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**THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE BRITISH OFFICIAL  
ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE PROBLEM OF CYPRUS**

1954 - 1959

By

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Submitted in partial fulfillment  
for the requirements  
of the degree Master of Arts  
in the Political Studies  
and Public Administration Department  
of the  
American University of Beirut

**Beirut, Lebanon**

1962

BRITAIN AND CYPRUS 1954-59 - KHURI

## PREFACE

This study was started in 1960, just after Cyprus was granted her independence by the British Government. Many people believed during that time that the Cyprus Problem ended with a complete defeat of the British policy in the island. This study, however, has revealed that, although the British Government had continuously failed to calculate properly the impact of most factors involved in the Problem, the final settlement was not so much a British defeat as it was a compromise among all parties concerned.

Although much literature has been written on the relations between the British Government and Cyprus, this is perhaps the second study which concentrates on the period 1954-1959. Doros Alastos' Cyprus Guerrilla is the first. Yet this study is dedicated more to the examination of the British attitude rather than to any other factor. Indeed other attitudes, particularly that of the Greek Cypriots, deserve further attention.

I wish to thank Professor Yusuf Ibish of the Political Studies and Public Administration Department who has kindly accepted to be my adviser during the last semester. Thanks are also due to Mrs. Hiyam Bortcosh for reading the transcript

of this work, to H.M. Stationery Office and to the Staff of the Jafet Library for supplying me with many of the sources and documents used throughout this work.

Z.N.K.

Beirut, August 8, 1962.

## ABSTRACT

The Cyprus Problem arose as result of the Greek Cypriot's demand for the union of the island with Greece and the categorical British refusal of such a demand. Although the Greek Cypriots, who form 80 per cent of the island's population, had aspired for Enosis (union) since the British came to Cyprus in 1878 (and even earlier), their movement took a violent form only in 1954 after a British official had announced that the Cypriots could never expect a change of sovereignty.

While the Greek Cypriots maintained that self-determination was their natural right, the Turkish Cypriots (19 per cent of the population) stood for keeping the status quo. Britain herself tried in vain to introduce many forms of self-government, but the Greek Cypriots insisted on self-determination. Britain claimed that due to the strategic value of the island and the composition of its people it was necessary for her to maintain her sovereignty.

Greece adopted the case of the Greek Cypriots by raising the question four times at the United Nations and by giving them moral and material support. Colonel George Grivas who led EOKA for four years was a Greek officer. Turkey like-

wise adopted the case of the Turkish Cypriots.

When violence broke out in the island Britain refused to discuss the problem either at the United Nations or with any other power. In 1955, however, it invited Greece and Turkey to discuss the Cyprus Problem in London. Later, in 1956, after the tripartite conference of London failed to give positive results Britain began negotiations with Archbishop Makarios. This Cypriot leader almost reached an agreement with the British Governor (the introduction of self-government with the recognition of the Cypriots' right for self-determination) when it was decided to deport him from the island on the charge of being implicated with the terrorist activities.

Between 1956 and 1958, Britain introduced new proposals for self-government (keeping for herself the control of foreign affairs, defense and internal security) and a partnership plan in which she invited Greece and Turkey to participate with her in running the affairs of the island. She also introduced the idea of partitioning the island into Greek and Turkish sovereign areas. The three ideas were rejected by the Greek Government and the Greek Cypriots.

After Archbishop Makarios was released from detention,

he announced that he was prepared to give up the idea of Enosis provided that the island would become independent. The Greek and Turkish Governments worked out a plan based on this idea which was approved in February 1959 by the British Government as well as by the representatives of the Greek and Turkish Cypriots.

Under the new plan Britain retained sovereignty over two military bases in the island. Any further development of the island's international status was made conditional on the joint approval of Britain, Greece and Turkey. The Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus was drafted primarily on ethnical basis.

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## CHAPTER ONE

### CYPRUS AND THE CYPRIOTS

Cyprus the Island.- Cyprus lies in the north-eastern corner of the Mediterranean Sea. With an area of 3,572 square miles, its shape resembles that of a deer-skin when spread on the ground.<sup>1</sup> Excluding the 40-mile long Karpass peninsula which points towards the Gulf of Iskandarun, the island is about 90 miles from east to west and 50 miles from north to south. Cyprus is the third largest island in the Mediterranean following Sicily and Sardinia. It is 40 miles away from the Turkish coast, 60 miles from the Syrian coast, 108 miles from Beirut and 245 miles from Rhodes, the nearest Greek territory.

Cyprus has four geographical regions including two mountain ranges (Kyrenia and Troodos), a central plain (Messaoria) and a coastal plain. The Kyrenia range runs about one hundred miles along the northern shore. It is not only unique for its picturesque bold peaks but also for its

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1. Home, Gordon, Cyprus - Then and Now, (J.M. Dent & Sons, London 1960), p. 1.

numerous castles and famous monasteries. The Troodos mountains in the south are higher than the Kyrenia range. The Olympus Mountain rises up to 6,403 feet above sea level. These mountains occupy about one third of the island's area and contain most of its well known summer resorts. The richest mineral deposits of Cyprus are also found here. There are at least ten small rivers that flow from these mountains during winter. None of them however is navigable nor important enough to be worth mentioning.

Running across the northern part of the island, between the two mountain regions, is the treeless Messaoria plain; Nicosia the capital lies almost in its center. This plain suffers from lack of rainfall and therefore crop agriculture often fails to give good results.

The coastal plain ranges between two and three miles in width only. It, however, receives enough rain to make it the most fertile region of the island.

Agriculture and Industry.- Cyprus is basically an agricultural island with some valuable mineral resources. Agriculture is not well-developed yet and most of the land is still kept at the mercy of seasonal rainfall. In 1955, for example, Cyprus

had 3,900,000 arable donums,<sup>1</sup> five per cent of which was only irrigable all the year round. The chief agricultural products are cereals, citrus fruits, vines and olives. Almost 20 per cent of the island's surface is covered with forests, and in 35 years<sup>2</sup> the island will be self-sufficient in timber.

Cyprus has mineral deposits of copper, iron, asbestos and chromite. These are mined by seven local and foreign companies. In 1956 the value of exports reached £ 13.9 million,<sup>3</sup> three quarters of which came from copper concentrates and iron pyrites. The mineral exports in 1958 reached the record of 1,227,727 tons.<sup>4</sup>

There are no big industrial concerns in the island, but small workshops and cottage industries exist in abundance.

The value of the island's foreign trade in 1956 reached £ 61 million, £ 22 million of which was in exports and £ 39 million in imports.<sup>5</sup> Major imports consisted of

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1. Bullard, Sir Reader (ed.), The Middle East, A Political and Economic Survey, (The Royal Institute of International Affairs, Oxford University Press, 1958), p. 168.
  2. Ibid., p. 169.
  3. Ibid., p. 171.
  4. Economic Development in Cyprus in 1958, United (States Department of Commerce, World Trade Information Service, Part 1, No.59-24), p. 3.
  5. Bullard, op.cit., p. 172.

manufactured goods, machinery, food and transportation equipment. Major exports were minerals, citrus fruits and wine.

Historical Sketch.- Cyprus is distinguished for having the longest historical record amongst the countries of the British Commonwealth.<sup>1</sup> There are indications that man lived in this island during the New Stone Age about 4000 B.C., and that copper and bronze were discovered here in the third millennium B.C. Throughout history this island has been too weak to maintain an independent status for long periods and almost as a rule it has always been dominated by the strongest naval power in the Mediterranean. The Egyptians were one of its earliest colonizers. They were followed by the Phoenicians, the Aegeans, the Greeks, again the Egyptians, the Venetians, the Turks and finally the British. A table showing the status of the island during the different periods of history can be seen on page 6. Page.

The Egyptians occupied Cyprus about the year 1,500 B.C. under the great Pharaoh Tuthmosis III, and although they ruled the island for many centuries, they did not influence

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1. Luke, Harry Charles, Cyprus, A Portrait and an Appreciation, (George G. Harrap & Co. Ltd., London, 1957), p. 28.

it much and left almost no religious or cultural marks.<sup>1</sup>

The Phoenicians came to Cyprus from Tyre and Sidon as traders during the 8th century B.C. They were not colonizers but they influenced the island by introducing the worship of Astarte and Melkarth and by developing the mineral wealth of the country.

During the 6th century B.C. the Greek civilization was spreading in the Aegean Sea. The Greeks established in Cyprus colonies which soon developed into city states inhabited by people coming from the Greek mainland. These settlers actually "reproduced the life and culture of the parent state"<sup>2</sup> which can still be noticed today. The city state system, however, did not help the new settlers to remain under the political domination of their country of origin and had kept the island disunited for a long period.

The Persians dominated Cyprus for almost two centuries and they were followed by the Ptolemies, the successors of Alexander the Great in Egypt. Under their three-century rule the Hellenic culture flourished in the island. The great philosopher Zeno, founder of the Athenian Stoic School

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1. Newman, Philip, A Short History of Cyprus, (Longman, Green & Co., London, 1953), p. 19.

2. Ibid, p. 23.

PERIODS OF CYPRUS HISTORY<sup>1</sup>

<u>Approximate Date</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
3500 B.C.	Neolithic Age	Many remains found
3000 B.C.	Bronze Age	Facilitated by presence of copper.
1500-525 B.C.	Egyptian and Assyrian rule	Large measure of local autonomy most of the time
525-334 B.C. 334-30 B.C.	Persian rule Alexander and Ptelomies	Progress of Hellenism
30 B.C.-A.D. 395 395 - 1191 649-964	Roman Province Byzantine Rule Arab incursions	Most prosperous and most populous period Treated as Dar-al-Harb hence harsh treatment
1191-1192	Richard I and Templars	"Harsh exactions" by Templars thus revolt
1192-1489	Lusignans	Prosperity and High Culture
1489-1570	Venetians	Decline in Prosperity
1570-1878	Ottoman rule	Sharp decline in prosperity
1878-1959	British rule	Progress, first slow then rapid

was born in Cyprus during this period. It is interesting to note that while this philosopher wrote in Greek and influenced

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1. Wosgian, Daniel, Cyprus Under British Rule, (A.U.B., 1959), p. 8

Greek thought most, his parents were Phoenicians and he was an Egyptian subject.<sup>1</sup>

The Romans ruled Cyprus from 57 B.C. to 394 A.D.<sup>2</sup> During their rule money was spent for the first time in the history of the island on public works. Population grew rapidly and reached the record of half-a-million which was only reached again in 1956. This period also witnessed the foundation of Christianity in the island and the establishment of the Church of Cyprus.

When the Roman Empire was split, Cyprus became part of the Eastern Empire<sup>3</sup> (Byzantium) and remained so for the next eight centuries. There was no serious development during this period except for a series of twenty-four invasions launched by the Arabs. The Caliphs Abu Bakr and Mu'awiyah headed two invasions<sup>4</sup> and Harun al-Rashid invaded the island twice. The latter took many inhabitants into captivity and sold them as slaves. The Bishop of Cyprus, being one of the captives of the second invasion, fetched 2000 dinars.<sup>5</sup>

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1. Hill, Sir George, A History of Cyprus, (Cambridge, 1952), Vol. I, p. 213.
  2. Home, op.cit., p. 208.
  3. Newman, op.cit., p. 58.
  4. Alastos, Doros, Cyprus in History (Zeno Publishers, London, 1955), p. 146.
  5. Luke, op.cit., p. 34.

Richard I, King of England, occupied Cyprus in 1191 during the second Crusade. He was married at Limassol to Berengaria of Navarre, whose coronation there marks the first and last coronation of a British Queen outside Britain. King Richard sold the island to the Knights Templars who transferred it one year later to the House of Lusignans. These ruled the island as an independent entity for the next three hundred years (1192-1489) and although their rule was unpopular, the island, during that period witnessed some very brilliant cultural developments.<sup>1</sup> Their rule is marked by making the Latin Church the supreme ecclesiastic authority in Cyprus and by suppressing the Orthodox Church.

In 1489 Queen Caterina abdicated the throne of Cyprus in favour of the rulers of the Republic of Venice<sup>2</sup> which at that time had the strongest fleet in the Mediterranean. Venice ruled the island for 82 years maintaining the same administrative principles of the Lusignans. Cyprus interested them only for its strategic location<sup>3</sup> and therefore there were few developments during this period.

Meanwhile the Turks were building a strong fleet. In

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1. Ibid., p. 43.
2. Home, op.cit., p. 67.
3. Luke, op.cit., p. 65.



1571 they conquered Cyprus and declared it as a new province in their vast Empire. The island remained as such for the next three hundred years; a period marked in its history as that of "maladministration and decay"<sup>1</sup> despite two major popular adjustments which the Turks had made. These were the recognition of the Orthodox Church as the supreme religious authority in the island and the abolishing of the feudal system of serfdom which was originally introduced during the Byzantine period. The Turks were far from being reformers. They looked at the island only as a good source of revenue and actually followed the practice of selling its governership to the highest bidder.<sup>2</sup> The inhabitants of the island were always dissatisfied with the way money was taken from them. And, although their Archbishop was recognized by the Porte as their guardian with the right of sending petitions to Constantinople directly on their behalf,<sup>3</sup> in 1821 they rose in revolt against the Ottoman rule. Archbishop Kyprianos and the three bishops of the island were accused of treason and collaboration with Greece<sup>4</sup> and were hanged together with other leading Cypriots.

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1. Newman, op.cit., p. 172
2. Ibid., p. 177.
3. Ibid, p. 179.
4. Luke, op.cit., p. 80.

Sultan Mahmoud II and his successor Abdul Majid I were enlightened reformers. In 1839 the practice of leasing the island to the highest bidder was stopped and the annual tribute of the island was fixed at 3,179,082 piasters.<sup>1</sup> Tax farming was officially abolished too and the Governor who was now called the qaimaqam had a fixed salary of 120,000 piasters a year.

Before these reforms started to give results, war broke out between Turkey and Russia, and as shall be seen in Chapter Two the island was leased to Great Britain.

Greeks, Turks and others.- The population of Cyprus at the end of 1956 was estimated at 531,000,<sup>2</sup> about 80 per cent being Greek Orthodox, 19 per cent Sunni Turks and a few thousand Armenians and Maronites. This demographic set up was one of the main reasons for the 1954-1959 crisis.

The difference in culture, political outlook and national aspirations of the two major communities has been so diverse that for many years it seemed as though it was impossible for them to live in one state.<sup>3</sup> In some way it has always been difficult to speak of the "Cypriots" as one

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1. Newman, op.cit., p. 191.
  2. Bullard, op.cit., p. 145.
  3. Comstock, Alzada, "Uneasy Cyprus", Current History, V. 34, No.202 (June, 1958), p. 356.

entity for the Greek and Turkish inhabitants almost have nothing in common except that they live in one island. Even today, when talking about the people of Cyprus one has always to differentiate between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. A British Member of Parliament,<sup>1</sup> in 1956, went as far as saying that "there are Cypriots in Turkey, there are Cypriots in London and Greece but there are no Cypriots in Cyprus. In Cyprus there are Greeks and Turks, utterly separated communities with a separate language, a separate education and a separate religion."

To add to the difficulty of the situation, the minority group, the Turks, are not concentrated in one part of the island. They form for example one third of the population of Nicosia while in some villages they utterly do not exist while still in other villages they form the majority.

Historians have always been faced with the controversial question of how Greek the Greek Cypriots are although they are in agreement that the Greek influence started to penetrate the island with the Mycenaean culture in the late Bronze Age.<sup>2</sup>

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1. Mr. R.T. Paget in Hansard, V. 550, Col.487.

2. Comstock, op.cit., p. 353.

During the crisis and in many instances before, the Greek Cypriots were faced with arguments claiming that their island had never in history been part of Greece and that they basically differed from the inhabitants of the land they called "Mother Greece".

Such arguments were enforced by great authorities such as Sir George Hill who said that "at no time has the island of Cyprus been a constituent part of Hellenic Greece"<sup>1</sup> and by Samuel Brown who wrote as far back as 1879 that the "Christian inhabitants (of Cyprus) though Greek by language and religion, possess little of the intelligence, enterprise and restlessness of the Greek character, nor physiologically are they of Greek type."<sup>2</sup>

The Greek Cypriots themselves have always ridiculed these arguments. Even today, while living in an independent Republic they still look to Athens as their ultimate capital. Sir Harry Luke, whose writings indicate that he had never favoured the union of Cyprus with Greece, could not but admit that "There is no doubt that the Greek of Cyprus passionately feels himself to be a Greek in speech, thought, faith and way of life." This opinion is supported by Sir

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1. Luke, op.cit., p. 33.

2. Durrell, Lawrence, Bitter Lemons, (Faber and Faber Ltd. 1958), p. 107.

Roland Storrs, once Governor of the island for six years.

"The Greekness of Cypriots is, in my opinion, indisputable," he says, "Nationalism is more, is other, is greater than pigmentations or cephalic indices. A man is of the race of which he passionately feels himself to be. No sensible person will deny that the Cypriot is Greek-speaking, Greek-thinking, Greek-feeling, Greek, as much as the French Canadian is French-speaking, French-thinking, French-feeling and French".<sup>1</sup>

The Turks of Cyprus are the descendents of the immigrants who came from Anatolia in the few years following the Turkish conquest of 1571.<sup>2</sup> These immigrants were given fiefs in the island by Sultan Selim in the 16th century and since then they have maintained themselves in independent communities. The Turkish Cypriots look towards Ankara in exactly the same way the Greek Cypriots look towards Athens.<sup>3</sup> They are even considered to be closer to Turkey than the Greek Cypriots are to Greece.<sup>4</sup>

The Turkish Cypriots feel that the Greek community

1. Alastos, Cyprus in History, op.cit., p. 337.
2. Beckingham, C.F., "The Cypriot Turks", Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society, (V. XLIII, January, 1956), p. 126.
3. Tachan, Frank, "The Face of Turkish Nationalism as Reflected in the Cyprus Dispute", Middle East Journal, (Summer, 1959), p. 263.
4. Beckingham, op.cit., p. 127.

of the island does not have the right to agitate for union with Greece because Cyprus has never been part of it. They moreover consider Greece the national enemy of their mother country, Turkey.<sup>1</sup> Throughout history they have always been in favour of maintaining the status quo. They believe that if any change in the island's international status occurs, the island should be ceded to Turkey of which it had been an integral part for over 300 years.

The Church of Cyprus.- The Church of Cyprus was founded in 46 A.D. by two apostles, St. Paul and St. Barnabas, while they were on their way from Palestine to Rome.<sup>2</sup> Since St. Barnabas was a Cypriot, the Archbishops of the island have always considered themselves to be his successors. They therefore sign in red ink, wear purple cloaks and recognize no church authority to be their superior.

The Archbishop of Cyprus is elected by a mixed council of Greek Cypriot laity and clergymen together with the island's Holy Synod.<sup>3</sup> The latter body is formed of the Bishops of Kyrenia, Paphos and Kitium, the abbots of the two principal monasteries of the island, the archamandrite and the Patriarchate exarch.

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1. Tuchan, op.cit., p. 264.

2. Lord Kinrass, "The Problem of Cyprus," History Today, (V. IV, November 1954), p. 727.

3. Burns, Sir Alan, In Defense of Colonies: British Colonial Territories in International Affairs, (Allen and Unwin, London, 1957), p. 224.

The leader of the Church has been traditionally called the "Ethnarch" or national leader, a word implying political as well as religious leadership. This word, though Greek, is not used by the Greek Orthodox elsewhere to mean the head of the Church. It was only introduced to the Church of Cyprus and by a Turkish Sultan, Mehmed the Conqueror<sup>1</sup>, in order to give the Archbishop wide authority. The Ethnarch today is officially advised by an Ethnarchy Council on all political and national problems. This council, which is composed of prominent churchmen and civilians, was founded in July 1948 by Archbishop Makarios II, predecessor of President Makarios.

The exceptionally great power which the Church enjoys at present is mainly the result of the three hundred years of Turkish rule of the island. Immediately after the Turks had taken over Cyprus from the Venetians in 1570, the Latin Church was liquidated and the Orthodox Church which had been previously forced into an inferior position, was recognized by the Porte as the official Church of the island.<sup>2</sup> The power of the Archbishop was revived; he was given an administrative position in Cyprus similar to that

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1. Luke, op.cit., p. 179.

2. Ibid., p. 226.

of the Patriarch of Constantinople.<sup>1</sup> The Archbishop thus became responsible for assessing and collecting taxes from the Greek-speaking islanders as well as for their good behaviour. These wide powers meanwhile served as a check on the activities of Turkish officials in the island who, in fact, could not exercise any power over the Church. Eventually these officials and other Turkish subjects in Cyprus started to resent the Church because they felt that "their position as conquerors has been changed into that of conquered." The power of the Church reached its climax during the 19th century when it became the unchallenged body controlling the fiscal, educational and religious affairs of the island, only responsible to deliver annually a certain sum of money to the Imperial Treasury. William Turner who once served at the British Embassy in Constantinople went, in 1820, as far as saying that "Cyprus, though nominally under the authority of a Bey appointed by the Qapudan Pasha, is in fact governed by the Greek Archbishop and his subordinate clergy."<sup>2</sup>

When the British came to Cyprus in 1878 the millet system was cancelled and a civil fiscal administration was

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1. Luke, op.cit., p. 77.

2. Ibid, p. 78.



established to deal with taxation. The Church lost much of its secular authority, though religious and educational affairs remained under its sole jurisdiction. Yet under the British administration the Church had never been weakened to the extent of being challenged by any other organization. Only once, in 1948, the Church had to organize anti-communist rallies and demonstrations to answer the left wing elements who were trying to compete in controlling some of the island's youth movements.<sup>1</sup>

It was actually extremely difficult for the British to regain political leadership from the Church. The clergymen, being used to wide forms of authority, began to exert religious pressure to maintain their political influence. Refusing marriage rites, baptism of children and Christian burial<sup>2</sup> were some of the threats they used to wave against those who disobeyed their orders.

The Church felt in 1950 that it commanded enough power and influence to organize a plebiscite among the Greek inhabitants of the island asking them if they wished to unite with Greece. This plebiscite was carried on January

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1. Alastos, Doros, Cyprus Guerrilla-Grivas, Makarios and the British, (Heinemann, London, 1960), p. 34.
  2. Cyprus, The Facts, (Central Office of Information, London, 1955), p. 5.

15 after the Cyprus government had refused to conduct it. The result showed that 96 per cent<sup>1</sup> of the voters favoured union. With this plebiscite it became very clear that the Church had once again fully assumed the role of national leadership of the Greek Cypriots. After this event it went as far as sending representatives to the United Nations, Greece and Britain to lobby and negotiate on behalf of the islanders. In Chapter Three we shall see that between 1954 and 1959 the Church became the Guardian of the organized terrorist movement, EOKA.

As an old institution, the Church of Cyprus is credited for its adaptability to the events and needs of the age. It is quite peculiar that since 1950 this institution, the oldest in Cyprus has sponsored the most radical movement in the island's modern history. In this endeavour the Church has not been only inclined to politics, but a political organizer and an inspirer of a revolutionary spirit as well.

The adaptability of the Church is mainly due to its long independent history which has drawn it closer to the aspirations of the Cypriot people than to any outside

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1. Alastos, Cyprus Guerrilla, op.cit., p. 35.

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1. Alastos, Cyprus Guerrilla, op.cit., p. 35.

authorities on the charge of being disloyal to the Empire. These clergymen actually were advocating a policy of union with Greece. The Turks were never able to suppress Enosis nor view it favourably.

When the British came to the island in 1878 the Greek Cypriots hailed this event as a major step to achieve their aspiration. Britain had in 1864 turned over the Ionian islands to Greece and she was considered to be primarily a supporter of the pro-Hellenic movement. This attitude was expressed almost immediately after the British landing in the island. Archbishop Sophronios of Kition, on welcoming the first British High Commissioner Sir Garnet Wolsely in 1878 said in a public address:<sup>1</sup> "We accept the change of Government inasmuch as we trust that Great Britain will help Cyprus, as it did the Ionian islands, to be united with mother Greece with which it is naturally connected."

A few years later, in 1895, the Cypriots sent a memorandum to the British Government stating that they "have never forgotten their Hellenic origin. Relying on the magnanimity of the British nation, they hope that in due time favourable consideration will be given to their aspirations."

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1. Ibid.

Their only aspiration is the Union with their mother-country Greece in accordance with the precedence of the Ionian states."<sup>1</sup>

British Attitudes.— During the first few years of the British occupation the official attitude of the British governments towards Enosis was not consistent though it was sometimes explicitly favourable, other times intricately not so. We see for example that in 1880 the British Prime Minister Gladstone had successfully avoided a direct statement on the British outlook towards Enosis by declaring that "Her Majesty's Government fervently wish the prosperity of Cyprus, but the inhabitants must remember that the island is occupied by England as part of the Turkish Empire by virtue of a convention with the Porte. Similar proposals (to those of Enosis) contravening that Convention cannot be discussed."<sup>2</sup>

Mr. Joseph Chamberlain in 1902 put forth another argument which added to the ambiguity of the British attitude. He claimed<sup>3</sup> that the cession of Cyprus to Greece was not favourable to the majority of the Cypriots "who preferred to live under the domination of a rich power than under that of

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1. Ibid., p. 331.

2. Ibid.

3. Alastos, Cyprus in History, op.cit., p. 331.

a small poor one." This statement was resented by the Greek members of the Legislative Council who cabled immediately to Chamberlain: "If obstacles beyond our control prevent the approachment of the blessed day of our Union, we consider nevertheless that our national feelings and aspirations deserved greater respect by our rulers."<sup>1</sup>

Sir Winston Churchill on the other hand told the Cyprus Legislative Council<sup>2</sup> in 1907 that it is "only natural that the Cypriot people, who are of Greek descent, should regard their incorporation with what may be called their mother country as an ideal to be earnestly, devoutly and fervently cherished." "Such a feeling," continued Sir Winston, "is an example of the patriotic devotion which so nobly characterises the Greek nation."

Britain made a positive step towards recognizing Enosis in 1913 when, during a meeting at London, between Greek Premier Venizelos and some British officials including Chancellor of Exchequer Lloyd George and First Lord of Admiralty Winston Churchill, the British suggested that they might cede Cyprus if their fleet was allowed to use

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1. Alastos, Cyprus in History, op.cit., p. 331.

2. Ibid., p. 337.

Argostoli in Cephallonia should war break out in the eastern Mediterranean. The Greek Premier accepted the offer, but since the British Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Gray was not present at the meeting, this talk was considered to be of an exploratory nature<sup>1</sup> and the arrangement was actually never discussed by the British Cabinet.

Two years later, in November 1915, Britain officially offered Cyprus to Greece if the latter would declare war on the Central Powers and march against Bulgaria.<sup>2</sup> The British Government was confident that this offer would be welcomed by Greece. As a matter of fact before the offer was officially made, the British entertained the idea of sweeping the Greek feelings towards the allies by putting the Cypriot Archbishop aboard a British warship and taking him to Athens where he himself would declare union, thus putting the Greek Government under a happy fait accompli.<sup>3</sup> The British Government however gave up the idea and made her suggestion through normal diplomatic channels. The offer was open only for a week and much to the disappointment of the British Government it was turned down.

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1. Ibid,

2. Luke, op.cit., p. 86.

3. Alastos, Cyprus in History, op.cit., p. 342.

This event caused disappointment in Cyprus as well, particularly after the British High Commissioner told a Greek Cypriot delegation in a later date that "the Enosis question was burried for ever" and that "Cypriots from now on should be oriented towards London, not towards Athens."<sup>1</sup>

Another attempt was made by Britain in October 1916 to persuade Greece to join the Allies after Serbia had been attacked by Bulgaria. The reward promised to Greece this time could be clearly found in the cable which was sent by the British Foreign Secretary at the time, Sir Edward Gray, to the British Minister in Athens. "If Greece is willing to come to the aid of Serbia," Sir Edward stated, "Her Majesty's Government is ready to cede to Greece the island of Cyprus. If Greece joins the Allies for all purposes she will naturally participate in the advantages secured at the end of the war."<sup>2</sup>

The Greek King and his Prime Minister again rejected the offer because during that period the Turkish and Bulgarian armies seemed to be victorious in the Balkans and any attempt to join the Allies seemed to be disastrous to Greece.

