# A SOCIO-POLITICAL ANALYSIS OF SYRIA 1943 - 1958 WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO THE ANALYTICAL SYSTEM OF GABRIEL A. ALMOND

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## PREFACE

There is a tendency to automatically make writings on the Middle East by occidentals synonomous with opprobrious criticism of the Middle East and suggestions for Western-patterned reforms. Certainly this has not been lacking in Western writing. What opprobrium may inadvertently appear in the following analysis should be mitigated by understanding that the writer does not hold that the characteristics attributed to the Arab or the conditions ascribed to the Middle East are necessarily unique, culpable or distasteful; and that the writer does not believe that Western democratic institutions, per se, are adaptable for use in the contemporary Middle East.

A further difficulty lies in the fact that this analysis is in large part subject to that same malady which afflicts most political and sociological studies: it describes a man who does not exist. The Arab, the Syrian present in these pages is a composite of the dominant character traits, actions and history of his country. This "normal man" is too transient to enable us to meet him at that precise instant when he may embody the norm before passing on to his next abberation from our abstracted picture of him. Without our paper man, however, it would be impossible to begin to know, in our limited time, the individuals of the Arab milieu.

I wish to thank Professor Nabih A. Faris, Director of the Arab Studies Department, for his guidance in our course of studies at the American University of Beirut. My particular thanks go to my advisor, Professor Walid Khalidi, for his counsel, assistance, and patience.

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# CHAPTER I

# INTRODUCTION

# I. INTRODUCTION

If in the early days of September, 1961, Egypt had forseen the fulmination which was to shatter the unity of the United Arab Republic on the 28th of that month . . . .

The "if's" of history make for fascinating speculation, and their abundance reflects the difficulty in predicting political changes. Even with our marvels of electronic computation, demographic and political statistics from the United Nations, space-shrinking advances in communication equipment, we are still confronted with unanswerable political questions and inexplicable social upheavals. Where formerly we had to solve only the problems spawned by the isolated rivalries between individual nations, today we are faced with conflicts that involve directly or indirectly the whole world. "Our problems have become so vast, their solution so painful and doubtful, and the weight of contingencies so overwhelming that even for the wisest statesman foreign policy is at least three-fourths guesswork."[1]

Nonetheless foreign policy remains and the need to inform that policy with relevant facts remains. These elusive facts are a vital factor in national survival. They form a body of strategic intelligence, consisting of those particular facts about foreign countries which enables the inquiring country to formulate foreign policies of co-operation and

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[1]Kenneth W. Thompson, "American Approaches to International Politics," The Year Book of International Affairs, XII (1959), 205.

national policies of defense.[1] The production of this strategic intelligence is accomplished by two operations: a surveillance operation and a research operation.

The surveillance operation consists of the many ways by which the contemporary world is put under systematic observation from seismographs measuring and locating nuclear detonations to spies enmeshed in the web of espionage. It is an unending operation, reporting the seemingly insignificant and unrelated facts of yearly gross tonnage shipped from Latakia seaport, promotions of key military personnel, erosion of roadbed on the Damascus-Beirut artery, or the imbroglio caused by the international amours of an ambassador's son. Whatever is changing -- or unchanging if such fixity is unusual -- is subject matter for the surveillance operation.[2]

The research operation establishes patterns from past observations and evaluates the data on contemporary changes furnished by the surveillance operation. Its field of interest encompasses all that of the surveillance operation and adds the element of history. Against the background of what has been, the research operation places the current economic, scientific, military, social and political information gleaned by the surveillance operation and searches for patterns that will enable the planners to speculate on the possible and probable courses of action a country will elect when faced with a given set of circumstances.[3]

The orientation of this thesis will be toward political analysis as a contributing factor in the research operation of strategic intelligence.

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[1]Sherman Kent, Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy, p.5.

[2]Ibid., p.4. [3]Ibid.

Politics has been defined in various ways. I have used Arnold Toynbee's definition: "the handling of the power that accumulates as a result of co-operation between people in large numbers".[1] Political analysis entails discovering the constituent elements of interaction among citizens and between citizens and their states; and establishing functional patterns from these interactions.[2] The various approaches to the performance of political analysis can be subsumed under four general headings: deductive, descriptive-historical, quantitative, and sociological-psychological.

The deductive method consists of a priori theorizing on the nature of the state and the citizen's duty toward it, based on philosophical assumptions about man's political and social instincts. Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), presents a good example of the a priori approach.[3] Another illustration can be found in Jeremy Bentham's idea that there were two prime motivations affecting man's life: pain and pleasure. All actions were directed toward avoiding the first and obtaining the second. In a priori approaches to political analysis, the ideal rather than the real dominates the conclusions and recommendations.[4] This is certainly helpful in presenting political goals and models as well as guidance in reaching them, but the a priori method has been criticized from a pragmatic point of view as being mere "verbal metaphysics" without much relationship to practical

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[1]Arnold Toynbee, A Study of History, Vol. XII: Reconsiderations, p. 658.

[2]This definition is based on ideas presented in David E. Butler's The Study of Political Behavior, passim.

[3]Ibid., p.28. [4]Ibid., p.29.

political problems.[1]

The descriptive or historical method utilizes the techniques of historical writing, selecting, interpreting and weighing data. It can be called the method of common sense observation. Some writers using this method have generalized from their experience and observation in a more or less theoretical way: Machiavelli, Montesquieu and Marx for example.[2] Others have begun in a more descriptive way: Bryce and Ostrogorski are two examples.[3] With this method the author must continually engage in a process of selection, making value judgements and using his intuition. Of all the approaches to the study of politics, the descriptive seems the easiest, but it does in fact make the greatest demands on integrity and judgement.[4]

The quantitative method entails statistical examination of political phenomena. In contrast to the subjective nature of the descriptive method, the quantitative method utilizes information that can be presented in numerical form and is subject to verification. Figures that are precise can be made the basis of precise comparisons; statistics that are comprehensive can support comprehensive generalizations.[5] There are many examples of the use of statistics in the study of politics: analysis of the backgrounds of those in public life, analysis of election results, or sample surveys such as the Gallup Poll. Two dangers seem to be present in the quantitative approach: statistics may become an end in themselves, and there is a tendency to equate quantification and science -- even though the former represents only one of the elements in scientific research.[6] It is difficult to

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[1] Ibid., p.38. [2] Ibid., p.42. [3] Ibid., p.43.

[4] Ibid., p.55. [5] Ibid., p.56. [6] Ibid., p.68.

imagine any political problem that could be entirely reduced to figures.

The sociological and psychological approach depends upon knowledge of the personality and background of individuals and the structure and customs of communities to explain politics. The main sociological contributions to political analysis have come from facts concerning specific problems in individual countries. For example, C. Wright Mills' The Power Elite attempts to identify the people who control political action in America, analyzing their characteristics and methods of wielding authority.[1] Harold Lasswell's The Psychopathology of Politics presents some conclusions about the compulsions which drive some people to become politicians.[2] Those using the sociological and psychological approach have generally tried to make scientific or verifiable statements, but on the really important questions of political change it seems very unlikely that there can be any final answers.[3] Nonetheless, sociology and psychology have already "provided many useful tools of research, propounding theories about group structures and types of individual character which have a direct bearing on every kind of political situation".[4]

Inherent in every method of political analysis there are two dangers: the tendency to over-rationalize human conduct; and ethocentrism -- that "inbred nationalism or unimaginativeness which leads people to take their own society as the norm and to assess the practices and institutions of other countries by their deviations from that norm".[5]

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[1] Ibid., p.78 [2] Ibid., p.81. [3] Ibid., p.86.
[4] Ibid., p.90. [5] Ibid., p.106.

In the socio-political analysis which follows, I will test the applicability of the method of political analysis presented by Gabriel A. Almond in The Politics of the Developing Areas.[1] Almond uses a functional approach in comparing, according to a common set of categories, the political systems of the developing areas. His concepts and categories are founded on sociological and anthropological theory. He justifies his functional approach on the grounds that governmental institutions in these areas typically bear so remote a relation to actual performance that detailed descriptions would be of little help in predicting behavior in these systems.[2] Utilizing this functional approach, Almond's ultimate goal is the development of a probabalistic theory of politics.[3] I have selected Almond's conceptual framework rather than an a priori theory, descriptive writing or a statistical approach, because it seems to best meet the pragmatic requirements of strategic intelligence. These requirements can be better understood through an analogy. If a delayed action bomb has plunged into the basement of your home, discussions of its philosophical implications, descriptions of its origins and means of delivery, or the statistics on its length and weight seem rather trivial while there are questions of how long the delay is, can it be safely disarmed, and if it does explode how large an area will it destroy. Almond's system seems to reveal the internal mechanism of the political systems of the developing areas with their fuses, points of detonation and explosive patterns. The following are his concepts and terms.

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[1]Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman (eds.), The Politics of the Developing Areas.

[2]Ibid., p.viii. [3]Ibid., p.4.

The purpose of Almond's method is to separate out analytically the structures which perform political functions.[1] The structures are examined for the style of their performance and the limits or boundaries which encompass them. The political system thus revealed is then compared with other political systems to identify common properties and isolate the peculiar properties of its particular species of politics and the conditions with which it is associated.[2]

By structures Almond means the patterns of interaction by which a society maintains its internal and external order. He uses this term in preference to "institutions" because the latter implies the clearly visible and continuous structures of the modern state. Political structures may not always be clearly visible or continuous in action, but only occasional or intermittent and not bounded by legal limitations to only one function. What is peculiar to modern political systems is a relatively high degree of structural differentiation (e.g. legislatures, bureaucracies, courts, electoral systems, media of communication parties), with each structure tending to perform a regulatory role for that function within the political system as a whole. The development of these specialized regulating structures creates the modern democratic political system and the peculiar pattern of boundary maintenance which characterizes the internal relations between the sub-systems of the polity and the relations between the polity and the society -- delineating where other systems end and the political system begins.[3] What kinds of structures man the boundaries of the political system is of the utmost importance. Here inputs are processed, and contact between the polity

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[1]Almond, op. cit., p.5. [2]Ibid., p.10. [3]Ibid., p.18.

and the society is established and maintained.

The boundaries between the society and polity differ from political system to political system. In a primitive society the shift from economy to church to polity may be hardly perceptible. Or the boundaries between the political and social systems of primitive societies may be distinctly marked, as in war dances, sacrificial rites and dramatic changes of costume. It is necessary when describing good and bad boundary maintenance to use criteria appropriate to the system. In one system diffuseness and intermittency may be appropriate boundary maintenance; in another specialized structures are appropriate.[1]

The style, or distinctive mode of execution, determines how the functions are performed. Is it contained within a specific structure or diffused through several? Does it employ particularistic and affective criteria or universalistic and performance standards? Does it function manifestly through direct means or is it more latent using analogous situations and primary relationships?[2]

Almond defines a political system as that system of interactions which are found in all independent societies, performing the functions of integration and adaption (integrating and adapting elements of the kinship, religious and economic systems) by means of the employment or threat of employment, of more or less legitimate physical compulsion. It is the legitimate order-maintaining or transforming system of the society. Physical compulsion is the factor which distinguishes the political system from other social systems, giving it its special coherence as a system.[3]

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[1]Almond, op. cit., p.9. [2]Ibid., p.11. [3]Ibid., p.18.

The most salient features of Almond's theoretical framework are his functional categories of inputs and outputs; or in other words, what is put into the system and what is put out by the system. These categories are presented as being common to all political systems. Under inputs he lists four categories: political socialization, recruitment; interest articulation; interest aggregation, and political communication.[1]

Political socialization is the educational process by which a person obtains knowledge about and attitudes toward his country's political system. This process may be latent or manifest. Latently, the socialization experiences of childhood and early adulthood -- family church, etc. -- are pre-political citizenship experiences. The individual is inducted into a sequence of decision-making systems with particular authority and participation patterns and with particular kinds of claim or demand inputs and policy outputs. The first years of life and the experience of the family "political process" seems to constitute the most rapid and binding stage of socialization.[2]

The style, or the distinctive mode of execution of political socialization may be specific or diffuse, depending on the complexity of the society. Thus a modern society may have one form of authority and participation in the family, another in the economy, and still a third in the political system. At the primitive level of the tribe, the socialization is diffuse since the family unit is usually basic to all activities; hence the socialization process is more alike from one system to the next.

The political socialization function may be particularistic or

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[1]Almond, op. cit., p.17. [2]Ibid., p.28.

universalistic, usually a combination of the two. What is unique in the modern political system is a political socialization function which creates in the individual a distinct loyalty to and membership in the general political system and a tendency to penetrate and affect the socialization processes of other social systems such as the family and church so that the latter introduce general citizenship concepts into their socialization processes.[1] In many primitive societies, kinship, lineage or village units tend to constitute the dominant group membership; and membership in the larger political system tends to be constituent -- that is, representation by membership in and identification with the kinship, lineage or village group -- rather than individual and direct. Kinship and narrow local affiliations tend to define the most enduring political relationships, the basic units of jurisdiction with claims on loyalty that are more powerful than those obtained through membership in the larger political system.[2]

Finally, the political socialization function in different societies may be compared according to the way in which affective and instrumental elements are combined. The affective component includes the inculcation of loyalty to, love of, respect for and pride in the political system. The instrumental involves manipulation, policy preferences, and strategems.

The early stages of the political socialization process are the same in all political systems, regardless of their degree of complexity. It is essentially a latent, primary process -- diffuse, particularistic and affective. Political socialization in primitive societies tends to stop

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[1] Almond, op. cit., p.30.

[2] Ibid.

at this stage. In the modern system, political socialization continues beyond latent, analogous political socialization into a whole sequence of manifest political socialization experiences via the primary and secondary structures of the society. But no citizen ever fully divorces himself from the effects of his latent, primary socialization experiences. Hence the cultural and structural dualism of the modern political system.[1]

The analysis of the political socialization function is basic to the whole field of political analysis, because it not only gives an insight into the pattern of political culture, but also locates the points where particular qualities and elements of the political culture are introduced.[2]

Political recruitment takes up where the general political socialization function leaves off. It recruits members of the society out of their particular subcultures -- e.g., religious organizations, status groups, ethnic communities -- and inducts them into the specialized roles of the political system, training them in the appropriate skills and providing them with political guide lines and values. Various structures have their own specific induction patterns -- political parties, election systems, bureaucratic examining systems, etc. Styles of political recruitment may be compared according to the way in which ascriptive and particularistic criteria combine with performance and universalistic criteria. The more completely modern a political system is, the more the ascriptive criteria (kinship, friendship, school ties, etc.) are limited by achievement criteria: educational levels, performance levels on exams, formal records of achievement in political roles, etc.[3]

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[1]Almond, op. cit., p.31. [2]Ibid. [3]Ibid., p.32.

Interest articulation is closely related to political socialization. Interests, claims, demands for political action are articulated through four main types of structures: institutional interest groups, non-associational interest groups, anomic interest groups, and associational interest groups.

Institutional interest groups encompass such organizations as legislatures, political executives, armies, bureaucracies, churches. These are organizations which perform other social or political functions, but which, as corporate bodies or through groups within them (e.g., legislative blocs, officer cliques), may articulate their own interests or represent the special interests of other groups in the society.[1]

Non-associational interest groups include kinship and lineage groups , ethnic, regional, religious, status and class groups which articulate interests informally and intermittently, through individuals, cliques, family and religious heads.[2]

By anomic interest groups Almond means those groups who cause the more or less spontaneous breakthroughs into the political system by riot, demonstration, etc. Their distinguishing characteristic is their relative structural and functional lability. Although they may begin as interest articulation structures, they may end up performing any of the other input or output functions (e.g., a recruitment function: transferring power from one group to another; or a rule adjucation function: trying and lynching).

Associational interest groups are the specialized structures of interest articulation -- trade unions, organizations of businessmen or industrial-

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[1]Almond, op.cit., p.33. [2]Ibid.

ists, ethnic associations and the like. Their particular characteristics are explicit representation of the interests of a particular group, orderly procedures for the formulation of interests and demands, and the transmission of these demands to other political structures such as political parties, legislatures, bureaucracies.[1]

The style of interest articulation can take many forms. It can be manifest: an explicit formulation of a demand; or it can be latent: presenting behavioral or mood cues. It may be specific, as in a request for a particular piece of legislation; or it may be diffuse, as in a general statement of dissatisfaction or preference. It may be general or particular, that is a demand in class terms, etc. or in individual, family terms. It may be instrumental, as when it takes the form of a bargain; or affective, as a simple expression of gratitude, anger, disappointment, etc. The more manifest, specific, general and instrumental the style of interest articulation, the easier it is to maintain the boundary between the polity and society, and the better the circulation of needs, claims and demands from the society in aggregate form into the political system.[2]

Every political system has some way of aggregating the interests, claims and demands which have been articulated by the interest groups. The aggregative function may be performed within all the subsystems of the general political system: in legislative bodies, political executives (i.e., cabinets, presidencies, kingships), media of communication, etc. The aggregative function is primarily concerned with the distillation of general policies from the mass of articulated interests, and with the recruitment of political

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[1] Almond, op. cit., p.34. [2] Ibid., p.35.

personnel who are more or less committed to a particular pattern of policy. This raises the question of party systems.

Almond classifies party systems (as distinct from parties themselves) as: authoritarian, dominant non-authoritarian, competitive two-party systems, and competitive multiparty systems. An authoritarian party system may in turn be classifie into the totalitarian and authoritarian types.[1]

The totalitarian party system is characterized by a high rate of coercive social mo bilization. The output of authoritative policy is not paralleled by, but only somewhat mitigated by, the input of demands. Overt interest articulation is permissible only at the lowest level of individual complaints against the lower echelon authorities. Above this level, interest articulation and aggregation are latent or covert. The authoritarian party system has some of the properties of totalitarian systems, except that the penetration of the party into the social structure is less complete and some interests are articulated openly. The lack of a free party system and an open electoral process usually reduces the aggregative function to the formulation of policy alternatives within the authoritarian party and authoritarian governmental structures such as the bureaucracy and army.[2]

Dominant non-authoritarian party systems are usually found in political systems where nationalist movements have been instrumental in obtaining emancipation. Most of the significant interest groups have joined in the nationalist movement for independence. After emancipation, it is difficult for a coherent loyal opposition to organize itself. Hence the dominant party is faced with the difficult problem of trying to aggregate the very

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[1] Almond, op. cit., p.40. [2] Ibid., p.39.

dissimilar interests of the different groups which formerly gave it allegiance in the cause of national liberation. The cohesion of the dominant party is difficult to maintain. In order to avoid divisive questions, decisions are postponed, and policy proposals take the form of diffuse programs selected more for their unifying symbolism than for practicality. When the dominant party has the goal of political modernization on Western lines, Almond calls these systems tutelary democracies. If modernization is not the goal, the elite may become a conservative oligarchy or an oligarchy modernizing on patterns other than those of Western democracy.[1]

The competitive two-party system is exemplified by the United States and the United Kingdom. Here a homogeneous, bargaining, secular political culture and an autonomous system of associational interest groups introduce claims into the party system, legislature, political executive, and bureaucracy which are combinable into responsive, alternative public policies. The whole process tends to be overt and calcuable, resulting in an open flow of inputs and outputs.[2]

Multiparty systems can be divided into two classes: the "working" multiparty systems of the Scandinavian area where interests are effectively aggregated, and the "immobilist" multiparty systems of France and Italy, where the political socialization processes tend to produce a fragmented, isolative political culture, with rather limited and ineffective aggregation.[3]

Based on the style in which the aggregative function is performed, Almond distinguishes three different kinds of political parties: (1) secular, pragmatic, bargaining parties; (2) absolute value-oriented or ideological

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[1]Almond, op. cit., p.42. [2]Ibid., p.42. [3]Ibid., p.43.

parties; and (3) particularistic or traditional parties.[1]

The manner in which the aggregative function is performed is crucial to the performance of the political system as a whole. If the parties have a broad popular base, they can maintain their boundaries distinct from the pressure of interest groups. With this autonomy, they can effectively aggregate the articulated interests of the masses into general policy alternatives. In this situation, a high degree of interest aggregation occurs, and to a large extent prior to the performance of the authoritative governmental functions. This renders responsibility for governmental outputs unambiguously clear. If the aggregative process is of a pragmatic quality, it serves to regulate the impact of latent, diffuse, particularistic and affective components in the political system.[2]

Although political communication takes place in all of the input and output functions, there also exists an autonomous medium that works toward objective and neutral communication of political information. For example, primitive political systems have their drummers and runners, medieval towns had their criers; noblemen and kings had their heralds. Today it can be found in free presses, radio and television.[3] Autonomy in the media of communication makes possible a free flow of information from the society to the polity and, within the polity, from political structure to political structure. It also makes possible an open feedback from output to input again; and, if truly free, it can criticize the acts of politicians or government officials, serving as a restraint on action when such action is

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[1] Almond, op. cit., p.43. [2] Ibid., p.39. [3] Ibid., p.46.

not responsive to the articulated interests of the people.[1] The basic importance of objective communication comes from the fact that effective political action must be based on rational calculation which requires relatively neutral information. Styles of communication can be a basis for comparing political systems (manifest, latent, etc.); comparison may also be made between the homogenity of political information (versus heterogeneous mixing of ascriptive and universalistic factors); the mobility of information (does it penetrate the diffuse and undifferentiated networks of the traditional and rural areas?); the volume of information (in transitional systems much political information remains covert and latent); and the direction of flow of information (the output of messages from the authoritative governmental structures tends to be far larger than the input of of messages from the society).[2]

Having fed the various claims, demands, special interests into the political system, the system reacts with what Almond terms the output functions: rule making, rule application and rule adjucation.[3] In using these terms, Almond turns aside from the traditional concept of separation of powers into legislature, executive and judiciary; but unfortunately is rather parsimonious in his explanation of his own terms. We will, therefore, examine these output functions as they are elucidated by Loewenstein, who designates the three governmental functions as policy determination, policy execution, and policy control.[4]

Rule making or policy determination refers to the fundamental resolves of the community governing its immediate or remote future. Their objective

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[1]Almond, op. cit., p.47. [2]Ibid., p.51. [3]Ibid., p.52.

