# A STUDY OF VERBALIZED ROLE CONFLICT AMONG A SELECTED SAMPLE OF ARAB UNIVERSITY STUDENTS

By

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ROLE CONFLICT AMONG ARAB STUDENTS

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#### Abstract

The present study is a partial replication of the Stouffer and Toby research on "Role Conflict and Personality" among undergraduate students in two United States universities. The original study sought to provide a link between the theories of institutionalization and personality. The present replication, based on a sample of 327 Arab students at the American University of Beirut, was conducted with the notion in mind that a replication of the original research in another culture might provide additional insight into the problem of how role-conflicts are resolved.

Both studies focus on a role conflict which Stouffer and Toby describe as "an especially" common one, namely, "that between one's institutionalized obligations of friendship and one's institutionalized obligations to a society." Specifically, what both studies are after, is to find out whether some people when faced with a variety of situations; all "involving conflicts between obligations to a friend and more general social obligations" manifest a tendency to choose the same solution to the conflicts.

Taking Parsons' "pattern-variable" of universalism particularism as alternative solutions for the dilemmas involving
conflicts between friendship obligations and more general social
obligations, we measured the tendency of the Arab students to make
consistently either particularistic (friendship obligation) or
universalistic (general social obligation) choices.

The data for this study were collected by means of a penciland-paper test administered during regular class hours in the students usual class rooms. In the questionnaire eight conflict situations were presented, four of them conflicts in academic situations and four in non-academic situations. Four forms of the questionnaire were used. In each form a different person is placed in the conflict situation. Thus in Form A the respondent is asked to imagine himself as being forced to make the choice between friendship and broader social obligations; in Forms B and C the respondent is asked to indicate how he thinks a cousin and a friend respectively would react to conflict situations in which the respondent would gain through their particularism. The Form D situations involve two strangers. The Sample consisted of 170 Sophomore and 157 Junior Arab males all taking General Education courses at the American University of Beirut. The responses of the sample were analyzed quantitatively on the basis of overall distribution along the universalism - particularism dimension for each situation and form of the questionnaire. Eight five-point Guttman scales were also devised, (one scale for each form of each set of situations) to measure the tendency or predisposition of certain individuals to choose one type of solution or the other.

Our general expectation was that in any situation in which obligations of friendship and obligations to a society were in conflict the Arab students who have been raised in a cultural milieu in which kinship and friendship obligations are presumed to be predominant would be more likely to choose the particularistic norm of the dilemma.

Contrary to our expectations, the Middle-Eastern respondents as a whole tended to choose the universalistic solution to the dilemmas rather than the particularistic. Furthermore, the Arab students tended to respond as universalisticly as the American students with respect to the four non-academic situations. However the responses of the Arab students did not scale in the same way as those of the Harvard and Radcliffe group.

We have suggested several interpretations for these unexpected results of the study. For example, they may be due to the circumstances under which the study was administered. It is possible that conducting the interviews in a classroom situation influenced the students to respond in terms of the more universalistic value orientations of the University rather than in terms of the standards of their indigenous culture group which purportedly give priority to particularism. In the last analysis, however, we are forced to conclude that further research is needed to arrive at a satisfactory understanding of our findings which so markedly contradict our expectations.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Pages
Acknowledgements	iv
Abstract	٧
CHAPTER I - ROLE CONFLICTS AND CULTURAL VALUES .	1
Introduction	1 5 9
CHAPTER II - MIDDLE EASTERN INSTITUTIONS PAST AND PRESENT	14
Religious Institutions	14 17 19 22 24
CHAPTER III - METHODOLOGY	27
Hypotheses	28 30 30 30 30 30
CHAPTER IV - PRESENTATION OF RESULTS AND ANALYSIS OF THE DATA	39
The Sample	39 39 41 42
Study The non-academic Situations The Scale Patterns of Responses Effect of risk Recapitulation The Instrument The Administration of the Instrument The Extreme Group The Distribution of Responses	48 48 50 52 55 56 56 58 65

	Pages
CHAPTER V - SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS .	81
APPENDICES	
A. THE QUESTIONNAIRES	85
FORM A FORM B FORM C FORM D	85 95 103 111
B. RESPONDENTS: Background characteristics and current status	119
Respondents <sup>†</sup> ages by class	119 120 121
class	122 123 124
home by class  Language usually spoken by parents at home by academic class of respondents Type of high school of respondents attended	125
by class	127 128 129 130
C. RAW DATA	131
Percentage of Arab male sophomores giving particularistic responses to the first 6 situations by form Percentage of Arab male juniors giving	131
particularistic responses to the first 6 situations by form	132
particularistic responses to situations 7 and 8 by form Percentage of Arab male juniors giving	133
particularistic responses to situations 7 and 8 by form	134
D. CODE BOOK	135

		Pages
E. 30	CALOGRAMMS	141
	Scalogramm pattern for respondents to first four items, for form "A"	141
	four items, for form "B"	142
	Scalogramm pattern for respondents to first four items, for form "C"	143
	four items, for form "D"	144
	Scalogramm pattern for respondents to academic items, for form "A"	145
	Scalogramm pattern for respondents to academic items for form "B"	146
	academic items for form "C"	147
	Scalogramm pattern for respondents to academic items for form "D"	148
CITED	SOURCES	149

E<sub>1</sub>

# LIST OF TABLES

Table		Page
1	Distribution of particularistic responses of Arab male respondents to all situations	43
2	Distribution of x <sup>2</sup> scores showing the difference between each situation and the others with respect to universalism	45
3	Distribution of $x^2$ scores between each pair of forms	47
4	Comparative percentages of particular- istic responses for the first four situations for the American group and the American University group	49
5	Distribution of Arab males giving 7 or more responses of one kind by age	60
6	Distribution of Arab males giving 7 or more responses of one kind by nationality	61
7	Distribution of Arab male giving 7 or more responses of one kind by time spent at A.U.B	62
8	Distribution of Arab males giving 7 or more responses of one kind by community of origin	63
9	Distribution of Arab males giving 7 or more responses of one kind by father's occupation	64
10	Summary table presenting composition of responses all forms and situations combined by universalism and particularism	69
11	Composition of responses to situation 1 by particularism and universalism	71

Table		Page
12	Composition of responses to situation 2 by particularism and universalism	71
13	Composition of responses to situation 3 by particularism and universalism	72
14	Composition of responses to situation 4 by particularism and universalism	72
15	Composition of responses to situation 5 by particularism and universalism	73
16	Composition of responses to situation 6 by particularism and universalism	73
17	Composition of responses to situation 7 by particularism and universalism	74
18	Composition of responses to situation 8 by particularism and universalism	74
19	Composition of particularistic responses for each form all situations combined	77
20	Composition of universalistic responses for each form all situations combined	78

## LIST OF CHARTS

Chart		Page
I	Percentage of respondents choosing particularism in situations 7 and 8, by respondents scale type, with respect to the non-academic	
	situations	53
II	COMPOSITION OF RESPONSES	67
	<ol> <li>"Definite" responses predominate</li> <li>"Some right" responses</li> </ol>	67
	predominate	68
	<ol><li>"Conflict" responses predominate</li></ol>	68

#### CHAPTER I

#### ROLE CONFLICTS AND CULTURAL VALUES

#### INTRODUCTION

The research reported here represents a partial replication of a "modest pilot study" of "Role Conflict and Personality" among undergraduate students in two United States universities. The original study sought to provide a link between "the study of social norms...and the study of personality." This even-more-modest replication, based on a sample of Arab students at the American University of Beirut, was undertaken with the notion in mind that replication of the study in another culture might well provide additional insight into the problem of how role conflicts are resolved.

The original study, conducted by Samuel A. Stouffer and Jackson Toby and reported in an article published in the American Journal of Sociology, March 1951, focused on a role conflict which the authors note is "an especially common" one, namely, "that between one's institutionalized obligations of friendship and one's institutionalized obligations to a society."

S.A. Stouffer and J. Toby "Role Conflict and Personality" in T. Parsons and E. Shils (Eds.), <u>Toward a General Theory of Action</u> (Cambridge, Massachussets: Harvard University press, 1951), pp. 481-494.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 481.

S.A. Stouffer and J. Toby "Role Conflict and Personality"

American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 56, (1950-51).pp.395-406.

S.A. Stouffer and J. Toby "Role Conflict and Personality" Parsons and Shils (Eds.), op. cit., p. 481

In their research, Stouffer and Toby were seeking an answer to the following general question:

"...when there is a lack of consensus in a group regarding the 'proper thing to do' in a morally conflicting situation, is there a tendency for some individuals to have a predisposition or a personality bias toward one type of solution and for other individuals to have a predisposition toward another type of solution?"

Specifically they wanted to find out whether some people when faced with a variety of situations, all "involving conflicts between obligations to a friend and more general social obligations", are more likely to honor friendship obligations while others are more likely to honor obligations to a society.

They reasoned that such a tendency might be expected as a result of "the intrinsic variability of particularistic obligations." In reporting their study, Stouffer and Toby explain their reasoning as follows:

The obligations of friendship in Western culture, to use the terminology of Talcott Parsons, are particularistic rather than universalistic, affectively toned rather than affectively neutral, and diffuse rather than specific. A universalistic obligation is applicable to dealings with anybody (for example, obligations to fulfill a contract); a

l<u>Ibid.</u>, p. 481.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 482.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup>Ibid., p. 482.

particularistic obligation is limited to persons who stand in some special relationship to one (for example, the obligation to help a relative or a close friend or neighbor). Diffuseness of particularistic obligations provide flexibility in the definition of these roles. That is, the content of an individual's particularistic obligations (toward a friends, a brother, a grandchild) depends in part on the intimacy of the relationship itself. The greater the affection, the greater the obligation. On the other hand, universalistic obligations are defined more rigidly, for they regulate behavior toward all human beings--regardless of affective involvement. Hence, in any specific situation involving conflict between duty to a friend and duty to a society, we would expect that some individuals are more prone to regard the particularistic obligation as taking precedence than others, because there is variability from individual to individual in the intimacy of friendships. That is, respondents tend to project into the hypothetical situations reference friendships drawn from their own experience. 1

Their data, based on "a short pencil-and-paper questionnaire completed by 648 undergraduate students at Harvard and Radcliffe, provided support for their expectation. When presented with the problem of choosing between friendship and more general obligations in a variety of hypothetical situations, some students manifested a tendency to choose one solution to the conflict while others manifested the opposite predisposition.

While reading the report, I was surprised by the fact that only 23 percent of the American students gave precedence to friendship obligations in one of the four situations for which data are reported.

Ibid., p. 482. Italics added.

I was much less surprised by the report that 70 percent of the students chose particularism over universalism in another of the situations. However, I was curious as to what the results might have been if Stouffer and Toby had posed similar problems for Arab students. Considering the oft-repeated remark that friendship and kinship obligations are more important to the Easterner than to the Westerner, I suspected that a higher proportion of Arab students would manifest a tendency or predisposition to honor friendship obligations if confronted with the same or similar conflict situations than American students.

This notion inspired the research reported in the following pages. More specifically, the general aims of the replication were:

- students at the American University of Beirut" according to a predisposition to select one or the other horn of a dilemma in role conflict." In brief, to test Stouffer and Toby's general suggestion based on data collected from undergraduates in the United States that: "...it is possible to classify people according to predisposition to select one or the other horn of a dilemma in a role conflict."
  - To investigate the possibility that the cultural milieu in which individuals are socialized will influence their

<sup>1 &</sup>lt;u>Ibid.</u>, p. 494.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 494. Italics added.

predisposition toward one type of solution rather than another, <u>i.e.</u>, toward that type of solution more compatible with the dominant value of the culture in which they were raised.

My general expectation was that, in any situation in which obligations of friendship and obligations to society were in conflict, the Arab students who have been raised in a cultural milieu in which kinship and friendship obligations are reported to be predominant would be more likely to choose the particularistic horn of the dilemma than American students who have purportedly been raised in a cultural milieu in which kinship and friendship obligations are less emphasized.

## Theoretical orientation

The Stouffer-Toby study which provides the model for the research presented here was "inspired" by the efforts of Talcott Parsons and his colleagues to delineate "a system of categories which may unify theories of culture, society, and personality." One of its major aims was investigation of "the possibility of operational definitions of certain types of role obligations" suggested by Parsons. Although this aim is not central to the present replication, Parsons concepts do provide the theoretical orientation around which the repeated study was designed.

<sup>1 &</sup>lt;u>Ibid.</u>, p. 479.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 481.

According to Parsons, every society can be analyzed into three interdependent but analytically distinct systems:

- 1) The "cultural system", which includes the "system of ideas", the "system of expressive symbols" and the "system of value orientations." 1
- 2) The "social system", which represents the totality of individual relationships of the members of society. As such, the "social system" has a large variety of role systems which are organized in accordance with the "cultural system."
- 3) The "personality system" which represents the role-behavior and role expectations of the individuals in their relationships with each other. Ideally, the three systems work in harmony because they are inter-related and interdependent with each other.<sup>2</sup>

Through the process of socialization, the individual members of society internalize the value-orientations of their culture and thus are able to institutionalize their "need-dispositions" in accordance

<sup>1 &</sup>lt;u>Ibid.</u>, p. 8.

<sup>2&</sup>quot;With the institutionalization of culture patterns, especially value-orientation patterns, the threefold reciprocal integration of personality, social system and culture comes full circle." Ibid., p. 26.

with the cultural-values and with the structure of the "social system."

In our research we are dealing with people living in two social cultural systems at the same time. The first of these systems is that in which they have been socialized since childhood, that of their indigenous culture. The value-orientations of this culture have been described as emphasizing primary relations, an orientation that will be referred to later as particularistic. The second system in which our study group lives and in which it has been recently socialized is that of the university. The value orientations of this latter system are thought of as emphasizing secondary relations and giving preference to general social obligations. These orientations will be referred to later as universalistic. The value-orientations of the two "social systems" mentioned above being different may involve the individuals into "role conflicts."

These "role-conflict" are the products of: (1) on the cultural level a conflict in the value orientations of the two systems, (2) on the social level a conflict of roles and (3) on the personality level a conflict between the "need-dispositions" of the individuals and the role expectations set by the structures of the two different social systems.

The term "Role-Conflicts" has been used to refer to this very fact that any ego is usually involved at different times, or even at the same time, in several different social structures or institutions and that the sorts of behaviors expected of him in these different social structures or institutions may be incompatible. Edward C. Tolman. "Value standards; pattern-variables; social roles; personality" in <u>Ibid.</u>, p. 350.

In such a case, there are three alternative behavioral orientations that our study group may adopt: (1) to behave in accordance with the values of their cultural group, (2) to take an intermediate position between the value-orientations of their culture and those of the university or, (3) to behave in accordance with the values of the university.

Further, Parsons holds that every individual before acting is confronted with a "choice" situation in which various alternative solutions are possible. In our study, as in the original, Parsons' "pattern-variables" will be used to describe the value patterns and normative orientations of the cultural and social systems of our study group and the role expectations and role behavior of the individuals. 2

This phrasing is not intended to convey the notion that the choice is either conscious or deliberate. In fact, one of the aims of socialization is to communicate to new members of a group the choices appropriate for their positions in the group <u>i.e.</u>, to train them in appropriate role behavior.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>"The pattern variables delineate the alternative preferences, predispositions, or expectations...in the personality system. The pattern-variables describe essentially the predispositions or expectations as evaluatively defined in terms of what will below be called ego-organization and superego organization...In the case of the social system, they are crucial components in the definition of role-expectations. Culturally they determine patterns of value-orientation..."T. Parsons and E.A. Shils "Categories of Orientation and Organization of Action", in <u>Ibid.</u>, p. 79.

## The "Pattern-Variables"

Parsons has provided five "pattern-variables" which as a whole give a complete description of the value-orientations, normative patterns and role expectations and behavior in any culture.

A pattern-variable is a dichotomy, one side of which must be chosen by an actor before the meaning of a situation is determinate for him, and thus before he can act with respect to the situation. We maintain that there are only five basic pattern variables and that, in the sense that they are all of the pattern variables which so derive, they constitute a system. 1

The Stouffer-Toby study and our own are mainly concerned with one of these five "pattern-variables", namely, universalism - particularism. <sup>2</sup>

l Ibid., p. 77.

