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THE PRESIDENCY OF LEBANON:

SOME SOCIO-POLITICAL FACTORS BEHIND THE LOCATION  
OF DECISION MAKING AND DECISION EXECUTION

(1585-1943)

By

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LOCATION OF DECISION MAKING AND DECISION EXECUTION

IN LEBANON

(1585-1943)

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## ABSTRACT

This thesis is an attempt to investigate the degree of truth in a general belief among many Lebanese that, mainly due to socio-political factors the Lebanese "rulers" have always been the main decision makers and decision executors in Lebanon ever since Lebanon's feudal era.

To accomplish this task the thesis has been organized as follows:

The first chapter is devoted to the definition of the problem of the thesis; the design followed; and the exposition of some factors influencing the power of the rulers. To that respect the temporal scope of the thesis has been divided into four epochs treated under four consecutive chapters.

Each of these chapters is a socio-historical survey of a certain epoch of the Lebanese history starting from the early sixteenth century to 1943. These chapters are meant to show the socio-political factors behind power distribution in Lebanon as strands evolving through history. The first of these chapters covers the period falling between 1585-1861 and deals with the Emirates' and Qaim-Maqamiyyahs' administrations. The second covers the period 1861-1915 and deals with the Mutasarrifiyyah administration. The third covers the period 1915-1918 and deals with the Ottoman war administration in Lebanon. The fourth and last of these chapters covers the period 1918-1943 and deals with the French military occupation and mandate administrations.

The last item in the text of the thesis is a concluding chapter revealing an overall picture of the location of the power of decision making and execution in Lebanon during the last four centuries or so. In this chapter the writer gives the results of his findings as he sees them in relation to the belief about the location of decision-making and decision-execution in Lebanon as stated above.

At the end of the text the reader will find a bibliography of the books and other sources of information used.

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## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

In any modern state organization there are three main functions: law making, law implementation and law interpretation.<sup>1</sup> Before the existence of the nation-state, towards the end of the Middle Ages, these functions were not conceived of as distinct state functions, but as mere tasks to be performed by the individual ruler. The ruler who, usually, enjoyed authoritarian, sometimes so-called superhuman, powers over the land and the people, was the law maker, the law implementer and the law interpreter. In other words the ruler was the center of decision-making and decision execution in his state. Furthermore the ruler, in his capacity as a superior, did not obtain his power from any earthly source. The administration of a state, however, even though the state might be the personal property of the ruler, could for all practical purposes not be done by only one individual. Other people, therefore, had to help the ruler in the process of administration and thus acquire a certain degree of power. But this power was delegated from the ruler to his subordinates with the ruler still superior. Power in this sense came from above with the mass not allowed to take part in the process of power location. This resulted in absolutism, execution of personal interests and favoritism. The public

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1. Raymond G. Gettell, Political Science (Boston, New York, London...: Ginn and Company, revised edition, 1949), p. 209.

welfare was given marginal interest by the state, if any interest at all. The ordinary citizen was conceived and treated as a mere personal property of the ruler. Under the stimulation of those conditions plus the teachings of eminent thinkers, together with the social, economic and political conditions favoring the rise of popular government, the public urge for popular rule, through popular representation, became stronger and stronger as time passed.<sup>1</sup> Finally representative bodies started to take shape in the early stages of the gradual development of the nation state.<sup>2</sup>

At this stage, the tasks of the state were more clearly distinguished and crystalized as separate and distinct powers to be exercised each by a different body in the state; hence the principle of the separation of powers which provided that the body which makes laws (the legislature) should not be the same body which executes laws (the executive) or the body which interprets them (the judiciary). The powers of decision-making and decision-execution should not be entrusted to the same hands, because of the likelihood that the ruler might abuse his power by legislating and executing laws that fit his own personal interests.<sup>3</sup>

These powers, especially the executive and the legislative, do not, however, function separately and independently. They are always inter-related and interdependent. This interdependence and this interrelationship are expressed at their minimum level in checks and balances between the powers as is the case in the United States of America. The degree of interrelationship between these different state powers (the legislative,

1. Ibid., p. 91.

2. Ibid., pp. 236-238.

3. Montesquieu as in R.M. Hutchins (ed.), Great Books of the Western World; The Spirit of Laws (Chicago, London, Toronto: William Benton, 1952), pp. 69-70.

the executive and the judiciary) and the role played and the check exercised upon each of those powers in the process of decision-making, decision-implementation and decision-interpretation, determines the form of government. By "form of government," the writer means the power structure in the state as related to decision making and decision execution. Thinking in terms of a continuum in relation to forms of government we can place democracy, "rule of the people by the people for the people,"<sup>1</sup> at one extreme and dictatorship (absolute dictatorial rule from above) at the other extreme. Varying degrees, however, fall between the two extremes. Generally speaking when decision-making, decision-execution and decision-interpretation are regularly and normally in the hands of the legislature, the executive and the judiciary respectively, then the form of government tends to be of a democratic nature. When all three; decision-making, decision-execution and decision interpretation are the exclusive right of the executive alone the form of government is of a dictatorial nature.

The thinking in terms of extremes leads us to thinking in terms of degree and nature. By degree is meant the extent to which powers are either fused or separated. By nature is meant the relative effect of this fusion or separation on the functioning of each of the powers. The degree of interrelationship and the nature of that interrelationship between the powers in the state is apt to determine the position of the individual state on the continuum. Because history is a process of evolution the majority of states have had a felt change in both the degree and nature of the interrelationship between the three powers. The structural evolution

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1. Abraham Lincoln, Address, Gettysburg National Cemetery, November 19, 1863, as in: Burton Stevenson, The Home Book for Quotations, 6th edition (revised) (New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1952) p. 432.



of Lebanon since 1585, for example, shows a clear tendency towards the separation of powers. Comparing Lebanon during its feudal era with Lebanon after 1926, one can very easily notice the progressive evolution towards democratic life. But nevertheless there is a strong tendency among the Lebanese--educated and non-educated, politicians and laymen--to believe that the chief executive is the actual, if not the legal, decision maker and decision executer in Lebanon. The role played by the executive, particularly by the chief executive, is relatively strong enough to overlap the role played by the legislature.<sup>1</sup> This location of power in the hands of the chief executive is said to be the result of a continuous consistent evolution of the Lebanese society and the Lebanese political experience.<sup>2</sup> In other words, it is said that behind what we have in independent Lebanon there are deeply rooted socio-historical factors that had been collaborating over the last four centuries, perhaps before, of Lebanon's history to make out of the presidency<sup>3</sup> the center of power in Lebanon.

The central goal of this dissertation is to investigate the degree of the truth or falsity of this belief. More precisely; it is the writer's

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1. Muhammad Majdub, The Problem of Democracy and Arabism in Lebanon (in Arabic), (Beirut: Mnaymeh Press and Publications, 1957), pp. 12-13; G. Naqqash, L'Orient, Vol. 29, No. 7930, 1953, p. 1, col. 3, 4, 5 and 6; A. Nabti, al-Jarida, Vol. 4, No. 1167, 1956, p. 4, col. 1; R. Malouf, al-Jarida, Vol. 4, No. 1172, 1956, p. 1, col. 4, 5 and 6; Kamal Junblat, The Truth Behind the Lebanese Revolution (in Arabic), The Arabic Book, (Beirut: The Arab Publications House, 1959), p. 40.
  2. Naqqash, op.cit., p. 1; Majdub, op.cit., p. 16; G. Tweini, Democracy in the Balance (in Arabic), Michel Asmar, 1957, pp. 7-8.
  3. I will use the expression presidency in this chapter and whenever I am not referring to a particular period, to mean the office of the Emir (1585-1841), the office of the Qaim-Maqam (1841-1861), the office of the mutasarrif (1861-1915), the office of the military ruler (1915-1920), the office of the high commissioner (1920-1943), and the presidency (1926-1943).

task to answer the following questions: Where were the powers of decision-making and decision execution located?<sup>1</sup> Were they located in the office of the president or somewhere else, during the last four centuries? What, in general, were the factors that were behind this power location?

It is necessary at the outset of this dissertation to state plainly that the writer does not adopt or reject the belief referred to above. His aim is to convey a moving picture about power location during a period of four centuries of Lebanon's history. History is a process and thus involves change over time. The author's duty, hence, is to point to the place or places in which power was located be it the president or others, and hence prove or disprove the statement that power was located in the chief executive. The achievement of this thesis, if it succeeds, will be the establishment of a sound reliable and partial, perhaps not final, judgment concerning a belief which most Lebanese tend to accept without questioning its validity.

The time scope of this study will cover four centuries of Lebanon's history. Those centuries falling between the **late** sixteenth and the middle of the twentieth centuries (more precisely 1585-1943).<sup>2</sup> The sixteenth century was chosen as a starting point because it was during that century that Lebanon's feudal system became fairly crystalized and Lebanon's territorial and social unities showed an emerging stability, as it will be established below. The year 1943 was chosen as the other limit of the time scope of this thesis, because it was the year during which Lebanon

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1. I will limit myself to these two powers because of the absence of references that help the investigation about the third power.
  2. The emirate of the Ma'nids is believed to have started early in the sixteenth century after the Ottomans had conquered the Syrian strip of the Arab Empire, but no definite date was given by historians as to the exact date.

won its national independence. It would be desirable, for the sake of completeness, to study the period since 1943, also. This period, however, is difficult and complex, composing a topic worthy of a separate thesis. Hence the author has omitted it here.

To make statements about power location in Lebanon the researcher must be explicit about the factors which determine it. To the writer power location depends upon factors belonging to four main categories: a) the personality of the ruler, b) the legal distribution of power, c) the social set up, and d) international strategy and power politics (peculiar to externally controlled states). The personal factor is nearly unexplorable, because of the lack of reliable information concerning the personal potentials of every president. The legal factor is not going to be disregarded but at the same time it is not going to be stressed except in relation to the last two categories, because it is not our main concern in this thesis to investigate about the formal structural organization of Lebanon. Emphasis, therefore, is going to be laid upon the last two categories, namely the social set up and the external control. Specifically the individual factors that will receive most stress are: a) land tenure, b) sectarianism, c) the basic social structure, and d) international strategy as related to power location in Lebanon.

By "land tenure" the writer means the nature and evolution of the individual's ownership, holding and control of land, and the effect this has on social allegiance, political loyalties and the power structure in the state.

By "sectarianism" is meant the way in which the nature of religious affiliations affect the national unity in Lebanon and the political allegiance and loyalty of its people.

"The basic social structure" means here the nature of the dominant type of social organization (primary or secondary) affecting the political loyalties of the Lebanese citizen.

And "international strategy" means the direct role played by international power politics in determining the Lebanese political destiny and form of government, especially after the year 1840.

In the following four chapters (II-V) a chronological discussion of the four factors in relation to power distribution in Lebanon is going to be undertaken. Chapter VI will be the conclusive, summing-up chapter in which the writer's findings are consolidated.

## CHAPTER II

### THE FEUDAL LEBANON AND THE QAIM-MAQAMIYYAHS

(1585-1861)

In the preceding chapter a number of generalizations were made about the office of the Lebanese chief executive. In this and subsequent chapters a documented chronological analysis of some socio-political factors behind power distribution in Lebanon shall be attempted.

As it was said in the introductory chapter the temporal scope of this dissertation covers the period that falls between the late sixteenth and the middle of the twentieth centuries. To have a definite date as his starting point the writer chose the year 1585 because it was during that year that Fakhr ad-Din Man II, 1585-1636, a Manid of genius, became the Emir of Lebanon<sup>1</sup> after the death of his father Qurqumaz (1544-1585).<sup>2</sup>

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1. In dealing with the feudal period of the Lebanese history I will refer to only the emirs who played decisive roles in that period, i.e. reference will be made to a) Fakhr ad-Din Man II, Haydar Shihoh and Bashir Shihoh II.
  2. Fakhr ad-Din's father, Emir Qurqumaz, "died in 1585, pursued by the Ottomans who accused him of having planned the pillage of a tribute caravan. Young Fakhr ad-Din, at the time, had been carried away to Kisrawan by his Buhturid mother. There he spent six years in the home of the Khazins--a Maronite family which he later raised to sheikhly rank," Kamal Salibi, "Lebanon in Historical Prospective," Middle East Forum, Vol. XXXIV, No. 3, March 1959, p. 20; the date of the pillage was related by T. Shidyaaq as has taken place in 1584, Tannus ash-Shidyaaq, The News of the Notables of Mount Lebanon (in Arabic), (Beirut: al-Urfan Library, Simya Press, 1954), p. 293.

Although the Manid rule had started early in the first half of the sixteenth century, the writer chose to start by the Emirate of Fakhr ad-Din Man II because it was during his emirate that the two parts of Mount Lebanon (the North and the South) became the Emirate of Mount Lebanon in 1627. Two main factors should have paved the road to this unity, i.e. the personal standing army which Fakhr ad-Din was the first emir to build, and the help of the Maronite Patriarch. The northern part of the mountain was mainly populated by Christian Maronites and religious leadership was fairly strong in the North. Hence, to achieve unity it sounded better to Fakhr ad-Din if he could do that peacefully and with the acceptance of the northern population themselves. The Maronite Patriarch was on good terms with the European powers especially with Rome and Paris, because the Maronites, in their capacity as Uniates, sought the satisfaction of the Pope. The good relations of Fakhr ad-Din with the West, especially with Rome, and hence his good relations with the Uniates (the Christians in general) "was the beginning of the alliance between the Maronites and the Druzes of Lebanon which led, in 1627, to the incorporation of northern Lebanon in the emirate of Fakhr ad-Din II, ... In that year the Emirate of Mount Lebanon was born, including the whole territory of present-day Lebanon."<sup>1</sup> But although Fakhr ad-Din II secured territorial unity between the South and the North, feudal uniformity was not achieved until during the rule of the Shihabi dynasty some seventy-six years later as will be shown later in this chapter.

During Fakhr ad-Din's Emirate, the ownership of the mugata'h (fief) in the south was hereditary, whereas the mugaddams of the north used to

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1. Salibi, op.cit., p. 20.

run the affairs of the Maronite villages and districts without any right of hereditary ownership of territories.<sup>1</sup> In spite of the non-uniformity in land tenure and its relation to the administration of the Emirate, the mountain enjoyed a high degree of socio-religious unity, because one of Fakhr ad-Din's pillars upon which his internal policy rested was non-sectarianism.<sup>2</sup> Together with this social solidarity the mountain enjoyed a period of prosperity and security. Lebanon was prosperous because of Fakhr's encouragement of trade with Europe<sup>3</sup> and Lebanon was secure because Fakhr ad-Din enjoyed the command over around 100,000 armed men.<sup>4</sup> The supreme porte, however, was in no way happy about the ever-increasing strength of Fakhr and was constantly suspicious and intolerant towards the Emir's policy of construction and progress. Fakhr was aware of the suspicions of the Supreme Porte and sought external reinforcement. To this effect he concluded defense treaties with the Medici dukes of Tuscany and the Pope (1608 and 1611).<sup>5</sup> When the power of Fakhr ad-Din, since he had a standing army, became a direct and strong threat to the Porte's position in the Middle East, Hafiz Pasha, the wali of Damascus, was provided with a "powerful host drawn from fifty sanjaks, and a fleet of sixty galleys intent upon the destruction of the audacious amir of Lebanon, and putting an end to his separatist and expansionist policy."<sup>6</sup> Failing to get the

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1. Ibid., pp. 18-19.

2. Philip Hitti, Lebanon in History, London: Macmillan and Company Ltd., New York: St. Martin's Press, 1957), p. 376, (Hence... Hitti, Lebanon...).

