

T
448
01

BRITISH POLICY IN EGYPT
DURING THE PERIOD
OF THE PROTECTORATE
1914 - 1922

By
John P. Spagnolo

Submitted in partial fulfillment for the
requirements of the Degree of Master of Arts
in the Arab Studies Program of the
American University of Beirut

Beirut, Lebanon

1962

THE PROTECTORATE OF EGYPT - SPAGNOLO

PREFACE

This thesis attempts to study the formulation of Britain's Egyptian policy during the years of the Protectorate, 1914-1922. During this period there occurred fluctuations in Anglo-Egyptian relations of far-reaching consequence. In the earlier period of the Occupation, Britain's intervention was of general benefit to Egypt, and the British were able to depend on the good will of many Egyptians. After the Protectorate, while Britain's intervention in Egyptian affairs was primarily for Imperial reasons, the British could no longer be said to possess the good will of the Egyptians. This change in the nature of Anglo-Egyptian relations was to a large extent the consequence of developments in the years of the Protectorate.

I would like to express my profound appreciation for the numerous and valuable suggestions concerning subject matter and organization made by my thesis advisor, Dr. Joseph Malone, Associate Professor of History. I am indebted to Dr. Mahmud Zayid, Assistant Professor of History at this university for allowing me to make use of his research into the history of the Wafd. Special thanks are also due to Dr. Trevor Legassick, Lecturer in the Department of Semetic Studies at the University of Wisconsin who read the whole thesis through and

made a number of valuable suggestions. Needless to say I am responsible for all the shortcomings of this thesis.

Further expressions of gratitude are due to Professor J.V. Mauzey, Chairman of the Department of Philosophy and the General Education Program, and to Miss Suad Malak, Secretary of the General Education Program. Both undertook duties which would normally have devolved on me in order to allow me more time to work on my thesis. My profound thanks also go to the friends who constantly encouraged me in my work.

John P. Spagnolo

American University of Beirut,
Beirut, Lebanon.
May 23, 1962.

ABSTRACT

When Britain occupied the Khedivate of Egypt in 1882 it was with the intention of a temporary intervention to restore stability and initiate reforms. After a few years had elapsed the strategic importance of Egypt convinced Britain of the impracticability of a complete withdrawal. However, in undertaking responsibility for the governance and reformation of Egypt, Britain's effectiveness was limited by the influence already exerted in that country by other European powers by means of the Capitulations. Britain's position was further complicated by the vocal expression of resentment against British intervention by educated Egyptians, conscious of Egypt's past achievements and confident of their own abilities. Britain's foremost achievement before World War I was the remarkable improvement in the standard of living among the lower classes. While these classes remained "benevolently neutral" there was no combination strong enough to threaten the British.

The multiple and conflicting demands of World War I made it seem necessary for Britain to tighten its control over Egypt, if possible without provoking dangerous opposition among Egyptians. Though Egypt was unilaterally declared a British Protectorate, Egyptians, in the British attempt to regularize the new situation, were promised that they would not be asked

to share in the war effort. Britain was unable to keep this promise. During the war Egypt became an important base of operations while Egyptians were called upon to contribute to the war effort in a number of ways. Moreover, Britain's total involvement in the prosecution of the war made inevitable the neglect of general Egyptian interests. While the upper classes and foreign communities benefitted economically during the war, the lower classes towards the end of it, began to suffer from the rising cost of living, a shortage of necessities and other hardships.

The postwar period revealed that the Sultan and the nationalists expected British recognition of their desire for a greater degree of independence. The British Government, however, did not consider it necessary to make a serious effort to meet these expectations. This complacent attitude invited nationalist agitation under the leadership of Zaghlul Pasha and the Wafd. Encouraged by extremist nationalists, the agitation flared in March 1919 into widespread insurrection. It became evident that the attitude of the lower classes towards the British was no longer one of "benevolent neutrality", and that the nationalist movement was greatly strengthened by this change. Though the British were able to suppress the insurrection, they recognized the problem by forming a Special Commission to study it. However, the British Government was reluctant to endorse the imaginative compromise solution suggested by the Commission in consultation with the Wafd Delegation.

Zaghlul and the extremists also proved reluctant to support the compromise. Under these circumstances it was impossible for the Adly-Curzon negotiations which followed in 1921 to achieve any understanding.

The Residency in cooperation with moderate nationalists proposed to break the deadlock by persuading the British Government to issue a unilateral declaration of Egyptian independence while maintaining Britain's freedom of action on certain reserved points until some agreement was reached. The British Government reluctantly accepted this proposal in February 1922, and thereby ended the transitional period in Anglo-Egyptian relations known as the Protectorate. The limitations on Egyptian independence contained in the Proclamation of 1922 effectively set the stage for Anglo-Egyptian relations until after World War II, even though the Egyptians did not formally acknowledge these limitations until the Treaty of 1936.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

| | Page |
|--|------|
| PREFACE | iv |
| ABSTRACT | vi |
| INTRODUCTION | 1 |
| Chapter | |
| I. THE PROCLAMATION OF THE PROTECTORATE | 10 |
| II. THE PROTECTORATE DURING THE WAR | 22 |
| Military Operations | 22 |
| The Administration | 31 |
| The Economy | 40 |
| III. POSTWAR COMPLACENCY | 44 |
| IV. THE EGYPTIAN INSURRECTION | 69 |
| V. THE WORK OF THE SPECIAL (MILNER) COMMISSION | 80 |
| VI. THE UNILATERAL TERMINATION OF THE PROTECTORATE | 104 |
| APPENDICES | |
| Appendix A: The Memorandum of August 18, 1920 | 125 |
| Appendix B: The Memorandum of November 10, 1921 | 135 |
| BIBLIOGRAPHY | 144 |

INTRODUCTION

Any assessment of Britain's influence on modern Egyptian history is complicated by the fact that, in 1882, Britain occupied a country which had already achieved a measure of Westernization through the interaction of its own efforts and those of other European forces. In the years preceding the French Revolution distinguished visitors, Volney to name one of the many, did much to awaken European interest in Egypt. Bonaparte's ambition and imagination stamped Egypt's strategic importance on the mind of European statesmen. Whatever its immediate impact, his campaign gave Egypt's past a new perspective and its future a new course. The change in perspective was brought about by French-inspired archeological investigations into pre-Islamic and pre-Christian history. As for the future, Napoleon affected the course of Egyptian history by making it possible for Muhammad Ali to appear on the Egyptian scene.

Muhammad Ali turned a largely feudalistic community into a dynastic state, modern in many of its aspects. Possessing a desire for aggrandizement and power, Muhammad Ali was one of those remarkable individuals whose primary contribution is to force history to unfold at an accelerated pace. Egypt, under Muhammad Ali, was the first non-Western country to

attempt, with some small signs of success, a judicious use of Western knowledge and method to better its position and influence. Muhammad Ali imported Western, mostly French, technicians to improve Egypt's military and economic power. He marshalled Egyptian resources and used Western techniques with the intention of leaving his mark on the history of the period. He succeeded, however, most eminently in thrusting Egypt into the current of European history with greater rapidity and forcefulness than might otherwise have been the case. His threat to the Ottoman Empire made it inevitable that Egypt should become a concern of the great European powers. His invitation to European advisors and educators to come to Egypt under the capitulatory provisions not only accelerated the introduction of Western conceptions, but also invited the potential interference of numerous European powers in the internal affairs of Egypt. Muhammad Ali was shrewd enough to limit and control this interference. His successors, with the exception of Abbas I, were drawn headlong into a process of Westernization.

Contacts with the West in Egypt were established on two levels--the international, because Muhammad Ali encouraged political and economic relations with the powers, and the individual, for he allowed Western advisors and residents into Egypt while sending educational missions to Europe. The latter contact, possibly the most influential on subsequent developments, brought the Egyptian ruling class into close contact with Europe and, hence, under the influence of

Westerners. The effect of Ferdinand de Lesseps' remarkable friendship with Said Pasha is one example. Similarly, Khedive Ismail's Western education was an important factor in accounting for his efforts to have the boundaries of the European continent redrawn to cover Egypt.

The introduction of Western influences, however, proved to be a mixed blessing. Under Said and Ismail the adoption of Western customs resulted in the separation of a whole strata of the population from its antecedents. The indiscriminating adoption of Western techniques produced considerable economic wastage. The thoughtless acceptance of capital loans brought economic chaos and the bankruptcy of the government. Of equal importance was the growth of relatively large settled communities of Europeans who, with the Turko-Circassian ruling class, controlled the commerce and shared richly in the prosperity of the country.

Egypt, before 1882, had in other ways set itself upon the road to modernization. It was one of the two Muslim centers in which efforts were being undertaken to redefine and strengthen the Islamic structure. It was a country where, despite dynastic and Turko-Circassian domination, the desire for social change was evident among constitutionalists, intellectuals and native Egyptians. While Britain was only partly involved, and to even a lesser extent responsible, for these developments, they undoubtedly limited the extent of British influence in Egypt after the Occupation. On the one hand, Egypt was too politically conscious to be easily converted

into a British colony while, on the other hand, Britain, for its own imperial interests, chose not to allow the Egyptians complete independence. Internationally, too many European powers were interested in Egypt to make its inclusion as an integral part of the Empire realistic international politics, while its strategic position did not make evacuation realistic imperial policy. Anglo-Egyptian relations thus revolved around an anomaly which was reflected in the juridical status of these relations.

Early in 1883 Lord Granville, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, addressed a note to the Powers defining Britain's objectives in Egypt:

Although for the present a British force remains in Egypt for the preservation of public tranquility, Her Majesty's Government are desirous of withdrawing it as soon as the state of the country and the organisation of proper means for the maintenance of the Khedive's authority will admit of it. In the meanwhile, the position in which Her Majesty's Government are placed towards His Highness imposes upon them the duty of giving advice with the object of securing that the order of things to be established shall be of a satisfactory character, and possess the elements of stability and progress.¹

This definition was only partially indicative of future developments. As the strategic importance of Egypt increased, Britain developed a fundamentally contradictory objective; it sought to continue the occupation of Egypt. By the time of the abortive negotiations for the evacuation of Egypt (the Drummond Wolff Convention) Britain was thinking in terms of the right to reoccupy Egypt in case of necessity. In 1895 the continued

¹The Earl of Cromer, Modern Egypt (London: Macmillan, 1908) I, 340.

occupation was important to the reconquest of the Sudan and the balance of power in the Straits. The 1904 Entente pushed the question of evacuation far into the background, and by 1919 Britain evinced definite opposition to any suggestion of a military evacuation of Egypt.

In 1883 Britain sought to reconstruct the administration of Egypt

on basis which would afford satisfactory guarantees for the maintenance of peace, order, and prosperity in Egypt, for the stability of the Khedive's authority, for the judicious development of self-government, and for fulfilment of obligations towards the Powers.¹

While Britain circumvented its promise to evacuate, it did not neglect its aim to bring about administrative reforms. Yet the aims outlined above could not be wholly fulfilled because they were contradictory by their very nature. Therein lay the dilemma upon which Anglo-Egyptian relations foundered. Britain could insure stability, but it could not insure a rational administrative order while maintaining the khedivial system and the capitulations. Nor could the support of the ruling dynasty, the capitulations and Britain's own position in Egypt facilitate the development of self-government. Much came to rest upon the meaning of the term "judicious". For the British, the ruling dynasty, and the capitulatory interests, it meant everything on the slow side of gradual; for the Egyptian constitutionalists and nationalists, it meant the opposite.

¹Instructions to Lord Dufferin, quoted in Cromer, ibid., I, 341.

Direct rule may have been a great benefit to Egypt as it has been to India. Egyptian nationalists have argued, with reason, that British occupation only maintained the status quo and did not inaugurate social and administrative changes, did not abolish the corrupt dynastic rule or the capitulations, and, thus, did not do the one thing which might have justified occupation. However, as long as Britain did not want to encourage the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, or risk a European crisis, she could not change her status (juridically precarious as it was) in Egypt. The attitude of the French serves to illustrate an aspect of the international problem involved. Although the French had withdrawn from the Egyptian expedition at the last moment, they had not lost interest in Egypt. Quite the contrary, they regretted their loss of initiative and, until the Entente Agreement of 1904, were active defenders of the extensive capitulatory rights enjoyed by Europeans. These rights enabled France to limit the range of British administrative action and to secure the presence of her own cultural and economic influence. This influence was considerable. It extended over a large segment of the educated population and over the court. The language of society was French. Even the khedives and sultans were much more at home in the French language than in English. Up to 1904, and even after, discontented nationalists divided their time between Paris and Constantinople.

During the period of Lord Cromer's "proconsulship" the economic position of Egypt was restored and strengthened;

agricultural productivity augmented; the Sudan reconquered; the efficiency of the government increased. Egypt prospered and developed, but prosperity and development only served to increase the underlying contradictions in the British commitment. The Khedive, Abbas Hilmi II, chafed under restrictions to his power. Constitutionally, he was only nominally responsible to the Ottoman Sultan, actually he had to respond to "suggestions" given by Cromer. Some wealthy landowners and some among the growing middle classes expressed an eagerness to govern themselves. They had the powerfully stimulating example of the Young Turk Revolution before their eyes. For certain nationalists the rapid development of Egypt revealed an even greater potential for advancement which, in their view, was vitiated by British support of the established order. Something, they felt, had to be done about this antiquated and corrupt system. For rather different reasons their frustration was shared by some British advisors.

It is interesting to observe that nationalists looked favorably on the capitulations to which they attributed their protection from more direct British control--even though these same capitulations fostered the growth of European middle classes in Egypt competing in every field with the growing Egyptian middle classes. A closer look, however, will show that this anomaly was more apparent than real. The European middle classes were their primary competitors, but they were also their educators. Many Egyptians learned Western methods either in foreign schools or in apprenticeship to foreign

concerns. A relatively small percentage of this education was English. If, as some have argued, Britain failed Egypt in its educational responsibility, it failed to develop British interests as well.

Britain's de facto position in Egypt before World War I remained, nevertheless, secure. French opposition diminished considerably after 1904 and the various opposition groups in Egypt, though vocal, were weak and divided. Britain enjoyed the support of a docile cabinet. Large segments of all classes benefited from the prosperous times. Most important of all, Britain enjoyed the "benevolent neutrality" of the fellah whose prosperity greatly surpassed that of any previous time. During Sir Eldon Gorst's consulship, efforts were made to placate the khedive and to introduce democratic reforms. Any success with the khedive was nullified by Gorst's premature death. Lord Kitchener inaugurated a slightly more democratic Legislative Assembly, but devoted himself to improving the material lot of the lower classes. The attitude of the lower classes was important because, as events were to show, the political balance remained in their hands.

Note: Two useful general surveys of most of the period covered in the Introduction are Sir Auckland Colvin, The Making of Modern Egypt (London: Seeley, 1906), and Edward Dicey, The Story of the Khedivate (London: Rivingtons, 1902). Mohammad Rifaat, The Awakening of Modern Egypt (London: Longmans, Green, 1947) wrote at a time when Egyptians still appreciated the achievements of the dynasty. John Marlowe, A History of Modern Egypt (New York: Praeger, 1954) is very readable, but not always accurate.

Henry Herbert Dodwell, The Founder of Modern Egypt (Cambridge, The University Press, 1931) is a standard work on

Muhammad Ali. Charles C. Adams, Islam and Modernism in Egypt (London: Oxford University Press, 1933) throws light on the reform movement in Egypt. Mrs. Juliette Adam, L'Angleterre en Egypte (Paris: Impr. du Centre, 1922) is a journalistic account which, however, serves to illustrate the contact between Egyptian nationalists and the French.

A controversial account of the occupation of Egypt is in Wilfrid Scawen Blunt, Secret History of the English Occupation of Egypt (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1922). The international complications of the Occupation are outlined in sections of the third volume of E. A. Benigns, et al., The Cambridge History of the British Empire (Cambridge, University Press, 1959). Three works which give an account of British achievements in Egypt are The Earl of Cromer, Modern Egypt (2 Vols., London: Macmillan, 1908); Alfred Milner, England in Egypt (London: Arnold, 1893); and Lord Lloyd, Egypt Since Cromer (2 Vols., London: Macmillan, 1933-1934).

CHAPTER I

THE PROCLAMATION OF THE PROTECTORATE

On August 5, 1914, the day following Britain's declaration of war on Germany, the Egyptian cabinet met and issued a decree terminating all commercial contacts between Egypt and Germany. The decree was issued because "the presence in Egypt of the Army of Occupation of His Britannic Majesty rendered the country susceptible to attack by the enemies of His Majesty. . . ." This state of affairs made it "necessary that all measures may be taken to defend the country against the risk of such an attack. . . ." ¹

The cabinet responsible for such prompt pro-British ² action was headed by Husain Rushdi Pasha, just then acting as

¹Edward C. Bleck et al. (ed.), British and Foreign State Papers, Vol. 109 (1915) (London: H. M. Stationery Office, 1919), 429f. The decree was originally issued in French.

²"This action was taken without the consent or advice of Turkey and was strictly illegal, as regarded from the Turkish point of view, since it was contrary to the firmans of the Sultan which laid down as part of the constitutional law of Egypt that all war measures must be instituted by an act of the Sultan alone. To clinch the argument supporting the proposition as to the illegal nature of the Council's decision, Turkey at this time had declared her neutrality with regard to the European War, and such declaration was by law efficacious in all parts of her empire." Vernon A. O'Rourke, The Juristic Status of Egypt and the Sudan (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1935), 38f.

Regent in the absence of Khedive Abbas Hilmi II.¹ The latter's vacation journey to Constantinople was fortunate for the British in view of the Khedive's sympathy for the Central Powers. The cabinet's decision marked the beginning of a period of Anglo-Egyptian cooperation lasting throughout the First World War. The Egyptians were of great assistance to the British war effort though the British, at first, viewed Egyptian cooperation with suspicious caution and, later, with scant appreciation. During the last phase of the war Britain took such advantage of this cooperation that it destroyed the foundations of much of its former influence in Egypt. The events of 1919 were intimately linked with wartime developments. The deterioration of relations may be attributed to British "imperial considerations"; to the pressures on Britain of total war; to misunderstanding; to a marked lack of imagination; and, in part, to the changing times. An important consequence of the war was the alienation of the fellaheen and lower classes whose neutralism was so important to Britain's position in Egypt. Under such circumstances, the inherent self-contradictions (discussed in the introduction) in the declared objectives of the British were greatly magnified. Whereas before the war it had taken two brigades to hold Egypt, in 1919 it took a much larger force to keep it quiet.

¹Sir Valentine Chirol, The Egyptian Problem (London: Macmillan, 1920), 120, describes the cabinet as "a relatively strong one, and on the whole well disposed towards the British controlling power. It included men of considerable capacity, such as Adli, Serwat, Serri, Yusuf Wahba, and Ismail Sidki."

During the opening period of the war, British policy in Egypt centered around five interrelated areas of concern. Most important was the extent of the Muslim Egyptian's Islamic ties to the Ottoman Empire and the Caliphate. Closely related was the Egyptian estimate of the relative strength of the two warring blocs. A third concern was the international status Egypt would receive if the Ottoman Empire entered the war on the side of the Central Powers and thereby rendered anomalous Egypt's suzerainty to it. The fourth and fifth concerns were how Egypt should be governed, and how to insure economic stability.

Despite the apparent cooperation of the Rushdi cabinet, Britain was cautious in assessing Egyptian attitudes. The Pan-Islamic appeal of the Caliphate could not be overlooked. It was characteristic of British Imperial policy, particularly affected by the fear of rebellion among Indian Muslims, to give Pan-Islamic tendencies considerable attention. This was one reason why Britain had done much to uphold the independence of the Ottoman Empire. If the Caliphate were to fall into stronger, aggressive and unfriendly hands, Britain's position in India could be seriously embarrassed. When it became apparent that the Caliphate might well ally itself to the Central Powers, Britain entered into secret negotiations with Sharif Husain of Mecca who had indicated a desire to raise the standard of revolt.¹ Britain hoped, thereby, to insure

¹Sir Ronald Storrs, Orientations (London: Nicholson and Watson, 1937), 173ff.

the restless Muslims in its Empire uninterrupted access to the Holy Cities of Islam. Events were later to show that Pan-Islamic ties and allegiance to the Caliphate had been over-rated, but the British could not have allowed themselves to disregard this factor.¹ It must be recalled that Jamal ud-Din al-Afghani had struck a strong Pan-Islamic chord in Egypt, and Islamic modernism had been an important factor in the Arabi movement.² Another aspect of the Islamic tie about which the British were concerned was the possibility of Muslim Egyptians rebelling at the prospect of witnessing the shedding by Muslims of Muslim blood for the victory of a Christian cause.

British impressions of the state of Egyptian opinion ranged widely. Ronald Storrs, then Oriental Secretary to the Agency, probably made the most knowledgeable assessment:

The highest classes--always excepting the khedivial family, about which there is temerity in the vaguest conjecture--and the lowest, are, the former by instinct and the latter by conviction, strongly in favour of Great Britian. Pious Moslems shake their heads and say, "We wish the Turks all success--from afar," the last portion of the benison receiving the emphasis; and the wealthier and better informed understand that, even if the legends of German brutality and colonial repression are exaggerated, their advent would signify at best the substitution of an unknown for a known evil. The most striking feature of the opposing faction is the apparent vigour and thoroughness with which the local middle-class Turks, Circassians, lawyers, students, and extremist journalists have absorbed, and continue to impart to others, the doctrine of affectionate and even passionate interest in and expectation of German successes. Germany is represented

¹See p. 16.

²Charles C. Adams, Islam and Modernism in Egypt (London: Humphrey Milford, 1933), 53.

as the one great Power that has befriended Islam without acquiring one acre of Moslem territory, and the Kaiser's Syrian journey, and his noble generosity in providing, as from the clouds, two battleships in place of those maliciously and at the last moment withheld by the English when most needed, are cited and magnified. . . .¹

There can be little doubt, however, that a number of Englishmen shared the following less knowledgeable assessment of the state of Egyptian opinion after the introduction of martial law:

Throughout Egypt excitement displaced the previous indifference, and alarm the former sense of security. Simultaneously, the deep-seated distrust, common to all classes of the population towards the Occupying power, expanded into a sentiment of bitter, if silent, hatred. Through an involuntary and despised association with Great Britain, Egypt had been dragged into a struggle, of which the origin was obscure to her and the objectives unknown. One, and one consolation only, gave a ray of comfort to the nation. The conflict would be short. Germany, reputed mistress of vast and invincible armies, would quickly humble England to the dust. That conviction supported Egypt throughout the first years of the War.²

The strong suspicion that the Ottoman Empire would soon join the Central Powers encouraged discussion between Milne Cheetham, in the absence of Lord Kitchener, senior representative at the Agency, and Sir E. Grey, Foreign Secretary, over the future status of Egypt. Cheetham and the Agency officials recommended the establishment of a Protectorate.³ This was a middle course between independence and annexation which the

¹Op. cit., 154.

²Lieut.-Col. P. G. Elgood, Egypt and the Army (Oxford: 1924), 1.

³F. O. Despatch: Mr. Cheetham to Sir E. Grey, September 10, 1914, referred to in Lord Lloyd, Egypt Since Cromer (London: Macmillan, 1933), I, 195.

Agency may have felt would receive some support. Ronald Storrs reported:

Unmistakable hints have been received that a formal change of regime, leaving the position of the Occupation unimpaired without wounding Egyptian amour-propre and "sense of nationality", would be far from unwelcome. It is pointed out that a transference of the temporal suzerainty from the Sultan to His Majesty the King, accompanied by guaranteed "autonomy" (for England must now show herself less generous than the Turks) or "independence" with subsequent abolition of capitulations, would go far towards disembarassing the conscientious from the incubus of Ottoman loyalty; localizing aspirations and diminishing almost to a vanishing point the attraction and influence of Pan-Islam.¹

Annexation to the Empire was, undoubtedly, an attractive solution which would enable the realization of a strictly imperialist policy--the reconstruction of the inefficient and wasteful governmental structure and the termination of the capitulations. At one stage it seemed as if the cabinet in London had been won over to annexation after French consent to the change had been secured.² Cheetham, however, protested

¹Op. cit., 155.

