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THE ARAB RESURRECTION SOCIALIST PARTY

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THE BA'ATH SOCIALIST PARTY

ABSTRACT

The following work deals with the political rise and fall of the Arab Resurrection (Ba'ath) Socialist Party. The first portion of this study sets out in some detail the period of the Syrian Mandate and indicates three aspects of Syrian political life which were revelent to the Ba'ath during the period of its growth. These were the influence of the personality in Syrian politics, the prevalence of violence as a means of political expression, and the anachronism of possessing a numerical Parliamentary majority while not maintaining effective political control. In the second chapter, Ba'ath Party history is described and the three factors related to its growth in the merger with Akram Hourani and his Socialist Party, in the utilization of the strike and demonstration, and in the Ba'ath's role as a minority party whose influence was to a certain degree responsible for the Union with Egypt. The third portion attempts to provide, through the use of extracts from Michel Aflaq's works, a picture of the type of ideology which motivated the Party, as well as description of the meaning behind Freedom, Socialism, and Unity.

The concluding section of this work sums up the points made earlier and postulates some questions as to why the Ba'ath felt the UAR to be a necessary adjunct of its policy and whether this move was, in fact, faithful to

its ideology. The conclusions are, however, based to a great extent on personal conjecture rather than established fact for the conversations, policy decisions and personal reflections of the Party leaders are not now known, and may never be so. It is, therefore, sincerely hoped that no injustice has been done either to individuals or the organization, itself, due to the lack of information or insight.

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CHAPTER I

Background

From 1516, when Selim the Grim defeated the Mameluks at Marj Dabiq until 1943 when the French evacuated Syria, the Arab countries existed under some form of non-Arab domination. First, it was the Turks who, although Muslims, nevertheless imposed their system of monolithic, despotic government. Consequently, when Western observers spoke of the great "Arab Awakening" of the early 1900's, they were thinking in terms of dissatisfaction with tyrannical, foreign rule. In reality, however, this "Arab Renaissance" represented "an awakening to the abuses, the corruption, and the despotism of the Turkish regime and a desire to reform it, i.e., to put an end to misgovernment, to grant the Arabs equal rights with the Turks and a greater measure of political freedom and civil liberty."^{1/}

This statement is significant because despite its gradual and relentless deterioration, the Ottoman Empire represented the Muslim Empire; the Turks, though often intolerant, nevertheless were brethren of the same faith. That there was, however, a consolidation of Arab nationalism can be traced to the sharp rise of Pan-Turanistic tendencies within Turkey, the oppression by IVth Army Commander-in-Chief, Jamal Pasha in Syria, and finally to Western aid and encouragement, expressed particularly in the McMahon-Hussein let-

^{1/} Zeine, Z.N.: Arab-Turkish Relations and the Emergence of Arab Nationalism; p. 58.

ters (July, 1915 - Jan., 1916)^{2/}

The end of World War I, the war to end all wars, the idealism evoked by Wilson's Fourteen Points and the formation of the League of Nations had created an aura of hope and optimism for the future among the Arabs - a dream which was promptly shattered by the San Remo Treaty (Apr. 10, 1920). The efforts of King Faisal to rectify the situation, the formation of Hashim al-Atassi's government, and the sporadic guerilla warfare carried on against the French were all to no avail. On the 24th July, 1920, the tragic and humiliating battle of Maisaloun took place. When the last shot had been fired, the French Mandate had been irrevocably established.

France ruled Syria for twenty-one years, a legal vacuum surrounding the first two as the actual instruments of Mandation were not signed until July 24, 1922. Article I of this document illustrates subsequent cynicism toward her moral commitments, and thus became the focal point for Syrian disenchantment with Western ethics.

"The Mandatory shall frame, within a period of three years from the coming into force of this mandate, an organic law for Syria and the Lebanon.

This organic law shall be framed in agreement with the native authorities and shall take into account the rights, interests, and wishes of all the population inhabiting the said territory. The Mandatory shall further enact measures to facilitate the progressive development of Syria and the Lebanon

2/ Ibid.: Chapters 5 and 6.

"as independent states. Pending the coming into force of the organic law, the Government of Syria and the Lebanon shall be conducted in accordance with the spirit of this mandate. The Mandatory shall, as far as circumstances permit, encourage local autonomy." ^{3/}

There is little question that France never acted to fulfill many aspects of this obligation. Rather than encourage local autonomy, little escaped the control and supervision of the Mandatory power; the French considered this domination of minutiae as "the essence of the mandate."^{4/} To implement their Mandate, a High Commissioner was installed who held absolute authority over all matters pertaining to the state. He was empowered to initiate legislation, conduct foreign relations, administer the "Common Interests" (customs, posts and telegraphs, railways, public utilities, tobacco concession), while in addition he held the veto power for local affairs. His subordinate, the Secretary-General, was charged with maintaining security, and controlling education, public works, antiquities and Bedouin affairs. The High Commissioner was further assisted both by a Cabinet and political "experts" and by the "Services Speciaux" - an intelligence organization whose operatives could be found in all regions, and whose influence over local village councils was sometimes tantamount to self-styled autonomy.

^{3/} Wright, Q.: Mandates under the League of Nations, p. 607.

^{4/} Longrigg, S.: Syria and Lebanon under French Mandate; footnote, p. 14; quoted from a statement by R. de Caix, Secretary-General in Syria, 1920-23.

Employing the age-old principle of "Divide and Rule", General Gouraud formed the Alawite Territory, Damascus, and Aleppo each into separate states in 1922. In April of the same year, Jabal ad-Druze was declared independent. Three months later, the States of Damascus, Aleppo, and Latakia (the Alawite Region) were bound together under a Federal administration. Possessing a Federal Council with substantial legislative powers, the new union did not prove successful, the nationalists of Damascus and Aleppo desiring a closer formation, if not complete unity, as in the past. In January, 1925, the amalgamation of these two regions into the State of Syria did something to satisfy their demands. Latakia and Jabal ad-Druze were given separate independence.

The festering wound created by these cynical divisions, in addition to tactless efforts of Captain Corbillet to reconstitute the economic position of the Druze mountain, touched off the revolt of 1925-27.^{5/} Fundamentally a war of attrition, the battle resulted in heavy casualties, and the willful bombardment of Damascus by French artillery. Not the least damage suffered was the almost total loss of whatever French popularity existed at that time. Nevertheless, true to form, High Commissioner, Henri Ponsot announced in July of 1927, that France had no intention of relinquishing

^{5/} MacCallum, E.: The Nationalist Crusade in Syria; p. 124.

its Mandate, although he did make vague promises of reforms.^{6/} These amounted simply to French respect for Syrian wishes as expressed during periods of peace and order, basic administrative reforms, and the delegation to the states, themselves, of responsibility for the maintenance of indigenous armed forces. Clearly, these did not cloy nationalist demands which had prominently featured unity of Syria and Lebanon.

Elections for a Constituent Assembly held in March, 1928 began a dreary history of coalition Governments which were both ineffective and transitory, a condition not to be altered until the union with Egypt. That this was the case can be attributed largely to the presence of the French, but there was an intrinsic difficulty the existence of which became highly significant during the Ba'ath rise to power in the 1950's. While the Ministry of Damad Ahmad Nami was replaced by that of Sheikh Taj ad-Din al-Hasani, the election tabulations showed the "Moderates" in possession of two-thirds of the seats in the Assembly. Nevertheless, it was the Nationalists who effectively controlled Parliament. The Moderates, with their potentially powerful voting-block, failed to act as a cohesive unit due to personal animosities and lack of forceful leadership. The Nationalists, on the other hand, coalesced to form a "National Bloc" under the leadership of Ibrahim Hananu, an extremist from Aleppo. The

6/ Ibid.; p. 231.

presence of such other dominant personalities as Jamil Mardam Bey, Sa'adullah al-Jabiri, Hashim al-Atassi (President of the Bloc) and Faris al-Khouri further assured to the new organization a prominent place in the affairs of Syria until after the French occupation.^{7/} This grouping imparted to the Nationalists a weight out of all proportion to their numbers, empowering them either to dictate their own programs or, to obstruct effective action by the Government in power.

The Assembly produced a Constitution unpalatable to the French on a number of grounds, particularly with respect to its stand on the indivisibility of those Syrian territories detached from the Ottoman Empire. When the intransigent National Bloc refused to alter its position, the Parliament was adjourned in August, 1928, and finally prorogued sine die in 1929. High Commissioner, Ponsot, promulgated his own Constitution on May 14, 1930. It remained dead-letter for nearly two years as it omitted those clauses repugnant to French interests, but sine qua non to the Nationalists.

The elections for the Chamber of Deputies which took place in December, 1931, revealed for the second time a heavy majority in favor of the Moderates.^{8/} President of

^{7/} Ziadeh, N.: Syria and Lebanon; p. 147.
^{8/} The Moderates received 54 votes to their rivals' 16. (vide. Longrigg, S.: op.cit.; p. 191, footnote #4.)

the Republic, Muhammad 'Ali al-Abid, appointed Haqqi al-Azm to form a government. Charged with negotiating a Franco-Syrian Treaty, along the lines of that between Britain and Iraq, the al-Azm government, faced with French insistence on recognition of their rule and on the continued existence of a divided "Syria" felt that a treaty would mark at least a small first step toward independence, and so began working with the French along those lines. The Nationalists objected strenuously and their two ministers^{9/} resigned from the Cabinet. When their places had been filled by Moderates, and the Government agreed to French stipulations, violent demonstrations broke out through the land. The Chamber was adjourned by the High Commissioner, and al-Azm's Ministry was replaced by that of Sheikh Taj ad-Din al-Hasani in March, 1934. The Chamber was later suspended sine die when the situation in the country did not return to normal.

After a period of relative political inactivity, the situation deteriorated rapidly with the assassination of Ibrahim Hananu, in late 1935. Perceiving that passive acquiescence to the Mandate was doing little to expel it from the country, the National Bloc issued its "National Pact" demanding independence, equality of rights for all sects, national unity and cooperation with the nationalist movements in other Arab countries, and the raising of cultural, educational, moral, economic, and social standards throughout

9/ Munir ar-Raslan and Jamil Mardam Bey.

the country. To drive their point home to the French, a fifty-day strike broke out

"which manifested itself in ways that were without parallel in the annals of the towns of the interior of Syria and above all in that of Damascus ... (where) a spectator could watch a movement which started from the capital imposing itself with a certain regard for discipline and organization, upon the country as a whole." 10/

The French responded by closing the headquarters of the Bloc, arresting the principle leaders of the Party, and imposing martial law. While the French were working themselves in to a cul de sac,

"the educated element in the rising generation played a part of prime importance in putting life into the resistance, in organizing processions, and even in imposing discipline upon the protesting movement." 11/

There was no amelioration of the situation despite promises of clemency for the demonstrators and replacement of Taj ad-Din's Ministry by that of 'Ata al-'Ayyubi.

The High Commissioner, de Martel, was forced to maneuver between the Scylla of the French Government and the Charybdis of intransigent nationalism. France, having undertaken colonialism, was not prepared to leave without a con-

10/ Montagne, R.: "Le Traite Franco-Syrien"; Politique Etrangere; October, 1936; p. 38.

11/ Ibid.: although there is no information, it is worth speculating on the effect these riots and their apparent organization may have had on Michel Aflaq who had only recently returned to Damascus from studying at the Sorbonne in Paris.

siderable amount of persuasion, a state of affairs complicated by the existence of several religious minorities. Although perhaps a sardonic postulation, the French position in respect to these minorities was couched in these words:

"It is, in effect, the necessity of permitting the compact minorities which reside in the territory of Latakia and Jabal ad-Druze to take consciousness of their own personality and free expansion which led the Mandatory Power to give these territories a distinct structure."^{12/}

The impasse in Syria, coupled with possible repercussions in other French possessions, forced at least an appearance of willingness to negotiate; it was, however, the advent of Leon Blum's Popular Front Government in Paris which led to the exchange of treaty signatures between France and Syria on September 9, 1936.

The content of the agreement is not relevant here. It is sufficient to say that Article III^{13/} delegated to the Syrian Government powers and responsibilities which had hitherto been the province of the French Administration. Elec-

^{12/} Ministere des Affaires Etrangere: La Situation de la Syrie et du Liban; 1936; p. 2.

^{13/} This Article proclaimed that upon termination of the Mandate the two parties would take proper measures to assure the transfer of all powers, conventions and treaties in the hands of a single Syrian Government. (vide. Ministere des Affaires Etrangere: op.cit.; p. 201-205.

tions for the expanded Chamber of Deputies (86 seats, 16 of which were for the minorities, and 7 for the Bedouin tribes), took place late in November, 1936, and the National Bloc won an overwhelming victory. Hashim al-Atassi became President of the Republic, and Jamil Mardam Bey its Prime Minister. ^{14/} The first order of business was the ratification of the Franco-Syrian Treaty; it was unanimously approved. There followed a transition period during which the French relinquished such of their powers as were stipulated under the agreement. Unfortunately, the hopes instilled by this Treaty dimmed over the next three years. While, at first, there were numerous pieces of legislation dealing with such aspects as Latakia, Jabal ad-Druze, Civil Debts, and the reorganization of the Chambers of Commerce, Agriculture and Industry, this period was, on the whole, not very fruitful. Latakia and Jabal ad-Druze, which had acquired quasi-autonomous status under the terms of the Treaty, became increasingly an-

^{14/} Mardam Bey's Cabinet included the following: Interior and Foreign Affairs - Sa'adullah al-Jabiri; Education and Justice - 'Abd al-Rahman al-Kayyali; Finance and Defense - Shukri al-Quwatli (former head of the Istiqlal Party). The National Bloc was assisted throughout the country by the Nationalist Youth Movement and the para-military Steel Shirts. (vide. Rabbath, E.: Unite Syrienne et Devenir Arabe; p. 49; and Nashabi, H.: Political Parties in Syria, 1918-1939; (M.A. Thesis, AUB); p. 125.

noyed by the Damascus Government's attempts to bring about increased centralization. Syrian animosity, Turkish belligerence, and dubious French fidelity lost the Sanjak of Alexandretta to Turkey in 1939. Ultimately, the failure of the National Bloc Government can be traced to the French refusal to ratify the Treaty agreement. Several currents of opinion prevalent in France appear to have had some bearing on this matter: 1) the likelihood of oil lying below the Syrian plain and the subsequent loss of profits to France should she become independent; 2) Syria's ideal strategic location as a military staging-area and jumping-off point toward the Far East; 3) the necessity for France to remain in order to supervise the flow and utilization of development capital to ensure its resultant profits for France; 4) the danger of a North African demand for independence should France relinquish her position in the Levant - a situation which, with the increasing threat of German militarism, would jeopardize the French strategic position as a whole.^{15/} The reason may simply be the French empire-complex, but her position not only betrayed whatever trust there may have been in Syria, but also provided an opportunity for the extremism of Shukri al-Quwatli and others, to embarrass the Government. Sensing the Janus-like attitude of the French, these leaders demanded immediate confirmation of the Treaty,

^{15/} Ziadeh, N.: op.cit.; p. 55.

and by implication, layed a share of the blame for the delay at the feet of Jamil Mardam Bey.

The ensuing period was clouded by repression and marked by the vain attempts of Mardam Bey to coerce the French into ratifying the Treaty. In August, 1938, he received a slight palliative through the conclusion of a "Protocol" which safeguarded minority rights, assured the French language for schools, renewed the concession for the Banque de Syrie, and undertook steps for the development of Franco-Syrian commerce and industry. This agreement augmented the intractitude of the nationalists, who viewed the whole matter as a retrograde step. Their resistance and the recurrence of difficulty involving de Martel's Personal Status Decree of 1936,^{16/} toppled the Mardam Government. In February, 1939, Lutfi al-Haffar formed a Cabinet which lasted only three weeks, to be followed by one formed by Nasuh al-Bukhari. Two months later, this Government withdrew. Thirty days more passed when President al-Atassi resigned. The High Commissioner, unable to find anyone able or willing to

^{16/} This Decree delimited the religious communities and prescribed their status, powers and legal personality. The Sunni Muslims, who numbered 2,023,429 of a total population of 2,487,027, felt that their standing as the religious and popular majority was jeopardized. The Christians and Shi'ite groups believed themselves to be relegated to an inferior position.

assemble a new Cabinet, suspended the Constitution, dissolved the Chamber, and appointed a council of departmental Directors-General to rule by decree.

The early years of World War II were marked by an attitude "not of enthusiasm but of mingled fear and apathy."^{17/} Uncompromising nationalists and Communist leaders were interned, and there was increasing pro-Axis interference in Syria. Although it is difficult to analyze with any precision the emotions in the country, the most general feeling seems to have been one of disgust with the nation which had gone down in meek defeat, but which continued, though hardly capable of enforcing it, to insist on her mandate. Neither the assassination of Dr. Shahbandar nor the abortive attempt to implicate the National Bloc leaders did anything to alleviate the situation. In 1941, latent hostilities exploded in a series of strikes and demonstrations, which were quelled only through the proclamation of General Dentz, the Vichy High Commissioner, recognizing the existing state of unrest and pledging the formation of a Government with a Head of State to be assisted by an Advisory Assembly which would work with a Council of State to mitigate the near-critical situation arising from the problem of food supply.