 $<sup>^2</sup>$ The other four "pattern-variables" are: (1) Affectivity -- Affective neutrality: Affectivity is related to the immediate gratification of impulses while affective neutrality is related to the renunciation of such gratification in the interest of discipline. (2) Self-orientation -- Collectivity orientation: Selforientation is seeking personal gratification and pursuing one's private goals, while collectivity orientation is giving preference to the goals and values shared with the other members of society. (3) Ascription -- Achievment: This pattern-variable describes the dilemma of the actor in deciding how to treat an object. Ascription is treating an object on the basis of what it is, while achievement is treating an object on the basis of what it does or might do. (4) Specificity -- diffuseness: Specificity is responding to a restricted range of aspects of the object while diffuseness is responding to many aspects of the object. See Ibid., pp. 80-83.

Particularism is treating an object in accordance with its standing in a particular relation to the actor, while universalism is treating an object in accordance with its standing under a general norm. In other words it may be referred to as a conflict between friendship obligations and more general social obligations. Since the concept of universalism -- particularism is crucial to our study, we have quoted the authors' definition fully.

This dilemma of transcendence versus immanance can be resolved by giving primacy to norms or value standards which are maximally generalized and which have a basis of validity transcending "any" specific system of relationships in which ego is involved, or by giving primacy to value standards which allot priority to standards integral to the particular relationship system in which the actor is involved with the object.

a - <u>Cultural aspect</u>. (1) universalism: The normative pattern which obliges an actor in a given situation to be oriented toward objects in the light of general standards rather than in the light of the object's possession of properties (qualities or performances, classificatory or relational) which have a particular relation to the actor's own properties (traits or statuses). (2) particularism: the normative pattern which obliges an actor in a given type of situation

to give priority to criteria of the object's particular relations to the actor's own properties (qualities or performances, classificatory or relational) over generalized attributes capacities or performance standards.

- b Personality aspect (1) universalism: a needdisposition on the part of the actor in a given
  situation to respond toward objects in conformity
  with a general standard rather than in the light
  of their possession of properties (qualities or
  performances, classificatory or relational) which
  have a particular relation to the actor's own.

  (2) particularism: a need-disposition on the part
  of the actor to be guided by criteria of choice
  particular to his own and the object's position in
  an object-relationship system rather than by criteria
- c Social system aspect. (1) universalism: the roleexpectation that, in qualifications for memberships
  and decisions for differential treatment, priority
  will be given to standards defined in completely
  generalized terms, independent of the particular
  relationship of the actor's own statuses (qualities
  or performances, classificatory or relational) to
  those of the object. (2) particularism: the role-

defined in generalized terms.

expectation that, in qualifications for memberships and decisions for differential treatment, priority will be given to standards which assert the primacy of the values attached to objects by their particular relations to the actor's properties (qualities or performances, classificatory or relational) as over against their general universally applicable class properties."

Although as noted above, all of the "pattern-variables" are required to provide a complete description of the choice alternatives emphasized in the cultural, social and personality systems, we shall restrict our discussion below to only one "pattern-variable," universalism -- particularism, as it relates to the three systems.

In the next chapter we shall examine materials descriptive of "traditional" and current Middle eastern institutions in an attempt to determine the predominant value-orientations with respect to universalism --particularism. In the third chapter we shall describe the instrument which was designed to provide information about the role behavior and expectations of our study group when facing situations which involve conflicts between friendship obligations and more general social obligations. In the fourth chapter we review the findings of the pencil-and-paper test that was discussed above in

<sup>1 &</sup>lt;u>Ibid.</u>, pp. 81-82.

order to determine the current role-behavior and role-expectations of the Middle-Eastern students with respect to universalism - - particularism.

The specific problem that we will be dealing with is this: on what side of the pattern will the Middle Eastern students stand when facing a dilemma which involves conflict between friendship obligations and more general social obligations?

#### CHAPTER II

#### MIDDLE-EASTERN INSTITUTIONS PAST AND PRESENT

In the following discussion, only those aspects of traditional institutions which have direct bearing on the particularism - universalism dichotomy will be considered.

The Middle-Eastern culture is predominantly Islamic and its institutions largely possess the same characteristics of the pre-Islamic ones. Islam added only to them the sacred aspect of a religious sanction.  $^2$ 

## Religious Institutions

The Middle-East, saw the birth of the three monotheistic religions: Judaism, Christianity and Islam. For the traditional minded people of these three religions, the will of God is omnipotent. For the Muslim, "the destiny of man in this life and in the hereafter

The countries considered in this discussion are: Lebanon, Syria, Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and its neighbouring countries, Sudan and the North African states, Turkey, Israel and Iran are excluded inasmuch as they are not Arabic speaking societies.

See E.A. Speiser, "Cultural Factors in Social Dynamics in the Near East," S.N. Fisher (Ed.), Social Forces in the Middle East (New York: Cornell University Press, 1955), p. 11.

was made to depend upon the unchangeable decree of the wise and merciful God. . . . Obedience and resignation to the will of God is also a Christian principle, as is the belief in predestination in a monotheistic theological system. \*I This fatalistic understanding of the relation of God to men could explain the particularistic attitudes of the Middle Easterner towards his own religion. Traditionally religion was a prime bond between the members of the community because it gave them a sense of identity. Religion ascribed to them their position in society and their scope of interaction. In other words, religious ethnocentrism led the Middle Easterners to adopt universalistic attitudes towards the in-group members of their community and particularistic attitudes towards the members of other religious communities. Sumner states in this respect, that:

The relation of comradeship and peace in the we-group and that of hostility and war towards others-groups are correlative to each other. The exigencies of war with outsiders are what make peace inside, lest internal discord should weaken the we-group for war... The closer the neighbors, and the stronger they are, the intenser is the warfare, and then the intenser is the internal organization and discipline of each. Sentiments are produced to correspond.

R.N. Anshen, "West Returning to East," R. N. Anshen (Ed.), Mid-East: World Center, Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1956), p. 364.

Loyalty to the group, sacrifice for it, hatred and contempt for outsiders, brotherhood within, warlikeness without - all grow together, common products of the same situation. These relations and sentiments constitute a social philosophy. It is sanctified by connection with religion.

The Middle Easterners with this respect presented a combination of particularistic and universalistic attitudes towards the other members of society, because they saw their religious ethics as social ethics. Although religion still fulfills the same functions in today's Middle Eastern culture, it has acquired a new meaning. R.N. Anshen states in this respect,

the dominant classes sank comfortably onto their soft pillows without fear of any change in the theocratic regimes. The intellectual class, a rather small group mostly influenced by western ideas, found now a dynamic substitute in the awakening of nationalism and of pan-Islamism. 3

As a summary we may state that the universalism found within the religious communities is merely an extension of particularism in the Middle Eastern religious institution.

W. G. Sumner, Folkways (Boston, U.S.A.: Ginn and Co., The Anathenaeum press, 1911), pp. 12-13.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>"To be a Muslim means to accept a revelation as to how life should be organized... The central message of Islam, as understood by its standard exponents, has been about society and the organization of political, social and moral power. Islam is a religion of ethics including social ethics." W. C. Smith "Islam confronted by Western secularism," D. S. Franck (Ed.), Islam in the Modern World (Washington D.C.: Middle Eastern Institute, 1951), pp. 22-23.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup>R. N. Anshen, <u>op. cit.</u>, p. 365.

# The Family Institution

The present day Middle Eastern family retains approximatively the same power and importance as the ancient Arab family. The traditional Middle Eastern family was patriarchal and its head had authority over the members of the household. Usually, the father and his married sons lived under the same roof for social as well as economic purposes. The extended family formed a very cohesive unit. Loyalty to the family was the most praised virtue. The kinship bonds were strong and the individual members of the clan were bound by honor to avenge their relatives. Intermarriages between cousins were the rule. Within the tribe as well as within the family, traditionally, meach individual had his secure position. As long as he was its recognized member... he could expect protection even as his cooperation and participation was expected and taken for granted. A man was born into this community and only by his own misdeeds could he

See H. Gaudefroy-Demonbynes, Moslem Institutions (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1950), pp. 127-128.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>See H. Ammar, <u>Growing up in an Egyptian Village</u> (London: Routlege and Kegan Paul Ltd. 1954), p. 44, 73.

See also: A. Jeffery, "The Family in Islam", in R. N. Anshen (Ed.), The Family: its Function and Destiny (New York: Harper and Brothers publishers, 1949), p. 65.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup>H. Ammar, op. cit., p. 47, 73.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup><u>Ibid.,</u> p. 48.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup>See A. Jeffery, op. cit., p. 68.

loose this birth right.\*\* This protection was also extended to non-family members provided they were the friends or were under the protection of a clan member.

An outsider could be received into the tribal fold by being granted protection by one of its members. This relation was sacred and his person inviolate. Whoever attacked him did so at his risks, for his protector was honorbound to stand up for him with all his influence and power. 2

The Modern Middle Eastern family, seems to retain some of the characteristics of the traditional one, I. Lichtenstadter states in this respect that:

The father's authority over his sons and daughters is still intact; In case of his father's death, the eldest son feels responsible for the welfare of his sisters and brothers, as his representative successor in authority. The respect for the oldest and wisest member of the large family circle is still great. These factors work for the coherence of a particular family group.

Even where the ancient institution of the 'extended' family is dying out, as has happened in cities, the relation between the members of a family unit is still very close. Blood relatives retain a strong feeling of responsibility for each other, marriages within the

<sup>1.</sup> Lichtenstadter, <u>Islam in the Modern Age</u> (New York: Bookman Associates, 1958), p. 36.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup><u>Ibid.</u>, pp. 36-37.

family circle are frequent in urban and all but habitual in rural environment...1

The family as an institution in the Middle East provides its members with protection, recognition and security, but in return demands from them strict obedience and loyalty. The norms of such an institution are particularistic in orientation. These particularistic orientations are focused on the family but not limited to it. There is an Arab proverb which says: "my brother and I against my cousin, my cousin and I against a stranger." In view of the unshaken loyalty to the extended family system, it is expected then that such a particularistic orientation will not only manifest itself within the limited confines of a given household, but may very well extend beyond family lines, and latent functions of this institution seem to promote particularism. However from the point of view of the out-group, the end effect of such particularism, is the welfare of the "in-group".

# Political Institutions

Without any painstaking efforts, one can readily observe similar manifestations of particularism within political institutions.

<sup>1</sup> Ibid., p. 119.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>A. Freiha, Modern Lebanese Proverbs (Beirut: American University Publications of the Faculty of Arts and Sciences, Oriental Series No. 25, 1953), p. 141.

As is the case perhaps with all other institutions, the cultural heritage of traditional Islam has had a perceptible effect in this direction.

According to Lenezowski, political institutions in Middle Eastern countries have certain common characteristics.

The first of these is the heritage of Islam, which in one way or another affects the political system of the overwhelming majority of these states. Another is a long tradition of aristocratic government that goes far back to the pre-Islamic era of the Middle East's history. The third is the memories (or actual presence) of foreign, mostly western, domination and influence. Most of the Middle Eastern Societies are somewhat uneasily balanced between the two opposing forces: The force of tradition, principally expressed by the influence of Islam upon the private and public life of their members, and the force of modernism as represented by the impact of the west. I

During the Turkish domination, the bulk of the population had no contact with the Turkish rulers or armies. Only the people living in the coastal areas where the garrisons were stationed, were in contact with them. The government's action was limited and social power was exercised by the local landlords. These local landlords were practically autonomous and their rule was hereditary. 2

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>G. Lenczowski, "Political Institutions," in R. N. Anshen (ed.), op. cit., p. 118.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>See A. Hourani, <u>Minorities in the Arab World</u> (Oxford: Oxford University press, 1947), pp. 16-17.

There were spheres of social and individual life with which the government did not try to interfere, and which could therefore be regulated by the customs of one's nation or the precepts of one's religion... The government imposed its will in the provinces by feudal delegation....its power of creating feudatories was limited and it was compelled to adjust itself to the facts of social power, to accept the existing leaders of tribes and communities and to deal with the individual members of the community through their leaders only, not directly.

Due to this feudal organization, Middle Easterners did not develop a national feeling, their loyalties remained in the families, clans or small communities; their particularistic attitude toward governmental institutions was manifested by their attachment and loyalty to the person of the ruler who was in direct contact with them. This tradition had its roots in the tribal organization of the pre-Islamic culture. Within the tribe, "the Arabs had leadership .... Their leaders were freely elected on the strength of their character, their outstanding courage and mature judgement. Their followers willingly acknowledged this leadership and submitted to it."<sup>2</sup>

Although this tradition seems to be dying in the present political institutions, political particularism is still manifested in the recognition of the minority groups by the constitutions and

<sup>1 &</sup>lt;u>Ibid.</u>, p. 17.

I. Lichtenstadter, op. cit., p. 36.

their representation in the governments.

Confessionalism is expressed by two sets of arrangements: (a) by recognizing the religious community councils as entities of public law; (b) by granting the religious minorities the right of separate representation in the legislative and in one case executive branches of the government.

As is evident from this discussion, particularism appears to be the primary orientation of the traditional and modern Middle Eastern political institutions. The lack of national consciousness that existed in the traditional institution, was the product of religious ethnocentrism and feudality. Further, at present, the universalism found in the awakening of nationalism in most of the Arab countries may be regarded as an extension of religious particularism.

# The Economic Institution

A cursary examination of the salient features of economic institutions, also indicates certain particularistic tendencies.

Considering the close and functional interdependence of all institutions within the society, any particularism within the economic sphere could after all, be considered an extension, a reflection of particularism in family, religious or political institutions. We need not here to go into endless detail, suffice it to say that the economic life of the Middle East was and still is largely based on two interdependent

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>Ibid., p. 155.

activities, namely: agriculture and trade. Traditionally, the merchant was the main representative of the economic institution.

For the urban population he buys and redistributes the agricultural products of the rural workers. For the rural population he collects the vast range of goods that are indispensable to the rather specialized rural economy. He plays, therefore, a crucial role ... because his is the one function that intersects the ways of life of all other members of the society. I

The bazaar was the typical economic center of the Middle Eastern economic life. The flourishing of trade in the Middle East, was due in part to the influence of the Islamic religion. The doctrine of Islam sanctions private property, and motivates the individual towards free enterprise and the accumulation of wealth. Thus for the Muslim, trade and the pursuit of self-interest are positively sanctioned by the values of his religion. In this respect, his attitude towards economic life is particularistic. But Islam, being a code of social ethics, imposed some limitations to this particularism. Islam encourages competition and free enterprise as long as it benefits the welfare of the community at large. Although at present, trade is still a major constituent of the Middle East's economy, it is no longer

D. Potter, "The Bazaar Merchant," S. N. Fisher (ed.), op. cit., p. 101.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>See M. A. Al-Araby, "Economics in the Social Structure of Islam," <u>Islamic Review</u>, Vol. XLVII, No. 6, June 1959, p. 6.

<sup>3&</sup>lt;u>Ibid.</u>, p. 7.

the only one, industry and large commercial firms are disputing its primacy. The small familial enterprises, which employed people on the basis of familial ties or friendship, are growing larger, and thus becoming more heterogeneous. Bureaucracy is growing and one of its inevitable results is a decline in particularism. This is only natural since, "bureaucratic organization requires a 'disinterested' impersonal devotion to a specialized task and a readiness to fit into the rational requirements of a complicated scheme of coordinated specialized activities regardless of tradition."

In the face of such impersonal, secular and rational trends, it is expected that if Middle Eastern economic institutions are to adopt themselves to changing needs, they must by necessity give more heed to universalism.

# Educational Institutions

Traditionally, education in the Arab World was religiously oriented. The Muslim population received education from the mosque schools and the Christian population from private religious community schools.<sup>2</sup> As in the political institution, confessionalism appears to be the basis of the particularistic orientation of education in the Middle East. Even today, parents continue to choose schools on

T. Parsons, The Structure of Social Action (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1949), p. 515.

See J. Heyworth-Dunne, An Introduction to the History of Education in Modern Egypt (London: Luzac and Co., 1937), pp. 6-7.

the basis of religion, i.e., Maronite and Catholic children tend to go to French religious schools. Moslems to Muslim schools, and Protestants to British or American schools. Traditionally, the task of education was to form good and religious citizens. The members of a given religious community were brought up according to its ethical and moral codes and they were also prepared to fulfill their station in life according to their family and religious standards. Although education today does not fulfill the same functions, it seems to retain, the particularistic orientation of the traditional institutions.