²F. O. Despatch: Sir F. Bertie to Sir E. Grey, November 19, 1914, referred to in Lloyd, op. cit., I, 196. Cf. A. J. P. Taylor, The Struggle for Mastery in Europe (Oxford: 1954), 540f., who argues that the British "meant to consolidate their position in Egypt, now that Turkey was their enemy; and this removed their last objection to a Russian control of the Straits. On 13 November George V, anticipating events, had said to Beckendorff: 'As to Constantinople it is clear it must be yours'; and on 18 November the British announced (Buchanan to Sazonov, 18 November 1914. Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya, third series, vi (ii), no. 533.) that they proposed to annexe Egypt.

"These developments were most unwelcome to the French. They were afraid that the Ottoman empire would be shared out between their allies, while their own strength was absorbed on the Western front. Paléologue in St. Petersburg complained: 'Great Britain has given Constantinople to Russia; today Russia

strongly and the idea of a Protectorate won. It was proclaimed on December 18, 1914. The arguments against annexation centered around the risks involved. Grey later gave the following reasons for establishing the Protectorate over Egypt:

The status of Egypt in relation to Turkey had not, so far as international law was concerned, been affected by the British occupation. Technically Egyptians became enemy subjects after the entry of Turkey into the war against us. Something had to be done to prevent legal complications. To annex Egypt would have been a complete solution of technical difficulties, but it would have been a great political blunder. It would have impaired the Moslem prestige and the character of Egypt as a Moslem State; it would also have been construed by our Allies as a hasty grasping at the opportunity of war to improve our position and gain a separate British advantage. The result must have been to make our Allies suspicious, to offend the sentiment and hurt the feelings of Moslems in India, and probably to stir up trouble in Egypt itself. This was not a time when we could afford to run such risks.¹

gives Egypt to England. The programme of Nicholas I has been realized.' (18 November 1914. *Paléologue, La Russie des Tsars*, i. 194.). . . ."

¹Twenty-Five Years: 1892-1916 (New York: Stokes, 1925), II, 176.

Sir William Hayter, Legal Adviser to the Egyptian Government, disclaimed any wish on the part of Britain to annex Egypt in 1914 even though, in his opinion, such an action would have involved no difficulty. "We had so great an army in Egypt that all resistance would have been hopeless; we should presumably have met with no difficulties from our allies . . . and annexation seemed to be the simple and obvious solution of all our difficulties. . . . It is betraying no secret to say that the annexation of Egypt was considered, but it was decisively rejected. There was no question of preparing the way for it; if it had been considered desirable, it would have been effected at once. We did not annex Egypt in 1914 because we did not wish to annex it, and for no other reason." Recent Constitutional Developments in Egypt (Cambridge: 1925), 6f. This view does not take into account the fact that at the beginning of August 1914, the small (four battalions of infantry, one regiment of cavalry, and two batteries of artillery) Army of Occupation had been withdrawn from Egypt and replaced by a division of new recruits. The contingents from Australia and New Zealand also had to undergo training in Egypt. Elgood, op. cit., 115.

The Protectorate had the additional advantage that while securing the status quo, it did not involve an increase in Egypt of British administrative man-power already rapidly decreasing in supply.¹

During the first days of the war, the Egyptian cabinet had to face a disturbed economic situation. To avoid panic it declared a short moratorium and eased the supply of money by making notes of the National Bank legal tender. To compensate for the fall in the cotton market the collection of the forthcoming installment of the land tax was postponed.² The economic crisis and the political uncertainties reduced the confidence of the Rushdi cabinet. Though relatively strong, it soon tried to seek shelter from the possibility of criticism. On October 18 the Legislative Assembly was suspended before it could reconvene after the summer recess. On November 2, as war with Turkey seemed imminent, the British military commander declared martial law over Egypt.³ At the request of the Prime Minister, who was becoming increasingly

¹F. O. Despatch: Mr. Cheetham to Sir E. Grey, November 18, 1914, quoted in Lloyd, op. cit., I, 197.

²The Times (London), November 7, 1914.

³"This action was taken without regard to the attitude of the Egyptian council, which was at this time favorable, and was in direct defiance of the expressed authority resident in the person of the Sultan. At this date Turkey had not yet entered the war and, thus, we witness the irregularity of one country enforcing martial law upon what was, in law, the territory of a state with which it was at peace." O'Rourke, op. cit., 40.

disturbed, martial law was amplified.¹ On October 26 Cheetham reported to Grey that public opinion was taking a turn for the worse because of the difficulty of disposing of the cotton crop.² Storrs reported that Rushdi and Adli threatened "to resign unless we are able to offer them some concession in the line of autonomy or self-government with which they can go to the country in the event of our proclaiming a Protectorate."³

Two statements were made by the British with the intention of strengthening their position and that of the Rushdi cabinet. The first accompanied the notification that a state of war existed between Great Britain and the Ottoman Government. Britain declared that:

Recognizing the respect and veneration with which the Sultan, in his religious capacity, is regarded by the Mohammedans of Egypt, Great Britain takes upon herself the sole burden of the present war, without calling upon the Egyptian people for aid therein; but she expects and requires, in return, that the population shall refrain from any action of a nature to hamper her military operations or to render aid to the enemy.⁴

The second was included in a note deposing Khedive Abbas Hilmi and appointing Husain Kamal, the uncle of the deposed Khedive, as Sultan. Basing itself on the claim that as a result of Constantinople's aggression "the rights over Egypt . . . are forfeit to His Majesty," the note continued "to lay down the

¹F. O. Despatch: Mr. Cheetham to Sir E. Grey, November 5, 1914, referred to in Lloyd, op. cit., 196.

²Ibid., 196.

³Op. cit., 158.

⁴Brit. and For. St. P., 1915, 434.

form of the future Government of the country, freed . . . from all rights of suzerainty or other rights heretofore claimed by the Ottoman Government." Great Britain decided that she

can best fulfil the responsibilities she has incurred toward Egypt by the formal declaration of a British Protectorate, and by the government of the country . . . by a Prince of the Khedivial family.

As regards foreign relations, His Majesty's Government deem it most consistent with the new responsibilities assumed by Great Britain that the relations between your Highness's Government and the representatives of foreign Powers should henceforth be conducted through His Majesty's representative in Cairo.

Having dealt with the most difficult aspect of the problem--Egypt's altered status--the note continues to indicate future benefits which would result from the redefined relationship:

His Majesty's Government have repeatedly placed on record that the system of treaties, known as Capitulations, by which your Highness's Government is bound, are no longer in harmony with the development of the country; but, in the opinion of His Majesty's Government, the revision of those treaties may most conveniently be postponed until the end of the present war.

In the field of internal administration, . . . in consonance with the traditions of British policy, it has been the aim of His Majesty's Government, while working through and in the closest association with the constituted Egyptian authorities, to secure individual liberty, to promote the spread of education, to further the development of the natural resources of the country, and, in such measure as the degree of enlightenment of public opinion may permit, to associate the governed in the task of government. Not only is it the intention of His Majesty's Government to remain faithful to such policy, but they are convinced that the clearer definition of Great Britain's position in the country will accelerate progress towards self-government.

The note continues:

The strengthening and progress of Mohammedan institutions in Egypt is naturally a matter in which His Majesty's Government take a deep interest and with which your Highness will be specially concerned, and in carrying out such

reforms as may be considered necessary, your Highness may count upon the sympathetic support of His Majesty's Government.¹

The new status of Egypt was the result of a policy which Cheetham described as "inclusion in the British Empire² without loss of Egyptian individuality."³ This policy proved to be as potentially rich in contention and self-contradiction as the policy outlined by Lord Dufferin in 1883. Three points of disagreement emerged. The first was the contentious point that Britain viewed the Protectorate as a "clearer definition of (her) position in the country" on the basis that the rights over Egypt had been forfeited by the Ottoman declaration of war.⁴ This argument came to be challenged by Egyptian nationalists on the basis that it was a unilateral declaration by a power whose juridical position in Egypt was already highly questionable, and also on the basis that the status of other

¹Ibid., 437ff.

²"After hanging in the balance for a period of thirty-three years, the political destiny of Egypt has at last been definitely settled. The country has been incorporated into the British Empire. No other solution was possible. Provided that the statesmanship be skillful and that there is no undue haste, the adoption of this measure, far from hindering, will tend to facilitate the execution of that rationally liberal policy to which Great Britain is wedded in dealing with its outlying dependencies." The Earl of Cromer, Abbas II (London: Macmillan, 1915), xvii.

³F. O. Despatch: Mr. Cheetham to Sir E. Grey, November 18, 1914, quoted in Lloyd, op. cit., I, 206.

⁴Cf. O'Rourke, op. cit., 44; "As the occupying power at war with the original owner she could, for the time at least, impose any system she desired upon the 'conquered' territory. Whatever disposition should later be effected would depend upon the treaties of peace."

less advanced areas of the defunct Ottoman Empire acquired as a result of the war, were made subject to the decisions of the Peace Conferences.¹ The second, a point of self-contradiction was contained in the statement that "the clearer definition of Great Britain's position in the country will accelerate progress towards self-government." This statement was difficult to reconcile with the fact that the net result of the Protectorate had been to deprive Egypt of the ability, nominal as it had been, to maintain direct relations with foreign powers.² This point was further elaborated by nationalists who argued that the acceleration "of progress towards self-government" was made dependent on a British assessment of the degree of enlightenment of public opinion which would permit the association of the governed in the task of government. The third point, again one of self-contradiction, became immediately apparent when Britain did not, and was not able to, take "upon herself the sole burden of the present war without calling on the Egyptian people."

¹Oriente Moderno, November 15, 1921, 325.

²"Rather than becoming possessed with the powers claimed by Turkey, Egypt, for the moment, lost even those lodged in her own Khedive. . . . The terms of the latter part of this despatch utterly destroyed whatever international personality Egypt had possessed under Turkish rule. . . ." O'Rourke, op. cit., 48.

CHAPTER II

THE PROTECTORATE DURING THE WAR

During the war years of the Protectorate certain aspects of British policy, combined with other factors, led inexorably to the postwar disturbances. Yet these disturbances were received in many quarters with considerable surprise. For an explanation of both the disturbances and the surprise, recourse must be had to the trend of events during these decisive years. It was in the three areas of military operations, administration and economy that a situation developed which made a deterioration in Anglo-Egyptian relations inevitable.

Military Operations

Britain was involved in a war which necessitated a total mobilization of effort. In most instances political considerations had to be sacrificed to military ones. The defense of the Western Front and questions of supply were first and foremost among these. During the first months of the war the Army of Occupation was denuded of its best elements by the requirements of the Western Front; but for a short time only, as the Suez Canal was a vital artery of supply, and, therefore, commanded a high priority in defensive arrangements. The canal's importance derived from the

fact that at no time did the air and naval forces of the Central Powers succeed in cutting the Imperial supply line through the Mediterranean. The defense of Egypt and the canal was made easier as only limited Ottoman forces could be brought to bear on it because of the difficulty of transporting supplies across the Sinai desert.¹ The Senussi attack from the West and the threat to the Sudan from Darfur were effectively countered by a small British force in the former case and a British-led Egyptian volunteer force in the latter.² Next in importance to defense and supply were the various offensives mounted on the Western Front or around the Dardanelles, Palestine and Mesopotamia. The British, in an effort to restore strategy to the war, were torn between committing all their forces to seemingly unavailing offensives on the Western Front, and exploring the strategically rich possibilities of piercing the Dardanelles. Thus, while from the start Egypt was a vital center of communications, during the Dardanelles venture she

¹"The evacuation of the [Dardanelles] at once raised the question of how far this easing of pressure would further Turkish designs on Egypt. . . . Estimates of the strength of the invading forces were, however, at this time unaccountably and even ridiculously high both in Egypt and at the War Office. This failed to take into account not merely the difficulties of supply but even the total Turkish strength south of the Taurus. When the practical Sir William Robertson reached the War Office as Chief of the Imperial General Staff he cut the estimate to a hundred thousand, which about represented Turkish hopes." Cyril Falls, The First World War (Longmans, 1960), 143.

²Sir Ronald Wingate, Wingate of the Sudan (London: John Murray, 1955), 184, and Sir George Macmunn and Cyril Falls, History of the Great War: Military Operations--Egypt and Palestine (2 Vols., London: H. M. Stationery Office, 1928-1930), I, 365.

also became an equally vital base area for operations against the Ottoman Empire. Large and important forces were supplied from, or through, Egypt and there developed a complex system of military command which often overshadowed the civil administration. British administrators found themselves forced to turn a blind eye when the war necessitated the adoption of measures which were not in the interests of equitable administration. Though the Dardanelles campaign had no adverse effect on Egypt, the advances across the Sinai and in Palestine were another matter.¹ The construction of railroads and water pipelines, and the use of numerous animals to transport equipment, were all required. The large army had to be supplied with food. All of the first, and much of the second, burden fell on Egypt. Lord Lloyd summarized the situation thus:

Egypt's position was unique. She was neither combatant nor neutral: she was in the heart of the strife, and yet not of it. In this position she never, so to speak, lost consciousness, nor the sense of continuity of her own problems. For England, Egypt became a theatre of war, merely a battle-front of the greatest importance. But to herself she was still a country occupied with her own political and economic problems, intensely aware of their importance, and only incidentally concerned with the issues of the armed struggle.

The attitude was natural enough, and ought to have pleased Great Britain, who (in view of her policy) should have

¹The Palestine campaign began as an extension of the defense of the Suez Canal. The first objective was to cross the Sinai Peninsula in order to deny important sources of water to the enemy. Under pressure from the Prime Minister, Lloyd George, the defense was turned into an attempt to knock out the Ottoman Empire with a relatively small loss of life. The campaign was to some extent political because Lloyd George needed a victory, though its strength remained subordinated to developments on the Western Front. Falls, op. cit., 222ff. & 304ff. and Macmunn, op. cit., I, 364ff. and II, 628ff.

been satisfied--and at the outset was more than satisfied--merely with an absence of hostility.

But we ourselves became gradually more and more absorbed in the progress of our own swaying fortunes, and as we did so our attitude changed and became as self centered as that of Egypt. Our attention inevitably became more and more intensely concerned with the pursuit of victory, and other matters ceased to have importance.¹

Britain had promised to take upon herself the whole burden of the war; it soon became evident, however, that she could not do so. Scarcely a month after this declaration, the Army of Occupation found it necessary to employ Egyptian artillery units in the defense of the Canal Zone.² In August of 1915 five hundred Saidi laborers from Southern Egypt were employed at Mudros to do construction work needed for the Dardanelles campaign.³ Their adaptability to the type of work required, and their excellent physique made them very useful to the British forces. By the time of the evacuation the number employed in the Labor Corps, as the organization of Egyptian labor came to be called, was around 3000. When Egypt became the base for the numerous forces attempting, after March 1917, the conquest of the Western coast of the Mediterranean, Egyptian labor rose much more sharply in demand. Before the Palestine campaign could gain momentum, communications had to be constructed through the Sinai Peninsula, and once it was underway, these had to be extended

¹Op. cit., I, 183f.

²Macmunn, op. cit., 23.

³For a more detailed assessment of the problems of the problems of the Labor Corps and Camel Transport Corps, see Elgood, op. cit., 238ff. and 313ff.

as the military forces advanced northward. The demand for Egyptian labor was accompanied by a need for Egyptian pack animals, camels and donkeys. The Egyptian Labor Corps was supplemented by the Egyptian Camel Transport Corps.¹

While the Saidis had been willing enough volunteers for the Labor Corps, they did not join for more than a short period. After three or four months they preferred to return home and enjoy the fruits of their earnings. Only when these were spent did they consider rejoining the Corps. Therefore, as the Corps' numerous activities expanded, more and more of the Delta fellaheen had to be brought in. These were agricultural laborers, unaccustomed to construction work. They were reluctant to join the Corps and not inclined to work outside Egypt; mainly because of the well-known aversion of the fellah to leaving his native soil. Both the Labor Corps and the Camel Corps suffered casualties.² Sometimes the

¹The following is a list of jobs on which Egyptian labor was engaged: "(a) railway construction and maintenance, and bridge building; (b) roadmaking and metalling; constructing and laying 'wire roads', clearing tracks; (c) laying pipe-lines; (d) construction of buildings and reservoirs; carpentry and general Royal Engineer work; (e) quarrying stone; (f) well-boring; (g) formation of supply depôts and general Army Service Corps labour; (h) stretcher bearing and conservancy; drainage of malarial areas; (i) ammunition depôts and general Ordnance labour; (j) loading and discharging ships; stevedoring, including working winches and derricks; (k) boatmen--manning surf boats landing stores along the coasts of Palestine and Syria; (l) labour for Royal Air Force, for 'signals,' and for salvage." The Palestine News, A Brief Record of the Advance of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force (Cairo: Government Press and the Survey of Egypt, 1919), 109.

²In 1917 there were 21,000 men enrolled in the Camel Corps. Of these 220 were killed, 1400 wounded, and 4000 died in hospitals. Tom Little, Egypt (London: Ernest Benn, 1958), 128.

fellah had to work on the front line or, due to an unexpected retreat, found himself exposed to enemy fire. Though they were well paid, such conditions did little to improve the attraction of service in the Corps. The work animals fared worse--casualties among them were quite high as they were overworked and had to consistently follow fighting units up the front line. By the end of 1917 the demands of the army on both Corps were pressingly urgent and heavy. Egyptian agriculture and the fellah made great sacrifices under unfortunate circumstances which will be elaborated later in this chapter. When the war ended the Labor Corps and Camel Corps' strength had risen to 123,500.¹ In 1916 around 10,500 were shipped across the Mediterranean to work on the Western Front, and some 8000 were sent to Mesopotamia.²

Egypt contributed in other ways to the war effort. To facilitate British military communications, it undertook development projects improving communication facilities. When Egypt became a base camp many public buildings were turned over for use by the military. During the last year of the war many lower class Egyptians had a taste of some of the harsher aspects of war. There is no doubt that Egypt on the whole came out a wealthier country after the war than before it, but there is also no doubt that certain Egyptians also suffered

¹As these men were engaged on a six months contract this meant an annual turnover of around 270,000 apart from casualty replacements. Ibid., 107.

²Ibid., 108. For an assessment of their usefulness to the allied effort see The Times (London), November 28, 1917.

from the war. As will be shown later the administration of Egypt deteriorated considerably during the war. Britain, which had in the last analysis made itself responsible for Egypt, was unable to insure habitual standards of administration while fully pursuing her own war effort.

One of the most unfortunate factors in this situation was that Egypt was given little or no credit for her contributions to this effort. Sir Valentine Chirol summarizes the extent and effect of Egypt's participation in the First World War:

In other respects, . . . than actual fighting power, Egypt's contribution to the war can challenge comparison with that of many other parts of the British Empire, though she was never given the chance of gaining credit for conscious and voluntary sacrifice.¹

Britain had chosen at the inception of the war to declare that she alone would bear the full burden. There was considerable immediate advantage to be gained by such a declaration, and there was at that early stage little realization of the demands of total war. When the pressure for Egyptian help became acute, the British chose to maintain the fiction of their initial declaration. With Russia weakening rapidly, or out of the war, 1917-1918 was a time of serious stress for the British Empire and a change of policy may have appeared too risky. The result was unfortunate. By not advertising Egypt's contribution the British Government gave England an unfortunate picture of Egypt and the Egyptians. When Egypt demanded political independence after the war, it seemed to the British that the

¹Op. cit., 130f.

Egyptians were being ungrateful. Had not Britain protected Egypt from occupation by the forces of the hated Central Powers? It was difficult for the English to understand that to the Egyptian the German threat was far distant, if not altogether non-existent. Nor could he understand that Egypt had itself, and long before, wrested its autonomy from the Turk--only to lose it to the British.

Throughout the war the British Government officially maintained the fiction that Egypt was not being asked to help. Some Egyptians have claimed that the Egyptian Government offered Britain the use of its army. Lord Lloyd believed there was good ground for crediting the truth of the offer.¹ Sir Edward Grey, however, emphatically denied in Parliament the existence of such an offer.² Grey went even further and tried to avoid giving any indication of the use of Egyptian forces upon being asked, in Parliament, if medals had been awarded to Egyptian officers for bravery.³ The denial of Egyptian assistance to the war effort created so misleading a picture, that it was possible for Colonel Yates, M.P., to ask Under-Secretary of State for War, in a debate on the Army Estimates for 1917-1918,

. . . whether, although we cannot introduce the Military Service Act in Egypt, we could not call upon Egypt to

¹Op. cit., I, 215.

²There was little recognition of the fact that the campaign against the Sultan of Darfur was carried out by Egyptian soldiers.

³In an oral answer to a question put by Mr. Ginnell, H. C. Deb. 5s, Vol. 74 (1915), 1772.

protect its own frontiers? We see an enormous number of British troops, mostly Yeomanry, held up defending the Western oases of Egypt against the attack of the Senoussis. I ask him whether he does not think the time has come when Egypt should raise its own troops, and should be honour bound to garrison the Western oases of its own country?¹

If the British Parliament remained ignorant of Egypt's contribution,² the average "Tommy" was hardly more appreciative. The "Tommy" saw little of the rural Egypt. Outside of the British community, he came into contact mostly with prostitutes and other less respectable urban Egyptians and foreigners established in Egypt. His contacts were usually detrimental to his purse. This lack of understanding of the Egyptian situation was regrettable when one realizes that, upon his return to England, the soldier contributed his share to molding public opinion. Misunderstanding led to friction on a number of occasions. The situation which arose was pointedly explained by Lord Lloyd:

Allegations have been freely made which asperse the behaviour of the troops and lay upon them a considerable portion of the blame for the ill-feeling which later showed itself. It cannot be too definitely asserted that such a view of the situation is entirely unfair to the fighting forces. Whatever else may be in dispute in regard to the conduct of the War in all theatres, this one fact is admitted by all observers to be true, that the British soldier whenever brought into contact with the civil population in the theatres of combat, succeeded unflinchingly in securing their respect and affection.

¹Ibid., Vol. 91 (1917), 101. The underlining is the authors.

²And, it may be added, unconcerned with developments in Egypt. During the whole course of the war there was not a single debate in which Egypt was discussed at length. References to Egypt are mainly to be found in answer to parliamentary questions. A majority of these were put by Mr. Laurence Ginnell, an Irish nationalist obviously intent on embarrassing the Government. After his absence from the House, and subsequent arrest, references to Egypt decrease noticeably.

. . . If this result was not so fully obtained in Egypt, the blame for it must be laid elsewhere. Egyptians were not fighting side by side with the rest of the Empire, and so could not be, and indeed were not, regarded as comrades-in-arms, as were the Indian and other Colonial troops. . . . The policy followed by His Majesty's Government had placed the Egyptians in an equivocal position, in which it was inevitable that they should be regarded by the troops as a people who were both profiting by and profiteering out of the sacrifices and sufferings of our own men.¹

The Administration

During the first months of World War I, Britain was seriously concerned with Egypt's attitude to the altered situation--that of war against the Ottoman Empire. This concern receded into the background when Djemal Pasha's initial attempt to cross the Suez Canal failed. Fears of an Egyptian revolt did not materialize. The British were relieved that extremist elements had not responded to Ottoman incitements, even when front-line military necessity reduced the forces of garrison to a minimum.² Some internal unrest and opposition existed but on a very limited scale.³ There were indications of an exaggerated number of hasty and irregular arrests, encouraged by British advisors, of Egyptians suspected of subversion.⁴ Ronald Storrs did not deny

that in the lower strata of students, politicians and journalists, palpitating rumours are not being

¹Op. cit., I, 214f.

²Elgood, op. cit., 141.

³Two unsuccessful attempts on the life of Sultan Husain and a localized demonstration of Egyptian reservists were the most noteworthy signs.