^{17/} Hourani, A.: op.cit.; p. 230.

Khalid al-Azm, appointed Prime Minister, assembled a Ministry composed of individuals who had taken little active part in the previous political life of the country.

On June 8, 1941, Allied forces moved on Syria in an effort to depose the Vichy regime which was aiding the German airlift of supplies into Iraq following the revolution there in May. Despite unexpectedly stiff French resistance, the Allies were victorious on July 14.

On September 28, true to his word, General Catroux, Commander-in-Chief of the Free French Forces and Delegate-General and Plenipotentiary of Free France in the Levant, announced the independence of Syria:

"Syrians,

On June 8th last, at the time of the entry into the Levant of the Allied Armies, in a manifesto which I addressed to you in the name of Free France and of her Chief, General de Gaulle, I recognized Syria as a sovereign and independent State, under the promise of a treaty guaranteeing our reciprocal relations ... On the 16th of this month, I put my declaration of June 8th into effect by translating into established fact the principle there enunciated.

Thus the era is begun in which independent and sovereign Syria will herself control her destinies."

18/

He went on to say that he had accepted Sheikh Taj ad-Din al-Hasani as President of the Republic. One month later, Hasan al-Hakim consented to form a Cabinet, which included one Alawi and one Druze, but no members of the National Bloc.

19/

18/ Ibid.; p. 247-248.

19/ Ibid.; p. 250.

Notwithstanding the recognition by several Allied governments of Syrian independence, the French began to demur, and announced that for various reasons elections could not yet be held.

In January, 1943, upon the death of President al-Hasani, acting High Commissioner, Helleu, initiated proceedings for the reestablishment of a constitutional government by installing a provisional Ministry to cope with election details. The Chamber was augmented to 124 seats. In the two-stage balloting which followed (July 10-11, July 26) the National Bloc decisively emerged as the major political power, and, due to its clear majority in the Assembly, played a prominent role in the Ministry.^{20/} Independence was, at last, a fact.

Although this discussion of the Syrian Mandate period has been by no means exhaustive, several points stand forth which have a direct bearing on the philosophy, the rise, and perhaps the fall of the Ba'ath Party. In the first in-

^{20/} President of the Republic - Shukri al-Quwatli; Prime Minister - Sa'adullah al-Jabiri; Minister for Foreign Affairs - Jamil Mardam Bey; Minister of the Interior - Lutfi al-Haffar; Minister of Finance - Khalid al-Azm; Minister of Defense and Public Instruction - Nasuh al-Bukhari; Minister of Public Works and Supplies - Mazhar Raslan; Minister of Justice - Abdul Rahman al-Kayyali; Minister of Agriculture and Commerce - Tawfiq Shamiyyah; (vide. Hourani, A.: op. cit.; p. 256.)

stance, ample evidence reveals a significant emphasis on the personality as it relates to the selection and formation of Syrian governments. When one failed or was dissolved, the search was on to find a candidate whose personal prestige, or political following (or perhaps the lack thereof) would render him capable of fashioning a Ministry. Should no one prove available, either new elections or collapse would follow. Inevitably, stability and sound precepts of administration suffer a strain which, if too often repeated, produce a dangerous state of anarchy. That the individual is, and always has been, important in politics is empirically verified by reference to the index of any history book. But, reliance must, essentially, be placed on the governing system and the ideals which engendered it; the attraction must emanate from policies or expressed aspirations rather than from their fleshy representation. Should selectivity or control stem from the individual alone, dictatorship will result and, if not that, then at best the nation will be faced by a dirth of those bases which constitute durability; it will, in effect, lose its identity due to the constant fluctuation of leaders and methods, goals and effectivity. The relevance of this point to the Ba'ath lies in the relation of its leaders to its followers and to the electorate at large. To take the Resurrection Party as originally composed, it was fairly clear that while it served as

an articulate spokesman for the economically-deprived mass, it did so without their comprehending the latent issues and solutions which the Party proposed. Fundamentally, the commodity which was being sold was an ideology - not a personality. It was only following the merger of the Ba'ath and the Socialist Party that it attained any political pre-eminence. In other words, the Party had acquired Akram Hourani, an able politician, a highly skilled orator, who was capable of swaying opinion through the magnetism of his own personality. He thus brought to the Resurrection movement a personal dynamism which it had previously lacked. In the end, it would seem that the movement, as an ideologically-oriented response to a set of unfavorable conditions, was weakened through this alliance, because when, under the UAR, the personalities were eliminated, the political concepts, so earnestly fought for, disappeared too.

The second significant issue revolves around the employment of violence in Syrian politics, either as a means to set a chain of events into motion or in response to them. The Western, established societies tend to view the violent reaction as a negative approach to a situation, as something which should be quelled swiftly and, if possible, forgotten. However, in Syria, with the big landowners and the well-to-do in power, it seems to have been virtually impossible to break into the political scene without some form of violence. The strike and the demonstration existed as an in-

strument through which popular dissatisfaction could be expressed and pressed home on a government all too often interested only in its own self-enrichment. This was a tool used frequently by the Ba'ath. And yet, when the Union was achieved, it was the Ba'ath Party, knowing so well the art of violence and calling so often for a "coup d'etat", which fell before a regime whose own violent birth is known only too well.

The third point, mentioned earlier, is the anachronism of possessing a numerical majority while lacking effective power in the Assembly. This has already been partially explained as the result of the absence of cohesion within the majority group, in this case the Moderates, who were not, in any case, a party, organized and possessing an effective chain of command. Their opponents, the National Bloc, while organized to a greater degree, had, in addition, the psychological advantage, the prerogative of an opposition party, of being able to criticize both the Mandate and social conditions within the country. They were, thus, able to appeal to the temper of the masses without having to bear the responsibility of government. They could criticize those who appeared both to be tractable to French rule, and to be remaining in power to further their own interests. The same pattern was to occur when the opposition became the ruling element, and the Ba'ath and other left-wing groups emerged as the opposition. While the French were not now

the whipping boy, it was Shishakli, his increasingly totalitarian rule, and the worsening social scene. After his demise it was the imperialistic Western powers. The Ba'ath which never possessed over 16% of the Assembly seats, successfully goaded Syria both toward Russian aid and Union with Egypt. But when they emerged as the leadership in Syria, it was not long before they too dropped from power.

CHAPTER II

Party History

In the midst of the Syrian difficulties of the early War years there emerged the Party whose influence was to contribute to the formation of the initial stage of that most important Arab dream -unity. The Ba'ath (Resurrection) Party was founded in 1940 by two men of roughly similar training, Michel Aflaq and Salah ad-Din Bitar. The former, a Christian, was born in 1910 in Damascus where he received his early schooling. He later moved on to the Sorbonne in Paris where he successfully completed his studies, obtaining a "Licence" in Arts. Returning to Syria in 1933, he taught in secondary schools and at the Syrian National University for the next nine years.

His colleague, Salah ad-Din Bitar, approximately the same age as Aflaq, attended the Sorbonne where he received his "Licence" in Law,^{1/} and returned to Syria in 1935. Sometime between 1935 and 1940, he became Aflaq's deputy and aided him in organizing the Ba'ath's structure and in disseminating Party literature.

Although the Party did not appear publicly until

1/ The Times: Aug. 23, 1957; p. 6. According to al-Khalil, A.Y.: Socialism and Socialist Movements in the Arab World; (AUB, 1958) p. 67, the "Licence" was in Science.

1943 ^{2/} and was not officially recognized until 1949, it was conceived as a "movement of renovation for the Arab nation ... believing in revolutionary methods" and professing agreement "with most Pan-Arab groups and organizations." ^{3/} Thus, in 1941, the Party instituted a "Liberation Movement" in support of Rashid 'Ali al-Gailani and his violently nationalist, anti-British faction in Iraq. Efforts were again undertaken in respect to the Lebanese conflict with the French in 1943, when the Party openly solicited support for a common Arab front. Further Party activity was evident when

"in mid 1945, in Damascus, events resulted in Party demonstrations, in its participation with other organizations in leading the youth and the people against the idea of a conclusion of a treaty, and finally, in the Party's demands for complete independence." ^{4/}

The Party Journal, al-Ba'ath, appeared in 1946 and was issued in a weekly edition until 1948, from which time it had only a sporadic existence. At the same time, the Party

"perceived that necessity demanded a transition from its introductory, simple sphere to a new stage of party organization, and the establishment of a party to study Arab

^{2/} Ziadeh, N.: op.cit.; p. 202.

^{3/} Ibid.

^{4/} Farzat, M.H.: Political Life in Syria (1908-1955); p. 233. Any English translation of this book or of Political Parties in Syria appearing in this thesis is solely the work of the author.

"problems and to find a solution for them based on a unified Arab opinion." 5/

This appraisal led to the holding of a Party Congress at Damascus in April 1947. Internal organization was laid down, a detailed constitution drawn up, and a Party Executive Committee elected, consisting of Michel Aflaq -President; Salah ad-Din Bitar; Jamal as-Said (since excluded from the Party); Wahib Ghanim; Midhat Bitar; and Faycal Rikabi. 6/

Later in the same year, responding to the deteriorating situation in Palestine, the Party dispatched many of its members to assist in repelling the Israeli aggressors.

"They seized this occasion both to come into contact with the conscious youth sent from the different countries to the struggle and to renew to them the pledge to rescue the Arab countries from both their own manifest ill, and those revealed by the Palestine struggle." 7/

With the defeat of the Arabs, the Party returned to Syria, where it disclosed "the policy of exploitation and corruption" as well as the "treachery of the ruling groups in the Palestine cause." 8/

The shock of the Arab collapse was enormous, but the reasons for it were not lost on the Party alone. In the ringing words of Constantine K. Zurayk:

"Seven Arab states declare war on Zionism

5/ Political Parties in Syria; (1954) p. 231.

6/ Jargy, S.: "Le Declin d'un Parti"; Orient, #11, 1959; p. 22.

7/ Political Parties in Syria; p. 23.

8/ Ibid.

"in Palestine, stop impotent before it, and turn on their heels. The representatives of the Arabs deliver fiery speeches in the highest international forums, warning what the Arab states and people will do if this or that decision be enacted. Declarations fall like bombs from the mouths of officials at the meetings of the Arab League, but when action becomes necessary, the fire is still and quiet, the steel and iron are rusted and twisted, quick to bend and disintegrate. The bombs are hollow and empty. They cause no damage and kill no one." 9/

The significance of such a description prompted people, groups and parties to turn upon the Governments which had led them in the struggle. But while the Ba'ath had, in this connection, correctly interpreted the popular will, the outcome in Syria seems not to have been what they had in mind. On the 30th of March, 1949, a group of young army officers under the leadership of Col. Husni az-Za'im carried off a bloodless coup d'etat against the Government of President al-Quwatli and Jamil Mardam. Az-Za'im took over first the Prime Ministership and then the Presidency. To counter the growing high cost of living and corruption, the Colonel undertook to implement sweeping reforms, including the revamping the Army, the introduction of a Civil Code and the emancipation of women. At the same time, he dissolved the Assembly and banned all political parties, thus incurring the enmity of the Ba'ath.

"But when the az-Za'im coup d'etat deviated

9/ Zurayk, C.K.: Palestine - The Meaning of the Disaster; p. 2.

"from its genuine aims, the Party, in conjunction with other aware groups in the country, began its opposition." 10/

Exactly what role the Ba'ath played in az-Za'im's overthrow is not clear, 11/ but on the 14th of August, 1949, he was banished from power by the insurrection of Colonel Sami Hinnawi. Az-Za'im and his Prime Minister were executed, and Hashim al-Atassi assumed the Presidency. During the three month interim period prior to the elections in November, the Ba'ath perceived its role in Syrian affairs as determined by

"the urgent request for policy makers who were subservient to the desires of the people. In such manner the Party shared in the provisional government, which grieved for the return to constitutional conditions and the holding of free, uncorrupted elections." 12/

The holding of elections, however, gave a substantial return to members of al-Atassi's People's Party 13/ who, in conjunction with Colonel Hinnawi, advocated the initiation of a Fertile Crescent Scheme. Initially, this scheme was opposed by the Republican Party which was antagonistic to the intrinsic monarchical basis of the proposed Iraq-Syr-

10/ Political Parties in Syria; p. 232.

11/ The Arabic sources for this work tend to omit whole periods in the Party's history, and what Western sources are available on the Ba'ath are incomplete until after 1954.

12/ Political Parties in Syria; p. 232.

13/ Bullard, Sir R.(ed.): The Middle East; p. 426.

ian Union. When, however, they withdrew their objections, Army circles, which "had the support of the Ba'ath Party"^{14/} became restless, a condition which resulted eventually in the deposition of Col. Hinnawi by Colonel Adib Shishakli "a former member of the Syrian Popular Party, who had played some part in the Palestine War."^{15/}

This newest addition to the sequence of military coups d'etat:

"began in the beginning, to guide matters indirectly. Then, the ruling groups submitted to direct rule. Profiting from the maladministration of the existing ruling clique there arose a military dictatorship and further persecution of political organizations in the country."^{16/}

This transition stemmed from the increasing disparity between "Parliament with the People's Party as its dominant group, and Shishakli and his collaborators in the army."^{17/} Upon his initial accession to power, Shishakli had hoped to gain the support of Shukri al-Quwatli's National Party in forming a counterpoise to the People's Party.^{18/} In this direction, he received the blessing of Akram Hourani and his Socialist Party, as well as the tacit support of the

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- ^{14/} Ziadeh, N.: op.cit.; p. 108.
^{15/} Bullard, Sir R.(ed.): op.cit.; p. 426.
^{16/} Political Parties in Syria; p. 232.
^{17/} Bullard, Sir R.(ed.): op.cit.; p. 426.
^{18/} Tadmor, Gideon: "The Syrian Scene"; Middle Eastern Affairs, #4, 1952; p. 107. Both of these parties were off-shoots of the former National Bloc.

Ba'ath. The struggle continued until late 1951 when Colonel Shishakli extended the limits of his power, forcing the resignation of President al-Atassi, and the dissolution of Parliament. His peremptory action led to a series of demonstrations and strikes - the first since the initiation of the coups d'etat. Shishakli responded by suppressing the Muslim Brethren and the Socialist Cooperative Party. In December, 1951, Shishakli completed his second coup d'etat, installed Colonel Fawzi Selo as head of the administration, and took for himself the offices of Chief of Staff and Deputy Prime Minister. At this time, however,

"Hourani found Shishakli no longer responsive to his suggestions for a drastic land reform at the expense of the owners of the great latifundia of the Hama District; instead, Shishakli followed a conservative, and specifically anti-Communist policy." 19/

The Chief of Staff also "found that it would be wise to free himself from this association"^{20/} (the Ba'ath Party and the Socialist Party). He conveniently uncovered several alleged plots against both himself and his regime. Aware that the outcome of this witch-hunt would be little less than imprisonment, Aflaq⁶ Bitar and Hourani fled to Lebanon where they spent six months as the guests of the Progressive Socialist Party.^{21/} Shishakli ultimately outlawed all political parties in April, 1952.

19/ Kirk, G.: Contemporary Arab Politics; p. 25.

20/ Ziadeh, N.: op.cit.; p. 127.

21/ Al-Khalil, A.: op.cit. (vide. footnote #21); p. 71.

While residing in Lebanon, the triumvirate continued clandestine opposition to Shishakli and his Arab Liberation Movement -described by Aflaq "as nothing more than dust thrown in the eyes of the Arabs to win popularity and impose a dictatorship."^{22/} Their efforts were a sufficient nuisance for Shishakli to bring pressure to bear on the Lebanese Government, which finally asked them to leave. They travelled on to Switzerland where they remained until they were permitted to return to Syria in July, 1953, after Shishakli assumed the Presidency.

The return of the three leaders signaled the initiation of a new phase in Party history. Opposition to the Shishakli regime was growing rapidly. The following extract is a case in point:

"The nationalist Arabs, working (for the Arab cause), ... consider it their patriotic duty to make known to you and to public opinion the facts of the present situation in Syria, which can be neither ignored nor denied ... Our country today is being governed by individual absolute rule ... The first feature of (this type of rule) has been the complete loss of public liberties, which has subjected the citizens to a form of suppression ... Thus, while the present regime has resorted to the dissolution of political parties, the liquidation of their funds, and the closing of their offices, regardless of differences in their propensities or beliefs ... it has at the same time itself adopted and nurtured a new movement which it did not want to call 'a party', when in reality it survives on the

^{22/} "The Times"; Jan. 5, 1953; p. 5.

