The Hindu-Muslim Problem
A Study Of British Policy In India
1918 - 1939

by

Samir M. Seikaly

Submitted in partial fulfillment for the requirements
of the degree Master of Arts
in the History Department of the
American University of Beirut
Beirut, Lebanon
1962
I and E
my respite in time of need
I
dedicate this Thesis
to you

To all those who in silence afforded me kindness and help; to F.S. and S.C. who typed this Thesis; to Dr. J. Malone, without whose guidance and advice this work would have been impossible, my limitless thanks and deepest gratitude.
Table Of Contents

Abstract  
II

Chapter I  Communal Relationships Prior to 1919  18

Chapter II  Unity Against Islam  53

Chapter III  Communalism - Internal Problem or Imperial Weapon?  80

Chapter IV  Communalism and Reform  119

Chapter V  The End Of An Era  135

Appendix

Bibliography.
The Hindu-Moslem Problem

A Study of British Policy in India

1918 - 1939
Abstract

The conclusion of the first world War found India — like so many other countries — in a state of great turmoil and agitation, arising from active participation in the War and the peculiar turn its internal political condition had taken. Nationalistic feeling, from rudimentary beginnings in the late nineteenth century, had by 1919 become clearly defined. It permeated almost every strata of society. But this nationalism, aspiring to be All-Indian in character, was compromised by Hinduism. Therefore conflicts were generated with the Muslims, the principal minority group, as well as with the Imperial power. However, all was not division between the Hindus and Muslims. Utter disillusionment bred that remarkable co-operation which confounded the British authorities immediately after the first world War — the aggressive Caliphate movement.

Yet the united front proved illusory and transitory. Division was fostered by religious, cultural and economic differences. The history of India in the interwar period became one long record of reprisal and counter-reprisal. Upon that violent history must be superimposed the record of the British Raj, sometimes overbearing in its paternalism, at times shortsighted and at other times visionary, alternately passive and active. Throughout most of the period it seemed as if the British were not in fact dealing with India, but with a British conception of what India was. This may account for departures from political realism.

India's inexorable drive toward increased power of self-rule elicited a number of reform proposals from the British. In a manner characterized by langour
and indecision the British groped for a means of endowing India with added responsibility. Because the official view was that such responsibility should entail no sacrifice of the Muslims or other minorities these attempts held out no hope of success. The Muslims were given an increased awareness of being in a politically precarious situation. For such reasons they held tenaciously to "safeguards" and demanded further guarantees, thereby endangering the small degree of self-government achieved by 1935. It was more important to the Muslims to have the safeguards institutionalized for them by the British. Separate electorates and separate representation became the very basis of Muslim political activity. Britain responded by protesting their right to maintain these communal guarantees. The Congress — the heart of nationalism — reacted by proclaiming its unalterable belief in a unitary India governed on democratic principles. The interwar years, then, saw crystallized the forces which were to divide the subcontinent into — India and Pakistan.
India's achievements were also very great. Her soldiers lie with ours in all the theaters of the war, and no Britisher can ever forget the gallantry and promptitude with which she sprang forward to the King Emperor's service when war was declared. That is no small tribute both to India and to the Empire of which India is a part. The causes of the War were unknown to India; its theater in Europe was remote. Yet India stood by her allegiance heart and soul, from the first call to arms .... India's loyalty in that great crisis is eloquent to me of the Empire's success in bridging the civilisations of East and West, in reconciling wide differences of history, of tradition and of race, and in bringing the spirit and genius of a great Asiatic people into willing co-operation with our own. 1

Thus spoke Prime Minister David Lloyd George in the Imperial Conference of 1921. India had indeed answered the call for help; but what political conditions reigned in India prior to, and during the momentous struggle? What, more precisely, were the conditions of the Hindu majority and the Muslim minority, and the relationship between them?

In order to comprehend the actual condition of the Hindus - or rather the articulate politically conscious Hindus - it would be essential to look back to 1857, when the last attempt but one to challenge British rule by violent means met with failure. The Hindus, possessed of a religion that was highly latitudinarian and tolerant, that imposed no dogma and prescribed no doctrine, and that could be described as a process not a result, as a movement rather than position, were not averse to adopt Western education and Western economic and political practices. Thus the Hindus immediately took to the study of the English language, as indeed they had hastened to learn the language of their earlier Muslim conquerors. After the Cornwallis

era English became the language of the government services, and was used increasingly in commercial transactions. In time these were able to virtually monopolize those governmental positions open to the indigenous population.  

It was also they who benefitted economically from the advent of the British. The earliest British activities of conquest and commerce occurred in predominantly Hindu areas. It was there that a replica of the British commercial and industrial system was developed by the Hindus, accompanied, inevitably enough, by the rude beginnings of a Hindu bourgeois society on Western lines.  

This society was given an adequate chance of survival, for the British, engrossed after the Mutiny with the shadowy and all but non-existent Muslim threat, were too occupied to be aware of the implications of the bourgeois movement which was the result of their presence in India.

The new social forces of the intelligensia and the commercial bourgeoisie were long in maturing. It was not until leaders of the new middle-class became aware of the extreme poverty of their peasant fellow-countrymen, the inferior position relegated them by the Europeans and the open partisanship shown towards British economic interests, that these commenced to betray discontent and dissatisfaction with the British ruling power.

It was in order to stem this discontent and to canalize it into constitutional channels that Mr. O. A. Hume with the collaboration of the then Viceroy, the Marquis of Dufferin and Ava, founded the Indian National Congress.

---

4. For the inner working of Indian politics see A. Lyall, *The Life Of the Marquis Of Dufferin And Ava*, London: Thomas Nelson and Sons 1905, Chs. XI, XIII & XIV
with the avowed intention that "Indian politicians should meet yearly and
point out to the Government in what respects the administration was defective,
how it could be improved ...." 1 Clearly intended as a means by which the
popular clamor may be mollified, the Indian National Congress soon became a
focus of national feeling, thus by far exceeding the limited role intended for
it.

The National Congress passed through two distinct phases prior to the
termination of the first world War — the Liberal phase in which it was
dominated by the Center Party and the extremist phase in which it was dominated
by the Left. 2

The Liberal phase, between 1885 and 1905, was dominated by men who
possessed an unlimited faith in British democracy. 3 It was to British
democracy and to Britain's people that they turned their hopeful gaze, aspiring
that these would somehow be instrumental in assisting in the struggle for
enlightenment, for social reform, for education and modernization against all
that was obscurantist and backward in India. 4 Thus could be understood the
oft-repeated confidence in the British, who, in the view of the center,
possessed interests in India, not antagonistic but allied. Leaders like
Dadabhai Naoroji exulted in proclaiming that "Indians are British citizens
and are entitled to all British citizens' rights." 5 So also Gokhale who,

1. B.P. Sitaramayya, The History Of The Indian National Congress, Madras:
3. A.R. Desai, op.cit., p.296
4. R.P. Dutt, The Problem Of India, New York: International Publishers, 1943,
   p.121.
5. B.P. Sitaramayya, op.cit., p.139.
on learning of the avowed policy of the Government, in 1894, to assign high posts only to Europeans, said that

the pledges of equal treatment which England has given us have supplied us with a high and worthy ideal for our Nation, and if these pledges are repudiated, one of the strongest claims of British rule to our attachment will disappear 1 —

thus and no more. 2

With such sentiments it was logical that the Center believed in orderly progress and evolution as opposed to revolution. Acquainted thoroughly with British radicalism it adopted the method of constitutinal agitation for the attainment of its goals — instilling national consciousness in the Indian people, disseminating among them democratic concepts and popularizing for them the idea of representative institutions. 3

The Liberal phase, so ineffectual in light of subsequent events, succeeded, despite its being exclusively representative of the upper bourgeoisie, 4

1. B.P. Sitaramayya, Ibid., p.148
2. Other examples of Liberal sentiments were provided by Surendra Nath Banerjea: "England is our political guide and our moral preceptor in the exalted sphere of political duty," and Sir Pherozeshah Mehta, who said:

It is, I repeat, the glory of the Congress that the educated and enlightened people of the country seek to repay the debt of gratitude which they owe for the priceless boon of education by pleading, and pleading temperately, for timely and provident statesmanship. I have no fears but that English statesmanship will ultimately respond to the call. I have unbounded faith in the living and fertilizing principles of English culture and ... education.

B.P. Sitaramayya Ibid., p.174
4. R.P. Dutt, op. cit., p.120.
in contributing to the national movement, not in goals attained but in

demands set forth. These demands gave the movement a character increasingly

national in scope — something which the British authorities did not desire.

Thus not many years had passed before Dufferin was speaking with utter contempt

of the "microscopic minority" represented by the Congress, \(^1\) and Lord Curzon

was writing to the Secretary of State of India that the "Congress is tottering
to its fall and one of my great ambitions while in India is to assist it to a
peaceful demise." \(^2\) And the British opposition to the Congress was not only

verbal, for in 1906, a year after the Congress came under Leftist domination,
the All-India Muslim League was founded. From this point there began what may
be termed "the policy of counterpoise." \(^3\) It was a policy which, whether
deliberately pursued by the British or not, \(^4\) was destined to succeed, since
the Congress, ever aspiring to be an All-India national body, failed to elicit
the allegiance of the minority community which was obsessed by the fear of
perpetual domination. \(^5\)

In 1905 Bengal, the home of Indian nationalism, was partitioned by Lord
Curzon, then Viceroy of India. Considering the rearrangement of the administrative

---

1. R.P. Dutt, Ibid., p.121
II, p.151.
3. See in this connection R.P. Dutt, op.cit., passim, R. Gopal, op.cit., passim
and W.C. Smith, op.cit., passim.
4. Lady Minto, on the foundation of the League, received the following from a
Government official: "I must send .... a line to say that a very big thing
has happened today. A work of statesmanship .... It is nothing less than
the pulling back of sixty-two millions of people from joining the ranks of
the seditious opposition." Quoted in R. Gopal, op.cit., p.100
5. N. Mansergh, Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs: Problems of External
boundaries as a means of allying the suffering of the vast inert masses,¹ Lord Curzon decided upon partition but in the process he crystallized more determined opposition by the emerging Left.²

The partition of Bengal supplied the Leftists with a central theme upon which their program could be articulated, but it definitely was not solely responsible for ushering the Congress into its extremist phase. Extremism was generated by the culmination of a process of disillusionment and dissatisfaction. Administration of the Indian Civil Service, despite high-sounding phases, was, as Surendra Nath Bännerjea stated, "one unbroken record of broken promises."³ There was dissatisfaction with the chosen method of parliamentary opposition⁴ — an opposition which elicited promises from the British authorities, never to be fulfilled.⁵

The Left, with its leaders like Lokamanya Tilak, Bepin Chandra Pal and Lala Lajput Rai,⁶ found its strongest supporters among the growing number of unemployed literate youth — the restless declassé who were prone to pursue ideals unrelated to British democracy by methods far removed from British Parliamentarianism.

1. Rolandshay, op.cit., p.323
2. The term Left here connotes those people who depended on a mass movement in their political agitation and who introduced direct action as the boycott.
5. A.R. Desai's list of unachieved national demands is a long one, and includes demands for the reform of land revenue policy, the repeal of cotton excise duty, the repeal of the Sedition Act and many others, op.cit., p.229.
6. Tilak, who was not one to be bemused or placated by the benefits flowing from association with the British Raj, pointed out that "If you take away the produce of the land and do not give it back in some form more material than advice and prestige the country must grow poorer and poorer," B.F. Siteramayya, op.cit., p.158. Rai likewise was a thorough — going nationalist from his first entry to Congress and preached direct action against the British — hence his frequent imprisonment and finally banishment. B.F. Siteramayya, Ibid., p.174 - 175.
The emergence of the Left and the advent of the extremist phase redirected the outlook of the Congress. Henceforth the ideal was to be sought not in modern Western civilization but in an orthodox Hinduism, endowed with an inner spiritual superiority. 1 The regeneration of India should come not by a cultural capitulation to the British but by a return to the Vedic past of India - thus Tilak's extolling of Hindu and Maratha revivalism. 2 But in returning to the purely Hindu past of India there existed two dangers. One was the possibility of commingling the nationalist movement with Hindu religious zeal, with adverse effect on non-Hindus. This danger quickly materialized. 3 The other derived from the attempt to build a national progressive movement on the foundation of an antiquated religion rife with superstition, 4 thus giving rise to the dichotomy, the strange and uneasy combination of political radicalism and social reaction, which explains the tardy acceptance of Jawaharlal Nehru's social program by the Congress.

Coupled with this change of ideals and source of inspiration went a change of method. The indirect, mild political agitation of the Liberal phase was abandoned. Henceforth the weapons applied would not be mere arguments and appeals to the democratic traditions of constitutional Britain, but the boycott, 5 the Swadeshi and the Hartal. 6 The goal to be attained was not working with "... 

1. R.P. Dutt, op.cit., p.122
3. W.C. Smith, op.cit., p.159
4. R.P. Dutt, loc.cit.
5. The Congress held at Calcutta in 1906 endorsed these methods, which had already been applied in the Bengal. B.P. Sitaramayya, op.cit., p.141
6. Swadeshi literally meant the production of home made goods while Hartal was the word used for strike.
unwavering loyalty to the British connection," but Swaraj or Self-Government. It was described as India's birthright, which could no longer be denied her. Swaraj, Tilak dramatically emphasized had to be fought for, and its achievement would insure that India's social, economic and cultural interests, which were utterly at variance with those of Britain, would be accomplished. The Center members of Congress had failed in their approach, now the Left sought to put its program into practice, their opportunity being provided by the partition of Bengal.

The partition under the aegis of Lord Curzon resulted in the creation of two new provinces: West Bengal with its capital Calcutta inhabited mainly by Hindus and East Bengal comprising East and North Bengal and Assam, with its capital at Dacca and inhabited mainly be Muslims. This partition immediately signalized the most extensive and violent public agitation to date. It was during this anti-partition campaign that the slogans of Swaraj, Swadeshi and Boycott were initiated. So completely were they adhered to that The Englishman, an Anglo-India paper of Calcutta, reported that, "... in boycott, the enemies of the Raj have found a most effective weapon for injuring British interests in the country ...."  

In the face of strong governmental opposition and indeed repression; in the face of repeated assertions that the partition of Bengal was a "settled fact;" in the face of the rigid opposition of the "special creation of the Almighty — the Bureaucracy," determined to yield neither to agitation from

---

1. B.P. Sitaramayya, Ibid., p.168
2. B.P. Siteramayya, Ibid., p.165
3. A.R. Desai, op.cit., p.504
4. A.R. Desai, loc.cit.,
5. Rolandshay, op.cit., p.328.
6. B.P. Siteramayya, op.cit., p.113
8. B.P. Siteramayya, op.cit., p.113
below nor authority from above, the nationalist movement continued to prosper. Its determination was rewarded in 1911 by the repeal of partition upon the occasion of the King's coronation celebrations in India. But in the light of future developments, the events of 1911 represent a hollow victory for the nationalist movement. At this point the Leftists of the Congress discovered that most unfortunate and impotent political weapon - individual terrorism, the employment of which caused the Left to depart from the established path of the Congress and lead a campaign in the wilderness. Equally important, the anti-partition campaign stimulated the fears of the Muslim minority and sowed the seeds of their future alienation.

The partition of Bengal, professedly a step towards administrative efficiency, resulted in the creation of the Province with a Muslim majority. The biographer of Curzon is at pains to establish that the partition was never intended as a means of driving a wedge in the relationships of Hindus and Muslims, yet he shows how Curzon was mindful, in face of the strong nationalist agitation, of Muslim sympathy, thus emphatically placing Hindus and Muslims on different sides.

1. B.P. Sitaramayya, Ibid., p.118 - 119
2. In refutation of Rolandshay, R. Gopal cites Sir Henry Cotton who, in his Indian And Home Memoirs, wrote:

The Muslims of Eastern Bengal are almost all descended from low-caste or aboriginal Hindus who long ago embraced Islam in hope of social improvement or from hard necessity. There was never any cause for quarrel between Hindus and Muslims as such .... For the first time in history a religious feud was established between them by the Partition of the Province. For the first time the principle was enunciated in official circles, Divide and Rule.

R. Gopal, op.cit., p.95
The nationalists, drawn primarily from the Hindu middle-classes, thus came to see the Muslims as collaborators with the Government in its attempt to frustrate national demands. Hence anti-British feeling was linked to anti-Muslim feeling, and the Muslims, as any other obstacle in the way of Indian freedom had to be removed. 1 Nor did the British authorities mitigate Hindu apprehensions when they referred to the Muslim community as their favorite wife, and when they imported Muslims officers from the United Provinces for the manning of the Intelligence Branch of the Police of Bengal. 2 Indeed it is not strange that it was in the atmosphere of suspicion and distrust that there was founded in 1906 the first Muslim political body, destined to articulate the wishes and demands of its community.

It is necessary again, in order to comprehend Muslim political conditions as they obtained at the close of the first world war, to hark back to 1857 — the year in which, so the British believed, the Muslims tried to regain their lost glory and re-establish on a strong basis their derelict Moghul Empire. 3 No wonder, therefore, the willful British policy of Muslim repression. 4 So strong was the suspicion felt towards the Muslims, and so often were they thwarted by the ruling authority that they developed the tendency to separate themselves from their surroundings and withdrew into a traditionalist cell, which, in a period of intellectual and social ferment, was, at best, archaic and decayed. Indeed the Muslims became possessed of a phobia of fear — fear of progress, fear of modern civilization. 5 In such circumstances it was natural that the

2. Ibid., p.5
3. J. Cuming, op.cit., p.87
Muslims, rigidly maintaining doctrinal uniformity, should view the emphasis upon English, instead of Arabic and Persian, with complete aversion, while the Hindus acquired English education and utilized it to achieve steady advancement. Aversion to the British, however, was not the sole reason for refusing to acquire English education, for there was a psychological factor involved. Unable to dissociate themselves from a glorious past and unable to break the fetters of the rigid religious code that bound them, the Muslims were unable to accept anything new; whereas the Hindus breathing in a religious atmosphere characterized by its ability for absorption, were not hindered in acquiring English education and making the best of it. This unwillingness to accept Western education was only one factor in retarding the political development of the Muslims. The Muslim community, concentrated for the most part in Northern India, was late in coming under British political domination and cultural influence. Since the extension of British rule was more for strategic than commercial and industrial reasons, the stimulus to the rise of a Muslim bourgeoisie was lacking. The late appearance of a Muslim middle-class had important and obvious ramifications for Muslim political consciousness.

It was left to Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan (1817 - 1898) to attempt, and to attempt successfully, to revitalize the Muslim community by directing their vision to the West. This meant an acceptance of British educational methods and curricula. Sir Sayyid's efforts were not in vain for, with the financial

1. It was not less natural that the Muslims soon came to believe that the Hindus ahead of them in education as well as in governmental posts, were depriving them of opportunities, and discriminating against them. R. Gopal, op. cit., p. VI I
2. J.M.S. Baljon, op. cit., p. 12
aid of the Muslim propertied classes, he was able to commence the Aligarh movement which culminated in 1873 in the founding of the Aligarh University.\(^1\) This institution was ultimately responsible for the creation of a modern Muslim intelligensia which imbibed Western culture and emphasized political loyalty to the British — which seemed to be their very raison d'etre for did not the founders of Aligarh declare that

\[...\text{the aims of the College are to educate our fellow countrymen in order that they may be able to appreciate the benevolence of the British; to make the Muslims of India worthy and useful subjects of the British Crown}...\text{. These are the aims of the founders of the College.}^2\]

The political program — if it can be called such — of Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan was not very different from his educational aims, in that it also sought to dispel the British suspicion of the Muslims.\(^3\) To this end he directed his every effort, but was confronted with formidable opposition. In 1871 Dr. W.W. Hunter published an authoritative, comprehensive study on the Muslim community entitled *The Indian Musalmans: Are They Bound In Conscience To Rebel Against The Queen?* in which he stated that the "Musalmans of India are ... a source of chronic danger of the British power in India," and that these "were bound, according to their own texts, to accept the status quo," but that "the Law and the Prophets can be utilised on the side of loyalty as well as on the side of sedition."\(^4\) It was against such perpetual suspicion that Sir Sayyid waged his campaign and, in the process, drew on his broad understanding of religious belief. To the Muslims he asserted that friendship between them and the British was tolerated by the Shari'a and that "Enmity between Christians and Muslims on

\[^{1}\text{A.R. Desai, op.cit., p.365.}\]
\[^{2}\text{Quoted in R. Gopal op.cit., p.47.}\]
\[^{3}\text{J.M.S. Baljon, loc.cit.}\]
\[^{4}\text{J.M.S. Baljon, Ibid., p.19}\]
religious grounds is not possible ...."¹ To the British he pointed that
if through the will of God we are subdued by a nation which
gives religious freedom, rules with justice, maintains peace
in the country and respects our individuality and property,
as it is done by the British rule in India, we should be
loyal to it. ²

Sir Sayyid's attempt at an understanding was not in vain; soon the Muslims
would return to the fold of the British and these would guard them lest they
be needed in combating the newly aggressive Hindus.

Prior to 1906 the Muslims did not articulate their political beliefs
in any political program or body. Instead they heeded Sir Sayyid's injunction
to abstain from joining the Congress, ³ or any other existing political body,
because these tended to be disrespectful to the established authority.⁴ Indeed,
before 1906 the Muslims were preoccupied with the acquisition of newly found
knowledge and with its utilization to compete, with varying degrees of acrimony,
with the Hindus for Governmental posts.⁵

The partition of Bengal in 1905 ushered in a new period of Muslim and
Indian political awareness. It has already been suggested that the anti-
partition campaign took the form of a purely Hindu movement ostensibly directed
against the Muslims. It was in fact from that juncture that extreme bitterness
characterized Hindu-Muslim relationships - whether the British willed it or not.⁶
Exasperated by the anti-partition campaign, which was both, by the nature of the
problem involved, anti-British and anti-Muslim, the Muslims commenced to evolve a
particular viewpoint based upon fear. Somehow the underlying impulse of every

¹ J.M.S. Baljon, Ibid., p.14
² J.M.S. Baljon, loc.cit.
⁴ W.C. Smith, op.cit., p.25
⁵ R. Gopal, op.cit., p.17
Muslim political movement, after the advent of the British rule in India, was fear; but now it was not fear of the British — rather fear of the Hindus; fear that they be permanently dominated by Hindus — educationally, economically and politically. This excessive apprehension, intensified by the subversive, and terroristic activities of the Congress, provides the explanation for the Muslim deputation dispatched to Lord Minto on October 1, 1906 and headed by the Agha Khan.

The Deputation composed mainly of nobles, zemindars¹ and lawyers suggested in the most inoffensive terms that

... under any system of representation extended or limited a community in itself more numerous than the entire population of any first class European power except Russia may justly lay claim to adequate recognition as an important factor in the State and 'ventured' to request

... that the position accorded to the Muslim community in any kind of representation, direct or indirect, and in all other ways affecting their status and influence should be commensurate, not merely with their numerical strength, but also with their political importance and the value of the contribution which they made to the defence of the Empire .... ²

The venture of the Muslim deputation was not without gain, for Lord Minto, in his reply, said that he was firmly convinced, just like the Muslims, that

... any electoral representation in India would be doomed to mischievous failure which aimed at granting a personal enfranchisement regardless of the beliefs and traditions of the communities composing the population of this continent ...

and prayed them to "rest assured that their political rights and interests as a community will be safeguarded in any administrative reorganization ...." ³

---

¹. This term is frequently used, but in the more modern sense of landowner rather than tax-farmer.
². For the full address see R. Gopal, op.cit., Appendix B
³. For the complete text see R. Gopal, op.cit., Appendix C
The date marks the 'pledge' — and this tendency to be governed by pledges became a recurrent phenomenon in British policy — recognizing the right of the Muslims to have separate representation, or in other words marks the advent of the concept of communalism. It was to be expected that growing Muslim political awareness would become institutionalized — and at the end of 1906 the All-India Muslim League was founded. Like the Congress before it its program — which in fact enslaved it before 1937 — was hardly radical, calling as it did for the prevention of hostilities between the different communities, for the protection and advancement of Muslim political rights and interest by respectful presentation of their aspirations to the Government and for the promotion, among all Muslims of India, of feelings of loyalty to the British. 1 So interdependent became the interest of both that a British observer could in 1910 declare that of all the responsibilities cast upon the shoulders of Muslim leaders none

... was more fully realized than that of showing their loyalty to the British Raj — a loyalty all the more unalterable in that it was based upon their growing conviction that the maintenance of the British Raj was essential to the welfare, and even to the existence, of the Muslims of India. 2

And the British, according to the same observer, should serve as a bulwark for the Muslims, for "it would be ... impolitic to forget that the Muslims have held steadfastly aloof from the anti-British movement of the last few years and represent on the whole a great conservative force ...." 3 Yet to agree fully with the observer would be wrong for by 1911 the Muslims seemed to be drifting away from the British Raj.

3. Ibid., p.155.
The Muslim bourgeoisie, like the Hindus before them, were in the first decade of the Twentieth Century, entering upon a new phase which made them less and less amenable to the ideal of loyalty. They, as a class, were no longer willing to be confined within the limits originally intended for them, hence their tendency to widen their horizons — preferably to the Hindu-led Congress movement, which in fact, contained within its ranks certain influential Muslims. Feeling more and more dissatisfied with existing conditions, the new Muslim bourgeoisie, in the view of Jawaharlal Nehru, was being drawn towards the nationalist movement, so much so that the Aga Khan felt impelled to call upon the British to rally moderate Muslim and Hindu opinion in order to provide a counterpoise to the radical tendencies manifesting themselves in both communities. Nor were the doubts of the Muslim bourgeoisie allayed when the British, under incessant national pressure, relented and revoked the partition of Bengal.

The Muslims were further alienated from the British due to occurrences outside India which were destined to have extreme repercussions. The leaders of Muslim India regarded themselves as a part of a universal Commonwealth — now led by a weak, disintegrating Ottoman Empire. A chain of events, commencing with the Italian occupation of Tripoli, the Balkan wars and finally the declaration

---

1. It is interesting to note that in the address presented to Lord Minto in 1906 the following appeared.

... recent events have stirred up feelings, especially among the younger generation of Muslims, which might, in certain circumstances and under certain contingencies easily pass beyond the control of temperate counsel and sober guidance.

R. Gopal, op.cit., Appendix A
2. N. Manseragh, op.cit., p.337.
of war on Turkey by the British, taught the new Muslim generation to read into British, indeed Western, policy deliberate hostility not confined to Indian Muslims but directed against Islam itself.¹ It was not unnatural than that the Muslims should look to the Hindu nationalists, represented by the India National Congress who, at least in conscience with its appellation, was eager to effect an understanding with them — an understanding which would be crowned in 1916 with the Hindu-Muslim Lucknow Pact. Let it be clear, however, that in this fraternization and co-operation both communities were driven by ulterior motives. To the Congress "the Lucknow session of the Congress", attended by Hindus and Muslims alike, "was altogether a unique one ... for the formulation of a scheme of Self-government."² To the Muslims, who were utterly disillusioned with the British, it became apparent that

.... to rely on this foreign and non-Muslim Government for support and sympathy ... was futile, and that if they were in need of support and sympathy, they must have a lasting equitable settlement with the sister communities of India.³

Clearly therefore each community saw in the other a means for the attainment of a goal — a goal which differed with each community. The fraternization was unprecedented and would attain formidable proportions, yet what bound both was a common foe. Ideologies, organizations, and identities remained separate; in effect they remained two distinct communities — thrown together by a strange accident of fate.

