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UNITED STATES POLICY IN JORDAN
1956 - 1960

Larry Larson

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LARSON

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ABSTRACT

Prior to 1957 the U.S. had only technical cooperation and development aid agreements with the Jordanian government. Political events in Jordan and throughout the Middle East reached a climax in April 1957 in Amman and the U.S. suddenly assumed a major role in maintaining the government of Jordan, largely through direct budgetary support grants.

The U.S. assumed this responsibility in line with the foreign policy goals which had characterized the foreign policy of the Eisenhower Administration since 1952. These goals, peace, combatting communism and support of the United Nations, were being actively sought through the provisions of the Mutual Security Act, originally legislated in 1954. The nature of this legislation allowed the U.S. to apply a predetermined program for the achievement of its foreign policy goals to the case in Jordan in 1957.

One of the major premises of the Mutual Security Act is John Foster Dulles' belief that the elimination of war is possible by making allowance for the inevitable social and economic changes throughout the world through peaceful methods. In Jordan, as in the rest of the underdeveloped countries of the world, the U.S. has sought to give military aid and assurances which would

guarantee internal and external security while permitting economic progress to take place within Jordan at a satisfactory rate.

Likewise, in the interest of peace the U.S. has continued to support the United Nations through heavy contributions to UNRWA to the extent necessary to keep the refugees politically passified. The U.S. has done little beyond this point to resolve the larger question of Palestine itself.

The force of communism has been fought unceasingly in Jordan by the governments to which the U.S. has lent its support since 1957.

By supporting the Jordanian governments which have the endorsement of King Hussein, the U.S. has assured peace in Jordan and along her frontiers, fought communism within Jordan and continued support of the United Nations to the extent thought compatible with U.S. interests.

Simultaneously this support has required the U.S. to stand opposed to the programs of the pan-Arabists as represented in Jordan by the ousted Nabulsi Government and in the Arab world by the President of the U.A.R., Gamal Abdul Nasser. During the period under consideration the State Department was not sure that the Soviet support for Nasser and Arab nationalism would not ultimately bring communists to positions of power in Cairo under the guise

of nationalists. Moreover, Nasser sought to resolve the Palestine problem in a way which could threaten the existence of Israel, a U.S. protégé.

For these reasons, and in spite of the economic burdens involved, the U.S. has unhesitatingly chosen to support with financial, technical and military aid the governments which have ruled Jordan since April 1957. This policy of support for the Hussein-endorsed governments is a thoroughly consistent application of the official U.S. policies designed for underdeveloped countries to maintain peace and allow for a satisfactory rate of economic growth while keeping the communist threat minimized.

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Introduction

Foreign policies are not born in a vacuum. Neither do they operate in a vacuum. Foreign policies are formed through a process of choice and elimination of alternatives, a process which represents ultimately the most desirable goals and objective of the most powerful forces. These forces may vary in their nature. For example, interest groups seeking personal gain, as well as the force of national historical tradition, working consciously or unconsciously through individuals engaged in formulating a nation's foreign policy, are both forces whose influence may be reflected in the ultimate product of the foreign policy process.

Once formulated, this foreign policy must come to grips with a set of factors which comprise the environmental setting within which the policy is to operate. Likewise this set of factors, characterized by the entire environmental setting, is the outcome of conflicting forces within a state and its immediate geographical and psychological neighbors.

Under optimum conditions the two results of these separate environmental settings will coincide 100% and both will be seeking the same objectives through the same means.

Or, objectives agreeable to both through means agreeable to both will materialize without altering the original intent of either.

In actual practice this very rarely occurs. Normally an observer is able to discern three policies; the two original ones, each having their foundation in its environmental setting, and a third which stems from the meeting of the original two. This third outcome is the result of both nations choosing it in preference to abandoning entirely the objectives originally sought.

In this case, a meaningful examination of the United States policy in Jordan necessitates more than just a cursory consideration of the elements which determine the original goals and means designated to attain them by the U.S. Commentary below will establish that world peace is one of the fundamental policy goals of the United States. The reason why the United States wants world peace is worthy of consideration. Peace for the sake of peace is commendable but would not lead one to fight for that peace. But, peace in order to maintain most effectively a way of life might conceivably in the future, as in the past, be the subject of war. There is definitely a need to consider why a given goal is sought if a proper assessment is to be made of the means chosen for attaining it.

Of equal importance is the consideration due the factors within the environmental setting of Jordan which

determine the degree of receptivity by that state to U.S. policy.

This paper will outline, to the extent necessary for this study, the elements composing the environmental settings within which U.S. policy for Jordan has been formulated and within which it must operate. The main consideration, however, will deal with the substance of that policy, the mechanics through which it is implemented and the relative effectiveness of these efforts to attain certain policy objectives of the U.S. in Jordan. But, as implied above, to see only the policy operative in Jordan alone, divorced from its relationship with overall U.S. policy in the world and, more specifically, the Arab world, is to minimize its meaning and run the risk of possibly misunderstanding the essence of that policy. It will be shown that this policy is a logical application of means to ends sought by the U.S. on a worldwide scale, not just in Jordan alone.

In several respects Jordan offers the student of American foreign policy a unique situation for assessing the effectiveness of that policy in the Middle East. This is because Jordan may be viewed as a dynamic microcosm of the entire Middle East. Within the boundaries of Jordan may be found the same conflicts and problems which characterize most of the states of the Arab world.

The differences between the educated and illiterate,

refugees and non-refugees, nationalists and pan-Arabists, Moslems and Christians, bedouin and city-dweller, etc. all are to be found in Jordan and throughout the Arab world.¹

In order to be effective, a foreign policy must take into consideration the problems of the areas and countries where it is applied. It logically follows, therefore, that the U.S. must necessarily consider and formulate an official attitude toward Jordan's internal problems in order to methodically implement an effective policy in that country and throughout the Arab world. It is equally true that the policy statements of the United States may not explicitly identify and convey a specific policy attitude for each of these problems or problem areas within Jordan. But, since they do exist and they must be dealt with by U.S. policy planners and administrators, there is, in effect, an official U.S. attitude toward each of these problems. It is one purpose of this paper to define, to the extent possible, the explicit and implicit attitudes adopted by the U.S. with regard to these internal problems of Jordan which influence the implementation of U.S. policy in that country.

¹The analogy drawn between Jordan and the Arab world is, as are all analogies, not free from obvious defects. But, it is used here only as an instructive tool and, like all useful tools, should be readily discarded where its applicability is questionable. Nevertheless this writer feels that there is sufficient similarity between the problems of the Arab world and those facing Jordan to render this tool useful in assessing American policy in the whole area.

If these attitudes were to be found only in U.S. policy in Jordan alone then the value of these efforts might be questionable. But, as the problems in evidence in Jordan are also common to the remainder of the Arab world, a clear definition of the attitude taken by the U.S. vis-a-vis each of them may shed some light on probable U.S. policies in other Arab countries. The logic of this observation is based on the presupposition that there is a discernable degree of consistency in U.S. policy throughout the Middle East and, with respect to major policy objectives, throughout the entire world. Provided this is valid it is hoped that the observer can be exposed to both the 'big picture', which gives insight into the fundamental principles upon which U.S. policy throughout the world is based, and what form that policy assumes in the context of the Middle East and Jordan.

The plan for making this exposure is a simple one. First comes a brief chronological sketch of recent Jordanian political history with emphasis on the U.S.-Jordan relations. This will be followed by two sections devoted to U.S. policy throughout the world and Middle East respectively. Following these the field will narrow to U.S. policy in Jordan itself and how Washington views the problems and demands of Jordan.

The second major section will outline and explain the workings of the mechanisms through which the U.S. operates in implementing its policy decisions in Jordan. This will

concentrate mainly on the distribution and use of U.S. aid funds and what has been accomplished to date with these funds. Also included in this section will be the U.S. activities in conjunction with the United Nations agencies operating in Jordan in as far as they complement U.S. policy objectives.

Conclusions drawn from the two preceding sections will compose the third section. This will include an assessment of the policies implemented to date and remarks dealing with the nature of the official attitudes manifest in policy actions. This is the writer's evaluation of the effectiveness and implications of the policies currently being implemented in Jordan by the U.S.

The last two sections will give an entirely different view of the policy which is the subject of this paper. Section IV will be composed of a series of interviews with politically conscious Jordanians whose comments may reveal inconsistencies and weak points in the policy structure of the U.S. in Jordan. Lastly the paper will terminate with the writer's comments on the interviews and their significance or potential significance in view of what has already been outlined as the U.S. policy in Jordan.

This presentation is designed to acquaint the student of U.S. policy in Jordan with the guiding principles of that policy, the mechanisms through which that policy is translated from the abstract into fact or attitudes and,

lastly, with the opinions of well informed Jordanians, who are not in 100% agreement with the policy followed by the United States in Jordan.

CHAPTER I

CHRONOLOGY

Before dissecting U.S. policy in Jordan and the reasoning behind that policy, it is essential that the events which have marked the recent political history of that country be outlined briefly. This outline will stress the role the U.S. has played in influencing these events.

Some twenty-five years after the British Colonial Secretary, Winston Churchill, placed the son of Sherif Hussein, Abdullah, at head of the administration of the Mandated Territory of Transjordan in 1921, Abdullah was recognized by the United Kingdom as the sovereign ruler of the Hashemite Kingdom of Transjordan, an independent state. This recognition, officially extended on May 25, 1946, was accompanied by a treaty arrangement between the two countries which called for the continued stationing of British troops in Transjordan as well as the maintenance of military installations and joint consultations on defense matters. In addition the British continued to bear the responsibility for the training and logistical support of the Arab Legion, at a cost of approximately £ 2 million annually.¹

¹Benjamin Shwadran, Jordan A State of Tension, Middle Eastern Affairs Press, New York, 1959, pp. 215.

Three years after the granting of independence to the Kingdom of Transjordan and subsequent to the Palestine war, the United States formally recognized that state in January, 1949.

The West Bank, or what constituted Arab occupied Palestine at the time, was incorporated into the Kingdom in 1950 following elections and the addition of a number of Palestinians to the Jordanian Parliament.

Hoping to quell the uneasiness in the area stemming from the Arab-Israel dispute, the United States, France and the United Kingdom joined together in 1950 and issued what has come to be known as the Tripartite Declaration. The main provisions of the declaration deal with the questions of recognizing the sanctity of the armistice lines and, of greater immediate importance, the control of arms shipments into the Middle East area.² King Abdullah, who was suspected in many quarters of trying to negotiate some sort of non-aggression pact with Israel, benefited from this declaration in that he was relatively free to concentrate on consolidating his domestic strength with the assurances of Western action in the event of a violation of the armistice line between Israel and Jordan. And, in the chaotic conditions which

²Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XXII No. 570 (June 5, 1956) Text of Declaration. p. 886.

prevailed in Jordan (formerly Tranjordan and Arab Palestine) with its newly absorbed population which outnumbered two to one the former Tranjordanians, this was a task of sizable proportions.

One year after the annexation of the West Bank, in April, 1951, the U.S. signed its first technical cooperation agreement with Jordan.³ This was in accordance with the program outlined by President Truman in the famous Fourth Point of his Inaugural Address of January, 1949. It initiated a program which emphasized development in the areas of agriculture, health and sanitation, education, and technical advice and loans for the development of small industries.⁴

The Soviet military threat had been recognized in Europe and gave rise to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization there. Still thinking along the lines of military alliances to thwart the Soviet threat, the West presented to Egypt a Four Power Proposal outlining a proposed Middle East Command. Not unexpectedly the Egyptians rejected the proposal without even giving it serious study.⁵ The idea of a Western

³Unclassified Records Center, United States Operations Mission, (Point IV), Amman, Jordan, Text of Agreements.

⁴House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, 85th Congress, 1st Session, Mutual Security Act 1957, (Washington C.P.O., 1956) Part V, pp. 791-2. Testimony of Norman Burns. (Hereafter referred to as: House of Representatives Hearings, Mutual Security Act, 19).

⁵Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XXV, No. 644 (Oct. 29, 1951) p. 702. (Statement by Secretary of State Acheson).

sponsored defense arrangement, after years of Western domination in the area, seemed too repugnant to merit the time for such consideration. The West's failure to promote any such type of military pacts or alliances among the Arab States has been a major consideration in determining the course of action to be followed in each of these Arab states separately.

The American Point Four mission continued to operate on a relatively small scale in Jordan until June of 1954. At that time a new economic assistance program was initiated which concentrated on road construction and the development of water resources.⁶ These two agreements continued to be operative, except for a short period of suspension until the sizable increase in aid given by the U.S. to Jordan after early 1957.

Baghdad Pact

The signing of the Iraqi-Turkish mutual defense pact, which was the foundation of what came to known as the Baghdad Pact, began a series of military and political events which placed Jordan in an extremely sensitive position and marked the beginning of the end of the predominant British political and military influence in that country. As 1955 progressed the two opposing camps, pro-Pact Turkey,

⁶Unclassified Records Center, United States Operations Mission, (Point IV), Amman, Jordan, Text of Agreements.

Iraq and Great Britain and anti-Pact Saudi Arabia, Syria and Egypt, became more and more insistent that Jordan follow the course of action that each advocated. The ties to a sister Arab and Hashemite Kingdom as well as the British influence in Jordan made official circles lean toward the Pact and membership. Elements within the country which were violently anti-British and consequently anti-Western and anti-Pact were suitable targets for anti-Pact propaganda pouring forth from Cairo and supported by Saudi gold.⁷ Following Nasser's announcement of the Czech arms deal in September, 1955, King Hussein handed the British ambassador a note calling for a revision of the 1948 treaty between the two countries through negotiations. In some of the anti-Pact quarters this move was interpreted as one which was directed at boosting Jordanian military strength as a prelude to entry as a member of the Pact.

The crisis over the Pact reached the boiling point after the December 6, 1955 visit to Amman of Sir General Templer who was sent by the Foreign Office to negotiate the revision of the treaty and probably prepare the way for

⁷Shwadram, op. cit., p.330F.

It is interesting to compare the stand taken by King Saud at this time with the position he assumed during the April, 1957 crisis in Jordan. That his change in attitude was in no small way effected by his visit to the U.S. and talks with the President and State Department officials is hardly open to question.

Jordan's membership in the Pact. When the Templer mission had returned to London to await the decision of the Jordanian government the newly formed cabinet of Haza al Majali announced its intention of bringing Jordan into the Pact on December 15, 1955. This announcement was met with demonstrations from the opposition which resulted in attacks on the Consulates of France, Turkey and the U.S. on December 20th.⁸ The continuation of these demonstrations and the inability of the new cabinet to handle the situation resulted in the defeat of the King and his advisors in their move to place Jordan in the Pact. Throughout the entire period the Pact was under consideration in Jordan, the Syro-Egyptian-Saudi combination dominated the political scene with money and propaganda attacks against the Pact and the Government of Jordan through unceasing radio broadcasts.

One of the sore points in Jordan itself and the subject of violent attacks broadcast by Radio Cairo was the figure of Glubb Pasha, who was depicted as the symbol of British domination over Jordan by virtue of his position as commander of the Jordanian Army, formerly the Arab Legion. Succumbing to internal and external pressures, King Hussein abruptly dismissed Glubb Pasha in early March 1956. This move was a clear sign of the diminishing British influence

⁸Middle East Journal, Vol. X No. 2 (Spring 1957)
p. 186.

and the growing influence of Cairo over the Jordanians, especially the discontented Palestinians carrying Jordanian passports. Nevertheless, after the initial shock, Great Britain decided to maintain her treaty relations with Jordan and continued to supply training, money and materials for the Jordanian Army.⁹ Needless to say this move by King Hussein brought him to the peak of his popularity among the Jordanians.

During the period, 1955-1956, the U.S. maintained a relatively small technical assistance mission in Jordan. As to the events themselves, the self-assigned role of the U.S. was that of an interested but silent onlooker.

The Nabulsi Government

In October, 1956, elections were held throughout Jordan which brought the pro-Nasser government of Suliman Nabulsi to power. Nabulsi himself had not won a seat in the Parliament but was designated by the King as one who could gain a majority in the Parliament and recognized as the leader of the powerful Nationalist Socialists. The rise to power of this Government left little doubt in the minds of American and British observers as to which way it would lead the country, especially after the spectacular

⁹House of Commons, Parliamentary Debates, (H.M.S.O. London, 1956) Vol. 549 (March 5, 1956) pp. 1709-1715. Ibid., Vol. 551, (April 25, 1956) pp. 1754-1755.

defeat the West had suffered at the hands of the President of Egypt who had taken control of the Suez Canal.

The period beginning in late October with the Israeli, Franco, British invasion of Egypt serves as an excellent example of how the other Arab states viewed Jordan at that time. During this period Jordan still enjoyed treaty rights with Great Britain which guaranteed her frontiers against any external aggression. This meant that the attack of Jordan by Israel would be covered by the treaty obligations Jordan had with Great Britain.

Immediately after the elections and prior to the appointment of Nabulsi to head the government, General Ali Abu Nuwar concluded, on October 24, a series of military agreements to coordinate defense measures with Syria and Egypt. The agreements placed the forces of the three nations under the command of the Egyptian General Abdel Hakim Amer "in case of further Israeli aggressions." General Nuwar also noted that Iraqi troops would enter Jordan upon the latter's request.¹⁰

During the crisis Iraqi troops moved into Jordan on the initiative of the Iraqi Government allegedly to "protect" her in the event of an Israeli attack. Within one day of this move Syrian troops had moved across the

¹⁰The Arab World, Vol. 35, No. 744 (October 25, 1956), p. 2.

border on the same pretext. In reality, both governments were waiting to deny the other the opportunity to take control of Jordan during this critical period.¹¹

After the threat of the invasion had subdued and the Iraqi troops had been withdrawn, the Prime Minister, Nabulsi, announced on December 16, 1956, that "Jordan cannot live forever as Jordan. She must be connected militarily, economically and politically..." with one or more of the Arab states. To this end he advocated an Arab federation as the solution to the country's problem.¹²

The composition of the Nabulsi cabinet was almost a written guarantee as to which direction it would take between the East and the West. It was a coalition, in the loose sense of the word, of National Socialists, Arab Resurrection Party (Baath) and National Bloc, described as being "crypto-communist."¹³

Five days later, in a speech given by Nabulsi, it was announced the President Nasser of Egypt was willing to make certain sacrifices in order to "free Jordan from her imperialistic ties..." with Great Britain.¹⁴

¹¹Shwadran, op. cit., p. 342.

¹²Middle Eastern Affairs, Vol. VIII, No. 2 (February, 1957), p. 86.

¹³The Arab World, Vol. XXXV, No. 739 (October 18, 1956) p. 22. Middle East Journal, Vol. XI, No. 1 (Winter 1957) p.81.

¹⁴The Times (London) December 22, 1956. p. 5.

It was under these circumstances in Jordan and the entire Middle East after the abortive Suez invasion that President Eisenhower submitted to the Congress, on January 5, 1957, his proposal on the Middle East which was to become known as the Eisenhower Doctrine.

Two days after this was presented to the Congress King Hussein announced that the Arabs would welcome any assistance that would strengthen their economy and defend their sovereignty.¹⁵ The reference to the Eisenhower Doctrine was obvious.

The movement by the Nabulsi government to replace the British subsidy with Arab money culminated on January 18, 1957 when the Arab Solidarily Agreement was signed in Cairo by representatives of Syria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Jordan. This agreement, citing as its raison d'etre "the preservation of Arab existence and independence..."¹⁶ set the scene for the abrogation of the Anglo-Jordan treaty of 1948 which was still operative at that time.

Two weeks after the signing of the Cairo Agreement, on February 2, 1957, King Hussein issued a letter to his Prime Minister warning him against the dangers of communist

¹⁵Middle East Journal, Vol. 11, No. 2, (Spring, 1957) p. 182.

¹⁶Middle Eastern Affairs, Vol. VIII, No. 3 (March, 1957) pp. 108-109. Text of Agreement. The payments were to be divided as follows: Saudi Arabia and Egypt - £E 5,000,000 annually, Syria - £E 2,500,000 annually.

infiltration and against "replacing imperialism with a new type of colonialism, from which we might be unable to redeem ourselves."¹⁷

Apparently this was issued by the King without prior consultation with the Government and caused bitterness among certain circles when its release to the government and the public proved to be simultaneous.¹⁸

Later that same month King Saud returned from the U.S. where he had been groomed by official Washington as the most likely candidate to carry back the message in the President's proposal on the Middle East. The communiqué released after the final meeting between Saud and the President was an obvious reference to the principles of the Eisenhower Doctrine and was, in effect, a Saudi endorsement of the Doctrine.¹⁹

In his summit conference held in Cairo on his way back to Saudi Arabia the King stressed the "new appreciation

¹⁷Middle Eastern Affairs, Vol. VIII, No. 4 (April, 1957) p. 171.

¹⁸Private correspondence of Suliman Nabulsi dated 20 January, 1961.

¹⁹The communique read, in part, "The aim of the peoples of the area is to maintain their full independence, live in peace, and enjoy economic freedom and prosperity. Any aggression against the political independence or territorial integrity of these nations and the intervention from any source in the affairs of the states of the area would be considered endangering world peace and stability. Such actions should be opposed in accordance with the purposes and principles of the U.N." Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XXXVI, No. 922, (February 25, 1957), p. 309.

of the Arab viewpoint" evidenced by Washington and urged the leaders of these Arab states to make clear their opposition to the threat posed by international communism to Egypt, Syria and Jordan. The Presidents of Syria and Egypt could not bring themselves to concur with this viewpoint but King Hussein strongly supported Saud and a new and significant feeling of solidarity between the two took root as a result.²⁰ This was to prove to be of major importance to Hussein in the coming months.

On the 5th and 7th of March the House of Representatives and the Senate approved a slightly ammended version of President Eisenhower's proposal and it was signed by the President on March 9, 1957. Shortly thereafter Special Ambassador Richards left for the Middle East to explain the Doctrine to the countries concerned.

Just a bit more than one year after Glubb's dismissal the final break came between Jordan and the United Kingdom. On March 13, 1957, after an initial exchange of notes, the 1948 treaty between the two countries was officially terminated.

In this same month the U.S. joined the military committee of the Baghdad Pact but refrained, out of deference to the feelings of Egypt and Saudi Arabia, to assume full membership in the organization. Nevertheless, this action

²⁰Richard P. Stebbins, The United States in World Affairs, 1957, Harper & Brothers, New York, 1958, p. 179.

drew a bitter attack from Jordan's Prime Minister Nabulsi who cited it as a move which "revealed the true policy of the United States toward the Arabs."²¹

The April Crisis

The month of April, 1957, witnessed a complete reversal of the trend in Jordan away from the West and towards Egypt, to a position of even more complete dependence on the West, specifically on U.S. dollars and military support.

The month began by an announcement by the Prime Minister that his government intended to establish diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union at ambassadorial level. Following this came a radio broadcast by Premier Nabulsi denouncing U.S. aid offers as a means of severing Jordan's ties with Egypt and for this reason such offers were being rejected by his government.²² At the same time it was announced that Jordan would accept any Soviet aid that was offered.

On April 10, four days after Premier Nabulsi had received a 39-1 vote of confidence in the Majlis, the King asked for the resignation of the entire Nabulsi cabinet,

The difficulties which marked the domestic political

²¹Middle East Journal, Vol. 11, No. 2 (Spring, 1957) p. 182.

²²On the same day Premier Nabulsi told the Middle East News Agency that projects undertaken in Jordan with American technical assistance under the Point IV program had been suspended and that the unspent balance of Point Four funds, \$6,000,000, was frozen. Middle East Economic Digest, Vol. I No. 10, (April 12, 1957), p. 9.

maneuverings in Jordan during the two weeks following the Premier's resignation serve to highlight the inner conflicts which confront any ruling clique in Jordan.

While King Hussein was facing the opposition of the Nationalist Socialists in trying to form a new government he was informed of a movement being organized against his throne within the army by a group of "Free Officers" dedicated to ousting the King. A clash between these "Free Officers" and troops loyal to the King occurred at the Zarqa military base when the former attempted to take action against the throne. The King made his now-famous appearance on the scene and, at the risk of personal danger, re-established his authority and restored order with the aid of his loyal troops.

Subsequent attempts to form an acceptable cabinet resulted in a compromise between the still powerful pro-Egyptian forces and what the King himself desired. His choice for Prime Minister was Hussein Fakhri Khalidi who gave the Foreign Minister's portfolio to the former P.M. Nabulsi. The latter claimed to be in the cabinet in a "private" capacity when he took the post and the cabinet was formed on April 15, 1957.

Burdened with this pro-Egyptian cabinet the King was unable to take advantage of U.S. aid offers, though the U.S. had made it clear on several occasions that it stood solidly behind the King's efforts in Jordan.

When asked, at a press conference on April 17, upon what grounds the U.S. might take action in Jordan, the President replied that either the Tripartite Declaration or the Mideast Resolution would be applicable, depending on the conditions of the aggression against Jordan.²³

On April 19 the U.S. warned the neighboring states of Egypt, Syria and Israel against any moves which might precipitate trouble in Jordan.²⁴ In rapid succession King Saud offered King Hussein command of his troops sent to Jordan and military aid, Jordan's chief of general staff resigned in Damascus, Premier Khalidi announced the Government's intention to establish diplomatic relations with Moscow, the Egyptian and Syrian radio and press intensified their violent anti-Husseini campaigns and accused the American Embassy of interfering in Jordan's internal affairs.

The clash of these various forces was heard on April 24, 1957 in the form of widespread rioting throughout Jordan. The immediate cause of these disturbances was found in the King's refusal to acquiesce to the demands of his Cabinet which was under severe pressure from elements within the country.²⁵

²³U.S. News and World Report, April 26, 1957, p. 100.

²⁴Shwadran, op. cit., p. 351. Middle Eastern Affairs, Vol. VIII, No. 6-7 (June-July, 1957) p. 264.