"debris of public and individual liberties." 23/

This statement, made and signed by Sultan al-Atrash, Lutfi al-Haffar, Rushdi al-Kikhya, Sabri al-Assali, Michel Aflaq, Akram Hourani, Salah ad-Din, and many others, represented almost the entire Syrian political spectrum, with the exception of the ruling clique.

The Ba'ath organized some strikes and demonstrations and, in September, 1953, in conjunction with the National and People's Parties, formulated the "Homs Pact" which unified their resistance efforts and signified their combined decision to boycott the elections proposed for October. Despite general popular discontent with Shishakli's increasing totalitarianism they were opposed by the Colonel's own Arab Liberation Movement, the Syrian National Socialist Party, and the Communists. When the elections were held on October 11, 1953, the Arab Liberation Movement won 72 of the 82 seats in the Parliament. Nine of the remaining seats were garnered by Independents, while the National Socialist Par-

23/ "Joint Statement by the Leaders and Members of the Syrian Political Parties and Independent Personages, Addressed to the Chief of the General Staff of the Syrian Army (Brig. A. Ash-Shishakli) as the Person Primarily Responsible for the Prevailing Situation in Syria"; June 20, 1953; The Arab States and the Arab League: A Documentary Record, vol. I; by Dr. Muhammad Khalil (soon to be published by Khayat's, Beirut.).

ty, which had put up 11 candidates, received one. ^{24/}

Neither the elections nor the resulting government served as a palliative to popular unrest which continued to spread, particularly in the Jabal ad-Druze region. Shishakli, regarding the situation as dangerous, arrested 10 leading Syrian politicians among them being Rushdi Kikhya - leader of the People's Party, Sabri al-Assali - leader of the National Party, Hourani, Aflaq, and Bitar. ^{25/} His precipitant action, far from forestalling the coming denouement, gave it intensified impetus. The Ba'athists had actively penetrated the Army - a tactic they duplicated again later both in Syria and in Jordan.

"One must not be slow to perceive the powerful attraction (for the Ba'ath) in the Army amongst the officers, who are typical elements of the formative middle class and who were smitten by faith in national independence and social progress." ^{26/}

They were successful to the extent that on February 25, 1954, the Army rose against its Commander-in-Chief in both North and South Syria. In this connection, Captain Mustafa Hamdun, a Ba'athist, and later a Minister of the United Arab Republic Government, after insuring the situation in Aleppo, made the following declaration:

"We (the Officers of the Syrian Army) wanted a

^{24/} "The Times"; Oct. 12, 1953; p. 7.

^{25/} Ibid.; Jan. 28, 1954; p. 8.

^{26/} Rondot, P.: "Tendances Particularistes et Tendances Unitaires en Syrie"; Orient, #5; 1958; p. 144.

"revolution against ignorance, disease, poverty and imperialism - a revolution against injustice, oppression, despotism and terrorism - a revolution against nepotism, corruption, bribery, and unlawful enrichment. (This we wanted) at a time, when he (ash-Shishakli) wanted us, the soldiers of the people, to act as servants to satisfy his sanguinary lusts, and to murder our own sons, fathers, mothers, and brothers. What we wanted (on the contrary) was a savage war against the enemies (of the people)...

We declare, in the name of the whole people, and in that of the officers in Aleppo, Hama, Homs, Dayr az-Zur, and Latakia, that ash-Shishakli is a criminal oppressor who should immediately accede to the will of the people, by relinquishing power and leaving the country." 27/

On the following day, political prisoners detained under the old regime were released, provision was made to restore the Constitution of 1950, and Brigadier Shawkat Shuquair took temporary command of the country. The situation returned to normal, with the exception of minor disturbances resulting from the designation of Assembly Speaker, Dr. Maman Kuzbari, as "Constitutional President". 28/ The problem was resolved by the reinstatement of Hashim al-Atassi as President of the Republic on March 1, 1954. Four days later the Ba'ath and Socialist Parties united to form the Arab Resurrection Socialist Party (Hizb al-Ba'ath al-Ishtiraki al-'Arabi).

The significance of this merger, other than its pure-

27/ "Statement by Captain Mustafa Hamdun on Behalf of the Aleppo Garrison, Announcing a New Movement Against Brig. A. Ash-Shishakli": translated by Dr. Muhammad Khalil; op.cit.; p. 592 & 594.

28/ "The Times"; March 1, 1954; p. 6.

ly political importance, lies in the collaboration of one man who was a thinker and philosopher, with another who was described by the former as "a complete opportunist."^{29/}

Akram Hourani, in contrast to his retiring colleague, was an old militant of the PPS and an able manipulator of mass sentiment. Though somewhat younger than either Aflaq or Bitar - he obtained his "Licence" in Law from the Syrian National University in 1943 - Hourani had led an active political life, entering Parliament in 1943, becoming Minister of Agriculture in 1949, and Minister of Defense in 1950. As Minister of Agriculture, he distributed land to the peasants and generally raised their standard of living, being particularly successful in the region around Hamah. In relation to the coups d'etat, Hourani appeared bent on assuming the figure "d'eminence grise".^{30/} His Party, consequently, represented, as was so often the case in Syria, a group of disciples following the master.

The Ba'ath, on the contrary, was marked by the singular vehemence of its ideology and approach to politics. Playing a secondary role in Syrian politics until the merger, it then acquired not only a strong ideological make-up, but also the demagogic skill of a talented politician with his enclave of adherents, who imparted to the movement

^{29/} Kirk, G.: op.cit.; p. 25.

^{30/} Jargy, S.: op.cit.; p. 23.

a political weight and dynamism which, coupled with a seductive social, political and economic doctrine, led it to victory.

The new Party advocated a platform of socio-economic radicalism blended with Arab Unity and the cry for independence, directed against colonialism and the great feudal landlords. Defining the idealistic aims of the Party, Michel Aflaq said:

"We do not demand independence in order to be insulated from other peoples, or in order to erect a wall between us and human civilization for the sake of returning to the past, that we might gain nourishment from it. Nor do we incline toward freedom in order to live in anarchy like the Bedouin, or to return to the darkness of the Middle Ages. We demand independence and freedom because they are, before everything, right and equitable; because they are a means through which to release our eminent gifts and creative energy, that we might realize on this piece of earth-our homeland - our objective and that of every man - perfect humanity."

31/

In the elections of October 7, 1954, the ARSP emerged as the rising political force. Hourani and his en-

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31/ Aflaq, M.: Fi Sabil al-Ba'ath (Toward Resurrection); p. 19.

32/ "The Times"; Oct. 7, 1954; p. 7. This paper states that the Party won 16 seats out of 142, a figure later reduced to 15 in the issue of Oct. 25, p. 5. Both these figures are refuted by Jargy, S.: op.cit.; p. 23, who states that the Party won 22 seats. He may have added to the total, seats won by smaller confederate parties.

tire list were returned to the Chamber from the Hama district, despite stiff opposition from Khalid al-Azm, Barazi, and other feudal families.^{33/} Although the Ba'ath received only 11% of the available seats in the Chamber, it was soon evident that through alliance with other left-wing groups, and through skillful employment of extra-parliamentary tactics, the Party was in a position to set the tone of and, in fact, to dominate the political scene.

In August, 1955, after a comparative lull in political activity, Shukri al-Quwatli was elected President over the distinct disapproval of the ARSP. A major architect of Syrian independence and a firm supporter of Pan-Arabism and union with Egypt,^{34/} al-Quwatli had had considerable experience in the field of political maneuver in Syria, having been President in 1943, 1948, and now again in 1955. Although possessing the support of the Nationalists, the People's Party, the Constitutional Bloc and others, he faced a difficult era in Syrian politics. First of all, "the Ba'ath and the Democratic Bloc decided to constitute the opposition so the new Cabinet would be a coalition government with Sha'ab Nationalists and the Constitutional Bloc."^{35/} This division thus left the large, uncommitted Independent

^{33/} Al-Khalil, A.: op.cit.; p. 71.

^{34/} "The Times"; Aug. 23, 1957; p. 6.

^{35/} Ziadeh, N.: op.cit.; p. 162.

Bloc. ^{36/}

Secondly, exploiting a feature, mentioned earlier, the Ba'ath intensified its infiltration of Army circles. "Young Army graduates from the Homs Staff College were fiery Arab Nationalists who pointed to the defeats in Palestine and the weakness of Syrian policies as positive proof of the senior officers' incompetence."^{37/} The assassination of Colonel Adnan Malki, a Ba'athist, early in 1955, was illustrative both of the level at which Party penetration was effective, and of the extent to which the ARSP was willing to go to eliminate a rival - the Syrian National Socialist Party (Hizb al-Qawmi al-Ijtima'i as-Suri). "Interpreted by some people as representing a trial of strength between the Ba'ath and the SNSP,"^{38/} the Ba'ath launched a series of treason trials, made ostensibly valid by the implication of a SNSP member in the murder, and aroused public indignation to such a pitch that the SNSP was dissolved and several of its followers brought to trial. The assassination provided a logical and highly attractive opportunity for the Party to destroy some of its opponents and demonstrate, in no uncertain manner, its determination to brook no competition.

^{36/} In contrast to the National and People's Parties which won 18 and 27 seats, respectively, the Independents had taken 67 seats. (vide. "The Times": Oct. 7, 1954; p. 7.)

^{37/} Fisher, S.N.: The Middle East; p. 563.

^{38/} Ziadeh, N.: op.cit.; p. 163.

The ascension of Sabri al-Assali to the Premiership - a position he had held in 1954, and from February to August in 1955 - with support from the People's Party and the Constitutional Bloc, also marked the official entry of the Ba'ath to the Syrian Government when it acquired the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and National Economy.^{39/} This new Cabinet constituted a "National Government" and bore within it true potential for Syria. But, for several reasons, it remained in power only seven months. Internally, the lines of conflict were being drawn between the conservatives, with their long political heritage and their new Chief of Staff, Brigadier Nizam ad-Din, and between the left-wing elements, who could number among their supporters, Major Abdul Hamid Serraj, Chief of the "Deuxieme Bureau" - the Military Intel-

^{39/} The Cabinet was composed of: Sabri al-Assali - Prime Minister and Finance; Majd ad-Din Jabiri (National Party) - Public Works; Ahmad Qambur (People's Party) - Interior; Abdul Wahib Houmid (People's Party) - Education; Rashad Jabri (People's Party) - Agriculture; Abdul Beq Nizam ad-Din (Democratic Bloc) - Health; Muhammad Ayst (Democratic Bloc) - without portfolio; Mustafa Zarka (Constitutional Bloc) - Justice; Abdul Hassib Raslan (Constitutional Bloc) - Defense; Salah ad-Din Bitar - Foreign Affairs. (vide. "The Times": June 18, 1956; p. 8.).

ligence Corps. ^{40/}

Externally, international diplomacy, particularly the Western predilection for regional arrangements, contributed heavily to the confusion in Syria. The signing of the Baghdad Pact in March, 1955, placed those Syrian conservatives and moderates who favored a pro-Western alignment at the mercy of the nationalists and leftists, who could safely and effectively denounce creeping imperialism. The conservative-moderate position was finally all but shattered by the Sinai invasion and the subsequent appearance of Russia as the benevolent protector, and Egypt as the hope and guiding light of Arab Nationalism. Her acceptance of the Soviet aid and assistance were enough to convince many of those who had been dubious of the true course to follow.

Shortly after the Sinai invasion in November, 1956, Syria received from Moscow \$60,000,000 in tanks and other materiel, President al-Quwatli visited the Soviet Union, and a shipment of nearly a dozen Russian-built MIG-17's arriv-

^{40/} Kirk, G.: op.cit.; p. 92. Major Serraj was a leading member of the Young Officers Committee and an ardent, anti-West nationalist. There is no concrete evidence to show that he was a Ba'athist, per se, but it is clear that his views ran parallel to those of the Party, in particular to Akram Hourani's. His control of the Intelligence Corps thus made him an invaluable instrument for Party policy.

ed on Syrian airfields.^{41/} On December 9, following the cease-fire on the Egyptian Front, and in response to an alleged attempt by Iraq to stage a military coup in Syria, a National Parliamentary Front was evolved, largely at the behest of the Ba'ath Party. Composed of 55 nationalists and leftist deputies, including Khalid az-Azm's Progressive Party, and entirely excluding the People's Party, the Front was pledged to the following aims:

"Destruction of all plots against the country's safety and safeguarding of the investigation of the 'recent plot' (referring to the smuggling of Iraqi arms into Syria); resistance to the Baghdad Pact; and efforts to liberate Arab countries subjected to direct or indirect colonization, with special support for the people of Iraq in their struggle against colonization."

^{42/}

The death knell for the People's Party sounded when several of its members were implicated in the Iraqi plot, and when Prime Minister al-Assali found himself maneuvered into reshuffling his Cabinet, on December 22, 1956. The Sha'ab Party members were utterly eliminated. The Ba'ath had thus succeeded in deposing another of its rivals.

The internecine war of attrition was far from over, however, and in March 1957, it was reported that Shukri al-Quwatli was threatening to resign.^{43/} On one side, the conservative-moderate faction, throwing themselves into a last-

^{41/} Fisher, S.N.: op.cit.; p. 563.

^{42/} "The Times": Dec. 10, 1956; p. 10.

^{43/} Ibid.: March 23, 1957; p. 6.

ditch effort to stave off a leftist victory were reported to have formed a union in the North, in the regions of Aleppo and Homs.^{44/} On the other side, the ARSP

"staged a series of treason trials, in which their opponents were charged indiscriminately with conspiracy with Turkey, or Israel, or the Iraq of Nuri as-Said, or Britain (three members of a 'British spy-ring' were arrested at the beginning of July)."^{45/}

The battle was joined in the Hourani-Serraj effort to remove Brigadier Nizam ad-Din, who was radically opposed to the methods and direction of ARSP policy. When on August 18, 1957, ad-Din, two other Brigadiers, and 7 Colonels were dismissed, and the Commander-in-Chief post went to Maj.-General Afif al-Bizri, a man openly accused of being a Communist sympathizer,^{46/} the locus of power in Syria lay with the Ba'ath - left-wing alliance: Akram Hourani - Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies; Salah ad-Din Bitar - Minister of Foreign Affairs; Khalid Kallas - Minister of Economy; Col. Abdul Hamid Serraj - Head of Military Intelligence; Brigadier Afif al-Bizri - Commander-in-Chief; and Khalid al-Azm - Minister of State and Defense. Six months later, Syria federated with Egypt to become the United Arab Republic.

^{44/} Ibid.

^{45/} Kirk, G.: "The Syrian Crisis of 1957 - Fact and Fiction"; International Affairs, vol. 36, #1, 1960; p. 59.

^{46/} Bizri "is described in Beirut newspapers as a card-carrying Communist." (vide "The Times": Aug. 19, 1957; p.8).

The Federation was not an unpremeditated act. As early as April, 1956, the Ba'ath officially called for a union between Syria and Egypt. Michel Aflaq writing in June of the same year said:

"For the first time, conditions for unity between the two Arab countries are abundant, without any detriment to their independence. The destiny of Arab Unity (now) lies in the hands of the Arab people, themselves. For the first time, also, it is apparent that the obstacles which stand in the way of unity, the same obstacles standing in the path of liberation, are, in the first degree, Arab problems accruing from the corruption of the internal social situation. Indeed the steps toward liberty which Syria and Egypt achieved last year have led to the conclusion that the symbol of unity between the two countries is a thing requiring immediate attainment. But, the delay in responding to this practical, nationalist expectation is not due to a simple postponement of union, but to resistance to the strides of liberation. This (resistance) will retreat and be reversed. Thus, the Arab struggle will achieve its logical victory tomorrow. This struggle must, however, continually advance in order that it not be compelled to retreat."

47/

The cry was taken up by President al-Quwatli in July of the same year. The plan was adopted in principle by the al-As-sali Government on July 5 with the approval of the Parliament.^{48/}

Preliminary concrete steps were taken on September 3, 1957 with an economic union, on October 13, 1957 with the sending

47/ Aflaq, M.: Mu'araka al-Masir al-Wahid
(The Struggle for One Destiny): p.79-80.