Thus the first world War found an India internally united in pursuit of the goal of responsible government. The Government of India, preoccupied with the greater task of war, was not disposed to discuss, much less grant responsible

---

¹ V. Chirol, India Old and New, London: Macmillan and Co., 1921 p.136 - 136
² B.P. Sitaramayya, op.cit., p.216
³ A.B. Rajput, op.cit., p.27.
government. But the demand could not be ignored. India's participation in the war — as would be indicated time and again in the House of Commons at a later date — far exceeded every anticipation. Was not India therefore entitled to be heard? Expressing nationalist sentiment at a later date Gandhi was to say: "In all these efforts at service I was actuated by the belief that it was possible by such services to gain a status of full equality in the Empire for my countrymen." 3


2. J. Nehru points out that "there was little sympathy with the British in spite of loud professions of loyalty," op.cit., p.28

CHAPTER II

Unity Against Britain?

In the House of Commons on August 20, 1917, Mr. Edwin Montagu, the new Secretary of State for India announced that

the policy of His Majesty's Government, with which the Government of India are in complete accord is that of the increasing association of Indians in every branch of administration, and the gradual development of self-governing institutions, with a view to the progressive realization of responsible government in India as an integral part of the British Empire. They have decided that substantial steps in this direction should be taken as soon as possible. 1

Indian nationalists, at first, elated by this declaration of goodwill, were soon to be disillusioned.

On January 5, 1918, Mr. Lloyd George, Prime Minister of Great Britain and spokesman of the whole Empire declared: "Nor are we fighting to deprive Turkey of its capital or of the rich and renowned lands of Asia Minor and Thrace, which are predominantly Turkish in race"2. The loyal Muslim subjects of His Majesty were likewise elated, but disillusion was as quickly to spread within their ranks. Out of this dual and common disillusionment, emanating from certain specific grievances, arose that unified opposition to the British Raj, which was to prove to be powerful and bewildering — the Caliphate Movement.

The Indian Muslims were, in the years before the first world war, conspicuous for their interest in, and at times, preoccupied with, international

Islam. In fact their religious identity with Turkey — the last remaining bastion of Islam — was purposely magnified by England through the nearly consistent policy — save for the aberrations of Gladstone and Salisbury — of bolstering the Nineteenth Century Ottoman Empire against Russian incursions. This policy culminated in the dispatch of Indian troops to Malta in 1878 when the Russians were all but pounding on the gates of Constantinople.¹ Though this was but a gesture, yet it helped impress upon the Indian Muslims their community of interests. It was hardly strange, therefore, that Abdu-l-Hamid, when he discovered the tactical advantages of Pan-Islam, played with great effect upon Indian Muslim feelings. Being sufficiently remote, they were not aware of the desperate condition of the Empire, yet were sufficiently accessible to acquire a sense of solidarity.² Not strange, therefore, that Abdu-l-Hamid established a Pan-Islamic organ, Peyk-i-Islam, printed at his private press in Yildiz Kyoshk under the editorship of a Punjabi Muslim, and intended for Indian consumption. The Indian Muslims, or at least part of them, reacted favorably, copies of the paper being found in circulation among them.³

The Indian Muslims, in conjunction with their newly awakened sense of solidarity, enlisted their sympathies in the cause of Turkey in 1911 when Italy was despoiling her territory of Tripoli and in 1912 when the Balkan

---

2. A. Toynbee, *Survey of International Affairs* — 1925, I, London: Humphrey Milford, 1927, p. 59. It must have appeared to the average Indian Muslim, with ever-present examples of British prowess before his eyes, that the Ottoman Empire, must be at least equally vigorous to be able to embark upon a project as breath-taking and meaningful as the Hedjaz Railway.
3. *Ibid*, p. 41
nations seemed intent on depriving her of her European flank. But in 1914
the Indian Muslims found themselves suddenly ranged against Turkey who,
seemingly in a rejection of a traditional policy, had declared war on Great
Britain — the heart of Empire.

Virtually, the entire of Indian Muslims — a notable exception being
the Ali brothers, who were interned for espousing Turkey's cause — retained
their loyalty to the British Empire in its hour of need. The valor of Indian
Muslim troops was decisive in many campaigns which were for Great Britain and
her Allies, crucial to the outcome of the war. The Indian Muslim soldiers were
exposed to numerous pressures — primarily psychological — which often made
their task distasteful. "The Turks set in their front lines Mullahs whose voices
rang out across the narrow No-Man's Land ... reproaching the Muslims opposite ...."¹

These, however, habituated in their view of the British Government of India as
their respite, affected by a persistent and traditional bent of mind and driven
by a generous and disinterested loyalty were able to successfully overcome the
sudden crisis and gain the admiration of their British masters.² But would
mere admiration suffice once the ordeal was over?

The first world War, like any other cataclysmic movement, generated great
unrest, unrest which among Indian nationalists took an anti-British form. This
anti-British feeling soon began to pervade the Muslim ranks who suddenly realized
that, in their opposition to the British Raj, they were adopting a policy
similar to that of the aggressive Hindus — the Hindus who ever made their
'minority complex' a living reality — the possibility of total submergence.

1. E. Thompson, Reconstructing India, New York: The Dial Press, 1950 p. 121
2. A. Toynbee, op.cit., p. 46
Alienated from the British and fearful of the Hindus, the Muslims were in need of a psychological make-weight. This they sought beyond their borders — in the Ottoman Empire and its Caliphate. But at this moment, when only the Caliphate could fill the void that engulfed the Indian Muslims and when these were turning to the Caliphate with a re-awakened zeal and fervor, the Ottoman Empire was in the course of being partitioned among victorious — and avaricious — allies.¹ From a source of spiritual refuge the Caliphate was transformed into an ideal to be defended against those Powers which Indian Muslim arms had helped to victory, against the British Raj. The attempt at partition aroused deep feeling and deeper apprehension,² and it soon became apparent that, "... all the sturdy loyalty and devotion of the Muslims were quickly forgotten ... and the Government did not hesitate to sacrifice them like so many pawns on the political chess-board to suit the ends of imperial expediency."³ From here it was but a step to coalescence with the aggressive Congress — a coalescence that was to prove that Hindu-Muslim unity, at least temporarily, was not "unreal and transitory" and that the "immemorial differences between Hindus and Muslims"⁴ could be bridged especially if at the head of the coalition was a veteran and seasoned politician like Mahatma Gandhi.

With the termination of the War and with the lapse of the special powers conferred by the Defence of India Act, it was deemed necessary that novel measures be introduced in order to combat and prevent any seditious

---

1. No more thorough and searching interpretation of the psychological factor is available than that of A. Toynbee, Ibid., p. 46—47.
2. The Times, 19 April, 1919
3. A. B. Rajput, op.cit., p. 25
4. The Times, 9 April, 1919
movement liable to occur in India. To this end two measures, known as the Rowlatt Bills were passed despite the opposition of Indian nationalists and native members of the Indian Legislature. The second measure — and the more important — entitled 'The Anarchical And Revolutionary Crimes Act' provided for arbitrary arrest without trial, and trial without jury, and was considered adequate to deal with any movement which threatened the tranquility of India. Soon the Bill, however, would prove neither adequate nor sufficient to maintain tranquility in India; for instead of this it elicited the active opposition of Gandhi with his Satyagraha or the passive-resistance technique.

Linked with this controversial and obtrusive measure was an even more provocative incident - the 'tragedy', in less polite terms - the massacre, of Jallianwala Bagh. On April 13, 1919 Brigadier-General Dyer, following too rigorously the existing laws, trapped and dispersed an Indian gathering; in the process taking, according to official estimates, the lives of 379 people and wounding 1,200 others. Immediately afterwards, martial law was proclaimed in Amritsar and the natives tasted the sour grape of military rule.

1. This was named after Justice Rowlatt who, together with a select commission, made a study of the internal Indian situation on the eve of the termination of the war and recommended several measures embodied in the Bills.
4. Mr. Fischer speaking for the Government said "The Secretary of State for India regrets that the existence of an anarchical and revolutionary movement should have made it necessary to place this law on the Indian Statute Book." H.C. CXIV, 5 S, 1919, 1701 - 1702
5. W. C. Smith, op. cit., p. 198
which caused Indians of all stations to crawl past a designated place, to voluntarily 'salaam' every British Officer or be forced to render such homage and to surrender to indiscriminate flogging.\(^1\) No wonder the bitterness aroused among native Indians of this galling incident, a bitterness that was destined, with the passage of years, to gain in importance.\(^2\) Indeed no wonder the official reaction of the British Government that stated that

the principle which has consistently governed the policy of His Majesty's Government in directing the methods to be employed when military action in support of civil authority is required, may be broadly stated as using the minimum force necessary... It must regretfully, without possibility of doubt, be concluded that Brigadier-General Dyer's action at Jallianwala Bagh was in complete violation of this rule.\(^3\)

No less was the consternation of Montagu who, in the House of Commons, said:

Once you are entitled to have regard neither to the intentions nor to the conduct of a particular gathering, and to shoot and go on shooting, with all the horrors that were here involved, in order to teach somebody a lesson, you are embarking upon terrorism, to which there is no end.\(^4\)

Gandhi was in fact to point out later that the Rowlatt Acts and Amritsar were direct causes of the non-co-operation movement inaugurated in 1919.

Speaking at his trial in March 1922, he said that

the first shock came in the shape of the Rowlatt Act, a law designed to rob the people of all real freedom. I felt called upon to lead an intensive agitation against it. Then followed the Punjab horrors beginning with the massacre at Jallianwala Bagh and culminating in crawling orders, public floggings and other indiscrivable humiliations.\(^5\)

1. H.G., CXXXI, 5 S, 1920, 1707
2. Hakim Ajmal Khan, President of the Muslim League, said that the policy of repression in the Punjab revived the traditions of Genghis Khan. The Times 3 January, 1920, A. P. Newton, late Professor of Imperial History, University of London, in his detailed chapter on "India And Constitutional Reform 1914 - 1939" of A Hundred Years of the British Empire, avoids mentioning the Rowlatt Acts and the Amritsar massacre. Yet the accounts of communal classes are detailed in.
3. Quoted in G.M. Dutcher, loc.cit.
5. Y. Meherally, op.cit., p. 92
The Secretary of State for India spoke in the same vein when he attributed the cause of unrest to the Rowlatt Acts which had resulted in extreme dissatisfaction.¹

The circle of dissatisfaction was thus destined to be complete when the Muslims of India, perplexed and perturbed over the fate of post-war Turkey and the partition arrangements² became vehemently anti-British.³ By 1920 the situation, which seemed so bright in 1918, had radically altered. The combination of the Caliphate and Punjab wrongs and the invisible flow of inadequate reforms enriched both in content and volume the spirit of national discontent.

Already disillusionment had cemented Hindu-Muslim unity, which had been developing under the most difficult conditions during the war years. A united front against the British Raj became a reality. So strong was the coalescence and so real the opposition that an official Government report recorded with amazement and not without alarm the breakdown of the official conceptions of Hindu-Muslim antagonisms. A noticeable feature of the general excitement stated India, 1919, was

the unprecedented fraternization between the Hindus and the Muslims. Their union, between the leaders, had now for long been a fixed plan of the nationalist platform. In this time of public excitement, even the lower classes agreed for once to forget their differences. Extraordinary scenes of fraternization occurred. Hindus publicly accepted water from the hands of Muslims and vice versa. Hindu-Muslim unity was the watchword of processions indicated both by cries and banners. Hindu leaders had actually been allowed to preach from the pulpit of a Mosque.⁴

---

1. H.C. CXVI, 5 S, 1919, 631. It is relevant here to note that in this general debate on Indian internal conditions Mr. Montagu purposely ignored mention of the Punjab troubles, which had begun a month earlier.

2. Mr. Montagu said that the intended partition was "mere rumors, but alarming rumors." H.C. CXVI, 1919, 628.

3. The Times, 11 February, 1919

4. R. P. Dutt, op.cit., p. 127
Mahatma Gandhi, that strange compound of the spiritual and the mundane, was aware as early as his South African years that his political program would meet its severest test over the question of Hindu-Muslim unity;\(^1\) and that if he sought Muslim acceptance and co-operation he should work for a just settlement of the Caliphate question.\(^2\) He quickly realized that the Muslim demands were well founded and that their justice had been admitted by Lloyd George — hence his determination to co-operate with them. Gandhi, it can be asserted, saw the Caliphate agitation as a revolt of the Muslim religious conscience against the tyranny of the West equally legitimate as the revolt of Hindu conscience against the same tyranny that had perpetrated the Amritsar massacre.\(^3\) But the Muslims if they were to enlist his aid, had to abide by his decisions; for, he said, "so long as you choose to keep me as your leader you must accept my conditions, you must accept dictatorship and the discipline of martial law".\(^4\) Soon, despite their predilections, the Muslims would, hand in hand with the Congress, indulge in non-violent non-co-operation and Gandhi would make himself, in the words of a pro-Government liberal leader, Tej Bahadur Sapru, "invaluable to the Muslims".\(^5\)

The vanguard of the Caliphate agitation among India's Muslims was not, as may have seemed reasonable, the influential All-India Muslim League, rather it was the impassioned brothers, Mohammed and Shaukat Ali, who were instrumental in founding a great number of All-India Caliphate Committees.

---

3. V. Chiroli, *India Old And New*, p. 174
The Muslim League, consistently conservative, could not, and in reality did not seek to, become a focus of Muslim agitation and hence there was a drift of the Muslim masses towards the new and virile movement — the Caliphate Committee. Jinnah, who had joined the All-India Muslim League only after extreme reluctance in 1913\(^1\), maintained towards the movement and its program an attitude of strict neutrality which, considered against the backdrop of post-war events, bordered on hostility.\(^2\) The Ali brothers whose fame became more widespread by their completely justified internment during the war, acted as a magnet to Muslim dissatisfaction and both possessed of that all devouring zeal that endeared them to the aggressive Muslims, were able to forge a movement pregnant with danger for the British position.

Moreover the Muslim divines formed themselves into the All-India Jamiat-ul-ulema, aligned themselves with the Congress and embarked upon an incendiary campaign of recrimination against the British. The Ulema declared their purpose to stand up against tyranny and fight for justice.\(^3\)

The interests of defeated Turkey were, unlike the other vanquished powers, to some extent defended at the Paris Peace Conference.\(^4\) The Maharajah of Bikanir and Lord Sinha, spokesmen for the British Indian delegation, worked with complete devotion and singleness of purpose in order to insure that the Muslims of Turkey would be treated with respect and justice.\(^5\) But these efforts,

---

2. M. H. A'thami, Al-Kaid Al-A'tham wa kisat al-Pakistan, Cairo, Dar il-Kitab al-Arabi, 1951, p. 45 - 47
3. R. Gopal, op.cit., p. 142
5. The Times, 8 March, 1919
plus those of the Secretary of State for India, were utterly in vain, for the fate of Turkey had long been decided upon — it was to be partitioned. The program of partition, however, met opposition which was effective in its execution and unexpected in its scope. Great Britain and her Allies were caught off guard by the three pronged opposition, comprised of a purely Turkish resistance led by Mustafa Kemal; an Indian opposition, both Muslim and Hindu, conducted by Gandhi and a British opposition led by the Secretary of State for India, Mr. E. Montagu, aided and abetted by the Government of India, under the enthusiastic viceregal direction of Lord Reading. But the "erratic genius" David Lloyd George, whose plans were far advanced with his chosen instrument, Venizelos, was unwilling to countenance the opposition of India and the India Office.

As long as the fears over Turkey's fate were not translated into reality the agitation of the Caliphate Committees was mild. It took forms of united meetings of Caliphate and Congress Committees, pledges of cooperation and joint proclamations. Such notable examples were the Amritsar session - 1919 - of the Caliphate Conference and the Congress where it was decided that the work of the former would be organized under the direction of the Mahatma; and the joint session at Delhi - 1919 - when Gandhi declared that "if the Caliphate question had a just and legitimate basis," as he believed it had, "and if the Government had really committed a gross injustice, the Hindus were bound to stand by the Muslims in their demands for the redress of Caliphate wrong."

3. B. P. Sitaramayya, op.cit., p. 320
4. M. Desai, op.cit., p. 399
The "gross injustice" was soon obvious enough, for it would have been impossible for the Greek occupation of Smyrna - 1919 - and Eastern Thrace - 1920 - to occur without the extensive support of the British.¹ And soon it was realized by the Indians concerned that new approach to the problem was required. Hence the visit of the Indian Deputation to the Viceroy, Lord Chelmsford, on January 10, 1920, and the presentation of an address, subscribed to by Gandhi, requesting the preservation of the Caliphate as a temporal institution, as a revered part, indeed the very essence of the Muslim religion. The Deputation insisted that no reduction in the Empire be permitted and demanded that the Caliph alone be entrusted with the wardenship of the Holy Places. With a note of veiled hostility the address reminded the Viceroy that "the war may be over; but peace is still distant and doubtful" and beseeched "the Imperial authorities not to underrate the worth and value of Islamic friendship and Indian loyalty". Indeed, the concluding lines of the address represented a break with the traditions of Indian courtesy and circumspection, stating:

A settlement unacceptable to Muslim and non-Muslim Indians, now happily reunited ..., will bring no peace, because it will bring no sense of justice and no contentment. No Muslim who hopes and prays for salvation would henceforward know any rest; and he could only aspire to salvation by following the dictates of Islam, however painful the consequences may be.²

The Viceroy did not, indeed could not, allay the fears of the Deputation. He did, however, facilitate the visit of an Indian Muslim body to London and Paris in order to acquaint European Governments with their views on the future of the Caliphate.³ This group, headed by the fiery Mohammed Ali

---

¹ H. W. V. Temperley, op.cit., p. 28 - 29
² For the details of the address see, The Turkish Settlement And ..., p. 6 - 7
³ The Turkish Settlement And ..., p. 2
was received by David Lloyd George in Downing Street on March 19, 1920. The demand that the Caliphate be preserved with adequate temporal power was repeated. It was stressed that Jazirat-al-Arab\(^1\) should remain in Turkish hands so that the Caliph might be the warden of the three sacred harems of Mecca, Medina and Jerusalem.\(^2\)

Lloyd George, whose anti-Turkish views were notorious for their depth and bitterness\(^3\), replied in terms at best uncourteous and reminded the Muslim group that it was Turkey that had initiated hostilities against Britain hence it could not be claimed that Britain had embarked upon a crusade against Islam, rather the Muslims themselves had risen in rebellion against the Caliph. Directing his answer to Mohammed Ali, he said

I do not understand Mr. Mohammed Ali to claim indulgence for Turkey. He claims justice, and justice she will get. Austria has had justice — pretty terrible justice. Why should Turkey escape? Turkey thought she had a feud with us. What feud had Turkey with us? Why did she come in and try to stab us and destroy liberty throughout the world when we were engaging in this life and death struggle? ... the Muslims of India stood by the Throne and the Empire. We gratefully acknowledge it. They helped us in the struggle. We willingly and gladly recognize that. We recognize that they have a right to be heard in a matter which affects especially Islam. We have heard them, Not merely have we heard them, but we have largely deferred to their wishes in the matter. The settlement was largely affected by the opinion of India and especially the Muslims of India. But we cannot apply different principles in the settlement of a Muslim country to those which we sternly applied in our settlement with the Christian communities with whom we were also at war.\(^4\)

Clearly then Turkey like other Empires had to succumb to the principle of

---

1. The Indian Muslims regretted the independence movement of the Arabs but saw their duty not in fighting it, but in attempting to reconcile its leaders with the Turks.
2. The Times, 22 March, 1920
3. In 1916 he was instrumental in drawing up the Peace proposals which demanded "the liberation of the non-Turkish peoples who then lay beneath the murderous tyranny of the Ottoman Empire ... which had proved itself so radically alien to Western civilization". Lloyd George, The Truth About the Peace Treaties, I, London: Victor Gollancz Ltd, 1932, p. 58
4. The Times, 22 March, 1920. There never has been any elaboration of the Prime Minister's interpolation "... we have deferred to their (the Muslims) wishes."
self-determination — or to the desire for revenge. She had forfeited the rights to rule, and now her former subject peoples were being encouraged to deprive her of the vast stretches of the Anatolian heartland. Mohammed Ali did, however, answer the Prime Minister in a similar vein reminding him that the Muslim had certain religious obligations concerning which "It is not possible to compromise."

The jubilation of the Turcophobes was expressed in crude and often offensive language. Said the Times: "We imagine ... that when the Indian Muslims really wish to speak, in their corporate capacity, to the Imperial Government, they will choose representatives of unquestionable standing and with irreproachable credentials." Also, "It was time that these pretenders to the representation to 'Indian' feeling in regard to Turkey ... should receive a lesson. They received it from the Prime Minister ...." For their part Mohammed Ali and Muslim group opened a vigorous propaganda campaign the harsh terms of which reflected the bitterness arising from their morning at Downing Street. In Paris Mohammed Ali declared that "one must realize that true religious conviction is a greater thing than material strength", and that "only if you save to us the liberty of our conscience, then and only then will you have peace". Also in England, speaking at Essex Hall, he said "I want to remain a loyal subject of the British Crown, but I can only do so on this basis, that I shall have ... complete religious freedom, that I shall be allowed to call my soul my own". Finally, in a meeting held in Kingsway Hall and attended by representatives of Labor he said that the

1. The Times, 22 March 1920
2. The Times, 22 March 1920
3. The Times, 22 March 1920
5. Ibid., p. 179
situation in India was different, for it was united one in opposition to
the dictates of the victorious powers,¹ and that he did "not want the
foreign policy of .... the Empire to be dictated ... by a tiny fraction
of forty-five millions of British birth and Christian faith."²

The protestations of Mohammed Ali were fruitless. It was during
the stay of the delegation in England that the Treaty of Sevres was finally
ratified — much to the chagrin of the Indian Muslims, the Indian Office
and, in the final analysis, the coalition ministry itself. With the
ratification of the Treaty on August 10, 1920, and with the commencement of
Greek hostilities against the Turkish nationalist forces the Turkish question
was ushered into a new phase both in England and India.³

After the terms of Sevres were made public in India, non-co-operation
was formally adopted by the Caliphate Conference and the Congress. The
Viceroy, Lord Chelmsford, sought to ameliorate the Muslim sense of grievance
when he, in his message to the India people said that the provisions
"... include terms which ... must be painful to all Muslims" but that the
prospect of friendship between Britain and Turkey after the formal conclusion
of the Treaty would strengthen them "to accept, with the resignation, courage
and fortitude" the terms of the Treaty and would cause them to retain their
"loyalty to the Crown, bright and untarnished as it has been for many
generations"⁴ This levy upon Indian loyalty and affection could not have served
its purpose, at a time when Indian Muslims were becoming aware of agitation

¹. Ibid., p. 188
². Ibid., p. 184
³. Temperly substantiated Indian Muslim claims, stating that the Greek invasion
was rendered possible only through Allied support and the floating of a British
loan, op.cit., p. 34
⁴. The Times, 16 May, 1920
by British and American religious leaders. It seemed that their goal was
the total obliteration of Turkey, the last hope of Islam, in favor of Christian
minorities.\(^1\)

Non-co-operation was adopted as the official policy of the Caliphate
Conference and the Congress at the Allahabad session of 1920. This policy
called for the surrender of titles and the resignation of honorary posts
conferred by the British, and for the boycott of schools, colleges and law
courts in the first stage.\(^2\) The second stage to become operative should
the primary stage prove ineffective, entailed the resignation of civil
servants from their governmental posts.\(^3\) The non-co-operation movement
—which according to Gandhi had to be absolutely non-violent — gathered
enthusiastic adherents, both Hindu and Muslim, thus seemingly invalidating
the claim that the newly acquired Hindu-Muslim unity was "an engineered
and an artificial one destined to fail"\(^4\). The Movement was conducted on a
national scale and quickly assumed mass proportions, people from every level
of society — the peasantry, students, government employees, women, all
participated in it.\(^5\) The Government was left with the impotent weapon of
derogatory announcements such as: "The appeal of the non-co-operation is to
prejudice and ignorance and its creed is devoid of any constructive germ"\(^6\)
Nor were the pronouncements of the \textit{Times} more dispassionate, for it saw in
Gandhi nothing but an "unbalanced fanatic" and considered it "characteristic
of the chaotic condition of current Indian political thought that Mr. Gandhi,
himself a Hindu", should start the movement of non-co-operation as a protest

\begin{itemize}
\item 1. \textit{The Times}, 22 March 1920
\item 2. \textit{E.P. Sitaramayya}, \textit{op.cit.}, p. 335
\item 3. \textit{The Times}, 5 May 1920
\item 4. A. R. Desai, \textit{op.cit.}, p. 320 - 321
\item 5. B. P. Sitaramayya, \textit{op.cit.}, p. 344
\item 6. \textit{The Times}, 22 October, 1920
\end{itemize}
against the Turkish Peace Treaty.¹

The movement was not, however, one long chapter of success. It failed to carry all Muslims with it, for its strongest appeal was to the Sunni majority. The Shias from the very outset, although reciprocating the feelings of brotherhood with other Muslim sects, emphasized that the Caliph was not their religious leader. They, therefore, considered it unnecessary to sever their connection with the British, choosing rather to remain as loyal as ever.² This undoubtedly was a psychological setback to the movement and at the same time elicited favorable response from the British authorities. This division in Muslim ranks was remarked upon in the House of Commons.³

Not only the Shias but also moderate Muslim elements rejected non-co-operation as was proved by the fact that the administration and the faculty of Aligarh College refused to close down, despite Gandhi's request and Mohammed Ali's intercession⁴. Such an incident may not have been "a blow to Gandhi", as the Times chose to put it, but it nevertheless revealed that non-co-operation was not all-inclusive and all-engulfing.⁵

The Muslim leaders of the Caliphate movement at times betrayed a lack of political foresight and acumen. This was particularly true of Shaukat Ali who commenced the emotionally charged and politically disastrous movement - the Hijrat.⁶ This exodus, taking the form of emigration of devout Muslims from the 'yoke' of the 'Satanic' and infidel British authority to the haven of a Muslim land, provided, at least in its earliest phase, a profound psychological impetus