[4]Karl Loewenstein, Political Power and the Governmental Process, p.42.

may be political, socio-economic or even moral when dealing with religious matters. The primary policy decision with which a nation is confronted is its choice of the political system and the pattern of government under which it wishes to live. Customarily the major policy decisions are initiated and formulated by a relatively small number of persons, the ruling elite or oligarchy. Though the policy decision may often be inspired and influenced by the articulated interests of the people, its formalization and legalization are incumbent on the legitimate power holders, that is, the government and the parliament. It depends on the prevailing pattern of government whether in the policy initiation the government or the parliament takes the lead.[1] Under a constitutional system, the rule making function is shared by government and parliament with or without subsequent injection of the electorate into the process. Under an autocratic system, the single power holder monopolizes the exercise of rule making, even though, for the pretense of national unity, he may command parliamentary indorsement or popular ratification of his decisions.[2]

Rule application or policy execution is the instrumentality for the implementation of the policy decisions. Administration is the most ubiquitous aspect of rule application and entails the application of the policy decisions as well as of the utilitarian regulations of social relations to the requirements of community life.[3] Under constitutional systems, the parliament participates in rule application by legislation, implementing the policy decisions, and by the utilitarian regulation of community life; the government shares in the function by administration through its agencies

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[1] Loewenstein, op. cit., p.44. [2] Ibid., p.46. [3] Ibid.

and staffs; and the courts by adjudicating controversies under the laws and checking on the legality of governmental actions. In an autocracy, the single power holder monopolizes the rule application function.[1]

Rule adjucation or policy control depends for its style of execution upon how it is parceled out among the government, parliament and the electorate. The division of the legislative function between two houses of parliament under bicameralism; the requirement of senatorial confirmation of a presidential appointment in the United States, the mandatory referendum of the people on a constitutional amendment -- are illustrations of control inherent in the constitutional requirement that a political act becomes valid only if the several power holders share in its consummation. On the other hand, there are autonomous rights: the vote of no confidence by the parliament against the cabinet; the right of the government to dissolve the parliament; the president's veto of congressional legislation: autonomous controls reserved to an individual power holder or segment of the government.

The essence of rule adjucation or policy control lies in the concept of political responsibility whereby a specific power holder is accountable for the conduct of the function assigned to him, to another power holder -- for example, the government to the parliament, the parliament to the government, and both of them to the electorate.[2] Constitutionalism is a responsible government in which the exercise of political power is reciprocally shared and mutually controlled. Autocracy, by contrast, is characterized by the absense of any techniques by which the political responsibility of

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[1]Loewenstein, op. cit., p.48. [2]Ibid., p.50.

the single power holder could be effectively invoked, short of revolution.[1]

This description of the output functions is based on Loewenstein. Almond's method of analysis places far greater stress on the political, input functions due to Almond's concept of the indeterminacy of the formal governmental structures in most of the non-Western areas and the gross deviations in the performance of the output functions from the constitutional and legal norms. Most of these political systems, according to Almond, either have had, have now, or aspire to constitutions which provide for legislatures, executives and judiciaries. In the distribution of legal powers, they follow either the British, the American or the French model. But it seems to be the exceptional case when these institutions perform in any way corresponding to these norms. "A careful examination of governmental structures and their formal powers would have yielded little of predictive value."[2]

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Almond's method, then, consists of two phases: unearthing the structures which perform the input and output functions in a particular political system, and then comparing that whole system with other systems in the light of these common categories. In the following analysis I have limited myself to the utilization of the first half of Almond's investigative technique in an attempt to evaluate its applicability. I have also rearranged the sequence of Almond's categories. As presented above, Almond's concepts are schematic for the sake of clarity. In the actual working of the political system, however, the functions are so closely inter-related that any examina-

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[1] Loewenstein, op. cit., p.52. [2] Almond, op. cit., p.52.

tion rigidly following the pattern of division presented by Almond would fail to a large extent to show the complete picture of these relationships. I have, therefore, arranged the various functions in an order which best shows their inter-dependence in Syria, beginning with the most basic -- socialization, recruitment, communication -- and proceding to those functions which are evolved from these foundations, i. e., articulation, aggregation, and anomic movements. Understanding the possibilities within each function, we can follow the logical thread of cause and effect by placing the two in proximity to each other. For example, rather than a separate examination of output functions, I have interposed them where they best illustrate the relationship between specific factors of input and output.

## II. POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION

In the Arab world, competition for power is as fierce and stark as it is anywhere in the underdeveloped countries. Political life tends to be sharply divided: either support of the regime or extreme and violent opposition to it.[1] An examination of the process of political socialization[2] as well as the character of the Arab may throw some light on the reasons for this.

Before we can speak in generalizations about Arab character, we should first ask: can there be such a thing as a national character? Hans J. Morgenthau maintains that the fact of national character is incontestable, especially in view of the anthropological concept of the culture pattern; "certain qualities of intellect and character occur more frequently and are more highly valued in one nation than in another. These qualities set one nation apart from others, and show as a rule a high degree of resiliency to change".[3] Such differences in national character have enabled, for example, the German and Russian governments to pursue foreign policies that the American and British governments would have found impossible.[4] What generalizations can we make for the Arab?

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[1] Morroe Berger, The Arab World Today, p.335.

[2] See above, p.10, for Almond's definition of political socialization.

[3] Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, p.126. [4] Ibid., p.131.

Sati' al-Husari, writing in al-Hayat, stated that the apparent differences among the populations of the Arab countries are accidental and superficial, not justifying the assumption that they are members of different nationalities, simply because they are citizens of different states. There are several Arab peoples, but all are members of the Arab nation.[1] Perhaps a more moderate view is that of Yusif Sayigh: although the Arabs do partake of many common cultural, social and economic features, there still exist marked differences between them.[2] It would seem safe to say that a more or less uniform Arab mentality has evolved from the interaction of numerous factors; the most important of which are the social, spiritual and economic.[3] Let us consider the social factor.

Roughly there are five social classes in the Arab world:

1. The large landowners, bankers, industrialists, who constitute the traditional, conservative ruling elite.

2. The higher civil servants and army officers, independent professionals, intellectuals, and religious leaders. When denied access to the upper class, a counter-elite often is formed from this class.

3. The lower professions (teachers, journalists, etc.), white-collar workers in government and private enterprise.

4. The shopkeepers, skilled workers and artisans.

5. The peasants, laborers and service workers.

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[1]Sati' al-Husari, "Ideas and Talks on Arab Nationalism," al-Hayat (Beirut), August 5, 1951, p.1, col.1.

[2]Yusif A. Sayigh, "Management-Labour Relations in Selected Arab Countries," International Labor Review LXXVII (June 1958), 519.

[3]Nabih A. Faris and Mohammed T. Husayn, The Crescent in Crisis, p.28.

Despite the prevalent Western opinion, Arab class structure is not feudal.[1] Arab society, traditional or modern, has little similarity to feudal Europe with its autonomous manorial order and defined system of personal dependence of one social group upon another. In some part of the Arab world, however, landless farm workers and tenants have been so tied to certain large estates that the complete control of their lives by the owners of the estates suggested a feudalistic relationship in practice.[2]

The class structure of the Arab world today reflects that of its past eras. The likenesses between present and traditional patterns extend throughout the class picture. First, there is still a far greater gulf between the highest and lowest classes with respect to wealth, power, and style of living in general than in industrial societies. Second, the middle classes are relatively small and weak with the military and civilian bureaucracy comprising a large proportion of them. Third, the learned professions have high status. Finally the peasants and urban workers are still so poor generally that the struggle for basic necessities either makes them apathetic toward politics or avidly seeking their self-interests in political activities.[3]

The primary social unit in the Arab world, as in all other societies, is the family. Here begins the process of political socialization, and there is evidence indicating that not infrequently this family environment is strongly authoritarian. This seems to be a characteristic of the underdeveloped areas, and certainly authoritarianism played a large part in the cultural development of Europe and America -- and can in fact be readily ascribed to certain segments of American society today.[4] It is not surprising,

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[1]Berger, op. cit., p.280. [2]Ibid., p.281. [3]Ibid., p.280.

[4]See below, p.27.

therefore, that we find a strong father figure in the traditional Syrian family. The father is generally accepted as the absolute head of the house. Out of the house and into the extended family, authority still centers in male hands since traditional Arab women, generally, have a lower status than men. This, of course, changes as one meets families that are modern or in transition to modernity, and it cannot be said to be true of the garrulous old women who have finished their obligations of child rearing. But in the period when the socialization process is most effective in educating the young, it is a man's world, with males given obvious preference over females.[1] In this traditional family, the individual subordinates his personal desires to the general good of the group -- which good is determined by the father.[2] When the individual participates in groups outside his family boundaries, it is on a family basis that he does so.[3]

Essentially the Syrian's loyalty reflects this family orientation. His loyalty is first to his family or clan, then his tribe, then his religious group; and there the loyalty seems to stop.[4] In this respect, it can be said that an extreme individualism is characteristic of the Arab mentality: the concern of the individual is for himself, his tribe, preventing him from giving his loyalty to any other established authority except under compulsion.[5] The spirit of tribalism can easily be taken as the predominant

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[1]Terry E. Prothro and Levon Melikian, "The California Public Opinion Scale in an Authoritarian Culture," Public Opinion Quarterly, XVII (1953), 355.

[2]A. H. Hourani, Syria and Lebanon, p.92.

[3]Raphael Patai, "The Middle East as a Culture Area," The Middle East Journal, VI (1952), 20.

[4]Nicola A. Ziadeh, Syria and Lebanon, p.284. [5]Faris, op. cit., p.30.

social characteristic in those segments of Arab society which have not been altered by modernism. And extending beyond the tribe and family into the entire social and political life of the Middle East -- as it did in other cultures where it dominated the family environment -- is the factor of authoritarianism.[1] It is the influence of authoritarianism in the family that in part determines the functioning of government in the Arab world, and authoritarianism in government that in part reinforces and modifies the attitudes and behavior in the family milieu.

How does this authoritarian environment affect the Arab? Studies of the relationship of the individual to authority have been primarily conducted in America based on Adorno's work.[2] This study concludes that the authoritarian environment can produce an adult with a power-oriented, exploitively dependent attitude which allows no room for anything but a desperate clinging to what is strong and a disdainful rejection of whatever is weak. Such a conclusion would clarify why, for instance, Germany with its long history of authoritarian father figures, could become susceptible to a fascist ideology. The son of such a father figure apparently has difficulty establishing his own personal, masculine identity; forcing him to look for it in a collective system where there is opportunity both for submission to the powerful and for retaliation upon the powerless.[3]

In a study of authoritarianism made at the American University of Beirut, test results from Middle Eastern students were compared with test results from an American group. The Arab students responded in a more

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[1] Prothro, op. cit., p.355.

[2] T. W. Adorno et al., The Authoritarian Personality. [3] Ibid., p.971.

authoritarian way than did the Americans, and in all but one test item the differences were so large as to make it unlikely that they were due merely to chance.[1] These findings were further substantiated in a later study by Melikian: "the Middle East group tended to be significantly more authoritarian and more hostile than the American group".[2]

Although neither of the two Middle East studies is exhaustive,[3] we should, as we proceed in our analysis, at least be aware of this authoritarian bent as a possible explanation for any political actions which appear to serve as an exaltation of power or an aversion from weakness.

The authoritarian pattern seems to have been present for centuries in Arab governments -- often introduced in military form by foreign governments ruling in Arab lands. Even though parliamentary systems were introduced by Western example or direction in the Middle East, political power remained in the hands of the British or French rulers and the large landowners who dominated the legislatures and administrations. This authoritarianism has persisted through the years, with only the wielders of political power being changed.[4]

In his attitude toward the government, the Syrian inclines to reflect this authoritarian bent. Lerner's study of Middle Eastern society disclosed that the Arabs in Syria, from among all those Arabs he classifies as modern,

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[1]Prothro, op. cit.

[2]Levon H. Melikian, "Some Correlates of Authoritarianism in Two Cultural Groups," The Journal of Psychology XLII (1956), 246.

[3]The Prothro-Melikian study examined 130 subjects (77 Lebanese, 19 Syrians, 12 Palestinians, 11 Jordanians, 6 Iraqi and 5 Bahreini). The Melikian study examined 90 Muslim Arab undergraduates also at A. U. B.

[4]Berger, op. cit., p.26.

were the most prone to present isolated, personal solutions to national problems. In 1951, they were suggesting reforms that envisaged no support from any existing social group, a perspective that ties in with what seems to be a proclivity of the Syrians for personal dictatorship in that same period.[1] It is quite possible for this individualism to be compatible with authoritarian government, perhaps even requiring it from an administrative point of view. Individualism that is not controlled and directed by politically oriented and responsible associations makes stable government difficult to achieve. "Authority cannot, in such circumstances, be maintained by tacit consent but only by constant repression of recalcitrant wills which are themselves neither organized nor stable."[2] In this sense, individualism and despotism are not merely compatible but symbiotic.[3] Some Arabs themselves are aware of their own vacillation between rejection of government and acquiescence in its repressions. ( There is a proverb expressing the apparent paradox: "govern the rabble by opposing them".[4] )

Perhaps this explains why the most prevalent response among the young, educated men in Syria was advocacy of force and violent dictatorship to solve Syria's problems. The feeling that strength, embodied in one strong man, is needed has diffused through the various classes of Syrian society.[5] We must remember, at this point, that Lerner's survey of Syria was made at a certain point in time, and that the responses he cataloged were necessarily colored by the particular political conditions of that time. There is nothing

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[1]Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society, p.280.

[2]Berger, op. cit., p.298. [3]Ibid.

[4]J. L. Burckhardt, Arabic Proverbs, p.104. [5]Lerner, op. cit., p.281.

to preclude an Arab in Saudi Arabia or Egypt from making a similar response given the same stimulation of particular events. It is quite possible that the character traits which do distinguish one Arab from another are only such responses to temporary stimuli and not factors deeply rooted in his basic personality.

Islam

A factor which is deeply rooted in the life of the Arab is Islam. Widespread similarities in the Arab world, such as mentality, individual and collective behavior, are to a large extent the result of the Arabs' being Muslims.[1] To what extent does Islam reinforce a tendency to subservience to government? Undeniably, a fatalistic acceptance of one's condition in life would be a strong sedative to political action; in a society where a traditional attitude of 'God will provide' predominates, a shift to the attitude of the 'state will provide' would not be very difficult to make.[2] Islam seems to contain fertile ground for fatalism: "and everything they do is in the writings; and everything small and great is written down;[3] Say: nothing will afflict us save that which Allah has ordained for us".[4] With other verses, a strong case can be made for predestination in Islam, but a countervailing case for free will and action can also be established: "except those who are patient and do good. For them is forgiveness and a great reward".[5] The frequent contradictory statements of the Qur'an on free will and predestination show that the Prophet was more of a pastor and

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[1]Faris, op. cit., p.27.

[2]Yusif A. Sayigh, "Development: the Visible or the Invisible Hand?" World Politics XIII (July 1961), 573.

[3]Maulana Muhammed 'Ali (ed.), The Holy Qur'an, 54: 52-53, p.1012.

[4]Ibid., 9: 51, p.398.

[5]Ibid., 11: 11, p.441

politician than a systematic theologian.[1] Writing in 1956, Nicola Ziadeh believed that in Syria the idea of predestination was adhered to by the majority of Muslims, although it was slowly giving way to the concept of free will.[2]

Generally speaking, as founded on Islamic theory the concept of the leader is one who is the first among equals, to be elected informally by the group as the need arises. The subsequent subservience to hereditary monarchy was an accretion of Persian and Byzantine influences. Since the emphasis was on equalitarianism rather than the individual freedom of democracy, autocracy and despotism were accepted so long as all were subject to equal justice under the ruler.[3] Islamic justice based itself on the Judaic concept of reciprocity; i.e. equality between the parties concerned. Islamic law attempts to redress a wrong by removing its effects from the victim or by inflicting the same wrong upon the guilty party. In Islamic law punishment is viewed as the right of God or the right of man; the latter usually involving retaliation or sometimes the payment of "blood" money.

Although there is this strong impulse toward equality in Islam, traditional Muslim society was far from egalitarian in practice. Again, the Qur'an presents the other side of the picture: "and He it is Who has made you successors in the land and exalted some of you in rank above others ...."[5] "And covet not that by which Allah had made some of you excel others. For

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[1]D. B. Macdonald, "Kadar," Shorter Encyclopaedia of Islam, edited by H. A. R. Gibb and J. N. Kramers, p.200.

[2]Ziadeh, op. cit., p.257. [3]Berger, op. cit., p.51.

[4]Ibid. [5]Ali, op. cit., 6: 166, p.316.

men is the benefit of what they earn. And for women is the benefit of what they earn."[1]

In practice Islamic equality has not permeated governmental institutions nor has the elective principle for selecting leaders ever been genuinely followed.[2] Leadership has been legitimate in Islamic societies if it could maintain itself in power, and since the elective principle was circumvented, the Islamic community could not acquire the experience normally associated with the elective principle in Western countries: toleration of the unsuccessful by the successful. Even during the brief parliamentary era in the Arab world, the rights and duties of the majority and the minority were not clearly defined. The majority sought to suppress the minority and the latter sought to depose the majority. The Western idea that criticism of government from the minority was not synonymous with disobedience to government has not been incorporated in most Arab systems. The present leaders of the independent Arab states (except Lebanon) feel as did the foreign rulers they ejected: official recognition of the opposition would imply approval of what the opposition might say and do. The opposition is viewed as a competing power, not as a political party competing for power. Thus many Arab governments suppress the opposition to demonstrate that their authority may not be challenged.[3] This absence of what we think of as Western democratic procedures is not solely the legacy of Islamic ambivalence toward authority.

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[1] 'Ali, op. cit., 4: 32, p.198.

[2] Berger, op. cit., p.307.

[3] Ibid., pp.306-308.

The socio-economic basis of democracy in general is lacking in most Arab countries. The economist Charles Issawi points out that the Arab states are at a disadvantage in the size of their territory, type of economy, distribution of wealth, level of education and patterns of voluntary co-operation.[1] Syria's economic picture fits Issawi's description.

What wealth Syria does have is based largely on agriculture, and the distribution of its profits is extremely limted. In 1948, Doreen Warriner wrote, "in every district half or more than half of the population live in extreme poverty, due to the low proportion of land cultivated, low yields, and the unequal distribution of land. The landlords are pure rent-receivers: and the poorer peasants are entangled in a network of debt without hope of escape".[2] In 1948, the average income per cultivated hectare was LS 365. Surveying the situation in 1955, between sixty-five and seventy-five percent of the Syrians derived their living directly from agriculture, and a considerable part of the remainder earned their livelihood by handling or processing agricultural commodities.[3] The national per capita income was LS 440, with the unskilled industrial worker getting only LS 3 to LS 4 daily.[4] In 1960 the national per capita income was LS 400 or about $100 U.S. The

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[1]Charles Issawi, "Economic and Social Foundations of Democracy in the Middle East," in Walter Z. Laqueur (ed.), The Middle East in Transition, pp.33-51.

[2]Doreen Warriner, Land and Poverty in the Middle East, p.91.

[3]The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, The Economic Development of Syria, p.9. (Hereafter cited as IBRD.)

[4]Ibid., pp.24-25.

great majority of Syrians, however, had an income substantially under the $100. per capita income.[1] The situation was little changed from 1955, when the bulk of the rural population remained impoverished, and those in the urban areas earned only a bare livelihood.[2]

Syria is rich in quantity of land but it has been the rich who controlled the greatest quantity of productive land. Of the 2.2 million hectares of Syrian land which was privately owned in 1955, 38% consisted of holdings of less than 100 hectares. Holdings of 500 to 1,000 hectares consisted of 9% of the whole, and holdings over 1,000 hectares only 16%.[3] This was the basis for the large landholders enormous political power, a concentration of wealth in a few hands so that the mass of the population, having no economic independence, was in no position to exercise its political rights.[4] The economic control of the peasant by the landlord was rather obvious in 1955: "the economic bargaining power of the landlord vis-à-vis the tenant and the pump owner vis-à-vis the cultivator is so great that the landlord and pump owner obtain a rather excessive share of the output of the land".[5] Even the little income tenants may have is rather precarious: generally they could be ousted at will by landlords and the land they did receive for cultivation was so frequently realloted that they acquired no interest in its improvement.[6]

Land reforms have been legislated in Syria. Legislative Decree No.

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[1]Dankwart A. Rustow, "The Politics of the Near East," in Almond, op. cit., p.388. In the same year: Morocco - $160; Tunisia - $138; Saudi Arabia - $40.

[2]IBRD, op. cit., p.26. [3]Ibid., p.355.

[4]Issawi, op. cit., p.39. [5]IBRD, op. cit., p.69. [6]Ibid.

135 of October, 1952, provided for legal absorption of unoccupied land by the state, and among other things limited ownership of land to 200 hectares per member of the occupier's immediate family. Although such efforts did have results, as we shall see later, the overall effect was relatively so slight that Bullard, writing in 1958, could say that the attempt of the Shishakli government to reform land holdings came to nothing and the average holdings of land remained large.[1]

Speaking of traditional society as found in the Middle East, W. W. Rostow describes the center of gravity of political power as generally being in the hands of those who own or control the land, with the large landowner maintaining a fluctuating but usually profound influence over such central power as may exist.[2] This description by Rostow is applicable to Syria in the period from 1943 to 1949; thereafter, no longer sustained by French influence, the landowning class was forced to give place more and more to the growing impatience of those desiring to have a turn at power, socialist oriented demands for reform, and the new values and sources of wealth developed in modern universities.

Since the political socialization process is affected by the transitory phenomena of political and governmental activity, it is necessary to consider a chronology of political phases in Syria during and peripheral to the period under analysis. Roughly we can distinguish six such phases:

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[1]Sir Reader Bullard (ed.), The Middle East: a Political and Economic Survey, p.472.

[2]W. W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth, p.5.