48/ Jargy, S.: "La Syrie Province de la R.A.U.";
Orient, #8, 1959; p. 22.

of 1000 Egyptian troops to the northern Syrian border to ward off a threatened Turkish attack (the Turks being disturbed by Syria's increasingly pro-Soviet policy), and on November 16, 1957 with the participation of an Egyptian Parliamentary Mission in the sittings of the Syrian Parliament.^{49/}

In essence, however, it was internal developments rather than idealistic conditions, which made the prospect of union with Egypt appear attractive if not necessary. The pro-Soviet, anti-Western slant of Syria's foreign policy had alienated her neighbors. Surrounded by pro-Western and, with the exception of Lebanon, monarchical governments, it was felt that the door was always ajar for an unexpected coup instigated from without. On the political front, all was not well in the left-wing camp. According to "The Times" the Communists had begun arguing vehemently for a union with Egypt - although certainly not along the lines envisaged by the ARSP where they would have plunged headlong into a conflict with Col. Nasser whose attitude toward Egyptian Communists was known.^{50/} Animosity clearly existed between the two parties as early as 1951, when Khalid Bakdash stated:

"We must work constantly also to unmask groups and parties claiming to be 'socialist', such as the Arab Socialist Party, the Islamic Socialist Front, and al-Ba'ath in Syria, for through their seductive propaganda they constitute a danger

^{49/} Ibid.

^{50/} "The Times": Jan. 17, 1958; p.8.

"to the growing democratic national movement against war and imperialism, feudalism and exploitation. They try to exploit the increasing popular orientation toward socialism, they especially destroy the effectiveness of our slogans of distribution of the lands of the feudalists and big landowners to the peasants ... They also try to prevent the growth of popular sympathy for the world-wide camp of peace and socialism led by the Soviet Union by calling for a so-called 'third force' or 'neutrality' between the two camps." 51/

Thus, to forestall a Communist attempt to usurp power, Hourani and Bitar hastened to conclude an agreement with Nasser on their terms. At the same time, a struggle was emerging

"between the Ba'ath and Khalid al-Azm, the able and ambitious landowner and businessman of ancient family, whose movement to the left had been an important factor in the past two years." 52/

The latter had been accruing both official posts and popular acclaim, the latter primarily due to a very fruitful journey to the Soviet Union. 53/ In the face of this challenge, the Ba'ath had available one strategy almost irresis-

51/ Laqueur, W.: Communism and Nationalism in the Middle East; quoting Bakdash, K.: "Report to the Central Command of the Communist Party in Syria and Lebanon (1951)"; p. 160.

52/ Hourani, A.: "Syria Makes the Running"; The Times; May 21, 1958; p. 11.

53/ He returned from Moscow with a loan of \$150,000,000 at favorable interest rates, and the promise of projects totaling \$570,000,000. (vide. Fisher, S.N.: op.cit.; p. 563).

tible from the point of view of opposition.

In the final analysis, the creation of the United Arab Republic represented for the Ba'ath not only an extension of its concept of Pan-Arabism, but also an accretion, through Nasser's dynamism, of that effervescence which the Party felt it lacked.

"Confident in its doctrinal force, but looking for the man who was able to impose its ideology and make it acceptable to the masses, the Ba'ath saw in the Egyptian President the herald capable of making its principles pass from the realm of the abstract into a concrete plan. He represented for it the 'material force' which it lacked."

54/

Thus, the Ba'athists, accompanied by President al-Quwatli, Brigadier al-Bizri, and Colonel Serraj, went to Cairo, and the Union was promulgated on February 4, 1958. But, while the Union was most certainly premeditated, insufficient time and soul-searching had been delegated to major and intrinsic problems, problems which were, prima facie, irreconcilable. How, for instance, would the Party militants, who had struggled for so long and suffered so much, harmonize their justifiable satisfaction in victory with their inevitable dissolution as a Party, demanded by Nasser and implemented by the March 12th Decree? While Nasser was felt by many Ba'athists to be one of them in prin-

54/ Jargy, S.: "Le Declin d'un Parti";
Orient, #11, 1959; p. 28.

principle, if not in name,^{55/} was it over-bearing confidence, pure naivety, or simple belief which prompted Michel Aflaq to say

"We are officially dissolved. But we will be present in the new unified party - the National Union. Born of the union of these two countries, this movement will be unable to be motivated by any principles save those of the Ba'ath."

56/

or does the reason lie, as some Western commentators believe, in the Ba'ath's misguided assumption that the Decree was directed against their opponents only? In a different sphere, how did the Party plan to adapt its stated belief in and desire for a constitutional regime, possessing guaranteed personal liberties and responsible legislature, with Nasser's one-man, absolute, military dictatorship?

Unfortunately the answers do not exist. A partial explanation perhaps lies with the above discussion of motives behind the formation of the Union. Undeniably, a clue rests with the Ba'ath's implicit faith in Unity, and its paramount position in the Arab dream. What seems to have happened, however, was the sacrifice of a legitimate, and worthy aim to a hasty miscalculation both of the situation as it existed in Syria, and of the role which the Party expected itself to play in the Union. No other explanation suitably accounts for such a headlong rush to obliteration.

^{55/} "The Times": Jan. 27, 1958, p. 6.

^{56/} Jargy, S.: op.cit.: p. 29.

Six months after the Union, it became apparent that the much-vaunted wedding of "nationalisms" was not going to be blissful.. The left-wing press and many Syrians regarded the elections as a "vaste supercherie" (a great hoax), ^{57/} in response to unconfirmed reports that the Cairo Government, with the collusion of Col. Serraj, was dickering in the Syrian elections at the expense of the Ba'athists. Verification of this theory is not possible, but it was evident that there was a new-found morale in the conservative and moderate camps, leading them to combine their forces and to present coalition electoral lists, which in some districts effectively forced the Ba'ath Party to withdraw. ^{58/} The success of this policy was demonstrated in the return of only 250 Ba'athists to the UAR Parliament out of a potential 9,445 seats set aside for the "Northern Province". ^{59/} All of the prominent leaders, with the exception of Michel Aflaq, were returned, a fact attributable largely to their own personal following and

^{57/} Jargy, S.: "La Syrie a la Veille d'un Nouvelle Experience": Orient, #10, 1959; p. 26.

^{58/} Jargy, S.: "Le Declin d'un Parti": Orient, #11, 1959; p. 32.

^{59/} Kirk, G.: Contemporary Arab Politics; p. 103.

popularity.^{60/} In a little over a year, came the beginning of the end, when Riad Malki was dismissed on September 14, 1959.^{61/} Three months later, the remaining Ba'athists save Khalid Kallas, were dismissed.^{62/} No specific information is available as to exactly why the Party was dealt such a summary blow. And speculation produces only the probability that, in addition to carrying on clandestine Party activity, there was opposition to Field-Marshal Abdul Hakim Ameri's land reform scheme, as it included a plan for the payment of debts incurred by state confiscation of land, a proposal not in line with true socialist principles. Even should the basis of the Party's demise lie with the inherent problem expressed earlier, it is inevitably the case that the Ba'ath, as a major political force, is dead.

Little is known of the Party's pattern of organi-

60/ Orient, #5, 1958(ed): "Institutions de la Republique Arab Unie"; p. 192.

Ba'athist Positions in the Union:

Central Gov't.:

Hourani - V-P in charge of Social Questions.

Bitar - Min. of State for questions re: integration of Syr. & Egypt.

Executive Council for Syria:

Col. Abdul Hamid Serraj - Min. of Interior.

Khalid Kallas - Min. of Econ. & Commerce.

Ahmad Younes - Min. of Agric.

Lt. Col. Mustapha Handoun - Min. of Social Affairs.

61/ Jargy, S.: op.cit.; p. 38.

62/ "The Times": Dec. 31, 1959; p. 8.

zational structure and internal chain of command. It does appear, however, to have followed these general lines:

"The Party preserves ... a certain degree of autonomy within each country, which has its own executive committee and secretary-general, who look after purely internal affairs. The secretary-general for each country is ipso facto a member of the National Executive Committee, which alone can take decisions of wider purport. In each country an annual congress meets to lay down the plan of work for the following year, strictly in accordance with the policy projected by the National Executive Committee, and by the National Congress of delegates from all the Arab countries."

63/

Information is equally sparse concerning Party activities in different countries, with the possible exception of Jordan. In Lebanon, where the Party has not assumed a commanding position, Ba'athist socialism was repugnant to the free-enterprise middle-class element which forms the pivot of Lebanese economic and political life. Commensurate to this drawback is the "Confessionalist" nature of the society, a feature which limits the appeal of the Ba'ath almost entirely to the Muslim population, for the Pan-Arab aspect of Ba'athist ideology is anathema to the Christian element which fears an eclipse of its status under an all-Muslim system of government. The Party, however, only appeared, in an official sense, during the 1958 revolution against President Cham'un, when it was led by its present

63/ Majdalany, G.: "The Arab Socialist Movement"; Middle East in Transition; Laqueur, W.(ed.); p. 338.

chief, Dr. Abd al-Majid Rifa'i.^{64/}

In Iraq, the situation is correspondingly vague. It is known, however, that its rival was the National Democratic Party led by Kamil Jadirgi,^{65/} and that the Party's opposition to Nuri as-Sa'id and the Baghdad Pact resulted in the imprisonment of several of its members. While the revolution promised better times for the Party, Col. Qasim reacted little better to Ba'athist aims, and imprisoned Party leader, Fuad Rikabi. After the Mosul fiasco, General Abd al-Salam Aref was arrested and accused of having plotted with Ba'athist leaders, of having actively connived in the clandestine voyage of Aflaq to Iraq, and of founding the paper "al-Jumhuriyya" which he later turned over to members of the Ba'ath.^{66/}

In Jordan, the Party played one of its more active roles, pursuing the same over-all pattern of operation as in Syria, with infiltration of the Army and the acquisition of the key Foreign Ministry post. Drawing its members from the ranks of malcontent intellectuals and the middle class, the Ba'ath capitalized on the nationalist sentiment which was opposed to the presence of the British, and in particular Glubb Pasha. In the elections of April, 1950, two Ba'-

^{64/} Jargy, S.: op.cit.; p. 25.

^{65/} Majdalany, G.: op.cit.; p. 342.

^{66/} Jargy, S.: "Le Proces de Abd al-Salam Aref"; Orient, #12, 1959; p. 89.

athists, Abdulla Rimawi and Abdullah Nawas, were elected to the Parliament where they constituted a permanent opposition to the Government.^{67/} Although in principle anti-Monarchical, and calling for the implementation of republican institutions, the Ba'ath, to insure its free operation within the country, recognized that the Hashemite family was solidly entrenched, and announced that it was willing to work with either a monarchical or republican regime.^{68/} When King Abdullah was assassinated in August of 1951, and elections were held, this Ba'ath policy was attacked by the League of National Liberation (known as the Jordan Communist Party after June 1951).^{69/} But, the Ba'ath remained adamant, while aiding the rise of an important follower, Ali Abu Nuwar, through the ranks of the Army.

On May 23, 1953, when King Hussein ascended to the Throne, he initiated a policy of political leniency, in contrast to the program already in effect under which parties could only form with government permission, and under which the Communists had been subjected to fairly vigorous suppression. To ameliorate this situation, Hussein had a new political parties' law passed which entitled a party to submit its case to the High Court of Justice should the Cabinet refuse it permission to become a legalized entity. Under

^{67/} Dearden, Ann: Jordan; p. 83.

^{68/} Glubb, J.: A Soldier with the Arabs; p. 431.

^{69/} Laqueur, W.: Communism and Nationalism in the Middle East; p. 128.

this ruling, the Ba'ath, having gained the approval of the Court, could legitimately channel its political agitations through its new-found rights of public assembly and activity.^{70/} This was particularly in evidence in the period when Fawzi Pasha Mulki and Abdul Huda were Premiers. It was the former who initiated the leniency campaign and it was he who paid for it. The country, at this time, was facing dire poverty. Whereas Budget deficits were made good by British loans, she also subsidized and trained a large portion of the Arab Army. Egyptian-Sa'udi pressure to expel the British notwithstanding, Jordan had the further misfortune to suffer from increased Israeli border aggression. Internally, with conditions ripe for exploitation, "liberty, had turned to license; there was neither respect for the Government nor fear of the law."^{71/} All institutions of foreign aid became the object of attack, and an attitude of disaffection was rife throughout the country. Rather than witness an utter holocaust, the King turned to Abu al-Huda to form a Cabinet, but as in Syria, the left-wing elements, primarily the Ba'ath and Sulaiman an-Nabulsi's National Socialists, had gained mastery of the Lower House, despite a numerical inferiority. Al-Huda promptly dissolved the House and called for new elections. In an effort to thwart grow-

^{70/} Dearden, A.: *op.cit.*; p. 104.

^{71/} *Ibid.*; p. 107.

ing left-wing power, al-Huda banned their publications, and turned their supporters away from the polls. "The restrictions affected the left-wing and liberal elements hardly less than the Communists ..., and they induced the Ba'ath to make common cause with the Communists in the struggle against the Government."^{72/} In the end, the October 1954 election resulted in some twelve people killed and the repeal of the more liberal aspects of political liberty.

Internationally, the Baghdad Pact excited deep-seated fears of imperialism and its role in fostering the Israeli cause vis-a-vis the Arabs. Furthermore, Nasser's arms deal with the Czechoslovaks in September 1955, added verve and morale to the nationalist cause, for it demonstrated that there were other than Western avenues open to the Arabs. In spite of the slight cooling of Arab tempers when the first meeting of the Pact Council evinced some concern for the Arab position in respect to the proposed UN border modification, the raucous Voice of the Arabs endeavored to keep fevers worked up. On the Sa'udi front, hopes for a monarchical entente to oppose the Communist threat fell apart when, with Egypt and Syria, the Sa'udis approved a mutual defense treaty pledging a unified military command in the event of aggression. Seeking a way out of her isolated position, the Jordanian Government under new Prime Minister, Sa'id Mufti, undertook negotiations with the British, in

^{72/} Laqueur, W.: op.cit.; p. 132.

December 1955, through their emissary, General Sir Gerald Templer. The nature of the discussions leaked out and the Egyptians promptly brought heavy pressure to bear on the Palestinian members of the Cabinet, who soon resigned. Sa'id Mufti had no recourse but to do likewise, and Hazza Majali assumed power. Ba'athist-National Socialist riots broke out, and King Hussein, acting on the advice of Majali, had the Lower House of Parliament dissolved, and new elections proclaimed. The dissolution order, lacking the requisite number of signatures, proved invalid and a new wave of rioting broke out again in January, 1956. Order was rapidly reestablished by General Glubb and the Arab Legion, but Hussein was still in a quandry. Seeking solace in the Army, the King turned to his close friend, Col. Abu Ali Nuwar, whom he had appointed his chief Aide de Camp in 1954. Colonel Nuwar, a leading Ba'athist, and his associates took advantage of the highly explosive situation, and urged Hussein to expel General Glubb and thus return the Arab Army to an Arab command. His diligence was rewarded, when in March, 1956, Glubb was summarily expelled along with the majority of remaining British officers. This abrupt action secured for the Throne a brief respite, and for his sagacity Colonel Nuwar was rewarded with both a Major-Generalcy and the post of Chief of Staff.^{73/} The Ba'ath had, then, as

^{73/} Kirk, G.: op.cit.; p. 108.

in Syria, successfully infiltrated the military in a paramount manner. And the result was a "pogrom" in which as many as possible of the conservative military element were replaced.

In the political area, Prime Minister, Samir Rifa'i, who had taken over the Government during the January rioting, pursued a neutral policy of discussion with the British, while attempting not to antagonize the surrounding Arab states. Major-General Nuwar, on the other hand, urged on Hussein a more pro-Egyptian policy, and had some success, for he led a military mission to Cairo in May to effect a joint Egyptian-Syrian-Jordanian military policy. Rifa'i resigned, and Sa'id Mufti again assumed the Premiership. In an effort to glean support from all quarters, he included two National Socialists in the Cabinet, but they refused to participate until the Parliament was dissolved and new elections held.^{74/} The Ba'athists with their left-wing allies rallied to the cause, and the Parliament fell on June 26, with elections scheduled for the following October.

The elections of October 21, influenced perhaps by Israeli attacks at Husan and Qalqilya, produced a decided

^{74/} Dearden, A.: op.cit.; p. 121.

left-wing advance, obtaining 16 of the 40 seats. The National Socialists of an-Nabulsi gained 11, the Ba'ath two, and the National Bloc (Communist) receiving one.^{75/} Identical to its pattern in Syria, Ba'athist, Abdullah Rimawi, became Foreign Minister under Prime Minister Sulaiman an-Nabulsi. But this success was short-lived, for on April 10, 1957, Hussein demanded the resignation of the Nabulsi Cabinet on grounds which are not altogether clear but which seem to hinge on an-Nabulsi's attempts to establish diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union.^{76/} Calling upon his loyal Bedouin troops at az-Zarqa to help him put down the opposition of a newly formed National Committee, (Ba'athist and National Socialist) Hussein dismissed the Cabinet. Major-General Nuwar was ordered arrested, but he and many of his Ba'ath colleagues fled to Syria, where they have continued to carry on a vitriolic campaign against the King.^{77/}

The remainder of this discussion concerns only a few unconfirmed items which were reported in Septmeber, 1959. An "Exceptional National Congress" was convened somewhere in Lebanon, attended by members representing the Party's regional divisions in Jordan, the Persian Gulf, Iraq, North

^{75/} Ibid.; p. 125.