1. The Times, 22 October, 1920
2. The Times, 7 April, 1920
3. H. C. CXXIX, 5 S., 1920, 1075
4. The Times, 6 November, 1920
5. This particular incident was, in light of more recent tensions, interpreted by A. B. Rajput as an attempt to close Aligarh College, as part of a cunning plot concocted by Gandhi, in order to annihilate the Muslim nation, op.cit., p.38
6. The Times, May 1, 1920
to the Caliphate agitation. Shaking the dust of British India off their feet, 18,000 religiously inspired, poverty-stricken Muslim peasants trekked towards neighboring Afghanistan. From Sind and the North-West Frontier Province they straggled north over the Khyber and Chaman passes, often being forced to leave behind their pitifully few possessions. But they never reached their destination — salvation was so near yet so unattainable. The Afghan authorities were desirous of remaining on good terms with the British and were staggered at the dimensions of the influx.¹ It became therefore necessary to stem it and finally resist it. Bitterly disappointed, the Sind and Pathan peasants started homewards. Deprived of their sustaining hope, many were unable to survive the horrible conditions of the trek. Starvation, heat, prostration, and the cruel indignity of being robbed by bands of their co-religionists were some of their experiences.² Cured of their illusions³ many Muslims must have felt antipathy to, if not outright hostility for, the Caliphate movement.⁴

Unlike many mass movements, non-co-operation sought to make non-violence its major operational tactic. But with the passage of time, intensification of efforts and the growth in numerical strength the movement became more and more violent. The moderation which early characterized its leaders gradually

---

1. R. Gopal, op.cit., p. 145
2. W. C. Smith, op.cit., p. 205. Illustrative of Smith's early political tendencies is the fact that he points out that several Muslims, instead of returning to India, went to the U.S.S.R. and "earned there of efforts towards building a better world. Returning ... to India they ... provided several of the best workers in the socialist movement."
3. A. B. Rajput again asserted that Gandhi was following a diabolical plan the crux of which was to inspire Muslim emigration to Afghanistan in order to leave India for the Hindus, op.cit., p. 57
was replaced by extremism and irrational appeals. Once such vehemence was communicated to the masses, the movement became definitely violent. Gandhi, at the inception of the non-co-operation movement, explicitly stated that participation should be voluntary, never under the threat of ostracism. Yet towards the end of 1921, the Congress, under his aegis, was declaring that it was "contrary to the National dignity and National interest for any Indian to engage or remain in the service of a Government in any capacity whatever." 1

Clearly this bordered upon coercion of those who did not conform. Mohamed Ali at the outset of the agitation, declared his faith in the constructive program of non-co-operation and asserted that violence was contrary to the injunctions of the Koran. 2 This certainly was a far cry from the speech in Madras in which he said that if Afghanistan were to fight India he would help the former and would be willing to give up his life if at the same time the British Empire breathed its last. 3 Even more provocative was his speech in Karachi — July 8, 1921 — in which he declared that it was unlawful for a Muslim to remain in the British army and urged all Muslims to convey this message to the recruits. 4

For this seditious speech he and other leading Muslims were prosecuted, but Gandhi, the prophet of non-violence, publicly repeated the speech and was emulated by agitators from thousands of platforms in India. 5 The trend towards violence, however, was not solely verbal in nature as was seen in the Moplah rebellion. 6

On the Malabar Coast, between the high hills and the sea — an area rendered almost inaccessible by dense jungles — the Moplahs, descendants of Arab conquerors, lived in dire poverty, existing by petty trade and subsistence

1. B.P. Sitaramayya, op.cit., p. 366
2. A.B. Rajput, op.cit., p. 54 — 56
3. H.C. CXLI, 5 S, 1921, 832 — 833
4. Y. Meherally, op.cit., p. 101 — 102
5. B. P. Sitaramayya, op.cit., p. 365
6. In the same Madras speech quoted above it is reported that Mohammed Ali had said that he differed from Gandhi in that he favored violence and in that he considered the British to have come to India like thieves. H.C. CXLI, SS, 1921, 162
agriculture.\textsuperscript{1} A life of unrelieved, unrewarded toil engendered extreme bitterness. Such circumstances explain their constant resistance to authority, their periodical outbreaks and the consequent necessity of passing a special legislation — the Moplah Outrages Act\textsuperscript{2}. Not strange, therefore, that these were "bitterly anti-Hindu, bitterly anti-British, bitter against the world that gave them only misery."\textsuperscript{3}

Late in 1921 the echoes of the Caliphate — Congress cry penetrated and reverberated in the hilly tracts of the Malabar Coast. The devout Moplahs, making the Caliphate grievance their own, rose in a violent revolt against British authority — that authority which had so desecrated the earthly citadel of their beliefs.\textsuperscript{4} They rose with the ardor of religious fanatics, regarding their appointed task as the destruction of the impure foreign lordship and the establishment of a kingdom of perfection. Such was their zeal that they successfully ejected the British authorities and founded the Caliphate Kingdom, under the Caliphate King Mohammed Hajji. In time the King was captured, tried by a military court and shot. But for the moment flushed with victory, indeed intoxicated by their success, the Moplahs turned their wrath upon the Hindus, for were not these — the money lenders and merchants — the cause of their misery? Then followed a sordid chain of events, destined to be repeated over and over again in the pathetic annals of the period: forcible conversions and forcible circumcisions were followed by looting, arson, murder and destruction\textsuperscript{5}. The Moplah rebellion was briefly victorious, thus the atrocities committed were beyond comprehension. Soon, however, the Government was able to establish its authority at the price of much bloodshed. So complete were the Governmental

\textsuperscript{1} R. Gopal, op.cit. p. 154 - 155
\textsuperscript{2} B. P. Sitaramayya, op.cit., p. 370
\textsuperscript{3} W. C. Smith, op.cit., p. 205
\textsuperscript{4} R. Gopal, op.cit., Obviously they were a Sunni sect.
\textsuperscript{5} H. C. CXLVII, 5 S, 1921, 1332
reprisals — 2,286 rebels killed, 1,165 wounded and 5,688 captured\(^1\) — that Lord Reading found it necessary to point out that the Government, in dealing with the rebellion, was not working to destroy Islam but to restore and maintain order.\(^2\)

The Moplah rebellion was of primary importance. It was an indication that non-violent non-co-operation was, at best a precarious method capable of misuse, especially when adopted by an illiterate mass of people. It was a further indication of the tenuous unity forged after the war — a unity that, in the hands of fanatic mobs, could degenerate into acute communal strife.

Reactions to the incident were, at once, varied and confused. Gandhi sought to isolate the rebellion lest it contaminate the atmosphere of unity which he had labored to create. Thus he said that

> the Hindus must have the courage and the faith to feel that they can protect their religion in spite of such fanatical eruptions. A verbal disapproval by the Muslims of Moplah madness is not a test of Muslim friendship. The Muslims must naturally feel the shame and humiliation of the Moplah conduct about forcible conversions and looting, and they must work away so silently and effectively that such a thing might become impossible even on the part of the most fanatical among them. My belief is that the Hindus as a body have received the Moplah madness with equanimity and that the cultured Muslims are sincerely sorry of the Moplah's perversion of the teaching of the Prophet.\(^3\)

The official Congress position was more outspoken. The Working Committee meeting at Calcutta "whilst ... condemning violence on the part of the Moplahs ... desires it to be known that the evidence in its possession shows that provocation

---

\(^1\) The ghastliest aspect of the reprisals occurred when 70 Moplahs were packed into a goods wagon for transportation from Calicut to Madras. The scorching sun of the Deccan took its toll and it was discovered — once the vehicle reached its destination, that 66 had died of suffocation.

\(^2\) *The Times*, 4 October, 1921

\(^3\) R. Gopal, *op.cit.*, p. 156 - 157
beyond endurance was given to the Moplahs and that the reports published by ... the Government have given a one sided and highly exaggerated account of the wrongs done by the Moplahs ...," and warned against "believing in the Government and inspired versions". The Congress in fact, turned the charges about by condemning the "needless destruction of life resorted to by the Government in the name of peace and order."

The British view of the "Moplah madness" was somewhat different. The rebellion, according to the Times, helped to show "how universally fictitious is the Hindu-Muslim unity of which Mr. Gandhi is most vociferously proud." Again the "ferocious" murder of Hindus made all India, declared a leading article in the Times, "realize the kind of anarchy which would supervene if the strong arm of the British disappear." The Pioneer, an English paper published in India saw at the base of the rebellion the incessant Caliphatist agitation of Gandhi and his friends. Said the paper that

the events of the last few months show that however peaceable and non-violent non-co-operation may be if preached in Utopia, it can only have violent results when served up by agitators animated by widely different motives in a country composed of races even more widely different in civilization, thought and outlook.

It added that "it is time that the logical conclusion between the cause and the effect was admitted, and accompanied by measures to end the present confusion." Even Sir Valentine Chirol came around to the conclusion that it was unrealistic to assume that the cause of unrest among the Indian Muslims was the festering Turkish problem. He saw the Moplah rebellion rather as a demonstration for Indian Muslims of their incompatible position between the Sacred Law of Islam and the British Raj.

1. B. P. Sitaramayya, op. cit., p. 364
2. B. P. Sitaramayya, loc. cit.
3. The Times, 2 September, 1921
4. The Times, 16 November, 1921
5. The Times, 29 August, 1921
6. The Times, 10, November, 1921
Clearly, therefore, the Moplah rebellion was interpreted — the motive being not far to seek — as indicative of Indian incapability for self-rule and of the necessity to maintain the British bond and connection. This view is further rendered explicit by demands made in the House of Commons that the Government of India not proceed with a proposed suspension of certain repressive Acts on the Indian Statute Book. Montagu, characteristically, declined to convey such a demand.¹

Lord Reading, speaking for the Government of India, considered the Moplah outrages to have assumed the character of a rebellion but would not regard them as symptomatic of the condition of the whole of India². Thus the duty of the Government was seen to be the maintenance of order, a duty which did not imply discrimination against Indian Muslims.³

The difficulties encountered by the non-co-operation movement were great, but did not portend a total failure. Unlike any other movement previously inaugurated in India, non-co-operation assumed staggering proportions and became increasingly rigid in its opposition to the Government. This was indicated by the total boycott of the visits both of the Duke of Connaught in February of 1921 and the Prince of Wales in November of the same year. Both

¹. H. C. XLVII, 5 S, 1921, 1517 - 1518
². The Times, 4 October, 1921. This view is shared by A. Toynbee who in The Western Question In Greece and Turkey, London: Constable and Co. 1922, p. 24, asserted that the Moplah rebellion was not intended as a spark for a general armed uprising against the British. This view, however, was opposed by Lord Willingdon, Governor of Madras during the period, who insisted that the suddenness and extent of the rebellion pointed to the definite existence of an organization intent on destroying the Government by force. The Times, 5 September, 1921.
³. The Times, 4 October, 1921
were greeted with paralyzing hartals — strikes — and the symbolic but costly gestures of the burning of foreign cloth. So vociferous were the demonstrations against the Prince of Wales in Bombay that Gandhi, after repeated attempts at pacification, made the statement that Swaraj stank in his nostrils.\(^1\)

Nor indeed was the intensity of the demonstrations surprising for had not Gandhi himself inspired — or at least prepared for — them when he caused the Congress to adopt — in November of 1921 — a resolution calling for a campaign of Civil Disobedience and the formation of a Volunteer Organization?\(^2\)

Civil Disobedience, "the only civilized and effective substitute for armed rebellion," was seen as the weapon to "dislodge the existing Government from its perfect irresponsibility to the people of India." Its proponents saw it as the key to invigorating the non-co-operation movement until "the Punjab and Caliphate wrongs are addressed and Swaraj is established and the control of the Government ... passes into the hands of the people ...."\(^3\) Clearly such over zealous pronouncements fed violence. The Volunteer Organization, pledged to "remain non-violent in word and deed," soon acquired aggressive tendencies especially when the Caliphate Volunteers donned a distinctive dress, drilled and marched in mass formation during their campaign for hartals and boycotts of foreign cloth.\(^4\)

It was this threat of growing violence which caused the Vicerey, now Lord Reading, to dispatch to Montagu, on the eve of the Graeco-Turkish Conference, a request for the revision of the Treaty of Sevres. Before observing the

---

1. B. P. Sitaramayya, *op.cit.*, p. 273
repercussions of this dispatch it is necessary to observe how the Turkish problem evolved in the British capital.

The British Government was, as has already appeared, committed to a specific policy for Turkey long before the war ended. As a result Lloyd George and his minister of Foreign Affairs, Lord Curzon — like Balfour before him — were determined to impose a harsh treaty on Turkey. The opposition of India was to be expected, but quite unanticipated was the position taken by the Secretary of State for India.

Edwin Montagu gained a transitory fame though seeking to ameliorate Indian grievances. Yet he was destined to abruptly end his official career by associating himself too completely with those grievances. From the very outset of his ministerial service he found himself in an anomalous position — his idealism brought him into sharp conflict with the decided pragmatism of his chief.1 As a Jew he was first to give expression to this anomaly upon learning of the Balfour Declaration on the National Home for the Jews. He wrote at that time:

It seems strange to be a member of a Government which goes out of its way, I think, for no conceivable purpose that I can see, to deal this blow at a colleague that is doing his best to be loyal to them, despite his opposition. The Government has dealt an irreparable blow at Jewish Britons, and they have endeavoured to set up a people which does not exist; they have alarmed unnecessarily the Muslim world .... Why we should intern Mohammed Ali when we encourage Pan-Judaism, I cannot for the life of me understand.2

1. H. Nicholson, Curzon: The Last Phase, London: Constable and Co., 1934, described Montagu as "an intelligent strong-minded, Saturnian figure, with deep if gloomy convictions and simple tastes such as bird watching and oppressed nationalities" p. 35
2. E. S. Montagu, An Indian Diary, p. 18, quoted by K. K. Aziz, Britain And The Khilafat Movement In India, A report to the Institute of Commonwealth Studies University of London, 1960, p. 5
Lord Beaverbrook, with whom Montagu worked during the war period, wrote in
a similar vein:

In preparing propaganda material, particularly for distribution in
America, I made full use of Balfour's declaration .... There arose
at once a fierce outcry from a section of Jewry objecting to this
conception of a National Home for the Jewish people. Edwin Montagu
... became the passionate exponent of this viewpoint in the Government.
He regarded the Jews as a religious community and himself as a
Jewish Englishman. To commit the Jews to the expression of a national
Home ... was to prejudice their civil rights in the country of their
birth. How could he ... as Secretary of State for India, negotiate
with the peoples of India on behalf of His Majesty's Government if the
world understood that His Majesty's Government regarded his National
Home as being in Turkish territory?1

Indeed Montagu was destined to be in constant opposition to, at least, two
members of the Cabinet — the adament Lloyd George and the self-centered
Lord Curzon.

David Lloyd George was moved by a deep and romantic admiration for
ancient Greece. He believed that Venizelos was, "the greatest statesman
Greece had thrown up since the days of Pericles"2 and was convinced that
the Turks had misruled the lands that were once the cradle, seminary and
temple of civilization, and had transformed them into a blighted desert.3
He was determined to impose upon Turkey a stringent treaty, a concomitant
of which was aid for Greece in its attempt to restore to Asia Minor its
early Greek character. He, in fact, considered this as one of the primary
aims of the Coalition Government.4 In this attitude the Prime Minister was
supported and sustained by his Foreign Minister, Lord Curzon was, if anything,

1856, p. 212
3. This description appeared in a 1917 speech by the Prime Minister to the
Imperial Cabinet. D. Lloyd George, op.cit., p. 80
4. "So the Government fell, and with it went ... the liberation of ... Asiatic
Greece". D. Lloyd George, op.cit., II, p. 1551
more outspoken than his chief in villifying Turkey. In 1918 he told the
Eastern Committee that the record of Turkish rule has been one of misrule,
oppression, intrigue and massacre and that "the presence of the Turks at
Constantinople has been an ulcer in the side of Europe". "If we could get
rid of them" he proceeded, "... we should all feel that a kind of miasma
had disappeared from the atmosphere of Europe."¹ Nor was Curzon impressed
by the agitation in India in favor of Turkey. Rather he regarded it as a
"factitious agitation", being unable to comprehend that the temper of India
had so radically altered since his viceregal tenure had ended.² Churchill
observing the scene said that

Lord Curzon, mounted upon the Foreign office, rode full tilt against
Mr. Edwin Montagu, whose chariot was drawn by the public opinion of
India, the sensibilities of the Muslim World, the pro-Turkish pro-
propensities of the Conservative Party, and the voluminous memoranda of
the Indian office.³

Montagu saw the attempt to expel the Turks from Constantinople, in the partition
of the Ottoman Empire with the assent or even connivance of Great Britain, a
fatal blow at the quickly diminishing loyalties of Indian Muslims.⁴ But Curzon
held that Indian opinion would be unaffected, that most Indians would remain
indifferent while some would actually favor the policy. As for the Muslims,
had they not fought without hesitation and with the greatest vigor against the
Caliph? ⁵

With these conflicting attitudes it was not unnatural that contradictory
—or at least confusing — declarations of policy should emanate from the

---

¹ D. Lloyd George, Ibid., p. 1014 - 1015.
⁴ W. Churchill, loc.cit.
⁵ W. Churchill, loc.cit.
Cabinet. Thus Montagu declared in the House of Commons that "if you want contended Muslim feeling in India, you can achieve it only by a just peace based on considerations of nationality and self-determination."\(^1\) He spoke in a similar vein on the Greek landing in Smyrna, which he saw as leading to grave apprehensions in and prejudicing, as it did, Lloyd George's undertaking not to partition Turkey.\(^2\) His fervent and repeated protestations proved to be of no avail. On the eve of the negotiation of a Graeco-Turkish treaty, Lloyd George, in the Commons, repeated his concept of a just peace:

> There is nothing to be gained by unjust concessions to fear. I emphasize the word unjust. We have held the balance even in India between various religions. The strength of British rule in India comes, not because we have given way to one faith, because it was menacing, at the expense of another, but because we have quite fearlessly held the balance between Muslim and Hindu and every other religion, and the principles we have applied in India we must apply in the settlement of the Turkish Treaty.\(^3\)

At this juncture and while the Conference of Lausanne was still in session, Montagu authorized, without previous consultation with the Cabinet the publication of a communiqué, issued by the Government of India, presenting the special claims of the Indian Muslims. It called for the evacuation of Constantinople, the suzerainty of the Sultan over the Holy Places, and the restoration of Ottoman Thrace.\(^4\) This produced consternation, and indignation quickly followed especially on the part of Curzon who wrote to Austen Chamberlain:

> My pitch is queered, my hand is shattered .... If the policy of His

---

1. H. C. CXVI, 5 S, 1919, 657
2. H. C. CXXII, 5 S, 1919, 873
3. H. C. CL, 5 S, 1922, 958
4. The Times, 9 March, 1922
5. On the 6th of March 1922, he wrote to Montagu: "The part that India has sought to play, or been allowed to play, in this series of events passes my comprehension." H. Nicholson, op. cit., p. 267
Majesty's Government is the policy of the Viceroy and Montagu, then let Montagu go to Paris in my place and fight to obtain Andirionople and the Holy Places for his beloved Turks. He will then have the failure which his own action has rendered inevitable instead of thrusting it upon me ... But matters cannot rest where they are, for in that case I cannot undertake my task.¹

The incident was debated in the Cabinet and Montagu was compelled to resign.² Thus Chamberlain told the House of Commons that Montagu, having violated the principle of collective responsibility, deemed it necessary to resign.³ Such, however, was not Montagu's version of the story, for in an impassioned speech he protested his sincerity and devotion to India and its just cause, and attributed his resignation to his opposition of the Prime Minister's Eastern policy — a policy calamitous to the British Empire.⁴

The resignation of Montagu was welcomed by many — none more than Lloyd George who wrote to Curson regretting the difficulty arising out of Montagu's folly and assuring him that "the dismissal of Montagu will make an undoubted impression both in Paris and Angora"⁵. The Times had, in February of 1922, deprecated Montagu's policy of conciliation which it equated with laxity of Government control in India and had declared Britain's determination to govern.⁶ Yet only a month later it deemed it essential that the views of the Government of India be considered in any projected peace between the Greeks and the Turks.⁷ But at the same time it was possible for this influential

1. H. Nicholson, Ibid., p. 267 - 268
2. This casts strong doubts on Nicholson’s contention that Montagu was successful in winning over a majority of colleagues to his point of view.
3. H. C. CLI, 5 S, 1922, 1489 - 1490
4. The Times, 15 March, 1922
6. The Times, 15 February, 1922 "We" said the editorial, "intend to rule, and are not to be harried out of India."
7. The Times, 9 March, 1922, "It is evident", said the article, "that the views of the Government of India must receive the fullest consideration ..." for that would prove that the British Government "is willing to give satisfaction to the religious susceptibilities of the Muslim subjects of India."
Journal to support the decision to compel Montagu's resignation. Clearly the Times was serving as a commentary on, and faithfully reflecting, the confusion and division over aims which beset the British Government.

But all was not jubilation over Montagu's resignation — not, at least in India. Public opinion, further confounded by the fact that Gandhi was taken into custody the day Montagu resigned, saw in his removal a defeat for the policy of reconciliation with India. It appeared as a victory for the die-hards. Thus a telegram was dispatched to Lloyd George by twenty Muslims of the Indian Legislative denouncing the "deplorable action" and reiterating their minimum demands as indicated by the Government of India communique. This was followed by a resolution of the Madras Legislative Council commending Montagu's services to Indian progress and advance. So rife were the suspicions of British policy that Chamberlain found it necessary to declare in the Commons that "the views of the Government of India; of Indian Muslims have been most fully before the Government", and will receive the "most careful consideration from His Majesty's Government." The Times also felt constrained to write that if means could be found to allay Indian opinion then these should be applied at once in order to insure that the resignation of Montagu did not "imply any weakening of the efforts of the Imperial Government to secure favourable treatment of Muslim aspirations ...."

The Home Government had to contend, however, with more than Indian public opinion — it had to contend with the Viceroy, Lord Reading. Like his superior at Whitehall, he had, from his arrival to India in 1921, taken pains

---

1. The Times, 13 March 1922
2. The Times, 13 March, 1922
3. The Times, 16 March, 1922
4. H. C. CLI, 5 S, 1922, 1757
5. The Times, 10 March, 1922
to make clear that Britain harbored no anti-Muslim feelings.\(^1\) In turn he communicated Indian complaints to the Cabinet in the hope that this would sincerely divest itself of anti-Muslim feeling, or at least anti-Turkish feelings — the two terms being synonymous in India. In his address to the Ahmadiyya community — June 1921 — Reading affirmed that the Government of India was forcibly presenting the attitude of Indian Muslims towards the problem of the Turkish settlement.\(^2\) He also assured a delegation of Muslim Punjabis that a treaty only satisfactory to Indian Muslim opinion would be signed.\(^3\) So acute did his concern become that he — as has appeared — found it necessary to make public Indian Muslim sentiment. But he survived Montagu in Government service and continued to express sympathy for the Indian cause. True it had been necessary for him to say that Montagu's resignation had not altered British policy regarding the Peace treaty, yet he pursued his efforts to translate his recommendations into reality.\(^4\) Before and during the Chanak crisis he repeatedly warned that India, if Britain went to war with Turkey, would be ungovernable, for Britain would lose her only support — that of the Muslims.\(^5\) In fact he was to write to the Home Government urging that Britain should "not again be placed in the unfortunate position of appearing to be the only ally who is withstanding the legitimate aspirations of the Turks as they appear to the Muslims in India."\(^6\) As a result Reading, like Montagu, gave no pleasure to the die-hards, one of whom

---

1. A Jew like Montagu, he also was strongly opposed to the National Home policy.
2. The Times, 29 June 1921
3. The Times, 4 October 1922
4. H.C. CLII, 5 S, 1922, 565
5. E. Winterton, Fifty Tumultous Years, quoted in K.K. Aziz, op.cit., p. 4
was heard saying that India was being lost because two Jews, one in Whitehall and one in Delhi, were afraid to grapple with the extremist. Perhaps it would not be totally wrong to accept the statement of Reading's biographer that Reading "played as important a part in shaping British policy towards Turkey as if he had been sitting at the actual Conference table at Lausanne."  

The resignation of Montagu was an important milestone in the history of the Caliphate movement. With it certain trends culminated in a form which served to undermine the whole movement. On January of 1922 Mustafa Kemal abolished the Sultante, thus abolishing the temporal power of the Sultan. This very action tended to rob the Caliphatist movement of its very impetus. The movement was rendered more impotent when Gandhi — stunned by the violence applied in Chauri Chaura — called off the non-co-operation movement. At a moment when the nationalist movement seemed to have attained great success, Gandhi, out of remorse over widespread violence, suddenly called off the whole struggle. Gandhi, apparently deeply moved by feelings of sorrow and self-recrimination, declared in his public trial that he knew he was playing with fire and that he could not dissociate himself from the diabolical crimes of Chauri Chaura. Nineteen Twenty Two, therefore, marks the beginning of the end of the Caliphate movement and Hindu-Muslim united action. The death was a slow and painful process. In 1923 Mohammed Ali was chosen President of the

1. E. Winterton, Orders of The Day, quoted in K. K. Aziz, op.cit., p. 6
2. The Marquess of Reading, op.cit., p. 232. V. A. Smith, op.cit., p. 792 holds an opposing view asserting that Reading was always seeking disharmonies among Indians and using them.
3. In Chauri Chaura, during a Congress procession, a mob, attached 21 Constables and a sub-inspector in a Police Station which was set on fire. All perished in the flames. B. P. Siharamayya, op.cit., p. 397 - 398
4. A. K. Azad, op.cit., p. 18, said that the suspension of the struggle "caused a severe political reaction ... and demoralized the country."
5. Y. Meherally, op.cit., p. 18
Congress and was still, in 1924, writing to Jawaharlal Nehru in the tenor of Indian nationalist. His pre-occupation with the Hindu-Muslim problem was, however, indicative of the new trend. In his presidential address to the Indian National Congress at Coconada he admitted that the fleeting glimpse of unity in the few previous years was a dream — a dream yet unrealized. 1 Again in his many letters to Jawaharlal Nehur he expressed astonishment and dismay at the quarrels over the proportion of posts between Hindus and Muslims. 2 He further expressed anxiety over the spread of movements which were purely Hindu or Muslim. 3

Why then was the attempt to achieve unity — the very nucleus of which was the Caliphate movement — not destined to succeed? Was it because, as the Times explained it, Gandhi's "attempt permanently to unite Hindus and Muslims on his indefinite program", was "hopeless, however, deplorably the Caliphate Committee" might "momentarily coquette with him?" 4 Was it because both groups in reality never possessed similar aims, and therefore could not achieve a basis for lasting cooperation? The crux of the problem can be best discerned by references to explanations made by the two contending groups.