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| 1920 - 1946 | The era -- encompassing the Mandatory period -- of French dominance of Syria by virtue of French military force; political activities have the common goal of Syrian independence. |
| 1943 - 1949 | The beginning of independence and governmental control by the conservative and reputable former leaders in the struggle for independence; partisan objectives begin to differentiate political parties. |
| 1948, May - 1949, March | The disaster of the Palestine War diminishes the repute of the civilian ruling elite, and catalyzes the political activity of vigorous, untried elements of Syrian society -- among them the military. |
| 1949, March - - 1954, February | The first era of army coup d'etats and direct or indirect control of the government from Husni az-Za'im through Adib Shishakli; characterized by precipitate plans for social reform, vacillation between Hashimite and anti-Hashimite alliances, popular criticism of the former landlord-industrialist oligarchy, and suppression of political activity. |
| 1954 - 1958 | Temporary re-establishment of the old power elite, growth of Communist influence, hardening of anti-Western feeling consequent to the 1956 Anglo-French attack on Egypt, and the ascendency of the Ba'th Party, leading to union with Egypt in February, 1958. |
| 1958 - 1961 | The union with Egypt, beginnings of social reforms, covert power struggles between elements of the old ruling elite, the relatively conservative counter-elite, and the supporters of the Union; culminating in the coup d'etat of September, 1961, which re-established military control of government and the separate Republic of Syria. |

The work, thought and bloodshed that gave reality to the years listed above was not shared equally by all Syrians. The classes manipulating these political events were economically and socially distant from the poorer masses. Participation was limited by the intellectual prerequisites of the work and a jealous husbanding of authority. Participation was shared with the masses on such occasions as Maysaloun and the Palestine War.

Those masses of the population which are employed in agriculture and survive periodically on only a subsistence level lie outside the short-run range of the modern economy of Syria, and are seldom affected by changes in the superstructure of her industry, commerce, or revenue from oil transit.[1] Their political interests are meager since their primary concern is provisioning their families with the essentials of life. When their basic needs have been satisfied, only then can they find the leisure and energy for active and intelligent participation in what political functions are open to them.[2] It is interesting to speculate on how this hardship environment can reinforce the power orientation of those reared in an authoritarian family: power in its economic form takes on an awesomeness by virtue of the poor man's dependence upon his landlord for sustenance. This awe of a power beyond his control can easily be translated into awe of the inexorable will of Allah or a fatalistic resignation to his condition in life. This, generally, is the attitude of the poorer Syrians to political machinations, but it is an attitude which is subject to manipulation by various partisans (e.g. political agitators, traditional opinion leaders) through a variety of means: school, radio, television, newspaper. The most profound modifications of political attitudes have been effected through education.

During the 1920 - 1946 era, the French enlarged the state school system in Syria, and presented a traditional French education to the upper Syrian classes. This system entailed twelve years of general education, a primary certificate examination, an examination for the brevet and examinations for

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[1]Berger, op. cit., p.331.

[2]Issawi, op. cit., p.39.

the Baccalaureat, all of which were prepared in France.[1] The liberal arts subjects of the French syllabus were slanted in their teaching with the aim of inculcating a love of France in the hearts of the students[2] rather than a love of the Syrian nationality. This syllabus was too classical to meet the needs of the Syrian economy: graduates were interested basically in becoming government officials, and failure to get a government job, no matter how lowly, meant that they usually preferred to be unemployed.[3] In the second era, 1943 - 1949, there was an acrimonious break with French educational supervisors and a boycotting of French schools -- understandably caused by the 1945 French bombardment of Damascus. The Government of Syria decreed that French language instruction was no longer required, Arabic was, and any schools desiring to operate in Syria, had to submit to control by the Syrian Department of Education.[4] The syllabus still included such studies as ethics, music and singing, logic and psychology,[5] but this was to be expected since the transition to utilitarian subjects such as public administration, business administration, farm management, etc. was dependent upon realization of the value and need for such instruction and then finding the persons qualified to teach them.

The French influence in Syrian education was important since it was mostly through this channel that the principles of the French Revolution, equality, fraternity, liberty and nationalism found their way into the

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[1]Roderic D. Matthews and Matta Akrawi, Education in Arab Countries of the Near East, p.325.

[2]Zeine N. Zeine, Arab Turkish Relations and the Emergence of Arab Nationalism, p.44.

[3]Faris, op. cit., p.172. [4]Matthews, op. cit., p.326.

[5]Syrian Ministry of Education, Education in Syria, p.2.

political vocabulary of the Syrians.[1]

Significant for the socialization process is the increased participation of Syrian women in education. For example, in 1931, there were 19,173 girls enrolled in public primary schools, but in 1954, the number had increased to 90,555.[2] The Syrian population in 1931 was approximately 2.11 million,[3] and had increased to 3.65 million in 1954.[4] In the primary environment, the effect of this education is to give Syrian girls a wider perspective and to create desires which traditional seclusion cannot satisfy. Many find upon graduation less freedom than they had been led to expect in family life, economic opportunities and social life.[5] This is not so true of the upper class girls as it is of the middle, since it is the latter who have made the greatest utilization of the public schools and universities, while the upper classes have either sheltered their daughters or -- more commonly -- Westernized them in schools abroad. The upper class girls who have been educated have customarily been able to lead lives more similar to the Western model than their poorer contemporaries. The total needs of the lower classes for education are far from being satisfied; it is the middle class by virtue of the numbers of girls it sends into the schools which has most felt the impact of education in changing the traditional family roles.[6]

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[1]Ziadeh, op. cit., p.38.

[2]Unesco, Compulsory Education in the Arab States, p.67.

[3]Computed on the basis of a 2% annual increase (IBRD, op. cit., p.4) over the 1929 figure of 2,035,338 listed in Robert H. Lyman (ed.), The World Almanac and Book of Facts for 1932, p.714.

[4]IBRD, op. cit., p.4. [5]Berger, op. cit., p.27. [6]Ibid., p.278.

Education

The fact of having or not having an education has palpable repercussions in the socialization process. Those with little or no education are usually the farmers who are also relatively impervious to changes in the industrial-commercial sector of the economy. This situation leads to political extremism in two ways: it usually takes hyperbole and repetition to arouse the masses from their apathy; and their lack of knowledge of the outside world makes them a gullible prey to propaganda and easily swayed to acts of anomic violence.[1] Lerner's survey in Syria revealed some interesting distinctions based on educational levels.

Lerner classified his respondents according to the type of problems which were most important to them. "Right" respondents were mainly concerned with national problems of the Syrian state as such. "Left" respondents gave priority to problems of social reform. Then each group was subdivided into three ranks of extremism and classified by the degree of violence they proposed for solving the problems they had named. For example, a leftist "reformer" would legislate an income tax on landlords, but a leftist "revolutionary" would have them hang. Those respondents who saw public problems only in a personal light were classed as "apoliticals".[2] Using this classification, the educational background of 250 Syrian respondents was:

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[1]Berger, The Arab World Today, p.332.

[2]Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society, p.288.

| | LEFT | | | APOLITICAL | RIGHT | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Revolutionary | Middle | Reform | | Conserv. | Middle | Nationalist |
| Illiterate | 0% | 31% | 13% | 58% | 9% | 16% | 39% |
| Elementary | 50 | 43 | 38 | 34 | 25 | 27 | 32 |
| Secondary | 17 | 8 | 27 | 5 | 41 | 25 | 16 |
| College | 33 | 18 | 22 | 3 | 25 | 32 | 13 * |

The two extremes, revolutionary left and nationalist right, are almost educational opposites. The extreme nationalists, perhaps representing the old landlord oligarchy which preceded the advent of general education in Syria, have the largest percentage of illiterates next to the apoliticals. In contrast, the extreme left is heavily committed to education, through which it undoubtedly recruits or nurtures those who are discontent with the status quo.

The largest percentage of illiterates, the apoliticals, are the rural poor and destitute.[2] The left reformists, weaker in education than the revolutionaries are probably not as moved by socialist or communist ideologies or even as aware of them as the revolutionaries; but may be more susceptible to Syrian rightest propaganda. And the conservative and middle right both reflect more exposure to education than the extremist right.

A concomitant to secular education -- if only on a semantic basis -- would seem to be secularization. As Western knowledge is taught, much of Western materialism is absorbed. An interesting event, which would almost

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*Taken from Lerner, op. cit., p.290. [2]Ibid.

seem to indicate that the longer the Arab is exposed to secular education, the greater is his deviation from the authority of Islam (certainly an acknowledged relationship between secular education and religion in the West), occured on 3 January 1956. Primary and secondary school pupils demonstrated at Homs against a book written by Hafez Jamali, a professor of sociology at The University of Syria, which the 'ulema of Damascus condemned as being harmful to Islam. At the university itself, however, 500 students signed a petition recommending the book and urging that it be used at the university.[1]

Education has also entered the socialization process at a more primary level, beneath the formulation of opinions on purely political questions. During the 1920 - 1946 period, education served to widen the distance between the worlds of the upper and lower classes. The lower classes were given greater reason to stand in awe of the rich who had gained the mysteries of reading, writing and thinking in a foreign tongue; while the rich found new reasons to disassociate themselves from the masses who had now become the "uneducated masses".

The elite became Western oriented, and having identified Westernization with progress, regarded the members of the lower classes who still represented a poor version of the traditional culture as backward and primitive. In the lower classes, there was a strong ambivalence: increased resentment of the display of anti-traditional Western traits, but also a frustrating attraction to the glitter of Western trappings.[2] Traditionally, luxuries and wealth

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[1]"Chronology," Middle Eastern Affairs, VII (1956), 87.

[2]Raphael Patai, "Dynamics of Westernization in the Middle East," The Middle East Journal, IX (1955), p.6.

were kept indoors behind simple drab walls; but the Western culture exposed before the poor, conveniences and luxuries which they had never seen before and which for them were unobtainable.[1]

The 1920 - 1946 era of French domination in Syria, did nothing to mitigate the ambivalence created by Western education and culture. Politically it only reinforced the situation by its contradictory policies. France introduced ideas of government through her educational system that she consistently refused to apply to her governing of Syria. Bent upon preserving order in Syria, the French turned to that class which likewise wanted most to preserve order -- the large landowners. The dilemma took form as ideas of economic and political changes were introduced from the West which tended to undermine the position of the very classes upon which the French depended for support. The French could neither deny the principles behind the proposed changes, nor support those groups that wanted political change, for the latter directly attacked the French position in Syria. The result was a French compromise by which parliamentary institutions would maintain internal stability and at the same time provide the means by which the Syrians could slowly move to self-government.[2] But in emphasizing these parliamentary institutions, France seems to have confused two issues: democracy and independence. The stand was taken that a country was not 'ready' for independence until it had democratic institutions; this, of course, put off independence indefinitely. "The Arabs, however, emphasized independence. To them, the main issue was self-government, after which Western conceptions

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[1]Carleton S. Coon, "The Impact of the West on Middle Eastern Social Institutions, " quoted by Patai, "Dynamics ....," op. cit., p.9.

[2]Berger, op. cit., p.318.

of political maturity could be adopted or rejected as Arab leaders saw fit."[1]

In the later periods, Westernization brought degrees of industrialization and consequent emphasis on urban centers. The rural worker migrated to the city in search of work, and in so doing severed most of his traditional family ties; divorcing himself from the emotional, esthetic and religious environment of his youth. With this movement to the cities, there has been an increasing secularization and de-emphasis, more through apathy than argument, of Islam as a way of life.[2]

Why has Westernization been accompanied by secularization in Syria? As we have seen, the concentration of Syrian wealth was typically in the hands of the few, with great poverty the lot of the many. The ideological rationalization for this was that the division of goods is willed by Allah, that the possession of wealth is not one of those important things for which man should strive, that there is virtue in poverty, and that it is the duty of the rich to give alms to the poor -- an ideology certainly not strange to the rest of the world. In this way extreme economic inequality was organically incorporated into the culture, not only being accepted realistically, but also supported ideologically.[3] Modernization on Western lines disturbed this old balance between reality and values. As the national per capita income began to increase and the state began to look at the laborer with an aim at some elementary social services, the worker began to see a consequent melioration of his hard life, and his faith and tradi-

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[1]Berger, op. cit., p.319. [2]Patai, "Dynamics ....," op. cit., p.14.

[3]Ibid., p.12.

tional beliefs are challenged by the doubt that perhaps it is not the will of Allah that he be poor and perhaps the will of Allah doesn't even enter the situation at all. In this way the reality ingredients of Western culture awaken whatever latent reliance on free will and the self there may be in the traditional Arab and give him a whole, new outlook on life -- not necessarily a happier one but surely one more in keeping with the value ingredients of Western culture.

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These are the broad, discernible factors at work in the political socialization process in Syria: authoritarianism where the traditional family still survives; a loyalty that is tribal-based within the traditional milieu; authoritarianism penetrating the secondary, governmental area; Islamic ambivalence toward power and authority; economic stifling of political activity for the masses of the poor; intrusion of foreign interests, creating through education, example, and industrialization ills for which they can not prescribe a proper cure; and the undermining of the spiritual basis of Arab society by these same Western influences.

## III. POLITICAL RECRUITMENT

Prior to the advent of military rule, the most powerful and coherent social group in Syria was formed by the large landowners.[1] From this group were recruited the traditional Arab nationalists: representatives of the old aristocratic families of the cities and the feudal and tribal chiefs of the countryside. As powerful industrial and commercial interests appeared on the scene, the landowners formed alliances with them.[2] A step below,[3] but supporting the landlord group stood the 'ulema, who traditionally performed a religious-legal administrative and judicial function. The position of these urban patricians, landowners and 'ulema, was so universally recognized that their support was invariably courted by successive foreign regimes and competing national factions.[4]

Below this upper class, are the higher civil servants and army officers, independent professionals, intellectuals, and most of the religious leaders. In Syria the influence of this and the lower middle classes is not in proportion to their size. The leaders who emerge from these groups are literate and articulate, and usually extremely capable in capitalizing on all opportunities that show promise of carrying them into the upper class.

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[1]Bullard, op. cit., p.472.

[2]W. Khalidi, "Political Trends in the Fertile Crescent," in W. Z. Laqueur, op. cit., p.121.

[3]See above, p.24, for a stratification of classes in Syria.

[4]Rustow, op. cit., p.438.

The military penetrated the political battlefront after the Palestine War in 1948. This was in part a response to the humiliations of that war, in part self-defense against the desperate accusations of the Quwatli-Mardem Bey government, and in part a response to the very real need to restore order in the country.[1]

The recruitment of the officer class deserves special mention since it seems probable that the future of most Arab countries will depend to a large extent on the political outlook of their officers, on the trend to which those officers give their support, and on the degree of co-operation between the officers of each of the various Arab countries.[2] During the mandatory period, a baccalaureate was the initial requirement for those wishing to become officers in the French-run Troupes du Levant, whence came such leaders as Husni Za'im. The French concentrated on recruiting sons of minority leaders, Kurds, Circassians, Armenians. Service under the French did not attract recruits from the bulk of the Muslim population until after independence. Then entrance requirements were lowered and a trend developed whereby many students who failed to win a baccalaureate in school were able to win a commission in the Syrian Army.[3] A typical picture of the class representation in the academy after the 1920 - 1946 era, is found in the cadet class of 1951, where the upper class comprised only about 35% of the cadets, and the middle and lower classes about 65%. The sons of the former ruling elites were not attracted to careers as officers primarily

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[1]George Lenczowski, The Middle East in World Affairs, p.293.

[2]Khalidi, op. cit., p.123.

[3]Personal communication from Dr. Yusif Ibish, professor of political science, American University of Beirut, former lieutenant in the Syrian Army, and the son of Husayn Ibish, a member of the large landowning class in Syria.

due to the low army wages.[1]

In the academy, the two year training period was devoted to military education with no manifest political indoctrination.[2] Great efforts had already been made by the French to divorce the Syrian officers from politics.[3] The importance of the army in politics was a fait accompli in 1949, but its utilization by a political party awaited the arrival of Akram Hourani on the scene. Thereafter the party in power carefully supervised the recruitment of army officers, attempting thereby to assure itself loyal support from the military.[4]

With the change to military rule in 1949, there was a change in emphasis from reliance on the traditional political leaders to utilization of men with technical training and accomplishments. The military turned for support to persons such as Husni Sawaf, a former professor of economics at the American University of Beirut; or Kahali, an accomplished engineer; Izzet Tarabalisi, a former governor of the Central Bank; Shafik Akhras, an economist, Awad Barakat, another economist; and Maj ed-Din Jabiri -- from a political family but himself an engineer.[5] Most of these relatively non-political personalities were in fact representatives of the upper and upper-middle classes who had sufficient wealth to enable their sons to acquire the technical education and knowledge which the military now sought. But

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[1]Communication from Dr. Ibish, cited above. Dr. Ibish was a member of the 1951 reserve officers' class in Syria.

[2]Ibid.

[3]Stephen H. Longrigg, Syria and Lebanon under French Mandate, p.138.

[4]Ibish; communication cited above.

[5]Based on a personal interview with Dr. Yusif A. Sayigh, professor of economics, The American University of Beirut.

other social groups were drawn further into political life with the advent of military rule -- the urban workers through state-controlled trade unions, the peasants through land reform and state-directed co-operatives, and an enlarged technical and administrative class of younger men and women who were needed in the increased activities of the government.[1]

This recruitment of new personnel met with a ready response from a large segment of the Syrian population. Through its educational system, France had produced in Syria a large number of young men who were ready to be recruited into active politics and governmental functions and who wanted to be so recruited. However, while the traditional ruling elite was supported by French power, it excluded from its ranks these new political aspirants; thereby engendering a counter-elite partly within its own class and largely from the class immediately below it.[2] These young men were able to challenge the old nationalists effectively in part because they occupied a strategic new political terrain between the apathetic masses and the traditional oligarchy: the terrain of public communication.[3] It is they who turned away from the old nationalists to the radical parties which made their appearance in the November 1949, elections -- the Ba'ath, the Muslim Socialist Front, etc., or who alternately became Communist supporters. It is this counter-elite which sought to penetrate the army officers' corps, and it is from this group that the army takes its most willing recruits.[4]

Although their commanding heights have been occupied by the military,

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[1]Berger, op. cit., p.286.

[2]See above, p.24.

[3]Lerner, op. cit., p.275.

[4]Ibid., p.276.

the original core of landowning nationalists has exhibited amazing homogeneity and longevity in its politica career. The same names continued to recur in Syrian parliamentary and cabinet roles: e.g., Khuri, Hakim, Mardam Bey, Jabri, Quwatli, Qudsi, 'Azm, Atassi. In the period from 1943 - 1949, there was relative continuity in the type of Syrian in the Chamber: landowners, lawyers, and old nationalist fighters predominate; even through 1958, their presence is obvious.[1] But the changes were also obvious. In the Syrian parliament of 1943, for example, 36% of its members were landlords and another 18% tribal leaders and notables. Ten years later, the legislature was already somewhat different: only 21% were landlords and only 10% were tribal leaders and notables. The 1953 legislature had a younger average age, higher education, and a smaller proportion of veteran parliamentarians.[2]

In the 1920 - 1946 period, the Mandatory introduced new techniques of administration in Syria, and created thereby new needs in the field of civil service. A formalized procedure, based on French methods, does exist for recruitment into the Syrian civil service, entailing basic qualifications: eighteen is the minimum age, specific educational degrees are required for particular classes of jobs, all applicants are required to take a written examination, etc.[3] But the absence of a civil service commission does not help in effecting a strict enforcement of the regulations. Once

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[1]Lerner, op. cit., p.273.

[2]Berger, op. cit., p.309, quoting an unpublished manuscript by Professor R. Bayly Winder, 1957, Princeton University.

[3]Wazarat al-Maliyat es-Suriyat, Qanun al-Muwathafeen al-Assasi, p.19.

in the civil service, it is not usual for these fonctionnaires to break out of the ranks and into ministerial status.[1] Even a survey of representatives as late as 1958, shows only two who were former fonctionnaires: Hassan Jebbara (who began public life as a fonctionnaire on the Baghdad railroad) and Mahmoud 'Azm, who also began public service as a fonctionnaire.[2] The more active of the educated young men are not attracted to this path to political office, and for those who would be satisfied with employment in government civil service, there are not sufficient positions open.

The civil service is afflicted by a paternalistic bent in governmental leadership combined with a tradition of using government for personal advantage. The spoils system, well-known to Americans, has affected the stability of jobs in the civil service of Syria. Civil servants become known by their political protectors; when significant changes were effected in elections, they were followed by significant changes in the non-elected civil service even down to very minor posts.[3]

In 1952 the civil service cadre consisted of a little over 15,000 most of whom received very low salaries. Due to the low salaries the government has had difficulty in attracting capable young people and in stimulating zeal among them. In recent years, however, it has recruited some promising young men, primarily by the device of paying for their study abroad in return for an undertaking to serve the government for a period

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[1]Personal communication from Dr. Bashir 'Aridi, professor of public administration, The American University of Beirut.

[2]Le Bureau des Documentations Syriennes et Arabes, Recueil des Archives Biographiques Permanentes du Monde Arabe, pp. 10 and 25 respectively.

[3]Berger, op. cit., p.314.

twice as long as the years of subsidized study. Very often, however, these people are waiting impatiently for the end of their government service in order to enter private employment. In many cases, too, they are not placed in positions for which their training has especially suited them.[1]

Recruitment problems reflect problems in social mobility, and in Syria the number of young, educated aspirants for social mobility is increasing at a much faster rate than the capacity of the Syrian political and governmental institutions to absorb them. From 1923 (the first year in which it issued diplomas) to 1950, there were 3,334 graduates of the Syrian University. The number of graduates in 1950 - 51 by itself was 553, or one-sixth the number of all previous graduates.[2] In 1955 - 56, the situation had not improved: the total number of graduates was 5,390. The largest part of the problem stems from the areas of concentration of these graduates. For example, the graduates of 1955 - 56 had mostly concentrated in law (2,199 of them) and the Arts (1,501). Only 100 had gone into engineering, and only 200 into teaching.[3] It is the type of opportunities that these young men desire that makes social mobility so immobile in Syria. The need for doctors, pharmacists, dentists is great in Syria, but these drew only 346, 86, and 88 respectively from the graduates of 1955- 56.[4] This stifling of social mobility whether caused by lack of foresight on the part of the individual or the under-developed nature of the economy in Syria,

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[1] IBRD, op. cit., pp.193-194.

[2] Syrian Ministry of National Economy, Statistical Abstract of Syria 1950, p.49.

[3] Syrian Ministry of National Economy, Statistical Abstract of Syria 1956, p.78. See also Appendix G for educational data.

