

T
409
C.1

SUDANESE INDEPENDENCE AND ITS PROBLEMS

by

William A. Fifer

submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
of the degree of Master of Arts
in the Arab Studies Department of the
American University of Beirut
Beirut, Lebanon
1962

SUDANESE INDEPENDENCE

Fifer

ABSTRACT

On 1 January 1956 the Republic of the Sudan officially entered the ranks of the independent nations of the world. Shortly thereafter she joined the Arab League and was admitted as the 77th member of the United Nations. The story of Sudanese independence has special interest in that it was achieved after a rather unique period of rule -- the Condominium. Any attempt to understand the problems facing this newly independent state must be accompanied by an understanding of the effect this rule had on the Sudan.

Most of the new states in the world which have achieved independence in the recent past have done so after a period of rule of another stronger power. In some cases this rule has followed colonization; in others conquest -- in the past fifty years independence has frequently followed diplomatically concealed forms of "imperialism" such as mandates and trusteeships. However, no matter what title has been used to denote this period of pre-independence rule, in form it has normally been characterized by the dominance of a more advanced, stronger power over a weaker, more backward area. In the Sudan, however, this period of rule took place under the dominance of two stronger powers; the co-dominion, Great Britain and Egypt.

In terms of international law both of the co-dominion were equal partners in the administration of the Sudan. Naturally, however, in terms of power politics, no two states

have equal strength; and of course Great Britain was and is much stronger than Egypt. This imbalance was equalized at least in official councils by the desire of Great Britain to play the game as a partner. It could be said that she was practicing imperialism in her control over Egypt itself, but the course of events within the Sudan were always veiled by the lip service given to the equality of "independent" Egypt and Great Britain in this joint rule.

The fact that the co-domini were not equal and that they had conflicting interests in the future of the Sudan resulted in continual disputes and left the Sudan with a legacy of problems which have plagued her since Independence Day in 1956. This study, then, is first a study of this unique rule and the peculiar problems it created, and secondly an examination of the effect these problems have had on this new state.

The problems which faced the Sudan on Independence Day, and which contributed to the coup d'etat in November 1958 are interrelated and stem from the Condominium in part, or from her location in the Nile River valley. Like many states with political rather than natural borders, the Republic of the Sudan embraces many different ethnic groups. Integration of these groups is one major problem which has been more difficult to solve after the legacy of separation left by the Condominium. A second major problem results from her location on the Nile and her dependence on its waters. This

has had a great effect on both foreign policy and internal development. Finally, the Sudan has had the problem of achieving political maturity and stability after a long period in which her early growth was marked by learning how to play one co-dominion off against the other. Normally nationalists are united in their desire to rid themselves of the "imperialistic" rule. In the Sudan the nationalists emerged in two strongly opposed factions as they backed either Great Britain or Egypt.

The Republic of the Sudan is faced with many of the other normal problems which confront new states such as internal development, raising the standard of living, and education. However, the three problems of integrating the north and south, controlling the Nile River, and achieving political maturity are the major ones which face her today -- which resulted to a large extent from her unique tutelage, and which lay behind the collapse of parliamentary government with the coup in 1958.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PART I - BACKGROUND TO INDEPENDENCE

Chapter 1. The Condominium	
Introduction	1
Creation of the Condominium	8
The Condominium in Practice	13
Anglo-Egyptian Dispute In Retrospect	25
Chapter 2. Development of Sudanese Nationalism	
Background	28
Early Societies And The Graduates' Congress	30
Formation of Political Parties And Sudanese Participation In The Government	35
Sudanese Nationalism And The Anglo-Egyptian Dispute	44
Chapter 3. Self-Government and Self- Determination	48
Sudanisation	53
Self-Determination	55
Legacy of the Condominium	58

PART II - INDEPENDENCE AND ITS PROBLEMS

Chapter 4. The South: "The Southern Policy" And Its Legacy	62
Background And Early Policy	62
The Southern Policy In Practice	67

The South As An Issue In Negotiations and Politics	73
The Mutiny	81
Chapter 5. The Nile	
Nature of the Problem	89
Beginning of the Controversy	96
The 1929 Agreement	103
The Problem of Egypt's High Dam	108
Chapter 6. Independence And Politics	115
The Defeat of Azhari's Government	117
The 1958 Parliamentary Elections	125
The Coup d'Etat of 17 November 1958	132
Chapter 7. Conclusion	138
Annex A	146
Bibliography	159

PART I - BACKGROUND TO INDEPENDENCE

CHAPTER 1. THE CONDOMINIUM

INTRODUCTION

The Republic of the Sudan is the largest of the numerous African nations which have attained full independence since World War II. Its name stems historically from the Arabic term Bilad as-Sudan, land of the Blacks, which in the past had been applied to the central belt of Africa, paralleling, and south of the great Sahara Desert.¹ This state achieved its present borders and political entity during a rather unique dual rule of both Great Britain and Egypt. Throughout this period which lasted from 1899 until 1956, the country was called the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan and the form of its government was known as the Condominium.

This peculiar form of government had a distinct effect on the events and developments which culminated in independence, and left the Sudanese with a legacy of problems, the solving of which would be a major task of the new nation. This Condominium resulted from Egypt's historic connection with the Sudan and Britain's virtual control over Egypt during this period. Prior to discussing the Condominium and the administration it established we should briefly examine the circumstances which gave rise to it, for these same influences

1. Barbour, K. M., The Republic of the Sudan.
(London, 1961) p. 13.

had a great deal to do with the manner in which it was implemented.

The area of the Sudan derives its primary entity from its location along the Nile River basin. Until the 19th Century it had a vague political history of petty kingdoms and tribes during which its various parts were either independent or came under the dominance of neighboring states. The unification of this area began in 1820 when the Egyptian Viceroy, Muhammad 'Ali, sent an invading army south along the Nile. At first this invasion was designed to crush the remaining elements of the Mamluks who had fled south into the Sudan after defeat by Muhammad 'Ali in 1811. But later as this Turko-Egyptian rule spread south along the Nile and branched west into Darfur and east to the Red Sea coast, it would appear that the basic motives were economic -- for slaves and reputed mineral wealth.²

The Sudan is a harsh country. Even the Nile River, which ties the country together geographically, is a very poor route of communication. In the north travel is hampered by series of cataracts; in the south it used to be impossible in the vast Sudd area of swamps and floating vegetation which completely blocked the river channels. Away from the Nile one encounters a variation of difficult terrain from the waterless deserts of the north to the thick rain forests in the south. It is not surprising then that

2. Holt, P. M., A Modern History of the Sudan.
(London, 1961) p. 35 - 48.

the extension of the Egyptian rule took a very long time and was never much more than a series of military posts. Outside of these administrative centers the small tribes continued to live as they had previously. The main effect the Egyptian rule had on them came from the encouragement of the slave trade.

What administration there was has been described as "rotten to the core." "The country was worthless to Egypt, in spite of Muhammad 'Ali's ambitions, except for the slave-trade, therefore Egyptian rule was based on it. Such a system, based on greed and sanctioned by Islam, had no consideration for the welfare of the people. The suffering masses themselves, reared in a tradition of fatalism, passively accepted the new order. Religion alone could give the needed impulse to concentrate all this submerged feeling into active expression."³ As it turned out, it was precisely this element, a religious revolution, which ended the Egyptian rule and gave Great Britain the opportunity to force her way into the joint rule of the Sudan.

During the Egyptian rule, as even today, the Sudan was divided between an Arabic-speaking Moslem north and a pagan, Negroid south. Islam had been introduced into what was nominally a Christian area with the Arab invasion in 651 A.D. But the real conversion of the masses did not take place until the 16th Century. The form which Islam took at

3. Trimmingham, J. S., Islam In The Sudan.
(London, 1949) p. 93.

this time was predominantly that of the mystical Sufi orders. Orthodox Islam was superimposed on the basic animism of the Sudanese by the feki dervishes who returned from the Sufi schools in the Hejaz. The faith was spread in the Sufi framework by the tariqas⁴ of the various orders and the numerous khalwas⁵ which were the primary source of training in the country. The impact these tariqas had on the Sudanese was very great and at times transcended their normal family and tribal loyalties. The dominant characteristic of these Sufi orders was absolute submission to the shaikh rather than adherence to Orthodox Islamic practices. Membership included not only the inner circle of disciples, but large masses of the population as "associates." Playing on the superstitions and animism of the people, the tariqa leaders could command unqualified allegiance; even to the extent of resisting the established government.⁶

In this atmosphere grew up a Sudanese, Muhammad Ahmad, who was destined to completely change the course of events. His early schooling was of a religious nature and was followed by membership in several Sufi orders. While living the mystic's austere life of prayer and contemplation he became convinced that he was the expected Messiah, and in August 1881 he openly proclaimed himself Mahdi. Early

4. Tariqas are local religious centers similar to Christian monasteries in organization and function.

5. Khalwas are small schools run by Moslem fekis for teaching the Koran.

6. Trimingham, op. cit., p. 50-120.

military successes against the Egyptian authorities brought many followers from the oppressed peoples, and by the time of his death in June 1885 he was in full control of the country.

This sudden overthrow of the Egyptian rule was greatly facilitated by the weakened state of Egypt herself and the reentrance of Great Britain into the Nile Valley. Increased indebtedness of the Khedival governments, particularly in connection with the newly opened Suez Canal, had aroused the concern of her European creditors and had led to foreign control of her finances. The canal itself held great strategic importance for the world powers, particularly Great Britain. Britain had intervened in Egyptian affairs for the first time at the beginning of the 19th Century when she sent forces to expel Napoleon's army of occupation. Now when the stability of the Khedival government was threatened by the nationalist revolt of Urabi Pasha, she came back and occupied Egypt in 1882. While her avowed purpose was to reestablish the Khedival government, and her presence intended to be only temporary as in 1807, she remained in force throughout this critical period when the Sudan broke away from its Egyptian rulers.⁷

The success of the Mahdiyya revolt, therefore, is a part of the general Anglo-Egyptian picture. In 1881 when Muhammad Ahmad first began to challenge the Egyptian rule, the Egyptian army was in the throes of a rebellion. In 1882

7. Little, Tom, Egypt. (London, 1958) p. 58, 80-90.

as his movement was spreading throughout the Sudan the Egyptian army fought and lost a decisive battle against the invading British at Tel el-Kebir, following which its remnants were dissolved by the Khedive. What units were left in the Sudan tried to contain the Mahdiyya revolt, but without success.

England's first reaction to the Sudan problem was to ignore it. After all, she had no legal position in Egypt and the Sudan was strictly an internal matter which seemed far removed from her immediate interest in establishing a firm government in Egypt itself. But the enormity of the military defeats in the Sudan soon forced her to take action. Official notice was first taken after the disaster of General Hicks' expedition in 1883. The British Agent, Sir Evelyn Baring wrote in a dispatch to London: "England should depart from her protocol aloofness, face facts, and realize that, for the time being at any rate, the responsibility for Egypt's policy in the Sudan was England's."⁸

Rather than assist the weakened Egyptian army in its attempt to quell the uprising, Great Britain ordered on 7 January 1884 that the Egyptian forces be withdrawn.⁹ A Sudanese author, Mekki Abbas, comments that this step was taken only for financial reasons; to stop the burden on the budget which had to pay off the European creditors.¹⁰ To

8. Wingate, Sir Ronald, Wingate of The Sudan. (London, 1955) p. 43.

9. Ibid, p. 44.

10. Abbas, Mekki, The Sudan Question. (London, 1952) p. 38.

effect the withdrawal, the Khedive hired General Charles Gordon, a colorful figure who had served as Governor of Equatoria in the 1870's. Gordon's orders were to evacuate all Egyptian forces and abandon the Sudan to the Mahdi, but he delayed in Khartoum trying to establish a government which would administer the area after the Egyptians left. He soon became cut off from Egypt and on 26 January 1885 was killed in the fall of Khartoum, just two days before a relief expedition reached the city.¹¹ No further attempts were made to delay and all Anglo-Egyptian forces were withdrawn to the vicinity of the present Sudanese-Egyptian border near Wadi Halfa.

In the Sudan the Mahdi was followed by his lieutenant, the Khalifa Abdallah at-Ta'ishi. The area was closed to all outsiders and internally the rule was even more corrupt and cruel than that of the Egyptians, but it remained unchallenged until the European powers became interested in this relatively weak independent state. In 1894, the maneuvers of three European powers stirred Great Britain into thoughts of reestablishing control over the Sudan. France penetrated Bahr al-Gazal from her territories to the west, Belgium entered Equatoria from the Congo, and Italy started expanding from Eritrea.¹² In addition, development of Nile River projects in Egypt had emphasized the necessity for her control over the sources of water upstream. For example, the projected Aswan Dam could not be regulated properly without

11. Moorehead, Alan, The White Nile. (London, 1960) p. 214 - 275.

12. Barbour, op. cit., p. 14.

regular hydrological readings from meters in the Sudan.

The result was that a reconquest was planned and carried out between 1896 and 1899. This campaign "was explicitly undertaken in the name of the Khedive of Egypt, in order to bring the main valley of the Nile under unified control, and was largely paid for by the Egyptian Treasury."¹³ The military forces involved were primarily Egyptian. A British officer who participated in the reconquest wrote: "The campaign was to be an all Egyptian Army affair, and the main force was to be comprised of five Sudanese and seven Egyptian battalions, supported by units of Egyptian cavalry and artillery. Only one British battalion, the 1st Battalion North Staffordshire Regiment, was ordered to join the expedition, to wave the flag of England beside that of Egypt."¹⁴ The campaign proceeded steadily against fanatical opposition from the Khalifa, and in effect was resolved by the defeat of the bulk of the Mahdiyya forces in the battle of Omdurman on 2 September 1898.¹⁵

CREATION OF THE CONDOMINIUM

Great Britain was now in a delicate position. Theoretically speaking she had no legal status in Egypt itself. However, she was the "power behind the throne" and had participated in the reconquest. What was she to do with this

-
13. Royal Institute of International Affairs, Great Britain and Egypt, 1914-1951. (London, 1952) p. 204.
14. Wingate, op. cit., p. 105.
15. Shibeika, Mekki, The Independent Sudan. (New York, 1959) p. 427.

vast area? The decision followed primarily the advice of the British Agent, Cromer. He "had to devise a formula that would placate France, preclude Ottoman interference, exclude the European powers from the enjoyment of capitulatory privileges in the Sudan, admit Egypt to a role in the administration and establish British paramountcy." He felt "that these conflicting requirements could not be satisfied without the creation of some hybrid form of government, hitherto unknown to international jurisprudence."¹⁶ Therefore, an agreement was signed on 19 January 1899 between Great Britain and Egypt, establishing a condominium in which both countries would govern the Sudan. This agreement formally defined Britain's right to share in the administration "by right of conquest," established the post of Governor-General to be the supreme military and civil authority, provided for the use of British and Egyptian flags side by side, established the basis for Egyptian laws and commerce in the Sudan, and closed the door to other foreigners.¹⁷

This agreement remained the basic constitution for the Sudan until the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement of 1953. However, its validity became one of the major elements in the greater Anglo-Egyptian dispute, and its implementation was to a great extent based on the relative position of the co-dominion in this dispute. Our main interest is in the effect

16. Hurewitz, J. C., Diplomacy In The Near And Middle East, Vol. I. (Princeton, 1956) p. 210.

17. Ibid. For full text see p. 216 - 218.

this Condominium had on the Sudan internally, but before discussing these developments, we must briefly examine the general trend of Anglo-Egyptian relations.

The history of these relations is one of a gradually shifting balance of power. At first Great Britain controlled Egypt through the presence of military forces, without any legally recognized basis. Starting with the First World War, Britain formalized her relationship with Egypt through a series of documents; the Protectorate in late 1914, a unilateral declaration of independence in 1922, a treaty in 1936, and agreements in 1953 and 1954. Throughout this latter period as the relationship became more legalized, Britain's military control decreased and finally ended. This gradual shift of power had its effect on the implementation of the Condominium, sometimes directly and sometimes indirectly. It also was one of the determining factors in the final steps which culminated in self-determination.

The clearest indication of this shift in power is the progress of formal negotiations. As concerned the Sudan, until the 1952 Revolution in Egypt, these negotiations revolved around the question of sovereignty and the legality of Britain's share in the Condominium. There is little point to detailing the claims and arguments raised in each of these series of talks; basically they remained the same. Egypt claimed the right to full sovereignty over the Sudan dating from her conquest beginning in 1820, and from the Ottoman Firmans in 1841 and 1866 in which the Sultan gave the Egyptian Viceroy

full authority over the Sudan.¹⁸ Even though during the Mahdiyya the Sudan had attained independence, the Egyptian withdrawal had been ordered by Great Britain. When the reconquest took place, it was done in the name of the Egyptian Government, and primarily by Egyptian troops and finances. Thus Egypt argued that she had a chain of legal right in the area which the Condominium never altered. In almost all of the negotiations in which Britain and Egypt tried to formalize their relationship, this Egyptian demand for full sovereignty over the Sudan remained as a stumbling bloc to success.

Great Britain, on the other hand, never claimed sovereignty over the Sudan. Her arguments during the negotiations revolved around attacking the Egyptian claim, and defending her own predominant position in the Condominium. Consequently the British claims are more elusive and when they failed to refute the Egyptian demands, it became simply a case "might over right." As previously mentioned, Cromer established the Condominium to give form to Britain's "right of conquest." In a detailed explanation of this "right," he itemized British efforts to strengthen Egypt and her participation in the reconquest.¹⁹ However, it might be pointed out that preponderance of Egyptian troops and money in this campaign would seem to relegate Britain's right of conquest to that she exercised over Egypt in 1882.

18. Fabunmi, L. A., The Sudan In Anglo-Egyptian Relations. (London, 1960) p. 422 - 423.

19. Hurewitz, op. cit., p. 212.

A second British claim which continued to be raised throughout subsequent negotiations was that the Egyptian rule during the 19th Century had been corrupt and that to allow it to carry on would be unjust to the Sudanese. This claim gave Britain no more legal basis for her action than did the frequent Egyptian argument that the physical and ethnological "unity" of the Nile Valley gave her the right of sovereignty. It would be about the same as if the more powerful United States or the Soviet Union took control of Kenya under the pretext that British misrule gave rise to the Mau Mau.²⁰

Thus we have seen how Egypt and Great Britain came to share in the administration of the Sudan and briefly what their official positions were regarding the area. A final question must be answered before we can examine the effect of Anglo-Egyptian relations on the Condominium. What were the conflicting interests which lay behind the formal claims?

On Egypt's side, undoubtedly the primary reason was the desire to control the Nile. An Egyptian professor wrote in 1947: "Egypt's desire for a permanent union with the Sudan does not rest merely upon historical connections, religious, linguistic and ethnic affinities, and mutual economic interests. Nor does it rest primarily upon the fact that unity of Egypt and the Sudan was an established political reality before the British appeared in the Upper Nile Valley. The most important consideration has always been that Egypt must possess the strongest guarantee that its water supply

20. Fabunmi, op. cit., p. 155.

is not to be interfered with."²¹

In addition to the Nile, Egypt desired to control the Sudan as a relief for her surplus population, as a market for the products of her industrialization, as an outlet for capital investment, and to stop the competition in growth of cotton, the major commercial crop of both countries.²²

On the other hand, Great Britain was interested in the Sudan for some of the same reasons. The country provided a vast underdeveloped area for British investors, the Sudanese cotton was in demand by British industry and in effect was controlled by it until 1950; she had long standing trade relations with the Sudanese, and on a small scale the area provided employment opportunities. In addition the British considered the Sudan a vital link in their world-wide strategic interests. It was close to the Suez Canal, her Red Sea bases and her east African colonies. Finally the British felt a strong moral obligation to try to bring certain benefits of Western Civilization to this underdeveloped area.²³

THE CONDOMINIUM IN PRACTICE

The Condominium Agreement of 1899 was a document establishing the dual administration. No where in its text did it make any mention of sovereignty over the area by either partner or by both. The only mention of its status is in the

21. Awad, Mohamed, "Egypt, Great Britain And The Sudan," Middle East Journal. v. 1, No. 3, July 1947, p. 66.

22. Abbas, op. cit., p. 91 - 93.

23. Ibid, p. 95 - 100, and Fabunmi, op. cit., p. 174 - 200.

preamble where it speaks of certain provinces, "which were in rebellion against the authority of His Highness the Khedive." The purpose of the Agreement was "to decide upon a system for the administration of, and for the making of laws for, the said reconquered provinces." Great Britain was to "share in the present settlement and future working and development of the said system of administration and legislation."²⁴

The initial implementation of the Condominium was a direct reflection of the status of Anglo-Egyptian relations at the turn of the century. Despite the fact that Britain had no legal status in the nominally Ottoman Nile Valley, her overwhelming power placed her in a position to dictate the application of the Agreement according to her own interpretation. From the very beginning the Governor-General was the Government. He had supreme military and civil authority, answerable only to the British Consul-General in Cairo and to the President of the Council of Ministers of the Khedive. The Condominium did not specify that he be either British or Egyptian, but by stipulating that he be appointed by the Khedive "on the recommendation of Her Britannic Majesty's Government," it in effect guaranteed that he would be British. Of the nine Governor-Generals who held the post from January 1899 until January 1956, all were British.²⁵ In actual practice, the Governor-General ran the Sudan as a dictator, independent of the political scene in

24. Hurewitz, *op. cit.*, p. 216 - 217.

25. Duncan, J. S. R., The Sudan's Path To Independence. (London, 1957) p. xiv.

Cairo, but responsive to the wishes of the London government as forwarded by the British Agent in Cairo.

The higher grades of the administration during the early period were filled by the British. Egyptians were allowed to work in minor posts, but the policy was adopted of replacing them by Sudanese personnel when they became available. Egypt's "share" in the administration was primarily one of footing all bills and providing the soldiers for the army garrison. She had 65 percent of her army stationed there while England had only one battalion and a battery of artillery at Khartoum.²⁶ That this disparity between the two partners was a matter of policy has been admitted. A biography of General Wingate, the Governor-General from December 1899 to December 1916 says, "he foresaw that the time would come when it would be a case of 'the Sudan for the Sudanese,' and during his governor-generalship he had been taking all possible steps against this time, by increasing the Sudanese element both in the Army and the Administration through the Military College and the Gordon College. For it was imperative that the Sudan should never again come under purely Egyptian control or misgovernment; and to ensure the progressive Sudanisation of the Army and the Administration, it was equally imperative that the Condominium should continue to function over the Sudan and that England should remain the predominant partner in the Condominium."²⁷ That such a policy

26. Wingate, *op. cit.*, p. 130 - 135.

27. *Ibid*, p. 250.

should be adopted from the start by the Sudan Government was not living up to either the letter nor the spirit of the 1899 Agreement. When one considers the fact that these officials received their salaries from the Egyptian Treasury it could be termed a case of biting the hand that fed them.

Thus the Sudan Administration was established as a predominantly British affair. Naturally the Egyptians objected. During and following World War I the first shift in relative power between the co-dominion occurred with the emergence of Egyptian nationalism. Egypt, as a British protectorate, had contributed her share in the war effort in both manpower and material. After the war world opinion was beginning to shift from acquiescence in the face of imperialism to the theme of self-determination, mandates and trusts in which the great powers were to hasten the liberated areas along the road to full independence. Commissions of inquiry consulted the people and Wilson announced his Fourteen Points. The Egyptian desire for full freedom was expressed by a popular nationalist movement under the leadership of Sa'd Zaghlul Pasha. This group could not be controlled by the English High Commissioner as could be the docile Egyptian Government. Riots and disturbances took place throughout the country, and among the demands of the nationalists was "that Egypt should have an equal share with Great Britain in the administration of the Sudan."²⁸ This new nationalism marked the beginning of pressures which

28. R.I.I.A., op. cit., p. 6.

eventually forced Britain to give in, but at this point she was still free to do as she liked in both Egypt and the Sudan. Lord Milner, who investigated the 1919 riots is reported to have told Zaghlul Pasha, "We are in Egypt in fact and we want our position based on legal acceptance. We have been looking for Egypt for the last 100 years and now we have it."²⁹

Negotiations took place during 1921, but broke down over Egypt's insistence to sovereignty over the Sudan.³⁰ Milner's stated desire for "legal acceptance" of the British position was effected through a unilateral proclamation by Great Britain on 28 February 1922. In it Egypt was granted nominal independence, but the major issues (including the Sudan) were reserved for the British Government.³¹

In the Sudan routine administration continued with definite progress in most fields. Financial solvency was obtained by 1913; the great Gezira plan to irrigate the lands between the Blue and White Niles south of Khartoum was being implemented and education of the Sudanese for administrative posts was beginning to bear fruit.³²

The first major change in the implementation of the Condominium from that already described, resulted from the effect of the emerging Egyptian nationalism. It will be remembered that Egypt's major share in the Sudan Administration

29. Ghurbal, Muhammad Shafiq, Tārīkh al-Mufāwadhāt al-Misriyya al-Baritaniyya, al-Jiz al-Awwal. (Cairo, 1952) p. 79.

30. R.I.I.A., op. cit., p. 7.

31. Hurewitz, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 102.

32. Abbas, op. cit., p. 59.

was in the stationing of the bulk of her army there. After the failure of the first Anglo-Egyptian negotiations and the disappointment resulting from the 1922 Declaration, the Egyptians began a policy of agitation among the Sudanese and their own troops.³³ The result of this activity was the outbreak of violence in the Sudan: "Anti-British and pro-Egyptian demonstrations and disturbances took place at four main points -- Atbara, Khartoum, Omdurman and Port Sudan. . . . On 9 August, Egyptian and Sudanese cadets from the Khartoum Military School marched with arms and ammunition through the streets of the town."³⁴ These events reached a climax on 19 November 1924 in the assassination of Sir Lee Stack, the Governor-General and Sirdar (Commander-in-Chief) of the Egyptian Army.

