THE PALESTINE PROBLEM

IN THE

HOUSE OF COMMONS

1917 - 1939

by

Basel Amin 'Aql

Submitted in Partial Fulfillment for the Requirements of the

Degree Master of Arts

in the

Political Science and Public Administration Department

of the

American University of Beirut

Beirut Lebanon

1962
PALESTINE
in
HOUSE OF COMMONS

B. AQL
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

It would have been impossible for the writer to have carried out this research had it not been for the invaluable guidance of Professor Walid Khalidi who introduced me to the subject and made me develop it through his wise criticisms and helpful advice. To him the writer is especially and sincerely grateful.

The writer also gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Mr. Ahmad Najm who was generous of his time in proof reading. I should also like to thank Mr. Emile Zeitoune of the Mouthing Institute in Beirut for having kindly accepted the tedious task of typing this dissertation within a very short period. Last but not least, I wish to express my appreciation of the facilities afforded for the writing of this Paper by Jafet Library of the American University of Beirut.
ABSTRACT

In April 1920, and in compliance with Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Supreme Council at its San Remo meeting assigned to Britain the Mandate for Palestine after it had been liberated from Turkish rule. The terms of the Mandate, while ensuring that the rights and position of the indigenous population shall not be prejudiced, stipulated that the Mandatory shall facilitate Jewish immigration into Palestine and encourage there the establishment of a Jewish National Home.

The purpose of this study, is to see how the House of Commons dealt with its overseas problems and the extent to which it reflected the interests and wishes of a people who were subjects of the British Crown. We shall examine the attitudes of the members of the House towards both the Arabs and Jews and the implementation of the basic terms of the Mandate as reflected and interpreted by the members.

The methodology followed in this dissertation shall be descriptive and the treatment is based on topics rather than on chronological order.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHAPTER</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGEMENT</td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONE BRITISH WAR TIME PROMISES TO THE ARABS AND JEWS</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TWO THE MANDATE FOR PALESTINE</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THREE JEWISH IMMIGRATION AND LAND SETTLEMENT</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOUR SELF-GOVERNING INSTITUTIONS</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIVE POLITICAL SETTLEMENT</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONCLUSION</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIXES</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) RESULTS OF GENERAL ELECTIONS</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) BRITISH PRIME MINISTER§1917-1939</td>
<td>149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) BRITISH COLONIAL SECRETARIES AND UNDER-SECRETARIES 1917-1939</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5) PRO-ZIONIST M.P.s</td>
<td>152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(6) PRO-ARAB M.P.s</td>
<td>153</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

vi
INTRODUCTION

The following pages are dedicated to an examination of the Palestine problem as seen and interpreted by the members of the House of Commons. In the course of this study around two hundred and fifty volumes comprising the debates of the House and covering the period from 1917 (the promulgation of the Balfour Declaration) to 1939 (the beginning of World War II) have been examined.

Theoretically speaking, this dissertation consists of two main parts. The first part is divided into two chapters and deals with the period that preceded the establishment of the Mandatory regime in Palestine. The first chapter is on British war-time pledges to the Arabs and Jews. The second chapter is concerned with the assignment by the League of Nations of the Palestine Mandate to the British Government.

The second part of the Paper deals with the implementation of the British Mandate in Palestine and consists of three chapters. The first chapter deals with Jewish immigration into Palestine and the question of land settlement. The second chapter treats the establishment of self-governing institutions in Palestine, while the third chapter is on the political settlement of the country.

- 1 -
CHAPTER I

British War-Time Promises To The Arabs And Jews

British war-time promises to the Arabs and Jews are mainly the Hussein-McMahon correspondence and the Balfour Declaration. The Arabs maintain that the British made further promises to them. These were the Hogarth message, the Declaration to the Seven Arabs, and the Anglo-French Declaration. The significance of these promises merits a few lines about each before we examine them through the views of the members of the House of Commons.

In 1900, Palestine formed part of the Ottoman Empire. It was administratively divided into three sanjaks: the sanjaks of Acre and Nablus both part of the vilayet of Beirut and the independent Sanjak of Jerusalem directly attached to Istanbul. The population was about 700,000 in 1914 of whom 55,000 were Orthodox Jews who were already settled in Palestine. When World War I broke out, it awakened a spirit of nationalism throughout the Near East, and the post-War Arab population developed a national sentiment which aimed at independence and liberation from Turkish rule. Moreover, in 1914, the Allies were bent on ousting the Turks from every possible quarter. Thus it was in this atmosphere that an exchange of correspondence took place in July-October 1915 between Sir Henry McMahon the British High Commissioner in Egypt and Sherif Hussein of Mecca. The question of Arab independence was the central theme
of this correspondence. Sherif Hussein defined the Arab area of independence to be bounded,

On the north by Mersina and Adana up to the 37° of latitude, on which degree fall Birjik, Amadia, up to the border of Persia; on the east by the borders of Persia up to the Gulf of Basra; on the south by the Indian Ocean, with the exception of the position of Aden to remain as it is; on the west by the Red Sea, the Mediterranean Sea up to Mersina. (1)

This comprehensive demand of the Sherif was made in a letter dated July 14, 1915. The area which he adumbrated included the whole of the Arabian peninsula (except Aden), Mesopotamia, Palestine, Transjordan and Syria, running up to the borders of Persia on the east and slightly into the present Turkish state on the north. Sir Henry's reply dated October 25, 1915 was to the effect that he had been authorized by the British Government to give certain assurances to the Arabs. These assurances amounted to a pledge by the British Government to recognize Arab independence within the frontiers proposed by the Sherif with the exclusion of certain districts. The reply stated,

The two districts of Mersina and Alaxandretta and portions of Syria lying to the west of the districts of Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo cannot be said to be purely Arab, and should be excluded from the limits demanded.

With the above modification, and without prejudice to our existing treaties with Arab chiefs, we accept those limits.

As for those regions, lying within those frontiers wherein Great Britain is free to act without detriment to the interests of her ally, France, I am empowered in the name of the Government of Great Britain to give the following assurances and make the following reply to your letter:

"Subject to the above modifications, Great Britain is prepared to recognize and support the independence of the Arabs in all the regions within the limits demanded by the Sherif of Mecca. (2)"

The Arabs assumed that Palestine was included in the independence area. This note which McMahon dispatches in reply brought the Arabs into the War, openly on the side of the Allies.

As the war proceeded, the Entente Powers became concerned with the future of certain territories in the Ottoman Empire in the event of an Allied victory. In the course of their deliberations, France and Britain each delegated a representative to confer with one another the interests of their respective countries in certain portions of the Ottoman Empire. The French delegate was Monsieur F. Georges-Picot and his British colleague was Sir Mark Sykes. They drew up a scheme for the disposal of some parts of the Ottoman Empire which was agreed to by the Russian Government. The negotiations which were conducted in secrecy, resulted in the exchange of notes between the three countries and finally culminated in May 1916 in what came to be known as the Sykes-Picot agreement.

(2) ibid., p. 5.
According to this agreement, Russia reserved for herself Constantinople, a few miles on either side of the Bosphorus and Eastern Anatolia; while France and Britain divided the land bridge between the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf into five regions. Part of the area was to be under British control, part under French, part to be a British sphere of influence, part a French sphere of influence. As for Palestine, the agreement stated that,

With a view to securing the religious interests of the Entente Powers, Palestine with the Holy Places, is separated from Turkish territory and subjected to a special regime, to be determined by agreement between Russia, France and Great Britain. (3)

It seems that the provisions of the Sykes-Picot agreement were incompatible with the aspirations of the Zionist movement which aimed at a Jewish return to Palestine. The British Government's attempts to provide a home for the Jewish people go as far back as the 19th century when, having failed to obtain a concession from the Turkish Sultan which would enable the Jews to go to Palestine, they offered them Uganda as a home; but the 1905 Zionist Congress rejected the offer and insisted on Palestine. It was however in 1906 when Dr. Chaim Weizmann interested Mr. Arthur Balfour in the prospect of a Jewish National Home in Palestine. Both played a prominent role in the negotiations between the Zionist Organization and the British Government. In December 1916, the first Coalition

(3) ibid., p. 7.
Government fell. Lloyd George replaced Asquith as Prime Minister, and Balfour became Foreign Secretary. On November 2, 1917, as Foreign Secretary, Balfour addressed a letter to Lord Rothschild which read as follows,

His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a National Home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish Communities in Palestine or the rights and political status enjoyed by the Jews in any other country. (4)

A month later, that is in December 1917, Jerusalem was captured by General Allenby and the occupation of the whole of Palestine was completed in October, 1918.

As for the other promises, these were statements made during the year 1918 concerning the future status of certain parts of the Ottoman Empire. The Hogarth message was delivered to Sherif Hussein at Jedda by Commander D.G. Hogarth of the Arab Bureau in Cairo on January 4, 1918. After reiterating the determination of the Entente Powers that the Arab race shall be enabled to form once again as a nation, the message said that since in Palestine there were holy places that were sacred to Moslems, Jews and Christians, "there must be a special regime to deal with these places approved of by the world." (5)

The British Government's Declaration to the Seven Arabs was made on June 16, 1918 in reply to a memorial submitted by seven Arab outstanding men who were perturbed about the future of the Arab countries as a whole following the disclosure of the Sykes-Picot agreement and the issuing of the Balfour Declaration. The British Government stated in the Declaration that they had lent the memorial their careful consideration and said that the areas mentioned in the memorandum fell into four categories. The first category comprised territories that were independent before the outbreak of war. The second category comprised territories that were liberated by the Arabs during the war. The third category comprised territories that were liberated from Turkish rule by the action of the Allied forces. The fourth category comprised territories that were still under Turkish rule. (6) In regard to the first two categories, the British Government recognized their complete and sovereign independence. In the third category, the British Government said it was their desire that the "future government of these regions should be based up on the principle of the consent of the governed." (7) In the fourth category,

(6) The categories were defined by George Antonius in Arab Awakening to have comprised: First and Second category: The Arabian Peninsula from Aden to Aqaba. Third category: Iraq from the Persian Gulf to a line some distance north of Baghdad, and Palestine from the Egyptian frontier to a line some distance north of Jerusalem and Jaffa. Fourth category: The Greater part of Syria and the province of Mosul in Iraq.

the Declaration asserted that the British Government would address themselves to the task of enabling the peoples of the territories in question to obtain their freedom and independence.

The Anglo-French Declaration was a joint declaration by the two countries which was issued in the form of an official communique on November 7, 1918. It was given out to the press in Palestine, Syria and Iraq and contained a broad outline of the nature of British and French administrations to be set up in those countries. It stated that the intention of the two governments was the complete and definite emancipation of the peoples so long oppressed by the Turks and the setting up of national governments and administrations. The Declaration also said that the two governments were far from wishing to impose any particular institution on the peoples of those regions. The Anglo-French Declaration was issued following the division of Syria between France and Britain into four sections known as O.E.T.A. (Occupied Enemy Territory Administration) North, South, East and West respectively. The Declaration was published in England and France, but the British version which was given by the Government to the press, had the preamble missing. The preamble contained the following statement,

The French Government in agreement with the British Government, has decided to issue the following joint declaration in order to give to the non-Turkish populations between the Taurus and the Persian
Gulf the assurance that the two countries, each in its own sphere, intend to secure for them the ampest autonomy, with the aim of guaranteeing their liberation and the development of their civilization. (8)

Even without the preamble which included Palestine says J.M.N. Jeffries, the terms of the Declaration "obviously refer to Palestine as part of Syria and as being 'liberated by the Allies' at the time. Allenby published it in Palestine as in a country for which it was intended". (9)

British war-time pledges to the Arabs and Jews gave rise to a great deal of controversy in the House of Commons. Palestine had always had special significance to Britain. It is the "Clapham junction of all the air routes between England, Africa and Asia ... It is an important naval position. Cyprus, Palestine and Egypt effectively held, would make it possible not only to hold open the Suez Canal, but to hold the whole of the Eastern Mediterranean ... There is also the possibility of railway communication between Haifa and Aqaba giving an alternative route to the Suez Canal." (10) As far as the Hussein-McMahon correspondence is concerned, the British Government maintained the view that Palestine was excluded from the territories promised independence by the British. (11) This was as the Colonial Secretary Mr. Ormsby-Gore put it in 1936, due to the fact that the British Government at the time was

(9) ibid., p. 240.
not in a position to include Palestine in the Arab territories promised independence because at that moment, it was bound to France, and France "had reserved the future of Palestine and aspired to the hope that it would be French." (12) Moreover in 1930, Dr. Drummond Shiels, the Colonial Under-Secretary pointed out in the House of Commons that the British Government had always taken the view that Palestine was excluded from the pledge which "was not made to the Arabs of Palestine." (13) It was this uncertainty about the real meaning of the McMahon pledge that led several members from 1922 to 1930 to insist on its publication in order to see the truth for themselves. In 1930, Mr. Cocks asked the Government to publish the correspondence because of a general feeling among the Arabs of Palestine that the correspondence had promised them independence. (14) The Government however maintained the view "that publication was undesirable". (15) During the same year, Mr. Howard Bury asked that it be published in black and white so that the members may know what had happened. He added that the "broken pledge is going to affect our prestige throughout the East". (16) This plea for publication was supported by several other members at a meeting of the Supply Committee. (17) In answer, Colonial Under-Secretary Drummond

(13) ibid., vol. 233 (1930) p. 214.
(14) ibid., vol. 237 (1930) p. 2148.
(15) ibid., vol. 237 (1930) p. 2148.
(16) ibid., vol. 238 (1930) p. 1088.
(17) The Supply Committee comprises all the members of the House of Commons. It examines the estimates and expenditures of the Government and discusses the Government's foreign policy.
Shiels appealed to the Committee to have confidence in the good intentions of the Government because it was not "by raking up the controversies of the past, but by tackling the differences of the present and of the future, that a satisfactory conclusion will be reached. (18) Answering the Colonial Under-Secretary Mr. McShane said that the Government's excuses were "too ridiculous". He added, "How by forgetting the causes, we can manage to get a remedy for the causes, I do not know". (19) In the face of the members' insistence on the publication of the correspondence, the Colonial Under-Secretary announced in 1930 that the British Government, impressed by the feeling shown in the House with regard to the correspondence had decided to re-examine it "in the light of the history of the period and the interpretations which have been put upon it". (20) It was not until 1939, that the correspondence was officially published i.e. following the 1939 London Conference. Since the attention of the members was mainly focused on the Hussein-McMahon correspondence and the Balfour Declaration, it is only appropriate to examine their views on these two war-time pledges.

The Hussein-McMahon Correspondence

In the course of their deliberations on the Hussein-McMahon correspondence, the members of the House expressed

(20) ibid., vol. 242 (1930) p. 902.
several different views on this question. Here it should be noted that it was only those members who were interested in the Arab case that dealt with it. Those who were not interested, have satisfied themselves, it seems, with the contention of the British Government that Palestine was not included in the correspondence. Mr. Howard Bury maintained that the territories bounded on the North by Mersina and Adana and on the West by the Red Sea and the Mediterranean up to Mersina included Palestine. It was on that assurance he said that the Arabs took up arms on behalf of the British against the Turks.(21) Mr. Crossley held the view that the Arabs' basis of claim is "founded on most definite evidence". He wondered why McMahon did not mention a town south of Palestine if he meant to include Palestine in the territories excluded from Arab independence. (22) Mr. MacLaren quoted extracts from the leaflets which had been dropped over the Turkish trenches by British aeroplanes,

To all the Arabs and other officers and men of the Ottoman army. We have with much regret heard that you are fighting us who are working for the preservation of the soul of the Moslem religion from being altered. We believe that the real truth has not reached you. We have therefore sent you this proclamation, sealed by our seal, to assure you that we are fighting for two noble aims, the preservation of religion and the freedom of the Arabs generally. We have sent strict orders to the heads of men on our line that if our Army happens to capture

any one of you, they should treat you well and send you to my sons who will welcome you and keep you well. The Arab kingdom has been for a long time in bondage to the Turks who have killed your brethren, and crucified your men and deported your women and families and have altered your religion. Come and join us who are labouring for the sake of religion and the freedom of Arabs so that the Arab Kingdom may again become what it was during the time of your fathers, if God wills. God is the leader of the right path. (23)

Mr. MacLaren commented on the proclamation by saying, "If this is not a promise, I do not know what a promise is". (24) He went on to say that later on, when there was an inquiry into the cause of the disturbances in Jerusalem in April, 1920, the following statement was made by the British authorities,

The general result of this, that is the rapprochement effected with King Hussein in 1915, was to convert any feeling the population may have had in favour of the Turks into one of friendliness towards the British occupation. There is no question but that was encouraged during the War by every kind of propaganda available to the War office. They were promised in pamphlets dropped from aeroplanes, peace and prosperity under British rule. As late as June 1918, active recruiting was carried on in Palestine for the Sherifian army, our allies, the recruits being given to understand that they were fighting in a national cause and to liberate their country from the Turks. These men, it is believed, actually took part in the offensive against the Turks. (25)

In the course of his appraisal of British pledges to the Arabs, Mr. MacLaren also quoted Ramsay MacDonald as having said in

1922, "We have encouraged an Arab revolt in Turkey by a promise to create an Arab Kingdom from the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire, including Palestine". He ended his remarks by adding that General Allenby's proclamation in Palestine in 1918, although it came a year after the issuing of the Balfour Declaration, contained not a word about the Balfour Declaration, a fact which he described as "an evidence of deceit". (26)

Mr. Ralph Beaumont considered "the breach of the McMahon pledge" as constituting one of the causes of Arab discontent in Palestine. He believed that any one reading the Hogarth message, the Declaration to the Seven Arabs and the Anglo-French Declaration would not "possibly imagine for a moment that Palestine was excluded from the area in which Arab independence was to be recognized. (27) The Hogarth message was also referred to in the House in 1939 by Colonial Secretary, Mr. Malcolm MacDonald who said that the British Government were bound to the Arabs by the Hogarth message and not the Hussein-McMahon correspondence. (28)

Owing to the wide discrepancy, associated with the correspondence, a mixed Anglo-Arab committee sat upon the question in London in 1939. In the House, Mr. Crossley reported the committee to have said in its report dated March 16, 1939, "In the opinion of the Committee it is, however,

(27) ibid., vol. 347 (1939) p. 2029.
(28) ibid., vol. 347 (1939) p. 1941.
evident from these statements (29) that H.M.G. were not free to dispose of Palestine without regard for the wishes and interests of the inhabitants of Palestine". (30) In as far as French interests were involved in Palestine, Mr. Crossley summarized the British Government's argument to be as follows: France claimed Palestine in 1915. England contested France's claim and in 1916, France relinquished her claim. Therefore, in 1917, because France had claimed Palestine in 1915, Palestine or Syria was specifically excluded from the McMahon correspondence. Moreover, he read a quotation from the diary of Mr. Asquith dated 13th March, 1915 i.e. before the McMahon correspondence had started. Mr. Asquith had said,

I have already referred to Herbert Samuel's dithyrambic memorandum urging that in the carving up of the Turks Asiatic Dominion, we should take Palestine, into which the scattered Jews would in time swarm, back from all quarters of the globe, and in due course obtain home rule. Curiously enough, the only other partisan of this proposal is Mr. Lloyd George who, I need not say, does not care a damn for the Jews or their past or their future, (31) but thinks it will be an outrage to let the Holy places into the possession or under the protectorate of agonistic atheistic France. (32)

Such were the views of the members of the House on the Hussein-

---

(29) The Committee was referring to the Hussein-McMahon correspondence, the Hogarth message, the Declaration to the Seven and the Anglo-French Declaration.


(31) Lloyd George was at the head of the Coalition Government which issued the Balfour Declaration in 1917.

McMahon correspondence. As we have seen a few members subscribed to the Arab contention that Palestine was included in the area of Arab independence. Apart from the Government who contested that view, no one in the House opposed the Arab view possibly because up to 1939 the correspondence was not officially published which made it difficult to state one's views clearly.

The Balfour Declaration

Unlike the Hussein-McMahon correspondence, the Balfour Declaration had its supporters as well as its opponents among the members. The Declaration being a government document was supported all through in principle by all British Governments. The Governments had at times made certain reservations as to its underlying implications and some of the interpretations laid upon it. We shall first examine the views that supported the Balfour Declaration.

