AMERICAN UNIVERSITY OF BEIRUT

THE UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING PRACTICE IN
SOUTHERN LEBANON: "THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY" AND LOCAL AUTONOMY

by
SUSANN HASSAN KASSEM

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Approved by:

_____

Dr. Mayssun Succarie, Visiting Assistant Professor   Advisor
Center for Arab and Middle Eastern Studies

_____

Dr. Karim Makdisi, Associate Professor   Member of Committee
Department of Political Studies and Public Administration

_____

Dr. John Meloy, Professor   Member of Committee
Department of History and Archaeology

Date of thesis defense: 21 October 2011

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AN ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS OF

Susann Kassem   for   Master of Arts
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This thesis examines the activities of the United Nations Interim Force In Lebanon (UNIFIL)—a "peace-keeping" organization—in order to address the dynamics and challenges of this international institution and its work in local communities within a conflict zone. My research focuses on the work of UNIFIL Civil Affairs employees and assesses their relationship to the local population using qualitative analysis of the acceptance or rejection of UNIFIL initiatives, rules, instruments and terms of engagement. UNIFIL was deployed in southern Lebanon in 1978 with the stated objectives "of confirming the withdrawal of Israeli forces, restoring international peace and security and assisting the Government of Lebanon in ensuring its effective authority in the area".[1] Following the July/August war of 2006, the size of the UNIFIL mission was significantly expanded from around 2,000 soldiers to a maximum of 15,000. My study seeks to show the implications of this expansion and to trace the "flows of experts, international organizations, and military personnel"[2] in the area. Extensive field research in the village of Blida reflects upon the perceptions of UNIFIL by ordinary people and community leaders, as well as the regulations of the international mandate in light of Lebanese sovereignty and local self-determination. My investigation reveals that while UNIFIL has faced marked criticism for their conflict management and military activities, their so-called "Quick Impact Projects", investment opportunities and humanitarian assistance designed for the immediate benefit of the local community, have led to a partial acceptance of this sizable foreign battalion from the people of southern Lebanon.

By looking at this "peace-keeping" mission in a post-9/11 context, this thesis shows how the objectives and implications the War on Terror influenced the design of this mission at the global level. Regarding the mission of UNIFIL in perspective with military interventions pursued by the "international community" in "states of emergency",[3] this thesis questions this particular institution's conceptualization of "peace." In conclusion this anthropological study on UNIFIL aims to deconstruct often naturalized and depoliticized assumptions about the state of conflict, utilizing a critical approach in order to question the often silently accepted "humanitarian interventions" of the past decades.

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[1] United Nations, "UNSC Resolution 425" *Security Council Resolutions- 1978*; available from http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/368/70/IMG/NR036870.pdf?OpenElement; Internet; accessed 8 November 2011.

[2] Mariella Pandolfi, "Laboratory of Intervention: The Humanitarian Governance of the Postcommunist Balkan Territories." In *Postcolonial Disorders*, by Sandra Teresa Hyde, Sarah Pinto, Byron J. Good eds. Mary-Jo DelVecchio Good (California: University of California Press, 2008), 170.

[3] Ibid.

CONTENTS

MAPS OF UNIFIL/SOUTHERN LEBANON I

MAPS OF UNIFIL/SOUTHERN LEBANON II

SIGNIFICANT DATES IN HISTORY

1920
- The borders of the modern state of Lebanon are declared by French mandatory authorities

1943
- Lebanese independence from France

1948
- The State of Israel is declared and the First Arab-Israeli War concludes with the expulsion of 700,000 Palestinians from their homes

1967
- The six-day Arab-Israeli War breaks out between Israel and Egypt, Syria and Jordan. Lebanon has no active role in the war but is affected as Palestinian factions use Lebanon as a base for retaliation strikes against Israel.

1968
- Israel raids Beirut airport in retaliation to a Palestinian airplane hijacking.

1973
- Israel performs another raid on Beirut and kills three prominent Palestinian leaders associated with PLO chairman Yassir Arafat. The Lebanese government resigns the next day and soon after battles break out between the PLO and Lebanese Armed Forces.

1975
- Clashes between Christian and Palestinian militias break out, widely considered the start of a lengthy civil war that devastated Lebanon.

1976
- Fighting between Lebanese factions during March 1975 and November 1976 kills 40,000 Lebanese.
- Lebanese factions associated with the status quo ask Syria to intervene to prevent the military victory of the Lebanese Left (or National Movement) and Palestinians. "Red Line Agreement" brokered by the US divides Lebanon into Syrian and Israeli zones of influence: Syrian troops enter Lebanon, putting an end to the first phase of the Civil War while Israel establishes their "Security Belt" along the Lebanese/Israeli border using their South Lebanese Army proxy militia.

1978
- "Operation Litani": Israel invades Lebanon and occupies land reaching as far north as the Litani river. An estimated 200,000 southern residents are displaced.
- The United Nations Security Council calls on Israel to withdraw from Lebanese territory and creates a 6,000-man peacekeeping force called UNIFIL to ensure it happens.
- Israel hands over their strongholds to their South Lebanese Army militia instead of UNIFIL.

1982
- A Palestinian assassination attempt on Israel's ambassador in London sparks Israel's second invasion and "Operation Peace for Galilee" is launched targeting the PLO based in Lebanon. An estimated 20,000 are killed.
- Approximately 7,000 Palestinians flee Lebanon to other Arab nations following the siege of Beirut.
- The Israeli occupied zone is enlarged up to Saida (Sidon)

1985
- Facing stiff resistance from a variety of groups and popular revolt throughout the south, Israel and the South Lebanese Army pull back to an enlarged version of their old "Security Belt."

- Hizballah is officially announced via their "Open Letter to the Downtrodden in Lebanon and in the World"

1989
- The Taif Accord is signed in Saudi Arabia, establishing a more equitable political system, giving Muslims a greater voice in the political process and institutionalizing sectarian divisions in the government.

1993
- "Operation Accountability": Israel invades Lebanon again in their largest operation since 1982. Around 500,000 displaced amongst the Lebanese.

1996
- "Operation Grapes of Wrath": Another large-scale Israeli attack on Lebanon aiming to eradicate the effectiveness of Hizballah's resistance. Produces "April Understanding" which institutionalizes rules for the border conflict between Israel and Hizballah, as well as establishes an international monitoring group to observe the hostilities.

2000
- Israeli cabinet votes to withdraw Israeli troops from southern Lebanon after 18 consecutive years of occupation.

2004
- UNSC demands Syria to remove its troops from southern Lebanon stationed in Lebanon for the past 28 years, but Syrian troops remain (is this 1559?)

2005
- Rafiq Hariri is assassinated and Syria is accused of involvement, sparking anti-Syria demonstrations in Beirut calling for a full withdrawal of Syria from Lebanon. The coalitions of March 14 (backed by US and Saudi Arabia) and March 8 (backed by Syria and Iran) are established.
- March 14 wins control of parliament; Syria withdraws all of its troops ending its 29-year presence.

2006
- Hizballah fighters capture two Israeli soldiers
- Israel launches a deadly 33-day military attack on Lebanon on July 12 crippling major infrastructure; 1,200 Lebanese civilians and 160 Israeli are killed
- Israel's attack deeply divides the Lebanese government, deeming it unconstitutional
- 1701 Establishes UNIFIL II?

2008
- The situation leads to a political stalemate. In May fighting breaks out between March 8 and March 14 coalitions, in a crisis eventually resolved by the Doha agreement.

2009
- In June parliamentary elections took place and is won by March 14 coalition, despite a clear March 8 victory in the popular vote.
- Tribunal for the assassination of Hariri

2011
- In January the government collapsed after all ten opposition ministers and one presidential appointee resigned due to disagreements about the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (which according to hearsay is indicting Hizballah members in the assassination of former Prime minister Rafiq Hariri).
- The Hizballah aligned March 8 coalition secures a majority of seats in parliament and forms a government under Prime Minister Najib Miqati

ABBREVIATIONS

CAO, Civil Affairs Officer

CIMIC, Civilian-Military Coordination

LAF, Lebanese Armed Forces

LF, Lebanese Front

LNM, Lebanese National Movement

NGO, Non-Governmental Organization

QIP, Quick Impact Project

SLA, South Lebanon Army

SOPA, Senior Officer for Political Affairs

SSNP, Syrian Social National Party

STL, Special Tribunal for Lebanon

UNDP, United Nations Development Program

UNEF, United Nations Emergency Force

UNRWA, United Nations Relief and Works Agency

UNICEF, United Nations Chidren's Fund

UNIFIL, United Nations Interim Forces In Lebanon

UNSC, United Nations Security Council

UNSCR, United Nations Security Council Resolution

UNTSO, United Nations Truce Supervision Organization

USAID, United States Agency for International Development

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

A. Peacekeeping In Lebanon

It is February 2010 and I am visiting the Blue Line demarcations, the unofficial border between Lebanon and Israel, with a citizen from the border village of Blida. Ibrahim[4] is 47 year-old tobacco farmer and a father of four children. He was born and has lived all his life in Blida. Ibrahim is an active member of the Shi'ite political party, Amal, which he supported during the last elections held in May/June 2009. When we arrive at the Blue Line, we stop at the first UN armored vehicle stationed there and tell the Nepalese soldiers, "we just want to see the border." We continue driving and stop at the place where the next armored vehicle is stationed. There, I walk towards the vehicle. The soldiers from the Nepalese battalion are taking pictures in the flowering fields. I ask whether we could go down to a nearby olive field, cutting exactly through the Blue Line. Just a few kilometers across from this field of olive trees is a small Israeli village. Rather than granting us permission, the soldiers ask us to take a picture with them, which Ibrahim rejects. The Nepalese soldier asks whether this is his land, to which Ibrahim answers, "This is all my land." Ibrahim's behavior towards the soldiers is rather cold and unwelcoming. The Nepalese soldier doesn't seem to understand his cold behavior. Ibrahim wants to know what they do here, and asks if their job is to secure the border then why didn't they save the two farmers who were kidnapped by Israeli

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[4] Pseudonym. All names of individuals in this thesis are changed.

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soldiers last year?[5] The soldiers explain that they were not here last year and that Nepal changes the personnel for UNIFIL, the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, every six months. Ibrahim wants me to ask them if they like to be here and how much more money they get as soldier for the UN than in Nepal. The soldier says it is more than ten times their usual salary. We are then told that we can walk up to five hundred meters from the Blue Line. The soldier points at a water reservoir; we can walk until there. On our way there, we hear a sound coming from the observer checkpoint of the Israel Defense Forces on the hill to the right side in front of us--a tank was getting into position, explains Ibrahim. Before we can reach the water reservoir, two Nepalese soldiers are running after us, telling us to come back. On the way back I ask Ibrahim whether he would prefer if UNIFIL would leave, and he explains that he "doesn't really care about having them here, they cannot really do anything to change the situation."[6]

A colonel in the Italian contingent of United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) explains in *Al-Janoub*, their official magazine, that "the international community, through the United Nations, committed a military force to restore international peace and security in southern Lebanon."[7] The United Nations Security Council was created UNIFIL in 1978 in order to "confirm the withdrawal of Israeli forces from southern Lebanon, restore international peace and security and assist the

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[5] Two farmers on December 19, 2008 were taken into Israel, tortured, questioned, and released soon after. The farmers were wrongly accused of working for Hizballah. See: Nate George, "Selective Reporting from Lebanon." *Electronic Intifada.* Available from http://electronicintifada.net/content/selective-reporting-lebanon/8057; Internet; accessed 12 November 2011.

[6] Susann Kassem, *Field Notes*, (1 February 2009); 1. Published in Susann Kassem, "The UN Peacekeeping Agenda in a Southern Lebanese Village- "The International Community" and Local Autonomy", in *Newsletter No. 9*, Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs, (Beirut: June 2011), 1-2.

[7] Col. Sergio Filippi, "UNIFIL Ground Operations," in *Al-Janoub UNIFIL Magazine*, (January 2010), 7.

Government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in the area."[8]

There is little reference to the social, political and economic ramifications of UNFIL's involvement in the region and the reactions of those within.

Following the July/August 2006 war UNIFIL was expanded and in addition to the original mandate, it would, among other things, monitor the cessation of hostilities; accompany and support the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) as they deploy throughout the south of Lebanon; extend its assistance to help ensure humanitarian access to civilian populations as well as the voluntary and safe return of displaced persons; and finally, to assist the LAF in taking steps towards the establishment of an area free of any armed personnel, assets and weapons other than those of the Government of Lebanon and UNIFIL between the Blue Line and the Litani river.

There are a range of UNIFIL activities that have both direct and discursive influence on the people of southern Lebanon; whether these are in the form of "Quick Impact Projects," (QIP)[9] inaugurations, the newly established radio station "Salam from the South", UNIFIL's messages and advertisements on local TV stations or its magazine "Al-Janoub", they are all newly introduced practices to reach a form of accountability, visibility and control that ensure a constant engagement with the local society.

The following thesis presents the results of ethnographic research of UNIFIL's Civil Affairs Department I conducted mainly from February 2009 until December 2010

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[8] UNIFIL, "UNIFIL Mandate", available from http://unifil.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=1500; Internet; accessed 8 November 2011.

[9] Short-term development projects with a "quick impact" on the population in UNIFIL's area of operation that are widely spread in southern Lebanon. They are funded within and outside UNIFIL's budget.

mainly in the southern Lebanese village of Blida. The research questions the extent of and in which ways ordinary people and community leaders in southern Lebanon feel that UNIFIL is imposed by the conflict management imperatives of world powers at the expense of their sovereignty and self-determination. This thesis looks at UNIFIL in order to call attention to its embodied apparatus within it executes its mission in southern Lebanon. Specifically, how the "Blue Helmets" are able to establish and maintain UN's primary objectives of "peace and security,"[10] after the thirty-three-day war with Israel in 2006 that had led to a total destruction of the infrastructure in southern Lebanon? This thesis will inquire whether the Department of Civil Affairs' main obligation "to win the support of the population"[11] and "maintain relations"[12] is successful in its application on the ground. Particularly, how are reconciliation, reconstruction and development projects fulfilled in the name of "peace" and what are the particular parameters entailed by a hypothetical future "peace." Further, how is the production of global knowledge, analyses and diagnoses of the "problem" of "conflict" (and its origins, if applicable) sustained?[13] Finally, this work aims to draft wider political and theoretical conclusion regarding international peacekeeping and the frameworks that drive it, as well as practical implications of UNIFIL's performance in southern Lebanon.

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[10] Col. Sergio Filippi, 7.

[11] Head of Spanish CIMIC Unit, Interview by Susann Kassem, "Interview on UNIFIL- Spanish CIMIC Unit," in *Unpublished Thesis*, (Humboldt-University Berlin: June 2009), 15.

[12] Civil Affairs Officer, Interview by Susann Kassem, "Interview on Civil Affairs at UNIFIL", in *Friedenspolitik im Südlibanon*, *Unpublished Thesis,* (*Humboldt-University Berlin:* June 2009), 3.

[13] Arturo Escobar, "Power and Visibility: The Invention and Management of Development in the Third World" (Cultural Anthropology: 1988), 434.

This chapter will first discuss my main research object, the Department of Civil Affairs at UNIFIL. A post-Cold War approach to peace and development, and the merging of both in widely Western discourse, shape the work of this department. Therefore, a theoretical framework will situate this particular scientific enquiry in the logical structure and procedure of previous studies. Next, I will outline the methods used, followed by a historical context of the UN, the shifting approaches to peacekeeping and UNIFIL's mission in Lebanon.

The second chapter will provide a detailed account of the village Blida in southern Lebanon, that I have mainly collected through interviews with its people. It will briefly uncover its history and the way it shaped the political, economic and cultural structure of the village.

The third chapter will present the main results of my fieldwork in this village and show ethnographic material I have collected on the ground in southern Lebanon. Here, the theoretical concepts of the latest approaches to peace can be observed in the work UNIFIL is conducting on the ground. While the theory is being implemented, its practical implications and its difficulties become apparent in a local opposition to UNIFIL. Yet I argue that in the work of Civil Affairs this opposition is not receiving the deserved attention instead its work concentrates on implementing and fulfilling the terms and assignments as manifested in its mission by the "international community".

Finally, my conclusion will discuss the material investigated and give an outlook on further implications and meanings of this research.

1. A Sketch of UNIFIL's Department of Civil Affairs

The Civil Affairs department at UNIFIL underlines conflict resolution and management, the relationship with the population and the "Quick Impact Projects" as their three main functions. They are in direct contact with the civilian population, because they want to address the needs of the people. "What we do is just to maintain the good relations with the local population, to monitor that the relations are fine, and if there is something wrong that can be addressed we need to bring it up to our supervisors and advise them what to do."[14] When the mission was deployed here after the war, the force engaged in *ad hoc* humanitarian operations to help in the post-war "humanitarian crisis" of 2006.

> And then there was a war in 2006 and after the war was the destruction, as you know and we had a completely different target to take from. Basic services like providing water and electricity for the people. […] In some places it was completely destroyed. […] So quick action and providing basic services, like the water. In some places, it took a while, if they were destroyed a lot.[15]

When first deployed, fulfilling the direct needs of the people was UNIFIL's first goal. Further, the department of Civil Affairs coordinated necessities it regarded as essential for the infrastructure. "Focusing a bit more on the long-term situation. So the people will... that there were other things that were needed, like rehabilitation of schools, yards, habilitation of medical clinics."[16]

The humanitarian ideals that UNIFIL embodies did not just emanate from its planners and leaders. Humanitarian concerns are also expressed by soldiers that are

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[14] Head of Civil Affairs, Interview by Susann Kassem, (23 May 2009), 3. In *Friedenspolitik Im Südlibanon, Unpublished Thesis*, (Humboldt-University Berlin: June 2009), 19.

[15] Ibid, 18.

[16] Ibid, 19.

interested in keeping a good relationship with the people of the area. Their efforts to express this, can be observed in their charitable giving:

> Sometimes the soldiers hear about a child that you know, that needs an operation, and that, sometimes they collect money among each other and help a family to send a child to a hospital or things like that. So this is I think how it originally started and then the militaries themselves decided oh well maybe it is a good way to do something like that also on the institutional level and that's how some of them now do some language classes, some do some sport classes with the kids, […]. And that's also connected to our mission.[17]

UNIFIL's involvement in civil society aims to prevent misunderstandings with the local population through continuous communication. Most important are the Quick Impact Projects that are described by critics as 'low-scale development projects' designed with the intent of having an immediate effect on the population. They are carried out throughout southern Lebanon with the explicit goal of attempting to "win the support"[18] of the population. As the Civil Affairs Officer, (CAO) explained to me, these projects are their primary connection with the population.

> I mean I have done several trainings in conflict resolution management and in negotiations, basic negotiation skills. But it comes with the personal approach and you learn it. Of course the more you are in the culture and the more confidence people have in you the more successful you are […]. If somebody new would come and talk to the mayor of let's say al-Qantara or Blida about some issue, he won't listen. If I go to him, I have done one project there and I have met him ten times over that project and he knows what I say I do […] and if I can't I come back until this can be done, then I believe he trusts me.[19]

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[17] Senior Officer for Political Affairs, Interview by Susann Kassem, (14 May 2009), 5. In *Friedenspolitik Im Südlibanon, Unpublished Thesis*, (Humboldt-University Berlin: June 2009), 19.

[18] Interview with Spanish CIMIC Unit, Interview by Susann Kassem, 1. In *Friedenspolitik Im Südlibanon, Unpublished Thesis*, (Humboldt-University Berlin: June 2009), 34.

[19] Civil Affairs Officer, Interview by Susann Kassem, (23 May 2009), 5. In *Friedenspolitik Im Südlibanon, Unpublished Thesis*, (Humboldt-University Berlin: June 2009), 20.

UNIFIL gives these projects a lot of importance and accordingly UNIFIL (and the countries contributing UNIFIL troops – especially European ones) are investing a lot of money and effort in their realization. The budget is approved by the United Nations General Assembly for UNIFIL. The budget for 2011 is US$ 545,470,600, from which officially only about US$ 500,000 (or less than a tenth of one percent) is allocated to Civil Affairs projects. However, these projects garner additional support from the home governments of the European contingents. Contributing countries supply southern Lebanon with resources scaled to individual capacity and political will: for the wealthier countries it is money for development and reconstruction; for other countries in-kind donations are forthcoming, such as the provision of medical care or water infrastructure development support. (For example, in Blida in November 2009, they started reconstructing a water canal. A large notice was erected in a prominent location on the main street, close to the reconstruction area, announcing the Government of Spain's investment of US$ 22,000 for reconstruction projects.[20]) Furthermore, Civil Affairs not only builds bilateral and multilateral funding partnerships but also teaches southern Lebanese people "ways to apply" for external funding themselves.[21] This phenomenon can be said to create close exchange relationships of money, people and ideas flowing between Southern Lebanon and Western government and NGO networks functioning in the international development sphere.

UNIFIL's department of Civil Affairs personnel is seen as an essential part of UNIFIL's mission with the following main functions: it "liaise[s] and coordinate[s]"

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[20] Susann Kassem, *Field Notes,* 29 November 2009, 1.

[21] Head of Civil Affairs, Interview by Susann Kassem, (8 May 2009), 2. In *Friedenspolitik Im Südlibanon, Unpublished Thesis*, (Humboldt-University Berlin: June 2009), 19.

with the local people and their actors and representatives (like mayors, mukhtars, civil society groups and NGO's); to support communities. Civil Affairs "assists in developing and strengthening the capacity of civil society organizations and represents UNIFIL in seeking technical assistance and funding support from multilateral and bilateral donors for projects", to direct social/cultural activities and direct support from UNIFIL battalions that mainly use the resources of the UNIFIL troops to support the people. [22] A special Military Community Outreach Unit focuses directly on communication with the local population, explaining the details of UNSC resolution 1701 and at the same time trying to get feedback from the people. In the Blida municipality, for example, this group of representatives (sometimes several groups from several countries) occasionally engages with the people in the course of passing through the village, keeping them updated about recent developments.[23] In 2007, this unit organized a series of town hall meetings between local community leaders and the UNIFIL force commander to inform the local population about their UNIFIL activities in the region. Furthermore a "Day with UNIFIL" with local pupils takes place either in a school or in the headquarters of local development projects or area initiatives.[24]

UNIFIL has 341 international as well as 653 local civilian staff. The departments of Civil Affairs/Political Affairs consists of about 14 employees each, half international, half Lebanese. Lebanese employees at UNIFIL make a hold of a wide variety of positions, from information technology to catering. They also work with Civil

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[22] UNIFIL, "Civil Interaction," Available from http://unifil.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=1520; Internet, accessed 8 November 2011.

[23] "They pass by to say hi, they are always nice, always smiling." Secretary of Blida municipality, Interview by Susann Kassem, (4 April 2009), 1; In *Friedenspolitik Im Südlibanon, Unpublished Thesis*, (Humboldt-University Berlin: June 2009), 36.

[24] UNIFIL, "Civil Interaction," Available from http://unifil.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=1520; Internet, accessed 8 November 2011.

Affairs primarily as Language Assistants, liaising with communities and handling administrative affairs. While Lebanese employees may be translators and interpreters, Civil Affairs "Also have quite of the work be that in engineering, be that in transport in personnel, in finance, you know lots of people who do office work, this is not always done by foreigners like me, but there is a lot that is also done by Lebanese, that, you know, that are working side by side in the same offices and doing that."[25] The administration maintains that the character of the work they do in these positions usually do not require the Lebanese to use their local knowledge- and could be described as typical of any large international development organization or institution. The Civil Affairs Officers are usually "internationals" coming mostly from European countries and have experience in various previous UN mission deployments elsewhere. In the department of Civil Affairs, the international "professionals"[26] with experience in Kosovo, Afghanistan and other mission countries come together with the national interpreters. Most of them come from an educational background in the humanities or in social, cultural or political studies. According to the international Civil Affairs officer the previous education contributes to the understanding on the ground "because it helps you to stay neutral and not to kind of– or to even realize your bias."[27] The work with the national counterparts and interpreters is meant to improve UNIFIL-CA work on the ground, especially regarding the interaction with the local population. To "narrow the cultural differences" is one of the main functions of the Department for Civil Affairs. Social scientists—or, as they are called, "interpreters" of culture—are often deployed at

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[25] Senior Officer for Political Affairs, Interview by Susann Kassem, (14 April 2009), 14; In *Friedenspolitik Im Südlibanon, Unpublished Thesis*, (Humboldt-University Berlin: June 2009), 40.

[26] Civil Affairs Officer, 4; In *Friedenspolitik im Südlibanon*,19.

[27] Ibid.

UNIFIL to teach, interpret and train soldiers and staff about local culture. As the Head

of Civil Affairs discloses further:

> We also [in addition to national counterparts] have interpreters, and they all used to interpret the culture for us so we get to know that. Of course it helps, when we get to know that, and we know something about Islam and we know something about the differences between Sunni and Shia villages, and how to behave, what to wear, what to do and what not to do, when to visit someone and when not to visit someone. […] So all that helps you to do your job properly and build confidence. [28]

In case conflict developed between UNIFIL personnel and locals, several

different ideas frame how those conflicts should be officially understood. At different

times, the discourses of cultural specificity and universal humanity are deployed.

Problems between UNIFIL and the people are reasoned in different "cultural"

interpretations in the handling of situations. Cultural miscommunication and the

distinctive contrasting behavior of UNIFIL and the people are often understood as the

main cause of disputes. [29]

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[28] Civil Affairs Officer, 4; In *Friedenspolitik im Südlibanon, 20.*

[29] See the following example described by the Head of Civil Affairs: "This is also what Civil Affairs is trying to do, to narrow the cultural differences, so when the traffic accidents happens, and I will tell a real story. How the cultural differences appear in real practices. […] A military vehicle with European soldiers and a local school bus crash. Now, and the children in the school bus are wounded. Now, in the training of the Europeans, is you call immediately the ambulance […]. So they come and you are told not to touch. Because if you touch they tell you, you know you are not a specialist so when you touch you might do more wrong than good. So the soldiers were told to secure the area, make space for the ambulance so you secure they can come through. So here it is different, people would pull out the injured, trying to help. And that is a misunderstanding, because the local people were trying to help by hand and to try to get people out of the car. And the soldiers wouldn't let them and tell them to stop the ambulance is coming so don't get this girl out of this bus. And there was a misunderstanding where some people were telling the local press that UNIFIL was doing nothing to help. Not just that they would make no effort, but they would prevent the locals to help. Lack of understanding on both sides. See. So our job is to go out and to explain the local Lebanese community that this is how it would be handled in Europe. So we would explain to the soldiers, that they are right, the locals would be trying to help. Reasons for that are maybe that they don't have such sophisticated help that would come and help the victims in 5 minutes. So that was, that is the issues that we are trying to deal with." Head of Civil Affairs, 5; In *Friedenspolitik im Südlibanon, 19.*

Generally, the "professionals" of the Civil Affairs department as well as the soldiers, are prepared for their mission before their deployment.[30] The Senior Officer for Political Affairs explains that the preparation in New York was "the preparation that [she] needed, I mean at least in a professional point of view," the other part, of being actually in the field, she describes as something "still very easy."[31] At the same time, she also points out that soldiers are often unable, especially at the beginning of their deployment to adapt to the new environment and situation adequately: "Often they are prejudiced from former deployments and experiences and therefore act in a particular manner."[32] Furthermore, she underlines that in most of the cases soldiers were previously deployed for NATO missions and not "peacekeeping" missions. The preparations for the UNIFIL staff include an introduction to the culture, language and specific customs of the people.[33] Generally, the soldiers do not speak any Arabic; usually they have local translators with them whenever an interaction with the locals is scheduled. Employees of Civil Affairs have different levels of Arabic. Most of the subjects of my interviews did not really speak any Arabic. According to the Civil Affairs Officer, Arabic language comprehension (even if it is basic) is another key to gaining acceptance from the locals—a measure of respect for local culture and identity. "Language is another issue, I know I speak Arabic very poorly but I did an effort to learn, to read my way through the signs and to greet the people, to have a very, very

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[30] Senior Officer for Political Affairs, Interview by Susann Kassem, (14 April 2009), 5; In *Friedenspolitik Im Südlibanon, Unpublished Thesis*, (Humboldt-University Berlin: June 2009), 41.