Following these events a drastic change took place in the implementation of the Condominium -- one which was greatly detrimental to Egypt's position in the Sudan. On 22 November 1924, the British High Commissioner, General Allenby submitted an ultimatum to the Egyptian Government, holding Egypt responsible for Stack's death and placing harsh demands on her for retribution. Included in the demands were several concerning the Sudan. A serious threat to Egypt's water supply was implied in the notification that Gezira irrigation would be increased to an unlimited figure; and

33. Jackson, H. C., Behind the Modern Sudan.
(London, 1955) p. 195.

34. Fabunmi, op. cit., p. 80.

Egypt was ordered to withdraw from the Sudan all Egyptian officers and army units.³⁵

Egypt tried in vain to resist these demands. After her Parliament rejected those concerning the Sudan, the High Commissioner ordered the occupation of the Alexandria Customs Office and the forceful expulsion of the Egyptian troops from the Sudan. Finally by December "all Egyptian troops were withdrawn from the Sudan and civil servants of purely Egyptian blood were expelled. The only thing left for Egypt in the Sudan was the Egyptian flag."³⁶ Since Egypt had filled 60 percent of the subordinate positions in the Sudan Administration prior to this time, and sufficient Sudanese were as yet not trained to take over, this meant that many British officials had to be recruited to fill their place. "Thus the Sudan became no longer a working partnership between England and Egypt, but in effect, a British mandate."³⁷

Anglo-Egyptian negotiations continued throughout the late 1920's in an attempt to arrive at an acceptable treaty. The Sudan continued to be an issue in these talks, and in 1929 a draft treaty was drawn up including the following article (11) on the Sudan; "While reserving liberty to conclude new conventions in the future modifying the Convention of 1899, the High Contracting Parties agree that, without prejudice to Egypt's rights and material interests, the status of the Sudan shall be that resulting from the same conventions.

35. Hurewitz, op. cit., p. 130 - 131.

36. Abbas, op. cit., p. 64.

37. Wingate, op. cit., p. 253.

Accordingly the Governor-General shall continue to exercise on the joint behalf of the High Contracting Parties the powers conferred on him by the said conventions."³⁸ A change in the Egyptian Government brought a new Prime Minister to power, and in the resumed negotiations he tried to obtain a guarantee that the defacto position existing in the Sudan before 1924 would be restored. However, no agreement could be reached. The British feared that a return to the pre-1924 situation might lead to more troubles and the Egyptians felt that England obviously had a fixed policy of putting an end to Egypt's interests in the Sudan.³⁹

The situation in the Sudan remained the same with Great Britain fully in charge. But in the mid-1930's a change in the world situation and the continuing gradual shift in the balance of power between Egypt and Britain resulted in a limited compromise of England's position. The Italian invasion of Ethiopia in 1935 brought a willingness to both Egypt and Britain to resolve their dispute. A treaty was signed on 26 August 1936 formalizing their relationship. This treaty was based on the 1929 draft, and the article on the Sudan was included with some modification. The phrase, "without prejudice to Egypt's rights and material interests," was dropped. In its place was substituted the statement, "Nothing in this article prejudices the question of sovereignty over the Sudan." In addition the following was added: "The

38. R.I.I.A., op. cit., p. 25.

39. Ghurbal, op. cit., p. 243.

High Contracting Parties agree that the primary aim of their administration in the Sudan must be the welfare of the Sudanese." Other clauses and an annex to the article were included which formally returned the Sudan Administration to the pre-1924 status. It specified that there be no discrimination between British and Egyptians, that Egyptian troops could again serve there and that Egyptian immigration would be unrestricted except "for reasons of public order and health."⁴⁰ Unfortunately for Egypt, adjustments had been made within the Sudan Administration which left few vacancies for the return of Egyptians.

With the signing of the 1936 treaty, Anglo-Egyptian relations took a turn for the better temporarily. In the Sudan development continued quietly and after World War II steps were taken to give the Sudanese a hand in the Government. However, these measures were primarily British inspired. They will be discussed in more detail in the following chapter.

Negotiations were resumed after the war to revise the 1936 Treaty. Official Egyptian opinion on the Sudan stated, "It goes without saying that the negotiations will include the question of the Sudan and will be inspired by the interests and aspirations of the Sudanese."⁴¹ However, Egypt was still interested in unity with and sovereignty over the Sudan. The official British position was stated by Foreign Secretary Bevin in the House of Commons on 26 March 1946. He said:

40. Hurewitz, *op. cit.*, p. 208 - 209.

41. *Ibid*, p. 259 - 260.

"The welfare of the Sudanese cannot be secured unless a stable and disinterested administration is maintained in the Sudan. The objects of such an administration must be to establish organs of self-government as a first step towards eventual independence, to accelerate the process of appointing Sudanese to higher government posts in consultation with Sudanese representatives, and to raise the capacity of the mass of the people for effective citizenship. These are the objects of the present Sudan Government, and His Majesty's Government consider that no change should be made in the status of the Sudan as a result of treaty revision until the Sudanese have been consulted through constitutional channels."⁴²

A draft treaty was negotiated in 1946 between Prime Minister Sidqi and Bevin in which was included a protocol on the Sudan generally embracing Britain's policy as mentioned above. However, to allow for Egypt's aspirations, this policy was to be followed "within the framework of the unity between the Sudan and Egypt under the common Crown of Egypt."⁴³ Differences in interpretation of this phrase were to be the direct cause of failure to reach any agreement. Sidqi was quoted on return to Cairo on 26 October as saying: "I said last month that I shall bring the Sudan back to Egypt, and I say now that I have succeeded; it has been definitely decided to achieve unity between Egypt and the Sudan under the Egyptian crown."⁴⁴

42. R.I.I.A., op. cit., p. 93.

43. Hurewitz, op. cit., p. 272.

44. Fabunmi, op. cit., p. 243.

Great Britain's interpretation of this phrase was entirely different, and on the following day Prime Minister Attlee rejected Sidqi's statement. In the Sudan the Governor-General continued to implement Britain's policies. He made various speeches towards the end of the year in which he announced his determination to create a Sudanese Government and to keep preparing the Sudanese for the day when they could decide their own future status. On 22 December he informed the Egyptian Government that the Chief Judgeship of the Islamic court -- the last important post held by an Egyptian -- would go to a Sudanese on 2 January. The Egyptian judge was in fact forced out on 10 January 1947 but the post remained vacant as a non-Moslem could not make an appointment to a supreme religious post.⁴⁵

Following the breakdown of negotiations, Egypt took her case to the United Nations' Security Council. As usual Egypt claimed full sovereignty over the Sudan and Britain defended her position as that emanating from the 1936 Treaty. No resolutions were passed, and negotiations were resumed in 1950. England continued to stress the need for self-government to be followed by self-determination in which the Sudanese would decide what form of relationship they desired with Egypt, if any; and while Egypt agreed to self-government, she continued to demand unity under the Egyptian Crown.⁴⁶

45. Awad, *op. cit.*, p. 288 - 289.

46. Fabunmi, *op. cit.*, p. 280 - 282, and R.I.I.A., *op. cit.*, p. 136 - 137.

As usual, no agreement was reached. But Egypt was in a stronger position than in the past. Although British troops still occupied Egyptian soil, Egypt was practically independent and was a member of the United Nations. Her reaction to the deadlock was in a unilateral abrogation of the 1899 Condominium and the 1936 Treaty in October 1951.⁴⁷ Great Britain refuted this abrogation and intimated that she would maintain her rights, "using, of course, no more force than is necessary."⁴⁸ But the two co-dominions seemed to have reached the point where neither could impose its will on the other. Only Great Britain's predominance in the Sudan Administration gave her any edge; and the world situation and balance of powers had changed to such an extent that she was soon to be forced out of her position by the combined efforts of a revitalized Egypt and the emerging Sudanese nationalist.

The beginning of the end of the Condominium came with the Egyptian revolution of 26 July 1952. The military group which came to power were a far different group from the Egyptian politicians. They were able within just over two years to conclude agreements with Britain on their two major disputes; the Sudan, and evacuation of British troops from Egyptian soil. That they were able to do so is a mark of the pragmatic approach used by the Revolutionary Government, and an indication of the extent to which the balance of power

47. R.I.I.A., op. cit., p. 150-151.

48. Fabunmi, op. cit., p. 286.

had shifted between the two nations. The discussion of events leading to the 1953 Anglo-Egyptian Agreement on the Sudan, and the description of its effect on Sudanese self-government will be taken up in the following chapters. But before we examine in detail the internal developments in the Sudan, let us briefly summarize the effect the shifting Anglo-Egyptian relations had on the broad interpretation of the Condominium.

THE ANGLO-EGYPTIAN DISPUTE IN RETROSPECT

What then, was the major pattern which Anglo-Egyptian relations followed concerning the Sudan. As suggested by various historians⁴⁹ it was primarily a case of power politics. Claims and counter claims were made throughout on various legal points, but agreements were reached and signed only when the balance of power and world atmosphere had changed sufficiently. From the very start in 1899, through the 1924 Ultimatum, Great Britain held all the cards and implemented the Condominium as she saw fit. She gave in a little in the 1936 Treaty when there was a threat of war and she needed Egypt's friendship, but she was still predominant. World War II saw the strengthening of Egypt's position while Britain had suffered an unprecedented drain of its manpower and resources. "It was clearly only a matter of time before the British-Egyptian relationship would have to be altered to

49. Ibid, and Lenczowski, George, The Middle East In World Affairs. (New York, 1958) p. 393 - 430; and Hurewitz, op. cit.

conform with the emergent realities."⁵⁰

At some point in the negotiations, both parties reached the point where they were stalemated in their ability to force the other's hand. No doubt this began when the question was aired in front of the UN Security Council in 1947. Obviously a deadlock had been reached at the time of the 1951 unilateral abrogation by Egypt of the 1936 Treaty. Finally the 1952 revolution created a major change in the atmosphere through which both parties were forced to compromise.

The effect of this shift in the balance of power in the Sudan was seen in the initial British predominance in the Administration, followed in 1924 by her almost complete control over the area. Then in 1936 Egyptians were allowed back into the Administration, and finally in the 1940's and early 50's, the agreement of the co-dominion in general terms to Sudanese self-government helped propel the Sudanese towards the eventual decision which only they could make concerning their future.

But it must be said that in general the Condominium was an all-British affair. One of the best summaries of the realities of this "dual" rule is found in a highly respected British survey published in 1952: "The Anglo-Egyptian Condominium implied that unified control would be maintained. In fact, since 1924 the Sudan has been controlled exclusively by Great Britain, except that the waters of the White Nile

50. Hurewitz, op. cit., p. 259.

are controlled by Egypt under the Nile Waters Agreement of 1929. The British Government, by encouraging Sudanese separatism, has not only violated its contract with Egypt and the moral and physical bases of its own occupation of the Sudan, but is exposing Egypt to the possibility of serious interference with the water supply upon which the lives of its rapidly expanding population depend."⁵¹

51. R.I.I.A., op. cit., p. 204.

CHAPTER 2. DEVELOPMENT OF SUDANESE NATIONALISM

BACKGROUND

As presented in the preceeding chapter, the story of the Sudan's evolution towards full independence seems to be primarily one of a corollary to the broad Anglo-Egyptian dispute. Basically this is true. However, a third element, Sudanese nationalism, entered into the final phases of the picture and was instrumental in shaping the course that independence was to take. Normally the Sudanese were never consulted by the co-dominion in their dispute; but the Sudan Administration was forced to recognize the rising Sudanese political voice and give it a governmental framework through which it could be heard. On the eve of the 1953 Agreement, these Sudanese politicians through clever maneuvering helped shape the form of the Agreement and hastened its signing. Then as they gained more and more control through self-government and Sudanisation, they completely overshadowed the co-dominion in directing the last minute developments which culminated in independence.

The Sudanese began to receive their political training very early in the Condominium. The shortage of qualified personnel and the need to economise in the Administration led to the establishment of the Gordon Memorial College in Khartoum in 1903. The graduates of this institution became an ever-increasing element in the Sudan Administration. In

1920 the Sudanese occupied 36.8% of the civil service posts; in 1930, 50.9%; and in 1947, 84.97%⁵² With their western education, and constant daily contact with the civil servants from the co-dominion, these Sudanese were a fertile field for the development of nationalism.

At the same time as these young Sudanese were being trained, the traditional group of tribal leaders were also being given a hand in the Government. The vastness of the Sudan and its extreme backwardness in the early years of the Condominium made this practice a practical necessity. Tribal Shaikhs were recognized as agents of government over their tribes, and established elders and chiefs were selected for town and provincial councils. A law was passed in 1922 entitled, "The Power of Nomad Sheikhs Ordinance" in which this policy was regularized.⁵³

These two Sudanese groups -- the westernized young and the traditional chiefs -- were each affected by the Anglo-Egyptian dispute and the one-sided implementation of the Condominium. "The British governors and district commissioners had learned how to deal with the Sudanese notables, and a degree of confidence, albeit with profound if unspoken reservations on both sides, existed between them. . . . But the urban middle-class, especially the Sudanese who had acquired a westernized education in the intermediate schools and Gordon College, they viewed with little sympathy or

52. Abbas, op. cit., p. 106.

53. Silberman, Leo, "Democracy In The Sudan," Parliamentary Affairs, v. 12, No. 3 - 4, p. 360.

respect." But the Egyptians who worked side by side in the Administration and army with these young Sudanese were on the same level with them as subordinates to the British. In addition, "their community of language and religion with the northern Sudanese were priceless assets."⁵⁴ These early alignments were to continue as the "intelligentsia" drifted towards unity with Egypt and the outmoded traditional elements backed Great Britain in hopes of prolonging their power.

EARLY SOCIETIES AND THE GRADUATES' CONGRESS

"The first signs of the emergence of nationalist thought in the Sudan were the foundation of a number of political leagues and societies among educated Sudanese between 1921 and 1924. Some of these campaigned for the independence of the Sudan, others for a form of unity with Egypt."⁵⁵ One of these which was formed primarily by graduates of Gordon College was the "Society for the Sudanese Union." Its aim was "liberation of the Sudan from British Imperialism with the support of Egypt, without specifying the relation between the two countries." Most of its activities were secret in nature, such as putting up posters inciting the people against the British.⁵⁶

Several other societies were founded by a young embittered Sudanese of Dinka origin, 'Ali 'Abd al-Latif. He was an ex army officer who had been involved in a clash with

54. Holt, op. cit., p. 127.

55. The Sudan. (London, Central Office of Information, 1953) p. 14.

56. Shibeika, op. cit., p. 476.

a high British Official. "His first political organization, the Sudanese United Tribes Society, founded in 1921, spoke of the Sudanese nation and demanded independence, but looked to the religious notables and tribal chiefs as the natural governors of the country."⁵⁷ 'Abd al-Latif is credited with publishing in May 1922 the first Sudanese nationalistic document entitled, "The Claims of The Sudanese Nation." As a result of his activities, he was put in jail and on his release in April 1923 he came out, "hating everything British." In 1924 he created the "White Flag League," named for its flag which had the Nile River on a white background with a small copy of the Egyptian flag in one corner and the word "forward" written in Arabic.⁵⁸ The aim of this group was to back the Egyptian claims for unity. Telegrams were sent in support of Egypt in her stand in the Anglo-Egyptian negotiations and demonstrations were staged throughout the Sudan against the British. Membership in the League was estimated at around 2,000 and included such people as Muhammad Neguib, later to become famous as the first leader of the 1952 Egyptian Revolutionary Government.⁵⁹ Finally following an armed demonstration in August 1924 by cadets of the Khartoum Military School the League was suppressed and 'Abd al-Latif arrested.⁶⁰

57. Holt, op. cit., p. 128.

58. Duncan, J.S.R., The Sudan. (London, 1952) p. 137 - 138.

59. Ibid, and Jackson, op. cit., p. 196.

60. Later he escaped to Egypt where, after his death in an insane asylum in 1948, he was given a state funeral.

This activity culminated in the assassination of the Governor-General, Sir Lee Stack, in Cairo. In addition to the expulsion of the Egyptian troops and officials mentioned in the previous chapter, measures were taken against the Sudanese which resulted in a suppression of the element tied to Egypt and strengthening of the traditional leaders. Contact with Egypt was cut off; movement between the two countries was restricted and reading of Egyptian newspapers amounted to an offense, particularly among school boys.⁶¹ In addition, the official policy of the British dominated Administration was to give more and more power to the shaikhs, even in cases where natural progress had resulted in a breakdown of the tribal system; "while the role of the educated Sudanese in the administration was to be progressively reduced." "The new policy was embodied in The Powers of Sheikhs Ordinance of 1927, which no longer restricted recognition to nomad chiefs and which deliberately sought to extend the powers committed to tribal authorities."⁶²

Thus suppressed, political development among the educated Sudanese lay dormant until 1936. In 1931, however, an incident took place which alerted the educated Sudanese to the need for organization. As a result of the general world depression, the Sudan Administration experienced a decrease in revenues. A decision was made to reduce the starting salaries of new graduates of Gordon College from

61. Shibeika, op. cit., p. 480.

62. Holt, op. cit., p. 134.

LE 8 to LE 5½ per month -- without any corresponding reduction in the salaries of the new British civil servant. This policy naturally led to discontent among the Sudanese. As a result the pupils of Gordon College organized and went on strike, "for self-protection and eventually for political purposes."⁶³

This natural instinct towards organization was greatly affected by the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936. This Treaty "had caused a widespread reaction among thinking Sudanese of all classes, who found it deeply unsatisfactory that their future should be settled by England and Egypt over their heads and were determined that it should not be allowed to happen again."⁶⁴ As a result, meetings were held by some of the graduates of Gordon College in 1937. In February 1938 a general committee of 60 and an executive committee of 15 were elected on a non-sectarian basis to draw up a constitution for the organization. The group adopted the name, "Graduates' General Congress," and was officially established on 12 March 1938 when they notified the authorities of their constitution. The stated objective of the organization was "to promote the general welfare of the country and its graduates."⁶⁵ At the time there were approximately 5,000 Sudanese with an education higher than elementary, of which about 1,200 joined the Congress.⁶⁶

This body ran into difficulties with the Administration

63. Fabunmi, op. cit., p. 328.

64. Henderson, K.D.D., The Making of the Modern Sudan. (London, 1953) p. 536.

65. Ibid., p. 537.

66. Duncan, op. cit., (1957) p. 139.

right from the start. In May 1938 it petitioned the Governor-General to "give due consideration to the views and suggestions which we may submit from time to time," as concerned matters of public interest. Their assumption was that as elected representatives of the educated Sudanese they were the best qualified to speak for the nation. But we have already seen how the Administration was wary of the educated Sudanese, and it promptly warned the group that their views would be accepted as representing the members only; and not the nation. In early 1940 following a tea party given in honor of the Egyptian Prime Minister who was visiting Khartoum, a direct appeal was made by the Congress for Egyptian financial assistance. This incident widened the gap between the Governor-General and the Congress, and paved the way for subsequent collaboration with Egypt.⁶⁷

The activities of the Congress took on a definite political tone when on 3 April 1942 its president submitted a memo to the Government with 12 demands calling for "the issue, on the first possible opportunity, by the British and Egyptian Governments, of a joint declaration guaranteeing the Sudan in its geographical boundaries, the rights of self-determination directly after the war; the promulgation of a Sudanese nationality law; and the creation of a representative body to approve the budget and the ordinances."⁶⁸ The reaction of the Administration to these demands came on 29 April in a very strongly worded rebuff in which not only were the demands

67. Henderson, op. cit., p. 537.

68. Abbas, op. cit., p. 109.

turned down, but the Congress was "reminded" that it had no right to speak for the Sudanese. The memorandum was returned without action.⁶⁹

Attempts were made by the Administration to assure the Congress of the good intentions of the Government. It was announced that provincial councils would be established to give the Sudanese more say in their affairs. However, nationalistic aspirations had progressed too far and a definite split began to appear among the members of the Congress. One group favored trusting the Administration to guide their future; while the second group felt that progress could be hastened by unity with Egypt.

An election within the Congress took place in November 1944 in which the pro-Egyptian faction won. A resolution was passed stating the goal of the Congress to be: "The setting up of a Sudanese democratic government in union with Egypt under the Egyptian Crown."⁷⁰ At this point the Congress changed its nature to a political body. "Illiterates were enrolled in increasing numbers and a party caucus came into power under Ismail el Azhari." The moderate faction withdrew and the Congress became an instrument of the pro-Egyptian group.⁷¹

FORMATION OF POLITICAL PARTIES

AND SUDANESE PARTICIPATION IN THE GOVERNMENT

As a result of this split in the Congress, two

69. Henderson, op. cit., p. 542.

70. Abbas, op. cit., p. 110

71. Henderson, op. cit., p. 552 - 553.

political parties were formed. The pro-unity party under the leadership of al-Azhari took the name Ashigga (blood brothers) while the pro-independence group in cooperation with the Sudan Administration called themselves the Umma Party.

A further result of this split was the emergence of religious issues onto the political scene. For, while the original Congress had crossed over sectarian lines and the early nationalistic movement had centered around a secular educated elite, in order to win the masses these leaders were forced to ally themselves with one or the other of the religious sects.⁷²

The Sudan is primarily a Moslem country. The first census taken in 1956 placed the population at just over ten million, of which about 75 percent is composed of the Moslem, Arabic-speaking northerners.⁷³ The remaining quarter consists of the southerners who are primarily pagan with a few Christians. This latter group, however, did not become involved in the early nationalistic movement. The south is a special case which will be discussed in detail in Chapter 4.

As mentioned earlier, the dominant characteristic of Sudanese Islam is the tariqa, or religious order. Prior to the rise of the Mahdiyya in 1881, there were numerous flourishing tariqas in the Sudan. Of these the Mirghaniyya, or

72. Holt, P.M., "Sudanese Nationalism and Self Determination," Part I, Middle East Journal. v. 10, No. 3, Summer 58, p. 243.

73. The Population of Sudan. (Khartoum, 1958) p. 21, and Rife, David C. and Randall, John R., "The Peoples of The Sudan," Middle East Journal. v. 7, No. 2, p. 167.

Khatmiyya tariqa was one of the most influential and became the major opponent to the Ansar (followers of the Mahdi) in subsequent political development. This tariqa was founded by Muhammad 'Uthman al-Mirghani (1793 - 1853) and was strongest in the north eastern section of the Sudan. On the outbreak of the Mahdiyya in 1881, the Khatmiyya supported the Egyptian Government and led several tribes against the dervishes. Finally the Mirghani family was forced to flee to the safety of Cairo where they remained the guests of the Egyptian Government until after the reconquest.⁷⁴

During the Mahdiyya rule all of the tariqas were suppressed. However, this did not last as, "The Sudanese 'Ulama, some of whom had been trained at al-Azhar, were for the most part convinced of the Mahdi's mission rather by his military successes than by his theological arguments and prophetic visions."⁷⁵ During the reconquest, these orders re-emerged to dominate the allegiances of the masses. The Khatmiyya leaders in particular, gave valuable assistance to the British during the reconquest, and in return were given considerable deference by the early Sudan Administration. Knighthood and other honors were heaped upon Sayid 'Ali al-Mirghani Pasha (b. 1879), the great grandson of the founder of the order. His position was such that he was considered by some to be the country's unofficial leader.⁷⁶

74. Trimingham, op. cit., p. 233.

75. Holt, op. cit., (Middle East Journal) Part I, p. 241.

76. Duncan, op. cit., (1952) p. 172.

The reconquest of the Sudan had put an end to the Mahdiyya rule but the Ansar still continued to be organized as a Muslim sect -- even if considered as outside the pale of orthodoxy. Their leader was the posthumous son of the Mahdi, 'Abd al-Rahman al-Mahdi (1885 - 1959). During the early stages of the Condominium Government, he had been given a L5 per month pension and generally relegated to the background while all the official attention was showered on the Khatmiyya. However, at the outbreak of World War I when Great Britain found herself fighting the Caliph of Islam in the form of the Ottoman Sultan, she turned to 'Abd al-Rahman for his support to counter any pro-Turkish tendencies among the Ansar. He very quickly rose to prominence and a position of wealth, and like his rival, was the recipient of many honors.