²⁵Among the demands were; 1) that the Government categorically reject the Eisenhower Doctrine and 2) that the U.S. Ambassador and the Military Attache, Lester D. Mallory and Col. James Sweeney, be expelled from Jordan. Shwadran, op. cit., p. 352.

On the same day a statement was issued by the Presidential Press Secretary from the vacation White House in Augusta, Georgia declaring that the Secretary of State and the President, "regard the independence and integrity of Jordan as vital."²⁶ This statement was backed up by an order dispatching the Sixth Fleet to the Eastern Mediterranean as a "precautionary measure" against the threat to Jordan by "international communism."²⁷ This move was also endorsed by the British who likewise found the independence of Jordan vital.

In Jordan itself the King accepted the resignation of Khalidi's cabinet, installed a caretaker government under Ibrahim Hashim, placed all police and security forces under the command of the army, abolished all political parties, suspended the constitution, declared martial law and placed Amman, the Old City of Jerusalem, Nablus, Ramallah and Irbid under day and night curfew. Force was employed unhesitatingly to round up leftist sympathizers and military courts were established to deal with the cases growing out of the political crisis.

The next major problem confronting the young King, after reasserting the authority of the throne by force, was

²⁶New York Times, April 25, 1957, p. 1. The Times (London) April 26, 1957, p. 8. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XXXVI, No. 933 (May 13, 1957) p. 768f.

²⁷Middle Eastern Affairs, Vol. VIII, No. 6-7 (June-July, 1957), p. 264.

one of finances. The King flew off to his new found ally King Saud in Ryaid for consultations on the 29th for one day of talks. Immediately upon his return the young King asked for U.S. economic assistance without which it would have been extremely difficult to maintain the authority of the throne.

Within hours the request was granted to the amount of \$10,000,000, "in recognition of the steps taken by His Majesty King Hussein and the Government and people of Jordan to maintain the integrity and independence of the nation." At the same time the U.S. announced its intention to "maintain a continuing review of Jordan's problems in cooperation with His Majesty's government to determine what further steps may be required."²⁸

U.S. Support And The Eisenhower Doctrine

The determination expressed by the U.S. to maintain the independence and integrity of Jordan during the time of heightened crisis on the diplomatic, economic and military fronts, plus the action of King Hussein and his loyal troops served to halt the trend in Jordan toward Nasser and relations with the Soviet Union.

On May 21, 1957, King Saud made his initial installment on his obligation in accordance with the Cairo Agreement signed in January. The Saudi payment of

²⁸Benjamin Shwadran, "The Kingdom of Jordan: To Be or Not To Be II," Middle Eastern Affairs, Vol. VIII, No. 8-9 (August - September, 1957) p. 288.

\$4,200,000 was not accompanied by payments from Syria and Egypt. These two countries declined to meet their obligations on the grounds that Jordan had violated the spirit of the original agreement.

King Hussein had successfully thwarted the moves of what was acknowledged to be the first freely elected government in Jordan. This was done with the material and political assistance of the United States. President Eisenhower, in referring to this series of events, made the following observations in a nationwide radio and TV broadcast on May 21, 1957:

"Most recently we have witnessed a like instance in the Middle East (like Iran). The Kingdom of Jordan came under the sway of a succession of cabinets each one seemingly more tolerant of Communist infiltration and subversion. King Hussein has acted swiftly and resolutely to forestall disaster, and the peril now seems checked.

"Yet this victory would surely be lost without economic aid from outside Jordan. Jordan's armed forces must be paid. The nation's utilities must function.²⁹ And, above all, the people must have hope."

By the end of June the governments of the U.S. and Jordan had signed two more aid agreements. The first was a general agreement providing for "economic, technical and related assistance to Jordan." The second agreement was for "special economic assistance to Jordan for budgetary

²⁹Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XXXVI, No. 937, (June 10, 1957) p. 919.

support."³⁰ Each of these had a dollar value of \$10,000,000 in their respective areas.

But, in a personal interview where the question of the applicability of the Eisenhower Doctrine arose, King Hussein was quick to divorce the aid he was receiving from the U.S. from any commitments which accompany Doctrine aid. Jordan's view of communism was explained by Hussein in the following manner.

"We fight communism because we believe in doing it, not because there is any particular doctrine or idea that requires us to do it. As I said, subscribing to the Eisenhower Doctrine would make it appear as though we were following certain instructions, rather than doing it on our own. Otherwise there is nothing basically wrong with the principles of the Eisenhower Doctrine as such."³¹

In actual fact the Doctrine was even used by the King as a weapon against the Nabulsi government. In explaining to the Jordanian people why the Nabulsi government was asked to resign the King accused that government of being agents for Israel and the communists, partisans of British and French groups and, the crowning iniquity, advocates of the Eisenhower Doctrine.³²

During this period of cabinet crisis and interstate

³⁰Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XXXVII, No. 945. (August 5, 1957) p. 260. Middle East Economic Digest, Vol. I No. 17, (July 5, 1957), p. 8.

³¹U.S. News and World Report, "Interview with King Hussein" July 5, 1957, p. 43.

³²The Reporter, "Plot and Counterplot in Jordan," Vol. 16, No. 11, (May 30, 1957) p. 27-29.

press and radio attacks the Richards Mission had been visiting the Middle East to "expound" the newly pronounced doctrine. The Mission only visited those countries from which it had received an invitation. Conspicuously absent from the list of invitations were the names of Cairo, Damascus and Amman. The official public reaction to the presence of the Richards Mission in the Middle East from the Jordanian government was that it would be "inopportune" for Amman to be visited by the Mission. Although there was no direct contact between the Mission and Amman there appears to have been adequate opportunity for the State Department to explain the doctrine to the Jordanian government and the King and properly assess the official reaction.³³

The two agreements which were concluded at the end of June came only after King Hussein had been politely refused financial assistance by his cousin King Faisal of Iraq and not so politely refused by Cairo and Damascus when they were requested to meet their obligations under the Cairo Agreement. In order to minimize the blow to Hussein and his supporters in Jordan, these agreements were accompanied with an announcement that henceforth the

³³House of Representatives Hearings, Mutual Security Act, 1957, p. 564. Special Ambassador Richards' testimony.

Government of Jordan itself would administer the Point IV aid in Jordan.

It appears that by the third quarter of 1957 the practical effect of the changed circumstances was one of American assistance replacing that formerly paid by the United Kingdom to keep Hussein on his throne and Jordan "in" the Western camp.

Syrian "Crisis"

The internal conditions in Jordan remained unchanged as did the relationships with her sister Arab states and her newly found friend, the U.S., during the period immediately after the April crisis. The next significant event in U.S.-Jordan relations was the speedup of U.S. arms shipments to Jordan in September, 1957. The leftward drift of the Syrian government caused marked alarm in Washington about the security of the entire area. Deputy Undersecretary of State Loy Henderson was dispatched to the area to make an assessment of the intentions of the Syrian and Soviet leaders after the announcement of the Damascus-Moscow arms deal. The arms shipment to Jordan was a direct result of the Henderson report which expressed "concern over the border incidents and intensive propaganda and subversive activities directed toward the overthrow of the duly constituted government of Syria's Arab neighbors."³⁴

³⁴Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XXXVII, No. 952, (September 23, 1957) p. 487.

In Jordan this speedup of U.S. arms via airlift was the object of both U.S. sponsored publicity and widespread Jordanian criticism which considered the whole affair uncalled for under the circumstances.³⁵

Once the official Washington reaction to the Syrian situation gave way to a more somber view, the arms shipments to Jordan were described by Secretary Dulles as "Not an emergency program. The arms going to Jordan...are an acceleration of deliveries under that (a previous) program, but this is not a new act."³⁶

In October, 1957, the Jordan Economics Minister, Mr. Khulusi Khairi, visited Washington with a request for aid to counter the recently concluded Syro-Russian multi-million ruble economic agreement. The results of the meetings were disappointing to the Jordanians when, in November of that year, Washington announced that \$10,000,000 had been advanced to Jordan for economic development. This grant was to be administered by the Point IV mission. Later in December a Finance Ministry spokesman announced that the U.S. had granted \$25 million in economic and an additional \$10 million in military aid to Jordan since April of that year.³⁷

³⁵The Arab World, Vol. XXXXVI, No. 967, (September 11, 1957), p. 429.

³⁶Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XXXVII, No. 953, (September 30, 1957), p. 526. Ibid., No. 952, p. 487.

³⁷Middle Eastern Affairs, Vol. IX, No. 2. (February, 1958) p. 81.

The last half of 1957 witnessed a serious strengthening of Syro-Soviet bonds and Cairo, now joined by the Soviet Union, once again intensified its campaign to bring about the downfall of Hussein in Jordan. The U.S. took up the defense of Jordan against this threesome. In November the U.S. accused the Soviets of joining with Egypt and Syria to dethrone Hussein by leveling false charges of conspiring with Israel against him.³⁸ This reaction on the part of the U.S. indicated that the U.S. considered its stake in Jordan too great to let the Soviet, Egyptian and Syrian radio and press attacks continue unchallenged.

July, 1958 - U.S. Action

Again in 1958, barely one year after successfully squelching internal and external efforts to bring Jordan under the sway of Cairo, King Hussein was faced with a similar situation which placed the very existence of his throne in jeopardy. In view of the events of July, 1958, the formation of the Arab Federal States by Iraq and Jordan to counter the United Arab Republic proved to be of little value to King Hussein in his campaign against the Nasser led propaganda offensive to oust him.

The overthrow of King Faisal in Jordan's sister Hashemite Kingdom, coupled with the civil disorder which

³⁸Middle Eastern Affairs, Vol. VIII, No. 12, (December, 1957), p. 429.

was alleged to have foreign backing in Lebanon, caused the U.S. to respond to the Lebanese government's request that troops be sent to assure Lebanon the maintenance of her independence and integrity. These events viewed with alarm by King Hussein who, immediately after U.S. troops were sent to Lebanon, requested military aid from both Great Britain and the U.S. With the "full support and approval of the United States Government"³⁹ the British airlifted paratroopers into Amman in response to the King's request. Preceding the British airlift by several hours was a one hour show of strength over Jordan by fifty U.S. fighter aircraft. This low altitude demonstration served two purposes; it served as a definite show of strength to bolster King Hussein's hand in the face of the opposition within Jordan and it also served to reassure the British that there would be no trouble getting into Jordan.⁴⁰

Shortly thereafter the U.S. declared that it "supported the actions of the Government of the United Kingdom in responding affirmatively to the urgent appeal of Jordan for assistance in defense of Jordan's independence and integrity."⁴¹

³⁹Paul E. Zinner, editor, Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1958, Council on Foreign Affairs, Harper & Brothers, New York, 1959, pp. 311-312. Also House of Commons, Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 591, (7 July - 18 July), 1958, p. 1509.

⁴⁰U.S. News & World Report, July 25, 1958, p. 32.

⁴¹Middle Eastern Affairs, Vol. IX, No. 8-9, (August - September, 1958), p. 294.

On July 18th, one day after the landing of British troops, the U.S. announced the massive airlift of petroleum products to Jordan. This was to alleviate the shortages incurred by the blockade the new Iraqi regime had thrown up against Jordan.

On the 20th of July the U.S. Embassy in Amman announced that Washington was making available immediately to Jordan a \$12.5 million grant. Of this five million was previously allotted under an economic aid agreement.⁴² Due to the political climate and relations between the two countries Jordan severed its relations with the United Arab Republic on this same date.

Diplomatic representations made by the U.S. State Department indicate the possibility of U.S. pressure on the King to renounce his claim to the position as head of the Iraq-Jordan union after the overthrow of his cousin King Faisal. In fact, during the crisis itself the Western powers were reassured that Jordan would not attempt to lead a movement to restore the former pre-revolutionary government in Iraq before agreeing to aid Jordan.⁴³ The diplomatic representations took the form of Under Secretary of State Robert Murphy's visit to Amman in late July when he met

⁴²Ibid., p. 295.

⁴³House of Commons, Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 591, (8 July - 18 July, 1958), p. 1511.

with King Hussein and Premier Samir al-Raifai. Shortly after this meeting, on August 2, 1958, the King did in fact renounce his claim to the position as chief of state of the Arab Union.⁴⁴

The Middle Eastern situation was still unsettled when President Eisenhower addressed the Third Emergency Session of the U.N. General Assembly in August of 1958. The position of the U.S. was clearly stated by the President when he called to the attention of the Assembly the urgent demand for prompt action as the events of July unfolded. Making reference to the possibility of "a further dangerous crisis" resulting from "indirect aggression discernible in Jordan," the President noted that "the U.S. reserves the right, within the spirit of this charter, to answer the legitimate appeal of any nation, particularly small nations."⁴⁵

"Normality" Returns

Thus, in no uncertain terms, the U.S. once again showed its determination to take overt military action in order to sustain the western-oriented government of King Hussein.

The remainder of 1958 was marked with more announcements of even more U.S. grants-in-aid to Jordan, all designed to

⁴⁴Middle East Journal, Vol. 12, No. 4, 1958, p. 431.

⁴⁵Zinner, op. cit., 1958, pp. 352-353. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 39, No. 1001, (September 1, 1958), p. 339. Vital Speeches, Vol. XXIV, No. 22, (September 1, 1958) pp. 675-78.

"maintain the independence and territorial integrity" of Jordan.

The spectacular phase of U.S.-Jordan relations which marked the 1957-58 era has faded into the background and been replaced with a relatively stable situation. Since the restoration of the King's authority he has been able to maintain control over the anti-government elements within the country with the help of indispensable aid of the U.S. In 1959 the King rendered an official visit to the U.S. and held talks with President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Herter on the state of U.S.-Jordan relations and the Middle East in general. Since that time there has been little change in the regularity with which the U.S. continues to announce grants-in-aid to Jordan. The final grant for budgetary purposes for fiscal year 1958/59 was made immediately following the King's departure. This \$4.4 million grant brought the year's total to \$43.2 million, a record high since the initiation of U.S. aid to Jordan.

CHAPTER II

FOREIGN POLICY GOALS

The preceding section has outlined what actions the U.S. has taken, primarily in April 1957 and July 1958, to safeguard the independence and integrity of Jordan, a state whose independence and integrity have been labeled "vital" by the U.S. Obviously there is more to U.S. policy than guaranteeing Jordan's existence. Behind these moves one may discern a set of basic principles and goals which are the guideposts for State Department policy planners and administrators who must deal with the day to day implementation of U.S. policy.

This section will attempt to shed some light on these guideposts which determine the scope and nature of the alternatives available to policy makers. In addition, to elucidating these basic principles and goals upon which U.S. policy is based, this section will allow the observer to determine the logical consistency of U.S. policy in Jordan when placed in the Middle Eastern context and the context of worldwide goals of U.S. policy. Logical consistency does not, of course, necessarily mean that a policy will automatically enjoy success or be effective when implemented. These results depend primarily upon the

validity of the propositions upon which the policy is based. This question of the validity of these propositions will be considered in a subsequent section of this paper where the success of U.S. policy in Jordan will be evaluated.

Values in Foreign Policy

All foreign policies are, to a certain extent, the result of an evolutionary process and reflect the pressures and changes, both internal and external, which have determined its final form. Among these internal or domestic influencing factors is tradition: the ideals and values which have become an integral part of a nation's way of life. Just as these values and ideals develop an air of "absoluteness" within a given society or nation so that nation itself views these same highly prized ideals and values as equally applicable to other nations. A passive embodiment of these values in foreign policy would entail efforts to insure that other nations are not denied the opportunity to enjoy these same values. A more positive position might involve a nation in a program of forcing its own values onto other nations. The difference between the two is that the former gives the "other nations" freedom of choice regarding the values they would adopt whereas the latter leaves no room for such a choice. To an extent these two are complementary in that positive action taken by a state to force its values onto another state automatically denies the subject state access to the opposing values or

the opportunity to embrace them. Consciously or unconsciously the U.S. has consistently sought to promote the values and ideals which she holds dear in the states where she exercises considerable influence.

The role that traditional concepts have played in the evolution of U.S. foreign policy have been of major importance. Belief in private property, personal and political freedoms, capitalism, freedom from foreign domination, etc. has found a prominent place as a major plank in the foreign policy platform of the U.S. To the extent that these may be promoted throughout the world without detriment to the other interests of the U.S. they are incorporated in the foreign policy implemented by the U.S.¹

¹To minimize any ambiguity rooted in the use here of the term 'national interest', that term will be defined simply as those interests which are so labeled by the leaders of the U.S. In other words, there is no 'absolute' national interest. The national interest of the U.S. is what the President and Secretary of State say it is and actively seek to promote.

This definition allows the move made by President Truman in 1948, the recognition of Israel, to be classified as an action designed to promote the national interest although some quarters had a great deal of difficulty in understanding the logic from the point of view of the nation as a whole.

In this paper those areas which are viewed as vital to the U.S. national interest by the Executive will be identified and treated as such. It must be borne in mind that the accuracy with which Washington perceives the national interest should be considered only after the results of policies pursuing these national interests have been determined and evaluated.

§ Thomas I. Cook and Malcolm Moss, "The American Idea of International Interest," American Political Science Review, Vol. XLVII, No. 1 (March, 1953), p. 30.

The role the U.S. played in taking the initiative in the formation of the United Nations gave an early clue to the growing importance of two characteristics of U.S. foreign policy which were to become factors of major significance in the policies later implemented.

Peace, to be found at the negotiating table and not on the battlefield (counting heads instead of breaking them) was the prime objective of the U.S. after the termination of World War II.

Of equal importance was the U.S. decision to acknowledge her role as a leader of nations; she enthusiastically shed her former isolationist thinking and assumed her new role as a leader of the Western world once this decision was finally made.

The actions of the Soviet Union in Iran, Greece and Turkey, and finally in Berlin left no doubt in the minds of official Washington as to the serious nature of the communist challenge to Western leadership in the world and, ultimately, to the existence of the West as characterized by Western values.

Working through the Security Council, the Truman Doctrine, Marshall Plan, Berlin airlift and finally military action on the battlefields of Korea, the U.S. displayed its increasing determination to meet the Soviet threat in the military and, to a limited extent in the developed countries of Western Europe, economic spheres.

The major economic and social challenge, which was related only by chance to the communist challenge, had its roots in the social conditions throughout most of the non-Western world. This was acknowledged by President Truman in his 1949 Inaugural Address. In his famous Fourth point he outlined a program which would take up this social and economic challenge by making "available to peace-loving peoples the benefits of our store of technical knowledge in order to help them realise their aspirations for a better life."²

Peace was the major issue in the 1952 campaign which elected President Eisenhower and it later became inseparably associated with his administration's goals in the foreign policy field. Eisenhower's choice for his Secretary of State was an individual whose past experience and personal qualifications made him at once a logical choice and an excellent team member for the Eisenhower administration, John Foster Dulles.

Due to the unique combination of circumstances which marked his term in office it is unlikely that the actions of any other Secretary of State ever had such far-reaching repercussions as did those of Secretary Dulles. It is for this reason that the statements and personal beliefs of

²"The Fourth Point in President 'Truman's Inaugural Address," The Annals: Aiding Underdeveloped Areas Abroad, 1950, Vol. 1268, p. 183 (Philadelphia).

Dulles will receive what may appear to be a disproportionate amount of attention in this paper.

It is impossible to calculate the impact Mr. Dulles' views had upon the State Department but suffice it to say that their impact was considerable at a time when the views of the U.S. were of major importance in international affairs. The views of Mr. Dulles literally became the official policy of the U.S. Understandably his views did not differ radically as to the basic objectives of the U.S. from those of his predecessors, but they were much more forcefully put forth by a much more dynamic and self-righteous personality

Policy Objectives

Just as the Eisenhower administration itself became almost a symbol for peace so John Foster Dulles had dedicated his life and efforts to the promotion of this goal. In his pursual of world peace Secretary Dulles based his policies on three fundamental propositions. The first was the theme of his book War or Peace. He readily acknowledged that world peace was not dependent on the preservation of the status quo. Change, wrote Mr. Dulles, was the law of life and the key to world peace was to be found in making allowances for peaceful change.³ The profound effect this belief had on the development of U.S. policy as implemented in Jordan will be shown in subsequent section.

³U.S. News & World Report, 3 May 1957, p. 90.
Speech by Secretary Dulles.

The second proposition which molded Dulles' foreign policy thinking was the extent of the threat presented by the Soviet Union and international communism. His biographer, John Robinson Beal, describes Dulles as "a man who was never deceived about the nature of the Soviet menace. Even during the honeymoon of Soviet-American partnership in W.W. II... he saw clearly the shape of things to come."⁴

Secretary Dulles himself, in his first address to the nation, removed all doubt as to his appreciation of the Soviet menace to the U.S. when he outlined his views regarding his new post with the Eisenhower Administration.

"President Eisenhower has often used the phrase 'enlightened self-interest'. That is going to be the guide as we go on to make our foreign policy. Now in our self-interest, our enlightened self-interest, we have to pay close attention to what is going on in the rest of the world. And the reason for this is that we have enemies who are plotting our destruction. These enemies are the Russian Communists and their allies in other countries. Now you may ask how do we know that they are really trying to destroy us? Well, the answer to that one is that their leaders teach it openly and have been teaching it for many years, and everything that they do fits into that teaching."⁵

The third proposition, which was almost a necessary condition to the priority granted world peace, was the complete support of the United Nations which characterized

⁴John Robinson Beal, John Foster Dulles: A Biography, Harper & Brothers, New York, 1957, p. xiii.

⁵Ibid., p. 11.

U.S. policy prior to and during the Dulles era. In spite of the nature of the communist menace or, perhaps because of this menace, Dulles saw this world organizations as the most likely area for the peaceful settlement of international differences. Moreover, Dulles saw in the agencies of the United Nations the media through which the highly-desired peaceful change via economic and social progress might be achieved.

World Peace

Peace is sought for a purpose, not for its own sake. As a leader in the world community with no imperialistic⁶ designs on the territories of other nations, the U.S. has adopted the official opinion that it is in the national interest of the U.S. to promote conditions which will allow America to "maintain and develop...institutions and values free from coercion by external powers."⁷

This means, in effect, that any peace which would not result in the conditions described above, freedom to maintain the desired institutions and values, would not be acceptable to the U.S. Thus the peace sought by the U.S. and Mr. Dulles was not the peace which prevails in Poland

⁶"Imperialism" is used here in the classic sense of the word connoting territorial acquisition and domination which characterized the international activities of the European powers during the 19th century. The relatively recent connotations of economic imperialism, etc. are not implied herein.

⁷House of Representatives Hearings, Mutual Security Act, 1957. Part IV, p. 607.

for example, but a peace based on certain U.S. dictated minimum requirements or conditions.

Ironically enough, but nevertheless logical under current circumstances, this peace may only be achieved by the threat of war sometimes. Secretary Dulles was not hesitant to admit this, even if it appeared to clash with his basic premise of the desirability of world peace. He was severely criticized by some critics in 1956 for making his position known on peace and war in the following terms,

"You have to take chances for peace, just as you must take chances in war. Of course we were brought on the verge of war. The ability to get to the verge without getting into the war is the necessary art. If you cannot master it, you inevitably get into war. If you try to run away from it, you are lost. We've had to look it square in the face - on the question of enlarging the Korean war, on the question of getting into the Indochina war, on the question of Formosa. We walked to the brink and looked it in the face. We took strong action."⁸

This clearly shows that in reality the peace sought by the U.S., and this is usually the case in all "peace-loving" nations, is a "peace at my price" peace. Acknowledging the raison d'etre behind this desire for world peace as a U.S. policy objective helps explain the readiness of the U.S. to practice "gunboat diplomacy" in April, 1957 and again July, 1958 when the peace of Jordan and the Middle

⁸Stebbins, op. cit., 1956, p. 28.

East was threatened.

World Plan

In 1954 the Congress approved the Mutual Security Act. This piece of legislation armed the Executive with the weapons it felt were necessary to maintain world peace and effectively combat the communist threat throughout the world. It permitted the Executive to make allowances for the already existing bilateral and multilateral military defense arrangements to which the U.S. was a party at the time. In addition it gave definite shape to the U.S. policies to meet the economic and social challenge laid before the west, by the lesser-developed countries.

The mechanics of the relevant sections of this Act will be examined in detail in the following sections; suffice it to say here that the entire conduct of U.S. foreign policy with respect to military, economic and special assistance is carried out under the provisions of this Act.

The Act itself is a concrete indication that both the Congress and the Executive readily recognized the interdependent nature of the "free world" and the necessity to render unqualified U.S. support to this interdependence, for the benefit of the national survival of the U.S.

In general the Act is an implicit continuation of the "containment" policy of the now famous Mr. X. It is aimed at, a) strengthening the military posture of allies

and friends of the U.S. with military aid, b) promoting economic growth in free countries thereby strengthening resistance to communist infiltration, c) lending qualified personnel for technical cooperation and d) making allowances for extraordinary circumstances or situations requiring funds not available through the other program.⁹

The logic behind each of these different aspects of the program is not difficult to define. President Eisenhower, in his 1958 State of the Union Address, clearly indicated the reasoning upon which the program is based in the following manner,

"There are two tasks confronting us that so far outweigh all others that I shall devote this year's message entirely to them.
"The first is to insure our safety through strength.
"And our second task is to do the constructive work of building a genuine peace. We must never become so occupied with our desires for military strength that we neglect those areas of economic development, trade, diplomacy, education, ideas and principles where the foundations of real peace must be laid."

Referring to a new kind of war which had been declared on the U.S., President Eisenhower continued,

"It is the massive economic offensive that has been mounted by the communist imperialists against free nations.
"The Communist imperialists regimes have for some time been largely frustrated in their attempts at expansion based directly on force. As a result, they have begun to concentrate heavily on economic penetration, particularly of newly developing countries, as a preliminary to political domination.