[31] Ibid, 3/41.

[32] Ibid, 2/41.

[33] Senior Officer for Political Affairs, 5; In *Friedenspolitik Im Südlibanon,* 41.

basic conversation and it helps too. It kind of opens doors."[34] Additionally, Lebanese vehicular traffic patterns are consistently pointed out as a major cultural difference that requires a certain adjustment period after deployment. Indeed, according to Civil Affairs employees, adjustment to traffic was a major issue.[35]

A special Military Community Outreach Unit under Civil Affairs focuses directly on communication with the local population, explaining the details of resolution 1701 and at the same time trying to get feedback from the people. In the Blida municipality for example, this group of representatives (sometimes several groups from several countries) occasionally engages with the people in the course of passing through the village, keeping them updated about recent developments.[36] In 2007, this unit organized a series of town hall meetings between local community leaders and the UNIFIL Force Commander to inform the local population about their UNIFIL activities in the region. This was dubbed a "Day with UNIFIL" and took place either in a school or in the headquarters of local development projects or area initiatives.[37]

For the Civil Affairs Officer, working for an UN mission would be impossible if there is no faith in the mission as it is being executed. Indeed, lack of good faith in the mission was the main reason why the Civil Affairs Officer left a previous mission in Kosovo.[38] In this instance, the CAO believes in the success of the mission in Lebanon while at the same time reporting again conflicting views about the partiality of the

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[34] Civil Affairs Officer, 4; In *Friedenspolitik Im Südlibanon,* 22.

[35] Head of Civil Affairs, 5; In *Friedenspolitik Im Südlibanon,* 19.

[36] Interview with the secretary of the Blida municipality, 2. "They pass by to say hi, they are always nice, always smiling."

[37] UNIFIL Civil Interaction, see: http://unifil.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=1520

[38] Civil Affairs Officer, p. 7; In *Friedenspolitik Im Südlibanon,* 23.

mission. Even though the Civil Affairs Officer sympathizes a lot with the people in south Lebanon, her work does not allow her to adopt such a public posture. She is clearly expected to retain a posture of neutrality. However, she clearly distinguishes her personal position from that of UNIFIL. In the interviews I have conducted with the Civil Affairs Officer, with the head of Civil Affairs, the former head of Political Affairs and through observations I have made, it becomes clear that often employees try to fulfill their job as they were told to, even though they don't share the official view on certain subjects.

> There will be countries listing Hizballah on a list of terrorist orgs but at the same time they will not touch Israel for what it has done in the Gaza conflict or what it has been done several times in Lebanon. You bite your lips. Because you can't say anything at that time. I understand, that is nothing you call justice but you have to keep the faith, it will probably take time, but it will happen and what is wrong that is wrong.[39]

Summing up, the department of Civil Affairs can be seen as the main interface between UNIFIL and the population for which reason anthropological investigation into its work is important for the present thesis. The above-presented material shows the discourse of peacekeeping as humanitarian assistance rather than an armed intervention on Lebanese sovereignty. UNIFIL's QIPs serve as "legitimacy function" and are particularly important in an by UNIFIL apparent and followed effort to "win the hearts and minds."

B. Why Anthropology of an Institution? - A Literature Review

The post Civil war situation in Lebanon, at the beginning of the 1990s, has attracted many NGOs, think tanks and international organizations, all of which officially or outwardly sought peace. As this thesis will show, the Western approach to

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[39] Civil Affairs Officer, p. 7; In *Friedenspolitik Im Südlibanon,* 20.

peace is highly contested and in fact often implies rather the opposite of what is supposedly aimed for: war or constant conflict. In the past, a variety of institutions were established and initiatives pursued by diverse groups of experts to guarantee peaceful solutions for any forthcoming conflicts.[40] The funding for these institutions originates mostly from the US and the European Union. Western-funded peacemaking initiatives have displaced local politics on an economic and social level. UN officials dampen potential resistance by donning the guise of benevolent experts and humanitarians. It is unclear whether UN soldiers could be formal enemies, even though they are militarized. Depoliticization occurs largely because the local population participates in their "development projects" (gaining personally and on the community level) by receiving grants, funding and reconstruction assistance, etc., and these advantages secure the aegis of the mission itself – as long as funding continues from Western powers.

The field of conflict theory and resolution is largely regarded as a field of expert knowledge and intervention: the realm of diplomats, military personnel and political scientists. Yet it can also be understood within the global discourse on peace and the projections of peace that link the "state of peace" to particular ideas about development and democracy.[41] The political and economic agenda of whoever is purports to seek "peace" must be taken into account.

In his book *No Peace No War: An Anthropology of Contemporary Armed Conflicts*, Paul Richards sketches an idea about the power that new emerging theories

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[40] For studies about expert knowledge see for example Timothy Mitchell, *Rule of Experts. Egypt, Techno-Politics, Modernity.* (Berkeley, LA: University of California Press, 2002).

[41] Boutrous-Ghali, cited in Eva Bertran, "Reinventing Governments: The Promise and Perils of United Nations Peace Building," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 39, no. 3 (1995): 387-341, 389.

on peace and war in the past decades have in the peacemaking field. For this reason he argues that conflicts should not be torn out of their context; much rather, he emphasizes, that a more detailed, anthropological account of single places *in conflict* should be given.[42] Following Richards, this thesis looks not only at the structure of UNIFIL, but also the historical and communal ramifications of this particular institution's involvement in Blida. A critical overview of the academic fields of conflict studies and development studies will follow.

Although anthropological and sociological literature on conflict, war and violence has been bountifully discussed since the end of the Cold War, ethnographic studies about this emerging field of peace expertise remain scant. Current studies have researched the sociology and anthropology of development aid and deal with the complex processes of knowledge transfer within the post-colonial framework of globalization, neo-liberalism and growing external interventionism.[43] Other literature has addressed humanitarian intervention.[44]

The discourse on *conflict/peacemaking* appears very similar to existing investigations on the subject of "development", [45] albeit in the past many anthropological efforts to explicitly study western-based experts in peace/conflict

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[42] Paul Richards, "New War: An Ethnographic Approach," in *No Peace No War: An Anthropology of Contemporary Armed Conflicts*, ed. Paul Richards (Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2005), 20.

[43] Escobar, *Anthropology and the Development Encounter.* Ferguson and Gupta, *"Spatializing States: Toward an Ethnography of Neoliberal Governmentality",* (American Ethnologist, 2002). Karim Makdisi, "Constructing United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701 or Lebanon in the Shadow of the 'War on Terror'", *International Peacekeeping,* Vol. 18, No. 1 (February 2011).

[44] Pandolfi, "Laboratory of Intervention", 170.

[45] Escobar, *Anthropology and the Development Encounter*. Ferguson, *The Anti-Politics Machine.*

resolution have failed. This can be attributed to the close ties between those generating knowledge and the governments or (peacemaking) institutions, which rely on them; researchers often later become employed experts in their selected fields.[46] Critical questions of knowledge transfer, expert authority and exclusionist politics are for the most part unaddressed.[47] Cultural studies in the past have changed the design of peacekeeping missions, which can be seen with the growing Department of Civil Affairs for example. The idea is that a deeper study and connection to the affected population will lead to a better acceptance of the force so that the troops can execute their mission without any obstacles.

Out of this context, this thesis will explore the "peacekeeping organization", UNIFIL, to provide the urgently needed but largely absent critical anthropological approach to peacekeeping. It will examine the correlation between conflict studies and development studies. The main goal of my research is to show the political implications of the growing legitimacy and the work of this institution and its projections on the ground.[48]

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[46] Like the one by Christopher Timura in an application for a Wenner-Gren scholarship (2001), in which he suggests a "comparative, ethnographic study of the development and spread of British and American conflict resolution expertise" are very exceptional. Christopher T. Timura, "Negotiating Expertise: The Globalizing Cultures of British and American Conflict Resolution Experts." (POLAR. Political and Legal Anthropology Review, May 2004,) 160.

[47] Nikolas Kosmatopoulos, "Guarding the B/Order of Modernity : Peace as Vocation in Lebanon". Paper presented at the "Tanmia : Le Dévelopmment, Fabrique de l'Action Publique dans le Monde Arabe? " Conference. (Geneva : *Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies*, March 19-21 2010,) 1.

[48] Arturo Escobar, *Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World*, (Princeton University Press: 1995). Ferguson, 1990.

C. Theoretical Framework: UNIFIL as an Apparatus of Transnational Governmentality

The following sections intend to give a more in-depth overview of existing scholarship in the fields of development and humanitarian intervention mentioned above. It will present relevant studies and try to underline the importance of their concepts to this study. I will start with a brief explanation of the term "transnational governmentality"[49] in order to explain Akhil Gupta's and James Ferguson's concept of the "spatialization of the state". Subsequently, I will briefly outline the concept of the "development apparatus"[50], and finally, the idea of "mobile sovereignty".[51]

In *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, Michel Foucault inquired into the organization of societies through the processes of identification, mastering, classification and rationalization of 'things' into established 'orders' through 'statements'.[52] He follows this with a subsequent analysis of the institutions and practices that are built on this specific knowledge. For him, power is visible in all kinds of relationships, especially when it is exercised rather than acquired.[53] This leads him to the concept of "Governmentality" that "is a reference to those processes through which objects are rendered amenable to intervention and regulation by being formulated

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[49] Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish.* (New York: Vintage Books, 1977).

[50] Escobar, Anthropology and the Development Encounter.

[51] Mariella Pandolfi, "Contract of Mutual (In)Difference: Governance and the Humanitarian Apparatus in Contemporary Albania and Kosovo," Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 1, No. 10, (Winter 2003): 369-381.

[52] Michel Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge.* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1972).

[53] Foucault, "The Subject and Power," Critical Inquiry, Vol. 8, No. 4 (Summer, 1982): 777-795.

in a particular conceptual way."[54] Once an idea is conceptualized and formulated into a claim, knowledge about it is created and translated into conduct through powerful structural means, mainly through discourse. Once knowledge is created, it provides a space for the operationalization of power. Similarly, power produces knowledge, which is an asset of the truth.[55] Since politics are mainly a contested field of emerging truth regimes, knowledge must be among the sites for an empirical study.

For their "concept of transnational governmentality", Akhil Gupta and James Ferguson use Foucault's term of governmentality and adapt it to the transnational and supranational organizations "that significantly overlap their traditional functions."[56] International institutions, therefore, create modes of government on a global scale, a "transnational governmentality."

> These include not only new strategies of discipline and regulation, exemplified by the WTO and the structural adjustment programs implemented by the IMF, but also transnational alliances forged by activists and grassroots organizations and the proliferation of voluntary organizations supported by complex networks of international and transnational funding and personnel.[57]

Since international organizations such as the UN have become integral parts of a transnational apparatus of governmentality, it is important to study them and other transnational non-state organizations. According to Gupta and Ferguson these organizations have the same spatial organs- enforced "horizontally"[58], beyond the natural limitations of state power. They show specific sets of practices that enable them

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[54] Barbara Townley, "Foucault, Power/Knowledge, and Its Relevance for Human Resource Management," The Academy of Management Review, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Jul., 1993): 520.

[55] Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*,194.

[56] Ferguson and Gupta; "Spatializing States," 989.

[57] Ibid., 990.

[58] Ibid., 994.

"to secure their legitimacy, to naturalize their authority, and to represent themselves as superior to, and encompassing of, other institutions and centers of power." They refer to this phenomenon as the "spatialization of the state."[59] This term implies the loss of democratic accountability for the affected society, through the decision-taking and policy-making of international institutions. Therefore they argue, the high presence of development agencies and institutions in Africa is "a product and expression of powerful national, regional, and global forces" and has replaced classical boundaries of state versus civil society. So, Gupta and Ferguson argue a new governmental apparatus has been formed. Although it substitutes the past model of direct colonial rule, control remains in the hands of the former colonial power(s).

Neoliberal ideology considers a "free" state a state that is the dominating entity and that has absolute power.[60] Gupta and Ferguson show the insufficiency of this argument by underlining, using the example of Africa, that "domination has long been exercised by entities other than the state."[61] Colonial companies are one example, while development agencies are another, more recent one. Policies imposed by the IMF and World Bank on the African states in the development process of "structural adjustment" can be regarded as "re-colonization," as they have led to the obliteration of the sovereignty of African states in favor of the policy dictates of international organizations.[62] Ethnographic research can help in defining the actors and performers of this power and to trace the processes of political and structural domination through

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[59] Ibid., 982.

[60] Ibid., 992.

[61] Ibid., 993.

[62] Ibid. Samir Amin, "Whither the United Nations?," in *Empire's Law: The American Imperial Poject and the 'War to Remake the World'*, ed. Amy Bartholomew, 340-366 (London: Pluto Press, 2006).

which governmentality is achieved. It also demonstrates how a country, to use Ferguson and Gupta's words, "is both legitimated and undermined by reference to claims of superior spatial reach and vertical height,"[63] referring to the applied authority over a country. The issues that are dealt with today are played on the local level in a "globalized" view of how they *should* be dealt with to result in the way they *should* be (a peaceful society). My discussion in this sense is centered on this specific normativity as dictated by the global discourse on conflict resolution.

> For the central effect of the new forms of transnational governmentality is not so much to make states weak (or strong), as to reconfigure states' abilities to spatialize their authority and to stake their claims to superior generality and universality.[64]

Accordingly, Ferguson and Gupta use the example of Zambia to show that the development apparatus has taken over the new, postcolonial face of domination of the Global South. Arturo Escobar has a similar argument, as he defines development aid in the Global South as a powerful "apparatus" that he compares to the exercise of power during colonialism.[65] For him development is a tool for the Global North to keep control over the former colonies.

> The development discourse [...] has created an extremely efficient apparatus for producing knowledge about, and the exercise of power over, the Third World. This apparatus came into existence roughly in the period 1945 to 1955 and has not since ceased to produce new arrangements of knowledge and power, new practices, theories, strategies, and so on. In sum, it has successfully deployed a regime of government over the third world, a "space for subject peoples'" that ensures certain control over it.[66]

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[63] Ibid., 995.

[64] Ibid., 996.

[65] See in general: Escobar, *Encountering Development.*

[66] Escobar, *Encountering Development*, 9.

Escobar wants to show the creation of the discourse of development in a similar approach – namely as a new hegemonic "apparatus" that he compares to one of colonialism. For him the discourse on the Global South is created through "concrete practices of thinking and acting." In order to do so he chooses the example of development aid to Latin America in the 1970s and 1980s. Escobar gives a detailed perspective on the specific cultural and social relations that manage the targets of development through certain practices, such as planning and measuring. Furthermore, the role of the anthropologist, he argues, is often still involved in western organizations and development agencies, which shows that as of yet not much has changed in the dedication of this discipline. Similar to the colonial era, anthropologists are still engaged to serve instead of questioning the instruments of control of the powerful western nations that have managed to establish a new net of domination over the former colonies.

The studies mentioned above become relevant when looking at UNIFIL, since, as I will argue later in this thesis, UNIFIL supports the work of development agencies in southern Lebanon and performs itself, through its QIPs development initiatives. Therefore, UNIFIL's QIP are to be understood in a wider picture of power and domination. Furthermore, the studies mentioned show that any kind of intervention in the Global South has to be regarded within a context that implies the historical, cultural and social circumstances of a place and the institution within it. UNIFIL's existence on the Lebanese side of the "conflict zone" for over three decades is an important marker.

D. "Humanitarian Intervention" and its Relevance to the Concept of "Transnational Governmentality"

Similar to Akhil Gupta's and James Ferguson's idea of "transnational governmentality" Mariella Pandolfi's work on humanitarian interventions in past decades[67] refers to "mobile sovereignties." These sovereignties are power structures placed in a country after a conflict has occurred and which pursue their "universal" work in the country in which the "emergency situation" has been declared. This shift from one "emergency" to another can take place in very short periods of time during which all crucial strategic and political decisions are made by donor countries. When the donor countries pull out, little is left behind save their native employees. Taking the example of the failed peacebuilding initiatives in Kosovo, she provides a practical account of her theory.[68] Here, after three years of continuous monetary support, all funds were stopped immediately once the situation was not regarded an "emergency" anymore, which had various consequences for the people living in the state previously declared as emergency.[69] Her argument is that "the military forces and multi- and bilateral organizations are transforming into a new form of transnational domination."[70] She argues, that instead of helping, on the contrary, it can weaken the society it anticipates to reconstruct.[71] This is largely due to its hybrid body that at first makes a variety of funds, support and employment available for the affected country and then

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[67] Pandolfi, "Laboratory of Intervention," 170.

[68] Ibid.

[69] Ibid., 169-170.

[70] Pandolfi, "Contract of Mutual (In)Difference," 371.

[71] Pandolfi, "Laboratory of Intervention," 160.

after a new humanitarian case has been declared, the support is withdrawn and the country is left with its initial problems and more.

The way UNIFIL applies its mandate on the ground shows a transnationalization of operational norms and procedures. While UNIFIL is a peacekeeping mission that cannot be simply compared to humanitarian interventions, it is still an international mission linked to a particular conception of a world order that is desired by the Global North. Furthermore these international bodies often consist of the same military that becomes a globally exchangeable "emergency army". With this continuous exchange of human resources, a comparison becomes almost inevitable. Concerning UNIFIL, a reproduction of knowledge can be observed by soldiers that shift their mission every four to six months from one "emergency" to the next, applying the same knowledge (such as the Spanish UNIFIL soldiers that commute between Lebanon and Afghanistan). Second, as I will argue in the next section, the mission itself is shaped by a larger framework of the "war on terror" which underwrites the intentions behind development projects of the past decade. International institutions therefore carry a flexible body of knowledge and authority, moving from one "humanitarian intervention" to the next.[72] Pandolfi describes them as "autonomous interlocutor[s] with the international community as experts in humanitarian matters."[73]

> Soldiers and humanitarian experts have found common ground in the immediacy of wars and humanitarian catastrophes. The capability or possibility of intervening on the ground, free from political and institutional ties, is welcomed by (1) local governments and communities, (2) the United Nations, (3) governmental institutions of donor countries who support intervention, and (4) independent donors who prefer expertise to entrenched bureaucracies. Since the mid-1990s, the intertwining of these four levels has ensured the tacit acceptance of any kind of

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[72] Ibid., 170.

[73] Ibid., 173.

intervention. Under the label of "humanitarian intervention," national governments have furthered their own interests while marketing a "human friendly" form of international politics.[74]

Comparable to Gupta and Ferguson's concept of "transnational governmentality," Pandolfi explains the extent of humanitarian intervention into state sovereignty and shows how these globally legitimized interventions are acting on behalf of a sovereign state, eliding its legitimacy.

Perceiving the actors, who work in these fields as representatives of "civil society" as international institutions often do, raises new questions of representation and legitimacy.[75]

> NGOs, international and bilateral organizations, and UN agencies intervene in numerous conflicts both to alleviate suffering and to proclaim their right as a member of international civil society to participate in all phases of diplomatic negotiation. […] Instead humanitarian action is defining itself through its role in parallel diplomacy, defining itself as an actor that is banally implicated in the actions and strategies of nation states.[76]

As we have seen in the sections above, a gap in the literature on conflict studies and development studies can be perceived. Thus, in order to address at a more human level global interferences in state matters, I have been investigating UNIFIL's impact on the communities within its area of deployment and under the terms of its internationally sanctioned mandate – apart from its efficacy as a *peacekeeping* force. I have inquired into how the people of southern Lebanon and the UNIFIL leadership mutually interpret their roles and identities within this conflict. Drawing from and inspired by the theoretical context outlined in this section, my ethnographic study of UNIFIL provides a case study that incorporates the two discourses of development and

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[74] Ibid., 173.

[75] Ibid., 174.

[76] Ibid., 175.

peacekeeping/conflict studies in order to reduce this deficit in scholarship and provide a more detailed account of one of the biggest and oldest UN peacekeeping interventions.

E. Methods

1. Field and Entrance

This research is based on grounded research including interviews, participant observation and review of official UN documents. I conducted empirical research from February 2009 until November 2010, mainly in the villages Blida, Khiam and their surrounding areas that UNIFIL refers to as "Sector East," which, according to UNIFIL's administrative division of the south, is Spain's "area of operations."[77]

My research has largely focused on a case study in the Lebanese village of Blida. Blida is a village in southeast Lebanon situated along the "Blue Line" – the unofficial border between Israel and Lebanon drawn by the United Nations in 2000 – when Israel withdrew its forces after 22 years of occupation. Because I was born in Blida and a large part of my family on both my maternal and paternal sides still lives there, I am not considered a foreigner in the village during my stays. This also facilitated my entrance into the field. My contacts with the population have made it easy to speak with the people, the mayors, and the municipalities. UNIFIL employees could see me as interlocutor between them and the local people, while the local people often saw me as one of them, especially because they had known me for many years. The fact that I left as a child and grew up in Germany at the same time makes me an outsider and one of the many villagers live abroad. The villagers were very curious about my work and pleased about my ability to conduct a research project like this. Because of this they

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[77] See map on page 16.

supported me and gave me the necessary information and help I needed. While working

with the various UN representatives I first had a similar open and supportive experience

until I presented a research paper at a workshop at the American University of Beirut,

which was attended by a UN representative. Immediately my credibility was attacked

and I was confronted with a sudden wariness of the UN representatives when I tried to

get in touch with the Department of Civil Affairs afterwards.[78]

2. *Interviews*

In order to ask my research questions, I decided to use semi-structured

interviews as well as participant observation as my two major methods.

For my empirical research I carried out mostly semi-structured recorded

interviews (single as well as group interviews). In total I interviewed eight UNIFIL

employees officially, four of which were working for the department of Civil Affairs. I

interviewed the former head of Political Affairs; the head of Civil Affairs; the Senior

Officer for Political Affairs; a Civil Affairs Officer; a Lebanese Officer at Civil Affairs;

a former soldier at UNIFIL; as well as the head of the Spanish Civilian-Military

Coordination Unit (CIMIC) as well as two of his soldiers. In addition to the interviews,

I was able to meet some of these individuals more often to accompany them during their

work with the population in Sector East. On these occasions, I had the chance to have

longer conversations with them during trips to and from their work. Often the processes

of their inauguration rituals were explained to me during the event. It was easier to get

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[78] One of the main judgments was that due to my origin I should not be able to
conduct a "neutral" research on the topic. Furthermore the Department of Civil Affairs got in
touch with me only a few hours later and asked me to send them my paper. After this incident I
was still able to conduct my research directly with the Spanish authorities.

permission from the soldiers of the Spanish battalion rather than others. For example, when I tried to talk to the Nepalese they did not get an authorization from their government to do so. Because of this I had to pursue informal interviews with them.

On the side of the population, I officially conducted ten interviews. In Blida, I interviewed five inhabitants plus two mayors (2009, 2010). In Khiam, I conducted one official interview with the mayor (October 2010) and had two informal interviews with villagers from the Khiam area (September/October 2010). Most of my interviewees in Blida, except the mayors, were villagers who predominately earn their living from tobacco cultivation. Due to the municipal elections in June 2010, the mayor of Blida changed. For this reason I have conducted interviews with both of the men who held office during the interval of my research.

In sum, the duration of the interviews varied from 40 to 80 minutes. Some of my interviewees trusted me and could talk openly, like the employees of the Civil Affairs department. They had absolutely no restrictions on me- allowing me to attend their meetings with the municipalities and joining them during inaugurations, etc. The interviews with most of the UNIFIL employees were conducted in English, except for the Senior Officer for Political Affairs, which was conducted in German and English. Additionally I conducted one interview in Spanish. The interviews with the citizens of Blida as well as with the national staff at Civil Affairs were all conducted in Arabic. I translated all interviews into English myself. Furthermore I conducted several informal interviews where I tried to capture people's opinion about UNIFIL.

3. *Participant Observation*

In addition to the interviews I utilized the method of participant observation. I took part and observed three inaugurations of projects, two in Blida and one in Kaukaba, a village outside Khiam. I initially had planned to visit an inauguration performed in Khiam, but the mayor had cancelled it due to the visit of the Iranian President Mahmood Ahmadinejad. I joined one meeting between CIMIC soldiers/Civil Affairs and the mayor of Khiam. Furthermore I participated in a computer class in Blida where I observed UNIFIL soldiers instructing teachers in Blida's community center previously sponsored by UNIFIL and UNDP. In addition to the participant observation during these events, I had the possibility to undertake informal interviews in Blida.

4. *Documents*

In addition to my fieldwork, for my analysis I used official UN documents, reports and material about and by UNIFIL. These include UNIFIL's website;[79] its magazine "Al-Jnoub" ("The South"), published in Arabic and English in Naqoura by the Public Information Office; the "Discover UNIFIL" video series;[80] and their recently launched radio station "Salam [Peace] from the South."

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[79] UNIFIL, *Official Website, available from http://unifil.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=1499;* Internet, accessed 8 November 2011.

[80] UNIFIL, *Discover UNIFIL*, UNIFIL Public Information Office, [Film Series DVD], 2010.

CHAPTER II

UNIFIL AND THE UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS: THE MERGING OF MILITARISM AND DEVELOPMENT?

The following section presents the context out of which UNIFIL evolved. On a structural level, the post-Cold war approach to peacekeeping has provided the military troops more authority and legitimacy to provide humanitarian aid. This thesis will explore how this change was projected in the past years, mainly looking at the extended UNIFIL troops in the aftermath of the 2006 war in Lebanon. Here, in the past the UN Security Council (UNSC) has often been criticized for only serving the interests of its five permanent members that are able to manipulate it to their own political interests.[81] In a similar vein, during UNIFIL's thirty-three year presence in southern Lebanon, the people of southern Lebanon often remember past events that, to them, emphasized UNIFIL's politicization on behalf of western interests and its weak ability to act against Israeli violations of their homeland.[82] Therefore, the following section explores the terms under which UNIFIL is deployed in Lebanon in order to understand the implications behind this international force and the reasons for it as a body.

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[81] Denis Halliday, "The UN and its Conduct during the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq," in *Empire's Law: The American Imperial Project and the 'War to Remake the World'*, ed. Amy Bartholomew, 77-85 (London: Pluto Press, 2006), 77. Alex J. Bellamy, *Understanding Peacekeeping* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004): 299.