The personal rivalry which existed between the two leaders cannot be underestimated. The enmity dated back to the Khatmiyya-Mahdiyya clashes in the early 1880's and persisted in the ever-prevalent fear of the Khatmiyya that 'Abd al-Rahman aimed at becoming the King of a second Mahdiyya state.⁷⁷ This bitterness assumed dangerous proportions in view of the loyalty given by the followers to their religious leaders -- a loyalty which was sometimes carried to the point of fanaticism.⁷⁸ "Either Sayed had only to lift a finger to

77. Abbas, *op. cit.*, p. 110

78. Crary, D., "Geography and Politics In The Nile Valley," *Middle East Journal*. v. 3, No. 3, p. 267.

command the obedience of hundreds of thousands of people who had never heard of the word 'politics,' nor will they understand it for years to come."⁷⁹ Thus with the Khatmiyya strength estimated at two million and the Ansar at three million,⁸⁰ a sharp division was created among the largest organized segments of the population in which each group was normally in opposition to the other, primarily for personal and religious reasons rather than political.⁸¹

It was in this religious framework that the first two political parties, the Ashigga and Umma, sought to find popular support. A rather peculiar shift in the relationship of the two Sayids with the Administration determined the direction in which these alliances were made. It will be remembered that at First Sayid 'Ali al-Mirghani backed the British while the defeated Ansar were the "opposition." But subsequent events, and perhaps the more dynamic nature of Sayid 'Abd al-Rahman, led him to become more closely entrenched with the Government; while Sayid 'Ali, more withdrawn politically, allowed himself to become associated with the pro-Egyptian group -- perhaps more from fear of another Mahdiyya Kingdom than from affection for Egypt.⁸² Consequently, Sayid Siddiq (d. 1961), the son of Sayid 'Abd al-Rahman al-Mahdi became the titular head of the Umma Party, while the

79. Duncan, *op. cit.*, (1952) p. 197.

80. Gosnell, H., "The 1958 Elections In The Sudan," *Middle East Journal*. v. 12, No. 4, p. 414.

81. MacMichael, Sir Harold, *The Sudan*. (New York, 1955) p. 106.

82. *Ibid*, p. 193, and Abbas, *op. cit.*, p. 110.

Ashigga, lead by al-Azhari, was backed by Sayid 'Ali's Khatmiyya. Other minor splinter parties were soon formed, but in general their aims and backing paralleled either the Umma or the Ashigga.

At the same time that these parties were being established, the first steps were being taken to give the Sudanese a hand in the formulation of Government policy. An Advisory Council for Northern Sudan was established on 16 May 1944 consisting of the three British Civil, Legal and Financial Secretaries and 28 northern Sudanese representing the provincial councils and the educated classes. However, this move did little to satisfy the aspirations of the nationalists, and it came under heavy attack from the Egyptians and Sudanese alike. Egypt was unhappy in that she had not been consulted by the Sudan Administration in the planning of these Councils, and she had no representation in them. She charged that Great Britain was following a policy which would lead to separating the Sudan from Egypt.⁸³ The Sudanese nationalists argued that the Councils were purely advisory in nature and that the large number of tribal notables sitting on them represented an attempt of the Administration to continue in the conservative status quo. In addition the question of southern Sudan was forced into the open, with British statements that the south was not ready to participate as yet, and Egyptian and northern Sudanese fears being voiced that Great Britain intended to permanently separate the south from the rest of the country.

83. R.I.I.A., op. cit., p. 78.

The end of World War II brought about a temporary cooperation between the Sudanese political parties. When it was learned in late 1945 that the British and Egyptians planned to resume talks on their problems, including the Sudan, the fear arose that just as in 1936 their fate would be decided without their having any say in the matter. Consequently a compromise was made between the Umma and the Ashigga and a delegation sent to Cairo with the major demand calling for a free Sudanese democracy in union with Egypt and in alliance with Great Britain. However, the Ashigga delegates came under the influence of Egyptian politicians who were demanding full unity, and the Umma members returned home.⁸⁴ The announcement of the Sidqi-Bevin Protocol in October 1946, with the accompanying counter claims by the co-dominion, accentuated the division between the two Sudanese factions. Demonstrations and clashes took place in Khartoum as the two groups drifted farther apart.

This widening of the gap between the Sudanese nationalists was unfortunate, in that the Administration, in response to the demands for greater self-government, had decided to expand the Northern Advisory Council into a mere representative body. A Sudanese Administrative Conference, consisting of both British and Sudanese members, was set up to study what steps should be taken. But the pro-Egyptian parties, adamant in their stand on unity, felt obliged to boycott the meetings.

84. Abbas, op. cit., p. 111.

In July 1947 this conference recommended that a legislative assembly be created representing the entire country.⁸⁵ A draft ordinance establishing an assembly was prepared from these recommendations and was accepted immediately by the British. However, Egypt had many objections and would not approve implementation of the plan. (It must be remembered that during this same period the formal Anglo-Egyptian negotiations had collapsed and Egypt was preparing to present her case to the UN Security Council.) Finally at the end of the year the two co-domini agreed to discuss their differences, and in May 1948 the British Ambassador, Sir Ronald Campbell and the Egyptian Foreign Minister, Ahmad Muhammad Khashaba initialled a compromise solution. However, this agreement was rejected by the Egyptian Senate on 14 June on the grounds that it continued the Condominium and prevented unity. As a result of this stalemate the Governor-General, with the unilateral backing of Britain, promulgated the ordinance on 19 June.⁸⁶

This "Executive Council and Legislative Assembly Ordinance,"⁸⁷ established a 12 to 18 man council which approximated the functions of a cabinet, and a 91 member assembly. At least half of the members of the Council were Sudanese, and 85 of the delegates in the assembly were Sudanese, including 13 from the South. The elected leader of the

85. Duncan, *op. cit.*, (1957) p. 133 - 135.

86. R.I.I.A., *op. cit.*, p. 108 - 111; Duncan, *op. cit.*, (1952) p. 208 - 211; and Fabunmi, *op. cit.*, p. 269 - 272.

87. For full text, see: Documents On The Sudan 1899 - 1953. (Cairo, 1953) p. 12 - 33.

assembly also filled the post of "acting Prime Minister." While this act was a concession to Sudanese political ambitions, it fell short of its goal in that the electoral procedures (in which only ten seats out of the assembly were filled by direct election) were such as to retain the tribal notables in power, rather than the younger educated nationalists. Naturally Egypt protested and the pro-unity parties ordered a boycott of the coming elections.⁸⁸

Elections were held in November 1948 in an atmosphere of riots and demonstrations staged by the Ashigga Party. The turn-out was small and resulted in a complete victory for the Umma Party. Several of the Ashigga demonstrators were arrested and later sentenced by a British criminal court after a trial in which the Administration refused to allow a group of Egyptian lawyers to defend the accused. The Legislative Assembly met for the first time on 15 December and elected Abdullah Khalil, Secretary-General of the Umma Party, as its leader. This session was also marked by demonstrations of the Ashigga during which the party leader, Isma'il al-Azhari, was arrested.

One result of this continuing intransigence on the part of the Ashigga was the creation of a new party, the National Front. Its leadership was composed of more moderate Ashigga members who felt that al-Azhari's extreme alliance

88. R.I.I.A., op. cit., p. 112 - 113; Abbas, op. cit., p. 113, and Holt, op. cit., (Middle East Journal) Part II, p. 371.

with Egypt was damaging their cause. They founded the new party with a platform calling for union with Egypt in which the Sudan would have a type of dominion status. Sayid 'Ali al-Mirghani gave his backing to them, thus making the National Front the leading Khatmiyya party.⁸⁹

SUDANESE NATIONALISM AND THE ANGLO-EGYPTIAN DISPUTE

The Legislative Assembly of 1948, even though implemented unilaterally by Great Britain over Egyptian objections, was in general in keeping with the agreed policy of both the co-dominion to give the Sudanese a greater measure of self-government. This policy had been embodied in the 1946 Sidqi-Bevin protocol and remained the one point of agreement during the deadlock in the UN in 1947 and with the abrogation of the treaties in 1951. However, though the two powers agreed to grant their ward political training, up until now, the Sudanese had never been given a chance to voice their opinions in the Anglo-Egyptian negotiations. With the coming of the Egyptian Revolution of 1952, the Sudanese politicians entered the dispute for the first time and became the determining factor in forcing an agreement.

Just prior to the revolution, the Sudan Administration began to take further steps to broaden self-government. In April 1951 a Sudanese constitutional commission was established to look into the matter. Their efforts were incorporated into a draft self-government statute, however the commission was

89. Duncan, op. cit., (1952) p. 231.

dissolved in November after Egypt abrogated the 1936 Treaty and started passing decrees concerning the Sudan.⁹⁰ This draft statute was approved by the Sudanese Legislative Assembly on 2 April 1952,⁹¹ and was endorsed by the British Government on 22 October, subject "to the rights reserved to the co-domini."⁹² The next day the Legislative Assembly was dissolved leaving the Executive Council to conduct the business of the Government through provisional orders.

Egypt did not approve of all of the clauses of this draft, but instead of arguing with Great Britain, she negotiated directly with representatives of the major Sudanese political parties. Agreement was reached and the Sudanese endorsed Egyptian demands for changes in the draft. These demands, which were submitted in a note to Great Britain on 2 November 1952, basically called for the creation of two international commissions; one to supervise the Governor-General and the other to control the elections. In addition, the Revolutionary Government made a major about face in policy towards the Sudanese which placed them in an excellent bargaining position. The traditional Egyptian demand to sovereignty was finally dropped, and the Sudan was to be given her choice of either linking with Egypt in any form or choosing complete independence. This placed Britain in a very awkward position, for she had argued for Sudanese self-determination and possible

90. Holt, op. cit., (1961) p. 154.

91. Documents, op. cit., p. 52 - 53.

92. Hurewitz, op. cit., p. 335.

independence for years.⁹³

Egypt continued to court the Sudanese and on 10 January 1953 she signed an agreement with them in which they basically backed the Egyptian note of 2 November and threatened to boycott the Sudanese Administration if it was not implemented.⁹⁴ Anglo-Egyptian negotiations followed in which these points were ironed out and on 12 February 1953 an agreement was signed by Great Britain and Egypt providing for the self-government and self-determination of the Sudanese. This Agreement was basically the 1952 draft statute as amended by the Egyptian and Sudanese politicians. "The main provision of the Agreement was that the Sudan should reach freedom in three stages; there were country-wide elections for a Sudanese Parliament, the formation of a Sudanese Government, and a Sudanese decision within three years, whether to join Egypt or remain independent."⁹⁵

From this point on the developments towards Sudanese independence were primarily effected by the Sudanese themselves. With the signing of the 1953 Agreement, the long Anglo-Egyptian dispute over the Sudan came officially to an end. This agreement "raised the status of the Sudan itself from a mere geographical expression to that of a quasi-state de facto if not de jure; from the position of a girl arbitrarily betrothed to two suitors to that of a maiden,

93. Fabunmi, op. cit., p. 295.

94. Documents, op. cit., p. 49 - 51.

95. Fabunmi, op. cit., p. 297.

able to choose her own partner."⁹⁶

96. Ibid, p. 302.

CHAPTER 3. SELF-GOVERNMENT AND SELF-DETERMINATION

In general the 1953 Agreement set up a transitional period of self-government, limited to a maximum of three years after formation of a Sudanese Parliament. Throughout this period Sudanisation of the Army and civil service was to be carried out to replace all remaining British and Egyptian officials with Sudanese. Finally an elaborate system was detailed for termination of the transitional period and effecting self-determination. This was followed in spirit, but once the Sudanese had firm control over their Government they dictated their own method of self-determination.

The first step in this process was the formation of an all-Sudanese Parliament. On 21 March 1953 the Self-Government Statute was formally promulgated and on the 6th of April the Mixed Electoral Commission assembled with one British, one American, one Egyptian and three Sudanese members, and an Indian Chairman. This Commission made a number of changes in the Electoral Law, primarily to increase the number of direct electoral constituencies.⁹⁷

The period prior to the elections saw several re-groupings of the Sudanese politicians and was marked by charges and accusations of bribery and interference from all sides. Within the unionist ranks there had been troubles since the creation of the National Front in 1949. This had

97. Duncan, op. cit., p. 161.

been followed by another split in the weakened Ashigga Party between the followers of its president, al-Azhari, and its vice-president, Nur al-Din. Then in December 1952 more of the Khatmiyya politicians banned together with some of the Umma to form the Socialist Republican Party. This party was composed mainly of northern tribal notables who had been influential in the 1944 Advisory Council and the 1948 Legislative Assembly. These conservative chiefs feared the rising nationalistic group of Azhari and distrusted Sayid 'Abd al-Rahman al-Mahdi, "because of his wealth as a cotton-capitalist and his dynastic ambitions."⁹⁸ The general aims of this party were to pursue self-government with the possible goal of becoming a member of the British Commonwealth.

Following the Egyptian-Sudanese cooperation over the revision of the draft self-government statute, all the different pro-unity parties recombined into a united front called the National Unionist Party (N.U.P.). As Party leader, al-Azhari was once again the spokesman of the Sudanese bloc favoring unity with Egypt.

Just prior to the elections two more parties were formed which were to win seats in the elections in addition to the Umma, N.U.P. and Socialist Republican. The first of these was the Southern Party which was created to give voice to the new southern politicians who, while they all had different aims, felt a close bond in their "southernness."

98. Holt, op. cit., (1961) p. 161.

A second party, rumored to be communist, was called the Front Against Imperialism. The Sudanese Communist Party known as the Sudan Movement for National Liberation had developed as an offshoot of the Egyptian Party from cells of Sudanese students in Cairo during the 1940's. Their main influence was among the 20,000 members of the Railway Worker's Union. However, following a left wing victory in union elections in late 1950, an ordinance was passed prohibiting communist organizations. This was followed in 1951 by trials of Sudanese youths accused of communist activities.⁹⁹

The Electoral Commission had as one of its duties the investigation of charges of interference and illegal practices. It could establish no positive proof of such interference, but the co-domini certainly had ample opportunity to exert their influence; Great Britain through the presence of her civil service officials, and Egypt through her massive propaganda campaign organized by Major Salah Salim, the Egyptian Minister for National Guidance and Sudanese Affairs.¹⁰⁰

The elections, conducted during November and December 1953, resulted in an overwhelming victory for the pro-Egyptian N.U.P. This came as a surprise to the British, and it naturally greatly pleased the Egyptians. While the Revolutionary Government in Egypt had cleverly given up all claims to sovereignty over the Sudan, this no doubt was a gamble that out of

99. Laqueur, Walter Z., Communism and Nationalism In The Middle East. (London, 1957) p. 64 - 69; Fabunmi, op.cit., p. 334; and Duncan, op.cit., (1952) p. 265 - 267.

100. Fabunmi, op. cit., p. 339 - 340.

gratitude the Sudanese would choose to link up with their Egyptian "brothers." The victory of the N.U.P. seemed to vindicate this gamble.

This victory, however, was more an expression of a negative rather than a positive emotion. Rather than wanting unity with Egypt, the Sudanese were more interested in getting their freedom from the British; "hence the Umma and Socialist Republican parties, which were generally regarded as tools of the administration, lacked support. . . . The Sudanese nationalists were in fact repeating more subtly and far more successfully the tactics which had been crude and ineffective in 1924, of allying with Egypt to break the British hold on the Sudan."¹⁰¹ Also, in trying to analyse this pro-Egyptian victory, some observers stressed the involvement of sectarian issues; particularly the underlying fear of a second Mahdiyya Kingdom under Sir 'Abd al-Rahman al-Mahdi and his Umma Ansar. Finally, there was considerable faith in the Neguib regime with some feeling that a loose economic unity with Egypt would benefit the Sudan.¹⁰²

Following the elections appointments were made to the remaining 20 of the 50 seats in the Senate. The final distribution of seats from election and appointment was as follows:¹⁰³

-
101. Holt, *op. cit.*, (1961) p. 163.
 102. Fabunmi, *op. cit.*, p. 341 - 346.
 103. *Ibid.*

	<u>House</u>	<u>Senate</u>
National Unionist	51	31
Umma	22	8
Southern	9	6
Socialist Republican	3	1
Front Against Imperialism	1	0
Independents	<u>11</u>	<u>4</u>
	97	50

Despite this seeming victory for unity with Egypt, the events which followed in the next two years resulted in a gradual change of policy which culminated in the declaration of independence in December 1955.

In January 1954 when the Sudanese Parliament first met to elect a Prime Minister and speakers it seemed as if the process of self-government would lead to some sort of unity. Al-Azhari was elected Prime Minister and formed his cabinet entirely from N.U.P. members. The Umma and conservative Socialist Republican parties were relegated to the position of the defeated opposition. However, this opposition still had considerable strength if for no other reason than its ability to call on the politically naive masses of the Ansar. This strength was clearly evidenced on the occasion of the formal opening of Parliament on 1 March. General Neguib and other foreign dignitaries had been invited to attend this session. The Umma had imported large groups of the Ansar to demonstrate against the Egyptian delegation.

A clash occurred in Khartoum in which several people were killed; as a result the opening of Parliament was postponed until 10 March and a state of emergency declared. This incident did nothing to strengthen the Umma position, but it made it clear to the N.U.P. leaders that unity with Egypt might result in a civil war.¹⁰⁴

SUDANISATION

A major factor which helped give the Sudanese the freedom to follow their own path to self-determination was the process of Sudanisation. In the early days of the Condominium, and particularly in 1924, Sudanisation meant the placement of Sudanese in the civil service and army to replace the remaining Egyptians. The process was accelerated in 1946 when an Anglo-Sudanese committee was appointed to consider the problem. This committee recommended that 62.2 percent of the posts held by non-Sudanese should be Sudanised by the end of 1962. "In 1947 the recruitment of expatriate officials on pensionable terms ceased, although long-term contracts continued to be offered, and these seemed likely to preserve the mainly British composition of the Political Service in particular for another twenty years."¹⁰⁵

This process of Sudanisation was changed from its gradual, practical nature to an abrupt, wholesale exchange by the 1953 Agreement. This Agreement established a mixed

104. Holt, op. cit., (MEJ) Part II, p. 375; and Shibeika, op. cit., p. 490.

105. Holt, op. cit., (1961) p. 153 - 154.

commission of one British, one Egyptian and three Sudanese, "to complete the Sudanisation of the Administration, the Police, the Sudan Defence Force, and any other Government post that may affect the freedom of the Sudanese at the time of Self-Determination. The Committee shall review the various Government posts with a view to cancelling any unnecessary or redundant post held by British or Egyptian officials."¹⁰⁶

This Sudanisation Committee held its first meeting on 24 February 1954. From the start it became obvious that the Sudanese members, along with the Egyptian representative, "were determined to make wholesale recommendations for the Sudanisation of the majority of posts held by British irrespective of the scope for 'interference' and of the availability of replacements."¹⁰⁷ At this time there were about 140 British civil servants, eight police officers and thirty army officers in the Defense Force. These were all dismissed with compensation in 1954. British technicians were also forced out except where absolutely necessary. Others saw the end to their career and took advantage of a law passed by the Sudanese Parliament in July 1954 granting them generous compensation.¹⁰⁸ The attitude of these British officials helped the Sudanese make up their minds about their future: "Time vindicated the British. They quickly realized that no useful purpose was served by holding to posts of diminishing power and influence, and co-operated fully with the Sudani-

106. Duncan, *op. cit.*, (1957) p. 153 - 154.

107. *Ibid*, p. 182.

108. Holt, *op. cit.*, (1961) p. 165.

sation programme. The people of the Sudan, seeing the British withdrawing while the Egyptian leaders, such as Major Salah Salim, behaved as though they were already masters of the Sudan, transferred their resistance to the Egyptians."¹⁰⁹

SELF-DETERMINATION

During 1954 al-Azhari's Government still outwardly favored unity. In fact, in December he dismissed three Cabinet Ministers who openly favored independence. They promptly formed a new party, the Republican Independence Party, which announced its aim as being a fully independent Sudanese Republic which would cooperate with Egypt on economic and cultural matters.¹¹⁰

However, behind this official facade was a growing mistrust of Egyptian intentions and a gradual shift towards the idea of full independence. Events within Egypt as well as the Egyptian methods used to acquire influence in the 1953 Sudanese elections all contributed to this move. In November 1954, the dispute between Colonel Nasser and General Neguib resulted in Neguib's dismissal from effective power. General Neguib was well liked in the Sudan. He had been born in Khartoum by the Sudanese wife of an Egyptian Army officer and had been educated at the Gordon Memorial College.¹¹¹ Expressions of "unity" and "brotherhood" sounded

109. Little, op. cit., p. 242.

110. Fisher, Sydney N., The Middle East. (New York, 1959) p. 639.

111. Fabunmi, op. cit., p. 292.

quite natural when voiced by him, and the major about face in Egyptian policy towards the Sudan had come during his leadership of the Revolutionary Government. His dismissal came as a great disappointment to many Sudanese and revealed the dictatorial nature of the Egyptian regime.

At the same time Egyptian-Sudanese talks were going on in Cairo and Khartoum in an attempt to come to an agreement over revision of the 1929 Nile Waters Agreement. These negotiations had been prompted by Egypt's declared plan to construct a new Aswan High Dam whose water would flood Sudanese land. The Egyptian intransigence in granting any fair concessions followed by the complete failure of these talks in April 1955 was another indication of the possible nature of future relations should the Sudan choose unity with Egypt. Finally, Nasser's repression of the Egyptian Communists and the Muslim Brotherhood antagonized the young educated Sudanese, who were attracted to these extremist groups.¹¹²

The Sudanese Government could not ignore the growing popular desire for full independence. Finally on 16 March 1955, al-Azhari committed himself for the first time publicly as favoring full independence.¹¹³ Again in May after his return from the Bandung Conference he pledged to work for independence and full sovereignty. Positive steps in this direction were taken in June when he dismissed two Cabinet Ministers who still favored unity and in August when he met

112. Holt, op. cit., (1961) p. 166.

113. Duncan, op. cit., (1957) p. 189.

with Umma leaders to discuss future Parliamentary action.¹¹⁴

Events now moved rapidly towards self-determination. On 31 July the Sudanisation Committee reported its work finished. Of 1,222 posts studied, 734 had been Sudanised. Of the remaining 488, 281 were abolished and the rest which were occupied by British and Egyptian officials were not considered of the type which could sway the Sudanese vote during self-determination. On 16 August the Parliament requested that all Anglo-Egyptian troops be evacuated within 90 days in preparation for self-determination. This was completed by 12 November, despite the disrupting effect of a serious mutiny of southern Sudanese army units between 17 August and early September.¹¹⁵

On 29 August the Sudanese Parliament asked the co-domini permission to hold a plebiscite. This was agreed to by Egypt in October and Great Britain in November, after which the Parliament proposed the holding of elections for the constituent assembly simultaneously with the plebiscite. This also was approved by the co-domini early in December.¹¹⁶

Meanwhile, Azhari's control over the Government was weakening. His dismissal of his N.U.P. rivals from the Cabinet and his increasing reliance on the old Ashigga faction was causing him difficulties. On 10 November he lost a vote of confidence by 49 to 45, but on 15 November was reelected

114. Ibid, p. 190 and Middle East Journal, v. 9, No. 4, Autumn 1955, chronology.

115. Middle East Journal, Ibid.

116. Ibid, v. 10, No. 1, chronology.

by a vote of 48 to 46. In addition, the Umma and other opposition parties were pressing for a coalition government for the period of self-determination. They rightly wanted to share the glory of the Sudan achieving independence. These forces combined to bring great pressure on Azhari after an unprecedented meeting of the two venerable Sayids, 'Ali al-Mirghani and 'Abd al-Rahman in early December. On 6 December Azhari announced his agreement to form a coalition government, but on the condition that the existing Parliament would be the vehicle for both the plebiscite and the constituent assembly.¹¹⁷

The final step in self-determination came when on 19 December 1955 the House of Representatives unanimously adopted a resolution declaring Sudan's independence and requesting Egypt and Britain to recognize the declaration. This was followed by a unanimous approval in the Senate three days later. A transitional constitution was adopted providing for a five-man commission to assume the duties of the Governor-General. Consequently, on 1 January 1956, with the lowering of the Egyptian and English flags and the raising of one new Sudanese flag, the Republic of the Sudan was born.