3. Ibid., pp. 376-378.

4. Ibid., p. 375.

5. Ibid., pp. 376-377.

6. Ibid., pp. 377-378.

necessary help promised by his European friends, and prudently refraining from risking his army, Fakhr fled to Italy (1613) on board a French ship that happened to be in Sidon harbour and refrained from coming back until in (1618) when "Changes in the grand vizirate of Constantinople and in the governorship of Damascus played in favour of the self-exiled amir."<sup>1</sup> Once back in the mountain Fakhr ad-Din resumed his old policy of expansion, independence, and prosperity. And once again, when the increased annual revenue enabled him to keep a huge standing army, the Porte (1633) ordered the pashas in Syria and Egypt to march against the trouble maker, the Emir of Lebanon who was finally deposed in 1635 after fleeing away for several months.<sup>2</sup>

"Lebanon under Fakhr ad-Din II and his successors especially welcomed Western cultural influences..."<sup>3</sup> Education and schooling by Christian European missions together with a flourishing trade with the West were introduced and encouraged by Fakhr ad-Din. It was said that Fakhr ad-Din was amongst the pioneers who have effectively introduced western educational systems and European trade into Lebanon. But it was natural that the educational renaissance be restricted almost only to the Christian communities for three main reasons: a) the Christian missions gave priority to Christian students to enroll in their schools, b) the Moslem and Druze families were relatively hesitant to send their children to institutions having a dominant Christian element, and e) the early missions found it

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1. Ibid., p. 380.

2. Ibid., pp. 382-383.

3. Philip Hitti, History of Syria, (London: Macmillan and Company Ltd., 1951), p. 694 (Hereafter, Hitti, Syria...).



more appropriate and peaceful to erect their schools in Christian environments.

During his Emirate "Fakhr ad-Din II" and later "his successors tried hard to unify the system of internal government in northern Lebanon. As the muqaddam dynasties gradually died out fighting their petty feuds, they were replaced by a new Maronite aristocracy: a class of Christian feudal sheikhs similar to the feudal class of the south."<sup>1</sup> This uniformity between the north and the south did not reach its maturity until 1711 when Emir Haydar Shihab (1707-1732)<sup>2</sup>, with the effective aid of the feudal emirs and sheikhs, defeated and exterminated the opposition faction at the battle of Ayn Dara.<sup>3</sup> With the opposition crushed the Shihabi Emir found it opportune to attempt internal reorganization. Subsequently the feudal system, in all of the mountain this time, became highly centralized under the sole control of the ruling emir,<sup>4</sup> at least theoretically.

According to the new organization Mount Lebanon was divided into muqata'at (feudal fiefs). Each muqata'h (fief) was to be administered by a muqati'ish (feudal lord) installed as a feudatory over the muqata'h.<sup>5</sup>

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1. Salibi, op.cit., p. 20.
  2. A member of the Shihabi family that took over power after the death of the last Manid in 1697.
  3. Salibi, op.cit., p. 20; Hitti, Syria..., p. 687.
  4. Hitti, Syria..., p. 687; Salibi, op.cit., p. 20; Shidyaq, op.cit., p. 20.
  5. The muqata'at were the following: ash-Shuf (given to the Janbalat sheikhs), al-Manasif (given to the abu-Nakad sheikhs), al-Arqud (given to the Imad sheikhs), al-Jird (given to the abdl-Malak sheikhs), al-Matin (given to the abul-Lama emirs), al-Gharb al-A'ala (given to the Talhuq sheikhs), al-Gharb al-Adna (given to the Arsalan emirs), Kisrawan (given to the Khazin sheikhs), az-Zawiyah (given to the Dhahir sheikhs), al-Kura (given to al-A'zar sheikhs) and Jubbat al-Munaytra (given to the Himadeh sheikhs); A Committee of Professors, Lebanon: Social and Other Studies, (in Arabic), (Beirut: al-Adabiyyah Press, 1334 (higra)), pp. 285-286, hence, Committee...

The feudatory is usually a sheikh or emir who parcels out the fief among subordinates,<sup>1</sup> called fallahin (plowmen or farmers). Each feudatory family was responsible for the "administration and revenue" of the district assigned to it.<sup>2</sup> The head of a feudatory family, however, was directly responsible to the ruling emir<sup>3</sup> who was supposed to be the melting pot of the executive and other powers,<sup>4</sup> i.e. his was an absolute authority,<sup>5</sup> at least theoretically. The ruling emir, however, used to be elected by an ad hoc assembly<sup>6</sup> composed of the Lebanese notables,<sup>7</sup> subject to the

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1. Nasif al-Yaziji, A History Paper about Lebanon in Its Feudal Era, (in Arabic), (Harisa: Dayr al-Mukhallis Press, n.d.), pp. 18-19.
  2. Ibid., p. 8; Salibi, op.cit., p. 20.
  3. Yaziji, op.cit., pp. 5-6; Salibi, op.cit., p. 20.
  4. Marun Abbud (trs.), Beirut and Lebanon since a Century and a Half, V. I, (in Arabic), (Beirut: Dar al-Makshuf, 1949), p. 225.
  5. Edmond Blayhil, The General History of Lebanon, (in Arabic), (Bekfayyah: Majallat al-A'ra'ss Press, 1938), p. 130.
  6. Dr. Kamal Salibi referred to this as a "general assembly," Salibi, op.cit., p. 20; Dr. Philip K. Hitti referred to it as a "national conference," Hitti, Syria..., p. 686; Tannus Shidyaq referred to it as a "meeting of notables," Shidyaq, op.cit., Vol. II, p. 150.
  7. A famous example of this assembly or national conference was the Samqaniyyeh conference held in 1697 when Bashir Shihab I, (1697-1707) was elected by the Lebanese notables and confirmed by the Porte as the ruling emir of Lebanon after the death of Ahmad Man (d. 1697) the ~~the~~ last Manid Emir, Shidyaq, op.cit., Vol. II, p. 150, Hitti, Syria..., p. 686, Dr. Hitti refers to another national conference held in Baruk in 1770 when Mansur Shihab abdicated and Yusuf "was proclaimed governor of the mountain," Ibid., p. 687, reference is made to this same conference by Haydar A. Shihab, The Glorious Penacles of the Historic Events of Time, (in Arabic), (Egypt: As-Salam Press, Vol. II, 1900), p. 748.

confirmation of the Porte through the Ottoman wali in either Damascus or Sidon.<sup>1</sup> The official status of Lebanon was that of a pay abonne<sup>2</sup> as early as 1516 when the Ottoman Turks occupied the territories of the Arab Empire and accepted the status of Lebanon as an independent Emirate provided its ruler paid an annual tribute to the Porte. The wali, in the neighboring vilayets was always ready to grant his confirmation to the highest bidder.<sup>3</sup> In return the ruling emir was granted the full right of selecting and appointing the individual feudatories of the different fiefs, and in increasing or decreasing the tax rate without convention.<sup>4</sup> Most important was the fact that the feudatory was given the power to exercise judicial authority over both criminal and civil cases in his own district subject to appeal to the Head Emir himself, save cases that involved death penalty and that should be treated by the Head Emir only.<sup>5</sup>

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1. Hitti, Lebanon..., pp. 387 and 393.
  2. A.N. Poliak, Feudalism in Egypt, Syria, Palestine and the Lebanon, (London: 1939), p. 56.
  3. Committee..., p. 179.
  4. Ibid., p. 179 (Bashir Shihab II had, for example, decided to increase the sum total of taxes in the mountain from 6782 currency units to 13564 units in order to give the Egyptian authorities 6782 units and keep a similar amount for himself, Ibid., p. 295, Fakhr ad-Din II concluded the treaties of 1608 and 1609 with the dukes of Tuscany without consulting any of the feudatories... Reference to this was made in Committee..., p. 282 and in Bulus Qara'li, Fakhr ad-Din Man II 1605-1621, (Harisa: St. Paul Press 1938), p. 171.
  5. Yaziji, op.cit., pp. 8-9.

The logic of this power structure in the Emirate led to the inevitability of granting the individual feudatories a free hand in the administration of their own provinces.<sup>1</sup> Under this system it was difficult to satisfy and please all the feudal chiefs; hence, it was natural that the different feudal lords often quarreled over issues of power and revenue. In fact, throughout its history, Lebanon was often occupied with factional fights between the individual feudatories.<sup>2</sup> In cases of such disagreements, however, the notables of the mountain usually used to come together in a general meeting to find a solution to the issue in controversy.<sup>3</sup>

The statement that the authority of the head emir was absolute and unlimited should not, therefore, be left unqualified. Although the power structure of feudal Lebanon invested strong powers in the hands of the Emir, yet one, due to the nature of this same structure, tends to believe with A. Poliak that the normal state of affairs was that the head emir himself was one of the notables and owed his superior position to their election or exertion.<sup>4</sup> Although it was built upon the same principles of feudal organization in Europe, the case of feudalism in Lebanon was, in a

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1. Ibid., p. 144 (As described above this system resembles the Agraria of Riggs in which both the primary organization and the self subsistent economy are dominant), William J. Siffin (ed.) Toward the Comparative Study of Administration, (n.p.: Department of Govt., Indiana University, 1957), pp. 30 and 40.
  2. Hitti, Syria..., p. 679.
  3. Evidence supporting this statement could be found in most of the writings dealing with the Emirate period; an example is the Baruk assembly of 1770, Hitti, Lebanon..., p. 393.
  4. Poliak and Colonel Churchill seem to agree on this point; Poliak, op.cit., p. 56 and Colonel Churchill, Mount Lebanon: A Ten Years Residence, V. III, (London: Saunders and Otley, 2nd ed., 1853), p. 29.

sense, peculiar to the Lebanon itself. There were at least two factors contributing to this peculiarity. They were, first that Lebanon was a pay abonne whose ruler had to pay an annual tribute to an external power; second, that the Emir used to have his own standing and regularly paid army. The power of the head emir, therefore, was conditioned by three factors: a) the degree of internal support from the individual feudatories, b) the support of the wali in the controlling vilayet,<sup>1</sup> and c) the strength of the personal army of the emir. Moreover, the history of the mountain is full of evidence that the head emir used to have his own consultants to whom he resorted whenever he was confronted with major problems for which he had to find decisive solutions.<sup>2</sup>

It was expected that under such a system as that of feudal Lebanon, as internal opposition grew clearer and stronger external help and reinforcement were sought more. This fact became clear during the emirate of Mulhim Shihab when the Yazbaki-Janbalati split was approaching its zenith. But never was this resort to external help as clear as it was during the emirate of Bashir Shihab II (1788-1840), the third and last emir to whom particular reference is to be made.

1. Poliak, op.cit., p. 57, Churchill, op.cit., p. 29.
2. Evidence of this kind is found in so many references and cases out of which the following are chosen:
  - a. Reference was made to the emir's consultative body, in Committee..., p. 43.
  - b. Aba Nadir al-Khazin, the muḍabbir (equivalent to a wazir) of Fakhr ad-Din II, is said to have cooperated with the emir in building up Lebanon, ibid., p. 281.
  - c. Reference was made by Yazbik to consultations with the chief feudatory families before the declaration of war, Awraq Lubnaniyyah, Vol. I, No. II, 1955, pp. 504-506.

"Bashir II was a man of remarkable qualities and a just and able ruler..."<sup>1</sup> Bashir's emirate, save the last eight years (1832-40), was one of construction and progress.<sup>2</sup> His major political goal was the attainment of a nonfeudal administrative unity in the mountain with himself the sole master of the new organization.<sup>3</sup> "In the Ma'nid tradition the Shihabs opened the door still wider to western culture particularly educational influences."<sup>4</sup> With this western element a new mentality and a concept of the state as belonging to all members of society were introduced to the mountain. The western impact manifested itself in the erection of new schools,<sup>5</sup> the deputation of delegations for education abroad,<sup>6</sup> the establishment of consultative councils<sup>7</sup> and lastly but not least the planned attempt to bring the feudal rule to its end by gradually reducing the privileges and powers of the feudal lords.<sup>8</sup> In his effort to achieve the last goal, Bashir resorted to clergymen of both sects (the Christians and the Druzes).<sup>9</sup> It was only natural that emirs and sheikhs who were enjoying feudal rights and privileges did not approve of Bashir's policy,

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1. Salibi, op.cit., p. 20.
2. Reference was made to Bashir's progressive development of Lebanon in: Shidyaq, op.cit., pp. 134, 136, 152, and 224; Blaybil, op.cit., pp. 114 and 116, A'bbud, op.cit., p. 229, Butrus S. Sfayr, Emir Bashir Shihab (in Arabic), (Beirut: Publication and Press House, 1950), pp. 90, 92, and 98.
3. Blaybil, op.cit., p. 229.
4. Hitti, Syria..., p. 694.
5. Abbud, op.cit., p. 229; Sfayr, op.cit., p. 98.
6. Shidyaq, op.cit., p. 224.
7. Sfayr, op.cit., pp. 100-101; Blaybil, op.cit., p. 114.
8. Blaybil, op.cit., p. 116.
9. Committee..., pp. 294-295.

hence, he could not escape some internal rivalries, most famous of which was his struggle with and the assassination<sup>1</sup> of the Druze sheikh, Bashir Janbulat.<sup>2</sup> The assassination of Bashir Janbulat meant more than the assassination of a sheikh by an emir. It meant the killing of a Druze by a Christian. Hence in his bloody struggle with the feudal lords, Bashir met resentment from the Druzes, and so he was obliged to resort to the help of the Maronites, thus playing the sects against each other. By doing that Bashir won the Christians to his side and thus made sure that the opposition party was limited to the Druzes alone<sup>3</sup> who formed half the population only. But this meant also that it became almost impossible for Bashir to have the mass solidly behind him. On the other hand the winds of international politics were not blowing according to Bashir's expectations. "The French expedition to Egypt in 1798 and the subsequent rise of Muhammad Ali Pasha in Egypt intensified the rivalry between France, England and the other European powers in the Near East. Bashir II chose to support Muhammad Ali against the Sultan, thinking he would thereby secure his position in Lebanon, but by so doing he caused the internal affairs of his country to become hopelessly entangled in the international imbroglio of the Eastern Question. Rivalries between the Lebanese sects, feudal factions and social classes became internationalized, as the Porte and its rival European powers took sides in issues which were often unimportant village squabbles."<sup>4</sup> Great Britain and the Porte sided with

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1. Bashir Janbulat was handed in to the wali of Sidon where he was assassinated.
  2. Committee..., pp. 291-292.
  3. Sulayman Abu-Iz-Addin, Ibrahim Pasha in Syria, (Beirut: Sadir Press, 1929), pp. 256-257.
  4. Salibi, op.cit., p. 20.

the opposition, mainly Druzes, against Emir Bashir and Ibrahim Pasha of Egypt and the French sided with the Uniates against the Druzes. To secure and preserve his position and in order at least to balance internal power, Bashir resorted to religious splits. By so doing he was negligently strengthening a new element that has characterized Lebanese history ever since the middle of the nineteenth century, i.e. sectarianism. This intended balance of internal power did not last long, because Ibrahim Pasha, the son of Muhammad Ali of Egypt, was at the same time putting Bashir II in a very critical position by his (Ibrahim's) effort to disarm and overtax the Lebanese who were accused of helping the western powers to bring Egyptian control over Lebanon to an end.<sup>1</sup> By so doing Ibrahim Pasha had strengthened the cause of the 'Ammiyyah (popular) movement. This movement was led by citizens belonging to the lower classes and its main objective was to clip the wings of landlords and give the ordinary citizen an opportunity to play a relatively decisive role in the political life of his country. This movement was mainly restricted to the north while the south was still sticking to the feudal system. Hence it could be concluded that the north was developing in a more progressive manner toward modernization than the south was.