[82] Such as the bombing of the UN building in Qana in 1996. Mayor of Blida, Interview by Susann Kassem 24 May 2009. Susann Kassem, *Field Notes*, (1 February 2009); 1. Published in Susann Kassem, "The UN Peacekeeping Agenda in a Southern Lebanese Village-"The International Community" and Local Autonomy", in *Newsletter No. 9*, Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs, (Beirut: June 2011): 1-2.

1. 'Liberal Peace' Hypothesis

The 'liberal peace' hypothesis works at achieving its ends through utilizing methods that merge development and security, and incorporate war into the development discourse.[83] The UN was founded in the wake of World War II with the main objective of "maintain[ing] international peace and security."[84] The UNSC failed to function as an impartial entity and representative of all states since its foundation. This was due to the polarization between the two superpowers USSR and US that dominated international politics and due to the power of the permanent members of the UNSC. Subsequently, following the end of the Cold War the UN has been further shaped by states largely uncontested US hegemony. In the years following the Cold War a 'liberal peace' was created and saluted by the newly uncontested superpower as liberation and the end of an era of "insecurity."[85] UN Secretary- General's Boutros Boutros Ghali's 1992 manifesto, *Agenda for Peace,*[86] attempted to re-define peace operations in the post-Cold War setting by classifying the missions in "a new taxonomy of peace operations" that was automatically linked to ideas about development and democracy, what Mark Duffield calls the "radicalization of development."[87] This new agenda for securing a 'liberal peace' is not so much about identifying and alleviating the

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[83] Mark Neocleous, "War as Peace, Peace as Pacification," *Radical Philosophy*, (January 2010): 6.

[84] United Nations. "Charter of the United Nations." *Preamble; Available from* http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/preamble.shtml; Internet, accessed 8 November 2011.

[85] Roland Paris, *At War's End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 35.

[86] Boutrous Ghali, "An Agenda for Peace, Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping," *Report of the Secretary-General.* 17 June 1992. Available from http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/agpeace.html; Internet, accessed 8 November 2011.

[87] Mark Duffield, *Global Governance and New Wars* (London: Zed Books, 2001), 2;18.

root causes of conflicts; rather it proceeds under the assumption that if all states are involved in this new system of global governance, then conflict will be minimal and regulated.[88] According to this view, "peace is the focal dynamic of civil society. The state exists in order to realize this 'liberal peace' within society, and that international law exists to ensure peace between states."[89] Within this discourse, war is presented as an irrational state that provides the 'liberal peace hypothesis' with a rationale and legitimation.[90] Hence, the 'liberal peace' hypothesis legitimizes wars, which are usually euphemized as "interventions" (sometimes "humanitarian" is added) in order to obscure their violent nature and to underline their urgency, always for the sake of peace. In 'liberal peace', underdevelopment is perceived as a main reason for states to fall into conflict or even wage *war*[91], which in the case of terrorism might constitute a danger to the Global North.[92] Meanwhile it is clear that development and security are interlinked, subsumed under this liberal discourse, and mutually dependent: "development and security have always been merged; indeed, development is a security concept."[93] It is the Global North that defines the criteria for "developed" and "underdeveloped" and

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[88] Following the Democratic Peace Thesis of the 1980s. "The radical agenda of social transformation is embodied within Northern strategic networks and complexes that are bringing together governments, NGOs, military establishments and private companies in new ways. Such complexes are themselves part of an emerging system of global liberal governance." Duffield, *Global Governance and the New Wars,* 2.

[89] Neocleous, 9.

[90] Ibid., 9.

[91] Ibid., 6.

[92] "The 2002 *National Security Strategy* (NSS), which operationalized the US 'war on terror', legitimated the logic of militarism, pro-active regime change, and the doctrine of preemptive attacks in the name of 'self-defense' against those deemed part of the 'terror' network."

[93] Neocleous, 8.

dictates the actions to be fulfilled in the countries of the Global South.[94] The question is

not *whether* to intervene or not, it is more a matter of *how* to do it.

2. *Major developments before 9/11*

Three key events/documents that enabled to have the "War on Terror" be part of

the UN security agenda were the military intervention in Kosovo in 1999, the Brahimi

report, and the concept of "responsibility to protect", or R2P. In 1999, NATO carried

out a military intervention, "Operation Allied Force" which was the NATO bombing of

Yugoslavia.[95] It was not officially authorized by the United Nations, but a UN mission

was deployed after the military objectives were accomplished with a peace-building

mandate.[96] Some have argued that the military intervention led by NATO lacked formal

legal authority in the absence of a UN Security Council mandate, but that it was of

humanitarian nature and therefore had a moral legitimacy.[97] From the mid-1990s

onward, member states of the UN were less reliant on UN peacekeeping to manage

conflicts that involve their interests, and thus turned to regional organizations that were

more efficient and coordinated when it came to military intervention.[98]

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[94] Duffield, 161.

[95] For more see: Diane Johnstone, *The Fools' Crusade.*

[96] Bellamy, 176.

[97] David Chandler, "The Responsibility to Protect? Imposing the Liberal Peace," International Security (Taylor & Francis Ltd.), Spring 2004: 59-81. See page 59. Richard Falk, "What Comes After Westphalia: The Democratic Challenge." *Widner Law Review* 13 (2007).

[98] Ahmed Salman, "Shaping the future of UN peace operations: is there a doctrine in the house?," *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 20, no. 1 (March 2007): 11-28. See the section, *Compartmentalization: the 'regionalization' of peacekeeping, pages 15-16.*

The Report of the Panel on United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, chaired by Lakhdar Brahimi is commonly referred to as the "Brahimi Report." It tries to identify the failures and shortcomings of the UN as a peacekeeping institution and was the result of a High-Level Panel on UN Peace Operations in August 2000. This process is the product of the period of retreat and self-reflection of the mid-1990s.[99] The report envisions essential structural changes and standardization of procedures of the peacekeeping missions. Until then, reforms had mainly focused on practical implementation and related problems, in the sense of corruption or harassment by the deployed soldiers.[100]

The most significant recommendations made by the panel include a call for more "robust" peacekeeping forces – i.e. more heavily armed forces– as well as the call for an "Integrated Missions Task Force" in order for missions to be more coordinated with all elements and agencies under the UN that are involved in any given region of conflict. This enabled the today existing, sometimes heavily armed peacekeeping troops that are partially pursuing humanitarian aid.

Along with this new assessment of peacekeeping operations another document resulted from this period that assessed the concept of sovereignty in the post-Cold War context. Following the NATO actions in Kosovo, a new responsibility of "protection" became important to the so-called international community.[101] At the UN Millennium

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[99] Chandler,16.

[100] Ilana Feldman, "Ad Hoc Humanity: UN Peacekeeping and the Limits of International Community in Gaza," *American Anthropologist,* Vol. 112, Nr. 3 (September 2010): 418.

[101] Mark Duffield, *Global Governance and New Wars* (London: Zed Books, 2001). Mark Malan, "The Post-9/11 Security Agenda and Peacekeeping in Africa," *African Secuirty Review* 11, no. 3 (2002)

Assembly in September of 2000, Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chretien initiated an independent "International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty". The outcome of this commission was the promulgation of a doctrine known as "the Responsibility to Protect."[102] The major policy change in the application of this concept is the right of foreign states to interfere in the matters of other states. In other words, an intrusion into a state's sovereignty became legitimized after declaring it as a humanitarian emergency, indicating intervention as a responsibility to interfere. Rather than the traditional view that sovereignty implies non-interference, the redefined concept of "sovereignty as responsibility" implies the right of interference if the community of responsible states decides this to be in the interests of protection.[103] Sovereignty was now a condition to be earned rather than an inherent right of states. The R2P is never applied with consistency or moral sincerity but rather the political interests of the most powerful Western states.

3. Peacekeeping at the United Nations

Peacekeeping has unique strengths, including legitimacy, burden sharing, and an ability to deploy and sustain troops and police from around the globe, integrating them with civilian peacekeepers to advance multidimensional mandates.[104]

By early 2011, the UN deployed fifteen peace operations on four continents with the credo: "Consent of the parties; impartiality; non-use of force except in self-defence

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[102] Chandler, 60. The Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Trade – Lloyd Axworthy was the main initiator of the R2P.

[103] Ibid., 65.

[104] United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. "Peace and Security," available from http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/peace.shtml; Internet, accessed on 9 November 2011.

and defence of the mandate."[105] According to its website, it counts "legitimacy, burden sharing, and an ability to deploy and sustain troops and police from around the globe, integrating them with civilian peacekeepers to advance multidimensional mandates" as its "unique strength."[106] The term "peacekeeping" is not defined in the Charter of the United Nations. Though peacekeeping is to be differentiated by its definition from conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacebuilding and peace enforcement, the boundaries are not clear: "While UN peacekeeping operations are, in principle, deployed to support the implementation of a ceasefire or peace agreement, they are often required to play an active role in peacemaking efforts and may also be involved in early peacebuilding activities."[107] The mandate of peacekeeping forces at the UN is undefined, as it is not in the UN charter. Its responsibilities lie between Chapter VI of the UN Charter, which calls for a "pacific settlement of disputes" and Chapter VII which is marked by the "action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace and acts of aggression" with the main difference that under Chapter VII, "enforcement action" is endorsed.[108] However, in practice, a concrete mission for the deployment of peacekeeping troops cannot be fully determined because of this lack of a definition. Often, armed peacekeeping is described as an unwritten chapter "six-and-a-half", which is the case for UNIFIL.[109] It is supposedly a term that is adapted to the changing nature

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[105] Ibid.

[106] Ibid.

[107] Ibid.

[108] United Nations, "UN Charter," available from http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/index.shtml; Internet, accessed 9 November 2011.

[109] Ibid. United Nations. "UN Peacekeeping," available from http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/; Internet, accessed 9 November 2011. Civil Affairs Officer, in *Friedenspolitik im Südlibanon*, 13.

of war and peace which today transcends the "strictly military."[110] This was inherent with a transition of the traditional tasks of peacekeepers whose responsibilities moved to a more complex and "humanitarian" dimension.[111] Since its first troop deployment, the UN has delineated three different eras of UN peacekeeping: beginning with "The Early Years, the Post Cold-War Surge and the Present,"[112] we move from the classical idea as "buffer" between belligerents and preventing conflict situations, to "multidimensional" peacebuilding missions after the Cold War era[113] and finally having peacekeeping engage in the "complex emergencies" of today, interfering after natural disasters as well as (post-) war catastrophes.[114] The characteristics of these forces have to be regarded as continuously changing policies rather than static bodies depending on the individual peacekeeping operations and the circumstances where they are stationed.[115] In addition to its military obligation, regarding its most important function to "maintain international peace and security"[116] peacekeeping troops are now also required to help the "civilian population that may need assistance," such is the case with

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[110] United Nations. "UN Peacekeeping," available from http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/; Internet, accessed 9 November 2011.

[111] Ibid.

[112] United Nations. "UN Peacekeeping Operations," available from http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/history.shtml; Internet, accessed 9 November 2011.

[113] Maria Kiani, 'The Changing Dimensions of UN Peacekeeping', Strategic Studies, Vol. 24, No.1, Spring 2004. Roland Paris, "Peacekeeping and the Constraints of Global Culture," *European Journal of International Relations* Vol. 9, No. 3, 2003.

[114] Kianni. O. Ramsbotham; T. Woodhouse and H. Miall, *Contemporary Conflict Resolution. The Prevention, Management and Transformation of Deadly Conflicts.* 2nd revised Edition. (London: Polity, 2005).

[115] Feldman, 418.

[116] United Nations. "UN Peacekeeping," available from http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/; Internet, accessed 9 November 2011.

UNIFIL.[117] According to UNSC Resolution 1701 in Lebanon the "Blue Helmets" have indeed the authority to use their weapons in order to save civilians lives, but in reality it is a very controversial debate that questions UNIFIL's legitimacy to engage in a conflict.[118]

4. Peacekeeping and Development Aid in the Arab World after 9/11

> And we will pursue nations that provide aid or safe haven to terrorism. Every nation in every region now has a decision to make: Either you are with us or you are with the terrorists.[119]

In his address on 20 September 2001 George W. Bush divided the world into two clearly divisible categories: "us" and "the terrorists"- a revived "us" and "them" dichotomy. The war against all evil that started after 9/11 continues with dramatic outcomes for a region that was declared as the root of terrorism: the Arab and Islamic world. In the case of Lebanon, the major consequence of his declaration was that the "notion that there could be, for instance, liberation struggles or resistance groups independent of global terrorism was now removed conceptually from this discourse, as organizations as

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[117] Senior Officer for Political Affairs, 14 May 2009, 5. In *Friedenspolitik Im Südlibanon,* 35.

[118] "UN peacekeeping operations may use force to defend themselves, their mandate, and civilians, particularly in situations where the State is unable to provide security and maintain public order." See: United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. "Peace and Security," available from

http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/peace.shtml; Internet, accessed on 9 November 2011.

In its country of deployment, the large UNIFIL force is often questioned and mistrusted by the population, due to its ways of *engaging* and *disengaging*: while it tries to engage actively against the arming of Hizballah, it has not done so in acting against the always ongoing and continuous Israeli violations of 1701.

[119] George W. Bush, "Transcript of President Bush's address," 21 September 2001, available from www.archives.cnn.com/2001/US/09/20/gen.bush.transcript; Internet, accessed 9 November 2011.

disparate as Hizballah and Al-Qaeda were lumped together."[120] The UN after 9/11 did

not necessarily introduce new methods for "maintaining international peace and

security", but remained in its behavior consistent with the approach (described above)

during the rebirth of UN peace operations in the late 1990s. The passing of anti-terror

Resolutions 1368 and 1372[121] by the Security Council institutionalized the "Global War

on Terror" as internationally legitimate, and allowed the United States for the

Afghanistan war to invoke the right to self-defense under Chapter VII of the UN

Charter. Most of the action to combat terrorism has been taken in the Arab region,

making Arabs the key target of this open-ended war against the nebulous threat of

"terrorists." Following 9/11, in order to combat "terrorism," foreign aid has been used as

a means and tool to secure states from spreading networks of "terror."[122]

The UN's main role in the war on terrorism is a reflection of its role prior to 9/11.

As before, it focuses on conflict prevention, and after threats to international security

arise or conflict takes place then the UN will turn to humanitarian activities, conflict

resolution, and peacebuilding/keeping. In Lebanon, the UN had no intention of

prematurely ending the conflict in July/August 2006, because the US insisted that the

elimination of Hizballah by Israel was crucial to the "War on Terror," and that Israel

"had the right to defend itself." In his speech on 20 July 2006 Secretary General Kofi

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[120] Karim Makdisi, "Constructing UNSCR 1701," 6. "In the memorable words of a senior Bush administration official, 'Hezbollah may be the A-team of terrorists and maybe al-Qaida is actually the B-team'". See Richard L. Armitage, 'America's Challenges in a Changed World', Remarks at the United States Institute of Peace Conference, Washington, DC, September 5, 2002.

[121] See Appendix. All UNSCR can be found on: http://www.un.org/documents/scres.htm

[122] See in general: Mark Duffield, Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of Development and Security (London: Zed Books, 2001); Wood and Shearing, *Imagining Security,* pp. 90–1; Mark Duffield and Nicholas Waddell, *Securing Humans in a Dangerous World,* (International Politics: Vol. 43, No. 1, 2006), 1–23.

Annan called Israel's response "excessive" and urged both countries to stop.[123] Later he recanted this reproach. "The UNSC, in other words, had chosen to breech its own mandate and sacrifice a defenseless UN member, Lebanon, in order to satisfy the geopolitical aims of a hegemonic state, the US, and its client state, Israel."[124]

In the immediate aftermath of the war on Lebanon Bush declared that resolution 1701, which formally put an end to the war, is "essential to the peace in the region and it's essential to the freedom of Lebanon," emphasizing that it should undermine Hizballah's "authoritarian" behavior within the Lebanese state.[125]

> Resolution 1701 authorizes an effective international force to deploy to Lebanon, which is essential to peace in the region and it's essential to the freedom of Lebanon. An effective international force will help ensure the cessation of hostilities hold in Lebanon once the Israeli troops withdraw. An effective international force will help the Lebanese army meet its responsibility to secure Lebanon's borders and stop them from acting as -- and stop Hizballah from acting as a state within a state. [126]

America's influence in Lebanese politics in the years after September 2001 was crucial.[127] The "March 14" alliance of Lebanese parties was formed shortly thereafter,

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[123] United Nations. Secretary General. Officer of the Spokesperson, "Secretary-General's briefing to the Security Council on the situation in the Middle East," (New York: 20 July 2006), available from http://www.un.org/apps/sg/sgstats.asp?nid=2142; Internet, accessed 8 November 2011.

[124] Karim Makdisi, "Israel's 2006 War on Lebanon: Reflections on the International Law of Force." *Ejmes* (2006): 22.

[125] George W. Bush, *Presidential Rhetoric*, 21 August 2006, available from http://www.presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches/08.21.06.html; Internet, accessed 26 April 2010.

[126] Karim Makdisi, "Constructing UNSC Resolution 1701," 7.

For NSS see: George W. Bush, *Presidential Rhetoric*, 21 August 2006, available from http://www.presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches/08.21.06.html; Internet, accessed 26 April 2010.

[127] Karim Makdisi argues in his article "Constructing UNSC Resolution 1701", that the UNSCR 1559 paved the way to the 2006 'war against terror', furthermore he notes that the attempt of the implementation after 1701, caused the tragic internal conflict among the Lebanese sects. As resolution 1559 could not been successfully implemented, the neo-conservatives in the US supported Israel's strive for a war that could enforce the major element of the resolution, to undermine Syrians influence and Hizballah's power in Lebanon. After a

in 2005, as a self-announced 'democratic opponent of Syria and Hizballah', openly aligning itself with the US—and implicitly with Saudi Arab and Israel. Prior to the war, in 2004, reacting to developments in Lebanon, UNSCR 1559, called on all remaining forces to leave Lebanon and was intended to weaken Hizballah and to undermine Syrians influence in Lebanon.[128] With these ambitions, the USA, France and Israel played a very big role in formulating UNSCR 1559, that mainly "calls upon all remaining foreign forces to withdraw from Lebanon" and for "the disbanding and disarmament of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias."[129]

5. *History of UNIFIL in Lebanon*

The United Nations Security Council established UNIFIL in 1978, during the Lebanese Civil War (1975–1990). The Israeli army had invaded southern Lebanon and occupied Lebanese territory south of the Litani River in order to repress the Palestine Liberation Organization and their Lebanese allies.[130] Since then, UNIFIL has attempted to serve as a buffer between Israel and Lebanon and their mandate was usually renewed

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big internal confrontation of the American supported March 14 coalition and the Syrian backed March 8 in what became to be known as May battles of 2008, the American backed Siniora government failed and was no longer acknowledged by the opposition. See: Makdisi, *Constructing UNSCR 1701,* 13.

[128] See Appendix for full text of resolution 1559, 97.

[129] David Hirst, *Beware of Small States,* (London: Faber and Faber Ltd, 2010), 302.; Makdisi, *Constructing UNSCR 1701,* 3. See: United Nations. "UNSC Resolution 1559," available from http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/498/92/PDF/N0449892.pdf?OpenElement; Internet, accessed on 9 November 2011.

[130] Prior to the invasion, in 1976 Israel had set up and supported a proxy militia, the South Lebanese Army (SLA), in order to fight the local Palestinian and Lebanese resistances. James A. Reilly, "Israel in Lebanon, 1975-1982," *MERIP Reports*, no. 108/109 (1982): 14.

annually.[131] The main goal of the resolution could not be fulfilled, since Israel remained an occupying force with a Lebanese proxy army[132] in southern Lebanon until 2000. This UNIFIL force, is criticized for its inability to carry out its objectives, since it was not able to implement resolutions 425 and 426.[133] "Essentially, there was no 'peace' to keep, instead it was about managing a low-level conflict that occasionally exploded."[134] The situation in south Lebanon during that time was very complex, with many warring parties and differing agendas. As the EuroMESCo[135] report explains, UNIFIL I was challenged to find a way to adopt its mission on the ground while simultaneously building up a trusting relationship with the local people and overall to retain a posture of "neutrality."

After a sustained campaign of guerrilla warfare by Hizballah and other Lebanese resistance groups, Israel and its proxy forces were eventually driven out of southern Lebanon in May 2000. Nonetheless the situation between Israel and Hizballah remained tense until Israel launched a massive military invasion of Lebanon in July 2006, seeking once again to destroy the social, political, and military capabilities of the Lebanese resistance. After a thirty-three day war between the Hizballah and Israel UNIFIL's mandate was created and deployed in southern Lebanon according to UNSCR 1701.

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[131] Makdisi, et al. "UNIFIL II: Emerging and Evolving European Engagement in Lebanon and the Middle East" *EuroMesco (*2009): 5. "Although also heavily involved in Africa and Asia, peacekeeping operations in the Middle East exemplify the repeated international efforts to provide a buffer force between Arab states and Israel. Indeed, originating in the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) in 1948, successive multinational forces have been deployed in Egypt, Syria, and Lebanon to assist in resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict."

[132] The Free Lebanon Army (FLA) and later to become the South Lebanon Army (SLA).

[133] See Appendix for full text of resolution 425 and 426, 90.

[134] Makdisi, Karim (et. al.), "UNIFIL II," 8.

[135] Makdisi, Karim (et. al.), "UNIFIL II."

Major modifications to original terms included the establishment of an international authority and the facilitation of more effective and successful control over the area.[136] The size of the mission was greatly expanded from 2,000 soldiers to a maximum of 15,000 who were deployed on the eve of the 2006 war, currently, in September 2011, consisting of 12,304. The expansion was construed as an extension of UNIFIL's humanitarian activities. A primary goal of UNSCR 1701 is to delimit the power of the party assumed by the UNSC to have caused the war: Hizballah.[137] Shortly upon the arrival of the peacekeeping forces in Lebanon, some countries, in particular Spain and France, began to interpret resolution 1701 widely to include the convenient disarmament of Hizballah.[138] Early on their troops actively searched houses and conducted reconnaissance to this end. This was not well received by the population. When six Spanish soldiers died in a planted car bomb, European countries began to realize the inherent dangers of such a confrontational plan.[139] Hizballah, after all, had successfully defended itself from the military onslaught of the greatest regional superpower and had achieved a strategic victory with the IDF's tactical failure and withdrawal. It was a force to be reckoned with. All attempts to disarm Hizballah have been and will likely continue to be successfully resisted. For Karim Makdisi, the development of the internal Lebanese situation always implied the failure of resolutions 1701 and 1559, since it become inevitably clear that the disarmament of Hizballah

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[136] United Nations. "UNSC Resolution 1701," available from http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/465/03/PDF/N0646503.pdf?OpenElement; Internet, accessed 9 November 2011.

[137] United Nations. "UNSCR 1701," 2-3. Makdisi, *Constructing UNSCR 1701*.

[138] Makdisi, "Constructing UNSCR 1701", 19. For full text of UN resolution see Appendix, 101.

[139] Naharnet. Available on http://www.naharnet.com/domino/tn/NewsDesk.nsf/getstory?openform&4FEF3F0698898EA3C22573050019A03F; Internet, accessed 4 May 2010.

could not be brought about by the international community.[140] Further, construing Hizballah a terrorist organization, as many influential Western states do, is highly problematic, considering its widespread legitimacy in Lebanon as a resistance front. The UNIFIL presence is enduring but it is unable to achieve its fundamental objectives.

6.   *History of UN Peacekeeping in the Region*

The first United Nations peacekeeping force was the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) deployed during the 1956 Suez crisis in Gaza, to "secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities, including the withdrawal [from Gaza and the Sinai] of the armed forces of France, Israel and the United Kingdom from Egyptian territory and, after the withdrawal, to serve as a buffer between the Egyptian and Israeli forces."[141] Neither the deployment nor the mission was planned in advance, which also resulted in an undefined situation on the ground.[142]

The region has been practically at war ever since the usurpation of Palestinian land in 1948, creating an enormous Palestinian refugee problem in the wake of the establishment of the state of Israel. UNEF was not the first UN presence in the region,

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[140] Makdisi, "Constructing UNSCR 1701", 19. He writes: "Moreover, a new government of national unity was formed in November 2009 with a clear mandate to implement the non-controversial elements of UNSCR 1701, that is shorn of the remnants of UNSCR 1559, and asserting Lebanon's right to resist Israel's occupation and threats."[140] The international conflict of 2006 was now fought on a national level, having the US-backed March 14 government "deny[ing] the claims of an armed resistance" and the Iran and Syria backed March 8 coalition as its main players.[140] This rivalry erupted violently during the clashes of May 2008, which ended with the Doha agreement that according to Makdisi implied a victory for Hizballah's interpretation of UNSCR 1701. Ibid., 20.

[141] United Nations. "First UN Peacekeeping Force." Available from http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unef1backgr2.html; Internet, accessed 9 November 2011.

[142] Feldman, 428.

however; the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) has been stationed in southern Lebanon/northern Israel since 1949- and until the present day.[143] Additionally, the United Nations Relief and Work Agency (UNRWA) that provided healthcare, education and rations, has delivered humanitarian assistance to Palestinian refugees since 1950.[144] UNRWA and UNTSO are present in the region for over six decades now and its ambitions to build "peace and security" are intertwined with humanitarian assistance. The three main UN agencies devoted to managing the Arab-Israeli conflict, in one way or another, are UNRWA, UNTSO and UNIFIL.

As mentioned above, the elimination of Hizballah as well as Israel's right to defend itself became crucial objectives of the US-led "War on Terror;" the clearest expression of these goals is to be found in UNSC resolution 1559.[145] As my interviews with the people of southern Lebanon show, Hizballah and its weapons are perceived as legitimate protection against Israeli violations, especially after the long Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon. Furthermore it is the leading democratically elected political party in southern Lebanon. UNIFIL's strategy is to counter its local opposition

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[143] The UNTSO was stationed as first peacekeeping force in the Middle East starting 29 May 1948, shortly after the declaration of the state of Israel. "UNTSO military observers have remained in the Middle East to monitor ceasefires, supervise armistice agreements, prevent isolated incidents from escalating and assist other UN peacekeeping operations in the region to fulfill their respective mandates." Today UNTSO's headquarters are stationed with UNIFIL in the Naqoura headquarters. Its military observer group, the "Observer Group Lebanon" coordinates their work with UNIFIL.

United Nations. "UN Peacekeeping." Available from http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/untso/; Internet, accessed 22 July 2011.

[144] Astonishingly, this agency exists since over half a century on an interim basis, like UNIFIL its mandate is renewed in certain time periods. (UNRWA's mandate is renewed every three years; UNIFIL's has been renewed yearly since 2000 mandate. Before 2000 it was renewed every six month.) Reasons for this might be that it was designed for a short-time period and that the reasons for their establishments were initially ought to be solved within a few years after their establishment. See: Riccardo Bocco, *UNRWA and the Palestinian Refugees,* 5.

[145] Makdisi, "Constructing UNSCR 1701," 13.

by garnering support through humanitarian aid.