Nafis Ahmad in The Basis of Pakistan, asserts that Gandhi's Caliphate compatriots vehemently protested against his cessation of the non-co-operation movement, and undertook to provide ten million volunteers for the continuation of the struggle — to no avail. In Ahmad's view it was not the Muslims but Gandhi and the Congress leadership who were responsible for crushing militant

1. A. Iqbal, op. cit., p. 257 - 258
3. Ibid., p. 37 - 38
4. The Times, 4 February, 1922
patriotism and the destroying of the basis for unity.¹

A. Ravoof in Meet Mr. Jinnah, contends that the Caliphate movement was
a transitional period of united effort — and nothing more. He goes so far
as to suggest that the movement was responsible, in later years, for communal
riots all over the country.² G. Heyworth-Dunne in Pakistan asserts that the
failure came solely as a result of the abolition of the Caliphate.³

In his Muslim League: Yesterday And Today, A. B. Rajput claims that
the very actions of Gandhi from the commencement of the Caliphate movement
were intended to frustrate the "whole Muslim nation" spiritually, morally
and physically. It was a colossal failure and the only redeeming feature
about this "otherwise tragic episode was that the Muslims were cured of all
delusions of a Hindu-Muslim unity."⁴

The interpretations of such Muslim authors are hardly devoid of bias —
but to brand them completely erroneous would be unjustified. Independent
observers and even Hindu writers at times agree with the interpretations
presented above. R. P. Dutt, a Hindu but whose political belief in Communism
makes it incumbent upon him, at least in principle, to transcend religious
differences, affirms that the whole Caliphatist movement and the attempted
unity were paralyzed and demoralized from within by Gandhi's sudden action.⁵

W. C. Smith speaks in a similar vein when he avers that the sudden cessation
of non-co-operation came as a shock, intense and devastating — "The Muslims"
he asserts "reeled". "The emotional frustration that ensued was morbid".

---

1. N. Ahmad, op.cit., p. 17 – 18
2. A. Ravoof, op.cit., p. 66
3. G. Heyworth-Dunne, Pakistan, Cairo: Renaissance Bookshop, 1952, p. 15
5. R. P. Dutt, op.cit., p. 51 – 52
He does, however, attribute much of the frustration to the external factor of the abolition of the Caliphate. Both factors were seen by him as being responsible for the ultimate failure of the unity movement. A. R. Desai concurs with the previous authors in emphasizing the frustration of the Muslims as a factor explaining the failure of the Caliphate and non-co-operation movements, but he adds that the end of these prepared for the disintegration of the projected unity. Even Jawaharlal Nehru writes: "It is possible that this sudden bottling up of a great movement — the non-co-operation movement — contributed to a tragic development in the country." R. Gopal, a Hindu historian, cites the fear of Muslim collaboration with Afghanistan against Hindu India as a cause for the ultimate rupture in unity. These fears were magnified, according to him, by Mohammed Ali's address to the jury on his trial in which he asserted that no Muslim could render military assistance against the Afghani Amir but rather should he declare a Jihad, then all Muslims were bound to assist him. Gopal also emphasizes the growing skepticism and suspicion of Congress leaders towards their Muslim comrades, especially when the latter refused to denounce the atrocities of the Moplahs.

Many of the factors cited above did in fact contribute to the rupture of the short lived Hindu-Muslim unity. But the explanation lies deeper. The Muslims and Hindus held one attitude in common, a negative attitude based upon anti-British feelings. Many of their leaders failed to face the implications of a successful anti-British movement. What would be their relationship once the British were gone?

---

1. W. C. Smith, op. cit., p. 204 - 205
2. A. R. Desai, op. cit., p. 374 - 375
4. R. Gopal, op. cit., p. 153 - 155, In two accounts of the trial available to the present writer, the statement attributed by Gopal to Mohammed Ali does not appear.
5. R. Gopal, op. cit., p. 157
Clearly the alliance was at best unnatural, based as it was upon that Muslim sentiment that exasperated the Hindu nationalists most — the community of world Islam. It was upon this foundation of international Muslim interest that Gandhi sought to construct his alliance, only to discover that the foundation was built not upon solid bedrock, but upon shifting sands. Gandhi sought to cement the alliance by utilizing Muslim fervor and excitement. Did he fail to realize that such entusiasms reach a peak, and then subside? Or did he use them for his own tactical purposes — his own anti-British purposes? The attempted unity of Hindus and Muslims, the passing wave of mutual sympathy, were based on the momentary suppression of deep communal differences. It could not suffice for long. There was the need rather for a long, laborious process of moral and spiritual regeneration. It did not occur. The nationalist and Muslim organizations had briefly come together, but they remained as two distinct parties each incapable of divesting itself of its past in order to secure a lasting fusion. The real mistake, as a perceptive nationalist leader intimated,\(^1\) did not reside in connecting the Caliphate issue with other national issues, but in permitting the Caliphate Committees to be established as independent organizations functioning on their own. For once the Caliphate issue lost its meaning, the organization broke up into sectarian and often pro-British Muslim organizations.

In short there existed a conflict in loyalties. The Hindus aspired for a united self-governing India; the Muslims idealized the Turkish struggle. It was as if the Muslims had fastened upon the Caliphatist struggle in order to avoid facing the implications of the Indian nationalist movement — for the latter was, after all, a threat to their separate identity.

---

CHAPTER III

Communalism - Internal Problem or Imperial Weapon?

"If rivers of blood must flow ... they should surely be the confluence of blood of Hindus and Muslims."¹ Thus spoke Sarojini Naidu at the Gaya Conference - December, 1922 - and her prophecy proved true except that Hindu and Muslim blood ran not in confluence. The entire period from 1922 was characterized by relentless and continuous bloodshed arising from internecine conflict between the Hindu and Muslim communities. It was in reality a period of civil war between the two religious communities with an occasional interval of peace.² To trace the struggle between both would be at once complicated and time-consuming, for one incident followed another in an unending, terrible chain. But an attempt must be made to account for such incidents, to diagnose their nature and cause.

By 1922 the Caliphate and non-co-operation movements were definitely on the wane. The following years were not years of concerted action but of constant strife arising from deliberate provocation, forced conversion and intentional humiliation. Suddenly in 1922 a mass nationalistic movement became paralyzed. Hindus and Muslims alike were frustrated and their energies, diverted from the political struggle, had to find another outlet. It was found in communal struggle. Sporadic and futile violence in the political sphere was now transformed into communal violence. The reaction was swift and

1. The Times, 9 January, 1922.
2. W. C. Smith, op. cit., p. 208, is the leading authority who considers the period subsequent to the first world War and up to 1937 as one of concerted Hindu and Muslim action seeking to disestablish the British.
sharp. Hindu-Muslim tension appeared and brought a harvest of communal disturbances — India's past became India's future.¹

Hindu-Muslim unity, so vociferously proclaimed, seemed now to fade into the dim past, to be replaced by Hindu-Muslim communal strife. Communalism engulfed everything, except, perhaps, the nationalist Congress — which was, however, branded as a purely Hindu party. But the question here arises: What was Communalism, what was the impetus that caused it to arise and expand? Was it only racial and religious? Or was it economic, political or a combination of all these? Was it in reality petty, blind and self-saving or did it give expression to some worthwhile motives?

Underlying Muslim Communalism — which may be defined as "that ideology which has emphasized as the social, political and economic unit the group of adherents of each religion, and has emphasized the distinction, even the antagonism, between such groups ..."² — is the constant fear of extinction by the numerically superior Hindus.³ Beginning with the concept of inferiority complex it was but a short step to the discovery by Muslims of circumstances setting them apart from the Hindus.

Most responsible for alienating Muslims from Hindus was the awareness of the former of their own cultural and social order, moulded and inspired by a specific ethical ideal emanating from their religion — Islam. This, organically related to any social order it had created, had formed a peculiar Muslim society in India, characterized by remarkable homogeneity and inner unity.

¹ J. Nehru, An Autobiography, p. 86 holds this view. So also M. Brecher, op. cit., p. 84
² W. O. Smith, op. cit., p. 157
³ V. Chirco, Indian Unrest, p. 119
Islam and the society it had created went hand in hand, hence to sacrifice either for the creation of a national polity was impossible. Hence Iqbal's logic drove him to conclude that democracy in India could be attainable only if communal groups could be recognised and tolerated. Therefore he demanded the creation of a Muslim India within India to include the Punjab, North-West Frontier Province, Sind and Baluchistan in one single state. J. Nehru, writing in 1934, took cognizance of this "non-too important tendency" to speak of the Muslim nation in India, of Muslim culture and its utter incompatibility with the Hindu culture and concluded that this was but a device to insure the continued presence of the British in India, holding the balance between the two cultures. Had Nehru carried this view to its logical conclusion he would have perhaps been able to anticipate the bid for partition and work against it. Then perhaps Jinnah would have been unable to declare that Islam and Hinduism "Are not two religions in the strictest sense of the word, but are in fact, different and distinct social orders, and it is a dream that the Hindus and Muslims can ever evolve a common nationality," and that the

Hindus and Muslims belong to two different religious philosophies, social customs, literatures. They neither inter-marry nor inter-dine together, and, indeed they belong to two different civilizations which are based mainly on conflicting ideas and conceptions. The concepts on life and of life are different.

1. Born in the Punjab, Sir Muhammad Iqbal (1875 - 1938) was destined to attain world fame as a Muslim poet and philosopher. Late in his life he was forced into politics and became the earliest Muslim leader to call for the creation of a Muslim nation in India.


It would be wrong to assume that the ideas above expressed by Iqbal and Jinnah were always present with the Muslims of India but it would be equally erroneous to conclude that these were the special product of Iqbal's and Jinnah's creativity. Religious differences there were, and these in turn gave rise to social and cultural differences. Indeed they possessed religions that were poles apart. Hinduism, with its vast and pervasive mass of mystical ideas, with its emotional overtones, exuberant polytheism and symbolism and indeed its apparent superstition, could not but come into conflict with the rigid monotheism and rigid cult of Islam. Hinduism being all-inclusive found no difficulty in adopting any new idea and justifying it in the all-embracing comprehensiveness of its spirit. Islam being all-exclusive was coming into conflict daily with the modern world. Out of this religious difference grew a difference in outlook on life and the role of man. To the Hindu the present life was, at best, unreal — a halting — place in the process of transmigration. He thus subsisted in a mild and gentle world, content with the endowments of intellect and spirit. To the Muslims, the present life was God's handi-work and he was but the servant, destined to confront its vicissitudes, ordained to do his duty and resigned to await the ultimate justification or condemnation.  

Believing that man is inescapably governed by his previous existence, therefore endowed with unequal intellect and spirit, social and economic position, the Hindu found it simple to sanction the institution of caste with all its undemocratic implications. Thus the social order was divisible into clearly

---

demarcated strata each functioning within and by itself. Considering that one man was born equal to any other, a Muslim, however, upheld a basic type of democracy. His awareness of this made him an essential part of an organic community. Clearly the social structures of the two communities were utterly at variance. In fact Hinduism never transcended its tribalism and never aspired to be more than a group religion. To Hindus a Muslim was outside the concept of caste and dealings with him should never transgress certain formal rules. This was a religious distinction but to the Muslims, who could not comprehend it, it was highly social — as well as being objectionable and offensive.¹ Social tension was a constant factor but the passage of years had rendered "co-existence" possible in relative peace.

Not less obvious and acute was the conflict generated by economic competition. The manner in which the Hindus evolved an aggressive middle-class prior to the Muslims, thus acquiring the rewards of added economic activity has already been observed. But latterly they had to contend with the growing and no less aggressive Muslim middle-class. That the Muslims were aware of their relatively low standard of preparation is attested by the fact that, in March of 1923, a Muslim delegate to the Indian Legislative Assembly demanded that communal qualifications be considered in appointments to Governmental offices.² A similar demand was again voiced by Iqbal himself, who speaking in the Punjab Legislative Council, denounced the principle of competition in filling governmental posts and demanded that this be mitigated by selection and nomination.³ Not strange therefore that students of Indian Muslim history should assert without

---

¹ W.C. Smith, op. cit., p.159
² The Times, 12 March, 1923
³ Shamloo, op. cit., pps.69 - 75.
qualification that a basic cause for antipathy between both communities was the uneven economic development and structure of the country.\footnote{See R. Gopal, \textit{op. cit.}, pps. 53 - 60 and G. Heyworth - Dunne, \textit{op. cit.}, pps. 1 - 14}

The economic factor was seen to be of primary importance by nationalist elements. To a large extent it was considered to have been responsible for the creation, intensification and perpetuation of the communal problem.

Jawaharlal Nehru, writing in a period when inter-communal conflict was rife, confirmed the close relationship between economic rivalries and the communal problem. At the very heart of the conflict was the struggle, among the middle-class Hindu-Muslim intelligensia, for a limited number of posts. This struggle was rendered more acute due to the fact that generally the Hindus were the richer, creditor urban class, whereas the Muslims were the poorer, debtor rural class. But in order to elicit the widespread support of their communities, the economic rivalry was given a religious garb. Religion became a tactical weapon for a small group seeking preferment and advancement at the expense of the masses of whom they were hardly representative. The communalists were, therefore, opposed to mass social advance and what is more, to political advance; for in their attempt to secure their interests they aligned themselves to the most reactionary groups in India - the landlords - and in England - the die-hards and conservatives. If "Islam in danger" was the cry of Muslim communalist, the Hindu communalist's slogan was "Hindu nationalism." Yet neither was religious or nationalist. To defeat such tactics it was necessary, not to haggle and bargain, but to evolve a new political framework and a new social order. Reform was not enough, the means had to be revolutionary. The solution was not to be found in Indianized India — for this would mean nothing
but a division of spoils among contesting India communities. It was in creating a new India. Nehru saw tragedy in the fact that nationalist leaders, deprived of clear ideals and objectives in their struggle, and habituated to think within the narrow steel frame of the existing political and social structure, were unable to tread the revolutionary path. Reformists in their attitude, constitutionalists in their method they shunned the revolutionary approach and thus were unable to combat communalism.¹

A.R. Desai, himself a Hindu and strongly sympathetic to the nationalist cause, also subscribes to the theory of the primacy of the economic factor in creating and perpetuating the communal issue. Aware that the Hindus were firmly established in governmental posts and key positions of trade, finance and industry the Muslims professionals and emerging bourgeoisie were eager to acquire a larger share. By emphasizing the religious issue for tactical purposes they transformed an internal class struggle within the ranks of the same class—the Indian bourgeoisie—into a communal struggle transcending economic classes.

There was a sinister aspect to the manner in which growing political consciousness was linked with communalism. With the communal rivalry as their predominant political interest, the humble classes of all communities were prevented from forming a united mass movement. The vested interests reigned unchallenged. Communalism thus cannot be comprehended without taking into consideration, the uneven development of Indian society and economy.² R.P. Dutt, for self-evident

reasons, adopted the same attitude and contended that behind communal antagonisms lay social and economic questions—competition for jobs among the middle-class, tension between Hindu money-lenders and Muslim debtors tension between Hindu landowners and Muslim peasant.\(^1\) Since communal antagonisms were themselves a reflection of social and economic issues, the solution of the problem was seen in social and economic advance. The unity of Hindus and Muslims in trade and peasant unions revealed the manner by which the barriers of communal divisions could be broken down. The common social and economic needs, the common bonds of class solidarity could destroy the very roots of communal tension and provide a lasting solution.\(^2\)

The heavy emphasis on the role of the economic factor in the communal problem is not confined to Hindu writers. W.C. Smith after taking into consideration other factors responsible for communal antagonisms, insisted that the economic factor was the most significant in producing communal tensions. Capitalism—rooted in India's economy, bred fear, distrust and aggressiveness when it failed to expand at a sufficiently rapid rate. Such tendencies among the middle-class became increasingly dangerous because the middle-class was divided on religious lines. In their search for economic gain the Muslim bourgeoisie found itself outstripped by the better trained, better equipped Hindus. Not only this but also the former — petty bourgeoisie, fearing economic extinction because of the tendency of Hindu big business to further and further concentrate all economic activity within its hand. For such reasons the Muslim middle-class appealed to communalism — the narrowest form of religion. Moreover Muslim communalism took on a nationalist

---

1. R.P. Dutt, op.cit., pps.96 - 111.
aspect for its leaders claimed to be the defenders of the Muslim nation in India. The economic factor was likewise stressed by Symonds who pointed out that riots between Hindu and Muslim peasants and artisans and the struggle between the Hindu-Muslim middle-class for posts in Indianized services were, in reality, responsible for the strife.

The economic factor and its role in communal strife may have received undue attention by Hindu sympathisers but it was almost totally ignored or unrecognized by British authorities. Indeed in the span of seven years — between 1924 and 1931 — this factor was rarely in parliamentary debates on communal riots. A rare exception occurred when Winston Churchill pointed out that Muslims found it repulsive to purchase goods manufactured by the Hindus, and even here the emphasis was more on social than economic antagonisms. Moreover, Churchill, it should be noted, was giving expression to British not Muslim grievances. His contention was that the boycott of Lancashire cotton should be combatted so that they might not be exploited by the Hindus. British circles rather conceived of the communal problem as emanating primarily from political causes. The inexorable trend towards reform was seen as creating ambitions and suspicions among the different communities — and with these the communal problem arose. When British authority was established — with its facade of neutralism — communal tension was at its lowest ebb; with the devolution of authority the high tide of communalism was

1. W.C. Smith, op. cit., pps. 157 - 194 provides a brief but comprehensive discussion of the communal problem;
3. H.C. CCLIII, 55, 1951, 1924
attained. Earl Winterton, speaking for the Government, asserted that the reforms themselves were to a large degree responsible for communal tension. Colonel Wedgwood, of the Labor opposition spoke in a similar vein, declaring that the cause for communal trouble was not religious but rather stemmed from the growth of self-government. Similar opinions were expressed by Britishers observant of the Indian scene. Reading's biographer asserted that it was inevitable, once the doctrine of responsible self-government became accepted as official policy, that clashes should occur between Hindus and Muslims. For the British, therefore, the political cause, overshadowed any other — and from there it was but one step to conclude that the elimination of the prospect of complete self-government would eliminate the communal problem. The heavy emphasis upon the political factor is understandable for it was the most conspicuous. Indian Muslims never stopped expressing their fears of a self-governing India and their precarious and threatened position therein. Such anxieties explain

4. P. Spear, op. cit., p.91 said that once the Hindus reached for the scepter, the Muslims cried for Pakistan. E. Walker, The British Empire: Its Structure And Spirit, London: Oxford University Press, 1947, p.161 - 162, asserted that the element of truth in that phase of Indian history was that communal differences had been inflamed by the prospect of self-government. C. Wint and G. Shuster, Indian And Democracy, London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1941, p.309, also asserted that the advent of self-government bred communal conflict. Even Lord Irwin, Indian Problems, London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1952, p.322, stated that "as soon ... as the prospect of national autonomy showed signs of taking definite shape, all men began to ask ... into what Indian hands it would fall?" And then proceeded to state Muslim claims which said that the "Muslim ... will not rest until he made good his claim to control those parts of India where his co-religionists are in a majority...."
the Muslim demand for separate representation in 1906, and once this was
granted, the demand that they be maintained. Mohammed Ali in fact expressed this
demand when he insisted that the "cry for mixed electorates cannot but alarm
the Muslims and create in their minds a strong suspicion of Hindu motives ..."
for "the cant about the interests being identical has grown too barefaced
even to serve as a tag for newspaper patriotism." ¹ Chirol was no less emphatic
in describing Muslim fears, writing that the burden of an Indian friend's story
was weighted with profound anxiety as to the future that awaited
the Muslims of India, either should the Raj disappear or should
it gradually lose its potency and be merged in a virtual ascendancy
of Hinduism under the specious mantle of Indian self-government. ²

Yet there is something formless and featureless about the factors of
economic antipathies and political fears. Shape and size was given to the
communal struggle by thousands of incidents — petty activities such as deliberate
cow slaughter, sacreligious to Hindus; deliberate musical processions before mosques
repugnant to Muslims, and forced conversions. ³ Constant repetition caused the
communal problem to be ever more inflammatory and extremist.

In the third decade of the Century the communal problem became acute. This
is explained by the changing circumstances of the relationships of Indian peoples
to their rulers and among themselves. After 1922 the attempt to achieve a mass
anti British movement, which had gained increasing momentum for half a decade,
suddenly slackened its pace and came to a complete halt. Only then did it become

---

¹. A. Iqbal, op.cit., p.68.
². V. Chirol, Indian Unrest, p.119.
³. Several missionary Hindu and Muslim societies were functioning during the period
under review. Examples are the Shuddi (Reclamation) and Sangathan (Consolidation)
Hindu movements; and the Tanzeem (Organization), Tabligh (Information) and
Ahmmediyya Muslim movements. For a comprehensive study of similar movements see
J.M. Farquhar, Modern Religious Movements In India, New York: The Macmillan Co.,
1924.
clear that national consciousness had not permeated the masses — especially not the backward Muslims. The nationalist leaders without an agreed program, without defined and positive goals drifted with the tide. Time and talent was wasted in fruitless political squabbles. The Congress had in fact become stagnant. Unable to inject a sense of purpose in the political field, unable to inspire all communities with a superior motive, it abdicated its responsibilities and extremists from both major communities had a free hand. Its primary purpose was now to protest its belief in unity, while turning a deaf ear to all Muslim demands thus causing a Congress leader to declare that

if the Hindus had quietly and willingly conceded what the Muslims wanted, the problem would have been solved earlier. Doubtless it is true that appetite grows with eating but equally it is that eating and more eating leads to satiety.  

The Hindu politicians were never aware that the relationships between Hindus and Muslims was not one problem with an intrinsic solution, but a process, which threw up problems at various stages. Had they, perhaps then they would have been more resilient and accomodating instead of driving inexorable towards ultimate separation.

But the question here arises: Were Hindu politicians themselves responsible for the failure to solve the communal problem or was there another element acting to frustrate their every endeavor? What was the role of the third party in India — the British Raj?

1. Those Muslims remaining in the ranks of the Congress were, at best, representative only to themselves or circumscribed interests. D.B. op.cit., p.16 dismisses them as "paid hirelings or careerists."
3. F. Sitaramayya, op.cit., p.75.
It is essential to establish at the very outset that the British Raj was castigated by the Hindus and Muslims alike. Both poured vituperation on its every effort.1 Both saw in the Raj an astute, shrewd ruling race skilfully manipulating, divisive influences in order to maintain their predominance. Examples of such claims are legion. A strong government is one based on the approbation and consent of a unified people. Perhaps in the special circumstances of India the British realized that a government based on the opposition and hostility of one people for another would likewise be strong. Indeed—and this is the contention of Hindus and Muslims—the actions of the British bear ample testimony to the existence of such tactics.

Almost all Hindu and Muslim authors ranging from the ultra-nationalist J. Nehru to the Pakistophile Rajput accuse the British of a policy of Divide Et Impera. The claim that the British themselves created the division is never made but they are blamed for exploiting the division, and for unwillingness to work to heal it. The communal problem remained unsolved, asserted Nehru due to the persistent policy of obstruction followed by the British.2 The British aware that a real settlement would strengthen the political movement, intentionally blocked every prospect of alleviating the problem.3 Iqbal used

---

1. The anti-British feelings of the nationalist Congress is understandable. Those of the Muslims seem rather peculiar. Perhaps these, eager to dispel the accusation of being "imperial stooges," embarked upon a hate campaign—primarily verbal in character.

2. J. Nehru, An Autobiography, p.137, asserted that there was deliberate thwarting of Congress and added: "Of course British governments... have based their policy on creating divisions in our ranks. Divide and rule has always been the way of empires...."

3. Said J. Nehru, The Discovery Of India, p.320: "It was a triangle with the government in a position to play off one side against the other, by giving special privileges."
similar terms declaring that the British were following a policy calculated simply to insure their position in India.¹ Yet like so many commentators during that period, both made claims but failed to indicate the manner in which British manipulation occurred or bias appeared. This is equally true of W.C. Smith who passed a more severe judgement declaring that it was "commonplace now to recognize that the communal antagonisms of India... are due to the British imperial policy of divide and rule."² He substantiated his claim with the strong but narrow argument of separate electorates, a technique through which enfranchised groups in India voted communally, thought communally and expressed their grievances communally.³ Others, however, like R.P. Dutt, R. Gopal and A.R. Desai, also held that communal divisions were fostered under British rule as a conscious act of policy, but these, unlike many others, cite evidence in support of their claims.⁴

In an era when it was not yet obvious that imperialism had passed its zenith, before Western writers began using apologetic terms in discussing it, it was not uncommon to encounter proclamations of the principle of 'Divide and Rule.' A British officer could still write in May of 1821 "Divide et impera should be the motto of our Indian administration, whether political, civil or military."⁵ This was but an echo of Lord Ellenbourough, who in 1843, wrote to the

---

¹ L. Shamloo, op.cit., p.47
² N. Bolitho, Jinnah: Creator of Pakistan, London: John Murray, 1954, p.63, asserted that Jinnah had to endure cynical and violent opposition from the Britons who still believed in the motto divide and rule.
³ W.C. Smith, op.cit., p.177 - 181
⁴ But for the above and N. Mansergh almost all other Western authors failed to mention the role of Great Britain in the communal issue.
⁵ Quoted in R.P. Dutt, op.cit., p.98.
Government: "I cannot close my eyes to the belief that that race (Muslim) is fundamentally hostile to us and our true policy is to reconcile the Hindus."¹ One year before the Mutiny Lord Elphinstone - Governor of Bombay - recorded in an official minute: "Divide et impera was the old Roman motto, and it should be ours."² And once the nightmare of the Mutiny was over sinister sentiments were expressed by Lieutent Cole, Commandant of Moradabad: "Our endeavour" he said "should be to uphold in full force the separation which exists between the different religions and races, not to endeavour to amalgamate them. Divide et impera should be the principle of the Indian Government."³ Sir John Lawrence, a future Viceroy, spoke in a similar manner when he asserted that among the defects of the pre-Mutiny army, unquestionably the worst, and the one that operated most fatally against us, was the brotherhood and homogeneity of the Bengal army, and for this purpose the remedy is counterpoise ... of the native races. ⁴

Indeed all the Indian authors quoted above seem inclined to believe that the British policy was solely that of counterpoise — Princes, landowners, industrial classes and Muslims countering and opposing the claims of the lawyers, schoolmaster, students, middle-class men and nationalists. This application of counterpoise was best expressed by K.B. Krishna in his book, The Problem of Minorities. "The Indian Mutiny," said he, "provided the bases for a new type of imperialism."

He then dwelt on this point saying

By this I mean that the British policy in India since the Mutiny, has been a combination of liberal and imperialist policies. The policy of counterpoise is one aspect of such a new imperialism. It is both liberal and imperialist: liberal in that it recognizes and concedes the claims of the classes as they arise, and imperialist in the sense that what is conceded is always circumscribed by imperial interests, utilizing the

¹ Quoted in H.R. Desai, op.cit., p.555 and R. Gopal, op.cit., p.46
² Quoted in A.B. Rajput, op.cit., p.14 and R.B. Dutt, op.cit., p.98
³ Quoted in R.P. Dutt, op.cit., p.98 and A.B. Rajput, op.cit., p.15
⁴ Quoted in R. Gopal, op.cit., p.46
rivalries of various classes and interests.¹

Indeed all Hindu protagonists hold that in this counterpoise of contending economic classes is to be found the origin of the theory of communal representation.

It would be no difficult task to reveal that the above facts cited by the Hindus to prove the application by Britain of the policy of Divide and Rule are highly tenuous, for they reveal not a policy but the suggestions for a policy - a policy which may have never been accepted or put into action. But this is not to absolve Britain of all guilt, for there are certain indications that cast shadows on her position.