British sympathy with Zionist aspirations is somewhat old. Addressing the House in 1939, Winston Churchill quoted Neville Chamberlain, a British Prime to have said in 1918,

The sympathy of the British Government with Zionist aspirations does not date from yesterday ... My father was anxious to find such a territory within the limits of the British constitution ... To-day the opportunity has come. I have no hesitation in saying that were my father alive to-day, he would be among the first to welcome it and to give it his hearty support. (33)

(33) ibid., vol. 347 (1939) p. 2169.
The entry of Turkey into the War, the prospective disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, British sympathy with Zionist aspirations (as evidenced by the Kenya and Sinai offers) and the British position in Egypt all pointed to Britain as the appropriate sponsor for a Jewish National Home to be created as a result of an Allied victory over Turkey. In March 1915, Herbert Samuel, a Jewish member of the British cabinet, circulated a memorandum in the circles of the Government in which he suggested the possible alternatives for the future of Palestine. The alternatives being: (a) annexation by France; (b) remaining Turkish; (c) internationalization; (d) the establishment of an autonomous Jewish state; (e) a British protectorate with encouragement for Jewish settlement. (34)

It was not however, until 1917, when Allenby's army was about to enter Jerusalem that the issue was brought to the forefront. At the same time, Lloyd George succeeded Asquith as head of the War Cabinet with Arthur Balfour as Foreign Secretary. Balfour had already been acquainted with Zionist claims in Palestine and it was he who issued the Balfour Declaration on November 2, 1917 to the Zionist Organization represented by Lord Rothschild.

The circumstances that attended the issuing of the Balfour Declaration have been described in the House by Lloyd George in 1936. He said,

... At the time, the French army had mutinied, the Italian army was on the eve of collapse, and America had hardly started preparing in earnest. There was nothing left but Britain confronting the most powerful military combination the world had ever seen. It was important for us to seek every legitimate help we could get. We came to the conclusion from information we received from every part of the world, that it was vital we should have the sympathies of the Jewish community ... They (the Jews) were helpful in America and in Russia, which at that moment was just walking out and leaving us alone ... In those conditions we proposed this to our Allies. (35)

Lloyd George stated in 1931 that the Balfour Declaration was "truly national in the sense that it presented the views of the three parties in the state". (36) He also believed that Dr. Weizmann's scientific discovery was one of the decisive factors which brought about the Balfour Declaration.

"Dr. Weizmann" he said, "absolutely saved the British army at a critical moment when a particular ingredient which was essential we should have for our great guns was completely exhausted. His great chemical genius enabled us to solve that problem". (37) Winston Churchill, who was a staunch supporter of the Balfour Declaration believed that there were no humanitarian or religious motives behind it. It was dictated he asserted by the exigencies of the situation during the war as a measure for promoting victory and not as "a mere act of crusading enthusiasm or quixotic philanthropy". (38)

(36) ibid., vol. 245 (1931) p. 77.
(37) ibid., vol. 313 (1936) p. 1339.
(38) ibid., vol. 326 (1937) p. 2330.
Mr. Denman, another supporter of the Balfour Declaration, stated in 1938 that the Declaration was a war pledge "given for value received" which aimed to safeguard Britain's strategic interests. He pointed out that it was hoped to set up through the Balfour Declaration a friendly state like Portugal bound to the British Government "by ties of reciprocal interest, so that a major strategical point is not in the hands of a hostile power". (39) On the other hand, Commander Locker-Lampson advanced a different kind of argument which he believed was a sufficient reason for the promulgation of the Balfour Declaration. He maintained in 1936 that the conquest of the air made Constantinople no longer the key of the world. The Suez Canal became the other great highway and the true key of the world. It was Disraeli he added who gave Britain the Suez Canal after having realized its importance. Disraeli got the Suez Canal through Jewish money advanced by the Rothschilds. That is why he concluded the British Government had to help the dispossessed Jews by granting them the Balfour Declaration. (40)

It may seem that not many members supported the Balfour Declaration. In fact, the Declaration was dealt with within the general context of a Jewish return to Palestine and their co-existence with the Arabs. That is to say, the majority of the pro-Zionist members were concerned with the Zionist cause as a whole. That is why not much has been said about the

(39) ibid., vol. 337 (1938) p. 172.
(40) ibid., vol. 313 (1936) p. 1362.
Balfour Declaration. Let us now turn to an examination of the views of those members of the House who opposed the Declaration.

In 1920, Sir J.D. Reeds stated in the House that the Arabs' claim in Palestine was stronger than that of the Jews, because they had been in Palestine for some time. "The claim of a people who have been there for hundreds of years, is better than one of a more scriptural character". He believed that the Government was not justified in issuing the Balfour Declaration. (41) Captain Foxcroft wondered in 1920 how the Balfour Declaration could be applied in a country 93% of whose population were Arabs; (42) while Col. T. Williams opposed the Balfour Declaration on the ground that the idea behind political Zionism was "unsound, unworkable and against the best interests of the Jews themselves". He asserted in 1923 that the Jews were not an exiled race from Palestine. Their national home he believed was in Southern Russia and Central Asia. (43) During a debate on the 1930 White Paper, Mr. Cocks said that the record of the treatment of the Arabs "reflects very little credit upon Western civilization." He added that the Balfour Declaration was made after McMahon wrote to Sherif Hussein, 'I have received orders from my Government to inform you that all your demands are accepted'.

(41) ibid., vol. 126 (1920) p. 1534.
(42) ibid., vol. 167 (1923) pp. 573-79.
(43) ibid., vol. 176 (1924) p. 1953.
The Balfour Declaration, Cocks added "has very little moral basis or mortal validity." He believed that in view of the principle of self-determination no one had the right to grant a National Home for the Jews. (44) In 1939 Mr. Pickthorn subscribed to the view expressed by Mr. Cocks and presented two views on the Balfour Declaration. First, the Balfour Declaration was "invalid in its origin and essence because it was promising to an undefined and unidentifiable party, something which the promising party did not own and had no right to promise, and could not promise except at the expense of a third party." Second, however valid the Balfour Declaration was at the time, "things including the Covenant of the League of Nations, have altered so much since that time that the words have no longer the same meaning and are invalid". He adopted neither of those views, but said, that the Balfour Declaration contained two sections. The first section 'views with favour' which is in Pickthorn's opinion "a different thing from promising, 'the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people'". (45) Col. Clifton Brown did not approve of the idea that the Balfour Declaration would enable the Jews to defend the British Empire. He said, "They never did it in the past. They were in a key position in the old days when they were the buffer state between Egypt and the Assyrians, and they had to be kicked out because they were

(44) ibid., vol. 245 (1930) p. 163.
such a nuisance. They never paid for the Roman Empire."  

Dealing with the Balfour Declaration along the same lines of opposition, Mr. Gallacher was of the opinion that the Jews were only a cover for British imperialism. He stated that Palestine could never be a home for the Jews and that it would remain, unless the Arabs had freedom, "a Clapham Junction" for the British Empire. He went on to say, "If the Jews will allow themselves to be used for the benefit of British Imperialism, they will remain in Palestine, but if they will not allow themselves to be so used, what will be done with them? You will chase them out of Palestine".  

The Balfour Declaration did not only have its supporters and opponents. Like the McMahon correspondence it had more than one interpretation laid on it. Outstanding among these interpretations was the one which said that the Jewish National Home was ultimately meant to be a Jewish state. Mr. Morris stated in the House in 1930 that no British Government had ever attempted to define the Balfour Declaration. He added that no one on the Permanent Mandates Commission was able to say what it meant. The Chairman of the Commission asked the British representative whether the Mandatory had formed any idea as to when the National Home for the Jews would be established. Mr. Morris quoted the British representative, Dr. Drummond Shiels to have answered that he

---

(47) ibid., vol. 313 (1936) p. 1364.
preferred not to express an opinion on that point. The Zionist charge that the British Government had, in the long run, betrayed them was "perfectly good and could be substantiated." He added that after the Balfour Declaration was made, the Zionists were led to believe that they were to have in Palestine a Jewish state. All the national leaders he insisted, "were talking of a Jewish state". (48) Mr. Noel Baker quoted the Peel Commission as having said in its report of 1937, "The Jews understood that if the experiment succeeded, the National Home would develop in course of time into a Jewish state." He maintained that from 1918 to 1920, the Jews were given to understand that they would have a Jewish state established in Palestine. (49)

Mr. T. Williams was of the opinion that the future of Palestine could not be left to be determined by the feelings of the Arab majority in the country. He added that if the Arabs "went to the length" of claiming Palestine in the same sense as Mesopotamia or Arabia were Arab countries, then they would be, "flying in the face of all facts, of all history, of all tradition and all associations of the most important character". He quoted President Wilson to have said, "I am persuaded that the Allied Nations, with the fullest concurrence of our Government and our people, are agreed that in Palestine shall be laid the foundations of a Jewish

(48) *ibid.*, vol. 245 (1930) p. 152.
(49) *ibid.*, vol. 347 (1939) p. 2039.
However, it should not escape us while dealing with British war-time promises to the Jews and Arabs to mention that a considerable number of the members of the House subscribed to the view that the inconsistency of the pledges rendered them incapable of implementation. Answering the leader of Opposition during a debate on the 1930 White Paper, Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald said that his Government did not inherit a word, "We inherited words, and the words are not always consistent. What has to be done ... is to straighten out the differences between the contradictory parts of certain declarations". (51) In 1939 Mr. MacLaren wondered in the House if between 1915 when the British Government was making advances to the Arabs, and the Balfour Declaration of 1917, the British Government of that day had at any time "attempted to correlate the two policies involved in these declarations". He then quoted Ramsay MacDonald who had said in 1922,

We encouraged an Arab revolt in Turkey by a promise to create an Arab Kingdom from the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire including Palestine. At the same time we were encouraging the Jews to help us by promising them that Palestine would be placed at their disposal for settlement and government; and also at the same time, we were making with the French the Sykes-Picot Agreement partitioning the territory which we had instructed our Governor-

(51) ibid., vol. 244 (1930) p. 24.
General in Egypt to promise to the Arabs. The story is one of crude duplicity, and we cannot expect to escape the reprobation which is bound to follow as a sequel. (52)

Sir Stafford Cripps spoke in 1939 of the necessity of admitting that the pledges were inconsistent. He said, "It was far more honest to recognize the inconsistency of those declarations". (53) Mr. Morgan Jones suggested that the House should register its protest against "the cynical levity with which pledges and promises were made to both sides years ago". (54) Mr. Amery, having recognized the irreconcilability of the pledges supported the partition scheme of the Royal Commission. He described partition which was adopted by the Government as "a device for abandoning pledges" and "an alternative method of implementing these pledges". (55) These views were not only confined to the members of the House. Colonial Secretary, Mr. M. MacDonald agreed with the Royal Commission's report that the problem in Palestine was "a conflict between right and right". He described British War obligations towards Arabs and Jews as "debts of honour which cannot be paid in counterfeit coinage". The phrase 'a National Home for the Jewish people in Palestine' was a "novel, carefully chosen expression, which was without precedent in constitutional charters". He went on to say that the Balfour

---

(53) ibid., vol. 347 (1939) p. 2033.
(54) ibid., vol. 326 (1937) p. 2253.
(55) ibid., vol. 332 (1937) p. 1764.
Declaration was to the Jews "the fulfilment of a prophecy, but already in 1918, there was a population of 600,000 Arabs in Palestine whose ancestors had been there for countless generations". "Any kind of Jewish National Home" he concluded, "could not be forced upon the Arabs ... We could not do that with any moral justification, for we are bound to the Arabs also by a pledge in this matter". (56)

Whether the pledges were compatible or incompatible with each other, it was on the basis of these pledges that Britain proceeded with the implementation of her Mandatory obligations in Palestine.

(56) ibid., vol. 347 (1939) p. 1937.
CHAPTER II

The Mandate For Palestine

Britain's post-war problem in Palestine was to secure international sanction for her continued occupation of the country in a manner concomitant with her war-time pledges. Perhaps that is why a view has been advanced that the mandates system incorporated in Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations which was signed in June 1919, was an instrument for harmonizing the irreconcilable pledges and interests involved. In other words, "as far as Mesopotamia, Palestine and Syria are concerned, the mandates system under which these territories were subsequently placed, is mainly a compromise between the secret inter-allied agreements and the obligations assumed towards the inhabitants concerned". (57) Article 22 was described by Robert Lansing, America's Foreign Secretary at the time as "a carefully drafted compromise". (58) The first two paragraphs of this Article read as follows,

To those colonies and territories which as a consequence of the late War have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the States which formerly governed them and which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world, there should be applied the principle that the well-being and the development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilization and that securities for the performance of this

(58) Jeffries, op. cit., p. 515.
trust should be embodied in this Covenant.

The best method of giving practical effect to this principle is that the tutelage of such peoples should be entrusted to advanced nations who by reason of their resources, their experience or their geographical position can best undertake this responsibility, and who are willing to accept it, and that this tutelage should be exercised by them as Mandatories on behalf of the League.

Paragraph 3 of the Article stated that the character of the Mandate was dependent on the geographical position of the territory, its economic conditions and the development of its people. Paragraph 4 provisionally recognized the independence of certain ex-Turkish communities "subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone". It also added that "the wishes of these communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of the Mandatory". Paragraph 8 stipulated that the degree of authority to be exercised by the Mandatory would be defined in each case by the Council of the League. (59) The Article did not point out which of the ex-Turkish territories was to be placed under the Mandatory regime. It was this vagueness of Article 22 which made the American historian Professor Quincy Wright observe,

The well-phrased second paragraph of Article 22 left it uncertain where the ultimate or sovereign authority rested, by whom or how the Mandatory should be selected, or how much control the League could exercise ...
The final text of Article 22 did not

(59) ibid., p. 515.
mention appeal nor did it specify whether the League or the interested Mandatory Power should have the right to decide when the people of the Mandated territory had become "able to stand alone". (60)

It should be mentioned in this connection that at the meeting on the 8th of February of the League of Nations Commission, Mr. Vesnitch of Serbia put forward an amendment to the effect that the Permanent Mandates Commission (provided for under paragraph 9 of Article 22) "Shall have power also, when it shall judge the moment for this to have arrived, to propose that the independence of any given people shall be proclaimed and be recognized with a view to its eventual admission as a Member of the League of Nations". (61) The amendment was brought up at the next meeting of the Commission, the Seventh Session, on the 10th of February, but was not adopted. However, it is doubtful if this ambiguity in the wording of Article 22 is purely accidental or that it was intended by the Powers concerned at the time. In a broadcast in June, 1938, Mr. Lloyd George said,

The Covenant of the League of Nations was in the main the work of a great Dominion Statesman - General Smuts - and the whole of his proposals were sifted and examined by the Imperial Cabinet before they were submitted to the Allied Committee that drafted the Covenant. (62)

In compliance with Article 22 of the Covenant, the assignment of the mandates over some former Turkish territories was made by the Supreme Council at its San Remo meeting in

(60) ibid., p. 518.
(61) ibid., p. 516.
(62) ibid., p. 519.
April, 1920. The mandates for Iraq and Palestine were assigned to Britain, while the mandate for Syria (including Lebanon) was assigned to France. These assignments were subject to the conclusion of a peace treaty with Turkey. The allocation of the mandates was more or less a reproduction of the Sykes-Picot Agreement which contemplated the division of the aforementioned territories between Britain and France with 2 modifications. The San Remo Conference considered the vilayet of Mosul to be an integral part of Iraq although according to the Sykes-Picot Agreement, it was to be part of Zone A, under French influence. The second modification was the inclusion of Palestine within the British mandate area instead of giving it an international administration as contemplated in the Sykes-Picot Agreement. When referring to this question, the British representative to the Permanent Mandates Commission said that "it was, after all, the Balfour Declaration which was the reason why the British Government was now administering Palestine". (63) The peace treaty was signed at Sevres on August 10, 1920 but was not ratified owing to the growth of the Turkish nationalist movement. Nevertheless, the Principal Allied Powers carried out the provisions of the treaty. It was not until July 24, 1923, that the Treaty of Lausanne was substituted for the Treaty of Sevres, though the mandate for

(63) Stoyanovsky, op. cit., p. 23.
Palestine was put into force on September 29, 1922. The preamble of the Mandate embodied the Balfour Declaration.

While Article 2 made the Mandatory responsible for placing the country under "such political, administrative and economic conditions as will secure the establishment of the Jewish National Home ... and the development of self-governing institutions". Article 4 allowed for the establishment of a Jewish Agency to advise and cooperate with the Palestine administration in matters affecting the Jewish National Home. Article 6 required that the Palestine administration "while ensuring that the rights and position of other sections of the population are not prejudiced" would facilitate under suitable conditions Jewish immigration and close settlement of Jews on the land. We should note here that while paragraph 4 of Article 22 of the Covenant confines the activities of the Mandatory to "administrative advice and assistance", Article 1 of the Palestine Mandate gives the Mandatory "full powers of legislation and administration." Moreover, the wishes of the Palestine communities were not "a principal consideration in the selection of the Mandatory" as provided for in paragraph 4, Article 22 of the Covenant.

One might have the impression that the Mandate for Palestine was prepared by the League of Nations. In 1920, it was announced in the House of Commons that the Mandate for Palestine was being prepared by the Drafting Committee
of the Peace Conference. (64) Later on in the same year, it was announced in the House that the Mandate for Palestine was prepared by the British Government in consultation with the French Government. (65) The Royal Commission (Peel) for Palestine recorded however in 1937 another view on this same question. It was on February 27, 1919, when the Zionist Organization made a formal pronouncement to the Peace Conference in which they expressed the Zionist view of how the Balfour Declaration was to be carried out and the National Home be established. The Royal Commission referred in its Report to this Zionist representation in the following terms,

On the 27th February its leaders (that is the Zionist Organization's leaders) appeared before the Supreme Council and explained the scheme. A more detailed plan, dated the 28th March, was drafted by Mr. Felix Frankfurter, an eminent American Zionist. From these and other documents and records, it is clear that the Zionist project had already in those early days assumed something like the shape of the Mandate as we know it. (66)

It has even been suggested that most of the Articles of the Mandate for Palestine are a slightly modified reproduction of Zionist documents and pronouncements made before the promulgation of the Mandate. For example, the gist of paragraph 2 of the preamble which repeats the Balfour Declaration is to be found in a "Joint Manifesto" of a number of American Zionist

(64) Hansard, op. cit., vol. 131 (1920) p. 441.
(65) ibid., vol. 136 (1920) p. 700.
societies, dated February 2, 1916. The same applies to several Articles of the Mandate:

**Article 2**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mandate Text</th>
<th>Zionist Text</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Mandatory shall be responsible for placing the country under such political, administrative, and economic conditions as will secure the establishment of a Jewish National Home .....</td>
<td>Palestine shall be placed under such political, administrative and economic conditions as will secure the establishment there of the Jewish National Home .....</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Zionist text is to be found in paragraph 5, Sub-section 1 of the Zionist Statement of views to the Peace Conference, 3rd February, 1919. (67)

This analogy could be pressed too far, but suffice it for the present to point out a few aspects which constitute this strange coincidence between the Mandate text and the Zionist text.

It is significant to note that the terms of the Mandate for Palestine were never submitted for debate in the House of Commons. In 1920, Mr. Bonar Law stated in the House in answer to a question that there was no advantage in publishing the terms of the Mandate before it was finally confirmed by the League of Nations. (68) During the same year it was announced in the House that the assent to the Mandate by the parliament was "unnecessary", and that the expenses incurred by the Mandate "had no connection with the matter". (69) Thus

---

(67) ibid., p. 554.
(68) Hansard, op. cit., vol. 131 (1920) p. 1227.
(69) ibid., vol. 129 (1920) p. 628.
the Mandate for Palestine was not ratified by the House although Winston Churchill had announced that the Mandate cost the British Ex-chequer in 1921, 8 million pounds, (70) the monthly expenditure of British troops in Palestine in 1920 being 900,000 pounds. (71) However, some members of the House persisted in their demands for a debate of the terms of the Mandate until the terms were laid before the House for "examination" only. (72) In March 1922, a debate of the Mandate was requested but the question received no answer. (73) In May 1922, Neville Chamberlain in answer to a question stated that he was not in a position to say when the Mandate would be discussed. Then he was asked, "As the Mandate means the expenditure of great sums, ought it not to come before the House?" to which he answered, "The Mandate will rather lessen our expenditure than increase it". (74) In February 1922, Mr. Joynson Hicks had asked the Colonial Secretary "if and in what manner the consent of the Palestinians has been accorded agreeing to Great Britain being the Mandatory Power?" for which he received no answer, (75) and in July 1922 the same member said that he could hardly conceive it, "that in a democratic country such as this, the Palestine Mandate is not submitted to the House for approval". (76) The

(70) ibid., vol. 151 (1922) p. 1547.
(71) ibid., vol. 135 (1920) p. 196.
(72) ibid., vol. 139 (1920) p. 16.
(73) ibid., vol. 152 (1922) p. 946.
(74) ibid., vol. 154 (1922) p. 357.
(75) ibid., vol. 150 (1922) p. 1040.
(76) ibid., vol. 156 (1922) p. 293.
question of the ratification of the Palestine Mandate dragged on in the House until it was put an end to by the Government in 1923 when they announced that the Mandate need not be ratified because it was not a treaty which required ratification by respective heads of governments. (77)

Having gone through the origin and formulation of the Mandate, we shall now turn to an examination of its implementation in Palestine.