In summary, it seems clear from our discussion, that the value orientation of the main Middle Eastern institutions are universalistic within the in-group and particularistic for the out-groups. However we should bear in mind that this universalism of the in-group is but the product of particularism within the group. A good example of the frame of reference of such universalism is the large extended family or clan. For the outsider, the clan forms a cohesive unit, although within it the different "jibs", or sections, are particularistically oriented towards each other. Thus these orientations may come into conflict. This conflict may be accounted for by the fact that these orientations

See H. G. Roberton, Education and its Progress in the Middle East: A survey of the Middle East school systems, prepared for the Trans-Arabian pipeline Co., September, 1953, p. 33.

are: (1) particularistic when the relations are within the group and (2) universalistic within the group as compared to relations outside the group.

#### CHAPTER III

#### METHODOLOGY

The main problem of this study 1 is to find out on which side of the pattern Middle Eastern students will stand when facing a dilemma which involves conflict between friendship obligations and more general social obligations. In the first chapter we presented the theoretical framework that will enable us to study the tendency of these people to respond in one way or another. That is, to choose either a universalistic or a particularistic solution to the dilemma. In the second chapter we have presented descriptive materials about the Middle Eastern institutions in order to find out what the major value orientations are with respect to the universalism — particularism dichotomy. The universalism — particularism mpattern — variable will be used in this study to describe the choices of the respondents, and by that see the conformity or deviation of these responses from the assumed cultural patterns of the Middle Eastern society.

Since this thesis is a replication of the Stouffer and Toby study, "Role, Conflict and Personality" conducted at Harvard and Radcliffe universities in 1950, a presentation of the original research will not be necessary. However departures from the original study design are indicated where they occur.

S. A. Stouffer and J. Toby, "Role Conflict and Personality" American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 56, (1950-51), pp. 395-406.

#### Hypotheses

The following hypotheses are derived from this theoretical framework and from the descriptive materials presented in Chapter two.

 The Middle Eastern respondents tend to favor particularistic friendship obligations more than universalistic social obligations.

The greater the affection between two individuals, the greater the sense of obligation, therefore in situations involving conflict between obligations to a friend and obligations to society, some individuals are more likely to consider particularistic obligations as more important than universalistic ones. By virtue of the nature of particularism, we may expect particularistic responses to decrease with increasing social distance from the actor. We expect, therefore, that particularistic responses will be greatest when ego gains from cousin, next when ego gains from friend, next when friend gains from ego and are minimized when a stranger gains from a stranger. The second hypothesis therefore reads as follows:

 The particularistic responses are maximized in the groups where a relative faces the dilemma,

The original hypothesis as stated by Stouffer and Toby is: "we would expect that some individuals are more prone to regard the particularistic pbligation as taking precedence than others." Ibid., p. 482.

next when a friend faces the dilemma, and next when ego faces the dilemma, and are minimized when a stranger faces the dilemma.

With respect to the risk factor, we hypothesize that:

3. Increased risk tends to minimize particularistic responses. The greater the social distance from ego, and the less ego stands to gain, the greater the effect of high risk.

Repeating the study in a culture presumed to be more particularisticly oriented provides an opportunity to state a final hypothesis based on the described differences between the American and Middle Eastern cultures.

4. The Middle Eastern students are more likely to make particularistic choices in situations involving conflicts between friendship obligations and social obligations than are American students.<sup>2</sup>

The risk factor is introduced in situations 7 and 8.

The meaning of this variable is discussed later in the chapter during the presentation of the instrument.

The 1st, 2nd and 4th hypotheses are not included in the original research, but have been devised for the purpose of the present study.

#### Collection of the Data

The Sample: The universe from which the sample was selected is the Arab male sophomore and junior Arts and Sciences students of the American University of Beirut. The sample consists of 327 Arab males: 170 from the sophomore class and 157 from the junior class. All the respondents were taking General Education courses; the study group approximates a census; missing are those absent from class or not taking General Education.

Administration of the questionnaires: The questionnaires were administered to the respondents during the second General Education discussion session for the second semester of the academic year 1960-61. General Education classes were selected because the course is compulsory for juniors and sophomores enrolled in the School of Arts and Sciences, and hence include the largest number of these students. Fifteen minutes of the class period were allocated to this study. The questionnaires were collected at the end of that period irrespective of their state of completion. No information was given to the respondents as to the purpose of the study.

The Questionnaire: The data is based on answers to a questionnaires completed by 327 respondents. 3 In the questionnaire,

The sample of the original study was composed of 648 undergraduate students from Harvard and Radcliffe. The proportion of students in each class was not specified. the authors add that they do not claim representativeness for the sample.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>In the original study the students were all taking a course in social relations.

See Appendix A for the complete text of the four forms of the questionnaire.

a common role conflict situation is presented to the respondents; namely one in which a choice must be made between institutionalized obligations of friendship and institutionalized obligations to society. Eight such conflicting situations were presented, the first four deal with every-day situations and the last four with academic situations. I The respondents were asked to answer two questions after reading each situation. The first question asked him to indicate the right the party involved had to expect a particularistic response. This may be considered a measure of the respondents role expectations. The second question asked the respondent to indicate how he felt he would actually behave in such a situation. This may be considered a measure of his role behavior.

The questionnaire was written in four different versions, here called Forms A, B, C, and D.<sup>2</sup> Due to a clerical error, the form A questionnaire received by the respondents differed in one situation from the form designed for the study.<sup>3</sup> The effects of this error will

In the original study, the first four situations were presented at one meeting and the last four, i.e., the academic situations, were given at a second meeting.

Form B was not presented in the original study.

As a result of the clerical error mentioned above, the content of situation one as presented in Form A is identical with the content of situation one in Form C. In the study design all Form A situations were phrased so that the respondent is asked to imagine himself as facing a conflict between ohligations to a friend and broader social obligations. As presented to the respondents, situation one in Form A depicts a friend of the respondent as being faced with the necessity of making a choice between friendship obligations and broader social obligations. That is, in this Form the first situation was cast in the version appropriate for Form C in which the respondent is asked to indicate how a friend would react to a situation in which the respondent stood to gain or lose by his friend's response to the particular universalism—particularism dilemma.

be discussed in the next chapter. With the exception of this one situation, Form A presents conflict situations in which a friend of respondent would gain from a particularistic choice of the respondent. Form B presents situations in which the respondent would gain from a cousin's particularism; in Form C the respondent would gain from a friend's particularistic choices; and Form D presents situations where a stranger would benefit from the particularism of another stranger.

Form C of the questionnaire reads as follows:

1. Your close friend is riding in a car which you are driving, and you hit a pedestrian. He knows that you were going at least 60 Km an hour in a 35 Km an hour zone. There are no other witnesses. Your lawyer says that if your friend testifies under oath that the speed was only 35 Km an hour it may save you from serious consequences. What right do you have to expect your friend to protect you?

Check one:

I have a definite right as a friend to expect him to testify to the lower figure.

The complete questionnaires for all situations and forms are presented in Appendix A.

Minor modifications in the wording of this situation (changing speeds from miles per hour to kilometers per hour) and others have been made in order to preserve the meaning for Middle Easter respondents. For the exact wording of the original situations see Stouffer and Toby, op. cit., pp. 483-484, 486-487, and 489-490.

I have some right as a friend to expect him to testify to the lower figure.
 I have no right as a friend to expect him to testify to the lower figure.

What do you think he would probably do in view of his obligations as a sworn witness and his obligation as your friend?

Check one:

 Testify that you were going 35 Km an hour.
 Not testify that you were going 35 K an hour.

Your close friend is a Beyrouth Show critic. You have sunk all your savings in bringing a new show to the Casino. Your friend thinks the show is no good.

What right do you have to expect your friend to go easy on your show in his review?

What would you think he would probably do in view of his obligations to his readers and his obligation to you as a friend?

3. Your close friend is a doctor for an insurance company. He examines you. You need more insurance. He finds that you are in pretty good shape except for two minor points he finds difficult to diagnose.

In this and subsequent situations the alternatives presented have been omitted for the sake of brevity. For the exact form of the questionnaire see Appendix A.

What right do you have to expect him to shade the doubts in your favor?

Would your friend shade the doubts in your favor in view of his obligations to the company and his obligations to you?

4. Your close friend has just come from a secret meeting of the board of directors of a company. You will be ruined unless you can get out of the market before the board's decision becomes known. It happens that your friend is having dinner at your home this same evening.

What right do you have to expect your friend to inform you?

Would your friend tip you off in view of his obligations to the company and his obligation to you as a friend?

5. Your close friend is employed by Professor X to mark examination books in his course. You make somewhat under a passing grade. If your friend gives you a special break he can boost you over the passing line. You need the grade badly.

What right do you have to expect your friend to give you a special break?

Would your friend give you this special break in view of his obligations to the university and his obligations to you as a friend?

6. Your friend is in charge of the reserve desk at a library.

A certain reserve book is in heavy demand. You are pressed for time and you can only use the book at a certain hour. You suggest that he

hides the book for a while before your arrival so that you will be sure to get it. You need it badly:

What right do you have to expect your friend to hide the book?

Would your friend hide the book in view of his obligations to the

Library and his obligations to you as a friend?

7. Your close friend is proctoring an examination in a middlegroup course. There is also another extremely conscientious fellow
in the examination room with him, and your friend is running a fiftyfifty risk of exposure by him to the authorities for failing as a
proctor to turn in a cheater. He sees you cheating, and you notice
that, and when he passes by you, you whisper to him: "O.K., I am
caught. That's all there is to it."

Under these circumstances, what right do you have to expect your friend not to turn you in?

Under these circumstances what do you think your friend would probably do in view of his obligations as a proctor and his obligations to you as a friend?

8. Your close friend is proctoring an examination in a middlegroup course. He is the only proctor in the room. About half way
through the exam he sees you openly cheating. You are copying your
answers from previously prepared crib notes. When you see that he has
seen the notes as he walks down the aisle and stops near the seat, you
whisper quietly to him: "O.K., I'm caught. That's all there is to it."

Under these circumstances what right do you have to expect your friend not to turn you in?

Under these circumstances what do you think your friend would probably do in view of his obligations as a proctor and his obligations to you as a friend?

In the situations 7 and 8 of the questionnaire the factor of risk is introduced. Situation 7 in forms C and D involves high risk because the respondent is running a fifty-fifty risk of exposure to the authorities due to the presence of a second proctor in the room, while situation 8 involves low risk because the respondent is proctoring alone. The risk situations are reversed in forms A and B. That is Forms A and B presented the low risk situation first, and C and D the high risk situation first. Thus half of the respondents answered the low risk question first and half the high risk question first.

Inasmuch as this questionnaire is a quasi-projective technique, it is based on the assumption that the respondents are able to, and do, imagine themselves in the situations pictured in the stories and respond to them veridically. In replicating the study in the Middle East, the important question to examine is: are the situations described in the original study common in the Middle East? And are they sufficiently known by the students to be meaningful? In the first set of conflicting situations, the first and fourth situations could be easily imagined by the Near Eastern respondents. Car accidents are frequent, and business service and the passing of

privileged information almost a rule. However the second and third situations involving the drama critic and his friend and the insurance doctor and his friend may not be too meaningful to the Middle Eastern respondent because life insurance and theatre productions are relatively new in this part of the World. But this should not prevent us from using those questions; the validity of these responses can be checked by comparing them for consistency with the other responses of each individual. Since all respondents are university students, the four academic situations should present no problem. All of the respondents should be reasonably well acquainted with these situations.

Statistical measurements: Our statistical measurements aim at analyzing quantitatively the tendency of the respondents to choose either the particularistic or universalistic solutions to the dilemmas that were presented to them in the questionnaires. The predisposition of the individuals to choose either solution are presented in scalogramms for each form of the questionnaire and each set of questions. The responses were classified particularistic when the respondent indicated that his friend had a definite right to expect

The responses of the original study were classified on a five-point scale for each form and set of questions. The four non-academic situations were presented in one scale and the four academic situations in another.

assistance. Responses were classified universalistic when the respondent indicated that his friend had no right to expect personal consideration. However, if the respondent indicated that his friend had some right, the answer is indeterminate. The coding of such answers was determined on the basis of the replies to the behavioral indicators. Those persons who indicated that their behavior would be in line with friendship obligations were coded as particularistic, while those who indicated that they would behave in accordance with more general social obligations were coded universalistic. Thus, all responses were coded as being either universalistic or particularistic.

See Appendix D for the code book.

#### CHAPTER IV

### PRESENTATION OF THE RESULTS AND ANALYSIS OF THE DATA

#### The Sample

The sample consists of 327 Arab males enrolled in General Education courses at the American University of Beirut. The respondents come from two academic classes: 170 are sophomores and 157 juniors. In the following pages we will give a description of the sample according to current status and background characteristics.

Current status: The average age of the respondents in each class is 20.5 years of age. Among the sophomores, 85.4 percent of them fall in the 19-22 years of age bracket as compared with 75.8 percent of the juniors in this same respect. The youngest respondents are 18 years old and the oldest 33. The two classes are homogeneous with respect to the age distribution. The sample's population is composed of nine different nationalities: Lebanese, Syrians, Egyptians, Jordanians, Palestinians, Iraqis, Arabs (Arabian peninsula), Sudanese, and North Africans. The majority of the respondents come from four sizeable nationality groups: 41.9 percent are Lebanese, 22.9 percent

See Appendix B, Table 1.

Jordanians, 11 percent Palestinians and 9.2 percent Sudanese. As should be expected, 63.5 percent of the sophomores have been at the university for two years and 72.5 percent of the juniors have been at the university for three years. In all 79.5 percent of the respondents have spent 2 or 3 years at A.U.B.. It was also found that 19 percent of the sample were students in their first year at the university and .9 percent were in their fourth year. Due to university regulations, more sophomores are living on campus than juniors. However a sizeable proportion of students from both classes live off campus (75.4 percent of the sophomores and 94.3 percent of the juniors). Among the juniors living off campus, 58.6 percent live with their parents, while only 37.1 percent of the sophomores living off campus live at home.

Most of the respondents are majoring in sciences or business. The percentage of science students in both classes amount to 42.1 percent and that of business students to 26.3 percent. This accumulation of people in these majors may be due to the fact that the respondents are all males.

See Appendix B, Table 2.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>See Appendix B, Table 3.

University regulations oblige the sophomore students if aged below 25, to live on campus. See Appendix B, Table 4.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup>See Appendix B, Table 5.

Background Characteristics: Slightly more than 80 percent of the respondents come to the university from urban areas, and of these only a minority come from towns. This should not amaze us since urban residents have greater access to preparatory schools. Since the sample was restricted to Arab students (i.e., students with Arab nationalities) it is not surprising that most of the respondents (83.5 percent) and most of their parents (82.0 percent) usually speak Arabic at home. However nearly an eighth of the respondents indicated that they usually spoke another language at home and thirteen percent indicated that their parents do not usually speak Arabic. The majority of the respondents (60.7 percent) have graduated from private high schools and a minority (26.3 percent) from government high schools. This may be due to the fact that government schools are new institutions in the Middle Eastern countries; traditionally, educational institutions were in the hands of religious organizations.

Only 24.5 percent of the fathers and 7.1 percent of the mothers of the respondents have college education. On the other hand, 10.7 percent of the father's and 24.4 percent of the mother's have no education at all. The bulk of the parents have either primary or

See Appendix B, Table 6.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>See Appendix B, Table 7.

See Appendix B, Table 8. Thirteen percent of the respondents did not answer this question.

secondary education. The respondent's fathers occupations are varied: 33.4 percent are self-employed, 23.1 percent are employees, 8.3 percent are independent professionals, 6.4 percent are farmers and 6.9 percent are unemployed or retired. The largest occupational group is that of self-employed people such as merchants, businessmen, and small plant owners and the smallest occupational group is that of farmers.

#### The Data

The following tables will present the distribution of the responses of the Arab males to the situations along the particularistic dimension. Since there are only two ways of classifying the responses, the presentation of any one of them is enough, because the alternatives are exclusive. The sum of the particularistic and universalistic responses amounts to a hundred percent. For the classification of responses, the "no answers" were discarded for each situation. 3

See Appendix B, Table 9-10,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>See Appendix B, Table 11.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup>Some respondents answered to situation No. 1 but not to No. 2; to situation No. 4 but not to No. 5. So the total number of responses was not the same for each situation and form.