The forty-four-year long illegal occupation of the West Bank and Gaza or, more recently, the 2006 war on Lebanon and the inability for the UN to prevent either sheds a bad light on this institution by mostly affected people in this part of the world. In the case of Israel's attack on Gaza in 2008/2009, the fact that the UN again failed to hold the state of Israel responsible for its clear violations of international law, again, seemed to confirm the perceptions of the people of southern Lebanon that UNIFIL is little more than an Israeli-Euro-American exercise sanctioned by the UNSC.[146] The United Nations agenda for Lebanon in the aftermath of 9/11 became part of a new security framework in which Israeli security is pre-eminent, alongside the maintenance of Western geostrategic interests from Iraq to Afghanistan.[147] Indeed it is difficult to separate UN activities in Lebanon from the more general "War on Terror". UN peace operations must be seen as subsumed within US imperialism. Indeed, development aid and humanitarian support are explicitly seen as strategic means of preserving the UN's primary goal of "maintaining international peace and security".[148] This thesis will explore the intersection between UNSC militarism and the UN agencies' avowed humanitarian activities. Ethnographic research can help to expose this post-cold war approach to "peace" and is in many ways the broader goal of this thesis.

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[146] Falk, R., & Bali, A. (2008). International Law at the Vanishing Point. In N. ed. Hovsepian, *The war on Lebanon* (pp. 208-224). Massachusetts: Olive Branch Press. pp. 208; 223. Makdisi, K. (2006). Israel's 2006 War on Lebanon: reflections on the international law of force. *Ejmes* , 9-26. 17.

[147] Antony Anghie, *Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law* (New York: Cambrigde University Press, 2004), 286.

[148] "We must now face the fact that the dominant powers (serving dominant global capital) have one plan for the future and that they are imposing it through systematic violence, including military violence." Samir Amin, "Whither the United Nations?," in *Empire's Law: The American Imperial Poject and the 'War to Remake the World'*, ed. Amy Bartholomew, 340-366 (London: Pluto Press, 2006), 348.

CHAPTER III

HISTORY OF BLIDA: A BORDER VILLAGE IN SOUTHERN LEBANON

The following chapter provides a historical account of Blida and shows the implications UN peacekeeping had since its existence that was created shortly after the creation of the state of Israel.

A. Blida: Structure of the Village

Blida is a Shi'a village located in the easternmost part of southern Lebanon, and is situated along the "Blue Line"– the unofficial line of withdrawal drawn by the United Nations between Israel and Lebanon after the Israeli withdrawal in 2000. It has around 11,000 registered inhabitants and 4,500 registered voters from whom only around 1,000 live in Blida year-round. Poverty, wars and official neglect of the rural areas in the south led to the migration of a large part of the population to Beirut, while another part migrated to Germany.[149] The migration to Beirut occurred only after 1948; before that many would go to work in Palestine.[150] During summer time and elections many of these registered inhabitants return and fill up the normally very quiet village with noise and motion.

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[149] According to the *mukhtar*, in Mukhtar of Blida, "Blida's Oral History", *Interview by Susann Kassem,* (15 May 2011), 1.Also see: Sheikh Ali Salim Salim, *Blida-Bayn el Madi w el Hader,* (Beirut, 2005), 42.

[150] Hussein Ali, *Interview by Susann Kassem*, (11. May 2009), 1. In *Friedenspolitik Im Südlibanon, Unpublished Thesis*, (Humboldt-University Berlin: June 2009), 40.

1. Economic

Similar to other villages in the Jabal Amel region, Blida has historically been primarily based on its agricultural production- Tobacco cultivation is the main source of income amongst other crops. Harvesting olives has grown in popularity recently due to its low cost profitability. Furthermore they grow vegetables for their own living. Dairy and other goods are produced and sold locally. However, overall agricultural production has regressed in the past decades due to the change in lifestyle following the numerous wars, occupations, migrations and expulsions from their lands. Another major source of income for the village comes in the form of remittances from people living abroad. Though exiles definitely contribute to the wealth of the village, they are usually not very wealthy themselves. The assets of the wealthiest among the migrants can be estimated between US $100-200,000, and a select few may have up to one million dollars. There are also a few Beirut-based merchants who originally hail from the village and contribute to its economy.[151]

Traditionally, Blida has been a very poor village in Lebanon. During the 1950s the national unemployment rate was estimated at twenty-two per cent.[152] People used to live mainly from farming.[153] The only education one could pursue was in a Koran school.[154] Because of starvation many villagers were forced to move or work outside the country. According to Moussa Salemeh, the educated professional class of Blida

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[151] Moussa Salemeh, *Interview by Susann Kassem*, (10 April 2009), 1. In *Friedenspolitik Im Südlibanon, Unpublished Thesis*, (Humboldt-University Berlin: June 2009), 10.

[152] Sheikh Ali Salim Salim, *Blida-Bayn el Madi w el Hader,* (Beirut, 2005), 9.

[153] In 1951, Lebanon counted 57,000 unemployed out of a population of 1,250,000. Fawwaz Traboulsi, *A History of Modern Lebanon* (London: Pluto Press, 2007), 124; Salim, 9.

[154] Salim, 9.

includes around thirty doctors in Blida, thirty engineers, ten lawyers, five Sheikhs and a few other professions. Many people had to leave Blida because of the financial situation.

2. Family Structures/Main Families

Blida has fifteen families that belong to the following root families: Khalil, Daoud, Mustafa, Farhat, Hanaoui, Jaber, Beydoun, Fadlallah, Neemi, Haidar, Hijazi, Ghazi, Margi, Kaawar and Faour. The role of the family grew less important in the past years, at the same time the role of political grew stronger. Today, main questions in the village or even decisions about elections are solved between the parties not the families-the political or party affiliation wins over the traditional family affiliation, which is also the case in other villages of the region. Family assemblies were mainly replaced by the party structure of the village. Often, families and parties are intertwined because of the political legacy of a family and the existing rivalry- until this day- between the two parties.

In the 1960s and 1970s the family had more importance and the families were independent of political affiliations. The role of the family in the village used to be essential when important decisions regarding family affairs needed to be made, on occasions such as weddings. Additionally, sometimes during elections people would come together in order to elect an appropriate party or person. After the 1980s and especially in the 1990s the importance of the family was reduced. This was the case on

a national level, in and outside the south, though some communities may have remained where family structures are more important up until this day. [155]

3. *Blida and the Nakba*

Since the creation of the State of Israel in 1948 the lives of people in southern Lebanon have changed enormously. The establishment of the Israeli state and the concomitant expulsion of the Palestinian people have had major effects on them, particularly the villages that are situated along the border. Blida was one of several Lebanese villages overtaken by Israeli military forces during the first Arab-Israeli war of 1948, and its inhabitants were forced to leave the village for several months and find refuge in villages further north and in Beirut. Arabs in general, including the people of Blida, refer to these events as the *Nakba* (catastrophe). Compared to Palestinian Oral Histories that have been recorded about the Nakba[156], very little work has been done on recovering this history of the people of southern Lebanon that were also affected by the Nakba.

Israeli policy and actions have not been limited to Palestine alone, rather they have deeply affected Lebanon's condition perhaps more than any other Arab state. Starting in the late 1960s and continuing up through the 1982 Israeli invasion, Palestinian guerrillas worked to establish a military base in southern Lebanon from which they could confront Israel. The southern Lebanese population was initially supportive of this and many, Shi'ites in particular, joined Palestinian organizations or

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[155] Salemeh, 3.

[156] Sayigh, Rosemary et al.

the Lebanese leftist and Arab nationalist parties aligned with the guerrilla movement. This popular mobilization became a pretext for Israel to invade Lebanese territory in order to halt the operations of the PLO and the spread of its support amongst the Lebanese population. During this time, Blida suffered on a daily basis and the destruction of houses as well as the killing of people became a systematic part of people's lives. Moussa Salemeh describes an air battle that took place above Blida in 1973 and that is remembered by the population despite its obscurity in literature on the 1973 war:

> Even in 1973 the war happened, the Arab-Israeli war, between Syria and Egypt from one side to Israel on another, there was an air jet battle over Blida, between the Israeli and Syrian warplanes. And that day a there were several martyrs in the village, three people from Blida. And nobody gives importance to what happened to the inhabitants of the village; there was a big demonstration in Bint Jbeil that used to be the center of the area.[157]

Israeli assistance to various right-wing Lebanese groups additionally played a major role in the furthering of political divisions internal to Lebanon.[158]

During the wars in 1973, 1982 as well as in the period between 1989-1990 Israel managed in usurping Lebanese land. In fact sometimes the blue line demarcations were changed under the pretext to be renewing the fence.[159] Later annexations, according to

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[157] Salemeh, 3.

[158] "The Israelis intensified their contacts with the Maronite border villages, which had hitherto coexisted peacefully with their Muslim neighbours, exchanging visits on the occasion of funerals and days of mourning, weddings, and religious feast days. As a youth in Bint Jubayl, I remember how young people used to walk to the neighbouring village of Ain Ible for a beer (prohibited in Shiite villages) and to watch the pretty girls out strolling of a summer evening. […] It soon became clear that the Israeli goal was to cut the Maronite villages off from their Muslim environment. None of the villages was more than 3 km from the border, which made it easy to provision and arm them so as to open a new front against the Palestinians. In implementing this policy, Israel worked through the Kataeb party, which it had been secretly assisting throughout the war and which already had a limited presence in each of these villages." Ahmad Beydoun, "The South Lebanese Border Zone: A Local Perspective," *Institute for Palestine Studies* (University of California Press), Spring 1992: 35-53. p. 41.

[159] Salim, 183.

Sheikh Ali Salim Salim, remained unnoticed until the United Nations started making

the people aware of it.[160] Major annexations also took place in 1975, when 183 Dunum

of Blida land were stolen.[161] The land on the Israeli side of the borderline that is used

today for largely agricultural purposes was land that the inhabitants of the border

villages regard as illegally annexed by the Israeli state and therefore is seen as their

occupied lands.[162] Even the territory with the only well in the village was partially taken

over by Israel in 1975.[163] Generally the fight for the water is often mentioned in the

wars with Israel, particularly about the Hasbani River.[164]

    A significant part of Blida remains occupied until this day but the UN or the

international community does not acknowledge it. Compared to the land in other

villages in the region, what is known as Jabal Amel, hardly any land for agricultural

production is left in Blida. For many citizens of Blida this remains an essential and

unjust circumstance that is not forgotten. [165] On the contrary, the fact that the UN does

not acknowledge it is one of the main motives to regard the UN as impartial.

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[160] Ibid., 184.

[161] Ibid., 185.

[162] Indeed, in several conversations with people in Blida, these annexations are mentioned. Indeed they contribute to a general negative sentiment and an awareness of the importance of resistance to illegal Israeli violations and annexations.

[163] Salim, 184-185.

[164] Jeffrey D. Dillman, "Water Rights in the Occupied Territories," Journal of Palestine Studies (Autumn 1989): 52.

[165] Salemeh, 3. In *Friedenspolitik Im Südlibanon, 50.*

4. *War, Occupation and Migration*

Starting in 1975 Lebanon was entrenched in a civil war between the right-wing forces of the Lebanese Front (LF) on one side and a reformist coalition between the Lebanese National Movement (LNM) and its Palestinian allies on the other side.[166] Since the Lebanese state incurred a severe loss of power to the advantage of militias and external actors, Israel was to some extent able to fill the emerging power vacuum in the Lebanese-Israeli border region. Attempts to restore state control over all parts of the country failed by the spring of 1976, when the Lebanese Army fractured along confessional lines. The outbreak of war automatically implies the migration of the inhabitants of Blida north to Beirut and later also to foreign countries. Major migration waves occurred in the seventies (between 1975–1977) to Beirut, followed by a wave outside the country, to the Gulf States, Africa, America, Australia, Brazil and European states. In 1972, 1.1%, about 30 people migrated to foreign countries. In 1983 the number of migrants reached 2.3%, about 101 persons. Between 1972 and 1982 about 71 persons from Blida left the country. By 1995, according to the municipality, about 497 families or about 2723 individuals had left Blida, about 37.5% of the total population.[167]

> About a fourth or even less lives in Blida, about 35-40% lives in Beirut and the rest is expatriated, especially to Germany. About 500-600 families live in Germany, which are about 4000 people. The main phase for migration to Germany and other European states took place between 1985-1990. During these times the doors in Europe and especially in Germany were open and major waves of migration were taken place. And of course through marriages and family reunifications this process was enlarged. So this is how we got this big number.[168]

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[166] James A. Reilly, "Israel in Lebanon, 1975-1982," *MERIP Reports* (1982): 14.

[167] Salim, 183-184.

[168] Salemeh, 3, In *Friedenspolitik Im Südlibanon, 50.*

The largest waves of migration from the south were all tied to the successive major Israeli invasions of Lebanon (1978, 1982, 1993, 1996, 2006), each of which resulted in the mass displacement of hundreds of thousands of people. Aside from these major operations, the south Lebanese border strip was turned into an Israeli "security zone" of occupation beginning in 1976 and lasting until May 2000. In 1976 Israel had set up and supported the South Lebanese Army (SLA), a proxy militia under the direction of rogue Lebanese Army Officer Major Sa'd Haddad, in order to suppress the local Palestinian and Lebanese resistance. The Israelis desired to build a force to protect its interests in Lebanon without having to keep Israelis permanently stationed there. The SLA was a fully Lebanese militia entirely "financed, armed, and officered by the Israeli army."[169] At the same time, the Christian rightist forces overran many of East Beirut's populous Shi'a neighborhoods. Shi'a escaped in masses to their villages in the south, which soon became overpopulated. Many people had no house of their own and were forced to stay with other family members.[170] The persistence of violence and deprivation surrounding this community, in both urban and rural contexts, created a highly precarious existence for most people. Political mobilization in both reformist and revolutionary parties was one way of dealing with this situation.[171]

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[169] Fawwaz Traboulsi, *A History of Modern Lebanon* (London: Pluto Press, 2007), 206.

[170] See: Ahmad Beydoun, "The South Lebanese Border Zone: A Local Perspective," *Institute for Palestine Studies* (University of California Press: Spring 1992), 40. "In Bint-Jubayl, for example, the normal population of 12,000-13,000 inhabitants ballooned to 24,000 in the space of a month, giving rise to nightmarish scenes of up to 50 persons crammed into two-room houses, sleeping on rooftops, in gardens, on balconies, wherever there was space."

[171] Salemeh, 4, in *Friedenspolitik Im Südlibanon, 51.*

5. *Political Engagement and Party Movements*

Blida's youth participated in the vibrant national movement of the late sixties until the early seventies and joined several of the existing national parties, such as the Lebanese Communist Party, the Ba'ath Party, the Syrian Social National Party (SSNP), Etihad Kuwat Shaab Amel.[172] This political awareness was also shaped by the Palestinian cause and its struggle against Israeli colonization. Around the same time the youth started entering universities, especially the Lebanese University. Salemeh underlines that of the 300-400 graduates hardly anybody managed to achieve a higher position on the governmental level[173]. Further he points out the high political participation among the youth in political movements.

> Hundreds of youth of the village participated in the national as well as Palestinian parties and it had a big influence on the consciousness of the people, from the consciousness of the youth, to the consciousness of this coming generation. In the south especially, there was now a political and cultural awareness in which respect Blida plays a big role. The people in Blida split into the different political, educational and social fractions. And this was also a part of the beginning of the building of the society of the people of Blida in order to establish a village council for the people of Blida that was now 13000 people. Now there is a second council after the one in 2008.[174]

During the invasions of 1978 and 1982 Blida's villagers played an active role in the resistance to the occupation. Also, there were a couple of villagers engaged in demanding rights for the villagers under occupation. Furthermore, like everywhere else in the south, there were a number of people who cooperated with the occupation army. Today some of them live in Lebanon still, some of them were imprisoned for a while,

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[172] Salemeh, 4, in *Friedenspolitik Im Südlibanon, 51.*

[173] Salemeh, 4, in *Friedenspolitik Im Südlibanon, 51.*

[174] Salemeh, 5, in *Friedenspolitik Im Südlibanon, 50.*

depending on the gravity of their acts, others fled the country and some are even living in Israel.[175]

From 1985 until now in Lebanon, the original role of the national parties receded, the parties that considered themselves part of a national Lebanese resistance, and their plan was taken by sectarian Shi'a parties, mainly Hizballah and Amal.[176] The young people that were affiliated with the main parties of the 1070s and 1980s, like the Baath party, or the Communist Party or the SSNP started joining the new resistance movements parties of Amal and Hizballah. Due to the outcomes of the civil war, external and internal factors and due to the particular sectarian situation in Lebanon that became more tangible after the war, the Amal movement and Hizballah were created as main Shi'a resistance parties.

> Naturally, this affected Blida just like everywhere else in the south and the surrounding villages. During this forming phase many conflicts that occurred between the two parties before, between Amal, Hizballah and the Nejm the listing. But there weren't any fights about this listing between those parties in Blida itself.[177]

6. Beginnings of Islamic Resistance

> Amal, and especially Hezbollah, were relative latecomers on the political scene and appealed to the Shi'a in clearly sectarian terms, despite their avowals of welcoming all comers.[178]

Since the majority of the inhabitants of the south were Shi'a, the nature of the Israeli occupation and resistance became a sectarian matter, affecting them more than anyone

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[175] Salemeh; Slim; Najib Younes, "Life Story," *Interview by Susann Kassem*, (17 May 2010): 6.

[176] Salemeh, 5, in *Friedenspolitik Im Südlibanon, 52.*

[177] Salemeh, 5, in *Friedenspolitik Im Südlibanon, 52.*

[178] Augustus Richard Norton, *Hezbollah. A Short Story.* (Princeton University Press: 2007), 15.

else. Taking into account the historical treatment of the inhabitants of the south, the opposition to occupation

> …indirectly reflected the deep economic and social injustices implicit in the sectarian political system, in which the Shi'a community, the largest, occupied the bottom of the social-political ladder.[179]

Imam Musa al-Sadr's Movement of the Disinherited had, since the early 1970s, been organizing the Shi'a on a sectarian basis to stand up for their rights. "The Amal Movement" was the name of their armed wing, which became public on 6 June 1975.[180]

7. *Hizballah*

In June 1982, for a second time, Israel launched a massive invasion of southern Lebanon. The primary purpose of "Operation Peace for Galilee" was to completely destroy the PLO. Main goals were "to diminish Syrian influence in Lebanon, facilitate the consolidation of a pro-Israel Lebanese government, and win Israel its second peace treaty with an Arab state."[181] Through its previously established "security zone" it was easy for Israel to enter the south. Finally the army was able to push towards Beirut, ultimately the loss of many civilians was caused. Soon after the Israelis had besieged Beirut, the migration movements started again. "Numerous families who had been displaced from the border zone since the 1976-78 period decided to return to their villages on the reasoning that since half the country was occupied anyway, they might

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[179] Tabitha Petran, *The Struggle Over Lebanon* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1987), 372.

[180] Traboulsi, 192.

[181] Eisenberg, Laura Zittrain (1997) p. 4.

as well return home where at least they would be safer."[182] Inspired by the 1979 historic

Iranian revolution, Shi'a opposition to Israel and the Lebanese political system

increasingly converted into a conservative, religious fundamentalist movement.[183] In

the Bekaa Valley, the emergence of the Iranian supported Hizballah epitomized this

trend.

> Even if Israel had not launched its invasion of southern Lebanon in 1982, the young would-be revolutionaries among the Shi'a would have pursued their path of emulating Iran's Islamic revolution. Undoubtedly, however, the invasion pushed the Shi'a further in this direction, creating conditions for the establishment and flourishing of Hezbollah.[184]

However, Hizballah's role in the resistance to Israeli occupation would not

become significant until 1985. The Syrian backed Amal militia still superseded it, and

often the groups clashed in competition for the representation of the Shi'a community.

Many of the more religious Amal fighters would end up defecting to Hizballah and their

rivalry would become one of the deadliest in all the civil war.

Young revolutionary Shi'a men founded Hizballah in 1982 in order to resist

Israeli occupation and organized the Shi'ite (who make up the majority of the

population of the south) on religious grounds.[185] Considering the circumstances the

Shi'a in Lebanon, especially in the south, were subjected to by the Israeli superiority, a

resistance movement against the oppressing and racist regime was inevitable. As

organization and resistance became the only way to fight Israeli occupation, Hizballah

was born out of a matter of urgency to the lives of the southern Lebanese Shi'a

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[182] Ahmad Beydoun, "The South Lebanese Border Zone: A Local Perspective," *Institute for Palestine Studies* (University of California Press), Spring 1992: 35-53. p. 46.

[183] Norton, 22.

[184] Norton, 33.

[185] Norton, 34.

population. "By the 1990s, however, Hezbollah was certainly the best-organized political phenomenon and enjoyed the largest base of popular support."[186] Since its formation, Hizballah is able to recruit most of its members directly from the population of the region.

At the end of the Civil War in 1990, Hizballah was the only militia that was allowed to keep their arms because of their continued resistance activity in the occupied regions, according to the internationally brokered Taif Agreement.[187] Hizballah also became a political party in government and they created and continue to run an extensive social network of social services that the government had never provided in the south or other predominantly Shi'a areas.

According to Salemeh, Amal and Hizballah do not have a major financial influence on Blida:

> Of course the general social and financial situation of the village improved compared to the past when the situation was totally different since the way of life has changed a lot. But this is rather due to the migration of its citizens than anything else. [188]

> So the role of the parties, if you want to take Hizballah for instance- it doesn't support the village with major monetary incomes, since it has hardly enough to sustain itself to be able to pursue its main functions. There are amounts or resources around 700-1000 $ for some households or less and these amounts are not enough to serve as resource. There are a few services that will help maybe the daily life a little bit. Like there is Beirut, the inhabitants of Dahye, there are some services it offers, for example social services and helps there are very good, because otherwise there is no attention paid to such things. And sometimes there are also services that help people of Blida like the building of common rooms and community centers etc. that are beneficial.[189]

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[186] Norton, 16.

[187] Source to Taef! After the Israeli withdrawal in 2000 this position has become more controversial, however it is still maintained.

[188] Salemeh, 4, in *Friedenspolitik Im Südlibanon, 50.*

[189] Ibid.

8. Citizen's Relations to the State of Lebanon

We are the first municipality in Blida.[190] Some of our responsibilities are to create a culture awareness, to build streets, to do things that a municipality has to do. These were ignored until 2000 because we, in Blida, were neglected by the Lebanese government.[191]

Nobody treats you well, I treat my nation well, and I am the citizen. I have land, like any other citizen here. And the land is what makes me a citizen. This what the government is doing, they have no right to do. They are all thieves. From the president to the representative. There is nothing that is honest in this country but the Lebanese Army, the one who earns an income of a donkey. The representative of a party makes 120 000 dollars a year, or in a month, I don't know. And now they have 130 representatives. All of Lebanon is only as big as a plate, what do they need so many representatives for? The representative gets 120 thousand a month, 120 million a month, and the soldier only gets 3- or 400 000? How is that? The person who is always in charge of the security of the nation, only get this little? How is that? They who are just up to cheat and when they found a worker who has some money they take it away from him.[192]

The municipality in Blida was only officially formed in 2000, after the liberation of southern Lebanon. Therefore, for a long time there was no local government that dealt with issues in occupied southern Lebanon or provided services for the people there. Today, the government is still regarded as an inefficient body by villagers in Blida. Therefore, UNIFIL is seen more as auxiliary force for a government that is not able to act actively upon Israeli border violations. In fact, the mayor believes if there was a well working government, UNIFIL would be unnecessary. He points out to me that the preferred solution for the situation at the southern Lebanese border is an effective army.

M.B. We just want that our army, our government is present here. We don't like UNIFIL to be here, because we would prefer to have a government that works, that secures our borders from violations.

S.K. So UNIFIL is here because there is no stable government in the region?

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[190] Mayor of Blida was part of the first municipality that came to existence after the liberation in 2000.

[191] Mayor of Blida, 5, in *Friedenspolitik Im Südlibanon*, 23.

[192] Najib Younes, 15-16.

M.B. So they are here for a reason, I hope this reason will disappear, doesn't exist anymore, so we have peace. How this is possible, who knows?

A human who has a will and believes in his country and who is willing to defend it. This is the idea of the resistance, to be able to free his country, so that nothing happens to the individual.[193]

In contrast to this, during an interview the Civil Affairs Officer at UNIFIL explained to me that the absence of the government had a damaging effect on the people in southern Lebanon. They view that this neglect has destroyed a supposedly existing "civil society" that was completely replaced by a political resistance movement, Hizballah. According to UNIFIL this political activism is not considered a "neutral" position of society, rather it is highly influenced by the supremacy of foreign states.[194]

> These people, especially I would say the communities from this area and from the area of al Kantara to Aitaroun. They have been misled and neglected and marginalized. Not only for the decades of the occupation, but also for the centuries that they have been like under-citizens of Lebanon. The power wasn't shared equitably. So you have a strong sense of resentment and frustration. They had limited educational opportunities, limited access to this, you know, public services.

At this point, I should point out that whether families are politically active in the resistance or not, they all support the resistance since it is the only force that was able to expel the Israeli occupation army from southern Lebanon in 2000.

9. *Electoral Participation/Main Parties*

The distribution of votes in Blida since 2000 is mainly divided between the two parties Hizballah and the Amal Movement, although Hizballah receives the majority of

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[193] Mayor of Blida, 3 in *Friedenspolitik Im Südlibanon*, 24.

[194] Civil Affairs Officer, 2, Interview by Susann Kassem, "Interview on Civil Affairs at UNIFIL", in *Friedenspolitik im Südlibanon*, *Unpublished Thesis,* (*Humboldt-University Berlin:* June 2009), 21.

> We are trying to outreach to these grassroots organisations, but then we have to be careful, because we can not consider them as in other countries, like in Western Europe, a strong stronghold of civil society. Here the civil society is being depleted and its being weakened, so the case and I think people with a kind of …and social activist are joining resistance rather than NGOS. And most of the NGOs are politically affiliated. The ones that we consider neutral that we consider neutral, that work with all communities are communists.

votes. Additionally there are a few supporters of the Lebanese Communist Party in the village, which constitute a very small minority. Excluding the people that live abroad, there were around 3,500 eligible voters. In sum, of seventy per cent have participated in the past elections in Blida. [195] Fifty-five per cent of these voted for the Amal Movement and Hizballah, ten per cent that voted for the alternative list, and about thirty-five per cent that doesn't participate in elections, also due to the big part of the population of Blida living outside. Therefore not more than 1400 people participate in elections and a big part doesn't care about the elections. During the last elections additionally to the list for Amal and Hizballah, there was another one consisting of a group of people that listed themselves as an independent camp. They reached a considerable amount of about twenty per cent of the total voting percentage.[196] During the last municipal elections in May 2010 there were some discrepancies between the Hizballah/Amal supporters and the small but sizeable *independent* camp, consisting of the communists and other independent groups that are not directly affiliated with Hizballah. The split occurred out of protest against Hizballah who had announced its favorite candidate as a mayor in advance who people should vote for. Often there are discrepancies in the village because non- Hizballah members experience political and social exclusion; active members of the party boycott their shops and products.

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[195] Mukhtar of Blida, "Blida's Oral History", *Interview by Susann Kassem,* (15 May 2011), 1.

[196] Salemeh, 2.

10. Liberation and the 2006 War

In May 2000 when Israel withdrew their approximately 1000 soldiers from southern Lebanon and the SLA lost its control over the territory. Though part still remains occupied until this day, this liberation is an important day in the history of southern Lebanon. Displaced persons returned to their homes, families were reunited, and many others came to the south and celebrated. It was a relief for everyone, to once again have the freedom of coming and going as they please without special permission from Israel and the SLA.

