UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE TO THE ARAB REFUGEES

by

Alfred W. Matthews

submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the degree of Master of Arts in the Arab Studies Department of the American University of Beirut, Beirut, Lebanon 1962
U. N. ARAB REFUGEE RELIEF

Matthews
PREFACE

This study examines the assistance provided by the United Nations to the Arab refugees. Much has been written about the refugee problem but little of it deals with the programs that provide them with subsistence and technical aid.

The refugee assistance program undertaken by the United Nations since 1948 will be examined. The writer has limited himself to relief and rehabilitation, eliminating the field of education except as related to rehabilitation and self-help projects.

The author has mostly relied on the official documents and records of the United Nations in preparation of this work. He has supplemented this material by consulting unpublished manuscripts, newspapers and secondary material.

I am very grateful for the assistance given to me by my advisor, Dr. Mahmud Zayid, Assistant Professor of History, American University of Beirut; Dr. Harry N. Howard, UNRWA; Mr. Richard D. Gatewood, American Embassy, Beirut; and the many representatives of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency, Beirut.
ABSTRACT

This dissertation studies the programs of assistance to the Arab refugees provided by the United Nations. The flight of the refugees was brought to the attention of the world by Count Folke Bernadotte, the United Nations Mediator for Palestine. Feeling the refugee problem would be of short duration and would vanish with a political solution to the Palestine question, he implemented short term relief measures which provided the refugees with the basic items required to keep body and soul together. Shortly, however, it became evident that a political solution was not to be achieved in the brief period originally contemplated. Relief measures had to become more elaborate and the United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees was formed to provide a more comprehensive relief program. Its term was to be limited, ending when a political solution was implemented.

Negotiations for solving the problem by political means faltered and the United Nations turned its hopes to an economic solution. A study by the United Nations Economic Survey Mission indicated that the economic development of the Middle East provided means for absorbing the Arab refugees in the host countries. Accordingly, the United Nations established an agency not only to provide relief, but to supplement it with a works program designed to develop the area's economy. As the refugees would become self-supporting, their requirement for relief and the United Nations responsibility
for providing it would cease.

Within a few years after the implementation of the new plan it became evident that the expectation of a quick economic solution was very optimistic. The economic program failed in its aims and rather than decreasing, the relief rolls of the UNRWA increased.

As UNRWA realized that no economic solution to the refugee problem on the vast scale originally visualized was forthcoming, the policy of the Agency underwent a complete reorientation. Provisions of the relief program have been expanded and a program of training selected refugees in fields enabling them to become self-supporting has been implemented. This is the situation as it presently exists in the Agency.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Background to the Tragedy</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1920 - 1945</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Final Years of the Mandate</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Arab-Israeli War</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Arab Refugee</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Early Relief Measures</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Background</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The United Nations Mediator for Palestine</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Resolution 194 and 212</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>An Attempted Economic Solution to the Refugee Problem</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Economic Survey Mission</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Formation of UNRWA</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>The UNRWA Program</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Refugees</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rations</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Shelter</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Health Care</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rehabilitation</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Funding of the UNRWA Program</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Conclusions</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER I - BACKGROUND TO THE TRAGEDY

INTRODUCTION

No specific event marks the beginning of the Arab refugee problem. It is impossible to designate any one happening or even any group of happenings and say this is the cause and from this has come the effect; the Arab refugee problem.

The cause of the problem, without a doubt, was the British mandate policy in Palestine initiated after the first World War. It is not meant to imply that the blame for this problem rests entirely with the British, but it is suggested that it was brought about by a series of interrelated events, that resulted in the British evacuation of Palestine, the establishment of the State of Israel, and the flight of the majority of the Arabs from their lands that rested in the portions of Palestine seized by the Jews.

It is not intended to discuss the history of the British mandate in Palestine. The events prior to the end of World War II, while determining the future of the mandate, have no direct bearing upon the subject of this paper. These events, therefore, will be considered only briefly. A more complete study, however, must be made of the period following World War II, for it was during this period that the events occurred that precipitated the Arab refugee problem.
1920 - 1945

After the end of World War I the British were charged with the mandate for Palestine. This occurred at the San Remo Conference on 24 April 1920, when Great Britain was assigned the mandate for Palestine and Transjordan. Sir Herbert Samuel became the first British Commissioner in Palestine and the period of British control began.¹

In the following twenty years, to the beginning of World War II, the Zionists, represented since 1929 by the Jewish Agency in Palestine,² attempted to set into operation the machinery that would guarantee a National Home for the Jews. During the 1920's the Zionists had the blessings of the mandatory power in their endeavours. As the mandate progressed into the thirties, the Zionist plans for domination of Palestine met increasing opposition from Arab political parties and other

---

² Article 4 of the Mandate for Palestine states, "An appropriate Jewish Agency shall be recognized as a public body for the purpose of advising and co-operating with the Administration of Palestine in such economic, social and other matters as may affect the establishment of the Jewish national home and the interests of the Jewish population in Palestine, and, subject always to the control of the Administration, to assist and take part in the development of the country.

The Zionist organisation, so long as its organisation and constitution are in the opinion of the Mandatory appropriate, shall be recognised as such agency. It shall take steps in consultation with His Britannic Majesty's Government to secure the co-operation of all Jews who are willing to assist in the establishment of the Jewish national home."
representative Arab groups that were formed. The Arabs became increasingly powerful in the country and by their resistance to government policy favoring the Jews, assisted by the spectre of approaching war, they succeeded in modifying the policy of the mandatory power until, the pendulum having swung its full arc, the British Government announced its 1939 White Paper. Though not accepted by the Arabs, the 1939 White Paper was an outward sign of the British desire to gain the esteem and favor of the Arabs in Palestine and in the Arab countries of the Middle East.

The 1939 White Paper conditionally proposed the granting of independence to Palestine, bound by treaty relations to Great Britain, at the end of ten years. The Palestine High Commissioner would have the power to regulate or prohibit the transfer of land, thus preventing the accumulation of land by Jewish interests. Jewish immigration would be limited to 75,000 persons in the first five years, after which further immigration would be dependent on Arab "acquiescence". The paper stated: "His Majesty's Government therefore now declare unequivocally that it is not part of their policy that Palestine should become a Jewish State."³

For the Arabs, this reversal of policy had come too late. The author believes that the high point of Arab unity in Palestine had been reached during the period from 1936 to

the time of the issuance of the 1939 White Paper. This period, marked by the Arab Rebellion, while obtaining the concessions of the White Paper had in fact sapped Arab strength for the decisive struggle that was to come in the late 1940's. History will show that following this time the energy of the Arab leaders was spent in trying to consolidate their own political interests rather than preparing and executing a plan that would insure Palestine's becoming an independent Arab country.

The early war years saw little activity on both sides. The British had realized the strategic importance of the Middle East and had entered a pro-Arab period. The Jews, on the other hand, had no choice in the war effort. In fact the complete support of the British Government was their only hope. They realized that victory by the Axis could end in death for their people and end their hopes for a Jewish State. They also felt that the 1939 position of the British Government was not irrevocable, so to insure the good will of the Allies they gave them, until 1943, their fullest support.  

As the war progressed and an Allied victory was assured, some of the Jews began to regard the British position, as expressed in the 1939 White Paper, as one that had been brought about by Arab violence and forms of illegality. The Zionist aims were expressed in the 1942 Biltmore Program and a program of resistance was started. This active opposition to the mandate is best expressed in the words of Ben-Gurion: "...there

will be no cooperation between us and the White Paper authorities... We are preparing our own plans...

Several Jewish terrorist organizations were active during this period. The two that were to remain in action for the following six year period were the Fighters for Israel's Freedom, a 1943 revival of the earlier Stern Gang which had lost power and effectiveness after the death of its leader in 1941, and the Irgun Zvai Leumi (I.Z.L.) which, though in existence for several years, became extremely active in 1943. The main activities of the two organizations were directed towards the British, but did not hesitate to perpetrate acts of violence against the Arabs. They carried out a series of incidents in Palestine that included abductions, bombings and murders. Their activities were not confined to Palestine only and in November of 1944, the Stern Gang murdered, in Cairo, the British Minister - Resident, Lord Moyne, in revenge for what they considered his anti-Zionist policy. As we study the later events in the history of Palestine we must remember that these acts received much publicity and they had a decided effect on the people residing in the area, raising in them apprehension and fear.

8. Ibid., p. 206.
In addition to the terrorist organizations there existed at the time the Haganah (self defense), the Jewish underground army. The Haganah numbered in 1942 approximately 60,000 men and women of which 2,000 belonged to the Palmach, an elite force selected from the Haganah, permanently mobilized for shock troop action. Sources of supply for the force were the purchase of arms from disreputable members of the British armed forces, Jewish members of the British Army and purchases from Jewish concerns that manufactured arms for the Allies.

The Jewish Agency began an overt policy of opposing any act which stood in the way of the establishment of the Jewish State. It took action designed to increase immigration and to absorb the Jewish victims of Nazi persecution in Germany. It was a complete shadow government that controlled the "Jewish economic sector of the country. It had its own hospitals and social services, it ran its own schools, its own intelligence service with virtually all Jewish Government officials as voluntary informers, and controlled its own para-military organization, the famous Haganah, nucleus of the future Army of Israel." The basis for the future state was on hand prior to the end of the Second World War.

As the war drew to a close, preparations began to take place for the final struggle yet to come. Actions of the

British Government allowed both groups to believe that the issue of the final determination of the status of Palestine was still in doubt. History has shown that the British were, during that period, thinking in terms of partition as the real solution to the situation, but because of the indecision in London to implement such a policy, the administration in Palestine had to continue to carry out, or at least give "lip service" to the policies dictated by the 1939 White Paper which could be shelved only if a new plan could be adopted. The feelings of vacillation among the representatives of the mandate were felt by the Arab and Jewish inhabitants of Palestine causing unrest.

Other activities included pressure by both Arab and Jewish groups on the governments of Great Britain and the United States in an effort to direct the final outcome of the situation. Jewish influence was extremely strong in the United States where the American Government was in the unfortunate position of being extremely sensitive to the importance of the Jewish vote. Arab influence, even though their support in the war effort was no longer required, had also become powerful because of the economic value of their oil rich land. The United States had, through a requirement for an insured portion of the Middle East oil, become extremely interested and active in the affairs of the area. 

The first real test of world opinion occurred at the Conference on International Organization in San Francisco (April 25 - June 26, 1945). At that time delegates of the Arab League states attempted to have the articles on the trusteeship of the projected United Nations Charter so worked as to limit the Jewish rights in Palestine to the existing Jewish population in the country. This would have ended the special status allotted the Jewish Agency under the original terms of the mandate. The final charter did not affect the terms of the mandate and left, until a later date, the final decision on the territories that were to be included under the trusteeship program.\textsuperscript{13}

The foreign policies of Great Britain and the United States toward the Arabs were at a critical stage. The British realized the Palestine problem was getting out of hand and a solution must be found. The United States had just begun to take an active interest in the Middle East and was still in the process of formulating a definite policy. Each country had its own ideas on what was to be done in Palestine. With the fall of the Churchill Government and the death of President Roosevelt, both countries had at their heads men who lacked the world renown of their predecessors and certainly lacked the experience of the wartime leaders. Within two weeks after he assumed office, Mr. Truman was briefed by Acting Secretary of State Joseph C. Grew on the Palestine issues. It was up to

\textsuperscript{13} Hurewitz, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 224.
President Truman to guide the State Department in the formation of future Middle East policy. A Washington Post statement summarizes the basis of the foreign policy evolved: "Domestic politics rather than a considered analysis of the interests of the United States has been the predominating factor in our policy concerning Palestine. The national platform planks of both major parties had continually attempted to out-bid each other for the so-called Jewish Vote."\(^14\) Churchill's successor, Attlee, no more experienced in the matter than President Truman, faced certain political and domestic problems that made the formation of a Palestine policy difficult.\(^15\)

As the two governments struggled with the formation of a comprehensive foreign policy, the Arabs launched, through the facilities and money of the Arab League States, a propaganda program designed to counteract the damage being done by the Zionist propaganda program. The League attempted to approach persons active in Great Britain and United States in the fields of government and finance and inculcate them with the idea that any reversal of the provisions of the 1939 White Paper would be considered a breach of faith by the Arabs and would do harm to the relations between the Arabs and the West. The Higher Committee, representing the Arab community in Palestine since the 1930's, began activities again after having spent some ineffective years during World War II. This committee was

dominated by the Palestine Arab party and consisted of a coalition of Husayni and Istiqlal leaders. It was able to provide a semblance of representation for the Arab community and was recognized as the Arab community spokesman by both the Arab League and the British Government in Palestine.\textsuperscript{16}

The Jewish Agency also increased its activities in an attempt to force a political decision that would culminate in the creation of a Jewish State. On 22 May 1945, the Jewish Agency demanded from the British Government:

"1. That an immediate decision be announced to establish Palestine undivided and undiminished as a Jewish State.
2. That the Jewish Agency be invested with the control of Jewish immigration into Palestine.
3. That an international loan be raised to finance the immigration of the first million Jews to Palestine."\textsuperscript{17}

On 31 August 1945, President Truman, after receiving a report on the condition of the Jews in Europe, wrote a letter to Prime Minister Attlee suggesting that 100,000 Jews be admitted to Palestine to alleviate their sufferings.\textsuperscript{18} The proposal was rejected by Attlee, unless the United States would assume a share of the practical responsibility for any change of policy in Palestine; a suggestion the American Government refused to accept. As an alternative the Attlee Cabinet suggested to President Truman that a joint Anglo-American

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{16} Ibid., p. 239.
\item \textsuperscript{17} Marlowe, op. cit., p. 199.
\item \textsuperscript{18} Kermit Roosevelt, "A Lesson in Pressure Politics," Middle East Journal (January 1948) and reprinted in Palestine Collected Works (A. U. B., Beirut: 1960).
\end{itemize}
Committee enter Palestine to conduct a joint investigation of
the problem.\footnote{19} Pending the outcome of the investigation,
immigration, which had exceeded the White Paper quota, would
be continued at the rate of 1500 per month.\footnote{20}

\textbf{FINAL YEARS OF THE MANDATE}

In 1945 the Arab League Pact established a loose
confederation of independent Arab States. An annex to the pact
stressed the Arab character of Palestine and provided the basis
for future Arab League participation in the activities of the
country.\footnote{21} In 1946 lack of agreement among members of the
Higher Committee and the refusal of the Istiqlal and other
political party representatives to associate themselves with
the goals of the Husaynis, resulted in the Arab League taking
an active interest in resolving the political difficulties in
the country. The League formed an Arab Higher Executive from
members of the various conflicting groups and placed in their
hands the affairs of the Palestine resistance. By January 1947,
eight of the ten members of the Arab Higher Executive were
from the Palestine Arab Party. This party, as previously
mentioned, was under the control of the Husaynis. Funds were
made available to it in the same year to continue the work of

\footnote{19} Jerusalem Government Printer, \textit{A Survey of Palestine}
(Jerusalem: 1946), pp. 99-102. These papers contain
an excellent account of British policy at the time
in a quoted address by Ernest Bevin, Secretary of
State for Foreign Affairs, 13 November 1945.

\footnote{20} Ibid., p. 84.

\footnote{21} Hurewitz, M.E. \textit{Documents}, op. cit., pp. 245-249.
attempting to end British rule in Palestine and trying to obtain Arab ascendancy over the country.

Groups of volunteers, the Arab Liberation Army, were formed in various countries to prepare for the seizing of Palestine when the times dictated but organization still seemed to be lacking in Palestine. The Husaynis were never able to forego political bickering for the much more important national cause. It seems too bad, in retrospect, that the party never had, since the 1930's, been able to resolve its political difficulties and organize the Arab community. The Jews, although they had internal struggles of their own, never seemed to forget their mission of establishing Palestine as an exclusively Jewish State. The Arab community was one without an active leader, actually located in Palestine (the Mufti, leader of the Husaynis was in exile in Egypt), and an established system that could control the people of the community. It was a community without a head and without organization as opposed to the highly complex and efficient Jewish organization, with which they would soon be engaged in a life and death struggle.

As the Committee of Inquiry prepared to enter the area, tension increased in the Middle East. There were demonstrations and riots, costing the lives of many persons in several of the major Arab cities. Jewish terrorism reached new heights with acts of violence carried out by the Haganah, as well as the I.Z.L. 22 These acts on the part of the Jews

22. Begin, op. cit., contains details of these actions.
resulted in an increase in the number of the British garrison in the area along with increased military and public powers being given the Administration. High Commissioner, Lord Gort, resigning on 5 November for health reasons, was replaced by General Sir Alan Cunningham and preparations were made to reestablish order until the fate of the mandate was decided.  

The report of the Anglo-American Committee was issued after an investigation that took it through the entire area. The report was in itself a compromise among the members of the committee, representing an attempt at unanimity in the hope that by this very unanimity it would produce a solution acceptable to the United States and Great Britain. The major recommendations were:

1. 100,000 Certificates for immigration be granted immediately and additional immigration be facilitated at a later date.
2. Ban on employment of non-Jews in Jewish enterprises should cease.
3. Palestine remain under British trusteeship.
4. The restrictions on land purchase should be lifted.

The report accomplished little and both the British and American Governments found themselves in about the same positions as in the previous year. The Americans seemed to lean towards the Zionists and the British towards the Arabs. In fact the British reception of the report and their comments on it

23. Jerusalem Government Printer, op. cit., p. 82.
25. Ibid., p. 12.
coincided with the beginning of a concerted attempt by the Zionists to establish the Jewish State by force.

Palestine was torn by the activities of the Haganah, the I.Z.L. and other militant groups. The British took steps to enforce its rule by searches and checks in an attempt to disrupt the activities of the Jews. The Jewish Agency was considered suspect in the activities and soon even the most pro-Zionist individual in the British administration was having misgivings. The enforcement of martial rule would have been much more complete if the British were not, by virtue of their need for U. S. economic assistance, under the threat of pressure from American Zionist Groups, who were not above making overt statements that could influence the men who determined American foreign aid, the Congress.

An attempt for formulating a solution was made at the London Conference, which opened on 10 September 1946, with the Arab States and the British Government taking part. The Morrison-Grady plan of trusteeship, a plan of dividing Palestine into a Jewish province, an Arab province, and the districts of Jerusalem and Negeb, was discussed and found unacceptable by both the Jews and Arabs. The Arab counterproposal was merely a repetition of the 1939 White Paper with an addition calling for the independence of Palestine by December 1948, while the Zionists refused to modify their demands for a Jewish State. The conference was suspended to enable the British to study these proposals.26

During this period of suspension, the statements of President Truman in the campaign preceding the 1946 elections, gave a new boost to Zionism. On 4 October, President Truman issued a statement calling for the admission of 100,000 Jews to Palestine and advocated the creation of a Jewish State in control of its own immigration and economic policies in an adequate area of Palestine. 27 The American foreign policy in Palestine was being established by the words of its president, not by the planning and recommendations of the Department of State. Secretary Byrnes, questioned at a later date on what he hoped to do about Palestine, replied that he had nothing to do with the policy, he just carried messages. 28

The second and final phase of the London Conference opened on 27 January 1947. The two parties refused to change their previous stand, and a British counterproposal was rejected by both groups. On 14 February 1947, the British Government decided to refer the entire matter to the United Nations for a decision and solution.

On 2 April 1947, the British Government requested a special session of the General Assembly "for the purpose of constituting and instructing a special committee to prepare for the consideration" of the Palestine problem. 29 As an investigating vehicle, an eleven man board known as the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP), composed of

27. Roosevelt, op. cit., p. 16.
28. Ibid., p. 17.
Australia, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, India, Iran, Netherlands, Peru, Sweden, Uruguay, and Yugoslavia was constituted.

Testimony before the First (Political and Security) Committee was given by both the Arab Higher Committee (Higher Executive)\(^{30}\) and the Jewish Agency\(^{31}\) on their conflicting claims. These claims showed just how deep the problem actually was and the difficulties that would have to be faced before a final solution could be reached.\(^{32}\)

During the special session of the General Assembly (April 28 - May 15) it became evident that Great Britain and the United States were in a defensive posture based upon previous statements and actions taken with regard to the question. Russia, recognizing a situation that could cause confusion in the Middle East, stated their position as being in favor of the measure that would give the Jews the opportunity to establish their own state, even if this called for the partition of Palestine.\(^{33}\)

While the UNSCOP investigation continued, Jewish terrorism increased to an extent never seen before and the Arabs became increasingly belligerent, staging demonstrations against Zionists, the British, Americans and the Arab "traitors" to the cause. An Arab army, composed of the Najjadah and the


\(^{31}\) Jewish Agency for Palestine, The Jewish Plan for Palestine (1947).

\(^{32}\) Hurewitz, op. cit., p. 286.

\(^{33}\) Ibid.
Futuwah, was organized into a single unit which the Arabs hoped would be able to provide an effective fighting force for the future action.34

The UNSCOP plan was completed on 31 August 1947, and consisted of two parts, a minority report, recommending a dual state organization, and a majority report. The majority plan recommended a partition of the area into two distinct states with economic ties between them. The Jewish state would consist of eastern Galilee, the Coastal Plain, from a point south of Acre to one north of Isdud, and the Negeb. The other areas, with the exception of Jerusalem, Bethlehem and their surrounding districts which were to be formed into the Jerusalem district and remain under United Nations' control, were to become an Arab state. A transitional period of two years was to be established in which 150,000 Jews were to be admitted to the country and in which the land transfer restrictions were to stop in the area of the Jewish state. During the mentioned transitional period, the area would continue to be administered by Great Britain with the assistance of the United Nations, if required.35

On 23 September, the United Nations General Assembly referred the Palestine question to the Ad Hoc Political Committee. This committee, after subcommittee action on the UNSCOP plan, approved a plan allocating 5,500 square miles,

34. Ibid., pp. 270-272. This section contains additional details on the Arab army.
which was 55 per cent of the total area of Palestine to the Jews; establishing the latest date for the termination of the mandate as 1 August 1948; and establishing the date of the activation of the two states as not later than 1 October 1948.