Distribution of particularistic responses of Arab male respondents

TABLE 1

to all situations

	• <del> </del>		SI	SITUATIONS					
FORMS	1	2	3	4	5	9	7	8	Total
A Percent	18.8	30.8	27.0	40.5	32.5	30.0	19.5	29.0	78 6
Number	(82)	(84)	(82)	(84)	(83)	(80)	(72)	(76)	(649)
B Percent Number	30.5	31.0	28.8	41.3	21.4	25.9	9.1	12.3 (81)	25.4 (673)
C Percent Number	20.8	39.5	27.8	43.0 (72)	34.7	21.6	27.9	25.4	30.2
D Percent Number	35.5	37.7	36.0	61.8	36.4	38.7	14.7 (68)	22.2	35,7
Total Percent Number	26.4 (318)	34.5	29,8	46.4 (319)	31.0	29.1	17.2	22.0	29.8 (2474)

\*AX The numbers in parentheses are the total number of responses per situation.

The risk factor is introduced in situations 7 and 8. Forms A and B of situation 7 and C and D of situation 8 represent the low risk i.e.; (one proctor in the room) while forms C and D of situation 7 and A and B of situation 8 represent the high risk, i.e.; (two proctors in the room). The respondents who answered the forms A and B responded to the low risk situation first, the other half, who answered the forms C and D, responded to the high risk situation first. The major conclusion that we can draw from the preceeding table is that in all situations and for all the forms the percentage universalistic responses are larger than the particularistic responses in the approximate proportion of 2.5 to 1. As a total percentage for all situations and all forms combined, we have 29.8 percent particularistic responses and 70.2 percent universalistic. That is, more than two thirds of the respondents choose the universalistic solution to the dilemmas. In other words, even though friendship obligations are particularistic, the respondents give preference to universalistic or broader social obligations. Our first hypothesis stating that the Middle Easterners give preference to particularistic obligations cannot be supported. However, the nature of our sample does not allow us to generalize to the whole culture.

Due to the error, situation 1 in forms A and C is identical. A chi-square test revealed that. There is no difference in the distribution of particularistic and universalistic responses to situation 1 of the two forms. We obtained  $x^2 = .092$  (1 df) .95 > P > .90.

TABLE 2

Distribution of x<sup>2</sup> scores showing the difference between each situation and the others

# with respect to universalism (all forms combined)

Situations	2	က	4	5	9	7	8
1	$x^2 = 9.01$	$x^2 = .89$	$x^2=27.46$	$x^2 = 1.89  x^2 = .57$		$x^2 = 7.2$	$x^2 = 1.65$
	(P= .001)	(,5>₽,3)	(P<.001)	(.2>P.1) (.5%)3)	(.5XP.3)	(Pz.01)	(.2>P>.1)
2		$x^2_{=1.81}$	$x^2 = 9.38$	$x^2 = .86$	$x^2=2.06$	$x^2=22.63$	$x^2_{=11.83}$
		(.2≯₽ <b>⟩</b> .1)		(Pz .001) (.57 P>.3) (.27P>.1) (R, 001)	(,2≯₽ <b>⟩</b> ,1)	(P. 001)	
က			x <sup>2</sup> =18.66	$x^2_{=11.44}$	x=x.3	$x^2=12.76$	x = 4.87
			(P∢.001)	(P <sub>=</sub> .001)	(,9 <b>&gt;P</b> > 8)	(P<.001) (P=.05)	(P= .05)
4				$x^2=15.82$	$x^2 = 19.9$	x <sup>2</sup> =69.02	$x^2 = 69.02$ $x^2 = 4.05$
				(P <.001)	(P<.001)	(P<.001) (R.001) (Pz.05)	(P= .05)
ıc					x <sup>2</sup> =2.62 (.2 <b>X</b> ►1)	x <sup>2</sup> =15.07 (P<.001)	$x^2 = 6.41$ (P< .01)
9						$x^2$ =11.45 $x^2$ =4.05 (P=.001) (P=.05)	$x^2 = 4.05$ (P= .05)
7							$x^2_{=1,99}$

Table 2 presents the results of chi square tests of significance between all pairs of the situations with respect to the percentage of universalistic responses. It indicates that ten pairs of the situations do not differ significantly from each other. These are: situations 1 and 3, 5, 6, and 8; situations 2 and 3, 5, and 6; situations 3 and 6; situations 5 and 6; and situations 7 and 8. For the remaining eighteen pairs of situations, the results of the chi square tests indicate a significant difference in the percentage of universalistic responses. However, even though a minority of the situations do not differ from each other when the responses to all of the forms of the questionnaire are combined, the direction of response to all of the situations is the same. In every situation the percentage of particularistic responses is low.

Our second substantive hypothesis states that particularistic responses are maximized in the groups where a relative faces the dilemma, next when a friend faces the dilemma, next when ego faces the dilemma, and least when a stranger faces the dilemma. The marginals in Table 1, indicate that the overall particularistic percentage in each form is 28.6 percent for form A. 1 25.4 percent for form B, 30.2 percent for form C and 35.7 percent for form D. If we reorder those percentages in order of decreasing particularism we see that the particularistic responses are maximized in the group where a stranger faces the dilemma,

This percentage includes the responses to situation 1 in form A.

next when ego faces the dilemma, next when a friend faces the dilemma and least when a cousin faces the dilemma. In the light of these results we have to reject our hypothesis regarding the effect of social distance from the respondents on the amount of particularistic responses. Our findings show the position of the cousin and stranger to be reversed from the order hypothesized.

In order to test whether each form differs from all the others with respect to universalism, we have computed  $\mathbf{x}^2$  scores between each pair of forms. Our null hypothesis states that there is no difference between forms with respect to universalism.

TABLE 3 Distribution of  $\mathbf{X}^2$  scores between each pair of forms

FORMS	В	c	D
A	$x^2 = 174.7$	$x^2 = 35$	$x^2 = 5$
	(P <b>&lt; .00</b> 1)	(P =.001)	(P < .05)
В		$x^2 = 30.18$	$x^2 = 33.05$
		(P ∠.001)	(P∠.001)
C			$x^2 = 3.82$
			(.1>P >.05)

Although all the forms are low in particularism, Table  $3^1$  shows that all forms except C and D differ according to the  $\mathbf{x}^2$  scores. In other words, the percentage of particularistic responses was affected by the differences in the individuals facing the dilemmas between forms.

#### Comparison of Results with the American Study

In our comparison of the results of the two studies, we are limited to the data presented in the report of the original study. However we can make the following comparisons: (1) the percentage distribution of the particularistic and universalistic responses to the four non-academic situations, (2) the scale patterns of responses and (3) an approximate comparison of the responses to high and low risk situations. The tests and comparisons we will use will be valid only for the responses of the two sample populations.

The non-academic situations: The following table shows the percentage particularistic responses of both the Middle Eastern and American groups to the four non-academic situations. Since the report of the original study does not give the total percentage of universalistic or particularistic responses we are limited to those comparisons of the responses to the specific situations.

As is evident from the table, forms A and C differ even though they have one situation in common. The chi square test as presented is, therefore, a conservative statement of the extent of difference between the seven situations which do differ in the two forms.

<sup>2</sup>S. A. Stouffer and J. Toby, "Role Conflict and Personality" in Parsons and Shils (eds.), op. cit., pp. 481-494.

TABLE 4

## Percentage particularistic responses to each of the four non-academic conflict situations of the Harvard and Radcliffe students and Arab Students at the American University of Beirut

Situations	Harvard and Radcliffe	American University of Beirut
1. Car accident	26%	26.4%
2. Show critic	45%	34.5%
3. Insurance doctor	51%	29.8%
4. Board of directors	70%	46.6%

a source: Stouffer and Toby, op. cit., p. 484.

In order to see whether there is any difference in the distribution of particularistic responses to the four non academic situations, the "U" test was used. The test showed that at the .05 level of significance, the probability of occurance of such a distribution is .443. In other words, such a distribution would occur

S. Siegle Non-Parametric Statistics For the Behavioral Sciences (New York: McGraw-Hill Company, Inc. 1956), pp. 116-127.

40.3 percent of the time. Thus we must accept the null hypothesis that there is no significant difference in the distribution of particularistic responses to these situations between the two groups. We are, in other words unable to support our fourth hypothesis that the Middle Eastern students have a greater tendency than the American students to respond in a particularistic manner.

The scale patterns of the responses: Following the original study, we have divided the situations into two sets, the non-academic and the academic situations. The first set of scalogramms is based on responses to the non-academic situations. From the preceeding table we see that the four situations can be ordered in terms of the percent of particularistic responses to each situation. This ranking of the situations forms the scale patterns according to which our scalogramms were constructed. Because the scale patterns of the scalogramms of the present study differ from those presented in the original study, a direct comparison with the scales constructed on the basis of the responses of the American students is not possible. In the original study the scale patterns followed the order of presentation of the situations used in this replication. However, within each scale type we have included the response patterns used in the scalogramms presented in the original study. Tables 17, 18.

Ideally, however, questions which are scalable should not be asked in the order of the scale pattern.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 485.

19, and 20 in the Appendix E present the scalogram analysis of the responses to the non-academic situations. A separate scalogram is presented for each form of the questionnaire. 1

For the academic situations, we have again formed the scale pattern on the basis of the percentages of particularistic responses for each item. From table 1, we see that the situations can be classified in order of decreasing particularism as follows: low risk cheating situation, high risk cheating situation, exam paper and the reserved book. Tables, 21, 22, 23, and 24 in the Appendix E present the scalogramm analysis of the responses to the academic situations. Since no scalogramm analysis of the responses to these situations is reported for the original study we are unable to make any comparison between the scaling of the responses of the Middle Eastern students and the Harvard-Radcliffe students.

As is evident from the eight tables presenting the scalogramm patterns of responses the reproducibility coefficients of each of the eight scalogramms exceed .85 thus indicating that each of the two sets of items range along a continuum which is that of the scale patterns for each of the sets. However, we cannot say that the two sets of items lie along the same continuum or that the continuum formed by the non-academic items is the same for the Middle Eastern

In spite of the error the scalogramm for form A was kept because of its high reproducibility. (R = .891).

students as for the Americans. The fact that the scale patterns of the original study are different from our own, indicates that for the Middle Easterners the situations do not lie on the same continuum. That is, the situations do not have the same meaning for the Arab male students as for the American students. Thus, no direct comparison can be made between the Middle East scales and the American scales.


Effect of Risk: The following chart shows the variation of particularistic responses when the element of risk is introduced. What we want to determine here is the relationship between the individuals position in the non-academic scales, and their responses to the cheating situation when the element of risk is introduced. We sorted all the individuals who have answered particularistically in each of the scale types of the non-academic scales and observed the percentage of respondents in each scale type who answered particularistically to each of the risk situations. On the abscissa of each chart we have put the five scale types and on the ordinate the percentage of people that have answered particularistically to the risk situations. In forms A and B, the low risk situations was presented to the respondents first, and forms C and D the high risk first. 1


Our order of presentation of the risk situations is different from that of the original study. In the original research the authors had two reports for each form. That is, half of the people in each form received the low risk first and the other half the high risk first. Thus they had six replications in all, and they could compare the effect of risk within each form (ego as proctor, ego's friend as proctor, and Smith as proctor.) Due to our misinterpretation of the procedure, we cannot make the same comparisons.

#### CHART /


\_ Percentage of respondents choosing particularism in situations 7 and 8 , by respondents scale type , with respect to the non-academic situations \_








#### HIGH RISK FIRST







\_\_\_ low risk --- High risk

#### CHART /


\_ Percentage of respondents choosing particularism in situations 7 and 8 , by respondents scale type , with respect to the non-academic situations \_








#### HIGH RISK FIRST





\_\_\_\_ low risk

Chart I indicates that the situation for the four forms is much the same irrespective of risk. That is, in the four forms, the particularistic percentages do not follow a given pattern; they seem chaotic. In the original study, "the prior presentation of the high risk situation produced a higher particularistic response to the two items than the prior presentation of the low risk situation."1 The fact, that the introduction of risk did not seem to affect the particularistic responses of our sample may be due to the fact that the Middle Eastern respondents did not perceive the risk in the same way as the Americans did or that they did not feel there was any difference between the situations. However, Cottrell's criticism2 of the Stouffer and Toby study is also relevant to our study. That is, it may be that the results indicate differences in the imaginative ability of the respondents and not differences in their attitudes. Basing ourselves on Chart I and on Cottrell's criticism, we are not able to say whether we can accept or reject our third hypothesis which states that increased risk tends to minimize particularistic responses in accordance with the social distance from ego. The means we had at our disposal were limited in this case. Therefore we have to assume no relationship between the element of risk and particularistic response.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>Ibid., p. 493.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 489.

#### Recapitulation

According to our results, the obligations of friendship for our respondents in the Middle Eastern culture are less important than the more general social obligations. That is, in several conflict situations they tended to respond universalisticly and favor the more general social obligations. Furthermore, the American University of Beirut students tend to respond about as universalisticly as the American students with respect to the non-academic situations. However the responses to the individual non-academic situations do not support fully our second hypothesis, which states that particularistic responses are maximized in groups where cousin faces the dilemma, next when ego's friend faces the dilemma, next when ego faces the dilemma and decrease when stranger faces the dilemma. The questionnaire responses indicate that the position of cousin and stranger are reversed. The empirical ordering was: stranger, ego, friend and cousin. Finally it seems that there is no relationship between the introduction of risk and the way the respondents answered to the last two situations.

#### Interpretation of High Universalism

Since these results differ markedly from our hypotheses and our description of the Middle Eastern culture, we are forced to search for factors which might account for the difference between our description of the culture and our first hypothesis stating that the Middle Easterners would favor particularistic obligations, in response to the questionnaire. Possible sources of such a difference lie in

the nature of the measuring instrument itself, in its administration or in the analysis of the data.

The Instrument: Taking Cottrell's criticism into consideration, it may be that the instrument did not measure the attitudes of the respondents, but their imaginative ability to project themselves in the situations presented to them. It may be that the situations were not real to them, and were distant from their student life. And this may be true for show business, financial investment and insurance. It may be also that they did not grasp the importance of the car accident situation due to the disregard of the respondents to traffic regulations in general. Furthermore, in view of the limited amount of time allotted for filling out the questionnaire, some of the respondents may have had difficulty in understanding the situations presented to them in English, which is not their native language.

The Administration of the Instrument: The respondents were asked to complete the questionnaires in their classroom and in the presence of their professor for the course. Since the questionnaires were administered at the University in a classroom situation, the measurement situation may have induced the students to respond in terms of the "western" value orientation of the university. That is, the respondents may have responded more universalistically than they would have in some other situation, say in their own homes. We may be fairly certain that these people are aware of the two systems of value orientation, namely, that of their own culture and that of the University. But awareness of the "western" value orientation does

not imply its internalization by the respondents. R.K. Merton makes the same observation with respect to the "American Soldier" studies.

It is clear, when one thinks about it, that the type of attitude described as conformist in this study is at the polar extreme from what is ordinarily called social conformity. For in the vocabulary of sociology, social conformity usually denotes conformity to the norms and expectations current in the individual's own membership group. But in this study, conformity refers, not to the norms of the immediate primary group constituted by enlisted men but to the quite different norms contained in the official military mores . . . . In the language of reference group theory, therefore, attitudes of conformity to the official mores can be described as a positive orientation to the norms of a non-membership group that is taken as a frame of reference. Such conformity to norms of an out-group is thus equivalent to what is ordinarily called non-conformity, that is, non-conformity to the norms of the in-group.

The explanation of the existence of high universalism in our result may be that the respondents have conformed to the norms of a membership group namely the University which in this case played the role of a reference group. That is, the measurement situation may have heightened the saliency of the norms of the university and led the respondents to make their replies in terms of these norms rather than some other, usually operative, standards of behavior.

R.K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1955), p. 264.

It is also possible that the rapid social change of the Middle East has created a state of anomie. That is, there may be a basic lack of clarity or consistency in the normative orientation of the society. If this is the case, one would expect the effects of the measurement situation to be even more pronounced. This possibility is discussed below when the distribution of the responses to the individual items is considered. Finally, the high percentage of universalistic responses may be due to an unrepresentativeness of the respondents in terms of their background characteristics, their social origins, previous schooling and residence. In order to examine this possibility the background characteristics of the "extreme" group, those respondents who made seven or more universalistic or particularistic responses were considered.

The Extreme Group: Out of the 327 respondents, 110 gave 7 or 8 universalistic responses and 13 gave 7 or 8 particularistic responses to all the situations. The question to examine here is: Why have these people answered this way?