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1. Committee..., pp. 295-296; according to S. Abu-Izzidini, Ibrahim disarmed the Druzes in 1835 and was intending to disarm the Christians that same year, but he did not do that because he was afraid that the attempt to disarm both sects might result in popular solidarity against the Egyptian regime in the mountain. So he sought the backing of the Christians in disarming the Druzes. The disarmament of the Druzes made the task of disarming the Christians easier because, a) the Druzes were interested in seeing their rivals disarmed and b) the other party was already without effective armaments. But by so doing Ibrahim won the enmity of both sects; Abu Izziddin, op.cit., pp. 190-191.



By the time Ibrahim decided to disarm the public, the ammiyyah have been already causing troubles to the Emir, since the early twenties of the nineteenth century.<sup>1</sup> In fact Bashir II had to leave his emirate for a while partly due to the pressure laid upon him by the ammiyyah of Antilyas in 1820.<sup>2</sup> With the ammiyyah, the first Lebanese semi-political party grouping,<sup>3</sup> coming to the arena of politics the Lebanese citizen started becoming an effective item in the accounts of both the Emir and the foreign powers. Whereas Bashir II was hopefully trying to suppress the ammiyyah while it was still in its embryonic phase,<sup>4</sup> the British, the local opposition and the Ottomans were all secretly nourishing this movement.<sup>5</sup> Earlier in this chapter it was said that the ammiyyah granted the Lebanese citizen the opportunity of becoming of some effective importance.

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1. Yusuf Khattar al-Hilu, The Popular Movements of Lebanon (in Arabic), (n.p., 1955) p. 19, Sfayr, op.cit., pp. 56-57, Shidyaq, Vol. II, op.cit., p. 158.
  2. Shidyaq, Vol. II, op.cit., p. 145.
  3. There is evidence that the ammiyyahs used to have an organizing representative in each qaryah (village) and their own publications; al-Hilu, op.cit., pp. 12, 34 and 48. Most famous amongst the ammiyyahs were: a) the Ammiyyah of Antilyas (1820), b) the Ammiyyah of Lihfid (1821), c) the Ammiyyahs of al-Hurg in Beirut, Zawyah and al-Matn (1840) and d) the famous Ammiyyah of Kisrawan led by Tanius Shahin (1858), Ibid., p. 53.
  4. Ibid., pp. 19, 20-27, 29 and 49. Shidyaq, Vol. II, op.cit., pp. 158 and 24.
  5. Shidyaq, op.cit., pp. 145, 226-228, and 230-231; it is believed that although the British and others whetted the movement yet originally it was not their creature, i.e. it was a purely national movement, Hilu, op.cit., p. 52; Mas'ad mentions the instigation of the people by the British against Bashir II, Bulus Masad, Lebanon and the Ottoman Constitution, (in Arabic), (Egypt: al-Fajaleh Press, 1909), p. 8.

In 1840 representatives of all sects together with few feudatories met at Dayr al-Qamar and decided to revolt against Bashir.<sup>1</sup> This decision was implemented (with the help of the Porte and the European powers) in a popular gathering near the coast of Beirut. Taking advantage of the relative weakness of Bashir II and his Egyptian allies, and depending on the support of the Porte and Great Britain, the rebels made several demands some of which were the following:<sup>2</sup>

- a) We will not pay except the usual taxes,
- b) The Emir must expel Butrus Karameh from his (the Emir's) Diwan -- Secretariat, and
- c) The people should not be disarmed.

These being the conditions in 1840 Bashir had to fight on both the internal and the external fronts. He tried to win both battles, but the task was too much for him and his Egyptian allies. Surrendering in the early Autumn of 1840 upon the "forced retreat" of his Egyptian allies, Bashir was exiled leaving behind him a collapsing feudal system and a feeble national union<sup>3</sup> if any national union at all. The collapsing feudal system gave opportunity for political groupings and the emergence of some kind of secondary organization especially in the north where people were starting to assemble around political issues instead of merely family and factional affiliations, as the ammiyyah movement shows.

If Fakhr ad-Din II had unified the territory of the mountain and opened the doors of Lebanon to the Western culture, and if Haydar Shihab

1. Abu Izziddin, op.cit., pp. 258-261.
2. As quoted in Shidyaq, op.cit., pp. 226-228.
3. Salibi, op.cit., p. 20.

had secured national union and feudal uniformity to the mountain, it was Bashir Shihab II who by opening up wider entry for the west into Lebanon and by trying to become the sole master of the mountain had contributed, perhaps unintentionally, to the partial cognizance of the ordinary citizen in governmental affairs. On the other hand, he contributed to the internationalization of Lebanon's internal problems, thus introducing a further element to the compound of power location in Lebanon, namely direct intense foreign pressure over the ruler of the mountain.<sup>1</sup> Add to these the sectarian dichotomy which he nourished.

The sad ending of Bashir II in September 1840 brought to power his rival relative Bashir Qasim Shihab III who was known to have "led a band of Lebanese irregulars against Ibrahim."<sup>2</sup> The emirate of Bashir III was a short one for in January 1842 he was deposed by the Porte, bringing the Shihabi dynasty to its end.<sup>3</sup>

By the termination of the Shihabi rule the original Lebanese feudal organization lost its axis, i.e. the ruling emir. On the other hand, the sectarian strifes perforated and disintegrated the national union between the Maronites and the Druzes. Moreover the relative autonomy the mountain enjoyed during the feudal period deteriorated under the impact of foreign intervention (the European consuls and the Ottoman mushirs). The whole destiny of the state was thrown in the midst of a network of conflicting

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1. It was said that during the year 1840 Richard Wood, a British, was the real ruler of the mountain; Awraq Lubnaniyyah, op.cit., Vol. III, pp. 481-485.
  2. Committee..., p. 298; Malcolm H. Kerr, (trs. and comt.), Lebanon in the Last Years of Feudalism, 1840-1868, (Beirut: Faculty of Arts and Sciences, A.U.B., Oriental Series No. 33, 1959), p. 3. (Kerr relates the date of Bashir III's coming to power as being October 1840).
  3. Committee, p. 298; Hitti, Lebanon..., p. 435.

forces. With the absence of both the emir and the union, the common man found himself lost because he was neither psychologically nor intellectually prepared to be the master of his own destiny. Besides, the newly emerging popular movement, the ammiyyah, could not follow an effective track of evolution. Instead of becoming a national movement which helped in drafting the policy of the state, it was trapped by foreign and local forces that used it mainly for the achievement of their goals in Lebanon.

The vacuum caused by the absence of the feudal head emir and which the citizen could not fill, was soon to be occupied by a new system which was not, as it will be shown, less oppressing and less disintegrating than the rather absolute rule of the emirs.

After the deposition of Bashir III the Porte attempted direct control over the mountain by appointing an Ottoman governor of Lebanon. In fact Umar Pasha an-Namsawi (the Austrian) was appointed to rule the mountain.<sup>1</sup> The European powers did not prove to be sympathetic with the idea. On the other hand the mountain was no more enjoying social unity in 1842,<sup>2</sup> hence it became too loose for central rule. Consequently Lebanon was partitioned, according to European, mainly British and Austrian, wishes,<sup>3</sup> into two qaim-maqamiyyahs:<sup>4</sup> A northern qaim-maqamiyyah with a mainly Christian population, to be administered by a Christian qaim-maqam (sub-governor) and a southern qaim-maqamiyyah, with a mainly Druze population,

1. Hitti, Lebanon..., p. 435.
2. The sectarian strifes of the early 1840s caused ill feelings and irritative suspicions amongst both the Maronites and the Druzes towards each other, Ibid., pp. 434-435.
3. The French preferred the return of the Shihabs to Power, Kerr, op.cit., p. 3.
4. The Beirut-Damascus road was chosen as the dissecting line... To the north of the road fell the Christian Qaim-maqamiyyah extending northwards till Nahr al-Barid in Akkar. To the south of the road fell the Druze Qaim-maqamiyyah extending southwards till the Rayhan mountain, Blaybil, op.cit., p. 121.

to be administered by a Druze qaim-maqam. Qaim-maqams, in both north and south, belonged to feudal families, the ~~abil-~~Iama emirs ruled the north and the Arslan emirs ruled the south. The two qaim-maqams were to be responsible to the wali of Sidon<sup>1</sup> and were, after 1845, very slightly checked by two twelve-member councils (majlis) one in each qaim-maqamiyyah. Those two councils (representing all sects) were introduced by the Reglement Shakib Afendi and included some relatively revolutionary stipulations. There was, for example, a limitation to the tax collection and judicial powers of the fief holders, since the Reglement invested these powers in the hands of people other than the feudatories.<sup>2</sup>

The Porte, however, was not satisfied with the qaim-maqamiyyah system and thus it was Turkey's objective, from the very beginning, to prove to the European powers that no native rule in Lebanon could possibly succeed.<sup>3</sup>

Though the qaim-maqamiyyahs were organized and instituted upon sectarian basis yet both had a mixed population of Druzes and Christians.<sup>4</sup> Hence it was easy for the Ottomans to make plans aiming at the resumption of sectarian strifes, especially exploiting Maronite resentment against Christian peasants being put under the jurisdiction of Druze fief holders in the south. Plans, though they did not give the expected results, were tactfully prepared and carefully executed. Consequently strife came soon

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1. Hitti, Lebanon...., p. 435.

2. A text (in Arabic) of the Reglement could be found in Philip and Farid al-Khazin (tras), The Collection of Political Documents... about Syria and Lebanon, 1840-1910, (in Arabic), (n.p.: as-Sabr Press, Vol. III, 1910), pp. 200-207.

3. Hitti, Lebanon...., p. 435.

4. Ibid., p. 436.

in 1845 and the new organization which was meant to release the tension of both sects confirmed the sad sectarian split and "aggravated the tensivity of the situation."<sup>1</sup> The unwillingness of the feudatory families to cooperate with the qaim-maqams,<sup>2</sup> because of the restrictions laid upon the fief holders' powers, and the hostility they showed against the regime especially in the north, together with the foreign Turkish and British, and ecclesiastical opposition to the Qaim-maqam added to the deterioration of the situation. The British, it is said, encouraged the feudatories against the Qaim-maqam (Bashir Ahmad Abil-Lami') particularly towards the end of the latter's rule.<sup>3</sup> The clergy were usually against the Qaim-maqam and the fief-holders, but never had this opposition manifested itself so strongly as it did during the time of Patriarch Bulus Masad (1854-1890) who was ardently against both Ahmad Shihab, the Qaim-maqam who was born a Druze, and the Khazin family.<sup>4</sup> At the same time the social revolution in the north was at its climax. Peasants, under the dictatorial leadership of Tanius Shahin, an ex-blacksmith, were revolting against the feudatories and the feudal system as a whole.<sup>5</sup>

By 1859-60 the power of the Qaim-maqam, especially in the north, was lost in the complexity and confusion of the competing powers of the

1. Ibid., p. 436, and Committee..., p. 299.
2. An example of this is the Zuq al-Kharab meeting (March, 1858) in which the Khazin Sheikhs got together with the peasants to arrange for a campaign of petitions calling for the dismissal of the Qaim-maqam, Hattuni, A History of Kisrawan (in Arabic), Beirut: no date), pp. 327-328.
3. Hattuni says that the British were encouraging the Khazin and Hubaysh sheikhs, already opposed to Bashir Ahmad, in their efforts to get rid of the Qaim-maqam (who was completely opposed to feudal rights and privileges, in so far as they limit his power), Ibid., p. 325.
4. Churchill, op.cit., Vol. I, pp. 120-122.
5. Committee..., pp. 299-300.

Church, the feudalists, the peasantry, the Porte, Great Britain, and France.<sup>1</sup> This confusion resulted in the loss of solidarity and unity in leadership in the north, while the south still enjoyed a relative social solidarity and a fairly united leadership. So when premeditated sectarian strifes<sup>2</sup> reached their climax 1860 the Druzes, effectively reinforced by the Ottomans and the British, scored high records in slaughtering their Christian fellow citizens.<sup>3</sup>

At this stage of Lebanese history we stop the story to convey a general picture of the socio-political conditions as they were during the period 1585-1860.

The four factors<sup>4</sup> that are investigated in this study were greatly effective in the process of power distribution during the feudal era, though not equally or always. The effect of each of the factors, however, depended, to a great extent, upon the intercourse of that factor with the rest of the factors or with some of them.

As early as the Emirate of Fakhr ad-Din Man II, perhaps before, it was recognized by the Emir that to secure social and territorial cohesion in the mountain the two main sects (Druzes and Maronites) should act as one unity. Fakhr ad-Din, for example, would perhaps have not been able to unite the mountain in 1627 had not the Maronites consented to that unity. The consent of the Maronites, however, was secured after the capital of Catholicism, Rome, stepped in to help the Emir of Lebanon secure the support of the Maronites. An external force was, therefore,

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1. For an account of this see Kerr, op.cit., pp. 21-25.
  2. Anonymous, Unveiling the Disasters of Damascus, (in Arabic), (Egypt: 1895), pp. 239-240; Hitti, Lebanon..., p. 437.
  3. Hitti, Lebanon..., pp. 437-438.
  4. Sectarianism, land tenure, international strategy and the social set up.

at least partly, behind the Uniates' co-operation with Fakhr ad-Din. On the other hand Bashir Shihab II, was believed to have exiled himself for some time in 1820, because the two sects were in opposition to his policies. But again if we investigate further it becomes evident that had not the Porte instigated that uproar against Bashir, he might have not thought of that self exile. Sectarianism in that sense was a factor that either added to the power of the Emir or reduced that power depending on the sects' attitude towards the Emir. But as the two, cases cited above, show, the attitudes of the sects were not dictated by exclusively internal forces. There were, in both cases, decisive external factors that affected those attitudes. This interrelationship was never as strong before (1832-1840) as it started to be during and after that period. It was during the thirties of the nineteenth century that Bashir Shihab II chose to side with one sect against the other thinking he might establish a balance of power between the forces of both sects since one of them, the Druze, was already against him. This choice resulted in extra internal problems that were entangled in the arena of international politics and within which the authority of the Emir was lost.

The cause-effect relationship between domestic differences and external factors in Lebanon was by no means restricted to the field of politics. It is well known that Lebanon, during its era of feudalism, was a pay abonne the ruler of which had to pay an annual tribute to the Porte. Relating this fact to the sectarian differences, the following argument could be established: The ruler who could win the confidence and secure the backing of both sects was able to secure a peaceful atmosphere under which the majority of the public would be willing, other



factors being equal, to pay the taxes required from them. Hence the ruler could earn the necessary money, a good part of which would be sent as tribute to the wali. On the otherhand when a high portion of the people were against the Emir, the collection of taxes became more difficult and less productive, hence the ruler used to have embarassing difficulties in securing the requested tribute on the fixed date due,<sup>1</sup> as has happened to Bashir Shihab II in 1820 and 1835-1840 when both Christians and Druzes were against his tax policy.

The fact, however, that there was a many sided close relationship between domestic sectarian differences in Lebanon and external forces does not mean that outside forces could never implement themselves except through a harmonious intercourse with internal factors. On the contrary outside forces often used to overcome all domestic difficulties that might come across their way. Although Fakhr ad-Din II, for example, enjoyed a relatively solid internal unity backing him, he had to surrender and exile himself to Europe (1613) under the direct military pressure laid by the Porte upon him.

As the connections between the sects of Lebanon and the outside gained strength overtime, a sort of a "nervous system" was built up between the two. The internal issues of Lebanon, as a result, during the last decade of Bashir II's rule were strongly and promptly responded to by the Porte and the European powers. It was partly by virtue of the sectarian split that foreign intervention in Lebanon's internal problems commenced.

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1. Because the Maronite peasants and fief-holders in Kisrawan and Matn were against him in July 1858 Bashir Ahmad (Qaim-maqam), was not able to collect taxes from them; as in M. Kerr, op.cit., p. 15.