⁴Elgood, op. cit., 60.

manufactured and propagated from hour to hour, but the manufacturers and propagators even as they speak look this way and that; for the arrests of turbulents and ne'er-do-wells have shown that, though it may be a long way to Tipperary, Malta can be reached with surprising celerity.¹

A rigorous censorship was imposed in Egypt. In Parliament a question about arrests and deportations was treated lightly by Sir Edward Grey.²

The administration of Egypt benefited during the war years to the extent that martial law proved to be a convenient way to circumvent the restrictions of the Capitulations on criminal justice, civil justice and the taxation of foreigners.³ In other respects administration declined considerably. In December of 1914 Sir Henry McMahon was appointed High Commissioner to replace Lord Kitchener (who expressed the intention of returning to Egypt after the war). McMahon came from India where he had been "foreign secretary" to the Viceregal Government. In Egypt he (and his wife), as Storrs so vividly wrote,

found themselves confronted with an unforeseen and unique situation set in an atmosphere and tradition entirely strange to their experience. Arabic and not Hindustani was the language of the Egyptians, whilst the numerous foreigners spoke, and thought in French. In place of the stately printed protocols and precedents of Calcutta or Simla, they had to grapple, officially and socially, with the haphazard hand-to-mouth methods of a rule which had been until a few weeks since almost ostentatiously provisional and which had committed hardly anything to paper, having governed in the beginning by interview and towards the end by telephone. The British system in Egypt had been a mean between the Hukum Hai (it's an order)

¹Op. cit., 168.

²H. C. Deb. 5s, Vol. 75 (1915), 1347f.

³The Times (London), December 19, 1917.

of direct Indian administration and the almost Byzantine technique which European Governments found necessary to maintain their prestige and privileges . . . at the Sublime Porte. We deprecated the Imperative, preferring the Subjunctive, even the wistful Optative mood. We "advised" Egyptian Ministers. We "inspected" Egyptian Departments.¹

McMahon was apparently unable to appreciate the need for the differences in the system of administration between India and Egypt. By the time he was recalled, less than two years later, the Residency had lost almost all contact with the political pulse of Egypt and Egyptian politicians. Under McMahon the "advisors" to the Egyptian cabinet ministers became for all practical purposes the de facto cabinet. Furthermore, these advisors were more immediately under the control of the Residency than had previously been the custom.²

Though the Residency and the British "advisors" assumed greater direct control over the Egyptian Government, their own position and influence was increasingly weakened. Their numbers and aggregate ability were steadily reduced by the manpower demands, administrative and military, of other theaters of war. Their policies had to be subordinated to the needs of the total war effort. Another important weakness of the Residency was that in comparison with their predecessor, Kitchener, and their successor, Allenby, the two intervening High Commissioners, McMahon and Wingate, were not of sufficient renown to command the full attention of the Foreign Office and

¹Op. cit., 223.

²Wingate, op. cit., 204ff.

the cabinet.¹

The Rushdi cabinet was willing to cooperate with the British, but, on the other hand, it had no intention of shouldering responsibility for unpopular measures caused by the necessities of the war. The British had imposed martial law and the Protectorate; it was for them to bear the brunt. Up to the middle of 1917, during the period of prosperity, this was relatively light. As the war drew to a close it became overwhelmingly heavy. While undertaking greater responsibility for the government of Egypt, the Residency lost such able men as Storrs and Clayton, involved as they were in Arab affairs, who could have given Egypt good "advice" and "supervision". It also lost its dominating voice in making recommendations to the British Government. Thus, while it would have been in the interest of the Egyptians as a whole to reduce the acreage devoted to cotton, it was in the interest of Britain to obtain all the cotton she could. The result was that reductions in acreage were not drastic enough, and the fines imposed for violation of planting restrictions were minimal. With the establishment in Cairo of the Headquarters of the Palestine Expeditionary Force, the influence and authority of the Residency was overshadowed. The demands of the military were paramount and led to a policy of requisitioning of supplies,

¹There are strong indications that McMahon's was a temporary appointment while Kitchener was occupied at the War Office. Wingate was appointed soon after Kitchener's death. (Storrs, op. cit., 222, and Wingate, op. cit., 201. Though well known in Egypt and the Sudan, Wingate's farsighted recommendations did not (as will be shown in the next chapter) carry much weight).

and forced recruitment for the Labor Corps.

Administratively these demands reopened the question of Egyptian help in the war. On May 23, 1917, the commander of the Expeditionary Force, General Murray, asked for the introduction of the conscription of Egyptian labor. Wingate, supported by Residency officials, refused, arguing that to carry out conscription would require more troops than the advantages gained would justify.¹ The British Government was still unconvinced, but Wingate remained adamant. Finally, unwilling to take the risk of additional trouble in an already tense year, a compromise measure was adopted by the Foreign Office. An official wrote to Wingate: "If I could report a vigorous recruiting campaign had already begun and had met with a certain measure of success, the bad impression likely to be caused by your reply might be mitigated."² The "more vigorous recruiting campaign" translated itself into pressure exerted by the Ministry of the Interior upon provincial and local authorities to induce fellaheen to "volunteer". The respect for authority was great³ and the "volunteers" were

¹Ibid., 215. It is interesting to observe that the possibility of annexation was again considered. Brigadier-General Clayton prepared a Note in July 1917 suggesting the advisability of such a move. For the text of the Note see Lloyd, op. cit., I, 262ff.

²Wingate, op. cit., 215.

³A humorous and revealing sidelight on the power of suggestion is this account of Storrs' effort to organize a commemorative celebration of Shakespeare's tercentenary. "I telephoned to the Bishop, Rennie MacInnes, suggesting he should work the thing into his Easter Sermon. Similar injunctions

produced, but the methods adopted led to numerous cases of injustice. A brisk market developed among local authorities for the sale of exemptions. As an unofficial quota of recruitment was fixed, the poor and unlucky ones had to "volunteer". This gave ample opportunity for the settling of feuds, private ones or those of local factions vying for power. In some instances, when the quota remained unfilled methods reminiscent of "press ganging" were used. This system of quotas was introduced towards the end of 1917. In May 1918 the need for Egyptian labor grew yet more urgent and the British encouraged the adoption of an outright system of "compulsion by persuasion".¹ The Prime Minister instructed the mudirs of provinces:

This Ministry wrote to you on October 21, 1917, that the Mamurs and Omdehs should encourage the inhabitants to volunteer into the Egyptian Labour Corps and Camel Transport Corps, and that after consultation with Lieut.-Colonel Hazel, the Inspector of Recruiting, you should yourself use all your moral influence to assure the success of the recruiting into these Corps. A supplementary notice was sent to you on the same day, to the

through the Coptic Patriarchate obtained an honorable mention . . . from every Coptic pulpit in the realm; I next binged up the Minister of Education to the tune of a memorial lecture in every school; and finally telephoned to the English, French, Italian, Greek, Arabic, and Armenian press; provoking a flow of leading articles, prize poems, and enthusiastic correspondence, the back-wash of which continues even now to clog my leisure. These are, at least, better than no notice at all, and will I hope give to an undiscerning world the impression that an interest in such things exists in Egypt." Op. cit., 230. It is not surprising, therefore, that the Red Cross and Our Day funds collected in good faith large sums from all sections of the population merely because they were sponsored by important personalities in the country. The Times (London) November 28, 1917, reported an Our Day collection of £320,000 mostly from Egyptians.

¹Wingate, op. cit., 216.

effect that we have been informed that some Notables, for personal reasons, were using their influence to hinder the progress of recruiting, and that you should stop their propaganda. Since then the recruiting went on all right till the middle of March, when it became so unsatisfactory that the Commander-in-Chief was obliged to ask the Egyptian Government to adopt compulsory service in order to enable him to obtain the necessary number of labourers.

You should therefore, in order to prevent the Government adopting such a measure, intensify your effort for the encouragement of recruiting, by explaining to the people that the voluntary system is much better for them as it means better pay, shorter period of service, more leave, etc.

I have observed in the recruiting lists that the proportion of recruits to the population is much smaller in some Markazes than in others, which indicates that some Mamurs and Omdehs are showing some neglect.

In the future I will deal myself with those of whose neglect the Military Authorities complain, and will reward all those who will do their work in a satisfactory manner.¹

In the course of the following month Lord Edward Cecil was able to report in Parliament that, because of Britain's initial promise,

recruitment in Egypt is therefore being left upon a voluntary basis, but a thorough recruiting campaign is in operation and has been attended with creditable results. Notwithstanding the Proclamation, the Egyptian Government have made most generous contributions to the cost of the War.²

Forced recruitment of some fellaheen into the Labor Corps was not the only unpopular measure which Egypt had to bear in order to satisfy the demands of the Palestine Campaign.

¹Ibid., 216f.

²H. C. Deb. 5s, Vol. 106 (1918), 2013. The strength of the Labor Corps and Camel Corps rose from 68,472 in 1917 to 123,454 in 1918. The Palestine News, op. cit., 107.

In May 1917 British fears of possible disturbances were re-awakened and a general disarmament of the civilian population was ordered. In November of the same year military headquarters announced the decision to requisition necessary supplies. Beasts of burden, both male and female, were subjected to requisition. Their purchase and sale was forbidden, and they were classified as "fit" or "unfit". Again the poorer and weaker fellah, without influence with the authorities or unable to circumvent the decree, suffered the most.

Reference has already been made to the loss of contact between the British authorities and the Egyptians during McMahon's High Commission. In December 1916, while on his way down the Nile from Khartoum, the new High Commissioner, Sir Reginald Wingate, had an interview with Sultan Husain. The latter confided that Anglo-Egyptian relations were near the breaking point. There had been no frank communication between himself and the Residency for over a year.¹ Wingate tried to repair the damage, but his range of action was limited by military necessity. During 1917 military headquarters moved out of Cairo and further away from contact with Egyptian opinion. Wingate's influence in the Foreign Office was limited. He had been appointed by Sir Edward Grey and the Asquith cabinet, but before he arrived in Cairo, Lloyd George had replaced Asquith and Balfour was in the Foreign Office. While Grey had been well acquainted with Egyptian affairs, Balfour had little special knowledge of the area. Sir Ronald

¹Wingate, op. cit., 204.

Graham was in charge of Egypt at the Foreign Office and with Lord Hardinge, Permanent Under-Secretary of State, was particularly influential in Egyptian affairs. Wingate's first action was to end McMahon's policy of turning the "advisors" to the Egyptian Government into Residency officials as well as the de facto Egyptian cabinet. Wingate found it difficult to impress this change on the most influential, both in his own capacity and in that of Financial Advisor, of the "advisors", Lord Edward Cecil, brother to the Under Secretary, Lord Robert Cecil.¹ While on leave in London Lord Edward put forward the suggestion in August 1917 that the conduct of Egyptian affairs be removed from the Foreign Office and placed under a separate department. This suggestion was submitted to a special committee consisting of Mr. Balfour, Lord Milner and Lord Curzon, with Ronald Storrs as Secretary.² The deliberations of this committee are noteworthy, primarily because it was not thought necessary to inform Wingate about them until later, and because, as Wingate's biographer comments:

Some of the opinions expressed, assuming that Egypt was an integral part of the British Empire and should be treated as such, were, however, singularly illuminating in the light of London's attitude during the Egyptian crisis eighteen months later.³

¹Ibid., 206ff.

²Storrs, op. cit., 303ff.

³Wingate, op. cit., 209.

The Economy¹

The economic disruption at the inception of hostilities had an adverse effect on the financial situation of Egypt. Cotton sales declined because buyers, using up their inventories, were reluctant to make additional purchases until the new situation caused by the war was clarified. The government assisted the growers by postponing the collection of certain taxes. The area of cotton cultivation was restricted and Britain purchased cotton through the Egyptian Government. Later, to raise prices and equalize the profits of landowners forced to grow food crops, the export, previously restricted, of foods was permitted. By the middle of 1915 the recession disappeared. With Britain's wartime needs the demand for cotton rose, and continued to rise at an accelerated pace throughout the war and for two years after it. With the rise in demand came a corresponding increase in prices. By the end of 1917 the value of cotton had risen over two hundred percent. The increased revenue from cotton was supplemented by large sums of money spent in Egypt by Imperial and French forces during the Dardanelles and Palestine campaigns. It has been estimated that in the period 1916-1919 Egypt's total wealth increased from outside sources by £E150,000,000. The effect of this increased inflow of money was on the whole beneficial to

¹For a valuable account of the economic situation of Egypt during the war, see A. E. Crouchley, The Economic Development of Modern Egypt (London: Longmans, Green, 1938), chap. v.

Egypt.¹ It enabled it to purchase a considerable share of its foreign debt. Internally it gave the opportunity to many of the fellaheen to liquidate their debts with their increased profits and in inflated currency. During the first half of 1915 the fellah had suffered from the difficulty of paying taxes and interest. For the following two years he prospered mainly because of his reduced indebtedness.

However, this prosperity proved to be temporary. The fellah, as will be shown, soon found himself in a worse condition than before. Psychologically the sudden variations of fortune had a serious affect on him.² Though the reasons for the fellah's misfortunes extend over a wider range of factors, economically he suffered from the shortage of food and spiraling prices, both of food and other commodities. Cotton planting was restricted soon after the outbreak of the war by thirty-six percent. It was permitted to return almost to normal the following year because of the attraction of increased profits on the cotton market and due to an increased demand from Britain. This meant, of course, less area for food crops when greater and greater military forces were using Egypt as a base for operations, and the demand for food supplies rose

¹It was also beneficial to the Allies because almost all of the surplus income of the country was invested in Britain or France in the form of subscriptions to War Loans or investment in Treasury Bills. The Times (London), November 28, 1917.

²Cf., The Times (London), December 20, 1915. "So long as agriculturally things go well and their material well being is undisturbed, so long will they remain docile, and deaf to the whisperings of reactionaries and revolutionaries."

sharply.¹ The government had already allowed the export of food with an accompanying rise in the price of food early in the war. It reversed its policy, but the damage had been done. In 1917 the British Army began to make extensive use of fellah labor and to requisition supplies. This seriously affected the fellaheen. They were losing their prosperity because of rapidly rising prices of food and fuel. They could not always work their fields because of their recruitment into the Labor Corps. And if they were left to work their fields, they found themselves losing their work animals, camels and donkeys, their primary source of power, to the military, who inconsiderately even requisitioned the females of the species. In addition to all these difficulties, those fellaheen who could not completely fulfill their requisition quotas were forced to purchase the residue on the open market at inflated prices. The fellah, having learned to enjoy a record prosperity, was soon after plunged into considerable economic distress. The distress of the fellah was shared by the "white collar" employes, and was to be increasingly aggravated immediately after the war.

The profits of the war were being rapidly absorbed by the rich landowners and the commercial middle classes, a considerable segment of which were foreign in origin. These

¹In a Note on the Budget, Sir William Brunyate reported the creation of a Supplies Control Board "due to the danger of a local shortage, and the feeling that Egypt is under an obligation to provide the largest quantity of food-stuffs for the British forces. . . ." The Times (London), April 20, 1918.

could now afford higher standards of living or could indulge in speculation. The consequence was inflated prices for scarce commodities and spiraling land values. Ronald Storrs observed that "the Egyptian Provinces began to feel the War towards its end. Cairo and Alexandria may be said not to have felt it at all, save pleurably. . . ." ¹ One economist stated that in the latter years of the war and during the immediate post-war period, there were greater extremes of wealth and poverty than at any time, "greater perhaps than in any period of Egypt's modern history." ² The same authority also stated that "the high profits gained during the war were not spread equally through the different sections of the population, but in the last resort were concentrated in the hands of comparatively small groups." ³

¹Op. cit., 168.

²Crouchley, op. cit., 194. See also Charles Issawi, Egypt at Mid-Century (London: Oxford University Press, 1954), 40f.

³Crouchley, op. cit., 209.

CHAPTER III

POSTWAR COMPLACENCY

The High Commissioner, Sir Reginald Wingate, deeply concerned over Egypt's postwar prospects, at one time hoped to have the country's problems studied by a Royal Commission.¹ When Sultan Husain died in October 1917, he favored the succession of the Sultan's son, Kemal ud-Din, whose independence of character and frankness, he felt, would in the long run be an advantage to Britain. The Foreign Office, however, fearing his son's pro-Turkish attitude, decided on the Sultan's brother, Fuad, who with his Italian background was believed to be more manageable.

A month after his accession Fuad indicated his desire to dismiss from the cabinet Ibrahim Fathy Pasha and Ahmed Hilmi; the former because of incompetence and the latter because of scandalous behavior, and to strengthen the cabinet with Sa'ad Zaghlul and Abdul Aziz Bey Fahmy. Wingate supported the idea and wrote to the Foreign Office:

That the inclusion of Zaghlul and Fahmy will give the reconstituted Ministry a somewhat stronger Nationalistic tendency is undoubted, but on the other hand I am not altogether adverse to this. Zaghlul . . . with his powers of oratory . . . has acquired a very prominent position, and I am not at all sure that we would not be

¹Wingate, op. cit., 221-224.

wise to secure his support on the side of the government rather than have him in opposition.¹

The advice went unheeded and the Foreign Office refused to permit the removal of two proven British supporters in the cabinet.

Two concrete measures were taken with regard to the future. The first was the formation by the Egyptian Government in March 1917 of a Capitulations Commission to study the changes and reforms in the judiciary which would be necessary in order to secure the eventual termination of the Capitulations.² This Commission was representative of Egyptian, British and other foreign interests immediately affected by the proposed changes. It was given wide terms of reference and unlimited authority to investigate. The leading figure in the Commission was Sir William Brunyate, Judicial Advisor to the Egyptian Government. Towards the end of 1917 another Special Commission was formed to study the whole question of legislative reforms.³ The Prime Minister requested Brunyate to prepare an outline of constitutional reforms for study by the Commission. In March 1918 an interim announcement of the Capitulations Commission recommended the amalgamation of the Native, Mixed and Consular Courts (except in cases pertaining to personal status where the Shari'a and Consular Courts would

¹Ibid., 224.

²Jasper Yeates Brinton, The Mixed Courts of Egypt (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1930), 335 and Lloyd, op. cit., 272ff.

³Ibid., 273ff.

continue to act) with a sufficient number of foreign judges to safeguard foreign interests.¹ The Commission also suggested certain reforms in the Commercial Code among which were modifications drawn from English bankruptcy laws. These changes were in response to pressures favoring "a fundamental break with traditions and a more or less openly avowed Anglicization of the law and legal institutions of Egypt."² The interim announcement awoke fears among foreign communities and Egyptian lawyers of an impending British attempt to tighten their grip over Egypt by replacing Latin with Anglo-Saxon law; the former being considered a safeguard against British control of the legal systems in Egypt. The opposition was sufficiently strong to bring about a suspension of the Commission's work.³

In mid-October 1918 the Sultan made known to Wingate his desire to see some form of "Home Rule" for Egypt.⁴ The

¹The Times (London), March 28, 1918.

²Quoted in Brinton, op. cit., 336, from a lecture delivered at Cambridge University in August 1924.

³Ibid., 335-338.

⁴Fuad gave expression to his frame of mind as early as November 1917 when he saw Mr. Montagu, then Secretary of State for India, who was passing through Egypt on his way home from India. "It appears", wrote Wingate, "that the Sultan said to Montagu that he hoped that Egypt would be granted full autonomy in due course; to which the latter (turning over in his mind the far wider executive powers possessed by Egyptians as compared with Indians) replied, 'But Your Highness would appear to have already considerable autonomy in Egypt.' Thereupon the Sultan turned to Rushdi, who was on his left, and said, 'Listen to this Rushdi, Mr. Montagu thinks we have autonomy in Egypt,' and followed his remark with a hearty laugh." Wingate, op. cit., 223.

Sultan felt his position to be precarious. He had been appointed by the British, he had no personal following in Egypt and he was afraid that Abbas Hilmi might, after the war, successfully reassert his claim to the throne. When Zaghlul and Fahmy were refused places in the cabinet, Fuad encouraged them to become part of his own unofficial cabinet. Although an autocrat by nature, he felt it politically expedient to reveal not only nationalistic, but democratic tendencies. In speaking of Egyptian autonomy, Fuad borrowed heavily from Wilson's statements on self-determination. Early in November he informed Wingate that he was in favor of a constitutional monarchy for Egypt.¹ On October 19 Wingate reported to Hardinge that the American leader's "self-determination ideas" had "taken a strong hold on the Sultan", and that the government "must expect a movement in this direction on the part of certain sections of this country after the war."²

Early in November the British and French Governments decided to issue a statement designed to allay the suspicions of the Arabs concerning their future at the hands of the occupying powers. The "Anglo-French Declaration" was obviously directed towards Syria and Mesopotamia, but its repercussions were strongly felt in Egypt. Couched in Wilsonian terms, it was rich in promises:

The aim which France and Great Britain have in view in

¹Elie Kedourie, "Sa'ad Zaghlul and the British" in St. Antony's Papers: Number XI (London: Chatto and Windus, 1961), 142f.

²Wingate, op. cit., 233.

waging in the East the War let loose upon the world by German ambition, is to ensure the complete and final emancipation of all those peoples so long oppressed by the Turks, and to establish national governments and administrations which shall derive their authority from the initiative and free will of the people themselves. To realise this, France and Great Britain are in agreement to encourage and assist the establishment of native governments in Syria and Mesopotamia, now liberated by the Allies, as also in those territories for whose liberation they are striving and to recognise those governments immediately they are effectively established.

Far from wishing to impose on the peoples of these regions this or that institution, they have no other care than to assure, by their support and practical aid, the normal workings of such governments and administrations as the peoples shall themselves have adopted; to guarantee impartial and even justice for all, to facilitate the economic development of the country by arousing and encouraging local initiative, to foster the spread of education, to put an end to those factions too long exploited by Turkish policy--such is the part which the two Allied Governments have set themselves to play in the liberated territories.¹

Wingate was sent a copy of the declaration on November 4, four days before its publication. On November 6 he warned Sir Ronald Graham:

I think we must expect a repercussion of this statement in Native circles here who will argue that as self-government is to be allowed to all territories liberated during the war, why should the same principle not be followed as regards Egypt, which was also liberated but placed under British protection after the war began?²

On November 8 Wingate saw Zaghlul, who urged that the Legislative Assembly, suspended since the beginning of the war, be reconvened again. Wingate advised Zaghlul to be patient. That same day he telegraphed the Foreign Office again warning that "the self-determination policy . . . may have its repercussions

¹Quoted in H. C. Deb. 5s, Vol. 113, col. 2351.

²Wingate, *op. cit.*, 233.

amongst Egyptian Nationalists who will no doubt desire similar treatment for Egypt."¹ Four days later Zaghlul contacted Wingate's A. D. C. to arrange for an interview. The meeting was arranged for the following day, November 13. Zaghlul, accompanied by Abdel Aziz Bey Fahmy and Sharawi Pasha, had a "frank and friendly" interview with the High Commissioner. Wingate's son, and biographer, gives this account of the meeting:

Zaghlul demanded complete autonomy for Egypt, as an ancient and capable race with a glorious past--far more capable of conducting a well-ordered government than the Arabs, Syrians and Mesopotamians to whom self-determination had so recently been promised. They argued that Egypt had shown a spirit of great loyalty in the war and had helped on its prosecution with men and money; and that now all danger of Turkish aggression was over, they expected their reward--independence. They looked upon England as their closest friend and . . . Egypt would be so ranged with England as to place their mutual relations on an entirely different footing to that of any other nation. Even a degree of financial supervision on the part of England would be acceptable. They finally stated that, when transport was available, they intended to proceed to London, to place their views before the British authorities and the British people.²

Wingate told Zaghlul that he did not know what the views of the British Government were and again counselled patience and moderation. A few hours after Zaghlul and his supporters had left the Residency, Wingate met the Prime Minister, Rushdi, who proposed that Adly and he go to London to discuss the future of

¹Ibid., 229 and 233.

²Ibid., 229. Sir Ronald's summary of the meeting has been given verbatim as it is presumably based on a study of Wingate's papers, and because it is not made clear whether Zaghlul asked for autonomy or independence--two quite different things.

Egypt accompanied by Nationalist representatives. Wingate immediately telegraphed an account of the interviews to Hardinge and concluded with:

If the burning questions are not settled now, we are likely to have considerable difficulty in the future. The general spirit of self-determination to which the war has given birth has taken a firm hold on Egypt, and I think it is only just that the Sultan, his Ministers and the Egyptians generally should be told how they stand. . . .¹

The following day Wingate received, in reply to his cable of November 8, a startling confession of ignorance from a responsible authority in the Foreign Office:

We have had up to now no indications of such Native aspirations nor of the form they are likely to take. . . . You should keep me fully informed of any developments on lines you mention.²

During the next two weeks Wingate pressed the Foreign Office to accept Rushdi's proposal. On November 20 he described the agitated state of Egypt to the Foreign Secretary, A. J. Balfour, and pointed out that though there were at the time "no signs whatever of a militant spirit, nor any attempts to excite religious fanaticism or anti-European feeling", there was

a genuine fear that the Egyptians may be absorbed into an Empire of which the most robust members are young, confident peoples, nearly related by blood to the Mother country and predominantly Christian by profession.³

Four days later he again took up the matter and warned Hardinge that

there is going to be a very determined all-around attempt

¹Ibid., 230.

