom"<sup>91</sup>. Allport's discussion and stress on equal status is essential in understanding why groups have certain prejudices and false perceptions towards each other. Furthermore, when some groups feel they do not possess the same chunk of power and control in comparison to other groups, intergroup relations are expected to aggravate. As a result, when certain groups feel 'left out' and their desires and objectives are not met, their group character will exhibit negative and tense vibes.

Another source of intergroup agitated relations is correlated with Allport's interpretation of "common goals"<sup>92</sup>. Accordingly, these common goals are correlated with intergroup cooperation and are simultaneously reflected in creating an active "goal oriented effort" that serves the interest of all the contending groups. The process involves instituting an atmosphere where all groups feel they have relative gain and benefit from their attempt to interact positively with other groups, primarily based on

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<sup>90</sup> Thomas Pettigrew (1998), Intergroup Contact Theory, ( pp. 65 – 85)

<sup>91</sup> Ibid, p. 66

<sup>92</sup> Ibid, p. 66

mutual benefit and gain<sup>93</sup>. Nevertheless, this goal oriented effort provides a stimulus for groups to interact positively with each other for their own common good, yet it is not measurable whether intergroup differences can be solved. The dimensions of mutual benefit can create a positive ambiance for groups to interact in reaching their common grounds, which can translate into equal grounds between rivalry groups.

The final cornerstone that invites positive attitudes and intergroup perceptions is associated with support for a legitimate body – the authorities and the existing framework of laws. The presence of a stronger body of power can necessarily calm the concerns and misconceptions groups shape about each other. As a result, an efficient and capable body exercising legal norms, practices and customs will certainly exhibit a feeling of security for groups that fear their existence.

However, any attempt aimed at ameliorating negative intergroup relations is grounded in theory, yet it should be supported by empirical findings and contribution. Therefore, intergroup relations can have similar problems in theory, yet in context when they are empirically revisited, fresh findings can materialize and help provide adequate information for improving positive contact theory<sup>94</sup>.

Another emanating problem is vital in understanding the framework of intergroup relations. The differences in perceptions and attitudes between different groups that are shaped and formed from negative stereotypes and biases are not exclusive and inclusive of all the members in the in-group. Moreover, study of intergroup relations attempts to explore intragroup differences and conflict within

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<sup>93</sup> Ibid, p. 66 - 67

<sup>94</sup> Wagner, p. 1 – 10

members from the same unit<sup>95</sup>. Certain members within respective groups can have positive and negative feelings towards certain members within other groups. This later assertion enables certain individuals within their groups to have viable relations with other individuals in other groups, as an inclusive pattern in intergroup relations. The formulation of such dissident<sup>96</sup> attitude attempts to explain the dichotomy between personal behavior and aspirations and group behavior and goals<sup>97</sup>. Furthermore, individuals that exhibit discordant ideals and perceptions weigh and balance their opinions on the grounds of the balance of costs and rewards. This aspect of measuring the costs and rewards in any given situation is directly correlated with choosing the optimal choice from the available alternatives. As a result, this form of intergroup relations needs to take into account these separatist individuals that might favor options that might contradict with their group's established line of action and thought. This line of action and conduct stipulates the group's behavior and identity towards the different alternatives.

However, it should be mentioned that dissident individuals and their attempt to exhibit different ideals than those portrayed by their group are abundantly influenced by social and group contexts. In addition to their personal motivation and ideals, the two main components that create a plateau for such comportment are related to the internal environment of the group – subordinate – and the superordinate groups at the external

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<sup>95</sup> Irwin Rinder (1965), *Minority Orientations: An Approach to Intergroup Relations Theory Through Social Psychology* (pp. 165 – 175)

<sup>96</sup> Dissident is defined as “deviating from commonly accepted beliefs or practices”, taken from Merriam – Webster Online Dictionary (<http://www.merriam-webster.com/thesaurus/dissident>)

<sup>97</sup> *Ibid*, p. 165

environment<sup>98</sup>. Irwin Rinder (1965) accounts for a typology of minority aspirations that involves: “assimilationist, pluralist, secessionist and militant”. Moreover, it should be noted that the form of interactions between groups are not constant, yet variable accordingly to the context. There is not a model or characteristic pattern that can be established to track and categorize any action carried out by such groups. According to this model, Rinder asserts “no group is ever unanimous in all attitudes and actions, and minority groups are no exception...they {minority groups} too, have their internal differentiations, their factions and ideological current and movements”<sup>99</sup>. Moreover, this assertion explains that any particular attempt carried out by dissident individuals should be accounted for in the overall conduct of the group; yet such group attitude and behavior is not a constant feature. This group behavior and approach can shape its attitudes and perceptions over the course of time, with no constraints or limitations.

Werner Landecker (1940) sets the stage for understanding the individuals’ subjective relations with their in-group and how it is subsequently useful in understanding that individuals’ personal aspirations are contributive to the overall reshaping of group aspirations and goals. In addition to understanding the anatomy of individualistic relations to the in-group, Gordon Allport’s (1954) work on the “Nature of Prejudice” has led to numerous attempts grounded in theory and visited in empirical findings, to understand the nature of problems that emerge from intergroup relations. Allport’s research findings have crafted a research stimulus in finding practical methods to initiate intergroup positive contact and as a result resolve imminent group conflict. This form of intergroup contact theory has been formulated by Pettigrew (1998) in an

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<sup>98</sup> Ibid, p. 165 - 166

<sup>99</sup> Ibid, p. 166

attempt to understand Allport's categorization of biases, false judgments and negative perceptions, and more importantly in inducing several modern day methods for resolving group conflict. These forms of biases and misconceptions that produce stressful and threatening situations have been thoroughly explored in Fiske's (2002) research work, which is a step further in exploring Allport's scale of Prejudice and Discrimination<sup>100</sup> used in measuring prejudice in society. Rinder's (1965) attempt is to understand the social factors that shape individual dissident behavior within homogeneous groups. As a result, Rinder focuses on the fact that the system of intergroup relations should take into account the form of relations initiated by separate individuals with outer-groups. Nevertheless, the dimensions of group behavior and perceptions do not have a fixed shape and form, rather are tangible and flexible in time and situational context.

In the previous section, intergroup relations are defined as the state for understanding the interaction that occurs between groups, whether it is in positive or negative situations. Additionally, the initial foundations of exploring intergroup relations begin with understanding the formation of group identity in a contended system. More importantly, intergroup relations between 'opposite poles' is centered on creating an active 'goal oriented effort' that provides mutual interests for groups that share common threats. This latter process creates a structure for groups to feel they have relative gain and benefit from cooperating with the opposite entity.

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<sup>100</sup> Gordon Allport (1954), *The Nature of Prejudice*. The scale explores the following items, labeled from 1 – 5, these items include "Antilocution", "Avoidance", "Discrimination", "Physical Attack", "Extermination".

### a. Theory of Collaborationism

The term collaboration is usually correlated with positive value judgments that include cooperation and collective joined effort for shared interests, and for better efficiency<sup>101</sup>. This concept is widely used in group dynamics within business and government institutions that include and require a positive work ethic that translates into higher productivity, with lower costs. Nevertheless, in different political cultures in Europe and the Middle East, the term collaboration has included negative attributes and values.

Collaborationism is defined as a synonymous explanation for treachery, duplicity and betrayal. The etymology of collaborator finds roots in the Latin word “collaboratus”, which clearly stipulates an ability to work with.

The available and plain definitions that explain the theory of collaborationism find spirit in referring to the Vichy Government and those who helped the Nazis against their French locals<sup>102</sup>. In common language, collaborationism is defined as a traitorous form of act or support or a kind of cooperation with the enemy. There is much focus given to explaining the line of differences between collaboration and collaborationism. The term collaboration includes any instance of individuals working together in scientific, literary or artistic endeavors. While, collaborationism carries on dark references and connotations lucidly referring to cooperating and colluding with an enemy invader<sup>103</sup>. There is no wonder Crimmings (2002) begins explaining and exploring the aspects of collaborationism, referring to the acts of betrayal and treachery,

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<sup>101</sup> The definition of collaboration is taken from Merriam – Webster Online Dictionary. (<http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/collaboration>)

<sup>102</sup> Stanley Hoffman (1968), *Collaborationism in France during World War II*, (pp. 375 – 395)

<sup>103</sup> Emma Crimmings (2002), *Sleeping With the Enemy*, (pp. 1 -3)

as “sleeping with the enemy”. An important benchmark in understanding collaborationism depends on who is defining, and who is analyzing the situation in any given condition<sup>104</sup>.

In a social and political context, collaboration<sup>105</sup> stands for voluntary action in assisting and providing support of the country’s recognized enemy. The term creates a dilemma when a need to justify it or link it to national interest arises. The problematic nature in defining national interest is rooted in understanding the underlying fundamental divisions in the portrayal of national objectives and national ethos. Certain factions within any given society can justify their acts of collaboration as a dire necessity that conforms to their national objectives and legacy<sup>106</sup>. Furthermore, this type of assistance is usually given to an invading or occupying force or any form of external power that threatens the way of life in any given setting<sup>107</sup>.

Collaborationist acts primarily include a body that exchanges with a foreign entity information and knowledge covertly and through the evasion of national frontiers<sup>108</sup>. According to Schneider the ethos of post-modern societies regards collaboration as expressive acts defined as singularities. This form of singularity is usually correlated with a form of discontinuity that has no predictable or concrete grounds, and as a result cannot be deterministic<sup>109</sup>. The latter assertion explains that acts

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<sup>104</sup> Hillel Cohen (2008), *Army of Shadows: Palestinian Collaboration with Zionism, 1917 – 1948*

<sup>105</sup> In this sense, for the context and sole purpose of this study, the terms “collaboration” and “collaborationism” will be used interchangeably

<sup>106</sup> Cohen, 2008

<sup>107</sup> Florian Schneider (2006), *Collaboration: The Dark Side of the Multitude*, (pp. 572 – 576)

<sup>108</sup> *Ibid*, p. 573

<sup>109</sup> *Ibid*, p. 574

of collaboration have a dissident sentiment being labeled as “out of the ordinary”. This manner of explanation associates such acts as occurring in an abnormal and irregular context. Collaboration has usually been linked to voluntary acts carried out by individuals or groups that provide support for any form of invading or occupying forces. Nevertheless, Hoffman (1968) distinguishes two interrelated forms of collaboration, namely “involuntary collaboration” and “voluntary collaboration”<sup>110</sup>.

If giving in to enemy demands could be justified by the need to save one’s last domains and one’s hostages, anticipating at least some of these demands or adopting an understanding attitude toward German {occupying force} economic and military imperatives could be defended as a way of warding off dangerous pressures, of enlarging one’s domain or of improving the prisoners or the nation’s lot (Hoffman, 378).

The following justification for the types of collaboration introduced by Hoffman emerges from actual and situational empirical evidence that has been collected and recorded in Germany’s invasion of France during World War II. More importantly, it should be mentioned that the available literature on “collaborationism theory” can only be explored through illustrating case studies relevant to the forms of cooperation and collaboration carried out by certain French factions with the Nazis during the war<sup>111</sup>.

As a result, this poses a limitation in understanding the true attributes that are explored in collaborationism theory. Therefore, it is quite mandatory to take into account that situational context of the events that followed between different individuals within the host country in respect to the invading forces of a foreign one<sup>112</sup>. Hoffman

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<sup>110</sup> Hoffman, p. 378

<sup>111</sup> It is noteworthy to mention that in many wars different forms of collaboration take place, where individuals or groups cooperate with the foreign enemy against a local foe.

<sup>112</sup> Certain case scenarios emerge from exploring such particularities within a historical framework. As a result, this form of interaction between an occupying force and a local one is crucial in understanding the concept of collaboration.



stipulates that involuntary and voluntary collaborationists give adequate justification for their acts, using a certain pretext or given or cover<sup>113</sup>.

The assertion follows that voluntary collaborationists are in quest of exploiting the necessities and alternatives in promoting their personal agenda. While involuntary collaborationists are hesitant to benefit from any form of alternative, they still have a tendency to explore some of the alternatives. Furthermore, these types of voluntary and involuntary collaborations share a common aspect: an attempt to rationalize collaboration for national interest and more importantly weighed and balanced on personal gain or advantage<sup>114</sup>. This form of personal gain is crafted upon the perception that the invading force is the champion, protector, guarantor, of a local transformation, certain individuals in society aim at achieving. This form of trust and belief in the invading force for personal or group motives justifies their cooperation with and support of a foreign group, given the fact that they oppose local domestic groups<sup>115</sup>.

Among the justifications given by such collaborationists is that they are able to show their satisfaction and closeness between their own national aspiration and policies in respect to the invading force. This aspect of common interest, according to Hoffman, is usually the backbone utilized by occupying forces in their attempt to attract local groups in their invasion and expansionist conquests<sup>116</sup>. Furthermore, Hillel Cohen (2008) argues that collaborators describe themselves as individuals within their respective groups, joining efforts {with the enemy or invading force} on the grounds of

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<sup>113</sup> Stanley Hoffman (1968), *Collaborationism in France during World War II*, (pp. 375 – 395)

<sup>114</sup> *Ibid*, p. 379

<sup>115</sup> *Ibid*, p. 379

<sup>116</sup> *Ibid*, p. 380

common interest<sup>117</sup>. This latter assertion is interpreted by several groups that the motives and objectives of an invading force gives justice and credibility to their own goals and interests<sup>118</sup>. In addition, Raphael Israeli (2008) gives lucid justification for collaboration acts assuming the superiority of feelings of “jealousy, political competition, family feuds, personal vendettas, economic gain, seeking favor with the enemy, a sense of adventure or tribal loyalty which has always been superior to national commitment”<sup>119</sup>.

Furthermore, Israeli asserts that certain situations force individuals to give primacy to their own interests that supersede any national interest. As a result, this form of collaboration becomes a necessity for survival and more importantly becomes labeled as a patriotic act<sup>120</sup>. More importantly, Cohen asserts that labeling certain individuals as traitors’ needs to take into account the flood of interests involved in any given situation. These interests include family, personal and political objectives and concerns<sup>121</sup>.

More importantly, Cohen assumes that collaborative acts can be divided into four categories. The first category includes the dimensions of “personal gain”, where individuals are in search for benefits in exchange for their services<sup>122</sup>. The second

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<sup>117</sup> Hillel Cohen (2008), *Army of Shadows: Palestinian Collaboration with Zionism, 1917 – 1948*, p. 66

<sup>118</sup> Raphael Israeli (2008), *Book Review: Army of Shadows: Palestinian Collaboration with Zionism, 1917 – 1948*, (pp. 1 – 5)

<sup>119</sup> *Ibid*, p. 1

<sup>120</sup> *Ibid*, p. 2

<sup>121</sup> Hillel Cohen (2008), *Army of Shadows: Palestinian Collaboration with Zionism, 1917 – 1948*, p. 51

<sup>122</sup> These services include exchanging information and the general framework of cooperating with the enemy

category is given to individuals that act on behalf of their community, labeling it as “communal interest”. In such collaboration, these communal groups justify their support of the “enemy” on the grounds of similar group identifications and ideals. The third category is for groups that claim to have a separate nationalistic tendency supported on the grounds of a different cultural and historical lineage or heritage. These groups visualize their nationalistic interests as synonymous with the national tendencies that all groups residing on the same territory should adhere to. The fourth category is correlated with personal gain and communal interest, which claims that several groups have motives based on ethical and humanist grounds. These groups take no issue in viewing other groups suffer from invading forces, because their territorial and communal integrity have not been tampered or challenged. As a result, they feel that they have no interest or purpose in matters that are out of their realm of concern<sup>123</sup>.

According to Hoffman (1968) and Crimmings (2002), this type of assistance and cooperation with the enemy of any country is an act of treason and betrayal. However, Israeli (2008) and Schneider (2006) argue that collaborative acts carry different meanings and as a result should be differentiated in any given situation. Some acts are considered as collaborative efforts, yet they might be exposed as common causes for the protection of national interest and group survival. Furthermore, Hoffman categorizes collaboration into two interrelated forms: involuntary and voluntary collaboration. In these two types, individuals or their groups are keen to explore the alternative necessities. Voluntary collaboration enumerates that individuals have tendencies for collaboration in their attempt to secure personal gain and benefit. While, involuntary collaboration contends that individuals are hesitant in their attempt to choose between

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<sup>123</sup> Ibid, p. 67

the available choices. In addition, Cohen (2008) explains that the overall structure and political culture of any given society is essential in trying to understand who has the ability to label other individuals as collaborators or not. This latter principle opens room for a lavish never ending discussion on the power and authority given in any political discourse. This form of discourse is a continuous argument throughout the process of understanding what constitutes an act of treason and what serves as an act of patriotism.

Cohen categorizes collaborationism into four interrelated forms. These sections include the benefits from “personal gain”, the depiction of “communal interest”, and the portrayal of a distinctive nationalistic tendency and heritage. In addition to these segments, in line with personal gain and communal interest, certain groups feel they have moral and ethical grounds in not partaking in any given circumstance. Their support for such “neutral” stances is rooted in their deep conviction that their interests are not in peril and as a result they feel passive towards what constitutes as an act of aggression or invasion.

In the previous section, collaboration is defined as treacherous acts carried out by individuals or groups supporting an ‘enemy’ against a local foe. Additionally, collaboration includes voluntary and involuntary acts of cooperation. Voluntary collaboration involves individuals or groups exploiting alternatives and choices put forth by the ‘invading’ enemy in light of promoting their ‘personal agenda’. While, involuntary collaboration involves individuals or groups that are hesitant in taking advantage of the alternatives provided by the ‘enemy’, yet - in given situations – they might explore the available possibilities. Furthermore, the problematic nature in understanding the relationship between collaboration and national interest is highlighted in investigating groups’ perceived self – identity.

## b. Alliance Formation Theory

The explanation of alliance formation is apparently correlated to intergroup relations. Alliances in their overall definition constitute one of the sub divisions within intergroup relations, in the general structure of group dynamics. An alliance in plain terms can be defined as an act of cooperation between any form of organization, entity, individual or states.

Stephen Walt<sup>124</sup> (2009) asserts that “the essential element in a meaningful alliance is a commitment for mutual support against some external actor(s)”. More importantly, alliances stipulate that the participating entities have a certain association that helps advance common interests. Walt contends that the vital purpose of alliances is to combine and boost members’ capacities in a manner that can accentuate their desired interests<sup>125</sup>. Therefore, this formed union exhibits a relationship with similar qualities<sup>126</sup>.

The bulk of research explaining the tenets of alliance formation are not strictly confined to the level of interstate cooperation, and as a result the patterns that can be derived from this model of interpretation can be utilized in understanding the overall depiction of any alliance<sup>127</sup>. Furthermore, the available theoretical literature that deals

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<sup>124</sup> Stephen Walt (2009), *Alliances in a Unipolar World*, (pp. 86 – 120)

<sup>125</sup> *Ibid*, p. 88

<sup>126</sup> The definition of alliance is taken from Merriam – Webster Online Dictionary. (<http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/alliance>)

<sup>127</sup> These patterns include all the determinant factors necessary, relevant and common in any alliance formation. These determinant factors are not exclusive for interstate relations, rather are commonly used in business and organization alliances

with defining and explaining the different forms of alliance are dominated and rooted in realist paradigms<sup>128</sup>.

Barnett and Levy (1991) assert that certain state leaders feel threatened domestically from other contending players that might pose a challenge to their rule. Moreover, these frightened leaders tend to seek an external alliance that can help boost their material resources and more importantly counter any form of opposition<sup>129</sup>. Alliances include all forms of informal and formal relationships that can be based on a collection of items or rather focused on a particular objective. However, the common factor in all alliances is that the true motives behind concluding such joint efforts lies in the expediencies and not on moral principles. More importantly, these forms of intergroup relations are always focused on an external threat. The nature of the threat is relative in any given situation and as a result there is not a definite universal conceptualization of what a threat constitutes. Accordingly, when groups have fears from rising threats, their ideological and identity preferences become second in the formulation of an alliance that safeguards their existence<sup>130</sup>.

More importantly, in line with Barnett and Levy, Steven David (1991) asserts that the initial reasons behind leaders seeking foreign aid in form of an alliance is directly linked to combating local enemies and not solely related to foreign threats<sup>131</sup>.

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<sup>128</sup> Michael N. Barnett and Jack S. Levy (1991), *Domestic Sources of Alliances and Alignments: the case of Egypt, 1962 – 73*, (pp. 369 – 395)

<sup>129</sup> *Ibid*, p. 370

<sup>130</sup> *Ibid*, p. 371

<sup>131</sup> Steven David (1991), *Choosing Sides: Alignment and Realignment in the Third World*.

Cooperative work between groups in the form of alliances is deemed successful when at least one of the parties is willing to sacrifice<sup>132</sup> support the other partner<sup>133</sup>.

Stephen Walt (1987) focuses on a neo-realist approach in asserting that alliances are formed on the fundamental importance of security concerns and motivations. More importantly, Walt contends that foreign aid is a direct result of alliance considerations, focused primarily on security grounds and objectives<sup>134</sup>. Furthermore, Barnett (1998) claims that groups seek alliances when they feel bound and constrained to a dominant understanding of their perceived self – identity in light of other domestic groups in society. The latter assertion is rooted in exploring the dynamics of similar identity and ideology characteristics that pave the way for concurrent alliances<sup>135</sup>. Barnett’s contention is deeply rooted in Walt’s (1985) categorization of the formation of alliances that are mainly developed on cultural, logical and rational similarities. This form of alliance is derived from Hans Morgenthau’s term which stipulates a sense of “ideological solidarity”<sup>136</sup>.

Furthermore, Walt claims that the formation of alliances includes economic and military assistance and more importantly political penetration in support for a group advocating a stronger position, in comparison to other rivalry groups<sup>137</sup>. More

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<sup>132</sup> This form of sacrifice includes paying a price for being part of this alliance. These signs of support can include personal and material losses to show authenticity and credibility in the union.

<sup>133</sup> F. Gregory Gause (1998), *Alliances in the Middle East*, (pp. 1 – 8)

<sup>134</sup> See Stephen Walt (1987), *The Origins of Alliances*.

<sup>135</sup> Michael Barnett (1998), *Dialogues in Arab Politics: Negotiations in Regional Order*, (pp. 1 – 8)

<sup>136</sup> Stephen Walt (1985), *Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power*, (pp. 3 – 43)

<sup>137</sup> *Ibid*, p. 4

importantly, alliances predicate that certain groups are keen on safeguarding the interests of the other harmonious partner<sup>138</sup>. Nevertheless, Walt points out that in the majority of alliances there is always a predisposition to consider security objectives over ideological preferences. As a result, when alliances are solely ideological in essence with no concrete pragmatic interests, they are unlikely to fail and cease to exist<sup>139</sup>. In alignment with the importance of ideological preference and perceived identity, certain alliances are formed on the grounds of national interest and aspirations.

Olson and Zeckhauser (1966, 1967) claim, based on the economic theory of alliances, that the success of an intergroup alliance is fundamentally based on the portrayal of parallel and beneficial advantages that overlap with a group's national interest<sup>140</sup>. In proximity with Walt's (1987) and Barnett's (1998) research, alliances are formed to depict a form of strength, power and prestige<sup>141</sup>. Leeds, Long, Mitchell (2000) claim that alliance agreements in essence should carry a reliable and credible attribution, where groups should be able to support and assist each other in any emerging conflict<sup>142</sup>. This form of credibility and reliability introduces factors that are mainly dependent on trust and authenticity. Furthermore, weaker groups are keen to challenge groups that have shaky and insecure alliances. This weakness and sense of

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<sup>138</sup> Ibid, p. 20

<sup>139</sup> Ibid, p. 24

<sup>140</sup> Wallace Thies (1987), *Alliances and Collective Goods: A Reappraisal*, (pp. 298 – 332)

<sup>141</sup> Brett Ashley Leeds, Andrew G. Long, and Sara McLaughlin Mitchell (2000), *Reevaluating Alliance Reliability: Specific Threats, Specific Promises*, (pp. 686 – 699)

<sup>142</sup> Ibid, p. 687



fragility between allies is an important advantage less privileged groups seek to penetrate and benefit from<sup>143</sup>.

The fundamental reason for alliance formation is creating a unified group of individuals that are persistent and adamant in confronting a common enemy, in Walt's (1987, 2009) diction: "a common external actor(s)". Furthermore, Walt asserts that the primary motivation for alliances is definitely correlated with security concerns and objectives. Accordingly, this security concern is deeply rooted in theoretical literature that is mainly derived from realist and neo-realist paradigms. Furthermore, Barnett and Levy (1991) claim that modern understanding of alliance formation is relatively interconnected with the balance of power and as a result there should be an attempt to deduce relevant factors that are determinants in any form of alliance. This form of cooperation can materialize on any concerned level<sup>144</sup> that involves group dynamics and more importantly intergroup relations.

Furthermore, David (1991) stipulates that alliances are mainly shaped in a domestic context when groups – leaders – fear opposition from other rivalry groups. The latter assumption explains why certain leaders may feel inclined to align with a foreign actor that will be able to provide necessary assistance in countering a particular threat. However, Thies (1987) argues that such assistance and support is based on the economic theory of alliances, where stronger groups will only support other weaker entities if it coincides with their national interest. This assertion points out that groups

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<sup>143</sup> Ibid, p. 686 - 688

<sup>144</sup> These levels include any form of cooperation that has a definite shared interest. Examples range business organizations to between members from the same family. A joined effort by individuals for a common goal constitutes the basic understanding of an alliance.

petitioning for support from a foreign actor will definitely receive their support if it serves the interest and objective of the stronger supporting player.

While Walt relentlessly focuses on the primacy of security concern in alliance formation, Barnett (1998) stresses that identity and ideology constitute major aspects of alliances. Furthermore, Barnett focuses on the similarities shared between allying groups and more importantly on the perceptions groups have when choosing their allies. Accordingly, Leeds, Long, Mitchell (2000) claim that for reasons of prestige, strength and superiority groups are willing to undertake alliances to boast their social status and dominance in any given society. More importantly, these facets<sup>145</sup> emerge from a sense of credibility, reliability and authenticity in an alliance created between different groups. Furthermore, Gause (1998) asserts that alliances that are durable should distinctively diffuse traits of credibility and integrity.

As a result, alliance formation can be categorized into four determinants. The first component involves the portrayal and projection of a common threat, or common enemy. In such a manner, groups ally and form a common front in countering any external threat. The second component stipulates that allies view themselves as having common characteristics and traits that emerge from their perceived self -identity and ideology. The third category explains that alliances are formed on the premises of national interests, focusing on personal gains and benefits in light of economic theory. The fourth category avers that groups that have powerful allies and find pride in their alliances, are determined to boast their strength and prestige as signals of strength.

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<sup>145</sup> When groups have the ability to boast their dominance and superiority, there is a certain degree of self – trust and assurance in the authenticity that alliance will not crumble as the first challenge arouses.

These signals of strength serve as a threat to opposing groups that might challenge their dominance.

In the previous section, the primary element in forming alliances is commitment for mutual support against some external or common enemy. The form of mutual support against a common enemy is rooted in security concerns and motivations that involve mutual assistance between two entities. More importantly, the formation of alliances between groups is based on cultural, logical and rational similarities, which postulates a sense of 'ideological solidarity'. Additionally, groups form alliances in their belief it will produce mutual benefit and gain in countering common perceived threats. Furthermore, groups form alliances in their firm conviction that it will boost their prestige and 'show of power'.

### **C. Concluding Remarks**

Chapter IV primarily dealt with the theoretical framework that is essential for designing the research instrument. The research variables in any empirical study need to find ground and spirit in relevant theory. In this section, the aspects of group dynamics were discussed. More importantly, they primarily included group identity and intergroup relations. The variables correlated with group identity involve social identity theory, group cohesion and group solidarity. In addition, the variables associated within the framework of interrelations were collaborationism and alliance formation.

Chapter V primarily deals with the research design and methodology for the study. The research design is based on the relevant theory enumerated in chapter IV. The design of the research instrument with the relevant hypotheses and assumptions will be meticulously discussed. More importantly, this chapter involves evaluating and

assessing the dynamics of group identity and intergroup relations. The correlation between these components will be addressed in light of constructing research hypotheses. These relevant hypotheses will be later accepted or rejected in light of the pertinent findings and results.

## CHAPTER 5

### RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

Chapter IV primarily dealt with the theoretical framework for the study at hand. The relevant theories for constructing the research instrument were thoroughly explored and discussed. In addition, the dimensions of group dynamics were thoroughly explained. The various components of the two major dimensions – group identity and intergroup relations - in the study at hand were investigated and explored.

Chapter V deals with the main methodological aspects of the study at hand. The importance of quantitative research will be depicted in light of retrieving bias free and accurate data. In addition, the operationalization of the research questions will be thoroughly enticed for defining the research variables into measurable factors. This latter process is essential for the hypotheses to be measured and assessed quantitatively. This section will explain the contours of the questionnaire, the manner of data collection and the quality of the findings.

#### **A. Introduction**

Quantitative methods express the assumptions of a positivist paradigm which holds that behavior can be explained through objective facts. Design and instrumentation persuade by showing how bias and error are eliminated -  
William Firestone<sup>1</sup>

The dynamics of quantitative research involve a number of advantages and benefits. The main objective of quantitative research is to produce accurate results objectively and impartially. Furthermore, quantitative research is a mode of inquiry that

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<sup>1</sup> William Firestone (1987), *Meaning in Method*, p. 16

is primarily based on “the assumption that social reality has an objective ontological structure and that individuals are responding agents to this objective environment”<sup>2</sup>. The nature of quantitative research follows the methods carried out in “true science”, where the usage of traditional mathematical and statistical means are used to measure results conclusively<sup>3</sup>. The range of benefits and advantages are numerous; these include: reaching and formulating a comprehensive answer that can be legitimately discussed and published<sup>4</sup>. These comprehensive answers emerge from a form of measurement that is “reliable, valid, and generalizable in its clear prediction of cause and effect”<sup>5</sup>. All forms of quantitative research are concerned with finding supportive evidence to either authenticate or contradict an idea or hypothesis.

These methods of inquiry can use numerous instruments such as questionnaires, interviews, observations, transaction logs, and documentary research<sup>6</sup>. In addition, the accurate and unbiased form of research conclusions come as a result of a constructed manner that allows others to repeat the experiment and presumably obtain similar results<sup>7</sup>. The nature of subjective bias and prejudice can be shunned and practically limited, when researchers keep a relative distance from the participants in the study<sup>8</sup>.

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<sup>2</sup> Alexel Matveev (2002), *Theory of Communication and Applied Communication*, p. 59

<sup>3</sup> Martyn Shuttleworth, (2008), *Quantitative Research Design*, (pp. 1 – 2)

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid*, p. 1

<sup>5</sup> Matveev, p. 59 - 60

<sup>6</sup> Alan Bryman (2006), *Integrating Quantitative and Qualitative Research: How is it Done?*, p. 102

<sup>7</sup> Shuttleworth, p. 1

<sup>8</sup> *Quantitative Data: Advantages and Disadvantages* (2008), Center for Research in Library and Information Management, [<http://www.learnhigher.ac.uk/analysethis/main/quantitative1.html>], p. 1

More importantly, quantitative researchers should have “scientific hypotheses” that should be “value free”. The researcher’s “own values, biases, and subjective preferences have no place in the quantitative approach”<sup>9</sup>.

The advantages that emerge with conducting quantitative methods are abundant. Furthermore, for the purpose of this study this mode of inquiry is essential in testing the relevant hypotheses that will be detailed later on. The main cognitive tools for this study will be deductive and particularistic reasoning<sup>10</sup>. These forms of cognitive reasoning are utilized for the purpose of enhancing the generalizations of the findings<sup>11</sup>. More importantly, such forms of reasoning can only find spirit in a set of hypotheses that have to be verified empirically, on a specific set of data. These hypotheses will be primarily focused on measuring the perceptions and attitudes of smaller groups for the study at hand. The data samples are limited to fewer groups out of a larger population, for the purpose of acquiring better and accurate findings.

The focus on perceptions and attitudes is crucial in studying an array of groups. Within the framework of quantitative research, the modes of inquiry are focused to test certain hypotheses that are relevant to exposing a certain social phenomenon. However, another important correlated tool with testing these hypotheses is extended beyond the social factors and objective factors alone.

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<sup>9</sup> Matveev, p. 60

<sup>10</sup> This form of deduction and reasoning involves understanding the relationship between modern day perceptions and historical actualities. Additionally, the data will be investigated in light of a certain set of historical patterns.