No offer to cede Cyprus was ever made again although

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1. Ibid, p. 344.

2. Ibid, p. 342.



in 1919 Greece was promised that the British Government would give Enosis "the most careful and sympathetic consideration" and that "when the Greek question was finally solved, Cyprus would become part of Greece."<sup>1</sup>

The British policy continued to fluctuate for the next forty years although as time went on it became obvious that Britain would not yield to the Cypriots increasing demand for Union. The greatest disappointment came from Ramsay Macdonald who, before his Labour Party came to power in 1924, was one of the supporters of Enosis. He had actually promised that the Labour Party would apply the principle of self-determination to the island.<sup>2</sup> Mr. Macdonald told the House of Commons soon after he became Prime Minister that "His Majesty's Government are not contemplating any change in the political status of Cyprus."<sup>3</sup> His Colonial Secretary Lord Passfield told some Greek members of the Cyprus Legislative Council who went to see him in London in 1929 that the subject of Enosis was definitely closed and cannot profitably be further discussed."<sup>4</sup>

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1. Ibid, p. 243.

2. Storrs, Sir Roland, Memoirs, (Putnam's, New York, 1937), p. 491.

3. Ibid, p. 488.

4. Alastos, Cyprus in History, op.cit., p. 327.

There was some hope during the Greco-Italian war in 1940-41 that Britain and Greece might reach a war formula by which the Cyprus problem would be settled. The British Foreign Office however did not make a statement to this effect although during this period Greeks and Cypriots regarded the question of ceding Cyprus as "quite within the bounds of probability."<sup>1</sup>

Manifestations of Enosis.- The relationship between the British administration and the Cypriots will be discussed in a later chapter. It should be mentioned here, however, that the demand for Enosis and self-determination had sometimes manifested itself in hostile acts against the government and the movement as such was often viewed as anti-British. That view is a misconception of the true motive of Enosis. Despite the bitter crisis in 1954-1959 the Greek Cypriots are basically great admirers of the British political and administrative systems and have always recognized with appreciation the "moral and material benefits" their rule had brought the island.<sup>2</sup> Yet it was inevitable sometimes that, in expressing pro-Greek sympathies, the Greek Cypriots were considered to be anti-British.

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1. Ibid, p. 367.

2. Wosgian, op.cit., p. 84.

According to Sir George Hill<sup>1</sup> "hardly a year has passed without the Hellenic idea finding form in some form or another." These usually took the form of publishing pro-Enosis articles, hoisting Greek flags, organizing demonstrations, sending delegations to London and resigning from public office to express dissatisfaction with some policies of the government. Most of these activities were considered by the government as anti-British. The most obvious challenge came in 1950 when the Church defied the British authorities in the island and carried its Enosis plebiscite in an emotionally loaded anti-British atmosphere.

The Archbishop-President.- No discussion of Cyprus and the Cypriots could be complete without reference to Archbishop Makarios, President of the Republic and for many years leader of the national movement in the island. Archbishop Makarios is particularly important to this study because during the critical years 1954-1959 he was by far the most prominent figure involved in the problem. Actually his name and the Cyprus Problem became synonymous terms in many minds, not only because he symbolized the national aspirations of the Cypriots, but because his personality and deep insight helped

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1. Hill, V. IV, op.cit., p. 531.

the Cypriots by giving their problem the prominence it had in the international sphere.

Since the outbreak of the Cyprus crisis in 1954, Archbishop Makarios has been viewed as a politician much more than a religious leader. This, as has been already shown, is mainly due to the great power the Archbishopric chair has traditionally enjoyed. It is however due to the personality of Archbishop Makarios himself, his educational background and political ability, that he emerged as the undisputed leader of the Greek Cypriots.

Archbishop Makarios was born in Cyprus in 1913. He started his ecclesiastic career as a novice in the Kykko Monastery<sup>1</sup> and then joined the Pan-Cyprian Gymnasium, the leading Greek High School in Nicosia. After his graduation he went to study theology in Athens where he stayed under German rule for a few years during the War. Archbishop Makarios was then sent to complete his studies at the School of Theology in Boston University. In 1948 he returned to the island to be immediately elected as the Bishop of Kition.

Having spent many years abroad, Makarios was then

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1. Luke, op.cit., p. 170.

almost unknown to the islanders. To attain the position of Bishop, he did not have to go through the normal preliminaries of favouratism and bargaining<sup>1</sup> but was strongly recommended to the chair by the ecclesiastic authorities in the island. The fact that he had never committed himself before to any political or provincial group actually helped him to be elected two years later to the top position of the Church of Cyprus - a position which he occupied as an independent and popular person.

All those who met Archbishop Makarios and spoke to him agree that he enjoys a strong and charming personality which manifests itself in the simplicity of his behaviour, the self-assurance and confidence of his conversation. He is primarily a politician who knows how to hide his emotions and how to impose his arguments upon people. He moreover enjoys an extraordinary ability of understanding what people want and how they would react to events. He is able to maneuver with the simplest Cypriot farmer as well as with the most brilliant British politicians. The historian of Cyprus, Alastos Doros, who knows the Archbishop very well has this to say about him:<sup>2</sup> "Makarios combined ecclesiastic

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1. Alastos, Cyprus Guerrilla, p. 11.

2. Ibid., p. 12.

willingness with political adroitness, and added to these grave affability and calculated charm. Moreover, he knew how to inspire people and rarely found it necessary to wield his authority as a bludgeon. He was a difficult person to fight."

When Makarios became the Ethnarch of the island he decided that, in order to succeed in their movement, the Greek Cypriots ought first to have a strong and unified leadership and second to propagate and popularize their cause in order to win international support. Being already in the position of leadership Archbishop Makarios acted accordingly. He worked very hard and succeeded in harmonizing the national groups, setting up youth movements and mobilizing all the potential popular forces in well-organized and responsible institutions.

On the international level, Archbishop Makarios started to have direct contact with foreign governments. He took upon himself the task of travelling abroad to meet officials and convince them of the Greek point of view. In 1953 he visited the United States, and not being able to get the support he was hoping for from the State Department, he stated upon his arrival in Nicosia<sup>1</sup> that "We shall seek the

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1. Luke, op.cit., p. 182.

support of the United Nations, of every nation and we shall accept support from dirty hands". Coming from a religious leader, this statement was rather unusual.

Archbishop Makarios in 1955 went as far as considering his national duties more important than his religious obligations. During the Orthodox Holy Week,<sup>1</sup> he left the island to attend the Afro-Asian Conference at Bandung where he met and won the support of many delegates.

As shall be seen in Chapter Three, the energetic and determined personality of Archbishop Makarios shaped the Cyprus Problem in many ways.

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1. Ibid., p. 177.

## CHAPTER TWO

### BRITISH ATTITUDES AND INTENTIONS

The Motive of Occupation.- It was once said that "he who would become and remain a great power in the East must hold Cyprus in his hand."<sup>1</sup> Exaggerated as it may be, the logic behind this statement has apparently guided the British policy in the area for almost two centuries. In British history this island enjoys the distinction of being the first strategically useful land to be acquired in the Middle East in the 19th century and the last to be retained in the 20th century.

Cyprus gained importance in the 19th century because it was a half-way station between Britain and India. In 1876 Queen Victoria was proclaimed Empress of India after British traders and politicians had succeeded in establishing great influence there. To protect the way to the new Empire the possession of Cyprus became necessary. There

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1. Gustav Hirschfeld as quoted in Hill, op.cit., V. I, p. 1.



were, of course, other equally important stations on this route including Crete, Rhodes, Acre and Haifa. Cyprus, however, being easily defensible by a sea power, was given priority. Actually Cyprus had always been looked upon by the British as a convenient pied-a-terre in the Eastern Mediterranean. Moreover, Great Britain already had her eye fixed on the Euphrates valley through which the Baghdad railway was to pass and it was necessary to establish peace and order, as well as British influence in the area before such an investment could be made. The occupation of Cyprus was therefore also considered by many Englishmen as a "prelude" to spreading British influence in the area;<sup>1</sup> the island itself was "a matter of secondary importance ... the real significance being the prospects of British penetration in Asiatic Turkey."<sup>2</sup> Lord Beaconsfield declared<sup>3</sup> before the island was occupied that "the possession of Cyprus would give to England a preponderating influence in the Mediterranean, and place at her disposal the future destinies of the Levant." In a subsequent letter to Queen Victoria he stated<sup>4</sup> that "If

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1. Alastos, Cyprus in History, op.cit., p. 306.

2. Wosgian, op.cit., p. 37.

3. Hill, op.cit., V. IV, p. 207.

4. Quoted by Major H. Legge-Bourke in Hansard, V. 531, Col. 558.

Cyprus be conceded to Your Majesty...the power of England in the Mediterranean will be absolutely increased in that region...and Your Majesty's Indian Empire immediately strengthened. Cyprus is the key of Western Asia."

Russia on the other hand was expanding. This Great Power was now looking southwards with more seriousness than ever. Constantinople and its "warm waters" had always been considered by Russia as its "natural borders", and, as the Ottoman Empire was getting weaker and weaker Russia's threat was becoming more serious. This culminated in 1877 with the invasion of Ottoman territory (the fourth invasion in one century)<sup>1</sup> under the pretence of supporting the Bosnians, "the Slav Brothers", who were revolting against the harsh tax laws of the Ottomans. Although Great Britain had never favoured the Ottoman Empire nor the way it administered the affairs of its subjects,<sup>2</sup> the preservation of this "sick man of Europe" in the face of Russia's threat of upsetting the European balance of power now became necessary. Britain's main route to her Eastern Empire moreover could never be secured under the threat of an equally powerful imperialist power emerging in the area.

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1. Luke, op.cit., p. 83.

2. Wosgian, op.cit., p. 27.

San Stefano and Berlin.- The treaty of San Stefano (signed March 1878) ended the Russo-Turkish war. Russia, securing a lion's share, emerged so great a power in the northern Balkans that Britain had to send her fleet to Constantinople in order to put an end to this expansion and check any further activity of the Northern Bear. Russia, fearing the might of the British fleet, agreed to sit down with the other European powers at Berlin to revise the terms of San Stefano. The meeting took place in June 1878 and Germany, having no vital interests in the Near East<sup>1</sup>, occupied the position of chairmanship in the person of its able statesman Bismark who was able to convince Russia of giving up half the territory it had gained during the war.<sup>2</sup> But just as he was pushing Russia backwards on the map, Disraeli surprised the delegates by announcing that Great Britain and the Ottoman Empire had signed a convention (see Appendix I) transferring the administration of Cyprus from the latter to the former in order to guarantee the protection of the Sultan's possessions in Asia and introduce some necessary reforms in these territories.

The manner by which Britain approached the Sultan

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1. Medlicott, W.N., The Congress of Berlin and After, (Methuen, London, 1938), p. 36.
2. Wosgian, op.cit., p. 27.

in order to secure the administration of the island was far from being friendly. The British Ambassador in Constantinople, Sir Henry Layard, on May 24, informed the Sultan that Russia was insisting on maintaining fortresses in Armenia and that Britain could not give any effective help to Turkey unless she was given a nearby place d'armes. Cyprus was suggested as a convenient place and the Sultan was given only 48 hours to give his reply.<sup>1</sup> The confused Sultan had no alternative but to accept. Great Britain was in a hurry; the Ambassador drew the draft of the convention himself, the Ottomans signed it on June 4 and the British warships started to arrive in the island on July 8. On July 12 Vice Admiral Sir John Hay hoisted the British flag in Nicosia<sup>2</sup> and ten days later Lieut. General Sir Garnet Wolseley landed at Larnaca and was proclaimed as the First British High Commissioner on the island.

Egypt versus Cyprus.- In 1882, four years after Cyprus had been occupied, British troops under Sir Garnet Wolseley himself defeated Arabi at Tel-el-Kebir and occupied Egypt. This event had a great impact on the future development of

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1. Ibid, p. 29.

2. Luke, op.cit., p. 85.

the island and the strategic importance Great Britain had originally given it. All the preponderance Great Britain had required from the occupation of Cyprus was found in Egypt with even greater advantages. For after the completion of the Suez Canal, Egypt became the most vital center of communication between East and West.<sup>1</sup> Cyprus, which only four years earlier, had been destined to play the most active strategic role in the area suddenly became out of the way. The facilities Egypt could offer to a great sea power obviously superseded those of Cyprus and since the two countries were close to each other they were treated as alternatives. Cyprus moved to the background and for many years received only scant attention from London.

It is interesting to note here that up to the 1950's Egypt and Cyprus had been viewed by Great Britain from this angle. Even in 1956, when the British Middle East High Command had to be transferred to Cyprus the British Chiefs of Staff were not satisfied with the island as a substitute base. They had to accept it as the only alternative to Suez which could at least be used as planning headquarters.<sup>2</sup>

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1. Alastos, Cyprus Guerrilla, op.cit., p. 37.
  2. Campbell, John C, Defense of the Middle East, (Praeger, New York, 1960), p. 45.

The Status of the Island.- The British rule of Cyprus is classically divided into four periods.<sup>1</sup> These are; 1) The period between 1878 and 1914 when the island was still considered to be part of the Ottoman Empire although it was completely administered by the British; 2) The period between 1914 and 1925, i.e., from its annexation during World War II up to its declaration as a Crown Colony; 3) The period between 1925 and 1931 when great efforts were made to introduce popular participation in running the affairs of the island and 4) the period between 1931 and 1959 when, after the Greek Cypriots refused to cooperate, the island was put under an authoritarian rule.

Although the 1878 Convention had "assigned" and not ceded Cyprus to Britain, the Sultan since that date had lost all his authority in the island and was not even given an explanation as to why it was never turned into an armed depot to defend his possessions in Asia.<sup>2</sup> On the other hand since the Convention was arranged by the Foreign Office and not the Colonial Office, Great Britain did not have a prepared administrative plan to apply to the island. During

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1. Alastos, Cyprus in History, op.cit., p. 320.

2. Ibid.

the first few years of the occupation the High Commissioner merely replaced the Turkish Mutessarif with orders coming to him from London instead of Constantinople. Six British district officers replaced the Quaimaqams.<sup>1</sup> Although the British High Commissioner enjoyed, by Order of Council,<sup>2</sup> wide legislative and executive authority, his position could not be viewed as that of an absolute dictator. In fact he was merely an agent of the British Government and could act only within the limits delegated to him by the Crown.<sup>3</sup>

Up to 1882 the High Commissioner used to appoint all members of both the Legislative and the Executive Councils in the island. The former consisted of seven members, four of whom were British officials and three non-officials, members of the local community. In 1880 Cyprus was transferred from the Foreign Office to the Colonial Office and was treated like a Crown Colony though it was only officially declared as such in 1925. During this year the High Commissioner submitted his first report on the social and economic conditions of the islanders. As a result of this

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1. Newman, Philip, A Short History of Cyprus, (Longman, Green, London, 1953), p. 203.
  2. Toynbee, Arnold, Survey of International Affairs, (1931), p. 384.
  3. Jeffries, Sir Charles Joseph, Transfer of Power: Problems of the Passage to Self-Government, (Pall Mall, London, 1960), p. 35.

report<sup>1</sup> the government decided to help in developing the agricultural resources of the island and improve its local and international means of communication. The British Government also decided to keep the schools under the local control of the Christian and Muslim communities. The English language was not imposed upon these schools.

In 1882 a partial step was made to introduce popular participation in the government. Great Britain came out with a constitution stipulating the setting up of a Legislative Council headed by the High Commissioner himself and consisting of 18 members; six appointed government officials and 12 elected members. Of the elected members three came from the Turkish community and nine from the Greek Community. This constitution also set up an executive council to advise the High Commissioner. It consisted of three government officials and three local members. The new constitution also stipulated that mayors, municipal councillors and mukhtars should be elected by the people.

The Legislative Council.- The establishment of the Legislative Council was received with great reaction in the island. The Greeks were delighted at first to occupy nine of the 18 seats while the Turks had some reservations about their

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1. Newman, op.cit., p. 204.



three seats. In practice however this arrangement was more suitable to the Turks.<sup>1</sup> Their three representatives together with the six government officials always managed to balance, and therefore paralyze, the Greek vote. The casting vote of the president (The High Commissioner), which usually favoured the Turkish position,<sup>2</sup> often used to put the Greek representatives to great disadvantage. Their vote was thus a vote of a minority although they were representing 80 per cent of the population. In 1911 it became obvious that they could not alter this well-planned formula and therefore submitted their resignation leaving the whole legislative power in the hands of the government officials and the Turkish representatives.

This set-up of the Legislative Council did not only deprive the Greek Cypriots from conducting some public affairs of the island, it also encouraged the development of antagonism between them and the Turkish minority. And, as time went on, the Greeks were continuously asking for more power and acting as an opposition, while the government was gradually losing its prestige and popularity. This tense situation was due mainly to the ambiguity of the

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1. Ibid, p. 203.

2. Alastos, Cyprus in History, op.cit., p. 322.

function of this Council. While the Cypriots viewed it as their "Parliament" the British merely considered it as "an advisory body through which representatives of the people could express their views but not necessarily enforce them." In 1925 the Council was enlarged to include 12 Greeks and three Turkish representatives together with nine government officials. The whole idea of the Legislative Council had to be given up in 1931.

The Tribute.- According to an annex attached to the 1878 Convention, Great Britain was to pay the Sultan the "excess of revenue over expenditure in the island." This, according to the agreement, was fixed at £92,000 a year.

After a fair system of taxation had been organized and some public works started in the island, the "excess of revenue" did not only fail to reach this figure, it did not exist at all. To the dissatisfaction of the Cypriots and the humiliation of the British this amount had to be drained from the islanders during the first few years of the occupation. In 1907 however, after Mr. Winston Churchill, the Under Secretary of State for the Colonies, visited the island and found out that the Tribute had caused a "detestable"

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1. Ibid, p. 323.
  2. Wosgian, op.cit., p. 45.
  3. Newman, op.cit., p. 205.

condition "unworthy of Great Britain", the British Parliament decided to contribute an annual grant-in-aid of £50,000 to the island. In 1927 the Parliament decided to pay the whole amount provided that the Cyprus Government would contribute £10,000 annually towards Imperial Defense.

It is perhaps worth mentioning that Britain had never "paid" the Tribute directly to the Sultan. The whole amount went to the British Treasury<sup>2</sup> and was paid in turn to the bondholders of the 1855 Turkish Guaranteed Loan. The Tribute was actually renamed in 1914 as the "Share of the Turkish Debt Charge."

The Annexation of the Island.- The Convention of 1878 remained in force until November 5, 1914 when, after the Ottoman Empire had entered the First World War on the side of Germany and her allies, Great Britain declared war on her and therefore annexed the island ipso facto. Until that date, Cyprus, though fully controlled by Great Britain, was legally considered to be under the suzerainty of the Sultan. In 1914 however, it became a British territory and its inhabitants were granted British citizenship. Turkey recognised this

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1. Hill, op.cit., v. IV, p. 477.

2. Ibid, p. 443.

annexation in Article 20 of the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne<sup>1</sup> (see Appendix III) to which Great Britain, France, Greece, Japan, Italy, Rumania and Yugoslavia were also signatories.

The British annexation was warmly welcomed by the Greek Cypriots. Their elected representatives in the Legislative Council hailed it as an event which "will make it easier for Cyprus to return to the arms of its mother Greece."<sup>2</sup> The Turkish leaders also expressed their satisfaction with this step to the High Commissioner.<sup>3</sup>

On March 10, 1925 Cyprus was proclaimed a Crown Colony and the High Commissioner came to occupy the title of Governor. The Crown Colony system gave greater authority to the Governor; the authority of the Executive Council was reduced to advising the Governor on his executive duties<sup>4</sup> rather than carrying out executive responsibilities. Although this system functioned properly in many British Crown Colonies, it failed to achieve its proper ends in Cyprus. This was believed to be due to "the inherent facts of the situation rather than to the inability of the British

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1. Burns, op.cit., p. 227.

2. Luke, op.cit., p. 86.

3. Alastos, Cyprus in History, op.cit., p. 320.

4. Jeffries, op.cit., p. 18.

authorities to think up suitable constitutional devices."<sup>1</sup>

The 1931 Civil Strife.- Up till 1931 the Greek Cypriots were hoping that one day the British Government would yield to their pressing demand for union with Greece. They actually had exhausted all means to reach that end and had always been met with disappointment and continuous change of British attitude. The example of Ramsay Macdonald and his Labour Party has already been cited in Chapter One. The British, it is true, had introduced many administrative and economic reforms to the island as soon as they established themselves there; the inhabitants themselves were materially much better off under the British than under any other rule. It is unfortunate however that they, the British, were never able to assess the emotional intensity which the Cypriots felt towards their "Mother Greece." Even in the 1920's, when a liberal spirit was sweeping Europe, the British showed no sign of interest in the union of Cyprus with Greece.

The Greek Cypriots' discontent culminated in 1931 when Lord Passfield made it clear to a Cypriot delegation

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1. Ibid, p. 20;

that the British Government did not contemplate any change in the future status of the island.<sup>1</sup> To add wood to the fire the Governor, then Sir Roland Storrs, increased the civil taxes in the island by an Order in Council<sup>2</sup> despite the opposition of the Greek and Turkish members of the Legislative Council and in a time when the economic depression was badly hitting the island.<sup>3</sup>

On September 12 the Greek members met in secret and decided to follow a policy of civil disobedience and boycott all British goods.<sup>4</sup> On October 21 they resigned their positions collectively and in the course of the same day mass riots broke out in all parts of the island causing the death of six persons and the injury of another 36. The most eventful incidents were the burning down of the Governor's house in Nicosia and the hoisting of the Greek flag over the Cathedral Church of Nicosia.

The British reacted immediately by depriving the islanders of most democratic privileges they used to enjoy. On November 12 the Constitution was suspended, the Legislative

1. Alastos, Cyprus in History, op.cit., p. 329.
2. Storrs, op.cit., p. 501.
3. Wosgian, op.cit., p. 50.
4. Alastos, Cyprus in History, op.cit., p. 351.

Council was abolished, all political parties were declared illegal and elections of Municipal Councils were brought to an end. As a result of these riots the British also exiled the Bishops of Kyrenia and Citium<sup>1</sup> together with some leading members of the Greek community; they imposed a £70,000 fine on this community as indemnity for damage caused by the rioters. Public assemblies were prohibited and censorship was imposed on the press. The Governor, by a Letter Patent<sup>2</sup>, was given the power to Legislate and rule by decree. For the coming few years he was theoretically the absolute ruler of the island.

Political Conditions since 1931.- The task of enforcing an illiberal rule by a liberal country on a liberty-loving people and in a liberal age was not only a difficult task, it was practically impossible. And so despite the laws which were introduced in 1931, Cyprus enjoyed during the 1930's and the 1940's a relatively free atmosphere which was not at all compatible with the spirit of these laws. In fact during these years "democracy" was more established<sup>3</sup> in the island than in most other countries in the area.

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1. Luke, op.cit., p. 175.
  2. Alastos, Cyprus in History, op.cit., p. 356.
  3. Wosgian, op.cit., p. 53.

A person should not forget that it was the British who first gave the islanders the opportunity to voice their views openly and without fear of persectuion.<sup>1</sup> Taking the opposite stand put the British administration in the awkward position of sponsoring a political system which they themselves did not believe in. After the 1931 uprising, however, they went ahead with their development program and did not interfere in the non-political activities of the islanders. Their respect to local traditions and established rights did not change either. As a matter of fact the government was still being run by "persuasion"<sup>2</sup> although channels for consent were not available.

During World War II a more liberal spirit spread in the island. The victories of the Greek soldiers in Albania and the famous Greek Oxi (No) to Mussolini won more British sympathy for the Greek aspirations. Most of the illiberal laws of 1931 were allowed to die a "natural death." In October 1941 the first political party in ten years was permitted to reorganize itself.<sup>3</sup> This was the Progressive Party of

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1. Alastos, Cyprus in History, op.cit., p. 309.

2. Wosgian, op.cit., p. 54.

3. Alastos, Cyprus in History, op.cit., p. 366.



the Working People (A.K.E.L.). Two other parties were also formed during the war - The Cyprus National Party (K.E.K.) which is a right-wing party advocating an open policy of union with Greece, and the Cyprus Rural Party (P.E.K.) which concentrated on the development of the economic conditions of the peasants. The law preventing the hoisting of "foreign flags" was overlooked and Greek flags now started to be displayed on all national occasions.

Elections of Municipal Councils were again permitted in 1943 and in 1946 the government allowed the political deportees of 1931 to return home.<sup>1</sup> During the same year the British Government introduced a ten-year program for the economic development of the island and established a Constituent Assembly to study the possibility of introducing a new democratic constitution, which, according to Mr. Creech-Jones, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, was intended to "establish a more liberal and progressive regime in the internal affairs of Cyprus."<sup>2</sup> The Greek community did not favour such a constitution. A delegation headed by Archbishop Leontios went to London in 1947 to plead the

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1. Alastos, Cyprus Guerrilla, op.cit., p. 32.

2. Alastos, Cyprus in History, op.cit., p. 369.

cause of union with Greece. The delegation met with Mr. Creech-Jones and asked him to raise the matter to the cabinet. To their disappointment he informed them that as far as Britain was concerned the question of union was "irrevocably closed."<sup>1</sup>

The Church and the rightist elements of the Greek community refused to participate in the Constituent Assembly thus leaving all their seats to the leftists who were not particularly keen on Enosis.<sup>2</sup> The British proposals were submitted to the Assembly in May 1948 in a form of a communication from the Colonial Secretary. These included a suggestion for the establishment of a Legislative Assembly based on adult suffrage and consisting of 18 Greek and four Turkish elected members together with four officials appointed by the Governor. The proposed Assembly was not given the power to discuss any bills on finance, external affairs, defense, special minority rights and the constitution,<sup>3</sup> without the authorization of the Governor. Discussions on the status of the island were completely excluded from the

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1. Alastos, Cyprus Guerilla, op.cit., p. 32.

2. Ibid, p. 33.

3. Ibid, p. 33.

scope of the Legislature. The British Colonial Secretary also proposed the establishment of an Executive Council composed of three Greek and one Turkish elected members and four officials appointed by the Governor.

The Greek (leftists) members of the Assembly rejected these proposals because "they opened up no prospects of democratic advance or of political assertion".<sup>1</sup> This step almost killed the last hope for a peaceful settlement of the problem. None of the Greeks were now willing to cooperate with the British. Actually after the rejection of these constitutional proposals the leftist organizations reversed their "moderate" policy of accepting self government as a tentative solution and adopted a strict policy of Enosis thus "uniting" with the other Greek elements in the island.<sup>2</sup>

Meanwhile the island was acquiring a more important strategic position. (The British had just withdrawn from Palestine). The British Government at this time could not have possibly thought of giving the Cypriots any more concessions, either in controlling the internal developments of the island or in deciding its foreign affairs and defense.

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1. Ibid.