The General Assembly on 29 November 1947, passed the Ad Hoc Political Committee's proposal by a vote of 33 to 13, giving the required two-thirds majority. 36 Upon receipt of this decision, Great Britain announced that she would evacuate Palestine on 15 May 1948. She denied the United Nations Commission for implementation of the decision, access to the area prior to 1 May which made their task of obtaining control of the area next to impossible and which provided the final means for the Jews and the Arabs to engage in conflict over the territory. The partition proposal meant the beginning of the Palestine war.

Sporadic attacks on the Jews in an attempt to preserve the Arab portions of Palestine, directed from outside Palestine, by the Higher Committee, expanded into countrywide warfare which had as its objective the severance of communication, isolation of outlying areas and other actions designed to make the Zionists accept a settlement on Arab terms. 37 By the end of January 1948, the first unit of the Arab Liberation Army had crossed into Palestine. 38 The Arabs were able to hold their

36. Roosevelt, op. cit., pp. 17-18. This work explains the maneuvers and pressure behind the adoption of the partition plan.
38. The Times (London), 20 April 1948, p. 4.
ground until April when the previously organized Jewish forces, based upon the Haganah, and supplemented by the several terrorist organizations, were able to take the initiative from the Arabs and rout some of their units. They were, after this, able to occupy the majority of the important towns in the area, including Acre, Haifa, Jaffa, the majority of Jerusalem proper, and others.

It was during this period that the failure of the Arab Higher Committee to form a quasi-governmental organization contributed to the fleeing of many Arabs from the areas stricken, or soon to be stricken with active combat. The Higher Committee, aware of the situation, in the last months of the mandate, asked that all Arab civil servants of the Palestine Government remain at their jobs. The senior official of each department was named as provisional director. These directors were to form the basis of a network that was to have fallen directly under local national committee representatives, thus forming a chain that ran to the Higher Committee itself.\(^39\) The idea would have been workable if the organization had been established before the period of panic had begun and the Arab forces had succeeded in at least maintaining the status quo, but at this late stage, the Zionist offensive had acquired such momentum that the exodus could not be stopped. By the time the British had given up their responsibility for the government of the area, there was no Arab, only Jewish authority, ready to take

---

\(^39\) Hurwitz, op. cit., p. 313.
up the reins of the country.

After studying many of the reports and investigations on the subject of why the Arabs fled their homes, I have come to the conclusion that the flight was caused by several factors: those persons who were able to afford to leave Palestine and move to the neighboring Arab countries, left and established themselves in these havens for the duration of the struggle; the effect on the people after hearing about the Jewish massacre of the settlers of Deir Yasin, 9 April 1948, from both Jewish and Arab sources alike, caused in many a fear that changed to panic before the advance of the Jews; actual persecution of the Arabs by Jewish elements, including the Jewish Armed forces, in the various areas; and the actual evacuation caused by the presence of war and fighting, with the destruction that goes with it, in many of the areas. The amount of panic that was felt among many of the common people is shown by the statement: "The enemy propaganda (Arab accounts of Deir Yasin) was designed to besmirch our name. In the result it helped us. Panic overwhelmed the Arabs of Eretz Israel. Kolonia village, which had previously repulsed every attack of the Haganah, was evacuated overnight and fell without further fighting..." In other areas "the Arabs began

40. See article in The Spectator, 12 May 1961, pp. 672-675 and letters to the editor on 16, 23, 30, June and 7, 21 July 1961. In addition see the articles on this subject in the Middle East Form by Walid Khalidy.
fleeing in panic, shouting 'Deir Yasin'. Another technique to encourage the flight of the Arabs was the spreading of reports of contagious diseases by Jewish broadcasting stations encouraging the Arabs to flee to save their families from the scourge of these sicknesses.42

THE ARAB – ISRAELI WAR

Very briefly we will consider the war so that we may put the flight of the refugees into its proper time frame. On 14 May 1948, Israel declared itself independent with the departure of the mandatory troops from Haifa. On 15 May 1948, the armies of Egypt, Iraq, Syria and Transjordan entered Palestine. They were able to advance rapidly during the first month of the fighting and establish themselves in the major part of Palestine. On 11 June 1948 a truce was declared through the United Nations,43 and it is felt that if the Arabs had taken this opportunity to negotiate terms, they would probably have won more concessions than they did later. At the end of a month the Arab League, under the influence of Arab public opinion, renewed hostilities.

The truce had enabled the Israelis to reorganize their forces, obtain arms from Iron Curtain countries in greater quantities, and plan for future operations. The

second phase of operations revealed that the Arab effort lacked the unification between the countries required to pursue successfully the course of the war. From the end of the first truce until the second, 18 July 1948, the Arabs lost many of their former holdings in the central portion of the country, particularly the towns of Cyddda and Ramley.

During the pause in the war the Israelis were again able to strengthen their forces while the Arabs did little but wait. On 15 October 1948, breaking the truce, the Israeli Army attacked the Egyptian Army. By the 21st of October, they managed to seize Beersheba and on the 22nd a new cease-fire went into effect, but localized fighting continued until 24 February 1949, when Egypt signed an armistice with Israel, followed by Lebanon's signing of one on 23 March 1949 and Syria on 20 July 1949.44

For the second time, on 7 March 1949, Israel broke a cease-fire and advanced towards the Gulf of Aqaba which they reached on 10 March 1949. On 3 April 1949, an armistice was signed between Israel and Transjordan. No armistice was concluded between Israel and Iraq, who shared no common boundaries with Israel; its army had been withdrawn prior to this time.45

THE ARAB REFUGEE

There were three distinct waves of flight by the

44. Kimche, op. cit., p. 267.
45. Ibid., p. 271.
Arabs from Palestine with the first taking place between 29 November 1947 and 15 May 1948. In this wave we find the previously mentioned group consisting of the more influential and wealthy members of the community who left the area, residing in nearby countries, until they could determine what would be the end result of the unrest. In addition to these persons, there were those driven out by the action of the Jews in the seizing of areas before the mandate came to an end. As one writer states, "It became the rule that, when the Jewish forces advanced, the Arab inhabitants of the occupied territory fled; nor was the flight without stimulation or encouragement by the Jews." The exact number that left during this later time is impossible to determine, but one authority who later visited the area stated that by 14 May 1948, when Israel declared its independence, "there were only a few thousand scattered Arabs left in the territory of the new State; around 300,000 Arab refugees, deserted by their leaders... had sought refuge in the Arab part of Palestine or in neighboring states." This number is disputed by several others and seems to be an overestimate. There is no actual figure available.

The second wave took place between May 1948 and the armistice agreement. An estimate of 350,000 refugees is given by Count Bernadotte in the summer of 1948, when he requested world assistance in the handling of the problem.

47. Koestler, op. cit., p. 162.
Another statement, this time by the Egyptian Prime Minister, contained in his terms for the continuation of the truce that was in effect, demanded that "the 300,000 Arab Refugees be allowed to return home." This statement was issued on 15 July 1948. I believe that these two figures are close estimates of the actual number of refugees in flight at the time.

The third wave, not complete in itself and extended over quite a period of time, took place after the armistice agreements and consisted of persons from the Negeb and the demilitarized zone. Again, there is no actual figure on the total number of refugees that left the area, but estimates seem to center around the 600,000 person figure. As I mentioned, a positive figure was never established and by the middle of 1949 the figure was given as 940,000 and by June 1950 as 960,021. It was impossible to establish the difference between the bonafide refugee and those persons who were not victims of the war, but victims of poverty. The actual figure, after much disagreement between those responsible for administering the refugees, was set to include many needy people in the area, thus the 960,021 figure.

The world was now faced with a group of nearly 1,000,000 persons, lacking homes, food, health facilities and a means to provide for themselves. In the following chapters it is proposed to delve into the international efforts to provide economic aid and assistance to these needy souls. While the world debated in an attempt to arrive at a solution, one that has not been reached in the last 14 years, persons were existing on the edge of death, lacking even those bare necessities that can provide life. How the world reacted to this situation will be the subject of the remainder of this work.
CHAPTER II - EARLY RELIEF MEASURES

BACKGROUND

In the previous chapter we noted the flight of the Arabs from Palestine and the beginning of the Arab refugee problem. No such situation or problem had been envisioned when plans were made for the implementation of the United Nations General Assembly's partition plan for Palestine. There was no administrative machinery on hand for dealing with and providing emergency relief for such a large number of persons. The plight of the refugee was to be an additional consideration that was to burden the United Nations organization as it attempted to evolve a final solution to the Palestine problem.

THE UNITED NATIONS MEDIATOR IN PALESTINE

It is evident from an investigation of the records of the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations that the members of these two organizations were unaware of the gravity and the extent of the refugee problem in May of 1948. Recognition was given the fact that such a situation existed, but it was overshadowed by the realization that the conflagration in the Middle East, if not contained, might spread and engulf the world in another world war. The main effort of the United Nations was to control and then bring to a close the fighting in Palestine. This was to be followed by an attempt at mediation to try and effect a final
solution to the Palestinian problem. Since it was now evident that a refugee problem had been created by the war, humanitarian reasons dictated that an effort must also be made to ease their sufferings until a final solution to the greater Palestine situation could be found.

In an effort to effect a truce in Palestine, the United Nations passed its resolution of May 14, 1948 (186 (S-2)).¹ Included in the resolution was a provision for providing refugee relief. The portion of the resolution applicable to our subject states:

"Empowered a United Nations Mediator in Palestine to be chosen by a committee of the General Assembly composed of representatives of China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and the United States of America... to invite, as seems to him [the Mediator] advisable, with a view to the promotion of the welfare of the inhabitants of Palestine, the assistance and cooperation of appropriate specialized agencies of the United Nations, such as the World Health Organization, of the International Red Cross, and of other governmental or non-governmental organizations of a humanitarian and non-political character;"

On May 20, 1948, the committee of the Assembly met and appointed Count Folke Bernadotte as the United Nations Mediator in Palestine.² He was a fortunate choice. Count Bernadotte possessed vast experience in international relations, having aided in the exchange of disabled British and German war prisoners, brought about by negotiations on an international level during World War II. By virtue of experience gained

². Ibid.
while serving with the Red Cross Organization he was well qualified to deal with the refugee problem. 3

Count Bernadotte, who was to die at the hands of an assassin in September 1948, spent the final months of his life in an attempt to bring peace to Palestine. It is obvious from a study of the period May to September 1948, that the original relief measures were brought about by the energy, knowledge, and personal interest of the Mediator.

Count Bernadotte's efforts on behalf of the refugees began before his arrival in Palestine when he met, in Paris, representatives of the International Red Cross in order to discuss with them the possibility of the Red Cross making an active contribution towards alleviating the suffering in Palestine. Arrangements were made to have a representative of this organization attached to his staff to assist in the coordination of any relief activities that might arise. 4

Bernadotte's role as mediator had three aspects: the mediation effort; arrangement and supervision of two truces; and assistance to the refugees. The first two fail to fall within the purview of this study and will be disregarded. The efforts exerted on behalf of the refugees will be covered in detail. We shall see that from the basic plan for relief

---


formulated by the Mediator, evolved practically the entire system of United Nations relief for the Arab refugees.

Referring to Bernadotte’s book, To Jerusalem, we find a complete record of events and impressions as seen by the Mediator. It is interesting to note that the problem of refugee relief and his personal concern with the problem became more and more intense as time passes. This can be seen clearly from his journal:

24 July 1948 - Azzam Pasha, Secretary-General of the Arab League, calls the Mediator’s attention to the horrible conditions in which the Arab refugees - between three and four thousand - live.5

26 July 1948 - Talks were held with the Jewish Foreign Minister, Moshe Shertok, on the question of the return of the Arab refugees to their homes in Palestine.6

1 August 1948 - The entry on this date mentions a preliminary examination in Amman of the refugee situation. The investigation revealed that "the refugee problem was vaster and more baffling" than had been imagined. It was obvious to the Mediator that strong measures would be needed to prevent a rash of epidemics and the outbreak of disturbances.7

2 August 1948 - On this date the Mediator visited a camp in Ramallah where thousands of refugees were assembled. The words of Bernadotte are worth quoting in their entirety because they reflect the spirit of the man and show his conviction that provisions would have to be made to furnish help to these stricken people. Bernadotte said: "I have made the acquaintance of a great many refugee camps; but never have I seen a more ghastly sight than that which met my eyes at Ramallah. The car was literally stormed by excited masses shouting with Oriental fervour that they wanted food and wanted to return to their homes....What would happen at the beginning of October, when the rainy season

5. Ibid., p. 185.
6. Ibid., p. 190.
7. Ibid., p. 197.
began and the cold weather set in? It was a thought one preferred not to follow to a conclusion."

The first action taken by the Mediator was done in response to an appeal from the Arab League to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. After referring to the creation of a bureau at Cairo to provide help for the refugees and to the readiness of the Arab States to co-operate in providing aid, the appeal said:

"It is felt that the situation of misery and distress of a large number of refugees merits the attention of the United Nations Organization concerned with the assistance and welfare of refugees, and this request is...made...with a view to initiating such action as is required to relieve the...situation."\(^9\)

This appeal was originally directed to the International Refugee Organization (IRO), but, lacking resources and facing technical difficulties, it was unable to assist on a sufficient scale. The Secretary-General then directed the request to the Mediator for action under the provisions of resolution 186 (S/2).

On July 21, 1948, the Mediator requested that a senior officer be sent by the Secretary-General to examine the problem. Sir Raphael Cilento of Australia, Director of the Division of Social Activities in the United Nations Department of Social Affairs, arrived and conducted an investigation in Transjordan.

---

8. Ibid., p. 200.
with officials of the League of Red Cross Societies.\textsuperscript{10} By 7 August 1948, a preliminary survey had been completed, reflecting dangerous health and living conditions among the refugees of Transjordan.\textsuperscript{11}

The immediate needs of the refugees were considered to be: food and protected water supplies in adequate quantity; preventive medicine service; work to occupy the refugees; tentage for 60,000 persons prior to 15 October and clothing and bedding.\textsuperscript{12}

On 12 August 1948, Count Bernadotte appealed for immediate relief to the United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF) for assistance in providing aid to children, pregnant women and nursing mothers. UNICEF allotted a sum of $411,000 plus costs in response to the appeal, an amount that provided a basis for immediate relief.\textsuperscript{13}

The Arab States, even though they had already provided money, supplies, and services to an extent that had strained their resources, continued to provide basic relief. The Mediator realized that these countries were unable to carry the burden of relief by themselves, so he expanded his appeal for assistance. On 16 August, he dispatched telegrams to 53

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{11} U.N.G.A. OR (A/648), \textit{op. cit.}, p. 48 contains details including the estimated number of refugees, age groups, and a description of living and health conditions.
\item \textsuperscript{12} \textit{Ibid.}
\item \textsuperscript{13} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 49.
\end{itemize}
members of the United Nations requesting them to provide
general food requirements, certain special equipment, and or
funds. He concluded agreements with Lebanon and Syria to
facilitate the import of supplies through Beirut and to insure
prompt passage of the supplies through these countries to the
refugee distribution centers.\textsuperscript{14}

A United Nations Disaster Relief program was instituted
at Beirut headed by Sir Raphael. The World Health Organization
(\textit{WHO}), the Food and Agriculture Organization (\textit{FAO}), the Intern-
national Refugee Organization (\textit{IRO}), the Red Cross organizations
of the Middle Eastern countries, and the World Council of
Churches agreed to provide administrative and advisory help
to this center in addition to their contributions to direct
relief.\textsuperscript{15}

Refugee camps were organized with the objective of
gathering the refugees into specific areas to facilitate the
distribution of rations and to make it easier to provide
needed medical attention. An attempt was made to provide
shelter through the utilization of tents provided by agencies
and contributing governments.

As can be seen, a basic relief program was put into
effect under the direction of the Mediator with the assistance
of contributions received from United Nations members and
international relief organizations. Though not complete, an

\textsuperscript{14} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{15} Ibid., pp. 49-52.
organization had been formed to provide the barest necessities to the refugees, enabling them to survive until a more comprehensive program could be provided. 16

On September 16, 1948, 24 hours before his assassination, Count Bernadotte had prepared a progress report for submission to the General Assembly. The report is extremely important to this discussion since a portion of it dealt with his activities in relation to refugee relief and offered a complete accounting of relief measures taken by him. It contained, in addition, a suggested plan for providing future assistance to the refugees.

When the Mediator submitted his progress report, he had received supplies or promises of supplies from UNICEF and from 33 nations. In addition, he had received aid from 13 agencies other than governments to which appeals were directed.17

In his report Count Bernadotte broke the problem into three distinct phases: "(a) Immediate relief of absolute basic needs; (b) a programme from September to December 1948 inclusive, based on exact figures...; (c) a long range programme if, as appears inevitable, operations would need to be continued through the winter of 1948 and until August-September 1949,


17. U.N.G.A. OR (A/648), op. cit., Annexes I, II and III, contain a complete account of the response to the telegraphic requests of the Mediator. It also contains a listing of contributions by agencies other than those to which appeals were sent.
when harvesting will be completed."\(^{18}\)

One other item of importance, outside the field of direct relief, is mentioned in the report in the section on specific conclusions.

"The right of the Arab refugees to return to their homes in Jewish-controlled territory at the earliest possible date should be affirmed by the United Nations, and their repatriation, resettlement, and economic and social rehabilitation, and payment of adequate compensation for the property of those choosing not to return, should be supervised and assisted by the United Nations..."\(^{19}\)

The Mediator recommended that the problems of repatriation and compensation be handled by a Palestine conciliation commission, acting under the authority and responsible to the United Nations.\(^{20}\)

In the covering letter (A/647) attached to the progress report, the Mediator proposed that the Palestine question be included in the agenda of the third session of the General Assembly which was due to meet in a few months time.

Within a month an additional report, Supplement 11A, was submitted to the General Assembly by the Acting Mediator, Dr. Ralph Bunche, who had assumed his position on the death of the Mediator.\(^{21}\) The report elaborated on and modified, in the light of additional developments, the original report of Count Bernadotte. It stressed that the urgency of the need

---

18. Ibid., p. 49.
19. Ibid., p. 42.
20. Ibid.
for assistance had been accentuated and that additional relief was required. The need of the refugees had increased because of several factors: (1) the refugees had previously been supported by their own cash resources and the resources of host Governments. These sources of aid had been exhausted; (2) the approach of winter had made the requirement for shelter a critical one; (3) the original estimate of refugees had been revised upwards from a 360,000 figure to a 472,000 figure and this was expected to reach over 500,000 in a short period of time.  

The voluntary aid that had been received, in response to the appeals of the Mediator, had supplemented the relief provided by the Arab Governments, but proved quite inadequate as compared with the requirements of the crisis that was developing. No aid was in sight after the consumption of the supplies donated as a result of the Mediator’s appeal. A program of relief, covering the period previously mentioned in the report of Count Bernadotte, was outlined along with its estimated cost.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Estimated Cost</th>
<th>Cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Food</td>
<td>$13,200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clothing</td>
<td>6,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blankets, Sleeping mats</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shelter</td>
<td>200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Routine Medical Maintenance Cost</td>
<td>3,600,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation</td>
<td>5,500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$29,500,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

22. Ibid., p. 5. The refugee distribution was given as Palestine, 237,000; Syria, 73,000; Lebanon, 61,000; Transjordan, 38,000; Egypt, 9,000; and Iraq, 4,000. Contained in this section is an interesting discussion explaining how this figure was obtained.

23. Ibid., pp. 7-11. These pages contain a list of contributors and the amount and type of item contributed.
Administrative costs were not included in the above figure. The Disaster Relief project at that time included 16 persons on its staff. It was contemplated expanding the staff to 50 persons which would entail the addition of $500,000 administrative costs to the total relief figure. 24

RESOLUTIONS 194 (III) AND 212 (III)

The report of the Mediator was referred to two committees, the First and Third Committees. The First Committee studied the political question in Palestine and the Third Committee considered that portion of the report dealing with assistance to the Palestine refugees.

The First Committee, after several months discussion, submitted a series of draft proposals on the Palestine situation to the General Assembly. The Assembly, at its 186th meeting on 11 December 1948, adopted resolution 194 (III) by a vote of 35 to 15 with 8 abstentions. This resolution established the United Nations Conciliation Commission of Palestine (CCP). The Commission received authority to facilitate refugee repatriation, resettlement, and economic and social rehabilitation. It must be noted that as part of an over-all peace settlement, the resolution stipulated "that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbors should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date..." 25

24. Ibid., p. 4.
25. For the complete contents of resolution 194 (III) see Annex A.
At its 142nd plenary meeting on 24 September 1948, the General Assembly referred part three of the Mediator's report (refugees) to the Third Committee. Also forwarded to the committee, at a later date, was the second progress report (A/689/Corr. 1/Add.1), submitted on 18 October by the Acting Mediator. Discussions on the problem lasted for over two months with many modifications made to the original recommendations. After a draft resolution had been prepared by the Third Committee, the matter was referred to the Fifth Committee for their consideration and recommendations.

On 19 November 1948, the report of the Third and Fifth Committees (A/725 and A/726) were presented to the General Assembly. A difference of opinion on the location of the headquarters of the relief agency was reconciled by omitting any reference to a specified location. The resolution, after additional discussion, was adopted by unanimous vote of the General Assembly as resolution 212 (III), establishing the United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees Organization (UNRPR).26 The resolution provided a sum of approximately $29,500,000 for furnishing relief to 500,000 refugees for a nine month period extending from 1 December 1948 to 31 August 1949. It provided additionally, the sum of $2,500,000 for administrative and local operational expenses.