> During the occupation the village was under control of the soldiers of Antoine Lahad, who were spying on and terrorizing the people and had a big importance. After the occupation the village changed totally and regained its independence and people returned from the places they had escaped to in and outside Beirut and this, of course, contributed to the better, especially considering the reconnection of the families.[197]

The war, which had ended in most of Lebanon in 1990, had finally come to a close in the south. The primary reasons for this withdrawal were the attacks of resistance groups, mainly Hizballah, which had caused too many strategic, political, and military losses for Israel. Hizballah regards the liberation of 2000 as their victory and as a result, they are highly respected in the area.[198]

The years after the withdrawal in 2000 and before the 2006 war were marked by "the rules of the game", an unwritten agreement that among other things, anticipated a prisoner exchange as reaction to kidnaped soldiers.[199] In 2006 another war broke out between the Hizballah and Israel. The war lasted 33 days and more than 1,200

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[197] Salemeh, 3.

[198] Theodor Hanf, Coexistence in Wartime Lebanon- Decline of a State and Rise of a Nation (London: The Centre of Lebanese Studies in association with I. B. Tauris, 1993), 299.

[199] Norton, 87.

Lebanese– mostly civilians– and 160 Israelis– mostly soldiers– were killed. Even though the kidnapping action of Hizballah was intended to encourage a prisoner exchange and Israel's reaction exceeded by far Hizballah's estimations of a possible response[200], the international community blames Hizballah for the war. Despite earlier calls from all UN member states for a cease-fire, Israel did not want to give in and was backed by its powerful ally, the United States of America. The US gave Israel a green light to continue the war, hoping it could remarkably weaken Hizballah and its resistance movement.[201] The war lasted 33 days and more than 1,200 Lebanese— mostly civilians—and 160 Israelis—mostly soldiers—were killed.

During this war, people in Blida had to leave their homes again for more than one month. Many spent the first few days in Blida, until it became too dangerous to stay there. Israel had issued a declaration telling all civilians to leave their homes. The escape to the areas north of Beirut and to Syria was not easy, as usual roads and bridges were bombed, routes usually drivable in three or four hours took twelve and more. People who didn't have a car or whose car got destroyed through Israeli attacks were trapped in the village. As usual, during wars like these, the old and poor stayed behind in the village, uncertain of their situation.[202] The main place of refuge was the old Mosque in the severely bombed village center. When the fighting became too strong, many escaped too, to the neighboring Christian villages. Others escaped to Syria and to Mount

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[200] Hirst, 329.

[201] "The US also repeatedly rejected calls for a cease fire in order to allow Israel added time to "punish" Hezbollah, even after the 25 July Rome Peace Conference, where Lebanon's pro-US Prime Minister had pleaded for an immediate end to the fighting and presented a "Seven Point Plan" to end the conflict." Karim Makdisi, "Israel's 2006 War on Lebanon: Reflections on the International Law of Force," *Ejmes*, 2006: 9.

[202] Najib Younes, interview by Susann Kassem, , *Life Story*, (16 May 2010), 11.

Lebanon.[203] People with cars helped in rescuing some of the Blida citizens while bringing them to the neighboring Christian villages.

In Blida today, the situation now is seen as more secure than it has ever been since 1948, which is a big accomplishment of the resistance, mainly because Hizballah "served as a military front towards the Israeli occupation army".[204] After liberation many villagers returned, including villagers, especially men that had been previously forced out of their village, some of then for over twenty years. The main reason was their unwillingness to participate in the Israeli proxy army that would otherwise obligate them to military service. Occupied or not, southerners have learned to live with their neighbor, whose presence is felt almost on a daily basis through air violations, border crossings and attacks on civilians, in addition to the continuous threat of another large-scale invasion. A new war is always possible, but always connected to a lot of fear too. *Where to go?* -A question, which is often raised, out of peoples' constant fear of a new war and a new displacement.

11. UNIFIL's Role in Blida/ Social Services

UNIFIL's role in Blida has changed considerably since it first arrived in 1978. While they offered some social services in the time before 2000, now their budget is much larger for this. The inhabitants look at this with suspicion. Blida has received much more support through projects and development after the 2006 war.

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[203] Jumana Younes, interview by Susann Kassem, , *Life Story*, (22 May 2010), 9.

[204] Salemeh, 5, in *Friedenspolitik Im Südlibanon, 51*.

Before the establishment of the municipality in Blida, the *mukhtar* used to be the formal representative that the peacekeeping forces would get in touch with. Today UNIFIL cooperates only with Blida's municipality and their representatives in order to conduct their work.[205]

> UNIFIL's social services have an agenda, there have a role that is other than to offer social services. The projects they support are very beneficial but they have to be looked at very carefully. They represent the international community and try to give a picture on the situation on the ground, considering the Israeli aggression on the ground that even today occur on a daily basis. [206]

For Salemeh, it is obvious that UNIFIL has geostrategic political bias, "considering the most engaged ones are the Spanish, Italian as well as French peacekeeping troops in the south."[207] In Blida, two years ago Italian peacekeepers walked into the old village center and were filming things, which led to an upheaval in the village against the troops. The villagers confiscated the tape that was made; the upheaval was independent and not driven by a particular party. Eventually, in cooperation with the Lebanese Armed Forces the tape was returned and the peacekeepers learned their limits of involvement. Furthermore Salemeh explained to me that the village representative is usually in charge of dealing with UNIFIL matters. "Obviously, when it comes to the, let us say Shi'a villages, the representatives are usually affiliated with Amal or Hizballah."[208] The work with the villagers is contingent

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[205] There are additional projects conducted in the villages that are not funded by UNIFIL, but by development agencies and foreign governments. These approach instances other than the municipalities for their funding. UNIFIL always cooperates with the municipalities, but they do recommend further development aid, institutions and funding the villagers or single groups can apply to.

[206] Salemeh, 5, in *Friedenspolitik Im Südlibanon, 51.*

[207] Ibid.

[208] Ibid, 6, in *Friedenspolitik Im Südlibanon, 52.*

on the personal relationship to the peacekeepers. If there is a political disagreement usually this worsens the relationship. "The sponsoring of projects depends on the relationship between the authority and the troops", argues Salemeh, since sometimes there is a political discrepancy and if something would happen between the peacekeeping troops and the villagers it would have an influence on the relationship.[209]

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[209] Ibid.

CHAPTER IV

UNIFIL: A THICK DESCRIPTION

Success is never guaranteed, because UN Peacekeeping almost by definition goes to the most physically and politically difficult environments. However, we have built up a demonstrable record of success over our 60 years of existence, including winning the Nobel Peace Prize.[210]

Everybody loves peacekeepers.[211]

Peace? What is peace? Peace is…Me, my life…I am supposed to decide about my life, without anybody violating my land. Peace doesn't give any country the right to invade my own and occupy my land. To have the right to invade whenever it wants, to be able to act like it wants, in the entire region? No. If there would be sanctions [on Israel], yes, that would change the situation. But when I see that in case an action is taken from our side, the whole world stands up against us. If now a rocket would be fired from Lebanon [into Israel] and it does not explode, every single person in the world would be talking about it and judging it, and every country in the world would defend Israel. Nobody questions why this has happened? There are people that fight for their existence, there is no food, no water, and nobody recognizes this.[212]

A. Fieldwork: A Sketch of Civil Affairs at UNIFIL

Clearly, as the quotes above illustrate, there are several interpretations for *peace* and how to approach it. In the same way there are different interpretations of international peacekeeping and the United Nations. This chapter presents and analyses the work of Civil Affairs and presents UNIFIL's Quick Impact Projects. Keeping in mind the previously presented theoretical framework of development/humanitarian aid and international organizations, it will outline the following points: first, the

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[210] United Nations. "UN Peacekeeping." Available from http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/untso/; Internet, accessed 22 July 2011.

[211] Timur Goeksel, *Interview by Susann Kassem*, (15 April 2009), 1. In *Friedenspolitik Im Südlibanon, Unpublished Thesis*, (Humboldt-University Berlin: June 2009), 15.

[212] Mayor of Blida, 4 *Friedenspolitik Im Südlibanon*, 25.

humanitarian involvement on the ground in southern Lebanon has political intentions and implications; second, UNIFIL's involvement in the provision of development aid is not peculiar to Lebanon but is common practice in different parts of the world; third, regardless of the need for such a development project and the interest of the studied community in it, I argue that people question their intentions cautiously. This attitude is mainly due to the obvious fact of having UNIFIL only stationed on the Lebanese and not on the Israeli side of the border. Further it is shaped through implications of the force and their intentions on the ground that this chapter is going to outline in more detail. The detailed account on the history of Blida will support this argument.

In Chapter I, I have explained how the imperatives driving UNIFIL evolved in the post 9/11-era and provided the reasons why humanitarian efforts in southern Lebanon should be linked to the "global war on terror". I argue that the humanitarian efforts provided serve as investment of higher world imperatives in "international security" (for their own benefits) against the "war on terror." Therefore, the main goal is to show the way UNIFIL applies its mandate on the local level, i.e. its political and military role and at the same time to clarify how the deployed troops derive their legitimacy from the people. In order to vindicate my argument, the first part introduces UNIFIL's work mechanisms, such as the "Quick Impact Projects" (QIP) and the "Inaugurations" that can be seen as "ritualizing effects"[213] of this institution that are applied on the ground. Both are principal reoccurring practices of UNIFIL's Civil Affairs department that revolve around the planning, realizing and celebrating of a newly funded project. UNIFIL's major function under mandate 1701 on the ground in southern Lebanon is

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[213] Richard Harper, "The Social Organization of the IMF's Mission Work." In The Anthropology of Development and Globalization, by Marc Edelman and Angelique Haugerud, 323-333. (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005), 324.

twofold: as it pursues its military goal of disarming Hizballah, it is quietly casting an

enormous humanitarian net over all the villages under the guise of its Quick Impact

Projects. The awareness of the inhabitants as well as the authorities of the villages to

these two major functions of UNIFIL and an eventual reaction to their employment and

how this contributes to my main argument in this thesis is the focus of the last part of

this chapter. Therefore, first a thick account of the Quick Impact Projects and UNIFIL's

military role is given, followed by statements and reactions by the responsible

authorities about UNIFIL.

B. A Case Study of UNIFIL's "Quick Impact Projects"

1. Quick Impact Projects: UNIFIL's Humanitarian/ Development Practice

> There is some kind of some trust relationship, because the people see, that we
> are good to them. The people see, that some of them they benefited from the
> presence. The shops, salons… Some of them are working with us…like some
> 900 of them are working with us… Lebanese. So everyone has economy, so
> everyone can feed a few people, so it provides the social income. And then even
> if people are complaining, like ok what you are [doing], why can you not stop
> the Israelis that are violating our air space almost every day and we cannot to
> something. [214]

The Quick Impact Projects are one of the three basic elements of UNIFIL's Civil

Affairs department. According to UNIFIL, "Quick Impact Projects" (QIP) are "small,

low-cost, rapidly implementable projects, which benefit to the local population." These

are conducted with the municipalities, NGO's and other non-profit entities. In practice,

the projects are anything between dispensing litter boxes to building basketball courts

and constructing water canals. A QIP can cost up to US$ 25000 each and has to be

completed within 90 days. Defined "priorities" for the QIP in 2009-10 are "the support

to the extension of state authority/civic education/ capacity building," "conflict

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[214] Head of Civil Affairs, 4-5; In *Friedenspolitik Im Südlibanon,* 19-20.

management/confidence building initiatives, access to basic services" and "environment". After a project is successfully implemented, an inauguration ceremony usually takes place. The whole process of a funded project as well as the inauguration constitutes an imbedded ritual for all the participating parties. Indeed, in the past years it became an important tool for the municipal elections since the mayors use the successfully implemented projects in their village as examples to secure their reelection. To say it in the words of the head of the Spanish CIMIC unit, the QIPs are designed to be able to "win the support of the population."[215] According to the Senior Officer for Political Affairs, "without the support of the people the work here would be impossible."[216]

2. *Funds: Amounts and Sources*

The main countries that fund projects in Sector East are Spain and France. In order to get more information about projects funded in Blida I visited the headquarters of the Spanish battalion in the Christian village of Ebel el-Saqui. Here I talked to the head of the Spanish CIMIC unit that is also responsible for the projects conducted in Blida. Moreover he invited me to join him and his team on their CIMIC patrol. In the interview I conducted with him and the soldiers of his CIMIC team, in Ebel El-Saqui they provide me with a very detailed description about the soldiers and this particular aspect of their work under their mission. Spain is responsible for "Sector East," which is considered the area of its mission, according to a UNIFIL division of southern Lebanon

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[215] Interview with Spanish CIMIC Unit, Interview by Susann Kassem, 1. In *Friedenspolitik Im Südlibanon, Unpublished Thesis*, (Humboldt-University Berlin: June 2009), 34.

[216] Senior Officer for Political Affairs, Interview by Susann Kassem, (14 May 2009), 2. In *Friedenspolitik Im Südlibanon, Unpublished Thesis*, (Humboldt-University Berlin: June 2009), 19.

that divides the border area into two main parts "Sector East" and "Sector West", each comprising about half of the area of concern.[217] Further, the head of CIMIC explained to me that the main goals of their mandate are the support of the population and the security of their troops. In order to achieve former, UNIFIL invests in the QIPs, which can be at best described as short-term micro-credit and development projects that deliver immediate help or support for the affected local community. The benefit of these projects is always a mutual one, i.e. the donor does not solely perceive it as support for the local, in this instance the Spanish government and other national institutions. Moreover it is seen as investment in the support and security of their own troops in their mission and in the field- it is supposed to win the support of the population, which potentially leads to a better acceptance and therefore more security for the forces on Lebanese soil.

In addition to the QIPs Spanish peacekeepers, among others, have a number of zero cost projects that "have a big positive impact, but cost [us] nothing." Usually UNIFIL states certain criteria a QIP has to fulfill and the local governments and municipalities apply for them accordingly. Three main requirements are: A "quick impact", "communal benefit" and the funding limit of US\$ 25 000. Criteria for the QIPs are the immediate benefit and positive effects for a community. Furthermore, QIPs should be judged to be impartial and self-sustainable. The reasons for the requirement of impartiality are described as two-fold:

> Because in the moment we work with a religion we would be perceived as impartial, no matter if it were [Maronite] Christians, Muslims, Orthodox. This is one part, this way we could lose the impartiality of this mission. The second thing is, because once we work with one religious sect, for example in a mosque, then

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[217] See map, 16.

the Sunnis, the Druze, the Christians will ask for the same. And we are not the World Bank. Therefore, we cannot work with religious groups.[218]

UNIFIL and every other participating institution, in this case the Spanish government, have their own criteria for the projects that are to be funded.[219] In general the projects funded by Spain underlie the same principles as the UNIFIL ones. Except, that meanwhile the final budget for UNIFIL projects is US$ 500 000, Spain does not have a limited annual budget. The only rule for Spain is to try to fund at least one small project (max. $25 000) yearly for every village in their sector.[220] In Blida for example the Spanish battalion has funded eight projects from October 2007 until June 2010, altogether a total sum of US$ 170 000. Additionally they execute so called "zero cost" projects, where they organize or offer activities for the communities of the villages.

> The funding from the Spanish government outside the UNIFIL budget comes from different instances, such as its foreign ministry, embassy, and other times even from the governments of the states within Spain where big parts of the troops come from. This is perceived as a part of donation for the safety of the troops.[221]

3. The Criteria of Quick Impact Projects: Military/People's Needs

Sometimes projects are also initiated when a need is recognized by UNIFIL- for example if there is an obstacle like a bridge on their daily routes. In this case they make the local authority aware of the problem and get his permission to work on it. After the realization of a project, after one or two years they go back to the place and make sure it is used and that it has benefitted the region in some way.

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[218] Interview with Spanish CIMIC Unit, Interview by Susann Kassem, 3. In *Friedenspolitik Im Südlibanon, Unpublished Thesis*, (Humboldt-University Berlin: June 2009), 36.

[219] Ibid., 4; 37.

[220] Ibid., 5-6; 38-39.

[221] Ibid.,4.

For the Spanish battalion, a main factor to qualify for a funded project is when it has mutual benefit, for both the troops and the people. The head of the CIMIC unit gives an example for the possibility of funding electric generators:

> If the houses, the villages don't have electricity, it doesn't matter to me as a UNIFIL soldier. But, if the houses have electricity during the night the patrols have electricity and I benefit from it as a soldier for UNIFIL. Light during the night means more security [for the soldiers]. Therefore, the patrols would be more secure, because there is light.[222]

Furthermore there is a direct and indirect way of benefit for UNIFIL:

> When we fund Windows for schools or other beneficial projects for the population we don't have a direct benefit from it. But, there is an indirect one. When the children are not cold anymore in their classes or if they got tables in their classrooms they will go home and tell their parents, Mama, Papa, the UNIFIL soldiers gave us tables. And their parents, if they thought badly about UNIFIL before, now they think well about them. Here we have an indirect benefit. If my soldiers pass through the village, their mum and dad will think good things.[223]

Generally these projects exist at UNIFIL in order to create a good relationship with the people. "UNIFIL's mission is to win the support of the people."[224] Indeed, the projects are improving the relationship a lot.[225]

The troop rotation of the Spanish battalion is every four months. At the moment Spanish soldiers are changing between Afghanistan and Spain. Before their mission they have to go through preparation training. The CIMIC soldier explains it as sufficient enough for the situation on the ground. "Misunderstandings", how he calls them, happen only in the relationship with the individuals; "not the institution creates the difference but the relationships with the people. And there can be good ones or bad

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[222] Ibid., 5; 38.

[223] Ibid., 5; 38.

[224] Ibid., 4; 37.

[225] Ibid.

ones. If there is a problem it is always because of the people that are interacting. Not the mission."[226] He points out, that the interaction with instances, such as authorities can be bad, but this does not inevitably mean that the relationship with the population cannot be good. "It's nothing that depends solely on the projects. But the projects with the people help a lot. It is good for the perception of UNIFIL. But there are more things, like to keep the doors open and to perform other activities with the people. It helps forming a better idea about UNIFIL."[227]

4. *The Anticipated Outcome of a Project: External Donor Attraction for "Grassroots Organizations" and How to Become a Professional Beggar*

While its main role within its mandate is "military, not humanitarian,"[228] the provision and distribution of humanitarian aid as well as the location of needs and the linkage with potential donors is an important aspect of UNIFIL's work. An important task of Civil Affairs is to attract potential donors for projects that cannot be funded within the budget of the QIPs, because it does not fit into the criteria or it exceeds its funding limit. The head of the Department of Civil Affairs explains how they want to get the locals engagement to apply for eventually available funds:

> And also we want to get the attention of the international community to some aid. We want to attract the funding or some attention from some others like Europeans or Japanese or any others like Emirates and Saudis. […] Sometimes we get the funds, sometimes they say there is a fund but local people have to

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[226] Ibid.

[227] Ibid., 6; 39. This better idea, the soldier is talking about is necessary because UNIFIL's presence is not easily accepted by the people of southern Lebanon. In fact, in the past many incidents have occurred in which the villagers were not happy about the duties UNIFIL executed. Often the people actively hindered UNIFIL's troops in their work.

[228] Head of Civil Affairs, 4; In *Friedenspolitik Im Südlibanon,* 19.

apply. […] Then we say ok, we go to the villages to the local people and say ok, there is a program but you need to apply. So they didn't know how to apply it is not so easy to fill the bureaucratic forms…So what we will do is actually, we taught them how to apply. […] So then they get the support, they now how it is possible that they put a bit more…not only complaining that the government is not paying. That they can do something, really good funding…you know, that they should also be more active.[229]

Indeed for this matter Civil Affairs has trained the municipalities "the ways to apply" for funding.[230] The head of the department of Civil Affairs explains that sometimes they wait for people living abroad returning to their villages in the summer to explain to the villagers the applications for funding or encourage them to handle the application process in the name of the villagers. Teaching the people "how to apply" the way UNIFIL as well as other donor countries require, is a certain way to teach the people the bureaucracy that the donor country speaks, which in the case of Blida mainly goes back to the Spanish authorities and their regulations. An employee at the Blida municipal building explains to me the usual procedure to get a Quick Impact Project funded:

> They call us when they have funds available [usually after the renewal of the interim mandate] and tell us, 'there are funds, and you can apply now'. So we write several proposals of projects or things we would like to get for the village, we make a formal proposal in which we explain what we would get. They pick which one is most appropriate according to their criteria and fund it. In Blida, so far the following projects were implemented: A fence was established for a citizen whose olive grows cut through the Blue Line [so that only the owner has access to it]; a basketball field was build; Spain has funded a water canal for the village; a tractor was given to the village community by Italy; the community center was funded by UNIFIL in cooperation with UNDP.[231]

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[229] Ibid., 2; 18.

[230] Ibid., 2; 18. Secretary of Blida municipality, Interview by Susann Kassem, (4 April 2009), 1; In *Friedenspolitik Im Südlibanon, Unpublished Thesis*, (Humboldt-University Berlin: June 2009), 36.

[231] Ibid.

Another main aspect of UNIFIL's work is to "see the real needs"[232] of the people and, if they do not fit in to the QIP agenda, to recommend and connect further developmental funding and funders with villagers. In fact, one of the main goals of the funding of the QIPs is to approach other people and organizations, outside governments and political parties. As the Civil Affairs Officer explained to me, once a successful project is funded, they hope that other associations get in touch with them in order to receive a funding.

> Here we had a very successful project that not just the mayor benefited from, this was the community center here in Blida. And that when many people came, also NGOs, Women associations…We are trying to outreach to these grassroots organizations, but then we have to be careful, because we cannot consider them as in other countries, like in Western Europe, a strong stronghold of civil society. Here the civil society is being depleted and its being weakened, so the case and I think people with a kind of …and social activist are joining resistance rather than NGOS. And most of the NGOs are politically affiliated. The ones that we consider neutral, that work with all communities, are communists.[233]

UNIFIL is obliged to work with the municipality, as it represents the acknowledged official body of the village, the benefit of the conducted projects and the anticipated outcome is a different one. The other associations the Civil Affairs Officer is pointing out in the quote above are favorably politically not affiliated NGO's or other "grassroots organizations" that UNIFIL perceives as "neutral".[234] The CAO makes clear, that the QIPs are used as a medium to reach people outside of the stronghold of Hizballah/the resistance. The next step for them would be to acquire further sources of funding, often outside the UNIFIL budget, and support once these "neutral" organizations are detected.

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[232] Head of Civil Affairs, 3; In *Friedenspolitik Im Südlibanon,* 20.

[233] Civil Affairs Officer, Interview by Susann Kassem, "Interview on Civil Affairs at UNIFIL." Published in Susann Kassem, "The UN Peacekeeping Agenda in a Southern Lebanese Village- "The International Community" and Local Autonomy", in *Newsletter No. 9*, Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs, (Beirut: June 2011), 13.

[234] Ibid.

Furthermore, UNIFIL holds a weekly meeting in Tyre with other development and humanitarian aid agencies, NGO's and organizations in the region (United Nations Country Group, UNDP and UNICEF etc.).[235]

> That is the UNICEF and UNDP and the different organizations, whoever of the whole UN family is represented in Lebanon, most of them of course are based in Beirut, but some of them have a small office in Tyre or have representatives for others, only someone who goes once a week down there. I think there are two meetings, one is for the UN and one is for the NGOs.[236]

According to the Senior Officer for Political Affairs these meetings function to improve the coordination the goals for future funding and projects and the budgets for these things and to ensure that there won't be any duplication in funding.

Altogether, it can be said that the Department of Civil Affairs prefers to support little groups or communist parties because they are less affiliated with the resistance, which is not perceived as a desired "civil society". Whereas in Blida not many other parties, NGO's and organizations exist, they can be found in villages in the area surrounding it and there they indeed do manage to connect them with other beneficiaries such as US AID and UNDP. Other villages, like Houla or Aitaroun, for example, have a bigger stronghold of the communist (and other alternative) parties than Blida'. As for Blida, Civil Affairs has to find other ways to reach the people, as in the example shown, through the teachers.

C. UNIFIL's Military Practice
1. *Incidents with Villagers after Implementation of the Military Aspect of 1701*

You know I have a connection, as I always go to talk to mayors etc. with the

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[235] Senior Officer for Political Affairs, Interview by Susann Kassem, (14 May 2009), 7. In *Friedenspolitik Im Südlibanon, Unpublished Thesis*, (Humboldt-University Berlin: June 2009), 38.

[236] Ibid.

CIMIC, but I don't have problems with the locals. As we were on many occasions told local people don't have problems with us, they don't …they are quite happy with us, a human dimension, because of the humanitarian efforts that UNIFIL is doing. But they have, what they have problems with is the continuous air violation and the blue line violations, especially here in the area of Blida, where the Blue Line marks have become a contentious issue.[237]

While previously described engagements of UNIFIL in southern Lebanon tend to have a positive impact on the general mood of the civilians, there are actions that UNIFIL is required to fulfill according to UN resolution 1701 that are not truly welcomed. In Blida, a significant incident UNIFIL was blamed for in the past years is the kidnapping of the two civilians by the Israeli Defense Forces, IDF in 2008.[238] In my interviews with the people it was repeatedly taken as a stand against the forces that they are not able to pursue their job, which for them means to secure the Lebanese border.[239] Also remarkable was an incident with Italian soldiers that occurred briefly after its deployment in 2006. As Moussa Salemeh describes:

In Blida there was a big clash exactly because of this, about two years ago, when Italian peacekeepers went in the old village center and were filming. It was solved when the Lebanese army got involved and they asked the Italian peacekeepers to hand over the tapes.[240]

UNIFIL's work in Blida always involves issues regarding the compliance of the parties with observing the Blue Line, which often involves peoples land (olive groves). The observation of it often implies UNFIL's control over people's territory. In some cases

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[237] Civil Affairs Officer, Interview by Susann Kassem, "Interview on Civil Affairs at UNIFIL." Published in Susann Kassem, "The UN Peacekeeping Agenda in a Southern Lebanese Village- "The International Community" and Local Autonomy", in *Newsletter No. 9*, Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs, (Beirut: June 2011), 15.

[238] George, "Selective Reporting," 1.

[239] Mayor of Blida, 2, in *Friedenspolitik Im Südlibanon*, 25. Susann Kassem, *Field Notes*, (1 February 2009); 1. Published in Susann Kassem, "The UN Peacekeeping Agenda in a Southern Lebanese Village- "The International Community" and Local Autonomy", in *Newsletter No. 9*, Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs, (Beirut: June 2011), 1-2.

[240] Salemeh, 3, in *Friedenspolitik Im Südlibanon*, 10.

UNIFIL has built a fence around the olive groves, prohibiting the entrance to this territory by any other than the owner's family.[241] A more recent example is UNIFIL's establishment of a helipad in Blida that took place against the will of the landowner of the place it was built.[242] This incident was resolved quickly since the helipad was not used and removed soon after. Several major incidents occurred in areas further north of Blida where UNIFIL soldiers tried to enter houses after an arms cache explosion had been observed. Here entire masses of people came together and resisted UNIFIL's soldiers while trying to enter their houses.