<sup>11</sup> Quantitative Data: Advantages and Disadvantages (2008), p. 1

Theodor Hanf (1993) contends that an essential element in empirical studies consists of “subjective factors, perception”<sup>12</sup>. It is crucial to identify the social factors that invite a certain attitude or affect a certain perception, yet the primary focus should undertake understanding the subjective ideals of these individuals. In any given society, individuals that feel they share common characteristics and traits are inclined to form a group. As a result, based on the assumption that a collection of individuals with similar traits form a group; the main actor in any group remains the individual. For that purpose it is crucial to isolate their individual and personal form of reasoning. This form of reasoning is used to measure intragroup and intergroup perceptions. Individuals that belong to the same group might have dissimilar intragroup perceptions, yet similar intergroup perceptions. Individuals within the same group have diversified opinions and attitudes, yet on the level of intergroup perceptions their attitudes are weighed according to the levels of group cohesiveness and solidarity.

For that specific purpose, the ability to study intergroup relations and identity formation is deeply connected to measuring the perceptions of the individuals that form these units.

## **B. Methodological Operationalization of the Research Question**

The process of operationalization is vital for defining variables with measurable factors. This is needed for the hypotheses to be measured quantitatively and empirically. As a result, this clarification process transforms the main research question into objects of study.

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<sup>12</sup> Hanf, p. 41 - 42



Therefore, the main research question is constructed into understanding the correlation between group perceived self – identity and the nature of intergroup relations and perceptions (See Figure 5.1).




Fig. 5.1- The Correlation between Self – Identity and Intergroup Perception

More importantly, the dimensions of group identity will be depicted to understand the effects they have on intergroup relations. This study will aim to answer three general questions: how does a group’s self - perceived identity affect the nature of intergroup relations? What are the factors that lead to the formation of group identity? What are the reasons and main concerns for groups to form alliances?

The dynamics of group identity involve several correlated factors that will be addressed separately in detail with the analysis of the findings. More importantly, intergroup relations entail several interconnected themes that will be singularly depicted and collectively formulated for the analysis of the findings. (See Figure 5.2)<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>13</sup> This figure was constructed in light of the pertinent review of theory in Chapter V.




Fig. 5.2- The Dynamics of Group Identity

### ***1. Operationalization of the Dimensions***

In earlier discussion on the importance of quantitative research, there was a focus on access to smaller groups that can produce better and accurate findings. In line with such an important factor and for the intention to retrieve bias-free and useful results, the opinions and perceptions of individuals will be limited to two groups.

In light of the pertinent literature, the dimensions of identity formation (See Figure 5.3) heavily depend on the factors that shape group distinctiveness and particularity. The basic components for identity formation emerge from individuals that share common traits – common fears and mutual interests - and attributes. Their mutual interests and characteristics help form the group. The identity becomes the result of the collection of these goals and perceptions. More importantly, the emergence of certain phenomena and events socially shapes the collective identity of the group. In addition, the levels of group cohesion (See Figure 5.4) and solidarity (See Figure 5.5) will be analyzed and compared in relevance to understanding group attachment, group commitment, loyalty, pride and membership satisfaction.




Fig. 5.3- The Dimensions of Identity Formation




Fig 5.4- The Dimensions of Group Cohesion




Fig. 5.5- The Dimensions of Group Solidarity

Furthermore, the dimensions of intergroup relations (See Figure 5.6) include the respondents' opinions on their understanding of collaborationism and group alliances. The theory of collaborationism (See Figure 5.7) stipulates that groups may voluntarily or involuntarily support the “enemy” in light of their personal interests and objectives. In addition, the dimensions of alliance formation (See Figure 5.8) stipulate that certain groups have similar tendencies and goals, and as a result form an alliance to safeguard mutual interest and existence.




Fig. 5.6- The Dynamics of Intergroup Relations




Fig. 5.7- Theory of Collaborationism




Fig. 5.8- Alliance Formation

### C. Research Assumptions and Hypotheses

For the purpose of this quantitative study, the hypotheses will be constructed in form of numerical bullets with respective figures that depict the main observations that will be tested and analyzed from the relative findings.

## ***1. Main Assumptions***

- a) Lebanese Maronites and Druze favor having relations with the state of Israel.
- b) The low level of Maronite group cohesion produces a fragmented disunited political vision – generally speaking - , while the high level of Druze group cohesion produces a unified political vision.
- c) The high level of Druze group solidarity gives lower priority over Lebanese national interests, while the low level of Maronite group solidarity gives higher priority to Lebanese national interests.
- d) Lebanese Maronites and Druze favor a Peace Treaty with Israel based on economic benefits.
- e) Lebanese Maronites and Druze are willing to form alliances with the state of Israel based on a common perceived threat.
- f) Lebanese Maronites and Druze justify collaboration with the state of Israel regardless of it being voluntarily and forcefully.

## ***2. Assumptions and Hypotheses***

### **a. Identity and Intergroup Relations**

A1 → Maronites and Druze favor having relations with the state of Israel.

H1 → There is a correlation between group perception of self – identity and favoring relations with the state of Israel.

(Identity → Positive intergroup relations) – (See Figure 5.9)



Fig. 5.9- Identity and Positive Intergroup Perceptions

b. Group Cohesion and Political Vision

A1 → The low level of Maronite group cohesion produces a fragmented political disunited vision. (See Figure 5.10)

A2 → The high level of Druze group cohesion produces a united political vision. (See Figure 5.11)

H2 → There is a relationship between group cohesion and political vision.  
 (Higher level of group cohesion → Stronger united political vision)




Fig. 5.10- Maronite Group Cohesion and Political Vision




Fig. 5.11- Druze Group Cohesion and Political Vision

c. Group Solidarity and National Interests

A1 → The low level of Maronite group solidarity gives higher priority to Lebanese national interests. (See Figure 5.12)

A2 → The high level of Druze group solidarity gives lower priority to Lebanese national interests. (See Figure 5.13)

H3 → The intensity of group solidarity is likely to weaken commitment to national issues.

(Higher level of group solidarity → Lower commitment to state - national interests)






Fig. 5.12- Maronite Group Solidarity and National Interests




Fig. 5.13- Druze Group Solidarity and National Interests

#### d. Prospects of Peace and Benefit

A1 → The Maronites favor a Peace Treaty with Israel based on their cold attitude towards the Palestinian cause.

A2 → The Druze favor a Peace Treaty with Israel based on their 'lukewarm' attitude toward the Palestinian cause.

A3 → The Maronites and Druze favor a Peace Treaty with Israel in the belief it will help solve the Arab – Israeli conflict.

A4 → The Maronites and Druze believe that Hezbollah, Syria and Iran impede a possible Peace Treaty with Israel.

H4 → The respondents are expected to assume that peace between Lebanon and Israel will reflect positively on the region.

(Prospects of peace → Higher benefits for the region) – (See Figure 5.14)




Fig. 5.14- Prospects of Peace and Regional Benefit

#### i. Prospects of Peace and Lebanese Economy

A1 → The Maronites and Druze favor a Peace Treaty with Israel based on economic benefit and gain

A2 → The Maronites and Druze value a Peace Treaty with Israel based on economic benefits that override their value to the Palestinian cause.

H5 → The respondents are expected to assume that peace between Lebanon and Israel will reflect positively on the Lebanese economy.

(Prospects of peace → Higher benefits for Lebanese economy) – (See Figure 5.15)




Fig. 5.15- Prospects of Peace and Lebanese Economy

#### e. Perceived Threats and Alliance Formation

A1 → The Maronites and Druze are willing to ally with Israel facing threat from other groups.

H6→ The perception of existential threats is likely to promote a minority group's affiliation with the state of Israel.

(Identity → Perceived Threats → Alliance Formation) – (See Figure 5.16)




Figure 5.16- The Relationship between Identity, Perceived Threats and Alliances

f. Collaboration and Alliance Formation

A1 → The Maronites and Druze justify their collaborative acts based on similar forms of acts carried out by different Lebanese groups.

A2 → The Maronites and Druze justify collaboration that emerges forcefully.

A3 → The Maronites and Druze justify collaboration that emerges voluntarily.

H7 → Members of minority groups can justify collaboration with the state of Israel on the grounds of existential threats.

(Identity → Collaboration → Perceived threats → Alliance formation) – (See Figure 5.17)




Fig. 5.17- The Correlation between Collaboration, Perceived Threats and Alliance Formation

## **D. Research Instrument**

### ***1. The Questionnaire***

The questionnaire included a total of 66 items. The two central components for the study were group identity and intergroup relations. Within the framework of group identity, the dimensions of group cohesion and solidarity will be analyzed. Furthermore, with the structure of intergroup relations, the dimensions of collaboration and alliance formation will be discussed.

#### **a. Independent Background Variables**

In addition, this research instrument appertained to basic background variables including: residence background, place and year of birth, political affiliation,

socioeconomic status (See Figure 5.18), place of study, and personal and family background.

The variables pertaining to the socioeconomic status include the father's education, occupation and monthly income. More importantly, family monthly income and place of study contributed to a better additional understanding of socioeconomic status.



Figure 5.18- The Socioeconomic Scale

## ***2. Sources of the Data***

The data come from a comprehensive survey that covered the main universities in Lebanon. A total of nine universities in different Lebanese regions were covered to retrieve appropriate, accurate, equal and general data. These universities include private and public institutions. In addition, the universities that were covered have secular and religious affiliations. The main secular institutions for the study were: the American University of Beirut and the Lebanese University (four different branches).

Furthermore, the main religious institutions were Notre Dame University (two different campuses), Saint Joseph University and Sagesse University.

### ***3. Data Sample***

In line with Khashan's<sup>1</sup> argument, the main focus is on college students, for the specific purpose that college students are much accessible and as a result depict a better understanding of the functioning of the political system. The findings that emerge from surveying college students can deeply invite insights and practical solutions for solving recurrent political and social problems.

The sample was composed of 556 respondents (287 males and 269 females). The ratio of Maronite to Druze respondents was approximately 2.1. The Maronite respondents enticed 180 male individuals' and 194 female individuals', while the Druze respondents involved 107 male individuals' and 75 female individuals'. The response rate was calculated on the number of complete interviews with those attempted, was around 94.3 percent. All the questionnaires that were not wholly completed were deleted and discarded. The mean age of the respondents is 21.26

### ***4. Data Collection***

To ensure the data was collected in accurate and bias free manner, the team that administered the survey included this author and five graduate students. All these graduate students were given survey guidelines on how to administer the survey and where to target the required respondents. More importantly, all these graduate students voluntarily assisted in the data collection for nothing in exchange. Ideally speaking, this author was not supposed to be part of the survey administration team; however, the

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<sup>1</sup> Hilal Khashan (1992), Inside The Lebanese Confessional Mind

sample is composed of a large population that needs to be covered in a precise time frame and as a result requires increased efforts for the objectives to be met. These graduate students are the author's close college friends which ensure that the collected data is accurate and valid. In addition, to ensure minimal prejudice and subjectivity, the majority of these graduate students were chosen because they do not belong to any political party. Furthermore, the majority of these graduate students do not belong to any of the communal groups that are pertinent in this study. The data collection team that consisted of close graduate students is to ensure and safeguard an ethical administration of the survey.

The data was collected throughout a period of three months from the universities mentioned. The rational and logical reasoning for choosing the aforementioned universities is deemed to meet the sensibility of respondents within their own environments. As a result, there was an attempt to target the specific campuses that house students from the mentioned sample groups. More importantly, students were surveyed independently to allow for better responses and opinions. However, in some cases students clustered in the cafeterias and student lounges – these were the primary locations for data collection – and as a result some were inclined to discuss several questions. As a result, their discussion on several items within the questionnaire provided the author with useful feedback that is important for the analysis and manipulation of the data. The comments and remarks made by the respondents ensured that the questionnaire was interesting and consistent.

In line with accurate data collection, the process of inputting the data into the required statistical program was conducted by a close relative. The reason for choosing a close relative is to ensure the data is inputted coherently and accurately



## *5. Data Quality*

The rationale behind choosing close graduate students was to ensure accurate and reliable methods in collecting data. The original questionnaire was designed following the guidelines of a previous<sup>2</sup> empirical study on a relatively similar topic. This author received adequate feedback on the original questionnaire from the concerned advisor in this study. Furthermore, it received additional comments and feedback from other members on the research committee.

The research dimensions for this study all find theoretical support in the pertinent literature. More importantly, the instrument was shown to several graduate students from different professional backgrounds, working in other fields of research. In addition, this instrument was shown to several students that are active members in Lebanese political parties. The politically active students that were targeted are in parties that have members from the similar confessional groups concerned in this study. Their insight was important and crucial for the purpose of ensuring that none of the questions had any negative effect or constituted an unethical behavior.

In addition, a set of procedures were needed to ensure the reliability of the data and the validity of the instrument. A pretest was administered among 40 students to ensure the lucidity of the questionnaire. The survey administrators following this author's guidelines asking the respondents to give their lengthy feedbacks and opinions concerning the questions. As a result, the valued comments and opinions were necessarily introduced and some alterations were made. The array of comments and opinions were entered into the final format of the questionnaire.

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<sup>2</sup> Jeffrey Karam (2010), *Revisiting The Political Values of Maronite College Students*, unpublished.

Following the requirements for ensuring the data had a high level of reliability, four tests were applied. These forms of tests included: internal consistency, congruence with reality, response stability and analysis of variance<sup>3</sup>. The questionnaires that were deleted failed to meet the required reliability guidelines. These deleted questionnaires usually included uneven and unstable responses – these responses did not have internal consistency.

## **E. Main Variables in the Questionnaire<sup>4</sup>**

### ***1. Dependent Variables***

#### **a. Identity**

- \* How do you perceive the direction of your nationalistic feelings?
- \* When you think of the history of your community, from what aspect do you look at it?
- \* When you think of the history of Lebanon, from what aspect do you look at it?
- \* Preserving my sect's identity is more important than my loyalty to my country.
- \* How proud are you to be Lebanese?

#### **b. Group Cohesion**

- \* How attached do you believe you are to your sect?
- \* I feel close to people from my community whether they are rich or poor.
- \* If my family was in conflict with the dominant movement in my sect, I will stand up for my family.
- \* Support your brother whether he is right or wrong
- \* It is preferable not to have a political conflict between members of the same sect

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<sup>3</sup> Khashan (1992), p. 40

<sup>4</sup> See Appendix (A) in the current study.

### c. Group Solidarity

- \* If a conflict arises between your sect and another sect, which one would you support?
- \* In the process of solving any Lebanese crisis, the interests and needs of your community should be given top priority.
- \* A person should always be cautious. One cannot trust the neighbors or colleagues from another sect or domination.
- \* I respect other sects in other religions; however, I believe that my sect is the only right one.
- \* I am particularly proud of being a member of my sect.
- \* My community's interests supersede any nationalistic interest and concern.

### d. Perceptions towards the Jews and state of Israel

- \* It is justified to collaborate with the enemy, if other communities were doing it.
- \* "The enemy of my enemy, is my friend".
- \* Minorities in the Middle East that have similar existential fears should have alliances.
- \* The Jews in the Middle East are a persecuted minority.
- \* The Jews in Lebanon have a different orientation and inclination in comparison to the Jews in Israel.
- \* The Arab minority groups in Israel are forced to collaborate with Israeli officials; as a result they are not traitors.
- \* "Not all Jews have Zionist aspirations and tendencies"

- \* My community relatively shares common characteristics and traits with the Jews
- \* If members from my own community or a different community in Lebanon collaborate with Israel, they are traitors.
- \* The survival of my community is extremely important, for that purpose the end justifies the means.

e. Perceptions towards the Peace Process

- \* Do you accept the Jewish state in Palestine as a lasting entity?
- \* Do you encourage and boost peace negotiations with Israel?
- \* If you support a peace treaty with Israel, will it ever be attained?
- \* Lebanon can benefit from establishing diplomatic relations with Israel.
- \* If Lebanon signs a peace treaty with Israel, the Arab – Israeli peace process will have feasible chance of success.
- \* The benefits that emerge from concluding peace talks with Israel are much greater than the losses taken during the course of the Arab – Israeli conflict.
- \* The economic and military benefits that materialize in a peace treaty with Israel are sufficient to justify a detachment from the Palestinian cause.

***2. Independent Variables (See Figure 5.19)***

- \* Sex of respondent.
- \* Place and Year of Birth
- \* Current Place of Residence
- \* Preferred Political Leader / Political Party
- \* Father's Occupation
- \* Father's Education

- \* Your family is composed of how many members
- \* How many members of your family work
- \* Family Monthly Income
- \* Major/University




Fig. 5.19- Independent and Background Variables

## **F. Concluding Remarks**

Chapter V explained the importance of quantitative research methods and the wealth of advantages that follow in conducting such research tools. Furthermore, the main research questions were enumerated in detail. Several justifications were enticed in choosing particular communal groups for the purpose of this study. The main research hypotheses and assumptions for the study at hand were listed in bullet form with respective figures.

In addition, the construction of the questionnaire was explained in detail. The different dimensions of data collection were portrayed. These included the sources of the data, the proposed sample and methods of collection and input. Furthermore, several tests were employed to ensure data reliability and instrument validity.

Moreover, a concise overview of the existing empirical studies on the groups similar to this study was mentioned. In line with the expected contribution each research study should provide, this study gave reference to three pivotal contributions.

Chapter VI will primarily deal with discussing and exploring the findings that were collected from survey research. The findings will be discussed in light of providing necessary material for coherent and meticulous analysis in Chapter VII. More importantly, the findings will be explored in light of the two main research components of the study at hand. The results will be discussed under two main sections. The first section involves the findings related to group identity and the second section involves the findings related to intergroup relations and perceptions.

## CHAPTER 6

### RESEARCH FINDINGS AND RESULTS

Chapter V dealt with the various components of the research design and methodology for the study. The various elements of quantitative analysis were thoroughly discussed. More importantly, the relevant hypotheses and assumptions were constructed in light of the historical framework explored in Chapter II and III, and the theoretical framework reviewed in Chapter IV. In addition, the former chapter investigated the different components of the questionnaire. It discussed the method of collecting the data, the sample of respondents and more importantly the different means utilized to ensure the validity and reliability of the data.

Chapter VI deals with discussing the data that was collected from survey research. The findings will be enumerated in light of providing the necessary components for the analysis in Chapter VII. In addition, this chapter will be divided according to the components of the main argument. The first section will primarily deal with discussing the findings related to group identity, while the second section deals with exploring the findings related to intergroup relations and perceptions. Furthermore, the findings in this chapter will be discussed according to their correlation and interrelatedness.

#### **A. Introduction**

The process of analyzing and discussing the findings preemptively requires a necessary word of caution. The results that emerge from the survey research express the perceptions and attitudes of individuals within a certain community. In addition, these

individuals form a group that serves as a segment of their religious community. In no manner can these findings – or any findings in any survey research - account for the opinions and perceptions of the entire community. It is scholarly and scientifically inaccurate and fallible to claim that the findings can encompass the whole group; however, it is noteworthy to mention that a substantial and well conducted survey can reveal certain patterns that are essential to understanding significant attitudes and opinions within and between contending groups. In deeply divided societies, similar to the Lebanese model, it is understandable that conducting field research using primarily scientific methods<sup>1</sup> can investigate and explore alternatives to recognized actualities and beliefs. The nature of prejudice and fear between different minorities in diverse societies allows for limited and constructive discourse towards authentic reconciliation and compromise. An additional approach initiated towards the individual within their respective unit can produce an alternative view to the recognized actualities and truths produced by the dominant current in any community<sup>2</sup>.

## **B. Background Variables and Findings**

The independent variables in survey research are crucial and vital because they deal with the constants and unchangeable factors needed for cross tabulation and analysis with other dependent and changeable variables. Accordingly, the independent variables for this study at hand include: the sex of the respondent, the socioeconomic status (SES) - that combines several factors -, political preference, place of birth, and current place of residence. However, some independent variables have more weight

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<sup>1</sup> These methods primarily include empirical and observational techniques.

<sup>2</sup> In cases similar to Lebanon, the majority of people engage in discourse according to preexisting realities and ‘truths’ produced by their community leaders. As a result, in most cases the opinion of an individual within any group becomes marginalized and trivial in light of a strong professed opinion and stance.



than others when cross tabulating with dependent variables. The sex of a respondent might not affect their political orientation, but their place of residence, political preference and socioeconomic background plays a pivotal role in shaping their political orientation and attitude.

### *1. Sex of the Respondent*

**Table 6.1 - Sex of the Respondent**

Community			Frequency	Valid Percent
Maronite	Valid	Female	194	52.0
		Male	180	48.0
		Total	374	100.0
Druze	Valid	Female	75	41.0
		Male	107	59.0
		Total	182	100.0

A total of 556 respondents were interviewed for the purpose of this study. A total of 48% of the respondents were female and the total rest – 51% - were male. The mean age of the respondents is 21.26.

#### a. Maronite Respondents

Generally speaking, on the level of the Maronite community, the ratio of female respondents to male respondents answering the questionnaire was higher. Nonetheless, the percentage difference between male and female Maronite respondents is trivial – 4%. In a previous study<sup>3</sup> carried out on the political values of Maronite college students, the female respondents felt that the questionnaire was too long and contained many questions that required in depth analysis and understanding of certain political

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<sup>3</sup> Karam, unpublished.

actualities. However, in this concerned study among the various instructions given to the interviewees, one of the most important elements was focused on showing “value and importance” to the opinions of female respondents. In addition, on numerous occasions, this author triggered female respondents by telling them that their ‘other’ female class mates enjoyed filling out the survey and more importantly that their opinion was highly valued in comparison to their male classmates and friends. It should be mentioned that on some university campuses, several female respondents actively helped out in the data collection expressing to their friends ‘the importance of enumerating their opinion in political matters’. The main catalyst was the importance of women participation in politics, especially in what some respondents called a ‘male dominated society’.

#### b. Druze Respondents

On the Druze level, it was the total opposite. There was a substantial percentage difference between male and female Druze respondents – around 20% - in actively answering the questionnaire. Around 60% of the Druze respondents that filled the questionnaire were male. However, the Druze female respondents that were not studying Druze religious studies were active in filling out the questionnaires and adding comments on the blank pages of the questionnaire sheet. The Druze female respondents that were studying Druze religious doctrine, indicated by their significant custom and attire, unanimously refused to participate in any survey of any kind. As many of their friends and classmates frequently mentioned that “our initiated friends find it hard to mingle with us {other Druze coreligionists}”. Nevertheless, this latter case did it not apply to the ‘initiated’ Druze male respondents. On the contrary, the majority of the

comments and remarks that followed with this author after the questionnaires were filled were given candidly and extensively by these ‘initiated’ Druze students.

## ***2. Place of Birth and Residence***

The majority of the respondents currently reside in their original place of birth. Nevertheless, there is a substantial portion that has migrated from their original birth location to the capital in search for higher education and career opportunities. In addition, a trivial percentage of the respondents, around 4%, happen to be born in foreign countries, notably in the United States, Canada, Saudi Arabia and the Emirates.

### **a. Maronite Respondents**

The majority of the Maronite respondents are spread around Beirut and the neighboring suburbs. However, from the various universities that were surveyed a good portion of the respondents have migrated from villages in Northern and Southern Lebanon to Beirut. These respondents have family in the suburbs, yet they frequently expressed that they felt ‘closer to their village’ and mandatorily commuted every weekend to their village to be ‘with their own kind’. The respondents are mainly dispersed between the Baabda, Metn, and Kesserwan – their coastal and mountainous regions – districts.

The relevant findings in investigating Maronite place of birth and current place of residence finds spirit in historical and legendary Maronite geographic localities. The partially homogenous cities within the Kesserwan district, Northern district and Southern district give claim and credence to existing historical references.

## b. Druze Respondents

On the level of the Druze respondents, the overwhelming majority – around 80% - trace their original place of birth and current residence to the Shouf Mountains. The availability of Druze college students around different university campuses is quite limited and restrained to a few notable universities. As a result, after extensive inquiries into the whereabouts of Druze college students in the Lebanese educational system, it became obvious that Druze families unanimously send their children to the same schools. The lack of educational institutes in the Shouf districts forces the Druze students to leave their village and join distant universities. Therefore, their temporary residence becomes the dorms provided by the different universities. A substantial portion of the respondents live around the Beirut district, yet on frequent occasions these respondents included additional remarks on several questionnaires that their parents owned a summer property in the Shouf Mountains.

In contrast to the Maronites, the Druze respondents are not dispersed around different districts that extend and create a bridge between Northern and Southern Lebanon. On the contrary, the majority of these respondents are scattered between Beirut, the Shouf Mountains, and the Rashaya/ Hasbaya districts. Nonetheless, it might seem fallible to claim that the Druze are solely located in these geographic locations, yet in light of the aftermath of the Lebanese Civil War and the different parliamentary and municipality elections, this fact seems credible. The political weight of the Druze community is dispersed over these geographic districts primarily.

### ***3. Political Preference and Orientation***

The respondents were divided on answering the question related to their political preference and orientation. The remarkable difference between the Maronite and Druze respondents was their willingness to express and proclaim their political attitudes. The Druze felt at ease in expressing their political preference, while the Maronites had several reservations on answering such 'personal' information.

#### **a. Maronite Respondents**

The majority of the Maronite respondents expressed their political values and preferences on various occasions as they filled the questionnaire. However, the same majority had reservations on explicitly mentioning their affiliation with any Lebanese political party or leader. The remarkable trait in surveying these respondents was that the overwhelming majority clustered in homogeneous hubs and circles. This meant that the team administering the survey was conscious of the fact that targeting this group meant retrieving one sided results. For that specific purpose, such a limitation turned into an effective method for retrieving wider ranged, generalized and random samples from all around the different campuses.

Maronite respondents were not relaxed in expressing their political orientation, in fear of 'who' might be reading and benefiting from such information. At numerous times, this author and fellow survey administrators had to calm their concerns and fears by providing necessary identification credentials and more importantly by explaining the 'true' perspectives of the study at hand. The nature of fears is understood in light of the Maronite political situation in Lebanon following the end of the Lebanese Civil War. With the forced exile of Michel Aoun and imprisonment of Samir Geagea, the

Maronite population felt disoriented and threatened from the Syrian regime in Lebanon and more importantly from other communal groups. On different occasions, several Maronite students were imprisoned and brutally interrogated by Lebanese authorities because they had political affinity towards a certain Maronite leader. It is invalid to claim that the surveyed respondents had ever faced such circumstances, given their age, yet it seems they are still threatened by what they coined as ‘military intelligence apparatus’ that was still ‘haunting them’.

Regardless of the numerous facts<sup>4</sup> that indicated the respondents’ political preference, it is inaccurate to base these findings accordingly. The relative findings that indicated Maronite political preference were retrieved and analyzed from what was written by the respondents solely. Moreover, any additional comment or remark or political symbol inscribed on the questionnaire had to be taken into consideration. As a result, the distribution of the Maronite respondents’ political orientation was primarily divided between the four largest and main Maronite political parties. These included: the Free Patriotic Movement – around 22% -, the Lebanese Forces – around 33% -, the Lebanese Kataeb – around 12% - and the Marada Party – around 8 %. The rest of the respondents expressed their belief in the Lebanese Army and certain individuals, most notably Lebanese Minister of Interior Ziad Baroud.

#### b. Druze Respondents

On the Druze level, the situation was completely dissimilar. The majority of the respondents proudly expressed their political preference with no reservation whatsoever. To an extent that the majority of the Maronite respondents asked whether they would

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<sup>4</sup> These mainly included, key chains, necklaces, stickers on copybooks, cell phone ringtones, labeling by other students and pictures of religious and party leaders.

have to mention their name – because if they had to, they would not want to participate in the survey -, the Druze on numerous occasions included their full name and phone number for future reference. In addition, it was quite hard for any Druze respondent to hand in the survey if it was not wholly completed. On several occasions, they mentioned that they have never been approached because the majority of the people believe that the Druze do not have ‘different’ opinions. They frequently claimed that they had similar political values, yet they still felt that they had the ‘need’ to express their opinions ‘freely’ and candidly.

The actual limitation with the Druze respondents was in the manner they viewed the survey and what was expected from their behalf. When the team administering the survey approached the students, the guidelines were clear: they had to ask for Maronite and Druze students solely. On several occasions, the Druze would claim that their political vision and preference does not allow them to be religious. As a result, their political orientation does not represent the vision of the Druze community, rather than of a socialist and leftist party. A recurring theme in all universities surveyed was the Druze would ask what their coreligionists in other universities were indicating. When asked why is there such a concern in knowing what their coreligionists were answering, their unified and unprepared answer unanimously was: ‘it is quite hard to find divergent views in anything that has to do with our community’. The majority of the respondents argued that the overwhelming majority of the Progressive Socialist Party members were Druze, yet it does not mean that the party did not have Christian, Sunnite or Shiite members.

The majority of the respondents indicated they are active members in the Progressive Socialist Party – 80% - and their undying allegiance is to Kamal and Walid

Junblatt. The respondents gave credence to other Druze clans and parties, yet they had firm belief – focusing on the most recent conflict in modern Lebanese history, the May 7 2008 clashes between the government and Hezbollah – that the entire Druze community acknowledges and understands that their well being is safeguarded solely and primarily by Walid Junblatt. Their recurrent theme and argument was that there is not a single Lebanese leader that has sacrificed for the well being and continuity of their community like Walid ‘Bey’ Junblatt.

#### ***4. Socioeconomic Status (SES)***

The ability to investigate the socioeconomic status of the respondents required complex statistical functions and operations. The main components of the socioeconomic scale include: father’s education, occupation and income. The main objective in analyzing and constructing the socioeconomic scale needs to take into account the correlated factors in the process. These components need to be addressed separately and individually. Moreover, another variable was added to the SES scale for retrieving accurate and precise findings. This variable included two main components. The first component asked the respondents to indicate ‘the number of family members that work’ and the second component asked the respondents to specify an approximate value of their ‘family monthly income’. The combination of the SES scale and this latter function contributed to the creation of a table that is divided into three main categories: low, medium and high<sup>5</sup>. Furthermore, it is noteworthy to mention that several

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<sup>5</sup> The main three categories were sectioned into 5 divisions. The range of the first division was for the respondents that belonged to the low (poor class) the range was less than \$1000, the second division was for respondents that belonged to the ‘lower middle class’ - \$1000 - \$3000, the third division was for respondents that belonged to the ‘middle class’ - \$3000 - \$5000, the fourth division was for respondents that belonged to the ‘upper middle class’ - \$5000 – \$7000 and the fifth division was for respondents that belonged to the ‘upper (rich) class’ – above \$7000. The divisions were constructed according to the findings from this study.



respondents asked this author and other members administering the survey if they could include the ‘monthly financial assistance’ they receive from close family working in foreign countries. On numerous occasions, they took it for granted that such assistance constituted a part of their family monthly income<sup>6</sup>. This latter fact had to be considered when designing the table that explores the socioeconomic background of these respondents. (See Table 6.2)

**Table 6.2 - Socioeconomic Scale (SES)**

Community		Valid Percent
Maronite	Low	28.0
	Medium	59.0
	High	13.0
Druze	Low	29.0
	Medium	63.0
	High	8.0

a. Maronite Respondents

The findings depict that the majority of the respondents indicated that their fathers have acquired a university degree. In some cases, some respondents felt awkward in mentioning their father’s education, claiming it might seem inappropriate to mention that their parents have only obtained a high school degree. In addition, the findings entice that a substantial portion of the respondents claimed their parents have had previous careers in foreign countries, and as a result were able to start up their

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<sup>6</sup> The family monthly income and the intervals mentioned in the previous footnote were constructed according to the findings from this study. The intervals were based on the mean average of ‘working family members’ in addition to the ‘number of family members’ in light of the average monthly income of an individual working in Lebanon (approximately \$ 400 - \$700 per month).

personal and self- owned businesses. In many cases, the respondents approached the team administering the survey, telling them they ‘actually did not know what their fathers do for a living’. An important factor used in evaluating the level of their socioeconomic status depended on the place of study and choice of major. In many cases, the Maronite respondents that majored in any of the engineering disciplines had fathers who owned their engineering firms. The same case applied to students majoring in Biology preparing to continue in medical school; their fathers are medical practitioners in the field. The majority of the Maronite respondents reported that 75% of their family members worked in part time and full time jobs. In addition, many respondents inscribed remarks on the questionnaire sheet that in some cases they even had ‘two part time jobs’ to make ends meet. In other cases, the level of income was solely dependent on the father’s income. The remarkable aspect of evaluating the socioeconomic status of the Maronite college students lies in its divergent nature. The findings indicate that the respondents belonging to the ‘high’ category on the SES scale - where their fathers have private businesses, higher university degrees and higher sources of income – are totally dependent on one individual, the source of income provided by the father. In such cases, the higher the respondents ranked on the scale, the less number of family members had part time or even full time jobs. The respondents that ranked between the ‘low’ and ‘medium’ categories indicated that in most cases the entire family members had to work and wait for assistance from family living abroad to secure the basic needs of living. The ‘medium’ category indicated that the respondents were able to enroll in private universities and had chance to take a part time job or not.