²Ibid., 233. Sir Ronald sees in this cable a "veiled reprimand" directed against his father.

³Ibid., 234.

to raise the Egyptian question and, if possible, get it settled once and for all. And I repeat my own convictions that the present appears to me a favourable time to grasp the nettle and have it seriously tackled.¹

On November 27 the Foreign Office informed Rushdi that Adly and he would be welcomed in London some months later, when the pressure of affairs would have lessened, but that no Nationalists could be allowed to leave the country. The next day Rushdi and his cabinet tendered their resignations though they continued in office at the High Commissioner's request.

Egypt was still quiet, but the various factors which were to lead to a crisis were beginning to make themselves felt. The Sultan, uncertain of his position, as was already shown, surrounded himself with Nationalist elements in the hope of gaining a following. Zaghlul, holder, as Vice-President of the suspended Legislative Assembly, of the highest elective office in Egypt, and a man of recognized ability, had assumed a leading position among the Nationalists. He did not, however, at this time possess the popularity and influence over Egyptians which he and the other Nationalists would have conferred upon them in the disturbances of March 1919. At this stage they still felt dependent upon the support of the Sultan. Rushdi and his Ministers were in the difficult position of having to show some positive gains for Egypt from their years of faithful collaboration in the British war effort. The benefits had been great during the first years of the war, but were fast disappearing as the fellah underwent greater hardships

¹Ibid., 234.

and the cost of living index rose to the detriment of the fellah, the urban population and the "white collar" workers. At this early date, however, the most vocal elements of discontent were still the Nationalist politicians and the Sultan. Rushdi was in close contact with both. The similarity in their views expressed to the High Commissioner appears to have been a result of collaboration on the part of all three groups to gain the anticipated reward of Egypt's cooperation and implied British promises.¹

That these efforts did not result in success was, in this writer's opinion, of tragic consequence to Anglo-Egyptian relations. Immediately after World War I, the British continued to regard Egypt as an Oriental province under their raj, while elsewhere in the Middle East their policy was opportunistic and expansionist.² Such policies defeated any hope of stability, in addition to making a mockery of repeated promises. If this was not unrealistic enough, the weakened financial and economic position of postwar Britain virtually insured that Britain could not give adequate military support to its policies. Britain was out of step with the Zeitgeist of the postwar world, indeed the country's leaders were not even responding to public opinion. The cabinet, the Foreign Office and the Residency, with the possible exception of Wingate, seemed to have assumed that the Protectorate was the only obvious

¹Kedourie, op. cit., 144-146.

²Particular reference can be made here to the contemporary situation in Iraq and Palestine.

framework for Anglo-Egyptian relations. In November, at the same time that the Nationalists were refused passports, Balfour informed Wingate that

His Majesty's Government desire to act on the principle which they have always followed of giving the Egyptians an ever-increasing share in the government of the country. . . . As you are well aware, the stage has not yet been reached at which self-government is possible. His Majesty's Government have no intention of abandoning their responsibilities for order and good government in Egypt, and for protecting the rights and interests both of the native and of the foreign populations of the country.¹

The government continued in this attitude until well after the disturbances of March 1919 and there appears to be no evidence that there would have been any change of opinion, within a reasonable space of time, without these disturbances. Thus, Egypt and Egyptian nationalist leaders were forced to resort to actions which revealed unexpected sources of political power, and latent demagogic tendencies that were to blight the seemingly smooth and progressive development of Egypt since the first days of the British Occupation.

Concurrent with the tendering of his resignation, Rushdi had publicised the content of the secret Note Brunyate had prepared in connection with the work of the Special Commission. It proposed constitutional reforms within the framework of the Protectorate and in the spirit of the Capitulations. It entirely ignored the aspirations of the nationalists. Its main feature was the creation of a bicameral legislature, the upper of which would have the preponderant

¹Lloyd, *op. cit.*, I, 293. F. O. Despatch: Mr. Balfour to Sir R. Wingate, November 27, 1918.

power and would contain Egyptian ministers, British advisors and representatives of the foreign communities elected by special electorates to give effective representation to the overwhelmingly dominant foreign commercial communities and interests. Based on constitutional proposals rejected in Cromer's time, its fundamental assumption was that as the Egyptians played a small role in the economy of the country, they could not claim a larger share in its administration.¹

After being refused permission to go to London, Zaghlul and the Nationalists, supported by the Sultan, began to agitate throughout the country to gain popular support for their request to be allowed to go to Paris. Committees were organized and petitions were circulated with the support of the government. Ironically the organization, which had recruited fellaheen for the Labor Corps, now helped collect signatures. The petitions were later confiscated at the request of the British advisor to the Ministry of the Interior, Mr. Haines, in a letter which was widely publicised by Rushdi.² The general feeling in Egypt was one of urgency and agitation in view of the forthcoming Paris Peace Conference. Egyptians, like people the world over, had the most exaggerated expectations concerning the outcome of this most momentous gathering since the Congress of Vienna. The Nationalists argued that they were, at least, entitled to the same treatment as the other occupied areas of the Ottoman Empire who were being

¹Ibid., 277.

²Kedourie, op. cit., 148.

invited to send official delegates.¹ Yet the British Government continued to underestimate the strength of Egyptian aspirations. On December 12 the Foreign Office agreed to receive the Egyptian Ministers in March 1919, but informed Wingate that

nothing vital to Egyptian interests will occur at the Peace Conference excepting that of the establishment of the British Protectorate, which the Allied Powers have already recognized and which Enemy Powers will be required to accept.²

Meanwhile, Nationalist agitation in Egypt gained momentum. Rushdi, supported by the Sultan, refused to withdraw his resignation and no other politician would replace him. Wingate was instructed to ask the Sultan to reprimand the Nationalist leaders, termed "Extremists" by the Foreign Office, but Fuad absolutely refused.³ The impasse continued until early in January 1, 1919, when the Foreign Office agreed, if it would have "a pacifying effect on Egypt", to allow the Ministers to come to England in February, although they would not be received until March. By January 16 Wingate negotiated a more

¹"The refusal of the British Government . . . was considered as a humiliation by the entire Egyptian people, especially as other delegations from neighbouring countries were freely welcomed in London. The Archbishop of Cyprus with six other Cypriot Greeks were actually on their way home when the Egyptian request was refused. The common saying in Cairo was: 'They will receive an Archbishop and six bakkals (grocers) from Cyprus but they won't receive Egyptian Ministers.'" Hayter, op. cit., 25.

²Wingate, op. cit., 237. This was a strange oversimplification in view of the fact that, as the United States had not recognized the Protectorate (it did not do so until April 1919), Egyptian Nationalists were hopeful of gaining Wilson's support.

³Ibid., 237.

hopeful compromise by which Rushdi and Adly would withdraw their resignations and proceed to London on condition that Zaghlul and his associates be allowed to travel outside Egypt.¹ This solution did not force the British Government to receive Zaghlul in London officially. Wingate immediately left for Paris and London to press for the acceptance of his solution. In Paris he met Hardinge, Lloyd George and Balfour, to whom he outlined his policy. Balfour expressed general agreement but referred him to Lord Curzon in London,² Curzon having, early in January 1919, become Acting Foreign Secretary in charge of Foreign Office affairs not directly concerned with the Peace Conferences.³ Wingate arrived in London on February 3 and immediately saw Sir Ronald Graham. Inexplicably, and most surprisingly, he was not granted an interview with Curzon until two weeks later. In the meantime, the Ministers in Egypt, who had resumed office in accordance with their agreement with Wingate, were pressing for results. On February 13 they were informed that matters were still "being considered in consultation with Sir R. Wingate".⁴ On February 17 Wingate saw Curzon and there resulted a complete deadlock. The issue was left to be resolved by Balfour. After another week's delay, he

¹Ibid., 238.

²Ibid., 238.

³The Earl of Ronaldshay, The Life of Lord Curzon (3 Vols., London: Ernest Benn Ltd., 1928), III, 201, and The Times (London), January 8, 1919.

⁴Wingate, op. cit., 239.

answered from Paris in support of Curzon.¹

Among the Egyptians there was an atmosphere of expectancy arising from Wingate's trip which the British in Egypt seriously misinterpreted. On February 14 The Times (London) contained this report from its correspondent:

Disdainful of the fact that from the earliest days of the occupation we have consistently endeavored to associate with ourselves in the administration of the country the better elements of the population, and that the Egyptian nation to-day enjoys a great degree of prosperity and well being, . . . misguided members of the Intelligenza would try to make out to the world at large that their country is in the same position as some of those nations . . . whom the war has liberated from oppression, and who are to be permitted to enjoy the political liberty to which their moral and intellectual development entitles them, and of which they have hitherto been deprived. . . . Equally disregarding the peculiar political and financial relationship of Egypt to Europe, they would claim the right to govern themselves without any interference from without. This blindness to the practical requirements of the situation is perhaps one of the strongest points in the case against any such departure as they advocate, since if, as they claim, they are representative of the nation, it shows that the Egyptians do not as yet possess the sense of proportion and of public spirit indispensable to responsible government.

It is only fair to point out, however, that these people do not represent in any way even the social class to which they belong. From their more enlightened fellows their actions meet with the strongest disapproval, and it is felt that, far from obtaining any greater political freedom for Egypt, any extension which their activities may assume will do the country an incredible amount of harm just at the moment when there is a prospect of a local reorganization on the lines of the complete removal of the obstacles to internal reforms hitherto set up by the Capitulations, and of closer association of all communities in the government of the country.

On February 24 Sir Milne Cheetham, Acting High Commissioner, reported to Curzon that Rushdi and Adly had lost the popularity

¹Ibid., 239f.

their resignation had won for them, and that Zaghlul was "trusted by no one". He wrote of the Nationalists:

The agitation which they have organized is dying out, or is at any rate quiescent in the country at large. A noteworthy feature is that this agitation has from the beginning been entirely pacific in character. . . . We still, no doubt, have to reckon with discontent among the upper classes, the landed proprietors, and professional elements. Most of these people vaguely desire some form of autonomy, which would make them individually more important, but the situation does not seem to me to differ materially from that of 1914 when Prince Hussein and the leading Ministers refused for a long time to accept a protectorate without concessions which we were not able to make. . . . The present movement, however, cannot be compared in importance with that of Mustapha Kamel, and there seems no reason why it should affect the decisions of H. M.'s Government on constitutional questions and the proper form to be given to the protectorate.¹

The above report coincided with Curzon's decision concerning the visit of the Egyptian Ministers to London. Wingate's biographer gives this summary of Curzon's telegram to Cheetham:

His telegram began by acknowledging that the Egyptian Ministers did not wish to come to England "unless the Nationalist leaders are also allowed to come", and that this attitude was approved by the Sultan. It proceeded to characterise the Nationalist leaders as of "doubtful standing and antecedents", and of organising a disloyal movement against the protecting Power; and then asserted that any permission given to them to come to England "would imply a measure of countenance and recognition" to which they were "not entitled", and "of which, if conceded, they would be likely to make the same illegitimate use that they did of their original reception at the Residency". . . . Lord Curzon was "not inclined" to favour the suggestion that the Nationalists be permitted to come to London in any circumstances, official or unofficial. Finally it could not be admitted "that Egyptian Ministers, invited by His Majesty's Government to visit this country, should be allowed to dictate the terms on which they are prepared to come".²

¹Lloyd, *op. cit.*, I, 290f. F. O. Despatch: Sir M. Cheetham to Lord Curzon, February 24, 1919.

²Wingate, *op. cit.*, 240.

On March 1, after Rushdi was informed of Curzon's decision, the cabinet resigned.

Thenceforward the atmosphere of crisis in Egypt developed rapidly. The Sultan attempted to form a new government. On March 3 Zaghlul called on the Sultan to deter him from the attempt. The Residency had, in the meantime, come to realize that there were reasons for concern. Cheetham considered Zaghlul's visit to the Sultan as a threat to stability and recommended his deportation.¹ Curzon cabled his agreement. On March 6, under the terms of martial law, a warning was issued to Zaghlul and his associates to cease forthwith any agitation likely to lead to disturbances. On the following day Zaghlul and his associates publicly replied to the warning in what was considered to be an unsatisfactory manner. This led to the arrest, in the afternoon of March 8, of Zaghlul and three of his supporters. The following morning they were placed on a destroyer bound for Malta. At the same time, the students went on strike and the disturbances fanned out and increased over wide areas of Egypt.

The Special Commission later sent to, among other things, investigate the causes of the disturbances which followed, produced a lucid and incisive report which traced, from the advent of the Occupation, these developments which culminated in the violent events of March and April 1919.² Some of the

¹Lloyd, op. cit., 296f.

²Report of the Special Commission to Egypt (Cmd. 1131 of 1920).

most important details of this report have been expanded upon in previous chapters. As the Commission concluded, it is difficult to judge the degree of resentment which these factors produced except in reference to the end result--the disturbances of 1919.¹ The extent and seriousness of these may have been exaggerated; their absolute spontaneity may remain in question, but it can be strongly argued that they mark the end of the neutrality of the poorer classes towards the British domination in Egypt. This break was foreshadowed at Denshawī, but on a very limited scale. The educated Egyptian's aspirations were apparent at an early stage--the resentment of the lower classes became apparent in March 1919. The union of the two irretrievably shattered the complacency the British had developed during the years of the Protectorate. The British officials in the Residency or in the Egyptian administration had increased considerably in number while their adaptability to the needs and circumstances of the country had steadily declined. Their dedication, standards and knowledge of Egypt declined at a time when the Egyptian politicians were developing a greater familiarity with the complexities of administration and a greater sense of confidence and critical ability.² As the British officials increased in number they tended to become, socially, a self-contained unit. At the same time

¹Ibid., (Part II, a, 2).

²Ibid., (Part II, a, 1).

their interests tended to focus on departmental responsibilities.¹ All this led to a loss of contact with the pulse of Egypt, the grave consequences of which have already been outlined. Although Wingate was aware of the state of Egyptian opinion, there seems to be no evidence to show that any of his advisors supported his assessment of the situation. Certainly his most important lieutenants continued to think of Egypt in prewar terms. Sir W. Brunyate suggested a Cromerian constitution, Mr. Haines failed to realize the delicacy of an "advisors" position, and Sir Milne Cheetham did not notice the difference in atmosphere between December 1914 and February 1919.²

¹Ibid., (Part II, a, 1).

²Lord Lloyd gives this assessment of Brunyate: "His scholastic career had been one of brilliant promise and he possessed exceptional intellectual ability and practical efficiency. He was, besides, extremely hard working and pertinacious. These were qualities which were bound to stand him in good stead in the early years of a career in Government service. . . . Unfortunately, he laid himself open to the charge of being 'ponderous', a charge which implied some deficiency in humour and imagination; unfortunately also he at times allowed himself to be dictatorial even to his friends. The combination is a very dangerous one in our Imperial services: their undoubted good qualities carry such men inevitably to positions of great trust in which their deficiencies may at times endanger the cause which they serve. In Brunyate's case the danger was aggravated by the fact that Sir H. MacMahon, unacquainted personally with Egypt, had had to rely a great deal upon his opinion, and this had perhaps enhanced his dictatorial inclinations." Op. cit., 275f.

The same authority gives this assessment of Mr. Haines who "had shown himself zealous and competent as Inspector, and then as Chief Collector of Taxes, but during his long tenure of the latter post he had become completely out of touch with Europeans and the upper Egyptian classes. He had, however, been appointed by Sir Henry MacMahon, upon the advice of Lord Edward Cecil, as Adviser to the Interior. In this post he displayed little of his former zeal or competence, and refused to listen to any sort of criticism or advice, thus cutting off the High Commissioner from his chief source of information." Ibid., 281.

In 1914, when the Protectorate was declared, there was only a small financial slump and, politically, the fear of pan-Islamism and political opportunism.¹ In 1919 there was much more about which to be concerned. As was noted at the end of the previous chapter, the fellaheen and the poorer classes were faced with a rapidly rising cost of living. Wages did not show a corresponding increase and, as the Special (Milner) Commission reported, the poorer people did not earn enough to cover the cost of necessities.² In the rural areas high rents cancelled higher cotton profits. In the urban areas the contrast in standards of living was very sharp. The fellaheen, who had sold his pack animals to the British Army, found that to repurchase them after the war, he had to pay more than he had originally received for them. British Army payments were generally slow in being processed and did not filter down through the officials of the Egyptian Government to fellaheen in their entirety. The attention paid to the interests of the poorer classes in prewar times was no longer in evidence. The Special (Milner) Commission reported that a long time had elapsed since the fellaheen had seen the British inspector stop to hear his complaints and intercede for him. He only saw him drive by in a car. The fellaheen, under Cromer and Kitchener, had become accustomed to expect more from life, while the younger generation had no vivid memories of past

¹ See p. 12.

² Cmd. 1131 of 1920, (Part II, a, 2)

oppression.¹

There were many reasons why the poorer classes should count themselves discontented. A number of these were not directly traceable to the British. Considerable responsibility for corruption and inefficiency must rest with the Egyptians. The activities of some rural administrators, like the Umdahs, are open to serious criticism. The economic disproportion was largely due to the exaggerated profits of foreign and Egyptian business men and landowners. However, in the last analysis, Britain had made itself responsible for the welfare of Egypt. This was a publicly announced raison d'etre of the Occupation. Consequently, it was not difficult for the Nationalists to channel the blame for what was happening on the British. Moreover, as British contacts with the fellaheen diminished, there was a corresponding increase in the influence of the landowners, a number of whom reflected Nationalist views.

Nationalist groups had been vocal since the Occupation, the most notable party was the Watan Party of Mustapha Kamel. The British, however, had been able to find, easily enough, Egyptian politicians who were willing to cooperate with them. After the war the matter became more difficult. Ministers who had cooperated earlier, now developed their own interests and opinions and became disinclined to serve as figureheads. This happened at a time when the extent of British influence was itself expanding. In addition, an increasing number of young

¹Ibid., (Part II, b).

men, in search of government employment or promotion, found themselves blocked by foreign officials.¹ The reaffirmation of the Protectorate which was implicit in Britain's postwar policy did much to strengthen antagonisms. The postwar Nationalist movement in 1919 was by no means a monolithic organization, although the Special (Milner) Commission did come to realize that it could command or enforce a considerable degree of unity when endowed with a purpose.² The main strength of the movement was to be found in the Wafd (delegation), the party which evolved, under the leadership of Zaghlul, from the delegation which visited Wingate in November 1919. The Wafd was united in its demand for Egyptian independence, but it had an extremist wing which did not stop at violent demonstration and assassination to further its objective. The Wafd was able, at this early period, to count on the support of the Sultan, for reasons already outlined, and politicians like Rushdi and Adly who became moderate nationalists in the face of British

¹The Special Commission found that, in 1920, of the pensionable and contract posts in the Egyptian Government below ministerial level the Egyptians held 86 percent of the posts and drew 71 percent of the salaries, the British held 6 percent of the posts and drew 19 percent of the salaries, while other foreigners held 8 percent of the posts and drew 10 percent of the salaries. Among the posts in the £E240-£E499 range, the Egyptian share was roughly two-thirds. This share declined to one-quarter in the higher posts. Between 1905 and 1920 the Egyptian element in the lower posts had shown a small increase, but in the higher posts it declined from 27.7 percent to 23.1 percent. Ibid., (Part III, c, 3).

²Ibid., (Part II, b).

intransigence, and in response to the groundswell of popular anti-British feeling. They could be numbered among those Egyptians which the Special (Milner) Commission found to have in good faith expected their wartime cooperation to earn Egypt favored consideration.¹ When they found themselves deluded they joined forces with the Wafd, although on a temporary basis. The Wafd was, as will be seen later, seriously weakened by personal rivalry, and by the frequent defection of moderates who were more readily inclined to negotiate with the British.

The attitude of the British, during these postwar months, has been the subject of much discussion. Early in December Wingate was indirectly criticised for having granted the Wafd an interview on November 13.² Lord Lloyd supports this criticism, arguing that it was incorrect for Wingate to receive these self-proclaimed representatives of Egypt.³ Wingate's son, and biographer, has replied to this criticism by pointing out that from Cromer on the British had at all times maintained unofficial contacts with Egyptian opinion. He has further shown how Wingate understood Zaghlul to be acting with the full knowledge of the Sultan and Rushdi.⁴ Sir Ronald Wingate has implied that Curzon was responsible for Egyptian policy in November and December 1918 and consequently responsible for ignoring Wingate's repeated warnings during

¹Ibid., (Part II, a, 3)

²Wingate, op. cit., 235.

³Op. cit., I, 285.

⁴Wingate, op. cit., 230.

those months. He further argues that Curzon had not the time to study the files on Egyptian aspirations, although he is also supposed to have regarded Egyptian nationalism as "dangerous . . . revolutionary . . . anti-British".¹ Sir Ronald's apportionment of the responsibility is open to question since all the available evidence points to Curzon's having been officially appointed Acting Secretary of State in the first week of January 1919.²

Despite the controversy, the central feature of these two months remains Balfour's dispatch to Wingate of November 27, 1918.³ A closely related consideration is the Foreign Office's seeming reluctance to attend immediately to Egyptian affairs. Much has been made of the fact that at this time the British Government was deeply engaged in matters connected with the Peace Conference. It may be argued, however, that an exaggerated emphasis has been laid on this point.⁴ Balfour's dispatch

¹Ibid., 236f.

²See p. 56.

³See p. 53.

⁴Captain Wedgwood Benn (Liberal) made the following comment on this point in the course of a debate in the House of Commons: "I want to ask . . . who was responsible for refusing permission to Zaghlul and Rushdi to present their case in this country? Was it Lord Curzon? . . . Lord Curzon makes a speech in the House of Lords which I venture to say was one of the most foolish and harmful speeches which had ever been made in the other House. He says, 'We cannot receive the Speaker into our House of Commons; we cannot receive the Prime Minister.' Why? 'Because the Foreign Secretary is busy at the Peace Conference.' In the first place if that were the reason it is a stultification of the Noble Lord's own position as head of the Foreign Office. If no business of this kind can be done until the Foreign

(and Curzon's telegram of February 26¹) appears to indicate definite views on matters of policy. These views appear to show no desire to negotiate in the future a change in the status of Egypt. The question remains open as to whether this was simply the result of a policy of maintaining the status quo in Egypt because of its pivotal importance in the Empire. A further possibility is that the British Government may not have wished to undertake negotiations with Egypt until their position in the Middle East, particularly in Palestine, had been clarified by the Peace Conference. Documentary evidence on this matter remains unpublished.

Another problem which arises in connection with the treatment of the Egyptian question during this period is the time that elapsed between Wingate's arrival in London and his interview with Curzon. While it is understandable that Balfour was a very busy person, it seems less likely of Curzon who bore a more limited responsibility. During his short stay in Paris, Wingate was able to discuss his suggestions with both Lloyd George and Balfour, but he had to wait two weeks to see Curzon. However, Curzon's insistence on rejecting Wingate's formula remains the most decisive factor since the Egyptians seemed to be patiently awaiting the time of their delegations'

Secretary is at liberty the position does not seem to be very important. As a matter of fact, the excuse is so thin that it amounts to nothing more than a public to the people who asked permission to come." H. C. Deb. 5s, Vol. 115, col. 1840.

¹See p. 58.

departure, originally arranged for the middle of February.¹ The tone of Curzon's telegram must have had a strong influence on Cheetham when he decided to recommend the arrest of Zaghlul and his associates.

¹Wingate, op. cit., 238.