(77) ibid., vol. 162 (1923) p. 263.
CHAPTER III
Jewish Immigration and Land Settlement

Immigration

In the course of its rule in Palestine, the Mandatory Power was beset by two basic problems, immigration and land settlement. Already in 1919, the American King-Crane Commission which was sent by President Wilson to study conditions in the Turkish Empire with reference to possible mandates, reported the situation in Palestine as follows,

... The Peace Conference should not shut its eyes to the fact that the anti-Zionist feeling in Palestine and Syria is intense and not lightly to be flouted. No British officer consulted by the Commissioners, believed that the Zionist programme could be carried out except by force of arms... That of itself is evidence of the strong sense of the injustice of the Zionist programme, on the part of the non-Jewish populations of Palestine and Syria. (78)

Following the allocation of the Palestine Mandate to the British Government, the military regime was succeeded by a civil administration as from July 1, 1920, with Sir Herbert Samuel as High Commissioner. Although, as mentioned above, the Mandate was not approved by the League of Nations until July 1922, the civil administration proceeded at once in the implementation of the Balfour Declaration and in September 1920, announced a quota of 16,500 Jewish immigrants for the first year. Already in April 1920, five Jews were killed and over two hundred injured in the first clash between Zionists and Arabs. A military committee of enquiry attributed one of

(78) Antonius, op. cit., p. 449.
the causes of the riots to the fear of the Arabs "that the establishment of the Jewish National Home would mean a great increase in Jewish immigration and would lead to their economic and political subjection to the Jews". (79) The announcement of the first quota of Jewish immigrants aroused Arab opposition throughout the country; and in May 1921, anti-Zionist riots in Jaffa resulted in 47 Jews being killed and 146 wounded. A commission of enquiry under the chairmanship of Sir Thomas Haycraft reached the conclusion that,

> The fundamental cause of the Jaffa riots and the subsequent acts of violence was a feeling among the Arabs of discontent with, and hostility to, the Jews, due to political and economic causes, and connected with Jewish immigration, and with their conception of Zionist policy as derived from Jewish exponents. (80)

As a result of these disturbances, Jewish immigration was temporarily suspended and in June 1922, the British Government issued a White Paper which was an authoritative interpretation of the Jewish National Home concept. As far as immigration was concerned, the White Paper announced that the British Government never had the intention of making Palestine "as Jewish as England is English". Jewish immigration the Paper added, was not to exceed the economic absorptive capacity of the country. (81) The Arabs rejected

(80) Marlowe, op. cit., p. 89.
the 1922 White Paper in principle because Jewish immigration which had a political objective, was to be regulated by an economic criterion. The Zionists accepted it, because the economic criterion for immigration offered them the opportunity of greater expansion. Meanwhile, the Government announced in the House that the total Jewish immigration into Palestine since the beginning of the Mandate was 27,000 at the end of 1922. (82)

So far the question of Jewish immigration had not been raised in the House of Commons except for a few explanatory remarks by the Government between now and then. Gradually, immigration took the shape of an acute issue. In July 1923, Captain Foxcroft stated in the House that at the beginning the Palestinians received the British "with fruit and flowers not as conquerors but as deliverers" and then wondered about the reason for the "extraordinary volt face of the Palestinians in their attitude towards the British". He attributed Arab unrest to their fear of Zionist domination and said that unless the Arabs were given control over immigration, the unrest "will have a serious and most pernicious repercussion throughout the entire East". He concluded by saying that the British policy in Palestine was a "dubious policy handed down by the coalition cabinet" and that the Balfour Declaration could not be implemented in a country 93% of its population were Arabs. (83)

(83) ibid., vol. 167 (1923) pp. 573-79.
After the outbreak of 1921, the country remained relatively quiet during the years 1923-29 except for Arab demonstrations against Lord Balfour's visit in 1925. Arab passivity was partly due to the fact that Jewish immigration fell sharply in the years 1926-28. It was announced in the House of Commons that Jewish emigration from Palestine in 1926 reached 7340 due to unemployment; and in 1927 emigrants exceeded immigrants by more than 2,000 while in 1928 there was a net Jewish immigration of ten persons only. This drop in Jewish immigration was ascribed by the Shaw Commission of 1929 and the British Government partly to the high volume of immigration in the preceding years and partly to the collapse of the Polish currency, since one in every two Jewish immigrants came from Poland during this period. (84) At the same time Colonial Secretary Mr. L.S. Amery informed the House that the population of the Jewish organized colonies in Palestine had risen from 17,000 in 1922 to 30,000 in 1927; (85) while the Colonial Under-Secretary also stated in the House that Jewish total population in Palestine which was estimated at the time of the Armistice at 55,000 became at the end of 1928, 149,554. (86) Following is a table showing the number of Jewish immigrants in each year between the beginning of the civil administration and the end of 1929:— (87)

(84) Royal Institute of International Affairs, op. cit., p. 43.
(86) ibid., vol. 227 (1929) p. 1714.
(87) Great Britain, op. cit., p. 8.
1920 (September - December) 5,514
1921 9,149
1922 7,844
1923 7,421
1924 12,856
1925 33,801
1926 13,081
1927 2,713
1928 2,178
1929 5,249

Total for ten-year period 99,806

On the 15th August, 1929, a dispute concerning religious practices at the Wailing Wall in Jerusalem, but indicative of the tension existing fanned the smouldering fire of the strained Arab-Zionist relations into a flame which resulted in 133 Jews being killed and 339 wounded, the Arab casualties mostly inflicted by the military were 116 killed and 232 wounded. (88) As a result of these incidents the Government announced in the House that one battleship, one aircraft-carrier, one cruiser and two destroyers had been sent to Palestine. (89) During the same meeting of the House the Under-Secretary for Dominion Affairs Mr. William Lunn said that the expenditure incurred in the recruitment and transport to Palestine of additional British police which was approximately £3,900 was to be borne by the Palestine Government. (90)

As a result of the Wailing Wall disturbances, the Colonial Office announced on September 14, 1929, that a Commission of Inquiry headed by Sir Walter Shaw would proceed

(88) ibid., p. 10.
(90) ibid., vol. 231 (1929) p. 1019.
to Palestine "to inquire into the immediate causes of the recent outbreak and to make recommendations as to the steps necessary to avoid recurrences." (91) Then when in February 1930, the Colonial Under Secretary asked the parliamentary Supply Committee (92) to vote a sum of £124,000 for Palestine and Jordan, Mr. Howard Bury objected to "spending this large amount of money to put an alien race into an alien land". (93) Dealing with immigration, the Shaw Commission said in its report,

... Among a large section of the Arab people of Palestine, there is a feeling of opposition to Jewish immigration, that this feeling is well founded in that it has its origin in the known results of excessive immigration in the past and that, given other and more immediate causes for disturbances, that feeling would undoubtedly be a factor which would contribute to an outbreak. (94)

The Commission recommended that His Majesty's Government "should issue at an early date a clear and definite declaration of the policy which they intend to be pursued in regard to the regulation and control of future Jewish immigration to Palestine". They also recommended that the administration for the regulation of immigration should be reviewed "with the object of preventing a repetition of the excessive immigration of 1925 and 1926", and that machinery should be

---

(91) Royal Institute of International Affairs, op. cit., p. 45.
(92) The Committee never disapproved any sum of money.
devised through which non-Jewish interests in Palestine could be consulted upon the subject of immigration. (95) On April 3, 1930, the Prime Minister, Mr. Ramsay MacDonald made a statement in the House of Commons in which he said that the Shaw Report affected His Majesty's Government policy in Palestine, but not to the extent of deflecting it from the terms of the Mandate. (96) The British Government moreover, appointed Sir John Hope Simpson to make a more detailed inquiry into land settlement, immigration and development.

Upon the publication of the Shaw Report, the Government announced in the House that they had suspended certificates of entry to Jewish immigrants because of the Shaw Commission's views, and until Simpson had completed his inquiry. (97) This decision was opposed by Captain Kenworthy who spoke of the "uneasiness" of the Jewish people in many parts of England and in foreign countries at the suspension of Jewish immigration into Palestine. Mr. Denman also said that the suspension caused "inconvenience and uncertainty" as to the intention of British policy. (98) In as far as immigration was concerned, the Simpson Report which was presented in August 1930, concluded that the economic absorptive criterion should take into consideration the effect immigration would have on Arab employment. "If there is unemployment, whether Jewish or Arab

(95) ibid., p. 165.
(97) ibid., vol. 239 (1930) p. 387.
(98) ibid., vol. 240 (1930) p. 1125.
it is clearly the duty of the Government to prevent immigration.

(99) In October 1930, the British Government published a White Paper together with the Simpson Report. Referring to the problem of immigration the White Paper said,

... There is at present a serious degree of Arab unemployment, and that Jewish unemployment likewise exists to an extent which constitutes a definitely unsatisfactory feature ... The economic capacity of the country to absorb new immigrants must therefore be judged with reference to the position of Palestine as a whole in regard to unemployment. (100)

Following the publication of the 1930 White Paper, Major Eliot and Mr. Bracken asked the Prime Minister that the British Government refrain from promulgating any ordinances on the basis of the Paper until parliament had had an opportunity to discuss it. In answer, the Prime Minister stated that the Paper would not be put into effect before it was discussed. (101)

In point of fact, these portions of the 1930 White Paper concerned with Jewish immigration were widely debated by a number of the members. Lloyd George attacked British policy in Palestine and suggested that Jordan could absorb Arab settlers if there was a surplus population in Palestine. (102)

Answering him, Colonial Under Secretary, Drummond Shiels,

(99) Marlowe, op. cit., p. 121.
(100) British Government, White Paper of 1930, paragraph 27.
(102) ibid., vol. 245 (1930) p. 77.
said that the Arabs had always opposed any systemized Jewish immigration. He reiterated the Government's determination to regulate immigration according to the economic absorptive capacity of the country because as he put it, "without a contented Arab population, the full success of the National Home cannot be assured". (103) Mr. Herbert Samuel said he was convinced that "with proper agricultural and industrial development", Palestine could support a population of 2,000,000 and in a generation it would support 3,000,000. He described the Simpson report as an individual report and was regretful that Simpson, did not mention Jordan which was "very under-populated" as an alternative. He added that had the Jews not gone to Palestine, the revenue of the country would have been one-third less than it was at the time. Samuel went on to say that if the White Paper was acted upon according to the terms in it which regulate immigration, it would result in "a real cessation of Jewish immigration". He concluded by wondering why Arab unemployment should mean suspension of Jewish immigration. (104) Colonel Howard Bury supported what was mentioned in the White Paper about immigration and said that had the 1922 White Paper which produced the economic absorptive capacity criterion been adhered to there would have been no trouble in Palestine. He maintained that the Zionist leaders "gave lip service" to the 1922 White

---

(104) *Ibid.*, vol. 245 (1930) p. 120.
Paper. Bury then quoted the following extract from the Jewish Chronicle of 24th October, 1930, on the subject of the 1922 White Paper,

_The manner in which the Government now appeals to it, in order to justify and excuse its new policy, is abundant testimony to the acumen of Mr. Sokolow who assured us that the memorandum was evanescent; to the foresight of Dr. Weizmann, who declared it no more than a passing phase; and to the political ingenuousness of Sir Herbert Samuel, who, I have been told, urged, with some ominous threats, its acceptance on the part of the organization, with the assurance that it was but a formal matter._ (105)

He ended up by asking whether members of the House would like "100,000 Rumanian or Polish to be settled on their best farm land". (106) Mr. H. Snell pointed out that Arab fear could be removed not by the restriction of Jewish immigration, but by training the Arab farmer and improving his condition. He was of the opinion that if Jewish immigration was to be restricted the British Government should at the same time prevent the "infiltration" of Arabs from the Eastern and Northern frontiers. (107) Mr. Morris believed that the 1930 White Paper set out the facts relating to immigration. He explained that the restriction of Jewish immigration did not mean the crystallization of the Jewish National Home. In 1928, he noted, Sir John Campbell's expert committee had made a survey of the Jewish settlement on behalf of the Zionist body, and the committee reported that there should be Jewish emigration

(105) ibid., vol. 245 (1930) p. 138.
(106) ibid., vol. 245 (1930) p. 138.
(107) ibid., vol. 245 (1930) p. 144.
not immigration. (108) The White Paper was also supported by Mr. Somers Cocks who stated that in Palestine there were 700,000 Arabs "whose forefathers have lived there almost as long as the English have lived in England" and 150,000 Jews, "the majority of whom have only been there for about ten years." He said that the criticisms levelled against the Government were unjustified because the Government "were trying to hold an even balance and protect the rights of the original inhabitants from excessive immigration". He considered Lloyd George's speech to be "one-sided and biased" because it did not mention the Arab side of the question at all. This he maintained was due to the fact that a by-election was about to take place in a part of the East End of London where there was "a population of very hard working and able Zionists". (109) During the same debate which lasted eight hours, Sir George Jones attacked British policy of immigration which he believed constituted a betrayal of the Zionist cause. He said that the Jewish National Home was a progressive movement and that "immigration should be facilitated and the Jewish population increased, (110) Mr. de Rothschild rejected the White Paper's recommendation that immigration be regulated according to the degree of unemployment. He observed that Arab suspicions of immigration which the White Paper spoke about were "unfounded". Without Jewish

(108) ibid., vol. 245 (1930) p. 152.
(109) ibid., vol. 245 (1930) p. 163.
(110) ibid., vol. 245 (1930) p. 167.
immigration he said, there would be no National Home, and without the National Home there would be no British Mandate for Palestine because "the National Home and the Balfour Declaration are the pivotal part of the Mandate". He then read a short passage from a pamphlet entitled "A Socialist in Palestine" published in 1922 and written by Ramsay MacDonald. In it MacDonald had said, "The Jew seeks a National Home in Palestine not only because he is denied a home elsewhere, but Palestine has always been calling to him from his heart, and he must go." Rothschild finally remarked that if the provisions for immigration contained in the White Paper "remained not in word only but in spirit, then it will truly be said that foxes have holes, the birds of the air have nests, but the Jewish people has nowhere to rest its head". (111)

Mr. Hopkin also subscribed to the view that the restriction of immigration under the 1930 White Paper was a breach of faith. He stated that if the Policy contained in the Paper was carried out, the flow of money into Palestine from America, Canada, South Africa and England would stop. (112) Several other members stood up and asked for a relaxation of the restrictions on Jewish immigration into Palestine. In answer, the First Lord of the Admiralty Mr. A.V. Alexander said that the terms of the White Paper were not incompatible with the Mandate and that the regulation of Jewish immigration was not

(111) ibid., vol. 245 (1930) p. 175.
(112) ibid., vol. 245 (1930) p. 183.
intended to hinder the formation of the Jewish National Home. (113)

Since immigration was perhaps the most important question dealt with by the White Paper, and as the Paper gave rise to a great deal of controversy, it might be appropriate to see where the Paper stood towards the end of the debate:

Commander Kenworthy: I take the word of the Government that they did not know the effect this White Paper would have; they did not know what they were signing. They were overworked.

Earnest Brown: Is the policy of the Government at this moment, the White Paper unaltered, or the White Paper modified.

Mr. Bracken: We want a straight answer. Does the White Paper stand or is it withdrawn. If not we shall put down a vote of censure.

Drummond Shiels (Colonial Under Secretary): ... As for the White Paper, the Government's intention should be better understood.

Mr. E. Brown: Does it remain unmodified or is it simplified?

Drummond Shiels: Well, the record of the debate is before the country for any one in doubt of our position (Laughter).

Major Nathan: The question is: Does or does not the Paper stand? Yes or no.

(113) Ibid., vol. 245 (1930) p. 196.
Drummond Shiels: The White Paper as explained and amplified to-day, certainly stands.

This passage is a good example of the strength of criticism levelled against the Paper and of the desire of the House to modify it. Consequently, the meeting adjourned without voting against the Paper. (114) In this connection, it should be added that Colonial Secretary Lord Passfield in whose name the 1930 White Paper was presented to Parliament said in the 'New York Daily Award' on November 7, 1930, "The White Paper is not my document; it is the cabinet's document; I am only technically responsible." Commenting on this, Mr. L.S. Amery said in the House that the cabinet said the opposite of Passfield's contention. (115)

The publication of the aforementioned White Paper caused a great deal of alarm in Zionist circles. In protest, Dr. Weizmann resigned his office as President of the Zionist Organization and the Jewish Agency declaring that the Passfield Paper was "inconsistent with the terms of the Mandate and in vital particulars marks the reversal of the policy hitherto followed by His Majesty's Government in regard to the Jewish National Home." (116) During the last week of October and the first week of November 1930, the correspondence columns of The Times reflected a widespread denunciation

(114) ibid., vol. 245 (1930) pp. 203-209.  
(115) ibid., vol. 245 (1930) p. 129.  
of the Government's policy in Palestine. The Conservative leaders, Baldwin, Chamberlain and Amery were among those who criticized the policy. As a result, Colonial Secretary Passfield wrote to The Times on November 6, 1930 stating that it was not intended to suspend Jewish immigration so long as Arab unemployment existed. In February 1931, the Prime Minister announced that a committee of the cabinet "has been exchanging views with the Zionist leaders with regard to the interpretation of certain passages in the Passfield Paper. It is proposed to embody the explanations which have been given, in the form of a letter to Dr. Weizmann which will be published". (117) Chamberlain then proposed to lay the letter as a White Paper before parliament but the Prime Minister answered that he did not want to give the letter which was "explanatory, the status of a White Paper". (118) During the same meeting of the House, Howard Bury asked why the Government had adopted a policy different from that outlined in the Passfield Paper to which he received no answer.(119) Bury's question was in fact an attempt to arrest the retreat of the Government from the White Paper policy of 1930. Answering another question put forth by Howard Bury related to the nature of the letter to Weizmann, the Prime Minister said it was "an authoritative interpretation of the White

(118) ibid., vol. 248 (1931) p. 389.
(119) ibid., vol. 248 (1931) p. 388.
Paper" which had an official character. He added that the letter would be communicated as an official document to the League of Nations and embodied in a dispatch as an instruction to the High Commissioner. (120) Howard Bury further inquired if the letter indicated a change of policy, to which the Prime Minister answered in the negative. When Bury finally asked, "Why is Weizmann satisfied now?" the Prime Minister said that the "misunderstanding of the paper's effect has been removed". (121)

On the 13th of February, 1931, the Prime Minister addressed his letter to Dr. Weizmann. The letter contained a number of statements which had not appeared in the Passfield Paper. Concerning immigration the letter said,

The obligation to facilitate Jewish immigration and to encourage close settlement by Jews on the land remains a positive obligation of the Mandate, and it can be fulfilled without prejudice to the rights and position of other sections of the population of Palestine, ... His Majesty's Government did not prescribe and do not contemplate any stoppage or prohibition of Jewish immigration in any of its categories. (122)

The letter also stated that Jewish immigration would be regulated by the economic absorptive capacity criterion of 1922 and that the Government did not mean to "permit no further immigration of Jews so long as it might prevent any

(120) [ibid.], vol. 248 (1931) p. 599.
(121) [ibid.], vol. 248 (1931) p. 600.
(122) [ibid.], vol. 248 (1931) p. 750.
Arab from obtaining employment". (123) The letter was read in the House of Commons amidst the "Written Answers" of the day and no debate followed.

It is worthy to note that the observations and recommendations of the Shaw Commission that Arab grievances should be considered were not provided for in the letter. The Arabs considered the letter to constitute a reversal of the policy contained in the 1930 Passfield Paper and called it the "Black Letter". The letter convinced the Arabs that recommendations made in their favour could be annulled in London by Zionist influence. Referring to the MacDonald-Weizmann letter, the Peel Commission of 1937 said,

In Arab eyes, the substitution of the Black letter for the White Paper was plain proof of the power which world Jewry could exact in London, and such confidence as they might previously have had in British determination to do at least what justice could be done under what they have always regarded an unjust Mandate was seriously shaken. (124)

In March 1931, Colonial Under Secretary Drummond Shiels announced in the House that the Arab Executive of Palestine had issued a manifesto on March 13 calling upon all Arabs to adopt within certain limits a commercial boycott of the Jews. (125) In April Howard Bury stated in the House that the Black Letter had increased the tension existing in

(123) ibid., vol. 248 (1931) p. 751.
(124) Jeffries, op. cit., p. 637.
Palestine, (126) and in December of the same year, a Moslem Congress was held at Jerusalem and attended by delegates from twenty-two Moslem and Arab countries to warn against the dangers of Zionism.