⁹House of Representatives Hearings, Mutual Security Act, 1957, Part IV, pp. 511-517.

"This non-military drive, if underestimated, could defeat the free world regardless of our military strength. This danger is all the greater precisely because some people may be tempted to finance our extra military effort by cutting economic assistance. But at the very time when the economic threat is assuming menacing proportions, to fail to strengthen our own effort would be nothing less than reckless folly."¹⁰

Essentially the same theme was expressed by Secretary Dulles when questioned about communist subversion as he appeared before the Senate Committees considering the President's Proposal on the Middle East. Secretary Dulles outlined three ways of resisting the threat of subversion, techniques which have become the pillars of U.S. policy in lesser developed countries. First, the fear of overt attack should be removed by providing adequate deterrent. Secondly, provision must be made for a security force which is loyal, well trained and disciplined. Thirdly, economic conditions should be created so people will not feel that they must turn to communism in desperation for economic progress. This last point may necessitate measures geared to avoid budgetary crisis which would lead to a breakdown in orderly governmental functions, i.e., Jordan. And, in the opinion of the Secretary, all three of these points are of equal importance.¹¹

¹⁰Zinner, op. cit., 1958, pp. 2-3.

¹¹U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations and Armed Services, 85th Congress, 1st Session. S.J. Resolution 19 and H. J. Resolution 117, Hearings, (Washington, G.P.O. 1957) p. 222. Hereafter referred to as Senate Hearings, President's Proposal.

Moral Restrictions

By adopting a "peace at my price" proposition, the U.S. has simultaneously placed upon itself certain restrictions in the field of economic and social progress, the acknowledged begetter of change in a peaceful manner. The moral tone of U.S. policy pronouncements and actions, i.e., moral repugnance to imperialism practiced by America's allies, has been reflected in the U.S. advocacy of "moral" institutions and processes of government, etc. Indeed, failure by the U.S. to accept the notion of a relative morality, if morality must enter into the international relations, may well place the policy planners and administrators in a planning straight jacket. In other words, the U.S. agrees to promote social and economic progress so long as such progress falls within the limit of a U.S.-dictated morality. Adjustments to rival viewpoints, the very essence of diplomacy, are automatically precluded when such adjustments transgress the moral limits recognized by the U.S.¹²

The relevance of this point to the policy followed in Jordan may be noted in the events leading up the April crisis. Prior to the negotiations for the Arab Solidarity Agreement, the Jordanian Prime Minister Nabulsi requested that the U.S. guarantee Jordan "not less than \$30,000,000"

¹²Hans J. Morgenthau, "The National Interest vs Moral Abstraction" Readings in American Foreign Policy, American Foundation for Political Education, Chicago, 1955, p. 196.

annually in economic aid, with the conditions that Jordan "be solely responsible for the selection, preparation and execution of all projects."¹³

In reply to this request the U.S. indicated that "it would be difficult to see a prosperous and secure Jordan in the absence of an Arab-Israel settlement."¹⁴ In other words unless certain conditions were complied with the government of Jordan had little reason to look to the U.S. for aid dollars.

The importance attached to the question of morality in the conduct of foreign policy by the U.S. and Mr. Dulles was in evidence when Prime Minister Macmillan announced his Government's decision to send troops to Jordan to Commons. In this statement Mr. Macmillan noted that, "The Secretary of State (Dulles) assured me that the action which we were contemplating would have the full moral support of the U.S. and that he believed it to be right."¹⁵

Thus it appears that the U.S. policy through the world since W.W. II has been geared to combat the communist offensive on two levels, military and, more recently, economic and social. Since the advent of the Eisenhower administration and the assumption of John Foster Dulles to the post of

¹³Middle Eastern Affairs, Vol. VIII, No. 3 (March, 1957), p. 121.

¹⁴Robert Murphy, "The U.S. Looks at the Middle East," Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XXXVI, No. 927, (April 1, 1957), p. 517.

¹⁵House of Commons, Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 591, (8 July - 18 July, 1958), p. 1509.

Secretary of State that policy has been redefined and embodied in the comprehensive Mutual Security Act. In addition, Secretary Dulles brought with him an awareness of the grave dimensions of the Soviet threat along with his own personal convictions regarding the key to world peace; peaceful change through social and economic progress. It is only within this context that one may attempt to give meaning to the policy the U.S. has followed to date in Jordan.

MIDDLE EAST

The preceding section gave a general picture of the official attitudes held by Washington with respect to the worldwide objectives of the U.S. and the assessment of the Soviet threat at that level.

Any attempt to apply these general principles and programs to uphold them in a given area will reveal the need for more explicit explanation of the objectives and means for their attainment within that area. To the extent that it is possible to consider the Middle East as one region for planning purposes, the objectives of the U.S. particular to this area will be briefly described in this section.

The entire Middle East assumed added importance in American eyes in the 1950's with the birth of the Baghdad Pact, the Egyptian arms deal with Czechoslovakia, the assumption of power by the Nabulsi government in Jordan, the Suez invasion and finally the proclamation of the American Doctrine.

In general terms U.S. policies in the Middle East may be explained in the following way,

"Stated simply, the principle American objective in the Middle East is to assist the countries to maintain their political independence and territorial integrity, and to achieve a steady development commensurate with each nation's human and material resources and capacity. We believe that so long as we are able to deal with free and independent countries in this vital part of

the world there will flow from that relationship our other objectives, such as trade, based upon mutual benefits and access to routes of transportation vital to free world welfare and security."¹⁶

Reduced to specifics this policy may be divided into four objectives. Listed below in order of their approximate priority, they are:

- 1) Keep the Soviets and communist influence out of the region.
- 2) Support the independence and territorial integrity of the countries in the area, including, above all, Israel.
- 3) Promote friendly relations with the leaders of the Arab countries in order to maintain the vital flow of oil upon which the industries of Western Europe depend so heavily.
- 4) Take whatever steps possible to bring social and economic progress to the lesser developed nations of the area while retaining the good relations of the leaders of these countries.¹⁷

To a certain extent these may be considered complementary, i.e., promotion of economic progress will, in all probability, serve to reduce the attraction of communism. Certainly the support flowing forth from Washington for Israel does not strike a favorable cord with the Arab states whose support is being courted by the U.S. The effects the Israel-U.S. relations have on U.S. policy in Jordan will be discussed below.

¹⁶House Hearings, Mutual Security Act, 1958, p. 656. Statement by William M. Rountree, Assistant Secretary of State for N. East, S. Asian and African Affairs.

¹⁷Current History, "Our Stake in the Middle East" (A.U.S. Government Specialist) November, 1957, p. 274.

Prior to looking more closely at these objectives note should be made of the events which preceded the entry of the U.S. into the Middle East as an influential power.

Subsequent to World War II several factors caused the United Kingdom to reluctantly relinquish its footholds in the Middle East. The U.S. approved in principle and even impatiently urged at times the speedup of the British withdrawal from the area. This process continued until it became apparent that the traditional desire of the Russian rulers had not abated in the least but rather began to make itself known in disturbing proportions. This threat of Soviet influence in the area caused alarm in some circles and prompted American support for the Iraqi-Turkish defense pact of February 1955. The activities of the Russians, notably the presence of Soviet technicians and arms in Egypt and later in Syria, coupled with their unqualified support of Arab nationalism to gain their own ends, were the pivotal points of Secretary Dulles' speech to the U.N. General Assembly in September 1957, in which he called for a limitation of arms shipments into the area.¹⁸

After the disastrous events of 1956 the U.S. felt it was imperative that something be done to give assurances to the Arab States, especially the weaker governments, of the U.S. willingness to actively aid them in combating

¹⁸Vital Speeches, "Limitations of Armament and the Middle East", Vol. XXIII, No. 24, (October 1, 1957), pp. 738-741.

international communism and, at the same time, give the Soviet Union a clear warning of the significance the U.S. attached to the Middle East and its resources. This "something" took the form of the Eisenhower Doctrine, a proposal initiated by the Executive and endorsed by both Houses of Congress.

The language of this resolution gives several clues to the view official Washington held of the Middle East at that time. Secretary Dulles, in his testimony before the Senate Committees considering the proposal, described the Middle East as a region sharply divided within itself, capable of uniting only on negative issues such as Israel.¹⁹ It was mainly for this reason that the proposal was designed for applicability to external threats from international communism and did not seek to settle inter-state difficulties in the area.²⁰

Soviet Threat

Moreover, Secretary Dulles expressed before the same body the opinion that the people of this area are "basically anti-communist" due to their religious beliefs and attitudes toward a materialistic approach to human affairs.²¹ Based partially on these two considerations the

¹⁹Senate Hearings, President's Proposal, p. 78.

²⁰Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XXXVI, No. 926 (March 25, 1957), p. 481. Text of Resolution.

²¹Senate Hearings, op. cit., p. 49.

proposal was designed to minimize fears among the Middle Eastern states of attack from without by international communism, while recognizing that only with the acceptance of the proposal by these same people could render the proposal effective.²²

Thus it appears that the U.S. had almost involuntarily and certainly without design assumed the burden of maintaining Western interests in an area which defied effective regional planning, an area which was basically anti-communist and yet was in need of a "shield" against the growing influence of the Soviet threat. This responsibility was assumed by a U.S. armed with considerable military might, technical skills, an almost bottomless bank account and a dearth of diplomatic experience in the area.

America's primary aim in the Middle East is and has been to keep the Soviets out. On the military side Secretary Dulles returned from his 1953 trip to the area impressed with the potential deterrent of the "northern tier" concept which later proved to be the groundwork for the Baghdad Pact. U.S. refusal to become a full fledged member of the Pact, based on the view that such move would alienate Saudi Arabia and Egypt, proved to be a fruitless gesture as these anti-Pact elements did not dissociate the U.S. from the Pact.

Once the "northern tier" was scaled by the Soviets

²²Ibid., p. 60.

by arms shipments to Cairo and later Damascus, the U.S. had little choice but back King Saud as its man in the area to counter the extremists in the Nasser camp. And, as the events in April 1957 proved, the U.S. was still willing to actively back the remnants of the pro-Western elements in Jordan to prevent further growth of the Egyptian ruler's influence; an influence which was oftentimes as extreme and uncontrollable to Nasser as it was unpredictable to Western observers.

If the professed policy objectives of the U.S. were to be consistently sought, the U.S., in its continuing effort to minimize Soviet influence in the Middle East, had little choice but to support the Iraq-Saudi-Jordan bloc in opposition to the Soviet-backed Egyptian leader.

In retrospect it may appear that the views the U.S. held of the Egyptian at that time, both of Nasser's self-concept and of his relations with the Soviets, may not have been wholly accurate. Since that time his relations with the Soviets have shown his past actions to be geared for practical political gain, not allegiance to the communist ideology.

"Integrity and Independence"

Almost invariably the words "maintain the independence and integrity of the countries of the Middle East" are found in official policy statements outlining U.S. policy in this area. Two major reasons appear to be

the basis upon which this policy was founded. The first is based on the view that any disturbance of the very delicately balanced state of affairs which has existed in the area since 1948 will almost certainly cause some sort of chain reaction and general upheaval in the area. Thus, given this proposition, the perennial insistence of the U.S. that the territorial status quo be maintained may be understood in terms of the basic policy objective in this area, peace. Needless to say, the benefits accrued to the U.S. and her allies from the oil producing states in this region would be seriously jeopardized in the event of any general upheaval there.

A second reason, related to the first but one which is important enough to the U.S. to merit the title of a separate policy objective, is the guarantee the U.S. has made virtually sans cesse of the existence of the state of Israel.

In testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in February, 1956, Secretary Dulles clearly stated, "The preservation of the State of Israel...is what I regard as one of the essential goals of U.S. foreign policy."²³

The seriousness with which the U.S. takes this question of Israel's independence was evidenced by the Tripartite Declaration of 1950 and innumerable policy

²³Zinner, op. cit., 1956, p. 273. Foreign Policy Bulletin, "What Should Be U.S. Policy in the Middle East?" September 15, 1956, p. 4. House of Representatives Hearings, Mutual Security Act, 1956, p. 572.

statements since that time declaring that aggression against any state in the area will be met with appropriate action by the U.S.

The U.S. has pinned its hopes of playing this dual role as defender of the Arabs and Israelis by adopting, with highly questionable success, an official attitude of "impartiality" or "sympathetic neutrality" in dealing with the states concerned.²⁴

The extent to which harmony can prevail between Jordan and the U.S. so long as the latter continues to support both sides is questionable, but it is obvious that the optimum relations cannot be achieved under such circumstances.

Palestine

The U.S. has unilaterally issued policy statements amounting to guarantees of existing national boundaries, and armistice lines, on numerous occasions. Yet, despite these policy statements, the U.S. nevertheless continues to refer the responsibility of resolving the Palestine problem to the United Nations.

Speaking of inter-area problems, primarily the Palestine problem, Secretary Dulles gave this general view of the official attitude the U.S. embraces regarding this problem.

²⁴William M. Rountree, "The Middle Eastern Policy of the U.S.", Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XXXVI, No. 933, (May 13, 1957), p. 757.

"Most of the problems of the area (Middle East) which you might call intra-area problems are being dealt with by the United Nations, and we believe that the United Nations provides the best forum for solving those problems.

"Of course the whole matter of Palestine was initially a responsibility of the United Nations. It was the United Nations which created the State of Israel. It was the United Nations which negotiated the armistice. It was the United Nations which has the observation teams which are supposed to supervise the carrying out of the armistice.

"It is the United Nations which is taking care of the refugees....

"At the moment those problems we believe are best dealt with through the United Nations. We are giving full support to the United Nations in its efforts in that respect.

"We have taken the initiative in the United Nations with respect to a great many of these matters, and we quite agree that all possible efforts should be made to solve these problems."²⁵

The question of the role the U.S. might play in a final settlement of the Palestine was answered by Secretary Dulles in his August 26, 1955 address to the Council on Foreign Relations.²⁶ His offer of U.S. financial aid for reparations and U.S. guarantees of mutually agreed upon permanent frontiers has been constantly mentioned and reaffirmed by the U.S. since that date as its main effort at resolving the problem,²⁷ through the United Nations.

That the U.S. had understandably sought to maintain

²⁵Senate Hearings, President's Proposal, p. 53.

²⁶John Foster Dulles, "The Middle East", Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XXXIII, No. 845. (September 5, 1955), pp. 378-380.

²⁷Senate Hearings, President's Proposal, pp. 8-9. James J. Wadesworth, (Statement) Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XXXIV, No. 862, (January 2, 1956), p. 32.

strong ties with the oil producing states of the area for the oil as well as a counterbalance against more extreme factions in some other states, was most evident in the reception official Washington gave King Saud on his visit to the U.S. in early 1957. The unqualified support offered by the State Department to an absolute monarch who openly discriminated against U.S. citizens,²⁸ gives dramatic evidence of the importance the U.S. attaches to maintaining amicable relations between the two countries. To the extent that Saudi and American interest coincide in the Middle East the King has proven to be of invaluable assistance to the U.S. in promoting its policies, especially in his support of the principles of the Eisenhower Doctrine and of King Hussein during the April, 1957 crisis.²⁹

Oil

Above all else in the area, with the possible exception of guaranteeing Israel's existence, the U.S. attaches highest priority to keeping the flow of Middle Eastern oil moving to Europe. Uppermost in the minds of U.S. politicians and military planners is the almost complete (90%) dependence western Europe manifests for

²⁸ Representatives of the Executive have often been subjected to severe attacks by certain members of the Congress for the policy the State Department has followed in Saudi Arabia in spite of the measures that country has effected against American Jews. House of Representatives Hearings, Mutual Security Act, 1960, p. 229.

²⁹ House of Representatives Hearings, Mutual Security Act, 1957, Part VI, pp. 1312.

Middle Eastern oil for her industries and NATO armed forces. Any change in the status quo with respect to the ruling cliques carries with it a potential threat to these oil resources and lifelines, whether that change be to a leftist oriented government or a government occupied solely with fulfilling the hopes and aspirations alleged to be at the root of Arab nationalism. Theoretically the choice between absolute monarch and some form of representative government has not been easy for the U.S. In practice the demands of fulfilling U.S. policy objectives has left the U.S. no alternative. The nature of the other theoretical alternatives, the exigences of the defense posture of Europe, and the Soviet threat have combined to leave the U.S. no choice as to what type of government is must support.

Regional Planning

It would be most ideal if the U.S. could approach the Middle East with one plan or policy equally applicable to all the states of the region. An earlier comment showed that Secretary Dulles found it impractical, due to the attitudes of the Middle Easterners, to attempt such planning on a meaningful scale. Nevertheless there have been attempts to do so, both in the military field and in promoting economic progress and advancement.

One prime example of the latter which displayed the almost insurmountable obstacles which must be overcome was

the Johnson Mission to win inter-state cooperation for the Jordan River Development Plan. After literally years of conferences and negotiations Eric Johnson was finally able to get agreement from all the states concerned for the technical phases necessary to make the project operative, i.e., division of water, etc.

But, the final approval of the Project was a political decision since it involved dealing with Israel and was put up to the Arab League in a meeting in Cairo.³⁰ For political, not technical, reasons the Syrian delegate felt compelled to veto the plan,³¹ a move which left its chances of ever materializing almost nil.

This serves to highlight with a concrete example the results which have crowned the West's efforts to deal with the region on a truly regional basis. Inter-Arab and Arab-Israel differences are of such a nature that the U.S. finds it virtually forced to deal with each separate state on an individual basis.³²

To recapitulate, the same basic policy objectives which the U.S. seeks to achieve on a worldwide scale are

³⁰October 11, 1955.

³¹U.S. Senate, Committee on Appropriations, 85th Congress, 2nd Session, Mutual Security Appropriations, 1959, (H.R. 13192), Hearings (Washington, G.P.O., 1958), pp. 446-47.

³²The concept of dealing with any geographic area on a "regional basis" is, of course, a relative proposition. What is suggested in this statement is that the Middle East, due to the conditions which prevail in the area, is much less susceptible to effective regional planning than Western Europe for example.

likewise the motivating factors behind the U.S. policy in the Middle East. The problems of peace, the Soviet threat, and cooperation through the United Nations assume an even greater importance and become more difficult to resolve for the U.S. in this area due to the strategic location, natural resources and political currents which exist throughout the region. Moreover, the problem of maintaining peace has become increasingly difficult since the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948 and the position of "impartiality" which the U.S. has assumed vis-a-vis this problem.

What these objectives mean in terms of U.S. policy in Jordan will be the subject of the following section.

JORDAN

One of the objectives of this paper is to define the substance and raison d'etre of U.S. policy in Jordan. The presentation is based on the proposition that a meaningful description of that policy is impossible if Jordan is divorced from the rest of the Middle East or, on a more comprehensive scale, the world itself. This is because the common denominators of U.S. policy throughout the world (peace, minimization or elimination of the Soviet threat and cooperation through the United Nations) are sought at each of these levels through a comprehensive plan geared for effective operation throughout the various regions and ultimately, the world, not just one country.

Each of these policy objectives faces a number of obstacles in Jordan. The roots of these obstacles may be traced to one source, the strategic location of Jordan. Certainly there is no wealth of natural resources, industrial capacity or any comparable reason to cause the U.S. government to pour over a quarter of a billion dollars into Jordan since 1952. The key to explaining the U.S. policy in Jordan in terms of peace, opposition to the Soviet threat and cooperation with the United Nations, lies with the strategic location of the country and, a consequence of that location, the composition of its population. It is unlikely that if Jordan were located elsewhere that she

would receive the attention, both positive and negative, which she has received from both the West and her sister Arab states.

Necessity of Long Range Policy

Speaking in general terms it is safe to say that all foreign policies are conducted on two distinct levels. These may be identified as the long range, strategic level and the short range, tactical or daily operations level. The latter, the headline making moves described in an earlier section, is designed to promote the long range policies either by sustaining already existing favorable conditions or, by reacting to unexpected opportunities so as to channel them into promoting the long range policy objectives sought.

The circumstances surrounding the role played by the U.S. in Jordan demanded that a comprehensive long range policy be designed for Jordan if U.S. efforts there were to be successful. The U.S. has based its planning on the acknowledged fact that Jordan, with its present resources at their present stage of development, is not an economically viable entity.³³ Detailed studies in 1954 and 1955³⁴ left

³³International Bank of Reconstruction and Development, The Economic Development of Jordan, Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1957, p. 69. Shwadran, op. cit., p. 320.

³⁴Ibid., Paul Grounds Phillips, The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan: Prolegomena to a Technical Assistance Program, University of Chicago, Chicago, 1954, p. 187.

little doubt as to the ability of Jordan to sustain herself economically without outside aid. The readiness which characterized the U.S. move to make economic assistance available to Jordan in time of dire need suggests that the question of financial expenditures demanded by the economic conditions of the country at this time is a relatively unimportant factor in view of the overall U.S. policy objectives in the area.³⁵

In any case, the U.S. has prepared and begun to implement plans which are designed to bring economic self-sufficiency to Jordan within ten or fifteen years. As basic work in the planning stages is still being carried out there is no exact determination of when this development should reach the desired stage of self-sufficiency. What these plans have called for and have accomplished in this long range policy will be outlined in some detail in the next section.

Another major reason, in addition to the economic condition of Jordan, which has made long range planning an absolute necessity for the U.S. is the concern manifested by the U.S. for the security of Israel. The U.S. has repeatedly made policy statements reiterating its stand regarding aggression by any state against Israel or vice

³⁵The U.S. actions indicate that the financial expenditures were of minor importance relative to the political gains accruing to the U.S. as a result of the move. House of Representatives Hearings, Mutual Security Act, 1958, p. 46.

versa. Since Jordan shares a common border in excess of three hundred miles with Israel and plays host to over half of the refugees from Palestine, it is obviously one of the most sensitive spots in the Arab world in regard to the question of military aggression from either side.³⁶ The absence of some long range plans designed to ameliorate the explosive situation between these two countries would in all likelihood prove fatal to U.S. hopes for peace in this vital area.

That Jordan is being arbitrarily separated from her neighbors for consideration in this section should not shroud the fact that U.S. policy planners see Jordan as a potential key to a chain reaction which could leave the Middle East wide open to Soviet penetration and ultimate takeover in the event of serious disturbances there.

Given the conditions which exist in Jordan the U.S. has geared its long range policy toward promoting the economic posture of the country while being careful to maintain an adequate security force and army to assure peace in the Kingdom by force. Hopes of achieving the long range goals are founded on the presumption that King Hussein's regime can be maintained until these begin to take hold

³⁶The resumption of active hostilities would, in all likelihood, give Israel the opportunity to attempt to swallow up the West Bank up to the natural frontier of the Jordan River as a primary objective.

of the Jordanian economy. To this end the U.S. has tried to leave very little to chance. Substantial amounts of military equipment and dollar aid to pay troops has been unhesitatingly granted Jordan to assure that the regime currently in power is not overthrown.³⁷

U.S. Aid Policy

From April 1951 (when the first technical cooperation agreement was signed between Jordan and the U.S.) through fiscal year 1956, \$32.7 million was obligated for technical assistance and economic development to Jordan. Since that time, and since the April, 1957 crisis, over five times that amount has been appropriated for expenditures in Jordan under the Mutual Security Act. In addition, approximately \$50 million worth of surplus foods and development loans has been granted Jordan.

It would be a mistake to assume that these figures were an accurate indication of the relative importance with which U.S. policy planners regard Jordan, or that Jordan has assumed a position of higher importance in the eyes of Washington since 1957. It must be kept in mind that in through the early 1950's, at least until early 1956, the British were in a position to "guide" Jordan's policies

³⁷The zeal with which Secretary Dulles moved to foil communist "attempts in subversion and infiltration..." was evidenced when he was defending the requests for funds in the 1957 MSA before the Senate committee on Appropriations. He went so far as to state categorically that the State Department was not concerned with making friends for the U.S. That if U.S. loans saved a people from communism, he (Secretary Dulles) did not care whether they liked us or hated us. Stebbins, op. cit., 1957, p. 27.

when they conflicted with the interests of the West.

The vital importance of Jordan to the West did not change radically during the 1950's. The marked increase in aid to Jordan in 1957 was a direct result of the nature of the government which emerged from the chaotic internal situation which began with the Baghdad Pact riots and ended with the ousting of the Nabulsi Government and ultimately the declaration of martial law. This series of events made it impossible for the British, (provided they were willing, which is doubtful) to resume their former position and virtually thrust upon the willing shoulders of the U.S. the burden previously borne by the United Kingdom.

There is evidence to indicate that the U.S. viewed with concern but detachment the leftist drift of the Nabulsi Government and the final break with the United Kingdom in early 1957.³⁸ Even as the break between the two nations occurred the U.S. expressed doubts as to the prospects of increasing U.S. aid to Jordan under the circumstances.³⁹

The official attitude toward aiding Jordan did not register a change until the events of April 1957. The U.S. later explained its actions by denying that there was any intention of "taking over where Great Britain left off in

³⁸ Robert Murphy, "The U.S. Looks at the Middle East," Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XXXVI, No. 927, (April 1, 1957), p. 517.

³⁹ Ibid.

Jordan." It was rather after "other Arab states" failed to meet their obligations that the U.S. decided to render economic assistance to Jordan. And, in conformity with the principles which have consistently guided U.S. foreign policy, the aid was given to safeguard the "independence and integrity of Jordan" under King Hussein.⁴⁰

Another factor which is more pronounced in Jordan than elsewhere in the Arab world is that of the Palestine refugees. Reference has already been made to the proposals put forth by the U.S. to help resolve this problem but until such proposals are translated into action the U.S. must take full account of the sizable refugee population in Jordan.⁴¹ The most pressing problem these refugees present, after that of lodging and food, is one of internal security. The existence of over half a million discontented homeless refugees within the borders of Jordan necessitated heavy expenditures for security and army forces. Combined, these two annual expenditures average 60% of the Jordanian Budget. The refugees, the common frontier with Israel and the political atmosphere in the domestic scene combine to make the continued existence of this heavy expenditure a likely burden for many years to come.