The project was to be financed by voluntary contri-

26. For the complete text of resolution 212 (III) see Annex E.
butions in kind or in funds from members of the United Nations. In order to finance the immediate needs of the program the sum of $5,000,000 was advanced, as a loan, from the Working Capital of the United Nations.

The Director of the United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees was appointed by the Secretary-General. He, the director, was responsible for the over-all planning and implementation of the relief program. Private and public agencies as well as FAO, IRO, WHO, and UNICEF were encouraged to support the program of the relief agency by furnishing actual material assistance, and furnishing advice and administrative support to the Director.

The recommendations of Count Bernadotte had found expression in both of the resolutions accepted at the Third Session of the General Assembly, which established the foundation for the treatment of the Arab refugees by the United Nations. The establishment of a relief agency was intended to insure the provision of international relief until the 1949 harvest. The establishment of the Palestine Conciliation Commission was intended to bring to a close the refugee problem during the period in which organized relief work was to be carried out.

**UNITED NATIONS RELIEF FOR PALESTINE REFUGEES**

**Establishment of the agency - Work of the Relief Agency** began with the appointment of Stanton Griffiths, then
United States Ambassador in Egypt, as its director on 1 December 1948. He was to provide relief to the Arab refugees in accordance with the terms of the General Assembly's resolution.

On 19 December 1948, agreements were signed in Geneva between Mr. Griffiths and representatives of the following organizations: the International Committee of the Red Cross, the League of Red Cross Societies and the American Friends Service Committee. These agencies (hereafter referred to as operating agencies), acting as independent and autonomous organizations, agreed to take full responsibility for the distribution, within assigned areas, of supplies furnished them by the UNRPR. The operating agencies were assigned responsibility for the following areas: (1) International Committee of the Red Cross: Israel, Israeli-occupied areas and Jordanian-occupied areas of Palestine; (2) League of Red Cross Societies: Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan; (3) American Friends Service Committee: Gaza area under Egyptian occupation.

Supporting activities - Procurement of food was the responsibility of UNRPR. The initial concept for the purchase of food was that it would be purchased from western sources and would be shipped to Beirut or Port Said. The major purchases would be made from the Geneva office of the organization and sent to the appropriate areas. It was found after

28. Ibid.
29. Ibid., p. 18.
a few weeks, in observing the field operations, that rather than incur a heavy transportation cost in carrying supplies from a great distance, purchases could be made in the Middle East area. Accordingly, from December on, food purchases, with the exception of 7,000 tons of flour handled by the IRO, were made by the Supply Procurement Officer in Beirut and the Supply Procurement Officer in Cairo. \(^{30}\) The advantages of such a policy are obvious: local purchases reduced the shipping costs on the food and the influx of money into the Middle East helped to bolster a lagging economy.

Even with this arrangement of local purchase, the Geneva office remained responsible for activities outside the Middle East as well as certain administrative functions. It must be noted that good management procedures vested the Geneva office with the responsibility of maintaining a check on the prices paid for foodstuffs by the field offices with a view to purchasing elsewhere if by so doing a large saving could be effected. The Geneva office also made purchases of supplies, other than food, that could not be procured in the Middle East. An example of this was the purchase of tents and blankets from the United Kingdom, using a portion of the sterling contribution made by Great Britain. This office also handled a peculiar problem dealing with contributions given the agency. As was mentioned, contributions could be given in money or in kind (representing a contribution of goods or services). Many of these contributions in kind (goods) were unsuitable for

---

\(^{30}\) Ibid., p. 26.
distribution to the refugees and the Geneva office had the task of exchanging these contributions for more suitable supplies. An example deals with cans of tinned meat contributed by Canada. Many of the refugees, on religious grounds, would not eat pork. They feared that the canned meat given to them had been mixed with pork or prepared with pork fat and they refused to eat this meat. The Geneva office, receiving later shipments of the same type of meat, exchanged it with UNICEF for flour, an item that was much in demand by the refugees. 31

Provision was made for a supplementary feeding program by UNICEF for children, nursing mothers and pregnant women. These persons constituted from 50 to 60 percent of the persons on the relief rolls. This supplementary ration, along with the rations provided by UNRPR were allocated to the operating agencies as follows: International Red Cross, 42 percent; League of Red Cross Societies, 32 percent; and the American Friends Service Committee, 26 percent. These percentages were recomputed each month reflecting a fairly accurate picture of the refugee population in each agency's area. The mechanics of providing the supplies to the operating agencies was extremely simple. Supplies which were procured locally were taken over directly from the supplier by the operating agencies in the presence of an UNRPR representative. Receipts were obtained from the agencies summarizing the amount of supplies

received and payment was made to the contractor on the basis of these receipts. Goods from abroad went directly to the agency responsible for relief in the area and, for accounting purposes, receipts listing the goods received were given to UNRPR. Supervisory capacity of UNRPR ended at this point as it was the responsibility of the agencies to insure the equitable distribution of supplies within their respective areas.32

The refugees - No official definition of the term "refugee" was given by the General Assembly. The Director of UNRPR did not consider it practicable to have the operating agencies impose any kind of eligibility test, nor did UNRPR have observers of its own in the relief areas for the purpose of establishing eligibility. The only guidance offered was in a letter of the Director, dated 2 February 1949, which asked the three agencies to take all possible measures to insure that food and other relief were given only to bonafide refugees.33

There is no evidence that the agencies paid any attention to this request and there seems to have been no UNRPR follow up on this suggestion. With guidance of this type it is of little surprise that the ration rolls increased from month to month. Many of the later problems dealing with refugee registrations can be traced to this failure of the UNRPR to establish rigid controls governing the granting of individual relief. The number of refugees that had been reported by the Acting Mediator was near the 500,000 figure. Upon their arrival in

33. Ibid., p. 20.
Palestine, the field representatives of the three operating agencies presented the Director of UNRPR with requests for rations exceeding 900,000 in number. Since there was no accurate information available on the number of refugees requiring relief, and since the agency was limited by a lack of funds, the Director felt it necessary to begin operations in a conservative manner. For this reason the number of rations distributed during January and February was held to a figure of 600,000. In March this figure was increased to 725,000. By the end of March, the three operating agencies felt that their registration of refugees was fairly complete. Based upon this registration they requested a total of 910,000 rations. The Director of UNRPR felt, on the basis of statistical estimates, that there was duplication in relief applications and registrations. For this reason the Director limited the rations to a total of 855,000 for the month of April. Utilizing the same line of reasoning, the ration distribution figure was set at 940,000 for the months that followed based upon a request from the operating agencies for a total exceeding 1,000,000. Even at the beginning of operations no fool proof system of registration was initiated, thus beginning a problem that was to hinder the United Nations relief efforts in the years that were to follow. The following chart indicates the numbers of refugees, by area, receiving rations as of 4 November 1949, a month considered representative of the entire period of operation of UNRPR.\footnote{Ibid.}
Lebanon................................................. 127,800
Syria.................................................. 78,200
Jordan.................................................. 94,000
Arab Palestine.................................357,400
Israel............................................... 37,600
Gaza Strip..........................................245,000
Total..................................................940,000

As a final comment on registration and the problems connected with obtaining a complete and accurate count of the refugees, a statement by Father Williams, a Franciscan priest, is interesting. He describes the early days of the work of the Red Cross in Jordan and the problems the Red Cross faced in registering refugees.

"One day a number of Bedouin came to Karl Reiser, director of the Red Cross in Amman, and asked that he go with them to the outskirts of Amman to enroll a group of Bedouin refugees on the Red Cross rolls. Karl went. The first day he enrolled two hundred. The next day he enrolled over five hundred. He came to me to ask if it were possible there were so many Bedouin refugees in this region. I suggested that there might be one hundred."

"So the next day Karl hired an Arab to mingle with the Bedouins and do some espionage work for him."

"With what results?" Stabler asked (American Charge d'Affairs in Amman).

Father Williams was chuckling from his waist up as he said: "Karl found that the Bedouins who enrolled went off on their camels behind a hill about a mile distant, reorganized their group, and reappeared as new Bedouin refugees." The Father added: "Some of those bunnies had registered twenty times under different names, while they looked Karl straight in the eye."

Rations - The original budget submitted by the Acting

Mediator was based upon providing each refugee with 2,000 calories a day. In addition to this, supplementary foods were to be provided to infants, young children, nursing mothers, and pregnant women by UNICEF. The original estimate was based upon a total refugee population not exceeding 500,000. As we have seen, this estimate fell short of the actual number of rations distributed by several hundred thousand. As the total of rations distributed increased, the caloric value of the combined UNRPR-UNICEF ration was reduced. It was strictly based on the amount of money that was available for relief to the refugees. Since the organization was on a fairly fixed budget, it was obliged to reduce the amount of relief given each individual as the total number of refugees increased. In February 1949, the caloric value was 1,800 calories daily; in March, 1,700 calories daily and for the following period this daily total was established at 1,600 calories per person. During the winter the ration was increased to provide the refugee with the additional fats needed to survive the hardships of colder weather. As of November 1959, the composition of the average daily ration was as shown below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component</th>
<th>UNRPR Component Grammes Calories</th>
<th>UNICEF Commodity Grammes Calories</th>
<th>Ration Combined Grammes Calories</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Flour</td>
<td>355</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>355</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pulses</td>
<td>24.5 85</td>
<td>- 56</td>
<td>24.5 85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rice</td>
<td>- 16</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>16 56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fats-Oil</td>
<td>9 72</td>
<td>5.5 44</td>
<td>14.5 116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sugar</td>
<td>7 23</td>
<td>6 23</td>
<td>13 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milk</td>
<td>- 20</td>
<td>20 72</td>
<td>20 72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sundries</td>
<td>1 3</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20 8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total 396.5 1,447 49 200 455.5 1,647

Any person studying the previous figures must realize that the ration scale is on a minimum basis. This was brought about by the previously mentioned shortage of funds for the purchase of rations. Two mitigating points are that over half of the population being fed was children under fifteen years of age, and of these, many were small children who would not consume a full ration. Secondly, since most of the adult males did not perform regular work requiring the expenditure of an undue amount of physical effort, the reduced figure provided adequate nourishment.

The following report, dated 8 June 1949, of a nutrition expert attached to the FAO Middle East Office, gives a precise description of the nutritional state of the refugee.

"The food provided to the refugees has been sufficient to keep them alive and there has yet been no gross deterioration in the state of nutrition. Relief workers expressed the view that the physical condition of the refugees may have slightly improved during the last few months as the result of the regular supply of food. Underweight is general, as might be expected from the size of the ration....There is no evidence of an abnormally high death rate among the refugees. No major epidemics have occurred. Patients under treatment in hospitals...have the diseases which are characteristic of the Palestine Arab population in normal circumstances..."

Health conditions - Despite the hardships under which the refugees lived, their general health condition was satisfactory. There were no major epidemics and the death rate (compared to the normal local rate) did not increase. The

37. Ibid., p. 24.
group hardest hit was the infant and children category. Surveys of these age groups revealed a wide incidence of vitamin deficiency and it was found that most of the children were underweight. There was also the continued danger of malnutrition brought about not by a lack of calories, but by a diet made up almost entirely of flour, oil, and sugar. Such a diet failed to provide the protein, iron and vitamins required by persons of that age group.38

The absence of any epidemic was the result of vigorous public health measures and an active preventative medicine program. In addition, an active campaign was waged using the insecticide DDT to prevent the growth of disease-carrying insects. This was found effective in limiting the number of cases of typhus fever and malaria among the refugees.39

Continuation of the relief program - According to the decision of the General Assembly, the Relief Agency was to end its work at the end of August 1949, but by April it was clear that a final solution to the refugee problem was not to be forthcoming until a much later date. It was considered essential that the term of the Agency be extended until a decision on relief could be made by the General Assembly. This prolongation of relief was secured by the response of the three operating agencies to the appeal of the Secretary-General. They indicated their willingness to continue their relief efforts, but each expressed a desire to end their operations as soon as possible.

38. Ibid., p. 22.
39. Ibid.
Their final decision was that they would continue to carry on 
the relief work until April of 1950, at which time they would 
terminate their activities in favor of a United Nations relief 
organization that would be responsible for all aspects of relief. 
The discussion on the formation of such an agency and the actual 
implementing of the General Assembly resolution establishing 
the agency will be covered in detail in the following chapter. 
Suffice it to say that the UNRPR was to continue its operations 
until April of 1950.  

Financial operations - In this section we will deal 
in detail with the finances and working accounts of the UNRPR. 
In a later chapter information will be given on the finances 
of the present United Nations relief agency so that the reader 
may draw a comparison between the early relief measures and the 
present relief measures.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income</th>
<th>[42]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contributions in cash</td>
<td>$23,980,118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contributions in kind</td>
<td>4,096,918</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct contributions by governments of the Near East</td>
<td>8,391,794</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous income</td>
<td>3,064</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>$36,471,894</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is interesting to note that a total of sixteen govern-
ments and ten non-governmental agencies or groups made cash

---

41. All figures quoted in this section are in US dollars and are as of 30 April 1950. Source of the figures is U.N.G.A. 5th Session-Annexes, (A/1354), United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees for the Period 1 December 1948 to 30 April 1950, Financial Report and Accounts.
42. Ibid., p. 22.
contributions totaling $1,000 or more; nineteen government and thirteen non-governmental agencies made contributions in kind. Also it is only fair to mention the contributions made by the Arab Governments to support the relief measures, since very few persons are aware of the burden these governments carried in support of the refugees. In addition to the amount shown below, there is an unrecorded total contributed by the Arab States in support of the refugees prior to the establishment of the UNRPR.

Direct Contributions by Governments in the Near East

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Aid to Refugees</th>
<th>Services to UNRPR</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>$1,531,314</td>
<td>$787,048</td>
<td>$2,318,362</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>2,309,101</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,309,101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>1,000,094</td>
<td>270,448</td>
<td>1,270,542</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan</td>
<td>933,481</td>
<td></td>
<td>933,481</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>892,598</td>
<td></td>
<td>892,598</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>534,168</td>
<td>133,542</td>
<td>667,710</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$7,200,756</td>
<td>$1,191,038</td>
<td>$8,391,794</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The expenditures of the Agency were broken down into relief and administrative categories, with a total expenditure of $39,115,975 recorded.

Expenditures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Basic foods</td>
<td>$18,673,545</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical and public health programme</td>
<td>2,003,789</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shelter, blankets</td>
<td>3,404,368</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>2,176,244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aid by local governments</td>
<td>8,391,794</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous-Local</td>
<td>102,288</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNRPR-Administration</td>
<td>473,492</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Termination</td>
<td>33,117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carried forward</td>
<td>$35,258,637</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

43. Ibid., p. 25.
44. Ibid., p. 19.
Agencies:
Operational costs 3,121,570
Termination costs 103,234  3,224,804
Depreciation of equipment .................. 171,579
Donations to national charitable
organizations .................................. 450,608
Losses in transit and on exchange ...... 10,347
$39,115,975

Not indicated in these figures are the supplies furnished
by UNICEF. These supplies, totaling approximately $9 million,
were distributed by the UNRPR operating agencies in their
respective areas.

It can be seen from our discussion that expenditures
exceeded income by $2,644,081. This deficit amount was financed
by advances from the United Nations Working Capital Fund and by
a loan from the International Refugee Organization. The total
liabilities of UNRPR, including these advances from other
organizations, totaling $7,761,785 and the total assets
totaling $5,117,704 were transferred, on 30 April 1950, to the
United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees
in the Near East (UNRWA/NRE), an organization which will be
discussed in detail in the remainder of this work. On the
closing date, the operations and responsibility of the UNRPR
ended, after having provided refugee relief from 1 December
1948, to 30 April 1950.45

UNITED NATIONS CONCILIATION COMMISSION FOR PALESTINE

General Assembly Resolution 194 (III), dated 11 December

45. Ibid., p. 20.
1948, established the Conciliation Commission for Palestine. The Commission was to complement the work of the UNRPR by attempting to provide a solution to the Palestine question and thus end, by that act, the refugee problem. Since this dissertation is limited to the scope of refugee assistance by the United Nations, we will consider the Conciliation Commission for Palestine (CCP) only briefly, their chief mission being to effect a political settlement, and then only in those matters that dealt directly with the Arab refugee.

Initially, the CCP made arrangements to establish close relations with the UNRPR and the governments concerned with the Palestine problem. Efforts were made to resolve the differences between the Arab States and Israel by meetings between the two groups, but the Arabs could not be persuaded to have direct contact with their Israeli counterparts. As conciliation efforts continued, it became obvious that the greatest obstacle to a solution was the Arab refugee problem. The CCP, during this initial period, made its greatest political effort to solve the Palestine question, but their efforts were always thwarted by the continuing insistence of the Arab States that the refugee problem be solved before other negotiations take place.


The CCP held conferences with Arab and Jewish representatives during the period 27 April to 8 June 1949 in Lausanne, Switzerland, following a Beirut conference with representatives of the Arab Governments. Priority was given to the refugee problem with emphasis placed upon repatriation, resettlement, and social and economic rehabilitation of the refugees. These efforts met with failure because of the Israeli refusal to accede to the Arab demand that Israel allow the repatriation of refugees who wished to return to their homes.

In later negotiations the Israeli Government expressed a willingness to accept the return of 100,000 refugees. They also offered to take more than 200,000 refugees in the Gaza Strip, provided the area was made a part of Israel. Both of these proposals came to naught; the first because of the withdrawal of the offer by the Israelis; the second because of the refusal of the Arabs to consider such a proposal.

In 1950 the CCP did manage to arrange for the repatriation to Israel of a few hundred wives and minor children of Arab residents in Israel. Since that time the basic attitudes of the Arabs and Israelis have undergone little change. Israel

48. Ibid. Conference was from 21 March to 5 April 1949. London Times, 14 April 1949 carries details of the conference.
has insisted that the refugee problem can be solved only as a part of an over-all peace settlement, while the Arabs have maintained that the refugee problem and the right of the refugee to repatriation must precede any peace settlement.51

In August 1949, the Commission reached the conclusion that it would be unable to effect a political solution to the refugee problem and that the only possibility of solving the problem lay in an economic solution. Accordingly, on 23 August, the CCF decided, in accordance with paragraph 12 of General Assembly Resolution 194 (III), to establish an Economic Survey Mission as a subsidiary body under the authority of the Commission. The Economic Survey Mission was an attempt to by-pass the political aspects of the Palestine question and to solve the economic problems involved, in the hope that such an economic solution might resolve the political tensions and lead to a final solution.52 The work of the Mission and its recommendations will be reviewed in the following chapter.

CHAPTER III

AN ATTEMPTED ECONOMIC SOLUTION TO THE REFUGEE PROBLEM

ECONOMIC SURVEY MISSION

As we noted in the previous chapter the United Nations Economic Survey Mission for the Middle East was appointed on 23 August 1949. It was established in the belief that "in the long run, the final solution of the problem will be found within the framework of the economic and social rehabilitation of all countries of the Near East."\(^1\) The Mission contained representatives of the United Kingdom, the United States, France and Turkey. Chief of the Mission was Gordon R. Clapp, Chairman of the Tennessee Valley Authority and the deputy chairmen were H. Gemil Gokcen (Turkey); Erik Lebonne (France); and Sir Desmond Morton (U.K.).\(^2\)

The CP charged the Mission with the task of examining the economic situation in the countries affected by the hostilities in Palestine and with making recommendations to the Commission for an integrated program that would enable the host Governments to overcome, with United Nations assistance, the economic difficulties resulting from the Arab-Israeli conflict. Also within the Mission's term of reference was the consideration of economic self-help measures that could be carried out by the Arab Governments with or without outside

---

assistance. A comprehensive program was to be prepared, including a suggested budget, by which an outside agency could assist the host Governments and promote economic growth within the host countries to provide both short range and permanent employment for the refugees. The Mission was also instructed to study the problem of compensation for those refugees not wishing to return to their homes. Finally, it was to make suggestions for the establishment, within the framework of the United Nations, of an organization to coordinate, supervise, and facilitate measures for the implementation of the Mission's proposals. It had the responsibility of formulating a complete economic program in the hope that economic prosperity, brought about by such a program, would provide the solution to the explosive political situation in the Middle East.  

This directive was given to the Mission in a meeting of the Conciliation Commission for Palestine held in Lausanne on 8 September 1949. While there, the Mission also met the delegations representing the Governments of Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and Lebanon. On 10 September the Mission left for the Middle East to begin its work. Its first stop was Beirut.  

Attached to the Mission were consultants representing the different fields covered by the survey. These experts were

5. The Times (London), 12 Sept. 1949, p. 3.
organized around four general subjects: analysis of the social and economic problem of the refugees, agricultural development, engineering development, and finance and economic analysis. 6

The latter part of September and the month of October were spent visiting the various governments in Alexandria, Egypt; Baghdad, Iraq; Tel Aviv, Israel; Amman, Jordan; Beirut, Lebanon; and Damascus, Syria gathering information and formulating an appropriate program. 7 A statement given by Mr. Clapp to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the United States House of Representatives on 16 February gives an indication of the problems the Mission faced.

"We were not well received in the Middle East. There was a fear in the minds of the Arab peoples that we were coming to their countries to impose upon them some preconceived plan affecting their peoples and their countries, which would settle upon them these 750,000 refugees, in the face of the fact that the United Nations in its resolution had assured the refugees that they had the right to go home. I shall not attempt to judge the basis of their fears and apprehensions, I just state it as a fact that for two weeks or so, the mission was more or less immobilized in the Near East because the governments were not quite sure whether they wanted to discuss with us any plan or idea that they thought we might have." 8

The Mission's work was divided into two distinct periods which were summarized in its interim report and its final report. Since the funds that had been provided for the

7. Ibid., Part I, Appendix I, p. 16.
relief of the Arab refugees were soon to be exhausted, the Mission was asked to present its interim report on the refugee problem in time for consideration by the then current session of the United Nations General Assembly. The final report, covering additional considerations, was to be submitted at a later date.