LEGACY OF THE CONDOMINIUM

Thus the long Condominium, which in effect had been replaced by the 1953 Anglo-Egyptian Agreement, officially came to an end. This Administration had had a definite

117. Ibid, v. 10, No. 2, chronology.

effect on the Sudanese in their development towards independence. On the positive side it brought certain Western advances to an area which in 1899 had been extremely backward. It brought relative peace and calm and a well organized administration in which the Sudanese could devote their efforts to advancing their position. It provided educational facilities and governmental experience which enabled the Sudanese to progress towards self-government. Through its health projects, Gezira scheme and improvement of communications facilities, it stimulated the move towards a much higher standard of living.

At the same time there were certain disadvantages to the Condominium system. Externally the conflicting interests of the co-domini and their competitive struggle for power and influence over the Sudan accentuated internal differences within the Sudan. The Mahdiyya had done much to destroy tribalism, but the British in the Administration revitalized this system through their reliance on the traditional chiefs as agents of the Government. The Egyptians, virtually excluded from actual participation in the Administration, worked among the new Sudanese intelligensia spreading ideas of nationalism. Egypt pulled her supporters in the Sudan towards unity; Great Britain implanted the desire for full independence. Then also there was the natural antagonism between the Khatmiyya and the Ansar. This division was accentuated as the Egyptians backed Sayid 'Ali al-Mirghani and the Bri-

tish his opponent, Sayid 'Abd al-Rahman al-Mahdi. Finally there was the natural difference between the Moslem Arab north and the Pagan Negroid south. The British at first excluded not only the Egyptians, but northern Sudanese as well from the south. By the time this policy was changed, it was too late to hope that both areas would enter the independent phase on equal footing with full confidence in each other.

Once the Sudanese gained sufficient control over their Government, they were able to temporarily forget their differences and unite in a common stand to end the Condominium. But the minute the co-dominion left the scene, all these varied Sudanese factions started drifting apart again. And while Great Britain could recede in the distance, Egypt remained as a powerful neighbor, and a co-user of the waters of the Nile. Cooperation with Egypt was hindered by the second place position she had held during the Condominium. For years Egypt had demanded full sovereignty over the Sudan; then as she changed her official policy, she employed an intense campaign to win the Sudanese over to a subordinate position in a "union." Once the Sudanese decided against unity, they kept a friendly but respectful distance from their northern neighbor. The mutual suspicion and anxiety between the two countries resulted in one of the biggest problems the Sudan inherited from the Condominium.

In the preceding chapters, an attempt has been made to examine the conflicting interests which resulted in the

creation of the Condominium, and to describe the nature of its implementation. The effect this dual rule had on the emerging Sudanese nationalism, particularly in the final steps leading up to self-determination has been discussed in some detail. Certain problems left by the Condominium, particularly the separation of the north and south, and control of Nile Waters have only been alluded to briefly, primarily because they normally developed and were treated separate from the general political scene. However, this exclusion does not imply that these matters were unimportant -- they had a great deal to do with the failure of parliamentary life in the independent Sudan. At this point, then, let us go back and examine these problems -- in the framework of the Condominium -- and see how they, along with the legacy of political factionalism, effected the history of the Republic of the Sudan.

PART II - INDEPENDENCE AND ITS PROBLEMS

CHAPTER 4. THE SOUTH: "THE SOUTHERN POLICY" AND ITS LEGACY

BACKGROUND AND EARLY POLICY

In the preceeding chapter we have seen how the newly independent Republic of The Sudan acquired its independence from the co-domini, and how this unique form of administration left a legacy of peculiar problems which needed immediate attention.

That the south was a problem had been dramatically brought to the forefront by the mutiny in August 1955. Then also, the group of southern politicians in the Parliament were always of an unknown quality which each of the two major blocs were trying to win over to their respective sides. Their agreement to the last minute maneuvers towards independence had been obtained only by vague promises to consider their desire for a federal system of government.¹¹⁸ What then was behind this "secession" movement? Had the Condominium contributed to its growth, and what were the real elements of this southern problem which faced the independent Sudan?

To begin with we must take a closer look at the physical nature of the south. The area consists of the three southern provinces -- Upper Nile, Bahr al-Gazal and Equatoria -- which lie mostly below the 10th parallel. Politically they

118. Kilner, Peter, "A Year of Army Rule In The Sudan," The World Today, v. 15, No. 11, p. 435.

are part of the Republic of the Sudan, but there the similarity ends. Their connection with the Sudan goes back to the days of the conquest by Muhammad 'Ali. However, although he controlled most of northern Sudan shortly after his invasion in 1820, this southern area only came under Egyptian rule very gradually, and was not fully a part of the Sudan until just shortly prior to the Mahdiyya revolt.¹¹⁹

With the reconquest it was assumed that these southern provinces had been regained along with the rest in the battle of Omdurman in 1898, but for a few months this political fact was threatened by the French occupation of Fashoda -- a village on the White Nile near the present-day town of Kodok.¹²⁰ This dispute was settled by diplomatic measures in Europe and when in 1899 the Condominium came into effect, the south was politically a part of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan.

This political delineation of the Sudan had little relationship to either ethnic or natural divisions. In the north the border at the 22nd parallel arbitrarily divided the Nubians along the Nile leaving some in Egypt and others in the Sudan, but to the east agreements were made to grant each country administration over tribes which extended across the border. In the south, however, the border is even more arbitrary. The three Southern Provinces are generally cut off from the rest of the Sudan by either the barren desert or the vast swampy Sudd. But the international border

119. Shibeika, op. cit., Chpt I, II

120. Ibid, Chpt XVII

separating this area from the African countries to the south cuts across tribal lands and in general follows no natural line such as a river or prominent mountain range. Thus the Negroid south has as much if not more connection with its African neighbors than it does with the northern Sudanese. Some tribes such as the Zande in Equatoria still cross back and forth with no regard to the frontier.

These southern provinces are different from the rest of the Sudan in many ways. In area the south consists of approximately one-third of the country. In population it also has about one-third. While all of the Sudan consists of an admixture of peoples and terrain, it can be said generally that the North is mostly desert with Arabs living near and depending on the Nile. In the south, again generally speaking, the land is mostly rain-grown savannah plains on which live pagan African Negroes. In the north the Sudanese had had contact with 19th Century civilization through the Egyptian rule, and were living along the Nile in a manner similar to the Egyptians. Most of them spoke Arabic and were Moslems. In the south the difficulties of communication off the river had discouraged the advance of civilization and the people lived as numerous close tribal units speaking a myriad of languages, worshiping equally as many gods, and raiding each other constantly. To the Dinka, Shilluk, Nuer and other tribes, their entire existence was their cattle. Cattle provided food, were used as a means of exchange and

were the topic of conversation and poetry.

This then was the general picture facing the Condominium Administration. In the north the Sudanese had a semblance of Arab culture. "They were uneducated by Western standards, but there were sufficient numbers in the town who were prepared to be educated, and to be law-abiding, to enable a start to be made almost at once."¹²¹ In the south, however, the first task was pacification of the tribes and settlement where possible to ensure an atmosphere of law and order in which advances could be made. This task was anything but simple -- primarily because of the inaccessability of much of the area. It was a very slow process -- even in the late 1920's the Nuer of Upper Nile were still raiding from almost impenetrable marshes.¹²² Education and development of this area was not considered seriously for years by the administration. "There was also probably in the back of the minds of the officials at the time the not unreasonable thought that the south might best be administered by, and become part of, Uganda and possibly Kenya."¹²³ At the very least, these early administrators considered the south to be a separate entity needing special measures.

One of these special provisions was the position given to Christian missions. Missionaries had come to the Sudan as early as 1848,¹²⁴ but had been evicted during the Mahdiyya

121. Duncan, op. cit., (1957) p. 60.

122. MacMichael, op. cit., p. 97.

123. Duncan, op. cit., (1957) p. 61.

124. Republic of The Sudan, Southern Sudan Disturbances August 1955. (Khartoum, 1956) p. 5.

period. After the reconquest they returned in force -- probably in part due to the great interest given by the European press to Africa in those days. Those who came to the Sudan were forbidden to proselytise in the north, but the whole south was divided into spheres of influence between the various foreign Christian missionary bodies.¹²⁵ What education was attempted of the natives was left in the hands of these missionaries. The administration, pressed for funds and preoccupied with the rapidly advancing north, was quite willing to put off its responsibilities in the south. When later in 1927 it was felt that some steps must be taken, the government subsidized the already existing missionary schools rather than create another system.¹²⁶ However, this economic expedient had repercussions later; for, by allowing the missions to carry out administration responsibilities, the government was granting them a privileged position from which they could press their own interests later.

A second special provision was that relating to control over movement of northern Sudanese in the south. The reason usually given for this is based on the slave trade which had flourished in the 18th and 19th centuries when the south was raided by Egyptian and northern Sudanese Arabs. Evidently early administrators of the Condominium felt that the southerners hated and feared the northerners -- who at the same time, it was assumed, would continue to exploit their more backward

125. Duncan, op. cit., (1957) p. 61.

126. Sudan Disturbances, op. cit., p. 5.

brothers in the south. In fact the slave trade had almost disappeared by the time of the Mahdia, and there was little likelihood that it could have been revived under the noses of the British administrators.¹²⁷ Nonetheless, "vigorous precautions, amounting to a virtual exclusion of the northern Sudanese, were taken to prevent a recurrence of the trade."¹²⁸ Another quote from an official Sudan Administration report in 1947 reads, "The confidence of these people could only be won by building up a protective barrier against northern merchants, which later crystallised into what is called the 'Southern Policy'."¹²⁹

THE "SOUTHERN POLICY" IN PRACTICE

This "policy" was at first unofficial and was merely a natural reaction to the existing differences between the north and the south previously enumerated. However, once pacification was practically completed and the administration might have considered measures towards integration, this "policy" was officially adopted. On 25 January 1930, the Civil Secretary, Mr. Harold MacMichael, issued a directive to the Governors of the three Southern Provinces which said: "The policy of the Government in the Southern Sudan is: to build up a series of self contained racial or tribal units with structure and organization based, to whatever extent the

127. Holt, op. cit., p. 148.

128. Ibid, p. 122.

129. Sudan Government, The Sudan - A Record of Progress (Khartoum, 1948) p. 12.

requirements of equity and good government permit, upon indigenous customs, traditional usage and beliefs."¹³⁰ To carry out this policy it was decided that the administrative, clerical, and technical staff should be all non-Arabic speaking; English should be used whenever communication in the local vernacular was impossible; and strict control was to be exercised over the northern traders.

The effect of this policy was to make the three Southern Provinces a closed area with little or no connection with the rest of the country. Practically all northern officials were transferred out; Moslem northern traders were refused licenses to trade; Islam was suppressed; and Arabic as a school language was abolished. Even the long, loose Gallabia robe worn by the Arabs of Egypt and northern Sudan was banned from the south and anyone with an Arabic name was forced to change it! "For eighteen years whilst the Northern Sudan progressed in practically every field, much of the time, the energy and the money of the administration in the Southern Sudan was spent on trying to introduce a new lingua franca, and to destroy whatever influence there was of Northern language, habits, traditions, and beliefs."¹³¹

This "Southern Policy," introduced and enforced by the Administration, was certainly implemented willingly by the missions in their role as educators of the southerners. "The missions, not unaturally, saw in the religion and the

130. Southern Disturbances, op. cit., p. 16.

131. Ibid, p. 17.

language of the north a challenge to their activities. They therefore took every opportunity in their teaching of religion and history to keep the memory of slavery alive."¹³² This was unfortunate in that in addition to the already existing differences between the north and south, now further barriers of religion and language were being created.

The northern Sudanese were not unaware of this Southern Policy. The growing nationalistic group of Sudanese feared a secession of the three Southern Provinces just as the Egyptian nationalists feared loss of sovereignty over the entire Sudan. Several events occurred in the 1940's which brought these fears to light and forced the Sudan Administration to abandon the Southern Policy.

The first event was the creation of the Advisory Council for Northern Sudan in 1944 as a direct response to militant demands of Sudanese nationalism. As discussed earlier¹³³ this concession was criticized as falling far short of the nationalists' aspirations, but in addition, the exclusion of representatives from the Southern Provinces resulted in the charge that the south was to be joined with Uganda.¹³⁴ The Sudan Administration did little to allay these fears at first. In an official publication discussing progress during the first 50 years it was noted that: "the Northern Sudanese fear that the ultimate result may be to split the

132. Abbas, op. cit., p. 176.

133. See Chapter 2, page 40.

134. Holt, op. cit., p. 147 - 150.

country in half, and even to attach the southern part of the South to Uganda." The real damage was done, however, when they said: "The arguments whether such a course would be to the ultimate advantage of the southern Sudan or to the rest of Africa are many on both sides and the whole question might at some date form a proper subject for consideration by an international commission."¹³⁵

Another incident which added pressure was the airing of the matter in the United Nations Security Council in 1947. Egypt was primarily pressing for her own real independence free from British troops or influence, but in those days she was still linking this demand with claims to sovereignty over the Sudan. In a letter dated 6 July 1947 in which Egypt formally submitted her case, she claimed among other things that, "Britain had adopted a policy designed to sever the Sudan from Egypt by discrediting Egypt and the Egyptians, creating discord between Egyptians and the Sudanese, and causing dissension among the Sudanese themselves by instigating and encouraging artificial separatist movements."¹³⁶ When the debate opened on 5 August the Egyptian delegate Nokrashy Pasha charged that British Officials in the Sudan, in anticipation of failure to separate the Sudan from Egypt, had attempted to divide the Sudan itself by severing the south from the north.¹³⁷ In all the debates which followed, no

135. Record of Progress, op. cit., p. 14.

136. Fabunmi, op. cit., p. 249.

137. Ibid, p. 251.

agreement was reached and no resolution was passed but undoubtedly they did contribute to the realization of the Sudan Administration that this policy was causing more harm than good.

Just prior to the UN debate the Sudan Administration had decided to grant the Sudanese nationalist a closer hand in the government than had been the case with the 1944 Advisory Council. In April 1946 a Sudan Administration Conference was formed, representing the existing political parties, to recommend what steps should be taken. This Conference recommended the abolition of the Advisory Council and the establishment of a legislative assembly which would include representatives from the south. In their report they stated: "We are fully aware of the relative backwardness of the peoples of the southern Provinces and the advances which they must make before they can reach the height of civilization attained by many peoples in the North. But at the same time a decision must be made, and made now, that the Sudan should be administered as one country. Though parts may lag behind, yet the aim of the whole is the same and there is no reason why the peoples of the southern Provinces in the relatively near future should not reach a degree of civilization which will enable them to play their full part in the progressive development of the Sudan.

"A majority of members wish to record their opinion that the unification of the Sudanese people would be greatly

assisted by the abolition of the Permits to Trade Order, 1928, the adoption of one educational policy for North and South, the improvement of communications between the two parts, the encouragement of transfer of officials between North and South and the unification of the system of establishment."¹³⁸

Great Britain accepted the recommendations of this conference and the "Southern Policy" officially came to an end. A new policy statement was issued replacing that made by the Civil Secretary in 1930. This new policy charged the administration, "To act upon the facts that the peoples of the Southern Sudan are distinctly African and Negroid, but that geography and economics combine (so far as can be foreseen at the present time) to render them inextricably mixed to the middle Eastern and arabicised Northern Sudan: and therefore to ensure that they shall, by educational and economic development be equipped to stand up for themselves in the future as socially and economically the equals of their partners of the Northern Sudan in the Sudan of the future."¹³⁹

The next step was to sound out the views of the southerners on this change of policy. For this purpose a conference was held in Juba, the capital of the Province of Equatoria, in June 1947 between the Civil Secretary, Sir James Robertson and leading southerners.¹⁴⁰ Despite some misgivings

138. Duncan, op. cit., (1957) p. 196 - 197.

139. Southern Disturbances, op. cit., p. 18.

140. Holt, op. cit., p. 153.

concerning their relative development as compared with the north, the southerners agreed to participate in the legislature. "Fear of white supremacy precluded any consideration of a common future with the territories of British East Africa; while every thinking Southerner could plainly see that the South by itself was not a viable country."¹⁴¹ In the elections which followed in late 1948, 13 southerners were picked to represent their constituencies in the assembly. These representatives were elected by the already existing Province Councils; five for Equatoria, four for Upper Nile, and four for Bahr el-Gazal.¹⁴²

Whatever doubts the Sudan Administration might have had over relinquishing their Southern Policy, from this point on they took positive steps to integrate the south with the north. Of immediate importance was the opening of the three Provinces to travel by northern Sudanese -- traders and politicians. In 1950 the Legislative Assembly decided that Arabic would be taught in all government schools and in all private (missionary) schools above elementary level in the south. In addition, southern students seeking higher education were now sent to Gordon College in Khartoum, instead of Makerere College in Uganda as previously.¹⁴³

THE SOUTH AS AN ISSUE IN NEGOTIATIONS AND POLITICS

Prior to 1948 the problem of the south did not actively

141. Atiyah, Edward, "The Southern Sudan and its Future," Spectator, 22 August 1952, p. 233.

142. Documents, op. cit., p. 31.

143. Abbas, op. cit., p. 175.

enter into the greater Anglo-Egyptian-Sudanese dispute. We have seen how the Southern Policy developed, but this was an internal matter of little interest in the conference rooms. However, once southerners were sitting in the assembly in Khartoum with their bloc of votes, the south became a popular area for northern politicians. Later Egyptian agents such as the "dancing major," Salah Salim, penetrated the south and added to the tension. Further, Egypt's introduction of this problem into the UN in 1947 was to be repeated in every future negotiation with the British. This sudden increase of sophisticated political activity in an area which desperately needed the more basic benefits of modern civilization started a chain reaction which erupted in the mutiny in 1955.

Following the 1947 UN debates, the first high level Anglo-Egyptian negotiations took place in December 1950 between the Egyptian Foreign Minister and the British Foreign Secretary. Among other matters discussed was the Egyptian charge that Britain had separated the north from the south. Salah Eddin Bey insisted that "four-fifths of the Sudanese are Arabs and Moslems speaking the Arabic language" and that Britain had "prevented the people of the north from contacting those of the south and at the same time encouraged Christian Missions to practice their activities there." But now Mr. Bevin could retort that the south was represented in the all-Sudan Legislative Assembly and southerners were taking posts as civil servants all over the Sudan.¹⁴⁴

144. RIIA, op. cit., p. 133 - 139.

The breakdown of negotiations, finalized by the unilateral Egyptian abrogation of the Condominium in October 1951, was followed by the report of the Sudanese Constitutional Commission which had met in the Summer and Fall of 1951 to draft a self-government statute. This draft, approved by the Sudanese Legislature on 2 April 1952, granted the Governor-General special powers concerning the south. Article 100 read: "The Governor-General shall have a special responsibility for the public service and for the Southern Provinces. It shall be his duty to ensure fair and equitable treatment both for members of the public service, whose contractual rights and interests shall be safeguarded and for the Southern Provinces, whose special interests shall be protected."¹⁴⁵

This clause had been included in the draft only after much discussion. Two attitudes prevailed. On the one hand some officials felt: "Without protection the southerners will not be able to develop along indigenous lines, will be overwhelmed and swamped by the north and deteriorate into a servile community hewing wood and drawing water. To pretend that there are not fundamental differences between them is like covering up a crack in a tree trunk with moss. Such a process, like any obscuring of the truth, is unsound." Others felt: "To include a specific safeguard will only arouse old suspicion in the North and intensify a wound that is beginning to heal. It will also increase the feeling of inferiority possessed by many southerners. As long as the Governor-General can inter-

145. Documents, op. cit., p. 90.

vene, then perhaps it is all right. But once British influence wanes and becomes impotent it will not matter what safeguards or charters have been created. They will make no difference."¹⁴⁶

The southerners themselves were in agreement with the inclusion of this special clause. The majority of southern leaders were Christian trained, and in their loyalty to the missions, still had doubts about close association with the Moslem Arab north. However, with the provision that there be two southerners in the proposed Council of Ministers, and secure in the Governor-General's special powers to look after their interests, they agreed.¹⁴⁷

So with these misgivings the Sudan Administration submitted the draft statute to the British and Egyptian Governments in May 1952. The British Government approved it in October, but Egypt refused, maintaining that such a clause was only a ruse to give the British the partition they desired. Anglo-Egyptian negotiations over the draft statute opened in November. Egypt demanded the removal of the clause but Great Britain maintained her position. Finally Egypt and representatives of the northern Sudanese political parties agreed on a compromise behind Great Britain's back. The final revised clause which was included in the 12 February 1953 Agreement read: "The Governor-General shall have a special responsibility to ensure fair and equitable treatment

146. Duncan, op. cit., (1957) 197 - 198.

147. Atiyah, op. cit., p. 233.

to all inhabitants of the various provinces of the Sudan."¹⁴⁸

Thus the result of all this discussion was that no special safeguards were guaranteed for the south, and the dispute had stirred up emotions that had lay dormant since 1948. It was in this charged atmosphere that the south had to feel its way through the self-government period.

With the signing of the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement on 12 February 1953, all the Sudan entered a phase of intense political activity in which the numerous factions, both internal and foreign, struggled for realization of their goals. The Southern Provinces, though they added their voice in the arena, were primarily the recipients of outside attention. However, not to be left behind in the political race, the southern leaders formed the Southern Liberal Party during the activity preceeding the parliamentary elections. The members of this party had divergent platforms; "some endorsed the Northerners' commitment to a unitary state, whilst others advocated a limited autonomy to the North and the South within a federated Sudan. Some supported union with Egypt, others favored membership of the British Commonwealth, whilst others supported the advocates for complete independence of the Sudan."¹⁴⁹ The one common characteristic of the party members was that they were all southerners and had Christian or pagan backing in opposition to the Arab

148. Documents, op. cit., p. 90.

149. Fabunmi, op. cit., p. 333.

Moslem north. The party president was a Roman Catholic priest, Saturnino Luhure.¹⁵⁰

In addition to this new party, the major northern parties campaigned in the south for votes and nominated southerners to represent them in the various constituencies. When the voting was completed in December 1953, there were 22 southern deputies elected or selected to the 147-member Parliament -- i.e., approximately one-half of their share of the seats considering that they represent about one-third of the population. Twelve of these deputies were from the Southern Party, six from the N.U.P. and four were independents.¹⁵¹

Since al-Azhari's pro-union N.U.P. won a clear majority in both the house and the senate, the Southern liberals found themselves members of the opposition along with the Umma and Socialist Republican parties. Shortly after the new parliament opened, Umma Party delegates began visiting the south to try to win support in their attempt to undermine the N.U.P. Government. Meetings were held only to be followed by counter meetings of southern N.U.P. members. On 18 August 1954, Azhari's Government issued a warning that they, "were fully aware of the conspiracies that are being worked out in the South," and threatened that they, "shall use the force of iron in dealing with any Southerner who will dare attempt to divide the nation."¹⁵²

150. Gosnell, op. cit., p. 415.

151. Southern Disturbances, op. cit., p. 20.

152. Ibid, p. 21.

Finally a second Juba Conference was called by the Southern Liberals in October for all elements opposing the Government. Prime Minister Azhari tried to mollify them by sending letters to influential tribal chiefs, and by announcing raises of some salaries for members of the administration in the south -- this was taken as a bribe and an insult. Finally he flew south on a tour to bring his personal influence to bear -- only to have an attempt made on his life at Malakal on 23 October.¹⁵³

The Juba Conference was held and passed a resolution demanding federal status with the north. This idea of federation, long dormant among the emerging southern voice, became stronger and stronger from this point on; and became a major factor in the southern problem contributing to the collapse of parliamentary government in 1958.

Troubles between the south and the north now began to multiply. Except for a few southern members of the N.U.P., the rest were united in their opposition against Azhari. In May 1955, even two of the southern N.U.P. Ministers left the Cabinet due to disagreement with the Prime Minister on southern affairs. Then in early July a third Juba Conference met to close southern ranks.

In late July a southern M.P., Sayed Elia Kuze, was imprisoned after a trial which "at best can only be described as a travesty."¹⁵⁴ Sayed Kuze had been holding meetings in

153. Middle East Journal, v. 9, No. 1, Chronology.

154. Southern Disturbances, op. cit., p. 22.

the Zande District of Equatoria Province, opposing Azhari's Government in general, the northern Sudan in particular, and favoring unity of the south with Egypt. He was tried on 25 July by a Chiefs' Court and charged with criminal intimidation as he had tried to get certain chiefs removed from office who had signed an unpopular "Declaration of Support of the Government." He was sentenced to two years imprisonment.¹⁵⁵

This trial was followed on 26 July by a riot of 1000 workmen in Nzara, Equatoria. The riot was in protest to Kuze's conviction, but behind it was both communist agitation during the summer and the dismissal of 300 workers from the Zande Scheme during the month of July. During the demonstration, units of the Southern Corps of the Sudan Defense Force panicked and shot into the mobs, killing six Azande and wounding many others. While these troops were southerners, their officers were northern Sudanese. Also, two northern merchants present at the incident shot into the unarmed crowds. Later the rumor spread that these two northerners had done all the killing.¹⁵⁶ This incident was followed by another threatening ultimatum from Khartoum.