⁴⁰House of Representatives Hearings, Mutual Security Act, 1957, p. 838.

⁴¹Secretary Dulles' speech of August 26, 1955 outlining the U.S. position vis-a-vis the Palestine problem.

Trade

Another major factor which the U.S. must overcome to make Jordan an economically viable unit is the disruption of trade patterns which remains as a scar from the 1948 Palestine war. Prior to that time Transjordan and Palestine had ready access to the Eastern Mediterranean seacoast for the trade necessary for the survival of the territories. Now that there is only the southern port of Aqaba through which Jordan can maintain contact with the open sea, the entire pattern of trading and transportation had to be radically revised to accomodate itself to the changed circumstances.

The U.S. has attempted to establish trade patterns which will compensate for this loss of trading ports on the Mediterranean coast and sees one possible answer in forming an economic trade union of some kind. The endorsement for this would come from the U.S. only if "suitable" members could be found in order to maximize the trade potential which now exists in Jordan.⁴²

The details of the programs undertaken along these lines will appear in the following section, suffice to say that this disruption of established and logically convenient trading patterns in Transjordan and the West Bank, coupled

⁴²Interview with Political Officer of American Embassy in Amman, July 6, 1961.

with the sorely lacking natural resources in Jordan, has encumbered the ruling regime with an economic problem of tremendous proportions. Consequently it is the business of the U.S. policy planners to seek some feasible solution to the problem.

Arab Nationalism

A force of undetermined potency in Jordanian politics is Arab nationalism. In his address to the Third Emergency Session of the United Nations General Assembly in August 1958, President Eisenhower outlined the official position taken by the U.S. vis-a-vis this phenomenon.

Referring to Arab nationalims President Eisenhower said:

"Let me state the position of my country unmistakably. The peoples of the Arab nations of the Near East clearly possess the right of determining and expressing their own destiny. Other nations should not interfere so long as this expression is found in ways compatible with international peace and security."⁴³

These remarks were made in clear reference to Arab nationalism in the Middle East. But, an attempt to reconcile them with the actions taken by the U.S. in April 1957, in supporting the King against a cabinet composed of representatives freely elected by the people, ends in dismal failure. The only possible way that this action might be explained in terms of this policy statement lies

⁴³Zinner, op. cit., 1958, p. 355.

in the contention that foreign influence, not the indigenous will of the people, was guiding or directing the activities of the Nabulsi government.

In fact, the U.S. has consistently viewed the phenomenon of Arab nationalism with skepticism, especially since it normally is channeled against the status quo and has almost invariably been used as a shield by communist agitators. Possibly one of the most powerful reasons why the U.S. in fact does not openly support Arab nationalist sentiments is to be found in the potential threat which a powerful anti-Western Arab federation or union would pose for Israel. Were these sentiments of a more conservative and restrained nature they might be supported by the U.S. in the hopes that this dynamic force could be channeled into Western-approved measures to ameliorate the economic and political conditions of the Middle East and Jordan. But, since to date Arab nationalism has proven to be almost by definition anti-Western, it would be impolitic for the U.S. to give support to the very elements which are seeking to displace the already pro-Western regime in power in Jordan.

Eisenhower Doctrine

The effect the Eisenhower Doctrine had on U.S.-Jordan relations is not easily discernable. When it was announced by the President, Jordan was preparing herself for negotiations

with the other Arab states which culminated in the signing of the Cairo Agreement in late January 1957. Two months after that, the final notes were exchanged to terminate the 1948 Anglo-Jordan treaty once there was Arab money to replace the British subsidy. The swing away from the West and toward the Egyptian-Syrian axis was reaching its climax at this time.

These events were not going unnoticed in Washington. The Doctrine was designed to halt the penetration of the area by international communism or its agents. With one eye on the Nabulsi government which was clearly challenging his power and the other on the provisions of the Eisenhower Doctrine, the King issued his anti-communist letter only one month after the Doctrine was announced by the President. This could be interpreted by Washington as a clear indication by the King as to what his own position was vis-a-vis the communist threat in his own country.

Later that same month, when King Saud returned from his visit to the U.S., Jordan's King Hussein went on public record as recognizing the threat communism posed in the Arab countries.

When the King finally did request U.S. aid, after the April 1957 crisis, he was unable to do so under the provisions of the Doctrine because of the still unsettled state of affairs within Jordan itself.

There was no lack of sympathy for the King's position in the State Department and the aid was announced as aid totally unrelated to the Doctrine.⁴⁴

Similar circumstances surrounded the July 1958 landing of British troops in Jordan. The close cooperation between London and Washington in the military, political and diplomatic spheres which marked the landing of British troops in shows without doubt the unqualified support the U.S. extended to both England and Jordan.⁴⁵ Had the British not been able to render the necessary assistance it appears probable that the U.S. would have done so unhesitatingly.

Twice then, since the proposal was initially presented to the Congress, King Hussein has, a) identified the forces that threatened his throne as directed by international communism and b) asked for U.S. aid with which to defeat those forces. In actual practice the Doctrine has enabled King Hussein to use the label "international communism" to squelch his rivals for power within Jordan. This has been the net result, if not the original intent, of the Eisenhower Doctrine in Jordan.

The policy followed by the U.S. in Jordan has varied in only one respect from that implemented in the other Arab

⁴⁴New York Times, April 30, 1957, p. 3. also "King Hussein's Balancing Act," The Economist, May 4, 1957, p. 410.

⁴⁵House of Commons, Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 591, (8 July - 18 July, 1958), p. 1509.

states and throughout the world; it has been implemented on a much more comprehensive scale than in the other states of the Arab world. In Jordan the U.S. has assumed both a burden and a blessing; a burden in that the problems of this particular state are many and urgently pressing and a blessing in that the U.S. has the opportunity to exercise with relative freedom its own formulae for resolving these problems in front of the rest of the Arab and underdeveloped world.

The methods employed by the U.S. to accomplish this task are the subject of Chapter III following.

CHAPTER III

MECHANICS OF U.S. POLICY IN JORDAN

The preceding sections of this paper have been aimed at describing what the U.S. is seeking in the world, Middle East and Jordan and why these goals are being sought. Note was made above that the efforts to attain these goals have entailed the expenditure of more than a quarter of a billion dollars in Jordan since 1951. This section will outline the classifications in the Mutual Security Act under which most of this money was spent and give examples of the various projects, which have been born of this expenditure to illustrate in concrete terms U.S. efforts to achieve policy objectives.

Until 1957 U.S. expenditures in Jordan were solely in the fields of technical cooperation and economic development projects which were conducted on a relatively minor scale.¹ Due to the political exigencies of Jordan during this period it was neither politic nor feasible to support a larger program from the U.S. viewpoint.

On January 11, 1956, only five days after the anti-Baghdad riots in Jordan had resulted in the burning of the Amman Point IV building and the stoning of the American Consulate in Jerusalem, the U.S. delegate to the U.N made

¹An average of about \$7 million annually was spent between 1951 and 1956 for technical cooperation and special economic and developmental assistance for projects. (See Appendix A).

an address before the General Assembly which showed a new awareness of the importance of the economic and social progress desired by the lesser-developed countries of the world. In part the statement read:

"The present period of history may one day be recognized as a major turning point in the struggle between Communism and freedom. It appears to be clearly a shift in the cold war, in which economic and social problems have moved to the forefront.

"Members of the U.N. delegation during this General Assembly session have observed the effectiveness of Soviet tactics under these new conditions.... As we observed maneuvers, we were conscious that the Soviet Union, elsewhere in the world, was using economic and social collaboration as a means for jumping military as well as political barriers.

"We believe that the U.S. must counter these Soviet efforts. We can succeed, not by outbidding communism in sheer amounts of economic aid, but by making newly independent and newly articulate people feel that they can best satisfy their wants by becoming and remaining part of the community of free nations...

"We are in a contest in the field of economic development of underdeveloped countries which is bitterly competitive. Defeat in this contest could be as disastrous as defeat in an armaments race."²

Within a period of eighteen months the U.S. was placed in a position to implement with a minimum of restrictions the measures it deemed necessary to meet this challenge in the economic and social spheres in Jordan. The \$33 million which had been spent by the U.S. from 1951 to early 1957 was to grow to eight times that amount by 1961 to accomplish this task.

²Zinner, op. cit., 1957, pp. 69-70. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 34, No. 865, (January 23, 1956), pp. 117-118.

The political and diplomatic success of the King and consequently the U.S. and the West over the pro-Egypt forces in April 1957 simultaneously placed upon the U.S. the burden of maintaining the state it had just "saved" and successfully meeting the economic challenge within that state.

The Department of State was charged with coordinating the U.S. efforts in this endeavor and achieving foreign policy objectives. Specifically the State Department is charged with the implementation and execution of the provisions of the Mutual Security Act (MSA) through the Department of Defense, the International Cooperation Administration (ICA) and the Development Loan Fund. Each of these agencies in turn is charged with the administration of a special area of the MSA provisions.

The Department of Defense assumes responsibility for the execution of the Military Assistance Program (MAP); the ICA administers the technical cooperation, defense support special assistance and contingency fund; and the Development Loan Fund administers long-range loans for economic development.³

Basically each of these different agencies is designed

³Questions and Answers on the Mutual Security Program, Department of State Publication 7027, September, 1960, (GPO, Washington, D.C.) p. 22.

to achieve a situation whereby the U.S. can maintain the internal and external security of Jordan while promoting projects which will assure the country the economic and social progress essential to the peace and well-being of the people of Jordan.

The U.S. did not begin this task alone. Already in 1952 the Jordan Development Board was established to outline projects which would alleviate the pressing problems of unemployment and economic advancement.⁴ In addition the Board has received invaluable advice from experts in various fields from the Ford Foundation in the creation of necessary long-term development plans. Projects originally begun with British aid and U.N. efforts were the subject of attempts to incorporate and integrate all developmental endeavors into the overall development plans.

Before noting the particular areas where the provisions of the MSA are being translated into projects in Jordan note should be made of the implications MSA aid carries with it. The U.S. cooperates with the governments of many countries under the provisions of the MSA. Some of these countries are Socialist, others are monarchies like Jordan, still others are dictatorships. That the U.S. has a technical cooperation program in Yugoslavia, for example, does not imply that the U.S. aid to such countries does, however,

⁴The Newly Independent Nations: Jordan, Department of State Publication 7030, (GPO, Washington, D.C.), November 1960, p. 6.

indicate to the world that the U.S. is prepared to support nations that endeavor to preserve their national independence.⁵

The official justification for this is quite simple. A nation that becomes a captive behind the Iron Curtain is certainly beyond the scope of free world aid, whereas even a dictatorship outside the communist camp, a) does not add to the power of that camp and, b) is a potentially free nation which may become a free nation in fact with the proper guidance and time.

In fact, in the case of Jordan it appears that the U.S. is attempting to "guide" a politically and economically underdeveloped country to political and economic maturity while assuring itself and the West of a "friendly" government in a strategic area. The discourse below will outline the techniques employed by the Executive under MSA authorization. Military Assistance.

The role of military assistance under the MSA is to supply "measures in common defense, including the furnishing of military assistance to friendly nations and international organizations in order to promote the foreign policy, security and general welfare of the U.S." In addition, the act also states that under the direction of the President, the Secretary of State is responsible for "determining whether there shall be a military assistance

⁵Questions, op. cit., p. 25.

program for a country and the value thereof."⁶ Thus the program established in Jordan represents a mixture of economic, political and military factors.

The majority of military assistance under the MSA goes to countries having firm commitments to meet in cases of communist aggression. Jordan, on the other hand, is being granted military assistance under a system of "presidential determination" which is subject to annual review by the Executive. Each year the Executive reassesses the military, political and economic needs of Jordan and bases the amount of military assistance on this review.

The arms furnished the Jordan Government in the June 1957 agreement were previously uncommitted but came from an on-the-spot presidential determination which authorized \$ ten million worth of military equipment "to maintain the level of efficiency of the Jordan Army."⁷

The amount determined by the Executive is not contingent upon the effectiveness of the Jordan Army against communist troops but rather the amount of aid necessary for maintaining internal security and a facade of military strength along the sensitive points of the armistice lines.⁸

⁶The Mutual Security Program, (GPO, Washington, D.C.) March, 1960, p. 23.

⁷Middle Eastern Affairs, Vol. VIII, No. 8-9 (August - September, 1957), p. 322.

⁸Interview with Lt. Col. Wallace, U.S. Military Attaché Amman, Jordan, 7 August, 1961.

In effect the total U.S. contribution to date in the area of military aid constitutes no more than ten percent of the equipment of the Jordan Army and even that is equipment which has been reconditioned in Europe or the U.S., not new equipment.⁹

Prior to 1959 the country by country figures of the Military Assistance Program were classified but this classification was lifted in that year and the cumulative 1950-59 totals were made public. For the period 1950-59 the total deliveries under MAP to Jordan were \$ 11,102,000. Of this total \$2,326,000 was delivered in Fiscal year 1959. Programmed for 1960 was another \$5,163,000 worth of military aid under MAP for Jordan.¹⁰

As indicated above this aid is rendered merely to assure adequate internal security and apparent military strength on the armistice line. It has not been offered with a view toward building up an effective military force to fight communist aggression as have the NATO armies in Europe.

Organizationally, the MAP operates entirely independent of the United States Operations Mission/Jordan (USOM/J), or the more widely known name of Point IV. It

⁹Ibid.

¹⁰House of Representatives Hearings, Mutual Security Act, 1960, p. 114.

is the sole responsibility and function of the Department of Defense which acts upon the guidance and advice of the State Department.¹¹

Special Assistance

A second major category under the MSA from which the largest dollar value of MSA funds is appropriated is the special assistance section. This category of assistance has been the most important of that granted to Jordan by the U.S.

In general accord with the goal of "the maintenance of promotion of political or economic stability" as stipulated in section 400(a) of the MSA, the Special Assistance under the ICA has the following objectives:

- a) To maintain the political independence or stability of countries threated in by incursion or internal political violence as a consequence of either temporary or chronic economic inadequacies or pending economic collapse. Major special assistance country programs of economic assistance are required in such circumstances.
- b) To maintain economic stability or support growth in countries where country programs of this nature will permit the receipient government to maintain its identification with the free world or to counter pressures in the opposite directions.
- c) To maintain political stability or further general U.S. foreign policy objectives by establishing or maintaining a U.S. presence through participating in beneficial projects.¹²

¹¹Interview with Assistant Controller, USOM/J, Harvey Howard, Amman, Jordan, 7 August, 1961.

¹²House of Representatives Hearings, Mutual Security Act, 1960, pp. 989-90.

It has been readily recognized that without the aid of funds under the MSA Special Assistance, Jordan would be unable to maintain the relatively stable political and economic conditions which have characterized recent years. Nor is it likely that even the national independence of the country could have survived when threatened by earlier crises without this aid.¹³

This task of "maintenance or promotion of political or economic stability" has been handled by employing special assistance funds in two distinctly different ways. First has been the budgetary support funds which have varied in amount from \$ 20 million in 1957 to \$ 40 million in 1960.¹⁴

These funds are usually referred to as those designated to "help the government of Jordan to meet its normal internal costs of operation including both its military and civil budgets."¹⁵ It is a means of "filling the gap" between the income and expenditures of the Government. In actual fact roughly three quarters of this budgetary support goes to support the Jordan Army, either directly through salaries or indirectly to cover the costs of rations and clothing.¹⁶ This grant of U.S.

¹³Grant S. McClellan, editor, U.S. Foreign Aid, H.W. Wilson Company, New York, 1957, p. 150. House of Representatives Hearings, Mutual Security Act, 1957, p. 512 N.Y. Times, 23 May, 1957, p. 22.

¹⁴See appendix A for chart on U.S. aid since 1951.

¹⁵House of Representatives Hearings, Mutual Security Act, 1958, p. 1807.

¹⁶The Jordan Budget, 1952-1960, USOM/J, p. 18.

funds makes up the largest single amount in the U.S. program in Jordan.

Theoretically this grant is given without strings to the Government of Jordan for its operation. In fact there are suggestions made by the U.S. as to how to best benefit from the expenditure of these funds in various fields. Since the Government plays a big hand in the area of developmental projects much of this money is channeled into areas where there is direct U.S. supervision or guidance.

A second function of special assistance funds is to finance economic development projects. To this end special assistance funds have been combined with those funds already allocated for technical cooperation to finance economic development projects. The now-meaningless distinction between the two will be noted below in the consideration of the various projects undertaken.

Technical Cooperation.

The technical cooperation program in its present form was born with President Truman's famous fourth point mentioned earlier. Originally it was a program to make available to other peace-loving nations technical skills which would expediate the social and economic progress of the lesser-developed nations. It was based on the principle of self help, that the recipient nation, once

shown how, would itself initiate programs utilizing this new technical know-how. Thus originally the funds made available were designated to cover the cost of the technicians themselves, not extensive projects with materials, etc. But, as the technical knowhow was made available to the lesser-developed countries it became evident that the utilization of the newly gained knowhow required capital investment not readily available to these countries.

To remedy this situation the MSA made allowances for economic assistance under special assistance funds. to supply the needed capital. Very simply then the technical cooperation agreements provided the technicians while the economic assistance agreements provided the capital where needed.

Since many developmental projects needed both capital and technical assistance, funds from both have been employed to activate these projects. For this reason the distinction between the two has been dropped in this consideration of USOM/J projects.¹⁷ In fact the proposed amendments to the MSA call for the abolition of the now useless distinction.

¹⁷Projects referred to in this section will be TC (Technical Cooperation), SA (Special Assistance) or TC/CA denoting the source of the funds financing the projects from the MSA.

Before examining examples of projects in the various fields where Point IV is operating it may be profitable to make two pertinent observations.

The first deals with the type of projects the Point IV programs has initiated or aided. To date these projects have been directed at what Dr. Hazem Nuseibeh, Secretary General of the Jordan Development Board, calls "infra-structural developments."¹⁸ That is to say the areas upon which further economic developments depend, i.e., transportation, education, industry and mining, agricultural research and extension service, etc.

Without this sound base, efficient transport facilities, educated or skilled people, etc., the economy has no chance of progressing at a satisfactory rate for a prolonged period of time. Whereas with these features the complementary aspects of each one tends to multiply geometrically the benefits derived from the efforts expended to achieve them.

A second relevant observation concerns the rate of progress shown in various fields in Jordan over the past several years since the Point IV projects have been underway. It may be said that a given amount of time and

¹⁸Hazem Nuseibeh, "The Economy of Jordan" Speech reproduced by the USIS, Jordan.

money has been invested by point IV in agricultural research, for example. Likewise it can be observed that certain increases have occurred in tomato production over the past several years. But, there is no way of proving absolutely the Point IV research was solely responsible for these increases in production. The implication is certainly there but to categorically impute the increases in Point IV research efforts would be logically invalid.

With these propositions in mind the remainder of this section will be devoted to a consideration of the projects Point IV has initiated or aided with funds from technical cooperation, special assistance or both.¹⁹

Transportation. This areas of development has concentrated on highway construction and maintenance with on the job training for Jordanian engineers who will assume the responsibility for the technical demands of the growing program.

In 1957 project Highway Engineering and Management (TC 278-31-076) was initiated and designed to assist the Government of Jordan in organizing a highway division with specialized sections.²⁰ Each of these sections is now in

¹⁹See Appendix C for information regarding costs of projects to be borne by U.S., anticipated dates of completion, and U.S. dollar contribution to date for 1958-1960 period.

²⁰These specialized sections are: Highway Location, Survey and Design, Material testing and Control, Construction and Maintenance, Administration, Cost Accounting, Planning and Programing and Highway Bridge Design.

operation. Five Jordanians have received third country training, ten others received training in the U.S. and approximately 120 persons have received on-the-job training in Jordan in various phases of highway engineering under this project.

Projects Highway construction and Roads (SA 278-31-053 & 278-31-088) have constructed a total of 208 miles of road under use today. Of this total 81 miles are asphalted, 115 miles gravel surfaced and 12 miles graded earth. These roads have been constructed in accordance with the requirements of their traffic loads and the minimum safety standards equal to U.S. recommended designs for secondary roads.

These projects have provided On-the-job Training for 150 equipment operators, 1 construction superintendent and five foremen. In addition sixty mechanics have received on-the-job Training in equipment maintenance and heavy duty equipment repair and two officials have received six months training in the U.S. heavy duty road building machinery has been provided in the amount of approximately \$ 2.6 million.²¹

In September, 1958, the Hedjaz Jordan Railroad

²¹Through 1957 alone the road construction programs had employed about 7,000 Jordanians, mostly refugees in East and West Jordan. The majority of these workers were unskilled laborers. Norman Burns, House of Representatives Hearings, Mutual Security Act, 1957, p. 792.

Assistance project (TC 278-33-097) was initiated after a detailed report by the USOM/Ankara railroad advisor had been prepared and submitted. At that time there was a serious backlog of 29,000 metric tons awaiting shipment to Amman with only one locomotive in service. USOM/J railroad personnel had four locomotives in service by February 1959 and had reduced the freight backlog to a normal 1200 MT. The USOM/J railroad team made improvements in the management and maintenance which brought the freight tonnage moved during the January - April 1959 period to 33% above that of the same period of the previous year.

The initial stages of training for 50 mechanics, 30 track and 20 traffic and administration employees has been completed and the \$100,000 annually formerly paid to Damascus for railroad rental and equipment repairs has been entirely eliminated.

USOM/J has also financed a survey to study the feasibility of extending the railroad 65 kilometers south to Aqaba, a project which would cost an estimated JD 5,000,000.

These projects in the area of transportation have been designed to make available to Jordan facilities for more efficient movement of produce, freight and tourists. The Dead Sea Highway has facilitated considerably access

to the Dead Sea and therefore has stimulated tourism in that area. Likewise the improved highway between Jerusalem and Amman has reduced the travel time between the two principle cities in Jordan and allows for more service and truck trips at less wear and tear over a shorter period of time. All of these benefits accrue to the nation as a whole and ultimately should be reflected in national income statistics.

And, of equal importance, there has been a substantial increase in the number of qualified Jordanians capable of carrying on the buildup of the much needed transportation network in the country. Another major feature of this program is the mass employment of unskilled refugees as laborers necessary for this type of development.²²

Education. The field of education in Jordan has been the target of some of the most energetic and profitable efforts of USOM/J. These efforts have been based on a clear recognition of the vital role education plays in the development of an underdeveloped economy. The vast potential of manpower which could be channeled into vocational training so sorely lacking in Jordan has caused the USOM/J efforts to be directed at promoting technical and vocational skills in lieu of the predominately arts curriculum of the past. Thus the USOM/J projects have been directed at

²²Ibid.

providing teacher-training education and vocational training facilities, both of which are needed to improve the educational and economic level of the Jordanian people.

The increasing school population has been surpassed in rate of increase by the increase in better qualified teachers taking their places in the teachers training colleges and rural schools throughout the country.²³

Since 1954 the teachers education project (TC 278-69-051) has been operating in conjunction with other programs to construct, equip, and operate a Men's Teachers Training school, a Women's Teachers Training school and a school specializing in training rural school teachers. The project has provided to date inservice courses and summer schools for a total of 6,000 teachers. This includes 86 Jordanians who have received or are receiving 4 year pre-service teachers training at A.U.B. and 119 teachers administrators who have attended summer institutes at A.U.B. for four to six weeks during recent years. Since the opening of the teacher training colleges in 1952, 855 teachers have been graduated. Others have also received specialized training in the U.S. and other countries.

²³Pupil population in 1952-86,000: 1959-186,000, 215% increase. During that same period the percentage increase in teachers was 277%. These figures do not include some 90,000 refugee students enrolled in UNRWA schools in 1959 or the present UNRWA staff of approximately 2,000 teachers.

Begun in 1953 the Industrial Technical Education project (TC 278-61-057) established the Amman Technical Institute which provides a three year course of training in electricity, woodwork, auto mechanics, metals, plumbing, and heating. Its current enrollment is 131 students. It offers inservice and summer courses for teachers as well as sponsoring demonstrations centers for arts and crafts in 32 other schools.

The Agricultural Education project (TC 278-62-001) began in 1952 by giving one years specialized training to fifteen Jordanian graduates of the Khadoorie Agricultural School in the U.S. Half of these returnees have been appointed assistant inspectors in charge of Agricultural Education which includes inservice training and summer courses for 100 teachers of agriculture in rural schools.

Funds from this project have also equiped a food and dairy processing building, a prefabricated farmshop building and a science and classroom building at the Khadoorie Agricultural School.

To carry the benefits of this training to the Jordanian people, Point IV has assisted the Ministry of Education in training some dixty home economics teachers who are now serving in every district of Jordan. To date USOM/J has either build or assisted in construction and equipment of the following major educational institutions:

Men's Teachers Training College, Beit-Hanian
Men's Teacher Training College, Amman
Women's Teachers Training College, Ramallah
Men's Teachers Training College, Ramallah
Amman Technical Institute
Khadoorie Agricultural School
Vocational Industrial School, Nablus (programed)

Community Development. The social and economic progress the U.S. is seeking to promote along with the Government of Jordan is contingent to a large extent upon the standard of living, productivity, and physical conditions which exist in the villages of Jordan where the majority of the Jordanians live. The concern of this program of community development is to maximize the villager's benefits from their resources, manpower, land, money, etc. through local organization and cooperative action aimed at improving their welfare.

To accomplish this task the National Community Development Program (TC/SA 278-81-072) has provided training for village level workers and block supervisors to guide and assist villages in local self-help programs, i.e., building village water supplies and improving community health and sanitation.²⁴ The current program reaches over 50 percent of Jordan's 1050 villages through trained village level and block level development workers.