In this way Lebanon's internal problems were <sup>almost</sup> completely internationalized. This taking place without Lebanon being ready or prepared to take part in the determination of its own destiny, transferred this national right to the hands of foreign powers who had vital cultural, economic and strategic interests in Lebanon. For the achievement of their interests the shortest way was the rule of one individual, and in accomplishing that the European powers met no serious difficulties mainly because of two reasons:

First, the European powers were in such a powerful position to impose almost any sort of solution they wanted to, although they had certain differences amongst themselves as to how they wanted it to be installed.

Second, although there are no first hand accounts about the social structure of the mountain during its feudal and Qaim-maqamiyyah era, still one can safely say that the factional and patriarchal authorities were dominant. Every citizen had to belong to a fief-holder not to the state. To belong to the fief-holder was to be his subject and obedient servant; never to do what the master did not like and always to do what the master dictated, whether one liked it or not. The child, on the other hand, had to be a member of a family and had to obey his father's orders. The role of the individual in the state, therefore, was one of obedience and submission to the wishes of others, who are superior. Hence the ordinary citizen was not yet ready for active participation in a democratic way of life. Moreover, the external powers resorted to winning the ammiyyah leaders to their sides.<sup>1</sup> By doing so foreign control contributed to the deviation of the ammiyyah movement from its original objective, i.e. the liberation of the ordinary citizen from the control of the landlord.

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1. Hitti, Lebanon..., pp. 440-441; Committee..., pp. 300-301.

So it was easy under such conditions for the Powers to instal a form of government through which they could implement their interests.

Feudalism as a factor that affected power distribution influenced and was also influenced by at least some of the other factors. The structure of the Lebanese society between 1585-1860 was, no doubt, predominantly feudal. The feudal organization of Lebanon gave the head emir a fairly strong and superior position especially when the majority of the individual feudatories were on his side. But to remain superior the emir had to secure the backing of the fief-holders. To do that the head emir had to keep them satisfied by giving each of the fief-holders a free hand in the administration of his own fief, otherwise the individual feudatory would turn against the head emir. Hence, the preservation of the supreme position of the head emir depended at least partly on the satisfaction of the individual feudatories. Moreover, the feudal organization, by nature, necessitated that the ordinary citizen be the subject of the landlord (the intercourse between feudalism and the primary organization is clear at this point). The relationship between the feudatory and the fallah (plowman) was, hence, a master-servant relationship, and the master planned, decided and executed without taking the citizen's opinion into the slightest consideration. This master-servant relationship, however, changed progressively towards the best during the second half of the 19th century up to 1861. But this progress was, first, very slow; second, it was almost restricted to the northern part of the mountain; and, third, it was deviated from its main objective.

Because the head emir was installed in power after the consent of the feudatories, he was thought of as primus enter pares. So the superior-subordinate relationship did not preserve its rigidity and vehemence at

the head emir-feudatory level. The strength and superiority of the emir depended to a great extent on other factors than his support by the feudatories. It was greatly due to the emir's personal standing army that he sometimes proved to be the ruler of the mountain. The emir's strength as a ruler was directly related to his military power whether in relation to internal or external checks upon his position. Furthermore, the attitude of foreign powers, especially the Porte, towards the emir was a further factor that either added to or decreased the power of the emir as a ruler.

The "president," it could be concluded at the end of this chapter, was in general very powerful during the 1585-1861 period, but his power depended upon an agglomeration of factors the interaction amongst which determined the extent and conditions of the "president's" power.

## CHAPTER III

### THE MUTASARRIFIYYAH ERA

(1861-1915)

In the preceding chapter the feudal and Qaim-maqamiyyah periods (1585-1861) were studied on the light of the four factors we are stressing in this study, e.g. land tenure, international strategy, sectarianism, and the social set up of Lebanon. As a result of that study it was shown that the "presidents" of Lebanon between 1585-1861 (the Emir and the Qaim-maqam) were not always the sole undisputed masters of the mountain. In this chapter a similar discussion of the Mutasarrifiyyah period (1861-1915), is going to be attempted.

The events of 1860 are believed to have been "a turning point in the history of Lebanon,"<sup>1</sup> because the fifty-five years that followed them were relatively accompanied with cultural, social, political, and economic progress. The response by the European powers,<sup>2</sup> especially France which attempted to act as the protector of the uniate churches in Lebanon, to those events was quick. A conference of the five powers together with Turkey, was held to negotiate a solution to the critical events of the mountain. In the meantime a direct intervention was made by the European powers<sup>3</sup> and Turkey to stop the slaughter. As a result of the conference

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1. Salibi, op.cit., p. 21.

2. Austria, France, Great Britain, Prussia and Russia.

3. Committee, op.cit., p. 301; al-Khazin, op.cit., pp. 238-240.

of June 9, 1841 the powers agreed on a short Reglement Organique which was amended on September 6, 1864.<sup>1</sup> The Reglement of 1861, as amended in 1864, reconstituted the mountain as an autonomous Mutasarrifiyyah.<sup>2</sup> According to the Reglement the administrative and executive powers were to be entrusted to a non-Lebanese Christian mutasarrif (governor general) designated by the Porte and approved of by the signatory powers.<sup>3</sup> The term of the mutasarrif was five renewable years, and his was a direct responsibility to the Porte. Defined as chief executive of Lebanon the mutasarrif was responsible for the maintenance of order and security; the collection of revenue; the appointment of employees and judges; the execution of the sentences of tribunals; and the presidency of the Great Administrative Council. Assisting the mutasarrif on the central level was a representative Ma'lis al-Idrah al-Kabir (Great Administrative Council, G.A.C.), composed of twelve members<sup>4</sup> elected by the sheikhs of the villages and in charge of the allocation of revenue, and with rendering advice to the mutasarrif on matters brought forward by the latter. To make the administrative process easier the mountain was divided into seven Qadas (districts) and an independent Mudiriyyah (small

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1. Committee..., pp. 301-302; Salibi, op.cit., p. 21.
  2. The boundaries of the Mutasarriflik were as follows: ad-Dinniyah to the north, Bigaa and Baalbak to the east, Sidon to the south, the Mediterranean and Beirut to the west; Ibid., p. 45.
  3. For a full text of the Reglement as in 1861 see al-Khazin, op.cit., pp. 317-321 and 335-337; for a text of the Reglement as amended in 1864 see Ibrahim al-Aswad, An Enlightening Essay on the Lebanese History, (in Arabic), (Beirut: Saint George Press, Vol. I, 1925), pp. 27-38.
  4. Four Maronites, one Greek Catholic, two Greek Orthodox, one Sunni, one Shite, and three Druzes.
  5. Al-Kurah, Northern Lebanon, Jubayl and Batrun, Zahleh and its suburbs, al-Matn, south of Beirut-Damascus road until Jezzih (referred to as ash-Shuf) and Jezzih and the Tuffah province.

county) each under a qaim-maqam who belonged to the sect of the majority group in the district.<sup>1</sup> From the fiscal point of view, it was stipulated in the Reglement that in case of any deficit in the Lebanese treasury the Porte will cover that deficit.

The mutasarrif held the right of increasing the value of taxes and the number of courts of first instance, hence it was very likely that the mutasarrif would increase the amount of taxes if a deficit was anticipated in the local finances, to save the Porte the cost of covering that deficit. Furthermore the mutasarrif had the full right of asking the G.A.C. to determine the salary of each employee relative to the latter's abilities as well as confirming the sheikhs' elections (the sheikhs were the predecessors of the mukhtars and were elected by the villagers) and the membership of each of the G.A.C.'s members. Besides it was the exclusive right of the mutasarrif to hold the final decision on matters already discussed and passed by the G.A.C.<sup>2</sup> All this gives a clear idea about the dictatorial rights bestowed upon the mutasarrif and inclines one to believe the statement: "the mutasarrif held the most serious position in the world,"<sup>3</sup> in the sense that his power was almost unlimited. It is, perhaps, clear enough from what was said about the mutasarrifiyyah organization that the mutasarrif was almost the chief executive and the chief legislator

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1. The Qaim-maqams were three Maronites, one Druze, one Moslem, one Greek Orthodox and one Greek Catholic, Hitti, Lebanon..., p. 442; A. Abu-Shaqara reported them as being four Maronites and no Moslems at all, Arif Abu-Shaqra (ed.) Movements in Lebanon until the Mutasarrifiyyah Era, (in Arabic), (Beirut: 1952), p. 146.
  2. Information (up to this point in this paragraph) are taken from the minutes of the Great Administrative Council preserved in the National Museum of Lebanon (not numbered).
  3. Adra, op.cit., pp. 23 and 32.

at the same time. Legally, therefore, one can safely conclude that the mutasarrif was, within the boundaries of the mountain, almost the sole decision maker and decision executer. On the other hand, we will see that the 1861 Reglement helped a great deal in providing a peaceful and secure atmosphere under which the intensity of social factors, analyzed in the previous chapter, was reduced. The abolition of land feudalism, the creation of a nucleus for a future parliament and the introduction of a regularly paid staff of administrators, together with the international safeguards of the mountain's autonomy all collaborated in securing a peaceful era of 54 years (1860-1914) during which the mountain was said to have "enjoyed a period of cultural flourish and economic prosperity<sup>1</sup> and achieved a state of security and stability unattained by any Ottoman province, European or Asian... In a few years the value of property increased a hundred fold."<sup>2</sup> The penetration of western culture through the Christian population and due to the western orientation of the mountain, had caused a relatively modern awakening in the Lebanese society.<sup>3</sup> Whereas during the Ottoman control over Lebanon, before 1860, "no Syrian poet, philosopher, artist, scientist or essayist of first order made his appearance,"<sup>4</sup> the "indigenous modern schools," established in the latter half of the 19th century, had graduated Lebanese "pioneers in modern scholarship," journalism and drama.<sup>5</sup> The economy was transformed from an 'agrarian'

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1. I do not adopt the word prosperity for reasons to be given in the following pages of this chapter, though I adopt the rest of the quotation.
  2. Hitti, Lebanon..., p. 447; mention of such conditions was made by Jirjis al-Khuri al-Maqdisi, The Greatest War in History and How It Passed, (in Arabic), (Beirut: al-Ilmiyyah Press, 1927), pp. 5-6.
  3. Hitti, Lebanon..., p. 452.
  4. Hitti, Syria..., p. 674.
  5. Hitti, Lebanon..., pp. 460-467; George Yazbik, Beirut in History, (in Arabic), (no place, 1923), pp. 68-70.



self-subsistence economy to an agrarian commercial one with craftsmanship making headway, and the social organization was transforming from the primary organization phase to the verge of the secondary organization phase.<sup>1</sup> But this social change was not uniform throughout the mountain, for historical facts show that the western culture and western institutions were, in general, more appealing to the Christian Lebanese than they were to the Moslem or Druze.<sup>2</sup> Hence the western culture tended to be accepted by one group in Lebanon and rejected by the other. Furthermore western institutions (such as representative bodies) that have, or presuppose, certain intrinsic values such as freedom and individualism were introduced into the Lebanese society without the latter being relatively ready to supply the imported institutions with those values. As a result it is believed that "a breakdown of the social solidarity of the entire community with a diminishing respect for the traditional denomination ensued,"<sup>3</sup> or rather continued.

With the gradual decline of the feudal system the concept of the nation state was being introduced. The intellectual awakening, on the other hand, had consequently resulted in a "political awakening with the urge to throw off the Ottoman yoke."<sup>4</sup> As a result, the emerging nationalistic tendencies were accompanied, especially towards the end of this

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1. Hitti, Lebanon..., pp. 470-473.

2. Albert Hourani, Syria and Lebanon, (London, New York, Toronto: Royal Institute of International Affairs, Oxford University Press, 3rd ed., 1954), p. 132.

3. Hitti, Lebanon..., p. 473.

4. Ibid., p. 473.

period, by fairly organized and planned programs set to get rid of foreign control. Those programs manifested themselves in underground societies and political groupings.<sup>1</sup>

Ambitious Lebanese and Syrian individuals emigrated to Egypt which was enjoying a relative freedom of the press under the British, where they established newspapers that were of a major significance in arousing the nationalistic feeling.<sup>2</sup> The emerging spirit of nationalism has, no doubt, had great effect on the evolution of Lebanon's history during the mutasarrifiyyah period, but the answer to whether this spirit gave fruitful results or not is left to a later discussion in this chapter.

This socio-intellectual and nationalistic awakening together with the external safeguards of Lebanon's autonomy constituted elements of inspiration in the progressive process towards democratic rule that ensued, in a preliminary shape, in 1861 and was practically never interrupted except during World War I. Though the G.A.C. had not exercised strong and decisive control over the mutasarrif's powers, yet it had often checked his actions though that check was still an exception and not a rule, as it will be shown in the following pages.

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1. Such were al-Jamiyyah al-Ilmiyyah as-Surriyah (Syrian Learned Society) ibid., pp. 458 and 477; Jamiyyat Tanshit at-Talabah al-Muslimin al-Arab fi Uroppah (The Society of Strengthening the Moslem Arab Students in Europe), al-Jamiyyah al-Islahiyyah (The Reformatory Society), al-Jamiyyah al-Iamarkaziyyah (The Decentralization Society), Jamiyyat an-Nahdah al-Lubnaniyyah (The Lebanese Awakening Society), Aziz Bayk, Syria and Lebanon in the World War (translated into Arabic), (no place: no date), pp. 260, 256, 250, and 207.
  2. Hitti, Lebanon..., p. 477.

So far the writer has presented one side of the coin. Investigating the other side one will perhaps notice that the majority of the chain of mutasarrifs "coveted primarily the favour of the Porte."<sup>1</sup> The first and perhaps the best mutasarrif, Daud Pasha (1861-1868) who "weathered the storm (events of 1860), established stability and made the new constitution (the Reglement Organique) work,"<sup>2</sup> had to resign under Ottoman pressure one year before the expiration of his term,<sup>3</sup> because he was not easily swayed by the Porte. Bakshesh flourished during the rule of Wasa Pasha (1883-1892), and under Muzaffar Pasha (1902-1907) members of the mutasarrif's family "were charged with exploiting the land and the people."<sup>4</sup> Muzaffar himself devoted his time to the random and strange appointment and deposition of employees, thus securing public hate for himself.<sup>5</sup> It is said that Muzaffar Pasha went very far in abusing and exceeding the limits of his powers. He exerted pressure upon courts of justice to secure judicial sentences favorable to his friend and favorites whether their cases were just or not.<sup>6</sup> To secure enough favorites in the G.A.C., he

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1. Ibid., pp. 445-446.
  2. Ibid., p. 444.
  3. Ibid., p. 446.
  4. Ibid., p. 447; Blaybil, op.cit., pp. 138 and 140.
  5. Blaybil, op.cit., p. 140.
  6. Examples are many, some of which are the following:
    - a) The mutasarrif (Muzaffar) did not execute seven criminal resolutions convicting the sons of his friend Ghandur Karam from Kafarshima.
    - b) The deposition of some members of the courts of appeals before securing permission from the G.A.C.; Anonymous, Muzaffar Pasha in Lebanon, (in Arabic), (Alexandria: 1907), pp. 15 and 18.

resorted to pressure and forgery to assure the success of his friends in the elections for membership in the G.A.C.<sup>1</sup> But this policy was not successful all the time.<sup>2</sup> Yusuf Franco Pasha (1907-1912) violated the Reglement Organique by deposing some members of the G.A.C. and jailing them.<sup>3</sup> Besides, Yusuf Franco suppressed the freedom of expression and thought, by following a violent policy against journalists, as some historians say.<sup>4</sup>

Theoretically speaking the mutasarrifiyyah administration was not based upon feudal grounds. In fact the Reglement Organique of 1861, as amended in 1864 declared "equality of all before the law, the abolition of all feudal privileges and notably those of the muqatigis" (feudatories), and hence the governor of Lebanon and his "district agents were no longer farmers of the tribute but salaried officials."<sup>5</sup> But never the less the Reglement Organique "still made considerable concessions to the old feudal families," for it required the governor "to take into account the importance of property of a district agent, before the latter's appointment, and the district administrative councils represented 'the various elements of the

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1. For example he laid pressure on and persecuted village sheikhs to secure the election of Fuad Abdul-Malak against Hamad Himadeh in the Shuf district, 1905, *ibid.*, p. 79.
  2. Muzaffar laid pressure to secure the election of his friend Mulhim Nasif against Masud al-Azuri in Jizzin but did not succeed; *ibid.*, p. 78.
  3. Perhaps the deposition of Khalil Akl and Elias ash-Shuwayri (members of the G.A.C.) in 1910, because they were anti-mutasarrif (Yusuf Franco) is an example. The judges that reconfirmed the membership of the two were deposed; Awraq Lubnaniyyah, Vol. 2, No. 8, 1956, pp. 343-345.
  4. Blaybil, *op.cit.*, p. 141.
  5. Poliak, *op.cit.*, p. 80.

population and the interests of the landowners."<sup>1</sup> Moreover the financial status of the average individual citizen of 1861-1914 was not, relatively speaking, very much ahead of that in the preceding epochs. As a whole each Lebanese had to secure an average of 15% more than his annual income in order to pay his share of taxes, the per capita income being around 71 Uthmali piasters.<sup>2</sup> As a result of this, and other factors, the helpless citizen started conceiving of emigration as the sole cure of his financial misery. Hence by 1908 out of the 750,000 inhabitants of the mountain around 350,000 had already left their country because of destitution.<sup>3</sup> The revolution of the Young Turks in 1908 and their attempt to Ottomonize Lebanon, added fuel to the fire. Most Lebanese were against the idea of sending representatives to Majlis al-Mab'uthan in Constantinople, thus the Ottoman attempt of administering the election of Lebanese representatives to the mentioned Majlis did not succeed except by forgery and under oppression.<sup>4</sup> Hence the words of 'election' and 'representation' were associated with the terms forgery and oppression. This, no doubt, shows that the rulers' power was not founded upon popular favour and backing; hence, the ruler had to resort to sources of power other than the public.