As early as 1910 J. Ramsay-MacDonald wrote in The Awakening Of India, that the political successes of the Muslims have been so significant as to give support to a suspicion that sinister influences have been at work, that the Muslim leaders were inspired by certain Anglo-Indian officials, and that these officials pulled wires at Simla and in London and of malice aforethought sowed discord between the Hindu and Muslim communities...²

Lord Olivier once a Secretary of State for India expressed his doubts of British intentions in a more outspoken manner. Writing to the Times he said:

No one with any close acquaintance of Indian affairs will be prepared to deny that on the whole there is a predominant bias in British officialdom in India in favour of the Muslim community

---

1. Quoted in A.R. Desai, op.cit., p.370. This long excerpt is essential since no books on the communal issue are available at the time of writing, and because it expresses the Hindu attitude towards the problem. It is worth noting here that he also regards the problem as having an economic cause and distinguishes between various kinds of communal struggle, one between the professional classes of different faiths and communities, the second between the commercial and industrial classes of different faiths and the third between the conservative classes.

2. Sydney Olivier, a Fabian Society pioneer, began his government career as one of the two resident clerks - Sidney Webb was the other - in the Colonial Office. See A. Freemantle, That Little Band Of Prophets, New York: New American Library, 1960, passim.
partly on the ground of closer sympathy, but more largely as
a make weight against Hindu nationalism. 1

Wedgwood Benn likewise a Secretary of State for India revealed similar fears
when he wrote that "the real enemies of India's claims - and they are many -
expliot these differences (of race, creed and class) to achieve an end they
dare not avow." 2 Theses fears, if doubted because they emanate from seasoned
laborites, seem to be substantiated by Lord Reading who said that "Some, doubt-
less, think that this (Hindu-Muslim antagonism) is to our advantage. 3 In fact
these are not to be dismissed lightly. If there was unease, there might be
reason for it, and articles in the press debates in the House of Commons and
declarations of officials reflect an awareness of a policy, unspoken but impossible
to disavow.

The influential Times never protagonist of Indian unity, reported in
detail the process of aggravation of relations between Hindus and Muslims. Behind
its measured prose there lurked definite bias towards the Muslims. In April of
1924 its columns urged that the two communities with their totally different
philosophies and outlook on life could never function together and went on to
draw that perpetual moral:

Until religious tolerance . . . is understood by the Indian masses,
and until a majority of the literate Hindus and Muslims have learnt
to trust one another . . . India cannot dispense with the British
official without the greatest peril to her internal peace. 4

1. The Times, 10 July, 1926.
2. From an introduction to Graham-Poles book, India In Transition, London:
   Leonard and Virginia Woolf, 1952, p.V.
3. The Marquess of Reading, op.cit., p.306
4. The Times, 21 April, 1924.
Again, "the acute racial and religious animosities which now afflict India can only be kept from flaring into disorder by the British Government." Indeed on occasion the Newspaper betrayed satisfaction with Hindu-Muslim discord. In an article entitled 'Better Outlook: Muslim Opinion Mobilizing,' the Special Simla correspondent said: "Although the cleavage between the Muslim community and the Hindu agitators appear to be widening every day, and Sir Mohammed Shafi himself has expressed to me his confidence in the situation." Moreover the paper undertook to dispel any hopes for amicable settlement. Commenting on the attempt in 1927 to devise a system of joint electorates it said "While therefore the situation offers hope, ground for optimism has hardly emerged." In the debates of the House of Commons there were similar sentiments expressed but these did not pass unchallenged – at least by Labor. The House was divided into three groups – one that used the communal problem for its purposes, one that deprecated the problem and one that simply took cognizance of it and vacillated in its position between both poles – this latter was the Government.

The declarations of those who sought to utilize the communal problem were many and varied, ranging from the sensible to the grotesque. Sir H. Craik stated that the central difficulty in India was the internecine conflict between Indians themselves and that this could be palliated and mitigated by the presence of somebody with a magisterial capacity who would be impartial to both. "But how are

---
1. The Times, 5 January, 1924.
2. The Times, 16 January, 1924.
4. Seeming to welcome the reappearance of the split between Hindus and Muslims, Earl Winterton – Under-Secretary of State for India – declared that "the rapprochement between these two (brought about by Gandhi in his early twenties), has gradually disappeared and today scarcely exists." H.C. CLXV, SS, 1925, 767-8 H.C. CLXV, SS 1925, 790
you" he inquired, "to get this impartiality between the different sects unless you have the Englishman there."¹ Not only had the Englishman to be present in his magisterial but also in his military capacity, for only British arms could *insure* peace and mitigation of the religious strife - and yet was this accomplished?² There was a crescendo of voices demanding that the Congress not be regarded as equivalent to India for it was abundantly clear that "seven million Muslims in India hate Gandhi and his associates and would fight them"³ rather than be dominated by them⁴ - a mere handful of the more active and politically-minded young people.⁵ They were in reality extremists who, as Earl Winterton put it - once out of office, were responsible for the communal riots and who sought to set up a Hindu Raj in place of the British

1. H.C. CLXV, 5 S, 1923, 790
2. Mr. Banks said that only the British army could deter religious strife. H.C. CLXVI, 5 S, 1923, 756. So also Mr. Wardlaw-Milne who said that there was "one outstanding feature in those disturbances, and that is the welcome ... that was extended the British troops," and went on to demand a cessation of the retrenchments in army expenditure, H.C. CXC VIII, 5 S, 1926, 1106 - 1107. Colonel Applin spoke in a similar vein where he asserted that "the British troops in India are the sole means by which we can prevent communal disorders," H.C. CXC VIII, 1926, 1178.
3. Many British politicians were honestly convinced that the Muslims could handle the Hindu majority without much effort. Leutnant-Colonel Moore stated

> It is no good expecting the Muslim lion to lie down with the Hindu lamb, especially when the lion knows he is stronger and especially when he is in a minority. And that is one of the reasons why I should like to ask ... not to try to press a constitution on the lion. The Muslim is our friend in India, the Muslim knows his master and he knows an honest man, and he has found him both in the Civil service and the Police Service.

one.\(^1\) And if these extremists were vocal and dangerous it was due to the spineless handling of the situation in India.\(^2\) Indeed, asserted Churchill, these, because of the conciliatory attitude of every Government, "have been lifted to a position far above the Muslims and other ... classes in India"\(^3\) Not only that but such extremists also felt at liberty to perpetrate horrible atrocities on the loyal Muslims.\(^4\) Aware, however, that a considerable section of Indians were alienated from the Congress it was necessary to maintain law and order by permitting British troops to use their weapons in order to show that these were top dogs in India.\(^5\) — and order could be maintained because the British authorities had certain definite advantages, as was indicated by Sir S. Hoare: "Ten years ago," he said, "the Muslim community was solidly united against us ... now it was not such."\(^6\) Thus Great Britain would show that it intended to carry on the government of India for the benefit of India and not one part of it. The people of India "ought to kneel down and thank God for the day the British Government came in. They would probably have cut each other's throats if" this "had not turned up at the right moment."\(^7\) Some even chose to doubt the very existence of an India. That there was an Indian nation

---

1. H.C. CCXXXIX, 53, 1930, 825-840. Commenting on Winterton's change of heart Colonel Wedgwood said; "There is nobody who feels more satisfaction, certainly at the back of his mind, than the Noble Lord at the fact that the Muslim and the Hindu in India cannot agree. In his view, that is one of the safeguards of British administration in India." H.C. CCXXXIX, 53, 1930, 841
2. H.C. CCLII, 53, 1932, 1279 - 1280
4. H.C. CCLII, 53, 1932, 1247 - 1248
5. H.C. CCXXXIX, 53, 1930, 878
6. H.C. CCXXXIX, 53, 1930, 895
7. H.C. CCXXXIX, 53, 1930, 925
Sir Charles Oman refused to acknowledge. "There are," he rather asserted "a great many nations in India as well as a great many sections of religion and other divisions," and undertook to remind his auditors that in such a state religious bitterness cannot die down but must rather be on the increase. In a similar vein Sir H. Croft said that because of its many races and religions India could not be considered as a nation. More outspoken than both, however, was Commander Oliver Locker-Lampson who asserted that there was no such thing as India. "It is," he added, "not in any sense of the word a nation — India is not one people it is a rampaging, ranging mess-up of climates and nationalities and faiths and races."

In a different manner spoke those who deprecated the communal problem, asserting that Indians should not be consistently reminded from the floor of Parliament that they are so torn by religious strife that nothing could be done for them. The Indians were thereby liable to become overly sensitive to such matters. This section tended to stress the possibility of understanding, asserting that the "difference between the Hindu and Muslim is steadily being bridged over, and the leaders of both sections are constantly in the same category." A living example of this understanding, according to Mr. Hicks, occurred within trade union organizations wherein the workers from whatever religion in India demonstrated their common cause. Some like Mr. Brockway, in fact proceeded to assert that within India was developing a mass democratic

4. H.C. CCLII, 5 S, 1931, 1502. This statement could hardly be further removed from R. MacDonald's view that underlying all assumptions in India was the unity of the Peninsula. H.C. CXXCVI, 5 S, 1925 747.
movement transcending communal and caste differences. However much the problem was minimized it did not pass unobserved - indeed this element tended to connect it with the ulterior motives of the British Government. Colonel Wedgwood stated that the British Government and administration in India favored the Muslims because of their virility and superior courage - something which had to be guarded against. He added that "it would not be in human nature if the British administration in India did not sometimes chuckle before a communal disturbance among people who were previously determined to remove that administration." In similar terms spoke Mr. Filcher, who demanded assurances that the British administration in India was "not in some measure directly responsible for all that has happened." A cynic, he added, might see security in communal strife for the British but in reality it decreased their justice. Mr. Thurtle, denouncing solicitude for minorities at the expense of the majorities, said

... when I hear the Noble Lord (Winterton) and other people dwelling upon the rights of the untouchables, dwelling upon the rights of the Muslims, when I hear the Noble Lord ... laying great stress upon that aspect of the Indian problem, I cannot help thinking that they are using that as a screen for the continuance of British domination in India. There is an old motto, which we know very well, about 'divide and conquer,' and it seems to me that is a variation of a particular theme.

Mr. Saklatvala, a Communist, was rather more outspoken in expressing similar feelings, stating that "... because the Muslims are a minority in India ... that is a justification for forty million Britishers to enslave two hundred and twenty million Hindus. That is the logic of what the world is asked to believe."\(^1\) Others condemned the whole period of British rule in India.

After one hundred and fifty years of British rule in India, said Mr. T. Shaw "human life is still as cheap as dirt."\(^2\) Such attacks, were not, however, solely reserved for the Government, for, censuring Churchill's claims of British weakness, Mr. Foot said: "... the attempts made by reactionaries in this country to drive a wedge between the Hindu and the Muslim is a most dangerous policy."\(^3\)

The Government steered a wary course between extremes, donning the garb of the neutralist who stands above factional strife but works to eliminate it. Thus instructions emanating from England were issued to prosecute people using inflammatory language,\(^4\) to prohibit the publication and circulation of seditious newspapers\(^5\) and to impress upon the British administration the need to utilize to the fullest extent moral force, through which the divided communities could be brought closer to promoting a conciliatory spirit. Legal action was recommended against persons stimulating communal hatreds.\(^6\) Nevertheless the British

---

1. H.C. CCX, 5 S, 1927, 2278. The gravamen of his charge was contained in newspaper articles - the newspaper not being identified - which regarded the existence of religious strife as the best news coming from India, for this enmity insured that the British remain in India H.C. CXXVIII, 5 S, 1926, 1110-1111
3. In the same speech Mr. Foot, a Liberal, insisted that the accusations that treat Britain as manipulating religious divisions was totally false. Thus dissociating himself from the radical Laborites. H.C. CCXXI, 5 S, 1931, 1291 - 1295.
Government never undertook to eliminate the crux of the problem for it could not "... prevent the sources of bitterness and distrust from polluting ... every department of human endeavour ...". Hence the solution of the problem should reside in the hands of the Indians themselves, who, because of their inability to resolve the issue, had to have the presence of the impartial third party—the British administrations and the British army, who together constituted the most effective safeguard against communal tension. Thus Lord Birkenhead could tell the House of Lords: "If we withdraw from India tomorrow the immediate consequence would be a struggle a outrance between the Muslims and the Hindu population." And, "it was an almost generally accepted conclusion that an immediate repudiation of our responsibilities in India would ... be fatal to the interest of India itself." Clearly the British third party was there to stay but it would be an impartial and unbiased one. Hence Lord Birkenhead asserted that in all communal strife Great Britain had kept its hands unsullied by partisanship, and that as long as the problem persisted the non-partisanship of the British authorities in India would be maintained.

It was perhaps the recurring claim that Britain was patronizing the Muslims which caused Wedgwood Benn to emphatically declare that in solving the communal problem no reliance should be placed on the archaic maxim Divide and rule. "That is not the principle upon which our Commonwealth has been built up. (It) has been built up by teaching persons of various interest and various races that in the bond of union exists the liberty to develop in their own way ..." For the same reason

1. H.C. CXXXII, 5 S., 1929, 1557.
2. H.C. CXXVIII, 5 S., 1926, 1074.
4. The Times, 8 July, 1925.
5. The Times, 8 July, 1925.
6. The Times, 29 May, 1926.
7. H.C. CXXXIX, 5 S., 1930, 872.
Lord Irwin, Viceroy to India, felt compelled to declare in a speech before the Combined Legislatures - August 1926 - that as long as tension between the communities existed the duty of the executive was the preservation of public peace, a duty "that the Government of India ... desire should be performed with fairness and scrupulous impartiality."¹ He repeated this view at the Chelmsford Club and asserted that the "Government will be careful to act with the strict impartiality towards both communities," but that it was "entitled to resent suggestions that they favor the purely communal interest of either."²

But the question suggests itself: Were the British as impartial as their declarations would seem to indicate? If so what explanations existed for actions which betrayed, if not partiality, then at least a measure of favoritism? How can one explain the dispatch of Lord Birkenhead to the Viceroy of India saying: "we have always relied on ... Muslims ... to break down the attitude of boycott. You and Simon (Head of the Parliamentary Inquiry Commission) must be the judges whether or not it is expedient ... to try to make a break in the wall of antagonisms ..."³ Or again how can one explain another dispatch from Birkenhead advising Simon "to see at all stages important people who are not boycotting the Commission, particularly Muslims," and to "widely advertize all his interviews with representative Muslims."⁴ Not only during the period of the Commissions’s work did such sentiments appear, for in 1930, when the Civil Disobedience movement was

---

1. Lord Irwin, op.cit., p.29
2. Lord Irwin, ibid., p.235
4. In the same dispatch the Secretary of State for India said: "The whole policy is now obvious. It is to terrify the immense Hindu population by the apprehension that the Commission, having been got hold of by the Muslims, may present a report altogether destructive of the Hindu position, thereby securing a solid Muslim support and leaving Jinnah (himself, at that period an Indian nationalist Muslim) high and dry."
launched, the Government of India issued an appreciation of the situation declaring with unyielded *éclat* that "despite the efforts made by deliberate misrepresentation ... to involve the Muslims ... the community as a whole has refused to join it ..."\(^1\) Still in another appreciation it was declared that "the deadfast adherence of the bulk of the Muslim community to constitutional methods is a reassuring feature of the general situation."\(^2\) Even the Laborite Secretary of State Wedgewood Benn found it dserviceable to inform the House that "it will be observed ... that generally ... the Muslims have held aloof" (from the Civil Disobedience movement).\(^3\) Again speaking to the Imperial Press Conference and commenting on the situation in India he declared that the Muslims as a rule had dissociated themselves from the Civil Disobedience movement.\(^4\) If such instances do not reveal partiality, they at least betray a certain satisfaction derived from the knowledge that the Muslims were not adding to what was surely an arduous task. They appeared to be the bulwark of reconciliation in India and their use, as a factor in weakening the unity of nationalist action, if not continuously practised, was persistently contemplated. One could even detect a further application of Muslim sentiments and communal tensions, specifically in the perpetuation of British rule. For is this not what was implied when Birkenhead said that he had as yet met no Indian who, critical though he may be, had demanded the withdrawal outright of the British from India?\(^5\) Perhaps the declaration of a Government of India official leaves no room for doubt. Chaudhri-

\(^1\) H.C. CCCXXXVIII, 5 S, 1930, 1427
\(^2\) H.C. CCCXL, 5 S, 1930, 21
\(^3\) H.C. CCCCXIX, 5 S, 1930, 865
\(^4\) The Times, 4 June, 1930
\(^5\) The Times, 19 March, 1927
Din Mohammed, Deputy Commissioner of Rohtak district - Punjab - remarked that the Indians should never attack the British for they were essential for the safe running of India. His view was that when a state of tension existed among the different religions, "it was not reasonable or justifiable to say that Indians themselves would govern and the English should quit."¹

In a situation rife with religious and political divisions it was tempting, but hardly wise, for the imperial power to manipulate and use those divisions. But the imperial power, or at least its individual representatives, did succumb to the temptation and it becomes evident, from instances already cited, that Indian allegations of a policy of divide and rule are partly justified. But this does not imply that all successive British governments, different in color and ideology, followed one settled imperial policy of divide and rule. This is highly improbable. Instances there were, but a settled and consistent policy has never become apparent. No authoritative corroborative evidence exists. At most it can be said, and with relative safety, that the British tended to view existing divisions with a certain amount of satisfaction, minimizing as they did the probability of a united front in India. Yet if the British cannot be accused of creating divisions, neither can they be praised for fostering unity.

¹. The Times, 26 January, 1923.
CHAPTER IV

Communalism And Reform

Between 1919 and 1939, indeed until independence, India's position in international and imperial affairs, was an anomaly. It had fought — with distinction — the first world War.¹ It was represented in the Imperial War Cabinet and at later imperial conferences; it was signatory to the treaty of Versailles and a founder — member of the League of Nations: it was a member on all Commonwealth bodies, yet it was not self-governing. India had attained international acceptance yet her British trustees did not deem her fit for unqualified self-government. The British Government of India was not responsible to any Indian representative legislature but rather to a removed and distant Secretary of State and Imperial Parliament. This Parliament, firm in its belief in the efficacy of its democratic traditions, undertook to bestow upon India a program of gradual reform, intended to ultimately transform India into Dominion Status. But in its belief in evolutionary democratic procedures Parliament had to contend with the rising and boisterous voice of Indian nationalism — which considered India fit and entitled to prescribe its own reforms. Why wait upon the dispensations of a distant, non-Indian parliament? The irony and indeed tragedy of that phase of Indian and imperial history

¹"During the first world War 1,400,437 volunteers passed through the ranks of the Indian army, and of these 62,056 lost their lives in action. Two Indian cavalry divisions and ten infantry divisions served overseas. Three divisions equipped for active service, guarded the Nort-West Frontier throughout the war. " C.E. Carrington, "The Empire At War, 1914 - 1918 ", Cambridge History of the British Empire, III, The Empire Commonwealth, p. 842 Carrington's chapter provides an excellent evaluation of the Indian contribution and a thorough description of the operations in which Indian forces participated."
resides in a reversal of roles. The politically conscious — politically unsophisticated — Indians believed in the virtues and benefits of transplanting the British Parliamentary system to the Indian sub-continent, whereas in the home of Parliamentary democracy itself less confident views prevailed.¹

The whole story of 1919 - 1939 revolves around this very factor — hesitation and indecision on the part of the imperial power in its approach towards reform; aggressiveness, determination and no small measure of confusion on the part of the nationalist forces. The latter could not — or would not — see the cause of British irresolution in India — the internal schisms and divisions of party and party, of race and race, and even more vivid and dangerous, the division of religion and religion. The British, in their slow and tortuous progress toward reforms, sought to accommodate religious differences by evolving the system of separate representation and separate electorates. In this they elicited the favor of the — thus safeguarded — Muslim minority but incurred the wrath and opposition of the nationalists — drawn largely from the Hindu majority. An attempt shall be made to evaluate the communal problem and its impact upon the move towards reform and self-government.

In 1909 the initial establishment of separate electorates and representation was made. Lord Morley, Secretary of State for India, and Lord Minto, the Viceroy, were both convinced that the spreading terroristic movement could be combatted only if combined policies of "repression and concession" would be pursued. The policy of concession found its expression

¹ N. Mansergh, op.cit., p. 354
in what were known as the Morley-Minto reforms, or the Indian Councils Act. By this Act the membership of the provincial councils was increased and a majority of non-official members was provided. Candidates were elected through designated bodies such as municipal and district boards, chambers of commerce, assemblies of landowners, universities — and Muslim communities. This began the first separate representation of Muslims provided by statute. Membership in the Central Legislature was also increased, but an official majority was retained. Of the executive councils only the Viceroy's was altered. There three members were appointed. Clearly these reforms sought to associate Indians with the government in an advisory capacity only. The fundamental principle underlying the reforms was that the executive should retain complete authority and make the final decision on all questions.\(^1\) Attention, however, should be directed not to the attempt at reform, which did not mitigate Indian dissatisfaction, but to the grant of separate representation. In conceding Muslim demands as set out by the Deputation to the Viceroy in 1906, did the British initiate the deliberate policy of sowing discord between the different communities? Many historians think so. To some it appeared a concession to unfounded but understandable fears.\(^2\) To others it was a deliberate policy, striking at the roots of any democratic electorate, inaugurated to undermine the social structure of India.\(^3\) Others regard the Morley-Minto policy as a means of securing the representation of an important body of opinion. It proved to be of the

\(^1\) This summary of the reforms is found in T. W. Wallbank, A Short History Of India And Pakistan, New York: The New American Library, 1958, p. 114 - 115
\(^2\) P. Spear, op.cit., p. 207
\(^3\) This view is held by P. R. Dutt, op.cit., p. 99 - 100 and W. C. Smith, op.cit., p. 171
deepest import, indeed it could be described as the embryonic beginning of Pakistan. Still others saw it as necessary and long overdue and commended Lord Minto’s realism in recognizing that “any electoral representation in India would be doomed to mischievous failure which aimed at granting a personal enfranchisement regardless of the beliefs and traditions of communities composing the population.”

The claim has been put forward that neither Morley nor Minto were thinking in terms of nationhood and democracy. Ample proof was provided by Morley’s dispatch to Minto in which he wrote: “Not one whit more than you do I think it desirable or possible, or even conceivable to adopt English political institutions to the nations who inhabit India.” This assertion he also made in public. Said Lord Morley in the House of Lords:

> If I were attempting to set up a parliamentary system for India, or, if it could be said that this chapter of reforms led directly or indirectly to the establishment of a parliamentary system for India, I for one would have nothing to do with it .... If my existence, either officially or corporally, were to be prolonged twenty times longer than either is likely to be, a parliamentary system in India is not at all the goal to which I would for a moment aspire.

It would seem that Morley and Minto must be totally absolved from purposely implanting division. Yet it appears that Minto himself had encouraged Muslim

---

1. V. A. Smith, op. cit., p. 774 - 776
2. Quoted in Griffith, Modern India, London: Ernest Benn Ltd., 1957, p. 81
4. Quoted in R. Coupland, op. cit., p. 106. The usage “Nations who inhabit India” was prophetic enough, and so might be his stricture on adopting English political Institutions.
claims. In a letter to him Lord Morley wrote: "I won't follow you again into our Muslim dispute. Only I respectfully remind you once more that it was your early speech about their claims that started the M. Hare".  

Morley did not, however, object to the rewards of such a policy for commenting upon his meeting with leading Muslims in the Meerut Division he said, "it is such a change to get a word of recognition from any of the sects for any of our acts."  

If it is granted that Morley and Minto never envisioned a democratic India, the question immediately arises: Why was it therefore necessary to provide safe-guards for the Muslim minority when the rights of these could not have been possibly threatened by servile legislative councils? Attempts to answer that question can only cast doubts on the intentions of Morley and Minto. If their guarantees were to be merely transitional how would it be possible to explain the position of the under-secretary of State for India when, in the House of Commons, he declared:

And more than that, particularly with regard to the Muslims, they have a special and overwhelming claim upon us, namely the solemn promises, given by those who are entitled with full authority to speak for us, that they should get adequate representation to the amount and of a kind they want — a promise given to them by Minto ... repeated in a dispatch by the Secretary of State to a deputation here and in another place. From that promise we cannot go back, and we will not go back.  

Whatever else is said about the special guarantees to the Muslims, this much is certain — that the Muslims were provided, from the highest level

2. Ibid, p. 235  
3. Quoted in J. Cumming, op.cit., p. 92
of Government, with a pledge and a cause — a pledge to which they hereafter constantly appealed, and a cause they protested without cease. Moreover, by shrinking in the face of Muslim opposition from creating territorial constituencies and by creating a system of special representation, the British made the Muslims aware of the political ramification of their distinctiveness. Thus the Muslim and Hindu communities were juxtaposed in political rivalry. As long as separate representation existed, this rivalry was destined to wax, not wane.\textsuperscript{1} It was easy enough to conclude as did one die-hard author that "it may be conceded, then, that the Government flung into modern India the apple of discord, so far as discord has proceeded from politics."\textsuperscript{2}

Communal representation a palliative for baseless fears in 1909 became in 1919 a regrettable concession to prejudice. India was deemed ready for reform and, in accordance with the fateful announcement of 1917, the Montford reform scheme was made law by Parliament. The Government of India Act provided for a devolution of power from the Center to the Provinces. Since provincial governments could not be made forthwith responsible as a whole to the Legislatures, the field of Government had to be divided. Specified subjects were "reserved" to the control of a Governor-in-council directly responsible to the Secretary of State through the Center; other subjects

\textsuperscript{1} D. Thomson, \textit{op.cit.}, p. 216
\textsuperscript{2} E. Thompson, \textit{op.cit.}, p. 275
\textsuperscript{3} This is an abbreviation for the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms.
were transferred to the control of Ministers responsible to Legislatures. The membership of the Legislative Councils was increased and at least 70 per cent of the members had to be non-official. The Central Legislature was made bicameral, with a Legislative Assembly composed of 106 elected and 40 nominated members, and a Council of State composed of 61 elected members. Threat of deadlock between the Central executive and the Legislatures was countered with a special provision whereby the former could pass Bills over the head of the Legislatures, if these were "certified" to be necessary for the safety and tranquility of India. This array of new councils was backed up by a new electoral system which had two features. The franchise — excepting the grants made to possessors of certain qualifications, such as a university degree or membership in a chamber of commerce — was based on property, the payment of income tax in the towns and land tax in the country. The constituencies were divided into "special" and "general". The former represented special interests — universities, great landowners, industry and commerce — while as the latter contained voters provided by the above — described franchise requirements. These, however, were further subdivided on the basis of the confession of the voter — Muslim or Hindu. Other categories

---

1. This system, later to be given the name Dyarchy, was the handiwork of Lionel Curtis, who was its first protagonist. See L. Curtis, Dyarchy, Oxford: The Claredon Press, 1920. Curtis had been a leading member of Lord Milner's "Kindergarten" in South Africa. How much his Indian views were influenced by his earlier attempts to bind together opposing communities in South Africa has never been assessed. But it is certain that he and all members of the Round Table group considering India's future were moved by the findings of the Mesopotamian Commission to ask, "How can British officials agitate in favor of self-determination in Mesopotamia, while India's aspirations are ignored?"
were recognised such as the Sikhs, Indian Christians, Anglo-Indians and Europeans.