²⁴Mutual Security in Action: Jordan, Department of State Publication 6897, November 1959.

Apart from these efforts Point IV has sponsored and financed a Village Self-Help Loan and Grant project (SA 278-81-064). Begun in 1956, this village revolving loan fund has enabled villages to complete the following projects: school construction (81); initiate domestic water supply projects (11); village roads built (33); irrigation system (1); village health clinics (8); bridge (1); and a housing project for demonstration purposes. Currently another 92 projects are under execution with an additional 103 project proposals under review.

Industry and Commerce. In the field of industry and commerce the efforts of USOM/J have been primarily aimed at identifying the major opportunities for Jordan's economic growth. Thus these efforts have taken the form of technical advisory services and services of commercial opportunities prepared by USOM/J technicians. These surveys cover aspects of industry ranging from market studies and production processing to cost accounting and pricing and financing techniques. The reports, numbering about 90, have been prepared in conjunction with the Industrial Technical Services project (TC 278-29-007) which was originally initiated in 1952. These reports have had far-reaching consequences in some cases such as the tourist industry. As a direct result of the survey and report filed under this Point IV project the Government of Jordan

established a Tourism Authority to organize Jordan's endeavors in this field. Likewise, the report made of the potential of the Jordan Phosphate Company was carefully considered by the Development Loan Fund personnel prior to granting the Company a \$ 1,500,000 loan in 1959.

The Industrial Development Loan Fund (SA 278-23-070), begun in 1958, incorporated an already existing revolving loan project dating back to 1952 into a new project for supplying loans to manufacturing and processing industries and hotels. By August 1, 1960 a total of 172 loans had been made from this project's fund totaling almost \$1.1 million. These loans have covered such enterprises as auto workshops, shoe production, carpentry, fire bricks, tire retreading, etc. Also through these loans 150 hotel rooms have been added to the Jerusalem area.

Another project, Industrial District (TC 278-29-096), was initiated to encourage industrial expansion by private firms and the establishment of new industries on new site facilities near Amman. This project makes available to interested industrialists research and advice concerning the economic feasibility of specific industries locating in the new industrial area near Amman. Successful operation of this project hopes to show that Jordanian capital exists and can be invested profitably in industry within Jordan. U.S. funds are spent only for services

rendered, not for the land or building costs.

Health and Sanitation. In this field Point IV work has concentrated on the needs for preventive medicine in Jordan, an area which is sorely deficient compared to the curative medical facilities available.²⁵

Work was begun in 1953 by Point IV personnel on the Nurse Education project (TC 278-54-027) which called for the construction and equipment of the Jordan School of Nursing in Amman. The school accomodates sixty students and graduated its fifth class in October 1960, bringing the total number of graduates to forty. The three year course is offered gratis to qualified students provided they agree to work with the government for a period of time following graduation.²⁶

Another project to provide local health services, the Public Health Nursing project (TC 278-53-061), was begun by Point IV in 1955. To administer this project Jordan was divided into six health districts and Jordanian nurses who have received specialized training in public nursing are assigned to these districts to promote public health practices in their respective districts. The

²⁵The 47 hospitals in Jordan with their 2,688 beds offer the population physical hospital facilities almost comparable to those of Lebanon.

²⁶Training of a Nurse, USOM/J Publication.

Ministry of Health assumed control of this program and in 1959 established a separate Public Health Nursing Division which has since taken complete charge of the project's execution. However, due to the shortage of qualified personnel at the local level it has been difficult for the project to expand in accordance with its needs in Jordan.

To provide training for the Government's health personnel USOM/J initiated in 1955 a training program in the use of health education methods and materials. Through the Health Education project (TC 278-54-084) thirty radio programs and 64 separate items of printed health education materials were prepared and distributed to schools, villages, agricultural extension agents, city centers and food establishments. Over 400,000 copies of these materials were distributed in this manner. The project also sponsored inservice training for Government employees of other agencies, a function which has been assumed by the Division of Health Education in the Ministry of Health.

Possibly the project in the field of health and sanitation which is most widespread is the Environmental Sanitation project (TC 278-52-062). Begun by Point IV in 1952 this project has conducted comprehensive programs to improve sanitation practices throughout Jordan. This program has included activities in improvement and

protection of water supplies, safe disposal of human and other wastes, sanitary food inspection and handling practices and control and elimination of communicable disease vectors.

To combat the problem of poor sanitation practices in Jordan a sanitary inspection service has been established in each health district. Twenty six sanitarians have been trained at A.U.B. and an additional 250 subsanitarians have received inservice training in this field. Demonstrations in improved environmental sanitation practices have induced the completion of a sewage treatment plant for salt in 1958 and a 70,000 gallon water storage tank for the city of Ma'an.

Another project which is a joint Government of Jordan, WHO, UNICEF, and USOM/J effort is the worldwide Malaria Eradication Program. In 1957 these four organizations joined in this worldwide campaign to eradicate malaria and their joint campaign has enjoyed a high degree of success in some areas of Jordan. It has been estimated by the program administrators that approximately 90% of the population of Jordan is protected from malaria. The anti-malaria staff of 90 has reduced incidence in West Jordan to a point where only surveillance operations are necessary. U.S. contributions pay for local operational costs and UNICEF supplies all needed commodities throughout the five

year period. The funds are authorized by a separate section of the Mutual Security Act designated specifically for the malaria eradication program.²⁷

Agriculture. Jordan is largely an agricultural and pastoral country with about 80% of the population settled on the land. Of the 37,000 square miles inside Jordan's boundaries only about 9% of the land is arable and of that only five percent of the total is under cultivation at any given time.²⁸ Since the tremendous increase in Jordan's population following the Palestine war, Jordan has needed to import a considerable amount of agricultural products to feed her people. Recently the expenditure for the importation of agricultural products has been approximately JD 12,000,000 annually.²⁹

The extent of the need and the potential available in Jordan has caused USOM/J to devote a good deal of its efforts to increasing agricultural production and consequently reducing the expenditure on imports while raising the farm income within Jordan.

Several projects attacking this problem in different ways have been initiated by Point IV to accomplish the

²⁷The MSA, op. cit., p. 35.

²⁸Mutual Security in Action: Jordan, op. cit.

²⁹Norman Burns, "The Economy of Jordan", op. cit.

desired result. In 1953 the Agricultural Extension project (TC 278-11-081) was begun to bring to the people on individual farms and villages more and better ways of increasing their agricultural yield. Better methods of planting, techniques of wheat and barley improvement, horticulture improvement, seed cleaning and treatment, insect and disease control for plant and animals, livestock feeding and home economics instruction are all part of the benefits which the extension service brings to the villages and farms of the country. Since 1954 the service has conducted over 21,000 demonstrations which have been attended by about 250,000 persons throughout Jordan. In addition meetings have been held regarding all kinds of extension service activities which have involved over 350,000 Jordanians.

Currently the Extension service has a local field staff of 88 (36 extension agents, 21 subject-matter specialists, 21 woman home agents and 4 supervisors) and six national officers plus supporting staff. The service also sponsors a popular radio program dealing with extension subjects, sewing centers, literacy centers and forty 4-H Sadiq Clubs which give technical information and leadership guidance to the membership.³⁰

³⁰House of Representatives Hearings, Mutual Security Act, 1960, p. 1045.

Until 1958 there was no organization in Jordan to carry out and coordinate agricultural research. The Agricultural Research project (TC 278-11-081) was established in 1958 to consolidate all agricultural research projects in one organization and insure proper coordination. To conduct the necessary research the project has built:

- 1) the 50 acre Wadi Fara'a Experimental Station in the Jordan valley with two wells and five buildings,
- 2) an experimental seed production farm of 290 acres at Shobak, with a deep well and three buildings, and
- 3) a desert range experimental station at Shaumari consisting of 4,000 acres fenced with a 2,800 acre water spreading area.

The results of these research efforts have been of considerable importance to Jordan's agricultural situation. The development of a thicker skinned, earlier maturing tomato (Victor) was mainly responsible for the increases in tomato exports. Work with grapes, wheat diseases, snapbeans squashes and melons has resulted in substantial increases in agricultural production and a drastic reduction of crop losses due to disease and poor agriculture techniques.

In certain areas the increases have been clearly calculable. Banana production rose 60% from 1956 to 1958, certain wheat growers have been shown how to increase their yield by 200%.³¹ These are examples of the profound

³¹U.S. Senate, Report on U.S. Foreign Operations, Document No. 20, p. 564.

effects these USOM/J projects, in conjunction with the Government of Jordan, have been able to bring to the area of agricultural production.

Another USOM/J project, the Agricultural Loan fund (SA 278-14-091), provides short and medium loans to individuals and cooperatives for land development, tree planting, irrigation projects, and citrus and banana plantings. This project was originally established to supplement a scheme previously begun with British funds. Loans in excess of \$92,000 have developed and placed under irrigation 14,000 acres of land. This project has provided an example of the feasibility of a government sponsored Agricultural Credit Corporation in Jordan. This agency was established by the Government of Jordan in August 1959 with a Point IV donated capital of \$1,884,000.³²

East Ghor Development Scheme. This project is undoubtedly one of the most spectacular and extensive projects supported by USOM/J. The project (SA 278-12-086) provides for technical and financial support for the construction of a 42 mile canal, diversion tunnel, laterals and drains which will utilize the waters of the Yarmuk River in northern Jordan to irrigate 30,000 acres of land

³²Point IV Operations in Jordan, USOM/J Publication, Beirut, 1961.

on the East Bank.³³ It is estimated that the yearly income from the controlled intensively irrigated crops of the total project will amount to JD 2,500,000 and the annual revenue to the Government of Jordan will amount to JD 450,000. The USOM/J had contributed \$4,104,000 to the project's completion by mid June, 1960 which is less than half of the anticipated cost of \$10 million that the entire project will require. Although most of the funds will come from regular TC/SA sources sizable contributions have been programed from Public Law 480 Wheat funds.³⁴

The project is also designed to provide employment for a large number of unskilled workers, reduce the import expenditures for agricultural products, make land available for commercial farming to independent Jordan farmers and insure the Government of Jordan a certain income from the land payments.³⁵

Another feature of this project is the establishment of the all powerful East Ghor Development Authority. This organization is charged with the complete control of the

³³Joseph L. Dees, "Jordan's East Ghor Canal" Middle East Journal, Vol. 13, No. 4, (Autumn 1959), p. 357.

³⁴See section below showing distribution of Public Law 480 funds.

³⁵There has been criticism from various quarters of the procedure to be followed by the GOJ in taking payment for land which was formerly uncultivable and developed with financial resources from outside the government. Some feel that this is placing an unwarranted burden on the farmer who works the land.

productive land resulting from the project, from setting irrigation rates to determining the most beneficial crops to raise on the land. This experiment in planning and central organization will provide the Jordanians with an administrative proving ground for future organizations of similar structure and function.

Other attempts to develop the water resources of Jordan have been combined under the Water Resources Development project (SA/TC 278-99-052). This project is designed to help develop domestic irrigation and industrial water supplies by locating water resources, drilling wells, renovating cisterns and developing springs.

The agency now bearing the title Central Water Authority (CWA) is charged with the development of water resources throughout Jordan today. Working with the CWA and its predecessors the USOM/J personnel have actually drilled over 100 wells throughout Jordan.³⁶ In addition USOM/J personnel advise and direct the CWA activities to maximize benefits from efforts expended in this field. Since 1955 Point IV has contracted for several investigations by U.S. engineering firms of the development possibilities of Jordan's water resources.

Other Projects. In addition to these general areas

³⁶Mr. Abdalla Bazyan, Engineering Department, Central Water Authority, Amman, (7 August, 1961).

of developmental projects Point IV also has supported several other projects which do not fall into any of the categories listed above. Among these are the Municipal Public Works Loans project (SA 278-99-078). The MLF is not a give-away project. It helps those who show their willingness to help themselves by displaying initiative and effort to solve their own problems. The MLF supplies the missing element, i.e., funds from which loans can be obtained by these municipalities which accept responsibility and do their part, which is the main part.³⁷

This project, operated on a revolving fund basis, provides financing for community services construction such as, sanitary water distribution systems, reservoirs, electricity generation, vegetable and meat markets, street improvement, and well drilling. By August 1960, 32 of Jordan's 43 municipalities had received one or more loans from this fund.

The municipality of Ramallah opened the Ramallah market in October 1960 which it had constructed with a JD 11,000 MLF loan at 4% interest. It is estimated that the market will pay for itself in three years while assuring the vendors regular hours and convenience as well as an increase in income.³⁸ By August 1960, 71

³⁷ Ambassador Sheldon T. Mills, Statement on signing MLF Agreement, March 23, 1960. USIS/J News release.

³⁸ Point IV Operations in Jordan, op. cit.

major municipal works had been authorized totalling JD 643,000 (\$1.8 million) in authorized loans under the MLF.

Another Point IV project being executed is photo-cartography (TC 278-25-094). This project has given the Government of Jordan the temporary assistance of a U.S. Army map technician to centralize and consolidate all the photogrammetric records and maps in Jordan's Governmental agencies. In addition the project calls for the provision of demonstration supplies, instrument and equipment for this service. This will enable the departments of land and survey to better serve the other governmental agencies requesting help and information.

It should be borne in mind that the original intent of technical cooperation was to help someone else help himself. Special assistance in the form of financial aid entered the picture when it became evident that the necessary capital to benefit from technical cooperation was not available. Nevertheless the theme of the TC/SA projects is still the promotion of the self-help spirit. For this reason it has been expected that areas which were originally directed exclusively by Point IV technicians to have become incorporated in the functions of the Ministry or department of government charged with the responsibility and now capable of discharging that responsibility.

Therefore, it is extremely difficult, if at all desirable, to point to a given Point IV project which has become closely associated with a governmental agency and identify specifically the areas of progress and directly resulting from Point IV efforts. It can only be said that Point IV has worked hand in hand with the Government of Jordan to promote the progress sought by both agencies.

Defense Support

The unique situation which exists in Jordan, i.e. substantial amounts of U.S. dollar aid in the form of budgetary support, precludes the necessity of U.S. aid under the defense support provisions of the Mutual Security Act.

Contingency Fund

The Mutual Security Act makes allowance for a presidential contingency fund from which the Executive may draw to initiate action to promote the U.S. foreign policy in cases where immediate action is imperative but not specifically authorized under the existing MSA legislation. Although description of the Use of this fund appears to be a clear and logical one it has been the subject of confusion among the legislators who are charged with voting the fund's money. The confusion seems to lie in distinguishing in practice between the use of contingency

fund money and shifting funds already authorized for other expenditures when the contingency fund reaches a dangerous low level.³⁹

In any case, when the USOM/J is given funds for a specific project or program, i.e., budgetary support or special assistance for project support, which have in fact come from the President's contingency fund, USOM/J receives the funds under the label of "Special Assistance". There is no further identification of the source or legislative authorization. For this reason it is impossible at the field level to ascertain exactly how much, if any, of the U.S. special assistance funds dispensed in Jordan originally was appropriated for the contingency fund.

Development Loan Fund

Established under the Mutual Security Act in September 1957 with \$300 million operating capital was the Development Loan Fund (DLF). The purpose of this fund was to make low interest loans on economically sound and technically feasible long-range development projects. This agency is not allowed by law to compete with the Import-Export or World Banks or any other such financing source. It may only entertain applications after the applicants

³⁹House of Representatives Hearings, Mutual Security Act, 1958, p. 468.

have been unable to locate other sources at reasonable terms. In addition there must be a reasonable prospect for repayment.⁴⁰

Due to the conditions under which this particular loan fund was born it has a political flavor to it and is admittedly designed as a weapon in the economic cold war the U.S. is waging against poverty and the Soviets.⁴¹

In Jordan the DLF loans have been made to two commercial organizations. On September 25, 1959, the DLF signed an agreement with the Transjordan Electric Company for a \$1,200,000 loan at 5 $\frac{3}{4}$ percent interest to be repaid in Jordanian dinars in ten years. It was made for the purpose of expanding the company's facilities in Amman.⁴²

One month after the above mentioned agreement was signed, on October 26, 1959, the DLF completed a second agreement in Jordan, this time with the Jordan Phosphate Mines Company. This loan was for \$1,500,000 to be repaid during a thirteen year period in pounds Sterling at 5 $\frac{3}{4}$ percent interest. The loan was made to enable the company to expand its operations from 320,000 tons annually to

⁴⁰U.S. Senate, Committee on Appropriations, 86th Cong. 1st Session, H.R. 8385 (Mutual Security Appropriations for 1960) Hearings, (Washington, GPO, 1959), pp. 629-34. House of Representatives, op. cit., pp. 732-733.

⁴¹U.S. Senate, Op. cit., 1958, pp. 157-58. (Statement by Deputy Undersecretary of State for Economic Affairs Douglas Dillon)

⁴²House of Representatives, 1960, op. cit., p.263. Middle Eastern Affairs, Vol. X, No, 12 (March 1959) p. 129.

600,000 tons.⁴³

Public Law 480 (Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954).

The original intent of this legislation was two fold. It was designed to reduce the U.S. agricultural surpluses while developing new markets for U.S. agricultural commodities. Depending on the title under which the goods are transferred to a second agency the surpluses may be sold or given away.

These original goals have been supplemented by the additional goal of promoting the foreign policy objectives of the U.S. through employing Public Law 480 surpluses to the same ends as formerly served by section 402 of the MSA.⁴⁴ In fact, in Jordan the promotion of foreign policy objectives has been the primary reason for grants of surpluses totaling over \$50 million under Public Law 480 and its predecessor Public Law 216.⁴⁵

Under Title II of Public Law 480, that most frequently used in Jordan by the U.S., the recipient government either gives the surplus commodities to its

⁴³House of Representatives, 1960, op. cit., p. 263. Middle Eastern Affairs, Vol. X, No. 12, (December 1959) p.405.

⁴⁴Due to reduction in MSA funds the administrators have decreased surplus transfers under section 402 and replaced them with PL 480 transfers where possible to promote US policy objectives. Mutual Security Program, op. cit., pp.114-15.

⁴⁵See appendix B for dollar value of commodities distributed in Jordan under these Acts and Titles.

people or they are sold and the funds are assigned to a special account. The expenditure of these funds from the sales is determined by a joint decision taken by the local ICA personnel and the government concerned.

Normally there is thorough consultation between the two agencies, the recipient government and ICA, prior to the actual shipments to decide the disposal of the surpluses and, if the commodities are sold, the income from the sale. In the case of sales the income will be anticipated and a joint decision will be made regarding the use of the funds and incorporated in an agreement signed by the two agencies.

Title III of Public Law 480 allows the U.S. government to transfer surplus commodities to private volunteer agencies for free distribution at levels not ordinarily reached by government-to-government programs. Funds from the MSA are employed to cover freight charges from the U.S. to the recipient country.⁴⁶



In 1960 the U.S. and Jordan signed three such agreements under the provisions of Title II of Public Law 480. The first, July 4, 1960, provided for 25,000 tons of wheat to be distributed free to persons in immediate need because of the effects the prolonged drought had on

⁴⁶U.S. Senate Appropriations Hearings, 1956, op.cit., p. 229.

crops and livestock in Jordan. The free wheat was to be distributed to approximately 800,000 people at 30 kilograms per person.⁴⁷

A second agreement, signed on October 15, 1960, provided for the sale of 65,000 tons of U.S. surplus wheat in Jordan. The sale of this wheat was to bring dinar proceeds estimated at JD 1,430,000 (\$4,004,000) and was to be used to provide jobs for persons unemployed as a direct result of the 3 year drought, or economic development projects mutually agreed to by the U.S. and Jordan Governments.⁴⁸

A third agreement provided 6,000 tons of flour and 10,000 tons of barley for sales to finance economic development projects in Jordan. This agreement, signed November 12, 1960, estimated the total dinar proceeds from the sales to be JD 285,000 (\$797,000).⁴⁹ The diagrams below show how these funds are to be employed in accordance with the agreement signed by the two countries.⁵⁰



⁴⁷USIS/Jordan News Release, November 12, 1960.

⁴⁸Ibid.

⁴⁹Ibid.

⁵⁰U.S. Senate Document No. 20, op. cit., p. 572.

Figure 1 total anticipated income \$4,004,000. Distribution

as follows:

- a) 52.6% - Highway construction.
- b) 28.4% - East Ghor Canal Authority.
- c) 8.8% - Central Water Authority.
- d) 4.2% - Improve primary road surfaces.
- e) 1.9% - Labor for emergency railroad repair.
- f) 1.8% - Construction of technical and agricultural school buildings.
- g) 1.5% - Afforestation project and nurseries.
- h) 0.8% - Restoration of historical sites.

Figure 2 total anticipated income \$797,000. Distribution

as follows:

- a) 36.8% - Road improvement.
- b) 35.3% - Agricultural activities.
- c) 7.0% - Central Water Authority.
- d) 7.4% - Emergency railroad repair.
- e) 3.5% - Mineral exploration.
- f) 10.0% - Emergency fund.

Private Enterprise

The area of economic progress in Jordan through the promotion of private enterprise has forced the ICA to take cognizance of several fundamental propositions. The Director of ICA, John B. Hollister, outlined these propositions in his testimony before the House Committee considering the MSA in 1957.

First he noted the "unique" contribution which private enterprise alone" can make to 1) providing sound economic judgement, management skills and capital flow to underdeveloped countries 2) reduce need to invest U.S. public funds in these areas, and 3) establishing a free way of life, both economic and political.

Secondly Hollister lamented the almost complete absence of "some freedom, some private capital and some

entrepreneurs" in many of the underdeveloped countries. This situation greatly impedes the expansion of the entire sector of private enterprise in these countries.

Lastly he noted the limited role the U.S. could play in this field. Basic decisions regarding the character of the economy and the extent to which foreign investment will be permitted are the responsibility of the government of the country. It is only after this decision is made in favor of promoting or allowing private enterprise and foreign investment that the U.S. can "undertake certain specific steps to encourage, assist and catalyze desired action...and use its own resources for the assistance of other countries, to encourage the growth of private enterprise."⁵¹

Recognizing the conditions outlined above the Director of ICA defined the organizations' role as one of finding investment opportunities for U.S. private investors in overseas areas and operating the investment guaranties program.⁵²

The activities of ICA in the first of these two areas has already been mentioned in the section above dealing

⁵¹John B. Hollister, "ICA Policies and Programs for the Advancement of Private Enterprise in Aid-Recipient Countries". House of Representatives, op. cit., 1957, p. 642.

⁵²Ibid.

with technical cooperation efforts. Specifically, ICA has contributed substantially to private enterprise in Jordan by providing technical and financial assistance where needed for improvement of existing facilities or expansion programs. The numerous surveys and reports prepared by ICA technicians in various fields have highlighted the feasibility for expansion or establishment of industry or enterprises throughout the economy of Jordan. By making this information available to Jordanians and overseas investors in the U.S. alike ICA has been instrumental in pinpointing areas offering profitable investment opportunities for private enterprise in Jordan.

One major impediment to foreign investment in the middle East is the political unrest and consequent fear or possibility of expropriation of foreign owned properties. Another potential obstacle is the question of convertibility of foreign earnings into dollars by the foreign investor.

In order to encourage foreign investment and overcome these obstacles for the foreign investor the ICA operates an investment guaranties program.

The first stage of this program consists of a bilateral agreement between the U.S. and the country with which it is dealing which binds the latter to accepting the principle of payment to the U.S. in the event the type of insurance issued by the U.S. to the private investor must

be paid. Of course the country signing with the U.S. must approve each case individually prior to the issuance of the insurance.

Secondly, the U.S. offers insurance to private U.S. investors in the categories covered by the bilateral agreements with the second country.

On September 24, 1956, Jordan signed with the U.S. agreements whereby she became a participant in the investment guaranties program with provisions for convertibility and expropriation insurance.⁵³ Subsequent to this date an American firm was issued insurance against expropriation for the amount of \$6,000,000. This investor, Edwin W. Pauley, undertook to conduct oil exploration activities in Jordan under a concession from the Government of Jordan.⁵⁴

On September 30, 1957, another American investor, Robert L. Parker, took out expropriation insurance for \$1,250,000 for his petroleum exploration equipment firm.⁵⁵

The rate paid by these firms is one half of one percent for each type of insurance.

It appears obvious that the heavy investments the U.S. government has made in Jordan's future have been a

⁵³House of Representatives Hearings, Mutual Security Act, 1958, p. 1094.

⁵⁴Ibid., 1957, p. 1263.

⁵⁵Ibid., 1958, p. 1097.

major factor in maintaining the political and economic stability essential to attract and give benefit to private capital, foreign or domestic, in Jordan.

United States Information Service

The USIS in Jordan has been described by its director, Public Affairs Officer Vincent Joyce, as "another arrow in the Ambassador's quiver."⁵⁶ By this the PAO meant that the USIS should be another instrument upon which the Embassy could rely to promote U.S. policy objectives in the area. More specifically the value of USIS lies in its ability to "sell" the United States and its policies to the Jordanian people or at least try to convey to these people the why and wherefor of the U.S. policies.

Mr. Joyce, and consequently the USIS/Jordan, views Jordan as a country manifesting a love for America and individual Americans but an extreme distaste for official Washington. He believes that the "institutional acceptance" of the USIS in Jordan has been achieved due to the positive nature of America's history in the entire Middle East and it is now the job of USIS to exploit the "favorable attitude towards America" of the Jordanians in order to gain understanding of official U.S. policies and actions.⁵⁷

⁵⁶ Interview with Public Affairs Officer of USIS/Jordan, Mr. Vincent Joyce, at Amman, 7 August, 1961.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

The USIS has been divided into to functional units to accomplish this formidable task, the library and informational services.