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1. Ibid., p. 81.
  2. Masad, op.cit., p. 33; (The average income of a citizen was .011% of mutasarrif's who used to get around 5,000 Uthmali pounds), ibid., p. 4.
  3. Ibid., p. 29; al-Ittihad al-Ibnani (ed.), The Lebanese Problem, (in Arabic), (Egypt: al-Marif Press, 1913), P.5. (there is almost no reference to Lebanese emigrating before the second half of the nineteenth century. The 350,000 people, therefore, should have left Lebanon between 1850-1908).
  4. Masad, op.cit., pp. 5-6 (it is said that around 40,000 dead people voted in those elections).

In this case the major source of power was the Porte.

"With the decay of the Maronite feudal aristocracy, the ecclesiastical hierarchy became ascendant."<sup>1</sup> It is believed that the Maronite patriarchs were ardent enemies of feudalism and feudal lords, because they (the patriarchs) were hoping to take over power after reducing the powers of the landlords. Both feudalism and the ecclesiastical hierarchy are based on authoritarianism at the top. Hence as feudalism became weaker, the clergy became the voice of the people and their leaders in national, economic, and political affairs.<sup>2</sup> B. Masad a clergyman of this period attributes the ecclesiastical intervention in temporal affairs to the weakness of the Lebanese citizen and the absence of capable civil leadership.<sup>3</sup> Clergymen "replaced" and filled the vacuum caused by the absence of the "emir and the sheikh."<sup>4</sup> After the decay of land feudalism, it is believed that the western powers, especially France, started thinking of the clergymen as the real leaders of the people.<sup>5</sup> Hence foreign intervention in Lebanese affairs continued, particularly now via the clergy who constituted a new class similar to that of the old aristocracy. Like the old aristocracy some members of the new leading class and their relatives became partners in sharing spoils and causing corruption.<sup>6</sup> Al-Bustani attributes this tendency towards holding excessive powers, to a tendency that

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1. Hitti, Lebanon..., p. 446.

2. Masad, op.cit., pp. 36-37.

3. Ibid., p. 39.

4. Ibid., p. 42.

5. Ibid., p. 42.

6. Ibid., p. 41.

might be present in the powerful person when he is surrounded by weak and helpless individuals.<sup>1</sup> This tendency was not restricted to the ecclesiastical people but extended to the mutasarrifs as well. Hence the relationship between the clergy and the temporal ruler was built upon competition for temporal powers. This competition led the mutasarrifs, especially Daud, Rustum and Muzaffar, to act aggressively towards the patriarchs who shared temporal power with them.<sup>2</sup> So power, during the mutasarriflik period, was mainly shared between the mutasarrif and the Maronite patriarch.

Once again let us stop at this stage of Lebanese history to examine the factors of power location as they were manifested in the late spring of 1914, just before the privileged autonomy of the mountain was abolished. It had been shown in the brief description of the socio-political conditions under the mutasarrifiyyah era (1861-1915) that Lebanon enjoyed a relative degree of security and social peace. Under those conditions it might have been opportune for Lebanon to secure more progress (gradual betterment), if plans had been erected to secure basic solutions to Lebanon's social problems. But things were almost left to evolve on their own, save the structural modernization of the state. Nevertheless a felt degree of progress was achieved in both the social and the political fields as was shown earlier in this chapter.

In the first place the mountain, not only in principle but more in fact, remained to be ruled by a foreign power, i.e. the Porte. Being appointed by the Porte, with the routine approval of the European Great

1. al-Bustani as in ibid., p. 40.

2. Awraq Lubnaniyyah, op.cit., Vol. II, pp. 404, 498-499, 557-558 and 197.

Powers,<sup>1</sup> and subject to its deposition, the mutasarrif had to remain the puppet of the Porte, or else risk losing his office as the first mutasar-rif, Daud Pasha did. In this way the Porte could execute its wishes and implement its interests in Lebanon through the mutasarrif. To do that it had to make sure that the mutasarrif had enough power and the necessary support. Add to this the stipulation in the Reglement Organique that required the Porte to cover any deficit in the budget of Lebanon. This stipulation made it easy for the Porte to guide the evolution of the Lebanese economy in the manner the Porte wanted. Not to meet any deficits in the budget, the expenditures, though necessary, were cut to the minimum or more taxes were collected to increase the national income in case any deficit was anticipated. This policy which was a result of the stipulation in the Reglement, resulted in giving the mutasarrif a free hand in molding the taxation system and its value the way he wished.

This should by no means be isolated from the question of feudalism which still had some socio-economic effects even though it was legally abolished as an institution. The landlords were still relatively powerful and the "importance of their properties was still recognized, with their interests represented in the district administrative councils." The check, therefore, that they had been exercising over the head emir, in the feudal epoch of Lebanon's history (which was a result of the feudal organization) was very much reduced between 1861-1914, due to the abolition of that system. The chief executive was no longer chosen by the different feudatories and hence does not owe his position to their consent.

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1. See al-Khazin, op.cit., pp. 317-321.



On the other hand the governor of Lebanon and his "district agents were no longer farmers of the tribute but salaried officials." With this being the case and the Porte having the right of deposing the chief executive, the external factor of power location became stronger than the factor of land tenure.

The relative decline of feudalism as a factor in power location in Lebanon did not mean that the power the feudal landlords used to enjoy was directly transferred to the mutasarrif. The mutasarrif did not become the sole master of the land and the people. There had been at least one group of people sharing power with the mutasarrif and the Porte, i.e. the Maronite clergymen, mainly concentrated in the north, led by the patriarch.

The story of the rise of the ecclesiastical hierarchy with the decline of the power of the feudal aristocracy was a long one. From at least the time of Fakhr ad-Din Man II, the Maronite patriarch enjoyed a relative degree of power in his capacity as the ecclesiastical head of the Maronites. Furthermore the feudal lords were unfriendly towards the patriarch whom they viewed as a threat to their powers. Hence a kind of traditional enmity grew up between the feudatories and the clergy, especially when Emir Bashir Shihab II (1797-1840) resorted to the help of the clergymen to curtail the powers of the feudatories in his attempt to make of himself the sole master of the mountain.

The power competition between the clergy and the landlords meant the competition between two groups built on identical bases of hierarchical authoritarianism. So when the feudal system was legally abolished in 1861 and the feudal hierarchy lost much of its power due to the social revolution

in the north, the clergy found themselves stronger than ever. That strength which they assumed was due not only to the relative weakness of the feudatories, especially in the north, but also to the absence of real civil leadership. Hence the Maronite patriarch, at the head of the ecclesiastical hierarchy, took over very easily and formed a new aristocracy dominating quite a good portion of the Lebanese citizens.

Due to the peculiar history of the mountain any internal claim for power did not succeed if it was not supported by an external power. Though not always or only, one can say that behind the head emir there was the Porte, behind the Druzes there was Great Britain, behind the mutasarrif there was the Porte again, and finally France was behind the Uniates and Tzarist Russia behind the Greek Orthodox. The patriarch, therefore, did not lack the major factors of power. The mutasarrifs, however, did not like to have strong partners in power, they especially resented the fact that the G.A.C. and certain secret societies together with the courts of justice sometimes exercised serious checks and controls over their political powers. A conflict, thereafter, ensued between the mutasarrif and the patriarch. Neither the mutasarrifs nor the patriarchs secured a complete victory over the other, and hence power remained to be shared mainly between both during the mutasarriflik era as it appears to the reader of Lebanon's history.

In spite of the felt progress of Lebanese society, especially in the north, the primary organization remained strongly effective during the mutasarriflik era. The basic social institutions remained the family, the sect, and the faction. But the dominance of the primary organization, under which authority is centered at the top, does not necessarily mean

the concentration of power in one and only one hand in the state. On the contrary power, due to the nature of this social organization, may equally lie in more than one person or group of persons. The competition between the Maronite patriarch and the mutasarrif is an example of the sharing of power. Loyalty of individuals was not mainly to the state. It was, for example, to the home, to the family which has protected and nourished them. This diversified deviation of loyalties from the state resulted in social disintegration and the development of "states" within the state. The state's decisions, therefore, were not executed except and until the other "states" accept them. It was possible that the mutasarrif could make decisions all by himself in his capacity as the legal and powerful chief executive. Yet the finality of these decisions and their capacity to endure long and get established in society depended, amongst other things, upon the degree to which the various social and religious groups felt that the particular decision embodied their interests and expressed their wishes.

## CHAPTER IV

### THE FIRST WORLD WAR ADMINISTRATION

(1915-1918)

The socio-historical discussion of the mutasarrifiyyah period in chapter three of this study shows a formal and an informal progress towards a democratic life in the mountain (1860-1915). Though the mutasarrif enjoyed strong power, his power was not a completely absolute one. The four factors hypothesized as affecting power distribution were effective during this period in Lebanon. They operated in such a way, though not equally or always, as to minimize the power of the chief executive more than ever before.

In this chapter (IV) the discussion of the evolution of power distribution and the effect which sectarianism, feudalism, international strategy and the social structure of society had upon that distribution during the First World War period will be examined.

The entry of Turkey into World War I in October 1914 commenced one of the gloomiest periods of Lebanon's history. One of the aims of Turkey in the war was the "turkification of the Ottoman Empire and its liberation from western tutelage."<sup>1</sup> The achievement of this aim was no easy task. First of all the people living within the Turkish orbit were not satisfied

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1. George Lenzowski, The Middle East in World Affairs, (Ithaca and New York: Cornell University Press, 1952), p. 44.

with the Turkish rule. Second, some of those peoples had already committed themselves to strong friendships with the European rivals of Turkey. Thirdly, the Turkish Empire contained a variety of national groups, in the Arab Middle East, with divergent loyalties.<sup>1</sup> And fourthly, Turkey was no match for this task because it had already become the "sick man of Europe." To achieve its aim, however, and in spite of all factors Turkey chose the shortest way, i.e. tyranny and terror as it will become clear later in this chapter. "Jamal Pasha," appearing in Damascus as commander-in-chief of the Fourth Army and "military governor of the area suspected of anti-Ottoman, pro-Arab or pro-French feelings, lost no time in occupying Lebanon, abolishing its autonomy and ushering in a reign of terror before which all earlier ones paled."<sup>2</sup> Direct Ottoman rule continued until 1918 when the war ended. To secure military conscription, during this period, Jamal exhausted the people with economic and physical burdens<sup>3</sup> which they (the people) were by no means able to bear. Public security, individual freedom, rights of man, etc... were non-existent. It is said that "guilt by association or hearsay, membership in one of the many clubs and societies on the black list, even the occurrence of a critical remark in a letter from a relative abroad were all considered punishable."<sup>4</sup> Affiliations with either France or the cause of Arabism were enough to merit the death penalty. In fact twenty-one citizens, fourteen Lebanese and seven Syrians, were sent on May 6, 1916 to the

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1. Ibid., pp. 45-46.

2. Hitti, Lebanon..., p. 483.

3. Ibid., p. 483.

4. Ibid., pp. 483-484.

gallows for this charge.<sup>1</sup> Tourism vanished, outside help was hindered by the blockade of the coast by the Allies, and the Turks made no effort to make up for that. Supplies of medicine and cloth were cut, trees were cut down to be used as train-fuel, currency depreciated, and famine, misery and disease spread over the land.<sup>2</sup> Even Beirut, the intellectual and economic center of the area, was reduced to a center of misery, terror, and economic depression.<sup>3</sup>

During the war period nobody shared power with Jamal as-Saffah (blood-shedder). Not even the Maronite Patriarch<sup>4</sup> could exercise the role of leadership he has been assuming since the decay of land feudalism. 1914-1918 was a period during which Ottoman tyranny, exercised through Jamal,<sup>5</sup> assumed the first and practically only role in the management of the Lebanese affairs.

Under such conditions it was only logical that the western Allies should seek the opportunity and ask the help of the Arabs against the Central powers through an arrangement that satisfied both the Arabs and the Allies. The deal was made between Great Britain through Sir Henry MacMahon--the British High Commissioner in Egypt during the War--on one side and the Arabs through ash-Sharif Husayn of Mecca--the prominent

1. Ibid., p. 484.

2. Ibid., pp. 484-486.

3. Yazbik, op.cit., pp. 71-72.

4. Hitti, Lebanon..., p. 484.

5. "... I was told that he (Jamal Pasha) considers the execution of people one of his daily duties;" from the memoirs of Mr. Henry Morgenthau, the U.S.A. Ambassador to Turkey, Fuad Sarruf (trs.), The Memoirs of the U.S.A. Ambassador to Turkey (tras. from the English origin), (al-Fajalah: al-Arab Bookshop, al-Muqattam Press, 1923), p. 65.

leading figure of Arab nationalism in the early 20th century—on the other side. The terms of the deal boiled down to this: Husayn was willing "to organize an Arab revolt against the Turks, provided he were given British assistance and an undertaking to recognize Arab independence should the revolt be successful."<sup>1</sup> At the same time (Oct. 1915) secret negotiations contrary to the MacMahon-Husayn agreement, were taking place between the Western Allies.<sup>2</sup> At the end of those negotiations partition agreements of spheres of influence were arrived at. The agreement directly involving Lebanon was that concluded in May 16, 1916, between Sir Mark Sykes for Great Britain and M. George Picot for France,<sup>3</sup> known as the Sykes-Picot agreement. According to that agreement Lebanon was defined as being within the sphere of French influence. Thus France was "to be at liberty," if the Allies won the war, "to establish... direct or indirect administration or control," over its spheres of influence "as she might desire or deem fit to establish after agreement with the Arab state or confederation..."<sup>4</sup>

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1. Hourani, op.cit., p. 43; "The two districts of Mersina and Alexandretta, and portions of Syria lying to the west of the districts of Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo" were explicitly excluded by Sir MacMahon's letters to Sharif Husayn... from the territories of the then possible Arab kingdom of Husayn... Great Britain "was free to act" as long as these strips were considered because she may cause "detriment to the interests of her ally, France," from a correspondence (Oct. 24, 1915) between MacMahon and Husayn, as in ibid., pp. 43-44.
  2. Lenczowski, op.cit., pp. 68-71.
  3. Ibid., pp. 71-72.
  4. Hourani, op.cit., p. 46.