In granting communal representation the authors of the reform seemed to fall back on an established precedent — a precedent all the more powerful and meaningful because it was Indian. In 1916 the Congress and the Muslim League, under the impact of the feverish nationalistic sentiments of the wartime period, evolved a scheme by which the conflict over separate representation was allayed and a common plan for communal representation and constitutional reforms was evolved. The Lucknow Pact conceded separate representation to the Muslims, laying down that "adequate provisions should be made for the representation of important minorities by election, and Muslims should be represented through special electorates on the Provincial Legislative Councils ..." To the Hindus was conceded the demand that "in the reconstruction of the Empire, India shall be lifted from the position of a dependency to that of an equal partner in the Empire with the self-governing Dominions." Henceforth the Muslims and their sympathizers — or those who sought to use them — could point to the fact that even the Congress had condoned the establishment of communal representation — why then should it not be perpetuated?

1. B. P. Sitaramayya, op.cit., Appendix II, p. VII - VIII
2. B. P. Sitaramayya, Ibid., Appendix II, p. VII. For the complete text see same, Appendix II, pps. VII - XIV
3. The manner in which the Lucknow Pact affected later communal representation was best expressed in the Report of the Joint Select Committee appointed to consider the Government of India Bill. Said it: "The recommendations ... in respect of the proportionate representations of Muslims, based on the Lucknow compact, may be accepted." L. Curtis, op.cit., p. 562
But in their inclusion of communal representation in the reforms Montagu and Chelmsford had to overcome determined resistance in the House of Commons. Ramsay MacDonald stated: "We have been listening to an argument thundered at us for many years, that there is no such thing as India, that you have got a tremendous complexity of ... creeds, castes, communities ..." but "that was ... a few years ago .... Today the two bodies (Hindu and Muslim) are very largely together."¹ Even more outspoken was Mr. Cotton who said:

Self-government must fail if in any way it encourages or attempts to develop discordant elements in the community. The only chance of success is by teaching the people that they belong to one great community, and that the sole interest to have at heart is the common well-being. You cannot attain to that, however, by simply establishing cast-iron compartments for this, that or the other caste.²

But not all was opposition to communal representation. Sir H. Craik said:

"I am very glad the right hon. gentleman ... has ... adopted as a political measure ... a system of communal representation."³ So also Sir J.D. Rees who said that "my hon. Friend who last spoke disagrees with the principle of communal representation. The Muslims, however, will stick to that which they have ..."⁴ Equally emphatic was Captain Lloyd who said, "therefore, I do suggest that, however repugnant the idea of communal representation may be ... the difficulty has to be faced ...."⁵

---

¹. H. C. CXIX, 5 S, 1918, 1165 - 1166
². H. C. CXIX, 5 S, 1918, 1182. Colonel Wedgwood was emphasizing the same point when he said that "any people who are elected by a special class confine themselves to looking after the interests of that class and not look after the interests of the country as a whole." H.C. CXVI, 5 S, 1919, 1182.
³. H. C. CXVI, 5 S, 1919, 2328
⁴. H. C. CXIX, 5 S, 1918, 1175
⁵. H. C. CXIX, 5 S, 1918, 1167
Such being the position it was not unnatural that Montagu and Chelmsford, even though the former had emphatically declared that communal representation was a necessity in India, should entertain certain doubts as to the efficacy of the plan adopted. Their report stated that, as long as sectional interests were paramount, "any form of self-government to which India can attain must be limited and unreal at best". Communal division they admitted was "the difficulty that outweighed all others", and felt the need to qualify the view "that religions dissensions between the great communities are over". On the contrary Montagu and Chelmsford asserted that "as long as the two communities entertain anything like their present view as to the separateness of their interests, we are bound to regard religions hostilities as still a very serious possibility." The extent to which those interests were regarded as being divided was acknowledged by retention of separate electorates. 1 But this did not stop them from declaring in the most emphatic terms that "division by creeds and classes means the creation of political camps organized against each other, and teaches men to think as partisans not as citizens." 2 To them communal electorates were opposed to the teachings of history; they perpetuated class divisions; they stereotyped existing relations; and they constituted "a very serious hindrance to the development of the self-governing principle". 3 The Montagu-Chelmsford Report went as far as to concede that it

1. From the Montagu-Chelmsford Report quoted in R. Coupland, op.cit., p. 114
2. Quoted in R. Coupland, Ibid., p. 106
3. Quoted in Cmd. 2568, p. 137
gave a semblance of a divide and rule policy. But despite all these apprehensions both felt constrained to admit such a system into the reforms they were framing. So ran their Report.

Much as we regret the necessity we are convinced that so far as Muslims at all events are concerned the present system must be maintained until conditions alter, even at the price of slower progress towards the realization of a common citizenship.

The Constitution therefore included a provision which served as a perpetual source of contention between the three elements — the Hindus, who sought to abrogate, the Muslims, who sought to perpetuate and the British, who sought to accommodate. Writing at the period Lionel Curtis said:

The concession of this principle (communal electorates) when electoral institutions were inaugurated a few years ago, is the greatest blunder ever committed by the British Government in India. I believe that, if this principle is perpetuated, we shall have saddled India with a new system of caste which will eat every year more deeply into her life. So long as it remains, India will never attain to the unity of a nationhood. The longer it remains, the more difficult will it be to uproot, till in the end it will only be eradicated at the cost of a civil war. To enable India to achieve nationhood, is the trust laid on us; and in conceding the establishment of communal representation we have ... been false to that trust.

With remarkable insight Curtis was able to foretell the nature and evolution of the communal problem. Neither British officials nor again the Indian nationalists had such insight — hence the inevitable communal tangle.

1. "The British Government", said the Report, "is often accused of dividing men in order to govern them.... If it unnecessarily divides them at the very moment when it professes to start them on the road to governing themselves, it will find it difficult to meet the charge of being hypocritical or short-sighted." Quoted in R. Coupland, op.cit., p. 114
2. Quoted in Cmd. 3568, p. 158
3. L. Curtis, op.cit., p. 441
The Government of India Act found the Indian political scene in utter confusion. It was a time of concerted Hindu-Muslim action in opposition to the British. The suspicion which greeted the Act soon turned to outright opposition. As early as September of 1920 the Congress, led by Gandhi, published its resolution on non-co-operation and boycott of the reformed Councils. The Muslim League, which was destined to be eclipsed by the more aggressive Caliphate Committees, followed suit, declaring in the words of Jinnah, that "there is no course open to the people except to inaugurate the policy of non-co-operation." After a heated contest which threatened to irrevocably split the ranks of the Congress, a decision to contest the elections was taken, but even then the approach was negative.

In 1924 a section of the Congress led by Pandit Motilal Nehru and C. K. Das formed — in an atmosphere of rancor and bitterness — the Swarajya Party. It was planned to work within the ranks of the Congress. As opposed to the "non-changers", they favored participation in the councils. But they sought to enter the councils with a pre-determined plan tantamount to wrecking them from within. In their manifesto they demanded that control of the existing machinery and system of Government be vested in Indian hands. In the event this demand be not conceded by the Government, however, the Party declared it

1. M. Gwyer and A. Appadorai, op.cit., p. 1 - 2. The resolution provided for a withdrawal by candidates of their candidature for election to the reformed councils, and refusal on the part of the voters to vote for any candidate who may ... offer him for election.
to be "the duty of the members of the Party elected to the Assembly and
the Provincial Councils ... to resort ... to a policy of uniform, continuous
and consistent obstruction with a view to make Government through the Assembly
and Council impossible."¹ Their failure to carry forward their program was
due to the Liberals, followers of Gokhale who refused to support the extremest
elements in the Congress, or the representatives of special interests —
chief among whom were the Muslims.² But the Swarajya party continuously
demanded, from within the Councils, a revision and extension of reforms.
With the similar demands coming from the non-co-operators the din became
deafening. Subjected to it, and responsive to it was the new Viceroy,
Lord Irwin — later Lord Halifax.

Lord Irwin succeeded to the Viceroyalty of India in 1926. Human and
humane in his outlook, deeply religious, Irwin sought to bring peace to
embattled India. Indeed his mission to India, asserted Viscount Templewood —
earlier on Sir S. Hoare — was "to humanise the Government of India after
Reading's chapter of rigid ceremony and cautious legalism."³ It was Irwin
who urged Lord Birkenhead, Secretary of State for India, the necessity of
evolving a new set of reforms for India. For this purpose he chose a purely
Parliamentary body to inquire into Indian affairs, thus antedating by two
years the provision set down in the Government of India Act of 1919. The
Commission, headed by Sir John Simon was composed of British Parliament

---

¹ For the full text of the manifesto see M. Gwyer and A. Appadorai, op.cit.
p. 2 - 5
² For this critical period of Congress History see B.P. Sitaramayya, op.cit.
pps. 451 - 541
³ Viscount Templewood, Nine Troubled Years, London: Collins, 1954, p. 43
members solely, and as such proved offensive to Indian sensibilities and to Indian sympathizers in London.\(^1\) There were objections in the House of Commons concerning the membership of the Commission. Colonel Wedgwood felt that it would be better that such an unrepresentative Commission not go out to India for it would widen the gulf already dug between the British and Indian people.\(^2\) Mr. Saklatvala spoke in a similar vein saying that the Commission was not sufficiently representative and in time was able to remind the House that his prediction of a boycott had proved correct.\(^3\)

The Simon Commission was boycotted by almost all Indian representative bodies, be they Hindu or Muslim. The Congress, after declaring that the British Government had appointed the Statutory Commission in utter disregard of India's right of self-determination, resolved that the only course for India to adopt was to boycott the Commission at every stage and in every form.\(^4\) Not only

---

1. An aside in Earl of Halifax's Fullness of Days, London: Collins, 1957, p.115 – 116, is indicative of the opinions held by British officials in India. He said that his advisers suggested that the Commission be composed of Parliamentarians only. In this they were inspired by one vital consideration "and that was that the Muslims certainly would not boycott, and that if the Muslims did not boycott, the Hindus would hardly dare to do so, so sharp was communal tension, and so keen would be the anxiety lest the decision might go against those who did not appear before the Commission to make their case."

2. H. C. CCL, 5 S, 1927, 2241
3. Mr. Saklatvala (1874 –1956) was born in Bombay but resided in London. There he indulged in politics, became an active communist and was elected to Parliament to become the third India to rise to that office.
4. For the complete text of the resolution see, B. P. Sitaramayya, op. cit., p. 539 – 540.
the Congress but also an All-India group of leaders, including such personalities as Tej Bahadur Sapru, the theosopohist Annie Besant, M.A. Jinnah and Yakkub Hasan, issued a manifesto declaring that the Commission would be boycotted if it did not alter its British character. Jinnah could not sway the whole Indian Muslim body for part of it, known as the All-India Muslim Conference, decided to cooperate with the Commission.\(^1\) So strong in fact was Indian opposition that Sir John Simon found it necessary to attempt to alter the character of the Commission by setting up a Joint free conference, composed of the British members of the Commission and a corresponding body of Indians chosen by the Legislatures.\(^2\) This tactic was rebuffed in a statement by the influential and highly regarded Tej Bahadur Sapru who said that the provision was a mere palliative and reiterated the decision not to approach the Commission. Thus the Commission proceeded with its task, virtually working in a vacuum.\(^3\) It paid two visits to India and after prolonged and exhaustive study published an authoritative report on India at once, comprehensive, lucid and clear. When, however, the Commission was only at the beginning of its labors, a Conference, representing all Indian parties, was held in order to draw up an All-Indian constitution. The progress of this Indian conference was quickly obstructed.

---

1. For the full text of the resolution see M. Gwyer and A. Appadorai, op.cit., p. 207 - 208
3. The Times Delhi correspondent found an explanation for boycotting the Statutory Commission which surely appealed to the die-hard element. His view was that Indian nationalists maintain some semblance of authority when working in opposition. Otherwise, he asserted, the insurmountable difference between Hindu and Muslim would appear and the demand for outright self-government thwarted. **The Times**, 9 January, 1928
by omnipresent communal discord, and it was deemed necessary to establish a separate committee to deal with the communal tangle. Hindu-Muslim aspirations for unity were in the air but the riots of the past years were on terra firma. Neither the fasts of Gandhi, nor Hindu-Muslim unity talks, nor again a resolution of the Indian National Congress on the political, religious and other rights of the minorities had solved the problem.¹ Now it was hoped a panel of experts could find a solution to the communal issue. Accordingly, a nine-member committee under the chairmanship of Pandit Motilal Nehru was appointed by the Conference. After three months of labor it produced what became known as the Nehru Report. The Report, drawn up with the collaboration of two Muslim delegates who did not represent the Muslim League, reverted to the earlier Hindu repudiation of separate electorates. It recommended the abolition of reserved seats in Provinces wherein Muslims were in a majority and proportional representation where they comprised a minority.²

Intended to mark out the road of salvation, the Nehru Report instead indicated the path to doom. Muslim reaction to it, despite Jinnah's belated attempt at compromise and accommodation,³ was swift and decisive. From all corners came declarations of Muslim opposition. Early in 1929 the All-India Muslim Conference published its resolution declaring its unequivocal belief

¹ For the full text of the resolution see M. Gwyer and A. Appadorai, op. cit., p. 241 - 243.
² See Appendix A. for the full text.
³ Together with other Muslim leaders, Jinnah attended the closing sessions of the Nehru Committee. His demands for one-third Muslim representation in the control legislature, for reservation of seats in the Punjab and Bengal and for the provision of the provinces with residuary powers, were, despite an impassioned speech, all refused. R. Gopal, op. cit., pps. 211 - 221
in the necessity of maintaining separate electorates and ensuring a just representation of Muslims in any projected constitution. ¹ The Muslim League followed suit and declared its refusal to accept the Nehru Report. Instead it adhered to Jinnah's Fourteen Points, which called for full religious liberty, a continuation of separate electorates, adequate Muslim representation in any proposed Central Legislature and a uniform measure of autonomy to all provinces.²

The first — and only thorough-going — attempt by Indian nationalists to resolve the communal issue thus met with failure. The sequel was bitterness and acrimony. Lines were hardened, positions fixed, and from these there would be no deviation. Seemingly the only purpose of the Nehru Report was to provide a striking review of the difficulties that lay ahead.³

Meanwhile, with the Simon Commission engrossed in its labors, new political developments were made possible by a restatement of British governmental policy. Lord Irwin, having conferred with the new Labor Prime Minister, Ramsay MacDonald, declared in October of 1929 that:

In view of the doubts which have been expressed both in Great Britain and in India regarding the interpretation to be placed on the intentions of the British Government in enacting the Statute of 1919, I am authorized on behalf of His Majesty's Government to state clearly that in their judgement it is implicit that the natural issue of India's constitutional progress as there contemplated is the attainment of Dominion Status.

Not only was there a restatement of policy but also a new and novel approach, for it was decided that Round-Table Conference be convened in order to

1. See Appendix B. for the full text.
2. For the full text see Appendix C.
3. For a brief but useful account of the Nehru Report see R. Coupland op.cit., pps. 127 - 150 and R. Gopal, op.cit., pps. 198 - 221
4. M. Gwyer and A. Appadorai, op.cit., p. 225 - 227
deliberate on India's political conditions. The reception accorded the new approach in India was at once cordial and enthusiastic. But such was not the case in Britain. The statement, in Templewood's view, seemed unobjectionable but caused an explosion which left its marks on Indian and British politics. The use to which the sacred and ritual phrase of "Dominion Status" was put served to divide Churchill and Baldwin and cut off the die-hards from the main body of the Conservative Party. The former, in a spirit both spiteful and malicious, consistently repeated their conviction that India plagued with its communal differences, was not fit for Dominion Status. Indeed the statement marked the advent of Churchill's vitriolic and unremitting campaign against further reforms for India.

June, 1930 witnessed the publication of the Simon Commission's Report—a work of great magnitude providing a superb survey and constructive recommendations. It delved deeply into the communal problem declaring that this was aggravated by the advent of the reforms and the anticipation of what might come behind them in the form of the predominance of one community. Hence communal representation was considered to be not the cause but the expression of communal strife. Yet this conclusion did not prevent the Commission from voicing the conviction that "...separate communal electorates serve to perpetuate political

---

1. The Congress published a manifesto saying: "We hope to be able to tender our co-operation to His Majesty's Government in their effort to evolve a scheme of Dominion Constitution suitable to India's needs ...." B. P. Sitaramayya, op.cit., p. 593 - 594. Undoubtedly much optimism was generated by the fact that new British Government was headed by R. Macdonald, who had often spoken in sympathetic terms of India's aspirations.
2. Templewood, op.cit., p. 45 - 46
3. Cmd. 3568, p. 29
4. Cmd. 3568, p. 30
divisions on purely communal lines", and stating, "... their sympathy with those who look forward to the day when a growing sense of common citizenship and a general recognition of the rights of minorities will make such arrangements unnecessary."\(^1\) Despite this the Commission was compelled to pronounce that

in the absence of a new agreement between Hindus and Muslims, we are unanimous in holding that communal representation for the Muslims of a province must be continued, and that Muslim voters could not be deprived of this special protection until a substantial majority of Muslim representatives in the provincial legislatures declared themselves in favour of the change.\(^2\)

But how was it possible to anticipate such a change when the Commission asserted that it recognized "that communal representation" was "an undoubted obstacle in the way of the growth of a sense of common citizenship"?\(^3\) Their ultimate conclusion bespoke the characteristic British attitude."Until the spirit of tolerance is more widespread ... and until there is evidence that minorities are prepared to trust the sense of justice of the majority, we feel that there is indeed need for safeguards."\(^4\) The manner by which such safeguards were to be provided was the obvious one, for, as the Report stated "... We consider that the only practical means of protecting the weaker or less numerous elements in the population is by the retention of an impartial power, residing in the Governor-General and the Governors of provinces ...."\(^5\) The Commission, it is abundantly clear, was caught up in a vicious circle. Any radical approach to the problem would presuppose concessions to the majority group, or to put it

---

1. Cmd. 3568, p. 30
3. Cmd. 3569, p. 56
4. Cmd. 3569, p. 25
5. Cmd. 3569, p. 23
in the form in which it doubtless occurred to the British, an abandoning of
the Muslims to their fate in an autonomous India. The reaction of the nationalist
press to the publication of the Report was what might have been expected. The
Indian Daily Mail — an organ which reflected liberal opinion — stated that
"if Sir John Simon thinks the instalment plan of constitutional advancement is
going to satisfy India, then the sooner he is disillusioned the better". It in
fact likened the Report to "a rather badly cooked rice pudding, strongly
flavoured with the cinnamon of die-hardism". The Bombay Chronicle — an extreme
organ — said that the Report has "in almost every line of its subject revolting
libel on India and her people". As for Muslim reaction, Shaukat Ali said that
he was convinced that the Simon Commission had treated the Muslims with sympathy;
but he was not totally representative of Muslim opinion. Jinnah advised that
the Report be not even read.

Years of inquiry had ended, vast amounts of time and energy had been
expended — and to no avail. Truly it was effort wasted, for the Commission
was opposed in India and by-passed in England. It was by-passed in favor of
the more representative Round Table Conference.

The initial session of the Round Table Conference was held in November
1930. It was a striking scene at St. James Palace. King George V, resplendent
with decorations, Government and Opposition, grim in their determination, the
Indians, faltering and bewildered, were present. Yet the picture was incomplete —
Gandhi and the Congress representatives were missing. The explanation for this
is that the good will created by the Vicerecy's declaration was quickly dispelled.

1. Quoted in The Times, 11 June, 1930
2. Quoted in The Times, 11 June, 1930
3. The Times, 11 June, 1930
To the Congress the declaration could be interpreted as a surrender to India in the form of full Dominion Status — if not a severance of the British connection.\(^1\) To the British and particularly to certain elements in Parliament, the declaration held no such import.\(^2\) Lord Irwin, as a result, found it necessary to personally inform Gandhi and Motilal Nehru that he could not provide an assurance that the Round Table Conference would proceed on the basis of guaranteed Dominion Status.\(^3\) Shortly afterwards, Congress, with an infusion of zeal from the young Jawaharlal Nehru, opted for complete independence.\(^4\) This became, after the fateful Lahore Congress, Article I of the Congress creed; and December 31, 1929, was declared Independence Day.\(^5\) Nor were Congress fears allevied by Lord Irwin's speech to the Combined Legislatures, on January, 1930:

> I have never sought to delude Indian opinion into the belief that a definition of purpose, however plainly stated, would of itself, by the enunciation of a phrase provide a solution for the problems which would have to be solved before the purpose is fully realized. The assertion of a goal is of necessity a different thing from the goal's attainment. No sensible traveller would feel that the clear definition of his destination was the same thing as the completion of his journey.\(^6\)

---

1. B. P. Sitaramayya, *op.cit.*, p. 595 - 596
2. See the heated debate in that connection in H.C. CCXXXI, 5 S, 1929, 1309 - 1339, Lloyd George in this debate specifically demanded that the Government disavow the interpretation entertained by the Congress — the Government graciously obliged.
3. B. P. Sitaramayya, *op.cit.*, p. 600
5. "This Congress" recorded the manifesto, "declares that the word Swaraj ... of the Congress constitution shall mean Complete Independence." It proceeded and demanded that "all Congressmen will henceforth devote their exclusive attention to the attainment of Complete Independence to India." B. P. Sitaramayya, *Ibid.*, p. 605
6. Lord Irwin *op.cit.*, p. 76
The Congress detected a deflection of course and it was rendered clear to it that definition was being differentiated from and contrasted with solution, assertion with attainment and direction with destination. This inspired the Civil Disobedience movement, commencing with Gandhi's spectacular — and theatrical — march to the sea in order to illegally extract salt. But it was not mere Congress obstinacy and lack of confidence that precluded its attendance at the first session of the Round Table Conference, and thus exacerbated feeling both in England and India. Lord Irwin in his biography records with regret the vehement reaction in Britain to the declaration of Dominion Status and states:

I cannot doubt that the choice of public men in England of an attitude and language so lacking in imagination and sympathy was not without the influence at a formative moment in (strengthening) the demand for Independence.  

At the first session of the Round Table Conference an attempt, novel in the annals of imperial Indian history was made to work out the details of an Indian constitution. The British delegates and the Indian emissaries worked together, the latter inspired with newly-gained hopes for an All-India Federation. This was not merely a shadowy ideal, rather was the basis for projected constitution. In such a manner the Simon Report's recommendation for provincial autonomy without any corresponding changes in the central government were discarded. Indian delegates were overwhelmed by the conception and by the Maharaja of Bikaner's assertion that India was one geographic unit, that the Princes had their roots deep in India's historic past. Similarly spoke Taj Bahadur Sapru who declared that in the federal form of government lay the solution of the difficulty and the salvation of India. Even

1. Earl of Halifax, op. cit., p. 123  
3. Ibid., p. 210
Mohammed Ali declared that the Conference could only conclude with federation established in India. But this consensus on federation did not mean that the Conference functioned with unobstructed smoothness. The communal problem here again made its appearance. The Muslims, echoed by all other communities — even the Depressed classes — made it explicit that any projected constitution should contain "adequate safeguards" for their communal rights. Jinnah attempted to transcend religious differences in his demand for a full measure of self-government, while Mohammed Ali declared that "... where India is concerned, where India's freedom is concerned, where the welfare of India is concerned, I am Indian first, an Indian second, an Indian last and nothing but an Indian". But more important is the fact that the latter, in a private letter to the Prime Minister, asserted that he would never surrender separate electorates but would further demand that the Muslims be given full powers in provinces were they form a majority and full protection where they form a minority.

The problem was real and British authorities were aware of it, hence the decision to create sub-committees. But even these could not solve the problem for they sought not compromise and amelioration but definition and perpetuation of their claims. At the meetings of the Minorities sub-committee — a body composed of 39 members of whom 33 were Indians, presided over by R. MacDonald — the old battle of electorates was fought over and over again with the same unchanging, sterile arguments and with the same unchanging outcome — deadlock. The Hindu Mahasabha adopted a rigid position based upon uncritical approval of the

1. Ibid., p. 221
2. Ibid., p. 221 - 222
3. Ibid., p. 220
Nehru Report. The Sikhs, fired by the excessive demands of other communities, demanded an increase in their representation. The Depressed Classes under the able leadership of Dr. Ambedkar joined the chorus to insist upon separate representation. The Muslims, influential and confident, emphasized the historic precedent of separate electorates. Clearly, therefore, the different communities appeared as warring factions with the British as the uncommitted arbitrator. Yet who desired arbitration?

The opening Conference was only notable for the Prime Minister's repetition of the Government's statement of policy. The Government emphasized its responsibility for inserting constitutional provisions guaranteeing political representation and liberty of worship to the several minorities. With a note of admonition, the Prime Minister ended:

In the opinion of His Majesty's Government it is the duty of communities to come to an agreement amongst themselves... During the continuing negotiations such an agreement ought to be reached and the Government will continue to render what good efforts it can to help secure that end... 4

The communal problem, unsolved, would plague the deliberations of the second session of the Conference. But in this the Congress was represented by Gandhi. The "naked fakir" representing the mighty Congress proceeded to London accompanied by a few followers. He was the dictator of the Congress; he unfortunately sought to be the dictator of India. To the chagrin and utter

1. The Mahasabha was a Hindu religious movement turned political. It was represented by Dr. Moonje.
2. The Sikh spokesman was Sardar Sampuran Singh.
3. For the specific demands see N. Mansergh, Documents And ..., pps. 235 - 239
4. N. Mansergh, Documents And ..., p. 231
5. The attendance of Gandhi was rendered possible by the agreement reached between himself and Lord Irwin. The Irwin-Gandhi Pact, among other things provided for a suspension of the Civil Disobedience movement, release of political prisoners and relaxation of a number of stringent regulations. For the full agreement see B.P. Sitaramayya, op.cit., pps. 738 - 744.
consternation of many in the second plenary session Gandhi declared in the strongest terms that all "... other parties at this meeting represent sectional interests. Congress alone claims to represent the whole of India, all interests. It is no communal organization; it is a determined enemy of communalism in any shape or form." He also asserted that the Untouchables, as Hindus, could not be separated from the main body of Hinduism. He said: "I would not sell the vital interests of the Untouchables even for the sake of winning the freedom of India. I claim myself in my own person, to represent the vast masses of the Untouchables." Likewise he pre-empted the right to speak for Muslims, declaring that they had lived and would live in peace and harmony with the Hindus. Such remarks only emphasized the importance of the communal question. Personal conversations were conducted between Gandhi and the Muslim leaders — the latter strengthened by the inclusion of Iqbal. These, however, were more than ready to challenge Gandhi's pretensions.