2. Ibid.

The British Government, though introducing some system of self-government by the 1948 constitution, were realizing more and more that self-determination (which implied union with Greece in the long run) was a principle that British interests in the area could not possibly allow to take place. "I can imagine no more disastrous policy for Cyprus than to hand it over to an unstable though friendly power," said the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Mr. Oliver Lyttleton in 1952.<sup>1</sup>

Yet even to the mind of many Britishers self-government was not a satisfactory answer to the Cyprus problem. The Greek Cypriots had always considered union as their ultimate goal, and self-government did not seem to lead them in that direction. Said the Labour M.P., Mrs. Lena Jeger, at the House of Commons:<sup>2</sup>

"It seems to have become, in the mind of some people, a cliché of colonialism that self-government is a government of a country whose people are allowed some say in their internal affairs but are certainly not permitted to take any real decisions about their own international status or about their own future. If self-government means anything it means giving the nation concerned the power to decide with which, if any, countries it wishes to associate itself; the power to make decisions about its international status, about its allies.

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1. Hansard, V. 531, Col. 552.

2. Ibid., V. 547, Col. 111.

"The term self-government has no reality if we deny the logical conclusion, and that is why it is so unfair and so unreal to say to the Cypriot people we will give you self-government but do not let us look any further than that."

The British had not only denied the Cypriots the right of self-determination, they also doubted whether the majority of the Greek Cypriots really wanted to unite with Greece, and went as far as officially considering this step as being against the interests and welfare of the Cypriots themselves. Mr. W.T. Aitken for example told the House of Commons<sup>1</sup> on July 28, 1954 that there are at least three reasons why Britain should remain in Cyprus. First, he said, is security; considering the kind of world in which we live today, British interests in the Middle East could not be secured if its bases in Cyprus were under "a weak and unstable" Greece. The second reason is welfare; and according to Mr. Aitken "the people of Cyprus do not realize what would happen to them if the sovereignty of Cyprus were transferred to Greece". Mr. Aitken's third reason was his doubt of the popular will to unite. "I do not trust plebiscites," he said, "and I do not think that we in this House ought to trust plebiscites of

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1. Ibid, V. 531, Cols. 537-540.

any kind, especially if they are run by the Church."

In the early 1950's the Cypriots themselves having given up the hope of British consent to their union with Greece brought to an end their 70-year peaceful maneuvering thus putting the British face to face with a problem which they failed to tackle with either sympathy or courage.<sup>1</sup> For the coming few years, i.e., until the beginning of the violent activities on the island, the British had no alternative but to "carry on their Direct Rule as liberally as possible."<sup>2</sup>

The Cypriots in the meantime had organized themselves under the leadership of the Ethnarcy Council which decided to internationalize the problem. We can say that since 1950 the problem ceased to be bilateral and gradually Greece and Turkey became involved.

Developments under the British.- So far the History of the British occupation of Cyprus has been discussed from one angle, i.e., the events which led to the violent crisis of 1954-1959. The presence of the British administration for 81 years in the island had of course resulted in more than a crisis. This period had beyond doubt caused more politi-

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1. Alastos, Cyprus Guerrilla, op.cit., p. 33.
  2. Wosgian, op.cit., p. 54.

cal, economic and cultural progress than any other period in the history of Cyprus. It is therefore worth our while to review briefly these developments before moving on to the heart of this study.

Economically, the British failed to introduce any substantial reforms during the first fifty years of their occupation. This "failure" is actually due to the circumstances<sup>1</sup> under which the island existed during that period rather than to the "intention" of the British Government itself. It shall be remembered that until 1914 the island was technically not under British sovereignty. The British Foreign Office was not definite on how many years British administration was going to stay there nor on the strategic role the island could be given in the future. The British therefore preferred to look at their stay in Cyprus as temporary and thus did not make long-range development plans. To add to all this, local capital was almost non-existent in the island itself and the continuous demand for union with Greece had discouraged much of the foreign capital which otherwise would have been invested there.

After the annexation in 1914 most of these factors

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1. Ibid, p. 56.

ceased to exist and as result the island started to prosper with many development programs and constant increase of public revenue. This was speeded up by the two World Wars. Although Cyprus itself was never a battlefield, the incoming and outgoing of soldiers resulted in the flow of great amounts of money. A brief look at the ordinary revenues<sup>1</sup> of the island during the period 1879-1957 indicate that the island's economic conditions were steadily progressing during this period:

1879 - £ 152,000	1949 - £ 4,958,000
1898 - £ 210,000	1950 - £ 5,983,000
1918 - £ 611,000	1951 - £ 7,201,000
1928 - £ 714,000	1952 - £ 8,053,000
1938 - £ 1,023,000	1954 - £ 10,602,000
1941 - £ 1,101,000	1955 - £ 11,595,000
1945 - £ 3,555,000	1956 - £ 15,359,000
1946 - £ 4,517,000	1957 - £ 19,448,000
1948 - £ 5,916,000	

In 1946 the British Government took a major step forward by deciding to spend 18 million pounds on a ten-year development program. In 1956 a figure of 38<sup>2</sup> million pounds was set to spend on development between 1956 and 1961.

Despite all this progress: the regulation of taxes, the increase of foreign trade, the development of resources and means of communication, the Cypriot nationalists had

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1. Ibid, p. 62.

2. Bullard, op.cit., p. 176.



always found reason to be discontented with the economic policy of the government. This could be best exemplified by what Archbishop Makarios told the editor of Middle East Forum<sup>1</sup> in 1956. "The British are under the impression that their rule has been of economic benefit to the island," he said, "I hold the opposite view. Cyprus is quite rich in resources and its living standard should be much higher. The balance of trade here is seriously unbalanced. Imports exceed exports by five million pounds sterling annually. We have to import all our goods from the United Kingdom although we could buy them elsewhere at cheaper price. Products not produced in Britain are imported to Cyprus via Britain increasing their cost to us. Cyprus budgetary surplus are ordered to be invested in the United Kingdom at  $1\frac{1}{2}\%$  interest but when our municipalities are in need of loans, they pay British banks  $4\frac{1}{2}\%$ ."

The improvement of health conditions under the British administration was unprecedented. In less than 80 years, and due to the improvement of sanitary conditions the population tripled in number, and death rates fell down to 6.30 per thousand<sup>2</sup> - one of the lowest figures in the world.

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1. Middle East Forum, V. 31, February, 1956, p. 20.
  2. Cyprus 1956, (Great Britain Colonial Reports), p. 14.

Malaria and other tropical diseases were completely exterminated thus making the island one of the healthiest countries in the Eastern Mediterranean.<sup>1</sup>

Great advancement was also made in the field of education. There were 7,000 students in 1881 and in 1956 the figure reached 81,660.<sup>2</sup> Keeping in mind the increase of population, the number of school children during this period had proportionally multiplied four times. The British Government did not interfere much in the educational policy of the island's communities. Until 1929 elementary and secondary education were financially and academically left under the control of independent institutions and individuals. Even the English language was not imposed on these schools. In 1929 however the government started controlling elementary education and paying 72% of the elementary schools expenses.<sup>3</sup> Secondary schools remained until independence completely free of any official control. Most Greek schools on the island followed the Greek Government program. Many teachers were recruited from Greece and pensioned by the Greek Government.

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1. Wosgian, op.cit., p. 75.

2. Ibid, p. 67.

3. Cyprus 1956, op.cit., p.45

This free educational policy had actually helped in widening the differences between the Greek and the Turkish communities. The absence of schools with a national Cypriot program has resulted in the absence of a Cypriot spirit in the island. In a sense one can say that "under the British the Greekness of the Greeks and the Turkishness of the Turks have, if anything, become more accentuated."<sup>1</sup> The failure to create a Cypriot spirit was one of the reasons which helped to bring about the Cyprus Problem.

But where the British have failed to create a national spirit in the island they succeeded, despite all apparent contradictions, in spreading a democratic and liberal atmosphere. It is true that the British had never officially encouraged Enosis nor supported any enosist, but it is also true that they never went as far as being completely unsympathetic towards the people who peacefully advocated this policy. Even after the 1931 uprising Cypriot journalists and politicians continued to refer to their "national struggle" and "Mother Greece". Under the British administration the Cypriots were allowed to organize political parties, express their aspirations openly and even march in

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1. Wosgian, op.cit., p. 80.

anti-British demonstrations. The British liberal attitude made it easy for the Greek Cypriots "to move within the Greek cultural orbit"<sup>1</sup> and the British writer Lawrence Durrell expresses this idea in the following manner:<sup>2</sup> "If we had been Russians or Germans the Enosis problem would have been solved in half an hour - by a series of mass murders and deportations. No democracy can think along these lines."

It goes without saying that the presence of the British in Cyprus for about eight decades put an end to all forms of corruption introduced during the Turkish rule. The Cypriots now enjoy a very efficient governmental administration and a respectable judicial body.

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1. Alastos, Cyprus in History, p. 390.

2. Durrell, op.cit., p. 202.

## CHAPTER THREE

### ISLAND IN TURMOIL

Beginning of the End: On July 28, 1954 the British Minister of State for Colonial Affairs, Mr. Henry Hopkinson, stood up in the House of Commons to make a statement on Cyprus. This statement, which later on came to be recognized as the starting point of the most bitter and hectic period in the modern history of the island, ran as follows:

"Her Majesty's Government have decided that a time has come to take a fresh initiative in the development of self-governing institutions in Cyprus. They are convinced that, given good will, an early start can be made in associating the people of Cyprus in the fuller management of their own affairs. They wish to make it clear once again that they cannot contemplate a change of sovereignty in Cyprus."<sup>1</sup>

After expressing Her Majesty's Government's wish to introduce a revised constitution for the island he went on to say:

"When the 1948 constitution was drawn up and offered to the Consultative Assembly, the full cooperation of the main parties was pre-supposed, but that cooperation has not been forthcoming and they have not been willing to operate that constitution of 1948. In many other respects certain of these political leaders in Cyprus have shown that the

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1. Hansard, V. 531, Col. 504.

necessary cooperation to operate such a constitution would not be forthcoming, so in fact the constitution will not work. We are therefore proposing a constitution which we hope will work." "... It has always been understood and agreed that there are certain territories in the Commonwealth which, owing to their particular circumstances, can never expect to be fully independent..... the question of the abrogation of British sovereignty cannot arise ... British sovereignty will remain."<sup>1</sup>

This statement, particularly the sentence; Cyprus can never expect to be fully independent, raised immediate reactions in Britain, Greece, and Cyprus. Leading members of the Labour Party, including Aneurin Bevan, R.H.S. Crossman, Tom Driberg and Mrs. Lena Jeger condemned this uncompromising attitude of the Government immediately at the House of Commons. At the Party's Conference at Margate in October a resolution was adopted deploring the "policy of the Government in connection with Cyprus"<sup>2</sup> and urging Labour Party members of the Parliament to oppose this policy "on all occasions".

In December 1954 the Liberal Party adopted a resolution in which it demanded that Cypriots be given a constitution under which they can freely elect their own government

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1. Ibid, Col. 508.

2. Alastos, Cyprus in History, op.cit., p. 384.

and control all the internal affairs of their island "save foreign policy and defence." The Cypriot Government should be given the power "to decide the future status and sovereignty of the island,"<sup>1</sup> the resolution stated.

It should be mentioned that Mr. Hopkinson's statement was not the only official declaration made in the House of Commons on July 28. Mr. Oliver Lyttleton, who made his last speech that day before he resigned as Colonial Secretary, stated:

"In all British Colonial Territories, we do not admit the right of any foreign Power, however friendly, to interfere with the sovereignty of the British Crown. Let me make it quite clear that that applies to Cyprus as well as to every other British territory. We want to build up self-government institutions, and if they do not take up the present constitution, as they have not done - and it has been lying on the table for six years - we have now to broaden the basis of the administration by taking action of our own. What cannot be done by agreement has to be done by what is popularly known as unilateral action now. There is nothing forcible about this. It is an attempt to broaden the representation of the Greek-speaking and the Turkish-speaking Cypriots in the management of their own affairs. The attitude of those who have said that we should do this by handing over Cyprus to a foreign power is quite unworthy."<sup>2</sup>

Greece and the Greek Cypriots resented these declarations. On August 22, about 100,000 Athenians demonstrated in the Greek

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1. Ibid., p. 385.

2. Hansard, V, 531, Col. 552.

capital to express their opposition to the British policy. The Athens City Council changed the name of a main boulevard in Athens from the Churchill Street to the Stadium Street.<sup>1</sup> The Greek press started a wide campaign of attack on the British anti-Enosis policy and the Greek Cypriot press followed suit.

The Cypriot Attorney General on August 2 declared that the illegal press campaign for Enosis would be stamped out in the future by the strict enforcement of the existing anti-sedition laws. All Greek-language papers in the island stopped publication for one week in protest. On August 22 Archbishop Makarios made one of the firmest speeches in his career. He told a big crowd assembled at the Phaneromeni Church in Nicosia that "we shall remain faithful unto death to our national claim (Enosis). We shall never give way; we shall never compromise. We shall rise above the obstacles in our way, aiming at Enosis and only at Enosis."<sup>2</sup>

Apparently Mr. Hopkinson's statement attracted more criticism in Britain and other countries than expected. Sir Winston Churchill himself had to interfere later on to

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1. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, (Bristol, 1954), p. 13775.
  2. Ibid, p. 13776.



declare that the Secretary of State did not have the intention of using the word "never" as far as the independence of Cyprus was concerned and that he had not been aware of mentioning this word until after he read it. "The word never," said Churchill, "need not be brought in to complicate our affairs."<sup>1</sup>

Cyprus at the United Nations: The Greek Prime Minister Field Marshal A. Papagos had declared on May 3, 1954 that if Britain did not cede the island before August 22, 1954 his Government would raise the Cyprus problem to the United Nations. Mr. Hopkinson's statement and the announcement of the British Ministry of Defence on June 24 of the intention to transfer the British Middle East Command from the Suez Canal Zone to Cyprus only made the Greek Government more adamant in its decision. Thus on August 16 it formally requested that the "Application, under the auspices of the United Nations of the principle of self-determination of people in the case of the population of the Island of Cyprus" be placed on the agenda of the General Assembly's ninth session. Greece based this request on article 1, paragraph 2, and Articles 10 and 14 of the Charter.

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1. Complete statement in Hansard, V. 531, Col. 1034.

The Steering Committee approved the Greek request by nine votes to three with three abstentions and the issue was eventually taken up in three sessions by the Political Committee on December 14 and 15. Greece had already submitted a draft resolution asking for the immediate application of the principle of self determination in the island. The Representative of New Zealand however submitted a second draft resolution suggesting that the Assembly should not consider the item at all. "The Cyprus question involved the stability and security of the Middle East," he said, and any debate in the General Assembly on this question "was bound to affect adversely relations between Greece, on the one hand, and the United Kingdom and Turkey, on the other."

The Representative of the United Kingdom insisted that the General<sup>1</sup> Assembly lacked competence to discuss this question and that the plaintiff State (Greece) was merely trying to "transfer to itself sovereignty over territory held by another member."<sup>2</sup> Greece itself, he said, had recognized the sovereignty of Britain over Cyprus by signing the Lusanne Treaty in 1923.

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1. U.N. General Assembly Official Records, First Committee, 749th meeting, (1954), p. 544.
  2. U.N. Yearbook, (1954), p. 94.

The Representative of Greece maintained that by previous information submitted to the United Nations Secretariat the United Kingdom had recognized Cyprus as a Non-Self-Governing-Territory and that therefore under Article 73 of the Charter the United Kingdom could not claim that Cyprus falls within its domestic jurisdiction. He said: "The Cyprus question was above all a matter of justice, it involved the implementation of one of the basic principles of the United Nations."<sup>1</sup> The Lusanne treaty, he argued, need not be brought into question because Greece was not asking for a transfer of sovereignty but merely for the application of the principle of self-determination.

The Committee decided to vote on the New Zealand draft resolution first. Before the vote, the Representatives of Colombia and El-Salvador introduced an amendment to the original draft. The amended resolution was adopted by 49 votes to none with eleven abstentions. The General Assembly adopted the resolution on December 17 by 50 votes to none with eight abstentions. It read as follows:

"The General Assembly,  
Considering that, for the time being, it does  
not appear appropriate to adopt a resolution  
on the question of Cyprus, Decides not to

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1. U.N. General Assembly Official Records, First Committee, 750th meeting, (1954), p. 94.

consider further the item entitled 'Application under the auspices of the United Nations, of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of the peoples in the case of the population of the Island of Cyprus.'

Reactions to Resolution: Immediately following the General Assembly's vote, a 24-hour strike was called by the communist and nationalist elements in the island. This was followed by a series of violent demonstrations during which many British-owned business establishments were attacked by the angry crowds. Such activities were not new in the history of the British rule of the island. The situation however began to develop seriously when, on the night of January 25-26, a British destroyer intercepted a Greek motorship, the St. George, carrying 27 cases of dynamite and 13 men - six Greeks and seven Greek Cypriots. These men were brought to trial under the charge of preparing to change the Government of Cyprus by force. Eleven were given between one and 12 years of imprisonment and two were acquitted.

It was during this trial that EOKA made its dramatic appearance in the island. On the night of March 31 and the following two nights a series of dynamite and grenade explosions took place in government, police and other British military installations. The bloody phase of the problem had

started.

The Greek Cypriot Attitudes: Before describing EOKA and its activities it is perhaps worthwhile to digress a bit and examine the attitudes and feelings towards self-determination or Enosis during this critical period. We are already aware that one cannot speak of a Cypriot attitude as such. The Greek and Turkish Cypriots stood in this case directly against each other. Yet within the Greek community itself there was dissension between the communist and the non-communist elements.

It should be emphasized first of all that in its essence, the Cyprus problem differed from all other national problems in the Middle East. The Colonial Power, Britain in this case, was not faced with a widespread emerging nationalism aiming at independence and sovereignty but rather with a purely racial sentiment directed towards union with Greece which meant, in reality, a transfer of sovereignty from one country to another. A British historian<sup>1</sup> observed at the time that "emotional movements based upon sentiment rather than upon historical facts are sometimes by far the

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1. Haughton, Major - General H.L., "Cyprus Since the War", Royal Central Asian Journal, (V. XL, January 1953), p. 109.

hardest to settle and deal with."

The Greek Cypriots however did not view the problem from this angle. To them self-determination was a just demand and a right which Britain could not deny. Their attitude was best described by the Greek historian Doros Alastos who published a book on the island during this critical period.

Alastos said:<sup>1</sup> "In the Twentieth Century when the principle of self-determination has been accepted and applied even to half-civilized areas, by what logic can it be denied to **Cyprus**? Here is an island with eighty per cent of its population Greek by origin, language, culture, religion and sentiment; what can there be more legitimate and natural than its wish to be united with the mother country? Whether by so doing we shall be impoverished, taxed more heavily, have a lower standard of living, have our young men conscripted, enjoy less freedom and justice, or not is our own concern and nobody else's. Even if we were to agree with those who have this specter in front of our eyes, we cannot live in another man's home simply because he is richer than our own father, no matter how great the benefits may be.

"We are reminded of the existence of an important

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1. Alastos, Cyprus in History, op.cit., p. 388.

Turkish minority that is opposed to Enosis. But should a minority be permitted to dictate its wishes to the majority? Moreover, we are not a backward people not to be trusted. We give our word of honor and every guarantee that the Turks and other minorities shall enjoy full rights of citizenship and all their privileges and traditions will be scrupulously respected as is the case in Greece, where there is no trace of discrimination against any minority.

"It is also argued that Cyprus is a base that is needed to safeguard British and Nato interests in the Middle East. But that base can be kept and rendered more effective if the wishes of the islanders are respected and their co-operation secured. In fact all these arguments the British have advanced against Enosis are merely excuses for keeping the island under their rule and in slavery. It is a case of colonialism pure and simple. We have been patient with the British; we have willingly contributed to their war efforts by defeating and discrediting Mussolini, by delaying Hitler's march on Russia and later by constantly harassing his rear; our mother country has materially contributed to the final victory of the United Nations and is therefore entitled to better treatment. Instead the British have been intriguing against us all along, their most shameful intrigue being the

rousing of the Turks against us, making Turkey a partner in the discussions and promising to do nothing about the Cyprus problem without consulting her. It is this unjustified, undignified colonialist policy of the British, unworthy of their liberal traditions, that has exasperated the patriotic youth of the island to take up arms and willingly die for the case of Enosis. It was no longer possible to hold them back because they have waited for eighty years hopefully and have exhausted all pacific and legal means for obtaining their undisputable and just right."

Yet many people doubted the sincerity of the Greek Cypriots towards this movement. The Cypriots, these people said, had been forced to support Enosis either by the Church, under the threat of excommunication or by EOKA under the threat of death. These people go on to argue that the best proof of this fact are the emigration<sup>1</sup> figures from the island. From January 1955 to April 1956, 7,372 Greek Cypriots emigrated from the island. 5,743 of these went to Britain; 1,247 to Australia; 190 to other Commonwealth countries; 143 to the United States and 48 to other countries. Only one person went to Greece. If the Greek Cypriots were

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1. These figures were given by Mr. Hare in Hansard, V. 555, Col. 44.



really sincere to Enosis, these people argue, the above figures should have been quite the opposite.

More than one commentater has pointed out that the private convictions of a Greek Cypriot differed from what he usually said in public during the crisis in the island. An average Greek Cypriot had always been aware that the standard of living in "mother Greece" was much lower than that of his island, that taxes there were heavier and that even land was less fertile; yet this Cypriot had always insisted in public that it was better for his welfare if Cyprus united with Greece.

The British found this very difficult to digest. The Labour M.P., Mr. Tom Driberg summed up the situation in a few words when he said<sup>1</sup> "people prefer self-government to good government; it may be even that ~~the~~ people of Cyprus - foolishly, as we think - prefer Greek Government to good government."

To an average Greek Cypriot, however, the question was deeper than preference of Greek Government to British Government. Union was a strong urge that trespassed every other consideration - an ultimate goal that had to be realized

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1. Hansard, V. 555, Col. 44.

at any cost. This emotional trend culminated in 1954 in an unprecedented fashion. The political realists among the Cypriots, one of whom was Archbishop Makarios, realized the weaknesses that might develop from such situations and felt that once they yielded a little to the British they would lose the whole case.

Describing the situation, a Greek Cypriot told Lawrence Durrell<sup>1</sup> in 1955: "We feel that any delay would spell the death of Union. We could easily be led away by political differences. Our unity would be impaired by a long period of waiting. If we accept any interim state of things we would flounder in apathy and self-division. This is where the English can be strong. If they produced a constitution so liberal as to be unexceptionable."

The Communist Attitude: The communists had never been very strong in Cyprus although the Akel Party had successfully attracted many trade and labour unionists and helped them to occupy leading communal and municipal positions. The Turkish Cypriots in general were never attracted by Akel because they saw in this party a disguise of their traditional enemy, Russia.<sup>2</sup> The Church did not favour Akel either although

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1. Durrell, op.cit., pp. 124-125.

2. Beckingham, op.cit., p. 130.

sometimes, due to provincial political activities only, the two institutions had to associate themselves with identical policies.<sup>1</sup>

Originally, the Cypriot communists did not advocate union with Greece. But in 1949 they suddenly reversed their policy and stood for Enosis. The communists however had always suspected EOKA as being organized by the British Intelligence<sup>2</sup> and had never given it their full support. Its activities were ridiculed and described as childish. On the face of it, Akel's support of Enosis seemed to be a forced decision because the Greek government was strictly anti-communist and, if Union ever became a reality, they could expect nothing but persecution. The communists did not follow this line of logic. Their support of Enosis meant the driving of another wedge in the disturbed Anglo-Greek relations and consequently contributing towards the weakening of Nato and creating a hostile atmosphere in one of its military bases. It was true that Enosis would mean persecution, but to the communists it meant a chance of strengthening the Party ranks in Greece.<sup>3</sup>

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1. Comstock, Alzada, "Uneasy Cyprus", Current History (V. XXIV, No. 202, June, 1958), p. 355.
  2. Alastos, Cyprus Guerrilla, op.cit., p. 60
  3. Luke, op.cit., p. 182

The Turkish Attitude.- During the first three years of the crisis, the Turkish Cypriots wished to see the status quo preserved in the island.<sup>1</sup> If Britain wanted to give up the island it should be handed over to the country to which it had originally belonged, i.e., Turkey. They did not believe that the principle of self-determination could be applied in the island. Should a new constitution be offered, argued the Turkish Mufti in 1956,<sup>2</sup> "the Greek and Turkish communities must be considered as two separate entities with equal rights and representations." The Mufti explained: "This condition may sound curious but the United Nations is based on the same principle. We regard ourselves as a part of Turkey. We are bound to Turkey by racial, cultural and religious bonds." The Turks conceived of Enosis as a communist-dominated movement which the government ought to confront with harsher treatment. To the Turks the Greek administration was inefficient and intolerable. It was impossible for a Turk to agree to living under Greek rule. Enosis was out of the question.

EOKA and Grivas: E.O.K.A. stands for Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston - The National Organization of Cypriot

1. Eden, Sir Anthony, Full Circle, (Second Edition, London, 1960), p. 396.
2. Middle East Forum, op.cit., p. 21.

Fighters. This secret movement which was very well organized and efficiently led by the Greek Colonel George Grivas was mainly composed of students and other young idealists who were determined to fight the British domination of the island until the Cypriots were granted self-determination. Its activities during four years of terrorism resulted in 142 British and 492 Cypriots deaths with hundreds of injured soldiers and civilians on both sides. The aim and the character of this organization were best revealed by the "EOKA Oath" which was secretly circulated in all parts of the island. The oath read as follows:<sup>1</sup>

"I swear in the name of the Holy Trinity that:

"I shall work with all my power for the liberation of Cyprus from the British yoke, sacrificing for this even my own life;

"I shall carry out unquestioningly all the orders of the Organization which may be given to me and I shall raise no objection, however difficult or dangerous the task allotted to me may be;

"I shall never abandon the struggle even after our aim has been accomplished, unless I receive the instructions of the Leader of the Organization;

"I shall never reveal to anyone any secrets concerning our Organization; neither the name of the Leader nor that of any of the members even if I am caught and tortured;

"I shall not reveal any of the instructions which may be given me by my commanders.

"If I betray this oath I shall deserve every punishment which will be meted out to me as traitor, and may I suffer eternal shame."

Among other things this oath implied that the organiza-

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1. Alastos, Cyprus Guerrilla, op.cit., p. 78

tion had a religious character which made it impossible for any Turk or true communist to join. It also implied that this organization was highly centralized, ruthless against its enemies and even merciless against any of its members who would betray its cause.

The structure of EOKA was based roughly on the cell system. Each cell, or local group, consisted of less than ten members directly responsible to a regional commander who was directly responsible to Grivas. Grivas's authority was absolute and indisputable.<sup>1</sup>

Colonel George Grivas.- Grivas signed himself as "Dighenis" - a name of a hero in one of the Byzantine sagas. Though Greek by nationality, Colonel Grivas was born in Cyprus in 1898 and received his elementary education there. He received his military education in Athens and Paris and during the Greco-Italian war of 1940 he served the Greek Army on the Albanian front. After the occupation of Greece in World War II he organized the secret Khi resistance movement in Athens to fight the occupation forces. After the war he turned this movement into a right-wing political party which failed to gain popular support.

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1. Ibid, p. 118.

In 1954 Colonel Grivas disembarked illegally in Cyprus to lead EOKA. He had already gained knowledge of the people and geography of the island during two previous legal visits in 1951 and 1952. To most Cypriots he was hardly known, but soon, and in spite of the fact that he remained in disguise during the whole period of trouble, his name had an unprecedented impact on the islanders. The majority of the Greek Cypriots followed his orders blindly. He was respected and admired by them to the point where "the struggle for freedom and Dighenis became one and the same thing."<sup>1</sup> He was an ideal soldier enjoying "infinite resourcefulness and uncommon ability."<sup>2</sup> His capacity as a military commander had even won him the respect of many British soldiers.