The interim report - The interim report of the Mission was transmitted to the Secretary-General of the United Nations on 16 November 1949 and given to the Ad Hoc Political Committee for its consideration.

This report gave priority to finding the means to "reintegrate the refugees into the economic life of the area on a self-sustaining basis within a minimum period of time" and attempting to discover means "to promote economic conditions conducive to the maintenance of peace and stability in the area." The Mission examined the conditions of the refugees, the operations of the UNRPR, the opportunity or lack of opportunity for the refugees to earn a livelihood in the host countries, and the possibility of the money provided for relief lasting through the critical winter period of 1949.

As a result of the investigation the Mission came to the conclusion that repatriation or resettlement of the refugees on a large scale, which offered a speedy solution to

the Palestine problem, was impossible because of the political
deadlock between the Arab States and Israel. The refugees
presented a problem that could have become disastrous if it
had not been for the help given by the UNRPR, the World Health
Organization, UNICEF, and the local and foreign charity agencies
operating in the Middle East. The direct relief provided by
these agencies had kept the refugees alive, but it offered no
direct solution to the problem. Even so, relief would have
to be continued, but it should be supplemented by a program
that offered the refugees a chance to perform useful work and
provided them with an opportunity to become self-sufficient.
With time, enough work could be found for these people by
utilizing them in useful projects to improve conditions in the
host countries. These work opportunities could be provided
as quickly as funds were allotted to finance a works program
within these countries. The countries themselves lacked the
resources to provide the money for these projects, therefore
assistance in the form of the necessary money, would have to
be provided from outside to implement the program.12

On the basis of its study of the problem in the Middle
East, the Mission suggested a specific program which it hoped
would end the problem within a period of two years. It
recommended that emergency relief to the refugees continue
during the winter months and be provided by the existing relief
organization, the UNRPR. Concurrently, a program of public

works would have to be established. This program would be
designed to increase the productivity of the area, and to
provide by this increase additional job opportunities for the
refugees in the host countries. Ration rolls would be reduced
by eliminating the persons finding employment under the program
and by examining the rolls and deleting persons who were not
bona fide refugees.13

To direct the entire program the Mission proposed that
an agency be established in the Middle East on or after 1 April
1950. This agency should be given full autonomy and authority
to handle all activities within the sphere of refugee relief
and public works. The assets and duties of the UNRPR would go
to the agency on 1 April 1950 so that the public works program
could be coordinated with the refugee relief program.14

The public works program would in time become the main
mission of the new agency. This program would begin on 1 April
and continue until 30 June 1951. The Mission estimated that
the cost of the program, including relief and public works,
would be in the vicinity of $53.7 million. Of this figure, it
was assumed that the local governments would provide $6 million.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Estimated cost of the program15</th>
<th>Millions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Direct Relief</td>
<td>$19.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work Schemes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour and Administration</td>
<td>21.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Materials, tools and equipment</td>
<td>13.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total cost to the United Nations and local governments</td>
<td>34.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

13. Ibid., p. 17.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid., p. 21.
Less 45% of materials, tools and equipment, assumed cost to local governments
Total cost to the United Nations $47.7

This figure of $47.7 million is equal to the amount that the United Nations would normally have spent for just direct relief over the same period of time if the program were not instituted. The members of the Mission felt that beginning such a program would provide enough work so that it would be possible for the United Nations to stop issuing rations after 31 December 1951. They also felt that the Arab countries would be in an economic position to accept full responsibility for the maintenance of refugees in their countries by this same date.16

Contained in the interim report was a list of more than 20 works relief projects which could be started within a short period of time. These works projects included such schemes as the development of the catchment basin of the Wadi Zarka in Jordan, the irrigation and drainage of the South Beqa' in Lebanon, and the development of the Syrian Jezirah. The recommended schemes were of four particular types: terracing of sloping land for the retention of rainfall; afforestation; road building to open areas to be developed; and the construction of irrigation projects and water-conservation works.17

A study of the type of projects proposed offers an insight into the thinking of the members of the Mission. They

16. Ibid., p. 17.
17. The Times (London), 12 December 1949, p. 4.
felt that the Middle East had sufficient land and under-developed water sources to support several million additional persons. The main problem was to bring water and then people to the land. The suggested work projects would provide funds to the refugee workers and the rehabilitated land, allotted the refugees by the host Governments, would provide a livelihood to the refugees after the works projects were completed. It should be noted that the interim report in no way envisaged the resettlement of the refugees, nor the establishment of relations between the Arab Governments and Israel.

Included in the interim report was an analysis of refugees and relief recipients. This is an interesting study which gives, in my opinion, an accurate picture of the actual number of bona fide refugees in the Middle East. The number of refugees was arrived at by taking the former non-Jewish population of the territory held by Israel and deducting the present non-Jewish population of that territory. To this were added borderline cases, persons who still resided in their homes, but were separated from their lands by the armistice lines and were thus without means. The chart also offers an accounting of the number of persons receiving rations in both the Arab countries and Israel. 18

| Refugees who fled Israel and are in need | 627,000 |
| Plus borderline cases | 25,000 |
| Plus refugees not requiring relief | 652,000 |

---

Less refugees presumed not to be receiving rations

<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Plus non-refugees in Arab countries receiving rations</td>
<td>160,000</td>
<td>892,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plus Arab and Jewish refugees in Israel</td>
<td>48,000</td>
<td>940,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total UNRPR ration strength</td>
<td>72,000</td>
<td>1,019,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The final figure of 1,019,000 is explained by the fact that UNRPR rations totaling 940,000 were issued to the operating agencies in bulk. The agencies stretched these rations to cover destitute and other needy persons as well as refugees.

The following chart, showing a breakdown of refugees by area, is quite revealing and well worth noting.\(^{19}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Alleged relief recipients 30 September 1949</th>
<th>Persons who have fled from Israel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arab Palestine</td>
<td>431,500</td>
<td>280,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaza Strip</td>
<td>210,987</td>
<td>190,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>4,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>100,905</td>
<td>70,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>140,448</td>
<td>100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>83,403</td>
<td>75,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>971,243</td>
<td>726,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>48,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand Total</td>
<td>1,019,243</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Final report** - On 28 December 1949, the Economic Survey Mission submitted its final report. It did not deal directly with the problem of the Arab refugees, but suggested four plans which the Mission felt would provide a practical beginning for a larger development program. These four pilot projects were expected to be carried out in Jordan, Arab

\(^{19}\) Ibid., p. 23.
Palestine, Lebanon and Syria. They were chosen as a logical continuation of the works program suggested in the interim report and as a foundation for more elaborate development projects that it was assumed would follow. The final report represented a new approach to the economic development of the Middle East, and as such it offered, in the judgment of the Mission, an economic solution to the refugee problem. 20

THE FORMATION OF UNRWA

The Ad Hoc Political Committee had before it the interim report of the Economic Survey Mission when it began on 24 November 1949 to consider the question of assistance to the Palestine refugees. 21 The discussions centered on a draft resolution submitted by the delegations of France, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States. This resolution proposed the establishment of a Near East Relief and Works Agency to supersede the UNRPR and to carry out the relief and works program recommended by the Economic Survey Mission.

During the process of the debate, the sponsors defended the proposal for the establishment of the Agency by extensive reference to the report of the Economic Survey Mission and by offering the proposal as a practical approach to a solution of the refugee problem. Debate on the proposed resolution continued for several weeks and during the hearings several administrative

20. Ibid.
amendments were incorporated in the draft resolution. On 2 December 1949, at the 55th meeting of the Ad Hoc Political Committee, the revised proposal as amended by Australia, Chile and Egypt was adopted by 48 votes to none, with 6 abstentions.\(^{22}\)

On 8 December 1949, the report of the Ad Hoc Political Committee (A/1222) was discussed at the Plenary Session of the General Assembly and was adopted by a vote of 47 to none, with 6 abstentions, as General Assembly Resolution 302 (IV). It established the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East. This Agency was to assist Palestine refugees through direct relief and works programs, in collaboration with local governments, as recommended by the United Nations Economic Survey Mission. On 1 April 1950, or a later date agreed upon by the Secretary-General and the Director of UNRWA, the assets and liabilities of the UNRPR would be transferred to the new Agency.\(^{23}\)

The resolution provided also for the establishment of an Advisory Commission consisting of the representatives of France, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States with power to add not more than three other members. This commission was to advise and assist the director of the new Agency in the execution of his program.\(^{24}\)

The resolution provided for a total expenditure over

\(^{22}\) Ibid.

\(^{23}\) U.N.G.A. OR, Resolution 302(IV), 8 December 1949. Full text of the resolution can be found in Annex C.

\(^{24}\) Ibid.
18 months of $54,900,000. Approximately $33.7 million was allocated for a direct relief and works program for the period 1 January to 3 December 1950, of which $20.2 million was for the relief and $13.5 million for the works program. Relief would terminate on 31 December 1950, but an additional $21.2 million would be allocated for the continuance of the works program from 1 January to 3 June 1951.25 To provide initial operating expenses, the Secretary-General in consultation with the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions of the United Nations, was authorized to advance funds of $5,000,000 from the working capital fund, to be repaid by 31 December 1950 from the voluntary contributions of member nations and non-member states. He was also authorized to negotiate with the International Refugee Organization for an interest free loan not exceeding $2,800,000 and to continue the Special Fund established under paragraph 5 of General Assembly Resolution 212 (II).26

The resolution urged the appropriate operating agencies of the United Nations including UNICEF, IRO, WHO, UNESCO and FAO to cooperate with and furnish assistance to the newly established United Nations Relief and Works Agency.27

Although the resolution might be criticized for its failure to deal with the repatriation and compensation of the refugees, it was a practical measure that had to be taken.

25. Ibid.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid.
UNRPR funds were nearly exhausted and the refugees faced the winter months with no opportunity for self-help. Its drafters seemed to believe that the implementation of the measures of the resolution would provide a solution and lead to the end of the refugee problem.

Inauguration of the UNRWA program - The first official meeting of the newly established Agency was held in Geneva during the week beginning 17 April 1950. At this meeting the members of the Advisory Commission of UNRWA met and discussed relief problems with representatives of the cooperating United Nations Agencies, the UNRPR and the officers of the League of Red Cross Societies and the International Committee of the Red Cross. Arrangements were made for the transfer of relief activities to UNRWA effective 1 May 1950.28

After initial arrangements were completed the Agency established its headquarters in Beirut, Lebanon, and began active negotiations with the governments of Lebanon, Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Israel, in an attempt to establish liaison for the implementation of the relief program. The first report of the Director of UNRWA, reflecting the feelings between the Agency and the governments in these initial proceedings, stated: "A cordial reception was accorded the Agency in all capitals, though it was evident that its motives and possibilities were generally not clearly appreciated

and in some instances were even under suspicion."\(^{29}\)

Responsibility for relief went to UNRWA after 30 April 1950. The work of the UNRPR and of the three voluntary agencies, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the League of Red Cross Societies, and the American Friends Service Committee was incorporated into the activities of the Agency. It is to the credit of the new Agency that it was able to provide the essential services to the refugees during the transition period with a minimum of delays. There were some stoppages in May in providing rations because of the late receipt, by the Agency, of the money to purchase rations, but these were minor in nature. There was also a reaction against the Agency marked by strikes of 30,000 relief recipients. The refugees participating in these demonstrations accused UNRWA of being a tool of the capitalistic governments and neglecting the rights of the refugees. The strike came to an end by the close of May and the refugees accepted their rations at the normal distribution time.\(^{30}\)

The Agency was faced with the immediate problem of determining the number of refugees and reducing the number of ration recipients. UNRWA's definition of a refugee, which was to change at a later date, was: "a needy person, who, as a result of the war in Palestine, has lost his home and his means of livelihood." It allowed a large measure of flexibility

\(^{29}\) Ibid.

\(^{30}\) Ibid., p. 3.
in the interpretation of the definition enabling the field representative to deal with the many border-line cases which arose. 31

It became obvious from the very beginning that the goals of the Economic Survey Mission had been extremely optimistic and that UNRWA would be unable to fulfill its responsibility of providing enough work to appreciably cut the ration relief rolls. A comparison of the following two charts reveals the difference between the estimated and actual numbers of persons receiving relief.

**Estimate of Relief Recipients - Economic Survey Mission** 32

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quarter</th>
<th>Estimate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First quarter</td>
<td>652,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second quarter</td>
<td>600,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third quarter</td>
<td>492,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fourth quarter</td>
<td>392,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Actual Relief Recipients** 33

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>No. on ration lists</th>
<th>No. of rations distributed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>965,000</td>
<td>900,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>969,000</td>
<td>900,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>977,000</td>
<td>897,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>974,000</td>
<td>847,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>800,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>957,000</td>
<td>860,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>930,000</td>
<td>860,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>922,000</td>
<td>860,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Within the first critical period of operation UNRWA had not even come close to solving the refugee problem. Various reasons were given to explain the fact that only a small decrease in the number of persons registered for rations had been made.

---

31. Ibid.
32. Ibid., p. 6.
33. Ibid.
Mention was made of the number of births over the number of
deaths among the refugees, but I feel the following state-
ment from the Director's report is indicative of the situation
as it existed: "It is regretted that, despite its earnest
desire to do so, the Agency has to date been unable to remove
many undeserving individuals from the relief rolls....It feels
little hope that it will meet with any cooperation in its
efforts toward the goal set. Conferring refugee status on
non-refugees in the first instance has created a situation
that cannot be ignored, but removing it exposes the Agency to
unwarranted and unfair criticism...as well as fanatical
opposition on the part of the undeserving recipient and his
friends and supporters."34

On the subject of the works program, the Director
stated that the Agency was unable to approach the number of
employed persons estimated by the Economic Survey Mission.
Several reasons for this situation were given ranging from the
failure of the Agency to get started as early as hoped to the
lack of contributions received from the supporting governments.
Perhaps more important was the failure of the Agency to convince
the Arab Governments of the importance of the projects and the
benefits that would accrue from these projects. There seemed
to be a lack of understanding of the motives of the Agency and it
met organized resistance from the Arab States based upon
the fear that the implementation of the Agency's program would

34. Ibid.
adversely affect the right of the refugee to repatriation or compensation.35

The following chart offers a revealing picture of the rise and fall of employment under the works portion of the UNRWA program.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of refugees employed on UNRWA works36</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

General Assembly Resolution 393 (V) - The interim report of the Director of UNRWA (A/1451/Rev. 1) contained, besides a narrative of the Agency's activities and the financial statement for the period 1 May - 31 August 1950, recommendations concerning the future of the relief program.37 The main recommendation in this portion of the report dealt with the proposal of establishing a Reintegration Fund for the purpose of integrating the refugees into the economic life of the host countries. The recommendation states:

---

35. Ibid., p. 7.
"The dominant fact in the Agency’s operation is the existence of over three quarters of a million refugees who for three years have been living in poverty, misery, and idleness. The compelling thought is that somewhere ahead is a huge task of rehabilitation and re-establishment. It is the Agency’s profound hope that the happy realization of this task may not be postponed through lack of readiness. Inevitably in the days ahead occasions will develop when governments and refugees on their own initiative will jointly agree on the project of rehabilitation. The international community may safely assume that assistance will be required by governments and refugees, if the refugee is to be rehabilitated as a producing member and an economic asset of an urban or rural environment. The assistance should be broadly available for either repatriation or re-establishment, as negotiations may permit."  

The report also recommended that direct relief be continued past the 1 December 1950 date specified in resolution 302 (IV) because of the difficulty in implementing the works program and the continued requirement of the refugees for such relief. An estimate of $50,000,000 was submitted for the period 1 July 1951 to 30 June 1952. From this amount $20,000,000 would be budgeted for direct relief and $30,000,000 for the proposed reintegration fund.  

At the 35th meeting of the Ad Hoc Political Committee on 7 November, a joint draft was submitted by France, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States. This draft resolution recognized that the direct relief could not end by 1 December 1950 and incorporated the suggestions by the Director of UNRWA on the formation of a reintegration fund. Emphasis was placed  

on providing additional technical assistance to the Arab Governments by utilizing the specialized agencies of the United Nations. At the insistence of the Arab States an amendment by the delegate from Pakistan was included in the draft which stipulated that no provision of this resolution would affect the refugees' claim to repatriation or compensation. The problem of finances was referred to the Fifth Committee and its recommendation was later incorporated in the draft resolution. At the 57th meeting of the Ad Hoc Political Committee the draft resolution was passed by 43 votes to none, with 6 abstentions. 40

The General Assembly at the 315th plenary meeting on 2 December 1950, adopted Resolution 393 (V) by 46 votes to none, with 6 abstentions. In this resolution the General Assembly agreed to continue direct relief from 1 July 1951 to 30 June 1952. It also directed UNRWA to establish a Reintegration Fund to be used for plans, developed by the Governments of the Near East and approved by the Agency, leading to the permanent rehabilitation of the refugees and the elimination of their need for relief. 41

The first annual report of the Director of UNRWA revealed little progress towards reducing the ration rolls. As we pointed out earlier, the number of persons finding

41. U.N.G.A. OR, Resolution 393(V), 2 Dec. 1950. Full text of the resolution can be found in Annex D.
employment under the works program had reached a peak in December of 1950. From that month on the number of persons employed on the works projects decreased continually. As this figure decreased, the number of persons receiving rations began to gradually increase.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of refugees reported receiving rations</th>
<th>Total in Thousands</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1950</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>957</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>933</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>926</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>904</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>892</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>887</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>863</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1951</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>857</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>862</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>879</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>875</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>878</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>876</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

During the reporting period an attempt had been made, at the cost of $295,639, to take a census to determine who should and who should not receive relief. The outcome was not considered a success in that it had been impossible to carry out the objectives and obtain an accurate total of those persons entitled to relief under the United Nations definition of an Arab refugee.  

**General Assembly Resolution 513 (VI)** - The officials of UNRWA realized that their program was not having its desired effect. Accordingly, a special report was prepared by the

---

43. Ibid., p. 3.
Director and the Advisory Commission with recommendations for consideration by the General Assembly. UNRWA had been charged, in Resolution 393 (V), with several missions: providing direct relief in the amount of $20 million; utilizing a $30 million reintegration fund for projects designed to promote the acceptance of the refugee into the economic system of the host country; and providing, with the assistance of the United Nations specialized agencies, technical assistance to the host Governments. 44

Comments were made by the Director on each of the three assignments given the Agency. He felt that pressure on UNRWA to provide more relief was going to increase over the next few years since many of the refugees who formerly possessed personal resources had nearly arrived at the point where they would require aid in the form of relief. At the same time, the cost of providing relief was increasing sharply while obtaining voluntary contributions for the continuation of the program became increasingly difficult. The main hope to counteract the increasing number of refugees was to implement an accelerated program leading to the integration of the refugees into the economy of the host countries. Indications were noted during the previous year of an increased awareness by the host Governments that a political solution to the Palestine question was

not in the offing and that something must be done to better the position of the refugee. 45

The Director of the Agency suggested that UNRWA begin a program of economic cooperation which would not interfere with the political issues between the Arab States and Israel. The Agency would enter the fields of technical and financial assistance, furnishing funds and guidance to the individual governments, with the responsibility for the implementation of the local programs falling to the Arab Governments. The refugees and the Governments must, through a planned information program, be made aware that their cooperation in the program would insure economic gains that would benefit both the refugees and the host Governments without prejudice to their claims in any final settlement made in the Palestine issue. 46

The Agency proposed that the General Assembly consider a resolution incorporating the following provisions:

The General Assembly urge the member and non-member nations to contribute to a $250 million program of assistance for refugee relief and reintegration to be carried out over a three year period. UNRWA was to make every effort to transfer relief administration to the Arab Governments by 1 July 1952. It was assumed that these expenditures, $50 million for relief and $200 million for reintegration, would bring to a close the United Nations' responsibility at the end of a three year period. 47

45. Ibid.
46. Ibid., p. 2.
47. Ibid.
The General Assembly increase to $27 million the $20 million amount provided in resolution 393 (V), the additional $7 million to be used for direct relief during the fiscal year ending 30 June 1952. This change was made necessary by an increase in world wide prices that raised the cost of relief approximately 25 per cent. In addition it was proposed that the reintegration fund for the fiscal year 1952 be raised from $30 million to $50 million. 48

This report and its proposals formed the basis of a draft resolution submitted by France, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States, in a meeting of the Ad Hoc Political Committee. After the approval of the Committee the draft resolution was forwarded to the General Assembly. On 26 January 1952, it was adopted as General Assembly Resolution 513 (VI). 49 The resolution incorporated the recommendations contained in the special report of the UNRWA Director and provided the basis for a three year program designed to bring the refugee problem to a close.

**General Assembly Resolution 614 (VII) and 720 (VIII)**

Before we consider the success or failure of the plan implemented under the provisions of resolution 513 (VI), we shall make mention of two later resolutions concerning assistance to the Palestinian refugees. On 6 November 1952, in General Assembly

---

48. Ibid., pp. 2-3.
49. U.N.G.A. OR, Resolution 513(VI), 26 January 1952. Full text of this resolution can be found in Annex E.
Resolution 614 (VII), the United Nations again emphasized the rights of the refugee to compensation and repatriation. It also established a relief budget for the fiscal year ending 1953 in the amount of $23 million.  

On 27 November 1953, the General Assembly in Resolution 720 (VIII) once again reaffirmed its previous resolutions and authorized a relief budget of $24.8 million for the fiscal year ending 1954. 