On the Maronite level, the divisions in Table 6.2 are categorized accordingly to working family members, father’s occupation, income and education. The respondents

in the 'high' category – around 13% - have highest monthly incomes and lowest number of working family members. In addition, the findings in this insignificant percentage show that the source of income is usually from private owned businesses, and in many cases was labeled under 'trade and business'. The majority of the respondents ranged in the 'medium' category – around 59%. The range of this category could be labeled as the 'middle class – upper and lower' in most societies. In this specific class, a trivial percentage of the respondents indicated their families owned private businesses. The overwhelming majority indicated that their working family members have university degrees and as a result have full time. The respondents that ranked in the 'low' category – around 28% - indicated that their working family members have temporary or free lance jobs. In addition, the majority of these respondents indicated that the entire family worked to meet and secure basic needs. In some cases the respondents indicated that their fathers passed away during the Lebanese Civil War and as a result they were forced to take part time jobs. In addition, these respondents claimed that they were fully dependent on external financial support provided by their close families and relatives in foreign countries.

#### b. Druze Respondents

A substantial portion of the findings – around 32% - indicate that the Druze respondents mentioned that their father's education does not surpass high school. It is interesting to note that the primary choice of study among Druze respondents seems to range heavily between social/natural sciences and engineering. An additional remarkable facet in investigating the socioeconomic background of the Druze respondents lies in the differences from one generation to the other. In many cases, these respondents claimed their working family members still cultivate and harvest their

personal agricultural property. In addition, the striking difference between the Druze and the Maronites is the nature of self owned business. Several Maronite respondents claimed their family owned corporations and private companies around the capital that provided the family monthly income. In the Druze case, the respondents claimed their fathers had their own businesses, yet they additionally claimed their businesses were directly correlated to land ownership.

Another major difference in evaluating the socioeconomic status of the Druze respondents is related to their level of income. More than 72% of the respondents claimed that the majority of their family members worked to provide and secure the monthly basic necessities. The majority of the respondents that come from the Shouf region and study at universities around the capital claimed their parents ‘wanted them to focus on completing their degrees’ and as a result the only work they had to do was to ‘study’. Furthermore, the Druze respondents’ ranks on the socioeconomic scale do not differ in shape and form in comparison to the Maronite respondents. In light of their father’s education, occupation and monthly income, the Druze respondents rank close to the Maronite respondents. The respondents that ranked in the ‘low’ category – around 29% - claimed that their family members had to commute daily from the Shouf Mountains to Beirut to provide for their families. In additional, they claimed that the career opportunities – mainly in agriculture and tourism in summer – did not generate sufficient income for a ‘decent living’. The percentage is significant in light of the father’s education and occupation. In many cases, their level of income was closer to a Maronite bank employee with higher education. These dissimilarities might find support in light of the manner of spending and entertaining opportunities in the capital. The majority of respondents ranked in the ‘medium’ – upper and middle – category – around

63%. These respondents claimed that their parents had career and residence opportunities in the districts around the capital and more importantly they maintained a summer residence in the village. In many cases, the respondents that belonged to the medium category indicated that nearly the entirety of their family members worked. On this level, the vast majority of the respondents claimed their parents had completed their university degrees and as a result have decent jobs in large firms and companies. However, it should be noted that within this 'medium' category, half of the respondents claimed their parents worked and lived in the Shouf – Aley districts. The respondents that ranked in the 'high' category – around 8% - had similar experiences in comparison to the Maronite respondents. These respondents indicated that their fathers had governmental or high ranking business positions. In many cases, the respondents claimed their parents had doctoral degrees and were working in prestigious academic institutions in Lebanon and elsewhere. In other cases, the respondents mentioned that their families owned companies and businesses in Lebanon and other foreign countries. On this level, many respondents claimed that the income generated by the father was sufficient for an average Druze family<sup>7</sup> that is composed of four people.

### **C. Dependent Variables and Findings**

In the former section, the independent and background variables were thoroughly discussed and explored. The findings indicated that the majority of the respondents ranked in the 'medium category' – upper and lower middle class. In addition, the results depicted that the family educational background of the Maronites was higher in comparison to the Druze.

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<sup>7</sup> According to the findings retrieved in this research study.

In this section, the findings pertaining to the dependent variables will be discussed thoroughly and separately. This section is necessary for establishing the variables that will be utilized when performing statistical operations and functions. The analysis of the findings and more importantly testing the relevant hypotheses requires the correlation and cross-tabulation of independent and dependent variables consistently. This section will be primarily divided into two main components. The earlier chapters discussed the fundamental aspect of this research study that is meant to study the relationship between perceived group identity and intergroup relations. These components are divided into five sections that include variables related to 'perception of self identity', the levels of 'group cohesion and solidarity', 'perceptions towards the state of Israel', 'opinions on the overall Peace Process' and 'intergroup perceptions and attitudes'. In this section, the frequency distributions will be illustrated in Tables for future analysis and discussion in Chapter VII.

### ***1. Group Perceived Identity***

Chapter V discussed the elements of the research methodology and design for the study at hand. The dimensions of perceived self identity, group cohesion and solidarity were explored in light of measuring and weighing the modern day perceptions of the communities at hand. The merger of these dimensions produces the professed identity of the group. The word of caution mentioned at the beginning of Chapter VI is relevant throughout the entire study whereas the merger of the findings into one

dimension<sup>8</sup> for further analysis does not account for the whole opinions and attitudes of either the Maronite or Druze communities.

a. Perception of Self – Identity

For the purpose of this study, the dimensions of self identity are defined in light of nationalistic orientations, communal history, history of Lebanon, degree of pride in being a Lebanese citizen, the preservation of communal identity and self perception of one's community.

i. Lebanese Nationalistic Orientation and Preference

**Table 6.3 - Lebanese Nationalistic Orientation**

Lebanese Nationalistic Orientation			Valid Percent <sup>a</sup>
Community			
Maronite	Valid	Lebanese Nationalist	84.0
		Arab Nationalist	3.0
		Egyptian Nationalist	1.0
		Syrian Nationalist	2.0
		Internationalist	13.0
		Total	100.0
Druze	Valid	Lebanese Nationalist	70.0
		Arab Nationalist	18.0
		Syrian Nationalist	2.0
		Internationalist	10.0
		Total	100.0

a. Percentages do not add up to 100 due to rounding.

<sup>8</sup> This word of caution is specifically necessary in establishing the patterns that define 'identity' in the study at hand.

The majority of the respondents indicated that their sense of nationalism is deeply connected to Lebanese Nationalism. The Maronites and Druze jointly expressed their sweeping preference to Lebanese Nationalism in comparison to an alleged belief that it is separate from Arab Nationalism. Accordingly, the majority of authors that explore Maronite history and legacy contend that the formation of Lebanese nationalism is primarily equal to Maronite nationalism<sup>9</sup>. The vast majority of Maronite respondents – around 84% - indicate their sense of Lebanese Nationalism. In addition, a trivial percentage indicates that some respondents believe in an Internationalist orientation.

On the level of the Druze respondents, the findings indicate that around 70% indicate Lebanese Nationalistic orientation, while only a partial segment of the respondents, 18%, indicated they had Arab nationalistic orientation.

## ii. Community History and History of Lebanon

The questionnaire included several questions that primarily dealt with investigating how the respondents view the history of their community and more importantly how they perceived the history of Lebanon. In previous studies<sup>10</sup> carried out on Maronite college students, the vast majority of the respondents indicated they view the history of their community interconnected with Phoenician legacy. More importantly, the respondents usually mentioned that the Maronites are the direct descendants of the Phoenicians, and for that specific purpose their history is the ‘same’.

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<sup>9</sup> See Matti Moosa (1986), *the Maronites in History*. Butros Dau (1984), *History of the Maronites: Religious, Cultural and Political*. Walid Phares (1995), *Lebanese Christian Nationalism: The Rise and Fall of An Ethnic Resistance*.

<sup>10</sup> These studies notably include the research carried out by Hilal Khashan (1990) on the political values of Lebanese Maronite College students. Several studies have been carried out since that time. Simon Haddad has conducted several studies on Maronite college students among others and Jeffrey Karam revisited Khashan’s findings in 2009 and 2010.



In contrast to previous findings that indicate the overwhelming majority of Maronite respondents to view their history based on Phoenician heritage and legacy, these findings indicate that there is a partial percentage – around 19% - that claim their history is derived from Arab heritage and tradition. Nevertheless, a considerable number of respondents maintain earlier findings; around 66% firmly believe they are direct descendants of the Phoenicians.

The Druze respondents are cohesive and consistent in their firm beliefs that their history is interrelated to Arab heritage and tradition – around 83%. The emergence and migration of the Druze community from Egypt to the Levant has always provided them with a self consciousness that is rooted in Arab legacy and history. More importantly, the majority of the Muslim Arab communities perceive the Druze sect as an ‘offshoot of Islam’; however, they cannot deny their Arab heritage. Apart from the case of the Druze community in Israel, the dispersion of the Druze community in Syria and Lebanon is considered an important segment and faction between the other Arab communities.

During the Lebanese Civil War, the Druze under the tight and keen leadership of Kamal Junblatt spearheaded the Lebanese National Movement – that consisted of various Palestinian, Syrian and Lebanese groups. The initial mission statement of the Lebanese National Movement was to counter the pro- Western camp represented by the coalition of the Christian parties under the leadership of the Maronite community. As a result, the Lebanese Druze have been always perceived by other communities as the ‘protectors’. However, it is noteworthy to mention that a trivial percentage of the Druze have similar opinions on the history of their community in comparison to the Maronites. The smaller percentages and inclinations between the Maronites and Druze are similar. Around 13% of the Druze respondents claim the history of their community is deeply connected to

Phoenician tradition and legacy, while around 19% of Maronite respondents believe that their communal history is related to Arab tradition and history

The respondents were asked to justify and express their opinions related to how they perceived the history of Lebanon. When the respondents were asked to express their opinions on the history of their community, they had substantial differences. The surveyed Maronites viewed themselves as Phoenician descendants and the surveyed Druze viewed themselves as Arab descendants. On their interpretation of the history of Lebanon, the respondents remained divided on choosing their viewpoints. The findings indicate that the Maronites firmly believed – around 74% - that the history of Lebanon is understood through investigating Phoenician history and legacy. Nevertheless, around 21% of Maronite respondents claimed that the history of Lebanon is directly correlated to the history of the Arabs. To an extent, some respondents claimed that ‘Phoenician heritage’ is a political myth and has no substantial support or historical and factual evidence.

On the Druze level, the findings indicated that around 56% of the respondents claim that the history of Lebanon is interconnected with the history of the Arabs. The remarkable point is that around 39% of the respondents claimed that the history of Lebanon is deeply connected to exploring the history of the Phoenicians. While on their perception of the history of Lebanon, a significant segment of the Druze respondents have similar perceptions in comparison to the Maronites, the findings signify that the Druze respondents portray Lebanese history from a Maronite perspective and understanding. Regardless of how other communities and notably Maronite respondents

might view the legacy of the ‘Phoenician myth’ it seems that almost 40% of the Druze respondents are convinced by its actualities with respect to Lebanon’s history<sup>11</sup>.

**Table 6.4 - History of your Community**

History of your Community			Valid Percent <sup>a</sup>
Community			
Maronite	Valid	Arab Heritage	19.0
		Phoenician Heritage	66.0
		Greco - Roman heritage	7.0
		Syrian Heritage	8.0
		Total	100.0
Druze	Valid	Arab Heritage	83.0
		Phoenician Heritage	13.0
		Greco - Roman heritage	2.0
		Syrian Heritage	2.0
		Total	100.0

a. Percentages do not add up to 100 due to rounding.

### iii. Sect Identity and Loyalty

The respondents were asked several questions on the importance of preserving their sect’s identity. The questions centered on understanding what was more important to these communities, preserving and safeguarding their communal identity or remaining faithful and loyal to their homeland. The main purpose of these variables was to understand how the respondents measure and weigh their group’s identity in light of their loyalty to their country. The variables were aimed at testing the degree of loyalty these respondents have towards their country in light of their perceived group identity.

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<sup>11</sup> It is noteworthy to mention that the ‘perceptions’ of national history in Lebanon are not channeled or constructed by a single national or public institution, despite the existence of national ‘public schools’. There does not exist a unified history textbook in the Lebanese high school educational system.

The findings indicated that the respondents in their respective groups were equally divided on assessing the greater importance between group identity and state loyalty. On the level of the Maronites, around 56% of the respondents claimed that preserving their sect's identity is vital and takes higher priority than securing loyalty to any nation – state. On the other hand around 44% of the Druze respondents indicated that their group identity should be safeguarded at all costs and it takes higher importance than preserving loyalty to any nation – state. On the Druze level, it seems a higher percentage of the respondents have loyalty towards their country than to preserving their group identity. On the Maronite level, it seems that the respondents favor safeguarding their communal identity in respect to remaining loyal to their country. More importantly, the findings depict that the Maronite respondents – around 71% - perceive and view their sect as the 'best' and 'respected' community in Lebanon. In addition, around 65% of the Druze respondents claimed that they perceive their community in a similar manner. These findings indicate a high level of pride expressed by the Maronite and Druze respondents in the manner they perceive their community.

#### b. Group Cohesion and Solidarity

In Chapter IV, the theoretical literature was thoroughly reviewed and discussed for retrieving theoretical support and ground for conducting empirical research. Among the various components discussed were the variables related to group cohesion and solidarity. The levels of group cohesion and solidarity are essential dimensions in understanding how individuals interact within their respective units and more importantly how they interact with other groups.

The dimensions related to group cohesion include the level of commitment, pride, satisfaction and attraction individuals have towards their group. For that specific purpose, the respondents were asked to answer relevant questions that explored these interrelated elements. The fundamental question that was mentioned in the questionnaire dealt with understanding ‘how attached’ the respondents are to their group. The value of this question lies in exploring how these individuals personally perceive their degree of attachment to their unit, regardless of how others observe it.

**Table 6.5 - Level of Group Attachment**

Level of Group Attachment			Valid Percent <sup>a</sup>
Community			
Maronite	Valid	Very attached	54.0
		Fairly attached	33.0
		Poorly attached	8.0
		Not attached	5.0
		Total	100.0
Druze	Valid	Very attached	41.0
		Fairly attached	35.0
		Poorly attached	17.0
		Not attached	8.0
		Total	100.0

a. Percentages do not add up to 100 due to rounding.

The vast majority of the Maronite respondents – around 87% - indicated that they are firmly attached to the community. In addition, the majority of the Druze respondents – around 76% - expressed similar sentiments. Furthermore, around 88% of respondents from the two groups expressed that they felt close and attached to people in their community, regardless of whether they were rich or poor, meaning despite any economic differences. The respondents from these groups expressed their high sense of

pride in being members of their respective units. The findings indicate that around 65% of the Maronite respondents claim that they valued their membership in their communities and more importantly they favored it to economic 'wealth'. In addition, the results depicted that around 63% of the Druze respondents expressed similar Maronite sentiments; they valued their community over wealth.

The respondents were asked to give their opinion on a popular saying: 'support your brother whether he is right or wrong'. The elements of group cohesion include the level of commitment members have towards their group and more importantly towards other individuals within their respective units. The findings indicated that around 48% of the Maronite respondents expressed their support to the members of their unit, regardless if they are right or wrong. On the Druze level, the findings indicate that around 51% of the respondents would support their group members in any given circumstance. The findings had to be supported with additional questions that investigated the level of internal group cohesion. The overwhelming majority- around 84% - in these two groups indicated that a conflict between members within a same group should be avoided at all costs. More importantly, these respondents claimed that all groups have internal problems, yet the ability to preserve a stronger unity requires that any conflict should be settled internally with limited external interference and meddling.

On the level of group cohesion, the respondents in their collective units were equally divided. When the respondents were asked to provide answers and justification on how they perceive their level of pride and attachment to their group, the overwhelming majority in these groups indicated a high level of attachment and pride. However, when the respondents in these communities were asked to express whether

they would support their group members regardless of the situation, the opinions were equally divided. Consequently, on the level of the individual it seems there is a high level of group cohesion; however, on the level of interaction between members in the same group, there is no collective attitude on 'blindly' and fully supporting each other. Following this observation, it seems that the level of group cohesion is quite high with the two communities on the level of interaction with other groups. However, on the internal level, half of the respondents question their support to other group members, yet overwhelmingly argue that internal conflict should be avoided at all costs.

The pertinent review of literature in Chapter IV explored the various theoretical dimensions that give support to the research variables in the questionnaire. The questionnaire included several questions that investigated the level of group solidarity. More importantly, in chapter IV the dimensions of identity formation were thoroughly discussed in light of understanding the levels and intensity of group cohesion and solidarity.

**Table 6.6 - Inter – Sectarian Conflict**

<b>Conflict between your Sect and Another Sect</b>			<b>Valid Percent <sup>a</sup></b>
<b>Community</b>			
Maronite	Valid	Support my sect unquestionably	32.0
		Support my sect even if its to blame	17.0
		Support my sect if it's the victim of aggression	34.0
		Support the other sect, if mine is the aggressor	6.0
		Support neither sect	14.0
		Total	100.0
Druze	Valid	Support my sect unquestionably	39.0
		Support my sect even if its to blame	17.0
		Support my sect if it's the victim of aggression	30.0
		Support the other sect, if mine is the aggressor	2.0
		Support neither sect	12.0
		Total	100.0

a. Percentages do not add up to 100 due to rounding.

The findings indicated that around 49% of the Maronite respondents indicated that they would support their sect unquestionably in any conflict. More importantly, these respondents claimed that they would support their group regardless if it is to blame for such turmoil. A segment of the Maronite respondents – around 17% - indicated that they would support their sect in any conflict in hope that their leaders would rectify the cause of the conflict. However, a substantial percentage – around 34% - of the findings indicates that the respondents would support their sect only if it is victim of aggression. In addition, the results depicted that approximately 6% of the respondents would support the rival sect, if their own sect was the aggressor and around 14% would support neither sect.



On the level of Druze respondents, the findings indicated that around 56% would support their sect unquestionably in any quarrel. More importantly, in close comparison to the Maronite respondents, the findings indicate that 17% would support their group even if it was responsible for the conflict. In addition, around 30% of the Druze respondents claimed that they would support their sect only if it is the victim of aggression. On the level of the Maronite respondents, around 6% expressed their support to the opposite sect if their group was the aggressor. In contrast to the Maronite case, around 2% of the Druze respondents claimed they would ever support the opposite sect against their own group.

These latter findings emerged in light of several questions answered by the respondents. The findings indicated that the 65% of the Maronite respondents have firm belief that the interests and concerns of their community should be given top priority in the process of solving any Lebanese crisis. More importantly, several Maronite respondents inscribed some comments claiming that their role was vital in solving any Lebanese crisis. On the level of the Druze, the findings indicate there was an equal division of opinion on this related subject. Around 48% of the Druze respondents expressed the importance of their community's interests and concerns in light of solving any Lebanese crisis. The latter pool of respondents claimed that their interests as a community are vested in solving problems that affect the entire Lebanese political system. Consequently, these respondents claimed that their communal interests are secured in light of a stable and unwavering Lebanese political system.

The dimensions of group solidarity include variables related to common values and unit conformity. Consequently, several questions explored the relevant and significant characteristics and traits of these groups at hand. Chapter II and III explored

the normative background of these communities. On the level of the Druze, the frequent and recurrent theme is ‘transnational solidarity’. This sense of group solidarity has ensured the balance and survival of the Druze community in the Levant. More importantly, the findings indicated that around 52% of the Druze respondents claimed that one of the most powerful characteristics of their community lies in its transnational scope. This observation finds roots in the sense of commonality expressed between the Druze brethren scattered around Lebanon, Syria and Israel. However, on the Maronite level, the dimensions of transnational solidarity have been thoroughly discussed in the reviewed literature concerned with the topic at hand. Nevertheless, the findings indicated that around 68% of the Maronite respondents expressed that their brethren in foreign countries have supported their cause in Lebanon. More importantly, these respondents claimed that one of the powerful characteristics of their community is that in the major countries their brethren are able to pressure their governments for their coreligionists in Lebanon.

## 2. Intergroup Relations and Perceptions

The former section explored the variables pertaining to group identity and vision. More importantly, the levels of group cohesion and solidarity were investigated in light of several research variables that find ground in relevant theory.

This section will deal with the theory of collaborationism and the nature of group alliances as subfields in the general structure of intergroup relations. In Chapter V, the dynamics of intergroup relations were translated into two different components. The first component included the elements of collaboration – mutual interests, personal and group benefit, common fate, survival and common enemy. The second component

included the facets of alliance formation – common enemy, security, mutual fears, prestige and ideological solidarity. Consequently, it is noteworthy to claim that these components overlap in their common characteristics. For the purpose of this study, the questionnaire was constructed in light of interrelatedness between intergroup collaboration and alliance formation. Therefore, it becomes drastically crucial to investigate the respondents' opinions through constructing relevant questions that measure such interconnected exploratory themes.

#### a. Dimensions of Collaboration and Alliance Formation

The respondents were given several questions to complete on the various recognized forms of collaboration in the political history of Lebanon and the Levant. In order to retrieve accurate findings, several questions included 'low profile' key terms which respondents were able to answer without feeling offended. It is noteworthy to mention that the questionnaire was constructed under the strict guidelines of research ethics. More importantly, it should be noted that several questions reflect how these respondents perceive their group identity in light of a correlated factor – collaboration and alliance formation. However, for the purpose of this section these variables will be investigated independently and separately. In the last section of this chapter, the findings from this section and the former one will be thoroughly explained and analyzed in light of the research hypotheses and assumptions.

The questionnaire included some preliminary variables that explored the dimensions of survival. The questions were constructed in a manner that each variable would build up a string of answers for a general concept. The respondents were asked questions related to the Machiavellian realist school of thought. The findings indicate

that around 60% of the Maronite respondents claim that the survival of their community is extremely important; as a result, they strongly believe that ‘the end justifies the means’. In addition, several Maronite respondents jotted down a few comments claiming that their ‘history is full of decisions they {community leaders} had to take to ensure the survival of the Maronite community in Lebanon.’

The findings indicated that a higher percentage of the Druze respondents have firm belief that the survival of their community is vital and essential. Around 68% of the Druze respondents claimed that each individual should be willing to sacrifice for the well being and continuity of the group. Several Druze respondents claimed that in moments of crisis, the Druze had to safeguard their existence by ensuring that every capable Druze male citizen would be willing to sacrifice in battle against the conquering rivals. On several occasions, the Druze respondents – especially when surveyed in the Shouf district – claimed that ‘we would prefer death over losing our dignity and pride {defeat}’.

**Table 6.7 - Group Survival**

**Survival of My Community**

Community			Valid Percent <sup>a</sup>
Maronite	Valid	Strongly Agree	24.0
		Agree	36.0
		Disagree	33.0
		Strongly Disagree	7.0
		Total	100.0
Druze	Valid	Strongly Agree	30.0
		Agree	38.0
		Disagree	24.0
		Strongly Disagree	9.0
		Total	100.0

a. Percentages do not add up to 100 due to rounding.

The dimensions of collaboration include various components. These components additionally include variables related to common fate and mutual interest. The respondents were asked several questions related to their understanding of ‘common fate’. The findings indicated that around 87% of the Maronite respondents have firm belief that the fate of their community should be united regardless of where its members reside. In addition, several Maronite respondents claimed that absentee voting is one of the possible methods that enable communities to safeguard their unified position and interests in light of any internal Lebanese crisis.

In comparison to the Maronite respondents, the findings indicated that around 85% of the Druze respondents claimed that an essential element of group survival is for the community to be unified regardless of its geographic location and existence. More importantly, several Druze respondents indicated that the majority of ‘solutions’ to the

internal Lebanese crisis could be materialized with the support of different Lebanese communities residing in foreign countries.

**Table 6.8 - Common Fate**

Common Fate			Valid Percent <sup>a</sup>
Community			
Maronite	Valid	Strongly Agree	34.0
		Agree	53.0
		Disagree	12.0
		Strongly Disagree	1.0
		Total	100.0
Druze	Valid	Strongly Agree	34.0
		Agree	51.0
		Disagree	13.0
		Strongly Disagree	3.0
		Total	100.0

a. Percentages do not add up to 100 due to rounding.

The respondents were asked for their opinions on a well worn adage “the enemy of my enemy is my friend”. This variable was introduced to understand the magnitude and dimensions of group survival according to these two communities. Contrary to existing beliefs, the findings indicate that the respondents in the two communities are substantially divided on this issue. Around 40% of the Maronite respondents actually believe that their ‘friend’ is truly the enemy of their enemy. Additionally, around 42% of the Druze respondents confirmed their belief in this well known Middle Eastern proverb. As a result, the primary observation that emerges with the latter findings is that these groups are willing to form alliances with their recognized ‘friend’ against the common enemy. More importantly, these groups based their alliances on their

projection of a common enemy that mandatorily includes a set of mutual fears and goals.

These findings were confirmed with an additional variable that measured and weighed possible justifications for collaborating with the 'enemy'. The respondents were asked if it is ever justifiable to collaborate with the enemy, if they knew that other communities were doing it. The findings consistently followed the earlier results. A small fraction – around 29% - of the Maronite respondents claimed that it is justifiable to work with the enemy, if they had knowledge that other communities were doing it. Additionally, an even lower bracket – around 23% - of the Druze respondents give justification to collaborating with the enemy, if other communities previously did.

From the previous section, the findings indicate that the overwhelming majority of the respondents are willing to sacrifice for safeguarding the existence of their community. More importantly, the vast majority indicated that the survival of their community is not limited to the group members that reside in a certain country. Rather, the majority of the respondents have firm belief that their communities should have a firm unified position regardless of their geographic dispersion. However, when the respondents were asked to enumerate their values on collaborating with the enemy, the percentage brackets were lower in product and result. The communities were partially divided on their belief that the 'enemy of their enemy is their friend'. Furthermore, the overwhelming majority of the respondents had firm grounds that collaboration with the enemy is not justifiable under any clause. When asked if it is justifiable if they had knowledge that other communities were doing it, the respondents persistently argued that there is no justification for such acts.

The former section investigated the respondents' perceptions on 'group survival', 'enemy collaboration', 'common fate' and 'alliance formation'. However, the questionnaire included additional elements to explore the respondents' understanding of group alliances.

In light of the Middle Eastern adage – my enemy's enemy is my friend – and the previous descriptive findings, the respondents were asked to give their opinion on the nature of existential fears in the Middle East. More importantly, the variables were constructed on the assumption that Middle Eastern minorities should form alliances if they shared similar existential fears and concerns. The question included two essential components. The first component was to evaluate whether the respondents felt their groups were actually minorities in the Middle East. The second component investigated whether these respondents felt that minority groups in the Middle East had mutual fears – primarily existential ones. The findings indicated that approximately 75% of the respondents from the surveyed groups firmly believe that groups that share common existential fears should have alliances. Furthermore, approximately 76% of the Maronite respondents asserted that minorities should form alliances in light of a perceived common threat. In addition, the Druze respondents voiced similar sentiments. Around 72% of the latter respondents claimed that minorities should form alliances when they feel their survival is threatened.



**Table 6.9 - Existential Fears and Common Perceived Threats**

**Minorities with existential fears should have alliances**

Community			Valid Percent <sup>a</sup>
Maronite	Valid	Strongly Agree	26.0
		Agree	50.0
		Disagree	20.0
		Strongly Disagree	5.0
		Total	100.0
Druze	Valid	Strongly Agree	17.0
		Agree	56.0
		Disagree	23.0
		Strongly Disagree	5.0
		Total	100.0

a. Percentages do not add up to 100 due to rounding.

i. Perceptions towards the Jews and the Arab Minority in Israel

The questionnaire included multiple variables that measured the respondents' opinions on group survival. The findings indicated that the majority of the respondents had firm belief that the continuity of their survival is vital and they are willing to sacrifice for maintaining it. However, the findings indicated that the majority of the respondents do not justify collaboration with the enemy under any given reason.

The main research component in the study at hand is focused on understanding the relationship between group identity and intergroup relations, in light of modern day perceptions of Maronite and Druze college students towards the state of Israel. As a result, it becomes crucial to understand how these communities perceive the Jews in general, how they observe the Jews in Israel and more importantly how they recognize the Arab minority in Israel. The earlier chapters that dealt with the historical evolution of relations between the Maronites, Druze and Zionists included various historical

determinants that shaped the nature of contact between these minority groups. As it was previously discussed, the Druze minority in Israel are faithful and loyal Israeli citizens. Their role in the Israel Defense Forces is widely acclaimed and acknowledged in light of their superior military skills. Consequently, it becomes crucial to understand how the Lebanese Druze and Maronites evaluate the performance of the Israeli Druze and to understand the perceptions of the Maronites and Druze alike, towards other Arab minority groups that have partnerships with the state of Israel.

The respondents were asked to indicate whether they perceived the Jews as a persecuted minority in the Middle East. Around 39% of the Maronite respondents agreed that the Jews are a persecuted group in the Orient. However, the substantial bracket of 61% of the Maronite respondents disagreed to the belief their coreligionists had. Furthermore, the findings indicated that a higher bracket - in comparison to the Maronite respondents - of around 42% of the Druze respondents have firm conviction that the Jews are persecuted.

**Table 6.10 - The Jews in the Middle East**

The Jews in the Middle East			Valid Percent <sup>a</sup>
Community			
Maronite	Valid	Strongly Agree	12.0
		Agree	27.0
		Disagree	37.0
		Strongly Disagree	23.0
		Total	100.0
Druze	Valid	Strongly Agree	21.0
		Agree	21.0
		Disagree	31.0
		Strongly Disagree	27.0
		Total	100.0

a. Percentages do not add up to 100 due to rounding.

The respondents were asked to indicate whether they felt that Lebanese Jews have a different political orientation and tendency in comparison to Israeli Jews. A segment of the Maronite respondents – around 34% - felt that the Jews in Lebanon have different political values and aspirations that their coreligionists in Israel. However, the findings on the Druze level indicate that around 50% of the respondents perceive that the political values of the Lebanese Jews are totally different from the political values expressed and practiced by Israeli Jews.

These latter findings were confirmed in light of a question that asked the respondents to indicate whether they felt that all Jews have ‘Zionist aspirations and tendencies’. The warm approach from the Druze and Maronites towards the Lebanese Jews finds evidence in their depiction of the Jewish community in Lebanon. Through retrieving the results of the data collection, it became obvious that the Maronite and

Druze respondents were able to distinguish between ‘Jews’ and ‘Zionists’. In many cases, these respondents claimed that the ‘majority of the Lebanese people think, these terms and values are interchangeable’. More importantly, the findings indicated that 67% of the Maronite respondents have firm belief that not all Jews are intrinsically Zionists. The rest of the Maronite respondents – around 33% - felt that the Lebanese Jews are not Zionists, yet they would support the state of Israel against Lebanon, based on religious solidarity. In addition, the findings indicated that 75% of the Druze respondents believe that the Jews can have different political values and tendencies than those practiced by the state of Israel. Additionally, these Druze respondents numerously claimed that there ‘still exists a substantial Jewish community in Lebanon’. Some respondents even went to say that ‘the Lebanese communities should understand and know that the Jewish sect is recognized as one of the Lebanese confessional groups’.

The respondents were asked whether they felt their community shared common characteristics and traits with the Jews. The findings indicated that a low bracket of approximately 35% of the Maronite respondents felt they had common traits and features with the Jewish community. The rest of the Maronite respondents – around 65% - argued that their community has always been blamed that it shared common traits with the Jews. These respondents claimed that ‘in reality we {the Maronite community} are very different and cultured’. In comparison to the Maronite respondents, the findings indicated that around 31% of the Druze respondents felt that their community shared common features and traits with the Jewish community.