CHAPTER IV

THE EGYPTIAN INSURRECTION

The disturbances in Cairo, sparked off by the arrest of Zaghlul and his supporters, assumed the proportions, in some instances, of active rebellion. The students were the first to riot. The rioters soon swelled in number, causing considerable material damage in various parts of the city. Little time elapsed before the police, unable to control the situation, called for assistance from the military authorities.¹ The latter soon felt it necessary to open fire on the crowds. The strike of students spread to include some government officials and the whole of the Egyptian bar. Meanwhile numerous meetings were being held by the Wafd under the presidency of Ali Pasha Sharawi. Deputations were formed and protest meetings organized. Emissaries were dispatched throughout the country to tell the people that the time had come to "display our feeling."² By March 12 the disturbances had spread throughout the Delta and a few days later to Upper Egypt. The

¹Sir Thomas Russell Pasha, at the time Chief of the Cairo Police, described the situation: "Up till then I did my best to cope with the disturbances with my Egyptian police but, with only a small force at my disposal, I found the situation quickly getting out of control and on Tuesday, the 11th, at 8:30 a.m., I handed over to the British Military Authorities." Egyptian Service: 1902-1946 (London: Murray, 1949), 192f.

²Chirol, op. cit., 178.

fellaheen and their Nationalist leaders were rioting in provincial towns, attacking and attempting to destroy railway stations, tearing up track and cutting telegraphic cables.¹ Isolated members of foreign communities were besieged by furious mobs and isolated soldiers were attacked. Some of the mob activities followed a pattern²--but there was much mindless destruction for destruction's sake. There were attacks on Copts as well. Alexandria was in a continually disturbed state. Government ceased to function in numerous areas and

¹As early as March 9, the Residency, completely surprised at the radical turn of events, hurriedly attempted to explain the situation. Cheetham reported to Curzon: "Movement is anti-British, anti-Sultanian, anti-foreign. It has Bolshevik tendency, aims at destruction of property as well as communications, is organized and must be paid. Extraneous influence is strongly suspected. British officials incline to the belief that, whatever Nationalist instigation there may have been in the last few months, the feeling now exhibited must have been growing during several years, and that an explosion at some time was inevitable." Foreign Office Despatch quoted in Lloyd, op. cit., I, 300f.

The Times of March 25, 1919 found, in a leader, that: "The purely Nationalist movement . . . is from the British point of view revolutionary. Like certain similar movements elsewhere now coming to a head, it is being stage managed for the benefit of distant spectators in Paris. That it lacks sincerity is clear from the fact that Zaghlul and his confederates are willing to retain the Capitulations, by which means they hope to encourage the support of the powers. . . . No Egyptian who sincerely seeks the welfare of his country can wish to see the Capitulations preserved a day longer than is necessary." The leader, however, continued to point out that the disturbances have "unquestionably some connexion with that spirit of unrest which is rapidly deepening throughout the Islamic world. One of the defects of the Peace Conference at Paris is that Mahomedan opinion finds far too little expression in the council of the delegates."

²Cmd. 1131 of 1921, (Part II, a, 2).

there were two or three instances where "provisional governments" were created.¹ The climax of the rebellion was reached on March 17. Communications with Cairo were completely cut off, and eight British soldiers were massacred in Upper Egypt between Deirut and Deir Mowas by mobs who attacked their train.

On March 18 Lloyd George, deeply involved in the peace negotiations in Paris, was sufficiently disturbed by events in Egypt to discard Curzon's approach to the Egyptian question. He conceded the Egyptians the form, though not the content, of their original request. While ordering the immediate restoration of order in Egypt, he agreed, once an Egyptian cabinet had been formed, that Egyptian Ministers and qualified Nationalist leaders would be permitted to visit London to discuss grievances.² Two days later he superseded Wingate by appointing as Special High Commissioner to Egypt, General Allenby. His immediate directive was

. . . to exercise supreme authority in all matters military and civil, to take all such measures as he considered necessary and expedient to restore law and order, and to administrate in all matters as required by the necessity of maintaining the King's Protectorate over Egypt on a secure and equitable basis.³

Allenby, who had just arrived in Paris in connection with the Syrian and Palestinian negotiations, immediately returned to Egypt. He arrived on March 25 to find the situation much improved.

¹Chirol, op. cit., 183-185.

²Wingate, op. cit., 242.

³The Times (London), March 22, 1919.

Early in the course of the insurrection the military authorities had warned the leadership of the Wafd that as the instigators of the disturbances they were expected to call a halt to them unless they wanted the army to take extreme measures. These, however, confessed that the disturbances were beyond their control.¹ They could not condemn the excesses without themselves incurring the displeasure of the mobs, or running the risk of losing their popular support.² On March 16 General Bulfin, commanding the Egyptian Expeditionary Force in General Allenby's absence, arrived in Cairo to press forward with the suppression of the rebellion. Mobile columns fanned out, rescuing the besieged, reestablishing order, restoring communications and in some cases imposing exemplary punishment.³ Patrols were set up to guard important points and lines of communication. By April 19, 1919, a month after the rebellion had started, the British were able to report:

In the provinces the work of reinstalling the civil authorities is almost everywhere complete. In certain localities it has been possible, owing to the return of normal conditions, to relax the restrictions on movement after dark. . . .⁴

Although at the time there were 103,000 British and Imperial troops in Egypt and Palestine, it is difficult to estimate

¹Ibid., March 28, 1919.

²Chirol, op. cit., 183.

³Viscount Wavell, Allenby: Soldier and Statesman (London: Harrap, 1946), 270.

⁴Chirol, op. cit., 188.

what percentage of this force was available in Egypt to put down the rebellion.¹ The official casualty figures of the period were thirty-one European civilians killed and thirty-five wounded. Among the Egyptians around one thousand lost their lives in the disturbances. Forty-nine were condemned to death. Sentences of from five years to life were passed on 430, while another 3286 received fines and lesser terms in prison.² The cost of material damage does not seem to be available. Communications and government property were particularly hard hit. To indemnify the innocent victims the Government budgeted £E1,000,000.

The consequences of the disturbances of March and April 1919 were far reaching. Zaghlul and the Wafd realized their strength during this upheaval, and their success gave them additional confidence. When the Wafd first organized agitation it leaned on the Sultan and the Rushdi cabinet for support. If the disturbances enabled the Wafd to discover the extent of their following, it also revealed that a considerable proportion of this support was of a radical and extremist nature. The Special (Milner) Commission concluded that though the initial outburst was organized by Wafdist leaders, they soon lost control of events.³ In these circumstances extremist elements made use of mob psychology to inflict casualties and

¹H. C. Deb. 5s, Vol. 114 (1919), col. 282.

²Ibid., Vol 118 (1919), col. 1534f.

³Cmd. 1131 of 1921, (Part II, a, 3).

cause considerable damage. As the disturbances did effect a change in policy and served to create a national party and a national leader it was not unnatural for the extremist tendencies of the movement to receive a share of the credit and influence. It was of tragic consequence for the future that Egypt was able to obtain recognition of its aspirations only by means of the influence of mob agitation and extremist methods. In the events that followed Zaghlul and the Wafd were unwilling to dissociate (deprive) themselves of their assistance. Consequently they fostered the instability which these elements brought to Egyptian political life.

As soon as the new High Commissioner arrived in Egypt on March 25 he reflected the changed attitude of Prime Minister Lloyd George. Allenby announced that he intended,

First, to bring the present disturbances to an end.
Secondly, to make careful inquiry into all matters which have caused discontent in the country.
Thirdly, to redress such grievances as appear justifiable.

and he concluded,

After quiet has been restored I feel confident that you will trust me to inquire impartially into all grievances, and to make such recommendations as may seem to be desirable for the content and well-being of the people of Egypt.¹

On March 31 Allenby issued a proclamation expressing the view that

. . . the time had come when responsible Egyptians with the interest of their country at heart should submit to him a statement showing what steps they consider necessary to restore tranquillity and content.²

¹Wavell, op. cit., 270f.

²The Times (London), April 8, 1919.

On the same day Allenby recommended that Zaghlul and his associates be released and allowed to proceed wherever they would. The recommendation was accepted and on April 7, just one month after their arrest, the Wafdist leaders were released.

This decision has been severely criticized by those who argue that it was unfortunate for British influence in Egypt to reverse its policy immediately after the disturbances. These critics hold this reversal responsible for giving Egyptians the impression that concessions could only be successfully obtained through a show of force. Wingate when asked to express his opinion on Allenby's proposal stated that

. . . to give way immediately . . . would be fraught with the gravest dangers, not only to the maintenance of our position in Egypt, but to the whole of our North African possessions. . . . I do not think that it is going too far to say that we shall have practically abandoned the position in Egypt which we have acquired after years of patient toil and labour. For the moment peace and order can doubtless be restored . . . , but our real power and authority will have practically gone and we shall be at the mercy of agitators at any time they care to repeat the methods by which they will say they have obtained their ends in the present crisis. I am confident that anyone who has had prolonged experience of ruling Orientals, and especially Egyptians, will concur with my views.¹

Sir Ronald Graham, in a "Memorandum on Unrest in Egypt" dated April 9, 1919, pointedly stated:

The trial of strength has now taken place, and the British authorities in Egypt, armed with full discretionary powers, have shown themselves unable or unwilling to stand up to the forces arrayed against them. The principle at issue has been surrendered . . . a fortnight's violence has achieved what four months of persuasion failed to accomplish. The object-lesson will not be lost in Egypt

¹Lloyd, op. cit., I, 308f.

and throughout the East.¹

Lord Lloyd has argued, in the same vein, that Allenby, given full powers and instructed to quickly find a way out of an unfortunate situation, did not give sufficient weight to

. . . one all-important fact which now dominated the whole situation. Whether deliberately, or simply in disregard of consequence, the weapon of violence had been adopted: and until that weapon had been struck from the hand of Egypt and conclusively shown to be valueless there could not safely be any talk of negotiation or concession. Of this view later circumstances have been one long confirmation.²

Though Allenby was given considerable freedom of action in dealing with the situation it is only fair to note that he must, to a large extent, have reflected Lloyd George's earlier reappraisal of the situation. It would seem that Lloyd George gave Allenby his full support in order to enable him to get his policy accepted by the Foreign Office where, the indications are, the opposition was strong. This policy was one of compromise. The concession made by Allenby was a moderate one. If made earlier it would have probably served to keep Egypt quiet. After March it proved to be only one of a series of steps towards a precarious stabilization of a situation which became increasingly more difficult to stabilize once the Wafd discovered its strength. In view of the many problems facing Britain in the postwar world, it is doubtful whether it would have been advantageous for Britain to sustain an uncompromising

¹Ibid., I, 309. For evidence of Graham's authorship of the memorandum see Kedourie, op. cit., note 31.

²Lloyd, op. cit., I, 304.

policy towards Egyptian aspirations. The objective of such a policy could only have been achieved if a "show of force" had succeeded in recreating a situation similar to that in the early days of 1919 when Zaghlul and the Wafd still felt uncertain of their strength. In such circumstances they would presumably have been more amenable to moderate concessions. Such a policy, deliberately ignoring the new circumstances inevitably brought by the passage of time, would have been fraught with greater complications and less likely to succeed.

The restoration of order in the Egyptian provinces and the release of the detainees from Malta did not bring an end to the disturbances. In Cairo they continued in the form of a series of crippling strikes of government servants, lawyers and students. The last two groups had been on strike since Zaghlul's arrest early in March. The civil servants had generally remained on duty throughout the worst period of the disturbances. On March 24 Curzon, taking note of this fact, stated in the House of Lords:

. . . one gratifying feature of these deplorable occurrences in Egypt has been the behaviour of many of the Egyptian officials and of the army and police. These last have behaved especially well.¹

The government officials took offense at this statement which implied that they were not in sympathy with the Nationalist agitation. A Special Committee of officials was set up which proposed to organize a protest strike for April 3. The strike which was originally meant to last two days was prolonged

¹Chirol, op. cit., 198.

indefinitely and produced a number of serious riots. The Special Committee came under the influence of extremist influences. When Zaghlul was released the strike turned into a joyous celebration, but for two days only. In the flush of victory the strikers demanded guarantees before they returned to work. Their conditions were:

1. That the Cabinet should officially recognize the Egyptian Delegation as the legal mandatory of the nation.
2. That the Cabinet should declare its non-recognition of the Protectorate.
3. That British sentries and guards should be withdrawn and their places taken by Egyptian troops.¹

The Cabinet referred to was the Rushdi cabinet which Allenby had succeeded in persuading to return to office. Soon after his arrival he had undertaken negotiations with Rushdi on the one hand and the Wafd representatives on the other. Both insisted on Zaghlul's release. When this demand was satisfied the cabinet resumed office on April 9. Despite exhaustive attempts it was unable to put an end to the strikes. Any attempts at compromise were denounced as "treacherous". The situation became increasingly serious as high government officials were on strike and British advisors were forced to work the highly centralized administration with only those few Egyptians who remained at work. On April 21 Rushdi admitted failure and resigned. Allenby swiftly invoked martial law to break the strikes. A series of proclamations induced officials, lawyers and students to return to their respective duties.²

¹Ibid., 200.

²The Times (London), April 26 and April 30, 1919.

Although the strike collapsed it demonstrated, in the words of Sir Valentine Chirol,

. . . for the first time the intense resentment of British control which had been slowly accumulating at the headquarters of Government in the public departments most closely and intimately associated, with the chief agencies of British control; and it gave thereby a fresh and powerful impetu to the political campaign of which it was itself the outcome for the abolition of the Protectorate and the complete emancipation of Egypt. . . . Though . . . it collapsed outwardly under the compulsion of martial law, it had defeated the Egyptian Government, and the spirit which inspired it quickly recovered from its collapse and produced a political deadlock. . . . Though British Ministers took a long time still to look the fact in the face, the maintenance of British control was henceforth to be a straight issue between them and the Party of Independence, the immediate result being to reduce the position of Egyptian Ministers to that of heads of departments carrying on merely routine work and without any influence whatever on the general political situation.¹

¹Chirol, op. cit., 204f.

CHAPTER V

THE WORK OF THE SPECIAL (MILNER) COMMISSION

Immediately after the strike was broken Allenby urged the British Government to send out the Special Commission which it was intended should make a thorough study of the Egyptian question.¹ Allenby's sense of urgency derived from the fact that there was no cabinet through which the British could "advise". In consequence the country was being administered by martial law contrary to the spirit of the Protectorate. The Foreign Office, once peace and order was restored to Egypt, no longer felt the need for prompt action on the Egyptian problem. Curzon informed the Residency that Lord Milner, the Colonial Secretary, who was to head the Commission, was busy with other matters and would not be able to go to Egypt until September.² On May 15 the decision to send a Commission was made public. Its terms of reference were given as:

To enquire into the causes of the late disorders, and to report on the existing situation in the country, and on the form of Constitution which, under the Protectorate, will be best calculated to promote its peace and prosperity, the progressive development of self-governing institutions, and the protection of foreign interests.³

¹Lloyd, op. cit., I, 352.

²Ibid., I, 352.

³Cmd. 1131 of 1921.

Following this announcement Egypt was debated in the House of Commons. Colonel Wedgwood Benn (Liberal) opened with a critical review of recent Anglo-Egyptian relations. He pointed out personal, material and political causes for the earlier disturbances. In 1914 he found "it was peace because there was trust. In 1919, it was insurrection because there was disappointment."¹

Administration of Egyptian affairs by the Foreign Office came in for criticism. Captain Ormsby-Gore (Unionist) deplored the lack of interest of the House in Foreign Affairs, but also noted:

There has grown up in the Foreign Office a spirit whereby they think it is a nuisance to answer questions put by Members of this House, though that is absolutely their first duty.²

The debate became acrimonious when a Labor member, Mr. Spoor, suggested the possibility that atrocities had been committed by British forces in suppressing the disturbances. Mr. Spoor also put forward the suggestion that, like the Arab countries, Egypt be placed under the League of Nations as a mandated territory.³ The Earl of Winterton (Unionist) did not find the

¹H. C. Deb. 5s, Vol. 115 (1919), col. 1833.

²Ibid., col. 1850.

³Ibid., cols. 1851-1860. It is interesting to contrast this suggestion with Lindsay Bushford's comment on the League's impact in the East: "A State, especially an Oriental State, cannot be run by ideals. More developed communities listened to Mr. Wilson's homilies, duly admired them, and carried on with the day's work very much as before. But the East still dreams. . . . The ideal will ever remain man's ultimate aim; it cannot be the touchstone of his daily work. Man is not big enough for that. Through the failure of the League of Nations tranquillity in the East may come." "Lord Milner and His Mission," in The Nineteenth Century, Vol. 87 (1920), 385f.

comparison between the Arabs and the Egyptians to be apt: "I have seen both the Egyptians and the Arabs fighting, and I am afraid the comparison is not altogether favorable to the Egyptians."¹ The general tenor of criticism was reflected by Colonel Wedgwood (Labor) when he pointed out that

if you are going to wipe out not merely the actual rioting but what is far more important, the cause of the rioting, you have to prove to those people that all we have talked about liberty and justice will find expression in constitutional reforms. . . .²

Mr. Harmsworth, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, made some interesting remarks while replying for the government. He found that not only the "suddenness" of the outbreak, but also

its extent, surprised those responsible for the government of Egypt. Those who, on such occasions as this, are described as intellectuals, joined hands with agriculturists; the students made common cause with the fellaheen; the railwaymen and the civil servants, as we know downed tools; and there was even a strike among the lawyers. I say the extent of this rising . . . deserves the attention of this House and this Government.

Assessing Britain's role in Egypt he claimed that

Egypt owed us something. It is said that we do not necessarily pursue our Imperialistic policies for the benefit of the people among whom we work. Not altogether; not perhaps mainly, but our rule is followed generally by advantage to the population, and there is no native population that has ever enjoyed greater advantages from British rule than the Egyptian. . . . I think it might have been remembered by the leaders of the Nationalist Party in Egypt.

He also observed that

on close and frequent survey of the facts before me I am

¹H. C. Deb. 5s, Vol. 115 (1919), col. 1866.

²Ibid., col. 1872.

led to believe that there is much room for improvement in the government of Egypt.

Mr. Harmsworth, however, concluded with a restatement of Britain's essential position:

I cannot but emphatically declare that His Majesty's Government have no intention whatsoever of abandoning the obligations and responsibilities which they incurred before the world when they assumed the task of governing Egypt. These obligations and responsibilities have been confirmed by the establishment of our Protectorate over the country.¹

In May 1919 a new cabinet was formed with Mohammad Said as Prime Minister. He had been Prime Minister before the war but enjoyed scant political prestige in postwar Egypt. Through this cabinet, however, the administration of Egypt returned to normal. After the strike was broken there was a lull in Wafd agitation. This was in part the result of Zaghlul's concentration on presenting Egypt's case at the Peace Conference. After his release from Malta, he and some of his supporters went straight to Paris. In Paris the Wafd argued Egypt's right to complete independence on economic, moral, administrative and social grounds. They rejected the British argument that England had certain rights in Egypt and that foreign control was in the interest of Egypt. Britain, it was claimed, had often proclaimed the temporary nature of the Occupation, while the Anglo-French agreement of 1904 and the Protectorate were not legally binding on Egypt. The Wafd further insisted that modern Egyptian progress had been inaugurated by Muhammad Ali when Egypt became autonomous. They did not deny the British

¹Ibid., cols. 1884-1890.

initiative, but argued that its impact was limited. In recognition of Egypt's contribution in the war, and in accordance with Wilsonian principles, Egypt, they argued, should be given complete independence and control over the Sudan.¹ But the Egyptian delegation never achieved official status. A few days after arriving in Paris, its hopes were dealt a severe blow with the recognition of the British Protectorate over Egypt by the United States on April 22, 1919.

With the formation of the new cabinet, Allenby reversed his policy with regard to the Special Commission. He advised the postponement of its arrival until the new government had had time to settle down.² In August the situation again took a turn for the worse. Agitation broke out in Alexandria and Cairo. Zaghlul, although he was still in Paris and was to remain abroad until April 1921, was successful in maintaining his leadership over the Wafd while remaining beyond the reach of the British. The Nationalists did not abandon hope of obtaining foreign recognition of their aspirations. The Treaty of Sevres with Turkey was still being negotiated. Italy had not yet recognized the Protectorate. The Prime Minister of Egypt and the Sultan strongly recommended that the Special Commission's arrival be postponed until after the negotiations with Turkey had been concluded. Agitation continued to mount. In addition to being anti-British it also assumed certain generally anti-foreign characteristics. Its most alarming

¹Oriente Moderno, I (November 15, 1921), 325.

²Lloyd, op. cit., I, 352f.

feature was the increasing opposition manifested to the impending arrival of the Special Commission. With the announcement of the formation of a Commission Britain had indicated that the termination of the Protectorate was not a subject for discussion. Only the form the Protectorate should take should be investigated.

Late in September the positions taken by both sides seemed to harden. Zaghlul addressed a message to the Wafd in Egypt commending the Egyptians for their determination to have nothing to do with the Special Commission when it should come to Egypt.¹ Milner, in an interview published by the Pall Mall Gazette, noted that his commission would assume the existence of the Protectorate in its investigations and recommendations.² Allenby returned from two months in England on November 10, 1919. He was responsive to the electric political atmosphere. Opposition was building up rapidly, and he felt that Britain should not yield to it.³ He had obtained a statement of policy which he made public on November 15, 1919:

The policy of Great Britain in Egypt is to preserve autonomy in that country under British protection, and to develop a system of self-government under an Egyptian ruler.

The object of Great Britain is to defend Egypt against all external danger and the interference of any Foreign power, and at the same time to establish a constitutional system, in which under British guidance, as far as may be necessary,

¹The Near East, XVI (October 27, 1919), 427.

²Ibid.

³Lloyd, op. cit., I, 354.

the Sultan and his ministers and elected representatives of the people may in their several spheres and in an increasing degree cooperate in management of Egyptian affairs.

After pointing to the decision of the British Government to send out a mission, he declared,

It is not the function of the Mission to impose a constitution on Egypt. Its duty is to explore the ground; to discuss in consultation with authorities on the spot the reforms that are necessary, and to propose, it is hoped in complete agreement with the Sultan and his Ministers, a scheme of government which can be subsequently put in force.¹

If Allenby had hoped with this statement to reduce the tension, he could not congratulate himself. On the following day there were serious riots in Cairo in which the British Army had to intervene to restore order. Muhammad Said, who had strongly opposed the proposal to speed the arrival of the Commission, resigned on November 15. Four days later another government was formed under the leadership of Yusuf Wahba, a Copt. As the date of the Commission's arrival approached, the situation was at a deadlock. The organization of the boycott by the Wafd was well under way. In the House of Lords, Curzon gave a realistic elaboration of

the reasons for which Great Britain is compelled to interest herself in the political fortunes of Egypt and is unable to give any encouragement to the claim for complete national independence. Quite apart from the fact that Egypt, if left to stand alone, could neither protect her frontier against external aggression, nor guarantee a strong and impartial Government at home, her geographical position at the gate of Palestine, . . . at the doorway of Africa, and on the high road to India, renders it impossible that the British Empire, with any regard to its own security and connections, should wash its hands of

¹The Near East, XVI (December 5, 1919), 621.

responsibility for Egypt.¹

The Special Commission arrived in Egypt on December 7, 1919. It was a distinguished group, some members having intimate contacts with Egypt. Lord Milner had been Financial Advisor during Lord Cromer's time and had written a widely read assessment of Britain's role in Egypt.² However, he was an acknowledged proponent of the concept of imperialism, and therefore considered highly suspect by the Wafd. Sir Rennell Rodd, well known as Ambassador to Italy, had also spent some time in Egypt under Cromer and during the war. The Labor Party was represented by Brigadier General Sir Owen Thomas, the Liberals by Mr. J. A. Spender, the editor of The Westminster Gazette. General Sir John Maxwell was another member of the Commission who, as Commander of the Army of Occupation until 1916, possessed extensive knowledge of Egypt. A Foreign Office expert on international law, Sir Cecil Hurst, was the sixth member of the Commission. Mr. A. T. Lloyd and Mr. A. M. B. Ingram acted as Secretaries.

The boycott of the Commission was carried out with enough determination that the Residency felt justified in imposing elaborate security measures. Sentries with fixed bayonets surrounded its headquarters. For the first three weeks of their stay the members were only able to talk to British officials or Egyptian Ministers. This was hardly a satisfactory manner to carry out a mission whose object was to gain a

¹Ibid., XVI (November 28, 1919), 591.