An examination of the Annual Report of the Director of UNRWA for 1953 is most revealing. It contains a summary of the Agency's efforts, to that date, made in carrying out the major mission assigned to it by the General Assembly, the elimination of the requirement for direct relief to the refugee. The Director mentions the fact that in 1953, five years after the fighting in Palestine, there were still nearly 872,000 refugees depending upon the United Nations relief program. This was about the same number of refugees registered on the UNRWA ration rolls at the end of 1951. This figure would have been even higher if Israel had not assumed, in 1952, the responsibility for 19,000 Arab refugees in that country. 

The reasons given by the Director for the inability

50. U.N.G.A. OR, Resolution 614 (VII), 6 November 1952. Full text of this resolution can be found in Annex F.
51. U.N.G.A. OR, Resolution 720 (VIII), 27 November 1953. Full text of this resolution can be found in Annex G.
53. Ibid., p. 2.
of UNRWA to bring the refugee problem to a close were: The opposition on the part of the refugees to the UNRWA program brought about by their failure to fully comprehend the benefits the program could provide them; the requirement for a longer period of time for negotiations with the Arab Governments on the technical projects than had been anticipated; and the reluctance of the Arab Governments to cooperate fully with the Agency.  

The year 1954 marks a decided change in the policy of UNRWA. The Director of the Agency, in a special report accompanying his annual one, stated:

"The Director and the Advisory Committee are obliged with regret to report that little progress has been achieved during the past year towards a basic settlement of the refugee problem. This continues to be a source of grave concern to the host countries, the contributing Governments and the Agency."

Realizing that any solution to the problem would not be forthcoming in a short period of time, the Director recommended that the term of the Agency be extended for an additional five year period. During this term the Agency hoped to induce the host Governments to accept responsibility for the administration of relief to the refugees and thus remove the United

54. Ibid., pp. 2-5.
Nations from the refugee relief program.

A draft proposal prepared by the Ad Hoc Political Committee which included the recommendations contained in the UNRWA Director's special report was adopted as General Assembly Resolution 818 (IX) by a vote of 48 to none, with 7 abstentions.

This resolution in effect represented the end of UNRWA's efforts to implement a solution based upon the proposals of the United Nations Economic Survey Mission. The UNRWA program would now be, as we shall discuss in the following chapter, a plan for the continuance of the required direct relief to the refugees and an effort to encourage the refugee towards and to provide a means for individual self-support as opposed to a much vaster solution to the entire refugee problem.

---

58. U.N.G.A. OR, Resolution 818 (IV), 4 December 1954. Full text of the resolution can be found in Annex H.

CHAPTER IV - THE UNRWA PROGRAM

During the period 1955 to 1961 there were six General Assembly resolutions that governed the activities of UNRWA. These resolutions, with the exception of the one that will be discussed later, were routine in nature dealing with administrative procedures and the funding of the Agency.

Operations of the Agency were normal for four of the six years under discussion. The other two years were marked by events in portions of the Middle East which directly affected the activities of UNRWA. In October 1956, the Israeli Army entered the Gaza Strip and occupied that area, containing approximately 216,000 refugees, for a five month period. The Agency managed to avoid political involvement in the situation and continued providing food and medical care to the refugees, even though other activities were curtailed. In 1958 internal strife in Lebanon cut lines of communication within the country which affected UNRWA activities in Lebanon, Syria and Jordan.

1. The full text of these resolutions can be found in the following annexes: Annex H, resolution 818 (IX); Annex I, resolution 916 (X); Annex J, resolution 1018 (XI); Annex K, resolution 1191 (XII); Annex L, resolution 1315 (XIII); Annex M, resolution 1456 (XIV) and Annex N, resolution 1604 (XV).


The comparative isolation of the UNRWA headquarters in Beirut and the closing of the port of Beirut meant that supplies normally routed through Lebanon had to be diverted and imported through other countries. This action, although not seriously delaying distribution, increased the cost of relief for that year.5

In the previous chapter we discussed the $200 million fund for rehabilitation which, within three years of its inception in 1951, was expected to have assisted immeasurably in rehabilitating the refugees and reducing the number of persons on the ration rolls. By mid 1956 only $27,522,058 had been expended from the fund and it became obvious that the scheme had met with little success.6 After 1957 slight mention is made of the fund and none of the large scale rehabilitation projects originally contemplated were put into effect. For all intents and purposes it ceased to exist and another phase of UNRWA operations was entered. Emphasis was now to be placed on self-help and vocational training programs rather than vaster rehabilitation schemes.

General Assembly resolution 1456 (XIX) adopted 9 December 1959 is worthy of note. It "extended the mandate of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency...for a period of three years with a review at the end of two years..."7

7. U.N.G.A. OR, Resolution 1456 (XIV), op. cit.
The present activities of the Agency are conducted under the authority granted by this document.

In the following sections we will deal with the activities of the Agency to the present time. As we study the figures provided it must be realized that it is impossible to make more than a general comparison with the previous relief organization, the UNRPR since the latter was in operation for such a short period of time and did so much of its work through voluntary relief agencies. Consequently its records are most incomplete as compared to those of the present relief agency, UNRWA.

**THE REFUGEES**

Under the portion of this dissertation dealing with the UNRPR, we mentioned the difficulties caused by the fact that a definition of the term refugee had not been stipulated. Under UNRWA this term was finally defined and a definite attempt was made to provide relief only to those persons who qualified under this definition as refugees. UNRWA defined a refugee as a person whose normal residence was in Palestine for a minimum period of two years preceding the outbreak of the 1948 Arab-Israeli conflict and who, as a result of these hostilities, lost both home and means of livelihood.  

As we consider the number of refugees registered with

---

UNRWA, several points must be kept in mind. As was discussed previously, the registration was poorly done under the UNRPR and many persons were registered who would not fit the UNRWA definition of a refugee. Many non-deserving persons have managed to gain refugee status over the years and the number of false registrations is high. In addition, it is the prevalent practice for the refugees to record births with the Agency, but not to record deaths. The ration card of the deceased person is then kept in circulation. While examining the subject of refugee registration, one person interviewed stated that he had good reason to feel that there were close to one quarter of a million false registrations.9

As we consider the chart below, we must remember that these figures are inflated by false registrations. The yearly numerical increase, shown after the 1951 adjustment in registration made by UNRWA, is explained for the most part by the number of births recorded over the number of deaths. It is interesting to note that the figures for the years 1951 to 1955 represent a decrease in refugee registration over those shown in our report on the activities of the UNRPR.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total registered refugee population10</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>June 1950</td>
<td>960,021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 1951</td>
<td>904,122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 1952</td>
<td>915,411</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 1953</td>
<td>916,761</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

9. Confidential source.
June 1954 941,851
June 1955 969,389
June 1956 996,338
June 1957 1,019,201
June 1958 1,053,348
June 1959 1,087,628
June 1960 1,120,889
June 1961 1,151,024

The refugees present peculiar problems to each of the host Governments. In Jordan, where refugees enjoy citizenship, the problem is mainly that of numbers since the refugees represent one-third of the entire population. If they become dissatisfied with the conditions under which they live, they can threaten the continued existence of the present regime.

In the Gaza Strip the situation is difficult because of numbers and the geographical aspects of the area. Not only is there a large number of persons, but there is little opportunity of expanding the agriculture or industry so as to absorb the population. Lebanon has a problem arising from the sectarian nature of its society. Anything that upsets the delicate balance between Christian and Moslem can become politically dangerous. Since 94 per cent of the refugees are Moslem their integration into the Lebanese society would without a doubt upset the political system as it presently exists.

One additional problem concerning the number of refugees has troubled the Agency since its inception. Besides the persons who fit the UNRWA definition of a refugee, there are many others who are deserving of relief since they too are indirectly victims of the events that took place in 1948.

These persons are divided into two groups: the first consists
of the occupants of the border villages situated on the Jordanian side of the Armistice demarcation line, who have lost the majority of their cultivable lands because of the proximity of the line to their villages. The second group are those non-refugees residing in the Gaza Strip. The sudden influx of refugees has shattered their economic life completely. These two groups are in desperate straits and since their numbers are so large (162,000 - frontier villages; 95,000 - Gaza), an organized program of relief cannot be furnished by any private agency. Each year the problem is placed before the United Nations and each year no decision is made to include these persons among the number of registered refugees.

RATIONS

It will be remembered that the UNRPR varied its ration according to the amount of funds available for the purchase of food. UNRWA was opposed to this policy and upon assuming responsibility for relief operations, established a basic ration which has not changed over the years. The ration provides about 1500 calories per day to each recipient in summer and about 1600 calories in winter. The basic dry ration issued monthly to one refugee is:


10,000 grs. of flour
6,000 grs. of pulses
600 grs. of sugar
500 grs. of rice and/or burghol
375 grs. of oil and fats

The above items represent a full basic ration which is sometimes supplemented by special feeding programs. Each day whole milk rations, providing 194 calories per day, are issued for babies less than one year old. There are also skimmed milk rations providing 125 calories per day for children from 1 to 15 years old and for pregnant and nursing mothers. Persons in poor health and possessing a medical certificate, and children up to 6 years of age receive in addition a hot mid-day meal providing between 600-700 calories six days a week. The following chart indicates the number of persons by country receiving rations as of 30 June 1961.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Number of Persons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>591,439</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaza Strip</td>
<td>247,294</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>116,467</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>108,743</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,063,943</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In Jordan, there is a special little known problem concerning rations for children born since February 1951 to registered refugees. These children receive all UNRWA relief services, except rations. This situation was brought about by UNRWA's attempt to adjust ration rolls to insure receipt by only bona fide refugees. Investigations were started by the Agency in cooperation with the Government of Jordan in 1951 and continued until September 1953 at which time the

13. Ibid.
refugee opposition to it caused the Government to stop participating in the survey. The Agency felt that it now faced a situation where there was a vast number of improper registrations supplemented by new births and not reflecting the proper deletions due to deaths. The UNRWA Director stated: "In view of this situation, the Agency maintained a ration ceiling in Jordan which, in effect, precluded the issue of rations to children born after February 1951." In 1961 these children totaled 139,987. At the present time there seems to be no end in sight for this situation. The policy of the Agency has been, and still is, to grant rations to these children in an amount equal to the savings made by the Agency through the deletion of ineligibles from the rolls.

As a portion of the ration distribution system, certain supplies are issued annually for refugees entitled to basic rations. Distributions are made on the following basis: blankets are issued annually to every third refugee and to every third child between the ages of 1 to 15 who is registered for only relief services; kerosene is issued during the five winter months, one and one half liters per month to refugees living in camps in Jordan, Lebanon and Syria and one liter per month to all registered refugees in the Gaza Strip; and soap in the amount of 150 grams per month is given to each refugee drawing rations.

17. UNRWA, Statistical Summary, op. cit., pp. 4-5.
Of interest is the method of ration distribution to the individual refugee. Under the UNRPR this distribution was made by the operating agencies. UNRWA now handles, through its employees, the distribution of all rations. The system of distribution varies in each country as does the interval between distributions. In the majority of areas distributions are made monthly; in the Gaza Strip, twice monthly; and in the desert of South Jordan, quarterly.¹⁸

The actual process of distribution was observed by the author in one country and information has been obtained on the areas in which these procedures were not seen by him. The method varies according to country, but is basically the same as the one to be described, that which takes place in Jordan.

Several days before rations are to be issued, notices are posted throughout the country stating the dates of distribution and the ration cards, by number, that will be honored on the appropriate day. Before the established date, rations are moved from central warehouses to the local distribution centers. On the appointed day the refugee arrives at the center carrying with him his ration card and the cards of his family. These ration cards, which are issued on a 24 month basis, are given to a clerk who should verify the identification of the refugee and the refugee enters the

¹⁸. UNRWA, United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine (Beirut: undated), p. 7.
center to receive his monthly ration issue. After entitlement of the refugee is established, the distribution begins. In Jordan an internal ration card is passed from one individual ration station to another and is marked as the refugee receives his entitlement. At the final station a ration of flour is received and the card is punched to indicate that the ration issue has been completed.

On the surface the system appears sound and efficient. In practice there are several abuses that have been instituted over the years. These were revealed in conversations with both refugees and UNRWA officials.\textsuperscript{19} The initial verification of the ration card is seldom carried out and persons have an excellent opportunity to draw rations for others not in the area or even use the cards of deceased persons. Another practice is the sale of rations by the refugees. UNRWA allows the head of the family to barter the rations of the family for vegetables, fruit, meat, or even funds. In theory, if controlled, this is an excellent practice that benefits the refugees since, for example, he receives a high grade flour that can be traded for a greater amount of second grade flour. This extends his ration and in the extreme poverty in which the refugee lives, quantity is more important than quality. The problem that results from this practice is that many of the refugees barter their rations months ahead to merchants. They receive money

\textsuperscript{19} In all these cases the participants in the conversations asked to be treated as confidential sources.
in return which is often spent on nonessential items and they find themselves in need of food with no authority to draw additional rations. UNRWA's rules that dictate rations be given to the actual recipient or the head of his family are disregarded in certain distribution centers and the rations are given to merchants, who in some cases hold several hundred cards. It is easy to see the situation and to criticize the Agency for allowing these practices, but it must be remembered that many of the persons responsible for the distribution of rations are members of the refugee community. These acts are accepted by them, and many of the refugees feel that this practice is to their benefit.

SHELTER

The shelter situation has advanced a long way since the time of the UNRPR. When this program began, few of the refugees had any type of shelter and even when responsibility for relief was turned over to UNRWA, the majority of the refugee shelter consisted of tents or temporary structures. UNRWA has made great advances over the years in providing suitable shelters for a considerable number of refugees. Provisions for shelter vary from country to country as does the means of providing this shelter. In the Syrian region, the majority of the work of erecting shelter was done by the refugees themselves, the Agency contributing a cash grant for roofing material and the Syrian Government giving another
grant. In Lebanon the Agency issued roofing material, and in some cases built entire camps. In Jordan and the Gaza Strip the construction was organized by the Agency and carried out by local contractors.\textsuperscript{20} The shelter program offers the advantage of providing central areas, known as refugee camps, in which the refugees gather and live. This offers untold advantages to UNRWA, simplifying the administration and care of such a large number of persons. The following chart gives a concise picture of the shelter situation both present and past. It shows that the shelter situation has improved immeasurably since the period of the UNRPR when over 80 percent of the refugees lived in tents.

\begin{table}
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|l|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
Year & Camps & Population & Tents & Huts  \\
\hline
June 1950 & - & 267,598 & 30,580 & 10,930 \\
June 1951 & 71 & 276,294 & 29,989 & 15,760  \\
June 1952 & 63 & 281,128 & 22,055 & 30,988  \\
June 1953 & 64 & 282,263 & 18,059 & 39,745  \\
June 1954 & 59 & 305,630 & 15,180 & 51,363  \\
June 1955 & 57 & 335,752 & 14,212 & 62,794  \\
June 1956 & 58 & 358,681 & 12,989 & 82,934  \\
June 1957 & 58 & 360,598 & 8,328 & 82,595  \\
June 1958 & 58 & 396,761 & 4,950 & 89,598  \\
June 1959 & 58 & 414,467 & 1,984 & 98,147  \\
June 1960 & 58 & 421,548 & 149 & 103,616  \\
June 1961 & 57 & 442,862 & - & 108,155  \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Number of UNRWA Camps, Total Population and Types of Shelter\textsuperscript{21}}
\end{table}

As is the case with the type and quality of shelter, camp organization varies from one camp to another according to population and to services provided. The Jebal Hussein Camp in Amman, Jordan provides us with a representative

\textsuperscript{20} U.N.G.A. OR, (A/3931), \textit{op. cit.}, p. 3.
\textsuperscript{21} U.N.G.A. OR, (A/4861) \textit{op. cit.}, p. 16.
picture of the organization of such a camp.  

**JEBAL HUSSEIN CAMP**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Huts - 3,444</th>
<th>Persons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Official Residents</td>
<td>2,848</td>
<td>15,911</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unofficial Residents</td>
<td>404</td>
<td>2,492</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3,252</td>
<td>18,403</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Squatters*  
500  
2,500

**Services** - (Average number served daily)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Health</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Sanitation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adult Clinic</td>
<td>Elem. Classes</td>
<td>Water Res</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>150</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maternity</td>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>Water Pts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ophthalmology</td>
<td>Elem. Students</td>
<td>Taps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>250</td>
<td>1950</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dentist</td>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>S.T.Holes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>460</td>
<td>214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TB</td>
<td></td>
<td>Priv. Lat.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td></td>
<td>653</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dressing</td>
<td></td>
<td>Inclin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>300</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Personnel**

| Camp Leader | Head Teacher | 5          |
| Asst. Leader| Teachers     | 72         |
|             | School att.  | 5          |
|             |              | Foreman    |
|             |              | 3          |
|             |              | Laborers   |
|             |              | 36         |
|             |              | Water Gds. |
|             |              | 3          |
|             |              | Bath att.  |
|             |              | 2          |
|             |              | San. Gds.  |
|             |              | 2          |

**Services** - (Average number served daily)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Supp. Feeding</th>
<th>Welfare</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Feeding</td>
<td>Library</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3700</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infant</td>
<td>Sewing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Personnel**

| Camp Food Man. | 1          |
| Asst. Food Man.| 1          |
| Cook           | 1          |
| Asst. Cook     | 1          |
| Milk att.      | 2          |

*This term is used to designate bona fide refugees who are not registered as camp residents, but who have settled in makeshift housing around the camps.*

---

22. Figure obtained from visit to the camp and a conference with the camp leader in January 1962.
Facilities vary by camp, but the majority of the camps contain in addition to the living quarters, schools, health clinics, feeding centers, a distribution center, bath houses and limited facilities for recreation.\textsuperscript{23}

**HEALTH CARE**

The UNRWA health program has been, over the years, designed to provide a comprehensive health service to the refugees. The system is based upon the diseases prevalent in the host countries and attempts to strike a proper balance between preventative and curative measures. Facilities are provided which include at the present time approximately 100 health centers and 8 mobile clinics. The Agency attempts to utilize wherever possible the hospitals operated by the host Governments, local authorities, voluntary agencies or private individuals. Only when these cannot meet the requirements of the Agency does it establish its own institutions.\textsuperscript{24}

Included in the program of disease prevention are such activities as the immunization of the refugees through mass campaigns or routine clinical actions. Health education has also assisted in arresting the spread of disease as has increased and continuing emphasis on the implementation of sanitation measures. An interesting comparison between the medical statistics of 1951 and 1961 provides an excellent

\textsuperscript{24} U.N.G.A. OR, (A/4861), op. cit., p. 7.
indication of just how effective the health program has been over the years. When considering these figures, the reader should note the increase in total population served in 1961 over 1951. The only diseases that have increased are the normal childhood diseases and this is readily understandable considering the large percentage of refugees which falls into the age groups susceptible to these diseases.

Medical statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>1951</th>
<th>1961</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Smallpox</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Typhus</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaria</td>
<td>77,231</td>
<td>164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Measles</td>
<td>3,190</td>
<td>14,072</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whooping cough</td>
<td>8,155</td>
<td>3,041</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syphilis</td>
<td>1,799</td>
<td>190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuberculosis</td>
<td>4,475</td>
<td>637</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Typhoid</td>
<td>1,127</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dysenteries</td>
<td>90,973</td>
<td>58,098</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diptheria</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meningitis</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acute conjunctivitis</td>
<td>175,151</td>
<td>115,986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trachoma</td>
<td>223,174</td>
<td>44,854</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bilharzia</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mumps</td>
<td>579</td>
<td>2,759</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relapsing fever</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>774,653</td>
<td>1,068,262</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Rehabilitation

Rehabilitation can, in most cases, be considered synonymous with increased education, whether this education falls within the field of general education, or that of vocational and teacher training, or of advanced education in institutes of higher learning. The fact is one of which

the author is fully aware, but because of a limitation in the scope of this work, general education will be disregarded, and only specialized programs will be discussed.26

There are several rehabilitation programs offered by UNRWA. The Agency’s teacher training program is one of several forms of technical assistance given that offers a means of rehabilitation. This program was created to solve a problem that has faced the Agency over the years, a shortage of trained teachers able to provide a basic education to the refugee children. In 1956 a pilot teacher training center was established in Jordan to raise the general level of teaching in the UNRWA schools. Because of budget limitations this center was closed in 1957, but an improvement in the fund situation enabled the Agency to reestablish the training program in 1959.

The course of study lasts for two years during which time the trainees receive free board and lodging, clothing and a small monthly allowance. The course consists of six periods a week of Arabic, six of English, four of mathematics, four of science, one of religion, and one of physical training. In the first year the students also receive four periods of social studies while the second year students receive three weekly periods of this subject. Additionally, in the second

26. A thesis by Marilyn Joy Sutton, prepared for the Education Department of the American University of Beirut, Education Provided for Refugees in Lebanon by UNRWA offers a complete and comprehensive picture of refugee education that is applicable to all countries serviced by the Agency.
year much of the time is spent in practice teaching, offering an opportunity to put into use the theory that has been studied. 27

By the year 1961 there were two teacher training centers, one for men in Ramallah, Jordan with a capacity of 200 students and one for women in Nablus, Jordan with a capacity of 84 students. 28

It is obvious that the program as it now exists is small, but it seems to be a step in the right direction. It has a dual advantage by providing seriously needed teachers for the UNRWA educational system and by providing these teachers with a profession enabling them to become self-supporting.

A second form of technical assistance is the UNRWA vocational training program. It has as its mission the teaching of vocational skills to selected refugee youths. These skills are those that are vital to the economic and technical development of the countries of the Middle East. Graduates of the course are, in most cases, assured employment in their host country or elsewhere in the Middle East. In the past few years many of the graduates have found employment with oil and pipeline companies in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, the Persian Gulf area, and North Africa. The vocational training program is believed, by Agency officials, to be one of the best methods to integrate the refugee youth into the economy of the host countries and


28. Ibid.
to make him self-supporting. In theory this is a correct assumption and it could contribute much to solving the problem of the refugee youth in the Middle East, but statistics reveal that only a limited number of persons can hope to receive this training unless expenditures on the program are drastically increased. Each year approximately 30,000 youths reach maturity and of this number only a small percentage can be accepted for training.