The respondents were asked to express their sentiments towards the Lebanese Jews and Israeli Jews. A body of questions measured how these minorities perceive other groups in Lebanon, Syria and Israel. For the section at hand, there will be focus on

two specific groups: the Jews in Lebanon and the Jews in Israel. The sentiments of these respondents were measured on the thermometer scale. The brackets ranged from: extremely warm, warm, to neutral, cold and extremely cold. The respondents were given strict guidelines that the ‘neutral’ option is not equal to ‘do not know’ or ‘not applicable’; rather, it was explained to each respondent that neutral in context meant that you expressed lukewarm sentiments. In many cases, numerous respondents claimed that their neutrality depended on the given case<sup>12</sup>. The findings indicated that approximately 21% of the Maronite respondents have warm sentiments towards the Lebanese Jews. More importantly, around 31% of the respondents have cold sentiments towards the Jewish community in Lebanon. In many cases, several respondents questioned the whereabouts of the Jewish community in Lebanon. The rest of the respondents – nearly half of the group (48%) – expressed neutral sentiments towards the Lebanese Jews. When the team administering the survey asked these respondents to define the nature of their ‘neutrality’, the majority of the respondents claimed that the Lebanese Jews had little or no influence on their daily affairs and activities. As a result, these respondents felt that the Jewish community did not affect their well being in any manner. However, when the respondents were asked to express their sentiments towards the Israeli Jews, a substantial portion of the Maronite respondents – around 48% - claimed that their feelings towards them ranged between cold and extremely cold feelings. It is noteworthy to mention, that from this percentage – 48% - approximately 80% of the respondents expressed extremely cold sentiments. A trivial 11% claimed

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<sup>12</sup> Some respondents claimed that they neither liked nor hated the Jews. However, many individuals claimed that if a war broke out between Lebanon and Israel, they would express morbid and cold sentiments towards the Jews. Even when the previous findings indicated that the respondents differentiated between Israeli Jews and other Jewish communities in the Middle East, in times of war they directly correlated Israeli Jews with any of the Jewish communities in the Middle East.

they had extremely warm or warm sentiments towards the Israeli Jews. However, around 41% of the respondents claimed they had neutral feelings towards the Israeli Jews. These respondents claimed that in any given circumstance they would undoubtedly support any Lebanese group against any 'possible aggression or acts of hostility against Lebanon'.

On the level of the Druze respondents, the findings indicated that 14% expressed warm sentiments towards the Lebanese Jews. In comparison to the Maronite respondents, the results portray a sense of neutrality expressed by half of the Druze respondents – around 49% - towards the Jewish community in Lebanon. Many respondents claimed while talking to each other that 'historically speaking we have heard of a few Jewish families around Rashaya and Hasbaya'. As a result, they shared similar sentiments with the Maronite respondents; as long as the Lebanese Jews were not meddling in their daily affairs, they had no problem with their existence. This sense of neutrality was lower in percentage – around 33% - in comparison to the Maronite respondents – around 41% -, when the findings indicated that the Druze respondents expressed neutral sentiments towards the Israeli Jews. Additionally, approximately 64% of the Druze respondents claimed that they have extremely cold or cold sentiments towards the Israeli Jews. More importantly, it is noteworthy to mention that this percentage bracket – 64% - was constructed by 90% of the respondents that candidly expressed 'extremely cold' sentiments. A trivial range of approximately 6% expressed extremely warm or warm sentiments towards the Israeli Jews. In comparison to the Maronite respondents, these Druze respondents claimed that their sense of neutrality – around 33% - and warm sentiments – 6% - would definitely change if any war takes place between Lebanon and Israel.

This former section explored two correlated dimensions. The first dimension included understanding how the respondents evaluate and explain the principles of group survival. More importantly, several questions were posed to understand how they perceive the dispersion of their community and whether it produces a unified position for the group. The second dimension included evaluating the respondents' perceptions towards the Jewish communities in the Orient. Specifically, several questions explored the differences between the respondents' perceptions towards the Jews in Lebanon and the Jews in Israel. The correlation of these two dimensions is extremely important in investigating this section at hand that deals with the perceptions of these communities towards the elements of collaboration. The findings in the previous section had to be separately addressed and analyzed in order to establish a structure needed for understanding how these groups observe intergroup collaboration with the state of Israel.

The respondents were asked to evaluate whether the Arab communities in Israel were traitors, if they were forced to collaborate with Israeli officials. It should be mentioned that the Arab community in Israel predominantly consists of several smaller groups. These groups include Muslim, Christian and Druze entities. Among these groups, the Druze community is fully submerged into the Israeli system. Members of the Druze population are active and loyal Israeli citizens.

The findings indicate that approximately 65% of the Maronite respondents believe that the Arab groups are not traitors if they were forced to collaborate with the state of Israel. However, the team administering the survey inquired on possible justifications for such collaboration. The overwhelming majority claimed that in 'some instances groups are forced to cooperate or else they would perish'. The rest of the

respondents –around 35% - expressed their utmost rejection to any form of collaboration with the ‘enemy’, and as a result they labeled these Arabs groups as ‘plain traitors’. A substantial segment of the Druze respondents – around 77% - claim that these Arab groups were forced to collaborate and under no circumstance are they to be labeled as traitors. In addition, in comparison to the Maronite respondents, the administrating team had to inquire on the reasons why these respondents support such a claim. The Druze respondents voiced similar claims expressed by the Maronite respondents. In addition, the Druze unconsciously supported the position of their coreligionists by claiming ‘their brethren had limited choices’.

Consequently, the respondents were asked to express their feelings towards the Arab groups that willingly collaborate with the state of Israel. The findings indicate that approximately 56% of the Maronite respondents affirmed that these Arab groups are ‘plain traitors’, if they willingly choose to cooperate with Israeli officials. The rest of the Maronite respondents felt that the situation in Israel forces all the Arab community groups to collaborate with the government; otherwise, they will perish. Furthermore, on the Druze level, the findings indicated that approximately 65% of the respondents felt that when the Arab groups willingly favor cooperation with the state of Israel, they are considered ‘blunt traitors’.

The respondents were asked two questions on their perception of intergroup collaboration between Lebanese groups and the state of Israel. The questions revolved around understanding how these groups perceive collaborative acts between members from their own unit or individuals from different communities. Around 51% of the Maronite respondents expressed that if members of their own group or other communal groups collaborated with Israel, they consider them to be traitors. When the rest of the



respondents – around 41% - were asked why they did not indicate that these individuals or groups are considered to be traitors; they voiced similar claims mentioned in respect to the Arab groups that forcefully collaborate with Israel. These respondents claimed that these individuals and segments of these minority groups collaborate with a ‘stronger party’ for safeguarding their existence. In addition, the findings indicated that a higher bracket – around 77% - of the Druze respondents claimed that if any group or individual from any community, collaborated with the state of Israel, then that mandatorily makes them traitors.

The last series of questions on Arab collaboration with the state of Israel encompassed the level of coordination and cooperation between different Lebanese communities and the state of Israel in South Lebanon. There are numerous archival documents that explore the level of relations between different Lebanese groups. These entities encompassed different sectarian and ideological lines. The state of Israel established a tight security structure under the leadership of Major Saad Haddad. The formation of the South Lebanon Army (SLA) included the majority of young individuals in the neighboring and bordering Southern villages. These militia recruits included members from the Shiite, Orthodox, Catholic, Druze and Maronite communities. However, the majority of the higher ranking officials were recruited from the Christian groups. As a result, it became crucial to investigate how these college students perceive the history of such collaboration. The questions triggered their responses by exploring their evaluation of how some groups collaborated with Israel, yet not all of them were considered traitors. The findings indicate that approximately 71% of the Maronite respondents felt that many Lebanese groups other than the Christians have collaborated with the state of Israel and yet they have never been

labeled as conspirators. This segment of Maronite respondents felt that following the collapse of the Lebanese Civil War, several members from the Maronite community have been always labeled as traitors for previous collaborative acts with the state of Israel. In addition, several respondents from South Lebanon claimed that ‘the majority of the Lebanese citizens do not understand and even know of the situation in South Lebanon during the Lebanese Civil War.’ Based on their parents’ experiences, many Maronite respondents felt that cooperation with Israel was a ‘fait accompli’ for existence and continuity. On the level of the Druze respondents, the findings indicated that 48% of the surveyed students agree that many Lebanese groups collaborated with Israel, yet they are not labeled as traitors. Nearly 52% of the Druze respondents claimed that all the groups that collaborated with the state of Israel in Lebanon were known and recognized.

#### ii. Perceptions towards the state of Israel and the Peace Process

This section primarily deals with investigating the respondents’ perceptions towards the state of Israel, specifically focused on the overall Peace Process. The dynamics of the Peace Process include several correlated factors. As a result, for the purpose of this study, several questions were constructed to reflect the respondents’ views on the Palestinian cause as well as the dimension of economic normalization with Israel. In addition, the respondents were asked to enumerate their opinions on concluding a peace treaty between Lebanon and Israel.

**Table 6.11 - Jewish State in Palestine**

**Do you accept the Jewish state in Palestine as a Lasting Entity?**

Community			Valid Percent <sup>a</sup>
Maronite	Valid	Strongly Agree	9.0
		Agree	20.0
		Disagree	38.0
		Strongly Disagree	33.0
		Total	100.0
Druze	Valid	Strongly Agree	3.0
		Agree	11.0
		Disagree	40.0
		Strongly Disagree	47.0
		Total	100.0

a. Percentages do not add up to 100 due to rounding.

The initial grounds for concluding a peace treaty between two states requires that each entity recognizes the existence of the other partner. This form of existence is usually recognized by establishing diplomatic missions. As a result, it became crucial to investigate whether these respondents accepted the ‘existence’ of the state of Israel. The findings indicate that the approximately 29% of the Maronite respondents accept the Jewish state in Palestine as a lasting entity. However, the majority of the respondents – around 71% - are against the existence of the Jewish state. Some of the Maronite respondents had mixed opinions on why they were against the existence the state of Israel. While some claimed that in ‘former times we {the Maronites} paid the price for supporting Israel against other Lebanese groups, others gave significant reference to the atrocities carried out by the Israeli Army against Lebanon in the July War in 2006.

On the Druze level, the findings indicated that even a lower bracket of respondents – around 14% - accept the Jewish state as a lasting entity in Palestine. The overwhelming majority of the Druze respondents – around 87% - are against the existence and continuity of the Jewish state in Palestine. In addition, many Druze respondents jotted additional comments and remarks on the questionnaire sheet. Some of these comments included phrases like ‘death to Israel’ and others included ‘we refuse to even accept to answer such a question’. This former question had to be phrased in acceptable terms to accommodate the required population sample.

The previous findings indicated that the majority of the respondents in these surveyed groups are totally against the existence of the Jewish state in Palestine. However, when the respondents were asked to indicate whether they supported and boosted peace negotiations with the state of Israel, the findings drastically altered and changed. The findings indicated that around 82% of the Maronite respondents fully support initiating peace talks with the state of Israel. In addition, 65% of the Druze respondents voice similar sentiments – expressed by the Maronite respondents. Many respondents in these communities claimed that the existence of the state of Israel is a ‘fait accompli’. More importantly, many respondents felt that the existence of the Jewish homeland has become an accepted actuality and all the nation – states in the Middle East ‘have to accept its existence’. Furthermore, many respondents went on to claim that ‘all the Arab states have economic relations with the state of Israel’. A small fraction of the Maronite respondents claimed that ‘Lebanon cannot exist and sustain without the support of all its neighboring countries’. When the team administering the survey asked these respondents to expand their jotted comments, their answers would

usually be revolved around the role of Syria and Israel in having a stable system in Lebanon.

It was not sufficient to retrieve findings that indicated that the majority of respondents in these two groups boost peace negotiations with the state of Israel. The fundamental question was to investigate whether these respondents had firm conviction that such a Peace Treaty is attainable. The findings indicate that approximately 58% of the Maronite respondents agree that the prospects of peace between Lebanon and Israel are possible and achievable. The other segment of the Maronite respondents – around 42% - strictly claimed that peace is achievable ‘if Israel accepts Lebanon’s sovereignty and independence’. This sense of optimism differs with the findings on the Druze respondents. Around 46% of the Druze respondents have firm belief that peace between Lebanon and Israel is probable. In addition, approximately 54% of the Druze respondents had firm convictions that peace is not achievable between Lebanon and Israel, because these entities have always been in economic competition. More importantly, these respondents were approached to understand how they explained the dimensions of ‘economic competition’. While it was expected to retrieve such opinions, the respondents frequently claimed that ‘Israel does not favor a stable and peaceful Lebanon’. These respondents had firm belief that a stable, peaceful and powerful Lebanon would lure away tourists and business investments from the state of Israel to Lebanon.

In general, the respondents in these two groups were optimistic concerning achieving peace between Lebanon and Israel. However, further investigation was a necessity in understanding their opinions on the possible obstacles towards concluding a Peace Treaty between Lebanon and Israel. The findings indicated that around 23% of

the Maronite respondents have firm belief that Hezbollah is the main hindrance to concluding peace between Lebanon and Israel. Additionally, approximately 20% of the Maronite respondents felt that a collection of individuals, groups and states<sup>13</sup> equally obstruct concluding a peace treaty. These respondents felt that Syria, Iran, Hezbollah, Lebanon, Israel and the Palestinian refugees had vital interests in obstructing a peace treaty between Lebanon and Israel. In addition, around 18% of the Maronite respondents bluntly claimed that Syria opposed to ‘any peace treaty between Lebanon and Israel’. Furthermore, approximately 17% of the Maronite respondents blamed Iran for impeding any possible peaceful resolution between Lebanon and Israel. Around 13% of the Maronite respondents claimed that Israel was not genuine concerning peace with any of the Arab nation – states. A trivial bracket of 7% of the Maronite respondents claimed that the existence of the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon hampered concluding peace between Israel and Lebanon. In addition, a smaller bracket of 4% of the Maronite respondents claimed that ‘Lebanon had no interest in concluding peace with Israel’.

On the other hand, the findings among the Druze respondents indicated that a higher bracket – around 30% - have firm belief that Hezbollah is the main entity hindering possible peace between Lebanon and Israel. In addition, a higher percentage<sup>14</sup> of the Druze respondents – around 22% - claim that a blend of groups and entities – Syria, Iran, Hezbollah, Lebanon, Israel and the Palestinian refugees - obstruct the possibility of achieving a peace treaty. A lower percentage of the Druze respondents –

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<sup>13</sup> In this question, the respondents were asked to indicate their answers according to priority. As a result, their answers were statistically processed to create one unified variable for accurate analysis

<sup>14</sup> In comparison to the findings on the Maronite respondents

around 10% - have firm belief that Syria is impeding the probability of peace between Lebanon and Israel. In addition, 22% of the Druze respondents blame Iran for obstructing lasting peace between Israel and Lebanon. In comparison with the Maronite respondents, a trivial bracket of Druze respondents – around 2% - believe that the existence of the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon is actually impeding peace prospects. Moreover, around 7% of the Druze respondents voice similar sentiments – in comparison to the Maronite respondents – that ‘Lebanon has no interest in concluding any form of peace with Israel’. Additionally, around 8% of the Druze respondents have firm conviction that Israel is not authentic in its declarations concerning peace in the Middle East.

**Table 6.12 - Hindrance to Lasting Peace between Lebanon and Israel**

**What is the main hindrance to conducting lasting peace between Israel and Lebanon?<sup>15</sup>**

Community			Valid Percent <sup>a</sup>
Maronite	Valid	Syria	18.0
		Iran	17.0
		Hezbollah	23.0
		Lebanon	4.0
		Palestinian Refugees	7.0
		Israel	13.0
		Combination of entities <sup>b</sup>	20.0
		Total	100.0
		Druze	Valid
Iran	22.0		
Hezbollah	30.0		
Lebanon	7.0		
Palestinian Refugees	2.0		
Israel	8.0		
Combination of entities <sup>b</sup>	22.0		
Total	100.0		

a. Percentages do not add up to 100 due to rounding.

b. The respondents' answers – in priority - were formulated into one category.

These former results converged to similar findings. The majority of the respondents in these two groups believe that Hezbollah, Syria and Iran mainly impede any possible peace treaty between Lebanon and Israel. Furthermore, trivial segments of these groups have alternative views. In some cases, the respondents outwardly claimed that the existence of Hezbollah with Iranian and Syrian support has ended any possible attempt to initiating peace talks between Lebanon and Israel. Around 9% of the

<sup>15</sup> The respondents were able to indicate that they did not support a peace treaty in previous questions, and as a result they did not have to answer this question.



respondents in these groups claimed that the existence of the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon hampered the possibility of concluding a peace treaty.

The respondents that supported a peace treaty between Lebanon and Israel were undoubtedly asked to justify their claims. It is noteworthy to mention that for response consistency, the respondents were given the option to confirm their rejection to any form of peace between Lebanon and Israel. The findings indicated that 52% of the Maronite respondents supported peace justified on the possibilities of economic prosperity and growth. More importantly, around 16% of the respondents claimed that Lebanon and Israel should conclude a peace treaty based on their perception of 'similar goals and ideals in the Middle East'. In addition, approximately 11% of the Maronite respondents justified their support to achieving peace based on their belief in the 'Right of Return' of the Palestinian refugees. These respondents felt that achieving peace between Lebanon and Israel would definitely provide a solution for the Palestinian refugee problem created by the birth of Israel in 1948. It should be acknowledged that approximately the same bracket – around 12% - that rejected establishing peace talks with Israel in the previous findings, reaffirmed their position in claiming 'they did not support any peace treaty with Israel'. A small number of Maronite respondents justified their desire for peace between Lebanon and Israel based on maintaining the balance of power in the Middle East – around 6% - and benefiting from Israel's military superiority and weapons industry – around 4%.

On the level of the Druze respondents, the findings indicate that approximately 38% feel that peace is justifiable based on economic gain and benefit. However, a segment of the respondents of around 23% confirmed their earlier convictions that they utterly did not support any peace treaty with the state of Israel. In addition, around 16%

of the respondents voiced similar sentiments - in comparison to the Maronite respondents – that they supported peace in the belief that a solution for the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon will eventually follow. These respondents firmly supported the ‘Right of Return’ of the Palestinian refugees. Around 9% of the Druze respondents favored a peace treaty based on the assumption that Lebanon and Israel shared similar goals and aspirations in the Middle East. Furthermore, approximately 8% of the respondents felt that the balance of power in the Middle East is maintained through achieving peace between Israel and Lebanon. A trivial bracket of 4% favored peace with Israel on the grounds of benefiting from Israel’s superior military skills and production. Some of the respondents in this small bracket added some comments claiming that ‘Israel would spare us from its military aggressiveness’.

### iii. Perceptions towards the Palestinian Cause and the Arab – Israeli Conflict

The previous section mainly dealt with the views of the respondents concerning the prospects of peace between Lebanon and Israel. A substantial segment of the surveyed communities supported peace based on multiple factors. The main justification for a peace treaty was based on the prospects of economic growth and prosperity. In addition, a small number of respondents favored peace based on the assumption that Lebanon and Israel shared similar goals and ideals in the Middle East.

This section will deal with the respondents’ views on the correlation between concluding peace between Lebanon and Israel from one side and the Arab – Israeli conflict on the other. In addition, this section will explore the respondents’ perceptions towards the Palestinian militants and refugees in Lebanon.

The respondents were asked to express their sentiments in light of the assumption that if Lebanon and Israel concluded a peace treaty, a peaceful resolution to the Arab – Israeli conflict might succeed. This assumption was generated to understand how the respondents viewed Lebanon’s role in the general structure of the Arab – Israeli conflict.

**Table 6.13 - The Role of Lebanon in the Arab – Israeli Conflict**

**If Lebanon signs a peace treaty with Israel, the Arab - Israeli peace process might succeed**

Community			Valid Percent <sup>a</sup>
Maronite	Valid	Strongly Agree	23.0
		Agree	55.0
		Disagree	16.0
		Strongly Disagree	7.0
		Total	100.0
Druze	Valid	Strongly Agree	16.0
		Agree	46.0
		Disagree	20.0
		Strongly Disagree	19.0
		Total	100.0

a. Percentages do not add up to 100 due to rounding.

The findings indicated that the majority of the Maronite respondents – around 78% - have firm belief that Lebanon’s fate is interconnected with the outcomes of the Arab – Israeli conflict. In addition, these respondents have firm conviction that the probability of peace between Lebanon and Israel might help pave the way for a positive peaceful solution to the Arab – Israeli conflict. Similarly, around 62% of the Druze respondents voiced similar sentiments. These respondents shared the belief that

achieving peace between Lebanon and Israel undoubtedly initiated the ‘positive’ track towards achieving the general Peace Process in the Middle East.

These results were supported by the respondents’ perceptions towards peace and the general framework of the Arab – Israeli conflict. The respondents were asked whether the benefits emerging from concluding peace with Israel are greater than the losses incurred during the Arab – Israeli conflict. The findings indicated that approximately 77% of the Maronite respondents claim that the benefits that emerge from concluding peace are higher than the losses that followed in the creation of the state of Israel in 1948. Many respondents further claimed that a general understanding with Israel should be undertaken to avoid additional human and material losses. Furthermore, the findings indicated that around 65% of the Druze respondents believe that achieving peace between Lebanon and Israel has higher benefits than the entire losses taken in the course of the Arab – Israeli conflict.

The earlier findings provided that the main justification for peace was based on economic benefit and gain. As a result, it became crucial to understand the respondents’ views on their ‘possible detachment to the Palestinian cause in light of economic growth and benefit’. The findings indicated that the two groups surveyed had opposing and different views. While the majority of the findings on the possibility of concluding a peace treaty between Lebanon and Israel were similar in product, these relevant findings differed greatly. Around 48% of the Maronite respondents claimed that the possible economic and military benefits that emerge from a peace treaty with Israel are sufficient to justify clear detachment from the Palestinian cause. More importantly, the higher percentage of the Maronite respondents – 52% - felt that regardless of the benefits that emerge from the peace treaty, they would not detach themselves from supporting the

Palestinian cause. The findings on the Druze respondents portray a higher sense of commitment to the Palestinian cause. Only a quarter of the respondents – around 25% - had firm belief that the economic and military benefits from a peace treaty are sufficient and adequate to justify detachment from the Palestinian cause.

In light of exploring the sincerity of the respondents towards the Palestinian cause, it becomes vital to explore the perceptions of these groups towards the Palestinian refugees and militants. The relevant findings on the level of intergroup perceptions differ greatly from the earlier findings that depict a sense of commitment to the Palestinian cause. The perceptions of the respondents were measured according to the thermometer scale. The findings indicated that around 21% of the Maronite respondents expressed extremely warm or warm sentiments towards the Palestinian refugees. In addition, half of the Maronite respondents expressed extremely cold or cold sentiments towards the refugees. More importantly, a substantial bracket of the Maronite respondents – around 29% - expressed a ‘sense of neutrality’ towards these Palestinian refugees. The team administering the survey had to further inquire on this ‘sense of neutrality’. The majority of the respondents claimed that these ‘refugees meant no harm whatsoever, and that the majority are extremely impoverished’. However, the same respondents that expressed sympathetic and compassionated sentiments towards the refugees were keen to mention that their attitudes and perceptions would alter ‘if these refugees get implicated in supporting groups against the Lebanese government’. On the level of the Druze respondents, the findings indicated that 23% of the respondents expressed extremely warm or warm sentiments towards the Palestinian refugees. However, around 43% of the Druze respondents expressed extremely cold or cold sentiments towards the Palestinian refugees. An additional fragment of the Druze

respondents – approximately 33% - expressed their ‘sense of neutrality’ towards the Palestinian refugees. These respondents explained their neutrality in light of the voiced sentiments uttered by the Maronite respondents. However, several Druze respondents claimed that as long as the ‘Palestinian refugee camps are away from the Shouf Mountains, we {the Druze} have no problem’.

On the level of their perceptions towards Palestinian militants, their opinions varied greatly and differently in comparison to their perceptions towards the refugees. The findings indicated that the majority of respondents in these surveyed groups expressed extremely cold or cold sentiments towards the Palestinian militants. On the level of the Maronite respondents, around 82% of the respondents expressed extremely cold or cold sentiments towards the militants. A small bracket of 8% of the respondents expressed extremely warm or warm sentiments towards these Palestinian militants. The interesting bracket in these findings was the segment of the Maronite respondents around 10% - that expressed ‘a sense of neutrality’. These respondents based their claims on the grounds of ‘forgiveness and reconciliation’. Several respondents claimed that their sense of neutrality towards the Palestinian militants emerged from their belief that ‘they {Palestinian militants} were used and exploited by other Lebanese groups in the course of the Lebanese Civil War.’ On the level of the Druze respondents, the findings differed slightly. A higher number of respondents – around 25% - expressed extremely warm or warm sentiments towards the Palestinian militants. These findings were intriguing and as a result the respondents were asked to further explore their sentiments. The majority of the respondents claimed ‘that their former militias {Druze armed groups} stood side by side the Palestinian militants against Israeli hegemony’. As a result, these respondents claimed that ‘these groups sacrificed for the continuity of one

another'. However, when the respondents claimed a 'sense of common fate' with the Palestinian militants, around 64% of the Druze respondents expressed extremely cold or cold sentiments towards them. Remarkably enough, the sense of neutrality expressed by the Druze respondents had similar explanations.

**Table 6.14 - Perception of the Palestinian Militants**

How do you perceive the Palestinian militants?			Valid Percent <sup>a</sup>
Community			
Maronite	Valid	Extremely Warm	3.0
		Warm	5.0
		Neutral	10.0
		Cold	15.0
		Extremely Cold	67.0
		Total	100.0
		Druze	Valid
Warm	14.0		
Neutral	11.0		
Cold	22.0		
Extremely Cold	42.0		
Total	100.0		

a. Percentages do not add up to 100 due to rounding.

#### iv. Maronite and Druze Intergroup Perceptions: Syria, Lebanon and Israel

The former section explored the perceptions of the Maronite and Druze respondents towards the state of Israel, the Peace Process, the Palestinian cause and the Palestinian militants and refugees.

This section primarily deals with exploring intergroup perceptions between the Maronites and Druze towards their coreligionists in Syria and Israel respectively. The

respondents were asked to express their sentiments towards the Druze in Israel, Lebanon and Syria. In addition, these respondents were asked to express their sentiments towards the Maronites in Lebanon and Syria. The respondents' sentiments were measured according to the thermometer scale.

The respondents began by expressing their sentiments towards the Israeli Druze. The findings indicated that around 6% of the Maronite respondents expressed extremely warm or warm sentiments towards the Druze in Israel. The striking point is that half of the respondents expressed a 'sense of neutrality' towards the Israeli Druze. This fundamentally intrigued the team administering the survey. The vast majority of the Maronite respondents – in the bracket that expressed neutral sentiments - claimed they did not have prior knowledge that there existed a Druze community in Israel that was fully supportive of the state of Israel. As a result, they expressed neutral sentiments based on their lack of knowledge. In addition, approximately 42% of the Maronite respondents expressed extremely cold or cold sentiments towards the Druze community in Israel. These specific respondents justified their claims on the grounds that the IDF did not include Jewish soldiers only, and as a result the previous wars with Israel accordingly meant that Israeli Druze soldiers were committing atrocities and crimes against Lebanon.

On the level of the Druze respondents, the overwhelming majority – around 83% - expressed extremely warm or warm sentiments towards their coreligionists in Israel. A trivial bracket of nearly 8% of the Druze respondents expressed extremely cold or cold sentiments towards their Israeli brethren. However, around 10% of the respondents expressed neutral sentiments towards their coreligionists on the grounds that they did not approve that their brethren served in the IDF.



**Table 6.15 - Perception of the Druze in Israel**

<b>How do you perceive the Israeli Druze?</b>			
Community			Valid Percent <sup>a</sup>
Maronite	Valid	Extremely Warm	2.0
		Warm	4.0
		Neutral	51.0
		Cold	16.0
		Extremely Cold	26.0
		Total	100.0
		Druze	Valid
Warm	37.0		
Neutral	10.0		
Cold	1.0		
Extremely Cold	7.0		
Total	100.0		

a. Percentages do not add up to 100 due to rounding.

The respondents were then asked to express their sentiments towards the Druze in Syria. The findings indicated that around 14% of the Maronite respondents expressed extremely warm or warm sentiments towards the Syrian Druze. However, the majority of the Maronite respondents expressed neutral sentiments towards the Syrian Druze.

On the level of the Druze respondents, the majority – around 78% - expressed extremely warm or warm sentiments towards their coreligionists in Syria. In line with the earlier findings on their perceptions towards their coreligionists in Israel, the findings indicated that the Druze in Lebanon – surveyed respondents – express extremely warm or warm sentiments to their brethren in Syria and Lebanon.

The respondents were asked to express their feelings towards the Druze community in Lebanon. The findings indicated that approximately 40% of the Maronite respondents expressed extremely warm or warm sentiments towards the Lebanese Druze. However, around 40% of the Maronite respondents expressed neutral sentiments and feelings. These respondents based on their expressions in light of what some labeled as ‘pending issues in the Shouf Mountains’. These respondents – even though the majority is not from the Shouf district – claimed that problems between the Druze and Maronites following the Mountain War in 1983 are still lingering. These Maronite respondents claimed that the majority of their Shouf brethren have not received ‘adequate compensation and assistance’ from the Lebanese government in comparison to the compensation given to the Druze community. In addition, approximately 19% of the Maronite sentiments expressed extremely cold or cold sentiments towards the Lebanese Druze. On the Druze level, it is needless to mention that the findings – around 93% - indicated that the Lebanese Druze respondents perceive each other passionately and fervently.

The respondents were asked to express their feelings towards the Maronite community in Lebanon. Needless to say, the findings indicated that around 86% of the Maronite respondents perceived themselves fervently and ardently. However, on the Druze level, it is noteworthy to mention that the Druze respondents have warmer sentiments towards the Maronite community in comparison to the feelings expressed on behalf of the Maronite respondents towards the Lebanese Druze. The findings indicated that the majority of the Druze respondents – around 63% - expressed extremely warm or warm sentiments towards the Maronite community in Lebanon. Nevertheless, a quarter of the Druze respondents expressed neutral feelings towards the Maronite community,

based on the assumption, as some respondents claimed – ‘that the Maronites did not like us {the Druze}’. A trivial bracket of approximately 10% of the Druze respondents expressed extremely cold or cold sentiments towards the Maronites.

The respondents were asked to express their sentiments towards the Maronite community in Syria. The Maronites emerged from the land of Syria prior to migrating and seeking refuge in Mount Lebanon. As a result, it became vital to explore how the Lebanese Maronites and Druze respondents perceived the Maronite community in Syria. The findings indicated that nearly half of the Maronite respondents expressed extremely warm or warm sentiments towards their coreligionists in Syria. However, a quarter of the respondents expressed neutral sentiments towards their Syrian brethren, on the grounds that these respondents felt ‘these Syrian Maronites have different tendencies and political values’. A trivial bracket of approximately 9% of the respondents expressed extremely cold or cold sentiments towards their brethren in Syrian on the grounds that some respondents mentioned that ‘these Maronites are different because they are Syrian citizens’. On the level of the Druze respondents, the findings indicated that around 31% expressed extremely warm or warm sentiments towards the Maronites in Syria. In addition, approximately 45% of the Druze respondents expressed neutral sentiments towards the Maronites in Syria, justifying their claims by mentioning ‘they have minimum concern or interaction with the Maronites in Syria’. Furthermore, approximately 24% of the Druze respondents expressed extremely cold or cold sentiments towards the Maronites in Syria.

#### **D. Concluding Remarks**

Chapter VI dealt with enumerating the relevant findings and results from the data collected from survey research. More importantly, this chapter thoroughly dealt with how these college students perceive their identity and their levels of group cohesion and solidarity. In addition, the findings relevant to the respondents' intergroup relations and perceptions towards Israel, the Peace Process, the Arab – Israeli conflict and the Palestinian cause were deeply examined. Moreover, the components of alliance formation and collaboration were jointly discussed in light of the respondents' opinions and attitudes.

Chapter VII deals with analyzing and examining the relevant findings to the proposed research hypotheses and assumptions enticed in Chapter V. Based on the main argument, this following chapter will examine the relationship between group identity and intergroup relations and perceptions; as a result, it is crucial for analyzing and connecting the theoretical and historical framework in light of the assessed findings.

## CHAPTER 7

### ANALYSIS OF THE FINDINGS AND RESULTS

Chapter VI dealt with the relevant findings and data collected from the surveys and questionnaires. The chapter was divided into two main sections. The exploratory variables that find spirit in relevant theory from chapter IV were thoroughly used to construct the questionnaire and relevant hypotheses and assumptions. Consequently, this framework was utilized in discussing the relevant findings and results in Chapter VI. The findings were investigated and narrated in light of the general structure of the study at hand. The first section explored the findings that emerged from the research variables interrelated to group identity. The second section explored the findings that emerged from the research variables interconnected with intergroup relations and perceptions.