[4] Ibid.

produced a large group of discontented, ambitious young men. It was such disaffected young men who provided the cadres of political extremism.[1]

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It would seem, then, that political recruitment has undergone an evolution which followed closely the shifting loci of political power in Syria. While the old nationalist fighters predominated, the criteria for recruitment were ascriptive; sons and nephews entered politics because their fathers and uncles before them had been politicians. When the locus of power was forcibly shifted out of civilian hands and into military, performance criteria definitely entered the recruitment process. That the ascriptive road into politics has never been completely blocked is seen by the continuity of members of the traditonal elite in the Chamber of Deputies, even through periods of ostensibly pragmatic and efficient military control.

## IV. POLITICAL COMMUNICATION

It is essential in characterizing a political system to analyze the performance of the communication function;[1] due to the fact that political communication is the crucial boundary-maintenance function keeping one function distinct from another.[2] Where there is an autonomous system of communication, the covert communications within the bureaucracy, the interest groups and political parties , may to some extent be regulated and controlled by publicity. In the same way, latent interests in the society may be made explicit through neutral media of communication. This autonomy in the media of communication makes possible a free flow of information from the society to the polity, and within the polity, from political structure to political structure. It also makes possible an open feedback from output functions to input again. An effective comparison can be made with the circulatory system of the human body. It is not the blood but the nutrients which it carries that sustain the body. The blood is the neutral medium carrying claims, protests, and demands through the veins to the heart. From the heart through the arteries flow back the outputs of rules, regulations and adjucations in response to the claims and demands.[3]

Autonomy of communications and a free flow of information should not

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[1] See above, p.17, for Almond's definition.

[2] Almond, op. cit., p.46

[3] Ibid., p.47.

be equated with democratic procedures and social justice. The difficulty in adhering to strict neutrality in communicating news is well illustrated by two cases in the United States. In one, a reputable scientist became subject to governmental suspicion of disloyalty. A survey of nine New York papers revealed a disturbingly wide variation in their supposed news (not in their editorial comment) treatment of the case even though all nine were reporting the same case with the same facts available for publication.[1] The second case involved "news" as reported by radio in a southern state. The supreme court of the state convicted three radio stations of contempt in obstructing the administration of justice by slanting news coverage of criminal charges against a Negro. It was held that the biased broadcasting must have prejudiced the minds of the jurors against the Negro.[2]

To what extent do the modern media of communication penetrate the traditional milieu in the Middle East? The writer was slightly amazed when spending a day in a Bedouin tent on the desert-steppe of Jordan, when our host unwrapped and proudly displayed a large, battery-operated radio by which he kept informed on events in the Arab world. Apparently this is not unusual. L. E. Sweet reporting on the Syrian village of Tell Toqaan relates that the villagers are well aware of their status as citizens of a national state; they are Syrians as well as fellahin, Arabs, and Muslims. They hear and listen regularly to news of national affairs on several radios

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[1]Joseph T. Klapper and Charles Y. Clock, "Trial by Newspaper," Scientific American CLXXX (1949), pp.16-21.

[2]Martin Millspaugh, "Trial by Mass Media?" Public Opinion Quarterly XIII (1949), pp.328-329.

in the village, although only rarely is a newspaper seen and read aloud to others. A flood in the Ghaab region which drove many people away from their villages, a trade agreement negotiated between Syria and America, the announcement that there were several American students living in Syrian villages, the fall of the Shishakli regime -- all were among the events heard by the villagers on the radio and discussed with Sweet. The effectiveness of radio in bridging distance and provincialism is indicated further by the fact that Tell Toqaan's nearest city is Aleppo, approximately fifty kilometers away, and that Tell Toqaan's population is only 326.[1]

The closer one is to the city in the Middle East, the greater is the exposure to the various media of modern communication. Lerner has formulated a relationship between urbanization and literacy:[2]

| No. of Countries | Literacy | Urbanization |
|---|---|---|
| 22 | Over 80 % | 28.0% |
| 4 | 61-80 | 29.2 |
| 12 | 41-60 | 25.0 |
| 13 | 21-40 | 17.0 |
| 22 | Under 20 | 7.4 |

Interpreting these data, Lerner concludes that only after a country reaches 10% of urbanization does its literacy rate begin to rise significantly. Thereafter urbanization and literacy increase together in a direct

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[1]Louise E. Sweet, Tell Toqaan: a Syrian Village, p.192

[2]Lerner, op. cit., p.59. Lerner's criterion for urbanization is cities with populations in excess of 50,000.

relationship until they reach 25%, which appears to be the optimum for urbanization. After this literacy continues to rise independently of the growth of cities.[1] In Syria the literacy rate is approximately 40%,[2] and urbanization is roughly 22%.[3]

The primitive social function of literacy is to reduce waste of human effort and train the skilled labor force of the cities.[4] Accordingly, increases in urbanization tend to multiply national increases in literacy and media participation. By taking people from their rural communities, cities create the demand for impersonal communication. By promoting literacy and media of communication, cities meet this demand. An interesting correlation for place of residence and media participation was established in Syria:[5]

| | LEFT | | | APOLITICALS | RIGHT | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Revolutionary | Middle | Reform | | Conservative | Middle | Nationalist |
| Place of Residence | | | | | | | |
| Urban | 50% | 67% | 42% | 38% | 55% | 50% | 35% |
| Rural | 50 | 33 | 58 | 62 | 45 | 50 | 65 |
| Media Participation | | | | | | | |
| Read newspapers: | 83 | 45 | 87 | 18 | 87 | 66 | 49 |
| See movies: | 83 | 47 | 73 | 48 | 72 | 68 | 58 |
| Hear radio: | 67 | 57 | 84 | 50 | 72 | 73 | 68 |

The newspapers which the Syrians do read are generally held in low esteem by their readers.[6] Here, too, the language problem often enters.

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[1] Lerner, op. cit., p.59. [2] IBRD, op. cit., p.23, 1955.

[3] Constucted from Rustow, op. cit., p.388 and Bullard, op. cit., p.452.

[4] Lerner, op. cit., p.61. [5] Ibid., p.290. [6] Ibid., p.269.

For example, one of Lerner's respondents, a high-school graduate and municipal clerk, said that he did not read Barq ash-Shamal, because he was not proficient enough in Arabic to enable him to understand it.[1] Lerner does not indicate how frequently this feeling of inadequacy in language was expressed in Syria, but his concluding generalization is that those with but a few years of elementary school cannot master enough of their language to understand newspapers.[2] However weak this generalization may be, the fact remains that the difference between colloquial Arabic and newspaper Arabic is usually greater than the difference between colloquial and written language in Western societies, and the extent of that difference in Syria further complicates the communication process for the masses of the Syrians.

No Syrian paper achieves national circulation, and the press run of the dailies ranges from 400 to 3,000 copies -- the latter being a maximum under normal conditions. Only in outstanding circumstances, a political crisis, for instance, do some papers sell as many as 6,000 copies in one day.[3] The 1953 press law required that the holders of publishing licenses must have been Syrian citizens for at least five years; that political dailies must appear six times a week in at least six pages; that 2,000 copies must be printed in Damascus and 1,500 in Aleppo; that papers must have three assistant editors and subscribe to at least two world news agencies.[4] In 1955,

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[1]Lerner, op. cit., p.269. [2]Ibid., p.270.

[3]Unesco, Reports on the Facilities of Mass Communication IV (1950), p.219.

[4]"Development of the Quarter," The Middle East Journal VIII (1954), 89.

there were twenty-nine papers published in Damascus, nine in Aleppo, and one or two in Homs and Suwayda.[1]

Almost all of the political parties and factions had one or more papers to serve their particular needs in political communication. The Sha'b had ash-Sha'b in Damascus, an-Nasir in Aleppo, and as-Suriyah al-Jadid in Homs. The Nationalists had al-Qabas in Damascus, and ash-Shabab in Aleppo. The newspaper of the Communist Party was called an-Nur. For the Ba'ath Party it was simply named al-Ba'ath. The P.P.S. sponsored al-Bina in Syria, and Saut Lubnan in Lebanon. The daily al-Rai al-'Aam represented the socialists; al-Barada was the paper of Shishakli's old Arab Liberation Movement. Al-Ayyam was considered to be independent.[2]

Political communication through these papers was overt and obvious. A few illustrations will demonstrate how particular interests were served:

The response to the 1954 agreement between Egypt and Britain regarding the Suez Canal was as follows:

al-Ayyam (independent) viewed the new agreement as an important landmark in the evolution of the Nile Valley, and hoped that the Suez settlement would be followed by settlements of all other pending problems in the Arab world.[3]

al-Ba'ath responded with the charge that the main purpose of the rulers in Egypt was to remain in power. Hence their efforts to make the people believe that their cause had triumphed even though it had not. al-Ba'ath warned the Arab people that the price of this conditional, obscure

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[1]Ziadeh, op. cit., p.253.

[2]The Arab World (periodical), passim.

[3]The Arab World, 30 July 1954, p.4.

evacuation could be entanglement of the Arabs in the ropes of imperialist treaties.[1]

an-Nasir (Sha'bist) called the treaty a bitter deception: the new treaty would tie up Egypt with the Western camp for at least seven years.[2]

On the occasion of the joint Syrian-Egyptian-Saudi Arabian declaration for an Arab Defense Organization, etc., in 1955, al-Bina (P. P. S.) attacked the declaration as being unrealistic because it bound only one part of Greater Syria and ignored Lebanon and Jordan. This, according to al-Bina, was the result of the traditional policy of the Arab League and in particular the policy of Egypt.[3]

al-Barada (Arab Liberation Movement) supported the declaration as a first step toward Arab unity.[4]

ash-Sha'b carried a long article by Atassi for the occasion. In it he attacked Egypt for being as much committed to the West as was Iraq. al-Barada responded the following day, accusing Atassi of collaboration during the French Mandate, and accusing Atassi and the Sha'b of pursuing a policy of union with Iraq.[5]

Later in March, 1955, the Syrian Foreign Minister Khalid 'Azm was preparing to leave for Baghdad for talks with the government of Iraq on the possibility of Iraq's joining a modified version of the Egyptian-sponsored Arab defense pact. The responses to this move were as follows:

From al-Rai al-'Aam (socialist) came the opinion that 'Azm's visit

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[1]The Arab World, 30 July 1954, p.4. [2]Ibid.

[3]The Arab World, 8 March 1955, p.4. [4]Ibid. [5]Ibid.

to Jordan which had been for the same purpose did no more than arouse feelings against Syria; the paper prognosticated that his visit to Baghdad would do the same.[1]

From al-Qabas (Nationalist): reference was made to the Baghdad Pact and Iraq's participation with Turkey; the conclusion being that there could be no friendship between Syria and those who had stolen her lands (meaning Alexandretta), or between Syria and those who had allied themselves with the enemies of Syria.[2]

ash-Sha'b merely put on the record the fact that there was evidently a rift in the Cabinet between those who supported 'Azm and those who didn't.[3]

an-Nasir (Sha'bist) paid tribute to the patriotism of the Government of Iraq, and professed every confidence that 'Azm's mission would succeed.[4]

al-Ayyam (independent) thought the whole thing was a good move, but did not expect that 'Azm would be completely successful.[5]

Certainly a variety of opinions are put before the reading, Syrian public; usually, however, the average Syrian does not read more than one daily paper, and that is usually the paper of the party or faction with which he is in sympathy. In many of these papers, editorial opinion and and satirical cartoons make up for a lack of solid news.[6] Longrigg describes the Syrian press as ephemeral, irresponsible; crying out for full liberty, but habitually abusing it themselves.[7] This is not entirely willful mali-

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[1] The Arab World, 15 March 1955, p.4. [2] Ibid. [3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid. [5] Ibid. [6] Rustow, op. cit., p.443.

[7] Longrigg, op. cit., p.360.

ciousness on the part of the Syrian press: the marginal economics of journalism make most of the poorer papers vulnerable to pressure from advertisers and gratefully receptive to publicity handouts from foreign embassies.[1] Fiercely competitive for the small reading public, Syrian papers cannot depend on circulation income alone, and must resort to party funds and gifts or blackmail.[2] This situation is not peculiar to Syria, but that does not change the fact that the press of Syria presents a far from neutral medium for political communication.

Syria has nearly two million villagers spread over 5,500 compact villages.[3] These people rarely see a newspaper, and even when they do, the majority of them are not able to read it. Political communications reach this segment of the population mostly through the radio. From 1946 a state broadcasting system has been broadcasting in Syria.[4] In 1956, the Syrian Broadcasting System was transmitting twenty-two hours a day, with special programs for women, farmers and the military. The System has had two transmittor stations since 1955,[5] but daytime reception was good only within a radius of thirty to fifty kilometers from Damascus and Aleppo.[6] As a result, for many Syrians the B.B.C. was closer than the Syrian Broadcasting System -- certainly changing the direction of political content as well as wave reception.

A further limitation comes from the low _per capita_ income in Syria. In 1949, when the average _per capita_ income was about $100, a radio cost an average of $135. About 50,000 sets were in use in 1949, which came to

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[1]Rustow, _op. cit._, p.443. [2]Lerner, _op. cit._, p.280.

[3]IBRD, _op. cit._, p.292. [4]Longrigg, _op. cit._, p.360.

[5]U.N., _Statistical Yearbook 1958_, p.576. [6]Lerner, _op. cit._, p.268.

about one for every sixty inhabitants.[1] As of January 1954, there were 149,600 receiver sets or about four for every one hundred persons in Syria.[2] This limitation is partially offset by community listening facilities -- in coffee houses, loudspeakers on the main streets, etc., andthe traditional opinion leaders.

The opinion leader, liason-man between the traditional and the modern, was thought to be an extinct species in Western political systems, but studies in America have uncovered a face-to-face communication and interest articulation system below the mass media of communication -- a particularistic, diffuse, and ascriptive system very much like that described in studies of the political systems of primitive societies. The typical opinion leader was found to be a trusted individual whose function is to bring the group into touch with events in the political world through whatever media are appropriate.[3]

Communications in Syria, although modernizing, can still be classed as traditional.[4] This predisposes the people to remain within the familiar channels of local leadership and to feel alien toward the national center.[5] Here it is that the opinion leader functions, listening to the radio and

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[1]Lerner, op. cit., p.268.

[2]"Facts and Figures," Middle Eastern Affairs, VII (1956)252. In the same year: Kuwait had 9/100; Lebanon 6/100; Turkey 4/100; Jordan 1/100.

[3]Almond, op. cit., pp.20-21, discussing the findings in The People's Choice, by Paul F. Lazarsfeld, et al.

[4]Lerner, op. cit., p.264.

[5]Ibid., p.270.

interpreting the news for his group, reading -- when he is able -- the newspaper, sifting and coloring the news to his own understanding and bias. In some villages in Syria, the role of the opinion leader is even more formalized. This occurs when the village is provided with an 'uda[1] (room) or sometimes a whole building which has eating, sleeping and entertainment facilities; and at which the men of the village are always welcome. All year, free coffee and tobacco are provided here for the village males, and as a result it becomes a social center -- usually the only social center in the village. The proprietor of the 'uda may have one of the few radios in the village and is well informed on current events. More important, the proprietor has the "right" contacts with persons in the government, specifically with the particular deputy in the Chamber who sponsors the 'uda, pays wages to the proprietor and provides the coffee and tobacco. If someone needs a special favor requiring an output from the government, the proprietor of the 'uda knows whom to contact. If a villager is in trouble with the police, anything that can be done to help him is done through the offices of the same proprietor. Over a four year period (the normal interval between popular elections), most of the villagers are indebted to the proprietor in some way, so that when election day draws near the proprietor can effectively deliver the vote of his village by threatening to cut off

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[1]Ralph Crow, "A Study of the Political Forces in Syria Based on a Survey of the 1954 Election," (unpublished manuscript, May, 1955), p. 19.
This study was directed by Professor Crow while he was attached to the Political Studies Department of The American University of Beirut, in 1954. The information was collected by twenty-four native Syrian investigators working in their home governorates immediately prior to the elections of 1954, and then was collated and interpreted by Professor Crow. No similar field study of this aspect of the Syrian political system is currently available.

recalcitrant voters from his useful political contacts, denying them access to the facilities of the 'uda, or simply by calling on the social pressure of public opinion in the village. The position of this opinion leader is a highly respected one and a highly effective means of assuring a deputy's position in parliament.[1]

There are other persons in the rural environment who act as opinion leaders: the village school teacher (if there is one), the occasional government inspector, the gendarme making his monthly rounds, and any eminent visitors passing through the village; and even though largely transitory, they serve to increase the amount of communication transmitted through this ascriptive channel.

The modern world in Syria confronts the Syrians with a very potent channel of communications: the movies. A young Syrian bureaucrat described the impact of the movies on his life: "when we see the lives of the people in the West, and then compare it with our own lives, we find that we still have a long way to go before attaining their levels. The movies are . . . like a teacher to us, who tells us what to do and what not".[2]

The movies teach new desires and new satisfactions, depicting situations in which the "good things" of life are taken for granted. They present roles in which these richer lives are lived, and provide clues as to how these roles can be enacted by others.[3] But cinema capacity in Syria is limited. Damascus and Aleppo account for about half of all the cinemas and two-thirds of the entire seating capacity. Movie attendance

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[1]Crow, op. cit., p.19. [2]Lerner, op. cit., p.400. [3]Ibid.

averages about once per year per capita, but this only reflects the relatively small degree of urbanization in Syria. About eighty per cent. of all feature films are imported from Western countries (with sixty per cent. from the United States). Syria does have a movie studio, but even with the help of Lebanese capital, only produced one full-length film and a few documentaries as of 1950. Writing in 1951, Lerner found no facilities for subtitling in Arabic or for dubbing the sound track. This had to be done in the country of origin or in Cairo where there were dubbing facilities. Foreign films, therefore, had to be read to be intelligible (which limits their attractiveness to those who are literate) or the Syrian had to adjust his ear to the Egyptian colloquial dubbing.[1]

UNESCO has ventured into the uncertain realm of making world-wide generalizations, and presented -- after a three-year survey -- what it believes are the basic, minimum means of being informed. For every one hundred inhabitants in any country, there should be ten copies of a daily newspaper, five radio receivers, and two cinema seats.[2] Using these criteria, the population of Syria probably comes within UNESCO's seventy per cent. of the world's population which UNESCO considers to lack adequate information media; this during the period we are analyzing in Syria.

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[1] Lerner, op. cit., p.269.

[2] "UNESCO Calls for Expansion of Broadcasting Services," Beirut, 9 April 1962, p.5.

The combined effect of having a limited audience for political communication by virtue of the low literacy rate, limited radio and cinema facilities, and government control of all media, is to detach the mass of the population from interest in political activities. This sustaining condition of apathy is broken, of course, by the dramatic communications which accompany extraordinary events -- as, for example, on 24 February 1954, when a "Free Syrian Radio" announced from Aleppo, that the country had risen in arms against Shishakli and called on him to resign immediately.[1]

For those whose livelihood is political activities, the restricted communications with the masses and the controllable press offer a great freedom of action which would be denied them under the scrutiny of an autonomous communications system. But when motivated by the desire to mobolize the will of the masses, the need for face to face communication due to that same lack in the media proves to be a great physical handicap.

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[1] "Developments of the Quarter," The Middle East Journal VIII (1954), 202.

## V. INTEREST ARTICULATION

Interest articulation[1] varies in extent and nature according to the character of the political regime. During dictatorships, the repressive power of government and the opportunism of political participants keep articulation within well-regulated channels. In competitive political situations, a far wider range of articulation prevails and the process of competition generally leads to a further widening.[2] It must be remembered that there are important local variations within the country itself. The resident of Damascus is exposed to, and himself likely to form, more political views than his small-town cousin in Abu Kamal -- who in turn is an expert articulator when compared with the villager of Tell Toqaan. These sharp differences in levels of articulation tend to make any true representation of interests difficult even in otherwise competitive political situations.[3] The level of articulation also varies markedly over periods of time. Generally articulation may be intermittent and sporadic, but during times of election, riot or revolution it may reach a high pitch of intensity almost overnight.[4] The range of articulation is also determined by a variety of factors. At various times, the government has

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[1] See above, p. 13, for Almond's definition.

[2] Rustow, op. cit., p. 429. [3] Ibid. [4] Ibid.

enacted numerous legal restrictions on association and expression and hence limited the physical possibility of articulation.

In addition, the traditional culture gap between the urban elite and the peasant mass prevents any continuous articulation of the interests of a vast majority of the population.[1] This situation is reinforced by Islam: the absence of a clergy as understood in the West and the nature of the religion itself, make the performance and living of the religion more an individual action than a group one -- at least when compared with the highly socialized churches of the West. There is no mediator standing between the individual Muslim and his God; the channel of communication is direct. The concept of representative government was a foreign import primarily from French regimes and was alien to the principle of equality which lies at the center of the Muslim's concept of the leader as the first among equals.[2] Arab fokelore is replete with tales of direct communications between the caliph and his subjects, further indicating that the Syrian is not inclined by his traditions to seek secondary channels for the articulation of his interests.

Articulation is further limited by the state of communications in Syria. The Western radio with its iconoclast commentators, the Western press with its syndicated columnists and letters to the editor are mirrored in the

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[1] Rustow, op. cit., p. 431. [2] Berger, op. cit., p. 51.

Middle East but not matched as a source of interest articulation. The interests which are communicated most commonly approach the boundaries of the political system by word of mouth.

What are the articulation needs in Syria? Who are the people trying to penetrate the government structure with their particular claims and demands? On the basis of articulation needs in Syria, there are approximately three large groupings: the rich, the minorities, the poor.

We have seen[1] that the highest economic class in Syria is comprised of the large landowners, bankers, industrialists, the highest government and military leaders. The needs of these people are not great -- materially, spiritually or from the standpoint of articulation. Obviously this is true only so long as the environment is favorable to their economic growth or at least does not threaten their position. When such threats do occur -- either through governmental action, disturbances from the lower classes, or extra-national dangers in the form of damaging trade competion, wars, etc. -- this class has a definite need for articulation. As long as the position of this elite section is firm, they have no need to change the status quo, and the input and output functions which are in their power to alter or let pass are viewed in that light: their effect upon the status quo.

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[1] See page 24, above.

Economically close enough to the upper class to also be wary of change, are the higher civil servants, independent professionals and some of the religious leaders. Here sympathies begin to be divided. The upper portion of this class, reasonably content with their lot, align their interest with those of the rich. The lower sections, close enough to wealth to be tantalized but distant enough to be discontent with what they have, align themselves with the interests of the classes below them and work for social reforms that are not so radical as to destroy the advances they already have but which are broad enough to give them a little more of that which they see above them.