The Senior Officer for Political Affairs implies that Hizballah is part of the Lebanese society and their presence cannot be stopped. Searching cars or houses is only possible in case previously weapons were seen inadvertently. Southern Lebanon is not a restricted area and the Lebanese army serves as protection for the inhabitants, this is a reason not to search cars.[243]

> Sometimes we drive in the private property. We don't have the right to interfere in people's lives; we have to be very careful. We are here in the end to support the Lebanese army. So the Lebanese are in the end of the day the ones we help and we have to respect them.[244]

UNIFIL's limitations are clear and tied to the engagement to the LAF, the local force that is legally authorized to intervene in such circumstances. Whereas UNIFIL is perceived as a foreign force that is forced upon the people and its actions are mostly not legitimized in peoples minds.

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[241] Secretary of Blida municipality, 2, in *Friedenspolitik Im Südlibanon*, 36.

[242] Mayor of Blida, 2, in *Friedenspolitik Im Südlibanon*, 25.

[243] Senior Officer for Political Affairs, Interview by Susann Kassem, (14 May 2009), 3. In *Friedenspolitik Im Südlibanon, Unpublished Thesis*, (Humboldt-University Berlin: June 2009), 41.

[244] Head of Civil Affairs, 6; In *Friedenspolitik Im Südlibanon,* 23.

A major confrontation occurred between UNIFIL and inhabitants of several villages, mainly in Touline and Khirbet Slim, further north from Blida, when UNIFIL tried to enter houses during a major maneuver exercise in southern Lebanon.[245] This exercise was one of the biggest UNIFIL ever pursued and it was not joined by the LAF. UNIFIL Senior Officer for Political Affairs explained to me that miscommunication was one of the main reasons for conflict since nobody knew what was happening. She told me that the LAF withdrew its willingness to participate in the last minute, meanwhile from the mayor of Blida I found out that permission or an agreement from the LAF never existed. The mayor of Blida sees this in a different light:

> The way I regard it, is that they, UNIFIL, entered without permission. They want to enter the houses, without being authorized to do so. And this caused trouble problems with the people. After all, the houses have owners.[246]

From the Senior Officer for Political Affairs I learned that "they [the attacks] were in response to, when UNIFIL was doing an exercise to full deployment we call it, to have an exercise for ourselves to have for 46, 48 hours a lot of troops outside, in case we need that ever."[247] She explained the usual routine of these military exercises:

> […] we have done these exercises a few times but each battalion would do it for two days, but that was a little bit smaller you know, that was always just in a smaller area and in UNIFIL it was felt that it would be good to do it, not just for each battalion, the whole force.[248]

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[245] Times, "Hezbollah Stockpiles 40,000 Rockets Near Israel Border," *Times Online;* available from http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/middle_east/article6739175.ece; Internet; accessed 5 August 2011.

[246] Mayor of Blida, 1, in *Friedenspolitik Im Südlibanon*, 23.

[247] Senior Officer for Political Affairs, Interview by Susann Kassem, (14 May 2009), 8. In *Friedenspolitik Im Südlibanon, Unpublished Thesis*, (Humboldt-University Berlin: June 2009), 44.

[248] Ibid., 8; 45.

Such a deployment would be necessary in case there are serious indications for a planned placement of missiles.[249] Furthermore I learn from the Senior Officer for Political Affairs, that the main purpose behind these exercises is to hinder the resistance from acting in this area in order to "not let what is called a hostile activity happen from the area where we are" and to prevent any attempt of resistance and preparations of placing missiles.[250] This, according to the Senior Officer, is seen as one of the main activities to undermine retaliation in their "area of operations" to prevent a new conflict from happening. In a place like southern Lebanon, the strong opposition to such training is not surprising.

The mayor of Blida described the actions of UNIFIL as impartial and clearly explains the boundaries of the force that do not allow UNIFIL to actively search for weapons in southern Lebanon, not without coordinating with the Lebanese Army.[251]

> M.B. UNIFIL works with the municipalities, sometimes they take appointments, sometimes they just come, take out some posters about the cluster bombs, for the awareness. They need to get in touch, with every village or town, so they get the feedback and that there is no miscommunication. We have a natural relationship, or even more it is almost friendship. Sometimes we benefit from their projects, like the community center or the visits of schools. And we got a firetruck from the Spanish, and the baseball court. Sometimes they invite us, or someone new is introducing himself to us. Or if they finish the work on a project they celebrate it and they invite the people and the municipalities. And yes, the relationship is normal.
>
> S.K. But there is a peacekeeping force here, they are here to guarantee the peace in this region, do you think these projects are involved in this task?

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[249] Ibid., 8-9; 44-45.

[250] Ibid., 9; 45.

[251] I met with the mayor of Blida a couple of times, he was the mayor in Blida until the municipal elections in 2010 after that he was still taking care of some of the work in Blida since the new mayor lives in Beirut. Similar to other citizens of Blida, during his childhood in the civil war and Israeli occupation he had to commute between Blida and Beirut, depending on the intensity of the wars.

M.B. No, with peace this has nothing to do. You are here to prevent us, not for the prevention of others. For example a few months ago Israelis kidnapped two civilians from this village. UNIFIL didn't interfere. Where were you, we asked? So we demand Israel to be charged of the crimes it committed.

Peace is when two parties have a conflict. Maybe there is an opportunity for them to make peace. But you have to see who is the aggressor and who is the defender. They still have occupied parts of our land, that is not right.

Spies, violations, invasions every day.[252]

This interview serves as a good contribution to understanding the reasons behind resistance of the villagers towards UNIFIL. It clarifies the villager's understanding of UNIFIL's terms of engagement that differs from the way UNIFIL or here the Senior Officer for Political Affairs describes them.

D. On The Ground in southern Lebanon: UNIFIL's Humanitarian and Military Practices – A View From Below

The relationship of UNIFIL to the people can be described as a very complex one. Once in the field, the dynamics are inevitably clear, as I try to show with the following part of my thesis that shows the direct interactions between UNIFIL and the municipalities in in southern Lebanon. The tension during an inauguration in Blida with the citizens of Blida, Civil Affairs, and soldiers from different UN-battalions, presented below is very clear. Briefly, I want to make some remarks about the context of this inauguration: The inauguration took place only a few days before the governmental election in Lebanon, where many citizens from all over the country returned to vote. At the same time the Israeli Army was conducting one of the biggest military maneuvers in its history. [253] Generally, it was a very frightening event since the military activities

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[252] Mayor of Blida, 1, in *Friedenspolitik Im Südlibanon*, 23.

[253] Many people in Blida believed Israel was doing that on purpose to scare people from coming to their villages to vote for the opposition, led by Hizballah.

during the maneuvers were very loud and since Blida is at the border they were very

noticeable.

1. *The Inauguration of a Common Room in Blida: Vignette One*

The "inauguration" is always organized by UNIFIL after every 'successfully'

fulfilled project and therefore is one of the common practices that UNIFIL carries out.

According to the former mayor of Blida, they (UNIFIL) require them to do that, to

publicize their work and stay visible.[254] Indeed, the rituals itself are of higher

importance to UNIFIL than it is to the citizens of the villages, as they are always very

richly documented by the UNIFIL staff but never well visited. After all, they have to

legitimize themselves towards both, local people and the international community. I am

invited by the Civil Affairs Officer to join an inauguration that is pursued after of

teaching computer lessons to teachers of Blida in a newly furnished community room in

the village center of Blida. The following paragraphs present an excerpt of my field

notes and the recording of the teachers' address to the attendants of the events and their

reaction. Afterwards, I will reflect on this happening in a separate comment section.

> I joined the inauguration with my aunt, a teacher herself who had participated in the lessons given by the Nepalese soldiers. The moderator/translator of the event was a young female Civil Affairs employee who is half Nepalese, half Lebanese, a daughter of a Nepalese soldier that married a Lebanese woman. (Nepal has contributed soldiers to UNIFIL since 1978.) Besides the teachers of Blida and the mayor hardly anybody participates in the event. In addition to the Nepalese soldiers a few Spanish ones are present and some of them are documenting the event with cameras.
>
> "This what you heard is unique, the comments about Israel…we rather don't want them to say that on events like this, but we can understand why they say it."
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> The Civil Affairs Officer just drove me back home after the inauguration of the computer classes that were given by Nepalese UNIFIL soldiers in a community center, which was also subsidized by UNIFIL in Blida. She seems quite

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[254] Mayor of Blida, 3, in *Friedenspolitik Im Südlibanon*, 24.

uncomfortable while she is telling me this in the car. [255] I am not sure whether she is nervous because I participated in the inauguration and she didn't want me to write about it or whether she is generally unhappy with what was said.[256]

Around ten to five, we leave from my grandparent's house to the event, which is in the center of the village. The Civil Affairs Officer drops us off in front of the building and continues, so she can turn with her car. We walk into the community center, where the classes have been taught, just next to the municipality building. My aunt and I step outside the room again, to see if the Civil Affairs Officer has parked yet. The CAO comes and introduces me to her colleagues, most of them were Nepalese, a few Spaniards. Most of the attending soldiers are working in this area, Sector East of operations. The CAO introduces me to the Nepalese soldier that I had contacted before who was not authorized by the Nepalese government to give me an interview. Generally, the soldiers seem to be very interested in my work, after the event they tell me that they hope they will be able to give me an interview.

After a few introductions, while are waiting for the last people to come, everyone sits down. A few people are told to sit in the front, like the Civil Affairs Officer, the mayor and some UNIFIL people. The male teachers from Blida that participated in the course sit down on the left hand side of the room. One soldier makes another get up from his seat again to make space for the three female teachers, my aunt and two other women from Blida that I know well. The women and I sit down in the third row on the right hand side. Even though this is a public event, nobody aside from the teachers and the mayor are attending it. I had asked people before the event if they would be coming, but nobody had heard about it and they weren't really interested.

The Computer course had taken place from 2nd April until 4th May. Four soldiers had given this course with the idea to teach the teachers. After the event my aunt tells me that even she was surprised about the strong willingness and the motivation of these older teachers to learn.

Before the event starts, the CAO tells me that when the Nepalese soldier heard that I would be coming to the event, he was a bit scared. I had been in touch with him before, but his authorities from the Nepalese side, hadn't given him the permission yet to talk to me. Eva says she had told him that I would be attending as a citizen from Blida and that he shouldn't worry, we would just be talking about the weather. At the same time she explains to me how glad she is, that she "got a green light [to talk to me] from [her] boss", the Head of Civil Affairs. When I inquire about the organizer of this event, she says both, UNIFIL and the

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[255] Susann Kassem, "Ritual Blida," *Field Notes*, (21 May 2009); 5, in *Friedenspolitik Im Südlibanon*, 48.

[256] On Nakba day, 15 May 2011, there was a big demonstration in southern Lebanon. Palestinians from allover the country came together to march towards the border. The demonstration ended with ten causalities and 112 wounded, mostly young Palestinian men that were killed by the IDF. The UN issued a statement, blaming Israel for the inappropriate use of force against the unarmed peaceful demonstrators. For more information see article "Nakba Marun Alrass," Al-Akhbar online, نكبة مارون الراس: 10 شهداء وأكثر من 112جريحا", available from http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/12195; Internet; accessed 13 November 2011.

Blida municipality, have organized it. [When I ask the mayor later, he tells me that UNIFIL are the ones who initiate events like this.]

The event starts with playing the anthems of the UN, Lebanon and Nepal; everyone is standing and the soldiers salute. First, the Nepalese general introduces the event, then, the mayor of Blida gives a speech following a speech by a teacher and a Nepalese soldier. The ritual is taking place in the room where the teachers had taken the computer courses. It is quite a small room and equipped with about 8 computers in total. UNIFIL helped refurbishing this room last year together with the UNDP. A projector is placed in the room and a power point slide shows the title and date in whose designation this inauguration is taking place. Next to it, on the right side, there is a speaker's desk; behind it are the three flags, the Lebanese, the UN and the Nepalese. The room is set and fruits, water, coffee, juices, and biscuits are arranged on a table. Some UNIFIL soldiers are responsible for the catering.

After playing the anthems, a Nepalese general introduced the event and then the mayor of Blida gave a speech and after him a teacher from Blida and a Nepalese soldier who had taught lessons. In total 4 people hold a speech. The mayor, an UNIFIL-official, an UNIFIL-soldier and a teacher. The teacher is the last to give a speech. In contrast to the UNIFIL speech this speech silences the room. He talks about the main reason why UNIFIL is in the south and he blames Israel, the 'enemy' for the various acts of violence it is performing, which according to him led to the necessity of the development projects UNIFIL is conducting. [257] He elucidates his frustration about the sufferings that the Lebanese population has to bear and how many killings happened and keep happening in this area. Even though his speech is very critical and emotional, nobody really shows any reaction. After the event, the CAO mentions it in the car to make clear to me that they don't wish to hear things like that on these kinds of events.[258]

2. Comment: Of How to Win Hearts and Minds

Such kinds of educational, cultural and social projects are conducted by UNIFIL because they have analyzed that we live in a very critical situation, especially because we are living at the border with our enemy, who does not believe in his neighbor. Ladies and Gentleman, we were born in this country suffering and we are facing a lot of fear and despair because the Israeli enemy is regularly violating our lands and killing our children under an international and an American cover where we are blamed and the Israelis are innocent. My brothers, we are here for peace not war. We want to live not to die. But our fate is to face the net as if it was imposed on us. And we have to face the enemy for its violations.[259]

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[257] Susann Kassem, "Ritual Blida," *Field Notes*, (21 May 2009); 5, in *Friedenspolitik Im Südlibanon*, 48.

[258] Inauguration Blida, p. 2-3.

[259] Recorded speech of the teacher., 21. May 2009. p. 1. In *Friedenspolitik im Südlibanon,* 30.

Presented above is an excerpt of the speech given by the teacher, who is mainly reflecting on the reasons for UNIFIL's presence in southern Lebanon. He makes clear that the circumstances under which they live are highly influenced and affected by foreign policies of powerful states. Furthermore his speech shows an awareness that the Lebanese are the ones blamed internationally for any conflict with the Israeli state.

The main telling aspect of the presented ritual that I want to reflect on is the irritation of the Civil Affairs Officer and her negligence for addressing the problem. Furthermore I want to briefly talk about the small attendance of other villagers on an event that for UNIFIL Civil Affairs department constitutes a main encounter with the people.

The Civil Affairs Officer is confronted with a political issue that is not addressed by Civil Affairs in the total interaction with the villagers. It is very surprising to see no reaction or attempt for a discussion of the speech afterwards, considering the conflict and its mediation is the main reason for UNIFIL's presence in Lebanon. Whereas he teacher is presenting the obvious truth for many people in Blida, the officer is reacting with unease.[260] However, in the car, the Civil Affairs Officer seems very stressed while she is telling me this, as if she does not want this event to become public without mentioning that the presented opinion in the speech of the teacher is not an accepted one by the UNIFIL employees.

I meet the Civil Affairs Officer later in the house of my mother's family. They received her in a very friendly manner, which is not always the case when any UNIFIL

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[260] I am not sure whether the reason fort her uneasiness is the speech itself or the merely fact that I was present and heard such a speech at a UNIFIL event.

personnel and people from the villages interact.[261] During my interview I ask her about her work and we talk about their presumed "neutral" role they have to maintain as peacekeepers. This encounter can be seen as an example of the complex relationship of the citizens of Blida and UNIFIL. I will first show a similar situation observed during a meeting between the mayor of Khiam and Spanish CIMIC soldiers/ Civil Affairs in the Khiam municipality I will introduce the event with an excerpt of my field notes followed by a comment and an analysis of both occurrences and their further implications.

3. Funding Meetings: Vignette Two

I am in the Khiam municipality with the soldiers of the Spanish CIMIC unit, the Civilian Military Co-operation troop of UNIFIL. They came together today, in order to find a date on which an inauguration for a project conducted by this unit could take place. Spain has recently funded 1000 litter boxes for people's households in Khiam and like every other contribution by the government of Spain, it will be celebrated in an inauguration ceremony in which people from Khiam and UNIFIL come together. During the meeting, the mayor does not show much importance to the planned inauguration, he rather wants to know about the solar lamps project that was planned and is asking continuously when the first steps for it will be made. The soldier explains to the mayor that their serving period[262] is over and that the project has been assigned to the next troop who will bring the necessary engineers that are responsible for the installation of the lamps. After the meeting the Spanish soldier comes up to me and informs me that Khiam has not been very cooperative in the past month and in an annoyed voice he tells me "if he is not willing to communicate with us he should not be surprised that the project we had planned (installing solar-lamps in the village center) could not be executed."[263] Further he tells me that the mayor is forbidden to interact with UNIFIL, that "they (I ask him who, he whispers Hizballah) forbid him to talk to us." The project had failed because of the miscommunication between UNIFIL and the municipality of Khiam during the tense relationship in the early summer,

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[261] The interaction here is in fact very different to what it would be like with the mayor for instance, who is member of Hizballah, or the situation I describe in the field notes at the beginning of this thesis. Often UNIFIL is rather encountered with mistrust and opposition. My mother's family is generally very apolitical and often not informed about happenings in their surrounding.

[262] Spain exchanges its soldiers every six month.

[263] Susann Kassem, *Field Notes*, (5 June 2009); 2.

when UNIFIL tried to enter a house (suspected of a hidden weapon-depot) in Khirbet Slim without being accompanied by the Lebanese Armed Forces, the LAF.[264] I ask the soldier what the reasons for the not existing communication in that period could be, to which he replies that the role of UNIFIL is often misinterpreted within the population. "They think we are here to save them from Israeli border violations, but this is not our role, this is a misinterpretation of our mandate".[265]

Generally, regarding both interactions presented above, I often experienced a dismissal from Civil Affairs Officers and CIMIC soldiers towards people and village representatives. The Civil Affairs Officer working in Blida as well as the Spanish CIMIC soldier point out to me during the events, that the opinions represented by the mayors are not "neutral". The CIMIC Officer goes even further, while explaining to me following the meeting in Khiam that "the mayor doesn't have a problem with us [UNIFIL], but he is forced in to being an in- between position"[266], between Hizballah's rejection of UNIFIL and the government's acceptance of it. During an interview with the Civil Affairs Officer after the event in Blida, she explains to me: "Of course they are not neutral, because you go to the municipality and it doesn't have a picture of Suleiman on the wall but a Nasrallah picture, I mean it is obvious. But even there you have to respect it."[267] Generally Civil Affairs does not perceive Hizballah, the main elected political representative in Blida as neutral, which accordingly deserves a special consideration in their work with the affected municipality.

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[264] Mayor of Khiam, Interview Susann Kassem, 5 June 2009. In *Friedenspolitik Im Südlibanon, Unpublished Thesis*, (Humboldt-University Berlin: June 2009), 50.

[265] Susann Kassem, *Field Notes*, (5 June 2009); 2.

[266] Ibid., 3.

[267] Civil Affairs Officer, 6; Published in Susann Kassem, "The UN Peacekeeping Agenda in a Southern Lebanese Village- "The International Community" and Local Autonomy", in *Newsletter No. 9*, Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs, (Beirut: June 2011), 13.

4. *Comment: From the Perspective of the Institutionalized*

As outlined in the first chapter, international organizations bring their own set of idea and their own approach with them that they implement on the ground. During the meeting described between the mayor and UNIFIL, the mayor was confronted with a team of international soldiers who come to pursue their work. They forced their model of work on him that he has to accept, which makes him the *institutionalized* of this relationship. To be able to account it in further detail, and to show the conflict that occurred behind the 'stage' of this meeting the following part is going to show the opinion of the mayor of Khiam that I have interviewed shortly after this meeting.

I met the mayor in the Khiam municipality building during one of the meetings he had with an UNIFIL unit planning an inauguration. It occurred just before Ahmadinejad's visit to southern Lebanon in 2010. The municipality building is one of the newest and biggest municipality buildings I have seen so far in southern Lebanon. It is built a little up the hill of the village, very close to the place of the former Khiam prison, now an almost empty field with little remaining of the prison if there wasn't a sign marking it. It was destroyed in the war of 2006 and with it one of the biggest remaining objects that remind of the Israeli occupation of the country. The Khiam prison used to be the main detention center in Lebanon during that time. Stories of people remembering the imprisonment itself or the severe inhuman conditions of the prison are everywhere; former inmates, their families, friends and other acquaintances aware of the situation remember them.

The mayor is relatively young, maybe in his early thirties. He interrupts the interview several times, because people would call or try to talk to him in person constantly. Last time I met him he was arranging a date for an inauguration with

UNIFIL. Today he tells me he had to cancel the date due to Ahmadinejad's visit. Furthermore he explains to me the situation that had led to the tense atmosphere before their last meeting took place. The situation started to be tense shortly after the incidents of the summer 2010 when UNIFIL tried to actively search houses suspicious of stocking missiles. The mayor explains to me why this has led to a conflict between the municipality and the forces:

> M.K. This has to do with their behavior that doesn't make the people feel well. For example if they [Israel] come and violate in certain areas, like recently happened in Adaysseh, as one example. After all, the initial reason for their presence is to prevent violations from happening. UNIFIL is impartial. Instead of preventing violations on this side just sides with Israel and allows violations to happen on a daily basis.[268]
>
> S.K. So you mean it is only recognizing one side of the situation?
>
> M.K. Yes, it is just regarding one side of the situation. So it came to this area and what has it done? Every day we witness air violations by Israeli planes. Whoever lives in Lebanon knows and spends the whole day observing and witnessing these air violations. Or there are cases where they violate the border and kidnap people. Or in some places, like in Ghajar they are still occupying the land. The Shebaa farms are still occupied which shows another violation on a daily basis. So we see all these violations and ask what is UNIFIL doing? What are they observing? […] Their role is just to count how many Israelis entered this country. [Laughter]. They are just observing. How many violated… So their role is just to observe and record. But this does not help anything.
>
> Unfortunately they were not able to prevent conflict. They were not able to intervene or to act in time. This gives a country who sees that it is able to invade whenever the chance to think that, oh well, UNIFIL is not able to prevent its border if we violate it, so we will keep doing it on their own. This is one part.[269]
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> […]
>
> So this created a situation in the region where in the end the LAF [Lebanese Armed Forces], the only official authority on the ground, was ignored. For example, so how should the people be able work with them in confidence? And the army is the instance here that all the people trust. When they ignore them, then of course they will create a problem. Even them they gave their plans and said they were going to do it, so…[270]

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[268] Mayor Khiam, 1; in *Friedenspolitik Im Südlibanon,* 50.

[269] Mayor of Khiam, 1-2; in *Friedenspolitik Im Südlibanon,* 50.

[270] Mayor of Khiam, 2-3. in *Friedenspolitik Im Südlibanon,* 51.

The mayor contextualizes the actual fears and discontentment in southern Lebanon and explains why UNIFIL's mission cannot be trusted or taken in to serious account by the people of southern Lebanon. Furthermore this interview underlines the practices that were explained in the previous part by the soldier and how they are understood or how it reaches them here. During my observations in the municipality, when the UNIFIL soldiers met with the mayor to plan an inauguration, I notice that the relationship among them seems very cold and mutually almost unwanted. The following description of the mayor's difficulties with their previous interactions will provide an explanation for this broken liaison.

> Of course, their intentions are to have some general interactions with the people. And this is what they say, that there has to be interactions with the people. We don't think that, because of this situation, it is important to have a good relationship with UNIFIL, the Spaniards or with anyone of their forces. It is important to have a relationship, something in the middle. But the relation, has to build first, has to be built on support. The projects that are executed in certain areas make people feel that there are people who care. This is one perspective. It makes people feel this way, for example those who apply for help. But also, it is a good example to show that they [UNIFIL] make a big deal out of it. They fund something and make a big thing out of it and the amount that is funded is sometimes not worth this big thing around it…No, I mean we support it, this area needs progress. We support these projects…but also they have to be kept in a relation somehow. This area has been under severe violence over decades, the people here live under bad circumstances. Especially during and after a war like in 2006, people here need support. Also, the chance of a new assault is always possible. The region needs support, people that stand with them, they need it and the presence and duty of UNIFIL should be to help the people that was exposed to this violence.[271]

He points out several issues he has with the UNIFIL mandate, the forces, and their presence and mission on southern Lebanese territory. He explains the situation in southern Lebanon as one of continuous Israeli violations on Lebanese territory and a constant insecurity of the population.[272] He shows the history of this region and points

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[271] Mayor of Khiam, 2-3. in *Friedenspolitik Im Südlibanon* 53.

[272] Ibid., 1; 50.

out what effect the Israeli occupation had on the people. For him, the aggressor in this conflict is clear: it was Israel who "came and assaulted [our] country."[273] Of an impartial UN, that respects humanity, he expects the following: "All that we are saying is that we want to preserve our borders, our people, our country. This is all we want. And this is what we expect from the UN."[274] Here is, also, where he places the creation of the resistance:

> The Israelis, and we all verify this; the resistance just came to existence to be able to face Israeli violations. If there wasn't the resistance, until today, it would be able to enter this place and nobody could do anything against it. So now, before it acts it has to make his calculations. Its hand is not as it used to be anymore, how you say, absolute.[275]

On the other hand, he notes, the role they are performing at the moment is simply an observing one. He blames UNIFIL for being inactive and unable to prevent conflict in the past decades, "Israel did a massacre, in the UN building. And what was UNIFIL able to do? Nothing. "[276] "Israel had occupied our country for a long time and they were not able to come to an agreement with it." This inability to act and prevent violations from happening provides the southern Lebanese with reason to protect their borders on their own.[277] UNIFIL is regarded as protector of the people, if it doesn't fulfill this role; they lose the trust in it.

> UNIFIL is lacking the trust, and the UN generally speaking. The politics of the UN are obvious, because there is a certain viewpoint, that fundamentally […] there is a power that can easily impose everything it wants on the people, to a degree that, take the invasion of Iraq, for example. The US invaded it, occupied it, they killed the civilians, under a lie that is the possession of weapons of mass

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[273] Ibid.

[274] Ibid.

[275] Ibid., 4; 54.

[276] Ibid., 2; 51.

[277] Ibid., 1-2; 50.

destruction. And the UN what did it do? The opposite, they just let this happen…so generally speaking you can say that the UN is following certain paths.[278] […] This organization does want to be impartial, but in the end there is one powerful actor in and within it that does not allow anyone to intervene- indeed, it is very bias.[279]

There are several reasons to question the UN's impartiality in this region, and recent developments are no exception. The imbalance in the resolutions of the UNSC is predominant in the recently passed resolutions and developments in the region, such as the discarding of the Goldstone[280] Report and the divisive UN Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL). Its investigation is regarded very ambivalently by the Lebanese and in fact has deeply divided the nation into supporting and opposing camps. Today, there are major discrepancies between the pro-American March 14 coalition and the March 8 opposition. This division has led to the failure of the government in January 2011, because it is assumed that various Hizballah members will be accused of involvement in the killing of former Prime Minister Rafic Hariri in 2005. For the mayor the partiality of the UN is more obvious than ever in this case: "And it says it is an international tribunal…other Lebanese got killed and where is the international tribunal. Why isn't there a tribunal for other people who got killed?"[281]

After having UNIFIL in Lebanon for such a long time without any improvement of the situation it is not surprising to the mayor that the people in the south do not believe in its good intentions anymore. Furthermore he describes that there are certain

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[278] Ibid., 2; 51.