The library services include U.S. cultural centers in Amman and Jerusalem which have library memberships and monthly attendance of approximately 4,000 and 1,500 respectively. Books are also made available by the USIS to UNRWA schools, teacher training colleges, the Parliamentary library, etc. The nature of these books depends upon the age, educational standard, etc. of the probable readership.

The library services also provide English teaching, presentations on varied subjects to groups and a lecture service featuring prominent American education, cultural and political personalities.

An area of particular interest in the USIS program is the student counselling service. The service welcomes inquiries about higher education anywhere in the world and seeks to aid the students in making final arrangements for undergraduate or post graduate work outside of Jordan. Staff members sit on the scholarship board and select students deemed qualified for ICA scholarships for schools in Europe, the U.S. and the Arab world.

The second feature of the USIS program is the informational service. This service provides an extensive film selection showing USOM activities in Jordan. These

films receive a very wide showing in all secondary schools, in some military units, refugee groups, UNRWA schools and training colleges.⁵⁷

The Public Affairs Officer and his staff try to maintain good relations with the local press and provide USOM activity reports and selected press items from the USIS daily wireless file, translated into Arabic, to the newspapers and radio station 7 days per week.

The USIS also prepares five to fifteen minute taped recordings in Arabic of interviews with Jordanians who are connected with or have benefited from USOM activities. for radio transmission over Voice of America and Radio Amman.

Severe budget limitations have caused the USIS/ Jordan activities to be directed at a selected group of individuals in Jordan. Targets for USIS efforts are, in their approximate priority, students of teacher training colleges, teachers in teacher training colleges, communications people (press and radio), junior-grade civil servants, and professional men (doctors, dentists, lawyers).⁵⁸

The director of the USIS programs expressed

⁵⁷U.S. Senate Document No. 20, op. cit., p. 547.

⁵⁸Interview with PAO, op. cit.

satisfaction with the job being done given the limitations imposed upon the agency, i.e., financial, personnel, political conditions, etc. Likewise he recognized that it would be unlikely that complete satisfaction for USIS would ever be reached due to the vast territory potentially subject to USIS efforts in explaining the U.S. and U.S. policies. He gave the impression that among the senior civil servants and upper social and professional strata there was adequate understanding of U.S. objectives. This accounts for the organization's efforts being aimed at the groups immediately below this level. But, the PAO stressed and fully recognized the highly subjective nature of assessing USIS efforts in Jordan and admitted readily the virtual impossibility of being completely certain of the effects of these efforts.⁵⁹

Another major feature of U.S. policy implementation in Jordan is the U.S. support for and attitude toward the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine refugees (UNRWA). UNRWA was approved by the U.N. General Assembly resolution 302 (IV) on December 9, 1949. The organization actually came into being in May 1950.

⁵⁹The USIS/Jordan distributes 10,200 copies of the biweekly News Review in Arabic and English. The impact of these copies on the minds of the Jordanians receiving them is an extremely difficult thing to determine with accuracy and is left to educated guesswork by the USIS personnel.

Today UNRWA is the largest subsidiary organization of the U.N. with a staff of more than 10,000, 98 percent of whom are Palestinians. The annual expenditure of this agency is about thirty four million dollars.

UNRWA's role, as defined by the resolution authorizing its existence, is twofold. It is to provide assistance, medical care, education and shelter for the refugees and provide assistance aimed at permitting the refugees to become self-supporting.⁶⁰

As more than half of the refugees are in Jordan the UNRWA activities in that country are of significance, both from an economic and political point of view. The agency is the largest employer, supplier and distributor in the country and somewhat relieves the serious unemployment problem through its small development schemes.⁶¹

In its operation in caring for the more than 613,000 refugees in Jordan UNRWA spent, in 1960, in excess of \$23,000,000 in the country.⁶² Since the birth of UNRWA the U.S. has consistently volunteered to contribute seventy percent of the operating funds needed. This 70 percent has averaged from \$23,000,000 to 25,000,000 annually.⁶³

⁶⁰Harry N. Howard, "UNRWA and the Arab Refugees: Some Random Notes" U.S. Senate Document No. 20, (GPO, Washington, D.C., 1961), p. 441.

⁶¹George L. Harris, Jordan, Hraf Press, New Haven, 1958, p. 118.

⁶²Howard, op. cit., pp. 458-461.

⁶³House of Representatives Hearings, Mutual Security Act, 1960, p. 890.

But, of this 70 percent the U.S. Congress has stipulated in the past that a specified percentage be set aside "to be used solely for the resettlement or repatriation of the refugees."⁶⁴ Under the circumstances which have existed since the inception of the problem of the refugees these funds have been virtually useless and have gone completely unused, much to the dismay of the UNRWA administrators.⁶⁵

The reasons why the U.S. has seen fit to make such substantial contributions are varied. There is little doubt from examining the past record of the U.S. that there is a sizable amount of humanitarianism behind this contribution on the part of the American people. On the diplomatic and political level the Department of State has not been hesitant to admit before the Congress that the contributions of the U.S. clearly promote the U.S. interests in Jordan and in the Middle East. The Congress has been told frankly that anything less than the present level of assistance could "have very detrimental consequences to the U.N. and the U.S."⁶⁶

The reasons for this are obvious. Failure of UNRWA

⁶⁴Senate Appropriations Committee, Mutual Security Act, 1960, p. 324. In 1959 this figure was 15%, in 1960 it was requested to be changed to 10% in the MSA legislation. House of Representatives Hearings, op.cit., pp. 877-78.

⁶⁵Interview with Dr. Harry N. Howard, U.S. field representative to UNRWA, American Embassy, Beirut, 3 July, 1961.

⁶⁶House of Representatives, op. cit., 1957, p. 801.

efforts to meet the minimum requirements of the refugees needs would, in all probability, cause civil unrest which could have far-reaching political repercussions in Jordan.

Furthermore, from the U.S. point of view, the activities of UNRWA, especially in the area of education, have been extremely well coordinated with the U.S. aid program and plans in Jordan. There has been no discrimination between schools and the Government schools have taken refugee children in at a subsidy rate far lower than that actually spent per child by the Government.⁶⁷

In spite of these efforts by the U.S. through UNRWA there is little evidence of anything but a feeling of distrust and sometimes hate on the part of the refugees toward the U.S. They feel that these efforts are little more than thinly disguised moves to partially pay them back for the homes and lands which the U.S. helped Israel take from them.⁶⁸

The U.S. is no doubt aware of the unsatisfactory circumstances surrounding the operation of the agency and the entire Palestine problem. When the question of UNRWA's existence was raised in the General Assembly of

⁶⁷Howard, Senate Document No 20, op. cit., pp. 459-460.

⁶⁸Interview with Assistant UNRWA Camp Director (Aqbat Jaber) Ibrahim Akel, Jerico Valley, 5 July 1961.

the U.N. in 1959 the U.S. stressed that it did not feel that a mere extension of the agency was a satisfactory way to serve the long term interests of the refugees.⁶⁹ As a result of the U.S. stand and the debate it was decided, on December 19, 1959, to extend UNRWA for a period of three years with a review at the end of two years.⁷⁰

Although the U.S. recognizes the unsatisfactory nature of UNRWA it is unlikely that the services currently performed by UNRWA could be halted abruptly without serious economic and political consequences for Jordan and the U.S. in the Middle East. It appears likely then that so long as the policy objective of the U.S., peace, is being served by UNRWA, U.S. support will continue to be forthcoming.

It is, therefore, through the various mechanisms outlined above, essentially the provisions of the Mutual Security Act, that U.S. policy in Jordan is implemented. This chapter has been concerned with outlining the substance of the programs which the U.S. has actually implemented under these provisions to further the foreign policy goals in Jordan referred to in Chapter II.

⁶⁹House of Representatives Hearings, op.cit., p.877.

⁷⁰General Assembly Resolution 1456. The review of UNRWA and a report by the Palestine Reconciliation Commission will be the subject of General Assembly debate at the forthcoming session of the Assembly in October 1961.

CHAPTER IV

DETERMINANT OF JORDAN'S FOREIGN POLICY

The introduction of this paper described the operative U.S. policy in Jordan as the result of the meeting of two sets of foreign policy objectives, those of the U.S. and those of Jordan. The subsequent chapters have outlined the raison d'etre of U.S. policy objectives and the means for achieving them in Jordan. In order to complete this depiction of policy formation this section will attempt to identify the determinant of Jordan's foreign policy conduct. This will be followed by this writer's evaluation of the policy followed by the U.S. in Jordan.

During the period under consideration in this paper Jordan has been ruled by two distinctly different factions. The October 1956 elections witnessed the assumption of power of a government which advocated policies in the area of foreign affairs of such a nature that its term of office was prematurely terminated. The regime which replaced it and has since held power in Jordan has adhered to policies which contradict almost to a word those of the Nabulsi Government.

Both these governments, the Nabulsi Government and regimes enjoying the support of the thrown since April 1957, have been faced with identical internal and external problems, i.e., refugees problem, unemployment, economic conditions, etc. Yet, despite the similarity of the conditions facing each of them these regimes chose radically different means of resolving these problems.¹ What can be said to account for this difference in the behavior of these regimes?

The primary reason these two regimes conducted themselves in completely different ways in office as the rulers of Jordan is to be found in their respective interpretations of the meaning of Arab nationalism in Jordan.² It was through its interpretation of this force that the Nabulsi Government saw the problems confronting Jordan. In this view certain solutions became the most logical solutions available for the resolution of Jordan's most pressing problems.

Likewise the view King Hussein and his supporters

¹In lieu of viewing these problems as the determinant of foreign policy in Jordan this writer feels that they are only of secondary importance in this respect, the basic foreign policy determinant is the government's attitude toward Arab nationalism of Arab unity.

²This term "Arab nationalism" is used with full awareness of the lack of consensus which surrounds it. It is used here because it is employed by the members of the former Nabulsi Government and supporters of that Government to distinguish themselves from the supporters of King Hussein. No doubt they disagree as to its exact meaning but in this case the use is merely to distinguish between the two groups and their ideological leanings.

had and have of this force automatically precludes certain solutions to Jordan's problems which were acceptable to the Nabulsi Government.

The effect the significance of Arab nationalism had on Nabulsi's actions in Jordan was obvious when, almost immediately after his appointment as Prime Minister, he announced that Jordan's days as a wholly independent state were limited. His cabinet members were predominantly pan-Arabists, those who believed in the necessity of only a single Arab state.³ Jordan's problems could all be better attacked and solved from a position of some sort of union with her sister Arab states. The Palestine problem could be handled much more advantageously from a position of Arab union. Funds from sister states were arranged for to accomplish one of the government's prime goals, the elimination of Western influence in Jordan. All these actions were in complete accord with the Nabulsi Government's view of the meaning of Arab nationalism i.e., Arab unity. And, as a direct result of this view of the meaning of Arab nationalism or unity certain solutions to problems confronting Jordan were accepted and certain others categorically rejected.

The same observations may be made of the regimes

³Private correspondence with Suliman Nabulsi dated January 20, 1961.

which have supported the King since April 1957, with one qualification. The King's supporters appear to have acted in accordance with what they thought Arab nationalism was not. In other words, there does not appear to be any real positive interpretation of this force by the present regime but its activities are based on an almost point by point rejection of the Nabulsi Government's interpretation of the meaning of this force to Jordan.

Thus for the King's governments Jordan should remain an independent state, Jordan can and should accept Western aid and influence. It is through these means, namely a heavy reliance on the West, that Jordan's problems can best be resolved.⁴

Since the governments in power since April 1957 have been basically pro-Western or pro-U.S. there has been a general tendency on the part of these governments to "go along" with whatever the financiers, (the U.S. policy planners) thought best for Jordan.

In effect, the theoretical meeting of two pure foreign policies described in the introduction has not

⁴This writer is not suggesting that the present rulers of Jordan are truly convinced of the efficacy of their policies in resolving Jordan's problems. There appears the likelihood that those presently dealing with the West in Jordan from high governmental positions may be doing so for reasons of personal gain and not necessarily for the benefit of the Jordanian people. In other words, it is much more difficult to impute to the current rulers of Jordan the ideological motivation that was in evidence during the Nabulsi era.

caused a major change in either of these policies in the case of Jordan-U.S. policy relations since 1957.

The point where the policies of the governments clash most openly is over the question of Palestine. The composition of the Jordanian population and the geographical proximity of Israel to Jordan literally demands that the leaders of Jordan, regardless of all other views, dedicate themselves, verbally at least, to the resolution of the Palestine problem in favor of the refugees.⁵

In the light of the current political conditions there seems to be little chance of this stand by the present government being translated into action aimed at actually resolving the problem of Palestine.

Thus it appears that where the Jordanian and U.S. policies meet and do not coincide the latter has unquestionably predominated over the former, especially in the case of the Palestine problem.

⁵In November 1957 King Hussein told the First Arab Refugee Conference in Amman that the Palestine question, which he had previously described as Jordan's main problem and a "matter of life and death", would never cease to receive the full attention of the Government of Jordan. Middle Eastern Affairs, Vol. VIII, No. 12 (December 1957), p. 429.

CONSIDERATION AND EVALUATION OF U.S. POLICY IN JORDAN

Prior to considering and evaluating the policy described above several of the questions which were raised earlier will be answered.

Of special significance among these questions was that dealing with the extent to which the field policy administrators concurred or "went along" with the policy directives issued from the deskmen in Washington. The relevance of the question is obvious in that disagreement between these two sections of the policy planning and administration machinery could lead to catastrophic consequences for the policy itself through improper administration.

Talks with the field administrator of both the State Department and the ICA, coupled with a basic familiarity of what Washington expects of these administrators, gave this writer the impression that there was generally a profound conviction on the part of these field administrators in the wisdom of the policy they are charged with implementing. Naturally there are minor disagreements which may be said to exist because the field administrator fails to have the "big picture" but the concepts upon which the policy is based stood completely uncontested by those spoken with.

The reasons for this may be numerous but it is of

vital importance in maximizing the policy's effectiveness that there be complete understanding of purposes, goals and means between these two ends of the policy machine.

This also provides a fairly good indication that Washington has an accurate picture of the conditions existing in Jordan, otherwise it would not be difficult to find field level administrators attempting to cope with problems of sizable proportions not previously considered and allowed for by Washington.

Mutual Security Act. It has been clearly shown above that the MSA has been designed to give both internal and external security to a country and safeguard its independence while that country is given aid in various forms to promote the economic and social programs. The 'artificial' nature of Jordan, geographically, economically, etc. has made that country an extreme example of the extent to which the U.S. will go in pursuit of this policy. After the preceding chapters it seems a propos to look into the applicability of this concept of the MSA to the situation in Jordan.

The U.S. aid program, especially technical assistance, is based on the self-help principle. It will enjoy maximum success where the majority of the population is hospitable to U.S. aid and is determined to take advantage of the offers to promote their own social and

economic progress. Likewise the success of the program depends to a degree on the popular support of the government with which the U.S. is administering the program. General acceptance of the principles of the program and the government of the people by the people themselves will not guarantee success but will minimize obstacles to effective program operation.

Over 600,000 Jordanians are refugees from Palestine. Another 500,000 are Palestinians of the Arab Left Bank. To this group, especially the refugees, there should be one prime objective established by the government of Jordan, that is the resolution of the Palestine question so they may return to their homes if and when they wish to do so. Above all else stands this desire. To these very refugees there is little logic in promoting social or economic conditions which might make life outside "occupied Palestine" more acceptable for them. The improvement of such conditions might in fact hinder their return to Palestine.

This condition, coupled with the relatively inactive role the U.S. has played in resolving the Palestine problem, reduces considerably the chances for the desired success of the economic aid program on the Jordanian economy. The presupposition that public support is behind the desire for economic progress and can be marshaled by the government to work to this end is not the case in Jordan. In fact

the Palestinian refugees are not seeking the economic progress of Jordan but rather their own interests. This lack of support from a sizable segment of the population has not tended to maximize the benefits of the U.S. aid projects throughout Jordan.

Another implicit presupposition found in the philosophy of the MSA is the idea that the economic levels desired by the populace and governments of participating states are some how attainable. This appears to be particularly weak point in the case of Jordan. An indication of the fluid stand taken by both U.S. and Jordanian economists and administrators in this respect may be found in their predictions as to when Jordan will be able to stand alone as an economically viable unit. In 1955 the Director of the Point IV administration, Mr. Clark Gregory, announced that Jordan would need five to ten years to become self supporting.⁶ That placed the date for economic self-sufficiency at 1960 or 1965.

Over six years later this writer spoke with the Secretary General of the Jordan Development Board and was assured that "within ten or fifteen years" Jordan would enjoy economic self sufficiency.⁷ In fact this practice

⁶Middle Eastern Affairs, Vol. V, No. 2, (February 1955), p. 63.

⁷Interview with Dr. Nuseibeh, 7 August 1961, Amman.

of predicting economic independence for Jordan has been going on since the early days of the British and has yet to materialize. And, even when the stage predicted by Dr. Nuseibeh is achieved he admits that there will still be an extremely heavy burden of unemployment due to the refugees in Jordan. The employment capabilities of Jordan will fall woefully short of absorbing the growing number of potential employees in Jordan, regardless even of their skills.

Therefore, even the economic self-sufficiency envisaged by the Secretary General of the Development Board is not to be a panacea for the economic problems of the country. In addition these forecasts include the continued functioning of UNRWA in Jordan as an important segment of the entire economy, a situation which may prove even more unsatisfactory to the refugees ten years from today than it has been in the past.

In the economic sphere it appears that the goal of economic self-sufficiency has been at best the subject of an unreliable series of estimates if in fact at all attainable with the present resources available to Jordan.

Closely connected to this question of economic growth is the question of how far "peace through peaceful change", the fundamental premise of Secretary Dulles' policy, has been followed in Jordan. Dulles argued that

the inevitable cause of war was that the "satisfied" dominant nations sought artificially to preserve the status quo and prevent change, repressing the forces of change until they explode in armed conflict.⁸

Setting aside the last part of this statement for a moment it appears that the course of action assumed by the U.S. in Jordan has been one unabashedly designed to "preserve the status quo" which Dulles labeled as the inevitable cause of war. Naturally this has been done on the grounds that while this temporary situation is being maintained changes in the economic sphere are taking place, with the guidance of the U.S., which will overcompensate in the long run for any disadvantages the state or people might have incurred during the period of guidance.⁹

Although this circumstance enjoys the endorsement of many prominent Jordanians, a good percentage of whom are working for or with the U.S. in Jordan, it still appears to this writers as a contradiction to the basic premise of not sustaining the status quo artificially by

⁸Beal, op. cit., p. 17.

⁹This reply cannot be subscribed to by this writer as either a morally or logically sound argument but is is nevertheless that put forward by U.S. policy administrators to whom the alleged inconsistency in U.S. action is suggested.

force.

It is recognized here that the U.S. has certain responsibilities to her people and to other members of the free world and that in order to dispatch these responsibilities she might be obliged to follow the current policy in Jordan. But, this writer wholeheartedly objects to the allegedly "moral" basis, i.e., the righteous U.S. leading the "free world" in fighting the evils of international communism, upon which the policy is based when in fact it contradicts the very base upon which it is alleged to stand.

Policy administrators in Jordan will not admit the validity of this criticism but turn instead to the argument that a little progress, in line with U.S. interests, under a friendly (and "guided") regime in Jordan is preferable to loosing the whole state to pan-Arabists who question its meaningful existence.

In this context it might be relevant to point out that the term "free nations of the Middle East", as employed by President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles, did not refer to the internal freedoms of the peoples but rather to whether the nation was controlled by international communism.¹⁰ Yet, in spite of recognizing that the internal

¹⁰Senate Hearings, President's Proposal, pp. 54-55. Statement by Secretary Dulles.

freedoms of the people of the free nations of the Middle East were not comparable to those of the West, Secretary Dulles expressed his belief that no Middle Eastern government which was really "selling its people out"¹¹ would receive U.S. support.

This view of the meaning of a "free nation" in the Middle East and the functions of the governments of the area held by the Secretary of State may serve to mitigate the criticisms penned above but cannot justify the U.S. policy on moral grounds.

"Peace"

The earlier chapters have shown that the U.S. has designated peace as its primary goal in its foreign policy. This peace is to be sought through support of the United Nations and support of a policy designed to contain, eliminate or prevent communist activities, depending on the sector of the world involved.

From a purely pragmatic standpoint the U.S. policy in Jordan with regard to maintaining peace has been a success in the short run. Since the U.S. has taken a major role in the economy and consequently the external policies of Jordan peace has prevailed along the frontiers of Jordan's neighbors, especially Israel. Whether or not

¹¹Ibid., p. 222.

that same peace would have prevailed in the absence of the U.S. presence in Jordan cannot be but conjecture. Nevertheless it is true that the U.S. has been a major factor in Jordanian politics since 1957 and a relatively peaceful situation has prevailed since that time.¹²

Communism

The question of communism in Jordan is another area where the U.S. policy appears to enjoy apparent success. By giving the Jordanian government its support the U.S. has sympathetically condoned the imprisonment of large numbers of political enemies of the throne in the name of fighting communism and communist sympathizers. The extent to which these labels are really indicative of the true political leanings of the individuals concerned may be known to the government alone but this writer talked personally with various individuals outside Jordan who were officials in the Nabulsi Government and yet who have been officially listed as communists by the current Jordanian government. Thus it may be that the "success" of the U.S. policy in fighting communism in Jordan is more apparent than real.

It is interesting to note that at least one prominent student of communism in the Middle East has

¹²The nature of this "peace" has made it much less desirable to some observers than to the U.S. policy planners. See relevant comments in interviews recorded below.

attempted to discredit the widespread belief that the "hotbeds of the refugee camps" are the sites of communist threats to Jordan. Walter Z. Laqueur suggests that the development of the Communist Party in Jordan began in the early 1950's among the most likely prospects for reliable cadres, i.e., lawyers, doctors, junior intellectuals, etc.¹³ And, it will be recalled that the efforts of the USIS in Jordan are aimed at promoting a favorable or at least understanding attitude toward American policy among these very groups.

It appears likely, under these circumstances, that the minimization of the communist threat in Jordan may be due to the zeal which has marked the current regimes' attempts to squelch political foes under the label of communists.

United Nations

The U.S. support for the United Nations in Jordan has been the result of policy dictates and political necessity. In spite of the vast sums of money the U.S. has donated to UNRWA and its operation among Jordan's refugees, these expenditures have still not engendered a feeling of anything but dislike and distrust for the U.S. Nevertheless, the principal U.S. aim of peace is being

¹³Walter Z. Laqueur, "Communism in Jordan", The World Today, Vol. 12, No. 3, (March 1956), p. 111.

served by the UNRWA operation and it will no doubt continue to receive U.S. support so long as this is the case.

Apart from UNRWA support the U.S. has done little to bring about a satisfactory solution to the Palestine problem. The U.S. is a member of the Palestine Conciliation Commission but the Commission itself has been disappointingly inactive in its assigned task of promoting a settlement between the states concerned. The U.S. is the donor of considerable sums in the forms of grants and loans to Israel and has other means at its disposal of pressuring the Arab states into negotiating but has failed to use these in an attempt to resolve the Palestine problem.

It appears that the main flaw in U.S. thinking vis-a-vis the Palestine issue is to be found in the stand on "sympathetic impartiality" which has characterized the U.S. actions both inside and outside the United Nations, especially since the Eisenhower Administration assumed power. It is understandable that the Jordanians find it illogical for their "friend", the U.S., to be giving substantial aid to the very same people who dispossessed them and are now living on their lands.

For these reasons and under circumstances which do not appear likely to change radically in the near future, the U.S. policy in supporting the United Nations may be said to be only a partial success. It has helped to

sustain the peace of the area but it has not been active to the extent possible in resolving the very issue which makes an eruption of that peace probable.

Economics

From an economic point of view it is extremely difficult to judge the effects of U.S. policy in Jordan. Undoubtedly certain gains have been made, especially in agriculture, industrial surveys and basic transportation improvements. Although no accurate records are available Dr. Nuseibeh suggests that the average income of the Jordanians has risen about ten percent over the last ten years.¹⁴ And he expects to duplicate this increase in the next ten years in accordance with Phase II of the current economic development plan.

In any case, the economic side of the U.S. policy in Jordan is admittedly geared to a long range program of development. This plan has the endorsement of economists from both the U.S. and Jordanian governments as well as from the Ford Foundation so it will be assumed here that the goal of economic progress sought in Jordan does in fact necessitate the development program currently called for by this plan. In as much as the plans for this foundation necessary for economic growth have thus far

¹⁴Dr. Hazem Nuseibeh, Secretary-General of Jordan Development Board, Interview, Amman, 7 August 1961.

materialized on schedule this aspect of U.S. policy may safely be termed a success to date.

One factor which should be borne in mind in accessing the economic side of U.S. policy is the high amount of aid which the Jordan army receives through the Special Assistance funds paid directly to the Jordanian government in the form of budgetary support.

Since 1957 the budgetary support funds have averaged 94 percent of the entire U.S. aid to Jordan. Of this 94 percent the Jordan Army has been the recipient of three quarters, or approximately sixty percent of the whole aid package given Jordan by the U.S.¹⁵ With such a substantial percentage of U.S. aid going to support, clothe and feed the Army it is not surprising that there are not more spectacular results in other fields where aid money finances schools, agricultural research, etc. Of course this money does go into the Jordan economy but is not used for the developmental buildup of Jordan as is the project aid support the U.S. renders in the case of technical assistance, etc.

The Role of Gamal Abdul Nasser.

The commentary and policy statements in the preceding sections give a clear indication of the stand the State Department was slowly assuming vis-a-vis

¹⁵The Jordan Budget, op. cit., p. 18.

President Nasser of the U.A.R. It is the opinion of this writer that the view the U.S. held of Nasser was one of if not the most influential factor in determining U.S. actions in Jordan.