²Alfred Milner, England in Egypt (London: Arnold, 1893).

deeper appreciation of the Egyptian situation.¹ It would seem that the Commission had already, either as a result of its composition or a result of first impressions, formulated an appraisal of the problem facing Egypt. Spender had early prepared a survey, which Milner approved, the underlining feature of which was an acknowledgement that

the Nationalist movement is, without doubt, deep and genuine, and it would be a total mistake to regard it as merely manufactured by "agitators". It is the inevitable result of our own efforts to educate the country and bring it into contact with western ideas and civilization.²

On December 28, the Commission issued a statement which showed that it was willing to discuss the future of Egypt in terms other than those of the Protectorate. It restated its terms of reference and objectives accordingly:

The Mission has been sent out by the British Government, with the approval of Parliament, to reconcile the aspirations of the Egyptian people with the special interests which Great Britain has in Egypt and with the maintenance of the legitimate rights of all foreign residents in the country. . . . It is the sincere desire of the Mission to see the relations of Great Britain and Egypt established on a basis of friendly accord which will put an end to friction and will enable the Egyptian people to devote the whole of their energies to the development of their country under self-governing institutions. . . . There is no wish on the part of the Mission to restrict the area of discussion, nor need any man fear to compromise his convictions by appearing before it. He will be no more compromised by expressing his opinions than the Mission will be compromised by hearing them.³

The statement did not produce any immediate results since the

¹J. A. Spender, The Changing East (New York: Stokes, n.d.), 72.

²H. Wilson Harris, J. A. Spender (London: Cassell, 1946), 194.

³The Near East, XVII (January 16, 1920), 69.

boycott of the Commission continued. However, as will be shown later, it did inaugurate another chapter in Anglo-Egyptian relations.

The Commission remained in Egypt until the first week in March. During this time it was able to make a remarkably thorough study of the situation. Members did not long remain confined to their quarters, but went out in search of information and opinion. Contact was established with moderate and extremist nationalist opinion in unofficial and secret conversations. In some instances, at considerable risk, members ventured to establish the closest contact with Egyptian opinion. Mr. Spender, because he had no governmental or military associations, was sought out by Egyptians willing to express their views, and was transported, blindfolded, to secret meetings.¹ The boycott was, however, officially sustained throughout, and a careful watch kept on all the movements of the Commission. In some cases the boycott caused serious disturbances calling for military intervention.

In attempting to break the existing deadlock between the Wafd and the British, the Commission undertook to consider the abolition of the Protectorate. The implications of this concession seem to have been more far reaching than the British Government had envisaged. There is evidence that Lord Milner, himself, was surprised at the direction in which the Commission's investigations were leading.² Lord Lloyd who, in his authori-

¹Spender, op. cit., 73.

²"Nearly four years later Sir Austen Chamberlain, who

tative history of the period, writes of "the story . . . of almost unbroken retreat," regretfully concluded:

Nothing in our history is more grievous than the continuing incapacity which our Governments have displayed since 1919 to unhold their own declarations against difficulties which they invariably proved afraid to face.¹

The Milner Mission's action was according to Lord Lloyd an "enormous concession" in view of,

the real fact . . . that the Mission had been sent out to reconcile Egyptian aspirations, not with the special interests of Great Britain but with a maintenance of the British Protectorate.²

Such an indictment of the Commission's decision seems to overestimate the scope of concessions. What was the position from which the Commission retreated? How far did it retreat? The Commission recognized that the position of Britain in Egypt had never been legalized and refused to accept the assumption that Egypt was part of the British Empire. The Commission therefore retreated from what it felt to be an anomalous position. In this it was motivated by its appraisal of the existing situation. It estimated the truly Nationalist portion of the population at

was a Cabinet Minister in 1921, meeting Spender accidentally, told him that 'Milner, though in the Cabinet, never said a word all through 1920, and then launched the Report on them like a bomb, and it was too much to expect any Cabinet to take it without preparation--especially when Milner himself told them he was never so surprised in his life as when he found his thoughts taking the form they did in the Report.' (From a letter from Spender to his wife)." Harris, op. cit., 197.

¹Op. cit., II, 9. Lord Lloyd was a defender of the imperial idea. A. P. Thornton, The Imperial Idea and its Enemies (London: Macmillan, 1959), 247. For a life of Lord Lloyd see Colin Forbes Adam, Life of Lord Lloyd (London: Macmillan, 1948).

²Op. cit., II, 15.

less than ten percent. However, these ten percent formed the educated and semi-educated classes. The middle and upper classes were strongly Nationalist. The Commission was aware that a number of individuals among these groups were subjected to Nationalist pressure, but it also felt that moderates tended to side with the extremists in the face of British intransigence. The Commission rejected the possibility of basing support for Britain's position in Egypt upon a reconciliation with the fellaheen. It saw signs of such a reconciliation, but did not feel it could last long if the relations of the British with the other classes remained unsatisfactory. In view of the strength of the Nationalist movement the Commission

. . . gradually came to the conclusion that no settlement could be satisfactory which was simply imposed by Great Britain upon Egypt, but that it would be wiser to seek a solution by means of a bilateral agreement--a Treaty--between the two countries.¹

Before the Commission returned to London, Spender had a meeting with Ali Maher, who was on his way to confer with Zaghlul in Paris.² Once the Commission had returned to London, negotiations were undertaken by Adly to arrange a meeting between Zaghlul and the Commission. The situation was favorable for such a meeting since the Wafdist boycott had achieved its desired effect of impressing upon the Commission that any lasting settlement in Egypt would have to be negotiated with, or supported by, the Wafd. It appears that Zaghlul was interested in a meeting which would give wider recognition to his

¹Cmd. 1131 of 1921.

²Harris, op. cit., 196.

leadership of the Wafd. He had had very little success in his efforts to obtain recognition for his delegation from the powers at the Peace Conference. Zaghlul and the Egyptian Delegation arrived in London on June 7, 1920 and immediately began "a series of conversations" with the Commission on a possible basis for the future of Anglo-Egyptian relations. The starting point of the discussions was the concept of a treaty between Britain and Egypt. The Commission had already decided to advise the British Government to adopt such a policy. The main difficulty encountered was the extreme apprehensiveness of the Egyptians to "agreeing to something which might conflict with their ideal of independence." The Commission reported that:

Over and over again they declared that it was impossible for them to accept some proposal or other made by us, the fairness of which they did not directly dispute, because it was inconsistent with the "mandate" which they had received from the Egyptian people. It was useless to point out to them that the alleged "mandate" was really their own programme, which the Egyptian public had simply accepted from them. . . . The reply always was, that they had no authority to depart from claims which, even if originally put forward by themselves, had been enthusiastically endorsed by a great majority of their countrymen. . . . While in the course of our discussions we were often very near agreement on points of substance, it was always difficult to clothe such agreement in words which did not conflict with formulae to which the Egyptians felt themselves committed.¹

¹Cmd. 1131 of 1921 (Part III, a). "In common with my colleagues on the Milner Mission, I have spent interminable hours in trying to find words which would reconcile what all parties acknowledged to be the facts with the formulas to which politicians were pledged, and we came in the end to speak of it as the 'word game'." Spender, op. cit., 82. Milner appears to have come to believe in the "magic power of words". In a letter to Churchill dated September 16, 1920, he said the "blessed" word, independence, would repair the damage caused by the "unfortunate" word, Protectorate. Kedourie, op. cit., 153.

The conversations continued until various obstacles were surmounted and the parties succeeded "in drafting the outlines of a settlement with which both parties were more or less satisfied." There now remained, however, the question as to whether Zaghlul and his Delegation were willing to give this compromise solution their full endorsement. The Wafd insisted that they could not do this until they had consulted their supporters in Egypt. They proposed to send three or four members of the delegation back to Egypt to carry out such a consultation. The Commission acquiesced in this procedure on the grounds that

the general public discussion, which was bound to ensue, would enable us to gauge Egyptian opinion more completely than had yet been possible, and to judge of the comparative strength of moderate and extreme Nationalists.¹

A Memorandum was therefore drawn up, embodying the outline of the proposed settlement, which it was understood the Egyptians "might make free use of . . . in public discussion. . . ."²

The Milner-Zaghlul proposals received a mixed reception in England. The view of the die-hard Tory Morning Post was that the policy recommended "manifestly amounts to sheer surrender." It deplored the fact that:

There is nothing in it about constitutional reforms. Egypt, being independent, is free to settle upon her own reforms or to do without them, which is the point the Nationalists contended for from the first. Lord Milner's Commission need never have gone to Egypt if this was the settlement intended. It would have been much simpler to announce Egyptian independence . . . and much more graceful than to

¹Cmd. 1131 of 1921 (Part III, b).

²The full text of the Memorandum can be found, with certain explanatory notes taken from the Commission's Report, in Appendix A of this thesis.

have it come about as a result of bargaining, and very unsuccessful bargaining on our part.¹

The Times, independent with Conservative leanings, was favorable to the proposed solution and commented that it

is both feasible and possible, that it will confer upon the people of Egypt the utmost freedom they have ever sought, and that it will not be inimical to those larger British interests which we are bound to conserve. . . . Our fear is that a purely Egyptian administration . . . may be more lax less efficient, and probably less beneficial to the masses than the order which is about to pass away. . . . Great Britain is taking a bold and perhaps startling step in Egypt, but we do not believe it to be a dangerous step.²

The proposed basis for an Egyptian settlement was an important concession to the Nationalists in that it accepted the principle of Egyptian independence. This independence, however, was conditional. In administrative matters it did not go further than the declared objectives of the Occupation. Britain continued to maintain an influential position in the internal affairs of Egypt through the Financial and Judicial Advisors, to say nothing of the continued presence of its army. In one important respect Britain's position in Egypt was strengthened. By the terms of the proposed treaty Britain would assume the Capitulatory rights of the other powers. The interference of these powers in Egyptian affairs had long been a cause of embarrassment to Britain. If the proposals were accepted Britain would gain the support of the foreign communities in Egypt, who would then be dependent on Britain for the

¹The Near East, XVIII (September 2, 1920), 337.

²August 25, 1920.

stewardship of their interests.¹

Insofar as Britain's strategic position was concerned, the treaty proposals could be interpreted to imply the restriction-during peacetime-of military forces to certain predetermined areas. On the other hand, the anomalous legal position of the Army of Occupation would be ended. Britain as Egypt's ally would benefit from an undisputed right to keep forces in Egypt. Furthermore, though Egypt would be allowed to resume the control of its foreign affairs it could not participate in any agreement prejudicial to British interests.

What was venturesome about the proposals was the relinquishment intimate involvement in Egyptian affairs through "advisors" to the Ministers. Martial law, operative since the inception of the Protectorate, would end. The number of British subjects employed in the Egyptian Government would decline rather than increase. There was a strong tendency among the British to expect the worst to happen in Egypt if they relinquished a portion of their control. Many saw as a consequence of the relinquishment of the dominant position, dangerous implications for the future of Britain's relationship to Egypt. A policy of concession could develop into an

¹It would appear that the British Government was aware of the advantages such a surrender of foreign rights would bring. Soon after the publication of the Memorandum, Ormsby Gore was informed "that negotiations had already been opened with all the Powers enjoying rights in Egypt under the capitulations for the transfer of their rights to Great Britain." W. Ormsby Gore, "Egypt and the Milner Proposals," in the Nineteenth Century, Vol. 88 (1920), 979. Some small powers did in fact negotiate treaties with Britain, but the larger powers including the United States refused their consent. Brinton, op. cit., 340.

irreversible trend. However, the extent of the Commission's "retreat" did not by any means amount to "sheer surrender".

The Memorandum of August 18, 1920 was an attempt to achieve a solution based on a balanced view of the imperial and economic interests of Great Britain and the foreign communities on the one hand, and the Nationalist aspirations of Egypt on the other. Admirable as compromise suggestions usually are, they risk satisfying neither side, and this particular compromise proved to be no exception. By the time the Memorandum was prepared Zaghlul was no longer willing to support it fully. There were probably a number of reasons for this change of attitude on his part. He may well have felt he had gone too far in making concessions at the expense of Egyptian aspirations. The Memorandum made no mention of the Sudan, nor did it secure guarantees that the activities of the British forces in Egypt would be strictly controlled. Since the Occupation the mere presence of British forces had enabled Britain to impose its "advice". Therefore, it was not without cause that many Egyptian Nationalists remained convinced that there could be no real political independence unless the British forces were withdrawn, or at least limited in size and confined to some specific area. The Nationalist contention was to a considerable extent justified. Allenby was later to realize the pivotal importance of these forces, and to defend the abolition of the Protectorate on the basis that:

Whatsoever may be the final solution of the problem our effective guarantees are our military and naval position in Egypt, and the variously penetrating influences of our

forty years' moral predominance in the country.¹

While their army remained, it was undoubted that freedom of action in the Egyptian political arena would be limited by the British. This was hardly a situation which could appeal to any determined movement or ambitious leader.

Zaghlul also may have had certain tactical reasons for withdrawing his support from the Memorandum. Having succeeded, with relative ease, in obtaining the concessions it embodied, he may have been attempting to gamble for additional advantages. Furthermore by accepting the Memorandum he would have risked compromising his position among the extreme Nationalists without guarantee that he could secure the leadership of the moderates.² Among the latter were experienced politicians, like Adly, who were potential rivals. However, Zaghlul, having secured the publication of the Memorandum, could make very good use of it. Although not an official document, it was signed by a cabinet Minister, and it outlined concessions which the British Government would later find difficult to ignore. Zaghlul's prestige would inevitably be enhanced by the publication of the Memorandum as he would establish the claim that he had obtained concessions without in any way committing not only himself, but also, for obvious reasons, Egypt to a policy from which it would be difficult to retreat. Furthermore, it

¹Wavell, op. cit., 296.

²Mahmud Zayid, "Nash'ah hizb al-wafd al-miṣrī: 1918-1924," unpublished lecture delivered to the Arab Studies Conference at the American University of Beirut in 1961.

was not certain that Milner would be doing the same for Britain. Such a definite commitment could only be taken by the cabinet whose attitude towards Egypt was by no means clear.

Zaghlul, although the leader of the Egyptian delegation, had been under considerable pressure from the moderate delegates to compromise with the Commission.¹ In order to achieve his aim he had to proceed with particular caution so as not to precipitate a break with the moderates. He did not go to Egypt to win support for the proposals, and refrained from making his position known publicly. His official pronouncement on the Memorandum was lengthy but non-committal. Privately he expressed his disagreement with it to Nahas Pasha, his Wafdist Lieutenant in Egypt.²

The delegates dispatched to Egypt arrived there on September 7, 1920. They avoided contact with government circles, but discussed the Memorandum with the foremost notables of the country who in turn were asked to discuss it with lesser figures, and so on down the line of interested opinion. These notables then reported back to the delegates the result of their consultations.³ By October 1, 1920 the delegates, having completed their mission, were able to embark for France, where Zaghlul had gone to await them. Their parting statement was non-committal, but it appeared that they had found general

¹Ibid.

²Kedourie, op. cit., 154.

³Cmd. 1131 of 1921, (Part III, e).

endorsement for the policy of the Memorandum.¹

In London the impending return of the Egyptian Delegation made it desirable for the British Government to consider its attitude to the work of the Commission. The cabinet, it appears, had not been kept informed of the direction the discussions were taking. Consequently, it received the Memorandum with considerable surprise.² Signed, as it was, by a cabinet Minister, there was a disturbing possibility that it might be taken for an official statement of political intention. Curzon consulted both Milner and Allenby (the latter being in London on leave) and prepared a note on the Commission's proposals which was submitted for the cabinet's consideration on October 11, 1920. In it Curzon emphasized that in supporting the Commission's suggestions the cabinet would be taking a momentous decision which "would not merely solve a difficulty but create a precedent." He pointed out certain dangerous implications within the proposals and suggested safeguards. He concluded by remarking that he did not dissent

either from Lord Milner's main proposition, that the solution is to be found in a Treaty of Alliance between Great Britain and the Egyptian Government, or from the major premise on which the principle is founded, namely, that if we are to advance it must be a large advance in the direction not merely of co-operation but of trust.³

Despite Curzon's arguments the cabinet refused to consider the

¹The Near East, XVIII (October 28, 1920), 593.

²

³Ronaldshay, op. cit., III, 247.

Milner-Zaghlul conversations as anything but "unofficial".¹

At the end of October Zaghlul, his delegation, and Adly returned to London. The Egyptian Delegation reported to the Commission that it had found general support for the proposals, but that this support was conditional upon certain rectifications. The three main amendments concerned the powers of the Financial Advisor, the modification of the fifth clause of the Memorandum which prevented the treaty from coming into force until the Consular courts had been abolished, and the demand for a termination of the Protectorate.²

Early in November, during the course of the second and last meeting, Milner explained to the delegation that the Commission did not intend to undertake the discussion of these amendments. Although he agreed that they did not contradict the spirit of the original Memorandum, he could see no advantage in reopening discussion of the proposed treaty. He reminded the delegation that the conversations were unofficial, and that it would be more suitable for the points in question to be dealt with by the official delegations who, presumably, would be appointed later. Milner also warned that any further discussions could endanger the success of any future negotiations.³ He ended by appealing for a determined effort by all concerned to work for an official solution in accordance with the

¹Harold Nicolson, Curzon: The Last Phase 1919-1925 (Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1934), 177.

²Cmd. 1131 of 1921, (Part III, f).

³Ibid.

principles upon which they had agreed. Zaghlul's reply to this appeal was not encouraging. He pointed out that his efforts to gain the support of the Egyptians would be very much weakened if he could not report the termination of the Protectorate.¹

The reluctance of the cabinet to endorse the Commission's recommendations must have had a discouraging effect on Milner. It represented a rebuff to the Commission for exceeding its terms of reference. Consequently, Milner could no longer continue the conversations, even if such a continuation remained desirable in view of the delegation's doubtful attitude.

It has been difficult to ascertain the exact result of the innumerable consultations in September 1920 in Egypt. Despite Zaghlul's attitude, the Memorandum was widely, but not overwhelmingly, endorsed by Egyptian opinion. It was rejected by certain Nationalists who insisted on complete independence. It was criticized by those desiring to discredit the Wafd and also by certain elements who feared any British withdrawal.² The supporters of the Memorandum, however, appear to have been divided. Some of them wanted certain modifications introduced into the Memorandum, particularly with reference to the relations of the Sudan and Egypt, and the abolition of the Protectorate. Others, such as Adly and Sarwat Pasha, were willing to accept the proposals as they stood.³ A notable endorsement

¹Ibid.

²Lloyd, op. cit., II, 27f.

³Zayid, op. cit.

was given to the Memorandum by the remaining members of the suspended Legislative Assembly who, almost unanimously, voted to accept it.

When the delegation reported its findings in London, it insisted on the unanimous desire of Egyptian opinion to secure positive guarantees of the Protectorate's abolition upon conclusion of a Treaty of Alliance. The delegation, it would also appear, expected that, as an immediate act of good faith, the Commission would secure the abolition of the Protectorate. The extent to which the delegation was justified by its findings to insist upon amendments at the risk of endangering the acceptance of the Memorandum is not clear. In view of Zaghlul's known influence over Egyptian opinion, and his secret opposition to the Memorandum as it stood, it would seem that he had found it convenient to emphasize them.¹ If Zaghlul expected to bargain for further concessions from the Commission, he must have been surprised at the sudden termination of the conversations. There is no reason to believe that the delegation knew of the cabinet's decision, and it may, therefore, have overestimated the Commission's importance and influence. Although the Egyptians realized that the Commission's views were unofficial, they may not have realized the full extent to which its views diverged from those of the cabinet. Such a miscalculation could account for the support Zaghlul received from his delegation when he asked for further rectifications, although it had

¹The Near East, XVIII (November 4, 1920), 626.

earlier exerted a moderating influence on him. Zaghlul's position--his demands for abolition of the Protectorate and for further concessions--was based upon his view of the Commission as a means of reconnaissance, an influential transmission belt to the highest councils of the British Government. His assessment was not unreasonable, in view of the range of discussion which the Commission had already undertaken.

CHAPTER VI

THE UNILATERAL TERMINATION OF THE PROTECTORATE

The final report of the Commission was presented to the government on December 29, 1920. A few days later Curzon forwarded the report to Allenby and informed him that the British Government desired, before taking any decision,

. . . to profit by consultation with the official delegation from Egypt, which it has always been in contemplation to invite. . . . I shall be glad therefore if you will take the necessary steps with the Sultan and the Egyptian Government for the appointment and despatch of this delegation at an early date so that they may be available for consultation with His Majesty's Government in the forthcoming spring. . . . Both parties will enter the discussion with free hands; since, pending the exchange of views to which I have referred, His Majesty's Government have not thought it right to arrive at a final judgement on either the principles or the details of the proposals contained in the report.¹

The cabinet was still unwilling to recognize that the situation had been altered by the Commission's work. Allenby had to remind them of the fact that

the proposals conveyed to Egypt in August were from the first regarded by the public opinion of Egypt in general as proposals which must eventually constitute a substantive offer by His Majesty's Government.

He added that, if Britain in no way felt committed to the principles of the Commission, it would be doubtful whether a representative delegation could be found to proceed to London. He

¹F. O. Despatch: Lord Curzon to Lord Allenby, January 6, 1921, referred to in Lloyd, op. cit., II, 34.

summed up by reiterating that

. . . Egypt expects a declaration of policy by His Majesty's Government based upon Lord Milner's conversation, and then to be called upon to produce a delegation to discuss details of a settlement.¹

On February 15, before the House, Lloyd George restated the Government's attitude and referred to possible consultations with representatives of the Empire and Dominions over the Egyptian question:

If it had been possible I should have liked also to take into consultation the representatives of the Dominions before we come to any decision. It is a matter of most vital moment to the Empire, to the peace of the middle East, and to our future relations, perhaps, with India.²

Three days later, however, the Report of the Special Commission was made public, and on February 22, the government made known its decision to accept a change of course. On that day, fourteen months after the Commission had reached the same conclusion, Curzon informed Allenby that the government,

. . . after a study of the proposals made by Lord Milner, have arrived at the conclusion that the status of protectorate is not a satisfactory relation in which Egypt should continue to stand to Great Britain.

His dispatch continued:

. . . while they have not reached final decisions with regard to Lord Milner's recommendations, they desire to confer regarding them with a Delegation nominated by the Sultan, with a view, if possible, to substitute for the protectorate a relationship which would, while securing the special interests of Great Britain and enabling her to offer adequate guarantees to foreign powers, meet the legitimate aspirations of Egypt and the Egyptian people.³

¹F. O. Despatch: Lord Allenby to Lord Curzon, January 12, 1921, referred to in ibid., II, 35f.

²H. C. Deb. 5s, Vol. 138 (1921), col. 39.

³F. O. Despatch: Lord Curzon to Lord Allenby, February 22, 1921, referred to in Lloyd, op. cit., II, 37.

Negotiations began in Egypt to form a delegation which would be as representative as possible. At first they proceeded in a propitious atmosphere. Egyptian opinion which had not been seriously disturbed by the ending of the Milner-Zaghlul conversations was somewhat alarmed by Milner's resignation from the cabinet. Shortly after, it was briefly incensed when his successor in the Colonial Office, Winston Churchill, suggested that Egypt become a Dominion of the Empire.¹ The uncertainty of the economic situation was a matter which preoccupied Egypt. A world-wide fall in prices reduced the cost of living, but it also reduced, within the space of a year, the price of Egypt's primary export, cotton, from \$187 a kantar down to \$18. In order to gain general support the Egyptian Government provided lavish price supports. This policy reduced the accumulated reserves from £E17,000,000 on March 31, 1920 to £E3,000,000 a year later.²

The investigations of the Special Commission in Egypt, and the conversations which followed, had discerned two groups in the Egyptian Nationalist movement--moderates and extremists. Efforts were made to organize a delegation from among the former. Zaghlul still remained in France and his influence seemed to have declined in favor of the Sultan, Adly and other

¹In a speech in Cairo in which he expressed the hope that one day both Egypt and Ireland would be "managing their own affairs and unfolding their own destiny peacefully and prosperously within the elastic circle of the British Empire." Quoted in H. C. Deb. 5s, Vol. 151 (1922), col. 2015.