[279] Ibid.

[280] For Goldstone see talk by Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs. "Summary of the Goldstone Report lecture with Col. Desmond Travers and Ms. Hina Jilani of the Goldstone Commission," available from http://www.aub.edu.lb/ifi/international_affairs/unmeri/Pages/unmeri_events.aspx; Internet, accessed on 12 November 2011. For STL see official STL webpage: "The Special Tribunal for Lebanon," available from https://www.stl-tsl.org/; Internet, accessed on 12 November 2011.

[281] Ibid., 7-8; 58.

issues with UNIFIL's behavior that are unacceptable, for example, when they want to

enter houses or places without coordinating with the LAF, or take pictures of people,

places and car plates. Similar was the case in Khirbet Slim and Touline in July 2010,

where he explains that UNIFIL executed maneuvers without getting the agreement of

the LAF. For him, situations like this do prevent a feeling of confidence towards the

UNIFIL troops. He explains further reasons for not having confidence to the troops is

because everything that they report to the NY Office arrives in a way in Israel. Here are

sensible issues at stake that concern Hizballah and information about positions,

weapons caches etc.; any report of such information can be perceived as spying.

Especially when Israel is able to get a hold of it. The only way to defend themselves and

prevent such a thing to happen is to not let UNIFIL in their houses.[282]

> It should investigate so its mission will stay impartial. And this is role does not guarantee that it is possible to implement this mission fully. […]Are they doing the same things on the other side, they are doing here? Do they do maneuvers on the other side like they do here in these regions? Are their intentions to save civilian lives on this side the same as their intentions to safe them there? For example, so how should the people find confidence in this mission if this is all not substantially guaranteed? And especially regarding the resistance….the army, the people, the resistance, they all have interrelations and these interactions decide that we are against…that we do not need this international peace force.[283]

> Because sometimes, they come in the middle of the night or they just want to enter things…what are you doing? I mean they should speak or do something so the people can build confidence in their presence here, what they are doing is more scaring them off, especially at night. I mean why are they doing his? For the security of the people? If they want to help them, they have to prevent these violations from happening.[284]

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[282] Ibid., 7; 58.

[283] Ibid., 3; 52.

[284] Ibid., 5; 55.

UNIFIL's support for this region is insufficient in the mayor's opinion, compared to the needs of the population.[285] He explains to me that often the promised projects take one to two years to be fulfilled. About the project they were talking about in the meeting I had observed between them he argues that "they make apologies that some things prevented them from acting upon it. [...] Time should be faster and the resources better. It should be more effective. The projects should be...there should be more money invested for the time we are investing in it."[286] Usually, every project UNIFIL conducts is inaugurated. One job of the CIMIC Officers in coordination with the Civil Affairs department is it to make the necessary arrangements for these inaugurations. In Khiam it was the case during the meeting that they were looking for a date on which an inauguration for recently donated litter boxes was supposed to happen. About the weird tension in the office I observed earlier I found out that the relationship was indeed weakened through that time because of the happenings in Adaysse, when artillery fire broke out between LAF and IDF soldiers because of an unclear borderline skirmish.[287] Any problem in the area reflects on the relationship with the forces.[288] The mayor was generally not happy with the amount that was spent on projects in Khiam- in his opinion the projects are too small compared with the size of the village and it is generally not enough to really help the region. It should be the duty of the international community to help them, as people that were exposed to violence.[289] He thinks that what the international community is doing in this region is not going to change the

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[285] Throughout the meeting the mayor belittles their efforts and laughs about the proposed help that for him is so obviously a joke.

[286] Mayor of Khiam, 6, 9; 56, 58.

[287] Ibid., 6; 57.

[288] Mayor of Khiam, 9;58.

[289] Ibid., 5; 56.

major problem with the political situation but rather healing little wounds of the people to make them feel the presence of the international community. Yet, the help the international community offers discourages him: "We are not talking about UNIFIL now, we are talking about countries if that would really care about the suffering of humans. Because the feelings of the person or the people and it is there responsibility to see that this person has suffered and they should help him develop and overcome the bad effects the occupation had."[290]

When he talks about the 2006 war he emphasizes this partiality and the way the international community dealt with the situation. For him, the grievance of the act was as incomprehensible as was the disproportionateness of the war. "Nobody did anything to stop Israel in this course of war. Similar was it with the war and the siege on Gaza."[291] He looks back to the time when UNIFIL II was deployed after the war, when Merkel pointed out in a speech that UNIFIL troops are being sent to the south in order to protect Israel. Merkel's speech caused many problems in the region in 2006.[292] Though it wasn't accurate and denounced by UNIFIL, it stayed in the minds of the people, implying motives of UNIFIL other than to help.[293]

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[290] Ibid.

[291] Ibid., 7; 57.

[292] Ralf Beste, Ralf Neukirch and Christoph Schult, "Bedingungslose Nähe," Spiegel Online; available from http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-56240563.html; Internet, accessed on, 13 November 2011. "Als erste Kanzlerin schickte Merkel deutsche Soldaten in den Nahen Osten. Seit Oktober 2006 patrouillieren Boote der Bundesmarine als Teil der Unifil-Truppe der Vereinten Nationen vor der Küste Libanons. Deutschland müsse zur Sicherheit Israels beitragen, begründete Merkel den Einsatz."- "Absolute Proximity-"As first chancellor Merkel sent German soldiers in the Near East. Since October 2006 boats of the Bundesmarine are patrolling as part of the UNIFIL troops of the United Nations by the Lebanese coast. Germany must contribute to the security of Israel, Merkel explained the deployment.

[293] Ibid. p. 9.

Considering all points he makes in the interview with me it becomes understandable why he cannot take the efforts that appear so superficial and minor to him as anything serious. Especially regarding recent UN efforts in this region, where internationally executed investigations against Israeli war crimes, as represented in the Goldstone report, remain unsanctioned.

Finally, observing this interaction between the mayor and the CIMIC soldiers/Civil Affairs raises one important question: While Civil Affairs supposed role is to improve and sustain relations to the civilians, it seems in this case they are not very interested in addressing the mayor's discontent. Instead they impose their own model of improving relations that consists of funding projects, inaugurating and documenting them. The point of the *meeting* itself and whether actual issues could be addressed here or not, is not further investigated. Rather, it seems, the soldiers and officers wanted to check that point off their list and plan an inauguration ignoring the unease of the mayor. This shows how Civil Affairs turns the UN-declared state of instability into a process of international bureaucracy.

The two vignettes presented in this chapter show clearly that Civil Affairs at UNIFIL excludes any political occurrence or disagreement. As I learn from the CAO, Hizballah or opinions of people siding with them are considered to be not "neutral".[294] On the other hand, ignoring this political context and not acting upon it, as shown in the last two examples, states an attempt to depoliticize the entire situation. From the point of view of the teacher as well as the mayor, Hizballah plays a big role in the lives of people; they are deeply connected to the community, indeed they *are* the community

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[294] Susann Kassem, "The UN Peacekeeping Agenda in a Southern Lebanese Village-"The International Community" and Local Autonomy", in *Newsletter No. 9*, Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs, (Beirut: June 2011), 13.

and not a foreign force. In the south, despite some internal political discrepancies, Hizballah's resistance force is largely supported, both theoretically and physically.[295] The resistance plays a big role within the population. The existence of the Israeli state and their actions in Lebanon have had major effects on the people in southern Lebanon, and regarding Israel's support of the South Lebanese army during the civil war, this led to a stronger division among the different sectarian groups.[296] Banning political issues in events such as the inauguration in order to preserve what UNIFIL perceives as a "neutral" situation indicates a very clear attempt to depoliticize the people.

One of the main roles of Civil Affairs is to win the 'hearts and minds' of the people, not to interfere in political matters. As I stated earlier, UNIFIL's involvement on the ground is not only beneficial for the people. Moreover it exists in order to implement UNIFIL's mandate. As Neocleous outlines correctly:

> Pacification is also very much about culture and ideology ('hearts and minds'), productivity and development ('modernization'), welfare and sexuality (from population censuses and surveys through to 'erotic' pamphlets), and much more, a range of activities which explain the numerous name changes undergone by

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[295] This support has to be seen in a historical context. Blida has suffered a lot and gone through various occupations and attacks of Israel, starting in 1948/49, when the Nakba took place. Since the Israeli state was created in 1948, life for the people in southern Lebanon has changed enormously.[295] In several interviews I have conducted with the population, it became clear that they do not fight for the sake of Hizballah because of its political agenda, as UNIFIL employees conceptualize their support, moreover Hizballah exists and came to existence through the merely reason of the liberation of the peoples homes and lands and is made up by people of the south itself, that united for and with a reason.

[296] "The Israelis intensified their contacts with the Maronite border villages, which had hitherto coexisted peacefully with their Muslim neighbours, exchanging visits on the occasion of funerals and days of mourning, weddings, and religious feast days. As a youth in Bint Jubayl, I remember how young people used to walk to the neighbouring village of Ain Ible for a beer (prohibited in Shiite villages) and to watch the pretty girls out strolling of a summer evening. […] It soon became clear that the Israeli goal was to cut the Maronite villages off from their Muslim environment. None of the villages was more than 3 km from the border, which made it easy to provision and arm them so as to open a new front against the Palestinians. In implementing this policy, Israel worked through the Kataeb party, which it had been secretly assisting throughout the war and which already had a limited presence in each of these villages." Ahmad Beydoun, "The South Lebanese Border Zone: A Local Perspective," *Institute for Palestine Studies* (University of California Press), Spring 1992: 41.

specific pacifications such as the war on Vietnam: Reconstruction, Rural Construction, Revolutionary Reconstruction, Land Development, Civic Action, and so on, all expressing the 'productive side' of power, as Foucault might have said and President Johnson more or less did say.[297]

UNIFIL has to perform projects as such to be able to maintain their authority and facilitate the implementation of their pacification. Further, as the Civil Affairs Officer explains to me in an interview after this inauguration, these projects serve as entrance into the society in order to determine their political affiliation, with the main goal to "outreach"[298] individuals or organizations that are not politically affiliated.

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[297] Neocleous, 14.

[298] Civil Affairs Officer, 6; Published in Susann Kassem, "The UN Peacekeeping Agenda in a Southern Lebanese Village- "The International Community" and Local Autonomy", in *Newsletter No. 9*, Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs, (Beirut: June 2011), 13.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

QUICK IMPACT PROJECTS: RITUALS AND REPRESENTATIONS OF THE SPATIALIZATION OF STATE POWER AT UNIFIL

> Soldiers generally are good people. And if they see someone who needs help and they say, they can't even put up the fence here, we have the right equipment; we can just help them, and pick up the fence. Military and peacekeeping missions generally carry out small projects in areas where they are deployed, and that takes very different forms from country to country. And the idea is that as a military in and amongst a civilian population you are an imposition you are a burden on the population. [299]

> [QIPs] are really meant to just support the fact that, you know, you have a large peacekeeping mission in an area and your relationship with the people and that you can sometimes do something positive for the people.[300]

UNIFIL describes the involvement of the soldiers as beneficial "activities" rather than as a part of a general western humanitarian approach to peace. The actions pursued by the soldiers that are described by the Senior Officer for Political Affairs as voluntary, are in fact deeply shaped by and embedded in neoliberal ideas about development and political stability. James Ferguson and Akhil Gupta describe a condition such as UNIFIL's as "images of state vertical encompassment" that "are influential not only because of their impact on how scholars, journalists, officials, activists, and citizens imagine and inhabit states, but because they come to be embedded in the routinized practices of state bureaucracies."[301] Only an anthropological approach can adequately

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[299] Senior Officer for Political Affairs, Interview by Susann Kassem, (14 May 2009), 6. In *Friedenspolitik Im Südlibanon, Unpublished Thesis*, (Humboldt-University Berlin: June 2009), 20.

[300] Ibid.

[301] Ferguson and Gupta, 983.

recover the embedded processes of knowledge and power as they play out within the institutions of transnational governmentality and, in turn, amongst those whom they govern. These images of state can be observed in procedures and practices that traditional political and social science may neglect.[302] As the examples provided in this thesis demonstrate, rituals such as the Quick Impact Projects, the inauguration ceremony and in a general sense all the meetings between UNIFIL and the population's representatives, show a dominant mode of Western state bureaucratic control that is implemented in southern Lebanon. European countries finance the humanitarian projects, UNIFIL, and influence their implementation. Looking at the QIPs in this light, I argue that the donor country, in this instance Spain, is present in everyday practices of its messenger, the Spanish soldiers.

> The force of metaphors of verticality and encompassment results both from the fact that they are embedded in the everyday practices of state institutions and from the fact that the routine operation of state institutions produces spatial and scalar hierarchies.[303]

As we have seen in the description of the previous chapter, UNIFIL's QIPs serve to obtain and sustain an access to the southern Lebanese population in order to implement UNIFIL's military practice. Further, the QIP serve as a socio-political access point which creates and strengthens networks between UNIFIL and individuals, groups and organizations *not* affiliated with Hizballah. Flows of money, people (experts) and ideas (humanitarian and development discourse) are directed to these potential allies. This outreach to a nascent clientele is needed in order to establish UNIFIL's authority in the region—something that ultimately implies an attempt to subvert and even to replace the social net of the resistance (Hizballah). This practice is obviously not one that can be

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[302] Scott, James. In Ferguson and Gupta, 984.

[303] Ferguson and Gupta, 984.

realized without power. This power or dominance starts with the bureaucratization of the southern Lebanese economic development along the lines of Western methods of adjustment. Once free "grassroots" organizations are determined as clients, a native shadow bureaucracy emerges. Now, rather than simply receiving aid, local groups become enfranchised within funding relationships through their empowerment and training in grant-writing processes as they go onto receive funding directly from other international organizations, such as the UNDP. This involvement undoubtedly constitutes a process of the projection of Western power (as Western donor countries remain the financial center of gravity) as is evidence by the stated goal of such interventions: to win the support of the people—showing that UNIFIL is changing the situation for the better, not the opposite. At the same time this process implies an attempt to weaken the connection between the people and the resistance (Hizballah). By focusing on aid and development, UNIFIL is defusing a potentially politicized population on the border with Israel. Of course, supporting UNIFIL's troops also implies supporting the political goals of the mission.

Hence, the support the soldiers provide is not an unconditional form of *'help'* as described by the Senior Officer for Political Affairs. On the contrary, the soldiers are not acting out of a personal notion of benevolence; they are carrying out a mission and have been trained to work in the way their institution desires them to. The execution of projects in the south is not just a benefit for the Lebanese people.[304] The so-called "Quick Impact Projects" (QIP), are designed to be able to "win the support of the population"[305] in the words of the Spanish CIMIC unit. To win the support of the people

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[304] Spanish CIMIC Unit, Interview by Susann Kassem, "Interview on UNIFIL-Spanish CIMIC Unit," 5. In *Unpublished Thesis*, (Humboldt-University Berlin: June 2009), 36.

[305] Ibid, 1; 34.

for the fulfillment of mandate 1701 which, as we have seen in my earlier analysis, has as its main object the prevention of any retaliation or "hostile activity happen[ing] from the area where [they] are."[306] One way of pursuing this is, is to find people, informants, among the population that would tell them about any relevant happenings in the region.

> For example if you have a situation in which, I mean we had several times when rockets have been launched from south Lebanon into Israel, if we got indications, really strong ones, and were different people would be telling us listen we see we know the preparations that were happenings, we don't exactly know where but maybe this area maybe that, in such a case and we have done it in the past, then we would really send out as many troops as possible to prevent this from happening. With the idea that when you have many troops outside, you know, you see more you hear more and maybe you can prevent people, people from…placing rockets.[307]

UNIFIL is really aiming at preventing any kind of attack on Israel from Southern Lebanon and its activities, such as the QIPs, must be seen as the non-military corollary of this kind of thinking.

UNIFIL as a political institution is acting in the name of influential states, in this instance, the Spanish authorities. Their foreign policy assumption is that a Spanish presence can help influence the situation in a manner broadly consonant with EU interests as well as the role the Spanish Government wishes to play as an earnest and responsible member of the 'international community'. Processes such as the bureaucracy in the application procedure of the projects can be regarded as "coercive power" of a state. [308] According to James Scott these "transformative state

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[306] Senior Officer for Political Affairs, Interview by Susann Kassem, (14 May 2009), 9. In *Friedenspolitik Im Südlibanon, Unpublished Thesis*, (Humboldt-University Berlin: June 2009), 20.

[307] Ibid., 8-9; 20.

[308] James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State. How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed. (Yale University Press: 1998), 4.

simplifications" constitute "the administrative ordering of nature by society."[309] The happenings that took place mainly in summer 2010 but also on different occasions when UNIFIL tried to enter and search buildings, show that people try to resist this unaccepted form of foreign governmentality. In fact, Ferguson and Gupta argue, "[a] host of mundane rituals and procedures are required to animate and naturalize metaphors" for states "to succeed in being imagined as both higher than, and encompassing of, society.[310] Therefore, UNIFIL work is carefully structured and pursued in order to achieve this power. Further, as I explain in the first chapter and which I make more clear in my fieldwork of the previous chapter, development projects function in order to fulfill a particular goal in the country where they are being implemented: to enforce certain political ideas. Gupta and Ferguson have shown in their fieldwork that in fact development aid is a way for states to control other states and remain in power. They perform their power and domination over the Global South in a truly neocolonial manner. In parallel, I show the same effect with my example of the work of the Civil Affairs Department at UNIFIL and how it "secure[s] legitimacy, to naturalize[s] [its] authority and to represent [itself] as superior to and encompassing of other institutions and centers of power."[311] Embodied procedures of their humanitarian projects are being utilized in order to engender some measure of popular support for the political and military implications of the mission. While there is a minimal acceptance of their presence, until today continuous attacks against the peacekeepers remain and various European contributors (against whom these attacks are mostly aimed) have threatened to withdraw their troops from Lebanon. Southern Lebanon still remains a

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[309] Ibid., 3.

[310] Ferguson and Gupta, 984.

[311] Ferguson and Gupta, 982.

stronghold of social, political, and military support for Hizballah, thus negating one of UNIFIL's primary goals—the end of armed resistance against Israel in Lebanon—five years after the war of 2006 and thirty-three years after UNIFIL was first implanted on Lebanese territory.

On a practical level, this thesis is arguing that the economic and humanitarian benefits of UNIFIL create a positive climate that contributes to the acceptance of foreign forces on southern Lebanese territory. On the other hand, the military practice of UNIFIL is firmly rejected by the populace. It can be said, that the engagement of UNIFIL leads to a partial positive reception among the population. The Head of Civil Affairs remarked in an interview: "they see the benefits, both economically and the presence of UNIFIL brings the attention that Lebanon is not neglected." As the Civil Affairs Officer explains to me, although the local population does not have a problem with UNIFIL personally, often the nature of disagreements is political:

> It is really politically. And politically they are not that happy with them [UNIFIL] staying there… As we were on many occasions told local people don't have problems with us […]…they are quite happy with us, a human dimension, because of the humanitarian efforts that UNIFIL is doing. […] What they have problems with is the continuous air violation and the blue line violations, especially here in the area of Blida, where the Blue Line mark has become a continuous issue […].[312]

This political rejection is largely due to UNIFIL's military practice that goes back to UNSCR 1701. This confirms the partiality of its mission, based on UNSCR 1701, which blames Hizballah for the war in 2006 and that mainly, regards the disarmament of Hizballah as the key to reestablish "international peace and security." Hizballah is perceived by the international community as an oppressive terrorist force that is leading

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[312] Civil Affairs Officer, Interview by Susann Kassem, "Interview on Civil Affairs at UNIFIL." Published in Susann Kassem, "The UN Peacekeeping Agenda in a Southern Lebanese Village- "The International Community" and Local Autonomy", in *Newsletter No. 9*, Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs, (Beirut: June 2011), 15.

to the destruction of civil society, rather than as a popular political body created out of resistance to an army of occupation. This leads to a very problematic issue, not at least because it challenges UNIFIL's presumably "neutral" role. Looking at the history of peacekeeping it becomes clear, that UNIFIL and its rules of engagement according to 1701 are strongly connected to the practice of the Bush-era US Department of State's initiative for a "New Middle East". The strong continuity between US, UN, and Israeli positions therefore leads to the partiality of UNIFIL. This in turn translates into a very critical and suspicious view of UNIFIL in the region.

On the other hand, UNIFIL's economic development programs *do* create a climate of positive support arising largely out of employment and investment opportunities, as well as humanitarian aid for the people of southern Lebanon. These oppositional tendencies led to a complex dynamic. UNIFIL often is perceived as a foreign power that has been forced on the Lebanese population. Regardless of the effort that UNIFIL is putting into the relationship with the population, mistrust continues to persist. It is a mistrust that is not based on the reaction of the population towards the UNIFIL employees themselves, but rather is based on the fact that UNIFIL is an institution of international organization *par excellence*, and the population definitely feels unfairly treated on the level of international relations. Additionally, I argue that UNIFIL's development efforts serve the safety of its troops against a local upheaval and as a legitimation of its presence in south Lebanon. Without these efforts the population would have practically no reason to accept a foreign presence on their land, even if they are here as "peacekeepers". Are they here to "keep the peace"? Peace for whom? Who do they want to protect? These are questions that were and are still raised by the inhabitants, especially after 2006.

They can't say anything, they are guests, and in the end we could ask them, "Why are you here? On this side of the border, not on the other?" And it is clear. Israel can invade our country whenever it wants; violate the air space, whenever it wants. This is normal, everybody knows. But we work with them, accept them here, we know it's not their fault.[313]

The mayor of Blida emphasizes that even though UNIFIL was created at the international level to prevent conflict, it is often perceived by the population of southern Lebanon as an unequal and illegitimate sanction forced on Lebanon by the international community. I show in this thesis how the projection of "peace" by the international community functions. Clearly, similar to war, peace is a process that has to be forced upon a society through power. This thesis shows how and under which circumstances this power is driven. The reasons for UNIFIL's acceptance in southern Lebanon are not guaranteed through the improvement of "cultural" difference and understanding, but because of the enhancement of the general economic situation that comes with the short-term development projects of the UNIFIL force. This enhancement is further used to establish an apparatus on the ground in order to curtail a political force that is not regarded as legitimate by the international community. Contrarily, by the inhabitants of southern Lebanon this resistance movement is regarded and elected as legitimate power.

The commuting of staff and military personnel that I presented earlier in this thesis can be described with Mariella Pandolfi's term as "mobile, migrant sovereignties", a global knowledge that moves from one country to the next, depending on in which declared "emergency" or in this case "conflict situation" it will be needed next. This creates a mobile governing body that is "determined to *help*"- when it can

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[313] Mayor of Blida, Interview by Susann Kassem, published in Susann Kassem, "The UN Peacekeeping Agenda in a Southern Lebanese Village- "The International Community" and Local Autonomy", in *Newsletter No. 9*, Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs, (Beirut: June 2011), 16.

and *where* it can.[314] UNIFIL therefore can be regarded as an "autonomous interlocutor" a political agency that deploys its "expertise" independently from national and governmental institutions in the name of the "international community."[315]

> In this operation, whereby the world's disorders, whether natural or human in origin, become equated, we can see a form of naturalization-or depoliticization-of war. Indeed, the humanitarianization of intervention implies the neutralization of conflict situations.

As Pandolfi explains, in the past, the US and the countries of Western Europe have intervened in "regions where economic and strategic issues are at stake" and this happened "with or without backing of the UN Security Council."[316] UNIFIL, the United Nations Interim Force In Lebanon, is one example of such an intervention made under international aegis, one that was in this instance meant to strategically undermine Hizballah's influence in the region.

This thesis demonstrates that this international mandate is not perceived as a legitimate authority in southern Lebanon. Further, it argues, that in order to overcome this perception or, in other words, the strong disapproval of the force by the citizens of southern Lebanon, UNIFIL operates not solely as a military but also as a humanitarian mission. In the studies presented in the first chapter I showed how in the past, humanitarian interventions as well as development projects constitute a new, neoliberal approach to maintain hegemony over the Global South. The dynamics that drive UNIFIL are not just clear to the people in southern Lebanon that have dismissed the

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[314] "My argument is that the military forces and multi- and bilateral organizations are transforming into a new form of transnational domination." Pandolfi, "Contract of Mutual Indifference," 371.

[315] Pandolfi, "Contemporary State of Emergency," 14.

[316] Pandolfi, "Contemporary State of Emergency," 13.

mission and its work on various occasions in recent years. Moreover *realpolitik* of the

mission appears to be equally visible to the *missionaries* of the mission itself:

> But then I also realize that there are issues that are beyond my capacity, beyond the mayor's capacity. That are, you know, high political issues and not even the first commander can address them. So and that is something that comes from…you know. Not even New York, because UN is something like an omnipotent authority. It is a connection with states, its like as in every multistate entity there are interests prevailing. We are trying to keep it neutral, we are trying to keep it impartial and everything, a lot depends on individual approach and how you try to implement what you get from New York, but then there are some things that are beyond our resolution.[317]

Although they observe discrepancies between the work they are conducting on the

ground and the people's response to it, they are tied to certain procedures or *techniques*

of their work that I refer to as their *expertise.* This allows for the process of the daily

reinscription of governmentality through the control apparatus of UNIFIL and the

acquiescence- if not the support or approval- of the local population. This thesis has

helped in exploring the internal functioning of UNIFIL expertise through an

anthropological exploration of institutional practices. Further, it has provided a view

from below; showing the direct implications this mission has on both its promoters (its

employees) and recipients (the people of southern Lebanon).

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[317] Civil Affairs Officer, Interview by Susann Kassem, "Interview on Civil Affairs at UNIFIL", 5, in *Friedenspolitik im Südlibanon*, *Unpublished Thesis,* (*Humboldt-University Berlin:* June 2009), 20.

APPENDIX I

UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL
RESOLUTIONS

At its 2073rd meeting, on 18 March 1978, the Council decided to invite the representative of the Sudan to participate, without vote, in the discussion of the question.

At its 2074th meeting, on 19 March 1978, the Council decided to invite the representatives of Iraq, Mongolia, Pakistan and Qatar to participate, without vote, in the discussion of the question.

Resolution 425 (1978)

of 19 March 1978

The Security Council,

Taking note of the letters from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon[19] and from the Permanent Representative of Israel,[20]

Having heard the statements of the Permanent Representatives of Lebanon and Israel,[21]

Gravely concerned at the deterioration of the situation in the Middle East and its consequences to the maintenance of international peace,

Convinced that the present situation impedes the achievement of a just peace in the Middle East,

1. *Calls* for strict respect for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries;

2. *Calls upon* Israel immediately to cease its military action against Lebanese territorial integrity and withdraw forthwith its forces from all Lebanese territory;

3. *Decides,* in the light of the request of the Government of Lebanon, to establish immediately under its authority a United Nations interim force for Southern Lebanon for the purpose of confirming the withdrawal of Israeli forces, restoring international peace and security and assisting the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in the area, the force to be composed of personnel drawn from Member States;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Council within twenty-four hours on the implementation of the present resolution.

Adopted at the 2074th meeting by 12 votes to none, with 2 abstentions (Czechoslovakia, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics).[22]

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[19] *Ibid.,* documents S/12600 and S/12606.
[20] *Ibid.,* document S/12607.
[21] *Ibid., Thirty-third Year,* 2071st meeting.
[22] One member (China) did not participate in the voting.