At the present time there are four vocational training centers in operation. Each will be described briefly.

The Gaza Vocational Training Center began operation in 1954 and by the end of this year will have the capacity to train nearly 400 boys, ranging in age from 18 to 21. Since employment problems are different in Gaza from any other area, the employment record of the graduates (approximately 1/3 have been employed) is not considered typical. Courses are offered in the following trades: electrician, wireman/cable jointer, radio/TV mechanic, carpenter, machinist, welder, auto mechanic, moulder, and sheet metal worker.

In December 1953 a vocational center was started at Kalandia with a total of 70 students receiving training in seven trades. The present capacity of the school is now 392 trainees. The courses offered are the same as at Gaza with


the following additions: plumber, diesel plant site mechanic, surveyor, and business practices.31

Two newer centers are the Wadi Seer Center in Amman, Jordan and the Damascus Center. Each center has a capacity of approximately 400 students and offers the same curriculum as the Kalandia Center.32 As in the other centers, the student is required to reside at the center during his training period which may last up to two years. During this period of service at the school his needs are provided for by the Agency. About half of the student's time is spent in vocational training and the other half is devoted to English, mathematics, science, and mechanical drawing. The annual cost for training one refugee is $500 which is a net amount applied only to the direct cost of instruction, food and accommodations. The costs of maintaining the establishments are provided for in the UNRWA budget. Plans have been made to expand the program over the next several years with the aim of turning out 2,000 graduates a year by 1963 as opposed to 300 graduates in 1960.33

A new center, Siblin, is being completed at the present time at a cost of $716,728. It is near Sidon, Lebanon and will add to the capacity of the existing vocational training system. The majority of the funds for this program have come from contributions made to UNRWA by various countries and organizations during World Refugee Year 1959-1960. After the

construction of all the centers has been completed, operating costs in the neighborhood of some $2,000,000 per year, will have to be financed almost entirely out of the regular UNRWA budget. 34

Another rehabilitation program, but not falling within the field of training, is the UNRWA program of individual loans and grants. This program has been in existence for a number of years and is a loan program designed to assist refugees in becoming self-supporting. The program has been limited mainly to Jordan and Syria. Small grants or loans are given to refugees desiring to establish themselves in economically sound ventures. While the major efforts of UNRWA have been directed towards expansion of education and vocational training projects, an increasing number of refugees has shown an interest and expressed a desire to participate in the UNRWA loan program. 35

In the Agency's three year plan, started in 1961, $343,000, received from World Refugee Year contributions, was allotted for the continuation of the grants and loan program. This program is being implemented in collaboration with the respective governments. In addition, UNRWA has implemented a housing program which enables refugees, who have some income and a plot of land, to build a house. 36

Funds are also provided for deserving refugees through

34. Ibid.
36. Ibid.
the auspices of the Development Bank of Jordan. This Bank was established in 1951 with UNRWA acting as its largest stockholder. The Bank issues loans to refugees for projects in agriculture, industry, and the construction field. By 1961 the Bank had loans in the amount of $1,993,434 for over 540 projects instituted by the refugees. It is estimated that more than 3,000 persons are employed in Bank projects, which benefit over 12,000 Arab refugees. As a point of interest, the average percentage of collections on loans made by the Bank stands at 74.71 per cent.37

This program, although small, offers a much needed service to persons within the refugee community. The side benefits of the loans are obvious. The projects not only provide employment to the refugees, but also provide goods and services that are needed by persons in the host countries.

**FUNDING OF THE UNRWA PROGRAM**

The funds by which UNRWA conducts its program come from three main sources; the major is the contributions from world governments; and the two other sources are contributions from United Nations agencies and voluntary agencies. When we use the word funds it must be remembered that this is a term used in a general sense representing not only money, but contributions in kind. For accounting purposes the contributions in kind are assigned a monetary value and actually represent

funds since they comprise items or services that would have to be purchased by the Agency.

Before we turn to a formal study of the income and expenditures of the Agency, it is worth making mention of two groups that have played a significant part in the success of the refugee relief program in the Middle East. The first group, the voluntary agencies, has made not only direct contributions to UNRWA, but has conducted relief programs of its own in the Middle East. The work of the voluntary agencies during the period of the UNRPR was previously covered in detail since they operated as an extension of that organization. At the present time direct contributions to the work of UNRWA are received from these agencies and are listed on page 105. Since 1950 these contributions have amounted to almost $3,000,000. It is worth while noting that the agencies also conduct independent relief programs in the Middle East coordinated through the Near East Christian Council Committee for Refugee Work and the Central Coordinating Committee for Refugee Work. The monetary value of this assistance since 1950 is in the neighborhood of $13,000,000. This is not reflected in the UNRWA records as a direct contribution to the organization, but it does represent an amount that the Agency has been able to invest in other fields.


39. The Near East Christian Council for Refugee Work, 10 Years of Service (Jerusalem: 1958) carries a complete account of the work of these agencies in the Middle East.
The second group that has made a major contribution to refugee relief is the Arab Governments. The author was fortunate to obtain, in the course of his research, an unpublished manuscript that deals in detail with the contributions of the Arab Governments to the support of the refugees. 40 Because of the excellence of this document and the lack of published information on this subject, tables from the work will be reproduced in this study. These tables represent perhaps the only complete accounting of these contributions.

Few people realize the extent to which the Arab Governments have supported the refugee relief program. Outside the Middle East the consensus of opinion seems to be that the host Governments and the other Arab Governments do little or nothing with regard to the refugees within their respective areas. 41 Proving how much of a misconception this is, is the fact that during the period 1950-1961 the host Governments contributed some $6,550,095. When their previously mentioned contributions to the UNRPR are included this figure is raised to $7,431,905. If we consider, in addition to the amounts contributed by the host Governments, the amount contributed by

41. Dr. Howard mentioned experiencing this reaction in conversations with visiting officials from many countries while serving at the American Embassy in Beirut and in his present position with UNRWA. For this reason he prepared the quoted study.
the other Arab Governments, this total is increased to $9,437,743. These figures represent actual monetary contributions. Giving consideration to the value of goods and services contributed by the host Governments since 1948, the total of all contributions amounts to more than $50,000,000. The rate of direct contribution by these governments at the present time amounts to some $5,000,000 per year. The following table, tabulating Arab contributions over the years is self-explanatory and offers a striking contrast with the $724,257 contributed by the Government of Israel since 1948 to the Arab refugee problem. To give a complete picture of contributions, those made to the UNRPR are also included in the following chart.

Arab Government Contributions (1948-1961)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Arab Host Governments</th>
<th>1948-1950</th>
<th>1950-1961</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To UNRPR</td>
<td>$881,425</td>
<td></td>
<td>$47,643,513</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To UNRWA</td>
<td>$6,550,905</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct to Refugees</td>
<td>$7,724,082</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct to Refugees</td>
<td>$30,644,433</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$45,800,845</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Other Arab Governments</th>
<th>1948-1961</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To UNRPR (Saudi Arabia)</td>
<td>$142,356</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To UNRWA</td>
<td>$971,742</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct to Refugees</td>
<td>$728,570</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$1,842,668</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

42. Dr. Howard, in his study, has obtained his figures by exhaustive research utilizing United Nations' records, UNRWA and UNRPR documents, and information issued by the Arab Governments.


44. Ibid., p. 13. See Annex 0 for additional figures.
As was stated, the majority of the funds for UNRWA has come from supporting governments, United Nations' Agencies, private contributions and voluntary agencies. The lack of funds has been a continuing problem that limits many of the activities of the Agency. The Agency has been promised, in most years, enough money to continue its basic operations. The problem that occurs time after time is that these funds are often contributed during the last quarter of the fiscal year in which the Agency operates. This means that it has to operate nine months of the year on insufficient funds and then in the last three months of operation, it finds itself with an abundance of funds. As a solution to this problem the Agency has attempted, over the last few years, to build up its working capital fund, so that money can be drawn from this fund for current expenses and later be replaced as the voluntary contributions are received.

During the period 1950-1961 some $368,776,096 has been contributed to the relief and rehabilitation of the Arab refugees through UNRWA. Of this sum the United States has contributed about 70 per cent in the amount of $250,579,393. The other primary contributors have been the United Kingdom ($66,224,004), France ($11,247,498) and Canada ($11,512,188). The total contributions to the Agency are as follows: 45

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Governments</th>
<th>UNESCO</th>
<th>WHO</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>Total*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>30 June</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>$38,781,617</td>
<td>$83,396</td>
<td>$42,847</td>
<td>$781,200</td>
<td>$40,127,942</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>42,808,698</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>25,425</td>
<td>671,969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>49,087,227</td>
<td>105,000</td>
<td>42,857</td>
<td>54,022</td>
<td>23,542,087</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>22,983,899</td>
<td>35,000</td>
<td>42,857</td>
<td>83,091</td>
<td>25,160,571</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>24,544,930</td>
<td>55,535</td>
<td>42,857</td>
<td>55,386</td>
<td>24,218,141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>23,646,275</td>
<td>102,140</td>
<td>56,706</td>
<td>39,976</td>
<td>24,218,141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 Dec</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>42,452,880</td>
<td>160,372</td>
<td>53,150</td>
<td>88,423</td>
<td>43,525,752</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>33,928,466</td>
<td>82,268</td>
<td>33,029</td>
<td>142,075</td>
<td>35,033,259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>32,553,673</td>
<td>114,916</td>
<td>33,610</td>
<td>254,392</td>
<td>33,958,878</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>32,852,870</td>
<td>164,121</td>
<td>25,254</td>
<td>1,118,528</td>
<td>35,482,005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 June</td>
<td>12,973,799</td>
<td>85,190</td>
<td>16,172</td>
<td>688,393</td>
<td>14,298,010</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* This figure includes miscellaneous income and exchange adjustments.

Expenditures of the Agency have remained fairly constant over the years considering the increased number of services it has been able to offer. The following chart represents the percentage of UNRWA funds spent on each major item.²⁶

- Administration and General Internal Services
- Transport and Warehousing
- Budget Reserves
- Assistance Toward Self-support
- Welfare
- Education and Training
- Rations
- Health
- Environmental Sanitation
- Shelter

The total expenditures of UNRWA over the last eleven years and the working capital of UNRWA at the end of each reporting period is as follows:²⁷

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>June</th>
<th>Expenditure</th>
<th>Working Capital</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>$33,383,180</td>
<td>$6,744,762</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>28,054,838</td>
<td>22,590,729</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>26,956,198</td>
<td>45,182,177</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Expenditures (USD)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>29,290,393</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>29,387,519</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>31,999,975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec</td>
<td>52,009,113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>31,665,379</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>34,041,427</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>34,584,432</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>17,073,387</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>20,350,255</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total Expenditures: $348,425,841

The average expenditure per year for each refugee receiving aid under the UNRWA program has been approximately $35.00 which includes clothing, feeding and sheltering the individual as well as providing additional benefits such as education, vocational training and other services. It is difficult to believe that the job could be done at a lower cost per capita than under the present system.
CHAPTER V - CONCLUSIONS

Fourteen years have passed since the beginning of the Arab-Israeli War. During these years the UNRPR and the UNRWA have provided relief to almost one million Arab refugees.

The original relief program was implemented upon the personal initiative of the United Nations Mediator and Acting Mediator for Palestine. It was, at its best, suitable only for limited relief, and was soon replaced by a more comprehensive system under the UNRPR.

When the UNRPR assumed responsibility it was contemplated that its program was only temporary, instituted as an interim measure to allow time for the Conciliation Commission for Palestine to negotiate a final settlement. At the beginning of its operations, it found difficulty in establishing the necessary structure and effecting the required coordination for a project of this size. Registration of refugees was done carelessly enabling non-deserving persons to obtain rations and, in some cases, to profiteer by selling them. Expenses of the organization soared and the amount of relief provided by the dollar decreased. A constant shortage of funds caused by a lack of contributions, and close to a 100 per cent increase in the numbers of persons requiring relief, caused restrictions to be placed upon the amount of assistance provided the individual.

Without such an organization certainly many of the
refugees would have perished for lack of food, shelter and medication. It did keep these victims of the Palestine war alive, while other organizations were seeking a solution to the refugee problem as a part of an over-all settlement in Palestine. It was not the fault of the UNRPR but rather the failure of the Conciliation Commission for Palestine that such a solution was not found.

The UNRPR was succeeded by the UNRWA which has continued to provide a program of refugee relief for the past twelve years. An evaluation of its program is somewhat difficult since there have been moments of both success and failure for the Agency.

During its term the Agency has continually provided food, shelter and medical care required by the refugees. As a result it has been shown that the condition of the refugees is better than that of comparative groups of people that live in the same area but do not receive UNRWA services.

Rapid advances have been made over the last three years in the field of rehabilitation. Self-help, vocational and educational projects have offered the opportunity for selected refugees to rise above their present situation. These persons not only benefit themselves by becoming self-supporting but also provide an excellent example to the members of the refugee community.

Another significant change has resulted from the activities of UNRWA. People who a few years ago would have
been content to lead a nomadic life have been brought into contact, in the refugee camps, with persons who enjoyed a different way of life prior to the war. Values have changed from these contacts and emphasis has been placed upon those items once important to only the village and city dweller. An example is education which parents now see as the key to the future and which they insist be provided their children.

Within the UNRWA, however, much has been left to be done. It has yet to eliminate from the rolls persons not deserving of rations. In this connection it has also to overcome a special difficulty in Jordan where the refugee, officially supported, resists any move on the part of the Agency to adjust the rolls. Continued study and increased efforts must be made to eliminate the situation since a solution would actually benefit all parties involved.

The UNRWA also has to remedy a situation existing in the distribution system. It is common knowledge to refugees and nationals of the host countries that certain workers within the ration distribution chain possess material wealth in excess of that which could normally be purchased from their wages. They have managed to profit from their employment as food handlers. UNRWA must take active steps above those followed under normal operating procedure to end this situation which is costly to both the refugee and the Agency.

Even with these shortcomings there is no doubt that the Agency is well equipped for carrying out its job of
refugee relief and rehabilitation. It has had the experience of over eleven years service. This experience aids in planning and implementing the present UNRWA program which is the most comprehensive of its entire term of service. The last three years has seen the Agency move ahead rapidly and decisively. With greater support from the host Governments and continued assistance from the nations of the world, the next few years should see even greater gains by the Agency on behalf of the refugees.

The question that is left in the reader's mind is what will be the end of the situation that has existed for these past fourteen years? Possibly there will be a political solution that will eliminate the situation as it now exists, but this seems unlikely in the near future because it requires a complete change in the attitudes of the countries that were a party to the 1948 hostilities. A military solution is also possible, but it too appears unlikely. Training and rehabilitation resulting from UNRWA training programs offers only a partial solution. Even if expanded the point will be reached where the demand for these trained persons will gradually subside and finally end.

A possible solution was offered in 1949 by the United Nations Economic Survey Mission in their report. At that time two basic mistakes were made. First, it was assumed that the program suggested by the Mission would provide a solution to the refugee problem within a two year period.
No evident progress was made within that period and initial enthusiasm died out. Second, and more important, the economic projects suggested were tied directly to the refugee problem. Each project would employ a certain number of refugees who would cease to be a United Nations responsibility. Lip service was paid to the fact that these people would not forfeit their right to compensation and/or repatriation, but few believed this would be the case and active opposition by both governments and refugees began. This opposition meant the gradual death of all but a few portions of the plan.

The basic idea of the plan is still sound. A balanced economic growth in the Middle East, independent of the refugee problem, would create job opportunities and would increase the standard of living of all persons in the area. Projects such as those being carried out under the auspices of the United States Overseas Mission are acceptable to the governments and improve the conditions in the project areas. As the standard of living rises, persons presently existing under UNRWA relief would gradually be absorbed in this growing economy and the requirement for relief would lessen and finally cease.

It is obvious that this is not a program that would end in a few years, but one which would most likely extend over one or two decades. Would it succeed? Only time can tell, but it does seem to offer the only opportunity for an end to the more than decade old refugee problem short of
a political or military solution to the entire Palestine problem.
ANNEX A

TEXT OF RESOLUTION 194 (III)
ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS

On 11 DECEMBER 1948

The General Assembly,

Having considered further the situation in Palestine,

1. Expresses its deep appreciation of the progress achieved through the good offices of the late United Nations Mediator in promoting a peaceful adjustment of the future situation of Palestine, for which cause he sacrificed his life; and

Extends its thanks to the Acting Mediator and his staff for their continued efforts and devotion to duty in Palestine;

2. Establishes a Conciliation Commission consisting of three States Members of the United Nations which shall have the following functions:

   a) To assume, in so far as it considers necessary in existing circumstances, the functions given to the United Nations Mediator on Palestine by resolution 186 (S-2) of the General Assembly of 14 May 1948;

   b) To carry out the specific functions and directives given to it by the present resolution and such additional functions and directives as may be given to it by the General Assembly or by the Security Council;

   c) To undertake, upon the request of the Security Council, any of the functions now assigned to the United Nations Mediator on Palestine or to the United Nations Truce Commission by resolutions of the Security Council; upon such request to the Conciliation Commission by the Security Council with respect to all the remaining functions of the United Nations Mediator on Palestine under Security Council resolutions, the office of the Mediator shall be terminated;

3. Decides that a Committee of the Assembly, consisting of China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and the United States of America, shall present, before the end of the first part of the present session of the
General Assembly, for the approval of the Assembly, a proposal concerning the names of the three States which will constitute the Conciliation Commission;

4. Requests the Commission to begin its functions at once, with a view to the establishment of contact between the parties themselves and the Commission at the earliest possible date;

5. Calls upon the Government and authorities concerned to extend the scope of the negotiations provided for in the Security Council's resolution of 16 November 1948 and to seek agreement by negotiations conducted either with the Conciliation Commission or directly, with a view to the final settlement of all questions outstanding between them;

6. Instructs the Conciliation Commission to take steps to assist the Governments and authorities concerned to achieve a final settlement of all questions outstanding between them;

7. Resolves that the Holy Places - including Nazareth - religious buildings and sites in Palestine should be protected and free access to them assured, in accordance with existing rights and historical practice; that arrangements to this end should be under effective United Nations supervision; that the United Nations Conciliation Commission, in presenting to the fourth regular session of the General Assembly its detailed proposals for a permanent international regime for the territory of Jerusalem, should include recommendations concerning the Holy Places in that territory; that with regard to the Holy Places in the rest of Palestine the Commission should call upon the political authorities of the areas concerned to give appropriate formal guarantees as to the protection of the Holy Places and access to them; and that these undertakings should be presented to the General Assembly for approval;

8. Resolves that, in view of its association with three world religions, the Jerusalem area, including the present municipality of Jerusalem plus the surrounding villages and towns, the most eastern of which shall be Abu Dis; the most southern, Bethlehem; the most western, Ein Karim (including also the built-up area of Motsa); and the most northern, Shu'fat, should be accorded special and separate treatment from the rest of Palestine and should be placed under effective United Nations control;

Requests the Security Council to take further steps to ensure the demilitarization of Jerusalem at the earliest possible date;

Instructs the Conciliation Commission to present to the
fourth regular session of the General Assembly detailed proposals for a permanent international regime for the Jerusalem area which will provide for the maximum local autonomy for distinctive groups consistent with the special international status of the Jerusalem area;

The Conciliation Commission is authorized to appoint a United Nations representative, who shall cooperate with the local authorities with respect to the interim administration of the Jerusalem area;

9. Resolves that, pending agreement on more detailed arrangements among the Governments and authorities concerned, the freest possible access to Jerusalem by road, rail or air should be accorded to all inhabitants of Palestine;

Instructs the Conciliation Commission to report immediately to the Security Council, for appropriate action that organ, any attempt by any party to impede such access;

10. Instructs the Conciliation Commission to seek arrangements among the Governments and authorities concerned which will facilitate the economic development of the area, including arrangements for access to ports and airfields and the use of transportation and communication facilities;

11. Resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live in peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible;

Instructs the Conciliation Commission to facilitate the repatriation, resettlement and economic and social rehabilitation of the refugees and the payment of compensation, and to maintain close relations with the Director of the United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees and, through him, with the appropriate organs and agencies of the United Nations;

12. Authorizes the Conciliation Commission to appoint such subsidiary bodies and to employ such technical experts, acting under its authority, as it may find necessary for the effective discharge of its functions and responsibilities under the present resolution;

The Conciliation Commission will have its official headquarters at Jerusalem. The authorities responsible for maintaining order in Jerusalem will be responsible for taking all measures necessary to ensure the security of the Commission.
The Secretary-General will provide a limited number of guards for the protection of the staff and premises of the Commission;

13. Instructs the Conciliation Commission to render progress reports periodically to the Secretary-General for transmission to the Security Council and to the Members of the United Nations;

14. Calls upon all Governments and authorities concerned to co-operate with the Conciliation Commission and to take all possible steps to assist in the implementation of the present resolution;

15. Requests the Secretary-General to provide the necessary staff and facilities and to make appropriate arrangements to provide the necessary funds required in carrying out the terms of the present resolution.
ANNEX B

TEXT OF RESOLUTION 212 (III)

ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS

ON 19 NOVEMBER 1948

Whereas the problem of the relief of Palestine refugees of all communities is one of immediate urgency and the United Nations Mediator on Palestine in his progress report of 18 September 1948, part three, states that "action must be taken to determine the necessary measures (of relief) and to provide for their implementation" (1) and that "the choice is between saving the lives of many thousands of people now or permitting them to die";