Concomitant with these developments, Jewish immigration into Palestine proceeded at the rate of 4,944 in 1930, 4,075 in 1931 and 9,553 in 1932. In 1932, Mr. Janner asked the Government to further facilitate Jewish immigration into Palestine because the Jewish people provided from 30 to 40 per cent of the actual income of the Palestine Fund, and because some £40,000,000 capital had been brought into Palestine by Jewish people and Jewish effort. (127) During the same meeting of the House, the Colonial Under Secretary announced that it had been left to the High Commissioner in conjunction with the Jewish Agency to decide the number of Jewish immigrants that could be admitted from time to time. (128)

The year 1933, witnessed the Nazi accession to power in Germany and this gave a great impetus to Jewish immigration. Anti-Semitic persecution in Germany gave the Zionists all the more reason to ask for further immigration through the relaxation of immigration regulations. Colonel Wedgwood asked the Colonial Secretary whether "in view of the measures taken against the Jews in Germany, he will relax the restriction on immigration into Palestine for the benefit of

(126) ibid., vol. 251 (1931) p. 171.
(127) ibid., vol. 264 (1932) p. 1835.
(128) ibid., vol. 264 (1932) p. 1854.
refugees; but Colonial Secretary Philip Cunliffe Lister informed him that while immigration into Palestine was to be governed by the economic absorptive capacity of the country, it was open to the Palestine Executive Agency to make any representations on the subject. (129) In July 1933, Foreign Secretary John Simon announced in the House that all applications for immigration presented by the Jewish Agency in Germany had been granted. At the same time Jewish immigration was mounting rapidly. In 1933, 30,327 Jewish immigrants entered Palestine of whom around 5,000 came from Germany while the remainder came from the Eastern European sources such as Galicia, the Ukraine and Bessarabia. In November of the same year Colonial Secretary Cunliffe Lister informed the House that on October 13, the Arab Executive Committee had called for a general strike; and despite the Government’s prohibition, a demonstration was made in Jerusalem which had to be dispersed by the Police. The same happened in Jaffa on October 27, and was followed later by disturbances in Haifa and Nablus and in some cases the police were forced to fire. (130)

Apart from the authorized immigrants, there was a considerable number of illicit immigration. In November 1933 the Government announced that they were taking preventive measures against unauthorized immigration. (131) Meanwhile,

(129) ibid., vol. 276 (1933) p. 1420.
(130) ibid., vol. 281 (1933) p. 29.
(131) ibid., vol. 281 (1933) p. 343.
it was reported that the number of unauthorized settlers during the two years 1932-33 had risen to 22,400. Three main classes of illegal Jewish immigrants were involved: (a) those who evaded the frontier controls; (b) a larger number who entered the country as travellers and stayed indefinitely without obtaining a valid residence; and (c) women who formally married "professional" Palestinian husbands and then divorced them. (132) The large volume of Jewish immigrants in 1933 made Major-General Sir Alfred Knox ask "why the number of Jewish immigrants permitted to enter Palestine during the first eight months of 1933 was over five times as great as the number immigrated during each of the two preceding years". In answer the Colonial Secretary said that it was the "great improvement in the economic position of Palestine" that made it possible for the High Commissioner to approve larger half-yearly quotas for the admission of immigrants of the wage-earning class, and the self-supporting class. The debate proceeded between the two in the following terms:

Knox: Is it not more probable that this large increase in the number of Jewish immigrants was the direct cause of the Arab revolt.

Colonial Secretary: I refuse to accept a statement of this kind.

(132) Royal Institute of International Affairs, op. cit., p. 64.
Knox: Is not this enormous increase an extraordinary coincidence.

Colonial Secretary: I regret to hear such a suggestion. His Majesty's Government are carrying out their policy impartially and immigration is governed by the economic absorptive capacity of the country. (133)

In March 1934, the Colonial Secretary stated in the House that on account of a shortage of skilled labourers, the High Commissioner for Palestine decided to authorize the grant of 1350 immigration certificates to the Jewish Agency as an advance on account of the following half-yearly schedule. (134) While the flow of Jewish immigrants into Palestine was going on, the Colonial Secretary announced that the number of Arabs unemployed at the end of April 1934 was 14,000. He added that "Jewish firms that employ Arabs have recently been picketed by Jews to prevent employment of Arab labour". (135) Moreover, the Colonial Secretary informed the House that the Director of Immigration in Palestine was empowered by law to admit persons skilled in certain trades or crafts who possessed capital of not less than £250, provided he was satisfied that the economic capacity of Palestine was such as to allow such persons to be absorbed in the trade or craft which

(134) ibid., vol. 287 (1934) p. 1046.
(135) ibid., vol. 291 (1934) p. 1129.
they proposed to follow, and that 500 Jews of that category would be admitted. (136) In October 1934, the Colonial Secretary also said that the High Commissioner had authorized a supplementary labour schedule for the admission as immigrants of 1,200 skilled and unskilled Jewish workmen. (137)

Towards the middle of 1935, the plea for further Jewish immigration into Palestine was strengthened when several members of the House representing all three parties asked that in view of the Jewish plight in Eastern Europe and the German Government's persecutions the Jews be allowed to enter freely into Palestine. Answering them Colonial Secretary Malcolm MacDonald stated that immigration was to be governed by the economic absorptive capacity of the country. In July 1935, Mr. Rothschild attacked the Palestine Administration because they hindered Jewish immigration while allowing the Arabs from Transjordan to enter Palestine. He said there was a great dearth of labour in Palestine which needed the Young German Jews formerly trained in the liberal professions and who were "deprived of their livelihood and forced to flee because of persecution". (138) Colonel Wedgwood subscribed to Rothschild's views and asked for unrestricted immigration. He added,

If a refugee goes from Poland or Germany

---

(137) ibid., vol. 293 (1934) pp. 31-32.
to Palestine, he leaves his wife, or his father and mother and all his help-
less relatives in Germany or in Poland, faced with the prospect of having to rely on what their relative in Palestine can do for them, or committing suicide. In these circumstances the boy remits from Palestine, say £1 a month to keep his old people alive. That money leaves Palestine. If those old people were allowed to go to Palestine, the boy would still be finding £1 per month to keep the old folks alive, but the money would be spent in Palestine in employing Palestinian Labour. (139)

Wegwood went on to say that the money spent on the naval and air service searches for illegal immigrants could be utilized in some useful way. The first thing, he explained that Jewish men and women did when they entered Palestine was to destroy their passports because it was better to be in prison in Palestine than to be in Germany and Poland. Mr. Janner asked those concerned with the administration of Palestine not to rely upon the definition of the absorptive capacity of Palestine because the absorptive capacity depended on the people who went into Palestine. "Immigration" he said, "is the life blood of that country, and as far as the absorptive capacity is concerned, it depends entirely on the amount of capital and energy which is brought into the country". (140)

He told the Colonial Secretary that he should enable the Jews "to proceed to Palestine and work out their destiny ...

We ought to exert ourselves in every direction, so that this mandate land may be not only a Jewish national home and a

home for refugees flying from oppression elsewhere, but also
a credit to able effort on the part of this great Empire
of ours in the years to come". (141)

Jewish immigration into Palestine reached its peak
in the years 1933-36. The following is a table showing the
sharp rise in numbers of Jewish immigrants:— (142)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>4,944</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>4,075</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>9,553</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>30,327</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>42,359</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>61,854</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>29,727</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This large volume of immigration had its effect on the Arab
population in Palestine. In November 1935, the Arab poli-
tical parties in Palestine collectively demanded the complete
stoppage of Jewish immigration, and in April 1936, the Arab
political parties formed an Higher Arab Committee presided
over by Haj Amin Husseini, Mufti of Jerusalem which called
for a general strike. Referring to this strike in the House
of Commons, Colonial Secretary Ormsby-Gore said,

The Arab strike has lasted for two weeks
and is even more general than a week ago
in spite of the heavy losses incurred by
Arab traders and transport workers. The
underlying cause is Arab discontent.
They threaten to continue the strike
until Jewish immigration is stopped. (143)

At the same time Ormsby-Gore informed the House that when

(141) ibid., vol. 304 (1935) p. 2112.
(142) Great Britain, op. cit., p. 15.
order was restored in Palestine, the British Government would advise His Majesty to appoint a Royal Commission to investigate "without bringing into question the terms of the Mandate", the causes of unrest and the grievances of Arabs and Jews. (144) During the Arab strike which had assumed the dimensions of a national revolt, the parliamentary Supply Committee held a meeting in which Ormsby-Gore announced that the military reinforcements which were sent to Palestine had prevented large-scale acts of violence. He believed that half of the trouble was psychological, the Arabs fearing Jewish domination, and the Jews fearing "an inferior status of barely tolerated aliens in Palestine under Arab domination". (145) During the meeting Earl Winterton maintained that the Arab rebellion was national in character and said that Hitler was less ruthless than the British Government in their treatment of the rebels in Palestine. (146) Lloyd George urged for further immigration because he believed that Palestine was an underpopulated country; and "not being a transcendentalist" he said that according to the old Bible story, there was in Palestine between 2,000,000 and 3,000,000. As for the disturbances and the strike, Lloyd George suggested a display of force and the arming of Jewish colonies for protection. (147) L.S. Amery believed that in as far as immigration was concerned

(144) ibid., vol. 312 (1936) p. 837.
(145) ibid., vol. 313 (1936) p. 1313.
(146) ibid., vol. 313 (1936) p. 1335.
(147) ibid., vol. 313 (1936) p. 1339.
there was a real Arab case. This was due to the fact that
during the years 1933-35, Jewish immigration into Palestine
had been at the rate of 50,000 a year. This "abnormal im-
migration" he observed made the Arabs fear that they might
become "a landless proletariat hewers of wood and drawers
of water in their own country". (148) Mr. Creech Jones did
not see the force of the Arab contention that they feared
Jewish domination because since 1919, increase in Jewish
population had been 300,000 as compared with the Arab in-
crease, 400,000. He was of the opinion that the root cause
of Arab discontent was not Jewish immigration but a clash
between the centuries. The landlords exploited the question
of immigration in order to maintain the system of old feu-
dalism in Palestine. (149) Colonel Clifton Brown however,
had a different view. He believed that the Arabs were jus-
tified in their fear of Jewish immigration and in turn domi-
nation; and that the Government neither allayed Arab fears
nor acted upon the findings of the Shaw Commission and the
policy of the Passfield Paper. Instead, he said,

The Prime Minister of that time wrote a
letter which started "Dear Dr. Weizmann"
and in which he said that nothing in the
statement of Government (Passfield) was
really meant and that what appeared to
be black was really white. Action of that
kind by the then Prime Minister gave rise
to the idea that the British Government

---

(149) ibid., vol. 313 (1936) p. 1352.
and the British House of Commons were entirely in the pocket of the Jews, that Dr. Weizmann had only to crack the whip and the British Government would respond. (150)

Brown went on to say that the Shaw Commission asked for a restriction of immigration. Up to that time (1929) the largest number of immigrants in any year was 20,000; but later on Jewish immigration reached 40,000, 50,000 and 60,000. He concluded by stating that the Mandate did not mean an unlimited expansion of Jewish immigration because in the 1922 White Paper which defined British obligations under the Mandate, it was laid down that not all of Palestine should be converted into a Jewish National Home, but that according to the Mandate, such a National Home should be founded in Palestine. "The one" he explained, "would embrace the whole of Palestine, whereas, the other would be a National Home, with limits, inside Palestine". (151) Commander Locker-Lampson pressed for an increase in Jewish immigration saying that the Arabs had a large country to go to which stretched from the Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean. He reminded the members of the House that it was the insight of Disraeli and the money of the Rothschilds which gave Britain in effect the Suez Canal. Consequently, he deduced, the Mandate was created for the dispossessed people. The Arabs he concluded, "have not a single holy place in Palestine". (152) Mr. Gallacher

(152) ibid., vol. 313 (1936) p. 1562.
rejected the thesis that Jewish immigration into Palestine brought in its tide civilization. That reminded him of Mussolini who wanted to penetrate into Abyssinia under cover of civilization and development. He asked that Arab grievances concerning immigration be considered and said that no one could blame the Jews who were fooled by Zionist leaders, "the agents for British imperialism". Gallacher challenged the Colonial Secretary to give him the name of any wealthy capitalist among the Arab leaders of the rebellion. He concluded by saying, "The revolt is thoroughly justifiable and Arab demands are fair... If ever a people were justified in making a protest and in making a demonstration, in order to get justice, it is the Arab people". (153) Mr. Herbert Morrison wondered how while Palestine had this conflict over immigration, Transjordan which is next door to it was underpopulated and underdeveloped, with the Jews not allowed to go in and the Arabs not bothering to go there. He suggested that Jordan could provide a solution for the problem of immigration. (154)

The strike which lasted six months was accompanied by widespread violence and terrorism, sabotage of communications and destruction of Jewish property. During the first six months of the rebellion 80 Jews lost their lives, the

(154) ibid., vol. 313 (1936) p. 1380.
government forces 37; It was estimated that over 1,000 Arabs were killed, mostly by fighting with troops and police. The strike was called off in October 1936 but the armed rebellion continued; and a Royal Commission under the Chairmanship of Lord Peel proceeded to Palestine with the task of inquiring into the underlying causes of the disturbances and to make recommendations for the removal of their causes.

Jewish immigration into Palestine may perhaps be illustrated by some statistics. In 1919 the total estimated population of Palestine was 590,000. The Jewish population was estimated at about 55,000 or 9 per cent. The first census was taken in 1922, and the census figures for the period 1922-1930 were as follows:— (155)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Moslems</th>
<th>Christians</th>
<th>Jews</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1922</td>
<td>589,177</td>
<td>71,464</td>
<td>83,790</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1923</td>
<td>609,331</td>
<td>72,030</td>
<td>89,660</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>627,660</td>
<td>74,094</td>
<td>94,945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>641,494</td>
<td>75,512</td>
<td>121,725</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>663,613</td>
<td>76,467</td>
<td>149,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1927</td>
<td>680,725</td>
<td>77,880</td>
<td>149,789</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>695,280</td>
<td>79,812</td>
<td>151,656</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>712,343</td>
<td>81,776</td>
<td>156,481</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>733,149</td>
<td>84,986</td>
<td>164,796</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While the Moslem and Christian population, that is the Arab population, of Palestine increased in these years by natural growth from 660,641 to 818,135, or about 23 per cent, the Jewish immigration increased, mainly through immigration from 83,790 to 164,796 or almost 100 per cent.

The figures for the subsequent ten-year period show an even more striking contrast between the growth of the Arab population and the Jewish population:— (156)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Moslems</th>
<th>Christians</th>
<th>Jews</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>759,700</td>
<td>88,907</td>
<td>174,606</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>778,803</td>
<td>92,520</td>
<td>192,137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>798,506</td>
<td>96,791</td>
<td>234,967</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>814,379</td>
<td>102,407</td>
<td>282,975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>836,688</td>
<td>105,236</td>
<td>355,157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>862,730</td>
<td>108,506</td>
<td>384,078</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>883,446</td>
<td>110,869</td>
<td>395,836</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>900,250</td>
<td>111,974</td>
<td>411,222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>927,133</td>
<td>116,958</td>
<td>445,457</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>947,846</td>
<td>120,587</td>
<td>463,535</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Thus the Arab population grew from 848,607 to 1,068,433 during this ten-year period while the Jewish population grew from 174,606 to 463,535 which indicates that it more than tripled and by 1940 constituted about 30 per cent of the population of Palestine.

As for the countries of origin of Jewish immigrants, these were as follows during the years 1919-1937:— (157)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Per cent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>131,249</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>35,346</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.S.R.</td>
<td>30,718</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rumania</td>
<td>15,528</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>9,642</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>9,181</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.A.</td>
<td>7,909</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>73,457</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It seems that Poland was predominant among the above-named countries as a source of Jewish immigration. This was

---

(156) *ibid.*, p. 20.
(157) *Royal Institute of International Affairs, op. cit.*, p. 66.
largely due to the fact that two thirds of world Jewry were to be found in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe. Moreover, the Jews of the United States, France and Britain were becoming assimilated, whereas the position of Jews in Eastern Europe was undermined because of the territorial changes caused by World War I.

The Royal Commission of Inquiry (Peel) published its findings in July 1937. Referring to immigration, the Commission said that the Palestine Administration took no account of political, social or psychological considerations. They added that the economic absorptive capacity could not remain the only criterion governing immigration and recommended that the Government should lay down in case of rejection of partition a "political high level" of Jewish immigration "to cover Jewish immigration of all categories". This high level "should be fixed for the next five years at 12,000 per annum, and in no circumstances during that period should more than that number be allowed into the country in any one year". (158)

The publication of the Peel Report was accompanied by a Government Statement of Policy (159) which announced among other things that "His Majesty's Government ... find themselves in general agreement with the arguments and conclusions of the Commission ... that a total Jewish immigration of all

categories of 8,000 persons shall be permitted in the eight
months August 1937-March 1938 provided that the economic
absorptive capacity of the country is not exceeded".

The question of Jewish immigration was brought to
the forefront of discussion in the House of Commons fol-
lowing the publication of the Peel Report which suggested the
partition of Palestine and the 1937 Statement of Policy which
restricted Jewish immigration. Colonial Secretary Ormsby-
Gore referred to the economic absorptive capacity as "a
wonderful phrase" but every six months the necessity of com-
puting how many Jews were to go into Palestine "ended in a
wrangle". Only by partition he observed could the "ideals"
of both nationalities be realized. (160) Sir Arnold Wilson
was in favour of restricting Jewish immigration because at
its largest Palestine could not absorb more than 10 per cent
of the surplus Jews from Europe alone. He said there were
16,000,000 Jews in the world and to them Zion should have been
a centre "a Mecca, a place of pilgrimage as it is for
Christians, but not a place of Jewish refuge". (161) Mr. Crossley
was also in favour of imposing some limits on Jewish immi-
...
by the following rate of Jewish immigration: 10,000 in 1932; 30,000 in 1933; 42,000 in 1934 and 62,000 in 1935. He read the following statement made by an Arab to the Peel Commission,

You say we are better off. You say my house has been enriched by strangers, but it is my house and I did not invite the strangers in or ask them to enrich it. I do not care how poor or bare it is, if only I am master of it. (162)

On the other hand, Colonel Wedgwood severely criticized British policy in Palestine relating to authorized and unauthorized Jewish immigrants. He said,

When Jewish immigrants (unauthorized) are led in chains to Acre goal, it is their business to stop it ... Such things should be remedied by the people out there, by collective action against injustice rather than by complaining to me or to the Government. British officials in Palestine will respect them far more ... The sooner we arm the Jews and allow them to do their own job, the better for the reputation of this country and for humanity and honesty. (163)

Mr. Denman attacked also the policy of the Palestine Administration regarding immigration and urged that the Jews be put into Palestine "as rapidly and in as large numbers as possible". He based his statement upon four arguments. First, the British were "irrevocably committed" to assist in the creation of the Jewish National Home in Palestine. That was "a war pledge given for value received". Secondly, the pledge was given during the war so that the British may set up a friendly

(162) ibid., vol. 326 (1937) p. 2322.
state like Portugal bound to the British Government by ties of political and strategical interests. Thirdly, the British Government were not committed to the Jews only, but to the Allied and Associated Powers. Fourthly, the British Government committed themselves to the Jews in order to have something to say at the Evian Conference called for by the President of the U.S.A. to provide international means for dealing with Jewish refugees. He concluded by reaffirming that the problem of Jewish immigration could only be solved by a mass immigration and "when this immigration is an accomplished fact, the two peoples will settle down". (164)

During a debate on the 1939 Conference, Colonial Secretary Malcolm MacDonald said that during the twenty years of British administration in Palestine, Britain had been fulfilling her obligations by facilitating Jewish immigration; but when the national home was promised, Jewish persecution in Europe was never anticipated. He added that the Arab fear of being dominated by the Jews "in the land of their birth" should be given some consideration. "If I were an Arab", he remarked, "I would be alarmed ... If we are ever to have an understanding of this problem ... we must be able to put ourselves in the shoes not only of the Jews, but of the Arabs". (165)

Answering the Colonial Secretary, Mr. Herbert Morrison said that his words amounted to saying, "If the Jews are naughty

(164) ibid., vol. 337 (1938) p. 172.
that is too bad, and if the Jews do good work and make it possible for more Arabs to live there in healthy conditions, that is too bad also". He recalled how Jewish immigration suffered during the past years when first, Transjordan, an area of nearly four-fifths that of Palestine was "lopped off" in 1922 from the Balfour Declaration, and then when immigration was restricted by the economic absorptive capacity and finally by a political absorptive capacity. Morrison pressed for a rapid increase in Jewish immigration into Palestine because British Guiana and Tanganyika "were not ready for a rapid immigration". (166) Mr. Pickthorn described Morrison's speech as containing references which took it for granted that Palestine was already a Jewish country. It was necessary he observed that there should be in the House some members to approach the matter "with a desire primarily to consider the interests of the majority of the population of Palestine and there is nothing anti-Jewish in that". He sympathized with Jewish misery in Europe but quoted an Arab friend of his to have written the following,

To place the brunt of the burden upon Arab Palestine is a miserable evasion of the duty that lies upon the whole of the civilized world. It is also morally outrageous. No code of morals can justify the persecution of one people in an attempt to relieve the persecution of another.

Pickthorn went on to say that Jewish immigration was a burden on and not a contribution to Palestine and expressed his

(166) ibid., vol. 341 (1938) p. 1996.
opposition to Jewish immigration in the following terms,

Surely there is no instance in history when the forces of a great state have been used to coerce a long-settled population in a small country to submit to a vast immigration from a third part of the world ... Surely in the present case we have anti-self-determination carried visibly beyond the bounds of parody. (167)

Jewish immigration, which was a corner-stone in the expansion of the Jewish National Home, continued to be debated in the House by supporters and opponents. Sir Archibald Sinclair commended the achievements of Zionism in Palestine and asked that restrictions on Jewish immigration be relaxed.