Not to be outdone by the north, eight southern leaders went to Cairo on 2 August and announced that they wanted independent status for the south with only a general federation link with the north. They attacked Azhari for

155. Ibid, p. 91 - 94.

156. Ibid, p. 97 - 101.

oppressive measures he had used in the south and appealed to Egypt for help.¹⁵⁷ Since in the previous May Azhari had publicly dropped the idea of unity with Egypt and declared that his Government's policy was now for complete independence, this southern secession movement and sudden friendship with Egypt only heightened the break of relationships between the north and south.

THE MUTINY

The incidents related above culminated in the mutiny throughout most of the south during the month of August, 1955. However, they were not the sole causes of the mutiny. In addition to the general legacy left by the Southern Policy of 1902 - 1948, there was also the harmful reaction to Sudanisation as carried out in the Southern Provinces. It will be remembered that the Self-Government Statute embodied in the 1953 Agreement called for Sudanisation of the Administration, Police and Sudan Defense Force within a period of three years.

This change-over caused some disruption to administration in the north, but nothing like it did in the south. For, in the north there were numerous Sudanese serving in governmental posts who could move up into executive positions. This was not the case in the south where the majority of the Administration was staffed by British. Since there were few qualified southerners to fill these posts, more experienced northern Sudanese were imported into the area. And, while

157. Middle East Journal, v. 9, No. 4, Chronology.

these northerners were for the most part new to the higher responsibilities of administration, they "were particularly at a disadvantage in dealing with the south from which they had been virtually excluded until less than ten years previously."¹⁵⁸ They had little knowledge of the south and its problems, and were unfamiliar with the many languages of that area. The result was that even though the southerners were represented by their politicians in Khartoum, this voice was a minority in the ineffectual opposition. The actual immediate hand of the Government -- the Province Governors, the District Commissioners, Administration officials, police chiefs and army officers were all northerners.

Sudanisation had been an issue in the political campaigns of 1953 and both the N.U.P. and Egyptian agents had promised that southerners would be given the vacated positions in their Provinces. When the decisions of the Sudanisation Committee were made known, extreme disappointment and frustration was felt by the southerners. At the same time, there arose the fear that the south would be dominated by the north through these officials.¹⁵⁹

The southern mutiny broke out on a full scale on 17 August 1955 with the rebellion of two companies of the Equatoria Corps at Torit. This incident had been preceded by a conspiracy and other minor isolated events, and was followed by a general uprising throughout all three Provinces

158. Holt, op. cit., p. 166.

159. Southern Disturbances, op. cit., p. 110 - 113.

during the period of 18 - 30 August. As this mutiny came at a critical time in the parliamentary maneuvers towards independence, and as it forced the Southern Problem out into the open once and for all, it is important to examine just how it took place and what were its causes. For while it was suppressed through stiff military measures, the problems it emphasized remained to plague the Republic of the Sudan immediately after achieving independence.

The initial incident leading to the mutiny occurred at Torit on 6 August when a southern soldier shot an arrow at a northern assistant post master, missed, and injured another soldier instead. During the investigation which followed, documents were discovered disclosing a conspiracy to mutiny in the Southern Corps of the Sudan Defense Force. It was revealed that members of this unit were in contact with the Southern Liberal Party, had heard that northern troops were to be sent into the southern Provinces, and had planned to kill their senior officers (northerners) as the rumor had spread that the northern troops were coming to kill southerners. This coup d'etat involved non-commissioned officers of units in all three Provinces. (The Southern Corps was composed primarily of men recruited from the three Southern Provinces. Only the senior officers were foreign to the area -- northerners who had replaced British during Sudanisation. No northern troops were stationed in the south prior to the mutiny.)

The basis of this rumor was a fictitious telegram

purported to have been sent by Azhari in the beginning of July 1955. It read: "To all my administrators in the three Southern Provinces: I have just signed a document for Self-Determination. Do not listen to the childish complaints of the Southerners. Persucute them, oppress them, ill-treat them according to my orders. Any administrator who fails to comply with my orders will be liable to prosecution. In three months time all of you will come round and enjoy the work you have done."¹⁶⁰ The investigation which followed the mutiny revealed that this telegram had been sent out by an unidentified southern clerk in Juba. It was received by one of the ring leaders of the coup who changed the heading to, "To my Northern Officers in the Southern Corps." He then called a meeting of southern NCO's on 20 July and used this ficticious telegram to stir up hatred and instill the desire for mutiny.

No immediate action was taken in the light of this discovery, but on 10 August a part of a company of northern troops did arrive in Juba. In view of the tense situation, there began an evacuation of the families of the northern officers from Torit, and on 14 August orders were issued for Number Two Company of the Southern Corps, stationed at Torit, to proceed to Khartoum on the 18th. This order resulted in intensification of the rumors and fears of the southerners, and on 17 August the mutiny began with the refusal of this unit to leave Torit and the outbreak of fighting between it

160. Ibid, p. 25 - 29, 82.

and some loyalist troops.

During the period of 18 - 30 August the mutiny spread into a general rebellion throughout the three Provinces. The demonstrations were directed solely against the northern Sudanese in the area. Murder, arson and looting were common everywhere. Communications were cut, government offices were closed; public services broke down. On 20 August a state of emergency was proclaimed and northern Sudanese troops were flown in from Khartoum. Meanwhile the mutinous troops captured the wireless transmitter at Torit and sent out signals to Nairobi asking for British reinforcements. These messages were intercepted in Khartoum and the Governor-General replied that no such aid would be given, but that the mutiny must end.¹⁶¹ On 23 August the rebels agreed to surrender only if British troops would replace the northern Sudanese in Juba. Azhari replied that their surrender could only be unconditional. Finally on 27 August the rebels agreed to complete surrender,¹⁶² but a large portion of the southern troops and about 3000 southern civilians fled across the border to Uganda where the British authorities accepted them as political refugees.¹⁶³

The Sudan Government immediately appointed a Commission, "To inquire into, and report upon, the recent disturbances in Southern Sudan, and their underlying causes." This Commission held 53 sessions in both north and south Sudan over a period

161. Duncan, *op. cit.*, (1957) p. 194.

162. *Middle East Journal*, v. 9, No. 4, Chronology.

163. Fabunmi, *op. cit.*, p. 361.

of five months. In addition, great effort was made to reestablish law and order and administration in the area, although for a long time this was limited to the areas immediately surrounding the various district headquarters. During the fighting 336 northern Sudanese and 75 southerners lost their lives.¹⁶⁴ In the trials which followed 200 southern Sudanese were sentenced to death, 500 to imprisonment for more than two years and 550 for shorter periods.¹⁶⁵ Thus ended a tragic episode in the history of the Sudan which both gave proof to the difficulties of integration and also added to the intensity of the problem through the bitter memories it created.

Despite this disastrous event, the Sudan as a whole continued to move rapidly towards full independence. The southern deputies and politicians continued to voice their particular demands in Khartoum -- perhaps with added strength in view of the crisis Azhari's Government was undergoing at the time and backed by the veiled threat of a new rebellion in the south should their demands go unheeded. A political commentator for the Economist wrote at the time, "Indeed the paramount difficulty of taking any immediate step towards self-determination lies in the outbreak of parochialism, uncertainty and mistrust of northern intentions that now riddles the whole southern Sudan."¹⁶⁶ Certainly implementation of a national plebiscite, which had been approved by the co-dominion,

164. Southern Disturbances, op. cit., p. 80.

165. Duncan, op. cit., (1957) p. 197.

166. Economist, 5 November 1955, p. 490.

was now almost impossible in the south where civil administration had almost totally broken down. As a result, in return for agreeing to Azhari's maneuvers towards independence, the southern leaders were able to obtain the promise that their desire for a federal form of government would be given full consideration in the new constitution.¹⁶⁷

Thus we see that on the eve of independence, the Sudan had successfully passed through a major crisis, but not without definite drawbacks. The Southern Policy had separated the country into two areas until 1948. Between 1948 and the mutiny of 1955, considerable progress had been made in integrating the two parts into one whole. Then came the mutiny, and with it a partial withdrawal -- a less desirable unity in the form of a promised federation. What then was this "legacy" of the Southern Policy -- what were the differences which needed to be resolved before full unity could be achieved?

In the first place, the two areas were definitely different -- in the nature of the terrain, racially, linguistically and religiously. Historically the north regarded the south as a primitive backward area to be exploited for slaves. In their turn, the south regarded the north as traditional enemies. The early Condominium Administration did little to change these attitudes and until 1947 their policy was to let the south progress on African and Negroid lines. Also, their acquiescence to Christian missions assuming the responsibility of education introduced new barriers of religion and language

167. Europa, op. cit., (1961) p. 304.

over and above those already existing, and further resulted in the training of a bloc of southern leaders who had been imbued with hatred for northern slaving and exploitation and the antagonism of Christian versus Moslem paths to salvation.

These natural and administrative differences resulted in the north progressing much faster than the south. Being relatively underdeveloped, the southerners inevitably felt that they were being cheated and dominated. In addition political consciousness in the south lagged far behind that in the north. Fostered by the Southern Policy and events such as the mutiny, loyalty was regional rather than national. Thus as the Sudan acquired independence on 1 January 1956, one of her most pressing problems was integrating the south -- developing it materially and instilling a sense of Sudanese nationality among its backward tribes. Finally, this problem had one aspect which needed immediate attention; the southern demand for federal status. How the Republic of the Sudan faced this problem and what success it achieved will be discussed in Chapter Six.

CHAPTER 5. THE NILE

NATURE OF THE PROBLEM

The problem of the Nile River is perhaps the greatest one facing the Republic of The Sudan today. This problem has had and continues to have two major aspects: agreement between the countries in the basin over sharing the water; and development within these countries of engineering and agricultural works to control and use the water. In the Sudan this problem has always been the driving force behind her relations with Egypt -- both during the Condominium period and since independence. Within the Sudan, use of the Nile in the Gezira Scheme has become the backbone of the economy and has provided the majority of her foreign exchange.

This problem did occasionally enter into the major Anglo-Egyptian dispute -- such as when Allenby issued his ultimatum in 1924 threatening to increase Gezira irrigation to an unlimited figure. However, the vital nature of the Nile River waters was such that the negotiations, agreements and development of control works normally followed a separate, less dramatic path than the major political maneuvers. Control of the Nile is a matter of life and death to Egypt; and to the Sudan it makes the difference between sufficiency and stringency.¹⁶⁸ Therefore, while the politicians haggled over sovereignty and "Unity of the Nile Valley," more pragmatic government officials and engineers did meet and come to definite

168. MacMichael, op. cit., p. 141.

agreements leading to the solution of this problem. The purpose of this chapter, then, is to review the progress of this development during the Condominium Administration. In this light we can better understand the nature of the Nile problem as it faced the Republic of the Sudan after achieving independence.

The Nile River is a complex system of watersheds, lakes and tributaries which dominate life in the north-east quarter of Africa. From its remotest source -- the Luvironza River near Lake Tanganyika -- it flows north for about 4,200 miles to the Mediterranean Sea making it the longest river in the world.¹⁶⁹ In its passage it flows through Kenya, Tanganyika, Ruanda-Urundi, Republic of the Congo, Uganda, Ethiopia, Sudan, and Egypt. This river system consists primarily of two main branches -- the White and Blue Niles, and then from their confluence at Khartoum, the Main Nile north to the sea.

The White Nile is the branch rising in the headwaters of the Luvironza River. From there the river flows into Lake Victoria, through Lake Kiyoga and Lake Albert; from which point it enters the Sudan. Shortly afterwards, this great river becomes lost in a vast swamp area called the Sudd. While meandering through the Sudd, the main branch is joined by several tributaries, but the end result of evaporation and drainage in the marshes is such that over 50 percent of the

169. The Encyclopedia Americana. (New York, 1956) v. XX, p. 352, and Hurst, H.E., The Nile. (London, 1952) p. 4, and Sudan Almanac. (Khartoum, 1960) p. 97.

water is lost by the time the White Nile emerges once again. While in this swamp, the river picks up a large quantity of decaying vegetable matter from the floating islands that drift through the Sudd. This material gives the White Nile its characteristic color -- which in comparison to the deep, dark, silt-laden Blue Nile -- does appear to be pale and light colored.

After leaving the Sudd, the White Nile is joined by its last major tributary, the Sobat, which flows down from the Ethiopian highlands. From this point to the juncture with the Blue Nile at Khartoum -- a distance of 840 kilometers -- the White Nile has very little drop; only $12\frac{1}{2}$ meters, or approximately one and one-half centimeter per kilometer! The Blue Nile, on the other hand, rises and falls five meters at Khartoum. When the Blue Nile is in flood, its greater volume and height dams up the water from the White Nile, forcing it to rise as far away as 400 kilometers south.¹⁷⁰

The Blue Nile begins at Lake Tana high in the Ethiopian mountains. It rushes down through deep gorges into the Sudan where it is joined by two intermittent rivers, the Dinder and the Rahad. Unlike the steady, slow White Nile with its natural flow control in the Sudd, the Blue Nile is responsible for the Nile flood -- the natural rise and fall of the river from Khartoum to the Sea on which man has depended for centuries to water the lands and bring new soil. The Blue Nile supplies

170. Barbour, op. cit., p. 111 - 118.

5/8ths of the average annual flow of the Nile, but its flow may be fifty times higher during flood than during the low period when it has to rely on Lake Tana. During this flood over one-third of the annual flow escapes into the Mediterranean. However, during the low period, Egypt has for years dammed up the mouths of the river at Damietta and Rosetta.¹⁷¹

The last tributary joining the Nile is the Atbara, several hundred kilometers north of Khartoum. This river is another flood season branch rising in Ethiopia and is dry half of the year. From Atbara north to the sea -- a distance of 1700 miles, the Main Nile runs through desert with no significant addition of water.

Ethiopia, then, is the primary source of Nile water, supplying 84 percent of the total through the Sobat, the Blue Nile and the Atbara. This flow is primarily seasonal during the rains and causes the flood. The remaining 16 percent comes from the Lake Plateau in east-equatorial Africa, and when this water reaches Khartoum through the White Nile, it provides the majority of the flow during the low season.¹⁷²

The story of the problem of the Nile has concerned primarily Egypt and the Sudan. The Lake Plateau countries are only now beginning to take an interest in utilization of the Nile -- and that primarily for hydro-electric power; for unlike Egypt and northern Sudan, these countries have sufficient rainfall for normal agriculture. Ethiopia as well -- the major

171. Ibid, p. 118 - 119.

172. Sudan Almanac, op. cit., p. 97.

source of the Nile -- has taken little interest in the Nile as she also has sufficient rain and the Nile tributaries which rise in the Ethiopian mountains flow through wild, inaccessible canyons. As early as 1902 Ethiopia signed a treaty with Great Britain in which she promised that, "except with British consent, she would never build or allow to be built any obstructions on the Blue Nile or other major Nile tributary."¹⁷³ Emperor Haile Selassie has labeled this treaty recently as being "obsolete and outmoded," but at the same time has not made any claims to Nile waters.

Egypt and the Sudan, on the other hand, are greatly effected by the Nile. There is an old saying that, "If the Nile dries tomorrow morning, Egypt dies tomorrow night."¹⁷⁴ This certainly is not much of an exaggeration, for, except for a few minor oasis, the inhabited area of Egypt is restricted to the narrow strip of land along the river. Even such major Suez Canal cities like Port Said and Isma'iliyya depend on Nile Water. "There is also a consciousness of the desert, always visible beyond the fertile land, but unapproachable, mysterious, closing in. The psychological weight of the desert on the Egyptian mind is tremendous."¹⁷⁵ It is, therefore, only natural that the Egyptian should have always been so interested in the river - its control and development.

In the Sudan, the Nile is not so much a matter of life

173. Gaskill, Gordon, "Troubled Waters of the Nile," Readers Digest. January 1960, p. 115.

174. Ibid, p. 112.

175. Crary, op. cit., p. 262.

and death, but it does have a great effect on life there. In the first place, it is the one feature which ties the country together physically. Until the coming of the airplane it was the only way to travel to the south. Even now it is the primary means of transportation between the north and south. In the northern desert region the Nile has the same importance as it does to Egypt. In the central Sudan the Nile supplies drinking water, transportation, and irrigation during the dry season. Even in the south where adequate rain does fall, the Nile sets the pace of life as its summer flooding repels the tribes with their cattle, then attracts them during the winter, back to its banks to eat the flood-grown grass and drink from its waters. Finally, further exploitation of the Nile still remains the best prospect the Sudan has for increasing the national income and raising the standard of living of her people.

Egypt and the Sudan, therefore, are the two riverain countries who have been primarily concerned with the control and use of the Nile. As irrigation has been expanded by them, the need has arisen for the construction of engineering works and for close cooperation between them in their control. The first means of irrigation was the natural flooding which occurs during late summer. As the river over flowed its banks, the flood waters soaked the land immediately adjoining the river and deposited a layer of silt which revitalized the land. This system enabled the growing of only one crop a year and was

entirely dependent upon the nature of the annual flood. The next major development in irrigation was the construction of basins with earthen retaining walls. In basin irrigation, the flood waters are trapped in an area long enough to soak the ground thoroughly, then are sent down to another lower adjoining basin. Through this system more land could be dependably irrigated, but still with only one crop.

Along with flood and basin irrigation, individual farmers have always watered very small plots by drawing the water from the river mechanically. Two main devices were and still are used, the shaduf and the saqia. The shaduf is a simple long pole hinged on a fulcrum along the river bank. On the water end is a container -- usually a five-gallon tin -- which is dipped into the Nile then raised up and emptied into a small trench leading to the plot. The other end of the pole has a stone counterbalance to lighten the load of the water. The saqia is a water wheel type device in which the power of domestic beasts is used to raise the water, through buckets on a chain or containers fastened directly onto a large wooden wheel. This device has a greater lift capacity than the Shaduf, but of course requires the animals and their fodder. Both these devices only worked during part of the year when the water level was high enough.

The major revolution in Nile irrigation came with the introduction of perennial or year-round irrigation in which two and even three crops can be grown each year. This type

of irrigation requires elaborate control devices such as barrages to raise the water level in low periods to the canals, and dams to store water for the low period and even for low years. Control of these sites has natural problems let alone the political ones. A steady flow of water for irrigation has to be maintained during the low season. However, it is not just a simple matter of building dams to trap the flood flow -- for this water is silt laden and would soon fill up any reservoir with mud, defeating its purpose. Then the dry hot climate in Egypt and the Sudan causes very high evaporation losses from any reservoir. A minimum level of water must be maintained for navigation, and measures must be provided for adequate high flood protection. Also, any system which is constructed must be worked as one integral unit. There are now 130 gauges throughout the Nile Valley which are used to predict its flow and regulate the existing control works. But naturally such cooperation requires a stable political climate. Any disruption such as the closure of the Sudan during the Mahdiya can create much havoc.¹⁷⁶

With this background of the immensity of the Nile system and the complexity of its control, let us take a look at the developments in the Sudan during the Condominium.

BEGINNING OF THE CONTROVERSY

Limited irrigation had always taken place in the Sudan even back during the Turko-Egyptian rule and the Mahdiya.

176. Hurst, op. cit., p. 224, 241.

However, this was on a small scale far behind Egypt where perennial irrigation had become wide-spread during the 19th Century. As a result there was no Nile water problem until the coming of the Condominium. Officials of the new government, desirous of finding the necessary capital for development projects, investigated all possibilities in the Sudan but very early in the 20th Century came to the conclusion that irrigated agriculture was the only practical solution. Egypt, however, was already using all the water flow of the low winter period for her irrigation. She had already built in 1902 the present Aswan dam to store some of the late flood waters for use in this low season.¹⁷⁷ Obviously any major development within the Sudan would require coordination with Egypt to guarantee her established rights.

Early experimentation in the Sudan was carried out by private investors under Government supervision. In 1904 the Sudan Experimental Plantations Syndicate was established to carry out trials of pump irrigation along the west bank of the Blue Nile south of Khartoum. This company experimented with long-staple cotton similar to that grown in Egypt and the first efforts proved very successful. In 1907 the company was operating at a profit and changed its name to Sudan Plantations Syndicate Limited.¹⁷⁸ This early project received great encouragement when in 1911 the British Cotton Growing Association took an interest and started wide-spread development in

177. Barbour, *op. cit.*, p. 122.

178. Gaitskell, Arthur, *Gezira*. (London, 1959)
p. 51 - 52.

the Gezira area. With their backing, the Governor-General, General Francis Wingate, was able to persuade the British Treasury to guarantee a loan to construct a dam at Sennar on the Blue Nile. This dam would serve two purposes; it would store flood water for use by the Sudan during the low season and it would act as a barrage to raise the water level to that of a main canal for irrigation of the Gezira area. A concession for working the Gezira was to be granted to the Sudan Plantations Syndicate and the Gezira would be managed on a cooperative tenant basis as had been the early pump experiments. Profits were to be shared; forty percent to the tenant, forty percent to the Sudan Government, and twenty percent to the Syndicate. Unfortunately work was delayed by the First World War and the Sennar Dam was not opened until 1925.¹⁷⁹

All this increased activity in the Sudan was beginning to have its effect in Egypt. The fear arose that the proposed Gezira irrigation would rob Egypt of water she desperately needed, and for which she had established rights. Accusations were made that this development was devised solely to benefit a syndicate of private companies at the expense of the poor Egyptian farmer.¹⁸⁰ Egypt's increasing needs for water had caused her to raise the level of the Aswan Dam in 1912. Then in 1913 there occurred the lowest Nile discharge for 180 years.¹⁸¹ The summer flood was insufficient to fill the dam and the winter flow was also exceptionally low. The result

179. Wingate, *op. cit.*, p. 155 - 157.

180. Hurst, *op. cit.*, p. 85.

181. Gaitskell, *op. cit.*, p. 109.

was a drastic curtailment of the cropped area and widespread hardship and famine.¹⁸²

All this pressure led to a detailed investigation of the entire question of Nile waters control and usage by the Ministry of Public Works in Egypt. Both the new Sudanese scheme and all possible control works in the Nile Valley were examined. The results of this effort were published in 1919 by Sir Murdoch Macdonald, the Irrigation Advisor to the Ministry, in a volume entitled Nile Control. Additional control works in the Sudan were discussed. A dam at Gebel Aulia on the White Nile near Khartoum was to be built to store more water for Egypt. Storage dams were to be built on the Blue Nile at Roseires near the Sudan-Ethiopia border and at Lake Tana. Dams were considered on the great lakes of Uganda, but first it was agreed that a canal would have to be constructed through the Sudd to eliminate the excessive losses.¹⁸³

Concerning the proposed Sennar Dam, Macdonald recommended that the project be implemented but that Gezira irrigation be limited to 300,000 feddans until other storage works could be completed. His reasoning behind this figure is important as it became the basis for future negotiations and treaties. The low period in Egypt occurs between 18 February and 25 July at Aswan. Allowing for the travel time of the water, this means from the 18th of January to the 25th of June south at Sennar. Therefore, according to established Egyptian

182. Barbour, op. cit., p. 123.

183. Gaitskell, op. cit., p. 110.- 111.

rights to all the water during the low season, no water should be drawn from the Nile by the Sudan during this period. However, Gezira cotton would require water until at least 15 April. Any water used for irrigation during this period would have to come from that stored in the Sennar reservoir during the flood season. It was calculated that the dam could hold 487 million cubic meters allowing for evaporation losses and that roughly 500 million would irrigate 300,000 feddans between 18 January and 15 April.¹⁸⁴

This report raised controversy among prominent engineers at the time and in addition 1919 saw the outbreak of Egyptian nationalism in the form of widespread riots and demonstrations. While primarily aimed at expelling the British from Egypt, this nationalist move also strove towards assuring Egyptian sovereignty over the Sudan -- no doubt desiring to guarantee full control over the vital Nile water. This interest in the Nile water was noted during the proceedings of the Milner Commission which met in 1919 - 1920 to investigate the causes of the 1919 violence. During the sessions Lord Milner wrote the Egyptian Prime Minister, Adli Pasha, "We fully realize the vital interest of Egypt in the supply of water reaching her through the Soudan, and we intend to make proposals calculated to remove any anxiety which Egypt may feel as to the inadequacy of that supply both for her actual and prospective needs."¹⁸⁵ Since Great Britain was in effect in control over both Egypt

184. *Ibid.*

185. Fabunmi, *op. cit.*, p. 77.

and the Sudan at that time, she was in a position to make such promises. In fact in the official report of the Milner Commission, Egypt was given a substantial guarantee that her established rights to water for all land under cultivation were indefeasible and that she would be given, "a fair share of any increased supply which engineering skill may be able to provide."¹⁸⁶

Meanwhile in February 1920, Lord Allenby issued a statement that the Gezira irrigation in the Sudan would not exceed the 300,000 feddans recommended by Macdonald. In view of the controversy over Macdonald's report a Nile Projects Commission was established by the Egyptian Government in August. This Commission visited the Sudan and considered all the proposed projects. They found that Macdonald's report had been based on reliable data and advocated execution of his recommendations. Egypt's right to all the water in the low season was reiterated. However, Egyptian politicians still remained suspicious.¹⁸⁷

In 1921 the Adli-Curzon negotiations took place in an attempt to draw up a treaty between Great Britain and Egypt. In Article 7 of the draft Britain guaranteed Egypt's rights to Nile waters by stating that no new irrigation would be started south of Wadi Halfa without the approval of an Egyptian-Sudanese-Uganda committee. But this treaty did

186. MacMichael, op. cit., p. 182.

187. Gaitskell, op. cit., p. 111 - 112, and Abbas, op. cit., p. 79 - 80.

not give Egypt full sovereignty over the Sudan so it was never accepted.¹⁸⁸

Despite all these attempts by both engineers and diplomats to work out an acceptable solution to the Nile waters problem; all their progress was wiped out overnight by Allenby's ultimatum of 22 November 1924. Item six of this demand required the Egyptian Government to: "Notify the competent department that the Sudan Government will increase the area to be irrigated at Gezira from 300,000 feddans to an unlimited figure as need may arise."¹⁸⁹ This demand was, "unquestionably a grave mistake, for apart from the appearance of seeking to profit from the crime committed, it served to confirm the most inveterate of Egyptian suspicions -- that the British intended to interfere with Egypt's water supply."¹⁹⁰ For, "The reference to the use of Nile waters in the Sudan strengthened Egyptian feeling that so long as the British stayed in the Sudan, Egypt would be under the mercy of Britain. Egyptians, therefore, consider that unless the control of the whole river is vested in Egypt, and unless the British evacuate the Sudan, Egyptian independence, even if all British troops were evacuated from Egypt, will always be dependent upon British good will."¹⁹¹

Negotiations were resumed in diplomatic circles over the general Anglo-Egyptian dispute. However, immediate steps

188. Ghurbal, *op. cit.*, p. 101.

189. Hurewitz, *op. cit.*, v. II, p. 130.

190. MacMichael, *op. cit.*, p. 186.

191. Abbas, *op. cit.*, p. 87.

were taken to solve the vital water problem. In an exchange of notes on 26 January 1925, Ziwar Pasha asked Allenby to withdraw the threat to increase Gezira irrigation. Allenby replied, "I need not remind your Excellency that for forty years the British Government watched over the development of the agricultural well-being of Egypt, and I would assure your Excellency at once that the British Government, however solicitous for the prosperity of the Sudan, have no intention of trespassing upon the natural and historic rights of Egypt in the waters of the Nile, which they recognize to-day no less than in the past."¹⁹² In paragraph five of this note the threat was formally withdrawn and a mixed commission was appointed to study the irrigation problem.