Whereas the Acting Mediator, in his supplemental report of 18 October 1948, declares that "the situation of the refugees is now critical" (2) and that "aid must not only be continued but very greatly increased if disaster is to be averted" (3);

Whereas the alleviation of conditions of starvation and distress among the Palestine refugees is one of the minimum conditions for the success of the efforts of the United Nations to bring peace to that land,

The General Assembly,

1. Expresses its thanks to the Governments and organizations which, and the individual persons who, have given assistance directly or in response to the Mediator's appeal;

2. Considers on the basis of the Acting Mediator's recommendation, that a sum of approximately $29.5 million will be required to provide relief for 500,000 refugees for a period of nine months from 1 December 1948 to 31 August 1949; and that an additional amount of approximately $2.5 million will be required for administrative and local operational expenses;

3. Authorizes the Secretary General, in consultation with the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, to advance immediately a sum of up to $5 million from the Working Capital Fund of the United Nations, the said sum to be repaid before the end of the period specified in

2. Document A/689
3. Ibid.
paragraph 2, from the voluntary governmental contributions requested under paragraph 4;

4. **Urges** all States Members of the United Nations to make as soon as possible voluntary contributions in kind or in funds sufficient to ensure that the amount of supplies and funds required is obtained, and states, that, to this end, voluntary contributions of non-member States would also be accepted; contributions in funds may be made in currencies other than the United States dollar, in so far as the operations of the relief organization can be carried out in such currencies;

5. **Authorizes** the Secretary-General to establish a Special Fund into which contributions shall be paid, which will be administered as a separate account;

6. **Authorizes** the Secretary-General to expend the funds received under paragraphs 3 and 4 of the present resolution;

7. **Instructs** the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, to establish regulations for the administration and supervision of the Fund;

8. **Requests** the Secretary-General to take all necessary steps to extend aid to Palestine refugees and to establish such administrative organization as may be required for this purpose, inviting the assistance of the appropriate agencies of the several Governments, the specialized agencies of the United Nations, the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the League of Red Cross Societies and other voluntary agencies, it being recognized that the participation of voluntary organizations in the relief plan would in no way derogate from the principle of impartiality on the basis of which the assistance of these organizations is being solicited;

9. **Requests** the Secretary-General to appoint a Director of United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees, to whom he may delegate such responsibility as he may consider appropriate for the overall planning and implementation of the relief programme;

10. **Agrees** to the convoking, at the discretion of the Secretary-General, of an ad hoc advisory committee of seven members to be selected by the President of the General Assembly to which the Secretary-General may submit any matter of principle or policy upon which he would like the benefit of the committee's advice;

11. **Requests** the Secretary-General to continue and to
extend the implementation of the present relief programme until the machinery provided for by the present resolution is set up;

12. **Urges** the World Health Organization, the Food and Agriculture Organization, the International Refugee Organization, the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund and other appropriate organizations and agencies, acting within the framework of the relief programme herein established, promptly to contribute supplies, specialized personnel and other services permitted by their constitutions and their financial resources, to relieve the desperate plight of Palestine refugees of all communities;

13. **Requests** the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly, at the next regular session, on the action taken as a result of this resolution.
ANNEX C

TEXT OF RESOLUTION 302 (IV)
ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS
ON 8 DECEMBER 1949

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 212 (III) of 19 November 1948 and 194 (III) of 11 December 1948, affirming in particular the provisions of paragraph 11 of the latter resolution,

Having examined with appreciation the first interim report of the United Nations Economic Survey Mission for the Middle East (1) and the report of the Secretary-General on assistance to Palestine refugees (2),

1. Expresses its appreciation to the Governments which have generously responded to the appeal embodied in its resolution 212 (III), and to the appeal of the Secretary-General, to contribute in kind or in funds to the alleviation of the conditions of starvation and distress amongst the Palestine refugees;

2. Expresses also its gratitude to the International Committee of the Red Cross, to the League of Red Cross Societies and to the American Friends Service Committee for the contribution they have made to this humanitarian cause by discharging, in the face of great difficulties, the responsibility they voluntarily assumed for the distribution of relief supplies and the general care of the refugees; and welcomes the assurance they have given the Secretary-General that they will continue their co-operation with the United Nations until the end of March 1950 on a mutually acceptable basis;

3. Commends the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund for the important contribution which it has made towards the United Nations programme of assistance; and commends those specialized agencies which have rendered assistance in their respective fields, in particular the World Health Organization, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization and the International Refugee Organization;

4. Expresses its thanks to the numerous religious,

2. Documents A/1060 and A/1060/Add.1
charitable and humanitarian organizations which have materially assisted in bringing relief to Palestine refugees;

5. Recognizes that, without prejudice to the provisions of paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 1948, continued assistance for the relief of the Palestine refugees is necessary to prevent conditions of starvation and distress among them and to further conditions of peace and stability, and that constructive measures should be undertaken at an early date with a view to the termination of international assistance for relief;

6. Considers that, subject to the provisions of paragraph 9 (d) of the present resolution, the equivalent of approximately $33.7 million will be required for direct relief and works programmes for the period 1 January to 31 December 1950 of which the equivalent of $20.2 million is required for direct relief and $13.5 million for works programmes; that the equivalent of approximately $21.2 million will be required for works programmes from 1 January to 30 June 1951, all inclusive of administrative expenses; and that direct relief should be terminated not later than 31 December 1950 unless otherwise determined by the General Assembly at its fifth regular session;

7. Establishes the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East:

(a) To carry out in collaboration with local governments the direct relief and works programmes as recommended by the Economic Survey Mission;

(b) To consult with the interested Near Eastern Governments concerning measures to be taken by them preparatory to the time when international assistance for relief and works projects is no longer available;

8. Establishes an Advisory Commission consisting of representatives of France, Turkey, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America, with power to add not more than three additional members from contributing Governments, to advise and assist the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East in the execution of the programme; the Director and the Advisory Commission shall consult with each Near Eastern Government concerned in the selection, planning and execution of projects;

9. Requests the Secretary-General to appoint the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East in consultation with the
Governments represented on the Advisory Commission;

(a) The Director shall be the chief executive officer of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East responsible to the General Assembly for the operation of the programme;

(b) The Director shall select and appoint his staff in accordance with general arrangements made in agreement with the Secretary-General, including such of the staff rules and regulations of the United Nations as the Director and the Secretary-General shall agree are applicable, and to the extent possible utilize the facilities and assistance of the Secretary-General;

(c) The Director shall, in consultation with the Secretary-General and the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, establish financial regulations for the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East;

(d) Subject to the financial regulations established pursuant to clause (c) of the present paragraph, the Director, in consultation with the Advisory Commission, shall apportion available funds between direct relief and works projects in their discretion, in the event that the estimates in paragraph 6 require revision;

10. Requests the Director to convene the Advisory Commission at the earliest practicable date for the purpose of developing plans for the organization and administration of the programme, and of adopting rules of procedure;

11. Continues the United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees as established under General Assembly resolution 212 (III) until 1 April 1950, or until such date thereafter as the transfer referred to in paragraph 12 is effected, and requests the Secretary-General in consultation with the operating agencies to continue the endeavour to reduce the numbers of rations by progressive stages in the light of the findings and recommendations of the Economic Survey Mission;

12. Instructs the Secretary-General to transfer to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East the assets and liabilities of the United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees by 1 April, 1950, or at such date as may be agreed by him and the Director of the
United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East;

13. **Urges** all Members of the United Nations and non-members to make voluntary contributions in funds or in kind to ensure that the amount of supplies and funds required is obtained for each period of the programme as set out in paragraph 6; contributions in funds may be made in currencies other than the United States dollar in so far as the programme can be carried out in such currencies;

14. **Authorizes** the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, to advance funds deemed to be available for this purpose and not exceeding $5 million from the Working Capital Fund to finance operations pursuant to the present resolution, such sum to be repaid not later than 31 December 1950 from the voluntary governmental contributions requested under paragraph 13 above;

15. **Authorizes** the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, to negotiate with the International Refugee Organization for an interest-free loan in an amount not to exceed the equivalent of $2.8 million to finance the programme subject to mutually satisfactory conditions for repayment;

16. **Authorizes** the Secretary-General to continue the Special Fund established under General Assembly resolution 212 (III) and to make withdrawals therefrom for the operation of the United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees and, upon the request of the Director, for the operations of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East;

17. **Calls** upon the Governments concerned to accord to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East the privileges, immunities, exemptions and facilities which have been granted to the United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees, together with all other privileges, immunities, exemptions and facilities necessary for the fulfillment of its functions;

18. **Urges** the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund, the International Refugee Organization, the World Health Organization, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, the Food and Agriculture Organization and other appropriate agencies and private groups and organizations, in consultation with the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, to furnish assistance within the framework of the programme;
19. Requests the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East:

(a) To appoint a representative to attend the meeting of the Technical Assistance Board as observer so that the technical assistance activities of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East may be co-ordinated with the technical assistance programmes of the United Nations and specialized agencies referred to in Economic and Social Council resolution 222 (IX) A of 15 August 1949;

(b) To place at the disposal of the Technical Assistance Board full information concerning any technical assistance work which may be done by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, in order that it may be included in the reports submitted by the Technical Assistance Board to the Technical Assistance Committee of the Economic and Social Council;

20. Directs the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East to consult with the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine in the best interests of their respective tasks, with particular reference to paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 1948;

21. Requests the Director to submit to the General Assembly of the United Nations an annual report on the work of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, including an audit of funds, and invites him to submit to the Secretary-General such other reports as the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East may wish to bring to the attention of Members of the United Nations, or its appropriate organs;

22. Instructs the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine to transmit the final report of the Economic Survey Mission, with such comments as it may wish to make, to the Secretary-General for transmission to the Members of the United Nations and to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East.
ANNEX D

TEXT OF RESOLUTION 393 (V)

ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS

ON 2 DECEMBER 1950

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 302 (IV) of 8 December 1949,

Having examined the report of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (1), and the report of the Secretary-General concerning United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees (2),

1. Notes that contributions sufficient to carry out the programme authorized in paragraph 6 of resolution 302 (IV) have not been made, and urges governments which have not yet done so to make every effort to make voluntary contributions in response to paragraph 13 of that resolution;

2. Recognizes that direct relief cannot be terminated as provided in paragraph 6 of resolution 302 (IV);

3. Authorizes the Agency to continue to furnish direct relief to refugees in need, and considers that, for the period 1 July 1951 to 30 June 1952, the equivalent of approximately $20 million will be required for direct relief to refugees who are not yet reintegrated into the economy of the Near East;

4. Considers that, without prejudice to the provisions of paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 1948, the reintegration of the refugees into the economic life of the Near East, either by repatriation or resettlement, is essential in preparation for the time when international assistance is no longer available, and for the realization of conditions of peace and stability in the area;

5. Instructs the Agency to establish a reintegration fund which shall be utilized for projects requested by any government in the Near East and approved by the Agency for the permanent re-establishment of refugees and their removal from relief;

1. Official Records of the General Assembly,
   Fifth Session, A/1451
2. Ibid. A/1452
6. **Considers** that, for the period 1 July 1951 to 30 June 1952, not less than the equivalent of $30 million should be contributed to the Agency for the purposes set forth in paragraph 5 above;

7. **Authorizes** the Agency, as circumstances permit, to transfer funds available for the current relief and works programmes, and for the relief programme provided in paragraph 3 above, to reintegration projects provided for in paragraph 5;

8. (a) **Requests** the President of the General Assembly to appoint a Negotiating Committee composed of seven or more members for the purpose of consulting, as soon as possible during the current session of the General Assembly, with Member and non-member States as to the amounts which governments may be willing to contribute on a voluntary basis towards:

   (i) the current programme for relief and works for the period ending 30 June 1951, bearing in mind the need for securing contributions from Member States which have not yet contributed;

   (ii) the programme of relief and reintegration projects as provided for in paragraphs 3 and 4 above for the year ending 30 June 1952;

   (b) **Authorizes** the Negotiating Committee to adopt procedures best suited to the accomplishment of its task, bearing in mind:

      (i) the need for securing the maximum contributions in cash;

      (ii) the desirability of ensuring that any contribution in kind is of a nature which meets the requirements of the contemplated programmes;

      (iii) the importance of enabling the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East to plan its programmes in advance and to carry them out with funds regularly contributed;

      (iv) the degree of assistance which can continue to be rendered by specialized agencies, non-member States and other contributors;

   (c) **Requests** that, as soon as the Negotiating Committee has ascertained the extent to which Member States are willing to make contributions, all delegations be notified accordingly by the Secretary-General in order that they may consult with their governments;
(d) Decides that, as soon as the Negotiating Committee has completed its work, the Secretary-General shall at the Committee's request arrange, during the current session of the General Assembly, an appropriate meeting of Member and non-member States at which Members may commit themselves to their national contributions and the contributions of non-members may be made known;

9. Authorizes the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, to advance funds, deemed to be available for this purpose and not exceeding $5 million from the Working Capital Fund to finance operations pursuant to the present resolution, such sum to be repaid not later than 31 December 1951;

10. Calls upon the Secretary-General and the specialized agencies to utilize to the fullest extent the Agency's facilities as a point of reference and co-ordination for technical assistance programmes in the countries in which the Agency is operating;

11. Expresses its appreciation to the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund, the World Health Organization, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, the International Refugee Organization, the International Labour Organization and the Food and Agriculture Organization for the assistance with they have rendered, and urges them to continue to furnish all possible assistance to the Agency;

12. Commends the International Committee of the Red Cross, the League of Red Cross Societies, and the American Friends Service Committee for their invaluable services and whole-hearted cooperation in the distribution of relief supplies until those functions were taken over by the Agency;

13. Expresses its thanks to the numerous religious, charitable and humanitarian organizations whose programmes have brought much needed supplementary assistance to the Palestine refugees, and urges them to continue and expand to the extent possible, the work which they have undertaken on behalf of the refugees;

14. Extends its appreciation and thanks to the Director and staff of the Agency and the members of the Advisory Commission for their effective and devoted work.
ANNEX E

TEXT OF RESOLUTION 513 (VI)

ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS

ON 26 JANUARY 1952

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 302 (IV) of 8 December 1949, as amended by resolution 393 (V) of 2 December 1950,

Having examined the report of the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (1) and the special joint report of the Director and the Advisory Commission of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (2),

Having considered the three-year programme of relief and reintegration recommended by the Director and the Advisory Commission of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency,

1. Commends the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for the development of a constructive programme which will contribute effectively to the welfare of the refugees;

2. Endorses, without prejudice to the provisions of paragraph 11 of resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 1948 or to the provisions of paragraph 4 of resolution 393 (V) of 2 December 1950 relative to reintegration either by repatriation or resettlement, the programme recommended by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for the relief and reintegration of Palestine refugees, which envisages the expenditure of $50 million for relief and $200 million for reintegration over and above such contributions as may be made by local governments, to be carried out over a period of approximately three years starting as of 1 July 1951;

Recognizing the concern of the United Nations in the problem of the Palestine refugees,

3. Urges the governments of the countries in the area to assist, with due regard to their constitutional processes,

in the carrying out of this programme and to extend to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency, a subsidiary organ established by the General Assembly, their co-operation in the elaboration of specific projects and in the general performance of its functions;

4. **Invites** the United Nations Relief and Works Agency to explore with the governments concerned arrangements looking towards their assuming administration of reintegration projects at the earliest possible date;

5. **Requests** the United Nations Relief and Works Agency to explore with the governments concerned the desirability and practicability of transferring the administration of relief to those governments at the earliest possible date, and considers that the United Nations Relief and Works Agency should continue to carry the cost of the supply programme, subject to paragraphs 2 and 6, and to provide assistance for the health, welfare and education programme along with the duty of making such inspection and such verification of accounts as may be necessary;

6. **Considers** that relief expenditures should be reduced in suitable proportion to reintegration expenditures;

7. **Decides** that the amount of $20 million provided for direct relief in resolution 393 (V) of 2 December 1950 should be increased to $27 million for the fiscal year ending 30 June 1952;

8. **Decides** that, consequent upon paragraph 2 above, the amount of $30 million provided in resolution 393 (V) of 2 December 1950 for reintegration should be increased to not less than $50 million, and credited to the reintegration fund provided for in that resolution for the fiscal year ending 30 June 1952;

9. **Approves the** budget recommended by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for the fiscal year 1 July 1952 to 30 June 1953, of the equivalent of $118 million of which $100 million shall be available for reintegration and $18 million for relief;

10. **Authorizes** the United Nations Relief and Works Agency to transfer funds allocated for relief to reintegration;

11. **Urges** the governments of Member States to make voluntary contributions to the extent necessary to carry through to termination the programme set forth in paragraph 2 above;

12. **Requests** that negotiation regarding contributions for the proposed three-year programme be carried out with Member and non-member States by the Negotiating Committee for
Extra-Budgetary Funds established by resolution 571B (VI) adopted by the General Assembly on 7 December 1951;

13. Expresses its appreciation of the assistance afforded to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency by the specialized agencies and the United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund and urges them to render all services possible to strengthen the programme of refugee relief and reintegration, and to co-operate with the Secretary-General and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency in ensuring that the total assistance of the United Nations to Palestine refugees is rendered with the maximum of co-ordination and efficiency;

14. Expresses its appreciation to the numerous religious, charitable and humanitarian organizations whose programmes have afforded valuable supplementary assistance to Palestine refugees, and again requests them to continue and expand to the extent possible the work which they have undertaken on behalf of the refugees.
ANNEX F

TEXT OF RESOLUTION 614 (VII)
ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS
ON 6 NOVEMBER 1952

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 194 (III) of 11 December 1948, 302 (IV) of 8 December 1949, 393 (V) of 2 December 1950 and 513 (VI) of 26 January 1952,

Having examined the report of the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (1) and the special joint report of the Director and Advisory Commission of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (2),

Noting that negotiations have taken place between the Agency and governments of Near Eastern countries under the programme approved in resolution 513 (VI),

Having in mind the goals for the reduction of relief expenditure envisaged in the three-year $250 million relief and reintegration programme, approved by the General Assembly in its resolution 513 (VI) without prejudice to the provisions of paragraph 11 of resolution 194 (III) or to the provisions of paragraph 4 of resolution 393 (V) relative to reintegration either by repatriation or resettlement,

Recognizing that immediate realization of these goals has not proved possible and that increased relief expenditures are therefore required, with a resultant reduction in the reintegration funds,

1. Authorizes the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East to increase the budget for relief to $23 million for the fiscal year ending 30 June 1953, and to make such further adjustments as it may deem necessary to maintain adequate standards; and to adopt a budget for relief of $18 million for the fiscal year ending 30 June 1954 which shall be subject to review at the eighth

2. Ibid. A/2171/Add. 1

131
2. **Authorizes** the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East to allocate funds remaining for reintegration according to time schedules deemed appropriate up to 30 June 1954,

3. **Requests** that negotiations regarding contributions for the programme be carried out with Member and non-member States by the Negotiating Committee for Extra-Budgetary Funds.
ANNEX G

TEXT OF RESOLUTION 720 (VIII)

ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS

ON 27 NOVEMBER 1953

A

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 194 (III) of 11 December 1948, 302 (IV) of 8 December 1949, 393 (V) of 2 December 1950, 513 (VI) of 26 January 1952 and 614 (VII) of 6 November 1952,

Having examined the report (1) of the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East and the special report (2) of the Director and the Advisory Commission of that Agency,

Noting that programme agreements envisaging the commitment of approximately $120 million have been signed by UNRWA with the governments of several Near Eastern countries, pursuant to the plan endorsed by the General Assembly in resolution 513 (VI), but that expectations as regards the execution of the projects programme have not been realized,

Noting also that the situation of the refugees continues to be a matter of grave concern,

1. Decides, without prejudice to the provisions of paragraph 11 of resolution 194 (III), or to the provisions of paragraph 4 of resolution 393 (V), that the mandate of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East shall be extended until 30 June 1955, and that its programme shall be again subject to review at the ninth session of the General Assembly;

2. Authorizes the Agency to adopt a budget for relief amounting to $24.8 million for the fiscal year ending 30 June 1954, subject to such adjustments as may be attributable to refugee employment on projects, or as may be necessary to maintain adequate standards, and to adopt a provisional budget

2. Ibid. Supplement No. 12, A/2470/Add. 1

133
for relief of $18 million for the fiscal year ending 30 June 1955;

3. Considers that the projects fund previously authorized by the General Assembly in paragraph 2 of resolution 513 (VI) should be maintained at $200 million until 30 June 1955, and urges UNRWA and the governments of the Near Eastern countries concerned to continue to seek acceptable projects to enable the fund to be utilized for the purposes for which it is intended;

4. Requests the Negotiating Committee for Extra-Budgetary Funds to seek the funds required to meet the current needs of the relief programmes and to invite governments to take into account the need for the additional pledges which will be required to meet the total programme now established at $292.8 million.