The personal conversations proved a failure. The Aga Khan in his memoirs claims that Gandhi sought to impose a fundamental condition prior to all agreement, namely the acceptance of the Congress interpretation of Swaraj. The Muslims in turn, retorted proclaiming that they would concede to any interpretation of Swaraj — if their demands were fulfilled. According to the Aga Khan yet another difficulty arose from the fact that Gandhi in a dogmatic and unrealistic manner, maintained the one-nation theory, relegating the Muslims to the position

1. N. Mansergh, Documents And ..., p. 224
2. B. P. Sitarramayya, op.cit., p. 907
3. N. Mansergh, Documents And ..., p. 229
4. Aga Khan, op.cit., p. 229
5. Shamloo, op.cit., p. 208
of a mere competent element.\textsuperscript{1} The Muslim reaction to that explains the absence of agreement.\textsuperscript{2}

It was not unnatural that the meetings of the Minorities Committee should likewise meet with failure. Gandhi mooted the Congress scheme for a communal settlement therein. Once again the principle of joint electorates was upheld, with reservation of seats for the minorities.\textsuperscript{3} Gandhi restated the same principles when he declared that the "Congress will always endorse clauses or reservations as to fundamental rights and Civil liberties. It will be open to everybody to be placed on the voters' roll and appeal to the common body of the electorates".\textsuperscript{4}

The minority communities countered with their own proposals, declaring that separate electorates should be maintained. Particularly annoying to Gandhi, was the demand that the Depressed classes be granted separate constituencies for twenty years.\textsuperscript{5} To Gandhi, however, the cause of division and inability to agree lay not in communal demand and counter-demand but in another direction. In the sessions of the Second Conference he stated:

I repeat ... that so long as the wedge in the shape of foreign rule divides community from community and class from class, there will be no real living solution, there will be no living friendship between these communities. It will be after all and at best a paper solution. But immediately you withdraw that wedge, the domestic ties, the domestic affections, the knowledge of common birth — do you suppose that all these will count for nothing?\textsuperscript{6}

\textsuperscript{1} Aga Khan, \textit{op.cit.}, p. 228 - 229
\textsuperscript{2} Nehru dismissed the Aga Khan as a reactionary. He said that the Muslims refused Gandhi's advance because of their reaction. "It was political reaction that barred all progress and sheltered itself behind the communal issue." J. Nehru, \textit{An Autobiography}, p. 294
\textsuperscript{3} M. Gwyer and A. Appadorai, \textit{op.cit.}, p. 229
\textsuperscript{4} M. Gwyer and A. Appadorai, \textit{op.cit.}, p. 258
\textsuperscript{5} M. Gwyer and A. Appadorai, \textit{Ibid.}, pps. 252 - 255
\textsuperscript{6} N. Mansergh, \textit{Documents And ...}, p. 228
To him communal divisions were coeval with the British presence — eliminate the latter and the problem would likewise be eliminated. The British departure was a condition of solving the communal problem. Gandhi protested that he did not have a shadow of doubt that the iceberg of communal differences "would melt under the warmth of the sun of freedom."¹ He may have been overzealous in accusing and denouncing the British. Perhaps they did not create the communal problem, but had they not perpetuated it? Had not the Muslims been informed time and again that safeguards would never be denied them? Were they not reminded time and again that communal representation was insured by law and could not be tampered with?² Had they not been provided with a warm welcome from influential die-hard circles during the period of the Conference? Did not Lord Peet and the Duke of Marlborough specifically demand in the House of Lords safeguards for the minorities in any projected constitution?³ Did not Lord Lloyd declare that any good government was one which provided at least a modicum of safety for the minorities, and did he not declare that separate electorates were the sole means to insure protection for the Muslims?⁴ Were not the Muslims entertained by the National League in the House of Commons and did not Lord Brentwood declare that the Muslims, loyal to the King-Emperor, were entitled to demand that Great Britain should allow nothing to be done that would be unfair to their community?⁵ Did not the Government of India nominate communal Muslims to attend the Conference, while discouraging nationalists?⁶

---
¹ The Times, 9 October, 1931
² Lord Irwin, op.cit., pp. 231 - 236
³ The Times, 19 March, 1931
⁴ The Times, 15 July, 1931
⁵ The Times, 2 October, 1931
⁶ The Times, 5 August, 1931
Finally, were not the Muslims reassured by speeches in the House of Commons? In a torrent of words one member of Parliament after another demanded safeguards for the Muslims. From Sir John Simon who declared that "the Government ... should not conciliate extremism" but should "repeat and reaffirm ... a perfectly definite assurance to the minority communities of India ... securing ... their interests...,"¹ to Mr. Hamilton Kerr who demanded "that ... any concessions made ... shall embody the ideal that not even the meanest person ... shall suffer at the hands of his superior,"² and beyond to Charles Oman's declaration that "we are responsible for the Muslims, that they shall not be handed over to be governed by those who never governed them before ..." came assurances of British backing.³ While such statements were challenged by Colonel Wedgwood, who urged the Government "to disregard, if they are unreasonable the demands of those minorities",⁴ and Mr. Williams, who hoped that there would be no such thing as a separatist votes. They nonetheless provided the Muslims with the determination to persist in their demands; clearly such incidents served to stiffen Muslim resolve.⁵ Clearly the British waited for the reconciliation of views which, in the nature of things,

---

1. H. C. CCLIV, 5 S, 1931, 2332
2. H. C. CCLX, 5 S, 1931, 1183
3. H. C. CCLIV, 5 S, 1931, 1890
4. H.C. CCIX, 5 S, 1931, 1167
5. The favorable treatment accorded the Muslims did not fail to impress them. On his return to India from the Conference, Shaukat Ali said "We in India have not settled our differences and are shirking our responsibilities, and whenever we get in a blind alley, instead of retracing our steps we indulge in a futile game of abusing the British." He then declared his belief in the honesty of their purpose. The Times, 11 June 1923
could never be reconciled — and thus perhaps made conflict inevitable.¹

The British, however, did attempt to provide a solution, once it became apparent that the communal problem if not mitigated, would permanently preclude any constitutional advance. On 16 August 1932 a little before the third and last Round Table Conference Ramsay MacDonald announced the intention of the British Government to publish a scheme to resolve the communal problem. He remarked: "Our duty was plain. As the failure of the communities to agree amongst themselves has placed an almost insurmountable obstacle in the way of any constitutional development, it was incumbent upon Government to take action in accordance ..."² Thus the scheme known as the Communal Award was advanced. Among other things it provided for the retention of separate electorates, not only to Muslims but also to Christians, Sikhs and the Depressed classes.³ In relation to this Mr. MacDonald said: "However much Government have preferred a uniform system of joint electorates, they found it impossible to abolish the safeguards to which Minorities still attach vital importance."⁴ To the British the Communal Award was intended as a first step in the attainment of a modus vivendi between communities and was an expression of the sincere desire of

---

British to speedily introduce further responsible government. But such was not the impression created in India — at least among the Congress and its organs. The Free Press Journal, reflecting Congress opinions, said that the Award was intrinsically wrong and described it as the forerunner of communal strife. Advance, of similar sympathies, wrote: "Mr. MacDonald’s Award virtually negatives the scheme and plan of responsible government", and added that "the Prime Minister has paid his reactionary supporters the price of office. Mr. Churchill (and his followers) at the India office have realized their dream and achieved their object. But the innings is not yet complete."

Official Congress reaction to the provision of separate electorates to the Depressed classes was vehement. It was only after Gandhi embarked upon a "fast unto death" that this provision was eliminated in favor of joint electorates but with the reservation of seats. The Communal Award, "judged by the national standard" was declared "wholly unsatisfactory, besides being open to serious objections on other grounds." The reaction of the Muslim was somewhat different. The Muslim League insisted that the communal decision

1. Viscount Templewood, op.cit., p. 62
2. Nor for that matter among Conservative circles in Parliament Churchill said that the slogan 'combine and abdicate' might be applied for this would occur should the settlement prove successful. H. C. CCLXVII 5 S, 1932, 1595.
3. The Times, 18 August, 1932
4. This Agreement was known as the Poona Pact. It insured in reality better representation to the Depressed Classes but helped bring them within the general fold of Hinduism. M. Gwyer and A. Appadorai, op.cit., p. 265 - 266
5. M. Gwyer and A. Appadorai, Ibid., p. 266
be upheld. Iqbal exhorted Muslim popular feeling to stand boldly by the Communal Award even though it did not satisfy all their demands, for such was the only course they could adopt as practical men.

With the communal problem dispensed with — as far as the British were concerned — it was deemed possible to proceed with constitutional reform. After a long, laborious process, including the presentation to Parliament of a White Paper — 1933 — the submission of this to a Joint Select Committee of both Houses — which sat for nine months — and finally the introduction of a Bill adumbrating the proposals of the Government, advance seemed possible. But there arose the challenge of the newly awakened Conservatives. These, ably led by Churchill and Lord Lloyd, pursued a program of obstruction, persistent and unceasing. Commencing with the Round Table Conference which Churchill characterized as "a sort of large and lively circus in which 80 or 90 Indians representing hundreds of races and religions and 20 or 30 British politicians divided by an approaching general election were to scrimmage about together on the chance of their coming to some agreement," and when Lord Lloyd declared that it was a meeting with the seditionists and traitors, the campaign proceeded — extremist in language, unyielding in vigor, uncompromising in purpose. In speech and declaration vitriolic attacks were poured upon the Government for its "sweetness" and weakness. Again and again the Government was attacked for abandoning India. Obstructionism became the faith for the Tories. Therefore, the White Paper recommendations should have had a difficult passage in the Commons. Conservative

1. M. Gwyer and A. Appadorai, op. cit., p. 267
2. Shamloo, op. cit., pps. 212 - 213
3. The Times, 21 August, 1930
4. The Times, 14 February, 1931
5. The Times, 25 April, 1931
6. The Times, 24 May, 1933
7. The Times, 8 July, 1933
members repeated time without number the necessity of having safeguards far beyond those provided by the Paper. For the ideal of responsibility at the Center they substituted Provincial autonomy. In fact they conceived of constitutional advance as a retrogression — a return to the Simon Commission. Suddenly was discovered the "virtues" of the Simon Report and Churchill and his band extolled it in their speeches. India was declared to be unfit for democracy — which would be there but a sham and reforms were declared the ghost that would inflame communal riots. The inevitable question became — why, after all, reform? In dealing with such tirades the Government could only repeat its determination to insist on safeguards and maintain them, until it seemed as if the central issue was the safeguards.

No sooner had the White Paper been released than India joined in the chorus of opposition. Speaking for the Muslims Jinnah declared it to be treacherous, and the Congress in its turn deprecated it and provided an alternative — a constitution drawn up by an Indian constituent assembly elected by manhood suffrage. The Hindu Mahasabha condemned it outright.

Yet work proceeded and on December of 1934 a debate on the recommendations of the Joint Select Committee was held. The Report fastened upon the Communal problem declaring:

Parliamentary Government, as it is understood in the United Kingdom, works by the interaction of four essential factors: the principle of majority rule, the willingness of the minority for the time being to accept the decisions of the majority; the existence of great political parties divided by broad issues of policy, rather than by sectional

1. H. C. CCLXXVI, 5 S, 1933, 913
2. H. C. CCLXXVI, 5 S, 1933, 742
3. H. C. CCLXXVI, 5 S, 1933, 742
4. H. C. CCLXXVI, 5 S, 1933, 1105 – 1106
5. H. C. CCLXXVI, 5 S, 1933, 702
6. H. C. CCLXXVI, 5 S, 1933, 724
7. The Times, 4 April, 1934
8. The Times, 18 June, 1934
interests; and finally the existence of a mobile body of political opinion, owing no permanent allegiance to any party and therefore, able, by its instinctive reaction against extravagant movements on one side or the other, to keep the vessel on an even keel. In India none of these factors can be said to exist today. There are no parties, as we understand them, and there is no considerable body of political opinion which can be described as mobile. In their place we are confronted with the age-old antagonism of Hindu and Muslim, representatives not only of two religions but of two civilizations; with numerous self-contained and exclusive minorities, all a prey to anxiety for their future and profoundly suspicious of the majority and of one another; and with the rigid divisions of caste, itself inconsistent with democratic principle. In these circumstances communal representation must be accepted as inevitable at the present time, but it is a strange commentary on some of the democratic professions to which we have listened. We lay stress on these facts because in truth they are of the essence of the problem and we should be doing no good service to India by glossing over them. These difficulties must be faced, not only by Parliament but by Indians themselves. It is impossible to predict whether, or how soon, a new sense of provincial citizenship, combined with the growth of parties representing divergent economic and social policies, may prove strong enough to absorb and obliterate the religions and racial cleavages which thus dominate Indian political life. Meanwhile it must be recognized that, if free play were given to the powerful forces which would be set in motion by an unqualified system of parliamentary government, the consequences would be disastrous to India, and perhaps irreparable. In these circumstances the successful working of parliamentary government in the Provinces must depend, in a special degree, on the extent to which Parliament can translate the customs of the British Constitution into statutory 'safeguards'.

The conclusions of the Joint Select Committee on the communal problem were accepted without opposition — excepting, of course, Colonel Wedgwood. In vain did he call for an abolition of the system, asserting that "communal representation divides a country for all time", and "introduces a cleavage which can never be repaired". His attempts could not have been but vain for the system was not only accepted but was also defended by a large number of members — some of whom, like Viscount Wolmer, still thought the Muslims were unjustly treated because the Hindus were insured a permanent majority in five provinces.  

1. N. Mansergh, Documents And ..., p. 248 - 249  
2. H. C. CCXCVI, 5 S, 1934, 152  
3. H. C. CCXCVI, 5 S, 1934, 92 - 3
demanded that the system be maintained, "for surely", he said, "if you have a division as deep and intense as that which separates Muslims and Hindus than (sic) if both sections are put into a common electorate it only means that division will be the subject matter of any election" and "the minority is bound in every case to be defeated and never to get a chance of representation in the Legislatures". ¹ Even Labor conceded the maintenance of the system.² And to remind Parliament that the system was, after all, partly beneficial to the British, Sir E. Percy, asserted that Congress could never challenge the Governor-General "since in the Central Legislature there were minorities that would never reconcile themselves to it".³

Such again was the case with the India Bill of 1935 — government sponsored communalism, endorsed by the Conservative Right. The opposition was scattered and disorganized. To the government the communal problem was a stumbling block to the attainment of responsible government, a problem which it hoped could be overcome.⁴ Meanwhile the provisions of the Communal Award were to be maintained as Sir Samuel Hoare pointedly indicated: "Greatly", said he, "as we regret the need for those communal divisions, I believe that if we once gave the impression in India that the question was again open, we should not only plunge ourselves into endless controversy, but we should do something much more serious, we should plunge India, into a controversy the end of which I would not foresee".⁵ To the Conservative Right the communal problem was a manifestation of the necessity of

¹. H. C. CCXCVI, 5 S, 1934, 229
². H. C. CCXCVI, 5 S, 1934, 234
³. H. C. CCXCVI, 5 S, 1934, 229
⁴. H. C. CCXCVII, 5 S, 1935, 1165
⁵. H. C. CCC, 5 S, 1935, 1027
maintaining British power in India for only thus could the conflagration, smoldering under the embers of communalism, be contained. Moreover, it provided an adequate reason for denying reforms, for reforms only rendered the divisions more acute. And if reforms were to be granted then communal representation had to be maintained for they were the expression of real grievances. As for all the questions of democracy in India, answers were provided by Mr. Churchill. He said: "I should like to ask the hon. Member does he call the Bill democracy? Is caste reconcilable with democracy?" The answer could not but be no, yet Churchill demanded not the abolition of the communal system but the disavowal of the Bill. In the same breath he said:

We are no more aliens to India than the Muslims or the Hindus themselves. We have as good a right to be in India as anyone there .... Our Government is not an irresponsible Government. It is a Government responsible to the Crown and to Parliament. It is incomparably the best Government that India has ever seen or will ever see. It is not true to say that Indians, whatever their creed, would not rather have their affairs dealt with by the British than by their own people, especially their own people of opposite religion.

Even the liberals, although conceding that communal electorates were contrary to British conceptions of democracy, asserted that their maintenance was unavoidable since these were the demands of the Muslim community ever since the question of constitutional reform arose in India. These were also the views of Mr. Attlee, the representative of Labor.

1. H. C. CCXCVII, 5 S, 1935, 1469
2. H. C. CCXCVII, 5 S, 1935, 1511
3. H. C. CCXI, 5 S, 1935, 1028
4. H. C. CCXCVII, 5 S, 1935, 1650
5. H. C. CCXCVII, 5 S, 1935, 1650 - 1651
7. H. C. CCXI, 5 S, 1935, 1028 - 1031
Almost alone in his perseverance, Colonel Wedgwood poured invective on
the system. To him it did not provide protection but was the harbinger of
permanent separation between the communities.\(^1\) He was convinced that the
communities would abolish separate electorates if they were given the permission
to form a common basis of Indian citizenship.\(^2\) Wedgwood saw the system as one
enacted for discreditable reasons by the British, who undertook to counterpoise
the contending parties giving advantages first to the Muslims, then to the Hindus,
etc.. Such a policy of revived "divide and rule" he considered immoral for it
perpetuated division and gave Muslims and Hindus the conviction that the British
sought to separate India.\(^3\) Mr. Vyvyan Adams shared these views declaring that
the aim of Britain should be to enable India to realize political unity and added

Some strange evidence was submitted to the Joint Parliamentary Committee
suggesting that at some date there would be a federation of Muslims
comprising Baluchistan, Sind, the Punjab, the North-West Frontier Province
and Kashmir, and it was proposed that with them was to be federated
Afghanistan.

He proceeded to assert that "such arrangement is not in accordance with our
traditional ideas of Muslim loyalty, and would be quite inconsistent with what ... we have grown to expect from the Muslim community."\(^4\)

In August of 1935 India was endowed with a new constitution. Nine years
deliberations had transpired and now India was granted the opportunity to progress
along the way to responsible government and Dominion Status. While the provinces
were to have parliamentary responsible government, even here the central authority
was still powerful, possessed as it was of the right to exercise its individual

---

1. H. C. CCCI, 5 S, 1935, 1019 - 1020
2. H. C. CCXCIX, 5 S, 1935, 1065
4. H. C. CCCI, 5 S, 1935, 1033
judgement in matters pertaining to security. While the franchise was extended to include 50 million people, communal representation was predominant. At the Center a federal government was to be established with a legislative composed of two houses—a legislative assembly and a council of state.—yet here again the provinces could not come into operation until 50 per cent of the princes had signed the instrument of accession. Although in general ministers were responsible to the Legislatures yet the portfolios of Defence and Foreign Affairs were reserved to the Governor-General in Council.¹ No wonder then that the Congress rejected the Act root and branch. It was, declared Nehru, "a new charter of slavery". Congress propaganda belittled every commission and magnified every omission. Every reservation and restriction, every check and safeguard was projected into the limelight and the Act was declared a deliberate mockery of self-government. Britain confused by the revitalized die-hards could not comprehend Indian nationalist demands for emancipation. The Indian nationalists could not realize that British constitutional practice was based, not on the provisions of an Act, but on usage and convention. The Indian Liberals and the Muslims, not without misgivings, acquiesced and sought to give the Act of 1935 a fair trial.²

Thus concluded a formative period of political development in India. A constitution was granted to India. It was suspect, for it was both belated and unsatisfactory. To some extent this could be explained by the ingrained British fear of overly rapid progression. To a greater extent it was caused by the

¹ This summary of the Act was adopted from R. Masani, op.cit., p. 157 - 158. A fuller treatment can be found in N. Mansergh, Documents And ..., pps. 254 - 271
² In the attitude of Indian parties see R. Masani, op.cit., pps. 161 - 162 and Coupland op.cit., pps. 145 - 147
obstruction of Churchill and his group, an obstruction which often utilized the communal problem as its weapon. Such circumstances acted to deny India the will and opportunity to digest the Act, to give it a trial. India was instead kept in a state of political confusion and ferment until the world was caught up in a second cataclysmic war. No more proof is here required of Churchill's impact on the problem than the testimony of distinguished British officials and contemporaries. In his autobiography Lord Halifax asserted that by one means or another the different parliamentary stages were unnecessarily and shrewdly extended, thus frustrating the speedy passage of the Bill. Herein lay the seeds of tragedy "The real misfortune", said he, "had been the delays arising during the passage of the Bill, consequent upon the die-hard opposition in Parliament." "Seldom", he added, "could a small minority have been able to affect more powerfully, and ... more unfortunately, the fate of a great constitutional enterprise. As events were to turn out the imperative need was to get Federation into working order ... before the war started. It would have been incomplete ... but even incomplete it would have exerted an attractive force not without effect in quarters where misgivings and hesitations lingered."¹ Viscount Templewood shared this opinion saying that although Churchill could not prevent the Bill from becoming law, he prevented it from becoming law in time, thus destroying the breathing-space requisite for the successful functioning of the Constitution. "Whilst in the eighteenth

¹. Lord Halifax, op.cit., p. 125
century", he asserted, "it had been Indian politics that for many years had dominated the British Parliament, it was British politics at the time of the Government of India Act that chiefly frustrated agreement on a united India."1

1. Templewood, *op.cit.*, p. 103
CHAPTER V

The End Of An Era

We go to the Legislature not to co-operate with the apparatus of British imperialism, but to combat the Act and seek to end it, and to resist in every way British imperialism in its attempts to strengthen its hold on India and its exploitation of the Indian people. That is the basic policy of the Congress and no Congress man, no candidate for election must forget this. Whatever we do must be within the four corners of this policy. We are not going to the Legislatures to pursue the path of constitutionalism or barren reform. 1

In these emphatic terms Jawaharlal Nehru described nationalist policy in the Faizpur - 1936 - session of the Congress. Such became the unswerving policy of the Congress in contesting the elections provided for in the Act of 1935. In milder, but similar terms, Mr. Jinnah advised that

... the provincial scheme of the constitution be utilised for what it is worth, in spite of the most objectionable feature contained therein, which render real control, responsibility of Ministry and Legislature over the entire Government and administration nugatory ... 2

These attitudes governed Congress and Muslim League in the election campaigns, but the Congress was by far the better equipped. Indeed, the Congress possessed the largest propaganda machine in Asia and it manipulated this machine with great effectiveness. Almost every village of India had its Congress office and flag, Congress processions and agents who persistently and unceasingly exploited grievances. Again and again promises were reiterated which created in the mass mind a vision of an earthly paradise, once the British Raj had been dispersed. The Muslim League content with its frank and outspoken exposition of

its policy, and deluded by its representative character campaigned hardly at all. The results of the election were what might have been expected. Out of 1,585 seats in all the Provincial lower houses the Congress won not less than 711. Yet the proportions of this victory could not obscure the fact that the Congress – in its role of a secular Party – was only able to contest 58 Muslim seats out of 482 with results which were hardly satisfying. For many the conclusion was inescapable that the Congress, for all its manifestoes, was nothing more than a Hindu party. Nehru was fully aware of the implications of this situation, and declared that only in regard to the Muslim seats did the Congress lack success. This was a development of ominous significance to India. On the other hand the Muslim League was by far worse off. It seemed obvious that many were hardly content to have the League arrogate to itself the function of spokesman for the entire community. In every Muslim majority province, except Bengal, the League was routed, and even in Bengal it did not secure an outright majority. Thus nowhere did it achieve the strength to have some bearing upon ministerial actions, let alone the ability of forming its own ministries. The election results served as a mirror in which the Congress and the Muslim League saw a reflection which invalidated their claims. The unambiguous verdict was passed: Congress did not represent All-India and the League was not All-Muslim. It was a verdict of

2. R. Gopal, op.cit., p.245.
3. M. Gwyer and A. Appadorai, op.cit., p.422
failure, and both organizations reacted strongly. The Congress, asserting that the Muslims had been long neglected and misled, declared that the election had laid the ghost of communalism. Therefore the Congress emphasized its determination to press unremittingly for the inclusion of the Muslim masses and intelligensia in its own ranks.² The clarified viewpoint of the Congress was that the Muslim League was not to be considered as the sole political body representing the Muslims. It was to be regarded as a communal organization like any other;² and in fact could not be considered as a contending party since in reality there were but two parties - the Congress and the British.⁵

The defeat the League sustained came as a stunning blow, but it was not fatal. Jinnah, aware as ever of the necessity of concerted action, sought to reconcile the League and the Congress and cause them to "work together as equal partners."⁴ He reiterated his conviction that there was no "substantial difference ... between the League and the Congress," and that he would "always be glad to co-operate with the Congress,"⁵ yet to the Congress this suggested something other than the spirit of reconciliation. Had not the League been disavowed by its very own? Thus an alternative road had to be taken. The nature of the League had to be transformed, from an upper class aristocratic body, conservative in program, narrow in outlook, limited in number and believing that political activity was the privilege of the few, it had to become a mass movement, possessed of a social program and able to infiltrate the ranks of the masses - the people it

---

2. M. Gwyer and A. Appadorai, ibid., p. 422.
5. R. Symonds, op. cit., p. 53.
had long claimed to represent. The rallying cry which was provided was "Islam in danger". By inflammatory speech and clever rhetoric, by insinuation and flattery the League succeeded in canalizing into one simple expression the hates, vexations, anxieties and ambitions of the Muslims. It was able to exact from the previously inert masses a passionate response. Gradually its ranks swelled and it soon proved, much to the surprise and consternation of the Congress, to be effectively the third party of India. New life seemed to be infused into Islam in India. Powers of recuperation and revival were demonstrated which the Congress could not, would not, comprehend. The ostrich-like attitude of the Congress contained the seeds of tragedy.