Also in the middle ground between rich and poor, are the minorities in Syria,[1] some numbered among the rich and others persecuted and poor. The former are usually found among the Christian minorities in Syria; the largest group being the Greek Orthodox.[2] Their interests are close to those of the Arab majority, and reflect the desire evidenced by the wealthy Muslims for maintenance of the status quo.

Another religious minority is the Alawis, a heretical Islamic sect, occupying the Latakia mountains along the Mediterranean. Being a heretical group, they feel persecuted

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[1]Information on Syrian minorities has been based on A.H. Hourani, Minorities in the Arab World, passim; Bullard, op. cit., pp. 453-454; and Longrigg, op. cit., pp. 6-14.

[2]See Appendix C for a listing of ethnic and religious groups in Syria.

and estranged from Syrians as a whole, and their interests show a desire to align themselves with whichever group offers the greatest amount of security.

The Druze, another heretical sect of Islam, occupy the Jebel Druze from which they have been able to defy various central governments in Syria for some time. Their interests are devoted to maintaining as much local sovereignty as possible vis-a-vis the central government.[1]

Strongly provincial like the Druze, are the Kurds in north-east Syria. Although mostly of Sunni Muslim faith, they are indo-European racially and thus feel set apart from the Arab population. They have fostered their own language and strong feelings of Kurdish nationalism.

The Armenians too have their own language, are Christians and largely centered in Aleppo. They are internally divided between choices of returning to Soviet Armenia, seeking autonomy within Syria, or giving complete allegiance to the Syrian nation.

Originally from the Caucus region, the Circassians are concentrated in two groups: one in south-west Hauran and the other on the northern Turkish border. They have been only superficially Islamized, and retain strong feelings of ethnic unity.

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[1] Of all the minority groups in Syria, the Druze have been the best organized for partisan warfare and have taken a leading part in the violence that has been a part of Syria's history; notably the 1925-26 revolt against French mandatory power in Syria.

Differing from these ethnic and religious minorities, are the Syrian Bedouins -- for whom the adjective Syrian is a misnomer. The Bedouins constitute a social minority, with a way of life so different from the rural and urban Syrians that they are in effect separted from the rest of the nation. They avoid as much interference from the central government as is possible, and given their nomadic mode of life, are quite successful in maintaining their tribal autonomy.

Below this fluctuating middle area, are the poor -- the city laborers and the farming peasants. By far the largest section of the population, its needs too are the greatest -- materially, spiritually and from the standpoint of articulation. Unable to help themselves due to their economic suppression, they must rely on the government for their needs. In contrast, the wealthy industrialist faced by conditions which make his life uncomfortable, can buy his "social reforms" or can leave Syria, possessing enough capital reserve to make his prospects in another country at least hopeful. The peasant, lacking the mobility attached to cash surpluses, does not have this option. He must stay where he is, and depend on nature to bring him sufficient rain for his crops, his religion to meliorate and rationalize the hardships of his life, and the altruism or opportunism of political leaders to improve his lot.

These articulation needs are diffuse and widely divergent from one another. There is practically no overlapping of interest which would permit compromises between particularistic

desires and claims. This furcated pattern of needs produces a requirement for similarly diverse channels of articulation.

What are the channels of interest articulation in Syria?

For the rich landowners there are only non-associational interest groupings that are informal and intermittent.[1] For example, on 8 August 1951, the landowners from the Aleppo area met under the chairmanship of Raf'at Ghuri, acting chairman of the Agricultural Chamber, to oppose the bill then in the parliament which would reduce the land holdings of these landlords to a few hundred acres.[2]

In contrast to the informal organization of the large landowners, stands the tightly knit Khumasiya, the United Commercial-Industrial Corporation of Syria. This industrial giant, the largest group in Syria, was master-minded by Bedr ed-Din Di'ab toward the end of World War II. The five largest industrial concerns in Syria (those of Haj Yaseen Di'ab and Sons, Di'ab Brothers, Rabbat and Dasougi, 'Adel Khuja, and Anwar Kutub and Brothers), pooled their resources in 1949, and began concerted efforts to increase the rate of industrialization in Syria. In time, the Khumasiya became the

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[1] See above, p. 13, for Almond's definitions and examples of these structures.

[2] "Developments of the Quarter," The Middle East Journal V (1951), 495.

industrial showcase of Syria, a point of national pride.[1] It gained a direct relationship with the government in this respect, but even more pertinently, members of the Khumasiya's board of directors also held posts in the Syrian Cabinets.[2] Badr ed-Din Di'ab's position as chairman of the Syrian Chamber of Industry and 'Adel Khuja's chairmanship of the Chamber of Commerce provided immediate channels of interest articulation for the Khumasiya. In addition to these means, Ma'mun Kuzbari, sometime-prime minister and speaker for the Chamber, is the son-in-law of 'Adel Khuja and chief attorney for the corporation. From 1949 to 1958, the Khumasiya played a major role in shaping the economic policy of the Syrian government. Governmental outputs reflected this close liason between the Khumasiya and its proponents in the Chamber. In 1950, for example, the Government of Syria granted loans through the National Bank equivalent to LS twenty million for textile mills, a sugar refinery, a building materials plant and a glass factory[3]-- areas of Khumasiya investment.

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[1]Information on the Khumasiya is based on personal interviews with persons intimately connected with the owning families and who have requested anonymity due to the present political conditions in Syria.

[2]See Appendix E for a survey of Syrian Cabinet membership.

[3]"Developments of the Quarter, "The Middle East Journal, VI (1952), 442.

These covert channels of articulation are open to and utilized by the other members of the upper class, the large landowners, etc.[1] But a characteristic trait of the Syrian political system is that these channels are largely denied to the lower classes. This is accomplished by controlling the mechanics of voting in popular elections.

The largest portion of the Syrian population is rural and farming. This group comes under the economic control of the large landowners, and any electoral contest that took place was usually between different factions of these notables. In order to control the balloting, a landlord will pack the polling places with his followers. Access to the polling places is obtained by virtue of having to enter to vote, by being an official tabulator of the ballots, or by being a candidate. To become a candidate, all that is necessary is the meeting of some elementary criteria (age, citizenship, etc.) and the submission of an application. No popular support is necessary since there are no primary elections. As a result, many of the candidates are, in fact, followers of the strong candidate, who have entered the race just to be eligible to be inside the polling place. Once inside, there are a variety of ways in which these "candidates" can control the voting: assisting the illiterate peasants in marking their ballots,

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[1] Cf. "Political Recruitment," p. 51, above.

threats of violence, outright disruption of the voting procedure by fights, or the purchase of the peasant's vote.[1]

Buying votes in Syria is officially illegal, but is considered to be an honorable procedure among the masses. After deciding for whom he will vote, the head of a family turns over the identity cards of his family (those who are eligible to vote) to a representative of the candidate. These are returned by the representative of the candidate outside the voting booth on the election day with the proper ballot and the agreed amount inside the identity card. The voter steps into the booth and deposits the ballot which has been provided for him.[2]

The fact that these channels of interest articulation are not open to the peasant is demonstrated, first of all, by the control of the voting exercised by the upper class candidates, and secondly by the lack of popular appeal which often characterizes the candidates. This apparent paradox: being elected by plurality of the voters, but not really representing their interest, reflects again the dominant economic control exercised by these landowners. It is the name of the candidate which is important and not the issues for which he stand. This is nicely illustrated by the case of the Hakim family.

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[1] Crow, op. cit., p.12.

[2] Crow, op. cit., p.19.

In the Qada of Idlib, the Hakim family has been traditionally one of the leading elements in the community. They are one of the largest landowners in the Qada and one of the largest families. In the 1949 elections, the Nationalist Party decided to boycott the entire proceedings. The head of the Hakim family had been a Nationalist all his life and had been a Nationalist deputy in the three previous parliaments. Adhering to his party's position, he was unable to run in the 1949 elections; but his brother stood for election with the opposition party, the Sha'b, and did so with the full backing of the head of the family. The brother was elected. The 1949 parliament was shortly overthrown by another coup, and new elections came up. All of the established political parties refused to participate. But the son of the brother -- a young man who sincerely supported the new dictator as a sign of new life in the country -- became a candidate in the dictator's newly formed party. Although the parties to which the family had previously belonged were all in opposition to the elections, the family let it be known that they were behind the nephew and since it was inevitable that someone be elected, it might as well be a Hakim. The nephew was elected. With the overthrow of Shishakli in 1954, the old head of the family returned representing the Nationalist Party. In the new elections of 1954, he was defeated: the first time in twenty years that the Hakim family

was not represented in the parliament.[1] It is impossible to say precisely why he failed. A significant development in the 1954 elections was the requirement that voters be provided with an enclosed booth in which to vote; envelopes of uniform size in which they placed their ballots, were then sealed by them and deposited in the ballot box.

For the minority groups the channel of articulation is specified by law. For example, since World War I, one-quarter of the population in Aleppo has been Armenian. As a result five of the fourteen Aleppo seats in the 1954 were allotted to Christians. The problem of articulation for the minorities is one of size. The immense preponderance of the Sunni Muslim population makes it essential for the minorities to ally themselves with the larger groups in order to give their interest any hope of being articulated effectively. By themselves they cannot command sufficient influence to enable them to be concerting or annoying.[2]

The mass of the poor fall into two groups: a small, organized force of industrial workers and the vast body of unorganized farmers.

Trade unions in Syria serve as a limited channel of articulation for the upper portion of the working masses.

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[1] Crow, op. cit., pp.12-14.

[2] Ziadeh, op. cit., p. 284.

As it is known today, unionism in Syria has developed only since World War II. Legal recognition was granted on 11 June 1946, and immediately thereafter a number of trade unions registered with the government. By 1957, there were 281 registered trade unions in Syria.[1]

In spite of governmental sanction, the labor movement in Syria has not developed into a powerful source of articulation. The primary reason for this is that much of the labor force still remains unorganized. Aside from the vast numbers of farmers who are not organized, much of the non-agricultural force of 130,000 remains unorganized. Furthermore, the statistics on the labor movement make it deceptively strong: a number of the registered unions are completely inactive, and the average union is small, averaging only 129 members in 1956.[2] In articulation, strength of numbers gives strength to demands and claims.

Notwithstanding these limitations, the labor movement has made itself known in Syria. Its most active period was from March, 1954, through February, 1955:

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[1]See Appendix F for the number of Syrian trade unions by year and membership.

[2]Willard A. Beling, Pan-Arabism and Labor, p.39.

28 March 1954: workers from the Damascus electricity company struck for higher wages and shorter hours.[1]

14 April 1954: workers from nineteen textile factories in Aleppo struck for higher wages and better working conditions.[2]

30 June 1954: the textile workers in Damascus struck for higher wages.[3]

In response to this, owners of several textile factories in Damascus, threatened to close their factories and turn over the premises to the government; some even threatened to move their factories out of the country;[4] this on 11 July 1954.

Unintimidated, the textile workers demonstrated in the streets of Damascus and before the government buildings on 12 July 1954.[5]

18 July 1954: after further demonstrations from the workers, a special meeting of the Cabinet was called. The output decision was that the government would take over the factories unless the owners accepted recommendations of a special mediation committee.[6]

On the 20th of July 1954, the Chamber approved an amendment to the Labor Code, giving the government the right to decide the legality of a labor strike. If the strike was declared legal,

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[1] "Developments of the Quarter," The Middle East Journal VIII (1954), 335.

[2] Ibid., p.89. [3] Ibid., pp.457-458. [4] Ibid., p.458

[5] Ibid. [6] Ibid.

the government had the authority to pay salaries to the workers (at the owner's expense) if the owners refused to open their factories for normal operations. As a result of this, a number of employers put in claims with the Supreme Court against the government in connection with the new amendment to the Labor Code.[1]

20 October 1954: 2,000 textile workers in Aleppo struck alledging that their employers were not abiding by labor contracts.[2]

6 February 1955: laborers demonstrated in Aleppo against decree No. 243 written during the Shishakli regime, which prevented members of labor syndicates from belonging to any political party or organization. Seven days later on the 13th, the Chamber abolished decree No. 243.[3]

Despite this rather impressive articulation, the labor movement in 1958, was still in a precarious position vis-a-vis management. Labor dared not run the risk of displeasing management to any serious degree due to the abundant supply of unskilled

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[1] "Developments of the Quarter," The Middle East Journal VIII (1954), 458.

[2] "Developments of the Quarter," The Middle East Journal IX (1955), 65.

[3] "Developments of the Quarter," The Middle East Journal X (1956), 192.

and semi-skilled labor which could be readily drawn upon if labor organizations became too demanding.[1] Again it must be pointed out that management if not identified with, was certainly closely allied with government by virtue of the entrenched position of the upper class in the Chamber. Thus labor was constricted in its articulation function from two sides: the abundance of labor supply and the partial identification of management with government.

Still the articulation potential of these trade unions is great. The new discipline of industrial labor and the impact of city life are unsettling experiences for the worker who comes from a rural traditional environment. These are experiences which the unions can meliorate in addition to negotiating wages and hours with management.[2] To a large extent this has been accomplished in Syria. A significant proportion of the trade unions had mutual funds, derived in part from the normal subscriptions of members and partly from government subsidies. These were used for grants to members for medical expenses, hospitalization, extension of the legal periods of sick pay, grants to aged workers, unemployment and the like.[3] "Of all Arab labor unions, only the Syrian has

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[1]Yusif A. Sayigh, "Management-Labour Relations in Selected Arab Countries," International Labor Review LXXVII (1958), 525.

[2]Berger, op. cit., p. 104.

[3]IBRD, op. cit., p. 375.

shown itself aware of the problems of the peasantry. Subhi al-Khatib, president of the Federation and the Damascus Textile Workers, and some of the other leaders have shown interest in working with peasant groups ...."[1] In September 1954, the Syrian General Trade Unions Federation had drawn up plans for the formation of a Workers' and Peasants' Party.[2] This type of effort will help labor to build up a broad, popular base, giving in turn greater weight to the increased number of interests it will articulate.

Perhaps realizing the potential of the labor movement as a force for the economic development of the country, or perhaps fearing the turbulent social unrest labor is capable of arousing, the Syrian government has not allowed the labor movement to fight its own fight. This has been manifested as an attitude of paternalism from government and a large amount of direct control. As a result labor is in an awkward position: on the one hand it cannot object too strongly to its status without running the risk of being accused of ingratitude and of being subjected to greater controls; on the other, it cannot accept the paternalism completely without reservation because by so doing it slows down the pace of maturity within the labor

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[1]Thomas B. Stauffer, "Labor Unions in the Arab States," The Middle East Journal VI (1952), 85.

[2]"Developments of the Quarter," The Middle East Journal VIII (1954), 89.

movement, the growth in numbers and techniques of bargaining essential to effective articulation of the interests of Syrian workers.[1]

For the bulk of the poor in Syria, there have been two main attempts at channeling and articulating their interests. One has come from the Communist party, which through its propaganda in Syria, as elsewhere in the Middle East, has been converting the peasants from a state of passive misery to one of alert and active misery.[2] The other has made the larger penetration into the sympathies of the peasants: the efforts of Akram Hourani and his Socialist Party. The party demonstrated a highly effective use of propaganda in the region of Hama, Hourani's home town, and rapidly won a growing number of followers. This activity was intensified when the Socialists merged with the Renaissance Party and became the Ba'ath-Socialists.

Hourani tried to awaken the docile peasants by a show of force in the areas where power and control of the peasants traditionally was in the hands of the large landowners. This often entailed physical violence, as in the clash between the Ba'ath and representatives of the landlords near al-Ma'rrah, 6 March 1955, when thirty people were injured;[3] or the riots at

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[1]Sayigh, "Management ....," op. cit., p. 531.

[2]Dorsey, op. cit., p. 76.

[3]"Developments of the Quarter," The Middle East Journal IX (1955), 320.

Hama, on 24 May 1956, when one Ba'athist was killed and forty-one others injured.[1] But this demonstration of physical power and willingness to fight for the rights of the peasants did succeed in rallying a portion of them behind Hourani's party.

It should be pointed out here that electioneering in Syria is quite different from the relatively peaceful debating and orating common to America. It is not unusual for violence to take the place of debate in Syria. For example, in 1947, the elections in Jebel Druze were postponed indefinitely due to political tensions: members of the Sha'b had attacked members of the Atrash Party.[2] In July 1951, members of the P.P.S. rioted at Tratus, fighting against the Communists and members of the Sha'b.[3] In the Nabak area of Syria, ten persons were injured in an armed clash between supporters of opposing candidates, on 28 September 1954.[4] This is not unusual for Syria, and it has the understandable effect of keeping the more timid among the electorate away from the polls.

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[1] "Developments of the Quarter," The Middle East Journal X (1956), 296.

[2] "Developments of the Quarter," The Middle East Journal II (1948), 74.

[3] "Developments of the Quarter," The Middle East Journal V (1951), 495.

[4] "Developments of the Quarter," The Middle East Journal VIII (1954), 89.

Hourani's party had other difficulties to face in attempting to articulate the interests of the peasants. Aside from competition and outright violence from the traditional parties, Hourani faced religious opposition. On 8 July 1954, for example, when the Ba'ath opened a party office in Aleppo, religious leaders from that city demonstrated against the Ba'ath, accusing it of being against religion.[1] On the 13th of July 1954, the 'ulama of Damascus, issued a proclamation supporting the stand of the Aleppo religious leaders against the Ba'ath.[2] Thus the Ba'ath had to fight not only the traditional attitude of peasant obedience to his landlord, but also his very strong allegiance to his faith. A glance at the election results[3] will show that it was not an easy contest. The Ba'ath was never able to achieve a working majority in the parliament.

For the bulk of the masses who were afraid to commit themselves to Hourani's ideologies or skeptical of the party machinery -- how, if at all, were their interests articulated? There was, as we have seen,[4] the 'uda, whose proprietor has a channel of communication with the deputy who sponsors the room. This cannot be ignored as an obvious response on the part of the traditional politician to the needs of his constituents.

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[1] Ibid., p. 457.

[2] Ibid., p. 458

[3] See Appendix D.

[4] See p. 64, above.

His maintenance of this channel of communication, though certainly an indirect and devious one, reflects his desire to at least keep informed on the political climate of his region. There are, however, no statistics which would indicate the prevelance of this phenomena.

For those without access to an 'uda, the anthropological study of the Syrian village of Tell Toqaan, population 326, is probably the best example of how interests are articulated.[1]

Tell Toqaan represents a rather typical Syrian village. Most of the cultivated lands of Tell Toqaan are held and controlled by four men of the landlord class. Three of these are city men, and one is the tribal sheik of Tell Toqaan. The urban landlords live in Aleppo and visit the village only occasionally.[2] Urban or large town origin was attributed to only six of the fifty-five families in Tell Toqaan. The remaining forty-nine families are rural in origin. Over sixty-two per cent of the families and over fifty-seven per cent of the total population belong to tribal Arab category by patrilineal descent. In the small, non-Arab ethnic group are two Kurdish families.[3]

Both state and tribal law function in Tell Toqaan. When a case of theft, injury or murder involves one non-tribal and

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[1] Louise E. Sweet, Tell Toqaan: a Syrian Village, (1960).

[2] Ibid., p. 59.

[3] Ibid., p. 27.

one tribal person, a choice can be made whether to settle the matter in the state court or by tribal custom. Matters which were said to be still referred to and decided by tribal law are murder, property disputes, adultery and elopement. The murder must be between members of different tribes in order to qualify for tribal law; this was preferred to state law, because a convicted murderer is hanged by the state but only fined by the tribe. Thus certain interests can be articulated and satisfied within the tribal complex without ever having recourse to the secondary structures of the Syrian government. But the mere existence of this tribal system does not mean that its functioning adheres to Robert's Rules of Order, debating and deciding disputes. For example, on 5 September 1956, four were killed and nine injured in a clash between the as-Sakhana and al-Bakara tribes north of Aleppo. The fight was generated by a dispute over the payment of blood money for five Bakarans who were killed by Sakhana tribesmen some time ago.[1]

Contact with the State is maintained chiefly through the weekly visits to the village of a contingent of gendarmes. The villagers are careful to maintain good relations with the gendarmes, and a slight to one of these state representatives must be rectified by a luncheon. The rule of reception requires that the first head of a household who sees the gendarmes arriving must invite them into his reception room for coffee,

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[1]"Chronology," Middle Eastern Affairs, VII (1956), 420.

provide a place for them to do their business with the villagers, bring the mukhtar, and send a son or client for anyone the gendarmes wish to see. When it becomes essential for a villager to communicate with the state government, he usually uses the services of the mukhtar.

The mukhtar holds the only political office in Tell Toqaan. He is chosen annually by and from among those who hold "much land". In Tell Toqaan, the electors are the urban landlords, the peasant freeholders, the elder peasant tenants and the lineage heads. His position is a paid one and his salary is made up by those who hold or sharecrop the land and by the shopkeepers -- not the central government. The mukhtar in office in 1954, was paid LS 200 annually. He also collected one pound for each document he stamped with his seal. The mukhtar must turn over any village men wanted by the gendarmes, is apparently responsible for seeing that the villagers contribute labor or materials for the maintenance of the telephone line, and speaks for the village before the gendarmes.

Apparently the mukhtar is not always used to articulate interests. The incident is reported of a summons brought by the gendarmes for the investigator's host in Tell Toqaan to appear in Idlib and explain why his son had not reported for military duty with his class. It was finally made clear that the son meant was a child of the host's first wife and had died in infancy many years before. To support his word before the

government officials in Idlib, the investigator's host took with him the personal seals of several men in the village as well as his living son. But the mukhtar did not accompany him or send his seal along with the man.[1]

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The importance of the socialization process in establishing style tendencies which permeate all the functions of the political system can be seen in interest articulation in Syria. The latent and particularistic articulation needs of the rich, the minorities, the partially organized laborers and the great mass of peasants present little common ground for unity and strength. Except for the upper classes and a small minority of the lower who adhere to radical parties such as Hourani's, these interest needs do not find effective channels of articulation. Due to the traditional structure of society and the economic gulf between rich and poor in the urban areas, the largest portion of the Syrian population does not have its interests articulated.

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[1] Sweet, op. cit., pp. 189-194.