B

The General Assembly,

Having noted that the present membership of the Advisory Commission of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, established pursuant to paragraph 8 of General Assembly resolution 302 (IV) of 8 December 1949, is composed of representatives of Egypt, France, Jordan, Syria, Turkey, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America,

Noting further that it is in the general interest that other contributing countries join the Advisory Commission,

Authorizes the Advisory Commission to increase its membership by not more than two additional members.
ANNEX H

TEXT OF RESOLUTION 818 (IX)

ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS

ON 4 DECEMBER 1954

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 194 (III) of 11 December 1948, 302 (IV) of 8 December 1949, 393 (V) of 2 December 1950, 513 (VI) of 26 January 1952, 614 (VII) of 6 November 1952 and 720 (VIII) of 27 November 1953,

Noting the annual report (1) of the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, and the special report (2) of the Director and the Advisory Commission of UNRWA,

Noting that repatriation or compensation of the refugees, as provided for in paragraph 11 of resolution 194 (III), has not been effected and that the situation of the refugees continues to be a matter of grave concern,

1. Decides, without the prejudice to the rights of the refugees to repatriation or compensation, to extend the mandate of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East for five years ending 30 June 1960;

2. Requests the Agency to continue its consultation with the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine in the best interest of their respective tasks, with particular reference to paragraph 11 of resolution 194 (III);

3. Requests the Governments of the area to continue to co-operate with the Director of the Agency in seeking and carrying out projects capable of supporting substantial numbers of refugees;

4. Decides to maintain the rehabilitation fund of $200 million, subject to reductions for expenditures already made;

2. Ibid. Supplement No. 17 A, A/2717 Add. 1

135
5. Approves a relief budget of $25.1 million and a rehabilitation budget of $36.2 million for the fiscal year ending 30 June 1955;

6. Requests the Director, in consultation with the Advisory Commission of UNRWA, to study and report upon the problem of assistance which should be given to other claimants for relief, particularly children and needy inhabitants of villages along the demarcation lines;

7. Authorizes the Director to prepare, in consultation with the Advisory Commission, the budgets for relief and rehabilitation in advance of each fiscal year, which budgets he shall transmit to the Negotiating Committee for Extra-Budgetary Funds, without prejudice to review each year by the General Assembly;

8. Requests the Negotiating Committee for Extra-Budgetary Funds, after receipt of such budgets from the Director of UNRWA, to seek such funds as may be required by the Agency;

9. Appeals to the Governments of Member and non-member States to make voluntary contributions to the extent necessary to carry through to fulfilment the Agency's programmes, and thanks the numerous religious, charitable and humanitarian organizations for their valuable and continuing work in assisting the refugees;

10. Requests the Director to continue to submit the reports referred to in paragraph 21 of resolution 302 (IV), as well as the annual budgets.
ANNEX I

TEXT OF RESOLUTION 916 (X)

ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS

ON 3 DECEMBER 1955

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 194 (III) of 11 December 1948, 302 (IV) of 8 December 1949, 393 (V) of 2 December 1950, 513 (VI) of 26 January 1952, 614 (VII) of 6 November 1952, 720 (VIII) of 27 November 1953 and 818 (IX) of 4 December 1954,

Noting the annual report (1) and the special report (2) of the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East and the report (3) of the Advisory Commission of the Agency,

Having reviewed the budgets for relief and rehabilitation prepared by the Director of the Agency,

Noting that repatriation or compensation of the refugees as provided for in paragraph 11 of resolution 194 (III), has not been effected, that no substantial progress has been made in the programme for reintegrations of refugees endorsed in paragraph 2 of resolution 513 (IV) and that the situation of the refugees therefore continues to be a matter of grave concern,

1. Directs the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East to pursue its programmes for the relief and rehabilitation of refugees, bearing in mind the limitations imposed upon it by the extent of the contributions for the fiscal year;

2. Requests the Agency to continue its consultation with the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine in the best interest of their respective tasks, with particular reference to paragraph 11 of resolution 194 (III);

2. Ibid. Supplement No. 15 A, A/2978/Add 1
3. Ibid. A/3017

137
3. Requests the Governments of the area, without prejudice to paragraph 11 of resolution 194 (III), to make a determined effort, in cooperation with the Director of the Agency, to seek and carry out projects capable of supporting substantial numbers of refugees;

4. Notes with gratification that the Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the Agency have made substantial progress toward resolving the difficulties which impede the granting of rations to all qualified refugee children in Jordan;

5. Notes the serious need of the other claimants for relief as described in the special report (2) prepared by the Director pursuant to paragraph 6 of resolution 818 (IX), namely, the frontier villagers in Jordan, the non-refugee population of the Gaza strip, a number of the refugees in Egypt, and certain of the Bedouin;

6. Appeals to private organizations to give them increased assistance to the extent that local governments cannot do so;

7. Urges all Governments and individuals to support these private organizations with food, goods and services;

8. Requests the Negotiating Committee for Extra-Budgetary Funds, after the receipt of the budgets from the Director of the Agency, to seek such funds as may be required by the Agency;

9. Appeals to the Governments of Member and non-member States to make voluntary contributions to the extent necessary to carry through to fulfilment the Agency's programmes, and thanks the numerous religious, charitable and humanitarian organizations for their valuable and continuing work in assisting the refugees;

10. Expresses its thanks to the Director and the staff of the Agency for their continued faithful efforts to carry out their mandate, and requests the Governments of the area to continue to facilitate the work of the Agency and to ensure the protection of its personnel and property;

11. Requests the Director of the Agency to continue to submit the reports referred to in paragraph 21 of resolution 302 (IV) as well as the annual budgets.
ANNEX J

TEXT OF RESOLUTION 1018 (XI)

ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS

ON 28 FEBRUARY 1957

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 194 (III) of 11 December 1948, 302 (IV) of 8 December 1949, 393 (V) of 2 December 1950, 513 (VI) of 26 January 1952, 614 (VII) of 6 November 1952, 720 (VIII) of 27 November 1953, 818 (IX) of 4 December 1954 and 916 (X) of 3 December 1955,

Noting the annual report (1) and the special report (2) of the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East and the report of the Advisory Commission of the Agency (3),

Having reviewed the budget for relief and rehabilitation prepared by the Director of the Agency,

Noting with concern that contributions to that budget are not yet sufficient,

Noting that repatriation or compensation of the refugees, as provided for in paragraph 11 of resolution 194 (III), has not been effected, that no substantial progress has been made in the programme endorsed in paragraph 2 of resolution 513 (IV) for the reintegration of refugees and that, therefore, the situation of the refugees continues to be a matter of serious concern,

Noting that the host Governments have expressed the wish that the Agency continue to carry out its mandate in their respective countries or territories and have expressed their wish to co-operate fully with the Agency and to extend to it every appropriate assistance in carrying out its functions, in accordance with the provisions of Articles 104 and 105 of the Charter of the United Nations, the terms of the Convention on

2. Ibid., Supplement No. 14 A (A/3212/Add. 1).
3. Ibid., Eleventh Session, Annexes, agenda item 23, document A/3498.

139
the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, the contents of paragraph 17 of resolution 302 (IV) and the terms of the agreements with the host Governments,

1. Directs the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East to pursue its programme for the relief and rehabilitation of refugees, bearing in mind the limitation imposed upon it by the extent of the contributions for the fiscal year;

2. Requests the host Governments to co-operate fully with the Agency and with its personnel and to extend to the Agency every appropriate assistance in carrying out its functions;

3. Requests the Governments of the area, without prejudice to paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 1948, in co-operation with the Director of the Agency, to plan and carry out projects capable of supporting substantial numbers of refugees;

4. Requests the Agency to continue its consultations with the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine in the best interest of their respective tasks, with particular reference to paragraph 11 of resolution 194 (III);

5. Decides to retain the rehabilitation fund and authorizes the Director of the Agency, at his discretion, to disburse such monies as may be available to the individual host Governments for general economic development projects, subject to agreement by any such Government that, within a fixed period of time, it will assume financial responsibility for an agreed number of refugees, such number to be commensurate with the cost of the project, without prejudice to paragraph 11 of resolution 194 (III);

6. Reiterates its appeal to private organizations and Governments to assist in meeting the serious needs of other claimants for relief as referred to in paragraph 5 of General Assembly resolution 916 (X) of 3 December 1955;

7. Requests the Negotiating Committee for Extra-Budgetary Funds, after receipt of the requests for contributions from the Director of the Agency, to seek from the Members of the United Nations the financial assistance needed;

8. Urges all Governments to contribute or to increase their contributions to the extent necessary to carry through to fulfilment the Agency's relief and rehabilitation programmes;

9. Notes with approval the action of the Agency in continuing to carry out its programme for the refugees in the Gaza strip;
10. Expresses its thanks to the Director and the staff of the Agency for their continued faithful efforts to carry out its mandate, and to the specialized agencies and the many private organizations for their valuable and continuing work in assisting the refugees;

11. Notes that the Agency is changing its financial period from a fiscal to a calendar year basis and that, consequently, the current budgets cover an eighteen-month period from 1 July 1956 to 31 December 1957, and that special arrangements for the audit of funds in this period are being made with the United Nations Board of Auditors;

12. Requests the Director of the Agency to continue to submit the reports referred to in paragraph 21 of General Assembly resolution 302 (IV) of 8 December 1949, as modified by paragraph 11 above.

663rd plenary meeting,
28 February 1957.
ANNEX K

TEXT OF RESOLUTION 1191 (XII)

ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS

ON 12 DECEMBER 1957

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 194 (III) of 11 December 1948, 302 (IV) of 8 December 1949, 393 (V) of 2 December 1950, 513 (VI) of 26 January 1952, 614 (VII) of 6 November 1952, 720 (VIII) of 27 November 1953, 818 (IX) of 4 December 1954, 916 (X) of 3 December 1955 and 1018 (XI) of 28 February 1957,

Noting the annual report of the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (1) and the report of the Advisory Commission of the Agency (2),

Having reviewed the budgets for relief and rehabilitation prepared by the Director of the Agency, and having noted the comment of the Advisory Commission to the effect that they are minimal,

Noting with grave concern that contributions to the budgets are not yet sufficient, that the financial situation of the Agency is serious, and that cuts already have had to be made in the rehabilitation programme,

Noting that repatriation or compensation of the refugees, as provided for in paragraph 11 of resolution 194 (III), has not been effected, that no substantial progress has been made in the programme endorsed in paragraph 2 of resolution 513 (VI) for the reintegration of refugees and that, therefore, the situation of the refugees continues to be a matter of serious concern,

Noting that the host Governments have expressed the wish that the Agency continue to carry out its mandate in their respective countries or territories and have expressed their wish to co-operate fully with the Agency and to extend to it every appropriate assistance in carrying out its functions,

2. A/3735.
in accordance with the provisions of Articles 104 and 105 of
the Charter of the United Nations, the terms of the Convention
on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, the
contents of paragraph 17 of resolution 302 (IV) and the terms
of the agreements with the host Governments.

1. **Draws the attention** of Governments to the critical
financial position of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency
for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, and urges them to
consider to what extent they can contribute or increase their
contributions in order that the Agency may carry out its
budgeted relief and rehabilitation programmes and that cuts in
services may be avoided;

2. **Requests** the Secretary-General, in view of the
critical financial position of the Agency, to make, as a matter
of urgent concern, special efforts to secure the additional
financial assistance needed to meet the Agency's budgets and
to provide adequate working capital;

3. **Directs** the Agency to pursue its programme for
the relief and rehabilitation of refugees, bearing in mind the
response to paragraphs 1 and 2 above;

4. **Requests** the host Governments to co-operate fully
with the Agency and with its personnel and to extend to the
Agency every appropriate assistance in carrying out its
functions;

5. **Requests** the Governments of the area, without
prejudice to paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194
(III) of 11 December 1948, in co-operation with the Director
of the Agency, to plan and carry out projects capable of
supporting substantial numbers of refugees;

6. **Requests** the Agency to continue its consultations
with the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine
in the best interest of their respective tasks, with particular
reference to paragraph 11 of resolution 194 (III);

7. **Expresses its thanks** to the Director and the staff
of the Agency for their continued faithful efforts to carry
out the mandate of the Agency and to the specialized agencies
and the many private organizations for their valuable and
continuing work in assisting the refugees;

8. **Requests** the Director of the Agency to continue to
submit the reports referred to in paragraph 12 of the General
Assembly resolution 1018 (XI) of 28 February 1957.

728th plenary meeting,
12 December 1957.
ANNEX L

TEXT OF RESOLUTION 1315 (XIII)

ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS

ON 12 DECEMBER 1958

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 194 (III) of 11 December 1948, 302 (IV) of 8 December 1949, 393 (V) of 2 December 1950, 513 (VI) of 26 January 1952, 614 (VII) of 6 November 1952, 720 (VIII) of 27 November 1953, 818 (IX) of 4 December 1954, 916 (X) of 3 December 1955, 1018 (XI) of 28 February 1957, and 1191 (XII) of 12 December 1957,

Noting the annual report of the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (1), and in particular the observations relating to the expiration of the Agency's mandate on 30 June 1960, and noting the report of the Advisory Commission of the Agency (2),

Noting with regret that repatriation or compensation of the refugees, as provided for in paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III), has not been effected, that no substantial progress has been made in the programme endorsed in paragraph 2 of Assembly resolution 513 (VI) for the reintegration of refugees and that, therefore, the situation of the refugees continues to be a matter of serious concern,

Having reviewed the budget prepared by the Director and having noted the endorsement thereof by the Advisory Commission of the Agency,

Noting with grave concern that contributions to the budget are not yet sufficient and that the financial situation of the Agency remains serious,

Recalling that the Agency is a subsidiary organ of the United Nations,

1. Draws the attention of Governments to the precarious

2. A/3948.
financial position of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East and urges them to consider to what extent they can contribute or increase their contributions in order that the Agency may carry out relief and rehabilitation programmes for the welfare of the refugees;

2. Requests the Secretary-General, in view of the serious financial position of the Agency, to continue, as a matter of urgent concern, his special efforts to secure the additional financial assistance needed to meet the Agency's budget and to provide adequate working capital;

3. Directs the Agency to pursue its programme for refugees bearing in mind the response to paragraphs 1 and 2 above;

4. Requests the Director of the Agency, without prejudice to paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III), to plan and carry out projects capable of supporting substantial numbers of refugees and, in particular, programmes relating to education and vocational training;

5. Requests the host Governments to co-operate fully with the Agency and with its personnel and to extend to the Agency every appropriate assistance in carrying out its functions;

6. Requests the Agency to continue its consultations with the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine in the best interests of their respective tasks, with particular reference to paragraph 11 of resolution 194 (III);

7. Expresses its thanks to the Director, Mr. Henry R. Labouisse, for the devoted attention he has given to the affairs of the Agency and to the welfare of the refugees for the four years of his incumbency, to the staff of the Agency for their continued faithful efforts to carry out its mandate, and to the specialized agencies and the many private organizations for their valuable and continuing work in assisting the refugees;

8. Requests the Director of the Agency to continue to submit the reports referred to in paragraph 21 of General Assembly resolution 302 (IV), as modified by paragraph 11 of Assembly resolution 1018 (XI).
ANNEX M

TEXT OF RESOLUTION 1456 (XIV)

ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS

ON 9 DECEMBER 1959

The General Assembly

Recalling its resolutions 194 (III) of 11 December 1948, 302 (IV) of 8 December 1949, 393 (V) of 2 December 1950, 513 (VI) of 26 January 1952, 614 (VII) of 6 November 1952, 720 (VIII) of 27 November 1953, 818 (IX) of 4 December 1954, 916 (X) of 3 December 1955, 1018 (XI) of 28 February 1957, 1191 (XII) of 12 December 1957 and 1315 (XIII) of 12 December 1958,

Noting the annual report of the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, in particular the expiration of the Agency's mandate on 30 June 1960,

Noting the recommendation of the Secretary-General and the Director of the Agency for the continuation of the Agency,

Noting with deep regret that repatriation or compensation of the refugees, as provided for in paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III), has not been effected, and that no substantial progress has been made in the programme endorsed in paragraph 2 of resolution 513 (VI) for the reintegration of refugees either by repatriation or resettlement and that, therefore, the situation of the refugees continues to be a matter of serious concern,

Having reviewed the Agency's budget and noting with concern that contributions from Member States are not sufficient,

Recalling that the Agency, as a subsidiary organ of the United Nations, enjoys the benefits of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations,

1. Decides to extend the mandate of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East for a period of three years with a review at the

end of two years;

2. Requests the Governments concerned to co-operate with the Agency in efforts to rectify the situation described in paragraphs 17 and 18 of the Director's report;

3. Requests the Director of the Agency to arrange with the host Governments the best means of giving effect to the proposals contained in paragraph 47 of his report;

4. Requests the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine to make further efforts to secure the implementation of paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III);

5. Directs attention to the precarious financial position of the Agency and urges Governments to consider to what extent they can contribute or increase their contributions so that the Agency can carry out its programmes;

6. Directs the Agency to continue its programme of relief for the refugees and, in so far as is financially possible, expand its programme of self-support and vocational training;

7. Expresses its thanks to the Director and the staff of the Agency for their continued faithful efforts to carry out the mandate of the Agency, and to the specialized agencies and the many private organizations for their valuable and continuing work in assisting the refugees.
ANNEX N

TEXT OF RESOLUTION 1604 (XV)

ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS

On 21 April 1961

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 194 (III) of 11 December 1948, 302 (IV) of 8 December 1949, 393 (V) of 2 December 1950, 513 (VI) of 26 January 1952, 614 (VII) of 6 November 1952, 720 (VIII) of 27 November 1953, 818 (IX) of 4 December 1954, 916 (X) of 3 December 1955, 1018 (XI) of 28 February 1957, 1191 (XII) of 12 December 1957, 1315 (XIII) of 12 December 1958 and 1456 (XIV) of 9 December 1959,

Noting the annual report of the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, covering the period 1 July 1959-30 June 1960,¹

Noting with deep regret that repatriation or compensation of the refugees as provided for in paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III) has not been effected, that no substantial progress has been made in the programme endorsed in paragraph 2 of resolution 513 (VI) for the reintegration of refugees either by repatriation or resettlement and that, therefore, the situation of the refugees continues to be a matter of serious concern,

1. Notes with regret that the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine has not yet been able to report progress on carrying out the task entrusted to it in paragraph 4 of General Assembly resolution 1456 (XIV), and again requests the Commission to make efforts to secure the implementation of paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III) and report thereon not later than 15 October 1961;

2. Directs attention to the precarious financial position of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East and urges Governments to consider to what extent they can contribute or increase


148
their contributions so that the Agency can carry out its programmes;

3. Expresses its thanks to the Director and the staff of the Agency for their continued faithful efforts to carry out the mandate of the Agency, and to the specialized agencies and the many private organizations for their valuable and continuing work in assisting the refugees.

993rd plenary meeting,
### ANNEX O

**ARAB GOVERNMENT CONTRIBUTIONS**

The following chart supplements the figures given on page 103 of this work and gives a more complete accounting of the Arab Government contributions to Arab refugee relief.

**ARAB GOVERNMENT CONTRIBUTIONS TO UNRPR AND UNRWA**

**(1948-1961)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contributor</th>
<th>Contributions to UNRPR</th>
<th>Recorded Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Dec. 1, 1948 - April 30, 1950)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Arab Host Governments</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>$ 503,690</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>32,375</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>16,070</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>329,290</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>$ 881,425</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Other Arab Governments</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia (Gasolene, Kerosene, Oil)</td>
<td>$ 142,356</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>$ 1,023,781</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Contributions to UNRWA**

**(May 1, 1950 - June 30, 1961)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contributor</th>
<th></th>
<th>Recorded Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Arab Host Governments</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>$ 1,090,873</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>367,057</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syrian Arab Republic</td>
<td>936,610</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Arab Republic (Egypt)</td>
<td>3,789,563</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaza Authorities</td>
<td>366,802</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>$ 6,550,905</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Other Arab Governments</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahrein</td>
<td>$ 1,960</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>131,205</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>52,022</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qatar</td>
<td>10,500</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>825,815</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>148,200</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>$ 1,169,702</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals for Host Governments</td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>$ 7,432,330</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals for Other Arab Governments</td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>$ 1,312,388</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand Total</td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>$ 8,744,388</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---


150
## DIRECT AID OF ARAB GOVERNMENTS

(1948 - 1961)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Amounts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1948 - 1950</td>
<td>$7,724,082</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950 - 1951</td>
<td>4,293,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951 - 1952</td>
<td>3,378,270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952 - 1953</td>
<td>2,954,312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953 - 1954</td>
<td>741,739</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954 - 1955</td>
<td>2,208,888</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955 - 1956</td>
<td>850,167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956 - 1957</td>
<td>1,802,915</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957 - 1959 (18 months)</td>
<td>4,875,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959 - 1960</td>
<td>5,159,273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960 - 1961</td>
<td>5,382,569</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Saudi Arabian Direct Contributions**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Amounts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1957 - 1959 (18 months)</td>
<td>$39,370,415</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960 - 1961</td>
<td>$728,570</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961 - 1961</td>
<td>$40,098,985</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BROCHURES, DOCUMENTS AND REPORTS


UNITED NATIONS:
General Assembly

Fourth Session, including reports of Secretary General, Assistance to Palestine Refugees (A/1060).


Sixth Session, including Supplement 16 and 16A, Report of the Director of UNRWA (A/1905) and Special Report of the Director and Advisory Committee of UNRWA (A/1905/Add. 1).


Eighth Session, including Supplement No. 12, Annual Report of the Director of UNRWA (A/2470).
Ninth Session, including Supplements Nos. 17 and 17A, Annual Report of the Director of UNRWA (A/2717) and Special Report of the Director and the Advisory Commission of the UNRWA (A/2717/Add. 1).

Tenth Session, including Supplements Nos. 15 and 15A, Annual Report of the Director of UNRWA (A/2978) and Special Report of the Director Concerning other Claimants for Relief (A/2978/Add. 1).


Resolution 194 (II). 11 December 1948.

Resolution 212 (III). 19 November 1948.

Resolution 302 (IV). 8 December 1949.

Resolution 393 (V). 2 December 1950.

Resolution 513 (VI). 26 January 1952.
______. Resolution 614 (VII). 6 November 1952.
______. Resolution 818 (IX). 4 December 1954.
______. Resolution 916 (X). 3 December 1955.
______. Resolution 1018 (XI). 28 February 1957.
______. Resolution 1191 (XII). 12 December 1957.


______. Third Year.

______. Fourth Year.


BOOKS AND ARTICLES


_____ *UNRWA and the Arab Refugees.* Unpublished.


NEWSPAPERS AND PERIODICALS

Economist. London.


Spectator. London.

The Times. London.