Are there any uniformities in the background of these extreme cases that predisposes them to select one solution rather than the other to the various dilemmas? That is, do they differ significantly from the general sample with respect to any background characteristics on which we have information.?

The following tables present the distribution of the respondents who gave 7 or 8 responses of one kind according to: age, nationality, time spent at A.U.B., community of origin and father's occupation, chi square scores were computed to see whether the universalistic extremists differ markedly from the sample population with respect to the background characteristics for which we have data: age, nationality, time spent at A.U.B., community of origin and father's occupation. Our null hypothesis assumes that there is no difference between the universalistic extremists and the total sample population, with respect to each of the background characteristics for which we have information. Our expected cell values for  $x^2$  scores are the percentages in each cell in the total sample distribution and the observed cell values are the percentages in each cell of the universalistic "extremist" group.

Since the number of particularistic extremists is too small to permit computations of  $x^2$  scores, the  $x^2$  analysis is restricted to the 110 universalistic extremists.

Distribution of Arab Males giving 7 or more responses of one kind By Age

TABLE 5

Total	13	110
30	1 1	6.
29	1 1	1 1
28	1 1	1.8
27	1 1	1 1
26	1 1	1 1
25	1 1	1.9
24	1 1	6 5.4
23	1 7.5	4°.5°
22	1 1	15
21	2 15.4	25
20	8 61.5	35
19	2 15.4	15
118	1	6.5.4
Age in Years	Particularism Number Percentage	Universalism Number 6 15 Percentage 5.4 13.6 31

 $x^2 = 1.98$  (7 Df.) .98>P > .95

TABLE 6

Distribution of Arab Males giving 7 or more responses of one kind by Nationality

100% 100% Total 13 110 Sudanese 5.4 unspecified 1 1 Arabs Africa North 1 Arab Peninsula 1 3 Iraqis 1.8 15.4 10.0 Palestinians I 23,1 22.8 Jordanians 25 2,1 1 1 S 3,5 Egyptians 7.5 8,2 Syrians 38.5 42.8 **repsuese** Percentage Percentage Particularism Nationality Universalism Number Number

 $x^2 = 3.5$  (11.Df) .95 >P > .90

Distribution of Arab Males giving 7 or more responses of one kind

by time spent at A.U.B.

Years		2	င	4	No answer	Total
Particularism						
Number	8	9	4	1	1	13
Percentage	23,1	46.1	30.8	1	1	100%
Universalism						
Number	25	45	37	2		110
Percentage	22.8	41.0	33.7	1.8	6.	%001

$$x^2 = 1.17$$
 (2df) .70 > P > .50

Distribution of Arab Males giving 7 or more responses of one kind by Community of Origin

	COM	MUNITY	COMMUNITY OF ORIGIN			
	City	Town	Village	other	no answer	Total
Dartienlariem						
mer an ara an a						
Number	11	H	-	1	1	13
Percentage	84,5	7:5	7.5	1	7.5	100%
Universalism						
Number	62	26	18	1	4	110
Percentage	56.5	23.6	16,4	1	3.7	100%

 $x^2 = 1.04$  (2df :) .70 >P > .50

Distribution of Arab Males giving 7 or more responses of one kind by Father's Occupation

Total	13	.00%
No answer of deceased	2 15.4	21
Retired	1 7.5	5.4
Unemployed	1 1	2 1.8
Collar semi-skilled Collar semi-skilled Rapourer blue	1 1	6 5.4
Clerical and kindered	2 15.4	9.5
Executives Managers assistants	1 7.5	2 1.8
Learned profession- als non Governmental	1 ' '	1 6.
Salaried professionals non Governmental	1 1	3.7
Landowners	1 1	- 6.
Farmers	1 1	8 7.2
Executive owners	1 1	8 7.2
Executive owners	5 39.5	27 24.5
tnabnaqabnI Isnoissalorq	1 1	13
емьјоуее емрјоуее	1 1	3.7
Government official	2	2.7
Occupation	Particularism Number Percentage	Universalism Number Percentage

P ≅ .99

 $x^2 = 1.73$  (14 Df.)

In considering the results of the  $x^2$  tests we can state, that the background characteristics of the universalistic "extremists" do not differ from those of the total sample. In no case is the observed probability less than .5.

The Distribution of Responses: A second way of investigating our problem is to examine the distribution of responses to each question since it is possible that the method of coding concealed significant differences in the responses made to the various situations. It will be remembered that every respondent was asked to respond to two questions after reading each situation. Those questions, which we have called the role expectation and the role behavior indicators, respectively, took the following form:

Check one: 1 - Has a definite right

2 - Has some right

Role expectations

3 - Has no right

Check one: 1 - help him

Role behavior

2 - not help him

As previously stated, the coding along the universalism - particularism dimension was made on the basis of the role expectation responses for alternatives 1 and 3 and on the basis of the indicated role behavior for alternative 2 of the role expectation set. These coding categories were established in the original study to provide a mutually exclusive and logically exhaustive categorization of all responses, i.e., as

being either universalistic or particularistic. The question to ask here is: What was the composition of our responses? There are three possible types of responses which could be coded as particularistic or universalistic: (1) "definite" response, (2) "some right" response and (3) "conflict" response.

The "definite" responses are those in which the respondents choose the third alternative in the role expectations and second alternative in the role behavior, or the first alternative in the role expectations and the first alternative in the role behavior. The "some right" are those responses in which the respondents choose the second alternative in the role expectations set and either alternative in the role behavior set. The "conflict" responses are those in which the respondents choose the third alternative in the role expectations set and the first alternative in the role behavior set or the first alternative in the role behavior set. These response patterns are presented diagrammatically in the following charts:

#### CHART II

#### COMPOSITION OF RESPONSES

## 1. "Definite" responses predominate


# Role expectation alternatives

				-
	: Majority of :	:		
Role	: particula- :	:		
behavior	ristic responses:	:		:
	:	:		
alternatives	<del></del>			
	: :	:		٠;
	: :		Majority of	,
	1 1		universalistic	
	:		responses	:
	:			:
	<u> </u>			÷

In this case, where the majority of responses are composed of universalistic role expectation and universalistic role behavior, or particularistic role expectations and particularistic role behavior, we can say that for the majority of the respondents the situations were clear and the norms were clear and consistent. That is, the respondents understood the situation and could project themselves to them and respond in terms of norms of their culture or reference group.

## 2. "Some right" responses predominate

Role expectation alternatives



In this case where the majority chooses the indeterminate role expectations and one of the two alternatives in the role behavior, we can assume that two things may have happened: (1) either the norms were not clear or (2) the situations were not clear. That is either the respondents did not clearly know what to expect from others in terms of role expectations or that the situations were not real to them.

# "Conflict" responses predominate

Role expectation:

		1	2	3	
Role	1	: : :		Majority of universalistic responses	-::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
behavior alternatives	2	Majority of : particularis- : tic responses:		:	· · · · · · · ·

In this case where the majority of responses are composed of universalistic role expectation and universalistic role behavior or a particularistic role expectation and a universalistic role behavior, we may say that for the majority of these respondents the situations were clear but the norms were not consistent.

A detailed presentation of the composition of our universalistic and particularistic responses is presented in the following tables, in order to determine which is the actual composition of our responses and by that see under which conditions our respondents have answered the questions.

Summary table presenting composition of responses all forms and situations combined by universalism and particularism

Type of responses	Percent Particularism	Percent Universalism
"Definite"	22.5	60.9
"Some right"	69.9	15,1
"Conflict"	7.5	24.0
Total % Number responses	728	1726

As is evident from this table, the composition of particularistic responses as a whole indicates that the majority of these responses (69.9 percent) are "some right" responses, followed by (22.5 percent) "definite" responses and (7.5 percent) "conflict" responses. On the other hand, the composition of the universalistic responses consists of a majority of "definite" responses (60.9 percent) followed by (24.0 percent) "conflict" responses and (15.1 percent) "some right" responses. This a symmetrical form of distribution of both particularistic and universalistic responses indicates that both these compositions differ from each other. But, is this overall composition of the responses reflected in the responses to each situation? The following tables, present the composition of responses in each situation with all forms combined.

Composition of responses to situation 1,

by particularism and universalism

All forms combined

	Percent particularistic	Percent universalistic
"Definite"	26.2	59.4
"Some right"	69.0	14.5
"Conflict"	4.8	26.1
Total % Number of responses	100.0	100.0

Composition of responses to situation 2,
by particularism and universalism
All forms combined

	Percent particularistic	Percent universalistic
"Definite"	16.4	52.3
"Some right"	75.4	22.9
"Conflict"	8.2	24.8
Total % Number of responses	100.0 110	100.0

TABLE 13

Composition of responses to situation 3,
by particularism and universalism

All forms combined

1 1 1	Percent particularistic	Percent universalistic
"Definite"	21.1	65.6
"Some right"	70.5	16.6
"Conflict"	8.4	17.8
Total % Number of responses	100.0 95	100.0 224

TABLE 14

Composition of responses to situation 4,
by particularism and universalism

All forms combined

	Percent particularistic	Percent universalistic
"Definite"	35.1	66.1
"Some right"	56.7	15,2
"Conflict"	8.2	18.7
Total % Number of responses	100.0 148	100.0 171

TABLE 15

Composition of responses to situation 5,

by particularism and universalism

All forms combined

	Percent particularistic	Percent universalistic
"Definite"	24.5	64.2
"Some right"	68.4	18.9
"Conflict"	7.1	16.9
Total % Number of responses	100.0	100.0

TABLE 16

Composition of responses to situation 6,

by particularism and universalism

All forms combined

•	Percent particularistic	Percent universalistic
"Definite"	14.4	74.6
"Some right"	77.8	13.4
"Conflict"	7.8	13.0
Total % Number of responses	100.0 90	100.0

TABLE 17

Composition of responses to situation 7.

by particularism and universalism

All forms combined

	Percent particularistic	Percent universalistic
"Definite"	16.9	51.1
"Some right"	76.9	10.8
"Conflict"	6.1	38.1
Total %	99.9	100.0
Number of interpretation	65	231

Composition of responses to situation 8,

by particularism and universalism

All forms combined

	Percent particularistic	Percent universalistic
"Definite"	29.2	56.5
"Some right"	62.5	12.6
"Conflict"	8.3	30.9
Total %	100.0	100.0
Number of responses	48	230

As is evident from the preceeding tables, both the universalistic and particularistic responses are composed of "definite", "some right" and "conflict" responses. However, the percentage distribution of these different types of responses is different in each dimension. There are only two situations in which the percentages of "some right" particularistic responses account for less than two-thirds of the responses. In the other six situations they vary between 66.7 and 77.8 percent, while the "conflict" responses in no case are more than 10 percent. The percentages of "definite" particularistic responses in every situation vary between 20 to 25 percent. In other words, the composition of our particularistic responses indicates that the majority of the responses coded particularistic were "some right" responses. According to the three alternative compositions that we have previously presented in Chart II we see that our data in this respect falls into the second alternative. Therefore, we can say that for the majority of the respondents who choose the particularistic solution to the dilemma either the norms were not clear and consistent or the situations may not have been clear and real. The first alternative strongly suggests the existence of "anomie" in their cultural or reference group norms. This group of people is aware of the particularistic value orientation of their culture but do not conform to it in their role behavior.

<sup>1</sup> See R.K. Merton, op. cit., p. 134.

On the other hand, the composition of our universalistic responses indicates that in no case did the "conflict" and "some right" responses exceed the definite responses. The preceeding tables indicate, that the "definite" responses account for more than half of the total number of responses for each situation. Further, the percentages of "conflict" responses are generally higher than the percentages of "some right" responses. The percentages for each type of responses, range respectively: "definite" (51.1 to 74.6 percent); "conflict" (16.7 to 38.1 percent); and "some right" (10.8 to 22.9 percent). According to the three alternative compositions of responses that we have presented previously in Chart II, we see that our data in this respect falls into the first alternative. That is, the majority of responses are "definite" responses, thus denoting that for the majority of respondents chosing the universalistic solution to the dilemma, the cultural or reference group norms were clear. This is true for all the situations. The sizeable "conflict" group supports the "anomie" interpretation and is evidence against unclear situations. The following tables, show the composition of responses by form with all situations combined.

TABLE 19

Composition of particularistic responses per form all situations combined

Forms	"Definite"	"Some right"	"Conflict"	Total
A				******
Number	40	136	10	186
Percent	21.5	73.1	5.4	100.0
B Number	50			
	50	107	14	177
Percent	29.3	62.6	8.1	100.0
С		**********		
Number	28	122	16	166
Percent	16.9	73.5	9.6	100.0
D				
Number	46	144	15	205
Percent	22.4	70.2	7.4	100.0
Total	······································		1	******
Number	164	509	55	728
Percent	22.5	69.9	7.5	99.9

TABLE 20

Composition of universalistic responses per form all situations combined

Forms	"Definite"	"Some right"	"Conflict"	Total No. of responses
A				
Number	284	93	86	463
Percent	61.3	20.1	18.6	100%
В		tereteretereteretereteretereteretereter		
Number	329	33	130	492
Percent	66.9	6.7	26.4	100%
С			armen yankan dan karakari antari karakari antari karakari a	
Number	240	66	82	388
Percent	61.8	17.0	21.2	100%
D				
Number	199	69	115	383
Percent	51.9	20.6	27.5	100%
Total				
Number	1052	261	413	1726
Percent	60.9	15.1	24.0	100%

At this point of the analysis we thought it would be important to test the reliability of the results presented in tables 18 and 19. First we used the  $x^2$  test, to test the difference in the distribution of responses between the two classes, the juniors and sophomores. We obtained a  $x^2 = .633$  with .50 > P > .30. Therefore we may assume that the fact of combining the responses of the two classes did not weight the balance in one way or the other. Second, we have computed new percentages for form A in tables 18 and 19. These new percentages were computed on the basis of seven situations in form A. In other words we did not consider the erroneous situation. The results show 1, that in no case do the new percentages differ by

#### Particularistic responses

	Definite	Some right	Conflict	Total
Form A				
Number	35	127	8	170
Percent	20.6	74.6	4.7	99.9%
Total				
Number	159	500	53	712
Percent	22.3	70.1	7.5	99.9%

#### Universalistic responses

	Definite	Some right	Conflict	Total
Form A				
Number	233	86	75	394
Percent	59.1	21.8	19.1	100%
Total				• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Number	1001	254	402	1657
Percent	60.5	15.3	24.3	100.1%

When the percentages are run on 7 situations only in form A, we get the following distribution in both the particularistic and universalistic responses.

more than 2 percent in each cell. In other words, the fact of incorporating situation 1 of form A with the other situations in the same form does not bias the results.

In conclusion, the high universalism found in our study seems to be a result of two factors: (1) in the case of the "definite" universalistic responses, conformity on both the role expectation and role behavior level to norms which are not usually characterized as being predominant in the Middle East, and (2) for the "some right" universalistic responses, a conflict between the norms prescribing priority to friendship obligations and norms prescribing priority to general social obligations. This we have characterized as anomie, the interpretation of anomie is also supported by analysis of the distribution of the particularistic responses. In both cases the measurement situation may have resulted in a bias toward universalism. However, the prevalance of "conflict" responses is interpreted as evidence for the existence of anomie. That is, the Middle Eastern respondents are aware of the particularistic value-orientation of their culture, but indicate a conflict between the role expectations and their projected behavior.

#### CHAPTER V

#### SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

By the very nature of research, a report on findings seems fragmentary and limited. Studies of this or even larger size cannot examine all factors affecting the phenomenon under study. Further, the results obtained are dependent on the available measuring instruments and on our conceptualization of the area of investigation. These limitations exist in our study, but they do not invalidate it.

As was already mentioned the results of the study contradict our four substantive hypotheses. It was found that the Middle Eastern respondents tend to choose the universalistic solutions more often than the particularistic ones. For this specific group of people, general social obligations appear to take precedence over particularistic or friendship obligations. Also, they tend to respond about as universalistically as the American students with respect to the four non-academic situations. Further, increased social distance from ego was not always associated with an increase in particularism. It was found that particularistic responses were maximized in the groups where a stranger faced the dilemma, next when a friend faced the dilemma, and next when ego faced the dilemma, and least when a cousin faced the dilemma. The results also, indicated, that there is no relationship between the risk factor and particularism.