²The Near East, XIX (June 16, 1921), 724.

moderates. Intrigues proliferated until Allenby intervened to get the Sultan to ask Adly to form a cabinet; he did so on March 17, 1921.

Zaghlul, however, was increasingly concerned about his own position, and about the growing influence of Adly and his moderate views. Zaghlul had expressed, through Nahas Pasha, his disapproval of Adly's moderating influence as early as November 1920. He went so far as to accuse Adly of having destroyed his chances of obtaining better terms from the Commission.¹ Three days after Adly became Prime Minister, Zaghlul cabled that he would support the new cabinet if martial law and censorship were abolished, and he was given the presidency of the official delegation which should contain a Wafdist majority.² He then quickly made arrangements to return to Egypt. He arrived on April 5, after an absence of just over two years. Allenby was able to write on the day of his arrival that, though he was received by gigantic and enthusiastic crowds whose management was left solely to the Egyptians, "not a single mishap occurred."³ Two days later, however, Zaghlul had raised the temperature of the internal situation. Allenby reported that:

The question whether the Ministry can now control the situation is, to say the least problematical. . . . I believe Zaghlul is in such an exalted state of mind that it would not be beyond him to attempt a coup similar to

¹Kedourie, op. cit., 155.

²Wavell, op. cit., 290.

³Ibid., 280.

that of Arabi Pasha.¹

Efforts to insure cooperation between Zaghlul and Adly broke down soon after the former's arrival. Adly approached the Residency with a view to obtaining certain concessions, but with scant success.² The disagreement between the two politicians was to a large extent personal, and Adly refused to accept Zaghlul's dominance. By April 25 Zaghlul made clear his opposition to the cabinet in violent declarations which continued unabated almost throughout Adly's period in office. Zaghlul, careful to avoid any accusation of republicanism, did not neglect to express his support of the Sultan.³ On April 29 serious rioting occurred outside a mosque in Tanta, in the Delta, resulting in the death of a number of students and policemen. By May 5 Zaghlul refused the cabinet support under any condition.⁴ Two weeks later, further rioting broke out in Cairo, and by the end of May, Alexandria had been the scene of the most serious disturbances since March 1919. What started as anti-government riots, turned into anti-European demonstrations.⁵ Allenby, who tried to follow a policy of allowing "the Egyptians to settle their politics for themselves," was forced to interfere and place Alexandria under British

¹F. O. Despatch: Lord Allenby to Lord Curzon, April 8, 1921, referred to in Lloyd, op. cit., II, 40.

²Ibid., II, 41.

³Oriente Moderno, I (July 15, 1921), 103.

⁴Ibid., 102.

⁵The Near East, XX (December 22, 1921), 794.

military administration.¹

Adly's position was considerably weakened by these events. He tried to gain support by emphasizing that he had Egypt's wider interests in mind just as much as did Zaghlul. He declared he would go to London to ask for complete internal and external independence, and a definite termination of the Protectorate. He would also insist on acceptance of the earlier delegation's amendments to the Milner Memorandum, while keeping himself free to ask for further concessions.² A few days before Adly left to begin negotiations, a Wafdist paper, al-Akhbar, warned him against accepting anything less than complete independence. It also reminded him that any agreement he reached must be ratified by a popularly elected National Assembly.³ The situation in Egypt did not leave much hope for compromise negotiations. In England there was also an indication of the difficulties lying ahead. Churchill, while addressing the Empire Cotton Association, in June 1921, had disclaimed the possibility of British troops leaving Egypt, and pointedly remarked that Britain's work in Egypt was not yet completed.⁴

Adly and his delegation arrived in England early in July. Negotiations with Curzon continued, intermittently,

¹Wavell, op. cit., 280.

²Oriente Moderno, I (July 15, 1921), 103.

³Ibid., 103.

⁴The Near East, XX (July 7, 1921), 5.

throughout the summer and well into the autumn of 1921. If Adly's position was difficult, Curzon's was little easier. Early in July the Egyptian question had been brought up at the Imperial Conference in London where stress was laid on the necessity for maintaining the status quo in relation to the security of the Suez Canal.¹ Throughout the Adly-Curzon negotiations a majority in the cabinet remained opposed even to accepting a treaty along the lines of Milner's suggestions. On October 21, 1921, after a long cabinet session during which he argued in favor of meeting some of Adly's demands, Curzon wrote: "The Cabinet all much stiffer than I am in the matter, and I am sure we shall have an absolute rupture with another Ireland in Egypt."² After this admission of failure, all there remained to do was terminate the negotiations. On November 10, 1921 Curzon presented Adly with the final draft of the treaty the British were willing to accept.³ This draft did not compare favorably with Milner's Memorandum. Although it accepted the principle of Egyptian independence, the termination of the Protectorate, and the conclusion of an alliance, it qualified that independence to a greater degree than the earlier Memorandum. The foreign relations of Egypt were to be closely supervised

¹Ronaldshay, op. cit., III, 248. Valentine Chirol reports that when Adly arrived in London and called on Lloyd George the latter showed him the Imperial Conference Room and offered him a seat in it. The Occident and the Orient (Chicago: University Press, 1924), 95.

²Ronaldshay, op. cit., III, 248.

³The full text of the draft is to be found in Appendix B of this thesis.

by Britain. Whereas in the Milner Memorandum Egypt was not to sign any agreement with a foreign power which would prejudice British interests, in the draft treaty Egypt was debarred from signing any agreement whatsoever without British consent.

While the Memorandum had implied the restriction of British forces in peacetime to certain defined areas, the draft treaty explicitly rejected all such restrictions.¹ In matters relating to the Capitulations the British contented themselves with reiterating their intention of continuing negotiations with the Capitulatory powers for the surrender of their rights in favor of Great Britain. No mention was made of how the British would use the rights they would thus obtain. In the earlier Memorandum Britain was to have agreed to refrain from using such rights "except in the case of laws operating inequitably against foreigners."

Five days after Curzon handed the Egyptians the draft treaty, Adly and his delegation formally rejected it. Many of the objections they expressed were based on the differences, already referred to, between the Milner proposals and those of Curzon. Disagreement was also expressed, however, on certain additional points. The powers of the Judicial and Financial Advisors were strongly criticized. The delegation argued,

¹The Westminster Gazette of November 26, 1921 commented that, in the breakdown of the negotiations, "the military authorities have had their way, and that a golden opportunity of placing our relations with Egypt on a sound basis . . . has been lost." Valentine Chirol detected Churchill's influence on Lloyd George. The Occident and the Orient, 95f.

moreover, that the negotiations for the termination of the Capitulations should be undertaken by Egypt, assisted by Great Britain, and that the Capitulatory rights should revert to Egypt. Finally, they objected to the draft's reference to the Sudan which, they claimed, "had not yet been discussed." The delegation therefore felt bound

. . . to point out that it has been made the subject of provisions which we cannot accept, and which do not guarantee to Egypt the exercise of her indisputable right of sovereignty over that country and of control of the waters of the Nile.¹

The breakdown of the negotiations was later described by Curzon to have occurred because

Adly Pasha dared not concede anything from fear of the extremists or Zaghlul party in Egypt, whereas my instructions rendered it impossible for me to meet him on many of the points on which he was disposed to insist.²

The British Cabinet gave expression to feelings of irritation over the failure of the talks. On December 3 Allenby was instructed to hand the Sultan a lengthy Note which constituted a severe reprimand. It contained an interesting mixture of "home truths", exaggerations and over-simplifications. Curzon was not responsible for drafting the Note, although he agreed to sign it. It was apparently composed in Lloyd George's secretariat.³ The Note began by expressing "disappointment"

¹The Near East, XX (December 8, 1921), 741.

²Ronaldshay, op. cit., III, 248.

³Nicolson, op. cit., 179. Lord E. Percy in a debate on Egypt in the House suggested that the authorship of the Note could perhaps be traced to No. 10, Downing Street. H. C. Deb. 5s, 151 (1922), col. 2055.

that Adly had rejected proposals which were regarded as "liberal in character and far-reaching in effect. . . ." It continued to remind Egypt that

When Great Britain first began to take an active interest in Egypt the Egyptian people were a prey to financial chaos and administrative anarchy. They were at the mercy of every comer, and could not have resisted those fatal forms of foreign exploitation which undermine a nation's self-respect and destroy its fibre. If the Egyptian people are a vigorous and self-respecting nation today they owe that recovery largely to British assistance and advice. They have been secured against foreign intervention; they have been helped to create an efficient system of administration; large numbers of them have been trained in the arts of government; their power has steadily grown; their finances have prospered beyond all expectations; the welfare of all classes has been laid on firm foundations. There has been no shadow of exploitation in this rapid development. Great Britain has sought for herself no financial gain or commercial privilege. The Egyptian nation has garnered all the fruits of her counsel and help.

Egyptians were also informed that during the war, covered by the ranks of Imperial forces, they had "passed scatheless through that period of ordeal." They were reminded that the freedom which they enjoyed, and the higher freedom to which they aspired, they owed "alike to British statesmanship and British arms." The Sultan was pointedly reminded that

Now, as in the past, the British Empire has to shoulder ultimate responsibility for the defence of your Highness's territories against external menace, as also for such assistance as your Highness's Government may at any time request in the maintenance of your authority at home.

The Note stated that Britain claimed the exclusive right to tender advice, not

. . . with any desire to derogate from Egypt's enjoyment of the full rights of national self-government. They are pressed only as against other foreign Powers; and they are based upon the fact that the independence, good order, and prosperity of Egypt are an essential element in the safety of the British Empire.

The Note further warned:

The progress of Egypt towards her ideals will not only be retarded, but completely jeopardised, if her people are tempted to indulge their national aspirations, however sound and legitimate in themselves, without sufficient regard to the facts which govern international life. Nothing is gained by minimising national obligations and exaggerating national rights. Extremist leaders who preach in this vein are not a stimulus but a menace to Egyptian development. By their influence on the course of events they have repeatedly challenged the interests and provoked the fears of foreign Powers; and they have sought to affect the outcome of these negotiations during the past few weeks by subversive appeals to popular ignorance and passion. His Majesty's Government do not consider that they would be consulting Egypt's welfare by making concessions to agitation of this kind; and Egypt will make no progress until her responsible leaders show the will and strength to put it down. The world is suffering in many places at the present time from the cult of a fanatical and purely disruptive type of nationalism. His Majesty's Government will set their face against it as firmly in Egypt as elsewhere. Those who yield to it only make more necessary and so prolong the maintenance of those foreign sanctions which they denounce.

It concluded with a definition of the type of political activity which Great Britain would consider acceptable in Egypt:

The more clearly your people recognise the identity of British interests with their own, the less necessary will safe-guards become. It is for the responsible leaders of Egypt, in this second generation of her association with Great Britain, to prove by their acceptance and steady use of the national status now open to them that the vital interests of the Empire in their country may be progressively entrusted to their care.¹

If the severity and bluntness of the Note was intended to be a warning to the Egyptians to mend their ways, it did not accomplish the desired effect. Three days after his arrival in Egypt on December 5, Adly handed in his resignation. Efforts to form a sufficiently strong cabinet had little chance

¹The Near East, XX (December 8, 1921), 741f.

of success without some concessions on the part of the British. Allenby had already given expression to the necessity for such steps on a number of occasions. He was in danger, like his predecessor, of remaining unheard. Unlike Wingate, however, Allenby was sufficiently determined to try forcing his views on the government. In this he was fortunate enough in being able to rely on the full support of his subordinates having, soon after his appointment, replaced the advisors who had shown themselves to be out of touch with the situation. On November 17, 1921, the four most important advisors, fearing the breakdown of the Adly-Curzon negotiations, cabled the Foreign Office that

. . . a decision which does not admit the principle of Egyptian independence and which maintains protectorate must entail serious risk of revolution throughout the country, and in any case result in complete administrative chaos, rendering government impossible.¹

They concluded by stating that unless a liberal policy was followed, the Residency could not expect to retain the confidence of the Egyptian Ministers.

Adly's resignation again left Egypt without a government, and British advisors were forced to perform the duties of ministers. The most likely politician to replace Adly was another moderate, Tharwat Pasha. But he refused to form a cabinet unless the Protectorate was ended, Egyptian independence recognized, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs reconstituted. This demand sought to secure the points upon which

¹Cmd. 1592 quoted in Ibid., XXI (March 9, 1922), 327.

there had been a concurrence of views between Adly and Curzon.¹ Moderate circles and the Residency were increasingly attracted by the political formula which promised to get the Egyptian question out of its present impasse by bringing into force points of agreement and, while acknowledging disagreement over the remaining points, leaving their solution for negotiation at a more propitious time. On December 15 Allenby secured permission from London to negotiate with Tharwat on such a basis.² The negotiations had first to overcome the objections of Adly who resented Tharwat's success at the expense of his own failure. A more formidable obstacle was Zaghlul's opposition to an incomplete solution of the question. After the breakdown of the Adly-Curzon negotiations, and with an understanding between the Residency and the moderates imminent, Zaghlul's opposition grew more pronounced. Intensified agitation made it increasingly more difficult for the moderates to accept even an outline of points of disagreement for fear that this would be interpreted as an acknowledgement of British claims.

Allenby, having succeeded in splitting the Nationalists, did not want to jeopardize the advantage he had gained. He therefore decided to curb Zaghlul's agitation on the one hand and strengthen the moderates on the other. On December 23, after careful preparations to prevent any disturbances, Zaghlul

¹Lloyd, op. cit., II, 53.

²Ibid.

was arrested and deported to the Seychelles. The procedure was reminiscent of his earlier arrest in March 1919. Zaghlul was warned not to continue organizing a protest against the findings of a commission of inquiry into the May disturbances. He refused to heed the warning and was deported. The effect this time, however, was quite different. The Wafd proclaimed a campaign of passive resistance, but the country at large remained relatively quiet.

With Zaghlul out of the way Allenby, who felt himself committed to the moderates, proceeded with single-minded determination to press his views on the government at home. On January 12, 1922 he outlined for Curzon his plan advocating ending the Protectorate and recognizing Egyptian independence by proclamation without waiting for a treaty to be negotiated, and without asking the Egyptians to commit themselves in any way. He proposed that Britain should maintain its liberty of action in the case of certain "reserved subject". In the final analysis, Allenby argued, the presence of British forces was the best guarantee of British interests in Egypt.¹ He concluded by asking that his plan be accepted "without modification" and "without delay".² In an accompanying personal message Allenby asked Curzon to support him in the cabinet. Curzon proposed to do so "up to the point of resignation." As it turned out, however, this did not include actual resignation.

¹Wavell, op. cit., 296.

²F. O. Despatch: Lord Allenby to Lord Curzon, January 12, 1922, referred to in Lloyd, op. cit., II, 56.

Curzon fought for acceptance, but when the cabinet opposed he backed down.¹ On January 18 Allenby was informed that his proposals could not be accepted as they stood, and it was suggested that he send two of his advisors to London to explain them further. On January 20 Allenby replied that his advisors were in full agreement with him.

Advice I have given to His Majesty's Government is my final considered opinion after full discussion with those most capable of advising me. I am certain that my proposals, if immediately accepted, will prove the basis of a lasting settlement in Egypt. If they are rejected, I foresee nothing but a rule of repression driving us to annexation of the country, which would greatly increase our difficulties. . . . Any prolonged hesitation on the part of His Majesty's Government will seriously undermine my influence.²

On January 24 the government retorted that they could not surrender a position so essential to the Empire without any binding guarantees. If, the government argued, the moderates were sincere in their views then they should accept to agree to the reservations.³ Allenby's reply was a clear ultimatum:

No Ministry exists, and if it did, no Egyptian dare at present sign his name to a bargain for anything less than complete independence. If His Majesty's Government will not take my advice now they throw away all chance of having a friendly Egypt in our time. . . . Though I have divulged no secrets, my opinions are well known here, and if the advice I have offered is rejected I cannot honourably remain. I therefore beg that my resignation may be tendered to His Majesty. . . .⁴

¹Wavell, op. cit., 297.

²F. O. Despatch: Lord Allenby to Lord Curzon, January 20, 1922, referred to in Lloyd, op. cit., II, 57.

³Ibid., II, 58.

⁴F. O. Despatch: Lord Allenby to Lord Curzon, January 25, 1922, referred to in ibid., II, 58.

Another cabinet meeting resulted at which a majority decided to accept Allenby's resignation, though this decision was not made known.¹ Instead a long cable was sent to Allenby charging him with having misled the government over the Tharwat negotiations. It concluded by recalling him for consultations. On February 2 the Foreign Office issued a statement which reiterated the government's conditions and concluded by promising that:

As soon as an agreement satisfying these conditions has been drawn up between an Egyptian Government and the British Government there will be no hesitation on the part of the latter in inviting Parliamentary sanction to such an accord.²

Before leaving Allenby had a lengthy, incisive memorandum prepared which refuted the government's accusations against him.³ When he left Egypt on February 3, he received enthusiastic send-offs all along the line from Cairo to Alexandria. In London, where he arrived a week later, he saw both Curzon and Prime Minister Lloyd George. His position vis a vis the government was as strong as his determination. He was a popular figure both in England and in Egypt. In Egypt he had come to be regarded as a supporter of Egyptian aspiration because of his policy of restricting his activities as much as possible to the formation of Egyptian Governments while allowing them once formed, a wide freedom of action. His policy had been criti-

¹Wavell, op. cit., 298.

²The Near East, XXI (February 2, 1922), 147.

³Wavell, op. cit., 298.

cized by British residents in Egypt on the grounds that it condoned disturbances, and encouraged the campaign of assassination against British citizens launched by extremists soon after the arrival of the Special (Milner) Commission. In the spring of 1921 the Foreign Office had asked Harry Boyle, a former assistant of Cromer's with numerous contacts in Egypt, to report on these criticisms. His findings proved to be favorable to Allenby's policy.¹ Allenby's policy was also fortunate at this time in having the sustained support of the London Times. Lord Northcliffe, its owner, at the time visiting Egypt, concurred in Allenby's views of what had to be done.²

¹For an account of Boyle's visit to Egypt, where he found it "rather painful to have to face the universal condemnation of our rule and administration during the last fourteen years . . .," see Clara Boyle, A Servant of the Empire (London: Methuen, 1938), chap. VIII. For an extract from his report see Lloyd, op. cit., II, 45f.

²The Times (London) of February 4, 1922, commented in its leader that Allenby "had gained the confidence of Egyptians and non-Egyptians alike. . . . It is perfectly futile in the present state of affairs to insist on guarantees when what is necessary is to establish confidence. . . . Harm enough has been done by carelessly squandering to no purpose the confidence the Egyptians felt in LORD MILNER. It may well be that the Cabinet is now chiefly engaged, with an election in view, in a close examination of the intricacies of its own composition. All our policies are pervaded now with an atmosphere of petty bargaining and party deals. . . . The task of the Government is to govern and not to prop up its own crumbling fabric by sacrificing the essentials of sound and straight-forward policy. A rare and remarkable opportunity is given us now in Egypt, and it would be worse than folly if through lack of courage and through absorption in its own narrow and trivial interests, the Government were to evade this great national issue. The only course is to trust LORD ALLENBY." Northcliffe had developed a megalomania against Lloyd George. C. J. Hambro, Newspaper Lords in British Politics (London: MacDonald, 1958), chap. III.

Lloyd George and the cabinet were in a difficult position. They had opposed or disregarded any far-reaching suggestions of their own. Nor had they been able to prevent a deterioration of the situation in Egypt. If Allenby should be permitted to resign the government could expect his strong criticism of their policy from the benches of the House of Lords. The shaky coalition over which Lloyd George presided could ill afford such criticism.

In his first interview at the Foreign Office, Curzon unsuccessfully attempted to persuade Allenby to withdraw his resignation, Allenby argued that he had secured the confidence of the Egyptians and that he did not intend to sacrifice it. On February 15 he had a memorable and decisive interview with Lloyd George. After being repeatedly questioned and contradicted, Allenby refused to argue any further. He bluntly informed the Prime Minister, "I have waited five weeks for a decision, and I can't wait any longer." Lloyd George then rose, and placing his hand on Allenby's arm, said, "You have waited five weeks, Lord Allenby, wait five more minutes." He then informed Allenby that he accepted the substance of his proposals.¹ On February 28, Allenby returned to Egypt and

¹Wavell, *op. cit.*, 301-305. In the debate which followed the proclamation of Egyptian independence Austin Chamberlain, Leader of the House, gave the following version of the government's surrender: "I am glad to say that the moment we came together . . . he (Allenby) agreed that it was essential that those British interests and obligations should be safeguarded as a part of the abolition of the Protectorate, and that they should not be left to the mercy of an agreement to be subsequently made." H. C. Deb. 5s, Vol. 151 (1922), col. 2063. This account attempted to save face for the

issued the following proclamation:

Whereas his Majesty's Government in accordance with their declared intentions, desire forthwith to recognise Egypt as an independent sovereign State; and
Whereas the relations between his Majesty's Government and Egypt are of vital interest to the British Empire;
The following principles are hereby declared:

1. The British Protectorate over Egypt is terminated, and Egypt is declared to be an independent sovereign State.
2. So soon as the Government of his Highness shall pass an Act of Indemnity with application to all inhabitants of Egypt martial law as proclaimed on the 2nd November, 1914, shall be withdrawn.
3. The following matters are absolutely reserved to the discretion of his Majesty's Government until such time as it may be possible by free discussion and friendly accommodation on both sides to conclude agreements in regard thereto between his Majesty's Government and the Government of Egypt:
 - (a) The security of the communications of the British Empire in Egypt;
 - (b) The defence of Egypt against all foreign aggression or interference, direct or indirect;
 - (c) The protection of foreign interests in Egypt and the protection of minorities;
 - (d) The Sudan.

Pending the conclusion of such agreements the status quo in all these matters shall remain intact.¹

In Allenby's own words, the Protectorate was "brought to an end, as it was established by a unilateral declaration."²

The years of the Protectorate constitute an important

Government by what could only be a deliberate distortion of the facts.

¹Cmd. 1592, op. cit., 327f.

²Wavell, op. cit., 299.

transitional period in the history of Anglo-Egyptian relations. During the Occupation Britain had, despite numerous internal and external complications, succeeded in raising Egypt to a level of prosperity and organization higher than at any previous time in Egypt's modern history. These very achievements made inevitable a clash arising from the contradictions inherent in the aims of the Occupation. Before the First World War the possibility of such a clash seemed remote. It seemed reasonable to expect over the years Britain would loosen, rather than tighten, its control.

Yet, when war broke out Britain found it necessary to disappoint such expectations. Imperial and military requirements took precedence over Egyptian interests. The Egyptians on the whole accepted these inevitable developments. During the last two years of the war, however, the lower classes were adversely affected and grew dissatisfied.

The increased expectations aroused among educated Egyptians during the war found expression in the immediate postwar period. Unfortunately, what has been called "the official mind of Imperialism" was influential and did not consider it necessary to give these expectations much consideration. This circumstance forced the Egyptians to resort to violence. The postwar period is a watershed in Egyptian history because it accentuated the development of characteristics which have marred Egyptian political life ever since, and because it destroyed any chance of a continuing satisfactory evolution of Anglo-Egyptian relations.

Three years passed before a formula could be worked out which could be applied to the new situation resulting from the Insurrection of 1919. The Proclamation of 1922 was not a solution, and while outlining a new Anglo-Egyptian relationship, it incorporated all its shortcomings. If the new relationship was, in terms of the Zeitgeist, an improvement over the Occupation, its unilateral character reflected the means through which it had been achieved. Nevertheless, the relationship outlined in 1922 was basically the one which Britain maintained throughout the inter-war period and up to 1954 when the 1936 Treaty was terminated. This treaty was in fact a recognition by the Egyptians of the limitations to their independence outlined in the earlier Proclamation.

Appendix A

The Memorandum of August 18, 1920¹

The accompanying memorandum is the result of conversations held in London in June to August 1920 between Lord Milner and the members of the Special Mission to Egypt, and Zaghlul Pasha and the members of the Egyptian Delegation, in which conversations Adli Pasha also took part. It outlines a policy for the settlement of the Egyptian question in the best interests both of Great Britain and Egypt.