Grivas had to operate under very difficult conditions. EOKA men were not professional soldiers and this meant that it was impossible to control them by normal military procedures. The island moreover had not seen a war since 1570; to put the Cypriots in a fighting "mood" was an irksome task. Over and above this, EOKA was inferior to its oponents both in the number of its men and the quality of its weapons. Yet

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1. Ibid, p. 18

2. Ibid, p. 14

despite all these disadvantages and all the great efforts that the British made to liquidate this organization, EOKA was able to survive and challenge its enemies throughout the four hard years of the crisis. In 1955 however it was most active. Its operations in that year resulted in 90 British soldiers dead, 291 injured, 405 bomb explosions and 152 various attacks<sup>1</sup> including an attempt on the life of the Governor, Sir Robert Armitage, on May 25.

As result of these activities the Government issued an Emergency Law<sup>2</sup> which gave the Governor power to detain "any person who he is satisfied has belonged to, or is a member of, an organization which has been responsible for acts of violence directed at the overthrow of the Government." In one month 46 persons were arrested under this law.

The Tripartite Conference.- The first turning point in the British policy after the appearance of EOKA was made on June 30 when the Prime Minister, Sir Antohony Eden, announced in the House of Commons that:<sup>3</sup>

"Her Majesty's Government have been giving further consideration to the strategic and other problems affecting alike the United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean. They consider

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1. Loizides, Savas, The International Development of the Cyprus Question in 1955, (Athens, 1956), p. 3
  2. The Cyprus Gazette, July 15.
  3. The Tripartite Conference on the Eastern Mediterranean and Cyprus, Cmnd. 9594 of 1955, (H.M. Stationary Office, London), p. 3.



that the association of the three countries in that area, based on mutual confidence, is essential to their common interest. Her Majesty's Government accordingly invite the Greek and the Turkish Governments to send representatives to confer with them in London at an early date on political and defence questions which affect the eastern Mediterranean, including Cyprus."

"The Government very much hope that the Greek and Turkish Governments will accept this invitation. The terms of the invitation are not restricted, and it is our intention that there should be no fixed agenda and that these discussions should range widely over all the questions involved. The discussions will be without prior commitment by any party."

Invitations were sent on the same day and in the same form to the Greek and Turkish Governments. The Turks accepted the invitation on July 2 and the Greeks on July 8. It is interesting to point out here that Sir Anthony Eden who stated on October 25, 1954, as Britain's Foreign Secretary, that "we cannot discuss the affairs of Cyprus, which fall under the domestic jurisdiction of the United Kingdom, with any foreign power"<sup>1</sup> was now "convinced that the Cyprus problem would only be resolved between the three Governments, British, Greek and Turkish."<sup>2</sup>

This shift in policy was considered by the Greek Cypriots as a victory<sup>3</sup> because this was the first time in

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1. Hansard, V. 531, October 25, 1954

2. Eden, op.cit., p. 402.

3. Loizides, op.cit., p. 16.

which Great Britain considered the problem as being not entirely British. Archbishop Makarios however raised objections on the discussion of the Cyprus Problem without Cypriot representatives as well as on the Turkish Government's participation in such discussions. The Archbishop actually visited Athens before the Conference took place in order to discuss the question with the Greek Government. He was dissatisfied with the way that Government was planning to handle the question and on July 16 declared in a press conference that:<sup>1</sup>

"We unhesitatingly believe that the convocation of a conference constitutes a trap and a means of delay, with the purpose of undermining Greece's appeal to the U.N. and of entangling the matter in complicated patterns, whence it will not be easy for it to be extricated."

"The Cyprus question does not constitute a political issue between Britain on the one hand and Greece and Turkey on the other. The Cyprus issue is purely a question of self-determination and concerns the British Government and the Cypriot people only, and it can be extended so as to concern the Greek Government, wherever the latter, in interpreting the feelings of the Greek and especially the Cypriot people, acts as the people's mandatory for the safeguarding of the island's self-determination."

The Conference took place in London between August 29 and September 7 and was officially called the Tripartite Conference on the Eastern Mediterranean and Cyprus. Mr. Harold

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1. Eden, op.cit., p. 400.

Macmillan, Mr. Stephanos Stephanopoulos and Mr. Fatim Zorlu headed respectively the British, Greek and Turkish delegations.

In their opening speeches the three Ministers emphasized the importance of maintaining their cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean, an area, they all agreed, which was vital for the defense of the free world. The British delegation emphasized that beside its obligations to N.A.T.O., Great Britain had special defense agreements with Iraq and Jordan<sup>1</sup> and was a signatory of the 1950 Tripartite Declaration regarding the maintenance of peace and security in the Middle East. These commitments, Mr. Macmillan declared, required the existence of British military facilities in the area, and Cyprus, "for geographical, historical and legal reasons" was the most suitable site for the establishment of these facilities. Yet "a base in Cyprus," he said, "is not enough". The complexities of modern defense, he explained, made it necessary for Great Britain to have facilities all over the island. "Cyprus is the heart of our defence system in that part of the world; and for its proper functioning every artery of the heart must play its

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1. Cmnd. 9594 of 1955, op.cit., p. 10

part in full coordination."<sup>1</sup>

In his address Mr. Macmillan did not refer openly to the Greek Cypriot request for self-determination. He, however, hinted at that by stating that "in the application of the principles which are the basis of Her Majesty's Government's policy and which are shared, I profoundly believe, by our allies, Greece and Turkey, we must observe the circumstances peculiar to Cyprus. We are all agreed that the best interests of the Cypriot people lie in the tranquil and progressive exercise of the rights of free men developing as may seem most expedient and just, according to circumstances." Mr. Macmillan insisted that "internal self-government in Cyprus must be the first aim. We believe that it can be realised with proper regard for the rights of all concerned, if there is a common effort and obstruction ceases,"<sup>2</sup> he said. "Only when self-government has been progressively established by orderly, legal process, such as it is the purpose of the United Nations to safeguard, can we hope to see our way still further ahead."<sup>3</sup>

The Greek Foreign Minister said that although his government had sponsored the Cypriot people's demand for

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1. Ibid, p. 12
2. Ibid., p. 13
3. Ibid.

self-determination it never entertained the idea of the British Forces' withdrawal from the island. He however strongly emphasized that if a territory is necessary to the security and defense of a given country it is not necessary that it should live under the sovereignty of that country. Mr. Stephanopoulos stated that although the Cyprus Problem was an international problem, only the Cypriots were entitled to settle their problem with Great Britain. "At this Conference," he said, "we cannot decide on the future regime under which the island shall live, as only the people of Cyprus have that right. It cannot be permitted that we should endeavour to act on their behalf."<sup>1</sup>

The Greek Minister denied that his government was following an expansionist policy in Cyprus; and, after devoting half of his speech to describing the delicacy of the problem, declared that self-determination was the only way to a fair solution. He was sure however that the application of this principle would ultimately lead to the union of the island with Greece, and as an indication to that he said:<sup>2</sup> "We are determined, when the time comes, to grant the Turkish minority a status of full equality and freedom

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1. Ibid., p. 16

2. Ibid., p. 19

that the Cypriots, according to that treaty, could not possibly become Greek citizens.

Mr. Zorlu said that his government had always considered the Cyprus Problem as a strictly British domestic problem. "Speaking frankly," he said, "so long as British sovereignty on Cyprus remains absolute there will be no change in our attitude based on commitments; but if there is any question of altering the status of Cyprus in this or that manner Turkey will consider herself primarily concerned, for, since the 'abnegation' and 'sacrifice' of Turkey in the matter of Cyprus was only in favour of Great Britain and under certain conditions, if there is any attempt to alter this situation, the Turkish government will demand a return to the status prior to such abnegation."<sup>1</sup>

The Turkish Foreign Minister argued that all the South-Western ports of Turkey were under cover of Cyprus. If the power that controls Cyprus is also in control of the Western islands, it will have effectively surrounded Turkey, he said. "No country should be allowed to leave its entire security at the mercy of any one country, no matter how great a friend and ally the latter may be."<sup>2</sup> He said that Turkey

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1. Ibid., p. 21

2. Ibid., p. 23

had always stood for self-determination, but maintained that its application in the case of Cyprus clashed with the sovereignty of Great Britain and with the right of Turkey to ensure her own security. He made his country's stand very clear when he concluded that the status quo should be maintained in Cyprus and that the island must revert to Turkey if this status quo were to be upset.

In summing up the proceedings of the Conference Mr. Macmillan divided the problem into two main aspects. The first was concerned with the development of self-governing institutions on which, he stated, there was a certain measure of agreement among the three governments; the second was concerned with the future international status of the island on which the divergent points of view made these governments "unable to agree". Before declaring the suspension of talks, Mr. Macmillan, on behalf of the British government, presented some proposals for the introduction of a new constitution (see Appendix IV). This constitution, he stated,<sup>1</sup> would give the fullest measure of internal self-government compatible with the strategic requirements of the then present international situation. The constitution

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1. Ibid., p. 42.

"would provide for an Assembly with an elected majority, a proportionate quota of seats being reserved for the Turkish community." Mr. Macmillan declared that "all departments of the Cyprus Government would be progressively transferred to Cypriot Ministers responsible to the Assembly, with the exception of Foreign Affairs, Defence and Public Security, which would be reserved to the Governor." He added that "there would be proper safeguards for the integrity and independence of the Public Service. As part of the safeguards to be provided for the Turkish community, a proportion of the ministerial portfolios would be reserved for that community." "A Cypriot Chief Minister," he stated, "will head the new Cypriot Administration. This Minister would be chosen by the Assembly with the approval of the Governor." Mr. Macmillan suggested the formation of a tripartite committee to examine details of the proposed constitution and the appropriate methods of its application.

The Greek and Turkish delegates reacted unfavourably to the British proposals. The Turkish Foreign Minister stated that as long as the three concerned partners were not agreed on the question of self-determination it would be impossible to implement self-government in the island. In



order to reach agreement on so important a point, he said, the three partners should be able to reach a preliminary agreement. Mr. Zorlu insisted<sup>1</sup> that Greece should retract her request for the application of self-determination in Cyprus; otherwise, Greece might, in the future, alter the meaning of self-government to that of self-determination. This, he said, would not only imperil the harmony of the island, but it might also produce further troubles which would impair international relations among the three countries.

The Greek Government formally replied to the British proposals on September 17, i.e., ten days after the suspension of talks. In rejecting these proposals the Greek reply stated<sup>2</sup> that "this constitution was of a type that could not be regarded as adequate for so highly developed and civilized a people as the Cypriots. Her Britannic Majesty's Government proposed the establishment of a Tripartite Commission which would have the right to intervene in the administration of Cyprus under the proposed self-government, thereby rendering the self-government so promised, purely theoretical."

The Conference achieved nothing beyond the expression

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1. Ibid., p. 38

2. Ibid., p. 43

of general views although Britain announced that it would go ahead with its constitutional scheme. After the Conference was called off anti-Greek demonstrations broke in Izmir and Istanbul.<sup>1</sup>

The United Nations Again.- Greece requested once more in July the "application, under the auspices of the United Nations, of the principle of equal rights and self-determination for the people of Cyprus". Again, this request was rejected. The Steering Committee on September 21 decided not to place this question for debate by seven votes to four with four abstentions. This decision was upheld by the Assembly on September 28 by 28 votes to 22 with ten abstentions.<sup>2</sup>

In debating the issue at the Steering Committee Mr. Anthony Nutting, representing the United Kingdom, declared that the public debate of the Cyprus Problem would only "deepen existing divisions" between Great Britain and her allies, Greece and Turkey. He insisted that Greek's real motive was to acquire sovereignty over the island, not to defend the principle of self-determination<sup>3</sup>, and expressed

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1. Alastos, Cyprus Guerrilla, opicit., p. 75.
  2. U.N. General Assembly Official Records, (1955), p. 9
  3. Keesing's, p. 14465

his hope that the British proposals presented during the Tripartite Conference might one day be acceptable "in one form or another".

The Greek and Turkish delegates maintained exactly the same attitude they had expressed at the U.N. former session and during the Tripartite Conference. It is interesting to note however that while the United States abstained in 1954 it voted in 1955 for the exclusion of this question from the Agenda.

The Harding-Makarios Talks.- On October 1, 1955 Field Marshal Sir John Harding, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, replaced Sir Robert Armitage as Governor of Cyprus. He was also given the duties of Commander-in-Chief of the British Forces in the island. The appointment of this top-ranking British soldier as Governor implied that the British Government were determined to put an immediate end to EOKA's activities. As a matter of fact as soon as Harding arrived in Cyprus he asked for military reinforcements and was sent nine battalions<sup>1</sup> so that by the end of 1955 there were 15,000 soldiers in actual operation against Colonel Grivas and his men.

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1. Alastos, Cyprus Guerrilla, op.cit., p. 97.

The new Governor however made great efforts to solve the problem on the political level. Immediately after he took office, he met separately with Archbishop Makarios and with leaders of the Turkish community. This was a remarkable step because up to this date it was an established tradition that no Governor should meet with religious or political leaders of the island in order to discuss current problems with them or even to get to know them.<sup>1</sup> His meetings with the Archbishop took place at the Ledra Palace Hotel in Nicosia on October 4, 7 and 11 and the subject of their discussions was the Macmillan proposals forwarded at the end of the Tripartite Conference. While these discussions were going on, the new Governor made a broadcast in which he urged the Cypriots to accept Macmillan's proposals. These proposals, he said,<sup>2</sup> "threw wide open the door to self-government and the path through that door is safeguarded." Her Majesty's Government look forward, he stated, "to a time when self-government having been effectively established, elected representatives of Cyprus will be in a position to express their views on the island's future."

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1. Ibid., p. 101.

2. Keessing's, p. 14513.

After Sir John had his third meeting with the Archbishop he announced that discussions between them had come to an end without an agreement on the basis of which they could both co-operate in the future. It was later revealed<sup>1</sup> that Archbishop Makarios had countered Macmillan's proposals by the following: 1. Great Britain must recognize the right of the Cypriot people to self-determination as the indispensable basis for the solution of the Cyprus Problem, 2. If this recognition were secured, he, the Archbishop, would be willing to cooperate in framing a constitution for self-government and in putting it into immediate operation. 3. The time of the application of the principle of self-determination should constitute a subject for discussions between the British Government and the elected representatives of the Cypriot people.

Self-Determination Recognized.- The two attitudes were irreconcilable. The British at that time could not openly agree to recognize self-determination as the principle on which all future political development should depend. They went ahead however with preparing a new statement of policy which, they thought, could be acceptable to all parties as a basis for further discussions. The proposed statement read

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1. Loizides, op.cit., pp. 14-15.

as follows:<sup>1</sup>

"It is not in Her Majesty's Government's position that the principle of self-determination can never be applicable to Cyprus. It is their position that it is not now a practical proposition both on account of the present strategic importance of the island and on account of the consequences or relation between N.A.T.O. powers in the eastern Mediterranean.

"Her Majesty's Government have offered a wide measure of self-government now. If the people of Cyprus will participate in the constitutional development, Her Majesty's Government will be prepared to discuss the future of the island with representative of the people of Cyprus when sufficient progress has been made and self-government has proved itself a workable proposition capable of safeguarding the interests of all elements of the people of Cyprus.

"In view of the considerations set out in paragraph one, Her Majesty's Government consider that the Greek and Turkish Governments should also be associated with these discussions by whatever method seems most appropriate."

Sir John Harding met with the Archbishop secretly in Athens on November 21, 1955 and laid this statement before him. The Archbishop was obdurate.<sup>2</sup> He insisted that the principle of self-determination should be accepted irrevocably by Britain before any progress could be made; since this statement implied a refusal of this principle any further discussion, he maintained, would be fruitless. The Arch-

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1. Eden, op.cit., p. 404.

2. Ibid., p. 405.

bishop agreed however that if Britain conceded to self-determination, he would not hesitate to accept a provisional settlement granting self-government for a transitory period during which the Governor could keep for himself all prerogatives concerned with foreign affairs and defense.<sup>1</sup>

There were now some glimpses of hope. The Governor was impressed<sup>2</sup> by the little flexibility the Archbishop had shown for the first time. He told him that he would contact his Government to see if the statement could be modified in an acceptable manner.

Meanwhile security conditions were deteriorating in the island. The shooting of British soldiers and other "traitors" continued while attacks on British military and civil institutions increased. Demonstrations took place regularly and with more aggressiveness. In the course of one of these demonstrations Charalambus Mouskos, cousin of Archbishop Makarios was shot dead and Renos Kyriakides, brother of the Metropolitan of Kyrenian, was wounded.<sup>3</sup> The Governor, in answer to the situation, proclaimed a state of emergency in the island on November 26. Under this state the

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1. Alastos, Cyprus Guerrilla, op.cit., p. 100

2. Ibid.

3. Loizides, op.cit., p. 2

use and possession of firearms, bombs and ammunition became an offense punishable by death; acts of sabotage became punishable by life imprisonment.<sup>1</sup> In addition communities whose inhabitants engaged in unlawful activities became liable to collective punishments such as the imposition of fines, the closing of shops and the confiscation of property.

On December 13 the left wing Akel party was banned as an "unlawful association" and 129 of its leading members were detained. This party was not actually involved in the fighting; it had however attacked the Archbishop for his "conciliatory attitude towards the Governor" a few days before it was banned. The Government now called it "a party of turbulence and violence".<sup>2</sup>

After meeting with British officials in London, Governor Harding had another series of meetings with Archbishop Makarios in Nicosia on January 9, 13 and 27. On January 28 he sent the Archbishop an official letter including the following statement of policy which, he stated, the British Government were ready to issue immediately:<sup>3</sup>

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1. Keesing's, p. 14694
  2. Alastos, Cyprus Guerrilla, op.cit., p. 99
  3. Cyprus, Correspondence exchanged between the Governor and Archbishop Makarios, Cmnd. 9708 of 1956, (H.M. Stationary Office, London), p.3.



"Her Majesty's Government adhere to the principle embodied in the Charter of the United Nations, the Potomac Charter and the Pacific Charter, to which they have subscribed. It is not therefore their position that the principle of self-determination can never be applicable to Cyprus. It is their position that it is not now a practical proposition on account of the present situation in the Eastern Mediterranean."

"Her Majesty's Government have offered a wide measure of self-government now. If the people of Cyprus will participate in the constitutional development, it is the intention of Her Majesty's Government to work for a final solution which will satisfy the wishes of the people of Cyprus, be consistent with the strategic interests of Her Majesty's Government and their allies and have regard to the existing treaties to which Her Majesty's Government are a party.

"Her Majesty's Government will be prepared to discuss the future of the island with representatives of the people of Cyprus when self-government has proved itself capable of safeguarding the interests of all sections of the community."

The Governor told the Archbishop in his letter that this statement was "so very reasonable as to be certain to command wide support not only in the United Kingdom but elsewhere also." He asked him therefore to accept this statement and to use all his influence to put an end to violence and disorder.

On February 2 the Archbishop replied unfavourably to the British proposals. He said that although the text in question recognizes indirectly the principle of self-determina-

tion and states that its application in Cyprus is not ruled out, its application is made dependent on conditions so general and vague and subject to so many interpretations that it really creates much doubt about the positive nature of the solution it offers. "For that reason," the Archbishop wrote,<sup>1</sup> "we would never put our signature under the above mentioned text if it were to take the form of a bilateral agreement."

To keep the door of agreement open, the Archbishop expressed his willingness to cooperate with the British Government and with representatives of the Turkish community in framing a constitution provided that the British Government would give a clearer definition to the statement "wide measure of self-government." He asked that the following points should be announced simultaneously with the proposed statement:<sup>2</sup>

1. All Legislative, Executive and Judicial powers, with the exception of those exempted, will originate from the people of Cyprus and will be exercised by them through their elected representatives and other organs.
2. Responsibility for the defense and external political relations of the island will be excepted from the above principle and will be vested in the Governor in his capacity as representative of Her Majesty's Government.

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1. Ibid., p. 6

2. Ibid.

3. The Governor, beyond the powers mentioned in the previous paragraph (2) will exercise the normal duties of a constitutional head of State; thus he will sign, without having the right to veto, laws which are enacted by the Assembly within the framework of the Constitution, including the budget, and will sign the decrees which are lawfully issued by the Government. He will entrust the duty of forming the Government to the person enjoying the confidence of the House, and will dissolve the House on his advice. Ministers will be chosen by the Prime Minister and will, like him, be responsible only to the Assembly.
4. Representation in the Assembly will be proportional to the composition of the population. Otherwise there will be an absolute equality of all citizens and everyone will be eligible to any public office. Exceptions to this rule may be provided for only in the case of special offices which are exclusively connected with the religious and educational rights of the island's communities. Such rights will be fully safeguarded and protected by the Constitution.
5. A procedure will be defined for the impartial settlement of any difference arising out of the interpretation of constitutional provisions, in particular on questions of disputed authority between the Governor on the one hand and the Assembly or the Government on the other.

The Archbishop added that in order to inspire the citizens with a feeling of freedom and safety, emergency military measures and emergency legislation should be revoked and an amnesty should be granted for all political offences.

It took the Governor more than ten days to discuss

the question with London. His answer which was handed to the Archbishop on February 14 made it obvious that the hope for a reconciliation was getting weaker. Three problems now stood in the way: the responsibility for public security which the Governor now specifically wanted to keep for himself "for as long as he deems necessary", the question of amnesty which he had completely ignored in his reply and the question of representation at the proposed Legislative Assembly. While the Archbishop suggested that this should be proportional to the composition of the population, the Governor maintained in his reply (2C) that the Constitution would provide for an Assembly with an "elected majority", the definition of which should be left to the recommendation of the Constitutional Commissioner.<sup>1</sup>

The Archbishop insisted on receiving further clarification and assured the Governor that his "national conscience and natural dignity"<sup>2</sup> did not allow him to make any further concession. The British Colonial Secretary Lennox-Boyd flew to Cyprus on February 26 to save the situation. He met with the Archbishop who, "without showing any emotion or disappointment"<sup>3</sup>, insisted on an amnesty for all political offenders held

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1. Ibid., p. 10

2. Ibid., p. 12

3. Alastos, Cyprus Guerrilla, op.cit., p. 112

under the Emergency Regulations and on an immediate definition of the composition of the Assembly and the period during which internal security would remain in the hands of the Governor. "This last point was decisive," said Sir Anthony Eden,<sup>1</sup> "We could not agree that the security of the island should depend on the Archbishop's timing." The British now believed that the Archbishop had not really wished to reach an agreement.<sup>2</sup>

On February 29 the Archbishop received directly from the British Secretary of State, a final statement in which the following points were made clear:<sup>3</sup> When law and order is re-established there will be an amnesty for all those convicted of offences under the Emergency Regulations (or of comparable offences prior to their enactment) which were committed before (date to be settled) except those involving violence against the person or the illegal possession of arms, ammunition or explosives which would come up for review in accordance with the normal rules. The British Government proposed to send a Constitutional Commissioner to the island to draw up a liberal and democratic constitution in consulta-

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1. Edén, op.cit., p. 411

2. Ibid., p. 412

3. Cmnd. 9708 of 1956, op.cit., p. 12

tion with representatives of all sections of opinion in the island. The Constitution would reserve for the Governor all powers in the fields of foreign affairs and defense. Public security would also be reserved for the Governor as long as he thinks necessary. Control of all other departments would be handed over to Cypriot Ministers responsible to a Legislative Assembly representing the people of Cyprus as quickly as is consistent with an orderly transfer. The Constitution would provide for an elected majority in the Legislative Assembly and would safeguard the interests of all sections of the community. It would be for the Constitutional Commissioner to recommend what arrangements should be made for this purpose including the precise composition of the elected majority which he would define in accordance with the normal liberal constitutional doctrine, the British statement declared.

The Archbishop did not agree to this statement. On March 5 Mr. Lennox-Boyd announced in the House of Commons the breakdown of talks. He told the Parliament that Archbishop Makarios insisted that "terrorists" found in possession of arms and explosives should be included in the amnesty which had been offered; that the composition of the elected majority

in the Legislative Assembly should be defined in advance to his satisfaction; and that the Governor should not retain powers for the preservation of public security for as long as he thought necessary.

Justifying the breakdown, Prime Minister Eden said:<sup>1</sup> "The Archbishop's original demand was just for self-determination. It then changed into a request for details about the constitution. From that we got to the third phase - amnesty, security and all the other questions. What I must emphasise to the House is that step by step, as we made some arrangement or concession, we were always asked for something more." He added, "It would have been utterly reckless to pledge ourselves to hand over public security in Cyprus within a clearly defined period."

On the same day, the Archbishop issued a statement calling on the people of Cyprus "to continue the struggle for self-determination until the British Government show respect for our national aspirations." After stating that he made many concessions to the British he said:<sup>2</sup> "The Cypriots were called upon to accept a regime under which it would be doubtful whether they would control their own

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1. Hansard, V. 550, Cols. 411-414

2. Keesing's, p. 14758

assembly, and on a basis in which a colonial ruling power would be able to interfere indefinitely in everything under the pretext of public security."

Deportation of Makarios.- It seemed that some British officials were now under the impression that the Archbishop was a prisoner of the extremist elements in the island and that his removal from the political scene might bring forward some Greek moderates to work a way out of the deadlock caused by his determined attitude.<sup>1</sup> The Archbishop, predicting such a maneuver had already branded as a traitor any Cypriot who would cooperate with the British Government behind his back. He declared<sup>2</sup>, "No one will wish to take part in the British constitutional conspiracy and by so doing contribute to the perpetuation of our shame and of our slavery."

Before the breakdown of the talks however the Governor was sure that the Archbishop was the strongest person among those who spoke for the Greek community and that his personal approval of any settlement was very important, if not essential. "I suspect that he knows this very well and admits it to himself," wrote the Governor to Prime Minister Eden in February 1956,<sup>3</sup> "But he will not hesitate to

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1. Alastos, Cyprus Guerrilla, op.cit., p. 47.

2. Ibid.

3. Eden, op.cit., p. 409



use pressure from the extremists to justify intransigence on his own part and to frighten the Greek Government," he added. After the breakdown of the Makarios-Harding talks the picture changed. "Makarios became an embarrassment. No more approaches could be made to him, as only less could be offered than what had already been rejected."<sup>1</sup>

Meanwhile, evidence had been accumulating, according to British sources, that the Church of Cyprus was collecting funds for EOKA, smuggling arms and ammunition to the island and even directing the terrorist movement.

The Governor believed that Archbishop Makarios himself was implicated with EOKA activities and was directing its violent campaigns through Colonel George Grivas.<sup>2</sup> The Archbishop until this time had refused to condemn EOKA and its men. His denunciation of their activities could have been a very powerful weapon, but the British were never able to use it. They asked him more than once to make a statement condemning violence as a first step for reaching a solution but he had refused to comment on EOKA claiming that both approval and disapproval would have unpleasant consequences,<sup>3</sup> which he was not ready to create before an agreement was reached with the British.

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1. Alastos, Cyprus Guerrilla, op.cit., p. 114

2. Comstock, op.cit., p. 356

3. Middle East Forum, op.cit., p. 22

Towards the end of February the Governor became convinced that the Archbishop "preferred the terrorist methods of EOKA to those of calm discussions"<sup>1</sup> and therefore decided, rather reluctantly, that his removal from the island might weaken EOKA and create a more peaceful atmosphere. Under the Emergency Regulations he was given power to deport any Cypriot whom he thought was responsible for disorder in the island. The British Government however had asked the Governor not to take such an action against the Archbishop before they were consulted. On March 6, and after the Governor had made it clear that the disturbed situation required the removal of Makarios,<sup>2</sup> the Government authorized his deportation to the Seychelles island in the Indian Ocean together with the Bishop of Kyrenia, the secretary of his Sea and the priest of the Phaneromani Church. Justifying this step later to the House of Commons the Prime Minister stated<sup>3</sup>: "I submit to the House that, having been told that order could not be restored while the Archbishop was in the island, we had no choice but to fulfil our responsibilities or abdicate our authority, and we chose the former. It was not an agreeable decision."