However the main theoretical contribution of the study is the attempt to measure by a projective method the analytical variable of particularism versus universalism, as a cultural orientation in the Middle East. In order to measure such orientations, we have insisted on the importance of the concept of role as the crucial coordinator between the individual's personality and the cultural The answers of the respondents to the conflict situations brought to light the pre-dispositions of certain individuals toward some type of solution which need not be the same as the one chosen by the other members of the group. This type of behavior, tended to be carried over all conflicts, thus showing an individual variability in the perception of obligations. Having described the traditional Middle Eastern culture as particularistically oriented, the existing variability of the individuals' perception of social obligations has pointed out to the fact, that social change is taking place in the Middle Eastern culture. Further, the existence of "conflict" responses in the composition of both the universalistic and particularistic responses, may be the indicator of the state of "anomie" brought about by the rapid pace of social change. Our findings, were in this respect at the opposite pole of our expectations which were based on our presentation of the traditional Middle Eastern culture. Finally, although the nature of our sample does not allow us to generalize beyond it, the distribution of both the universalistic and particularistic responses provide evidence of a considerable amount of normative conflict or anomie.

Methodologically, this study is important because it has measured in a non-western culture the universalism--particularism "pattern variable." Having succeeded in measuring such a variable in a non-western culture by the same methods as the original study, supports the utility of the analytic concept for descriptions of the value orientations of any culture.

Substantively, the study is important insofar as the data indicate that the majority of the Middle Eastern students had a tendency to choose the universalistic solution to the dilemmas presented to them in the questionnaire. Furthermore, the responses to the non-academic situations are as universalistic as those of the American sample. We sincerely hope that these results, by virtue of their "lack of fit" with usual descriptions of Middle Eastern society, will provide further impetus for investigations of the validity of sterotyped conceptions of the culture.

In future research it would be desirable to attempt measurements of the same group in settings other than the American University of Beirut since the administration of the questionnaires in the classroom situation may have induced the respondents to answer in terms of the norms of the university. It would also be desirable to see how a sample drawn from the general Middle Eastern population would respond to similar situations. In this respect, new situations

respondents. In future studies it would also be adviseable to include in the study design a means of identifying the respondents so that a sub-sample from each of the response categories could be interviewed in some detail. Such an interview schedule should include probe and open-ended questions aimed at gathering information about the actual behavior of the respondents as well as their understanding of the situations presented to them. In view of frequent statements as to differences in value orientations between the various religious groups, further studies of this sort should also gather information on the religious affiliations of the respondents.

In conclusion we may say that, although the restricted sample limits the generalizability of the study, the study in itself has proved to be of theoretical, methodological, and substantive value. Our data indicate that as a whole our sample gave preference to universalistic obligations and that the Middle Eastern students responded as universalisticly as the Americans. Our study has also pointed to the existence of anomie on the cultural level as reflected in the projected role expectations and behavior of the respondents. Further investigations along these lines would seem promising from the point of view of description of Middle Eastern personalities in a changing society.

#### THE QUESTIONNAIR

FORM A

DO NOT WRITE YOUR NAME ON THIS

BOOKLET

Instructions

This is not an examination, nor is it an intelligence test. It is merely an attempt to find out how you think, you would feel and act in several situations.

Inside the booklet you will find several brief stories describing everyday situations. We would like to have you read each of the stories carefully and indicate how you think you would feel and act in each of these situations.

Remember, there are no "right" answers other than how you actually believe you would think and act. Please give honest replies. Do not sign your questionnaire. The answers are completely confidential.

Thank you

1. Your close friend is riding in a car which you are driving, and you hit a pedestrian. He knows that you were going at least 60 kilometers per hour in a 35 kilometer an hour zone. There are no other witnesses. Your lawyer says that if your friend testifies under oath that the speed was only 35 kilometers an hour it may save you from serious consequences.

What	right do yo	u have	to expect your friend to protect you ?
	Check One	e <b>:</b>	
			I have a definite right as a friend to expect him to testify to the lower figure.
			I have some right as a friend to expect him to testify to the lower figure.
	-		I have no right as a freind to expect him to testif to the lower figure.
What as a	do you think sworn witnes	your s and	friend would probably do in view of his obligations his obligation as your friend?
	Check One	:	
	-		Testify that you were going 35 kilometers an hour.
	-		Not testify that you were going 35 kilometers an hour.

2. You are a Beirut Show critic. A close friend of yours has sunk all his savings in bringing a new Show to the Casino. You really think the show is no good.

What right does your friend have to expect you to go easy on his show in your review?

Check Gne:	
**************************************	He has a definite right as a friend to expect me to go easy on his show in my review.
	He has some right as a friend to expect me to go easy on his show in my review.
Without the state of the state	He has no right as a friend to expect me to go easy on his show in my review.
uld you go easy on h ur readers and your	is show in your review in view of your obligatiobligation to your friend?

W or ons to you

Check	One:	
		Yes
		No

3.	You are a doctor for an insurance company. You examine a close friend who needs more insurance. You find that he is in pretty good shape, but you
	are doubtful on one or two minor points which are difficult to diagnose.
	What right does your friend have to expect you to shade the doubts in his favor?
	Check One:

	My friend would have a definite right as a friend to expect me to shade the doubts in his favor.
	He would have some rights as a friend to expect me to shade the doubts in his favor.
	He would have no right as a friend to expect me to shade the doubts in his favor.
Would you shade the do	oubts in his favor in view of your obligations to and your obligation to your friend?

Check One:
Yes

You have just come	from a secret meeting of the board of directors o	of a
company. Iou have	a close friend who will be ruined unless he can	+0+
out of the market b	before the boards decision becomes known You harm	en
to be having dinner	at that friend's home this same examing.	10.11

to be having dinner at	that friend's home this same exening.
What right does your f	riend have to expect you to inform him?
Check One:	
	He has a definite right as a friend to expect me to inform him.
	He has some right as a friend to expect me to inform him.
	He has no right as a friend to expect me to inform him.
Would you inform him in your obligations to you	view of your obligations to the company and or friend?
Check One:	
	Yes
	No

5.	You are em	oloyed 1	oy Pr	ofess	or X	to m	ark	examinat:	ion book	ks	in his	cou	rse.
	Your close special brebadly.	friend ak you	make	s some	what him	over	er a the	passing passing	grade. line.	H <sub>e</sub>	f you needs	give the	him a grade

special break you can badly.	boost him over the passing line. He needs the grade
What right does your :	friend have to expect you to give him a special break
Check One:	
	He has a definite right as a friend to expect me to do this for him.
	He has some right as a friend to expect me to do this for him.
	He has no right as a friend to expect me to do this for him.
Would you give him thi University and your ob	s special break in view of your obligations to the ligation to your friend?
Check One:	
	Yes
-	$N_{\mathbf{G}}$

6.	You are in charge of the reserve desk at a library. A certain reserve book
	is in heavy demand. A close friend is pressed for time and can only use the
	book at a certain hour. He has suggested that you hid the book for a while
	before his arrival so that he will be sure to get it. He needs it badly?
	What right does your friend have to expect you to hide the book?
	Check One:

 He has a definite right as a friend to expect me to hide the book for him.
 He has some right as a friend to expect me to hide the book for him.
 He has no right as a friend to expect me to hide the book for him.

Would you hide the book for him in view of your obligations to the library and your obligation to your friend.

Check	One:	
		Yes
		$N_{\mathbf{O}}$

7.	You are proctoring an examination in a middle-group course. You are the
	only proctor in the near At 1112
	only proctor in the room. About half-way through the exam you see a fellow
	and is also your close friend, openly chesting He is asset
	answers from previously prepared onth natural Williams and is copying his
	answers from previously prepared crib notes. When he sees that you have
	seem the motes as you walked down the sigle and at a
	whispers, quietly to you; "O. K., I'm caught. That's all there is to it."
	and Sall there is to it.

Under these circumstances, what right does he have to expect you not to turn him in?

Check One:	
	He has a definite right as a friend to expect me no to turn him in.
	He has some right as a friend to expect m c turn him in.
	He has no right as a friend to expect me not to turn him in.
Under these circumstan obligations as a proct	ces what would you probably do in view of your or and your obligations to your friend?
Check One:	
	Report him
	Not report him

8. You are proctoring an examination in a middle-group course. There is another proctor, an extremely conscientious fellow in the examination room with you, and that you would be running a fifty-fifty risk of personal exposure by him to the authorities for failing as a proctor to turn in a cheater. About half way through the exam you see a fellow student, who is also your close friend, openly cheating. When he notices that you have seen him, he whispers to you when passing by him. "O. K., I'm caught. That's all there is to it."

Under these circumstances, what right does he have to expect you not to turn him in?

Check One:	
	He has a definite right as a friend to expect me not to turn him in.
	He has some right as a friend to expect me not to him in.
	He has no right as a friend to expect me not to turn him in.
Under these circumstantial	nces, what would you probably do in view of your tor and your obligations to your friend?
Check One:	
	Report him
	Not report him

Age:
Sex: Male Female
Nationality:
Years of study at AUB (Do not include Prep)
Specialization at AUB
Beirut residence: Check one: On Campus Off Campus
If Living off campus, are you living with your family? Check one: Yes No
Have you lived all your life in the above mentioned place? If not, where have you spent most of your life? Check One:
City Village
Do your Parents usually speak Arabic at home? Check one: Yes No
Do you usually speak Arabic at home? Check One: Yes No
Have you ever stayed in any Western country more than three months? If yes:
Where How Long
High school you graduated from: Check One:
Government School Private school
Level of your father's education: Check one:
College graduate Secondary school
Elementary School No education
Level of your mothers education: Check One:
College graduate Secondary school
Edementary school No education
Father's occupation

#### FORM B

1. Your cousin is riding in a car driven by you, and you hit a pedestrian. He knows you were going at least 60 kilometers an hour in a 35-km-an-hour-speed zone. There are no other witnesses. Your lawyer says that if he testifies under oath that the speed was only 35 km an hour, it may save you from serious consequences.

What right have you to expect your cousin to protect you?

Check one:	
	I have a definite right as a cousin to expect him to testify to the lower figure.
	I have some right as a cousin to expect him to testify to the lower figure.
	I have no right as a cousin to expect him to testify to the lower figure.
What would you think obligations to you as	your cousin would probably do in view of the a cousin?
Check One:	
	Testify that you were going 35 km an hour
	Not testify that you were going 35 km an hour.

2.	Cour cousin is a Beirut Show critie. You have sunk all your savings in a new show you are bringing to the Casino. Your cousin thinks the play is no good.
	hat right do you have as a cousin to expect him to go easy on your show in is review?

Check One:	
	I have a definite right as a cousin to expect him to go easy on my show in his review.
	I have some right as a cousin to expect him to go easy on my show in his review.
	I have no right as a cousin to expect him to go easy on my show in his review.
What would you think y	our cousin would probably do in view of his obligations obligations to you as a cousin?
Check One:	
	Go easy on his review
	Not go easy on his review

										ту. Не				
need	more	insu	rance.	He	find	s that	you	are	in	pretty	good	shape	excep	pt
for t	wo mi	nor	points	he	finds	diffi	cult	to	diag	mose.				

What right do you have	to expect him to shade the doubts in your favor?
Check One:	
	I have a definite right as a cousin to expect him to shade the doubts in my favor.
	I have some rights as a cousin to expect him to shade the doubts in my favor.
	I have no right as a cousin to expect him to shade the doubts in my favor.
Would your cousin shade to the company and his	the doubts in your favor in view of his obligations obligations to you?
Check One:	
	Yes
	No

4. Your cousin has just come from a secret meeting of the board of directors of a company. You will be ruined unless you can get out of the market before the board's decision becomes known. Your cousin happens to be having dinner at your home this same evening.

What right do you have to expect him to inform you?

and right do you have	to expect him to miorm year
Check One:	
	I have a definite right as a cousin to expect him to inform me.
-	I have some right as a cousin to expect him to inform $\ensuremath{me}\xspace$ .
	I have no right as a cousin to expect him to inform $\ensuremath{me} \bullet$
	rm you in view of his obligations to the tions to you as a cousin?
Check One:	× "
-	Yes
	$N_{\mathbf{O}}$

5•	course. You make some	d by Professor X to mark examination books in his what under a passing grade. If your cousin gives can boost you over the passing line. You need the
	What right do you have	to expect your cousin to give you a special break?
	Check One:	
		I have a definite right to expect him to do this for $\ensuremath{me} \boldsymbol{.}$
		I have some right to expect him to do this for me.
		I have no right to expect him to do this for me.
		you this special break in view of his obligations to obligation to you as a cousin?
	Check One:	
		Voa

No

6.	Your cousin is in charge of the reserve desk at a Library. A certain
	reserve book is in heavy demand. You are pressed for time and you can
	only use the book at a certain hour. You suggest that he hides the book for a while before your arrival so that you will be sure to get it. You
	need it badly.

What right do you have	to expect your cousin to hide the book?
Check One:	
	I have a definite right as a cousin to expect him to do that for me.
	I have some right as a cousin to expect him to do thi for me.
	I have no right as a cousin to expect him to do this for $\ensuremath{me}_{\:\raisebox{1pt}{\text{\circle*{1.5}}}}$
Would your cousin hide and his obligations to	the book in view of his obligations to the Library you as a cousin?
Check One:	
	Yes
	$N_{O}$

7. Your cousin is proctoring an examination in a middle group course. He is the only proctor in the room. About half way through the exam he sees you openly cheating. You are copying the answers from previously prepared crib notes. When you see that he has seen the notes as he passed down the aisle and stopped near the seat, you whisper quietly to him: "O. K., I'm caught. That's all there is to it."

Under these circumstances, what right do you have to expect your cousin not to turn you in?

700 111	
Check One:	
	I have a definite right as a cousin to expect him not to turn me in.
	I have some right as a cousin to expect him not to turn me in.
	I have no right as a cousin to expect him not to turn me in.
Under these circumsta in view of his obliga cousin?	nces what do you think your cousin would probably do tions as a proctor and his obligation to you as a
Check One:	
	Turn you in
	Not turn you in

8.	Your cousin is proctoring an examination in a middle group course. There
•	There
	is also another extremely conscientions fellow in the evamination man with
	and your cousin is running a fifty-fifty risk of personal owners be
	him to the authorities for failing as a proctor to turn in a cheater. He
	to railing as a proctor to turn in a cheater. He
	sees you cheating, and you notice that, and when he pages hy work
	whisper: "O.K., I am caught. That's all there is to it."

onder these circumstances, what right to turn you in?	t do you have to expect your cousin not
Check One:	
I have a defi	nite right as a cousin to expect him
I have some r	ight as a cousin to expect him not to turn
I have no rig	nt as a cousin to expect him not to turn
Under these circumstances what do you view of his obligations as a proctor	think your cousin would probably do in and his obligations to you as a cousin?
Check One:	
Turn you in	
Not turn you i	n

## FORM C

1.	Your close friend is riding in a car which you are driving, and you hit a
	pedestrian. He knows that you were going at least 60 km an hour in
	a 35 km an hour zone. There are no other witnesses. Your lawyer says
	that if your friend testifies under oath that the speed was only 35 km
	an hour it may save you from serious consequences.

What right do you have to expect your friend to protect you?

Check One:	
	I have a definite right as a friend to expect him to testify to the lower figure.
	I have some right as a friend to expect him to testify to the lower figure.
	I have no right as a friend to expect him to testify to the lower figure.
What do you think he sworn witness and his	would probably do in view of his obligations as a obligation as your friend?
Check One:	
	Testify that you were going 35 km an hour.
	Not testify that you were going 35 km an hour.

2.	Your close	friend is a Beyrouth Show critic .	You have sunk all your
	savings in is no good.	bringing a new show to the Casino.	Your friend thinks the show

What right do you have to expect your friend to go easy on your show in his review?