## VI. INTEREST AGGREGATION

The distinction between interest articulation and interest aggregation[1] is a fluid one. The smallest event of interest articulation initiated by a lineage head or the smallest constituent unit of a trade association, involves the aggregation of the claims of even smaller groups of individuals. Modern interest groups carry aggregation quite far, sometimes to the point of speaking for whole classes of the society -- labor, agriculture, manufacturers.[2]

The aggregative function may actually be performed within all of the subsystems of the political system; i.e., legislative bodies, political executives, bureaucracies, media of communication, party systems, interest groups of the various types. Parties, factions, blocs in legislatures; cliques in political executives and bureaucracies; individual parties or party coalitions outside the legislature; individual interest groups or ad hoc coalitions of interest groups -- all perform an aggregative function, either by supporting or advocating changes in political personnel.[3]

The distinctively modern structure of political aggregation is the party system. In the modern democratic political system, it is the party system which regulates or gives order to the performance of the aggregative function by the other structures. To the extent that the party system is lacking, the aggregative function may be performed covertly, diffusely and

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[1] See above, p.14, for Almond's definition.

[2] Almond, op. cit., p.39.

[3] Ibid., op. cit., p.40

particularistically.[1]

Since the process of aggregation is also influenced by and affects in its turn the concrete realities of political events, it is important to understand the primary features of the political scene during the period under consideration.

During the mandatory era, the sole political activity open to the intelligentsia was that of demanding, meeting, talking and writing in support of their claims. This activity, conducted with emotion against a determined enemy, called for none of the restraints, the compromises or responsibilities of normal politics, and still less offered any awareness of the complexity of administration.

After independence the traditional ruling class faced a task of construction and reform too great to be solved with the celerity demanded by the discontent sections of Syrian society. Critics were quick to maintain that the traditional leaders were interested only in personal rewards for their victory over the French and in perpetuating their own rule. These old nationalist fighters realized that their own position of power could not be divorced from Syria' sovereignty as a nation. Pan-Arabism at that time had taken on a Hashimite tone, so that it was only natural that opposition to Hashimite plans for monarchal unity should take the form of emphasis on Syrian republicanism. For this reason, the nationalists turned aside from their pan-Arabist ideologies and became jealous particularists.[2] Their strongest element of unity was in opposing plans

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[1]Almond, op. cit., p.40. [2]Khalidi, op. cit., p.122.

for unification that would result in the submergence of Syria in a larger entity.[1] The scene changed in 1948.

The Palestine War has become a historic and political landmark in the Middle East. The threat of Zionism in the Arab world has served as a platform for Middle Eastern politicians when it was impossible to present feasible programs of economic and social reform to the electorate, as well as the source of a tremendous ground swell of pressure from the same electorate to "do something" about Israel. The fact of the Zionist intrusion in the land of the Arabs has produced political problems -- not the least of which is the problem of the Palestine refugges. The number of parties to this Arab-Zionist conflict has grown continuously since it first started; in the background today all the big Powers are in some way involved.[2]

The apparent military superiority of Israel in the Palestine War emphasized the importance of the Syrian army officers. Moreover, being keenly aware that they lag far behind the West in modern developments, the Arabs looked to the military to supply them with short cuts to a more egalitarian society. The Arab officer class became "the repository of self-conscious political power at a time when the traditional ruling class is bankrupt, the other growing forces and trends have not sufficiently crystallized, and the general masses positively look to this class as a

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[1] Lenczowski, op. cit., pp.292-293.

[2] Hans E. Tutsch, "Arab Unity and Arab Dissensions," in W. Laqueur (ed.), The Middle East in Transition, p.30.

saviour."[1]

Since the mandatory era and up to the union with Egypt, Syria has suffered from a chronic feeling of isolation. It had never recovered sufficiently from the French-decreed divorce with Lebanon during the Mandatory to feel at one with that country. It saw itself hedged about by hostility and distrust: Turkey's purloining of Alexandretta and military maneuvering on the Syrian border in the '50's; the ambition of the Hashimite monarchies of Iraq and Transjordan to create a unified "fertile crescent" dominated by Baghdad; the Iraqi-Turkish coalition in the Baghdad Pact; and in more recent times the proximate danger from a militant Israel and the Eisenhower Doctrine, to which the states surrounding Syria subscribed in one way or another.[2]

Against this background of motives and machinations, Syrian interests were aggregated.

Interest aggregation in Syria has been largely devoted to the interests of the relatively small upper class. These have been aggregated at different periods by different parties, coalitions and factions in the Syrian Chamber of Deputies. The first of these was a comprehensive-nationalist party,[3] the Hizb al-Istiqlal al-'Arabi, the Party of Arab Independence,

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[1]Khalidi, op. cit., p.123.

[2]Pierre Rondot, The Changing Patterns of the Middle East: 1919 - 1958, p.31.

[3]See above, p.16, for Almond's classification of political parties.

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founded in 1919, in Damascus during the reign of Amir Faysal. The Istiqlal's program was general and popular enough to aggregate not only the interests of the upper class (which were articulated), but also those of the general population (which were more taken for granted than articulated). The party stood for the independence and union of all Arab countries, rejected the French and British zones of influence, and opposed the idea of the mandates then under discussion at the Paris Peace Conference. From the Istiqlal were drawn the later leaders for many of the parties, the Sha'b, Kutla, etc.[1]

After independence, the party system in Syria, took on the appearances of the dominant, non-authoritarian typology.[2] Prior to the departure of the French, most of the significant interest groups in Syria had naturally joined the nationalist movement for independence. After independence, the Istiqlal although still dominant, began to experience the difficult problem of trying to aggregate the very dissimilar interests of the secularist, socialist, and conservative groups which had formerly given it allegiance in the cause of national liberation. Gradually it narrowed the area of its aggregation down to the interests of the dominant leaders within the party. These were the traditional ruling elite, the local dignitaries and administrators from the days of Ottoman rule in Syria, the large landholders in Syria; and it became a traditional, particularistic party.

Upper class interests were also aggregated by the Hizb ash-Sha'b, the

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[1]Historical information on these Syrian parties has been based on Stephan and Nandy Ronart, Concise Encyclopaedia of Arabic Civilization, pp.218-222; Lenczowski, op. cit., passim; and Longrigg, op. cit., passim.

[2]See above, p. 15, for Almond's classification of party systems.

People's Party, founded in 1924. It too began as a comprehensive-nationalist party, and followed a pattern of maturity similar to that of Hizb al-Istiqlal. During the mandate, it aimed at independence, the establishment of the traditional geographic Syria, and the union of all Arab countries in a confederation of independent states. Its leaders were Muslims, Christians and Druzes from among the intellectual groups of the younger Syrian generation -- many of whom were to play a prominent part in the political life of Syria, such as 'Abd ar-Rahman Shabandar, Faris Khuri, Sa'd Ghazi and Tufiq Shamiyah. In 1925, Shabandar assumed leadership of the anti-France revolt in Damascus. After suppression of the rebellion by the French, the party leaders were forced to go into exile, bringing about the disintegration of the Sha'b. Ten years later, they were allowed to return, whereupon some of them with Shabandar at their head formed a new political group, the Popular Front, Hay'ah ash-Sha'biyah. During the revival of Syrian party life toward the end of the second World War, the Sha'b was reconstituted in Aleppo. Now, however, it could be clearly classified as a traditional, particularistic party. Its right-wing program aggregated the interests of the upper class in northern Syria in an effort to counter the socialist and communist gains made among the peasants and industrial workers. Under the leadership of Rushdi Kikhia and Nazim Qudsi, it formed the strongest opposition group in the 1947 Chamber and gained a victory in the elections of November 1949. With Qudsi as prime minister and Kikhia as president of the Chamber, the Sha'b operated as the parliamentary expression of the officers' regime under Colonel Shishakli -- at least until November 1951. Even after the overthrow of Shishakli in 1954, it was the Sha'b which emerged as the second strongest political force in the country and

Qudsi was again President of the Chamber. Two years after this, however, as the interests of the upper class pushed the Sha'b into a policy of close alignment with the conservatives in Iraq -- as an attempt again to counter the growing strength of leftist elements in Syria -- it rapidly fell from popularity and was temporarily overwhelmed by the Party of the Arab Socialist Renaissance. At the time of the union with Egypt, the Sha'b had practically lost all significance.

The greatest amount of aggregation for the upper class was effected not by a party at all but by a nebulous group of deputies who listed themselves as Independents. These were the notables from the landed and moneyed families of Syria who would not give their allegiance willingly to any party. None of the organized parties can form a Government without the support of some of the Independents. In order to strengthen its own position inside any coalition, each group tries to make its own appeal to the Independents.[1]

An important coalition which was representative of the upper classes and in which the general style of aggregation would class it as comprehensive-nationalist was the National Bloc or Kutla al-Wataniya. It was founded in 1925, with the purpose of concentrating the patriotic efforts of the other parties in the struggle for independence. In the Constituent Assembly of 1928, it was the strongest group, and obtained over a quarter of the seats in the parliamentary elections of 1930. When the French dissolved the Syrian parliament in 1934, the popularity of the Kutla increased to such an extent that four of the six members of the delegation which was to negotiate the 1936 treaty in Paris, had to be drawn from its members. Following the elections of 1936, Kutla leaders took over all the key positions in the government: Hashim Atassi became President of the Republic, Faris Khuri

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[1]Bullard, op. cit., p.464.

became President of the Chamber, and Jamil Mardam Bey -- Prime Minister. After a two-year eclipse following the outbreak of World War II, the Kutla was again active. Under the leadership of Shukri Quwatli, it emerged from the parliamentary elections of 1943, with an overwhelming majority and took over the government with Quwatli as President of the Republic. In 1949 Za'im's coup put an end to the last Kutla government in our period. With the arrest of Quwatli and other prominent political leaders, the Kutla disintegrated.

Of the ideological parties working in Syria, perhaps the most salient was Antun Sa'adeh's P.P.S. (Parti Populaire Syrien)or Hizb as-Suri al-Qaumi, later known as Hizb al-Qaumi al-Ijtima'i or National-Social Party. The P.P.S. was originally founded in Lebanon in 1932, as a clandestine organization with the objective of uniting the territories and peoples of Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and Palestine in a common Syrian nationality, under a strong dictatorial government which would execute social and economic reforms. Its radical and aggressive methods brought it in frequent conflict with the authorities. In 1949, after an abortive attempt to stir up a popular rising in Lebanon, Sa'adeh was executed by the Lebanese authorities. The P.P.S. continued its propaganda in Syria. Early in 1955, some 800 P.P.S. members were arrested in Syria and indicted with subversive activities. The party moved back to Lebanon, where it conducted a vehement campaign against Syria's entry into the United Arab Republic. The P.P.S. attracted and aggregated interests for a large portion of the young intellectuals and students in Syria. It was an innovation in the Syrian political scene in that it had a fairly definite program, a businesslike and widespread organ-

ization, a genuine enthusiasm among its members, and an eager self-manifestation in the form of uniformed and diciplined squads of young men. Although its opposition to the older generation of politicians was always impressive, the P.P.S. never succeeded in getting more than one or two representatives in the Syrian Chamber.

Ostensibly ideological in its make up but pragmatic in practice, is the Communist Party in Syria. The period immediately before the union with Egypt, saw a great advance in the power of the Syrian Communist Party, but the Party itself had been working in Syria from around 1930. Early control of the Party was assumed by Kalid Bekdash, a Kurd by origin, and party branches opened in all the main cities of Syria. Relations between the Armenians and Arabs within the party were strained, and divided views were held concerning collaboration with the Syrian nationalists until, in 1936, the decision was made to support the nationalists. "The party took its place in all the disorders of the time, conducted demonstrations on its own, revealed its superior organization, and strove acceptably in Alexandretta for the Syrian cause. Well controlled, it held its own as a national Communist Party (though detached from the Comintern after 1938), and was at endless loggerheads with . . . Sa'adeh's Party, and with all Catholic spokesmen."[1] Although only able to get one or two representatives into the Syrian Chamber (and that not until 1954), the Communists held decisive leadership in the trade unions. After the outbreak of World War II, the party was suppressed by the French High Commissioner and disappeared from view for the next three years.

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[1]Longrigg, op. cit., p.227.

Up to 1939, opposition to fascism had been the main plank of Communist policy. After the German-Russian entente, the Communists said that the main task was to fight British and French imperialism within the framework of a national front and to stay out of the imperialists' war. After June 1941 and the German attack on Russia, the Communists again called for an all-out effort against Nazism and Fascism.[1] It was during the 1941 - 1945 period, that the Communist Party was divided into two sections, one for Lebanon and one for the Syrian Republic.

When the Shishakli dictatorship was overthrown, in 1954, the Syrian Communists emerged -- according to Laqueur's estimate -- with little more than 1,ooo militants, apparently a hard core of party members. Only three years later, it had become one of the strongest parties in Syria.[2] The Communists had a fairly broad area of interest aggregation in Syria. When the National Front was established in 1956, Khaled Bekdash made rather aweeping statements in the parliament to the effect that his country was, and would remain, Arab nationalist and nothing else. Communism and Arab nationalism were presented as being in complete harmony. In addition to its appeal to nationalism, the party aggregated a vast area of interests among the industrial workers of Syria as evidenced by their penetration of Syria's trade unions. Its pragmatism was seen in its attempts to also aggregate the interests of various intellectual segments of the population through front organizations such as the Arab Writers' Congress and the Lawyers' Association. Among the student and teacher groups, their ideology

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[1]Walter Z. Laqueur, The Soviet Union and the Middle East, p.115.

[2]Ibid., p.133.

was well-received, and a certain degree of penetration had been made into the army command and internal security forces.[1]

More effective aggregation of lower class interests was accomplished by the Ba'ath-Socialists. This party was an amalgamation of Hizb al-Ba'ath al-'Arabi, the Party of the Arab Renaissance, and Hizb al-Ishtirakiyah, the Socialist Party. The former, the originial Ba'ath, was a pragmatic party which originated in Damascus around 1944, as a clandestine association of students and other educated youths under the leadership of Michel Aflaq and Salah Bitar, with the aim of combating the French in Syria. After the French evacuation, the party came out in the open with a middle-of-the-road program of agrarian reform directed against the absentee landlords and rich merchants. In 1953, the Ba'ath merged with the Socialist Party.

The Socialist Party in Syria was founded in 1950 by Akram Hourani on a radical program of agrarian reform aimed at breaking the political and economic power of the rich landowners and raising the standard of living of the workers through the enactment of far-reaching social legislation.

The party which emerged from the union of these two, Hizb al-Ba'ath al-Ishtiraki (hereafter referred to simply as the Ba'ath), was dominated by the forceful personality of Hourani. It emerged as an ideological party, attempting to fit Marxist ideologies into a structure of pan-Arab nationalism. It aggregated interests from among the younger generation in the professional circles and lower officer ranks who were dissatisfied with the performance of the traditional ruling class but who also hesitated to

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[1]Laqueur, The Soviet Union and the Middle East, p.300.

align themselves with the Communists. Through strenuous effort the Ba'ath was able to win over sections of the peasant population, especially in the Hama area; but neither this nor its representation of other dissatisfied groups was sufficient to ever give it a working majority in the parliament.[1]

These were the main party aggregators of interests in Syria. There were other parties (the Muslim Brotherhood, the Arab Liberation Movement, the Socialist Co-operative Party) but their presence only served to confuse the electorate and make alignments more difficult among the parties. For ecample, in the 1954 elections following the ousting of Shishakli: ex-president Quwatli returned from Egypt and tried unsuccessfully to re-establish first a popular following, then a union of moderate and conservative elements. The candidates from the Kutla and Sha'b parties were no more successful in agreeing on a combined slate of candidates, and as a result entered the election separately with only partially completed lists. Partial lists were characteristic of the entire election, forcing the voter to select from a variety of parties. In Damascus, for example, with a total representation of 12, the Kutla presented 6 candidates, the Sha'b 4, the Ba'ath 3, the Socialist-Co-operatives 2, the P.P.S. 2, the National Union (Communist) 3. In addition to these, the voter was faced with several lists of independents.[2]

The results of the same election reflected the relatively shallow penetration effected by organized parties into the allegiance of the elec-

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[1]See Appendix D for results and election data.

[2]"Developments of the Quarter," The Middle East Journal IX (1955), 53.

torate: most of the candidates elected were classed as independents, and in the parliament they ignored the organized parties and grouped themselves into blocs around individual spokesmen. Thus there was a "democratic bloc" of about thirty-eight deputies under the leadership of Khalid 'Azm; a "liberal bloc" of twelve under Munir Ajlani; a "Muslim bloc" of five which included several members of the Muslim Brotherhood; and a "tribal bloc" of twenty-six in which were grouped the nine representatives of the tribes, representatives of the rural districts and assorted leaderless independents. The organized parties could together muster only about sixty-one seats: twenty-eight for the Sha'b, sixteen for the Ba'ath, twelve for the Kutla, and one for the Communists.[1]

In effect this indicates that in Syria, the organized political parties have failed to aggregate the interests of three-quarters of the Syrian population. The upper classes -- in the period under consideration -- always found channels of aggregation for their interests that led directly into the parliament. But the poorer classes, roughly three-quarters of the Syrian population, have usually not had access to these channels, and when their interests were served by representatives in the parliament it was rather for individual favors than for changes in the social order that would permanently improve their lot. An examination of some of the legislation emanating from the Syrian Government will illustrate the failure of the political parties to aggregate for the masses, from a different aspect:

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[1] "Developments of the Quarter," The Middle East Journal, IX (1955), 53.

12 September 1949: the parliament ratified a new electoral law, allowing Syrian women to vote.[1]

25 October 1949, decree No. 291, provided for the distribution of state forested lands with wild olive trees to the farmers.[2]

6 March 1951: the Damascus and Aleppo electricity and transportation companies were nationalized. The Government of Syria appointed Syrian directors to replace the foreign directors of these companies.[3]

1 October 1951: the Government of Syria instructed provincial officials to enforce the abolishment of the practice of small tenants having to provide butter and wool for their landlords, paying two-thirds of their crops to their landlords in lieu of rent, and forced labor.[4]

20 December 1951: The Government of Syria announced the abolition of all civilian titles. Henceforth all Syrians would be addressed as as-Sayyid.[5]

1 February 1952: the Government of Syria enacted a law regulating the ownership of state land. The legal limit of ownership was established at 150 hectares in the Jezira area, fifty hectares elsewhere. Land reverting to the State from the application of this law would be sold or rented for a minimum price to individual farmers. The area of State domain was

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[1] "Developments of the Quarter," The Middle East Journal, IV (1950), 92.

[2] Fouad Chbat (ed.), Repertoire Permanent des Lois et Reglements Syriens, p.(44) - 1.

[3] "Developments of the Quarter," The Middle East Journal, V (1951), 351.

[4] "Developments of the Quarter," The Middle East Journal, VI (1952), 81.

[5] Ibid., p.219.

redefined to include vast areas of Syria.[1]

12 March 1952: the Government of Syria legislated restrictions on foreign business in Syria. All companies capitalized in Syria must have a Syrian president and a Syrian majority among their directors.[2]

3 November 1952: decree No. 768 provided for the distribution of the "amiyres" territories to the citizens of Syria.[3]

19 November 1952: the government of Syria passed a law prohibiting foreigners from owning land and other immovable property in Syria.[4]

15 January 1953: decree No. 18 provided for the free distribution of state domains in certain regions of the Mohafazat of Hassake to the citizens of Syria.[5]

25 January 1954: the Government of Syria fixed the minimum daily wage of manual laborers at LS 3.50.[6]

The above legislation has several things in common: it is all directed toward social reform either through State control of the economy,

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[1]"Developments of the Quarter," The Middle East Journal, VI (1952), 219.

[2]Peter G. Franck, "Economic Nationalism in the Middle East," The Middle East Journal, VI (1952), 445.

[3]Chbat, op. cit., p.(44) - 1.

[4]"Chronology," Middle Eastern Affairs, III (1952), 405.

[5]Chbat, op. cit., p.(44) - 2.

[6]"Developments of the Quarter," The Middle East Journal, VIII (1954), 202.

equalization of class differences, or the elimination of foreign "profiteering" in Syria. It was all enacted during periods when the military -- not the political parties or blocs -- were in control of the government. It is the sum total of significant social reform outputs from the Government of Syria during the period under consideration. No social legislation to abate the afflictions of the Syrian poor was enacted while the Syrian rich maintained control of the government. The civilian control of the government and the dominance of the upper class in that control produced outputs which were designed to perpetuate the status quo or reestablish the status quo ante military control. The most significant reform of the first Quwatli regime, for example, was the amending of the constitution so that Quwatli could be legally reelected for a second term. The civilian governments paid attention only to those matters that served the interests of the ruling oligarchy.[1]

The record of political parties in Syria thus has shown a very limited aggregation of interests and a failure to produce a constructive program of domestic development. The foreign problems which impinged upon and further complicated Syrian politics made the task of governing all the more difficult for the traditional ruling class. Thus when Syria was unable to make any progress toward regaining Alexandretta from the Turks, or to maintain successfully a completely independent currency in 1945, or to

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[1]Majid Khadduri, "Constitutional Development in Syria," The Middle East Journal, V (1951), 149.

free its assets blocked in France, or to assume a leading role in Arab unity, or to wage war successfully in Palestine, there was little left on which the government could claim the loyalty of the people.[1]

The nature of the Syrian political system as it evolved after the French evacuation prevented parties such as Hourani's -- which were oriented toward the drastic social changes that were Syria's only reasonable hope for internal development -- from becoming strong enough to break through the entrenched position of the traditional status quo forces and obtain a majority in the parliament. From the dominant non-authoritarian beginning after independence, the Syrian political system had fragmented itself into the immobilist multiparty system that is characteristic of France and Italy.[2] This again is indicative of an earlier and deeper fragmentation: the abiding heterogeneity of the body politic with its disparate levels of evolution, knowledge and wealth; the division by confessions and sects, as well as by regional loyalties.[3]

Despite the lack of aggregation, there was a growing need for aggregation, an increasing ferment of unrest that had to find an outlet. This was in no small part an infection spread by Ba'athist ideology.

The increase of radical nationalism as the result of World War II, the enormous increase in Russian prestige consequent to her military victories

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[1]"Developments of the Quarter," The Middle East Journal, III (1949), 316.

[2]See Almond's classification of party systems, p. 15, above.