^{76/} Kirk, G.: op.cit.; p. 109.

^{77/} Ibid.; p. 110. See also Jargy, S.: "le Declin d'un Parti"; Orient, #11, 1959; p. 24.

Africa, and Lebanon. A "New National Command" was elected and took the following decisions: 1) The Syrian branch of the Party was to be dissolved in compliance with the March 12 Decree;^{78/} 2) Abdullah Rimawi, the Secretary-General of the Jordanian Party, was divested of his powers and responsibilities in Jordan, and was suspended from Central Party activity pending his personal appearance before the National Command; 3) The Congress decided to cooperate on an enlarged basis with the UAR leaders in the Algerian national revolution and with other popular national movements in the Arab world.^{79/} This ukase was followed shortly by a rebuttal issued in the name of the Jordanina Regional Command and the Committee of Safety, and signed by Rimawi and Bahjat Ghraibeh, the gist of which was that the "Exceptional National Congress" did not represent the Party, could not speak in its name, and was thus illegal.^{80/} The "New National Command" promptly reiterated its intention to implement its decisions and to diligently seek out and eliminate from the Party all opportunists and deviationists, especially those who threaten to sabotage the newly-oriented work of the Party.^{81/} Notwithstanding the fact that these resolutions lack

^{78/} See above, p. 42.

^{79/} Jargy, S.: op.cit.; p. 34 (vide. footnote 96).

^{80/} Ibid.

^{81/} Ibid.; p. 35.

signatures and were deviously revealed, evidence points to three divergent tendencies within the Party late in 1959: a) the pro-Nasserites led by Michel Aflaq, whose position was defined in the first manifesto of the "Exceptional Command"; b) the "attentistes" (wait-and-see-ers) like Akram Hourani, who are not committed to any one course; and c) the intransigents led by Abdullah Rimawi, who intend to follow their own Party line at any expense.^{82/} Whatever may be the outcome of these views is anyone's guess, but, in summary, the over-all Ba'ath picture appears as follows: it seems to be non-existent or at least clandestine in Syria; much the same condition exists in Jordan; the Tripoli branch in Lebanon is still active, but has achieved no major political breakthrough; and in Iraq, Qasim maintains suppression.

While the Party is now less than a success, it is difficult to imagine that as an ideology it is finished. There will always be an Arab dream of Unity, and for many years to come, there will exist conditions which are ripe for Socialism. As concomitant with the dream and the conditions there will be men anxious to preserve both their local or regional independence as well as their privileged position, thus there will always be a need for steady and severe struggle. It is toward these ideological aspects that we now turn our attention.

82/ Ibid.; p. 37.

CHAPTER III

Party Ideology

Many parties in the Middle East have professed nationalism, several have preached socialism, but few have based their struggle on such a comprehensive, detailed Constitution as that of the Arab Resurrection Socialist Party. Beyond this, few parties have possessed a theoretician of such stature as Michel Aflaq. Although, at times, appearing both vague and repetitious, Aflaq, nevertheless employs forceful language to set forth the internal Arab problems, and to map out his road to their solution. It is proposed, therefore, to present this most important element of a dynamic party in the following manner: as the Constitution forms the basis of the Party's socialist aims, and as it will be reproduced in full elsewhere,^{1/} only the most significant of its sections will be set down, to be followed where possible by extracts from Aflaq's own writings. It is hoped that these will provide both a commentary and a further elucidation. It would be advisable at this point, however, to make one or two cautionary observations.

In Aflaq's own words, "The aims of the 'Arab Resurrection', which we have summarized as 'Freedom, Socialism and Unity', are without doubt fundamental objectives of equal importance, which may not be attended to one before the

^{1/} See Appendix.

other, or separated from each other."^{2/} The reader is thus warned that he may frequently find, in any particular extract, that these subjects will be interrelated, will weave in and out of each other. Every effort has been made, however, to render all quotations as relevant to the text under discussion as possible. The reader will also encounter a preponderance of material dealing with Socialism which, in addition to forming an integral part of the Ba'ath's tripartite ideology, assumed an especial significance for the Party leaders as Syria was facing not only oppression from without, but repression from within. The Mandate, for from being altruistic, molded the country to its own interests and extracted from it what resources it could. The old-guard leaders, who through family power, political connection, or outright collaboration with the colonialists, had built up a jealously guarded system of privileges and vested-interests. Socialism thus appeared to provide both a pattern and a theory through which to eliminate foreign encroachment and to readjust the social order, with a view to the redistribution of wealth and opportunity for all.

The Constitution of the ARSP is composed of 48 General Principles, preceded by three Basic Principles which set out the over-all aims and aspirations of the Party. The First Basic Principle reads as follows:

^{2/} Aflaq, M.: Mu'araka' al-Masir al-Wahid
(The Struggle for One Destiny); (1953); p.18.

"Unity and Freedom of the Arab Nation.

"The Arabs are one nation having a natural right to live in one state and to be free to direct its affairs.

"The Arab Socialist (BA'TH) Party therefore considers:

- 1) the Arab homeland an indivisible political and economic unity and that no Arab country can live in isolation from another Arab country;
- 2) the Arab nation a cultural unity, and that existing differences are incidental and false and will totally disappear with the awakening of Arab consciousness;
- 3) that the Arab homeland belongs to the Arabs who alone have the right to direct its affairs and utilize its resources and potentialities."

3/

The above statement is self-explanatory, but Michel Aflaq develops the theme to a greater extent, placing much of the blame for the failure to achieve unity at the present time on regional parties and the Arab League, and stressing the essential need for the people to be aware that unity comes only from continual, arduous struggle.

"It was called the 'Arab Resurrection Party not because it was the first Party to believe, ideologically and practically, in Arab unity, and to place its organization only on a universal Arab foundation, but also because it believed, from the beginning that any viewpoint and remedy of the vital difficulties of the Arabs, either in part or en toto, which does not emanate from this axiom: 'The Unity of the Arab people', is an erroneous outlook and an injurious cure. The distinction, there-

3/Constitution of the Arab Resurrection (BA'TH) Socialist Party; translated by the Department of Public Administration, American University of Beirut, Lebanon; Appendix.

fore, lies not between 'The Arab Resurrection' (Party) and other parties established in the Arab countries, some of whom proclaim socialism, others democracy, while others proclaim both within the borders of the country in which they were set up. Most of them profess Arab Unity as a result and an ultimate aim which each country will reach when it has completed its evolution and the necessary conditions have matured for the realization of unity. We say that the difference between our party and the others is not in the quantity but in the kind. The freedom which an Egyptian or Lebanese party demands, and the socialism toward which an Iraqi or Syrian party strive are not the same as the freedom and the socialism which are needed, and which the Arab people can achieve, as one nation, possessing a cultural heritage, and the propensities and abilities for a new genuine awakening. Thus, the freedom toward which each Arab country is, individually, proceeding, is unable to attain the depth, comprehensiveness and positive meaning which the freedom, for which the Arab people long, would reach if they place their destiny and that of humanity in a questionable position ... The work of the regional parties did not prepare a stage through which to arrive at unity, but rather, a new direction and a different road remote from and weakening the potentials of socialism and freedom. It is the distinction, itself, between the Arab League which unites not only incompetence with failure, but exploitation, malevolence, and special interests with each other, and between the Arab unity which creates the Arabs anew. There is nothing which would prevent the unity and fusion of the regional parties, having the same aims, and suffering from the same barriers and obstacles which governments put in their way or weakness of means used in pursuance of this goal, as much as the nature of these parties and the nature of their aims which are directly derived from the position and mentality of disunity and which renounces all unification.

Thus, as there is a specific difference between the positive content (freedom and socialism) for splintered Arabism and between

the content of unified, perfect Arabism, so there is an essential distinction in the framework of this content, which is Arab Unity. While the divided advocates of unity consider unity as an automatic thing, attained through political unification when the circumstances are ripe and the opportunities arise, and requiring no prior disposition save political preparation through negotiation and maneuver, ideological preparation may not be - at best - a general proclamation of unity, making room for various improvisations, contradictions, and plans like those which have detracted the League of Arab States from unifying the programs of education, customs, passports, and diplomatic representation, and which since the foundation of the League 9 years ago, still remain as ink on paper without the realization of a single article. Thus, the League meddles in the realm of fruitless intellectual debate more than in the sphere of practical preparation. While unity resembles, according to this, a mechanical, superficial, and confused thing, lacking seriousness, and falling to the lowest degree of importance in respect to the regional worries which occupy, in practice, all their cares. Unity, in the view of the 'Arab Resurrection' Party is a fundamental, living idea, as much a part of its theory as are freedom and socialism; it has a basic, daily, ordered and continuous struggle, and it has its practical stages which increase in the force of the struggle and which prepare the road for ultimate victory.

Arab unity is an idea and a level (of development): It is not a consequence or result of the struggle of the Arab people for freedom and socialism; it is, rather, a new idea needing to accompany and direct this struggle...The idea of unity devises audacious, honest thoughts (revolutionary) and strenuous, enduring methodical deeds (struggling), and it unites the aptitude for practical ideology with the ability to achieve it...

Arab unity is an operation of struggle: as Arab unity is an essential idea, possessing a consciousness which must be explained and generalized until it inflames the souls and raises the ideology, so too it is an operation possessing an organization which must

govern and be enlarged until it dominates the circumstances and evolution; in fact, the circumstances do not serve it, and, on the contrary, evolution drives it toward a false crystallization of division. Thus, in the sense that it is effective and creative, struggling against the current and competing with time, Arab unity is a revolutionary ideology and an action of struggle. The attacks of colonialism and (Zionism) strengthen and support Arab unity. Colonialism does not need direct interference in order to counterfeit democracy and progress, thus division is guaranteed in that colonialism has perpetuated the position and logic of division, which stirs up enmity between the different parts, in order to exploit the divisiveness to attain some deceitful profits at the expense of other sectors. In this manner, and in spite of the unity of the Arab peoples' needs in all countries, the greater part of their struggle has been scattered and wasted.

Thus, the logic of division did not merely prevent similar movements in the Arab countries from uniting and cooperating, it also compelled them to be contradictory and inconsistent.

But it is in this manner that we arrive at the realization: the Arab people will not attain unity of struggle, if they do not pursue the struggle of unity." 4/

While the Second Basic Principle emphasizes the "Personality of the Arab Nation" as characterized by "abundant vitality and creative powers", the Third Principle relates this quality to the mission of the Arab Nation. With an aspiration toward "reviving human values, encouraging human development and promoting harmony and cooperation among the nations", the Party considers:

"I) imperialism and everything connected

4/ Aflaq, M.: op.cit.; (1953); p. 19-24.

- therewith a crime to be fought by the Arabs with all the means at their disposal. The Arabs further endeavor, with all their moral and material resources, to help all peoples fighting for their freedom;
- 2) humanity as one mass with common interests, values and civilization. The Arabs nourish and are nourished by world civilization, and stretch a brotherly hand to and cooperate with other nations in the establishment of equitable systems which guarantee for all people, comfort, peace and loftiness of character and spirit." 5/

The Arab reaction to colonialism is both natural and well-known. Michel Aflaq, however, goes on to describe and discuss some less-easily accepted aspects of the internal Arab situation which stand in the way of its mission. He then formulates, in general terms, the state which the Ba'ath desires for its own people, and concludes with a statement of the Ba'ath's ambition.

"If we enumerate the different national movements which arose in the Arab countries in response to foreign colonialism - and the ideological and social movements which arose in answer to the ills of Arab society - (for example, feudalism, sectarianism, regionalism, and intellectual reactionism, etc.) and (if) we look carefully at these movements together, we find one quality which unites all of them in spite of their differences and contrasts, and that quality is negativism ...

The national movements copy colonialism and its methods; the revolutionary, rebellious intellectual movements copy the state of stagnation in its absolutism, bigotry, and excesses; while the social movements which arose upon the late social and economic scene in the Arab countries carried the seeds of negativity...

5/Vide. Appendix; Third Principle.

Imperialism is an unnatural condition. Feudalism which is the exploitation of one group over another is an unnatural state. Sectarianism which represents the domain of superficial, insignificant ties over deep fundamental relationships is an unnatural condition. Regionalism, the prevalence of local, secondary qualities in one region over national qualities is unnatural. These states are all negative, and they have nothing of real life in them. They are rather the result of feebleness of life and its lassitude. When life is weak, the scum comes to the surface." 6/

" Indeed, we want to find that state which is satisfactory for the nation, itself, of which the society is confident, and which repudiates both the aberration of stagnation and rotten conservatism, and the aberration of purposeless, artificial progress, living in an atmosphere other than our own, and unable either to affect us or to provide us with any profit or benefit. As for the social and economic aspect, which is the most important area of concern for the 'national' movement, it is our duty to look toward and take into consideration a solution which is in accordance with the positive needs of the nation." 7/

" Brothers, our ambition is great; it is man's ambition and that of all noble people who feel their personality and know the meaning of their human existence. Our ambition is not confined to overcoming dangers and getting rid of enemies and their tyranny which has oppressed us for a long time; it doesn't stop at the extent of negativity, refusal and escape. It is, rather, in its depths, an active, constructive emotion which induces us to work, to invent, to regain once more our true response to life and to take part in building civilization, in cultivating the human values, in defending and embodying them truthfully both in

6/ Aflaq, M.: op.cit.; p. 10-11. (1948)

7/ Ibid.; p. 15.

our lives and in our behavior ... Who could return blood and life to these values devoid of their meaning and content in the West, except the peoples who suffered cruelty and tribulation and who deeply suffered the experience of pain? Thus, destiny prepared them to take their place and to be rewarded for their pains by showing these external principles and values as indispensable to man and life as well. Perhaps, fate will prepare all Asian and African peoples and all those who have suffered internal and external oppression to derive from this tribulation a mature result, not restricted to them only, but diffused to all humanity. That is why I have said that our ambition doesn't stop at driving the colonizers out of our country and putting an end to the internal exploiters, and that it doesn't stop at insuring freedom and prosperity to all. These are all means to set free the genius of this nation toward invention, toward participating seriously in bearing the human responsibilities...

We consider that we have entered the universal zone, and should play our role which has gone beyond the boundaries of our country and our nationalism. We must also face this positive future with confidence, optimism and courage."

8/

Having set out in broad terms the idealistic mission of the Party, the Constitution then turns to matters of a more specific nature. The first two General Principles designate both the area within which the Ba'ath shall operate, and the location for its headquarters. Article 3, on the other hand, touches on a most important aspect of the ARSP - its nationalism. Believing that nationalism is "an immortal reality", the Article indicates that national consciousness is that force which carries within it the power to bind

8/ Aflaq, M.: Fi Sabil al-Ba'ath (Toward Resurrection); (1957) p. 207-9/

the citizen to his homeland while imparting to him the incentive to shoulder heavy responsibilities and suffer great self-sacrifice. The Article concludes:

"The concept of nationalism which the Party upholds is inspired by the will of the Arab people to unite and be free, and be given the opportunity to make a place for Arab personality in history and cooperate with other nations in all matters that help in the steady advance of humanity towards comfort and prosperity." 9/

Michel Aflaq devotes considerable attention to this aspect of his Party's struggle, in that it depicts the motive force behind the movement. Nationalism, and particularly Arab Nationalism, is the sine qua non of the Resurrection, for without it there is no raison d'etre for Unity, Freedom or Socialism. In the following treatment, Aflaq first considers Arabism as an intrinsic quality, if not a synonym, of Nationalism, and then launches into a more detailed consideration of Nationalism, itself.

"... our understanding of Arabism differs greatly from the traditional concept. We believe that the dissemination of this new understanding in the midst of the people guarantees the people's support and consequently, the overthrow of rotten opinions and understanding, as well as ancient considerations. There are many concepts of Arabism or nationalism which create infinite problems that rend the people's unity, particularly at this stage in the situation of the people after centuries of delinquency. We are, therefore, in dire need of a true understanding of Arabism to

present to the world, to civilization and to human thought. Restrictive, fanatic nationalism is the greatest danger to us, because it nourishes differences instead of abolishing them. As a result of ignorance, hundreds of men are found in the Arab countries who adopted Nazi theory even before Nazism appeared. Arabism always found people who gave it a false image, being restricted to a certain type and number of people who boasted and lorded it over the others. It is natural that this reaction should happen and that racial minorities should feel that these arguments for nationalism constitute a threat to their existence. Therefore it was a reaction of Kurds, Armenians and Assyrians to fanatic nationalism. It was also a reaction of religion and creed: the call for Islam and the other sectarian calls were unsuccessful, as was the fanatic, despotic nationalism. Thus, how did we know Arabism in the beginning, and how can we find very strong guarantees for it, in order that it not collide with any obstacle of this kind, or become petrified, but rather that it be always open, evolutionary and human. To define Arabism and its extent is not sufficient. The basic thing in the subject is that we have explained our nationalism through socialism and the idea of freedom. These are the true guarantees when nationalism is inseparable from socialism and socialism is inseparable from nationalism."