THE 1929 AGREEMENT

This Nile Commission opened on 17 February; conducted extensive field trips in Egypt and the Sudan; and submitted its report on 21 March 1926. The recommendations were similar to those of the previous commissions; i.e., Egypt was to receive all the natural flow of the Nile from 19 January to 15 July at Sennar, and any extraction of water by pumping schemes below the dam during this period would have to be compensated for by an equal discharge of water from that stored in the reservoir.¹⁹³

192. Great Britain, Treaty Series No. 17, Cmd. 3348, (London, 1929) Appendix A, para. 88, p. 33.

193. Ibid, Appendix A, para. 88.

The major importance of these recommendations was that they replaced the previous area limitation of 300,000 feddans with a limitation on water extraction to certain amounts at certain times. This guaranteed Egypt's rights and left the Sudan free to expand as much as water economy and agricultural science would permit. The Sennar Dam was completed in 1925 and its operation was based on the recommendations of the Nile Commission. The initial 300,000 feddans were irrigated, and over the next five years this area was doubled without any increase in water extraction.

The report of the 1925 Commission was formally accepted in an exchange of notes between Egypt and Great Britain on 7 May 1929. These notes and the annexed report formed what became known as the 1929 Nile Waters Agreement. By placing specific limitations on the volume of water which could be released into the Main Gezira Canal throughout the year, the effect was to allow the Sudan approximately 1/22nd of the average annual flow. In addition, concrete guarantees were given to Egypt concerning future development: "Save with the previous agreement of the Egyptian Government, no irrigation or power works or measures are to be constructed or taken on the River Nile and its branches, or on the lakes from which it flows, so far as all these are in the Sudan or in countries under British administration, which would, in such a manner as to entail any prejudice to the interests of Egypt, either reduce the quantity of water arriving in Egypt, or modify the

date of its arrival, or lower its level."¹⁹⁴ At the same time Egypt was required to obtain prior agreement from the Sudanese authorities for such developments and the subject of sovereignty over the Nile Valley was relegated to the continuous political negotiations.

Until the Egyptian revolutionary government of 1952 announced their intention to construct the Aswan High Dam, the Nile problem was simply a problem of internal development. Any agreements required by new projects were quietly negotiated in an atmosphere of cooperation. The long-planned Gebel Aulia Dam was completed in 1935, giving Egypt three milliards more water for use in the low season.¹⁹⁵ An agreement was signed in 1932 granting the Sudan compensation for lands flooded by this new reservoir.¹⁹⁶ The operation of this dam depends on the peculiar characteristic of the Blue Nile, which while in flood during July to October, acts as a natural dam holding back the water of the White Nile and raising its level about five meters. The sluice gates of the dam are left open during this period until the White Nile reaches its highest level, then they are closed trapping the water for release later between February and May.¹⁹⁷

To further increase the annual storage, Egypt added a third level to the Aswan Dam in 1934, and in 1935 an Egyptian-Sudanese agreement was signed for a proposed dam at Lake Tana.

194. Documents, op. cit., p. 6.

195. One milliard equals 1,000 million cubic meters of water.

196. Hurst, op. cit., p. 236.

197. Barbour, op. cit., p. 118.

However, Ethiopia would not agree and to this date no construction has taken place. In 1952 negotiations were completed for another storage dam on the fourth cataract near Merowe and the 1929 Agreement was modified allowing the Sudan to raise the level of the Sennar Dam one meter.¹⁹⁸ Expansion within the Gezira brought the area under cultivation to almost one million feddans.¹⁹⁹

Along with all these relatively small-scale developments, research continued to solve the problem of needed over-year or "century" storage. Further raising of the level of the Aswan Dam was considered impractical, and construction of dams in this desert area would result in very high evaporation losses. The Blue Nile in the Sudan is so silt-laden during the flood that large reservoirs there would soon fill up with mud, and the gradient of the White Nile south of Khartoum is so slight that any large-volume reservoir would spread out over a prohibitively vast area. Lake Victoria seemed to be the ideal location since its large surface area could be used to hold the required century storage with only a minimal raise in its level. It had the additional advantage in that rainfall equalled evaporation losses. It was decided, therefore, to build a dam at Owen Falls one mile down river from the Lake which would provide Uganda with hydro-electric power, and would supply Egypt with the required storage. Egypt and Uganda shared the construction costs of this dam which was completed

198. Documents, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

199. The Sennar Dam, Ministry of Irrigation (Khartoum, 1959)

in 1953. However, before Egypt can benefit from this project, some means must be devised to prevent the great evaporation and drainage losses in the Sudd area of southern Sudan.

The one generally accepted solution to this problem has always been to construct a canal by-passing the Sudd from Jonglei at the southern edge to a point near the confluence of the Sobat and White Nile north of the Sudd. This project is technically feasible, but it presents a major problem for the Sudan as it would drastically upset the lives of one million Nilotic Sudanese now living in the area. Adequate rain does fall in this area, however, during the long dry season the only drinking water source available is the river. Therefore these cattle-raising Sudanese have evolved a pattern of life tied to the present Nile flood. During the rains and flood in the summer, these people move to the highlands away from the river. As the rain stops and the flood recedes, they are forced to return to the river banks to find water and new grass.

If a by-pass canal is dug its effect will be to reverse this pattern and eliminate much of the present flood-grown grass. During the wet-flood season, water will be being stored in the lakes up-river, and only a minimum flow for navigation will be allowed. During the dry-low season, water will be released to supply increased needs in Egypt and northern Sudan. Some lands now grazed at this time will

be flooded resulting in further loss to the Nilotics.²⁰⁰ In an effort to solve this problem, the Sudan Government in 1945 appointed the Jonglei Investigation Team. Their report recommended various technical solutions such as new types of grass and irrigations, but it is certain that implementation of this project will create a large problem for the Sudan.

THE PROBLEM OF EGYPT'S HIGH DAM

Up until the 1952 revolution in Egypt, Egyptian engineers were still planning for their century storage in Lake Victoria. As mentioned earlier, raising of the existing Aswan Dam was ruled out for technical reasons. With the July revolution, political motives became all important and the new Egyptian Government announced her intention to construct an enormous dam just south of the present one.

This new reservoir, the Sadd el-Aali, or High Dam, was to be the panacea for all Egypt's ills. Primarily this dam would assure, once and for all, that Egypt would have all the water she could possibly need under her direct control. No longer would she have to worry about what her neighbors upstream would be doing. The price would be high -- ten to twelve milliards would be lost each year due to evaporation and early estimates of the cost ran well over 400 million pounds. However, the advantages seemed to outweigh the costs. In addition

200. Jonglei Investigation Team, The Equatorial Nile Project and Its Effects In the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. (Khartoum, 1954), and Hurst, op. cit., p. 307 - 308.

to relieving Egypt's fears, the project would stimulate the economy and allow great increases in irrigation to feed Egypt's rapidly multiplying population. The hydro-electric power it could produce would be available for new industry and would reduce the annual consumption of fuel oil by about two million tons.²⁰¹

Unfortunately for Egypt, this project would have a detrimental effect on the Sudan in that the reservoir would flood out 50 - 75,000 Sudanese in the Wadi Halfa area. At first the Revolutionary Government acted as if the Sudan did not even exist. However, refusal of the World Bank to grant a loan until this matter be settled resulted in a change of heart. In addition, the 1929 Agreement bound Egypt to consult the Sudanese. Paragraph four of Note one in the Agreement read: "In case the Egyptian Government decide to construct in the Sudan any works on the river and its branches, or to take any measures with a view to increasing the water supply for the benefit of Egypt, they will agree beforehand with the local authorities on the measures to be taken for safeguarding local interests. The construction, maintenance and administration of the above mentioned works shall be under the direct control of the Egyptian Government."²⁰²

As a result Egypt notified the Sudan Government late in 1954 of her desire to start work on the High Dam project. The Sudanese agreed on three conditions: First, the Sudan's

201. Egyptian Government, The Aswan High Dam.
(Cairo, 1960) p. 4 - 5.

202. Documents, op. cit., p. 7.

share of the new water as measured at Aswan must be determined before work starts. Second, the Sudan was to be free to build dams or other control works she deemed necessary to effectively utilize her share. Third, Egypt must pay the entire cost of resettling the Wadi Halfa people.²⁰³

Informal discussions were held in Khartoum to fix the Sudan's share. The new dam was to hold 130 milliards. For negotiations it was agreed that the average flow of the Nile was 84 milliards annually. It was further agreed that Egypt now had established rights to use 48 milliards annually and the Sudan four milliards. Sudanese technicians worked up claims to use a total of 44 milliards in the future (35 milliards measured at Aswan). This claim virtually eliminated any advantages Egypt hoped to accrue from the dam so naturally she refused. The Sudanese admitted they could not use this water then, but feared that unless the matter was equitably settled before construction began, Egypt would keep on establishing rights to the Sudan's detriment.

The 1929 Agreement had not limited either country to the area she could irrigate; however, by limiting the Sudan to fixed amounts of water during the low season it did in effect put a definite ceiling on the Sudan's ability to expand. Thus while in 1929 Egypt had 40 milliards in established rights, by 1954 she had raised this to 48. The Sudan, which had two

203. The Nile Waters Question, Ministry of Irrigation, (Khartoum, 1955), p. 4.

milliards in 1929 had only been able to increase to four milliards, "and numerous sound proposals for the extension of irrigated agriculture have had to be turned down for lack of the necessary water."²⁰⁴

Egypt's formula for water distribution was based on a 50 - 50 split of excess water -- after the agreed established rights and the estimated 12 milliard evaporation loss were subtracted from the 84 milliard average flow. This meant ten more milliards for the Sudan, but was rejected by the Sudanese as inadequate.²⁰⁵

Finally in April 1955, after all this preliminary discussion, formal negotiations began in Cairo to revise the 1929 Agreement and pave the way for the High Dam. But these negotiations were no more successful than the earlier talks, for one day later they were suspended indefinitely when the two sides were unable to agree on a basis for discussion.²⁰⁶ This rupture continued throughout the rest of the year and the High Dam problem was still unsettled when the Sudan became fully independent.

The need to settle the High Dam question and revise the 1929 Agreement was the most pressing aspect of the Nile water problem facing the Republic of the Sudan. However, this broad problem had its internal as well as foreign aspects.

204. Barbour, K.M., "A New Approach to the Nile Waters Problem." International Affairs. v. 33, No. 3, July 1957, p. 325.

205. "The Sudanese and the High Dam," Economist, 3 December 1955, p. 858.

206. Middle East Journal, v. 9, No. 3, Chronology.

Very basically, development of further irrigation projects within the Sudan was the key to future development of the country as a whole. Like Egypt, the Sudan's cotton crop provided the cash for all other major improvements. For while some of the Sudan does receive adequate rainfall; this falls in a short period of time and in the dry months much of this area is uninhabitable. Expanded perennial irrigation would provide a much more reliable source of income and steady employment for the Sudanese working force.

Prior to the 1953 Anglo-Egyptian Agreement, the Nile problem had been behind Egypt's insistence on sovereignty over the Sudan. This demand was primarily based on Egypt's desire to control her life-giving water, but it was also involved in the question of cotton rivalry. Since the late 19th Century cotton had been over 80 percent of Egypt's export,²⁰⁷ and now it formed 70 percent of the Sudan's total exports.²⁰⁸ Egypt felt that with her rapidly increasing population and her complete dependence on the Nile, she had more right to the water than the Sudan which has a smaller population and some rain. However, this argument does not stand up under analysis. Remembering that the Sudan's population is almost one-half that of Egypt -- Egypt now uses 11 milliards of water for this cash crop as against two milliards in the Sudan. Egypt's receipts in 1955 for exported cotton amounted to 130 million Egyptian

207. Abbas, *op. cit.*, p. 78.

208. Cook, Don, "The Sudan As The British Leave," *Reporter*, v. 13, No. 1, 14 July 55, p. 36.

Pounds as compared with 31 million for the Sudan.²⁰⁹ Thus Egypt already had a definite advantage in foreign exchange over the Sudan from the use of Nile water. Were Egypt using most of her share of the water to grow food, her claims might be more justifiable. However, as it stood, she was using her larger population figures and lack of rainfall to cover up her long-standing advantage over the Sudan financially. The Sudan, with its own vast development problem was equally justified in desiring to expand in this field.

This rivalry for Nile water seemed to have faded away as Egypt gave up her claims to sovereignty and agreed to Sudanese self-determination. But later events seemed to indicate that the Egyptian politicians were merely becoming more sophisticated. In 1952, still interested in the Jonglei Canal to benefit from the Owen Falls Dam, Egypt succeeded in denying the Sudan's Governor-General any special powers over the three Southern Provinces. Knowing that the Nilotic cattle-raising tribes wanted no parts of the canal, Egypt sent a steady stream of agents into the area and this agitation was one of the contributing causes to the 1955 mutiny in the south.²¹⁰ Should this Jonglei project still be implemented even after the High Dam is built, the Sudan will still have this resettlement problem.

The High Dam itself -- of primary benefit to Egypt -- seemed to have nothing but disadvantages to the Sudan. In

209. Barbour, *op. cit.*, (1957) p. 327 - 328.

210. "The Southern Sudan and Egypt's Water," *Economist*, 16 April 1955, p. 209 - 210.

addition to the problem of resettling the people, there was the loss to the Sudan of the installations, crops, possible resources, and antiquities in the area. At least one good site at Semna for hydro-electric power would be flooded.²¹¹ True, the High Dam would store water now wasted at Sea during the annual flood, and the Sudan would get a share -- but this "share" was computed from that stored at Aswan after a high evaporation loss. Further, since all of the Sudan is up-stream from the High Dam, this "share" could only be utilized by the construction of further dams up-stream from Sudanese irrigation projects -- such as the proposed Roseires Dam. But Egypt would not agree to these Sudanese projects until the Sudanese agreed to the High Dam.

Thus the Nile waters lay behind many of the Sudan's problems; past, present and future; internal and external. They had shaped much of the course of events leading up to independence and their solution would have a great effect on the success of the independent government and the development of the new Republic. For, "since life is so dependent on the Nile, this is not merely a division of river waters. It is a division of life itself -- a circumscribing of national growth, a binding of future generations."²¹²

211. Barbour, op. cit., (1961) p. 127.

212. Cook, op. cit., p. 35.

CHAPTER 6. INDEPENDENCE AND POLITICS

We now come to the third and most complex problem which faced the Sudan after achieving independence -- that of using the political machinery developed during the Condominium to administer the country and to establish relationships with the other nations of the world. It was the most complex problem because of its interrelation with all the other issues, large and small. The questions of the south and the Nile continued to plague the new government. In addition there were numerous other matters such as general educational and material development, border disputes with neighboring countries and the need to establish a foreign policy in the midst of the cold war.

The success or failure of the Sudanese in using their parliamentary apparatus was further complicated by the many factions within the government itself and by the strong role which religion still played in the formation of these blocs. This political factionism was generally a legacy of the Condominium. The Sudanese nationalists had learned their politics in an atmosphere of dispute between the co-dominion and had themselves sided with either Egypt or Great Britain depending upon the goals of the various Sudanese leaders. Sectarianism, which had dominated the major political alignments since their establishment in the 1940's continued to have its effect despite Prime Minister Azhari's strong secular backing. The question, then, is did the Condominium rule leave

the Sudan with any unique political problems which she might not have acquired under a sole guardian? And, just how well did this apparatus work once the co-domini were completely removed from the scene? Let us examine the course of political events culminating in the 1958 military coup in this light.

Certainly in its outward form, the independent Sudanese Government was normal; it was a western, democratic government molded along British Parliamentary lines. When the Sudan became fully independent on 1 January 1956, very little change took place in the political structure as it had evolved during the Condominium. The incumbent Parliament which had been elected to office in 1953 continued in session without any change. Al-Azhari remained as Prime Minister with the same N.U.P. cabinet. A transitional constitution was enacted which basically confirmed the existing system as detailed in the Self-Government Statute and the 1953 Agreement. The only major change required was the creation of a five-member Supreme Commission to assume the duties of the Governor-General. These officials were elected by the Parliament for the interim period until a permanent constitution should be enacted. The group represented the opposition and the south as well as the N.U.P. The members rotated each month through the Presidency of the Commission.²¹³

Daily routine government administration continued as

213. Fabunmi, op. cit., p. 378.

it had during the self-government period. Membership in the Arab League and the United Nations was requested and granted. The only technical change resulting from independence was the official assumption by the Sudanese of responsibility for foreign affairs -- the one major power which had been reserved for the Governor-General by the 1953 Agreement.²¹⁴

THE DEFEAT OF AZHARI'S GOVERNMENT

However, despite these outward appearances of a smooth transition to complete political independence, actually many troubles lay just below the calm surface which had been brewing for a long time. It will be remembered from earlier discussion how this independence had been acquired only after considerable maneuvering among the major Sudanese political factions. Azhari's N.U.P. Government had been the vehicle through which self-determination had been effected; but his last-minute moves had been possible only after he placated the Umma opposition and the separatist south with promises to meet their demands. Even within the N.U.P., opposition was developing to Azhari's secular trend away from Khatmiyya support.

All of these various factions -- each with goals widely divergent from the others' -- now united in the common cause of weakening Azhari's N.U.P. monopoly. On 18 January 1956 his Government was defeated on a vote of confidence (46 to 44) on a budget question. The Prime Minister refused to resign, however, and in a second vote the following day he won (49 to

²¹⁴. Hurewitz, op. cit., v. II; p. 336.

46). Pressure continued from the opposition for a coalition government which he had promised in December. This was finally carried out on 2 February. Mirghani Hamza and Muhammad Nur ad-Din, two ex-N.U.P. leaders who had been dismissed from cabinet posts by Azhari previously, were returned along with Ibrahim Ahmad and Abdullah Khalil, two leading Umma politicians.²¹⁵

A few weeks later an extremely unfortunate event occurred which brought heavy pressure against the Government. Farmers in the vicinity of Kosti had been demonstrating for higher crop prices. After a clash with the local police 281 demonstrators including women were jailed overnight in a small windowless room. During the night 192 persons died of suffocation. The leader of the opposition took this opportunity to demand Azhari's resignation and demonstrations against the government occurred in the major urban centers.²¹⁶ This incident was primarily the result of too rapid Sudanisation as had been the southern mutiny,²¹⁷ but naturally Azhari's Government was blamed.

In the months which followed the major development was the reassertion of sectarian power behind the scenes leading to the formation of a new party in June, the People's Democratic Party, and the defeat of al-Azhari in July. This point is worth a brief review since it was one of the vital issues in Sudanese

215. Middle East Journal, v. 10, No. 2, chronology.

216. Ibid.

217. "The Lesson of Kosti," Economist. 3 March 1956.

politics -- at times dormant, and at other times blatantly apparent.

It will be remembered that even as far back as the establishment of the Condominium, sectarianism had been one of the major motives behind internal alignments. Certainly during the Mahdiyya it was the reason for existence of the state. Then the early cooperation between the Condominium Administration and the Khatmiyya, followed later by an even closer tie between the Government and the Ansar, encouraged sectarianism. Even without this official attitude, the appalling lack of education and "Sudanese" national consciousness made religious loyalty assume great importance. This importance has continued through the course of Sudanese political history. Commenting on the 1958 elections, a political observer wrote: "Wingate's Mahdism In The Egyptian Sudan (1891) is still the best guide to how a constituency will vote: votes go according to where one's fathers stood during the Mahdiyya. One is born into a party; there is not much of a floating vote."²¹⁸

We have seen how the Graduates Congress was formed at first along secular lines, but then as it split up over the question of loyalty to one or the other of the co-domini, the opposing leaders allied themselves with either the Khatmiyya or the Ansar to take advantage of the large bloc of votes each of these sects could command. The Umma Party was composed primarily of Ansar members and Azhari's Ashigga Party was backed

218. Silberman, op. cit., p. 364.

by the Khatmiyya. Azhari, however, also had great strength among the young urban educated class and the workers, and did not always follow the wishes of the Khatmiyya leadership. In addition, Sayid 'Ali al-Mirghani chose to remain publicly aloof from party politics. As a result Azhari had more freedom to develop as a purely nationalist political leader than did the Umma leaders who were always overshadowed by their more ambitious religious head, Sayid 'Abd al-Rahman al-Mahdi.²¹⁹

Despite Sayid Mirghani's desire to remain in the background, his influence over the pro-unity group was powerful, and everytime Azhari's intransigence gave rise to fears that he might become too strong, invariably a split would occur in the party. This happened for the first time in August 1949 when the National Front Party was formed as the official Khatmiyya pro-unity party. This split was healed prior to the 1953 elections by the formation of the N.U.P.

The 1953 elections were another battleground for sectarian rivalries. Each sect would put up candidates in the constituencies of their rivals even when they knew they would lose. Voting was primarily as Khatmiyya against Ansar, and had little to do with the platforms of the candidates.²²⁰ As an example of the lengths to which these issues were carried, Sir Harold MacMichael cites the case of "a nomad Kababish in northern Kordofan, where the successful candidate stood as an N.U.P. candidate for the very simple reason that his grandfather

219. Holt, op. cit., p. 160.

220. Duncan, op. cit., (1957) p. 162 - 163.

was beheaded by the Mahdi in 1883."²²¹

Once Azhari was firmly in power after these elections, he began to drift away from his Khatmiyya backing again. In December 1954 he ousted three N.U.P. ministers. One of them, Sayid Mirghani Hamza, had been particularly favored by the Khatmiyya. These politicians formed the Republican Independence Party, which like the National Front in 1949 - 1952, now became the Khatmiyya Party. However, the fact that Azhari was able to flaunt the tariqa and carry out his policies with impunity showed that a political awareness was gradually developing among the people, apart from their strong sectarian ties. For example, Azhari's popularity was again able to save him in the government crisis in November 1955, despite his disagreement with Sayid Mirghani.²²²

Even though Azhari seemed able to challenge the Khatmiyya, he certainly was not strong enough to take on a combination of both the major sects. This is exactly what he faced after the unprecedented meeting of the two Sayids in December 1955. The result, as we have seen, was the formation of a coalition government in February 1956 in which was included Mirghani Hamza and two Umma ministers.