Dealing with the grounds of Arab fear, he said that the total population of Palestine had been doubled since 1919 by an increase from 700,000 to 1,400,000. The total Arab increase had been 390,000 whereas the Jews had increased by 310,000.

Therefore, the Jews were not dominating the Arabs. On the contrary he believed that if Jewish immigration was cut down, it was not only the Jews who would suffer but the Arabs as well. In support of his argument, he quoted the Woodhead Partition Commission to have said in its Report of 1938 "that the Arabs in Palestine would be faced with the prospect of greater economic hardship if Jewish immigration should be completely closed down than they would be even if it should

be allowed to continue". (168) Trying to reach a compromise on the controversial immigration issue, Winston Churchill suggested in 1938 a plan based on his 'principle of perseverance'. It was a ten-year plan. Roughly, it was to fix the immigration of Jews into Palestine for ten years at a certain figure, which at the end of a ten-year period, would not have "decisively altered the balance of population as between Arab and Jew." Churchill was prepared to give the Arabs an assurance that in ten years, "they would be in a large majority in the country. That policy, he imagined, would yield an immigration figure of between 30,000 and 35,000 a year. (169) Commenting on Churchill's scheme, Sir Ernest Bennet described it as unworkable because the Zionists had "flatly refused such a minority status". While recognizing the unhappy situation of the Jews in Central Europe, he stated that Palestine could not conceivably provide an adequate solution for their plight. He asked the Government that when they finally decided on a policy of immigration - during or after the 1939 London Conference - the Zionists "shall not have the last word". Benet recalled an incident to illustrate what he meant,

In 1930, the Labour Government produced a White Paper. It was a reasonable document which put forward, through Lord Passfield, the Colonial Secretary, the definite conclusion arrived at by the

Cabinet. It proposed certain limitations on the immigration of Jews, and one or two other things to which the Zionists took exception. The result was that we had a perfect tornado of opposition, propaganda, lobbying and literature and a series of speeches in this House and the other. The Government capitulated and abandoned the whole scheme. (170)

During this same debate on the London Conference, Colonel Wedgwood urged that Jewish immigration into Palestine be let loose and without restraint. "Let them go to Palestine" he said, "to their friends, and do not keep them out of Palestine because you are afraid of offending a gang of murderers". (171) Mr. McGovern referred to Sir Charles Warren who suggested in 1875 that Palestine should be handed over to a company similar to the old East India Company to be developed and governed for twenty years 'with the avowed intention of gradually introducing the Jews, pure and simple, who would eventually occupy and govern the country'. He also quoted Warren to have said, 'Palestine is about the size and shape of Wales ... The soil is rich ... and its productivity will increase in proportion to the labour bestowed on the soil, while a population of 15,000,000 might be accommodated here'. McGovern drew the line at 7,500,000 and said that there was a wide margin before it could be said that Palestine had had its complete quota of men and women. He asked the Government to facilitate the immigration of 30,000

(171) *ibid.*, vol. 341 (1938) p. 2054.
Jewish children into Palestine for colonizing and agriculture work; and concluded his remarks about immigration in the following terms,

There is no antagonism between Arab and Jew. What we see is only a false antagonism developed by the feudal people who, throughout history have always and to the last ditch, resisted progress ... After all the East must be developed along lines similar to those of other countries. You cannot allow continuance of the present backward state of filth, disease, ill health and low standards, as these have existed in Palestine. (172)

Mr. Ralph Beaumont was opposed to the admission of any more Jewish settlers. He quoted the following extract from the Report of the Peel Commission,

Can it be the duty of the Mandatory or, indeed, is it in the interests of the National Home itself, to allow immigrants to come into the country in large numbers without any regard to an increasing hostility? ... The principle of economic absorptive capacity is at the present time inadequate, and it ignores factors in the situation which wise statesmanship cannot disregard.

He went on to say that the Peel Commission was not the only Commission which recommended the limitation of Jewish immigration. The Shaw Commission warned the Government against excessive immigration, while Simpson reported that Arab unemployment was widespread and serious and recommended the cessation of Jewish immigration unless conditions changed. Beaumont asked, "What was the reply?" He answered that

immigration which at that time was about 5,000 a year, rose in 1932 to 9,500, in 1933 to 30,000, in 1934 to 42,000 and in 1935 to 62,000. (173) Lieutenant-Commander Fletcher supported Churchill's ten-year plan for immigration and said that only by removing Arab fear could the Jews and Arabs live together. He added that Emir Abdulla of Jordan had told him that the Jew would be welcome in Transjordan provided "he brought no politics with him". (174) Sir R. Glyn while sympathizing with the persecuted Jews believed that in the long run "it will not be to their good to let them go into Palestine". He asked that Jewish immigration be not influenced by the events in Europe. (175) He was opposed by Mr. T. Williams who attributed the economic deterioration in Palestine to the reduction in Jewish immigration plus the effects of the insurrection. "No country on earth" he added, "has such opportunities for a large number of immigrants, opportunities created and made for them, as are available in Palestine".

He was of the opinion that the stoppage of Jewish immigration and in turn Jewish capital would not help the Arabs except "to stifle them and retard their economic development. (176)

To resume our examination of the development of Jewish immigration into Palestine, the British Government having found that no agreement was reached at the London Conference

(173) ibid., vol. 341 (1938) p. 2069.
(175) ibid., vol. 341 (1938) p. 2089.
issued in May, 1939 a White Paper defining their policy in Palestine. According to the Paper, the Government "did not find anything in the Mandate or in subsequent Statements of Policy to support the view that the establishment of a Jewish National Home in Palestine cannot be effected unless immigration is allowed to continue indefinitely". The Paper as such announced that 75,000 Jews would be allowed into the country within the next five years after which "no further Jewish immigration will be permitted unless the Arabs of Palestine are prepared to acquiesce in it". Immigration was to be at the rate of 10,000 for each of the next five years, while the remaining 25,000 were considered a "contribution towards the solution of the Jewish refugee problem". (177)

Perhaps the 1939 White Paper was the first Statement of policy which clearly defined British policy towards Jewish immigration and the number of Jews to be admitted into Palestine each year. It was followed by a long debate in the House of Commons inaugurated by Colonial Secretary Malcolm MacDonald who stated that the Mandatory obligations about immigration were to aid in the establishment of the Jewish National Home by facilitating immigration 'under suitable conditions' and also without prejudice to the 'rights and position' of the other sections of the population. He added that in 1922 and 1931, the economic absorptive capacity of

(177) British Government, White Paper of 1939, pp. 8-11
the country was the sole criterion for measuring immigration and under it the Jewish population grew from 80,000 in 1922 to some 450,000 in 1939. But the Arabs objected to this immigration because "they were not thinking of the material things at all". They were thinking of their freedom. He informed the House that the Government had rejected the Arab demand to stop all immigration but "is there no point at which we, in consideration of our obligations to the Arabs under the Mandate, should pay heed to their opinions on a matter so vital to them". That is why he concluded, the White Paper said that after 5 years further Jewish immigration depended on the acquiescence of the Arabs. (178)

In general, the White Paper was severely criticized during the debate although it was finally endorsed. Answering the Colonial Secretary on the subject of immigration, T. Williams considered the White Paper to be contrary to the Mandate. He said that the "so-called" Arab fear of Jewish domination had been originated by a small number who were encouraged by the Nazis and to whom Britain should not have surrendered. (179) The new immigration policy was supported by Mr. Crossley who maintained that the "allegation" that the Jews were going back to their land was a "fallacy"; because of the 400,000 Jewish immigrants only 4,000 settled in part of the territory which was ruled by the Kings of

Judah and Israel while the rest settled in the former country of the Philistines or in the Valley of Esdraelon which were usually subject to Tyre. (180) Mr. de Rothschild explained the provisions contained in the White Paper relating to immigration to have meant that Britain was "bowing the knee" to the Arabs. He believed that even if the 75,000 Jews were admitted in five years, Jewish proportion was likely to decline because of the higher Arab birth rate and the absence of restrictions on the influx of Arabs from the adjacent Arab countries. He demanded an increase in Jewish immigration because "for the majority of Jews who go into Palestine, it is a question of migration or physical extinction". (181) Lieutenant-Colonel Wickham favoured the British policy towards immigration and hoped it would put an end to Arab fear of Jewish immigration which was "indefinitely prolonged". He said that Ramsay MacDonald adopted the policy of the economic absorptive capacity but in 1933 immigration "sprang" from 9,500 to 30,000. "In some mysterious manner, the economic absorptive capacity multiplied more than three-fold in the space of 12 months". Although he considered the figure of 75,000 to be small, Palestine, nevertheless was to him a small country. He concluded his remarks on immigration by saying,

The policy of continued immigration would be contrary to justice and common sense,

---

and it would arouse the intense hostility of the entire Moslem world, and we should remember that 100,000,000 Moslems are subjects of the British Crown. (182)

The debate continued and many criticisms were leveled against the new immigration policy by Mr. Amery, Mr. Morrison, Sir Archibald Sinclair, Dr. James Little, Mr. Maxton and Mr. Churchill. Their speeches amounted to saying that the new immigration regulations contained in the 1939 White Paper were tantamount to an abrogation of the Mandate and a crystallization of the National Home. Defending the Government's policy, Sir Thomas Inskip, Secretary of State for the Dominions said that under the Mandate, and while facilitating Jewish immigration, the Government were to protect the civil rights of the non-Jewish population which "included the right to be secured from the political domination of an immigrant alien race". He added that according to the 1922 White Paper, the Jews could go to Palestine "within the limits fixed by the numbers and interests of the present population ... We are not putting the Arabs in a position to veto the establishment of a Jewish National Home, but to veto the future number of immigrants into Palestine". He ended up by saying "There is not a single word in the Mandate to compel us indefinitely to prolong the immigration of Jews ... If Palestine is the citadel of Jewish hopes, it is the native land of a large Arab population". (183)

Land Settlement

As stated earlier in this chapter, the question of land, its ownership, occupation and colonization was perhaps as important as that of immigration. In the House of Commons, there was not much reference to the land question since it was believed that any change in the immigration policy entailed, inter alia, a change in the land policy, the assumption was that the two questions were inseparably intertwined and that any change in one was bound to affect the other. Nevertheless, we shall, through the few references to land made in the House, and the Reports and Statements of Policy dealing with it, examine the development of this question.

It should be remembered that all through, Zionist policy aimed at territorial expansion for colonization and other purposes since without land, Jewish immigrants could not possibly be absorbed. On the other hand, the Arabs felt that the increased Jewish acquisition of land endangered their position and rendered a considerable number of them landless. That was the crux of the problem. That is why the land problem constituted one of the basic reasons of Arab unrest and Jewish dissatisfaction.

Under Article 6 of the Mandate, the Administration was to encourage close settlement by Jews on the land "while ensuring that the rights and position of other sections of the population are not prejudiced". During the first five years of the Mandate (1920-25) the High Commissioner announced
in his report that Jewish bodies and individuals in Palestine came to possess 319 square miles of land as against 177 square miles before the war. (184) Land acquisition by Jews continued and with it Arab fears mounted. In 1930, the Colonial Under-Secretary announced in the House that of the total area of Palestine which was 26,000,000 dunums (185) the estimated area of cultivable land excluding 1,000,000 dunums in the Beersheba district which were occupied by Bedouins was about 11,000,000 dunums. Of these, 1,000,000 dunums were in Jewish possession. (186) When the Disturbances of 1929 broke out, a Commission of inquiry (Shaw) was sent to investigate the causes. Dealing with the land problem, the Commission said that its solution was essential "in the interests of the whole population", and unless the problem was solved, it would remain a source of discontent and future disturbance. (187) The Commission recommended that a scientific study be undertaken by experts for the purpose of introducing improved methods of cultivation in Palestine. It also recommended that "the eviction of peasant cultivators from the land should be checked". (188) The Government acted upon these recommendations and appointed Sir J. Hope Simpson who proceeded to Palestine to make a detailed study on the spot on the questions

(184) Ibid., vol. 189 (1925) p. 945.
(185) A dunum is equal to 1,000 square metres.
(188) Ibid., p. 166.
of immigration, land settlement and development. Simpson's report, which was published in October 1930, established that there was at the time no margin of land available for agricultural settlement by new Jewish immigrants. Simpson placed the cultivable area of Palestine at 6,544,000 dunums, (189) a drop of almost 54 per cent on the estimate given by the Colonial Under-Secretary earlier in 1930. Starting from this premise, he reached the conclusion that while an area of at least 130 dunums was required to maintain a fellah family "in a decent standard of life in the unirrigated tracts", the whole of the cultivable land which at the time had still not passed into Jewish hands "would not afford an average lot in excess of 90 dunums, were it divided among the existing Arab cultivators". (190) This meant that about eight million dunums of cultivable land were required. Simpson also declared that of the 86,980 rural Arab families in the villages, 29.4 per cent were landless. (191) He believed that the condition of the Arab fellah was little better than it was under the Turkish regime because "no definite policy of agricultural development of the country held by the Arabs has been adopted". (192) Simpson recommended that the position of the Arabs should not be prejudiced while the Government encouraged close settlement of the Jews on the land.

The Passfield White Paper published simultaneously

(190) ibid., pp. 141-2
(191) ibid., p. 142.
(192) ibid., p. 142.
with the Simpson Report, endorsed, in as far as land was concerned the findings of both Shaw and Simpson and announced that future transfer of land would be regulated by acts of legislation.

The land policy adumbrated in the White Paper was criticized by Lloyd George who commended Jewish efforts in Palestine and said that had there been any policy of development the land occupied by Arabs would have taken twice as many of them. He charged the Government with failure to introduce any new methods of cultivation or irrigation and suggested Jordan as a suitable place for absorbing the surplus Arab population. Lloyd George directed his words to the Government and said, "You are using the fact that you are doing nothing to the Arabs as an excuse for forbidding the Jews to do something for themselves. (193) Colonial Under-Secretary Drummond Shields defended the new land policy on the ground that the Shaw Report which laid particular stress on the danger of the development of a class of landless Arabs as a result of Jewish settlement on the land, had been considered by the Permanent Mandates Commission. He added that if the Arabs rejoiced it was because "the fact of landless Arabs is being realized". (194) Prime Minister MacDonald recorded his approval of the Simpson findings because during his visit

(194) ibid., vol. 245 (1930) p. 88.
to Palestine he had discovered that the land question was going to be a source of trouble unless "it was boldly faced". He put the blame on former Governments which did not do their duty towards Arab settlement and attributed the 1929 religious troubles of the Wailing Wall to economic causes. (195) Herbert Samuel criticized Simpson's conclusions and said that the Simpson Report was an "individual report". He was convinced that with proper agricultural and industrial development, Palestine could support a population of 2,000,000 and suggested Arab migration to Jordan because "Arab occupation cannot be an absolute barrier in all cases". Samuel however, pointed out that the policy of the National Home did not mean that 600,000 Arabs would be ousted from their land because it would be an unjust policy incapable of enforcement and the League of Nations would not endorse such a "tyrannous" policy which would reflect the "gravest discretion on the whole Jewish movement". (196) Mr. H. Snell subscribed to the views put forth by Samuel and recommended that where the Arabs had been dispossessed of their land "through any fault of the Government", Jordan would provide an opportunity for an Arab colonization scheme. He could not see how Simpson proposed to settle Arabs on five sixths of the land in Palestine on the basis of the existing Asiatic farming and concluded that

---

(195) *ibid.*, vol. 245 (1930) p. 115.
(196) *ibid.*, vol. 245 (1930) p. 120.
unless the Jews kept spending, as they were doing, all the expenditure on health, education and several other services would fall on the Government which would be reduced to "the size and efficiency of that which runs an Indian Province". (197)

As we may notice, the restrictions on further Jewish acquisition of land in Palestine were the subject of much criticism on the part of the members. Sir George Jones opposed the land policy contained in the 1930 White Paper and asked for further transfer of land in Palestine to the Jews. He wondered at the discrepancy between the figures of the White Paper and those announced earlier concerning cultivable land in Palestine. Whereas the White Paper had estimated the cultivable land at 6,500,000 dunums, earlier official estimates had set the figure at 11,000,000 dunums. He also rejected the idea that every Arab family needed 130 dunums to live upon and said that that was two or three times the area used by the average Arab family. Mr. de Rothschild, Hopkin and Janner all attacked the new land policy and asked for its modification. "According to the White Paper" said Hopkin, "if a Jew buys land, he is wrong, if he is a farmer he is wrong. To some people Trotsky is always a Jew, but Einstein is always a German"; (198) while Janner maintained that the Zionist movement made Palestine "an oasis of optimism in the desert of the world's economic position". (199)

(197) ibid., vol. 245 (1930) p. 144.
(198) ibid., vol. 245 (1930) pp. 167-83.
(199) ibid., vol. 264 (1932) p. 1835.
However, the land problem remained with the Zionists maintaining that there was plenty of room for their settlement in Palestine while the Arabs insisted that Jewish settlement had already rendered a considerable number of them landless. In July 1933, the Colonial Secretary announced in the House that after careful examination of the problem of landless Arabs, the Government had decided to admit as entitled to resettlement Arabs who had been displaced from the lands which they had occupied, and who had failed to obtain equally satisfactory occupation subject to the following exceptions:

"First persons who had sold their land of their own free will, persons who owned land somewhere; persons who had found, and were cultivating as tenants, land other than that from which they were displaced. (200) By that time the Jews in Palestine were in possession of large areas susceptible to intensive cultivation - the citrus areas near Jaffa, the Valley of Sharon, the plain of Acre, the Valley of Esdraelon between Carmel and Nazareth, the Valley between Nazareth and Beisan and the marshes of Huleh. (201) A principal demand of the Arabs on the eve of the rebellion of 1936, was the complete stoppage of all land sales. Arab protest against land sales continued accompanied by Zionist dissatisfaction with the policy regulating land transfer. Such was the state of affairs

(200) ibid., vol. 280 (1933) p. 1439.
(201) ibid., vol. 310 (1936) p. 1090.
when the Government issued the 1939 White Paper. About the
land problem, the Paper said that the Reports of Several
expert Commissions had indicated that owing to the natural
growth of the Arab population and the sale of Arab land to
Jews there was, in certain areas no room for further transfer
of land to Jews. Transfers of land were to be restricted
in some other areas "if the Arab cultivators were to maintain
their existing standard of life and a considerable landless
Arab population is not soon to be created". (202) The High
Commissioner for Palestine was accordingly empowered to
prohibit and regulate transfers of land.

In the House, Mr. Crossley praised the land policy
contained in the White Paper and said it was high time the
transfer of land was regulated. He said that the Woodhead
Commission of 1938 laid it down that the average holdings
for an Arab family was 111 dunums, but all the land that was
available, he explained, for an Arab peasant family was an
average from 50 to 58 dunums. He also added that although
only one ninth of Palestine belonged to the Jews, that one
ninth was the most fertile area of the country, as it hap-
pened to include the valleys of Sharon and Esdraelon. Eighty
per cent of that land was "sold over the heads of the Arab
tenants who were forcibly dispossessed. In the tin shanties
about Haifa, there are 25,000 unemployed Arabs who have been

dispossessed of their land". (203) On the other hand, Colonel Wedgwood rejected any restrictions on land transfer in Palestine. He considered the law which was expected to regulate land transfers to be "inhuman" and urged the Jews to break it. (204)

However, until 1939, the land problem remained without a definite settlement.

CHAPTER IV

Self-Governing Institutions

The establishment of self-governing institutions in Palestine is another Mandatory obligation which was a source of discontent on the part of both Arabs and Jews and which was eventually left unfulfilled. British proposals for self-government in Palestine did not, on the whole, meet the satisfaction of the Palestine population. That is why the question aroused great deal of controversy, both in Palestine and in the House of Commons.