Chapter VII primarily deals with analyzing and examining the relevant findings in light of the proposed research hypotheses and assumptions. This chapter will examine the modern day perceptions and attitudes of the respondents in light of the historical determinants and actualities discussed in chapter II and III. The main units of analysis for this chapter are primarily derived from the theoretical structure and historical framework. The tools that will be utilized for measuring and exploring the modern day perceptions of Maronite and Druze college students towards the state of Israel find ground and spirit in the previous chapters. Consequently, this chapter will study the relationship between group identity and intergroup relations, in light of the previous literature in the earlier chapters. The division of this chapter will be done according to the research hypotheses and assumptions.

## A. Introduction

This section will primarily deal with presenting the data in context of the main argument. Several statistical functions<sup>1</sup> will be used to determine the correlation between the previous findings in chapter VI. In addition, in this chapter the hypotheses will be either rejected or accepted. It becomes crucial to explore the results and findings in light of the initial research assumptions and postulations.

The general structure of the findings indicated that the majority of the respondents in the surveyed groups support peace talks with the state of Israel. More importantly, the overwhelming majority of the respondents believe that peace is probable and attainable. However, many respondents claim that different entities and players are impeding the possibility of concluding a peace treaty. The respondents from these groups voice similar sentiments. The findings primarily indicated that these college students felt that in general, these respondents blamed Hezbollah, Syria and Iran for hindering the possibility of a peace treaty. Nevertheless, the majority of the respondents expressed their support to concluding peace between Lebanon and Israel based on economic growth and prosperity. An additional fraction of the respondents justified their support to lasting peace between Lebanon and Israel based on the assumption that these nation – states have similar goals and ideals in the Middle East.

On the level of perceived identity, the respondents were asked to express their understanding of the history of Lebanon and the history of their community. It is noteworthy to mention, that the questions were constructed in light of the importance of ‘history and tradition’ in the formation of a group’s identity. As a result, it became

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<sup>1</sup> These functions mainly include cross tabulation, frequency distribution and bivariate analysis.

fundamental to examine how the respondents perceive their own history in order to establish structural guidelines for understanding their conception of self – identity. The majority of the Maronite respondents associated Lebanese and Maronite history with Phoenician heritage and legacy. On the other hand, the majority of the Druze respondents correlated their group history with Arab heritage and tradition. Nevertheless, a substantial portion of the respondents associated the history of Lebanon with Phoenician legacy and heritage.

### **B. Accepting or Rejecting the Research Hypotheses and Assumptions**

The preface of this chapter indicated that the sections will primarily deal with analyzing and cross-tabulating the relevant proposed research postulations. Therefore, each sub – heading will deal with the correlated variables for the study at hand. It is noteworthy to mention that it is invalid to claim that the findings and analysis of the data can be generalized to encompass and represent the entire views and opinions of the surveyed groups at hand. However, these findings reflect the perceptions and opinions of segments within these communities. It should be mentioned that throughout this chapter, the terms ‘Maronites’ and ‘Druze’ are interchangeable for ‘Maronite respondents’ and ‘Druze respondents’ respectively. Furthermore, the reader should bear in mind that the analysis of the findings is relevant to the general structure of Lebanese – Israeli relations<sup>2</sup>. As a result, the majority of the variables throughout this research study have been focused on understanding the political values – perceptions and opinions – of Maronite and Druze college students towards Israel.

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<sup>2</sup> This framework includes all the relevant variables constructed in the questionnaire. These research variables included questions on the respondents’ perceptions towards the Peace Process and the Palestinian cause.

## *1. Identity and Intergroup Relations*

A1 → Maronites and Druze favor having relations with the state of Israel.

It seems inappropriate to claim that Maronites and Druze favor relations with the state of Israel today, in light of historical actualities and realities solely, and given the studied time period from 1920 – 1985. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy to mention that post 1985 the principles of the Israeli interventionist school radically altered. Consequently, the form of relations between these minority groups has never been maintained or overtly continued after 1985. The Israelis lost faith in their junior partner in Lebanon, the Christians, and the Druze community in Israel protected and safeguarded the interest of their coreligionists in Lebanon. As a result, and according to Israeli political and military strategists, the ‘Maronite option failed’. Nevertheless, on Israel’s domestic level, the relations with the Druze community strengthened and continued gradually and strongly. In addition, the ‘Follow up Commission- between the Druze in Lebanon and Israel’ continued until the final Israeli withdrawal to South Lebanon in 1985. Given all these correlated historical actualities, it seems crucial to give value to these determinants in light of understanding their effect on the self – consciousness of these college students. The nature of the Lebanese society should be evaluated according to the confessional division and its accommodationist political system. Then the main question to be addressed is the relationship between the major events occurring between 1920 and 1985 and how these respondents understand and perceive them while reflecting upon modern political realities. From the process of data collection, it seemed plain obvious that the overwhelming majority<sup>3</sup> had prior knowledge of the historical relations between their group and the state of Israel. In some

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<sup>3</sup> To an extent, one could claim ‘every surveyed respondent’.



cases, these college students praised the legacy of these historical relations – giving importance to their necessity in the given context and time frame – while in other cases, several respondents felt ‘ashamed’ to accept existing historical realities. In addition, these college students undergo socialization via their parents, their school system, and their larger society, including the media. Following 1985, Israel began facing a newly emerged and strong enemy – Hezbollah. This struggle encompassed a 15 year period of war and clashes between the SLA – supported by Israel – and the militant Islamic party. Given this framework, the respondents were occasionally exposed to the day to day military skirmishes between Hezbollah and SLA units in Southern Lebanon. The major turning points in the battle between the Lebanese resistance movements, led by Hezbollah, and Israel took place in 1993, 1996, 2000 and 2006. All of these historical landmarks meant an additional rift in the relations between Lebanon and Israel and fundamentally a change in vision towards the ‘friendly’ Lebanon. The bloody atrocities in Operation Accountability in 1993 and Operation Grapes of Wrath in 1996, created a huge impact and effect on the self – consciousness of these respondents. The bloody images of massacred children by Israel’s war machine undoubtedly left a horrific trace in the psyche of these students. Following Israel’s total withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000, the students were exposed and submerged into a society that expressed and diffused several accusations towards Lebanese individuals and groups that collaborated with Israel. The Lebanese laws are strict and decisive in the measures to be taken against treacherous and collaborative acts. Lebanon has for long recognized the state of Israel as the ‘true’ and ‘official’ enemy.

The concept of minority alliances failed drastically with the assassination of Bashir Gemayel, the massacres of Sabra and Shatila and the Mountain War. As a result,

it became lucid that the fate of the May 17 Agreement was doomed from inception. Following the demise of the Likud government, the entire vision and policy towards Lebanon changed. The state of Israel had to revisit its earliest assumptions towards a 'friendly' weak Lebanon. With the emergence of resistance groups in 1982 following Operation Peace for Galilee, the state of Israel had to find appropriate security solutions. Instead of hypothesizing on the possibility of installing a friendly Lebanese regime, Israeli officials had to focus their concern on supporting and strengthening their local proxy – the SLA.

It becomes vital to explore how these respondents perceive the state of Israel in light of the historical relations of their communities from 1920 – 1985, and in given context of the situation from 1985 to Israel's final withdrawal in 2000.

The findings indicated that the majority of the respondents favor relations with the state of Israel. A bivariate analysis of two interrelated factors established how these respondents favor relations with Israel. The first factor included supporting and boosting peace talks with Israel and the second factor explored the possibility of economic growth and benefit from establishing such a peace accord. In addition, internal response consistency maintained that the respondents favored relations with the state of Israel based on their assumption that Lebanon and Israel shared common ideals and goals in the Middle East.

#### a. Maronite Respondents

On the level of perceived self – identity, the majority of the Maronites associated their history with Phoenician heritage and legacy. The Taef Accords strictly indicated the 'Arab nature, face and identity' of Lebanon. Nevertheless, the majority of

the surveyed Maronite respondents still view their history and identity associated with Phoenician heritage and legacy. This postulated attitude formulates a sense of distinction in their portrayal and depiction of their identity. In various historical instances, individuals and segments from the Maronite community diffused 'Phoenician' tendencies in light of supporting their cultural superiority and distinctiveness vis-à-vis the other communal groups. In other stances, these Maronite segments associated Phoenician heritage in light of 'archaic' ties with the Hebrews. In addition, the Maronites viewed the history of Lebanon from their own perceived identity.

Multivariate analysis – established from combining multiple factors – indicates that the vast majority of the Maronites associate and perceive their identity in light of Phoenician heritage and legacy. In addition, the vast majority of the Maronites support and boost peace talks with Israel. Even though a substantial segment of the respondents were against the existence of Israel, they claimed they had to accept the 'actual reality' – the recognized existence of Israel – and search for the 'lesser of two evils', economic normalization for projected benefit and prosperity. The overall findings depict that the majority of the Maronites perceive their identity – Phoenician (majority) and Greco – Roman - distinct from Arab heritage.

It is noteworthy to mention that around 81.7 % of the Maronite respondents favor peace with Israel. However, within the different Maronite sub – categories, it is necessary to indicate that the respondents that associate themselves with Greco – Roman heritage constitute the highest percentage bracket (88%) out of the 81.7%, followed by the sub – category that adhere to Phoenician heritage (84%). Furthermore, the percentage brackets of the sub – categories of the Maronite respondents that

associate with Arab and Syrian heritage out of the total 81.7% are (69%) and (73%) respectively.

**Table 7. 1 - Perceived Identity \* Peace With Israel Cross-tabulation**

Community			Peace with Israel				Total <sup>a</sup>
			Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	
Maronite	Perceived Identity <sup>b</sup>	Arab Heritage	4.3%	8.9%	2.7%	3.0%	19.0%
		Phoenician Heritage	25.3%	31.2%	7.5%	2.2%	67.0%
		Greco - Roman heritage	3.0%	3.2%	1.1%	.0%	7.0%
		Syrian Heritage	2.4%	3.5%	1.1%	.8%	8.0%
	Total		34.9%	46.8%	12.4%	5.9%	100.0%
Druze	Perceived Identity <sup>b</sup>	Arab Heritage	17%	35%	19%	13.2%	83.0%
		Phoenician Heritage	3%	9%	.0%	1.6%	13.0%
		Greco - Roman heritage	.5%	1.1%	.0%	.5%	2.0%
		Syrian Heritage	.5%	.0%	.0%	1.1%	2.0%
	Total		20.3%	44.5%	18.7%	16.5%	100.0%

a. Percentages do not add up to 100 due to rounding.

b. Multivariate analysis of several correlated variables on identity.

H1 → There is a correlation between group perception of self – identity and favoring relations with the state of Israel.

(Identity → Positive Intergroup relations)

In light of the historical actualities that depict long years of relations between segments from the Maronite community and the state of Israel, and the modern day perceptions of Maronite college students towards the state of Israel, hypothesis (H1) is accepted in the case of the Maronite respondents.

The self distinctiveness – different from Arab heritage - of the Maronite respondents in comparison to other communal groups and their appreciation and support towards initiating peace talks with the state of Israel, gives credence and accuracy to the formulated hypothesis.

#### b. The Druze Respondents

On the level of perceived self – identity, the majority of the Druze associated their history with Arab heritage and legacy. The historical position of the Druze community in Lebanon has always been supportive of Arab nationalism as opposed to pro – Western factions. Initially, the Druze community in Lebanon spearheaded the Lebanese National Movement that supported the Palestinian cause against the state of Israel and the Maronite political dominance and superiority. A smaller segment of the Druze associated their history with Phoenician heritage and legacy. However, it is noteworthy to mention that the majority of Druze associated Lebanon’s history with Phoenician heritage and legacy. It is crucial to understand the position of the Druze community in Lebanon as the vanguards of the Palestinian cause. However, there should be a clear acknowledgment of Druze transnational solidarity in the wake up of

the Mountain War in 1983. The findings indicated that the vast majority of the Lebanese Druze expresses extremely warm or warm sentiments towards their coreligionists in Israel. In light of historical realities, the Druze in Israel lobbied their government for protecting and safeguarding the existence and survival of the Druze in Lebanon.

Multivariate analysis of the empirical data indicates that the vast majority of the Druze associate and perceive their identity in light of Arab heritage and legacy. In addition, the majority of the respondents support and boost the establishment of peace talks between Lebanon and Israel. The Druze justify their claims in light of the economic benefit and gain that emerges from economic normalization with the state of Israel.

In light of the historical actualities that depict long years of relations between the Druze community in Israel and the government, and the sense of commonality between the Druze in Lebanon and those in Israel – mutual concerns for survival that were translated into overt relations between the Lebanese Druze and the state of Israel - and the modern day perceptions of Druze college students towards the state of Israel, hypothesis (H1) is rejected in the case of Druze respondents.

The Lebanese Druze have had relations with their Israeli coreligionists, yet it has not affected their sense of identity. The overwhelming majority associate themselves with Arab heritage and tradition, yet they support and endorse the probability of a peace treaty with Israel. In light of their support for a peace treaty and their perceived identity as ‘Arabs’, there is not a correlation between self – identity and favoring relations with Israel.

It is noteworthy to mention that around 64.8% of the Druze respondents favor peace with Israel. However, within the different Druze sub – categories, it is necessary to indicate that the respondents that associate themselves with Phoenician heritage constitute the highest percentage bracket (92%) out of the 64.8%, followed by the sub – category that adhere to Greco - Roman heritage (80%). Furthermore, the percentage brackets of the sub – categories of the Druze respondents that associate with Arab and Syrian heritage out of the total 64.8% are (62%) and (25%) respectively.

## ***2. Group Cohesion and Political Vision***

### **a. Maronite Respondents**

A1 → The low level of Maronite group cohesion produces a fragmented political disunited vision.

Group cohesion was thoroughly discussed and defined in light of understanding individuals' level of attachment and loyalty to their respective unit. Multiple factors had to be transformed into a single variable that is essential for Crosstabulation analysis. On the level of Maronites, the assumption was that the level of group cohesion was low and as a result it produced a fragmented political vision. It is noteworthy to mention that 'political vision' in the context of this study is defined as the group's political visions and perceptions towards the state of Israel. This political vision is measured accordingly to the respondents' feelings towards boosting and supporting peace with the state of Israel.

As a result, using multivariate analysis - established from combining multiple factors – the findings indicated that the majority of the Maronite respondents are very attached to their group. Consequently, with the combination of several interrelated



variables on group cohesion, the findings indicated that the Maronites have a high level of group cohesion. In addition, the previous findings indicated that the majority of the Maronites supported achieving peace between Lebanon and Israel.

In light of the existing findings and results, the Maronites have a high level of group cohesion and more importantly they have a unified political vision – towards the state of Israel; therefore, in the case of the Maronites, the assumption (A1) needs to be revisited<sup>1</sup>. Consequently, in the case of the Maronites, the hypothesis (H2) is accepted.

#### b. Druze Respondents

A2 → The high level of Druze group cohesion produces a unified political vision.

With the case of the Druze respondents, the proposed assumption was that the Druze have an extremely high level of group cohesion. In light of historical realities, the Druze have had an expressed transnational identity that maintained the existence and survival of the community in the Levant. The Druze have frequently maintained a unified political attitude in their interaction with other communal groups. In the different nation – states in the Levant, the Druze have had a cohesive attitude in dealing with their host governments. As a result, they were always able to maintain their religious autonomy and land property regardless of any given circumstance. In Lebanon, the Druze community is recognized as one of the most important groups in Lebanese history and regardless of their smaller population they maintain important positions in the political system. In Israel, the Druze were able to maintain their land property and possessions by supporting the Zionists in creating the Jewish homeland in

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<sup>1</sup> This assumption that postulates the correlation between Maronite group cohesion and political vision should be revisited in a different given circumstance or situation.

Palestine. This sense of group cohesiveness enabled the Druze to become full Israeli citizens receiving the benefits equal to the ones granted to Israeli Jews.

Applying multivariate analysis to the findings indicates that the majority of the Druze respondents are very attached to their group. Consequently, with the combination of several interrelated variables on group cohesion, the findings indicated that the Druze have a high level of group cohesion. In addition, the previous findings indicated that the majority of the Druze supported achieving peace between Lebanon and Israel.

In light of the existing findings and results, the Druze have a high level of group cohesion and more importantly they have a unified political vision – favoring peace - towards the state of Israel. However, their level of group cohesion is not related to their political vision. There is not a progression in the findings within the sub – categories that measure and assess the level of Druze group cohesion. Therefore, in the case of the Druze assumption (A2) needs to be revisited. Consequently, in the case of the Druze, hypothesis (H2) is rejected.

H2 → There is a relationship between group cohesion and political vision.

(Higher level of group cohesion → Stronger United Political Vision)

**Table 7.2 - Group Cohesion \* Peace with Israel Cross - tabulation**

Community			Peace with Israel				Total <sup>a</sup>
			Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	
Maronite	Group Cohesion <sup>b</sup>	Very attached	20.6%	25.5%	5.4%	2.1%	54.0%
		Fairly attached	9.4%	16.4%	4.3%	2.7%	33.0%
		Poorly attached	2.7%	3.5%	1.6%	.5%	8.0%
		Not attached	2.1%	1.6%	1.1%	.5%	6.0%
	Total		34.9%	46.9%	12.3%	5.9%	100.0%
Druze	Group Cohesion <sup>b</sup>	Very attached	11.5%	14.3%	8.2%	6.6%	41.0%
		Fairly attached	4.9%	20.3%	7.1%	2.7%	35.0%
		Poorly attached	2.2%	6.6%	3.3%	4.4%	17.0%
		Not attached	1.6%	3.3%	.0%	2.7%	8.0%
	Total		20.3%	44.5%	18.7%	16.5%	100.0%

a. Percentages do not add up to 100 due to rounding.

b. Multivariate analysis of several correlated variables on group cohesion.

### *3. Group Solidarity and National Interests*

#### a. Maronite Respondents

A1 → The low level of Maronite group solidarity gives higher priority to Lebanese national interests.

The findings in Chapter VI indicated that the majority of Maronite respondents supported their sect in any emerging conflict. However, some of the respondents vowed their support for their sect, only if it is was the victim of aggression. Given this contending situation and high degree of rivalry between the different Maronite factions and parties, it was viable to assume that the Maronite community has a very low level of group solidarity.

The results of a multivariate analysis indicated that the majority of the Maronite respondents would support their group; however, half of these individuals would only support their entity if it was the victim of aggression. Consequently, with the combination of several interrelated variables on group solidarity, the findings indicated that the Maronites have a high level of group solidarity; however, their diversity of political values and their divisions between contending political parties translates into the absence of a solid and unified perception of ‘national interest’. Therefore, in the case of the Maronites, the assumption (A1) needs to be revisited<sup>1</sup>.

Consequently, in the case of the Maronites the hypothesis (H3) is rejected.

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<sup>1</sup> This assumption that postulates the correlation between Maronite group solidarity and Lebanese national interest should be revisited in a different given circumstance or situation. In revisiting this assumption, it seems crucial to explore how the respondents perceive ‘national interest’.

## b. Druze Respondents

A2→ The high level of Druze group solidarity gives lower priority to Lebanese national interests.

The findings indicated that the level of group solidarity within the Druze community is higher than the level of group solidarity in the Maronite community. In light of historical realities, the dispersion of the Druze community in the Levant did not affect their sense of group solidarity and commonality. The level of Druze solidarity should be understood in context of group survival. The historical overview of relations between Israel and the Druze community narrated several historical landmarks. The Druze sense of group solidarity has been defined differently through different time periods. As early as the 1920s, the Druze community had expressed a sense of neutrality in light of the riots that followed the Balfour Declaration in 1917. Additionally, the Druze in Palestine actively supported the Zionists in the First Arab – Israeli War in the belief that they could be spared from any form of expulsion and land appropriation. More importantly, the Druze have become fully integrated in the Israeli system. They are loyal and faithful citizens of the state of Israel and they fully participate in their military campaigns in Palestine and the Middle East.

The primary indication of a strong level of solidarity is justified through understanding the nature of relations between the Israeli Druze and the state of Israel in light of understanding the evolution of relations between the Lebanese Druze and the state of Israel. An additional overt and blatant indication is mainly derived through investigating the dimensions of Operation Peace for Galilee. This military campaign was conducted by the state of Israel in the assumption that the Maronite Kataeb party

will support their mission. What is important about this campaign is not exploring the declared security objectives, but assessing the dimensions of Druze transnational solidarity – between Lebanon, Israel and Syria - in safeguarding their existence. When the Lebanese Druze feared the possible repercussion of Maronite Kataeb deployment in the Shouf following Israeli invasion, they urgently contacted their Israeli brethren for expedited support and assistance. The Druze in Israel extensively lobbied their government for an express solution in the Shouf District and an Israeli protection for their Lebanese coreligionists.

The findings indicated that the overwhelming majority of the Druze respondents would support their group unquestionably. Furthermore, a pool of historical actualities narrates that the Druze regardless of their geographic location would definitely coordinate their efforts for the survival of their community. Consequently, with the combination of several interrelated variables on group solidarity, the findings indicated that the Druze today have a high level of group solidarity that correlates with the possibility of negating the national interest for the sake of preserving this solidarity. Therefore, in the case of the Druze, assumption (A2) is viable. Consequently, hypothesis (H3) is accepted.

H3 → The intensity of group solidarity is likely to weaken commitment to national issues.

(Higher level of group solidarity → Lower commitment to state - national interests)

**Table 7.3 - Group Solidarity \* National Interest Cross-tabulation**

			Lebanese National Interest				Total <sup>a</sup>
			Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	
Community							
Maronite	Group Solidarity <sup>b</sup>	Support my sect unquestionably	12.9%	10.4%	8.2%	.3%	32.0%
		Support my sect even its to blame	1.9%	5.2%	5.2%	1.4%	14.0%
		Support my sect if it's the victim	4.9%	7.1%	17.8%	4.4%	34.0%
		Support other sect, if mine aggressor	.3%	2.5%	2.2%	1.1%	6.0%
		Support neither sect	.8%	4.4%	6.3%	2.7%	14.0%
Druze	Group Solidarity <sup>b</sup>	Support my sect unquestionably	10.7%	10.7%	14.1%	2.3%	38.0%
		Support my sect even its to blame	2.3%	7.3%	6.8%	.6%	17.0%
		Support my sect if it's the victim	4.0%	9.6%	14.7%	2.8%	31.0%
		Support other sect, if mine aggressor	.0%	.0%	.6%	1.7%	2.0%
		Support neither sect	1.1%	.6%	5.6%	4.5%	12.0%

a. Percentages do not add up to 100 due to rounding.

b. Multivariate analysis of several correlated variables on group solidarity.

#### ***4. Prospects of Peace and Its Benefits***

##### **a. Maronite Respondents**

A1 → The Maronites favor a Peace Treaty with Israel based on their cold attitude towards the Palestinian cause.

The findings indicated that the majority of the Maronite respondents favor a peace treaty with the state of Israel. Furthermore, the findings specified that approximately half of the respondents expressed extremely cold or cold sentiments towards the Palestinian refugees. In addition, around 82% of the surveyed Maronite respondents expressed extremely cold or cold sentiments towards the Palestinian militants. These feelings should be understood in light of the Lebanese Civil War and the regional and historical context. During the Lebanese Civil War, mainstream Maronite political leaders – including the Gemayel and Chamoun families – claimed that the Palestinians posed a great threat to the stability and existence of Lebanon. In earlier time periods, several Maronite politicians – namely Emile Edde – and religious leaders – Patriarch Arida – voiced similar existential threats from the Muslim communities prior to the creation of the state of Israel in 1948. In the aftermath of the creation of the state of Israel, a collection of Maronite religious and civil leaders feared the settlement of the Palestinian refugees following their expulsion from Palestine in 1948. The historical determinants in the relations between the state of Israel and the Maronites – as narrated in chapter II – were primarily concerned on finding alternative methods to contain the Palestinians. A substantial fraction of the Maronite community cooperated with the state of Israel in sketching possible measures for neutralizing the Palestinian threat in Lebanon and Israel respectively. It is noteworthy to mention that



the majority of the respondents felt that the Palestinians were trying to ‘abduct Lebanon from its rightful people’.

Multivariate analysis provides data indicating that the overwhelming majority of the Maronite respondents express extremely cold sentiments towards the Palestinian refugees and militants. Consequently, with the combination of several interrelated variables on supporting peace with the state of Israel, the findings indicated that the Maronites unquestionably favor a peace treaty with Israel. Therefore, in the case of the Maronites the assumption (A1) is viable. Consequently, hypothesis (H4) is accepted from the Maronite perspective.

**Table 7.4 - How do you perceive the Palestinian militants? \* Peace with Israel Cross-tabulation**

Community			Peace with Israel				Total <sup>a</sup>
			Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	
Maronite	How do you perceive the Palestinian militants?	Extremely Warm	.3%	1.9%	.5%	.5%	3.0%
		Warm	.8%	2.4%	1.1%	.3%	5.0%
		Neutral	3.5%	5.4%	1.3%	.3%	11.0%
		Cold	2.7%	8.3%	2.4%	1.6%	15.0%
		Extremely Cold	27.6%	29.0%	7.0%	3.2%	67.0%
	Total		34.9%	46.9%	12.3%	5.9%	100.0%
Druze	How do you perceive the Palestinian militants?	Extremely Warm	1.1%	4.4%	2.7%	3.3%	12.0%
		Warm	1.6%	6.6%	4.4%	1.6%	14.0%
		Neutral	.0%	6.0%	3.8%	1.1%	11.0%
		Cold	4.9%	9.9%	2.7%	3.8%	22.0%
		Extremely Cold	12.6%	17.6%	4.9%	6.6%	42.0%
	Total		20.3%	44.5%	18.7%	16.5%	100.0%

a. Percentages do not add up to 100 due to rounding.

## b. Druze Respondents

A2 → The Druze favor a Peace Treaty with Israel based on their lukewarm attitude toward the Palestinian cause.

The findings indicated that the majority of the Druze respondents encouraged and supported the probability of a peace treaty between Lebanon and Israel. The respondents had multiple reasons explaining why they supported the probability of peace between these two nation– states. In light of their strong support for a peace treaty with the state of Israel, an assumption was constructed on the correlation between supporting peace with Israel and attitude towards the Palestinian cause. The findings indicated that a quarter of the Druze respondents expressed extremely warm or warm sentiments towards the Palestinian refugees. However, around 43% of the respondents expressed extremely cold or cold sentiments towards the Palestinian refugees. The research assumption was based on the grounds of Druze support to the Palestinians since 1948. Additionally, the active role of the Druze community in Israel – fully supportive of the regime and against the different Arab communities – and the active role of the Druze community in Lebanon – fully supportive of Arab nationalism and the Palestinian cause – was translated into an assumption that was based on investigating a ‘lukewarm’ attitude. The existence of these Druze communities on extremely different sides – politically at least – made the construction of the assumption quite ambiguous. Nevertheless, given the option of ‘neutral’ sentiments the respondents were able to indicate their responses in this given category that was neither warm nor cold.

As a result, using multivariate analysis - established from combining multiple factors – the findings indicated that the majority of the Druze respondents expressed extremely

cold sentiments towards the Palestinian militants and a substantial portion of the Druze respondents expressed cold sentiments towards the Palestinian refugees. Consequently, with the combination of several interrelated variables on supporting peace with the state of Israel, the findings indicated that the Druze unquestionably favor a peace treaty with Israel and more importantly express extremely cold or warm sentiments towards the Palestinian refugees and militants. Therefore, in the case of the Druze the assumption (A2) needs to be revisited<sup>1</sup>. Consequently, in the case of the Druze the hypothesis (H4) is accepted.

### c. Maronite and Druze Respondents

A3 → The Maronites and Druze favor a Peace Treaty with Israel in the belief it will help solve the Arab – Israeli conflict.

The respondents were asked to indicate whether they felt the Peace Process had a feasible chance of success in light of concluding a peace treaty between Lebanon and Israel. The respondents acknowledged the importance of Lebanon in any peaceful resolution to the conflict in the Middle East. The findings indicated that the majority of the respondents supported a peace treaty with the state of Israel based on a variety of reasons and multiple factors. Additionally, the respondents felt that the geographic location of Lebanon in the Levant gives it pivotal importance to any peace proposal in the Middle East.

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<sup>1</sup>This assumption that postulates the correlation between supporting peace with Israel and perception towards the Palestinian refugees and militants should be revisited in a different given circumstance or situation. In revisiting this assumption, it seems crucial to explore how the respondents bluntly – warm or cold – perceive these respondents.

Using multivariate analysis - established from combining multiple factors – the findings indicated that the majority of the respondents support the probability of peace accord with the state of Israel. Consequently, with the combination of several interrelated variables on supporting peace with the state of Israel, the findings indicated that the respondents unquestionably favor a peace treaty with Israel and more importantly have firm belief that it will enhance the feasibility of success in the process of the Arab – Israeli conflict. Therefore, in the case of these respondents the assumption (A3) is viable. Consequently, hypothesis (H4) is accepted

**Table 7.5 - Success of the Arab - Israeli Peace Process \* Peace with Israel Cross-tabulation**

Community			Peace with Israel				Total <sup>a</sup>
			Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	
Maronite	Success of the Arab - Israeli Peace Process	Strongly Agree	15.3%	6.5%	.5%	.3%	23.0%
		Agree	13.4%	34.4%	5.6%	1.3%	55.0%
		Disagree	4.6%	5.6%	4.8%	.8%	16.0%
		Strongly Disagree	1.6%	.5%	1.1%	3.5%	7.0%
	Total		34.9%	47.0%	12.1%	5.9%	100.0%
Druze	Success of the Arab - Israeli Peace Process	Strongly Agree	11.0%	2.7%	1.1%	1.1%	16.0%
		Agree	6.0%	33.5%	4.9%	1.1%	46.0%
		Disagree	2.2%	6.6%	8.2%	2.7%	20.0%
		Strongly Disagree	1.1%	1.6%	4.4%	11.5%	19.0%
	Total		20.3%	44.5%	18.7%	16.5%	100.0%

a. Percentages do not add up to 100 due to rounding.

A4 → The Maronites and Druze believe that Hezbollah, Syria and Iran impede a possible Peace Treaty with Israel.

The emergence of resistance groups in South Lebanon following Israel's invasion in 1982 changed the main actors and players in the evolution of relations between Lebanon and Israel. Prior to 1985, the chances of concluding a peace treaty between Lebanon and Israel were primarily focused on the Lebanese Kataeb Party, specifically under the leadership of President Elect Bashir Gemayel. However, following Israel's withdrawal to the Security Belt and the abrogation of the May 17 Agreement, three main players were added to the mixture. The newly formed Islamic party Hezbollah emerged on the battle scene resisting any Zionist project in Lebanon, with full support from Iran. Additionally, following Syria intervention in 1976, its role was greatly expanded in the Lebanese political scene and Lebanon's relations with Israel, especially after 1990 and the series of treaties signed with Lebanon that postulated the latter's foreign and domestic politics. More importantly, the situation in Lebanon resembled a clash between Syrian proxies from one side and Israeli proxies from the other. As a result, the quest for hegemony between Israel and Syria over the Middle East began in Lebanon. From one side, Israel had lost its main ally in Lebanon and consequently had to retreat to supporting the SLA in the Security Belt with limited feasibility for a future peace accord. On the other hand, Syria gained greater control over Lebanon's political institutions that fundamentally tied Lebanon's political decision making and foreign policy orientation in different association with Syrian interests and aspirations in the Middle East and the international community. As a result, it becomes crucial to measure the modern day perceptions of the college students

towards the state of Israel in light of these dominant actors in the balance of power in the Middle East.

As a result, using multivariate analysis - established from combining multiple factors – the findings indicated that the majority of the respondents support peace with the state of Israel. Consequently, with the combination of several interrelated variables on supporting peace with the state of Israel, the findings indicated that the respondents extravagantly favor a peace treaty with Israel, yet they believe that several groups and entities are hindering the probability of peace. The findings revealed that the overwhelming majority of the respondents have firm belief that Hezbollah, Syria and Iran collectively, independently and interchangeably were obstructing the prospects of peace between Lebanon and Israel. Therefore, in the case of the Druze and Maronite respondents, assumption (A4) is viable. Consequently, hypothesis (H4) is accepted.