The final culmination of this long standing rivalry between Azhari and the Khatmiyya came on June 26th with the formation of the People's Democratic Party (P.D.P.).²²³ This

221. MacMichael, *op. cit.*, p. 240.

222. Duncan, *op. cit.*, (1957) p. 201.

223. "Sects and Splits In The Sudan," *Economist*.
7 July 1956, p. 19.

party had the full backing of Sayid 'Ali al-Mirghani, and since it included 21 deputies and 14 senators who had been N.U.P. members, Azhari's cabinet had in effect lost its majority.²²⁴ It then was only a matter of time before the temporary alliance between the two Sayids dealt the final blow to Azhari's Government. This came on 4 July when he was defeated by a vote of no confidence. The following day the leading Umma politician, Abdullah Khalil was elected as Prime Minister by the House with a vote of 60 to 32.²²⁵

The Government now shifted from an N.U.P. predominate coalition to one in which the Umma and P.D.P. were equally represented. Of course, many of the P.D.P. ministers had been members of Azhari's N.U.P. until June. The result was that the coalition changed in name, but most of the same politicians remained in power. In the new cabinet formed on 7 July, nine of the sixteen ministers had served in Azhari's cabinet. The breakdown was as follows: six P.D.P., six Umma, three Southern Liberals and one Socialist Republican. Mirghani Hamza of the P.D.P. was given the portfolio of Deputy Premier as well as his other positions.²²⁶

This Umma - P.D.P. coalition began to run into difficulties right from the start. The only thing they had in common was their desire to oust Azhari and those N.U.P. members who remained loyal to him. In every other area they had different

224. Fisher, *op. cit.*, p. 640 - 641.

225. Middle East Journal. v. 10, No. 4, chronology.

226. Ibid.

and opposed objectives. In Foreign Policy the Umma remained friendly to Britain and the West while the P.D.P. followed Egypt in its pro-East "neutralism."²²⁷ The British-French landings at Suez helped to drive a wedge between the coalition and at the same time was helpful to Azhari and his N.U.P. opposition.

A major internal question which caused dissention in the coalition was that of a new permanent constitution. In sub-committee debates over a draft, neither side could agree on the powers of the president -- or even on his tenure. The Umma were proposing Sayid 'Abd al-Rahman al-Mahdi as permanent president for life. Naturally the P.D.P. opposed any such measure which would belittle their religious leader, Sayid 'Ali al-Mirghani.²²⁸

Another major problem was that of the south. The downfall of Azhari's Government had been made possible by the split off of the P.D.P. and the coalition between it and the Umma. However, Azhari and the remaining N.U.P. deputies still remained powerful in a numerically large opposition. For while with his 51 out of a total 97 seats in the 1954 House he had a clear majority, in 1956 - 1957 neither the Umma with 24 seats nor the P.D.P. with 18 had such an advantage.²²⁹ In this context, the vacillating bloc of southern deputies were given a disproportionate importance, for even though they were nominally backing the Umma - P.D.P. coalition, they could always swing

227. Holt, *op. cit.*, p. 174.

228. *Economist*. 19 January 1957, p. 211.

229. Europa, *op. cit.*, (1958).

their 15 votes over to Azhari's 34 and bring down the Government.

Internally the three Southern Provinces still were suffering from the aftermath of the 1955 mutiny. Schools remained closed for almost a year as most of the teachers had been northerners who had fled. Death sentences handed down in the trials of the mutineers had caused further distrust and hard feelings.²³⁰ Administration was only gradually being reestablished and scattered clashes between the Army and mutineers continued throughout the Fall of 1956.²³¹

Politically the south continued to demand a federal system of government. This demand, "which to the tribesman and his chief embodies the somewhat negative attitude of not wishing to be administered by northerners and to the educated parliamentarian a separate government for the southern provinces autonomous in all internal affairs," was common among almost all southern deputies no matter to which party they belonged.²³² The Government did little to increase its popularity in the south when it brought to trial in August an ex-minister, Stanislas Paysama, for alleged criminal intimidation in his pressure for formation of a federation. He was sentenced to 18 months imprisonment, and even though this was reversed on appeal, the damage was done.²³³

230. World Today. v. 12, No. 7, July 1956, p. 263 - 264.

231. Middle East Journal. v. 11, No. 1, chronology.

232. Kilner, op. cit., p. 435.

233. "South of Khartoum," Economist, 22 September 1956, p. 967.

Tension continued to develop within the coalition during 1957. The divergent views towards foreign policy were heightened as the Sudan became a new pawn in the East - West cold war. In February the United States offered financial aid. This was followed by a state visit in March of Vice President Nixon. Then in August the USSR offered to purchase all export crops "to help the Sudan liberate itself from imperialist influence." Then in September a delegation of Gezira officials went to Moscow for a visit and ten Sudanese students accepted a Soviet offer of scholarships to attend Russian universities. In October Prime Minister Khalil went to Cairo to study a Russian proposal for an economic and trade agreement and an ICA survey team came to Khartoum to discuss US aid.²³⁴

THE 1958 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS

The major political event which occurred between independence and the 1958 revolution was the preparation for and holding of parliamentary elections. The First Parliament after independence was merely a continuation of that convened in 1954 to carry out self-government. Self-determination and independence had altered the statutory basis for its life, but even under the 1953 Agreement, this parliament was to have dissolved prior to the three-year maximum decreed for self-government. This would have meant on or before 9 January 1957. In addition the changes of power resulting from the events of

234. Middle East Journal, v. 11, No. 2, 3, 4, chronology.

June-July 1956, combined with the dissensions in the Umma - P.D.P. Government all led to talk of elections in early 1957. At first these were to be held in April, but later were postponed several times until at last February 1958 was agreed upon.²³⁵ Parliament was finally dissolved in June 1957 in preparation for these elections.

Unfortunately, even in this basically internal matter, the Sudan was plagued by foreign interference. One month before the elections were to take place, the Egyptian Ambassador presented a memorandum to the Sudanese Government, protesting their holding elections in border areas which Egypt considered to be legally part of her territory. The areas in dispute were two enclaves above the 22nd Parallel which had been the agreed border in the 1899 Condominium Agreement. However, subsequent negotiations had allowed the Sudan to administer these areas and had included in Egypt a part of the Sudan south of the 22nd Parallel. This agreement had been based on the location of tribes along the Nile River and in the northeast near the Red Sea. The status of these areas had never been challenged prior to this time.²³⁶

Egypt was preparing to hold a presidential election and plebiscite at the same time as the Sudanese elections; she demanded the surrender of this territory before February 21st, and sent troops in to take over. The Sudanese resisted and appealed to the Security Council of the UN on 20 February.

235. Ibid.

236. Barbour, op. cit., p. 16.

No resolution was passed, however, the Egyptian delegate promised that Egypt would postpone this question until after the Sudanese elections -- in effect conceding the issue to the Sudan. President Nasser blamed the incident on "imperialists" and Sudanese politicians sent him a message of gratitude. This latter move caused a further split within the Sudanese in that Prime Minister Khalil refused to have any connection with it. He withdrew his Umma Party from a pre-election United Front which had sponsored the message of thanks to Nasser.²³⁷

As a result of a national census conducted in 1956, constituencies for the 1958 election were increased and redistributed, raising the number of seats in the House from 97 to 173. In the redistribution more constituencies were formed in the central Sudan and the number in the north was decreased. This gave the advantage of Sayid Mahdi's Umma Party which dominated the central Sudan.²³⁸ By 27 January 1958 nominations were completed. There were 637 candidates for the 173 seats in the House and 135 for the 30 senatorial seats.²³⁹

In their conduct, the elections ran quite smoothly and were a credit to the Sudanese. Registration had presented many problems in that over 90 percent of the electors were illiterate, many different languages were involved, some of the areas were very inaccessible and the borders were ill-defined. To over-

237. Middle East Journal, v. 12, No. 2, chronology.

238. Holt, op. cit., p. 177.

239. Fisher, op. cit., p. 641.

come some of these difficulties, each candidate was assigned a symbol by lot. As the voter went to the polls he would place a token in the box bearing the symbol of the candidate of his choice. The voting began on 27 February and took place over a ten-day period. Some charges of bribery were made after the elections, but "the weight of evidence seems to be that religions, tribal, regional and personal loyalties were more important in determining how votes were cast than pecuniary inducements."²⁴⁰

The result of the election was the return of the Umma - P.D.P. coalition to power. The breakdown was as follows:²⁴¹

	<u>House</u>	<u>Senate</u>
Umma	63	14
P.D.P.	27	4
N.U.P.	45	5
S.L.P.	20	
Independents	<u>18</u>	<u>7</u>
	173	30

On 20 March Abdullah Khalil was chosen to continue the premiership and on 26 March the new 14-member cabinet was announced including in it seven ministers from the previous one.

This victory of the Umma - P.D.P. coalition showed that sectarian loyalties were still the strongest in the country.²⁴² However, even though this was able to bring the

240. Gosnell, op. cit., p. 410 - 412.

241. Kilner, op. cit., p. 432, and Middle East Journal, v. 12, No. 2, chronology.

242. Economist, 15 March 1958.

sects to power, it did not help them cooperate once they were in power.

The recalcitrant south once again threatened the stability of the new Government. All three southern ministers of the old cabinet were defeated in the election. Those selected by Khalil for the new cabinet, however, were not the men nominated by the Southern Liberal Party.²⁴³ "The result of this was to antagonize the southerners, forty of whom combined in an alliance known as the Federal Bloc, which was prepared to vote with the N.U.P. opposition, especially on questions concerning the south."²⁴⁴ In addition, when the House met in May as a constituent assembly to discuss the new draft constitution, the southerners protested that the draft excluded federal organization. They threatened to boycott the parliament unless their demand be met.²⁴⁵ One southern deputy, "who was found to have drawn up a plan for obtaining federal government by force if constitutional methods failed, was imprisoned and was not able to take his seat."²⁴⁶

A further source of southern resentment was the Government's declared policy of absorbing the missionary schools. Beginning in April 1957 the Ministry of Education had announced their intention to take over all subgrade and elementary schools run by the missionaries.²⁴⁷ While the south was still primarily

243. Ibid.

244. Holt, op. cit., p. 177.

245. Al-'Azzām, 22 May 1958.

246. Kilner, op. cit., p. 435.

247. Middle East Journal. v. 11, No. 3, chronology, and Holt, op. cit., p. 179.

pagan, most of the southern politicians had been trained by and still felt a loyalty towards the Christian missions. Certainly there were many more nominal Christians than Moslems. One writer familiar with the area estimated in 1952 that there were 100,000 Christians compared to 10,000 Moslems in the south.²⁴⁸

Concurrent with all these political difficulties was the Nile Waters question. As usual negotiations had continued quietly in the background, but this problem erupted into the open when on 1 July 1958 the Sudanese took water from the Blue Nile for their new Managil extension of the Gezira scheme.

After independence, negotiations between Egypt and the Sudan were not resumed until December 1957. Now that the Sudanese were completely free to speak for themselves without any British officials in the background, these talks seemed to have even less chance for success. The 1929 Agreement had always been the basis for all developments and negotiations. But now the independent Sudanese were prompt to notify Egypt that they did not consider this document valid as they themselves had not been involved in it. Therefore they were no longer bound by it and would act as they saw fit. The actual negotiations which took place in Cairo saw basically the same arguments about the High Dam water distribution as had been used earlier. Egypt claimed that the mean annual flow was now only 80 milliards rather than the 84 previously agreed upon. Also, she now upped her "established rights" claim from

248. Atiyah, op. cit., p. 233.

48 to 51 milliards. In a formula based on population, she offered the Sudan a total of 8 milliards compared to 62 for herself. The Sudanese used their own figures and formula, and demanded a minimum of 15 milliards per year.²⁴⁹

On 5 January 1958 the Sudanese delegation returned from Cairo after the breakdown of the talks. The three main objections of the Sudanese were: inadequate compensation for the Wadi Halfa residents, the Egyptian insistence that the Sudan share in the High Dam evaporation losses, and the method of distribution of excess water. Mirghani Hamza, who had led the Sudanese delegation, returned on 25 January. He felt that Nasser was waiting until after the February elections for a more favorable government.²⁵⁰ The fact that Egypt's clumsy threat in her border area claims came just a few days later would seem to indicate the importance placed by Egypt on the Nile problem.

Both Egypt and the Sudan were hurt by their inability to reach an agreement. Just as Egypt had been denied financial support for her High Dam, the Sudan could not raise the funds for the Roseires Dam until an agreement would be concluded.²⁵¹ However, the Sudan's readiness to go it alone and ignore the provisions of the 1929 Agreement were amply demonstrated in July.

Following a continuous program of expansion in the

249. Barbour, *op. cit.*, (*Int. Affairs* article) p. 326.

250. *Economist*, 25 January 1958, p. 321.

251. "Facts About Nile Water Talks And Related Problems Between Egypt And The Sudan," Khartoum, Office of Public Information, 2 September 1958, p. 5 - 9.

Gezira scheme, the Sudan Government had started work on the Managil extension early in 1956. This area was to take advantage of the increased water allowed by the 1952 Agreement to raise the Sennar Dam one meter, and would add another 200,000 feddans to the total.²⁵² On 1 July 1948 the Irrigation Department began to fill the main canal of this project for testing purposes. This water was extracted without Egypt's permission. (According to the 1929 Agreement no extra water could be taken before July 15th). Egypt promptly protested and claimed that this water diversion had caused direct damage to 1,250,000 Egyptians.²⁵³ The Sudanese in turn issued a statement in an effort to prove their innocence. They claimed that the 130 million cubic meters extracted had been compensated for by a release of 180 million to Egypt prior to the test; and that as a result Egypt had actually received a bonus of 50 million.²⁵⁴ Other technical figures were cited to show that Egypt had not been hurt, and comparisons were drawn between populations and areas irrigated between the two countries in an effort to show that the Sudanese were in effect the injured party. On 4 September Egypt proposed a conference to settle the problem and the dispute temporarily subsided.

THE COUP D'ETAT OF 17 NOVEMBER 1958

The Sudanese Parliament had remained in session until

252. Ibid., p. 2.

253. Middle East Journal, v. 12, No.4, chronology.

254. "Statement About Water For Managil Scheme in 1958," Khartoum, Office of Public Information, 2 September 1958.

July. In face of all these pressing matters it had confined most of its activity to trivial subjects such as pay raises for the deputies and nudity in the south.²⁵⁵ The one major item debated was acceptance of foreign aid; and this almost broke up the coalition.

The Sudan's economy had been gradually getting worse. The 1957 cotton crop was still unsold and the 1958 crop was exceptionally poor. Reserves fell rapidly so imports were cut severely and foreign aid was sought. An Economic and Technical Aid Agreement was concluded on 31 March with the United States, but the P.D.P. opposed ratification in the House; preferring to seek help from Egypt and her eastern friends. The Umma just as strongly feared UAR dominance, particularly after the border dispute and the breakdown of Nile Waters negotiations.²⁵⁶ Prime Minister Khalil was forced to compromise with the southern bloc in their demands for federation in order to secure their votes on the aid bill. Ratification was finally passed on 7 July and on 24 July Parliament adjourned to avoid a vote of no-confidence.²⁵⁷

In the months which intervened prior to scheduled reopening of Parliament in November, there were many behind the scenes attempts to either save the collapsing Umma - P.D.P. coalition, or to form a new, stronger one. The incompatible nature of these negotiations clearly showed to

255. Silberman, *op. cit.*, p. 372.

256. Holt, *op. cit.*, p. 177 - 178, and Europa, *op. cit.*, (1961) p. 304.

257. Middle East Journal. v. 12, No. 4, chronology.

what lengths the politicians were prepared to go to retain power. Following the P.D.P. objection to US Aid, the Umma leaders met with Azhar's N.U.P. opposition in August in hopes of forming an Umma - N.U.P. coalition. A month later in Cairo the P.D.P. approached Azhari who was returning from a visit to Baghdad. Now it was the turn of the Umma to be afraid.²⁵⁸ All the time publically Azhari continued to blast both the Umma and the P.D.P. in the press, charging their government with all the faults of the country from the economic crisis to the Nile waters deadlock.²⁵⁹ Finally on 16 November an agreement was reached between the Umma and N.U.P. in which six Umma Ministers would resign to facilitate formation of a new coalition. It was felt that between Azhari's popularity with the urban population and the Umma's strong position this new government should work.²⁶⁰

On 17 November 1958 the Parliament was to have resumed its session. However, during the night of 16 - 17 November a small group of the Sudanese army siezed the major communications installations and Government offices in Khartoum and surrounded the homes of the leading politicians. The coup leader, Lt. General Ibrahim Abboud declared a state of emergency, suspended the constitution and all newspapers, dismissed Parliament and dissolved all political parties. In a public statement General Abboud declared that the country was suffering from the malady of political wrangling and self-seeking leaders: "The natural

258. Kilner, *op. cit.*, p. 432.

259. *Al-'Azzām*, 16 October 1958.

260. Kilner, *op. cit.*, p. 433.

step in such circumstances is for the Army to put an end to the corruption and to restore stability and security for all."²⁶¹

In explaining how the coup took place, General Abboud later declared that a small group of high-ranking army officers had been holding secret meetings since 16 March 1958 to determine what steps should be taken to return the country to stability. As to the number of officers involved he said: "Not a single officer in the Army except we 13 officers of the Supreme Council had any knowledge of what was going on but every individual was executing the orders issued to him without question as they all have full confidence in the C.O.'s."²⁶² Ex-Prime Minister Khalil declared on 26 November that he knew of the coup in advance and "approved of it." He claimed that it saved the country from a "foreign-sponsored move to end Sudanese independence."²⁶³ Whether or not the coup resulted from a coordinated plan cannot be determined. However, Khalil had been an Army officer himself and it is assumed that he kept his contacts after transferring to the Government.

This military coup d'etat brought an abrupt end to the Independent Sudan's parliamentary period. Whether the peculiarities of condominium rule hastened or delayed this event is extremely difficult to determine. Besides, the coup cannot be considered as an exceptional incident as it certainly followed

261. Middle East Journal, v. 13, No. 1, chronology.
 262. Al-Sudan Al-Jadid. 16 November 1960.
 263. Middle East Journal, v. 13, No. 1, chronology, and Europa, op. cit., (1961) p. 304.

the general pattern of events throughout the Arab Middle East since World War II. A comparison of this coup with others such as that in Egypt in 1952 or in Iraq in 1958 for this purpose would not prove much. Certainly many of the reasons behind the military coup were common to those in other countries where no condominium had taken place. For one thing, the general illiteracy and political naivety of the Sudanese made the realistic operation of advanced parliamentary institutions almost impossible. It can be said that the dispute between the condominium encouraged the Sudanese to grab independence when they could without waiting for full development, but this desire to be free no matter how ill prepared has not been confined to the Sudan.

However, it can be safely said that the Condominium rule did participate in the creation of an atmosphere favorable to a military coup. The greatest effect this dual rule had on Sudanese politics was the fostering of widely divergent factions among the Sudanese themselves. All through the Condominium administration the Sudanese had been at odds with each other as they supported either Egypt or Great Britain, rather than the normal pattern of a single nationalist voice united in its struggle for independence. This factionalism had a sectarian element which was further heightened by the support Egypt gave to the Khatmiyya as opposed to that Britain gave to Sayid Mahdi's Ansar. Then also there was the legacy of the Southern Policy and the Nile waters problem, the backgrounds of which

had their own peculiar aspects relating to this dual administration.

These internal differences carried over once independence had been achieved. Then all it took was the press of all the normal problems of development and it soon became impossible for these factions to cooperate in anything except trivial matters. The basis for political activity became maneuvering to retain or gain power.

Thus the Sudanese experiment in western parliamentary politics failed. In part this failure could be traced to the Condominium, but generally speaking this development seems to be more one of the evils of our time as relatively underdeveloped areas are suddenly gaining full statehood in a world atmosphere that is marked by tension and strife.

CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSION

The Military Coup d'Etat of 17 November 1958 ended the Sudanese experiment in western democracy, but it did not eliminate the basic underlying problems which have been previously discussed. Special new problems have arisen as a corollary to the military dictatorship, in general common to most of the military governments existing today. It is not within the scope of this study to discuss these very recent events resulting from the coup.

However, developments since the coup d'etat have shown the permanence of the major problems already discussed in detail. That the military government recognizes and is attempting to solve these issues in a way bears witness to their seriousness. In conclusion, therefore, it would be appropriate to summarize the essence of these problems and briefly mention any steps taken in their solution since the coup.

The first problem we examined in detail was that of integrating the three Southern Provinces after the legacy of separation left by the Condominium. While the mutiny of 1955 could be taken as a turning point in this issue, much still remains to be done to implant a sense of Sudanese nationalism among these peoples and to develop them to an equal status with the northerners. Fortunately the military government has begun to take steps towards achieving these goals. For

example, the present crisis in the Congo has focused attention on the border between the two countries, and strong measures have been taken to stop the indiscriminate crossing.²⁶⁴ This border cuts across the Azande tribal lands with the result that there are approximately 230,000 in the Sudan, 520,000 in the Congo and 20,000 in the Central African Republic. The possibility always exists that unless the Sudanese sub-tribes become oriented towards Khartoum, a new nationalistic desire might arise for a "Zandeland" similar to that for an independent Kurdistan in Iraq, Turkey and Iran.²⁶⁵

This separatist tendency will be difficult to curb as long as the south remains physically cut off from the north, and as long as its administration and development remain primarily in northern hands. Even though there are now scheduled flights between the north and south, and there has been the Nile steamer service for years, there still is no day-to-day contact between the peoples of the two areas. Except for a narrow strip along the Nile, there is a belt of uninhabited country which acts as a natural barrier to such contact. Administration in the south is still primarily run by northerners. These northerners now realize that the south will need their help for a long time, and that at present the southerners are an alien minority oriented to Africa.²⁶⁶ At the same time the northerners "are bound to feel that they are

264. Kilner, op. cit., p. 436.

265. Barbour, op. cit., (1961) p. 17, 89.

266. Atiyah, op. cit., p. 233.

themselves already true Sudanese, while the Southerners have yet to become so, and the very fact that Northerners are trying to create a single nation out of the whole country makes it difficult for them to study the local languages and customs dispassionately."²⁶⁷

To further this integration increased efforts have been made since the coup d'etat in the use of Arabic in administrative affairs, in bringing the school system in line with that of the north (often at the expense of the missionaries) and in appropriating more funds for the training of southern Moslems. To develop the south materially measures have been taken to encourage new plantations which will produce crops needed in the north.²⁶⁸ The south needs irrigation and drainage projects almost as much as the north and there is at present a shortage of manpower with any capacity for sustained labor. The general lack of capital for investment in the Sudan acts as a detriment to rapid development of the south and is a further source of friction since most of these funds come from the Gezira scheme in northern Sudan.²⁶⁹ The military government is doing what it can to erase this basic internal disparity, "but no regime can hope to produce a neat programme for dealing with the problem of the south; its solution will be the gradual work

267. Barbour, op. cit., p. 88.

268. Kilner, op. cit., p. 436.

269. Southern Development Investigation Team, Natural Resources And Development Potential In The Southern Provinces of The Sudan. (London, 1954.)

of economics and education and, above all, time and patience."²⁷⁰

The second major problem which demanded immediate attention was the Nile waters dispute, and its related internal issues. It will be remembered that talks had taken place between Egypt and the Sudan in late 1957, and then in July 1958 the dispute had flared up over the Sudan's early use of water for her Managil extension to the Gezira scheme. Negotiations had been suggested in September, but the November coup d'etat interrupted this plan. The difficulties of establishing the new regime and several abortive mutinies in 1959 delayed further talks until late in the year. Finally in September the acting Sudanese Minister of Irrigation announced that negotiations would be resumed and on 7 October a Sudanese delegation arrived in Cairo for this purpose.²⁷¹ The combination of the urgency for both countries to reach agreement in order to implement internal development plans, and the pragmatic nature of the two military governments resulted in the signing on 8 November 1959 of the new Nile Waters Agreement.

This Agreement replaced the outmoded 1929 Agreement and provided for the solution of the outstanding problems between Egypt and the Sudan.²⁷² Both sides were forced to compromise from their previous stands; the Sudan agreed to share in the evaporation losses of 10 milliards resulting from the High Dam, and Egypt conceded almost two-thirds of

270. Holt, *op. cit.*, (1961) p. 188.

271. *Middle East Journal*, v. 13, No. 4 and v. 14, No. 1, chronology.