Before the installation of the British regime in Palestine, Palestinian Arabs found opportunities in the service of the Ottoman Empire and Palestine deputies sat in the Ottoman Parliaments of 1876 and 1908. The people of Palestine regarded the establishment of British Administration in Palestine as a step towards self-government. This belief was reinforced by Article XXII of the League of Nations which embodied the mandates system. Paragraph 4 of that Article stipulated that certain communities of the ex-Turkish Empire had reached a stage of development which entitled them to independence "subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such a time as they are able to stand alone". Moreover, under Article 2 of the Mandate, the Mandatory was responsible for the development of self-governing institutions.
So, Shortly after the establishment of the civil administration, the High Commissioner had formed in 1920 a nominated Advisory Council, consisting of 10 British officials and 10 Palestinians (4 Moslem Arabs, 3 Christian Arabs and 3 Jews). Two years later, in August, 1922, and in an attempt to win Arab cooperation, the British Government proposed to establish a Legislative Council which was to consist of the High Commissioner and 22 other members, 10 official and 12 elected; of the elected members, 8 were to be Moslems, 2 Christians and 2 Jews. This proposal was made to a Palestine Arab delegation which was at the time in London. The Delegation rejected the proposal on the ground that it was an abrogation of paragraph 4 of Article XXII of the League of Nations previously referred to. The Arab Delegation accordingly declared that "no constitution which would fall short of giving the People of Palestine full control of their own affairs could be acceptable". (205) Replying to these observations, the Colonial Office stated that according to the interpretations laid on paragraph 4 of Article XXII of the League Covenant by the Principal Allied Powers in the unratified Treaty of Sevres, the provision for the provisional recognition of the independence of certain ex-Turkish territories did not apply to Palestine. The Colonial Office went on to say,

The position is that His Majesty's Government are bound by a pledge which is antecedent to

(205) Great Britain, op. cit., p. 5.
the Covenant of the League of Nations, and they cannot allow a constitutional position to develop in a country for which they have accepted responsibility to the Principal Allied Powers, which may make it impracticable to carry into effect a solemn undertaking given by themselves and their Allies... it is quite clear that the creation at this stage of a national Government would preclude the fulfilment of the pledge made by the British Government to the Jewish people. (206)

This passage in the reply of the Colonial Office was described by the Arab Delegation as,

"the strongest proof that the Jewish National Home undertaking is the cause of depriving us of our natural right of establishing an independent government the same as Mesopotamia and the Hedjaz." They also expressed their fears that, "Self-government will be granted as soon as the Jewish people in Palestine are sufficiently able through numbers and powers to benefit to the full by self-government, and not before." (207)

Despite Arab opposition to the idea of the Legislative Council, the High Commissioner propounded a constitution and elections were held early in 1923. Convinced that the Council would not contain a clear majority of Arabs over all others, the Arabs boycotted the elections to the Council. In the meantime, it was stated in the House of Commons that the whole Arab electorate which comprised 93% of the population refrained from voting. (208) The result was that only 107 Moslem secondary electors were elected out of a total of

---

(206) ibid., p. 5.
(207) ibid., p. 5.
approximately 663, and only 19 Christians out of 59. In the House of Commons, Mr. Peto raised the case of six Arab notables who were prosecuted for having encouraged certain voters not to participate in the elections. "Is it" he asked, "an indictable offence to do in Palestine what is an ordinary incident of elections in this country". (209) Other members in the House maintained that nominations for the Legislative Council were obtained in many cases by fraud and threats and even forgery but no clarification was given by the Government. (210) Sir F. Sanderson also asked by what statute of international or other law was the Government of Palestine, acting as the occupant, entitled to hold elections since Palestine was not as yet ratified by the League of Nations. He also asked from what source of authority, the High Commissioner drew his powers. (211) To both questions, Sanderson received no answer.

The High Commissioner was obliged in May 1923 to nullify the elections since they failed to reflect the opinion of the whole population; and there was a return once more to the nominated Advisory Council system, but composed in the same proportions as had been intended for the Legislative Council, that is to say with 10 officials and 8 Moslems, 2 Christians and 2 Jewish Palestinians. The Arab members appointed resigned one after the other within a very short

(209) _ibid._, vol. 163 (1923) p. 1889.
(210) _ibid._, vol. 163 (1923) p. 1890.
(211) _ibid._, vol. 162 (1923) p. 562.
period. The Government therefore abandoned the idea of non-official representation; and from 1923 onwards, legislation was effected by the High Commissioner in consultation with an Advisory Council, composed entirely of British officials.

The Arab Agency

Later in 1923, a further attempt was made to secure Arab cooperation by a proposal to establish "an Arab Agency in Palestine, which will occupy a position exactly analogous to that accorded to the Jewish Agency." (212) The proposal was made to a meeting of Arab notables by the High Commissioner on October 11, 1923. It was rejected as falling short of the demands of the Arab population. The attitude adopted by the Arabs was explained to the High Commissioner in a letter from the President of the Executive of the Arab Congress,

The object of the Arab inhabitants of Palestine is not an Arab Agency analogous to the Zionist Agency. Their sole object is independence. The Arab owners of the country cannot see their way to accepting a proposal which tends to place them on an equal footing with the alien Jews. (213)

The Arabs had thus rejected the establishment of the Legislative Council, the reconstitution of the Advisory Council and the institution of an Arab Agency. It became apparent that the Arabs were not prepared to reconcile them-

(212) For a full statement of the proposal see British White Paper (md. 1939.
(213) Royal Institute of International Affairs, op. cit., p. 42.
selves to any policy which recognized the implications of the Balfour Declaration. Any proposal for self-government which precluded an Arab majority was thus considered as falling short of Arab demands. Appearing before the Permanent Mandates Commission in 1924, the High Commissioner summarized as follows the policy which was to be pursued by the Mandatory in regard to the constitutional development in Palestine,

The British Government desired to establish a self-government in Palestine, but to proceed in this direction by stages... It had been announced that the nominated Advisory Council was to be the first stage. The second stage would have been a Legislative Council without an Arab majority. If this worked satisfactorily, the third stage, after a lapse of perhaps some years, would have been a constitution on more democratic lines. (214)

This policy of gradual constitutional development proved in the long run to be impossible of implementation. From 1922 until the termination of the British Mandate in Palestine, the High Commissioner continued to govern Palestine with the aid of Councils consisting entirely of British officials. Meanwhile, Zionists and pro-Zionists feared and even opposed the establishment of self-governing institutions based on proportional representation since that meant that they would not be placed on equal footing with the Arabs. They maintained that self-government or any form of representative institutions should not be given until there was no longer

the risk of a Jewish minority being "persecuted and oppressed by the majority". (215)

The question of the constitutional development of Palestine remained unsettled. Referring to Arab constitutional grievances, the Shaw Commission which reported on the disturbances of 1929 said,

To-day the Arab people of Palestine are united in their demand for a measure of self-government.... It is our belief that a feeling of resentment among the Arabs of Palestine consequent upon their disappointment at continued failure to obtain any measure of self-government is greatly aggravating the difficulties of the local Administration. (216)

The Shaw Report was followed in 1930 by a British White Paper. In the section of the White Paper dealing with constitutional development, the British Government said,

The time has now come when the important question of the establishment of a measure of self-government in Palestine must, in the interests of the community as a whole, be taken in hand without further delay. (217)

The Government accordingly decided to set up a Legislative Council along the lines proposed in 1922. Sir George Jones was the only member in the House who dealt with the new proposal. He was of the opinion that the Government was trying to impose the Legislative Council because both sections of the population "strongly object to it". He added that the

(216) Shaw Commission, op. cit., p. 162.
scheme could not give the population any form of government because they were brought up under different political systems. (218) Nevertheless, the High Commissioner informed the Permanent Mandates commission in 1932 that the Legislative Council would be established "When the new Local Government Ordinance has been brought into working order" (219) early in 1933. The Ordinance did not enter into force until January 12, 1934. Municipal elections were held during the same year and by the beginning of 1935 twenty newly-elected local councils came into being. In the House Colonel Wedgwood was critical of the steps taken towards the establishment of the Legislative Council. He asked the Government to follow in Palestine the policy adopted in Cyprus instead of "scuttling away from our responsibilities and attempting to placate our enemies". (220) In answer, the Colonial Secretary said that British obligations and responsibilities would remain as they were whether the Legislative Council was established or not. (221) He also gave the House "an absolute and complete assurance" that the powers of the Government, the House and the High Commissioner to carry out the policy of the Mandate would remain "completely unimpaired after the Council had been established", (222) and that the Legislative Council was

(219) Royal Institute of International Affairs, op. cit., p. 84.
(221) ibid., vol. 283 (1933) p. 259.
(222) ibid., vol. 283 (1933) p. 260.
not intended to supersede the executive authority of the
High Commissioner. (223)

Throughout 1935, the Arabs showed restlessness and
dissatisfaction with the British policy pursued in Palestine,
and in November 1935, an Arab delegation headed by Haj Amin
Husseini and consisting of the leaders of the six Arab politi-
cal parties formally asked the High Commissioner to forward
to London their demand for a democratic parliament, that is
a sovereign parliament with an Arab majority. In the mean-
time the Administration had been paving the way for the es-
tablissement of the promised Legislative Council; and in
December 1935, the High Commissioner communicated to Arab and
Jewish leaders proposals for a Legislative Council. These
proposals were on the same lines as had been rejected by the
Arabs and accepted by the Jews in 1922. The twenty-eight
members of the proposed Council were to be made up as
follows: (224)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Elected</th>
<th>Nominated</th>
<th>Officials</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Moslems</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christians</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representatives of Commerce</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officials</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Council was to have a neutral Chairman unconnected with
Palestine, and its powers were the following:- (225)

(223) ibid., vol. 283 (1933) p. 866.
(224) Great Britain, op. cit., p. 18.
(225) ibid., p. 18.
(1) To debate on all Bills introduced by Government, to amend and to pass them for assent or dissent by the High Commissioner;

(2) to introduce Bills except Money Bills, subject to the consent of the High Commissioner;

(3) to consider and debate on the annual budget; ... 

(4) to propose any question of public interest for debate provided that no vote for the expenditure of public money or the imposition of taxation may be proposed except by the direction of the High Commissioner, nor any resolution which, in the opinion of the High Commissioner, is likely to endanger the public peace; ...

(5) to ask questions of the Executive relative to the administration of government.

The determination of Labour Schedules for immigration was to rest with the High Commissioner who could also legislate when the Council failed to. In general, the High Commissioner was to have power of veto over all legislation.

The Zionists were unanimous in condemning the proposed Council which they believed was an attempt to crystallize the National Home through a constitutional Arab majority. The Arabs, although not represented in the Council in proportion to their numbers, were willing to consider the proposals. In February 1936, the Colonial Under-Secretary officially announced in the House that the Zionists were unable to cooperate
with the Government on the question of the Legislative Council. (226) During the same meeting, Mr. Archibald Sinclair asked the Government not to give a statutory majority in the Council to those "who demand to repeal of the Mandate". (227) Three days later, while dealing with the Zionist argument that the proposed Legislative Council was inconsistent with the Mandate, the Colonial Under-Secretary said that no one could challenge the Legislative Council as being contrary to the Mandate because as far back as 1922, when Herbert Samuel was High Commissioner, he had made a proposal for a Legislative Council which, at that time, was accepted by the Jewish community and refused by the Arabs. (228)

The Legislative Council Scheme in the House of Commons

At the outset, it is interesting to note that out of the 13 members who expressed their views on the Legislative Council, only one member supported the project. During the debate, two sets of opposing opinions crystallized. The first opposed the proposal because it placed the Jews in a minority, subject to Arab domination while the second set attacked the proposal on the ground that the population of Palestine was not as yet mature enough for the experiment.

The debate took place on March 24, 1936. Colonel

(227) ibid., vol. 308 (1936) p. 552.
(228) ibid., vol. 309 (1936) pp. 1363-64.
Wedgwood, Sir Archibald Sinclair, Mr. Hopkin, Mr. Amery and Major Procter belonged to the first set. Captains Cazalet and Strickland belonged to the second set, while Mr. Churchill, Mr. Silverman and T. Williams used both categories of arguments.

Colonel Wedgwood maintained that if the proposal for the Legislative Council was implemented, the "magnificent" Jewish achievements in Palestine would be jeopardized because the country would be handed over to the people "who do not want Jews there at all". All the proposed laws, he pointed out, concerning immigration and land sale would be in the hands of the Legislative Council which was to have a statutory Arab majority. He added that since the Moslem Arabs had 11 seats and the Christian Arabs, who in his opinion were "far more anti-Semitic than Mohammedans had also three seats as against 7 seats to the Jews, the Legislative Council would not be "the beginning of a democracy but the beginning of a dictatorship" by one section of the population over another. He concluded by pointing out his objection to communal representation and a statutory majority which would have the same result in Palestine as they had had in Cyprus, in Syria and in India, giving all the power to one and "unending subservience" to the other. (229) Sir Archibald Sinclair believed that the constitutional proposals were bound to create discord.

(229) *ibid.*, vol. 310 (1936) p. 1095.
among Arabs and Jews because a representative assembly could only work when there was a "fundamental basis of consent". He reminded the members that the machinery of the House of Commons was impaired because of 80 Irish members in a House of over 700, as it then was. Sinclair asked the Government to withdraw their proposal because the majority in the Legislative Council consisted of members who would "defeat the purpose of the Mandate, and if possible secure its repeal". If the Council was to be created Sinclair remarked, the Jews should be given parity of representation on account of their contribution towards the prosperity of Palestine. (230) Mr. Hopkin was of the opinion that the Legislative Council would freeze the National Home policy which would in turn make impossible the implementation of the terms of the Mandate. (231) Mr. Amery subscribed to Hopkin's views and said that the Council would not succeed as long as it accorded to the Jews the status of a minority. Referring to the impracticability of the scheme, he stated that the speaker of the Council had to provide over a Council whose members talked in Arabic, Hebrew and English and to be guided by an interpreter whether the speeches were in order or not, whether they were seditious and should not be printed or whether they touched on the Mandate and should be stopped. Then he asked, "Is the interpreter to be a Jew or an Arab? At once the whole poli-

(231) *ibid.*, vol. 310 (1936) p. 1125.
tical problem is raised there". He added that the Government would be forced to back one section in the Council against the other, and when they had done that four or five times in succession, the desire to show themselves impartial by voting the other way on the sixth occasion would become irresistible. He went on to say that the constitution should have its own inherent check to protect the minority because, in his opinion, the essence of the Mandate was the equal right of the two communities. Amery suggested to the Government to make provision in the Standing Orders of the proposed Council that no vote could be valid unless it had secured "the concurrence of a majority of members of each section". (232) Major Procter was also of the opinion that the scheme was unfair in as far as the Jews were concerned. He believed that the Council was calculated to serve the interests of the "political agitators and absentee landlords" and concluded that the Arabs were the people whom the Council was designed to benefit. (233) Such were the views of the first set.

Winston Churchill was critical of the Legislative Council proposal as being both premature and unfair to the Jews. He said, "I cannot conceive that you will be able to reconcile, at this juncture and at this time, the development of the policy of the Balfour Declaration with an Arab majority on the Legislative Council". Churchill pointed out that

(233) ibid., vol. 310 (1936) p. 1147.
the British Government had made an undertaking before the Permanent Mandates Commission at Geneva to establish a Legislative Council by first introducing municipal and local Government in Palestine; he suggested the postponment of the project, otherwise the two Opposition parties would bring the matter "not merely to the test of Debate, but also to the test of a Division". (234) Mr. Silverman also believed that the time was premature for a Legislative Council and observed that if it was a question of the number of Jews and Arabs on the Council, there were many Jews outside Palestine "with a stake in this experiment". (235) The Legislative Council was described by T. Williams as a "premature movement" which would arrest the "constructive efforts" made by the Jews in Palestine and even threaten the National Home scheme. Referring to local government he said that in a southern district in Palestine where there were 15 Arab villages with a population of between 1,500 and 3,500, there was one local council in existence. He asked the Government to give the "ancient Arabs with their donkeys, oxen and camels" some education of how to cast an independent vote before giving them a Legislative Council which would mean that "we are starting at the top before we have done anything at the bottom". (236) Captain Cazalet viewed the Legislative Council as "a very

(234) ibid., vol. 310 (1936) p. 1111.
(235) ibid., vol. 310 (1936) p. 1135.
(236) ibid., vol. 310 (1936) p. 1140.
rash and dangerous step" which would enfranchise some
250,000 people, "the large majority" of whom were illiterate
and who had had practically no experience in representative
government. He believed that the Council would develop into
an Arab majority and that every question raised would be
debated "purely on racial lines". In an attempt to show how
the Arabs view the Legislative Council, he read the following
passage from an Arab newspaper,

We shall be able to use the Legislative
Council for exposing the policy of the
Jewish national home and arraigning His
Majesty's Government before the Moslem
and Christian world for upbuilding the
national home.

In his concluding words, Cazalet quoted Chateaubriand to have said,

I know that people beat their heads
against an existing wall, but I have
never known people first building a
stone wall and then beating their
heads against it. (237)

The same attitude was expressed by Captain Strickland who said
that the time was not ripe and the country was unprepared for
the Council. (238) While opposing the Legislative Council
proposal, Mr. Crossley suggested as a solution a system of
cantonization by which all the fertile lands from Jaffa to
Acre, from Acre to Tiberias and from Tiberias to Safad
were to be Jewish cantons governed from Tel-Aviv. Conversely,

(237) ibid., vol. 310 (1936) p. 1118.
(238) ibid., vol. 310 (1936) p. 1166.
Emir Abdulla was to be transferred to Nablus where he would have an Arab kingdom consisting of the hills and valley of Jordan and the rest of Palestine. Crossley added that his proposal had been advocated by G.K. Chesterton, Weizmann in 1920 and Mrs. Steward Erskine in "Palestine of the Arab". (239) Mr. Marcus Samuel also attacked the scheme but suggested at the same time a round-table conference between leading Arabs and Jews. (240) Colonel Clifton Brown was the only member who supported the Legislative Council scheme. He said that the High Commissioner had already announced his intention to create a Council. If he lost the trust that the Arabs had in him, the Government would require soldiers and would face a situation analogous to the 1936 rebellion. He added that since the Palestine press was either Arab or Jew, and as it was difficult with a biased press to formulate public opinion, the Legislative Council, with the High Commissioner in control, could contribute to the formulation of public opinion. (241) Defending the Legislative Council, the Colonial Secretary said, "When we instruct our High Commissioner to go to Geneva and, in the presence of the nations of the world, to make a clear and definite declaration, it is difficult to go back on that and we must have very good reasons before we do it. He informed the House that Dr. Drummond Shiels, a minister of the Labour Government had gone to Geneva "with

---

(239) ibid., vol. 310 (1936) p. 1090.
(241) ibid., vol. 310 (1936) p. 1123.
the absolute unanimity of the Labour Government" to welcome
the promise that there should be established a Legislative
Council. He said that every Government without exception
since 1922 had endorsed the "pledge" of a Legislative Council.
The Colonial Secretary then gave the Houses three assurances
regarding the Legislative Council. (1) Whatever the compo-
sition of the Council might be, the Mandate could not be
changed or "even be a subject of discussion". (2) The question
of immigration was dealt with through the Jewish Agency, the
final word resting with the High Commissioner. (3) No news-
paper could print "seditious utterances" even if these ut-
terances were made in the Council. Mr. Churchill interrupted
him at this point saying, "This is the new Liberalism".
Referring to the suggestions of equal numbers of representatives
of the different communities the Colonial Secretary asked
the members to consider whether they could justify the sug-
gestions on the figures of the population of Palestine which
showed 825,000 Moslems, 100,000 Christians and 320,000
Jews. (242)

It is perhaps noticeable that the general trend within
the House was towards an abandonment of the Legislative
Council scheme. In the face of the lukewarm reception by the
members of the project, the Government eventually abandoned
their proposal in February 1937. Meanwhile, the Arab revolt
had already taken new dimensions in 1936, and there is reason

(242) ibid., vol. 310 (1936) p. 1104.
"within ten years" of an independent Palestine State in which Arabs and Jews would take part. The Paper explained that before the State could be established, a period of transition was necessary for the building up of the machinery of self-government. During this period, Arabs and Jews were to be placed in charge of the Departments of Government approximately in proportion to their respective population. (244) Nothing was said in the Paper about the future constitution of the independent State or about the proportional representation of the two communities.

Explaining the new constitutional policy contained in the White Paper to the members of the House, Colonial Secretary Malcolm MacDonald said that although Arabs and Jews were to be appointed in the transitional period in proportion to their respective population in the country, the Jewish minority would not be "at the mercy of the Arab majority" because: (1) At the beginning, Palestinians were to be put in charge of "only certain of the departments of government". A majority of the departments would remain under the charge of British officials. (2) The Arabs and Jews to be in charge of the departments were to have associated with them, each, a British adviser who, in cases of disagreement, had the right of "direct access" to the High Commissioner. (3) The Palestinian heads of departments were not to have "executive

to believe that the debate in the Legislative Council in the House of Commons had been one of the factors that fanned the smouldering fire of the Arab revolt into a flame. The manner in which the Government abandoned the proposal was described in 1938 by Sir Ernest Bennett in the House. He recalled how in 1935, the National Government had sent General Wanchope to Geneva to bring before the League of Nations Mandates Commission a plan for the creation of Legislative Council. He then quoted J.H. Thomas who was Colonial Secretary at the time to have said that whatever happened, the Government had been determined to go through with the proposal. Lord Plumer had been even more outspoken according to Bennett when he had said that the proposal was to be passed into law "cost what it might". Bennett concluded, "Despite these pronouncements, the Government, in the face of Zionist opposition capitulated and abandoned once more the considered and mature decision of a British Cabinet". (243)

The Arab revolt which lasted all through 1936 and the first nine months of 1937 left the constitutional issue unsettled. Both the Peel Commission of 1937 and the Woodhead Commission of 1938 were critical of the absence of a measure of self-government in Palestine. In May 1939, the British Government issued a White Paper which embodied among other things, a new constitutional policy aiming at the establishment

and ministerial functions". They were to sit as ordinary members on the Executive Council, which was a body purely advisory to the High Commissioner. The final decision would rest with the High Commissioner who could "override any of his advisers whether British or Arab or Jewish". The Colonial Secretary concluded his remarks by reiterating the Government's determination not to subject the Jewish minority to the Arab majority. (245)

Thus all the schemes aiming at the establishment of self-governing institutions were doomed to failure and until 1939 the High Commissioner governed Palestine with the aid of Councils consisting exclusively of British officials.