10/

" I remember, in Syria twenty-five years ago, the leaders seldom mentioned the word Arab or Arabism. They used to find in the words Syria and Syrians an outlet to get out of many dangerous situations. They never utilized nationalistic expressions, but patriotic ones, intending that all Muslims and Christians, Arabs and the non-Arab minorities should gather under patriotism to face the foreign occupant. This continued

10/ Aflaq, M.: Fi Sabil al-Ba'ath (Toward Resurrection); (1955); p. 165-166.

until ten years ago when our movement obliged them, in the last resort, to adopt slogans of Arabism; but even now there sometimes appear expressions reminiscent of the old manner, such as Syrian nation." 11/

" Thus, we return to the definition of Arabism we understand and desire to achieve because it is the title, name and cover which bind the people into one and which enable them to discern their personality and mission in life, and so there is in it no inertia, petrification, or pride in ancestry and rank.

No one forbids the Kurds to learn their language, provided that they obey the laws of the state, and do not quarrel with the state; the Christian sects, for example, do not find themselves prohibited from practicing their religious rites and Christian culture within the overall Arab culture. Our understanding is utterly different from that of Nazi nationalism which believes in racial superiority which has special characteristics necessitating purification from everything and consequently oppressing all those who do not fulfill its conditions in terms of pride and special customs. Arabism is humanitarianism and thus, we understand our Arab nationalism because it is truly humanitarian in that it respects other nationalists and the feelings of all other people. But we do not say it is international, and this is the great difference between communism and ourselves. We consider communist humanitarianism artificial. Internationalism is an attempt to make every nation lose its personality and to bind everyone by mere synthetic economic bonds which failed, as did the religious state, due to the contradictions in them. Thus, ostensibly, the Marxian call to internationalism appears to be a product very akin to the attempt to form a religious state during the Middle Ages. The people

11/ Ibid.; p. 164.

are in need of a prediction because internationalism has failed and communist propaganda, day after day, leads to a road of rapid failure, as we have said, and because its attempt to weaken other peoples is a road to extinction. Yugoslavia, although socialist, was the first to shun internationalism in defense of its nationalism, because it did not wish to lose its personality. Thus we see in nationalism a true theory for there is true humanitarianism in genuine nationalism."

12/

" The expression, Arab nationalism, in today's common usage, is a mixture of ideas, political tendencies and emotions, of dregs and active and passive aberrations carrying it far from the true, creative meaning which it inspires. We, sometimes, see Nationalism as a current synonymous with fanaticism and expansion, and sometimes as a current bound to chains of race, religion and history, or equal to unity and refusing division, or to the unity of the peoples' struggle. And yet all these meanings - whether active or passive - are transitory, changeable and trivial. Nationalism is the only eternal, stable, comprehensive one.

The Ba'ath Arab Nationalism is self-evident reality that presents itself without any need for argument or struggle, yet the scope of disagreement and the necessity of struggle in those above are within the contents of this nationalism. This evolutionary content needs at every stage an adequate nationalistic theory. That is why there is no need to dispute whether we are Arabs or not, but must choose and limit the content of Arabism at the present stage. Is it reactionary or progressive? Could it become erect under colonization and despotism or does it require unity? Would it remain divided or is unity its fundamental condition?

Therefore, the Ba'ath, since its foundation, has differentiated between the 'Arabistic Idea' by which we mean Arab Nationalism, and between the 'Nationalist Theory',

and has said that the former is an eternal axiom, that it is a beloved value, for it is a love before everything. Whereas the latter is the evolutionary explanation of this eternal idea, according to time and circumstances. This (our) theory is represented today - according to our belief - by freedom, socialism and unity. Through this distinction, Arab nationalism makes room for all this rich reality extending throughout historical ages in all our countries. It embraces this history and is nourished by it, harmonizing its different elements to experience a consolidated entity. So, there is in this the common quality which gathers in elements and numerous historical epochs, without colliding with any of them.

We declare, therefore, that Arab nationalism is nationalistic as well as Arabistic; nationalistic in the sense that it has the primary conditions of every nationalism, and Arabistic because it has the special evolution of the Arab nation throughout various roots, civilizations and centuries. The common Arab quality which united all these ingredients is the one which has continued without interruption. The Arabic language has been the subject of this perpetuity, for language usually helps to accomplish unity in thought, principles and ideals.

In this meaning only, history has gained a value in our nationalism, our history in the first stage, and general history in the second. We don't put history into our nationalism to be merely an image or example, but because it is the vital soil in which our consciousness has grown, been revitalized and perfected until it reached the present stage, in which we can explain our positive nationalism in its entirety, and in which there is no place for discrimination, superiority, domination or isolation.

It isn't important that various active or negative meanings, such as race, religion and historical heritage, took part in fashioning this nationalism and meddled with it. What is important is the meaning which we deduce from all these in our present stage,

a stage of resurrection and creation of the future of the Arabs. What is important is that we know that this nationalism - which we have characterized by immortality because it is distinct from different contents which were expressed in it, itself, during the period, and in reaction to events and circumstances - doesn't mean immortality in an inert stage, but means perseverance and continuation to the lowest level of subsistence building upon it and weaving the different, renovated explanations around it. Thus, it is an everlasting creation; it is neither sterile nor a creation out of nothingness, but rather springs from vital experiences, for it is these which endow it with the energy and insure the perpetuity of its vitality and perfection. We, therefore, consider the present experience of the Arab nation the foremost and greatest value for this nationalism, because it is richer and more valuable than all the stages our nation lived through in the past. Consequently, the scope for renovation and creation is now open before it in all its extensiveness, that it might give to its nationalism the free and genuine meanings which its present experience reveals in all its depth and force, while giving its past experiences a new meaning. It is, in this sense, the creation of the future, as well as the past itself, and it - whatever the experience - will relinquish in the second phase, the active and passive meanings which habitually enter the construction of nationalism; it will rise above racial, religious and historical views as we avoid the barren international outlook.

The Arabs, today, do not desire for their nationalism to be racist, a desire which springs from their experience. They have experienced the meaning of racialism and iniquity.

The Arabs, today, don't want their nationalism to be religious, because religion has another aspect, a field which does not bind the nation, but which, on the contrary, divides a single people and bequeaths to them an impractical, fanatic

view, although there is no fundamental distinction between the religions.

The Arabs, today, do not wish for their nationalism to be historical. Arab nationalism doesn't deny the historical heritage of non-Arabs, that is to say, it (Arab Nationalism) does not clash with it. The Arab nation has a rich, vast, civilized heritage comprising the various civilizations which entered it and reacted to it, like the Egyptian, Assyrian, Babylonian, and Phoenician, etc. Thus, to profess Arab nationalism does not mean at all that we should disregard or renounce the Pharonic heritage, for instance. This is a superficial, and very misleading appreciation. Furthermore, Arab Nationalism does not mean being cut off completely from human civilization; on the contrary, it signifies a continuous reaction to it.

Our nationalism, in spite of this flexibility and this inclusiveness, must remain a nationalism possessing a personality of its own. In order to comprehend the ancient manifold and enumerated heritage, in order to react to human civilization, it must have a personality. We designate as Arabs that collection of men who have taken from the past those values and primary, essential conditions (necessary) for mutual feelings and common interests, but who do not stop at this point, which is like a zone of release from which to begin a new life, filled with all the humanitarian ideals which inspire it, or toward which present experience is impelled.

Nationalism, in its new understanding, is that which - while preventing the leap into fluid and barren universalism - safeguards against relapse and the return to small leagues. Thus, it preserves man's personality from dilution and contraction. Marxism calls for internationalism and considers nationalism degenerate, whereas it is, in reality, a progressive movement, because it has liberated man from the small band and raised him to more extensive relationships. It is maturity and its existence on humanitarian bases which renders it (Nationalism) of too great a value that it be destroyed or that man be compelled, syn-

thetically and superficially, (to adopt) universalism. In that case, man becomes lost in this world and needs gigantic, absolute faith to preserve himself and his faith in the role of "universal citizen." This, without fail, will lead man to a type of small league.

Nationalism, as we understand it, if free from the danger of being immersed in and of yielding to factors of environment and the local social circumstances. It is also free from the danger of being detached from the climate of complete life and free from falling into degradation, because in nationalism there is the reasonable limit of degradation that makes the Egyptian, the Syrian and the Yemenite, Arabs. This does not prevent the Arab from feeling that he is a man, that he has a mission in conjunction with the remainder of mankind, provided that he still remains an Arab. His connection and cooperation with others are fulfilled through his Arabic personality.

Lastly, our nationalism cannot fade away if we so wish, and yet, at the same time, cannot continue or be completely achieved without our will. It contains both the propensities for falling to pieces and being dispersed, as well as for unity, harmony and maturity.

Arab nationalism is neither a stage of mutual struggle nor a symbol of this stage, which will end with the termination of the struggle or its impulses, that every country may regain its particular personality. Some regard the success of the struggle as marking the end to Arab nationalism and to justify its existence. But, we see its end - if there is an end - in the failure of this struggle. It is more correct to say that: this failure is a relapse and retrogression of nationalism. However, we believe that the Arab countries are in a state of revolution, progress and emergence of their unified Arab personality, which increases in proportion to the success of their struggle.

This joint struggle today is, in real-

ity, the symbol of Arab Nationalism, resurrected and manifest once more. It is nationalism which created this struggle and, it is nationalism which nourishes it." 13/

Before turning to the problem of Socialism, it would first be advisable to discuss the characteristic of the Ba'ath Party which marks its struggle, and is inherent in its attitude toward the achievement of ultimate victory.

"The Arab Socialist Party, is a revolutionary party which believes that its main objectives - the revival of Arab Nationalism and the building up of socialism - can only be achieved through revolution and struggle, and that reliance on slow development and contentment with partial and superficial reform threaten these objectives with failure and loss. The Party therefore decides:

- a) to fight foreign imperialism for the complete liberation of the Arab homeland;
- b) to strive for the unity of all Arabs in one independent state;
- c) to rise in revolt against corruption in all spheres of intellectual, economic, social and political life." 14/

Sensing both the backwardness of the people, and the apparent unwillingness of the ruling classes to push forward, the

13/ Ibid.; (1957); p. 211-215

14/ Appendix; Article 6. The word "Revolution" used above comes from the Arabic "Inqilab" more usually translated as coup d'etat. Because both these terms have a political connotation, I have chosen to use the word "reformation" in its sense of removing faults and abuses and restoring to a former good state. (vide.; Webster: A Dictionary of the English Language; p. 711).

Party calls for a violent and complete kicking over of the traces. In essence, what they desire is not so much a revolution in the political sense as a total and drastic reformation of the existing society and the mores upon which it is presently based. As the above Article states, this change cannot be gradual for if it is the impetus for change will be lost, there will be an opportunity for the old forces to creep in, perhaps to reconstitute the previous social order of privileges and corruption, leisure and complacency.

"The opinion of the Resurrection Party toward our national problem rests on the principle that it is one question. Its solution depends on the realization of an Arab reformation (coup d'etat), a reformation in the deepest sense, not confined merely to policy, but also dealing with ideas and the spirit, social upbringing and the economic situation. Policy, in our view, is the expression of our revolutionary position to all these situations and conditions...If the policy does not always meet the needs of the true expression from all sides, then, undoubtedly, it is destitute of the instrumentality for this expression. Thus, whenever we say that the true solution to our national problem is a revolutionary, Resurrectionist solution, this simply means that the conditions which befell the Arabs a number of centuries ago - not merely since the beginning of foreign colonialism - and the situations which prevailed in our countries from hundreds of years past up to the present day, have not only created a gap and a very serious disfigurement in our national structure, but also a remoteness between the feelings of the Arab people and life itself, and consequently, didn't prepare our people to respond to the curses of life with a sound answer... Thus, the reformation represents the attempt to re-establish the sound, transparent response

between the people and the demands of life.

....
Indeed, the practical explanation of this revolutionary theory is that it is a struggle in the widest sense, i.e., the re-education of the nation that we may know how to face the troubles and so that we may draw upon its hidden forces and sleeping might in the friction, clash, and difficulties.

This struggle - as I have said - must be understood in its most extensive meaning. Thus, it is, at once, a struggle with foreign forces (which are at times Zionism, and at other times foreign colonialism). It is a struggle against the rotten conditions in the nation's interior, these situations and obstacles being political or social injustice, exploitation or ignorance, as well as weakness of thought and bigotry and shortcomings in love, tolerance and extent of ideas... When we summon patriots to struggle against these conditions, the object is not only to destroy these situations, but is - especially - to recall the people to the attainment of their genuine value and to set as their goal in this contest their realistic existence. Again, the struggle lies in the interior, and particularly between the disputants themselves. Then, it is most dangerous that the strugglers, charged with the creation of this reformation in the national life, be frozen by superficial understanding... for if they are, how can they stir up the others? Thus, the revolutionaries must be in a continual struggle with themselves, in order that they deepen and repeatedly examine their thought, being wary of misleading themselves, and in order that they avoid increasing any deviciveness or interruption in the course of their revolutionary thinking until they attain unalloyed clarity and complete sincerity."

15/

15/ Aflaq, M.: Mu'araka al-Masir al-Wahid;
(1956); p. 34-37.

"Our movement is one of Arab reformation. We have explained the relation between reformation and the quality of nationalism by saying that our reformation springs from our national bond, from our perception of the poverty and corruption of the present, and from the necessity to change it. To carry out the reformation returns to the nation its real meaning, while revealing (to it) its actual fitness, and its spirit and character of negativity. Now, we ask about the means of reformation. It is true that the reformation is an idea, but there first must be persons who understand it, believe in it, represent it and then realize it. Thus, reformation must possess living tools, human beings, who adopt it and struggle toward its realization. To the extent that their adoption of this idea is profound and their struggle toward it is genuine, reformation will be strong and complete. In this case, the reformation is an image of those who believe in it and work for it. It is neither a miracle descending from heaven nor an event stemming from the will or actions of men. This leads to the fundamental conclusion, that the reformation must first be realized in the souls of the few, who believe in it, who will preach it to the many, and who will work to achieve it in the whole nation. An indulgence in an honest portrayal of these virtues in the reformers' souls will threaten the movement with artificiality and failure. It would not be wise for us to demand that the nation rise to a standard we ourselves have not yet attained or proved that it is possible for others to attain.

Unquestionably, the obvious goal of reformation is to eliminate the synthetic conditions imposed on the nation and which pervert it, be they political, social or economic. But these conditions are apparent in individuals. They are, namely, a mentality of individuals, their interests and customs. It is these which make up these conditions, covet them and defend them. Thus it is impossible to combat these conditions except through the chinks of those who cling to them and benefit from them. Thus, the reformation movement certainly must stir up

"all those who submit to these corrupt conditions and must oppose them until there has been created in the nation a reaction to the disease, at which time free ideas, sound character, and perfect spirit will awaken. Reformation, then, has only a clear, manifest meaning: it is struggle and opposition to the prevailing mentality, character and interests. In point of fact, Resurrection is born of this struggle." 16/

The Party outlook on Socialism is viewed on two levels - the practical and the theoretic. Concerning the former, the Constitution employing generally accepted socialist precepts, lays down 14 Articles delineating the distribution of wealth, private ownership, public health, interest rates, and the position of the family. 17/

In the theoretical realm, however, Michel Aflaq discusses socialism in a far more doctrinaire manner opening with his own views on Socialism as an entity, followed by its relation to the Arab world and Arab Nationalism. He closes by contrasting the Socialism as envisaged by the Ba'ath with that of the Communists, which comparison provides further enlightenment as to the sought-for goals of the Arab Resurrection Party.

"Socialism, in a simple image as understood in its utterances, is that all citizens should share in their country's resources with the intention that they better

16/ Aflaq, M.: Fi Sabil al-Ba'ath: (1950);
p. 134-135.

17/ Vide.: Appendix. Articles 26-40.

"their life and consequently the life of their nation, because man, the individual, does not accept his rendering of himself an end in life. We see, even those of the basest character in manners and thought, an inclination and this need to make the aim of their life remote from personal interest. Thus, with greater reason, the dignified man who aims only for important results and fruition and socialism is able to understand also that it is a new economic theory which appeared in parts of the world in this age. Other definitions, rules and methods are known, but they all return to this simple definition which we have mentioned, and that is, all citizens must share in the resources of the country of which they are a part.

But we must understand that there is another meaning for socialism other than the particular meaning which appears in the West. It is a natural meaning justifying the human soul, mind and conscience, and is, therefore, a meaning which doesn't distinguish a nation by its essence and does not single out an age or period for itself. It is more general and permanent than a theory.