Since his rise to power in 1952 Nasser was a violent foe of the American protégé Israel. In 1955 he turned to the Soviet bloc, mortgaged his major export crop and obtained armaments capable of translating his threats against Israel into action. He fought the Western-endorsed Baghdad Pact and rallied Syrian and Saudi Arabian support to the Egyptian cause. Finally he nationalized the Western owned Suez Canal Company and subsequently accepted Soviet aid offers to commence construction of the huge Awsan High Dam.¹⁶

The deepening relations between the Cairo-Damascus axis and Moscow was a concrete sign of the successful Soviet attempts to hurdle the northern tier established by the Baghdad Pact. The Soviet offensive in the Middle East, renewed after years of relative inactivity, was

¹⁶It is not suggested here that each of these actions was initiated by Nasser without attempts to achieve his aims by cooperation with the West, Britain and the U.S. Neither is it suggested that the West is wholly without fault in reacting to Nasser's proposals in such a way as to leave him little alternative but to turn to the Soviet bloc. Suffice it to say here that, regardless of the reasons, these actions were an important part of Nasser's record with which the U.S. had to deal and access in determining the stand it would take in Jordan, especially in April 1957.

assuming menacing proportions as the Soviet Union lent its unqualified support to Gamal Abdul Nasser and the force of Arab Nationalism Nasser symbolized.

Previous experience with the communists in other parts of the world armed the West, especially the U.S., with extreme caution in discounting the serious nature of the threat the Soviets posed to the remaining states of the Middle East. It was highly conceivable that the Soviet Union could, by working through the combined forces of Gamal Abdul Nasser and Arab nationalism, solidly establish a foot hold in the Arab world from which it could spread its influence, much to the detriment of the U.S. and the West. All of this led the West to have grave doubts as to Nasser's ability to maintain himself independently of Soviet ideologically leanings while accepting Soviet financial and political support, provided he was even desirous of doing so.

If this question mark did in fact, hover over Egypt's future it would not have been a very prudent gesture on the part of the U.S. to allow Nasser to go on gathering even more support which might later come under communist influence.

All of these events were compounded by Nasser's avowed goal of settling the refugee problem by guaranteeing the rights of the refugees, by force if necessary.

If one is to assume that the State Department view of the pre-April 1957 role played by Nasser was that described above the U.S. reaction is understandable and consistent with the policies followed by the U.S. until that date. For the U.S. to have allowed Jordan to continue to move toward the proposed union with Egypt would have been allowing a state where the U.S. might have considerable influence move into a potential communist orbit. To do so would have been inconsistent with the professed U.S. goals of promoting peace and combatting communism throughout the world and in the Middle East. The alternative was to support the King, the constitutional chief of state, and his supporters. This support from the U.S. would mean Jordan would have an anti-communist government, security for Israel and continued peace in the area, all of which were potentially threatened by the Egyptian ruler's increasing power and all of which were U.S. policy goals.

U.S. Policy Goals - Arab Nationalism - A Choice?

In conclusion there appear to be two relevant questions which merit consideration. The first deals with the compatibility of the U.S. foreign policy goals and Arab nationalism.

Earlier chapters have indicated that the U.S. has placed peace, under certain minimum conditions, as its prime foreign policy objective. In the Middle East one

of these minimum conditions has been the preservation of the state of Israel.¹⁷ Policy statements by the U.S. have shown a marked desire to continue trading privileges with the states of the Middle East for the mutual benefit of all parties concerned. The tone of these statements has shown a desire to maintain Western presence and influence in the Middle East, primarily in order to keep the Soviets and communism out of an area considered vital to U.S. interests. These are the fundamental U.S. objectives in the area.

In general it may be said that the Arab nationalists also want peace, also at certain minimum conditions. They also wish to keep out any Soviet influence which might infringe in any way on their freedom of action in political, economic or military spheres, although this does not necessarily mean the continued presence of the U.S. or the West.

It appears that on a broad general plan the least compatible of the U.S. and Arab nationalists goals is the question of Israel. The preservation of this state has been a U.S. foreign policy goal in the Middle East since its birth. The elimination of this state has been the

¹⁷This has been clearly stated on numerous occasions by State Department and White House Officials in the past and it appears highly unlikely that there will be a departure from this stand, at least in the immediate future.

professed goal of some prominent Arab nationalists. The stands assumed by both sides, the U.S. and these Arab nationalists, appear to have become more determined with the passage of time, creating a condition which allows neither side room for reconsideration except at a prohibitively high diplomatic or political cost.

Thus it is evident from the policy statements and actions which have characterized U.S. policy in Jordan and the Middle East that the U.S. has chosen to regard the preservation of Israel as a more desirable foreign policy goal than that of rendering support to the Arab nationalists.

The second relevant question in this context regards the wisdom of this choice by the U.S. In fact how practical would it be for the U.S. to give unqualified or substantial support to a socio-political phenomenon which seeks the destruction of another U.S. goal? For a variety of reasons the U.S. chose to continue to support Israel and, consequently, render only absolute minimum support to the Arab nationalists, support which did not really jeopardize Israel's existence.

Although the wisdom of this choice may be considered at length the conclusions are admittedly of a subjective nature and therefore not beyond dispute. It is however, the opinion of this writer that the general interests of the U.S. as a nation would be much better served by giving

U.S. support to the Arab nationalist cause and, almost a necessary concomitant, forgoing the adamant stand behind Israel.

This judgment means that although this writer can admit an understanding of the logic behind U.S. policy in Jordan he will also deny that the overall interests of the U.S. are being served in the most efficacious manner by that policy.

But, it must be constantly be borne in mind that U.S. policy in Jordan is based on the proposition that the U.S. supports Israel's existence completely. Any attempt to pass judgment on this policy as if this were not the case would be a sterile effort.

Résumé

The actions of the U.S. in Jordan may be logically explained in terms of U.S. policy goals, peace, combatting communism and support of the U.N. The peace desired is a "peace at my price" peace for the U.S. This involves guarantees for the State of Israel and the effective limitation or elimination of communist influence where that policy is operative. U.S. support is rendered in and through the United Nations to the extent that such support will promote the designated goals.

Likewise anything perceived by the U.S. as a threat to these goals or their achievement has been opposed,

both in Jordan and the Middle East. In the immediate past the most prominent threat to these goals has been the force of Arab nationalism as symbolized by President Nasser of the United Arab Republic.

Since King Hussein became a rallying point for the anti-pan-Arabists in Jordan the U.S. has lent its unqualified support to this faction to further U.S. interests in Jordan and in the Middle East. In this way the U.S. has simultaneously sought to promote its own policy goals in Jordan and the Middle East on the one hand while effectively combatting forces indigenous to Jordan and the Arab world, i.e., pan-Arabism, which contradict and are contrary to U.S. goals.


There is little reason to believe that U.S. actions in the future will vary considerably from those which have characterized the past in Jordan. Under the circumstances, i.e., the U.S. adamant assurances of Israel's existence and the U.S. view of Arab nationalism and President Nasser, the policy followed by the U.S. to date in Jordan has been a success. This success has made it probable that so long as similar conditions continue to exist in Jordan and the Middle East and the U.S. continues to view them as it has in the past the actions of the U.S. will likewise continue to be basically identical to those of the past.

In terms of concrete actions by the U.S. this means

that there will in all likelihood be a continuation and possibility intensification of the current U.S. aid program to Jordan, at least until the much talked about economic sufficiency stage is reached within Jordan. It is also very likely that the U.S. stand on the Palestine problem will continue to be at least as passive as it has been in the past provided the conditions surrounding the problem continue to allow this stand. The most significant implication of this stand is that the resulting peace is valued over and above the risk of forcing a settlement for the ultimate benefit of the refugees themselves. Likewise this position implies that this peace is preferred to endorsing and promoting Arab nationalist sentiments throughout the Middle East.

APPENDIX A

U.S. ASSISTANCE TO JORDAN UNDER MUTUAL
SECURITY ACT AND PREDESSOR ACTS¹



[§] July 1, 1960 - March 31, 1961.

¹U.S. Point Four Operations in Jordan, USIS Publications.

Dollar Value of U.S. Aid by Category

Year	Technical Cooperation	Special Economic & Development Assistance for Projects	Development projects	Budget Support	Total ^{\$}
1952	4,668				4,668
1953	2,851				2,851
1954	2,341	8,000			10,341
1955	2,250	4,995			7,245
1956	2,251	4,973			7,494
1957	1,200			20,000	21,200
1958	1,766		10,913	20,000	32,679
1959	2,100		4,567	38,230	44,897
1960	1,629		7,192	40,500	49,311
1961	846		2,870	30,500	34,212
Total	22,172	17,954	25,542	149,230	214,898

\$In \$ '000.

APPENDIX B

U.S. POINT IV OPERATION IN JORDAN

Table I. U.S. Economic Assistance to Jordan, 1951 through March 31, 1961.

Mutual Security Act (all grants)	\$ 214,898,000
Technical and Economic aid for projects	(65,668,000)
Budget Support	(149,230,000)
Surplus Agricultural Products (all grants)	
P. Law 216, in 1952-53	2,569,000
P. Law 480, 1954-61	
Title II grant, for gift or sale in Jordan	37,887,000
Title III grant to voluntary agencies in Jordan	6,388,000
Development Loan Fund (loan):	
Transjordan Electric Company	1,200,000
Jordan Phosphates Company	1,500,000
 T O T A L	 \$ 264,442,000
	(equivalent to JD 94,443,000)

From U.S.I.S. booklet on Jordan

APPENDIX C

Mutual Security Program Projects,
Active Fiscal Years 1958-60

No.	Title	Source of funds	Planned total US cost of project	Completion date	D8, June 30, 1960, U.S. dollars contribution to June 30, 1960	1958 to 1960 only	
						GOJ cash contribution to budget to June 30, 1960	GOJ contribution "in kind" (ProAg) to June 30, 1960
	Agriculture:						
11-042	Agricultural extension	SA/TC	1,555,000	64	1,164,000	71,000	508,000
11-081	Agricultural research	T.C.	692	63	393,000	141,000	349,300
12-086	East Ghor Main Canal	SA/TC	10,712,000	64	4,104,000		984,000
13-016	Plant protection			58	150,000		
13-047	Livestock and poultry improvement			58	121,000		
12-075	Range management			60	55,000		36,200
13-090	Seed farms	S.A.	2,914,000	64	1,296,000		250,000
14-091	Agricultural loans	S.A.		50	778,000		37,200
17-056	Afforestation and watershed protection	S.A.	36,000	60	36,000		
14-098	Agricultural credit training	T.C.		60	134,000		
11-089	Agricultural research facilities	S.A.					
	Industry and minign:						
22-050	Telecommunications	T.C.	90,000	60	90,000	5,504	5,025
23-070	Industrial development fund				1,099,000		160,270
24-102	Tourism development	SA/TC	146,000	62	102,000		18,300
25-094	Photocartography	T.C.			67,000		
25-093	East Jordan map plan	S.A.	850,000	63	850,000		
25-104	Engineering services to CWA	SA/TC	2,196,000	64	549,000		308,000
29-007	Industrial technical services	T.C.	411,000	60	411,000	7,100	7,500
29-105	Industry and business services	SA/TC	681,200	62	150,000		10,000
29-096	Industrial district - Jordan	T.C.	150,000	61	150,000		14,500
	Transportation:						
31-076	Highway engineering and management	T.C.	632,000	60	632,000	11,300	54,000
31-053	Roads	S.A.	8,662,000	60	8,662,000	112,000	71,200
31-088	Highway construction	S.A.	2,587,600	62	2,033,000		42,800
31-100	Highway maintenance	S.A.	2,712,300	65	384,000	33,500	59,790
33-095	Hedjaz-Jordan Railway assistance	S.A.			27,000		
33-097	Hedjaz-Jordan Railway technical assist-	T.C.	228,000	63	81,000	2,500	9,000
39-082	Equipment utilization and management	T.C.	177,000	60	177,000	18,500	10,000
39-087	Equipment operation and maintenance	SA/TC	936,000	62	796,000		100,000
	Health and sanitation:						
51-080	Malaria eradication	S.A.	1,243,000	67	343,000	252,000	10,000
52-062	Environmental sanitation	SA/TC	904,200	64	536,000	40,300	56,000
53-061	Public health nursing	T.C.	385,100	65	189,000	10,600	5,000
54-027	Nurse education	T.C.	537,000	61	512,000		55,000
54-084	Health education	T.C.	57,000	61	53,000	9,760	7,000

No.	Title	Source of funds	Planned total US cost of project	Completion date	D8, June 30, 1960, U.S. dollars contribution to June 30, 1960	1958 to 1960 only	
						GOJ cash contribution to budget to June 30, 1960	GOJ contribution "in kind" (ProAG) to June 30, 1960
Education:							
61-057	Vocational industrial education	T.C.	463,000	67	463,000	4,200	72,000
62-011	Agricultural education	T.C.	410,000	60	410,000	40,100	166,000
62-063	Khadouri Agricultural School	S.A.	729,000	60	729,000	5,040	297,547
69-051	Teacher education	T.C.	1,295,000	65	677,000	44,600	191,000
69-092	Expanded education facilities	S.A.	3,539,000	65	483,000		234,650
69-085	Expansion of training facilities of (ADS)	T.C.	90,000	60	90,000	10,7000	
69-000	ADS (contract)	T.C.	450,000	64	150,000		
Public administration							
75-077	Public budgeting and finance administration	T.C.	10,000	58	10,000		
79-083	Public administration training	T.C.	1,276,000	70	42,000		
78-101	National population census	S.A.	160,000	62	80,000		
Community development:							
81-064	Village loans and grants	S.A.	4,682,000	65	2,192,000		15,500
81-072	National community development program	SA/TC	926,700	65	613,000	191,540	15,000
Miscellaneous:							
99-052	Water resources development	SA/TC	1,912,000	60	1,913,000		50,000
99-078	Municipal loan fund	SA/TC	3,270,000	63	2,320,000		47,860
	Social survey					2,800	
	National income					21,500	
	Statistical training					5,000	
Total					36,306,000	1,040,544	4,266,642
Percent					87	13	

Does not include "sales proceeds" from Public Law 480, title II, which were made available for some of these projects.

NOTE. "GOJ" designates government of Jordan.

APPENDIX D

INTERVIEWS WITH PROMINENT ARABS

The earlier commentary considered the policy the U.S. has followed in Jordan from the point of view of official Washington and U.S. field administrators. Needless to say, these views are determined by U.S. interests in Jordan and the Middle East, interests which embody certain values and a philosophy advocated by the U.S.

In order to obtain a more complete picture¹ of exactly what U.S. policy means to those individuals seeking objectives and embracing ideals and values not necessarily the same as those sought and professed by the U.S., this concluding section will include résumés of several interviews held with politically conscious Jordanians and former Jordanians.²

Such interviews can give an "outsider", (non-Jordanian, non-Palestinian, or non-Arab as this writer for example), insight into the type of thinking with which foreign policy formulators deal or should in any case consider. And, more important, the type of thinking

¹This should not be confused with an "objective" picture of U.S. policy in Jordan. Such a picture, in the opinion of this writer, is virtually non-existent in any meaningful sense. All those holding opinions of U.S. policy hold, by definition, subjective views and it is these individuals with which the researcher must work.

²Several of these men have been stripped of the Jordanian nationality as a result of their political views and actions which did not coincide with the desires of King Hussein and his government.

with which foreign policy formulators deal or should in any case consider. And, more important, the type of thinking which is sometimes fostered by U.S. policy behavior in Jordan.

Just as Americans and Jordanians may hold differing views because of their different backgrounds so these individuals interviewed may display a wide divergence of views in certain areas, a divergence which has its roots in their respective backgrounds and varied experiences in government and out.

The purpose of the interviews was twofold.³ First the interview sought to establish what the interviewee thought to be the substance of U.S. policy in Jordan, what objectives were being sought, means employed, etc. Secondly, the interviewee was asked his opinion regarding the objectives and means sought by official Washington as found in policy statements, and finally, the relative effectiveness of U.S. policy in general toward attaining these objectives. The completeness of the answers to these areas of questioning varies considerably but nevertheless these answers do provide a critical view of U.S. policy which was one of the purposes of the effort.

The writer had the opportunity to speak with

³Immediately following the account of these interviews follows a list of the questions given to each interviewee.

Mr. Mousa Nasir⁴ on two separate occasions regarding the subject of this paper. On both occasions the meeting took place in Mr. Nasir's office at Bier Zeit College in Jordan. During both meetings Mr. Nasir was unhesitatingly frank in answering questions posed and, with equal frankness, readily admitted that he did not feel qualified to answer a specific question when ignorance of the answer or circumstances surrounding the question obliged him to so state.

Mr. Nasir began by describing U.S. policy in Jordan as one aimed at raising the standard of living of the Jordanian people. He was not prepared to comment beyond this general observation on the substance of the policy. The question of the consistency which has characterized the implementation of this policy was declined by Mr. Nasir as he felt unqualified to pass judgment on this point.

The subject of the communist menace to Jordan brought out what proved to be central theme of Mr. Nasir's comments. According to the former Foreign Minister the

⁴Mr. Mousa Nasir is a Palestinian Christian who has held cabinet posts on several occasions in various governments in Jordan. His latest portfolio was that of Foreign Minister, a post from which he retired in early July 1961. Prior to that he had been Education Minister in 1960. Mr. Nasir was in England at the time of the Nabulsi Government's fall in April 1957 and was in no way associated officially with that Government.

Mr. Nasir is owner and headmaster of Beit Zeit College in Beit Zeit, Jordan and in this capacity he cooperates with the USOM/Jordan Public Administration training program by conducting courses in this field for USOM/J-financed Jordanian students.

These interviews were held with Mr. Nasir on July 3 and August 5, 1961 at Beit Zeit, Jordan.

communist menace in Jordan is a phenomenon which always exists. The relevant question should be, he said, whether or not the efforts of the U.S. have served to diminish that everpresent menace to the government of Jordan. In reply to this question he observed that communism has its roots in two related sets of conditions, economic and political. He opined that the U.S. has reduced considerably the day-to-day menace that communism offers to Jordan in the economic sphere but has failed to make any real permanent gains against this menace. Furthermore, Mr. Nasir expressed doubts as to whether or not the increase in the productivity of the country as a whole had equaled that of the population growth. Failure of the former to increase at a rate much faster than the latter would lead to a steady increase in the communist threat.

In the political sphere Mr. Nasir saw the question of Palestine as the key to the problem of a communist menace in Jordan. According to him this menace will exist to a significant degree until such time as this problem is resolved to the satisfaction of all concerned. Although not directly related to the communist menace Mr. Nasir did note the damaging effects which this problem continues to have for the entire Middle East, especially when exploited by the leaders of the United Arab Republic.

When questioned about the effects of U.S. aid to Jordan Mr. Nasir replied that most of the aid, 80 percent or thereabout, was actually being used for the purposes for which it was originally designed. He did not feel that the problem was subject to excessive abuses by those handling funds or administering them. Possibly because of his special qualifications or awareness of Jordan's educational needs Mr. Nasir cited the work sponsored by the U.S. in this field as "especially effective" in meeting those needs.

Much more interesting from the U.S. point of view was Mr. Nasir's description of the reaction of the Jordanian people to these various forms of U.S. aid to their government. "Indifference" was the term used by Mr. Nasir to convey the Jordanian attitude toward U.S. aid. Again he found the reason for this indifference in the Palestine problem. The Jordanians view this aid as merely a "duty" of the U.S. toward them as a sort of debt to be paid for the creation of Israel. There is certainly no thought of gratitude or a basis for friendship springing from this extensive aid program. But, here again Mr. Nasir reiterated his belief that the aid forthcoming from the U.S. is not sufficient to give the real hope to the people for the marked rise in the standard of living demanded by the circumstances. He felt the aid was only

sufficient to keep the people just above starvation level and therefore above the level of being a politically disruptive force in Jordan.

He stressed that personally he was conscious of the humanitarian motives of the American people in this respect but that these motives were not necessarily guiding Washington nor were they recognized by Jordanians.

Peace, as a U.S. policy objective in the area, has been preserved by these methods Mr. Nasir admitted. Although in the same breath he did not appear convinced that this peace was the most desirable peace attainable under the circumstances.

The U.S. stand that the Palestine problem was in reality a United Nations problem was belittled by Mr. Nasir. He reduced this stand to a semantic exercise. According to him effective action by the West in the United Nations is almost always initiated and supported by the U.S. Thus, for this same U.S. to place the responsibility for a solution to the Palestine problem on the shoulders of an organization which it controls to a large extent is, in the view of Mr. Nasir, a meaningless gesture on the part of the U.S. The American government could, he believes, achieve both the "conflicting" goals it seeks in the Middle East, peace and the preservation of Israel, by a relatively simple move. By admitting that it had made a mistake in

in originally supporting Israel Mr. Nasir feels that Washington would create an atmosphere surrounding the question which would be totally different from that which currently prevails. This changed atmosphere would, in turn, lead to a resolution of the problem on a basis satisfactory to all concerned. But, having toured the U.S. and knowing the nature of the U.S. press, Mr. Nasir has no illusions about this taking place in the immediate future.

Just as the former Foreign Minister described the Jordanian view of direct U.S. aid to Jordan as "indifference", so he classified the U.S. contribution to UNRWA in this same category, a "duty" of the U.S. to attempt to alleviate the irreparable damage it caused in playing sage-femme at Israel's birth.

Next Mr. Nasir was asked about the often heard reference to the "independence and integrity" of Jordan in U.S. policy statements. His commentary on this point merely indicated that "every Arab" wants some sort of union with his sister Arab states. But, added Mr. Nasir, the nature and extent of this union varies with individuals. Likewise, the relevance of "independence and integrity" depends upon the type of union against which these terms are contrasted. He did not specify the type of union which he viewed as most desirable and therefore did not pass

judgment on the applicability of these terms to Jordan.

After answering queries regarding the communist menace, peace, and the U.N. in U.S. foreign policy in Jordan, Mr. Nasir was asked several specific questions regarding the events of April 1957. He explained that he was out of the country on a private religious mission at that time but did advance his opinion as to the apparent conditions in Jordan at that time. He believed that the Governments of Premier Nabulsi and Khalidhi were not equipped to handle the situation confronting them at the time; that they were imprudent in their conduct in office and therefore tacitly invited the results which ultimately took place. Mr. Nasir found it difficult to discern the logic that motivated the actions of these Governments and the Jordan Army personnel who had become involved in the political maneuverings at the time. He still confesses that even today he had not yet been able to fully understand the reasoning behind the actions of these Government's and accredits their fall to their own errors, not subsequent U.S. support for King Hussein.

Mr. Nasir felt that he had no valid grounds for drawing any conclusions regarding the effect of the Eisenhower Doctrine in U.S.-Jordan relations or policy between the two countries. He did not feel that the King's statements voicing opposition to communism could

necessarily be related to the recently announced Eisenhower Doctrine.

In brief, Mr. Nasir prefers to view U.S. policy in Jordan on a broad general scale, through the eyes of one who sees that policy as an outgrowth of the Palestine problem. This problem, he feels, will continue to increase the seriousness of the communist menace and act as an obstacle to permanent peace until the U.S. takes the initiative and offers an achievable and satisfactory solution. Until such time the efforts of the U.S., both direct and through UNRWA in Jordan, will be viewed by the Jordanians as a U.S. "duty" and greeted by total indifference.

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General Ali Abu Nuwar,⁵ who described himself as "a soldier, not a politician", has been labeled by others as everything from being extremely naive to being a perceptive Arab patriot.⁶ For this reason this interview

⁵General Ali Abu Nuwar, an officer in the Jordan Army, met King Hussein while on duty as Jordan Military Attaché in Paris in 1955. Befriended by the King, Nuwar was returned to Amman to duty in the Royal Palace. Nuwar became the acknowledged leader of the "Free Officer" element in the Army and, when General Radi Annab was retired subsequent to Glubb Pasha's dismissal, Nuwar was promoted to Commander of the Jordan Army on May 24, 1956 with the rank of Major General. He held this post until April 1957 when the events of that time caused his flight to Damascus. General Nuwar has been in Damascus as a political refugee since that time.

The interview with General Nuwar was held in his home in Damascus August 14, 1961.

⁶This does not necessarily mean that these two labels cannot logically and justifiably be applied to the same person. In this case few people seem to hold General Nuwar to be both an Arab patriot and politically naive.

proved to be the most interesting, if not the most informative, of the series. Prior to the meeting with General Nuwar he had received a letter explaining why he was being interviewed with a list of questions which indicated the nature of the information sought.

Once this writer had been introduced to the General, he began a lecture which he felt would cover the same grounds covered by the questions as well as fill in some background in line with the general purpose of the meeting. It should be noted that the interview took place in the presence of three prominent leaders of the Baath party in Jordan and this writer left with the impression that the General's actions may have been effected to some extent by this situation. That is he may have tended to express himself a bit more vigorously in the area of Arab nationalist's goals and aspirations under these circumstances than he might have under different circumstances.

The General began by pointing out the prime importance of freedom and democracy to the Jordanians. The attainment of these two goals relegates all else to a position of secondary importance, including U.S. aid to Jordan. Such aid will be useful and used for the benefit of the Jordanians only after freedom and democracy become political facts in Jordan. After this the aid offered by the U.S. should be used to build for the achievement of the ambitions and aspirations of the Arab nationalists.

Today in Jordan, declared the General, the U.S. aid program is being used to deny the Jordanian people their freedom and democracy by supporting a regime of "traitors" hated by the people, a regime of enemies of the people. This aid is insuring the loss of democracy and freedom to the people of Jordan.

With reference to the uses to which the aid is put the General listed the following groups or activities as recipients of U.S. aid: a) the power holders, b) security and police forces to subdue the peoples' real feelings, c) activities to falsify election and, d) espionage against sister Arab states.

General Nuwar noted that the U.S. dollar aid is offered only on the conditions that the power holders will cooperate with the plans of the U.S. or that those who agree to do so will take office.