But it was not solely changes of technique and approach which effectively transformed the Muslim League into the vocal protagonist of the Muslim masses. The Congress, with blunders of Himalayan proportions, was also responsible. In its moment of victory, when it was the unchallenged master of six provinces, the Congress was confronted with two choices. One was the adoption of a policy of reconciling and accommodating the Muslim League. This would have entailed taking the League into partnership and constituting Congress-League ministries in provinces with Congress majorities. The other was the adoption of a policy of non-recognition in an attempt to discount and ignore the League. The Congress chose the latter path as indeed seemed natural. The Congress' action is not

---

1. The attempt to achieve a communal settlement in 1938 between Jinnah and Subhas Bose failed because the Congress never recognized the League's claim to sole representation of the Muslim. M. Gwyer and A. Appadorai op.cit., pps.248 - 269. Smith characterized its policy as "Fascist."
fully explained by an adamant policy generated by sweeping electoral successes. This was, to be sure a factor for the Congress, having distinguished itself in the elections could now record in resounding language "its high appreciation of the magnificent response ... to the call of the Congress ... and the approval by the electorate of the Congress policy and programme."\(^1\) This approach was quickly interpreted as having set the seal to the Congress' demand for termination of the Act of 1935, in favor of total independence.\(^2\) For such reasons the Congress felt justified in denying the Muslims' League's claim to sole representation of the Muslims.\(^3\) This led directly to the decision, which seemed to emphasize the League's impotence, to form purely Congress ministries. Yet this uncompromising attitude cannot be understood unless it is realized that the Congress - like other doctrinaire parties - was encaptured by its own problem of total independence and social change, anti-imperialism and the establishment of an Indian Raj.\(^4\) If such were its aims how could it align itself to a Muslim League, conservative in outlook feudal in organization limited in aim? Would not the League prove a hindrance, a retarding factor militating against a rapid process of change. Indeed why should the Congress, the party with an overwhelming majority in the Legislatures

---

1. N. Mansergh, *Documents And ..., p.293 - 294.*
3. J. Nehru, *The Discovery of India*, p.328, further clarifies this point, asserting that the demand of the League could not be accepted since it would mean the elimination of other Muslim organizations, and would cause the abandonment of Muslims in the ranks of the Congress. This he considered impossible since it would involve a transformation of the character of the Congress and render it highly sectarian.
shackle itself to so miniscule, so ineffectual and, in its opinion so reactionary
a body as the League, merely because it was Muslim? Furthermore the Congress,
in a logical and consistent extension of its general political ideology, always
denied the validity of communalism - the very raison d'être of the Muslim League -
and proclaimed its unalterable belief in total democracy. It stood for a genuine
democratic state in India wherein political power would be transferred to the
people as a whole and wherein the Government would be their servants.\(^1\) Clearly
the Muslim League could not fit into the scheme of Congress political ideology.\(^2\)
This ideological difference was rendered more apparent and acute by the very
nature of the Act of 1935 - which indeed was to prove its most dangerous draw-
back. The Act, providing as it did for minority representation through communal
electorates and such devices as weightage and second chambers, nevertheless main-
tained the theory of sovereignty based on the concept of a homogeneous
democratic and national state. Majority decisions were to provide the ultimate
answers to all questions. Such a governing philosophy failed to take cognizance
of India's plurality of religions and cultures.\(^2\) Hence it was an open invitation
to the Congress to work directly toward establishing an unchallenged authority.
Yet the Congress reacted to this situation prior to its assumption of office, in
a manner revelatory of a certain amount of pettiness and bad faith. During the
election campaign both parties had co-operated to a certain extent - particularly
in the United Provinces - on the tacit understanding that coalition governments
would be formed. This was definitely the agreement in the United Provinces. But

\(^1\) M. Brecher, op. cit., p.252 - 255.
\(^2\) V.A. Smith op. cit., p.814 - 815.
what had been applicable before the elections was ignored after the votes had been cast. Now, intoxicated by the response of Indian opinion the Congress was in a position of strength; it did not reject outright the offer of cooperation but met it with scorn and disdain. Impossible conditions were laid down, transparent in their aim of eliminating the League as a political factor. Its members, if they were to join the Congress provincial Cabinet, had to disavow their affiliation to the League and merge themselves in the Congress. Furthermore the League groups in the Assemblies were required to disband - to hitch their wagon to the Congress star, as it were. In one instance - in the United Provinces - the League was to desist from contesting by elections.\(^1\) Such conditions constituted an invitation to commit political suicide. The League resisted, the Congress scoffed and Congress Cabinets were formed, with a sprinkling of obedient Muslims. Therein the Congress erred and its mistake, seemingly insignificant at the time, was to prove to be of crucial importance. From this juncture the rift between the Congress and the League widened greatly. The split served but one purpose, which was to strengthen the Muslim League.\(^2\)

Then, as if the alienation was not complete enough, the Congress undertook to aggravate feelings of tension. An electioneering program, with grassroots appeals to the Muslims was initiated. This and the high price asked for participation in provincial ministeries had a decisive impact upon Jinnah. Henceforth the Muslim League would appeal directly and energetically to the Muslim masses and would be astounded - as the Congress would be also - at the volume and

\(^1\) M. Gwyer and A. Appadorai, *op.cit.*, p.389. This to Jinnah was "the height of ignorance."
intensity of the response. Indeed by 1936 Jinnah, participating in arid and fruitless negotiations with Nehru over the communal problem, began to betray extreme intransigence. His stand was inspired by the growing power of the League. Hence it became possible for him to declare repeatedly, and with justification, that the Muslim League alone was the representative of the Muslims.

A deadlock arose from the Congress demands before its assumption of office. They sought a public commitment by the Governors not to use their special powers to interfere in the operation of the ministries. The British declined to provide such an assurance and interim governments failed to function. Finally the Congress took over the ministries of those Provinces in which they possessed a majority. No attempt will be made to discuss the two-year period of Congress rule - 1937 to 1939 for this is beyond the scope of this study. It will suffice to point out that the Congress Cabinets were governed to a great extent by the comprehensive program prescribed by the Congress Party. Substantial reductions in rent and revenue, repeal of all repressive laws, release of political prisoners and unemployment relief were included in this program. But immediately, on its assumption of office, the Congress was confronted by the problem of reconciling theory and practice. How could it, a party dedicated to the overthrow of a constitution, maintain and run a province? Would the responsibilities of the rule enforce a conservative trend?

1. The negotiations took the form of correspondence between both, but these proved a failure due to the intransigence of both.
3. These Provinces were Madras, Bombay, the United Provinces, Bihar, the Central Provinces, Orissa and the North-West Frontier.
This in reality became the situation and the Congress Cabinets, although responsible for the passage of much worthwhile legislation seemed to abandon many preconceived plans and tactics. Political prisoners were released, emergency powers repealed, bans on illegal associations lifted and securities of newspapers returned.\footnote{R. Coupland, \textit{op.cit.}, p.151 - 158.} Law and order were to the greatest extent maintained, and in reality the Congress successfully retained the coherence and internal stability of their Provinces. The burdens of Government worked a transformation in the Congress image. Non-violence was transformed into legalised violence in order to cope with peasant disturbances - as occurred in Bihar, or labor agitation - as occurred in Bombay and Cawnpore, or communal strife which after a period of lull seemed to be re-awakening with added vigor and intensity. And now Congress Cabinets had to act forcefully for they were frequently reminded that only they were responsible for the maintenance of law and order.\footnote{H.C. CCCXLIV, 5 S, 1939, 37 - 40.} It was to be expected that charges of inefficiency, vacillation and even deception were soon levelled against Congress ministries. They became the targets for extreme criticism by the Leftist nationalists, socialists and leaders of labor and peasant movements. The list of grievances recorded in the most provocative language, soon became extremely lengthy. Included were the continuation of the Criminal Law Amendment Act in Madras, the enactment of the Trade Disputes Act in Bombay which restricted the freedom of strike, the application of the Criminal Law Amendment Act in the North-West Frontier Province, the application rather than the destruction of the Constitution, and - ultimately the most damaging - the
failure of the Congress to implement the long-heralded social program. But such criticisms were dwarfed by still more violent criticism and opposition from the revitalized Muslim League.

Stunned by its defeat at the polls, left in the political wilderness because it resisted absorption by the Congress, the League could not but turn to its own Muslim masses who were being so assiduously courted by the Congress. The Congress reiterated that only it - and not the Muslim League, shot through with feudalistic and upper-bourgeois tendencies - was the champion of the poor and the harbinger of their social advance. But social advance came neither to Hindu nor Muslim and the League, aware of this, turned the weapon of the Congress against itself. The Hindus, it declared, did not promise economic advance, but denied such advance to all but Hindus. In an endless chain of declarations the Muslim League described a catalogue of horrors - economic, social and political - which awaited the complacent Muslims. They were reminded that "all the economic bourses, the bloated userers, industrial magnates and capitalists in the country are all Hindus," and asserted that "Hindu middle-class is prosperous and flourishing and controls all the ... trade of the country." Clearly then the only solution resided in emancipation from the economic slavery of the Hindus." Only the Muslim League, it averred, could show the way, provide the solutions. The Muslims responded. The League accumulated

1. A.R. Desai op. cit., p. 345 - 348. The failure may be simply explained - long after the crises - by the non-availability of resources to support such a program.
3. Jinnah, denouncing the Congress mass contact drive, said: "It is a dangerous move (intended to divide Muslims) and it cannot mislead anyone ... The Muslim League ... considers the policy of direct action as suicidal." N. Mansergh, Documents And ... p. 297.
strength and commenced a campaign of defamation against the Congress ministries - corruption in Government was described, abuses in governmental educational program detailed, governmental partisanship exposed, all in the most provocative terms imagineable. The Congress ministries were pictured as intent on one purpose - utter domination of the Muslims. Substantiation for this claim was sought by the publication of three key reports - the Pirpur, Sharif and Fazl-ul-Huq reports. The first was mild in tone and repeated the grievance of the Muslims - over exclusion from the Cabinets and the commencement of the Congress program of mass agitation among the Muslims. The League's refusal to recognize the undisputed authority of Congress was emphasized. The conviction was restated that "no tyranny can be as great as the tyranny of the majority and ... that only that state can be stable which gives equal rights and equal opportunities to all communities ..." The other two reports were more violent acerbic, dwelling with almost repulsive detail on atrocities allegedly committed against the Muslims. That there was some truth in the allegations is undeniable but to accept them totally would be wrong. The Congress might have erred in not sanctioning the formation of composite ministries, it might have possessed a Hindu character, it might have shown - be it purposely or not - favor to the Hindus, but to conclude that if enforced upon its governments a deliberate policy of suppressing and destroying the Muslim community would be a surrender to mere fancy. The Congress, from its inception, sought to establish its non-sectarian character, and it would be inconceivable, contrary to all its political maxims to have worked to destroy

---

3. R. Coupland, op.cit., p.185
this over a period of two years. Indeed independent opinion justified and
supported the Congress policy. The Governor of the United Provinces said, on
his retirement in 1939, that "in dealing with communal issues" Ministers "had
normally acted with impartiality and a desire to do what was fair".¹

Until 1938 the Muslim League campaign was a best negative in character.
It was anti-Hindu anti-Congress and opposed to a unitary India in which Muslim
identity would be lost. Protests were vehement, accusations filled with acrimony.
All was antagonism. But after 1938 the Muslims evolved a dynamic and positive
ideology. To the merits of total democracy persistently preached by the Congress
was counterpoised the belief in nationalism. The appeal of democracy — which
considered a Muslim akin to any other Indian — was now countered by the appeal
of nationalism. But that nationalism was sectional and narrow in nature, relating
only to the Muslims of India. These no longer regarded themselves a minority
community like any other — they were a nation. Thus could the Sind Muslim League
declare in October of 1938 that this

Conference in the interest od abiding peace of the vast Indian continent
and of unhampered cultural development, economic and social betterment, and
political self-determination of the Hindus and Muslims, recommends ... to
review the entire question of what should be a suitable constitution for
India, which will secure an honourable and legitimate status due to the
Muslims, and further devise a scheme of constitution under which, the
Muslims may attain full independence.²

India*.
². A.B. Rajput, *op.cit.*, p.71. The resolution of the same Conference is reproduced
by R. Gopal, *op.cit.*, p.765 but differs in that it concludes by saying "... and
political self-determination of the nations, known as Hindus and Muslims, that
India may be divided into two federations, viz. the federation of the Muslim
states and the federation of non-Muslim states." Worthwhile noting here is the
fact that two-nation theory was actually encouraged as early as 1937 by the
Hindu Mahasabha communal party. Its President V.D. Savarkar stated: "Let us
bravely face unpleasant facts as they are. India cannot be assumed today to
be a unitarian and homogenous nation, but on the contrary there are two nations
Indeed so tense had the relationship become between the Hindus and Muslims in 1939 that Jinnah called for the commemoration of December 22nd as "Deliverance Day." At that date, because of the question of India's participation in the war, each of the Congress Ministries resigned. Said Jinnah:

I wish the Muslims all over India to observe Friday the 22nd December as the "day of deliverance" and thanksgiving as the mark of relief that the Congress regime has at least ceased to function. 1

Clearly the year closed on an ominous note. It was in fact the end of an era. World War II introduced new factors and so altered the relationship of India to the British Empire, that the period from the onset of World War II until partition must be considered as a separate period.

What, however, had become of the British authority and what was its role, if any, in the communal problems which plagued India after the implementation of the India Act of 1935.

Lord Willingdon-Viceroy until 1936 - declared before his departure from India that before the country could attain a national democratic life it would be necessary to get rid of the communal problem which, like a cancer, was eating into her body. And this solution had to emanate from India. 2 His was a restatement of the long-standing appeal for a solution to a problem for which as had been established over the years - there was no solution without some form of external guidance or stimulus. This persistent attitude was shared by the new Viceroy, Lord Linlithgow. If anything, he was more determined to stand above the

2. The Times, 24 March, 1936
fray. In his first address he reminded the Indians that he was incapable of preferring any one community over another and he gave assurances that all communities would receive his attention yet none his partiality. Once again there was seen - and this was the story of the British Raj in the interwar years - willingness to listen, willingness to advise, but never willingness to decide. With that perspective which history affords us, now that years have passed since partition institutionalized the communal problem, it is possible to conclude that had decisions in fact been taken, had initiative been grasped by the British, the subcontinent might today experience a much greater degree of harmony and tranquility.

Parliament, on the eve of the Second World War, again discussed the communal problem. Two decades had passed since the first debates on communalism, and yet the speeches, the attitudes, the terms of reference were identical with those of the early 1920's. The scene was the same, the roles were unchanged, only the actors were different. The results were no different. Perhaps this is the most telling commentary of all on the communal problem, or indeed on the closing years of the Raj.

From the conservative right there arose that perennial demand that the minorities, before India be granted Dominion States, be, assured that they, would retain their separate identity, unquestioned and unchallenged by the majority. "We," said Sir G. Schuster, "are not prepared to force a new constitution on India which abandons the safeguards for the minorities. We pledge ourselves to give safeguards for the protection of minorities and those safeguards cannot

1. The Times, 20 April, 1936.
be weakened."¹ Viscount Wolmer was more emphatic, reminding the Parliament that "when we conquered India we did not conquer it from the Hindus but ... from the Muslims" and that to "plunge the country into full democracy without getting the goodwill of the Muslims ... would be to ask for trouble."² Again the communal problem was used as a weapon to hold back change, innovation or experiment in search of a formula for greater freedom and self-rule. The Torries used communalism to rationalize inaction and support for the status quo.

The representatives of Labor restated their long-standing conviction that the communal problem should not be used - or misused - for any ulterior motives. "It is often said," asserted Wedgwood Benn, "that Hindu-Muslim differences are fostered on behalf of the retention of British control. If that is so ... it is a crime."³ Sir Strafford Cripps in those vehement terms which characterized his speeches, declared that "the argument that communal antagonism precludes any constitutional advance is a false one and not valid."⁴ Reflecting upon their own role in bringing the democracy to England, these Labor M.P.'s were expressing a desire that the spread of democracy to the subcontinent should not face obstacles erected by the country which was the home of the Mother of Parliaments. And yet, battle was - at that time - a losing one, for the representatives of Government reiterated their unchanging maxim, stating willingness to grant further self-government but ... with securities for the minorities. Sir Samuel Hoare - Lord

---

¹ H.C. CCCLII, 5 S, 1650 - 1651.
² H.C. CCCLII, 5 S, 1670 - 1671.
⁴ H.C. CCCLII, 5 S, 1939, 1660 - 1661 Mr. Maclean said that religious differences were manipulated by the British to deny India further responsible government. H.C. CCCLII, 5 S, 1939, 1677. Mr. Sorensen denied that the Muslim League was the sole representative of Muslim interests and implied that many Muslims were in the ranks of the Congress H.C. LCCLII, 5 S, 1688, 0 1684.
Privy Seal - repeated his Government's intention to maintain the safeguards for the minorities and to continue working for Dominion status which could be attained if the internal divisions of India could be reconciled. Once again Indian initiative was stressed - this would have to come as a result of Indian and not British efforts. Indeed the closing words of the Under-Secretary of State of India harked back to the days of Montagu and Reading. Hugh O'Neil stated: "In any constitutional advance of this kind you cannot proceed in accordance with the wishes of one party alone, however, strong and well-organized, in a country such as India with all its conflicting races, creeds and interests."\(^2\)

Thus Parliament continued to debate in a vacuum - to a considerable extent self-induced. If the debates were arid, more arid still were the "solutions" suggested. The British proposals only created further divisions in India. Indian Intelligensia - "Political" India, that is to say - had looked to the Imperial Parliament with optimism. In two decades, nothing had nourished that optimism, and the rapidly deteriorating European situation could only suggest to Indian that their struggle would continue much longer before Indian aspirations would be in any degree realized.

\(^1\) H.C. CCCLII, 5 S, 1939, 1637 - 1638.
\(^2\) H.C. CCCLII, 5 S, 1939, 1713.
APPENDIX A

Nehru Committee Proposals
Regarding Communal Representation

There shall be joint mixed electorates throughout India for the House of Representatives and the Provincial Legislatures.

There shall be no reservation of seats for the House of Representatives except for Muslims in Provinces where they are in a minority and non-Muslims in the North-West Frontier Province. Such reservation will be in strict proportion to the Muslim population in every Province where they are in a minority and in proportion to the non-Muslim population in the North-West Frontier Province. The Muslims or non-Muslims where reservation is allowed to them shall have the right to contest additional seats.

In the Provinces, (a) there shall be no reservation of seats for any community in the Punjab and Bengal; provided that the franchise is based on adult suffrage; provided further that the question of communal representation will be open for reconsideration if so desired by any community after working the recommended system for 10 year; (b) in Provinces other than the Punjab and Bengal there will be reservation of seats for Muslim minorities on population basis with the right to contest additional seats; (c) in the North-West Frontier Province there shall be similar reservation of seats for non-Muslims with the right to contest other seats.

Reservation of seats, where allowed, shall be for a fixed period of 10 years; provided that the question will be open for reconsideration after the expiration of that period if so desired by any community.

---

APPENDIX B

Resolution of the All-India Muslim Conference 1

Whereas, in view of India's vast extent and its ethnological, linguistic, administrative and geographical or territorial divisions, the only form of government suitable to Indian conditions is a federal system with complete autonomy and residuary powers vested in the constituent States, the Central Government having control only of such matters of common interest as may be specifically entrusted to it by the Constitution;

And whereas it is essential that no Bill, resolution, motion or amendment regarding inter-communal matters be moved, discussed or passed by any Legislature, Central or Provincial, if a three-fourth majority of the members of either the Hindu or the Muslim community affected thereby in that Legislature oppose the introduction, discussion or passing of such Bill, resolution, motion or amendment;

And whereas the right of Moslems to elect their representatives on the various Indian Legislatures through separate electorates is now the law of the land and Muslims cannot be deprived of that right without their consent;

And whereas in the conditions existing at present in India and so long as those conditions continue to exist, representation in various Legislatures and other statutory self-governing bodies of Muslims through their own separate electorates is essential in order to bring into existence a really representative democratic Government;

And whereas as long as Mussulmans are not satisfied that their rights and interests are adequately safeguarded in the Constitution, they will in no way consent to the establishment of joint electorates, whether with or without conditions;

And whereas, for the purposes aforesaid, it is essential that Mussulmans should have their due share in the Central and Provincial Cabinets;

And whereas it is essential that representation of Mussulmans in the various Legislatures and other statutory self-governing bodies should be based on a plan whereby the Muslim majority in those Provinces where Mussulmans constitute a majority of population shall in no way be affected and in the Provinces in which Mussulmans constitute a minority they shall have a representation in no case less than that enjoyed by them under the existing law;

And whereas representative Muslim gatherings in all Provinces in India have unanimously resolved that with a view to provide adequate safeguards for the protection of Muslim interests in India as a whole, Mussulmans should have the right of 33 per cent representation in the Central Legislature and this Conference entirely endorses that demand;

And whereas on ethnological, linguistic, geographical and administrative grounds the Province of Sind has no affinity whatever with the rest of the Bombay Presidency and its unconditional constitution into a separate Province, possessing its own separate legislative and administrative machinery on the same lines as in other Provinces of India is essential in the interests of its people, the Hindu minority in Sind being given adequate and effective representation in excess of their proportion in the population, as may be given to Mussulmans in Provinces in which they constitute a minority of population;

And whereas the introduction of constitutional reforms in the North-West Frontier Province and Baluchistan along such lines as may be adopted in other Provinces of India is essential not only in the interests of those Provinces but also of the constitutional advance of India as a whole, the Hindu minorities in those Provinces being given adequate and effective representation in excess of their proportion in population, as is given to the Muslim community in Provinces in which it constitutes a minority of the population;

And whereas it is essential in the interests of Indian administration that provision should be made in the Constitution giving Muslims their adequate share along with other Indians in all Services of the State and on all statutory self-governing bodies, having due regard to the requirements of efficiency;

And whereas, having regard to the political conditions obtaining in India it is essential that the Indian Constitution should embody adequate safeguards for protection and promotion of Muslim education, languages, religion, personal law and Muslim charitable institutions, and for their due share in grants-in-aid;

And whereas it is essential that the Constitution should provide that no change in the Indian Constitution shall, after its inauguration, be made by the Central Legislature except with the concurrence of all the States constituting the Indian Federation;

This Conference emphatically declares that no Constitution, by whomever proposed or devised, will be acceptable to Indian Mussulmans unless it conforms with the principles embodied in this resolution.
APPENDIX C

Mr. Jinnah’s Fourteen Points.1

Whereas the basic idea on which the All-Parites Conference was called in being and a Convention summoned at Calcutta during Christmas Week 1928 was that a scheme of reforms should be formulated and accepted and ratified by the foremost political organizations in the country as a National Pact; and whereas the Report was adopted by the Indian National Congress only constitutionally for the one year ending 51st December 1929, and in the event of the British Parliament not accepting it within the time limit, the Congress stands committed to the policy and programme of Complete Independence by resort to civil disobedience and non-payment of taxes; and whereas the attitude taken up by the Hindu Maha Sabha from the commencement through their representatives at the Convention was nothing short of an ultimatum, that if a single word in the Nehru Report in respect of the communal settlement was changed they would immediately withdraw their support to it; and whereas the National Liberal Federation delegates at the Convention took up an attitude of benevolent neutrality, and subsequently in their open session at Allahabad, adopted a non-committing policy with regard to the Hindu-Muslim differences; and whereas the non-Brahmin and Depressed Classes are entirely opposed to it; and whereas the reasonable and moderate proposals put forward by the delegates of the All-India Muslim League at the Convention in modification were not accepted, the Muslim League is unable to accept the Nehru Report.

The League after anxious and careful consideration most earnestly and emphatically lays down that no scheme for the future constitution of the government of India will be acceptable to Mussulmans of India until and unless the following basic principles are given effect to and provisions are embodied therein to safeguard their rights and interests:

(1) The form of the future Constitution should be federal with the residuary powers vested in the Provinces.

(2) A uniform measure of autonomy shall be granted to all Provinces.

(3) All Legislatures in the country and other elected bodies shall be constituted on the definite principle of adequate and effective representation of Minorities in every Province without reducing the majority in any Province to a minority or even equality.

(4) In the Central Legislature, Mussulman representation shall not be less than one third.

L. M. Gwyer and A. Appadorai, Speeches And Documents on The Indian Constitution, 1921-1947, I, pps. 245 - 247.
(5) Representation of communal groups shall continue to be by means of separate electorates as at present; provided it shall be open to any community, at any time, to abandon its separate electorate in favour of joint electorate.

(6) Any territorial redistribution that might at any time be necessary shall not in any way affect the Muslim majority in the Punjab, Bengal and the North-West Frontier Province.

(7) Full religious liberty, i.e., liberty of belief, worship and observance, propaganda, association and education, shall be guaranteed to all communities.

(8) No Bill or resolution or any part thereof shall be passed in any Legislature or any other elected body if three-fourths of the members of any community in that particular body oppose such a Bill, resolution or part thereof on the ground that it would be injurious to the interests of that community or in the alternative, such other method is devised as may be found feasible and practicable to deal with such cases.

(9) Sind should be separated from the Bombay Presidency.

(10) Reforms should be introduced in the North-West Frontier Province and Baluchistan on the same footing as in other Provinces.

(11) Provision should be made in the Constitution giving Muslims an adequate share, along with the other Indians, in all the Services of the State and in local self-governing bodies having due regard to the requirements of efficiency.

(12) The Constitution should embody adequate safeguards for the protection of Muslim culture and for the protection and promotion of Muslim education, language, religion, personal laws and Muslim charitable institutions and for their due share in the grants-in-aid given by the State and by local self-governing bodies.

(13) No Cabinet, either Central or Provincial, should be formed without there being a proportion of at least one-third Muslim Ministers.

(14) No Change shall be made in the Constitution by the Central Legislature except with the concurrence of the States constituting the Indian Federation.

The draft resolution also mentions an alternative to the above provision in the following terms:

That, in the present circumstances, representation of Mussulmans in the different Legislatures of the country and other elected bodies through the separate electorates is inevitable and further, the Government being pledged
over and over again not to disturb this franchise so granted to the Muslim community since 1909 till such time as the Mussulmans chose to abandon it, the Mussulmans will not consent to joint electorates unless Sind is actually constituted into a separate Province and reforms in fact are introduced in the North-West Frontier Province and Baluchistan on the same footing as in other Provinces.

Further, it is provided that there shall be reservation of seats according to the Muslim population in the various Provinces; but where Mussulmans are in a majority they shall not contest more seats than their population warrants.

The question of excess representation of Mussulmans over and above their population in Provinces where they are in a minority is to be considered hereafter.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS.

Great Britain, Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Fifth Series vols. CII - CCIV

Report Of The Indian Satutory Commission, London H.M.S.O., 1930

Report Of The Indian Franchise Committee, I, London: H.M.S.O., 1932

Proposals For Indian Constitutional Reform, London: H.M.S.O., 1932


PRIVATE DOCUMENTS.


Shamloo, (Pseud.), Speeches And Statements Of Iqbal, Lahore: Al-Manar Academy, 1948.

Letters Of Iqbal To Jinnah, Lahore: Muhammad Ashraf, n.d.

SECONDARY LITERATURE.

I | Autobiographies And Memoirs.


II | Biographies.


**III Contemporary Material**


. *India Old And New*, London: Macmillan and Co., 1921

. The Occident And The Orient, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1929

. *India*, New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1926


Hull, W., *India's Political Crisis*, London: Oxford University Press, 1930

*India*, Foreign Policy Association, 1930


**III Contemporary Material**


———, *India Old And New*, London: Macmillan and Co., 1921

———, *The Occident And The Orient*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1924

———, *India*, New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1926


Hull, W., *India’s Political Crisis*, London: Oxford University Press, 1930

*India*, Foreign Policy Association, 1930


Stokes, R., New Imperial Ideals, London: John Murray, 1930

Temperely, H.W.V., A History Of The Peace Conference of Paris, VI, London: British Institute of International Affairs, 1924

Thompson, E., Reconstructing India, New York: The Dial Press, 1930.


IV General


Menon, V.P., *The Transfer Of War In India*, Princeton: University Press, 1957


Virananpalli, M.S., *Are We Two Nations?*, Lahore: Hubert Milton Williams, 1946


Journals of Opinion.


Dolobran, Lord Lloyd of, "The Problem Of Constitutional Reform In India," International Affairs, XII, 1933.


Kraemer, H., "Islam In India Today," The Muslim World, XXI, 1931.


Shirstrate, G.F., "India In Convalescence," Foreign Affairs, IV, 1925 - 1926.


Newspaper

The Times, 1918 - 1939.