Realities are always simple. Is not the treasure of the sun a tangible reality, one of the simplest realities? What do we want of life for ourselves, for our people and for the land on which we live? Do we wish anything for it but good and progress? Do we wish anything for it save that it be one for whose needs we are responsible, and before which paths are open that it may reveal its talents, be enlivened, work and result in the aspects which will improve it and guarantee the ideals of this path for its children? Consequently, we wish our nation to be one where good, justice and active and refined production prevail. We want its social condition to be on the most refined form possible in art and science. This is what both the individual and the people as a whole wish, but how can this be attained?

"A minority of the people possess most of the wealth, dominate the authority, behave as they wish. They are not satisfied with this, but demand more. The natural result is that the majority are deprived of their rights...

Socialism, then, is neither a strange nor difficult thing to attain, although it comes from distant countries and has complicated theories. It is the simple, legitimate thing which every sound mind and living conscience demand. It is not possible for any person or group of men, sincere with his countrymen, and feeling genuine emotions toward his nation, to refuse the people their rights at the same time, because nationalism, which is the zeal for the national interest, and socialism are affirmed as being one entity.

The realization of socialism in the conditions of our life, is basic for the preservation of our nation and the maintenance of its prosperity. Should socialism not prevail, should we not be able to achieve social justice for every individual, and should the Arabs not become productive to the fullest extent of their ability, then all the speeches about Arab freedom and independence would be nonsensical and misleading.

The interest of nationalism, the preservation of the nation, its attempt to reach the civilized nations and to hold out against the strong current of international competition, are dependent upon the realization of socialism; in other words, to allow every Arab, without distinction, a tangible, productive reality, not an illusion." 18/

" If I were asked about the reasons for my inclination toward socialism, I would answer: the coveted object (represents) not an increase of manufactured wealth, but rather, (an increase) in the wealth of life. My interest is not that people be equal regarding the quantitative distribution of food, but that it be possible for every in-

"dividual to free his talents and abilities ... I do not look forward toward Socialism today merely as a means to satiate the hungry or clothe the naked. The hungry man is of no interest for^{me} in regard to the barrenness of his existence, but rather for the possibilities which lie within him, and which change the starvation without appearing. I don't see food as an end for man, but rather as a path toward his liberation from animal necessities, and toward his resolution to undertake the function of mankind.

Those who think of Socialism as a faith for compassion are completely mistaken. We are not monks, taking refuge in God's mercy in order to salve our consciences, disturbed at the sight of wretchedness and misery, until we are extolled in the depths of ourselves and we sleep peacefully. In our defense of the deprived masses, we do not ask them for charity, but rather for truth. The alleviation of misery does not interest us if it does not increase life's wealth.

If I were asked to define Socialism, I would not seek a definition in the works of Marx or Lenin, but would reply: 'Socialism is a faith of life and the triumph of life over death. Thus, it opens the door to action before everything, permitting the benefits and merits of mankind to open, release, serve and preserve the possessions of life for life, leaving nothing for death except rotten mean and decayed bones.' 19/

"The Arab nation is socialist because it is impossible to ensure for it a sound society unless it is based on a socialist foundation. Ba'ath Socialism is therefore suitable for a vital national society with its past, present and future tied to the land. It is an audacious and decisive socialism unlike the socialisms of speeches and addresses behind which Governors and statesmen take cover." 20/

" We have always said that socialism is not alien to Arab nationalism. Thus, when Arab

19/ Ibid; (1936); p. 21-22.

20/ Ibid; (1950); p. 96.

"nationalism is deeply and truly conscious of itself, when the conditions are favorable for genuine maturity and self-expression, you will find that socialism is indigenous to it.

I believe that this meaning differs from the widespread understanding which wishes to restrict the Arab quality of our socialism or the nationalist quality of any socialism to a provincial existence only, subject to the circumstances of time and place.

This is to say that the quintessence of socialism is one and invariable, but there are secondary modifications which occur unexpectedly when its fields of application are altered. It is this understanding which Marxism began to follow and proclaim. But this entered Ba'ath thinking from the beginning and yet it isn't everything.

I believe the second point is characteristic of Ba'ath thought: There is between our Socialism and our Nationalism a synonymy, disposition and mutual reaction that there is not a Socialism and a Nationalism. We merge them in order to attain a new form of nationalism, a nationalism which is socialism in the abstract, and in practice. If it were not socialist, it would lose its own existence.

Therefore, in specifying that our Socialism is Arab, in essence and in its support of our Nationalism, we provide the Arab people with an opportunity to regenerate in Freedom and contentment, and without weakness and external intimidation, their view toward mankind, character, history, policy, and the several fields of thought and action.

It results from our regard toward nationalism and our consideration of the Arabs as one indivisible nation and the Arab countries as one single homeland, that our call was always for socialism which needs the struggle of the whole Arab people for its achievement and needs all the Arab nations as a field of application. We did not believe at any time that genuine socialism could be realized in one single country; we have perpetually worked to prepare for this socialism to achieve improvement in each

country. Some Arab countries, at least, do not have sufficient economic pre-conditions for the establishment of sound Socialism. The communist movement, because it does not view the Arab nation as a unity, fell, theoretically at least, into contradiction when it promised the people to establish a socialist-type organization in a small country having neither industry nor sufficient economic subsistence. Therefore, communism falls into contradiction as a result of its disbelief in nationalism and the national unity, while binding our lives between the struggle in the Arab country and the universal struggle, leaping over the struggle in the other Arab countries.

Our socialism, built on a united Arab foundation has always preserved its reformatory (revolutionary) direction, for it has always relied upon the reality of the Arab nation, in its entirety, which is a revolutionary, reformatory reality of the first style. But if the expression of national unity be neglected, then socialism will not always be revolutionary in respect to all the Arab countries, because some of these countries are in a relatively privileged economic and social state or condition, and thus don't require a reformation, but are satisfied with improvement. Such countries may occasionally benefit by the state of division which colonialism and the reactionary class support and thus obtain synthetic economic gains which tend to weaken their need for a socialist revolution. Our movement is the only one which reveals this falsehood and artificiality because it regards these countries as parts of one body, and consequently demands for them all a single revolutionary socialism."

21/

" Socialism in the communist system does not confine itself to economic readjustment, but submits to aims and goals drawn from the communist system, in the sense that Communism - as a universalist theory - strives to achieve a complete revolution in the world situation. It is unable to

"apply this economic readjustment until it achieves this revolution. As long as this universal revolution cannot be achieved, the economic conditions in the communist countries submit to certain goals, restrictions and directives suitable to the policy of the communist movement; and include the preparation for war and competition with other nations...

Ba'ath Socialism confines itself to an economic organization which aims at a redistribution of wealth in the Arab world, at the laying of bases and rules for the economy insuring economic equality and justice for all the citizens, while, on the other hand, guaranteeing the realization of a complete reformation in production and its means...

The communist philosophy is supported on a basis of belief in materialism, and explains the evolution of history and societies in economic terms, thus being induced to disregard ideological philosophy and spiritual principles. The philosophy of the Arab Resurrection does not hold to this theory of materialism, but rather considers that ideological and spiritual factors are a great influence in the development of history and the progress of humanity, a matter which prompts the ideological and spiritual movements which appeared on Arab soil like 'Islam' being considered as not alien and non-contradictory to this theory.

The communist philosophy does not place much value in the individual, does not respect or glorify him. Rather, it permits the slaughter of his freedom for the sake of its material existence, because the society, in its theory, is the root. This outlook leads to dictatorship, to a mechanical, materialistic society lost to the spirit. It leads, further, to an imbalance between the individual and society, and between the Arab society and other societies.

Our socialism, however, relies upon the individual and upon the emancipation of his personality; it does not allow the killing of his personal freedom. It considers that all individuals are equal and that there is no place for an arbitrary dictatorship.

" Communist socialism went to the utmost limit of degradation and did away with the right of possession, and thus destroyed personal and instinctive motives in the individual. But Ba'athist socialism considers an abundant strength in the nation lies hidden in the personal impulses of the individual. Therefore, the Ba'ath preserved the right of property but restricted it by imposing heavy regulations and dispersing all the drawbacks which arise as a result.

Communism does not acknowledge inheritance, whereas our socialism does, because a citizen in a cohesive nation is unable to be deprived of that right. But we place restrictions on this right to preserve a theoretical picture in some conditions and significant abstract rights in order that the individual not be utilized or exploited for the sake of others." 22/

CHAPTER IV
Conclusions

In 1940, the Ba'ath Party was born; in 1959, it was all but dead. Its history was conceived as one of struggle, of reaction to internal and external factors repugnant to the Arab ideal, and thus to those who wished for their people a life in which man had some dignity and pride. Inspired and nourished by a keen sense of nationalism, the Party viewed its tripartite aims of Freedom, Socialism, and Unity as an entity, each portion being delicately in balance with and intrinsically dependent upon the other two. Motivated by a sense of those Arab qualities which once flourished proudly during the days of the great Muslim Empires, and urged into action by the prevailing situation, Michel Aflaq erected an ideological framework which was to serve as the guideline toward an Arab solution to an Arab problem. To be free, the Arabs must first perceive and understand the quality of their heritage and its inherent existence within themselves as individuals, and then unify these latent spiritual and moral propensities. This freedom is not envisaged as merely personal freedom from political tyranny and economic poverty, or individual nation-state freedom from colonial oppression. It is the freedom for the Arab peoples - unified in mind and spirit, united in Socialism, to exercise their own particular skills for the bene-

fit both of themselves and mankind, and to pursue their own, self-chosen objectives.

The Aflaq postulation of Unity is not merely political or economic; it is also the unity of purpose and spirit. It is not something which evolves after Freedom and Socialism, or "requiring no prior disposition save political preparation through negotiation and maneuver." Unity is present in the very nature of Arabs as Arabs, in their cultural heritage and common needs. That it is not, at present, a cohesive factor is attributed to the machinations of the colonial powers, and to the power of indigenous ruling groups bent on preserving their vested interests. The League of Arab States is not an expression of Unity, but rather, represents a loose-knit union of sovereign nations, and divergent personalities. The people must, then, struggle for its resurrection, and be warned that they will "not attain unity of struggle, if they do not pursue the struggle of unity."

To solidify both freedom and unity into an operative whole, Michel Aflaq turns to the theories of Socialism. Uniting all the Arab countries under democratic and economic principles, Socialism would provide that system best suited to the free exercise of Arab potentialities, talents and resources, on the one hand, while on the other, permitting to them the exercise of their rights of self-expression and free choice. Economically, Socialism would bring together

those countries whose lack of capital and resources renders them incapable of achieving prosperity, with those whose vast wealth would serve as an asset to the entire Arab nation. Politically, Ba'ath Socialism is not analogous with Communist Socialism and its doctrine of "Democratic Centralism", but reveals a greater affinity for that Socialism as practiced in Britain with its clearly defined system of political freedoms. In other words, Aflaq desired a system which could effectively regulate the economic potential of the Arab world, as a unity, but which would embody those principles preached by the West, and modified to fit the conditions extant in the Middle East, but which were, unfortunately, denied to the Arabs by the Mandate.

To bring to fruition these aims and desires, Aflaq formulates his theory of Ingilab. As mentioned in Chapter III, this term can be misleading in its English translation, for it means coup d'etat or revolution. In his thesis, it appears that the word can have both a literal and a symbolic meaning. Aflaq may well have had a political coup d'etat in mind in referring both to the French Mandate and the political domination of the privileged classes. On the social front, however, he calls for a revolution, or reformation of the entire social order and of the position of the productive forces within the society. Whichever sense was intended, Aflaq clearly desired an alteration that would be

swift and drastic, leaving no time for the coalescence of conservative forces and the resumption of control by the vested interests. At the same time, any reformation was deemed to be incomplete unless it contained elements which would reach into "ideas and the spirit" while redressing "the remoteness between the feelings of the Arab people and life itself."

Western observers who see the coup d'etat in the Middle East as merely a swinging of the political pendulum from one self-interested clique to another, occasionally resulting in some amelioration of poor economic conditions or abused political rights, are commentators who have not experienced the growing pains of a developing nation. They reap not the rewards of a struggle long past, and are thus quick to pass a judgment of "negativism" on such a policy as advocated by the Ba'ath. They tend to forget what one of their forefathers did not:

"Each generation has the right to choose for itself the form of government it believes the most promotive of its own happiness.

The idea that institutions established for the use of a nation cannot be touched or modified, even to make them answer their end ... may perhaps be a salutary provision against the abuses of a monarch, but is most absurd against the nation itself.

A generation holds all the rights and powers their predecessors once held and may change their laws and institutions to

"suit themselves."

1/

They overlook the hundreds of years during which democratic principles evolved. They neglect also the necessity of preparing adequate conditions for its unblemished acceptance as an operative philosophy and theory of government. Those democratic principles which appear in the Arab world either filtered in from the West through education and travel or were advocated by a colonial power which seldom offered the indigenous population constructive guidance in their application. That these ideals are incorporated in Ba'athist theory attests to their appeal for the Arab people. That the Ba'ath proposed an Inqilab demonstrates their keen and urgent desire to create both an atmosphere and environment for a democratic way of life.

To the Western mind, confident in its own national integrity and achievement, the Union of Syria with Egypt failed to realize the aims championed by the Ba'ath, for there can be little Freedom under military rule; there can be little spiritual Unity when unification has been dictated by the few; and Socialism, despite nationalization of the means of communication and finance, is far from fulfilled. To the Egyptian or Syrian mind, the situation might appear variously at different levels. The peasant, in that he re-

1/ Grimes & Morowitz; Modern Political Ideologies; a quote from Thomas Jefferson; p. 53.

ceives increased lands due to reform and, perhaps, better value for his crops as a result of price regulation, may be appreciative, if only from the materialistic standpoint. The middle class element, having a better grasp of Arab ideals and the problems which a united Arab people must face, will possibly regard the Union as a step in the right direction. The intelligentsia will be divided between those who believe in a republican government, and those who view the military dictatorship as a necessary evil through which to bring at least a segment of the Arab world together under stronger bonds than those of the Arab League. The problems posed here are undeniably over-simplified. There will always be a conglomeration of opinion in respect to such a momentous decision. In the strictest analysis, however, it is apparent that the Ba'ath settled for something far short of its ideal. There seem to be several reasons for this.

Aflaq continually speaks of the Arab people, or nation (ummah) in referring to Party aims. But he posed too great a problem for his audience. Tens of pages are used to make a single point, often couched in complicated verbal images and obtuse grammatical forms. In synthesis, the issues he raises are valid, and the ideals set forth, wholly justified. But, he is faced with the problem of presenting to a largely illiterate public a thoughtful and idealistic philosophy.

"This leads to the fundamental conclusion that the reformation must be realized in the souls of the few, who believe in it, who will preach it to the many, and who will work to achieve it in the whole nation." This recognition that their ideals and aspirations were too deep and complex to be fully understood and supported by the masses, explains in part the use of the strike and demonstration, both instruments needing little more than a tried and true slogan or whipping-boy such as colonialism or corruption, and both accepted tools for inculcating mass support. In so doing, however, the essential Arab ideal, the driving impetus behind the movement becomes lost in the clash of personalities or the battle of slogans, obscured by simple action and reaction.

The amalgamation with Akram Hourani and his Party, brought to the Ba'ath a personality skilled in political rhetoric and dynamic in appeal. While his popularity undoubtedly lent to the Ba'ath an increased measure of political prestige, his own apparent inclination for the short-term tactical success, coupled with mounting Ba'ath impatience to move forward, served to further compromise and dilute the long-term ideological objectives. This is exemplified in their acceptance of the Union's military dictatorship, an apparent denegation of Aflaq's precepts of Nationalism, which combine principles of Locke and Rousseau, ar-

iving at the conclusion that an individual's liberty, dignity and happiness are the basic elements in the national life, dependent upon the "general will" as expressed by a virtuous and united people. This could be expressed in much the same way by saying that:

"the most essential element is a living and active corporate will. It is this will which we call nationalism, a state of mind inspiring the large majority of a people and claiming to inspire all its members." 2/

Was the United Arab Republic, then, truly the first step toward the Arab Unity which the Ba'ath had striven and sacrificed to achieve? Did it fulfill, even in part, the prerequisites for the unity of spirit, aim and ambition of the Arabs? Were the people free from colonialism, and feudalism; were their talents, potentials, and energies free of the mundane, restricted and restrictive personal considerations which would hold them back in the achievement of a unified success? Were the seeds of democratic Socialism sown in soil ready to nurture them and to bring the Arab Nation into the full flower of economic, political and social life? Were the individual countries ready and willing to pool their spiritual and material resources for the common good?