HIS LEATEM!		
Check	One:	
		I have a definite right as a friend to expect him to go easy in his review.
		I have some right as a friend to expect him to go easy in his review.
		I have no right as a friend to expect him to go easy in his review.
hat would you is readers an	think he	e would probably do in view of his obligations to ligation to you as a friend?
$^{\mathrm{C}}_{\mathrm{he}\mathbf{c}\mathbf{k}}$	One:	×
		Go easy
		Not go easy

3.	Your close friend is a doctor for an insurance company. He examines you. You need more insurance. He finds that you are in pretty good shape except for two minor points he finds difficult to diagnose.
	What right do you have to expect him to shade the doubts in your favor?
	Check One:
	I have a definite right as a friend to expect him to shade the doubts in my favor.
	I have some right as a friend to expect him to shade the doubts in my favor.
	I have no right as a friend to expect him to shade the doubts in my favor.
	Would your friend shade the doubts in your favor in view of his obligations to the company and his obligations to you?
	Check One:
	V <sub>2</sub> z

 $N_{\rm O}$ 

4.	directors of a company. market before the board	You will be ruined unless you can get out of the s decision becomes known. It happens that your at your home this same evening.
	What right do you have to Check One:	o expect your friend to inform you?
	I	have a definite right as a friend to expect him to
		have some right as a friend to expect him to inform
		have no right as a friend to expect him to inform

Would your friend tip you off in view of his obligations to the company and his obligation to you as a friend?

Check One:
Yes

5.	nis course. Iou make	employed by Professor X to mark examination books in somewhat under a passing grade. If your friend gives can boost you over the passing line. You need the
	What right do you have	to expect your friend to give you a special break?
	Check One:	
		I have a definite right to expect him to do this for me.
		I have some right to expect him to do this for me.
		I have no right to expect him to do this for me.
	Would your friend give the university and his	you this special break in view of his obligations to obligations to you as a friend?
	Check One:	
		Yes

 $N_{\mathsf{O}}$ 

6.	Your friend i	is in charge	of the reser	ve desk at a	library.	certain
	reserve book	is in heavy	demand. You	are pressed	for time ar	nd you can only
	use the book	at a certain	hour. You	suggest that	he hides th	e book for a
	while before	your arrival	so that you	will be sure	to get it.	You need it
	badly:					

What right do you have to expect your friend to hide the book?

	4
Check One:	
	I have a definite right as a friend to expect him to do that for me.
· Management and a second and a	I have some right as a friend to expect him to do that for me.
	I have no right as a friend to expect him to do that for $\ensuremath{\text{me}}_{\:\raisebox{1pt}{\text{\circle*{1.5}}}}$
Would your friend hide and his obligations to	the book in view of his obligations to the Library you as a friend?
Check One:	
	Yes
	No

7.	Your close friend is proctoring an examination in a middle-group course.
	There is also another extremely conscientious fellow in the examination
	room with him, and your friend is running a fifty-fifty risk of avecune
	by him to the authorities for failing as a proctor to turn in a charter
	me sees you cheating, and you notice that, and when he passes by you
	whisper to him: "O. K., I am caught. That's all there is to it."

Under these circumstances, what right do you have to expect your friend not to turn you in?

not to turn you in	
Check One:	
	I have a definite right as a frien d to expect him not to turn me in.
	I have some right as a friend to expect him not to turn me in.
	I have no right as a friend to expect him not to turn me in.
Under these circumstar in view of his obligat friend?	nces what do you think your friend would probably do

Check One:

Turn you in

Not turn you in

8. Your close friend is proctoring an examination in a middle-group course. He is the only proctor in the room. About half way through the exam he sees you openly cheating. You are copying your answers from previously prepared crib notes. When you see that he has seen the notes as he walks down the aisle and stops near the seat, you whisper quietly to him: "O. K., I'm caught. That's all there is to it."

Under these circumstances what right do you have to expect your friend not to turn you in?

Check One:	
	I have a definite right as a friend to expect him not to turn me in.
	I have some right as a friend to expect him not to turn me in.
	I have no right as a friend to expect him not to turn me in.
Under these circumstand do in view of his obligations friend?	ces what do you think your friend would probably gations as a proctor and his obligations to you as
Check One:	
	Turn you in
	Not turn you in.

## FORM D

1. Samir is riding in a car driven by his close friend, Nabil, and Nabil hits a pedestrian. Samir knows that his friend was going at least 60 km an hour in a 35 km an hour speed zone. There are no other witnesses. Nabil's lawyer says that if Samir testifies under oath that the speed was only 35 km an hour, it may save Nabil from serious consequences.

What right has Nabil	to expect Samir to protect him?
Check One:	
	Nabil has a definite right as a friend to expect Samir to testify to the lower figure.
-	Nabil has some right as a friend to expect Samit to testify to the lower figure.
	Nabil has no right as a friend to expect Samir to testify to the lower figure.
If Samir were an avera view of his obligation friend?	ge person what do you think he would probably do in as as a sworn witness and his obligations to his
Check One:	
	To testify that Nabil was going 35 km ar hour
	Not testify that Nabil was going 35 km an hour

2. Samir is a Beyrouth Show critic. His close friend Nabil has sunk all his savings in bringing a new show to the Casino. Samir thinks the show is no good.

What right does Nabil have as a friend to expect Samir to go easy on his

	his review?	have as a fifeha to expect samir to go easy on his
	Check One:	
	-	Nabil has a definite right as a friend to expect Samir to go easy on his show in his review.
		Nabil has some right as a friend to expect Samir to go easy on his show in his review.
	-	Nabil has no right as a friend to expect Samir to go easy on his show in his review
What do readers	you think Sami and his obliga-	r would probably do in view of his obligations to his tion to his friend?
	Check One:	
		Go easy
	-	Not go easy

3. Samir is a doctor for an insurance company. He examines his friend Nabil who needs more insurance. He finds him in pretty good shape except for two minor points he finds difficult to diagnose.

What right does Nabil have to expect his friend Samir to shade the doubts in his favor?

Check	One:	
		Nabil has a definite right as a friend to expect Samir to shade the doubts in his favor.
		Nabil has some right as a friend to expect Somir to shade the doubts in his favor.
		Nabil has no right as a friend to expect Samir to shade the doubts in his favor.
If Samir were	an avera	ge person would he shade the doubts in Nabil's favor?
Check	One:	
		Yes
		$N_{O}$

4. Samir has just come from a secret meeting of the board of directors of a company. He has a close friend Nabil who will be ruined unless he gets out of the market before the board's decision becomes known. Samir happens to be having dinner at Nabil's home this same evening.

What rig	tht has Samir	to expect Nabil to inform him?
	Check One:	
		Nabil has a definite right as a friend to expect Samir to inform him.
		Nabil has some right as a friend to expect Samir to inform him.
		Nabil has no right as a friend to expect Samir to inform him.
If Samir to the co	were an avera	age person what would he do in view of his obligations obligations to his friend Nabil?
C	heck One:	
		Yes
		No

5.	Samir is employed by Professor X to mark examination books in his course.	
	His friend Nabil makes somewhat under a passing grade. If Samir gives ha	im
	a special break he can boost him over the passing line. Nabil needs the grade badly.	

grade badly.	
What right does Nabil	have to expect Samir to give him a special break?
Check One:	
	He has a definite right to expect Samir to do this for him.
	He has some right to expect Samir to do this for him.
	He has no right to expect Samir to do this for him.
If Samir were an average view of his obligations a friend?	ge person would he give Nabil his special break in s to the university and his obligations to Nabil as
Check One:	
	Yes
	$N_{O}$

6.	Samir is in charge of the reserve desk at a library. A certain book is in
	heav y demand. His friend Nabil is pressed for time and he can only use the
	book at a certain hour. He suggests that Samir hides the book for a while
	before his arrival so that he will be sure to get it. He needs it badly.
	What right does Nabil have to expect his friend to hide the book?
	Check One:
	He has a definite right to expect his friend to hide the book.

He has a definite right to expect his friend to hide the book.

He has some right to expect his friend to hide the book.

He has no right to expect his friend to hide the book.

If Samir were an average person would he hide the book, in view of his obligations to the library and his obligations to Nabil as a friend?

Check	One:	
		Yes
		$N_{O}$

7. Samir is proctoring an examination in a middle-group course. There is also another extremely conscientious fellow in the examination room with him, Samir is running a fifty-fifty risk of personal exposure by him to the authorities for failing as a proctor to turn in a cheater. Samir sees his friend Nabil cheating openly, and Nabil notices that. So when Samir passes by him he whispers to him: "O.K., I am caught, that's all there is to it."

Under these circumstances, what right does Nabil have to expect his friend Samir not to turn him in?

Samir not to turn him	in?
Check One:	
	He has a definite right as a friend to expect him not to turn him in.
	He has some right as a friend to expect him not to turn him in.
	He has no right as a friend to expect him not to turn him in.
Under these circumstant of his obligations as	nces what would an average person like Samir do in view a proctor and his obligations to his friend?
Check One:	
	Turn him in
	Not turn him in

Samir is proctoring an examination in a middle group course. He is the only proctor in the room. About half way through the exam he sees his friend Nabil openly cheating. He is copying his answers from previously prepared crib notes. When Nabil sees that Samir has seen the notes, and he whispers to him as he passes by him: "O.K., I'm caught, that's all there is to it."

not to turn him in?	nces, what right does Nabil have to expect his friend
Check One:	
	He has a definite right as a friend to expect him not to turn him in.
· · · · · ·	He has some right as a friend to expect him not to turn him in.
-	He has no right as a friend to expect him not to turn him in.
Under these circumstan	ces what would an average person like Samir do in view proctor and in view of his obligations to his friend?
Check One:	
-	Turn him in
	Not turn him in.

TABLE 1

Respondents Ages by Class

ı.						'	AGE IN YEARS	N YEA	IRS			1			
Class	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30 and over	No An- swer	Total
Sophomores					han bun han ha										
Number	10	40	65	25	15	2	r.	5		Н	0	0	*1	0	170
Percent	5.9	23.6	23.6 38.3	14.7 8.8	8.8	1.2	2.9	2.9	9.0	9.0	0	0	9.0	0	100%
Juniors															
Number	က	6	43	42	25	15	7	6	0	0	61	0	1*K#	-	157
Percent	1.9	5.7	5.7 27.4 26.8	26.8	15.9 9.5	9.5	4.5	5.7	0	0	1.2	0	9.0	9.0	%001
Total								<b>T</b>	T	T	T				
Number	13	49	108	1.9	40	17	12	14	7		61	0	21	1*0€	327
Percent	4.0		15.0 33.0 20.5 12.2	20.5	12.2	5.2	3.7	4.3	0.3	0.3	0.6	0	9.0	0.3	100%
				1		1	1	1		1					

\* Exact age 30

MM Exact age 33

Respondents Nationalities by Class

	Total		170	100%		157	100%		327	100%
	No		0	0		0	0		0	0
ř	Arabs		-	9.0		Н	9.0		2	9.0
	North Africans		0	0			9.0			0.3
4	əsəuepns		15	8.8		15	9.5		30	9.2
	Arab Peninsula		1	9.0		9	3.8		7	2.1
ALITY	sipsil		4	2.4		Н	9.0		ro.	1,5
NATIONALITY	Palestinian		14	10.6		18	11.5		36	11.0
	Jordanians		38	22.4		37	23.6		75	22.9
	U.A.R. unspecified		0	0		8	5.1		80	2.4
	Egyptians		က	1.8		က	1.9		9	1.8
	Syrians		14	8.2		9	3.8		8	6.1
	Геряпезе		92	44.7		19	38.9		137	41.9
	Class	Sophomores	Number	Percent	Juniors	Number	Percent	Total	Number	Percent

TABLE 3

Respondents years spent at AUB by Class

Total 100% 100% 327 100% 170 157 No 1.2 9.0 2 N 0 0 TIME SPENT AT AUB IN YEARS 1.9 0.9 0 0 72.5 2.4 36.0 က 114 118 63.5 43.5 142 108 2 33.0 3,8 19.0 26 62 Sophomores Number Number Percent Percent Number Percent Juniors Class Total

Respondents' Place of Beirut Residence by Class

		OFF CAMPUS	AMPUS		
Class	On Campus	With Parents	Not with Parents	No	Total
Sophomores					
Number	32	65	63	10	170
Percent	18.8	38.3	37.1	5.8	%001 1
Juniors			,		
Number	2	56	92	4	157
Percent	3.2	35.7	58.6	2.4	7001
Total					
Number	37	121	155	14	327
Percent	11.3	37.0	47.5	4.2	100%

Respondents Majors by Class

		MAJOR	OR			
Class	Humanities	Sciences	Business	Social Sciences	No answer	Total
Sophomores						
Number	29	12	44	13	13	170
Percent	17.1	42,1	25.6	7.6	7.7	100%
Juniors						
Number	28	89	42	16	က	157
Percent	17.1	51.0	26.8	2,8	1.9	100%
Total						
Number	57	141	98	56	16	327
Percent	15.8	42.1	26.3	8.8	4.9	100%

Respondents Types of Community of Origin by Class

		TYPE OF	COMMUNITY			
Class	City	Town	Village	Other	No answer	Total
Sophomores	93	37	27	1*	12	170
Percent	54.7	21.8	15.9	9.0	7.0	%001
Juniors						
Number	36	39	15	0	8	157
Percent	9.09	24.8	9.5	0	5.1	%001
Total	8	7,5	49	*	6	397
Percent	57.5	23.3	12.8	0.3	6.1	7001

\* Refugees Camp

Respondents Language usually spoken at home by Class

Class	Speak Arabic	Do not Speak Arabic	No answer	Total
Sophomores Number Percent	139	20	11	170
Juniors				
Number Percent	134	18 11.5	3, 2	157
Total	273	38	16	327
Percent	83.5	11.6	4.9	100%

TABLE 8

Language usually spoken by Parents at home By academic class of Respondents

Class	Speak Arabic	Do not Speak Arabic	No	Total
Sophomores				
Number	136	23	п	170
Percent	80.0	13.5	6.5	100%
Juniors				
Number	132	20	ıo	157
Percent	84.0	12.7	3.2	100%
Total				
Number	268	43	91	327
Percent	82.0	13,1	4.9	100%

TABLE 9
Type of High School of Respondents by Class

	TYPE 0	TYPE OF HIGH SCHOOL		
Class	Private School	Government	No answer	Total
Sophomores				
Number	116	39	15	170
Percent	68.2	22.9	6*8	%001
Juniors				
Number	103	47	7	157
Percent	65.5	29.9	4.6	%00I
Total				
Number	219	98	22	327
Percent	0.79	26.3	6.7	100%

TABLE 10
Fathers' Education by Respondents' Class

Class	College	Secondary	Primary	No Education	No answer	Total
Sophomores Number Percent	47 28.6	46	41 24.2	19	17	170
Juniors Number Percent	34	44 28.1	56	16 10.2	7.4	157
Total Number Percent	81	90	29.7	35 10.7	24	327 100%

Mothers \* Education by Respondents \* by Class

Class	College	Secondary	Primary	No Education	No answer	Total
Sophomores Number Percent	18	55	44	36	17	170
Juniors						
Number	3.2	47 29.0	52 33,2	44 28.0	9	157
Total Number Percent	23	102 31.3	96 29.4	90	26 8.0	327 100%

Total	170	157 100%	327 100%
Yeanswer bns bead Tailsi	35	29 18.4	74
Betired	5	9	14
Unemployed	3	3.2	8 2.5
Laborer blue collar skilled & semi	2.9	2.5	9
Clerical 5 kindred	5 2.9	15	20 6.2
Manager Manager Assistant	2.3	3	7 2.2
Learned professional non-government	3.4	2.5	10 3.1
Salaried professional non-government	2 1.2	3	5
Landowners	3	.6	1.2
Farmers	9 5.2	12 7.6	21
pjne cojjsi omuets Executives	9	10	19
DSTFUGES OMUGES EXECUTIVES	43 25.2	42 26.9	85 26.4
Independent professional	20 12.5	7.4.5	27.
смріоуеся Сочетимент	4 2.3	2.5	2.5
Government officials	7 4.1	5.7	16
Class	Sophomores Number Percent	Juniors Number Percent	Total Number Percent

TABLE 13

## Percentage of Arab Male Sophomores giving particularistic responses to the first 6 situations by situation and form.

FORMS

Situations	A	В	С	D	Total
No. 1 Percent Number	20.5 (44)	28.3 (46)	17.1 (35)	41.0 (39)	26.8 (164)
No. 2 Percent Number	38.6 (44)	26,1 (48)	36.1 (36)	33 <b>.</b> 3 (39)	33.5 (167)
No. 3 Percent Number	29.5 (44)	25.0 (48)	38.9 (36)	34.2 (38)	31.3 (166)
No. 4 Percent Number	42.2 (45)	45.8 (48)	40.0 (35)	62,2 (37)	47.3 (165)
No. 5 Percent Number	27.9 (43)	17.0 (47)	33.3 (36)	37.5 (40)	28.3 (166)
No. 6 Percent Number	22.5 (40)	19.9 (47)	29.4 (34)	47.5 (40)	29.2 (161)
Total Percent Number	30.3 (260)	27.1 (284)	32.5	42.4 (233)	23.7 (989)

The numbers in parentheses represent the total No. of responses for each form per situation.