[3]Longrigg, op. cit., p.360.

in that same war facilitated the presentation of Hourani's Marxist ideas. It is easy to understand the eager sympathy with which the masses received Ba'athist ideology. The party believes that sovereignty is the property of the people, that the value of the state is measured by the support it receives from the masses.[1] Politically pliable students were won with Ba'athist pleas for equal opportunities in education and economic life so that all citizens may show their true and maximum aptitudes.[2] For the farmers and the peasants: land ownership shall be limited according to the ability of the owner to cultivate it fully without exploiting the efforts of others; ownership of small industries shall be limited in conformity with the economic standard enjoyed by the rest of the citizens of the state; workers shall participate in the management of factories and shall, in addition to their wages which shall be fixed by the state, be granted a share of the profits, the percentage of which shall be fixed by the state.[3] The state envisioned by the Ba'athists was truly an ideal one, with no distinction between one citizen and another except in so far as mental efficiency and manual skill are concerned,[4] and a livelihood guaranteed for all disabled citizens[5] -- ideal at least to those who were deprived of the comforts and security described by the Ba'ath. It was these Syrians who were infected with Ba'athist ideas, the peasants, students and the younger army officers whose background was usually rural and poor. For these, there could be

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[1]"Article 5," Constitution of the Arab Renaissance-Socialist Party, (translated by the Department of Public Administration, The American University of Beirut), p.3.

[2]Ibid., "Article 13," p.4. [3]Ibid., articles 30, 31, 32, p.6.

[4]Ibid., "Article 42," p.8. [5]Ibid., "Article 40," p.7.

no temporizing with ineffectual party channels: their interests had to be aggregated, and if there were no legal channels open to them, they would make their own. This they did.

## VII. ANOMIC ARTICULATION AND AGGREGATION

The political phenomenon of anomic movements and their customary violence are largely accepted as a normal condition of life in the Middle East as in most of the underdeveloped areas of the world. For instance, the simple but highly disruptive maneuver of exploding bombs in order to eliminate or intimidate political opponents is almost a commonplace. Events such as the bomb explosion on 29 May 1950, in the building which housed Prime Minister 'Azm's office,[1] or the bomb explosion of 15 September 1950, when the United Nations' Relief and Works Agency office in Damascus was blown up, killing one and injuring two,[2] or the bomb which damaged the residence of U.S. Ambassador Cannon on 25 March 1951,[3] are accepted by Syrians as a dangerous but normal part of their political life.

The last of the explosions cited above should help us bear in mind that there is a large area of activities, beyond the scope of this paper, which frequently penetrates Syria's political boundaries with imperceptible but devastating rapiers of intrigue. These foreign thrusts into the Syrian body politic must be evaluated by research and surveillance operations within the foreign country concerned in order to understand their aim in penetrating Syria's boundaries.[4] But their presence and disruptive

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[1] "Developments of the Quarter," The Middle East Journal, IV (1950), 342.

[2] "Developments of the Quarter," The Middle East Journal, V (1951), 86.

[3] Ibid., p.351. [4] See above, p.3, for intelligence operations.

force cannot be denied.

Anomic activity has a definite function in Syrian politics. It circumvents the roadblocks of particularism which prevent normal articulation and aggregation and forces into the political system the interests of the masses. The three media for anomic activities in Syria are the mob, the students and the army.[1] The following are some of the occasions when mob action broke through the political boundaries of the Syrian system:

7 November 1947: mobs stormed the government offices at Deir ez-Zor, when the government failed to deliver wheat rations on time; thirty persons were killed or injured.[2]

30 November 1947: a crowd of Syrians protesting the proposed partition of Palestine stoned the United States and French legations in Damascus, stormed and burned the headquarters of the Communist Party, killing four.[3]

24 April 1948: 5,000 Syrians demonstrated in Damascus, shouting for a Syrian army to be sent to fight the Jews in Palestine.[4]

1 December 1948: climaxing three days of rioting in the streets, during which one Syrian was killed and fifty-seven wounded, Mardam Bey and his cabinet resigned.[5]

27 March 1949: demonstrations broke out in the Syrian port city of

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[1]Trade unions are not included here, since strikes are legal tools of interest articulation; whereas anomic activity has no constitutional basis.

[2]"Developments of the Quarter," The Middle East Journal, II (1948), 74.

[3]Ibid. [4]Ibid., p.337.

[5]"Developments of the Quarter," The Middle East Journal, III (1949), 198.

Latakia, protesting the government's decision to enter armistice negotiations with the Israelis. This was followed on 30 March 1949, by Husni Za'im's coup d'etat.[1]

27 February 1954: the Damascus populace demonstrated against some of the officials from the Shishakli regime. Sixteen persons were killed or severely wounded when government buildings were set on fire.[2]

3 November 1954: demonstations in the streets of Damascus prevented the formation of a new coalition cabinet.[3]

15 January 1955: demonstrations broke out in Aleppo, protesting the visit of Turkish Prime Minister Menderes; thirty-five were injured.[4]

21 April 1956: a general strike took place throughout Syria; 32,000 demonstrators in Damascus urged a boycott of France in protest against her actions in Algeria. Approximately a month later, 29 May, the Syrian Government forbid the exportation of wheat to France.[5]

These sudden, sporadic and usually unplanned outbursts of political activity came from discontent individuals who used the anomic movement to register that discontent. The target of their wrath may not have always been related to the cause of their discontent, but simply fullfilled their

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[1] Ibid., p.327.

[2] "Developments of the Quarter," The Middle East Journal, VIII (1954), 202.

[3] "Developments of the Quarter," The Middle East Journal, IX (1955), 65.

[4] Ibid., p.175.

[5] "Developments of the Quarter," The Middle East Journal, X (1956), 160.

psychological need to blame someone or some things for their lot. In a more developed society, most of these malcontents would be able to find specific interest groups to articulate their particular complaints,[1] but in Syria these channels are not open to them. So that their unarticulated and unaggregated interests spill over into the streets of Damascus, sometimes producing outputs in their favor from the government, sometimes resulting in their violent death.

In contrast to the lability of the anomic activities of the mob, are the students' demonstrations and strikes. After the first World War, the student movement was married to the various causes of the predominant parties. Representing one of the few literate groups destined to become the backbone of the nationalist movements, students were wooed by the government and opposition parties alike. Parties vied with one another in arousing the students to a high pitch of nationalist fervor and in catering to the preference of many of the students for politics over academics.[2] The problem of articulation and aggregation for these students is created by their impatience with formal procedures and their commitment to the ideal -- never having had to accept the responsibilities and compromises of the real. Their education also enables them to see the shortcomings of their government, and breeds in them a feeling of responsibility for effecting reforms. The following were some of the occasions when the students of Syria turned from academic to anomic activities:

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[1]James S. Coleman, "Conclusion: the Political Systems of the Developing Areas," in Almond, op. cit., p.556.

[2]Berger, op. cit., p.311.

3 August 1951: university students in Damascus demonstrated in favor of annexing Jordan to Syria.[1]

19 January 1952: students and Army officers clashed in Damascus, when the students demonstrated against the Shishakli government; students also rioted in Aleppo; twenty-seven were killed and 287 wounded.[2] On the 27th, martial law was declared in Aleppo; and on 30 January 1952, Prime Minister Silo published a decree barring students from participation in political activities.[3]

Possibly an indication of agitation from politicians among the students: on 27 January 1954, Shishakli's security forces arrested most of the leading politicians, among them: Kikhya, Jabri, Assali, Hourani, Aflaq, Bitar, Kayyali, and charged them all with carrying out political activities to encourage disorders among the students and to incite them to strike.[4]

13 April 1954: Aleppo students demonstrated against the invitation extended to former President Quwatli to return to Syria.[5]

29 November 1954: students demonstrated on the anniversary of the U.N.'s Palestine partition plan and the loss of the Sanjak of Alexandretta.[6]

16 January 1955: students tried to storm the main government building in Damascus, demanding the release of the Aleppo students who had been detained

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[1] "Developments of the Quarter," The Middle East Journal, V (1951), 496.

[2] "Developments of the Quarter," The Middle East Journal, VI (1952), 219.

[3] Ibid.

[4] "Developments of the Quarter," The Middle East Journal, VIII (1954), 202.

[5] Ibid., p.89.

[6] "Developments of the Quarter," The Middle East Journal, IX (1955), 65.

by the police on the 15th of January.[1]

26 March 1955: over 15,000 students demonstrated against the Turkish-Iraqi Pact.[2]

24 March 1956: Syrian students demonstrated against French violence in Algeria. Shortly after this, 3 April 1956, the Chamber passed a resolution recommending that the Arab League boycott France economically, politically and culturally if she continued her aggressive policies in Algeria.[3]

2 June 1956: students occupied the Syrian Minsitry of National Economy and demanded prohibition of exportation of cereals to France and Algeria. On 11 June 1956, the Syrian Government prohibited exportation of grain to France in protest against France's policy in Algeria.[4]

These university students share with the officer corps in Syria a privileged position of access to the knowledge and techniques associated with modernization.[5] Aware of this, these students are also keenly aware that the Syrian economy does not afford them a well-established transition from the university to a job commensurate with their expectations.[6] As a result they had little stake in existing social conditions which they felt did not offer them adequate opportunities.[7] The gathering of these three -- idealism, impatience and an unpromising future -- into the lives of Syria's

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[1] Ibid., p.175. [2] Ibid., p.320.

[3] "Developments of the Quarter," The Middle East Journal, X (1956), 296.

[4] Ibid., p.423. [5] Rustow, op. cit., p.427.

[6] See Appendix G for data on education in Syria.

[7] Berger, op. cit., p.333.

students made this group one of the most forceful and explosive anomic movements in the country.

The most rationally organized, rationally oriented, competent hierarchical organization[1] in Syria, is the army. Obviously ordered and disciplined, it is a far cry from the turbulence of the street violence we usually associate with anomic movement. Yet its unconstitutional intrusions into the political system of Syria are well-published history. It is certainly the most efficient of all three anomic movements, and has been the most effective in aggregating the interests of the social forces of change in Syria. History has cast the army in this anomic role and made the bulk of the Syrian population receptive to its seizures of power.

Warfare was originally legitimacized and enobled for the Muslims by the actions of the Prophet and his followers. The Arabs who conquered the Syrian area in the seventh century were wariors for whom fighting was the highest way of life. Under the Ottomans, Persian concepts of sovereignty acquired by force and maintained by force strengthened the prestige of the military in society.[2] In more recent times, there was the powerful example of Attaturk, a military leader who built a new country on the ruins of an old. When the French came to Syria, it was by virtue of their military strength that they were able to do so; and with the revolt of 1925-26, the Syrians

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[1]Shlomo Avineri, "Afro-Asia and the Western Political Tradition," Parliamentary Affairs, XV (1961-1962), 70.

[2]H. A. R. Gibb and Harold Bowen, Islamic Society and the West, p.31.

were able to force the calling of the first Syrian constituent assembly — seeming to demonstrate further that in politics only military force could be relied on to achieve results. Beneath these obvious events in the history of Syria, the undercurrent of authoritarianism in the Arab family continued to emphasize strength and disparage weakness. Then the debacle of the Palestine War gave apparently vivid evidence of the insufficiency of civilian governments. The people and the army were ready for what history seemed to have been preparing them: authoritarian rule founded on military strength. Where, we may wonder, did the concept of parliamentary democracy come from in this military-oriented environment?

The introduction of Western goals and desires for material comforts[1] came from a variety of cultural sources. Ironically, the army itself served as an important channel of Western penetration, through the appointment of foreign missions and instructors and the organization of medical and sanitary services, the promotion of technical training,and the necessity of providing modern equipment.[2] Once the criteria had been accepted, a means had to be found to put these Western goals within reach of the Syrian public. The means presented was the parliamentary-democratic system of government.

The trial period did not last long. The Western accomplishments in social justice and economic development seemed further away than ever. The comparisons were made more disappointing by the introduction of Communist ideologies and the picture of Hourani's ideal socialistic state. The conviction grew among the masses and the army that what a young state needs is a

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[1]See above, pp.42-43. [2]Gibb, op. cit., p.8

good government rather than a democratic one;[1] and finally in 1949, when the Mardam Bey Cabinet had been forced to resign after three days of mob violence and two weeks elapsed before a new government could be formed, the army under Husni Za'im stepped into the role which by now seemed almost natural to it.

From 1949 on, the army took the position of a supra-national judge evaluating the progress of democratic government in Syria. Whenever progress seemed halted, the army intervened in accordance with what it assumed to be its legitimate right, but which in the light of the Syrian constitution was anomic intervention in the political system.

In spite of the apparent suitability of the army to accomplish social reform through anomic intervention, its record, like that of the political parties, is one of failure. The four years of governmental control under Adib Shishakli best illustrate the causes for this.

Between December 1949 and December 1951, Shishakli even with the strength of the army behind him, co-operated and compromised with the Sha'b in the parliament.[2] These status quo forces were so well entrenched in the governing process of Syria that they could not be ignored. When Shishakli finally did break with them in 1951, he found the tasks and problems confronting Syria beyond his individual capabilities. Shishakli was not an Attaturk. He did not have the type of personality to capture the popular imagination. Rarely did he appear in public, and when he did so, "it was under the panoply

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[1] "Developments of the Quarter," The Middle East Journal, IV (1950), 477.

[2] Lenczowski, op. cit., p.299.

of the army".[1] He did not attract the popular appeal that General Nagib drew to the military in Egypt. True, he did avoid the personal ostentation that hastened the fall of General Za'im, but this was a negative virtue. After his break with the Sha'b, his efforts to build the Arab Liberation Movement into a legitimate party failed to clarify his principles or popularize his rule.[2]

Within the army itself there was not complete unanimity. There had always been a division within the Syrian officer group between pro-Hashimite and anti-Hashimite factions.[3] Added to this were the rivalries among personalities that were common to West as well as East, and which were recorded as early as the 14th century: "every Arab regards himself as worthy to rule, and it is rare to find one of them submitting willingly to another . . . ."[4]

These are the elements which have stymied the success of the army's anomic movement in every period: the entrenched, tenacious position of the upper class, the absence of a sufficiently able army leader, the magnitude of the reforms and changes desired in Syria, and the rivalries among the officers' corps itself.

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[1] "Developments of the Quarter," The Middle East Journal, VIII (1954), 185.

[2] Ibid. [3] Ibid., p.184.

[4] Issawi, op. cit., quoting Ibn Khaldun.

The failure of these anomic activities of the mobs, students, and the army to aggregate the interests of social discontent in Syria carried the nation along increasingly desperate paths. Communist influence and alignment with Russia gained great popular support as the end of 1957 approached. The Ba'ath with their sympathetic segment of army officers turned toward Egypt to counter the growing strength of the Communists; and President Quwatli negotiated the union with Nasser in order to keep a rival with Russian backing, Khalid 'Azm, from eclipsing his position of power.[1]

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[1] Berger, op. cit., p.354.

# VIII. CONCLUSIONS

Evaluating Almond's system of analysis, brings us to the conclusion that there are discernible regularities underlying the disparate particularities of political behavior and these can be understood by utilizing Almond's categories. Fitting the various functions into Almond's framework, clarifies their relationships one to the other, and demonstrates the cyclical cause and effect relationship between input and output functions.

The sequence Almond uses in presenting and describing the political functions, although helpful in the abstract discussion of their properties and characteristics, was found to be too rigid to be used in the actual analysis. Thus the analytical picture was closer to the realities of politics in Syria, with outputs listed where they best illustrated the cause and effect relationship, for example, than held off for later consideration under the functions of output as in Almond's presentation. Given this flexibility, Almond's system of analysis provides an excellent framework for ordering and identifying the specific functions in a political system and uncovering the causative links between them.

The picture of Syria that emerges is one of a traditional society in transition to modernity patterned on Western economic progress. The transition is affected in varying degrees by a socialization process that is largely authoritarian, recruitment into politics that was ascriptive but later added performance criteria , media of communication which are feeble transmittors of information, and articulation and aggregation processes which are limited to upper class interests.

Through all the processes runs one unifying theme: conflict between the forces of change and the forces of immobility.

The forces of change come from the transition itself. Uprooted from their traditional environment, that part of the population with the propensity for modernization begins to experience a drastic change in its needs. These people now need housing, employment, social security against illness and old age, hospital care for their children, education -- a wide range and large amount of new government services.[1] These ordinarily cannot be met by traditional types of government.

The uprooted, disoriented masses need a direct ransition from traditional government to a modern welfare state. This means that the developing countries have to accomplish within a few decades a process of political change which took America many generations, and they may have to accomplish this accelerated change without stopping at some of the historical stages of transitions, such as the period of near laissez-faire that occured in the West. Here the forces of immobility are not only unable to aid the transition but also unwilling since the end in sight includes the end of their economic control of the country.

The inability of the government to meet the increasing burdens of increased governmental services results in a proportion of the population becoming alienated and disaffected from the state. If the government proves to be persistently incapable or unresponsive to the new needs of the people, some or many of its subjects will cease to identify with it psychologically;

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[1]Karl W. Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development," The American Political Science Review, LV (1961), 493.

the government will be reduced to ruling by force where it can no longer rule by display or persuasion.[1] Given this condition, if political alternatives present themselves, the traditional government will be replaced by other political units which at least promise to respond more effectively to the needs of the people.[2]

This has been characteristic of Syria. Blocked in articulating and aggregating their interests, the forces of change tumbled into anomic activities, seeking satisfaction for their needs. When this was not forthcoming either in quantity or quality of governmental outputs, there was no other course left except to change the government when such action became feasible. The struggle between the forces of change and those of immobility has given alternating victories to one and then the other, but the developing trend seems to favor change as an irresistable force.

Almond's underlying purpose in developing a comparative system of political analysis is the evolution of a probabalistic theory of politics. If we were to make a prognostication on the probable course of Syrian politics based on the patterns uncovered in the preceding analysis, it would be that Syria will soon abandon its pursuit of democratic forms in government and accept authoritarianism as the only alternative to no government -- for the ostensible reason that the country is not economically ready for democracy.

It is possible, however, to see that in some respects Syria is in fact drawing closer to the democratic ideal. Jefferson's idea of democracy centered on small, self-contained communities where everyone knew everyone else.

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[1]Deutsch, op. cit., p.502. [2]Ibid.

"The cherishment of the people was our principle," wrote Jefferson,[1] but the people he cherished almost exclusively were the small landowning farmers. In these self-contained communities there was time to exchange opinions on problems that were not more than local, and time to debate and compromise until the majority opinion of the citizens had been satisfied. Due to the homogeneity of the community, there was usually very little dissension.

To the extent that Syria is able to effect agrarian reforms, establish small new villages and increase communication facilities to these villages, she is approaching Jefferson's democratic communities.

In proportion, however, to Syria's entanglement in foreign affairs, her growth of cities where numbers of persons make a community of acquaintanceship and exchanged opinions impossible, her increase in industrialization whereby the means of livelihood of the many is controlled by the few -- to that proportion the democratic ideal of deciding one's own fate is lost.

Syria seems to have chosen a course of development that is presently carrying her away from Jefferson's rural, self-contained communities. Her politics reflect the conflict between striving for realization of the Jeffersonian sovereignty and independence of the people and the practical need of supporting and guiding the people through the intricate problems entailed in modernization. If a counter-idealism of the value of efficient, authoritarian rule can be implanted in the people, Syria may obtain vocal support for that form of government for which the character and traditions of the Syrians give her natural support.

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[1] Walter Lippmann, Public Opinion, p.267.

# APPENDIX A

## POSITIVE INTELLIGENCE

| Where | Range of interest | Function to be served |
|---|---|---|
| FOREIGN (all foreign lands and peoples) | LONG RANGE | The intelligence of High Policy; foreign and national security. |
| | MEDIUM RANGE | The intelligence of Departmental policy; notably the departments of State, Army, Navy and Air Force. Other departments with secondary responsibilities in foreign affairs: Commerce, Agriculture, Treasury, Justice, Tariff Commission. In wartime, this range includes theatre intelligence, perhaps, Army Group intelligence. |
| | SHORT RANGE | The intelligence of Departmental Operations. In wartime, this would include the operational and combat intelligence of the armed service. |

Main Categories of Investigation: personalities, military, political, economic, social, moral, scientific and technical, education and the arts.

Based on Sherman Kent, Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy, p.211.