CHAPTER V

Political Settlement

So far we have examined the implementation of some of the Mandatory obligations as interpreted by the members of the House of Commons. In point of fact, many and various interpretations have been laid by the members on the dual nature of the Mandate "to establish a Jewish National Home" and "to safeguard the civil and religious rights of the inhabitants of Palestine". Some of the views put forth by the members pointed to an inconsistency between the Balfour Declaration and British promises which had been made to the Arabs concerning the future of Palestine. There were also some arguments advanced as to whether Jewish immigration to and Jewish settlement in Palestine under Article "6" of the Mandate had prejudiced "the rights and position of other sections of the population" or not. The establishment of self-governing institutions was disputed on the grounds that the "political, administrative and economic conditions" stipulated under Article 2 of the Mandate for such institutions had not been reached in Palestine.

It should however be noted that a considerable number of the members subscribed to the view that the two sections of the Mandate could be carried out without prejudice to either of the two parties in Palestine. Some of those members
were pro-Arab, others were pro-Zionist, while some others were pro-Mandate, as some of them have put it. What we are concerned with in this chapter is to see to what extent the members were convinced of the reconcilability between British obligations under the Mandate.

At the outset, none of the members raised the question seriously. As the Government proceeded with the implementation of the Mandate, and as the Arab-Jewish relations became intensified, the question of the reconcilability of the Mandatory obligations with each other posed itself in the House. It was dealt with during three major debates.

The first of these debates occurred in 1930 after the publication of the 1930 White Paper. The Paper was issued following the Shaw and Simpsoon Reports on the 1929 disturbances. Referring to "the root of the trouble" in Palestine, Colonial Under-Secretary Dr. Drummond Shiels said that the Arabs had from the beginning objected to the Mandate because they believed that Palestine had been included in the area to be part of the Arab Kingdom. Then they had objected to the terms of the Mandate because of the Jewish National Home. They wanted the whole stress to be laid upon self-governing institutions. That is why in his opinion the Arabs had refused to cooperate in the Legislative Council of 1922; rejected the idea of an Arab Agency and opposed any systemized Jewish immigration. The Colonial Under-Secretary went on to say that the "vagueness and qualifications" of the terms of the Mandate made
them "a source of difficulty" from the beginning. There was to be a Jewish National Home, a safeguarding of the rights of non-Jewish inhabitants and the development of self-governing institutions but no "order of precedence" was stated. He added that when he was British representative to the Permanent Mandates Commission, he had suggested that the Mandate "was not an easy one" and he was "promptly" reminded that the Mandate had been presented "in its present form" to the League of Nations by the British Government and all the League had done was to approve it. He concluded that in view of the "dangers" disclosed by the Shaw and Simpson reports, it had become necessary "to define more clearly and in more detail than was necessary in the 1922 White Paper, the implications of both sides of the Mandate". (246) Ramsay MacDonald the then Prime Minister believed that "the one mark of success" would be how far the Mandate "in its two aspects" could be carried out. (247) Such were the views of the Government at the time. They saw in the terms of the Mandate a certain vagueness rather than a basic inconsistency. Herbert Samuel was convinced that the two sections of the Mandate were compatible with each other and that the National Home could be a stimulus to intellectual and religious forces which "have long been in abeyance, but are not

(247) ibid., vol. 245 (1930) p. 115.
yet dead". He said that if the English were seeking in 
Blake's words to build a new Jerusalem 'in England's green 
and pleasant land', "the old Jerusalem exists, the model, 
the ideal". Nevertheless, Samuel blamed the Government for 
not having been able to carry out their Mandatory obliga-
tions and asked them to pursue a policy of "equilibrium but 
not of oscillation". (248) Unlike Samuel, Howard Bury viewed 
the Mandatory obligations as incompatible with one another. 
As an illustration of this incompatibility he said that the 
Government were constantly changing their policy in Palestine. 
He believed that there was little hope of peace in Palestine 
as long as Zionism had a political end. (249) Mr. Snell while 
amitting the difficulties hindering the implementation of the 
Mandate insisted that the terms of the Mandate be carried out 
otherwise Britain "should be shamed and humiliated before 
mankind if she either abandoned, betrayed or failed in her 
trust". He concluded, "Tasks in hours of insight willed, in 
hours of gloom must be fulfilled". (250) Mr. Morris observed 
that the two sections of the Mandate could not be carried out 
because he doubted if anyone could "state authoritatively" 
the meaning of the Mandate. No one on the Permanent Mandates 
Commission had been able to say what it meant and more than 
once the Commission had "changed and reversed" the priority

(248) *ibid.*, vol. 245 (1930) p. 120.
(249) *ibid.*, vol. 245 (1930) p. 138.
(250) *ibid.*, vol. 245 (1930) p. 144.
of one of the two parts of the Mandate. If the Mandate meant "primarily" the establishment of a Jewish National Home, the Jews would have a case to make against the Government. If, on the other hand, the Mandate was meant to look "primarily" after Arab interests, the Arabs would have a case against the Government. If both sections of the Mandate were "to have equal weight" attached to them, then a different set of circumstances would arise. He concluded by asking the Government to make a full and detailed examination of the whole matter. (251)

Thus we may see that though the question of the reconcilability or irreconcilability of the Mandatory obligations did not take the form of a keen issue, it was nevertheless brought up by some members as one of the causes of unrest in Palestine. From 1930 onwards, the situation in Palestine became more intensified. In 1931, Ramsay MacDonald forwarded his famous letter to Dr. Weizmann which was an "authoritative interpretation" of the 1930 White Paper. The Arabs considered the letter a reversal of the policy contained in the Black Letter. They became convinced that their word in England could not be taken against that of the Zionists. In 1933, the State of affairs in Palestine became more strained as a result of the rise of the Nazis to power in Germany and the increased volume in Jewish immigration that followed. In

(251) ibid., vol. 245 (1930) p. 152.
1936, the Arab rebellion broke out in Palestine, and the Royal Commission of Inquiry (Peel) which was sent to study the causes of the rebellion, published its findings in July 1937. The Peel Commission came to the conclusion that the two sections of the Mandate were "irreconcilable" because the British Government could not "both concede the Arab claim to self-government and secure the establishment of a Jewish National Home". (252) The Commission accordingly suggested the partition of Palestine; otherwise the continuance "of the present situation cannot be contemplated without the gravest misgivings". Palestine was to be divided into a Jewish and Arab canton (the former corresponding to the areas of densest Jewish settlement), while the Holy Places of Jerusalem and Bethlehem with the port of Haifa would remain under direct Mandatory control. Each of the two cantons would have its own autonomous government while the central Mandatory Government would retain control over such matters as foreign relations, defence, customs, railways and the like.

The recommendations of the Peel Commission are particularly important because the solution it suggested gave the Jews for the first time, the right of establishing a state. Moreover, the Commission strengthened the view that the two sections of the Mandate were mutually incompatible and hence incapable of implementation. The debate on the 1937 White

Paper is also manifestly significant because it was the first time that a British Government officially admitted that the Mandatory obligations were mutually incompatible. All former British Governments formulated their policy on the assumption that the terms of the Mandate were compatible with each other.

Generally speaking, the partition scheme was heavily criticized by the members of the House. The number of those who supported it did not exceed four members. Colonial Secretary Ormsby-Gore opened the debate by praising the Royal Commission's report as a "remarkable document". Justifying partition, he mentioned a number of reasons: (1) The Mandate did not allow mixed schools or any common system of education; and as long as the Mandate remained, there would be a constant cause of friction. Very largely, the intensification of the Arab National Movement and the Jewish National Movement was the product of the schools system. (2) Article 2 of the Mandate promised self-governing institutions, but the House and "other places" were not receptive to the idea. (3) The Mandate was not a "bible" and the evolution of events had shown that it required revision. (4) The presence of a "keen vivid" Arab nationalism and a "keen vivi Jewish nationalism. (5) The trouble in Palestine was political rather than economic. Ormsby-Gore pointed out two other subsidiary reasons for partition. The first was the Iraqi emancipation from the Mandate, and the setting up of two independent Arab states.
namely Syria and Lebanon. The fact that all those territories "were all one" for 400 years" under the Turkish Empire and long before that, back to the Arab conquest when the Byzantine Empire was driven out, had made Arab nationalism in Palestine look forward towards independence. The other subsidiary reason was that the Jews came to look upon Palestine not only as a national home, but "as a refuge from persecution". "Only by partition" concluded the Colonial Secretary, "can the ideals of both nationalities be realized". (253) Mr. Morgan Jones was the first to oppose the partition scheme. He said that the question of education could be solved by asking the League of Nations to change the Article concerned under the Mandate. It was not the Mandate itself that was at fault, but the "maladministration of the Mandate". The partition scheme was "unthinkable". In the Jewish state there would be 225,000 Arabs and 258,000 Jews. If one million Arabs could not "live and work" with 400,000 Jews, how could 225,000 Arabs live and work with 258,000 Jews. He went on to say that at the beginning the Jews believed they were entitled to an area which comprised Transjordan, and that comprised 45,000 square miles. Transjordan was excluded and that reduced the area to 10,000 square miles. The partition scheme further reduced the area to 2,000 square miles. He criticized the exclusion of Jerusalem from the proposed Jewish state, and read a

passage from an interview with the Chief Rabbi of Palestine, Dr. Isaac Herzog showing the significance of "Yerushalayim" to the Jews. (254) Sir Archibald Sinclair could not read the Peel Report without a "sense of humiliation". It meant that since 1929, the record of British administration in Palestine had been one of "irresolution". According to the partition scheme, the national home of the 16,000,000 Jews in the world had been "whittled down" to a territory the size of an English country. Then he exclaimed, "Why for 20 years have successive governments not come to this House or gone to the League of Nations to ask for an amendment of that paragraph concerning education". To him partition meant the creation of two "racially totalitarian" states with the Jews established along an "indestructible" coastal strip and Mount Zion before them. They would try to reach Mount Zion and the Jordan Valley by force. Partition also meant "sitting on the safety valve of the Jewish problem in Europe." Although he regarded partition with "repugnance", Sinclair was willing to support it provided the Jews were given "real sovereignty" and the Jewish frontier pushed forward into the "foot hills of Palestine". (255) Mr. Frankel rejected the idea of partition because preference had been given to the Arabs and because the Arabs and Jews did not give evidence as to the possibility of partition. (256) Colonel Wedgwood declared

(254) ibid., vol. 326 (1937) p. 2253.
(255) ibid., vol. 326 (1937) p. 2264.
(256) ibid., vol. 326 (1937) p. 2285.
himself an opponent of partition and said, "with the farms of the Jews in the Valley and the Arabs hungry in the hills, does anybody suppose that there will not be continual raids? In that part of the world, people almost take in raiding with their mother's milk". (257)

The partition scheme was criticized by Mr. de Rothschild who said that the "tragic disappointment" that had been brought about by the publication of the 1937 White Paper "has dispelled a most cherished vision, a vision of one country undivided from 'Dan to Beersheba' as the Prime Minister of a former day Mr. Lloyd George said". He described the partition scheme as a "concession" to Arab violence. The Peel Commission had "torn up" their terms of reference, the terms of the Mandate, the Balfour Declaration and the whole of Palestine. Referring to the Negeb, he said it was excluded from the proposed Jewish state because it was a desert and as Colonel Jarvis had said, the Arab was also the father of the desert. Rothschild considered the partition plan as the "Arab reward" for inflicting on the Jews in Palestine damages amounting to millions of pounds. (258) Winston Churchill also refused the principle of partition because the Balfour Declaration could not be ignored. He suggested that the Government persevere in the old policy of "persuading one side to concede and the other to forbear" and to pursue that policy

---

(258) ibid., vol. 326 (1937) p. 2311.
"hard and heavy though it may be". He could not commit himself to partition and if it turned to be the only alternative, he would have no choice but to vote against it. (259) Mr. T. Williams believed that the proposals of the Peel Commission were "ill-considered, hopelessly inconclusive, tremendously speculative and hazardous". Partition would create artificial barriers, minorities in each of the two states, three sets of customs duties and three defence forces. He asked the House not to commit itself to a scheme which had not been "worked out". (260) Mr. Stephan was convinced that there was no need for partition. The Peel Commission was a high class Commission. They did not deal with the question from the point of view of Jewish and Arab workers. They dealt with it from the point of view of "big capitalism and great Imperial interests." The British Government had always pursued the policy of 'divide and rule' so that "British Imperialism" could make use of both races in connection with Imperial interests in the Eastern Mediterranean. He urged the working classes and the peasantry in Palestine to unite their forces and drive out Arab and Jewish capitalists and British Imperialism so that Palestine could be the country of a "united Arab and Jewish people". (261) Mr. Gallacher was the last of the members who refused to commit themselves to the principle of partition. The question could not be

solved he remarked, unless the "basic right" of the Arab Palestinians to Palestine was understood. He made an appeal to Zionists throughout the world to come to an understanding with the Arabs and bring about a united Palestine. (262)

Among those who supported partition was Mr. L.S. Amery. He accepted it "with regret" and said, "We have lost the situation in Palestine, as we lost it in Ireland, through a lack of whole-hearted faith in ourselves and through the constitutional inability of the individual Briton and indeed of the country as a whole not to see the other fellow's point of view and to be influenced by it, even to the detriment of any consistent policy". Amery believed that partition would meet one important aspect of Zionist aspirations, namely the establishment of a Jewish state. It would also lead to closer cooperation between the two communities. He concluded by saying that had the Peel Report been made two or three years before, the Jews would not have obtained "half what they are given to-day". (263) Sir Arnold Wilson, another supporter of the partition scheme stated that there was a deep gulf between the Arabs and Jews, deeper than the Government could bridge. That is why he believed that partition was "absolutely inevitable". Peace, he concluded could not be established in Palestine, unless nationalism was given its "fullest scope". (264) Colonel Brown said that the debate was

unfair because most of the members who spoke had been biased towards the Jews. He was in favour of partition because there was no other alternative. The fact that only 1,250 Jews were left in the Arab state while 235,000 Arabs were left in the Jewish state showed that the Arabs had "the worst of the deal". (265) Mr. Crossley, the fourth member for partition, had two criticisms against it. First the Jews had been given the best of land and second, a "purely" Arab population in the North was given to the Jewish state. (266) It should be pointed out here, that Colonel Brown and Mr. Crossley who were well known all through for their pro-Arab tendencies in the House supported the partition scheme although the Arabs had rejected it. Moreover, most of the members dealt with the partition scheme not as the product of the irreconcilable Mandatory obligations, but as a political settlement in itself.

At any rate, the House did not commit itself to the 1937 White Paper which endorsed the Peel recommendations. An amendment introduced by Lloyd George and Churchill to the effect that the White Paper was to be approved first by the League of Nations was agreed to by the members of the House. (267) Later on, in 1938, Mr. Pickthorn referring to the partition scheme said that it was abandoned "by a most elaborate and multi-angular maneuvering between Epping

(265) ibid., vol. 326 (1937) p. 2306.
(266) ibid., vol. 326 (1937) p. 2322.
(267) ibid., vol. 326 (1937) pp. 2367-68.
(Churchill) and Carnarvon (Lloyd George) and South Hackney (Herbert Morrison)." (268)

The Peel Report was examined by the Permanent Mandates Commission at its thirty-second session in August 1937. The Commission decided that the Mandate became unworkable. The League Council accordingly adopted, on September 16, 1937 a resolution authorising the Mandatory to prepare a detailed plan for the partition of Palestine. Consequently, technical Commission was appointed in February, 1938, under the chairmanship of Sir John Woodhead to prepare a detailed partition plan. The Woodhead Commission reported in November 1938 that the Jewish State proposed by Peel contained an Arab minority amounting to 49 per cent of the total population. The Commission suggested alternative partition plans which reduced the areas and sovereignty of the adumbrated Arab and Jewish states. In a White Paper issued simultaneously with the Woodhead Report, the British Government announced in 1938, that partition was "impracticable" and called for a round-table conference to convene in London.

Meanwhile, in November 1938 Winston Churchill attacked the Government in the House and said that the fact they were unable to make up their minds amounted to a "crime". All that the Government had been able to do in three years of "classic incapacity was to palter and mewder ..." The

scheme of the Royal Commission was "a council of feebleness, and a bankruptcy of ideas". Referring to partition, he said, "By coaxing, by cajoling, and by one kind of appeal and another we persuaded the Government not to force the House of Commons to endorse what they now admit was an impracticable policy". (269) No agreement was reached at the Conference and in May 1939, the Government issued a White Paper which was intended to put an end to the fluctuating policy in Palestine. For the first time the Paper stated clearly that 75,000 Jewish immigrants would be allowed into the country within the next five years after which further Jewish immigration would be subject to Arab "acquiescence". Land transfer was also confined to certain areas. Moreover, an independent Palestine state was to be established within ten years in which Arabs and Jews share in government. Generally, the policy contained in the 1939 White Paper was formulated on the assumption that the Mandatory obligations towards the Arabs and Jews were still reconcilable and that it was possible for the two communities to live and cooperate together. Specifically, the Paper reinforced the view that the terms of the Mandate as they existed were irreconcilable. For the first time the immigration policy and the land policy were clearly defined and restricted to certain figures and areas respectively. This had never been done by former Governments.

The policy expounded in the White Paper was condemned by the Zionists. The Arabs, while criticizing the length of the transition period, showed their readiness to accept the new policy. In the House of Commons, the Paper was severely criticized. The debate on the Paper is the third and last major debate on the compatibility or incompatibility of the Mandatory obligations with each other.