TABLE 14

# Percentage of Arab Male Juniors giving particularistic responses to the first 6 situations by situation and form \*\*

#### FORMS

Situations	A	В	С	D	Total
No. 1		1			
Percent	17.1	33.3	24.3	31.6	26.0
Number	(41)	(39)	(37)	(38)	(154)
No. 2					
Percent	22.5	35.9	42.9	42.1	35.5
Number	(40)	(39)	(35)	(38)	(152)
vo. 3		1	<b>!</b>	1	
Percent	24.4	33.3	16.7	37.8	28.1
Number	(41)	(39)	(36)	(37)	(153)
No. 4		<b>†</b>		<b>1</b>	
Percent	38.5	35.9	45.9	61.5	45.5
Number	(39)	(39)	(37)	(39)	(154)
No. 5					
Percent	37.5	27.0	36.1	35.1	41.0
Number	(40)	(37)	(36)	(37)	(150)
No. 6		<b> </b>		1	
Percent	37.5	34.2	14.3	28.6	29.1
Number	(40)	(38)	(35)	(35)	(148)
Total		<b> </b>	l	1	
Percent	18.8	33.3	30.1	39.2	28,8
Number	(371)	(231)	(216)	(224)	(1042)

The numbers in ( represent the total No. of responses for each form per situation.

TABLE 15

# Percentage of Arab Male Sophomores giving particularistic responses to situations 7 and 8 by form and situation

### FORMS

Situations	A	В	C	D	Total
No. 7			1		
Percent	24.4	6.7	30.3	18.4	19.1
Number	(41)	(45)	(33)	(38)	(157)
No. 8					
Percent	21.1	2.3	33.3	12,8	15.5
Number	(38)	(44)	(27)	(39)	(148)
Total		<b>T</b>	1		
Percent	22.8	4.5	31.6	15.5	17.4
Number	(79)	(89)	(60)	(77)	(305)

The numbers in ( represent the total No. of responses for each situation and form

TABLE 16

# Percentage of Arab Male Juniors giving particularistic responses to situations 7 and 8 by form and situation

FORMS

Situations	A	В	Ć	Ď	Total
No. 7	34.3	19.4	20.6	26.5	25.2
Number	(35)	(36)	(34)	(34)	(139)
No. 8					
Percent	17.6	18.2	23.5	17.2	19.2
Number	(34)	(33)	(34)	(29)	(130)
Total					
Percent	26.1	18.8	22.0	22.2	22.3
Number	(69)	(69)	(68)	(63)	(269)

The number in (trains) represent the total No. of responses for each form per situation

# CODE BOOK

Columns	Items	Code No.
	Situations I	
1		1. has a right
		2. has some right
		3. has no right
		x, no answer
2		1. yes
		2. no
		x. no answer
	Situation II	**************************************
3		1. has a right
		2. has some right
		3. has no right
		x. no answer
4		1. yes
		2. no
		x no answer

The coding for the remaining 6 situations is the same as for the 1st one with 2 columns for each situation.

# Situation 3

5

6

Columns	Items	Code No.
	Situation 4	
7		
8		
	Situation 5	
9		
10		
	Situation 6	
11		
12		
	Situation 7	
13		
14		
	Situation 8	
15		
16		
	Age	
17		Give the No. of years
		x. no answer
	Sex	
18		1. Male
		2. Female
		x. no answer
	Nationality	
19		1. Lebanese
		2. Syrian

	- 137 -	
Columns	Items	Code No.
		3. Egyptian
×		4. U.A.R. unspecified
		5. Jordanian
		6. Palestinian
		7. Iraqi
		8. Arab peninsula
		9. North African
		10. Sudani
		11. Arab unspecified
		x. no answer
	Years of study at AUB	
20		Give no. of years
		x. no answer
	Specialization	
21		1. Education
		2. English
		3. Arabic
		4. History
		5. Geography
		6. Psychology

7. Sociology

9. P.S.P.A.

10. Philosophy

8. B.B.A. and Economics

11. Premedics and Biology

Columns	Items	Code No.
		12. Pharmacy
		13. Mathematics
		14. Physics
		15. Chemistry
		16. Engineering
		17. Arts
		18. Geology
		x. no answer
	Beirut residence	
22		1. on campus
		2. off campus
		x. no answer
	Living with family	
23		1. with family
		2. not with family
		x. no answer
	Lived most of your life	
24		1. City
		2. Town
		3. Village
		4. Other
		x. no answer
	Parents speak Arabic	
25		1. yes
		2. no
		x. no answer

Columns	<u>Items</u>	Code No.
	Respondent speak Arabic	
26		1. yes
		2. no
		x. no answer
	Lived in any western country	
27		1. yes
		2. no
		x. no answer
	(Where)	
28		1. Europe
		2. U.S.A. and Canada
		3. South America
		4. Oceania
		x. no answer
	How long	
29		Give no. of months
		x. no answer
	High School	
30		1. Private
		2. Government
		x. no answer
	Father's education	
31		1. College
		2. Secondary
		3. Primary

	- 140 -	Cado No
Columns	Items	Code No.
		4. no education
		x. no answer
	Mother's education	
32		Same coding as for father's
	Father's occupation	Double coding
33		Employment status
		1. Government officials & employees
		<ol><li>Self employed and persons who employ others</li></ol>
		<ol> <li>Employee. (Salary outside Government)</li> </ol>
		4. unemployed
		5. retired
		x. no answer
		Occupational status

x. no answer

1. Independent professional

2. Salaried professionals

3. Learned professionals

White collar

or deceased.

4. Executives, owners, partners

5. Clerical, sales, and kindred

7. Farmers and farmworkers

8. unemployed or retired.

6. Skilled and semiskilled workers

employees: managers, assistants

TABLE 17
Scalogramm Pattern for Respondents to First Four Items, for the FORM "A"

Scale Type					Par	res	lari pons ite	stic es m	Un	ivers res per	pons	Errors	
	Sca 1	le 3	Pat 2	tern 4	1	3	2	4	1	3	2	4	
	4	+	4	+	1	1	1	1					0
	+	-	ŧ	t	2		2	2		2			2
	+	ŧ	-	-		••	••	••		••	• •	••	
	+	ŧ	-	+	1	1		1			1	4. "	1
5	1 +	ŧ	ŧ	-	1	1	1					1	1
	+	-	ŧ	-	2		2			2		2	4
	-	‡	‡	+		4	4	4	4				0
4	-	+	+	-		2	2		2			2	2
	-	-	7	+			5	5	5	5			0
3	-	-	ŧ		Ü.,	100	8	ä.	8	8		8	8
	-		-	+				11	111	11	11		0
2	-	ŧ	-	+		6		6	6		6		6
	+	) and	-	ŧ	4			4		4	4		4
	-		-	-					27	27	27	27	0
1	-	1	-	-		4			4		4	4	4
	+	1	-	2	4					4	4	4	4
	i				15	19	25	34	67	63	57	48	36

Reproducibility  $= 1 - \frac{36}{4 \times 82} = .891$ 

<sup>1</sup> As is evident from above, the responses scaled even though the positions of alter and ego are reversed in the first situation

TABLE 18

Scalogramm Pattern for Respondents to First Four items, for the FORM "B"

Scale						res	ular pons ite	istic es m	Un.	resp per	onse	Errors	
Туре	1	cal 3	e P	attern 4	1	3	2	4	Ī	3	2	4	111015
	i x	x	x	x	5	5	5	5					0
	x	x	x	-	2	2	2					2	2
5	x	x	-	_	5	5					5	5	10
	x	x	-	x	3	3		3			3		3
	x	-	x	х	1		1	1		1			1
	х	-	x	-	••	••	••	••			٠.		
												ļ	
4	-	х	x	x		4	4	4	4			I	0
	-	х	x	-	٠.	••	••	••	••	••	••		
	1	_	x	x			8	8	8	8		The contract of the contract o	0
3	-	-	x	-			5		5	5		5	5
	_	,	-	x				8	8	8	8		0
2	-	x	-	x		4		4	4		4	- 1	4
1	X	-	-	x	3			3		3	3	1	3
İ	-	-	-	-					29	29	29	29	0
1	7	x	-	-		2			2		2	2	2
I	x	-	-	-	6					6	6	6	6
					25	25	26	36	60	60	59	49	36

Reproducibility = 1 - 364x 85 = .895

TABLE 19
Scalogramm Pattern for Respondents to First Four Items, for the FORM "C"

Scale					Par	res	lari spons	ses	Universalistic responses per item				Errors
Гуре	Sc 1			ttern 4	1	3	2	4	1	3	2	4	
1	x	x	x	x	4	4	4	4				į	0
i	x	-	x	x	3		3	3		3		1	3
1	x	x	-	-	• •	••	• •	••		• •	• •		
5	x	x	-	x	1	1		1			1	1	1
1	x	-	x	x	• •	• •	••	• •		• •	• •	]	
1	x	-	x	-	2		2			2		2	4
- 1												1	
1	-	x	x	x		3	3	3	3			1	0
4	_	x	x	- 1		2	2		2			2	2
1												İ	
1	1	_	x	x			3	3	3	3			0
3	-		x	-			9		9	9	9	i	9
			_	x				9	9	9	9		9
2		x		x		6		6	6		6	i	6
-		^		1				•			•	- 1	
	х	-	~	x	**	• •	• •	••	••	••	••	]	
	_	_	_	_					20	20	20	20	0
1	_	x	-	_		3			3		3	3	4 3
	x	-	-	-	3					3	3	3	3
					14	18	26	29	54	50	51	30	31

Reproducibility =  $1 - \frac{31}{4 \times 68}$  = .887

TABLE 20
Scalogramm Pattern for Respondents to First Four items, for the FORM "D"

Errors	s	Universalistic responses per item					rtic res per	Pa					Scale
	4	2	3	1	4	2	3	1	ttern 4		ale 3	So	Туре
0		-de-to-de-de-			8	8	8	8	x	x	x	x	j
4	į		4		4	4		4	х	x	-	x	1
2			2	1	2		2	2	x	-	x	x	5
2	1	1					1	1	- 1	-	x	x	İ
1	1					1	1	1	-	x	x	x	i
2	1		1			1		1	-	x	7	x	
	l								- 1				i
0	1			2	2	2	2		x	x	x	-	- 1
2	2			2		2	2		-	x	x	-	4
0			4	4	4	4			x	x	-	-	l
3	3		3	3		3			-	x	1	-	3
0		13	13	13	13				x	-	_	-	defendance
2	1	2		2	2		2		x	-	x	-	2
4		4	4		4			4	x	-	-	x	i
0	16	16	16	16					-	-		-	
6	6	6		6			6		-	-	x	-	1
1	1	1	1					1	-	-	-	x	1
29	41	45	46	48	39	25	24	22					1

Reproducibility =  $1 - \frac{29}{288} = .90$ 

TABLE 21
Scalogramm Pattern for Respondents to Academic Items, for the FORM "A"

Scale						resp per	onse	1	r	versa espon	ses	Errors	
Гуре	7 <sub>L</sub>	ale 8 <sub>H</sub>	Pa 6	ttern 5	$7_{\rm L}$	8 <sub>H</sub>	6	5	7 <sub>L</sub>	8 <sub>H</sub>	6	5	
1	x	x	x	x	1	1	1.	1				į	0
1	x	-	x	х	6		6	6		6		İ	6
į	x	x	-	x	1	1		1			1	1	1
5	x	x	x	-	2	2	2					2	2
1	x	x	-	-	5	5					5	5	10
į	x	-	x	-	1		1			1		1	2
ļ												1	
1	-	x	x	x		• •		• •					••
4	-	x	x	-	••	••	••	••		••	••		
	-	-	x	x			1	1	1	1			0
3	-	-	x	-			8		8	8		8	8
ļ	_	-	_	x				10	10	10	10	į	0
2	_	x		x		1		1	1			1	1
	x	-	-	x	3			3		3	3		3
1	-	_	_	-					27	27	27	27	0
1	-	x	-	-		1			1		1	1	1
1	x	-	-	-	••			••					
į					19	11	19	23	48	56	21	44	34

Reproducibility  $= 1 - \frac{34}{4x68} = .874$ 

TABLE 22
Scalogramm Pattern for Respondents to Academic Items, for the FORM "B"

Scale						resp	onse		1	ersa espo er i	nses	Errors	
Туре	Sc 7 L	ale 8 <sub>H</sub>	Pa 6	ttern 5	7 <sub>L</sub>	8 <sub>H</sub>	6	5	7 <sub>L</sub>	Вн	6	5	
	x	x	x	x	1	1	1	1				l	0
1	x	-	x	х	2		2	2		2		i	2
į	x	x	-	-		• •	• •	••		••	• •		••
5	x	x	-	x		• •	• •			••	• •		
	x	x	x	-	1	1	1					1	1
	x	-	x	-	2		2	*		2		2	4
	-	x	x	x		2	2	2	2				0
4	-	x	x	-		1	1		1			1	1
	1	_	x	x			2	2	2	2			0
3	1	-	x	-			9		9	9		9	9
	1	_	_	x				6	6	6	6		0
2	-	x	-	x		1		1	1		1		é 1
	х	-	-	x	2			2		2	2		2
	-	_	_	-					44	44	44	44	0
1	-	x	-	-	1	1			1		1	1	1
	x	-	~	-	1					1	1	1	1
					9	7	20	16	66	68	55	59	22

Reproducibility =  $1 - \frac{22}{4x75} = .927$ 

TABLE 23
Scalogramm Pattern for Respondents to Academic Items, for the FORM \*\*C\*\*

Scale						resp per	onse item	s	Univ	spon r it		Errors	
Туре	Sc 7 L	ale 8 <sub>H</sub>	Pa 6	ttern 5	7 <sub>L</sub>	8 <sub>H</sub>	6	5	7 <sub>L</sub>	8н	6	5	
	x	x	x	x	1	1	1	1				and the same of th	0
	x	_	x	x	2		2	2		2			2
	х	x	-	x	3	3		3	1		3	Ì	3
5	х	x	x	-	1	1	1					1	1
	x	x	-	-	3	3					3	3	6
	x	_	x	-	2		2			2		2	4
												1	
	-	x	x	x						• •			••
4	-	x	x	-		2	2		2			2	2
												1	
	-	_	x	x			2	2	2	2		i	0
3	-	_	x	-			2		2	2		2	2
												1	
	-	-	-	x				5	5	5	5	1	0
2	-	x	-	x		4		4	4		4		4
	x	-	-	x	1			1		1	1	1	1
	-	-	1	-					27	27	27	27	0
1	-	x	-	-		••	• •	**		••		:	
	x	-	1	-	1					1	1	1	1
					14	14	12	18	42	42	44	38	26
				100									

Reproducibility =  $1 - \frac{26}{4x56} = .893$ 

TABLE 24
Scalogramm Pattern for Respondents to Academic Items, for the FORM \*D\*

Scale Type					Par	res	lari pons ite	es	Uni	versa respo Per i	nses	ic	Errors
	Sc 7 <sub>L</sub>	ale 8	Pa 6	ttern 5	7 <sub>L</sub>	8 <sub>H</sub>	6	5	7 <sub>L</sub>	8 <sub>H</sub>	6	5	
	x	x	x	x	2	2	2	2					0
1	x	-	x	x	5		5	5		5		1	5
1	x	x	-	-		• •		••		••	• •		
5	х	x	-	x	1	1		1			1	- 1	1
	x	x	x	-	1	1	1		1			1	1
1	x	-	x	-	2		2			2		2	4
								*	1			1	
1	_	x	x	x		2	2	2	2			I	0
4	1	x	x	-		1	1		1			1	1
1				1.4								İ	
1	-	-	x	x			7	7	7	7		į	0
3	-	-	x	_			7		7	7		7	7
												į	
İ	-	4	-	x				5	5	5	5		0
2	-	x	-	x		1		1	1		1	I	1
	x	-	-	x	2			2		2	2	į	2
	4	4	_						27	27	27	27	0
1	_	x	_	_		2			2		2	2	2
	x	_	-						١				
İ					_	<del></del> .			-			_	
					13	10	27	25	52	55	38	40	24

Reproducibility = 1 - 24 = .92

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