These questions cannot now be answered; history must

2/ Kohn, H.: Nationalism: Its Meaning and History; p. 10.

run its course. Although the Ba'ath is, in the corporeal sense, no longer with the United Arab Republic, its ideas may still remain. If so, it has made a contribution to Arab progress. If not, then these words of Michel Aflaq's are prophetic:

"(Our National problem's) solution depends on the realization of an Arab reformation, a reformation in the deepest sense, not confined merely to policy, but also dealing with ideas and the spirit, social upbringing and the economic situation. Policy, in our view, is the expression of our revolutionary position toward all these situations and conditions ... If the policy does not always meet the needs of the true expression from all sides, then, undoubtedly, it is destitute of the instrumentality for this expression."

3/

3/ Aflaq, M.: Mu'arakat al-Masir al-Wahid; (1956); p. 34.

APPENDIX

Constitution of the
ARAB RENAISSANCE (BA'TH) SOCIALIST PARTY

One Arab nation with an immortal Mission
The Arab Renaissance (Ba'th) Socialist Party
A popular national revolutionary movement
Striving for
Arab Unity, Freedom and Socialism

STATUTES

BASIC PRINCIPLES

First Principle

Unity and Freedom of the Arab Nation.

The Arabs are one nation having a natural right to live in one state and to be free to direct its affairs.

The Arab Socialist (BA'TH) Party therefore considers:

- 1) the Arab homeland an indivisible political and economic unity and that no Arab country can live in isolation from another Arab country;
- 2) the Arab nation a cultural unity, and that all existing differences are incidental and false and will totally disappear with the awakening of Arab consciousness;
- 3) that the Arab homeland belongs to the Arabs who alone have the right to direct its affairs and utilize its resources and potentialities.

Translated from Arabic for Academic Use
by
The Department of Public Administration
American University of Beirut
Beirut, Lebanon
25 May, 1957

Second Principle

Personality of the Arab Nation.

The Arab nation has special characteristics reflected in its recurrent revivals, and is characterized by abundant vitality and creative powers and by being amenable to revival and development. Its revival is proportionate to the growth of the freedom of the individual and with the extent of the harmony between his development and the national interest.

The Arab Socialist (BA'TH) Party therefore considers:

- 1) freedom of speech, assembly, belief, and art as sacred things which no authority can diminish;
- 2) that the worth of the citizens should be assessed - after giving them equal opportunities - by the work they do towards the development and prosperity of the Arab nation, regardless of any other consideration.

Third Principle

The Arab Nation's Mission.

The Arab nation has an immortal mission which has manifested itself in renewed and complete forms in the different stages of history and which aims at reviving human values, encouraging human development and promoting harmony and cooperation among the nations.

The Arab Socialist (BA'TH) Party therefore considers:

- 1) imperialism and everything connected therewith a crime to be fought by the Arabs with all the means at their disposal. The Arabs further endeavor, with all their moral and material resources to help all peoples fighting for their freedom;
- 2) humanity as one mass with common interests, values and civilization. The Arabs nourish and are nourished by world civilization, and stretch a brotherly hand to and cooperate with other nations in the establishment of equitable systems which guarantee for all people comfort, peace and loftiness of character and spirit.

GENERAL PRINCIPLES

ARTICLE 1

The Arab Socialist (BA'TH) Party is an inclusive Arab Party with branches to be established in the different Arab countries. It does not tackle individual country policies except in so far as they affect Arab higher interests.

ARTICLE 2

The headquarters of the party shall for the present be in Damascus and may be transferred to another Arab city if the national interest so requires.

ARTICLE 3

The Arab Socialist (BA'TH) Party is a national party which believes that nationalism is an immortal reality, and that national consciousness which tightly binds the individual to his nation is a sacred feeling rampant with creative power, an incentive to self-sacrifice and the shouldering of responsibility, and a factor which constructively directs the human feeling of the individual.

The concept of nationalism which the party upholds is inspired by the will of the Arab people to unite and be free, and be given the opportunity to make a place for Arab personality in history and to cooperate with other nations in all matters that help in the steady advance of humanity towards comfort and prosperity.

ARTICLE 4

The Arab Socialist (BA'TH) Party is a socialist party which believes that socialism is necessary for Arab nationalism, being the ideal system which allows the Arab people to develop its potentialities and genius, enables the nation to increase its production, raises its morale and strengthens the ties of brotherhood among its members.

ARTICLE 5

The Arab Socialist Party is a popular party which believes that sovereignty is the property of the people, that the people alone is the source of authority and leadership, that the value of the state is measured by the support it receives from the masses and that its sanctity is contingent upon the freedom they enjoy in the choice of their government. In the fulfillment of its mission, therefore, the

Party relies on the people. It endeavors to establish close contact with them and makes concerted efforts to raise their intellectual, moral, economic and health standards in order to make the nation conscious of its personality and to enable its members to exercise their full rights in private life and as members of the nation.

ARTICLE 6

The Arab Socialist Party is a revolutionary ^{1/} party which believes that its main objectives - the revival of Arab nationalism and the building up of socialism - can only be achieved through revolution and struggle, and that reliance on slow development and contentment with partial and superficial reform threaten these objectives with failure and loss. The Party therefore decides:

- a) to fight foreign imperialism for the complete liberation of the Arab homeland;
- b) to strive for the unity of all the Arabs in one independent state;
- c) to rise in revolt against corruption in all spheres of intellectual, economic, social and political life.

ARTICLE 7

The Arab homeland is the region which is inhabited by the Arab nation, extending from the Taurus Mountains, to the Push-i-Kuh Mountains, to the Gulf of Basra, the Arabian Sea, the Abyssinian Mountains, the Great Desert, the Atlantic Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea.

ARTICLE 8

The official language of the state, the recognized language of the citizens, and the medium in both writing and education shall be the Arabic language.

ARTICLE 9

The flag of the Arab State shall be the flag of the Arab Revolution which broke out in 1916 for the liberation and unity of the Arab nation.

ARTICLE 10

An Arab is a person whose mother tongue is Arabic, who

- ^{1/} The Arabic word here is inqilāb, a term usually used to describe a coup d'etat.

has lived or who looks forward to living on Arab soil and who believes in being a member of the Arab nation.

ARTICLE 11

Every person who calls for or joins a racial alliance against the Arabs or who has immigrated to the Arab homeland for imperialistic purposes shall be ousted from the Arab homeland.

ARTICLE 12

The Arab woman shall enjoy the full rights of a citizen. The Party shall fight for the raising of the woman's standard so that she may be worthy of enjoying these rights.

ARTICLE 13

Equal opportunities in education and economic life shall be given to all citizens so that they may show their true and maximum aptitudes in all fields of human activity.

THE PROGRAMME

THE INTERNAL POLICY OF THE PARTY

ARTICLE 14

The system of government in the Arab State shall be a parliamentary constitutional system. The Executive authority shall be responsible to the legislative authority which shall be directly elected by the people.

ARTICLE 15

Nationalism shall be the only tie in the Arab State which ensures harmony among the citizens and facilitates their integration in one Arab nation. It fights all religious, sectarian, tribal, racial and regional fanaticism.

ARTICLE 16

The system of administration in the Arab State shall be a decentralised one.

ARTICLE 17

The Party shall encourage and spread the popular spirit (the people's rule) and make it a living reality in the life of the individual. It shall further endeavor to lay

down a constitution for the State which ensures for the citizens absolute equality before the law, the free expression of their will, and the proper election of their representatives, thereby ensuring for them a life of freedom within the limits of the law.

ARTICLE 18

A legislative program shall be laid down, with complete freedom, for the Arab State in harmony with the spirit of the present age, and in the light of the past experiences of the Arab nation.

ARTICLE 19

The judicial authority shall enjoy full immunity and protection and shall be independent of any other authority.

ARTICLE 20

Full citizenship rights shall be granted to every citizen who has lived on Arab soil, who is loyal to the Arab homeland and who has kept away from racial alliances.

ARTICLE 21

Military service shall be compulsory in the Arab State.

THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE PARTY

ARTICLE 22

The foreign policy of the Arab State shall be laid down in the light of the Arab national interest and of the immortal mission of the Arabs which aims at collaborating with other nations in creating a harmonious, free, secure and continuously progressing world.

ARTICLE 23

The Arabs shall fight with all their force to uproot imperialism, occupation and every foreign influence, whether political or economic, in their countries.

ARTICLE 24

Inasmuch as the Arab people alone is the source of every authority, therefore all treaties and agreements previously concluded by the governments and impairing full Arab sovereignty shall be cancelled.

ARTICLE 25

Arab foreign policy aims at giving a true picture of the will of the Arabs to live a life of freedom and of their sincere (desire) to see all nations enjoying similar freedom.

THE ECONOMIC POLICY OF THE PARTY

ARTICLE 26

The Arab Socialist (BA'TH) Party is a socialist party which believes that the economic resources of the country are the property of the nation.

ARTICLE 27

The present distribution of wealth in the Arab homeland is unjust, and should therefore be reconsidered with a view to ensuring the fair distribution of these resources among the citizens.

ARTICLE 28

All the citizens are equal in so far as the human value is concerned. The party therefore prohibits the exploitation of the efforts of others.

ARTICLE 29

Public utility institutions, major natural resources, and big production and transport facilities are the property of the nation to be operated by the state directly, and all foreign companies and concessions shall be cancelled.

ARTICLE 30

Under the supervision of the state and in agreement with its general economic programme, land ownership shall be limited according to the ability of the owner to cultivate it fully without exploiting the efforts of others.

ARTICLE 31

Ownership of small industries shall be limited in conformity with the economic standard enjoyed by the rest of the citizens of the state.

ARTICLE 32

Workers shall participate in the management of factories and shall, in addition to their wages which shall be fixed by the state, be granted a share of the profits, the percentage of which shall be fixed by the state.

ARTICLE 33

Ownership of buildings is open to all citizens provided that the latter shall have no right to lease and utilize them at the expense of others, and that the state shall guarantee a minimum ownership of landed property for all citizens.

ARTICLE 34

Ownership and inheritance are natural rights which shall be protected within the limits of the national interest.

ARTICLE 35

Usury among the inhabitants shall be abolished and one governmental bank shall be established for the issue of currency which shall be covered by national production. The bank shall finance essential agricultural and industrial projects.

ARTICLE 36

The State shall have direct control over internal and external trade with a view to abolishing exploitation of the consumer by the producer, protecting the trade, protecting national production from foreign competition and ensuring an equilibrium between exports and imports.

ARTICLE 37

An overall programme shall be laid down in the light of modern economic experience and theories, with a view to industrializing the Arab homeland, developing national production, opening new spheres for it and directing industrial economy in each country according to its potentialities and the availability of raw materials in it.

THE SOCIAL POLICY OF THE PARTY

ARTICLE 38

Family, offspring and marriage:

- (a) The Family is the nucleus of the nation and it is the duty of the State to protect, develop and make it happy.
- (b) Offspring is a sacred trust, of the family in the first place, and of the state in the second. Both should endeavor to multiply it, look after its health, rear and educate it.
- (c) Marriage is a national duty and the state shall encourage, facilitate and regulate it.

ARTICLE 39

Health of the community:

The State shall establish at its expense institutions for preventive medicine, sanatoria and hospitals, which fully meet the needs of all the citizens, and ensure for them free medical treatment.

ARTICLE 40

Labour:

- (a) Labour is compulsory for all able-bodied persons and the State shall ensure mental or manual labour for all citizens.
- (b) Income from work must ensure at least a decent standard of living for the worker.
- (c) The State shall guarantee the livelihood of all disabled citizens.
- (d) Equitable legislation shall be enacted, fixing the daily working hours for labourers, granting them a weekly holiday and an annual leave with pay, safeguarding their rights, ensuring social security against old age, and indemnity in respect of service-incurred partial or total disability.
- (e) Free trade unions for labourers and farmers shall be formed and encouraged so that they may become

a good means of defending labourers' rights, raising their standards, developing their efficiency, affording them opportunities for betterment, promoting the collective spirit among them and representing them in the high labour tribunals.

- (f) Special labour tribunals shall be established, on which the state, the labour unions and the farm workers shall be represented. These tribunals shall decide disputes arising between the labourers on the one hand and the factory managers or the state representatives on the other.

ARTICLE 41

The culture of the society:

- (a) The Party shall endeavor to provide for the Arab homeland a general, national, Arab, free, progressive, comprehensive and deep-rooted culture, humanitarian in its aims. It shall be spread among all classes of the people.
- (b) The state shall within the limits of the higher Arab national interest be responsible for protecting the freedom of speech, publication, meeting, the right of protesting and the freedom of the press, and shall provide all the facilities which ensure such freedom.
- (c) Mental labour is one of the most sacred kinds of labour and the State shall protect and encourage intellectuals and scholars.
- (d) Opportunities shall be provided - within the concept of Arab nationalism - for the establishment of clubs, the formation of societies, political parties and youth organizations, the encouragement of tourism, and the utilization of the cinema, broadcasting, television and all methods of modern civilization in spreading national culture and providing recreation for the people.

ARTICLE 42

Abolition of class differences and distinctions:

Class differences are the result of a corrupt social system. The Party therefore shall strive on the side of the persecuted working classes of the community until such dif-

- a good means of defending labourers' rights, raising their standards, developing their efficiency, affording them opportunities for betterment, promoting the collective spirit among them and representing them in the high labour tribunals.
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ARTICLE 42

Abolition of class differences and distinctions:

Class differences are the result of a corrupt social system. The Party therefore shall strive on the side of the persecuted working classes of the community until such dif-

ferences and distinctions are removed and all citizens recover their full human values and are given the opportunity to live under an equitable social system with no distinction between one citizen and another except in so far as mental efficiency and manual skill are concerned.

ARTICLE 43

Bedouinism:

Bedouinism is a primitive social state which weakens national production and makes of a big group of the nation a paralyzed organ which retards its growth and progress.

The Party shall strive for the settlement of the bedouins by giving them lands, abolishing tribal systems and applying the laws of the State to them.

THE PARTY'S EDUCATIONAL POLICY

The Party's educational aims at creating a new Arab generation which believes in the unity of the Arab nation and the immortality of its mission, a generation with a logical and scientific mind, free from superstition and reactionary traditions, saturated with a spirit of optimism, strife and cooperation towards the success of the general Arab revolutionary movement and the progress of humanity.

The Party therefore decides:

ARTICLE 44

That all features of intellectual, economic, political, development and technical life shall bear the stamp of Arab nationalism, so that the nation may resume its relations with its glorious history and look forward to a more glorious and ideal future.

ARTICLE 45

Education is one of the exclusive functions of the State. Therefore all foreign and private educational institutions shall be abolished.

ARTICLE 46

Education in all its stages shall be free for all citizens, and shall be compulsory in its elementary and secondary cycles.

ARTICLE 47

Vocational schools equipped with the most modern facilities shall be established, and study in them shall be free.

ARTICLE 48

The teaching profession and everything connected with education, with the exception of higher education, shall be restricted to Arab citizens.

AMENDMENT OF THE STATUTES

A separate Article - The Basic and General Principles shall not be amended. Other Articles of the Statutes may be amended with the approval of two-thirds of the members of the Council of the Party, when proposed by the Executive Committee, or by one-fourth of the members of the Council or by one-tenth of the members of the General Assembly.

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CORRIGENDA

Page 63:

- Paragraph 1, line 3 read "accidental" for "unnatural".
- " " lines 6-7 read "foreign" for "unnatural".
- " " line 9 read "alien" for "unnatural".
- " 3 line 8 read "limits" for "extent".

Page 66:

Line 15-18, read

"There was, therefore, a reaction to fanatic nationalism by the Kurds, Armenians and Assyrians and a reaction of creed and religion:"

for: "Therefore it was ... creed:"

Page 67:

- Paragraph 2, line 8 read "concept" for "understanding".
- " " line 16 read "humanistic" for "humanitarian".
- " " " " read "it is in such fashion that" for "thus".
- " " line 18 read "humanistic" for "humanitarianism".

Page 67-68:

Paragraph 2, last line read "The people need to foresee that internationalism ..." for "The people ... internationalism."

Page 68:

- Paragraph 1, line 4 read "vestiges" for "dregs".
- " " line 10 read "equated with" for "equal to".
- " " line 14-15 read "Nationalism is an eternal, stable, comprehensive entity." for "Nationalism ... one."

Page 69:

Line 2 read "destiny" for "value".

Page 69:

Line 3-7 read:

"Whereas, the latter is the explanation of this eternal idea, evolved according to time and circumstances, and is represented today -"

for:

"Whereas ... today -".

Page 71:

Paragraph 3, line 3 read "formless" for "fluid".

" " line 5 read "tribal fanaticism" for "small leagues".

" " line 11-12 read "bonds" for "relationships".

Page 72:

Line 3-4 read "needs gigantic faith for abstraction in order to preserve ..."

for "needs gigantic, ... preserve".

Line 7 read "tribal fanaticism" for "small league".

Line 15 read "abstraction" for "degradation".

Line 16 read "abstraction" for "degradation".

Page 76:

Line 31 read "Any" for "An".

Page 78:

Line 4 read "even in" for "even".