In October 8, 1918<sup>1</sup> the "if" became an "is" when the British and the French forces occupied the Syrian strip of the Ottoman Empire thus bringing the Turkish dream of Ottomanization to its end.

Before going to the next stage of Lebanese history a general perspective of the socio-political conditions illustrates the following points: First the war burdens that the Lebanese had suffered contributed to the partial acceptance of the French rule in 1918 and gave them opportunity to exercise absolute military rule. Hence the chain of direct foreign influence upon the administration was not interrupted. Second, the nucleus of representative government was destroyed by the abolition of the 1861 protocol in 1916. Instead of securing an opportunity for the G.A.C. towards the better, a reign of terror and international tension demolished anything which might have become representative governance. Third, under an absolute form of government such as that of 1914-18, freedom of thought, expression and belief were denied under the threat of severe penalty, hence, members of patriotic societies calling for decentralization (decentralizing Lebanon from the Porte) were persecuted.<sup>2</sup> They had to work underground, with the overwhelming majority of the citizens not only afraid of joining those groups but also fully occupied with the search for means of their mere existence.<sup>3</sup> Fourth, with the achievement of the citizens' welfare

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1. Stephen Hemsley Longing, Syria and Lebanon under French Mandate, (London: 1958), p. 65.
  2. Ibid., pp. 53-54.
  3. "It is estimated that Lebanon in general lost a hundred thousand people and could have lost more had it not been for emigrants' remittances, reaching \$259,000,000 in the first war year, and for American philanthropy initiated by a private citizen of New York, Cleveland H. Dodge... The American Near East Relief Committee continued its work into the post-war period (1916-1929) and is credited with having distributed the equivalent of \$100,000,000, educated 136,000 children, fed 12,500,000 and given medical aid to 6,000,000." Frank Ross and others as in Hitti, Lebanon..., op.cit., pp. 485-486.



left to foreign aid and relief, while the government of Lebanon was busy in persecution and oppression, tended to remain unfulfilled. A probable consequence was that most of the people came to conceive of their government less than ever as a group of institutions existing to serve them and protect their lives. Hence the citizens' concept of their government became two-fold; in the first place it became a concept shrouded with fear and frustration<sup>1</sup> resulting in submission to and obedience of the ruler, and in the second place it became a concept saturated with non-confidence and disloyalty which resulted in a huge gap between the ruler and the public. That was what has happened to the Lebanese citizen during the Ottoman administration. But that was not strange,<sup>2</sup> on the contrary, it was a consistent social evolution of the Lebanese citizen under the Ottoman political theory. During the Ottoman era of control over Lebanon the ordinary citizen was conceived of as a mere potential source of taxes. "Ottoman political theory, at least as understood by the average wali held that the conquered peoples, especially if non-Moslems, were flocks to be shepherded for the benefit of the conqueror... As human cattle the conquered were to be milked, fleeced and allowed to live their own lives so long as they gave no trouble... Clearly the dark ages which began under the Saljuq Turks were getting darker under the Ottoman Turks... While Europe was entering upon her age of enlightenment, Syria was groping in Ottoman darkness."<sup>3</sup>

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1. People were sent to exile for no charge. In fact 50,000 Syrians (Syrians and Lebanese) met this fate during the war, al-Maqdisi, op.cit., p. 73.
  2. It was told that steps were even attempted to close schools of university standard such as the Syrian Protestant College (now A.U.B.)..., ibid., pp. 86-87.
  3. Hitti, Syria..., pp. 667-669.

In general one is inclined to believe with Jirjis al-Maqdisi that what Lebanon has achieved during the mutasarriflik era disintegrated during the war,<sup>1</sup> and that society experienced a stagnant period if not a retarding one.

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1. al-Maqdisi, op.cit., pp. 44-45.

## CHAPTER V

### THE MANDATE ADMINISTRATION AND ITS PROLOGUE

(1918-1943)

Chapter three of this thesis showed encouraging signs of improvement in the socio-political life of Lebanon. This improvement, unfortunately, was disrupted by the cruel adventures of Jamal Pasha who assumed a fully absolute power over Lebanon during the war period which was dealt with in the preceding chapter (IV). During that period Ottoman military forces, under the command of Jamal Pasha, were almost the only factor behind whatever decisions were taken in Lebanon. Whether the period that followed the war was a period during which the signs of hope were revived or not, is a question that will be answered in this fifth chapter.

The victory of the Allies in the autumn of 1918 brought World War I to its end. By that time French and British troops, with the help of the Arab troops under Emir Faysal,<sup>1</sup> had already been in occupation of the Arab territories previously under the Ottoman rule.<sup>2</sup> Consequently the French sphere of influence, of which present Lebanon was a part, were divided into administrative districts (vilayets, sanjaks, and qadas) to be directly administered by the French.<sup>3</sup> Everything terminated in the hands of the administrator in chief, later High Commissioner (hereafter

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1. Hitti, Lebanon..., p. 486.

2. The French occupied Lebanon according to agreement between the Allies, Salibi, op.cit., p. 21.

3. Contaut-Biron, Comment la France S'est Installée en Syrie 1918-1919, (Paris: 1922), pp. 104-105.

H.C.), at the center where specialized technical bureaus (similar to present ministries) and a military cabinet were established.<sup>1</sup> The administration between 1918 and 1920 was, therefore, military and centralized in nature. In the meantime (1918-1920) the Arab nationalists were expecting the execution of the promise for independence made by the British during the war.<sup>2</sup> But the Sykes-Ficot agreement turned things upside down. Hence in the San Remo Conference, and to the dissatisfaction of the Arab nationalists, the administration of Syria and Lebanon was officially entrusted to France by giving her mandate over them.<sup>3</sup> "If foreign advice and control were necessary" the Arab nationalists, it is said, "would have preferred British to French and American to either."<sup>4</sup> So from the very beginning the French control over Syria and Lebanon was partly received with a hostile attitude, at least by the Arab nationalists. The creation of the State of Greater Lebanon on August 31, 1920,<sup>5</sup> by General

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1. Ibid., pp. 105-108; Arrête No. 947 of January 23, 1930, Recueil des Arrêtes et Décisions de la Zone Ouest, 1918-1920 (Beyrouth: 1924), pp. 6-7, (Hereafter Recueil...), Arrête No. 948 of January 23, 1920, Ibid., pp. 8-10.
  2. In fact Arab nationalists raised the Arab flag over the governmental residence in Beirut on the evening of October 4, 1918... but it was removed later that day in execution of French military orders, al-Maqdisi, op.cit., p. 108.
  3. But it was not until September 29, 1923 that the mandate system became officially implemented.
  4. Hourani, op.cit., p. 50.
  5. Arrête No. 318 of August 31, 1920, Recueil des Actes Administratifs du Haut Commissariat de la République Française en Syrie au Liban, 1919-1920, Vol. I (Beyrouth) pp. 132-34, hereafter Recueil des Actes... (The boundaries of the new state were defined as follows: in the north it was bounded by a line that runs from the outlet of Nahr al-Kabir following its course until it meets with its tributary Quade Khalid opposite Jisr el-Kamar. In the East by the bridge separating the valleys of Quade Khalid and the Orontes and passing through the villages of Mosraat, Hasbaana Hait, Ebbidji-Faissen, on a line with the

Gouraud, the first French H.C. to the Orient, was hailed by the Maronites, especially that Arabism was not strong amongst them,<sup>1</sup> and was rejected by the majority of Sunni Moslems who were aiming at Arab national unity.<sup>2</sup> Hence the temporary unity between the sects which Lebanon is said to have enjoyed during the war ended with the expiration of the common factor which brought them together, i.e. getting rid of the Ottoman yoke.<sup>3</sup> Even the members of the Great Administrative Council, restored after the war (1918-1920) were divided amongst themselves with some of them protesting against the military rule and demanding independence and more Arabism for Lebanon.<sup>4</sup>

The declaration of Greater Lebanon was followed in September 1, 1920 by an Arrete,<sup>5</sup> that regulated the Lebanese administration characterizing it with high centralization and power concentration in the hands of the H.C. The Arrete provided, amongst other things, for a Governor of Greater Lebanon who exercised executive power delegated to him by the H.C., for specialized ministries presided over by French counsellors and for a provisional "Administrative Commission of Greater Lebanon" (A.C.G.L.) whose fifteen members were appointed by the H.C. and representing all sects. The A.C.G.L.--supposed to be the legislature--was given the right

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villages of Bkifa and Matrabe including the northern and eastern limits of the kaza of Baalback with the eastern limits of Begaa, Rachaya and Hasbayyah. In the south it was bounded by the borders of Palestine, and in the west by the Mediterranean.

1. Hourani, op.cit., p. 120.
2. Ibid., p. 120.
3. al-Maqdisi, op.cit., p. 100.
4. Masad, op.cit., pp. 74-75.
5. Arrete No. 336 of September 1, 1920, Recueil des Actes, 1919-1920, Vol. I, pp. 141-152.

of advising on legislative issues, drawing and regulating the budget, and introducing new taxes. If it happened that the A.C.G.L. disagreed, in the process of its functioning, with the Governor on any issue the final decision was left to the H.C. Almost nothing could be decided upon without the final word being said by the H.C. Add to the legal factor the French army that backed the H.C. in Lebanon, and it becomes no object of wonder that the H.C. was the prime decision maker and decision executer. The French administration under that system proved to be dissatisfactory to the majority of the Lebanese especially in that the first Governor, contrary to the Mandate's Charter, was a French officer who contributed, in a dictatorial manner, to the illegal subordination of local employees to French ones.<sup>1</sup>

Under popular pressure an attempt aiming at reorganization was undertaken by Robert de Caix (acting H.C.) in March 1922 when he dissolved the A.C.G.L.<sup>2</sup> and promulgated an Arrete<sup>3</sup> (basic law) reorganizing the Lebanese administration. This time the A.C.G.L. was replaced by a more developed and modern, though not more effective,<sup>4</sup> Representative Council of Greater Lebanon (R.C.G.L.) whose 30 members were to be elected by universal male suffrage. But all of its resolutions were, like those of the A.C.G.L., subject to the approval of the H.C. A Governor's Council (Majlis Wuzara') composed of the directors general of the different departments was in charge of studying the state's budget which was to be passed by the

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1. Masad, op.cit., pp. 79-80.

2. Arrete No. 1304 of March 8, 1922, Recueil des Actes, 1922, Vol. III, pp. 177-178.

3. Arrete No. 1304 bis, of March 8, 1922, ibid., pp. 178-193.

4. Masad, op.cit., pp. 100-102.

R.C.G.L. But in case of the Council's refusal to pass the budget, the H.C. could promulgate it by decree. Further the Secretary-General (of the state) who was nominated by the Governor had to wait for the final approval of the H.C. before his position was confirmed. The H.C., moreover, could impose new taxes when the general budget was faced with a deficit. Giving the mandatory the supreme and almost only hand in the administration of Lebanon, the March Arrete was received with bitter criticism and popular resentment especially from the side of the Arab nationalists.<sup>1</sup> Within a few weeks this dissatisfaction, instigated by the opposition, turned into demonstrations and violence that soon spread to the rest of the Arab world.<sup>2</sup> This popular reaction stimulated General Gouraud, who responded in May 25, 1922 by introducing some amendments to the basic law of March. Those amendments extended the powers of the R.C.G.L.<sup>3</sup> Later (between 1922-1925) few reforms were erected that gave a better share in the administration to the national element.<sup>4</sup> It is

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1. Ibid., pp. 100-102 and 106.

2. Ibid., pp. 106-110.

3. Ibid., pp. 115-116.

4. Such were the State Council created by Arrete No. 266 of September 6, 1924, and the Council of Directors reformed by Arrete No. 2867 of December 23, 1924, Recueil des Arretes et Decision du Grand Liban, 1924-1925, (Beyrouth: 1927) pp. 3 and 6, hence Recueil des Arretes. Most important was Arrete No. 3023 of January 5, 1925 which provided for the selection of the Governor (from amongst candidates who may include Lebanese) by the R.C.G.L., Recueil des Actes VI, pp. 2-3, but it remained the right of the H.C. to dissolve the R.C.G.L.; in fact he dissolved it in January 1925 when it failed to elect the Governor, Arrete No. 7/S of January 13, 1925, ibid., pp. 11-12.

important here to notice how public pressure in 1922, had a strong effect in the process of decision making.

In January 1925, the R.C.G.L. was dissolved and six months later, in July 1925, a new one was elected. The newly elected R.C.G.L. was asked by the H.C. to "expand and revise the basic laws of Lebanon in keeping with article one of the Act of the Mandate."<sup>1</sup> The organic law, however, was prepared by an interdepartmental commission in Paris to be discussed and approved by the R.C.G.L.<sup>2</sup> Accordingly the constitution of 1926,<sup>3</sup> still in effect today as amended, was promulgated on the 23rd of May. The new constitution proclaimed Greater Lebanon a republic. It also included provisions for parliamentary institutions and a democratic form of government. The 1926 constitution, as amended in 1927, provided for an indirectly elected president of the Republic. The term of the president was an un-renewable term of three years.<sup>4</sup> He was charged with the execution of laws and had the right of personal excuse.<sup>5</sup> Also, it was the president's right to negotiate and conclude treaties within the limits of article three of

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1. George Grassmuch and Kamal Salibi, A Manual of Lebanese Administration (Beirut: Public Administration Dept., A.U.B., 1955) p. 5 Art. one of the Mandate Act says that the mandatory shall frame an "organic law" for the land within three years.
  2. Ibid., p. 5.
  3. For English text see Helen M. Davis, Constitutions, Electoral Laws, Treaties of States in the Near East, 2nd ed. (Durham: N.C., 1953), pp. 291-305. And for the Arabic text as in 1927 see the Collection of Laws and Decrees of the Republic of Lebanon, V. I, (in Arabic), (Beirut: al-Adab Press, 1930), pp. 2-3, 9, (hereafter, Collection...)
  4. Article 49 of the 1926 constitution.
  5. Article 51 of the 1926 constitution.



the Mandate charter. Treaties, however, related to financial and economic affairs had to be brought before parliament for ratification.<sup>1</sup> According to article fifty-three the president could appoint and depose ministers from amongst whom he chooses the prime minister. The president of the Republic was not held responsible for executive decisions, because the concerned minister or ministers countersigned all decisions.<sup>2</sup> In cases of refusal to meet, rejection of the whole budget, and/or passing of decisions that might infringe upon the status of the mandate the President could, with the approval of the cabinet, dissolve parliament.<sup>3</sup> Furthermore, the President could, once per session, veto any law passed by parliament which would then require an absolute majority of the total members of parliament to be passed again.<sup>4</sup> Urgent project-laws could be published by the president forty days after they were sent to parliament if the latter did not reach a decision about them within the defined period.<sup>5</sup> Besides his right to dissolve parliament the president could postpone the date of parliament's session for a maximum of one month's time after the date set for that session (59). Before finally installed in its position the cabinet had to take the confidence of parliament. After this confidence the cabinet remained individually and collectively, responsible to parliament who could at any moment vote non-confidence (65). Hence,

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1. Ibid., article 52.