The members of the Mission are prepared to recommend the British Government to adopt the policy indicated in the memorandum, if they are satisfied that Zaghlul Pasha and the Delegation are likewise prepared to advocate it, and will use all their influence to obtain the assent of an Egyptian National Assembly to the conclusion of such a Treaty as is contemplated in Articles 3 and 4.

It is clear that unless both parties are cordially united in supporting it, the policy here suggested cannot be pursued with success.

(Signed) MILNER.

¹Quoted from Cmd. 1131 of 1920, (Part III, b).

Memorandum

1. In order to establish the independence of Egypt on a secure and lasting basis, it is necessary that the relations between Great Britain and Egypt should be precisely defined, and the privileges and immunities now enjoyed in Egypt by the capitulatory Powers should be modified and rendered less injurious to the interests of the country.
2. These ends cannot be achieved without further negotiations between accredited representatives of the British and Egyptian Governments respectively in the one case, and between the British Government and the Governments of the capitulatory Powers in the other case. Such negotiations will be directed to arriving at definite agreements on the following lines:
 3. (i) As between Egypt and Great Britain a Treaty will be entered into, under which Great Britain will recognise the independence of Egypt as a constitutional monarchy with representative institutions, and Egypt will confer upon Great Britain such rights as are necessary to safeguard her special interests and to enable her to furnish the guarantees which must be given to foreign Powers to secure the relinquishment of their capitulatory rights.
 - (ii) By the same Treaty, an alliance will be concluded between Great Britain and Egypt, by which Great Britain will undertake to support Egypt in defending the integrity of her territory, and Egypt will under-

take, in case of war, even when the integrity of Egypt is not affected, to render to Great Britain all the assistance in her power, within her own borders, including the use of her harbours, aerodromes and means of communication for military purposes.

4. This Treaty will embody stipulations to the following effect:

- (i) Egypt will enjoy the right to representation in foreign countries. In the absence of any duly-accredited Egyptian representative, the Egyptian Government will confide its interests to the care of the British representative. Egypt will undertake not to adopt in foreign countries an attitude which is inconsistent with the alliance or will create difficulties for Great Britain, and will also undertake not to enter into any agreement with a foreign Power which is prejudicial to British interests.¹

¹"The Egyptians were all absolutely unanimous in maintaining that the denial of diplomatic status to the representatives of Egypt vitiated the idea of an Alliance and would make the settlement we were contemplating entirely unacceptable to their countrymen. And in this assertion we believed them to be justified. For, even while in Egypt, we had realised that all Egyptians, including the Sultan and his Ministers, however much they were divided on other questions, were united in their desire for the diplomatic representation of their country abroad. It was a sore point with all of them that, when declaring the Protectorate, we had dispensed with an Egyptian Minister for Foreign Affairs, and placed the Egyptian Foreign Office, with which it was found impossible to dispense, under the High Commissioner. The hope was universal that, when the time came to put the relations of Great Britain and Egypt on a permanent footing, we should allow the Ministry for Foreign Affairs once more to have an Egyptian chief and foreign representatives, as of old, to be directly accredited to the ruler

- (ii) Egypt will confer on Great Britain the right to maintain a military force on Egyptian soil for the protection of her Imperial communications. The Treaty will fix the place where the force shall be quartered and will regulate any subsidiary matters which require to be arranged. The presence of this force shall not constitute in any manner a military occupation of the country, or prejudice the rights of the Government of Egypt.¹
- (iii) Egypt will appoint, in concurrence with His Majesty's Government, a Financial Adviser, to whom shall be

of Egypt. And on the same principle it was hoped that, now that Turkish suzerainty had disappeared, Egyptian representatives in those foreign countries to which it might be necessary to send them would enjoy a similar status to that of foreign representatives in Egypt." Ibid., (Part III, c, 1).

¹"The question of the strength of that force was never raised in the course of the discussion. It was recognised that this depended on external conditions and, apart from what would be necessary if Egypt was herself in danger, might vary with the varying exigencies of Imperial defence. The great point was, that it should not be regarded in any sense as a garrison of Egypt. The maintenance of internal order was a matter for the Egyptians themselves.

"In order to emphasise this aspect of the case the delegates urged very strongly, that the force in question should be stationed on the bank of the Suez Canal and preferably on its eastern side. But to this it was quite impossible for us to agree. For, in the first place, the presence of British troops in the neutral 'canal zone' would be calculated to raise trouble with other Powers interested in that international waterway. The neutrality of the canal is guaranteed by international agreements and the permanent occupation of the canal zone by troops of any single Power might be challenged as a breach of that neutrality. Moreover, Great Britain's strategic interest in Egypt is not limited to securing a free passage through the Suez Canal. 'The defence of her Imperial communications' involves much more than that. For Egypt is becoming more and more a 'nodal point' in the complex of those communications by land and air as well as by sea." Ibid., (Part III, c, 2,).

entrusted in due course the powers at present exercised by the Commissioners of the Debt, and who will be at the disposal of the Egyptian Government for all other matters on which they may desire to consult him.¹

- (iv) Egypt will appoint, in concurrence with His Majesty's Government, an official in the Ministry of Justice, who shall enjoy the right of access to the Minister. He shall be kept fully informed on all matters connected with the administration of the law as affecting foreigners, and will also be at the disposal of the Egyptian Government for consultation on any matter connected with the efficient maintenance of law and order.¹
- (v) In view of the contemplated transfer to His Majesty's Government of the rights hitherto exercised under the régime of the Capitulations by the various foreign Governments, Egypt recognises the right of Great

¹"It is, however, a fundamental principle of the contemplated settlement that any powers which may still be necessary to safeguard foreign interests in Egypt and to assure foreign Governments that the rights of their nationals will be respected shall be vested in Great Britain. This is the reason for the stipulation that the two high officials already referred to should continue to be appointed with the concurrence of the British Government--the duty of the one being to ensure solvency, that of the other to watch the administration of the laws as affecting foreigners. The functions of these officials are only described in general terms in the memorandum, and the scope of their authority will have to be very carefully defined in drafting the Treaty. Here again we had to content ourselves with agreement in principle and to leave details to be settled in future negotiations." Ibid., (Part III, c, 4).

Britain to intervene, through her representative in Egypt, to prevent the application to foreigners of any Egyptian law now requiring foreign consent, and Great Britain on her side undertakes not to exercise this right except in the case of laws operating inequitably against foreigners.

Alternative:

In view of the contemplated transfer to His Majesty's Government of the rights hitherto exercised under the régime of the Capitulations by the various foreign Governments, Egypt recognises the right of Great Britain to intervene, through her representative in Egypt, to prevent the application to foreigners of any Egyptian law now requiring foreign consent, and Great Britain on her side undertakes not to exercise this right except in the case of laws inequitably discriminating against foreigners in the matter of taxation, or inconsistent with the principles of legislation common to all the capitulatory Powers.

- (vi) On account of the special relations between Great Britain and Egypt created by the Alliance, the British representative will be accorded an exceptional position in Egypt and will be entitled to precedence over all other representatives.
- (vii) The engagements of British and other foreign officers and administrative officials who entered into the service of the Egyptian Government before the coming

into force of the Treaty may be terminated, at the instance of either the officials themselves or the Egyptian Government, at any time within two years after the coming into force of the Treaty.¹ The pension or compensation to be accorded to officials retiring under this provision, in addition to that provided by the existing law, shall be determined by the Treaty. In cases where no advantage is taken of this arrangement existing terms of service will remain unaffected.

5. This Treaty will be submitted to the approval of a Constituent Assembly, but it will not come into force until after the agreements with foreign Powers for the closing of their Consular Courts and the decrees for the reorganization of the Mixed Tribunals have come into operation.

¹"It is not indeed to be feared that, with the retirement of the British officials, the country would relapse into the state of maladministration from which we have delivered it, and that all the old evils would return. The number of Egyptians qualified by education and character to take part in the work of government on civilised principles has greatly increased since the occupation. All the Egyptians, even the humblest, have become so habituated to the new standard of orderly, equitable and honest administration, that a complete return to the abuses of the past would not be tolerated. Nevertheless, the 'new model' would certainly be exposed to danger of serious deterioration if the men who have built it up and are still its mainstay were to be suddenly withdrawn.

"Thus it is only natural that the proposal to leave a purely Egyptian Government entirely free to retain or not to retain British or other foreign officials in the Civil Service should be at first sight regarded with considerable uneasiness. But a calm consideration of the practical aspects of the case is calculated greatly to allay these misgivings. The idea of any Egyptian Government, however free to do so, attempting to make a clean sweep of its foreign officials is a chimera."
Ibid., (Part III, c, 3)

6. This Constituent Assembly will also be charged with the duty of framing a new Organic Statute, in accordance with the provisions of which the Government of Egypt will in future be conducted. This Statute will embody provisions for the Ministers being responsible to the Legislature. It will also provide for religious toleration for all persons and for the due protection of the rights of foreigners.
7. The necessary modifications in the régime of the Capitulations will be secured by agreements to be concluded by Great Britain with the various capitulatory Powers. These agreements will provide for the closing of the foreign Consular Courts, so as to render possible the reorganisation and extension of the jurisdiction of the Mixed Tribunals and the application to all foreigners in Egypt of the legislation (including legislation imposing taxation) enacted by the Egyptian Legislature.
8. These agreements will provide for the transfer to His Majesty's Government of the rights previously exercised under the régime of the Capitulations by the various foreign Governments. They will also contain stipulations to the following effect:
 - (a) No attempt will be made to discriminate against the nationals of a Power which agrees to close its Consular Courts, and such nationals shall enjoy in Egypt the same treatment as British subjects.

- (b) The Egyptian Nationality Law will be founded on the jus sanguinis, so that the children born in Egypt of a foreigner will enjoy the nationality of their father, and will not be claimed as Egyptian subjects.
- (c) Consular officers of the foreign Powers shall be accorded by Egypt the same status as foreign Consuls enjoy in England.
- (d) Existing Treaties and Conventions to which Egypt is a party on matters of commerce and navigation, including postal and telegraphic Conventions, will remain in force. Pending the conclusion of special agreements to which she is a party, Egypt will apply the Treaties in force between Great Britain and the foreign Power concerned on questions affected by the closing of the Consular Courts, such as extradition Treaties, Treaties for the surrender of seamen deserters, etc., as also Treaties of a political nature, whether multilateral or bilateral, e.g. arbitration Conventions and the various Conventions relating to the conduct of hostilities.
- (e) The liberty to maintain schools and to teach the language of the foreign country concerned will be guaranteed, provided that such schools are subject in all respects to the laws applicable generally to European schools in Egypt.
- (f) The liberty to maintain or organise religious and

charitable foundations, such as hospitals, etc., will also be guaranteed.

The Treaties will also provide for the necessary changes in the Commission of the Debt and the elimination of the international element in the Alexandria Board of Health.

9. The legislation rendered necessary by the aforesaid agreements between Great Britain and the foreign Powers, will be effected by decrees to be issued by the Egyptian Government.

A decree shall be enacted at the same time validating all measures, legislative, administrative or judicial, taken under Martial Law.

10. The decrees for the reorganisation of the Mixed Tribunals will provide for conferring upon these Tribunals all jurisdiction hitherto exercised by the foreign Consular Courts, while leaving the jurisdiction of the Native Courts untouched.
11. After the coming into force of the Treaty referred to in Article 3, Great Britain will communicate its terms to foreign Powers and will support an application by Egypt for admission as a member of the League of Nations.

August 18, 1920.

Appendix B

Memorandum of November 10, 1921¹

Suggested Convention between Great Britain and Egypt,
handed by the Marquess Curzon to Adly Pasha.

I. Termination of Protectorate

1. The Government of His Britannic Majesty agree, in consideration of the conclusion and ratification of the present Treaty, to terminate the Protectorate declared over Egypt on the 18th December, 1914, and thenceforth to recognise Egypt as a sovereign State under a constitutional monarchy.

There is hereby concluded, and there shall henceforth subsist, between the Government and people of His Britannic Majesty on the one hand, and the Government and people of Egypt on the other hand, a perpetual Treaty and bond of peace, amity and alliance.

II. Foreign Relations

2. The foreign affairs of Egypt shall be conducted by the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs under a Minister so designated.
3. His Britannic Majesty's Government shall be represented

¹The Near East, XX (December 8, 1921), 740.

- in Egypt by a High Commissioner, who, in virtue of his special responsibilities, shall at all times be entitled to an exceptional position, and shall take precedence over the representatives of other countries.
4. The Egyptian Government shall be represented in London, and in any other capital in which, in the opinion of the Egyptian Government, Egyptian interests may require such representation, by diplomatic representatives enjoying the rank and title of Minister.
 5. In view of the obligations which Great Britain has undertaken in Egypt, notably in respect of foreign countries, the closest relations shall exist between the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the British High Commissioner, who will render all possible assistance to the Egyptian Government in respect of diplomatic transactions or negotiations.
 6. The Egyptian Government will not enter into any political agreement with foreign Powers without consultation with His Britannic Majesty's Government through the British High Commissioner.
 7. The Egyptian Government will enjoy the right of appointing such consular representatives abroad as their interests may require.
 8. For the general conduct of diplomatic relations, and the consular protection of Egyptian interests in places where no Egyptian diplomatic or consular representative is stationed, His Britannic Majesty's representatives

will place themselves at the disposal of the Egyptian Government, and will render them every assistance in their power.

9. His Britannic Majesty's Government will continue to conduct the negotiations for the abolition of the existing Capitulations with the various capitulatory Powers, and accept the responsibility for protecting the legitimate interests of foreigners in Egypt. His Majesty's Government will confer with the Egyptian Government before formally concluding these negotiations.

III. Military Dispositions

10. Great Britain undertakes to support Egypt in the defence of her vital interests and of the integrity of her territory.

For the discharge of these obligations and for the due protection of British Imperial communications, British forces shall have free passage through Egypt, and shall be maintained at such places in Egypt and for such periods as shall from time to time be determined. They shall also at all times have facilities as at present for the acquisition and use of barracks, exercise grounds, aerodromes, naval yards and naval harbours.

IV. Employment of Foreign Officers

11. In view of the special responsibilities assumed by Great Britain and of the existing position in the

Egyptian army and public services, the Egyptian Government undertake not to appoint any foreign officers or officials to any of those services without the previous concurrence of the British High Commissioner.

V. Financial Administration

12. The Egyptian Government will appoint, in consultation with His Britannic Majesty's Government, a Financial Commissioner, to whom shall be entrusted in due course the powers at present exercised by the Commissioners of the Debt, and who will more especially be responsible for the punctual payment of the following charges:
 - (1) The charges for the budget of the Mixed Courts.
 - (2) All pensions or other annuities payable to retired foreign officials and their heirs.
 - (3) The budgets of the Financial and Judicial Commissioners and their respective staffs.
13. For the proper discharge of his duties the Financial Commissioner shall be kept fully informed on all matters within the purview of the Ministry of Finance, and shall at all times enjoy the right of access to the President of the Council of Ministers and to the Minister of Finance.
14. No external loan shall be raised nor the revenue of any public service be assigned by the Egyptian Government without the concurrence of the Financial Commissioner.

VI. Judicial Administration

15. The Egyptian Government will appoint, in agreement with His Britannic Majesty's Government, a Judicial Commissioner, who, in virtue of the obligations assumed by Great Britain, shall be charged with the duty of watching the administration of the law in all matters affecting foreigners.
16. For the proper discharge of his duties, the Judicial Commissioner shall be kept fully informed on all matters affecting foreigners which concern the Ministries of Justice and of the Interior, and shall at all times enjoy the right of access to the Egyptian Ministers of Justice and of the Interior.

VII. Soudan

17. The peaceful development of the Soudan being essential to the security of Egypt and for the maintenance of her water supply, Egypt undertakes to continue to afford the Soudan Government the same military assistance as in the past, or, in lieu thereof, to provide the Soudan Government with financial assistance to an extent to be agreed upon between the two Governments.

All Egyptian forces in the Soudan shall be under the orders of the Governor-General.

Great Britain further undertakes to secure for Egypt her fair share of the waters of the Nile, and to this end it is agreed that no new irrigation works on the

Nile or its tributaries south of Wadi Halfa shall be undertaken without the concurrence of a Board of three conservators representing Egypt, the Soudan and Uganda respectively.

VIII. Tribute Loans

18. The sums which the Khedives of Egypt have from time to time undertaken to pay over to the houses by which the Turkish loans secured on the Egyptian tribute were issued, will be applied as heretofore by the Egyptian Government to the interest and sinking funds of the loans of 1894 and 1891 until the final extinction of those loans.

The Egyptian Government will also continue to apply the sum hitherto paid towards the interest of the guaranteed loan of 1855.

Upon the extinction of these loans of 1894, 1891 and 1855, all liability on the part of the Egyptian Government arising out of the tribute formerly paid by Egypt to Turkey will cease.

IX. Retirement and Compensation of Officials

19. The Egyptian Government shall be entitled to dispense with the services of British officials at any time after the coming into force of this Treaty on condition that such officials shall receive monetary compensation as hereafter provided, in addition to any pension or indemnity to which their conditions of

service may entitle them.

On the like condition British officials shall be entitled to resign at any time after the coming into force of this Treaty.

The scheme shall apply to pensionable and non-pensionable officials as well as to employees of municipalities, provincial councils or other local bodies.

20. An official dismissed or retiring under the terms of the preceding clause shall receive in addition to compensation a repatriation allowance sufficient to cover the cost of transporting himself, his family and his household goods to London.

21. Compensation and pensions shall be payable in Egyptian pounds at the fixed rate of $97\frac{1}{2}$ piastres to the pound sterling.

22. A table of compensation, (a) for permanent officials, (b) for temporary officials, shall be prepared by the President of the Society of Actuaries.

X. Protection of Minorities

23. Egypt undertakes that the stipulations following shall be recognised as fundamental laws, and that no law, regulation or official action shall conflict or interfere with these stipulations, nor shall any law, regulation or official action prevail over them.

24. Egypt undertakes to assure full and complete protection of life and liberty to all inhabitants of Egypt without

distinction of birth, nationality, language, race or religion.

All inhabitants of Egypt shall be entitled to the free exercise, whether public or private, of any creed, religion or belief, whose practices are not inconsistent with public order or public morals.

25. All Egyptian nationals shall be equal before the law, and shall enjoy the same civil and political rights without distinction as to race, language or religion.

Differences of religion, creed or confession shall not prejudice any Egyptian national in matters relating to the enjoyment of civil or political rights, as, for instance, admission to public employments, functions and honours or the exercise of professions and industries.

No restriction shall be imposed on the free use by any Egyptian national of any language in private intercourse, in commerce, in religion, in the press or in publications of any kind or at public meetings.

26. Egyptian nationals who belong to racial, religious, or linguistic minorities shall enjoy the same treatment and security in law and in fact as the other Egyptian nationals. In particular, they shall have an equal right to establish, manage and control, at their own expense, charitable, religious and social

institutions, schools, and other educational establishments, with the right to use their own language and to exercise their religion freely therein.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Unfortunately the sources available in the library of the American University of Beirut are rather limited. One official source which it would have been desirable to see available is a collection of Parliamentary Papers for the period under study. Not a single one is available in the library. It has been necessary to use an Arabic translation of the Report of the Special (Milner) Commission, and to glean extracts of others from secondary sources. Because the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs sat in the Lords, a record of the debates in that House would also have been invaluable. There are, of course, numerous secondary sources whose availability would also have been of great benefit. The lack of a complete collection of The Near East was most seriously felt since this weekly reprints extracts of official documents and editorial comment.

The British Government has not yet made available to all the interested public the Foreign Office papers on this period. Therefore, certain works, whose authors have had access to Foreign Office documents or to the private papers of its officials, have been listed in this bibliography under "primary sources".

Official Sources

Bleck, Edward C. et al (ed.) British and Foreign State Papers.

Vol. 109 (1915), London: H.M.S.O., 1919.

Great Britain. Official Report of the Parliamentary Debates:

House of Commons. 1914-1922.

Report of the Special (Milner) Commission to Egypt, Cmd 1131
of 1921.

Primary Sources

Boyle, Clara. A Servant of the Empire. London: Methnen & Co.,
1938.

Wingate, Sir Ronald. Wingate of the Sudan. London: John Murray,
1955.

Spender, J.A. The Changing East. New York: Stokes, 1926.

Storrs, Ronald. Orientations. London: Nicholson & Watson, 1937.

Ronaldshay, The Earl of. The Life of Lord Curzon. London:
Benn, 1928.

Nicolson, Harold. Curzon: The Last Phase 1919-1925. Boston:
Houghton Mifflin, 1934.

Lloyd, Lord. Egypt Since Cromer. 2 vols. London: Macmillan, 1933-1934.

Kedourie, Elie. "Sa'ad Zaghlul and the British" in St. Antony's Papers: Number XI. London: Chatto & Windus, 1961.

Grey, Viscount. Twenty-Five Years: 1892-1916. Vol. II, New York: Stokes, 1925.

Newspapers and Periodicals

The Near East from 1919-1922.

The Nineteenth Century and After from 1919-1920.

Oriente Moderno, 1921-1922.

The Times (London) from 1914-1922.

Secondary Sources

Adam, Colin Forbes. Life of Lord Lloyd. London: Macmillan, 1948.

Adams, Charles C. Islam and Modernism in Egypt. London: Oxford, 1933.

Brinton, Jasper Yeates. The Mixed Courts of Egypt. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1930.

- Chirol, Sir Valentine. The Egyptian Problem. London: Macmillan, 1920.
- Chirol, Sir Valentine. The Occident and the Orient. Chicago: University Press, 1924.
- Cromer, The Earl of. Abbas II. London: Macmillan, 1915.
- Crouchley, A.E. The Economic Development of Modern Egypt. London: Longmans, 1938.
- Dutcher, George Mathew. The Political Awakening of the East. New York: Abingdon, 1925.
- Elgood, Lieut. - Col. P.G. Egypt and the Army. London: Oxford University Press, 1924.
- Falls, Cyril. The First World War. London: Longmans, 1960.
- Hambro, C.J. Newspaper Lords in British Politics. London: Macdonald, 1958.
- Harris, Murray. Egypt Under the Egyptians. London: Chapman & Hall, 1925.
- Harris, Wilson. J.A. Spender. London: Cassell and Company Ltd., 1946.
- Hayter, Sir William. Recent Constitutional Developments in Egypt. Cambridge, University Press, 1925.

- Issawi, Charles. Egypt at Mid-Century. London: Oxford University Press, 1954.
- Kohn, Hans. A History of Nationalism in the East. London: Routledge, 1929.
- Landau, Jacob M. Parliaments and Parties in Egypt. New York: Praeger, 1954.
- Little, Tom. Egypt. London: Ernest Benn, 1958.
- Marlowe, John. A History of Modern Egypt and Anglo-Egyptian Relations: 1800-1953. New York: Praeger, 1954.
- Newman, Major E.W. Polson. Great Britain in Egypt. London: Cassell, 1928.
- O'Rourke, Vernon A. The Juristic Status of Egypt and the Sudan. Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1935.
- The Palestine News. A Brief Record of the Advance of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force. Cairo: Government Press & Survey of Egypt, 1919.
- Royal Institute of International Affairs. Great Britain and Egypt: 1914-1951. London: R.I.I.A., 1952.
- Russell Pasha, Sir Thomas. Egyptian Service: 1902-1946. London: Murray, 1949.
- Taylor, A.J.P. The Struggle for Mastery in Europe: 1848-1918. Oxford: Clarendon, 1954.

Temperley, A History of the Peace Conference of Paris, Vol. VI,
London: R.I.I.A., 1924.

Thornton, A.P. The Imperial Idea and its Enemies. London:
Macmillan, 1959.

Toynbee, Arnold J. The Islamic World Since the Peace Settlement.
Vol. I of the Survey of International Affairs: 1925.
London: Humphrey Milford, 1927.

Wavell, Viscount. Allenby: Soldier and Statesman. London:
Harrap, 1946.

Young, George. Egypt. New York: Scribner's, 1927.

Youssef, Amin Bey. Independent Egypt. London: Murray, 1940.

Unpublished Material

Zayid, Mahmud. "Nash'at hizb al-wafd al-misri: 1919-1924."
Unpublished paper delivered before the Arab Studies
Group at the American University of Beirut in 1962.