H4 → The respondents are expected to assume that peace between Lebanon and Israel will reflect positively on the region.

Prospects of peace → Higher benefits for the region



**Table 7.6 - Main Hindrance to Concluding Peace \* Peace with Israel**

Community			Peace with Israel				Total <sup>a</sup>
			Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	
Maronite	Main Hindrance to Concluding Peace	Syria	7.5%	8.6%	1.1%	.3%	18.0%
		Iran	5.4%	8.6%	1.9%	.5%	17.0%
		Hezbollah	8.6%	11.5%	2.4%	.8%	24.0%
Druze	Main Hindrance to Concluding Peace	Syria	2.2%	4.9%	2.2%	.5%	10.0%
		Iran	3.3%	10.4%	6.6%	1.6%	22.0%
		Hezbollah	3.8%	17.6%	2.2%	6.0%	30.0%

a. Percentages do not add up to 100 because the choices were indicated in chosen priority from among other alternatives. For accuracy the additional responses were eliminated from the table.

i. Prospects of Peace and Lebanese Economy

A1 → The Maronites and Druze favor a Peace Treaty with Israel based on economic benefit and gain

The overwhelming majority of the respondents favored a peace treaty with Israel based on the prospects of economic growth and benefit. From the initiation of contacts between the Zionists and Lebanese minorities, economic benefits that result from the formation of such relations have constituted a vital factor. The majority of the respondents had firm belief and conviction that peace with Israel translated into higher economic benefits for Lebanon. Regardless of the fact that the overwhelming majority rejected the existence of the state of Israel, this majority justified their support for peace on the grounds of economic gain and benefit. Several respondents claimed that 'Lebanon does not need any exchange of diplomatic missions or any establishment of separate embassies with Israel', rather it can benefit from any form of economic normalization with the Zionist state.

As a result, using multivariate analysis - established from combining multiple factors – the findings indicated that the majority of the respondents support peace with the state of Israel. Consequently, with the combination of several interrelated variables on supporting peace with the state of Israel, the findings indicated that the respondents strongly favor peace in light of their perception of economic materialization and benefit for Lebanon resulting from such a solution. Therefore, in the case of the respondents the assumption (A1) is viable. Consequently, in the case of the respondents the hypothesis (H5) is accepted.

**Table 7.7 - If you support peace with Israel, how do you justify your claim? \* Peace with Israel Cross-tabulation**

Community			Peace with Israel				Total <sup>a</sup>
			Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	
Maronite	If you support peace with Israel, how do you justify your claim?	Economic prosperity	25.5%	21.5%	3.2%	1.9%	53.0%
		Similar goals in the Middle East	2.2%	9.9%	2.4%	.5%	15.0%
		Military superiority	1.3%	2.2%	.3%	.0%	4.0%
		Balance of power	1.1%	3.5%	.8%	.3%	6.0%
		'Right of Return'	1.6%	7.5%	1.1%	.3%	11.0%
Druze	If you support peace with Israel, how do you justify your claim?	Economic prosperity	11.0%	18.1%	5.5%	2.7%	38.0%
		Similar goals in the Middle East	.5%	6.0%	2.2%	.0%	9.0%
		Military superiority	1.1%	2.7%	.0%	.0%	4.0%
		Balance of power	2.7%	4.4%	.5%	.5%	8.0%
		'Right of Return'	1.6%	10.4%	2.2%	1.6%	16.0%

a. Percentages do not add up to 100 because the choices were indicated in chosen priority from among other alternatives. For accuracy the additional responses were eliminated from the table.

A2 → The Maronites and Druze value a Peace Treaty with Israel based on economic benefits that override their value to the Palestinian cause.

The findings indicated that the majority of the respondents supported a peace treaty with Israel based on their assumption that economic benefit and gain would gradually follow. In addition, several respondents had firm belief that Lebanon and Israel shared common goals and ideals in the Middle East and for that specific reason a peace treaty was achievable. However, a higher number of Druze and Maronite respondents justified their support for peace in light of finding a peaceful solution for the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. These respondents were clearly attached to the principles of the 'Right of Return'. As a result, these students have firm belief that the probability of peace with Israel meant a pragmatic and acceptable solution for the Lebanon and Israel with respect to the Palestinian refugees. However, when the respondents were asked to express their feelings towards the Palestinian refugees and militants, their answers varied greatly. A considerable segment of the respondents in these two groups expressed warm sentiments towards the Palestinian refugees. However, a larger pool of respondents expressed extremely cold or cold sentiments towards the Palestinian refugees and militants. Based on these findings, it seems crucial to evaluate whether the respondents favored peace with Israel in light of an acceptable solution for the Palestinians or whether they perceived that a suitable solution to their demands meant an adequate one for all. For that specific reason, the respondents were asked to indicate whether they perceived economic and military benefit – derived from concluding peace with the state of Israel – constituted a higher aim to them than the 'Palestinian Cause'. The findings indicated that half of the Maronite respondents felt that the economic and military benefits that materialize from peace with Israel, are not

actually sufficient to detach them from the Palestinian Cause. In addition, a lower but close percentage of the Druze respondents voiced similar sentiments. These findings require additional exploration on whether these respondents remained attached to the Palestinian cause in light of finding an acceptable solution for the refugees. More importantly, it is probable that the respondents – from historical actualities – have ‘lack of trust’ in the probability of substantial and significant economic benefit and gain from achieving peace with Israel. However, in giving consideration to the perception that peace between Lebanon and Israel would provide Lebanon with a peaceful and stable economic situation, the respondents might be fervently attached to the Palestinian cause in light of their personal and group interests. These respondents might have firm belief that a Peace treaty with Israel provides for an acceptable solution for the Palestinians that equally results in higher economic gain and benefit.

As a result, using multivariate analysis - established from combining multiple factors – the findings indicated that the majority of the respondents value a Peace Treaty with the state of Israel. Consequently, with the combination of several interrelated variables on supporting peace with the state of Israel, the findings indicated that the respondents would not detach themselves from adhering to the Palestinian cause in light of probable financial profit materialization. Nevertheless, it remains ambiguous on how these respondents express dual and seemingly contradictory sentiments. From one side, these respondents utterly and unquestionably support peace with Israel. While, on the other side these respondents justify their support for peace in light of economic prosperity; however, they feel an obligation to the Palestinian cause. Regardless, of the probability of economic benefit, the respondents overtly remain attached to the

Palestinian cause. Therefore, in the case of the respondents the assumption (A2) is viable. Consequently, hypothesis (H5) is accepted.

H5 → The respondents are expected to assume that peace between Lebanon and Israel will reflect positively on the Lebanese economy.

Prospects of peace → Higher benefits for Lebanese economy

**Table 7.8 - The Palestinian cause \* Peace with Israel Cross-tabulation**

Community			Peace with Israel				Total <sup>a</sup>
			Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	
Maronite	The Palestinian Cause	Strongly Agree	11.9%	5.1%	.5%	.3%	18.0%
		Agree	10.8%	17.3%	2.4%	.5%	31.0%
		Disagree	9.2%	20.1%	6.2%	2.4%	38.0%
		Strongly Disagree	2.7%	4.6%	3.0%	2.7%	13.0%
Druze	The Palestinian Cause	Strongly Agree	3.8%	3.3%	.5%	.5%	8.0%
		Agree	3.3%	9.3%	3.3%	.5%	17.0%
		Disagree	9.3%	24.7%	7.7%	6.6%	49.0%
		Strongly Disagree	3.8%	7.1%	7.1%	8.8%	27.0%

a. Percentages do not add up to 100 due to rounding.

## *5. Perceived Threats and Alliance Formation*

A1 → The Maronites and Druze are willing to ally with Israel facing threat from other groups.

The findings indicated that the majority of the respondents claimed they would take any measure to ensure the survival of their group. Additionally, these respondents based their assumption in light of a common perceived threat. These respondents indicated that they would form alliances with other minority groups that shared mutual concerns and ideals. However, the respondents were asked to express their sentiments regarding alliance formation with other Middle Eastern minorities in light of an existential threat. Consequently, using bivariate analysis, the correlation between group alliances and group survival was formulated. Moreover, bivariate analysis formulated the correlation between existential fears and the projected enemy. As a result, the findings were associated to study the relationship between existential threats and group survival, in the broader structure of alliance formation and the projection of the enemy.

As a result, using multivariate analysis - established from combining multiple factors – the findings indicated that the majority of the respondents value relations with the state of Israel based on mutual concerns and fears. Consequently, with the combination of several interrelated variables on favoring relations with the state of Israel, the findings indicated that the respondents would form an alliance with the state of Israel in light of an existential threat. More importantly, the findings indicated that these respondents would undertake any measure to ensure and maintain their group's survival in any given circumstance.

Therefore, in the case of the respondents the assumption (A1) is viable.



Consequently, in the case of the respondents the hypothesis (H6) is accepted.

H6 → The perception of existential threats is likely to promote a minority group's affiliation with the state of Israel.

Perceived Threats → Alliance Formation

**Table 7.9 - Existential Threat \* Group Survival Crosstabulation**

Community			Group Survival				Total <sup>a</sup>
			Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	
Maronite	Existential Threat	Strongly Agree	11.3%	6.9%	7.4%	.8%	27.0%
		Agree	7.1%	20.6%	16.8%	4.4%	49.0%
		Disagree	4.1%	7.4%	7.4%	1.4%	21.0%
		Strongly Disagree	1.4%	.5%	1.4%	1.1%	4.0%
Druze	Existential Threat	Strongly Agree	9.3%	4.9%	.5%	2.2%	17.0%
		Agree	13.2%	24.7%	15.4%	2.2%	56.0%
		Disagree	4.9%	7.1%	7.7%	2.7%	23.0%
		Strongly Disagree	1.6%	1.1%	.5%	1.6%	5.0%

a. Percentages do not add up to 100 due to rounding.

## *6. Collaboration and Alliance Formation*

A1 → The Maronites and Druze justify their collaborative acts based on similar forms of acts carried out by different Lebanese groups.

The findings indicated that the majority of the respondents would favor relations with any Middle Eastern minority, given they shared common goals and aspirations. More importantly, after using multivariate and bivariate analysis, the findings indicated that the respondents favor relations with the state of Israel in light of a common perceived threat. These threats usually focused on existential concerns. Given the context of the nature of Lebanese – Israeli relations, it seemed vital to explore how these groups justified their alliances with Israel. The respondents were asked to indicate whether they justified collaboration with Israel if they had knowledge that other groups were doing it. The vast majority of the respondents claimed that collaboration was not justifiable under any circumstance. As a result, it became crucial to further investigate how these respondents justified their group's collaborative acts with the state of Israel. By using bivariate analysis, the respondents indicated that their collaboration with Israel was not justifiable, even if they knew other groups were doing it; however, it was necessary to maintain their survival in the context of facing a common enemy. Even when the respondents indicated that they did not have faith in the well known Middle Eastern proverb 'the enemy of enemy is my friend', multivariate analysis produced alternative findings. The correlation between alliances, collaboration, group survival and existential threats formulated primary justification to the collaborative acts these communities established with the state of Israel. Therefore, in the case of the respondents, assumption (A1) is viable. Consequently, hypothesis (H7) is accepted.

**Table 7.10 - Alliance Formation\* Justification for Collaborative Acts \* Group Survival \* Existential Threat Crosstabulation**

Community			Group Survival * Existential Threat				Total <sup>a</sup>
			Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	
Maronite	Alliance Formation * Justification for Collaborative Acts	Strongly Agree	4.1%	2.5%	1.4%	.0%	8.0%
		Agree	6.6%	10.5%	4.7%	.3%	22.0%
		Disagree	8.6%	18.5%	19.3%	1.4%	48.0%
		Strongly Disagree	4.7%	4.1%	7.5%	5.8%	22.0%
Druze	Alliance Formation * Justification for Collaborative Acts	Strongly Agree	3.4%	5.6%	.0%	.6%	10.0%
		Agree	4.5%	7.8%	2.8%	.0%	15.0%
		Disagree	12.8%	15.1%	12.8%	1.7%	43.0%
		Strongly Disagree	7.3%	10.1%	8.9%	6.7%	33.0%

a. Percentages do not add up to 100 due to rounding.

A2 → The Maronites and Druze justify collaboration that emerges forcefully

The respondents were additionally asked to express their sentiments towards different groups that forcefully collaborate with Israel. In light of understanding how these respondents perceive and justify their collaboration with the state of Israel, it became crucial to explore how these respondents observe collaboration in two different contexts. The respondents were first asked to indicate whether they justified ‘forceful’ collaborative acts with the state of Israel. The findings indicated that the majority of the respondents in these surveyed groups felt that collaboration is ultimately justifiable when groups have no alternative choice. For the purpose of exploring these findings, frequency distribution was a necessary tool for analysis. However, for the ability to explore how these respondents justified this sense of collaboration – regardless if it was by force – bivariate analysis was utilized to examine the correlation between ‘forced collaboration’ and ‘group survival’. Additionally, the analyzed variables had to be cross tabulated for additional validity and verification. Therefore, in the case of the Druze and Maronite respondents, assumption (A2) is viable. Consequently, hypothesis (H7) is accepted.

**Table 7.11 - Group Survival \* Forced Collaboration Cross-tabulation**

Community			Forced Collaboration				Total <sup>a</sup>
			Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	
Maronite	Group Survival	Strongly Agree	4.6%	14.2%	3.6%	1.4%	24.0%
		Agree	3.3%	19.1%	9.8%	3.0%	35.0%
		Disagree	4.9%	16.1%	7.9%	4.4%	33.0%
		Strongly Disagree	1.1%	3.6%	1.6%	1.4%	8.0%
Druze	Group Survival	Strongly Agree	15.9%	11.5%	.0%	1.6%	30.0%
		Agree	12.6%	14.8%	7.7%	2.7%	38.0%
		Disagree	8.2%	8.2%	4.9%	2.7%	24.0%
		Strongly Disagree	3.8%	1.6%	2.7%	.5%	9.0%

a. Percentages do not add up to 100 due to rounding.

### A3 → The Maronites and Druze justify collaboration that emerges voluntarily

The respondents were asked to express their sentiments towards the groups that willingly and voluntarily collaborate with Israel. The findings indicated that the overwhelming majority of the respondents were against any form of collaboration that emerges willingly. More importantly, these findings had to be correlated with the respondents' understanding of 'group survival'. As a result, by using bivariate analysis, the correlation was established between the dimensions of 'voluntary cooperation' and 'existential claims'. Furthermore, the assumption was made in light of the possibility that groups voluntarily collaborate with the 'enemy' for the purpose of survival. However, in many cases the respondents rejected this sense of group survival. When the earlier findings indicated that the respondents were totally against any form of collaboration, their answers altered in light of maintaining their group's existence because they claimed they had 'no alternative choice'. However, when the respondents were given the choice to cooperate and collaborate with another group – presumable enemy – the vast of the respondents drastically rejected such interaction.

Consequently, by using multivariate analysis, the findings indicated that the respondents would not justify voluntary and intended collaborative acts under any given context or circumstance. In addition, several variables were correlated using bivariate and multivariate analysis in the assumption that a certain factor might alter their established opinion. The statistical functions included correlating distinct factors that dealt with the perception of group survival in light of a common threat. Nevertheless, the findings remained constant in nature and product. The vast majority of the respondents are candidly against any form of intended and deliberate collaboration.

Therefore, in the case of the respondents the assumption (A3) needs to be revisited.

Consequently, hypothesis (H7) is rejected.

H7 → Members of minority groups can justify collaboration with the state of Israel on the grounds of existential threats.

Collaboration → Perceived threats



**Table 7.12 - Group Survival \* Intended Collaboration Cross-tabulation**

Community			Intended Collaboration				Total <sup>a</sup>
			Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	
Maronite	Group Survival	Strongly Agree	6.4%	7.5%	5.8%	4.2%	24.0%
		Agree	8.3%	12.5%	10.3%	4.2%	35.0%
		Disagree	8.6%	10.0%	11.1%	3.6%	33.0%
		Strongly Disagree	3.1%	1.4%	1.9%	1.1%	8.0%
Druze	Group Survival	Strongly Agree	12.6%	6.0%	3.8%	6.6%	30.0%
		Agree	10.4%	15.4%	7.7%	4.4%	38.0%
		Disagree	9.3%	4.9%	6.0%	3.8%	24.0%
		Strongly Disagree	2.7%	3.3%	1.1%	1.6%	9.0%

a. Percentages do not add up to 100 due to rounding.

### **C. Connective Associations and Findings**

The former section dealt with analyzing and exploring the relevant findings from Chapter VI. More importantly, this chapter focused on assessing the findings in light of the relationship between group identity and intergroup relations and perceptions.

The major observation that can be made concerning the analysis of the findings is constructed in light of assessing the interrelatedness of the research variables in this concerned study. The theoretical structure included the various components and dimensions of the given concepts. In addition, the historical framework established the operationalization of these theoretical concepts and dimensions in given context. The modern day perceptions of the respondents should be evaluated in light of the merger of 'history' and 'theory'. As a result, the correlation between these disciplines should be assessed.

Without establishing the fundamental theoretical structure that gives credence and value to the research variables, the discussion of the historical actualities becomes senseless and worthless. In addition, without the occurrence of these historical realities, the theoretical concepts of any given variable can never be explored. These concepts require given sample subjects and case studies for adequate research hypothesizing. The relationship between these two disciplines requires an assessment of their interrelatedness and mutual value in any given circumstance. As a result, the main argument was formulated in light of the study of the relationship between identity and intergroup relations and perceptions. Consequently, as the findings indicated and explored, the dimensions of identity remain vague and abstract concepts that have and require adequate value in light of their relation to intergroup relations and interactions.

Furthermore, the level and manner of intergroup relations is assessed and evaluated in concrete manner in light of deriving its essence from theoretical themes. More importantly, the dynamics of intergroup relations cannot be understood without understanding the structure that provides the adequate medium for interaction. Therefore, it becomes crucial to understand that the conceptual framework of any given concept finds relativity and depth in exploring their formation in the actual physical meaning.

### ***1. Reflecting on the Given Variables***

This section deals with studying the relationship between the findings on perceived identity and the nature of intergroup relations and perceptions. The correlation of these findings is established in light of the historical realities between these groups. As a result, the research variables on group identity and intergroup relations complete each other. While some of these variables can be investigated and examined independently, the relationship between identity and intergroup relations requires an evaluation of these themes jointly. The correlation between group identity and the perceptions towards the state of Israel will be assessed.

It was vital to investigate how the respondents perceived their history, history of their community, and the history of Lebanon. It became crucial to explore how these respondents identify themselves in context of Lebanese political history. Needless to say, it was expected the majority of the Maronite respondents view themselves as the descendants of the Phoenicians. Additionally, it was pointless to expect that the majority of the Druze respondents would not associate themselves with Arab heritage and tradition. However, the value of these findings- exploring self – distinctiveness – is

vested in understanding their correlation to how these groups perceived the state of Israel. It was expected that the majority of the Maronite respondents would prefer to associate with Phoenician heritage and undoubtedly their 'separate' self – consciousness might lead them to favor relations with another 'dissident' minority in the Middle East. However, it was not expected that the majority of the Druze respondents who would prefer to associate with Arab heritage and tradition, would support and advance achieving peace with the state of Israel. In the latter case, it became obvious that investigating the prospects of group identity alone would have not produced any viable evidence for assessing their perceptions towards a certain phenomena. The findings provided by investigating Druze identity provided the obvious and expected reality. However, when the findings on group identity were cross tabulated with their perceptions towards their Israeli coreligionists and the state of Israel, the findings drastically altered. The data from the Druze respondents indicated that groups can associate themselves with an Arab identity, yet they can still favor peace with Israel in light of an additional given factor. According to historical actualities, it seems that Druze transnational solidarity expands beyond the nature and nationalist essence of the Arab – Israeli conflict. The Druze community in Lebanon supported and spearheaded the Lebanese National Movement that fought against Maronite supremacy and pro – Western orientation. However, in light of a threat to their group's survival and existence their values shifted into providing the necessary measures for group continuity. In the wake of Operation Peace for Galilee, the Druze in Lebanon with full support from their Israeli brethren perceived the incoming 'enemy' – the state of Israel – as their incoming 'friend' and 'savior' from their local enemies – the Maronite Kataeb primarily.

The historical evolution of relations between the Zionists and these Lebanese groups involved several important landmarks. The common factor and primary fear for the Maronites in Lebanon and the Jews and Druze in the Jewish state was to find measures to contain the Palestinians. For more than 60 years, Israeli foreign policy towards Lebanon was engineered towards concluding peace with a Maronite ‘friendly’ government in light of providing mutual security objectives and interests. The fundamental concern for the Maronites – an elite circle in the community – was to keep their political dominance in the Lebanese system without altering the sensitive demographic nature of Lebanon – with the presence of the Palestinian refugees. On the level of the state of Israel, the primary concern was to ensure Druze undying support and loyalty to the Jewish homeland in countering the rise of Palestinian nationalism – demanding their rightful claims for their land. As a result, the Israeli diplomatic and security policy was to ensure regional allies that would support their concentrated efforts against the Palestinians in Lebanon and Israel.

The previous chapters discussed the nature of Zionist policy towards Lebanon and in light of understanding their alliances with minority groups. The section that described the principles of Zionist diplomacy focused on investigating the dimensions of the ‘divide and conquer’ strategy. This strategy involved the correlation between creating ‘a sense of commonality’, the approach towards minorities ‘minority alliance’, the dynamics of ‘group survival’ and the dimensions of ‘security and economic objectives’. The latter components of the ‘divide and conquer’ strategy are initiated interchangeably without setting a constant starting point. Given the circumstance, these components can interchange and produce one another. Consequently, this sense of commonality was modeled on the assumption of similar ‘ideological identities and

beliefs'. The belief was that minority groups perceive their self – identity 'differently' from other groups in the system. On that belief, Zionist policy was conducted in its ability to further expand the 'beliefs' and 'differences' of minority groups within their given structure. The Zionists had firm belief that these minority groups would form alliances with other groups that shared similar fears and concerns. As a result, the Zionists initiated their policy towards the Maronites – relations were initiated interchangeably - by embossing their shared fears and concerns. These fears and concerns from Muslim dominance and control in the Yishuv period, was later transformed to fears and concerns from the Palestinians in general. This same policy was initiated in Palestine during the Yishuv period. The Zionists approached the Druze in their understanding that they share common goals, fears, and aspirations from the Arab communities in Palestine. This sense of neutrality expressed by the Druze gave impetus to the Zionists that a probable alliance was achievable.

The Zionists formed a partnership with the Maronites based on three interconnected dimensions. The first dimension was that the Maronites expressed to the Zionists their support in the creation of a Jewish homeland – in their belief it maintained the balance of power in the Middle East. They actually supported the creation of a separate Jewish state in their belief that Lebanese – Zionist cooperation and alliance - provided a strong front against the surrounding Arab states. The second dimension was that the Maronites claimed that their culture and identity had direct association with Phoenician heritage and legacy. Additionally, the Zionists perceived the Maronites had a different political inclination and orientation in comparison to other Arab groups, because they have always expressed pro – Western sentiments. The third dimension was that the Zionists knew the Maronites feared losing their political dominance. More

importantly, their political dominance undoubtedly meant economic dominance in the system. The Zionists claimed that the Maronites among other groups value economic growth and prosperity primarily to providing significance for ideology and beliefs.

Therefore, the relationship between group identity and intergroup relations was transformed into an alliance between the Maronites and the Zionists in light of their mutual fears of the Muslims in the Arab world, their understanding of a 'separate' and different identity, and more importantly their passion for economic benefit and gain.

The Zionists constantly observed the movement and political tendencies of the Arab communal groups in light of seeking sympathetic Arabs that would support the emergence and creation of a Jewish homeland. Following the first riots in 1920 – 1921 following the Balfour Declaration in 1917, the Zionists began to have fond interest in the neutrality expressed by the Druze in supporting the Arabs. The Zionists depicted the Druze community had no interest in supporting the Muslims against the Jews in any internal brawl. Consequently, the Zionists formed a partnership with the Druze based on three correlated dimensions. The first dimension included the perception of the Druze as a 'separate' group with different religious values and ideals in light of their neutrality and lack of support to the Arab groups. Additionally, the Zionists received ample support to their beliefs - by sending individuals from the Political Department in the Jewish Agency to Druze villages in Syria, Lebanon and Palestine – that the Druze perceived their identity and history differently in comparison to other Arab religious communities. The second dimension was based on the belief that the Druze valued their survival by all means and more importantly they ensured it by providing support and allegiance to their local governments in Lebanon, Syria and Palestine. As a result, it became necessary for the Zionists to further exacerbate the differences between the

Druze and other Muslim groups in the belief they would have their loyalty and support in the creation of the Jewish homeland. The third dimension was related to understanding the religious principles of the Druze faith. The Zionists gained knowledge that the Druze highly valued their attachment to their agricultural fields and vast stretches of land. The Zionists had knowledge that the Druze had superior military skills that were necessary for utilization against the Arab communities.

Therefore, the relationship between group identity and intergroup relations was transformed into an alliance that still continues and prospers between the Druze and the Zionists primarily in light of Israeli Druze neutrality towards the Arabs. Additionally, the relations continued passionately following the creation of the state of Israel. The Druze and Zionists share mutual concerns and fears towards the Muslims in the Arab world and Israel. The Zionist – Druze partnership is based on their understanding of a ‘separate’ and different identity and more importantly their passion and attachment to land ownership and property.

#### **D. The Correlation between the Discussion and Analysis of the Findings**

This section will deal with combining the discussion of the findings and results in Chapter VI and the respective analysis of these results in Chapter VII. For that specific purpose, this section will provide the correlation of these findings enticed in bullet form.

From this concerned study, five different contributions can be narrated in context of understanding the nature of relations between Lebanon and Israel.

- The overwhelming majority of the respondents favor relations with Israel. More importantly, they support and boost peace talks with the state of Israel. It is



noteworthy to mention that the majority of these respondents were against the existence of a Jewish state in Palestine; nevertheless, the same group claimed that they had to accept 'the given reality of Israel's existence'. Additionally, these respondents justify their support for peace with Israel in light of the economic benefit and gain that emerges from concluding such an agreement. Furthermore, a partial segment of the respondents claim that Lebanon and Israel have common ideals and goals in the Middle East.

Therefore, the findings indicated that these groups support peace with Israel.

- The vast majority of the respondents claim that Hezbollah – primarily – Syria and Iran are hindering the possibility of achieving peace between Lebanon and Israel. Additionally, a segment of the respondents believe that the presence of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon is impeding the chances for peace with Israel. Therefore, the findings indicated that these groups believe Hezbollah is impeding the probability of peace.
- The vast majority of the respondents justify collaboration with Israel when groups are threatened and forced to cooperate. While the same majority of the respondent reject any form of intended and voluntary collaboration with the state of Israel. Therefore, the findings indicated that these groups justify collaboration with Israel only when such collaboration is by force and involuntary.
- The overwhelming majority of the respondents express cold sentiments towards the Palestinian refugees and militants; however, they are not willing to detach themselves from the Palestinian cause regardless of the economic and military gains that materialize following peace with the state of Israel. Therefore, the

findings indicated that these groups are not willing to detach from the Palestinian cause regardless of the given circumstances.

- The vast majority of the respondents believe that any measure should be taken for the survival of their community. Additionally, the respondents indicated that Middle Eastern minorities that share similar fears and concerns are supposed to form alliances. Therefore, the findings indicated that that these groups justify collaboration and alliance formation with Israel in light of existential threats.

### **E. Future Academic Endeavors**

Historically, the Lebanese-Israeli relations have been conducted based on the principle of minority alliances and the categorical divisions of sects. This has enabled this study to use this criterion of sect as an instrument of analyzing and interpreting inter-group relations and perceptions towards the state of Israel. However, future endeavors that aim to complete and improve this work must concentrate on utilizing different criteria and categories of study. These latter areas of focus could be socio-economic status, levels of education, political affiliation, and other indicators that determine perceptions and attitudes towards the state of Israel maybe even more than the criteria of sect could do.

### **F. Concluding Remarks**

Chapter VII dealt with exploring and analyzing the relevant findings from Chapter VI. This chapter investigated the correlation between the findings pertaining to identity and the results related to intergroup relations. Additionally, the findings were analyzed in light of the historical actualities presented in earlier chapters.

Chapter VII deals with a conclusion of the study at hand. It will explore the association between the modern day perceptions of the Maronites and Druze towards the state of Israel in light of the historical realities and actualities. In addition, the last chapter will discuss the additional elements that require deeper investigation and exploration for further research endeavors.

## CHAPTER 8

### CONCLUSION

Chapter VI and VII dealt with discussing and analyzing the findings and results in light of the constructed research assumptions and hypotheses in Chapter V. The relevant findings on group identity and intergroup relations and perceptions were thoroughly explored and investigated. In addition, the analysis of the findings paved way for understanding the relationship between group-perceived identity and intergroup relations and perceptions.

Chapter VIII will primarily assess and evaluate the relevancy of the findings in light of existing studies on the subject at hand. The expected contributions mentioned in Chapter I will be discussed with respect to the entire process of this research study. In light of Chapter VII, this chapter will discuss the relevant assumptions in the course of this study that need to be revisited. Finally, this chapter, given relevant research findings, will produce vital guidelines for future research on the same research variables in the course of evaluating the evolution of Lebanese – Israeli relations.

#### **A. Introduction**

This research study aimed to explore and study the relationship between self – identity and intergroup relations and perceptions in the context of modern day perceptions of Maronite and Druze college students towards the state of Israel. A historical survey was conducted on the different forms of relations between the Maronites and Zionists in the Yishuv Period and later on following the creation of Israel in 1948. Furthermore, the relations between the Druze and Zionists were thoroughly explored and investigated in close comparison to the similar periods covered with the

Maronites. The methodological research and design of this study included two main components. The first component was focused on exploring the historical determinants in the relations between these three minority groups in context of providing adequate background information for the modern day opinions and perceptions of the respondents in the surveyed groups. On the other hand, the second component of the research design included conducting survey research through the construction of a questionnaire that finds spirit and relevancy in theory. As a result, this research study explored the nature of Lebanese – Israeli relations in light of addressing the nature of minority fears, group alliances and intergroup relations. These dimensions were thoroughly discussed in the theoretical framework of this study and more importantly in the construction of the research instrument that provided statistical findings and results.

The study was basically grounded in a historical survey of important events shaping the relations between these minority groups on the one hand, and a questionnaire that finds spirit in theories that aimed to measure and investigate the modern day perceptions of Maronite and Druze college students on the other hand. These two research methodologies were essential in addressing the main research question that was centered around studying the relationship between identity and intergroup relations.

## **B. Expected Contributions and Findings**

Chapter I mentioned the expected contributions from this research study. For the sole purpose of this research at hand, the expected contribution involved three added values. The first contribution included a comparative analysis that entices the process of identity formation between the Druze and the Maronites with respect to different social

factors in light of historical actualities. The second contribution exposed the perceptions of the Lebanese Druze towards the Druze community in Israel and more importantly explored Druze opinions on collaborationism theory. The third and final contribution exposed modern day political perceptions of the Maronite and Druze towards the state of Israel and the Peace Process.

### ***1. Identity Formation***

The findings and results indicated that the majority of the respondents in the surveyed communities – Druze and Maronites – support and boost peace talks with Israel irrespective of their perceived self – identity. As a result, the main research question that aimed to study the relationship between identity and intergroup relations was thoroughly investigated in light of understanding how these groups view the state of Israel. The respondents claimed they would primarily support peace with Israel in their firm belief that it would produce economic benefit and gain. The respondents in the surveyed groups are deeply attached to their unit which makes the level of group cohesion very high. Additionally, the surveyed students claimed they would support their group against a perceived threat mainly in a form of an existential threat. The respondents were asked to indicate how they perceived the history of Lebanon and the history of their community. The relevancy in posing such questions was to understand how they view themselves – history – in comparison to other groups in Lebanon.

### ***2. Perception of Israeli Druze***

The second expected contribution was related to investigating how the Lebanese Druze perceived their Druze brethren in the Middle East – mainly Israel and Syria. The availability of such published research is limited and nearly non – existent. As a result,

it became crucial to assess how the Lebanese Druze perceived their brethren in Israel irrespective of the tension and conflict between Lebanon and Israel. The overwhelming majority of the Druze respondents expressed extremely warm sentiments to their Israeli brethren. This indicated that Druze transnational solidarity extended beyond state borders. More importantly, the surveyed respondents were asked whether they viewed the Arab groups in Israel as traitors if they were forced to collaborate with the government; the majority of the respondents claimed that on the grounds of group survival, it becomes justifiable to collaborate with the enemy.