272. For full text of the 1959 Agreement, see Annex A.

the remaining water to the Sudan. (After subtracting established rights of 48 milliards for Egypt and 4 for the Sudan and the evaporation losses, distribution of the average 22 milliards annually was to be made on a ratio of $14\frac{1}{2}$ for the Sudan and $7\frac{1}{2}$ for the United Arab Republic. Any increase above the average was to be divided equally.) A joint board was established to administer the Agreement, and arrangements were made to take care of the interim period until the two countries could complete their major projects. Finally, both parties agreed to a figure of 15 million Egyptian pounds as compensation for the displacement of the Sudanese at Wadi Halfa.

To the Sudan, signing of this agreement had immediate beneficial effects. It gave the Sudanese the freedom to go ahead with their Gezira extension schemes and it cleared the financial atmosphere for negotiation of loans for major projects such as the Roseires Dam. In addition there were side benefits such as enabling restricted pumping schemes along the river to become perennial and allowing the Sudanese to reconsider the possibility of supplying drinking water for non-riverain areas.²⁷³

But the Agreement intensified other problems, in particular that of the Wadi Halfa resettlement. At first the Government promised these people any area they desired. Some of the Wadi Halfans wanted to move south of Khartoum; Government circles were split between the area of Khashm El-Girba

273. Barbour, op. cit., p. 122.

in Kassala Province and the Dongola area. The Khashm El-Girba site had a good potential for a dam on the Atbara which would provide one milliard of water for an irrigation project. However, the Dongola area was close to Wadi Halfa, and the Dongolawis were the closest to the people from Halfa in customs, dialect, traditions and spiritual beliefs. In addition, the 15 million compensation would not be enough for a long move, and USA aid had been offered on the contingency that the Dongola area be used.²⁷⁴ The Sudan Government finally settled on the Khashm El-Girba area and immediately ran into objections from the Wadi Halfans. They claimed that this area was "a howling wilderness," and that this site was the one they liked the least. Measures are being taken to improve the area, but "the Wadi Halfan spirit is thoroughly aroused, and it is remarkable that women are playing a leading part in the agitation. One of them enjoys the distinction of being the first woman political prisoner in Sudan."²⁷⁵

The Nile River will no doubt remain a major problem for the Sudan as long as she continues to rely so heavily on its waters for irrigation, domestic needs and navigation. The 1959 Agreement was a major step towards resolving this problem, but certainly not the final one. Even if Egypt and the Sudan can resolve all their differences, the other countries upstream are bound to stake their claims to this water as they develop. That this fact is no idle possibility was clearly

274. Daily Star, Beirut, 15 October 1960.

275. Ibid, 3 February 1961.

indicated by a conference held in Khartoum on 16 October 1961 in which representatives of the British East African territories informally demanded a bigger share of the Nile waters.²⁷⁶

The final matter of interest to this study was the attainment of political maturity after the legacy of factionalism left by the Condominium. The coup d'etat suppressed political activity, but did not end it nor did it effect its basic nature. Political parties were outlawed and their funds confiscated. The politicians themselves were all allowed their freedom and the two former Prime Ministers, Abdullah Khalil and Ismail al-Azhari were granted life pensions of LS 1,222 per year.²⁷⁷ At first these politicians remained in the background and the only opposition experienced by the military government came from various army elements. But the desire for the return of the army to its barracks remained. This had been promised by General Abboud five days after the coup "as soon as things are put to right."

Underneath the apparent army control of the situation, the traditional elements continued to pair off in silent opposition to each other. The sectarian divisions posed a possible threat to stability as the army like the rest of the population was divided up between the major sects. The Khatmiya followers basically backed the military government, while the Umma and secular N.U.P. formed a "United Front" in opposition under Sayid al-Mahdi's leadership. This group lost

276. Ibid, 17 October 1961.

277. Holt, op. cit., (1961) p. 182.

some of their strength after al-Mahdi's death in March 1959, and their only agreed policy was to return the old politicians which General Abboud has declared he will never do. This opposition came out in the open in November 1960 and submitted a petition to the government demanding the return of the army to its barracks. It was signed by 18 leading politicians, including Khalil, Azhari and Sayid Siddiq (al-Mahdi's son and leader of the Ansar since March 1959).²⁷⁸ The fact that the Khatmiyya leader, Sayid 'Ali al-Mirghani declined to sign this petition helped support the military government.²⁷⁹

At present the Sudan is going through an outwardly stable period in which slow but steady progress to solve her problems is being made. What direction future developments will take cannot be predicted. However, this study has endeavored to show the background of her major problems and in particular the effect the Condominium rule had on the creation and formation of these problems. No matter what type of regime rules the Sudan in the future, or what alignments she makes in the broader international disputes, it is certain that for years to come her progress and development will reflect to a great extent her ability to face and solve these basic issues.

278. Sayid Siddiq died in October 1961.

279. Middle East Journal, chronology.

ANNEX A

A G R E E M E N T

B E T W E E N:

THE REPUBLIC OF THE SUDAN

AND

THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

FOR FULL UTILISATION OF THE NILE WATERS.

As the River Nile needs schemes, for its full control and for increasing its yield for the full utilisation of its waters by the Republic of the Sudan and the United Arab Republic on technical working arrangements other than those now applied:

And as these works require for their execution and administration, full agreement and co-operation between the two Republics in order to regulate their benefits and utilise the Nile waters in a manner which secures the present and future requirements of the two countries:

And as the Nile Water Agreement concluded in 1929 provided only for the partial use of the Nile waters and did not extend to include a complete control of the River waters, the two Republics have agreed on the following:

First: THE PRESENT ACQUIRED RIGHTS:

1) That the amount of Nile waters used by the United Arab Republic until this Agreement is signed shall be her acquired right before obtaining the benefits resulting from Nile Control

Projects which increase its yield and which are referred to in this Agreement. The total of this acquired right is 48 Billiards of cubic meters measured annually at Aswan.

2) That the amount of water used at present by the Republic of the Sudan is her acquired right before obtaining the benefits of the Projects referred to before. The total amount of this acquired right is 4 Billiards of cubic meters measured annually at Aswan.

Second: THE NILE CONTROL PROJECTS & THE DIVISION OF THEIR BENEFITS BETWEEN THE TWO REPUBLICS:

- 1) To regulate the River waters and control preventing its flow into the sea the two Republics agree that the United Arab Republic shall construct the High Dam at Aswan as the first link of series of projects on the Nile for over-year storage.
- 2) To enable the Sudan to utilise its share the two Republics agree that the Republic of the Sudan shall construct the Roseires Dam on the Blue Nile or any other works which the Republic of the Sudan considers essential for the utilisation of its shares.
- 3) The net benefit from the High Dam shall be calculated on the basis of the average normal River yield of water at Aswan in the years of this century which is estimated annually at about 84 Billiards of cubic meters. The acquired rights of the Two Republics referred to in item "First" as measured at Aswan shall be deducted from this amount. The continuous

losses of the High Dam shall also be deducted; the result will be the net benefit which shall be divided between the two Republics.

4) The net benefit of the High Dam mentioned in the previous item, shall be divided between the two Republics in a ratio of $14\frac{1}{2}$ for the Sudan to $7\frac{1}{2}$ for the United Arab Republic so long as the average yield remains in future within the limits of the present average referred to in the above para. This means that, if the average yield remains the same as the average of the previous years of this century which is estimated at 84 Milliards, and if the losses of the over-year storage remain equal to the present estimate of 10 Milliards, the net benefit from the High Dam shall be 22 Milliards of which the share of the Republic of the Sudan shall be $14\frac{1}{2}$ Milliards and the share of the United Arab Republic shall be $7\frac{1}{2}$ Milliards. By adding these shares to their acquired rights, the total share of each of them from the net yield of the Nile after the full operation of the High Dam shall be $18\frac{1}{2}$ Milliards for the Republic of the Sudan and $55\frac{1}{2}$ Milliards for the United Arab Republic.

Should the average increase, the net benefit resulting from the increase in the yield shall be divided equally between the two Republics.

5) As the net benefit from the High Dam (referred to in para 3) is calculated from the average normal yields of the river at Aswan in the years of this century after deduction of

the acquired rights of the two Countries together with the losses due to over-year storage at the High Dam, it is agreed that this amount shall be reviewed by the two parties after sufficient periods of time to be agreed upon after starting the full operation of the High Dam.

6) The United Arab Republic agrees to pay to the Sudan Republic 15 Million Egyptian Pounds as a comprehensive compensation for the damage caused to the Sudanese present properties as a result of the storage in the High Dam up to a reduced level of 182 meters (survey datum). The payments of this compensation shall be in accordance with the basis agreed to between the two parties and which is attached to this Agreement.

7) The Republic of the Sudan undertakes to arrange the transfer of the population of Halfa and other Sudanese whose lands shall be submerged by the stored water so that they finally leave Halfa before July, 1963.

8) It is to be understood that when the High Dam is fully operated for over-year storage, the United Arab Republic will abandon storing any water at Jebel Aulia Dam. The two contracting parties shall discuss any repercussions resulting from this abandonment in the appropriate time.

Third: PROJECTS FOR UTILIZATION OF LOST WATER IN THE NILE

BASIN:

In view of the fact that at present, considerable volume of the Nile basin water is lost in the Swamps of Bahr el Gebal, Bahr El Zaref, Bahr el Ghazal and the Sobat River,

it is essential that efforts be made to prevent these losses, in order to increase the yield of the River for use in agricultural expansion in the two countries, the two Republics agree to the following:-

1. The Republic of the Sudan in agreement with the United Arab Republic shall construct projects for increasing the yield of the River by preventing losses of waters of the Nile basin in the Swamps of Bahr El Gabal, Bahr El Zaraf, Bahr El Ghazal and its tributaries, the Sobat River and its tributaries and the White Nile basin. The net benefits from these projects shall be divided equally between the two Republics and each of them shall also contribute equally to the costs.

The Republic of the Sudan shall finance the above mentioned projects out of its own funds and the United Arab Republic shall pay its share in the costs in the same ratio of 50% allotted for her in the benefits of these projects.

2. If the United Arab Republic finds it necessary, according to its planned agricultural expansion to start in any of these projects, which are referred to in the above para, for increasing the yield of the Nile and after these are approved by the two governments, and when the Republic of the Sudan is not in need for such a project the United Arab Republic shall notify the Republic of the Sudan of the convenient time she thinks fit to start that project. In the course of two years from the date of this notification, each of the two Republics shall present its programme for the

utilisation of its share of waters conserved by the project in the specified dates for such benefits. This programme shall be binding to the two parties. At the end of the two years the United Arab Republic shall begin execution at her own expenses. When the Republic of the Sudan is ready to utilise its share in accordance with the agreed programme, she shall pay to the United Arab Republic part of the total costs proportional to its share in the net benefits from the project. The share of any of the two Republics shall not exceed half the total benefits of the project.

Fourth: TECHNICAL CO-OPERATION BETWEEN THE TWO REPUBLICS:

In order to achieve technical co-operation between the Governments of the two Republics and to continue with the researches and studies necessary for the Nile control projects and for the increase of its yield and also to continue the hydrological records of the Nile in its upper reaches, the two Republics agree to set up a permanent technical body of equal numbers for each which shall be appointed immediately after signing this Agreement. Its terms of reference shall be:

- (a) To draw the main lines for the projects which aim at increasing the yield of the Nile and to supervise the researches necessary for working out completed plans for these projects which shall be presented to the governments of the two Republics for approval.
- (b) To supervise the execution of the projects approved by the two Governments.

- (c) The technical body shall work out the working arrangements for the works which shall be constructed on the Nile within the boundaries of the Sudan, and also working arrangements for works to be constructed outside the boundaries of the Sudan in agreement with those concerned in the countries where such projects shall be constructed.
- (d) The technical body shall supervise the executions of all working arrangements referred to in para (c) through the engineers entrusted with this work from the officials of the two Republics, in the case of works constructed within the boundaries of the Sudan and also the High Dam and Aswan Dam and also in compliance with agreements which may be concluded with other countries regarding the construction of the upper Nile projects within their boundaries.
- (e) As it is probably that a series of low years may occur which will be followed by a succession of low levels in the High Dam Reservoir to such an extent which may not permit of the full obstructions of the two countries in any year, it will be the duty of the Technical Body to make an arrangement which should be followed by the two Republics in such cases of low years and which causes no damage to any of them. The Technical Body shall submit its recommendations in this respect for the approval of the two Governments.

2. To enable the Technical Body to exercise its duties referred to in the above item, and for the continuation of recording the Nile gauges and discharges in its upper reaches, this work shall be performed under the supervision of the Technical Body by engineers of the Republic of the Sudan and those of the United Arab Republic in the Sudan and in the United Arab Republic and in Uganda.

3. The two Governments shall issue a joint decree for the formation of a joint technical body and provide for its necessary budget out of funds of the two countries. This technical body shall meet at Cairo or Khartoum as the circumstances may be. This body shall lay down regulations which shall be approved by the two Governments, in order to organize its meetings and its technical, administrative and financial proceeding.

Fifth: GENERAL RULES:

When the need arises for conducting any discussions on Nile waters question with any of the riparian countries on the Nile outside the boundaries of the two Republics, the Governments of the United Arab Republic and the Republic of the Sudan shall agree on a unified opinion on such matters, after it has been studied by the mentioned technical body. This decision shall be the one with which the technical body shall be contacting the other countries mentioned above.

Should the discussion lead to an agreement to execute works on the River outside the boundaries of the two Republics

it shall be the duty of the Technical joint body to lay down, in consultation with the authorities of the Governments of the countries concerned, all technical details relating to the execution and working arrangements and also what is required for the maintenance of those works. When such details are sanctioned and ratified by the Governments concerned, it shall be part of the duty of this technical body to supervise the execution of the provisions of these technical agreements.

2. As some countries on the Nile other than the two contracting Republics demand for a share in the Nile waters it has been agreed by the two Republics to discuss together the claims of such countries and agree on a common opinion about them. If the discussion has resulted in an acceptance of any volume of the river yield to be allotted to one or any of these countries, this volume as measured at Aswan shall be equally deducted from the two countries.

The technical joint body referred to in this agreement shall arrange with those concerned in these countries and assure that they shall not exceed the quantity agreed to.

Sixth: TRANSITIONAL PERIOD BEFORE THE BENEFITS FROM THE COMPLETE HIGH DAM:

As the utilisation of the specified shares of the two Republics from the net benefits of the High Dam shall not begin before the construction of the full High Dam and its operation, the two parties shall agree on their agricultural expansion in the transitional period from now and until the High Dam is

completed in such a way which shall not affect their present water requirements.

Seventh:

This Agreement shall come into force after being approved by the two contracting parties and each shall inform the other about the date of approval through the diplomatic channel.

Eighth:

Annex number (1) and Annex number (2) (A) & (B) attached to this Agreement shall be considered as integral part of it.

Written in Cairo in two Arabic original copies dated 7 Jamada the first 1379 Gregorian year/ 8th November, 1959.

For

The Republic of the Sudan

Signature

Lewa,

Mohammed Talant Fareed.

For

The United Arab Republic

Signature

Zakaria Mohie El Din.

ANNEX NO. (1)A SPECIAL NOTEWATER LOAN REQUIRED BY THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

The Republic of the Sudan agrees in principle to give the United Arab Republic a water loan from the share of the Sudan in the High Dam waters to enable her to proceed with her planned programmes for Agricultural Expansion.

The request of United Arab Republic for this loan shall be made after it revises its programmes within five years from the date of signing this Agreement. If the revision by United Arab Republic reveals that she is still in need for this loan the Republic of the Sudan shall give her from her share a loan not exceeding one and a half Milliard which should be paid back in November, 1977.

ANNEX (2) (A)

The Head of the Delegation of the Republic of the Sudan

With reference to item (second) paragraph 6 in this Agreement signed today concerning the full utilisation of the River Nile Waters, there shall be a payment of compensations amounting to L 8.15 million in Sterling or in a third currency agreed upon by the two parties calculated on the basis of a fixed rate of 2,87156 to the Egyptian Pound. According to what has been agreed upon, the Government of United Arab Republic shall pay this sum in instalments in the following manner:

LE. 3 Million as at 1st January, 1960	
LE. 4 " " " " "	1961
LE. 4 " " " " "	1962
LE. 4 " " " " "	1963

I would be very grateful if you confirm your agreement on this.

With highest considerations

Head of the United Arab Republic
Delegation

(Sgd.) Zakaria Mohie EL Din.

The Head of United Arab Republic Delegation

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter dated today stipulating the following:-

(With reference to item (second) paragraph 6 in the agreement signed today concerning the full utilisation of the River Nile Waters, there shall be a payment of compensations amounting to L 8.15 million in Sterling or in a third currency agreed upon by the two parties calculated on the basis of a fixed rate of 2.87156 dollars to the Egyptian Pound. According to what has been agreed upon, the Government of United Arab Republic shall pay this sum in instalments in the following manner:-

LE. 3 Million as at 1st January, 1960
LE. 4 " " " " " 1961
LE. 4 " " " " " 1962
LE. 4 " " " " " 1963

I would be very grateful if you confirm your agreement on this.

I have the honour to confirm to you the agreement of the Government of the Republic of the Sudan on what has been stated in this letter.

With highest considerations.

Head of the Delegation of
 Republic of the Sudan
 (Lewa)

(Sgd.) Mohammed Talaat Fareed.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BROCHURES, DOCUMENTS AND REPORTS

Agreement Between The Republic of The Sudan And The United Arab Republic For Full Utilization Of The Nile Waters. Cairo, 8 November 1959.

The Aswan High Dam, Cairo, Egyptian Government, 1960.

Documents On The Sudan 1899-1953. Egyptian Society of International Law, Brochure No. 14, Cairo, 1953.

"Facts About Nile Water Talks And Related Problems Between Egypt And The Sudan," Khartoum, Office of Public Information, 2 September 1958.

Great Britain, Treaty Series No. 17 (1929), Use of the Water of the Nile for Irrigation Purposes. London, His Majesty's Stationery Office, Cmd. 3348.

Jonglei Investigation Team, The Equatorial Nile Project And Its Effects In The Anglo Egyptian Sudan. Khartoum, Sudan Government, 1954.

The Nile Waters Question. Khartoum, Ministry of Irrigation, 1955.

The Population of Sudan. Khartoum, Philosophical Society of Sudan, 1958.

The Sennar Dam, Khartoum, Ministry of Irrigation, 1959.

Southern Development Investigation Team, Natural Resources And Development Potential In The Southern Provinces of The Sudan. London, Sudan Government, 1954.

Southern Sudan Disturbances August 1955, Report of The Commission of Enquiry, Khartoum, Republic of the Sudan, 1956.

"Statement About Water For Managil Scheme in 1958," Khartoum, Office of Public Information, 2 September 1958.

The Sudan. Great Britain, London, Central Office of Information, 1953.

The Sudan A Record of Progress 1898-1947. The Sudan Government, 1948.

Sudan Irrigation, Khartoum, Ministry of Irrigation, 1957.

Sudan Today. Special Issue, The Middle East Observer. No. 1, Cairo, 1958.

BOOKS

- Abbas, Mekki, The Sudan Question. London, Faber, 1952.
- Barbour, K.M., The Republic of The Sudan. London, University of London Press, 1961.
- Davies, Reginald, The Camel's Back. London, Murray, 1957.
- Duncan, J.S.R., The Sudan. London, Blackwood, 1952.
- _____ The Sudan's Path To Independence. London, Blackwood, 1957.
- Fabunmi, L.A., The Sudan In Anglo-Egyptian Relations. London, Longmans, 1960.
- Fisher, Sydney Nettleton, The Middle East. New York, Alfred Knopf, 1959.
- Gaitskell, Arthur, Gezira. London, Faber, 1959.
- Ghurbal, Muhammad Shafiq, Tarikh al-Mufawadhat al-Misriyya al-Baritaniyya, al-Juz al-Awwal. Cairo, Renaissance Bookstore, 1952.
- Henderson, K.D.D., The Making of The Modern Sudan. London, Faber, 1953.
- Hodgkin, Robin A., Sudan Geography. London, Longmans, 1951.
- Holt, P.M., A Modern History of The Sudan. London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1961.
- Hurewitz, J.C., Diplomacy in The Near And Middle East. Volume I & II, Princeton, Van Nostrand, 1956.
- Hurst, H.E., The Nile, London, Constable, 1952.
- Jackson, H.C., Behind The Modern Sudan. London, MacMillan, 1955.
- _____ Sudan Days and Ways. London, MacMillan, 1954.
- Langley, Michael, No Woman's Country. London, Jarrolds, 1950.
- Laqueur, Walter Z., Communism And Nationalism In The Middle East. London, Routledge, 1957.

Lenczowski, George, The Middle East In World Affairs. New York, Cornell University Press, 1958.

Little, Tom, Egypt. London, Benn, 1958.

MacMichael, Sir Harold, The Sudan. New York, Praeger, 1955.

Marlowe, John, Arab Nationalism And British Imperialism. London, Cresset, 1961.

_____ A History of Anglo-Egyptian Relations. New York, Praeger, 1954.

The Middle East. Europa Publications Ltd, London, 1958, 1961.

Moorehead, Alan, The White Nile. New York, Harper, 1960.

Nigumi, M.A., A Great Trusteeship. London, Caravel, 1958.

Royal Institute of International Affairs, Great Britain And Egypt 1914-1951. London, Oxford University Press, 1952.

Shibeika, Mekki, The Independent Sudan. New York, Speller, 1959.

Sudan Almanac 1960, Khartoum, McCorquodale, 1960.

Trimingham, J. Spencer, Islam In The Sudan. London, Oxford University Press, 1949.

Wingate, Sir Ronald, Wingate Of The Sudan. London, Murray, 1955.

SPECIAL ARTICLES

Atiyah, Edward, "The Southern Sudan And Its Future," Spectator, No. 6478, 22 August 1952.

Awad, Mohamed, "Egypt, Great Britain And The Sudan," Middle East Journal, v. 1, No. 3, July 1947.

Barbour, K.M., "A New Approach To The Nile Waters Problem," International Affairs, v. 33, No. 3, July 1957.

Bochenski, Feliks, and Diamond, William, "TVA's In The Middle East," Middle East Journal, v. 4, No. 1, January, 1950.

Cook, Don, "The Sudan As The British Leave," Reporter, v. 13, No. 1, 14 July 1955.

- Corbyn, E.N., "Democracy In The Sudan," Political Quarterly, v. 16, p. 135-138, 1945.
- Crary, Douglas D., "Geography and Politics In The Nile Valley," Middle East Journal, v. 3, No. 3, July 1949.
- Gaskill, Gordon, "Troubled Waters of the Nile," Readers Digest, January 1960.
- Gherson, Randolph, "The Anglo-Egyptian Question," Middle East Journal, v. 7, No. 2, Spring 1953.
- Gosnell, Harold F., "The 1958 Elections In The Sudan," Middle East Journal, v. 12, No. 4, Autumn 1958.
- Holt, P. M., "Sudanese Nationalism And Self-Determination," Part I and II, Middle East Journal, v. 10, No. 3 and 4, Summer and Autumn 1958.
- Hourani, Albert, "The Anglo-Egyptian Agreement," Middle East Journal, v. 9, No. 3, Summer 1955.
- Kilner, Peter, "A Year of Army Rule In The Sudan," The World Today, v. 15, No. 11, p. 430 - 441.
- Niloticus, "Britain, Egypt And The Sudan," Political Quarterly, v. 19, p. 24-31, 1948.
- Rife, David C. and Randall, John R., "The Peoples of The Sudan," Middle East Journal, v. 7, No. 2, Spring 1953.
- Silberman, Leo, "Democracy In The Sudan," Parliamentary Affairs, v. 12, No. 3-4, p. 349-376.
- "Sudanese Sects and Politics," The Economist, Part I, 7 December 1957; Part II, 14 December 1957.
- "The Sudan For The Sudanese," The World Today, v. 11, No. 10, p. 421 - 430.

NEWSPAPERS AND PERIODICALS

Al-Azzām, Khartoum.

Daily Star, Beirut.

Economist, London.

Political Quarterly, London.

The Middle East Journal, Washington.

Spectator, London.

Al-Sudan Al-Jadid, Khartoum.

The World Today, RIIA, London.

ADDITIONAL USEFUL BOOKS NOT QUOTED

Arkell, A.J., A History of the Sudan to 1821. (London 1955)

Cromer, Lord, Modern Egypt. (London, 1908)

Hill, Richard, Egypt in the Sudan, 1820-1881. (London, 1959)

Holt, P.M., The Mahdist State in the Sudan, 1881-1898.
(Oxford, 1958)

Kirk, George, The Middle East, 1945-1950. (London, 1954)

MacMichael, Sir Harold, The Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. (London, 1934)

Neguib, M., Egypt's Destiny. (London, 1955)

Theobald, A.B., The Mahdiya. (London, 1951)