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1. Home, op.cit., p. 200
  2. Eden, op.cit., p. 412
  3. Ibid.

The following official statement<sup>1</sup> was issued in Cyprus on  
March 9:

"Today the Governor, Field-Marshal Sir John Harding, ordered the deportation of Archbishop Makarios under Regulation VII of the Emergency powers (Public Safety and Order) Regulations. The Archbishop has already left the island under escort for a destination which will be announced later.

"The Governor entered into discussions on the political and constitutional problems of the island with Archbishop Makarios as being the traditional leader of the Greek Cypriot community. In embarking on these discussions the Governor was aware that there were grounds for believing that the Archbishop was personally implicated in the terrorism. Nevertheless, the Governor decided to negotiate with him in the hope that he might be induced to denounce violence and to advise his fellowmen to follow his lead.

"Over the past five months while the discussions have proceeded, further evidence, both direct and circumstantial, has accumulated to show the extent to which the Archbishop has been personally implicated in Eoka's activities. Nevertheless, the Governor has pursued these discussions to the furthest possible limit of conciliation and concession in the hope that the Archbishop might be induced to denounce violence, and so to open the door to cooperation and orderly constitutional progress.

"This hope has now been disappointed by the Archbishop's refusal to abandon the weapons of violence and intimidation in the pursuit of his political aims. The matters over which he has broken off the discussions cannot possibly be held to justify or excuse the continued resort to violent and extreme methods which are still rife in the island, and which have recently culminated in a dastardly attempt to wreck an aircraft carrying British Servicemen and their families. It is impossible to escape the conclusion that the Archbishop is now so far committed to the

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1. Keesing's, p. 14759

use of violence for political ends that he either cannot or will not abandon it.

"The Governor has therefore reluctantly concluded that the Archbishop now personally constitutes a major obstacle to a return to conditions, and that his influence must therefore be removed from the island in the interest of promoting peace, order and good government."

This statement was followed by another detailed explanatory statement in which the Governor showed the reasons that led him to order the deportation. "The Governor," said the statement, "has scrutinized the information thus collected with the greatest possible care, and has reluctantly reached the conclusion that it established beyond all reasonable doubt that the Archbishop has not merely countenanced but has actively fostered terrorism in order to promote his political aims."<sup>1</sup>

Meanwhile, the deportation caused great reactions in various parts of the world. In Greece, huge anti-British demonstrations were organized and Radio Athens started to attack the British policy in an unprecedented fashion. The attack was so bitter that the British Government decided to jam its transmission to prevent the Cypriots from listening to it. The American Ambassador in Athens, on the other hand,

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1. Ibid., p. 14761

told the Greek Foreign Minister<sup>1</sup> that the U.S. Government was viewing the Cyprus Problem with "sympathetic concern" and that the State Department "notes the dignity and statesmanship with which the Greek Government had dealt with the current situation."

In Cyprus itself the people were furious and the anti-British feeling reached its climax. Following the deportation, Colonel Grivas declared<sup>2</sup> that "Cyprus must rid, and will rid itself of British rule. The deportations of the Orthodox prelates reveal the desperate difficulties with which Governor Harding is faced. I am determined to continue the struggle in the absolute conviction that the final victory is ours."

In April and May 195~~6~~ the increasing activities of E.O.K.A. . . resulted in the murder of many British soldiers, Turkish and Greek policemen. and civilians who were accused of cooperating with the British. The Turks started a campaign of retaliatory attacks against Greek shops and premises and as result the Government decided to separate the Greek and Turkish quarters of Nicosia by barbed wire. On May 10 the authorities hanged two EOKA members, Karaolis and

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1. Ibid.

2. Alastos, Cyprus Guerrilla, op.cit., pp. 121-122

Demetriou who were respectively accused of killing a Cypriot policeman and of wounding a British businessman. These were the first two Cypriots to die under the Emergency Legislation, and, responding to this move, EOKA put to death two British soldiers it had previously held as hostages.

Cyprus Conciliatory Committee.- On March 14 the House of Commons debated the Cyprus question. Members of the Labour and Liberal Parties violently criticized the act of deportation, accusing the Government of following short-sighted and unwise lines of policy. Mr. Aneurin Bevan urged the Government to declare whether it wanted Cyprus as a base or just a base in Cyprus. If they wanted the former, he said, then the discussions with the Archbishop were dishonest from the beginning. He added that the reasons given for the deportation of Makarios "were there before the negotiations started" and therefore they were not good reasons for the Governor's sudden decision.<sup>1</sup>

Following this, a Cyprus Conciliatory Committee was formed in London in an endeavour to work out a compromise. It consisted of six members from the House of Lords, nine Labour M.P.s, two Liberal M.P.s, one Conservative M.P. and

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1. Hansard, V. 550, Col. 391.

three prominent personalities from outside the Parliament. This Committee issued a statement<sup>1</sup> urging the Government to repeal progressively the Emergency Laws in the island and to specify the terms and timing for a general amnesty. It also urged the Government to resume negotiations on the basis of immediate self-government and unequivocal guarantee of the right of the Cypriot people to self-determination. The Committee suggested that Archbishop Makarios should be informed that his exile was temporary and that it would end as soon as order was restored in Cyprus. Members of this Committee agreed that the new Constitution should reserve the prerogatives of Foreign Affairs and Defense to the Governor and that he should keep Internal Security for a limited period to be agreed upon. The Constitution should provide for a Legislative body with an elected Greek Cypriot majority but with certain safeguards for the rights of the Turkish Cypriots and other minorities.

The Committee did not achieve much beside this statement.

EOKA Suspends Operations.- The House of Commons had another major debate on Cyprus on July 19. In this session, Prime

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1. Keesing's, p. 14763

Minister Sir Anthony Eden announced that the British Government had decided to proceed with the development of internal self-government in Cyprus and that Lord Radcliffe had been asked to be a Constitutional Commissioner.<sup>1</sup> The Prime Minister stated that this step was taken after it had become clear that "creating conditions which might lead to the application of self-determination for Cyprus would raise far wider issues for our Turkish allies as parties to the Lausanne Treaty settlement." Mr. Eden refused to say whether Lord Radcliffe was going to meet with Archbishop Makarios. Mr. Walter Elliot on the other hand suggested<sup>2</sup> that the Commissioner should consider partition as a possible solution "with an enclave or enclaves" which should remain under British sovereignty.

Mr. Aneurin Bevan, giving the major speech for the opposition, made an appeal to EOKA to stop their activities. Said he;<sup>3</sup> "The (British) Government change their tune and change their policy so often that it is clear to the (Cypriot) nationals that the Government have no policy at all. All they can do is to plead that they cannot surrender to violence. So I beg and pray, if my voice has any influence

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1. Hansard, V. 556, Col. 596.

2. Ibid., Col. 1122

3. Ibid., Col. 1508



at all outside this country, especially in Cyprus and Greece, that they will stop any further violence, because then the British Government will have to talk sense for the first time on Cyprus."

With the hope that such a step would be appreciated and "not to embarrass Britain in her difficulties with Egypt", Colonel Grivas on August 16 ordered the suspension of EOKA activities. The leaflets which carried this order read (in parts):<sup>1</sup>

"If the British are really sincere when they state that under the conditions created by our activities it is impossible to achieve a just solution which we are seeking, I am ready to suspend the operations of my men. I await full corresponding action on the part of England to enable the fulfillment of Greek Cypriot claims as they have been expressed, supported and outlined for the future discussion by our Ethnarch, Archbishop Makarios.

"To prove my unshakable desire to promote a favourable solution of the work undertaken by Makarios, and to give him once again a chance to solve the Cyprus national question, I order from today a suspension of operations of all forces under my authority.

"The National Organization of Cypriot Fighters (EOKA) state nevertheless that they will keep their arms ready and at the alert, ready for new sacrifices if these should be imposed on us by any further threat, in the certainty that they have at their disposal the moral and material resources to prevail."

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1. Keesing's, p. 15061

Instead of appreciating this gesture for what it was, the British Government considered EOKA's move as a sign of weakness<sup>1</sup> and therefore invited its members to surrender with their arms within three weeks. The terms the British offered were as follows:<sup>2</sup> A "terrorist" who surrenders will have the choice of being dealt with in one of two ways: He may opt (a) to leave Cyprus for Greece as soon as the necessary arrangements can be made, and subject to certain conditions; or he may opt (b) to remain in Cyprus. Once he has opted for one or the other of these courses his decision will be final.

If a terrorist decides to leave Cyprus for Greece, declared the British statement, the following terms will apply: (a) he will be kept in detention pending his departure, (b) he will not be persecuted for any crime he may have committed before this announcement, even involving violence against the person, (c) his option may be conditional upon proof that Greece is willing to admit him, (d) if a British subject, he will be required to undertake that on arrival to Greece he will apply for Greek nationality and will renounce his British nationality as soon as possible,

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1. Alastos, Cyprus Guerrilla, op.cit., p. 140

2. Keesing's, p. 15061

and that he will not in the future claim protection and privileges as a British subject, (e) on his departure he will be declared as a prohibited immigrant and will not be allowed to re-enter Cyprus. If he is not admitted to Greece, he will be treated as though he had opted to remain in Cyprus.

If a terrorist decides to remain in Cyprus the following terms will apply: (a) if there is evidence against him of the commission of a specific offence involving violence against the person, he will be brought to trial, (b) he will not be brought to trial for any terrorist offence not involving violence against the person committed before this announcement. (c) unless brought to trial and sentenced, he will remain in detention until released either by the ending of the state of emergency or by virtue of an Order of the Governor, whichever is the earlier.

The statement also declared that at a later stage, when the Governor is satisfied that stable conditions of peace and order have been re-created, he will be prepared to declare an amnesty for certain offences committed by the terrorists and their supporters now in prison or under detention.

Colonel Grivas rejected the British offer immediately.

A leaflet distributed secretly and signed by "Dighenis" read:<sup>1</sup> "I reply to your demand for the surrender of arms: No, Come and get them." The leaflet added: "If by the 27th of this month the surrender order is not withdrawn and negotiations on the basis of Archbishop's Makrios's terms are not begun, then I am relieved of obligations in connexion with the truce which I declared of my own initiative, and still reserve my freedom of action."

Justifying the British refusal of the truce, the British Secretary of State for the Colonies Mr. Alan Lennox-Boyd stated in the House of Commons<sup>2</sup> that since EOKA members wanted to keep their arms ready and at the alert, their offer was as much a threat as it was a gesture. "Apart from a desire to impress outside opinion," he stated, "the offer was to give an opportunity to EOKA to take advantage of a breathing space to regroup its formations, to swear in new recruits, to continue the manufacture of bombs, to seek to obtain more arms and to prepare to strike again when the moment seemed best to them."

On August 26 Lennox-Boyd announced that security forces in Cyprus had captured a large number of EOKA documents

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1. Ibid.

2. Hansard, V. 558, Cols. 372-4

including Colonel Grivas's personal diary. It was stated that this diary showed that Archbishop Makarios was not only responsible for building and financing this organization but also for its leadership.<sup>1</sup> Grivas regarded the Archbishop as his chief: The Archbishop, stated the alleged diary, in order to prevent bloodshed, refused to allow guerilla activities and insisted that EOKA activities should be confined to government and British military installations.<sup>2</sup>

The Cyprus government, following its refusal to accept Grivas's truce, hanged three convicted EOKA members in Nicosia. EOKA retaliated by killing 13 people, eight of whom were British.

The Attitude of Turkey.- At this critical period the Turkish Government made her position clear to the British Government: Turkey considered the question of Cyprus of such importance to her that it was extremely difficult for her to maintain and safeguard her friendship and alliance with Britain if the latter was favouring the union of Cyprus with Greece or entertaining the possibility of giving the Cypriots the right to exercise self-determination.<sup>3</sup> The Turkish Prime Minister Mr. Adnan

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1. Home, op.cit., p. 200.

2. Alastos, Cyprus Guerrilla, op.cit., p. 56.

3. Hansard, V. 547, Col. 82.

Menderes insisted in a press conference held on June 30, 1956 that Britain should maintain the island's constitutional status quo. He stated that Britain would be encouraging Soviet penetration in the whole area if she were to relinquish her sovereignty over the island.

The leader of the Turkish community in Cyprus, Dr. Kutchuk, proposed<sup>1</sup> on the other hand a self-governing constitution for the island which would provide for two Houses: a Lower House with an elected member for every 10,000 inhabitants and an upper House with eight Turks and Eight Greek members. The Upper House would have the right to veto legislations of the Lower House but the Legislature as a whole should not be given the right to discuss self-determination. Dr. Kutchuk also proposed that Cyprus should be considered as a self-governing territory within the British Commonwealth.

The Radcliffe Proposals.- Lord Radcliffe, who was asked by the British Government to act as a Constitutional Commissioner for Cyprus visited the island twice: on July 14 and on September 26; his second visit lasted until October 5.

The Commissioner met with officials of the Cyprus

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1. Keesing's, p. 15066

Government and with leaders of the Turkish community. The Greek Ethnarchy Council boycotted Lord Radcliffe on the basis that Archbishop Makarios was the only person who could discuss the question of self-government, as a transitional stage, with the British Government. Many members of the British Labour Party urged the Government in vain to call the Archbishop to London for further negotiations, but the Government reacted only by sending Lord Radcliffe's secretary and another Cyprus Government official to hand the Archbishop a Greek translation of the proposals after they had been made.

Lord Radcliffe's mission for drafting a Constitution for Cyprus was limited by the following terms of reference<sup>1</sup> set by the British Government on September 13:

(a) that during the period of the Constitution Cyprus is to remain under British sovereignty.

(b) that the use of Cyprus as a base is necessary for the fulfillment by Her Majesty's Government of their international obligations and for the defence of British interests in the Middle East and the interests of other Powers allied or associated with the United Kingdom.

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1. Constitutional Proposal's For Cyprus, Cmnd. 42 of 1956, (H.M. Stationary Office, London), p. 6.

(c) that all matters relating to external affairs, defence and internal security are retained in the hands of Her Majesty's Government or the Governor.

(d) that, subject to this, the Constitution is to be based on the principles of liberal democracy and is to confer a wide measure of responsible self-government on elected representatives of the people of Cyprus, but is at the same time to contain such reservations, provisions and guarantees as may be necessary to give a just protection to the special interests of the various communities, religions and races in the island.

The Constitutional proposals of Lord Radcliffe were presented to the House of Commons on December 19, 1956 and later on published as a White Paper (Cmnd. 42). Before they were published however, Mr. Lennox-Boyd visited Anakara and Athens to explain them to the two governments and to ask for their support as well as to inform them that the British Government had accepted these proposals as they stood.<sup>1</sup>

Lord Radcliffe's proposals were introduced by a Covering Note in which he explained the difficulties he had

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1. Hansard, V. 562, Col. 1268



encountered in drafting the proposals and the circumstances under which these proposals could best be exercised. One of these pre-conditions was the establishment of a state of affairs "in which men may express their will by voting and their views by speaking without fear of terrorism or intimidation."<sup>1</sup>

The proposed Constitution reserved for the Governor the control of Foreign Affairs, Defence and Internal Security. These it called "Governor's Matters". Other "Self-Governing Matters" were to be exercised by a Legislative Assembly and a Cabinet of Ministers. Realizing the difficulties which might arise out of this system of diarchy, particularly in providing exhaustive definitions for the terms "defence" and "internal security", Lord Radcliffe suggested that the Governor must be the final judge in deciding to which field every piece of legislation belonged.<sup>2</sup>

The Legislative Assembly was to consist of a Speaker, a Deputy-Speaker and 36 other members, 24 of whom would be elected by the Greek Community, six by the Turkish Community and six nominated by the Governor. The proposed Constitution stated (F 1&2)<sup>3</sup> that "No Bill passed by the Legislative As-

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1. Cmnd. 42 of 1956, op.cit., p. 5.
  2. Ibid., p. 10.
  3. Ibid., p. 38.

sembly shall become law unless and until the Governor has signified assent to it. The Governor's decision to give or withhold assent will not be capable of being challenged, and if he signifies assent to a Bill the assent shall be conclusive of the question whether the Bill deals with Governor's matters or self-governing matters."

Article B. 4 of the proposed Constitution stated that "the provisions of the Constitution cannot be altered or revoked by ordinance of the Governor or by Law of the Legislative Assembly except (a) where the Constitution explicitly provides that a particular matter can be dealt with or altered by the Legislative Assembly, then it may be dealt with or altered accordingly so long as any prescribed conditions are properly observed; (b) without prejudice to (a) any provisions as to the Constitution, powers and procedure of the Legislative Assembly may be altered by it by law passed for the purpose if such law is concurred in by (i) a majority of the members of the Legislative Assembly elected on the General (Greek) Roll, (ii) a majority of the members of the Legislative Assembly elected on the Turkish Cypriot Communal Roll and (iii) a majority of the nominated members of the Legislative Assembly.<sup>1</sup>

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1. Ibid., p. 30

The Chief Minister of Cyprus who would act as Head of Government in self-governing matters, was to be appointed by the Governor from among the members of the Legislative Assembly. The Governor was given the power to relieve the Chief Minister of his office but only when he was satisfied that the Chief Minister was not enjoying the general support of members of the Legislative Assembly or that "public interest" required his removal.<sup>1</sup>

The proposed Constitution also stipulated that<sup>2</sup> "apart from the Chief Minister and other Ministers, there will be a Minister for Turkish Cypriot Affairs who will be responsible for an Office dealing with Turkish Cypriot Affairs. He will be appointed by the Governor at his discretion from among the members of the Legislative Assembly elected by voters on the Turkish Cypriot communal roll."

The proposed Constitution suggested the setting up of a Joint Council from the Governor Office and the Cabinet to harmonize the relations between the two bodies and to endeavour to eliminate conflict.

Reactions to Radcliffe's Proposals.- After announcing this Constitution in the House of Commons, Mr. Lennox-Boyd stated

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1. Ibid., pp. 34-35

2. Ibid., p. 35

that when the international and strategic situation permits, and provided that self-government can work satisfactorily, the British Government will give the Cypriots their right to exercise self-determination. "There would be a vote for the island as a whole," he said.<sup>1</sup> "If as a result of that vote, the majority voted for a change of sovereignty and for breaking their link with the British Commonwealth, then there would be a second vote among the Turks in the island. If the Turks then decided that they did not wish to follow the Greek majority, they would be allowed then to have integral self-determination with Turkey." Explaining this statement the British Secretary of State for Colonies said, "The Turkish Cypriot community, no less than the Greek Cypriot community, shall, in the special circumstance of Cyprus, be given freedom to decide for themselves their future status... The exercise of self-determination in such a mixed population must include partition among the eventual options."<sup>2</sup>

The Greek Government issued a statement on the same day<sup>3</sup> rejecting the proposed Constitution on the basis that

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1. Hansard, V. 522, Cols. 338-9.
  2. Ibid., Col. 1268.
  3. Kessing's, p. 15472.

it was incompatible with the post-war spirit and with the high grade civilization of the Cypriots. The Greek statement said that these proposals did not create the pre-requisites for self-determination. It accused Mr. Lennox-Boyd of complicating the issue when he announced that partition was one of the possible solutions while ignoring two essential points: the release of the Archbishop and the granting of an amnesty.

The Turkish Prime Minister Adnan Menderes announced in Ankara on December 20<sup>1</sup> that his government would accept the Radcliffe proposals as a "reasonable basis for discussion" although it had some suggestions to make to the British Government.

At the United Nations Again.- Greece and the United Kingdom raised the Question of Cyprus to the United Nations in February 1957. Greece again asked for the application under the auspices of the U.N. of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of people in Cyprus while the United Kingdom complained of the continuous support Greece was giving to the terrorists in the island. Both countries presented a draft resolution.

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1. Ibid.

After debating the question for three days, the Political Committee on February 22 approved<sup>1</sup> by 76 votes to nil with two abstentions an Indian draft resolution stating that the solution of the Problem of Cyprus "requires an atmosphere of peace and freedom of expression" and expressing the U.N. "earnest desire that a peaceful, democratic and just solution will be found in accordance with the purposes and principles of the U.N. Charter, and the hope that negotiations will be resumed and continued to this end." The General Assembly in full session adopted this draft resolution on February 26 by 55 votes to nil with Afghanistan abstaining.

Following this resolution EOKA announced<sup>2</sup> that in conformity with the U.N. decision, and to facilitate the resumption of talks between the British Government and Archbishop Makarios, "the real representative of the Cypriot people" it was ready to suspend its operations as soon as Makarios was set free.

NATO Offers to Conciliate.- Meanwhile the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Council, Lord Ismay, offered the British, Greek and Turkish Governments to use his good offices to for

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1. U.N. General Assembly Official Records, First Committee (1957, 856th meeting), p. 274
  2. Alastos, Cyprus Guerrilla, op.cit., p. 155

a conciliation on the Cyprus question in accordance with the U.N. resolution and a NATO resolution adopted during its Council meeting in December 1956.<sup>1</sup> The British and Turkish Governments announced that they were ready to accept the offer but the Greek Prime Minister announced that his Government considered that "the only appropriate procedure consists in negotiations between the ruling Power and the Cypriot people, who cannot in any case be bound by any decision made in their absence."<sup>2</sup>

Lord Ismay therefore was never able to start his conciliatory mission.

The Release of the Archbishop.- During the period when there was some hope that the Secretary General of NATO might succeed in bringing the three governments together, Mr. Lennox-Boyd announced<sup>3</sup> that the British Government were ready to release Archbishop Makarios and set him free to go anywhere except to Cyprus, if he would make a public statement calling for the cessation of violence by EOKA.

The Archbishop responded in a very diplomatic manner making an indirect appeal to EOKA and to the British Govern-

1. See Hansard, V. 567, Col. 392
2. Keesing's, p. 15474
3. Hansard, V. 567, Col. 392

ment to stop violent activities in the island and asking for an end to the state of emergency and for a general amnesty to all political offenders. His statement read in parts:

"... I wish to make clear that my personal release will never be an object for bargaining. As spritual and national leader of the Greek people of Cyprus, I had and always will have, as my first concern, the interests of the people, and not my personal welfare. But I feel most deeply that my return to Cyprus will create a response from the people of the island, and this factor should not be under-estimated... I sincerely believe that if the British Government think that any Greek Cypriot could be found to negotiate in my absence, it would be a waste of time."

"I express the hope that the British Government will understand and appreciate my sincere desire for the restoration of peace in the island. I also express the wish that the way now open will lead towards peace in a spirit of mutual trust and understanding."<sup>1</sup>

Mr. Lennox-Boyd said that the Archbishop's statement

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1. Keesing's, p. 15474



was not considered as the clear appeal he had asked for but added that "it was no longer necessary to continue the Archbishop's detention"<sup>1</sup>. Another British official confessed at the time<sup>2</sup> that "to come to grips with Makarios is like trying to come to grips with quick silver. We've asked for a clear statement on violence and this is what we've got."

The Secretary of State for Colonies at the same time offered<sup>3</sup> an immediate safe conduct out of Cyprus to Colonel Grivas and his men but added that there can be no question of an immediate abolition of the state of emergency in the island.

Archbishop Makarios, after 13 months of detention, sailed from the Seychelles on April 6 aboard the Greek tanker Olympic Thunder. He arrived in Athens by plane on April 17 where he was given an official welcome by many members of the Greek Government. The Turkish Prime Minister Mr. Menderes objected to the official ceremony given to the Archbishop in Athens calling the affair "a deliberately inflated expression of the long standing Greek aspirations

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1. Hansard, V. 567, Col. 1356

2. Alastos, Cyprus Guerrilla, op.cit., p. 155

3. Hansard, V. 567, Col. 1356

for the annexation of Cyprus." The Greek Foreign Minister answered back by calling Menderes's remarks as "insolent terms appropriate to a Sultan" and accusing him of "arrogating to himself the right to criticize the Greek Government's action in a purely domestic matter."<sup>1</sup>

Two months after his arrival in Athens, the Archbishop sent a letter to the British Government reminding them that they had failed to comply with the General Assembly's resolution of February 4 by not creating an atmosphere of peace and freedom of expression in the island. The Archbishop said in his letter that he was "ready" to start negotiations with the British Government on behalf of the Cypriot people, in order to reach an agreement for the application of self-determination in accordance with the U.N. Charter.

To this, the British replied, not directly to the Archbishop, but to his adviser on Foreign Affairs. They said<sup>2</sup> that the British Government had given irrefutable proof of their desire to achieve a satisfactory solution by accepting Lord Radcliffe's proposals, by ordering the release of the Archbishop as well as by accepting the good

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1. Keesing's, p. 15474

2. Ibid., p. 15649

offices of an impartial conciliator (NATO's Secretary-General). The reply added that the British Government could not accept the Archbishop's proposals that the future of the island should be decided by bilateral talks between him and the British Government because other wider interests had the right to be consulted. The statement concluded by saying that the British Government would be glad to consider the views of any individual or community in Cyprus, including the Archbishop, on the proposals for self-government which were put forward by Lord Radcliffe.

Further Developments in 1957.- After a two-month period of relative lull, the political situation deteriorated quickly.

The Turkish Government started to accuse the Archbishop of playing "tricks" with the British Government while the Turkish community in Cyprus formed the slogan "Cyprus is Turkish" and started a terrorist organization of their own "VOLKAN" to combat EOKA activities. They warned that the lives of five Greeks would be taken for every Turk killed by the Greeks.<sup>1</sup>

The Greek Government and Archbishop Makarios started meanwhile to accuse the Cyprus Government of "brutality" and

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1. Alastos, Cyprus Guerrilla, op.cit., p. 182

"torture"<sup>1</sup> against the people of Cyprus and on July 12 requested the U.N. Secretary General to include on the Agenda of the coming General Assembly session the item:<sup>2</sup>  
"The violation of human rights and atrocities by the British colonial administration against the Cypriots as well as the application of the principle of equal rights and self-determination."

Dr. Kutchuk declared in Ankara during June that enmity between the Greeks and Turks in Cyprus "had reached such a pitch that they could not live together any more under the same regime. The only acceptable solution was therefore partition."<sup>3</sup> And upon his return from Paris after a NATO meeting in December, 1957, Mr. Menderes announced in Ankara that partition was the only solution and the final sacrifice his country could accept. Mr. Karamanlis announced during the same month that self-determination was the only solution acceptable to his Government and to the Cypriot people.<sup>4</sup>

Two major developments took place in Cyprus itself:<sup>5</sup>

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1. Keesing's, p. 15649
2. U.N. Yearbook, (1957), p. 72
3. Keesing's, p. 15649
4. Alastos, Cyprus Guerrilla, op.cit., p. 184
5. Keesing's, p. 15701

(1) During August and September 1957, Governor Harding revoked about 40 out of the 76 Emergency Regulations introduced in 1956 and (2) on October 22, the Colonial Office in London announced that Sir Hugh Foot, Captain-General and Governor of Jamaica, would succeed Harding as Governor and Commander-in-Chief of Cyprus as from December 3.

Once More at the United Nations.- At the beginning of the General Assembly's session in December 1957 Greece presented a draft resolution asking again that the Cypriots be given the opportunity to determine their own future by the application of their right to self-determination. The question was taken by the First Committee, and, following a long debate, Canada, Chile, Denmark and Norway presented some amendments to the resolution which the Committee adopted on December 12 by 33 votes to nil with 25 abstentions. The resolution<sup>1</sup> expressed concern that more progress had not been made towards a solution of the problem, and, considering that the situation in Cyprus "is still fraught with danger and that a solution at the earliest possible time is required to preserve peace and stability in the arena," the resolution also expressed "earnest hope that further negotiations and discussion will be undertaken with a view to having

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1. U.N. Yearbook, (1957), p. 75.

the right of self-determination applied in the case of the people of Cyprus."