### ***3. Israel and the Peace Process***

Irrespective how the respondents perceive the Palestinian refugees and militants, the vast majority of the respondents indicated they would not detach from the Palestinian cause regardless of the materialized benefit of concluding a peace treaty with Israel. More importantly, the overwhelming majority of the respondents have firm belief that peace between Lebanon and Israel is an important task in context of the Arab – Israeli conflict. The respondents believe that peace between Lebanon and Israel can have a positive impact on the general course of the Peace Process. Even when the majority of the respondents did not accept the Jewish state as a lasting entity in Palestine, they persistently supported peace talks with the state of Israel. Additionally, the majority of the respondents have firm belief that Hezbollah, Syria and Iran are the major impediments towards attaining peace between Lebanon and Israel.

### **C. Association and Comparison with Earlier Studies**

The findings and results on the Maronite respondents are not new in product; however, in the most recent published study specifically on Christian perceptions<sup>1</sup> towards the state of Israel, the findings indicated that the majority of the Christians in Lebanon totally support peace talks with Israel. As a result, the relevant findings of this research study have previous relevance and importance.

More importantly, in previous studies carried out by Hilal Khashan (1996, 2000) on Arab attitudes towards Israel and the Peace Process, the findings indicated that the Christian Maronites, among other Arab groups, spearheaded any attempt to conclude peace with the state of Israel. From among the different surveyed groups by Khashan, the Christian groups were always supportive of peace and economic normalization with Israel. As a result, the findings that produced from this research study give credence and support to Khashan's findings that frequently portrayed 'Maronite' encouragement towards concluding peace between Lebanon and Israel.

The remaining intriguing section of this research study is correlated to the findings on the Druze respondents. The bulk of research on the Druze in Lebanon – mainly carried out by Judith Harik as empirical studies - is mainly focused on investigating their sense of continuity and perceptions within their own unit. In addition, Gabriel Ben – Dor carried out empirical studies on the Druze in Israel, trying to explore the different elements of Druze socio – political distinction. However, it seems there does not exist any published scholarly material that has reflected on how the Lebanese Druze perceive the state of Israel. More importantly, the Druze have not been chosen

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<sup>1</sup> Simon Haddad (2002), *Lebanese Christians' Attitudes Toward Israel and the Peace Process*



among the representative samples in former studies that aimed to explore attitudes towards the state of Israel. As a result, it becomes crucial to carry out additional and in – depth research on the Druze community in Lebanon in light of extracting further evidence and support to the findings relevant in this study. The Druze respondents in comparison with the Maronite respondents favor a peace treaty with Israel based on the economic benefits attained. Moreover, additional dimensions should be constructed in future endeavors to investigate further support - beyond what was retrieved in this research study - on why these minorities favor peace with Israel.

#### **D. Revisiting Assumptions and Future Endeavors**

Chapter VII primarily dealt with the analysis of the findings and results. The research hypotheses and assumptions in Chapter V were either accepted or rejected in Chapter VII. As a result, it becomes mandatory to discuss the assumptions that have to be revisited in light of exploring deeper in the subject at hand.

On the level of the Maronite respondents, the assumption on the association between group cohesion and political vision needs to be revisited. Additionally, this latter research assumption needs to be focused in context of a given time frame or event for accurate and valid findings. Furthermore, on the correlation between group solidarity and national interests, the assumptions need to be revisited in similar context to the variables on group cohesion. The associations of the research variables on solidarity and cohesion need to be addressed in a specific context with a relevant event or incident, to further investigate whether there exists a relationship between group formation – solidarity and cohesion - and national interest.

On the level of the Druze respondents, the assumption was that the Druze support peace with Israel based on their lukewarm attitude toward the Palestinian cause. It was expected that the Druze in first place would not support any form of peace with Israel. However, as the findings previously indicated, the overwhelming majority of the Druze support peace with Israel on the grounds of economic benefit. Additionally, the political and social history of the Druze in Lebanon narrates their support to the Palestinian Cause in Lebanon against other groups and the state of Israel. It was assumed that the Druze would favor peace with Israel because their coreligionists in Israel were active citizens and supportive of the state of Israel. However, the ambiguity in constructing the assumption – ‘lukewarm’ – mandatorily forces this author to revisit the relevancy of the assumption in future research endeavors.

On the level of the Maronite and Druze respondents, the assumptions that centered on exploring probable causes for justifying collaboration voluntarily need to be revisited. The respondents were asked whether they would collaborate with the enemy out of the free will, against a common perceived threat. The earlier assumptions focused on exploring the different possible scenarios for collaboration – forcefully and voluntarily. However, the respondents portrayed consistency in their responses throughout the research study, yet their opinions were not crystal clear in investigating how they justified collaboration voluntarily. As a result, it becomes crucial to revisit how these respondents express their sentiments towards collaboration in a specific given context or relevant incident.

The findings in this research study indicated that a substantial segment of the surveyed groups support and favor peace with Israel. However, these groups have firm belief that peace between Lebanon and Israel would support the probability of success

of the general Peace Process. Additionally, the overwhelming majority of the respondents claim that peace with Israel meant economic revenue and prosperity. Nevertheless, these surveyed college students claimed that the existence of Hezbollah – mainly - , Syria and Iran were impeding and obstructing the possibility of peace with the state of Israel. The dynamics of quantitative research involves several dimensions. One of the major functions of quantitative research is to provide grounds for future in depth research on specific portraying that a certain segment of the Lebanese population favors peace with Israel. For accuracy and validity, it seems inadequate to claim that the entire Maronite and Druze community favor peace with Israel; however, it remains factual and realistic that a large segment of these respondents and what they represent – sample that reflects the opinions of the entire community – support peace with the state of Israel, even when they reject the existence of the Jewish entity in Palestine.

Therefore, it becomes crucial to further explore and investigate how other Lebanese groups perceive the state of Israel and the prospects of peace. It might seem fallible to claim that certain communities or groups within these units favor peace with Israel; however, in light of survey research and this relevant study, it becomes accurate and valid to claim that certain segments within Lebanon favor peace with Israel. For future endeavors it becomes crucial to explore how other groups feel about this option of peace, and more importantly the probability of achieving peace in the general course of the Arab – Israeli conflict.

## **E. Concluding Remarks**

Chapter VIII dealt with mentioning the different steps and division chapters that were taken in course of this research study. The main research question was highlighted

and the assumptions that need to be revisited were discussed thoroughly. More importantly, the relevancy of the findings was discussed in light of previous studies and results. Finally, the last section of this chapter dealt with setting stage for future endeavors and research tasks in context of the Lebanese – Israeli relations.

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APPENDIX (A)

THE QUESTIONNAIRE

**V1.** It is argued that many Lebanese have specific nationalistic orientations. In your case, how do you perceive the direction of your nationalistic feelings?

1. Lebanese nationalist
2. Arab nationalist
3. Egyptian nationalist
4. Syrian nationalist
5. Internationalist

**V2.** When you think of the history of your community, from what aspect do you look at it?

1. Arab heritage
2. Phoenician heritage
3. Greco-Roman heritage
4. Syrian heritage
5. Other \_\_\_\_\_

**V3.** When you think of the history of Lebanon, from what aspect do you look at it?

1. Arab heritage
2. Islamic heritage
3. Greco-Roman heritage
4. Phoenician heritage
5. Other \_\_\_\_\_

**V4.** Your nationalistic feelings can be expressed best in the form of:

1. A centralized political system
2. A decentralized political system
3. An independent political entity

**V5.** How proud are you to be Lebanese?

1. Very Proud
2. Quite proud
3. Not very proud
4. Not at all proud

**V6.** Preserving my sect's identity is more important than my loyalty to my country

1. Strongly agree
2. Agree
3. Disagree
4. Strongly disagree

**V7.** How do you view your sect?

1. The best
2. Respected
3. Like the rest
4. Less advanced
5. Envied
6. Weak
7. Revered

**V8.** How attached do you believe you are to your sect?

1. Very attached
2. Fairly attached
3. Poorly attached
4. Not attached

**V9.** Do you think one should live among same sect members?

1. Strongly agree
2. Agree
3. Disagree
4. Strongly disagree

**V10.** I feel close to people from my community whether they are rich or poor

1. Very close
2. Fairly close
3. Poorly close
4. Not close

**V11.** Which is more important to you?

1. Wealth
2. Your community

**V12.** If my family was in conflict with the dominant movement in my sect, I will stand up for my family

1. Strongly agree
2. Agree
3. Disagree
4. Strongly disagree

What is your opinion regarding this popular saying?

**V13.** Support your brother whether he is right or wrong

1. Strongly agree
2. Agree
3. Disagree
4. Strongly disagree

**V14.** It is preferable not to have a political conflict between members of the same sect

1. Strongly agree
2. Agree
3. Disagree
4. Strongly disagree

**V15.** If a conflict arises between your sect and another sect, which one would you support?

1. Support my sect unquestioningly
2. Support my sect even though it is to blame for the conflict and hope its leaders would rectify the cause of the conflict
3. Support my sect only if it is the victim of aggression
4. Support the other sect if mine is the aggressor
5. Support neither sect

**V16.** How do other Lebanese perceive your sect?

1. They look at it as the best
2. Respected
3. Like the rest
4. Less advanced
5. Envied
6. Weak
7. Revered

**V17.** In the process of solving any Lebanese crisis, the interests and needs of your community should be given top priority

1. Strongly agree
2. Agree
3. Disagree
4. Strongly disagree

**V18.** The most powerful characteristic of my community lies in its transnational scope (Diaspora etc...)

1. Strongly agree
2. Agree
3. Disagree
4. Strongly disagree

**V19.** A person should always be cautious. One cannot trust the neighbors or colleagues from another sect or domination

1. Strongly agree
2. Agree
3. Disagree
4. Strongly disagree

**V20.** I respect other sects in other religions; however, I believe that my sect is the only right one

1. Strongly agree
2. Agree
3. Disagree
4. Strongly disagree

**V21.** In every country there are differences between the poor and the rich; however, in your country there are also differences between Christians and Muslims. Which do you think are the more significant differences?

1. Between the rich and the poor
2. Between the Christians and the Muslims

**V22.** I am particularly proud of being a member of my sect

1. Strongly agree
2. Agree
3. Disagree
4. Strongly disagree

**V23.** I believe that my sect can serve this country better than any other sect

1. Strongly agree
2. Agree
3. Disagree
4. Strongly disagree

**V24.** Culturally speaking, my group is superior to other groups

1. Strongly agree
2. Agree
3. Disagree
4. Strongly disagree

**V25.** My community's interests supersede any nationalist interest and concern

1. Strongly agree
2. Agree
3. Disagree
4. Strongly disagree

I would like to know your opinion concerning the following statements:

**V26.** The survival of my community is extremely important, for that purpose the end justifies the means

1. Strongly agree
2. Agree
3. Disagree
4. Strongly disagree

**V27.** It is justified to collaborate with the enemy, if other communities were doing it

1. Strongly agree
2. Agree
3. Disagree
4. Strongly disagree

**V28.** "The enemy of my enemy, is my friend"

1. Strongly agree
2. Agree
3. Disagree
4. Strongly disagree

**V29.** Minorities in the Middle East that have similar existential fears should have alliances

1. Strongly agree
2. Agree
3. Disagree
4. Strongly disagree

**V30.** The fate of a community regardless of its geographic location should have one united position

1. Strongly agree
2. Agree
3. Disagree
4. Strongly disagree

How much do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements?

**V31.** The Jews in the Middle East are a persecuted minority

1. Strongly agree
2. Agree
3. Disagree
4. Strongly disagree

**V32.** The Jews in Lebanon have a different orientation and inclination in comparison to the Jews in Israel

1. Strongly agree
2. Agree
3. Disagree
4. Strongly disagree

**V33.** The Arab minority groups in Israel are forced to collaborate with Israeli officials; as a result they are not traitors

1. Strongly agree
2. Agree
3. Disagree
4. Strongly disagree

**V34.** The Arab minority groups in Israel are traitors, if they willingly collaborate with Israeli officials

1. Strongly agree
2. Agree
3. Disagree
4. Strongly disagree



**V35.** “Not all Jews have Zionist aspirations and tendencies”

1. Strongly agree      2. Agree      3. Disagree      4. Strongly disagree

**V36.** My community relatively shares common characteristics and traits with the Jews

1. Strongly agree      2. Agree      3. Disagree      4. Strongly disagree

**V37.** If members from my own community or a different community in Lebanon collaborate with Israel, they are traitors

1. Strongly agree      2. Agree      3. Disagree      4. Strongly disagree

**V38.** Many Lebanese citizens from different communities in South Lebanon collaborated with Israel, yet not all of them are considered traitors

1. Strongly agree      2. Agree      3. Disagree      4. Strongly disagree

**V39.** Do you accept the Jewish state in Palestine as a lasting entity?

1. Strongly agree      2. Agree      3. Disagree      4. Strongly disagree

**V40.** Do you encourage and boost peace negotiations with Israel?

1. Strongly agree      2. Agree      3. Disagree      4. Strongly disagree

**V41.** If you support a peace treaty with Israel, will it ever be attained?

1. Strongly agree      2. Agree      3. Disagree      4. Strongly disagree

**V42.** Lebanon can benefit from establishing diplomatic relations with Israel.

1. Strongly agree      2. Agree      3. Disagree      4. Strongly disagree

**V43.** If Lebanon signs a peace treaty with Israel, the Arab – Israeli peace process will have feasible chance of success

1. Strongly agree      2. Agree      3. Disagree      4. Strongly disagree

**V44.** In your opinion which of the following is the main hindrance to concluding lasting peace between Israel and Lebanon? **(If you have more than ONE choice, please list your choices in level of priority and importance)**

1. Syria    2. Iran    3. Hezbollah    4. Lebanon    5. Palestinian refugees    6. Israel    7. \_\_\_\_\_

**V45.** If you support a peace treaty with Israel, how do you justify and support your claim?

**(If you have more than ONE choice, please list your choices in level of priority and importance)**

1. Economic prosperity
2. Similar goals and ideals in the Middle East
3. Military superiority
4. Dissident isolationist attitude in the Arab world
5. Balance of power in the Middle East
6. The Palestinian refugees in Lebanon (the right of return)
7. I do not support a peace treaty
8. Other \_\_\_\_\_

**V46.** The benefits that emerge from concluding peace talks with Israel are much greater than the losses taken during the course of the Arab – Israeli conflict.

1. Strongly agree      2. Agree      3. Disagree      4. Strongly disagree

**V47.** The economic and military benefits that materialize in a peace treaty with Israel are sufficient to justify a detachment from the Palestinian cause

1. Strongly agree      2. Agree      3. Disagree      4. Strongly disagree

How do you perceive the following groups?

		Extremely Warm	Warm	Neutral	Cold	Extremely Cold
<b>V48.</b>	Lebanese Jews	1	2	3	4	5
<b>V49.</b>	Israeli Jews	1	2	3	4	5
<b>V50.</b>	Israeli Druze	1	2	3	4	5
<b>V51.</b>	Syrian Druze	1	2	3	4	5
<b>V52.</b>	Lebanese Druze	1	2	3	4	5
<b>V53.</b>	Lebanese Maronites	1	2	3	4	5
<b>V54.</b>	Syrian Maronites	1	2	3	4	5
<b>V55.</b>	Palestinian refugees	1	2	3	4	5
<b>V56.</b>	Palestinian militants	1	2	3	4	5

**V57.** Sex of respondent:

1. Female      2. Male

**V58.** Place and Year of Birth: \_\_\_\_\_

**V59.** Current Place of Residence: \_\_\_\_\_

**V60.** Preferred Political Leader / Political Party: \_\_\_\_\_

**V61.** Father's Occupation: \_\_\_\_\_

**V62.** Father's Education: \_\_\_\_\_

**V63.** Your family is composed of how many members: \_\_\_\_\_

**V64.** How many members of your family work: \_\_\_\_\_

**V65.** Family Monthly Income (approx.)

1. Below \$ 1,000      2. \$ 1,000 - \$ 3,000      3. \$ 3,000 - \$ 5,000      4. \$ 5,000 - \$ 7,000      5. Above \$ 7,000

**V66.** Major/University: \_\_\_\_\_

## APPENDIX (B)

### FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF THE RESULTS

(The findings of the major research variables)

**Leb Nationalistic Orientation**

Community			Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Maronite	Valid	Lebanese Nationalist	312	83.4	83.4	83.4
		Arab Nationalist	9	2.4	2.4	85.8
		Egyptian Nationalist	1	.3	.3	86.1
		Syrian Nationalist	5	1.3	1.3	87.4
		Internationalist	47	12.6	12.6	100.0
		Total	374	100.0	100.0	
Druze	Valid	Lebanese Nationalist	128	70.3	70.3	70.3
		Arab Nationalist	33	18.1	18.1	88.5
		Syrian Nationalist	4	2.2	2.2	90.7
		Internationalist	17	9.3	9.3	100.0
		Total	182	100.0	100.0	

**History of your community**

Community			Frequency	Percent
Maronite	Valid	Arab Heritage	71	19.0
		Phoenician Heritage	246	65.8
		Greco - Roman heritage	27	7.2
		Syrian Heritage	29	7.8
		Total	373	99.7
		Missing	System	1
	Total	374	100.0	
Druze	Valid	Arab Heritage	151	83.0
		Phoenician Heritage	24	13.2
		Greco - Roman heritage	4	2.2
		Syrian Heritage	3	1.6
		Total	182	100.0

**History of your community**

Community			Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Maronite	Valid	Arab Heritage	19.0	19.0
		Phoenician Heritage	66.0	85.0
		Greco - Roman heritage	7.2	92.2
		Syrian Heritage	7.8	100.0
		Total	100.0	
Druze	Valid	Arab Heritage	83.0	83.0
		Phoenician Heritage	13.2	96.2
		Greco - Roman heritage	2.2	98.4
		Syrian Heritage	1.6	100.0
		Total	100.0	

### History of Lebanon

Community			Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Maronite	Valid	Arab heritage	78	20.9	20.9	20.9
		Islamic heritage	1	.3	.3	21.1
		Greco - roman heritage	21	5.6	5.6	26.7
		Phoenician heritage	274	73.3	73.3	100.0
		Total	374	100.0	100.0	
Druze	Valid	Arab heritage	102	56.0	56.0	56.0
		Islamic heritage	2	1.1	1.1	57.1
		Greco - roman heritage	7	3.8	3.8	61.0
		Phoenician heritage	71	39.0	39.0	100.0
		Total	182	100.0	100.0	

### Nationalistic feelings

Community			Frequency	Percent
Maronite	Valid	A centralized political system	59	15.8
		A decentralized political system	157	42.0
		Independent political entity	153	40.9
		Total	369	98.7
		Missing	System	5
	Total	374	100.0	
Druze	Valid	A centralized political system	32	17.6
		A decentralized political system	65	35.7
		Independent political entity	85	46.7
		Total	182	100.0

### Nationalistic feelings

Community			Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Maronite	Valid	A centralized political system	16.0	16.0
		A decentralized political system	42.5	58.5
		Independent political entity	41.5	100.0
		Total	100.0	
Druze	Valid	A centralized political system	17.6	17.6
		A decentralized political system	35.7	53.3
		Independent political entity	46.7	100.0
		Total	100.0	

**Proud to be Lebanese**

Community			Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Maronite	Valid	Very Proud	231	61.8	62.1	62.1
		Quite proud	99	26.5	26.6	88.7
		Not very proud	31	8.3	8.3	97.0
		Not at all proud	11	2.9	3.0	100.0
		Total	372	99.5	100.0	
	Missing	System	2	.5		
	Total	374	100.0			
Druze	Valid	Very Proud	118	64.8	64.8	64.8
		Quite proud	46	25.3	25.3	90.1
		Not very proud	12	6.6	6.6	96.7
		Not at all proud	6	3.3	3.3	100.0
		Total	182	100.0	100.0	

**Preserving my sect's identity**

Community			Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Maronite	Valid	Strongly Agree	109	29.1	29.3	29.3
		Agree	101	27.0	27.2	56.5
		Disagree	99	26.5	26.6	83.1
		Strongly Disagree	60	16.0	16.1	99.2
		Don't know	3	.8	.8	100.0
		Total	372	99.5	100.0	
	Missing	System	2	.5		
	Total	374	100.0			
Druze	Valid	Strongly Agree	37	20.3	20.3	20.3
		Agree	43	23.6	23.6	44.0
		Disagree	58	31.9	31.9	75.8
		Strongly Disagree	43	23.6	23.6	99.5
		Don't know	1	.5	.5	100.0
		Total	182	100.0	100.0	

**How do you view your sect**

Community			Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Maronite	Valid	The Best	128	34.2	34.2	34.2
		Respected	136	36.4	36.4	70.6
		Like the Rest	61	16.3	16.3	86.9
		Less Advanced	4	1.1	1.1	88.0
		Envied	22	5.9	5.9	93.9
		Weak	22	5.9	5.9	99.7
		Revered	1	.3	.3	100.0
		Total	374	100.0	100.0	

**How do you view your sect**

Community			Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Druze	Valid	The Best	56	30.8	30.8	30.8
		Respected	64	35.2	35.2	65.9
		Like the Rest	38	20.9	20.9	86.8
		Less Advanced	2	1.1	1.1	87.9
		Envied	4	2.2	2.2	90.1
		Weak	6	3.3	3.3	93.4
		Revered	12	6.6	6.6	100.0
		Total	182	100.0	100.0	

**How attached to your sect**

Community			Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Maronite	Valid	Very attached	201	53.7	53.7	53.7
		Fairly attached	122	32.6	32.6	86.4
		Poorly attached	31	8.3	8.3	94.7
		Not attached	20	5.3	5.3	100.0
		Total	374	100.0	100.0	
Druze	Valid	Very attached	74	40.7	40.7	40.7
		Fairly attached	64	35.2	35.2	75.8
		Poorly attached	30	16.5	16.5	92.3
		Not attached	14	7.7	7.7	100.0
		Total	182	100.0	100.0	

**One should live among same sect members**

Community			Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Maronite	Valid	Strongly Agree	40	10.7	10.8	10.8
		Agree	99	26.5	26.7	37.5
		Disagree	153	40.9	41.2	78.7
		Strongly Disagree	79	21.1	21.3	100.0
		Total	371	99.2	100.0	
	Missing	System	3	.8		
		Total	374	100.0		
Druze	Valid	Strongly Agree	14	7.7	7.7	7.7
		Agree	35	19.2	19.2	26.9
		Disagree	91	50.0	50.0	76.9
		Strongly Disagree	40	22.0	22.0	98.9
		Don't know	2	1.1	1.1	100.0
		Total	182	100.0	100.0	

**Feel close to my community whether rich or poor**

Community			Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Maronite	Valid	Very close	164	43.9	43.9	43.9
		Fairly close	179	47.9	47.9	91.7

**Feel close to my community whether rich or poor**

Community			Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Maronite	Valid	Poorly close	24	6.4	6.4	98.1
		Not close	7	1.9	1.9	100.0
		Total	374	100.0	100.0	
Druze	Valid	Very close	82	45.1	45.3	45.3
		Fairly close	78	42.9	43.1	88.4
		Poorly close	18	9.9	9.9	98.3
		Not close	3	1.6	1.7	100.0
		Total	181	99.5	100.0	
	Missing	System	1	.5		
	Total	182	100.0			

**More important, wealth or your community**

Community			Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Maronite	Valid	Wealth	127	34.0	34.4	34.4
		Your community	242	64.7	65.6	100.0
		Total	369	98.7	100.0	
	Missing	System	5	1.3		
		Total	374	100.0		
Druze	Valid	Wealth	62	34.1	34.4	34.4
		Your community	118	64.8	65.6	100.0
		Total	180	98.9	100.0	
	Missing	System	2	1.1		
		Total	182	100.0		

**Support my family if in conflict with the dominant movement in my sect**

Community			Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Maronite	Valid	Strongly Agree	87	23.3	23.7	23.7
		Agree	92	24.6	25.1	48.8
		Disagree	142	38.0	38.7	87.5
		Strongly Disagree	46	12.3	12.5	100.0
		Total	367	98.1	100.0	
	Missing	System	7	1.9		
	Total	374	100.0			
Druze	Valid	Strongly Agree	49	26.9	27.7	27.7
		Agree	47	25.8	26.6	54.2
		Disagree	62	34.1	35.0	89.3
		Strongly Disagree	19	10.4	10.7	100.0
		Total	177	97.3	100.0	
	Missing	System	5	2.7		
		Total	182	100.0		



**Support your brother whether he is right or wrong**

Community			Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Maronite	Valid	Strongly Agree	80	21.4	21.6	21.6
		Agree	96	25.7	25.9	47.4
		Disagree	143	38.2	38.5	86.0
		Strongly Disagree	52	13.9	14.0	100.0
		Total	371	99.2	100.0	
	Missing	System	3	.8		
	Total	374	100.0			
Druze	Valid	Strongly Agree	42	23.1	23.1	23.1
		Agree	46	25.3	25.3	48.4
		Disagree	61	33.5	33.5	81.9
		Strongly Disagree	33	18.1	18.1	100.0
		Total	182	100.0	100.0	

**There should not be a conflict between members of the same sect**

Community			Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Maronite	Valid	Strongly Agree	222	59.4	60.2	60.2
		Agree	103	27.5	27.9	88.1
		Disagree	34	9.1	9.2	97.3
		Strongly Disagree	10	2.7	2.7	100.0
		Total	369	98.7	100.0	
	Missing	System	5	1.3		
	Total	374	100.0			
Druze	Valid	Strongly Agree	93	51.1	51.4	51.4
		Agree	56	30.8	30.9	82.3
		Disagree	17	9.3	9.4	91.7
		Strongly Disagree	15	8.2	8.3	100.0
		Total	181	99.5	100.0	
	Missing	System	1	.5		
	Total	182	100.0			

**If conflict occurs between your sect and another**

Community			Frequency	Percent
Maronite	Valid	Support my sect unquestionably	117	31.3
		Support my sect even its 2 blame	50	13.4
		Support my sect if its the victim	126	33.7
		support other sect, if mine aggressor	22	5.9
		Support neither sect	53	14.2
		Total	368	98.4
	Missing	System	6	1.6
	Total	374	100.0	

**If conflict occurs between your sect and another**

Community			Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Maronite	Valid	Support my sect unquestionably	31.8	31.8
		Support my sect even its 2 blame	13.6	45.4
		Support my sect if its the victim	34.2	79.6
		support other sect, if mine aggressor	6.0	85.6
		Support neither sect	14.4	100.0
		Total	100.0	

**If conflict occurs between your sect and another**

Community			Frequency	Percent
Druze	Valid	Support my sect unquestionably	69	37.9
		Support my sect even its 2 blame	30	16.5
		Support my sect if its the victim	55	30.2
		support other sect, if mine aggressor	4	2.2
		Support neither sect	21	11.5
		Total	179	98.4
Missing	System		3	1.6
		Total	182	100.0

**If conflict occurs between your sect and another**

Community			Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Druze	Valid	Support my sect unquestionably	38.5	38.5
		Support my sect even its 2 blame	16.8	55.3
		Support my sect if its the victim	30.7	86.0
		support other sect, if mine aggressor	2.2	88.3
		Support neither sect	11.7	100.0
		Total	100.0	

**How do others perceive your sect**

Community			Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Maronite	Valid	The Best	33	8.8	8.8	8.8
		Respected	165	44.1	44.2	53.1
		Like the Rest	64	17.1	17.2	70.2
		Less Advanced	4	1.1	1.1	71.3
		Envied	51	13.6	13.7	85.0
		Weak	48	12.8	12.9	97.9

**How do others perceive your sect**

Community			Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Maronite	Valid	Revered	8	2.1	2.1	100.0
		Total	373	99.7	100.0	
	Missing	System	1	.3		
		Total	374	100.0		
Druze	Valid	The Best	23	12.6	12.6	12.6
		Respected	81	44.5	44.5	57.1
		Like the Rest	26	14.3	14.3	71.4
		Less Advanced	6	3.3	3.3	74.7
		Envied	11	6.0	6.0	80.8
		Weak	6	3.3	3.3	84.1
		Revered	29	15.9	15.9	100.0
	Total	182	100.0	100.0		

**In any Lebanese crisis, my community's interests and needs should receive top priority**

Community			Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Maronite	Valid	Strongly Agree	95	25.4	26.2	26.2
		Agree	143	38.2	39.4	65.6
		Disagree	94	25.1	25.9	91.5
		Strongly Disagree	31	8.3	8.5	100.0
		Total	363	97.1	100.0	
	Missing	System	11	2.9		
	Total	374	100.0			
Druze	Valid	Strongly Agree	35	19.2	19.4	19.4
		Agree	56	30.8	31.1	50.6
		Disagree	70	38.5	38.9	89.4
		Strongly Disagree	19	10.4	10.6	100.0
		Total	180	98.9	100.0	
	Missing	System	2	1.1		
	Total	182	100.0			

**Most powerful characteristic of my community is its transnational scope**

Community			Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Maronite	Valid	Strongly Agree	85	22.7	22.8	22.8
		Agree	167	44.7	44.9	67.7
		Disagree	99	26.5	26.6	94.4
		Strongly Disagree	21	5.6	5.6	100.0
		Total	372	99.5	100.0	
Missing	System	2	.5			
	Total	374	100.0			

**Most powerful characteristic of my community is its transnational scope**

Community			Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Druze	Valid	Strongly Agree	40	22.0	22.0	22.0
		Agree	50	27.5	27.5	49.5
		Disagree	71	39.0	39.0	88.5
		Strongly Disagree	21	11.5	11.5	100.0
		Total	182	100.0	100.0	

**One cannot trust neighbors or colleagues from another sect**

Community			Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Maronite	Valid	Strongly Agree	63	16.8	16.9	16.9
		Agree	85	22.7	22.8	39.7
		Disagree	152	40.6	40.8	80.4
		Strongly Disagree	73	19.5	19.6	100.0
		Total	373	99.7	100.0	
Missing	System		1	.3		
		Total	374	100.0		
Druze	Valid	Strongly Agree	24	13.2	13.2	13.2
		Agree	26	14.3	14.3	27.5
		Disagree	84	46.2	46.2	73.6
		Strongly Disagree	48	26.4	26.4	100.0
		Total	182	100.0	100.0	

**I believe my sect is the only right one**

Community			Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Maronite	Valid	Strongly Agree	120	32.1	32.6	32.6
		Agree	109	29.1	29.6	62.2
		Disagree	102	27.3	27.7	89.9
		Strongly Disagree	37	9.9	10.1	100.0
		Total	368	98.4	100.0	
Missing	System		6	1.6		
		Total	374	100.0		
Druze	Valid	Strongly Agree	48	26.4	26.8	26.8
		Agree	39	21.4	21.8	48.6
		Disagree	63	34.6	35.2	83.8
		Strongly Disagree	29	15.9	16.2	100.0
		Total	179	98.4	100.0	
Missing	System		3	1.6		
		Total	182	100.0		

**Differences between rich and poor, or between Christians and Muslims**

Community			Frequency	Percent
Maronite	Valid	Between the rich and poor	153	40.9

**Differences between rich and poor, or between Christians and Muslims**

Community			Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Maronite	Valid	Between the rich and poor	40.9	40.9

**Differences between rich and poor, or between Christians and Muslims**

Community			Frequency	Percent
Maronite	Valid	Between Christians and Muslims	221	59.1
		Total	374	100.0
Druze	Valid	Between the rich and poor	82	45.1
		Between Christians and Muslims	100	54.9
		Total	182	100.0

**Differences between rich and poor, or between Christians and Muslims**

Community			Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Maronite	Valid	Between Christians and Muslims	59.1	100.0
		Total	100.0	
Druze	Valid	Between the rich and poor	45.1	45.1
		Between Christians and Muslims	54.9	100.0
		Total	100.0	

**Proud of being a member of my sect**

Community			Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Maronite	Valid	Strongly Agree	236	63.1	63.1	63.1
		Agree	105	28.1	28.1	91.2
		Disagree	18	4.8	4.8	96.0
		Strongly Disagree	15	4.0	4.0	100.0
		Total	374	100.0	100.0	
Druze	Valid	Strongly Agree	102	56.0	56.0	56.0
		Agree	65	35.7	35.7	91.8
		Disagree	7	3.8	3.8	95.6
		Strongly Disagree	8	4.4	4.4	100.0
		Total	182	100.0	100.0	