Speaking of the "National Government",⁷ Nuwar observed that it had come to power only after a series of bloody battles and events of political significance in Jordan.⁸ The philosophy of this Government was "independence for the people and strengthening of ties between Arab countries." This strengthening was to be

⁷The Nabulsi Government, October, 1956 - April 1957.

⁸Over 100 Jordanians died during the 1955-56 Baghdad Pact riots. Glubb Pasha's dismissal on March 2, 1956, preceded the advent to power of the "National Government."

only with free Arab countries and on a "limited" plane, i.e., military, economic, cultural, etc. through bilateral agreements.

When asked if this strengthening might not constitute a real threat to Israel the General replied that the Arabs had actual proof of Israeli intentions to expand at least as far as the Jordan river. In any case, he said, the Arabs' first enemy is the West, Israel is nothing more than a manifestation of the West's colonialist aspirations in the Middle East. The overall Western plan calls for the implementation of the "divide and rule" policy which the West has historically employed to control the Middle East. Specifically, in regard to Israel he said that the plans of the Arab states are of a defensive nature and have never been based on aggressive intent.

The General depicted the U.S. interest in Jordan as virtually non-existent during the days of the British Mandate and even after 1948 until the year 1956. At that point the diminution of British influence to guarantee the success of the West's plans in Jordan caused the Americans to move into Jordan. The U.S. moved into Jordan "like cowboys, with a gun in one hand and a dollar in the other." Contrary to his impression of the Americans formed during his Paris military attaché days, the General found the Americans "even worse than the British." in

their policies and their implementation of them.

In reply to the question regarding the steps the U.S. might take to improve its position in Jordan the General began by recognizing the responsibilities that the U.S. must assume as the most powerful nation and consequently the leader of the free world. But, he said, in spite of these responsibilities, the U.S. did not have the duty or right to impose itself and its dollars on Jordan, where they are not wanted under the present circumstances.

He recognized the right of the U.S. to defend itself and its philosophy but, not, he insisted, at the expense of the political freedom of the Jordanian people. The fact that the U.S. is combatting communism meant little to the General because "we hate communism as much as we hate the U.S." He observed that the Arabs did not struggle for years at the cost of Arab lives to have the French and British imperialism replaced by the U.S. or the U.S.S.R. But, the efforts of the U.S., by dealing with "puppets" and subduing the political freedoms of the Jordanian people, will cause these same people to at least listen with sympathy to the offers of the communists and Soviets.

In other words, said the General, recognition of a threat from the communists does not make the people of Jordan any more willing to accept domination by the

Americans through a puppet regime.

He mocked the terminology "free world" as employed by the West against the communist world. He asked if the freedoms of the "free world" had to be purchased by the U.S. at the cost of the freedoms of the Jordanian people. Likewise he expressed doubt as to the possibilities of success of the U.S. in changing by force the ideology and way of life of the Jordanians in a way to benefit the U.S.

The General cited the case of Iraq as a potentially valuable lesson for the U.S. in its dealings with Jordan. But the U.S. continues to support a regime which keeps its prisons full of political prisoners, "communists" most of them are called, and has failed to learn a thing from the 1958 chapter in Iraq's history.

The subject of the Eisenhower Doctrine drew some interesting comments from the former commander of the Jordan Army. He had "wholeheartedly tried to talk with Colonel Sweeny and the U.S. Ambassador" in an effort to convince them that the Doctrine's effects, for the two countries, would be negative. The reaction of these two representatives of the U.S., disregard of his views, crystalized Nuwar's hate for U.S. diplomacy as it operated in Jordan. Finally he told Colonel Sweeny frankly that "Jordan was not prepared to accept either U.S. dollars or guns" under the Doctrine.

General Nuwar spoke next with scorn of the alleged communist menace in Jordan. He defied this writer to locate one communist in Jordan who represented a threat to the country's independence. He reiterated emphatically his opinion that the methods currently being employed by the U.S. to support the regime in Jordan would serve only to popularize and gain sympathy for the communist movement in Jordan.

To his way of thinking there is only one truly effective way the U.S. can combat this menace successfully in the Arab world and in Jordan. That way is through the unqualified support of Arab nationalism as symbolized by the President of the UAR, Gemal Abdul Nasser. In effect the support the U.S. could lend to the nationalists would assure the people of Jordan "decent" people as rulers and the freedom of choice as to the way of life the Jordanians themselves want.

However, the General indicated that he prefers to cooperate with the "dirtiest communist" than to cooperate with the French and British agents in Jordan. He predicted complete failure of U.S. efforts in Jordan as inevitable. The future gains of Arab nationalism are equally inevitable. And, the reason why the U.S. will not cooperate with this potent force of Arab nationalism is to be found in its inability to control or dominate Jordan once this movement assumes power in Jordan.

This theme of Western domination and imperialism ran consistently through General Nuwar's discourse. He noted the post-World War II move of the U.S. into the Middle East to replace and the ebbing European influence and engage the Middle East in the East-West struggle on its side. The Arabs, said the General, have nothing to gain and do not want or need to be on one side or the other in World War III. The anti-communist and anti-imperialistic nature of the Arab world make it ridiculous to try and enlist their aid on either side. History has pitted the Arabs against the West and ideology has made natural enemies of the Soviets, the anti-communist sentiment is already indigenous to the Arabs and need not be artificially bolstered by the U.S.

The nationalist movement in Jordan was forced to cooperate with the communist by circumstances, i.e., Sir General Templer's mission to Amman in December 1955, but once the common enemy is defeated the movement turns on the communist themselves, i.e., Baghdad after the events of July 1958 witnessed the decline of communist strength relative to that of the nationalists.

Referring to the Eisenhower Doctrine in this context General Nuwar recounted how the Army had offered to imprison all the Jordanian communists after the Doctrine was announced. This offer was not acted upon by the throne. He regarded

the Eisenhower Doctrine as a complete failure in Jordan so far as gaining official acceptance or popular support.

General Nuwar summarized the purpose of U.S. dollar aid to Jordan as two fold, a) surpression of the Arab nationalist movement and, b) the safeguarding of Israel.

This second goal may only be accomplished at the sufferance of the Jordanian people as they are paying the price for Israel's existence.

It is an absolute impossibility to accept the proposition that the state of Israel will continue to live, declared the General. The Jordanians and all Arabs are seeking justice. This means the recognition of the rights of the refugees. Until there is concrete action taken to translate these rights into action, i.e., opportunity to return to their homes, etc. there can be no thought of the U.S. being able to keep Israel and enjoy the friendship and support of the Arabs, the masses of Jordan.

The question of Palestine as a United Nations problem triggered off a tirade of cynical remarks from the General. In essence he said that the role of the U.S. in U.N. decisions was one of major importance. Therefore, the fact that the U.N. General Assembly resolution calling for the partition of Palestine is completely disregarded by Israel, while there is a continuing flow of U.S. aid to Israel, clearly shows the extent to which the U.S. is

willing to work to resolve the Palestine problem in the U.N. The powerful role the U.S. can play in U.N. action and the actions of U.N. members has, to date, gone unused as the efforts of the U.N. to resolve the problem have been sterile.

At the conclusion of his discourse the General emphasized the complete distrust with which he viewed the U.S. and Western actions in Jordan and in the rest of the Arab world. He even went so far as to ask of the attitude of cultural superiority, implicit in U.S. attitudes towards European states as compared to U.S. attitudes toward non-European states, i.e., Arabs, was really justified by a culture which produced "T.V. sets, automobiles, and means of massacring thousands of people." This comment conveys the attitude upon which his view are currently based and according to which he interprets U.S. policy in Jordan.

Once the purpose of the meeting was explained to Mr. Arshidad⁹ he began giving his views regarding U.S.

⁹Mr. Shafik Arshidad was a Member of the Jordanian Parliament from 1949 to 1957. He was Chief Secretary of the National Socialist Party in Jordan and became Minister of Justice and Education in the Nabulsi Government in 1956. During his term as Minister in the Nabulsi Government Mr. Arshidad was a member of Jordan's delegation to Damascus, Medina and Cairo to arrange for the Arab Solidarity Pact. Since April 1957 he has been a political refugee in Damascus with a twenty year prison sentence awaiting him in Jordan.

The interview with Mr. Arshidad took place in his home in Damascus, August 13, 1961.

policy in a somewhat broader context than just that policy in Jordan, although he laid continual stress on the role Jordan played in that policy.

The first point that Mr. Arshidad made was the artificial nature of Jordan as a state. He emphasized the total lack of logic in picturing Jordan as independent, economically, militarily or politically, especially after the creation of Israel by the West. The birth of Israel was a move calculated by the West to give the Western states a base in the Middle East from which Western imperialism could expand throughout the Arab world.¹⁰

To a large extent the aims of the U.S. and the United Kingdom are complementary in Jordan and the Middle East. The primary aim is to protect the fruits of Western imperialism already in the area. For this protection the Western powers are able to use Israel as a base from which to penetrate. Likewise Israel herself must be protected, protected against the force of Arab nationalism. This potentially dominant force is seen by the West as its primary enemy in the Middle East. The battles waged against this force are fought under the guise of fighting international communism, a situation which has absolutely no relationship to reality in Jordan.

¹⁰The West, for Mr. Arshidad, means primarily England during the period prior to World War II and the U.S. and England after World War II.

Specifically the U.S. influence in Jordan is aimed at three goals; a) protecting Israel, b) hindering a movement toward an Arab union and, c) minimizing the activities and strength of Arab nationalists in Jordan.

To exemplify how these aims were achieved Mr. Arshidad referred to the period of the Nabulsi Government. He noted that the Nabulsi Government was definitely not communist. It was strictly a national government acting with a clear mandate from the people to further the desires and aspirations of the Jordanian people, desires and aspirations which were, in fact, anti-communist in character.

One of these desires was that aid given to Jordan be given free of any "strings" by the donor government. The December 16, 1955 request of Premier Nabulsi to the U.S. for \$30,000,000 annually on an unconditional basis was cited as evidence of this.

Mr. Arshidad was a member of the three man committee which met with U.S. Embassy officials to consider this request. He said that the U.S. reply included the following conditions: a) the aid could not be used in any way against Israel, b) Jordan was to buy only U.S. products or have U.S. approval to buy elsewhere, and c) all aid-financed projects were to have prior U.S. approval.

When asked if "a" and "b" above were necessarily against Jordan's national interest, the former Finance Minister replied that these conditions were definitely

against the interests of Jordan. To substantiate this reply he cited several examples of projects he was backing as Minister of Education in the Nabulsi Government. A teachers college was not approved by the U.S. Embassy so as to allow funds for the construction of a chicken house on an agricultural school. This, to Mr. Arshidad, was a blatant attempt on the part of the U.S. to really minimize the long-range benefit to the country from U.S. aid. He also stressed the untactful manner which characterized the U.S. administrators' refusal to approve his projects. It gave, he said, the impression that they, not the Jordanian, were actually the Ministers.

Turning again to the character of the Nabulsi government, Mr. Arshidad described the goals of that government as, a) terminating all foreign influence and, b) continuing to bring Jordan into a federal-type Arab state.

The efforts of the government to achieve such goals were thwarted by such U.S. tools as King Saud. When King Saud returned from Washington in early 1957 Mr. Arshidad was a member of the Jordanian delegation which met with the King at the Arab "summit conference" in Cairo. There he saw a "written copy" of the plan the U.S. had outlined for Saud to follow in dealing with the other Arab states as an agent of the U.S. in the Middle East. This was in

complete unison in purpose and principle with the recently announced Eisenhower Doctrine.

When questioned about the Soviet Union he observed that the U.S.S.R. is "not our enemy." Zionism and imperialism were listed as the significant enemies of the Arab people. The policies followed by the true representatives of the people are based on their own interests, not the individual interests of the selfish power holders supported by the U.S. in Jordan. These were the number one enemies of the Jordan people.

The aid the U.S.S.R. is now giving the U.A.R. is not a prelude to a Soviet move into the Middle East, it is primarily designed to "neutralize" the area by eliminating the predominant Western influence in the Middle East.

Whereas the aid given Jordan by the U.S. is, according to Mr. Arshidad, designed to perpetuate the predominant role of the U.S. which has existed since 1957. It consists of non-essentials and is not sufficient from a dollar point of view to really accomplish meaningful results. It has been directed at sustaining Jordan's dependence on Western support by supplementing expenditures for "daily consumption" products and services, not capital development schemes.

In addition, Mr. Arshidad cited the example of the proposed Yarmuk River dam as a project which would give long term benefit to Jordan but one which the U.S. vetoed. The U.S. insisted that Jordan cooperate with Israel in

connection with the dam's construction as a condition for financing the project.

The U.S. attitude in the United Nations on the Palestine question was condemned as being illogical by Mr. Arshidad. He listed several instances where the U.S. had dealt with an international situation unilaterally and outside the U.N. when it felt itself menaced or world peace sufficiently endangered. Failure of the U.S. to take the action it could take, inside or outside the U.N., does not relieve it of the responsibility for the resolution of the problem it created. U.S. actions have only demonstrated that it is not willing to use all its influence and power as a leader to bring about a just solution of the problem in the U.N.

Likewise Mr. Arshidad thought that the U.S. goal of peace had a rather hollow ring to it when mentioned in connection with Jordan. In lieu of speaking of peace in Jordan he preferred to refer to the "quiet situation" which has existed since 1957. He stressed that what the people want was seen in October 1956 and, more recently, in the popular reaction to the King's exchange of letters with President Nasser.

When asked if an Arab union between the U.A.R. and Jordan, a move which has consistently been opposed by the U.S., would jeopardize the peace of the Middle

East, the former minister again referred to the primary importance of the union itself. He felt that most of the problems of the Arab world will continue to exist until such a union materializes. Then the union will bring true peace only when the rights of the refugees are respected.

This union is especially suitable to Jordan's future if she is to be freed of her dependence on foreign¹¹ aid from the West.

That this move to participate in such a union has been downgraded and fought by the U.S. to date may be attributed to the strategic location of Jordan in the Middle East. Through control of Jordan the U.S. is able to maintain the status quo in the rest of the area.

Mr. Arshidad's concluding comments were aimed at evaluating the threat communism offered to the National Government and poses today for the King's regime. In both cases he belittles the actual potency of this force, it has been grossly exaggerated by the U.S. in policy considerations in Jordan.

But, in spite of this exaggeration on the part of the U.S. of the communist menace to Jordan, he feels

¹¹In line with the thought pattern of the brand of Arab nationalism to which Mr. Arshidad subscribes he was shocked when asked if Egyptian money might be considered "foreign". Needless to say, "foreign" aid means non-Arab aid.

that the actions the U.S. has taken to weaken the communists in Jordan have only served to strengthen the force. The communist movement in Jordan has enjoyed benefits, not harmful effects, from the Government of Jordan and U.S. efforts to squelch it.

According to Mr. Arshidā the answer to eliminating communism in Jordan and in the rest of the world lies in the promotion of Arab nationalism which will virtually guarantee the disappearance of communists and communism in the Arab world.

Lastly he expressed doubts that the U.S. can ever gain the support of the Arabs and the State of Israel. Before this support and friendship from both sides can be gained the rights of the Arabs must be honored and respected. And, whatever else the U.S. has achieved or aimed at in its policy in Jordan this has certainly not been one of its goals.

Mr. Suliman Haddeedi¹² began the meeting by explaining that the U.S. was interested in achieving two

¹²Mr. Suliman Haddeedi was formerly President of the lawyers association in Jordan and a prominent member of the Baath Party. He was a member of the Baath Committee for Jordan and Jordan's representative to the Baath Central Committee. He has not held any official positions with the government. From 1957 to 1959 Mr. Haddeedi worked for the Baath Party underground inside Jordan. Since 1959 he has been living in Damascus as a political refugee. During this time he has continued to work for the Party and is a practicing lawyer in Damascus.

The interview was granted in Mr. Haddeedi's Damascus home on August 13, 1961.

main objectives in the Middle East. The first of these was to gain allies for the West. The second is the protection of Israel.

In connection with this first goals and U.S. aid to Jordan he classified the roads, agricultural research, etc. financed by U.S. funds as "secondary projects." Jordan's needs, he said, were in the fields of industry and mining, areas where real meaningful productivity could take place. In addition Mr. Haddeedi said that too much money originally intended for these "secondary projects" is going into the pockets of private individuals, not for the accomplishment of the projects' goals.

When asked if these projects would necessarily hurt the Arab cause he replied in the affirmative. Those who deal with the U.S. in Jordan are just what the U.S. wants, agents whose main purpose is to undermine the Arab cause as they did in April 1957.

Note was made by Mr. Haddeedi of the Jordanian people's desire to rid themselves of their inept rulers, even if the alternative is to cooperate with the communists. The goal of the people of Jordan is to see Arab nationality and Arab union reach a stage of fruition. This would automatically eliminate any communism or communist threat from within. Nasser's U.A.R. was cited as walking talking proof of this.

He admitted that such a union would strive

increasingly to bring to an end the present Palestine situation. Whether or not the peace of the area would be disturbed would depend on the receptivity the Jews showed to the demands for justice for the Palestinians made by the union. But the creation of a union of Jordan and the U.A.R. would not necessarily cause a break in the peace of the area.

In this context he noted that the whole of U.S. policy revolves about the question of Palestine. The U.S. is "buying" Jordan merely for the sake of keeping the status quo in Israel.

The question of the United Nations' role in resolving the Palestine question was answered by depicting the U.N. as a tool manipulated by the U.S. in 1947 to breath life into Israel. This was the culmination of joint U.S.-U.K. efforts to given Palestine to the Jews.

The U.S. support for Israel has its roots in two reasons. The first is simple economics. Israel is a foreign state in the Middle East and cannot live without aid from the U.S., England and Europe.

The reason this aid is furnished to maintain Israel is also the second reason for U.S. support of Israel. The West, predominantly the U.S., desires to keep the Arab states divided. Arming Israel will necessitate costly arms purchases by the Arabs for their defense. The heavy burden

of cost of these armaments saps the Arab economies and prevents them from raising their standards of living and joining an effective Arab union.

There was clear evidence of the "divide and rule" policy of the West in the Suez crisis. Certainly the U.S. was aware of British and French plans prior to the Suez invasion and, had President Eisenhower really wanted to stop the invasion he could have done so before it took place. But, when the U.S. saw that the Arabs stood shoulder to shoulder against the aggressor, President Eisenhower moved to stop the attack and gain the friendship of the Arabs. There was no real intent to help the Arabs when an injustice had been incurred, just a thinly disguised attempt to benefit from an unsuccessful political and military operation of the French, British and Israelis.

In addition Mr. Haddeedi pointed out the needlessness of a foreign power dominating the Middle East to fill the alleged "power vacuum". The Arab view of free Arab states imputes to these states the capability of meeting the non-existent Soviet threat. The only real threats to Jordan and other Arab states are the forces of Western imperialism and Zionism. And, as representatives of the Western imperialists, the regime under King Hussein in Jordan is the prime enemy of the Jordanian people.

Referring to the role the U.S. played in the events of April 1957, Mr. Haddeedi said that King Hussein was

working all along with the American Embassy, especially Colonel Sweeny, and the American puppet King Saud. He identified the "great sums of money" paid to maintain the King's regime and authority in Jordan as coming directly from the U.S. Embassy in Amman or through King Saud from Washington.

Since that time Jordan has not experienced peace but rather an "unnatural life." The people are awaiting the day when the King is overthrown and the "fire, prisons and dollars" that protect his "peace", all of which are supported by the U.S., are demolished.

He observed that the influence of the communists has grown weaker in Jordan but this has not been a result of U.S. policies. It has been caused by Nasser's treatment of the communists and the disruptive role the Iraqi communists played in the political events of Baghdad following the July 1958 coup d'etat. In fact, Mr. Haddeedi noted, the government of Jordan has recently been less severe on Jordanian communists because of their aroused opposition to Nasser's policies and the Arab union. He cited instances of individuals with communist backgrounds who have been released from prison early and some who are even holding positions with Radio Amman in this category.

In the area of the United Nations and the Palestine problem Mr. Haddeedi spoke with unconcealed possessism.

He saw little chance for a U.N. success in achieving a settlement for the problem. The efforts of the U.S. through the U.N. have been mainly directed at supporting UNRWA. This support serves to keep one million refugees relatively content, "not so revolutionary", and thus protects the agents of the U.S. in Jordan and the State of Israel.

Moreover, added Mr. Haddeedi, this is the main purpose of other U.S. aid which is given directly to Jordan, to make the people less prone to revolt against their leaders.

He discounted entirely the possibility of the U.S. ever being able to have the support of the Jordan people and the state of Israel. According to him the future calls for one single Arab state which will allow a minority group such as the Jews to exist within its boundaries but only as citizens of the Arab state. There can be no such existence as a separate political entity. For this reason Mr. Haddeedi saw no hope for the U.S. to seek to gain the support of the true majority of the Jordanians and the Israelis.

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Commentary on these interviews should be made only after certain presuppositions are made clear. The first of these presuppositions holds the key to the importance of the interviews and the commentary. This deals with the question of the extent to which these same or similar views

are held by a significant number of Jordanians. Obviously, if such views are held by these political exiles alone then it is hardly worth considering them. It has, however, been the impression of this writer that there is a sufficient amount of widespread belief, with regard to the views expressed above, to warrant a few general comments.¹³

The critical attitude of the U.S. policy toward Israel and the Palestine problem may certainly be said to enjoy widespread support in Jordan. In part this support is based on the view that the U.S. backing is merely a step in a larger plan to dominate or maintain Western domination of the entire Arab world via imperialism.¹⁴

If one is to take official U.S. policy statements at face value there is not sign that the U.S. does in fact seek to "imperialize" the Middle East in the manner described by those interviewed above. Therefore, it is the responsibility of the U.S. to conduct in such a way as to not allow its actions to be interpreted as reinforcing this idea held by some Jordanians, while not foregoing the substance of policy goals

¹³The extent to which these views are widely accepted does not necessarily attest to their validity. In fact, invalid conclusions widely held to be true by large numbers of Jordanians demand more attention than valid criticisms about which little could be done to change.

¹⁴Certainly the U.S. aspires to maintaining some influence in the Middle East, to keep the Soviets out if nothing else, but it would not agree that the desired degree of influence constituted the domination referred to by the anti-Western critics of U.S. Jordan policy.

Notwithstanding this premise there is widespread opposition to U.S. support for Israel based on the injustice which the Jordanians have been forced to bear as a direct result of this support, seemingly a valid criticism.

Therein lies the key to effectively answering the baseless charges found in these interviews. Each of the men interviewed has described his interpretation of U.S. policy in Jordan. Each interpretation is, moreover, based on that individual's view of the conditions and circumstances surrounding the situation.

Therefore, the policy planners and administrators have to take two steps to effectively combat the fallacies held to be true by these men and others like them. First, the U.S. must determine the nature of the structured situation through which these men view and perceive U.S. actions in Jordan. This involves determining the attitudes held about the West, the Soviets, U.S. goals and motivation, etc. These are usually of a highly complementary nature and tend to reinforce each other and combine to structure the situation as viewed by the Jordanian observer.

The second step the U.S. must take deals with combatting the misinterpretations of U.S. policy. To do this the U.S. must initiate policy moves which may not be interpreted with any degree of compatibility with the attitudes already held by some, i.e., those expressed above. Such moves should not under any circumstances fit into the structural framework through which those interviewed and others holding similar views.

For example, if the U.S. began promoting and publicizing truly productive industries this might tend to put doubt on the criticism of U.S. support for non-productive projects only. A more extreme example might

be active U.S. support for some kind of Arab union. Certainly this would invalidate the anti-Arab nationalist criticism these leaders hold against the U.S.

Needless to say such moves can and should be made only where U.S. policy objectives will remain uneffected. Since the U.S. has gone on record numerous times in defense of Israel's existence it would be foolhardy to suggest that the U.S. reverse this stand just to appease some Arab leaders. It would not, however, be foolish to suggest that the U.S. make much clearer its determination to condemn and prevent Israeli expansion beyond the armistice lines and, in the future, beyond the national frontiers. Since Israelis take much less reassuring than the Arabs that the U.S. will consider a breach of the lines behavior which will receive U.S. condemnation, the U.S. must repeat this stand before the Arabs until it gains popular acceptance.

As indicated above the steps to be taken are applicable and may only be effective in areas where the perception of the Arab leaders has led them to draw erroneous conclusions regarding the motives and actions of the U.S. In areas where criticisms of U.S. actions are validly based on reasons which are in fact those upon which the U.S. itself bases its policy, the U.S. can do little but attempt to explain more thoroughly the reasoning behind its policy.

It is the view of this writer that in both cases

the U.S. has a lot of ground to cover in explaining its policy to the Jordanians and making it more palatable if nonetheless unacceptable. The inclusion of résumés of these interviews was directed at the highlighting of probably areas where such actions by the U.S. might be most advisable.

Prepared Questions for Interviews

1. What do you feel U.S. policy in Jordan to be?
2. What is the U.S. seeking to achieve by implementing this policy?
3. Why is the U.S. financing road construction, agricultural research, etc. projects in Jordan?
4. Are the Jordanian people receiving the benefit of these projects?
5. How do the people of Jordan react to the U.S. financed development projects and benefits they derive from U.S. aid to Jordan?
6. Is there a threat to Jordan from communism and, if so, are the efforts of the U.S. effectively employed to combat this threat?
7. Have the efforts of the U.S. maintained or helped maintain peace in Jordan and between Jordan and her neighbors?
8. Is the question of the Palestine problem, as the U.S. has frequently stated, a problem for the United Nations?
9. Why is the U.S. contributing so heavily to UNRWA and how do the refugees react to the U.S. contribution?
10. What, if anything, can the U.S. do to guarantee the continued existence of the State of Israel and gain the friendship and support of the Arab states?

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