2. Ibid., article 54.

3. Ibid., article 55.

4. Ibid., article 57.

5. Ibid., article 58.

like the French constitution of 1875 the Lebanese constitution vested strong powers in the hands of the chief executive. But no matter what was the nature of the powers granted to the president by the 1926 constitution still he was restricted by the November 23, 1920 Decree of the President of the French Republic that gave the H.C. the supreme hand in almost all phases of the political process.<sup>1</sup>

On the other hand the 1926 constitution provided for a democratic form of government by providing for a publicly elected parliament. This parliament was to be elected on sectarian bases, giving a certain number of seats to each sect proportional to the number of its members. But because each electoral district included members from different sects representation was not purely confessional because a sectarian group did not have the sole and final word in electing its representative, which other sectarian groups shared with them. Not being able to decide on their own representatives by themselves alone the members of a certain sect had to seek informal representation by deciding on their representative through means other than that laid by the law. Hence, as P. Rondot says, true representation was outside parliament instead of being within it.<sup>2</sup> Bkirki for example was the real representative of the interests of the Maronites. That is why patriarch Huwayyik was present at Paris (during the post-War I settlements) in his capacity as representing the Maronite point of view more than almost any Maronite deputy of that time. So it could be safely concluded here, that to control public opinion in Lebanon

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1. This was deduced from the whereases of the important decisions and decrees of the H.C., because the writer could not find the text of the decree.
  2. P. Rondot, "Quelques Reflexions sur les Structures du Liban," L'Orient, Vol. 6, 1958, pp. 23-36.

the chief executive had to control not parliament alone but had also to control the leaders in whom the real public will was embodied (leaders of sects for example).

Democracy, one can say, is not achieved by laws alone no matter how basic are these laws, because a democratic way of life requires certain social conditions that Lebanon did not have. The law, having a reformative mission in society, has to stimulate society and at the same time respond to its stimulations. This process of continuous mutual interaction between society and law--as instituted in governmental institutions--requires social peace and constitutional stability. The 1926 constitution was not stable enough nor was it accompanied with suitable environmental conditions<sup>1</sup> that allowed it to be used as an instrument for alleviating political life in Lebanon. To illustrate: the constitution was amended twice between 1926 and early 1943, before the famous amendment of that year, in 1927 and 1929.<sup>2</sup> On May 9, 1932 the constitution was suspended<sup>3</sup> and the executive

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1. Divergent loyalties and the economic depression of the early 1930s.
  2. The first amendment--1927--abolished the senate and provided for a 2/3 elected and 1/3 appointed parliament...and the cabinet became collectively responsible to parliament. The 1929 amendment introduced the following changes:
    - (a) Ministers could all be from the chamber, whereas only up to a simple majority of the cabinet could be from the chamber before 1929.
    - (b) Confidence could be withdrawn from cabinet even during extraordinary sessions, whereas this could be done only during ordinary sessions before 1929.
    - (c) The term of the president was changed from a 3 renewable years to 6 unrennewable years.
    - (d) The president was given a free hand in the dissolution of parliament, whereas this right was limited before 1929.
    - (e) The presence of a simple majority of the deputies became enough to proceed with a vote of confidence whereas the presence of 2/3 was required before 1929; Collection..., pp. 2-39.
  3. Decision No. 55/L.R., of May 9, 1932, Official Gazette (O.G.), (in Arabic), No. 2661, 1932, p. 2; causes behind this suspension were

powers were vested in a "Head of the Government" (H.G.) who was appointed by the H.C. and assisted by the Council of Directors (C.D.). In his legislative capacity the H.G. could issue decrees having the power of law, but his "laws" were subject to the approval of the C.D. Legislative decrees, however, were subject to the approval of the H.C. This system, which was without parliament, lasted until January 2, 1934,<sup>1</sup> when a restricted Chamber composed of 18 members (2/3 elected and 1/3 appointed by the president and approved by the C.D.)<sup>2</sup> and the office of the Secretary of State were created. As the May 1932 decision, (cited above) itself shows the executive enjoyed an almost free hand in the administration of the state.<sup>3</sup>

In 1937 the 1926 constitution was restored,<sup>4</sup> but in July of the

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claimed to be economic in nature, i.e. representative democratic life was very expensive for the Lebanese economy. But this claim defeated itself overtime, since economic conditions did not improve after suspension, Jubran Tweini, In the Midst of the Daylight, (in Arabic), (Beirut: an-Nahar Press, 1939), pp. 80-82, 186-187 and 221-223. According to Dr. Subhi Mahmasani the real reason was that the 1929 Chamber of Deputies was about to elect a president (Sheikh M. al-Jisir) not approved of by the H.C.; Subhi Mahmasani, Democracy and Constitution, (in Arabic), (Beirut: Dar al-Ilm lil-Malayin, 1952), p. 62.

1. Decision No. 1, of January 2, 1934, O.G., No. 2916, 1934, pp. 2-5.
2. The meetings of the Council were presided over by the President of the Republic who had a casting vote in case of tie in the C.D.
3. The legislature for example, was at the mercy of the President of the Republic who could dissolve it at any time if the C.D. approves.
4. Decision No. 1/L.R. of January 4, 1937, Official Bulletin, Vol. XVI, No. 1, 1937, pp. 11-12.

same year the "troublesome" parliament was dissolved.<sup>1</sup> A new 42-member Chamber was elected in November 1937<sup>2</sup> to be dissolved two years later with the constitution suspended.<sup>3</sup> The September 1939<sup>4</sup> amendment established a very strong executive by vesting the executive power in the Secretary of the State, a French Counsellor and an Advisory Council of the Government; and the legislative power in the President of the Republic subject to the countersignature of the Secretary of State in minor legislation and the H.C.'s in major ones. This arrangement remained until March 8, 1943 when the constitution was restored with some minor amendments.<sup>5</sup> Six months later parliamentary elections were held that resulted in an anti-mandate majority. Even most of the deputies who were pro-French became dissatisfied with the manner in which the French were administering the state.<sup>6</sup> Taking advantage of this and the fact that the French had promised independence for the Lebanese at the outset of World War II, the national government headed by R. as-Sulh sent to parliament a project asking for the amendment of certain articles, in the constitution that restricted the full independence of the country. On November 8, 1943 the Lebanese Parliament met and amended the 1926 constitution.<sup>7</sup> Two

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1. Decree No. 891/E.C. of July 24, 1937, Collection..., Beirut, Azar Press, Vol. X, 1938, pp. 20-21.
  2. Decision No. 13/L.R., ibid., pp. 24-25.
  3. Decision No. 246/L.R. of September 21, 1939, O.G., No. 3727, 1939, pp. 5214-15.
  4. Ibid.
  5. Arrete No. 129/F.C. of March 8, 1943, The Official Bulletin of Administrative Acts of the High Commisariat, 1942-1943, (in Arabic), (Beirut: Vol. XXII, 1943), p. 65; (hereafter Official Bulletin...); Vols. XXI-XXII are bound in one volume.
  6. Munir Taky ad-Din, The Birth of Independence, (in Arabic), (Beirut: Dar al-Ilm lil-Malayin, 1953), p. 32.
  7. Articles 1, 11, 22, 95, and 102 were amended and articles 90, 91, 92,

days later on November 10, 1943 Arrete No. 464<sup>1</sup> suspended the constitution, dissolved parliament and restored the articles amended by the March 8, 1943 arrete to their original form. On November 11, 1943, the President of the Republic, the Prime Minister and some ministers were arrested during the night and sent to the "coolers" of Rashayyah.<sup>2</sup> Severe demonstrations all over the republic were followed by hot fights in Bshamun (a small village to the southwest of Aley).

Let us at this point leave the flaming fire of Bshamun for a moment to go a little back into the earlier years in an attempt to trace the socio-religious conditions in Lebanon.

It was due to the nature of international politics,<sup>3</sup> internal weaknesses and external affiliations, that the administration of Lebanon was entrusted to a French mandate, but the mandate was not unanimously accepted by the Lebanese. When they were confronted, by the end of World War I, with the problem of choosing to side with either Arabism or a provisionally French controlled Lebanon, a great number of the Moslem elements sided with Arabism,<sup>4</sup> and the majority of the Maronites, the uniates in general, sided with the mandate.<sup>5</sup> Deeply, the Lebanese Christians felt that Lebanon should remain their safe and protected refuge,

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93, and 94 were all abolished. All of those articles dealt with the powers of the H.C. and the status of the mandate in Lebanon, O.G.: Minutes of Parliament (Beirut: 1943), p. 4.

1. Official Bulletin..., p. 190.
2. Taky ad-Din, op.cit., p. 58.
3. Mainly the Sykes-Picot agreement.
4. Taky ad-Din, op.cit., pp. 18-19; al-Maqdisi, op.cit., p. 120.
5. al-Maqdisi, op.cit., p. 119.

their basic loyalty was to Lebanon. On the other hand the majority of the Moslems and the Arab nationalists in general, felt deeply that it is to Syria not to Lebanon that they should belong. In fact the newly annexed **areas** to the mountain sent representatives in 1928 to a convention held in Damascus and that demanded the reincorporation of those territories into Syria.<sup>1</sup> The difference between the two was, therefore, a basic difference of national loyalties. This contradiction of loyalties at that time could be interpreted on two bases; first, it was historically established that the Christians of Lebanon perceived of France as their protector against the "oppression" by the other sects; and second, Arabism was not yet differentiated from Islamism.

The declaration of Greater Lebanon nourished the hostile unfriendly attitude of the Moslems towards France and indirectly towards the Christians of Lebanon, because of the newly added territories that were believed by the Arab nationalists to belong to Syria more than they were the right of Lebanon. The national sectarian division gave impetus to the two-party feeling amongst the Lebanese. Even major political parties, though this was not explicit in their doctrines, were erected on sectarian bases. The so-called political parties of an-Najadah and al-Kataib, were in fact Sunni and Maronite groupings respectively, each serving as a pressure group for the achievement of the interests of its sect. By their natures the two parties pulled the two major communities of Lebanon, the Sunni and the Maronite, still farther and farther from each other.

The military dictatorship in Lebanon between 1918 and 1926 was believed to have pushed suspicion and resentment of the mandate to the

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1. Abdallah Kibrsi, We and Lebanon, (in Arabic), (Beirut: Lebanon Press, 1954), p. 73.

domain of the Christian element itself.<sup>1</sup> Confronted with this suspicious atmosphere the Mandate authority did not find a better way to balance power than by playing the sectarian game and intentionally perpetuating the "domination of spiritual leaders over the members of their communities."<sup>2</sup> In trying to hold the balance between the sects the French, "were believed", Hourani says, "to be, not altogether impartial in their efforts, and to show excessive favor to the Maronites and other Uniates. Thus the other communities became hostile both to France and to the Maronites."<sup>3</sup> By doing that the mandate authority had at least postponed the national unity between the sects. But the uniates, pro-French as they were, were so because France was supposed to be the defending and assisting friend of Lebanon. In the long run, therefore, the Uniates or rather a great majority of them could very easily turn against France if the latter proved to be acting in a manner that intentionally postponed the birth of independent Lebanon. An independent and secure Lebanon was the deeply rooted goal of the Uniates. The Arab nationalists, on the other hand, hoped that when France left Lebanon for good the latter would very easily be incorporated in a united Arab state. So the sooner France left the more their ultimate goal would become achievable.

In their efforts to secure a balanced situation the French did not fail to resort to the creation and satisfaction of local zuama (leaders)

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1. Masad, op.cit., pp. 73, 80 and 113.

2. Hourani, op.cit., p. 181.

3. Ibid., p. 183.



especially in regions where the primary organization (family and factional) and feudal society were still of effective dominance. A way of securing compromise between the various points of view was to bring the leaders of the various parties in an alliance. But because the difference in objectives between the opposing groups was so basic such an alliance could not succeed unless it satisfied personal needs of the leaders. So "alliances of prominent politicians, based upon common personal interests rather than common doctrine... and usually so organized as to include representatives of all the leading sects"<sup>1</sup> were one of the ends of the mandate to achieve a supreme and uncontested status. To achieve this end the mandate authority created and supported pro-French zuama (leaders).<sup>2</sup> Those zuama were, in general, chosen from amongst old feudal families. The mandate authorities, for example, encouraged and helped members of feudal families in southern Lebanon, the Bigaa, and the Hirmil districts, to become pro-French political leaders.<sup>3</sup> Landlords were chosen because they each had a good number of favorites whom he can sway as he wishes.

To become and remain a zaim one had to serve the personal interests of individuals. Services of this kind presuppose four main elements; first, the citizen had to be confronted with obligating situations, i.e. to get his right or safeguard his personal interests he had to resort to the mediation of a superior; second, the individual citizen had to be

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1. Ibid., p. 184.

2. George Hanna, From Occupation to Independence, (in Arabic), (Beirut: Dar al-Funun, 1946), pp. 43-45.

3. The Asads and Zayns in the south, the Haydars and Himadehs in Bigaa and Hirmil, Iskandar Riyashi, Before and After, (in Arabic), (Beirut: al Hayat Press, '53), pp. 210-215.

psychologically ready to accept and resort to mediation; thirdly, the administration had to be set in such a manner that allowed the achievement of services through mediation; and fourthly, the mandatory authority had to make sure that such an administration was still under its sole control. The achievement of the first two elements did not require much effort because the basic Lebanese social structure and administrative history allowed this kind of administration. The third and fourth elements were secured by centralizing and concentrating power and by selecting employees who were morally ready to serve personal interests and by evading the establishment of a healthy Lebanese administration.

"... The French officials were too often corrupt, avaricious, and arbitrary; while the Syrian and Lebanese officials were not wisely chosen, properly trained, or given a due measure of responsibility... Not only was no independent government established but no appreciable progress was made towards that end. Only half hearted attempts were made to set up representative institutions... and little was made to create an efficient civil service..."<sup>1</sup>

All of those factors together with the hesitant attitude of the mandate authorities to give Lebanon its independence served as a background for a perpetual national unity against the French in 1943. Even the Kataib and the Najjadah united their efforts in fighting the mandate administration.<sup>2</sup> Almost all sects were one block against the behavior of the mandate authorities. This unity together with the direct intervention by Great Britain who actually occupied Lebanon in 1943 and the United

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1. Hourani, op.cit., pp. 176-177.

2. Taky ad-Din, op.cit., pp. 146-152.

States of America<sup>1</sup> and the neighboring Arab states co-operated with the people's determination to win the battle of independence against France at any price this time. So behind the fight of Bshamun there were two main factors, national unity and foreign help, that resulted in the freeing of the President and his colleagues<sup>2</sup> and in the abolition of Arrete No. 464 of November 10, 1943,<sup>3</sup> thus resulting in the independence of Lebanon.

1943, the year of independence, brought to the political scene the question of arriving at an agreement between the Christians and the Moslems as to how the Lebanese should share positions and settle certain basic political issues, once they became independent. Seeking apparent social unity after the independence strifes, some prominent Christian and Moslem leaders got together and agreed upon what is generally known as al-Mithaq al-Watani (the National Covenant). The National Covenant was, up to 1943, the last of the superficial compromises between the major sects of Lebanon. The agreement included the following points: a) Christians would give up the idea of isolation of Lebanon and accept the 'Arab character' of Lebanon, b) Moslems would give up the ideas of annexing some Lebanese territories to Syria, those territories that were added to the mountain (1920), and uniting Lebanon with the other Arabic speaking states, c) Christians would

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1. Ibid., pp. 189 and 208.