## APPENDIX B

### DATES RELEVANT TO THE HISTORY OF SYRIA

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 1908 | | Young Turks' Revolution |
| 1914 | | World War I |
| 1916 - 1920 | | The Arab Revolt |
| 1918 | | End of World War I and of nominal Ottoman control of Syria; Amir Faysal in Damascus |
| 1920 | April | San Remo Conference |
| | July | General Gouraud occupys Damascus and ousts Faysal |
| | Sept. | Aleppo is made a separate State by the French |
| 1922 - 1945 | | French Mandate over Syria |
| 1922 | | French make Jebel Druze and Latakia separate States |
| 1924 | | Alexandretta is made an autonomous sanjak |
| 1925 | | Aleppo-Dasmascus regions are unified under the title of the State of Damascus |
| 1925 - 1926 | | Insurrection spread from Jebel Druze to Damascus and other parts of Syria; crushed in 1926 |
| 1928 | | Convocation of a Syrian Constituent Assembly which draws up a constitution: unacceptable to the French. |
| 1930 | | M. Ponsot issues a constitution for Syria |
| 1932 | | Elections: moderates - 75% of the seats, nationalists - 25% |
| 1936 | | Draft treaty concluded in Paris; French never ratify;<br>Elections: Kutla dominates;<br>Jebel Druze and Latakia incorporated into the Syrian Republic |
| 1937 | | League of Nations recommends that the sanjak of Alexandretta be granted autonomy internally; foreign affairs to be entrusted to Syria; linked to Syria by a fiscal and monetary union; Turkish to be the official language |
| 1938 | | Alexandretta becomes the Republic of Hatay |
| 1939 | June | France cedes Alexandretta to Turkey; |
| | July | M. Pueaux suspends the Syrian constitution, dissolves the Chamber; seperate regimes restored for the Druze and Latakia |

APPENDIX B
CONTINUED

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 1940 | June | France is defeated by Germany |
| 1941 | 8 June | British troops invade Syria; the Anglo-French Declaration of Syrian independence |
| | July | Vichy French in Syria surrender |
| | Sept. | General Catroux proclaims the independence of Syria |
| 1943 | March | The suspended Syrian constitution is re-established |
| | July | Elections: the National Bloc dominates (Kutla) |
| | Dec. | Agreement with the French Committee of National Liberation for a transfer of powers from the delegate general to the Syrian government |
| 1944 | | All the functions of the French delegate general are transfered to the Syrian government except the Troupes Speciales |
| 1945 | March | Syria declares war on Germany and Japan; signs the Arab League Pact |
| | May | French reinforcements land in Beirut; demonstrations break out; Churchill requests the French to return to their barracks |
| | July | France consents to transfer control of the Troupes Speciales to the Syrian government |
| 1946 | April | Last of the foreign troops withdraw from Syria |
| 1947 | July | Elections: Kutla predominates |
| 1948 | April | Quwatli is re-elected for a second term |
| | May | Palestine War |
| | Dec. | Anti-government riots; order restored by Col. Husni Za'im |
| 1949 | March | Coup d'etat by Za'im; dissolves parliament and assumes dictatorial powers |
| | Aug. | Coup d'etat by Col. Sami Hinnawi; Za'im executed |
| | Nov. | Elections: women vote for the first time; Sha'b dominates |
| | Dec. | Coup d'etat by Lt. Col. Adib Shishakli |
| 1950 | Sept. | New Syrian constitution adopted |
| 1951 | Dec. | Shishakli dissolves parliament |
| 1952 | Aug. | Shishakli establishes the Arab Liberation Movement as a political party |
| | Oct. | Shishakli passes an agrarian reform law |
| 1953 | June | Shishakli publishes a draft constitution |
| | July | Shishakli orders a plebiscite which approves the constitution and elects him president of the republic; establishes a presidential system in place of the parliamentary |

APPENDIX B
CONTINUED

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 1953 | Oct. | Elections: victory for the Arab Liberation Movement |
| 1954 | Feb. | Army rebellion in Aleppo; Shishakli resigns and flees; |
| | Mar. | Constitution of 1950 is reinstated |
| | Oct. | Elections: the Sha'b dominates |
| 1955 | Oct. | Syria signs a mutual defense pact with Egypt |
| | Nov. | Syria signs an economic pact with Saudi Arabia, whereby Saudi Arabia grants Syria a $10,000,000 loan |
| | Dec. | Israeli attack on the Syrian outposts east of Lake Tiberias |
| 1956 | Nov. | IPC pipelines in Syria are blown up |
| 1957 | Oct. | Turkish Army maneuvers on the Syria border; Egyptian forces arrive at the port of Latakia; Syria signs an economic co-operation agreement with U.S.S.R. |
| | Nov. | Egyptian parliamentary delegation in a joint session with the Syrian parliament votes for the federal union of Syria and Egypt |
| | Dec. | Military trial of ten Syrians accused of conspiring with the U. S. to overthrow the Syrian government |
| 1958 | Feb. | Egypt ratifies the union of Syria and Egypt in the United Arab Republic |

# APPENDIX C

## ESTIMATES OF POPULATION BY RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES [1]

| | 1944 | 1945 | 1946 | 1947 | 1948 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Total: | 2,901,316 | 2,949,815 | 3,006,028 | 3,043,300 | 3,092,703 |
| Sunnites | 1,995,588 | 2,033,734 | 2,075,093 | 2,105,183 | 2,137,602 |
| Alawites | 333,019 | 335,454 | 338,449 | 339,466 | 344,362 |
| Shi'ites | 12,808 | 12,901 | 13.145 | 13,201 | 13,335 |
| Ismailites | 29,181 | 29,856 | 30,549 | 31,051 | 31,813 |
| Druzes | 88,177 | 89,796 | 95,749 | 96,641 | 97,795 |
| Yazides | 2,848 | 2.858 | 2,883 | 2,885 | 2,888 |
| Jews | 30,038 | 30,309 | 30,646 | 30,873 | 31,005 |
| Greek Orthodox | 139,265 | 140,832 | 143,038 | 144,577 | 149,706 |
| Armenian " | 103,180 | 104,331 | 104,072 | 104,925 | 106,298 |
| Syrian " | 40,994 | 41,719 | 42,560 | 43,081 | 43,652 |
| Greek Catholic | 47,522 | 48,430 | 48,773 | 49,543 | 50,423 |
| Armenian " | 17,072 | 16,979 | 17,258 | 17.493 | 17,706 |
| Syrian " | 16,562 | 16,916 | 17,389 | 17,613 | 17,830 |
| Latin " | 6,083 | 6,063 | 6,150 | 6,125 | 6,323 |
| Maronites | 13,621 | 13,821 | 13,986 | 14,133 | 14,797 |
| Chaldians | 4,765 | 4,854 | 4,938 | 4,991 | 5,022 |
| Protestants | 11,379 | 11,639 | 11,806 | 11,959 | 12,433 |
| Nestorians | 9,215 | 9,327 | 9,544 | 9,630 | 9,693 |

[1] Syrian Ministry of National Economy, Department of Statistics, Statistical Abstract of Syria, 1952, p.20, for years 1944-1951.

APPENDIX C
CONTINUED

| | 1949 | 1950 | 1951 | 1952 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Total: | 3,177,751 | 3,252,687 | 3,329,235 | 3,433,626 |
| Sunnites | 2,198,015 | 2,248,509 | 2,305,838 | 2,387,435 |
| Alawites | 355,468 | 367,327 | 374,850 | 384,331 |
| Shi'ites | 13,708 | 14,007 | 14,196 | 14,493 |
| Ismailites | 32,804 | 33,503 | 34,529 | 35,637 |
| Druzes | 100,554 | 103,150 | 104,945 | 107,060 |
| Yazides | 2,889 | 2,926 | 2,937 | 3,084 |
| Jews | 31,157 | 31,312 | 31,488 | 31,559 |
| Greek Orthodox | 153,886 | 157,354 | 160,782 | 164,150 |
| Armenian " | 107,251 | 108,278 | 109,005 | 110,515 |
| Syrian " | 44,971 | 46,440 | 47,805 | 49,750 |
| Greek Catholic | 51,493 | 52,497 | 53,615 | 54,703 |
| Armenian " | 18,010 | 18,631 | 19,219 | 19,348 |
| Syriac " | 18,127 | 18,521 | 18,893 | 19,373 |
| Latin " | 6,348 | 6,445 | 6,555 | 6,645 |
| Maronites | 15,112 | 15,439 | 15,789 | 16,117 |
| Chaldians | 5,116 | 5,201 | 5,295 | 5,411 |
| Protestants | 12,661 | 12,910 | 13,131 | 13,433 |
| Nestorians | 10,181 | 10,237 | 10,359 | 10,582 |

APPENDIX C
CONTINUED

| | 1953 | 1954 | 1955 | 1956 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Total: | 3,655,904 | 3,806,973 | 3,914,625 | 4,025,165 |
| Sunnites | 2,578,810 | 2,702,531 | 2,708,744 | 2,870,473 |
| Alawites | 398,445 | 409,514 | 411,870 | 429,441 |
| Shi'ites | 14,887 | 15,193 | 15,382 | 15,687 |
| Ismailites | 36,745 | 38,106 | 39,147 | 40,142 |
| Druzes | 113,318 | 117,804 | 120,789 | 125,063 |
| Yazides | 3,082 | 3,095 | 3,157 | 3,326 |
| Jews | 31,647 | 31,899 | 32,013 | 32,034 |
| Greek Orthodox | 168,747 | 172,873 | 174,099 | 181,750 |
| Armenian " | 110,594 | 111,648 | 112,356 | 114,041 |
| Syriac " | 51,363 | 52,758 | 53,841 | 55,343 |
| Greek Catholic | 55,880 | 57,344 | 58,542 | 60,124 |
| Armenian " | 19,492 | 19,889 | 19,999 | 20,637 |
| Syriac " | 19,738 | 20,013 | 20,325 | 20,716 |
| Latin " | 6,749 | 6,880 | 6,843 | 7,079 |
| Maronites | 16,530 | 17,000 | 17,144 | 19,291 |
| Chaldians | 5,492 | 5,570 | 5,553 | 5,723 |
| Protestants | 13,209 | 14,393 | *13,351 | 12,535 |
| Nestorians | 11,176 | 11,353 | 11,470 | 11,760 |

*Corrected figure.

Figures from 1952-1956 are based on the Statistical Abstract of Syria 1956, pp.18-19.

# APPENDIX D

## RESULTS OF GENERAL ELECTIONS IN SYRIA 1947-54

| | July 1947 | Nov. 1949 | July 1953 | Oct. 1953 | Oct. 1954 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Nationalists (kutla) | 24 | 13 | | | 12 |
| Opposition to Nationalists[1] | 53 | | | | |
| Muslim Brotherhood | 3 | | | | |
| Jebel Druze Bloc[1] | 4 | | | | |
| Independents | 51 | 42 | 28 | 9 | 63 |
| Sha'b | | 43 | | | 28 |
| Ba'ath | | 1 | | | |
| Ba'ath-Socialist[2] | | | | | 16 |
| Socialist Co-operatives | | | | | 2 |
| P.P.S. | | 1 | | 1 | 2 |
| Arab Liberation Movement | | | 53 | 72 | 9 |
| National Union (Communist) | | | | | 1 |
| Tribes[3] | | | | | 9 |
| Totals | 135 | 100 | 81 | 82 | 142 |

The election of 26 July 1943 is only listed as an overwhelming majority for the Nationalists.

[1]Listed as such only in 1947.

[2]The result of the 1953 merger of the Ba'ath and Hourani's Socialist Party.

[3]Tribal seats are usually counted with those of the Independents.

The elections of 1953 were boycotted by all parties except Shishakli's Arab Liberation Movement and the P.P.S.

# APPENDIX E

## SURVEY OF SYRIAN CABINET MEMBERSHIP

| July 1943 | Oct. 1943 | March 1945 | April 1945 | Aug. 1945 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| S. Jabri[1] | F. Khuri | F. Khuri | F. Khuri | F. Khuri |
| J. Mardam | J. Mardam | J. Mardam | S. Ghazzi | L. Haffar |
| L. Haffar | K. 'Azm | K 'Azm | N. Antaki | H. Jabbara |
| N. Bukhari | A. Kayyali | A. Kayyali | H. Hakim | H. Hakim |
| A. Kayyali | S. Jabri | S. Jabri | S. Assali | M. Liyan |
| T. Shamiya | | S. Assali | A. Sharabati | K. 'Azm |
| K. 'Azm | | A. Sharabati | J. Mardam | S. Assali |
| M. Raslan | | | | A. Sharabati |

| Oct. 1945 | April 1946 | Dec. 1946 | Aug. 1948 | Dec. 1948 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| S. Jabri | S. Jabri | J. Mardam | J. Mardam | K. 'Azm |
| S. Assali | H. Hakim | A. Atassi | M. Aglani | A. Azmah |
| N. Antaki | N. Antaki | S. Ghazzi | S. Ghazzi | J. Sihnawi |
| L. Haffar | T. Shamiya | H. Hakim | L. Haffar | H. Jabbara |
| | L. Haffar | A. Arslan | A. Arslan | M. Jabri |
| | | N. Antaki | S. Afali (Assali) | M. Barazi |
| | | A. Sharabati | M. Barazi | M. Ayish |
| | | | M. Ayish | A. Rifa'i |
| | | | M. Liyan | |

[1]The initial name in each column was prime minister for that cabinet.

The prime minister is usually in charge of one of the ministries, and it often happens that two ministries are in the hands of one minister. Usually there were ten ministries: Foreign Affairs, Interior, Justice, National Defense, Finance, Public Works, National Economy, Agriculture, Education, and Public Health. Except for the Ministry of Justice, there were no special qualifications required of a minister before he could accept a ministry, and most individuals had a turn at three or four different ministries.

APPENDIX E
CONTINUED

| Aug. 1949 | Dec. 1949 | June 1950 | Sept. 1950 | Mar. 1951 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| H. Atassi | K. 'Azm | N. Qudsi | N. Qudsi | K. 'Azm |
| A. Azmah | F. Atassi | S. 'As | H. Siba'i | S. Kabara |
| K. 'Azm | F. Asiyun | G. Shalhub | Col. Silo | A. 'Azm |
| R. Kikhia | S. Kabara | F. Jandali | H. Hakim | R. Mulqi |
| N. Qudsi | A. Hourani | R. Barmada | Z. Khatib | A. Din |
| M. Jabri | H. Siba'i | Z. Khatib | S. 'As | Col. Silo |
| A. Atfah | M. Mubarrak | H. Jabbara | A. Qanbar | S. Tayyarah |
| F. Atassi | A. Din | Col. Silo | G. Shalhub | |
| F. Asiyun | M. Dawalibi | | R. Barmada | |
| S. Kabara | A. 'Azm | | A. Buzo | |
| M. Aflaq | | | | |
| A. Hourani | | | | |

| Aug. 1951 | Nov. 1951 | June 1952 | July 1953 | Mar. 1954 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| H. Hakim | M. Dawalibi | Col. Silo | J. Mardam | S. Assali |
| F. Atassi | G. Shahin | Z. Rifa'i | N. Ebeiche | F. Atassi |
| R. Barmada | M. Mubbarak | S. Zaym | F. Asiyun | A. Buzo |
| S. 'As | A. Salah | M. Ghannam | G. Shahin | M. Dawalibi |
| F. Asiyun | A. Kikhia | M. Di'ab | A. Heneidi | M. Sulayman |
| A. Mawmad | S. Antaki | S. Tayyarah | N. Kabbani | F. Kayyali |
| A. Hasan | H. Barazi | T. Harun | Gen. Khankan | A. Sulh |
| H. Khuja | | A. Hundisy | A. Mahasen | H. Atrash |
| Col. Silo | | M. Khatir | A. Pasha | M. Ajlani |
| | | | A. Jabri | A. 'Azm |
| | | | | I. Sukkar |

| June 1954 | Nov. 1954 | Feb. 1955 | Sept. 1955 | May 1956 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| S. Ghazzi | F. Khuri | S. Assali | S. Ghazzi | S. Assali |
| I. Sukkar | F. Atassi | F. Kayyali | M. Ajlani | M. Ayish |
| A. Kurani | M. Ajlani | K. 'Azm | R. Barmada | M. Jabri |
| I. Quli | A. Qanbar | R. Mulqi | R. Antaki | A. Din |
| N. Qasim | R. Barmada | L. Zamarya | M. Kuzbari | A. Qanbar |
| N. Ghazzi | A. Buzo | A. Din | A. Humad | R. Jabri |
| | M. Ahmad | H. Khiya | M. Mirza | S. Bitar |
| | F. Kayyali | W. Ghanim | A. Din | K. Kallas |
| | R. Antaki | M. Kuzbari | A. Buzo | A. Hasib |
| | A. Futayh | | B. Abbud | |
| | | | H. Atrash | |
| | | | A. Harun | |
| | | | M. Ahmad | |

APPENDIX E
CONTINUED

| June 1956 | Dec. 1956 | March 1958 Cabinet of the United Arab Republic |
|---|---|---|
| M. Jabri | S. Assali | A. Baghdadi |
| S. Bitar | S. Bitar | Marshall Amir |
| K. Kallas | K. Kallas | A. Hourani |
| M. Zarka | K. 'Azm | S. Assali |
| A. Humad | F. Kayyali | A. Din and Col. Serraj |
| R. Jabri | A. Harun | H. Shaf'a |
| A. Raslan | H. Khiya | H. Jabara |
| A. Din | H. Siba'i | M. Hamdun |
| M. Ayish | A. Mahasan | K. Husayn |
| | M. Kuzbari | N. Tarraf and S. Qanawati |
| | S. Aqil | A. Hisnu and A. Humad |
| | | F. Radwan |
| | | M. Fawzi |
| | | A. Sabri |
| | | S. Bitar |
| | | A. Bakuri |
| | | A. Sharabati and N. Kahhali |
| | | M. Nusayr and A. Karim |
| | | A. Qaysuni and K. Kallas |
| | | K. Stino |
| | | S. Mara'i and A. Yunis |
| | | H. Zaki and F. Kayyali |
| | | A. Sidqi |
| | | M. Khalil and A. Nafuri |
| | | F. Rizq |

Sources: The Middle East Journal, Middle Eastern Affairs, Longrigg, op. cit.; Le Jour; L'Orient.

# APPENDIX F

## NUMBER OF SYRIAN TRADE UNIONS AND MEMBERSHIP [1]

| Year | Number of Trade Unions | Membership | Average Membership |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1947 | 60 | .. | .. |
| 1948 | 105 | .. | .. |
| 1949 | 127 | .. | .. |
| 1950 | 149 | .. | .. |
| 1951 | 182 | 27,253 | 150 |
| 1952 | 190 | 27,391 | 144 |
| 1953 | 199 | 27,612 | 139 |
| 1954 | 219 | 30,261 | 138 |
| 1955 | .. | .. | .. |
| 1956 | 256 | 32,943 | 129 |
| 1957 | 281 | .. | .. |

At the end of 1954, 10,870 workers were organized in industry; 5091 in commerce; 2867 in construction; 4531 in transportation; 375 in mining; 1972 in public utilities; 2140 in service industries; and 2403 in government services. [2]

[1] Based on Beling, op. cit., p.40.

[2] Ibid., p.114.

APPENDIX G

NUMBER OF RECIPIENTS OF PRIMARY, ELEMENTARY & SECONDARY CERTIFICATES[1]

1928 - 1957

| Years | Secondary Certificates | | | Elementary Certificates* | | | Primary Certificates | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Girls | Boys | Total | Girls | Boys | Total | Girls | Boys | Total |
| Total: | 3,142 | 16,134 | 19,276 | 10,337 | 37,547 | 47,884 | 59,453 | 190,215 | 249,668 |
| 1928 | — | 24 | 24 | — | — | — | 162 | 462 | 624 |
| 1929 | — | 30 | 30 | — | — | — | 142 | 498 | 640 |
| 1930 | 1 | 39 | 40 | — | — | — | 103 | 453 | 556 |
| 1931 | — | 49 | 49 | — | — | — | 163 | 558 | 721 |
| 1932 | 1 | 45 | 46 | — | — | — | 186 | 699 | 885 |
| 1933 | 3 | 58 | 61 | — | — | — | 201 | 755 | 956 |
| 1934 | 6 | 85 | 91 | — | — | — | 182 | 688 | 870 |
| 1935 | 2 | 79 | 81 | — | — | — | 219 | 817 | 1,036 |
| 1936 | 12 | 70 | 82 | — | — | — | 233 | 1,372 | 1,605 |
| 1937 | 7 | 96 | 103 | — | — | — | 372 | 1,320 | 1,692 |
| 1938 | 9 | 127 | 136 | — | — | — | 671 | 1,940 | 2,611 |
| 1939 | 6 | 83 | 89 | — | — | — | 539 | 1,959 | 2,498 |
| 1940 | 20 | 142 | 162 | — | — | — | 772 | 2,221 | 2,993 |
| 1941 | 9 | 134 | 143 | 47 | 243 | 290 | 621 | 1,691 | 2,312 |
| 1942 | 12 | 144 | 156 | 88 | 374 | 462 | 957 | 2,704 | 3,661 |
| 1943 | 13 | 112 | 125 | 162 | 394 | 556 | 953 | 2,790 | 3,743 |
| 1944 | 14 | 202 | 216 | 156 | 521 | 677 | 1,248 | 3,581 | 4,829 |
| 1945 | 37 | 333 | 370 | 165 | 645 | 810 | 823 | 3,188 | 4,011 |
| 1946 | 176 | 979 | 1,155 | 236 | 803 | 1,039 | 1,411 | 5,279 | 6,690 |
| 1947 | 145 | 521 | 666 | 292 | 1,083 | 1,375 | 2,002 | 6,853 | 8,855 |
| 1948 | 182 | 568 | 750 | 404 | 1,441 | 1,845 | 1,937 | 7,259 | 9,196 |
| 1949 | 143 | 606 | 749 | 364 | 1,629 | 1,993 | 2,321 | 8,407 | 10,728 |
| 1950 | 236 | 732 | 968 | 549 | 1,859 | 2,408 | 3,319 | 11,626 | 14,945 |
| 1951 | 262 | 981 | 1,243 | 761 | 2,869 | 3,630 | 3,807 | 14,297 | 18,104 |
| 1952 | 273 | 1,156 | 1,429 | 768 | 3,125 | 3,893 | 4,008 | 15,832 | 19,840 |
| 1953 | 317 | 1,383 | 1,700 | 1,045 | 3,565 | 4,610 | 5,786 | 20,556 | 26,342 |
| 1954 | 284 | 1,225 | 1,509 | 1,337 | 4,095 | 5,432 | 4,763 | 14,122 | 18,885 |
| 1955 | 183 | 1,254 | 1,437 | 938 | 3,563 | 4,501 | 5,855 | 16,108 | 21,963 |
| 1956 | 321 | 1,748 | 2,069 | 1,264 | 4,873 | 6,137 | 7,314 | 21,333 | 28,647 |
| 1957 | 468 | 3,129 | 3,597 | 1,761 | 6,465 | 8,226 | 8,383 | 20,847 | 29,230 |

[1]Minstry of Education, Statistical Abstract 1957, p.80

*Initiated in 1941.

# APPENDIX H

## RATIO OF THE EDUCATION BUDGET TO THE GENERAL BUDGET 1924 - 1956

| Year | Per cent. |
|---|---|
| 1924 | 8.67 |
| 1925 | 7.82 |
| 1926 | 8.26 |
| 1927 | 9.08 |
| 1928 | 5.82 |
| 1929 | 8.76 |
| 1930 | 11.27 |
| 1931 | 10.36 |
| 1932 | 11.03 |
| 1933 | 12.73 |
| 1934 | 13.69 |
| 1935 | 13.36 |
| 1936 | 12.68 |
| 1937 | 14.71 |
| 1938 | 15.74 |
| 1939 | 16.23 |
| 1940 | 16.09 |
| 1941 | 16.71 |
| 1942 | 17.06 |
| 1943 | 16.45 |
| 1944 | 10.71 |
| 1945 | 9.61 |
| 1946 | 10.89 |
| 1947 | 13.48 |
| 1948 | 16.00 |
| 1949 | 17.04 |
| 1950/51 | 17.98 |
| 1951/52 | 18.78 |
| 1953 | 17.85 |
| 1954 | 17.78 |
| 1955 | 19.01 |
| 1956 | 16.26 |

Based on: Syrian Ministry of Education, Statistical Abstract of Syria 1956, p.60

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