Resolution 426 (1978)

of 19 March 1978

The Security Council

1. *Approves* the report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 425 (1978), contained in document S/12611 of 19 March 1978;[23]

2. *Decides* that the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon shall be established in accordance with the above-mentioned report for an initial period of six months, and that it shall continue in operation thereafter, if required, provided the Security Council so decides.

Adopted at the 2075th meeting by 12 votes to none, with 2 abstentions (Czechoslovakia, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics).[24]

Decision

At its 2076th meeting, on 3 May 1978, the Council proceeded with the discussion of the item entitled "The situation in the Middle East: letter dated 1 May 1978 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council (S/12675)".[25]

Resolution 427 (1978)

of 3 May 1978

The Security Council,

Having considered the letter dated 1 May 1978 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council,[26]

Recalling its resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978) of 19 March 1978,

1. *Approves* the increase in the strength of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon requested by the Secretary-General from 4,000 to approximately 6,000 troops;

2. *Takes note* of the withdrawal of Israeli forces that has taken place so far;

3. *Calls upon* Israel to complete its withdrawal from all Lebanese territory without any further delay;

4. *Deplores* the attacks on the United Nations Force that have occurred and demands full respect for the United Nations Force from all parties in Lebanon.

Adopted at the 2076th meeting by 12 votes to none, with 2 abstentions (Czechoslovakia, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics).[27]

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[23] See *Official Records of the Security Council, Thirty-third Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1978.*
[24] One member (China) did not participate in the voting.
[25] See *Official Records of the Security Council, Thirty-third Year, Supplement for April, May and June 1978.*
[26] *Ibid.,* document S/12675.
[27] One member (China) did not participate in the voting.

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Referring to the humanitarian principles of the Geneva Conventions of 1949[33] and to the obligations arising from the regulations annexed to The Hague Convention of 1907,[34]

Recalling its resolutions 512 (1982) and 513 (1982),

1. *Demands* that the Government of Israel lift immediately the blockade of the city of Beirut in order to permit the dispatch of supplies to meet the urgent needs of the civilian population and allow the distribution of aid provided by United Nations agencies and by non-governmental organizations, particularly the International Committee of the Red Cross;

2. *Requests* the Secretary-General to transmit the text of the present resolution to the Government of Israel and to keep the Security Council informed of its implementation.

Adopted at the 2385th meeting by 14 to none.[36]

Resolution 516 (1982)

of 1 August 1982

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its resolutions 508 (1982), 509 (1982), 511 (1982), 512 (1982) and 513 (1982),

Recalling its resolution 515 (1982),

Alarmed by the continuation and intensification of military activities in and around Beirut,

Taking note of the latest massive violations of the cease-fire in and around Beirut,

1. *Confirms* its previous resolutions and demands an immediate cease-fire, and a cessation of all military activities within Lebanon and across the Lebanese-Israeli border;

2. *Authorizes* the Secretary-General to deploy immediately, on the request of the Government of Lebanon, United Nations observers to monitor the situation in and around Beirut;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report back to the Security Council on compliance with the present resolution as soon as possible and not later than four hours from now.

Adopted unanimously at the 2386th meeting.

Decisions

At the 2387th meeting, on 3 August 1982, the President read out the following statement:[37]

"Following consultations with the members of the Security Council, I have been authorized to make the following statement on their behalf in connection with the present grave situation in Lebanon:

" '1. The members of the Security Council are seriously concerned at the prevailing high state of tension and at reports of military movements and continued outbreaks of firing and shelling in and around

Beirut, contrary to the demand in resolution 516 (1982), which was adopted at 1325 hours, New York time, on 1 August 1982, for an immediate cease-fire and cessation of all military activities within Lebanon and across the Lebanese-Israeli border. They consider it vital that these provisions be fully implemented.

" '2. The members of the Security Council have taken note of the Secretary-General's reports submitted pursuant to resolution 516 (1982).[38] They express full support for his efforts and for the steps he has taken, following the request of the Government of Lebanon, to secure the immediate deployment of United Nations observers to monitor the situation in and around Beirut. They note with satisfaction from the Secretary-General's report that some of the parties have already assured General Erskine of their full co-operation for the deployment of United Nations observers and they call urgently on all of the parties to co-operate fully in the effort to secure effective deployment of the observers and to ensure their safety.

" '3. They insist that all parties must observe strictly the terms of resolution 516 (1982). They call further for the immediate lifting of all obstacles to the dispatch of supplies and the distribution of aid to meet the urgent needs of the civilian population in accordance with previous resolutions of the Council. The members of the Security Council will keep the situation under close review.' ''

At its 2389th meeting, on 4 August 1982, the Council decided to invite the representatives of Cuba and India to participate, without vote, in the discussion of the question.

Resolution 517 (1982)

of 4 August 1982

The Security Council,

Deeply shocked and alarmed by the deplorable consequences of the Israeli invasion of Beirut on 3 August 1982,

1. *Reconfirms* its resolutions 508 (1982), 509 (1982), 512 (1982), 513 (1982), 515 (1982) and 516 (1982);

2. *Confirms once again* its demand for an immediate cease-fire and withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon;

3. *Censures* Israel for its failure to comply with the above resolutions;

4. *Calls* for the prompt return of Israeli troops which have moved forward subsequent to 1325 hours, eastern daylight time, on 1 August 1982;

5. *Takes note* of the decision of the Palestine Liberation Organization to move the Palestinian armed forces from Beirut;

6. *Expresses its appreciation* for the efforts and steps taken by the Secretary-General to implement the provisions of resolution 516 (1982) and authorizes him, as an imme

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[36] One member (United States of America) did not participate in the voting.

[37] Document S/15342, incorporated in the record of the 2387th meeting.

[38] *Official Records of the Security Council, Thirty-seventh Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1982*, documents S/15334 and Add.1.

diate step, to increase the number of United Nations observers in and around Beirut;

7. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the implementation of the present resolution as soon as possible and not later than 1000 hours, eastern daylight time, on 5 August 1982;

8. *Decides* to meet at that time, if necessary, in order to consider the report of the Secretary-General and, in case of failure to comply by any of the parties to the conflict, to consider adopting effective ways and means in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.

Adopted at the 2389th meeting by 14 votes to none, with 1 abstention (United States of America).

Resolution 518 (1982)

of 12 August 1982

The Security Council.

Recalling its resolutions 508 (1982), 509 (1982), 511 (1982), 512 (1982), 513 (1982), 515 (1982), 516 (1982) and 517 (1982),

Expressing its most serious concern about continued military activities in Lebanon and, particularly, in and around Beirut,

1. *Demands* that Israel and all parties to the conflict observe strictly the terms of Security Council resolutions relevant to the immediate cessation of all military activities within Lebanon and, particularly, in and around Beirut;

2. *Demands* the immediate lifting of all restrictions on the city of Beirut in order to permit the free entry of supplies to meet the urgent needs of the civilian population in Beirut;

3. *Requests* the United Nations observers in, and in the vicinity of, Beirut to report on the situation;

4. *Demands* that Israel co-operate fully in the effort to secure the effective deployment of the United Nations observers, as requested by the Government of Lebanon, and in such a manner as to ensure their safety;

5. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report as soon as possible to the Security Council on the implementation of the present resolution;

6. *Decides* to meet, if necessary, in order to consider the situation upon receipt of the report of the Secretary-General.

Adopted unanimously at the 2392nd meeting.

Decision

At its 2393rd meeting, on 17 August 1982, the Council proceeded with the discussion of the item entitled "The situation in the Middle East: report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (S/15357)".[35]

Resolution 519 (1982)

of 17 August 1982

The Security Council.

Recalling its resolutions 425 (1978), 426 (1978), 427 (1978), 434 (1978), 444 (1979), 450 (1979), 459 (1979), 467 (1980), 483 (1980), 488 (1981), 490 (1981), 498 (1981), 501 (1982) and 511 (1982),

Reaffirming its resolutions 508 (1982) and 509 (1982), as well as subsequent resolutions on the situation in Lebanon,

Having studied with grave concern the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon[39] and noting its conclusions and recommendations and the wishes of the Government of Lebanon as set out therein,

Bearing in mind the need, pending an examination by the Security Council of the situation in all its aspects, to preserve in place the capacity of the United Nations to assist in the restoration of the peace and of the authority of the Government of Lebanon throughout Lebanon,

1. *Decides* to extend the present mandate of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon for a further interim period of two months, that is, until 19 October 1982;

2. *Authorizes* the Force during that period to continue to carry out, in addition, the interim tasks in the humanitarian and administrative fields assigned to it in paragraph 2 of resolution 511 (1982);

3. *Calls on* all concerned, taking into account paragraphs 5, 8, and 9 of the report of the Secretary-General on the Force, to extend full co-operation to it in the discharge of its tasks;

4. *Supports* the efforts of the Secretary-General, with a view to optimum use of observers of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, as envisaged by relevant resolutions of the Security Council;

5. *Decides* to consider the situation fully and in all its aspects before 19 October 1982.

Adopted at the 2393rd meeting by 13 votes to none, with 2 abstentions (Poland, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics).

Decision

At its 2394th meeting, on 16 September 1982, the Council decided to invite the representatives of Kuwait and the Syrian Arab Republic to participate, without vote, in the discussion of the item entitled:

"The situation in the Middle East:

"(a) Letter dated 4 June 1982 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/15162);[16]

"(b) Letter dated 28 July 1982 from the Permanent Representatives of Egypt and France to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/15316);[35]

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[39] *Ibid.*, document S/15357.

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"(c) Letter dated 16 September 1982 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/15392)".[35]

Resolution 520 (1982)

of 17 September 1982

The Security Council,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General of 15 September 1982,[40]

Condemning the murder of Bashir Gemayel, the constitutionally elected President-elect of Lebanon, and every effort to disrupt by violence the restoration of a strong, stable government in Lebanon,

Having listened to the statement by the Permanent Representative of Lebanon,[41]

Taking note of the determination of Lebanon to ensure the withdrawal of all non-Lebanese forces from Lebanon,

1. *Reaffirms* its resolutions 508 (1982), 509 (1982) and 516 (1982) in all their components;

2. *Condemns* the recent Israeli incursions into Beirut in violation of the cease-fire agreements and of Security Council resolutions;

3. *Demands* an immediate return to the positions occupied by Israel before 15 September 1982, as a first step towards the full implementation of Security Council resolutions;

4. *Calls again* for the strict respect of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity and political independence of Lebanon under the sole and exclusive authority of the Government of Lebanon through the Lebanese Army throughout Lebanon;

5. *Reaffirms* its resolutions 512 (1982) and 513 (1982), which call for respect for the rights of the civilian populations without any discrimination, and repudiates all acts of violence against those populations;

6. *Supports* the efforts of the Secretary-General to implement resolution 516 (1982), concerning the deployment of United Nations observers to monitor the situation in and around Beirut, and requests all the parties concerned to co-operate fully in the application of that resolution;

7. *Decides* to remain seized of the question and asks the Secretary-General to keep the Security Council informed of developments as soon as possible and not later than within twenty-four hours.

Adopted unanimously at the 2395th meeting.

Decision

At its 2396th meeting, on 18 September 1982, the Council decided to invite the representatives of Algeria, Democratic Yemen and Greece to participate, without vote, in the discussion of the question.

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[40] *Ibid.*, document S/15382/Add.1.
[41] *Ibid.*, *Thirty-seventh Year*, 2394th meeting.

Resolution 521 (1982)

of 19 September 1982

The Security Council,

Appalled at the massacre of Palestinian civilians in Beirut,

Having heard the report of the Secretary-General[42] at its 2396th meeting,

Noting that the Government of Lebanon has agreed to the dispatch of United Nations observers to the sites of greatest human suffering and losses in and around that city,

1. *Condemns* the criminal massacre of Palestinian civilians in Beirut;

2. *Reaffirms* once again its resolutions 512 (1982) and 513 (1982), which call for respect for the rights of the civilian populations without any discrimination, and repudiates all acts of violence against those populations;

3. *Authorizes* the Secretary-General, as an immediate step, to increase the number of United Nations observers in and around Beirut from ten to fifty, and insists that there shall be no interference with the deployment of the observers and that they shall have full freedom of movement;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Government of Lebanon, to ensure the rapid deployment of those observers in order that they may contribute in every way possible within their mandate to the effort to ensure full protection for the civilian populations;

5. *Requests* the Secretary-General, as a matter of urgency, to initiate appropriate consultations and, in particular, consultations with the Government of Lebanon on additional steps which the Security Council might take, including the possible deployment of United Nations forces, to assist that Government in ensuring full protection for the civilian populations in and around Beirut and requests him to report to the Council within forty-eight hours;

6. *Insists* that all concerned must permit United Nations observers and forces established by the Security Council in Lebanon to be deployed and to discharge their mandates and, in this connection, solemnly calls attention to the obligation of all Member States, under Article 25 of the Charter of the United Nations, to accept and carry out the decisions of the Council in accordance with the Charter;

7. *Requests* the Secretary-General to keep the Security Council informed on an urgent and continuing basis.

Adopted unanimously at the resumed 2396th meeting.

Decisions

At its 2400th meeting, on 18 October 1982, the Council decided to invite the representative of Lebanon to participate, without vote, in the discussion of the item entitled "The situation in the Middle East: report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (S/15455 and Corr.1)".[43]

At the same meeting, the Council also decided, by a vote, that an invitation should be accorded to the representative

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[42] *Ibid.*, *Thirty-seventh Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1982*, document S/15400.
[43] *Ibid.*, *Supplement for October, November and December 1982*.

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of the Palestine Liberation Organization to participate in the debate and that that invitation would confer upon it the same rights of participation as those conferred on a Member State when it was invited to participate under rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure.

Adopted by 11 votes to 1 (United States of America), with 3 abstentions (France, Japan, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland).

Resolution 523 (1982)
of 18 October 1982

The Security Council,

Having heard the statement of the President of the Republic of Lebanon,[44]

Recalling its resolutions 425 (1978), 426 (1978) and 519 (1982),

Reaffirming its resolutions 508 (1982) and 509 (1982), as well as all subsequent resolutions on the situation in Lebanon,

Having studied the report of the Secretary-General[45] and taking note of its conclusions and recommendations,

Responding to the request of the Government of Lebanon,

1. *Decides* to extend the present mandate of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon for a further interim period of three months, that is, until 19 January 1983;

2. *Insists* that there shall be no interference under any pretext with the operations of the Force and that it shall have full freedom of movement in the discharge of its mandate;

3. *Authorizes* the Force during that period to carry out, with the consent of the Government of Lebanon, interim tasks in the humanitarian and administrative fields, as indicated in resolutions 511 (1982) and 519 (1982), and to assist the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the security of all the inhabitants of the area without any discrimination;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General, within the three-month period, to consult with the Government of Lebanon and to report to the Security Council on ways and means of ensuring the full implementation of the mandate of the Force as defined in resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978), and the relevant decisions of the Council;

5. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the progress of his consultations.

Adopted at the 2400th meeting by 13 votes to none, with 2 abstentions (Poland, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics).

Decisions

In a letter dated 27 October 1982,[46] the Secretary-General informed the Council that, in accordance with the decision

[44] *Ibid., Thirty-seventh Year,* 2400th meeting.
[45] *Ibid., Thirty-seventh Year, Supplement for October, November and December 1982,* document S/15455 and Corr.1.
[46] S/15468.

of the Government of Nepal, the Nepalese contingent would be repatriated from the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon. Subject to the usual consultations, he intended to accept the offer of Finland to provide a replacement contingent of equivalent strength for service with the Force. In a letter dated 28 October,[47] the President of the Council informed the Secretary-General as follows:

"I wish to inform you that I have brought your letter dated 27 October 1982[46] concerning the organization of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon to the attention of the members of the Security Council. They considered the matter in informal consultations on 28 October and agreed with the proposals contained in your letter."

At its 2401st meeting, on 12 November 1982, the Council decided to invite the representatives of Morocco, Niger and Senegal to participate, without vote, in the discussion of the item entitled:

"The situation in the occupied Arab territories:

"Letter dated 5 November 1982 from the Permanent Representative of Morocco to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/15481);[43]

"Letter dated 9 November 1982 from the Permanent Representative of Niger to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/15483)".[43]

At the same meeting, the Council also decided, by a vote, that an invitation should be accorded to the representative of the Palestine Liberation Organization to participate in the debate and that that invitation would confer upon it the same rights of participation as those conferred on a Member State when it was invited to participate under rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure.

Adopted by 12 votes to 1 (United States of America), with 2 abstentions (France, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland).

At the same meeting, the Council further decided to extend an invitation, under rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure, to the Chairman of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People.

At its 2403rd meeting, on 29 November 1982, the Council proceeded with the discussion of the item entitled "The situation in the Middle East: report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (S/15493)".[43]

[47] S/15469.

Security Council

RESOLUTION 1223 (1999)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 3970th meeting,
on 28 January 1999

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978) of 19 March 1978,
501 (1982) of 25 February 1982, 508 (1982) of 5 June 1982, 509 (1982) of
6 June 1982 and 520 (1982) of 17 September 1982, as well as all its resolutions
on the situation in Lebanon,

Having studied the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations
Interim Force in Lebanon of 19 January 1999 (S/1999/61) and taking note of the
observations expressed and the commitments mentioned therein,

Taking note of the letter dated 8 January 1999 from the Permanent
Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-
General (S/1999/22),

Responding to the request of the Government of Lebanon,

1.   Decides to extend the present mandate of the United Nations Interim
Force in Lebanon for a further period of six months, that is until 31 July 1999;

2.   Reiterates its strong support for the territorial integrity,
sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon within its internationally
recognized boundaries;

3.   Re-emphasizes the terms of reference and general guidelines of the
Force as stated in the report of the Secretary-General of 19 March 1978
(S/12611), approved by resolution 426 (1978), and calls upon all parties
concerned to cooperate fully with the Force for the full implementation of its
mandate;

4.   Condemns all acts of violence committed in particular against the
Force, and urges the parties to put an end to them;

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Security Council

Distr.: General

12 September 2001

Resolution 1368 (2001)

**Adopted by the Security Council at its 4370th meeting, on
12 September 2001**

The Security Council,

Reaffirming the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations,

Determined to combat by all means threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts,

Recognizing the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence in accordance with the Charter,

1.   *Unequivocally condemns* in the strongest terms the horrifying terrorist attacks which took place on 11 September 2001 in New York, Washington, D.C. and Pennsylvania and *regards* such acts, like any act of international terrorism, as a threat to international peace and security;

2.   *Expresses* its deepest sympathy and condolences to the victims and their families and to the people and Government of the United States of America;

3.   *Calls* on all States to work together urgently to bring to justice the perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of these terrorist attacks and *stresses* that those responsible for aiding, supporting or harbouring the perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of these acts will be held accountable;

4.   *Calls also* on the international community to redouble their efforts to prevent and suppress terrorist acts including by increased cooperation and full implementation of the relevant international anti-terrorist conventions and Security Council resolutions, in particular resolution 1269 (1999) of 19 October 1999;

5.   *Expresses* its readiness to take all necessary steps to respond to the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, and to combat all forms of terrorism, in accordance with its responsibilities under the Charter of the United Nations;

6.   *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.

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01-53382 (E)

Security Council

Resolution 1559 (2004)

**Adopted by the Security Council at its 5028th meeting, on
2 September 2004**

The Security Council,

Recalling all its previous resolutions on Lebanon, in particular resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978) of 19 March 1978, resolution 520 (1982) of 17 September 1982, and resolution 1553 (2004) of 29 July 2004 as well as the statements of its President on the situation in Lebanon, in particular the statement of 18 June 2000 (S/PRST/2000/21),

Reiterating its strong support for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized borders,

Noting the determination of Lebanon to ensure the withdrawal of all non-Lebanese forces from Lebanon,

Gravely concerned at the continued presence of armed militias in Lebanon, which prevent the Lebanese Government from exercising its full sovereignty over all Lebanese territory,

Reaffirming the importance of the extension of the control of the Government of Lebanon over all Lebanese territory,

Mindful of the upcoming Lebanese presidential elections and *underlining* the importance of free and fair elections according to Lebanese constitutional rules devised without foreign interference or influence,

1. *Reaffirms* its call for the strict respect of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity, and political independence of Lebanon under the sole and exclusive authority of the Government of Lebanon throughout Lebanon;

2. *Calls upon* all remaining foreign forces to withdraw from Lebanon;

3. *Calls for* the disbanding and disarmament of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias;

4. *Supports* the extension of the control of the Government of Lebanon over all Lebanese territory;

Security Council

Resolution 1697 (2006)

**Adopted by the Security Council at its 5501st meeting, on
31 July 2006**

The Security Council,

Recalling all its previous resolutions on Lebanon, including resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978) of 19 March 1978 and 1655 (2006) of 31 January 2006 as well as the statements of its President on the situation in Lebanon, in particular the statement of 18 June 2000 (S/PRST/2000/21),

Expressing deepest concern at the escalation of hostilities in Lebanon and Israel since 12 July 2006,

Taking note of the letter dated 7 July 2006 (S/2006/496) from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the United Nations conveying to the Secretary-General the request that the Security Council extend the mandate of UNIFIL for a further period of six months,

Having examined the Secretary-General's report on UNIFIL of 22 July 2006 (S/2006/560), including its observations that, as a result of the continuing hostilities along the Blue Line, UNIFIL has been impeded to carry out its activities effectively, and noting in this context the Secretary-General's recommendation that the mandate of the Force be extended for a period of one month pending consideration of other options for future arrangements in South Lebanon,

1.   *Urges* all concerned parties to abide scrupulously by their obligation to respect the safety of UNIFIL and other United Nations personnel, and avoid any course of action which might endanger United Nations personnel, and *calls on* them to allow the Force to resupply its positions, conduct search and rescue operations on behalf of its personnel and undertake any other measures the Force deems necessary to ensure the safety of its personnel;

2.   *Decides* to extend the mandate of UNIFIL until 31 August 2006;

3.   *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

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06-45028 (E)

United Nations   S/RES/1372 (2001)

Security Council

Distr.: General

28 September 2001

Resolution 1372 (2001)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 4384th meeting, on 28 September 2001

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 1044 (1996) of 31 January 1996, 1054 (1996) of 26 April 1996 and 1070 (1996) of 16 August 1996,

Noting the steps taken by the Government of the Sudan to comply with the provisions of resolutions 1044 (1996) and 1070 (1996),

Noting in that respect the communications from the Permanent Representative of South Africa on behalf of the Non-aligned Movement, and the Permanent Representative of Algeria on Behalf of the League of Arab States and the Permanent Representative of Gabon on behalf of the African Group (S/2000/521, S/2000/517 and S/2000/533), and from the Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity dated 20 June 2000,

Noting further, the letter of the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, dated 5 June 2000, and the letter of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Arab Republic of Egypt, dated 9 June 2000 supporting the lifting of sanctions imposed on the Republic of the Sudan,

Noting also the contents of the letter dated 1 June 2000 from the Minister of External Relations of the Republic of the Sudan addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations (S/2000/513),

Welcoming the accession of the Republic of the Sudan to the relevant international conventions for the elimination of terrorism, its ratification of the 1997 International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombing and its signing of the 1999 International Convention for the Suppression of Financing of Terrorism,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1.   *Decides* to terminate, with immediate effect, the measures referred to in paragraphs 3 and 4 of resolution 1054 (1996) and paragraph 3 of resolution 1070 (1996).

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01-55646 (E)

Security Council

Resolution 1701 (2006)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 5511th meeting, on 11 August 2006

The Security Council,

Recalling all its previous resolutions on Lebanon, in particular resolutions 425 (1978), 426 (1978), 520 (1982), 1559 (2004), 1655 (2006) 1680 (2006) and 1697 (2006), as well as the statements of its President on the situation in Lebanon, in particular the statements of 18 June 2000 (S/PRST/2000/21), of 19 October 2004 (S/PRST/2004/36), of 4 May 2005 (S/PRST/2005/17), of 23 January 2006 (S/PRST/2006/3) and of 30 July 2006 (S/PRST/2006/35),

Expressing its utmost concern at the continuing escalation of hostilities in Lebanon and in Israel since Hizbollah's attack on Israel on 12 July 2006, which has already caused hundreds of deaths and injuries on both sides, extensive damage to civilian infrastructure and hundreds of thousands of internally displaced persons,

Emphasizing the need for an end of violence, but at the same time *emphasizing* the need to address urgently the causes that have given rise to the current crisis, including by the unconditional release of the abducted Israeli soldiers,

Mindful of the sensitivity of the issue of prisoners and *encouraging* the efforts aimed at urgently settling the issue of the Lebanese prisoners detained in Israel,

Welcoming the efforts of the Lebanese Prime Minister and the commitment of the Government of Lebanon, in its seven-point plan, to extend its authority over its territory, through its own legitimate armed forces, such that there will be no weapons without the consent of the Government of Lebanon and no authority other than that of the Government of Lebanon, *welcoming also* its commitment to a United Nations force that is supplemented and enhanced in numbers, equipment, mandate and scope of operation, and *bearing in mind* its request in this plan for an immediate withdrawal of the Israeli forces from southern Lebanon,

Determined to act for this withdrawal to happen at the earliest,

Taking due note of the proposals made in the seven-point plan regarding the Shebaa farms area,

Welcoming the unanimous decision by the Government of Lebanon on 7 August 2006 to deploy a Lebanese armed force of 15,000 troops in South Lebanon as the Israeli army withdraws behind the Blue Line and to request the assistance of

Security Council

Resolution 1937 (2010)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 6375th meeting, on 30 August 2010

The Security Council,

Recalling all its previous resolutions on Lebanon, in particular resolutions 425 (1978), 426 (1978), 1559 (2004), 1680 (2006), 1701 (2006), 1773 (2007), 1832 (2008) and 1884 (2009) as well as the statements of its President on the situation in Lebanon,

Responding to the request of the Government of Lebanon to extend the mandate of UNIFIL for a new period of one year without amendment presented in a letter from the Lebanese Foreign Minister to the Secretary-General of 20 July 2010 and welcoming the letter from the Secretary-General to its President of 11 August 2010 (S/2010/430) recommending this extension,

Reaffirming its commitment to the full implementation of all provisions of resolution 1701 (2006), and aware of its responsibilities to help secure a permanent ceasefire and a long-term solution as envisioned in the resolution,

Calling upon all concerned parties to strengthen their efforts to implement all provisions of resolution 1701 (2006),

Expressing deep concern at all violations in connection with resolution 1701 (2006), in particular the latest grave violation of 3 August 2010 highlighted in the Secretary-General's letter of 11 August 2010 and *looking forward* to the rapid finalization of UNIFIL's investigation with a view to preventing such incidents in the future,

Emphasizing the importance of full compliance with the prohibition on sales and supply of arms and related materiel established by resolution 1701,

Recalling the utmost importance that all parties concerned respect the Blue Line in its entirety and encouraging the parties to accelerate their efforts in coordination with UNIFIL to visibly mark the Blue Line,

Recalling the relevant principles contained in the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel,

Commending the active role and dedication of the personnel of UNIFIL, notably of its Commander, and *expressing* its strong appreciation to Member States

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