Out of the sixteen members who spoke during the debate, only four members supported the 1939 White Paper, two of them with reservations. On the whole, the debate which took place in May, 1939, was comprehensive in the sense that it was not confined only to the policy contained in the White Paper. In fact, some of the members reviewed the implementation of the Mandate since its inception in 1920. Colonial Secretary Malcolm MacDonald who opened the debate subscribed to the view expressed by the Peel Report that the problem in Palestine was a "conflict between right and right". Though the National Home was the fulfilment of a prophecy to the Jews, but already in 1918 there was a population of 600,000 Arabs in Palestine whose ancestors had been there for generations. As for immigration it was to be facilitated as long as it did not "prejudice the rights and position" of the non-Jewish inhabitants in the country. Under that provision in the Mandate, the Jewish population grew from 80,000 in 1922 to 450,000 in 1939; but the Arabs objected to immigration because they were thinking of their freedom rather
than of the material gains, and "beyond a certain point, the Arabs must have their wishes observed in that matter". That is why the White Paper set a limit to Jewish immigration. Concerning land policy, he said that every Commission that had visited Palestine had stated that there were areas where the Arab population with their methods of cultivation, were "so congested" that further sales of land were to be prohibited. That is why the transfer of Arab lands to the Jews was restricted to certain areas. The Colonial Secretary went on to say that the crux of the problem was to prevent either one of the two communities from dominating the other. In regard to the Palestine state which was to be established after ten years, it may be a unitary or a federal state. He concluded by saying that the White Paper policy was consistent with the Mandatory obligations to both people. (270)

The first of the opponents was Mr. T. Williams. He suggested as an amendment that as the proposals contained in the White Paper were "inconsistent with the letter and spirit of the Mandate and not calculated to secure the peaceful and prosperous development of Palestine, the House should not be committed pending the examination of the proposals by the Permanent Mandates Commission. The White Paper was an abrogation of the Mandate which could not be left under the control of the Arab majority. He then read a passage from

---

a Sunday Paper which was critical of the British Government because they had accepted partition on the ground that they could not induce the two races to live peacefully together and then had changed their mind and thought they could make for friendly cooperation if the Arabs were assured a majority of two to one. He concluded by saying that the Balfour Declaration was the Jewish "Magna Charta" and the 1939 Paper was the "funeral" of the Mandate. (271) Mr. de Rothschild said that the White Paper proposed that "Britain shall wash its hands of its obligations". The League of Nations should approve the White Paper first especially as Article 2 of the Mandate did not provide for an independent state. He regretted the fact that Britain was "bowing the knee" to the Mufti and his men who were the agents of Berlin. (272) Colonel Wedgwood described the White Paper as an example of the policy of "appeasement" and surrender to the violence of the Arabs. He urged the Jews to fight and to stop "complaining and begging for justice". (273) Mr. Amery asked if the view about the "unlimited right" of the 600,000 Arabs of Palestine to control their destiny could apply equally to the "unlimited right" of the 450,000 Germans of Danzig to dispose of their destiny "without any regard to the wider issues at stake". The White Paper was an invitation to the Arabs to persevere in their policy of violence. The House would be "foolish" if

(271) *ibid.*, vol. 347 (1939) pp. 1954-64.
it approved the new policy. It is "preposterous to ask the
House to shut its eyes, open its mouth and swallow this
half-baked object". (274) Mr. MacLaren was next to criticize
the White Paper. He said the British were pledged to es-
establish an independent Arab Kingdom including Palestine. He
then quoted Ramsay MacDonald to have said in 1922 that the
British had promised to create an Arab Kingdom including
Palestine and at the same time promised Palestine to the Jews.
"The British," MacDonald had remarked, "cannot expect to
escape the reprobation which is bound to follow as a sequel".
MacLaren added that the White Paper was not well drawn. He
urged the encouragement of an Arab Confederation and not to
leave "the wound opened for ten years". (275) Sir Stafford
Cripps advised the Government to recognize the inconsistency
of their obligations, and insisted that partition was the
only solution. (276) Mr. Noel Baker quoted the Royal Com-
mission of 1937 to have stated that the Jews understood the
National Home as an eventual Jewish state. The White Paper
was a "flagrant violation" of the Mandate, the Balfour
Declaration and the 1922 White Paper. He could not conceive
how could the Government "throw the policy of the Balfour
Declaration aside" at a time when terrorism had almost ended
in Palestine and when the Jews had been persecuted in
Europe. (277) In the words of Herbert Morrison, the White

(276) ibid., vol. 347 (1939) p. 2033.
(277) ibid., vol. 347 (1939) p. 2039.
Paper was a "cynical breach of pledges given to the Jews". The Jews had been the victims of the "incompetence of the Government ... its inability to govern ... its apparent fear of ... murder and assassination." Morrison begged the House not to approve the Paper. (278) Likewise, Sir Archibald Sinclair believed that the White Paper was inconsistent with the terms of the Mandate. Leaving both the Arabs and Jews uncertain whether after a few years, either of them would not be subjected to the dominance of the other was the worst settlement that the Peel Report warned against said Sinclair. He concluded by saying that the "good name of Great Britain will be tainted" if Parliament accepted the White Paper before referring the matter to the Hague Court and the Mandates Commission. (279) Dr. James Little asked the Government to take back the Paper because it was drawn up "with an eye on the terrorists in Palestine" and Mr. Maxton criticized it because the problem was not of frontiers or nationalism but of social and economic conditions. He urged that self-government be given immediately not after ten years. Winston Churchill the last of those who criticized the Paper said that the Paper was a violation of the pledge made to world Jewry. He wondered, "Can we strengthen ourselves by this repudiation ... What will our friends say ... What will be the opinion

(278) ibid., vol. 347 (1939) p. 2132.
of the U.S.A. ... What will Arab agitators think ... Who shall say where we are going to be five years from now". (280)

Mr. Crossley, the first member to support the White Paper said that unlike the Jews, the Arabs had no members in the House nor did they have Arab constituents to bring influence upon their members in the House. Referring to British civil servants in Palestine, he said that they were all pro-Arab "at heart". They did not go to Palestine pro-Arab, but they saw that "no race of men under the Colonial standard of government in the British Empire has been so harshly or so unfairly treated or has had so raw a deal as the Arabs in Palestine". Crossley was willing to support the White Paper but could not understand how according to paragraph 9 of the Paper, the establishment of an independent state in Palestine required "such relations between the Arabs and Jews as would make good government possible". That meant that the non-co-operation of the Jews would deprive the Arabs of what had been admitted to be their "legitimate aspirations." "By what principle of justice" he said, "can the non-co-operation of a minority refuse or cause to be refused the legitimate desires of a majority". He concluded by regretting the fact that only violence had brought Arab claims to the attention of the British Government, and asked that responsible government be established soon not after ten years. (281) Lieutenant Colonel Wickham also endorsed the

(280) ibid., vol. 347 (1939) p. 2169.
White Paper and described it as a "step forward from the stagnation in which the Government found itself." He urged the Government to meet Arab demands because their grievances would arouse the hostility of 100,000,000 Moslems who were subjects of the British Crown. (282) Mr. Ralph Beaumont started by saying, "In spite of the immense power, the propaganda and the influence of the Zionists, the Arabs have at last achieved recognition of the justice of a case which was entirely ignored, and even deliberately disregarded, for so many years". He objected to the length of the transition period and wanted to be assured that the non-co-operation one section of the population would not invalidate the establishment of self-government. (283) The fourth and last supporter was Sir R. Glyn who described the White Paper as "a chance which should be accepted. He believed that Palestine could serve as a cultural centre for the Jews but not a solution to their problem in Europe. (284)

Despite the severe criticism levelled against the White Paper by the members, it was nevertheless approved by 268 Ayes and 179 Noes. (285) The Mandatory's new policy was examined by the Permanent Mandates Commission at their thirty-sixth session in June, 1939. The Commission reported that

(283) ibid., vol. 347 (1939) p. 2029.
(284) ibid., vol. 347 (1939) p. 2147.
(285) ibid., vol. 347 (1939) p. 2188.
"the policy ... was not in accordance with the interpretation which in agreement with the Mandatory Power and the Council, the Commission had always placed upon the Palestine Mandate". (286) However, the new policy was not approved by the League Council because of the outbreak of World War II in September 1939.

(286) Great Britain, op. cit., p. 29.
CONCLUSION

Thus far, we have examined the different attitudes of the members of the House of Commons towards the basic issues in the Palestine problem. These issues were respectively, British war-time pledges to the Arabs and Jews; the Mandate for Palestine; Jewish immigration and land settlement; self-governing institutions and finally the political settlement of Palestine. The attitudes of the members have been studied through five major debates on the 1930 White Paper, the Legislative Council of 1935, the 1937 partition scheme, the London Conference of 1939 and the 1939 White Paper. The views of the members have also been expressed during the question periods. Four times a week at the beginning of the sitting of the House of Commons, ministers devoted almost an hour to answering questions which had been put to them in writing and in advance by anymember of the House. Moreover, the few times on which the Palestine problem had been dealt with in the Supply Committee, have been another source of information.

During the years 1917-1939, Britain witnessed seven general elections and eleven cabinets of which five were national. Of the eleven cabinets, two were headed by a Liberal, five by a Conservative and the remaining four by a Labour. Party rule was intermittently divided between the three parties and amounted to a total of ten years for the Conservatives, seven years for the Labours and five years
for the Liberals.

Out of a total of 68 members who have contributed with their views to the debates on Palestine, 37 were generally pro-Zionist, 16 were generally pro-Arab and 15 were on the whole neutral. In this connection, the writer has not been able to find, despite several persistent attempts, the party affiliation of 15 of these members. The remaining 53 have been divided in the following manner:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party Affiliation</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>pro-Zionist</th>
<th>pro-Arab</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unionist</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As to the frequency of participation, it might be interesting to note that whereas the minimum participation of each of the pro-Zionist members was not less than five times all through (excluding the question periods), some of them exceeding twenty times, twelve out of the sixteen pro-Arab members spoke only twice each throughout the entire debates, while the rest had a maximum participation of five
times each (excluding the question periods). In other words, and irrespective of the disparity in participation, around 55% of the members who have been interested in the Palestine problem have been pro-Zionist, while the pro-Arab members did not exceed 24%. That is to say the pro-Zionists were more than twice as many as the pro-Arabs. In this respect, perhaps it is appropriate to examine the relation that existed between the House of Commons and Palestine as a mandated territory.

The House of Commons is the Lower House of England's two Houses of Parliament, and virtually the ruling one since the reduction of the powers of the Upper House (House of Lords) by the Parliament Acts of 1911 and 1949. In general, it is maintained that the government's control over legislation and foreign policy had resulted in the government enjoying a dictatorship over the House whose role had declined. Policy is not regarded as the product of legislative deliberation but only as a matter for debate by the House after it had been submitted by the government. Thus, the House of Commons is usually faced with a fait accompli, and although it may criticize and question, it is too late to prevent or modify because the administrative action on the part of the government is prompt and does not wait for a parliamentary decision on the matter at hand. However, it is always in the Commons that a government makes its principal defence of its policies against the Opposition.
Throughout the course of the Mandatory rule in Palestine there had never been a popularly elected body to represent the wishes of the population. All the schemes for a representative body or a legislative Council were doomed to failure because they did not meet either Arab demands or Jewish demands. In other words, the Palestine population had no constitutional avenues through which they could put their grievances against the Mandatory policy. Their wishes were communicated to the High Commissioner who transmitted them to the Colonial Secretary who in turn delivered them to the Cabinet. There was no direct contact between the people in Palestine and the League of Nations. The Colonial Secretary was always the man in-between. Then on an important occasion, the government's policy in Palestine is presented and defended in the House by the Colonial Secretary and Under-Secretary. Although the Prime Minister himself sometimes assumed a special responsibility, ordinarily, the Colonial Secretary and Under-Secretary were responsible for Colonial affairs before the House. The policy is then discussed in the House vigorously and significantly though in debate and not in voting. Thus it may seem that the House of Commons was the only body of appeal available to the population of Palestine. How did the House deal with the problems of a British Mandated area such as Palestine.
It is assumed that whatever party happens to be in power, the major elements of British foreign policy always remain almost the same, and the definition of the national interest remains fairly stable. In formulating its policy, the government may be motivated by political, economic, strategic or other considerations, which put together, constitute the national interest of the country. Unlike the government, the House is not bound by a national interest which overrides all other considerations. Like any representative assembly, it is the nation in microcosm and the main ring in the chain of "checks and balances" against the Executive. Strangely enough, in the case of Palestine, the House did not act within the scope of its prerogatives. It rather went outside the pale of its traditional behavior and assumed the role of the government. This was made clear by three instances. The first instance was the 1930 White Paper which accorded priority of Mandatory obligations to the Arabs. The policy contained in the Paper was severely criticized in one of the longest debates on Palestine. The Government was apologetic. The House was so critical of the parts concerning the Jews in the Paper, so much so, that the Prime Minister had to send a letter to Haim Weizmann containing certain modifications of that policy and restoring friendly relations between the Zionist movement and the British Government. The second instance was in 1935 when the Government, with the
approval of the Permanent Mandates Commission of the League of Nations and the objection of the Zionists, (287) proposed to establish a legislative Council in Palestine. The opposition of the House to the scheme was so strong, that the government had no other alternative but to capitulate and withdraw the proposal. The third instance was in 1937 when the Government endorsed in a statement of policy they issued, the partition scheme of the Royal Commission of Inquiry which was also rejected by the Zionists. The members were so reluctant to the proposal that they refused to approve it before it was submitted to the League of Nations. Thus the House did not commit itself to partition which was later on abandoned upon the recommendations of the Woodhead Commission.

These instances indicate that there has been a reversal of roles in which the House emerged as a policy-maker and at a time when the three issues at stake were opposed and rejected by the Zionists. What is the reason for this change? This could have been partly due to the presence of a considerable number of pro-Zionist members in the House. It could have been partly because of the Nazi accession to power in Germany and the beginning of Jewish persecution which might have elicited more support for the Jews from the members. The presence of a large and influential Jewish community with its

(287) The Zionist Congress which was held in Lucerne in 1935, rejected the scheme as being contrary to the spirit of the Mandate.
control of some newspapers and financial houses might also have enabled some pressure groups to find their way through the members although political parties in England are coherent and disciplined that it is sometimes difficult to approach the members on individual basis as in the U.S.A. Negatively, the fact that the Arabs had no Arab members of parliament, and no Arab constituents to bring influence upon their members might have been another reason.

Be it what it may, all these reasons may be granted; but what should be remembered first and foremost, is that on the question of Palestine, there was no opposition in the literal sense of the word. The policy of the Jewish National Home had never been a one-party policy. In principle, there was agreement between the three parties in the House, Conservative, Labour and Liberal alike on the necessity of establishing a Jewish National Home in Palestine.

The attitude of the Conservative Party had always sympathized with the Jewish return to Palestine. Mr. Bonar Law, Neville Chamberlain, Winston Churchill, Leopold Amery, Stanley Baldwin and other prominent leaders of the Conservative Party have supported the policy of the Balfour Declaration. It was also endorsed in the most enthusiastic terms by many of the conservative members who entered the House of Commons when a great conservative majority came to power after the general election at the end of 1918.

The Liberal Party was no less enthusiastic than the
Conservative Party. David Lloyd George a Liberal and Prime Minister from December 1916 to October 1922 had been throughout an enthusiastic supporter of the Balfour Declaration. The same was true of the other leading figures in the Liberal Party.

The Labour Party had expressed its sympathy with Jewish national aspirations before the promulgation of the Balfour Declaration. In the draft 'War Aims memorandum' which was submitted to Labour organizations in August 1917, there was the following paragraph, which was later approved by the special conference of the Labour Party and the Trades Union Congress at Central Hall, Westminster, London, in December 1917, and subsequently adopted by the conference of the Socialist and Labour Parties of the Allied countries in February 1918,

The British Labour Movement . . . expresses the opinion that Palestine should be set free from the harsh and oppressive government of the Turk, in order that this country may form a Free State, under international guarantee, to which those of the Jewish people who desire to do so may return, and may work out their salvation, free from any interference by those of alien race and religion. (288)

The national Labour organizations also urged the British Government to carry out the Balfour Declaration by accepting a mandate for Palestine "with a view of its being reconstituted

as the National Home of the Jewish people". (289)

The Parliamentary Palestine Committee (a body of pro-Zionist M.P.s) was also formed for the purpose of placing facts and arguments before the M.P.s and sending deputations to Government departments if the Government seemed to follow a policy in Palestine that was contrary to Zionist aspirations. John Buchan acted as chairman of the committee for some years and was succeeded in office by Josiah Wedgwood. Sir Archibald Sinclair, Lord Hartington, Victor Cazalet and Barnett Janner and other eminent figures, have been members of the committee. Opposition in the House was thus centered around the details and within the general framework of what was the soundest and safest policy leading to the establishment of the Jewish National Home. That is why, throughout this study, our attention has been focused on individual views rather than on party views.

The sympathy with the aspirations of the Zionist movement in Palestine was not confined only to the three political parties. At the time of the Palestine Conference of March 6, 1939, the London News Chronicle published the result of a survey made by the British Institute of Public Opinion on the question as to whether the British Government should continue its policy of allowing Jews to immigrate into Palestine. The replies received showed that sixty per cent

(289) ibid., p. 113.
were in favour of the continuation of that policy, fourteen per cent were against it and twenty-six per cent gave no opinion. (290)

Perhaps it was the goodwill of the House of Commons that made it at times exchange roles with the government and resort to opposition only as a precautionary measure against any unintentional meandering from the National Home policy. Nevertheless, a question poses itself at this juncture: Did the Mother of Parliaments observe in a manner concomitant with its deeply-rooted democratic spirit, the wishes of the majority of the inhabitants in British-mandated Palestine?

(290) ibid., p.115.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Main Sources

Great Britain, Hansard's Parliamentary Debates,
(House of Commons), vols. 100 (1917)-350 (1939).

Secondary Sources


**Official Documents**


3. ___________________________ *White Paper of 1930.*

4. ___________________________ *White Paper of 1937.*

5. ___________________________ *White Paper of 1938.*

6. ___________________________ *White Paper of 1939.*


١٢ الوثائق الرئيسية في قضية فلسطين ١٩٤٦-١٩٤٨

جامعة الدول العربية . إدارة فلسطين . القاهرة ١٩٥١


**Official Documents**


3. ___________________ *White Paper of 1930*.

4. ___________________ *White Paper of 1937*.

5. ___________________ *White Paper of 1938*.

6. ___________________ *White Paper of 1939*.


١٢ الوثائق الرئيسية في قضية فلسطين ١٩١٥ – ١٩٤٦

 جامعة الدول العربية. إدارة فلسطين. القاهرة ١٩٥٩
APPENDIX 1

Chronology of Events

1915, July 14–January 30, 1916
McMahon correspondence with
Sherif Hussein of Mecca.

1916, May 16
Sykes-Picot Agreement.

1917, November 2
Balfour Declaration.

December 9
Sir Edmund Allenby enter
Jerusalem.

1918, November 7
Anglo-French Declaration,
assurance to the Arabs of the
establishment of national
governments.

1919, February 3
Anglo-French Declaration,
assurance to the Arabs of the
establishment of national
governments.

August 28
Memorandum of Zionist Organiza-
tion to the Supreme Council
Recommendations of the King-
Crane Commission on Syria
and Palestine.

1920, April
First anti-Zionist outbreak
in Jerusalem.

May
Haycraft Commission.

July 1
Civil Administration established
in Palestine under Sir Herbert
Samuel.

1921, May
Disturbances in Jaffa and
vicinity.
1922, June
    July 24
Churchill White Paper
    Great Britain approved as
    Mandatory Power by League
    of Nations.

1923, September 23
Treaty of Lausanne. Mandate
    becomes legally effective.

1929, August
Disorders and attacks against
    Jews.

1930, March
Shaw Commission Report.
    October 20
Passfield White Paper.

1931, February 13
MacDonald Letter.

1933, October
Arabs demonstrate and riot
    against the British Administration.

1936-1939
Arab rebellion primarily
    directed against the Mandatory
    Power.

1936, April-October
Arab General Strike.
    August
Royal Commission appointed,
    headed by Lord Peel.

1937, July 7
Peel Commission Report pub-
    lished, British Government
    issues White Paper.

1938, February
Technical Commission under Sir
    J. Woodhead appointed.
    October
Woodhead Commission Report
    published.
November
1939, February 7-March 17
May 17
August 1

White Paper of 1938.
London Conference.
White Paper of 1939.
Beginning of World War II.
APPENDIX 2

Results of General Elections
1922-35

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Con.</th>
<th>Lib.</th>
<th>Lab.</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1922</td>
<td>615</td>
<td>346</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1923</td>
<td>615</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>615</td>
<td>419</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>615</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>288</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>615</td>
<td>521</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>615</td>
<td>431</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- 148 -
APPENDIX 3

British Prime Ministers
1917-1939

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1917</td>
<td>Lloyd George</td>
<td>Liberal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1919</td>
<td>Lloyd George</td>
<td>Liberal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1922</td>
<td>Bonar Law</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1923</td>
<td>Stanley Baldwin</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>Ramsay MacDonald</td>
<td>Labour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924 Nov.</td>
<td>Stanley Baldwin</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>Ramsay MacDonald</td>
<td>Labour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>Ramsay MacDonald</td>
<td>Labour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931 Nov.</td>
<td>Ramsay MacDonald</td>
<td>Labour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>Stanley Baldwin</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>Neville Chamberlain</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX 4

British Colonial Secretaries
and
Under-Secretaries 1917-1939.

1917
Col. Sec. Walter H. Long.
Col. Under-Sec. A.D. Steel Maitland.

1919
Col. Sec. Viscount Milner.
Col. Under-Sec. L.S. Amery.

1922
Col. Sec. Duke of Devonshire.
Winston Churchill.
Col. Under-Sec. W. Ormsby-Gore.

1923
Col. Sec. Winston Churchill.
Col. Under-Sec. W. Ormsby-Gore.

1924
Col. Sec. J.H. Thomas.
Col. Under-Sec. Lord Arnold.

1924 Nov.
Col. Sec. L.S. Amery.
Col. Under-Sec. W. Ormsby-Gore.

1929
Col. Sec. Lord Passfield.
Col. Under-Sec. Drummond Shiel.

1931
Col. Sec. James Thomas.

1931 Nov.
Col. Sec. Philip Cunliffe-Lister.
Col. Under-Sec. Robert Hamilton.

1935
Col. Sec. James Thomas.
Ormsby Gore.
Col. Under-Sec. Earl of Plymouth.
Earl de La Warr.
1937  Col. Sec.  W. Ormsby Gore.

Malcolm MacDonald.

Col. Under-Sec.  Marquess of Dufferin and Ava.
## APPENDIX 5

### Pro-Zionist M.P.s

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Stafford Cripps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Creech Jones</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>George Jones</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Locker Lampson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>F. Cocks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>J. Kenwarthy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>W. Elliot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>W. Kelly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>V. Cazalet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>R. Morris</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>B. Bracken</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>J. Hopkin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>H. Proctor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>C. Stephan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>D. Denman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>W. Strickland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>H. Nathan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>J. Wedgwood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>J. McGovern</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>M. Samuel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Winston Churchill</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Stanley Baldwin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Samuel Silverman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Lloyd George</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Neville Chamberlain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>W. Ormsby Gore</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>M. Jones</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Janner Barnett</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>T. Williams</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>James Hudson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>Stewart James</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>Ernest Brown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>J. de Rothschild</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>Herbert Morrison</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>L.S. Amery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>Archibald Sinclair</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>Bonar Law</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX 6

Pro-Arab M.P.s

1. C. Foxcroft
2. A. Crossley
3. K.M. Pickthorn
4. Clifton Brown
5. A. MacLaren
6. Joynson Hicks
7. Howard Bury
8. Ralph Beaumont
9. E. Wickham
10. Harry Snell
11. Austin Hudson
12. Alfred Knox
13. V. Adams
14. Walter Smiles
15. James Little
16. W. Gallacher