This resolution failed to secure the two-third majority required in the General Assembly when a roll-call in December 14 resulted in 31 votes for, 23 against and 24 abstentions. The U.S. delegate abstained.

In defiance to his Government's instructions<sup>1</sup>, the Iraqi delegate, Dr. Hashim Jawad voted in favour of the resolution. He was recalled to Baghdad and the Iraqi Ambassador in Ankara later on apologized to Mr. Menderes.

1958, A "Bad" Year.- Following a few months of quiescence in Cyprus, the security situation deteriorated very badly at the beginning of 1958. The new Governor, who tried to follow a compromising policy with the Greeks, was accused by the Turkish community of being pro-Greek while he was suspected by the Greek community of "double-crossing" them. It was said at the time that whereas "Harding had succeeded in losing for Britain whatever there was of Greek-Cypriot friendship and support, Foot did likewise with the Turks."<sup>2</sup>

It seemed in 1958 as though the Greeks and the Turks

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1. Keesing's, p. 16047

2. Alastos, Cyprus Guerrilla, op.cit., p. 185

would never be able to live peacefully in the same island any more. Both communities, as a matter of fact, were prepared to start a campaign of total extermination against each other.<sup>1</sup> On January 27 the Turks launched an anti-Government demonstration during which two of them were killed and 70 injured by the police. On June 8, 1000 Turks, armed with knives and iron bars attacked the Greek sector of Nicosia. Although warned by Church bells, the Greeks had 59 casualties. 2000 British armed troops interfered that day.

In February, 1958 Colonel Grivas opened a campaign of passive resistance by ordering the boycott of all British goods and establishments in the island. He also started to attack the left-wing trade unionists and, in the first few months of that year EOKA shot dead five Greek communists. In April, Governor Foot invited the leader of EOKA to meet him "alone and unarmed" in order to reach an agreement to end violence. Grivas rejected this offer calling it "a trap and a fraud".<sup>2</sup> He issued an ultimatum to Sir Hugh Foot threatening that attacks would be renewed against British servicemen unless "repressive measures against political detainees" were lifted within 48 hours.

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1. Ibid., p. 194

2. Keesing's, p. 16481

Meanwhile the Governor of Cyprus went to Ankara in February to discuss the Cyprus Problem with Mr. Selwyn Lloyd who was there to attend the Baghdad Pact Council Meeting. On February 10-11 Lloyd and Foot flew to Athens to discuss the Problem with Greek Prime Minister Karamanlis and his Foreign Minister Averoff. During his presence in Athens, Governor Foot had a private meeting with Archbishop Makarios.

Although statements issued at that time did not go into details, observers believed that Britain was trying to reach a solution through quiet diplomacy. On June 15, however, the Greek Government announced<sup>1</sup> that it was going to stop cooperation with Turkey in NATO and that Greek Officers and their families in Izmir (H.Q. of the Allied Land Forces) had been withdrawn.

The Partnership Plan.- The British Prime Minister announced on June 19, 1958 a major change in the British policy towards Cyprus. He introduced in the House of Commons a seven-year "Partnership" Plan (Appendix V) in which he invited the Greek and Turkish Governments to participate in running the affairs of the island by appointing a representative each to cooperate with the Governor, provided that the international

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1. Ibid., p. 16222



status of the island would not be changed before seven years. Mr. Macmillan suggested the creation of a separate House of Representatives for each of the two communities with the power to legislate in communal affairs. Authority other than External Affairs, Defense and Internal Security (which were reserved for the Governor) and communal affairs, were to be undertaken by a Council presided over by the Governor and including the representatives of the Greek and Turkish Governments and six elected Ministers drawn from the House of Representatives, four being Greek Cypriots and two Turkish Cypriots.

The Greek Prime Minister informed Mr. Macmillan on June 20 that his Government did not accept the new proposals because they put self-determination aside for seven years and because the problem was essentially "for the people of Cyprus and the U.N. to solve".<sup>1</sup> Archbishop Makarios, who was informed of the new plan on June 9 by Governor Foot, also rejected it on the basis that it "will create unrest and a threat to peace".. The Archbishop said however that he was ready to accept a transitory period of self-government and was prepared to resume bilateral talks on behalf of the Cypriots.<sup>2</sup>

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1. Keesing's, p. 16451

2. Ibid.

The Turkish Foreign Minister on the other hand said that his Government continued to maintain its conviction and decision that partition was the best possible solution. He said however that his Government was prepared to "fuse" together the principles of partnership and partition.

Mr. Macmillan made another effort by visiting Athens and Ankara, August 8-10, and later by introducing some changes to his original plan. Although Turkey now accepted the plan, Greece held her same position. The Archbishop was urged personally by Governor Foot to accept the Macmillan Plan "as perhaps the last opportunity of making a fresh start in the endeavour to bring peace and progress in Cyprus".<sup>1</sup> He did not accept and wrote to the Governor: "The people of Cyprus will not accept any arbitrary and unilateral decision and are more than ever intent on asserting their right to self-determination and achieving freedom."

The Turkish Government appointed its Consul-General in Nicosia as the first Turkish Representative on the Cyprus Government. The Greek Cypriots however refused to cooperate and on October 1, the appointed day for the application of the Macmillan Plan, they staged a general strike on EOKA

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1. Ibid., p. 16454

orders. It is worth mentioning here that during June and July of that year enmity and violence between the Greeks and Turks had reached its peak. Between June 1 and July 22, 95 people were killed and over 170 were wounded.<sup>1</sup> On August 4 however Colonel Grivas announced a truce. This was the third since the beginning of the violent crisis in 1954.

Makarios Changes his Attitude.- A major modification of Archbishop Makarios's stand was made on September 22, 1958 when he told Mrs. Barbara Castle<sup>2</sup>, British M.P. and vice-chairman of the Labour Party, in Athens that he was prepared to agree:

1) That after a fixed period of self-government Cyprus should become an independent state linked neither to Greece or Turkey.

2) That the independent status of Cyprus should not be changed "either by union with Greece, by partition, or by any other way unless such a change was approved by the U.N.

3) That the independence of Cyprus should be guaranteed by the U.N.

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1. As reported by Mr. Lennox-Boyd, Hansard, V. 592, Col. 676.

2. Keesing's, p. 16454

4) That membership of independent Cyprus in the British Commonwealth will not be precluded.

On September 29, the Greek cabinet held an emergency session after which it announced its acceptance of the idea of an independent Cyprus. Commenting on Makarios's statement the British Prime Minister said that it "falls outside the immediate problem of setting up interim arrangements for restoring order and developing representative institutions, although these proposals could be open for consideration along with any other proposals for final settlement."<sup>1</sup>

Spaak Interferes.- At the beginning of September Mr. Paul Henry Spaak, Secretary-General of Nato, proposed the holding of a Cyprus round-table conference under his own chairmanship with representatives of the British, Greek and Turkish Governments and the leaders of the Greek and Turkish communities in Cyprus. He flew to Athens on September 23, to meet with the Greek Prime Minister. Later on in Paris, during the Nato Council meeting in October, he had further talks with Mr. Averoff. Eventually the problem was discussed at the Nato meetings. But when Mr. Averoff returned to Athens on October 23 for consultation, the Greek Government

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1. Ibid.

announced that it declined to participate in a round-table conference due to Britain's "incomprehensible and unacceptable intransigence."<sup>1</sup>

On October 31 the British Government published the official minutes of the Nato discussions in a white paper. These minutes showed no indication of the reason the Greek Government had refused to take part in the proposed conference. Many observers however believed that Archbishop Makarios had put much pressure on the Greek Government insisting that partnership and partition should be discarded by all parties before such a conference could be held.

The United Nations Again.- Meanwhile the question of Cyprus was again debated in the Political Committee of the U.N. During a lengthy debate (November 25 - December 4) seven resolutions, including a Greek, a British and a Turkish were presented. The Greek resolution called on Britain to "assist the Cypriots towards the status of independence following a period of genuine and democratic self-government", while the Turkish resolution urged the parties concerned to reach "a friendly solution in the application of the principles of equal rights and self-determination according

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1. Ibid., p. 16643

to the particular circumstances of Cyprus and its peoples". The British resolution asked the United Nations to invite the U.K. Government "to continue its efforts to arrive at a solution to the problem which will be acceptable to all the parties concerned and in accord with the U.N. Charter."<sup>1</sup>

The Political Committee however on December 4 adopted a Persian resolution by 31 votes (including those of the U.K. and Turkey) to 22 (including the Greek vote) with 28 abstentions. This resolution called on the three parties to resume negotiations in cooperation with representatives of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities so that a solution could be found "in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter, with due regard to fundamental rights of the two communities living in the island and to the particular circumstances of that territory."

Realizing from the Political Committee's vote that this resolution would not secure the required two-thirds majority in the General Assembly, the Mexican delegation, after private talks with the British, Greek and Turkish delegates, drafted a new resolution calling on all parties concerned "to continue their efforts to reach a peaceful,

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1 . Ibid.

democratic and just solution in accordance with the U.N. Charter."<sup>1</sup> This resolution was adopted by the General Assembly unanimously and without debate.

Towards a Settlement.- Mr. Harold Macmillan expressed his hope<sup>2</sup> at the House of Commons on December 10 that, after the U.N. resolution, Greece and Turkey would be able to start negotiations during the Ministerial meeting of the Nato Council which was due to be held in Paris the same month.

The Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers together with Mr. Selwyn Lloyd had some informal discussions on Cyprus during the Paris meetings. The three Ministers declared that their discussions were "useful", and this was affirmed when Mr. Averoff and Mr. Zorlu had further talks, again in Paris, from January 18-20 during an O.E.E.C. meeting to study the European Common Market.

The Zurich Agreement.- On February 5, 1959 Athens and Ankara announced that the Greek and Turkish Prime Ministers assisted by their Foreign Ministers had begun discussions in Zurich "with a view to negotiating a bilateral settlement of the Cyprus dispute".<sup>3</sup> The discussions lasted for six

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1. Ibid., p. 16644

2. Hansard, V. 597, Col. 346

3. Keesing's, p. 16644

days (February 5-11) and ended with a brief joint communique which announced that "a compromise agreement was finally reached by which the cause of the unity and welfare of Cyprus emerges victorious."<sup>1</sup> No details of the agreement were announced; although it was known that both countries agreed that Cyprus should become an independent state.

At the end of the Zurich Conference the Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers flew to London to inform Mr. Lloyd of the details of the agreement. Archbishop Makarios, who was briefed by Mr. Karamanlis upon his return to Athens announced that the agreement "lays the foundation for an immediate and final solution of the Cyprus issue under which Cyprus will become an independent state."<sup>2</sup> He expressed his approval of the agreement by stating that it will "pave the way for a new period of freedom and welfare for both the Greeks and the Turks in Cyprus."

The London Settlement.- Mr. Averoff, Mr. Zorlu and Mr. Lloyd continued their talks on February 11, 12 and 13 in London. On the latter date it was announced that Archbishop Makarios and Dr. Kutchuk would be invited to take part in the last phase of the negotiations. The two leaders

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1. Ibid.

2. Ibid., p. 16645



arrived in London together with other representatives from Cyprus on February 15. The Greek and Turkish Prime Ministers also arrived in London to attend the final Conference. (Mr. Menderes's plane crashed at the airport and he escaped death "by a miracle".)

The London Conference opened at the Lancaster House on the morning of February 17 under the chairmanship of Mr. Lloyd who was accompanied by Mr. Lennox-Boyd and Sir Hugh Foot.

Archbishop Makarios raised some objections against the Zurich agreement; but the other parties insisted<sup>1</sup> that "there could be no departure from the principles agreed in Zurich if the London Conference were to have any chance of success". Following a "night's prayer" the Archbishop announced his willingness to acquiesce. In the evening of February 19, following a day-long session, documents ending the four-year Cyprus dispute were signed in the London Clinic where Mr. Menderes was recovering from the effects of the air crash. Mr. Macmillan declared on signing the agreement<sup>2</sup> that "it has been clear to me, and more particularly

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1. Ibid., p. 16646

2. Conference on Cyprus, Final Statements at the Closing Plenary Session at Lancaster House on February 19, 1959, Cmnd. 680 of 1959, (H.M. Stationary Office, London) p. 3.

since the Tripartite Conference in 1955, that Cyprus was a problem which could only be resolved by agreement between our three countries, as well as with Cyprus itself. After all, it is the Cypriots who live in Cyprus."

And summing up the character of the agreement Mr. Macmillan said:<sup>1</sup> "This settlement is one which recognizes the right of the people of Cyprus to an independent status in the world. It is one which recognizes the Hellenic character of the majority of the Cypriot people. But it is also one which protects the national character and culture of the Cypriot Turkish community. It is one which preserves to the United Kingdom the defence facilities which are essential not only for our narrow national purposes but for the greater alliances of which we are members."

The Memorandum setting out the agreed foundation for the final settlement of the problem was a very brief statement (see Appendix VI) signed by the British, Greek and Turkish Prime Ministers. The nine documents attached to the Memorandum however were signed by the Foreign Ministers of these countries as well as by Archbishop Makarios and Dr. Kutchuk.

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1. Ibid.

Annex (A) which established the basic structure of the Republic stated<sup>1</sup> in Article 1 that "the State of Cyprus shall be a Republic with a presidential regime. The President being Greek and the Vice-President Turkish elected by universal suffrage by the Greek and Turkish communities in the island respectively." Article 5 stated that the "executive authority shall be vested in the President and the Vice-President. For this purpose they shall have a Council of Ministers composed of seven Greek Ministers and three Turkish Ministers. The Ministers shall be designated respectively by the President and the Vice-President who shall appoint them by an instrument signed by them both." The Legislative authority was vested by Article 6 in a House of Representatives "elected for a period of five years by universal suffrage of each community separately and in the proportion of 70 per cent for the Greek community and 30 per cent for the Turkish community, this proportion being fixed independently of statistical data."

Articles 10 and 20 respectively stipulated that each community shall have its Communal Chamber and its own municipal councils in the five largest towns in the island

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1. Conference on Cyprus, Documents signed and initialled at Lancaster House on February 19, 1959, Cmnd. 679 of 1959, (H.M. Stationary Office, London), p. 5.

while Articles 11 and 14 respectively stipulated that the civil service shall be composed of 70 per cent Greeks and 30 per cent Turks and that Cyprus shall have an army of 2,000 men, of whom 60 per cent shall be Greek and 40 per cent Turkish.

The British Government declared on February 17<sup>1</sup> that "with the exception of two areas (a) Akrotiri - Episkopi - Paramali, and (b) Dhekelia - Pergamos - Ayios Nikolaos - Xylophagou, which will be retained under full British sovereignty, they are willing to transfer sovereignty over the Island of Cyprus to the Republic of Cyprus ..."

Announcing the agreement at the House of Commons Mr. Macmillan stated:<sup>2</sup> "... Our requirements were that two areas should be retained under full British sovereignty, together with such rights as were necessary to ensure those areas being used effectively as military bases, and that satisfactory guarantees should be given by Greece, Turkey and the Republic of Cyprus for the integrity of those areas and for our use and enjoyment of the necessary rights."

Makarios and Grivas Return Home.- Before his return to Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios was acclaimed in the Greek

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1. Ibid., p. 12

2. Hansard, V. 600, Col. 620

Orthodox Church of London as a Nikephorus (bringer of victory). In Nicosia he was greeted on March 1 by more than 200,000 Cypriots.<sup>1</sup> Later on during the same day, after attending a service at the Cathedral of Saint John the Evangelist, he gave a victory speech in which he paid a "tribute of gratitude and honor" to the "great man" (Grivas) and the "gallant fighters of EOKA".<sup>2</sup>

On February 23 the Governor revoked the principal of Emergency Regulations after the closing down of detention camps in the island and on February 27 an amnesty for all members of EOKA was announced together with a safe-conduct to Greece for Colonel Grivas and anyone who wished to accompany him.

Colonel Grivas left Nicosia airport on March 17 under heavy British guard. A week earlier he issued a pamphlet in which he announced<sup>3</sup> his full support for the London agreement calling on the Cypriots to rally around Archbishop Makarios in "harmony, unity and love."

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1. Keesing's, p. 16833

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid., p. 16834

## CHAPTER FOUR

### ANALYSIS

Implications of the Zurich and London Settlements.- The agreements concluded at Zurich and London in February 1959 made Cyprus an independent territory for the first time in twenty seven centuries.<sup>1</sup> These agreements also brought to an end a four-year bitter crisis during which many possible solutions were suggested except independence; that came only at the very end. The fate of the island during this period was highly unpredictable, and independence, coming as a solution, was a surprise not only because it ended the crisis in a most dramatic way, but because for many years it was not considered at all.

As far as the Cypriots were concerned the new constitution created an unexpected situation. The Greek Cypriots had always struggled to achieve a clearly defined goal - self-determination, while the Turkish community, fearing the consequence of the application of this principle (which obviously meant Enosis), held various attitudes including the maintenance of the status quo, the cession of the island to

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1. Alastos, Cyprus Guerrilla, op.cit., p. 204.

Turkey, and partition.

Therefore, and despite the fact that leaders of the Greek and Turkish communities gave their consent to the Zurich and London settlements, it can easily be said that both communities were awarded with a situation which neither of them had ever sought, (although this situation turned to be more in favour of the Turkish community). The Republic of Cyprus was created by Greece and Turkey with the agreement of Britain and without any direct reference to the popular wish of the Cypriots themselves. This status moreover can neither be changed nor modified without the advanced consent of these three countries. It is also circumscribed by a clause which gives Britain, Greece and Turkey, collectively and individually, "the right to take action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs established by the present Treaty."<sup>1</sup>

Archbishop Makarios himself was keenly aware of the situation and hesitated much before signing the various documents. He realized that his consent would mean, in a sense, a betrayal of what the Cypriots had always fought for, and an undertaking which would put his own prestige under a

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1. Article 3 of the Treaty of Guarantee, Annex 1, Section 3 of the Constitution.

great political risk. On the other hand great pressure was brought upon him by the Greek Government to sign. (There was a special appeal from the Greek Palace.)<sup>1</sup> The Archbishop also had to consider the question of war and peace: To sign meant the end of a crisis and the opening of new paths for advancement and development; not to sign meant the continuation of terrorism, a forced application of the principle of partnership by Britain, and perhaps, at the end, partition.

Makarios preferred to sign. By so doing he not only brought the crisis to an end but also laid aside the idea of Enosis indefinitely, gave military bases to the British for as long a time as they wished and made any future development of the island's international status conditional on the joint agreement of three foreign powers. The Archbishop also made a great concession when he agreed that the Greek Cypriots, who form 80 per cent of the population, could never occupy more than 70 per cent of the positions in all governmental institutions.

Nature of the Problem.- A person should not be misled by any oversimplification of the problem. The circumstances of 1959 and 1954 were very different. The concessions made

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1. Alastos, Cyprus Guerrilla, op.cit., p. 2.



by the British and the Archbishop in 1959 would not have avoided the problem in 1954 because both attitudes were then diametrically opposed. It was only after four years of merciless bloodshed and vast political maneuvers that the various political attitudes involved were shaped in such a way as to make conciliation possible.

In 1954 the nature of the problem was not placed in the right perspective by most parties concerned. The Greek Cypriots and Greece had considered the problem as being mainly colonial. In 1954, after all peaceful efforts to reach a bilateral agreement between Britain and the Cypriots had been exhausted, the Greek Government decided to patronize the case and internationalize it, while the Greek Cypriots, convinced that justice was on their side, made it clear that they would not accept any solution short of self-determination. They revolted against the British rule and, unlike the 1931 uprising which was motivated by economic factors, and which was spontaneous and unarmed,<sup>1</sup> this revolution was political, well-organized and armed. The Greek Cypriots were not chauvinists in their revolt. Realizing that Britain had certain strategic interests in the island and that the Turkish minority was afraid of persecution and maltreatment

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1. Ibid., pp. 29-30.

(in case of Enosis), they made it clear, through Archbishop Makarios and other leaders, that if self-determination were granted, there would be enough guarantees to maintain the British military bases and to safeguard all minority rights.

The Greek Cypriot attitude during the first year of the crisis is best exemplified by the following statement which Archbishop Makarios made on December 30, 1955. He said:<sup>1</sup> "The Cyprus Problem was simply a question of time. As the people of Cyprus have taken the irrevocable decision to regain their freedom, and as the British Government have recognized the existence of a problem calling for a fair and honourable solution, I personally consider the question to be solved."

This attitude is also exemplified in a statement an unidentified Cypriot made to Laurence Durrell, also in 1955. Durrell quotes this man as saying:<sup>2</sup> "First there was no Cyprus problem. Then a few bangs followed and you agreed that there was a problem but that it couldn't be solved ever. More bangs followed. Then you agreed to try and solve it, but in fact only to bedevil it further. Meanwhile however, EOKA has seen that a few bombs could change your inflexible "Never"

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1. Keesing's, p. 14695.

2. Durrell, op.cit., p. 224.

to "Sometime". Now they feel they have the right to provoke an answer to the question "When". They are not politically as stupid as the authorities believe them to be."

While the Greek Government took the attitude that the Problem was bilateral, the Turkish Government preferred at the beginning to look at it as a strictly British domestic problem which should be solved by a British unilateral action. The Turkish Government maintained that the principle of self-determination could not possibly be applied in this case. Turkey made it clear that she would never accept the union of Cyprus with Greece,<sup>1</sup> because due to geographical, historical and strategic considerations the island should become a Turkish territory once and if the British relinquished their sovereignty. Turkey believed that the Problem of Cyprus could not possibly be isolated from the political and strategic pattern of the area and threatened<sup>2</sup> that if an unfavourable change of sovereignty took place she would review her position towards the islands of Thrace and the Dodecanese which had been ceded a few years earlier to Greece.

Turkey was justified in her attitude to a certain extent. If Cyprus became part of Greece and Greece happened to become a communist country, she would be completely

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1. Eden, op.cit., p. 405.

2. See Hansard, V. 556, Col. 1409.

surrounded in the north and the south by the communists. Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots therefore worked hard to stop Enosis. They succeeded.

The British Indecision.-- Both the Greek and the Turkish attitudes would not have been shaped in such precise and urgent terms had the British Government taken a clear and realistic position from the very start. They could have at least postponed the crisis. It is true that the demand for Enosis was old and deep rooted in the minds of the Cypriots, but it is also true that it was not an urgent demand. Even in 1954 many Cypriots did not expect Enosis to take place before at least 25 years. This fact was proven by Makarios's acceptance in 1956 of a transitory period of genuine self-government before self-determination could be applied.

It might be argued on the other hand that the British did not create the Problem of Cyprus in 1954 because it had potentially existed since their landing in the island in 1878. It cannot be denied however that their indecision and their miscalculation of the moral influence of Enosis and the military strength of EOKA caused a lot of unnecessary bloodshed, political and economic damage in the island beside endangering the harmony of NATO and upsetting the international community at large.

The British policy in Cyprus since 1954 had passed through many distinct stages. It started with a complete denial that any problem existed at all, and that even if it did, it was for Britain alone to settle it by her own means. The scope of the problem was then enlarged to include Greece and Turkey (The London Tripartite Conference). When this failed, Britain turned directly towards the Cypriots in an endeavour to reach a bilateral agreement (The Harding-Makarios talks). When this policy was about to give positive results it was abandoned. Then there was a deadlock (The deportation of Makarios). Later on, Britain tried to impose its own solution (The Radcliffe Proposals) and when this failed it turned again towards Greece and Turkey (The Partnership Plan). Meanwhile the Problem was internationalized and NATO started to exert pressure on Greece and Turkey to reach a settlement. After a period of quiet diplomacy, these two countries were able to reach a compromise (The Zurich Agreement) to which Britain finally conceded (The London Agreement).

The agreement which was supposed to be reached in 1956 between Britain and the Cypriots was, in 1959, primarily drawn by Greece and Turkey.

Commenting on the British policy towards Cyprus, the Labour M.P. Mr. James Chagallagh said:<sup>1</sup> "All I say about

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1. Hansard, V. 627, Col. 378.

changing minds is that there has never been such a dramatic change of mind by any Government or any party -- and certainly not on such a very serious issue -- as there has been over the setting up of the Republic of Cyprus.

The British "change of mind" was coupled at the end with a change of mind by Greece, Turkey and the Cypriots themselves. There is no doubt that all these changes deserve further attention. Unfortunately they lie beyond the scope of this study which is concerned only with the development of the British attitude.

While reviewing the situation quickly, a person may argue that although the British policy towards the Problem of Cyprus had fluctuated during 1954-59, the British attitude towards the island itself -- its strategic value and its union with Greece -- had nevertheless remained unchanged. This argument has some merit in the sense that the British were, after all, able to maintain military bases in the island and to stop Enosis. A deeper look, however, would reveal that a change of attitude towards the island had definitely taken place. In 1954 British officials kept reiterating that Cyprus "can never expect to be fully independent", that Cyprus "is a British territory" and that "our sovereignty in future shall remain as in the past". In 1959 the British attitude

changed radically when the Government declared that, subject to a few conditions, "they were willing to transfer sovereignty over the island of Cyprus to the Republic of Cyprus". In 1954 Mr. Macmillan insisted during the Tripartite Conference that "a base in Cyprus is not enough" and that "it is necessary for Britain to have facilities all over the island." In 1959 Britain accepted to have two military strips in the island whose total area was 99 square miles only.

Perhaps one of the most important keys to the understanding of the British change of attitude lies in Mr. Bevan's accusation that the Government did not know "whether they wanted Cyprus as a base, or a base in Cyprus".<sup>1</sup> The British insistence at the beginning to have "Cyprus as a base" was the major cause of the problem. Their failure in responding to the Greek Cypriots' national aspirations in the right manner and, as mentioned before, their inability to assess the influence of Archbishop Makarios and the power of EOKA had complicated the Problem still further.

In order to reach a settlement Britain suffered political retreat and, in the case of EOKA, humiliation. It should be emphasized, however, that had it not been for the Greek Cypriots' acceptance of the principle of independence as a

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1. Ibid., V. 550, Col. 391.

basis for a solution, the Problem would, most probably, have not been solved before many years.

The Strategic Position of Cyprus.- Britain came to Cyprus in 1878 to stop the expansion of Tsarist Russia, to guard the commercial route to India, and to protect her growing interests in the Middle East. Today, she stays there for almost the same reasons although many developments in the world's military, political and economic strategy have taken place since. The threat of Tsarist Russia has become a communist threat and the various investments of the 19th century have been overshadowed by oil.

Cyprus gains special importance because it is the only military base left in the hands of Britain in the Middle East and one of the few remaining bases that the West controls in the whole region. Experts<sup>1</sup> believe that its location on the doorsteps of the Middle East makes it an excellent staging area in case of a limited conventional war. Cyprus also has the advantage of being "beyond the reach of Arab nationalism and untouched by the conflicts of the Arabs with other Middle Eastern nations."<sup>2</sup>

Yet the island has its own limitations as a military

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1. For example Campbell, op.cit., p. 198.

2. Ibid.



base. Its harbours are inadequate for the servicing of large ships, and, although they may be useful sometimes, they are not essential to any navy operation in the area. Being an island, Cyprus is also handicapped by not having direct means of land communication with the Asian mainland. To get troops in and out of the bases, Britain can depend only on air transportation.

The limitations of the island's military capacity in large-scale operations were made obvious during the Anglo-French attack on Suez in 1956.<sup>1</sup> The attack could not be carried out solely from Cyprus although it was the nearest British spot to Egypt.