2. Ibid., p. 210.

3. Arrete No. 483/F.C. of November 22, 1943, Official Bulletin..., p. 198.

give up the idea of foreign protection over Lebanon, d) the ratio of sectarian representation of Moslems to Christians in parliament was agreed upon to be 5:6, and e) the President of the Republic should be a Maronite and the Prime Minister a Sunni.<sup>1</sup>

What was discussed in the preceding few pages is not all about the Lebanese administration under the mandate. The real administration of the state was done by a French official, i.e. the French H.C. As it is clear from Arrete No. 42/S of 1925<sup>2</sup> the Lebanese administration was almost fully in French hands. To administer all the mandatories, the H.C. had a Central Bureau or office composed of counsellors (see preceding footnote) who in turn had subordinate counsellors representing them in the local governmental departments. The tentacles of the counsellor's octopus reached even the muhafazah and qada (local administrative divisions) levels. No minister, director-general, muhafiz (prefect), or qaim-maqam could function without the approval or countersignature of the responsible counsellor. The administrative authority was so centralized and concentrated in the hands of those counsellors that the Lebanese

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1. George Dib, "Riadh Solh's Speech in the Lebanese Assembly (October 1943) Embodying the Main Principles of the Lebanese 'National Pact,'" Middle East Forum, Vol. XXXIV, No. 1, 1959, p. 6.
  2. Official Bulletin..., 1925, pp. 44-47; according to this arrete the following were the bureaus of the High Commisariat: a) The Office of the Secretary General, b) the Bureau of the Legislative Studies Counsellor, c) the Bureau of the Finance Counsellor, d) the General Inspectorate of Customs, e) the General Inspectorate of Post and Telegraph, f) the Bureau of the Public Works and Companies' Control Counsellor, g) the Bureau of the Public Education Counsellor, h) the Bureau of Archeology and Fine Arts Counsellor, i) the Bureau of the Hygiene and Public Relief Counsellor, j) the Bureau of the Economy Counsellor, k) the Bureau of Consulate Departments, l) the Office of Commercial, Industrial, and Artistic Property Protection, and m) the Office of Local Police Control.

administration came to be known by the public as 'the administration by counsellors.'<sup>1</sup>

It was said that the mandate authority was almost the sole decision maker and administrator in the state. The H.C., for example, could by an Arrete abolish a law passed by parliament or could, even, suspend the constitution by an arrete, as it was shown earlier in this chapter. Iskandar Riyashi, a contemporary writer of the mandate period, relates in one of his books that the H.C. was the monopolizer of power and the final authority in almost everything.<sup>2</sup> To have any hope of winning the presidential elections, before the early 1940s, the candidate had to enjoy the backing of the H.C. who used to put into the presidency only persons whom he chose as happened when Emile Edde won the presidency against Bishara al-Khury<sup>3</sup> in 1936. The term of this same president, E. Edde, was renewed by an arrete though the President was required to be elected.<sup>4</sup> The relation of the H.C. with parliament was not different than those with the president. In 1936, for example, the seats of the 63-member parliament were divided, by the H.C., into twenty-six and thirty-seven quotas between B. al-Khuri and Emile Edde as a compromise in order to solve the crisis of 1936, that was going on between the two (Khuri and Edde).<sup>5</sup>

Most devastating of all was the administration of financially

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1. Information from H.E. Hamid Franjiyeh (early February, 1957).
  2. Riyashi, op.cit., p. 58.
  3. Ibid., p. 148.
  4. Ibid., pp. 182-183.
  5. Ibid., pp. 156-161.

independent special organizations that were directly responsible to the H.C., i.e. the 'Common Interests,' and the 'Special Services.' The first of these was a financial burden and a depreciating factor to the state's economy because the mandatory authorities could play with customs policy as they wished. The Special Services were in fact French 'special informational and tutelary services' in the mandated states. It is said by Grassmuck and Salibi:

...Among those activities which the High Commissioner reserved to assure his administrative control were the special informational and tutelary services, the "Services Speciaux," through which the mandate authority was exercised at every administrative level (with expenses paid from the French budget); and the "Common Interests," which grouped together certain economic functions of both Syria and Lebanon, including customs administration and the control of concessionary companies. Under a separate budget for the Common Interests, the Collection of Customs yielded most of the revenue which covered the expenses of these activities as well as the costs of the "Troupes Speciales du Levant." The control of concessionary companies included the administrative organizations for granting private companies the rights to operate the railways and other public utilities, and to produce tobacco. As might be expected, the Lebanese people expressed considerable opposition to the Common Interests as well as to the 'Services Speciaux' and the "Troupes Speciales du Levant" early in the mandatory period. That opposition did not end until after the termination of the mandate.<sup>1</sup>

Legally speaking all laws and regulations were so set by the French as to concentrate power in the hands of the H.C. Even the powers that were given to the President of the Republic in the constitution were overruled by a French presidential decree as it was shown above. The legal powers of the H.C. were backed and preserved by the military power

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1. Grassmuck and Salibi, op.cit., p. 7.

the French had on the Lebanese and Syrian lands by reason of the war agreements between the powers. Legal and French military powers, therefore, were major factors in power location in Lebanon during the mandate period.

Sectarianism and sectarian-national affiliations served during the mandate, as during the previous eras, as a factor in power location. Sectarian affiliations split the Lebanese into two opposing parties each trying to achieve its end which is almost the contrary of the other party's. The objective of the Christians was to secure an independent, safe Lebanon. The aim of the Moslems was to secure an independent United Arab state. To satisfy both was almost impossible. To side with neither, the mandate would indirectly have won the enmity of both, because the Christians were expecting its help and the Moslems were already against it, and hence have the public, en masse, against it. The French strategy, therefore, was to keep the sects busy with each other, giving the Christians the maximum help possible. By doing that, the H.C. insured that the public would not be one bloc against the mandatory administration, and hence the latter can go on executing French interests in Lebanon.

On the other hand, sectarianism could be taken to have acted as a limitation on the chief executive's power, because the latter could not act at will, since he had so to mold his decisions as not to raise the disgust of both parties as has happened in 1943. In that year, 1943, the H.C.'s decision not to accept the terms of the national government cost him public unity against the French regime in Lebanon. Similar examples were also the popular opposition to Arrete No. 336 of 1920 and to Arrete No. 1304 of 1922 when both arretes were amended under public pressure.

Furthermore, sectarian representation contributed, in the manner shown above, to the weakness of popular representation, by leaving actual representation to individuals and bodies other than deputies and parliament. Due to this fact the chief executive had not only to secure the backing of deputies but also of people outside parliament, before he could ensure popular backing for his decisions. That, however, was not a very difficult task as far as deputies were concerned, because the H.C. could install deputies who were ready to back his decisions in parliament. By doing this, and by having a pro-French president, and pro-French administration, the H.C. would then secure the backing of legal constitutional bodies. Once this was secured, any popular opposition would be a non-institutionalized, sometimes illegal, one, and hence would be suppressed by the government. Such an opposition, therefore, could not achieve its goals except by either revolution and violence or by the help of legal bodies and foreign help, as has happened in 1943.



## CHAPTER VI

### CONCLUSION

Perhaps it is wise to start this final chapter by a general concluding statement as to where power was located in Lebanon between 1585-1943? Contrary to what is generally believed power was not always concentrated in the presidency alone. Power, in Lebanon, was usually located in more than one place though not equally at all times. This should by no means be interpreted to mean that the "president" of Lebanon was not powerful. On the contrary, it was shown in the body of this study that up to 1943 he enjoyed strong powers, but was not, as it is believed, the monopolizer of that power. The distribution of power, however, varied from one period to another, depending on various factors some of which were analyzed above. The chief executive, public institutions, social group leaders, and certain foreign powers, were all partners in sharing power in Lebanon.

Knowing where power was located logically leads us to the following question: Why was power so located in Lebanon? Factors behind power location could be many as it was said in the introductory chapter, but factors that had most affected the distribution of power were: a) land tenure, b) sectarianism, c) the basic social structure, and d) international strategy or power politics. These were the major factors which were behind power location in Lebanon because they were the four main individual elements around which the history of Lebanon was centered and by which the political evolution of the mountain was determined. Land

tenure was a factor in power location because a) the power structure was partly determined by it and b) it was a source of social prestige and political influence. Sectarianism derived its effectiveness in power location because; a) it created a factional feeling within the sect; that feeling made the sect act as one force against anybody who opposed it, and b) the sects were given help and reinforcement by foreign powers. Like land tenure, the basic social structure partly determined the structure of power and like sectarianism greatly contributed to the orientation of the citizens to factional feeling and factional affiliations. By the nature of their power status and their interests in the Levant, Turkey and the Great European powers were determinant factors in the location of power in Lebanon.

Stating the problem in a simple form we can, therefore, say that power location in Lebanon was greatly affected by factors that were predominantly social by nature, using 'social' in its broad sense.

To say that power was located in more than one place, because of the effect of several factors, is no convincing argument by itself. To state the cause and then state the effect of that cause does not prove anything if the way in which the cause is related to the effect is not analyzed. How did land tenure, sectarianism, the basic social structure and international strategy contribute to the location of power?

The subordinate-superior relationship between the ploughman and the landlord was of the essence of feudal organization. Because the ploughman was legally subject to the landlord and at the same time considered to be his property, the former could not decide on or do anything

except through or with the consent of his superior.

(The evolution of hereditary land feudalism, from its official abolition in 1861, into political feudalism, carried with it the mentality of subordination and allegiance to the superior--the leader or zaim--after 1861. To attain his rights, or at least merely to safeguard his existence, the citizen, in general, had to resort to his superior, the zaim. Mediation through the zaim, hence, was expected to become the major means of reaching the all powerful administration.) But because unlike the feudal era none of the favourites of the zaim were officially his own personal property, the latter could no longer claim absolute authority over them, and so it was very likely that the leader would serve the interests of his favourites or at least some of them in order to assure the continuity of his leadership. To be a successful mediator, therefore, it became essential for the zaim to have effective influence in the administration. The achievement of such an influence seemed to be difficult without securing the consent and help of the executive and particularly the chief executive. The chief executive, on the other hand, needed the backing of the leaders to implement his own plans with the least opposition. (Hence, the zaim, who was usually a deputy, agreed with the chief executive on backing and helping him provided the chief executive put the administration at the disposal of the zaim. The chief executive and the leader (zaim), therefore, formed the two props of an informal unwritten agreement under which both parties secured strong measures of power.)

The extent to which the chief executive benefitted from this agreement depended on two factors; a) the effects that the decisions of the

chief executive might have upon the prerogatives of the individual leaders, and b) the degree to which the leaders with whom the agreement was made, represented the public. In the first place if the decisions of the chief executive threatened the prerogatives of the leaders they directly turned against that decision as often happened during the period of this study.

(In the second place, and this leads us to the question of sectarianism, the chief executive used to benefit from that agreement more, when the individual leaders represented, amongst other social forces, the various religious communities of Lebanon.) A sect was important as a social force because in its essence it was a faction and a faction is defined by J. Madison to be "a number of citizens whether amounting to a majority or minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the right of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community."<sup>1</sup> Hence by securing the backing of the different sects the chief executive could secure the backing of the different competing sectarian communities, which formed the bulk of Lebanese society.) But sectarianism, through sectarian representation, and due to the fact that members of several sects joined in electing the representative of only one sect, served as it was shown in Chapter Five as a major factor in locating actual and real representation outside parliament. The chief executive, therefore, had to win the support of representatives inside and outside parliament before he could claim full public support for his decisions. To win such

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1. James Madison, "The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Factions and Insurrection," in Ernest Rhys, (ed.) The Federalists, p. 42.

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support, however, the decision of the chief executive had to satisfy the interests of the different sects. And being relatively in opposition to each other, the interests of the sects could not be satisfied by a decision that was more advantageous to one sect than it was to the other. The power to take decisions, therefore, was highly limited by the interests of the sects whether these interests were in harmony with the common good or not.

Almost the only solution to that critical situation was to make compromise decisions. By nature this intermediate <sup>solution</sup> does not coincide fully with the interests of any of the parties. It, therefore, does not give complete satisfaction to any of them. The main satisfaction a compromise might give to each of the competing parties is the feeling that the other party did not get more, i.e. "we are still equals." The compromise in this sense is a balancing mechanism. As soon as decisions go beyond the central area between the two opposites to side with one of them the feelings of the other will get irritated and hence it declares its opposition in one way or another.

(It might be objected at this point that since the citizen was no more the slave of the landlord and since sects were so effective as a social force, why was it that the chief executive should have made the power-sharing agreement with the leaders, and not with the public? The answer to this question is that the history of Lebanon shows that feudal society, agrarian society and primary organizations were co-existent. Although Lebanon during the first half of the twentieth century was no longer mainly feudal in organization, still it was relatively highly

dependent upon primary social organization, i.e. patriarchal authority. The citizen's loyalty was still to a family, "to a friend or to one's social or religious group rather than to absolute abstract principles.)"<sup>1</sup> Patriarchal, factional authority pre-supposed absolute obedience from any individual member to the head of the organization. The son, for example, had to obey his father under all circumstances and a member of a sect had to obey the leader or head of the sect. This, no doubt, affected a great deal and helped in concentrating authority in one individual, i.e. the head of the organization. It was easier for the chief executive, therefore, to make his agreement with the head of the sect or any other organization rather than bothering about the individual members whose affiliations were determined by the head.

Besides, patriarchal authority killed one's initiative and stultified his efforts as a member of society who could take part in determining the destiny of that society. Moreover, this same person, with stultified suppressed potentials, might have become himself, a head of a family or any larger organization the members of which conceived of him as the unmistakable wise leader whose decisions were unchallengeable. Such a leader might not have matched the new changing needs of society. The public, therefore, as it happened in certain parts of Lebanon; might have revolted against its leader or head, destroying the prevailing social discipline and establishing a new one under which the individual could have more rights to enjoy. Moves of this kind definitely reduced the strength of the primary organization, at least in certain parts of Lebanon.

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1. F.A. Ross, C.L. Fry and E. Sibley, The Middle East and American Philanthropy, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1929), pp. 255 and 259.

If patriarchal authority led to the centralization of power in the hands of one individual within the group, this did not necessarily mean that it led to the centralization of power in the head of the state alone. The head or leader of the sect, the faction or the family was usually unwilling and very hesitant to surrender all his powers to the chief executive in the state. The leader might have agreed to accept the authority and supremacy of the chief executive as long as the latter satisfied the leader's interests and recognized his status. So, power remained to be in more than one hand and in more than one place in the state.

Up to this point, all the factors discussed in this chapter could have served, other things being equal, as serious limitations on the powers of the chief executive. But other things were not equal all the time. The check exercised by the sects and factions over the powers of the chief executive was itself checked by other factors, most important of which, in the writer's opinion, was the foreign control over Lebanon.

By their interests in Lebanon foreign powers, whether Turkey, France or Great Britain, used to suppress, by force, all kinds of internal factors that might cause serious limitations to the powers of the chief executive (their representative) in as long as the latter proved to be sincere and faithful to the power he represented.

To secure a continuous suppression of whatever internal opposition there was against foreign control over Lebanon, the controlling power resorted to systems of administration that concentrated power in the chief executive. This, together with the strong and effective physical and moral help that the foreign state used to supply its representative,

often served as one of the strongest factors, if not the strongest factor, behind power location in Lebanon. It was one of the strongest factors because it often proved that it could overcome any other factor opposing it.

The intensity of foreign control, however, was not equally strong during all the periods of Lebanon's history falling between 1585-1943, or during different phases of the same period. The strength of foreign control over Lebanon depended mainly on two factors: a) the actual physical presence of foreign military forces in Lebanon, and b) the relative domestic ability to block external intervention. Foreign control, for example, was not as strong during the Mutasarrifiyyah period as it used to be under the Qaim-maqamiyyahs, nor was it as intense during the last years of the Mandate as it used to be during the early Mandate. Hence it will be neither true nor valid to conclude that foreign control over Lebanon kept power, all power and always, in the hands of the chief executive during the period 1585-1943.

Concluding we can, therefore, say that power was not always in one hand between the early sixteenth and the middle of the twentieth centuries. But at the same time we can say that power was definitely not in the hands of the people. Land tenure, sectarianism, the social set up and international strategy together with other factors have all cooperated, through a network of interaction, to locate power in the hands of one person, few persons or a foreign power but almost never in the hands of the people.



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