**My sect can serve this country better than any other sect**

Community			Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Maronite	Valid	Strongly Agree	106	28.3	28.7	28.7
		Agree	135	36.1	36.6	65.3
		Disagree	104	27.8	28.2	93.5
		Strongly Disagree	24	6.4	6.5	100.0
		Total	369	98.7	100.0	

**My sect can serve this country better than any other sect**

Community			Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Maronite	Missing	System	5	1.3		
		Total	374	100.0		
Druze	Valid	Strongly Agree	24	13.2	13.4	13.4
		Agree	66	36.3	36.9	50.3
		Disagree	72	39.6	40.2	90.5
		Strongly Disagree	17	9.3	9.5	100.0
		Total	179	98.4	100.0	
	Missing	System	3	1.6		
	Total	182	100.0			

**Culturally, my group is superior**

Community			Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Maronite	Valid	Strongly Agree	116	31.0	31.3	31.3
		Agree	130	34.8	35.0	66.3
		Disagree	98	26.2	26.4	92.7
		Strongly Disagree	27	7.2	7.3	100.0
		Total	371	99.2	100.0	
	Missing	System	3	.8		
	Total	374	100.0			
Druze	Valid	Strongly Agree	25	13.7	13.7	13.7
		Agree	84	46.2	46.2	59.9
		Disagree	56	30.8	30.8	90.7
		Strongly Disagree	17	9.3	9.3	100.0
		Total	182	100.0	100.0	

**My community's interests supersede any nationalist interest**

Community			Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Maronite	Valid	Strongly Agree	78	20.9	21.0	21.0
		Agree	109	29.1	29.4	50.4
		Disagree	147	39.3	39.6	90.0
		Strongly Disagree	37	9.9	10.0	100.0
		Total	371	99.2	100.0	
	Missing	System	3	.8		
	Total	374	100.0			
Druze	Valid	Strongly Agree	32	17.6	17.8	17.8
		Agree	50	27.5	27.8	45.6
		Disagree	77	42.3	42.8	88.3
		Strongly Disagree	21	11.5	11.7	100.0
		Total	180	98.9	100.0	
	Missing	System	2	1.1		
	Total	182	100.0			

**The survival of my community is important, the end justifies the means**

Community			Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Maronite	Valid	Strongly Agree	88	23.5	23.9	23.9
		Agree	130	34.8	35.3	59.2
		Disagree	122	32.6	33.2	92.4
		Strongly Disagree	28	7.5	7.6	100.0
		Total	368	98.4	100.0	
Missing	System		6	1.6		
		Total	374	100.0		
Druze	Valid	Strongly Agree	53	29.1	29.1	29.1
		Agree	69	37.9	37.9	67.0
		Disagree	44	24.2	24.2	91.2
		Strongly Disagree	16	8.8	8.8	100.0
		Total	182	100.0	100.0	

**It is justified to collaborate with the enemy, if other communities were doing it**

Community			Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Maronite	Valid	Strongly Agree	29	7.8	7.9	7.9
		Agree	80	21.4	21.9	29.9
		Disagree	173	46.3	47.4	77.3
		Strongly Disagree	83	22.2	22.7	100.0
		Total	365	97.6	100.0	
Missing	System		9	2.4		
		Total	374	100.0		
Druze	Valid	Strongly Agree	17	9.3	9.5	9.5
		Agree	27	14.8	15.1	24.6
		Disagree	76	41.8	42.5	67.0
		Strongly Disagree	59	32.4	33.0	100.0
		Total	179	98.4	100.0	
Missing	System		3	1.6		
		Total	182	100.0		

**The enemy of my enemy is my friend**

Community			Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Maronite	Valid	Strongly Agree	40	10.7	10.9	10.9
		Agree	110	29.4	29.9	40.8
		Disagree	153	40.9	41.6	82.3
		Strongly Disagree	65	17.4	17.7	100.0
		Total	368	98.4	100.0	
Missing	System		6	1.6		
		Total	374	100.0		

**The enemy of my enemy is my friend**

Community			Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Druze	Valid	Strongly Agree	37	20.3	20.6	20.6
		Agree	38	20.9	21.1	41.7
		Disagree	67	36.8	37.2	78.9
		Strongly Disagree	38	20.9	21.1	100.0
		Total	180	98.9	100.0	
Missing	System		2	1.1		
		Total	182	100.0		

**Minorities with existential fears should have alliances**

Community			Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Maronite	Valid	Strongly Agree	96	25.7	26.2	26.2
		Agree	181	48.4	49.3	75.5
		Disagree	74	19.8	20.2	95.6
		Strongly Disagree	16	4.3	4.4	100.0
		Total	367	98.1	100.0	
Missing	System		7	1.9		
		Total	374	100.0		
Druze	Valid	Strongly Agree	31	17.0	17.0	17.0
		Agree	101	55.5	55.5	72.5
		Disagree	41	22.5	22.5	95.1
		Strongly Disagree	9	4.9	4.9	100.0
		Total	182	100.0	100.0	

**The fate of my community regardless of its geographic location should have one united position**

Community			Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Maronite	Valid	Strongly Agree	125	33.4	33.6	33.6
		Agree	197	52.7	53.0	86.6
		Disagree	45	12.0	12.1	98.7
		Strongly Disagree	5	1.3	1.3	100.0
		Total	372	99.5	100.0	
Missing	System		2	.5		
		Total	374	100.0		
Druze	Valid	Strongly Agree	62	34.1	34.1	34.1
		Agree	92	50.5	50.5	84.6
		Disagree	23	12.6	12.6	97.3
		Strongly Disagree	5	2.7	2.7	100.0
		Total	182	100.0	100.0	

**The Jews in the Middle East are a persecuted minority**

Community			Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Maronite	Valid	Strongly Agree	45	12.0	12.1	12.1
		Agree	102	27.3	27.5	39.6



**The Jews in the Middle East are a persecuted minority**

Community			Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Maronite	Valid	Disagree	138	36.9	37.2	76.8
		Strongly Disagree	86	23.0	23.2	100.0
		Total	371	99.2	100.0	
	Missing	System	3	.8		
		Total	374	100.0		
Druze	Valid	Strongly Agree	37	20.3	20.4	20.4
		Agree	38	20.9	21.0	41.4
		Disagree	56	30.8	30.9	72.4
		Strongly Disagree	50	27.5	27.6	100.0
		Total	181	99.5	100.0	
	Missing	System	1	.5		
	Total	182	100.0			

**The Jews in Lebanon have a different orientation and inclination in comparison to the Jews in Israel**

Community			Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Maronite	Valid	Strongly Agree	21	5.6	5.6	5.6
		Agree	110	29.4	29.6	35.2
		Disagree	161	43.0	43.3	78.5
		Strongly Disagree	80	21.4	21.5	100.0
		Total	372	99.5	100.0	
	Missing	System	2	.5		
	Total	374	100.0			
Druze	Valid	Strongly Agree	26	14.3	14.3	14.3
		Agree	65	35.7	35.7	50.0
		Disagree	57	31.3	31.3	81.3
		Strongly Disagree	34	18.7	18.7	100.0
		Total	182	100.0	100.0	

**The Arab minority in Israel are forced to collaborate with Israel, they are not traitors**

Community			Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Maronite	Valid	Strongly Agree	51	13.6	13.8	13.8
		Agree	196	52.4	53.1	66.9
		Disagree	85	22.7	23.0	90.0
		Strongly Disagree	37	9.9	10.0	100.0
		Total	369	98.7	100.0	
	Missing	System	5	1.3		
	Total	374	100.0			
Druze	Valid	Strongly Agree	74	40.7	40.7	40.7
		Agree	66	36.3	36.3	76.9
		Disagree	28	15.4	15.4	92.3
		Strongly Disagree	14	7.7	7.7	100.0
		Total	182	100.0	100.0	

**The Arab minority are traitors if they willingly colloborate with Israeli officials**

Community			Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Maronite	Valid	Strongly Agree	95	25.4	26.2	26.2
		Agree	115	30.7	31.7	57.9
		Disagree	106	28.3	29.2	87.1
		Strongly Disagree	47	12.6	12.9	100.0
		Total	363	97.1	100.0	
	Missing	System	11	2.9		
	Total	374	100.0			
Druze	Valid	Strongly Agree	64	35.2	35.2	35.2
		Agree	54	29.7	29.7	64.8
		Disagree	34	18.7	18.7	83.5
		Strongly Disagree	30	16.5	16.5	100.0
		Total	182	100.0	100.0	

**Not all Jews have Zionist aspirations and tendencies**

Community			Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Maronite	Valid	Strongly Agree	64	17.1	17.8	17.8
		Agree	186	49.7	51.7	69.4
		Disagree	72	19.3	20.0	89.4
		Strongly Disagree	38	10.2	10.6	100.0
		Total	360	96.3	100.0	
	Missing	System	14	3.7		
	Total	374	100.0			
Druze	Valid	Strongly Agree	45	24.7	24.9	24.9
		Agree	91	50.0	50.3	75.1
		Disagree	22	12.1	12.2	87.3
		Strongly Disagree	23	12.6	12.7	100.0
		Total	181	99.5	100.0	
	Missing	System	1	.5		
	Total	182	100.0			

**My community shares comon characteristics with the Jews**

Community			Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Maronite	Valid	Strongly Agree	10	2.7	2.7	2.7
		Agree	124	33.2	33.2	35.8
		Disagree	153	40.9	40.9	76.7
		Strongly Disagree	87	23.3	23.3	100.0
		Total	374	100.0	100.0	
Druze	Valid	Strongly Agree	12	6.6	6.6	6.6
		Agree	46	25.3	25.3	31.9
		Disagree	76	41.8	41.8	73.6
		Strongly Disagree	48	26.4	26.4	100.0
		Total	182	100.0	100.0	

**Members from my own community or a different one in Lebanon collaborate with Israel, they are traitors**

Community			Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Maronite	Valid	Strongly Agree	90	24.1	24.2	24.2
		Agree	116	31.0	31.2	55.4
		Disagree	119	31.8	32.0	87.4
		Strongly Disagree	47	12.6	12.6	100.0
		Total	372	99.5	100.0	
Missing	System		2	.5		
		Total	374	100.0		
Druze	Valid	Strongly Agree	78	42.9	43.1	43.1
		Agree	65	35.7	35.9	79.0
		Disagree	28	15.4	15.5	94.5
		Strongly Disagree	10	5.5	5.5	100.0
		Total	181	99.5	100.0	
Missing	System		1	.5		
		Total	182	100.0		

**Many Lebanese citizens in South Lebanon collaborated with Israel, not all of them are traitors**

Community			Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Maronite	Valid	Strongly Agree	79	21.1	21.1	21.1
		Agree	188	50.3	50.3	71.4
		Disagree	80	21.4	21.4	92.8
		Strongly Disagree	27	7.2	7.2	100.0
		Total	374	100.0	100.0	
Druze	Valid	Strongly Agree	19	10.4	10.4	10.4
		Agree	69	37.9	37.9	48.4
		Disagree	53	29.1	29.1	77.5
		Strongly Disagree	40	22.0	22.0	99.5
		33	1	.5	.5	100.0
Total	182	100.0	100.0			

**Do you accept the Jewish state in Palestine as a lasting entity**

Community			Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Maronite	Valid	Strongly Agree	33	8.8	8.8	8.8
		Agree	74	19.8	19.8	28.6
		Disagree	142	38.0	38.0	66.6
		Strongly Disagree	125	33.4	33.4	100.0
		Total	374	100.0	100.0	
Druze	Valid	Strongly Agree	5	2.7	2.7	2.7
		Agree	19	10.4	10.4	13.2
		Disagree	73	40.1	40.1	53.3
		Strongly Disagree	85	46.7	46.7	100.0
		Total	182	100.0	100.0	

**Do you encourage and boost negotiations with Israel**

Community			Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Maronite	Valid	Strongly Agree	130	34.8	34.9	34.9
		Agree	175	46.8	46.9	81.8
		Disagree	46	12.3	12.3	94.1
		Strongly Disagree	22	5.9	5.9	100.0
		Total	373	99.7	100.0	
	Missing	System	1	.3		
	Total	374	100.0			
Druze	Valid	Strongly Agree	37	20.3	20.3	20.3
		Agree	81	44.5	44.5	64.8
		Disagree	34	18.7	18.7	83.5
		Strongly Disagree	30	16.5	16.5	100.0
		Total	182	100.0	100.0	

**If you support peace with Israel, will it ever be attained**

Community			Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Maronite	Valid	Strongly Agree	47	12.6	12.6	12.6
		Agree	170	45.5	45.7	58.3
		Disagree	113	30.2	30.4	88.7
		Strongly Disagree	42	11.2	11.3	100.0
		Total	372	99.5	100.0	
	Missing	System	2	.5		
	Total	374	100.0			
Druze	Valid	Strongly Agree	13	7.1	7.1	7.1
		Agree	70	38.5	38.5	45.6
		Disagree	56	30.8	30.8	76.4
		Strongly Disagree	43	23.6	23.6	100.0
		Total	182	100.0	100.0	

**Lebanon can benefit from establishing diplomatic relations with Israel**

Community			Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Maronite	Valid	Strongly Agree	89	23.8	23.9	23.9
		Agree	199	53.2	53.5	77.4
		Disagree	46	12.3	12.4	89.8
		Strongly Disagree	38	10.2	10.2	100.0
		Total	372	99.5	100.0	
	Missing	System	2	.5		
	Total	374	100.0			
Druze	Valid	Strongly Agree	27	14.8	14.8	14.8
		Agree	85	46.7	46.7	61.5
		Disagree	40	22.0	22.0	83.5
		Strongly Disagree	30	16.5	16.5	100.0
		Total	182	100.0	100.0	

**If Lebanon signs a peace treaty with Israel, the Arab - Israeli peace process might succeed**

Community			Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Maronite	Valid	Strongly Agree	84	22.5	22.5	22.5
		Agree	205	54.8	55.0	77.5
		Disagree	59	15.8	15.8	93.3
		Strongly Disagree	25	6.7	6.7	100.0
		Total	373	99.7	100.0	
	Missing	System	1	.3		
	Total	374	100.0			
Druze	Valid	Strongly Agree	29	15.9	15.9	15.9
		Agree	83	45.6	45.6	61.5
		Disagree	36	19.8	19.8	81.3
		Strongly Disagree	34	18.7	18.7	100.0
		Total	182	100.0	100.0	

**What is the main hindrance to conducting lasting peace between Israel and Lebanon**

Community			Frequency	Percent
Maronite	Valid	Syria	65	17.4
		Iran	61	16.3
		Hezbollah	88	23.5
		Lebanon	17	4.5
		Palestinian Refugees	24	6.4
		Israel	48	12.8
		More than Four Choices or ALL	71	19.0
		Total	374	100.0
Druze	Valid	Syria	18	9.9
		Iran	40	22.0
		Hezbollah	54	29.7
		Lebanon	13	7.1
		Palestinian Refugees	4	2.2
		Israel	14	7.7
		More than Four Choices or ALL	39	21.4
		Total	182	100.0

**What is the main hindrance to conducting lasting peace between Israel and Lebanon**

Community			Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Maronite	Valid	Syria	17.4	17.4
		Iran	16.3	33.7
		Hezbollah	23.5	57.2
		Lebanon	4.5	61.8
		Palestinian Refugees	6.4	68.2
		Israel	12.8	81.0
		More than Four Choices or ALL	19.0	100.0
		Total	100.0	
Druze	Valid	Syria	9.9	9.9
		Iran	22.0	31.9
		Hezbollah	29.7	61.5
		Lebanon	7.1	68.7
		Palestinian Refugees	2.2	70.9
		Israel	7.7	78.6
		More than Four Choices or ALL	21.4	100.0
		Total	100.0	

**If you support peace with Israel, how do you justify your claim?**

Community			Frequency	Percent
Maronite	Valid	Economic prosperity	194	51.9
		Similar goals and ideals in the Middle East	57	15.2
		Military superiority	14	3.7
		Dissident isolationist attitudes in the Arab World	3	.8
		Balance of power in the Middle East	21	5.6
		The Palestinian refugees in Lebanon(right of Return)	39	10.4
		I do not support a peace treaty	35	9.4
		More than Four Choices or ALL	10	2.7
		Total	373	99.7
		Missing		System
Total	374			100.0

**If you support peace with Israel, how do you justify your claim?**

Community			Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Maronite	Valid	Economic prosperity	52.0	52.0
		Similar goals and ideals in the Middle East	15.3	67.3
		Military superiority	3.8	71.0
		Dissident isolationist attitudes in the Arab World	.8	71.8
		Balance of power in the Middle East	5.6	77.5
		The Palestinian refugees in Lebanon(right of Return)	10.5	87.9
		I do not support a peace treaty	9.4	97.3
		More than Four Choices or ALL	2.7	100.0
		Total	100.0	

**If you support peace with Israel, how do you justify your claim?**

Community			Frequency	Percent
Druze	Valid	Economic prosperity	68	37.4
		Similar goals and ideals in the Middle East	16	8.8
		Military superiority	7	3.8
		Dissident isolationist attitudes in the Arab World	4	2.2
		Balance of power in the Middle East	15	8.2
		The Palestinian refugees in Lebanon(right of Return)	29	15.9
		I do not support a peace treaty	41	22.5
		More than Four Choices or ALL	2	1.1
		Total	182	100.0

**If you support peace with Israel, how do you justify your claim?**

Community			Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Druze	Valid	Economic prosperity	37.4	37.4
		Similar goals and ideals in the Middle East	8.8	46.2
		Military superiority	3.8	50.0
		Dissident isolationist attitudes in the Arab World	2.2	52.2
		Balance of power in the Middle East	8.2	60.4
		The Palestinian refugees in Lebanon(right of Return)	15.9	76.4
		I do not support a peace treay	22.5	98.9
		More than Four Choices or ALL	1.1	100.0
		Total	100.0	

**Benefits that emerge from conducting peace are greater than losses taken during the Arab - Israeli conflict**

Community			Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Maronite	Valid	Strongly Agree	94	25.1	25.1	25.1
		Agree	194	51.9	51.9	77.0
		Disagree	56	15.0	15.0	92.0
		Strongly Disagree	30	8.0	8.0	100.0
		Total	374	100.0	100.0	
Druze	Valid	Strongly Agree	41	22.5	22.8	22.8
		Agree	75	41.2	41.7	64.4
		Disagree	38	20.9	21.1	85.6
		Strongly Disagree	26	14.3	14.4	100.0
		Total	180	98.9	100.0	
	Missing	System	2	1.1		
	Total	182	100.0			

**Economic and military benefits from a peace treaty are sufficient to justify dettachment from the Palestinian cause**

Community			Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Maronite	Valid	Strongly Agree	66	17.6	17.8	17.8
		Agree	115	30.7	31.1	48.9
		Disagree	140	37.4	37.8	86.8
		Strongly Disagree	49	13.1	13.2	100.0
		Total	370	98.9	100.0	
Missing	System	4	1.1			
	Total	374	100.0			



**Economic and military benefits from a peace treaty are sufficient to justify detachment from the Palestinian cause**

Community			Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Druze	Valid	Strongly Agree	15	8.2	8.2	8.2
		Agree	30	16.5	16.5	24.7
		Disagree	88	48.4	48.4	73.1
		Strongly Disagree	49	26.9	26.9	100.0
		Total	182	100.0	100.0	

**How do you perceive the Lebanese Jews?**

Community			Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Maronite	Valid	Extremely Warm	20	5.3	5.3	5.3
		Warm	60	16.0	16.0	21.4
		Neutral	177	47.3	47.3	68.7
		Cold	56	15.0	15.0	83.7
		Extremely Cold	61	16.3	16.3	100.0
		Total	374	100.0	100.0	
Druze	Valid	Extremely Warm	9	4.9	4.9	4.9
		Warm	16	8.8	8.8	13.7
		Neutral	89	48.9	48.9	62.6
		Cold	36	19.8	19.8	82.4
		Extremely Cold	32	17.6	17.6	100.0
		Total	182	100.0	100.0	

**How do you perceive the Israeli Jews?**

Community			Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Maronite	Valid	Extremely Warm	12	3.2	3.2	3.2
		Warm	31	8.3	8.3	11.5
		Neutral	153	40.9	40.9	52.4
		Cold	57	15.2	15.2	67.6
		Extremely Cold	121	32.4	32.4	100.0
		Total	374	100.0	100.0	
Druze	Valid	Extremely Warm	7	3.8	3.8	3.8
		Warm	4	2.2	2.2	6.0
		Neutral	60	33.0	33.0	39.0
		Cold	25	13.7	13.7	52.7
		Extremely Cold	86	47.3	47.3	100.0
		Total	182	100.0	100.0	

**How do you perceive the Israeli Druze?**

Community			Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Maronite	Valid	Extremely Warm	8	2.1	2.2	2.2
		Warm	16	4.3	4.3	6.5
		Neutral	192	51.3	51.6	58.1
		Cold	59	15.8	15.9	73.9

**How do you perceive the Israeli Druze?**

Community			Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Maronite	Valid	Extremely Cold	97	25.9	26.1	100.0
		Total	372	99.5	100.0	
	Missing	System	2	.5		
		Total	374	100.0		
	Druze	Valid	Extremely Warm	83	45.6	45.6
Warm			67	36.8	36.8	82.4
Neutral			18	9.9	9.9	92.3
Cold			2	1.1	1.1	93.4
Extremely Cold			12	6.6	6.6	100.0
Total		182	100.0	100.0		

**How do you perceive the Syrian Druze?**

Community			Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Maronite	Valid	Extremely Warm	15	4.0	4.0	4.0
		Warm	37	9.9	9.9	13.9
		Neutral	213	57.0	57.1	71.0
		Cold	44	11.8	11.8	82.8
		Extremely Cold	64	17.1	17.2	100.0
	Total	373	99.7	100.0		
	Missing	System	1	.3		
		Total	374	100.0		
Druze	Valid	Extremely Warm	70	38.5	38.9	38.9
		Warm	67	36.8	37.2	76.1
		Neutral	24	13.2	13.3	89.4
		Cold	10	5.5	5.6	95.0
		Extremely Cold	9	4.9	5.0	100.0
		Total	180	98.9	100.0	
	Missing	System	2	1.1		
		Total	182	100.0		

**How do you perceive the Lebanese Druze?**

Community			Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Maronite	Valid	Extremely Warm	44	11.8	11.9	11.9
		Warm	106	28.3	28.6	40.5
		Neutral	149	39.8	40.3	80.8
		Cold	48	12.8	13.0	93.8
		Extremely Cold	23	6.1	6.2	100.0
		Total	370	98.9	100.0	
	Missing	System	4	1.1		
		Total	374	100.0		

**How do you perceive the Lebanese Druze?**

Community			Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Druze	Valid	Extremely Warm	130	71.4	71.4	71.4
		Warm	39	21.4	21.4	92.9
		Neutral	8	4.4	4.4	97.3
		Cold	4	2.2	2.2	99.5
		Extremely Cold	1	.5	.5	100.0
		Total	182	100.0	100.0	

**How do you perceive the Lebanese Maronites?**

Community			Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Maronite	Valid	Extremely Warm	250	66.8	67.8	67.8
		Warm	71	19.0	19.2	87.0
		Neutral	37	9.9	10.0	97.0
		Cold	3	.8	.8	97.8
		Extremely Cold	8	2.1	2.2	100.0
		Total	369	98.7	100.0	
Missing	System		5	1.3		
		Total	374	100.0		
Druze	Valid	Extremely Warm	31	17.0	17.2	17.2
		Warm	84	46.2	46.7	63.9
		Neutral	46	25.3	25.6	89.4
		Cold	13	7.1	7.2	96.7
		Extremely Cold	6	3.3	3.3	100.0
		Total	180	98.9	100.0	
Missing	System		2	1.1		
		Total	182	100.0		

**How do you perceive the Syrian Maronites?**

Community			Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Maronite	Valid	Extremely Warm	103	27.5	27.9	27.9
		Warm	137	36.6	37.1	65.0
		Neutral	92	24.6	24.9	90.0
		Cold	22	5.9	6.0	95.9
		Extremely Cold	15	4.0	4.1	100.0
		Total	369	98.7	100.0	
Missing	System		5	1.3		
		Total	374	100.0		
Druze	Valid	Extremely Warm	13	7.1	7.1	7.1
		Warm	45	24.7	24.7	31.9
		Neutral	82	45.1	45.1	76.9
		Cold	25	13.7	13.7	90.7
		Extremely Cold	17	9.3	9.3	100.0
		Total	182	100.0	100.0	

**How do you perceive the Palestinian refugees?**

Community			Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Maronite	Valid	Extremely Warm	13	3.5	3.5	3.5
		Warm	64	17.1	17.3	20.8
		Neutral	108	28.9	29.1	49.9
		Cold	62	16.6	16.7	66.6
		Extremely Cold	123	32.9	33.2	99.7
		44	1	.3	.3	100.0
	Total	371	99.2	100.0		
Missing	System	3	.8			
	Total	374	100.0			
Druze	Valid	Extremely Warm	8	4.4	4.4	4.4
		Warm	35	19.2	19.2	23.6
		Neutral	60	33.0	33.0	56.6
		Cold	29	15.9	15.9	72.5
		Extremely Cold	50	27.5	27.5	100.0
		Total	182	100.0	100.0	

**How do you perceive the Palestinian militants?**

Community			Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Maronite	Valid	Extremely Warm	12	3.2	3.2	3.2
		Warm	18	4.8	4.8	8.0
		Neutral	39	10.4	10.4	18.4
		Cold	56	15.0	15.0	33.4
		Extremely Cold	249	66.6	66.6	100.0
		Total	374	100.0	100.0	
Druze	Valid	Extremely Warm	21	11.5	11.5	11.5
		Warm	26	14.3	14.3	25.8
		Neutral	20	11.0	11.0	36.8
		Cold	39	21.4	21.4	58.2
		Extremely Cold	76	41.8	41.8	100.0
		Total	182	100.0	100.0	

**Sex of the Respondent**

Community			Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Maronite	Valid	Female	194	51.9	51.9	51.9
		Male	180	48.1	48.1	100.0
		Total	374	100.0	100.0	
Druze	Valid	Female	75	41.2	41.2	41.2
		Male	107	58.8	58.8	100.0
		Total	182	100.0	100.0	

**Year of Birth**

Community			Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent	
Maronite	Valid	1981	2	.5	.5	.5	
		1982	3	.8	.8	1.3	
		1983	5	1.3	1.3	2.7	
		1984	2	.5	.5	3.2	
		1985	8	2.1	2.1	5.3	
		1986	18	4.8	4.8	10.2	
		1987	27	7.2	7.2	17.4	
		1988	79	21.1	21.1	38.5	
		1989	88	23.5	23.5	62.0	
		1990	79	21.1	21.1	83.2	
		1991	55	14.7	14.7	97.9	
		1992	7	1.9	1.9	99.7	
		1998	1	.3	.3	100.0	
		Total		374	100.0	100.0	
Druze	Valid	1980	1	.5	.5	.5	
		1983	1	.5	.5	1.1	
		1984	5	2.7	2.7	3.8	
		1985	6	3.3	3.3	7.1	
		1986	14	7.7	7.7	14.8	
		1987	20	11.0	11.0	25.8	
		1988	24	13.2	13.2	39.0	
		1989	44	24.2	24.2	63.2	
		1990	38	20.9	20.9	84.1	
		1991	25	13.7	13.7	97.8	
		1992	4	2.2	2.2	100.0	
		Total		182	100.0	100.0	

**Preferred political leader/ party**

Community		Frequency	Percent
Maronite	Valid	100	26.7
	Bashar Assad	1	.3
	Free Patriotic Movement	70	18.7
	Georges Frem	1	.3
	Hezbollah	1	.3
	Kataeb	43	11.5
	Lebanese Army	1	.3
	Lebanese Forces	125	33.4
	Lebanon	1	.3
	Marada	12	3.2
	March 14	4	1.1
	Michel Murr - Elias Murr	3	.8
	Progressive Socialist Party	5	1.3
	Waad Party	5	1.3

**Preferred political leader/ party**

Community		Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Maronite	Valid	26.7	26.7
	Bashar Assad	.3	27.0
	Free Patriotic Movement	18.7	45.7
	Georges Frem	.3	46.0
	Hezbollah	.3	46.3
	Kataeb	11.5	57.8
	Lebanese Army	.3	58.0
	Lebanese Forces	33.4	91.4
	Lebanon	.3	91.7
	Marada	3.2	94.9
	March 14	1.1	96.0
	Michel Murr - Elias Murr	.8	96.8
	Progressive Socialist Party	1.3	98.1
	Waad Party	1.3	99.5

**Preferred political leader/ party**

Community			Frequency	Percent
Maronite	Valid	Ziad Baroud	1	.3
		Ziad Rahbani	1	.3
		Total	374	100.0
Druze	Valid	Amal	1	.5
		Hezbollah	1	.5
		Lebanese Army	5	2.7
		Lebanese Communist Party	2	1.1
		Lebanese Forces	1	.5
		Lebanon	2	1.1
		Progressive Socialist Party	161	88.5
		Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party	9	4.9
		Total	182	100.0

**Preferred political leader/ party**

Community			Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Maronite	Valid	Ziad Baroud	.3	99.7
		Ziad Rahbani	.3	100.0
		Total	100.0	
Druze	Valid	Amal	.5	.5
		Hezbollah	.5	1.1
		Lebanese Army	2.7	3.8
		Lebanese Communist Party	1.1	4.9
		Lebanese Forces	.5	5.5
		Lebanon	1.1	6.6
		Progressive Socialist Party	88.5	95.1
		Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party	4.9	100.0
		Total	100.0	

**Your family composed of how many members?**

Community			Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Maronite	Valid	2	2	.5	.5	.5
		3	27	7.2	7.2	7.8
		4	136	36.4	36.5	44.2
		5	128	34.2	34.3	78.6
		6	57	15.2	15.3	93.8
		7	15	4.0	4.0	97.9
		8	5	1.3	1.3	99.2
		9	1	.3	.3	99.5
		10	1	.3	.3	99.7
		12	1	.3	.3	100.0
		Total	373	99.7	100.0	
		Missing	System		1	.3
Total	374			100.0		
Druze	Valid	2	2	1.1	1.1	1.1
		3	10	5.5	5.5	6.6
		4	53	29.1	29.1	35.7
		5	72	39.6	39.6	75.3
		6	33	18.1	18.1	93.4
		7	9	4.9	4.9	98.4
		8	3	1.6	1.6	100.0
		Total	182	100.0	100.0	

**How many of your family members work?**

Community			Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Maronite	Valid	0	1	.3	.3	.3
		1	88	23.5	23.7	24.0

**How many of your family members work?**

Community			Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Maronite	Valid	2	124	33.2	33.4	57.4
		3	94	25.1	25.3	82.7
		4	43	11.5	11.6	94.3
		5	17	4.5	4.6	98.9
		6	2	.5	.5	99.5
		7	1	.3	.3	99.7
		8	1	.3	.3	100.0
		Total	371	99.2	100.0	
Missing	System	3	.8			
	Total	374	100.0			
Druze	Valid	1	54	29.7	29.7	29.7
		2	64	35.2	35.2	64.8
		3	36	19.8	19.8	84.6
		4	19	10.4	10.4	95.1
		5	5	2.7	2.7	97.8
		6	3	1.6	1.6	99.5
		7	1	.5	.5	100.0
		Total	182	100.0	100.0	

**Family Monthly Income**

Community			Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Maronite	Valid	Below \$ 1000	18	4.8	4.8	4.8
		\$ 1000 - 3000	169	45.2	45.2	50.0
		3000 - 5000	115	30.7	30.7	80.7
		5000 - 7000	30	8.0	8.0	88.8
		Above 7000	42	11.2	11.2	100.0
		Total	374	100.0	100.0	
Druze	Valid	Below \$ 1000	11	6.0	6.0	6.0
		\$ 1000 - 3000	82	45.1	45.1	51.1
		3000 - 5000	53	29.1	29.1	80.2
		5000 - 7000	27	14.8	14.8	95.1
		Above 7000	9	4.9	4.9	100.0
		Total	182	100.0	100.0	

**University**

Community			Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Maronite	Valid	AUB	18	4.8	4.8	4.8
		LU	88	23.5	23.5	28.3
		NDU	191	51.1	51.1	79.4
		NDU S	1	.3	.3	79.7
		SU	51	13.6	13.6	93.3
		USJ	25	6.7	6.7	100.0
		Total	374	100.0	100.0	



**University**

Community			Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Druze	Valid	AUB	32	17.6	17.6	17.6
		NDU	20	11.0	11.0	28.6
		NDU S	113	62.1	62.1	90.7
		SU	16	8.8	8.8	99.5
		USJ	1	.5	.5	100.0
		Total	182	100.0	100.0	