Since the end of World War II the strategy of Cyprus has been bound up with the world's contemporary military set-up as well as with British interests in the Middle East. In other words, the presence of British military basis has not been the concern of Britain and the Cypriots alone, but also that of Nato members, including Greece and Turkey. One of the peculiarities of the Cyprus Problem is that during the crisis, 1954-59, Turkey insisted more than once that Britain should stay in Cyprus, while Greece and the Cypriot leaders always maintained that Britain could retain her bases regardless of any possible change in the island's international status.

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1. Ibid.

This last factor had further confused the picture. With these bases guaranteed in advance by Greece and the Cypriots, Britain found herself in a very critical position. She could not justify her attitude towards Enosis except by claiming that she needed the whole island as a base. When confronting the Opposition in Parliament, the British Government often stressed the idea that Cyprus was vital not only as a Nato base but as an island under British sovereignty for the purpose of protecting Britain's special interests in the area.

British officials expressed this idea in various terms. In 1954, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Mr. Lennox-Boyd, said<sup>1</sup> that "in the present troubled state of the world, we cannot foresee a time when a relinquishment of our sovereignty over Cyprus would be compatible with our responsibilities for the security of the Middle East." Governor Harding declared<sup>2</sup> in January 1956 that "one of the difficulties about (the) union (of Cyprus) with Greece arose from the fact that we might desire to use the base on Cyprus for military operations in the Middle East in which Greece was not directly associated and concerned." In the same

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1. Hansard, V. 531, Col. 2150.

2. Ibid., V. 550, Col. 391.

year, the Foreign Secretary, Mr. Lloyd, repeated the same idea in the following form:<sup>1</sup> "Cyprus remains essential for the maintenance of British interests and the discharge of British obligations, both under Nato and in the Middle East. It is not just a Nato question, but also of the Baghdad Pact, the protection of the oilfields and the Tripartite Declaration. A Nato base on Greek soil could not satisfy our needs. We cannot accept any doubt about the availability of facilities in Cyprus as and when we need them."

Describing the situation in 1956, Sir Anthony Eden writes in his memoirs:<sup>2</sup> "The action which the British Government could take was circumscribed by international considerations. First came the strategic value of the island. Our military advisers regarded (Cyprus) as an essential staging point for the maintenance of our position in the Middle East, including the Persian Gulf. There must be some security of tenure. It was not then thought enough to lease certain sites on the island from some future administration on whose policies we could not depend."

Justifying their need for the whole island as a base, British officials in 1956 also argued that if Britain handed

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1. Ibid., V. 556, Col. 481.

2. Eden, op.cit., p. 396.

over the sovereignty of Cyprus to Greece, Turkey might withdraw from the western alliances and by so doing cause the collapse of the eastern flank of Nato and the death of the Baghdad Pact. A British Member of Parliament<sup>1</sup> said at that time: "The Cyprus interest so far as Nato is concerned, is based on two grounds; there is the interest of Nato in having a base in Cyprus... and there is also the interest of Nato in keeping peace among Nato members." In 1956, the British Government argued that by staying in Cyprus they would safeguard both interests at the same time.

It is very difficult to believe that Turkey was serious in her threat to withdraw from Nato and the Baghdad Pact just because of her dissatisfaction with any British attitude in Cyprus. That action would have isolated her completely, and, as generally known, Turkey is one of the few countries in the Middle East that are anxious not to be isolated from the western defensive system. Britain however did not hesitate to make use of the Turkish threat to justify her own attitude.

Yet all British arguments that the control of the whole island was essential for any effective military operation seemed to collapse when Britain herself accepted in 1959 to limit her sovereignty to 99 square miles of the island. By

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1. Mr. E.L. Mallalieu, Hansard, V. 550, Col. 456.

taking that step Britain made a great political retreat because what was granted to her in the London Agreements could have been arranged with either Archbishop Makarios or the Greek Government in 1956. But British officials would not admit the retreat. When asked in the House of Commons to explain this change of British attitude towards the bases, Mr. Lennox-Body said:<sup>1</sup>

"Members have raised the question whether, over the last few years, we have needed Cyprus as a base, or merely a base in Cyprus. The answer is quite clear. Until the recent talks the Greek Government and the leaders of the Greek Cypriot community were pledged to Enosis or self-determination of the island as a whole which would have led to Enosis.

"The Turkish Government and the Turkish community in the island, were pledged with equal intensity to partition, either as the ultimate or as the immediate answer. Either of these solutions would have led to civil war in the island - and to war not only in the island - civil war on a scale far transcending last year's communal riots.

"In such circumstances, with civil war in the island, the bases would have been in great danger. Communications between the two bases would have been threatened. Our port facilities at Famagusta - guaranteed in the agreement - and our airfield facilities in Nicosia - also guaranteed - would both probably have been unusable. Indeed, most of the vital requirements to make the bases effective, as set out in the annex to the British Government's Declaration could not have been fulfilled.

"Because, without any agreement between Greeks and Turks, such a situation was sure to rise, we could not contemplate any relinquishment of sovereignty. We needed all Cyprus as a base. But with the settle-

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1. Ibid., V. 602, Col. 645.

ment and the determination of all the leaders to make it work, the security and value of British bases can be ensured and sovereign bases in the island can fulfil our strategic requirements. Under this agreement we have now retained sovereignty over those parts of the island necessary to meet our interests and to fulfil our obligations."

Britain and the Archbishop.- British officials may find enough arguments to justify their concept of how and when a military base could be effective. They will fail, however, to find one good reason to justify their behaviour towards Archbishop Makarios during the crisis. This behaviour was in fact typical of blind colonial policies. It is very difficult to believe that after staying in the island for over seventy years, and after learning many lessons from other countries, Britain fell into the common colonial error of strengthening her political foe in the eyes of his nationals while trying hopelessly to bedevil him in the eyes of the world. It was the Cypriots who made Makarios their leader, but it was the British who made a hero out of him.

The British in 1955 refused to enter into discussions with the Archbishop although he was prepared to give up the idea "Enosis and only Enosis"<sup>1</sup> and accept a system of self-government provided that this would eventually lead to self-determination. Britain thought that she could reach a settle-

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1. See Hansard, V. 550, Col. 492.

ment with Greece and Turkey. But after this had failed in London in 1955, she turned to the Archbishop and recognized him as the spokesman for the Greek Cypriot community.

The talks between the Archbishop and Governor Harding proved to be fruitful; but they were suspended, rather unwisely, due to disagreement on a few details. When these talks were suspended, Archbishop Makarios was willing to keep the foreign affairs and the defense of the island in the hands of the British Government, but insisted that a time should be set for the transfer of internal security into the hands of the Cypriots. Britain refused to set such a time. Commenting on this attitude Mr. Bavan declared<sup>1</sup> in the House of Commons on March 14, 1956: "... If, therefore, external affairs, defence and internal security were to be kept indefinitely in our hands, then we were offering the Cypriots not the reality of self-government, but a shame."

At that moment many people doubted the sincerity of the British Government in wanting to arrive at a settlement with the Archbishop. A few more minor concessions (which were made anyway in 1959) would have brought the crisis to an end. But all of a sudden the Archbishop became to the British the symbol of terrorism and extreme national fanaticism. His

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1. Ibid., Col. 397.

deportation was decided on the basis that he was directly responsible for EOKA's activities. (The Archbishop actually had relations with EOKA since 1954 and the British knew it.) The British also believed that as soon as he was out of the island moderate Cypriots could step in to accept the constitutional proposals already rejected by the Archbishop.

That was a great miscalculation on the side of the British. "The deportation of the Archbishop which was operationally just was politically nonsensical - as he was not only the one true representative of the Greek community who could not be replaced, but his absence left the field open to the extremists. Though his complicity in EOKA was obvious, nevertheless he was the only brake to terrorism and the only person who could curb it."<sup>1</sup>

Not a single Cypriot was capable, or even willing, to replace the Archbishop whose deportation left a great political vacuum in the island. EOKA moreover was not weakened at all by the absence of Makarios. The Cypriots instinctively realized that the deportation was a sign of defeat<sup>2</sup> and their determination was strengthened.

The British had definitely committed an error of judgement. Thirteen months later, without defeating EOKA or

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1. Durrell, op.cit., B 3, p. 243.

2. Alastos, op.cit., p. 121.



suppressing Enosis, without even getting a clear statement condemning violence from the Archbishop, they ordered his release. This was not only a sign of their defeat, it was a recognition of it.

Although the British had refused to resume bilateral talks with the Archbishop, they had, in 1959, to accept him as the representative of the Greek Cypriot community thus proving that their attitude in 1956 was unwise.

Britain and EOKA.- But whereas the British attitude towards the Archbishop was unwise, their attitude towards EOKA was disastrous. Britain in 1954 was set out to destroy EOKA while in 1959, after failing to do so, had to bow down and grant a general amnesty and a safe conduct to all its men who were once declared criminals and gangsters.

To be fair, it should be admitted that Britain, at the beginning of the crisis, had no alternative except to fight EOKA whose sole aim was to "destroy the British yoke". But as it became clear in 1955 that EOKA was not an organization serving its own ends but rather an expression of the national wish of the majority of the Cypriots, its defeat came to signify the moral defeat of the Cypriot people. It was here where the British failed to be realistic. Instead of showing some understanding towards this organization as a

movement of freedom and justice which was, at least in the eyes of the Cypriots, based on moral grounds, Britain insisted that it was an illegal movement aimed at establishing disorder and terrorism in the island. The British failed to understand that the person they called "terrorist" was considered by the Cypriots to be a "patriot." Their behaviour showed also that they failed to predict that one day they would be forced to take back their words, as they had previously done in many of their ex-colonies.

Another major failure lay in the British incapability of assessing the actual military force of EOKA. British officials once and again kept reiterating their determination to crush this organization. But they failed to do so in four years despite the presence of 15,000 armed troops in the island for that purpose. Every time Colonel Grivas offered the British a truce, they refused it on the basis that he was getting weaker and was about to give up. But Grivas never did give up and was actually believed by many observers to be getting stronger every day.

The British went as far as deporting Archbishop Makarios under the pretence that his absence would demoralize EOKA. That did not work either. On the contrary, Grivas and his men insisted that the Archbishop was the only spokesman

for the Greek Cypriots and that they were not prepared to accept any settlement unless it was first approved by him.

The role of EOKA in the Cyprus Problem was remarkable. Britain and the Turks.- There is no doubt that the British Government took full advantage of the presence of a Turkish minority in the island. The application of the classical colonial theory - Divide and Rule - was obvious in this case.

Up till 1956 the Turks had no policy except to oppose any constitutional development which might lead to the union of Cyprus with Greece. Although they often declared that the whole island should be returned to Turkey if Britain relinquished its sovereignty, they were quite aware that this was, if anything, next to an impossibility.

The picture changed radically when the British Colonial Secretary, Mr. Lennox-Boyd, announced that partition could not be ruled out as a solution. By doing so he "ruled it in" and all of a sudden "the Turks quickly persuaded themselves of the sanctity of a solution to which none of them had given any detailed thought."<sup>1</sup>

When the British introduced the idea of partition, they were well aware that it was difficult to carry out even if the Greek Cypriots accepted it. The Turkish minority was scattered

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1. Ibid., p. 182.

all over Cyprus and there was no conceivable way to divide the island except by transferring a big number of Greek and Turkish families. Moreover, Turkey insisted that the Turkish community should be allotted the northern half of the island which was facing the Turkish mainland; it so happened that very few Turks lived in that part.

Although British officials<sup>1</sup> declared at the end of the crisis that partition was the "worst possible solution which must, at all costs, be avoided", they did not hesitate in 1957 and 1958 to keep waving it against the Greeks as an answer to Enosis. (The Greeks were naturally opposed to any form of dividing the island.) The British went as far as encouraging the Turks to believe that they could no longer live with the Greeks within one state.

The idea of partition was a political maneuver which, as far as the British were concerned, worked perfectly. On being challenged in the House of Commons in 1959, Mr. Lennox-Boyd admitted<sup>2</sup> that he "certainly" had introduced the idea of partition in 1957, "and had it not been brought in we should never have had the settlement which we have reached."

Self-Government versus Self-Determination.— During the Cyprus crisis the terms self-government and self-determination signified respectively the British and the Greek Cypriot attitudes.

1. For example Mr. Selwyn Lloyd in Hansard, V. 617, Col. 234.

2. Hansard, V. 602, Col. 655.

As far back as 1930 Britain was prepared to give the Cypriots some form of government whereby they could control such fields as economy, communications, public works and health. This intention was manifested in actions like the setting up of a Consultative Assembly in 1930, the constitutional proposals of 1948 and the Radcliffe proposals of 1956. Although the British had always reserved for themselves the fields of foreign affairs, defense and internal security, they believed that the various forms of self-government they proposed were the best answer to the complicated situation in Cyprus.

But the Greek Cypriots, determined since 1878 to make the British accept Enosis, kept rejecting (until 1959) any settlement which did not embody a recognition of their right for self-determination.

Although Britain had accepted the principle of self-determination as embodied in the United Nation's Charter, she believed that its application in Cyprus would create more international and local problems than those which had existed in 1954. For reasons already mentioned, Britain had never been able to accept the union of Cyprus with Greece. Her refusal of the application of self-determination therefore was not a denial of the principle per se but an attempt to avoid an unfavourable situation. Mr. Selwyn Lloyd justified this policy by the following argument:<sup>1</sup> "If it were to be accepted that people have the right to self-determination whenever they ask for it, it would make nonsense of organized international

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1. Ibid., V. 556, Col. 1406.

society. I have never heard the most virulent supporters of self-determination suggest that the Turkish Cypriots should have the right of self-determination."

Yet the British official attitude was not inflexible in this respect. While in 1954 it was: "Self-determination could never be applied in the case of Cyprus" in 1956 it became: "It is not the position of Her Majesty's Government that the principle of self-determination can never be applicable to Cyprus. It is their position that it is not now a practical proposition." In 1957 the British showed their willingness to recognize the principle provided it was equally applied to the Greek and Turkish communities. The British Government in 1958 voted in favour of a United Nations resolution which urged all parties concerned "to continue their efforts to reach a peaceful, democratic and just solution in accordance with the U.N. Charter." This implied a recognition of self-determination.

Although the Cypriots were granted independence with the full approval of their leaders, it is only fair to mention that they were never given the right to exercise self-determination in the way they had always wanted.

Conclusion.- While looking at the Problem of Cyprus in retrospect any person would note that the British attitude between 1954 and 1959 had developed, as far as changing of sovereignty was concerned, from a definite "never" to a clear "yes". Although

the British had succeeded in stopping Enosis and, in a way, in forcing the Greeks and Turks to find a satisfactory solution, they had suffered from a serious military and moral defeat. This was due to their failure, from the very start, to view many of the factors involved with precision and reality. These included the nature of the problem as a whole, the area they required for their bases, the moral force of Enosis, the military strength of EOKA and the importance of Archbishop Makarios.

Although the British change of attitude was often a result of self-adjustment to situations emerging from the island itself, a person could not ignore that it was Britain herself who had indirectly created one of the most important situations which led to the final settlement, i.e., the Turkish pressing demand for partition.

Other factors emerging from the Middle East region had undoubtedly encouraged Britain to reach an immediate solution. These factors included the collapse of the Hashemite rule in Iraq and eventually the collapse of the Baghdad Pact, the evacuation of the British Forces from Egypt and Jordan and the increasing role the American Sixth Fleet was playing in the Eastern Mediterranean. The Suez war had beyond doubt proved that Cyprus can only be used as a striking air base, not as a depot of land and sea forces.

The terms of the London Agreement indicate that both the British and the Greek Cypriots were losers. Reason and peace were the only victors.

APPENDIX I

THE CYPRUS CONVENTION<sup>1</sup>

CONVENTION OF THE DEFENSIVE ALLIANCE BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN  
AND TURKEY, WITH RESPECT TO THE ASIATIC PROVINCES OF TURKEY.  
SIGNED AT CONSTANTINOPLE 4TH JUNE 1878.

Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great  
Britain and Ireland, Empress of India, and His Imperial  
Majesty the Sultan, being mutually animated with the sincere  
desire of extending and strengthening the relations of  
friendship happily existing between their two Empires, have  
resolved upon the conclusion of a Convention of Defensive  
Alliance with the object of securing for the future the  
territories in Asia of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan.

Their Majesty's have accordingly chosen and named  
as their Pleni-potentiaries, that is to say:

Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great  
Britain and Ireland, Empress of India, the Right Honourable  
Austen Henry Layard, Her Majesty's Ambassador Extraordinary

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1. Hill, op.cit., V. IV, pp. 300-301.



and Minister Plenipotentiary at the Sublime Porte;

And His Imperial Majesty the Sultan, His Excellency Safvet Pasha, Minister of Foreign Affairs of His Imperial Majesty;

Who, after having exchanged their full powers, found in due and good form, have agreed upon the following Articles:

ARTICLE I. If Batoum, Ardahan, Kars or any of them shall be retained by Russia, and if any attempt shall be made at any future time by Russia to take possession of any further territories of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan in Asia, as fixed by the Definitive Treaty of Peace, England engages to join His Imperial Majesty the Sultan in defending them by force of arms.

In return, His Imperial Majesty the Sultan promises to England to introduce necessary reforms, to be agreed upon later between the two Powers, into the government, and for the protection of the Christian and other subjects of the Porte in these territories.

And in order to enable England to make necessary provisions for executing her engagement, His Imperial Majesty

the Sultan further consents to assign the Island of Cyprus to be occupied and administered by England.

ARTICLE II. The present Convention shall be ratified, and the ratifications thereof shall be exchanged, within the space of one month, or sooner if possible.

In witness whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the same, and have affixed thereto the seal of their arms.

Done at Constantinople, the fourth day of June, in the year one thousand eight hundred and seventy-eight.

A.H. LAYRAD

SAFVET

APPENDIX II

ORDER IN COUNCIL<sup>1</sup> (ANNEXATION), NOVEMBER 5, 1914

THE CYPRUS GAZETTE

(Extraordinary)

Nicosia, 5th November, 1914

ORDER IN COUNCIL

By the King

Whereas by virtue of the Convention of Defensive Alliance between Her Majesty Queen Victoria and His Imperial Majesty the Sultan signed June the fourth, 1878, the Annexe to the said Convention signed on July the first, 1878, and the Agreement signed on behalf of Her Majesty and His Imperial Majesty the Sultan on August the fourteenth 1878, His Imperial Majesty the Sultan assigned the island of Cyprus to be occupied and administered by England upon the terms and conditions specified in the said Convention, Annexe, and Agreement.

And Whereas by reason of the outbreak of War between His Majesty and His Imperial Majesty the Sultan, the said

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1. Great Britain, Cyprus Handbook, 1920, pp. 68-69.

Convention, Annexe, and Agreement have become annulled and are no longer of any force or effect.

And Whereas it has, for the reasons hereinbefore appearing, seemed expedient to His Majesty that the said island should be annexed to and should form part of His Majesty's dominions, in order that proper provision may be made for the Government and protection of the said island:

Now Therefore, His Majesty is pleased by and with the advice of his Privy Council to order, and it is hereby ordered as follows:

1. From and after the date hereof the said island shall be annexed to and form part of His Majesty's dominions and the said island is annexed accordingly.

2. Nothing in this order shall affect the validity of instructions issued by His Majesty under the Royal Sign Manual and Signet to the High Commissioner and Commander-in-Chief of Cyprus or of any Order in Council affecting Cyprus or of any law or Proclamation passed or issued under any such instructions or order, or of any act or thing done under any such instructions, order, law, or proclamation save in so

far as any provision of any such Order in Council, law or proclamation may be repugnant to the provisions of any Act of Parliament which may, by reason of the annexation hereby declared, become extended to Cyprus, or to any order or regulation made under the authority of any such Act, or having in Cyprus the force and effect of any such Act.

3. His Majesty may from time to time revoke, alter, add to or amend this Order.

4. This Order may be cited as the Cyprus (Annexation) Order in Council, 1914.

And the Right Honourable Lewis Harcourt, one of His Majesty's Principal Secretaries of State, is to give the necessary directions herein accordingly.

### APPENDIX III

TREATY OF PEACE BETWEEN THE BRITISH EMPIRE, FRANCE  
ITALY, JAPAN, GREECE, ROUMANIA AND TURKEY.

LAUSANNE, JULY 24, 1923.

#### Articles<sup>1</sup> concerning Cyprus

20. La Turquie declare reconnaitre l'annexsion de Chypre proclame par le Gouvernement britannique le 5 Novembre, 1914.

21. Les ressortissants turcs, etablis dans l'ile de Chypre a la date du 5 Novembre 1914, acquierront, dans la condition de la loi locale, la nationalite britannique, et perdront de ce chef la nationalite turque; Toutefois, ils auront la faculte, pendant une periode de deux ans a date de la mise en Vigeur de present Traite, d'opter pour la nationalite turque; dans ce cas ils devront quitter l'ile de Chypre dans les douze mois qui suivront l'exercise de droit d'option.

Les ressortissants turcs, etablis dans l'ile de Chypre a la date de la mise en Vigeur de present Traite, et qui, a cette date, auront acquis ou seront en voie d'acquérir la nationalite britannique sur demande faite dans les conditions de la loi locale, perdront egalement de ce chef la

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1. Great Britain, British and Foreign State Papers, 1923, V. 117, p. 549.

nationalite turque.

Il demeure entendu que le Gouvernement de Chypre aura la faculte de refuser la nationalite britannique aux personnes qui avaient acquis, sans le consentement du Gouvernement turc, une nationalite autre que la nationalite turque.

APPENDIX IV

TEXT OF PROPOSALS<sup>1</sup> PUT FORWARD BY MR. HAROLD MACMILLAN  
ON BEHALF OF HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT AT THE  
RESTRICTED SESSION ON SEPTEMBER 6, 1955

The first stage of the Conference has shown that, despite certain important differences of opinion, all three Delegations are agreed upon the over-riding importance of maintaining their friendship and co-operation and the ties which bind them in alliance. They are also agreed in recognising the key strategic position of Cyprus and the vital contribution of the British military headquarters and base in the Island to the maintenance of peace and security in the areas of the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. They also share the desire to further the welfare of the population of Cyprus, to put an end to the acts of violence which have recently been disturbing the community and to restore harmony between all sections of the population.

2. The British Delegation are convinced therefore that their colleagues will agree that it would be unthinkable that the present Conference should end in a failure, which

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1. Cmnd. 9594 of 1955, p. 41.



would run counter to their common objectives and impair their friendship and alliance, which all recognise as essential in the present state of world affairs. Having made a careful analysis of the respective positions of the three Delegations as disclosed at the Conference, the British Delegation wish to offer the following observations and proposals as a basis for the common understanding which they are confident it will be possible to reach:-

3. It is clear that there are two main problems in determining the future of Cyprus. The first of these comprises the introduction and operation of a new constitution leading to internal self-government by the Cypriot people, under the proper safeguards and guarantees required by the international situation and the protection of the interests of the communities concerned. The second of these is the future international status of Cyprus.

4. With regard to the first of these two problems, the British Delegation believe that their colleagues share the opinion of Her Majesty's Government that an essential element in the restoration of harmony in Cyprus and in the future progress of the island must be a progressive advance towards internal self-government, with proper regard for the

rights and interests of all parties. The British Delegation are confident therefore that the way is open for the Conference to establish a large measure of agreement upon the necessary plans and procedures for attaining this end. It is the responsibility of Her Majesty's Government to introduce the necessary constitutional measures, but in view of the close interest which the Governments of Greece and Turkey naturally take in the welfare of the Greek and Turkish communities within Cyprus, the British Delegation wish to put before their colleagues the following proposals and to discuss them with a view to reaching common agreement. Her Majesty's Government would hope to obtain the expressed approval of the Greek and Turkish Governments for this programme, since it is evident that this would be of the greatest importance in securing the full co-operation of the Cypriot people. In thus inviting the co-operation of the Greek and Turkish Governments in this task, the British Delegation are in no way departing from the principle which has already been emphasised by the Foreign Secretary in his remarks to the Conference that Her Majesty's Government are solely responsible for the internal affairs of Her Majesty's possessions.

5. The proposals of Her Majesty's Government are

intended to set Cyprus upon the normal path of democratic development. To this end Her Majesty's Government propose the introduction of a new and liberal constitution leading to the fullest measure of internal self-government compatible with the strategic requirements of the present international situation. The constitution would provide for an Assembly with an elected majority, a proportionate quota of seats being reserved for the Turkish community. All Departments of the Cyprus Government would be progressively transferred to Cypriot Ministers, responsible to the Assembly, with the exception of Foreign Affairs, Defence and Public Security, which would be reserved to the Governor. There would be proper safeguards for the integrity and independence of the Public Service. As part of the safeguards to be provided for the Turkish community, a proportion of the Ministerial portfolios would be reserved for that community. A Cypriot Chief Minister to head the new Cypriot administration would be chosen by the Assembly with the approval of the Governor.

6. Her Majesty's Government propose that a special Tripartite Committee should be set up in London by the present Conference, and should be responsible to it, in order to examine detailed proposals to be drawn up by Her Majesty's Government for new constitutional instruments for Cyprus. It

would be the duty of this Tripartite Committee to consider a suitable system of guarantees for the interest of the communities in Cyprus and the appropriate method of their implementation. The Committee might investigate any suggestions for the further benefit of the Cypriot population from the point of view of the close links between Cyprus and the United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey, for example, questions concerning the status and rights of Cypriots within the other three countries.

7. After completing its initial tasks the Tripartite Committee might be kept in being in order to receive reports regarding the development of self-government in Cyprus, and to act as a centre for discussing problems or differences arising out of self-government which it had not been possible to resolve locally in Cyprus.

8. With regard to the second of these main problems a divergence of view is unfortunately apparent between the three Delegations. It is evident that these positions cannot at present be reconciled. But the British Delegation feel strongly that this fact should not be allowed to create a breach between the three countries with very unfortunate and incalculable consequences to their co-operation as friends and

allies in all the many fields of common endeavour. Nor should failure to settle this aspect of the problem at this time be allowed to destroy the wide measure of agreement established in regard to the other main problem of internal self-government.

9. Consequently the British Delegation propose that the Conference should record that it is unable to agree upon the problem of the future international status of Cyprus. The Conference would at the same time agree that each Government retains the position which it has taken up at the Conference and is in no way committed by the proceedings of the Conference to change its attitude. It would in particular be expressly recognised between the three parties that the fact of their co-operation over the introduction of self-government in no way invalidated their respective attitudes over the question of sovereignty.

10. When the new constitution has come into working order in Cyprus, Her Majesty's Government would be prepared to call the Conference together again to take counsel once more together on the military and political problems of the Eastern Mediterranean, including the situation in Cyprus. It is hoped that sufficient progress will have been made to allow elected

representatives of the Cypriot people to be associated with the Conference. In the meantime the Special Tripartite Committee proposed in connexion with the programme of self-government will serve as a standing instrument of consultation between the three allied Governments.

## APPENDIX V

### CYPRUS

#### STATEMENT OF POLICY<sup>1</sup>

##### Aims of Policy

The policy of Her Majesty's Government in Cyprus has had four main purposes:-

- (a) to serve the best interests of all the people of the Island;
- (b) to achieve a permanent settlement acceptable to the two communities in the Island and to the Greek and Turkish Governments;
- (c) to safeguard the British bases and installations in the Island, which are necessary to enable the United Kingdom to carry out her international obligations;
- (d) to strengthen peace and security, and co-operation between the United Kingdom and her Allies, in a vital area.

2. These are the aims which Her Majesty's Government have consistently pursued and which have guided their efforts in recent months to find common ground on which an agreed settlement might be reached. It is deeply regretted that all attempts in this direction have hitherto proved unsuccessful.

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1. Cmnd. 455 of 1958.

3. In view of the disagreement between the Greek and Turkish Governments and between the two communities in Cyprus, and of the disastrous consequences for all concerned if violence and conflict continue, an obligation rests with the United Kingdom Government, as the sovereign Power responsible for the administration of the Island and the well-being of its inhabitants, to give a firm and clear lead out of the present deadlock. They accordingly declare a new policy which represents an adventure in partnership - partnership between the communities in the Island and also between the Governments of the United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey.

4. The following is an outline of the partnership plan:-

#### The Plan

I. Cyprus should enjoy the advantages of association not only with the United Kingdom, and therefore with the British Commonwealth, but also with Greece and Turkey.

II. Since the three Governments of the United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey all have an interest in Cyprus, Her Majesty's Government will welcome the co-operation and participation of the two other Governments in a joint effort to achieve the peace, progress and prosperity of the Island.



III. The Greek and Turkish Governments will each be invited to appoint a representative to co-operate with the Governor in carrying out this policy.

IV. The Island will have a system of representative Government with each community exercising autonomy in its own communal affairs.

V. In order to satisfy the desire of the Greek and Turkish Cypriots to be recognised as Greeks and Turks, Her Majesty's Government will welcome an arrangement which gives them Greek or Turkish nationality, while enabling them to retain British nationality.

VI. To allow time for the new principle of partnership to be fully worked out and brought into operation under this plan in the necessary atmosphere of stability, the international status of the Island will remain unchanged for seven years.

VII. A system of representative government and communal autonomy will be worked out by consultation with representatives of the two communities and with the representatives of the Greek and Turkish Governments.

VIII. The essential provisions of the new constitution

will be:-

- (a) There will be a separate House of Representatives for each of the two communities, and these Houses will have final legislative authority in communal affairs.
- (b) Authority for internal administration, other than communal affairs and internal security, will be undertaken by a Council presided over by the Governor and including the representatives of the Greek and Turkish Governments and six elected Ministers drawn from the Houses of Representatives, four being Greek Cypriots and two Turkish Cypriots.
- (c) The Governor, acting after consultation with the representatives of the Greek and Turkish Governments, will have reserve powers to ensure that the interests of both communities are protected.
- (d) External affairs, defence and internal security will be matters specifically reserved to the Governor acting, after consultation with the representatives of the Greek and Turkish Governments.
- (e) The representatives of the Greek and Turkish Governments will have the right to require any legislation which they consider to be discriminatory to be reserved for consideration by an impartial tribunal.

IX. If the full benefits of this policy are to be realised, it is evident that violence must cease. Subject to this, Her Majesty's Government intend to take progressive steps to relax the Emergency Regulations and eventually to end the State of Emergency. This process would include the return of those Cypriots at present excluded from the Island under the Emergency Regulations.

X. A policy based on these principles and proposals will give the people of the Island a specially favoured and protected status. Through representative institutions they will exercise authority in the management of the Island's internal affairs, and each community will control its own communal affairs. While the people of the Island enjoy these advantages, friendly relations and practical co-operation between the United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey will be maintained and strengthened as Cyprus becomes a symbol of co-operation instead of a cause of conflict between the three Allied Governments.

#### The Future

5. Her Majesty's Government trust that this imaginative plan will be welcomed by all concerned in the spirit in which it is put forward and for their part they will bend all efforts to ensuring its success. Indeed, if the Greek and Turkish Governments were willing to extend this experiment in partnership and co-operation, Her Majesty's Government would be prepared, at the appropriate time, to go further and, subject to the reservation to the United Kingdom of such bases and facilities as might be necessary for the discharge of her international obligations, to share the sovereignty of the Island with their Greek and Turkish Allies as their contribution to a lasting settlement.

APPENDIX VI

CONFERENCE ON CYPRUS

DOCUMENTS SIGNED AND INITIALLED AT LANCASTER HOUSE  
ON FEBRUARY 19, 1959<sup>1</sup>

I

MEMORANDUM SETTING OUT THE AGREED FOUNDATION FOR THE FINAL  
SETTLEMENT OF THE PROBLEM OF CYPRUS

The Prime Minister of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Greece and the Prime Minister of the Turkish Republic.

Taking note of the Declaration by the Representative of the Greek-Cypriot Community and the Representative of the Turkish-Cypriot Community that they accept the documents annexed to this Memorandum as the agreed foundation for the final settlement of the problem of Cyprus.

Hereby adopt , on behalf of their respective Governments, the documents annexed to this Memorandum and listed below, as the agreed foundation for the final settlement of

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1. Cmnd. 679 of 1959.

the problem of Cyprus.

On behalf of the  
Government of  
the United King-  
dom of Great  
Britain and  
Northern Ireland

HAROLD MACMILLAN

On behalf of the  
Government of  
the Kingdom of  
Greece

C. KARAMANLIS

On behalf of the  
Government of  
the Turkish Re-  
public

A. MENDERES

London,

February 19, 1959.

#### List of Documents Annexed

- A.- Basic Structure of the Republic of Cyprus.
- B.- Treaty of Guarantee between the Republic of Cyprus and Greece, the United Kingdom and Turkey.
- C.- Treaty of Alliance between the Republic of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey.
- D.- Declaration made by the Government of the United Kingdom on February 17, 1959.
- E.- Additional Article to be inserted in the Treaty of Guarantee.
- F.- Declaration made by the Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers on February 17, 1959.
- G.- Declaration made by the Representative of the Greek-Cypriot Community on February 19, 1959.
- H.- Declaration made by the Representative of the Turkish-Cypriot Community on February 19, 1959.
- I.- Agreed Measures to prepare for the new arrangements in Cyprus.

II

ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF THE DOCUMENTS AGREED IN THE FRENCH  
TEXTS AND INITIALLED BY THE GREEK AND TURKISH PRIME  
MINISTERS AT ZURICH ON FEBRUARY 11, 1959.

(a)

Basic Structure of the Republic of Cyprus

1. The State of Cyprus shall be a Republic with a presidential regime, the President being Greek and the Vice-President Turkish elected by universal suffrage by the Greek and Turkish communities of the Island respectively.

2. The official languages of the Republic of Cyprus shall be Greek and Turkish. Legislative and administrative instruments and documents shall be drawn up and promulgated in the two official languages.

3. The Republic of Cyprus shall have its own flag of neutral design and colour, chosen jointly by the President and the Vice-President of the Republic.

Authorities and communities shall have the right to fly the Greek and Turkish flags on holidays at the same time as the flag of Cyprus.

The Greek and Turkish communities shall have the right to celebrate Greek and Turkish National holidays.

by an absolute majority.

Decisions so taken shall be promulgated immediately by the President and the Vice-President by publication in the official gazette.

However, the President and the Vice-President shall have the right of final veto and the right to return the decisions of the Council of Ministers under the same conditions as those laid down for laws and decisions of the House of Representatives.

6. Legislative authority shall be vested in a House of Representatives elected for a period of five years by universal suffrage of each community separately in the proportion of 70 per cent, for the Greek community and 30 per cent for the Turkish community, this proportion being fixed independently of statistical data. (N.B.- The number of Representatives shall be fixed by mutual agreement between the communities.)

The House of Representatives shall exercise authority in all matters other than those expressly reserved to the Communal Chambers. In the event of a conflict of authority, such conflict shall be decided by the Supreme Constitutional Court which shall be composed of one Greek, one Turk and one neutral, appointed jointly by the President and the Vice-

President. The neutral judge shall be president of the Court.

7. Laws and decisions of the House of Representatives shall be adopted by a simple majority of the members present. They shall be promulgated within 15 days if neither the President nor the Vice-President returns them for reconsideration as provided in Point 9 below.

The Constitutional Law, with the exception of its basic articles, may be modified by a majority comprising two-thirds of the Greek members and two-thirds of the Turkish members of the House of Representatives.

Any modification of the electoral law and the adoption of any law relating to the municipalities and of any law imposing duties or taxes shall require a simple majority of the Greek and Turkish members of the House of Representatives taking part in the vote and considered separately.

On the adoption of the budget, the President and the Vice-President may exercise their right to return it to the House of Representatives, if in their judgment any question of discrimination arises. If the House maintains its decisions, the President and the Vice-President shall have the right of appeal to the Supreme Constitutional Court.

8. The President and the Vice-President separately



and conjointly, shall have the right of final veto on any law or decision concerning foreign affairs, except the participation of the Republic of Cyprus in international organisations and pacts of alliance in which Greece and Turkey both participate, or concerning defence and security as defined in Annex I.

9. The President and the Vice-President of the Republic shall have, separately and conjointly, the right to return all laws and decisions, which may be returned to the House of Representatives within a period of not more than 15 days for reconsideration.

The House of Representatives shall pronounce within 15 days on any matter so returned. If the House of Representatives maintains its decisions, the President and the Vice-President shall promulgate the law or decision in question within the time-limits fixed for the promulgation of laws and decisions.

Laws and decisions, which are considered by the President or the Vice-President to discriminate against either of the two communities, shall be submitted to the Supreme Constitutional Court which may annul or confirm the law or decision or return it to the House of Representatives for reconsideration, in whole or in part. The law or decision

shall not become effective until the Supreme Constitutional Court or, where it has been returned, the House of Representatives has taken a decision on it.

10. Each community shall have its Communal Chamber composed of a number of representatives which it shall itself determine.

The Communal Chambers shall have the right to impose taxes and levies on members of their community to provide for their needs and for the needs of bodies and institutions under their supervision.

The Communal Chambers shall exercise authority in all religious, educational, cultural and teaching questions and questions of personal status. They shall exercise authority in questions where the interests and institutions are of a purely communal nature, such as sporting and charitable foundations, bodies and associations producers' and consumers' co-operatives and credit establishments, created for the purpose of promoting the welfare of one of the communities. (N.B.- It is understood that the provisions of the present paragraph cannot be interpreted in such a way as to prevent the creation of mixed and communal institutions where the inhabitants desire them.)

These producers' and consumers' co-operatives and

credit establishments, which shall be administered under the laws of the Republic, shall be subject to the supervision of the Communal Chambers. The Communal Chambers shall also exercise authority in matters initiated by municipalities which are composed of one community only. These municipalities, to which the laws of the Republic shall apply, shall be supervised in their functions by the Communal Chambers.

Where the central administration is obliged to take over the supervision of the institutions, establishments, or municipalities mentioned in the two preceding paragraphs by virtue of legislation in force, this supervision shall be exercised by officials belonging to the same community as the institution, establishment or municipality in question.

11. The Civil Service shall be composed as to 70 per cent. of Greeks and as to 30 per cent. of Turks.

It is understood that this quantitative division will be applied as far as practicable in all grades of the Civil Service.

In regions or localities where one of the two communities is in a majority approaching 100 per cent., the organs of the local administration responsible to the central administration shall be composed solely of officials belonging to that community.

12. The deputies of the Attorney-General of the Republic, the Inspector-General, the Treasurer and the Governor of the Issuing Bank may not belong to the same community as their principals. The holders of these posts shall be appointed by the President and the Vice-President of the Republic acting in agreement.

13. The heads and deputy heads of the Armed Forces, the Gendarmerie and the Police shall be appointed by the President and the Vice-President of the Republic acting in agreement. One of these heads shall be Turkish and where the head belongs to one of the communities, the deputy head shall belong to the other.

14. Compulsory military service may only be instituted with the agreement of the President and the Vice-President of the Republic of Cyprus.

Cyprus shall have an army of 2,000 men, of whom 60 per cent shall be Greek and 40 per cent Turkish.

The security forces (gendarmerie and police) shall have a complement of 2,000 men, which may be reduced or increased with the agreement of both the President and the Vice-President. The security forces shall be composed as to 70 per cent of Greeks and as to 30 per cent of Turks. However, for an initial period this percentage may be raised to

a maximum of 40 per cent of Turks (and consequently reduced to 60 per cent of Greeks) in order not to discharge those Turks now serving in the police, apart from the auxiliary police.

15. Forces, which are stationed in parts of the territory of the Republic inhabited, in a proportion approaching 100 per cent., by members of a single community, shall belong to that community.

16. A High Court of Justice shall be established, which shall consist of two Greeks, one Turk and one neutral, nominated jointly by the President and the Vice-President of the Republic.

The President of the Court shall be the neutral judge, who shall have two votes.

This Court shall constitute the highest organ of the judicature (appointments, promotions of judges, &c.).

17. Civil disputes, where the plaintiff and the defendant belong to the same community, shall be tried by a tribunal composed of judges belonging to that community. If the plaintiff and defendant belong to different communities, the composition of the tribunal shall be mixed and shall be determined by the High Court of Justice.

Tribunals dealing with civil disputes relating to

questions of personal status and to religious matters, which are reserved to the competence of the Communal Chambers under Point 10, shall be composed solely of judges belonging to the community concerned. The composition and status of these tribunals shall be determined according to the law drawn up by the Communal Chamber and they shall apply the law drawn up by the Communal Chamber.

In criminal cases, the tribunal shall consist of judges belonging to the same community as the accused. If the injured party belongs to another community, the composition of the tribunal shall be mixed and shall be determined by the High Court of Justice.

18. The President and the Vice-President of the Republic shall each have the right to exercise the prerogative of mercy to persons from their respective communities who are condemned to death. In cases where the plaintiffs and the convicted persons are members of different communities the prerogative of mercy shall be exercised by agreement between the President and the Vice-President. In the event of disagreement the vote for clemency shall prevail. When mercy is accorded the death penalty shall be commuted to life imprisonment.

19. In the event of agricultural reform, lands shall

be redistributed only to persons who are members of the same community as the expropriated owners.

Expropriations by the State or the Municipalities shall only be carried out on payment of a just and equitable indemnity fixed, in disputed cases, by the tribunals. An appeal to the tribunals shall have the effect of suspending action.

Expropriated property shall only be used for the purpose for which the expropriation was made. Otherwise the property shall be restored to the owners.

20. Separate municipalities shall be created in the five largest towns of Cyprus by the Turkish inhabitants of these towns. However:-

- (a) In each of the towns a co-ordinating body shall be set up which shall supervise work which needs to be carried out jointly and shall concern itself with matters which require a degree of co-operation. These bodies shall each be composed of two members chosen by the Greek municipalities, two members chosen by the Turkish municipalities and a President chosen by agreement between the two municipalities.
- (b) The President and the Vice-President shall examine within four years the question whether or not this separation of municipalities in the five largest towns shall continue.

With regard to other localities, special arrangements shall be made for the constitution of municipal bodies, following, as far as possible, the rule of proportional representation

for the two communities.

21. A Treaty guaranteeing the independence, territorial integrity and constitution of the new State of Cyprus shall be concluded between the Republic of Cyprus, Greece, the United Kingdom and Turkey. A Treaty of military alliance shall also be concluded between the Republic of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey.

These two instruments shall have constitutional force. (This last paragraph shall be inserted in the Constitution as a basic article).

22. It shall be recognised that the total or partial union of Cyprus with any other State, or a separatist independence for Cyprus (i.e., the partition of Cyprus into two independent States), shall be excluded.

23. The Republic of Cyprus shall accord most-favoured-nation treatment to Great Britain, Greece and Turkey for all agreements whatever their nature.

This provision shall not apply to the Treaties between the Republic of Cyprus and the United Kingdom concerning the bases and military facilities accorded to the United Kingdom.

24. The Greek and Turkish Governments shall have



the right to subsidise institutions for education, culture, athletics and charity belonging to their respective communities.

Equally, where either community considers that it has not the necessary number of schoolmasters, professors or priests for the working of its institutions, the Greek and Turkish Governments may provide them to the extent strictly necessary to meet their needs.

25. One of the following Ministries - the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defence or the Ministry of Finance - shall be entrusted to a Turk. If the President and the Vice-President agree they may replace this system by a system of rotation.

26. The new State which is to come into being with the signature of the Treaties shall be established as quickly as possible and within a period of not more than three months from the signature of the Treaties.

27. All the above Points shall be considered to be basic articles of the Constitution of Cyprus.

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ANNEX I

A

The defence questions subject to veto under Point 8 of the Basic Structure are as follows:-

- (a) Composition and size of the armed forces and credits for them.
- (b) Appointments and promotions.
- (c) Imports of warlike stores and of all kinds of explosives.
- (d) Granting of bases and other facilities to allied countries.

The security questions subject to veto are as follows:-

- (a) Appointments and promotions.
- (b) Allocation and stationing of forces.
- (c) Emergency measures and martial law.
- (d) Police laws.

(It is provided that the right of veto shall cover all emergency measures or decisions, but not those which concern the normal functioning of the police and gendarmerie.)

(b)

Treaty of Guarantee

The Republic of Cyprus of the one part, and Greece,

the United Kingdom and Turkey of the other part:-

I. Considering that the recognition and maintenance of the independence, territorial integrity and security of the Republic of Cyprus, as established and regulated by the basic articles of its Constitution, are in their common interest;

II. Desiring to co-operate to ensure that the provisions of the aforesaid Constitution shall be respected;

HAVE AGREED AS FOLLOWS:-

#### Article 1

The Republic of Cyprus undertakes to ensure the maintenance of its independence, territorial integrity and security, as well as respect for its Constitution.

It undertakes not to participate, in whole or in part, in any political or economic union with any State whatsoever. With this intent it prohibits all activity tending to promote directly or indirectly either union or partition of the Island.

#### Article 2

Greece, the United Kingdom and Turkey, taking note of the undertakings by the Republic of Cyprus embodied in Article

1, recognise and guarantee the independence, territorial integrity and security of the Republic of Cyprus, and also the provisions of the basic articles of its Constitution.

They likewise undertake to prohibit, as far as lies within their power, all activity having the object of promoting directly or indirectly either the union of the Republic of Cyprus with any other State, or the partition of the Island.

### Article 3

In the event of any breach of the provisions of the present Treaty, Greece, the United Kingdom, and Turkey undertake to consult together, with a view to making representations, or taking the necessary steps to ensure observance of those provisions.

In so far as common or concerted action may prove impossible, each of the three guaranteeing Powers reserves the right to take action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs established by the present Treaty.

The present Treaty shall enter into force on signature.

The High Contracting Parties undertake to register the present Treaty at the earliest possible date with the Secretariat of the United Nations, in accordance with the

provisions of Article 102 of the Charter.<sup>(1)</sup>

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Treaty of Alliance between the Republic of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey

1. The Republic of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey shall co-operate for their common defence and undertake by this Treaty to consult together on the problems raised by this defence.
2. The High Contracting Parties undertake to resist any attack or aggression, direct or indirect, directed against the independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus.
3. In the spirit of this alliance and in order to fulfil the above purpose a tripartite Headquarters shall be established on the territory of the Republic of Cyprus.
4. Greece shall take part in the Headquarters mentioned in the preceding article with a contingent of 950 officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers and Turkey with a contingent of 650 officers, non-commissioned officers and

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(1) "Treaty Series No.67 (1946)," Cmd. 7015, page 21.

soldiers. The President and the Vice-President of the Republic of Cyprus, acting in agreement, may ask the Greek and Turkish Governments to increase or reduce the Greek and Turkish contingents.

5. The Greek and Turkish officers mentioned above shall be responsible for the training of the Army of the Republic of Cyprus.

6. The command of the tripartite Headquarters shall be assumed in rotation and for a period of one year each by a Cypriot, Greek and Turkish General Officer, who shall be nominated by the Governments of Greece and Turkey and by the President and the Vice-President of the Republic of Cyprus.

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### III

#### DECLARATION BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM

The Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, having examined the documents concerning the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus, comprising the

Basic Structure for the Republic of Cyprus, the Treaty of Guarantee and the Treaty of Alliance, drawn up and approved by the Heads of the Governments of Greece and Turkey in Zurich on February 11, 1959, and taking into account the consultations in London, from February 11 to 16, 1959, between the Foreign Ministers of Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom

Declare:-

- A. That, subject to the acceptance of their requirements as set out in Section B below, they accept the documents approved by the Heads of the Governments of Greece and Turkey as the agreed foundation for the final settlement of the problem of Cyprus.
- B. That, with the exception of two areas at
- (a) Akrotiri - Episkopi - Paramali, and
  - (b) Dhekelia - Pergamos - Ayios Nikolaos - Xylophagou, which will be retained under full British sovereignty, they are willing to transfer sovereignty over the Island of Cyprus to the Republic of Cyprus subject to the following conditions:-
    - (1) that such rights are secured to the United Kingdom Government as are necessary to enable the two areas as aforesaid to be used effectively as military bases, including among others those rights indicated in the Annex attached, and that satisfactory guarantees are given by Greece, Turkey and the Republic of Cyprus for the integrity of the areas retained under

British sovereignty and the use and enjoyment by the United Kingdom of the rights referred to above;

- (2) that provision shall be made by agreement for:-
- (i) the protection of the fundamental human rights of the various communities in Cyprus;
  - (ii) the protection of the interests of the members of the public services in Cyprus;
  - (iii) determining the nationality of persons affected by the settlement;
  - (iv) the assumption by the Republic of Cyprus of the appropriate obligations of the present Government of Cyprus, including the settlement of claims.

C. That the Government of the United Kingdom welcome the draft Treaty of Alliance between the Republic of Cyprus, the Kingdom of Greece and the Republic of Turkey and will co-operate with the Parties thereto in the common defence of Cyprus.

D. That the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus shall come into force and the formal signature of the necessary instruments by the parties concerned shall take place at the earliest practicable date and on that date sovereignty will be transferred to the Republic of Cyprus.

SELWYN LLOYD.  
ALAN LENNOX-BOYD

E. A.-T.

A.M.

F. R. Z.

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## ANNEX

The following rights will be necessary in connexion with the areas to be retained under British sovereignty:-

- (a) to continue to use, without restriction or interference, the existing small sites containing military and other installations and to exercise complete control within these sites, including the right to guard and defend them and to exclude from them all persons not authorised by the United Kingdom Government;
- (b) to use roads, ports and other facilities freely for the movement of personnel and stores of all kinds to and from and between the above-mentioned areas and sites;
- (c) to continue to have the use of specified port facilities at Famagusta;
- (d) to use public services (such as water, telephone, telegraph, electric power, &c.);
- (e) to use from time to time certain localities, which would be specified, for troop training;
- (f) to use the airfield at Nicosia, together with any necessary buildings and facilities on or connected with the airfield to whatever extent is considered necessary by the British authorities for the operation of British military aircraft in peace and war, including the exercise of any necessary operational control of air traffic;
- (g) to overfly the territory of the Republic of Cyprus without restriction;
- (h) to exercise jurisdiction over British forces to an extent comparable with that provided in Article VII of the Agreement regarding the Status of Forces of Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty, (2) in respect of certain offences committed within the territory of the Republic of Cyprus;

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(2) "Treaty Series No. 3 (1955)," Cmd. 9363.

- (i) to employ freely in the areas and sites labour from other parts of Cyprus;
- (j) to obtain, after consultation with the Government of the Republic of Cyprus, the use of such additional small sites and such additional rights as the United Kingdom may, from time to time, consider technically necessary for the efficient use of its base areas and installations in Cyprus.

## IV

## ADDITIONAL ARTICLE TO BE INSERTED IN THE TREATY OF GUARANTEE

The Kingdom of Greece, the Republic of Turkey and the Republic of Cyprus undertake to respect the integrity of the areas to be retained under Republic of Cyprus, and guarantee the use and enjoyment by the United Kingdom of the rights to be secured to the United Kingdom by the Republic of Cyprus in accordance with the declaration by the Government of the United Kingdom.

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## V

DECLARATION MADE BY THE GREEK AND TURKISH FOREIGN MINISTERS  
ON FEBRUARY 17, 1959

The Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey, having considered the declaration made by the Government of the United Kingdom on February 17, 1959, accept that declaration,

together with the document approved by the Heads of the Greek and Turkish Governments in Zurich on February 11, 1959, as providing the agreed foundation for the final settlement of the problem of Cyprus.

E. AVEROFF-TOSSIZZA

FATIN R. ZORLU

S. L.

A. M.

F. K.

VI

DECLARATION MADE BY THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE GREEK-CYPRIOT  
COMMUNITY ON FEBRUARY 19, 1959

Archbishop Makarios, representing the Greek Cypriot Community, having examined the documents concerning the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus drawn up and approved by the Heads of the Governments of Greece and Turkey in Zurich on February 11, 1959, and the declarations made by the Government of the United Kingdom, and by the Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey on February 17, 1959, declares that he accepts the documents and declarations as the agreed foundation for the final settlement of the problem of Cyprus.

ARCHBISHOP MAKARIOS.

S. L.

E. Z.-T.

F. R. Z.

F. K.

## VII

DECLARATION MADE BY THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE TURKISH-CYPRIOT  
COMMUNITY ON FEBRUARY 19, 1959

Dr. Kutchuk, representing the Turkish Cypriot Community, having examined the documents concerning the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus drawn up and approved by the Heads of the Governments of Greece and Turkey in Zurich on February 11, 1959, and the declarations made by the Government of the United Kingdom, and by the Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey on February 17, 1959, declares that he accepts the documents and declarations as the agreed foundation for the final settlement of the problem of Cyprus.

F. KUTCHUK.

S. L.

E. A.-T.

F. R. Z.

A. M.

## VIII

## AGREED MEASURES TO PREPARE FOR THE NEW ARRANGEMENTS IN CYPRUS

1. All parties to the Conference firmly endorse the aim of bringing the constitution (including the elections of President, Vice-President, and the three Assemblies) and the Treaties into full effect as soon as practicable and in any case not later than twelve months from to-day's date (the 19th

of February, 1959). Measures leading to the transfer of sovereignty in Cyprus will begin at once.

2. The first of these measures will be the immediate establishment of:-

- (a) a Joint Commission in Cyprus with the duty of completing a draft constitution for the independent Republic of Cyprus, incorporating the basic structure agreed at the Zurich Conference. This Commission shall be composed of one representative each of the Greek-Cypriot and the Turkish-Cypriot community and one representative nominated by the Government of Greece and one representative by the Government of Turkey, together with a legal adviser nominated by the Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey, and shall in its work have regard to and shall scrupulously observe the points contained in the documents of the Zurich Conference and shall fulfil its task in accordance with the principles there laid down;
- (b) a Transitional Committee in Cyprus, with responsibility for drawing up plans for adapting and reorganising the Governmental machinery in Cyprus in preparation for the transfer of authority to the independent Republic of Cyprus. The Committee shall be composed of the Governor of Cyprus, the leading representative of the Greek community and the leading representative of the Turkish community and other Greek and Turkish Cypriots nominated by the Governor after consultation with the two leading representatives in such a way as not to conflict with paragraph 5 of the Basic Structure;
- (c) a Joint Committee in London composed of a representative of each of the Governments of Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom, and one representative each of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities, with the duty of preparing the final treaties giving effect to the conclusions of the London Conference. This Committee will prepare drafts for submission to Governments covering inter alia

matters arising from the retention of areas in Cyprus under British sovereignty, the provision to the United Kingdom Government of certain ancillary rights and facilities in the independent Republic of Cyprus, questions of nationality, the treatment of the liabilities of the present Government of Cyprus, and the financial and economic problems arising from the creation of an independent Republic of Cyprus.

3. The Governor will, after consultation with the two leading representatives, invite individual members of the Transitional Committee to assume special responsibilities for particular departments and functions of Government. This process will be started as soon as possible and will be progressively extended.

4. The headquarters mentioned in Article 4 of the Treaty of Alliance between the Republic of Cyprus, the Kingdom of Greece and the Republic of Turkey will be established three months after the completion of the work of the Commission referred to in paragraph 2 (a) above and will be composed of a restricted number of officers who will immediately undertake the training of the armed forces of the Republic of Cyprus. The Greek and Turkish contingents will enter the territory of the Republic of Cyprus on the date when the sovereignty will be transferred to the Republic.

S. L.

E. A.-T.

F. R. Z.

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